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Cite as 308 Neb. 210

In re Estate of Janette H. Loder, deceased. 

Nebraska Department of Revenue, appellant, 

v. Miranda Loder, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of Janette H. Loder, 

deceased, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed January 22, 2021. No. S-19-1104.

1. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In the absence of 

an equity question, an appellate court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing on the record made in the county court. When 

reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 

whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent 

evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of 

law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

3. Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Notice: Time. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 30-2485(a) (Reissue 2016), if the personal representative complies 

with the notice provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-520.01 (Reissue 

2016) and 30-2483 (Cum. Supp. 2018), a claim generally must be presented within 2 months after the date of the first publication of notice 

to creditors.

4. Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Debtors and Creditors: Notice. There 

are two requirements that must be satisfied to mandate that a personal 

representative mail a creditor notice: (1) The creditor must have a direct 

legal interest in the decedent’s estate, and (2) the personal representative 

must have knowledge of the creditor’s claim.

5. Decedents’ Estates: Claims. A claim that is easily ascertainable and 

not subject to dispute qualifies as a direct legal interest in a decedent’s estate.

6. Taxation: Time. Nebraska individual income taxes are due, without 

demand, on the date fixed for filing individual income tax returns.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/05/2021 09:08 AM CST
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7. Decedents’ Estates: Taxation. A decedent’s unpaid Nebraska individual 

income taxes are easily ascertainable and not subject to dispute, and 

therefore qualify as a direct legal interest in the decedent’s estate.

8. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors. To reasonably ascertain a 

decedent’s creditors, a personal representative must make a reasonably 

diligent search, such as a reasonably prudent person would make in view 

of the circumstances and must extend to those places where information 

is likely to be obtained and to those persons who would be likely to have 

information regarding a decedent’s creditors.

9. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors: Time. Traditionally, 

Nebraska courts have classified the nonclaim statute as a personal representative’s affirmative defense to untimely creditor claims.

10. Evidence: Proof. Unless an exception applies, the burden of proof in 

civil cases requires only the greater weight of the evidence.

11. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors: Claims: Evidence: Proof.

If a personal representative disallows a non-notified creditor’s claim, the 

burden of proof is upon the personal representative to prove by the 

greater weight of the evidence that it conducted a reasonably diligent 

search to ascertain a decedent’s creditors.

Appeal from the County Court for Sarpy County: Todd J. 

Hutton, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James D. Smith 

for appellant.

Wayne E. Janssen for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The personal representative of a decedent’s estate dis

allowed a claim filed by the Nebraska Department of Revenue 

(Department) for unpaid lifetime Nebraska income taxes, 

because the Department did not file it within 2 months after 

published notice. 1 However, the personal representative never 

mailed the Department a copy of the published notice. The 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2485(a)(1) (Reissue 2016) (nonclaim statute).
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parties disagree whether the Department qualified as a known 

creditor, to whom the personal representative was required 

to mail notice. 2 Because it appears the county court failed to 

impose the burden of proof regarding diligent investigation and 

inquiry on the personal representative, we reverse the court’s 

order disallowing the claim and remand the cause for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. BACKGROUND

Janette H. Loder (the Decedent) died intestate on September 

1, 2014. Miranda Loder, acting as personal representative of 

the Decedent’s estate, published a notice to creditors in a local 

newspaper for 3 consecutive weeks and mailed copies of the 

notice to 36 creditors, warning them that the creditors’ claims 

filing deadline was November 24, 2014. But the Department 

was not one of the creditors to whom notice was mailed.

During the administration of the estate, Miranda and William 

Loder, the Decedent’s ex-husband, personally investigated the 

Decedent’s affairs to determine her creditors. They reviewed 

her financial records and various documents in her home, 

and talked with friends and acquaintances while compiling 

the creditors list. Miranda testified that she did not know 

that the Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s estate, 

because she and William did not find any records indicating 

that the Decedent had unpaid taxes, such as a notice from the 

Department. However, William admitted that they did not specifically search for the Decedent’s tax history, because “[they] 

had no reason to.”

According to Miranda’s testimony, the Decedent said she 

received alimony from William that was directly deposited 

into her bank account by the State of Pennsylvania. Miranda 

admitted that she had not inquired whether Pennsylvania paid 

taxes on the money the Decedent received as income. And she 

agreed that “any time you have income . . . taxes are owed.”

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 2016).
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In December 2016, the Department notified Miranda that 

the Decedent had not filed her individual income taxes for 

the 3 years preceding her death. In March 2017, Miranda 

filed the Decedent’s individual income tax returns for the tax 

years 2011, 2012, and 2013. Those returns showed income 

taxes due, none of which were paid by the Decedent’s estate. 

In August 2017, the Department filed a claim for $21,331.23, 

representing income tax, penalties, and interest due for the 

unpaid tax years. Miranda did not dispute the Department’s 

tax calculation, but she disallowed the claim, arguing it 

was untimely.

Within 60 days of disallowance, the Department filed a 

petition with the county court for allowance of the claim. The 

Department argued that because it did not receive notice in compliance with both § 25-520.01 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2483 

(Cum. Supp. 2018), it retained the right to file a claim within 3 

years of the Decedent’s death under § 30-2485(a)(2).

The court denied the Department’s petition and sustained 

Miranda’s disallowance, finding that the Department’s claim 

was time barred because it received adequate notice of the 

Decedent’s death under § 30-2483(a). The court stated that 

Miranda “afforded known creditors, by publication and mailing, and unknown creditors by publication, notice of their 

deadline to present claims.” The court found that “neither 

party was aware the [D]ecedent had neglected to file until 

after [Miranda] filed returns in 2017.” The court reasoned 

that “[b]ecause publication is reasonably calculated to provide 

notice to all claimants of the . . . deadline for presentation 

of claims,” the Department’s claim was untimely. The court 

did not state any factual finding regarding the adequacy of 

Miranda’s investigation and inquiry to identify reasonably 

ascertainable creditors.

The Department filed a timely appeal. We granted the 

Department’s petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals. 3

3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Department assigns that the county court erred by denying its petition and sustaining Miranda’s disallowance of its 

claim against the Decedent’s estate.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In the absence of an equity question, an appellate 

court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing on the record made in the county court. When reviewing 

a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 

whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by 

competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor 

unreasonable. 4

[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we 

resolve independently of the trial court. 5

V. ANALYSIS

1. Alternative Arguments

The Department presents three alternative arguments. First, 

the Department argues that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2768 (Reissue 

2018) controls over the Nebraska Probate Code for the 

Department’s filing of a creditor claim when the claim involves 

income taxes. Alternatively, the Department claims that its 

regulations, found in 316 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 36, § 015.02 

(2013), govern the Department’s deadline to file its claim 

against an estate for income taxes instead of § 30-2485(a)(1), 

which the county court concluded governed. If neither of 

these arguments is successful, the Department finally argues 

that because it did not receive a written copy of the published 

notice in accordance with § 25-520.01, it retained the right to 

file a claim within 3 years after the Decedent’s death under 

§ 30-2485(a)(2). We find no merit to the Department’s first two 

alternatives and turn our attention to its final argument.

4 In re Estate of Adelung, 306 Neb. 646, 947 N.W.2d 269 (2020).

5 In re Interest of Nedhal A., 289 Neb. 711, 856 N.W.2d 565 (2014).
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[3] Nebraska’s nonclaim statute limits the time in which 

claims may be presented against an estate and specifically 

explains what is to be done when a creditor is not provided 

proper notice. 6 Under § 30-2485(a), if the personal representative complies with the notice provisions of §§ 25-520.01 and 

30-2483, a claim generally must be presented within 2 months 

after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors. 7

However, if the personal representative fails to provide compliant notice, then a claimant may present its claim within 3 years 

after the decedent’s death. 8

The nonclaim statute requires that a creditor receive notice 

under both §§ 25-520.01 and 30-2483 to ensure creditors 

know of the decedent’s death and are afforded the opportunity to collect from the decedent’s estate, while also allowing 

the personal representative to expedite the distribution of the 

estate. 9 It is undisputed that Miranda satisfied the publication 

requirement of § 30-2483(a) and that the notice requirement 

of § 30-2483(b) 10 does not apply to the case before us. The 

parties disagree on whether Miranda was required to mail the 

Department notice under § 25-520.01, with which compliance 

is also required by § 30-2483(a).

2. Notice Requirements 

Under § 25-520.01

Section 25-520.01 was not originally included in Nebraska’s 

nonclaim statute. Historically, before adoption of the Uniform 

Probate Code (UPC), the nonclaim statute 11 required only 

6 See In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 606 N.W.2d 750 (2000).

7 See Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).

8 Id.

9 See, Francisco v. Gonzalez, 301 Neb. 1045, 921 N.W.2d 350 (2019); In re 

Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983).

10 See § 30-2483(b) (notice to Department of Health and Human Services 

regarding certain decedents who resided in specified medical institutions).

