# IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF TEXAS

No. P D-0039-09

THE S TATE O F TEXAS

v.
HARVILL BL ACK SHE RE, Appellee

On Discretionary Re view of Case No. 11- 07-00030-CR of the Eleventh Court of Appeals, Brown County

Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion of the unanimous Court.

This case involves a State’s a ppeal f rom a trial c ourt’s orde rs suppressing evidenc e and terminating a prose cution.

I n the District Court
The a ppellee w as indicted in B rown County for possession of me thamphetamine. More than two y ear s passed. F our day s befor e trial, a detec tive from the B rownwood Police D epartment discovere d that the methamphetamine that the appe llee wa s acc used of possessing was missing from the D epar

tment’s evidenc e vault.

## Bla cksher e - 2

The a ppellee the n filed a Motion to Suppress, arg uing tha t evidence rela

ted to the methamphetamine should be suppressed be cause the State violated ce rtain constitutional and
statutory provisions by

misplacing the methamphetamine. The trial c ourt dec ided to “ca rry ” the
Motion to S uppress, so that it could rule a fter he aring the evidenc e pre sented a t the trial.
Trial bef ore a jury beg an on F ebrua

ry 6, 2007. After

the testimony

of the fir st six witnesses, the State said that it had pre sented a ll its evidenc e that wa s releva nt to the appellee ’s 1


## Motion to S uppress. The court made an ora l ruling tha t it was suppressing the evidenc e and
dismiss ing the jury , but that it was not dismi ssing the c ase or direc ting a

verdic t of ac quittal. The
discussion after

the ruling shows that there was some c onfusion about the ruling and the State’ s ability to appea l:
THE COURT: ... Ifind that on balanc e that I cannot ... a dmit the evidence . ... I find that the def

ense ha s minim ally

shown that the State – and the State being the Police Depa

rtment and its proce dures that we re w oefully inadequa te, obviously , and the c ustodian himself who is curre ntly incar cer ated, that justice c an’t be done in this m atter be cause of the State’s a ctions attributed in that reg ard ba sed on a showing that the Def

ense ha s established under a totality of the e vidence . So I suppress the e vidence . I dismiss the ca se ag ainst this Defenda nt. I ’m g oing to discharg e the jury

and the State will be a

ble to appea l this ruling of the Court if it desires.

... [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Your Honor , just for clar ification, I believe the Court used the wor d “dismissed” in this. I s it my understanding that the Court is entering a dire cted ve rdict of a cquittal in this case?

F o u r o f t h e w i t n e s s e s w e r e B r o w n w o o d P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c e r s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e
. T h e o f

f i c e r s 1 t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e a p p e l l e e ’ s a r r e s t , t h e s e i z u r e o f a s u b s t a n c e w h i c h a p p e a r e d t o b e m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e f

r o m a v e h i c l e i n w h i c h t h e a p p e l l e e w a s r i d i n g , a n d t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f t h e s u b s t a n c e t o a D P S l a b o r a t o r y f o r t e s t i n g
. A n o t h e r o c c u p a n t o f t h e v e h i c l e , W i l l i e C a l v i n , J r
. , t e s t i f i e d t h a t b o t h h e a n d t h e a p p e l l e e p o s s e s s e d
m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a p p e l l e e ’ s a r r e s t

. F i n a l l y , a D P S c h e m i s t t e s t i f i e d o n v o i r d i r e t h a t a s u b s t a n c e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e a p p e l l e e w a s s u b m i t t e d f o r t e s t i n g i n M a y 2 0 0 4 , a n d n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e s u b m i s s i o n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s u b s t a n c e h a d b e e n i m p r o p e r l y h a n d l e d o r t h a t t h e t e s t s h e p e r f o r m e d w e r e i n v a l i d

.

