This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 TAMMY GONZALES, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 27,896 9 PAUL LIVINGSTON, 10 Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUADALUPE COUNTY 12 Abigail Aragon, District Judge 13 Law Offices of Daymon B. Ely 14 Daymon B. Ely 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 Border Law Office, P.A. 17 Dean Border 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 for Appellant 20 Paul Livingston 21 Placitas, NM 22 Pro Se Appellee 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION 24 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 252 This case arises from a malpractice suit brought by Plaintiff, alleging Defendant 1 was negligent in his representation of Plai ntiff by failing to timely file her appeal 2 from a decision of the Human Rights Commi ssion prior to the expiration of the 3 relevant statute of limitations. The distri ct court found in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding 4 her $54,837 in damages. De fendant appeals, arguing insufficient evidence supports 5 both the verdict and the award, and that th e district court made several evidentiary 6 mistakes. Unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments, we affirm the district court. 7 I. FACTS 8 Plaintiff was employed as the fire and safety sergeant for Wackenhut Detention 9 Facility (Wackenhut) from 1998 until 2000. Wackenhut hired Plaintiff because of her 10 previous experience with the fire department . She was apparentlyassured her lack of 11 experience with prisoners would ensure sh e would not be require d to “work the line” 12 as a corrections officer. This distinction was important to her. 13 For some time, Plaintiff, working under Warden Eloy M ondragon, received 14 good performance reviews. A riot occurred at Wackenhut in August 1999. After the 15 riot, Warden Mondragon was replaced by Warden Bravo. Sometime after the change 16 in warden, Plaintiff began to observe change s in behavior toward her that she felt were 17 discriminatory. For example, Plaintiff received a written reprimand for an incident 18 in which a male driver backed into and damaged a sally port. Even though Plaintiff 193 was the passenger rather than the driver, th e male driver appare ntly received no formal 1 reprimand. Plaintiff also testified she was formally reprimanded for leaving early 2 after the conclusion of a seminar; her malecounterparts received no similar reprimand 3 despite having left at the same time as Plai ntiff. Moreover, Plaintiff was apparently 4 demoted for her performance and originally replaced by an uncertified male worker; 5 she was brought back after one week becau se of the lack of the new employee’s 6 certifications. Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff was again demoted and was told she 7 would be required to work on the line. Plai ntiff resigned rather than work on the line, 8 claiming she had received threats which had made her fear for her life. 9 Plaintiff filed a complaint with th e New Mexico Human Rights Commission 10 (HRC), alleging gender discrimination in vi olation of NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-7(A) 11 (2001). She received an initial finding of probable cause and her claim proceeded to 12 hearing. After losing the hearing in front of the HRC, Plaintiff was entitled to a de 13 novo appeal in district court, by filing a comp laint. The statute of limitations for her 14 appeal ran April 8, 2002. 15 On April 8, 2002, Defendant attempte d to file the complaint/appeal by 16 facsimile, without filing fee, in Santa Rosa , New Mexico, just before closing. The 17 clerk refused to file the complaint without the filing fee, and the complaint was not 18 actually filed until April 10, 2002, when the fee was submitted. The district court 194 dismissed the complaint because it was file d outside of the statute of limitations. 1 Plaintiff filed this malpractice action against Defendant in 2004, alleging legal 2 negligence. 3 After a bench trial, the district court specifically found Defendant was negligent 4 in his representation of Plaintiff, Defendant’s conduct fell below the requisite standard 5 of care, and Plaintiff had a greater than even chance of prevailing in the lawsuit 6 against Wackenhut and its employees. The di strict court found in favor of Plaintiff, 7 awarding her $54,837 for lost wages, bene fits, and retirement, but denying her 8 requests for attorney’s fees and damages for emotional di stress. Defendant appeals 9 both the verdict and the damages award. 10 II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT 11 COURT’S VERDICT 12 Defendant asserts insufficient evidence supports the district court’s decision. 13 Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to prove he acted neg ligently, failed to support her 14 contention that she had been constructively discharged, failed to make a prima facie 15 case for gender discrimination, and failed to prove adequate job performance, thus 16 failing to prove she had a reasonable chan ce of prevailing on the underlying appeal. 