[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11531

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CHRISTIE BAILEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01664-NAD

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christie Bailey appeals a magistrate judge’s order affirming 

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). In this appeal, Bailey challenges only the Appeals 

Council’s refusal to consider certain new evidence presented by 

Bailey to the Appeals Council. First, she argues that the Appeals 

Council erred in finding that a medical record from CED Mental 

Health Center (“CED”) by Dr. Huma Khusro, dated February 

2020, and a psychological evaluation by Dr. June Nichols, dated 

May 2020, were not chronologically relevant. Second, she argues 

that (1) a medical record from CED by Dr. Chardonney Johnson, 

dated December 2019; (2) a medical record from Quality of Life, 

dated January 2020; (3) a one-page mental health source statement 

by Dr. Khusro, dated March 2020; and (4) a one-page mental health 

source statement by Dr. Nichols, dated May 2020, were not material. She adds, without citing to any authority, that, where a doctor, especially a treating physician like Dr. Khusro, opines that a 

claimant has disabling symptoms, the opinion is per se material.

In a social security case, we review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings to determine whether they 

are supported by substantial evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether evidence 

meets the new, material, and chronologically relevant standard is a 

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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 3

question of law subject to our de novo review. Washington v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). The Appeals Council commits reversible error when it improperly refuses 

to consider such evidence. Id. We will not address a new issue in 

a social security appeal that was not raised in the district 

court. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 

2004). 

Generally, a claimant may present evidence at every stage of 

the administrative process. Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 

F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2018). If a claimant presents evidence 

after the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, the Appeals 

Council must consider it if it is new, material, and chronologically 

relevant.” Id. at 1309. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable 

probability that the evidence would change the administrative result, and it is chronologically relevant if it relates to the period on 

or before the date of the ALJ’s hearing decision. Id.; 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.970(a)(5), 416.1470(a)(5). The Appeals Council is not required to provide a detailed rationale for denying review. Mitchell 

v. Soc. Sec. Admin, Comm’r, 771 F.3d 780, 784 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Medical opinions based on treatment occurring after the 

date of the ALJ’s decision may be chronologically relevant. Washington, 806 F.3d at 1322. In Washington, the claimant submitted to 

the Appeals Council a psychologist’s evaluation and accompanying 

opinion about the degree of the claimant’s mental limitations, 

which were prepared seven months after the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 

1319. We concluded that the psychologist’s materials were 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

chronologically relevant because: (1) the claimant described his 

mental symptoms during the relevant period to the psychologist, 

(2) the psychologist had reviewed the claimant’s mental health 

treatment records from that period, and (3) there was no evidence 

of the claimant’s mental decline since the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 

1322-23 (limiting our holding to “the specific circumstances of th[e]

case”). 

In Hargress, the Appeals Council denied the appellant’s petition for review and refused to consider her newly submitted evidence—which included medical records dated after the ALJ’s decision—stating that the new records were “about a later time” than 

the ALJ’s decision, and, therefore, did not affect the ALJ’s decision 

as to whether she was disabled prior to the date of that decision. 

See Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. We stated that the Appeals Council

had declined to consider these new medical records because they 

were not chronologically relevant. Id. We also held that the new 

records were not chronologically relevant because nothing in them 

indicated that the doctor, who did not treat the claimant during the 

relevant period, had reviewed the appellant’s medical records, or 

that the information in them related to the period at issue. Id.

at 1309-10. 

In Harner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, we

explained that, for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ 

does not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including 

controlling weight, to any medical opinions or prior administrative 

medical findings. 38 F.4th 892, 898 (11th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. § 

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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 5

404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ considers the persuasiveness of medical opinions or prior administrative findings and will articulate the 

persuasiveness of the medical opinions in its finding. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520c(a), (b). The ALJ considers several factors when assessing medical opinions, including supportability and consistency, 

which are the most important factors in conducting this assessment. Id. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), (c)(1)-(5).

Here, the Appeals Council did not err in denying review after Bailey submitted new, post-decision evidence consisting of: (1) 

Dr. Nichols’s 2020 psychological evaluation, (2) the February 2020 

CED medical record, (3) the January 2020 Quality of Life medical 

record, (4) the December 2019 CED medical record, (5) the March 

2020 mental health source statement from Dr. Khusro, and (6) the 

May 2020 mental health source statement from Dr. Nichols. Regarding Dr. Nichols’s May 2020 psychological evaluation and the 

February 2020 CED medical record, the Appeals Council did not 

err in determining that this evidence was chronologically irrelevant. Like in Hargress, here both records were “about a later time” 

than the ALJ’s decision issued on January 28, 2020. See Hargress, 

883 F.3d at 1309-10. And nothing indicates that the doctors here 

relied on Bailey’s earlier medical records or that the information in 

them related to the period at issue, which also distinguishes this 

case from Washington. See id.; Washington, 806 F.3d at 1322-23. Although Dr. Nichols’s evaluation had summarized Bailey’s prior 

medical records, the evaluation expressly noted that the opinion 

was based on the examination conducted on that date and Dr. 

Khusro’s March 2020 mental health source statement. (Doc. 9-3 at 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

27-28, 31). Thus, the discussed evidence did not relate to the relevant period on or before the ALJ’s decision on January 28, 2022, 

and the Appeals Council was not required to consider it. Id. 

As to the December 2019 CED medical record, the January 

2020 Quality of Life medical record, and the March 2020 and May 

2020 mental health source statements from Dr. Khusro and Dr. 

Nichols, the AC did not err in failing to consider this evidence. Regarding the December 2019 CED medical record, consistent with 

the ALJ’s findings, that record showed that Bailey had moderate 

mental health symptoms and diagnoses and continued to receive 

treatment with prescription medications. And the ALJ had specifically accounted for these moderate symptoms with additional limitations in Bailey’s RFC. Although Bailey did complain at that time 

that her medications were not working, Dr. Khusro prescribed her 

alternative medication and continued therapy, and nothing in that 

record otherwise contradicts the ALJ’s finding that there was no 

continuous evidence of marked or extreme mental health issues. 

As such, that record was unlikely to change the outcome of the 

ALJ’s decision. Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. As to the January 2020 

Quality of Life medical record, Bailey has waived any argument in 

this regard by failing to raise it before the district court. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. 

Regarding the source statements from Dr. Khusro and Dr. 

Nichols, these opinions were also unlikely to change the outcome 

of the decision because they were not supported by and/or consistent with the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2). 

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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 7

Both statements were one-page forms that did not provide substantive explanation or evidence as to the limitations described. Dr. 

Khusro opined that she would expect Bailey to be off-task 50% or 

more of an 8-hour day and that, in a 30-day period, she would expect Bailey to miss work 15 days or more. Dr. Nichols opined that 

she would expect Bailey to be off-task 40 to 50% in an 8-hour day 

and that, in a 30-day period, and she would expect Bailey to miss 

work 10 to 15 days or more. Neither provided any explanation as 

to the extreme limitations described—other than broadly describing Bailey as having a longstanding history of mental illness. Moreover, neither attempted to reconcile their opinions with other record evidence showing periods where Bailey was reporting reduced 

symptoms or no symptoms at all and with Bailey’s unchanged 

treatment plan for the relevant period. And, contrary to Bailey’s 

unsupported assertion, the Appeals Council was not required to 

defer or give any specific weight to Dr. Khusro’s opinion because 

she was a treating physician or Dr. Nichols’s opinion because she 

was a doctor. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); Harner, 38 F.4th at 987. 

As such, the source statements were unlikely to change the outcome of the ALJ’s decision, and the AC was not required to consider them. Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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