United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1583

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jason Debarge Devers

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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 Submitted: September 20, 2013

Filed: September 23, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Jason Devers appeals the district court’s judgment entered upon a jury verdict

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finding him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, Chief Judge, United States District Court

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for the District of Nebraska.
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). His counsel has filed a brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing primarily that the evidence was insufficient

to support the verdict; and Devers has filed pro se supplemental briefsraising various

points. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

First, we reject the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that Devers

possessed the gun. As relevant, the trial included the testimony of two police officers

who were dispatched to an Omaha residence after the city’s Shot Spotter system

indicated that approximately four shots had been fired there. The officers testified

that, having obtained permission to search, they found Devers in the basement of the

residence, a firearm near him under a couch cushion, and spent shell casingsfrom the

firearm in the back yard; and that Devers initially lied about his identity because he

had outstanding warrants, and was observed reaching in the direction where the

firearm was eventually found. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government,

this evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. See United States v. Spears, 454

F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review); United States v. Brown, 422 F.3d

689, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2005) (elements offelon-in-possession offense); see also United

States v. Bradley, 473 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2007) (while mere physical proximity

is insufficient to establish constructive possession of firearm found in vehicle driven

by another, factfinder may infer defendant had control of it based on totality of

circumstances, which included defendant’s movements indicative of reaching to

check on or hide firearm); United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733-34 (8th Cir.

2002) (constructive possession is established where defendant has dominion over

premises where firearm is located, or has control, ownership, or dominion over

firearm itself; possession need not be exclusive).

We reject Devers’s other arguments. In particular, we find no merit to the

argument that the indictment should have been dismissed for a Speedy Trial Act

violation, see United States v. Villarreal, 707 F.3d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 2013) (under

Act, trial must commence within 70 days of indictment or initial appearance unless

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running of time is stopped for reasons set out in statute), or dismissed sua sponte

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) for pre-indictment or pre-trial delay,

see United States v. Gladney, 474 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2007) (defendant must

establish delay resulted in actual and substantial prejudice). We further find no

violation of the Second Amendment, see United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586

(8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1159 (2012), and no abuse of discretion in the

exclusion of an affidavit offered by Devers, see Fed. R. Evid. 802 (hearsay

inadmissible absent exception); United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 900 (8thCir.

2008) (standard of review). We do not reach any ineffective-assistance claim, to the

extent it survives Devers’s waiver of counsel and election to proceed pro se. See

United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2004) (ineffective-assistance

claims are generally better left for postconviction proceedings); Hunter v. Bowersox,

172 F.3d 1016, 1024 (8th Cir. 1999). 

Finding no other nonfrivolous issue for review, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), we affirm. We grant counsel leave to withdraw.

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