1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Andrew Paul Mize, et al. 

Defendants. 

No. CR-16-00219-TUC-JGZ (DTF)

ORDER 

In an October 12, 2017 Report (“R&R”) (Doc. 226), Magistrate Judge Thomas 

Ferraro recommended denying: (1) Defendant Slayden’s Motion for Reconsideration and 

Rehearing on Motion to Suppress (Doc. 133); (2) Slayden’s Amended Motion to 

Suppress (Doc. 148); and (3) Defendant Mize’s Motion to Suppress Illegal Checkpoint 

Search (Doc. 136). The Defendants filed timely Objections to the R&R (Docs. 230 & 

Doc. 232),1

 and the Government filed a response to the Objections. (Doc. 234.) A 

technical amendment was made to the R&R on December 22, 2017 to correct the caption. 

(Doc. 239.) Upon independent review of the record, the Court will adopt the Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 239). 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear error the unobjected-to 

 

1

 Defendant also filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his Objection. (Doc. 238.) 
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 

734, 739 (7th Cir.1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 

1998). 

 Credibility findings of a magistrate judge may be adopted without conducting 

further evidentiary review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, if a district court rejects the 

credibility findings of the magistrate judge, a de novo hearing is required. United States v. 

Ridgway, 300 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

 The parties do not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings—only the 

legal significance of those findings.2

 Accordingly, the Court will adopt the findings as 

set forth in the Factual Background section of the R&R. (Doc. 239.) 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Defendant Slayden argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by: (a) declining to 

evaluate whether the border patrol checkpoint was constitutional; (b) finding that 

Defendants’ detention at the checkpoint was not an arrest without probable cause; (c) 

concluding Defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona; (d) determining Agent Smith and Ranger Rinck’s erroneous October 

5, 2016 testimony was reasonably mistaken rather than recklessly false; (5) concluding 

the canine Anouk alerted to Defendants’ vehicle, providing probable cause to search the 

vehicle; and (6) failing to address his claim that the warrantless search of the vehicle was 

unconstitutional. (Doc. 230, p. 1-2.) 

 Defendant Mize raises two objections: (1) the Magistrate Judge failed to address 

the border checkpoint’s constitutionality by analyzing its primary purpose, and (2) if the 

constitutionality of the border patrol checkpoint is not at issue, the Magistrate Judge 

 

2

 Defendant Slayden argues that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly found that the canine Anouk “alerted” to the Defendants’ vehicle. (Doc. 230, p. 7.) Because, as discussed in section E, a canine’s alert, or final indication, is not necessary for the establishment of probable cause, the Court does not consider this factual challenge. 

The Magistrate Judge’s credibility finding with respect to Agent Smith is discussed in Section D, nt. 4. 
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

incorrectly applied border-crossing law to find that Defendants were not arrested, but 

were merely detained, at the border checkpoint. (Doc. 232.) 

 A. The Magistrate Judge did not err in failing to evaluate the constitutionality 

of the checkpoint. 

 Defendants Slayden and Mize argue that stop of their vehicle was illegal because 

it occurred at a border patrol checkpoint that operates as a general crimes checkpoint. 

Defendants’ argument misses the mark. 

 General crimes checkpoints are unlawful. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

U.S. 543, 556-64 (1976). Unlike immigration checkpoints, general crimes checkpoints 

cannot be used to stop vehicles and develop reasonable suspicion or probable cause for 

detention or arrest. Id.; cf. United States v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 

2016) (immigration checkpoints provide an exception to the general rule that a search or 

seizure is unreasonable unless it rests on individualized suspicion; immigration control is 

a valid purpose for stopping cars and posing questions without individualized suspicion.) 

The checkpoint’s legality is not relevant here because the authority of the checkpoint was 

not used as a basis for forming reasonable suspicion. 

 Reasonable suspicion exists when the totality of the circumstances support a 

“particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Here reasonable suspicion existed that Defendants 

were transporting marijuana in their vehicle before the Defendants arrived at the 

checkpoint. As set forth in the R&R, Border Patrol Agent Hughes observed eight 

individuals in camouflage cross through a hole in the International Boundary Fence 

carrying large packages consistent with marijuana bundles; the individuals entered an RV 

park located adjacent to the border. (Doc. 239, p. 2.) He observed the individuals cross 

back into Mexico, without the bundles (Doc. 111, 34:1-12), and saw a white utility truck 

leaving the RV park. (Doc. 239, p. 2.) Agent Hughes radioed the information to Ranger 

Rinck, who followed the vehicle toward the checkpoint. Ranger Rinck made additional 

observations about the vehicle that supported an objective, particularized belief that the 
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

truck was transporting marijuana. Rinck observed that the truck’s bed appeared old and 

its reflector marks appeared new; the telephone number on the truck’s exterior was not 

hyphenated and did not reach Rural Electric, the business name displayed on the truck; 

and the license plate was not registered to Rural Electric. (Doc. 239, pp. 2-3.) 

 Defendants do not challenge the finding that reasonable suspicion existed prior to 

the checkpoint. Rather, they argue that law enforcement officers improperly use the 

checkpoint as a matter of “convenience” to stop vehicles when the agency develops 

reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. While it may be true that the 

agents use the checkpoint as a convenience, or, from the agents’ perspective, as a safe 

and controlled environment in which to initiate a vehicle stop, the use of the checkpoint 

does not merit ignoring the fact that reasonable suspicion supported the detention of 

Defendants’ vehicle. The reasonable suspicion did not become inert as the vehicle 

traversed the checkpoint regardless of the checkpoint’s primary purpose.3

B. The Magistrate Judge did not err in finding that Defendants’ were detained, 

not arrested, at secondary inspection. 

 Defendant Slayden objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that 

Defendants were not under arrest until the marijuana was found. Defendant Slayden 

asserts that their stop and detention was not a “temporary detention occasioned by border 

crossing formalities” because the agents retained the Defendants’ drivers licenses, Ranger 

Rinck pulled in behind Defendants’ vehicle and provided security to make sure the 

Defendants could not leave, and Defendants were told they were detained and not free to 

leave. (Doc. 230.) The Court finds no error. Slayden and Mize were not arrested until 

after marijuana was discovered in their truck. 

 An arrest occurs “if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude 

 3

 Defendant Mize argues that the Court must assess the validity of the checkpoint 

because the Magistrate Judge relied on border stop cases in determining whether 

Defendants were placed under arrest. The Court disagrees. The Court analyzes the 

Defendants’ claims that they were arrested, not detained, applying non-border law. See

section B. 

 
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that he was not free to leave after brief questioning.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 

573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009). The “reasonable person” test presupposes an innocent 

person. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991). An investigative stop is not 

transformed into an arrest merely because a defendant is told he is not free to leave, or 

merely because his freedom of movement is restricted. See United States v. Patterson, 

648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 

1985) (“the fact that a person may reasonably believe he is no longer free to leave 

indicates only that a consensual encounter has evolved into a seizure implicating [F]ourth 

[A]mendment values and not that an ‘arrest’ has occurred.”) 

 A reasonable innocent person in the Defendants’ circumstances would not 

conclude he was under arrest. Defendants were not summoned away from their daily 

routines. They voluntarily entered a fixed border patrol checkpoint on State Route 85, 

twenty miles north of the border. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559 (“The regularized 

manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to 

law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public 

interest.”). At primary, agents asked two to three minutes of routine screening questions 

to identify where Defendants were coming from and what their business was near the 

border. (Doc. 111, pp. 121-22.) Defendant Mize, the driver, did not respond, but 

Defendant Slayden, the passenger, stated that they were electricians and had a job at the 

Gringo Pass RV Park. (Doc. 239, p. 3.) Defendants, however, could not produce a work 

order, invoice, or contact information for the person ordering the work, only a first name 

of the alleged customer. . (Doc. 239, p. 3.) 

 Based on Defendants’ responses and the information previously overheard, the 

Defendants were directed to secondary inspection. As Defendants drove the vehicle to 

the secondary inspection area, Agent Smith noticed fresh paint on the tool box and a large 

compartment in the middle of the truck’s cargo area that appeared inaccessible and could 

hold contraband. He also noticed that the truck was missing a Registrar of Contractors 

license number, which Agent Smith typically sees on contractors’ vehicles. (Doc. 239, p. 
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3-4.) 

