SEE DISSENTING OPINION

Filed 8/29/16



## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BRISTOL

- MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY , ) ) Petitioner, ) ) S 221038
v. ) ) Ct.App. 1/2 A140035 THE SUPERIOR COURT ) OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY , ) ) San Francisco County Respondent; ) Super. Ct. JCCP No. 4748 ) BRACY ANDERSON et al., ) ) Real Parties in Int erest. )

________________________________ ____ )

Bristol

- Myers Squibb Company (BMS) , a pharmaceutical manufacturer , conducts significant business and research activities in California but is neither incorporated nor headquartered here

. In March 2012, eight separate amended complaints were filed in San Francisco Superior Court by or on behalf of 678 individuals, consisting of 86 California residents and 592 nonresidents, all of
who m allegedly were prescribed and ingested Plavix, a drug created and marketed by BMS, and as a result suffered adverse consequences

. BMS contests the propriety of a California court ‘s exercising personal jurisdiction over it for purposes of adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims

. Under the particular circumstances present here, we conclude personal jurisdiction is authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, which2

extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible under the U nited States
Constitution . Although BMS‘s business contacts in California are insufficient to i nvo ke general jurisdiction , which permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of the subject of the litigation, we conclude the company‘s
Calif ornia activities are sufficiently related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ suits to support th e invocation of speci fic jurisdiction, under which personal jurisdiction is limited to specific litigation related to the defendant‘s state contacts . ( See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446 ( Vons ) .) Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held
that BMS was subject to the personal jurisdictio n of the California courts on the
basis of specific jurisdiction.

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug used to inhibit blood clotting. In the eight amended complaints filed in the superior court , 86 California
residents and 592 residents of 33 other states sued BMS and McKesson Corporation, a pharmaceutical distributor headquartered in California, for injuries allegedly arising out of their use of Plavix. 1 The state in which the largest number of plaintiffs reside i s Texas, with 92 plaintiffs, followed by the 86 California plaintiffs , followed by Ohio, with 71 plaintiffs.
Each amended complaint contains the sa me 13 causes of action: strict products liability (based on both design defect and manufacturing defect ) ; negligence; breach of implied warranty; breach of express warranty; deceit by

1 A ninth case, filed in Santa Clara Superior Court by the County of Santa Clara against defendants was also joined with the other eight cases and assigned to a coordination trial judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. The complaint filed in that matter is not in the record before us nor is it a subject of dispute among the parties as to matters of personal jurisdiction.3

concealment (Civ

. Code, §§ 1709, 1710 ) ; negligent misrepresentation; fraud by concealment; unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 ); false or misleading advertising (Bus. & Prof. Code , § 17500 ) ; injunctive relief for false or misleading advertising ( Civ

. Code , § 1750 et. seq. ) ; wrongful death; and loss of consortium.
The plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in ―negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of Plavix.‖ According to the complaint s, defendants allegedly promoted the drug to

consumers and physicians by falsely representing it ―as providing greater cardiovascular benefits, while being safer and easier on a person‘ s stomach than aspirin , ‖ but defendants knew those claims were untrue b ecause ingesting Plavix allegedly involves ―the risk of suffering a heart attack, stroke, internal bleeding, blood disorder or death [which] far ou tweighs any potential benefit.‖
P laintiffs allege different injuries, and sometimes combinations of injuries , which they claim were caused from the ingestion of Plavix. These injuries include
b leeding, bleeding ulcers, gastrointestinal bleeding, cerebral bleeding, rectal bleeding, heart attack, stroke, hemorrhagic stroke, subdural hematoma, thrombotic
thr om bocy topenic purpura , and death. The complaints allege that 18 of the 678 individuals whose injuries underlay these actions died as the result of ingesting
Plavix.
The action s were assigned as a coordinated matter to a judge of the San
Francisco Superior Court

. BMS moved to quash service of summons on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it to adjudicate the claims of the 592 nonresident plaintiffs, who are real parties in interest in this proceeding (hereafter referred to

as ― the nonre sident plaintiffs ‖). BMS noted that the complaints‘ allegations do not4

include any factual claims that the nonresident plaintiffs‘ injuries occurred in
California or that they had been treated for their injuries in California. In declarations supporting the motion, BMS officers stated that the
company is incorporated in Delaware , is headquartered in New York City , and maintains substantial operations in New Jersey, including major research and development campuses. BMS has approximately 6 , 475 employees in the New
York and New Jersey area, comprising 51 percent o f its United States workforce. BMS further asserted that its research and development of Plavix did not take place in California, nor was any work related to its labeling, packaging, regulatory ap proval, or its advertising or marketing strategy performed by any of its employees in this state. BMS has never manufactured Plavix in California. These activities were instead performed or directed from the company‘s New York headquarters and New Jersey operating facilities. According to data provided by the company, in a 12

- month period ending in July 2012, BMS‘s sales revenue from Plavix sales in California constituted 1.1 percent of the company‘s
total nationwide sales revenue of all of its products

. But the declarations submitted by BMS also disclosed that the company
maintains substantial o perations in California , includ ing five offices that are primarily res earch and laboratory facilities employing approximately 164 people

. BMS additionally employ s approximately 250 sales representatives in the state. BMS also has a small office in Sacramento to represent and advocate for the company in state government affairs. In opposition to the motion to quash, plaintiffs submitted materials showing
that BM S sold almost 187 million Plavix pills to distributors and wholesalers in
California in 2006

- 2012, with sales revenue of almost $918 million. Furthermore, plaintiffs noted that BMS maintains a registered agent for service of process in
California

.5

The sup erior court denied BMS‘s motion to quash service of summons, concluding the company‘s sales and other activities in California were sufficiently extensive to subject it to the general jurisdiction of the state courts. BMS petitioned the Court of Appeal fo r a writ of mandate, naming the nonresident plaintiffs as real parties in interest. The Court of Appeal first summarily denied the petition on the same day as the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. ___ [ 134 S.Ct.
746 ] ( Daimler ) , which clarified limits on general jurisdiction

. W e granted review
and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal for issuance of an order to
show cause in light of Daimler . After briefing and oral argument, the Cour t of Appeal again denied the writ, this time by an opinion holding that BMS‘s
activities in California were insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction in the

state , but that , given the nature of the action and BMS‘s activities in California ,

our co urts may properly exercise specific jurisdiction over BMS in this matter. We granted BMS‘ s petition for review, requesting briefing on both types of personal jurisdiction, general and specific.
II. D ISCUSSION Under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, California courts ―may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this

s tate or of the United States.‖ ― The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State‘s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. ‖ ( Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121].) ― Due process limits on the State‘s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant

— not the convenience of plaintiffs

or third parties. ‖ ( Id . at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 1122].) Under the federal Constitution, a court exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process as long as the defendant ― has6

such minimum contacts with the state that the as sertion of jurisdiction does not
violate  ̳ ― traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ‖ ‘ ‖ ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 444 , quoting International Shoe Co. v. Wash ington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 ( International Shoe ).) Plaintiffs bear th e initial burden of proving state contacts sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) The jurisdiction of courts to render judgment against a person is historically grounded in the courts ‘ power over the person, originally premised

on a person‘s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at p. 316.) Because ― the corporate personality is a fiction, ‖ however, a corporation‘s ―  ̳ presence ‘ ‖ in a state must be determined by the activities of its agents ( ibid. ) , and the demands of due process in this context ― may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. ‖ ( Id. at p. 317.) In some cases, the corporation‘s continuous activities within the state have been found ― so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. ‖ ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at p. 318 .) This has become known as ―general,‖ or ―all

- purpose , ‖ jurisdiction. ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. ___ [ 134 S .Ct. 746, 751, 754 ] .) In other circumstances, where the company‘s activities in the forum state are more limited, general jurisdiction may be lacking but jurisdiction may nonetheless
be proper because the litigation is derived from obligations that ― arise out of or are
connected with the [company‘s] activities within the state

. ‖ ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at pp. 319 , 320.) This has become known as ―specific,‖ or ― case

linked , ‖ jurisdiction. ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. a t pp. 751,7

754 ] ; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ [ 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 ] ( Goodyear )

. )

― When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant ‘ s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreas onable. [Citation.] When there is conflicting evidence, the trial court ‘ s factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record. ‖ ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) Although t he briefing and record at the trial court did not have the benefit of being informed by the high court‘s decision in Daimler , there appear s to be no material factual conflicts nor any dispute over any factual findings in the superior
court. We , therefore , consider the possible exercise of each type of jurisdiction as

a m atter of law and on the undisputed facts.
A . General Jurisdiction
1

. Case law concerning general jurisdiction
The landmark 1945 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. 310, serves as the starting point of mode rn jurisprudence concerning general jurisdiction. Although the high court resolved that case under a specific jurisdiction theory, it also described general jurisdiction as embracing ― instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a

state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. ‖8

( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at p. 318.) Subsequent to International Shoe , the high court has addressed the concept of general jurisdiction in only a handful
of cases.
In Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437 ( Perkins ) , the high court concluded that a company that had temporarily ceased mining operations
abroad and had reloca ted its limited corporate activities to Ohio could be sued in
Ohio on a cause of action unrelated to its Ohio corporate activities. ( Id. at
pp. 447

- 448.) In Perkins , because of the wartime Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands , a Philippine corpo ration had ceased mining operations on all its properties there , but it maintained limited corporate activities through its president and principal sharehol der who had relocated to Ohio. A shareholder then sued the company in Ohio for unpaid dividends and for its failure to issue her certifi cates for her shares of stock. The high court applied the standard set forth in
International Shoe and concluded that the president‘s business activities through
his home in Ohio reflected ― a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company. ‖ ( Perkins , supra , 342 U.S. at p. 448.) The high court in Perkins explained that after the company‘s mining operations ceased due to the occupation, t he president of the company retu rned to
his residence in Ohio. He kept a home office there , maintaining the company ‘s
files . From that office he ― carried on correspondence relating to the business of the company and to its employees , ‖ drew and distributed salary checks on behalf
of the company, used and maintained two active Ohio bank accounts carrying
substantial balances of the company ‘s funds , retained another Ohio bank to act as transfer agent for the stock of the co mpany, held several directors‘ meetings in his
home or home office , ― supervised policies dealing with the re habilitation of the corporation‘ s properties in the Philippines ‖ from his Ohio home office, and9

dispatched funds from Ohio to cover purchases of machinery for such
rehabilitation. ( Perkins , supra , 342 U.S. at p. 448.) The high court observed that although ― no mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the company, many of its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of its president in that State
at the time h e was served with summons. ‖ ( Perkins , supra , 342 U.S. at p. 448.) Thus, the company‘s wartime operations had been effectively shifted almost entirely to the president‘s home office in Ohio, which meant that ― under the circumstances above recited, it woul d not violate federal due process for Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding. ‖ ( Ibid .) In other words, the requirements for the exercise of general jurisdiction were met.
In Helicopteros Nacionales d e Colombi a v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408 ( Helicopteros ) , the high court concluded that general jurisdiction was not supported in the forum state when the defendant corporation was based abroad , had no physical presence in the forum state other than limited business p urchases
and contract negotiations , and the cause of action arose abroad and was unrelated

to the company‘s contacts with the forum state. In Helicopteros , the survivors of
four U nited S tates citizen s , who had died in a helicopter crash in Peru, filed wrongful death actions in Texas against the owner and operator of the helicopter, a Colombian corporation. ( Id. at p p

. 409

- 410.) Prior to the helicopter crash, the Colombian corporation had conducted contract negotiations in Texas with the
decedent s‘ Texas employer to provide helicopter services, bought helicopters in
Texas , and sent employees there for training, but did not conduct other operations

or maintain a place of business in the state. None of the plaintiffs or their
decedents resided in T exas

. ( Id. at p p. 410

- 412 .) The high court concluded that neither the negotiation of a single contract and receipt of contractual payment through a Texas bank, nor the purchase of helicopters and associated employee10

training sessions in Texas , constitute d ―the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts ‖ th at had justified general jurisdiction in Perkins

. ( Helicopteros at p. 416 ; see id . at pp. 416

- 418 .) More recently, in Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. 2846 ] , and
Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. ___ [ 134 S.Ct. 746 ] , the high court significantly elaborated upon its analysis of general jurisdiction, clarifying that in order to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation its contacts with the
forum state must be so exte nsive as to render the company essentially ―  ̳ at home ‘ ‖ in the state. ( Daimler , supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 751; see Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2851 ] .) The United States Supreme Court‘s description of general jurisdiction for purposes of the federal due process clause, as set forth in Goodyear and Daimler , is binding upon us and, as explained below, dictates the conclusion that BMS is not subject to the general jurisdiction of California courts.
In G oodyear , the high court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish support for the exercise of general jurisdiction where the defendant companies were based abroad, sold only a limited quantity of their products in the forum state, and the cause of action

— involving the defendants‘ products sold abroad

— also arose abroad

. In that case, two young men from North Carolina were killed in a bus accident outside Paris, France. ( Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2851 ] .) Their paren ts attributed the accident to an allegedly defective tire manufactured by Goodyear‘s subsidiary in Turkey and filed suit in a North Carolina state court, naming Goodyear and its subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg as defendants. ( Id. at pp.

