An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-651

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 April 2014

BRETT ALLSBROOK,

Employee,

Plaintiff

v. From The North Carolina 

Industrial Commission

I.C. No. W13767

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS/WILSONART,

Employer,

BROADSPIRE,

Carrier,

Defendants

Appeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 22 

October 2012 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 6 November 2013.

Brett M. Allsbrook, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.

Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by M. Duane 

Jones and Elias W. Admassu, for defendants-appellees.

DAVIS, Judge.

Brett Allsbrook (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the Opinion and 

Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Full 
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Commission” or “the Commission”) denying his workers’ 

compensation claim against Illinois Tool Works/Wilsonart 

(“Defendant”). On appeal, Plaintiff primarily argues that the 

Commission failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support 

its determination that his injury was not a compensable injury 

by accident. After careful review, we affirm the Commission’s 

opinion and award.

Factual Background

At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 52 years old. In 

November 2000, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant - a manufacturer 

of high-pressure decorative laminate and backer boards - as a 

packer, and in February 2008, he was reassigned to the position 

of saw helper. He continued to work in that position until 

February 2009. As a saw helper, Plaintiff’s responsibilities 

included working in the finishing area and assisting saw 

operators in cutting material to specific measurements. While 

working for Defendant, Plaintiff used two different saws to cut 

laminate and backer boards, a Schelling saw and a Mereen-Johnson 

saw.

The Schelling saw is a newer saw and is computercontrolled, allowing employees to load the laminate while the 

saw automatically pushes and pulls the laminate through the 

machine to make the appropriate cuts. The Mereen-Johnson saw is 

an older saw that requires more physical force by the operator 
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than the Schelling saw and is used as a back-up to the Schelling 

saw. The Mereen-Johnson saw uses air pressure to help guide the 

laminate and backer boards through the cutting process. When 

using the Mereen-Johnson saw, two employees load the laminate or 

backer board and then push it to other employees who guide the 

laminate or backer board through the cutting process. After the 

cutting process is complete, an employee pushes the material to 

other employees who unload the material from the saw.

On 26 February 2009, Plaintiff was working with several 

other employees to cut five foot by ten foot by one inch backer 

boards with the Mereen-Johnson saw. In order to achieve the 

necessary cuts, two employees would pull the backer board onto 

the air table, cut the ends, and then push the backer board to 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff would then rearrange the backer board to 

cut the other end and push the backer board down the air table 

to other employees, who would then remove it from the waist-high 

air table. Plaintiff alleges that near the end of his shift on 

26 February 2009, he was bent at the waist at approximately a 

90-degree angle using the Mereen-Johnson saw, when he felt a pop 

in his chest.

On 27 March 2009, Plaintiff gave a recorded statement to 

Mollie Murphy, a representative of his employer’s workers’ 

compensation carrier. In this recorded statement, he stated the 

following, as captured in the Commission’s finding of fact 7:
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Plaintiff indicated “We put in full size 

laminate which could be as large as 5 foot 

by 12 foot.” Plaintiff further indicated 

that at the time of the alleged accident he 

was working on the Mereen-Johnson saw and 

that he had worked on that saw prior to 

February 26, 2009. When asked by Ms. 

Murphy, “Marine [sic] Johnson though has 

been in operation still and there are 

occasions that you work on it just like you 

work on the um . . . the newer model?”

Plaintiff responded in the affirmative. 

Plaintiff indicated that boards he was 

working with at the time of the alleged 

accident measured 5 feet by 8 to 10 feet, 

less than the maximum size Plaintiff 

indicated he worked with. Plaintiff 

described the angle at which he pushed 

boards on the Mereen-Johnson saw as 

“awkward” in that he ended up leaning at 

almost a 90 degree angle due to the height 

of the table. However, this was the method 

Plaintiff normally used when pushing boards, 

and he stated with respect to the push in 

question that it was a normal push for him 

and that it was not uneven or any harder 

than he typically pushed.

