This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 KEITH BELL, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-35296 4 GREGORY G. JONES, THE LAW 5 FIRM OF GREGORY G. JONES, P.C.; 6 ALAN DUNCAN, and ALLAN T. CURRY, 7 Defendants-Appellees, 8 and 9 GORDON EUGENE BELL, 10 Interested Party-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 12 C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge by Designation 13 Davis Kelin Law Firm, LLC 14 Ben Davis 15 Zackeree Kelin 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee Keith Bell 18 Gregory Jones 19 Southlake, TX 202 Pro Se Appellee 1 Allan Curry 2 Flower Mound, TX 3 Pro Se Appellee 4 Kemp Smith LLC 5 Richard Bonner 6 Rachel Moreno 7 El Paso, TX 8 for Appellee Alan Duncan 9 Hinkle Shanor LLP 10 Lucas M. Williams 11 Roswell, NM 12 for Appellant 13 MEMORANDUM OPINION 14 HANISEE, Judge. 15
{1} This appeal involves a discovery dispute in a legal malpractice case brought by 16 Keith Bell (Plaintiff) against attorneys Gre gory Jones, Alan Duncan, and Allan Curry 17 (Defendants), though the particular issue we must decide involves only Defendant 18 Duncan. Plaintiff’s father, Gordon Eugene Bell (Gene Bell), who is the appellant in 19 this case, entered a limited appearance in order to object to any compelled disclosure 20 of information sought by Plaintiff of which Gene Bell claimed to be the holder of a 21 privilege, specifically the attorney-client privilege as between Gene Bell and 223 Defendant Duncan. The district court appointed a special master to review in camera 1 the documents contained in the “Gordon Eugene Bell Privilege Log” (the Privilege 2 Log) and make a determination regarding the documents ’ discoverability. The special 3 master concluded that all of the “Non-J ones Emails”—i.e., emails between Defendant 4 Duncan and Melanie Lorant (Gene Bell’s daughter and the holder of Gene Bell’s 5 power of attorney in the litigation then at issue known as Bell-1125) that Gene Bell 6 contends “were intended to remain c onfidential from” the Bell-1125 plaintiffs, 7 including Plaintiff—are “fully discoverabl e” and provided five bases to support that 8 conclusion. Over Gene Bell’s objections to the special master’s report, the district 9 court adopted it in its entirety. 10
{2} Gene Bell appeals the district court’ s order denying his objections to and 11 adopting the special master’s report. Because we cannot discern that the district court 12 exercised independent judgment regarding th e substantive matters adopted within the 13 special master’s report, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Because this 14 is a non-precedential opinion intended only to in form the parties and the district court 15 of our reasoning, we discuss the facts only as they are relevant to our analysis. 16 DISCUSSION 17
{3} Rule 1-053(A) NMRA provides that “[t]hecourt in which any action is pending 18 may appoint a special master therein.” The rule further provides: 194 A reference to a master shall bethe exception and not the rule. In 1 actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the 2 issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in 3 matters of account and of difficult co mputation of damages, a reference 4 shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 5 requires it. 6 Rule 1-053(B). 7
{4} Here, in an action to be tried by a jury , the district court appointed a special 8 master based on the following: 9 I am in receipt of the Gordon Eugene Bell Privilege Log, the 10 related briefing and the request fo r a hearing. Having reviewed the 11 materials submitted, it is clear that th e issues related to the Privilege Log 12 will entail an in camera review of the documents. Accordingly, the 13 [c]ourt is inclined to appoint a [s]p ecial [m]aster to analyze the Privilege 14 Log and the legal arguments related to the same. This will facilitate a 15 timely disposition of the issues. 16 Although the rule itself restricts appointment of a special master to complicated issues 17 or unique circumstances, no party herein appears to have objected to the ensuing 18 district court order, which provided that “[ t]he [c]ourt specifically refers the dispute 19 between the parties regarding . . . [the Priv ilege Log to the] [s]pecial [m]aster for in 20 camera review and decision.” 21
