IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19

- 1913 Filed January 23, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF A.P., Minor Child, D.C., Father, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Colin J. Witt , District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two

- year - old daughter. AFFIR MED.

Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant father. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey

- Kacena, Assistan t Attorney General, for appellee State. Erin Mayfield of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Doyle, P.J. , and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.2

TABOR , Judge

. A father, David, appeals the termination of his parental r elationship with his
two

- year - old daughter , A.P. He argues the better outcome would have been to postpone a permanency decision so he could b uild a relationship with A.P. Because nothing in the record shows David

— who was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing

— wil l be ready to care for his daughter in six months , we find termination was the proper course. 1
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings David “wasn’t even aware [Cassie] was pregnant” until he was already
in carcerated

. The criminal court sentenced David to prison in September 2016 on four felony drug convictions. After A.P. was born in March 2017, Cassie brought the baby to see David at the Clarinda Co rrectional Facility a few times but stopped visits after about seven months. In October 2018, Cassie left A.P. with a social worker at Iowa Methodist Hospital. Cassie was struggling financially and intended to invoke Iowa’s Newborn Safe Haven Act, which allows parents to voluntarily release custody of a n infant. See Iow a Code § 233.2 (2018). But that act only applies to children who a re thirty days or younger. Id

. § 233.1(c). A.P. was eighteen months old. After Cassie abandoned A.P., t he juvenile court issued a removal order and pl aced the child in

1 Our review of the juvenile court proceedings is de novo. In re M.W. , 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). Th at court’s fact findings do not bind us, but we give them weight, particularly on credibility issues. Id. The State must present clear and convincing evidence to support termination. In re A.M. , 843 N.W.2d 100, 110

– 11 (Iowa 2014). Evidence satisfies that standard if no serious or significant doubts exist that the conclusions of law drawn from the proof are correct

. In re C.B. , 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Our top concern is A.P.’s best in terest. In re L.T. , 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019).3

foster care. The court adjudicated her as a child in need of assistance (CINA) in
De cember 2018. 2 At that adjudication hearing, David asked for a home study under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for his mother and sister
in Alabama. The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) did not pursue that ICPC inquiry u ntil after the permanency hearing in October 2019. It was not completed by the time of the termination hearing in November. David remained incarcerated for the life of the CINA case

. At the termination hearing, he testified from the Anamosa State Penite ntiary. He could not quote the court an exact release date, but estimated he could be free in the early months of 2020. He testified his preference from the beginning was for A.P. to remain with Cassie, but also wanted his mother and sister considered for placement. Davi d did not address his substance

- abuse history at the termination hearing, but the State offered exhibits showing the extent of his addictions. A
subs tance

- abuse evaluation conducted in September 2016 chronicled David’s use of cocaine and marijuana dating back to his early teens and recommended high

intensity residential treatment. A year after A.P.’s removal, in October 2019, t he State petitioned to
t erminate the parental rights of both Cassie and David

. The juvenile court granted
the petition the next month , relying on paragraphs (e) and (h) of Iowa Code

2 A.P.’s case went to Polk Coun ty’s Zero

- to

- Three Safe Babies C ourt , which focuses on the science of early childhood development to help improve the well

being of young children in dependency proceeding s.4

section 232.116(1) (2019) to terminate David’s rights

. 3 David c ontests the
termination order on appeal.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
In his petition on appeal, David challenges both bases for termination of his parental rights. When the juvenile court relies on more than one statutory alternative, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. In re A.B. , 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Here, w e focus on paragraph (h). Under that paragraph, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is three years of age or younger; (2) she has been a djudicated as CINA under section 232.96; (3) she has been removed from her parents’ physical custody for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days; and (4) t here is clear and convincing evidence she cannot be returned to parental custody as provided in section 232.102 at the present time. Iowa Code § 232

. 116 ( 1 )( h ); see A.M. , 843 N.W.2d at 111 (interpreting statutory language “at the present time” as the time of the termination hearing). On appeal, David asserts the State did not prove the final element. But at
the termination heari ng, David acknowledged he was not in a position to care for his daughter due to his incarceration. 4 And his argument on appeal is not that he

3 Cassie consented to the termination and does not appeal. 4 The juvenile court explained that David requested visits with A.P. while in prison but the court denied th os e request s because he was incarcerated three hours away. The court acknowledged had he been closer “we might have been able to do better.” David does not raise a reasonable

- efforts challenge on appeal.5

could have assumed custody of A.P. in November 2019, but that the juvenile court “could have granted a six month extension” until his release from prison.
T o grant an extension under Iowa Code section 232.104 (2) (b) , the court must determine the need for removal will no longer exist after that reprieve. In re A.A.G. , 708 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). We cannot make such a
determination here. David was unsure when he would be released from prison. And aft er his release, his parenting skills would be untested. He has a long history of unaddressed substance abuse. This record offers no assurance David could provide a stable home for A.P. after six months. See A.B. , 815 N.W.2d at 778 ( looking to a parent’s past performance for clues about the prospect for future

care ). Under these circumstances , termination of David’s parental rights was proper under section 232.116(1)(h).
B. Best Interests David next argues termination of his rights did not serv e A.P.’s best
interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). In making the best

- interests determination, we give primary consideration to the child ’s safety, the best placement for furthering her long

- term nurturing and growth, as well as her physical, mental, a nd emotional condition and needs. See In re P.L. , 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010). That consideration also may include a child’s integration into
her foster family and their willingness to adopt the child

. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). Safety and the need for a permanent home mark the “defining
elements ” in a child’s best interest s

. In re J.E. , 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially).6

David complains that A.P. is placed with a n Iowa foster family despite his repeated request s for an ICPC home study of his relatives in Alabama. While the DHS was slow in pursuing the home study requested by David, by the same token, his mother and sister did not make any overtures to start a relationship with A.P. in Iowa. Meanwhile, the fost er family provided A.P. with a loving, stable home. The DHS extolled the efforts of the foster parents in working closely with Cassie in a “kind of coparenting relationship.” The foster father told the court that even after termination they were willing to keep relationships open with A.P.’s biological mother and father. After our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court’s assessment that termination of David’s parental rights is in A.P.’s be st interests under the criteria in section 232.116(2).
AFFIRMED.