In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAPHAEL CAMPUZANO-BENITEZ AND

URIEL SORIA-OCAMPO,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 15-CR-367-4 & 15-CR-367-3 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED DECEMBER 13, 2018

____________________

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellants Raphael Campuzano-Benitez and Uriel Soria-Ocampo pleaded guilty for their 

roles as middlemen in a cocaine deal. The formal charge was 

a conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Both men appeal their sentences. 

They argue that the district court erred on two sentencing 

guideline issues: the amount of cocaine the court attributed to 
2 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

them and their relative roles in the conspiracy. They also argue that the district court erred by allowing a witness to consult with his attorney during his testimony in the appellants’ 

joint evidentiary hearing for their sentencing. We affirm. The 

district court did not commit clear error in its findings on the 

amount of cocaine and roles in the offense, and the court did 

not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to confer with 

his attorney. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

Raphael Campuzano-Benitez and Uriel Soria-Ocampo initiated and organized the drug deal that led to their arrests 

and convictions. The two men had known each other before 

these events, and they played similar roles in the nine-person 

conspiracy. Soria-Ocampo knew two brothers who were trying to sell multiple kilograms of cocaine. Campuzano-Benitez 

knew a man named Cesar Perdomo who was looking to arrange a drug transaction for his four potential buyers.

In the days leading up to their arrests, the two appellants 

and Perdomo worked with their respective contacts to arrange the deal. Three of the four potential buyers, however, 

were cooperating with law enforcement, and they recorded 

many of their telephone and in-person conversations with 

Perdomo. On June 15, 2015, Perdomo told one of the cooperating buyers that the “little cars that were just painted the 

other day are ready now.”1 In that conversation, the cooperating buyer told Perdomo that he would take “the five,” 

meaning five kilograms of cocaine. Over the next few days,

 1 In the July 18, 2017 evidentiary hearing, Perdomo explained that the 

conspirators used “cars” as a codeword for kilograms of cocaine because 

Perdomo worked at an auto body shop.
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 3

Perdomo negotiated the final quantity of cocaine and confirmed the details of the transaction with the cooperating witnesses. Perdomo was the only conspirator who communicated directly with the potential buyers. Appellants in turn 

passed along information between Perdomo and the sellers. 

Perdomo never spoke to Soria-Ocampo or to the sellers directly. He communicated to the sellers’ side exclusively 

through Campuzano-Benitez, who in turn communicated 

only with Soria-Ocampo.

On the evening of June 17, 2015, though, the conspirators 

came together. The appellants met Perdomo, one of the 

sellers, and three of the buyers (two of whom were cooperating) before traveling to the sellers’ apartment together to complete the transaction. When they arrived, appellants and the 

others entered the sellers’ apartment with one of the cooperating witnesses. One kilogram of cocaine had been placed on 

a bed for the buyers to inspect. Law enforcement arrived before the transaction was complete and arrested everyone present. The officers saw and seized the single kilogram of cocaine on the bed. They later returned to find five additional 

kilograms of cocaine and four kilograms of heroin hidden in 

a closet.2

 

2 The government initially believed all ten kilograms found at the 

sellers’ apartment were cocaine, but testing confirmed that four were actually heroin. The government contends that the two sellers mistakenly 

believed all ten kilograms were cocaine, and both sellers accepted responsibility for ten kilograms of cocaine even after the heroin was discovered. 

Appellants contend the government’s position is “absurd” because the cocaine and heroin were wrapped in different ways and hidden in different 

sections of the closet. They further contend that the sellers would have 

received a higher sentence for possessing heroin, so their plea to ten kilograms of cocaine should be discredited as too self-serving. Because the 
4 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

Appellants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

In their plea declarations, Campuzano-Benitez and SoriaOcampo both accepted responsibility for one kilogram of cocaine. Despite the appellants’ similar roles in the conspiracy 

and similar criminal histories, their presentence investigation 

reports proposed inconsistent sentencing guideline calculations. In Soria-Ocampo’s report, the probation officer attributed only one kilogram of cocaine to Soria-Ocampo and 

recommended a base offense level of 24. Campuzano-Benitez’s probation officer found that he was responsible for ten 

kilograms of cocaine and recommended a base offense level 

of 30. Neither officer recommended a downward adjustment 

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, which allows for a two- to four-level 

reduction if a defendant played a minor or minimal role in the 

group’s crimes.

