alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                   Exhibit 10.43

March 7, 2003

Crescent Real Estate Equities and Vornado Realty Trust (the "Landlord")
acknowledge there will be a need to restructure the existing leases between
Landlord and AmeriCold Logistics LLC (the "Tenant"). As a first step towards a
larger lease restructure, the Landlord will extend the maturity of the current
rent deferral period from December 31, 2003 to December 31, 2004.

                  ACCEPTED BY LANDLORD - AMERICOLD REALTY
                  TRUST THROUGH ITS OWNER VORNADO CRESCENT
                  PORTLAND PARTNERSHIP:
                  CRESCENT REAL ESTATE EQUITIES
                  LIMITED PARTNERSHIP - PARTNER

                  By:  Crescent Real Estate Equities, Ltd., its
                       general partner

                  By:  /s/ Jerry R. Crenshaw
                       ---------------------
                       Name:  Jerry R. Crenshaw
                       Title: Executive Vice President,
                              Chief Financial Officer


                  VORNADO REALTY, L.P. - Partner

                  By:  Vornado Realty Trust, its general partner

                  By:  /s/ Joseph Macnow
                       -----------------
                       Name:  Joseph Macnow
                       Title: Chief Financial Officer


                  ACCEPTED BY TENANT - AMERICOLD LOGISTICS, LLC THROUGH ITS
                  OWNER VORNADO CRESCENT LOGISTICS OPERATING PARTNERSHIP:
                  CRESCENT OPERATING, INC. - PARTNER

                  By:  /s/ Jeff Stevens
                       -------------------

                  VORNADO OPERATING COMPANY - PARTNER

                  By:  /s/ Joseph Macnow
                       -----------------
                       Name:  Joseph Macnow
                       Title: Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                             160
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   16,442
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,620
<INVENTORY>                                      2,253
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,907
<PP&E>                                          81,462
<DEPRECIATION>                                  40,527
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 129,549
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,641
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           109
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,507
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   129,549
<SALES>                                         20,557
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,557
<CGS>                                           13,816
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   20,419
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 940
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (802)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (335)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (372)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     380
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         8
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .00


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 641 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 641

 To implement equal protection under the 14th article of amendment to 
 the Constitution for the right to life of each born and preborn human 
                person from the moment of fertilization.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 6, 1997

 Mr. Hunter (for himself, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Barcia, Mr. Barr of Georgia, 
Mr. Bartlett of Maryland, Mr. Barton of Texas, Mr. Bunning, Mr. Burton 
   of Indiana, Mr. Coburn, Mr. Crane, Mr. Dickey, Mrs. Emerson, Mr. 
    Forbes, Mr. Hansen, Mr. Hill, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Inglis of South 
 Carolina, Mr. Lewis of Kentucky, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Pappas, Mr. Petri, 
    Mr. Pitts, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Stearns, Mr. Taylor of 
 Mississippi, and Mr. Young of Alaska) introduced the following bill; 
          which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To implement equal protection under the 14th article of amendment to 
 the Constitution for the right to life of each born and preborn human 
                person from the moment of fertilization.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Right to Life Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. RIGHT TO LIFE.

    To implement equal protection for the right to life of each born 
and preborn human person from the moment of fertilization, and pursuant 
to the duty and authority of the Congress, including Congress' power 
under Article I, Section 8, to make necessary and proper laws, and 
Congress' power under section 5 of the 14th article of amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, the Congress hereby declares that 
the right to life guaranteed by the Constitution is vested in each 
human being at fertilization.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION OF ``STATE''.

    For the purposes of this Act, the term ``State'' used in the 14th 
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States and other 
applicable provisions of the Constitution includes the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each other territory or 
possession of the United States.
                                 <all>
```
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 2023

- 0 863

_____________________________
T OLAND J. B ONNER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Jennie Kinsey , Judge

. February 28, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , B ILBREY , and L ONG , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Toland J. Bonner, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 651

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act for the construction

of a hydroelectric project located in the State of Washington, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 6, 1997

Mr. WHITE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Commerce

A BILL

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act for

the construction of a hydroelectric project located in the

State of Washington, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period

5 specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16

6 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to Federal Energy

7 Regulatory Commission project numbered 8864, the Com8 mission shall, upon the request of the project licensee, in

9 accordance with the good faith, due diligence, and public
2

•HR 651 IH

1 interest requirements of that section and the Commis2 sion’s procedures under that section, extend the time pe3 riod during which the licensee is required to commence

4 construction of the project for not more than 3 consecutive

5 2-year periods.

6 (b) APPLICABILITY.—An extension under subsection

7 (a) shall take effect for a project upon the expiration of

8 the extension, issued by the Commission under section 13

9 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806), of the period

10 required for commencement of construction of the project.

11 (c) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the

12 license for the project referred to in subsection (a) has

13 expired prior to the date of enactment of this Act, the

14 Commission shall reinstate the license effective as of the

15 date of its expiration and extend the time required for

16 commencement of construction of the project as provided

17 in subsection (a) for not more than 3 consecutive 2-year

18 periods, the first of which shall commence on the date of

19 such expiration.

Æ
#### Geo. W. Upton *v.*Job. D. Redman, &c.

Pleading — Petition—Insufficiency on Bond.

A petition, which does not set out, or state in terms or substance the covenants of an official bond, held insufficient to constitute a cause of action on the bond.

Same — Cause of Action Stated.

A petition alleges that two executions, which are sufficiently described, were collected by R., who refused, on demand, to pay over the money, and alleges a joint liability of both defendants for money had received. Held to be good on general demurrer to its sufficiency.

APPEAL PROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT.

January 24, 1868.

*Read, for appellant.*

*Hays, for-appellee.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Hardin :

Testing the sufficiency of the petition in this case by the opinion of this court in the case of Hill for the use of Wintersmith against Barrett, &c., 14 B. Monroe 84, we incline to the opinion, that as it does not set out or state in terms or substance the covenants of the official bond of Redman, it fails to state facfs sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon the bond. But we are nevertheless of the opinion that the petition states facts which constitute a cause of action. It alleges that the two executions which are sufficiently described against Duckworth and in favor of the plaintiff, were collected by Job D. Redman, who refuses on demand to pay over the money, and alleges a joint liability of both defendants for the money so received to the use of the plaintiff. The general cause of demurrer jointly assigned by the defendants, simply raised the question whether or not the petition disclosed a cause of action, and as we are of the opinion that it did, it results that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Case 2:16-mj-01080-JFM Document 3 Filed 02/09/16 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:16-mj-01080-JFM Document 3 Filed 02/09/16 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:16-mj-01080-JFM Document 3 Filed 02/09/16 Page 3 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandon Williams Tsosie,

 Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

 Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-16-08003-PCT-PGR (JZB)

 ORDER

 

 

Having reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Boyle, filed on August 19, 2016, notwithstanding that no party has filed any

objection to the Report and Recommendation, the Court finds that the Magistrate

Judge correctly determined that the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, should be dismissed as time-barred because it was

filed over two years after the expiration of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations and the petitioner has made no legally sufficient showing that the

limitations period should be equitably tolled. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 14) is accepted and adopted by the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §

Case 3:16-cv-08003-PGR Document 15 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

- 2 -

2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody is denied and that

this action is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue

and that leave to appeal in forma pauperis is denied because the dismissal of the

petitioner’s § 2254 petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable

jurists would not find the ruling debatable.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 17th day of October, 2016.

Case 3:16-cv-08003-PGR Document 15 Filed 10/17/16 Page 2 of 2
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 731

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permit the interest on

water, waste, and essential community facilities loans guaranteed by

the Secretary of Agriculture to be tax-exempt.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 12, 1997

Mr. POSHARD (for himself and Mr. GOODE) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permit

the interest on water, waste, and essential community

facilities loans guaranteed by the Secretary of Agriculture to be tax-exempt.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. WATER, WASTE, AND ESSENTIAL COMMUNITY

4 FACILITIES LOANS GUARANTEED BY SEC5 RETARY OF AGRICULTURE TO BE TAX-EX6 EMPT.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (3) of section 149(b)

8 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to federally
2

•HR 731 IH

1 guaranteed bond is not tax exempt) is amended by adding

2 at the end the following new subparagraph:

3 ‘‘(E) EXCEPTION FOR WATER, WASTE, AND

4 ESSENTIAL COMMUNITY FACILITIES LOANS

5 GUARANTEED BY SECRETARY OF AGRI6 CULTURE.—A bond issued for a purpose de7 scribed in paragraph (1) of section 306(a) of

8 the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development

9 Act (as in effect on the date of the enactment

10 of this subparagraph) shall not be treated as

11 federally guaranteed by reason of any guarantee

12 by the Secretary of Agriculture under section

13 309(h) of such Act.’’

14 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

15 subsection (a) shall apply to obligations issued after the

16 date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

 

I, Robert C. Singer,Chief Financial Officer, certify, that:

 

(1)         I havereviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Scotsman Holdings, Inc.;

 

(2)         Based on myknowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

(3)         Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this annual report;

 

(4)         Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)              Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under  mysupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

 

b)             Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)              Disclosed inthis report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

 

(5)         Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

 

a)              Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)             Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 
| /s/ Robert C. Singer    |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Robert C. Singer        |   |
| Chief Financial Officer |   |
|                    |   |
| March 30, 2005     |   |
|                         |        |  |

 

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kimber Edmondson,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03804-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Marc J Bern & Partners LLP

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/17/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 26, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8502 Filed 11/01/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8502 Filed 11/01/17 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-1260

KANHUA YOUNG; LIHYING YOUNG,

Petitioners - Appellants,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 98-8215)

Submitted: May 25, 2000 Decided: June 2, 2000

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kanhua Young, Lihying Young, Appellants Pro Se. Janet A. Bradley,

Loretta C. Argrett, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Stuart L. Brown, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Washington,

D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Kanhua and Lihying Young appeal from the tax court’s orders

determining a deficiency and assessing an accuracy-related penalty

for their 1994 and 1995 income taxes and denying their motions for

reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the tax court’s

opinion and orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the tax court. See Young v. Commissioner, Tax Ct. No. 98-8215 (U.S.T.C. Sept. 15 & 16, 1999; Jan. 11

& Feb. 24, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED