alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William D. Jones,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04424-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Freese & Goss PLLC - Birmingham, AL

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 1/23/2018, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: February 1, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9961 Filed 02/05/18 Page 1 of 2
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“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9961 Filed 02/05/18 Page 2 of 2
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23





The Board of Directors
American Homestar Corporation:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
333-2037) on Form S-8 of American Homestar Corporation of our report dated June
26, 1997, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of American Homestar
Corporation and Subsidiaries as of May 31, 1997 and 1996, and the related
consolidated statements of operations, shareholders' equity and cash flows for
each of the years in the three-year period ended May 31, 1997, and the related
schedule, which report appears in the May 31, 1997 annual report on Form 10-K
of American Homestar Corporation.


                                                /s/ KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP

Houston, Texas
August 27, 1997
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Aurora Lee, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Asurion Insurance Services Incorporated, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-02606-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

 Pursuant to the Parties’ Joint Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law for 

FLSA Settlement Approval and their Joint Stipulation of Settlement, the Court finds the 

Parties have satisfied the standards for final approval of a collective action settlement 

under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The Court finds that the 

terms of the Joint Stipulation, which were negotiated at arms-length, are fair, reasonable 

and adequate. Plaintiffs’ counsel have certified that the Joint Stipulation is in Plaintiffs’ 

best interests. Furthermore, the Court finds that the attorneys’ fees claimed by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel are fair and reasonable. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Parties’ Joint Motion for FLSA Settlement Approval 

(Doc. 111) is GRANTED and the Parties’ Joint Stipulation is APPROVED in its 

entirety. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court enters final judgment in this case, 

and the Court dismisses this case with prejudice as to the Named Plaintiffs and all opt-in 

Case 2:15-cv-02606-ROS Document 114 Filed 10/11/17 Page 1 of 2
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Plaintiffs participating in the settlement. The Parties will bear costs and fees in 

accordance with the terms of the Joint Stipulation. This Court will retain jurisdiction to 

implement and enforce the terms of the Parties’ Joint Stipulation. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Parties’ Joint Motion and Incorporated 

Memorandum of Law for Leave to File the Confidential Joint Stipulation of Settlement 

under Seal (Doc. 112) is GRANTED. 

 Dated this 10th day of October, 2017. 

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

 

Case 2:15-cv-02606-ROS Document 114 Filed 10/11/17 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


          In connection with the accompanying Annual Report of American Homestar
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 28, 2002
(the  "Report"),  I,  Finis  F.  Teeter, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
hereby  certify  that  to  my  knowledge:

     (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2)     The  information  contained  in  the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated:  September 24, 2002                      /s/  Finis F. Teeter
                                                --------------------------------
                                                Finis F. Teeter,
                                                Chief Executive Officer


<PAGE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          45,493
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   26,028
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (620)
<INVENTORY>                                     32,904
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               107,138
<PP&E>                                          95,718
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (4,915)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 325,651
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           55,540
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      89,625
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   325,651
<SALES>                                         59,958
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                65,241
<CGS>                                           21,412
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   40,739
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,150
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,432
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,683
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,463
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   (286)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,463
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .37
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .37
        

</TABLE>
#### John J. Litton et al *v.*L. Litton, Guardian, et al.

Creditors Suit — Necessary Parties in Action to Subject a Life Estate.

In a creditors suit, to subject a life estate descending to the debtor, under a will, providing that the property was to be held by the debtor for his children, but under his control and in every respect as his own, but not subject to his debts, it is held that the children were necessary parties thereto.

APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT.

February 17, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

By the will of the testator, Labem Litton, he made this devise, “I want my son John J. Litton’s children to inherit his portion *439of my estate subject to his control in every respect as his own, only it is not to be sold for any debts he may have made or may hereafter make so as to disinherit his children.”

Davis, *for appellant.*

Prall, *for appellee.*

It is evident that this will was drawn by one not skilled in legal principles or legal phrases, but taken with other provisions of the will the intention of the testator we think can be perceived.

Immediately preceding this devise he had bequeathed to his grand-daughters Mary L. and Nannie E. Hutsel *"their portion of toy estateP*and immediately succeeding said devise he said: “I don’t want Montgomery' Hutsel to have the management or control of any property that Mary L. and Nanie Hutsel may inherit from my estate.” The devise to his grand-children Hutsels he wanted to be free from the control of their father, testator’s son-in-law, but the devise to his son John’s children he wanted controlled by their father, the devise to both, however, were equally direct and immediate to his grand-children.

In other words, he gave to each set of grand-children that proportion which by law would have descended to their parent had there been no will, the one was, to be free from the control of their father, whilst the other was to be controlled by the father. The devise to his son John’s children was substantially that he gave to them the portion which would descend by law to his son John but for the will, but John was to be testamentary guardian for his children with unlimited power at his own discretion to sell and dispose of the property for their use and benefit, but it was not to be sold or taken to pay any of his existing and subsequently created debts. John’s minor children were, therefore, essential in any attempt by his execution creditors with a return of no property found to subject this property or a life estate therein to sale in satisfaction of their demands, and therefore these minors should have been properly served with process and a guardian appointed to defend.and defense put in, and irregularities in these particulars were reversable errors.

So whether- the cause now adjudicated on its merits or the irregularity of the proceedings the error is equally fatal to the present judgment. Wherefore, it is reversed, with directions for further proceedings consistent herewith.
#### Harrison *v.*Lagow and Others, on Appeal.

