F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

D A L A D I E R M U R

I L L O -A L V A R A D O , AKA Doming o Arredondo, AKA Daladier Murillo, AKA Daladier Alvarado Murillo,

Defendant-Appellant. N o. 14-50354

D.C. No. 5:14-cr-00014- VAP-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Virg inia A. Phillips, Chief District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted J uly

8, 2016 * Pasadena, California

F iled December 4, 2017

* T h e p an el u n an im o u s ly

co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A p p. P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 2

B efore: Richard R. Clifton, Michelle T. F riedland, Circuit J udg es, and Edward M. Chen, * * District J udg e.

Opinion by

J udg e Clifton

SUMMARY * * *

Crim inal Law

Affirming a sentence, the panel held that section 11351 o f the Californ ia Health and Safety Code (possession o r purchase f

or sale of desig nated control l ed substance) is divisible –as d iscussed in Mathis v. U nited States
, 1 36 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) –as to its controlled substance requirement, such that a conviction under that statute may , a pply i n g the modified categ orical appr o a c h

, be held to be a d rug trafficking offense under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

Apply ing the modified c a teg orical approach, the panel held that t he g overnment established, throug h judicially noticeable documents, that t h e defendant’s § 11351 conviction w as for a substance, cocaine, that was a controlled substance under fed eral law, and that the district court therefore properly applied a 16-level enhancem en t pursuant to USSG § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (2014) (amended 2016).

** T h e Ho n o rab le Ed w ard M. Ch en , Un ited States District Ju d g e f or th e No rth ern District o f

Calif o rn ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 3

COUNSEL

J ames H

. L ocklin, Deputy F ederal Public Defender; Hilary L

. Potashner, F ederal Publ i c D e fender; Office of the F ederal Public Defender, L os Ang eles, California.

Abig ail W

. Evans, As s i s tant United States Attorney ; L awrence S. Middleton, Chief, Criminal Div i s i o n; United States Attorney ’s O ffice, Riverside, California; for PlaintiffAppellee.

OP INION

CL I F TON, Circuit J udg e :

The p rimary question presented by this appeal is whether section 11351 of the California Health and Safety Code (“Possession or purchase for sale o f desig nate d controlled

s ubstances”) is a divisible statute, as discussed in Mathis v. United States
, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), such that a conviction under that s t a t u te may be held to b e a d rug trafficking offense under the United States Sentencing Guide l i n es (“USSG” or “ Sentencing Guidelines”), a pply ing the modified categ orical approach. W e pr eviously held that section 1 13 5 1 i s divisible with reg ard to its controlled

su b s tance r equirement. United States v. Torre-Jimenez
, 771 F .3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014). I n Guevara v

. Uni t ed States
, 136 S. Ct. 2542 (2016), however, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a d ecision by this court, rely ing on that precedent, th a t section 11351 is divisible, d irecting us to reconsider the issue in lig ht of Mathis

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 4

I n United S

tates v. Martinez-Lopez
, 864 F .3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2017) ( e n b anc), we held that section 11352 of the California H ealth and Safety Code (“Transportation, sale, gi ving away , etc. of desig nated controlled substances” ), a very similar statute, is divisible under Mathis

. Id. at 1039–41. B ased on the same reasoning we applied in that decision, we conclude that secti o n 1 1351 is similarly divisible. B ecause the g overnment e stablished that Murillo-Alvara d o was previously convicted of possessing cocaine for sa le, which qualifies as a drug trafficking o ffense under the Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm.

I. Background

I n 2001, Defendant- A

p p e l l a n t D aladier Murillo-Alvarado

wa s convicted of a violation of section 11351. Specifically

, in count 1 of a c riminal information

, he was charg ed with “violation of Section 11351 of the [ Cali f o r n i a] H ealth a

nd S a f e t y C o d e ( P O S S E S S IO N F O R S A L E O F A C O NTROL L ED SUB STANCE), a F EL ONY.” Count 1 specified that “[ o] n o r about May 29, 2001, [MurilloAlvarado]

. . . did w illfully and u n l awfully possess for sale and purchase for sale a controlled su b stance, to wit, COCAI NE.” Murillo-Alvarado pled g uilty to count 1.

Murillo-Alvarado was later d eported but then returned to the United States without authoriz ation. I n 2013, immig r ation authoritie s f

ound Murillo-Alvarado in California. He was indicted on a charg e of illeg al r eentry in violation of 8 U .S.C. § 1326. The indictment also ch a r g ed that he had been previously convicted f

or the violation of secti o n 1 1351 described above. Murillo-Alvarado p led g uilty to the charg e of illeg al reentry , without a plea ag reement.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 5

The district cour t sentenced Murillo-Alvarado to imprisonment for 60 months. I n determining the sentence, the district court c oncluded, over objection by Murillo-Alvarado, that his prior conviction under section 11351 w as for a “drug trafficking offense,” which increased his offense lev e l b y 16 levels p ursuant to U .S. Sente n ci n g Guidelines Manual § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 014) (amended 2016).

Murillo-Alvarado timely

appealed.

II. Discussion

At the t ime that Murillo-Alvarado was sentenced, the Sentencing Guidelines provided for sentence enhancements when a defendant had previously bee n c o n v icted of v arious predicate offenses under f ederal, state, or local law, including

a “ d r u g t r a f

f i c k i n g o f

f e n s e

. ” S e e , e

. g

. , U S S G § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A). The Sentencing Guidelines define a “drug trafficking offense” to be:

an offense under federal, state, o r local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex port, distribution, or dispensing of, or o f f e r to sell

a controlled substance (or a counterf eit substance) or the possession o f a co n t r olled substance (or a counterfeit substan ce) with intent to manufacture, i m port, ex port, distribute, or dispense.

Id. § 2L 1.2, Application Notes (1)(B )(iv).

Section 11351 specifies punishment for “every person who possesses for sale or p urchases for purposes of s ale

. . .U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 6

any controlled substance” specified in a list o f crossreferen c e d c ode provisions. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351. 1 To be covered under the section, the involved substance must be one of the substances on o ne of the crossreferenced lists.

W e a p ply a three-step analy sis to determine whether a prior conviction under state law q ualifies as a predicate d

rug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. F irst, we ask whether the state law is a categ orical match with a federal drug trafficking offense. See Taylor v. U nited States
, 495 U.S. 5 7 5, 599–600 (1990). At this step, we look only to t h e “statutory definitions” of the c o r r esponding offenses. Id. at 600. I f a state law “proscribes the same amo u n t o f or less conduct than” that qualify ing as a federal drug traffi c king offense, then the two offenses a re a categ orical match. United States v. Hernandez

, 769 F .3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). I n that scenario, a conviction under sta t e law automatically qualifies as a predicate drug trafficking offense, e nding our analy sis. See Taylor , 495 U.S. at 599.

1 Sectio n 1 1 3 5 1 read s, in

f u ll:

Ex cep t as o th erw ise p ro v id ed i n th is d iv isio n , ev ery p erso n w h o p o ssesses f

o r sale or p u rch ases f

o r p u rp o ses

o f s ale (1 ) an y c o n tro lled su b stan ce sp ecif

ied in

su bd iv isio n (b ), (c), o r (e) o f Sectio n 1 10 5 4 , sp ecif ied in p arag rap h (1 4 ), (1 5 ), o r (2 0 ) o f su b d iv isio n (d ) of Sectio n 1 1 05 4
, o r sp ecif

ied in su b d iv isio n (b ) o r (c) of Secti o n 1 1 0 5 5
, o r sp ecif i ed i n su b div isio n (h ) of Sectio n 1 10 5 6
, o r (2 ) an y co n t ro l l ed su b stan ce classif ied in Sch ed u le III, IV, o r V w h ich is a n arco t ic d ru g , sh all b e p u n ish ed b y im p riso n m en t p u rsu an t to

su bd iv isio n (h ) o f Sectio n 11 7 0 o f th e P en al Co d e f or tw o , th ree, o r f

o u r y ears.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 7

Second, if the state law is not a categ orical match, w e ask whether the statute of p rior conviction is divisibl e. Mathis

, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. A statute i s d i v i s i b le when it “list[ s] elements in the alternative, a nd thereby define[ s] multiple crimes.” Id.

I f the statute of prior conviction is d ivisible, the third step is to d e t e r mine whether the c o nviction is a match to the federal drug trafficking offense u nder the mod i f ied categ orical approach. At this s t e p, w e ex amine judicially noticeable documents of conviction “to determ i n e which statutory phrase w as the basis for the c onviction.” Descamps

v. United St ates , 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013) (quoting Johnson v. United S

tates , 559 U.S. 1 33, 144 (2010)). I n this
case, the question w ould be whether the conviction o f Murillo-Alvarado involved a substance that appeared on the federal list of controlled substances. I f so, the p rior conviction
may serve a s a predicate offense u nder the Se n t e ncing Guidelines. See Shepard v. United S tat e s , 5 4 4 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).

A. The Divisibility of Section 11351

The parties do not dispute that in this case the state law at issue, section 11351, is not a categ o rical match with a federal drug trafficking offe n se. W e h ave a lready held that section 11351 is not a categ orical match with a federal d rug trafficking off

e nse b ecause California’s list of controlled substances includes some that a r e not on the federal list. United States v. Leal-Vega

, 680 F .3d 1160, 1162 ( 9 t h Cir. 2012). Thus, our focus h ere is whether, at step two of the analy sis, section 11351 is a divisible statute.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 8

A statute is not divisible w hen it “contains

. . . a lternative

means by which a defendant mig ht commit the same crime.” Martinez-Lopez , 864 F .3d at 1039 (citing Mathis

, 136 S. Ct.
at 2 2 56). A statute is divisible when it “list[ s] elements in the alternative, and thereby define[ s] multiple crimes.” Mathis

, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. W e r eview the divisibility o f a statute de

novo. Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch

, 815 F .3d 469, 4 77 ( 9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

Murillo-Alvarado a

rg ues th at the c ontrolled substance requirement in section 11351 i s not divisible because the controlled substan ces enumerated in the cross-referenced
statutes a re means by w hich a defendant commi t s a sing ular controlled-s u b s tance offense, not elements of separate crimes. 2 I n its supplemental brief, the Government contends that Martinez-Lopez requires us to hold that those controlled substances are elements, a nd that the con t r o lled substance requirement is therefore divisible.

W e a ddress e d a very similar q uestion in our recent en banc opinion in Mar t inez-Lopez
, in which we h eld that California Health and Safety Code section 11352 was divisible. See Martinez-Lopez
, 864 F .3d at 1039–41. Section 11352 contains a list o f cr o s s

- r eferenced substances nearly identical to the list in section 11351. The list in section 11351 differs from the list i n section 11352 only in that section 11352 includes cocaine base a n d section 11351 does not.

2 Mu rillo

- A lv arad o h as n o t arg u ed th at th e actu s reu s req u irem en t in sectio n 1 1 3 5 1 is n o t d iv isib le. T h eref o re, an y su ch arg u m en t i s w aiv ed

. S ee Miller v. Fa irch ild In d us. , 7 9 7 F.2 d 7 2 7, 7 3 8 (9 th Cir. 1 9 86 ) (n o tin g th at th is co u rt “ w ill n o t o rd in arily co n sid er m atters o n ap p eal t h at are n o t

s pecif ically an d d istin ctly arg u ed in ap p ellan t’ s o p en in g b rief ”) (citin g In t’l Un io n o

f Br i c k l a yers an d Allied Cra

ftsmen Lo ca l N

o

. 2 0 v. Ma r tin Ja ska , In c. , 7 5 2 F.2 d 1 4 0 1 , 1 4 04 (9 th Cir. 1 98 5 )).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 9

Compare Cal. Heal t h & Safety Code § 1 1351 with id. § 11352(a) (listing the same subsections and subparag raphs, with one addition, subparag raph (f)(1) of Section 1 1 054); see id. § 11054(f)(1) (cocaine b ase). Thus, the list in section 11351 is just a subset of the list in section 11352.

O u r reasoning in Martinez-Lopez g uides us here. 3 I n Martinez-Lopez
, we noted that In re Adams

, 5 3 6 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1975), a n d i ts p rog eny establish that “ defendants a re routinely subjected to multiple convictions unde r a sing le [ California] statute f

or a sing le ac t as it relates to multiple controlled substances.” M artine z -L opez , 864 F .3d a t 1040. Relevantly here, in People v. Monarrez
, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2 d 247 (Ct. App. 19 9 8 )

, the California court of appeal upheld separate convictions for possession of cocaine for sal e a nd possession of heroin for sale under section 11351 based on a sing le incident. Id

. at 248. This holding establishes that the controlled substances incorporated in section 11351 a re elements e stablishing separate o ffenses a n d not means b y which to commit the same offense.

F urther, similar to section 11352, the jury instructions for section 11351 “require a jury t o fill in a blank identify ing ‘a controlled substance’—i.e., o n l y o n e

— d emonstrating that the

3 In d eed

, o u r o p in io n in th at case ref erred to th e S u

p rem e Co u rt’s

rem an d o f Gu eva ra , a case w h i ch in v olv ed a p rio r co n v ictio n u n der sectio n 1 1 3 5 1, an d stated th at “ w e resp o n d to th e Su p rem e C o u rt’ s in stru ctio n b y rev isit i n g t h e en tire lin e o f cases.” Ma rtin ez-Lo p ez , 8 6 4 F.3 d at 1 0 3 6 n .1

. W e h av e alread y relied o n Ma rtin ez-Lo

p ez t o h old th at tw o o t h e r sectio n s o f th e C alif o rn ia Health an d Saf

ety C od e are d iv isib le w i th resp ect to th eir co n t r o l l e d su b stan ce req u irem en ts. S

ee Un ited S ta tes v. Oca mp o -Estra d a , 8 73 F.3 d 66 1
, 6 6 8 (9 th Cir. 20 1 7) (Cal. Health & Saf

ety Co d e § 1 13 7 8 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Ba rra g an , 8 7 1 F .3 d 6 8 9
, 7 1 5 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 1 7 ) (Cal. Health & Saf ety Co d e § 1 1 37 9 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 10

jury identify and unanimously ag ree on a particular controlled

s u b s tance.” Martinez-Lopez
, 864 F

. 3d a t 1041; see J udici al Council of California Criminal J ury I n structions CAL CRI M No. 2302 (2017 edition). The jury ins t r u ctions thus treat the particular controlled substance as an element, not a means.

I n lig h t of how it is interpreted by California c ou r t s , w e hold that section 11351—like section 11352—is divisible a s to its controlled substance requirement.

B. Application of the Modified Categorical Approach

B e cause section 11351 is a divisible statute, we now turn to step three, in which w e e x amine judicially noticeable documents of prior conviction to determine whether it is clear which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction. I f the defenda n t p l ed or was found g uilty of the elements constituting a f

ederal drug trafficking offense, the prior state

c onviction may serve a s a predicate offense u nder the Sentencing Guidelines.

Murillo-Alvarado arg ues that, at s t e p three, the
g overnment failed to meet its burde n t o prove b y clear a nd convincing evidence th a

t M u r i l l o

- A l v a r a d o ’ s prior conviction

was a “drug trafficking offense.” S e e United States v

. Valdavinos-Torres

, 704 F

. 3d 6 79, 691 (9th Cir. 2012). “W e review de novo the classification of a defendant’s prior conviction for purpose s of apply ing the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Coronado

, 603 F

. 3d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

I n this c ase the question is whether th e go v ernment established that Murillo-Alvarado’s s e c t i o n 11351 conviction

was for a substance that was a controlled substance u n d e rU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 11

federal law. T he g overnment presented a certified c opy of the
g uilty plea form which contained a handwritten f actual basis in which Murillo-Alvarado admitted that on May 29, 2001, he “possessed cocaine to be used for purposes of sale .” The
g overnment a lso provided certified copies of the criminal information, the court’s minute order, and the abstr a c t o f judg ment.

“W here the minute order or oth e r equally reliable document specifies that a defendant pleaded g uilty to a pa rt i c u l ar count of a criminal complaint, the court may consider the facts alleg ed in t he complaint.” Coronado v

. Holder

, 759 F

. 3d 977, 9 86 (9th Cir. 2 014) (citation omitted). Here, the go v ernment provided reliable documents that clearly specified that Murillo-Alvarado pled g uilty to count 1 of the c rimina l information. The g uilty plea form stated that Murillo-Alvarado p led g uilty to count “ 1 of the information.” The form further specified that count 1 was for a violation o f “H& S 11351.” L ikewise, the court’s min u t e order reflected that Murillo-Alvarado p led g uilty to “11351 H S as charg ed in
count 1” of the “[ o] rig inal information.” The abstract o f judg ment stated that Murillo-Alvarad o p led g uilty to count “1A” f or violating “ H S” “ 11351.” All of these sources indicated a p l ea date of D ecember 7, 2001, and they all referred only to a sing l e count. Count 1 of the information cha r g ed that, on May 29, 2001, Murillo-Alvarado “possess[ ed] for s a l e a n d purchase[ d] for sale a controlled substance, to wit, COC A I N E.” Thus, these documents conclusively established that Murillo-Alvarado pled g uilty to

a May 29, 2001 o ffense invol v i n g the possession of cocaine for purposes of sale. I t is undisputed that cocaine was and is a controlled substance under federal law.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 12

M u rillo-Alvarado arg ues that the abstract of judg me n t created doub t a b o u t the plea b ecause it referenced a plea to count “1A” rather than c o u n t “1.” H e cites M edina-Lara v

. Holder

, 771 F .3d 1106, 1113–15 ( 9th Cir. 2014), wh e re we held that the record w as insufficient to establish that the plea

was to the o ffense orig inally charg ed. I n that case the
g overnment presented o n ly two documents to meet its burden : (1) an amended complaint alleg ing in count “003” that the defendant possessed cocaine f or sale, and (2) an abstract of judg ment reflecting that the d efendant pled g uilty
to coun t “ 3 A ,” without identify ing the c ontrolled substance involved. Id. at 1113–14. The immi g ration judg e a nd
g overnment a t t o rney openly speculated that the orig inal charg e ha d b een amended, b ut the g overnment failed to produce additional documents to clarify the record. Id

. at 1114, 1118. “Ag ainst this b ackdrop, we [ were] hard-pressed
to say that there [was] a ‘clear and convincing ’ link b etween the ‘3A’ i n t h e a b stract and the ‘3’ in the amended complaint.” Id

. at 1115. I n reaching that result, however, we acknowledg ed other cases where the record clearly reflected that the plea was to a particular count “as charg ed in the information.” Id

. a t 1113 (quoting U n i t e d States v. Vidal

, 504 F .3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).

This case is different because th e d istrict court here h ad

a more substantial r ecord. The court had a handwritten f actual basis on the g uilty p lea fo r m in w hich Murillo-Alvarado admitted that on May 29, 2001, he possessed coc a i n e to be used for purposes of sale. The g uilty plea form and the minute order b o th clear l y indicated that Murillo-Alvarado was pleading g uilty to count 1 a s charg ed in the infor m a t i on. Count 1 was the only count, and it ex pressly charg ed MurilloAlvarado with possessing cocaine for sale. T a ken tog ether, the documents demonstrated that Murillo-Alvarado p ledU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. M U R I L L O -A L V A R A D O 13

g uilty to possess i on of c ocaine for sale, a drug trafficking offense supporting the 16-level sentencing enhancement. The reference to “1A” i n the a bstract of judg ment does not, standing a lone, nullify those admissi o ns or create sufficient ambig uity

.

III. Conclusion

California Health and Safety Code sec tion 1 1351 is divisible as to its controlled substance requirement. MurilloAlvarado’s specific c onviction involving coca ine under section 11351 qualifies as a dr ug trafficking o f fense for
purpo s e s of the Sentencing Guidelines. The trial court properly applied a 16-level enhan c em en t in its Sentencing Guidelines calculation.

AF F IRMED.