11 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-609 (Reissue 1964) (barring claims not presented 

within time established).
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notice by publication pursuant to the statutes governing notice 

to creditors. 12 The county judge would publish a notice in a 

local newspaper requiring creditors to bring their claims within 

a specified time. 13 However, creditors could request an extension from the court to submit their untimely claim for “good 

cause.” 14 Commonly, a creditor could show good cause by 

proving it did not have notice of a decedent’s death, because 

the creditor lived in a different county and did not receive the 

newspaper publication. 15

When Nebraska first adopted the UPC, § 30-2483 (Reissue 

1975) required publication of notice to creditors, as well as 

“mail[ing] the published notice and giv[ing] proof thereof 

in accordance with section 25-520.01.” But § 30-2485(a)(1) 

(Reissue 1975) adhered to the essence of the former law 

and provided a creditor who did not receive notice only an 

additional 60-day window to apply for additional time and 

show good cause for an extension of the deadline. At that 

time, § 30-2485(a)(2) allowed presentation of a claim “within 

three years after the decedent’s death, if notice to creditors 

has not been published.” (Emphasis supplied.) That language 

later changed.

After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Tulsa Professional 

Collection Services v. Pope 16 that reasonably ascertainable 

creditors must be provided actual notice of a decedent’s 

death, the Legislature amended § 30-2485 to condition the 

2-month bar date upon compliance with both § 25-520.01 

12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-601 to 30-604 (Reissue 1964) (publication of 

notice and establishment of time for claim presentation).

13 See id.

14 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-605 (Reissue 1964); In re Estate of Tucker, 128 

Neb. 387, 258 N.W. 645 (1935).

15 See id.

16 Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 

1340, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988).
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and § 30-2483. 17 We have observed that notice by publication, while constitutionally permitted in some circumstances, 

is a poor bet to provide actual notice to a party of an action 

that affects his or her rights. 18 Recognizing the Court’s decision that due process requires actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, the Legislature incorporated 

§ 25-520.01 into the nonclaim statute, supplementing the 

notice statute’s mailing requirement. 19

And the Legislature did so in both subsections (1) and (2) 

of § 30-2485(a). Now, § 30-2485(a)(2) (Reissue 2016) specifies that a claim will be barred if it is not presented “[w]ithin 

three years after the decedent’s death if notice to creditors has 

not been given in compliance with sections 25-520.01 and 

30-2483.” (Emphasis supplied.)

[4] Under § 25-520.01, the personal representative must 

now mail “every party appearing to have a direct legal interest 

in [the administration of a decedent’s estate] whose name and 

post office address are known to [the personal representative]” 

a copy of the published notice. 20 The personal representative 

or his or her attorney must also state by affidavit that “after 

diligent investigation and inquiry,” both were unable to ascertain the address of any other party appearing to have a direct 

legal interest in the proceeding. 21 Therefore, there are two 

requirements that must be satisfied to mandate that a personal 

representative mail a creditor notice: (1) The creditor must 

have a direct legal interest in the decedent’s estate, and (2) the 

personal representative must have knowledge of the creditor’s 

claim. 22 Each requirement will be addressed in turn.

17 See, id.; 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 95. See, also, Mullane v. Central Hanover 

Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).

18 See Francisco, supra note 9.

19 See 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 95.

20 See, § 30-2485(a)(2) (incorporating § 25-520.01); Francisco, supra note 9.

21 See § 25-520.01.

22 Id.
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(a) Direct Legal Interest

[5] The Department must have a direct legal interest 

in a decedent’s estate in order to satisfy § 25-520.01. The 

Legislature has not defined the term “direct legal interest” for 

purposes of § 25-520.01, but we have inferred from the language employed by the Legislature that the reference was to 

property of the estate and property in which the law recognized 

that the claimant had an existing interest. 23 A claim that is 

“easily ascertainable and not subject to dispute” qualifies as a 

direct legal interest in a decedent’s estate. 24 In contrast, a claim 

featuring potential liability of a decedent, without establishment of liability and amount of damage, does not constitute a 

direct legal interest. 25

[6,7] The Department possesses a direct legal interest in all 

unpaid individual income taxes. Nebraska individual income 

taxes are due, without demand, on the date fixed for filing 

individual income tax returns. 26 Failure to pay taxes results in 

the Department’s having a claim for unpaid taxes against the 

person, which the Department may collect through the seizure 

and sale of a person’s property. 27 A decedent’s unpaid Nebraska 

individual income taxes are easily ascertainable and not subject 

to dispute, and therefore qualify as a direct legal interest in the 

decedent’s estate. 28

The Department may not have a direct legal interest in 

every estate, but it does here. Prior to the Decedent’s death, 

she owed individual income taxes for the tax years 2011, 2012, 

23 See Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 

537 (1963).

