Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEVEN KNECHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana

Lafayette, Indiana

KARL M. SCHARNBERG

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RAY A. CHAMORRO, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 91A05-1309-CR-445

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, Judge

Cause No. 91D01-1210-MR-136

May 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Ray Chamorro (Chamorro), appeals his conviction for Count 

I, murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3.

We affirm. 

ISSUES

Chamorro raises two issues on appeal which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on 

self-defense; and 

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two autopsy 

photographs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 1, 2012, Alexandria Chapman (Chapman) communicated to David 

Jones (Jones) that she wanted to “get high.” (Transcript p. 53). On the same day, Jones 

called Robert Breeden (Breeden), a drug supplier, met with him, and purchased a quarter 

gram of methamphetamine. Jones took it back to Chapman’s house. Also present at the 

house was Robby Brown (Brown) and Chamorro. According to Jones, he gave a little bit 

of the methamphetamine to Brown, Chamorro, and Chapman. He then used the rest of the 

methamphetamine. Jones never felt a rush. The next day, Jones received a phone call from 

Chris Martin (Martin), also a friend to Breeden, who told him that Breeden had sold him

bad drugs. Soon after, Jones placed a call to Breeden and complained of the bad drugs. 

Breeden promised Jones he would take care of him the next time he cooked a batch. 
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On October 3, 2012, Chamorro, Jones, Brown, Chapman, and LaShae Ramsey

(Ramsey) were hanging out at Brown’s house. That evening, Jones called Breeden several 

times, demanding that he delivers on his promise and replace the bad drugs. During one 

of the many phone calls that Jones made to Breeden, Tye Rentfrow (Rentfrow), a friend to 

Breeden and who also helped to manufacture the methamphetamine, grabbed the phone 

from Breeden and told Jones, “[y]ou’ll get it at [7:00] a.m.” (Tr. p. 58). Jones asked who

he was talking to, and Rentfrow responded, “It’s your daddy, bitch.” Id. The comment 

angered Jones, and he started arguing with Rentfrow. Jones kept calling Breeden’s phone,

but every time either Rentfrow or Breeden would hang up. On one of the calls that went 

through, Chamorro grabbed the phone from Jones and started yelling at Rentfrow, asking 

him, “Do you know who the fuck you’re talking to, bitch? [] Where the fuck you at?” (Tr. 

p. 185).

After the heated exchange, Chamorro and Jones decided to go find Rentfrow. 

Before that though, Chamorro wanted to go back to his house to obtain his gun. At the 

time, Ramsey was the only person who had a car. At first she refused to take Chamorro,

but she eventually agreed. All five got in the car and drove to Chamorro’s house. After 

Chamorro retrieved his gun, Ramsey drove the men to Martin’s house. Martin’s house, to 

some extent, operated as a flop house where people, including Breeden spent time. On 

their way their way to Martin’s house, according to Ramsey, Jones asked Chamorro why 

he needed the gun and Chamorro responded by saying “I’m tired of people out here 

thinking I’m a bitch. I’m going to show them I ain’t a bitch.” (Tr. p. 498). Ramsey 
4

dropped off Chamorro, Jones, and Brown at Martin’s house and then she left with 

Chapman. 

Once Chamorro, Jones, and Brown were inside the house, they found a passed out

Martin in the hallway. Jones shook him aggressively until he woke up. Next, Chamorro 

pointed a gun to Martin’s head and asked him to call Breeden. Martin called Breeden and 

asked him to bring back his car which Breeden had been borrowing. Breeden promised 

Martin that he would be at Martin’s house in about ten minutes. They waited for about ten 

to fifteen minutes before Martin suggested that Breeden and Rentfrow might be down at 

“Tioga Bridge,” cooking methamphetamine. (Tr. p. 194). Just as the men were leaving 

Martin’s house, Breeden and Rentfrow pulled into the driveway in Martin’s car. Jones and 