17 A. Standard of Review 18 In reviewing a sufficiency of the ev idence claim, we consider whether 19 substantial evidence supports the district court’s decision. “Substantial evidence is 205 such relevant evidence th at a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a 1 conclusion.” Landavazo v. Sanchez , 111 N.M. 137, 138, 802 P.2d 1283, 1284 (1990). 2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard 3 evidence and inferences to the contrary. Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc. , 1998-NMCA4 021, ¶ 30, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (filed 1997). Our concern is not whether 5 substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether 6 substantial evidence supports the result reached. Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. 7 City of Las Cruces , 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177 (filed 1996). 8 “Additionally we will not reweigh the ev idence nor substitute our judgment for 9 that of the fact finder.” Id. Where there is conflict in the testimony, we therefore 10 defer to the trier of fact. Buckingham v. Ryan , 1998-NMCA-012, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 498, 11 953 P.2d 33 (filed 1997). Finally, we also pres ume the district court is correct. The 12 burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the di strict court erred. 13 Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc. , 111 N.M. 6, 8, 800 P.2d 1063, 1065 14 (1990). 15 B. Substantial Evidence Supports the District Court’s Finding 16 Defendant’s Actions Were Negligent and the Proximate Cause of 17 a Loss to Plaintiff 18 For a malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she employed the defendant 19 attorney, (2) her attorney ne glected a reasonable duty, and (3) the negligence resulted 206 in and was the proximate cause of loss to the plaintiff. Hyden v. Law Firm of 1 McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor , 115 N.M. 159, 162-63, 848 P.2d 1086, 1089- 2 90 (Ct. App. 1993). Defendant disputes all three elements onappeal. Defendant 3 asserts he was not employed as Plaintiff’s attorney, and that hefulfilled any duty he 4 had by faxing the complaint before the e xpiration of the statute of limitations. 5 Defendant further asserts there was insu fficient evidence his actions were the 6 proximate cause of any loss to Plaintiff. 7 First, Defendant argues, without any citation to legal authority or supporting 8 documentation, he was not representing Plai ntiff at the time the statute of limitation 9 ran on the HRC appeal. He claims his representation of Plaintiff was always intended 10 to be limited to the HRC hearing and that he communicated this limitation to Plaintiff. 11 He also asserts that, even assuming he had a duty to Plaintiff, his facsimile filing of 12 the complaint was enough to discharge his duties because the Guadalupe County 13 Clerk should have accepted the facsimile comp laint for filing. Wedisagree and affirm 14 the district court. 15 The question of whether Defendant represented Plaintiff at the time the HRC 16 appeal was to be filed is a question of fact for the fact finder, inthis case the district 17 court. Here, the district court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 18 Those findings indicate the district court de termined a legal relationship continued to 197 exist between Plaintiff and Defendant at th e time Defendant untimely filed the appeal; 1 we see no reason to disagree. See Herrera v. Roman Catholic Church , 112 N.M. 717, 2 721, 819 P.2d 264, 268 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Unless clearly erroneous or deficient, 3 findings of the trial court will be construe d so as to uphold a judgment rather than to 4 reverse it.”). 5 The sole evidence of the terminati on of the legal relationship Defendant 6 apparently introduced was Defendant’s te stimony. Defendant apparently did not 7 provide any written evidence the relationship had been terminated nor did he provide 8 any evidence he had complied with the notice requirements found in the Rules of 9 Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Rule 16-116(D) NMRA. 10 Plaintiff’s testimony contradicted Defendant’s; the question of representation 11 was therefore a matter of whose testimony was mo re credible. Plaintiff stated she had 12 hired Defendant as her attorney and that she had little or no contact with Defendant 13 after her hearing before the HRC until sh e received a call from him requesting she 14 take a filing fee to the district court. Moreover, Defendant attempted to file the 15 complaint, which belies his suggestion hewas under the impression he had no duty 16 to Plaintiff. 