2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-2695

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UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________
Nos: 02-2695/3762

_____________ WYATT, VI RGIN I SLANDS, INC.

HOVENSA, L LC,

Intervenor-P laintiff in District Cou rt

v.

GO VE RN ME NT OF TH E V IRG IN IS LANDS BY AND THROUGH T HE VIR GIN I SLANDS DEPART MENT OF LABOR; CECI L BENJ AMIN, IN HI S OFF ICI AL CAPAC IT Y AS CO MM ISSIO NE R O F TH E V IRG IN IS LANDS DE PARTMENT OF LABOR

VIRGINI E GEORGE; MALCOLM MAC COW ; EDGAR BA RRIOS; CLAUDE GAI NE

Intervenors-D efenda nts in District Cou rt

Governm ent of the Virgin Islands,
Appellant

in 02-2695

Virginie George, Malcolm M accows, Edgar Barrios and Claude G aines,
Appellant s in 02-3762 Appeal from the Dis tri ct Court of the Virgin I slands (D.C. Civi l Action No. 02-cv-00029) Dist ri ctJudg e: Honor abl e Ray mond L.

Finch

Argued on April 30, 2003

Befor e: ROTH, MCKEE and COWEN

Circuit Judges
(Opinion fi led: Oct ober 12, 2004)

Iver A. St

ridi ron AttorneyGeneral

Elliott M . Dav is Solici tor General
Douglas J. Juergens ( Argued) Maureen Phelan Rich ard S . Dav is Assist ant Attorney General Department of J usti ce 48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade GE RS Bu ildin g, 2 nd Floor St. Thomas, VI 00802
K. Glenda Cameron (Argued) Lee J. Rohn Law Office Lee J. Rohn 1101 King Street , Suite 2 Christianst ed St. Croi x, USVI, 00820

Co unse l for A ppella nts2

Charles E. Engeman (Argued) Ogletree , Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewa rt 1336 Beltj en Road Suite 202 Charlotte Amalie, St . Thomas, VI 00802

W. Carl Jorda n Tara Porte rfiel d (Argued) Vinson & Elkins L.L. P. 2300 First

CityTower 1001 Fannin Str eet Houston, TX 77002-6760
George H. T. Dudley Micol L. Morgan Dudle y, Toppe r an d Feue rze ig, LLP Law House, 1A Frederiksber g Gade Charlotte Amalie, St . Thomas U.S. Virgi n Islands 00802

Counsel for Ap pellees

O P I N I O N

RO TH , Circuit

Judge

Plaintiffs, Wyatt

V.I., Inc., and HOVENSA, L.L .C., brought an ac tion for decl arat ory and injunc tive relie f in the Distri ct Court of the Virgin I slands. The dispu te arose fr om the req uirem ent W yatt imposed on p rospe ctive e mp lo y ees that theysign a Dispute Resol ution Agreement (DR A) a s a co ndition of em ployme nt. Plaintiffs s ought (1) a declar ation t hat the DR A is enforceabl e and (2) an i njuncti on

to prohibit the C omm issioner o f the Departmentof Labor from interfe ring w ith their use of the DR A. Th e District Cou rt granteddeclaratoryrelief i n plaintiffs’ favor. Al t hough the defendant s rai se many grounds on appeal, the only issue we need address is whether

the plainti ffs’ action for declaratory and injunc tive relie f is ripe for judici al rev iew

. F or the r easo ns w e state be lo w, we conclude t ha t, under Pub lic Service Commi s sion v. Wycoff Co., I nc. , 344 U.S. 237 (1952) , the re is no “case of actualcontrover sy” here as i s requi red by 28 U.S. C . § 2201(a). Thus, plaintiffs’

ca us e o f a ctio n i s n otri pe fo r r ev ie w.