After being treated by his employer’s physician, Plaintiff 

sought treatment from Dr. Werner C. Brooks (“Dr. Brooks”), a 

board-certified orthopedic surgeon, on 11 March 2009. Plaintiff 

received treatment for A.C. joint and sternoclavicular joint 

strains and was ultimately diagnosed with a labral tear. On 22 

May 2009, Dr. Brooks performed a right shoulder arthroscopy, 

acromioplasty, distal clavicectomy, and labral tendon repair on 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff continued to complain of problems with his right 

shoulder and sternoclavicular joint following his treatment with 
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Dr. Brooks. On 27 July 2011, another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 

Christopher L. Elder (“Dr. Elder”), examined Plaintiff. Dr. 

Elder diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic “right shoulder pain and 

mechanical symptoms status post arthroscopy with a labral repair 

and subachromial decompression, distal clavicle excision” and 

“continued right S.C. joint pain, swelling, and instability with 

manageable symptoms.” Dr. Elder was also concerned that 

Plaintiff had a recurrent labral tear and scheduled a right 

shoulder arthroscopy for 9 September 2011 in order to make a 

diagnosis. Dr. Elder opined that Plaintiff’s S.C. joint 

symptoms were related to his initial injury in February 2009 and 

that his current symptoms were related to the shoulder surgery 

performed by Dr. Brooks. Plaintiff has not worked for Defendant 

since April 2009.

On 14 June 2011, a hearing was held before Deputy 

Commissioner Keisha M. Lovelace. On 29 March 2012, the deputy 

commissioner entered an opinion and award denying Plaintiff’s 

claim. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission on 19 June 

2012. On 22 October 2012, the Full Commission entered its 

opinion and award affirming the deputy commissioner’s decision. 

Plaintiff appealed the Commission’s decision to this Court.

Analysis

Our review of an Opinion and Award by the Industrial 

Commission is “limited to consideration of whether competent 
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evidence supports the Commission’s findings of fact and whether 

the findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law.” 

Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 

669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008). With regard to the Commission’s 

findings of fact, this Court’s “duty goes no further than to 

determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to 

support the finding[s].” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The findings of fact made by the Commission are 

conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence even if 

there is also evidence that would support a contrary finding. 

Nale v. Ethan Allen, 199 N.C. App. 511, 514, 682 S.E.2d 231, 

234, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 454 (2009). 

The Commission’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de 

novo. Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 713 

S.E.2d 68, 74, disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 719 S.E.2d 26 

(2011).

A plaintiff is entitled to compensation for an injury under 

the Workers’ Compensation Act “only if (1) it is caused by an 

accident, and (2) the accident arises out of and in the course 

of employment.” Pitillo v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Health & 

Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 645, 566 S.E.2d 807, 811 

(2002). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving both elements 

of the claim. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 13, 

282 S.E.2d 458, 467 (1981). Here, neither party disputes that 
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Plaintiff’s injury arose out of and in the course of his 

employment. Rather, the sole issue on appeal is whether 

Plaintiff’s injury occurred as a result of an “accident” within 

the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

The terms “accident” and “injury” are separate and distinct 

concepts. Gray v. RDU Airport Auth., 203 N.C. App. 521, 525, 

692 S.E.2d 170, 174 (2010). An accident is “‘an unlooked for 

and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the 

person who suffers the injury,’” that involves “‘the 

interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby 

of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected 

consequences.’” Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Hosp. 

Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999) (quoting 

Adams v. Burlington Indus., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d

455, 456 (1983)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 351, 543 S.E.2d 

124 (2000).

“If an employee is injured while carrying on usual tasks in 

the usual way the injury does not arise by accident.” Gunter v. 

Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 673, 346 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1986).

However, “when an interruption of the employee’s normal work 

routine occurs, introducing unusual conditions likely to result

in unexpected consequences, an accidental cause will be 

inferred. The essence of an accident is its unusualness and 

unexpectedness . . . .” Gray, 203 N.C. App. at 525, 692 S.E.2d 
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at 174 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, “once an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise 

unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee’s normal work 

routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of 

an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an ‘injury by 

accident’ under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Bowles v. CTS 

of Asheville, 77 N.C. App. 547, 550, 335 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1985).

Among the findings of fact made by the Commission were the 

following:

3. As a saw helper, Plaintiff worked in the 

finishing area assisting saw operators in 

cutting material to specific measurements. 

Defendant-Employer uses two different saws 

to cut laminate and backer boards, a 

Schelling saw and a Mereen-Johnson saw.

. . . .

5. The Mereen-Johnson saw is an older saw 

than the Schelling saw. Cutting materials 

with the Mereen-Johnson saw is more 

physically demanding than with the Schelling 

saw. The Mereen-Johnson saw uses air 

pressure to help guide the laminate and 

backer boards through the cutting process, 

however, the saw operators and saw helpers 

have to use more effort to push and pull the 

material through the Mereen-Johnson saw. 

Defendant-Employer cuts 5 foot by 10 foot 

pieces of laminate weighing approximately 18 

to 19 pounds and 5 foot by 10 foot pieces of 

backer board weighing at least 100 pounds 

and up to approximately 400 pounds. When 

using the Mereen-Johnson saw, two employees 

load the laminate or backer board, and then 

push it to other employees who guide the 

laminate or backer board through the cutting 
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process. After the cutting process is 

complete, an employee pushes the material to 

other employees who unload the material from 

the saw. The Mereen-Johnson saw is used as a 

"back-up" saw to help in times of heavy 

work-loads or to cut backer boards and other 

items not requiring the same level of 

precision and accuracy as laminate.

6. On February 26, 2009, Plaintiff was 

working with several other employees to cut 

5 foot by 10 foot by 1 inch thick backer 

boards on the Mereen-Johnson saw. In order 

to achieve the necessary cuts, two employees 

pulled the backer board onto the air table, 

cut the ends or sides, and then pushed the 

backer board to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then 

rearranged the backer board to cut the other 

end and then pushed the backer board down 

the air table to other employees who removed 

it from the air table and placed it on a 

pallet. To push the backer board after 

making his cuts, Plaintiff would lean over 

the air table, which was waist-high, bend at 

approximately a 90 degree angle, and push 

the backer board. Plaintiff alleges that, 

while pushing a board near the end of his 

shift on February 26, 2009, he felt a pop in 

his chest.

7. On March 27, 2009, Plaintiff gave a 

recorded statement to Mollie Murphy from 

Defendant-Carrier. When describing his 

position to Ms. Murphy, Plaintiff indicated 

"We put in full size laminate which could be 

as large as 5 foot by 12 foot." Plaintiff 

further indicated that at the time of the 

alleged accident he was working on the 

Mereen-Johnson saw and that he had worked on 

that saw prior to February 26, 2009. When 

asked by Ms. Murphy, "Marine (sic) Johnson 

though has been in operation still and there 

are occasions that you work on it just like 

you work on the um...the newer model?" 

Plaintiff responded in the affirmative. 

Plaintiff indicated that boards he was 

working with at the time of the alleged 
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accident measured 5 feet by 8 to 10 feet, 

less than the maximum size Plaintiff 

indicated he worked with. Plaintiff 

described the angle at which he pushed 

boards on the Mereen-Johnson saw as 

"awkward" in that he ended up leaning at 

almost a 90 degree angle due to the height 

of the table. However, this was the method

Plaintiff normally used when pushing boards, 

and he stated with respect to the push in 

question that it was a normal push for him 

and that it was not uneven or any harder 

than he typically pushed. Relative to the 

circumstances surrounding his alleged 

accident, Plaintiff went on to state, "So um 

again nothing out of the ordinary."

