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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEVADA 

* * * 

ANDES INDUSTRIES, INC. and PCT 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CHENG SUN LAN; KUN-TE YANG; 

CHI-JEN (DENNIS) LAN; POLAR 

STAR MANAGEMENT LTD.; 

EZCONN CORPORATION; and 

EGTRAN CORPORATION. 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:14-cv-00400-APG-GWF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

[Dkt. ##18, 75] 

Plaintiffs Andes Industries and PCT International claim defendants eGtran and EZconn 

stole intellectual property Plaintiffs use in their broadband business. Defendants move to dismiss 

the claim based on, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. Taiwanese companies,1 they 

argue that they lack sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada to be haled into court here. I agree. 

 Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to tie defendants to Nevada. Although plaintiffs 

argue theories such as alter ego, agency, and conspiracy, all these theories depend on plaintiffs 

showing that at least one defendant had sufficient minimum contacts to trigger personal 

jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have not done that. Accordingly, I grant defendants’ motions to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs develop, manufacture, and sell products for broadband communications 

networks.3 They hold patents on their technology and sell their products throughout the United 

 

1

 Defendant EZconn also has a principal place of business in China. (See Dkt. #1 at ¶ 16.) 

2 This section summarizes the facts alleged in the complaint. I assume these allegations are true 

only for purposes of addressing the motions to dismiss. 

3

 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 1.) 

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States, “including to customers who use them in [Nevada].”4 They are incorporated in Nevada, 

but their principal place of business is in Arizona.5 

Defendants, neither of whom resides in the U.S. and both of whom principally operate in 

Taiwan, allegedly contracted with plaintiffs to manufacture some of plaintiffs’ broadband 

products.6

 According to plaintiffs, defendants used their access to plaintiffs’ product design “to 

wrongfully seize control over Plaintiffs’ valuable intellectual property”7 and secretly file patents.8 

Plaintiffs do not identify the patents they claim defendants filed. Nor do they identify the country 

in which these patents were filed. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD: MOTION TO DISMISS 

A complaint must provide “[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.”9

 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it 

demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.”10 “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.”11 Thus, to 

 

4

 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 10.) 

5

 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 9-10.) 

6

 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 24-26.) 

7

 (Dkt. #76 at 1.) 

8

 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 50.) 

9

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986)). 

11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.”12 

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply 

when considering a motion to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual 

allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of 

truth.13 Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.14 Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in 

the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.15 A claim is facially plausible when the 

complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the alleged misconduct.16 Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more 

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged–but not shown–that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.”17 When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from 

conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed.18 

III. DISCUSSION 

1. Personal Jurisdiction 

 “The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is permitted 

by a long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due 

 

12 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted). 

13 Id. at 1950. 

14 Id. at 1949. 

15 Id. at 1950. 

16 Id. at 1949. 

17 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

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process.”19 Because “Nevada’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

to the extent allowed by federal due process,”20 I need determine only whether the exercise of 

jurisdiction over defendants would be consistent with due process. 

A. Minimum Contacts: General Jurisdiction and Specific Jurisdiction 

Due process requires the defendant have at least “minimum contacts” with the forum state 

so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.”21 “[T]he defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that 

he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”22 “[I]t is the defendant, not the 

plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum State.”23 

 When analyzing whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state, 

courts distinguish between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is 

appropriate when the defendant’s forum activities are so “substantial, continuous and 

systematic”24 that the defendant can be deemed to be “essentially at home in the forum state.”25 

“This is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a 

defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in 

 

19 Pebble Beach v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2006). 

20 Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 11109, 1115 (D. Nev. 2013). 

21 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

22 World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 

23 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). 

24 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). 

25 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); see also

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct 746, 757-762 (2014). 

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the world.”26 In this case, none of the parties contends that I could exercise general jurisdiction 

over defendants. 

Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, exists if “the defendant purposely avails itself of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . [and] the controversy [is] 

sufficiently related to or arose out of [the defendant’s] contacts with the forum state.”27 “This 

purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction 

solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.”28 

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for determining specific jurisdiction: 

a. The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct its activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof, or perform 

some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws; 

b. the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and 

c. the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 

i.e., it must be reasonable.29

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. If they are satisfied, then the 

burden shifts to the defendant to show why the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 

unreasonable.30 

 

26 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 

27 Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). 

28 Id. 

29 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. 

30 Id. 

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(a) Purposeful Availment 

The Ninth Circuit treats purposeful availment in tort cases differently from purposeful 

availment in contract cases.31 In contract cases, the Ninth Circuit “typically inquires whether a 

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities or consummates a 

transaction in the forum.”32 In tort cases, on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit applies “an 

‘effects’ test that focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not 

the actions themselves occurred within the forum.”33 Here, Plaintiffs plead both contract claims 

and tort claims, so I will analyze each separately. 

i. Contract Claims (Causes of Action 4 and 9) 

The purposeful availment focus in contract cases is on activities such as “delivering goods 

or executing a contract” within the forum.34 It is not enough that a defendant has signed a 

contract with a party that resides in the forum.35 Courts instead look to whether the defendant has 

“performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of 

business within the forum state.”36 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has emphasized “the need for a highly realistic approach 

when it comes to personal jurisdiction in contract cases,” one “that recognizes that [a] ‘contract’ 

is ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future 

 

31 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitism, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quotations omitted). 

32 Id.

33 Id. at 1206 (quotations omitted). 

34 Id. 

35 Unocal, 248 F.3d at 923 (“[A]n individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot 

establish sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction.”). 

36 Id. at 924. 

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consequences which themselves are the real objects of the business transaction.”37 From this 

emphasis, courts have concluded that “the contemplated future consequences [of a contract] are 

often of particular significance, with future consequences essentially being where the contract 

will be performed.”38 The Ninth Circuit in particular has adopted three factors to consider: (1) 

prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, (2) the parties’ actual course of dealing, 

and (3) the terms of the contract.39

These factors, however, and the purposeful availment requirement in general, are “but a 

test for determining the more fundamental issue of whether ‘a defendant’s conduct and 

connection with the forum state are such at he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there.”40 The key question is one of due process: would it be fair, based on defendants’ contacts 

with Nevada, for them to expect to be have to defend themselves in a Nevada court? 

I find that it would not be fair. Defendant eGTran is incorporated in the British Virgin 

Islands and has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. 41 Defendant EZconn is 

incorporated in Taiwan and has its principal places of business in China and Taiwan.42 Plaintiffs 

have not pointed to any connection between either eGtran and Nevada or EZconn and Nevada. 

They have not alleged that either defendant makes or sells products in Nevada or that this 

 

37 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). 

38 IPS Shared Tech. Servs. v. Overwatch Sys., Ltd., No. C-14-1112, 2014 U.S. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

69878, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2014); see also Selhorst v. Alward Fisheries, LLC, No. C-11-

3266, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120810, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Oct 19, 2011). 

39 Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924. 

40 Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Haisten court also makes clear that “jurisdiction may be exercised with a lesser showing of 

minimum contact than would otherwise be required if considerations of reasonableness dictate.” 

Id. at 1397. 

41 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 16.) 

42 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 15.) 

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particular contract was negotiated in Nevada. Nor do they allege that the parties’ contract would 

be performed in Nevada. 

Similarly, the parties’ actual course of dealing did not involve Nevada. Plaintiffs do not 

allege that defendants made any visits to Nevada or that defendants performed any duties here. 

As for the precise terms of the contract, plaintiffs have not shown how it calls for any 

performance in Nevada. Instead, plaintiffs have included a few select quotations from the 

contract that lay out Plaintiff PTC’s general policy regarding the confidential nature of its 

proprietary information.43 But nothing in those quotations connects defendants to Nevada. 

In sum, plaintiffs fail to show that defendants purposefully availed themselves of the 

privilege of conducting activities within Nevada. They therefore cannot establish that specific 

jurisdiction exists. 

ii. Tort Claims (All other Causes of Action) 

The same is true with regard to plaintiffs’ tort claims. In tort cases, the focus of the 

personal jurisdiction analysis is on “evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum state 

that are directed at the forum, such as distribution in the forum state of goods originating 

elsewhere.”44 In particular, I apply the “effects test,” which requires plaintiffs to show the 

defendants (1) committed an intentional act (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing 

harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.45

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that defendants’ conduct satisfies these three parts. 

Citing College Source, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc.,46 they claim “misappropriation of a forum 

citizen’s proprietary information constitutes an intentional act aimed at a forum citizen.”47 But in 

 

43 (See Dkt. #76 at 2.) 

44 See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co. 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir). 

45 Id. (quotations omitted) 

46 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). 

47 (Dkt. #76 at 7.) 

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that case, the court was moved by the fact that the misappropriation occurred on the defendant’s 

website for the specific purpose of competing with the plaintiff in the forum.48 Plaintiffs have not 

alleged any facts to show that defendants tried to compete with them in Nevada.49 They simply 

claim that their propriety information was used by defendants to file patents. They do not identify 

any information about these patents—where they were filed, what they protected, to what purpose 

they are being used—to show that defendants committed an intentional act, expressly aimed at 

Nevada, that caused harm they knew was likely to be suffered in Nevada. 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg50 is similarly misplaced. That 

case involved a shareholder’s derivative action against non-resident officers and directors. But 

neither defendant eGtran nor defendant EZconn is an officer or director, and this case does not 

involve a derivative action. Consipio, a case Magistrate Judge Foley already cautioned against 

using,51 does not apply. 

I also find that alter ego theory, agency theory, and conspiracy theory do not apply. 

Plaintiffs try to use each of these to establish personal jurisdiction, claiming in one paper that 

these theories apply to EZconn via eGtran and in another that they apply to eGtran via EZconn.52 

But as defendants point out, this reasoning is circular.53 Because plaintiffs have not shown that 

either defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada, they cannot use one defendant to 

establish personal jurisdiction over the other. 

 

48 (Dkt. #76 at 7.) 

49 See Johnson v. Venzon, No. C12-895RSL, 2012 WL 3778877, at *4-*5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 

2012) (noting the “competing-in-the-forum” language from CollegeSource and holding that, 

“unlike in College Source . . . Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants are specifically 

attempting to compete with him in the Washington market”). 

50 282 P.3d 751, 755 (Nev. 2012). 

51 (See Dkt. #68 at 9 (denying jurisdictional discovery and expressing concern about applying 

Consipio in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1997))). 

52 (See Dkt. #41 at 11-15; Dkt. #76 at 11-18.)

53 (See Dkt. #78 at 5.) 

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2. Jurisdictional Discovery and Leave to Amend 

Plaintiffs request jurisdictional discovery. Magistrate Judge Foley has already denied two 

requests for jurisdictional discovery,54 and plaintiffs have not provided any additional facts to 

show what important issues would be resolved by granting it now.55 I therefore deny plaintiffs’ 

request. 

 I also deny plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. Plaintiffs have not identified any new 

facts they would allege if granted leave.56 Nor have they complied with Local Rule 15.1, which 

requires litigants to “attach the proposed amended pleading” to their motion for leave to amend.57 

Plaintiffs have not done that. 

 Finally, I deny defendants’ request for sanctions. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant eGtran’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #18) and 

Defendant EZconn’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. #75) are both GRANTED. 

DATED this 25th day of March, 2015. 

 

 ANDREW P. GORDON 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

 

54 (See Dkt. #68.) 

55 See, e.g., Lang v. Morris, 823 F. Supp. 2d 966, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Plaintiffs have also not 

provided any detail to the Court as to what discovery would establish. Therefore, the Court 

declines to permit jurisdictional discovery as it would appear to be futile in this case.”). 

56 See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). 

57 Id. 

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