J-A22029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

NATHAN LEE SKIDMORE,

Appellant

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 2113 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 29, 2013,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-29-CR-0000032-2013.

BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2014

Appellant, Nathan Lee Skidmore,1appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his conviction of six counts of robbery, one count 

of theft, and one count of possession of a controlled substance.2 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:

[Appellant] was charged with three counts of robbery 

threatening serious bodily injury,2three counts of robbery 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that certain court documents list Appellant’s first name as Nathan, 

and other documents list his name as Nathen.

2 Although in his notice of appeal Appellant purports to appeal from the 

order denying his pretrial motion in limine, the appeal properly lies from the 

judgment of sentence because pretrial orders denying a defendant’s motion 

to suppress evidence are interlocutory and not appealable. 

Commonwealth v. Strong, 825 A.2d 658, 667 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Therefore, we have amended the caption accordingly.
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threatening to commit any felony of the first or second degree,3

three counts of robbery fear of immediate bodily injury,4three 

counts of robbery by force,5three counts of terroristic threats,6

one count theft by unlawful taking or disposition,7and one count 

possession of a controlled substance8on February 3, 2013 

related to an incident at MacDonald’s Pharmacy on February 2, 

2013. The Information filed by the Fulton County District 

Attorney on February 14, 2013, did not include the three counts 

of robbery fear of immediate bodily injury, the three counts of 

robbery by force, or the three counts of terroristic threats. On 

February 19, 2013, [Appellant] signed a waiver of arraignment 

and pled guilty to one count of robbery threatening serious 

bodily injury. On March 3, 2013, [Appellant] filed a Motion to 

Withdraw Plea of Guilty.9 The Motion to Withdraw Plea was 

granted on April 17, 2013. The trial date was set for September 

25 and 26, 2013, before Judge Angela R. Krom and the jury was 

impaneled on July 22, 2013.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

8 35 [P.S.] § 780-113(a)(16).

9

It appears that even though [Appellant] was 

represented by Attorney Harper, he filed a pro se

Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty. Thereafter, 

another Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty was filed 

on April 9, 2013 by Attorney Harper.

[Appellant] filed a Motion in Limine on September 12, 

201310 to suppress the written statement obtained on February 

2, 2013 by the Pennsylvania State Police. [Appellant] asserts 

that at the time the confession was obtained he was in a 
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confused and less than lucid state of mind as the result of being 

struck in the head by a metal pipe the morning of the 

interrogation. Motion ¶¶ 4, 8. [Appellant] alleges that despite 

knowledge of [Appellant’s] head injury and his confused mental 

state, troopers proceeded to obtain [Appellant’s] confession. 

Motion ¶ 9. Additionally, the written statement was obtained 

approximately five hours after [Appellant] had been taken into 

custody and before his preliminary arraignment. Motion ¶¶ 1, 5. 

[Appellant] asserts that based on the totality of the 

circumstances the confession was not voluntary and should be 

suppressed. Motion ¶¶ 10, 11.

10 A Motion in Limine Amended was filed on 

September 24, 2013. The Motion in Limine 

Amended addressed the late filing of the Motion in 

Limine, otherwise the content is the same as the 

Motion in Limine.

The Commonwealth filed an Answer to [Appellant’s] Motion 

in Limine on September 20, 2013. The Commonwealth denied 

that [Appellant] has grounds to have the written statement 

suppressed. Answer ¶ 1. The Commonwealth acknowledged 

that [Appellant] appeared to be under the influence of drugs and 

had difficulty focusing while writing the custodial written 

statement; however, [Appellant] appeared to be oriented and 

coherent, and willingly admitted his guilt. Answer ¶ 6. The 

Commonwealth asserted that [Appellant’s] custodial written 

statement was voluntary, that he received Miranda warnings, 

and that in the document itself [Appellant] acknowledges that he 

understood his rights and that he gave his statement voluntarily. 