24 See In re Estate of Karmazin, 299 Neb. 315, 322, 908 N.W.2d 381, 387 

(2018).

25 Mach, supra note 7.

26 § 77-2768.

27 See 316 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 36, § 009.01 (2014).

28 Compare In re Estate of Karmazin, supra note 24, with Sidner, supra 

note 23.
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and 2013. After she died and Miranda was appointed personal 

representative, the Department was entitled to present its claim 

for the Decedent’s Nebraska individual income taxes as a claim 

against the Decedent’s estate. 29 Death did not extinguish her 

tax obligations, and the Department had full authority to collect 

from the Decedent’s estate. 30 Therefore, the Decedent’s failure 

to pay her overdue taxes generated a direct legal interest for 

the Department.

(b) Known to Personal 

Representative

[8] Moving to the second requirement, Miranda must have 

“known” the Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s 

estate for § 25-520.01 to require that Miranda mail the 

Department notice. But a personal representative is not 

allowed to rely on ignorance; the Pope Court’s decision 

requires actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable 

creditors. 31 The statutory text requires a party to learn what 

he or she could discover through diligent investigation and 

inquiry. 32 Legislative history confirms our understanding of 

the plain text: a personal representative knows of a creditor 

if the creditor is known or can reasonably be ascertainable. 33

To reasonably ascertain a decedent’s creditors, a personal 

representative must make a reasonably diligent search, such 

as a reasonably prudent person would make in view of the 

circumstances and must extend to those places where information is likely to be obtained and to those persons who 

would be likely to have information regarding a decedent’s 

29 See 316 Neb. Admin. Code, supra note 27, § 015.02 (2013).

30 See id.

31 See Pope, supra note 16.

32 See § 25-520.01.

33 See Statement of Legislative Bill, L.B. 589, Judiciary Committee, 68th 

Leg. (Apr. 25, 1957). See, also, Pope, supra note 16.
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creditors. 34 If a personal representative fails to perform a reasonably diligent search to ascertain creditors, it cannot avoid 

the requirement of § 25-520.01 to mail notice to those who are 

reasonably ascertainable.

The county court did not make an express determination as 

to whether Miranda performed a reasonably diligent search. 

And our previous decisions have not articulated who bears the 

burden of proving that a reasonably diligent search was or was 

not made.

[9] Traditionally, Nebraska courts have classified the nonclaim statute as a personal representative’s affirmative defense 

to untimely creditor claims. 35 Nebraska law consistently places 

the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the person utilizing the defense. 36 However, no Nebraska court has addressed 

whether the nonclaim statute remains an affirmative defense 

after the Legislature incorporated § 25-520.01 into the nonclaim statute.

Because Nebraska adopted its current statutory structure 

from the UPC, we look for guidance to the UPC and the states 

that have adopted it. 37 But since Nebraska’s adoption of the 

UPC, the UPC has been amended, causing the Nebraska nonclaim statute to become nonconforming. 38 Additionally, the 

UPC does not propose a knowledge requirement as seen in 

§ 25-520.01, because the UPC does not mandate that notice 

34 See, Francisco, supra note 9; In re Interest of A.W., 224 Neb. 764, 401 

N.W.2d 477 (1987); Committee Statement, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 

92d Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary 

Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991); 

Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72 

(Jan. 28, 1991).

35 See, In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989); In 

re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707, 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945).

36 See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 195 Neb. 215, 237 N.W.2d 414 (1976).

37 See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d 

Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974).

38 See, Unif. Probate Code § 3-801, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 261 (2013); Unif. 

Probate Code § 3-803, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 271 (2013).
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be mailed to known creditors. 39 Uncertain about “the possible 

applicability [of Pope] to [its nonclaim statute],” 40 the UPC 

editors updated the UPC to make mailing notice to creditors 

optional, stating: “A personal representative may give written notice by mail or other delivery to a creditor . . . .” 41

Consequently, the UPC’s language provides little guidance on 

this matter, because it does not mandate a personal representative to perform a reasonably diligent search to ascertain creditors and mail notice to known creditors. These requirements 

are imposed by Nebraska’s nonclaim statute. 42

Looking to other UPC states, the UPC’s uncertainty on Pope 

has led to significant variation in states’ nonclaim statutes and 

who carries the burden of proving compliance. 43 Some states 

have incorporated Pope into their nonclaim statutes and require 

personal representatives to conduct a reasonably diligent search 

to ascertain the decedent’s creditors, but other states have mirrored the UPC’s optional approach. 44

UPC states incorporating Pope into their nonclaim statutes have classified the nonclaim statute as an affirmative 

defense that a personal representative has the burden of proving. 45 Because, as a non-UPC state explains, “the operation 

of the nonclaims provisions result[s] in the forfeiture of what 

39 See id.

40 Unif. Probate Code, supra note 38, § 3-803, comment, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 

at 272. See Pope, supra note 16.

