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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1607
U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

N I C OL A S A L E G R

I A-S AL D ANA

, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Western Di v i sio n. No. 11 CR 50 06 5- 1 — Frederic k J. K apa la , Judg e.
A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 16, 2013

— D E C I D E DA P RI L 17, 2014

Before K AN N E, R OVN E R , and W I L L I AM S

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Ni colas Alegr i a-Saldana, a ci tizen of Mex ico , challen ges the di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to di smi ss hi s indic tment for i llegal reent ry after remov al. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b) (1). He enter ed a condi tional guil t y p l e a but mainta ins t hat the charges should be di smi ssed based on alleged due-pro ce ss violati ons in the underlyin g remov al
or der

. Becaus e Alegr i a-Saldana has no t met the statuto ry2 No. 13-1607 requirements to collaterally attack hi s remov al or der , 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), we affi rm the dis tr i ct court’s j udgment. Alegr i a-Saldana enter ed the Uni ted St ates a t t he age of 7, becam e a lawfu l perman ent resi dent at 20, but w as charged wi th remov abi li ty at 34—in 2003—by i mmi gr ation authoriti es fo r co mmi tting an aggr av ated felony , s e e 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)( i i ), and a contro lled-s ubs tance o ffense, see id. § 1227(a)( 2)(B) (i ). During remov al pr oceedi ngs, he conceded that hi s tw o convic tions for possess ing cocaine inv olv ed a contro lled sub stance. But hi s lawy e r arg ued that mere possess i on w as not a drug-tr affi cking cri me, and thus not an aggr av ated felony

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 43)(B) (defin ing

“ aggr av ated felony” as “i lli ci t tr affi cking in a contro lle d sub stance”). The di stincti on matter ed becau se an aggr av ated felony deter mina t i on w ould render hi m statuto rily ineli gib le fo r di screti onary relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (3). Based o n preced e nt fr om the Board of Immi gr ation Appeals, the i mmi gr ation judge ruled that Alegr i a-Saldana’s convic tion for cocaine possess i on w as an aggr av ated fe l ony , and deni ed hi s appli cati on for canc ellation of remov al. See 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (defining cocaine possess i on as felony under state law); In re Y anez-Ga r cia , 23 I & N Dec. 390, 398 (BIA 2002) (ch aracter i zing state felony convic tions for drug possess i on as aggr av ated feloni es). A l e g r i a-Saldana di d not appeal that deci si on, and he w as remov ed to M exic o tw o months later

. The agency precedent on whic h t he i mmi gr ation judge relied w as ov ert ur ne d three y ears later when the Supreme Court ruled that mere p os s e ssi on w as not an aggr av ated felony und e r i mmi gr ation law

. Lopez v
. Gonza les , 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006); see also Gonza les-Gomez v

. Achim , 4 4 1 F .3d 532, 535 (7thNo. 13-1607 3
Ci r
. 2006) (Illinoi s felony convic tion for possess ing cocaine di d not bar lawfu l permanent resi dent from seeki ng di screti onary relief ). B y then Alegr i a-Saldana had reent ered the Uni ted St ates i llegally

, and he w as again convict ed in Illinoi s of possess ing cocaine. St ate authoriti es turned hi m o v er to i mmi gr ation offi ci als after hi s release in 2011. Alegr i a-Saldana w as charged wi th i llegal presence in the Uni ted St ates after remov al, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b) (1), but he sought to di smi ss the indi ctment based on alleged defi ci enci es in the underlyin g remov al or d e r , see id. § 1326(d). Under § 1326(d), a defendant may collatera l l y a t tack the remov al
or der in a cri minal proceeding by showing (1 ) e x haustion of admini strat i v e remedies, (2) un av ai labi li ty of judi ci al rev i ew duri ng the remov al process, and (3) fund amental unfai rness of the re mov al order

. See id. § 1326(d)( 1)–(3)

. Alegr i a-Saldana maintai ned that he sati sfi ed these three requirements. He poin ted fi rst to hi s lawy er’s alleged defi ci enci es, and explain ed in an affi davit that he beli ev ed hi s lawy er w ould fi le an appeal. He noted that hi s lawy er reserved hi s right to appeal and poin ted out that the i mmi gr ation judge di scu ssed his lawy er’s ro le in the appeal process, statin g that “[y]our lawyer has 30 days to decid e if a n appeal wi ll be perfected or n ot, and y ou could deci de that any tim e betw een the next 30 days

. ” S e cond, Alegr i a-Saldana arg ued that he lacked “any understanding or particu lar knowledge of the law” and di d not hav e the abi li ty to fi le an appeal on h i s own. Fin ally , he challen ged the fai rness of the remov al or der in li ght of the S upreme Court ’s later decis i on in Lopez, 549 U.S. at60.4 No. 13-1607
The di stric t court deni ed Alegr i a-Saldana’ s motion to di smi ss the indi ctment, finding that he had not met any of the § 1326(d) require me nt s to challen ge the underlyin g remov al
o r d e r
. F i r s t , A l e g r i a
- S a l d a n a f a ile d t o e x h a u s t h i s admini strat i v e remedies becau se he nei ther appeale d the deci si on nor asked hi s attor ney to do so. T o the ex tent t hat he suggested that hi s i mmi gr ation lawyer prov i ded ineffec tiv e assi stance, the court noted that hi s lawy er nev e r p ro mi sed to fi le an appeal. Second, Alegr i a-Saldana di d not take adv antage of the form of judicia l r eview av ai lable at the tim e of hi s remov al proceedings—h abeas co r pus relief—an d he di d not justif y why he fai led to file a p e t i tion o ther than asserti ng hi s gener al lack of legal knowledge. And thi rd, he could not show that the remov al or der w as fund amentally unfai r becau se he had no due-process right to apply for dis cretionary r eli ef. On appeal Ale g r ia -Saldana challen ges the di stric t court’s deci si on wi th respect to all three requirements of § 1326(d). W e hav e not deci ded whether a l l t hree mus t be met before a collateral attack can proceed, though w e hav e imp l ied that i s the case. See United States v
. Lara-Unzueta, 735 F .3d 954, 961 (7th Ci r . 2013) (dec lining to deci de i ssu e). As to the fi rst requirement, Alegr i a-Saldana arg ues that the d ist ric t court err ed in ruling that he fai led to exhaust his admini strat i v e remedies, giv en hi s beli ef that hi s i mmi gr ation lawy er w ould fi le an appeal. He maintains that he w as “entitled to interpr et that reserv ation [of the right to appeal] by
couns el as meaning that hi s atto rney w ould ei ther follow thro ugh on the perfection of the appeal or advis e [Alegria-Saldana] of h i s deci si on not t o follow thr ough.”No. 13-1607 5
B ut the di stric t court’s finding reg ardin g exhausti on is
corr ect. Despi te being informed of hi s right to appeal, he di d not fi le an appeal or ask hi s lawyer to do so, and thus he fai led to exhaust hi s av ai lable r e me di es. See United States v
. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F .3d 724, 728–29 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (ali en may not collaterally attack remov al or der when “he and hi s lawy er
w ere inf or med of hi s ri ght to pu rsue such an [adm ini strat i v e] appeal” and hi s lawy er reserved right to appeal); United States
v
. V i llavicen cio-Burruel , 608 F .3d 556, 559–60 (9th Ci r
. 2010) (sam e). Nor di d Alegr i a-Saldana exhaust hi s av ai lable remedies in the form of a motion to r e open, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7); United Stat es v

. Arita- Campos , 607 F .3d 487, 491–92 (7th Ci r
. 2010), whi ch w ould hav e allow ed the Board to consid e r whether hi s lawyer w as ineffec tiv e for not
commu ni cating wi th hi m after the remov al he aring, see In re Lozada, 19 I & N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) (setti ng out
r e quirements to bri ng ine ff e ct ive- a ss ist a nc e cl a im in i mmi gr ation proceedings) ; se e al so United States v
. Cern a , 603 F .3d 32, 42 (2d Ci r
. 2 0 1 0 ) (excus ing lack of exhausti on when lawy er promis ed to fi le an appeal duri ng remov al hearin g and fai led to do so). Second Alegr i a-Saldana arg ues gener ally that the di stric t court err ed in conclu ding that judi ci al rev i ew w as av ai lable in the form of a petiti on for habeas corp us. He concedes that judi ci al rev i ew exis ted “in theor y” but asserts that i t w as unav ai lable “as a practic al matter ” becau se, betw een the entry of hi s r emov al or der and his actual remov al, he had only tw o months to r esearch the law or fi nd a new l awy er

. Th e d i s tr i c t c ou rt c or re c tly d e ter mined that Alegri a
- Sa l d a n a di d not meet hi s burden of p r ov ing that he w as unabl e to6 No. 13-1607 petiti on for judi ci al re l ie f. See Arita- Campos , 607 F .3d at 493; United States v
. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F .3d 1015, 1019 (7 t h C ir

. 2006). The court here conc l uded that he fai led to meet thi s burden becau se he offered no explanation o t he r t han that he lacked “any understanding or particu lar knowledg e of the law .” As the co ur t noted, ali ens are presumed capabl e of researchin g ge n e ra lly av ai lable remedies, see Bayo v
. Napolita no , 593 F .3d 495, 505 (7th Ci r
. 2010); Dimen ski v. INS , 275 F .3d 574, 578 (7 t h Ci r
. 2001) (“In i mmi gr ation law , as in tax law—and cri minal law

, t o o , wher e knowledge of the law i s presumed—the Constituti on permi ts the government to leav e people to their own research.”) (internal ci tation omi tte d), and Alegr i a-Saldana offers no other reason to thi nk that tw o months w as not enough t ime to fi le a petiti on for habeas
co rpus, see Arita- Campos , 607 F .3d at 492 (39 days betw een arr est and remov al w as su ffi ci ent time f or ali en to fi le motion to r eopen). Fin a l l y Al e gr i a
- Sa l d a n a a rgu e s th at the di stric t court should hav e r ul e d t hat hi s remov al or der w as fund amentally unfai r becau se the incorre ct aggr av ated-felony deter minat ion depriv ed hi m of the oppor tuni ty to apply fo r di screti onary relief. But, as the court noted, fai lure to consi der a n a l i en for discretionary relief does not violate due process and thus i s not fund amentally unfai r
. See Arita- Campos , 607 F .3d at 493; United S ta tes v
. De Horta Garcia , 519 F .3d 658, 661 (7th Ci r
. 200 8 ) ; Santiago-O c h oa , 447 F .3d at 1020 (collecting cases from other ci rcui ts). A minority of ci rcui ts do recog ni ze a procedural dueprocess right to seek di screti onary relief, but ev en these courts consi der whether the i mmi gr ation judge err ed “under the governing case law at the tim e of [remov al],” United States v
.No. 13-1607 7
Gom e z , 7 3 2 F .3d 971, 987 (9th Ci r
. 2013), and require ali ens to show prejudi ce in the form of a “reasonable pro babi li ty” t hat they w ould hav e receiv ed relief, see United States v

. Daley, 702 F .3d 96, 101 (2d Ci r
. 2012). Alegr i a-Saldana’s rem ov al or der relied on agency precedent, see In re Y anez-Ga r cia , 23 I & N Dec. at 398, and he has no t a t t empted to show any li kelih ood that the Board of Immi gr ation Appeals—after consi dering hi s tw o convic tions for drunk driving, tw o convic tions fo r cocaine p os s e s s i on

, a n d a c onvi cti on for domesti c batter y—w ould hav e exer ci sed i ts di screti on in his favor

. See In re Sotelo-Sot elo , 23 I&N Dec. 201, 205–06 (BIA 2001) (di screti onary relief no t
w arr anted for lawfu l permanent resi dent wi th U.S.-ci tizen chi ld who had smu ggled ali ens into Unit e d St ates). Though Alegr i a-Saldana w as unabl e t o seek canc ellation of remov al, the Supreme Court ’s deci si on in Lopez di d reduce the potent i al puni shm ent for hi s i llegal reent ry : becau se hi s convic tions are no longer aggr av ated feloni es, t he statuto ry maxi mum w as 10 y ears i nstead of 20. See8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1)–( 2). AFF IRM ED.