17 The district court apparently found Plaintiff more credible than Defendant. As 18 previously stated, “when there is a conflict in the testimony, we defer to the trier of 198 fact.” Buckingham, 1998-NMCA-012, ¶ 10. We theref ore accept the district court’s 1 determination that a legal relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant. 2 Further, we decline to accept Defendant’s contention his facsimile filing of the 3 complaint, minutes before closing, on the la st day prior to the running of the statute 4 of limitations, without filing fee, was suffici ent to discharge any duty he may have had 5 toward Plaintiff. Defendant suggests th e problem lies with the clerk because she 6 improperly rejected the complaint contrary to Rule 1-005(E), (F) NMRA (2006). See 7 also, Ennis v. Kmart Corp ., 2001-NMCA-068, ¶¶ 6-10, 131 N.M. 32, 33 P.3d 32 8 (holding court clerk lacks discretion to refu se filing because of technical violations). 9 Here, however, the clerk did not refuse to file the complaint b ecause of a “technical 10 violation,” but rather because she was following statutory requirements. 11 Plaintiff’s HRC appeal was subject to the guidelines found in Rule 1-076(B) 12 NMRA, which governs de novo appeals to the district court and states: “An appeal 13 from the Human Rights Commission may be taken by filing a notice of appeal in the 14 form of a complaint in the district court in the manner provided by these rules for the 15 filing of a civil action in the district court.” That same rule states that the clerk shall 16 docket the appeal upon filing of the noti ce and the filing fee. Rule 1-076(H). 17 Additionally, the rules for filing civil actions state that, with limited exceptions, “a 18 filing fee shall be collected in civil matters in the amountprescribed by law for the 199 docketing of any cause, whether original or reopened or by appeal or transfer from a 1 court of limited jurisdiction.” Rule 1-099 (A) NMRA. Finally, Rule 1-005.1(D) also 2 only permits facsimile filing of documents in cases where a fee is not required. 3 Clearly, the rules required Defendant to file the complaint in person, 4 accompanied by a filing fee. Defendant’s error, rather than the clerk’s, led to 5 Plaintiff’s complaint being dismissed. This is buttressed by the testimony of 6 Plaintiff’s expert, Diane Garrity (Garrity ) who testified Defendant’s actions were 7 below the required standard of care relevant to an attorney and his client. Andrews v. 8 Saylor , 2003-NMCA-132, ¶ 16, 134 N.M. 545, 80 P.3d 482 (permitting expert 9 testimony to assist the fact finder in reso lving the hypothetical case and to determine 10 whether a lawyer violated the standard of care); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 11 359, 622 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the testimony of another attorney 12 to the applicable standards is usually n ecessary in legal malpractice cases). We 13 therefore affirm the district court’s findi ng that Defendant’s ne gligent conduct directly 14 caused the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case against Wackenhut. 15 Turning next to the issue of proximate cause, in legal malpractice actions 16 involving a failure to appeal, proximate cause “ultimately reduces to a prediction as 17 to what the outcome of a hypotheti cal appeal would have been.” Andrews, 18 2003-NMCA-132, ¶¶ 1, 15. The success of the hypothetical appeal is a question of 1910 fact for the fact finder. Id. ¶ 16. The party bearing the burden of proof need only 1 persuade the fact finder that “the likeli hood of a favorable outcome in the hypothetical 2 appeal was greater than even.” Id. ¶ 15. 3 In Plaintiff’s case, because her underlying case was based on gender 4 discrimination, she was required to demons trate she had a greaterthan even chance 5 of proving, by either indirect or direct evidence, Wackenhut intentionally 6 discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. See, e.g., Sonntag v. Shaw, 2001- 7 NMSC-015, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d 1188 (explaining that, under Section 28-1- 8 7(A), a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination). 9 Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to make her case on essentially two grounds, 10 negating the required element of proximate cause. First, Defendant argues there was 11 a lack of evidence proving Plaintiff was c onstructively discharged. Constructive 12 discharge permits an employee to recast a resignation as a de facto firing, depending 13 on the circumstances surrounding the empl oyment relationship and the employee's 14 departure. Because Plaintiff resigned and was not terminated, the parties agree she 15 would be required to prove constructive di scharge as part of establishing wrongful 16 termination. See Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enters. , 2005-NMSC-003, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 192, 17 109 P.3d 280 (explaining the concept of constructive discharge). Plaintiff was 18 therefore required to demonstrate her empl oyer made working conditions intolerable, 1911 and that when viewed objec tively, a reasonable person would be compelled to resign. 1 Id. ¶ 10. 2 Defendant argues Plaintiff improperl y failed to permit her employer an 3 opportunity to “work out a problem” because she had predetermined she would resign. 