1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher Hammons, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-01620-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Christopher Hammons’ motion for attorneys’ 

fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). 

(Doc. 29). The Commissioner has no objection to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 30). After 

reviewing Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement of hours, and considering the relevant fee award 

factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30 & n.3 (1983), the Court finds 

Plaintiff’s requested fee award of $3,067.20 to be reasonable. The Court will therefore 

grant Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it seeks an award of attorneys’ fees. 

 Plaintiff also requests, however, that the fee award be made payable directly to his 

counsel. (Doc. 29 at 4–5). Plaintiff purports that he validly executed an assignment of any 

EAJA fee award to his counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to understand that the AntiAssignment Act (the “Act”) prohibits such an assignment, and thus, requests that the 

Court order the Commissioner to issue the award directly to Plaintiff’s counsel if the 

Commissioner (1) determines that Plaintiff does not owe an existing debt to the federal 

government and (2) waives the requirements of the Act. (Doc. 29-1 at 1). 

Case 2:15-cv-01620-JAT Document 31 Filed 09/13/16 Page 1 of 3
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In Astrue v. Ratliff, the Supreme Court of the United States construed § 2412(d) 

and held that EAJA fees are payable to litigants and therefore subject to offsets when a 

litigant has outstanding federal debts. 560 U.S. 586, 598 (2010). The Supreme Court 

noted that the government has made direct payments to a litigant’s attorney “only in cases 

where the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government and assigns the right to receive 

the fees to the attorney.” Id. at 597 (quotations and citations omitted). Since Ratliff, 

district courts in other circuits have ordered fees to be paid directly to a litigant’s attorney 

provided that the government is afforded an opportunity to offset any preexisting debt 

owed by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has assigned all rights in the fee award to counsel. 

See Meyer v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4036398, at *3 (D. Minn. 2011). 

 Nonetheless, the Act forbids the assignment of claims against the United States 

unless certain requirements are satisfied. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727. Namely, such an 

assignment is permitted only: (1) “after a claim is allowed,” (2) when “the amount of the 

claim is decided,” and (3) when “a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued.” 

§ 3727(b). In this case, Plaintiff’s assignment was executed on August 12, 2015, well 

before any EAJA claim was “allowed” or the amount “decided.” (Doc. 3 at 2). Because 

Plaintiff’s assignment does not meet the Act’s requirements, and the Commissioner does 

not appear to waive the Act’s provisions, the Court concludes that the assignment is 

invalid as contrary to the Act. In any event, the determination of whether to pay 

Plaintiff’s counsel directly “must be made by the Commissioner after confirming that 

Plaintiff has assigned his right to fees and does not owe a debt that is subject to offset 

under the Treasury Offset Program.” Zamora v. Colvin, No. CV-13-01970-PHX-DGC, 

2014 WL 4388537, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2014) (citing Ratliff, 560 U.S. at 594) 

(emphasis added). Consequently, the Court will not order the Commissioner to pay the 

EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff’s counsel.1

 For the foregoing reasons, 

 

1

 The Commissioner may ultimately decide to pay the awarded fees directly to 

Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court, however, will not order the Commissioner to do so. 

Case 2:15-cv-01620-JAT Document 31 Filed 09/13/16 Page 2 of 3
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA, 

(Doc. 29), is GRANTED to the extent it seeks $3,067.20 in attorneys’ fees. This award is 

subject to offset to satisfy any pre-existing debt that Plaintiff owes the United States of 

America pursuant to Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED to the extent it 

requests that the fees be made payable directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. Unless the 

Commissioner decides otherwise, the award shall be made directly to Plaintiff. 

 Dated this 12th day of September, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01620-JAT Document 31 Filed 09/13/16 Page 3 of 3