I. BACKGROUND In 2001, HOVE NSA aw arded Wyatt a contra ct to provide maintenance and other s ervice s at H OVE NS A’s o il refinery in S t. Cr oix , Vir gin Islan ds. In Novem be r 2001, Wyatt began acce pting

e m ploy ment applic ations in the V irgin Islands. As a conditi on of emp loymen t, Wyatt requ ired all ap plican ts to sig n th e DRA. Under the DRA, each appli cant agree d to su bm it to binding arbitratio n all cl ai ms aris ing from the applic an t ’s candidacyfor em ployment or t he te rms and co nd itio ns of an y o ffer o f emp loymen t . 1 Wy a tt’ s paren t

1 The Dispute Resol ution Agreement prov ides in r eleva nt part:

NOTICE TO ALL APPLICANTS

If you wish to be considered for employment

with Wyatt V .I.,3 corporation, Wyatt F iel d S erv ices Co ., does not requ ire app licants fo r employment

on the mainlandUnited States to si gn a DRA. Prospective employe es complained to the Virgi n Islands Department of Labor about the DRA. As a result of the se complaints, the Commissione r of the Departmentof L abor sent tw o letters to Wyatt requesting that

Wyatt “cease and desist” its use of the DRA . In the fir st letter, dated December20, 2001, the Co mmissioner

wrote to Todd Reidl inge r , a manager at Wyatt i n t he Virgin Islands, “[t]he agreement i s improper and illegal; it does not serve as a port

ray al of rea sona ble and fair lab or/ma nage men t relati ons. ” The Commissioner also a ssert ed t h e De partm e nt of Labor ’s bel ie f that th e DRA violated the Virgi n Islands Wrongful Discharge Ac t (W DA ), 2 4 V. I.C. § 76. Then in a February 1, 2002, let ter, sent to Carm elo Rivera , a human resource s Inc. ( “Wyatt ”), y ou must read and sign t he fo ll owing Disput e Resoluti on Ag r eement. Your applic ation will not

be considered unti l y ou h ave s igned th e Agreement. I f you des ire t o do so, y o u may tak e this do cum ent w ith you to re vi ew. You must, how ever,
r eturn a signed copy of t h e Agreement with your ap plication if you wish to cont inue t h e application process.
Dispute Resol ution Agreement

I recogniz e that

differe nces may arise between Wyatt and me in relat ion to my ap plicati o n for emp loymen t. B ot h W ya t t and I agree to res olve anyand all clai ms, disput es or contr oversi es ari sing out of or re la ti ng t o my applic ation

or candidacyfor employ ment or the te rms and conditions of anyoffer of employment

excl u sivel y byfinal and binding ar

bitr at ion before a neutralar bi trat or pursuant to the Am erican Arbitr ation Association’s Na ti on al Rules for

the Resol ution of E mploymentDisputes , a copyof which is av ai lable at ww w.adr.org

or from Wya tt . By

wa y of exa mp le onl y, som e of

th e t y pes of c la ims subject t o final and binding arbit rati on include claims f or an alle ged wrongful dec i sion n ot to hire me; clai ms for disc riminat ion or harassment on the basi s of age,
race, reli gion, di sabil ity , national origin or other

basis prohibited by stat e, federal , orte rri tori al la w; or cl ai ms for br each of an y emp loy ment ag reem ent o r promises; and any c laims for personalinjury or

property damage. This agreementextends t o disput es with or claim s aga inst W yatt V

. I., Inc ., HOV ENSA , L.L. C., and any of th eir r elat ed or affi liated companies, entit ie s, employ ees or individ uals (as intend ed third party beneficiaries to this ag reemen t).4

consult ant f or Wyatt , the Commissioner stated: We will do wh ateve r is

ne cessary to ens ure tha t t h e Virg in Islands ’ workforce recei ve every‘employ ment protect ion’ guar antee d to them under our labor laws. You are here by advisedthat

a willfulviolat

ion of 24 V.I .C. § 76 w ill be report e d to Office of

the Attorney General for prose cution. Please cease and desist

from this pract ice. You r
coo per ation is ex pec ted.
Wyatt neve rth eless continu ed to use t he DRA as a

con di ti on o f emp lo y me nt. 2 The Dep art ment of Labor then requested

an opinion from the Office of the Attorney General of t he Virgin I slands regarding Wyatt’s use of the DRA. On M arch 1, 2002, the Attorney Generalissued an opinion l ette r, s tati ng: We find that thi s case i s ripe for i njuncti ve a nd/o r declar ator y re li ef , and w e shall proceed t o seek such

re l ief on behalf of t

he Departmentof Labor and the prospective employ ees of Wyatt . We expe ct to gather affidavits t o suppo rt such an ac ti on fro m prospective employe es who

were told t

hey hadto sign these agreements if the y wanted to be consider ed for employment

with Wyatt, and felt coerced into s igning the agreements.