Chamorro saw the car as they were walking away from the house, so they changed their 

course and ran toward Martin’s car. Rentfrow hopped out from the passenger seat. Once 

outside the car, Jones asked Rentfrow if he had called him a bitch, but Rentfrow denied

having said that. At that moment, Jones punched Rentfrow in the face. Rentfrow staggered 

back toward the car but caught his balance and came right back. At that point, Chamorro

pulled out his gun and shot straight at Rentfrow. Rentfrow ran from the scene screaming, 

clutching his chest but later fell at the corner of the Martin’s house. Chamorro also fired 

two additional shots toward the house as he was running away from the scene. During the 

same time or close to the end of the third shot, Jones, Brown, and Chamorro took off 

running in different directions but soon reunited at a high school nearby. Brown then called 

Ramsey and asked her to pick them up. Before Chamorro got inside the car, he hid the gun 

under a garbage can. While in the car, Chamorro admitted that he had shot Rentfrow in 
5

the chest. Ramsey drove Chamorro and Jones to Chicago and returned to Indiana with 

Brown and Chapman. Meanwhile, at the crime scene, Breeden called 911, and shortly 

thereafter the police arrived, arrested Breeden and started their investigation. 

On October 26, 2012, the State filed an Information charging Chamorro with Count 

I, murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-3. On November 2, 2012, the State filed an amendment, adding, 

Count II, felony murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(3). However, on June 4, 2013, the State moved 

to dismiss the felony murder Count. A four-day jury trial was conducted from July 15 

through July 18, 2013. At trial, Chamorro requested a jury instruction for self-defense,

which the trial court denied. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Chamorro guilty

as charged. On August 22, 2013, the trial court sentenced him to sixty years, executed.

Chamorro now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Self-Defense Instruction

Chamorro contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct 

the jury on self-defense. The giving of jury instructions is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s refusal to give a tendered 

instruction for an abuse of that discretion. Creager v. State, 737 N.E.2d 771, 776 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2000), trans. denied. Generally, we will reverse a trial court for failure to give a 

tendered instruction if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) it is 

supported by the evidence; (3) it does not repeat material adequately covered by other 

instructions; and (4) the substantial rights of the tendering party would be prejudiced by

the court’s failure to give it. Id.
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Moreover, we note that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury 

instructed on any theory of defense that has some foundation in the evidence. Id. at 777. 

We apply this rule even if the evidence is weak and inconsistent so long as the evidence 

presented at trial has some probative value to support it. Id. Further, we recognize it is 

within the province of the jury to determine whether the defendant’s evidence was 

believable, unbelievable, or sufficient to warrant the use of force. Id.

Additionally, our supreme court set forth three factors that a defendant must prove 

to support his claim for self-defense: (1) that he was in a place where he had a right to be; 

(2) that he acted without fault; and (3) that he has a reasonable fear or apprehension of 

death or great bodily harm. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999).

In denying Chamorro’s self-defense instruction, the trial court noted that Chamorro 

provoked and instigated the confrontation. We also note that Chamorro’s claim of selfdefense failed in two ways—Chamorro did not act without fault, and he was not in 

reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. The evidence shows that it was Chamorro 

who brandished the gun and fired shots at Rentfrow. Prior to the shooting, Chamorro was 

angry at Rentfrow for disrespecting him on the phone. Chamorro and Jones wanted to find 

Rentfrow and seek revenge. First, they drove to Chamorro’s house, where Chamorro 

picked up his gun. Afterwards, Ramsey drove the men to Martin’s house. When they were

inside Martin’s house, Chamorro pointed his gun at Martin and demanded that he call

Breeden. When Breeden and Rentfrow pulled into the driveway, both Chamorro and Jones,

who were walking away from Martin’s house, changed their course and ran toward the car

to confront Breeden and Rentfrow. When Rentfrow jumped out of the vehicle, neither 
7

Chamorro nor Jones retreated. Instead, Jones punched Rentfrow in the face, and Chamorro 

pulled out his gun and shot Rentfrow. 

Moreover, the evidence does not show that Chamorro was in reasonable fear of 

death or great bodily harm. Chamorro’s self-serving testimony that during the altercation, 

Rentfrow dipped his hands in his sweater as if to reach out for “something steel” from his 

pocket, is simply a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and credit his version of 

events, which we will not do. 

In addition, the trial court’s decision refusing to tender the self-defense instruction 

was premised on the fact that Chamorro was the initial aggressor and that he first opened

fire to an unarmed Rentfrow. Lastly, we find that Chamorro’s use of force was excessive, 

thus his right to claim self-defense was extinguished. See Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 

72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 

In sum, because there is no evidence to support the tendering of the instruction, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a self-defense 

instruction. 

II. Autopsy Photographs

Lastly, Chamorro argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

into evidence, over his objection, the autopsy photographs at trial.

The admission and exclusion of photographic evidence falls within the trial court's 

sound discretion and we review the admission of said evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

Alsheik v. Guerrero, 956 N .E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied. Relevant 

photographic evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed 
8

by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. Gory and revolting photographs may be admissible 

as long as they are relevant to some material issue or show scenes that a witness could 

describe orally. Id. Photographs, even those gruesome in nature, are admissible if they act 

as interpretative aids for the jury and have strong probative value. Id. The potential that 

passions may be aroused by the gruesomeness of the photograph is not sufficient grounds 

for exclusion if the photograph is material and relevant. Id.

Further, autopsy photos often present a unique problem because the pathologist has 

manipulated the corpse in some way during the autopsy. Therefore, autopsy photographs 

are generally inadmissible if they show the body in an altered condition. Id. This is so 

because the photographs may impute to the accused the handiwork of the pathologist and 

thereby render the defendant responsible in the minds of the jurors for the cuts, incisions, 

and indignity of an autopsy. Custis v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), 

trans. denied. However, there are situations where some alteration of the body is necessary 

to demonstrate witness testimony. See id.

The two photographs at issue were State’s Exhibits 15 and 17. The first showed a 

metal dowel inserted into the bullet wound, and the second showed Rentfrow’s heart held 

outside the body with the metal dowel rod inserted. Chamorro argues that these 

photographs were irrelevant in establishing Rentfrow’s cause of death because it was not 

disputed that he died from a bullet wound. Also, Chamorro argues that the photographs 

were gruesome in nature and had the potential risk of inflaming the passions of the jury. 

The State, however, maintains that these two photographs were helpful in assisting the jury 
9

understand Chamorro’s stance during the shooting, and also visualize the trajectory of the 

bullet fired by Chamorro. We agree. 

The record reflects that the photographs were relevant in describing Rentfrow’s

autopsy, including the procedures and the results. More importantly, the pathologist

testified at trial that the “bullet went straight through the breastbone” and was on a “flat 

plane.” (Tr. p. 335). Thus, both autopsy photographs revealed that the wound inflicted on 

Rentfrow was on a level shot, and that Chamorro was standing in front of Rentfrow when 

he made the shot. Furthermore, the photographs also dispelled Chamorro’s claim that he 

fired the shots blindly, and not directly to Rentfrow, as he was running away from the 

scene. 

Moreover, the relevance of the photographs is not lessened by Chamorro’s claim 

that he did not contest Rentfrow’s cause of death. The State had to prove beyond 

reasonable doubt that Chamorro intentionally killed Rentfrow. It is well-established that 

“‘the State is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, and that a criminal 

defendant may not stipulate his or her way out of the full evidentiary force of the case to 

be presented against him or her [.]’” State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008) (quoting Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634, 635 (Ind. 2004)).

Finally, the graphic and gruesome character of the photographs was not unfairly 

prejudicial simply because they depicted the autopsy. The pathologist testified in depth 

about the autopsy, how it was performed, and that he inserted the dowel rods so as to show 

the trajectory of the bullet. Further, the jury was not so overcome with passion that it 

unintelligently convicted Chamorro. 
10

In conclusion, we find that the autopsy photographs were relevant and their 

probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to Chamorro. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting these photographs into evidence at 

Chamorro’s trial.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense or by admitting the autopsy photographs into 

evidence. 

Affirmed. 

ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur