UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20-cv-1948

)

v. ) Hon. Steven C. Seeger

)

BASHAR SADIG, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The government filed this action to collect unpaid federal income taxes owed by 

Defendant Bashar Sadig. He owes almost $100,000, but he is basically broke. But he wasn’t 

broke when he incurred the tax liabilities. He owned a property in the Chicagoland suburbs – a 

house that he renovated, before it was torn down. 

After the tax bills came due, Sadig transferred the property to his (now former) wife, 

surrendering the property in exchange for nothing. His former wife, in turn, put the property into 

a trust. The government now seeks to recover the tax liabilities through a forced sale of Sadig’s 

former property. The government basically argues that federal tax liens attached to that property 

before Sadig signed the quitclaim deed to his former wife. 

The government moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion 

for summary judgment is granted. 

Non-Compliance with the Rules

The Court begins by calling attention to Defendant Sadig’s failure to comply with the 

Local Rules. It is not uncommon for parties to file a response to a statement of facts that does 

not comply with Local Rule 56.1. But here, Sadig did not file a response at all. 

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The Local Rules require parties to follow a specific procedure when filing and opposing a 

motion for summary judgment. All litigants – including pro se litigants – must follow the Local 

Rules, or face the consequences of non-compliance. Sadig, a pro se litigant, is no exception. 

Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing a motion for summary judgment. The 

moving party must file a “statement of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d) and that 

attaches the cited evidentiary material.” See L.R. 56.1(a)(2). “Each asserted fact must be 

supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the specific page number, 

that supports it.” See L.R. 56.1(d)(2).

Local Rule 56.1 also explains how to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The 

non-moving party must file a “response to the LR 56.1(a)(2) statement of material facts that 

complies with LR 56.1(e).” See L.R. 56.1(b)(2). That response “must consist of numbered 

paragraphs corresponding to the numbered paragraphs” of the movant’s statement of facts. See 

L.R. 56.1(e)(1). So, by way of illustration, imagine if the movant filed a statement of material 

facts with 15 paragraphs. The non-movant must file a response that addresses each of those 15 

paragraphs, and must do so paragraph by paragraph, one at a time. 

To help pro se litigants, the Local Rules require parties to serve a notice that explains the 

procedure, so that they are not lost at sea. See L.R. 56.2. That way, unrepresented parties will 

receive clear instructions about what they need to file, and how they need to do it. 

Substantial compliance with Local Rule 56.1 is not enough. See Ammons v. Aramark 

Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). All parties, including pro se litigants, must 

fully comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 

2015); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow 

procedural rules.”). 

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Compliance is necessary for the smooth running of the wheels of justice. The Local 

Rules are designed to give district courts the information that they need to assess whether a case 

deserves a trial. The uniformity of the procedure – across hundreds of cases on a district court’s 

docket – promotes efficiency and speeds things along. It helps courts manage a pile of motions 

in a mountain of cases. 

Consistent with the Local Rules, the government filed a statement of undisputed facts 

with its motion for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts (Dckt. No. 61-2). The 

government also served a Local Rule 56.2 Notice that explained the requirements of Local Rule 

56.1. See Rule 56.2 Statement (Dckt. No. 61, at 3–7 of 7).

Sadig did not file a response to the government’s statement of facts. Instead, he simply

filed an eight-page response brief. See Def.’s Resp. (Dckt. No. 63). Sadig’s brief devoted a few 

pages to the facts, under the heading “Substantive Facts.” Id. at 5–8. Sadig basically told his 

side of the story, relying on a declaration that he had filed months earlier. Id.; see also Sadig 

Dec. (Dckt. No. 40).

That submission did not comply with the Local Rules. Local Rule 56.1 requires the 

non-moving party to file a supporting memo, plus a freestanding response to the movant’s 

statement of material facts. See L.R. 56.1(b). Here, Sadig filed a response brief, but did not file

a response to the statement of material facts. Worse yet, he did not file anything that offered a 

paragraph-by-paragraph, point-by-point response to the government’s facts. See L.R. 56.1(e). 

Sadig’s brief did not constitute a statement of additional facts, either. Again, the Local 

Rules explain how the non-movant can supplement the record with additional facts. Local Rule 

56.1(b) provides that if the opposing party wants to add facts, that party must file a “statement of 

additional material facts that complies with” Local Rule 56.1(d). See L.R. 56.1(b)(3). The 

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non-movant must attach the cited evidentiary material, too. Id. Simply offering additional facts 

in a response brief doesn’t cut it. See Friend v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 

F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding a statement of additional facts “deficient” because 

plaintiff “failed to cite or submit evidence in support of nearly all of the additional facts he 

asserted”). But here, that’s all Sadig did. 

The punchline is that the government offered a statement of material facts, and Sadig did 

not respond as required by the Local Rules. So the government’s facts are deemed admitted. 

See L.R. 56.1(e) (“Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific 

citations to evidentiary material.”). That outcome is not a surprise. In fact, the government sent 

Sadig a notice that forewarned him of the consequences of failing to comply with the rules: “If 

you do not respond to a fact asserted by the defendant, the judge may decide that you have 

admitted that the fact is true.” See L.R. 56.2.

The Court thus accepts as undisputed the facts put forward (and properly supported) by 

the government. See Olivet Baptist Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 672 F. App’x 607, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2017) (“The district court treated most of the [defendant’s] factual submissions as 

unopposed, because the [plaintiff] failed to contest them in the form required by Local Rule 

56.1(b). We have held that the district court is entitled to enforce that rule in precisely the way it 

enforced the rule in this litigation.”); Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (“When a responding party’s statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the 

moving party’s statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for 

purposes of the motion.”). 

That said, Sadig’s failure to respond does not mean that the government must prevail on 

its motion for summary judgment. The material facts are undisputed, but as the movant, the 

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government still must carry its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

See Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021); Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 

F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] nonmovant’s failure to respond to a summary judgment 

motion, or failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, does not, of course, automatically result in 

judgment for the movant.”). 

So, this Court must view the undisputed facts in Sadig’s favor, consider the claims in 

light of the undisputed facts, and decide whether there is any genuine need for a trial. With those 

standards in mind, the Court turns to the record at hand. 

Background

Between 2005 and 2006, Defendant Bashar Sadig failed to timely file federal income tax 

returns. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 2 (Dckt. No. 61-2). By 2008, he learned that he owed 

over $40,000 in federal taxes for 2005 and 2006. Id. at ¶ 9; Sadig Dep., at 42:8-22 (Dckt. No. 

61-5). Sadig knew about the unpaid taxes, but he never paid up. 

In 2010, the IRS assessed his federal income tax liabilities for 2005 and 2006. 

Specifically, the IRS assessed his tax liabilities at $19,084 for 2005, and $22,625 for 2006. See

Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 1–2 (Dckt. No. 61-2). The Secretary of the Treasury gave Sadig 

notice of the tax bill and demanded payment of the outstanding balances that year. Id. at ¶ 5.

More unpaid tax liabilities followed. Sadig failed to pay his taxes for 2012 and 2013. Id.

at ¶ 1. He received a notice and demand for payment of the outstanding balances, which totaled 

about $30,000. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5. As before, Sadig didn’t pay what he owed. 

Sadig wasn’t paying his taxes, but he was paying for home improvements. In 2002, 

Sadig and his wife, Defendant Cuu A. Lau, purchased a home at 4 Granville Avenue in Park 

Ridge, Illinois. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. They paid between $275,000 and $280,000 for the property and 

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were joint tenants. Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. The couple shared the mortgage and utility bills. Id. at 

¶¶ 16, 20.

Soon after they bought the home, Sadig began an extensive remodeling project. Id. at 

¶ 21. He estimates that he spent about $160,000 on repairs and renovations from 2002 to 2014. 

Id. Sadig would make decisions to renovate the property without input from Lau. Id. at ¶¶ 22–

25. The couple didn’t have a set payment plan for their renovations – both Sadig and Lau 

contributed to the improvements. Id.

Beginning around 2012, Sadig attempted a “total renovation” of the home. Id. at ¶ 26. 

He attempted to add a second floor, and he wanted to improve the “foundation” of the property. 

Id.; see also Sadig Dec., at ¶ 7 (Dckt. No. 40). 

Sadig’s renovations failed, catastrophically. His project compromised the structural 

integrity of the house. See Sadig Dec., at ¶ 8 (Dckt. No. 40). In December 2013, the City of 

Park Ridge sent him a notice that the residence was “not in compliance with the health and safety 

code due to structural issues.” See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 27 (Dckt. No. 61-2). The letter 

explained that, given its current state, the property may need to be demolished. See Sadig Dec., 

at ¶ 8.

Amidst his home improvement disaster, Sadig’s federal tax liabilities caught up with him. 

In February 2014, the IRS sent him a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (“NFTL”), stating that he owed 

over $150,000 in unpaid federal taxes.1 See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 29 (Dckt. No. 61-2); 

Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Dckt. No. 61-21, at 1 of 7). Sadig did not respond.

1

 The NFTL included Sadig’s unpaid taxes from 2004, which amounted to just over $90,000. See Notice 

of Federal Tax Lien (Dckt. No. 61-21, at 1 of 7). The government does not seek to collect on Sadig’s 

2004 tax liabilities because they have expired. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 29 (Dckt. No. 61-2).

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Three months later, Sadig transferred his interest in the Granville property to Lau. See 

Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 30 (Dckt. No. 61-2). He signed a quitclaim deed conveying his 

interest to his wife on May 16, 2014. Id.; see also Quitclaim Deed (Dckt. No. 61-14). Sadig 

simply gave the property to Lau. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 32–33, 35–37, 40. The

quitclaim deed includes a stamp indicating that any consideration for the property was less than 

$100 (if there was any at all). Id. at ¶ 34; see also Quitclaim Deed, at 1.

Apparently, Sadig felt frustrated and responsible for the state of the Granville property. 

See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 38 (Dckt. No. 61-2). He transferred his interest to Lau to make 

amends for the home’s disrepair. Id. He was fed up, and he wanted to move on. Id. In Sadig’s 

words, “the lot was messed up because of what I did . . . and I left it and said hell with it. 

Literally that was the intensity of those moments of my life.” See Sadig Dep., at 118:9-10 (Dckt. 

No. 61-5).

The Granville home was not long for this world. In June 2014, one month after 

transferring his interest to his wife, the Granville house was demolished. See Pl.’s Statement of 

Facts, at ¶¶ 28–29 (Dckt. No. 61-2). The property is now a vacant lot. Id. at ¶ 28; see also Lau 

Dep., at 70:3-6 (Dckt. No. 61-6) (“And I mean the house was there, and then the moment you see 

it, it disappeared. It was empty land. And then after that nothing happened.”). 