* * * The pre-empl oy ment dispute resolu t i o n agreemen t requir ed by Wyat

t, I nc. for prospective employees is i n violat ion of 24 V .I. C. 76, and is unco nscio nable , coerci ve, an ad hesio n contra ct, and is contra ry to

an important public pol icy in the Virgi n Islands which recog niz e s the employ ment reality of an isl an d

ec on om y.

After t he A ttorney Generalissued t he opinion, the Commissione r notifie d W yatt of his inten t to brin g ch arges if W yatt

con tinu ed to use the D RA

. The Government, howeve r , never file d suit against

Wyatt . Ins tead, on March 20, 200 2, W yatt in sti tuted an acti on for declaratory and in junctiv e relief against the Go vern men t. In Count I, Wyat t sought 2 In an appa rent ef fort to re conc ile the dis pute over t

he use of the DRA , the Commissioner and Wy att’ s att orney conferred by

tele phone before the Co mm issione r sent th e first letter. W yatt agreed t o remove objectionable language from the DRA concerning employ ment at will but continue d to use es senti ally the same DRA . The two als o met after the Co mm issione r sent th e first letter b ut did not reso lve th e dis put e.5

a declar ation unde r the Federa l Declarato ry Judgment Act , 2 8 U .S.C . § 2201(a ), and the Virgin I sland s De cla ratory J udgment Act, 5 V.I .C. §1261, that 1) by agreei ng to arbi trate, an applic ant or em plo yee does not for ego substant ive righ ts, bu t instead agree s to resol ution of all d ispute s in an arbit ral forum; 2) the F edera l Arb itratio n Ac t (FAA ), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 16, governs the enfo rceab ility of arbi tr ation a greem ents covering e m ploy ment disputes; 3) the DRA i s prote cted b y and en force able under th e FA A ; 4) t

he DRA does not violate the WDA; 5) the DRA is not unconscionabl e; 6) th e D RA is not contrary to the publi c polic y of the Virg in I slands; 7) even if the DRA violates t h e WDA, th e WDA is pr eemp ted by the F AA; and 8) the Commissi oner’s “ ce as e and desist” letters are unen force able to the extent th ey p urpo rt to requ ire W yatt to abandon its use of

the DR A. In C ount II, Wyatt cla imed a viol ation of the feder al civil ri ght s s ta tu te , 4 2 U. S. C. § 19 83, and alle ged that t he Commissioner was atte mpting to dep rive W yatt of its liberty interest in ente ring into lawfu l contracts. In Count I II , Wyatt sought injunct ive rel ief against the Co mm issione r. Wyatt named,

as defendants , the Government of the Virg in Islands by a nd through the Virg in Islands Department of Labor and C ec il Benjamin, in his OfficialCapacityas Commission e r of the Virgi n Islands Dep artment of Labo r. HOVE NSA mov ed to interv ene as
a third party

beneficiary to Wyatt’s D R A because the DRA granted HOVEN SA the

sa me right to dema nd arb it ration a s it grantedW yatt. The motion was grant ed. HO VE NS A’s complaint in interve n tion alle ged the same c oun ts as Wyatt’ s, excludi ng the reque st for injunct ive rel ief. After the suit

had commence d Virg inie Geo rg e, M alcolm Maccow , Edgar Berrios, and Claud Gaines, prospective employe e s whom W yatt would not consider for employ ment be c ause of the ir ref usal to sign the D RA , mov ed to intervene as defendants. That motion was also gr anted. 3 The Distric t Cour t becam e concerned about it s juri sdiction to hear the

case and orderedthe part ies t o address t

hat issue. In it s Memorandum O pinion dated June 5, 2002, t

he District Court

concluded that it di d n o t have subj ect matter juri sdiction based on the al leged vi olati on of 42 U. S.C. §1983 . Th e District Cou rt h eld, however, that it

did have fe dera l questi on jurisdictio n pu rsuan t to 18 U. S. C. § 1331, based on Wyatt ’s cl aim that the FAA provides a substantive right to enter into an arbit

rati on agreement and t

hat any local law in con f lict with the F AA is pr eempted by vi rtue o f the S upr ema c y Clause of the Unit ed State s Constit ution. Wyatt, V.I., Inc . v. Go vern men t of t he

