Filed 1/12/24 Blanco v. Cargasacchi CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

HENRY BLANCO,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

GIOVANNI CARGASACCHI, 

Individually and as Trustee, 

etc., et al.,

 Defendants and 

Respondents.

2d Civil No. B324397

(Super. Ct. No. 17CV04672)

(Santa Barbara County)

Henry Blanco appeals from the judgment after the trial 

court concluded he must comply with the terms of a 

memorandum signed in 1990 (the 1990 memorandum) before 

securing permits necessary for completing the construction of a 

residence in the Lakeview Estates development of the Santa 

Ynez Valley. He contends the court erred in finding that the 

1990 memorandum terminated an easement granted in 1968 to 

his predecessor-in-interest (the 1968 easement). He also
2

contends the court erred in finding that he could not improve an 

existing road that runs over the 1968 easement, requiring him 

instead to construct a new road to secure his desired permits per 

the terms of the 1990 memorandum. And lastly, Blanco claims 

the court’s findings amount to an unconstitutional taking. We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1968, a previous owner of Blanco’s property recorded 

“[a]n easement and right-of-way . . . for road purposes[] on, over[,] 

and across a strip of land” owned by the Cargasacchi family.

1 

Nineteen years later, the Cargasacchis and Lakeview Estates 

landowners signed a document specifying that the 1968 easement

was 30 feet wide and available for all Lakeview Estates 

landowners to use (the 1987 clarification). The clarification also

reaffirmed the terms of the 1968 easement: “Except as expressly 

clarified and expanded herein, all terms, conditions[,] and 

stipulations of [the 1968 easement] shall remain in full force and 

effect and are hereby confirmed as such.”

In 1990, the Cargasacchis, Lakeview Estates landowners, 

and owners of an adjacent plot of land, Rancho Dos Mundos, 

signed the 1990 memorandum. This memorandum specified the 

location of a 30-foot-wide easement across the Cargasacchis’ land, 

and required Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos 

landowners to “release all other easements or other rights that lie 

outside [the 1990] easement, and . . . release and quitclaim all 

1 The Cargasacchi Family Trust; the estate of Giovanni 

Cargasacchi; John M. Cargasacchi; Laura Teresa Cargasacchi 

Belluz, as trustee of the Laura Teresa Cargasacchi Belluz 

Separate Property Trust; Mark J. Cargasacchi; and Peter A. 

Cargasacchi. 
3

other rights and claims across” Cargasacchi lands. The 

memorandum permitted the construction of a paved road across 

the easement (the 1990 road), but allowed landowners to

continue using the road crossing the 1968 easement until the 

1990 road was completed. They could not “materially increase 

the burden or impose new or additional burdens [on] the 

easement,” however. The signing parties acknowledged that the 

1990 memorandum “result[ed] in the relocation of the [1968] 

easement,” but that all other “terms, conditions[,] and 

stipulations of [that easement] and [the 1987 clarification would] 

remain in full force and effect.”

In 1998, the prior owner of Blanco’s property, the Marks 

family, obtained a permit from the County of Santa Barbara (the 

County) to build a residence. They commenced construction of 

the residence, which continued until it was about 90 percent 

complete. At that point, the County ordered the Markses to stop 

construction until the 1990 road was completed.

In 2004, the Cargasacchis agreed to permit the Markses to 

increase the use of the 1968 easement, as clarified in the 1987 

clarification and 1990 memorandum, to allow them to finish the 

construction of their residence (the 2004 agreement).

2 This 

increase in the use of the easement did not allow the Markses to 

change or alter the road crossing the 1968 easement, however, 

and required them to stop using it once the 1990 road was 

useable. 

After Blanco acquired the Markses’ property in 2012, 

County officials told him he would need to widen and add 

2 The 2004 agreement was admitted into evidence, but the 

trial court did not rely on it in its decision. Neither do we; we 

describe it only for context.
4

compacted gravel to the road leading to his residence before it 

would issue the permits necessary to finish construction. This 

required Blanco to show that the Cargasacchis had granted him 

“the authority to alter and improve” the road crossing the 1968 

easement. The Cargasacchis refused to grant that authority, 

claiming that Blanco instead had to construct the 1990 road to 

meet County standards. 

Blanco sued the Cargasacchis for quiet title and declaratory 

relief.3 The trial court rejected Blanco’s claims. It concluded the 

1990 memorandum “expressly rejects the [1968] easement, 

substitutes it for the new road, and identifies a new location . . . 

with specific requirements and dimensions.” The road crossing

the 1968 easement could not be updated to County standards 

because if Blanco were “permitted to go forward with the 

improvements of” it the easement “would no longer be ‘old.’ ” 

Instead, it would “essentially [become] the new easement road, 

semi-permanent and fully operational, with no future transition 

realistically possible,” rendering the 1990 memorandum’s 

requirements “ephemeral.” The court concluded that the road 

crossing over the 1968 easement must be “phased out,” and 

Blanco must build a new road to finish construction of his 

Lakeview Estates property. 

DISCUSSION

Termination of the 1968 easement

Blanco first contends the trial court erred in finding that 

3 Blanco also petitioned the trial court to issue a writ of 

mandate to compel the County to issue the permits. The court 

denied Blanco’s petition, and we affirmed the judgment on 

appeal. (See Blanco v. County of Santa Barbara (Oct. 18, 2021, 

B308340) [nonpub. opn.] [2021 WL 4839083].) 
5

the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968 easement. We do 

not resolve this contention.4 As explained below, even if the 1968 

easement were not terminated the terms of the 1990 

memorandum do not permit Blanco to improve the road crossing

it.

Improvement of the road crossing the 1968 easement

Blanco next contends the trial court erred in finding that 

he could not improve the road crossing the 1968 easement and 

instead had to construct and improve the 1990 road to secure 

building permits from the County. We are not persuaded.

Interpreting the 1968 easement, 1987 clarification, and 

1990 memorandum presents a question of law subject to our 

independent review. (Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 

Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470.) Standard principles of contract 

interpretation apply. (Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners,

LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 777.) Our “paramount goal . . . 

is to determine the intent of the parties.” (Ibid.) We ascertain 

that intent “from the language of the [documents] alone” so long 

as it is “ ‘clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.’ ” 

(Ibid.) We read the documents “together, so as to give effect to 

every part.” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) The language of the documents, 

“or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired,” 

defines the extent of the easement granted. (Civ. Code, § 806.)

The trial court here correctly interpreted the language of 

the relevant documents. The 1968 easement granted Blanco’s 

predecessor-in-interest a right-of-way “for road purposes” over 

4 We also do not resolve Blanco’s assertion, not raised 

during the proceedings below, that he acquired a prescriptive 

easement if the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968 

easement. 
6

Cargasacchi family lands. The 1987 clarification specified that 

the easement was 30 feet wide. The 1990 memorandum relocated 

that easement and required Lakeview Estates landowners to 

build a new road. It also required landowners to “release all other 

easements or other rights that lie outside [the 1990] easement,” 

and prevented them from “materially increas[ing] the burden or 

impos[ing] new or additional burdens [on] the [1968] easement.” 

(Italics added.) Read together, these documents indicate that 

Blanco could not improve the road crossing over the 1968 

easement, as the trial court correctly concluded.

Blanco complains that this conclusion runs counter to 

long-established laws governing easements. He first cites 

Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428 (Dolnikov), 

for the proposition that “ ‘[e]very easement includes what are 

termed “secondary easements,” ’ ” including “the right to make 

‘repairs, renewals[,] and replacements on the property that is 

servient to the easement’ [citation] ‘and to do such things as are 

necessary to the exercise of the right’ [citation].” But a secondary 

easement cannot “ ‘increase the burden on . . . the servient 

tenement, or make any material changes therein.’ ” (Id. at p. 

429.) Rather, such an “easement may be exercised ‘only when 

necessary and in such reasonable manner as not to increase the 

burden needlessly on the servient estate or to enlarge it by 

alteration in the mode of operation.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Here, Blanco does not seek to make repairs necessary to 

exercise his right to use the road crossing over the 1968 

easement. Instead, he seeks to improve the road to meet County 

standards—improvements that will require laying thousands of 

tons of compacted gravel, materially enlarging the road and 

significantly increasing the burden on the Cargasacchis’ land. 
7

These improvements are not needed for any dominant tenement 

owners—including Blanco—to use the right of way, but rather 

are required so that the County will issue the permits he needs to 

complete construction of his home. In our view, such

improvements are outside the scope of any secondary easements 

included in the 1968 easement. (Dolnikov, supra, 222 

Cal.App.4th at p. 429 [only “ ‘ “changes that do not affect [the]

substance” ’ ” of an easement are permitted].)

