The Honor able Thoma s Ludington, United States District J udg e for the E astern D istrict of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0739n.06 No. 08-6080 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. KATRI NA NEWSON, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges; LUDI NGTON , District J udg e. *

L UDI NGTON , District J udg e. De fenda nt K atrina Newson enter ed a g uilty plea to one c ount of fr aud in conne ction with identification documents, 18 U.S.C. § 1 0 2 8 (a )( 7 ), on June 16, 2008. Pursuant to a Rule 11 plea ag ree ment, the gover nment ag ree d to dismi ss two additional identity fra ud counts and thre e counts of f raudule nt use of a soc ial secur it y n umber, 42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (8). On Aug ust 29, 2008, the district c ourt sentenc ed Ne wson to thirty months in prison followed by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. On appeal , N e w s o nc o n te n d s th a t t h e s e n te n c in g c o u rt e r

r e d in c a lc u lati n g th e “ p e c u n ia

ry harm that wa s intended to result fr om the offen s e” p ursuant to the United States Sentenc ing Guidelines Manua l, 2B1.1, c mt. n.3(A)(ii), a nd imposed an “unr easona ble” se ntence within the-2-

meaningof United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). B eca use the sent en ci n g court did not develop a fac tual rec ord as to whether Newson intende d to cause more than $40,000 in loss, and the actua l loss amounted to less than $9,00 0 , Ne ws o n ’s sentenc e will be vac ated a nd the ca se will be

re m an d edt o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fo r an ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. Using the name “ Katrina Wurshen” and a s o ci al s ecur ity number be longingto Audra Wurshen, Newson c ompleted two sepa rate cre dit applications in an attempt to purcha se automobiles on Dec ember

17, 2007 and on January 17, 2 0 0 8, respe ctively . Her first attempt failed a fter a salesman at Gossett Motors became suspicious and conta cted the r eal Audra W urshen. The rec ord is unclear as to why

Newson did not complete t h e s ec ond purcha se. Ne wson appa rently left B ud Davis C adillac after submit ting a completed credit application and did not return. See Presentenc e Rep. ¶ 7. At var ious tim es duringDec ember 2007 and January

2008, Newson also used Wurshen’s information to acc ess exist ing cre d i t acc ounts or start new one s at sever al re tail stores, making

a dd iti on a l pu

rc ha se s to ta lin g mor e tha

n $ 8, 00 0. A g ra

nd jur y re tur ne d a six- c ount i nd ic tme nt a g a ins t the def endant on Febr

uary 26, 2008. Pursuant to the plea a g ree ment, the cour t dismi ssed all but one count of identity

fra ud. A p ro batio n of

fi c e r pr e pa

re d a pr e se nte nc e re po rt , w hic h c a lc ulate d th e tot a l in te nd e d lo ss at $44,600.03. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l § 2B1.1(b) (1) & cmt. n.3(A) (2007). The Sentencing G u id e li n e s c a ll e d f o r e n h an c e me n ts b a s e d o n th e g r e a te r o f th e “ a c tu a l lo s s ” o r the “intended loss” if the total loss exceede d $5,000. Id. I ntended loss means “pecunia ry harm that wa s intended to re sult from the offe nse” e ven if it “would have bee n impossibl e or unlikely to occur .” Id. at cmt. n.3(A) (ii). The prese ntence repor t’s total inc luded $10,900 for the f irst car , which wa s-3-

a 2004 L exus ES 330 valued at $24,450. The calc ulation w as arr ived at by subtracting$13,550, the value of a 2005 Mitsubishi Newson offe red as a t ra d e, from the total value of the L exus. The intended loss for the second car , a 2005 L exus ES 330, was c alculate d to be $25,000, its retail value. The fr audulent re tail purcha ses amounted to $8,700.03.
The sente ncing judge adopted the in te n d e d lo s s c a lc u la

ti o ns from the pre sentenc e re port, over the def endant’ s obje c ti o n s , a

n d a p p li e d a six -leve l enhanc ement in ac corda nce w ith § 2B1.1(b) (1)( D) of the Guide lines. Newson’ s total offense level wa s thirteen, base d on a base -leve l of seven, § 2B1.1( a)( 1), addingsix levels for the intended loss enhan ce m ent, § 2B1.1(b)(1) (D), a dding two levels for “unauthor ized . . . use of an y m ea ns of identification unlawfully to . . . obtain any

other means of ide ntification,” § 2B 1.1(b)( 10)(C)( i), and a two-leve l reduc tion for ac ce p t an ce of responsibility , § 3E1.1. Com b i n ed wi t h a cr iminal hist ory score of eig ht points, t he Guidelines

