SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3559-18

 A-3240-19

ABIGAIL WEIDEL,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD A. WEIDEL, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

Argued (A-3559-18) and Submitted (A-3240-19) 

October 28, 2021 – Decided November 18, 2021

Before Judges Mawla and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, 

Docket No. FM-11-0161-13.

Derek M. Freed argued the cause for appellant/crossrespondent (Ulrichsen Rosen & Freed LLC, attorneys;

Derek M. Freed, of counsel and on the briefs; Lauren 

Koster Beaver, Amanda E. Nini, and Neethi 

Vasudevan, on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3559-18

Brian G. Paul argued the cause for respondent/crossappellant (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, PC, 

attorneys; Brian G. Paul, of counsel and on the briefs). 

PER CURIAM

These are back-to-back appeals, consolidated for purposes of this opinion. 

In A-3559-18, defendant Richard A. Weidel, Jr., appeals from: a May 4, 2016 

order granting plaintiff Abigail Weidel summary judgment declaring a purported 

pre-nuptial agreement (PNA) and a subsequent amendment unenforceable; a 

September 12, 2016 order denying reconsideration; equitable distribution 

provisions of a December 26, 2018 dual final judgment of divorce; an April 12, 

2019 order denying reconsideration of the judgment; and equitable distribution 

provisions of an April 12, 2019 amended judgment. Plaintiff cross-appeals from 

portions of the equitable distribution provisions and the court's retroactive 

calculation of pendente lite support contained in the April order and amended 

judgment. In A-3240-19, defendant challenges a March 3, 2020 post-judgment 

order granting plaintiff's motion to enforce litigant's rights and counsel fees. 

When the parties began dating in 1983, defendant worked for his father's 

real estate business. Soon, the parties moved in together. Plaintiff also started 

working for defendant's father's business as well. The parties were engaged in 

February 1985. Shortly before the parties' wedding in July 1985, defendant 
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hired an attorney to prepare the PNA. There is no signed PNA in the record. 

According to an unsigned version of the document, all property acquired before

and during the marriage in one party's name would remain separate, including 

defendant's businesses "The Richard A. Weidel Corp. [(RAWC)], Princeton 

Mortgage Corp. [(PMC)] and all of their affiliates or any entities into which such 

companies may evolve." The PNA also contained an alimony provision. 

The PNA contained a schedule of assets, but plaintiff did not recall seeing 

it and defendant could not recall if it was attached to the agreement plaintiff 

signed. Moreover, the schedule did not identify defendant's interest in Weidel 

Corp., a premarital business, and did not state the value of RAWC, PMC, their 

affiliates, or defendant's income or debts. The document also lacked a schedule 

of plaintiff's assets. Although the PNA stated each party had counsel, plaintiff 

testified she did not have an attorney. 

In 1991, plaintiff was pregnant with the parties' third child and financially 

dependent on defendant when he presented her with an "Amendment to AnteNuptial Agreement." An attorney who previously represented plaintiff in 

drafting a will and separately represented the parties' business drafted the 

amendment. Plaintiff was not represented, and signed the document without 

reading. She testified that she felt she could not refuse to sign.
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Like the original PNA, the amendment lacked a schedule of plaintiff's 

assets and contained an incomplete schedule of defendant's assets. It did not 

identify the value of Weidel Corp., RAWC, PMC, the Princeton School of Real 

Estate, Richard A. Weidel Referral Corp., or the life insurance policy defendant 

owned on his father. The amendment also stated the marital residence belonged 

to defendant despite the property's transfer into both parties' names in 1990. It

also addressed the contemplated purchase of a new marital residence and altered 

the formula for support payments to plaintiff in the event of separation or 

divorce.

Before the marriage, defendant purchased the first marital residence and 

an investment property located at 166 North Union Street in Lambertville. The 

investment property was encumbered by a $105,000 mortgage as of the date of 

marriage. During the marriage, defendant purchased two more properties in 

Lambertville: 41 North Union, whose mortgage was paid from the rental income, 

and 46 York Street, which defendant claimed was paid for with a down payment 

from an account used to maintain the properties and premarital assets. The 

parties formed Coryell Properties, LLC to operate all three investment 

properties. In addition to raising the children and homemaking, plaintiff 
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managed the LLC, advertised, secured tenants, collected rent, and paid property 

expenses with funds from a marital bank account. 

RAWC was founded by defendant's grandfather and was later expanded 

by defendant's father into a brokerage. Defendant's father diversified RAWC by 

creating PMC, the real estate school, the referral business, and a Pennsylvania 

brokerage called R.A. Weidel Corporation. In 1989, defendant acquired an 

ownership interest in RAWC through a Stock Cross Purchase Agreement 

(SCPA) with his father. The SCPA established RAWC's purchase price and 

defendant's exclusive right to purchase the business from his father, including 

at his father's death. The SCPA also required each of them to maintain life 

insurance, the proceeds of which would fund the purchase of the deceased 

partner's interest. Defendant's father also executed a will bequeathing three 

RAWC properties to defendant. Between 1989 and 2003, defendant purchased

the rest of RAWC's shares. 

The parties acquired several more properties during the marriage, 

including Pennington Road Properties, 2482/2490, LLC which owned two 

commercial buildings relevant to these appeals. The parties also owned various 

notes receivable, stocks, bank accounts and retirement accounts.
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Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2012. In 2015, she moved for pendente lite 

support. The parties entered a March 26, 2015 consent order granting plaintiff 

$6,000 per month of unallocated non-taxable support, up to $1,000 per month in 

vehicle expenses paid through the businesses, and health insurance paid by 

defendant. The parties agreed defendant would pay "[a]n additional unallocated 

non-taxable monthly payment that will be quantified at final resolution of the 

case that is not less than $3,000 per month or more than $10,000 per month,

retroactive to February 1, 2015 . . . ." The order also stated:

The parties have reserved their rights regarding a 

judicial finding as to [p]laintiff's reasonable and 

appropriate pendente lite budget. The parties agree that 

[p]laintiff's pendente lite budget shall not be less than 

$10,000 per month or more than $17,000 per month,

and will attempt to agree upon an amount at final 

resolution of the case. If the [c]ourt is required to 

adjudicate the issue at the time of the final hearing, 

[p]laintiff's total pendente lite budget shall not be found 

to be less than $10,000 per month or more than $17,000 

per month, inclusive of Schedule "A," "B," and "C" 

expenses. This budgetary determination by the parties 

or court shall be made effective as of February 1, 2015, 

with [d]efendant receiving credit for all payments that 

he made . . . .

In March 2016, plaintiff moved for summary judgment dismissal of

defendant's claim to enforce the PNA and its amendment. The judge granted the 

motion. She found the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement because defendant 
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failed to produce a signed copy of the document. She also found the PNA 

unenforceable because it waived plaintiff's interests in RAWC and PMC before 

defendant even owned the entities. The judge concluded the lack of financial 

disclosures rendered plaintiff's "waiver of her future marital rights" 

unenforceable. The judge also found the amendment unenforceable because the 

attorney who prepared it had a conflict of interest. On September 12, 2016, the 

judge denied defendant's motion for reconsideration.

During the ensuing twenty-day divorce trial, the court heard testimony 

from the parties and twelve other fact and expert witnesses. The trial judge 

made extensive findings in her October 1, 2018 written opinion, an amended 

October 9 opinion, the December 26, 2018 judgment, and a January 9, 2019 

supplemental opinion.

The judge granted plaintiff thirty-three percent interest of the value of 

RAWC, PMC, the real estate school, R.A. Weidel Corp., and the referral 

company. She rejected defendant's argument that fifty-seven of the 100 shares 

acquired in the businesses were gifts from his father because the SCPA and the 

father's will stated shares could only be acquired by purchase. 

The trial judge also awarded plaintiff thirty-three percent of the life 

insurance proceeds, again rejecting defendant's argument they were a gift. She 
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found defendant's testimony incredible because the life insurance application 

designated defendant as the policy owner and defendant paid the premiums.

The judge awarded plaintiff a thirty-five percent interest in the value of

Princeton Assurance Corp., Weidel Corp., and a note receivable held by Weidel 

Corp. She awarded plaintiff thirty-three percent of the equity in the real estate 

branch offices, forty-five percent of a farm property, and fifty percent of the 

equity in the marital residence. The judge found 166 North Union Street had a 

value of $180,000 at the start of the marriage and was encumbered by $135,000 

in debt, resulting in $45,000 of pre-marital equity. The parties stipulated the 

property's value at the time of trial was $560,000. The judge concluded only 

$140,000 of the property's value was subject to equitable distribution. The judge 

found the 46 York Street property subject to equitable distribution and rejected 

defendant's argument the $75,000 down payment on the property was exempt 

from equitable distribution because it was paid from pre-marital assets.

Plaintiff's equitable distribution was more than ten million dollars, which 

the judge ordered paid through in-kind transfers, lump sum payments, and 

periodic payments.1 Among the properties awarded in-kind, the judge awarded

plaintiff the 2482/2490 Pennington Road commercial buildings, reasoning the 

1 Defendant's equitable distribution was nearly double plaintiff's.
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rental income would sustain her at the marital standard of living. The property 

housed the RAWC corporate headquarters, PMC, and the real estate school,

which the judge noted were in the process of vacating the premises. 

The judge attached post-judgment interest to the payment portion of the 

equitable distribution and ordered the payments be secured by a mortgage to 

plaintiff. The judge did not specify which properties would secure the 

mortgages. The judge denied plaintiff's request for pre-judgment interest 

because she received over $1.3 million as an advanced equitable distribution, 

defendant paid the pendente lite carrying costs on the parties' properties, and 

defendant had substantial equitable distribution payments to make postjudgment. Because defendant would have to pay plaintiff her share of the 

business values through a taxable dividend, the judge reduced plaintiff's share 

of the amount she would receive by an amount equivalent to the tax. 

The trial judge concluded plaintiff required $18,007 per month to live 

reasonably comparable to the marital lifestyle. The judge awarded plaintiff a 

pendente lite credit of $163,184, representing $3,472 per month for the fortyseven-month pendente lite period of additional support owed to plaintiff. The 

figure was calculated by setting a pendente lite budget for plaintiff of $13,372 

per month, subtracting the $7,000 defendant agreed to pay pendente lite, and 
10 A-3559-18

$2,900 in income imputed to plaintiff. The judge denied plaintiff's request for 

alimony and each party's request for counsel fees. 

Each party filed motions for reconsideration related to the court's award 

of the Pennington Road property to plaintiff. Relevant to the issues raised on 

appeal, defendant certified, "we have continued the process of moving [the 

businesses] out of 2482 [Pennington Road]. The process is irreversible." The 

parties ultimately agreed plaintiff should retain the Pennington Road property. 

The trial judge entered the April 12, 2019 amended judgment, incorporating 

their agreement to transfer the property to plaintiff "subject to existing leases" 

by July 1, 2019. 

After the transfer, plaintiff learned defendant entered multi-year leases 

with PMC and Princeton Assurance Corporation to continue occupying the 

property. Plaintiff rejected the leases and filed a post-judgment enforcement 

motion in July 2019, which was heard by the post-judgment motion judge. She

alleged defendant failed to execute the mortgages to secure his equitable 

distribution obligations and failed to vacate the Pennington Road property. She 

requested defendant pay her rent of thirteen dollars per square foot under a triple 

net lease, commencing July 2019 until the businesses vacated the property. 

Plaintiff did not quantify the triple net expenses. 
11 A-3559-18

On October 29, 2019, the motion judge found defendant in violation of 

litigant's rights for failing to execute the mortgages. She ordered the parties to 

negotiate the terms of the mortgages granting plaintiff "all rights and remedies" 

of a mortgage, as stated in the amended judgment. The judge also ruled 

defendant violated the judgment by failing to vacate the property. She ordered 

the businesses to vacate within thirty days and granted plaintiff's request for 

rent. 

In January 2020, plaintiff filed a second enforcement motion. She alleged 

defendant failed to execute the mortgages. She also sought $103,073.83 in past 

due rent, which she calculated at the thirteen-dollars-per-square-foot-rate for the 

entire building plus triple net expenses less defendant's payments. Plaintiff 

alleged defendant's businesses occupied the entire property as sole tenants, 

frustrating her ability to market and sell the buildings. She also sought counsel 

fees.

Defendant filed a cross-motion and opposition to plaintiff's motion. He 

admitted the businesses formerly occupied the entire property, but claimed he 

owed back rent only for the portion the businesses currently occupied. He 

disputed the rental rate, asserting thirteen-dollars-per-square-foot-rate already
12 A-3559-18

included triple net expenses. In the cross-motion, he argued plaintiff should be 

compelled to cooperate with the October 2019 order.

On March 3, 2020, the motion judge found defendant violated the October 

2019 order by failing to execute the mortgages. The judge denied defendant's 

cross-motion, noting the October order identified the properties securing the 

mortgages based on the parties' agreement. She also found defendant violated 

the October order by failing to pay the rent. She concluded the October order

procedurally barred him from contesting the amount of the rent. The judge 

further ordered defendant to pay the sum of rent sought in plaintiff's motion. 

She granted plaintiff $7,315 in counsel fees, reasoning defendant had the greater 

ability to pay, plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith, and plaintiff

succeeded on her enforcement motion.

I.

In A-3559-18, defendant raises the following points on appeal:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARED THE 

PNA AND THE AMENDMENT TO BE 

UNENFORCEABLE.

. . . .
13 A-3559-18

B. Plaintiff's Motion for a Partial Summary 

Judgment Should Have Been Denied as There Were 

Disputed Genuine Facts.

C. Enforcement of the 1985 PNA Is Not 

Barred by The Statute of Frauds as a Matter of Law.

D. The PNA Was Ratified by the Amendment 

and Any Disputed Material Facts Concerning the 

Agreement's Ratification Should Have Been Construed 

in Defendant's Favor.

E. The Trial Court Erred by Entering 

Summary Judgment Given the Caselaw.

F. Plaintiff's Claim that the 1991 Amendment 

Was Unenforceable Due to An Alleged Conflict of 

Interest Was Based on Questions of Fact Involving 

Subjective Elements and Credibility, Which Should 

Not Have Been Resolved by Summary Judgment.

G. Plaintiff's Claim Regarding the 

Enforceability of the 1991 Amendment Due to Alleged 

Lack of Full Financial Disclosure Was Based on 

Questions of Fact Involving Subjective Elements and 

Credibility, Which Should Not Have Been Resolved by 

Summary Judgment.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS AS IT 

PROVIDED PLAINITFF WITH EQUITABLE 

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS THAT WERE EXEMPT 

EITHER IN WHOLE OR PART.

. . . .

B. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied 

Defendant's Request to Exclude the Life Insurance 
14 A-3559-18

Proceeds Derived from the Life Insurance Policy 

Covering Defendant's Father's Life and [Fifty-Seven 

Percent] of the RAWC Entities from the Marital Estate.

C. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Rule 

that [Fifty-Seven Percent] of the RAWC-Related 

Entities Defendant Received by way of Gift were 

Exempt from Equitable Distribution.

D. The Trial Court Erred when it Declined to 

Find that any Portion of the Down Payment Defendant 

made on 46 York St. was Exempt from Equitable 

Distribution.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE 

MANNER IN WHICH IT TREATED THE DIVIDEND 

TAX INCURRED BY DEFENDANT WHEN 

EFFECTUATING PAYMENT OF EQUITABLE 

DISTRIBUTION.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE 

PERCENTAGES OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 

IT AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.

A. Plaintiff Should Have Received a Lesser 

Percentage of the Business Entities.

B. The Plaintiff's Percentage Share of the 

Coryell Properties Should Have Been Reduced.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR 

RECONSIDERATION.

Plaintiff raises the following points in her cross-appeal:

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF THE 
15 A-3559-18

RETROACTIVE PENDENTE LITE CREDIT 

REQUIRED UNDER THE PARTIES' MARCH 26, 

2015 CONSENT ORDER.

[II.] [THE TRIAL JUDGE'S] DETERMINATION 

ONLY $140,000 OF THE $515,000 OF 

APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF 166 NORTH

UNION ST. THAT TOOK PLACE DURING THE 

MARRIAGE IS SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE 

DISTRIBUTION IS NOT BASED UPON 

SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE 

RECORD AND FAILS TO COMPORT WITH 

CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

[III.] PURSUANT TO [RULE] 4:42-11(a)(iii), THE 

COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 

PLAINTIFF POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE 

$3,345,000 OF REAL ESTATE (2482/2490 

PENNINGTON RD. AND 46 YORK STREET) SHE 

WAS AWARDED IN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 

IN THE DECEMBER 26, 2018 FINAL JUDGMENT 

OF DIVORCE, BUT WAS NOT RECEIVING UNTIL 

JULY 1, 2019; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

AWARDING TEMPORARY ALIMONY UNTIL THE 

JULY 1, 2019 TRANSFER TOOK PLACE.

A.

We defer to a trial judge's factfinding "when supported by adequate,

substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "We

do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make

conclusions about the evidence." M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 293 (App.
16 A-3559-18

Div. 2018) (quoting Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super.

486, 498 (App. Div. 2008)). "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare,

154 N.J. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117

(1997)). However, "legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions

to the facts, are subject to our plenary review." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super.

552, 568 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

The Family Part has "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters,"

which often requires the exercise of reasoned discretion. Cesare, 154 N.J. at

413. Judges have broad discretion to allocate assets in equitable distribution. 

Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Steneken v.

Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2004)). If we conclude there is

satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial judge's findings, our "task is

complete and [we] should not disturb the result." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480,

496 (1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). 

Similarly, "the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . [and] will be left undisturbed 
17 A-3559-18

unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. 

ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).

We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same legal 

standard as the trial court. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire 

Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Summary judgment must be 

granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment or order as a matter of law." Ibid. (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). 

B.

Having thoroughly considered the record and the parties' arguments, we 

affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the pendente lite motion judge 

and the trial judge. We add the following comments. 

Summary judgment for plaintiff was proper because there is no credible 

dispute that: the PNA was unsigned; there was no full financial disclosure; and 

plaintiff was unrepresented. Under these circumstances, a hearing was not 

required to adjudicate the enforceability of the PNA because it was 

unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute of Frauds. See N.J.S.A. 25:1-

5(c). 
18 A-3559-18

Notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, defendant notes we have reversed 

summary judgment where the parties admitted the existence of an agreement but 

lacked a copy of the fully executed agreement. Gabesons Realty Co. v. 

Natelson, 208 N.J. Super. 684, 686-87 (App. Div. 1986). However, Gabesons

is inapposite because it did not concern a pre-nuptial agreement, which requires

full financial disclosure and must be "fair and not unconscionable." See Rogers 

v. Gordon, 404 N.J. Super. 213, 219 (App. Div. 2008). Moreover, unlike 

Gabesons, here there was no mutual understanding that the parties had signed 

an agreement.

Defendant's argument the amendment ratified the PNA is misplaced. We 

recently stated

mid-marriage agreements are generally unenforceable 

as they are "inherently coercive." [Pacelli v. Pacelli, 

319 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 1999).] A midmarriage agreement is "entered into before the marriage 

[has] lost all of its vitality and when at least one of the 

parties, without reservation, want[s] the marriage to 

survive." Id. at 190-91. Such agreements are carefully 

reviewed because they are "pregnant with the 

opportunity for one party to use the threat of dissolution 

'to bargain themselves into positions of advantage.'" Id.

at 195 (citation omitted).

[Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 436 (App. Div. 

2021) (second and third alterations in original).]
19 A-3559-18

In Steele, we reversed the entry of a declaratory judgment, which 

determined the parties' mid-marriage agreement was a pre-nuptial agreement. 

