* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 96-11333

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

LEONARD MAULDIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FIESTA MART,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-2747)

May 7, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant Leonard Mauldin appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee

Fiesta Mart, Inc. (“Fiesta M art”) on Mauldin’s claims of

discriminatory demotion an d retaliation under Title VII of the-2-

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq

.

Fiesta Mart, a supermarket chain, hired Mauldin, who is white,

as produce manager for its new Dallas store in August 1993.

Mauldin held this position for several months until Fiesta Mart

transferred Jaime Murillo, who is Hispanic, from Austin to replace

Mauldin as produce manager in Dallas. Fiesta Mart asserts that

Mauldin’s performance in that position had been unsatisfactory and

that Murillo was a more qualified and experienced produce manager.

Mauldin, on the other hand, denies that his performance was

substandard or, if it was, argues that any deficiencies in his

performance were due to factors beyond his control. Instead, he

alleges that Fiesta Mart demoted him because it wished to fill his

position with an Hispanic manager.

Mauldin filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging

discriminatory demotion. Some time after filing the complaint,

Mauldin asked f or a raise, but his request was denied. As a

r esult, Mauldin filed a second EEOC charge alleging unlawful

retaliation. Mauldin continued to work for Fiesta Mart until his

resignation in 1996.

Mauldin brought this action under Title VII alleging

discriminatory demotion and retaliation. During discovery, Mauldin

served Fiesta Mart with interrogatories requesting detailed

personnel and salary information on all managers for all thirtyfour Fiesta Mart stores for the previous ten years. Fiesta Mart-3-

provided Mauldin with information concerning its Dallas stores, but

otherwise objected to the interrogatories on the ground that they

were overly broad, unduly burdensome, and vexatious. The parties

negotiated unsuccessfully to narrow the scope of the inquiry.

Approximately two m onths before trial, Fiesta Mart filed a

motion for summary judgment. Mauldin submitted a request for

extension of time to file a response to the motion and moved to

compel Fiesta Mart to respond to his interrogatories. The district

court denied Mauldin’s request for an extension of time, but did

not immediately rule on his motion to compel. Mauldin then filed

a “partial response” to Fiesta Mart’s motion for summary judgment,

asserting that the additional discovery s ought in the motion to

compel would produce evidence sufficient to successfully oppose

summary judgment. The district court construed Mauldin’s partial

response as a request for continuance to allow fo r additional

discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), but denied the continuance

on the ground that the additional discovery requested was a

speculative “fishing expedition” unlikely to uncover relevant

evidence. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of

Fiesta Mart and denied Mauldin’s motion to compel.

Mauldin appeals, asserting that the district court erred by

refusing to allow time for additional discovery u nder Rule 56(f)

and by denying his motion to co mpel. Rule 56(f) states that

“[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the

motion that the party cannot for reasons stated pre sent by-4-

affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the

court

. . . may order a continuance to permit

. . . discovery to be

had

. . . .” We review the district court’s disposition of motions

to compel and other discovery matters for abuse of discretion.

Atkinson v. Denton Pub. Co.

, 84 F.3d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1996). We

likewise review the grant or denial of a continuance pursuant to

Rule 56(f) for abuse of discretion. K rim v. BancTexas Group, Inc.

,

989 F.2d 1435 , 1441 (5th Cir. 1993). We review the district

court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ward v. Bechtel Corp.

,

102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Rule 56 does not entitle a party to unlimited discovery before

summary judgment is granted; “if a party cannot adequately defend

such a motion, Rule 56(f) is his remedy.” Washington v. Allstate

Ins. Co.

, 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990); Paul Kadair, Inc. v.

Sony Corp. of Am.

, 694 F.2d 1017, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1983). Mauldin

may not invoke Rule 56(f) by the mere assertion that discovery is

not yet complete, but must show how the additional discovery will

establish a genuine issue of material fact. I d. at 1286; see also

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit

, 28 F.3d 1388, 1396 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). The

district court may deny a continuance when (1) the record shows

that the requested discovery is unlikely to produce facts necessary

to withstand summary judgment, (2) the nonmovant seeks to embark on

a “fishing expedition,” or (3) the discovery is sought for dilatory2 The court, however, held that Mauldin failed to establish

a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation because denial of a

requested raise does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Mauldin does not contest this finding on appeal.

-5- reasons. M ills v. Damson Oil Corp.

, 931 F.2d 346, 350-51 (5th Cir.

1991).

Applying the Title VII burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green

, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-

25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), the district court assumed without

deciding that Mauldin established a prima facie case of

discriminatory demo tion. 2 The court then determined that Fiesta

Mart satisfied its burden of production by proffering a legitimate

and nondiscriminatory reason for its ac tions. Mauldin offers no

evidence tending to show that Fiesta Mart’s reasons are pretextual

other than his own subjective beliefs. He now seeks to obtain

detailed employment information with respect to all persons holding

managerial posi tions in all thirty-four Fiesta Mart stores for a

ten-year period in the hope that such information will reveal a

company-wide preference for Hispanic managers. We agree with the

district court that Mauldin’s discovery request constitut e s a

“fishing expedition” calculated to uncover something upon which to

rest the otherwise unsupported allegations in his complaint. See

Kadair

, 694 F.2d at 1030 (holding that plaintiff could not rely

upon Rule 56(f) to defeat motion for summary judgment “where the

result of a continuance to obtain further information would be-6-

wholly speculative”); Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources,

Ltd.

, 40 F.3d 1474, 1487-88 (5th Cir. 1995) (same). Thus, we find

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the Rule

56(f) continuance and, consequently, no abuse of discretion in its

denial of Mauldin’s motion to compel.

Mauldin does not otherwise contest the propriety of the

district court’s ruling. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Fiesta Mart.