FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 23, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

COLORADO CHRISTIAN

UNIVERSITY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JUDY P. WEAVER, in her official

capacity as Chair of the Colorado

commission on Higher Education;

RAYMOND T. BAKER, Chair of the

Colorado Commission on Higher

Education; RICHARD GARCIA, 

official capacity as commissioner of

the Colorado Commission on Higher

Education; DEAN L. QUAMME, 

Vice Chair of the Colorado

Commission on Higher Education;

GREG C. STEVINSON, official

capacity as commissioner of the

Colorado Commission on Higher

Education; JAMES M. STEWART, 

official capacity as commissioner of

the Colorado Commission on Higher

Education; RICK RAMIREZ, in his

official capacity as a member of the

Colorado Commission on Higher

Education; DAVID SKAGGS, in his

official capacity as Executive Director

of the Colorado Commission on

Higher Education and of the Colorado

Department of Higher Education;

EDWARD ROBINSON, in his official

capacity as a member of the Colorado

Commission on Higher Education, 

No. 07-1247
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Defendants-Appellees,

and

AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW

AND JUSTICE; UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; COUNCIL FOR

CHRISTIAN COLLEGES &

UNIVERSITIES; AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION OF PRESIDENTS OF

INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND

UNIVERSITIES; CENTER FOR

PUBLIC JUSTICE; FOUNDATION

FOR MORAL LAW; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF

EVANGELICALS; BECKET FUND

FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND

VARIOUS CHRISTIAN, JEWISH

AND MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS;

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF

AMERICA; THE NATIONAL

EDUCATION ASSOCIATION;

COLORADO EDUCATION

ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION;

NATIONAL PARENT TEACHER

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

JEWISH CONGRESS, AMERICANS

UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF

CHURCH AND STATE; AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION; PEOPLE

FOR THE AMERICAN WAY

FOUNDATION; THE

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE; THE

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF

TEACHERS; THE AMERICAN

JEWISH COMMITTEE,

Amici Curiae.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. NO. 04-CV-02512-MSK-BNB)

Gregory S. Baylor, Center for Law & Religious Freedom, Springfield, Virginia

(Timothy J. Tracey & Isaac Fong, Center for Law & Religious Freedom,

Springfield, Virginia; Eric V. Hall & L. Martin Nussbaum, Rothgerber Johnson &

Lyons, LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Thomas N. Scheffel, Thomas N.

Scheffel & Associates, P.C., Denver, Colorado; Benjamin W. Bull & Gary S.

McCaleb, Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, Arizona, with him on the briefs) for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniel D. Domenico, Solicitor General (John W. Suthers, Attorney General, John

R. Sleeman, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Antony B. Dyl & Michelle M. Merz,

Assistant Attorneys General with him on the briefs) Denver, Colorado, for

Defendants-Appellees.

Rena J. Comisac, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark L. Gross & Dirk C.

Phillips, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division for

United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Norton, Burns, Figa & Will, P.C., Greenwood Village, Colorado;

Douglas Laycock, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan; &

Carl H. Esbeck, Columbia, Missouri for Center for Public Justice and National

Association of Evangelicals as Amici Curiae in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric. C. Rassbach & Roger T. Severino for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

as Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jay Alan Sekulow, Washington, D.C., Francis J. Manion, & Geoffrey R. Surtees,

New Hope, Kentucky for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae

in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stuart J. Lark, Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for The

Council for Christian Colleges & Universities, The American Association of

Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities, and The Catholic University

of America as Amici Curiae in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
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Gregory M. Jones & Benjamin D. DuPré, Montgomery, Alabama for Foundation

for Moral Law as Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Walter Dellinger with Michael Bern, Franciska Coleman & Jessica Lindeman

(Student Participants), Harvard Law School, Supreme Court and Appellate

Practice Clinic; Pamela Harris & Allison Orr Larsen, O’Melveny & Myers LLP,

Washington, D.C.; Marc Stern, American Jewish Congress, New York, New

York; Ayesha N. Khan & Richard B. Katskee, Americans United for Separation of

Church and State, Washington, D.C.; Daniel Mach, American Civil Liberties

Union Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Mark Silverstein, American Civil Liberties

Union of Colorado, Denver, Colorado; Judith E. Schaeffer, People For the

American Way Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Steven M. Freeman & Steven C.

Sheinberg, Anti-Defamation League, New York, New York; David Strom,

American Federation of Teachers, Washington, D.C.; Joshua J. Kunis, American

Jewish Congress, New York, New York for American Jewish Congress,

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, American Civil Liberties

Union, People For the American Way Foundation, the Anti-Defamation League,

the American Federation of Teachers, and the American Jewish Congress as

Amici Curiae in support of Defendants-Appellees.

John M. West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C.; Francisco M.

Negron, Jr., National School Boards Association, Alexandria, Virginia; Robert H.

Chanin, National Education Association, Washington, D.C.; Martha R. Houser,

Colorado Education Association, for National Education Association, Denver,

Colorado; Colorado Education Association, National School Boards Association,

and National Parent Teacher Association as Amici Curiae in support of

Defendants-Appellees.

Before McCONNELL, SEYMOUR and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.

The State of Colorado provides scholarships to eligible students who attend

any accredited college in the state—public or private, secular or religious—other

than those the state deems “pervasively sectarian.” To determine whether a
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school is “pervasively sectarian,” state officials are directed, among other things,

to examine whether the policies enacted by school trustees adhere too closely to

religious doctrine, whether all students and faculty share a single “religious

persuasion,” and whether the contents of college theology courses tend to

“indoctrinate.” Applying these criteria, state officials have extended scholarships

to students attending a Methodist university and a Roman Catholic university run

by the Jesuit order. They have refused scholarships to otherwise eligible students

attending a non-denominational evangelical Protestant university and a Buddhist

university. Colorado Christian University, one of the two schools held

pervasively sectarian by the State, contends that excluding its students on the

basis of this inquiry violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district

court disagreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants. 

We find the exclusion unconstitutional for two reasons: the program expressly

discriminates among religions without constitutional justification, and its criteria

for doing so involve unconstitutionally intrusive scrutiny of religious belief and

practice. We reverse, and order that summary judgment be granted in favor of the

university. 

I. BACKGROUND

The parties have stipulated to a joint statement of facts, from which we

draw the following.
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A. Colorado Scholarship Programs

Colorado subsidizes higher education in two ways: it provides subsidized

education at public universities and scholarships to in-state students who choose

to attend private institutions in the State. These scholarships include the

Colorado Leveraging Education Assistant Partnership Program, Colo. Rev. Stat. §

23-3.5-102 et seq., Supplemental Leveraging Education Assistant Partnership

Program, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.7-102 et seq., Colorado Student Grants, Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 23-3.3-101 et seq., Colorado Work Study, id., and the College

Opportunity Fund, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-18-102 et seq. Details of these programs

vary, but the differences are not pertinent to this dispute. See infra note 1. The

scholarships are administered by the Colorado Commission on Higher Education. 

The Defendants-Appellees are members or officers of the Commission.

