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PH I L L I P S DA Y E S

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW FIRM

A Professional Corporation

3101 North Central Avenue, Suite 1500

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Telephone: 1-800-JOB-LAWS

docket@phillipsdayeslaw.com

TREY DAYES, No. 020805

SEAN DAVIS, No. 030754

(602) 288-1610 ext. 301

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Crowder; 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC, an Arizona

limited liability company; Rafael Bravo

and Jane Doe Bravo, husband and wife

Case No.: ________________________

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Brian Crowder, for his Complaint against Defendants, alleges as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. The Fair Labor Standards Act is designed to eliminate “labor conditions 

detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, 

efficiency and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). To achieve its goals, 

the FLSA sets minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for covered employers. See 

29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a).

2. Employers must compensate employees for all work that employers permit 

employees to perform. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.11. In such cases, it is the responsibility of 

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employers’ management to ensure that work is not performed if management does not 

desire for such work to be performed. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.13. Employers may not accept 

the benefits of employees performing work without compensating the employees for their 

work. Id.

3. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants for unlawful failure to pay 

overtime wages in direct violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 

seq. (“FLSA”).

4. Defendants had a consistent policy and practice of requiring its employees to 

work well in excess of forty (40) hours per week without paying them time and a half for 

hours worked over forty (40) hours per week.

5. Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation and an equal amount 

of liquidated damages, including interest thereon, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees, and 

costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants reside within 

the State in which this District Court is located and because a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to this matter occurred in this District.

8. The named Defendants, by virtue of their own acts and omissions or by 

virtue of the acts and omissions committed by one or more of their agents, employees or 

representatives, as described herein, have conducted business or caused events to occur 

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within the District of Arizona and, more particularly, within Maricopa County, Arizona, 

as more particularly described herein so as to give rise to both subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction of this Court.

PARTIES

9. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was a resident of Maricopa County, 

Arizona. 

10. At all times material hereto, Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC was 

incorporated in the State of Arizona with its principal place of business in Maricopa

County, Arizona.

11. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto, Defendant Rafael 

Bravo, was and continues to be a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona.

12. Jane Doe Bravo is Rafael Bravo’s wife. Rafael and Jane Doe Bravo have 

caused events to take place giving rise to this Complaint as to which their marital 

community is fully liable.

13. Upon information and belief, and consistent with the information available 

from the Arizona Corporation Commission, Defendant Rafael Bravo was and is the 

owner of Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC

14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an “employee” of Defendants, as defined 

by 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 

15. The provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 207 of the FLSA apply to Defendants.

16. At all relevant times, each of the Defendants was and continues to be an 

“employer” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

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17. Each of the Defendants should be deemed an “employer” for purposes of the 

FLSA including, without limitation, 29 U.S.C. § 216.

18. Defendant Rafael Bravo is deemed an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA, 

including, without limitation, 29 U.S.C. §216.

19. All Defendants are co-equally liable for all matters.

20. Defendant Rafael Bravo made all decisions on the daily activities of his

employees and is therefore individually liable under the FLSA.

21. Defendant Rafael Bravo makes all decisions regarding pay policies for Bravo 

Cleaning Services, LLC.

22. Defendant Rafael Bravo exerted financial control over Bravo Cleaning 

Services, LLC.

23. Defendant Rafael Bravo exerted operative control over Bravo Cleaning 

Services, LLC.

24. Defendant Rafael Bravo has the power to close Bravo Cleaning Services, 

LLC.

25. Defendant Rafael Bravo has the power to hire and fire employees. 

26. Defendant Rafael Bravo hired managerial employees. 

27. On information and belief, Defendant Rafael Bravo maintained employment 

records. 

28. On information and belief, Defendant Rafael Bravo dictated the corporate 

message in pending labor investigations. 

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29. Defendant Rafael Bravo profited from the FLSA violations detailed in this 

complaint. 

30. At all times material to this action, each of the Defendants was and continues

to be an “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” 

as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).

31. As a resurface technician, Plaintiff handled supplies, such as countertops, 

kitchen items, granite, concrete, and radios that originated out of state.

32. Plaintiff’s uniform that he was required to wear moved in interstate 

commerce.

33. Plaintiff engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce 

and is therefore individually covered under the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§206(a), 

207(a)(1), 212(c).

34. Plaintiff was involved in transacting business across state lines via interstate 

telephone calls or the U. S. Mail which included taking new orders from customers.

35. Plaintiff was involved in ordering or receiving goods from out-of-state 

suppliers.