41 Unif. Probate Code, supra note 38, § 3-801, 8 (part II) U.L.A. at 261.

42 Compare § 25-520.01 and § 30-2485, with Unif. Probate Code, supra note 

38, §§ 3-801 and 3-803.

43 Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.2121(3)(a) (West 2017 & Cum. Supp. 

2020) and Jones v. Golden, 176 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 2015), with N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 45-3-801 (2019) and Corlett v. Smith, 106 N.M. 207, 740 P.2d 1191 

(N.M. App. 1987).

44 Compare § 733.2121(3)(a) and Jones, supra note 43, with § 45-3-801 and 

Corlett, supra note 43.

45 See, Jones, supra note 43; Morgenthau v. Estate of Andzel, 26 So. 3d 628 

(Fla. App. 2009), disapproved on other grounds, Jones, supra note 43.
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might otherwise be meritorious claims, the burden of pleading 

and proof regarding compliance with the provisions properly 

rests on one claiming the benefit of those provisions.” 46 In 

fact, some UPC states that do not have a knowledge requirement nonetheless apply this policy principle and classify the 

nonclaim statute as an affirmative defense, citing “the general 

rule in civil cases that one who pleads an affirmative defense 

has the burden of proving it.” 47

[10,11] We see no reason not to continue to classify the nonclaim statute as an affirmative defense and follow other UPC 

states in that regard. Unless an exception applies, the burden 

of proof in civil cases requires only the greater weight of the 

evidence. 48 We therefore hold that if a personal representative 

disallows a non-notified creditor’s claim, the burden of proof is 

upon the personal representative to prove by the greater weight 

of the evidence that it conducted a reasonably diligent search 

to ascertain a decedent’s creditors. 49

3. Resolution

Because Miranda relied upon the affirmative defense of the 

nonclaim statute, she had the burden of proving that she conducted a reasonably diligent search to ascertain whether the 

Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s estate. We have 

already noted that Nebraska individual income taxes are due 

every year, without demand, by any individual who generates 

income over a specified threshold. 50

The language of the county court’s order suggests that it 

did not address the question whether Miranda conducted a 

46 See Matter of Estate of Pope, 733 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1987), reversed 

sub nom. Pope, supra note 16 (overturned on other grounds).

47 Hitt v. J. B. Coghill, Inc., 641 P.2d 211, 213 (Alaska 1982).

48 Burgardt v. Burgardt, 304 Neb. 356, 934 N.W.2d 488 (2019).

49 See, generally, § 733.2121(3)(a); Jones, supra note 43; Morgenthau, supra 

note 45; Hitt, supra note 47.

50 See § 77-2768.
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reasonably diligent search regarding the potential claim against 

the Decedent for unpaid lifetime individual income taxes. 

Rather, the court seems to have focused only on Miranda’s and 

the Department’s actual knowledge. This may have been driven 

by the court’s articulation regarding the publication requirement for unknown creditors. Thus, the court’s language does 

not demonstrate that it examined whether Miranda established 

that the Department’s potential claim was not ascertainable by 

reasonably diligent inquiry. In this sense, the court’s decision 

did not conform to the law.

But the question thus posed turns upon the court’s view of 

the facts. As William testified, he and Miranda did not search 

for tax records. Miranda seemed to have some knowledge of 

the Decedent’s alimony income. And Miranda acknowledged 

that when one has income, taxes are owed. Whether the extent 

of the inquiry was reasonable may turn on issues of credibility 

and heavily depends upon the fact finder’s view of the evidence. Because our standard of review gives considerable deference to the county court’s factual findings, that court should 

assess in the first instance the facts underlying the sufficiency 

of Miranda’s search.

VI. CONCLUSION

We therefore reverse the disallowance of the Department’s 

claim and remand the cause to the county court for reconsideration of the existing record to determine whether Miranda 

met her burden of proving that she conducted a reasonably 

diligent search and that the Department’s status as a creditor 

was not reasonably ascertainable. If upon remand the court 

concludes that Miranda did so, the court should disallow the 

Department’s claim. On the other hand, Miranda did not dispute the amount of taxes owed or that she did not mail notice 

of the proceeding to the Department. If the court concludes that 

Miranda did not satisfy her burden of proof, the court should 

allow the claim in full.

Reversed and remanded.