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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Chester Wayne Wilson, 

Defendant.

No. CR-15-02231-TUC-CKJ (LCK)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements (Doc. 

29) and Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of Illegal Seizure (Doc. 30). This matter 

came before the Court for a hearing and a report and recommendation as a result of a 

referral, pursuant to LRCrim 57.6. Evidence and argument were heard on July 18, 2016, 

and August 17 and 19, 2016.1

 This matter was submitted following oral argument at the 

conclusion of the hearing. 

 Defendant alleges his statement was involuntary and the government agents lacked 

probable cause to seize the package. Having now considered the matter, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, deny Defendant’s 

motions to suppress. 

 

1

 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript of the July 18, and August 17, 2016 evidentiary hearing. (Docs. 58, 68.) 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 DEA Special Agent Julio Chicas testified that, in July 2015, DEA agents Bell and 

Key from Panama City, Florida notified him that a Chester Wayne Wilson was supplying 

methamphetamine to persons in Florida. (RT 7/18/16 at 12, 61; RT 8/17/16 at 11-12, 14-

16.) Based on a records check on Wilson, on August 12, 2015, DEA agents conducted 

surveillance at an address on Lola Place, at which agents saw a motorcycle registered to 

Wilson. (RT 7/18/16 at 12-13; RT 8/17/16 at 26-27.) They also observed a green Bravada 

and a silver Honda Civic at that address, both of which were registered to Lee Allen 

Babb. (RT 7/18/16 at 12-13; 26-27.) The records check included Wilson’s driver’s 

license photo. (RT 8/17/16 at 29.) 

 Agents Bell and Key informed SA Chicas that, on November 17, 2015, they would 

be sending money to Wilson at a townhome located at 2505 North Dodge. (Id. at 14-16.) 

Florida agents provided Tucson agents a tracking number which allowed the Tucson 

agents to track when the FedEx truck would be delivering the package of money. (RT 

7/18/16 at 17.) SA Chicas conducted surveillance at the Dodge address and Wilson 

arrived there in the Bravada at 9:23 a.m., just before the FedEx truck was scheduled to 

arrive. (Id. at 16-17.) The agents could not observe the actual FedEx delivery but the 

truck arrived at that address at 9:26 a.m. (Id. at 17; RT 8/17/16 at 38.) Wilson left that 

address approximately one hour later with a satchel. (RT 7/18/16 at 18.) 

 Agents Bell and Key informed SA Chicas that they anticipated Wilson shipping 

them a package of methamphetamine on November 18, 2015. (Id.) SA Chicas set up 

surveillance on the 18th, beginning at 5:30 p.m. at Wilson’s house and the FedEx 

shipping center, because this was shortly before FedEx closed at 6 p.m. (Id. at 29-30, 51.) 

During a call between Wilson and an undercover agent (UA), at 5:40 p.m.2

 on the 18th, 

Wilson clarified that he was to ship the methamphetamine to Conlon at 4003 West 19th 

Street, Panama City, FL 32405. (Id. at 25-26; Ex. 12 at 4.) Wilson told the UA that he 

 

2

 The times have been adjusted to reflect Mountain Standard Time in Tucson. The 

transcript times are in Central Standard Time. 

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was right on schedule and that he didn’t like leaving packages “sitting around there all 

day . . . people walking by it all . . . day long.” (Ex. 12 at 5-6.) Wilson arrived at the 

FedEx location at 5:50 p.m. driving the Civic. (RT 7/18/16 at 30.) He entered the facility 

with a package and filled out a shipping label. (Id.; RT 8/17/16 at 52.) At 6:02 p.m., 

Wilson called the UA with a tracking number. (Ex. 12 at 6-7.) The agents in Tucson 

received confirmation that the agents in Panama City received a package from Wilson 

containing methamphetamine. (RT 7/18/16 at 31-33; RT 8/17/16 at 31-32.) 

 At 1:31 p.m. on November 19, 2015, Wilson called the UA and stated that another 

package of methamphetamine would arrive Friday morning. (Ex. 12 at 19-20; RT 7/18/16 

at 33.) Agents Key and Bell informed SA Chicas that Wilson was expected to ship 

methamphetamine again that day. (RT 7/18/16 at 31.) SA Chicas received notice a few 

hours prior to the shipping of the package but it did not occur to him to get a search 

warrant because he “didn’t know he needed it.” (Id. at 62-63.) At 4:52 p.m., the UA 

called Wilson with a tracking number for the money being sent to Wilson, and Wilson 

provided a tracking number for the methamphetamine he would be sending to the UA 

that day. (Ex. 12 at 22-23; RT 7/18/16 at 34-35.) 