 The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that probable cause to search the 

vehicle existed at this time. See Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d at 1003-04 (probable cause to 

search exists if there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place based on a totality of the circumstances); United States v. 

Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (probable cause determinations may be based 

in part on reasonable inferences). However, Defendants were not confronted with 

evidence of guilt. Rather, at secondary inspection, Defendants were permitted to remain 

near the truck where Defendant Slayden recorded the encounter on his cell phone without 

interference. (Doc. 239, p. 4.) Defendants were not handcuffed or physically restrained 

at any point. (Doc. 239, pp. 3-5.) It is undisputed that, at secondary, Border Patrol 

agents told Defendants they were not free to leave, retained Defendants’ drivers’ licenses 

and parked Ranger Rinck’s vehicle behind Defendants’ truck for security. However, in 

light of the short duration and circumstances of the detention, the Court concludes that a 

reasonable innocent individual would believe he was free to leave once the checkpoint 

formalities were concluded. 

C. No Miranda violation occurred. 

Defendants argue that their detention at the checkpoint constituted a custodial 

interrogation and that any statements made prior to Miranda warnings being given are 

inadmissible. (Doc. 230, p. 5.) 

 Miranda warnings are required during questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 

of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346, 443 (1966). An 

officer's obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, “only where there 

has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon 

v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 

U.S. 292, 296 (1990). In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must 

examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but “the ultimate inquiry 
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of 

the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 

(1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 

 In determining whether detention rises to the level of “custody” within the 

meaning of Miranda, courts must examine the “objective circumstances of the 

interrogation.” United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)). One is in custody if a reasonable 

person would believe that he or she was not free to leave. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 

969, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2002). The following factors are relevant to a finding of custody: 

“(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is 

confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) 

the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the 

individual.” Id. at 974 (citations omitted). “Although the existence or non-existence of 

probable cause might be one factor to consider in determining someone’s custodial status 

in the twilight zone between detention and custody, what ultimately matters to the 

determination of whether Miranda is triggered is custody.” Butler, 249 F.3d at 1099. 

 The objective circumstances do not support Defendants’ argument that they were 

in custody for the purposes of Miranda upon referral to secondary. The circumstances of 

their detention as set forth in in Section B above would not lead a reasonable person to 

believe that he was in custody until the officers found marijuana in the vehicle and 

formally arrested Defendants. The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that a motorist’s 

voluntary entry into a permanent immigration checkpoint is the equivalent of being 

summoned to a police station for questioning. 

 In addition, Defendants have not shown that the agents’ routine border checkpoint 

questions regarding Defendants’ route and purpose for travel rose to the level of 

interrogation. See United States v. Manasen, 909 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(“Routine questioning by customs officials is normally not custodial interrogation that 

triggers Miranda.”) Thus, because Defendants were neither in custody nor interrogated, 
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Miranda warnings were not required. 

D. Law enforcement officials’ testimony at the suppression hearing was not 

recklessly false. 

 Defendant Slayden asserts that law enforcement officials intentionally gave false 

testimony at the suppression hearing to support a finding that it was unusual for a utility 

truck like Defendants’ truck to be leaving the RV park. (Doc. 230, p. 6.) Slayden argues 

that this testimony should be excluded from the Court’s probable cause assessment. (Doc. 

230, p. 6.) The Court disagrees. 

 Erroneous statements made “knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth,” 

are set aside in the determination of probable cause. United States v. Senchenko, 133 

F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998). A finding of recklessness requires the testifying 

individual to harbor a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity.” Id. 

 1. Agent Smith’s Testimony 

 At the first suppression hearing Agent Smith testified that he was familiar with 

the maintenance person at the RV park; the worker was an American citizen who lives in 

Ajo and drives through the Border Patrol checkpoint every day; the worker carries tools 

for general maintenance in his small pickup truck; and Agent Smith had seen that 

individual at the RV park before. (Doc. 111, pp. 133-135.) At the second evidentiary 

hearing, it was established that Agent Smith was incorrect in his prior testimony. 

