alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### General Motors Acceptance Corporation *v.*Whatley.

Opinion delivered October 13, 1930.

*379
      *Ben D. Brickhouse*and *Limoood Brickhouse,*for appellant.

*Mahony, Yocum & Saye,*for appellee.

Smiti-i, J.

This is a companion ease to that of *General Motors Acceptance Corporation*v. *Jerry,*181 Ark. 771, 27 S. W. (2d) 997. The litigation in each case arose over the attempt to collect the balance of purchase money due upon the sale of a Delco; lighting plant, and the con-tract of sale in the two cases is identical. The undisputed testimony in each case was to the effect that the subject-matter' of the sale was a definitely known article of commerce, designed to generate electricity for lighting purposes, and that each plant was a separate and complete unit in itself. From fifteen to eighteen such plants had been sold and installed in Union County alone, the county in which both cases originated.

The undisputed testimony in the instant case shows that one of the lighting plants was installed at the home of appellee Whatley, and that with some minor adjustments it gave fairly satisfactory service for a period of from six to eight months, so that there can be, and is, no question that it was adapted to the purpose for which it was sold, that of generating electric lights.

The contract of sale containing the following and no other warranty: “It is understood that the Delcolight Company of Dayton, Ohio, guarantees said Delcolight products against defective material or workmanship for one year from the date of delivery, except the starting battery on the Model 775 or 750- Delco light plant, which battery is guaranteed for 90 days.” The plant sold appellee did not have a starting battery of either Model 775 or 750, but was Model 758, so .that this exception from the general warranty lasting only ninety days did not apply to this sale.

It was therefore proper to submit to the jury the question whether there had been a breach of this war*380ranty, although the article sold 'was a definitely known article of commerce upon the market. But in the submission of this question one of the instructions was modified by adding thereto this qualification: *‘ ‘** * * or that it was not a definitely known article of commerce upon the market and was not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended.”

Injecting this question into the case was error, for the reason that under the undisputed evidence the light plant was a definitely known article of commerce upon the market, and was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended. This modification was objected to, and is erroneous, as it is error to give an instruction which permits the jury to make a finding which is unsupported by any evidence. *Sherrin*v. *Coffman,*113 Ark. 8, 219 S. W. 318 *; Bissell*v. *Katter, 14*1 Ark. 467, 217 S. W. 779 ; *Ozark Fruit Growers’ Assn.*v. *Tetrick,*130 Ark. 165, 197 S. W. 30 ; *Athletic Mining Co.*v. *Sharp,*135 Ark. 330, 205 S. W. 695.

The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to submit only the question of the breach of the written warranty.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roy Wayne Dillard,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03849-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Law Office Of Christopher K Johnston LLC

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/20/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 26, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8560 Filed 11/02/17 Page 1 of 2
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“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8560 Filed 11/02/17 Page 2 of 2
j ~OFFiCE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

I AUSTIN 

SROV~RSCLLLRS 

I *rrO”NKv OKNLRAL r. . 

;; 

Capitol Statlou. 

-Austin, Texa.Y 

, 

-. 598 

.’ 

“A state employee 

In question was 

1 eccouut~, and a supbe subtitted ‘to you, 

nt haa attached to 

as to ~W!IJ the -cons:dcrs 

ch’X am fob jec~tlng, should 

Nelth& the expcase account accompanyirq yo.iw request nor the supportlnz statement of the enployee.attached 

‘thereto reveal that auy State business was attended to ic 

Dallas by the enplogee thou claim is made for mileege on 

a return trip frzim Las Jqeles to Austin via Dallas. Wrthermore, the claimant states in hls.letter of explanation that, 

. 
. . “8Jcl 

: I_ 1 

goaomble George II. Shsppsrd, page 2 : 

'Thir axpellie account inClUd89 only 8ipe59e9'15curr8d outaide OS a direct line frm Los A5geles to Austln.n. 

iectioa 2, (12)a, Chapter 400, Act; of the 48th 

?.+@slatllF8, one 0r the general provisions reletlag to departmental apwoprlatioas, provfdes that, "Bo traveling expenses shall b6 claimed, allowed or paid unless iucurred 

Uhi18 travelbg 05 State business.” The sat38 laac;uage was 

used in Section 12 of 5. D. 423, Acts 47th LegLslature,, and 

bur Opitaioa Bo; O-6923 had, this, to, 8~ about its, conatruction: ‘. j, 

-. <, 

~"Bro&? the expense account'stibtitted, the'trlp 

to Dallas represents a distinct and unexpJained de- 

~' parture fron any usual or reasonable line of travel _' ,.. 