 SA Chicas again set up surveillance at the FedEx shipping facility. (RT 7/18/16 at 

35-36.) Wilson arrived at the FedEx facility at approximately 5:50 p.m. in the Bravada. 

(Id. at 36.) After Wilson parked his vehicle, a DEA agent saw Wilson hand a package to 

Shane Karwoski, who was in the vehicle with him. (Id. at 36-37.) As Karwoski 

approached the FedEx building with the package, both Karwoski and Wilson were 

arrested. (Id. at 37-38; RT 8/17/16 at 56.) The package was seized at that time. (RT 

8/17/16 at 56.) The tracking number on the package matched the number Wilson 

provided to the UA over the phone. (Compare Ex. 4 with Ex. 12 at 23.) The package was 

being shipped to John Conlon at the Panama City address provided by the UA. (Ex. 4; RT 

7/18/16 at 39-40.) The sender’s address was 2505 N. Dodge, the address at which SA 

Chicas earlier conducted surveillance because the UA sent Wilson money there. (RT 

7/18/16 at 40.) 

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 Wilson was taken to the DEA office and at 6:13 p.m. that day he was read his 

Miranda rights. (Id. at 42.) The interview was conducted by SA Chicas and SA Stark, 

with SA Almaraz present for part of it. (Id.) No guns were visible and Wilson was not 

handcuffed for the interview. (Id. at 43.) Wilson stated that he understood his rights and 

he agreed to waive them and answer questions. (Id. at 43-44, 45; RT 8/17/16 at 81-82, 

87.) Wilson stated that he did not want the interview recorded (which would have been 

standard DEA procedure) and he signed a form declining to have it recorded. (RT 

7/18/16 at 45-46; RT 8/17/16 at 82; Ex. 1.) Wilson confirmed his signature on the 

recording declination form. (RT 8/17/16 at 76-77.) The interview lasted approximately 

one hour. (RT 7/18/16 at 52.) 

 According to SA Chicas, no agent pressured Wilson to make a statement. (RT 

8/17/16 at 63.) During the interview, Wilson was calm and did not appear frightened or 

intimidated. (RT 7/18/16 at 51-52; RT 8/17/16 at 87.) Wilson testified the agents were 

not threatening and he wasn’t forced to say anything. (RT 8/17/16 at 79, 82.) Wilson 

testified that he was high on heroin during the interview. (RT 8/17/16 at 90-91.) 

 SA Chicas testified that Wilson stated that he was shipping methamphetamine to 

Panama City, Florida, to a person he had not met and that Karwoski had no involvement. 

(RT 7/18/16 at 47.) When SAs Chicas and Stark told Wilson they had been conducting 

surveillance on him and knew he had been shipping methamphetamine to Florida for 

some time, Wilson stated, “What took you guys so long?” (Id.; RT 8/17/16 at 88.) 

 During the interview, SA Chicas asked Wilson if he would consent to SA Chicas 

opening the FedEx package and Chicas testified that Wilson consented. (RT 7/18/16 at 

47-48, 58, 59; RT 8/17/16 at 64.) SA Chicas determined that Wilson’s verbal consent was 

sufficient and he did not ask him to sign a consent form.3

 (RT 8/17/16 at 64-66.) Wilson 

testified that when the agents asked if they could open the package, he told them the 

 

3

 SA Chicas testified that Wilson signed a consent form for the search of a 

cellphone because electronic devices are sent elsewhere for data extraction and forms are 

usually preferred. (RT 8/17/16 at 66.) Wilson testified that the signature on the cellphone consent to search form was not his and that he did not remember signing the form. (RT 8/17/16 at 77.) 

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package was not his so he could not give them permission to open it. (Id. at 70, 85.) At 

the hearing, Wilson denied ownership of the package and testified that he gave Karwoski 

a ride to FedEx and never handed the package to Karwoski. (Id. at 85, 87.) 

 Wilson testified that he told the agents that Karwoski had nothing to do with it 

because he wanted Karwoski to be released so he could feed Wilson’s dog. (Id. at 72.) 