Answer ¶ 4. The Commonwealth asserts that [Appellant’s] 

statement was voluntary, notwithstanding that [Appellant] was 

suffering from an injury or under the influence of drugs, as 

[Appellant’s] interrogation was not so manipulative or coercive 

that it deprived [Appellant] of the ability to make a free and 

unconstrained decision to confess. Answer ¶ 9.

Based on the Court’s schedule, a hearing on the motion 

was held immediately before the trial began. At the hearing 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Michael A. Sprague (“Trooper 

Sprague”), Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Timothy Daniel 

Lear (“Trooper Lear”), and [Appellant] testified. Trooper 
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Sprague testified to [Appellant’s] demeanor on February 2, 

2013. Trooper Sprague spoke to [Appellant] at his home and 

the police station and described [Appellant] as very hyper, as if 

he had drank several cups of coffee. N.T. p. 4. According to 

Trooper Sprague, [Appellant] did not exhibit any behavior that 

suggested he was not comprehending what was occurring. N.T.

p. 4-5. Within thirty minutes of being brought back to the 

interview room, [Appellant] gave a verbal confession. N.T. p. 7. 

Trooper Sprague testified that he did not threaten or intimidate 

[Appellant], nor did he offer him leniency in exchange for his 

cooperation. N.T. p. 8. Trooper Sprague was unable to testify 

regarding the written statement as his shift was over and he 

went home shortly after [Appellant] had given a verbal 

confession. N.T. pp. 8, 10-11.

Trooper Lear also testified that [Appellant] was talkative 

and that he did not appear to be impaired in any way. N.T. p. 

16-17. Although Defendant attempted to negotiate lenient 

treatment in exchange for providing information about drug 

dealers in the area, Trooper Lear testified that he did not 

threaten, coerce, or promise [Appellant] leniency. N.T. p. 18. 

Trooper Lear was involved in obtaining a written custodial 

statement from [Appellant]. Trooper Lear testified that he 

initially left [Appellant] alone in the interrogation room to 

complete the written custodial statement. N.T. p. 19. Trooper 

Lear periodically checked on [Appellant] and gave him a new 

piece of paper when he saw that [Appellant] had scribbled out 

his entire statement. N.T. p. 19. While [Appellant] did 

eventually write and sign a confession, the handwriting was 

poor. In an attempt to clarify things Trooper Lear wrote a 

question and had [Appellant] answer the question. N.T. p. 20. 

Trooper Lear did testify he had referred to [Appellant’s] written 

statement as an “attempt” at a written statement in the police 

incident report that he authored; however, he stated this was 

only in reference to the page that had been entirely crossed out. 

N.T. pp. 23-24.

[Appellant] took the stand during the hearing and testified 

that he can only remember parts of the day of February 2, 2013. 

N.T. p. 31. [Appellant] remembers being hit over the head with 

an iron pipe in the early morning hours, but he does not 

remember being in the hospital for his injuries. N.T. p. 33. 
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[Appellant’s] testimony was difficult to follow and he had to be 

instructed by his attorney to slow down. [Appellant] testified 

that he passed out on a bench at the police station and that the 

troopers were laughing at him. N.T. p. 36-37. In regards to the 

written statement, [Appellant] testified that he did not 

remember what he wrote down, but he did remember passing 

out and spilling coffee on the form. N.T. p. 37. [Appellant] did 

not remember writing an answer to the question written by 

Trooper Lear. N.T. p. 38.

The Court found that the Commonwealth had proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that based on the totality of the 

circumstances, [Appellant’s] written confession was voluntary. 

Therefore, by Order of Court dated September 25, 2013, the 

Court denied [Appellant’s] Motion in Limine seeking suppression 

of his written statement of February 2, 2013.

The case went to trial at which the Commonwealth 

introduced the written statement as an exhibit. The jury found 

[Appellant] guilty of three counts of robbery threatening serious 

bodily injury, three counts of robbery threatening to commit 

murder, one count of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and 

one count of possession of a controlled substance. [Appellant] 

was sentenced on October 29, 2013, to a State Correctional 

Institution for a period of not less than sixty-six (66) months nor 

more than one hundred thirty-two (132) months on each [of] 

the three robbery threatening serious bodily injury counts to be 

served consecutively. [Appellant] was also sentenced to six (6) 

to twelve (12) months on the possession of a controlled 

substance count to be served concurrently with the first count of 

robbery threatening serious bodily injury.

[Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal on November 26, 2013 

challenging the Order of Court entered on September 25, 2013, 

denying [Appellant’s] Motion in Limine to suppress his written 

statement. The Court ordered a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal on November 27, 2013.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/14, at 1-6 (footnotes in original).

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
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DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMITT [sic] ERROR IN DENYING 

APPELLANT’S REQUEST TO SUPPRESS AN INCULPATORY 

STATEMENT MADE BY APPELLANT WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY 

AND PRIOR TO PRELIMINARY ARRAIGNMENT WHERE THE FACTS 

AND CIRCUMSTANCES INCIDENT TO THE STATEMENT INDICATE 

THAT IT WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY GIVEN?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s motion in limine seeking to suppress the written statement that 

he provided to the police. Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to 

meet its burden of showing that Appellant’s confession was voluntary 

because he was not in a satisfactory physical or psychological condition to 

make the written confession.

We begin by observing that a motion in limine is a procedure for 

obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to or during trial, but 

before the evidence has been offered. Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 

638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any 

evidence in a case is that it be competent and relevant. Id.

Furthermore, it is well settled that “[t]he admission of evidence is 

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed on appeal 

only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Miles, 846 A.2d 132, 136 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 740 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1999)). 

Abuse of discretion requires a finding of misapplication of the law, a failure 
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to apply the law, or judgment by the trial court that exhibits bias, ill-will, 

prejudice, partiality, or was manifestly unreasonable, as reflected by the 

record. Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. 2009).

Moreover, we are aware that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 

581, which addresses the suppression of evidence, provides in relevant part 

as follows:

(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of 

establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in 

violation of the defendant’s rights.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).

The standard of review an appellate court applies when 

considering an order denying a suppression motion is well 

established. An appellate court may consider only the 

Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of 

the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119, 

126, 934 A.2d 1199, 1203 (2007) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75 (2004)). Where the 

record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, the 

appellate court is bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Id. It is 

also well settled that the appellate court is not bound by the 

suppression court’s conclusions of law. Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438, 817 A.2d 455 

(2003)). However, [w]hether a confession is constitutionally 

admissible is a question of law and subject to plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 160, 709 A.2d 879, 

881 (1998).

Thus, this Court does not, nor is it required to, defer 

to the suppression court’s legal conclusions that a 

confession or Miranda[

3

] waiver was knowing or 

voluntary. Instead, we examine the record to 

 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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determine if it supports the suppression court’s 

findings of fact and if those facts support the 

conclusion that, as a matter of law, Appellant 

knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda

rights. Preliminarily, we note:

Regardless of whether a waiver of 

Miranda is voluntary, the 

Commonwealth must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the 

waiver is also knowing and intelligent.

Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant 

may waive effectuation” of the rights 

conveyed in the warnings “provided the 

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly 

and intelligently.” The inquiry has two 

distinct dimensions. First the 

relinquishment of the right must have 

been voluntary in the sense that it was 

the product of a free and deliberate 

choice rather than intimidation, coercion 

or deception. Second, the waiver must 

have been made with a full awareness 

both of the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the 

decision to abandon it. Only if the 

“totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation” reveals 

both an uncoerced choice and the 

requisite level of comprehension may a 

court properly conclude that Miranda

rights have been waived.

Commonwealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (Pa. 

Super. 1987) (emphasis in original).

In the Interest of T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 505-506 (Pa. Super. 

2010).