## Bla cksher e - 3

THE COURT: Well, at this poi nt, I want to be c lear about that. B ased on w hat I ’ve he ard f

rom the evide nce, the State had no other evidenc e other

than what I ’ve hear d. [P ROSECUTOR] : That is corre ct. Howe ver, w e would objec t to the Court using the word “ direc ted ver dict” bec ause tha t has g rave conseque nces f or our a bility – THE COURT: Iwill ag ree . I will not use that, beca use I did state that – what I have done is, I have e ssentially dismiss ed the jury . I have g rante d y our Motion to Suppress. Ihave e x cluded the e vidence . And then they can ta ke up this motion, i f they want, on the Court’s r

uling. B ut there w ill be no further trial on this matter. I f they desire to take it up, then, it will be anothe r jury at another

time. I f they

don’t then, ef fec tively , beca

use of this, then, I

think Iwill leave it to the State or the Def ense c an subseque ntly

file a motion if y ou want.

... But ... the jury

is discharg ed. The case itself – I did say dismiss ed, but I

rea lly meant dismiss the jury . So it’s not a directed ve rdict of a cquittal. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: We would move for a direc ted ver dict of ac quittal. THE COURT: All rig ht. At this poi nt, I will deny that g iven – I

think the rulings
are clea r otherw ise. Idon’t want to pre vent the State fr om being able to take this matter up if they

desire to do so.

... [P ROSECUTOR] : That was my only conce rn. I

don’t know if we ’re g oing to or not. I just want to make sure we ha ve the a bility to if –
THE COURT: Iwant y ou to have that. I want y ou to have that. B ut I also want y ou to look at it real closely . And I know y ou will. Bec ause I don’t want this to be hang ing ove r this defe ndant. Get it done. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Right, Your H onor. That wa s our re quest. Be cause I believe tha t even on a

n acquittal, they

can a ppeal the issue. T hey

are just barre d from fur ther prose cution of the c ase. That is the reason f or our r equest for

a direc ted ver dict of ac quittal in thi s matter.
THE COURT: Iwill say

this: I f all the e vidence is as it is right now, then I would g rant it. Unless [the prosecutor ] has something fur ther – I mean, Idid not specifically state that I

would g rant that.

## Bla cksher e - 4

[P ROSECUTOR] : That is the rest of it. I would just ask that it be left as-is. I f counsel would like to file a motion with t he Court later , he may do so.
THE COURT: What I would ask y ou to do is thi s: The State has to g ive notice of intent to appeal within 30 day s. I f y ou will file a Motion to Dismi ss along with the order at this point, t hen, g iven the fa ct that I think jeopardy

has attac hed, y ou know ... it would seem to me if they don’t appe al it, then I will sign a dismissal at that point.

... I don’t want ther e to be a

retria l unless there is something differ ent and ne w or unless the State pre vails on appea l.
A fe w hours af

ter the tria l ended, the State r equeste d that the cour t make for

mal finding s
of fa ct and c onclusions of law to assist the State in deciding whether to appea l.
On Fe bruar

y 23, the trial cour

t executed and f

iled a wr itten order ( which wa s dated

Fe bruar y 6) that included mistrial and dismissal as dispositions of the case. T he orde r wa s
entitled “Or der G ranting Def endant’ s Motion to S uppress, Dismissing the Ca se B eca use of

I nsufficie nt Evidence to Sust ain a Conviction, Dec laring a Mistrial, and Discha rg ing the J ury .”
The orde r stated, in par

t: [T] he Court found ba d faith and dismissed the cha rg es ag ainst the defe ndant and discharg ed the jury

beca use the State ha d otherwise insuff icient evidenc e to sustain a conviction in light of the suppression being g rante d and the f indings of this court. ACCORDI

NGL Y, I T I S THE ORDER of this Court that the Defe ndant’s Motion to Suppress is gra nted, the State’s c ase is dismissed due to bad fa ith on the par t of the evide nce c ustodian of the B rownwood Police D epar tment resulting in insufficient evide nce to sustain a c onviction, a mistrial is declare d, and the jury

is hereby discharg ed.
On Fe bruar

y 28, the trial cour

t filed finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, one of which was, “ The Court conc luded that there was insuffic ient evidenc e re maining a s a matter of law to

## Bla cksher e - 5

sustain a conviction af

ter the State’ s evidenc e wa s suppressed a nd acc ording ly , a mistrial was
decla red, the case ag ainst the defe ndant was dismissed and the jur y was discha

rg ed.”

