alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### A. C. Kinnison *v.*S. D. Brook’s Admr.

Principal and Surety — Contribution on Guardian’s Bond.

A ward obtained judgment against sureties, who were! solvent, and severally as well as jointly liable upon a bond that was a nullity: Held, that without objection below, they cannot complain of the error in the bond.

Same — Judgment a Bar — Parties.

In a suit by a surety who paid the liability, for contribution, the judgment is no bar, because it was not rendered between the sureties.

Bonds — Guardian and Ward — Order Releasing Surety.

An order of the County Court, releasing the surety in a Guardian’s Bond, from past'and future responsibility, without taking another bond, is void.

*341Same — Blank Signatures,

upon or papers, purporting to he bonds, is held to be no official bond.

appeal PROM bullitt oiRcuit court.

January 21, 1870.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Williams:

As heretofore adjudged by this court in the case of Brooks vs. Morrow, manuscript opinion, the order of the County Court releasing the security in the first guardian’s bond from past and future responsibility without taking another bond was a nullity and the taking signatures upon a blank forms or pages was therein decided to be no bond. (See Brooks vs. Morrow, Ky. Opin., vol. 2, p. 202.)

And as the ward had obtained judgment in that suit against sureties that were good and solvent and were severally as well as jointly liable to them they did not see proper to complain of the error and those securities being so severally liable could not complain, therefore, they could not reverse said judgment though this palpable error was committed.

But in this suit by the security or his administrator who paid the liability for contribution, said judgment is no bar because it was not rendered between these parties, hence, the judgment against appellant for a due contribution was both just and legal.

and, the securities of R. F. Samuels, the County Court Clerk who transacted said business so imperfectly, and who are parties to Kinnison’s answer and cross petition has not yet been decided, their demurrer to his cross petition seems to have been overruled but were it not as his cross pleadings are still pending we could not correct any error which is not a final order.

As Kinnison’s right to recover as against the County Judge and the Clerk upon his official bond can only be predicated upon his final responsibility to the wards it was right not to adjudicate the cross petition until this responsibility was ascertained.

Wherefore, the judgment on the petition of Brooks’ administrators herein is affirmed. It is considered by this court that recovery of a *pro rata*part of the cost by appellee against anuel ‘ *342lant was equitable and right because be wrongfully escaped from tbe just litigation.

,B. *II.*Field, *for appellant.*

*A. E. Fieldj for appellee.*
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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Antonio Juan Lopez, 

Defendant. 

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CR-15-50187-PHX-SPL

CR-15-50188-PHX-SPL

ORDER OF DETENTION

Defendant appeared before this Court on a Petition for Revocation of Supervised

Release. The issue of detention was submitted to the Court. The Court considered the

Petition and file in determining whether defendant should be released on conditions set by

the Court.

The Court finds that defendant has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he

does not pose a serious flight risk or danger to any other person or to the community pursuant

to Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Court concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is a serious

flight risk and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably

assure his appearance at future proceedings.

The Court also concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is a

danger and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure

the safety of the community.

Case 2:15-cr-50188-SPL Document 10 Filed 01/19/16 Page 1 of 2
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant be detained pending further

proceedings.

DATED this 19th day of January, 2016

Case 2:15-cr-50188-SPL Document 10 Filed 01/19/16 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Getty
Images, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, Elizabeth J. Huebner, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: November 7, 2003



|/s/    ELIZABETH J. HUEBNER                                           
|----------------------------------------------------------------------
|Elizabeth J. Huebner Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer
Order filed August 4, 2016 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-15-00569-CR

____________

WALTER R SAM, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 337th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1419418

ORDER

Relevant items have been omitted from the clerk’s record. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 34.5(c). Those items are:

1. the court’s charge to the jury; and

2. the jury’s verdict

Accordingly, the Harris County District Clerk is directed to (1) file a 

supplemental clerk’s record on or before August 15, 2016, containing the documents 
listed above; (2) furnish the supplemental clerk’s record to appellant so that he may 

prepare a pro se brief in response to the brief filed by his appointed counsel pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); and (3) certify to this court the date on 

which delivery of the supplemental clerk’s record to appellant is made. 

If a requested item is not part of the case file, the district clerk is directed to 

file a supplemental clerk’s record containing a certified statement that the item is not 

a part of the case file.

PER CURIAM
#### Doc Waring *v.*Commonwealth.

Elections — Proof of Vote.

Upon identification of one, who voted at a certain precinct, it is proper to permit the poll books to be read as evidence to the jury to show that his vote was recorded and counted.

Same — Residence.

The statute on “residence,” of one claiming the right to vote, is the place where the family of a married man resides, unless such residence is for a temporary purpose only. If the family is permanently at one place, and he transacts business at another, the former shall be his residence.

APPEAL EROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT.

November 7, 1871.

Opinion oe ti-ie Court by

Ludge Pryor :

Having identified appellant as Eranklin 'Warren, who voted at the Liberty precinct in August, 1870, it was proper to permit the poll books to be read as evidence to the jury to show that his vote was recorded and counted.

But it was erroneous to instruct the jury without qualification, that the place where a married man’s family is, is his residence.

The statute on the subject of fixing the residence of an individual claiming the right to vote in a particular precinct, is that the place where the family of a married man resides shall generally be considered his residence unless the family so resides for a temporary *573purpose. If his family is permanently in one place and he transacted business in another, .the former shall be his residence.

Halbert, Thomas, *for appellant.*

The instruction under the evidence should have embraced the foregoing propositions in conformity to the statute.

1 Yol. K. S'., pp. 434-435.

For the error in the instruction, therefore, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial and for further proceedings consistent herewith.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 31.2
                    RULE 13A-14(A) / 15D-14(A) CERTIFICATION

I, Lauren Farrell, Chief Financial Officer of Ambient Corporation (the
"Company"), certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of,
and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the Company is made known to us by others
within the Company, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Company's most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting;

5. The Company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Company's auditors and the audit committee of the Company's board of directors
(or persons fulfilling the equivalent function):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: May 13, 2005


/s/ LAUREN FARRELL
---------------------------------
LAUREN FARRELL
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, MICHAEL SCHUTZ, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Most Home Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|Date: June 15, 2006 | /s/ Michael Schutz
Michael Schutz
Chief Financial Officer
|------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------
Case 2:15-mj-01929-JFM Document 5 Filed 12/22/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01929-JFM Document 5 Filed 12/22/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01929-JFM Document 5 Filed 12/22/15 Page 3 of 3
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 630 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 630

   To amend the Clean Air Act to permit the exclusive application of 
  California State regulations regarding reformulated gas in certain 
                        areas within the State.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 6, 1997

  Mr. Bilbray (for himself, Mr. Lewis of California, Mr. Torres, Mr. 
   Calvert, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Filner, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Herger, Mr. 
  Rohrabacher, Mr. Packard, Mr. Dooley of California, and Mr. Cox of 
 California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Clean Air Act to permit the exclusive application of 
  California State regulations regarding reformulated gas in certain 
                        areas within the State.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CALIFORNIA REFORMULATED GAS RULES.

    Section 211(c)(4)(B) of the Clean Air Act is amended by adding the 
following at the end thereof: ``Whenever any such State that has 
received a waiver under section 209(b)(1) has promulgated reformulated 
gasoline rules for any covered area of such State (as defined in 
subsection (k)), such rules shall apply in such area in lieu of the 
requirements of subsection (k) if such State rules will achieve 
equivalent or greater emission reductions than would result from the 
application of the requirements of subsection (k) in the case of the 
aggregate mass of emissions of toxic air pollutants and in the case of 
the aggregate mass of emissions of ozone-forming compounds.''.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 813 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 813

    To amend the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 to 
 prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from requiring States to use 
the metric system with respect to designing, advertising, or preparing 
              documents for Federal-aid highway projects.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 25, 1997

   Mr. Bachus (for himself, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Riley, Mr. Clement, Mr. 
   Everett, and Mr. Stump) introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 to 
 prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from requiring States to use 
the metric system with respect to designing, advertising, or preparing 
              documents for Federal-aid highway projects.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. METRIC REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROJECTS.

    Section 205(c)(2) of the National Highway System Designation Act of 
1995 (23 U.S.C. 109 note; 109 Stat. 577) is amended by striking 
``Before September 30, 2000, the Secretary'' and inserting ``The 
Secretary''.
                                 <all>
```
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

476 

CA 11-00335 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM JOHNSON, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

 

EMMETT J. CREAHAN, DIRECTOR, MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, BUFFALO

(AILEEN M. MCNAMARA OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L.

Michalski, A.J.), entered January 28, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to

Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The order committed respondent to a

secure treatment facility. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law

article 10, respondent appeals from an order revoking his prior

regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) and

committing him to a secure treatment facility (see § 10.11 [d] [1],

[4]). We reject respondent’s contention that he was denied due

process when Supreme Court denied his request for an independent

psychiatric evaluation. An indigent respondent in a civil commitment

proceeding does not have an absolute right to an independent

psychiatric evaluation (see Goetz v Crosson, 967 F2d 29, 36-37). 

Instead, a right to present the testimony of an independent

psychiatrist arises only where “such testimony is necessary to a

reliable assessment” of an indigent respondent’s mental condition

(id.). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

respondent’s request for an independent psychiatric evaluation, which

was made during the trial after petitioner had rested and respondent

had called two witnesses. We also note that this was a SIST

revocation hearing, not an initial proceeding under Mental Hygiene Law

article 10, and that respondent stipulated that he had a mental

abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i). We

further conclude that petitioner established at the hearing by the

requisite clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a dangerous 
-2- 476 

CA 11-00335 

sex offender requiring confinement (see § 10.03 [e]; § 10.07 [f]). 

Entered: April 27, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Ben Daven's Exors. *v.*Mary Ash.

Res Judicata — Judgment.

Rormer judgment a bar to relief sought. Injunction properly dissolved.

APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT.

June 1, 1870.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:

The agreement of T. Ash and wife, of record in connection with the judgment for the recovery of the slave Bedford, as we construe it, bound them in consideration of the judgment to account for the sum of $700 furnished by Ben Davens to pay for land, and $315, as the price of Bedford, as advancements in the settlement of Daven’s estate, when, it seems to have been contemplated, that the several sons of Davens would also account for nearly like sums advanced to each of them; but we do not think it was understood by the parties that Ash and wife should account for said advancements if the other distributees did not also account for advancements. But the whole matter was afterwards litigated in the suit *577for a settlement and distribution, and the court upon its construction of Ben Davens’ will, decided that no advancements should be charged to any of the parties, and in effect decided that. Ash and wife should not account for said sums of $700 and $315. The suit was not dismissed as to them without prejudice, as seems to have been supposed, but it was only so dismissed as to the right of some other parties than Mrs. Ash and the executors. That judgment is, in our opinion, a bar to' the relief sought in this action, and for that reason, at least, the court in this case properly dissolved the injunction and dismissed the petition.

Grigsby, *for appellant.*

Newman, *for appellee.*

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.