Wilson stated that after 30-45 minutes of the interview had elapsed, the agents promised 

that they would let Karwoski go if Wilson talked to them. (Id. at 72-73, 74.) This 

mattered to Wilson because he needed his dog fed; he spoke to the agents for the sake of 

his dog. (Id. at 72, 73, 79, 83.) Wilson testified that he was reluctant to tell the agents 

anything, he did not say very much to them during the interview, he didn’t confess or 

incriminate himself, and he did not agree with anything they said. (Id. at 71, 74, 75, 83, 

89.) According to SA Chicas, neither he nor any other agent promised Wilson that if he 

confessed, Karwoski would be released. (RT 7/18/16 at 50-51.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. PACKAGE

 Wilson seeks to have the search of the FedEx package supressed, arguing the 

seizure of the package was illegal. Absent limited exceptions, agents cannot seize 

property without a warrant supported by probable cause. United States v. Licata, 761 

F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Standing 

 A defendant may only claim the benefit of the exclusionary rule if his Fourth 

Amendment rights have been violated because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy 

in the item seized or searched. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). The 

defendant has the threshold burden of establishing his expectation of privacy. Rakas v. 

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978); United States v. Singleton, 987 F.2d 1444, 1449 

(9th Cir. 1993). 

 At the hearing, Wilson testified that he had no ownership or interest in the 

package, that he merely drove Karwoski to FedEx on November 19. When the agents 

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asked if they could open the package, Wilson testified that he replied that he could not 

give permission because it was not his package. A person has no Fourth Amendment 

interest in property he has abandoned, which occurs when the person “so relinquish[s] his 

interest in the property that he no longer retain[s] a reasonable expectation of privacy in it 

at the time of the search.” United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976). To 

assess relinquishment, a court examines a person’s actions, words, and other objective 

signs. United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit 

has found that express disclaimer of ownership, even if the person has previously been 

seen in possession of the item, constitutes abandonment and the person has no standing to 

challenge the search or seizure of the item. See United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 

1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant denied owning wallet lodged in seat of car where 

defendant had been sitting) (citing Jackson, 544 F.2d at 1283); United States v. Decoud, 

456 F.3d 996, 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (defendant denied ownership of briefcase in 

trunk of car he was driving). Accepting Wilson’s testimony as true, his disavowal of the 

package could constitute abandonment. 

 However, in conducting an evaluation of standing, the Court must consider all the 

evidence and determine which is more credible. Singleton, 987 F.2d at 1449. SA Chicas 

testified that Wilson was observed in the car handing the package to Karwoski. Further, 

SA Chicas testified that Wilson stated that he had been shipping methamphetamine to 

Panama City, Florida and that Karwoski had no involvement. SA Chicas also stated that 

Wilson verbally consented to the agents opening the package. 

 The Court finds Wilson’s testimony disavowing ownership of the package not 

credible. On November 18, Wilson was recorded telling a UA that he didn’t like to leave 

packages sitting around at FedEx all day. (RT 7/18/16 at 26.) It is undisputed that Wilson 

was observed personally delivering a package to FedEx at 5:50 p.m. that same day 

(November 18) (ten minutes before closing time). (Id. at 29-30.) Critically, Wilson was 

recorded at 4:52 p.m. on November 19th informing the UA that he would be shipping 

another package of methamphetamine that day, and he provided the UA a tracking 

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number. (Id. at 31-35.) Wilson arrived at FedEx approximately one hour later, the same 

time he mailed the package of methamphetamine to the UA the previous day. (Id. at 36.) 

The package Karwoski was carrying when arrested had a tracking number on it that 

matched the tracking number Wilson had provided over the phone to the UA one hour 

prior. (Id. at 35-40.) Because the Court finds that Wilson had an ownership interest in the 

package, it concludes he has standing to contest the seizure of the package. 

Seizure of the Package without a Warrant 

 Law enforcement agents may seize contraband in plain view without a warrant, if 

“there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.” Payton v. New 

York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) 

(“if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating 

character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the 

object, they may seize it without a warrant.”) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 

136–137 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion)). If the 

agent has probable cause to know a sealed container contains contraband, the plain view 

rationale is equally applicable. United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 

1978) (“The inescapable nexus between the brown bag and the purpose of the Agents' 

entry and arrest of Blalock is too obvious to play riddle games.”). Here, the warrantless 

seizure of the package was lawful if: “(1) the initial intrusion [was] lawful, and (2) the 

incriminatory nature of the evidence [was] immediately apparent to the officer.” United 

States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2008) (citing United States v. 