3 The prospective employees also moved to reopen t

he evidence to allow present ation of

evidence of “c oercion, duress, lack of abi lit

y t o applyfor jobs elsewhere, the il legal ity of the provi sion and th e pub lic policy of the V irgin Islands.” The Dist

rict Court denie d the prospective employ ees’ moti on to reopen the e vid enc e.6

Virg in I slands , 2002 WL 31599790, * 2 (D.V .I. June 5, 2002 ). The District Cou rt ru le d that declaratory re li ef

wa s an ap prop riate remedy in the ca se because Wy att was facing “a th reat of

liabi lit y i f it c ontinues to us e the Dispute Resoluti on Agreement withouta determinati on of its leg ality.” In granti ng d eclaratory relief in Wyatt’s fav or, t he court f

irst noted that there was
no preem p tion i ssue becaus e there is no Virg in Island s law or po licy directly in confli ct with enforc ement of th e DRA

un der the FAA. The Distri ct Court ne xt concluded th at

th e DRA is enfo rceab le under the FAA because it is not unconscionabl e, coercive, or c o ntrary to pub lic policy. Finally, the District Cou rt denied Wyatt’s re que st for injunct ive reli ef. The co urt reasoned that any further Government action wo uld b e unlik ely as a result of the decl aratory j udgment entered in Wyatt’s favor. The Go vern men t a nd th e prospective employe es fil ed the ir appe als

on June 7, 2002, and September 27, 2002,

re sp ec tiv ely. 4 Wyatt d oes n ot app eal t he Distri ct Court’s de nial of injunct ive reli ef.
During the pe nden cy of this a ppea l,

we have held i n Ll oy d v. HO VEN SA, L.L .C. , 369 F.3d 263 ( 3d Cir. 2004) , that Wyatt’s DRA was not unenforcea ble as violat

ive of public policy , 369 F.3d at 274, and we affirmed an order compelli ng arbit rati on pursuant

to th e DRA. 369 F.3d at 275. II . J URIS DICTI ON AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Distric t C ou rt purp orted to

exer ci se juri sdiction pursuant to t he general federal questi on stat ute, 28 U.S .C. § 1331. We have jurisdictio n ov er this appeal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which gives t

he cou rt s of a ppea ls juri sdiction over appeal s from allfinal decisi ons of

th e distri ct courts. We

exe rcise plenary review o ver wh ether a

cause of ac tion is ripe. See Do e v. C oun ty of Centr e, PA , 242 F.3d437, 452 (3d Cir. 2001). II I. DIS CUSS ION

As one ground of appeal, the prospective employe e defendants have chall enged the District Cou rt’s decisio n to exercise judici al revi ew of the case on the ground that the case is not yet ripe. 5 First, theysubmit that the Commissioner’s cease and desist lette rs we re no t order s with in th e mean ing of 24 V.I.C. § 68 (c). The y further urge that, eve n if

t he cease and desistletters ar e co n sider ed orders , the Commissionerne ver peti tion ed th e TerritorialCourt for enforcement of the orders. They ar gue that , b ecause the TerritorialCourt never e n te red a decr ee

4 The prospective employ ees fil ed a motion to rec onsider in the D istrict Court on June 19, 2002, but they withdrew that motion on Sept ember 27, 2002 and fi led

a n ot ice of ap pe al t he sa m e d ay. 5 The prospective employ ees rel ied on a ripene ss argument

in their bri ef and at oral a rgum ent, bu t the G over nm ent did not rely on this gro und for ap peal.7

enforci ng the o rde rs, t here was no final ad min ist rati ve or state action; t herefore, the case w as no t ripe fo r ju dicia l inter ven tion

