United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 12, 2006

Decided December 21, 2006

Before

 Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05–4635

LAHBIB OUINTI,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General of the United States,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A95-925-001

 

O R D E R

Facing removal for remaining in the U.S. long after his visitor’s visa expired,

Lahbib Ouinti applied for asylum, claiming that he fled Algeria in 1997 because he

was persecuted by the Groupe Islamique Armé (“GIA”) and will be harmed or killed

if he returns. Finding that Ouinti’s asylum application was time-barred, the

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) considered his application as a request for withholding of

removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied both forms

of relief but granted Ouinti voluntary departure. The Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, and Ouinti petitions for review of the denial of his

withholding of removal claim. We deny his petition for review. 

Ouinti, who is 46, was born in Mechera, Algeria. In 1987 he received a

teaching certificate in art from the Medeghri Institute of Technology in Saïda,

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4635 Page 2

Algeria, and began working as an art teacher at a public high school in Bougtob,

Algeria. He worked there until July 1997, when he started receiving death threats

from the GIA, a radical Islamic group. See Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 499 (7th

Cir. 2005); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2003). According to

Ouinti, unidentified members of the group called him “three or four times” at his

home and told him that he had to quit his job or he would be killed. After receiving

a letter from the GIA repeating the same threat, Ouinti fled to the Algerian city of

Olan and then to Tunisia, where he obtained a visitor’s visa for the United States.

When Ouinti arrived in New York in October 1997, he did not apply for

asylum because he was “scared” and unaware of the asylum process. Instead, he

traveled to Chicago, where he remained well past the expiration of his visa. In

February 2003, the Department of Homeland Security informed Ouinti that he had

overstayed his visa and commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(B). Ouinti conceded removability and applied for asylum, appearing for

his hearing on October 6, 2004. 

Although the IJ deemed Ouinti credible, the IJ found his asylum claim timebarred with no “exceptional circumstances” to excuse the delay. See 8 U.SC. §

1158(a)(2). The IJ also concluded that Ouinti was not entitled to withholding of

removal because the threats he received were insufficient to qualify as past

persecution and the improved political situation in Algeria undermined the

likelihood that he would be persecuted if he returned. Finally, the IJ concluded

that Ouinti was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture. See 8

C.F.R. § 208.18(a). The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Ouinti

appeals.

Where, as here, the BIA has adopted the IJ’s reasoning without opinion, we

review the IJ’s decision directly and will uphold it as long as it is supported by

reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. 

Mabasa v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2006). We will overturn the BIA’s

decision only if “the record compels a contrary result.” Id. (quotation marks and

citation omitted). To qualify for withholding of removal, Ouinti was required to

demonstrate a “clear probability”—i.e., it is more likely than not—that he will be

persecuted if he returns to Algeria. Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 605 (7th

Cir. 2005). If he suffered past persecution, Ouinti was entitled to a presumption of

future persecution. Id.

Ouinti first argues that the IJ erred by determining that he did not suffer

past persecution based on the threatening phone calls and letter he received. But

threats alone will rarely compel a finding of past persecution. See Bejko v.

Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2006); Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d

720, 723 (7th Cir. 2005); Boykov v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997). Over the
No. 05-4635 Page 3

course of a month, Ouinti received “three or four” phone calls and a letter, each

telling him that he would be killed if he did not quit his job. But he was never

physically harmed and had no contact with the GIA except by phone and letter, and

at his asylum hearing he presented no evidence suggesting that the GIA intended to

follow through on its threats. Thus, the threats Ouinti received were not of a “most

immediate and menacing nature” that might compel a finding of persecution. See

Bejko, 468 F.3d at 486; Ahmed, 348 F.3d at 616; Hernandez-Baena, 417 F.3d at

723; Boykov, 109 F.3d at 416; cf. Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir.

2005) (soldier stating death threat while pressing gun against applicant’s head

supported finding of persecution). Accordingly, the IJ’s determination that Ouinti

had not suffered past persecution is supported in the record.

Without evidence of past persecution, Ouinti bore the burden of showing that

he would more likely than not be persecuted if returned to Algeria. See

Firmansjah, 424 F.3d at 606. He did not make such a showing. Instead, he

testified that the last time he or his family members (who remain in Algeria) were

ever contacted by the GIA was in 2000. But he offered his personal belief that the

GIA is still active in Algeria and that they “kill a lot of people,” including “anyone

who support[s] the government.” Ouinti supported these assertions only with

documentary evidence dated no later than 1998. 

The IJ found the State Department’s 2003 Country Report more convincing;

the report states that conditions in Algeria have improved since the 1990s and that

daily violence has declined. Although the 2003 report acknowledges that terrorist

groups continued to target “government officials,” it also observes that attacks on

civilians were often for financial, not political reasons. Indeed, more recent State

Department reports indicate that the number of active terrorists in Algeria has

declined dramatically since the mid-1990s and that the government’s successful

efforts to capture GIA leaders has “further weakened the effectiveness” of the GIA. 

U.S. State Department, Country Report on Terrorism in Algeria (2005). As a sign of

the decline in hostilities, in 2005 President Bouteflika proposed an amnesty for

members of insurgent groups involved in the violence of the 1990s. See U.S. State

Department, Country Report on Terrorism in Algeria (2006). 

We have held that “unsubstantiated, uncorroborated, and self-serving

evidence concerning current political conditions in a country is not sufficiently

credible evidence to reverse the BIA or to rebut the BIA’s reliance on a Country

Report.” Pop v. INS, 279 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Ouinti did not

present any current documentation about political conditions in Algeria, nor did he

offer any evidence to suggest that he would be targeted for persecution upon return. 

Thus, the IJ was entitled to give more weight to the more recent country report, see

id. at 462, which suggests that Ouinti is unlikely to be persecuted. Thus, since

Ouinti did not corroborate his claim that he faces a clear probability of persecution
No. 05-4635 Page 4

if returned to Algeria, the IJ’s denial of his withholding of removal claim is

supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.