UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IMAD KHALIL DAJANI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GOVERNOR AND GENERAL  No. 01-1179

ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF

MARYLAND; MAYOR AND CITY

COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(CA-00-713-CCB)

Submitted: June 29, 2001

Decided: August 2, 2001

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Imad K. Dajani, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Andrew H. Baida, Solicitor General, Baltimore, Maryland; Thurman W. Zollicoffer, Jr., City Solicitor, William

R. Phelan, Principal Counsel, Robert D. Anbinder, Assistant Solicitor,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Imad K. Dajani appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42

U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) action against the Governor and

General Assembly of Maryland and the Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore, Maryland. Dajani challenged the constitutionality of

Maryland Code Ann., Transp. § 21-202.1 (1999), which allows for

cameras to be used at intersections to photograph drivers who run red

lights. Dajani received a citation and was assessed a fine after his car

was photographed running a red light in Baltimore, Maryland. Dajani

challenged his citation in the District Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, arguing § 21.202.1 was unconstitutional. Dajani did not prevail,

paid the fine, and did not appeal this decision in Maryland courts.

Instead, Dajani brought a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000)

action in federal court. Dajani argued the traffic code was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Appellees moved

to dismiss Dajani’s action. The district court held that the RookerFeldman* doctrine precludes Dajani’s action and dismissed the case.

We affirm. 

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. United

States v. McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 882 (4th Cir. 1994); Mylan Labs.,

Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1983). Applying the de

novo standard, we review Dajani’s claim viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Dajani. Revene v. Charles County

Comm’rs., 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1989). 

Dajani raised his constitutional challenges to the Maryland traffic

code in Maryland state court. A litigant cannot make a constitutional

*Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

2 DAJANI v. GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
challenge in state court and make the same constitutional challenge

in federal court. Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners, 967 F.2d 998,

1003 (4th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the federal courts lack jurisdiction

over Dajani’s constitutional challenges to the Maryland code because

Dajani is necessarily asking the district court to conclude the Maryland court wrongly decided the issues before it, which the district

court does not have jurisdiction to do. Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Va.

State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not significantly aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

DAJANI v. GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 3