The Honorable John G. Koeltl, of the United States Distr ict Court for the Southern * Di s tr ict of New Yor k, s it ti ng b y de s ign ati on . The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the officia l caption of this action to conform ** to th e cap ti onlis te d ab ov e. 1 09- 2860- cv Pu gh

- Perr y v. N ew Y or k C i t y H um an R es our ces A dm i ni s t r at i on UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

### S UM M ARY ORD ER Rul in gs by s um mar

y or der do no t h ave p r eced ent

ial ef fe ct . Cit ati onto s um mar

y or der s filed on or after J anuary 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Fede ral Rule of Appella te Procedure 32. 1 an d thi s cou r t’ s Lo cal Rule 3 2.1 .1. Whencit in g a s um mar

y or der ina do cum ent

filedwith thi s court, a party must cite either the Federal A ppendix or an el ectronic data base (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any

party not r epr es ent ed b y co un s el. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he ld at the Daniel Pa trick Moynihan United Sta tes Courthous e, 500 Pea rl Street, in the City of New Y ork, on the 30 day of Novembe r, two thous and and te n.

th P R E S E N T : J OHN M. W

AL KER , J R ., J OS É A. C AB R ANES ,

Circuit Jud ges , J OHN G. K O ELTL ,

District Judge. *

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Pl aint iff -A ppella nt ,
-v .- No . 09 -2 860 -c v N E W Y O RK C I T Y H UMA N R E SO U RC E S A DMI NI S R T A T I ON ,

Defenda nt-App ellee

. **

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F OR P LAIN TIF F
- AP P ELLAN T: R OB I N G. P UG H -P ERRY , pro se , Jers ey C ity, NJ. F OR D EF EN DAN T- AP P ELLEE : S CO TT S HO RR , Senior Counsel, A ppeals Division (M ich ael A . Car do zo, Corpo r ati onCou ns el, o n th e brief ), T he Ci ty

of New Yor k L aw D epar tm ent , N ew Yor k, N Y. Appea l from a June 2, 2009 judgment of the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Ea stern Di s tr ict of New Yor k ( San dr a J . F eue r s te in , Judge ).
UPON DUE CONSIDERAT ION, IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, A DJUDGED, AND DECREED th at t

he j ud gm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t b e MO DIF IED , an d as mo di fi ed i s AF F IRME D

. Pl ain ti ff -A pp ell ant

Rob inG. Pugh- Pe r ry, p r oce edi ng pro se , brought this action a gainst the New Y ork City Human R esources Administr ation, al leging that she was discriminated and r et ali ate d ag ain s t i n v

io lat io n o f Tit le VI I of th e Civ il Right s Act

of 196 4, 4 2 U. S.C. § 20 00e , et seq
. The District Court dismis sed the complaint for failure to st ate a clai m upon which relie f can be gr ant ed b ecau s e it

is ti me- bar r ed p ur s uan t t o 4 2 U. S.C. § 20 00e -5 (f )( 1) . P ugh -P er ry f

ile d a t im ely appea l. On appea l, Pugh-Perr y argues that the District Court err ed in dec lining to apply the do ct r in e of equ it abl e t olling an d i n d eny

in g he r leav e t o am endher

com pl ain t. Sh e als o ar

gue s th at th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e r r ed i n dis mi s s in g he r clai ms un der

th e New Yor k Cit

y Hu manRigh ts La

w, N. Y.C. Admin . Co de § 8- 101 et seq . We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts andpr oce du r al his to ry of

th e cas e. Pug h-Per ry ’s Fe der al Cl aim
We r evi ew de novo a Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s di s mi s s al f

or fa ilu r e t o s tat e a cl aim , as s um in g all well -p lead ed, no nco ncl us or y f actual all egat io ns inth e co mp lai nt

to be tr ue, se e, e.

g. , Chambe rs

v. T ime Wa rner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 15 2 (2d Cir. 2002). W e read pro se com pl ain ts with “s pec ial

s ol ici tu de” andin te r pr et

th em t o r ais e the “ s tr on ges t ar gum ent s th at they

s ugg es t. ” Tries

tma n v. Fed. Bureau of Pr is o ns , 470 F.3d 471, 47 4-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation ma rks and citations omitted).
Hav in g co nd uct ed a de novo review, w e conc lude, for subs tantially the reasons s tated by the Di s tr ict Cou r t, Pug

h-Per ry v. N .Y. C. H uman Re s. Admi n. , No. 07-CV-4050 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009), th at P ugh -P er ry has no t d emo ns tr ate d the t ype of extr aor di nar

y cir cum s tan ces th at w ouldmer it th e app lic ati onof

equ it abl e t olling inthis cas e. See Bo os v . Ru nyon , 20 1 F .3d178 , 18 5 ( 2dCir . 20 00) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to demonstr ate that equi table tolling should be applied, and noting that vague or conclusory ass ertions are “insuf ficient to justify any further inquir y into tolling”). Just as the Supreme C ourt obs erved in BaldwinCnty W elcome Ctr. v. Bro wn :3 This is not a case in whic h a cla imant has receive d inadequa te notice; or whe r e a m ot

io n f or app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el i s pen di ng a ndequ it y wo ul d justify tolling the statutor

y period until the motion is acted upon; or where the c ourt has led the plaintiff to believe tha t she had done ever ythi ng r equ

