alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 13,472.

#### Mattinger *v.*The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co.

Biel of *Exceptions.*— Failure *to State that it Contains all the*Fmdence.— *Supreme Court.*— Practice.—Where a bill of exceptions does not contain the statement, “ this is all the evidence given in the cause,” or equivalent words, questions which depend upon the evidence will not be considered.

From the DeKalb Circuit Court.

*W. L. Penfield, F. K. Blake*and *H. J. Shafer,*for appellant.

*J. H. Baker, G. C. Greene*and *O. G. Getzen-Danner,*for appellee.

Berkshire, J. —

This suit was instituted before a justice of the peace. The complaint, when the cause was tried, was in one paragraph.

This is an action against the appellee by the appellant, depending upon what is known as the “ Stock Law.”

The complaint charges that, on the 22d day of July, 1884, the defendant was a corporation, operating a line of railroad which passed through the county of DeKalb, in the State of Indiana, and that on said day, at said county, its employees, operating a locomotive engine upon its said line of road, ran the same over a cow belonging to the appellant, thereby killing her; that she was of the value of sixty-five dollars, and that at the point where she went upon the railroad track it was not securely fenced.

The case was tried by a jury, and a special verdict returned. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and a judgment rendered for the defendant.

*137Filed Jan. 26, 1889.

The only error which the appellant assigns is the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

The motion contains several reasons, but in their brief the able counsel for the appellant confine the discussion to certain of them which relate to the admission and exclusion of testimony offered upon the trial, thereby waiving all other questions.

There is what purports to be a bill of exceptions containing the evidence in the record, but it fails to state, *“*this is all the evidence given in the cause; ” nor does it contain equivalent words. There is nothing in the record bringing the case within section 630, R. S. 1881.

Following the numerous decisions of this court, which hold that the evidence is not properly in the record, and that questions depending upon it can not be considered, unless the bill of exceptions contains the words, “ this is all the evidence given in the cause,” or their equivalent, we must hold that the questions which are discussed by appellant’s counsel are not in the record so that we can consider them. *Kleyla*v. *State, ex rel.,*112 Ind. 146; *Brickley*v. *Weghorn,*71 Ind. 497; *Gazette Printing Co.*v. *Morss,*60 Ind. 153; *McDonald*v. *Elfes,*61 Ind. 279; *Sessengut*v. *Posey,*67 Ind. 408.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CEDC FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           3,504
<SECURITIES>                                     1,442
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,410
<ALLOWANCES>                                       116
<INVENTORY>                                      3,548
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                16,174
<PP&E>                                           1,212
<DEPRECIATION>                                     409
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,977
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,430
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            38
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,509
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,977
<SALES>                                         34,861<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                34,861
<CGS>                                           29,593
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   29,593
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 180
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,335
<INCOME-TAX>                                       475
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                860
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       860
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.38
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.38
<FN>
<F1>All sales are in the country of Poland.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christina Mowery, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Good Ole Tom Management Company 

LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-02595-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue to the Tucson Division (Doc. 

8), to which Plaintiff filed a Notice of Non-Opposition (Doc. 10). This employment 

lawsuit arose from Plaintiff’s work for Defendants Good Ole Tom Management 

Company, LLC and Good Ole Tom Tucson, LLC, whose corporate addresses are within 

the Tucson division. Plaintiff worked at the personal home of Defendants Patricia Futch 

and Tommon Tinney, also located in the Tucson division. Thus, this case is founded on 

causes of action arising in the Tucson division and could have been brought there. See 

LRCiv 77.1(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff, Defendants Ms. Futch and Mr. Tinney, and 

potential witnesses reside in the Tucson division. For the convenience of the parties and 

witnesses, the Court will transfer this case to the Tucson division. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 

1406.

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue 

to the Tucson Division (Doc. 8). 

Case 2:15-cv-02595-JJT Document 11 Filed 02/26/16 Page 1 of 2
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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court transfer and open this 

case in the Tucson Division and assign it to a Tucson Division Judge. 

 Dated this 26th day of February, 2016. 

 

 Honorable John J. Tuchi 

 United States District Judge 

Case 2:15-cv-02595-JJT Document 11 Filed 02/26/16 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit
32.2
 
 Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
 
 As
Adopted Pursuant to
 
 Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Imagin Molecular Corporation (the
“Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2008 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), Corey N. Conn, as Chief Financial Officer hereby certifies, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:
 
 (1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d), as
applicable of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.
 
 
 Dated:
      November 19, 2008
                  /s/ Corey N. ConnCorey
      N. ConnChief
      Financial Officer
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Imagin Molecular Corporation and will be retained by Imagin Molecular
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Vanessa Crystal Anderson, 

Defendant. 

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CR-15-01494-PHX-DGC

ORDER OF DETENTION

Defendant was released on Pretrial Supervision on 12/11/2015. Pretrial Services filed

an Amended Petition for Action on Conditions of Pretrial Release alleging that defendant

violated the terms of her release. Defendant was arrested and appears before the Court with

counsel.

A Pretrial Release Revocation Hearing was held.

The Court finds that the Government has established by a preponderance of the

evidence and based on the allegations in the petition, that the defendant violated conditions

of her release. Arguments made on the issue of continued detention, the Court finds that

defendant is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's release is revoked and she is

detained pending further order of the Court.

DATED this 25th day of February , 2016.

Case 2:15-cr-01494-DGC Document 29 Filed 02/25/16 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial extracted from the
financial statements of RB Asset, Inc. for the quarter ended September 30, 2000
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000

<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                                  Jun-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                                                     Jul-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                                       Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                                                  41,867
<SECURITIES>                                                             1,316
<RECEIVABLES>                                                           39,575
<ALLOWANCES>                                                            13,341
<INVENTORY>                                                                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                        49,019
<PP&E>                                                                       0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                               0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                         180,370
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                                        0
<BONDS>                                                                 13,095
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                        0
<PREFERRED>                                                                938
<COMMON>                                                                 7,100
<OTHER-SE>                                                              88,892
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                           180,370
<SALES>                                                                      0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                         5,386
<CGS>                                                                        0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                            3,176
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                         1,035
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                       1,007
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                            168
<INCOME-TAX>                                                               226
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                        (58)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                              0
<CHANGES>                                                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                                                               (58)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                              (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                            (0.01)



</TABLE>
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jerry Emerson Martin, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

United States of America, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00525-TUC-RM

ORDER 

On January 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Bernado P. Velasco issued a Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 23) recommending that this Court dismiss Petitioner Jerry 

Martin’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 7) for lack of 

jurisdiction. No objections to the Report and Recommendation were filed. 

 A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a 

magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 

72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, “[w]hen no timely objection is 

filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 

in order to accept the recommendation” of a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 

advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition. See also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection or only partial objection is made, the 

district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”); Prior v. Ryan, 

CV 10-225-TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 1344286, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2012) (reviewing for 
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clear error unobjected-to portions of Report and Recommendation). 

 The Court has reviewed Judge Velasco’s Report and Recommendation, the 

parties’ briefs, and the record. The Court finds no error in Judge Velasco’s Report and 

Recommendation. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 23) is accepted 

and adopted in full. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 7) is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to 

enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability, because 

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 478, 484 (2000).1

 Dated this 13th day of February, 2018. 

 

 

1

 Although Petitioner has brought his claims in a § 2241 petition, a certificate of appealability is required where a § 2241 petition attacks the petitioner’s conviction or 

sentence. See Porter v. Adams, 244 F.3d 1006 (9th. Cir. 2001).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffery Curtis,

Plaintiff,

v.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al.,

Defendant.

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-18-00101-PHX-DGC

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

Date: January 12, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Attorney's signature

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed name and bar number

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6000

Telephone number

(404 322-6050

FAX number

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9681 Filed 01/16/18 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>   1


                                                                     Exhibit 23


                       INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement No. 
333-65279 on Form S-8 of our report dated March 5, 1999, except as to the last 
two paragraphs of Note 17, which are as of March 17, 1999, relating to the 
consolidated balance sheets of Citadel Communications Corporation and 
subsidiary as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and the related consolidated 
statements of operations, changes in shareholders' equity and cash flows for 
each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1998, which 
report appears in the December 31, 1998 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Citadel 
Communications Corporation.



                                                                 /s/ KPMG LLP


Phoenix, Arizona
March 29, 1999
2:15-cv-01813-SPL NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

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TRINETTE G. KENT (State Bar No. 025180)

10645 North Tatum Blvd., Suite 200-192

Phoenix, AZ 85028

Telephone: (480) 247-9644

Facsimile: (480) 717-4781

E-mail: tkent@lemberglaw.com

Of Counsel to 

Lemberg Law, LLC

A Connecticut Law Firm

43 Danbury Road

Wilton, CT 06897

Telephone: (203) 653-2250

Facsimile: (203) 653-3424

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

Katrina Chavez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Katrina Chavez,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. Collections West, Inc.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 2:15-cv-01813-SPL

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

Case 2:15-cv-01813-SPL Document 20 Filed 02/02/16 Page 1 of 4
2

2:15-cv-01813-SPL NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the parties in the above-captioned case have 

reached a settlement. The parties anticipate filing a Stipulation of Dismissal with 

Prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) within 60 days.

By: /s/ Trinette G. Kent 

Trinette G. Kent, Esq.

Lemberg Lemberg, LLC

Attorney for Plaintiff, Katrina Chavez

Case 2:15-cv-01813-SPL Document 20 Filed 02/02/16 Page 2 of 4
3

2:15-cv-01813-SPL NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and 

not a party to the above-entitled cause. On February 2, 2016, I served a true copy of 

foregoing document(s): NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT.

BY ELECTRONIC FILING: I hereby 

certify that on February 2, 2016, a copy 

of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically. Notice of this filing will be 

sent by operation of the Court's electronic 

filing system to all parties indicated on 

the electronic filing receipt. All other 

parties will be served by regular U.S. 

Mail. Parties may access this filing 

through the Court's electronic filing 

system.

Attorney for Defendants U.S. 

Collections West, Inc.

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing 

correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. 

Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary 

course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed 

invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the 

date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I hereby certify that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this 

Court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on February 2, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-01813-SPL Document 20 Filed 02/02/16 Page 3 of 4
4

2:15-cv-01813-SPL NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

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By: /s/ Trinette G. Kent 

Trinette G. Kent, Esq.

Lemberg Law, LLC

Attorney for Plaintiff, Katrina Chavez

Case 2:15-cv-01813-SPL Document 20 Filed 02/02/16 Page 4 of 4
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ARTHUR B. FRAZIER.

May 22, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Elwell and Others *v.*Tucker.

*A*seat of justice which had been established at Brownsville, in *Union*county, by authority of an act of the legislature, was, by virtue of a subsequent act, removed to Liberty, in the same county: *Held,*that the statute authorizing the removal is not unconstitutional.

The establishment of the time and place of holding Courts, is a matter of general legislation, respecting which the acts of one session of the general assembly cannot be binding on another.

ERROR to the *Fayette*Circuit Court.

Scott, J.

Commissioners were appointed by the general assembly of this state, to establish a seat of justice in Union county. The defendant, *Tucker,*entered into an agreement, binding himself to pay 200 dollars to the county agent, for the use of the county, on condition that the commissioners would fix the seat of justice at *fyownsville.*The commissioners did fix the seat of justice at *Brownsville.*And the county agent assigned the said agreement to the plaintiffs, in consideration of their undertaking to erect the public buildings for said county. At a subsequent session of the general assembly, other commissioners were appointed, who fixed the scat, of justice at Liberty. *286The plaintiffs brought suit against *Tucker*on his agreement. The defendant sets out these facts, and pleads a failure of con-side ration. There was a general demurrer to the plea, and judgment for the defendant.

*Ray,*for the plaintiffs.

*Test*and *Caswell,*for the defendant.

The plaintiffs insist, here, that the second act of assembly, appointing commissioners, is unconstitutional and therefore void. They release all errors except the constitutionality of that act. Thus situated, the case presents but one point for our consideration. If that act is constitutional, the judgment must stand; if otherwise, it must be reversed, The establishment of the time and place of holding Courts is a matter of general legislation, respecting which the act of one session of the general assembly cannot be binding on another, When the legislature fix a seat of justice, either directly by their own act, or through the medium of commissioners by them appointed for that purpose, they fix it, there to remain until altered by some future legislature. When the commissioners fixed the seat of justice at Brownsville, there was no covenant of perpetuity. There was no stipula-. fion, express or implied, that *Brownsville,*should forever be. the. place of holding the Courts for the county of *Union.*No such contract could exist, according to the first principles of legislation. The only assurance that was, or could then be, given to the citizens of that place, was, that *Brownsville*should be the place of holding the Courts for the county of *Union,*until otherwise directed by the competent authority. The general assembly then, in passing the act in question, exercised their constitutional power, and the act is constitutional and valid.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.