alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE COMBINED
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS OF U.S.  TIMBERLAND  KLAMATH  FALLS,  L.L.C.  FOR THE NINE
MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                         9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                    SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                                5,743
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         8,389
<ALLOWANCES>                                            200
<INVENTORY>                                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     14,004
<PP&E>                                                1,517
<DEPRECIATION>                                          439
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      341,443
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                11,387
<BONDS>                                             225,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                                  0
<OTHER-SE>                                          105,056
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        341,443
<SALES>                                              57,601
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     57,601
<CGS>                                                10,981
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        35,475
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      (637)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   16,461
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       6,573
<INCOME-TAX>                                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   6,573
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                          6,573
<EPS-BASIC>                                               0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                             0



</TABLE>
#### Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. *v.*C. W. Clark.

Railroads — Killing Stock — Burden of Proof.

While the onus was on the appellant, it offered no evidence to show how the mule was killed or why. The jury had the right to- infer from the facts proven by appellee, that ordinary care might have avoided the accident.

APPEAL PROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 25, 1871.

*Underwood, for appellant.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Robertson :

The instructions to the jury, though somewhat' plethoric are yet substantially as favorable to the appellant as it could reasonably ask.

And, while the *onus*was on the appellant, it offered no evidence to show how the mule was killed or why. The jury had a right therefore to infer from the facts proved' by the appellee that ordinary care might have avoided the accident of running over the mule.

We cannot say that the verdict was either unauthorized or exorbitant.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
#### Jos. L. Francis & Wife *v.*Rice G. Woods, *&c.*

Fraud — Collateral Attack — Former Judgment.

Though fraud and collusion in a petition be admitted as true, a defendant cannot attack collaterally a judgment rendered 26 years before, especially as she did not avail herself of the provisions of Civil Code, Sec. 421, and Sec. 579, Sub. 8.

APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT.

March 20, 1872.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The frauds and forgeries which the appellants allege were committed by Bridges, are charged to have constituted the grounds of the proceedings which resulted in the judgment under which Woods holds title to the land in controversy.

It is not directly alleged that any improper practices were resorted to by Bridges touching the proceedings in court, by or through which the appellant’s administrator or her guardian ad litem were overreached or misled, or the court imposed upon.

The alleged falsehoods contained in the pleadings’ and the fabricated exhibits by which they were sustained were matters which were directly put in issue in such suit, and can not in a collateral proceeding be relied upon as sufficient grounds for treating a judgment rendered nearly twenty-six years before this suit was instituted as an absolute nullity.

It is alleged that the whole record in the ease of Mary S. Kennedy vs. W. A. Bridges is false and fraudulent from beginning to end, but from this general and indefinite charge it can not be implied that the falsehoods and frauds were practiced in obtaining the judgment by imposing upon the court or misleading the parties.

The charges set up in the pleadings in this case if true, would have been available for a vacation of the judgment in the case of Kennedy vs. Bridges. If Mrs. Francis had seen proper, within twelve months after she became twenty-one years of age to have filed her petition in the proper court, and ashed such relief, *484Civil Code, Section 421, snbsec. 8, Section 579. This she failed to do, hence such judgment remains in full force and effect.

*Bradley, for appellants.*

Dunlap, *A.*Harding, *for appellees.*

. Admitting everything in her pleadings to be true, still no court in this State has the right to treat it as void, nor has the Garrard circuit court the power to vacate or modify it.

Appellees’ demurrers were properly sustained, and appellants failing to amend further the circuit court did not err in dismissing their petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Peters did not sit in this case.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-28-1997
<CASH>                                       1,597,430
<SECURITIES>                                 1,222,083
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    196,443
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,540,032
<PP&E>                                      21,393,085
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,009,066
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              23,646,765
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,207,891
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                         8,586
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  20,112,621
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                23,646,765
<SALES>                                     24,259,156
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            24,259,156
<CGS>                                        6,929,221
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,929,221
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            16,070,345
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,702
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,958,419)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,958,419)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,958,419)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.17)


</TABLE>
#### Barlow and Another *v.*Reno and Another, in Error.

THE Court held, in this case, that the confession of judgment by one partner, in the name of the partnership, does not bind the firm (1).

In cases of general partnership, one of the partners cannot bind the others without an authority express or implied; and an authority can only be implied for what is necessary to carry on the trade in which the partners are concerned. Per Best, C. J., in *Stead et al.*v. *Salt,*3 Bing. 101. To confess, judgments does not seem to be any part of the ordinary business of a trading company: not more so, certainly, than entering into a submission to arbitration ; which, agreeably to the case cited above, one partner cannot do, ss as to bind the firm, This letter point — that one partner cannot by a submission *253
        *to*arbitration bind his co-partner — is considered in a note to *Mills*v. *Conner,*ante, p. 9, to be unsettled; *Taylor*v. *Coryell,*there cited, deciding that he may! When that note was written, the report of the late case of *Stead et al.*v. *Salt,*supra, had not reached this country; nor had the case of *Karthaus*v. *Ferrer,*1 Peters, 222, 228, to the same effect, been then decided. As to the authority of one partner to bind another, vide *Posey*v. *Bullitt,*ante, p. 99, and *note.*— Flood *v. Yandes,*ante, p. 102. — 3 Kent’s Com. 17 — 27.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of a meeting of the Board of Scientific Counselors, NIDA.

The meeting will be closed to the public as indicated below in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended for the review, discussion, and evaluation of individual intramural programs and projects conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, including consideration of personnel qualifications and performance, and the competence of individual investigators, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         Board of Scientific Counselors, NIDA.                    

*Date:*                         November 20, 2014.                    

*Closed:*                         8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate personal qualifications and performance, and competence of individual investigators.                    

*Place:*                         Intramural Research Program, National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH, Johns Hopkins Bayview Campus, Baltimore, MD 21223.                    

*Contact Person:*                         Joshua Kysiak, Program Specialist, Biomedical Research Center, Intramural Research Program, National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH, DHHS, 251 Bayview Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21224, 443-740-2465,                         *kysiakjo@nida.nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos.: 93.279, Drug Abuse and Addiction Research Programs, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: October 28, 2014.

Michelle Trout,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2014-26025 Filed 10-31-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**Certificateof the Chief Executive Officer**

**Pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report of Xponential,Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Dwayne A. Moyers, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.             TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             Theinformation contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial conditions and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: May 17, 2004 |   | /s/ Dwayne A. Moyers    |
|--------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|               |   | Dwayne A. Moyers        |
|               |   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.2

Western Division

Perez C. Funches

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:20−cv−50088

Honorable Philip G. Reinhard

Jason Hermeyer, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, June 3, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard: Due to Covid

restrictions, the hearing on plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [4]

previously set for 9:00 a.m. on June 17, 2020, is canceled and reset to 9:30 a.m. on July

27, 2020, in Courtroom 5100 of the Stanley J. Roszkowski United States Courthouse, 327

South Church Street, Rockford, Illinois. Plaintiff Perez C. Funches is ordered to appear in

person on July 27, 2020. Mailed notice(sb)

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 3:20-cv-50088 Document #: 16 Filed: 06/03/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:79
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   5-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 AUG-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                               1,465
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          566
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                            256
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       109
<PP&E>                                               1,509
<DEPRECIATION>                                      (1,283)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       2,697
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                2,109
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            71,526
<OTHER-SE>                                         (81,193)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         2,697
<SALES>                                                629
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                       629
<CGS>                                                  377
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          377
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     1,183
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     244
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (1,175)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (1,175)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        214
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (961)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (0.010)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.010)



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
32.1








CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Report of Physical Property Holdings Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ngai Keung Luk,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:








1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.








/s/ Ngai Keung
Luk


Ngai
Keung Luk


Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer





November
14, 2008
----

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the AnnualReport (Form 10-K), Registration Statement No. 333-148866 on Form S-8, andRegistration Statement No. 333-142684 on Form F-3 of our report (which auditreport expresses an unqualified report and includes an explanatory paragraphreferring to our consideration of internal control over financial reporting)dated March 25, 2009 on the consolidated financial statements of Zi Corporationincluded in the 2008 annual report to shareholders of Zi Corporation for theyear ended December 31, 2008. 

| Calgary, Canada | /s/ Ernst & Young LLPApril 1, 2009
Chartered Accountants |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
#### J. T. Greer *v.*Arnette.

Bail Bond — Taken before County Court.

Under Sec. 61 and 67, and Sec. 80,' Criminal Code, the county judge has the right to take a bail bond, when the defendant was legally in custody and charged with a public offense, this right extending to any time before the commencement of the first term of the circuit court-after commitment.

APPEAL FROM CRITTENDEN CIRCUIT COURT.

April 20, 1872.

Opinion oe ti-ie Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The answer in this case does not refer to, or in any way bring before the court, the action of the committing magistrates, nor of the judge of the common pleas court.

It is true certain papers, purporting to be the records or minutes of proceedings had before these officers are copied into the transcript before us, but for the reason indicated they can not be considered on this appeal.

The recitals of the forfeited bond show that Albert Greer was legally in custody charged with a public offense; that he had been admitted to bail in the sum of seven hundred dollars, and that the bond was taken by the presiding judge of the Crittenden County Court.

By Section 61, Criminal Code, such officer had the right to take such bond at any time before the commencement of the-first term of the Crittenden Circuit Court, after his commitment to jail. Nor is it material that said Greer was not brought before such judge upon a written petition as provided for in Section II, Criminal Code.

The county judge had the undoubted right to take' the bond and it is expressly provided in Section 80, that “No bail bond or bail recognizance shall be deemed to be invalid, by reason of any variance between its stipulations and the provisions of this Code, or of the failure of the magistrate or officer to transmit or deliver the same at the times herein provided, *or of any other*
      *445irregularity, so that it be made to appear that the defendant was legally in custody, charged with a public offense, and that he was discharged therefrom by reason of the giving of the bond V recognizance, and that it can be ascertained from the bond or recognizance that the bail undertook that the defendant should appear before a magistrate for an examination of the charge, or before a court for the trial thereof.” Tested by the.standard of responsibility fixed by this section there can be no doubt but that the bond and answer of the appellant warranted the judgment of the circuit judge.

Marble, *for appellant.*

*Attorney General, for appellee.*

Such judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
#### Josh. Euhelberger, &c. *v.*John Pfaender.

Landlord and Tenant — Lease—Sub-letting—Rent.

Appellants sub-rented the premises and agreed to pay the rent to the landlord. Held, That while the promise does not appear to have been made directly to appellee, still he must be regarded as having affirmed the contract, and there is no reason why he should not recover the rent from appellants.

APPEAL PROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT.

January 16, 1872.

Opinion op the Court bt

Judge Peters:

Erom the evidence in this case it appears that Keibick and Hightower leased the vinegar factory from the appellee by parol for one year with the privilege of extending the lease for ten years, that they entered under their lease and held the premises a short time, and then sublet them to appellants, who, in consideration of a verbal transfer of the lease to them, under-. took and promised to pay the rent to appellee.

We perceive no legal reason why appellee may not recover the. rent from appellants. It is not denied in their answer that they owe the rent, the evidence shows they promised to pay the same to appellee, and while the promise does not appear to have been made directly to him, still he must be regarded as having affirmed *662the contract, and the judgment for the rent' in favor of appellee will bar any action in favor of Keibick and Hightower against appellants for the rent. Consequently they are not prejudiced by the judgment, and the same must be affirmed.

.Hallam, *for appellants.*