* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30494

Summary Calendar

 

ELLIS GUILLOT,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ED DAY, ET AL

 Defendants

ED DAY, Warden; M. R. WINSTEAD,

JR., LYN H. PIGOTT,

Defendants-Appellants.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 94-CV-1832-A

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March 12, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendants Ed Day, Sgt. M.R. Winstead, Jr., and Lyn H.

Pigott appeal the magistrate judge’s decision denying in part

their summary judgment motion based upon qualified immunity. A

lower court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment asserting

qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the
No. 97-30494

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collateral-order doctrine to the extent review is sought of an

issue of law and not of the lower court’s determination that

sufficient evidence existed to create a question of fact or

support the claim. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995);

Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 471-72 (5th Cir.

1996). This court reviews the magistrate judge’s denial of a

summary-judgment motion de novo. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,

1164 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996). 

“Movants may prevail only if they have demonstrated that there

are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

The magistrate judge understood Guillot’s claims to be twofold: (1) falsification of records by Winstead, which Guillot

wished to complain of to Winstead’s superiors and ultimately to

litigate in court, and (2) retaliation by Winstead and Pigott

because Guillot had grieved Winstead’s actions. 

Denial of access to the courts

 It is not clear that the magistrate judge treated the first

claim as a “denial-of-access-to-the-courts” claim, per se, as the

parties argue on appeal. The magistrate judge cited no case law

in her order related to such a claim; she instead explicitly

relied upon case law espousing the scope of retaliation claims. 

The magistrate judge also stated only “that the retaliation

claims would go to trial.”
No. 97-30494

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To the extent that Guillot seeks relief for denial of access

to the courts, as we have previously held, Guillot has not

alleged specific facts showing that his access to the courts has

been denied or that his legal position has been prejudiced or

that he suffered an actual injury. See Guillot v. Day, No. 95-

31235 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1996); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,

2179-80 (1996); Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.

1992) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) dismissal). Although Guillot amended

his complaint on remand, he again failed to alleged that his

legal position had been prejudiced or that he had suffered an

actual injury. Accordingly, Guillot has failed to state a claim

for denial of access to the courts.

Retaliation

The elements of a retaliation claim are (1) the invocation

of a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to

retaliate against the plaintiff for exercising that right, (3) a

retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation. Clarke v. Stalder,

121 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 1997). Prisoners enjoy a

constitutional right to be free from harassment or retaliation

for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s misconduct. 

Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164; see also Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040,

1046 (5th Cir. 1986) (a guard “may not harass an inmate in 

retaliation for the inmate complaining to supervisors about the

guard’s conduct”); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1154 (5th

Cir.) (holding that prison officials were prohibited from
No. 97-30494

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“retaliati[ng] against inmates who complain of prison conditions

or official misconduct”), opinion amended in part and vacated in

part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982). The inmate must produce

direct evidence of the defendants’ motivation, or “allege a

chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be

inferred.” Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). With respect to causation, Guillot must show

“direct evidence of motivation or allege a chronology of events

from which retaliation may be plausibly inferred.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation omitted). “An action motivated by

retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected

right is actionable, even if the act, when taken for a different

reason, might have been legitimate.” Id. at 1165.

Winstead

We previously held that Guillot’s pleadings contained

specific allegations of a chronology of events regarding actions

taken by Winstead from which it may be inferred that Winstead

retaliated against Guillot for filing a grievance against him. 

Guillot, No. 95-31225, slip op. at 7. Accordingly, the

magistrate judge did not err in denying summary judgment as to

Winstead on the retaliation claim.

Pigott

Although this court previously held that Guillot had failed

to allege sufficient facts of retaliation against Pigott, see

id., the magistrate judge allowed Guillot to amend his complaint. 
No. 97-30494

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Guillot alleged that Pigott had retaliated against him when she

rejected his grievances filed under the Administrative Remedy

Procedure (ARP) and filed a disciplinary report against him for

allegedly abusing the ARP procedure; he further alleged, based on

“information and belief,” that Pigott had complained that Guillot

had “filed too many ARPs, causing more work for her” and that she

had denied the ARP to punish him. 

Guillot enjoys a constitutional right to be free from

harassment or retaliation for complaining to a supervisor about a

guard’s misconduct. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164. Guillot alleges

that Pigott complained about Guillot having filed too many ARPs,

and he relies on a letter from an attorney for the Secretary of

Safety and Corrections to show Pigott’s retaliatory intent. 

Whether Pigott’s denial of Guillot’s ARPs is objectively

reasonable is in dispute. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did

not err in denying summary judgment as to Guillot’s alleged claim

of retaliation against Pigott.

Finally, the appellants argue that the magistrate judge

erred when she failed to dismiss Warden Day as a defendant in his

individual capacity because Guillot had failed to plead actions

attributable to Day which articulate the violation of a clearly

established federally protected right. Supervisory officials

like Warden Day are not liable for the actions of subordinates on

a theory of vicarious liability. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d

298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). A supervisor will have personal
No. 97-30494

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liability only if he is personally involved in the constitutional

deprivation, or if there is a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor's conduct and the violation. Id. at 304. 

Guillot has not stated a valid claim of denial of access to the

courts against Day, nor has he alleged that Day retaliated

against him. Accordingly, the magistrate judge erred in failing

to dismiss Day in his individual capacity.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion, including dismissal of

Warden Day in his individual capacity.