alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial extracted from the financial statements
of RB Asset,  Inc. for the 3 months ended September 30, 1999 and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER>                                         1,000

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Jun-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jul-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-1999
<CASH>                                              50,305
<SECURITIES>                                         1,147
<RECEIVABLES>                                       40,548
<ALLOWANCES>                                        17,858
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    53,452
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     173,526
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                             11,903
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                            938
<COMMON>                                             7,100
<OTHER-SE>                                          87,660
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       173,526
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     4,772
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        3,285
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     1,008
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     969
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (490)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           182
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (672)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (672)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.09)


</TABLE>
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court is the parties’ Stipulation to Extend Dismissal Date (Doc. 273). 

Finding good cause appearing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Stipulation to Extend (Doc. 273) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED IT IS ORDERED that this case will be dismissed 

with prejudice on September 9, 2019 unless a stipulation to dismiss is filed prior to the 

dismissal date. 

 Dated this 9th day of July, 2019. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan 

United States District Judge 

Keith Early, et al., 

 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. CV-16-00031-PHX-SPL 

ORDER 

 

Case 2:16-cv-00031-SPL-DMF Document 274 Filed 07/09/19 Page 1 of 1
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION**     I, Dwayne A. Moyers, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Xponential, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscalquarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the smallbusiness issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date: February 19, 2007   /s/ Dwayne A. Moyers    Dwayne A. Moyers    Chief Executive Officer
#### John Davis *v.*Wm. Davis.

Pleading — Limitations..

Plea in bar, when court suspended by military authority.

States.

The Legislature may, at its will change, modify or repeal the Statutes of Limitation, so that it does not change or injuriously affect vested rights.

APPEAL EROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 14, 1870.

Opinion oe ti-ie Court by

Judge Peters :

The cause of action accrued in the spring of 1860. By an act of the Legislature, approved *20th of February, 1861, Myers’ Supp. 298-%.*The running of the statute of limitations was suspended in the county of Johnson, in which county this suit was brought, from the 1st of May, 1861, until quiet was restorediand the courts could be held in said county, and, according to the proof, no circuit-court was held in said county until May, 1865, and this suit was brought in February, 1869; counting out the time during which the running of the statute of limitations was suspended by said act, even - if one year, had expired before the 1st of May, 1S61, still the bar would not have been complete until May, 1869, three months after the suit was brought.

In *Cassity vs. Storm, &c., 1 Bush 452,*in commenting on the statute of *186%,*this court said this statute doubtless must have the effect of striking from the computation such time in all cases which have mot been barred, and in which the statute was running at the time of its enactment. It is true that the question involved in that case was not the precise question in this. But the doctrine was fully recognized in that case, and has been in many others, that the Legislature of the State may change, modify, or repeal statutes of limitations at its will, so that it does not change, or injuriously affect, vested rights, _ rights perfected by the law "before its modifica.tion, or repeal.

*603*Moore, Ireland, for appellant.*

*Bteiuart & Brown, for appellee.*

We must, therefore, give effect to the statute *supra.*

As to the lauds claimed by appellant and for which the court gave him no relief, he filed no title papers, and his claim was too imperfectly set out, and the location too uncertain to authorize judicial atcion on that branch of the case.

Concurring, therefore, with the circuit court, his judgment must be *affirmed.*
Boates Law Firm 

1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Aleksey Silenko, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Party Bus MN LLC, a Minnesota limited 

liability company. 

 Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

TO: 

 Party Bus MN LLC, 

9659 Vagabond Lane North 

Maple Grove, Minnesota 55311

 

 A lawsuit has been filed against you. Within 21 days after service of this summons on 

you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United 

States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 

(a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion 

under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on 

the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are: 

Craighton T. Boates, Esq. 

Case 2:15-cv-02126-GMS Document 2 Filed 10/22/15 Page 1 of 2
Boates Law Firm 

2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

BOATES LAW FIRM, PLLC 

42104 N. Venture Dr., Suite D126 

Anthem, AZ 85086 

Telephone: 623-551-5457 

Facsimile: 623-551-5458 

Craig@anthemlaw.com 

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in 

the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. 

CLERK OF THE COURT 

__________________ ___________________________ 

Date Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

Case 2:15-cv-02126-GMS Document 2 Filed 10/22/15 Page 2 of 2
#### James Bales *v.*John Peters.

Execution — Levy on Personal Property — Negligence in Leaving Property in Hands of Defendant. •

If a sheriff permits the defendant to retain personal property on which an execution has been levied and the same is thereby lost, he is re sponsible to plaintiff for the value of the property.

APPEAL PROM OWSLEY CIRCUIT COURT.

January 26, 1872.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

It is not directly charged that Bales was the surety of Wilson in the debt due to Powell. There is, however, some proof conducing to show that he was, and 'it is evident that both parties conducted the action upon that hypothesis.

It was the duty of the sheriff, Peters, to sell the personalty levied on by him. He had the right, and it was his duty to sell, with or without, a writ of. venditioni exponas. Colgen vs. Haggins, 1 Duvall 6; Savings Inst. vs. Chinn’s Admr., 7 Bush 542. If lie-permitted Wilson to retain the property, and sell or otherwise dispose of it, and by reáson of such neglect of duty, Bales was com*680pelled to pay the judgment, he is certainly damaged to the. extent of the value of the property levied on.

*Lilly, for appellant.*

*Dishman, for appellee.*

It was erroneous to instruct the jury to find for appellee. The question of fact, upon which appellant's right to recover depends, ought to have been submitted to the jury.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial upon principles consistent with this opinion.
#### J. M. Taylor, Trustee, *v.*W. G. Taylor.

Judgment by Default — Defendant’s Negligence.

A plea that a defendant, who had not employed an attorney, • was present at a term of court and learned that all ordinary cases would go over, and had a good defense, is insufficient to set aside a default judgment.

APPEAL EROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 2, 1870.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Williams:

Appellant recovered a judgment by default against appellee on a note, December 27; on the 30th the defendant filed his affidavit showing he was in attendance on the court on the 24th when the jury was adjourned over until January 1, and learned that no business would be done on the ordinary but would be on the equity docket; that he had not then employed an attorney, but did so since, and had a good defense to the entire action and presented his answer also.

As by the recognized rule both the days of judgment and motion must be counted, the motion was too late unless prevented, unavoidably, as provided in section 371, Civil Code. It was the parties’ own negligence and not unavoidable casualty, for there is no pretense that the court had misled him, nor does he disclose *79how he got his information; had he appealed to the proper source he would doubtless have been properly informed. But the judgment on the merits is equally erroneous.

Turner, *for appellant.*

*Yeaman, for appellee.*

The single error of $364.05 for which he got an allowance, in his administrator’s settlement, as for money paid out on his decedent’s liability for railroad stock, when the widow of the decedent furnished the money out of her own means to pay it, will cover all the balances which he set up in his answer.

Upon a fair adjustment of his accounts as- apparent from the proof in this cause he has no just set-off or counter-claim as to the debt sued upon.

And even if the $1,000, reserved in the trust deed to Wilson was due to appellee as administrator how he can set it off against an individual debt of his own is not perceptible unless he was in advance to the estate, but to do so would be an improper and illegal conversion of the assets. The money would be due the widow and heirs of Wilson immediately had he collected it, for the two years allowed for winding up a decedent’s estate had long since elapsed, and no -cause for returning it is averred or proved.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, with directions to reject the answer and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### A. D. Geoghegan *v.*Michael Miller’s Admr.

Judgment — Defense to Action, After Rendered.

A defendant cannot by answer, after a judgment has been rendered on a note, plead set-oifs and payments on a note, the judgment not thus being subject to a collateral attack.

APPEAL EROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT.

April 24, 1871.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Peters:

The note upon which the judgment now complained of was rendered bears date August 8th, or 5th, 1850. Shit was brought upon it the 23rd of June, 1858. On the 24th of April, 1865, judgment was rendered for the amount, credited by the payments endorsed on the note. TTp to that period no answer had been filed —nor was any answer filed till the 26th of April, 1866, nearly eight years after a summons was served on appellant.

Of the demands pleaded as an offset against the judgment it is proved that of the execution No. 2622 it was satisfied as early as May, 1848, and of the one numbered 2623 all of the principal of that debt was made by a sale of the property of Miller at the same time except $21.02 principal, with some interest and costs; for that balance an execution issued on the 4th of June, *4851850, directed to the sheriff of Meade county — the county in which the defendant therein lived — that execution has never been returned, and none other has since ever issued.

Gofer, *for appellant.*

Marriott, *for appellee.*

Of the judgment in favor of E. D. Greoghegan and claimed to have been assigned to appellant, an execution issued on it on the 28th of January, 1851, which has never been returned. See Brown’s statement in the record, former clerk of Hardin circuit court — proved to be correct by Stone.

It appears that after the last execution had been issued for a small balance on one of the debts now claimed to be unpaid, appellant executed the note sued on — and then delayed for about sixteen years to claim a credit for what he now says is unpaid, and does not make an effort to explain the cause of the delay, nor to rebut the presumption of a satisfaction of all previous demands by the execution of the note sued on.

These unanswered facts were not stated in the opinion, as it was then supposed that it was not necessary to comment specially ion them as another reason might be assigned for an *affirmance.*But a petition for a re-hearing rendered this necessary.

