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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Scott Douglas Nordstrom, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections; James O’Neil 

Warden, ASPC Eyman; and Staci Fay, 

Deputy Warden, Browning Unit, 

Defendants. 

CV15-02176-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 Before the Court is death-sentenced inmate Ruben Garza Jr.’s motion to reconsider 

the Court’s ruling on his third-party motion to enforce a settlement agreement between 

Plaintiff Scott Nordstrom and Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) 

and others. Doc. 111. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion. 

I. Background. 

In October 2015, Plaintiff Nordstrom, a death-sentenced inmate in state custody, 

brought an action against Defendants for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments related to death row conditions. Doc. 1. Having already planned to make 

death row inmates eligible for reclassification to close-custody housing, ADOC settled 

with Plaintiff on March 3, 2017 (“the Settlement”). Doc. 39. Based on this settlement, the 

Court dismissed Mr. Nordstrom’s action, incorporated the Settlement terms in its order, 

and retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Doc. 45. 
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 In 2019, seven death-sentenced inmates, including Mr. Garza, filed motions to 

enforce the Settlement, asserting standing as third-party beneficiaries under Rule 71. 

Docs. 71, 75, 76, 80, 81, 85, 86. In a May 15, 2019 order, the Court found that the seven 

inmates lacked standing because they were not recognized as the Settlement’s primary 

parties in interest and were not privy to the promise of the Settlement. Doc. 110. 

II. Legal Standard. 

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare 

circumstances. See Stetter v. Blackpool, No. CV 09-1071-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3348522, 

at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 15, 2009). A motion for reconsideration will be denied “absent a 

showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have 

been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); 

see Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Mere disagreement with an 

order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-

PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 1776502, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2008). Nor should reconsideration be used 

to ask the Court to rethink its analysis. Id.; see N.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., 

Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. Discussion. 

Garza asserts that the Settlement affected all death row inmates, not just Mr. 

Nordstrom and created a vehicle for all death-sentenced inmates to be reclassified to close 

custody. Doc. 111 at 6. Mr. Garza seems to argue that because all death-sentenced inmates 

benefitted from the Settlement, they should all have standing to enforce it. Id. at 7. He 

further argues that because the Settlement mentions all death-sentenced inmates as a group, 

they were the intended third-party beneficiaries. Id. 

 Mr. Garza’s arguments are all addressed by the Court’s previous order. While the 

Settlement mentions all death-sentenced inmates as a group, the underlying case was only 

between Mr. Nordstrom and Defendants. As stressed in the previous order, Mr. Nordstrom 

never took steps to represent interests other than his own, and the Settlement was the result 

of an agreement between Mr. Nordstrom and ADOC only. Further, under Arizona law it 
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is not enough that the inmates are affected by the Settlement or that it operates to their 

benefit. See Sherman v. First Am. Title Ins., 38 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). 

The death-sentenced inmates must be the intended, primary parties in interest, which they 

were not. Basurto v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 485 P.2d 859, 863 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). 

 Garza also argues that if the death-sentenced inmates do not have standing to 

enforce the Settlement, then Plaintiff Nordstrom would not have had standing to originally 

assert his claims. This clearly is incorrect. To assert standing in the underlying suit, Mr. 

Nordstrom needed to show that he suffered an injury and the injury could be redressed by 

the Court’s favorable opinion. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992). As a party to the underlying suit and the Settlement, Mr. Nordstrom’s continues 

to have standing to enforce the Settlement. Doc. 72 at 4-5. But as nonparties, Garza and 

the other death-sentenced inmates need third-party beneficiary status to have standing to 

enforce the Settlement. Sherman, P.3d at 1232. As discussed in the Court’s previous order, 

they do not. 

 Garza also does not address the Court’s alternative ground for dismissing the deathsentenced inmates’ motions – that none of the inmates asserted claims are covered by the 

terms of the Settlement. Doc. 110 at 6-8. Specifically for Mr. Garza, the Court found that 

the Settlement does not address disciplinary procedures for death-sentenced inmates 

following reclassification. Id. at 7. Thus, even if the Court agreed that the inmates have 

standing, the May 2019 order would not change. 

IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Garza’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 111) is denied. 

 Dated this 30th day of May, 2019.