IN assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiffs, La*goto*and others, to prove their demand, offered in evidence certain books of account, proved to be those of the steam mill company. *Held,*that the books, not being proved to be the plaintiffs’, were inadmissible.
#### Sarah L. Smith et al *v.*Thomas B. Smith’s Exors.

Wills — Dower—Words and Phrases.

By the word “dower” is meant the widows legal portion in both kinds of an estate, real and personal.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

June 25, 1868.

*Phister, for appellant.*

*Botts, for appellee.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson:

It seems to this court that, considering the separate provisions as illustrated by the context, the testator’s entire intention is quite plain.

The first clause imports that, the previous gift of the life policy of insurance, being imperfect, the testator intended to recognize and confirm it as an advancement to the accounted for as such in the distribution, and, consequently, to be treated as no portion of the distributable fund.

The same intent is even more manifest as to the $32.00 advanced a short time before the publication of the will.

Whether the land, when sold under testamentary authority with the widow’s consent, should be considered as personalty or realty is not material; because, by the word “dower” the testator'evidently intended the widow’s legal portion in both kinds of estate, and, as such, devised her whole interest to her children after her death, and it would be inconsistent with the letter of the will and the testator’s notion of equality to allow to those devisees, a remainder interest during the widow’s life, any more than to charge some advancements excepted by the will and the bequests of the piano, two cows, and horse and buggy specifically bequeathed, as not chargeable, in the distribution. Concurring, as we do, in all the conclusions of the circuit judge, his judgment is *affirmed.*
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of The Newark Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 31, 2005 filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Joseph E. Byrne, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and



(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.



Dated: September 13, 2005



/s/ Joseph E. ByrneJoseph E. ByrneChief Financial Officer




This certification has been
furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure statement.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<NAME>                        GLENOIT CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
<CIK>                         0001047368
       
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                   JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                     APR-03-1999
<CASH>                                 1,458
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                         36,022
<ALLOWANCES>                           3,001
<INVENTORY>                           46,523
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      89,889
<PP&E>                                94,668
<DEPRECIATION>                        23,260
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       223,250
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 44,583
<BONDS>                              224,583
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                                   0
<OTHER-SE>                           (57,688)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         223,250
<SALES>                               54,882
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      54,882
<CGS>                                 40,458
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          4,885
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      21,831
<LOSS-PROVISION>                         641
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     5,415
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      (18,300)
<INCOME-TAX>                          (6,779)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  (11,521)
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                         (11,521)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         (11.52)
<EPS-DILUTED>                         (11.52)
        

</TABLE>
DISTRICT JUDGE'S MINUTES 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA – TUCSON 

U.S. District Judge: Raner C. Collins Date: November 20, 2018 

USA v. Lonnie Ray Swartz Case Number: CR-15-01723-001-TUC-RCC (DTF)

Assistant U.S. Attorney: Wallace Kleindienst/Mary Sue Feldmeier 

Attorney for Defendant: Sean Chapman/Jaime Calle, Retained 

Deputy Clerk: Sherry Gammon 

Court Reporter: Erica McQuillen 

Spanish Interpreter for victim’s family: Sandy Frady (presence not required) 

 

Defendant: ☒ Presence not required ☐ Not Present ☒ Released ☐ Custody ☐ Summons ☐ Writ 

JURY TRIAL – Day 16: 

The jury arrives at 9:30 a.m. to resume deliberation. 

Recess taken 11:55 a.m. – 12:08 p.m. 

Lunch recess taken 1:10 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. 

Lunch is provided to the jurors. The jurors continue to deliberate during lunch. 

2:23 p.m. – Jury question received. The Court consults with counsel and provides a written response to 

the jury. 

Recess taken 2:55 p.m. – 3:10 p.m. 

3:25 p.m. – Jury note received. The Court consults with counsel. Mr. Chapman orally motions the 

Court for a mistrial. The motion is denied. The Court provides a written response to the jury. 

3:38 p.m. – Jury note received. The Court provides a written response. 

3:40 p.m. – Jury note received. The Court consults with counsel. The Court proposes to have the jury 

return the following day to resume deliberation. Mr. Chapman objects and renews his oral motion for a 

mistrial. The motion is denied. A written response is provided to the jury. 

The jury is excused at 4:47 p.m. Jury deliberation continues to 11/21/2018 at 9:30 a.m. before Judge 

Raner C. Collins. 

 Jury Trial: 16 Minutes 

 2:23 p.m.– 2:31 p.m. 3:25 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. 

 4:32 p.m. – 4:35 p.m. 

 Jury deliberation time: 6 Hour 49 Minutes 

 9:30 a.m. – 4:47 p.m. 

Case 4:15-cr-01723-RCC-DTF Document 629 Filed 11/20/18 Page 1 of 1
**EXHIBIT 32.1****Written Statement Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**The undersigned, the President of Webster Preferred Capital Corporation (the “Company”),hereby certifies that, to his knowledge on the date hereof:(a) the Form 10-Q Report of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 filed on thedate hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13a or 15d of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(b) information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.       /s/ William T. Bromage     William T. Bromage    President    Principal Executive Officer    November 7, 2005  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided toWebster Preferred Capital Corporation and will be retained by Webster Preferred Capital Corporationand furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
19
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     We hereby certify that the accompanying Report of Harris Preferred Capital
Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that information contained in such Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Harris
Preferred Capital Corporation.

Date August 12, 2005

<Table>
<S>                                                              <C>        <C>
-------------------------------------
Janine Mulhall
Chief Financial Officer
Paul R. Skubic
Chief Financial Officer
</Table>

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Harris Preferred Capital
Corporation and will be retained by Harris Preferred Capital Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.