36. Plaintiff was involved in handling the accounting or bookkeeping for the 

ordering or receiving of goods from out-of-state suppliers.

37. Plaintiff also handled credit card transactions that involved the interstate 

banking and finance systems.

38. On information and belief, at all relevant times, the annual gross revenue of 

Defendants exceeded, and continues to exceed, $500,000.00.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

39. Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC is a residential and commercial cleaning and 

resurfacing company in Arizona. 

40. Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC hired Plaintiff in July of 2014 as a resurfacing 

technician.

41. Plaintiff’s job duties and responsibilities included traveling to homes or 

business of clientele of Defendants and resurfacing and creating enclosures for bath tubs 

and resurfacing bathroom and kitchen countertops. 

42. Plaintiff’s job was that of pure manual labor. 

43. Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC compensated Plaintiff on a per job basis. 

44. Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC treated Plaintiff as a 1099, independent 

contractor. 

45. Defendants withheld taxes out of Plaintiff’s paycheck pursuant to IRS 

regulations. 

46. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee of Defendants, not an independent 

contractor. 

47. Defendants attempted to create an independent contractor relationship with 

Plaintiff even though he was an employee of Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC. 

48. Defendants suffered and permitted Plaintiff to work for Defendants without 

properly compensating Plaintiff for all his time spent working. 

49. Defendants had complete control over the manner in which Plaintiff would 

complete his work. Plaintiff followed Defendants’ strict and rigid requirements for the 

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performance of his work.

50. The Defendants had the complete authority to exercise complete control 

with respect to all details of the employment relationship between the parties. 

51. The work Plaintiff performed was not for a finite period of time, Plaintiff 

was directed to report to job sites continually. 

52. Plaintiff was not allowed to take on any other work while in the employ of 

Defendants.

53. Plaintiff had no opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his skill as he 

was paid a consistent wage for the work he did for Defendants. Plaintiff was not given 

the opportunity to earn more based on his skill.

54. Plaintiff made no investment in equipment to perform his work with 

Defendants. 

55. Plaintiff’s work was integral to Defendants’ operation. 

56. Defendants’ operated a resurfacing company. 

57. Plaintiff’s tasks were directly related to actual resurfacing. 

58. If Defendants did not employ resurfacing technicians, Defendants’ business 

would cease to operate. 

59. Plaintiff would turn in time sheets or invoices that would detail the days 

worked each week directly to Defendants.

59. Plaintiff had no supervision or management responsibilities. 

60. Plaintiff could neither hire nor fire employees.

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61. Plaintiff had no authority to exercise significant independent judgment on 

issues that affect the whole company when carrying out her job responsibilities.

62. Defendants managed, supervised, and directed all aspects of Plaintiff’s job 

duties and responsibilities.

63. Plaintiff’s primary duty was not the performance of work directly related to 

the management or general business operations of Bravo Cleaning Services, LLC or its’ 

customers. 

64. Plaintiff’s primary duty was not the performance of work requiring advanced 

knowledge in a field of science or learning that was acquired by a prolonged course of 

specialized intellectual instruction. 

65. Plaintiff did not perform work requiring advanced knowledge. 

66. Plaintiff did not perform work in a field of science or learning. 

67. Plaintiff did not have an advanced degree and was not required to have one to 

perform the work.

68. The knowledge required to perform the work of resurfacing technician is not 

acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual study.

69. Plaintiff’s work did not require consistent exercise of discretion and 

judgment. 

70. Plaintiff’s work did not require him to analyze, interpret, or make deductions 

from varying facts or circumstances.

71. Plaintiff’s duties were carried out in a mechanical and routine manner and he

had no authority to make independent decisions in performing those duties. 

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72. Plaintiff’s work did not require invention, imagination, originality, or talent.

73. Plaintiff’s work did not require creative or original analysis and 

interpretation. 

74. Plaintiff’s regular schedule was six days per week, 8.5 hours on average each 

day.

75. There were many weeks in which Plaintiff would also have to work Sundays.

76. Each and every week that Plaintiff has worked his regular schedule, he has 

worked over forty hours in a week. 

77. By improperly classifying Plaintiff as an independent contractor, Defendants 

are depriving Plaintiff upwards of ten to fifteen hours of overtime pay each and every 

week. 

78. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff overtime. 

79. Plaintiff was not a commissioned employee. 

80. Commissions did not consist of more than half of Plaintiff’s weekly earnings. 

81. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of Phillips Dayes National Employment 

Law Firm to prosecute her claims against Defendants on his behalf and has agreed to pay 

reasonable costs and attorney’s fees in the prosecution of this matter.

