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Paul B. Mengedoth, Esq. (018507)

MENGEDOTH LAW PLLC

20909 N. 90th Place, Suite 211

Scottsdale, AZ 85255

Tel: (480) 778-9100

Fax: (480) 778-9101

E-mail: paul@mengedothlaw.com

James A. Francis, Esq.

John Soumilas, Esq.

FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.

Land Title Building, 19th Floor

100 South Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19110

Tel: (215) 735-8600

Fax: (215) 940-8000

E-mail: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com

E-mail: jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Anam Abbas

and all other similarly situated individuals.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANAM ABBAS,

individually and on behalf of a class of 

similarly situated persons,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EARLY WARNING SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

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No. CV-15-01976-PHX-DLR

CLASS ACTION 

PLAINTIFF’S UNCONTESTED 

MOTION FOR SERVICE AWARD 

AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’

FEES AND LITIGATION 

EXPENSES AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

THEREOF

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1

II. ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................2

A. A $6,000.00 Service Award to Plaintiff Is Fair, Reasonable, and

Uncontested by Defendant ......................................................................... 2

B. Class Counsel’s Request for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and

Litigation Expenses in the Amount of $90,000 Is Fair, Reasonable,

and Uncontested by Defendant ................................................................. 3

1. The Hourly Rates of Class Counsel Are Reasonable.......................5

2. The Number of Hours Billed is Reasonable ....................................6

3. Other Factors ....................................................................................7

4. Class Counsel Incurred $858.13 in Litigation Expenses .................7

III. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................7

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35066 (C.D. Cal. 

Mar. 13, 2013)..........................................................................................................3 

Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (5th Cir. 1982) ..........................................................5 

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................4 

Chakejian v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 275 F.R.D. 201, 217 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ...................5 

City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) ................................................................5 

D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1990) ..................3 

Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49477 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 22, 2010) ..........................................................................................................3 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) ..................................4 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983) ...................3 

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40729 (D.N.J. June 5, 

2007) ........................................................................................................................3 

Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21824 (S.D. Cal. 

Mar. 3, 2011)............................................................................................................6 

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975)...........................................4 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87685 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2009) .................6 

Love v. Mail on Sunday, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97061 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) .............6 

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................4 

Pellet v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2009) .............................3 

POM Wonderful, LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110460 (C.D. 

Cal. Sept. 22, 2008)..................................................................................................5 

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................6 

Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) ..........................................2 

Sheppard v. Cons. Edison Co. of NY., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16314 (E.D.N.Y. 

Aug. 1, 2002) ...........................................................................................................2 

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Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................................3 

Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995)...........................2, 3 

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 1681n ............................................................................................................... 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) ................................................................................................ 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1681o ................................................................................................................5 

Rules

L. R. Civ. 54.2(A)-(M)........................................................................................................ 4 

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Plaintiff Anam Abbas (“Ms. Abbas” or “Plaintiff”), through her undersigned 

counsel, respectfully presents the following uncontested motion for an award of her 

reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses. Plaintiff’s motion is 

supported by the below Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the following 

documents, all of which are attached and incorporated by reference: (1) the Declaration of 

John Soumilas (Exhibit 1) and its Exhibits A-D; (2) the Declaration of Paul B. Mengedoth 

(Exhibit 2) and its Appendix I; and Plaintiffs’ proposed order.

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 4, 2016, the Court granted preliminary approval (Doc. 45) of the 

Settlement set forth in the September 19, 2016 Settlement Agreement in this class action 

matter. Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and 

litigation expenses for Class Counsel and a service award for her efforts in connection with 

this action. As detailed herein, the requested service award for Ms. Abbas is fair and 

reasonable in light of her efforts on behalf of the Class. Additionally, the requested 

attorneys’ fees and expenses are reasonable and in line with precedent. 

The Parties to this matter have, at arm’s length, and after negotiating relief for the 

class, negotiated an award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to which Defendant 

will not object, of $90,000. Class Counsels’ fees are reasonable in light of the nearly full 

statutory damage recovery achieved by Class Counsel in this action and Class Counsel’s 

actual time spent prosecuting this mandatory fee-shifting matter, as reflected in Class 

Counsel’s lodestar, which is well in excess of the $90,000 request here.

In this matter, each Class Member who did not opt out will receive an automatic 

FCRA statutory damages payment of $900, without the need to submit a claim. This result 

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is close to the maximum statutory recovery of $1,000.00 available for a willful violation 

of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). Further, payments to Actual Damages Class 

Members will be at least $3,500 and as much as $7,500. Given this excellent recovery for 

the Class, no Class Member objected to the Settlement, the service award, or the requested 

attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses. Likewise, Defendant does not oppose this relief.

II. ARGUMENT

A. A $6,000.00 Service Award to Plaintiff Is Fair, Reasonable, and 

Uncontested by Defendant

Service awards “are fairly typical in class action cases.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g 

Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009). Such awards “serve an important function in 

promoting class action settlements.” Sheppard v. Cons. Edison Co. of NY., Inc., No. 94 

CV-0403(JG), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16314, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002). The Ninth 

Circuit has recognized that service awards “are intended to compensate class 

representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational 

risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act 

as a private attorney general.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958-59.

Service awards are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and should 

be awarded based upon the court’s consideration of, inter alia, the amount of time and 

effort spent on the litigation, the duration of the litigation and the degree of personal gain 

obtained as result of the litigation. See Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 

299 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Here, Class Counsel respectfully requests that the Court approve a service award 

of $6,000 for Ms. Abbas, in recognition of her contributions toward the successful 

prosecution of this litigation. Ms. Abbas’s service as class representative has been 

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laudable. She sought out relief not only for herself but also all other similarly situated, 

retained experienced class counsel, cooperated fully in the pre-suit investigation and in 

discovery, and provided document and other information needed to properly prosecute this 

matter and achieve a very favorable settlement for the class. Moreover, Defendant does 

not oppose a $6,000 service award to Ms. Abbas, which award was negotiated after, and 

separately from, the relief afforded to the Class. Ms. Abbas is deserving of a service award 

of $6,000.1

B. Class Counsel’s Request for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and

Litigation Expenses in the Amount of $90,000 Is Fair, Reasonable, and

Uncontested by Defendant

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a lodestar/multiplier approach for assessing the 

amount of reasonable attorney fees. D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 

F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990), citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 434 n.9,

103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). Under a fee-shifting statute such as the FCRA, 

the lodestar method is generally the correct method for calculating attorneys’ fees. Staton 

v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003). The lodestar/multiplier analysis has two

parts. The Court first calculates the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours 

the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 

1 The amount requested is in line with amounts awarded in other class action cases. 

See, e.g., Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, No. SACV 11-00173 DOC(Ex), 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 35066, at *7-*8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (approving $8,000 incentive 

award); Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV-08-1365-CW(EMC), 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 49477, at *47 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (service award of $20,000 was “well 

justified” given plaintiffs’ efforts on behalf of the class) (compiling cases); Pellet v. 

Weyerhaeuser Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“When compared to 

service awards in other cases, the $7,500 payments requested here are justified.”); In re 

Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., No. 04-5184-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40729, at *68 

(D.N.J. June 5, 2007) (approving incentive award of $10,000); Van Vranken, 901 F. Supp. 

at 300 (approving service award of $50,000). 

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Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). The product of this 

computation yields a presumptively reasonable fee. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 

F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th 

Cir. 2008). The Court may consider the following factors: (1) the time and labor required; 

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform 

the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5) the 

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by 

the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the 

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; 

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards 

in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).

Additionally, Arizona’s local rules also contain a list of the following 

nonexhaustive factors closely tracking Kerr: (1) the time and labor required of counsel; 

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill requisite to perform 

the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by counsel because of 

the acceptance of the action; (5) the customary fee charged in matters of the type involved; 

(6) whether the fee contract between the attorney and the client is fixed or contingent; 

(7) any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount of 

money, or value of the rights involved, and the results obtained; (9) the experience, 

reputation and ability of counsel; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and 

length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the client; (12) awards in 

similar actions; and (13) any other matters deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 

See L. R. Civ. 54.2(A)-(M). 

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Importantly, the Fair Credit Report Act (FCRA), the statute under which this class 

action was prosecuted, mandates reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost in any successful 

action to enforce liability. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o. The purpose of awarding attorney 

fees under the FCRA is to encourage enforcement of the statute by consumers, acting as 

“private attorneys general.” See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (5th Cir. 1982). In 

FCRA actions, attorneys’ fees can be, and often are, much higher than the recovery 

received by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chakejian v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 275 F.R.D. 201, 

217 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (large attorneys’ fees award in FCRA class action “eminently 

reasonably” when fee request was less than lodestar and class members received credit 

monitoring only). However, because Plaintiff prevailed on the statutory fee-shifting FCRA 

claim, the fee award cannot be diminished to maintain some ratio between the fee and the 

individual statutory damages award and no proportionality analysis applies between the 

amount of the recovery for plaintiffs and the amount of attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 

in achieving that recovery. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (affirming 

award of $245,456 in fees where plaintiff received $13,300 in damages in civil rights 

litigation).

Here, the parties negotiated the mutually agreeable amount of $90,000 for Class 

Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses after, and separately from, the relief 

afforded to the Class. This amount is fair and reasonable when evaluated under the lodestar 

method as it less than the total amount of attorneys’ fees actually incurred, $105,789.25.

1. The Hourly Rates of Class Counsel Are Reasonable

Class Counsel’s requested hourly rates are in line with awards from elsewhere in 

the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., POM Wonderful, LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., No. 07-2633, 2008 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110460, at *11-*13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2008) (partner rates of $750 to 

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$450 and associate rates of $425 to $275 were reasonable); Prison Legal News v. 

Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 455 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming reasonableness of hourly 

rates where partner rates were up to $875, associates charged $425, and paralegals charged 

$190); Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N Am., No. 05-CV-0633, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

21824, at *31 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (rates from $410 to $750 for attorneys, and $195 

for paralegals were reasonable); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, No. SA CV-03-00264-VBK, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87685, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2009) ($600 is “reasonable”); Love v. 

Mail on Sunday, No. CV-05-7798-ABC(PJWX), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97061, at *25 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (approving partner rates of $540-$690 and associate rates of $305-

$485). 

Class Counsel Francis & Mailman, P.C.’s rates are as follows: $580 per hour for 

James A. Francis, $470 per hour for John Soumilas, $300 per hour for Jordan M. Sartell, 

and $200 per hour for Lauren KW Brennan. See Soumilas Dec. at ¶ 5, Ex. B. 

Class Counsel Paul Mengedoth’s hourly rate is $425. See Mengedoth Dec. at ¶ 13. 

This Court should approve Class Counsel at the indicated rates in light of their 

significant experience litigating FCRA actions and the exceptionally good result obtained 

for the Class Members in this case.2

2. The Number of Hours Billed is Reasonable

Class Counsel worked for approximately 295 hours during the course of this action 

for a total lodestar of $105,789.25. These hours are properly described in the attached

declarations of Soumilas and Mengedoth and reasonably incurred in the prosecution of this 

2 The rates requested in this Motion are Class Counsel Francis and Mailman, P.C.’s lower, 

2014 rates. See Exhibit B to Soumilas Declaration. The firm’s rates for similar work are 

slightly higher in 2017. 

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action. Notwithstanding, in the interest of obtaining a good settlement result for the Class 

Members, Class Counsel negotiated with Defendant such that Defendant agreed not to 

contest an attorneys’ fees award of $90,000.00. Class Counsel urges this Court to award 

that sum in light of the agreement of the Parties and the good result obtained for the Class

Members.

3. Other Factors

The universally favorable reaction of the class supports approval of the fee award. 

No Class Member objected to the settlement or the fee award requested and only one 

Member requested to be excluded.

4. Class Counsel Incurred $858.13 in Litigation Expenses

Class Counsel seeks reimbursement for $858.13 in litigation-related expenses 

reasonably incurred in the course of this action. See Mengedoth Dec., Appx. 1; Soumilas 

Dec. Exhibit C. This amount is included in the $90,000 amount negotiated by the Parties.

III. CONCLUSION

Class Counsel’s request for $90,000 in attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses is 

well within the range of awards that district courts have allowed in analogous cases. And 

against the backdrop of the significant and time-intensive work performed by Class 

Counsel in connection with this case, this award is fair and reasonable and should be 

approved. As noted, Defendant does not oppose these awards. Plaintiff respectfully 

requests that the Court approve a service award of $6,000.00 to Ms. Abbas, award Class 

Counsel attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses of $90,000.

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Respectfully submitted,

Francis & Mailman, P.C.

DATE: February 24, 2016 /s/ John Soumilas

James A. Francis (pro hac vice)

John Soumilas (pro hac vice)

100 South Broad Street, Suite 1902

Philadelphia, PA 19110

T: 215.735.8600

jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com

jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com

Paul B. Mengedoth

Mengedoth Law PLLC

20909 N. 90th Place, Suite 211

Scottsdale, AZ 85255

T. 480.778.9100

paul@mengedothlaw.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Anam Abbas and 

the Settlement Class

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