I n the Court of Appe als
The State a

ppeale d the trial cour

t’s order s and ra ised two points of err or: (1) The trial

court e rre d in gr anting the Motion to S uppress be cause the appe llee had not a dequate ly proved
that the State ac ted in bad fa ith. (2) The tria l court er red in de clar ing a

mistrial as a re sult of the suppression of e vidence

. The Court of Appe als held that the trial c ourt err ed in suppressing the evidenc e, and
there fore sustained the State’s issues on a ppeal, se t aside the trial c ourt’s orde r, and r emande d the

case
. The Court’s opinion did not discuss the declar ation of a mistrial. 2


## The a ppellee f iled a Motion for Rehe aring , in which he r aised the issue of jurisdiction for
the first time. The Court of A ppeals ove rruled the motion.
The Parties’ Arg uments
The a ppellee now

arg ues, as he did in his Mot ion for Rehe aring , that the Court of Appe als
lacke d jurisdiction for three rea sons: (1) Article 44.01(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not allow the State to appea l an orde r g ranting a mistrial; (2) Ar ticle 44.01(a )(5) does not allow the State to appea l the g rant of the Motion to S uppress a fter je opardy has attac hed; and ( 3) the
State did not make the ce rtification re quired by Article 44.01( a)( 5) in order to appea l the g rant of
the Motion to S uppress.
The State a

rg ues that the trial c ourt’s ac tions terminating the pr osecution should be interpre ted as a

dismiss al of the indictment, a ppeala ble under Article 44.01( a)( 1), bec ause the

S t a t e v

. B l a c k

s h e r e , 2 0 0 8 T e x
. A p p
. L E X I S 6 9 2 2 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 )

. 2

## Bla cksher e - 6

trial court indica ted that it was “dismissing the c ase.” I n the alter native, the State sug g ests that
the trial cour

t’s actions could be interpre ted as the g rant of a new tria l, appea lable under Article 44.01(a) (3), be cause a trial c ourt’s use of the term “ mistrial” often ha s been he ld to be the
functional e quivalent of a n order g ranting a new

trial. The State f

urther a rg ues that, eve n if it did
not meet the re quirements under Article 44.01( a)( 5) to appe al the suppre ssion ruling, the Court of Appea ls had jurisdiction to consider the suppre ssion point of error onc e the State pr operly invoked the Court’s jurisdiction under A rticle 44.01(a )(1) or (3) to consider the te rmination of

prosec ution point of error.

J urisdiction over Motion to Suppress Point of Err or Article 44.01( a) of

the Code of Criminal Proce dure sa y s, “The sta te is entitled to appea l
an orde r of a

court in a c riminal case if the orde r ... (5) g rants a motion to suppress evide nce, a
confe ssion, or an admission, if jeopar dy has not attac hed in the ca se ....” B y expressly limit ing a State’s appe al of the g rant of a motion to s uppress e vidence to case s in which jeopar dy has not
attache d, the statute must be construe d not to authorize a State’s appe al of such a ruling that was
made a fter je opardy

had attac hed.

I n a jury trial, jeopar dy

attache s at the time the jury is empanele d and sworn. Be cause the 3 

## trial court g rante d the motion to suppress after jeopar dy attache d in the prese nt case , Article 44.01(a) did not authorize the State to appea l the ruling which wa s made ther eaf ter. 4

U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. M a r t i n L i n e n S u p p l y C o

. , 4 3 0 U

. S

. 5 6 4 , 5 6 9 ( 1 9 7 7 )

. 3

S e e S t a t e v

. S c h a e

f f e r , 9 8 1 S

. W

. 2 d 5 1 5 , 5 1 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. – A u s t i n 1 9 9 8 , n o p e t

. ) ( “ T h e p r a c t i c e o f 4

c o n s i d e r i n g p r e t r i a l m o t i o n s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a f

t e r t h e t r i a l h a s b e g u n i s s t r o n g l y d i s f a v o r e d [ b e c a u s e ] t h e S t a t e i s d e p r i v e d o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a p p e a l t h e u n f a v o r a b l e r u l i n g
. ” ) ; G E O R G E E

. D IX & R O B E R T O

. D A W S O N , 4 3 A T E X A S P R A C T IC E : C R IM IN A L P R A C T IC E A N D P R O C E D U R E § 4 3

. 2 1 7 ( 2 d e d

. ) ( “ S i n c e t h e t r i a l j u d g e i s u n d e r n o o b l i g a t i o n t o r u l e o n a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s b e f o r e t r i a l , t h i s m e a n s a t r i a l j u d g e h a s a l m o s t i f n o t t o t a l p o w e r t o f r u s t r a t e t h e S t a t e ’ s

‘ r i g h t ’ t o a p p e a l b y r e f

u s i n g t o r u l e o n t h e m o t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t r i a l b e g i n s
. ” ) ( c i t i n g S c h a e f f e r )

.

## Bla cksher e - 7

The State c ontends, howeve r, that if the Court of A ppeals ha d jurisdiction over the
termination-of- prosec ution point of error, the motion-to-suppress point of err or could be
considere d by

the Court under its “e x tended jurisdiction.” B eca use we hold below that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appea ls to consider the ter mination-of-prose cution point of err or wa s not properly

invoked, we ne ed not addr ess the State’s e x tended- jurisdiction theory

. J urisdiction over Te rmination of Prosecution Point of Error The pa rties’ primar

y arg uments could be said to turn on the a ppropriate labels to attac h to
the trial cour

t’s termination of the pr osecution and the State’s re sulting authority to appea l under Article 44.01( a). I n the re cord a nd the brief

s, four labe ls can be found. The tr ial court indica ted in its oral ruling that it was only discharging the jury

. The trial c ourt’s written or der state d that, in 5 

## addition to discharg ing the jury , the trial cour t both dismissed the case and declare d a mistrial

. Finally , the State now sug g ests that the trial cour t effe ctively granted a new trial

. 6



## But we beg in by

rec og nizi ng that the State’s appe al of the tria l court’s a ctions violates the
law of double jeopar dy . This Court’s interpreta tion of Article 44.01 r ecog nizes that doublejeopar dy law ser ves as the ke y

boundary to the State’s rig ht to appeal unde r the statute. We look to Supreme Court dec isions when we c onsider the limits of the State’s rig ht to appeal unde r
Article 44.01. We presume that the le g islature intended to e nact a constitutional statute. W e 7

“ B u t

... t h e j u r y i s d i s c h a r g e d

. T h e c a s e i t s e l f

– I d i d s a y d i s m i s s e d , b u t I r e a l l y m e a n t d i s m i s s t h e j u r y
. ” 5

T h e S t a t e m e n t i o n s a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e a r g u m e n t , t h a t “ [ o ] n c e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s p r o p e r l y i n v o k e d o n o n e i s s u e , 6

a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t w i l l a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e e n t i r e c a s e , ” a n d c i t e s t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e T e x a s S u p r e m e C o u r t i n B r o w n v

. T

o d d , 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 1 )

. T h e S t a t e f a i l s , h o w e v e r , t o m a k e a n y a r g u m e n t f o r a p p l y i n g t h e e x t e n d e d

-

j u r i s d i c t i o n d o c t r i n e t o t h e c o n t e x t o f S t a t e a p p e a l s o f c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s u n d e r A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1

. T h e a r g u m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e i n a d e q u a t e l y b r i e f

e d

.
S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 4 , 5 9 9

- 6 0 0 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 9 )

. 7

## Bla cksher e - 8

should avoid an unnec essar y construction of the statute that would g ive the State a r ight to an

appea l that would result in a prosec ution that would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
There fore we sha ll procee d direc tly to consider whe ther the D ouble J eopar dy Clause prohibits a State’s appe al of the tria l court’s a ctions, howeve r they may be labe led for sta tutory

purposes.
A def endant’ s double-jeopa

rdy protec tions are f

ound in the Fifth Ame ndment to the
United States Constit ution, which provides that no per son shall be “subjec t for the sa me offe nse to be twice put in jeopa

rdy of life or limb.” The “ controlling constitutional principle [of the

8 

## Double Jeopardy

Clause] focuses on prohibitions ag ainst multi ple trials.” Two conditions are 9


## there fore nece ssary

to impli cate double jeopar dy in the context of a State’s appe al: (1) jeopa rdy
must have “a ttached,” as whe n a jury is empanele d and sworn in a jury trial, and (2) the State’s