Id. at 443. On remand, we directed the trial court to apply "heightened scrutiny," 

review the document for "fundamental fairness," consider the adequacy of the 

financial disclosure, and consider the circumstances of the negotiation and 

execution of the document. Ibid. 

Here, regardless of how the amendment is styled, it bears the hallmarks of 

an unenforceable mid-marriage agreement. Plaintiff was not represented by 

independent counsel and there was no credible dispute that there was no full 

financial disclosure. Therefore, the hearing required in Steele was unwarranted

and plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

C.

Plaintiff appeals from the trial judge's adjudication of the pendente lite 

support credit. She also challenges the equitable distribution of the appreciation 

on the marital portion of the value of 166 North Union Street, and the lack of 

post-judgment interest or a temporary alimony award for the approximately 

seven month period she awaited her equitable distribution. 
20 A-3559-18

As we noted, plaintiff sought pendente lite spousal support. In the March 

2015 consent order, the parties agreed to a pendente lite payment subject to a 

final adjudication by the court, which could be no less than $10,000 and no 

greater than $17,000 per month. 

Initially, in adjudicating the pendente lite credit, the trial judge found

plaintiff required $18,007 per month to maintain the marital standard of living. 

Because the figure exceeded $17,000, the judge reduced the figure by the $7,000 

per month defendant had paid and concluded plaintiff should receive an 

additional $9,000 retroactive to February 1, 2015. 

However, in the trial judge's January 9, 2019 supplemental opinion, she

concluded, sua sponte, her initial ruling was wrong and reasoned: 

In resolving this issue in the October opinion, the court 

did not consider the standard dictated by the consent 

order – a "reasonable and appropriate" budget pending 

resolution of the case. The court utilized the marital 

standard of living as the measure, which is not what the 

consent order requires. The consent order focuses on a 

budget that is "reasonable and appropriate" pending 

resolution of the case, not post-judgment. 

Ignoring her findings regarding the marital lifestyle, the judge prepared 

her own Case Information Statement budget for plaintiff, adjusted plaintiff's

budget, and set a pendente lite budget of $13,372 per month. The judge reduced 
21 A-3559-18

this figure by $2,900 in imputed income and the $7,000 support plaintiff 

received, leaving a $3,472 per month credit. 

The judge denied plaintiff's reconsideration motion. She found the 

consent order did not require her "to simply use the $18,007 per month 

(representing a standard of living reasonably comparable to the marital 

standard). That is what was done in the October opinion inadvertently, and that 

is why it was re-adjusted sua sponte." Plaintiff urges us to reverse.

Pendente lite support awards are subject to amendment after trial because 

they are typically established by the submission of certifications and without the 

benefit of a plenary hearing. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. 

Super. 8, 11-12 (App. Div. 1995). 

In many instances the motion judge is presented reams 

of conflicting and, at times, incomplete information 

concerning the income, assets and lifestyles of the 

litigants. . . . Absent agreement between the parties, 

however, a judge will not receive a reasonably 

complete picture of the financial status of the parties 

until a full trial is conducted. 

[Id. at 16.] 

The Supreme Court has emphasized the goal of spousal support "is to 

assist the supported spouse in achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable 

to the one enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the marriage." 
22 A-3559-18

Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000), see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4). 

Because spousal support is so closely identified with the marital lifestyle, even 

where parties have settled their divorce, they must address the marital lifestyle 

in the settlement. See R. 5:5-2(e) (providing a range of options, including 

preserving the means to calculate the marital standard of living and agreeing the 

marital lifestyle is satisfied by the settlement). The marital lifestyle is the

yardstick to measure and establish appropriate spousal support, whether 

pendente lite or post-judgment. See S.W. v. G.M., 462 N.J. Super. 522, 532-33 

(App. Div. 2020) (holding that fashioning spousal support from the pendente 

lite lifestyle is an error because it ignores the statutory mandate to consider 

marital lifestyle and does not capture how the parties actually lived). 

A court must enforce written agreements absent unconscionability, fraud, 

or overreaching. Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 47 (2016). Waivers must be done 

"clearly, unequivocally, and decisively." Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 

265, 277 (2013) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003)). There 

must also be valuable consideration to enforce a waiver. Fattore v. Fattore, 458 

N.J. Super. 75, 88 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. 

Indus. Tr. Co., 27 N.J. 144, 152-53 (1958)). 
23 A-3559-18

We are unconvinced plaintiff waived the applicability of the marital 

lifestyle to the calculation of pendente lite support. The consent order contained 

no such language. Plaintiff sought alimony, and convinced the trial judge she 

needed $18,007 per month to sustain herself in accordance with the marital 

lifestyle. Therefore, the judge was required to start with the marital lifestyle in

calculating the reasonable and appropriate amount of the Mallamo credit. For 

these reasons, we reverse the calculation of the pendente lite credit and direct 

the court to utilize the marital lifestyle figure of $18,007 per month to determine 

the reasonable and appropriate pendente lite budget for plaintiff, not exceeding

$17,000 per month. 

The remaining arguments raised on the cross-appeal relating to the 166 

North Union Street property and the post-judgment interest lack sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

II.

In A-3240-19 defendant asserts the following points:

I. PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 

MARCH 3, 2020 ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED, 

AS DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROCEDURALLY 

BARRED FROM ASSERTING THAT HIS 

BUSINESSES OCCUPIED ONLY [FIFTY 

PERCENT] OF THE OFFICE BUILDING LOCATED 

AT 2482 PENNINGTON ROAD.
24 A-3559-18

. . . .

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CALCULATION OF 

THE ALLEGED RENT ARREARS 

MISCALCULATED THE TRIPLE NET EXPENSES.

III. PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE TRIAL 

COURT'S MARCH 3, 2020 ORDER SHOULD BE 

REVERSED, AS THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE 

SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING THE 

TERMS OF THE MORTGAGES THAT WOULD ACT 

AS SECURITY FOR DEFENDANT'S 

OBLIGATIONS.

. . . .

IV. [PARAGRAPH] 6 OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 

MARCH 3, [2020] ORDER REQUIRING 

DEFENDANT TO PAY $7,315 IN COUNSEL FEES 

TO PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY SHOULD BE 

REVERSED [BECAUSE THE] DECISION IS NOT 

BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE 

RECORD AND LACKS A RATIONAL 

EXPLANATION.

A trial court's enforcement of litigant's rights is subject to an abuse of 

discretion standard. Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). 

Likewise, "[t]he assessment of counsel fees is discretionary." Slutsky v. 

Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 365 (App. Div. 2017) (citations omitted). 

In Points I and II, defendant challenges the post-judgment motion judge's

rent calculation for the Pennington Road property under a triple net lease. "A 
25 A-3559-18

'triple net' or 'net-net-net' lease is a lease in which a commercial tenant is 

responsible for 'maintaining the premises and for paying all utilities, taxes and 

other charges associated with the property.'" Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Dev. 

Corp., 388 N.J. Super. 392, 400 n.2 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting N.J. Indus. Props.

v. Y.C. & V.L., Inc., 100 N.J. 432, 434 (1985)).

Notwithstanding this definition, we conclude the motion judge erred in 

ruling defendant was barred from disputing the rent calculation because the 

expenses included in the rent were not adjudicated in the October 2020 order. 

The judge did not explain her decision to impose the base rent plus the additional 

expenses. See R. 1:7-4(a). The only trial evidence in the record on the matter 

was an appraisal prepared by plaintiff's real estate expert in which he opined the 

rental rate for the Pennington Road property was "15,104 square feet at [thirteen 

dollars] per square foot = (Triple Net) $196,352." For these reasons, we remand 

this issue for further findings. 

Our decision to remand the rent issue does not affect the counsel fee award 

because those fees were clearly warranted considering defendant's failure to 

vacate the Pennington Road property or comply with the October 2020. The 

remaining arguments raised on this appeal lack merit. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 
26 A-3559-18

III.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part in A-3559-18. 

Affirmed in part and remanded in part for further findings in A-3240-19. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.