In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-20-00031-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 3

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR-2018-07419-C

Before Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.; and Lee Ann Dauphinot (Senior Justice, Retired, 

Sitting by Assignment)

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Dauphinot

MADISON CHANDLER SCHROEDER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon her open plea of guilty during trial, the trial court convicted Appellant 

Madison Chandler Schroeder of driving while intoxicated and assessed her 

punishment at six-months’ confinement and a $500 fine. Imposition of the 

confinement portion of the sentence was probated for twelve months. Appellant 

brings three issues on appeal, arguing

1. The trial court erred when it refused to suppress the stop and seizure of 

Appellant because the traffic stop was improper;

2. The trial court erred in determining that the detaining officer was 

unavailable during trial; and

3. The trial court erred in not suppressing the testimony given during trial 

about the DWI investigation that occurred after the original stop for failure to follow 

a traffic-control device because no evidence supported conducting a DWI 

investigation.

Because the trial court committed no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Brief Facts

At a little after midnight, Officer Urbano Rodriguez saw a black Jeep Wrangler 

pass a “no through traffic” sign at the edge of a two-block-long construction zone. 

Officer Rodriguez followed the Jeep through the construction zone and pulled it over 

after it had driven through the zone without stopping at one of the houses within the 
3

zone. He explained to the driver the reason he had pulled her over. As he spoke with 

her, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and otherwise suspected that she might be 

intoxicated. He asked her to get out of the Jeep and then spoke with her. She 

became very emotional and exhibited what Officer Rodriguez considered indications 

of intoxication. 

Officers Rachel Valarezo and Blake Jackson were called to the scene. Officer 

Valarezo had Appellant perform various field sobriety tests. She concluded that 

Appellant was intoxicated and placed her under arrest. Appellant refused a blood test. 

Officer Jackson found an empty wine bottle in the front seat of Appellant’s car and 

two empty wine bottles in the backseat. All three were cold to the touch. Appellant’s 

blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant. Her blood alcohol content was .14. 

Denial of Appellant’s Pre-trial Motion to Suppress

In her first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it 

refused to suppress the evidence obtained after the stop and seizure of Appellant for 

the traffic offense of disregarding a traffic-control device. She contends that Officer 

Rodriguez had no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense had or was about to 

occur because he had no information whether Appellant was a resident of the portion 

of the street within the no-through-traffic prohibition. She argues that residents of 

this construction area were not subject to the prohibition against through traffic and 

were free to use the street for through traffic. 
4

At the suppression hearing, Officer Rodriguez testified he saw a black Jeep 

Wrangler pass a “No Through Traffic” sign on West Hickory Street in Denton. The 

sign protected a two-block-long construction zone. Only residents of the area who 

were going to their homes were allowed beyond the sign. He followed the Jeep

through the zone and stopped it after it had driven through the zone. Officer 

Rodriguez identified Appellant as the driver of the Jeep. The trial court admitted 

Officer Rodriguez’s dash camera’s and body camera’s recorded video footage of the 

stop into evidence and watched it before ruling on the motion to suppress. The trial 

court denied Appellant’s motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The court found Officer Rodriguez had “both reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause” to detain Appellant for a violation of Section 544.004 of the Transportation 

Code. 

As Appellant correctly states, “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence and its determination of the reasonableness of either a temporary 

investigative detention or an arrest, appellate courts use a bifurcated standard of 

review.”

1 An appellate court must give almost total deference to the trial court’s 

determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial 

court’s findings of fact are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.2 We 

1Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

2

Id. (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
5

must also defer to a trial court’s ruling on application of law to fact questions or 

mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor. But appellate courts review mixed questions 

of law and fact that do not depend upon credibility and demeanor by a de novo

standard.3 

Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that Officer Rodriguez 

had no reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed a traffic offense when he 

stopped her because he had no prior knowledge of whether Appellant was a resident 

of the street controlled by the No Through Traffic sign. On appeal, she argues that 

because Officer Rodriguez did not determine whether Appellant was a resident of the 

street controlled by the sign, his stop of Appellant was based on “a mere hunch or 

suspicion that she was not a resident of the street.” Appellant argues that the sign did 

not prohibit a resident’s using the street as a through street.

As we understand Appellant’s argument, because the sign provided, “No Thru 

Traffic, Residents Only,” it created a private road for residents of the blocked-off 

portion of the public road. That is, she argues that it provides unrestricted use of the 

blocked-off portion of the road to all residents and does not limit their use of the 

road to that necessary to reach their homes. Otherwise, she argues, the sign would 

say only, “No Thru Traffic.” There would be no need to include the phrase, 

3

Id.
6

“Residents Only.” That is, the sign appears to instruct drivers that through traffic is 

prohibited except to residents, who may use the road for through traffic. We find no 

case discussing this concept, and neither Appellant nor the State directs us to such a 

case. We, therefore, treat this as a case of first impression.

