J-S67019-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RICARDO ALPHONSO PEOPLES 

 Appellant No. 424 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 17, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008708-1997 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2014

Appellant, Ricardo Alphonso Peoples, appeals pro se from the January 

17, 2014 order dismissing as untimely his second petition filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we affirm. 

 The certified record discloses the following factual and procedural 

history of this case. On February 4, 1999, a jury found Appellant guilty of 

one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder1

for the May 14, 1997 killings of Orlando Price and his girlfriend, Dionda 

Morant. At the time of the offenses, Appellant was 17 years old but he was 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 2502(b), respectively. 
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tried as an adult.2 Immediately following the verdict, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility 

of parole. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 28, 

2000, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on 

January 18, 2001. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 761 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 766 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 

2001). His judgment of sentence became final on April 18, 2001, when the 

filing period for a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States 

Supreme Court expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. 

Ct. R. 13(1). 

Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on December 11, 

2001. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on August 13, 2002, and this 

Court affirmed on August 11, 2003. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 833 A.2d 

1148 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of 

appeal with our Supreme Court. 

On July 9, 2012, Appellant filed pro se a second PCRA petition that is 

the subject of this appeal. On November 6, 2013, the PCRA court issued a 

notice of intent to dismiss the petition. Appellant was subsequently granted 

permission to amend his PCRA petition. On December 12, 2013, Appellant 

filed an “Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Under Article I, Section 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Appellant’s date of birth is September 13, 1979. 
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14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and for Post-Conviction Relief Under the 

[PCRA]” (Amended Petition). The PCRA court gave notice of its intent to 

dismiss this Amended Petition. Appellant did not respond to this notice. On 

January 17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed the Amended Petition as 

untimely, and filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant timely filed pro se a 

notice of appeal on February 13, 2014.3 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues for our review. 

I. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion 

in concluding that relief under habeas corpus

ad subjiciendum is unavailable? 

II. Whether Article 1, Section 13 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution should be construed 

as providing greater protections than its 

quasi[-]analogous provision of the [] United 

States Constitution? 

Appellant’s Brief at iix. 

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of 

review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). The PCRA court’s 

January 17, 2014 1925(a) statement states that the petition was dismissed 

because it was time-barred without supplying any further reasoning. 
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is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court 

level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation 

omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(3). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to the 

PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 

259 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

We must first address whether the PCRA court properly treated 

Appellant’s Amended Petition as solely a PCRA petition even though the 

Amended Petition sought both a writ of habeas corpus and PCRA relief. 

[I]t is well established that pursuant to Pennsylvania 

law, the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus

unless the claim does not fall within the ambit of the 

PCRA statute. 

Our Supreme Court has consistently held that 

the PCRA statute and its eligibility requirements are 

to be broadly construed. Nevertheless, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has recognized 

that certain unique claims do not give rise to a 

cognizable claim under the PCRA statute. In those 

rare instances that a post-conviction claim does not 

fit within the statutory scheme of the PCRA, a writ of 

habeas corpus may be appropriate. 

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted). “Only if neither the PCRA nor any other remedy is 
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available for the condition alleged may the writ of habeas corpus then 

issue.” Commonwealth v. O’Brian, 811 A.2d 1068, 1070 (Pa. Super. 

2002). 

 The following relief is encompassed by the PCRA. 

§ 9543. Eligibility for relief

(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under 

this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 

following: 

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a 

crime under the laws of this Commonwealth 

and is at the time relief is granted: 

(i) currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for 

the crime; 

(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of 

death for the crime; or 

(iii) serving a sentence which must 

expire before the person may commence 

serving the disputed sentence. 

(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted 

from one or more of the following: 

(i) A violation of the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so 

undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. 

... 
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(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater 

than the lawful maximum. 

... 

(3) That the allegation of error has not been 

previously litigated or waived. 

(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to

or during trial, during unitary review or on 

direct appeal could not have been the result of 

any rational, strategic or tactical decision by 

counsel. 

... 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a). 

 The issues raised in the portion of Appellant’s Amended Petition 

seeking a writ of habeas corpus are that Appellant’s mandatory sentence of 

life without parole violates Article 1, Sections 1, 9, and 13 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant’s pro se Amended Petition, 12/12/13, at 

12-20. Appellant’s claims of constitutional violations concerning the legality 

of his sentence are encompassed within the PCRA, and as such, the PCRA is 

the proper and sole avenue for obtaining relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(i), (vii). As a result, the trial court properly treated Appellant’s 

Amended Petition as his second PCRA petition, and we review it as such. 

Burkett, supra. 

Before we may address the merits of a PCRA petition, we must first 

consider the petition’s timeliness because it implicates the jurisdiction of 
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both this Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 

44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa. 

2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an 

untimely PCRA petition.” Williams, supra. The PCRA “confers no authority 

upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation 

omitted). This is to “accord finality to the collateral review process.” Id. “A 

petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, 

must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless 

the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time 

for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), 

is met.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Pa. Super. 

2009), appeal denied, 982 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 2009). 

Section 9545 provides, in relevant part, as follows. 

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings 

... 

(b) Time for filing petition.— 

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall 

be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition 

alleges and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference 

by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of 
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the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or 

 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional 

right that was recognized by the 

Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section 

and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception 

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 

60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 

... 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). 

In this case, Appellant’s second PCRA petition is patently untimely as it 

was filed over 11 years after his judgment of sentence became final. 

Therefore, Appellant must plead and prove one of the three enumerated 

statutory exceptions to the time-bar. See Harris, supra. Appellant’s 

Amended Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus asserts the newly 

recognized constitutional right exception to the time-bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s brief does not develop this argument, but we 
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note it cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 

Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).4 Appellant’s Brief at 2-5, 7-11. To the 

extent this could be construed as raising an exception to the time-bar, our 

Supreme Court has held that Miller does not create such an exception as it 

does not apply retroactively to judgments of sentence that were final at the 

time Miller was decided. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 

(Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014). Further, to the extent 

Appellant’s brief could be read as arguing for this Court to apply broader 

retroactivity principles under state law, we note that Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) 

requires the alleged new constitutional right to have been held to be 

retroactive by either our Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court 

only. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). As set forth above, our Supreme 

Court has determined that Miller does not apply retroactively. 

Cunningham, supra. As noted, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on April 18, 2001, which is over 11 years before Miller was decided on 

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4

 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life 

without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 

punishments.’” Miller, supra at 2460. This holding does not “categorically 

bar” the sentence of life without parole for juveniles, but “[i]nstead, it 

mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an 

offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular 

penalty.” Id. at 2471. 
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June 25, 2012. Therefore, Miller is inapplicable to Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence and cannot form the basis of a time-bar exception. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA 

court’s January 17, 2014 order is affirmed. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Judge Donohue joins the memorandum. 

 Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/19/2014