By the time the appellants entered their guilty pleas, all 

but one of their co-conspirators had pleaded guilty and been 

sentenced. The district judge decided to hold a joint evidentiary hearing for the appellants to address the disputed factual issues about quantity of cocaine and roles in the offense. 

Perdomo had chosen to cooperate with law enforcement, and 

he testified at the hearing as part of his plea deal. Perdomo 

testified about the events leading up to the June 17, 2015 transaction and arrests. He claimed that Campuzano-Benitez was 

aware of his attempts to negotiate the sale of more than one 

kilogram of cocaine. During cross-examination, Perdomo 

 

base offense level for appellants is the same regardless of whether the 

transaction was for five or ten kilograms of cocaine, we do not resolve the 

dispute. See U.S.S.G.§ 2D1.1(c)(5).
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 5

asserted he “was positive that we were going to sell five kilos 

of cocaine.”

After the government concluded Perdomo’s direct examination but before cross-examination began, Campuzano-Benitez’s attorney asked for a short break to speak with her client. During this break, Perdomo asked if he could also speak 

with his attorney. The judge granted Perdomo’s request over 

Soria-Ocampo’s objection. The appellants’ attorneys then 

cross-examined Perdomo, questioning his motives for testifying, his inconsistent statements of the events leading to the 

transaction, and the terms of his plea deal.

The district court later held separate sentencing hearings 

for each appellant. After referring to the presentence investigation reports, the plea declarations, and testimony from the 

evidentiary hearing, the court found that the government had 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that both men 

were responsible for five kilograms of cocaine, determined 

that both had a base offense level of 30, and found that neither 

was eligible for a mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2. The court sentenced both men to 69 months in prison 

followed by three years of supervised release.

Both Soria-Ocampo and Campuzano-Benitez argue that 

the district court erred by (a) finding them accountable for five 

kilograms of cocaine instead of one, (b) denying them a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and (c) allowing 

Perdomo to consult with his attorney between direct and 

cross-examination during the evidentiary hearing.
6 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

II. Analysis 

A. Attributable Drug Quantity

By finding that both appellants were responsible for arranging the sale of five kilograms of cocaine instead of one, 

the district court increased their sentencing guideline ranges 

from 37–46 months in prison to 70–87 months (after a downward adjustment of three levels for accepting responsibility).

See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(8), (5). Appellants argue that the district court erred in attributing five kilograms to them because 

they both accepted responsibility for only one kilogram in 

their plea agreements, Soria-Ocampo’s presentence investigation report concluded he was unaware of any negotiations for 

a larger sale, and no reliable evidence supported a larger 

quantity.

We review the district court’s sentencing guideline finding 

of the attributable drug quantity under § 2D1.1 for clear error. 

United States v. Austin, 806 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 2015). When 

reviewing for clear error, “we will reverse only if after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the firm and definite 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. 

Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting United States 

v. Marty, 450 F.3d 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court did 

not commit clear error when it determined that Soria-Ocampo 

and Campuzano-Benitez were both responsible for five kilograms of cocaine. 

In calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing 

Guidelines for a drug crime, “the government must prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant.” Austin, 806 F.3d at 430. A defendant can be held responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable 
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 7

acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” including drug quantities. Id. at 

430–31, quoting United States v. Soto-Piedra, 525 F.3d 527, 531 

(7th Cir. 2008). To determine the foreseeable amount of drugs 

involved in a conspiracy, the district court must conduct a 

three-part analysis. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3; Soto-Piedra, 525 

F.3d at 531–32. First, the court must determine the scope of 

the criminal activity the co-conspirators agreed to undertake. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(B)(i). The scope of the criminal activity can 

include “the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement,” and when determining the scope, “the court may consider any explicit agreement 

or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the 

defendant and others.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 3(B).

Next, the court must consider whether the conduct of the 

co-conspirators was both in furtherance of the agreed criminal 

activity and was reasonably foreseeable to the particular defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(B)(ii), (iii); United States v. Hollins, 

498 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasonable foreseeability “refers to the scope of the agreement that [a defendant] entered 

into when he joined the conspiracy, not merely the drugs he 

may have known about,” and government need not prove 

“that the defendant is involved in or even [had] direct 

knowledge of a particular transaction”), quoting United States 

v. Flores, 5 F.3d 1070, 1083 (7th Cir. 1993). When making these 

determinations, the district court may rely on whatever evidence has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 665 (7th 

Cir. 2010). 