Blanco next relies on Kosich v. Braz (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 

737 to claim that he had the right to improve the 1968 easement. 

But as the Kosich court noted, “a purchaser of real property in fee 

takes the property subject only to the servitude which [they]

know[] or should know.” (Id. at p. 740, italics added.) There, the 

appellants knew that the easement at issue had been enlarged,

and they impliedly consented to that enlargement. (Ibid.) But 

here, Blanco points to no evidence that the Cargasacchis knew of 

or consented to the improvement of the road crossing over the 

1968 easement. The 1990 memorandum shows the opposite: It 

requires Blanco to “release all other easements or other rights 

that lie outside [the 1990] easement, and . . . release and 

quitclaim all other rights and claims across” Cargasacchi lands. 

Zissler v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 630 similarly does 

not aid Blanco. In Zissler, this court explained that “the parties 

to an express right-of-way easement presumptively contemplate 

‘normal future development,’ ” meaning that “such an easement 

will generally not be restricted to its historic use.” (Id. at p. 641.) 

We cautioned, however, that “ ‘ “uncontemplated, abnormal uses[]

[that] greatly increase the burden [on the easement] are not” ’ ” 

within the realm of “normal future development.” (Ibid.) What is 

paramount is the intent of the parties: i.e., an “easement may be 
8

used to the extent that the use is reasonably necessary for the 

convenient enjoyment of the easement and is consistent with the 

purpose for which the easement was granted.” (Id. at pp. 645-646, 

italics added.)

Unlike Zissler, this case is about improving an easement, 

not increasing its use. The 1968 easement was granted for road 

purposes, to permit Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos 

landholders ingress to and egress from their properties. But the 

documents defining the purpose of the easement do not suggest 

that landholders can materially improve the road crossing it to 

meet County standards, as Blanco seeks to do here. To the 

contrary, the documents expressly restrict landholders from 

“materially increas[ing] the burden or impos[ing] new or 

additional burdens [on] the easement.” And they impliedly 

exempt improvements of the road crossing the 1968 easement 

from the realm of “normal future development” by permitting the 

construction of a paved road across the 1990 easement. Such 

limitations distinguish the easement at issue in this case from 

the unrestricted easement at issue in Zissler.

Blanco argues that improving the road crossing over the 

1968 easement will not increase the burden on the easement. 

But this argument ignores testimony that the improvements 

required by the County would require laying several inches of 

gravel on the road and the trial court’s finding that such 

improvements would be “significant.” And it ignores the fact that 

improving the road crossing over the 1968 easement would 

undermine the 1990 memorandum’s purpose of delineating 

future road development.

Blanco also complains that preventing him from improving 

the road crossing over the 1968 easement forces him to bear the 
9

“onerous burden” of building the 1990 road himself, something 

not contemplated by the 1990 memorandum. We disagree that 

the 1990 memorandum forces Blanco alone to shoulder this 

burden. The memorandum does state that Lakeview Estates and 

Rancho Dos Mundos landowners “shall” form an assessment 

district to pay for the “costs of design, construction[,] and 

maintenance of the [1990] road.” But it puts no timeline on when 

the landowners must do so. And it contemplates that such a 

district may not be formed: “If such a funding mechanism is not 

established, then [the landowners] will make every effort to 

ensure that each of [them] will individually have [their] own 

homeowner’s policy extended to include the [1990] road easement 

and to name [the Cargasacchis] as additional insureds.” 

Unconstitutional taking

Finally, Blanco contends the trial court’s decision to “phase 

out” the 1968 easement constitutes a taking without just 

compensation. Blanco did not raise this contention below, and we 

do not resolve it. (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 

1229 [constitutional arguments forfeited on appeal if not raised 

at trial].) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The Cargasacchis shall recover 

their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
Timothy J. Staffel, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire and Nicholas D. Lauber 

for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Law Offices of E. Patrick Morris and E. Patrick Morris for 

Defendants and Respondents.