Defendant Slayden called Ramon Garcia, who performed landscaping maintenance at the 

RV park during the time period in question. (Doc. 192, p. 9.) Mr. Garcia testified that he 

is not a U.S. citizen and does not live in Ajo or drive through the checkpoint every day. 

(Doc. 192, pp. 12, 14.) He also testified that many different contractors provide services 

at the park, including the phone and electric companies based in Ajo, as well as a man 

from Apache Junction who did electrical work and maintained the well and the electric 

pump. (Doc. 192, pp. 15-16.) The government re-called Agent Smith, who testified that 

he had subsequently learned that the individual he had thought was the maintenance 

worker at the RV park is actually Cesar Aguirre, an employee of CSC Electric who 
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

performs maintenance at the Lukeville Port of Entry. (Doc. 192, p. 59.) Smith learned 

that Aguirre maintains the employee housing at the Port of Entry, which abuts the RV 

park, and is located 500 to 1,000 feet from the entrance to the park. Aguirre was also 

called as a witness. He testified that he is a U.S. citizen who, during the time period in 

question, drove through the checkpoint every day on his way home to Ajo. 

 Searches and seizures based on reasonable mistakes of fact are nonetheless 

constitutional. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014). The Court finds no 

error in the Magistrate Judge’s determination that, in light of all of the evidence, Agent 

Smith’s testimony was not made with a reckless disregard for the truth, but rather 

reflected reasonable mistakes of fact. (Doc. 239, p. 8.)4

 Agent Smith’s mistaken belief 

that Mr. Aguirre worked at the RV park is not unreasonable. Agent Smith saw Mr. 

Aguirre at the RV Park. Agent Smith observed Mr. Aguirre daily passing through the 

checkpoint wearing a uniform. Agent Smith was unaware of Mr. Garcia, who did not 

often pass through the checkpoint. The Magistrate Judge observed Agent Smith testify at 

both hearings and heard Agent Smith’s explanation for his incorrect testimony at the first 

hearing, as well as facts supporting Agent Smith’s initial mistaken conclusion that Mr. 

Aguirre was the RV Park’s maintenance worker. This explanation did not suggest that 

Agent Smith harbored a high degree of awareness that his testimony was false. The Court 

sees no basis for setting aside the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Agent Smith 

credibly established that he made reasonable mistakes of fact at the first evidentiary 

hearing. 

 2. Ranger Rinck’s Testimony 

 Ranger Rinck testified at the first hearing that a number of things about the 

Defendants’ truck appeared suspicious and unprofessional to him, including that, 

 

4

 It appears that Judge Ferraro’s conclusion was based to some degree on his evaluation of the credibility of the law enforcement witness. (Doc. 239, p. 9.) To the extent that the Magistrate Judge made credibility determinations, the Court adopts those findings. 
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

although the truck had a Rural Electric logo on the back of the truck,5 the truck’s decals 

were uneven and were stickers rather than painted on; the web address did not begin with 

a “www”; the telephone number on the side of the truck was not hyphenated; the vehicle 

was registered to an individual rather than to a company; and there was no Registrar of 

Contractors (“ROC”) number on the side of the vehicle. (Doc. 226.) 

 Defendant Slayden objects to Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s finding that any errors in 

Ranger Rinck’s testimony were reasonable mistakes. Slayden argues that Ranger Rinck’s 

testimony that he found the truck to be suspicious was unfounded and recklessly false 

because: a Google search printout showed that one can reach the website for the 

legitimate Rural Electric company without typing “www” into a web search engine; a 

registration history of Defendants’ truck showed that the vehicle had previously been 

registered to individuals; Slayden never stated he was an employee of Rural Electric; and 

Slayden was not permitted under Arizona law to display an ROC number on his vehicle 

because he was not, in fact, a licensed contractor. (Doc. 230 at 6-7). 