{5} The special master, upon completing his in camera review of the documents 22 listed in the Privilege Log, concluded thatthose “labeled as ‘Non-Jones Emails’ are 23 discoverable in this case upon entry of a [p]r otective [o]rder agreed to by the parties 24 or as approved by the [c]ourt.” The special master first stated that it was not his 255 function to resolve factual issues, then added that “[t]he facts set out are those that do 1 not appear to be in dispute.” As we understand it, the special master perceived his 2 assignment to entail resolution of a pure que stion of law, which he answered by way 3 of the following five conclusions he reached: 4 1. That under Rule 16-106(B)(5) NMRA—which provides that “[a] lawyer 5 may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 6 lawyer reasonably believes necessary” inspecific circumstances, including “to 7 respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the 8 client”—“the privileged documents are discoverable and should be produced[;]” 9 2. That any privilege that existed between Gene Bell and Defendant Duncan 10 had been waived because th e documents Gene Bell sought to protect from disclosure 11 had already been disclosed to third partie s, including Melanie Lorant and Plaintiff; 12 3. That the work product doctrine does not shield the documents; 13 4. That the accountancy privilege does not apply; and 14 5. That collateral estoppel does not apply. 15 After determining that none of the reasons argued by Gene Bell supplied a basis for 16 denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel disc overy, the special master concluded that 17 “[a]ll of the ‘Non-Jones Emails’ are fully discoverable.” 186 {6} Gene Bell objected to the special master’s report on numerous bases and 1 continued to argue that the Non-Jones Emails “should not be discovered.” The district 2 court issued a one-page order denying GeneBell’s objections in which it found the 3 following: 4 1. The [c]ourt has jurisdiction over this matter. 5 2. [Gene Bell] has not demonstr ated any error in the [s]pecial 6 [m]aster’s [r]eport. 7 3. [Gene Bell] has raisedno meaningful new issues not addressed by 8 the [s]pecial [m]aster. 9 4. The [o]bjections to the [s]pecial [m]aster’s [r]eport and [d]ecision 10 are not well taken. 11 5. Accordingly, the [s]pecial [m]a ster’s [r]eport is affirmed and 12 adopted by the [c]ourt. 13 The district court reviewed “the [r]eport, [m]otion[,] and [r]esponses[,]” yet provided 14 no discussion or analysis of the special master’s legal conclusions. 15
{7} While a district court need only review a special master’s findings of fact for 16 substantial evidence, New Mexico case law “has established that a special master’s 17 conclusions of law are to be revi ewed de novo by district courts.” State ex rel. Office 18 of State Engineer v. United States , 2013-NMCA-023, ¶¶ 16, 17, 296 P.3d 1217. 19 Indeed, when a district court determines th at a particular issue warrants use of Rule 20 1-053 and chooses to appoint and garner the work product of a special master, it then 217 assumes a quasi-appellate role that entails assessing the legal validity of the 1 conclusions reached by the non-judicial offi cial. The many reasons a district court 2 must scrutinize a special master’s report incl ude that “[s]uch revi ew permits correction 3 of possible error at the earliest time” and “will also give the appellate court the benefit 4 of the district court’s reasoned consideration.” Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. , 634 5 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted); cf. Buffington v. McGorty , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 30-32, 136 N.M. 226, 96 7 P.3d 787 (discussing, in terms of due process, the obligation of the district court to 8 make independent determinati on of objections to a domestic relations hearing officer’s 9 report, and explaining that “the record of the hearing held before the district court 10 must demonstrate that the court in fact c onsidered the objections and established the 11 basis for the court’s decision”). De novo review requires the reviewing court to 12 “exercise [its] own independent judgment w ithout assigning special weight to [the] 13 decision” being reviewed. Lee v. Martinez , 2004-NMSC-027, ¶ 12, 136 N.M. 166, 96 14 P.3d 291 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a 15 district court has exercised sufficient i ndependent review of a special master’s 16 conclusions of law, we consider such fact ors as whether the district court held a 17 hearing on objections to the report, stated its analysis, and provided any discussion of 188 the special master’s legal conclusions. See Lozano v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc. , 1996- 1 NMCA-074, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 103, 920 P.2d 1057. 2