ir ed o f h er . N or

is this a cas e wh er e af

fi r mat ive misconduct on the part of a defendant lulle d the plaintiff into inaction. The simple fact is that [P ugh-Perr y] wa s told [s everal] times wha t she mu s t d o t o p r es er

ve h er clai m, ands he didno t d o i t. On e wh o f ail s to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lac k of dilig enc e. 466 U.S. 14 7, 151 (1984) (internal c itations omitted). We therefore hold that the Distr ict Court correctly dismiss ed her Title VII claim as time-barred.
We r evi ew the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s denial

of leav e t o am endfo r

“ab us e of di s cr et io n. ” Mc Cart hy v. Du n & B rad

st re et Co rp. , 48 2 F .3d184 , 20 0 ( 2dCir . 20 07) . “Adi s tr

ict cou r t h as abu s ed its dis cretion if it [has] based its ruling on an erroneous view of the lawor on a clea rly erroneous assess ment of the evidenc e, or rendered a dec ision that cannot be loc ated wi thin the range of per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 13 2 (2d Cir. 2008) (cita tion, alterations, and qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) . “Altho ughRul e 15 (a) of th e F ede r al Rules of

Civil P r oce du r e pr ov

id es that leav e to amend ‘shall be freely gi ven whe n justice so requires ,’ it is within the sound discr etion of th e di s tr ict cou r t t o gr ant

or deny lea ve t o am end .” Mc

Cart hy , 48 2 F .3dat 2 00.
T he D is tr ict Cou r t d eni ed l eave to ame ndbec aus e it fo un d that

ame nd men t w ouldhav e bee n f ut ile

. Pugh-Perry , No. 07-CV-4050 , at *4. W e ag ree. Whi le Pugh-Perry’s appell ate briefs contain no indic ation of the manner in whic h she might amend the compla int, to the extent, as the Di s tr ict Cou r t s ugg es ts , Pugh-Perry , No. 07-CV-4050 , at *3, tha t Pugh-P erry seeks to amend the complaint to add a dditional a llega tions of “retalia tory harass ment,” those alleg ations would not cu re the de fe ctin the ori gi na l c om pl a in t—t ha t i s, t ha t th e c om pl a in t w a s ti me -ba rre d. Bec a use “[ i] t i s well -e s tab lis hedth at o ne g oo d r eas onto deny lea ve t o am endis

. . . whe n the ad di ti on al in fo r mat io n d oes no t c ur e the c om pl ain t, ” Mo rt ime r O ff Sho re Sv s. , Lt d. v . F ede ral Repu bli c o f Ge rman y , 615 F.3d 97, 114 (2d C ir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted), we ca nnot con clu de that

th e de cis io n t o d eny

her leav e t o am endwas ou ts id e the r ang e of permi s s ib le dec is io ns availab le t o the D is tr ict Cou r t. Se e Po rat

v. Lin co ln T

o we rs Cmty . A ss ’n , 46 4 F .3d274 , 27 6 (2 d Ci r . 20 06)

. Pug h-Per ry ’s Pe nde nt Stat

e Law Clai ms On appea l, Pugh-Perr

y also cla ims that the Dis trict Court err ed in dismiss ing with prejudice he r pendent clai m under the New York C ity administrative code . Howeve r, neither the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Rec ommendation (“R &R”) nor the District Court’s order adopting4

the R &R in it s en ti re ty

a dd re ssed a ny

a spe ctof P ugh-P er ry ’s c om pl a in t ot he r th a n th e tim el in ess of her Tit le VI I clai m an d h er

argum ent r egar di ng e quit abl e t olling as di s cus s ed ab ov e. Acco r di ngl

y, b ecau s e it

is well s et tl ed that

“[ n] eed les s dec is io ns of

s tat e law s ho ul d b e avo id ed both as a matter of comity and to promote justice betwee n the parties, by procuring for them a s ur er -f oo te d r eadi ng o f app lic abl e law ,” Uni te d M ine Wo rk er s v . Gi bbs , 383 U.S. 7 15, 726 (1966), Pugh-Perr y’s putative cla im under the New Y ork City admini str ative c ode—whic h would be governed by a different s tatute of limitation—should have bee n dismis sed without prejudice on th e gr ou ndth at the D is tr

ict Cou r t d ecli nedto exer cis e s up pl eme nt al j ur is di ct io n o ver it . We therefore direct that, to the extent Pugh-Perr y asserted a cla im under the New Y ork City adm inis tr ati

ve co de— a qu es ti ononwhi ch w e in ti mat e no view—the j ud gm ent s ho ul d b e mo di fi ed to clarify that the dismiss al of any such asser ted cla im is based on a lac k of juris diction. Such a dismis sal does not for eclose Pugh-Perry’s pur suit of such a cla im in the appropriate forum.
CONCLUSI ON
We ha ve considered ea ch of Pugh-Perr y’s arguments on appeal a nd find them to be witho ut mer it . F or th e r eas on s s tat ed ab ov e, we MO DIF Y the judgment of the Distr ict Court, a nd a s mo di fie d th e j ud gm en t of the Di stri ctC ou rt i s AF F IRME D

.

FO R T HE CO URT Ca therine O’Haga n Wolfe, C lerk