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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Eli Sloan, 

Defendant. 

No. CR-15-08232-PCT-DLR-1

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for DNA analysis. (Doc. 125.) Defendant 

seeks DNA testing of the victim’s clothing. The motion is fully briefed and, for reasons 

stated below, is denied. 

 After a seven day jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of kidnapping, assault 

with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse, two counts of aggravated sexual abuse, 

assault resulting in substantial bodily injury, and assault by strangling. Defendant took 

the stand at trial. He testified that after a physical altercation involving himself, the 

victim, and her sisters, he forced the victim to flea with him walking into the wilderness 

in pitch darkness. He testified further that the victim repeatedly fell down and that during 

their foray, the victim lost consciousness on two occasions and he performed CPR to 

revive her. He felt it necessary to twice strike her in the face to bring her back to 

consciousness and to hold her by her neck. When she could walk no further, with an 

injured leg and no shoes in the wilderness, Defendant testified that he put the victim on 
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his back and carried her half a mile until, exhausted, he collapsed to the ground. He then 

carried her piggyback to a barbed wire fence and as he was helping her over the fence, he 

sustained a five inch cut to his arm. He claimed that despite the cold and rain, and having 

an injured ankle and cactus needles in her back, the victim twice requested to engage in 

intercourse. He further claimed that despite his reluctance, he yielded to her wishes and 

they had intercourse twice, including anal intercourse. Because it was cold and raining, 

Defendant testified that he had the victim dig a hole in the dirt with a tree branch where 

they had sex, cuddled, and spooned. 

 Based on Defendant’s testimony alone, there is no dispute that the victim suffered 

facial and neck injuries. Photos of the victim’s face were admitted at trial which showed 

scratches and bruising. The type of injures she sustained as depicted in the photos, 

however, were not the type that would have resulted in substantial bleeding. The 

evidence was that there was substantial physical and sexual contact between the victim 

and Defendant on the ground and in the mud. 

 Defendant contends that the origin of the blood on the victim’s clothes was a 

crucial component to his theory of the case. He argues that if the stains on the victim’s 

shirt, which appear to be blood, are tested and found to contain Defendant’s DNA, this 

would be exonerating or mitigating evidence. In his reply, he expands his argument to 

include the theory that the stains may not be blood: “The quantum of violence 

occasioned against the witness can be impeached if the stains are not blood.” (Doc. 135 

at 2.) 

 The Court is puzzled by Defendant’s assertions regarding the stains on the 

victim’s clothes. Neither side presented evidence or otherwise argued that there was 

significant bleeding. Defendant himself testified about substantial physical and sexual 

contact between him and the victim on the muddy ground. Where or from whom the 

stains originated would not be meaningful on any issue, guilt or mitigation. 

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 Defendant cites no Ninth Circuit authority for his request. Instead, Defendant 

refers to A.R.S. § 13-4240, an Arizona post-conviction DNA testing statute, which 

requires a showing that “a reasonable probability exists” that the defendant “would not 

have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained” through 

DNA testing. A.R.S. § 1340(B). Arizona courts may, in their discretion, order postconviction DNA testing only if a “reasonable probability” exists that either (1) the verdict 

would have been more favorable if the results of DNA testing had been available, or 

(2) DNA will produce exculpatory evidence. A.R.S. § 1340(C). The defense has not met 

these standards. Defendant has not shown how the determination of the contents of the 

stains or the origination of the stains could result in exculpatory evidence or a more 

favorable result. As noted above, neither side presented evidence or argued that there 

was significant bleeding, but there was substantial evidence showing physical and sexual 

contact between Defendant and the victim on the ground and in the mud. Where or from 

whom the stains originated would not be probative of guilt or mitigation. 

 Defendant also cites 18 U.S.C. § 3600, another post-sentencing DNA testing 

statute. This statute is not applicable, however, and Defendant otherwise has not met his 

burden. Section 3600 has very specific requirements, all of which must be met to support 

the request. Among other things, Defendant must show that (1) he did not “knowingly 

fail to request DNA testing in a prior motion;” (2) his theory of defense “would establish 

actual innocence;” and (3) the “identity of the perpetrator was at issue in the trial.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3), (6)(B), (7). There is no evidence that the lack of DNA testing was 

not a defense tactic. This is not a case where there is any question about the identity of 

the perpetrator. As indicated above, where or from whom the stains originated is not 

meaningful on any issue, including actual innocence. 

 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is no substantive due process 

right to post-conviction DNA evidence. Turner v. Dumanis, 415 Fed. Appx. 831, 832 

(9th Cir. 2011). 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for DNA Analysis (Doc. 125) is 

DENIED. 

 Dated this 27th day of April, 2017. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge