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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SUNBURST MINERALS, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, ) 3:15-cv-08274 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

EMERALD COPPER CORP., ) [Re: Motion at Docket 52]

)

Defendant/Counterclaimant. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 52 plaintiff and counterdefendant Sunburst Minerals, LLC (“Sunburst”)

moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Sunburst supports the motion with a separate statement of facts at docket 53. 

Defendant and counterclaimant Emerald Copper Corp. (“Emerald”) opposes the motion

at docket 70, supported by controverting statement of facts and separate statement of

additional facts at docket 71. Sunburst replies at docket 76 and supports its reply with

a “supplemental statement of facts” at docket 78.1 Oral argument was requested, but

would not assist the court.

1Although this latter filing is not contemplated by LRCiv 56.1, the court will consider it

because Emerald has not objected to or moved to strike it.
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II. BACKGROUND

Sunburst’s complaint refers to 53 unpatented lode claims and mill sites in

Mohave County, Arizona, commonly known as “the Emerald Isle Mine,” but identifies

only the following 52:2

Mill Sites:

1. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 1

2. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 2

3. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 3

4. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 4

5. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 5

6. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 6

7. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 7

8. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 8

9. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 10

10. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 11

11. Copper Hill Mill Site No. 12

12. Hermes Mill Site No. 13

13. Copper Hill Mill No. 1 Mill Site 14

14. Copper Hill Mill No. 1 Mill Site No. 15

Lode Claims:

1. Copper Hill No. 2

2. Hermes

3. Hermes No. 2

4. Jimtown Copper No. 1

5. Valley Copper No. 1

6. Valley Copper No. 2

7. Valley Copper No. 3

8. FDR

9. Emerald No. 1

10. Emerald No. 2

11. Emerald 5

12. Emerald 6

13. Emerald 7

14. Emerald 8

15. Emerald 9

16. Emerald 10

17. Emerald 11

18. Emerald 12

19. Emerald 13

20. Emerald 14

21. Emerald 15

2Compare doc. 45 at 1 ¶ 1 (53 claims and mill sites), with doc. 45-1 at 1–2; doc. 45-2

(52 claims and mill sites). The discrepancy may have resulted from the fact that Emerald #19 is

listed twice in the trustee’s deed conveying the claims and mill sites to Sunburst. See doc. 78-1

at 54–57.

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22. Emerald 16

23. Emerald 17

24. Emerald 18

25. Emerald 19

26. Emerald 20

27. Emerald #21

28. Emerald #22

29. Emerald #30

30. Emerald 31

31. Emerald #43

32. Emerald 44

33. Emerald #45

34. Emerald 2B

35. Emerald 3A

36. Emerald 4A

37. Emerald 40

38. Emerald 41

Sunburst located these last five claims (claims 34–38) in June 2016.3

 Sunburst’s

motion does not seek summary judgment regarding these new claims; it seeks partial

summary judgment regarding the remaining claims and mill sites, which were located

on various dates between 1907 and 2004. All subsequent references to “Sunburst’s

claims” excludes the claims Sunburst located in 2016. 

In 2012, 2014, and 2016, Emerald located unpatented mining claims in the same

general location as Sunburst’s claims.

4

 Sunburst brings this quiet title and trespass

action against Emerald, alleging that Emerald’s claims are invalid because they overlap

with and are junior to Sunburst’s valid claims. Emerald’s counterclaim alleges that its

claims were staked on open ground, and therefore asserts quiet title and trespass

causes of action against Sunburst. The parties recognize that the fate of their

competing trespass causes of action depends solely on the success of their respective

quiet title actions.5

3Doc. 45 at 4 ¶ 22.

4Doc. 46 at 7 ¶ 2.

5Doc. 52 at 17; doc. 70 at 11.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6

 The

materiality requirement ensures that “only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.”7 Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”8

 However, summary

judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”9

 The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact.10 Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial

on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show that

summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute

as to material fact.11 Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party

must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for

trial.12 All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of

summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the

6Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

7Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

8

Id.

9Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

10

Id. at 323.

11

Id. at 323–25.

12Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49.

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non-movant.13 However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or

denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual

dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.14

IV. DISCUSSION

At the outset, it is necessary to define the nature of the parties’ causes of action. 

Although the parties denominate their respective suits as quiet title actions, they are

properly classified as competing possessory actions.15 In an ordinary quiet title action,

such as an action that involves patented mining claims, the fee title is at issue. Actions

such as this, where the parties assert competing possessory rights to mine the land but

paramount title is held by the United States, are determined by the law of possession.16

The plaintiff need not rely solely on the strength of her own title, as in a quiet title action. 

Rather, the prevailing party is the one with better possessory rights.17 Emerald does not

dispute that Sunburst is in possession of the disputed land and that Sunburst’s claims

were located first. Thus, Emerald bears the burden of proving that its mining rights are

superior, and Sunburst’s evidence will be viewed in the most favorable light.18 

13

Id. at 255.

14

Id. at 248–49.

15See Rundle v. Republic Cement Corp., 341 P.2d 226, 228–29 (Ariz. 1959).

16

Id. at 228. See also 2 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, American Law of

Mining § 36.03 (2d ed. 2017) (“The statute grants a possessory right, a term that is more

correct than possessory title, because the United States retains the equitable title until

application has been made for patent and the purchase price paid and retains the legal title until

patent is issued.”).

17Rundle, 341 P.2d at 229 (quotation omitted).

18Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Co., 354 P.2d 40, 45 (Ariz. 1960) (“[W]here the party in

possession seeks to free its property from the adverse claims of a subsequent locator,” the

subsequent locator bears the burden of showing “a superior right to possession in himself” and

“the evidence of the prior locator will be viewed in the most favorable light it will justify.”).

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Sunburst’s motion essentially argues that Emerald cannot produce sufficient

evidence to meet its burden of proving the invalidity of any of Sunburst’s senior claims. 

In response, Emerald argues that there are “disputes of material fact concerning:

(1) Sunburst’s title; (2) abandonment of Sunburst’s claims; (3) claim monumenting;

(4) mineralization of millsite claims; and (5) Sunburst’s predecessor’s failure to act when

notified of oversized claims.”19 The court will address these arguments in turn. But

before doing so, it is necessary to address Emerald’s argument that a motion for

summary judgment is premature “[w]here discovery on the merits is not complete and

the case is not ready for trial.”20 This argument is without merit. Neither of the cases

upon which Emerald relies involved summary judgment motions.21

 Rule 56(b) provides

that “a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the

close of all discovery.” Thus, even though discovery remains open, Sunburst will be

entitled to summary judgment on each claim and defense for which it can show there is

no genuine dispute of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

22

 If

Emerald believed that it lacked evidence necessary to support its opposition, it was

required to submit an affidavit or declaration that specifically explained why it could not

19Doc. 70 at 2.

20

Id.

21Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 2008)

(involving class certification motion); Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d

493, 493 (D.N.J. 2000) (involving motion to certify claim as collective action under the Fair

Labor Standards Act).

22Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

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yet present this evidence.23 Simply observing that “[d]iscovery remains open”24 does

not suffice.25

A. Sunburst’s Title 

In a March 22, 2010 deed and bill of sale, Redstone Resources Corp.

(“Redstone”) sold its interest in the Emerald Isle Mine to Medina Property Group, LLC

(“Medina”).26 About three months lather, Medina sold its interest in the mine to Sierra

Resource Group, Inc. (“Sierra”).27 Then, in 2015, Sunburst obtained Sierra’s interest in

the mine via trustee’s deed.28 Emerald acknowledges these facts, but argues that there

may be a gap in the chain of title because Sierra might not have owned the title to the

property.

29 In support of this argument, Emerald points to two pieces of evidence.

The first is a press release issued by Copper Mesa Mining Corp. (“Copper

Mesa”), Redstone’s parent company. The release states that on October 2, 2009,

Copper Mesa “announced the transfer of Redstone Resources’ properties to the lender

of a bridge loan facility . . . as a result of a non-payment by [Copper Mesa] in June

23Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

24Doc. 70 at 9.

25See State of Cal., on Behalf of California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to submit necessary affidavit is proper

ground for denying request for additional discovery and proceeding to summary judgment);

THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1980) (“THI’s failure

to move for a continuance under [a previous version of Rule 56(d)] prevents it from complaining

of the timing of summary judgment in this case.”); 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et

al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2740 (4th ed. 2017) (“[W]hen the movant has met the initial

burden required for the granting of a summary judgment, the opposing party either must

establish a genuine issue for trial under Rule 56(c) or explain why it cannot yet do so under

Rule 56(d).”).

26Doc. 78-1 at 8.

27

Id. at 11.

28Doc. 78-1 at 54–57.

29Doc. 70 at 3.

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2009.”30 Emerald argues that this evidence creates a factual dispute as to whether

Redstone sold its interest to some unspecified lender in 2009, as the press release

states, instead of to Medina in 2010. In response, Sunburst argues that the press

release is hearsay and there is no evidence corroborating its statement that Redstone

transferred its interest in the mine in 2009.31

 

The second piece of evidence is the 2010 complaint that the Securities and

Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed against Jaime Santiago Gomez (“Gomez”), who

was the president of Quri Resources, Inc. (“Quri”) and, according to Emerald, a

managing member of Medina.32 The SEC’s complaint alleges that in February 2009

Gomez issued false and misleading press releases stating that Quri “had signed a letter

of intent with Copper Mesa Corp. to acquire the Emerald Isle Copper Mines.”33

According to the SEC’s complaint, Gomez did not actually sign the letter of intent until

August 2009 and the deal was doomed anyway because Quri was in “no financial

position to complete an acquisition.”34

Emerald’s evidence is insufficient to raise a question of material fact. In light of

the signed and recorded bill of sale that purports to transfer Redstone’s interest in the

mine to Sierra, no reasonable jury could find that Redstone lacked a valid interest in the

mine based on Copper Mesa’s vague press release or the SEC’s tangentially-related

allegations.

B. Abandonment

Emerald argues that Sunburst’s predecessors-in-interest abandoned the claims

under two theories: (1) failure to make necessary filings and (2) failure to properly

30Doc. 71-1 at 119.

31Doc. 76 at 3.

32Doc. 71-1 at 142–57.

33

Id. at 146 ¶¶ 20–21.

34

Id. at 147 ¶ 22.

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monument the claims’ boundaries. Emerald bears the burden of proving abandonment

with clear and convincing evidence.35

1. Failure to make necessary filings

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) imposed a

new requirement on claim owners to make certain filings in order to maintain their

possessory title.36 This included an annual requirement to file with the BLM an affidavit

of assessment work, a notice of intention to hold the claim, or a related report.37

 The

consequence for not filing such an instrument was abandonment of the claim.

38

Emerald argues that there are disputed questions of material fact regarding

whether Sunburst’s “Mineral Survey Claims” were abandoned in this manner.39

Emerald asserts, without any evidentiary support, that the BLM’s records “provide no

evidence that annual assessment work was performed” for these claims between 1980

and 1992.40 This assertion is refuted by the records that Sunburst submitted in support

of its reply, which show that Sunburst’s predecessors-in-interest filed FLPMA-compliant

notices with the BLM between 1980 and 1992.41 

35Velasco v. Mallory, 427 P.2d 540, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (“Proof of abandonment or

forfeiture lies with the party asserting the fact and it must be established by clear and

convincing evidence.”). See also Kinney v. Fleming, 56 P. 723, 724 (Ariz. 1899) (“Referring to

a mine in a location notice casts upon the party attacking the notice the burden of showing that

there is no such mine as referred to.”).

3643 U.S.C. § 1744.

37

Id. § 1744(a)(2).

38

Id. § 1744(c).

39The “Mineral Survey Claims” consist of Copper Hill No. 2; Hermes; Hermes No. 2;

Jimtown Copper No. 1; Valley Copper No. 1; Valley Copper No. 2; and Valley Copper No. 3.

Doc. 52 at 3.

40Doc. 70 at 9.

41Doc. 78-1 at 59–119.

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2. Claim monumenting

Section 27-203 of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides that the locator of a

claim must, among other things, “[m]onument the claim on the ground within ninety

days from the time of the location so that its boundaries can be readily traced.”42 With

respect to lode claims, the monuments must consist of either “six substantial posts

projecting at least four feet above the surface of the ground” or “substantial stone

monuments at least three feet high, one at each corner of the claim and one at the

center of each end line of a lode claim.”43 A locator’s failure to comply with the

requirements of A.R.S. § 27-203 results in “an abandonment of the claim, and all right

and claim of the locator shall be forfeited.”44

Emerald argues that the affidavits of Kenneth E. Schaaf (“Schaaf”), Brian Dirk

Hatter (“Hatter”), Donald T. Scoretz (“Scoretz”), Howard Metzler (“Metzler”), and Llao

David Hutzinger (“Hutzinger”) create a genuine dispute as to whether Sunburst’s

predecessors-in-interest complied with A.R.S. § 27-203(A)(2).45 Specifically, Emerald

argues that these affidavits show that (1) Sunburst’s predecessor, El Paso Natural Gas

(“El Paso”), failed to re-stake the Mineral Survey Claims after it abandoned its patent

application,46 and (2) Sunburst’s predecessor St. Genevieve Resources (“SGR”) failed

to monument the 20 new claims it located in 2004.47

Schaaf is a co-owner of Southwest Land Surveying and Consulting (“Southwest

Land Surveying”). He states in his affidavit that he and surveyor Earnest Schaaf visited

42A.R.S. § 27-203(A)(2).

43A.R.S. § 27-204.

44A.R.S. § 27-203(E). 

45Doc. 71 at 2 ¶ 6.

46Doc. 70 at 4; doc. 71 at 6 ¶ 17.

47Doc. 70 at 4–5; doc. 70 at 6–7 ¶¶ 22–24.

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the Emerald Isle Mine site in 2012 and looked for monuments.48 “Of the 20 claims

purported to be located on the eastern side of the property,” Schaaf states, “there was

minimal evidence of monuments being placed on the site.”49

 Southwest Land

Surveying’s 2012 survey of mining claims states in pertinent part that no location

monuments were found for each of the seven Mineral Survey Claims or the following

five claims that SGR located in 2004: Emerald 22, 31, 43, 44, and 45. 50

Hatter is a surveyor Emerald hired to conduct a field evaluation in 2015. With

regard to monumentation, Hatter’s report generally concurs with Earnest Schaaf’s

findings

51

 and additionally states as follows: 

A 1 1⁄2” aluminum cap on a No. 5 rebar was found at all of the corners that

I found that were not destroyed by mining activity. This clearly does not

meet Statute. There was no evidence that a post or rock mound meeting

the Arizona Statute was placed at the center of each end line or at the

corner. Older 4” x 4” wood posts were found in the area and it is my

opinion that these posts predate Mineral Survey 4732 A & B and were not

placed at the corners after Mineral Survey 4732 A & B Final Certificate

was withdrawn. I did find some 3⁄4” PVC pipe at or near some of the

corners that were not shown on the Record of Survey by Mr. Schaaf. 

These clearly do not meet Arizona Statute.52

Scoretz is Emerald’s CEO. His affidavit merely states that [t]hrough the work of

Southwest Land Surveying and Consulting, [he] learned of numerous deficiencies

involving prior claims on the site.”53

 Metzler is a geologist who states that “[i]n 2005-

2006” he worked at the Emerald Isle Mine for at least a year, and during that time he

“noticed a few occasional markers in the ground, but the markers were not of the sort

48Doc. 71-1 at 3.

49

Id.

50Doc. 52-7 at 39.

51Doc. 71-1 at 8 (“In conclusion it is my opinion that the field conditions shown on

Mr. Schaaf’s Record of Survey . . . has not substantially changed in the exception of the 3⁄4”

PVC Pipe.”).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 11.

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that would give [him] any indication that [he] was on unpatented mining claims.”54

Finally, Hutzinger states that he has worked at the mine since 2004, and “the only

claims on the land that [he] witnessed and recognize are the claims made by Emerald

Copper Corporation and the one claim located by Howard Metzler.”55 

a. The Mineral Survey Claims

Sunburst responds to Emerald’s arguments regarding the Mineral Survey Claims

by noting that Emerald cites no authority that requires a locator to re-stake the

boundaries of a claim after it abandons a patent application. A.R.S. § 27-203 merely

requires a locator to monument his claim within 90 days “from the time of the location.” 

Sunburst also argues that Emerald’s witnesses shed no light on whether Sunburst’s

predecessors complied with A.R.S. § 27-203 because they did not observe those

claims anywhere near the time of location (which occurred on various dates “between

1907 and the 1970s”).56 At most, Emerald’s evidence shows that the Mineral Survey

Claim monuments were not maintained over time, Sunburst argues, and “[t]he failure to

maintain the monuments does not invalidate the claims.”57

The court agrees with Sunburst that El Paso was under no obligation to re-stake

the monuments after it withdrew its patent application. As the Nevada Supreme Court

stated in Nichols v. Ora Tahoma Mining Co.:

The general rule is that when a location is once sufficiently marked on the

surface so that its boundaries can be readily traced, and all other acts of

location are performed as required by law, the right of possession is fully

54

Id. at 15.

55

Id. at 21.

56Doc. 76 at 5.

57

Id. (citing 2 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, supra, § 33.04[8] (“Once a

location is properly marked, the claimant has complied with the requirements of the law, and in

almost all states he need not, to preserve his right of possession as against rival claimants,

maintain or restore the monuments or markings if they are removed or obliterated without his

fault. The inability of a subsequent locator to find monuments or to trace the boundaries of a

location is not proof that it was not marked on the ground.”)).

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vested in the locator, and he cannot be divested of this right by the

removal or obliteration or destruction of the monuments, stakes, marks, or

notices done without his fault, while he continues to perform the

necessary work upon the claim.

58

Thus, the pertinent question is whether Emerald’s evidence tends to clearly and

convincingly show that Sunburst’s predecessors failed to place the required monuments

within 90 days of when the claims were located.

The California Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Temescal Oil

Mining & Development Co. v. Salcido.

59

 Salcido involved a dispute over oil-mining

rights. Although the defendant located his claim in 1891 and the plaintiff did not locate

its claim until 1900, the plaintiff argued that its claim was superior in part because the

defendant had failed to adequately monument his claim.

60

 At trial, the plaintiff

presented the testimony of witnesses who “did not see the monuments when they

looked for them some years after they were placed” and argued that this evidence

created a jury question regarding whether the monuments were ever constructed.61

The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to submit this question to

the jury, finding that the plaintiff’s evidence did “not raise a substantial conflict with the

testimony of the parties who placed the monuments.”62

 “The evidence that the stakes

were placed there in 1891 is not disputed,” the court held, “and, as ag ainst that

evidence, testimony to the effect that the stakes could not be found in 1899 raises no

presumption.”63

58Nichols v. Ora Tahoma Mining Co., 151 P.2d 615, 622 (Nev. 1944).

5969 P. 1010 (Cal. 1902).

60

Id. at 1010.

61

Id. at 1011.

62

Id.

63

Id.

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In accord with Salcido, the court finds that Earnest Schaaf’s and Hatter’s failure

to find monuments placed on the Mineral Survey Claims in 2012 and 2015 does not

raise a genuine issue of material fact. No reasonable jury could find that these

observations, which occurred between 40 and 105 years after the fact, clearly and

convincingly dispute the locators’ attestations that the monuments were posted at the

time of location.64 

b. The claims that SGR located in 2004 

The claims that SGR located in 2004 present a different story, however. 

Emerald first asserts that “SGR’s records [show] that [it] failed to monument its claims

within 90 days.”65

 This is an apparent reference to “[i]nternal reports generated by the

project manager of the site, Joe Sawyer,” that according to Emerald, “indicate that on

the weeks of January 23, 2005 and January 30, 2005, [the individual who located these

claims, Robert Cameron,] was still in the process of ‘staking the claims.’”66 But in

support of these factual assertions, Emerald merely cites the five affidavits discussed

above, generally.

67

 This citation violates both Rule 56(c)(1)(A) and LRCiv 56.1(b)

because it does not refer to any specific parts of any materials in the record. Further,

the court has reviewed the cited affidavits and finds that they contain no mention of any

reports generated by Joe Sawyer. The court will disregard Emerald’s argument

regarding Joe Sawyer’s reports for lack of evidentiary support.

Emerald next cites Huntzinger’s affidavit, in which he states that SGR hired him

in November 2004 to “perform maintenance on the heap leach.”68 After a couple of

months, Huntzinger was “assigned the job of checking the monitor wells around the

64See doc. 52-2 at 2–69.

65Doc. 70 at 11.

66

Id. at 4.

67Doc. 71 at 7 ¶ 25.

68Doc. 71-1 at 18.

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site,” which involved traveling “to different parts of the mine site where the monitor wells

were located.”69 Huntzinger states that the claim posts placed by Metzler in “[s]ometime

around 2006-2007” were the only ones “he recognized on the site” until Emerald started

placing its posts in 2012.70 Around that time, Huntzinger states, then-owner Sierra

Resources told him to “go into town and get some PVC pipe and [start] putting stakes

on the claims.”71

In response, Sunburst argues that strict compliance with the claim

monumentation requirement is not required; substantial compliance suffices.72 This

argument is of no avail to Sunburst, however, because Sunburst does not explain how

SGR might have substantially complied with the monumentation requirement. Sunburst

next challenges the weight of Huntzinger’s observation that no monuments were posted

because Huntzinger “was not tasked with inspecting the claims staked by SGR.”73

Sunburst also argues that Huntzinger’s observation is refuted by (1) Hatter’s and

Metzler’s statements that they found “claim markers on the ground;”74 (2) Southwest

Land Surveying’s 2012 survey, which located “various markers on Emerald 5–20;” and

(3) Emerald’s position in this litigation that the “Block Claims” (Emerald Claims Nos. 1A,

69

Id. at 19.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 20.

72Doc. 76 at 9 (citing Hagan v. Dutton, 181 P. 578, 582 (Ariz. 1919) (“We find no

indication in the evidence that there was any intentional concealment of the notices, and it fairly

appears that there was a substantial compliance with the statute in posting the notices, and we

shall not disturb the finding of the court that sufficient and legal notices of location had been

posted on the Red Metal claims.”)).

73

Id.

74

Id.

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2A and 3–20)75 are oversized, “which relies on the distance between monuments for

these claims that were found on the ground.”76

Sunburst’s factual assertions are either not supported by the record or do not

effectively refute Huntzinger’s observations. Contrary to Sunburst’s insinuation, Hatter

and Metzler did not specifically state that they located claim markers on any claims that

SGR located in 2004. And, although Southwest Land Surveying’s 2012 survey and

Emerald’s litigation position regarding the Block Claims reflect that some markers were

placed on some of these claims, not even Sunburst contends that this evidence shows

compliance (substantial or otherwise) with A.R.S. § 27-203. The court finds that

Huntzinger’s affidavit, which includes his observations of the mine site at the same time

the monuments were allegedly placed in 2004, coupled with Sunburst’s lack of any

evidence showing that the required monuments were timely placed, is sufficient to

create a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether the 2004 claims were properly

monumented. 

C. Mineralization of the Mill Site Claims

A lode mine operator may use land “not contiguous” to the lode for milling

purposes.77 By statute, a mill site may only be located on non-mineral land.78 The

widely-recognized test for determining whether a mill site is located on mineral land

asks, “does such land contain minerals of a quantity and quality which can be extracted

at a profit?”79 If the land contains “mineral of such quality and quantity to render

75Doc. 52 at 4.

76Doc. 76 at 10.

7730 U.S.C. § 42(a).

78

Id. § 42.

79Cleary v. Skiffich, 65 P. 59, 61 (Colo. 1901).

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expenditures for its extraction reasonable and prudent,” the land is mineral in character

and unsuitable for a mill site.80 

Sunburst asserts that its mill site claims are all located on non-mineral land,

relying on two authorities. The first is a report prepared by Burrett W. Clay (“Clay”), a

Certified Mineral Examiner.81

 In that report Clay opines that the drill hole data and the

cost data demonstrate “that there is no known commercial grade mineralization under

the mill sites.”82

 The second authority is the Non-Mineral Affidavit executed in 1975 by

Harold W. Horst and W.T. Hollis in support of El Paso’s patent application.83 

Emerald argues that whether Sunburst’s mill sites are located on mineral land

presents a genuine factual dispute for two reasons. First, Emerald argues that “SGR

attempted to overlap multiple load claims on the Sunburst Millsites,” something it could

not do unless it “believed minerals were present and could be extracted

economically.”84 As Sunburst points out, however, Emerald “provides no evidence that

SGR made a discovery of valuable mineral deposits or that those deposits, if they were

discovered, were on the millsites.”85 Second, Emerald argues that Schaaf’s affidavit

creates a genuine question of fact. In paragraph ten of his affidavit, Schaaf states that

in 2014 he “was involved in drill testing,” including horizontal drilling across the mill

sites, which showed “trace mineralization of copper and cobalt.”86 He states that he and

professional geologist Barry Price (“Price”) concluded that “the mineralization and

80Silver Chief Mining Co., Inc., 40 IBLA 244, 248–49 (1979). See also California v.

Rodeffer, 75 Interior Dec. 176, 179 (IBLA 1968).

81Doc. 52-7 at 2–29.

82

Id. at 27.

83

Id. at 31–37.

84Doc. 70 at 5 (citing A.R.S. § 27-201).

85Doc. 76 at 7.

86Doc. 71-1 at 3 ¶ 10.

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discovery of cobalt are indicative of sufficient mineralization so that the mill site claims

could be designated as being mineral in character.”87 In response, Sunburst contends

that Schaaf’s statement is outside the scope of his expertise as a surveyor and as to

Price it is hearsay.

Schaaf’s affidavit is insufficient to create an issue for trial. “[T]here is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.”88 Schaaf’s opinion that Sunburst’s mill

sites are located on land that is mineral-in-character is one that requires scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. And Emerald

has not established that Schaaf, a surveyor, possesses the requisite expertise to offer

expert opinion testimony on this topic.89 Further, the court finds that Sunburst’s hearsay

objection to Schaaf’s statement about Price’s opinion is well-taken. But, even setting

aside these two deficiencies, Schaaf’s affidavit still fails to raise a question of material

fact. His affidavit does not set out the quantity of minerals that their drill testing

uncovered, the quality of those minerals, or the expenditures needed to extract the

minerals. Even if Schaaf’s opinion were admissible, it would still fall well-short of

creating a jury question as to whether the Sunburst mill sites are located on land that is

mineral-in-character. 

87

Id.

88Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).

89See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (the trial court

must decide whether an individual offering expert testimony has sufficient “specialized

knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in the case.”) (internal quotation

omitted).

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D. Oversized Claims

The Mining Law of 1872 establishes that the width of a lode claim may not

exceed 600 feet (300 feet on each side of the center of the claim).90

 A claim that

violates this size limitation is void if the locator acted in bad faith.91 The Arizona

Supreme Court has defined good faith in this context “as honesty of purpose and

absence of intent to defraud.”92 Where an oversized claim is the product of an honest

mistake (for example, where the claim is not “so excessive as to show bad faith”), bad

faith may be found only where the locator was notified of the excess, was given an

opportunity to correct it, and subsequently failed to remedy the problem.

93

 Whether a

locator acted in bad faith is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

94

Sunburst concedes that its Block Claims are oversized,95 but argues that they

are “not so excessive as to indicate bad faith” and Sunburst’s predecessor was never

given an opportunity to fix the problem before Emerald staked its claims.96 In response,

Emerald asserts that Scoretz’s affidavit creates a question of material fact as to

9030 U.S.C. § 23 (“No claim shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of

the middle of the vein at the surface . . . .”).

91Velasco, 427 P.2d at 548 (“Had the Hogvalls and the subsequent Black Eagles been

so excessive as to show bad faith, they would have been void.”).

92Geomet Expl., Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 601 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Ariz. 1979).

93Velasco, 427 P.2d at 548 (quoting Jones v. Wild Goose Mining & Trading Co., 177 F.

95, 98 (9th Cir. 1910) (“Until [the defendants] had received [notice of the excess], and were

given an opportunity to exercise [their right to select and cast off], the whole claim, including

any excess due to honest mistake and free from fraud, was so far segregated from the public

domain as to exempt it or any part thereof from relocation.”)).

94

Id.

95Doc. 52 at 11.

96

Id. at 7, 12.

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whether Sierra was notified of the problem, given an opportunity to fix it, yet did

nothing.

97

 Again, the evidence upon which Emerald relies is deficient. 

In his affidavit, Scoretz merely states that he discussed with Sierra’s CEO, Rod

Martin, the “numerous deficiencies” he had discovered with Sierra’s claims.98 “After

Mr. Martin denied that any deficiencies existed and expressed no interest in remedying

those deficiencies,” Scoretz states, “[he] directed Southwest Land Surveying and

Consulting to place several mining claims on the Emerald Isle mine site.”99

 Scoretz

does not specifically state that he notified Sierra that the Block Claims were oversized,

a fact essential to Emerald’s assertion of bad faith. Lacking this evidence, Emerald has

failed to raise a question of material fact. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the motion at docket 52 is granted in part and denied in

part as follows. Sunburst is entitled to judgment in its favor as to both counts of its

complaint and both counts of Emerald’s countercomplaint with regard to Copper Hill Mill

Site Nos. 1–8, 10–12; Hermes Mill Site No. 13; Copper Hill Mill No. 1 Mill Site Nos.

14–15; Copper Hill No. 2; Hermes; Hermes No. 2; Jimtown Copper No. 1; Valley

Copper Nos. 1–3; and FDR. In all other respects the motion is denied. 

DATED this 25th day of September 2017.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

97Doc. 70 at 7.

98Doc. 71-1 at 11.

99

Id. ¶¶ 4–6.

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