IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 148

 October Term, A.D. 2014

November 19, 2014

DHARMINDER VIR SEN,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-14-0113

ORDER REMANDING FOR RESENTENCING

[¶1] This matter came before the Court upon a “Stipulated Motion to Remand for 

New Sentencing Hearing,” e-filed herein October 31, 2014. After a careful review of the 

motion and the file, this Court finds as follows. This Court agrees with the parties that 

this matter should be remanded for resentencing in light of this Court’s recent opinion in 

Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014). There, this Court held 

that “the teachings of the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy require sentencing courts to 

provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a 

juvenile’s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ when, as here, the 

aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without parole.” Id., ¶ 33, 

334 P.3d at 141-42. Based on the district court’s statements on the record, this Court 

agrees with the parties that the district court did not consider the analysis from Miller v. 

Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) “in light of the entire sentencing 

package.” Bear Cloud, supra, at ¶ 48. This Court agrees that Appellant should be 

resentenced based on the considerations noted in Bear Cloud.

[¶2] This Court also finds that it should clarify a matter with regard to parole 

eligibility. When this Court initially reversed Appellant’s and Mr. Bear Cloud’s 

sentences, this Court instructed that, if a sentence of life according to law was imposed, 

the district court must specify a period of parole ineligibility. See Bear Cloud v. State, 

2013 WY 18, ¶ 47, 294 P.3d 36, 47-48 (Wyo. 2013) (“because the current statutory 

scheme provides no other method by which to determine parole eligibility, we hold that 

when a trial court imposes a sentence of life imprisonment according to law upon a 

juvenile homicide offender, the trial court must also pronounce a specific period of time 
which must pass before the juvenile becomes parole eligible.”). The district court here 

did as instructed. It imposed a sentence of life according to law, with the specification 

that Appellant was eligible for parole on that sentence after 35 years. This Court 

concludes that, at the resentencing required by this order, the district court is neither

required nor authorized to specify a period of parole ineligibility. 

[¶3] Normally, this Court would not address this parole eligibility issue, inasmuch as 

the parties did not include the issue in their stipulation (although Appellant raised the 

issue in his brief). However, this Court will address the issue here, for two reasons. For 

one, the State, in its brief, concedes Appellant’s life sentence is subject to parole 

eligibility after 25 years. In its brief, 

The State agrees that, at the time Sen was resentenced and currently, 

Wyoming law provides that any person currently serving a sentence of life 

according to law, who was sentenced as a juvenile, may be paroled after 

serving twenty-five years of that life sentence if otherwise eligible. Sen 

will benefit from the law [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c)], regardless of the 

district court’s statement in the Judgment and Sentence.

Brief of Appellee, p. 32. Second, this Court recently clarified that “[a]ny juvenile 

offender sentenced to life imprisonment under the former law is now, by operation of the 

amended parole statutes, serving a sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for 

parole in twenty-five years, and a juvenile offender serving such a sentence is not 

required to file a Rule 35 motion to implement that revised sentence.” State v. Mares, 

2014 WY 126, ¶ 26, 335 P.3d 487, 498 (Wyo. 2014). Based on the foregoing, this Court 

concludes the district court is neither authorized nor required to establish a period for 

parole ineligibility on a sentence of life according to law. It is, therefore, 

[¶4] ORDERED that this Court hereby vacates the sentences imposed in the district 

court’s “Judgment and Sentence” entered on March 19, 2014 in Sheridan County District 

Court Docket CR-2009-54. This matter is remanded to the district court for resentencing

on all counts, consistent with this order; and it is further

[¶5] ORDERED that the oral argument setting in this matter is hereby vacated. The 

Court retains no jurisdiction over this matter. 

[¶6] DATED this 19

th day of November, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

E. JAMES BURKE

Chief Justice