8. Plaintiff testified at the hearing before 

the Deputy Commissioner that at the time the 

alleged accident occurred, he pushed the 

backer board in the same manner he normally 

did when working on the Mereen-Johnson saw. 

Plaintiff contended, however, that he did 

not use the Mereen-Johnson saw on a regular 

basis, and that at times the saw went unused 

for months at a time.

9. Plaintiff's testimony about the frequency 

with which the Mereen-Johnson saw was used 

is in direct contradiction to the testimony 

of Harold Whitted and Charles Dennis Clark. 

Mr. Whitted is Plaintiff's former supervisor 

and no longer works for Defendant-Employer. 

He testified that using the Mereen-Johnson 

saw in the manner Plaintiff testified he did 

on February 26, 2009 was a normal job duty 

for an employee in Plaintiff's position. Mr. 

Clark, who is currently the manager for 

Defendant-Employer's Fletcher facility, was 

previously the manager of the pressing 

department, which included the finishing 

area where Plaintiff worked. He testified

that Plaintiff used both the Schelling saw 

and the Mereen-Johnson saw on a regular 

basis, and that the duties Plaintiff 

testified he was performing at the time he 

was injured were consistent with Plaintiff's 
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normal job duties.

. . . .

15. The Full Commission gives greater weight 

to the testimony of Mr. Whitted and Mr. 

Clark and finds, based upon the 

preponderance of the evidence in view of the 

entire record that, at the time his injury 

occurred on February 26, 2009, Plaintiff was 

working with other employees to cut material 

which was consistent in size with the 

materials with which he normally worked. 

Plaintiff's use, along with the other 

employees, of the Mereen-Johnson saw was 

also not unusual, nor was the manner in 

which he pushed the board any different from 

the manner in which Plaintiff typically 

pushed boards when working on the MereenJohnson saw. As such, the Full Commission 

finds that Plaintiff was engaged in his work 

duties in his usual and . . . customary 

manner, and there was no interruption of his 

normal work routine likely to result in 

unexpected consequences.

Based on these factual findings, the Commission issued the 

following conclusions of law:

1. Under the North Carolina Workers’ 

Compensation Act, an injury arising out of 

and in the course of employment is 

compensable only if it is caused by an 

“accident” and the claimant bears the burden 

of proving an accident has occurred. An 

accident is an unlooked for and untoward

event which is not expected or designed by 

the person who suffers the injury. An 

accident therefore involves the interruption 

of the routine of work and the introduction 

thereby of unusual conditions likely to 

result in unexpected consequences.

2. In the instant case, Plaintiff has 

failed to establish that he sustained an 

injury by accident within the meaning of the 
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Act on February 26, 2009. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

97-2(6). Plaintiff was performing his 

regular job in his normal, usual manner at 

the time of the injury. Although Plaintiff 

may have assumed an awkward body position 

when pushing the heavy board, the position, 

and the size of the board were not unusual, 

nor was the use of the Mereen-Johnson saw to 

cut the board. Plaintiff had previously 

worked with materials of the same size, as 

evidenced by his recorded statement, and, 

per his statement, there was nothing unusual 

about the push he made at the time he felt 

the pop and the body position resulting from 

the push saw was the body position he 

normally assumed when pushing boards on the 

Mereen-Johnson saw.

As a result of these findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, the Commission ultimately determined that ”Plaintiff failed 

to establish that he sustained an injury by accident within the 

meaning of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act.”

In arguing for the reversal of the Commission’s decision, 

Plaintiff claims there is “no evidence” supporting the 

Commission’s finding that Plaintiff was not injured by accident 

and that he was instead carrying out his regular job duties in 

his usual manner. Plaintiff attempts to discredit the testimony 

of Mr. Harold Whitted (“Mr. Whitted”) and Mr. Dennis Clark (“Mr. 

