Filed 6/20/16 P. v. Walker CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RODNEY DWYANE WALKER,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G052496

 (Super. Ct. No. 12NF3291)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.

Rodney Dwyane Walker, in pro. per.; and Mark D. Johnson, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
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INTRODUCTION

Defendant Rodney Dwyane Walker appeals from a judgment entered after a 

jury found him guilty of robbery, evading a police officer while driving recklessly, and 

possessing a firearm. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting we review the 

entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed 

counsel identified a potential issue to assist us in our independent review. We provided 

defendant 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf; he did so.

We have examined the entire record, appointed counsel’s Wende/Anders

brief, and defendant’s supplemental brief; we have found no reasonably arguable issue. 

(Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

FACTS

Around 10:30 to 10:45 p.m. on October 12, 2012, Maria Erickson, who was 

67 years old at the time of trial, drove to her friend’s house in Placentia, parked her car, 

and walked to the front door of the house. As she was about to open the door, which was 

ajar, she felt tugging at her purse. Initially thinking someone was playing a joke on her,

Erickson tightened her grip on her purse by hugging it, and said, “no, stop. Stop that.” 

She turned around, and felt someone push her; she fell on her back. She screamed for 

help. Erickson felt someone pull her by the legs “towards the walkway where [she] came 

from towards [her] car.” At some point, the strap on her purse broke and she did not see 

her purse again. 

Jeremy Chiong and James Chiong,

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the sons of Erickson’s friend, were 

inside the house and heard a crashing sound; they walked to the front door to investigate. 

Erickson was on the ground and, while pointing upward and behind her, said, “he robbed 

 

 

1

 We refer to Jeremy Chiong and James Chiong by their first names for the sake of 

clarity; we intend no disrespect.
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me.” The brothers saw a man, later identified as Walker, running away from the front 

door and across the front lawn. The brothers gave chase. 

As James chased Walker, he saw Walker “start[] to reach for something” in 

front of him, so James slowed down because his instinct told him that Walker was 

reaching for a gun or a knife and was going to turn around and use it. Walker turned 

around, said, “no, please no. No,” and threw contents of Erickson’s purse at James. 

Walker then ran to a car and got into the driver’s seat. After he saw that Walker was 

alone inside the car, James grabbed Walker’s shirt and tried to pull him out of the car. 

Walker, however, put the car into drive and sped away. 

Jeremy made a note of the license plate number and the description of 

Walker’s car. He ran back to the house where he found his sister already on the phone 

with the 911 operator. Jeremy took the phone and provided the car’s license plate 

number and description to the operator. 

Around 10:45 p.m., Officer Chris Anderson of the Placentia Police 

Department heard a broadcast regarding the robbery. He got onto the State Route 91 

freeway going westbound toward Long Beach because the license plate number that 

Jeremy had given to the 911 operator showed the car was registered “out of the City of 

Long Beach.” While traveling on the freeway, Anderson scanned the license plates of 

vehicles that he approached and noticed a car with a similar license plate number to the 

one given by Jeremy. Anderson started to follow the car and advised dispatch that he 

was following “a possible robbery suspect vehicle.” 

While Anderson was waiting for additional units to arrive, the car 

accelerated at a high rate of speed. Anderson activated his overhead emergency lights 

and siren, and pursued the car. During the police pursuit, the car reached a speed of over 

100 miles per hour, exited and reentered the freeway, ran red lights, and struck another 

vehicle while traveling about 70 miles per hour. After suffering a flat tire, the car 

slowed. The driver’s door opened and Walker started to run away from the police before 
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he was apprehended by a K-9 unit. A police officer found a semiautomatic handgun in 

Walker’s right front pants pocket with a live round bullet in its chamber and a fully 

loaded magazine. Erickson’s purse was found on the front passenger seat of the car. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Walker guilty of second degree robbery in violation of Penal 

Code sections 211 and 212.5, subdivision (c), evading a peace officer while driving 

recklessly in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, and possession of a firearm by a 

felon in violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). (All further statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.) The jury found that during the commission of the 

robbery offense, Walker was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, 

subdivision (a)(1). Walker admitted he had suffered 12 prior strike convictions within 

the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and two prior 

serious felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 

1192.7, subdivision (c). 