Appellant is correct in stating that the sign would be clearer if it provided only 

“No Thru Traffic.” The addition of “Residents Only” confuses matters. Nor would 

it be reasonable to expect a sign to cover every possible exception to the prohibition 

of general traffic on the road. But the essence of the traffic control is to prohibit 

through traffic. Officer Rodriguez did not detain Appellant within the restricted area

but waited until she had cleared the restricted area. That is, she had clearly violated 

the “No Thru Traffic” provision of the sign. A common-sense reading of the sign 

suggests that, since only through traffic was prohibited, residents traveling on the road 

to reach their homes were not in violation of the through traffic prohibition. We do 

not agree with Appellant’s attempted interpretation of the sign as creating a private 

road for residents. But even if she were correct, in the absence of some indication on 

the vehicle that it belonged to a resident, the fact that the person is a resident is more 

properly a defense to violating the prohibition of through traffic.4 

4See Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“[A] 

defense would matter only if the facts establishing it were so obvious that an objective 

officer viewing the situation would be unreasonable in failing to realize that the 

person’s conduct was allowed by law.”).
7

We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in holding that Officer 

Rodriguez’s detention of Appellant was properly based on, at a minimum, reasonable 

suspicion that she had violated a traffic law. “A police officer has reasonable 

suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational 

inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person 

detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.”

5

 A police officer 

has the authority to stop and temporarily detain a driver who has violated a traffic 

law.6

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion of law and hold, “Officer Rodriguez 

[had] both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop the Defendant for a

traffic violation pursuant to Texas Transportation Code Section 544.004.”

Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s first issue on appeal.

Propriety of Determining Officer Rodriguez Was Unavailable and Allowing 

His Prior Testimony to Be Read into the Record before the Jury, and Propriety 

of Admission of DWI Investigation Evidence

In her second issue on appeal, Appellant argues the trial court reversibly erred 

in holding Officer Rodriguez was unavailable to testify during her trial and in allowing 

his testimony from the pre-trial motion to suppress hearing to be presented to the 

jury. She contends in her third issue that because the parts of his testimony read to 

5Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

6Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2004, pet. 

ref’d).
8

the jury did not establish reasonable suspicion for Officer Valarezo’s continued 

detention, the trial judge should have granted her trial objection to suppress the 

evidence of Officer Valarezo’s continued detention and investigation.

Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress “any and all evidence seized or 

obtained as a result of the government’s acts.” Before trial, the court heard and 

denied the motion. On July 22, 2019, at the pre-trial hearing on the motion, Officer 

Rodriguez testified to the original detention. The video recordings of the detention 

were admitted into evidence and watched by the trial judge. We also have closely 

watched these video recordings. One shows Officer Rodriguez speaking to Appellant 

through a lowered window, returning to his car, and then commenting to another

officer, “It just reeks in there . . . .” Later, Appellant admitted that she might have 

had a shot. 

During the pre-trial hearing, the State attempted to ask Officer Rodriguez 

questions about evidence of intoxication he might have observed. Appellant objected 

that such inquiry was beyond the scope of the hearing on the propriety of the original 

stop. That is, Appellant orally informed the trial court that her motion to suppress 

was limited to the propriety of the original stop of her Jeep. The trial court sustained 

the objection and limited the testimony to the grounds for Officer Rodriguez’s traffic 

stop of Appellant. 

In October––after he had testified at the pretrial hearing in July, but before the 

trial the following January––Officer Rodriguez was shot in the leg and in the head 
9

during an unrelated traffic stop. At trial, the State offered the transcription of Officer 

Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony regarding the traffic stop. Appellant objected that the 

testimony was hearsay and that she was being denied the right to cross-examination. 

She argues on appeal that Officer Rodriguez’s testimony does not satisfy the 

requirements of Rule 804 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which provides in pertinent 

part:

(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be 

unavailable as a witness if the declarant:

. . . . 

(4) cannot be present or testify at trial or hearing because of death or

a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness . . . .

(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule 

against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:

. . . . 

(B) when offered in a criminal case:

(i) was given as a witness at a trial or hearing of the current or 

different proceeding; and

(ii) is now offered against a party who had an opportunity and 

similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect 

examination . . . .

7

7Tex. R. Evid. 804(a)(4), (b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
10

Appellant also challenges the testimony under Crawford v. Washington, which 

provides that “the Sixth Amendment demands what common law required: 

unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”

8 She points out that 

this opportunity must be a complete and adequate opportunity to cross examine the 

witness regarding that witness’s testimony as explained by the United States Supreme 

Court in Pointer v. Texas.

9 She argues that the evidence of Officer Rodriguez’s

unavailability is insufficient and that she was not given a full, complete, and adequate 

opportunity to cross-examine Officer Rodriguez. 

We must again note that, in the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress, the 

State attempted to introduce evidence of Appellant’s suspected intoxication. 

