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James R. Condo (#005867)

Amanda C. Sheridan (#027360) 

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 

One Arizona Center 

400 E. Van Buren, Suite 1900 

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2204 

Telephone: (602) 382-6000 

jcondo@swlaw.com 

asheridan@swlaw.com 

Richard B. North, Jr. (admitted pro hac vice) 

Georgia Bar No. 545599 

Matthew B. Lerner (admitted pro hac vice) 

Georgia Bar No. 446986 

NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP 

Atlantic Station 

201 17th Street, NW, Suite 1700 

Atlanta, GA 30363 

Telephone: (404) 322-6000 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

matthew.lerner@nelsonmullins.com 

Attorneys for Defendants 

C. R. Bard, Inc. and 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability 

Litigation, 

No. 2:15-MD-02641-DGC

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

BIFURCATE TRIAL 

SHERR-UNA BOOKER, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. R. BARD, INC., a New Jersey 

corporation and BARD PERIPHERAL 

VASCULAR, INC., an Arizona 

corporation, 

Defendants.

(Assigned to the Honorable David G. 

Campbell) 

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc. (collectively “Bard”) move to bifurcate the trial of this case to avoid 

prejudice. Specifically, Bard requests this Court conduct trial in two phases: determining 

liability, compensatory damages, and whether punitive damages should be awarded in the 

first phase of trial and, if necessary, determining the amount of punitive damages in the 

second phase following the procedure set out in Georgia’s state statute on punitive 

damages O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d). 

I. Factual Background 

This is a product liability action in which the plaintiff asserts that she suffered 

personal injuries arising out of the implantation of Bard’s G2 Filter (“G2 Filter”). The G2 

Filter was designed and sold by Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., a division of Bard, 

headquartered in Arizona. As part of her suit against Bard, the plaintiff has alleged she is 

entitled to recover punitive damages against Bard – which Bard denies. In light of 

plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the trial of this case should be bifurcated in order to 

avoid prejudice. 

II. Legal Standard 

Section 51-12-5.1 of the Georgia Code Annotated specifically defines the 

substantive limitations of punitive damages awards and mandates a bifurcated trial 

procedure in determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. While the 

substantive portions of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 apply to this case1, bifurcation is a matter of 

1

 Plaintiff resided in Georgia at the time she allegedly suffered injuries due to the G2 

Filter implant and listed the Northern District of Georgia in her Short Form Complaint as 

the appropriate forum court absent direct filing in this MDL. (Case 2:16-cv-00474-DGC, 

Doc. 1, ¶¶ 5-7) Consequently, Georgia substantive law – including substantive law 

concerning punitive damages – applies to this case. See Sanchez v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 

2:12-CV-05762, 2014 WL 202787, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 17, 2014) (recognizing that 

courts apply the choice-of-law rules of the “originating jurisdiction” for cases that 

originate outside the MDL court’s judicial district and that are filed directly into the 

MDL); In re Fresenius Granuflo/NaturaLyte Dialysate Prod. Liab. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 3d 

294, 303 n. 6 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that direct-filing MDL plaintiffs should be required 

to declare an appropriate home forum in their complaint to serve as the “proper 

originating forum”); Coon v. Medical Center, Inc., 335 Ga.App. 278, 282, 780 S.E.2d 118 

(2015) (noting that, under its choice-of-law rules, Georgia applies the substantive law of 

the place where the injury was suffered). 

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procedure and, thus, the Federal Rules govern a bifurcation decision in diversity cases. 

Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding 

bifurcation is procedural and applying federal rules); Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 

F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding bifurcation under federal rules); Moss v. 

Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 24 (6th Cir. 1965) (upholding bifurcation under 

federal rules). 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, bifurcation is governed by Rule 42(b) 

which allows federal courts discretion to order bifurcation of issues “[f]or convenience, to 

avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). As set out below, 

when considering bifurcation of punitive damages in cases applying Georgia substantive 

law, a number of district courts have exercised their discretion under Rule 42(b) and 

adopted the bifurcation procedures set out in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) to avoid prejudice 

to defendants. The bifurcation procedures outlined in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) should, 

likewise, be adopted in the present case in order to avoid prejudice to Bard. 

III. Argument 

Bifurcation of trial in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) is necessary to avoid 

introduction of prejudicial evidence during the determination of liability and 

compensatory damages. 

The most common reason for bifurcating is to exclude evidence of the defendant's 

wealth or net worth from the compensatory damages phase. Traditionally, evidence of a 

defendant’s financial net worth is admissible and relevant for the purpose of evaluating 

the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,

453 U.S. 247, 270, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); United States v. Big D 

Enterprises, Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 932 (8th Cir.1999). Courts, however, have widely 

recognized that such evidence is wholly irrelevant to liability or compensatory damages 

and can be highly prejudicial to the jury’s determination on those issues. See Parsons v. 

