1

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-2371

_____________

ANDREW CARMAN and KAREN CARMAN,

Appellants

v.

JEREMY CARROLL

 

_____________

On Appeal From the United States District Court for the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(No. 3:10-cv-01013)

District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

_____________

Argued: December 17, 2013

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge, and 

SCHILLER, District Judge.

1

 

1 Honorable Berle M. Schiller, United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 

designation.
2

(Opinion Filed: May 15, 2014)

Barry H. Dyller, Esq. [ARGUED]

Kelly A. Bray, Esq.

88 North Franklin Street

Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701

Attorneys for Appellants Andrew Carman and Karen Carman

Kathleen G. Kane

Sean A. Kirkpatrick [ARGUED]

John G. Knorr, III

Office of Attorney General

Appellate Litigation Section

15th Floor, Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Attorneys for Appellee Jeremy Carroll

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OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Responding to a police dispatch, Pennsylvania State 

Trooper Jeremy Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the 

home of Andrew and Karen Carman to search for a man who 

had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey 

plates. Upon arriving at the Carmans’ residence, the troopers 

bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the 

house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a 
3

scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. This

§ 1983 action arises from Carroll’s warrantless entry onto the 

Carmans’ property. Carroll contends that he did not violate 

the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered 

into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their 

home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” 

encounter. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the 

back of the Carmans’ property and did not begin his visit at 

the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant 

requirement does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the District 

Court’s denial of the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a 

matter of law on their unlawful entry claim. We affirm the 

jury verdict regarding the Carmans’ unlawful seizure claim 

because there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that 

Carroll acted reasonably.2 Accordingly, we affirm in part and 

reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.

 

2

In reviewing a jury verdict, “[w]e are not free to weigh the 

evidence or to pass on the credibility of witnesses,” but rather 

“[o]ur function is to determine only whether there is evidence 

upon which the jury could properly return a verdict, viewing 

the evidence most favorably to . . . the non-movant, and 

giving [the non-movant] the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences.” Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850 

F.2d 958, 961-62 (3d Cir. 1988). Therefore, we construe the 

facts in the light most favorable to Carroll, the non-movant.
4

I.

A.

In July 2009, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers

Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts were dispatched to the 

Carmans’ residence to search for a man named Michael Zita

and a car bearing New Jersey license plates. The troopers 

were told that Zita had stolen the car, was armed with two 

loaded handguns, and might have fled to the Carmans’ 

residence. Neither Roberts nor Carroll had been to the 

Carmans’ property before, and neither knew what Zita looked 

like. The troopers did not have a warrant to search the 

Carmans’ property nor did they have a warrant to arrest Zita. 

The Carmans’ house sits on a corner lot. The main 

street runs along the front of the house and a side street runs

along the left of the house, as viewed from the front. A

clearly marked path leads to the front door. See Pl.’s Exs. 22, 

26.

3

There is no other marked path to the Carmans’ house. A

stone parking area is located on the left side of the house, see 

Pl.’s Ex. 25, and a shed and carport, which the parties refer to 

as a “garage,” are located in the Carmans’ backyard.

The Carmans also have a back deck that adjoins their 

kitchen area. See Pl.’s Ex. 18, 21. Two sets of stairs lead up to 

the deck, and a sliding glass door by the deck leads to the 

kitchen. See id. However, the Carmans testified that visitors 

use the front entrance when they come to visit.

 

3

For ease of reference, various photographs introduced at 

trial are appended to this Opinion.
5

When the troopers arrived at the Carmans’ home, 

Andrew and Karen Carman were sitting in their kitchen with 

Karen Carman’s sister; they were the only people present at 

the home. Because there was no parking in front of the 

Carmans’ house, the troopers drove down the side street, 

passed numerous cars parked along the side of the Carmans’ 

house, and parked their cars at the first available spot, at “the 

far rear of the property.” App. 79. The troopers then got out 

of their cars, entered the Carmans’ backyard, and headed 

toward the garage. Carroll purportedly took this route because 

he saw a light on in the garage and thought someone might be 

there. He “poked [his] head in” the garage “and said, 

Pennsylvania State Police,” but “there was nobody in there.” 

App. 80.

Carroll thought the sliding door attached to the back 

deck of the house “looked like a customary entryway.” App. 

92. Thus, after searching the garage and finding no one there, 

he and Roberts continued walking through the backyard and 

proceeded to the back deck. As the troopers stepped onto the

deck, Andrew Carman came out of the house. Carman was 

belligerent and aggressively approached the troopers, asking,

“Who the fuck are you?” App. 63, 80-81. Given Carman’s 

behavior, Carroll thought the man he was speaking with 

might be Zita. Carroll informed him that they were looking 

for Zita and asked Carman to identify himself. Carman 

refused to divulge his identity, made a quick turn away from 

the troopers, and appeared to reach for his waist, bringing his 

hands outside the troopers’ view. Still unsure of Carman’s 

identity, Carroll feared that Carman might be reaching for a 

weapon. He, therefore, momentarily grabbed Carman’s right 

arm. Upon seeing that Carman was unarmed, he let go.

Carman twisted and fell off the deck.
6

Karen Carman subsequently exited her house and 

came onto the deck with her sister. The two women were 

screaming when they approached Roberts. Consequently,

Roberts ordered them to stand back and drew his Taser.

Karen Carman asked the troopers what was going on, and 

Carroll explained that they were looking for Zita and asked

her if they could search the house for him. She gave her 

consent and everyone went into the house. 

The troopers searched the Carmans’ house and did not 

find Zita. The stolen vehicle was not at the Carmans’ 

residence, and the Carmans were not charged with any 

crimes.

B.

Andrew and Karen Carman brought this case pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Carroll violated their 

Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, the Carmans’ twocount complaint alleged that Carroll’s warrantless entry into 

their backyard, garage, back deck, and home constituted an 

unlawful search and that Carroll unreasonably seized Andrew

Carman. Before trial, the Carmans advised the District Court 

of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida v. Jardines, 

133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and asserted that they should be 

entitled to a directed verdict at trial based on that case. They 

also submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the 

“knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement; their 

instruction cited heavily to Jardines. 

The District Court conducted a two-day jury trial. 

After opening arguments, the Carmans moved for a directed 
7

verdict, effectively a judgment as a matter of law, on their 

unlawful entry claim.

4 At the close of Carroll’s testimony, the 

Carmans renewed their request for judgment as a matter of 

law on the unlawful entry claim and also moved for judgment 

as a matter of law on their unreasonable seizure claim. Carroll 

moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Carmans’ 

unlawful entry claim on the ground that he was entitled to 

qualified immunity. The District Court denied all of the 

motions without explanation. 

The District Court also rejected the Carmans’ proposed 

jury instruction regarding the “knock and talk” exception.

Over the Carmans’ objections, the District Court charged the 

jury with a different instruction; the District Court’s 

instruction cited language from our decision in Estate of 

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003), but did not 

cite Jardines. 

 

4 As a result of the 1991 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 50(a), the term “directed verdict” has been

abandoned and replaced with the term “judgment as a matter 

of law.” Therefore, we construe the parties’ motions for a 

directed verdict as motions for judgment as a matter of law 

under Rule 50(a). See Wittekamp v. Gulf & W., Inc., 991 F.2d 

1137, 1141 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The parties’ briefs have 

referred to the motion as seeking a directed verdict, but the 

motion more appropriately is termed a motion for judgment 

as a matter of law because the 1991 revision to Rule 50(a) 

abandoned the term ‘directed verdict.’”).
8

Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict finding in 

Carroll’s favor on both claims. Judgment was entered on 

April 10, 2013. This appeal followed.5

II.

On appeal, the Carmans argue that the District Court

erred in denying their motions for judgment as a matter of law

on their Fourth Amendment unlawful entry and unreasonable 

seizure claims. The Carmans also argue that the District Court 

provided an erroneous jury instruction regarding the “knock 

and talk” exception to the warrant requirement.

A.

The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 

cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth 

Amendment, a search occurs when the government: (1)

 

5 We have jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s denial of 

judgment as a matter of law. Moyer v. United Dominion 

Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 545 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007). Such a 

motion “should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 

question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other 

than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing 

law.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 

1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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physically intrudes on constitutionally protected areas, see 

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, or (2) invades “a subjective 

expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable,” 

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. 

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). Accord Jardines, 

133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test 

‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional 

property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . 

.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952

(2012))).

“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that 

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 

presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule 

is “subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 

218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). We “regard 

the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the 

home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the 

home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” Jardines, 133 

S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 

180 (1984)); see also Marasco, 318 F.3d at 518 (“Fourth 

Amendment protections extend not only to a person’s home, 

but also to the curtilage surrounding the property.”). Thus, we 

presume a warrantless search of curtilage to be unreasonable. 

B.

From the moment that Carroll entered the Carmans’ 

backyard, he was in the curtilage surrounding their house. It 

is undisputed that Carroll entered into the Carmans’ curtilage 

without a warrant, without consent, and without exigent 
10

circumstances. Carroll argues that he nonetheless did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment because he entered the 

Carmans’ property while conducting a “knock and talk.” As 

he correctly points out, a “knock and talk” encounter is a 

permitted exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, 

we assess whether this exception applies to this case.

Under the “knock and talk” exception, “a police officer 

not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, 

precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen 

might do.’” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. 

King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)); see also Marasco, 318 

F.3d at 519 (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s 

door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to 

the inhabitants just as any private citizen may.”). Needless to 

say, government officers cannot benefit from the “knock and 

talk” exception simply because they knock on a door. For

purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a “knock and talk” is a 

brief, consensual encounter that begins at the entrance used 

by visitors, which in most circumstances is the front door.

6 A 

“knock and talk” encounter must satisfy three requirements.

First, a police officer, like any visitor, must “knock 

promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent 

invitation to linger longer) leave.” See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 

1415.

 

6 We recognize that there may be some instances in which the 

front door is not the entrance used by visitors. Despite 

Carroll’s argument to the contrary, this is not one such 

instance.
11

Second, the purpose of a “knock and talk” must be to

interview the occupants of a home, not to conduct a search. 

See id. at 1416 n.4 (“[I]t is not a Fourth Amendment search to 

approach the home in order to speak with the occupant, 

because all are invited to do that. . . . But no one is impliedly 

invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to 

do nothing but conduct a search.”); Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520 

(noting that the “knock and talk” exception may apply

“[w]here officers are pursuing a lawful objective, 

unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities 

of criminal activity” (emphasis added)). In Jardines, for 

example, the officer’s entry into the curtilage violated the 

Fourth Amendment because his “behavior objectively 

reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what 

anyone would think he had license to do.” 133 S. Ct. at 1417.

Third, a “knock and talk” encounter must begin at the 

front door because that is where police officers, like any other 

visitors, have an implied invitation to go. It is well settled that 

“the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or 

license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by 

solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” Id. at 1415 

(quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951))

(internal quotation marks omitted). This implied invitation 

“typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the 

front path . . . . Complying with the terms of that traditional 

invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is 

generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl 

Scouts and trick-or-treaters.” Id. at 1415.

Although officers have a right to knock at the front 

door while executing a “knock and talk,” this right does not 

“necessarily extend[] to the officers the right to enter 
12

[elsewhere] into the curtilage.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520. In 

Marasco, we recognized that an officer’s entry into other 

parts of the curtilage “after not receiving an answer at the

front door might be reasonable” in limited situations. Id.

(emphasis added). However, we rejected the “sweeping 

proposition” that “officers may proceed to the back of a home 

when they do not receive an answer at the front door any time 

they have a legitimate purpose for approaching the house in 

the first place.” Id. at 519-20.

In this case, Carroll cannot avail himself of the “knock 

and talk” exception to the warrant requirement because he 

entered the back of the Carmans’ property without 

approaching the front door first. Carroll contends that the 

layout of the Carmans’ property “made the back door the 

most expedient and direct access to the house from where the 

troopers had to park.” Carroll Br. at 18. While it may have 

been more convenient for the troopers to cut through the 

backyard and knock on the back door, the Fourth Amendment 

is not grounded in expediency. The “knock and talk” 

exception requires that police officers begin their encounter at 

the front door, where they have an implied invitation to go. 

This exception does not license officers to bypass the front 

door and enter other parts of the curtilage based on where 

they park their cars. Because Carroll did not knock on the 

Carmans’ front door, but instead proceeded directly through 

the back of their property, his intrusion cannot be justified as 

a “knock and talk.” Accordingly, Carroll’s warrantless entry 

into the Carmans’ curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment 

as a matter of law.

C.

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government 
13

officials are shielded from civil liability for conduct that does 

not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Therefore, 

in determining whether Carroll is entitled to qualified 

immunity for violating the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment 

rights, we must decide whether these rights were “clearly 

established at the time of [Carroll’s] alleged misconduct. 

Qualified immunity is applicable unless [his] conduct violated 

a clearly established constitutional right.” See id. at 232

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“An individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in the 

curtilage of his home has been well settled for over a 

century.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 521 n.13. Over a decade ago, 

in Marasco, we made clear that an officer’s right to knock at 

the front door while conducting a “knock and talk” does not 

carry a concomitant right to enter other parts of the curtilage. 

We established that “entry into the curtilage after not 

receiving an answer at the front door might be” justified 

under the “knock and talk” exception in limited situations. Id. 

at 520 (emphasis added). Because Carroll bypassed the front 

door completely, he exceeded the boundaries of the “knock 

and talk” exception. Based on Marasco, which pre-dated 

Carroll’s conduct, it was clearly established that the trooper’s

warrantless entry into the Carmans’ curtilage violated their 

Fourth Amendment rights.

Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s denial of the 

Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect 
14

to their unlawful entry claim.

7

D.

We next address Andrew Carman’s unreasonable 

seizure claim. It is undisputed that Carroll seized Carman

when he grabbed Carman’s arm. Thus, the relevant question 

is whether there was a “minimum quantum of evidence from 

which the jury could have rationally reached [its] verdict” that 

the seizure was reasonable. See Dutton v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

“[S]ubject only to a few well-defined exceptions, 

warrantless . . . seizures are per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 

347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Ross, 466 

U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)). However, “an officer may, 

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, 

investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. 

(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000))

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a 

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 

maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts 

known to the officer at the time.”). This right to conduct an 

 

7 Because we hold that Carroll’s warrantless entry violated 

the Fourth Amendment, entitling the Carmans to judgment as 

a matter of law, we do not address the Carmans’ challenge to 

the District Court’s jury instructions.
15

“investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use 

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect 

it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 

Based on the facts presented at trial, there was a

“minimum quantum of evidence” from which a jury could 

rationally conclude that Carroll’s conduct was reasonable. 

Carroll testified that he was unsure of Carman’s identity at 

the time, did not know whether he was dealing with Zita, and 

did not know why this unidentified man approached him and 

Roberts with such hostility. Thus, a jury could rationally find 

that Carroll had reasonable suspicion to momentarily question 

Carman to ascertain his identity. Moreover, based on 

Carroll’s testimony that he thought Carman might be an

armed car thief and feared that the man was reaching for a 

weapon, a jury could rationally find that Carroll was justified 

in momentarily grabbing Carman’s arm to effectuate a stop. 

Because the facts provide a minimum amount of evidence to 

support the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably, we 

affirm the jury verdict on the unreasonable seizure claim. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and 

reverse in part the judgment of the District Court. As to the

unlawful entry claim, we reverse the District Court’s denial of 

the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. We 

remand the case with the direction that judgment be entered 

in the Carmans’ favor and that a new trial be ordered with 

respect to damages. As to the unreasonable seizure claim, we 

affirm the jury verdict and the District Court’s denial of 

judgment as a matter of law.
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