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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

ERNESTO FONTANEZ

Appellant :

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: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2428 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 18, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0005937

- 2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: F iled: April 30, 2021

Ernesto Fontanez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed June 18, 2018, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.

This appeal returns following a remand by a prior panel of this Court for the

appointment of new appellate counsel. See Commonwealth v. Fontanez

,

2428 EDA 2018 (unpub. memo. at 7

- 8) (Pa. Super. Dec. 18, 2019).

Appellant ’s sole issue on appeal asserts the trial court erred when it denied

his pret rial motion to dismiss the charges based upon a violation of

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. We affirm.

The facts underlying Appellant’s conviction ar e summarized by the trial

court as follows:

The complainant in this case is Sherry Szymanek ( “ Sherry ” ).

At the time of the underlying incident, she resided in a home on

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East Monmouth Street in Philadelphia. [T]wo weeks prior to the

alleged crimes, [Sherry] allowed Appellant and his paramour to

store their belongings on the first floor of her home, after the two

had been evicted from their shared residence. Sherry provided

Appellant with a copy of her house key (so he could access his

belongings), but neither Appellant nor his paramour ever resided

with the complainant. On the day at issue, Appellant did not have

permission to enter Sherry ’ s home.

On April 3, 2016, around 3:00 p.m., Sherry returned from

the supermarket and realized that her front door “ was kicked in

and the whole frame was messed up. ” Sherry immediatel y

knocked on her neighbor ’ s door to see if he could provide

information about how the damage occurred. When she

approached the neighbor ’ s door, she observed Appellant

“ screaming and yelling and fighting with whoever was in the

house. ” Sherry testified th at as soon as she stepped through the

neighbor ’ s door, Appellant aggressively ran towards her, threw

her against the wall, and used both of his hands to choke her.

Appellant did not stop until Helena Meeker ( “ Helena ” ) pulled him

away.

Sherry quickly retu rned to her own home, locked the door,

and ran upstairs to her bedroom. A few minutes later, she looked

through her bedroom window and observed Appellant and three

women “ screaming ” outside of her residence. Specifically,

Appellant threatened Sherry, sta ting that he was “ going to beat

[her] the ‘F’ up. ” He then unlocked her front door and the three

women

— Helena, Alexandra Orosco ( “ Alexandr a ” "), and a third,

unidentified woman

— followed him to Sherry ’ s bedroom

.

As Appellant entered the bedroom, he pointed a firearm at

Sherry and ordered her to sit on the bed. He then told Alexandra,

“ Fuck her up, beat her up. ” Alexandra immediately complied and

punched Sherry “ several ” times over the course of ten to fifteen

minutes. At some point, the unidentifi ed woman grabbed a metal

pipe from Appellant and attempted to strike the complainant.

Sherry testified that she heard Appellant cock the gun, before

Helena “ grabbed him ” and “ wrestled him to the ground. ” Helena

eventually gained possession of the weapon and placed it in a bag.

Subsequently, Appellant and the three women exited the

bedroom. Before Appellant left, he took Sherry ’ s cellphone and

told her that “ [she] was going to die. ” Sherry testified that her

assailants also took $400 in cash from her cl oset, but she did not

see which assailant took her money.

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- At some point during the altercation, Sherr y’ s neighbor

called the police. By the time the officers arrived, Appellant and

the three women were no longer on the property. Officer Daniel

Mitchell ( “ Officer Mitchell ” ) testified that Sherry was “ frantic ” and

surveyed the immediate area. The officers quickly found

Appellant among a group of people (which included the women

who helped him attack Sherry), walking northbound on Emerald

Street. Sherry i dentified Appellant, Helena, and Alexandra as the

individuals who assaulted her and took her belongings

.

Officer Mitchell and [another officer] stopped Alexandra and

recovered $100 from her person. Officer Derrick Clark stopped

Appellant and, upon searching him, recovered $226 and Sherry ’ s

cellphone. Officer Paul Sulsuk testified that as the officers

approached the group, he observed Helena throw a black and

yellow bag into the road. He testified that he recovered the bag,

searched its contents, a nd found a loaded Browning Arms .22

caliber semiautomatic handgun and a twelve

- inch metal pipe.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/9/20, at 2

- 5 (footnote and record citations omitted)

.

Appellant was subsequently arrested, and a criminal complaint was filed

on April 4, 201 6, charging him with numerous offenses including criminal

conspiracy , aggravated assault, and robbery. 1 

### See Criminal Complaint,

4/4/16. On December 15, 2016, Appellant filed a motion for release on

nominal bail pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(B)(1) (“Except in cases in which

the defendant is not entitled to release on bail as provided by law, no

defendant shall be held in pretrial incarceration in excess of . . . 180 days from

the date on which the complaint is filed[.]”). The trial court denied the motion

on December 21, 2016.

On January 11, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion,

seeking suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an alleged illegal

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 

### 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(c), 2702(a), 3701(a)(1)(ii).

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seizure and arrest, and dismissal of the charges based upon a violation of Rule

600(A)(2)(a) (“Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against

the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the

complaint is filed.”). On April 9, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on

the Rule 600 motion. 2 

### See N.T., 4/9/18, at 4

- 21. The court denied the

motion, and immediately proceeded to a non

- jury trial. The court found

Appellant guilty of simple assault, criminal conspiracy, theft , and possession

of an instrument of crime (PIC)

. 3 

### The trial court found Appellant not guilty of

robbery, intimidation of a witness, and three firearms offenses. 4 

### Charges of

aggravated assault , recklessly endangering another person, and receiving

stolen property 5 

### were nolle prossed by the Commonwealth before trial.

On June 18, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two

, concurrent

terms of eleven and one

- half to 23 months’ imprisonment on the charges of

criminal conspiracy and simple assault, followed by a consecutive three years’

probation for his conviction of PIC. 6 

### Appellant filed a timely

, pro se notice of

appeal, but mistakenly directed it to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See

Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, 7/18/18. On August 16, 2018, t he Supreme

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 

### The record does not reveal a ruling on Appellant’s suppression issue.

3 

### 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a), 3921(a), and 907(a), respectively.

4 

### 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(a)(4), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108.

5 

### 18 Pa.C.S. § § 2705, 3925(a).

6 

### The trial court imposed no fur ther penalty for Appellant’s theft conviction.

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Court transferred the appeal to this Court. On August 20, 2018, the trial court

directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Trial counsel, who still represented Appellant,

did not respond to the order, and the trial court deemed all issues waived.

See Fontanez , 2428 EDA 2018 (unpub. memo. at 2).

Counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders 7 

### brief

in this Court. Upon review, a prior panel concluded counsel’s Anders brief

was “woefully deficient,” and determined, in any event, counsel had waiv ed

all issues for review by failing to comply with the trial court’s Rule 1925(b)

order. See Fontanez , 2428 EDA 2018 (unpub. memo. at 4, 6

- 7 ) . Thus, the

panel remanded the appeal to the trial court for the appointment of new

counsel

. See id. at 7

- 8. The appeal is now ready for our consideration. 8



### Appellant raises one issue on appeal:

Did the Trial Court err by denying the Rule 600 Motion and not

dismissing the charges[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

7 

### See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.

Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

8 

### Upon remand, Douglas Earl, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant,

and complied with the trial cou rt’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.

However, Attorney Earl failed to file a timely brief in this Court. Thus, on

November 18, 2020, we remanded the appeal to the trial court to determine

if Attorney Earl had abandoned Appellant. Following a hea ring, the trial court

determined Attorney Earl did not abandon Appellant, and Attorney Earl

subsequently filed the brief before us.

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Rule 600 requires that “t rial in a court case in which a written complaint

is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date

on which the complaint is filed. ” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). When a

defendant is not brought to trial within the requisite time period, “at any time

before trial, . . . the defendant . . . may file a written motion requesting that

the charges be dismissed with prejudice[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). We

review the trial court’s grant or denial of a defendant’s Rule 600 pretrial

motion to dismiss fo r an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Andrews

,

213 A.3d 1004, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied , 222

A.3d 376 (Pa. 2019). In doing so, our scope of review is limited to the trial

court’s findings and the evidence presented at t he Rule 600 hearing , which we

must view “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation

omitted).