. Wyatt and HOV ENSA contend that the case is ripe for judicial review because t he Co mm issione r’s “ce ase an d des is t ” ord ers consti tute c oncrete acti on in th e
sense that the orders a ffect W yatt’s primary conduct, namel y w hat co ntracts Wyatt can uti lize in i t s hiring process. A dd itio na lly, Wyatt

as sert s that

it had no choice but to bring i ts action for declaratory and injunct

ive rel ief beca use it thoughtit

wo uld be subject

to fine s or impris onment und er24 V

. I.C. § 75 if it continue d to ignore the o rders of the Co mm issio ner

. We agree w ith the pros pecti ve emp loy ee defendants that t his cas e is not ripe under the “case of

ac tu al c on tro ve rsy” requir ement of

the Declar atoryJudgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. A. § 2201. Because

we decid e the a ppea l on this basis, we will not go o n to discuss the othe r grounds for app eal. The Declar a toryJudgment Act creat es a rem edy by w hich f edera l courts “may declar e th e right s and other legal relat ions of any i nteres ted part y se eking such decla ration” wh en the re is a “case of actualcontrover sy. ” 2 8 U. S.C. § 22 01(a). The Supr em e Court, in upholdi ng the

cons titutionality of

the A ct, has int erpreted the remedy as l imit ed to case s and controver sies in the c onstit uti onal sens e. See Aetna Life Ins urance Co. of Hartfor d, Conn. v. H aw orth , 300 U.S. 227, 240 (193 7). A “c as e o f a ctu al c on tro ve rsy”

mean s on e of a just iciable nature. Ashwander v. Tenne ss ee ValleyAuth. ,

297 U.S . 288, 3 25 (1 936 ). The Ac t is consti tuti onal “so f ar as it authori zes rel ief which is consonant with t he exerci se of

the judici al functi on i n th e determinati on of controvers ies to w hich u nder th e Constit ution the judi cial pow er exte nds .” Aetna , 300 U.S . at 24 0. In order for

there to be a “case of act ual controver sy” in the c onsti tuti onal
sense, the controversy

must be

one tha t i s appropri ate for judici al det e rmin ation . A justiciabl e contro versy is thus di stin gui she d fr om a differ enc e or dispute of a hypothetic al o r ab stra c t character; from one t hat is

aca dem ic or moot. The controversy mu st be d efinite and concret e, t ouching the legal relat

ions of p ar ties having adverse l eg a l interests

. It must

be a real and substant

ial c ontrove r sy admitting of s p ecifi c reli ef through a decree of a
conc lu sive char acter , as dist inguis hed f ro m a n opinion advisi ng what the law would be upon a hypo theti cal s tate o f fa cts.

Aetna , 300 U.S. at 240- 41 (cit ations omitted). The confli ct bet ween the parti es must be ripe for jud icial interv ention ; it cannotbe “nebulous or continge nt” but “must have taken on fi xed and finalshape so that a court c an see what le gal issues it is decid ing, w hat ef fect its d ecisio n will8

have on th e adv ersarie s, and some useful purpose to be achie ved in dec idin g th em .” Wycoff , 344 U.S . at 24 4. Int e rrel ated to our di scussi on of what cons tit ut es a “case of actual contro versy” in the co nstitution al sens e is the ripeness doc tri ne. The purpose of the ripeness doctrin e is to “preve nt the courts, through avoidance of pr ematur e adjudic ation, from entangl ing themsel ves in abstr act di sag reements ove r administ rati ve policie s, and also to protect the agencies from judic ial i nt e rference until an administ

rati ve decisi on has been formali zed and its effects felt in a conc rete way by the chall enging p arti es.” Ab bott Labo ra tori es v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) , o verrul ed on other grounds , Califano v. Sande rs , 430 U.S. 99, 10 5 (1977). In determining whethe r a dispu te ha s matured to a point to requ ire judici al adjudic ation, courts must consi der “the fitness of the is s ues for judi cial decisi on and the ha rdship to the part ies of withholdi ng court cons iderat ion. ” Id . at 149. A dispute i s not ripe for judi cial determi nation “‘if i t res ts upon contingent fu ture events that m ay not occur a s antic ipate d , or indeed maynot occur at all.’” Doe v. Count

y of Centr e, PA , 242 F. 3d 437 , 453 ( 3d C ir. 2001 ) (quo tin g Texas v. Unite d States , 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). “ Claims based mer elyupon ‘assumed potenti al invas ions’ o f rights are not enou gh to wa rrant jud icia l interv en tion .” Ashwander , 297 U.S. at 325 (quoti ng Ariz ona v . Califo rnia , 283 U.S. 42 3, 462 (19 31)). In Wy c of f , the Suprem e Cou rt faced the issue whether there was a “case of actualcontrover sy” in an acti on seeking declaratory and injunc tive relie f, under t he Federal Declaratory Ju dgm ent A ct, to establishthat

