17‐2061

Adams v. Horton

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.    CITATION TO A SUMMARY

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@).    A PARTY

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY

COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in

the City of New York, on the 4th day of June, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT:   

Dennis Jacobs,

Denny Chin,

Circuit Judges,   

William F. Kuntz,

District Judge.*   

_____________________________________

Bahji Adams,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.    17‐2061

Keith Horton, individually, Georgia

Division of Child Support Services,

 

* Judge William F. Kuntz of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York, sitting by designation.
2 

Commissioner for State of Vermont for

the Office of Child Support, et al., Robyn

A Crittendon, in her official capacity as

Commissioner of the Georgia Department

of Human Services, Vermont Office of

Child Support,   

Defendants‐Appellees,

John Doe, Jane Doe,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT:    Bahji Adams, pro se, Burlington, VT.

FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy

Attorney General, Susan E. Teaster,

Michelle J. Hirsch, Senior Assistant

Attorneys General, for Christopher

M. Carr, Attorney General of the

State of Georgia, Atlanta, GA (for

Keith Horton, Georgia Division of

Child Support Services, Robyn A.

Crittenden in her official capacity as

Commissioner of the Georgia

Department of Human Services).

   

David R. Groff, Assistant Attorney

General, for Thomas J. Donovan, Jr.,

Attorney General of the State of

Vermont, Montpelier, VT (for

Commissioner of Vermont Office of

Child Support, Vermont Office of

Child Support).
3

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Vermont (Murtha, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.   

Appellant Bahji Adams, pro se, sued Georgia and Vermont child support

offices and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, challenging the defendants’ enforcement of a

child support order against her.    The district court dismissed the complaint as to

the Georgia defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine as to the Vermont

defendants.    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.   

“We review a district court’s dismissal of an action for want of personal

jurisdiction de novo, construing all pleadings and affidavits in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff[s] and resolving all doubts in the plaintiff[s’] favor.”    Licci

ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations

in original).    We review a district court’s application of the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine

de novo.    Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005).    We

review a district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint for abuse of

discretion.    Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir.

2012).

Adams’s complaint, like others she has filed, challenges the Georgia child

support order and the Vermont enforcement of that order by arguing that the

defendants did not consider her disabilities.    These challenges are barred by the

Rooker‐Feldman doctrine.    That doctrine states that federal courts lack jurisdiction

over “cases brought by state‐court losers complaining of injuries caused by state‐

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review of those judgments.”    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).   
4

All four elements are present here.    Adams lost in state court (both Georgia

and Vermont), seeks redress for injuries caused by those orders (child support),

functionally seeks review and rejection of those orders, and filed herfederal lawsuit

after the orders were entered in the state proceedings.    Adams dresses up her

claims as failures to accommodate her disabilities, but she primarily complains

about the child support amount ordered by a court, and the accommodation she

seeks is to reduce the amount.    She thus attacks the orders by challenging the

defendants’ enforcement.    Her claim is therefore barred by Rooker‐Feldman.    See,

e.g., Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 (“[A] federal suit complains of injury from a state‐court

judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the

third party’s actions are produced by a state‐court judgment and not simply

ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.”).   

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend as

to the Rooker‐Feldman issue.    Ordinarily, district courts should not dismiss a pro se

complaint without permitting at least one opportunity to amend; but leave to

amend is not necessary if it would be futile.    See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,

112 (2d Cir. 2000).    Here, Adams has twice sought (unsuccessfully) to challenge

her child support obligation through federal lawsuits alleging violations of the

ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and due process.    Nothing in her brief gives any

indication that she would be successful were she given another attempt to assert

her claims.   

We have considered all of Adams’s remaining arguments and find them to

be without merit.    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.   

FOR THE COURT:   

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court