Garcia, 205 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.2000)). 

 The Court first evaluates whether the agents had probable cause to arrest Wilson. 

Blalock, 578 F.2d at 247-48. Probable cause exists if, “at the time the arrest is made, ‘the 

facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had 

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 

that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.’” Bailey v. Newland, 263 

F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “When 

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the officers involved are working in close concert with each other, the knowledge of one 

officer is the knowledge of all . . . in the operation of an investigative or police agency 

the collective knowledge and the available objective facts are the criteria to be used in 

assessing probable cause.” United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 1979); 

United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1426 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 Taking into consideration the knowledge of the DEA agents in both Panama City 

and Tucson, the Court finds they had probable cause to arrest Wilson. The agents in 

Florida identified Wilson as a person their UA was in contact with as a supplier of 

methamphetamine. The Tucson agents identified Wilson’s residence from a driving 

records check that was confirmed by surveillance. His image was verified by a review of 

his driver’s license photo. Several times the agents in Florida relayed information to the 

DEA agents in Tucson about packages Wilson was going to receive or send, based on 

conversations with Wilson. Each time, the information conformed with surveillance 

conducted in Tucson—Wilson timely appeared at the address on Dodge where the UA 

agreed to ship him cash; he appeared at the FedEx shipping location on both November 

18 and 19 when he told the UA he would ship methamphetamine those days; and the 

agents in Florida received the November 18 package of methamphetamine shipped by 

Wilson. Specifically, just before 5 p.m. on November 19, Wilson told the UA in Florida 

that he was going to mail him the methamphetamine that day and provided the UA with a 

tracking number. Within the hour, just before FedEx closed, Wilson arrived at the FedEx 

facility and handed the package to his passenger (Karwoski) who approached the FedEx 

facility presumably to ship the package. 

 Taking into account the facts available to all of the agents involved, a reasonable 

person would believe Wilson was committing an offense. Next, the incriminatory nature 

of the package was immediately evident to the agents. Based on the information from the 

UA, the agents anticipated Wilson would be shipping methamphetamine that evening and 

he arrived at the FedEx facility with a package prepared for shipping. Therefore, the 

Court finds the seizure was lawful. 

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 Grounds to Search the Package without a Warrant 

 One of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 

requirement is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). In order for the prosecution to demonstrate that consent was 

voluntarily given, courts look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

acquisition of consent. Id. at 223. Some of the factors taken into account have included 

“youth of the accused; or his low intelligence; his lack of education; the lack of any 

advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and 

prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as deprivation 

of food or sleep.” Id. at 226. 

 SA Chicas testified that shortly after reading Wilson his Miranda rights and 

beginning the interview, he asked Wilson if he would consent to a search of the package. 

According to SA Chicas, Wilson verbally consented to the search. In contrast, Wilson 

testified that he told the agents he could not consent because it was not his package. 

 Wilson does not argue that his consent to a search of the package was involuntary; 

rather, he contends he did not consent to a search under any circumstances. Indeed, there 

is no evidence that consent, if given, was involuntary. It is undisputed that Wilson was 

advised of his Miranda rights, had experience as an adult with the criminal justice 

system, was detained and questioned for only a short period of time before consent was 

requested, and was not subject to any physical punishment or deprivation. 

 As discussed above, the Court found not credible Wilson’s testimony that the 

package was not his. For the same reasons, the Court finds not credible his testimony that 

he did not consent to a search of the package. Further, Wilson knowingly waived his 

Miranda rights. And, he agreed that when the agents told him he had been under 

surveillance for a period of time for shipping the methamphetamine to Florida, he said 

“What took you so long?” Thus, Wilson did not decline to participate in the interview or 

wholly deny involvement. Because the Court finds Wilson consented to a search of the 

package, the Court finds the agents did not need probable cause or a warrant.

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 B. MIRANDA

 In the motion to suppress his statement, Wilson argues that his Miranda waiver 

was not valid because it was affected by promises made by the agents. Accepting 

Wilson’s statements at the evidentiary hearing as true, he testified that the agents’ alleged 

promise regarding the release of Karwoski occurred more than 30 minutes after he 

waived his Miranda rights. He also testified that he chose to waive his Miranda rights 

and speak with the DEA agents. (RT 8/17/16 at 81-82.) Counsel for Wilson 

acknowledged in closing arguments for the evidentiary hearing that Wilson agreed to 

waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Court recommends the motion be denied with 

respect to a Miranda violation. 