COUNT ONE

OVERTIME VIOLATION—29 U.S.C. § 207

82. Plaintiff incorporates and adopts paragraphs 1 through 81 above as if fully set 

forth herein.

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83. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked multiple hours of 

overtime per week.

84. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee.

85. Defendants have intentionally and willfully failed and refused to pay Plaintiff 

overtime according to the provisions of the FLSA.

86. On information and belief, Defendants further engaged in a widespread 

pattern and practice of violating the provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff in 

accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 207.

87. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, 

Plaintiff has suffered damages by failing to receive compensation in accordance with 29 

U.S.C. § 207.

88. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for an amount 

equal to one and one-half times her regular pay rate for each hour of overtime worked per 

week.

89. In addition to the amount of unpaid wages owed to Plaintiff, he is also 

entitled to recover an additional equal amount as liquidated damages pursuant to 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b).

90. On information and belief, Defendants’ conduct in failing to properly 

compensate Plaintiff, in violation of the FLSA, was willful.

91. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA.

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Plaintiff has been required to bring this action to recover her overtime compensation, and 

her statutory liquidated damages, and as the direct and foreseeable result of Defendants’

conduct, Plaintiff has incurred costs and attorneys’ fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his

favor against Defendants:

a. Awarding Plaintiff overtime compensation in the amount due for all of 

his time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a pay rate 

equal to one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay while at 

work for Defendants, in an amount proved at trial;

b. Awarding Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the 

overtime award;

c. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of the 

litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

d. Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, on all 

amounts awarded under subsections (a) and (b) above from the date of 

the payment due for that pay period until paid in full;

e. Awarding Plaintiff post-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, on 

all awards from the date of such award until paid in full; and

f. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT THREE

MISCLASSIFICATION AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

92. Plaintiff incorporates and adopts paragraphs 1 through 91 above as if fully 

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set forth herein.

93. Plaintiff’s working relationship with Defendants as described above was 

that of an employee, not independent contractor. 

94. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as an independent contractor.

95. In addition to providing Defendants with presumed justification to violate 

the FLSA, the misclassification also allowed Defendants not to pay employment taxes, 

shifting the burden onto the Plaintiff in the form of self-employment taxes.

96. As a direct and proximate result of the misclassification, Plaintiff is entitled 

to compensation for payment of excess taxes and other lost benefits of the 

employer/employee relationship.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his 

favor against Defendants:

a. Awarding Plaintiff the difference between the amount that should have 

been taxed if Plaintiff was appropriately classified and the amount that 

Plaintiff actually paid in self-employment tax.

b. Awarding Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the selfemployment tax award;

c. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and expenses of 

the litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

d. For Plaintiff’s costs incurred in this action;

e. Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, on all 

amounts set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above from the date of the 

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payment due for that pay period until paid in full;

f. Awarding Plaintiff post-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, on 

all awards from the date of such award until paid in full; and 

g. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT THREE

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

97. Plaintiff incorporates and adopts paragraphs 1 through 96 above as if fully set 

forth herein.

98. Plaintiff and Defendants have an overtime compensation dispute pending.

99. The Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief 

pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02.

100. Plaintiff is entitled to declarations, and requests that the Court make 

declarations as to the following matters and as to other matters deemed appropriate by the 

Court:

a. Defendants employed Plaintiff.

b. Defendants are engaged in an enterprise covered by the overtime provisions 

of the FLSA.

c. Plaintiff individually is covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

d. Plaintiff was not an exempt employee pursuant to the FLSA.

e. Defendants failed and refused to make payments of overtime compensation 

to Plaintiff, in violation of the provisions of the FLSA.

f. Defendants’ failures to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff were willful.

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g. Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of overtime compensation not 

paid by Defendants at the rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular 

rate of pay.

h. Plaintiff is entitled to an equal amount as liquidated damages.

i. Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee 

incurred in prosecuting his claim.

101. It is in the public interest to have these declarations of rights recorded as 

Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action serves the useful purposes of clarifying and 

settling the legal relations at issue, preventing future harm, and promoting the remedial 

purposes of the FLSA.

102. The declaratory judgment action further terminates and affords relief from 

uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his

favor against Defendants:

a. Declaring, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2201–02, that the acts and practices complained of herein are in 

violation of the overtime and wage provisions of the FLSA;

b. Awarding Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs and 

expenses of the litigation pursuant to the FLSA; and

c. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper

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Dated: November 11, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIPS DAYES NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 

FIRM PC

By: /s/ Trey Dayes

Trey Dayes

Attorney for Plaintiff

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