rec ommended a sentence of betwe en twenty -four and thirty

months. The sentenc ing judg e, af ter consideringthe 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factor s, sentence d Newson to thirty months in prison.
The fir st issue raised on a ppeal is whether the district c ourt err ed by including the value of the se c on d a

uto mob ile in i ts int e nd e d los s c a lc ulatio n. Ne ws on c on te nd s th a t su

bmi tti ngthe c re dit application without taking “fur ther steps in completing the purcha se” doe s not constitute sufficient evidence that she “subjec tively intended to inflict [the loss] on the victim.” See U nited States v. Moored , 38 F.3d 1419, 1427 ( 6th Cir. 1994).
The fa ctua l fi n d i n gs of the sente ncingcourt a re r eviewe d for c lear

err or. United States v. Garner , 940 F.2d 172, 1 7 4 (6 t h C ir. 1991). Application of those fac ts, however , “to a pa rticularW atkins em ploy ed a three part test: the defend ant m ust hav e intende d the loss; the defend ant m ust 1 hav e co m pl et ed th e lo ss , o r be en

a bo ut to co m

pl et e it but fo r in te rr

up ti on ; an d “i t m

us t hav e be en

p os si bl e for the defe ndan t to cause the loss.” 994 F.2d at 1196. How ev er, the th ird pro ng w as later superse ded by am endm ents to app lication note 3(A)(ii) to § 2B1 .1 of the Se ntencin g G uidelines

. See United States v. Younes , 1 94 F

. App ’x 3 02 , 3 16 ( 6th C ir

. 2 00 6)

. -4- g uideline provision is purely a lega l question and is revie wed de novo by this court.” Id. L os s calc ulations pursuant to § 2B1.1( b)(1) are fin d i n gs o f fa ct and will only be over turned if they

are clea rly err oneous. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G uth rie , 144 F.3d 1006, 1011 ( 6th Cir. 1998). The g overnme nt bear s the burden of proving intended loss by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e. Un ite d S

tates v . B lac k

we ll , 4 5 9 F. 3 d

7 3 9 , 7 7 2 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Davidson , 4 09 F .3 d 3 04 , 3 10 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d S tates v . R oth we ll , 387 F.3d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2004)). “ When an y fa ct o r important to the sentenc ing de termination is rea sonably in dispute, the parties sha ll be g iven an a dequate opportunity to present i n fo rm at i o n to the court re g ardingthat fac tor.” U.S. Sentenc ing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3. “ [I ]f there is any al leg ation of a f actua l inacc urac y

[i n the pre senten ce report] , the cour t must m ake a

written fa ctual findingor a d et erm i n at i o nt h at s u ch a f i n d i n g i s n o tn ec es s ar

y . I f a d i s t ri ct co u rt fa i l s t o m ak e afa ct u al fi n d i n g, this court must remand for rese ntencing .” United St ates v. Edge comb , 910 F.2d 1309, 1313 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Manni , 810 F.2d 80, 83 ( 6th Cir. 1987)). “[I ]nt ended loss [is] the l oss the defendant subjectively intended to inflict on the victim . . . .” Moored , 3 8 F .3 d at 14 27 . T o be inc lud e d in the int e nd e d lo ss c a lc ulatio n, the de fe nd ant a lso “ mus t have c ompleted or be en about t o complete but for interruption, all of the a cts nec essar y to bring about the loss.” United States v. W atkins , 994 F.2d 1192, 1196 ( 6th Cir. 1993). 1-5-

Her e, it is not clear f

rom the re cord that the defe ndant was “ about to complet e but for interruption” the pur chase of the sec ond automobile. Id. The defe ndant contends in her brie f that she “did c omplete a c redit application at t he ca r dea lership, but she subseque ntly abandone d her attempt at purcha sing the automobile when she failed to c omplete any further paper work or a ttempt to take possession of the c ar.” Def .’s Br. at 12. Perhaps more importantly , she also off ere d to prove at the sente ncing hear ing that she was offe red possession of t he vehic le by the dea lership’s staff

on the day she compl eted the c redit application, and ref used it. The trial c ourt reje cted he r off er of proof.

The Court: Well, the loss t hen bec omes the amount that y ou soug ht to obtain the cre dit for. And ther e mi gh t b e some circ umstances . . . whe re it wa s not sufficient to result in inclusion of it as a loss. [ But i]t’s the intended loss, it’s not what y ou actua lly rec eived. I

think it’s clea

rly supported in the re cord. The fac t that an ef fort fails or the pe rson b ec omes very nervous a

nd decide s not to pursue it further, whateve r happe ns, we don’t know. [De fend ant’s Counsel]: Ithink in thi s case the car was off ere d to her to take home, and she de clined that. The Court: Rig ht. [De fend ant’s Counsel]: Th os e are the fa c ts. The Court: I ’m not sure I have g ot that. [De fend ant’s Counsel]: I t is no t in the pr e se nte nc e re po rt , b ut I thi nk in t a lki ngto Ms. Ne ws om [sic ], and a c tua lly Ithi nk pe rh a ps it w ou ld b e he lpf

ul t o h e ar t

he fa c ts from Ms. New som [ sic] concer ning that transac tion. The Court: D o w e h av e a r e p o rt ? The Pr obation O ff

icer : No, Your H onor, that wa sn’t in the investigative file. Th e C o ur t: Not in the investigative file. I t is kind of hard to assess infor mation that’ s not in the inv e sti g a tiv e fi le , it is ve ry ha rd to as se ss that. I t app e ars in the c a se ba sed on the un dis pute d r e c or d a s e sta bli sh e d b y

the pr e se nte nc e re po rt

that th is i s pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d. Th a t w a s p art of the int e nd e d los s, and it s ho uld be re fl e c te d in the loss calculation. I f there ’s nothing e lse on that, let’s g o ahea d beca use I know we have g ot a fe w other thing s to acc omplish t oday

.Althou gh re m o v i n g the value of the sec ond vehicle f

rom the intended loss asse ssment 2 reduc es the loss enha

nceme nt by

two levels, it would only reduc e the defe ndant’s over all Guideline calc ulation by

one level beca

use the application of the e nhance ment for “ unauthorized . . . use of a ny me ans of ide nti fi c a tio n unla wf ull y to . . . ob ta in a

ny oth e r m e ans of

ide nti fi c a tio n” re c omm e nd s a minimum offe nse leve l of twelve. See U.S. SentencingGuidelines Manua l § 2B1.1(b) (10)( C)(i). -6- [De fend ant’s Counsel]: The c ourt has rule d, y ou know my position.
Tr. of Sente ncing Hr’gat 23–24.

I t was cle ar er ro r fo r t he district cour t to ignore the def

endant’ s offe r of pr oof. I f in fac t Newson w as off

ere d the vehicle , but refuse d it with the i n t en t i on of aba ndoning he r sche me, the

va lue of the ve hic le sh ou ld not have be e n inc lud e d in the int e nd e d loss c a lc ulatio n b e c a us e sh e did not “subjectively i n t en d ” t o ca u s e the loss. Moored , 3 8 F .3 d at 14 27 . N or wa s sh e “ a

bo ut t o complete but for

interruption, all

of t he acts nece ssary

to bring about the loss.” W atkins , 994 F.2d at 1196 (e mphasis added). I f t h e value of the sec ond automobile had not bee n included in the intended loss calc ulation, the enhanc em en t wo u l d h ave be en four levels instead of

six , and the

re c omm e nd e d s e nte nc e wo uld have be e n n o lo ng e r t

ha n tw e nty -s e ve n mo nth s. 2

I f the defe ndant acc epted the car , or some outside forc e beyond her c ontrol interrupted the tr ans a c tio n b e fo re it w a s c omp le te d, it w ou ld b e a pp ro pr iate to i nf

er th at sh e ha d s ub

je c tiv e ly intended to cause the loss. See M oored , 3 8 F .3 d at 14 27 ; cf. United States v. Cunningham , 191 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999) (table) (af firming economic loss c alculations in a fra udulent loan sche me base d in part on a fr aud that wa s discovere d and interr upted by a suspicious bank mana g er a fter a ll the steps had bee n completed to proc ess the loan, but be fore the loan proce eds wer e ac tually paid). I f,

o nth e o th e r

h an d , N e w s o ns im

p ly a b an d o n e d th e s c h e me b e f

o r e s h e c o mp le te d

th e f r a u d u le nt-7-

purcha se, the value of t he vehicle s hould not be included in the i ntended loss calc ulation. W atkins , 99 4 F .2 d at 11 96

. I t is imp os sib le to de te rm ine fr om t he fa c ts o n th e re c or d w hy the de fe nd ant d id not complete the pur ch as e o f t h e sec ond vehicle, le avingunresolved the issue of whe ther she “subjec tively

intended to inflict on the victim” a loss equal to the value of that vehicle. Moored , 38 F.3d at 1427.

Be cause the t ri al j udg e re jected the offe r of pr oof that Ne wson voluntarily abandone d the transac tion before it was completed, N ewson’s se ntence is vacated and the c ase is re manded to the distr i ct court for

a new sentenc ing he aring

. See E dgecom b , 9 10 F .2 d at 13 13 . U nd e r t he se circ umstances we need not c onsider Newson’ s second argument reg ardingthe re asonable ness of the sentenc e under Booke r .