___ -

_ __ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2851

- 2852 ]

. ) Although a small percentage of their tires was distributed in North Carolina by other Goodyear affiliates, the foreign subsidiaries challenged the North Carolina
court‘s exercise of general jurisdiction over them , contending that they did no11

direct business and employ ed no workers in North Carolina . ( Id

. at pp. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2850, 2852 ] .) The high court first noted that North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy be cause the accident had occurred abroad and the allegedly defective tire had been manufactured and sold abroad. ( Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2851 ] .) The court then held
that the defendant corporations ‘ contacts with North Carolina were also insufficient for general jurisdiction: ― Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at
home in North Carolina. Their attenuated connections to the State

. . . fall fa r short of

. . .  ̳ the continuous and systematic general business contacts‘ necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State. ‖ ( Goodyear , supra , at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2857 ] , quoting Helicopteros , supra , 466 U.S. at p. 416 .) The Goodyear court explained its ―at home‖ rule for corporations as analogous to a natural person‘s
domicile in the forum state: ― For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general j urisdiction is the individual‘ s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home .‖ ( Goodyear , supra , at p. ___ [ 13 1 S.Ct. at pp. 2853

- 2854 ] .) Three years after Goodyear , in Daimler , supra, 571 U.S. ___ [ 134 S.Ct. 746 ] , the court further elaborated on its articulation of the ―at home‖ requirement. In Daimler, Argentini an residents brought an action in California against DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler), a German public stock compa ny , alleging that its wholly owned subs idiary, Mercedes

- Benz Argentina, had ― collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill ‖ the plaintiffs or their relatives in Argentina during that nation‘s ―  ̳ Dirty War. ‘ ‖ ( Daimler , supra , at
p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 750

- 751 ] .) The p laintiffs‘ claim of general jurisdiction12

over DaimlerChrysler in California was based in significant part on the California
activities of another Daimler Chrysler subsidiary, Mercedes

- Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) . Al though incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New Jersey,
MBUSA had substantial facilit ies in California, using them to import and
distribute Mercedes

- Benz automobiles in the state . ( Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at
p p. 751

- 752 ] .) Even attributing to Daimler Chrysler the activities of its subsidiary, MBUSA, the high court nevertheless found Daimler Chrysler ‘s contacts with California insufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over it . ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___ [ 134 S.Ct. at p

. 760 ] .) T he court reiterated its observation in Goodyear that a corporation‘s state of incorporation and its princip a l place of
business are the two ―paradigm all

- purpose forums

. ‖ ( Daimler , supra, at p.

___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 760.) Although it did not li mit general jurisdiction to those two
circumstances , the Daimler court explained that general jurisdiction may not be based merely on activities in the forum state that can be characterized as continuous and systematic; rather, the corporation‘s activities must be ―  ̳so

― continuous and systematic ‖ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State. ‘ ‖ ( Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 761 ] , quoting Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. at
p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2851 ] .)
The Daimler court acknowledged that in an exceptional case such as Perkins ―a corporation‘ s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at ho me in that State. ‖ ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 19 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 761, fn. 19 ] .) The court, however, emphasized the truly

―  ̳exceptional facts‘ ‖ of Perkins , where ―[g] iven the wartime circumsta nces, Ohio could be considered  ̳ a surrogate fo r the place of incorporation or head office. ‘ ‖ ( Daimler , supra , at p. ___, fn. 8 [134 S.Ct. at p. 756, fn. 8 ] .) Daimler Chrysler ‘s13

activities in California, the court observed, ― plainly do not approach that level .‖ ( Id. at p. ___, fn. 19 [134 S.Ct. at p

. 761, fn. 19.)
Furthermore , in responding to a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor , the Daimler majority made clear that the general jurisdiction inquiry ―does not  ̳focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant‘s in

- state contacts.‘ ‖ ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 20 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20 ] .) Instead, general jurisdiction ―calls for an appraisal of a corporation‘s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.‖ ( Ibid .) Otherwise, a corporation with significant operat ions in many states would be deemed at home in all of them. ( Ibid. ) The majority reasoned that t o allow the adjudication in California of a dispute arising solely in Argentina merely based on MBUSA‘s sales activities in the state would give the same glob al adjudicatory reach to every state in which Daimler Chrysler or its subsidiary had sizeable sales. The court rejected such an ― exorbitant
exercise [] of all

- purpose jurisdiction ‖ because it would defeat the ability of out

- of

state defendants to structure their conduct so as to have some predictability regarding the possibility of being subjected to litigation in a given forum state

. ( Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p p. 761

- 762 ] .) The high court also made clear that because the plaintiffs in Daimler had never attempted to argue that California could assert specific jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler , the court had no reason to undertake such an analysis. ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___ [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 758 ] .)
2

. Plaintiffs have failed to show that BMS is subject to general jurisdiction in California
The United States Supreme Court‘s at home rule for general jurisdiction over a corporation, as articulated in Goodyear and Daimler , and, to some extent
Perkins , defeats the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claim that California may assert general jurisdiction over BMS

. BMS may be regarded as being at home in Delaware,14

where it is incorporated , or perhaps in New York and New Jersey, where it
maintains its principal business centers

. A lthough the company‘s ongoing
activities in California are substantial , they fall far short of establishing that is it at home in this state for purposes of general jurisdiction

. Similar to the California subsidiary in Daimler , BMS has sold large volumes
of its products in California. Nevertheless, the high court plainly rejected the theory that a corporation is at home wherever its sales are ―sizeable.‖ ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p.___ [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 761 ] .) BMS employed approximately 164 people in California in addition to its 250 sales representatives in this state.
But the company‘s total California operations are much less extensive than its
activities elsewhere in the United States

. As noted earlier, i n New York a nd New Jersey alone, BMS employed approx imately 6 , 475 people, 51 percent of its United
States workforce. In a ssessing BMS‘s California business activities in comparison to the company‘s business operations ―in the ir entirety, nationwide,‖ we find nothing to warrant a conclusion that BMS is at h ome in California. ( Daimler , supra , at p. ___, fn. 20 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20 ] .) As the high court warned in
Daimler , t o conclude that BMS may be sued in California on any cause of action,
whether or not related to its activities here, under a theor y of general jurisdiction, would be to extend globally the adjudicatory reach of every state in which the company has significant business operations. The nonresident plaintiffs stress that in neither Goodyear nor Daimler did the high court strictly limit general jurisdiction to a company‘s state of incorporation

or its principal place of business. Nevertheless, both decisions make clear that the suitability of general jurisdiction is rooted in the concept of an individual‘s
domicile and its equivalent place for a corporation . ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at
p. ___ [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 760 ] ; Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. 437 [ 131 S.Ct. at
pp. 2853

- 2854 ] .) Therefore, setting aside the state of a company‘s incorporation15

or its headquarters, a pl aintiff has the burden of showing that a company‘s conduct in a given forum state may be so substantial and of such a kind as to render it at
home there

. Goodyear and Daimler approved t he finding of general jurisdiction in
Perkins , supra , 342 U.S. 437 . Th at case involved the exceptional fact pattern of a mining company‘s wartime relocation of its overseas operations to Ohio, which functioned as the equivalent of the corporation‘s headquarters through a home
office in the company president‘s own residence

. Quite literally, the mining company in Perkins was also at home in this unique context. But n othing in the
record of the present matter suggests that California has served as the equivalent of BMS‘s headquarters, even temporarily. The nonresident plain tiffs also rely on the fact that BMS has long been regist ered to do business in California and has maintained a n agent for service of
process here. California law, however, requires a foreign corporation transacting business here to name an agent in the s tate for service of process. (Corp. Code, § 2105, subd. (a)(5).) As the high court has explained, ―[t] he purpose of state statutes requiring the appointment by foreign corporations of agents upon whom process may be served is primarily to subject them to the jurisdiction of local
courts in controversies growing out of transactions within the State

. ‖ ( Morris &
Co. v. Ins. Co. (1929) 279 U.S. 405, 408

- 4 09 , italics added.) Accordingly, a corporation‘s appointment of an agent for service of process , when required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated
to its California transactions. The ―designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business in California alone are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction.‖ ( Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 268, citing DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1095 ; Gray Line Tours v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 190, 194 .)16

Finally, the nonresident plaintiffs argue BMS is subject to general jurisdiction in California because it has contracted for distribution of Plavix with McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in San Francisco , allowing BMS ―to make a substantial profit within California through McKesson‘s California
contacts.‖ As explained above , however, BMS ‘s sizeable sales of its products in
California are insufficient, under Goodyear , supra , 564 U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2846]
and Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746], t o make it at home in this state and subject it to the general jurisdiction of our courts. That some of these sales were made to or through a distributor headquartered here does not change the analysis. As a result, we conclude that BMS is not subject to t he general jurisdiction of
the California courts. B. Specific Jurisdiction
1

. Case law concerning specific jurisdiction Although the high court‘s recent cases have narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction, in Daimler the majority specifically commented on the continued viability and breadth of the court‘s preexisting specific jurisdiction jurisprudence

. In responding to the concern expressed by Justice Sotomayor in her separate opinion in Daimler that the court was committing an injustice by l imiting the availability of general jurisdiction, the majority remarked that ― Justice Sotomayor treats specific jurisdiction as though it were barely there‖ and that ―[g]iven the many decades in which specific jurisdiction has flourished, it would be hard to conjure up an example of the  ̳deep injustice‘ Justice Sotomayor predicts as a consequence of our holding that California is not an all

- purpose forum for suits against [ Daimler Chrysler] .‖ ( Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 10 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 758, fn. 10 ] .)17

T he basic precepts governing specific jurisdiction set forth in pre

- Daimler
decisions are well settled. In ascertaining the existence of specific jurisdiction , courts must analyze the ―  ̳relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
liti gation.‘ ‖ ( Helicopteros , supra , 466 U.S . at p. 414, quoting Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 U.S. 186, 204 .) The question of whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves examining (1) whether the defendant has ―  ̳purposefully directed‘ ‖ its activities at the forum state ( Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 774 ( Keeton ) ) ; (2) whether the plaintiff‘ s claims arise out of or are related to these forum

- directed activities ( Helicopteros , supra , 466 U. S. at p. 414); and (3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and does not offend ―  ̳ ― traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ‖ ‘ ‖ 2 ( Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113 (

Asahi ), quoting International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at p. 316

. ) In our own jurisprudence, we have said that a plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts to support the first two factors, which establish the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum state. Th e burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the third factor. ( Snowney v. Harrah’ s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 ( Snowney ) ; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 4 71 U.S. 462, 477 ( Burger King ) [― where a defendant who purposefully has direct ed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that

2 BMS states it is not contesting the first or third factors and that the company is contesting only whether the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs are related to its activities in California. But, as we will explain, BMS‘ s arguments are not as narrow as it contends. Accordingly, we will examine here all three factors relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis.18

the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unre asonable ‖] .)
Our courts have also explained that t he relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction is determined under the ―  ̳substantial connection‘ test,‖ which ―is satisfied if  ̳there is a substantial nexus or c onnection between the defendant‘ s for um activities and the plaintiff‘ s claim.‘ [Citation.]‖ ( Snowney , supra , 35
Cal.4th at p. 1068.) This test requires courts to evaluate the nature of the defendant‘s activities in the forum and the relationship of the claim to those
activities in order to answer the ultimate question under the due process clause : whether the exercise of jurisdiction in the forum is fair. U nder the substantial connection test, ―  ̳the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim
to those contacts are inverse ly related.‘ ‖ ( Ibid .) ―  ̳[T]he more wide ranging the defendant‘ s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.‘ [Citation.] Thus,  ̳[a] claim need not ar ise directly from the defendant‘ s forum c ontacts in order to be sufficientl y related to the

contact to warrant the exercise of specif ic jurisdiction.‘ .

. . Indeed,  ̳ ―  ̳[o]nly when the operative facts of the controversy a re not related to the defendant‘ s contact with the state can it be said that the c ause of action does not arise from that [contact].‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ ( Ibid .) Finally, t he defendant‘s activities in the forum state need not be either the proximate cause or the ―but for‖ cause of the plaintiff‘s injuries. ( Ibid. )
2

. Purposeful availmen t As the high court has explained, ―[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual‘s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful  ̳contacts, ties, or relations,‘ ‖ and that ―[b]y requiring that individuals have  ̳fair warning that a particular19

activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, ‖ ‘ the due process clause affords predictability and allows potential defendants to tailor their
condu ct ―  ̳with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.‘ ‖ ( Burger King , supra , 471 U.S. a t pp. 471

- 472 .) ―Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out

- of

- state defendant who has not co nsented to suit there, this  ̳fair warning‘ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has  ̳purposefully directed‘ his activities at residents of the forum, [citation], and the litigation results from alleged injuries that  ̳arise out of or relate to‘ those a ctivities.‖ ( Burger King , supra , 471 U.S. at p. 472 , fn.
omitted .) These activities cannot be the result of the unilateral actions of another party or a third person, because the ―  ̳purposeful availment‘ requirement ensures
that a defendant will not be h aled into a juri sdiction solely as a result of  ̳ random, ‘  ̳fortuitous,‘ or  ̳attenuated‘ contacts .‖ ( Id . at p. 475.) ―When a [ non resident defendant]  ̳purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,‘ [citation], it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing
its connection with the State.‖ ( World

- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ( World

- Wide Volkswagen ).)
In Snowney , a California resident filed a class action in this state a gainst a group of Nevada hotels , alleging several causes of action related to their purported
failure to provide notice of an energy surcharge imposed on hotel guests. ( Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1059

- 1060.) T he hotels conduct ed no business
and had no bank accounts or employees in California, but they advertised heavily
in this state using California

- based media, including billboards, newspapers, and
ads aired on radio and television stations , as well as a W eb site for room quotes20

and reservations

. They also received a significant portion of their business from
California residents who sta yed at their hotels

. ( Id . at p. 1059.)
This court held that the Nevada hotels had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in California because their W eb site had touted

― the proximity of their hotels to California ‖ and provided ― driving directions from California to their hotels, ‖ thereby ―specifically target[ing] residents of
California

. ‖ ( Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 106 4 .) Furthermore, ―[a] side from their Web site specific ally targeting California residents, defendants advertised extensively in California through billboards, newspapers, and radio and television stations located in California‖ and ―r egularly sent mailings advertising their hotels
to selected California residents .‖ ( Id . at p. 1065.) ― In doing so, defenda nts necessarily availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in California and could reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in California. ‖ ( Ibid .) In the present matter, there is no question that BMS has purposely availed
i tself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, invoking the benefits and protection of its laws, and BMS does not contend otherwise. Not only did BMS market and advertise Plavix in this state, it employ s sales representatives in
California , contracted with a California

- based pharmaceutical distributor, operates research and laboratory facilities in this state, and even has an office in the state capit a l to lobby the state on the company‘s behalf. As in Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th 1054, BMS actively and purposefully sought to promote sales of Plavix to California residents, resulting in California sales of nearly $1 billion over six years. Moreover, unlike the Nevada hotels in Snowney , BMS maintains a physical presence in California, employi ng well over 400 people here. Accordingly, we conclude that BMS has purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of California such that the first element of the test for specific personal21

jurisdiction is met concerning matters arising from or related to BMS‘s contacts
with the state. On the basis of these extensive contacts relating to t h e design, marketing , and distribution of Plavix , BMS would be on clear notice t hat it is subject to suit in California concerning such matters . ( World

- Wide Volkswagen,

supra , 444 U.S. at p. 19.)
3

. Arises from or is related to As previously described, ―for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to those contacts are inversely related.‖ ( Vons , supra , 1 4 Cal.4th at p. 452.) ―[T]he more wide ranging the defendant‘ s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.‖ ( Id . at p. 455.) Thus, ―[a] claim need not ar ise directly from the defendant‘ s forum contact s in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.‖ ( Id . at p. 452.)
In Vons , we assessed , on relatedness grounds, whether California courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over nonresident companies for cause s of
action involving out

- of

- state injuries that did not arise directly from their California contacts. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal. 4th 434 .) The plaintiffs in Vons were restaurant franchisees who brough t an action for loss of business after contaminated hamburger meat caused illn esses in California and Washington , resulting in adverse publicity . In California, the franchisees sued two parties: the
franchiso r and the hamburger supplier, Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons) , which processed hamburger patties in California and supplied them to the franchisor

. Vons cross

- complained against the franchisor and two Washington franchisees , suing them for negligence and indemnification for failing to properly cook the
h amburger meat at restaurants in Washington , causing the injuries and deaths to
customers there that gave rise to their joint liability with Vons . In Vons , the issue22

was whether the California court had specific jurisdiction over these two Washington

- based franchisees, Seabest Foods, Inc. , and Washington Restaurant Management, Inc. (WRMI). ( Id . at pp. 440

- 442.) Seabest‘s and WRMI‘s contacts with California included food purchases from California suppliers, sending personnel to franchis or training sessions in California, remitting franchise payments to California, permitting the franchisor ‘s inspection of their restaurants by its California

- based inspectors, and the negotiation of the ir franchis e agreements in California , which agreement s stated that any disputes would be governed by California law

. Because Vons was not a party to the franchise contracts for either Seabest or WRMI, those franchisees‘

contacts with California did not directly give rise to the cause s of action asserted by Vons . ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.) Nevertheless, this court found personal jurisdiction was properly exercised over them in California because the
forum contacts bore a substantial relation to the cause of action. We explained
that requiring the two Washington franchisees to answer to Vons‘s claim ― is not to allow a third party unilaterally to draw them into a connection wit h the state; rather, it was Seabest and WRMI who established the connection. ‖ ( Id . at p. 451.)
This court further elaborate d: ―A claim need not ar ise directly from the defendant‘ s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim bears a
substantia l connection to the nonresident‘ s forum contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate. The due process clause is concerned with protecting nonresident defendants from being brought unfairly into court in the forum, on the
basis of random contacts. That constitutional pro vision, however, does not provide defendants with a shield against jurisdiction when the defendant purposefully has availed himself or herself of benefits in the forum.‖ ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.)23

In the present matter, plaintiffs allege that BM S negligently designed and manufactured Plavix, failed to disclose material information in its advertising and promotion of Plavix and fraudulently and falsely advertised and promoted the product, and that BMS is liable to those who relied on such represen tations and were injured by Plavix

. T he ir complaint s also contend that ―Plavix was heavily marketed directly to consumers through television, magazine and internet advertising.‖ BMS does not contest that its marketing , promotion , and distribution
of Plavix was nationwide and was associated with California

- based sales representatives and a California distributor, McKesson Corporation, which plaintiffs allege is jointly liable

. The California pla intiff s ‘ claim s concerning the alleged misleading marketing and promotion of Plavix and injuries arising out of its distribution to and ingestion by California plaintiffs certainly arise from BMS‘s purposeful
contacts with this state , and BMS does not deny that it can be sued for such claims
in Californi a

. As to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, the Court of Appeal understood plaintiffs‘ complaints as alleging that BMS sold Plavix to both the California plaintiffs and the nonresident plaintiffs as part of a common nationwide
course of distribution

. BMS has not taken issue with that characterization, nor has
it asserted that either the product itself or the representations it made about the product differed from state to state

. Both the resident and nonresident plaintiffs‘
claims are based on th e sam e allegedly defective product and the assertedly misleading marketing and promotion of that product , which allegedly caused injuries in and outside the state

. Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims bear a substantial connection to BMS‘ s contacts in Cali fornia. BMS‘s nationwide marketing , promotion , and distribution of Plavix created a substantial nexus
between the nonresident plaintiff s‘ claims and the company‘s contacts in California concerning Plavix.24

P laintiffs also allege that BMS negligently developed and designed Plavix , which serves as the basis of its claims of products liability , negligence, and breaches of express and implied warranties. BMS maintains research and laboratory facilities in California , and it presumably enjoys the protecti on of our
laws related to those activities . Although there is no claim that Plavix itself was designed and developed in these facilities, the fact that the company engages in
research and product development in these California facilities is related to pl aintiffs‘ claims that BMS engaged in a course of conduct of negligent research and design that led to their injuries , even if those claims do not arise out of BMS‘ s research conduct in this state. Accordingly, BMS‘s research and development activity in Ca lifornia provides an additional connection between the nonresident plaintiffs ‘ claims and the company‘s activities in California

. BMS and our dissenting colleagues attempt to characterize the claims of the California plaintiffs a s ―parallel‖ to and fail ing to ―intersect‖ with the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims and argue based on this characterization that BMS‘s conduct in California is insufficiently related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims

. More specifically, BMS contends that the nonresident plainti ffs‘ claims would be exactly the same if BMS had no contact whatsoever with California. This
characterization ignores the uncontested fact that all the plaintiffs‘ claims arise out
of BMS ‘s nationwide marketing and distri bution of Plavix. T he claims are based not on ―similar‖ conduct, as our dissenting colleagues contend, bu t instead on a single, coordinated, nationwide course of conduct directed out of BMS‘s New York headquarters and New Jersey operations center and implemented by distributors and salesp ersons across the country

. (See Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 [reasoning that the interstate nature of a d efendant‘s business, while ―not an independent basis of jurisdiction ‖ weighs ― in favor of requiring him to defend here ‖ ].)25

Moreover , the argument that claims based on a nationwide course of conduct
fail to establish relatedness for purposes of minimum contacts rests on the invalid assumption that BMS ‘s forum contacts must bear some substantive legal relevance

to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims , as the dissent explicitly contends

. Yet in
Vons , this court carefully considered and ultimately rejected such a substantive
relevance requirement. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 475 [― we conclude that the
substantive relevance test is inappropriate ‖] .) Rather, it is sufficient if ―because of the defendants‘ relationship with the forum, it is not unfair to require that they answer in a California court for an alleged injury that is substantially connected to the defendants‘ forum conta cts.‖ ( Id. at p. 453.) Here, BMS‘s forum contacts , including its California

- based research and development facilities, are substantially connected to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims because those contacts are part of the nationwide marketing and distr ibution of Plavix , a drug BMS researched and developed, that gave rise to all the plaintiffs‘ claims

. BMS relies on two cases to contend that California courts may not exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant sued by a nonresident plaint iff for injuries occurring outside the state. But in both cases, the defendant company conducted no business in California and had no employees here. ( Fisher
Governor Co. v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 222, 224 [ the defendant had ―no employees or pro perty in California and has not appointed an agent to receive service of process here‖]; Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 715 ( Boaz ) [ the defendant had ―not been licensed to do business in California, and

. . . had neither salespersons, employees or representatives here, nor any offices, bank accounts, records or property in this state‖].) Our dissenting colleagues also rely on Boa z and a pharmaceutical case from the First Circuit, Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co . (1s t Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 213, which held that specif

ic jurisdiction had not been established because the plaintiff‘s cause of26

action did not ―arise from‖ the company‘s forum activities. ( Id at p. 216

. ) Although the facts of Glater are also involve the sales and marketing of an allegedly defective drug , the pharmaceutical company‘s contacts with the forum
state, New Hampshire , appear to have been far less substantial than BMS‘s
contacts to California. 3 Moreover, none of these cases had the benefit of our rea soning in Vons , where we made clear that we had adopted a sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction in which we recognized that ―the more wide ranging the defendant‘s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum

contacts and the claim.‖ ( Vons , supra , 1 4 Cal.4th at p. 455.) As previously described, BMS ‘s contacts with California are substantial and the company has enjoyed sizeable revenues from the sales of its product here

— the very product that is the subject of the cl aims of all of the plaintiffs. BMS‘s extensive contacts with California establish minimum contacts based on a less direct connection between BMS‘s forum activities and plaintiffs‘ claims than might otherwise be required

. In sum, t aking into account all of BMS‘ s activities in this state and their
relation to the causes of action at issue here , we conclude that the second element of specific jurisdiction is met, and hence, absent a showing to the contrary by

3 In addition, the dissent relies on Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235 , where the plaintiffs filed suit in Florida against a Delaware

- based trustee who had
no purposeful contacts with Florida , other than those caused by the unilateral activity of the pla intiffs

. The dissent‘s reliance on this case is inapposite because the high court concluded that the defendant in that matter had not purposefully availed herself ― of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefit s and protections of its laws .‖ ( Id . at p. 253.) Here, the parties do not contest that BMS has purposefully availed itself of California law.27

BMS, it would be consistent with due process for i t to be subject to litigation in this state concerning injuries allegedly caused by its product Plavix , including those injuries occurring out of state . Not only did BMS purposefully avail itself of the benefits of California by its extensive marketing an d distribution of Plavix in
this state and by contracting with a California distributor and employing hundreds
of California

- based salespersons, resulting in its substantial sales of that product here, but the company also maintains significant research and develop ment facilities in California

. All of plaintiffs‘ claims either arose from these activities
or are related to those activities

. The circumstance that numerous nonresident plaintiffs have filed their claims alongside those of resident plaintiff s does not alter
or detract from this substantial nexus. As previously discussed, t he due process protections afforded by the doctrine of specific jurisdiction are designed to give a potential nonresident defendant adequate notice t hat it is subject to sui t there , and , accordingly, a prospective
defendant can assess the extent of that risk and take measures to mitigate such risk
or eliminate it entirely by severing its connection with the state. ( World

- Wide Volkswagen , supra , 444 U.S. at p. 297.) Indeed, far from taking measures to mitigate the risk of suit in particular forums, BMS embraced this risk by coordinating a single nationwide marketing and distribution effort and by engaging in research and development in California. In that regard, BMS was o n notice that it could be sued in California by nonresiden t plaintiffs. In fact , our
courts have frequently handled nationwide class actions involving numerous nonresident plaintiffs. (See Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148; Wash ington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906 , 915 ; Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036; Rutledge v. Hewlett

- Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164 ; Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App. 4th 1 .)28

To the extent t hat BMS‘s arguments imply that a California court lacks personal jurisdiction over BMS to adjudicate the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs simply because the nonresident plaintiffs have no connection to and did not suffer any Plav ix

- related injuries in the state, the high court has repe atedly rejected such a focus

. The minimum contacts test assesses ―the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.‖ ( Shaffer v. Heitner , supra , 433 U.S. at p. 204.) As the high court explicitly declared in Keeton , a ―plaintiff‘s residence in the forum State is not a separate requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant‘s contacts.‖ ( Keeton , supra , 465 U.S. at p. 780 ; see also Walden v. Fiore , supra , 571 U.S. ___, ___ [ 134 S.Ct. 1115, 112 6 ] [― it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties,
who must create contacts with the forum State ‖]; Helicopteros , supra , 466 U.S. at
p. 412, fn. 5 [ t he plaintiffs‘ ―lack of residential or other contacts with Texas of itself does not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction‖]; Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 788 [ the ―plaintiff‘ s lack of  ̳contacts‘ will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction‖] ; Rush v. Savchuk (1980) 44 4 U.S. 320, 332 [―the plaintiff‘s contacts with the forum‖ cannot be ―decisive in determining whether the defendant‘s due process rights are violated‖] ; see also Epic Communications, Inc . v. Richwave Technology, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 314, 336 [―We fail to see how the non