The district court properly identified and applied this 

analysis to determine the quantity of cocaine attributable to 
8 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

the appellants. First, in a written opinion explaining its drugquantity finding, the district court determined the “specific 

conduct and conspiratorial objectives embraced by both [appellants] consisted of serving as brokers for a single wholesale 

cocaine transaction between mid-level suppliers . . . and representatives . . . of purported wholesale buyers within the 

greater Chicago area.” United States v. Soria-Ocampo, 2018 WL 

527926, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018). The court reached this 

conclusion because it was undisputed that the conspiracy involved a relatively small group over a short period of time.

The court found that the transaction was not limited to a single kilogram of cocaine because, when the appellants “agreed 

to join this endeavor, the parties had not yet decided upon an 

exact amount of drugs for the deal,” and there was “no convincing evidence in the record that somehow the scope of the 

jointly undertaken criminal activity was ever restricted to no 

more than one kilogram.” Id. 

Next, the district court did not err in determining that the 

attempted sale of five kilograms of cocaine was in furtherance 

of the appellants’ joint criminal activity. Appellants did not 

dispute their roles as brokers of the transaction, so the court 

reasonably found that this attempted sale “constituted the desired result of the joint criminal activity at issue.” Id. at *3.

Finally, the district court did not clearly err in concluding 

the agreement for five kilograms was reasonably foreseeable 

to the defendants. The court found that a deal for five kilograms of cocaine was “the natural and intended consequence 

of their actions.” Id. The evidence before the court included 

recorded conversations between Perdomo and the buyers negotiating a five- to ten-kilogram deal and testimony from Perdomo that the deal was for five kilograms of cocaine. On this 
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 9

evidence, the district court would not have been required to 

find the appellants were responsible for five kilograms, but 

we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the 

court committed a mistake in its analysis. The district court 

reached a reasonable result on the basis of evidentiary conflicts and uncertainties that are common in drug conspiracy 

cases.

Appellants argue that the court erred by relying on Perdomo because he was not a credible witness. They highlight 

inconsistencies in his statements to detectives, his possible 

motives to lie, and the lack of corroborating evidence. Appellants believe it was clear error to give any weight to Perdomo’s testimony regarding the final drug quantity and 

whether he communicated that amount to the appellants because these statements were “unsubstantiated and self-serving.”

We have declined to presume a co-conspirator’s testimony 

is unreliable. We have said many times that “a sentencing 

judge is free to credit testimony that is totally uncorroborated, 

comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, . . . large scale 

drug-dealing, paid government informant, or self-interested 

co-conspirator.” United States v. Isom, 635 F.3d 904, 908 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); Austin, 806 F.3d at 431 (“Determining 

witness credibility is especially within the province of the district court and can virtually never be clear error.”) (also 

cleaned up). We will not second-guess on appeal the district 

court’s evaluation of Perdomo’s testimony.

The district court did not give great weight to Perdomo’s 

testimony anyway. The judge explained that he “didn’t find 

him incredible . . . [or] credible, either. It just didn’t really 

matter as to the uncorroborated portions of his testimony.” In 
10 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

light of Perdomo’s possible motive to cooperate and his inconsistent statements, the judge explained that he “of course, 

considered [the] cooperator testimony with caution and great 

care.” Soria-Ocampo, 2018 WL 527926, at *1 n.1. The judge 

noted that in addition to Perdomo’s testimony, “the record 

here includes numerous recorded undercover conversations, 

the sworn plea colloquies of several coconspirators, the undisputed portions of the PSRs of Ocampo and Benitez, and the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. That was an 

eminently reasonable approach to Perdomo’s testimony.

Appellants also contend that “for there to be reasonable 

foreseeability on the part of a drug co-conspirator, there must 

be both, (1) a long tenure of conspiracy and (2) multiple transactions in the course of the conspiracy.” They argue that 

United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014), and

United States v. Seymour, 519 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2008), require a 

court to consider these additional factors when determining 

foreseeability of drug quantities. Both Gonzalez and Seymour 

used the long-tenure and multiple-transactions factors, however, to “support the finding that the defendant can be held 

accountable for the aggregate amount of drugs attributable to 

all the conspirators.” Gonzalez, 765 F.3d at 739. These cases did 

not create a new requirement that the court should find defendants liable for the actions of their co-conspirators only if 

the scope of the conspiracy involved multiple transactions 

over a long period. The district court did not commit clear error by supposedly failing to consider these factors.

In sum, the district court did not err when it attributed five 

kilograms of cocaine to the appellants and used base offense 

level 30 for both.
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 11

B. Mitigating Role Adjustment

Appellants next argue that the district court erred in denying them a minimal or minor role adjustment because the 

judge did not consider each of the non-exhaustive factors 

listed under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). This issue involves a 

mixed question of law and fact, requiring us to “review a district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de 

novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. 

Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 2016), citing United States 

v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016). When reviewing 

sentencing courts’ decisions on mitigating or aggravating 

roles for clear error, we “will rarely reverse, as the sentencing 

court is in the best position to determine the role that a defendant had in the criminal activity.” United States v. SandovalVelazco, 736 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2013). 

The Guidelines provide for a downward adjustment of 

four offense levels for a person who played a minimal role in 

the joint criminal activity, or two levels if the person was a 

minor participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The appellants remind us 

that playing a necessary role does not definitively prevent that 

same role from also being minor. See Orlando, 819 F.3d at 1025. 

In 2015, the Sentencing Commission added a list of non-exhaustive factors to guide courts in deciding whether a defendant should receive a mitigating role adjustment in an effort to 

allow more frequent use of mitigating role adjustments. 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); see U.S.S.G. App. C. Amend. 794 

(list of non-exhaustive factors added because “mitigating role 

is applied inconsistently and more sparingly than the Commission intended,” and noting that adjustment may be appropriate for drug couriers or “mules,” or others who have no 

“proprietary interest in the criminal activity” but are “simply 
12 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

being paid to perform certain tasks”). The enumerated factors 

are: 

(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity;

(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity;

(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised 

decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority;

(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s 

participation in the commission of the criminal 

activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the 

defendant had in performing those acts;

(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to 

benefit from the criminal activity.

U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). The court should weigh these factors to determine if the defendant seeking the reduction is 

“substantially less culpable than the average participant in the 

criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. 3(A).

The district court did not state explicit findings on each of 

these enumerated factors, but that omission alone was not a 

reversible error. We do not require district courts to treat sentencing factors as a checklist or to spell out their analyses of 

each factor at each sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The district 

court need not address each § 3553(a) factor 
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 13

in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusion for 

each factor; rather, the court must simply give an adequate 

statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for believing 

the sentence it selects is appropriate.”). Nothing in § 3B1.2 or 

its application notes suggests the sentencing judge is required 

to treat these mitigating role factors differently. See also 

United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2018) (“the district court was not obligated to tick off the [§ 3B1.2] factors on 

the record to show that it considered them . . . and we have no 

trouble determining from the sentencing memoranda and the 

transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district court was 

well aware of the factors added by Amendment 794”).

Like the Ninth Circuit in Diaz, we have no trouble determining from this record that the district court was aware of 

the mitigating role factors. Appellants and the government argued this issue thoroughly before the court several times in 

their position papers and during their sentencing hearings. 

With this background, the court explained the facts before it, 

compared the appellants to other co-conspirators (including 

one who was granted a mitigating role adjustment), and 

found appellants were not substantially less culpable than the 

average participant. While a more explicit discussion of the 

factors would assist our analysis, the district court did not err 

by denying appellants mitigating role reductions.3

 3 Appellants ask us to consider remanding as the Ninth Circuit did in 

United States v. Diaz. 884 F.3d 911. In Diaz, the Ninth Circuit remanded the 

case for resentencing because the district court erred in denying the mitigating role adjustment when the factors clearly weighed in the defendant’s favor. Id. at 917–18. Our case is unlike Diaz in this respect because the 

mitigating role factors here do not weigh clearly in the appellants’ favor. 

As middlemen in this crime, both appellants understood the scope of the 

criminal activity was to sell cocaine. Both participated in planning and 
14 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

C. Perdomo’s Consultation with his Attorney

Finally, appellants argue that the district court erred by allowing Perdomo to consult with his attorney at the evidentiary hearing after the government’s direct examination but 

before their attorneys began cross-examination. The parties 

dispute the standard of review on this issue. Appellants argue 

that allowing Perdomo to “regroup” with his attorney before 

cross-examination limited their ability to expose fully Perdomo’s bias and thus violated their Sixth Amendment right 

to confrontation. Appellants contend this violation requires de 

novo review under the logic of United States v. Hernandez, 84 

F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 1996). The government contends we should 

review for abuse of discretion because the Confrontation 

Clause does not apply at sentencing.

We have held that the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth 

Amendment does not apply at sentencing. United States v. 

Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. 

Isom, 635 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2011). The reliability of information used at sentencing, however, is key. Isom, 635 F.3d at 

908; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) 

(due process requires that information used for sentencing be 

accurate); United States v. Guajardo-Martinez, 635 F.3d 1056, 

1059 (7th Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 

863, 864 (7th Cir. 1984). Even if the Confrontation Clause had 

applied here, it would not have been violated by the judge’s 

 

organizing the sale, influenced more than a small degree the exercise of 

decision-making authority, and played key roles in the sale. While the record is not clear regarding their share of the expected profits, it is undisputed that they stood to make some money from a successful transaction. 

The district court did not err by denying the reduction under the logic of 

Diaz.
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 15

handling of the witness at the sentencing hearing. See United 

States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The right 

to confrontation is not implicated where limitations on crossexamination did not deny the defendants the opportunity to 

establish that the witness may have had a motive to lie; rather, 

the limitations denied them the opportunity to add extra detail

to that motive.”), quoting United States v. Nelson, 39 F.3d 705, 

708 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in Nelson). We review for abuse 

of discretion the judge’s decision in managing the witness’s 

testimony. 

The trial court has broad discretion to control the court 

during the cross-examination of a witness so that the court 

can implement the most effective procedures for determining 

the truth, avoid wasting time, and protect a witness if necessary. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). This discretion certainly includes deciding whether to allow a non-party witness to 

speak with his attorney between direct and cross-examination. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989) (“it is entirely 

appropriate for a trial judge to decide, after listening to the 

direct examination of any witness, whether the defendant or 

a nondefendant, that cross-examination is more likely to elicit 

truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with third parties, including 

his or her lawyer”); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87–88 

(1976) (trial judge has “sound judicial discretion” to sequester 

non-party witnesses before each recess, forbidding them from 

even speaking with their attorneys, but the accused has 

broader Sixth Amendment rights to confer with his attorney).

It was squarely within the district court’s discretion to allow Perdomo to confer briefly with his attorney after direct 
16 Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315

examination. We find no evidence in the record that the court

abused that discretion.4

 

4 Appellants argue that the Supreme Court decision in Perry v. Leeke

demands that we find the court abused its discretion. In Perry, the district 

court refused to allow a defendant-witness to consult with his attorney in 

circumstances much like these. The Supreme Court reasoned that prohibiting a witness from consulting with his attorney in a fifteen-minute break 

between direct and cross-examination was appropriate because 

the truth-seeking function of the trial can be impeded in 

ways other than unethical “coaching.” Cross-examination 

often depends for its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the right 

time, in just the right way. Permitting a witness, including 

a criminal defendant, to consult with counsel after direct 

examination but before cross-examination grants the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and 

sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not possess. This is true even if we assume no deceit on the part 

of the witness; it is simply an empirical predicate of our 

system of adversary rather than inquisitorial justice that 

cross-examination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is more 

likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness who is given time to pause and consult with his attorney.

488 U.S. at 282. While this reasoning supported appellants’ request to forbid Perdomo from consulting his lawyer, Perry was explaining the reasons 

to allow a district court the discretion to forbid such consultation. The 

Court did not create a blanket rule prohibiting courts from allowing such 

consultation, nor would such a rule be practical, particularly in light of the 

issues a witness may face concerning privilege, duties of confidentiality to 

third parties, and so on.
Nos. 18-1236 & 18-1315 17

The district court did not err in sentencing or abuse its discretion during the evidentiary hearing. The judgments of the 

district court are AFFIRMED.