appea l must t hrea ten the def endant with an imper

missibl e succ essive trial. 1 0


## One of the most fundamental r

ules of double-

jeopar dy jurisprudenc e is that when a trial
ends in an a cquittal, the def endant may

not be tried a g ain for the same off ense. Whether the 1 1 

## acquittal is “ba sed on a jury verdic t of not g uilty

or on a r uling by the cour t that the evidenc e is

T h e d o u b l e j e o p a r d y p r o t e c t i o n s o f t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t a p p l y t o t h e s t a t e s t h r o u g h t h e F o u r t e e n t h 8 A m e n d m e n t

. B e n t o n v

. M a r y l a n d , 3 9 5 U

. S

. 7 8 4 , 7 9 4 ( 1 9 6 9 )

. W e h a v e f o u n d s u c h F i f

t h A m e n d m e n t p r o t e c t i o n s t o b e “ s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l ” t o t h o s e a f f o r d e d u n d e r t h e T e x a s C o n s t i t u t i o n
. E x p a r t e M i t c h e l l , 9 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 5 , 5 8 0 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 9 7 )

.

M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 6 9 ( “ A t t h e h e a r t o f t h i s p o l i c y i s t h e c o n c e r n t h a t p e r m i t t i n g t h e s o v e r e i g n 9 f r e e l y t o s u b j e c t t h e c i t i z e n t o a s e c o n d t r i a l f o r t h e s a m e o f

f e n s e w o u l d a r m G o v e r n m e n t w i t h a p o t e n t i n s t r u m e n t o f
o p p r e s s i o n
. T h e C l a u s e , t h e r e f o r e , g u a r a n t e e s t h a t t h e S t a t e s h a l l n o t b e p e r m i t t e d t o m a k e r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s t o c o n v i c t t h e a c c u s e d , t h e r e b y s u b j e c t i n g h i m t o e m b a r r a s s m e n t , e x p e n s e a n d o r d e a l a n d c o m p e l l i n g h i m t o l i v e i n a c o n t i n u i n g s t a t e o f a n x i e t y a n d i n s e c u r i t y a s w e l l a s e n h a n c i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e v e n t h o u g h i n n o c e n t h e m a y b e f o u n d g u i l t y
. S o c i e t y ’ s a w a r e n e s s o f t h e h e a v y p e r s o n a l s t r a i n w h i c h a c r i m i n a l t r i a l r e p r e s e n t s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t i s m a n i f

e s t e d i n t h e w i l l i n g n e s s t o l i m i t t h e G o v e r n m e n t t o a s i n g l e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g t o v i n d i c a t e i t s v e r y v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n e n f o r c e m e n t o f c r i m i n a l l a w s
. ” ) ( i n t e r n a l p u n c t u a t i o n a n d c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

.
M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 6 9

- 7 0 ; S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 5 9 7

. 10

M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 7 1 ; S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 5 9 7

- 9 8

. 11

## Bla cksher e - 9

insufficient to convic t,” any further prosec ution, including an a ppeal by the prosec ution that
would lead to a se cond trial, is prohibited. Even whe re a n acquittal is based on a

n “eg reg iously 1 2



## err oneous founda tion,” such as e rrone ous exclusion of evidence or er roneous we ighing of 1 3 1 4


## evidenc e, the ac quittal bars appe llate re view of the ultimate disposit ion as well as the unde rly

1 5 

## ing f oundation. 1 6 

## The Supreme Court of the United States has e mphasized that what constitutes an
“ac quittal” is not controlled by the form of

the judg e’s a ction. For

jeopar dy purposes, a 1 7


## defe ndant is acquitted whe n “the r uling of the judg e, wha tever

its label, actua lly

repr esents a

U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. S c o t t , 4 3 7 U

. S

. 8 2 , 9 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 5 9 8

. T h e c r i t i c a l 12

e x c e p t i o n w i t h i n t h i s r u l e i s t h a t t h e s t a t e m a y a p p e a l a n a c q u i t t a l r e n d e r e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o l l o w i n g a j u r y v e r d i c t
o f g u i l t

