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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

State Bar of Arizona, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Jeffrey D. Moffatt, 

Respondent.

No. CV-15-02391-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 The State Bar of Arizona has filed a motion to remand this matter to the Arizona 

bar disciplinary process. Doc. 5. Respondent Jeffrey D. Moffatt opposes remand. 

Doc. 10. The Court will grant the State Bar’s motion. 

 On November 3, 2015, the State Bar filed a complaint against Mr. Moffatt with 

the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. 1, Ex. A. 

Mr. Moffatt is an attorney licensed to practice law in Arizona, and the State Bar’s 

complaint alleges that he engaged in unethical conduct. Id. Mr. Moffatt removed the 

matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), asserting diversity and federal question 

jurisdiction. Doc. 1. 

Pursuant to the removal statute, any “civil action” brought in state court over 

which the federal district courts have “original jurisdiction” may be removed to the 

federal district court in the district where the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

Courts strictly construe the statute against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the party invoking the statute. California Ex Rel. 

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Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, there is a “strong presumption” against removal and 

“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in 

the first instance.” Id. 

An Arizona bar disciplinary proceeding is not a “civil action” within the meaning 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and therefore is not subject to removal under that statute. See 

Supreme Court of California v. Kinney, No. 3:15-CV-01552 LB, 2015 WL 3413232, at 

*5 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2015) (“the disciplinary proceedings formerly pending before the 

State and now pending before the California Supreme Court are not “civil actions”; they 

are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in character. As such, they may not be removed 

to federal court pursuant to the general removal statute.” (citations omitted)); Alaska Bar 

Assoc. v. Dickerson, 240 F.Supp. 732, 734 (D. Alaska 1965) (“The complaint before the 

Grievance Committee clearly discloses that it is simply a disciplinary proceeding wherein 

it is alleged that respondent’s conduct violated certain rules of the Alaska Bar 

Association. As such it is not a civil action within contemplation of the federal removal 

statute.”); see also In re Doe, 801 F.Supp. 478, 484 (D. N.M. 1992) (remanding an action 

removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 – which allows for removal of a “civil action or 

criminal prosecution” brought against a federal officer or agency – and stating: “In light 

of the regulatory function of a disciplinary proceeding which federal courts have 

consistently left in state hands, the Court finds this disciplinary proceeding is not a ‘civil 

action’ against nor a ‘criminal prosecution’ of John Doe.”). 

In addition, a bar disciplinary proceeding is not a matter over which the federal 

district courts have “original jurisdiction” as required by the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). It is state bar regulatory matter entrusted exclusively to the jurisdiction of the 

Arizona Supreme Court. See In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 698 (Ariz. 1994). 

Mr. Moffatt cites no authority for the proposition that such a matter can be 

removed to federal court. He relies primarily on Miller v. Washington State Bar, 

679 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1982), but that case did not concern removal of a bar disciplinary 

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proceeding to federal court. The plaintiff in Miller brought an action directly in federal 

court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Miller does not stand for the proposition that bar 

disciplinary proceedings can be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). To 

the contrary, Miller acknowledges the established rule “that orders of a state supreme 

court relating to discipline and disbarment of members of its bar could be reviewed only 

by the United States Supreme Court on certiorari to the state court, and not by means of 

an original action in a lower federal court.” Id. 

Moffatt also argues that matters pending before state administrative agencies may 

be removed to federal court under § 1441(a), but this position has been squarely rejected 

by the Ninth Circuit. See Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus. ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. 

Commc’ns, Inc., 288 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore hold that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a) does not authorize removal of proceedings from an administrative agency, 

regardless of how court-like the proceedings may be. The statute authorizes removal 

only if the action is pending in a state court.”). 

Mr. Moffatt’s other arguments largely concern the merits of his claim and the 

constitutional rights be believes are being violated. They do not establish his right to 

removal in light of the authorities cited above. 

Mr. Moffatt has failed to carry his burden of showing that removal to this Court 

was proper. The Court will remand this matter to the Arizona State Bar disciplinary 

process. 

IT IS ORDERED that the Arizona State Bar’s motion to remand (Doc. 5) is 

granted. This matter is remanded to the Arizona State Bar disciplinary process. The 

Clerk is directed to terminate this federal action. 

 Dated this 16th day of December, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-02391-DGC Document 11 Filed 12/16/15 Page 3 of 3