Filed 1/12 /24 Blanco v. Cargasacchi CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

HENRY BLANCO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

GIOVANN I CARGASACCHI

, Individually and as Trustee, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents. 2d Civil No. B32 4 397 (Super. Ct. No. 17CV04672) (Santa Barbara County)

Henry Blanco appeals from the judgment after the trial court concluded he must comply with the terms of a
memorandum signed in 1990 (the 1990 memorandum ) before

secur ing permits necessary for complet ing the construction of a
residence in the Lakeview Estates development of the Santa Ynez Valley. He contends the court erred in finding that the
1990 memorandum terminated an easement granted in 1968 to
his predecessor

- in

- interest (the 1968 easement)

. He also2

contends the court erred in finding that he could not improve an existing road t hat runs over the 1968 easement , requiring him
instead to co nstruct a new road to secure his desired permits per the terms of the 1990 memorandum . And lastly, Blanco claims the court’s findings amount to an unconstitutional taking. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1968, a previous owner of Blanco’s pr operty recorded “[a]n easement and right

- of

- way . . . for road purposes[] on, over[,] and across a strip of land ” owned by the Cargasacchi family

. 1 Nineteen years later , the Cargasacchis and Lakeview Estates
landowners signed a document specif ying that th e 1968 easement was 30 feet wide and available for all Lakeview Estates
landowners to use (the 1987 clarification)

. The clarification also
reaffirmed the terms of the 1968 easement: “ Except as expressly clarified and expanded herein, all terms, conditions [

, ] and stipulations of [ the 1968 easement] shall remain in full force and
effect and are her e by confirmed as such.” In 1990, the Cargasacchis

, Lakeview Estates landowners

, and owners of an adjacent plot of land, Rancho Dos Mundos, signed the 1990 memoran dum . This memorandum specified the
location of a 30

- foot

- wide easement across the Cargasacchis’ land

, and required Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos
landowners to “ release all other easements or other rights that lie
outside [ th e 1990 ] easement , and . . . release and quitclaim all

1 The Cargasacchi Family Trust ; the estate of G iovanni Cargasacchi ; John M. Cargasacchi; Laura Teresa Cargasacchi Belluz, as trustee of the Laura Teresa Cargasacchi Belluz Separate Property Trust ; Mark J

. Cargasacchi ; and Peter A. Cargasacchi

.3

other rights and claims across” Cargasa c chi lands . The
memorandum permitted the construction of a paved road across the easement (the 1990 road), but allowed landowners to continue us ing the road crossing the 1968 easement until the
1990 road was co mplet ed . They could not “materially increa se the burden or impos e new or additional burdens [ on ] the

easement
, ” however. The signing parties acknowledged that the
1990 memorandum “result[ed] in the relocation of the [1968]

ease ment,” but that all other “terms, conditions[,] and stipulations of [that easement] and [the 1987 clarification would] remain in full force and effect.”
In 1998 , the prior owner of Blanco’s property, the Marks family, obtained a permit from the County of Santa Barbara (the County) to build a residence. They commenced construction of the residence, which continued until it was about 90 percent complete. At that point, the County ordered the Marks es to stop construction until the 1990 road was completed. In 2004, the Cargasacchis agreed to permit the Markses to increase the use of the 1968 easement, as clarified in the 1987
clarification and 1990 memorandum , to allow them to finish the
construction of their residence ( the 2004 agreement )

. 2 This
increase i n the use of the easement did not allow the Markses to change or alter the road crossing the 1968 easement, however, and required them to stop using it once the 1990 road was
useable. After Blanco acquired the Markses’ property in 2012

, County officials t old him he would need to widen and add

2 The 2004 agreement was admitted into evidence , but the trial court did not rely on it in its decision

. Neither do we; we describe it only for context.4

compacted gravel to the road leading to his residence before it would issue the permits necessary to finish construction. Th is required Blanco to show that the Cargasacchis had granted him “the authority to alter and improve ” the road crossing the 1968

easement . The Cargasacchis refused to grant that authority

, claiming that Blanco instead had to construct the 1990 road to

meet County standards

. Blanco sued the Cargasacchi s for quiet title and declaratory
relief. 3 The trial court rejected Blanco’s claims. It concluded the
1990 memorandum “expressly rejects the [1968] easement, substitutes it for the new road, and identifies a new location . . . with specific requirements and dimensions.” The road crossing
the 196 8 easement could not be updated to County standards
because if Blanco were “permitted to go forward with the improvements of