California residency of plaintiff can make a  ̳compelling case‘ ‖ with respect to any of the factors supporting personal jurisdiction].) Finally, BMS and our dissenting colleagues further allege that permitting the
exercise of specific jurisdiction in California for the claims of nonresidents based on the company‘s nationwide sales and marketing would effectively subvert the holding of Daimler , supra , 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746], in which the co urt refused to base jurisdiction merely on nationwide sales. But BMS‘s argument

overstates the effect of our conclusion that specific jurisdiction is properly29

exercised here . Our decision does not render California an all

- purpose forum for filing suit ag ainst BMS for any matter, regardless of whether the action is related to its forum activities. Rather, as with any matter concerning specific jurisdiction,
the minimum contacts test is applied on a case

- by

- case basis, focusing on the

natu re and quality of the defendant‘s activities in the state

. ( Burger King , supra , 471 U.S. at pp. 474

- 475 .) We simply hold under this specific set of circumstances that, for purposes of establishing the requisite minimum contacts, plaintiffs ‘ claims concerning the allegedly defective design and marketing of Plavix bear a
substantial nexus with or connection to BMS ‘s extensive contacts with California as part of Plavix‘s nationwide marketing , its sales of Plavix in this state , and its
maintenan ce of research and development facilities here so as to permit specific jurisdiction

. 4

. The reasonableness of specific jurisdiction As previously described, after a plaintiff meets the burden of show ing that a defendant has purposefully established min imum contacts with the forum state, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the assertion of specific jurisdiction is unreasonable because it does not comport with ―  ̳ traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. ‘ ‖ ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at
p. 316

. ) BMS does not argue that the assertion of jurisdiction in this case would be fundamentally unfair, but does advance sever al arguments it contends defeat
the claim that their causes of action arose from or are related to its contacts with
California. A nalytically , these arguments are more pertinent to consideration of whether the exercise of spec ific jurisdiction is reasonable , not whether the
contested c laims arise from or relate to the company‘s forum activities. The questions raised by BMS

— whether California has an interest in litigating the claims of nonresidents, whether BMS will unfairly bear a disproportionate burden30

of defending itself against a ll nationwide claims in a single venue of relatively few resident plaintiffs, and whether California should expend its judicial resources on the claims of nonresident plaintiffs

— are all circumstances relevant to the issue of
whether BMS has established t hat the exercise of ju risdiction is unreasonable.
T hey do not bear upon the issue of whether the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims arise from or are related to BMS‘s activities in the forum state. Accordingly, we will examine these arguments using the crite ria governing reasonableness. In determining whether the defendant has established that the exercise of specific jurisdiction is un reasonable, the court ― must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff‘ s inte rest in obtaining
relief. ‖ ( Asahi , supra , 480 U.S. at p. 113 .) Although it must a lso weigh in its
determination ― the interstate judicial system‘ s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies [,] and the shared interest of the sever al States in furthering fundament al substantive social policies ‖ ( World

- Wide Volkswagen , supra , 444 U.S. at p. 292 ) , a requirement that may ―reflect [] an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis

- à

- vis other States‖ ( In surance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 703, f n. 10) , the due process clause ―is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.‖ ( Id

. at p. 703, fn. 10. ) Accordingly, ―[t]he relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States . . . [is] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.‖ ( Shaffer v.
Heitner , supra , 433 U.S. at p. 204.)

a
. The burden on defendant in litigating the claims in California BMS complains that joining the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs to those
of the comparatively small er group of California plaintiffs would unfairly distribute the company‘s burden of defending this mass tort action by requiring it31

to defe nd itself against all nationwide claims in a forum where only a minor portion of its sales occurred. However , as the Court of Appeal noted, regardless of whether California exercises jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims , BMS is already burdened by having to defend against the claims of 86 California plaintiffs. Certainly, the addition of 5 92 nonresident plaintiffs is a significant
added burden, but the alternative is to litigate the claims of these other 5 92 nonresident plaintiffs in a scattershot manner in various other forums, in potentially up to 34 different states. 4 Such an alternative would seem to be a far more burdensome distribution of BMS‘s resources in defending these cases than defending them in a single, focused forum.
Pret rial preparation and discovery concerning plaintiffs‘ claims may pose challenges given the diversity of their states of residence, but, as the Court of Appeal recognized, our state‘ s Civil Discovery Act provide s for taking depositions
outside California fo r use at trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2026.010.) Moreover,
information and documents relevant to plaintiffs‘ requests for discovery will likely
be located in New York or New Jersey, as will the individuals whom plaintiffs are likely to seek to depose, rega rdless of the venue in which the plaintiffs‘ claims are
filed. Finally, BMS has provided no evidence to suggest that the cost of litigating plaintiffs‘ claims in San Francisco is excessive or unduly burdensome for BMS

4 Our dissenting colleagues note that nonresident plaintiffs presumably could file their claims in Delaware or p erhaps New Jersey or New York, or in federal court, where they could be coordinated as part of multidistrict litigation, but nothing requires them to choose one of these forums rather than their home states.32

compared to any other relevant forum o r forums. 5 BMS, therefore, fails to show that its defense of plaintiffs‘ claim s in California places on it an undue burden.

b. California’s interest in providing a forum for plaintiffs in this
case BMS further claims that California has no legitimate in terest in adjudicating the claims of nonresidents because they have no connection to the state

. Admittedly, the fact that the nonresident plaintiffs greatly outnumber the California plaintiffs does give us some pause. But in ascertaining the
reasonablene ss of exercising specific jurisdiction, no one factor, by itself , is determinative. More important, there are identifiable interests our state holds in providing a forum for both the resident and nonresident plaintiffs.
First , e vidence of other injuries is ―admissible to prove a defective condition, knowledge, or the cause of an accident,‖ provided that the circumstances of the other injuries are similar and not too remote. ( Ault v. International Harvester (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113, 121

- 122; see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984)
37 Cal. 3d 540 , 555 [ evidence of prior accidents involving similar airplane with identical single

- engine stall

- spin characteristics was admissible]

. ) To the extent
that evidence of the injuries allegedly suffered by the non resident plaintiffs m ay be relevant and admissible to prove that Plavix similarly injured the California plaintiffs , trying their cases together with those of nonresident plaintiffs could promote efficient adjudication of California residents‘ claims

. California , therefore, has a clear interest in providing a forum for this matter

.

5 Of course, BMS is free to make such a showin g on a motion asserting forum non conveniens. ( Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751.) We merely hold that, for purposes of defeating specific jurisdiction, BMS fails to meet its burden.33

This interest is further underscored by the substantial body of California law aimed at protecting consumers from the potential dangers posed by prescription medication, incl uding warnings about serious side effects and prohibiting false and misleading labeling. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 4070

- 4078.) As this court has previously recognized, ―California has a strong interest in protecting its consumers by ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with the state‘s safety standards.‖ (

Asahi , supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 53.) It also bears reemphasis that there are no fewer than 250 BMS sales representatives in California. Although at this early stage of the proceedings, the record contains very little evidence concerning the promotional and distribution activities of these sales representatives, California has a clear interest in regulating their conduct. 6 (Cf. Bus

. & Prof

. Code , § 17500 [permitting claims by nonresidents who are deceived by representations ―disseminated from‖ the S tate of California ].)
In addition , California also has an interest in regulating the conduct of BMS‘s codefendant, McKesson Corporation , which is headquartered in California, as a joi nt defendant with BMS. As noted above, in Vons , we held that specific jurisdiction was proper over cross

- defendant s who entered into contracts in California that gave rise to the joint liability and the corresponding right to

6 Our dissenting colleagues contend that the record does not establish that BMS‘s sales representatives misled nonresident physicians concerning the safety and efficacy of Plavix or that McKesson was responsible for providing Plavix to any of the nonresident plaintiffs

. (Dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post , at pp. 11

- 12.) Certainly, the existence of such evidence would lend additional support to the question of whether the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs are not just related to but actually also arise out of BMS‘s contacts with California. But our discus sion here is merely focused on the reasonableness of asserting specific jurisdiction in this matter because our state has a n interest in regulating conduct in the pharmaceutical industry that could pose a danger to public welfare, regardless of residency.34

indemnification on which the cross

- claim s against them were based. ( See Vons , supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 456

- 457.) California‘s interest in adjudicating claims on
which McKesson Corporation , a California resident, may be jointly liable with BMS, a nonresident defendant, is readily apparent. Were BMS dismissed from nonresident plaintiffs‘ cases, California courts would be required to hear their claims against McKesson Corporation while the same plaintiffs litigated the same
claims arising from the same facts and the same evidence against BMS in a forum potentially on the o pposite side of the country.

c. Plaintiffs’ interest in a convenient and effective forum
Nonresident p laintiffs have obviously purposefully availed themselves of the jurisdiction of courts in this state by choosing to file all of their claims here

— strong evidence that the forum is convenient to them

. Eighty

- six of the 678 plaintiffs reside in California; only Texas, with 92 plaintiffs, is home to more. Moreover, the current forum, San Francisco Superior Court, is equipped wi th a complex litigation department that is well suited to expeditiously handle such large cases. BMS has not shown that this forum is inconvenient for plaintiffs.

d. Judicial economy and the shared interests of the interstate judicial system BMS argues that it would be a waste of California‘s judicial resources to provide a forum for the nonresident plaintiffs. To be sure, a single court hearing the claims of hundreds of plaintiffs is a significant burden on that court. But the
overall savin gs of time an d effort to the judicial system, both in California and interstate, far outweigh the burdens placed on the individual forum court. The
alternative that BMS proposes would result in the duplication of suits in in

numerous state or federal juri sdictions at substantial costs to both the judicial system and to the parties , who would have to deal with disparate rulings on
otherwise similar procedural and substantive issues.35

For claims of mass injuries stemming from a single product or event , plaint iffs often resort to the mechanism of the class action, which promotes

― efficiency and economy of litigation .‖ ( Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker (1983)
462 U.S. 345 , 349.) But, unlike class actions in which common questions of law, fact, and proximate cau se predominate among members of the plaintiff class,
―mass

- tort actions for personal injury most often are not appropriate for class action certification.‖ ( Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1123.) As this court has previously recognized, ― [t] he major elements in tor t actions for personal injury

— liab ility, causation, and damages

— may vary widely from claim to claim, creatin g a wide disparity in claimants‘ damages and issues of defendant liability, proximate cause, liability of skilled int ermediaries, comparative fault, informed consent, assumption of the risk and periods of
limitation. ‖ ( Ibid .) Yet, because mass tort injuries may involve divers e injuries or harm not amenable to the efficiency and economy of a class action, they present s pecial problems for the proper functioning of the courts an d the fair, efficient , and speedy administration of justice

. Without coordination, ―those who win the race to the courthouse [and] bankrupt a defendant early in the litigation process‖ would recover but effectively shut out other potential plaintiffs from any recovery. ( In re Exxon Valdez (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 790, 795

- 796.) Moreover, coordinated mass tort actions ―also avoid the possible unfairness of punishing a defendant over
and over again for the same tortious conduct.‖ ( Id . at p. 796.)
It is also important to note that many of the resident plaintiffs allege that Plavix caused them to suffer heart attacks, strokes, cerebral bleeding, and gastrointestinal bleeding. These are obviousl y severe medical conditions, and
California has an interest in ensuring that litigation brought by its residents is resolved in a timely fashion. By separating the nonresident plaintiffs from the36

resident plaintiffs and forcing the nonresidents to sue in other states, it is fair to anticipate delays in the California proceedings that would be created by the litigation and appeals of discovery and factual conflicts in the various other
forums. In that event , the California plaintiffs ‘ litigation could be s talled for a significant period without resolution. Likewise, defendants would suffer the costs created by delay and uncertainty as to their potential liability, if any. Moreover, the same concerns of delay and efficiency apply equally to the interstate j udicial system. The other forums have an equally strong interest in the fair, efficient, and speedy administration of justice for both their resident plaintiffs
and resident defendants. The consolidation of plaintiffs‘ claims in a single forum
is a mecha nism for promoting those interests. Of course, the other potential forums also have a sovereign interest in seeing their laws applied to actions such as this one . But for purposes of establishing the propriety of personal jurisdiction, the high court has stated, ― we do not think that such choice

- of

- law concerns should complicate or dis tort the jurisdictional inquiry.‖ ( Ke e ton , supra , 465 U.S. at p. 778.) Choice

- of

- law concerns might very well make a mass tort action unmanageable in certain circumstances, but that issue is not determinative at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, BMS has failed to carry its burden of show ing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in this matter is unreasonable.
III. C ONCLUSION We conclude that BMS, despite its significant business and research activities in California, is not at home in our state for purposes of asserting general personal jurisdiction over it. However, we conclude that in light of BMS‘s extensive contacts with California, encom passing extensive marketing and distribution of Plavix, hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue from Plavix sales, a relationship with a California distributor, substantial research and development facilities, and37

hundreds of California employees, court s may, consistent with the requirements of
d ue p rocess, exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims in this action, which arise from the same course of conduct that gave rise to California plainti ffs‘ claims: BMS‘s developm ent and nationwide marketing and
distribution of Plavix. BMS cannot establish unfairness: B alancing the burdens imposed by this mass t ort action , and given its com plexity and potential impact on the judicial system s of numerous other jurisdictions , we co nclude that the joint litigation of the nonresident plaintiffs ‘ claims with the claims of the California plaintiffs is not an unreasonable exercise of specific jurisdiction over defendant
BMS

.

IV. D ISPOSITION The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed

. C ANTIL - S AKAUYE , C. J.

W E C ONCUR :
L IU , J. C UÉLLAR , J
. K RUGER , J.DISSENTING OPINION B Y WERDEGAR, J.

The court holds today that 592 plaintiffs residing in states other than California may sue Bristol

- Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in a California superior court for injuries resulting from these plaintiffs‘ use in their own states of BMS‘s prescription drug, Plavix. Because BMS is not incorporated or based in California, its activities in the state are insufficient to establish general p ersonal jurisdiction

—

jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to the company‘s California
activities

— over it in California courts. (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 2.) The majority, however, finds BMS‘s California contacts sufficient for specific, case

- related
persona l jurisdiction, even though Plavix was not developed or manufactured in California and the nonresident plaintiffs did not obtain the drug through California physicians or from a California source, and despite the requirement for specific jurisdiction that there be a substantial connection between the plaintiff‘s claim and the defendant‘s forum activities. ( Id. at pp. 16

– 28; see Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 452 ( Vons ).) I respectfully dissent from the court‘s decision on personal jurisdiction. I agree the extent and type of contacts to support general jurisdiction are lacking.
But I find in the record no evidence of contacts with California that bear a
substantial connection to the claims of these nonresidents. I th erefore would hold specific jurisdiction has also not been established.2

On a defendant‘s motion to quash service of process, the plaintiff asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the extent of the defendant‘s forum
contacts and their relations hip to the plaintiff‘s claims. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at
p. 449; Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568.) In this case, the nonresident plaintiffs (real parties in interest on BMS‘s petition for writ of mandate) ha ve failed to show any substantial nexus, causal or otherwise, between their claims and BMS‘s activities in California. One can imagine a number of factual circumstances that might justify specific jurisdiction in a case like this. Unfortunately, none of t hose circumstances
have been established here: If real parties in interest had purchased Plavix while in California or from a California source, their claims could be considered substantially related to BMS‘s
sale of Plavix in this state. But the record c ontains no evidence connecting the Plavix taken by any of the nonresident plaintiffs to California. If real parties had been prescribed Plavix by a California doctor, their misrepresentation claims might be considered substantially related to BMS‘s
marketi ng of Plavix to physicians here. But there is no evidence of a California connection through real parties’ prescribing physicians

. If the Plavix taken by real parties had been manufactured in California, one might well consider their defective product cla ims substantially connected to BMS‘s forum contacts. But the record shows Plavix has never been manufactured in California

. If the Plavix taken by real parties had been distributed to their respective states by codefendant McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in San Francisco, it could be argued real parties‘ defective product claims were related to the distribution agreement between BMS and McKesson. But real parties have3

adduced no evidence to show how or by whom the Plavix they took was distr ibuted to the pharmacies that dispensed it to them. If Plavix had been developed in California, real parties‘ defective product claims could be considered related to that California activity. But the record shows Plavix was developed not in California but in New York and New Jersey, where BMS has, respectively, its headquarters and major operating facilities. If the labeling, packaging, or regulatory approval of Plavix had been performed in or directed from California, some of real parties‘ misrepresentati on claims would arguably be related to those California activities. But BMS did none of those things in California. Finally, if the ― nationwide marketing‖ campaign on which the majority relies (maj. opn., ante , at p. 27) had been created or directed from California, claims of misrepresentations in that marketing would have arisen from BMS‘s California

contacts. But according to the record, none of that marketing work was performed or directed by BMS’s California employees.
In the absence of a concrete fac tual relationship between their claims and BMS‘s contacts with the forum state, on what do real parties, and the majority of this court, base their argument for specific jurisdiction over BMS in California courts? In brief, their argument rests on similar ity of claims and joinder with California plaintiffs. First, real parties‘ claims arise from activities similar to those BMS conducted in California, because in marketing and selling Plavix throughout the United States, BMS sold the same allegedly defecti ve product in California as in real parties‘ various states of residence and presumably made some of the same misrepresentations and omissions in those states and in California. Second, real parties are joined in this action with plaintiffs who are
Califo rnia residents and who allege similar claims. Neither of these factors,4

however, creates a connection between real parties‘ claims of injury and BMS‘s California activities sufficient to satisfy due process. By statute, the personal jurisdiction of Califo rnia courts extends to the limits set by the state and federal Constitutions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Constitutional due process limits dictate that in the absence of general jurisdiction

— which exists only if a corporation is incorporated in the for um state or conducts such intensive activities there as to make it ―at home‖ in that state ( Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919 ( Goodyear ))

—

personal jurisdiction over the corporation to adjudicate a particular claim (sp ecific jurisdiction) is established only if the controversy ―is related to or  ̳arises out of‘ ‖ the company‘s activities in the forum state. ( Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414 ( Helicopteros ).) The majority‘s decision is not supported by specific jurisdiction decisions from the United States Supreme Court, this court, or the lower federal and state courts. (See pt. I, post .) And as I will discuss later (see pt. II, post ), today‘s decision impairs important functions of r eciprocity, predictability, and limited state sovereignty served by the relatedness requirement. By weakening the relatedness requirement, the majority‘s decision threatens to subject companies to the jurisdiction of California courts to an extent unpredi ctable from their business activities in California, extending jurisdiction over claims of liability well beyond our state‘s legitimate regulatory interest. Just as important, minimizing the relatedness requirement undermines an
essential distinction betwe en specific and general jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S.___, ___ [187 L.Ed.2d 624, ___, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751], the United States Supreme Court made clear that general jurisdiction

— jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies unrelated to th e defendant‘s forum contacts

— is not created merely by commercial contacts that are ―continuous and systematic‖5

( Helicopteros , supra , 466 U.S. at p. 416) but only by contacts so extensive as to render the defendant ―  ̳at home‘ ‖ in the forum state. ( Daimle r , supra , 187 L.Ed.2d at p. 761.) The majority applies that holding to conclude, correctly, that general jurisdiction is lacking here. (Maj. opn., ante , at pp. 13

– 16.) But by reducing relatedness to mere similarity and joinder, the majority expands spec ific jurisdiction to the point that, for a large category of defendants, it becomes indistinguishable from general jurisdiction. At least for consumer companies operating nationwide, with substantial sales in California, the majority creates the equivalen t of general jurisdiction in California courts. What the federal high court wrought in Daimler

— a shift in the general jurisdiction standard from the ―continuous and systematic‖ test of Helicopteros to a much tighter ―at home‖
limit

— this court undoes today under the rubric of specific jurisdiction. I. The Case Law Does Not Support Specific Jurisdiction in These Circumstances Specific jurisdiction over a defendant

— jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute connected to the defendant‘s contacts with the forum stat e

— depends on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. ( Helicopteros , supra , 466 U.S. at p. 414.) We have summarized the requirements for specific jurisdiction as threefold: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy arises out of or is otherwise related to the defendant‘s forum contacts; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction in the particular litigation is reasonable in light of the burdens and benefits of forum litigation

. ( Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 ( Snowney ).) BMS contests neither the first prong of this tripartite test, that the company has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits by its continuous course of
substantial bu siness activities in California, nor the third, that taking jurisdiction6

would impose unreasonable burdens on the company. ( Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) The key issue here is therefore whether the claims of the real parties in interest (plaintiffs residing in states other than California) arise out of, or are otherwise related to, BMS‘s activities in California.

A. The Relatedness Requirement for Specific Jurisdiction The requirement that the litigation be related to the defendant‘s activities in or directed to the forum, by which it has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in the state, was first stated in the landmark decision of Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310 ( International Shoe ). The high court first noted that jurisdiction is well established when a corporation‘s ―continuous and systematic‖ activities in the state ―give rise to the liabilities sued on.‖ ( Id. at
p. 317.) Even when a corporation has engaged in only occasional activit ies in the state, due process may still be satisfied if those activities have created the obligations sued on: ―[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of th e laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.‖ ( Id. at p. 319.)
In International Shoe itself, the relationship between the forum activities and the litigation was a straightforward one: The defendant corporation had employed
salesm en in the State of Washington, which required it contribute to the state‘s unemployment compensation fund; the litigation concerned an assessment for unpaid contributions. ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at pp. 312

– 313.) Thus ―the obligation which i s here sued upon arose out of those very [forum] activities,‖7

making it reasonable for Washington ―to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.‖ ( Id. at p. 320.) The United States Supreme Court has not, since International Shoe , greatly elaborated on its understanding of the relatedness requirement. The court in Helicopteros slightly reformulated the requirement: jurisdiction may be appropriate if the controversy ―arise[s] out of or relate[s] to‖ the company‘s forum contacts. ( Helicopt eros , supra , 466 U.S. at p. 414.) But the high court did not explain or apply that standard in Helicopteros , and in Goodyear , supra, 564 U.S. at page 919, the court again used a different formulation, suggesting a narrower vision of relatedness: ―Specifi c jurisdiction

. . . depends on an  ̳affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,‘ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation .‖ (Italics added.) The Good year court went on, very briefly, to explain why specific jurisdiction did not exist in the case before it, which involved the deaths of two North Carolina boys in an overseas bus accident: ―Because the episode

- in

- suit, the bus accident, occurred in Franc e, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.‖ ( Ibid .) None of the injury

- causing events having occurred in the forum state, the bas is for specific jurisdiction was lacking. Of the post

- International Shoe decisions in which the high court actually found a factual basis for specific jurisdiction, each featured a direct link between forum activities and the litigation. (See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 479

– 480 [specific jurisdiction in Florida courts proper where franchise dispute ―grew directly out of‖ contract formed between Florida franchisor and Michigan franchisee, whose breach ―caused foreseeable injuries to the corporation in Florida‖]; Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789 [California8

jurisdiction over writer and editor based in Florida proper for article distributed in California and defaming California resident, where the defendants‘ ―intentional,
and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California‖ and they knew article ―would have a potentially devastating impact‖ on California resident]; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 776

– 777 ( Keeton ) [specific jurisdiction in Ne w Hampshire courts proper over Ohio corporation where corporation‘s sale in New Hampshire of magazine defaming the plaintiff injured her reputation in that state]; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 220, 223 [specific jurisdiction in Cali fornia courts proper where action was based on a life insurance contract delivered in California and on which the insured, a California resident at his death, had paid premiums from the state].) Nothing in the high court‘s specific jurisdiction decisions suggests an abandonment or broad relaxation of the relatedness requirement. This court did, in Vons , adopt a relatively broad standard for relatedness. After canvassing formulations put forward by scholars and lower courts, we held the relationship betwee n the defendant‘s forum contacts and the plaintiff‘s claims in litigation need not be one of proximate legal causation or even ―but for‖ factual causation, nor need the forum contacts be substantively relevant in the plaintiff‘s action. ( Vons , supra , 14 C al.4th at pp. 460

– 475.) Rather, the relationship required for specific jurisdiction exists if the claims bear a ―substantial nexus or connection‖ to the activities by which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits. ( Id. at p. 456; accord, Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1067

– 1068.) The test is not a mechanical one, but a weighing process in which ―the greater the intensity of forum activity, the lesser the relationship required between the contact and the claim.‖ ( Vons, supra, a t p. 453; accord, Snowney, supra, at
p. 1068.) Specific jurisdiction in California courts is proper if ―because of the defendants‘ relationship with the forum, it is not unfair to require that they answer9

in a California court for an alleged injury that i s substantially connected to the defendants‘ forum contacts.‖ ( Vons, supra, at p. 453.) Notwithstanding our relatively broad substantial connection standard, mere similarity of claims is an insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. The claims of
real parties in interest, nonresidents injured by their use of Plavix they purchased and used in other states, in no sense arise from BMS‘s marketing and sales of Plavix in California, or from any of BMS‘s other activities in this state. Nor is any
other subs tantial connection apparent. BMS promoted and sold Plavix in this state, giving rise to the California plaintiffs‘ claims. BMS also engaged in such promotion and sales in many other states, giving rise to claims by residents of those states. As all the claims derive from similar conduct and allege similar injuries, the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims closely resemble those made by California residents. But I can perceive no substantial nexus between the nonresidents‘ claims and BMS‘s California
activiti es. In each state, the company‘s activities are connected to claims by those who obtained Plavix or were injured in that state, but no relationship other than similarity runs between the claims made in different states. As BMS argues, its
California cont acts fail to ―intersect‖ with the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. Even a commentator ―sympathetic to an expanded role for specific jurisdiction‖ found the approach of the Court of Appeal in this case, which the majority in this court largely replicates, so overly broad as ―to reintroduce general jurisdiction by another name.‖ (Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections

on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States (2015) 19 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 675, 687 (hereafter Silbe rman).) ―A more plausible specific jurisdiction forum might be the state where the drugs were
manufactured or distributed to both the California and non

- California plaintiffs; all plaintiffs‘ claims might be said to  ̳arise from‘ such defective manufacture and10

thereby provide an alternative single forum in which to have all the plaintiffs
assert their claims. In Bristol

- Meyers [ sic ], no such connection to California can
be established for the non

- California plaintiffs. The claims of the California and

non resident plaintiffs are merely parallel.‖ ( Ibid. , fn. omitted.) One form of substantial connection between a defendant‘s forum activities and the claims against it exists when the forum activities are legally relevant to establish the claims. ( Vons , supr a , 14 Cal.4th at p. 469.) In that situation, the forum state‘s interest in regulating conduct occurring within its borders is implicated, as the plaintiff is seeking to impose liability, at least in part, for acts
the defendant committed in the forum stat e. ( Id. at p. 472.) But no such legal relevance connection is apparent here. The nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims rest on allegations that BMS deceptively marketed and sold Plavix to them or their prescribing physicians, but, as noted earlier, the record is devoid of any suggestion, nor do real parties claim, the nonresident plaintiffs bought or were prescribed Plavix from a California source. BMS‘s marketing and sales activities in California thus appear irrelevant to real parties‘ claims. To quote BMS‘ s brief, the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims ―would be exactly the same if BMS had never set foot in California, had never engaged in any commercial activity in California, had never sold any product here, and had engaged only non

