Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1701-CR-8 | June 23, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Jeffrey Schlesinger

Appellate Division 

Office of the Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard Olufeni Ani-Obot,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

June 23, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A05-1701-CR-8

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Clarence D. 

Murray, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

45G02-1501-F6-4

45G02-1603-F6-41

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1701-CR-8 | June 23, 2017 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] On February 22, 2016, Appellant-Defendant Richard Olufeni Ani-Obot

knowingly or intentionally spat in an officer’s face while the officer attempted 

to take him into custody. On March 1, 2016, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of 

Indiana charged Ani-Obot with battery by bodily waste, a Level 6 felony; public 

intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class B 

misdemeanor; resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; and 

intimidation, a Level 6 felony. At the time of the offense, Ani-Obot was 

already participating in a pre-trial diversion program for multiple theft, fraud, 

and counterfeiting charges.

[2] On October 28, 2016, the parties filed a stipulated plea agreement disposing of 

all pending charges. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Ani-Obot agreed 

to plead guilty to battery by bodily waste, a Level 6 felony, in exchange for the 

dismissal of all other pending charges. The parties also agreed there would be a 

maximum cap of two years of incarceration. The trial court held a sentencing 

hearing on December 2, 2016. Following the submission of evidence, the trial 

court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances and sentenced Ani-Obot to two years of incarceration. 

[3] On appeal, Ani-Obot raises the following restated issues: whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in its findings regarding the mitigating and aggravating 

circumstances and whether the sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and Ani-Obot’s character. Because the trial court did not abuse 
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its discretion when it weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 

Ani-Obot’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

Ani-Obot’s character, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[4] On January 2, 2015, the State charged Ani-Obot in Cause No. 45G02-1501-F6-

4 (“Cause No. F6-4”) with: Count 1, Level 6 Felony fraud; Count II, Level 6 

Felony attempted fraud; Count III, Level 6 Felony attempted fraud; Count IV, 

Level 6 Felony counterfeiting; Count V, Level 6 Felony forgery; Count VI, 

Level 6 Felony theft; and Count VII, Class A Misdemeanor attempted theft. 

Several days later, on January 8, 2016, the parties agreed to a stipulated pretrial 

diversion program for Ani-Obot. The trial court approved the agreement on 

January 13, 2016. 

[5] On February 22, 2016, Officer Ridgway of the Merrillville Police Department 

was dispatched to an address in Lake County, Indiana to help a female. When 

Officer Ridgway arrived at the scene, he approached Ani-Obot. Ani-Obot, 

however, ran away from the officer. During the ensuing chase, Ani-Obot threw 

the female’s telephone into a pond. Soon after, Officer Ridgway was able to 

catch Ani-Obot. However, Ani-Obot knowingly or intentionally spat in Officer 

Ridgway’s face while Officer Ridgway tried to take Ani-Obot into custody. 

[6] On March 1, 2016, the State charged Ani-Obot in Cause No. 45G02-1603-F6-

41 (“Cause No. F6-41”) with: Count 1, Level 6 Felony intimidation; Count II, 
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Level 6 Felony battery by bodily waste; Count III, Class A Misdemeanor 

criminal mischief; Count IV, Class A Misdemeanor intimidation; and Count V, 

Class B Misdemeanor disorderly conduct. 

[7] On October 28, 2016, the parties entered into a plea agreement covering both 

Cause No. F6-4 and Cause No. F6-41. Ani-Obot pled guilty pursuant to the 

plea agreement to Level 6 Felony battery by bodily waste in Cause No. F6-41. 

On December 1, 2016, the trial court accepted the plea agreement. Prior to 

sentencing, the trial court found that Ani-Obot’s lengthy history of arrests and 

multiple drug related convictions to be aggravators. As for mitigators, the trial 

court found that Ani-Obot was likely to respond affirmatively to short term 

incarceration and that Ani-Obot admitted his guilt. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced Ani-Obot to two years of incarceration and the State 

dismissed the other charges in both causes. 