 Defendant’s objection to Ranger Rinck’s testimony is specious. Ranger Rinck did 

not provide any inaccurate factual testimony. Defendants do not dispute Ranger Rinck’s 

description of the truck’s markings or that the truck was registered to an individual and 

not the Rural Electric Company. Ranger Rinck’s inferences from this factually correct 

information were reasonable. That fact that some allegedly legitimate businesses might 

also have unpolished markings or include full website addresses with their logo does not 

undermine the reasonableness of Ranger Rinck’s conclusions. Similarly, the fact that 

Slayden was not a licensed electrician and therefore could not include an ROC number on 

 

5

 Slayden asserts that Agent Smith originally testified in October that no maintenance personnel or vehicles worked at the RV Park, but conceded, during impeachment, at the second hearing, that he had in fact seen “utility trucks and pump repair trucks going through the checkpoint to do work at the RV park.” (Doc. 230, p. 6.) Slayden has confused the testimony of the witnesses. Ranger Rinck testified that he had 

never seen a contract utility truck entering and exiting the RV park. (Doc. 239, p. 9; Doc. 111, p. 71.) Agent Smith’s subsequent testimony that he regularly saw contractors and other maintenance workers come through the checkpoint, including utility trucks and pump repair trucks, was not impeachment of Ranger Rinck’s testimony. (Doc. 192, pp. 46-47.) 
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the truck’s markings is irrelevant to Ranger Rinck’s concern that the Rural Electric truck 

did not indicate an ROC number, as he had observed on other commercial vehicles. It 

was not unreasonable for Ranger Rinck to believe that an electric company would 

employ licensed technicians. 

 In sum, upon review of the record and the defendants’ objections, the Court finds 

no error in the Magistrate Judge’s determination that, in light of all of the evidence, 

Agent Smith’s and Ranger Rinck’s testimony was not recklessly false. 

E. Canine Anouk’s alert behavior established probable cause for the vehicle 

 search.

 Defendant Slayden objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that canine 

Anouk’s behavior constituted an “alert” establishing probable cause to search the vehicle. 

(Doc. 230, p. 7.) Defendant argues that because there was no indication by Anouk, no 

probable cause was established. (Doc. 230, p. 7.) The Court need not decide whether 

Anouk alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle because, as discussed in Section B 

above, probable cause to search the vehicle existed at the time the vehicle entered 

secondary inspection, prior to Anouk’s arrival at the checkpoint. 

 To the extent there is any argument that probable cause did not exist prior to that 

time, the Court agrees that Anouk’s behavior was sufficient for the trained agents to 

conclude that they had probable cause to search Defendants’ truck. Probable cause is 

established by an alert by a reliable canine. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013); 

United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Evidence from a trained 

and reliable handler about alert behavior he recognized in his dog can be the basis for 

probable cause.”) An alert is not required to establish probable cause. Thomas, 726 F.3d 

at 1098; see also Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013) (“the court should not 

prescribe . . . an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements” to determine if a dog alerted.). 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Anouk’s behavior coupled 

with his handler’s testimony that Anouk alerted is sufficient to find probable cause. 

Notably, both parties’ expert witnesses testified that Anouk exhibited demonstrable, if 

not bright-line, indicating behavior, as recorded by Defendant Slayden. 
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 F. Because agents had probable cause to search the vehicle, they did not need 

 a warrant.

 Finally, Defendant Slayden generally objects that neither a warrant nor exigent 

circumstances were present to justify the search of the Defendants’ vehicle. (Doc. 230, p. 

8.) 

 Because of the inherent mobility of automobiles, and the fact that there is a lesser 

expectation of privacy in vehicles than in houses, law enforcement may search a car 

without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or 

evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Probable cause to 

search a vehicle exists when there are “facts and circumstances within law enforcement 

officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information . . . 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that . . . 

contraband was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.” 

United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 

United States v. Patterson, 492 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1974).) Here, no warrant was 

required because, as discussed in Section B, probable cause existed to search the vehicle. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT the Report and 

Recommendation is ADOPTED (Doc. 239). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Slayden’s Motion to Suppress 

(Doc. 148) and Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing (Doc. 133) are DENIED. 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Mize’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

136) is DENIED. 

 In light of the Court’s denial of the foregoing motions, IT IS FURTHER 

ORDERED GRANTING the Government’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence At 

Trial Regarding Legality of Stop (Doc. 137.) 

 Dated this 25th day of January, 2018.