:: by ~aucoaobile fro3 Am~illo to Austin. fn the ab- 

. 'sence of a.stater;?ent of facts showing j, necessity 

for such departure fron a reasoaeble line of travel, 

,the presmptioo obtains that the departure or side 

~8XCUlWiO5 was ndt 05 State business, but upon a per- 

~.‘,‘!. sons1 r&ssion or for reasons personal to the enQloyear 30 farm as appears fro% the expense-account, 

therefore, the,exponses,dis~llo~~ed were net lacurred I 

while 05 Stnte business, and the Comptroller was not 

eauchorlzed but required by law to'refug8 pay- 

% k -.reent.l .). ., ,, .' 

Section (12)f of tho~&*eeent Act provides, that," “Ii 

the Comptroller is of the opinim that said officer or ercplogee 

did not take. the shortest practical route,.ho shall have the 

authority and St shall be his duty tom compute the mileage of 

the shortest practical route, between the point cf origin and 

destination of each trip via lntemedlate points visited, and 

he shall issue his warrant in ra-inbursercent therefor o~the.~. 

basis of the above rate." ., .~ 

Ye thinlc the Comptroller properly exckised his authority in refusiw this account oo the @oilnd thet the stated 

expenses were iacumed outside of the cldlrmnt~s "reasmable 

line of travel” or hia “shortest practical route.' 

" Very truQr yours 

ATTOR.RXY GEXZtAL OF T?SWl
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report of The Newark Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form10-Q/A for the quarter ended October 31, 2005 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert H. Mullen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934;and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financialcondition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented. 

Dated: August 31,2006 

 

This certification has been furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q/A or as a separate disclosure statement. 

A signed original of this written statement required bySection 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 99

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cirond Technologies Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Nicholas R. Miller, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
    the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ NICHOLAS R. MILLER
------------------------------
Nicholas R. Miller
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer
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Floyd W. Bybee, #012651

BYBEE LAW CENTER, PLC

90 S. Kyrene Rd., Ste. 5

Chandler, AZ 85226-4687

Office: (480) 756-8822

Fax: (480) 302-4186

floyd@bybeelaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

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Angelica Jackson, )

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Plaintiff, )

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General Revenue Corporation, )

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Defendant. )

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No. CV16-0021-PHX-DGC

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby gives notice of dismissal of this

case in its entirety with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorney’s fees

and costs. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:16-cv-00021-DGC Document 6 Filed 02/23/16 Page 1 of 2
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: February 23, 2016 .

 s/ Floyd W. Bybee 

Floyd W. Bybee, #012651

BYBEE LAW CENTER, PLC

90 S. Kyrene Rd., Ste. 5

Chandler, AZ 85226-4687

Office: (480) 756-8822

Fax: (480) 302-4186

floyd@bybeelaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

Copy of the foregoing emailed and

mailed February 23, 2016 to:

Dana Z. Glaeser

General Revenue Corp.

4660 Duke Dr Ste 300

Mason, OH 45040-8466

General Counsel for Defendant

by Floyd W. Bybee 

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Case 2:16-cv-00021-DGC Document 6 Filed 02/23/16 Page 2 of 2
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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sergio Osvaldo Galeano-Larreynaga, 

Defendant. 

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CR-15-50158-PHX-DJH

ORDER OF DETENTION

Defendant appeared before this Court on a Petition for Revocation of Supervised

Release. The issue of detention was submitted to the Court. The Court considered the

Petition and file in determining whether defendant should be released on conditions set by

the Court.

The Court finds that defendant has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he

does not pose a serious flight risk pursuant to Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

The Court concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is a serious

flight risk and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably

assure his appearance at future proceedings.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant be detained pending further

proceedings.

DATED this 14th day of October, 2015

Case 2:15-cr-50158-DJH Document 6 Filed 10/14/15 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Webster Preferred Capital Corporation (the Company) hereby certifies, that to his knowledge on the date hereof:



|(a) | the Form 10-Q Report of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(b) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

May 5, 2011



/s/ Gregory S. MadarGregory S. MadarChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)


Pursuant to Securities
and Exchange Commission Release 33-8238, dated June 5, 2003, this certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or incorporated
by reference in any registration statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 72 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 72

To amend title 17, United States Code, to allow the making of a copy of 
 a computer program in connection with the maintenance or repair of a 
                               computer.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 7, 1997

 Mr. Knollenberg introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 17, United States Code, to allow the making of a copy of 
 a computer program in connection with the maintenance or repair of a 
                               computer.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Computer Maintenance Competition 
Assurance Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS; COMPUTER PROGRAMS.