4 He further argues Plaintiff’s alleged fear was entirely subjective, rather than objective, 5 because other female employees worked on the line. However, our review of the 6 record indicates Plaintiff testified to a specific reason for her fear; she was told on 7 “numerous occasions” that a fe male officer would be killed and that she, specifically, 8 had been warned she was the next targ et. Her testimony indicates she resigned 9 because she feared for her life. Plaintiff’s employment law expert, Garrity, also 10 testified that, based on her experience, a review of a deposition of Plaintiff’s prior 11 supervisor, and Plaintiff’s testimony, she thought Plaintiff’s fears were sincere and 12 reasonable, given the threats and recent riot. See Andrews , 2003-NMCA-132, ¶ 16 13 (also permitting expert testimony to assist the fact finder in resolving the hypothetical 14 case). 15 While it is true the HRC came to a different conclusion regarding constructive 16 discharge, the district court clearly gave more credibility to the testimony of Plaintiff 17 and Garrity than had the HRC. This may have been at leas t partly because of 18 Defendant’s lack of rebuttal w itnesses at trial. Regardless, the district court was not 1912 bound by the HRC findings in this case, and, as previously stated, we do not reweigh 1 issues of credibility on appeal. Id. ¶ 15 (stating that in cases of legal malpractice 2 involving a failure to appeal, the fact finder’s answer to the question of who would 3 likely prevail does not change the result inthe earlier lawsuit and does not establish 4 precedent for future lawsuits.) We hold sufficient evidence supports Plaintiff’s 5 constructive discharge. 6 Second, Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of 7 gender discrimination and that the clear weight of the evidence establishes it was 8 instead incompetence and misconduct that le d to Plaintiff’s demotion and subsequent 9 resignation, rather than any discrimination. Defendant again cites to the HRC’s 10 findings of fact, the non-binding nature of wh ich we have already addressed. He also 11 claims Plaintiff failed to demonstrate she was treated less favorably than male 12 employees in similar positions. However, this issue again goes to credibility. As 13 Plaintiff points out, she testified to at leas t three instances where she was treated less 14 favorably than her male counterparts: (1 ) the sally port incident, (2) the seminar 15 incident, and (3) her original demo tion and replacement by a non-certified male 16 worker. Garrity testified her review of depositions and the record indicated that 17 Plaintiff had been doing a good job, that she followed instructions, that she did not 18 call in sick, that she followed through, that she got along well with the other staff, and 1913 that she was well qualified for her position. Further, both Plaintiff and Garrity 1 testified Wackenhut failed to follow their own disciplinary procedures, which stated 2 Plaintiff should have been given verbal warnings before she was issued a written 3 reprimand. 4 Defendant asserts some of Plaintiff’s testimony suggests Plaintiff’s verbal 5 reprimands were for incompetence or b ecause of her unique position, rather than 6 because of her gender. The di strict court clearly disagreedwith this characterization 7 of Plaintiff’s testimony, instead viewing the actions as discriminatory in nature. As 8 we have previously ex plained, the strength of a plaintiff’s case is factual in a legal 9 malpractice case and we will not reweigh the evidence. Id. ¶ 16. 10 As previously discussed, the district c ourt entered detailed findings of fact and 11 conclusions of law sufficient to support the verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Specifically, 12 the district court found: (1) Plaintiff had hired Defendant to represent her, (2) 13 Defendant had acted negligently in that representation, (3) Defendant’s negligence 14 caused the dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and (4) Plaintiff had a greater than even 15 chance of prevailing in the lawsuit agains t Wackenhut and its employees. Based on 16 the record, findings and briefs, we see no reason to disturb these findings and hold 17 substantial evidence exists to support the verdict. 1814 C. Substantial Evidence Supports the District Court’s Award of Damages 1 “We will uphold a [district] court’s [award of damages] if . . . supported by 2 substantial evidence.” Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp. , 2006-NMSC-046, ¶ 12, 3 140 N.M. 478, 143 P.3d 717. While we agree with Defendant that damage awards 4 must be more than merely speculative, we also note “[p]recise mathematical 5 computation is not required.” Ledbetter v. Webb , 103 N.M. 597, 604, 711 P.2d 874, 6 881 (1985). Reasonable certainty is enough and ordinarily an award of damages will 7 be upheld unless the amount awarded is “so grossly out of proportion to the injury 8 received as to shock the conscience.” Martinez v. Ponderosa Products, Inc., 108 9 N.M. 385, 386, 772 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Ct. App. 1988). 