When trial commences more than 365 days after the complaint is filed,

a defendant is not automatically entitled to relief under Rule 600

.

Commonwealth v. M oore , 214 A.3d 244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2019). The Rule

provides that “ periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due

diligence shall be included in the computation of the time w ithin which trial

must commence[,]” but that [“ a ] ny other periods of delay shall be

excluded from the computation

. ” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis

supplied). Thus, d ismissal of the charges is the appro priate remedy only when

the defendant is not brought to trial within the extended run date, which

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accounts for excludable and excusable time under the Rule. Moore , 214 A.3d

at 248.

“Excludable time” is classified as periods of delay caused by the

defend ant. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(2). “Excusable delay” occurs

where the delay is caused by circum stances beyond the

Commonwealth’ s control and despite its due diligence. “Due

diligence is a fact

- specific concept that must be determined on a

case

- by

- case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect

vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the

Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Due

diligence includes, inter alia , listing a case for trial prior to the run

date, preparedness for trial within the run date, and keeping

adequate records to ensure compliance with Rule 600. Periods of

d elay caused by the Commonwealth’ s failure to exercise due

diligence must be included in the computation of time within which

trial must commence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Id. at 248

- 49 (some citations omitted). We note “[t]he Commonwealth has

the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it

exercised due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Plowden , 157 A.3d 933, 941

(Pa. Super. 2017 ) ( en banc ).

Here, Appellant’s criminal complaint was filed on April 4, 2016 ; thus, his

mechanical run date was April 4, 2017 . However, he was not brought to trial

until April 9, 2018

. In its opinion, the trial court provides a detailed timeline

of Appe llant’s case, and concludes his run date was extended an additional

451 days, or until June 29, 2018. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7

- 15. Thus, because

Appellant was tried before the expiration of the extended run date, it

concludes no Rule 600 violation occurred

. Id. at 15.

Appellant takes issue with two specific time periods, which he contends

should run against the Commonwealth

— (1) 58 days between September 27,

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2016, and November 22, 2016, and (2) 57 days between April 10, 2017, and

June 6, 2017. Appellant ’s Brief at 12. He insists that the Commonwealth did

not provide discovery during the first period, occasioning a delay, and that the

second delay was caused by “[t]he Commonwealth . . . trying to link up the

case of Appellant with another case.” Id.

Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs

, and the relevant

statutory and case law, we conclude the trial court thoroughly addressed and

properly disposed of Appellant’s claim in its opinion. Thus, we rest on its well

reasoned bas e s

. 9 

### See Trial Ct. Op. at 5

- 15 (detailing each trial delay and the

cause thereof; explaining the delay between September 27 and October 25,

2016, was due to appointment of new defense counsel, delay between October

25 and November 22, 2016, was due to defense counsel’s “ technical issues .

. . preventing him for accessing discovery” and not attributable to

Commonwealth, and delay between April 10 and June 6, 2017, was due to

court’s calendar, and not “‘normal progression’ of a case, a lack of due

diligence, or other dilato ry conduct on behalf of the Commonwealth” ).

Accordingly, we affirm.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

9 

### We note the trial court addressed an additional challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence that Appellant included in h is Rule 1925(b) statement, but did

not argue in his brief. See Trial Ct. Op. at 19

- 21.

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Judgment of sentence affirmed. We direct that a copy of the trial court’s

September 9, 2020 , opinion be filed along with this memorandum and

attached to any future filings in this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/30/21**Circulated 04/21/2021** **10:06 AM** **IN THE** **COURT OF** **COMMON PLEAS** **FIRST JUDICIAL** **DISTRICT OF** **PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL** **DIVISION —** **CRIMINAL SECTION** **COMMONWEALTH OF** **PENNSYLVANIA n.•** **r •,** **V. CP-5I-CR-0005937** **016 ;** **2428 EDA** **2018 ro** **ERNESTO FOUNTANEZ** **OPINION LANE,** **J. September** **9, 2020** **OVERVIEW AND** **PROCEDURAL HISTORY** **On April** **4, 2016,** **Ernesto Fountanez** **("Appellant") was** **arrested and** **charged with** **simple assault** **and related** **charges. On** **April 9,** **2018, counsel** **for Appellant** **moved to** **dismiss Appellant's** **charges, pursuant** **to Pa.R.Crim.P.** **600. On** **that same** **date, this** **court denied** **Appellant's motion** **and, following** **a waiver** **trial, found** **Appellant guilty** **of conspiracy** **to commit** **simple assault,** **theft by** **unlawful taking,** **possessing an** **instrument of** **a crime** **("PIC"), and** **simple assault.'** **On .tune** **18, 2018,** **this court** **sentenced Appellant** **to an** **aggregate term** **of eleven** **and one-half** **to twenty-three** **months in** **prison, followed** **by three** **years of** **probation. On** **July 18,** **2018, Appellant** **filed a** **pro se** **notice of** **appeal, but** **mistakenly filed** **it in** **the Supreme** **Court of** **Pennsylvania. The** **Supreme Court** **transferred the** **appeal to** **the Superior** **Court on** **August 16,** **2018. On** **August 20,** **2018, this** **court ordered** **Appellant to** **file a** **concise statement** **of errors,** **pursuant to** **Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),** **and served** **that order** **on counsel** **of record.** **Counsel did** **not respond** **to the** **order. In** **its 1925(a)** **opinion, this** **court determined** **that any** **appellate issues** **were waived** **for failure** **to comply** **with the** **1925(b) order.** **' 18** **Pa.C.S. §** **903, 18** **Pa.C.S.A, §** **3921(a), 18** **Pa.C.S.A, §** **907(a), and** **18 Pa.C.S.A.** **§ 2701(a),** **respectively. 1** **Appellate counsel** **sought to** **withdraw his** **representation pursuant** **to Anders** **v. California,** **386 U.S.** **738 (1967)** **and Corn** **nonwealth v.** **Santiago, 978** **A.2d 349** **(2009). After** **reviewing the** **matter, the** **Superior Court** **determined that** **counsel's appellate** **brief was** **"woefully deficient"** **and his** **failure to** **respond to** **this count's** **1925(b) order** **constituted per** **se ineffective** **assistance of** **counsel. Commonwealth** **v. Fontanez,** **No. 2428** **EDA 2018,** **2019 WL** **6899901, at** ***2---3 (Pa.** **Super. Ct,** **Dec. 18,** **2019). Accordingly,** **on December** **18, 2019,** **the Superior** **Court remanded** **the case,** **ordering the** **appointment of** **new counsel** **and the** **filing of** **a supplemental** **1925(a) opinion** **from this** **court. Douglas** **P. Earl,** **Esquire, entered** **his appearance** **on behalf** **of Appellant** **on February** **19, 2020.** **On March** **9, 2020,** **this court** **ordered counsel** **to file** **a 1925(b)** **statement within** **twenty-one days.** **Counsel did** **not seek** **an extension** **of time** **and did** **not file** **a 1925(b)** **statement until** **105 days** **later, on** **June 22,** **2020, in** **which he** **asserted the** **following claims:** **1. The** **[trial] court** **erred by** **denying [the]** **Rule 600** **Motion of** **Ernesto Fountanez,** **particularly the** **time from** **September 27** **to November** **22, 2016** **when discovery** **remained outstanding.** **2. There** **was insufficient** **evidence to** **convict Appellant** **Fountanez of** **conspiracy—simple assault,** **theft by** **unlawful taking,** **[PIC], or** **simple assault.** **Ernesto Fountanez** **never intended** **to injure** **the complainant** **or conspire** **with another** **person to** **injure the** **complainant Ernesto** **Fountanez never** **used an** **instrument of** **crime against** **the complainant.** **(App.'s 1925(b)** **Statement) (unnecessary** **capitalization and** **words omitted,** **citations omitted).** **FACTS The** **complainant in** **this case** **is Sherry** **Szymanek ("Sherry").** **At the** **time of** **the underlying** **incident, she** **resided in** **a home** **on East** **Monmouth Street** **in Philadelphia.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 29).** **On March** **9, 2020,** **this court** **was aware** **and the** **docket reflected** **that new** **counsel had** **been appointed.** **This court's** **instruction to** **appoint new** **counsel (which** **is indicated** **within its** **1925(b) order)** **was included** **in error.** **2 Sherry** **testified that** **she was** **acquainted with** **Appellant through** **his best** **friend, Jennis** **Watson, who** **Sherry was** **dating at** **the time.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 33).** **Sherry further** **explained that** **two weeks** **prior to** **the alleged** **crimes, she** **allowed Appellant** **and his** **paramour to** **store their** **belongings on** **the first** **floor of** **her home,** **after the** **two had** **been evicted** **from their** **shared residence.** **(Id. at** **32). Sherry** **provided Appellant** **with a** **copy of** **her house** **key (so** **he could** **access his** **belongings), but** **neither Appellant** **nor his** **paramour ever** **resided with** **the complainant.** **(Id. at** **34, 49).** **On the** **day at** **issue, Appellant** **did not** **have permission** **to enter** **Sherry's home.** **(Id. at** **49). On** **April 3,** **2016, around** **3:00 p.m.,** **Sherry returned** **from the** **supermarket and** **realized that** **her front** **door "was** **kicked in** **and the** **whole frame** **was messed** **up." (Id.** **at 30).** **Sherry immediately** **knocked on** **her neighbor's** **door to** **see if** **he could** **provide information** **about how** **the damage** **occurred. (Id.** **at 30).** **When she** **approached the** **neighbor's door,** **she observed** **Appellant "screaming** **and yelling** **and fighting** **with whoever** **was in** **the house."** **(Id. at** **31). Sherry** **testified that** **as soon** **as she** **stepped through** **the neighbor's** **door, Appellant** **aggressively ran** **towards her,** **threw her** **against the** **wall, and** **used both** **of his** **hands to** **choke her.** **(dI. at** **34, 36--37).** **Appellant did** **not stop** **until Helena** **Meeker ("Helena")** **pulled him** **away. (Id.** **at 37).** **Sherry quickly** **returned to** **her own** **home, locked** **the door,** **and ran** **upstairs to** **her bedroom.** **(Id. at** **38). A** **few minutes** **later, she** **looked through** **her bedroom** **window and** **observed Appellant** **and three** **women "screaming"** **outside of** **her residence.** **(Id. at** **38-39). Specifically,** **Appellant threatened** **Sherry, stating** **that he** **was "going** **to beat** **[her] the** **`F' up."** **(Id. at** **38). He** **then unlocked** **her front** **door and** **the three** **women—Helena, Alexandra** **Orosco ("Alexandra"),** **and a** **third, unidentified** **woman—followed him** **to Sherry's** **bedroom. (Id.** **at 39-40).** **As Appellant** **entered the** **bedroom, he** **pointed a** **firearm at** **Sherry and** **ordered her** **to sit** **on the** **bed. (Id.** **at 38,** **41-42). He** **then told** **Alexandra, "Fuck** **her up,** **beat her** **up." (Id.** **at 43).** **3 Alexandra** **immediately complied** **and punched** **Sherry "several"** **times over** **the course** **of ten** **to fifteen** **minutes. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **44-45). At** **some point,** **the unidentified** **woman grabbed** **a metal** **pipe from** **Appellant and** **attempted to** **strike the** **complainant. (Id.** **at 43,** **45). Sherry** **testified that** **she heard** **Appellant cock** **the gun,** **before Helena** **"grabbed him"** **and "wrestled** **him to** **the ground."** **(Id. at** **43). Helena** **eventually gained** **possession of** **the weapon** **and placed** **it in** **a bag.** **(Id. at** **45). Subsequently,** **Appellant and** **the three** **women exited** **the bedroom.** **(Id. at** **45-46). Before** **Appellant left,** **he took** **Sherry's cellphone** **and told** **her that** **"[she] was** **going to** **die." (Id.** **at 46).** **Sherry testified** **that her** **assailants also** **tools $400** **in cash** **fi•om her** **closet, but** **she did** **not see** **which assailant** **took her** **money. (Id.** **at 51).** **At some** **point during** **the altercation,** **Sherry's neighbor** **called the** **police. (Id.** **at 47-48).** **By the** **time the** **officers arrived,** **Appellant and** **the three** **women were** **no longer** **on the** **property. (Id.** **at 88).** **Officer Daniel** **Mitchell ("Officer** **Mitchell") testified** **that Sherry** **was "frantic"** **and "visibly** **shaken" when** **he arrived** **on the** **scene. (Id.).** **The officers** **put Sherry** **in a** **police vehicle** **and surveyed** **the immediate** **area. (Id.** **at 89).** **The officers** **quickly found** **Appellant among** **a group** **of people** **(which included** **the women** **who helped** **him attack** **Sherry), walking** **northbound on** **Emerald Street.** **(Id. at** **89, 106).** **Sherry identified** **Appellant, Helena,** **and Alexandra** **as the** **individuals who** **assaulted her** **and took** **her belongings.** **(Id. at** **48, 89,** **97). Officer** **Mitchell and** **Officer Sutton** **stopped Alexandra** **and recovered** **$100 from** **her person.** **(Id. at** **90). Officer** **Derrick Clark** **stopped Appellant** **and, upon** **searching him,** **recovered $226** **and Sherry's** **cellphone. (Id.** **at 97).** **Officer Paul** **Sulsuk testified** **that as** **the officers** **approached the** **group, he** **observed Helena** **throw a** **black and** **yellow bag** **into the** **road. (Id.** **at 106).** **s Officer** **Sutton's frill** **name is** **not contained** **within the** **notes of** **testimony. 4** **He testified** **that he** **recovered the** **bag, searched** **its contents,** **and found** **a loaded** **Browning Arms** **.22 caliber** **semiautomatic handgun** **and a** **twelve-inch metal** **pipe. (Id.** **at 107).** **DISCUSSION I.** **This court** **did not** **err or** **abuse its** **discretion in** **denying Appellant's** **Rule 600** **motion. In** **his first** **claim, Appellant** **argues that** **this court** **erred in** **denying his** **Rule 600** **Motion. He** **particularly challenges** **the fifty-six** **days between** **September 27,** **2016 and** **November 22,** **2016, arguing** **that this** **period should** **have been** **included in** **this court's** **calculation of** **non-excludable and** **non-excusable time.** **For the** **reasons discussed** **infra, Appellant's** **claim has** **no merit,** **and this** **court's decision** **should be** **affirmed. The** **standard of** **review for** **a trial** **court's denial** **of a** **Rule 600** **motion is** **well settled:** **In evaluating** **Rule [600]** **issues, our** **standard of** **review of** **a trial** **court's decision** **is whether** **the trial** **court abused** **its discretion.** **Judicial discretion** **requires action** **in conformity** **with law,** **upon facts** **and circumstances** **judicially before** **the court,** **after hearing** **and due** **consideration. An** **abuse of** **discretion is** **not merely** **an error** **of judgment,** **but if** **in reaching** **a conclusion** **the law** **is overridden** **or misapplied** **or the** **judgment exercised** **is manifestly** **unreasonable, or** **the result** **of partiality,** **prejudice, bias,** **or ill** **will, as** **shown by** **the evidence** **or the** **record, discretion** **is abused.** **Commonwealth v.** **Leaner, 202** **A.3d 749,** **765-66 (Pa.** **Super. 2019)** **(citation omitted;** **brackets in** **original), appeal** **denied, 2019** **W1 2754197** **(Pa. 2019).** **An appellate** **court's scope** **of review** **is "limited** **to the** **evidence on** **the record** **of the** **Rule 600** **evidentiary hearing"** **and the** **trial court's** **findings of** **fact. Commonwealth** **v. Watson,** **140 A.3d** **696, 698** **(Pa. Super.** **2016). Moreover,** **appellate courts** **must construe** **the facts** **in the** **light most** **favorable to** **the prevailing** **party. Id.** **Pennsylvania Rule** **of Criminal** **Procedure 600** **("Rule 600")** **states, "[tjrial** **in a** **court case** **in which** **a written** **complaint is** **filed against** **the defendant** **shall commence** **within 365** **days from** **the date** **on which** **the complaint** **is filed."** **Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).** **Generally, Rule** **600 requires** **the Commonwealth** **to try** **a defendant** **before the** **expiration of** **the "mechanical** **run date,"** **i.e., 5** **within 365** **days of** **the filing** **of a** **criminal complaint.** **Id.; Commonwealth** **v. Ramos,** **936 A.2d** **1097, 1101** **(Pa. Super.** **2007). However,** **the rule** **allows certain** **circumstances to** **extend the** **Commonwealth's deadline.** **See Pa.R.Crim.P.** **600(C). To** **determine the** **final date** **by which** **a defendant** **must be** **tried, Rule** **600 provides** **that "periods** **of delay** **at any** **stage of** **the proceedings** **caused by** **the Commonwealth** **when the** **Commonwealth has** **failed to** **exercise due** **diligence shall** **be included** **in the** **computation of** **the time** **within which** **trial must** **corn mence.** **Any other** **periods of** **delay shall** **be excluded** **from the** **computation." Pa.R.Crim.P.** **600(C)(1). The** **Commonwealth's failure** **to satisfy** **the prompt-trial** **requirements of** **Rule 600(C)** **constitutes grounds** **for dismissal.** **See Pa.R.Crim.P.** **600(D)(1). A** **defendant is** **not automatically** **entitled to** **dismissal under** **Rule 600** **if his** **trial commences** **after the** **mechanical runt** **date. Commonwealth** **v. Goldman,** **70 A.3d** **874, 879** **(Pa. Super.** **2013). Rather,** **dismissal is** **an appropriate** **remedy only** **if the** **defendant has** **not been** **brought to** **trial by** **the expiration** **of the** **adjusted runt** **date. Id.** **"The adjusted** **run date** **is calculated** **by adding** **to the** **mechanical run** **date, i.e.,** **the date** **365 days** **from the** **complaint, both** **excludable and** **excusable delay."** **Commonwealth v.** **Roles, 116** **A.3d 122,** **125 (Pa.** **Super. 2015).** **Periods of** **delay are** **excludable if** **they are** **attributable to** **a defendant** **or his** **lawyer. Commonwealth** **v. Martz,** **--- A.3d** **--- ----,** **2020 WL** **2029287, at** ***5 (Pa.** **Super. April** **28, 2020)** **reargument dismissed** **(May 18,** **2020). Conversely,** **periods of** **delay are** **excusable "where** **the delay** **is caused** **by circumstances** **beyond the** **Commonwealth's control** **and despite** **its due** **diligence." Id.** **To determine** **whether Rule** **600 requires** **dismissal of** **charges against** **a defendant,** **the following** **three factors** **must be** **considered: First,** **Rule 600(A)** **provides the** **mechanical run** **date. Second,** **we determine** **whether any** **excludable time** **exists pursuant** **to Rule** **600(C). We** **add the** **amount of** **excludable time,** **if any,** **to the** **mechanical run** **date to** **arrive at** **an adjusted** **runt date.** **6 If** **the trial** **takes place** **after the** **adjusted run** **date, we** **apply the** **due diligence** **analysis set** **forth in** **Rule 600([D]).** **As we** **have explained,** **Rule 600[** **] encompasses** **a wide** **variety of** **circumstances under** **which a** **period of** **delay was** **outside the** **control of** **the Commonwealth** **and not** **the result** **of the** **Commonwealth's lack** **of diligence.** **Any such** **period of** **delay results** **in an** **extension of** **the run** **date. Addition** **of any** **Rule 600[** **] extensions** **to the** **adjusted run** **date produces** **the final** **Rule 600** **run date.** **If the** **Commonwealth does** **not bring** **the defendant** **to trial** **on or** **before the** **final run** **date, the** **trial court** **must dismiss** **the charges.** **Commonwealth v.** **Armstrong, 74** **A.3d 228,** **236 (Pa.** **Super. 2013)** **(citations and** **internal quotation** **marks omitted;** **brackets in** **original). It** **is well** **settled that** **due diligence** **is a** **fact-specific inquiry** **and must** **be determined** **on a** **case-by-case basis.** **Commonwealth v.** **Selenski, 994** **A.2d 1083,** **1089 (Pa.** **2010). A** **finding of** **due diligence** **"does not** **require perfect** **vigilance and** **punctilious care,** **but merely** **a showing** **the Commonwealth** **has put** **forth a** **reasonable effort."** **Id. In** **Commonwealth v.** **Mills, the** **Supreme Court** **of Pennsylvania** **held that** **"time attributable** **to the** **normal progression** **of a** **case simply** **is not** **[excludable] `delay'** **for purposes** **of Rule** **600." 162** **A.3d 323,** **325 (Pa.** **2017). Thus,** **trial courts** **are required** **to distinguish** **the "time** **necessary to** **ordinary trial** **preparation [from]** **judicial delay** **arising out** **of the** **court's own** **scheduling concerns."** **Id. Delay** **caused by** **the "normal** **progression of** **a case"** **must be** **included in** **the Rule** **600 computation** **unless the** **Commonwealth can** **show it** **exercised due** **diligence during** **the period** **or the** **record establishes** **that the** **judiciary or** **the defense** **was responsible** **for the** **delay. Id.;** **Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C).** **In the** **case at** **bar, Appellant** **was arrested** **and the** **criminal complaint** **was filed** **on April** **4, 2016.** **Accordingly, the** **mechanical run** **date was** **April 4,** **2017. See** **Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).** **Appellant's trial** **did not** **commence until** **April 9,** **2018--735 days** **after the** **filing of** **his criminal** **complaint. However,** **there were** **significant periods** **of excusable** **and excludable** **time that** **sanction this** **delay. This** **court calculated** **the time** **as follows:** **The shaded** **regions indicate** **periods of** **excludable or** **excusable delay.** **7 DATE** **EVENT REASON** **FOR DELAY** **NUMBER OF** **DAYS BETWEEN** **DATES TRIAL** **COURT'S DETERMINATION** **April 4,** **2016 Appellant's** **arrest; criminal** **complaint filed** **Scheduled for** **preliminary hearing** **15 Attributable** **to Commonwealth** **April 19,** **2016 Case** **listed for** **preliminary hearing** **Commonwealth request** **to continue** **preliminary hearing** **57 Attributable** **to Commonwealth** **June 15,** **2016 Preliminary** **Hearingl Court** **continuance— preliminary** **hearing held** **under advisement** **--:...::.