- California distributors.‖ In addition to its interest in regulating conduct within its borders, each state has an interest in providing a judicial forum for its injured residents, regardless of whether the conduct sued on occurred in the state. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at
pp. 472

– 473.) ―[T]he state has a legitimate interest as sovereign in providing its residents with protection from injuries caused by nonresidents and with a forum in which to seek redress. This assertion of sovereignty with respect to nonresident
defendants is f

air when those defendants have availed themselves of certain11

benefits within the state and the claim is related to those contacts.‖ ( Id. at p. 473.) But reference to the state‘s interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek legal redress is of no help to real parties in interest here, as they are not California residents. California has no discernable sovereign interest in providing an Ohio or South Carolina resident a forum in which to seek redress for injuries in those states caused by conduc t occurring outside California. A mere resemblance between the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims and those of California residents creates no sovereign interest in litigating those claims in a forum to which they have no
substantial connection. The majority argues that taking jurisdiction over the nonresidents‘ claims furthers a California interest because evidence of their injuries may be admissible to help the California plaintiffs prove Plavix was a defective product. (Maj. opn.,

ante , at p. 32.) But adm issibility of other injuries does not depend on joinder of the other injured person, as the cases the majority cites illustrate. In neither Ault v. International Harvester (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113 nor Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, whe re evidence of prior similar injuries was held admissible, were those injured in the prior accidents joined as parties in the action. The majority also suggests that jurisdiction over the nonresidents‘ claims is proper because California law attempts to ―p rotect[] consumers from the potential dangers posed by prescription medication.‖ (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 33.) The statutes cited, however, regulate the dispensing of prescription drugs by California pharmacists ( Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 4070

– 4078) , while the claims at issue in this case are against BMS, a drug manufacturer. Moreover, real parties in interest have neither alleged nor proven they were prescribed or furnished Plavix in California. How the cited California laws might apply to their c laims is thus unclear, to say
the least.12

In the same passage, the majority implies that the activity of BMS‘s California sales representatives, whose representations California has an interest in regulating, might somehow be related to real parties‘ claims . (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 33.) In this instance as well, the majority ignores the complete absence of evidence showing any such relationship. Real parties in interest, who have the burden of proving forum contacts related to their claims, have not even attempted to establish that sales representatives in California misled physicians in other

states about Plavix‘s efficacy and safety. While no doubt correct California has an interest in regulating dangerous conduct within our state (maj. opn, ante , p. 33 , fn. 6), the majority neglects to explain how that interest can be served by taking jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of persons unaffected by any such conduct. Finally, the majority asserts that California‘s interest in regulating the
conduct of code fendant McKesson Corporation (McKesson), a pharmaceutical distributor headquartered in California, justifies adjudicating real parties‘ claims against BMS in a California court. (Maj. opn., ante , at pp. 33

– 34.) Of all the majority‘s red herrings, this is perhaps the ruddiest. Why plaintiffs sued
McKesson as well as BMS is not obvious

— BMS suggests it was merely to avoid removal to federal court (see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2))

— but at no point have real parties argued McKesson bore any responsibility in provid ing them with Plavix. In their brief on the merits, real parties contended BMS‘s relationship with McKesson helped BMS make substantial profits ―within California,‖ and at oral argument their attorney acknowledged he had no evidence tying McKesson to the Plavix that allegedly injured real parties outside this state. The notion of a connection between McKesson‘s conduct in California and the claims of real parties in interest, which arise from their acquisition and use of Plavix in other states, is purely a product of the majority‘s imagination.13

Notwithstanding the majority‘s speculative suggestions, as far as the record shows real parties‘ claims arise solely from conduct in other states and do not implicate California‘s legitimate interest in regulating c onduct within its borders.

B. Jurisdiction Over Liability Claims for Pharmaceutical Drugs Neither real parties in interest nor the majority cites any decision, state or federal, finding specific jurisdiction on facts similar to those here. In fact, court s in both systems have rejected jurisdiction over drug defect claims made by plaintiffs who neither reside in nor were injured by conduct in the forum state.
In Boaz v. Boyle & Co . (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700 ( Boaz ), a group of plaintiffs, mostly residents of New York and New Jersey, but including one California resident, sued several manufacturers of the drug DES for injuries allegedly resulting from their grandmothers‘ ingestion of the drug in New York. ( Id. at p. 704.) The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the action against defendant Emons Industries, Inc., which was not subject to California‘s general jurisdiction, holding the basis for specific jurisdiction was also lacking as the defendant‘s activities in California were unrelated to the pla intiffs‘ injuries. ( Id. at
p. 705.) ―It is conceded that none of appellants‘ grandmothers, who ingested DES, did so in California. Nor did any of them acquire the product as the result of any of Emons‘s activities related to California. Indeed, as we h ave seen, none of them except [the single California resident] has any connection with this state.‖ ( Id. at
p. 718.) Though the defendant had sold DES in California as it had in other states, that similarity of conduct did not subject it to personal juri sdiction for the purposes of adjudicating the out

- of

- state plaintiffs‘ claims, though, as the court noted, jurisdiction might be appropriate ―in a case arising out of ingestion in California or14

by purchase or prescription in California of DES.‖ ( Id. at p. 721.) 1 As in the present case, none of those facts had been or could be established. Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1st Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 213, presented a similar fact pattern in an indi vidual suit. The plaintiff there sued a DES manufacturer in a federal court in New Hampshire for injuries she allegedly suffered from in utero exposure to the drug. The plaintiff‘s mother took the drug in Massachusetts, where she lived. ( Id. at p. 214.) That the manufacturer had marketed DES nationwide, including in New Hampshire, was insufficient to support specific jurisdiction: Although Lilly marketed and sold DES nationwide, including in New Hampshire, ―Glater‘s cause of action did not arise from L illy‘s New Hampshire activities; rather, her injuries were caused in Massachusetts by exposure in utero to DES which her mother purchased and consumed in Massachusetts.‖ ( Id. at
p. 216.) Were the defendant‘s New Hampshire contacts deemed sufficiently
rel ated to the cause of action arising in Massachusetts, the court ―would be obliged
to hold that any plaintiff in Glater‘s position

— a nonresident injured out of state by a drug sold and consumed out of state

— could bring suit in New Hampshire for DES injuries .‖ ( Id. at p. 216, fn. 4.) Such ―retributive jurisdiction‖ over claims

1 As to the California resident, the Boaz court reasoned jurisdiction was lacking because h er grandmother had not taken DES in California and therefore ―any DES

- related affliction she suffers has nothing to do with any of Emons‘s activities related to California.‖ ( Boaz , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 718.) The court may have gone too far in this respect; California‘s interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek redress for actions having injurious effects in the state arguably justified specific jurisdiction over the California resident‘s claims. For the same reason, In re DES Cases ( E.D.N.Y. 1992) 789 F.Supp. 552 can be distinguished as involving the claims of New York residents seeking a remedy for injuries occurring in New York; although the defendants challenging jurisdiction there did not market DES in New York, they bore legal re sponsibility for injuries there under the state‘s rule of market share liability. (See id. at pp. 592

– 593.)15

unconnected to the forum ―comports with neither logic nor fairness.‖ ( Ibid. ; accord, Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Company (1st Cir. 1970) 423 F.2d 584, 585, 587 [suit in New Hampshire o ver drug taken and allegedly causing injury in Massachusetts ―did not arise [in New Hampshire], or as a result of anything which occurred there‖ and hence was an ―unconnected cause[] of action‖ that could only be justified by general jurisdiction, the basi s for which was also lacking].) Also similar, though less extensively reasoned as to specific jurisdiction, is Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc. (4th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 745. That decision addressed two consolidated cases brought in a federal court in South Carolina, both by residents of other states who bought and consumed the allegedly harmful drugs (not named in the decision), against drug manufacturers that conducted business in South Carolina but were not incorporated or headquartered there and
had not made the subject drugs there. ( Id. at p. 746.) The court observed that the plaintiffs were not residents of South Carolina and their causes of action ―arose outside the forum and were unconnected with the defendant‘s activities in South Carolina.‖ ( Id. at p. 747.) Noting ―the lack of a  ̳rational nexus‘ between the forum state and the relevant facts surrounding the claims presented‖ such as would support specific jurisdiction, the court moved on to general jurisdiction (for which
it also found the f

orum contacts insufficient). ( Id. at p. 748.) In all these cases, the defendants had sold their pharmaceutical drugs in the forum state. Indeed, in Boaz , California physicians accounted for 9 percent of the defendant‘s DES sales. ( Boaz , supra , 40 Cal.Ap p.4th at p. 715.) 2 Yet these

2 The majority (maj. opn., ante , at p. 25) notes that the defendant in Boaz , unlike BMS, did not employ salespeople or maintain offices in the st ate. Yet through ―advertising in selected professional magazines and professional journals, and targeted mailings of samples and brochures to obstetricians and gynecologists,‖ all ―done on a national scale‖ ( Boaz , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at
(footnote continued on next page)16

courts

— correctly, in my view

— considered that forum activity to be unconnected to the plaintiffs‘ claims, which arose from use of the drugs in other states. Not until today‘s decision has specific jurisdiction over a drug li ability claim arising from the nonresident plaintiff‘s purchase, use, and injury outside the forum state been premised on the fact that the defendant also sold the drug in the forum state.

C. Specific Jurisdiction Decisions Relied on by Real Parties Turning from pharmaceutical liability to the broader case law, we see that none of the decisions real parties cite support specific jurisdiction based, as here, on the mere resemblance between the disputed claims and distinct claims brought by other plain tiffs that arose from the defendant‘s forum contacts. Each of these cited cases involved a substantial connection between the defendant‘s activities in the forum state and the plaintiff‘s claims, not merely a connection between the forum activities and si milar claims made by other plaintiffs.
In Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143 ( Cornelison ), a California resident sued for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in an automobile accident in Nevada. The defendant, a Nebraska resident, was a tru cker hauling goods in interstate commerce. He made approximately 20 trips to California each year and was en route to this state with a shipment when his truck collided with the decedent‘s vehicle in Nevada, near the California border. ( Id. at pp. 146

– 14 7.) We concluded the plaintiff‘s cause of action did bear a substantial connection to the defendant‘s business activities in California: ―As we have seen, defendant

(footnote continued from previous page)

p. 715), the com pany sold a large amount of DES

— the same product at issue in the disputed lawsuits

— in California. Like BMS, then, the defendant in Boaz ―enjoyed sizeable revenues from the sales of its product here.‖ (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 26.) Why the absence of other , dissimilar ties should serve to distinguish the case is unclear.17

has been engaged in a continuous course of conduct that has brought him into the
state alm ost twice a month for seven years as a trucker under a California license. The accident occurred not far from the California border, while defendant was bound for this state. He was not only bringing goods into California for a local manufacturer, but he intended to receive merchandise here for delivery elsewhere. The accident arose out of the driving of the truck, the very activity which was the essential basis of defendant‘s contacts with this state. These factors demonstrate, in our view, a substantia l nexus between plaintiff‘s cause of action and defendant‘s activities in California.‖ ( Cornelison , supra , 16 Cal.3d at p. 149.) In further support, we observed that California had an interest in providing a forum for the litigation because the plaintiff was a California resident. ( Id. at p. 151.)
Cornelison has in common with the present case that the plaintiff‘s injury arose directly from the defendant‘s conduct outside California. But in Cornelison the defendant‘s out

- of

- state conduct, his allegedly negligent driving in Nevada, was directed (literally) toward California and resulted in injury to a California resident. The connections to California that justified jurisdiction in Cornelison are missing from the claims of real parties in interest here.
In Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th 434, we held specific jurisdiction proper over two restaurant franchisees based and operating in Washington State. In multiparty litigation arising out of food poisoning incidents at their and other Jack

- in

- the

- Box restaurants, the supplier of the allegedly tainted meat (Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons)) cross

- complained against several franchisees, including the Washington franchisees, alleging their failure to cook the meat properly caused the poisoning. ( Id. at pp. 440

– 441.) Among other contacts with California, the franchisees had executed the franchise agreements, which specified methods of preparing Jack

- in

the

- Box food products, in California, did regular busi ness with the franchisor at its18

headquarters in San Diego, and had officers attend training sessions offered by the franchisor in California. ( Id. at pp. 442

– 443.) We held Vons‘s claims against the franchisees bore a substantial relationship
to their cont acts with California for two reasons: first, the franchise relationship

— formed in California, under which the franchisees bought meat Vons supplied to
the franchisor

— had drawn Vons and the franchisees into a relationship as alleged joint tortfeasors, with certain joint liabilities and rights of indemnification, rights upon which Vons‘ cross

- complaint in part rested; second, the franchise relationship, by imposing uniform standards for cooking food, buying equipment, and training employees, was itself an al leged source of Vons‘ injuries, which Vons traced to the ―  ̳systematically deficient‘ ‖ procedures required by the franchisor. ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at pp. 456

– 457.) Real parties in interest rely on Vons for the propositions that for specific jurisdict ion to be justified the defendant‘s forum activities need not be directed at the plaintiff or directly give rise to the plaintiff‘s claims. (See Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at pp. 453, 457.) Both points are well taken. Nonetheless, in Vons the
connection be tween the forum activities and the claim was far more substantial than in the present case. By their activities in California, including the formation of franchise relationships, the franchisees in Vons established the conditions that would ultimately all ow the franchisor‘s meat supplier, Vons, to seek indemnity for their joint liability and redress for its own injuries. The franchisees‘ forum activities were not directed at Vons, with which they had no direct relationship, and may not have proximately gi ven rise to Vons‘s claims, but by establishing a franchise relationship pursuant to which the franchisees bought Vons‘s meat and prepared it according to methods set out in the franchise agreement, they set the stage for those claims, to say the least. No such nexus is apparent here, where19

BMS‘s marketing and sales of Plavix in California did nothing to establish the circumstances under which it allegedly injured plaintiffs in other states. Finally as to California cases, real parties in interest cite Snow ney , supra , 35 Cal.4th 1054, in which we held a California resident could sue a group of Nevada hotels in a California court for the hotels‘ failure to provide notice that they would impose an energy surcharge on their room prices. ( Id. at p. 1059.) In a relatively brief discussion of the relatedness issue (the bulk of our analysis concerned the question of purposeful availment), we held the plaintiff‘s claims had a substantial connection to the defendants‘ California forum activities because the plaintif f‘s false advertising and unfair competition claims were based on the hotels‘ alleged omissions in their California advertising and in the reservation process. ( Id. at
p. 1068.) ―Because the harm alleged by plaintiff relates directly to the content of
de fendants‘ promotional activities in California, an inherent relationship between plaintiff‘s claims and defendants‘ contacts with California exists.‖ ( Id. at p. 1069.) Real parties rely on Snowney for its adherence to the substantial connection
test artic ulated in Vons and for its reiteration of Vons ‘s statements that the required intensity of forum contacts and connection of the claim to those contacts are inversely related (the greater the contacts, the less of a relationship need be shown)
and that the forum contacts need not be directed at the plaintiff or give rise directly to the plaintiff‘s claim. (See Snowney , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) I find those principles unavailing in this case. However intense the defendant‘s activities in California, they must still bear a substantial relationship to the plaintiff‘s claims,
and neither Snowney nor any of the other decisions real parties cite suggests that a mere resemblance between the plaintiff‘s claims and those made by other plaintiffs that are base d on the defendant‘s California contacts establishes a
substantial connection.20

Cornelison , Vons and Snowney establish that we do not demand the relationship between the defendant‘s California contacts and the plaintiff‘s claims be causal or direct. They do not, however, support specific jurisdiction on the
tenuous basis of a resemblance to other claims by other plaintiffs. (See
Greenwell v. Auto

- Owners Ins. Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 783, 801 [ Vons and Snowney require a substantial connection between th e plaintiff‘s claims and the defendant‘s forum contacts; test is not satisfied whenever there is ― any relationship at all ‖].)
In Keeton, supra , 465 U.S. 770, the United States Supreme Court upheld the assertion of specific jurisdiction in New Hampshire to adjudicate the libel claims of a New York resident against an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. ( Id. at pp. 772

– 774.) The high court found the defendant‘s regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire was sufficient to support the state‘s jurisdiction over a libel claim based on the magazine‘s contents, even though the plaintiff could, under the ―  ̳single publication rule‘ ‖ followed in New Hampshire, recover damages from publication of the magazine throughout the
Un ited States. ( Id. at pp. 773

– 774.) The court emphasized that the plaintiff was suing, in part, for damages she suffered in New Hampshire, ―[a]nd it is beyond dispute that New Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State.‖ ( Id. at p. 776.) Unlike the plaintiff in Keeton , real parties in interest suffered no injury in California or from BMS‘s conduct in California. They nonetheless argue Keeton is analogous because the plaintiff there sought recovery, in large part, for injuries incurred outside the forum state. For two reasons, however, the analogy does not
hold. First, the single publication rule at work in Keeton was a state law rule governing the measure of damages for defamation, not one governing the joinder21

of claims or claimants. The propriety of that state law damages rule was not itself a jurisdictional issue; rather, the question was whether personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire violated due process given the state‘s single publication rule (and its unusually long statute of limitations). ( Keeton , supra , 465 U.S. at pp. 773

– 774.) In contrast, BMS‘s motion to quash service of summons as to the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs directly presents the jurisdictional issue as to those plaint iffs. We ask whether the superior court may take jurisdiction over defendant to adjudicate those claims, and are not required to decide whether the entire suit, including the claims of the California residents, would be subject to dismissal for lack of ju risdiction if the nonresidents‘ claims were included in it. Second, New Hampshire had an interest in adjudicating the out

- of

- state damages that does not translate to the factual context of this case. (See Keeton , supra , 465 U.S. at p. 777.) To prevent th e extraordinary burden on courts and litigants of having a defamation plaintiff sue separately in 50 states

— and to allow effective application of a statute of limitations for publications that continue or recur over lengthy periods

— most states have adopted the single publication rule, allowing only a single action per publication, but one in which all damages from the publication may be recovered. (See Civ. Code, § 3425.3 [Cal. Uniform Single Publication Act]; Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4t h 468, 477

– 479;
see also Keeton , supra , at p. 778.) On the facts of this case, there is no analogous state interest of similar force that would justify California courts adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims.
This is not a case in which the in dividual California plaintiffs would be stymied by procedural obstacles or restrictive damages rules were the nonresidents excluded from the action. Plaintiffs allege they suffered ―severe physical, economic and emotional injuries‖ from their use of Plavi x, including bleeding ulcers, gastrointestinal bleeding, cerebral bleeding, heart attack and stroke. Even if some22

of the California plaintiffs might have individual claims too small to justify suit,
the consolidation of scores of such claims from within C alifornia would remedy that insufficiency without the addition of hundreds of nonresidents‘ claims. California can thus provide an effective forum for its residents to seek redress without joining those claims to similar claims by nonresidents. Nor does this case raise the specter of a continually restarting statute of limitations that would subject defendants like BMS to the harassment of unending suits for the same conduct (see Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc. , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 478), as was the case
with the defamation suit in Keeton

. The majority argues jurisdiction over nonresidents‘ claims is justified by the efficiencies of litigating all claims arising from a ―mass tort‖ in a single forum and by the existence of a complex litigation division in San Francisco Superior Court ―well suited to expeditiously handle such large cases.‖ (Maj. opn., ante , at pp. 35, 34.) If these 678 plaintiffs were all the injured Plavix users in the United States, and the only options for the nonresident plaintiffs wer e participation in this action or individual actions in their home states, then joint proceedings in California would likely be the most efficient procedure, though the extent of that efficiency would depend on how choice of law questions are resolved, amo ng other factors. (See Silberman, supra , 19 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. at p. 687 [―As for the efficiency arguments relied on by the California appeals court, only the issue of the defective quality of the drug is common to all the claims.‖].) But these plaintiffs do not constitute the entire universe of those claiming injury from Plavix

— far from it

— and real parties‘ options are not limited to joining this action or each bringing separate actions in their respective states. In
addition to conso lidated multidistrict federal litigation in the District of New23

Jersey, individual, mass or representative actions have been brought in several
other states. 3 Whether or not real parties‘ claims are heard together with those of the California plaintiffs, inefficiency and the potential for conflicting rulings will exist so long as actions are simultaneously pending in several state and federal courts. (See generally Miller, Overlapping Class Actions (1996) 71 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 514, 520

– 525.)
No mechanism exi sts for centralizing nationwide litigation in a state court; there is no means by which pending actions in Illinois courts, for example, can be transferred to a California court. The San Francisco Superior Court, no matter how well equipped for trying com plex cases, cannot adjudicate the entire dispute between injured Plavix users and BMS. If efficiency is the goal, federal litigation

3 See In re Plavix Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation (No. II) (U.S. Jud. Panel Multidist. Litig. 2013) 923 F.Supp.2d 1376, 1379

– 1381 (centralizing in District of New Jersey litigation arising in that state and in Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and Pennsylvania, and potentially centralizing additional actions from California and Mississippi); Mills v. Bristol

Myers Squibb Co . (D.Ariz., Aug. 12, 2011, No. CV 1 1

- 968

- PHX

- FJM) 2011 WL 3566131, at *1 (individual action); Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co. (D.Hawaii, Aug. 5, 2014, No. CIV. 14

- 00180 HG

- RLP) 2014 WL 3865213, at *2 (parens patriae action brought by the Attorney General of Hawaii remanded to state court); Davidson v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. CIV. 12

- 58

- GPM) 2012 WL 1253165, at *5 (action by 83 plaintiffs remanded to state court); Boyer v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co . (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. CIV. 12

- 61

- GPM) 20 12 WL 1253177, at *5 (same, as to action by 71 plaintiffs); Anglin v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. CIV. 12

- 60

- GPM) 2012 WL 1268143, at *5 (same, as to action by 67 plaintiffs); Tolliver v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co. (N.D.Ohio, July 30, 2012, No. 1:12 CV 00754) 2012 WL 3074538, at *1 (individual action); Employer Teamsters

- Local Nos. 175/505 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Bristol

- Myers Squibb Co . (S.D.W. Va. 2013) 969 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (action by third party payors alleging mislead ing and false marketing of Plavix).24

centralized through the multidistrict procedure offers a more promising path than a
series of uncoordinated state and fede ral court actions.
Keeton , in which jurisdiction was found proper despite a state law rule allowing damages for out

- of

- state injuries, thus fails to support real parties‘ contention that jurisdiction over litigation brought by nonresident plaintiffs whose claims arose in other states may be obtained by joining their cases to similar ones brought by California plaintiffs. Such jurisdiction by joinder, moreover, would run counter to the holding of Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235 ( Hanson ).
In Hanson , th e high court held a Florida court considering the validity of a trust created in Delaware did not have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, who had performed no relevant acts in Florida (357 U.S. at p. 252), 4 even though other parties to the di spute resided in Florida and could be brought before the Florida court: ―It is urged that because the settlor and most of the appointees
and beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida the courts of that State should be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees. This is a non sequitur. With personal jurisdiction over the executor, legatees, and appointees, there is nothing in federal law to prevent Florida from adjudicating concerning the respective rights and liabilities of those parties. But Florida has not chosen to do

4 The majority‘s account of Hanson as resting solely on the purposeful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test (maj. opn., ante , at p. 26, fn. 3) is incomplete. The trust settlor in Hanson had moved to Florid a after establishing the trust; the trustee then paid the settlor trust income in that state and received from her directions for trust administration, including the execution of two powers of appointment. ( Hanson , supra , 357 U.S. at p. 252 & fn. 24.) Bu t because the litigation concerned the validity of the trust agreement itself ( id. at p. 253), the cause of action was ―not one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State.‖ (Id. at p. 251.) Hanson ‘s holding was thus based on the lack of a relationship between the litigation and the defendant‘s forum contacts as well as on the paucity of those contacts.25

so. As we understand its law, the trustee is an indispensable party over whom the court must acquire jurisdiction before it is empowered to enter judgment in a proceeding affecting the validity of a trust. It d oes not acquire that jurisdiction by being the  ̳center of gravity‘ of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation.‖ ( Id. at p. 254, fn. omitted.) It is likewise a non sequitur to argue that because many Californians have
sued BMS for i njuries allegedly caused by their use of Plavix, and the superior court‘s jurisdiction to address their claims is not disputed, the claims of nonresidents injured in other states should also be adjudicated here. California might or might not be an especia lly convenient and efficient forum for nationwide Plavix litigation, but joinder of California plaintiffs cannot confer personal jurisdiction over BMS to adjudicate claims that do not arise out of, and are not otherwise related to, BMS‘s business activitie s in California. The majority posits two bases for deeming BMS‘s California activities related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. First, despite a silent factual record on this point, the majority infers that BMS employed the ― same .