10 Here, contrary to Defendant ’s assertions of speculation, testimony supports the 11 district court award. Both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s expert, Garrity, testified as to 12 Plaintiff’s damages. Specifically, Plaintiff testified as to her annual income and that 13 her tax returns were indicative of said salary. She further testified she had been 14 unable, despite numerous attempts, to find co mparable employment. Garrity testified 15 how employment attorneys calculate damages including lost wages, emotional distress 16 and attorney’s fees. The testimony further indicated Plaintiff’s lost wage claim alone 17 was worth $54, 837 and that Garrity’s calculations were consistent with how both she 18 and other employment lawyers regularly calculate lost wages. 1915 Defendant disputes this testimony, but this , again, is an issue of credibility left 1 to the district judge. Moreover, we are notpersuaded that Plaintiff’s testimony is per 2 se speculative simply because her tax return s were prepared by a tax service. The 3 district judge properly exercised her discretion, weighing the testimony and 4 determining Plaintiff had sufficiently proven losses in wages, benefits, and retirement, 5 but that she had failed to prove damages for emotional distress or attorney’s fees. We 6 therefore find sufficient evidence supports the district court’s decision. 7 III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 8 BY PERMITTING GARRITY TO TESTIFY ABOUT 9 FORMER DEPUTY WARDEN SPRUNK’S DEPOSITION 10 TESTIMONY OR BY REFUSING TO RE-OPEN TESTIMONY 11 Defendant asserts the district court erre d in two evidentiary decisions. First, 12 Defendant argues the district court improperly permitted Garrity to testify concerning 13 former Deputy Warden Sprunk’s (Sprunk) deposition and that the court improperly 14 relied on said testimony. S econd, Defendant argues the court improperly denied its 15 request to re-open testimony to permit Defendant to call Plaintiff on direct 16 examination. Unpersuaded by these argumen ts, we affirm the district court on both 17 issues. 1816 A. Standard of Review 1 The admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 2 Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 36, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999. 3 When reasons both supporting and detracting from a decision exist, there is no abuse 4 of discretion. Talley v. Talley , 115 N.M. 89, 92, 847 P.2d 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1993). 5 We assume the district court is correct and the burden is therefore on the appellant to 6 clearly demonstrate the district court's error. Akins v. United Steelworkers of America, 7 AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 187, 2009-NMCA-051, ¶ 40, 146 N.M. 237, 208 P.3d 457, 8 cert. granted , 2009-NMCERT-005, N.M. , P.3d (No. 31,637, May 13, 9 2009). Moreover, “[i]n a non-jury case, the trial court is presumed to have 10 disregarded incompetent evidence, absent a showing that the court was influenced 11 thereby.” In re I.N.M. , 105 N.M. 664, 669, 735 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Ct. App. 1987). We 12 may affirm a district court’s ruling for any reason so long as reliance on the new 13 reason would not be unfair to the appellant. Meiboom v. Watson , 2000-NMSC-004, 14 ¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154. 15 B. Rule 11-703 NMRA Permits an Ex pert to Testify to Facts Relied 16 on in Formulating Her Opinion, Including Otherwise 17 Inadmissable Evidence 18 Defendant argues the district court erroneously relied on Sprunk’s out-of-court 19 deposition when formulating its findings. He argues that, while the court may have 2017 been entitled to “hear” those portions of th e deposition relied on by Garrity in forming 1 her expert opinion, it was improper for the deposition materialto be “transmuted” into 2 findings of fact. 3 Defendant relies on Rule 1-032 NMRA for his arguments. We, however, note 4 that it is actually Rule 11-703 which govern s this type of evidence. Rule 11-703 5

states: 6 The facts or data in the particul ar case upon which an expert bases an 7 opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 8 expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 9 experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 10 subject, the facts or data need not beadmissible in evidence in order for 11 the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise 12 inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the 13 opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative 14 value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 15 outweighs their prejudicial effect. 16 As discussed at trial, Garrity used the deposition testimony of Sprunk, who had 17 day-to-day dealings with Plaintiff and her job performance, in formulating her expert 18 opinion. Pursuant to Rule 11-703, she is permitted to testify to these facts. See also 19 Lopez v. City of Albuquerque , 118 N.M. 682, 684, 884 P.2d 838, 840 (Ct. App. 1994) 20 (permitting the admission of otherwise inadmissable evidence where said evidence is 21 introduced as the basis for an expert’s opi nion). As previously discussed, the fact 22 finder is entitled to rely on such testimony incases of legal malpractice. Moreover, 23 this case involves a bench trial. There was therefore obviously no requirement that 2418 the district court engage in any formal balancing test between th e probative value and 1 prejudicial effect of the deposition testimony. 