No reason is offered why these demands were not relied on before the judgment was rendered, having waited until after that was done, although appellant had the opportunity to make his defense he can not after judgment, in this way open a litigation which has been closed.

Petition overruled.
Case 2:15-mj-01791-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/30/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01791-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/30/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01791-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/30/15 Page 3 of 3
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

189 

KAH 12-02327 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. 

NICHOLAS ROBLES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V ORDER

WARDEN ORLEANS STATE PRISON, ET AL., 

RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

STEVEN D. SESSLER, GENESEO, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (FRANK BRADY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,

Orleans County (James P. Punch, A.J.), entered October 25, 2012 in a

proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70. The judgment converted the

petition under CPLR article 70 to one under CPLR article 78 and denied

the petition. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision

at Supreme Court.

Entered: March 21, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### J. K. & A. Funk *v.*Martin Mannister.

Husband and Wife — Action for Necessaries Furnished at Wife’s Instance— Answer.

The denial that the alleged necessaries were furnished at the wife’s instance, *were*or on her credit, is sufficient to bar the action for 'subjecting her estate, even if she authorized the signature of her name to the note..

Same — Non est Factum.

The answer imports a plea of non est factum, the averment that her name was signed by the husband in her absence impliedly negatives his authority.

APPEAL PROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

January 11, 1871.

*Lisle, for appellant.*

*Bo & Fo, for appellee.*

Opinion op ti-ie Court by

Judge Robertson:

Tbe denial that the alleged necessaries were furnished at the wife’s instance or on her credit, is sufficient to bar the action for subjecting her estate even if she authorized the signature of her name to the note, for, as hitherto adjudged, there was no statutory consideraton for the note.

Moreover the answer imports a plea of *non est factum;*for, connected with other facts, the averment that her name was signed by the husband in her absence impliedly negatives his authority.

It seems to this court therefore that the circuit court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the answer.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 211 (Friday, October 31, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 64754]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-25930]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR SEVERELY DISABLED


Procurement List; Proposed Addition

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled.

ACTION: Proposed Addition to the Procurement List.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Committee is proposing to add a product to the Procurement 
List that will be furnished by a nonprofit agency employing persons who 
are blind or have other severe disabilities.

DATES: Comments Must Be Received on Or Before: 12/1/2014.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled, 1401 S. Clark Street, Suite 10800, Arlington, Virginia 22202-
4149.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR TO SUBMIT COMMENTS CONTACT: Patricia 
Briscoe, Telephone: (703) 603-7740, Fax: (703) 603-0655, or email 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#296a647d6c6f4c4d7b4c4e69684b4045405d5066474c074e465f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="eeada3baaba88b8abc8b89aeaf8c8782879a97a1808bc0898198">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 
U.S.C. 8503(a)(2) and 41 CFR 51-2.3. Its purpose is to provide 
interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed 
action.

Addition

    If the Committee approves the proposed addition, the entity of the 
Federal Government identified in this notice will be required to 
procure the product listed below from the nonprofit agency employing 
persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities.
    The following product is proposed for addition to the Procurement 
List for production by the nonprofit agency listed:

Product

NSN: 8520-01-432-2618--Hand Soap, Liquid, Biobased
NPA: The Lighthouse for the Blind, St. Louis, MO
Contracting Activity: General Services Administration, Fort Worth, 
TX
Coverage: A-List for the Total Government Requirement as aggregated 
by the General Services Administration, Fort Worth, TX.

Patricia Briscoe,
Deputy Director, Business Operations, (Pricing and Information 
Management).
[FR Doc. 2014-25930 Filed 10-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6353-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Jerome E. Natoli, Chief Financial Officer of NexPrise, Inc. (the
"Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this
        certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
        with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

        (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
        the Registrant.


Dated: August 7, 2002                   /s/  Jerome E. Natoli
                                        -----------------------------------
                                        Jerome E. Natoli
                                        Chief Financial Officer
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Larson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Desert Sun Pizza LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

NO. CV-16-08011-PCT-SRB

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 

 Decision by Court. This action came for consideration before the Court. The 

issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered. 

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, pursuant to the Court’s Order filed January 5, 

2017, judgment is entered dismissing with prejudice this action and the released claims of all 

collective action opt-in Plaintiffs. The Court has approved a $2,000.00 incentive award to Named 

Plaintiff Michael Larson and the disposition of the gross Settlement Fund. Defendants are 

directed to disburse the gross Settlement Fund as set forth in the Parties’ Settlement and Release 

Agreement. This Final Judgment constitutes a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(a). 

 Brian D. Karth

 District Court Executive/Clerk of Court

January 5, 2017 

s/ Leann Dixon

 By Deputy Clerk

Case 3:16-cv-08011-SRB Document 64 Filed 01/05/17 Page 1 of 1