Clark”), both of whom testified that the use of the MereenJohnson saw in the manner described by Plaintiff was a normal 

job duty for him, by citing the witnesses’ failure to produce a 

log book regarding the number of hours and number of times the 
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Mereen–Johnson saw was used in order to corroborate their 

testimony.

In making this argument, Plaintiff asks us to substitute 

our own views of the witnesses’ credibility for those of the 

Commission. This we cannot do. Our Supreme Court has made 

clear that:

(1) the Full Commission is sole judge of the 

weight and credibility of the evidence, and 

(2) appellate courts reviewing Commission 

decisions are limited to reviewing whether 

any competent evidence supports the 

Commission’s findings of fact and whether 

the findings of fact support the 

Commission’s conclusions of law.

Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 

549, 553 (2000).

Moreover, when making determinations on credibility, the 

Industrial Commission is not obligated to explain why it deemed 

certain evidence credible or not credible. Id. This is so

because

[r]equiring the Commission to explain its 

credibility determinations and allowing the 

Court of Appeals to review the Commission’s 

explanation of those credibility 

determinations would be inconsistent with 

our legal system’s tradition of not 

requiring the fact finder to explain why he 

or she believes one witness over another or 

believes one piece of evidence is more 

credible than another.

Id.
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Here, the Commission’s findings of fact make clear that it 

deemed Mr. Whitted’s and Mr. Clark’s testimony to be credible.

In finding of fact 15, the Commission stated:

15. The Full Commission gives greater weight 

to the testimony of Mr. Whitted and Mr. 

Clark and finds, based upon the 

preponderance of the evidence in view of the 

entire record that, at the time his injury 

occurred on February 26, 2009, Plaintiff was 

working with other employees to cut material 

which was consistent in size with the 

materials with which he normally worked. 

Plaintiff's use, along with the other 

employees, of the Mereen-Johnson saw was 

also not unusual, nor was the manner in 

which he pushed the board any different from 

the manner in which Plaintiff typically 

pushed boards when working on the MereenJohnson saw. As such, the Full Commission 

finds that Plaintiff was engaged in his work 

duties in his usual and . . . customary 

manner, and there was no interruption of his 

normal work routine likely to result in 

unexpected consequences.

Competent evidence supports this finding. Mr. Whitted, 

Plaintiff’s former supervisor, testified that any employees who

worked with the saws “could work on either saw at you know, 

given times.” He also responded affirmatively when asked if 

both saws were rotated in their use by Plaintiff’s department. 

Mr. Whitted explained that

[t]he initial saw crew . . . could be asked 

to work on either saw. Primarily the 

Schelling saw, that was our primary saw, but 

depending on what needed to be cut or if we 

needed assistance from other people, then 

we’d try to split the saw personnel up to

work with the less experienced people, and 
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so they could work on either saw at, you 

know, given times.

Similarly, Mr. Clark, the manager of the Fletcher facility,

also testified in the affirmative when asked if he agreed that 

both the “Schelling and the Mereen-Johnson saws were used on a 

regular basis by the staff, including Plaintiff.” Mr. Clark 

further testified that both the physical activity of “pushing 

and pulling” and the use of both saws was consistent with what

the “normal job involved for [Plaintiff] and other people in 

that department.”

This testimony by Mr. Whitted and Mr. Clark serves as

competent evidence that directly supports the Commission’s 

finding that, at the time of the injury, Plaintiff was 

performing his work duties in his usual and customary manner. 

This, in turn, supports the Commission’s ultimate conclusion 

that Plaintiff failed to show that he sustained an injury by 

accident within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Plaintiff also contends that his statements that he had 

worked on the Mereen-Johnson saw previously did not establish 

any “regularity” and that the Commission erred in finding that 

this was part of his normal job duties. However, Plaintiff 

admits in his brief that “it is clear from the preponderance of 

the evidence that [he] had previously worked on the Mereen-
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Johnson saw.” This admission by Plaintiff simply adds to the 

competent evidence supporting the Commission’s determination.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Opinion and Award of the 

Full Commission is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).