In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-2916 

IN RE: USA GYMNASTICS,*

Debtor. 

JANE DOE J.J., 

Creditor-Appellant, 

v.

WILLIAM L. BETTINELLI,†

Party-in-Interest-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:20-cv-2507 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JUNE 7, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 18, 2022 

____________________ 

* USA Gymnastics is not participating in this appeal. 

† We granted a motion substituting William L. Bettinelli, the Settlement 

Trustee of the USA Gymnastics Trust, for the Additional Tort Claimants 

Committee of Sexual Abuse Survivors, an interested party. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 43(b).
2 No. 21-2916 

Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges.

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. During the decade that she was a 

member of USA Gymnastics, Jane Doe J.J. was one of the hundreds of gymnasts sexually assaulted by Larry Nassar, a physician for the organization. In response to the overwhelming 

number of claims against it based on Nassar’s conduct, USA 

Gymnastics filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court set a 

deadline for any claimant to file a proof of claim, but J.J. did 

not receive actual notice of this deadline and filed her proof 

of claim five months late. The bankruptcy court treated her 

claim as untimely, and the district court affirmed.

On appeal to this court, J.J. argues that she was entitled to 

actual notice because USA Gymnastics should have known 

that she was a potential claimant. According to J.J., USA Gymnastics needed to retain medical records under Michigan law

and thus should have known that she had been seen by Nassar for medical care. But we lack any evidence that USA Gymnastics had these records, and her argument that Michigan

law required USA Gymnastics’ retention of any relevant documents is dubious. We therefore affirm.

I 

From the ages of 7 to 17, J.J. competed as a member of USA 

Gymnastics. During this time, Nassar acted as J.J.’s physician 

and sexually assaulted her. Important for this appeal, the record does not disclose that USA Gymnastics had access to or 

possession of J.J.’s medical records showing her visits with 

Nassar, as J.J.’s counsel conceded at oral argument. 

In 2018, USA Gymnastics filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 

The bankruptcy court set a deadline of April 2019 for all 
No. 21-2916 3

claimants, including sexual-assault survivors, to file a proof 

of claim. USA Gymnastics mailed notices to individuals it 

viewed as potential claimants, including, among others: all 

known survivors who had filed or threatened to file lawsuits 

against USA Gymnastics alleging sexual abuse, had reported 

abuse to USA Gymnastics, had entered into a settlement 

agreement with USA Gymnastics stemming from allegations 

of abuse, or had received payment from USA Gymnastics as 

a result of an allegation of abuse. This amounted to more than 

1,300 individuals. USA Gymnastics also emailed copies of the 

notice to more than 360,000 current and former members of 

the organization. Beyond these mailings, USA Gymnastics executed a constructive-notice campaign. It placed information 

about the bar date on its website, its social media pages, in 

USA Today, and in gymnastics journals, podcasts, and websites.

J.J. did not learn about the bar deadline until after it had 

passed. After telling her parents that she had been assaulted 

by Nassar, she retained legal counsel, who helped her file a 

proof of claim. By the time she filed her proof of claim, it was 

five months late.

J.J. moved for the bankruptcy court to treat her claim as

timely. As relevant here, she argued that the court should 

treat her claim as timely because she was entitled to actual 

notice. The pertinent body appointed to represent sexual-assault claimants’ interests—the Additional Tort Claimants 

Committee of Sexual Abuse Survivors—objected to J.J.’s request. It contended that J.J. was entitled only to constructive 

notice, which she had received through USA Gymnastics’ media campaigns. 
4 No. 21-2916 

The bankruptcy court agreed with the Committee’s argument and denied J.J.’s motion, finding her entitled only to 

constructive—rather than actual—notice. The district court 

affirmed, and J.J. has appealed. 

II

J.J. argues that she was entitled to actual notice and that 

the courts below erred in holding otherwise. We review the 

bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal conclusions of both the bankruptcy and district courts de 

novo. In re Dimas, 14 F.4th 634, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Creditors must receive adequate notice before their claims 

can be discharged in bankruptcy. See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 

955, 962–63 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 

Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 318 (1950)); Dahlin v. Lyondell 

Chem. Co., 881 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2018). A notice’s adequacy generally depends on whether a creditor is reasonably 

ascertainable. See Fogel, 221 F.3d at 963; Tulsa Pro. Collection 

Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1988). If so, the creditor is entitled to actual notice; if not, the creditor is typically 

entitled only to constructive notice. See Fogel, 221 F.3d at 963

(“If his name and address are reasonably ascertainable, he is 

entitled to have that information sent directly to him, but if 

not, then publication of the information in the newspaper or 

other periodical that he’s most likely to see is permitted.”); 

Dahlin, 881 F.3d at 604. 

A creditor qualifies as reasonably ascertainable if the 

debtor could uncover the creditor’s claim and identity using 

only “reasonably diligent efforts.” Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., 

Inc., 485 U.S. at 490 (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983)); see In re Placid Oil Co., 
No. 21-2916 5

753 F.3d 151, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2014) (framing the question as

whether the debtor possesses “some specific information ... 

reasonably suggest[ing] both the claim for which the debtor 

may be liable and the entity to whom [the debtor] would be 

liable”) (citation omitted). In general, a creditor is reasonably 

ascertainable only if the debtor has information about the 

creditor’s claim in its possession. See Dahlin, 881 F.3d at 606 

(citing Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346–47 (3d Cir. 

1995)). 

J.J. contends that her identity as a tort victim was reasonably ascertainable to USA Gymnastics. But J.J. fails to point to 

any evidence that USA Gymnastics possessed medical documentation of her interactions with Nassar. See Dahlin, 

881 F.3d at 606 (whether a creditor is reasonably ascertainable 

generally depends only on information in the debtor’s own 

books and records). That shortcoming doesn’t foreclose her 

argument, J.J. argues, because USA Gymnastics had a responsibility to know that Nassar had seen her for medical treatment under Michigan’s recordkeeping requirements. See In re 

Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 159–60 (2d Cir. 2016) 

(creditors considered reasonably ascertainable based on unambiguous federal record-keeping requirement). But we do 

not find such a clear legal obligation under Michigan law. The 

only statute she cites, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.16213(1), applies solely to “natural person[s],” id. § 333.1105(1); see id.

§ 333.16101(2), which USA Gymnastics is not. The only other 

potentially relevant Michigan recordkeeping statute we’ve 

found (which was not cited by J.J.) applies to “health facilit[ies] or agenc[ies],” id. § 333.20175(1), and defines those 

terms with an enumerated list of specific categories of entities, 

see id. § 333.20106(1). USA Gymnastics does not appear to fit

within any of those categories. Cf. Kuznar v. Raksha Corp., 750 
6 No. 21-2916 

N.W.2d 121, 126–27 (Mich. 2008) (holding that a pharmacy is 

not a “health facility or agency”); Sabbagh v. Hamilton Psych. 

Servs., PLC, 941 N.W.2d 685, 694–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019) 

(holding that a psychological practice and a human resources 

company fail to satisfy the statute’s definition of “health facility or agency”).

Because J.J. has neither presented evidence that USA 

Gymnastics had records of her medical visits with Nassar nor 

shown that Michigan law required it to possess such records, 

we agree with the bankruptcy and district courts that J.J. was 

not a reasonably ascertainable creditor. She was thus entitled 

only to constructive notice, the sufficiency of which she does 

not contest.

AFFIRMED