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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Miguel Corzo,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Maricopa County Community College 

District, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-15-02552-PHX-ESW

ORDER 

The Court has reviewed: (i) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 151); (ii) Defendant Glaspers’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 155); and (iii) 

Defendant Maricopa County Community College District’s (the “District”) Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 156).1

 Defendants have joined in one another’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 157). Plaintiff’s “Objection to Defendants’ Notice of Joinder 

Regarding Separate Motions for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 166) is overruled. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 1. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s and Defendant Glasper’s 

Motions (Docs. 151, 155) are denied and the District’s Motion (Doc. 156) is granted in 

part and denied in part.2

 

1 The parties have consented to proceeding before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and 28 U.S.C.§ 636(c). (Doc. 9). 

2 Although requested, the Court does not find that oral argument on the Motions would assist the Court in its determination of the issues. The parties have fully briefed 

their respective positions. Therefore, oral argument is unnecessary, and the parties’ 
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I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the termination of Plaintiff’s 28-year career in the 

District’s Information Technology Services Department following database breaches in 

2011 and 2013. (Doc. 190, ¶ 1; Doc. 159, ¶¶ 34, 41; Doc. 192, ¶¶ 34, 41). In May 2013, 

the District issued a Staff Policy Manual that attached as Appendix C a separate group 

manual for “Management, Administrative, & Technical” (“MAT”) employees 

(collectively, the “MAT Policy Manual” or the “Manual”). (Doc. 159, ¶ 1; Doc. 192, ¶ 

1). Plaintiff was a MAT group employee. (Doc. 190, ¶ 11). The Manual distinguishes 

between “classified” and “unclassified” employees. (Id., ¶ 12). The Manual provides 

that MAT employees are “classified.” (Id.). A process for terminating classified 

employees is detailed in the Manual. (Doc. 159, ¶ 2; Doc. 192, ¶ 2). In his eleven-count 

Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Manual created an employment 

contract and that the District failed to follow the procedures therein when it terminated 

his employment on July 22, 2014.3

 (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 339-43).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when reviewed in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material in a case and “only 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, 

 request is denied. 

3 The following three counts were dismissed pursuant to the parties’ stipulation: (i) Count VI—Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Against the District and Chancellor Glasper); (ii) Count VII—Violation of Title VII (Against the District); and (iii) Count IX— Violation of the ADEA (Against the District). (Doc. 72).
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Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the 

nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “can be resolved only by a 

finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Cal. 

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

Because “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . 

[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor” at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 

1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be 

left to the jury.”) (citations omitted).

When moving for summary judgment, the burden of proof initially rests with the 

moving party to present the basis for his motion and to identify those portions of the 

record and affidavits that he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant fails 

to carry his initial burden of production, the non-movant need not produce anything 

further. The motion for summary judgment would then fail. However, if the movant 

meets his initial burden of production, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

show that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is not entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; Triton Energy Corp. v. 

Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a 

material issue of fact conclusively in his favor. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). However, he must “come forward with specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation and emphasis omitted); see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual material are insufficient to defeat a 
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motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see 

also Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 502 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[c]onclusory, 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment”). Nor can such allegations be the basis for 

a motion for summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I 

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges wrongful termination in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT.

§ 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). (Doc. 16, ¶ 319-25). ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 was enacted 

as part of the Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), which “was intended to 

narrow the availability of wrongful termination claims.” Galati v. America West Airlines, 

Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1014 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-

1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), an employee has the right to bring a claim for wrongful termination if 

he or she is terminated in retaliation for disclosing to certain personnel that the employer 

“has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this 

state.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501(B), however, provides that “ If the statute provides a 

remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an 

employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the 

statute or the public policy prescribed in or arising out of the statute.”

To succeed on Count I, Plaintiff must establish three elements: (i) that he had a 

good faith, reasonable belief that the District violated or was violating state law; (ii) that 

he disclosed his belief in a reasonable manner to someone that he believed had the 

authority to investigate the alleged violation and take action to prevent further violations; 

and (iii) that his disclosure was a substantial motivating factor in the District’s decision to 

terminate his employment. See Murcott v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088 (2000). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he made a good faith effort to report to the District a 

violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-141(A), which pertains to the release of educational 

records. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 20, 319-23). Although the parties agree that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
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15-141 provides its own remedy for violations, Plaintiff asserts that “no part of A.R.S. § 

15-141 gives a remedy to an employee who reports a violation or potential violation of 

an educational institution’s student record keeping obligations.” (Doc. 188 at 10) 

(emphasis in original). Plaintiff contends that the District “mistakenly conflate[s] the 

remedy available to the parents or students regarding the disclosure of educational 

records as a remedy available to the employee.” (Id.). 

The preamble to the AEPA states: “If a statute provides an express remedy for a 

cause of action, that remedy is the exclusive remedy for the violation of the statute or the 

public policy arising out of the statute.” Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of 

Commerce, 33 P.3d 518, 522 (2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting 1996 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws, ch. 140, § 1(G)). Based on legislative history, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

concluded that “the legislature clearly did not intend for the [A]EPA to authorize a 

wrongful termination action based on violation of another statute’s public policy when 

that statute ‘provides an express remedy for a cause of action,’ even if such remedy is 

unavailable to a particular employee/claimant due to the employer’s size or otherwise.” 

Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added).

Taylor is distinguishable from this case as it involved ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-

1501(A)(3)(b), not § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). The Court, however, need not decide the 

applicability of Taylor to this case as the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce 

sufficient evidence showing that (i) Plaintiff made a good faith effort to report a violation 

of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-141 and (ii) the District retaliated against Plaintiff for making 

such a report. (Doc. 156 at 13 n.6; Doc. 204 at 10 n.8). The Court does not find that the 

clear purpose of Plaintiff’s October 24, 2012 Grievance Letter was to inform Defendants 

of a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-141(A). The Court will grant summary judgment 

in favor of Defendants on Count I. See, e.g., Gray v. Motorola, Inc., No. CV07-1466-

PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 3173987, at *18 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing Dahlberg v. 

Lutheran Social Services of North Dakota, 625 N.W.2d 241, 256 (N.D. 2001), which 

concluded that based on the record, “reasonable minds could only conclude that 
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[Plaintiff's] statements . . . were made for the purpose of questioning disparate discipline 

of staff for incidents of inadequate supervision and not for the purpose of reporting an 

illegality”). 

B. Counts II, III, IV

Plaintiff alleges that the MAT Policy Manual constitutes a contract between the 

District and Plaintiff. (Doc. 16, ¶ 339). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges wrongful 

termination in violation of an employment contract, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-

1501(A)(3)(a). (Id., ¶¶ 326-36). Counts III and IV present claims alleging a breach of 

contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id., ¶¶ 337-

56).

4

To state a claim for relief under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501(A)(3)(a), Plaintiff 

must establish the existence of an employment contract, which requires:

[A] written contract . . . setting forth that the employment 

relationship shall remain in effect for a specified duration of 

time or otherwise expressly restricting the right of either 

party to terminate the employment relationship. Both 

the employee and the employer must sign this written 

contract, or this written contract must be set forth in the 

employment handbook or manual or any similar document 

distributed to the employee, if that document expresses the 

intent that it is a contract of employment, or this written 

contract must be set forth in a writing signed by the party to 

be charged.

 4 Defendants’ argument that Counts III and IV are barred by the one-year statute 

of limitations set forth in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-541(3) is without merit. (Doc. 156 at 

14). “The determination of when a cause of action accrues requires an analysis of the 

elements of the claim presented.” Glaze v. Larsen, 83 P.3d 26, 29 (Ariz. 2004). One of 

the elements of a breach of contract action is damages. Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 

1103, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is well established that, in an action based 

on breach of contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of 

a contract, breach of the contract, and resulting damages.”). The Court is persuaded by 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the District’s alleged breach of its “pre-termination procedures 

do not result in an injury unless [Plaintiff] is terminated. (Doc. 188 at 14).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501(A)(2) (emphasis added).

Defendants assert that the alleged employment contract does not satisfy any of

the statutory requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501(2), and therefore, the

employment relationship between the parties was terminable at will. In contending that a

statutory employment contract exists under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501(2), Plaintiff 

asserts that the MAT Policy Manual expresses the intent to be an employment contract. 

(Doc. 188 at 11).

In Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce. 33 P.3d 518 (2001), the

Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an employee manual “expresses

the intent that it is a contract of employment” and “expressly restrict[s] the right of either

party to terminate the employment relationship” for breach of contract under the AEPA.

The employee manual at issue in Taylor explicitly disclaimed that it was not an expressed

or implied contract. Id. at 194. The manual also stated that the company reserved the right

to terminate an employee at any time and that the employment was “terminable at will.”

Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in 

favor of the employer, holding that under the clear language in the manual, the plaintiff 

failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of the AEPA. Id. at 195.

Here, in contrast to Taylor, the MAT Policy Manual does not explicitly disclaim 

that it is not intended to be a contract. See Shaver v. Twin City Hardware Co., No. 2:10-

CV-01868 JWS, 2010 WL 5297230, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2010) (“Disclaimers in 

employment handbooks are effective if they reinforce at will status because their 

presence precludes a reasonable conclusion that the employer intended to commit to 

additional terms.”). As Plaintiff recounts (Doc. 188 at 12), the Manual contains a number 

of provisions outlining purported rights of classified employees. For example, the 

Manual states “Upon the recommendation of the Chancellor and approval by the 

Governing Board, a MAT employee may be dismissed for cause. The employee shall 

have access to the following due-process procedures.” (Doc. 160-2 at 48). Yet the 

Manual does not explicitly state that it constitutes an employment contract with respect to 
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classified employees. The Court finds a genuine issue of fact for determination by a jury. 

See Tabler v. Indus. Comm ‘n, 47 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (the 

determination of intent to contract is a question of fact); Beloozerova v. Dignity Health, 

No. CV-18-01976-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 3660043 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2018). There is also 

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 156) as to Counts II, III, and IV is

denied. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 151) also is denied.

C. Defamation Count5

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly made false 

and malicious statements about Plaintiff during termination proceedings. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 

357-66). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is barred by the privilege of 

qualified immunity. (Doc. 156 at 3). “To avoid summary judgment pursuant to the

qualified privilege that protects such reports, plaintiffs must produce clear and convincing

evidence” that the reporting party abused the privilege. Advanced Cardiac Specialists,

Chartered v. Tri-City Cardiology Consultants, P.C., 214 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2009). “[T]he plaintiff may [ ] prove an abuse of [the] privilege either by proving

publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” Green Acres

Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 624 (1984).

“Abuse through excessive publication results from publication to an unprivileged

recipient not reasonably necessary to protect the interest upon which the privilege is

grounded.” Id. “An abuse through ‘actual malice’ occurs when the defendant makes a

statement knowing its falsity or actually entertaining doubts about its truth.” Id. To

prevail at trial, Plaintiff must demonstrate actual malice by “clear and convincing

evidence.” Selby v. Savard, 655 P.2d 342, 345 (Ariz. 1982). “The proof of ‘actual

 

5 The Second Amended Complaint incorrectly labels this claim as Count IV as it is 

actually the fifth claim. For clarity of the record, the Court will refer to the claim set 

forth in Paragraphs 357-66 as the “Defamation Claim” and will refer to the remaining counts in accordance with the labels provided in the Second Amended Complaint.
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malice’ calls a defendant’s state of mind into question and does not readily lend itself to

summary disposition.” Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).

Adefendant’s alleged “subjective belief in the truth of the matter published” is sufficient

to escape liability. Selby, 655 P.2d at 345. “[P]roof of the necessary state of mind could be

in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be inferred.”

Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).

“While recklessness may be found where a defendant deliberately ignores

evidence indicating that a published statement is in fact false, ‘[i]t is well established that

failure to investigate, sloppy investigation, poor reporting practice and the like are not per

se actual malice.’” Heuisler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 812 P.2d 1096, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 90(1st Cir. 2009)

(finding that recklessness “amounting to actual malice may be found where a publisher . . .

deliberately ignores evidence that calls into question his published statements”). Plaintiff 

has not produced sufficient evidence showing that Defendants deliberately ignored

evidence that should have given rise to serious doubts about the truth of the 

statements they were making. There is no evidence of excessive publication. The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on 

the issue of qualified privilege. See Heuisler, 812 P.2d at 1101. Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim is granted. See Carboun v. City of

Chandler, No. CV-03- 2146-PHX-DGC, 2005 WL 2408294, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27,

2005) (granting summary judgment where a reasonable jury could not be “clearly

convinced from [the plaintiff’s] evidence that [the defendant] acted with malice”); see

also Aspell v. Am. Contract Bridge League of Memphis, Tenn., 595 P.2d 191, 193 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 1979) (court can dispose of malice issue on summaryjudgmentwhere non-moving

partypresentsnoevidenceofmalice).

D. Count V- Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants move for summary judgment on Count V, which alleges that Plaintiff 

“has been deprived of his property interest in his public job and liberty interest in his 
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good name without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

Constitution of the United States.” (Doc. 16, ¶ 374). To establish a claim under Section 

1983, Plaintiff “must show that an individual acting under the color of state law deprived 

him of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the United States Constitution or 

federal law.” Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2008). To state a 

due process violation, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of either a property or 

liberty interest without receiving the process that he was constitutionally due. Id.

Defendants concede that Plaintiff had a property interest in his job with the 

District that could be removed only through due process. (Doc. 151 at 2). The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment as to 

Count V. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment therefore is denied as to Count V.

E. Counts VIII and X- Retaliation Claims

In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that he “has been subjected to retaliation by the 

District and its management, supervisors, employees and agents in direct contravention of 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).” (Doc. 16, ¶ 401). In Count X, Plaintiff contends that he 

engaged in protected activity when he complained verbally and in writing regarding 

alleged discrimination based on age and that the District retaliated against him in 

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. (Id., ¶¶ 415-19).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (i) he 

had engaged in a protected activity; (ii) he was thereafter subjected by the District to an 

adverse employment action; and (iii) a causal link existed between the protected activity 

and the adverse employment action. Porter v. California Dept. of Corrections, 419 F.3d 

885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). If Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to 

show a prima facie case of retaliation, then the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate 

some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. Id. If Defendant sets forth such a 

reason, then Plaintiff bears the burden of submitting evidence to establish that 

Defendant’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for an underlying retaliatory 

motive. Id.; Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 
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U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (“Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has 

been taken into account in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the 

employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision.”).

Causation “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s 

knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time 

between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment 

decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). Proximity of time 

between a protected activity and an adverse action may support an inference of 

causation. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000); Villarimo v. Aloha 

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n order to support an inference 

of retaliatory motive, the termination must have occurred fairly soon after the employee's 

protected expression.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[i]t is 

important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an 

element of plaintiff's prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an 

evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.” Porter, 383 F.3d at 895 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although a lack of temporal proximity 

may make it more difficult to show causation, ‘circumstantial evidence of a ‘pattern of 

antagonism’ following the protected conduct can also give rise to the inference.’” Id. 

(quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3rd Cir.1997)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (the nonmoving 

party), the Court concludes that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to defeat 

summary judgment as to Counts VIII and X. Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 156) thus is denied as to Counts VIII and X.

F. Punitive Damages

Defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiff's request for punitive 

damages. “To recover punitive damages something more is required over and above the 

‘mere commission of a tort.’” Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 679 

(Ariz. 1986) (quoting Rawlinqs v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986)). As 
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explained by the Arizona Supreme Court,

[T]o obtain punitive damages, plaintiff must prove that 

defendant’s evil hand was guided by an evil mind. The evil 

mind which will justify the imposition of punitive damages 

may be manifested in either of two ways. It may be found 

where defendant intended to injure the plaintiff. It may also 

be found where, al-though not intending to cause injury, 

defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing 

that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.

Rawlinqs, 726 P.2d at 578.

In whatever way the requisite mental state is expressed, the 

conduct must also be aggravated and outrageous. It is 

conscious action of a reprehensible character. The key is the 

wrongdoer's intent to injure the plaintiff or his deliberate 

interference with the rights of others, consciously 

disregarding the unjustifiably substantial risk of significant 

harm to them.

Linthicum, 723 P.2d at 680.

Gross negligence or reckless disregard is not sufficient to justify an award of 

punitive damages. Id. at 680. “To recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove 

that defendant acted with the requisite evil mind ‘by clear and convincing 

evidence.’” Thompson v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Products Co., 832 P.2d 203, 210 (Ariz. 

1992) (quoting Linthicum, 723 P.2d at 681). “The question of whether punitive damages 

are justified should be left to the jury if there is any reasonable evidence which will 

support them.” Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Calif., 699 P.2d 376, 

384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). “The evidence, however, must be more than slight and 

inconclusive such as to border on conjecture.” Id.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment 

regarding his claim for punitive damages. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 156) therefore is granted on that issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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(Doc. 151). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s “Objection to Defendants’ 

Notice of Joinder Regarding Separate Motions for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 166). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Glasper’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 155). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying in part and granting in part the District’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 156) as set forth herein. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Count I of the Second Amended 

Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the Defamation Claim set forth in the 

Second Amended Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. 

Dated this 10th day of October, 2018.