Discussion and Decision 

1. Abuse of Discretion

[8] Ani-Obot challenges his sentence on appeal, claiming that the trial court abused 

its discretion in sentencing him to two years of incarceration as opposed to only 

one year. We begin by noting that sentencing decisions rest within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of 

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other 

grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 
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before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Id. 

One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing 

to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include 

entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and 

mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the 

reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under those 

circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the appropriate 

remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court 

would have imposed the same sentence had it properly 

considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.

Id. at 490-91. In claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him, Ani-Obot argues that the trial court improperly balanced the aggravating 

and mitigating circumstances. This is a request for us to reweigh the 

aggravators and mitigators which we will not do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 

491. Moreover, based upon a review of the record, there was ample evidence to 

support the trial court’s findings. 

[9] Ani-Obot points to his employment history as a mitigator. However, other than 

what Ani-Obot told the probation officer, there is no evidence supporting his 

claims of employment nor is there information regarding his performance. 

Nevertheless, the fact that Ani-Obot has been regularly employed is not 

necessarily a significant mitigating factor. See Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 

301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“Many people are gainfully employed such that this 
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would not require the trial court to note it as a mitigating factor[.]”), trans. 

denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to find that 

Ani-Obot’s employment history was a significant mitigating circumstance. 

[10] Ani-Obot also argues that the trial court should have considered the fact that he 

has dependents and provides for them. However, according to the evidence, 

Ani-Obot admitted that he is not court-ordered to pay child support for his 

children. Ani-Obot has failed to produce any evidence that his incarceration 

would result in an undue hardship on his dependents. Moreover, even if there 

was evidence of undue hardship, a trial court is not required to consider it to be 

a mitigating circumstance. Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d 695, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011). “Many persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children 

and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that 

imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 

1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

failed to find this as a mitigating circumstance. 

[11] The trial court found two mitigating circumstances — that Ani-Obot would 

likely respond affirmatively to short term incarceration and he admitted his 

guilt by taking a plea deal. The collective weight of these mitigating factors 

does not outweigh the nature of the offense or the character of the offender. 

Moreover, the trial court imposed a sentence that was only one year above the 

advisory sentence. Given the aggravators mentioned above, such sentence was 

not an abuse of discretion. 
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2. Appropriateness of Sentence

[12] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), “[t]he Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” When reviewing such claims, we 

“concentrate less on comparing the facts of the [case at issue] to others, whether 

real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity 

of the offense for which the defendant is being sentence, and what it reveals 

about the defendant’s character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Ani-Obot, as the defendant, 

bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. 

State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[13] With respect to the nature of the offense, Ani-Obot admitted in his plea 

agreement that he fled from a police officer and when arrested spit in the 

officer’s face. While not a particularly egregious example of this crime, the 

record shows that Ani-Obot committed this offense while he was participating 

in a pre-trial diversion program for committing several fraudulent credit card 

transactions. In light of this, the nature of the offense is more deplorable that it 

would have been under different circumstances. 

[14] As for his character, Ani-Obot has an extensive history of arrests and contacts 

with the criminal justice system including, approximately thirty different 

charges resulting in multiple convictions. While a record of arrest may not be 
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properly considered as evidence of criminal history, “[s]uch information may be 

relevant to the trial court’s assessment of the defendant’s character in terms of 

the risk that he will commit another crime.” Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 

(Ind. 2005). Consequently, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider 

both Ani-Obot’s previous convictions and his history of arrests as circumstances 

touching on his character. Based upon the above-mentioned evidence of AniObot’s character and nature of his offense, he has failed to establish that his 

sentence was inappropriate. 

Conclusion

[15] After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors. We also 

conclude that Ani-Obot failed to establish that his sentence is inappropriate in 

light of his character and the nature of his offense. Consequently, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.