. . assertedly
mi sleading marketing and promotion‖ in California as in the states where real parties resided and were allegedly injured. 5 (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 23.) I have shown above that neither the case law nor an analysis of forum state interests supports basing sp ecific jurisdiction on a similarity between activities in the forum state and those outside the forum. Characterizing BMS‘s multistate marketing activities as ―coordinated‖ (maj. opn., ante , at p. 24) adds nothing to the

5 Despite relying on BMS‘s nationwide marketing of Plavix as a basis for jurisdiction, and despite bearing the burden of proof on contacts and relatedness, real parties in interest introduced no evidence of particular marketing materials or broadcasts deployed in any state.26

jurisdictional argument given that , as the majority concedes, the record shows BMS‘s marketing campaign for Plavix was coordinated from New York and New Jersey rather than from California. The majority‘s supposition that California courts have personal jurisdiction over an out

- of

- state de fendant to adjudicate a claim arising from deceptive advertising in, say, Maryland because the defendant used a common marketing strategy in California, Maryland and other states is
without rational foundation. Nor does calling BMS‘s nationwide marketing o f Plavix a ―course of conduct‖ (maj. opn., ante , at pp. 24, 25, 36) advance the majority‘s cause. As already noted (fn. 5, ante ), real parties introduced no evidence of marketing materials or broadcasts used in any state. Other than that some degree of

c ommonality existed, which BMS conceded, the extent of marketing overlap among the states is simply unknown. Certainly, this record provides no basis for assuming that real parties and the California plaintiffs were all injured by a single
television broad cast made simultaneously in every media market or a single print advertisement published simultaneous in newspapers and magazines throughout the nation. This is not a case, that is to say, of a single act injuring plaintiffs in multiple states at one blow , where the argument for common jurisdiction might be stronger. All that appears is that Plavix was marketed nationwide and that BMS may have used many of the same materials

— none of them generated in
California

— in various states. Such similarity of cause s is not sufficient to give our courts jurisdiction over all claims, wherever they arise, based on misrepresentations or omissions in a company‘s marketing materials. Second, the majority notes that BMS maintains some research facilities in California, alt hough the majority concedes Plavix was not developed in those27

facilities. 6 (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 24.) This second ground of relatedness is both illogical and startling in its potential breadth. Because BMS has performed research on other drugs in Cali fornia, claims of injury from Plavix may, according to the majority, be adjudicated in this state. Will we in the next case decide that a company may be sued in California for dismissing an employee in Florida because
on another occasion it fired a differ ent employee in California, or that an Illinois
resident can sue his automobile insurer here for bad faith because the defendant sells health care policies in the California market? The majority points to no
substantial connection between Plavix claims ar ising in other states and research on unspecified other products in this state. II. The Relatedness Requirement Serves Important Functions and Should Not Be Minimized As shown in part I, ante , the case law on specific jurisdiction does not support a Calif

ornia court taking jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, arising from their use of Plavix in other states. BMS marketed and sold Plavix to other plaintiffs within California, but those forum activities are not substantially
related to the nonr esident plaintiffs‘ claims. In the absence, however, of any United States Supreme Court decisions closely on point, stare decisis does not prevent the majority from giving the relatedness requirement scant consideration, while relying on its theory that t he asserted benefits of consolidating multistate claims in California outweigh the burdens for BMS of defending real parties‘

6 This is not a ma tter of the absence of evidence. In support of its motion to quash service, a BMS executive submitted a declaration stating that ―none of the work to develop Plavix took place in California,‖ and that all development, manufacture, labeling, and marketing of Plavix was performed or directed from New York or New Jersey; none was accomplished or directed by California employees.28

claims here together with those of the California plaintiffs. (Maj. opn., ante , at
pp. 29

– 35.) Nevertheless, this approach is, i n my view, a serious mistake. By essentially ignoring relatedness and merely satisfying itself that defendant is not being haled into an inconvenient forum where it has no significant contacts, the majority blurs the distinction between general and specif ic jurisdiction and impairs the values of reciprocity, predictability, and interstate federalism served by due process limits on personal jurisdiction. Reciprocity, in this context, refers to the idea that the litigation to which a defendant is exposed in a particular forum should bear some relationship to the benefits the company has sought by doing business in the state. (See Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction (2001) 37 Idaho L.Rev. 583, 599 [―The party has garnered the benefits offe red by the government in which the court sits. These benefits include the laws, the administrative framework and their restraining effects. In return, the party concedes to that government a quantum of power to govern his conduct, a power which he himsel f holds in a natural autonomous state.‖].) Such reciprocity is most clearly maintained by the state taking jurisdiction over disputes arising directly from the defendant‘s activities in the state. As the high court said in International Shoe , where ―[t]h e obligation
which is

. . . sued upon arose out of those very activities,‖ it will generally be ―reasonable and just

. . . to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.‖ ( International Shoe , supra , 326 U.S. at p. 320.) More broadly, enforcing a meaningful relatedness requirement ensures some degree of reciprocity; because the forum‘s assertion of jurisdiction cannot encompass disputes that have no substantial connection with the defendant‘s forum activities, the liabi lities to which the defendant is exposed in the forum will tend to bear a relationship to the benefits it has sought in doing business there. ―Relationship helps test whether the benefits and burdens are similar. When a suit29

concerns the activities from which the corporation received in

- state benefits, there is some similarity in the burden imposed by the assertion of jurisdiction.

. . . Relatedness may be a rough measure, but it placed a logical limit on the burdens arising from in

- state activities.‖ ( Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness” (2005) 58 SMU L.Rev. 1313, 1345

– 1346 (hereafter Andrews).) Relatedness bears on predictability in much the same way. ―In order for a business to properly structure its behavior

— set consumer costs, procure insurance, or sever its relationship with a particular state

— it must not only know that a contact has been made in a particular state (an aim protected through the
purp oseful availment standard), but it also must have some minimal appreciation of the effect of that contact. The relationship standard helps give this knowledge. If a business entity chooses to enter a state on a minimal level, it knows that under
the relat ionship standard, its potential for suit will be limited to suits concerning the activities that it initiates in the state.‖ (Andrews, supra , 58 SMU L.Rev. at
p. 1346; see World

- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ( World

- Wide Volkswa gen ) [observing that when a corporation sells its products in a state, ―it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there,‖ and jurisdiction over a suit would not be unreasonable ―if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injur y to its owner or to others.‖].) Finally, limiting specific jurisdiction to litigation that is substantially connected to the defendant‘s forum activities prevents states from straying beyond their legitimate regulatory spheres. Appropriately limited, sp ecific jurisdiction ―acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.‖ ( World

- Wide Volkswagen , supra , 444 U.S. at p. 292 .) As the high cour t explained
in Hanson , the growth in interstate commerce and the easing of communications30

and transportation may have tempered, but they have not eliminated, the role that territorial limits on state regulation play under due process. Due process
restrict ions on personal jurisdiction ― are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.‖ ( Hanson , supra , 357 U.S. at p. 251.) Expanding on th is point in World

- Wide Volkswagen , the court explained that while the Constitution‘s Framers foresaw a nation of economically interdependent states, they ―also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particul ar, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States

— a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fou rteenth Amendment.‖ ( World

Wide Volkswagen , supra , 444 U.S. at p. 293.) Thus even in the modern era due process limits on personal jurisdiction retain a territorial aspect: ―Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being force d to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrume nt of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.‖ ( Id. at p. 294; accord, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (2011) 564 U.S. 873, 879 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [―The Due Process Clause prot ects an individual‘s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful power.

. . . This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect31

to the power o f a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.‖].) 7 The relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction plays a key role in implementing these interstate federalism limits. By conducting business within a state or directing its efforts at the state, a company brings its activities within the state‘s core regulatory concerns. Litigation that arises from those activities falls squarely within the state‘s sovereign power to adjudicate. In contrast, litigation arising outside the state is unlikely to be a fit subject for state court adjudication except to the extent it involves state residents. ―A state has sovereignty with regard to activity conducted within its borders, and it thus has power over claims arising from that activit y.

. . . A state seemingly has no sovereignty over activity that neither involves its citizens nor occurs within its borders.‖ (Andrews, supra , 58 SMU L.Rev. at p. 1347.) Relatedness thus ―helps limit the reach of states so that they do not exceed legit imate state interests.‖ ( Id. at p. 1348.) As this court remarked (in a choice of law discussion, but with equal applicability to jurisdiction), our state‘s legitimate regulatory interest does not ordinarily extend to measures aimed at ―alter[ing] a defen dant‘s conduct in another state vis

- à

- vis another state‘s residents.‖ ( Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, 104, italics omitted.)

7 In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 703, footnote 10, the high court n oted that concern for federalism is not ―an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court,‖ but rather ―a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,‖ waivable by the party. Though not an independent, unw aivable restriction on jurisdiction, interstate federalism remains an important consideration in determining how the due process limits on jurisdiction should be applied. ― The defendant has a due process right to have states act only within the limits of their sovereignty.‖ (Andrews, supra , 58 SMU L.Rev. at p. 1347.)32

Basing specific jurisdiction on mere similarity between a corporation‘s forum
activities and those ou tside the state, as the majority does in this case, defeats the relatedness requirement‘s functions of reciprocity, predictability, and interstate federalism. If BMS must answer in a California court for Plavix claims arising across the country simply bec ause some Californians have made similar claims, the link between the benefits BMS has sought by doing that business in the state and the liabilities to which it is exposed here has been severed. In the same way, predictability has been severely impaired, as the company‘s potential liabilities cannot be forecast from its state activities. And interstate federalism is perhaps most directly impaired; by taking jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute arising only from BMS‘s actions in, for example, Texas, and a llegedly resulting in injuries only to a Texan, the California courts infringe directly on Texas‘s sovereign prerogative to determine what liabilities BMS should bear for actions in its borders and injuring its residents. ―[T]he forum state arguably excee ds its sovereignty when it asserts jurisdiction over claims that are merely similar to activities within its borders, as opposed to causally connected to the forum conduct.‖ (Andrews,

supra , 58 SMU L.Rev. at pp. 1354

– 1355.) For decades, commentators have rejected similarity as an adequate criterion of connection or relatedness, recognizing that its excessive breadth would create jurisdiction in every state for every breach by a national corporation, wherever it occurred. ―Thus the similarity test would ap parently have to allow jurisdiction in any State in the country where the defendant has engaged in similar activities.‖ (Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction (1980) Sup.Ct.Rev. 77, 84; accord, Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction (2014) 48 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 207, 242 [allowing specific jurisdiction ―in every forum in which the defendant conducts continuous and systematic forum activities that are sufficiently similar to th e33

occurrence in dispute

. . . would give the plaintiff the choice of essentially every state for proceeding against a national corporation‖].) Today, the majority, by holding the presence of California plaintiffs with claims similar to those of real parti es in interest constitutes a substantial connection between real parties‘ claims and BMS‘s California activities, effectively sanctions California courts taking jurisdiction over actions by plaintiffs throughout the nation alleging injuries from any nation wide business activity. As California holds a substantial portion of the United States population, any company selling a product or service nationwide, regardless of where it is incorporated or headquartered, is likely to do a substantial part of its bus iness in California. Under the majority‘s theory of specific jurisdiction, California provides a forum for plaintiffs from any number of states to join with California plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries from virtually any course of business conduct

a defendant has pursued on a nationwide basis, without any showing of a relationship between the defendant‘s conduct in California and the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. The majority thus sanctions our state to regularly adjudicate disputes arising purely from conduct in other states, brought by nonresidents who suffered no injury here, against companies who are not at home here but simply do
business in the state. Such an aggressive assertion of personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the limits set by due process. Although those limits are more flexible and less strictly territorial than in the past, the high court has explained that they still act to keep any one state from encroaching on the others: ―[W]e have never accepted the proposition that st ate lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.‖ ( World

- Wide Volkswagen, supra , 444 U.S. at p. 293.) That BMS marketed and sold Plavix throug hout the United States, presumably using much of34

the same advertising in many markets, does not give California authority, under our federal system, to assert jurisdiction over claims arising throughout the nation. Speaking of the limits to jurisdiction s et by interstate federalism, the court in Boaz

— also involving a pharmaceutical drug marketed throughout the nation

— observed: ―We have no warrant to jettison these principles in favor of an approach which recognizes no defined limits to the assertion of ju risdiction against any defendant whose national marketing somehow affects commerce in the forum state.‖ ( Boaz , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.) Assessing the fairness of specific jurisdiction ―  ̳in the context of our federal system of government‘ ‖ ( Worl d

- Wide Volkswagen, supra , 444 U.S. at pp. 293

– 294), we should be restrained here by the absence of any discernable state interest in adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. Where the conduct sued upon did not occur in California, was not directed at individuals or entities in California, and caused no injuries in California or to California residents, neither our state‘s interest in regulating conduct within its borders ( Vons , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 472) nor its interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek redress for their injuries ( id. at p. 473) is implicated. On the critical question of why a Texan‘s claim he was injured in Texas by taking Plavix prescribed and sold to him in Texas should be adjudicated in California, rather than T exas (or in Delaware or New York, BMS‘s home states), the majority offers no persuasive answer.35 C ONCLUSION Like the majority, I conclude BMS, despite its significant business activities in California, is not at home in our state for purposes of asserting general personal jurisdiction over it. But neither, in my view, is specific jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims proper. No substantial connection has been shown between BMS‘s activities in California and the nonresidents‘ claims, which arose out of BMS‘s marketing and sales of Plavix in other states. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
W ERDEGAR , J.

W E C ONCUR :
C HIN , J. C ORRIGAN , J.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Bristol

- Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court

____________________________ ______________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 228 Cal.App.4th 605 Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________ Op inion No. S221038 Date Filed: August 29, 2016

__________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: San Francisco Judge: John E. Munter

__________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Lea Brilmayer; Horvitz & Levy, Jon B Eisenberg; Arnold & Porter, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Sean M. SeLegue, Sharon D. Mayo, Jeremy McLaughlin, Steven G. Reade, Daniel S. Pariser, Anna K. Thompson, Maurice A. Letter and Anand Agneshwar for Petitioner. Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, California Chamber of Commerce and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of Ame rica as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Goodwin Proctor, Richard A. Oetheimer, Sarah K. Frederick, David J. Zimmer and Claire C. Jacobson for Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. Pepper Hamilton, Nicholas M. Kouletsis, Christopher W. Wasson and Eric S. Wolfish for American Tort Reform Association, National Association of Manufacturers, National Federation of Independent Business and Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petit ioner. Utrecht & Lenvin and Paul F. Utrecht for Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, Kelly McMeekin, Hunter J. Shkolnik, John Lytle, Jessica Y. Lee, Shayna E. Sac ks, Priya Gandhi; Audet & Partners, William M. Audet, Joshua C. Ezrin, Mark E. Burton; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Stuart B. Esner for Real Parties in Interest. J. Burton LeBlanc; Andrus Anderson, Lori E. Andrus, Jenny Lee Anderson; Law Offices of Collyn A. Peddie and Collyn A. Peddie for American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd and Kevin K. Green for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Cu riae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Anand Agneshwer Arnold & Porter 399 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022

- 4690 (212) 715

- 1000

Stuart B. Esner Esner, Chang & Boyer 234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 750 Pasadena, CA 91101 (626) 535

- 9860