cer tain film produ cts were being trans ported i n i nters tate commerce. The Utah Pub lic Service Commissi on had denied the pla intiff’s a ppli c ation f or autho riz ati on to carry fi lm commoditie s with in the stat e. The plaint iff commenced

an acti on in feder al cou rt, seeking bot h a declar at or y judgment that it s carriage of motion picture film an d newsreels between poin ts in U tah co nstituted interstate

commerce and an injunc tion from inter fering wi th this trans portation

. Wycoff , 344 U.S . at 23 9. The Court deci ded that

the case was
no t ripe for

judici al revi ew. Firs t, t he Cou rt noted that the di spute had not matured to a point w here the C ourt could

see w ha t co nt ro ve rsy w as goin g to develop. Id . at245

. It was not enough that the p laint iff feared fut ur e administ rati ve or judi cial ac tion by the

com mis sion

. Id

. Second, th e C ourt not ed that the declar ator y proceedi ng, as i t was invoked by the plaint

iffs, not only

“forecl os[ed] an administ rat ive bod y,” but w a s “inco mp atible with a pro per fe deral-s tate relat ion ship .” Id. at 247 . The C ourt stat ed: Declarato ry proceedings i n the federal courts aga in st stat e offic ials must be d e cided with regard for the impli cati ons of our f ed eral sys te m. State a dm inistrativ e bodies have t he init

ial right to reduce t he genera l9

polici es of state regulatory stat utes into concrete o rders and the primary right

to take evidence and make findings of fac t. It is the state cour ts which have the firs t and the lastword as to the m e aning of stat e stat utes and whether

a particular

order is wi thin the legis lati ve terms of

r eference so as to mak e i t the action of the State.

Id .; C f. To pp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 314 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963) (hol ding that, under Wycoff , District Court erred in exerci sing jurisdiction over the p laintiff’s acti on for decl aratory r elie f because, j ust

as fed er al “interf erenc e” w ith state administ rati ve agencies and inter pretat ion of state law is “con demn ed,” plaintiff’s federal acti o n seeking relief fro m territorial administ

rati on of Puerto Ric an trademark law is similarly condem ned). The disput e presen ted in the case before us is W yatt ’s clai m that i t was facing prosecution under 24 V. I.C. § 75

a nd the possibili ty of the i mpositi on o f fines. Section 75 provides: Whoever wilfu ll y resists , prev ents , impedes or interferes

w i t h th e Commissioneror his duly a uthori z e d repres entative, in the p erformance of h is duties pursu ant to this chapter , shal l be fined not more than $500 or impr i soned not m o re than 3 months, or

both.
(emp hasis ad ded). We note first that Wyatt does not mention potenti al prosecution under § 75 in its com plaint request

ing decl aratory reli ef. Nor is § 75 menti oned at the Dis tri ct Co urt hea ring o n A pril 4 , 2002, or i n t he D istrict Court’s Memorandum Opinion of Jun e 5, 2002, granti ng declaratory relief to Wyatt. In fac t, at the A pril 5 hearing, the Assis tant Attorney General , repres enting t h e Government, st ated:

With respect to e nforcement of a

cease and desis t order, I beli eve that there is no sin gle way in which cease and desist orders are to be enfor ced.

T h e governmenthas atits arsenalmo r e than

o n e tech nique , inc lu ding the seeki ng o f declar ato r y judg men t, which was the intentio n in this matter and whi c h, to

som e extent, appea rs to be the di rect io n in which it’ s going.

We b elie ve10

that by getting a court to adju dicate the dispu te we wo uld be re solvin g th e issues rais ed by t

he

ce ase and d esis t orde r, and th at’s it.

The government, howeve r , has never taken any steps to obtain

a declar atoryjudgmentor to invoke any other r eme dy as set o ut in Chapter3 of Title 24 of the Virg in I slands Code. Such remedi e s
wo uld include a peti tion for judici al enforcementof an order, pursuant to § 69, a petiti on fo r judici al review of an or der, pur suant t o § 70, or an order

for reins tate ment of

a wrongfullydischar ged employ ee, p urs uant to § 77(c) . Because t he penalties of § 75 ar e limited to resi s ting, preventi ng, impedi ng or interfering with the C o mmissioner in the pe rform ance of h is duties , as
se t o ut in C hapte r 3, it wo uld appeartha t the Commissione r
w ould have to see k further remedi a l acti on under Chapter

3, tha n he has don e here, be fore he coul d invo k e the penalties of § 75. Wyatt’s fears appear then to be pre mature. The only acti on that Commissi oner did take w as to w rite tw o letters i n which he request ed that

Wyatt “cease and d esist” its us e o f the DRA. Such a letter is not an “or der ,” nor w as there any eviden tiary hearing held pri or to t he trans mitt al of eithe r letter . T he inconcl usivenes s of the Com missioner’s decisi on on ho w h e w ould follow up the initial letters and the opi nion lett er of the Att or ney G enera l i s demonstrated by the state me nt, wh ic h we quo te above, of t

he Assist ant Attorney General at the Ap ril 5 District Court hea ring

. As in Wycoff , the plaint iffs mere ly feared potential future ad ministra t ive or jud icia l acti on and brought t his action fo r declaratory relief “t o hold in readiness for

us e sh ould the Commissi on[er] at any future time a tt emp t to” use his po we rs to issue an order an d enf orce that order through the Territorial Co urt. See Wycoff , 344 U.S . at 245 . In esse nce, th e disp ute be t ween the part

ies i s conti ngent upon

even ts that maynot occur at allor may
occur di ff er en tly th an a ntici pate d. See Do e v. C oun ty of Centre, PA , 242 F.3d at 45 3. B ecause Wyatt did not give the Commissionerthe chance to procee d on its

own gr ound s, the Department of Labor

never had the oppo rtu nity “to reduc e the general polici es of [its] s tate [statute ] into [a] concret e order, ” and the Virgin I slands

never had the opport

unity to give the “last

wo rd” as to the meaning of the WDA and whether the C om mis si oner’s order was “w ithin the le gi slative te rms of reference
so as to m ake it th e actio n of ” the V irgin Islands. Wycoff , 344 U. S. at 247 . Wyatt has not y et fel t the e ffects of final administ rati ve or state action in a con crete

w ay. Abbott Laborat ories , 38 7 U.S. at 148-49. For

th e a bov e r ea so ns , w e conclude that this cause of acti on is not

yet ri pe fo r r ev ie w. The Go vern men t and t h e prospective employ ees also argue that the Distri ct Court did not have feder al11

questi on jurisd ict ion und er 2 8 U .S.C . § 1331. The y conten d that W yatt ’s r equest for a declar ation that“even if t he Agreement violate s the W DA , the W DA is preempted by the FAA” is in reali ty an antic ipate d federal defense of pre emption whi ch , under the wel l-pl eaded complai nt rule, does notby its elf gi ve the Dist rict Cou rt su bject

matter juri sdiction over Wyatt’s caus e of a ctio n. In respons e, Wyat t submits that t

he District Court

di d have juri sdiction, notwithst anding the well-pl eaded com plain t rule , u nd er Shaw

v. De lta Airlines , 463 U .S. 86 (1983 ). Wyatt argues that the y pr esented a federal questi on over which the Distri ct Court ha d juri sdiction because they s ought to enjo in the Com missioner fro m interfe ring w ith their feder al ri ght to enter int o arbit rati on agree men ts on th e gro und that the WD A is preempted by th e FA A. See id . at 96, n.14 (“A plaint

iff w ho seeks i njuncti ve reli ef from stat e regulat ion , on the ground that such regulat

ion is pre -empted bya federal stat ute, which by vi rtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Co nstitu tio n m ust pre vail, thus present s a federalquesti on which the federal courts have juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C . § 1331 to resolve.”). Because we will dis miss this ca s e
on ripeness gr oun ds, w e do n ot nee d to decide the fe deral q uestion ju ris dicti on issue at thi s tim e. See Wycoff , 344 U.S. at 248-49 (“Since t

hi s c ase shoul d be dism issed in any eve nt, it is not necessary t o determi ne whether, on this record, the alle ged co nt ro ve rsy o v er an action that may be begun in st ate court wou ld be main tai nable und er the h ead o f fed eralque stion juris dicti on.” ). IV. Conclusion For the f ore goi ng r eas ons , we will

reverse the Dist

rict Court’s gr ant of decla rat ory relief an d rem and th is case to the District Cou rt with dire c tions to dism iss it.