* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 29 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM E. BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-6095 (D.C. No. 96-CV-719) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Following a lengthy procedural history which we wil l not repeat here, plaintiff William E. Brown appeals the district cou rt’s order affirming the Commissioner’s latest determination that he is not entitled to disability benefits. We affirm. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in l ight of the entire record and to determine whether he applied the correct legal stan dards. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted). In the course of our review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence no r substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health& Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Brown alleged disability due to injuries to his back and left wrist, resulting back pain, and diabetes. The administrat ive law judge (ALJ) determined at step five of the five-step sequential process, s ee Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), that Mr. Brown was no t disabled as he could perform sedentary work. On appeal, Mr. Brown argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate fully his medical records as to the combined impact of his impairments. Mr. Brown-3-

contends he is disabled at step three due to his ba ck injury. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.05(C). At step three, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of the listed impairments the Commissioner has determined are “so severe as to pr eclude substantial gainful activity.” See Williams , 844 F.2d at 751 (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Listing 1.05(C) requires that the c laimant have a vertebrogenic disorder which has persisted for at least three months despite prescribed therapy and is expected to last twelve months. The vertebr ogenic disorder will be deemed disabling upon repeated findings, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00B, of “[p]ain, muscle spasm, and significant li mitation of motion in the spine,” as well as “[a]ppropriate radicular distrib ution of significant motor loss with muscle weakness and sensory and reflex loss.” Id. § 1.05(C). The evidence showed that none of Mr. Brown’s treati ng physicians has opined that Mr. Brown is disabled. While the physi cians acknowledge he experiences pain, physical findings show neither atrophy of his leg muscles nor marked limitations of his range of motion. Electro myograms have shown no abnormalities. One doctor of osteopathy did opine that Mr. Brown was totally disabled whether or not “orthopedic or neurological evaluation confirms that opinion.” Appellant’s App. at 268. The ALJ proper ly rejected this opinion. See-4-

Castellano , 26 F.3d at 1029. Mr. Brown failed to show that h e met the requirements of § 1.05(C). Mr. Brown argued to the district court that he coul d not perform the full range of sedentary work and, because of that, the A LJ erred in determining he was not disabled. On appeal, Mr. Brown appears to have accepted the district court’s correct determination that a claimant need only be able to perform other work existing in the national economy, not the full rang e of work in a specified exertional range in order to be determined not to b e disabled. See Williams , 844 F.2d at 751; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Abandoning that issue, Mr. Brown now presents the n ew argument that the ALJ did not evaluate all the evidence in determinin g he could perform sedentary work. We will not consider arguments not presentedto the district court. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge