97-316

 No. 97-316

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

CYNTHIA DeMARS,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

CONNIE CARLSTROM,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Fergus,

 The Honorable John R. Christensen, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Thomas J. Murphy; Conklin, Nybo, LeVeque & Murphy, P.C.;

 Great Falls, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Paul R. Haffeman; Davis, Hatley, Haffeman & Tighe, P.C.;

 Great Falls, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 1997

 Decided: November 4, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 In May 1996, plaintiff and appellant, Cynthia DeMars, filed an action in the

District Court for the Tenth Judicial District in Fergus County against Connie 

Carlstrom

to recover damages she incurred as a result of a single vehicle automobile accident

allegedly caused by Carlstromþs negligence. Following trial, the jury returned a 

verdict

finding DeMars comparatively negligent, and apportioning liability between the two

parties. DeMars subsequently filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

pursuant to Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., on the issue of liability. In the alternative, 

DeMars

moved for a new trial on the issue of comparative negligence pursuant to õ 25-11-102

(7),

MCA. On April 21, 1997, the District Court issued an order denying DeMarsþ

alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. 

For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred by denying DeMarsþ

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on the basis that

Carlstromþs testimony at trial did not constitute a judicial admission which would 

have

precluded the jury from considering comparative negligence and apportioning liability

between the parties.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On March 13, 1995, DeMars was injured in a single-vehicle automobile accident

which occurred on a county road, commonly known as þThrill Hills Road,þ just south

of Winifred, Montana. At the time of the accident, Carlstrom was driving and DeMars

was a passenger, as were the partiesþ two teenaged daughters and a mutual friend. 

The

accident occurred when Carlstrom lost control of the vehicle, which rolled and 

landed on

its top in a ditch near the side of the road.

 DeMars filed suit on May 29, 1996, to recover her damages, alleging the accident

was caused by Carlstromþs negligence. Carlstrom admitted that her negligence was a

cause of the accident, but alleged comparative negligence as an affirmative 

defense. On

February 12, 1997, the case went to trial before a jury on issues of comparative

negligence and damages.Following testimony by Carlstrom, DeMars moved for

a directed verdict on the issue of comparative negligence. The court denied DeMarsþ

motion, and the case went to the jury on issues of comparative negligence and 

damages. 

On February 14, 1997, the jury rendered a verdict setting damages at $45,000, but

finding DeMars contributorily negligent in causing the accident. The jury 

apportioned

40 percent liability to DeMars and 60 percent liability to Carlstrom.

 On March 12, 1997, DeMars filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., on the issue of liability. In the 

alternative,

DeMars moved for a new trial pursuant to õ 25-11-102, MCA, which provides that the

court may order a new trial where there was an þerror in law occurring at the trial 

and

excepted to by the party making the applicationþ and which þmaterially affected the

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substantial rightsþ of the aggrieved party. Section 25-11-102(7), MCA. In an order

dated April 21, 1997, the District Court denied DeMarsþ post-trial motions. It is 

from

this order that DeMars appeals.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err by denying DeMarsþ motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on the basis that Carlstromþs 

testimony at

trial did not constitute a judicial admission which would have precluded the jury 

from

considering comparative negligence and apportioning liability between the parties?

 

A. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

 We have held that, in evaluating a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, þthe court must view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.þ Nelson v. Flathead Valley Transit (1992), 251 Mont. 269, 271-72, 824

P.2d 263, 265. Further, we have recognized that a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding

the verdict is appropriate þonly where there is a complete absence of any evidence to

warrant submission to a jury.þ Ryan v. City of Bozeman (1996), 279 Mont. 507, 510,

928 P.2d 228, 229-30 (citing Jacques v. Montana Nat'l Guard (1982), 199 Mont. 493,

504, 649 P.2d 1319, 1325). The District Court should not grant a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict þ[unless there is a complete absence of any credible 

evidence

in support of the verdict. Ryan, 279 Mont. at 510, 928 P.2d at 230 (citing Barmeyer

v. Montana Power Company (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 191, 657 P.2d 594, 597 (overruled

on other grounds by Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d

140)). Here, DeMars argues that Carlstrom, while testifying at trial, admitted the

accident was entirely her fault and thereby made a binding judicial admission which

should have prevented her from thereafter contesting liability. Specifically, DeMars

points to the following testimony rendered by Carlstrom while under crossexamination: 

Q: [By DeMarsþ counsel] At any rate, at one point, and actually for

 several months, you said that [the accident] was all your fault. Isnþt

 that true?

A: [By Carlstrom] I donþt believe I have ever changed it, how guilty

 and how responsible I feel about that car wreck.

Q: And I am not trying to make you feel bad, but I need to ask you

 questions. Is it true that you have said it was all your fault?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: And you said that for a number of months on a number of different

 occasions. Isnþt that correct?

A: Yes, and I believe I have also said that here today. 

 DeMars contends that this portion of Carlstromþs testimony constitutes a binding

judicial admission with respect to the issue of liability and, therefore, argues the 

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District

Court erred in permitting the jury to consider the issue of comparative fault and in

permitting it to apportion liability for the accident. In support of her 

contention that

Carlstrom made a binding judicial admission, DeMars points to our decision in

Rasmussen v. State Fund (1995), 270 Mont. 492, 893 P.2d 337. 

 In Rasmussen, we described a judicial admission as þan express waiver made in

court by a party or his attorney conceding the truth of an alleged fact.þ 

Rasmussen, 270

Mont. at 497, 893 P.2d at 340. We noted that such an admission has a conclusive 

effect

upon the party who makes it, and prevents that party from introducing further 

evidence

to þprove, disprove, or contradict the admitted fact.þ Rasmussen, 270 Mont. at 497, 

893

P.2d at 340 (citing Kohne v. Yost (1991), 250 Mont. 109, 112, 818 P.2d 360, 362). In

Kohne, we recognized that þ[f]or a judicial admission to be binding, it must be an

unequivocal statement of fact.þ Kohne, 250 Mont. at 113, 818 P.2d at 362. DeMars

contends that Carlstrom, by agreeing the accident was all her fault, made just such 

an

unequivocal statement of fact and that the court consequently erred in permitting 

the jury

to consider the issue of comparative negligence.

 Carlstrom, however, argues her testimony did not constitute a binding judicial

admission because it was made under pressure of cross-examination by a party to the

litigation, rather than by an attorney, and because the alleged admission of 

liability was

by no means unequivocal in light of conflicting evidence of record. Carlstrom

additionally argues the statements she made on the stand do not qualify as judicial

admissions because they were not statements of fact, but were rather expressions of

opinion or legal conclusions. 

 Having considered the record on appeal, we conclude, as did the District Court

below, that Carlstrom did not make a binding judicial admission as contemplated by 

our

decisions in the Rasmussen and Kohne cases. Although we recognized in both Rasmussen

and Kohne that a litigant may, under certain circumstances, render a judicial 

admission,

Carlstrom did not do so in the present case. 

 For a judicial admission to be binding upon a party, the admission must be one of

fact rather than a conclusion of law or the expression of an opinion. Larson v. A.T.

S.I.

(Colo. App. 1993), 859 P.2d 273, 275-76. See also Kohne, 250 Mont. at 113, 818 P.2d

at 362 (citing Childs v. Franco (E.D. Pa. 1983), 563 F. Supp. 290, 292). Black's Law

Dictionary, 6th Edition, distinguishes facts and law as follows:

 A "fact," as distinguished from the "law," may be taken as that out of

 which the point of law arises, that which is asserted to be or not to be, and

 is to be presumed or proved to be or not to be for the purpose of applying

 or refusing to apply a rule of law. Law is principle; fact is an event. Law

 is conceived; fact is actual. Law is rule of duty; fact is that which has been

 according to or in contravention of the rule.

Black's Law Dictionary 592 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).

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 Similarly, Black's defines opinion evidence or testimony as "[e]vidence of what

the witness thinks, believes, or infers in regard to fact in dispute, as 

distinguished from

his personal knowledge of the facts themselves." Black's Law Dictionary 1093 (6th 

ed.

1990).

 As the foregoing definitions clearly demonstrate, Carlstrom's testimony that the

automobile accident was all her fault was either her legal conclusion based upon her

understanding of the facts as she knew them, or was, in the alternative, the 

expression

of her personal opinion. Accordingly, because Carlstrom's statements that she was at

fault were not statements of fact, we conclude they were not judicial admissions.

 Having held that Carlstrom's statements regarding fault for the accident do not

qualify as judicial admissions because they were not statements of fact, we need not

address Carlstrom's alternative arguments that her testimony did not constitute a 

binding

judicial admission because it was not unequivocal, and was made under pressure of

cross-examination by a party to the litigation, rather than by an attorney. 

 As noted above, we have previously held that a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict is properly granted only where the record displays þa

complete absence of any evidence to warrant submission to a jury." Ryan, 279 Mont.

at 510, 928 P.2d at 230. Further, the District Court should deny such a motion þ[u]

nless

there is a complete absence of any credible evidence in support of the verdict.þ 

Ryan,

279 Mont. at 510, 928 P.2d at 230. Here, the District Court concluded, and the 

parties

do not dispute, that the record contained evidence upon which the jury could have 

based

its decision that DeMars bore partial responsibility for the accident. Having held 

that

Carlstrom did not render a judicial admission, and in light of the conflicting 

evidence of

record regarding the issue of liability for the accident, we conclude the District 

Court

properly permitted the issue of contributory negligence to go before the jury. 

Thus, we

hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying DeMarsþ motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

B. Motion for new trial.

 DeMars alternatively moved for a new trial on the issue of liability pursuant to

õ 25-11-101(7), MCA, which provides that the court may order a new trial where there

was an þerror in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the

applicationþ and which þmaterially affected the substantial rightsþ of the aggrieved 

party. 

 We review a district courtþs denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion. Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376, 395, 913 P.2d 625, 637; Hando v.

PPG Industries, Inc. (1995), 272 Mont. 146, 149, 900 P.2d 281, 283. See also Tope v.

Taylor (1988), 235 Mont. 124, 131-32, 768 P.2d 845, 849-50 (reviewing denial of

motion for new trial pursuant to õ 25-11-102(7), MCA, for manifest abuse of 

discretion).

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 For the reasons discussed above, we hold the District Court did not err in

permitting the question of comparative negligence to go before the jury. 

Accordingly,

we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in denying DeMarsþ alternative motion 

for

a new trial

 In summary, we conclude, as did the District Court below, that Carlstromþs

testimony did not constitute a binding judicial admission because it did not 

constitute an

unequivocal statement of fact. Therefore, we hold the District Court properly 

permitted

the question of comparative negligence to go before the jury and did not abuse its

discretion in denying DeMarsþ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or her

alternative motion for a new trial. 

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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