< ........:..::.::.:.** **°:.:_ _;_.** **::.: :** **`...:::._:. .::.......** **Attributable to** **MC. ::,** **:.......:........ :..!.** **-:..-.. June** **17, 2016** **Case held** **for court** **by the** **Hon. Francis** **T. Shields** **Formal arraignment** **scheduled for** **7/8/11 21** **Attributable to** **Commonwealth July** **8, 2016** **Formal arraignment** **Scheduled for** **pre-trial conference** **81 Attributable** **to Commonwealth** **September 27,** **2016 Pre-trial** **bring back** **Defense continuance** **request '::``::`._:** **- :......** **. 'Attributable** **to .** **.......... efense** **...;.::: October** **25, 2016** **Pre-trial bring** **back Defense** **request to** **convey Commonwealth** **offer :-:,;** **:; .::** **:--:..: :::-:** **::Attributable ta'** **.;.; :.** **:.: -.._.:...** **Defense ;....** **_.... .** **November 22,** **2016 Pre-trial** **bring back** **Defense request** **to convey** **Commonwealth offer** **=:::_==.: -** **:::,::,..:-:=; .g** **;; .** **.....;._...--. Attributable** **to :-:::::** **..::;__:: ;..:...-:** **:-_:::::-•::.::;::::. Defense.....** **December 21,** **20 16 Pre-trial** **bring back** **Defendant rejected** **offer; Commonwealth** **requested trial** **date 14** **Attributable to** **Commonwealth January** **4, 2017** **Scheduling conference** **Commonwealth continuance** **request, for** **the purpose** **of "linking** **up" codefendant** **trials 96** **Attributable to** **Commonwealth April** **10, 2017** **Motions hearing** **and scheduling** **conference Trial** **listed for** **earliest possible** **date :_.:.** **=: 57** **' .** **a. ...:.v.°:=** **:. --** **- '°** **. Attributable** **_to ..** **1W.:: comrt's** **calendar' June** **6, 2017** **Listed for** **trial Defense** **continuance request** **?-==: _** **"- =--** **_:: _-..;2.24,.,'** **...:= Attributable** **=to Defense** **:.._...:..::>.: January** **16, 2018** **Listed for** **trial Joint** **continuance request** **- -** **Attributable $o** **Defense. February** **2, 2018** **Listed for** **trial Commonwealth=:** **continuance request—key** **witness family** **emergency ``_** **' -:.** **'°: 52** **.". ::** **Attributable to.** **Commonwealth .but** **excusable..:; .** **April 2,** **2018 Listed** **for trial** **Commonwealth continuance** **request witness** **contracted influenza** **7 Attributable** **to. Commonwealth** **but .** **excusable "** **April 9,** **2018 Waiver** **trial N/A** **N/A 8** **a. April** **4, 2016** **to September** **27, 2016-174** **days attributable** **to the** **Commonwealth. Between** **April 4,** **2016 and** **September 27,** **2016, Appellant's** **case was** **listed for** **his preliminary** **arraignment; two** **preliminary hearings--due** **to the** **Commonwealth's request** **to continue** **the initial** **preliminary hearing** **(MC Docket** **at 7);** **formal arraignment;** **and a** **pre-trial bring** **back. (Id.** **at 2).** **The Commonwealth** **did not** **argue that** **it was** **prepared to** **proceed to** **trial at** **any point** **during this** **period. See** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 11-16,** **19-20). Thus,** **this court** **determined that** **174 days** **of this** **176-day period** **was simply** **due to** **the case's** **"normal progression"** **and, therefore,** **attributable to** **the Commonwealth** **for the** **purposes of** **Rule 600.** **See Mills,** **162 A.3d** **at 324-25** **(holding that** **the 174** **days between** **the filing** **of the** **criminal complaint** **and a** **status conference** **was not** **excludable "delay"** **for Rule** **600 purposes,** **as the** **Commonwealth was** **not ready** **to proceed** **to trial** **during that** **time). This** **court excluded** **from its** **calculation the** **two-day period** **between June** **15, 2016** **and June** **17, 2016,** **during which** **the Honorable** **Francis T.** **Shields held** **Appellant's preliminary** **hearing under** **advisement. See** **(MC Docket** **at 8).** **b. September** **27, 2016** **to October** **25, 2016—hventy-eight** **excludable days** **attributable to** **the defense.** **On September** **14, 2016,** **Appellant's original** **trial counsel** **was suspended** **from the** **Bar of** **this Commonwealth** **.6 On** **September 23,** **2016, Kevin** **Thomas Birley,** **Esq. ("trial** **counsel") was** **appointed to** **represent Appellant.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 6).** **Four days** **later, on** **September 27,** **2016, Appellant's** **case was** **listed for** **a pre-trial** **bring back.** **On that** **date, trial** **counsel requested** **a continuance,** **and the** **case was** **scheduled to** **return on** **October 25,** **2016. (Id.** **at 12).** **The Superior** **Court has** **held that,** **for the** **purpose of** **Rule 600** **calculations, the** **Commonwealth is** **not accountable** **for delays** **caused by** **the defense's** **request for** **a continuance.** **Appellant's Originating** **Docket Number** **is MC-51-CR-000960** **1-20 1** **6. See** **Order, Office** **of Disciplinary** **Counsel v.** **Stosic, No.** **2280 DD** **No. 3,** **No. 65** **DB 2015** **(Pa. September** **14, 2016).** **9 See** **Martz, 2020** **WL 2029287** **at*****5 (noting** **that periods** **of delay** **are excludable** **if they** **are attributable** **to the** **defense); Watson,** **140 A.3d** **at 699** **(noting that** **Pennsylvania case** **law suggests** **that the** **Commonwealth may** **not be** **held accountable** **for delay** **caused by** **defense continuances);** **Commonwealth v.** **Hunt, 858** **A.2d 1234,** **1244 (Pa.** **Super. 2004)** **(holding dismissal** **under Rule** **600 unwarranted** **where most** **of the** **factors resulting** **in postponement—primarily** **defense continuances—were** **beyond control** **of Commonwealth).** **Here, trial** **counsel argued** **that the** **twenty-eight days** **between September** **27, 2016** **and October** **25, 2016** **should have** **been attributed** **to the** **Commonwealth. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **7, 16-17).** **The Commonwealth** **disagreed, noting** **that on** **September 27,** **2016, trial** **counsel requested** **a continuance,** **as he** **had only** **been appointed** **to the** **case four** **days prior.** **(Id. at** **12). Trial** **counsel did** **not deny** **seeking a** **continuance. Rather,** **he argued** **that this** **time should** **have counted** **against the** **Commonwealth because,** **as of** **September 27,** **the Commonwealth** **had not** **yet provided** **discovery. (Id.** **at 7,** **16-17). This** **court disagreed.** **Specifically, this** **court determined** **that trial** **counsel sought** **and a** **continuance was** **granted for** **the purpose** **of enabling** **him, as** **newly-appointed counsel,** **to become** **familiar with** **the case.** **Original counsel's** **professional suspension** **and the** **necessary appointment** **of new** **counsel was** **neither caused** **by the** **Commonwealth nor** **within its** **control. Thus,** **for the** **purposes of** **Rule 600,** **the twenty-eight-day** **period between** **September 27,** **2016 and** **October 25,** **2016 is** **attributable to** **the defense** **and, therefore,** **excludable. c.** **October 25,** **2016 and** **November 22,** **201.6 twenty-eight** **excludable days** **attributable to** **the defense.** **On October** **25, 2016,** **Appellant's case** **was listed** **for a** **pre-trial bring** **back. The** **case was** **scheduled to** **return on** **November 22,** **2016. During** **the hearing** **on Appellant's** **Rule 600** **motion, the** **Commonwealth argued** **that the** **twenty-eight days** **between October** **25, 2016** **and November** **10 22,** **2016 were** **excludable. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **13).The Commonwealth** **explained that** **on October** **25, 2016,** **it conveyed** **an offer** **to Appellant,** **and "there** **was a** **defense [continuance]** **request to** **consider the** **offer." (Id.).** **Conversely, trial** **counsel argued** **that the** **time should** **have been** **attributed to** **the Cominonwealth,** **as he** **did not** **receive discovery** **until November** **22, 2016:** **[Mr. Birley]:** **October 25,** **2016, the** **Commonwealth reported** **that [discovery]** **was uploaded** **on the** **system[,] but** **I did** **not have** **it available** **to me.** **I'm obviously** **capable of** **downloading the** **discovery. I** **have on** **every other** **case that** **I've got.** **This one** **I couldn't** **get discover[y]** **on the** **case. (Id.** **at 7).** **The Commonwealth** **countered that** **discovery was,** **in fact,** **available on** **that date,** **explaining that** **it was** **"released and** **marked as** **released on** **October 25** **into the** **1✓-discovery system[.]"** **(Id. at** **19). This** **court agreed.** **First, this** **court determined** **that the** **circumstance occasioning** **postponement was** **the defense's** **request for** **a continuance.** **Accordingly, the** **time was** **excludable. See** **Leaner, 202** **A.3d at** **767 ("[T]o** **the extent** **[the] [a]ppellant** **suggests the** **Commonwealth may** **be held** **accountable for** **delay caused** **by the** **defense's requests** **for continuance,** **our jurisprudence** **has held** **the opposite.** 

