Filed 12/12/23 In re S.A. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re S.A., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D082538

 (Super. Ct. No. NJ13627I)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Affirmed.

Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

A.M. (Stepfather) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying him 

presumed father status under Family Code1 section 7611, subdivision (d) and 

excluding him from the dependency proceeding for his wife’s minor daughter, 

S.A. He contends the juvenile court’s order is not supported by substantial 

evidence. He further asserts that the juvenile court erred by improperly 

requiring him to show a specific duration that he acted as S.A.’s parent and

by improperly assuming his drug use disqualified him from presumed father 

status. After Stepfather appealed, the Agency moved to dismiss, contending

the order was interlocutory and not appealable because it preceded the 

juvenile court’s dispositional order, which the Agency argues is the first 

appealable order in a dependency proceeding. On the merits, the Agency

contends the order is supported by substantial evidence and the court did not 

err.

We agree with Stepfather that the order denying him presumed father 

status is appealable as a final judgment against him because it was “the end 

of the matter” for him in the dependency proceeding. (See In re Sheila B.

(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 197 (Sheila B.) [predisposition order dismissing 

petition on the merits is appealable because “[i]t is the end of the matter”].) 

On the merits, however, we agree with the Agency. The juvenile court’s order 

was supported by substantial evidence, and the record does not compel a 

finding that Stepfather openly held out S.A. as his own child, as required by 

section 7611, subdivision (d). We also disagree with Stepfather that the court 

imposed an improper duration requirement or concluded that Stepfather’s 

drug use disqualified him from presumed father status. Therefore, we affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Agency Investigation and Proceedings Before Paternity Determination

Late at night in early February 2023, police found five-year-old S.A. 

and Stepfather asleep in a vehicle parked at a casino. Stepfather appeared to 

be under the influence, and officers found bags of fentanyl in his pocket and 

bags of methamphetamine on the vehicle’s floor. Officers also found cans, 

bleach, and other dangerous chemicals in the vehicle, which were accessible 

to S.A. and could have caused her serious injury or death. After locating 

Mother in the casino, police arrested her and Stepfather for child cruelty, 

among other charges, and detained S.A.

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency), 

which had previously opened an investigation regarding S.A. after Mother’s 

arrest for shoplifting in late December 2022, continued its investigation. 

Until Mother and Stepfather’s arrests on February 3, 2023, the Agency had 

been unable to locate them or S.A. A few days later, the Agency filed a 

juvenile dependency petition on S.A.’s behalf. At the detention hearing, 

Mother identified M.M. as S.A.’s likely biological father. She asserted, 

however, that Stepfather qualified as S.A.’s presumed father under section 

7611, subdivision (d) because he lived with S.A. in early 2020, provided for 

her, and acted as her father figure. The juvenile court designated Stepfather 

and M.M. as alleged fathers and ordered them both to appear at the next 

hearing.

According to the Agency’s detention report, S.A. reported that

Stepfather spit on, choked, and physically intimidated Mother, which made 

S.A. feel “horrible.” Mother had a history of substance abuse, criminal 

activity, and domestic violence, and nine of her children were removed from 

her care between 2002 and 2017. Mother reported that S.A. was enrolled in 
4

school when she lived in Texas, and she claimed the methamphetamine that 

police found belonged to Stepfather.

When the Agency first spoke with Stepfather in late February 2023, he 

asked to be involved in S.A.’s dependency case. He was appointed counsel on 

March 1, 2023. Like Mother, Stepfather had a child welfare history. In 2017, 

he lost parental rights to one child, and his other child had lived with his 

mother since 2016.

The Agency’s jurisdiction and disposition report indicated that Mother 

confirmed M.M. was S.A.’s biological father. M.M. was in prison and had met 

S.A. only one time on the day he was sentenced. S.A.’s birth certificate did 

not list either Stepfather or M.M. as parents.

Throughout the Agency’s investigation, Mother, S.A., and Stepfather 

provided differing information about where S.A. had lived and when. S.A., 

reported that she had lived in a car before the investigation. S.A. also said 

she and Mother had lived at her grandfather’s house in Mexico. Meanwhile, 

Mother told the Agency that she and S.A. lived with maternal grandfather in 

Texas until December 2022 and that they moved to San Diego so that S.A. 

could see Stepfather and Mother could try to visit with her other children. 