To be eligible for any of the scholarship programs, a student must attend an

“institution of higher education.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-3.5-102(2), -3.3-101(2),

-3.7-102(3), -18-102(5)(a)(I). The state statutes defining such an institution

exclude any college that is “pervasively sectarian” as a matter of state law. Id. §§

-3.5-102(3)(b), -3.3-101(3)(d), -3.7-102(3)(f), -18-102(9). As to the meaning of

this term, the statutes provide: 

(1) An institution of higher education shall be deemed not to be pervasively

sectarian if it meets the following criteria:
1

 One of the five scholarship programs, the recently-enacted College

Opportunity Fund, does not refer to these six criteria. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-18-

102 et seq. However, the parties have litigated this appeal under the assumption,

which we accept, that the State’s administration of the Fund is no different from

the other programs. 

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(a) The faculty and students are not exclusively of one religious

persuasion.

(b) There is no required attendance at religious convocations or

services.

(c) There is a strong commitment to principles of academic freedom.

(d) There are no required courses in religion or theology that tend to

indoctrinate or proselytize.

(e) The governing board does not reflect nor is the membership

limited to persons of any particular religion.

(f) Funds do not come primarily or predominantly from sources

advocating a particular religion.

Id. §§ 23-3.5-105, -3.3-101(3)(d), -3.7-104.1

 The meaning of this provision is not

plain on its face. The provision tells us what institutions “shall be deemed not to

be pervasively sectarian” but provides no affirmative definition. The provision

therefore could be construed as a safe harbor for schools that satisfy the criteria,

without necessarily implying that failure to satisfy some, but not all, of the

criteria must result in exclusion. The record indicates some confusion among

Commission officials on this score. The Commission’s financial aid officer
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testified that “she believed that failing four out of six of the statutory criteria was

sufficient to fail the ‘pervasively sectarian’ test.” App. 97, ¶ 53. The chief

financial officer of the Commission testified that the Commission “‘would rely on

the advice of legal counsel’ to determine how many factors an institution would

have to satisfy before it passed the test” and that “he now believed that an

institution ‘[would] have to meet all of them.’” App. 101, ¶ 74 (brackets and

internal quotations in original). That appears to be the Commission’s position, at

least for now. For purposes of this federal constitutional case, the plaintiff does

not challenge the Commission’s interpretation of the state law.

The legislative history suggests that the legislature designed these statutes

to make funds available as broadly as was thought permissible under the Supreme

Court’s then-existing Establishment Clause doctrine. See Americans United for

Separation of Church & State Fund v. Colorado, 648 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Colo.

1982) (describing the “pervasively sectarian” provision as “an attempt to conform

to First Amendment doctrine.”). When the provision was first adopted in 1977,

Supreme Court precedents held “that no state aid at all [may] go to institutions

that are so ‘pervasively sectarian’ that secular activities cannot be separated from

sectarian ones,” Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (citing

Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)), and the Court struck down in their entirety

state statutes that contained insufficient safeguards against the direct funding of

pervasively sectarian institutions. Thus, under the doctrine applicable at the time,
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“pervasively sectarian” institutions had to be excluded from direct funding

programs in order to fund private education at all. Since that time, the Supreme

Court has substantially modified its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 845 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g.,

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Agostini v. Felton, 521

U.S. 203, 225, 232–34 (1997); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the

Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986). The parties agree that under current

interpretation, the Establishment Clause poses no bar to inclusion of CCU in the

Colorado scholarship programs. The Colorado legislature has not, however,

repealed its statutory restriction on “pervasively sectarian” institutions.

B. Colorado Christian University

Colorado Christian University (“CCU”) is an accredited private university

in Lakewood, Colorado. It offers education “framed by a Christian world view.” 

App. 87, ¶ 16. Approximately 800–850 of the university’s 2,000 students are

full-time, non-adult undergraduates enrolled in its College of Undergraduate

Studies. The others are graduate, adult, or part-time students. The students

adhere to a variety of Christian denominations; a small number—just under

1%—are non-Christians. Students sign a “Lifestyle Covenant Agreement”

promising to emulate “the example of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the

Bible.” App. 92, ¶ 34. This relates to conduct, not belief. They are not required

to adhere to any creedal statement. Traditional undergraduate students must
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attend chapel weekly, although those who miss services may watch recordings of

the services, attend classes that give chapel credit, or pay a small fine. Of the 26

required courses for undergraduates, four are in theology or Biblical studies.

Unlike students, faculty members and trustees must sign a statement

affirming their acceptance of the basic beliefs of the University. The statement

explains that the University “unites with the broad, historic evangelical faith

rather than affiliating with any specific denomination.” App. 88, ¶ 21. It affirms

the Bible as the infallible Word of God, the existence of God in the Father, Son

and Holy Spirit, the divinity of Jesus Christ, and principles of salvation, present

ministry, resurrection, and “the spiritual unity of believers in our Lord Jesus

Christ.” App. 88–89, ¶ 21. “These declarations . . . establish the essential

framework within which members of the University both unite in shared beliefs

and explore differences.” App. 89, ¶ 21. 

The University has adopted the “1940 Statement of Principles of Academic

Freedom of the American Association of University Professors,” a traditional

guarantee of academic freedom. App. 90, ¶ 27. A proviso notes that “[t]he

framework within which academic freedom operates is the CCU Statement of

Faith.” App. 90, ¶ 27. It concludes: “Academic freedom at CCU is based on the

premise that because it is God who reveals knowledge, an inherent part of the

imago dei is a rigorous inquiry into that knowledge, freely using all the academic

disciplines.” App. 91, ¶ 27.
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C. This Litigation

In September, 2003, CCU applied to participate in the State’s financial aid

programs. In filling out the application questionnaire, the university asserted that

it was “not a theological institution,” and that the board of trustees was “not

limited to persons of a particular religion,” nor were the faculty or students. App.

95–96, ¶ 47, 49. It also attested that the majority of its students were not required

to attend religious services or take theology courses, and that in any case the

theology courses did “not tend to indoctrinate or proselytize.” App. 96, ¶ 51. 

Skeptical of these claims, Financial Aid Officer Diane Lindner wrote back

to the university in February, 2004, requesting more information about the

religious beliefs of the faculty, students, and trustees. She also requested syllabi

for the university’s theology courses. CCU provided the requested information in

a letter, while also taking the position that the state test was “patently

unconstitutional.” App. 194. CCU compared its status with respect to each

criterion with that of Regis University, a Catholic school that had been admitted

to the scholarship program. 

The Commission concluded that CCU failed to meet at least three of the

criteria. After examining the syllabi for the theology courses, the commission

decided that the courses impermissibly “tend[ed] to indoctrinate or proselytize.” 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.5-105(d). It also concluded that CCU’s board of trustees

reflected or was limited to a single religion. Id. § 23-3.5-105(e). This was
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predicated on the judgment that Christianity constitutes a single religion, without

regard to denominational differences. Commission officials disagreed among

themselves as to whether the university’s statement of faith was consistent with a

“commitment to principles of academic freedom.” Id. § 23-3.5-105(c). Finally,

the commission concluded that because of the chapel attendance required for

some of its students, the university impermissibly “required attendance at

religious convocations or services.” Id. § 23-3.5-105(b). 