After the transfer of the Granville property, Sadig had empty pockets. He had no 

ownership interest in any real property, and no ownership interest in any personal property worth 

more than $5,000. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 45–46 (Dckt. No. 61-2). He was left with 

only his car, a 2002 Volkswagen Jetta valued at $500. Id. at ¶ 45. 

Lau wasn’t oblivious to Sadig’s position, either. According to her deposition, “I believe 

that he lost all the money that he put into the construction of the house. And I don’t think he had 

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a job at that time. And so basically the house was gone, I mean destroyed, with an empty, ruined 

property. And all the money was gone. So that’s what happened.” See Lau Dep., at 79:12-18 

(Dckt. No. 61-6).

The home was gone, and the marriage soon followed. In October 2016, Sadig petitioned 

for dissolution of his marriage with Lau. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 48 (Dckt. No. 61-2). 

In July 2018, their marriage officially dissolved. Id. at ¶ 51. During the dissolution, Sadig and

Lau did not transfer property to each other. Id. at ¶ 52.

In September 2018, Lau entered into a Trust Agreement with Defendant ATG Trust 

Company. Id. at ¶ 53; see also Trust Agreement (Dckt. No. 61-18). Lau conveyed her interest in 

the Granville property to the trust. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 57 (Dckt. No. 61-2); 

Warranty Deed In Trust (Dckt. No. 61-20). ATG Trust did not provide anything of value in 

exchange for the transfer of her interest in the property. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 59.

As a result, ATG Trust currently holds title to the Granville property. Id. at ¶ 58. Lau is

the sole beneficiary and holder of the power of direction of the trust during her lifetime. Id. at 

¶ 60. So the Granville property remains in Lau’s ownership and control (albeit through the 

trust). Lau considers the property to be hers, and she continues to pay property taxes on the lot. 

Id. at ¶ 61. 

The Trust Agreement names Sadig as the sole beneficiary of the trust in the event of 

Lau’s death. Id. at ¶¶ 55–56.

As of September 2021, Sadig remains on the hook for $98,450.18 in federal tax 

liabilities. Id. at ¶ 7. That amount includes Sadig’s liabilities for 2005 ($24,847.42), 2006 

($27,720.34), 2012 ($6,805.66), and 2013 ($39,076.76). Id. Those figures take into account all 

abatements, payments, and credits, as well as assessed and accrued late-filing penalties, late 

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payment penalties, failure to make estimated tax payments penalties, costs, and statutory interest. 

Id. at ¶¶ 7–8. Statutory interest continues to accrue. Id. at ¶ 8.

On March 24, 2020, the United States filed a complaint against Sadig to collect the

unpaid tax liabilities, and later filed an amended complaint. See Cplt. (Dckt. No. 1); Am. Cplt. 

(Dckt. No. 4). The government seeks to reduce Sadig’s federal tax liabilities to judgment and to 

enforce tax liens on the Granville property based on Sadig’s unpaid taxes for 2005, 2006, 2012, 

and 2013. 

After discovery, the government moved for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mtn. for 

Summ. J. (Dckt. No. 61).

Legal Standard

A district court “shall grant” summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of 

establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To survive summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond 

the pleadings and identify specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

The Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving 

him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Chaib v. Geo Grp., Inc., 819 F.3d 337, 341 (7th 

Cir. 2016). The Court does not weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or determine the truth of 

the matter, but rather determines only whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. See Nat’l 

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Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if, on the evidence provided, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in 

favor of the non-movant. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc.,

674 F.3d 769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012).

Analysis

The amended complaint includes two claims. See Am. Cplt. (Dckt. No. 4). The first 

claim is against Sadig (only), and the second claim is against Sadig, Lau, ATG Trust Company, 

and Cook County (the government included Cook County to give notice in case there is a local 

tax lien, too). 

In Count I, the government seeks to reduce Sadig’s federal tax liabilities to judgment. Id.

at ¶¶ 9–11. In Count II, the government seeks to enforce the government’s federal tax liens on 

the Granville property. Id. at ¶¶ 12–27. 

The government moved for summary judgment on each claim, so the Court will address 

them in that order. 

I. Sadig’s Tax Liabilities 

“[T]axes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an 

imperious need.” Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935). To that end, the IRS has an 

ongoing obligation to “make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . which 

have not been duly paid.” See 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a). And the IRS may base its assessments of 

unpaid taxes on its own “reasonable” estimations. See United States v. Fior D’Italia, Inc., 536 

U.S 238, 243 (2002). 

A tax assessment is simply “the formal recording of a taxpayer’s tax liability.” See Our 

Country Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 855 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2017) 

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(citing I.R.C. § 6203); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 89 (2004) (“[A]n assessment is 

closely tied to the collection of a tax, i.e., the assessment is the official recording of liability that 

triggers levy and collection efforts.”). Importantly, “‘[t]he assessment is given the force of a 

judgment,’ authorizing the IRS to collect the tax.” See Our Country Home, 855 F.3d at 778 

(quoting Bull, 295 U.S. at 260).

Courts presume that IRS assessments of tax liability are correct, and that presumption 

“can help the Government prove its case against a taxpayer in court.” See Fior D’Italia, Inc., 

536 U.S. at 242. Indeed, “courts will not look behind an assessment to evaluate the procedure 

and evidence used,” so long as the assessment is not shown to be “without rational foundation or 

arbitrary and erroneous.” See Ruth v. United States, 823 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1987). The 

presumption also may be overcome “by a showing that the assessment was computed in an 

incorrect manner.” United States v. Schroeder, 900 F.2d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1990).

The IRS records its assessments on Forms 4340, which “establish the fact of assessment 

and carry with them a presumption of validity and that the assessments they reflect were properly 

made.” See Hefti v. IRS, 8 F.3d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 

Braithwaite, 2017 WL 2793801, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“[I]t is well established in tax law that an 

assessment is entitled to a presumption of legal correctness.”) (citing Fior D’Italia, Inc., 536 

U.S. at 242); Gen. Star Indemn. Co. v. Hubbard Bowling Lanes, Inc., 2003 WL 22048740, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Federal tax assessments are presumptively correct.”).

Here, the government submitted three sets of documents to substantiate Sadig’s federal 

tax liabilities: (1) IRS Form 4340s showing assessments for the tax periods ending in 2005, 

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2006, 2012, and 2013; (2) so-called “INTST”2reports from the Information Data Retrieval 

System for 2005, 2006, 2012, and 2013; and (3) a declaration of Larita A. Minor, an IRS 

Revenue Officer Advisor. 

According to assessments as reflected on the Form 4340s, Sadig owed $19,084 in 2005, 

$22,625 in 2006, $8,421 in 2012, and $21,974 in 2013. See 2005 Form 4340 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 

6 of 34); 2006 Form 4340 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 14 of 34); 2012 Form 4340 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 22

of 34); 2013 Form 4340 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 27 of 34). The IRS Revenue Officer Advisor 

confirmed the accuracy of the numbers. See Minor Dec., at ¶¶ 5, 9 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 2–3 of 

34). They add up to $72,104. 

The assessments took place at different times. The IRS assessed Sadig’s liabilities for 

2005 and 2006 in March 2010. Id. at ¶ 5. It assessed his liabilities for 2012 in June 2013. Id. 

And it assessed his liabilities for 2013 in July 2014. Id. 

But assessments do not necessarily tell the full story when it comes to current tax 

liabilities. Tax liabilities can go up (because of late fees, penalties, interest, and so on), and they 

can go down (because of payments, and so on). Here, Sadig apparently made a few payments 

over the years. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 7 (Dckt. No. 61-2); Minor Dec., at ¶ 15 (Dckt. 

No. 61-3, at 4 of 34). So, to tell the full story, the government needed to do more than come 

forward with the numbers from the assessments in the Form 4340s. 

2

 The government never explains what “INTST” stands for, leaving the Court stranded in Acronym-ville. 

But based on this Court’s search, it appears that the term refers to a computer program for calculating 

liabilities. See Kay v. IRS, 1998 WL 681432, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“INTST is an internal IRS interest 

and penalty computation program. It shows the amount of taxes and tax penalties and interest due from 

or owing to the taxpayer with respect to a tax account as of a specific date, based upon both posted and 

pending transactions.”).

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To fill in the missing pieces, the government submitted four INTST reports covering 

2005, 2006, 2012, and 2013. Those reports reflect the IRS’s initial tax assessments of Sadig’s 

liabilities, plus penalties, interest, statutory additions, payments, credits, abatements, and 

accruals. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 7 (Dckt. No. 61-2). Once again, the IRS Revenue 

Officer Advisor confirmed the numbers. See Minor Dec., at ¶ 14 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 4–5 of 34).

According to the INTST reports as of September 2021, Sadig owed $24,847.42 for 2005, 

$27,720.34 for 2006, $6,805.66 for 2012, and $39,076.76 for 2013. See 2005 INTST Report 

(Dckt. No. 61-3, at 31 of 34); 2006 INTST Report (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 32 of 34); 2012 INTST 

Report (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 33 of 34); 2013 INTST Report (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 34 of 34). Adding 

them up, Sadig faces $98,450.18 in unpaid federal taxes. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 7

(Dckt. No. 61-2); Minor Dec., at ¶ 14 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 4 of 34).

The process seems complex, but the punchline is simple: Sadig owes the federal 

government almost $100,000 in unpaid taxes. Again, courts generally do not “look behind an 

assessment to evaluate the procedure and evidence used in making the assessment.” Ruth, 823 

F.2d at 1093. Those assessments (i.e., the Form 4340s) receive a presumption of validity. See

Hefti, 8 F.3d at 1172; Braithwaite, 2017 WL 2793801, at *2. The same presumption applies to 

INTST Reports. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 2021 WL 3508092, at *7 n.19 (M.D. Fla. 

2021); United States v. Seeley, 2018 WL 5845214, at *3 (D. Mass. 2018); United States v. 

Sanchez-Martinez, 2012 WL 1825325, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 2012).

In his response, Sadig does not challenge the “tax principal amounts.” See Def.’s Resp., 

at 3 (Dckt. No. 63). Instead, he makes a smattering of equitable arguments. He points to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, his personal health problems, and the 2008 recession, offering them as a 

“basis for offsetting the excessive interest rates incurred as per the assumed tax liabilities.” Id. at 

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2. He also contends that his failed renovations on the Granville property should offset “the tax 

principles at least for tax year 2012 and tax year 2013 (at the time of escalating the house 

construction activities).” Id. at 3.

The Court fully appreciates that Sadig may have faced a number of significant challenges 

in his personal life. But people with problems must pay their taxes, too. Sadig does not offer 

this Court any authority for the notion that district courts enjoy discretion to reduce the interest 

rates on unpaid taxes, or to revisit whether a tax bill is appropriate, based on personal 

considerations. If anything, the law flows in the opposite direction. See United States v. 

Braithwaite, 2017 WL 2793801, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“[A]ccepting [defendants’] (poorly 

developed) argument now would amount to a refusal to allow the IRS to obtain the taxes to 

which it is legally entitled – a request that is fundamentally beyond the Court’s power.”) (citing 

26 U.S.C. § 7421); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the 

assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person . . . .” ). The 

government’s assessment of tax liabilities is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and Sadig 

has not come forward with anything to undermine that presumption.3 

Accordingly, Sadig owes $98,450.18 in unpaid federal tax liabilities as of September 8, 

2021, the date offered in the government’s submission.

3 Sadig also submitted an “Intent to File Response” after he had already filed his response brief. See

Intent to File Resp. (Dckt. No. 70). He then filed a sur-response without waiting for the Court’s ruling. 

See Def.’s Sur-Resp. (Dckt. No. 71). The sur-response repeats his original response: Sadig feels 

“remorseful of the situation and overwhelming burdens he may have exerted on many,” and he requests 

leniency based on the COVID-19 pandemic, his personal health problems, and the 2008 recession. Id. at 

2, 9–10. Despite filing his sur-response without the Court’s permission, the Court has nevertheless 

considered the sur-response in making this ruling. The equitable arguments don’t move the needle. 

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II. Federal Tax Liens on the Granville Property 

The next question is whether the IRS can collect the amount owed through a forced sale 

of the Granville property. The government contends that federal tax liens attached to the 

Granville property. The government also contends that the tax liens survived the later transfer of 

Sadig’s interest to his wife (Lau), and Lau’s later transfer of ownership to the trust. The Court 

agrees. 

A federal tax liability gives rise to a federal tax lien. When a tax(non)payer fails to pay a 

tax liability on demand, “the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, 

or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien 

in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, 

belonging to such person.” See 26 U.S.C. § 6321. 

Notice the sweep of the text – the statute covers “all property and rights to property,” full 

stop. Id. The statute “is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest 

in property that a taxpayer might have.” United States v. Nat’l Bank of Com., 472 U.S. 713, 

719–20 (1985); see also Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945) (“Stronger 

language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes.”).

A federal tax lien attaches “at the time the tax assessment is made, and it continues until 

the liability has been satisfied or it becomes unenforceable due to the lapse of time.” See United 

States v. Librizzi, 108 F.3d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6322). Once attached, 

“the lien cannot be extinguished (assuming proper filing and the like) simply by a transfer or 

conveyance of the interest.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 691 n.16 

(1983)). The property and the lien are fused together, and the lien goes wherever the property 

goes. 

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Sorting out the existence of a lien requires a look at state and federal law. Whether a 

certain interest in real property falls under section 6321 “is a matter of federal law.” Drye v. 

United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (cleaned up). Courts “look initially to state law to 

determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to 

federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or 

‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Id. In other words, 

“State law determines which sticks are in a person’s bundle, but federal law determines whether 

those sticks constitute property for federal tax lien purposes.” See United States v. Craft, 535 

U.S. 274, 274 (2002).

Sadig and Lau purchased the Granville property as joint tenants in 2002. See Pl.’s

Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 10–12 (Dckt. No. 61-2). Under Illinois law, a joint tenancy consists of

“the four unities which are fundamental to both the creation and the perpetuation of the joint 

tenancy. These are the unities of interest, title, time, and possession.” See Harms v. Sprague, 

105 Ill. 2d 215, 85 Ill. Dec. 331, 473 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1984). A joint tenancy exists as “a 

present estate in all the joint tenants, with each joint tenant being seized of the whole.” See Stone 

v. United States, 2014 WL 1289788, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Snyder v. Heidelberger,

2011 IL 111052, 352 Ill. Dec. 176, 953 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ill.)).

In May 2014, Sadig purportedly conveyed his interest in the Granville property to Lau by 

quitclaim deed. If the conveyance was valid, it would have severed the joint tenancy. See 

Harms, 473 N.E.2d at 932.

The government argues that federal tax liens attached to the Granville property for 

Sadig’s tax liabilities for 2005, 2006, 2012, and 2013. And the government argues that the liens 

attached before Sadig gave up his interest in the property in May 2014. 

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The Court will discuss the tax liabilities in two different groups. The tax liabilities for 

2005, 2006, and 2012 arose long before the conveyance in May 2014, so the Court will address 

those liabilities first. 

The liability for 2013 is a closer call, from a chronological perspective. Sadig owed his 

2013 taxes as of April 15, 2014 – tax day. Sadig transferred his interest to his wife on May 16, 

2014. See Quitclaim Deed (Dckt. No. 61-14). And the IRS assessed his 2013 tax liabilities on 

July 14, 2014. See Minor Dec., at ¶ 5 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 2 of 34). 

For the sake of simplicity, the Court will address the existence of a lien for the 2005, 

2006, and 2012 tax liabilities first, and then will address the existence of a lien for 2013. 

A. Tax Liens for 2005, 2006, and 2012 

The government assessed Sadig’s tax liabilities for 2005, 2006, and 2012 long before he 

surrendered his ownership interest in the Granville property. Again, the IRS assessed Sadig’s tax

liabilities for 2005 and 2006 in March 2010. Id. And it assessed his 2012 tax liabilities in June 

2013. Id. At that time, the government mailed notice and demand letters to Sadig’s last known 

address. Id. at ¶ 10.

The assessments for the 2005, 2006, and 2012 tax liabilities took place by June 2013, 

long before Sadig signed the quitclaim deed in May 2014. So the liens attached to the Granville 

property before Sadig gave it up. See Librizzi, 108 F.3d at 137 (“Federal tax liens attach ‘at the 

time the tax assessment is made . . . .’”) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6322). Sadig’s conveyance of his 

interest in the Granville property to Lau in 2014 did not affect the validity of the preexisting 

liens. Id.; Wilmington, 2022 WL 160286, at *3. 

Sadig couldn’t convey his interest free and clear, because he didn’t own the Granville 

property free and clear. He owned an interest in that property subject to federal tax liens. The 

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liens were tethered to the property. So, when Sadig transferred the property, the liens went along 

for the ride. 

In sum, tax liens existed on the Granville property for Sadig’s federal tax liabilities for 

2005, 2006, and 2012. The subsequent transfer of that property did not eliminate the existence 

of the liens. Basically, Sadig transferred an interest that was encumbered by federal tax liens. 

B. Tax Lien for 2013 

The chronology for the 2013 tax year is a little more complicated, but the end result is the 

same. There is a tax lien on the Granville property for Sadig’s 2013 tax liabilities, too. 

Unlike the assessment for the 2005, 2006, and 2012 tax years, the IRS assessed Sadig’s 

2013 liabilities after he conveyed his interest in the Granville property to Lau. Sadig signed the 

quitclaim deed and conveyed his interest to his wife on May 16, 2014. See Pl.’s Statement of 

Facts, at ¶ 30 (Dckt. No. 61-2); Quitclaim Deed (Dckt. No. 61-14). The IRS assessed his 2013 

liabilities on July 14, 2014, two months later. See Minor Dec., at ¶ 5 (Dckt. No. 61-3, at 2 of 

34). The IRS mailed an automatic notice and demand letter to Sadig at the time of the 

assessment. Id. at ¶ 10.

So Sadig conveyed his interest in the Granville property in May 2014, two months before 

the IRS assessed his 2013 tax liabilities in July 2014. The question is whether a federal tax lien 

attached to the property, even though the taxpayer transferred the property before the assessment. 

A debtor’s transfer of property does not necessarily remove the property beyond the 

grasp of a creditor. The Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“IUFTA”) prevents the

“fraudulent transfers of property by a debtor who intends to defraud creditors by placing assets 

beyond their reach.” See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Personnel Staffing Grp., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 

172281, 423 Ill. Dec. 571, 105 N.E.3d 979, 984 (2018) (citation omitted). Under the IUFTA, a 

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creditor may seek to avoid a “transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the 

creditor’s claim.” See 740 ILCS § 160/8(a)(1).

The IUFTA defines a “creditor” as “a person who has a claim,” and a “debtor” as a 

person “who is liable on a claim.” See 740 ILCS § 160/2(d), (f). A “claim” is defined as “a right 

to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 

contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 

Id. at § 160/2(c). For any action under the IUFTA, the plaintiff must establish a creditor-debtor 

relationship. See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 

383 (7th Cir. 2008).

The IUFTA prohibits two types of fraud: actual fraud (i.e., fraud in fact) and constructive 

fraud (i.e., fraud in law). See 740 ILCS § 160/5(a)(1)–(2); 740 ILCS § 160/6(a); Centerpoint 

Energy Servs., Inc. v. Halim, 743 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2014). Actual fraud requires a showing 

of “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” See 740 ILCS 

§ 160/5(a)(1). The government does not pursue a theory of actual fraud against Sadig.

Constructive fraud, on the other hand, does not require fraudulent intent. Constructive 

fraud occurs “when the debtor makes a transfer without receiving a reasonably equivalent value 

in exchange; there is an existing or contemplated debt against him; and he does not retain 

sufficient property to pay that debt.” See Malek v. Malek, 2020 WL 6075871, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 

2020) (citing Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (7th Cir. 

1997)). The concept is the flipside of “you can’t get something for nothing.” 

Under the statute, “[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to 

a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the 

debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent 

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value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the 

debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.” See 740 ILCS § 160/6(a). In 

other words, a transfer is constructively fraudulent if: (1) it arose after a creditor’s claim; (2) the 

debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the transfer; and (3) the debtor was 

insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of it. Id.; see also Malek, 

2020 WL 6075871, at *3.4

For fraudulent conveyance purposes, the IRS had a claim when the taxes were due, not 

when the assessment took place. “Courts facing this issue in this district have found that for 

fraudulent conveyance purposes, the United States is a creditor as to any unpaid tax liabilities 

prior to the issuance of an assessment.” See United States v. Brickman, 906 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 

(N.D. Ill. 1995) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). Instead of the date of assessment, tax 

liabilities “become due and owing on the date the tax returns are required to be filed.” Id. 

As Americans know all too well, tax returns are due on April 15 following the close of 

the calendar year. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6072(a). Tax liabilities for Year 1 are due on April 15 of 

Year 2. At that point, the taxpayer is a debtor, and the government is the creditor. 

So Sadig’s 2013 tax liabilities accrued in April 2014, not when the IRS assessed his 

liabilities two months later. Accordingly, a creditor-debtor relationship for the 2013 tax

liabilities arose between the government and Sadig in April 2014, one month before he signed 

the quitclaim deed in May 2014.

Based on the undisputed facts, Sadig’s conveyance of his interest in the Granville 

property to Lau satisfies all three elements of constructive fraud under section 6(a) of the 

4

 The Fraudulent Transfer Act prohibits two types of constructive fraud, under § 160/5(a)(2) and 

§ 160/6(a). The elements are similar, but not exactly the same. See Malek v. Malek, 2020 WL 6075871, 

at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The government here relies on the constructive fraud provision appearing in 

section 6(a) of the statute. 

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IUFTA. First, the government became a creditor before Sadig transferred the property. Sadig 

owed his 2013 taxes to the government by April 15, 2014. He signed the quitclaim deed in May 

2014, one month later. 

Second, Sadig did not receive anything of value in return for the conveyance of his 

property interest. Sadig gave the property to Lau for no consideration, as Lau acknowledged. 

See Lau Resp. to Pl.’s Interrogatories, at ¶ 1(b)(i) (Dckt. No. 61-19). Sadig also admits that he 

“gave her the house” based on “no financial exchange.” See Sadig Resp. to Pl.’s Interrogatories, 

at ¶¶ 2(a)(i)-(ii) (Dckt. No. 61-7). Similarly, his response never mentions receiving 

consideration for the transfer. See Def.’s Resp., at 3 (Dckt. No. 63). 

Sadig transferred something for nothing. Without consideration, Sadig could not have 

received anything of value in return for his attempted transfer. See Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Fid. Nat. 

Title Ins. Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“A transfer is not made for 

‘reasonably equivalent value’ when the transferee gives no consideration, or too little 

consideration, for the assets received.”) (citation omitted).

Third, Sadig was insolvent at the time of his attempted transfer, or he became insolvent 

because of the conveyance. A debtor becomes insolvent if the sum of his debts exceeds his 

assets at a fair valuation. See 740 ILCS § 160/3(a). After his transfer, Sadig had no ownership 

in anything and only possessed his $500 Volkswagen Jetta. At the same time, his tax liabilities 

surpassed $150,000.5 See Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Dckt. No. 61-21, at 1 of 7). His debts in 

May 2014 exceeded his assets by a wide margin. 

5

 Sadig received the NFTL describing his tax liabilities in February 2014, and he transferred his interest 

in the Granville property in May 2014. The NFTL lists an unpaid balance of over $150,000 because it 

accounted for Sadig’s 2004 liabilities (over $90,000). See Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Dckt. No. 61-21, 

at 1 of 7). While the government does not seek to enforce Sadig’s 2004 tax liabilities in this action 

because they have expired, Sadig still owed that amount in 2014. The Court therefore includes Sadig’s 

2004 tax liabilities in determining his insolvency in May 2014.

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Based on the undisputed facts, Sadig’s transfer of his interest in the Granville property 

was constructively fraudulent, and thus may be avoided. In sum, the government has a federal 

tax lien on the Granville property for Sadig’s 2013 federal tax liabilities, and that lien survived 

Sadig’s attempt to transfer the property. 

C. Lau’s Transfer to ATG Trust 

There is one more wrinkle. The Granville property did not stay in Lau’s hands. She 

transferred ownership of that property to ATG Trust. The question is whether Lau’s transfer of 

ownership into a trust interferes with the government’s ability to enforce a federal tax lien. 

The government argues that ATG Trust holds title to the property as Lau’s nominee. The 

Court agrees. So the transfer of Lau’s interest to the trust is not an impenetrable barrier. Truth 

be told, the trust is simply Lau’s nominee. 

But before diving in, at the end of the day, it does not matter much whether the trust was 

Lau’s nominee. The purported transfer from Sadig to Lau was constructively fraudulent, and is 

avoided. As a result, the signing of the quitclaim deed was a nullity, and Sadig and Lau 

continued to own the Granville property. So, it does not matter whether Lau or the trust owns 

the other half of the property. The key point is that Sadig continues to own an interest in the 

property, despite the purported transfer to Lau.

6

 

A nominee is someone who holds legal title for the benefit of another person. See United 

States v. Swan, 467 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2006). An entity qualifies as a taxpayer’s nominee 

when “the taxpayer has engaged in a legal fiction by placing legal title to property in the hands of 

[that entity] while actually retaining some or all of the benefits of true ownership.” See Stone v. 

6

 That said, the later transfer of Lau’s interest to the trust may have converted the interest of Sadig and 

Lau from a joint tenancy to a tenancy in common. See Sathoff v. Sutterer, 373 Ill. App. 3d 795, 311 Ill. 

Dec. 680, 869 N.E.2d 354, 356–57 (2007). 

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United States, 2014 WL 1289788, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citation omitted). “Because the 

nominee does not hold a valid ownership interest in the property, a creditor of the property’s true 

owner can recover against it – even though the true owner is not the legal title holder.” United 

States v. Maier, 2019 WL 1399983, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Swan, 467 F.3d at 658); see 

also United States v. Wesselman, 406 Fed. App’x 64, 65 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The lien that arises 

after a taxpayer fails to pay an assessed tax liability attaches not only to property belonging to 

the taxpayer, but also to property held by the taxpayer’s nominees – someone who has legal title 

when, in substance, the taxpayer enjoys the benefits of ownership.”).

Illinois courts have not addressed the nominee theory, so federal courts use a multi-factor 

standard to determine whether an entity is a nominee. See Maier, 2019 WL 1399983, at *8; 

Stone, 2014 WL 1289788, at *9 (collecting cases). Those factors include whether: “(1) there is 

a close personal relationship between the nominee and the transferor; (2) the nominee paid little 

or no consideration for the property; (3) the parties placed the property in the name of the 

nominee in anticipation of collection activity; (4) the parties did not record the conveyance; and, 

(5) the transferor continues to exercise dominion and control over the property.” See United 

States v. Szaflarski, 614 F. App’x 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2015). In the specific context of trusts, 

courts also look to the identity of the sole beneficiary. See United States v. Sanders, 676 F. 

App’x 599, 600 (7th Cir. 2017). 

A few of the considerations don’t come into play, such as the existence of a close 

personal relationship between the nominee and the transferor. (Here, the trust is an entity, so it 

has no personal relationships.) There isn’t anything in the record about why Lau placed the 

property in a trust. But several other factors weigh heavily in support of the conclusion that 

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ATG Trust is holding the property for Lau. Based on the undisputed facts, the trust is simply a 

nominee. 

First, ATG Trust paid nothing for the property. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 59

(Dckt. No. 61-2). Lau paid $190 to create the trust and pays ATG Trust $95 annually to hold 

title to the property. See Trust Agreement, at 3 (Dckt. No. 61-18). So, ATG received title to the 

property, and is getting paid to own it. The trust is simply holding the property, for the benefit of 

Lau. 

Second, under the Trust Agreement, Lau has dominion and control. Lau maintains the 

sole power to possess, manage, and physically control the Granville property. Id. at 1–2. She 

receives any income generated by the property. Id. She directs ATG Trust as trustee in dealing 

with title to the property, and receive proceeds from the sale of the property made under the 

power of direction during her lifetime. Id. 

Third, the Trust Agreement identifies Lau as the sole beneficiary of the trust during her 

lifetime, and Sadig as the sole beneficiary in the event of Lau’s death. Id. at 2. 

All of those facts support the conclusion that ATG Trust is a nominee, and there are no 

material facts on the other side of the ledger. Based on the undisputed facts, ATG Trust is Lau’s 

nominee. As a result, the transfer of the property to the trust does not close the door on the 

enforcement of the federal tax liens.

III. Sale of the Granville Property 

A federal tax lien is not “self-executing.” See Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB v. 

Cosmano, 2022 WL 160286, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (citing Nat’l Bank of Com., 472 U.S. at 720). 

Instead, the Internal Revenue Code provides the government with a right of action to enforce its 

liens. See 26 U.S.C. § 7403(a); United States v. Adent, 821 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2016). The

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government relies on the Code to enforce its liens on the Granville property. See Am. Cplt., at 

¶ 27 (Dckt. No. 4). 

The Court may order the forced sale of property to enforce a federal tax lien. The 

Internal Revenue Code provides that, in all lien-enforcement cases involving a claim or interest 

of the United States, a court “may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the 

court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in 

respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States.” See 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c).

Notice the use of “may” in section 7403. A court may decree a sale of such property. 

When the subject property implicates innocent third-party interests, a court can exercise its 

discretion to deny the forced sale of the property. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 

703–05 (1983). That said, a district court has “limited discretion” under section 7403, which 

must be “exercised rigorously and sparingly, keeping in mind the Government’s paramount 

interest in prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes.” Id. at 711.

In accounting for innocent third-party interests during forced property sales, courts look 

to four non-exhaustive factors: “(1) the prejudice to the government’s interest as the result of a 

partial, rather than a total, sale; (2) whether the third party with a non-liable separate interest in 

the property would, in the normal course of events have a legally recognized expectation that that 

separate property would not be subject to forced sale by the delinquent taxpayer or his or her 

creditors; (3) the prejudice to the third party as the result of a total sale; and (4) the relative 

character and value of the non-liable and liable interests held in the property.” Adent, 821 F.3d 

at 915 (cleaned up) (citing Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 710–11).

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Here, Lau had an innocent half-ownership interest in the Granville property, but the

factors weigh in favor of the government’s request for a forced sale. Based on the undisputed 

facts, a forced sale is appropriate. 

First, a partial sale of the Granville property is not a viable or practical option. Second, 

Lau has no “legally recognized expectation” that her interest would not be subject to a forced 

sale due to Sadig’s delinquency. See Adent, 821 F.3d at 916 (“Derek, the non-delinquent 

co-owner of Parcel B, has no ‘legally recognized expectation’ that his interest would not be 

subject to a forced sale due to Leonard’s delinquency.”). Third, Lau does not reside on the 

Granville property and would not be dislocated (it is an empty lot). Fourth, the “relative 

character and value of the non-liable and liable interests” does not weigh in any party’s interest. 

Id. at 915. Lau’s innocent interest in the Granville property does not outweigh the government’s

“paramount” interest in collecting Sadig’s tax delinquencies.

The government can file a motion if it seeks the appointment of a receiver. See 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7403(d) (“[A]t the instance of the United States, the court may appoint a receiver to enforce the 

lien . . .”). In requesting the appointment of a receiver under section 7403(d), “the Government 

needs only to make a prima facie showing that a substantial tax liability probably exists and that 

the Government’s collection efforts may be jeopardized if a receiver is not appointed.” See 

Matter of McGaughey, 24 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1994). If the government seeks a different 

form of relief (e.g., public auction of the property), it may make such a request.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

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Date: June 30, 2022

 

Steven C. Seeger

United States District Judge

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