Through counsel, Mother also stated that Stepfather had started living with 

S.A. in 2020. Her counsel additionally stated that Mother and S.A. were in 

California from December 2020 until December 2022 but were only in San 

Diego for the holidays in early 2023 and intended to leave the night Mother 

was arrested. Mother later reported that she had been living “back and 

forth” with maternal grandmother in Florida and maternal grandfather in 

Texas. In contrast, Stepfather claimed he met and began living with S.A. 

from the age of three in May 2020, but on his parentage inquiry form, he 

stated that he lived with S.A. from September 2020 to April 2022 and again 
5

from December 2022 to her removal. Meanwhile, Stepfather’s parole agent 

reported that Stepfather did not meet Mother until December 2022.

Stepfather and Mother began supervised visits with S.A. in late 

February 2023. Stepfather asked the Agency if he could bring homemade 

food that he knew S.A. liked. Mother reported that S.A. was very close to her 

and Stepfather and that S.A. was “always” asking to return home to them.

In mid-March 2023, the Agency suspended Stepfather’s visits after 

learning of a Criminal Protective Order prohibiting him from contact with 

S.A. unless the juvenile court ordered otherwise. During the same period, 

S.A. asked to visit Stepfather and expressed that she would like to live with 

Mother and him. In the same conversation, S.A. also said that she would like 

to live with maternal aunt and uncle and her sibling, with whom she was 

later placed.

On April 5, 2023, Stepfather filed a parentage inquiry form providing 

information about his relationship with S.A. It indicated that he and Mother 

married on April 9, 2021, and that S.A. lived with him from September 2020 

through April 2022 and from December 2022 until her removal in February 

2023. Stepfather confirmed that he had never been ordered to pay child 

support for S.A., never signed a paper or declaration stating he was S.A.’s 

father, was not on S.A.’s birth certificate, and that a court never adjudicated 

him as S.A.’s father. In response to a question asking if he told anyone he 

was S.A.’s father, Stepfather checked the box for “Yes.” When asked to list 

the names, relationships, and addresses of those individuals, he wrote in 

“[f]amily, friends,” but did not provide any names or addresses. In response 

to a question asking if he had supported S.A. and in what way, he wrote, 

“Provided food, shelter, clothing, emotional support and nurturing, teaching 

her things (alphabet/counting).” He stated that he would present witnesses 
6

who knew that he claimed S.A. as his daughter and that she identified him as 

her father.

At a hearing the same day, M.M. provided the juvenile court with a 

June 2021 judgment of paternity from the family court. M.M. and Stepfather 

both requested presumed father status, and Mother joined Stepfather’s 

request. The court deferred the issue of paternity but granted the Agency 

discretion to permit supervised visitation for Stepfather.

In an interview two weeks later, S.A. said she was happy in her 

placement but wished she could visit with Stepfather, whom she referred to 

as her “dad.” When the Agency later informed Stepfather he could begin 

video visits with S.A., he cried and expressed appreciation and excitement. 

During those twice-a-week video visits with Stepfather and Mother, S.A. 

often baby-talked, babbled, and made screaming and screeching noises. At a 

visit in late April 2023, she shouted that she was “done visiting,” and she did 

not want to visit again for 10 days.

The following month, S.A.’s caregivers—maternal aunt and uncle—

reported concerns that nearly six-year-old S.A. had trauma related to food 

because she constantly asked for food, hid food in her room, requested a 

snack a few minutes after eating a meal, and struggled to understand which 

meals occurred at which times of day. They also reported S.A. did not know 

how to write her name correctly, did not know the full alphabet, and was 

behind in learning numbers. S.A.’s school counselor similarly reported that 

S.A. was behind academically, had not previously attended school, did not 

discuss Mother or Stepfather, and instead referred to maternal aunt and 

uncle as her parents.

During a late May 2023 video visit with Mother, S.A. asked where 

Stepfather was. Although she referred to him as a parent, she also asked to 
7

speak to her “real dad,” M.M. At a June 1, 2023 visit, S.A. expressed sadness 

that Stepfather had missed a prior visit but informed him that M.M. was her 

“real dad” and disputed that Stepfather held this position. When asked by 

Mother, S.A. claimed she disliked M.M. and preferred Stepfather. However, 

S.A. later told maternal aunt that she liked M.M., wished to visit him, and 

did not want Mother and Stepfather to know her feelings about M.M.

At a video visit about a week later, Stepfather and S.A. played with 

Legos. Then S.A. repeatedly told Stepfather and Mother to “go to jail” and hit 

herself with her fists on the sides of her face.

II. Paternity Hearing and Determination

At the July 19, 2023 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the 

juvenile court continued its decision on disposition due to outstanding issues 

under the Indian Child Welfare Act, but it went forward with evaluating 

paternity and jurisdiction. In support of Stepfather’s request for presumed 

father status, the court received into evidence Stepfather’s parentage inquiry 

form and a screenshot from the sheriff’s website estimating Stepfather’s 

release date as August 1, 2023.

Stepfather testified at the hearing that he had met and lived with S.A. 

since the age of three in 2019 or 2020, and that S.A. called him “dad.” When 

asked what kinds of things he did with S.A. while acting as her father, 

Stepfather responded that “[s]he had everything she needed” and that he 

provided a home and emotional support for her. When his counsel asked if he 

provided food and clothing for her, Stepfather responded, “That little girl had 

everything.” As for family activities, Stepfather testified that they went to 

the park and he bought toys for S.A. He testified that they loved to draw, 

worked on the alphabet and numbers, and discussed S.A.’s schooling.
8

On cross-examination, Stepfather testified that when he met S.A. for 

the first time, she asked if he was her dad, and he and Mother said “no.” He 

explained that he and Mother “hung out and stuff,” and S.A. “just decided 

[he] was going to be her dad.” He said “it took a minute for [him] to accept 

it . . . [b]ut she grew onto [him].” He testified that he lived apart from S.A. 

and Mother twice—once during a seven-day incarceration and once for about 

a month.

During closing arguments, Stepfather’s counsel asked the juvenile 

court to elevate Stepfather to presumed father status under section 7611, 

subdivision (d). The Agency argued that the juvenile court should deny the 

request under In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202 (T.R.) because the 

conditions S.A. was found in, including Stepfather being under the influence 

of fentanyl and having drugs in the car, showed that Stepfather had acted 

“contrary to being a father.”

After hearing the parties’ arguments and considering the evidence, the 

juvenile court issued its ruling. The court first observed that it “did not hear 

any testimony as to when [Stepfather] began to see himself in a paternal role 

to [S.A.]” and that it did not hear any testimony regarding “when he began to 

see [S.A.] in a way to indicate that he held her out as his own or viewed 

himself in a parental role to her.” The court stated that Stepfather “need[ed] 

to openly receive [S.A.] into his home” and “openly hold her out as his natural 

child.” It observed “[t]here simply was not enough information provided . . . 

to be able to put a time line on that.”

The court further noted the conditions S.A. was found in, including that 

drugs were accessible to her while Stepfather was under the influence. The 

court continued, “I know that [Stepfather’s] testimony is that [S.A.] had 

everything she wanted whenever she wanted . . . [b]ut based on the 
9

conditions that she was found under and the fact that [he] was, in fact, 

charged with felony child cruelty and child abuse, his characterization of how 

[S.A.] was cared for by him is belied by the facts in this case.” The court 

concluded Stepfather had not met his burden by a preponderance of the 

evidence and denied his request to elevate him to presumed father status. It 

then struck Stepfather as an alleged father from the petition, removed him 

from the proceedings, and ordered his counsel relieved “upon notice of a filing 

of a notice of appeal” or within 60 days.

Stepfather appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Appealability

We first address the threshold question of appealability. The Agency 

argues that Stepfather’s appeal must be dismissed as being from a 

nonappealable interlocutory order because Stepfather appeals from a 

predisposition order, even though the disposition order is the first appealable 

order in a juvenile dependency case. We disagree.

Appeals in dependency proceedings are governed by Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 395, subdivision (a)(1), which provides that “[a]

judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same 

manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as 

an order after judgment.” The juvenile court’s disposition order, and not its 

jurisdictional finding, is generally considered the “ ‘first appealable order’ ” in 

a dependency proceeding. (In re Nicholas E. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 458, 

463.) Nonetheless, appellate courts have concluded that predisposition 

orders can be appealable where they are sufficiently “final.” (See, e.g., ibid.; 

Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 197.) That conclusion is consistent 

with Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a), which permits an 
10

appeal “[f]rom a judgment,” defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 577 as 

“the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or 

proceeding.”

In Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 197, for example, the appellate 

court concluded that an order dismissing a dependency petition on the 

merits—despite occurring before the court’s disposition order—was 

appealable because “[i]t [wa]s the end of the matter, and the child goes 

home.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the court’s order here, which denied Stepfather 

presumed father status and relieved him of counsel, was “the end of the 

matter” for Stepfather because it excluded him from the dependency 

proceeding without further recourse in the juvenile court. (See ibid.)

We recognize, as did the court in Sheila B., that allowing an appeal 

from a predisposition order is not a perfect solution, particularly given the 

passage of time before an appeal can be concluded and the potential for 

disruption in the event of a reversal. (See Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 197–198.) But the alternative—waiting until the juvenile court issues a 

disposition order—is even less attractive. As was the case here, disposition 

hearings are often continued, sometimes for extended periods. Postponing an 

appeal until after a disposition order would cause even more delay, making a 

reversal even more disruptive. Moreover, because Stepfather was excluded 

from all further proceedings and his court-appointed counsel was relieved, 

there was no practical way that he could learn when the disposition order 

had been issued, and at that point, he would not have any counsel to file his 

notice of appeal.

Accordingly, we conclude the court’s predisposition order denying 

Stepfather presumed father status and excluding him from further 
11

proceedings is appealable, and the Agency’s motion to dismiss is denied. We 

next consider the merits.

II. Presumed Father

A. Applicable Law

In dependency proceedings, “the premise behind the category of 

presumed father is that an individual who has demonstrated a commitment 

to the child and the child’s welfare—regardless of whether he is biologically 

the father—is entitled to the elevated status of presumed fatherhood.” (T.R., 

supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1211–1212.) Section 7611, subdivision (d) 

provides that someone is a child’s presumed father if he both “receives the 

child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.” It 

is the burden of the person claiming entitlement to presumed father status to 

establish these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Spencer W.

(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653 (Spencer W.); § 7611, subd. (d).)

When determining whether a person has satisfied the statutory 

requirements of receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the 

child as his own, courts have considered a number of factors, including 

“whether the man actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether he 

paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so; 

whether he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether 

he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how 

long he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that he had 

acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom he had acknowledged 

the child; whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with 

him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued completion 

of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was merely incidental.”

(T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) No single factor is determinative,
12

and the court may consider all the circumstances in making its decision. 

(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774 (R.M.).)

B. Standard of Review

We review a juvenile court’s determination of presumed father status 

for substantial evidence. (Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 

361, 368 (Charisma R.).) Under the substantial evidence standard, “[w]e 

must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and 

decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 369.)

Because Stepfather bore the burden of establishing presumed father 

status, and the juvenile court found that he failed to meet his burden, the 

substantial evidence standard requires him to demonstrate that the evidence 

compels a finding in his favor. Specifically, the question becomes whether his 

evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached; and (2) of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it 

was insufficient to support a finding in his favor. (Kinder v. Capistrano 

Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 811.)

To the extent Stepfather claims that the juvenile court considered 

impermissible factors in its evaluation, we review his claims de novo.

C. Analysis

Stepfather contends the juvenile court erred by not elevating him to 

presumed father status under section 7611, subdivision (d). We disagree.

First, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Stepfather 

failed to meet his burden of showing that he openly acknowledged S.A. as his 

own child. Although he checked a box in his parentage inquiry form 

indicating that he told others he was S.A.’s father, short of vaguely 

referencing “[f]amily, friends,” he failed to identify any of these purported 
13

individuals by name, relationship, or address, as the form asked. Nor did he 

offer any testimony at the hearing that he had held out S.A. as his child or to 

whom he had done so. (Cf. Charisma R., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 

[nonbiological parent held out child as her own in birth announcement, online 

message board for women trying to conceive, and communications with 

visiting former coworker, the nurse at a medical visit, and strangers in the 

street].) There was also no evidence that, for example, Stepfather named 

S.A. as his child on insurance or other paperwork. (Cf. In re L.L. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1314 [evidence sufficient to support court’s finding that 

man held out child as his own where he named child as his own on insurance 

and employment forms; told family, friends, and strangers that child was his; 

and filed action to obtain joint legal custody].) For these reasons alone, the 

evidence did not compel a finding that Stepfather “ ‘openly and publicly’ ” 

acknowledged S.A. as his child. (Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1652.)

Stepfather argues that the juvenile court erred by finding there was 

“not enough information” as to “when [Stepfather] began to see himself in a 

parental role to [S.A.]” or “when he began to see [S.A.] in a way to indicate 

that he held her out as his own.” We disagree with Stepfather’s contention 

that the court’s comments show it imposed an impermissible “duration 

requirement” on his relationship with S.A. (See Jason P. v. Danielle S. (2017) 

9 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1021 (Jason P.) [“ ‘A party seeking to establish he is a 

presumed parent is not required to show that he acted as a parent to the 

child for a specific period.’ ”].) Rather, the court was merely articulating the 

lack of clarity surrounding the nature of Stepfather’s purported parental 

relationship with S.A. and at what point it came about. Other courts, too, 

have considered evidence regarding the “timeline” of a purported parental 
14

relationship and the specific periods of time during which an individual 

“received” a child into his home or as his own. (See, e.g., In re M.R. (2017) 

7 Cal.App.5th 886, 899 [in concluding substantial evidence supported court’s 

presumed father finding, appellate court recounted specific time periods and 

dates during which presumed father “received” child into home or visited 

child].) We see no error in the juvenile court’s observation that the evidence 

of a parental relationship fell short because it was not sufficiently clear and 

unambiguous. (See Jason P., supra, at p. 1023 [under section 7611, 

subdivision (d), “ ‘receipt of the child into the home must be sufficiently 

unambiguous as to constitute a clear declaration regarding the nature of the 

relationship, but it need not continue for any specific duration’ ” (italics 

added)].)

Moreover, construing the evidence in favor of the judgment as we must, 

the record demonstrates other factors, too, weighing against a finding of 

presumed father status. For example, Stepfather’s relationship with S.A. 

could reasonably be considered only “incidental” to his relationship with 

Mother. (T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) “ ‘Section 7611, 

subdivision (d) . . . requires . . . “someone who has demonstrated an abiding 

commitment to the child and the child’s well-being” regardless of his 

relationship with the mother.’ ” (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 144-

145.) Yet, Stepfather offered no evidence of any instances during which he 

spent time with S.A. on his own or cared for her outside of his relationship 

with Mother. (See R.M., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 [person seeking 

presumed parent status under section 7611, subdivision (d) must have a fully 

developed parental relationship with the child; a caretaking role and/or 

romantic involvement with the child’s parent is insufficient].)
15

Stepfather sees the evidence differently. But each of his arguments 

requires that we impermissibly reweigh the evidence against the juvenile 

court’s order or construe inferences in his favor. That is not our role when 

reviewing an order for substantial evidence. (Charisma R., supra, 

175 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 [“ ‘It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes 

in the evidence,’ ” and we instead “ ‘[m]ust accept as true all evidence and all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness 

of the trial court’s findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of 

the judgment.’ ”].)

As one example, Stepfather emphasizes evidence that he gave S.A. 

“everything she needed,” including “food, shelter, clothing, emotional support 

and nurturing.” Yet, evidence also showed that after S.A. was detained with 

her caregivers, she constantly asked for food, hid food in her room, requested 

a snack a few minutes after eating a meal, and struggled to understand how 

mealtimes worked. Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably infer 

Stepfather had not, in fact, given S.A. “everything she needed” as he 

claimed—especially considering the circumstances surrounding the discovery 

of Stepfather asleep and under the influence in a vehicle with five-year-old 

S.A. and easily accessible bags of fentanyl and methamphetamine and 

dangerous chemicals. (See Charisma R., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 

[“ ‘Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two 

or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this 

court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those 

of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the 

absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn’ ”].)

In a related argument, Stepfather asserts the juvenile court erred by 

adopting the Agency’s argument at the hearing, based on T.R., supra,
16

132 Cal.App.4th 1202, that Stepfather should be “disqualified” from 

presumed father status because of his drug use. While we agree that “a 

parent need not be a perfect parent to be found to have received a child into 

his . . . home” (Jason P., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1023), we disagree with 

Stepfather that the juvenile court required such perfection of him or that the 

record shows the court considered his drug use as a basis to disqualify him 

from presumed father status. On the contrary, the juvenile court discussed 

Stepfather’s drug use and “the conditions that [S.A.] was found to be living 

under” to explain why it did not find credible his testimony that S.A. had 

“everything she needed.” Moreover, there is simply no indication that, in 

reaching its decision, the juvenile court relied on the Agency’s arguments 

under T.R.

As another example, Stepfather points to evidence showing he helped 

S.A. with learning the alphabet and numbers, and discussed school with her. 

But again, other evidence undermined that testimony. S.A. told the Agency 

that she had not been to school in a long time, and her school counselor 

reported that S.A. had not previously attended school until her placement 

with maternal aunt and uncle. Evidence also showed that S.A. could not 

write her name, did not know the alphabet, and was behind in learning 

numbers. Accordingly, the court was not required to find Stepfather’s 

testimony credible. Although Stepfather suggests that S.A.’s learning deficits 

could be explained by a potential learning disability or other obstacle, we 

must construe all inferences and conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 

court’s order, not in favor of a finding for Stepfather.

Stepfather further highlights evidence that S.A. called him “dad,” 

wanted to live with him, and asked to see him for visits. Other evidence, 

however, indicates that S.A. similarly referred to her maternal aunt and 
17

uncle as her parents and to her biological father as her “real dad.” Although 

evidence surrounding S.A.’s view of Stepfather as her parent and Stepfather’s 

view of S.A. as his child was relevant to the paternity determination, the 

totality of the evidence did not compel a finding in his favor on presumed 

father status. We cannot conclude the juvenile court erred in finding such 

evidence insufficient to show Stepfather carried his burden under section 

7611, subdivision (d). (See R.M., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 [no single 

factor is determinative, and the court may consider all the circumstances in 

making its decision.].)

For the same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Stepfather’s arguments 

regarding when he claims to have lived with S.A. Stepfather contends it is 

“undisputed” that S.A. lived with him and Mother from 2020 through her 

detention in February 2023. Although Stepfather testified to having lived 

with S.A. beginning in May 2020 through her removal, the record is replete 

with evidence contradicting that timeline, including Stepfather’s own 

statement in the parentage inquiry form that he lived with S.A. from 

September 2020 to April 2022 and again from December 2022 until her 

removal. Meanwhile, S.A. reported that she and Mother lived at her 

grandfather’s home in Mexico. Mother, too, claimed a number of 

contradictory timelines and residences, including that she and S.A. had lived 

back-and-forth with maternal grandmother in Florida and maternal 

grandfather in Texas, including from December of 2020 to December 2022—

without mentioning that Stepfather lived with them during these periods. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court could have discounted Stepfather’s testimony 

and inferred that the evidence was too conflicting to determine whether, 

when, or for how long Stepfather lived with S.A. (Charisma R., supra, 
18

175 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [substantial evidence review requires resolving 

evidentiary conflicts in support of judgment].)

For all these reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supports the 

court’s findings that Stepfather had not received S.A. into his home and had 

not openly held her out as his own child. We further conclude that the 

juvenile court did not consider impermissible criteria in making this 

determination.2

DISPOSITION

The July 19, 2023 order is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

2 Because we affirm, we need not address Stepfather’s additional 

argument that the juvenile court on remand must consider whether S.A. 

would suffer detriment by only recognizing two parents under section 7612, 

subdivision (c) before determining whether S.A.’s biological father’s judgment 

of paternity would have rebutted Stepfather’s presumed parent status under 

section 7612, subdivision (d). (See id., subd. (c) [“a court may find that more 

than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if 

the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the 

child”]; id., subd. (d) [“Unless a court orders otherwise after making the 

determination specified in subdivision (c), a presumption under Section 7611

is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another 

person”].) As Stepfather concedes in his reply brief, the juvenile court’s 

finding that Stepfather did not qualify for presumed father status meant that 

a detriment analysis under section 7612, subdivision (c) “would have been 

purely academic.”