### ").**This court** **further determined** **that trial** **counsel's technical** **issues (which** **allegedly prevented** **him from** **accessing discovery)** **could not** **be reasonably** **attributed to** **the Cominonwealth.** **Moreover, counsel's** **claim—that he** **"kept making** **an issue** **of [not** **receiving discovery]** **at court"—is** **not persuasive.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 16).** **Discovery was** **not available** **until October** **25, 2016.** **(dI. at** **19). Notably,** **the case** **was not** **listed again** **until November** **22, 2016,** **and, on** **that date,** **the Commonwealth** **also provided** **counsel with** **a paper** **copy of** **discovery. (dI.** **at 17).** **The October** **25 hearing** **is the** **only court-date** **on which** **(1) discovery** **was available** **and (2)** **counsel could** **have claimed** **that he** **did not** **have it.** **Thus, his** **argument that** **he continuously** **had to** **"jump up** **and down** **in court[,** **asking for** **discovery]" is** **somewhat misleading** **and does** **not support** **a finding** **of lack** **of due** **diligence on** **behalf of** **the Commonwealth.** **(Id.). 11** **d. November** **22, 2016** **to December** **21, 2016—twenty** **-nine excludable** **days attributable** **to Appellant.** **Appellant's case** **was listed** **for pre-trial** **bring back** **on November** **22, 2016.** **The case** **was scheduled** **to return** **twenty-nine days** **later (December** **21, 2016).** **Appellant conceded** **that this** **time was** **attributable to** **the defense,** **explaining, "[O]n** **November 22** **, I** **took a** **date to** **pass discovery** **and an** **offer which** **was rejected** **at the** **next court** **date, so** **I concede** **that the** **11/22 to** **12/21 should** **be excludable."** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 8)** **(emphasis added).** **This court** **agreed. e.** **December 21,** **2016 to** **April 10,** **2017-110 days** **attributable to** **the Commonwealth.** **On December** **21, 2016,** **Appellant rejected** **the Commonwealth's** **offer. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **8). The** **Commonwealth requested** **a trial** **date, and** **the case** **was scheduled** **to return** **for a** **scheduling conference** **fourteen days** **later on** **January 4,** **2017. (Id.).** **This court** **attributed this** **fourteen-day delay** **to the** **Commonwealth, as** **the Commonwealth** **did not** **argue that** **it was** **ready to** **proceed to** **trial on** **December 21,** **2016. At** **the subsequent** **listing on** **January 4,** **2017, the** **Commonwealth was** **not prepared** **to try** **Appellant. (Id.** **at 13** **-14). Accordingly,** **Appellant's case** **was scheduled** **to return** **ninety-six days** **later, on** **April 10,** **2017. (Id.** **at 8,** **14). The** **Commonwealth conceded** **that it** **was responsible** **for this** **period of** **delay, explaining** **that "this** **was a** **three-codefendant case"** **and "we** **were trying** **to link** **those up** **for trial."** **(Id. at** **20, 14).** **This court** **agreed and** **included this** **time in** **its non** **excludable Rule** **600 calculation.** **L April** **10, 2017** **to June** **6,2017—fifty-seven excludable** **days attributable** **to this** **court's calendar.** **On April** **10, 2017,** **Appellant's case** **was listed** **for a** **motions hearing** **and scheduling** **conference. On** **that date,** **the Commonwealth** **indicated that** **it was** **prepared to** **proceed to** **trial, and** **12 the** **case was** **scheduled for** **trial on** **June 6,** **2017, the** **earliest feasible** **date permitted** **by this** **court's calendar.** **As the** **Commonwealth correctly** **noted: There** **were efforts** **made in** **order to** **bring [the** **three co-defendants]** **back together.** **.. not** **only from** **the Commonwealth** **perspective but** **also [in** **the interest** **of] judicial** **efficiency as** **well and** **again[,] that** **... [delay]** **was based** **[on] the** **earliest date** **that we** **could have** **gotten, I** **assume[,] based** **on the** **Court calendar** **in order** **to link** **all the** **defendants up** **in that** **case. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **20) (emphasis** **added). Thus,** **the Commonwealth** **is not** **accountable for** **this period** **of delay,** **as the** **postponement was** **not caused** **the "normal** **progression" of** **a case,** **a lack** **of due** **diligence, or** **other dilatory** **conduct of** **behalf of** **the Commonwealth.** **Where, as** **here, "a** **trial-ready prosecutor** **must wait** **several months** **due to** **a court** **calendar, the** **time should** **be treated** **as `delay'** **for which** **the Commonwealth** **is not** **accountable." Mills,** **162 A.3d** **at 325.** **See also,** **Leaner, 202** **A.3d at** **767 (citation** **and quotation** **marks omitted)** **("[I]t is** **well-settled that** **judicial delay** **can support** **the grant** **of an** **extension of** **the Rule** **600 run** **date. This** **is particularly** **true where,** **as here,** **there is** **no indication** **the trial** **court did** **not schedule** **the criminal** **proceedings at** **the earliest** **possible date** **consistent with** **the court's** **business.**

## ").**Accordingly, this** **count determined** **that the** **fifty-seven days** **between April** **10, 2017** **and June** **6, 2017** **were excludable.** **g. June** **6, 2017** **to January** **16, 2018** **-224 excludable** **days attributable** **to the** **defense. On** **June 6,** **2017, Appellant's** **case was** **scheduled for** **trial. However,** **trial counsel** **requested a** **continuance, as** **he was** **on trial** **in an** **unrelated matter.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 9).** **Appellant's case** **was rescheduled** **to proceed** **on January** **16, 2018.** **This court** **determined—and Appellant** **conceded— that** **the 224** **days between** **June 6,** **2017 and** **January 16,** **2018 constituted** **excludable time.** **(Id. at** **9). 13** **h. January** **16, 2018** **to February** **2, 2018—sevcnteen** **excludable days** **attributable to** **a joint-continuance** **request. On** **January 16,** **2018, Appellant** **elected to** **proceed with** **a waiver** **trial, and** **the parties** **requested a** **joint continuance.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 9).** **Appellant's case** **was scheduled** **for a** **waiver trial** **on February** **2, 2018.** 

### (W.).**The seventeen** **days between** **these dates** **are excludable.** **See Commonwealth** **v. Peterson,** **19 A.3d** **1131, 1137** **(Pa. Super.** **2011) (citation** **omitted) ("[A]** **joint continuance** **is excludable** **delay.**

## ").**i. February** **2, 2018** **to April** **2, 2018—fifty** **-nine excusable** **days attributable** **to circumstances** **beyond the** **Commonwealth's control,** **despite its** **due diligence.** **On February** **2, 2018,** **the Commonwealth** **requested a** **continuance after** **a witness** **unexpectedly and** **abruptly left** **court due** **to a** **family emergency.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 15).** **The Commonwealth** **was otherwise** **ready to** **proceed to** **trial and** **would have** **proceeded on** **that date,** **but for** **the witness's** **sudden unavailability.** **Obviously, no** **amount of** **due diligence** **on behalf** **of the** **Commonwealth can** **control or** **predict emergencies** **in a** **witness's personal** **life. Thus,** **although the** **fifty-nine days** **between February** **2, 2018** **and April** **2, 2018** **are attributable** **to the** **Commonwealth, this** **period of** **delay is** **excusable. See** **Peterson, 19** **A.3d at** **1138 ("[T]** **he prosecution** **in the** **case sub** **judice had** **no control** **over the** **officer's inability** **to appear[,]** **and the** **sixteen-day time** **frame from** **January 16,** **2007 until** **February 1,** **2007 is** **excusable."); Commonwealth** **v. Staten,** **950 A.2d** **1006, 1010** **(Pa. Super.** **2008) (The** **court found** **due diligence** **on behalf** **of the** **Commonwealth, as** **it "stood** **ready but** **for the** **unavailability of** **a necessary** **witness, an** **arresting police** **officer who,** **beyond the** **control of** **the Commonwealth,** **had been** **assigned to** **serve warrants** **that day.").** **14 j.** **April 2,** **2018 to** **April 9,** **2018—seven excusable** **days attributable** **to circumstances** **beyond the** **Commonwealth's control,** **despite its** **due diligence.** **On April** **2, 2018,** **the case** **was again** **listed for** **trial. The** **Commonwealth requested** **a continuance** **on that** **date, as** **the complaining** **witness was** **infected with** **the flu.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 15).** **The Commonwealth** **was otherwise** **prepared to** **proceed to** **trial. Thus,** **this court** **determined that** **the seven** **days between** **April 2,** **2018 and** **Appellant's trial** **on April** **9, 2018** **constituted excusable** **delay. In** **sum, this** **court found** **451 days** **of excludable** **or excusable** **delay. The** **mechanical iun** **date was** **April 4,** **2017, i.e.,** **365 days** **after the** **criminal complaint** **was filed** **against Appellant.** **Accordingly, Appellant's** **adjusted run** **date—the final** **date by** **which the** **Commonwealth was** **required to** **try Appellant—was** **June 29,** **2018. See** **Roles, 116** **A.3 d** **at 125** **("The adjusted** **run date** **is calculated** **by adding** **to the** **mechanical run** **date, i.e.,** **the date** **365 days** **from the** **complaint, both** **excludable and** **excusable delay.** 

## ").**This court** **denied Appellant's** **Rule 600** **motion on** **this basis,** **and its** **decision should** **be affirmed.** **II. The** **evidence is** **sufficient to** **sustain Appellant's** **convictions of** **conspiracy to** **commit simple** **assault, theft** **by unlawful** **taking, PIC,** **and simple** **assault. In** **his second** **allegation of** **error, Appellant** **claims that** **the evidence** **presented at** **trial is** **insufficient to** **sustain his** **convictions for** **conspiracy, theft,** **PIC, and** **simple assault.** **Each claim** **is without** **merit. A** **challenge to** **the sufficiency** **of the** **evidence is** **a question** **of law** **requiring a** **plenary scope** **of review.** **Comimonwealth v.** **Jacoby, 170** **A.3d 1065,** **1076 (Pa.** **2017). In** **reviewing sufficiency** **of evidence** **claims, a** **reviewing court** **must determine** **whether the** **evidence admitted** **at trial,** **and all** **reasonable inferences** **drawn therefrom,** **when viewed** **in the** **light most** **favorable to** **the verdict** **winner, are** **sufficient to** **support all** **the elements** **of the** **offense beyond** **a reasonable** **doubt. 15** **Commonwealth v.** **Eckrote, 12** **A.3d 383,** **385 (Pa.** **Super. 2010).** **The Commonwealth** **may satisfy** **its burden** **of proving** **every element** **of the** **crime beyond** **a reasonable** **doubt by** **means of** **wholly circumstantial** **evidence. Commonwealth** **v. Valentine,** **101 A.3d** **801, 805** **(Pa. Super.** **2014). In** **applying the** **above test,** **the entire** **record must** **be evaluated** **and all** **evidence actually** **received must** **be considered.** **Commonwealth v.** **Passmore, 857** **A.2d 697,** **706 (Pa.** **Super. 2004).** **Finally, the** **trier of** **fact while** **passing upon** **the credibility** **of witnesses** **and the** **weight of** **the evidence** **produced, is** **free to** **believe all,** **part or** **none of** **the evidence.** **Id. a.** **The evidence** **presented at** **trial is** **sufficient to** **sustain Appellant's** **conviction for** **conspiracy. Appellant** **argues that** **the evidence** **presented at** **trial is** **insufficient to** **sustain his** **conviction for** **conspiracy. This** **claim is** **baseless, and** **Appellant's conviction** **should be** **affirmed. Section** **903 of** **the Pennsylvania** **Crimes Code** **defines "conspiracy"** **as follows:** **(a) Definition** **of conspiracy.** **--A person** **is guilty** **of conspiracy** **with another** **person or** **persons to** **commit a** **crime if** **with the** **intent of** **promoting or** **facilitating its** **commission he:** **(1) agrees** **with such** **other person** **or persons** **that they** **or one** **or more** **of them** **will engage** **in conduct** **which constitutes** **such crime** **or an** **attempt or** **solicitation to** **commit such** **crime; or** **(2) agrees** **to aid** **such other** **person or** **persons in** **the planning** **or commission** **of such** **crime or** **of an** **attempt or** **solicitation to** **commit such** **crime. 18** **Pa.C.S.A. §** **903. To** **sustain a** **conviction for** **conspiracy, the** **Commonwealth must** **establish that:** **(1) the** **defendant intended** **to commit** **or aid** **in the** **commission of** **the criminal** **act; (2)** **the defendant** **entered into** **an agreement** **with another** **to engage** **in the** **crime; and** **(3) the** **defendant or** **one or** **more of** **the other** **co-conspirators committed** **an overt** **act in** **furtherance of** **the agreed** **upon crime.** **Commonwealth v.** **Johnson, 985** **A.2d 915,** **920 (Pa.** **2009). Most** **cases involving** **conspiracy do** **16 not** **involve an** **explicit or** **formal agreement.** **dI. Nonetheless,** **"[t]he essence** **of a** **criminal conspiracy** **is a** **common understanding,** **no matter** **how it** **came into** **being, that** **a particular** **criminal objective** **be accomplished."** **Commonwealth v.** **Melvin, 103** **A.3d 1,** **42 (Pa.** **Super. 2014).** **Accordingly, an** **agreement between** **coconspirators is** **generally established** **through circumstantial** **evidence, including** **"the relations,** **conduct, or** **circumstances of** **the parties** **or avert** **acts on** **the part** **of co-conspirators."** **Johnson, 985** **A.2d at** **920. In** **the case** **at bar,** **the evidence** **clearly supports** **Appellant's conviction** **for conspiracy** **to commit** **simple assault.** **Appellant claims** **that he** **"never intended** **to ...** **conspire with** **another person** **to injure** **the [c]omplainant."** **However, the** **record is** **patently at** **odds with** **this claim.** **Appellant's explicit** **threat "to** **beat [her]** **the `F'** **up" and** **his express** **order to** **"[f]uck her** **up, beat** **her up,"** **coupled with** **his act** **of holding** **the victim** **at gunpoint,** **demonstrate that** **he positively** **intended to** **assault Sherry.** **(Id. at** **38, 43--45).** **Logic does** **not permit** **any other** **interpretation. Moreover,** **Appellant's hostile** **cohort followed** **him into** **the victim's** **house, and,** **on Appellant's** **command, violently** **attacked the** **victim. (Id.** **at 43-45).** **Although there** **is no** **evidence of** **an explicit** **agreement to** **conspire, Appellant** **and his** **codefendants were** **clearly acting** **in concert** **to facilitate** **and achieve** **the same** **criminal objective** **to assault** **and injure** **Sherry. This** **is unequivocally** **sufficient to** **prove conspiracy.** **Thus, Appellant's** **conviction should** **be affirmed.** **b. The** **evidence is** **sufficient to** **sustain Appellant's** **conviction for** **theft by** **unlawful taking.** **Appellant next** **claims that** **the evidence** **presented at** **trial is** **insufficient to** **sustain his** **conviction for** **theft. This** **claim is** **waived due** **to lack** **of specificity.** **If an** **appellant seeks** **to challenge** **his convictions** **on the** **basis that** **the evidence** **presented at** **trial was** **insufficient to** **sustain those** **convictions, his** **1925(b) statement** **must specify** **which element** **or elements** **upon which** **the evidence** **was insufficiez.** **Commonwealth v.** **Williams, 959** **17 A.2d** **1252, 1257-58** **(Pa. Super.** **2008). Failure** **to specifically** **identify which** **elements are** **unsupported by** **the evidence** **results in** **waiver of** **the issue:** **If [a]ppellant** **wants to** **preserve a** **claim that** **the evidence** **was insufficient,** **then the** **1925(b) statement** **needs to** **specify the** **element or** **elements upon** **which the** **evidence was** **insufficient. This** **Court can** **then analyze** **the element** **or elements** **on appeal.** **The instant** **1925(b) statement** **simply does** **not specify** **the allegedly** **unproven elements.** **Therefore, the** **sufficiency issue** **is waived.** **Id. Here,** **Appellant simply** **argues that** **"[t]here was** **insufficient evidence** **to convict** **[him] of.** **theft by** **unlawful taking[.]"** **Appellant does** **not identify** **any particular** **element that** **was allegedly** **unsupported by** **the evidence.** **Thus, the** **issue is** **waived. Moreover,** **even if** **the issue** **were not** **waived, the** **evidence presented** **at trial** **clearly supports** **Appellant's conviction** **for theft.** **A person** **is guilty** **of theft** **by unlawful** **taking if** **he "unlawfully** **takes, or** **exercises unlawful** **control over,** **movable property** **of another** **with intent** **to deprive** **him thereof."** **18 Pa.C.S.A.** **§ 3921(a).** **Here, Sherry** **testified as** **follows: Q:** **You mentioned** **that your** **cell phone** **was taken.** **A: Yes.** **Q: Did** **you see** **who took** **your cell** **phone? A:** **[Appellant] .** **Q: And** **how did** **he take** **that? A:** **In the** **struggle everyone** **lost their** **phone so** **he picked** **up my** **phone off** **the floor** **and took** **my phone,** **so there** **was no** **way for** **me to** **call the** **police or** **anything. Q:** **Did you** **see him** **actually pick** **it up?** **A: Yes.** **Q: Did** **you see** **where he** **put it?** **A: Yes,** **in his** **pocket. (N.T.** **4/9/19 at** **46). 18** **Sherry directly** **observed Appellant** **take her** **phone, and** **there is** **absolutely no** **evidence indicating** **that he** **had permission** **to do** **so or** **that he** **took the** **phone by** **mistake. Moreover,** **Sherry's allegation** **is corroborated** **by the** **testimony of** **Officer Clark,** **who stated** **that he** **recovered the** **complainant's cellphone** **from Appellant.** **(Id. at** **97). Thus,** **the evidence** **is clearly** **sufficient to** **sustain Appellant's** **conviction for** **theft. c.** **The evidence** **presented at** **trial is** **sufficient to** **sustain Appellant's** **conviction for** **PIC and** **simple assault.** **Finally, Appellant** **claims that** **there was** **insufficient to** **convict him** **of PIC** **and simple** **assault, as** **he "never** **intended to** **injure the** **complainant ...** **[and] never** **used an** **instrument of** **crime against** **the complainant."** **Appellant is** **not entitled** **to relief** **on either** **of these** **remarkably frivolous** **claims. Section** **2701 of** **the Crimes** **Code provides** **that a** **person is** **guilty of** **simple assault** **if he:** **(1) attempts** **to cause** **or intentionally,** **knowingly or** **recklessly causes** **bodily injury** **to another;** **(2) negligently** **causes bodily** **injury to** **another with** **a deadly** **weapon; (3)** **attempts by** **physical menace** **to put** **another in** **fear of** **imminent serious** **bodily injury;** **or (4)** **conceals or** **attempts to** **conceal a** **hypodermic needle** **on his** **person and** **intentionally or** **knowingly penetrates** **a law** **enforcement officer** **or an** **officer or** **an employee** **of a** **correctional institution,** **county jail** **or prison,** **detention facility** **or mental** **hospital during** **the course** **of an** **arrest or** **any search** **of the** **person. 18** **Pa.C.S.A. §** **2701(a). Section** **2301 defines** **"bodily injury"** **as "[i]mpaiiment** **of physical** **condition or** **substantial pain."** **18 Pa.C.S.A.** **§ 2301.** **A fact-finder** **may infer** **that a** **defendant's actions** **actually caused** **bodily injury** **(i.e., "impairment** **of physical** **condition or** **substantial pain")** **and enter** **a conviction** **of simple** **assault, even** **if the** **victim does** **not explicitly** **testify to** **pain. Commonwealth** **v. 19** **Jorgenson, 492** **A.2d 2,** **6 (Pa.** **Super. 1985),** **rev'd on** **other grounds,** **517 A.2d** **1287 (Pa.** **1986) (upholding** **a conviction** **of simple** **assault and** **finding bodily** **injury, despite** **"a lack** **of testimony** **on pain,"** **where the** **defendant struck** **the victim** **twice across** **the face** **after she** **refused his** **advances). Here,** **the Commonwealth** **presented substantial** **evidence which** **proved Appellant** **guilty of** **simple assault.** **Sherry testified** **that Appellant** **slammed her** **against the** **wall before** **using both** **of his** **hands to** **strangle her.** **(N.T. 4/9/18** **at 36-37).** **Appellant choked** **her with** **such force** **that she** **began to** **lose consciousness** **and sustained** **bruises on** **her neck** **"for quite** **some time."** **(Id. at** **37). This,** **alone, is** **sufficient to** **prove simple** **assault. See** **Commonwealth v.** **Emler, 903** **A.2d 1273,** **1278 (Pa.** **Super. 2006)** **(finding sufficient** **evidence of** **simple assault** **where the** **defendant "vigorously** **and forcefully"** **the victim,** **causing the** **victim to** **feel pain** **for several** **weeks). Sherry** **also testified** **that Appellant** **explicitly threated** **to harm** **her before** **holding her** **at gunpoint** **for several** **minutes. (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **38, 45).** **This--independently of** **any other** **act—is sufficient** **to sustain** **Appellant's simple** **assault conviction.** **See Commonwealth** **v. Alford,** **880 A.2d** **666, 672** **(Pa. Super.** **2005) (noting** **that pounding** **on the** **victim's front** **door and** **pointing a** **gun at** **her was** **"certainly ...** **sufficient to** **prove simple** **assault," i.e.,** **an attempt** **by physical** **menace to** **put her** **in fear** **of imminent** **serious bodily** **injury). Moreover,** **the acts** **of Appellant's** **coconspirators support** **his conviction** **for simple** **assault. It** **is well** **settled that** **"[C]onspirators are** **liable for** **acts of** **co-conspirators committed** **in furtherance** **of the** **conspiracy. Even** **if the** **conspirator did** **not act** **as a** **principal in** **committing the** **underlying crime,** **he is** **still criminally** **liable for** **the actions** **of his** **co-conspirators taken** **in furtherance** **of the** **conspiracy." Commonwealth** **v. Lambert,** **795 A.2d** **1010, 1016** **(Pa. Super.** **2002). As** **discussed .supra,** **Appellant and** **his codefendants** **conspired to** **assault Sherry.** **Appellant directed** **his 20** **coconspirators to** **"[fjuck her** **up." (N.T.** **4/9/18 at** **43). Alexandra** **repeatedly punched** **Sherry, which** **caused the** **victim to** **sustain several** **injuries, including** **swollen eyes,** **the loss** **of a** **tooth, the** **formation of** **a blood** **clot behind** **her eye,** **and the** **formation of** **a seemingly** **permanent lump** **on her** **jaw. (Id.** **at 44,** **64). These** **injuries are** **easily sufficient** **to prove** **simple assault.** **Finally, Appellant's** **use of** **a firearm,** **under the** **particular circumstances** **of this** **case, is** **sufficient to** **sustain his** **conviction for** **PIC. A** **person is** **guilty of** **PIC if** **he "possesses** **any instrument** **of crime** **with intent** **to employ** **it criminally."** **18 Pa.C.S.A.** **§ 907.** **Section 907(d)** **defines an** **instrument of** **crime as** **"(1) [a]nything** **specially made** **or specially** **adapted for** **criminal use[,** **or] (2)** **[a]nything used** **for criminal** **purposes and** **possessed by** **the actor** **tinder circumstances** **not manifestly** **appropriate for** **lawful uses** **it may** **have." Here,** **Appellant possessed** **and used** **a loaded** **firearm for** **the purpose** **of assaulting** **Sherry---an undeniably** **unlawful use** **of a** **firearm. Thus,** **Appellant's PIC** **conviction should** **be affirmed.** **CONCLUSION This** **court has** **undertaken careful** **review of** **the record** **and finds** **no harmful,** **prejudicial, or** **reversible errors,** **and its** **decision should** **be affirmed.** **21 IN** **THE COURT** **OF COMMON** **PLEAS FIRST** **JUDICIAL DISTRICT** **OF PENNSYLVANIA** **TRIAL DIVISION** **— CRIMINAL** **SECTION COMMONWEALTH** **OF PENNSYLVANIA** **. ERNESTO** **FOUNTANEZ CP-51-CR-0005937-2016** **2428 EDA** **2018 PROOF** **OF SERVICE** **I hereby** **certify that** **I am** **this day** **serving the** **foregoing Court** **Opinion upon** **the person(s),** **and in** **the manner** **indicated below,** **which service** **satisfies the** **requirements of** **Pa. R.** **Crim. P.** **114: Defense** **Counsel: Douglas** **P. Earl,** **Esq. 1015** **Chestnut St.,** **Suite 902** **Philadelphia, PA** **19107 Type** **of Service:** **(J) First** **Class Mail** **( )** **Certified ()** **Personal Service** **District Attorney:** **Paul George,** **Esq. Supervisor,** **Appeals Unit** **Philadelphia District** **Attorney's Office** **Three South** **Penn Square** **Philadelphia, PA** **19107-3499 Type** **of Service:** **(J) First** **Class Mail** **() Certified** **() Personal** **Service Date:** **September 9,** **2020 Stachelrodt,** **Esq. Law** **Clerk to** **the Honorable** **Timika Lane**