The trial court sentenced Walker to a 10-year prison term, by imposing 

mandatory five-year terms for Walker’s two prior serious felony convictions, pursuant to 

section 667, subdivision (a)(1), followed by a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years 

to life. Walker appealed. 

ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL ISSUES

In his supplemental brief, Walker argues that insufficient evidence 

supported the jury’s finding that he was armed with a firearm in the commission of the 

robbery, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). In the Wende/Anders

brief, Walker’s appointed appellate counsel raises the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the true finding on the firearm enhancement as a potential issue. 
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Section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) provides in part: “Except as provided in 

subdivisions (c) and (d), a person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a 

felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of 

imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for one year, unless the arming 

is an element of that offense.” In People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 999, the 

California Supreme Court stated: “As we have pointed out, for a defendant to be ‘armed’ 

for purposes of section 12022’s additional penalties, the defendant need only have a 

weapon available for use to further the commission of the underlying felony.” The 

Supreme Court further stated: “[A]rming under the sentence enhancement statutes does 

not require that a defendant utilize a firearm or even carry one on the body. A defendant 

is armed if the defendant has the specified weapon available for use, either offensively or 

defensively. [Citations.] . . . As a recent Court of Appeal decision observed, ‘a firearm 

that is available for use as a weapon creates the very real danger it will be used.’ 

[Citation.] Therefore, ‘[i]t is the availability—the ready access—of the weapon that 

constitutes arming.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 997.)

Section 211 provides: “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal 

property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against 

his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” The California Supreme Court has 

explained: “‘The taking element of robbery’ consists of both a caption and an 

asportation. [Citation.] Therefore, to determine the duration of a robbery, the focus must 

be on its final element, asportation. We emphasized that ‘[a]lthough, for purposes of 

establishing guilt, the asportation requirement is initially satisfied by evidence of slight 

movement [citation], asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time. The asportation 

continues thereafter as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary 

safety.’” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256.)

Substantial evidence supported the finding that Walker committed a 

robbery while armed with a firearm. Trial testimony showed that Anderson was able to 
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find Walker driving on the freeway minutes after he had taken Erickson’s purse and 

while Walker was still in the process of carrying it away. Walker never reached a 

temporary place of safety after he took Erickson’s purse and before he was apprehended 

by the police who found him in possession of a semiautomatic handgun in his pants 

pocket. Therefore, sufficient evidence showed that during the commission of the robbery 

offense, Walker had ready access to the firearm and thus was armed within the meaning 

of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).

Walker also argues the trial court erred by sentencing him to two five-year 

terms for the two prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)

which provides: “In compliance with subdivision (b) of Section 1385, any person 

convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in 

this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the 

elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the 

court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on 

charges brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each 

enhancement shall run consecutively.” (Italics added.) 

Walker admitted he committed two prior serious felonies within the 

meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c), and that each 

had been charged and tried separately. Specifically, he admitted the enhancement 

allegation in the information that “pursuant to Penal Code section 667[, 

subdivision ](a)(1) . . . , [he] was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 211, a 

serious felony listed in Penal Code section 1192.7, on charges brought and tried 

separately on or about August 01, 2000 in the Superior Court of the State of California, in 

and for the County of LOS ANGELES, case number: TA056323-01.” Walker also 

admitted a second enhancement allegation that he had a prior conviction for violating 

section 211, a serious felony within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 

1192.7, “on charges brought and tried separately on or about June 06, 2000 in the 
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Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of LOS ANGELES, case 

number: KA068544.” 

The trial court therefore did not err by imposing two five-year terms for the 

two prior serious felony convictions that Walker admitted, pursuant to section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1). 

Walker has not raised any other issues in his supplemental brief. We have 

reviewed the record in accordance with our obligations under Wende and Anders, and we 

find no arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 120, 

124.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

ARONSON, J.