Appellant objected that any evidence of intoxication or other criminal misconduct was 

beyond the scope of the hearing, which was limited to the sufficiency of the grounds 

for the original detention. The trial court correctly sustained Appellant’s objections to 

the State’s attempts to ask questions beyond the limited scope of the hearing.

On appeal, both Appellant and the State appear to suggest the trial court erred 

in limiting the hearing on the motion to suppress to the announced scope of the 

hearing: the traffic stop. Appellant argues that the trial court’s sustaining her 

objections to questions beyond the limited scope of the hearing denied her the right 

8541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).

9380 U.S. 400, 407, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1069–70 (1965).
11

to fully question Officer Rodriguez. The State argues the trial court’s sustaining 

Appellant’s trial objections to the questions that exceeded the scope of the hearing on 

the motion to suppress was error, but it was invited error. 

Specifically, relying on Vennus v. State,

10 the State contends on appeal,

Since Schroeder invited error by making meritless objections that 

prevented the State from showing why her traffic stop became a DWI 

investigation, she may not make this complaint on appeal.

Schroeder cannot repeatedly prevent the State from admitting 

evidence to show why her traffic stop became a DWI investigation and 

then complain on appeal that the State failed to prove a constitutional 

basis for its DWI investigation. The invited error doctrine stands in her 

way. 

The law is well established that a search cannot be justified by what it 

uncovers.11 Nor is a trial court required to allow every motion hearing to become a 

general fishing expedition or a practice trial of the entire case. The record reflects that 

the pre-trial hearing was understood by the State, Appellant, and the trial court to be

limited to a determination of the propriety of the initial stop of Appellant. The issue 

before the trial court was Appellant’s contention that the traffic-control sign limited 

only non-resident motorists’ ability to travel freely through the construction area

governed by the traffic-control sign. The record is also clear that Appellant was not 

challenging evidence of intoxication in the pre-trial hearing. The trial court, 

10282 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

11State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Brown v. State, 

481 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
12

consequently, did not allow the State to offer evidence of grounds for the intoxication 

investigation during the pre-trial hearing. No one could have anticipated Officer 

Rodriguez’s injuries that prevented his testifying on that issue at trial.

The fact that at trial, Officer Rodriguez was seriously injured and still required 

in-patient rehabilitation treatment in an out-of-state facility was uncontested. Officer 

Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony that was read into evidence before the jury at trial was 

limited to his testimony regarding the grounds for the stop of the Jeep and his 

detention of Appellant. Officer Rodriguez’s interaction with Appellant was before 

the court in the pre-trial hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress, and Appellant 

had the opportunity for full cross-examination of the officer at that time. The video 

and audio recording of the stop and the interaction between Appellant and Officer 

Rodriguez was offered, admitted, and viewed during the pre-trial hearing. 

At trial, Appellant contended for the first time that the original detention was 

unduly extended beyond the purpose of the stop. She contends she was denied the 

opportunity to question Officer Rodriguez about the length and the purpose of the 

detention after the original stop. But all of Officer Rodriguez’s actions, the arrival of 

the other two officers, and the conduct of Appellant are all captured on the video 

recordings that are part of the record and that have been viewed by the trial court, the 

attorneys, and this court. The recordings clearly show the length of time Appellant 

was detained both before and after evidence of her intoxication arose, why Officer 

Rodriguez thought Appellant was driving while intoxicated and his communication of 
13

that reason to Officer Valarezo, and the length of time between Appellant’s original 

detention and when Officer Valarezo performed the field sobriety tests. 

At trial, the evidence of intoxication was offered through the testimony of 

Officer Rachel Valarezo, who performed the field sobriety tests. She was present at 

trial and available for cross-examination. The recordings of her interaction with 

Appellant were admitted into evidence before the jury and were played for the jury,

with portions muted by agreement between Appellant and the State. 

The trial court properly overruled Appellant’s trial objections to the admission 

of Officer Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony regarding the original detention of 

Appellant. That testimony was limited to the grounds for the traffic stop of 

Appellant. Because the evidence showed that Officer Rodriguez was unavailable,

because the testimony of Officer Rodriguez admitted at trial was limited to his

testimony offered in opposition to Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the 

original detention, and because Appellant had full opportunity to confront and crossexamine Officer Rodriguez regarding that testimony and full opportunity to challenge 

the admission of that testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing, we hold that the 

trial court committed no error in allowing Officer Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony to 

be read into evidence before the jury.

Additionally, because the record shows the reason for and length of Appellant’s 

continued detention of Appellant, the trial court did not commit error by overruling 

Appellant’s trial objections to admission of the DWI evidence.
14

We overrule Appellant’s second and third issues on appeal.

Conclusion

Because we have overruled Appellant’s three issues on appeal, we affirm 

Appellant’s conviction.

/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot

Lee Ann Dauphinot

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 12, 2022