. A p p e a l o f s u c h a n a c q u i t t a l i s p e r m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e r e v e r s a l o n a p p e a l w o u l d n o t s u b j e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a s u c c e s s i v e t r i a l , b u t w o u l d r a t h e r s i m p l y r e i n s t a t e t h e j u r y ’ s o r i g i n a l v e r d i c t o f g u i l t

. W i l s o n , 4 2 0 U

. S

. , a t 3 4 4

- 4 5 , 3 5 2

- 5 3

.
F o n g F o o v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 6 9 U

. S

. 1 4 1 , 1 4 3 ( 1 9 6 2 )

.

13

S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 6 0 0 ( f i n d i n g e x c l u s i o n o f w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y “ u n a c c e p t a b l e a n d 14 i n e x c u s a b l e , ” b u t b a r r i n g a p p e a l o f a c q u i t t a l b a s e d o n r e s u l t i n g i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f r e m a i n i n g e v i d e n c e )

.
F o n g F o o , 3 6 9 U

. S

. , a t 1 4 2 ( f i n d i n g a c q u i t t a l b a s e d o n p o o r c r e d i b i l i t y o f p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s a n d 15 i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t o f p r o s e c u t o r w a s “ e g r e g i o u s l y e r r o n e o u s ” )

.

S a n a b r i a v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 4 3 7 U

. S

. 5 4 , 6 8

- 6 9 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ( A f t e r e r r o n e o u s l y i n t e r p r e t i n g a n i n d i c t m e n t , a t r i a l 16

c o u r t e x c l u d e d c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t t o t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d

. T h e a c t i o n s o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t w e r e “ p r o p e r l y t o b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a n e r r o n e o u s e v i d e n t i a r y r u l i n g , w h i c h l e d t o a n a c q u i t t a l f o r i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e
. T h a t j u d g m e n t o f
a c q u i t t a l , h o w e v e r e r r o n e o u s , b a r s f u r t h e r p r o s e c u t i o n o n a n y a s p e c t o f t h e c o u n t a n d h e n c e b a r s a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s e r r o r
. ” ) ; s e e a l s o M o r e n o v

. S t a t e , 8 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d 3 2 7 , a t 3 3 2 n
. 6 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( “ O f c o u r s e , i t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l c a n n o t b e r e v i e w e d r e g a r d l e s s o f h o w e g r e g i o u s l y w r o n g t h e v e r d i c t m a y b e
. ” )

.
M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 7 1 ; s e e a l s o M o r e n o v

. S t a t e , 8 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d , a t 3 3 2 ( “ T h e m e r e l a b e l a t t a c h e d

17

e i t h e r t o t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s m o t i o n o r t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s o r d e r r u l i n g o n s a m e c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e i t s a p p e a l a b i l i t y u n d e r 1 8 U

. S

. C

. , S e c t i o n 3 7 3 1

. ... A n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , m u s t l o o k t o t h e e f f e c t o f a n y o r d e r s c o n c e r n i n g a n i n d i c t m e n t o r i n f o r m a t i o n , n o t w h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r t h e p a r t i e s a t t r i a l h a v e l a b e l e d s u c h
o r d e r s
. ” ) ; S t a t e v

. M o r e n o , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 5 9 8 ( I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a n a p p e a l i s j e o p a r d y b a r r e d , “ w e a r e n o t b o u n d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s l a b e l ; i n s t e a d , w e m u s t e x a m i n e t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e o r d e r
. ” )

.

## Bla cksher e - 10

resolution, corr ect or

not, of some or a ll of the fac tual elements of the offe nse cha rg ed.” For

1 8 

## example, the United States Supreme Court held in Martin Linen that a judg ment of ac quittal,

enter ed by

a trial c ourt afte r a jury

beca me “hope lessly

deadloc ked,” w as an a cquittal in
substance a s well as for

m despite the g overnme nt’s char acte rization of the trial court’ s action as a
mistrial. I n enter ing the judgme nt of ac quittal, the trial court re corde d its view that the

1 9



## g overnme nt “ha[d] failed to prove the mate rial alleg ations bey ond a re asonable doubt,” and that
the def endant should be f

ound not guilty

. Be cause the trial cour t evaluate d the g overnme nt’s 2 0


## evidenc e and de termined that it was leg ally insufficient to sustain a c onviction, double jeopar dy
barr ed appe al of the a cquittal. 2 1



## I n another

example, this court held in State v. More no that an orde r g ranting the defendant’s motion for dire cted ve rdict and dismissing the c ase w as an a cquittal. A key witness for 2 2


## the State in Moreno failed to a ppear on time for the tria l. The State conc eded tha t it had no additional witnesses, but ref used to rest its case and aske d for more time since the ke y witness literally had just arr ived at the c ourthouse. The court re fused to allow more time, and the
defe ndant moved for

a dire cted ve rdict. The c ourt g rante d the motion because the State had not proved a ll of the eleme nts of the offe nse. Despite our opinion that the tria l court’s e x clusion of 2 3

M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 7

. S e e S m i t h v

. M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 5 4 3 U

. S

. 4 6 2 , 4 6 8 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; S t a t e v

. S t a n l e y , 18 2 0 1 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 4 , 7 6 0 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 6 )

.

4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 7 2

. 19

I d

. 20

I d

. 21

2 9 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 6 0 0

. 22

I d

. , a t 5 9 6

- 9 7

. 23

## Bla cksher e - 11

the witness was “ unacc eptable a nd inexcusable,” we nonetheless r ecog nized that the trial court
had rule d expli citly

that the State’s evide nce ha d not met the require d elements, a nd appea l from
such an a cquittal was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy

Clause. 2 4



## I n contra st is the Supreme Court’s dec ision in United States v. Sc ott that an appe al from a
dismiss al was not jeopa

rdy barr ed. During his trial, Scott moved to dis miss counts of the

2 5 

## indictment ag ainst him on the gr ounds that his defense had bee n prejudice d by preindictment delay

. The trial c ourt g rante d Scott’s motion at the close of all the e vidence . The Supreme Court

2 6 

## held that, while the tria l court’s ruling may have be en base d on fac ts outside the indictment, the ruling was not base d on a conc lusion that the gove rnment had not produc ed suff icient evidenc e to establish g uilt. The Court there fore held that Scott suffer ed no injury cog nizable under the 2 7 

## Double Jeopardy

Clause when the g overnme nt appea led the dismissal. 2 8


## Simi larly , in State v. Stanley , this court held that an or der dismissing a prosec ution, on the

g rounds that it proce eded unde r an unc onstitut ional ordinanc e, could be appea led by the State. 2 9

I d

. , a t 6 0 0 ; s e e a l s o S m i t h , 5 4 3 U

. S

. , a t 4 6 9 ( f i n d i n g a c q u i t t a l w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t e v a l u a t e d t h e 24 C o m m o n w e a l t h ’ s e v i d e n c e a n d d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t w a s l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n ) ; S m a l i s v

. P e n n s y l v a n i a , 4 7 6 U

. S

. 1 4 0 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ( f i n d i n g a c q u i t t a l w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d a d e m u r r e r a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ’ s c a s e a n d d i s m i s s e d t h e c h a r g e s o n g r o u n d s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n ) ; H u d s o n v

. L o u i s i a n a , 4 5 0 U

. S

. 4 0 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( f i n d i n g a s u c c e s s i v e p r o s e c u t i o n v i o l a t e d d o u b l e j e o p a r d y w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d a m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l b a s e d o n l e g a l i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. S i s s o n , 3 9 9 U

. S

. 2 6 7 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ( f i n d i n g a c q u i t t a l w h e r e a m o t i o n i n a r r e s t o f j u d g m e n t w a s g r a n t e d b a s e d o n i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d a t t r i a l ) ; S t a t e v

. S a v a g e , 9 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 7 , 4 9 9 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( f i n d i n g a c q u i t t a l
w h e r e a m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l w a s g r a n t e d b a s e d o n i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e )

.
4 3 7 U

. S

. 8 2 ( 1 9 7 8 )

. 25

I d

. , a t 8 4

. 26

I d

. , a t 9 5

. 27

I d

. , a t 9 9

. 28

2 0 1 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 4 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 6 )

. 29

## Bla cksher e - 12

The a ppellees in Stanley wer e tried f or violation of a c ity

ordinanc e prohibiting demonstrations in school zones. The appe llees filed a motion to di smiss before the trial on g rounds that the
ordinanc e wa s unconstitutional, but t he trial c ourt dec ided to “ca rry the motion along until [it ]
hear [d] the trial on the mer its.” After the evidenc e wa s closed and the case was submitted to the 3 0


## trial court a s fac t-finder , the cour t gr anted the a

ppellees’ motion to di smiss. W e said that the tria l
court’s c onsideration of the g uilt or innocence of the a ppellees “ was c ontinge nt upon [ the trial judge ’s] first ruling upon the c onstitut ional validity of the ordina

nce. I n essenc e, having ruled in the appe llees’ f

avor on tha t issue, he neve r re ache d the conting ent issue of their g uilt or innocenc e.” Be cause the trial cour t’s order did not purport to resolve a ny of the fa ctual ele ments of 3 1


## the offe nse, we did not construe the tria l court’s orde r as a n acquittal, and the re w as no doublejeopar dy impediment to the State’s appea l. 3 2



## Her e, ther e is littl e doubt that the trial c ourt did not intend to acquit the appe llee, in such

terms. I n fac t, the parties a nd the trial cour

t expl icitly

discussed avoiding the term “ direc ted
verdic t of ac quittal” in order to pr eser ve the State’ s ability

to appea l. But the intent and f orm of
the trial cour

t’s actions ca

nnot trump the substance of the protec tions afforde d by the Double

J eopar dy Clause. Whatever

label we may

aff ix to its actions, the trial court ultimately terminated the prosec ution based on its finding tha t the State’s re maining e vidence was leg ally insufficient to convict the appe llee. Not only did the trial court’ s oral ruling imply that it had made suc h a finding , but its written order a nd conclusions of law wer e quite explicit: “[ T]he Court found bad

I d

. , a t 7 5 6

. 30

I d

. , a t 7 5 9

. 31

I d

. , a t 7 5 9

- 6 0

. 32

## Bla cksher e - 13

faith and dismissed the cha rg es ag ainst the defe ndant and discha rg ed the jury

beca use the State
had other wise insufficie nt evidence to sustain a conviction in light of the suppression being

g rante d and the f

indings of this cour

t.” And the tria l court’s c onclusions of law stated, “ The
Court concluded tha t there w as insufficie nt evidence rema ining a s a matter of law to sustain a
conviction af

ter the State’ s evidenc e wa s suppressed a nd acc ording ly , a mistrial was de clar ed, the

case ag ainst the defe ndant was dismissed and the jur y was discha

rg ed.” This finding, in the w ords of the Supre me Court, “ac tually repr esents a r esolution, corre ct or not, of some or a ll of the fac tual elements of the offe nse cha rg ed.” The trial c ourt expli citly

3 3


## decide d that the State’s re maining e vidence was leg ally insufficient to convic t the appellee of the
offe nse and, on tha t basis, terminated the pr osecution. Ther efor e, the tria l court’s a ctions were functionally

an ac quittal for purposes of double jeopar dy

. Whether there was a n underly ing 3 4



## err or in suppressing evidenc e is irre levant; such a n underly ing e rror cannot be revie wed a fter a n acquittal for

insufficient e vidence

. 3 5


## We theref ore r ever se the de cision of the Court of Appe als and re mand this case to that
court for further proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

Deliver ed June 22, 2011. Publis h.

M a r t i n L i n e n , 4 3 0 U

. S

. , a t 5 7 1

.

33

S e e , e

. g

. , S m a l i s , 4 7 6 U

. S

. , a t 1 4 4 ( “ [ A ] r u l i n g t h a t a s a m a t t e r o f l a w t h e S t a t e ’ s e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t 34 t o e s t a b l i s h h i s f

a c t u a l g u i l t

... i s a n a c q u i t t a l u n d e r t h e D o u b l e J e o p a r d y C l a u s e
. ” )

.
S a n a b r i a , 4 3 7 U

. S

. , a t 6 8

- 6 9

. 35