{8} Here, there is no evidence that the di strict court exercised the independent 3 judgment necessary to adopt the specialmaster’s conclusions of law. Although 4 Plaintiff requested a hearing on Gene Bell’s objections to the special master’s report 5 and decision, we find no indication in the record that a hearing or other avenue of 6 substantive review ever took place. To the c ontrary, the district court’s one-page order 7 contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law relating to the le gal issues addressed 8 in the special master’s report, nor did the district court issue, for example, a letter 9 decision providing analysis and explaining the basis for the district court’s decision 10 to adopt the special master’s report. Cf. id. Absent a reasoned decision by the district 11 court evincing its fulfillment of its obligation to exercise independent judgment in 12 reviewing the special master’s conclusions of law, we are not in a position to 13 determine whether the district court properly adopted the special master’s blanket 14 conclusion that all of the Non-Jone s Emails are fully discoverable. Cf. Buffington , 15 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (explaining that by conducting a hearing on objections to a 16 hearing officer’s report, “the parties are assured that the issues have been decided by 17 a judge vested with judicial power and an appropriate record is made to allow for 18 appellate review of the district court’s decision”). 199 {9} That is particularly so given the ambiguitythat exists in various aspects of the 1 special master’s legal explanations and c onclusions. To illustrate one such point of 2 confusion on appeal, we point to the special master’s determination that Rule 16- 3 106(B)(5)—a rule of professional conduct thatis permissive in nature (“[a] lawyer 4
mayreveal information” (emphasis added)) and identifies an area “in which the lawyer 5 has discretion to exercise professional judgment[,]” ScopeRules of Professional 6 Conduct—serves as a basis for concludi ng that “the privileged documents are 7 discoverable and should be produced.” Whilewe agree with the special master’s 8 observation that Rule 16-106(B)(5) “ permits[Defendant] Duncan to reveal and use 9 [the documents listed in the Privilege Log] in discovery” (emphasis added), we are 10 concerned about the possibility that the special master’s discussion of Rule 16- 11 106(B)(5) could be read as s upplying a basis for the district court to compel disclosure 12 of privileged documents, something which we do not believe Rule 16-106(B)(5) does 13 or is intended to do. Compare Rule 1-026(B)(1) NMRA (providing that “[p]arties may 14 obtain discovery of any information, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 15 matter involved in the pending action” (emphasis added)), and Rule 11-503(B) 16 NMRA (providing that “[a] client has a privile ge to refuse to disclose, and to prevent 17 any other person from disclo sing, a confidential communi cation made for the purpose 18 of facilitating or providing professional legal services to that client”), withRule 16- 1910 106(A) (providing that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 1 representation of a client unle ss the client gives informed c onsent . . . or the disclosure 2 is permitted by Paragraph B of this rule” (emphasis added)), and Rule 16-106(B)(5). 3 To the extent the special master’s conclu sion can be read as merely concluding that 4 Rule 16-106(B)(5) allowsDefendant Duncan, in his di scretion, to disclose the 5 documents in order to defend himself against Plaintiff’s claims, such an interpretation 6 is altogether different, and produces an altogether different outcome, than one that 7 would allow the district court to comp el disclosure based on Rule 16-106(B)(5). 8 Unless and until the district court sets forth a reasoned discussion and analysis of this 9 conclusion—as well as all of the conclu sions reached by the special master—this 10 Court cannot meaningfully evaluate the merits of the district court’s wholesale 11 adoption of the special master’s ultimate c onclusion that all of the Non-Jones Emails 12 are fully discoverable. 13 CONCLUSION 14
{10} It is not this Court’s duty to review, determine the correctness of, and identify 15 and correct any possible error in the sp ecial master’s legal conclusions. That 16 obligation was and remains the district court’s. Because the record is devoid of any 17 evidence that the district court undertook th at obligation in the first instance, we 18 reverse its order denying GeneBell’s objections to the special master’s report and 1911 decision and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court 1 is to undertake its assigned de novo review responsibility with respect to each of the 2 legal conclusions set forth in the special ma ster’s report. Only when we are guided by 3 an explanation-driven adoption—or modi fication and adoption, or even possibly 4 rejection—of the special master’s legal conclusions will we be in a circumstance 5 where appellate review canbe properly effectuated. 6
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________________________________ 8 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 9

WE CONCUR: 10

_______________________________ 11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 12

_______________________________ 13 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 14