” it the easement “ would no longer be ‘old

. ’ ” Instead, it would “ essentially [become] the new easement road,
semi

- permanent and fu lly operational, with no future transition realistically possible

, ” rendering the 1990 memorandum ’s requirements “ephemeral.” The court concluded that the road crossing over the 1968 easement must be “phased out

, ” and
Blanco must build a new road to finis h construction o f his Lakeview Estates property.
DISCUSSION Termination of the 1968 easement
Blanco first contends the trial court erred in finding that

3 Blanco also petitioned the trial court to issue a writ of mandate to compel the County to issue the permits. The court denied Blanco’s petition, and we affirmed the judgment on appeal. (See Blanco v. County of Santa Barbara (Oct. 18, 2021, B308340) [nonpub. opn.] [ 2021 WL 4839083 ] .)5

the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968 easement. We do
not resolve this contention. 4 As explained below, even if the 1968 easement were not terminated the terms of the 1990
memorandum do not permit Blanco to improve the road crossing
it. Improvement of the road crossing the 1968 easement
Blanco next contends t he trial court erred in finding that
he cou ld not improve the road crossing the 1968 easement and instead had to construct and improve the 1990 road to secure building permits from the County. We are not persuaded

. I nterpret ing the 1968 easement, 1987 clarification, and
1990 memorandum presents a question of law subject to our independent review. ( Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470 .) Standard principles of contract interpretation apply. ( Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners,
LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 777.) O ur “paramount goal . . . is to determine the intent of the parties.” ( Ibid. ) We ascertain that intent “from the language of the [documents] alone” so long as it is “ ‘clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.’ ” ( Ibid. ) We read the documen ts “ together, so as to give effect to every part.” ( Civ. Code, § 1641.) The language of the documents, “or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired,”
define s the extent of the easement granted. (Civ. Code, § 806.)
The trial court here correc tly interpreted the language of
the relevant documents. The 1968 easement granted Blanco’s predecessor

- in

- interest a right

- of

- way “for road purposes” over

4 We also do not resolve B lanco’s assertion, not raised during the proceedings below, that he acquired a prescriptive easement if the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968
easement.6

Cargasacchi family lands. The 1987 clarification specified that
the easement was 30 feet wide . The 1990 memorandum relocated that easement and required Lakeview Estates landowners to
build a new road. It also required landowners to “ release all other easements or other rights that lie outside [the 1990] easement ,” and prevented them from “ materially i ncreas[ing] the burden or impos[ing] new or additional burdens [on] the [1968] easement .” (Italics added.) Read together, these documents indicate that
Blanco could not improve the road crossing over the 1968 easement, as the trial court correctly conclu ded. Blanco complains that this conclusion runs counter to long

- established law s governing easements. He first cites
Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428 ( Dolnikov )

, for the proposition that “ ‘[e]very easement includes what are
termed “sec ondary easements,” ’ ” includ ing “the right to make ‘repairs, renewals[,] and replacements on the property that is servient to the easement’ [citation] ‘and to do such things as are necessary to the exercise of the right’ [citation].” But a secondary

ease ment cannot “ ‘ increase the burden on

. . . the servient tenement, or make any material changes therein. ’ ” ( Id. at p. 429.) Rather, such an “ easement may be exercised ‘ only when necessary and in such reasonable manner as not to increase the
burden needl essly on the servient estate or to enlarge it by alteration in the mode of operation. ’ ” ( Ibid. ) Here, Blanco does not seek to make repair s necessary to exercise his right to use the road crossing over the 1968

easement . Instead, he seeks to improve t h e road to meet County
standards

— improvements that will requir e laying thousands of tons of compacted gravel , materially enlarging the road and significant ly increas ing the burden on the Cargasacchis’ land.7

The se improvements are not needed for any dominan t tenement

owners

— including Blanco

— to use th e right of way , but rather are required so that the County will issue the permits he needs to complete construction of his home. In our view, such improvements are outside the scope of any secondary easements
in cluded in the 1968 easement. ( Dolnikov

, supra , 222 Cal.App.4 th at p. 429 [only “ ‘ “ changes that do not affect [the]
substance ” ’ ” of an easement are permitted].)
Blanco next relies on Kosich v. Braz (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d
737 to claim that he had the rig ht to improve the 1968 easement.
But as the Kosich court noted, “a purchaser of real property in fee takes the property subject only to the servitude which [t he y]
know [] or should know .” ( Id. at p. 740, italics added.) There, the appellants knew that th e easement at issue had been enlarged

, and they impliedly consented to that enlargement. ( Ibid. ) But here, Blanco points to no evidence that the Cargasacchis knew of or consented to the improvement of the road crossing over the
1968 easement. The 1990 m emo randum shows the opposite : It requires Blanco to “ release all other easements or other rights
that lie outside [the 1990] easement , and . . . release and quitclaim all other rights and claims across” Cargasacchi lands.
Zissler v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal .App.5th 630 similarly does
not aid Blanco. In Zissler

, this court explained that “ the parties to an express right

- of

- way easement presumptively contemplate ‘normal future development,’ ” meaning that “ such an easement will generally not be restricted to its historic use.” ( Id. at p. 641.) We cautioned, however, that “ ‘ “uncontemplated, abnormal uses [] [that] greatly increase the burden [on the easement] are not” ’ ” within the realm of “normal future development.” ( I bi d

. ) What is paramount is the int ent of the parties: i.e., an “easement may be8

used to the extent that the use is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the easement and is consistent with the purpose for which the easement was granted .” ( Id. at pp. 645

- 646, italics added.)
Unlike Zissler , this case is about improving an easement, not increasing its use. The 1968 easement was granted for road purposes, to permit Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos landholders ingress to and egress from their properties. But the
document s defining th e purpose of the easement do not suggest
that landholders can materially improve the road crossing it to meet County standards , as Blanco seeks to do here. To the contrary, the documents expressly restrict landholders from “materially increas [ing] the burden or impos[ing] new or additional burdens [on] the easement.” A nd they impliedly exempt improvements of the road crossing th e 1968 easement from the realm of “normal future development” by permitting the construction of a paved road across the 1990 easement. Such
limita tions distinguish the easement at issue in this case from
the unrestricted easement at issue in Zissler

. Blanco argues that improving the road crossing over the
1968 easement will not increase the burden on the easement.
But this argument ignores testimony that the improvements required by the County would require laying several inches of gravel on the road and the trial court’s finding that such improvements would be “significant.” And it ignores the fact that improving the road crossing over the 1968 easement would
undermine the 1990 memorandum ’s purpose of delineating future road development.
Blanco also complains that preventing him from improving
the road crossing over the 1968 easement forces him to bear the9

“onerous bu rden” of building the 1990 road himself, something not contemplated by the 1990 memorandum

. W e disagree that
the 1990 memorandum force s Blanco alone to shoulder this
burden

. The memorandum does state that Lakeview Estates and
Rancho Dos Mundos landowners “shall” form an assessment district to pay for the “costs of design, construction[,] and maintenance of the [1990] road.” But it puts no timeline on when the landowners must do so. And it contemplates that such a district may not be formed: “If such a f unding mechanism is not established, then [the landowners] will make every effort to ensure that each of [them] will individually have [their] own homeowner’s policy extended to include the [1990] road easement and to name [the Cargasacchis] as additional insured s .”

Unconstitutional taking Finally, Blanco contends the trial court’s decision to “phase out” the 1968 easement constitutes a taking without just compensation. Blanco did not raise this contention below, and we
do not resolve it

. ( People v. Ha rrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211,
1229 [constitutional arguments forfeited on appeal if not raised at trial] .)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Cargasacchis shall recover
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.Timothy J. Staffel, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________ Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire and Nicholas D. Lauber for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of E. Patrick Morris and E. Patr ick Morris for Defendants and Respondents.