* * *
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In examining the totality of circumstances, we also consider: (1) 

the duration and means of an interrogation; (2) the defendant’s 

physical and psychological state; (3) the conditions attendant to 

the detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; and (5) “any 

and all other factors that could drain a person’s ability to 

withstand suggestion and coercion.” Nester, 551 Pa. at 164, 

709 A.2d at 882.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 746 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The trial court offered the following analysis pertaining to Appellant’s 

claim:

In considering the factors that are part of the totality of 

the circumstances determination of the voluntariness of a 

confession, on the record the Court emphasized the physical and 

psychological state of [Appellant] as that was the focus of 

[Appellant’s] Motion in Limine and his rationale for suppressing 

the written statement. The Court stated on the record that it 

found the testimony of Trooper Sprague and Trooper Lear to be 

credible in their descriptions of [Appellant’s] behavior and 

mental state on February 2, 2013. N.T. p. 44. The Court also 

had the opportunity to assess [Appellant] and his demeanor. 

[Appellant] appeared hyper and had to be redirected by his 

attorney during his testimony. [Appellant] had difficulty 

expressing his thoughts in a linear fashion on the stand and the 

Court found that his written statement with all of its scribbles, 

horrendous handwriting, and ambiguous content was consistent 

with [Appellant’s] observed behavior. Id. There is nothing in 

the record to suggest that based on the physical and 

psychological state of the accused that he was manipulated or 

coerced such that his written statement was not voluntarily 

given.

While the Court focused its discussion on the record to the 

physical and psychological state of the accused when 

determining whether the confession was voluntary, the Court did 

consider the other factors that are part of the totality of the 

circumstances test. Regarding the duration of the interrogation, 

the Court heard evidence that [Appellant] verbally confessed 

after less than a half an hour in the interrogation room. At the 
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hearing there was testimony from the troopers in regards to 

their conduct during the interrogation. Both Trooper Sprague 

and Lear testified that they did not threaten or coerce 

[Appellant], nor did they offer [Appellant] leniency in exchange 

for his cooperation. Additionally, [Appellant] was given Miranda 

warnings twice. Considering all of the evidence presented at the 

hearing there was nothing to suggest that under any of the 

factors that the confession was not voluntary. Therefore, based 

on the totality of the circumstances, the Court found that the 

written statement was voluntary and denied [Appellant’s] 

request that it be excluded.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/14, at 8-9. We are constrained to agree with the 

trial court’s determination in this regard.

Our review of the record indicates that the totality of the facts support 

the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion in limine seeking to 

suppress his written confession. Appellant was present with the police at his 

residence for several hours during the initial investigation of the robbery 

prior to Appellant being taken to the police barracks. N.T., 9/25/13, at 4, 9-

10, 14. After Appellant was transported to the police barracks, Appellant 

was twice given his Miranda warnings prior to making his written 

confession. Id. at 5, 10-11, 14-16. Approximately one-half hour after 

arriving at the police barracks, Appellant verbally confessed to the robbery. 

Id. at 7. Both troopers who handled the interrogation of Appellant testified 

that Appellant was never threatened; was never coerced; was never offered 

lieniency for cooperation; was never verbally or physically intimidated; was 

never held in an uncomfortable position; and they did not yell at him. Id. at 
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8, 18. The record further reflects that after Appellant verbally confessed to 

police, they asked him to write his confession, and they left the room while 

Appellant did so. Id. at 18-19. It was only after Appellant had difficulty 

drafting a written statement that Trooper Lear assisted Appellant. Id. at 19-

20. Specifically, Trooper Lear offered the following testimony in this regard:

Q. And at the end, to clarify things, did you write a question 

and have him answer it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that question?

A. The question is, Did you go to MacDonald’s Pharmacy and 

hand a note to the cashier stating you have five seconds to put a 

Ritalin, comma, Adderall, comma, and Xanax in a bag, before I 

kill you and everybody here. This is not a game, comma, test 

me, explanation point.

Q. And did he respond to that?

A. Answer was yes, then he initialed it, and then signed it, 

and then put the time.

Q. At any point in the process did [Appellant] appear to not 

know what was going on?

A. No.

Id. at 20. 

In light of these facts, it is our conclusion that the trial court did not 

err in denying Appellant’s motion in limine seeking to suppress his 

confession to police. Therefore, Appellant’s contrary claim lacks merit.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Panella joins the Memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/8/2014