COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLe e and Senior Judge Clements

LAKEISHA DOROTHY CRUMP MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0898- 17-1 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 7, 2017 PORTSMOUTH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH James C. Hawks, Judge (Elizabeth M. Wood, on brief), for appellant. (Solomon Ashby, City Attorney; Burle U. Stromberg, Assistant City Attorney; Michael Rosenberg, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Richardson and Rosenberg, LLC, on brief), for appellee.
Lakeisha Dorothy Crump (mother) appeals an order terminating h er parental rights to her child. Mother argues that the “trial court committed reversibl e error because it was not in the best interests of the child to be taken away from [mother], as her i ncarceration was the only thing advanced by the division as the reason she should have her chil d taken away from her.” Upon reviewing the recor d and briefs of the part ies, we conclude tha t this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial cour t. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prevail ing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Se e Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Mother gave birth to her ch ild in May 2015, when she was incar cerated. Since there were no relatives available to take c ustody of the child, the Portsm outh Department of Social Services (the Department) obtained custody and placed the child in foste r care. 1 Mother’s expected release date from prison is June 20, 2018. The Department’s initial foste r care plan included concurrent goals of relative placement and adoption. The Department liste d several requirements for m other to complete in order to receive custody of the child. The requirements included being released from prison, obtaining and maintaining employment and ho using, participating in mental health services, completing a parenting class, and completing a drug rehabilit ation program. Mother has an extensive criminal history. She also has mental health issues, stemming from an a utomobile accident when she was a teenager. While in prison, mother completed a parenting class. However, at the time of the trial, she did not have plans for empl oyment or housing when she is re leased. Mother also does not have a driver’s license. In addition to the child who is th e subject of this appeal, mo ther has two other children. She shares custody of one child w ith her mother. She voluntari ly relinquished custody of the other child. In October 2016, the Department filed a foster care plan with the sole goal of adoption. On March 7, 2017, the Portsmouth Juve nile and Domestic Relation s District Court (the JDR court) terminated mother’s parent al rights and approved the fos ter care plan with the goal of adoption. 2 Mother appealed the order term inating her parental rights to the circuit court.

1 The child’s father is unknown.

2 The JDR court also terminated the unknown father’s parental ri ghts.- 3 - On May 4, 2017, the parties presente d their evidence and argum ent. The evidence proved that the child was doing we ll in foster care. He has sp ecial needs, which are being met. He has bonded with the foster care parents and is in an adoptiv e home. At the conclusion, the trial court terminated mother’s parental rights pursuant to Cod e § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2). This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her par ental rights. She contends her incarceration prevented her from completing all of the Depa rtment’s requirements. Mother argues that her incarcerati on should not be the only reason why her parental rights were terminated.

“ [ C]lear and convincing evidence that the termination [of parental rights] is in the child’s best interests is a requireme nt in common to t ermination of par ental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) [or] (C) . . . .” Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8 n.5, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 n.5 (2005). In the argument section of moth er’s brief, she contends the evi dence was insufficient to support the termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) , but she does not challenge the termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) or (C)(1). While th e best interests of the child is “the paramount consideration of a t rial court” in a termination proceeding, Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463, we note that terminations under Code § 16.1-283(B) and the subsections of Code § 16.1-283(C) provide distinct, “in dividual bases upon which a petitioner may seek to terminate residual parental ri ghts,” City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 563, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003). In any event, the evidence supports the trial court’s determina tion that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. The child has been with the same- 4 - foster family since he was two days old. The child has special needs, and the foster family has taken him to physical, occupational, and speech therapy. He al so has been treated for vision problems. The child will be thr ee years old when mother is rel eased from prison. He has not had any contact with her due to her incarceration. While long-term incarceration doe s not, per se, authorize termination of parental ri ghts . . . it is a valid and proper circumstance which, when combined with other evidence concerning the parent / child relationship, ca n support a court’s finding by clear and convincing evide nce that the best interest s of the children will be served by termination. Ferguson v. Stafford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 333 , 340, 417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1992). In addition, mother does not have plans for employment and hou sing when she is released. She does not have a driv er’s license, which will imp act her ability to take the child to his appointments. She is not in a position to assume custody o f the child. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to s pend a lengthy period of time wai ting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resum ing his [or her] responsibilitie s.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990 ). Considering the totality of the evidence, the trial court did not err in findi ng that it was in the child’s best interest to ter minate mother’s parental rights

. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summaril y affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.