CCU continued to dispute these assessments, as well as the legitimacy of

the inquiries. After another meeting at which it again argued, to no avail, that

this inquiry and exclusion was unconstitutional, CCU filed this lawsuit. The

university alleged that the state defendants had violated the Free Exercise,

Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses—both facially and as-applied. It

also brought and then dropped a pendent claim under state law that would have

challenged the Commission’s interpretation of the statute. After stipulating to a

set of facts, both sides moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment for the state defendants. It

concluded that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.

712 (2004), so long as “there is no manifest evidence that a challenged statute is

motivated by hostility towards religious beliefs or practices,” discrimination

against religion need only be justified by a rational basis. Colo. Christian Univ.

v. Baker, No. 04-CV-02512, 2007 WL 1489801 at *5 (D. Colo. May 18, 2007). 
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Finding no such hostility, the court concluded that the State had a legitimate

interest in “vindicating” a provision of the Colorado Constitution that forbids

appropriating public money to aid religious institutions. Id. at *8. The district

court then applied strict scrutiny to CCU’s Establishment and Equal Protection

claims, but concluded that the State’s interest in vindicating its state constitution

was compelling and that the statute was narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. at

*14–15. CCU appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

 It is now settled that the Establishment Clause permits evenhanded funding

of education—religious and secular—through student scholarships. See Locke v.

Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,

652–53 (2002); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.

481, 488–89 (1986). It is therefore undisputed that federal law does not require

Colorado to discriminate against Colorado Christian University in its funding

programs. Rather, the parties’ dispute centers on whether the State may

nonetheless choose to exclude pervasively sectarian institutions, as defined by

Colorado law, even when not required to. We conclude that it may not. 

The state defendants contend that this issue was definitively resolved in

their favor by the Supreme Court in Locke v. Davey. CCU argues that Locke is

distinguishable, and that other principles of First Amendment law point to a

decision in its favor. We therefore turn first to the debate over Locke.
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A. Locke v. Davey

It has long been clear that there is some “play in the joints” between what

is constitutionally required and what is constitutionally forbidden under the two

parts of the First Amendment protecting religious freedom. Walz v. Tax Comm’n

of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). Just as religion-specific accommodations

not required by the Free Exercise Clause are not necessarily forbidden under the

Establishment Clause, see Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720–24 (2005)

(setting forth criteria for application of Establishment Clause to legislative

accommodations of religion), the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate the

inclusion of religious institutions within every government program where their

inclusion would be permissible under the Establishment Clause. There is room

for legislative discretion.

Locke is the Supreme Court’s most recent and explicit recognition of that

discretion. In Locke, the Court ruled that it is constitutional for a state to exclude

from an otherwise neutral college scholarship program those who intend to major

in “devotional theology,” which the Court took to mean those who were studying

for the clergy. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 n.5 (noting that “the only interest at

issue here is the State’s interest in not funding the religious training of clergy”). 

Although recognizing that the First Amendment generally prohibits discrimination

against religion as such, id. at 720, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
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Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), a 7-2 majority of the Court held that the

nondiscrimination principle did not extend to a refusal to fund the training of the

clergy, at least absent antireligious animus and outside the contours of a public

forum for speech. In explaining its decision, the Court reasoned that the State

had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.” Locke, 540

U.S. at 721. It is clear that a state may decide not to create theology departments

in its public universities; Locke holds that the state may similarly choose to

refrain from “even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare

students for the ministry.” Id. at 719. 

The precise bounds of the Locke holding, however, are far from clear. On

the one hand, we are disinclined to think that Locke is confined to its facts. See

Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance,

and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv.

L. Rev. 155, 184 (2004) (noting that “[o]n its face, the holding [of Locke] is

confined to the training of clergy, to refusals to fund that are not based on

hostility to religion, and to cases that do not involve forums for speech,” but

predicting that these limitations will prove “illusory”). Presumably, there are

other forms of state decisions not to fund religious instruction that would pass

muster under the Free Exercise Clause beyond the clergy training involved in

Locke. 
2 See id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion is

“devoid of any mention of standard of review”). That First Amendment

challenges to selective funding would be subject only to rational basis scrutiny

seems especially unlikely after Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, 2008 WL

2520816, at *29 n.27 (U.S. June 26, 2008). There the court noted that rational

basis scrutiny had been applied only to “constitutional commands that are

themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.” In contrast, the Court said that

“[o]bviously the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a

legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech,

the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep

and bear arms. If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear

arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the

separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” 

Id. (internal citation omitted). The same goes, we assume, for the Free Exercise

and Establishment Clauses. 

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On the other hand, we cannot accept the state defendants’ argument that

Locke subjects all “state decisions about funding religious education” to no more

than “rational basis review.” Appellees’ Br. 33. To be sure, the Court indicated

that the State has greater latitude to discriminate in decisions about the use of tax

dollars than in its use of regulatory authority, but the Court did not employ the

language of “rational basis” except with reference to equal protection claims,

Locke, 540 U.S. at 720–21 n.3,2

 and did not overrule any prior cases subjecting

funding decisions to constitutional scrutiny. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,

828 (2000) (“[O]ur decisions . . . have prohibited governments from

discriminating in the distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or

sincerity”). The Court described discrimination in funding as “disfavor of

religion (if it can be called that) . . . of a far milder kind” than discrimination with

regard to “criminal []or civil sanctions,” such as was involved in Lukumi, and
3 The Court also indicated that the prohibition on discrimination on the

basis of religion continues to apply to funding programs that are forums for

speech. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (distinguishing Rosenberger v. Rector &

Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)). 

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recounted the long history of state refusals to use tax dollars to support the

clergy. Id. at 720, 722–23. But the Court also indicated that the State’s latitude

with respect to funding decisions has limits. For example, the Court reaffirmed

that students may not constitutionally be required “to choose between their

religious beliefs and receiving a governmental benefit,” id. at 720–21; see

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963), and stressed that denying

scholarships for “the pursuit of devotional degrees . . . places a relatively minor

burden on [the students].” Locke, 540 U.S., at 725.3

 Indeed, the Court noted that

the Washington scholarship program in Locke (in contrast to the Colorado

program here) “permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long

as they are accredited,” id. at 724, and even allows students to take “devotional

theology courses” at state expense, so long as they are not pursuing a degree

preparatory for the ministry. Id. at 725 & n.9. 

The opinion thus suggests, even if it does not hold, that the State’s latitude

to discriminate against religion is confined to certain “historic and substantial

state interest[s],” id. at 725, and does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of

religious institutions and their students from otherwise neutral and generally

available government support. The Court’s language suggests the need for
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balancing interests: its holding that “minor burden[s]” and “milder” forms of

“disfavor” are tolerable in service of “historic and substantial state interest[s]”

implies that major burdens and categorical exclusions from public benefits might

not be permitted in service of lesser or less long-established governmental ends. 

Id. at 720, 725. 

We need not decide in this case whether such a balancing test is necessary

or how it would be conducted, however, because the Colorado exclusion, in

addition to imposing a far greater burden on affected students, has two features

that were not present in Locke and that offend longstanding constitutional

principles: the Colorado exclusion expressly discriminates among religions,

allowing aid to “sectarian” but not “pervasively sectarian” institutions, and it does

so on the basis of criteria that entail intrusive governmental judgments regarding

matters of religious belief and practice. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246

(1982) (imposing strict scrutiny on governmental decisions that discriminate

among religions); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502–03 (1979)

(discussing limitations on the power of the government to base decisions on

intrusive questions regarding religious belief or practice). 

Locke involved neither discrimination among religions nor intrusive

determinations regarding contested religious questions. The scholarship program

at issue in Locke excluded all devotional theology majors equally—without regard

to how “sectarian” state officials perceived them to be—and therefore did not
4 Eulitt went well beyond the holding in Locke. Rather than declining to

fund “particular categories of instruction,” the State in Eulitt declined funding the

entire program of education at the disfavored schools, based on their religious

affiliation. Id. at 346–47; cf. Locke, 540 U.S. at 724–25 (noting that “[t]he

program permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they

are accredited,” withholding its funding only from “the pursuit of devotional

(continued...)

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discriminate among or within religions. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715–16. Evangelicals

and Unitarians, Catholics and Orthodox Jews, narrow sectarians and freewheeling

latitudinarians, all were under the same interdiction. And since under the

program “[t]he institution, rather than the State, determine[d] whether the

student’s major [was] devotional,” the State did not engage in intrusive religious

inquiry. Id. at 717. 

We therefore reject the argument of the state defendants and their amici

that Locke compels affirmance in this case. Although Locke precludes any

sweeping argument that the State may never take the religious character of an

activity into consideration when deciding whether to extend public funding, the

decision does not imply that states are free to discriminate in funding against

religious institutions however they wish, subject only to a rational basis test.

The same may be said of Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Maine Department of

Education, 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004), on which the state defendants also rely. 

Eulitt upheld a program providing tuition to private secular secondary schools but

categorically excluding religious ones. We need not decide if we would have

upheld the same program,4

 because Colorado’s funding scheme raises
4

(...continued)

degrees,” thus “plac[ing] a relatively minor burden on [the students]”). The

Colorado exclusion challenged in this case is similar in its breadth to that in

Eulitt. As we have explained, because of other constitutional violations we need

not decide whether this aspect of the Colorado program would independently

render it unconstitutional. 

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constitutional problems not confronted there. The program at issue in Eulitt

excluded all religious schools without discriminating among them or (so far as

Eulitt discusses) using any intrusive inquiry to choose among them. See id. at

346–47. By contrast, Colorado’s system does both.

B. Discriminating Among and Within Religions

From the beginning, this nation’s conception of religious liberty included,

at a minimum, the equal treatment of all religious faiths without discrimination or

preference. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting) (arguing that this was all that the Establishment Clause required);

Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About

Original Intent, 27 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 875, 922–23 (1986) (arguing that the

First Amendment forbade both discrimination among religions and discrimination

for or against religion). When the First Amendment was written, at least ten of

the twelve state constitutional free exercise provisions required equal religious

treatment and prohibited denominational preferences. See Arlin M. Adams &

Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1559,

1637–39 (1989) (collecting sources). James Madison made the point in his
-21-

famous Memorial and Remonstrance, criticizing a denominational preference for

Christianity because it “violate[d] that equality that ought to be the basis of every

law.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious

Assessments ¶ 4 (1785) reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 82-84 (Philip

B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987). The First Amendment incorporates these

values. Adams & Emmerich, supra, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1638. This is not to

say that a generally applicable law is invalid simply because it has a different

“incidental effect” on some religions than others. See Employment Div. Dep’t. of

Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). But when the state passes

laws that facially regulate religious issues, it must treat individual religions and

religious institutions “without discrimination or preference,” in the words of the

New York Constitution of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 5 The Founders’

Constitution, at 75.

Many Supreme Court decisions have confirmed the principle. The Court

has called neutral treatment of religions “[t]he clearest command of the

Establishment Clause.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Bd.

of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 707 (1994)

(“It is clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored.”). Such

discrimination is forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause as well. Larson, 456 U.S.

at 245 (“This constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is

inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause”);
5 We recognize that the term “sectarian” imparts a negative connotation. 

See Funk & Wagnalls New International Dictionary of the English Language

1137 (comp. ed. 1987) (defining “sectarian” as meaning “[p]ertaining to a sect;

bigoted.”). We use it in this opinion because it is the statutory term; the Colorado

legislature presumably used it because the Supreme Court did so at the time; the

Supreme Court has not used the term in recent opinions except in quotations from

earlier opinions or other sources. 

-22-

see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532–33; Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (citing Abington

School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg J., concurring)). 

The Court has suggested that the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement is

parallel. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415

U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)). In other

words, “no State can ‘pass laws which aid one religion’ or that ‘prefer one

religion over another.’” Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (quoting Everson v. Board of

Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). While CCU raises claims under three

different constitutional clauses governing religious discrimination, all of them

draw on these common principles. So while the Establishment Clause frames

much of our inquiry, the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and Equal

Protection Clause proceed along similar lines.

By giving scholarship money to students who attend sectarian—but not

“pervasively” sectarian—universities,5

 Colorado necessarily and explicitly

discriminates among religious institutions, extending scholarships to students at

some religious institutions, but not those deemed too thoroughly “sectarian” by

governmental officials. The sole function and purpose of the challenged
-23-

provisions of Colorado law, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-3.5-105, 23-3.3-101(3)(d), and

23-3.7-104, is to exclude some but not all religious institutions on the basis of the

stated criteria. Employing those criteria, the state defendants have decided to

allow students at Regis University, a Roman Catholic institution run by the

Society of Jesus, and the University of Denver, a Methodist institution, to receive

state scholarships, but not students at CCU or Naropa University, a Buddhist

institution. This is discrimination “on the basis of religious views or religious

status,” Smith, 494 U.S. at 877, and is subject to heightened constitutional

scrutiny.

The Supreme Court has recently criticized the now-discarded doctrine that

“pervasively sectarian” institutions could not receive otherwise-available

education funding for discriminating in just this way. In Mitchell v. Helms, 530

U.S. 793 (2000), the plurality observed that “the application of the ‘pervasively

sectarian’ factor collides with our decisions that have prohibited governments

from discriminating in the distribution of public benefits based upon religious

status or sincerity.” Id. at 828; see also Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d

1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[A]n exemption solely for ‘pervasively sectarian’

schools would itself raise First Amendment concerns—discriminating between

kinds of religious schools.”). While Justice O’Connor did not join the plurality

opinion in Mitchell, her separate opinion also refused to employ the pervasively-
-24-

sectarian distinction. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857–58 (O’Connor, J., joined by

Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Columbia Union College v. Oliver, 254

F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2001) (Wilkinson J.), is similarly instructive. There, the Court

confronted the Maryland Higher Education Commission’s refusal to provide funds

to a college affiliated with the Seventh-day Adventist Church because the

Commission had found it to be “a ‘pervasively sectarian’ institution” pursuant to

Establishment Clause precedent. Id. at 498. Relying on the Mitchell plurality,

the Fourth Circuit concluded that the pervasively sectarian test was

unconstitutionally discriminatory and should be abandoned. Id. at 502–04. As

Judge Wilkinson put it in his dissent in an earlier stage of the litigation, “[t]he

denial of state aid to only certain types of religious institutions—namely,

pervasively sectarian ones . . . directly violate[s] a . . . core principle of the

Establishment Clause, the requirement of nondiscrimination among religions.”

Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 172 (4th Cir. 1998) (Wilkinson,

J., dissenting).

In response to CCU’s argument that the Colorado statute impermissibly

discriminates among religions, the state defendants offer a puzzling and wholly

artificial distinction: “Colorado’s law,” they say, “distinguishes not between types

of religions, but between types of institutions.” Appellees’ Br. 51. “Any

religious denomination,” they say, “could establish a pervasively sectarian
6 The state defendants’ brief also repeatedly mischaracterizes the Colorado

law. See Appellees’ Br. 51 (claiming that the statute “merely distinguishes

between secular and religious institutions”); id. at 55 (claiming that the statute

distinguishes “between institutions that are sectarian and those that are not”); id.

at 56 (stating that “states may distinguish between sectarian and non-sectarian

institutions”). The issue is not whether the State can distinguish between

sectarian and nonsectarian, or religious and secular, but whether it can distinguish

among religious institutions, disadvantaging those the State deems “pervasively”

sectarian.

-25-

institution, and any denomination could establish an educational institution that is

not pervasively sectarian.” Id. at 55.6

 No doubt—just as any religion could

engage in animal sacrifice or instruct its adherents to refrain from work on

Saturday rather than Sunday. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524–25, 542, Sherbert, 374

U.S. at 399, 402–03. The defendants supply no reason to think that the

government may discriminate between “types of institution” on the basis of the

nature of the religious practice these institutions are moved to engage in. 

The defendants’ argument is inconsistent with the leading case on

denominational discrimination, Larson v. Valente, in which the Court invalidated

a Minnesota statute imposing special registration requirements on any religious

organization that did not “receive[] more than half of [its] total contributions from

members or affiliated organizations.” 456 U.S. at 231–32. The statute

discriminated against religions, like the Unification Church, that depend heavily

on soliciting donations from the general public. The Court did not suggest that

the problem would go away because the Unification Church could change its

fundraising methods, as our State defendants seem to suggest; the Court instead
-26-

held that the law was “not simply a facially neutral statute” because it “ma[de]

explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.” Id.

at 246 n.23. 

The Colorado law seems even more problematic than the Minnesota law

invalidated in Larson. The Minnesota law at least was framed in terms of secular

considerations: how much money was raised internally and how much from

outsiders to the institution. Here, the discrimination is expressly based on the

degree of religiosity of the institution and the extent to which that religiosity

affects its operations, as defined by such things as the content of its curriculum

and the religious composition of its governing board. Although application of

secular criteria does not invalidate a law even if there is a disparate impact, see

Children’s Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc., v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084,

1092 (8th Cir. 2000), that logic will not save a law that discriminates among

religious institutions on the basis of the pervasiveness or intensity of their belief.

Alternatively, the State defendants argue that discriminatory funding is

permissible because the State is entitled to discriminate in spending legislation in

ways that it could not if legislating directly. They rely on Harris v. McRae, 448

U.S. 297, 315–18 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), where the

Supreme Court rejected the argument that decisions creating a constitutional right

to an abortion required the State to “accord equal treatment to both abortion and

childbirth” and therefore provide healthcare funding for abortion when such
-27-

funding was provided for childbirth. Id. at 470; cf. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 354–55

(citing Maher). But the analogy is inapt. “The right to choose abortion is a right

to be free of undue burdens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government

neutrality.” Laycock, supra, 118 Harv. L. Rev. at 177. The State is thus

permitted “to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion” (so long

as any burden imposed is not undue), Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, but not one

favoring some religions over others. As Columbia Union and Mitchell rightly

conclude, the requirement of neutrality among religions applies to state aid just as

much as to other laws. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 

Finally, the state defendants argue that they may discriminate in favor of

some religions and against others so long as their discrimination is not based on

“animus” against religion—by which they mean religious “bigotry.” Appellee’s

Br. 35–36 (citing Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7). There is no support for this in any

Supreme Court decision, or any of the historical materials bearing on our heritage

of religious liberty. Even in the context of race, where the nondiscrimination

norm is most vigilantly enforced, the Court has never required proof of

discriminatory animus, hatred, or bigotry. The “intent to discriminate” forbidden

under the Equal Protection Clause is merely the intent to treat differently. 

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,

2773–74 (2007); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484–87

(1982) (discussing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); Pers. Adm’r of
7 The section of the Lukumi opinion presenting evidence that the prohibition

of animal sacrifice was based on hostility to the religion was joined by only two

Justices. 508 U.S. at 540–42 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.). See Midrash

Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1234 n.16 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“Under Lukumi, it is unnecessary to identify an invidious intent in enacting a

law—only Justices Kennedy and Stevens attached significance to evidence of the

lawmakers' subjective motivation.”).

-28-

Mass v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260, 273–74 (1979) (same). Similarly, the Court

has made clear that the First Amendment prohibits not only laws with “the object”

of suppressing a religious practice, but also “[o]fficial action that targets religious

conduct for distinctive treatment.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534; see id. at 533 (a law

is facially discriminatory “if it refers to a religious practice without a secular

meaning discernible from the language or context”).7

 

To be sure, where governmental bodies discriminate out of “animus”

against particular religions, such decisions are plainly unconstitutional. But the

constitutional requirement is of government neutrality, through the application of

“generally applicable law[s],” not just of governmental avoidance of bigotry. 

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. If First Amendment protections were limited to

“animus,” the government could favor religions that are traditional, that are

comfortable, or whose mores are compatible with the State, so long as it does not

act out of overt hostility to the others. That is plainly not what the framers of the

First Amendment had in mind. 
-29-

C. Intrusive Religious Inquiry

Even assuming that it might, in some circumstances, be permissible for

states to pick and choose among eligible religious institutions, a second line of

Supreme Court precedents precludes their doing so on the basis of intrusive

judgments regarding contested questions of religious belief or practice. As stated

by the Court in Mitchell v. Helms: “[T]he inquiry into the recipient’s religious

views required by a focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only

unnecessary but also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts,

that courts should refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s

religious beliefs.” 530 U.S. at 828 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 887); Americans

United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc.,

509 F.3d 406, 414 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (joined by O’Connor, J.) (same); see also

NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It is not only

the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights

guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading

to findings and conclusions.”); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335,

1341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same). 

Most often, this principle has been expressed in terms of a prohibition of

“excessive entanglement” between religion and government. See, e.g., Agostini v.

Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–35 (1997); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 499,

502. The anti-entanglement rule originated in the context of education, changing
-30-

with re-interpretations of the famous doctrine of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.

602 (1971), although it has migrated to other contexts. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v.

Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

unconstitutional as applied to ordained priest); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518

F.3d 472, 474, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2008) (Fair Labor Standards Act presumptively

excepts “clerical personnel”). At first the prohibition on entanglements was

formulated as an independent requirement of the Establishment Clause, later as

one element of determining the “effect” of the law in advancing or inhibiting

religion. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–33; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536

U.S. 639, 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing history of the

“entanglement inquiry.”). Properly understood, the doctrine protects religious

institutions from governmental monitoring or second-guessing of their religious

beliefs and practices, whether as a condition to receiving benefits (as in Lemon)

or as a basis for regulation or exclusion from benefits (as here). See Carl H.

Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with

Religious Organizations, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347, 397 (1984). 

 The Colorado provisions challenged here are fraught with entanglement

problems. The most potentially intrusive element of the Colorado statute is the

criterion requiring Commission staff to decide whether any theology courses

required by the university “tend to indoctrinate or proselytize.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §

23-3.5-105(1)(d). To apply this criterion, the Commission demanded to see
-31-

syllabi from theology courses at CCU. The record contains two syllabi for “Early

Christian Literature,” a course studying “the New Testament as literature.” App.

273. In these courses, the students are asked, for example, to give “big ideas” of

all of the books of the New Testament, and “explain how the differences in the

various gospels reflect the different theological concerns of the various writers.” 

App. 279, 284. The Commission concluded that the course failed the statutory

criterion, although it did not explain why. All we know is that one official

defined the term “indoctrinate” to mean “to try and convince, to try and convert,

to try and get individuals to subscribe to a particular set—to whatever the subject

is, in this case, a theological subject or religious subject,” and “proselytize” to

mean “to evangelicize (sic), to do more than just educate but to advocate that an

individual subscribe to a certain theological point or religious point.” App.

102–03, ¶ 79. To decide that these syllabi were likely “to convince” the students

of religious truths, the Commission had to decide how religious beliefs are

derived and to discern the boundary between religious faith and academic

theological beliefs.

Such inquiries have long been condemned by the Supreme Court. In New

York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), for example, the Supreme Court 

considered a state statute that reimbursed private religious schools for the costs of

in-class examinations and other state-mandated teaching activities only if they

were devoid of religious content. The Court held the process of examining the
-32-

schools’ teaching practices for religious content unconstitutional, explaining that

“this sort of detailed inquiry into the subtle implications of in-class examinations

and other teaching activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on

the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 132. The Court

pointed out that “[i]n order to prove their claims for reimbursement, sectarian

schools would be placed in the position of trying to disprove any religious content

in various classroom materials” and the court “would be cast in the role of arbiter

of the essentially religious dispute.” Id. at 132–33. The Court concluded, in

words equally applicable to the Colorado statute: “The prospect of church and

state litigating in court about what does or does not have religious meaning

touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious

establishment.” Id. at 133. 

More recently, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of

Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court rejected the argument, put forth by the

dissent, that a public university must refrain from extending the benefits of a

neutral subsidy to a student publication that contained religious “indoctrination”

and “evangelis[m],” as opposed to “descriptive examination of religious

doctrine.” Id. at 867, 876, 877 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks

omitted). That proposal is similar to the line drawn by the Colorado statute. The

majority rejected this idea, noting that “it would require the University . . . to

scrutinize the content of student speech, lest the expression in question . . .
-33-

contain too great a religious content.” Id. at 844. “That eventuality,” the Court

stated, “raises the specter of governmental censorship,” which “would be far more

inconsistent with the Establishment Clauses’s dictates than would governmental

provision of [assistance] on a religion-blind basis.” Id. at 844–45. 

The same “specter of government censorship” is present in this case, except

that it has actually materialized. Commission officials testified that they

demanded to see CCU’s religious education curriculum, and (for reasons known

only to themselves) determined that it “tend[ed] to indoctrinate or proselytize.” 

App. 103 ¶ 79. The line drawn by the Colorado statute, between “indoctrination”

and mere education, is highly subjective and susceptible to abuse. Educators

impart information and perspectives to students because they regard them as true

or valuable. Whether an outsider will deem their efforts to be “indoctrination” or

mere “education” depends as much on the observer’s point of view as on any

objective evaluation of the educational activity. Anyone familiar with the varied

reactions to the New York Times and FOX News knows how often assessments of

objectivity and bias depend on the eye of the beholder. Many courses in secular

universities are regarded by their critics as excessively indoctrinating, and are as

vehemently defended by those who think the content is beneficial. Such

disagreements are to be expected in a diverse society. But when the beholder is

the State, what is beheld is the exercise of religion, and what is at stake is the

right of students to receive the equal benefits of public support for higher
-34-

education, the Constitution interposes its protection. The First Amendment does

not permit government officials to sit as judges of the “indoctrination” quotient of

theology classes.

A second statutory criterion presenting serious entanglement concerns is

that “[t]he governing board does not reflect nor is the membership limited to

persons of any particular religion.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.5-105(1)(e). As

authoritatively interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Americans United

for Separation of Church and State Fund v. Colorado, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo.

1982), this provision requires state officials to examine the educational policies of

the governing board and match them against the officials’ understanding of the

religious doctrine. There, the court confronted an argument by Regis, a Catholic

college (it is now a university), that it satisfied this criterion because only a

majority, and not all, of its trustees were required to be Jesuits. Id. at 1087–88

n.14. The court responded that this was not enough, because the university was

also required to show that its board did not “reflect” a particular religion:

To “reflect” is to give back an image or likeness of an object or

condition. . . . Of particular importance are the procedures employed

by the governing board in its decision-making process and the fruits

of that process. The record here does not permit a determination, for

the purpose of summary judgment, that the Regis Board of Trustees

does not give back an image or likeness of a particular religion in its

policies and decisions pertaining to the educational function of the

institution. Further evidentiary development of this issue is

necessary.

Id. at 1088. 
-35-

This inquiry goes not just to “decision-making process” but to substance,

(i.e. “the fruits of that process”). To perform the substantive inquiry and decide

whether a university’s governing board complies with the statute, state officials

must look at the “policies and decisions” of the board and see whether those

policies have “the image or likeness of a particular religion.” Id. We do not see

how the state can constitutionally do this. It is not for the state to decide what

Catholic—or evangelical, or Jewish—“polic[y]” is on educational issues. That is a

question of religious doctrine on which the State may take no position without

entangling itself in an intrafaith dispute. Asking whether a university’s

educational policy on a given issue has “the image or likeness of a particular

religion,” id., is thus unconstitutional.

This form of inquiry was rejected by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.

Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). There, the Court reversed the

NLRB’s “assertion of jurisdiction over teachers in religious school[],” explaining

that such oversight would create “excessive entanglement” with the schools’

religious views. Id. at 499, 502. The entanglement would occur whenever a

school claimed that its “challenged actions were mandated by [its] religious

creeds.” Id. at 502. Resolving this claim would “necessarily involve inquiry into .

. . [the] relationship [of the actions] to the school’s religious mission.” Id. This

“very process of inquiry,” the Court held, “may impinge on rights guaranteed by
-36-

the Religion Clauses,” and “presents a significant risk that the First Amendment

will be infringed.” Id. 

In University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002), a

similar NLRB inquiry was again rejected. After Catholic Bishop, the NLRB

granted a religious exemption to the National Labor Relations Act only when it

was satisfied that a school had “a religious mission,” an issue on which it

conducted its own inquiry. Id. at 1340 (internal citations omitted). After the

NLRB concluded that the University of Great Falls—despite its own claims to the

contrary—did not have a religious mission, the D.C. Circuit held this inquiry

impermissible under Catholic Bishop. Id. at 1341–44. Under the NLRB’s new

test, the University president was called before the government and asked to

explain the school’s curricular and policy choices and policies and “respond to

doubts that [they were] legitimately ‘Catholic.’” Id. at 1343. “This is the exact 

kind of questioning into religious matters which Catholic Bishop specifically

sought to avoid,” the D.C. Circuit held, id., and it is the exact kind of questioning

required by the Colorado statute. It is no business of the State to decide what

policies are entailed by or “reflect” the institution’s religious beliefs. 

The First Circuit’s decision in Surinach v. Pesquera De Busquets, 604 F.2d

73 (1st Cir. 1979), further demonstrates the problem. Relying on Lemon and

Catholic Bishop, the court held it unconstitutional for the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico “to investigate the operating costs of Roman Catholic schools in the
8 We are unable to figure out why the statute employs these two different

expressions for what appears to be the same thing. 

-37-

Commonwealth” in order to enforce local price controls. Id. at 73–75. Under the

regulatory scheme, the Commonwealth was required to decide in some cases how

money “should best be allotted to serve the religious goals of the schools.” Id. at

79. As the First Circuit held, this judgment was not the government’s to make. 

Moreover, because of the illegitimacy of these purposes, the “compelled

disclosure” itself was unconstitutional because of its “potential . . . chilling of the

decision making process.” Id. at 78.

Three of the six statutory criteria involve yet another entanglement problem. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.5-105(1)(a), (e), (f). Each of them prohibits the institution

from having students, faculty, trustees, or funding sources that are “exclusively,”

“primarily,” or “predominantly,” of “one religious persuasion” or of a “particular

religion.” This requires government officials to decide which groups of believers

count as “a particular religion” or “one religious persuasion,”8

 and which groups

do not. That requires them to wade into issues of religious contention. In

answering the Commission’s questionnaire, CCU stated that its students, faculty,

and trustees are not of a single religion, because the school is an

interdenominational institution; it “unites with the broad, historic evangelical faith

rather than affiliating with any specific denomination.” App. 88, ¶ 21. The state

defendants took a different view: to them, all Christians are of the same religious
-38-

persuasion, and denominational distinctions do not matter. The “correct” answer

to that question depends on one’s ecclesiology. But under the First Amendment,

the government is not permitted to have an ecclesiology, or to second-guess the

ecclesiology espoused by our citizens. “Courts are not arbiters of scriptural

interpretation.” Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,

716 (1981).

The State defendants blithely assumed that they could lump together all

“Christians” as a single “religion.” But the definition of who is a “Christian” can

generate an argument in serious circles across the country. Some students at CCU

are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, or “Mormons.” 

Members of the LDS Church stoutly insist that they are Christians, but some

Christians, with equal sincerity and sometimes vehemence, say they are not. In

order to administer Colorado’s exclusionary law, government officials have to

decide which side in this debate is right. Similar questions plague the religious

taxonomy of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Christian Scientists, Unitarian-Universalists,

various syncretistic groups and even (in some circles) the Roman Catholic Church. 

To make matters worse, the Commission has (no doubt without animus)

applied different standards to different religious traditions. When confronted with

the question of whether Regis College was eligible for student scholarships, the

Commission (and later the Colorado Supreme Court) focused on the particular

denomination, which is Roman Catholicism, and concluded that the institution was
-39-

eligible. In CCU’s case, however, the Commission focused on a broader category:

all Christians. Logic tells us that the broader the category deemed “a particular

religion” the more difficult it will be for an institution to qualify. Thus, the

Commission’s choice of the level of analysis made it more likely that a broadly

interdenominational institution like CCU, whose students, faculty, and trustees

adhere to a range of churches, would be deemed “pervasively sectarian,” while an

institution operated by a single denomination (indeed, a single religious order

within the denomination) would not. 

Also troublesome is the provision regarding mandatory attendance at

religious “convocations or services.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.5-105(1)(b). The

record is sparse regarding how the Commission interprets this provision. What

counts as a “religious convocation or service”? Would this include celebration of

the mass at graduation ceremonies? Does it matter if the student is required to

attend, but not required to partake of the sacrament? Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505

U.S. 577, 592–96 (1992) (reflecting on the meaning of “coercion” in the context of

graduation prayers). What counts as “mandatory” attendance? What if the student

is permitted to satisfy the obligation by attendance at a worship service of his own

choosing? And what if (as is evidently true at CCU) some but not all students are

required to attend? Would an entire student body be rendered ineligible if the

institution had, for example, a graduate seminary for whose students attendance

was required? These determinations threaten to embroil the government in line-
-40-

drawing and second-guessing regarding matters about which it has neither

competence nor legitimacy.

The final criterion is whether the institution has a “strong commitment to

principles of academic freedom.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-3.5-105(1)(c). A majority

of the Commission officials determined that CCU satisfied this criterion, on the

basis of its adoption of the “1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom of

the American Association of University Professors.” App. 90, ¶ 27. This can be

seen as a form of self-definition, and therefore as less intrusive and entangling

than the others. But even as to this criterion, one Commission official stated he

was “not satisfied” and questioned whether CCU’s stated commitment to academic

freedom could be squared with the statement of religious beliefs it required of

faculty and governing board members. App. 102, ¶ 78. If that sort of secondguessing were permitted, state officials would be in a position of examining

statements of religious beliefs and determining whether those beliefs are, or are

not, consistent with scholarly objectivity. Such determinations would seem to be

an excessive entanglement and intrusion into religious affairs.

The state defendants respond that all of these inquiries are justified by

Locke v. Davey, because determining whether a theology program is “devotional”

is just as intrusive as determining what a single “religion” is, whether classes

“indoctrinate,” and what educational policies “reflect” a religion. This misses a

crucial point in Locke: the Court explicitly pointed out that “[t]he institution,
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rather than the State, determines whether the student’s major is devotional.” 540

U.S. at 717. This avoided the intrusiveness problem; the State made no

contentious religious judgments, but simply deferred to the self-evaluation of the

affected institutions. Unlike Washington, Colorado insists on second-guessing an

institution’s characterization of its own religious nature. The Commission refused

even to accept CCU’s assessment of what religions were entailed by its own

statement of faith. We do not mean to say that states must allow universities to be

the final judge of their own eligibility for state money—of course not. However,

if the State wishes to choose among otherwise eligible institutions, it must employ

neutral, objective criteria rather than criteria that involve the evaluation of

contested religious questions and practices.

D. Governmental Interest

Having identified these constitutional problems with the Colorado statute,

there remains the issue of governmental interest. Violations of the Equal

Protection and Free Exercise Clauses are generally analyzed in terms of strict

scrutiny, under which discrimination can be justified only if it is narrowly tailored

to achieve a compelling state interest. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751–52 (2007); Church of Lukumi

Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993). Establishment

Clause violations, by contrast, are usually flatly forbidden without reference to the

strength of governmental purposes. E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Hull, 393 U.S.
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440, 449–52 (1969); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14, 625 (1971). 