2 We also note that Defendant appears to have at least partially waived his right 3 to object to the introduction of Sprunk’ s deposition. During Defendant’s cross4 examination of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counselinformed the district court and Defendant 5 that the questions being asked “open the door to Officer Sprunk’s investigation.” 6 Plaintiff’s counsel stated he would seek to “include Officer Sprunk’s deposition or 7 portions of that investigation.” Defendant responded “[t]hat’s understood.” Further, 8 even were we to find the di strict court erred in issuing findings based on Sprunk’s 9 deposition, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. Even were we to find 10 specific findings improper, the districtcourt was entitled to rely on Garrity’s 11 testimony and conclusions, including her revi ew of Sprunk’s deposition. The result 12 would therefore have been the same. “On appeal, error will not be corrected if it will 13 not change the result.” In re Estate of Heeter, 113 N.M. 691, 695, 831 P.2d 990, 994 14 (Ct. App. 1992). Further, those findings were not necessary to the verdict and we 15 have previously held “erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the 16 judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal.” Downs v. Garay , 106 N.M. 321, 17 323, 742 P.2d 533, 535 (Ct. App. 1987). 1819 C. The District Court Did Not A buse its Discretion by Refusing to 1 Re-open Witness Testimony or Denying Defendant’s Motion 2 for a New Trial 3 The bench trial was held in 2007. Plaintiff presented three witnesses: former 4 Clerk Georgia Gomez, Plaintiff, and Garrity. Plaintiff rested and Defendant testified. 5 Directly after Defendant tes tified, the district court as ked whether Defendant had any 6 other witnesses. Defendant ’s counsel replied he did not, but thereafter Defendant 7 reminded counsel he wanted to call Plaintiff on direct. Defense counsel then 8 attempted to correct his error, but Plai ntiff objected, claiming the other side had 9 already closed their case. The district court agreed, noting Defendant had ample time 10 to cross-examine Plaintiff, and directed th e parties to proceed to closing arguments. 11 Defendant subsequently brought a motion to re-open testimony, but that motion was 12 denied. 13 Defendant argues the district court’s d ecision and subsequent refusal were an 14 abuse of discretion, as cross-examination of a witness is limited to the subject matter 15 of the direct examination and Plaintiff tes tified before Plaintiff’s expert. Under the 16 specific circumstances of this case, we hol d the district court’s actions were not an 17 abuse of discretion because Defendant had ample opportunity to examine Plaintiff and 18 Defendant has failed to show any prejudice. 1920 As Defendant states, Rule 11-611(B) NMRA limits cross-examination to the 1 “subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the 2 witness.” Moreover, Defendant also co rrectly points out that Rule 1-040(C)(3) 3 NMRA permits the court to allow parties to introduce additional evidence after the 4 regular close of trial, and Rule 1-059(A) NMRA gives the court discretion to re-open 5 the judgment, take additional testimony, or amend its findings. 6 We begin by noting the latter two rules do not require the court to do anything. 7 Instead, they simply permit the court to correct possible problems at its discretion. 8 Moreover, while we may agree it might have been preferable for the district court to 9 permit additional testimony, there is every indication Defendant had ample 10 opportunity to examine Plaintiff during the lengthy cross-examination. It appears 11 Plaintiff’s counsel did not try to limit Defendant’s cross-examination and that 12 Defendant’s cross-examination was lengthy. 13 Defendant has also faile d to demonstrate he has suffered any prejudice as a 14 result of the district court’s decision. De fendant has not suggested the court’s decision 15 resulted in a denial of his examining Plai ntiff on any substantive topic, nor has he 16 provided this Court with any specific exampl es of relevant ques tions he would have 17 asked but for the district court’s denial of his request to re-open testimony. We 18 reiterate we do not consid er errors that would notchange the result. In re Estate of 1921 Heeter , 113 N.M. at 695, 831 P.2d at 994. Given the particular facts in this case, we 1 affirm the district court’s decision. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 We hold substantial evidence supports both the district court verdict and 4 damage award and that the district court did not abuse its discretion with regard to 5 either evidentiary issue. We therefore affirm the district court. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

8 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 12

13 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 14