alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

JULIUS RUSSELL KIRVEN, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-2489 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed June 6, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Glenn T. Shelby and Kelly P. Butz, Judges. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
#### Barbee v. Inman.

In chancery.

Saturday, *December*2.

A CONVEYANCE of real estate was, by the contract of the parties, to be executed on payment of the purchase-money; and the money was to be paid *on or before the first of May,*1834, The money was tendered, and the deed demanded, *on the 29th of April,*1834. *Held,*that the tender and demand were valid.

If the vendor in such case, having by the contract the right to designate the point, between two given points, for the beginning corner of the tract, refuse, when properly applied to, to exercise that right,—the point may be designated by the vendee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Balance
Sheet and the Statement of Operations filed as part of the annual report on Form
10-K and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such annual report on Form
10-K.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       6,031,809
<SECURITIES>                                 1,466,871
<RECEIVABLES>                                  161,434
<ALLOWANCES>                                    32,068
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,934,124
<PP&E>                                       2,223,299
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,043,448
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,113,975
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,444,762
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        69,911
<OTHER-SE>                                  25,666,213
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,113,975
<SALES>                                        627,390
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               627,390
<CGS>                                          283,082
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                8,543,107
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              54,461
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (7,455,973)
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</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00869-CV

Elias J. De La Garza d/b/a Elias De La Garza Insurance, Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Insurance and Commissioner of Insurance Mike Geeslin, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-10-000643, HONORABLE RHONDA HURLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings for 90 days and a

motion to withdraw as counsel of record. See Tex. R. App. P. 6.5, 10. Appellant’s lead counsel died

unexpectedly, his law firm is in the process of winding down, and the law firm is unable to continue

to represent appellant in this case. We grant the motions and stay the proceedings for 90 days or

further order of this Court.

It is ordered August 14, 2013.

Before Justices Puryear, Rose, and Goodwin
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 533

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the treatment of

frequent flyer mileage awards.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 4, 1997

Mrs. KENNELLY of Connecticut introduced the following bill; which was

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify

the treatment of frequent flyer mileage awards.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF TREATMENT OF FREQUENT

4 FLYER MILEAGE AND AWARDS.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Part III of subchapter B of chap6 ter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended

7 by redesignating section 138 as section 139 and by insert8 ing after section 137 the following new section:
2

•HR 533 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 138. FREQUENT FLYER MILEAGE AND AWARDS.

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—If an individual receives a fre3 quent flyer benefit as a result of the purchase in a trade

4 or business of property or services—

5 ‘‘(1) no amount shall be includible in such indi6 vidual’s gross income by reason of receiving such

7 benefit,

8 ‘‘(2) no deduction otherwise allowable for the

9 purchase of such property or services shall be re10 duced by reason of such benefit, and

11 ‘‘(3) no deduction shall be allowed for the por12 tion of any transportation purchased using such a

13 benefit.

14 ‘‘(b) FREQUENT FLYER BENEFIT.—For purposes of

15 this section, the term ‘frequent flyer benefit’ means any

16 right to receive (or the receipt of) air transportation serv17 ices or other benefit for an individual for free or at a re18 duced cost by reason of prior purchases of property or

19 services. Such term shall include such a right only if the

20 value of such right is de minimis relative to the cost of

21 property or services purchased in order to receive such

22 right.’’

23 (b) CLARIFICATION OF TREATMENT UNDER REIM24 BURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.—Subsection (c) of section

25 62 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the fol26 lowing new flush sentence:
3

•HR 533 IH

1 ‘‘An arrangement shall not be treated as described in

2 paragraph (2) merely because it permits the employee to

3 retain a frequent flyer benefit (as defined in section

4 138(b)).’’

5 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

6 for part III of subchapter B of chapter 1 of such Code

7 is amended by striking the last item and inserting the fol8 lowing new items:

‘‘Sec. 138. Frequent flyer mileage and awards.

‘‘Sec. 139. Cross references to other Acts.’’

9 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

10 this section shall apply to taxable years ending after the

11 date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

Timothy D. Robbins, 

Defendant,

GC Servicescorp & GC Fin Corp,

Garnishee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 98-210-PHX-SMM 

ORDER

A Writ of Garnishment, directed to Garnishee, has been duly issued and served upon

the Garnishee. Pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment, Garnishee filed an Answer on May 6,

2008, stating that at the time of the service of the Writ, it had in its possession non-exempt

earnings belonging to and due Defendant and that Garnishee was indebted to Defendant.

On April 21, 2008, Defendant was notified of his/her right to a hearing and has not

requested a hearing to determine exempt property or to object to the answer.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Garnishee pay the sum of 25% of Defendant's nonexempt earnings to Plaintiff and continue withholding Defendant's non-exempt earnings and

paying them to Plaintiff until the debt to Plaintiff is paid in full or until Garnishee

no longer has possession of any non-exempt earnings belonging to Defendant or until further

Order of this court. Checks should be made payable to Department of Justice and mailed to

Case 2:98-cv-00210-SMM Document 29 Filed 06/19/08 Page 1 of 2
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U.S. Attorney's Office, Financial Litigation Unit, 405 West Congress, Suite 4900, Tucson,

Arizona 85701-5041. 

DATED this 18th day of June, 2008.

Case 2:98-cv-00210-SMM Document 29 Filed 06/19/08 Page 2 of 2
#### John Crittenden’s Heirs *v.*Simeon Bush *&*Others.

Statute of Limitations — Filing of Suit after Lapse of Five Years.

Though the limitation of five years for filing suit, after judgment rendered, for setting same aside, has expired, the statute will not begin to run, until after the actual time of discovery of the cause of .action thereon.

Same — Demurrer.

A demurrer to such petition should not have been sustained.

APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT.

September 28, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson:

The petition alleges facts which if true, show that the judgment of dismission of 1862 was fraudulent, and a petition within five years, to set it aside, is, according to the code, the appropriate remedy. And, although more than five years had elapsed before the filing of this petition, yet the admitted allegation that the cause of action was not discovered until within less than two years, apparently prevents the bar.

And the .reason assigned for the non-discovery sooner is sufficient to repel the imputation of gross negligence.

It seems to this court therefore, that the circuit court ought to have over-ruled the demurrer to the petition and required an answer.

*193
      *Foote, Carlisle, for appellants.*

*O’Hara, for appellees.*

Wherefore the judgment sustaining demurrer and dismissing the petition is reversed, and the cause remanded.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I,John Carrozza, Chief Financial Officer of PSB Bancorp, Inc., certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PSB Bancorp, Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I am responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) and we have:

 

(a)  Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)  Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)  Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonable likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

 

1

----

 

(a)  All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

(b)  Any fraud, whetheror not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date:  August 15,2005

 

 
|   | /s/John  Carrozza       |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | John  Carrozza          |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

2

----
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT C HR ISTOPHER

OJI DAR

KINS, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. DAVID SNOW DEN, in his offic ia l c a pa c i ty a s B e ve rly

Hills C hie f of Polic e , De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 13-56865 D.C . No. 2:13-c v-03831-JLSM AN M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia Jose phine L. Staton, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d April 26, 2016 ** B e fore : M c KEOW

N , WA RDLAW , a

nd PAEZ, C i rc u it Judge s. C hristophe r Oji Da

rkins a ppe a l s pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dism issing his ac tion a lle ging viola tions of thePrivile ge s a

nd Im m unitie s C la

use of the U nite d State s C o nstitution. We have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e 

# FIL ED M AY02 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).re vie w de novo. C hubb C ustom Ins. C

o. v . Spac eSy

s./Loral, Inc
. , 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th C i r. 2013) (dismissa l for fa ilure to sta te a c la i m unde r Fe de ra l R

ule of C ivil Proc e dure 12(b)(6)); Sommatino v . Unite d State s , 255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th C ir. 2001) (dismissa l for la c k of subje c t m atte r jurisdic tion). W e a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly dism isse d Da

rkins’ a c tion be c a

use Da rkins c annot sta te a c la im dire c tly unde r the Unite d State s C onstitution. Se eArpin v . Santa C lara Valle y Transp. Age nc

y , 261 F.3d 912 (9th C ir. 2001) (“ This C ourt ha s he ld tha t a litiga nt c om pla ining of a

viola tion of a c onstitutiona

l right doe s not have a dire c t c a

use of a c tion unde r the Unite d State s C onstitution but m ust utiliz e 42 U.S.C . § 1983.” ). M ore ove r, to the e xte nt tha t Da rkins’ c o m

pla int c an be libe ra lly

c onstrue d to a lle ge c la im s unde r 42 U.S.C . § 1983, thedistric t c ourt prope rly dism isse d Darkins’ a c tion be c a

use Da rkins fa ile d to a lle ge fa c ts suffic ie nt to sta te a pla usible c la im . Se e Unite d Bldg. & C onstr. Trade

s C ounc il v . C

amde n , 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (in-sta

te re side nts “ hav e no c la im unde r the Privile ge s a

nd Im m unitie s C la use ” to c ha lle nge the ir sta t e ’ s la ws). AFFIRM E D.

1 3 - 5 6 8 6 5 2
EXHIBIT 14.1  CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

In my role as Chief Executive Officer of First Choice Health Network,

I recognize that I hold an important and elevated role in corporate governance
I am uniquely capable and empowered to ensure that stakeholders' interests are
appropriately balanced, protected and preserved. Accordingly, this Code
provides principles to which I am expected to adhere and advocate. The Code
embodies rules regarding individual and peer responsibilities, as well as
responsibilities to the company, the public and other stakeholders

I certify to you that I adhere to and advocate the following principles and
responsibilities governing my professional and ethical conduct.

To the best of my knowledge and ability:

1.  I act with honesty and integrity, avoiding actual or apparent conflicts
    of interest in personal and professional relationships, including in
    connection with disclosure included in reports and other documents filed
    with the Securities and Exchange Commission or in other public
    communications

2.  I provide constituents with information that is accurate, complete,
    objective, relevant, timely and understandable.

3.  I comply with laws, rules and regulations of federal, state, provincial and
    local governments, and other appropriate private and public regulatory
    agencies.

4.  I act in good faith, responsibly, with due care, competence, and
    diligence, without misrepresenting material facts or allowing my
    independent judgment to be subordinated.

5.  I respect the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of
       my work except when authorized or otherwise legally obligated to
       disclose.  Confidential information acquired in the course of my work is
       not used for personal advantage.

6.  I share knowledge and maintain skills important and relevant to my
    constituents' needs.

7.  I proactively promote ethical behavior as a responsible partner among
       peers in my work environment and community.

8.  I achieve responsible use of and control over all assets and resources
    employed or entrusted to me.

9.  I will report known or suspected violations of this Code to the Chairman
    of the Audit Committee.

10. I will be accountable for adhering to this code. Violations of this Code,
    including failures to report potential violations by others, will be viewed
    as a severe disciplinary matter that may result in personnel action,
    including termination of employment.


/s/
---------------------------------------
Gary Gannaway, Chief Executive Officer
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 17 - 00382 - CR TYRA FAITH COX, APPE LLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1449042D, Honorable Elizabeth Beach, Presiding



### November 17 , 2017 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. Pending before the Court is the motion of appellant Tyra Faith Cox to dismiss her appeal. Appellant and her attorney have signed the motion. T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.2(a). No decision of the Court having been delivered to date, we grant the motion. According ly, the appeal is dismissed. No motion for rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith. James T. Campbell Justice Do not publish.
Case 2:16-cr-00064-SPL Document 4 Filed 12/10/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:16-cr-00064-SPL Document 4 Filed 12/10/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:16-cr-00064-SPL Document 4 Filed 12/10/15 Page 3 of 3
THE ATNDRNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

May12, 1976 

The Honorable E. L. Short 

Chainsan 

Opinion No. H- 821 

Cossnittee on Intergovernxental Per Location of offices 

Affairs of justices of ,ths peace. 

Xouse Office Building 

P. 0. Box 2910 

Austin, Texas 70767 

Dear Representative Short: 

At the direction of the House Intergovernmental Affairs 

Cosunittee you ask: 

If a justice precinct has a population 

of more than 75,000, is the 'comissioners 

court prohibited by [article 2379, V.T.C.S.] 

from transferring the justice court frch 

the county courthouse to .another building, 

such as the county jail or a separate 

county office building? 

Article 2379, V.T.C.S., providesr 

When the justice precinct where the 

courthouse of any county is located 

contains more than seventy-five 

thousand inhabitants, the commissioners court of said oounty shall 

provide and furnish a suitable place 

in such courthouse for such justice to 

hold court. 

The statute provides that the county "shall" provide 

and furnish qualifying justices of the peace with a place 

to hold court in the courthouse. The.word, *shalla ordinarily 

implies a mandatory requirement. Attorney Gemma Opinion 

H-326 (1974). The term 'kourthouseW has been defined as 

follows: 

p. 3466 
The Honorable E. L. Short - page 2 (H-821) 

The courthouse means the building at 

the county seat in which the courts are 

held, the records kept, and the officers 

of the county maintain their offices 

and perform their functions. Harris 5 

Elder, 49 S.W.Zd 973 (Tex. Civ. App. -- 

-80 1932, writ dism'd). 

Accordingly, pursuant to the clear term of article 

2379, when a justice precinct in which the county courthouse 

is located contains more than 75,000 inhabitants, the county 

is required to provide and furnish a suitable place in the 

courthouse for the justice of the peace to hold aourt. 

Whether a particular place is suitable for the holding 

of court and whether a particular building or group of 

buildings is the courthouse involve questions of fact which 

canuot be resolved in the opinion process. Attorney General 

Opinions H-56 (19731, M-307 (19681, M-195 (19681, M-187 

(1968), C-697 (1966)) WW-277 (1957) and O-2911 (1940). 

SUMMARY 

When a justice precinct in which the 

county courthouse is located contains 

more than 75,000 inhabitants, the 

commissioners court is required to 

provide the justice of the peace 

with a suitable place to hold court 

in the courthouse. 

Very truly yours, 

rney General of Texas 

Opinion Committee 

W p. 3467