Larson v. Valente, alone among Establishment Clause cases, looked to whether the

challenged law survives strict scrutiny rather than simply declaring it

unconstitutional. 456 U.S. at 246. From this we conclude that statutes involving

discrimination on the basis of religion, including interdenominational

discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny whether they arise under the

Free Exercise Clause, Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, the Establishment Clause, Larson,

456 U.S. at 246, or the Equal Protection Clause, Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (citing

McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)), while those involving other

Establishment Clause issues, such as excessive entanglement, are unconstitutional

without further inquiry. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ

of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (“Larson indicates that

laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny.”)

As already discussed, Locke v. Davey introduces some uncertainty about the

level of scrutiny applicable to discriminatory funding. The majority opinion

refrained from stating what level of scrutiny it was applying to Joshua Davey’s

First Amendment claim, but dropped two hints that the proper level of scrutiny

may be something less than strict. First, the Court noted that discrimination in

funding is a “milder” form of “disfavor” than the imposition of criminal or civil

sanctions, which may suggest that a lesser governmental interest is required to

justify it. 540 U.S. at 720. Second, the Court characterized the government’s
9 To the extent the Court examined factors similar to the ones outlined in

the Colorado statute, it applied a holistic approach rather than insisting that

(continued...)

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interest in Locke as “historic and substantial.” Id. at 725. While considerably

more demanding than rational basis, this likely falls short of requiring that the

government’s interest be “compelling.” On the other hand, as we have noted,

Locke did not involve discrimination among religions, and the Court may not have

intended the new lower standard (if that is what it is) to apply to cases of this sort. 

Fortunately, we need not decide precisely what level of scrutiny applies to the

denominational discrimination in this case, because the State scarcely has any

justification at all.

In Americans United for Separation of Church and State Fund v. Colorado,

648 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court described the

“pervasively sectarian” exclusion as “an attempt to conform to First Amendment

doctrine.” That accords with what is known of the legislative history. The

legislature framed these statutes to make funds as broadly available as was thought

permissible under the Supreme Court’s then-existing Establishment Clause

doctrine. Id. at 1075 n.1. The sponsor of the bill described the six criteria as an

“inclusive” attempt to conform to Supreme Court decisions and avoid “interesting

lawsuits.” Id. (quoting Sen. Fowler). Even at the time (1977), it is not clear that a

religiously affiliated university would have had to satisfy all six of the legislative

criteria to be eligible for public funding under the Establishment Clause,9

 but it
9

(...continued)

institutions satisfy every factor. See generally Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of

Md., 426 U.S. 736, 755–761 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686–87

(1971) (plurality). In fact, the Supreme Court never found an accredited college

or university “pervasively sectarian.” The Court appeared to use the concept as a

rationale for distinguishing between primary schools and higher education. See

Frederick M. Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church & State: A Critical Analysis of

Religion Clause Jurisprudence 85–88 (1995). Moreover, by 1977 there was

dictum that a program of “indirect” aid through broad-based scholarships, akin to

the “G.I. Bill,” would satisfy the Court’s Establishment concerns. Comm. for

Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973). This

ripened into a holding of the Court in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91

(1983). 

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has become clear in the intervening years that exclusion of institutions like CCU is

in no way necessary for compliance with the Establishment Clause. In light of the

changes in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the original

purpose of the exclusion provisions has been rendered obsolete; there apparently

was no other.

The district court held that the purpose of the exclusion was to comply with

Colo. Const. Art. IX § 7, which provides: 

Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township,

school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any

appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever,

anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian

purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary,

college, university or other literary or scientific institution, controlled

by any church or sectarian denomination whatsoever; nor shall any

grant or donation of land, money or other personal property, ever be

made by the state, or any such public corporation to any church, or for

any sectarian purpose. 
10 The State defendants rely heavily on a brief statement in Americans

United that the criteria “militate[d] against the type of ideological control over

the secular educational function which Article IX, Section 7, at least in part,

addresses.” Id. at 1084. But we do not think the court suggested that the

pervasively-sectarian exclusion was necessary for the scholarship programs to

comply with the state constitution, nor can we see why the Colorado Constitution

would be read to impose such a requirement. 

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That, however, must be mistaken. The Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted

Art. IX § 7 as applying to direct subsidies to the religious institutions themselves,

not to scholarships to students. In Americans United, the court upheld the

scholarship programs at issue here against state constitutional challenge on the

basis of the indirect nature of the aid, the higher-education context, and the

availability of the aid to students at both public and private institutions. 

Americans United, 648 P.2d at 1083–84. Because “the aid is designed to assist the

student, not the institution,” id. at 1083, the Colorado Supreme Court would likely

uphold the program even if CCU were admitted.10 Cf. Op. Colo. Atty. Gen. No.

05-03, 2005 WL 4020085 (July 29, 2005) (holding that Colo. Const. Art. X, §20

imposes lesser restraints on indirect than direct aid). And if money given to

college students who choose religious colleges were some day held to violate

Article IX, the “pervasively sectarian” distinction would not save it, because

Article IX applies to all colleges and universities “controlled by any church or

sectarian denomination whatsoever,” and makes no distinction among religious

institutions on the basis of the pervasiveness of their sectarianism. The
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exclusionary provisions of the statute are therefore a square peg with respect to the

state constitutional round hole.

The defendants also contend that, apart from its constitution, the State of

Colorado has a compelling interest in keeping taxpayers from supporting students

who choose religious education. The defendants provide no evidence that this is

so, and the legislative history and state court interpretation are to the contrary. 

The evidence shows that the sponsors of the legislation attempted to provide

student scholarships on as “inclusive” a basis as was then deemed permissible. 

We cannot and will not uphold a statute that abridges an enumerated constitutional

right on the basis of a factitious governmental interest found nowhere but in the

defendants’ litigating papers. But even if saving taxpayers from supporting

students who choose a religious education were an actual state interest, it would

still fail because the statute is not narrowly tailored to this asserted goal. Under

the challenged provisions, Colorado does not stop students from taking scholarship

money to religious universities—it stops them only from taking scholarship money

to a narrow set of them that state officials regard as too pervasively so. This

underinclusiveness undermines the defendants’ claim of narrow tailoring. See

United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 958 (10th Cir. 2008)

(“Underinclusive[ness] . . . suggests that the government’s ‘supposedly vital

interest’ is not really compelling.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As best we can tell, the State’s actual interest in enacting the statute was to

award scholarships to deserving students as universally as federal law permits. 

That purpose is not served by excluding CCU. Accordingly, on any plausible level

of scrutiny, the discriminatory nature of the exclusion provisions cannot be

justified by reference to an “historic and substantial state interest.” Locke, 540

U.S. at 725. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the State must be reversed. CCU also appeals the denial of summary

judgment in its favor. See Yaffe Cos. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 1182, 1184

(10th Cir. 2007) (“An order denying summary judgment is reviewable when it is

coupled with a grant of summary judgment to the opposing party.”) (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted.). Because we have held that the

challenged statutes violate the First Amendment and have no constitutionally

sufficient justification, CCU is entitled to summary judgment for the same reasons

the State defendants were not. 

The district court’s order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment

and denying CCU’s is therefore REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the

district court to enter summary judgment in favor of CCU and to determine the

appropriate remedy.