    Section 117 of title 17, United States Code, is amended--
    (1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the following:
    ``(a) Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.--
Notwithstanding'';
    (2) by striking ``Any exact'' and inserting the following:
    ``(b) Lease, Sale, or Other Transfer of Additional Copy or 
Adaptation.--Any exact''; and
    (3) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Machine Maintenance or Repair.--Notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner or 
lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a 
computer program if such copy is made solely by virtue of the 
activation of a machine that lawfully contains an authorized copy of 
the computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of 
that machine, if--
            ``(1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is 
        destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is 
        completed; and
            ``(2) with respect to any computer program or part thereof 
        that is not necessary for that machine to be activated, such 
        program or part thereof is not accessed or used other than to 
        make such new copy by virtue of the activation of the machine.
    ``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            ``(1) the `maintenance' of a machine means servicing the 
        machine in order to make it work in accordance with its 
        original specifications and any changes to those specifications 
        authorized for that machine; and
            ``(2) the `repair' of a machine means restoring it to the 
        state of working in accordance with its original specifications 
        and any changes to those specifications authorized for that 
        machine.''.
                                 <all>
```
Case 2:15-mj-01764-JFM Document 4 Filed 10/20/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01764-JFM Document 4 Filed 10/20/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01764-JFM Document 4 Filed 10/20/15 Page 3 of 3
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 12



       COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF INCOME TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK

                              DIVIDEND REQUIREMENTS


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                            Six Months Ended            Three Months Ended
                                        -------------------------------------------------------
                                                 June 30,                      June 30,
                                            2000        1999             2000            1999
                                        -------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                     <C>          <C>              <C>            <C>
Net income                              $1,398,132   $1,180,362        $ 713,093      $ 565,751
Fixed charges:
Income before fixed charges             $1,398,132   $1,180,362        $ 713,093      $ 565,751
Fixed charges, as above
Preferred stock dividend requirements   $  900,450   $  900,450        $ 450,225      $ 450,225
Fixed charges including preferred
  stock dividends                       $  900,450   $  900,450        $ 450,225      $ 450,225
Ratio of income to fixed charges and
  preferred stock dividend requirements       1.55         1.31             1.58           1.46

</TABLE>




15
#### T. T. Shreve *v.*D. J. Cross.

Depositions — Notice to Take — Service—Affidavit Against Officers Return— Laches.

It is at best but the affidavit against the official oath of the officer with the intrinsic probabilities in favor of the latter. As the deposition had probably been on file for months it was great laches in the defendant not to have known it.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

September 24, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

Shreve was sued for work and 'labor, varnish and paints, done and furnished on his house and furniture by Cross, a verdict and judgment were rendered for $121.13, which the court refused to disturb and which he seeks to reverse. There were no instructions, but after trial Shreve filed his own affidavit that he knew nothing of Williams deposition being taken, which was read and constituted an important part of the evidence. That no notice had been served on him though one returned executed by Rutlege a deputy constable was attached thereto.

Nutlege made affidavit that he was executing some notices on Shreve for Cross to stop some pay of other mechanics in his hands and that he delivered these over to Cross when Cross a day or so after returned saying, here is a notice you forgot to make a return on, and he then wrote and signed a return of executed and that he believes this to be the same; that he did not execute a notice to take depositions. Shreve says nothing of any notices being executed on him to stop wages. This deposition was taken May 25, preparatory to the next trial day, when the suit was at Shreve’s instance continued over to September and was not tried until the 18th of that month. It may be fairly presumed the deposition had been lodged at least before the first trial day, by the rules, though the record does not, as it should, show this as well as the notice which is also absent.

It is at best but the affidavit against the official oath of the officer with the intrinsic probabilities in favor of the latter, as *205Shreve did not mention, the notices spoken of by the officer be likely bad forgotten them or else the officer was mistaken and no snob notices were really executed but this notice to take depositions. As the deposition bad probably been on file for months it was great *laches*in the defendant not to know it and give bis. counsel the proper information, nor does bis affidavit disclose any necessity for bis absence at the time of trial. The reasons are too slender for a reversal over the bead of the judge who tried the case. Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*

*Harris &*Hagan, *for appellant.*

*Cochran, for appellee.*