First Investors Corp., 122 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir.1997) (recognizing that bifurcation of 

trial into separate phases to consider, first, liability and compensatory damages, and 

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second, punitive damages, can avoid the potential that evidence pertinent to punitive 

damages will improperly prejudice a determination on liability and compensatory 

damages); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woods, 896 F. Supp. 658, 660 (E.D. Tex. 1995) 

(ordering bifurcation and holding that “[w]hile [defendant’s] net worth will be relevant to 

a determination of punitive damages, that same information could severely prejudice the 

[defendant] in the calculation of actual damages.”). 

Here, evidence relevant only to the amount of punitive damages – such as Bard’s 

financial net worth – carries the same potential for severe prejudice recognized by other 

courts. The balance between relevance and prejudice of punitive damages evidence 

creates a dilemma not resolvable under the all-or-nothing approach of Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Limiting instructions are also ineffective at curtailing the potential prejudice inherent in 

trials involving punitive damages claims. See Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 

592, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. City of Anaheim, Cal. v. Estate of 

Diaz, 137 S. Ct. 2098, 197 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2017) (reversing district court’s denial of 

bifurcation of punitive damages issue and noting that “if a limiting instruction was 

considered sufficient to cure all prejudice, there would be no need ever to bifurcate to 

avoid prejudice”). Bifurcation of the proceedings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), however, 

provides a solution for both problems. On one hand, bifurcation protects against prejudice 

by excluding the offending evidence during the first phase of trial. And, on the other 

hand, it allows the appropriate introduction of relevant evidence during the second phase. 

The bifurcation procedure laid out in Georgia’s statute on punitive damages – 

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) – is instructive.2 Under the Georgia statute, cases involving 

2

 Other portions of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 dealing with punitive damages are substantive 

and, thus, binding on federal courts sitting in diversity. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for 

Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2221, 135 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1996) 

(holding that N.Y. state statute governing determination whether punitive award is 

excessive applies in diversity cases); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco 

Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921–22, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1989) 

(“In a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law provides the basis of 

decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and 

the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state 

law.”); In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:07-CV00101, 2010 WL 1998166, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 18, 2010) (applying “one award” 

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punitive damages are bifurcated with the jury determining liability, compensatory 

damages, and the availability of punitive damages in the initial phase of trial. O.C.G.A. § 

51-12-5.1(d)(1). Should the jury find that punitive damages should be awarded, then the 

second phase of trial immediately recommences in order to receive additional evidence 

relevant to the amount of punitive damages and for the jury to make a determination as to 

the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d)(2). A number of 

other federal district courts, applying substantive Georgia law on the issue of punitive 

damages, have exercised their discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) and applied the 

procedural bifurcation structure set out by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d). See Scroggins v. 

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (exercising 

discretion under FRCP 42, in case involving Georgia law, to bifurcate proceedings – if 

necessary – in light of O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(d)’s intended purpose to protect defendants 

from prejudice); Galack v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 4:13-CV-0288-HLM, 2015 WL 

11578452, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2015) (granting bifurcation and finding that “trial 

should proceed according to O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(d)”); In re Mentor Corp. ObTape 

Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:07-CV-00101, 2010 WL 1998166, at *4 

(M.D. Ga. May 18, 2010) (“Pretermitting whether this issue [of bifurcation] is procedural 

or substantive and thus governed by federal or Georgia law, the Court finds Georgia law 

on the issue instructive.”). 

The structure of the bifurcation procedures under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) strikes 

the appropriate balance between exclusion of prejudicial evidence and admission of 

relevant evidence pertinent to the issue of the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be 

awarded. Thus, in order to avoid severe prejudice through the admission of net worth or 

other evidence during the determination of liability and compensatory damages, the trial 

provision of O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(e)(1) in MDL case where Georgia’s punitive damages 

statute applied); Cisson v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00195, 2015 WL 251437, at *4 

(S.D.W. Va. Jan. 20, 2015), aff'd sub nom. In re C.R. Bard, Inc., MDL. No. 2187, Pelvic 

Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 810 F.3d 913 (4th Cir. 2016) (MDL court sitting in 

diversity applied and upheld constitutionality of O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(e)(2)’s requirement 

that 75% of any amount awarded as punitive damages be paid to the state treasury). 

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of this case should be bifurcated in accordance with the procedure set out in O.C.G.A. 51-

12-5.1(d). 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the trial of this case should be bifurcated in accordance 

with the procedures set out in O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(d). 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2018. 

s/Richard B. North, Jr. 

Richard B. North, Jr. 

Georgia Bar No. 545599 

Matthew B. Lerner 

Georgia Bar No. 446986 

NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP 

Atlantic Station 

201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 

Atlanta, GA 30363 

PH: (404) 322-6000 

FX: (404) 322-6050 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

matthew.lerner@nelsonmullins.com 

James R. Condo (#005867) 

Amanda Sheridan (#027360) 

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 

One Arizona Center 

400 E. Van Buren 

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2204 

PH: (602) 382-6000 

jcondo@swlaw.com 

asheridan@swlaw.com 

Attorneys for Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of January, 2018, the foregoing was 

electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will 

automatically send email notification of such filing to all attorneys of record. 

s/Richard B. North, Jr. 

Richard B. North, Jr. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9825 Filed 01/26/18 Page 7 of 7