 C. VOLUNTARINESS

 Even when the procedural safeguards of Miranda have been satisfied, a defendant 

is deprived of due process if his conviction is founded upon an involuntary confession. 

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). To ensure due process, the test 

for determining the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession is whether, considering all the 

circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological 

coercion or by inducement so that the suspect’s will was overcome. See United States v. 

Coutchavlis, 260 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 

503, 513-14 (1963)). In determining voluntariness, courts consider the defendant’s age, 

education, and mental and physical health; whether the defendant was advised of his 

constitutional rights; the nature of any questioning; whether there was police coercion; 

the length of the interrogation, its location and its continuity; and the use of any physical 

punishment. See United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004). A 

statement is involuntary if it is “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained 

by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper 

influence.” Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 

U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “In short the true test of admissibility is that the confession is 

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made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.” Haynes, 

373 U.S. at 513-14. 

 In this case, Wilson does not assert there was police coercion; nor complain about 

the length of the interrogation, its location or its continuity; nor allege he was not advised 

of his rights. During the course of the one-hour interview there is no evidence that Wilson 

was deprived of food, water or rest. Wilson was 57 years old at the time he was arrested 

and had been interrogated on more than three prior occasions. (RT 8/17/16 at 78-79.) He 

was advised of his rights and interrogated across a desk within the DEA offices by SAs 

Chicas and Stark. (RT 7/18/16 at 42.) The Court finds there is no evidence of a police 

dominated or coercive environment. 

 Wilson’s single claim is that his confession resulted from the direct promise of a 

benefit – Karwoski would be released if Wilson cooperated.4

 SA Chicas testified that he 

was present for the entirety of Wilson’s interview and neither he nor any other agent 

made Wilson any promises. The Court believes it is worth noting that if Wilson had not 

refused to have the interview recorded, there would be little question what occurred 

during the interview. The Court finds Wilson’s testimony regarding a promise was not 

credible. Although Wilson spoke compellingly at the hearing about his concern for his 

dog, he never mentioned this concern to the agents. (RT 8/17/16 at 83.) 

 According to Wilson he told the agents both that the package belonged to 

Karwoski and that Karwoski had nothing to do with shipping methamphetamine. Those 

statements are in direct contradiction to one another. At the hearing, Wilson agreed that 

when the agents stated that they had been conducting surveillance and knew he had been 

shipping methamphetamine to Florida for some time, he said, “What took you so long?” 

However, he stated that he did not confess or incriminate himself. Further, as discussed 

above, the Court found Wilson not credible with respect to ownership of the package. For 

 

4

 In his motion, Wilson also alleges that the DEA agents promised that his Maricopa County pretrial release officer would not seek to revoke his release based on 

this arrest if he confessed. Wilson did not testify to any such promise at the evidentiary hearing; therefore, the Court does not evaluate it with respect to voluntariness. 

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all of these reasons, the Court finds Wilson was not credible when he testified that his 

confession was premised on a promise by the DEA agents to release Karwoski. 

 Even accepting Wilson’s assertion of a promise as true, Wilson stated that it 

occurred thirty to forty-five minutes into a one-hour interview. This undermines Wilson’s 

statement that his only statements to the agents were because of concern for his dog. 

Further, Wilson repeatedly testified that he did not incriminate himself, said very little 

and did not agree with anything the agents said. Again, accepting the truth of that 

statement, then Wilson was not compelled to confess based on a promise from one of the 

agents. Further, Wilson testified that the agents did not force him to make a statement. In 

light of Wilson’s testimony, the Court finds that Wilson’s statements during the interview 

were not the result of his will being overborn. 

 Discounting Wilson’s testimony, there is no evidence of any promise or coercion. 

Accordingly, evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the government has 

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Wilson’s statement was voluntary. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

It is recommended that, after its independent review of the record, the District 

Court deny Defendant’s Motions to Suppress his Statements and the Fruits of Illegal 

Seizure (Docs. 29, 30). 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 6th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Lynnette C. Kimmins

United States Magistrate Judge

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