alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph E. Sobeck,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-18-00030-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP - New York, NY

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 1/10/2018, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: January 12, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9684 Filed 01/16/18 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9684 Filed 01/16/18 Page 2 of 2
No. 87-1303.

#### Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. *v.*County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia; and East Kentucky Energy Corp. et al. *v.*County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia.

No. 87-1310.

Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.
#### Caldwell McAfee's Exr. *v.*William McKinney et al.

Judicial Sales — Purchase by One for the Benefit of" Another — Reimbursement— Right of Creditors.

Where land is sold at a judicial sale and purchased for the benefit of the execution debtor, he has no right to hold it against his creditors, after the purchaser has been reimbursed for money advanced on account of the purchase.

APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT.

February 9, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson:

While it may be literally true, as stated, in the answer, that, *427when Vanarsdale, for himself and Kinnell, bought the land, there was no agreement to hold it for McKinney’s benefit, there can be but little doubt that there was some such implied understanding; and both Vanarsdale and Kinnell admit that, shortly afterwards, there was such agreement. As a consequence of that trust, McKinney has continued ever since to occupy and use the land and has made advancements for reimbursing the price paid by them. And these advances, by whomsoever made, should be charged to both Vanarsdale and Kinnell as jointly interested.

*C. A. Hardin, for appellant.*

*Thompson, for appellee.*

Now, as Vanarsdale and Kinnell consent to a sale of the land for the benefit of McKinney’s creditors after reimbursing the amount paid by them, there can be no legal or equitable objection to such a decree. McKinney, under these circumstances, has no right to hold the land free from the claims of his creditors.

It seems to us, therefore, that the circuit court ought to have decreed the sale of the land as sought by the appellant and assented to by the only persons who could have a semblance of right to object to it. And that,, as preparatory to the disposition of the proceeds, the master ought to have been required to ascertain and report how much has been, in any way, advanced by McKinney towards a redemption from the sale to Vanarsdale and Kinnell.

And consequently the dismission of the appellant’s petition was erroneous.

In estimating the amount yet due, if any, to Vanarsdale and Kinnell they should be credited with legal interest, but no rent for the land.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for such proceedings and decree as hereinbefore indicated, and with instructions to require the master, if desired by the appellant, to examine on oath Vanarsdale, McKinney and Kinnell, or, if this cannot be conveniently done, to retake their depositions on full interrogatories so far as they or any of them may fail to appear before him. And also to take any other proof that the parties or either of them may offer, and make a full report of all the facts.
Certification of Pasquale Pistorio





Exhibit 10.1 
 
CERTIFICATION OF
PASQUALE PISTORIO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF STMICROELECTRONICS N.V. AND MAURIZIO GHIRGA, GROUP VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF STMICROELECTRONICS N.V., PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
 
In
connection with the Annual Report of STMicroelectronics N.V. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
undersigned hereby certify that to the best of our knowledge: 
 
1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 
 
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. 
 

	 Date: March 14, 2003
	 	 	  	 /s/ PASQUALE PISTORIO


	 	 	 Name:
	  	 Pasquale Pistorio

	 	 	 Title:
	  	 President and Chief Executive Officer

	
	 Date: March 14, 2003
	 	 	  	 /s/ MAURIZIO GHIRGA


	 	 	 Name:
	  	 Maurizio Ghirga

	 	 	 Title:
	  	 Group Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 7540** 

DEVIN JAMAAL KERSHAW , P etitioner

- Appellant ,

v. ANTHONY J. PADULA, Warden of Lee C.I. , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Orangeburg

. Margaret B. Seymour , Chief District Judge. ( 5 :1 1

- cv - 00 306

- MBS )

Submitted : January 22, 2013 Decided: January 24, 2013

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Devin Jamaal Kershaw , Appellant Pro Se. Brendan McDonald, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Devin Jamaal Kershaw seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S . 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional rig ht. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Kershaw has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Kershaw’s motion for appointment of counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the3 materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISM ISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>



       

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTE FROM
FERRELLGAS  FINANCE CORP. BALANCE SHEET ON JULY 31, 1996, AND
THE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS ENDING JULY 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATMENTS)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000922360
<NAME>                        FERRELLGAS FINANCE CORP.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 AUG-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUL-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         1,000
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,000
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<COMMON>                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,000
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (89)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (89)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (89)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0


<FN>
1.  For the Ferrellgas Partners Finance Corp. has no income statement items
other than totals as their only costs are G&A, and such costs are not required
in the Financial Data Schedule.
</FN>
        


        

</TABLE>
FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 3/19/2015 11:12:14 AM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"NASA","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov","author_name":"Michele Ostovar","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/author\/michele-e-ostovarnasa-gov\/","title":"Contributions of the DC-8 to Earth System Science at NASA: A Workshop","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"6y2emiosnx\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/contributions-of-the-dc-8-to-earth-system-science-at-nasa-a-workshop\/\">Contributions of the DC-8 to Earth System Science at NASA: A Workshop<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/contributions-of-the-dc-8-to-earth-system-science-at-nasa-a-workshop\/embed\/#?secret=6y2emiosnx\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Contributions of the DC-8 to Earth System Science at NASA: A Workshop” — NASA\" data-secret=\"6y2emiosnx\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/EC00-0050-001\/EC00-0050-001~large.jpg?w=600&h=1530&fit=clip&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint","thumbnail_width":600,"thumbnail_height":1530}
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF IKON CAPITAL, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                            1,298,976,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      58,390,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              20,160,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           1,352,788,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                  1,027,900,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                 191,400,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             1,352,788,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           151,124,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            41,927,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          60,255,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             54,662,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                23,150,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         31,512,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                31,512,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald Redder,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-18-00284-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Blankenship Law Firm

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 1/26/2018, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: February 1, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9998 Filed 02/06/18 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9998 Filed 02/06/18 Page 2 of 2
#### John A. Blaydes et al *v.*William Glum & Sons

Appeal and Error — Objections to Insufficiency of Petition.

An objection to the insufficiency of a petition, in the failure to allege that the plaintiffs were the holders of the bills sued on, may be made on appeal.

Action — Petition Insufficient.

Where a petition fails to allege that the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the bill in litigation, this does not constitute a cause of action.

APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT.

June 11, 1870.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:

It is not alleged in the petition that the plaintiffs were the owners or holders of the bill, or in any manner interested in recovering a judgment thereon. The petition does not, therefore, state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and this objection was not waived by the failure of the defendants to demur or answer in the court below, but as has been repeatedly held, the objection is available by appeal to this court. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

*707*Turner &*Cornelison, *for appellant.*

*O. S.*Tenney, *for appellee.*

As to the motion to discharge the supersedeas, the bond being deemed insufficient, and the appellants not offering to give another with sufficient surety, the supersedeas will be discharged.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, the plaintiffs being allowed to amend their petition. And the supersedeas is discharged.
Order entered March 1 3 , 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 19 - 01040 - CR No. 05 - 19 - 01041 - CR No. 05 - 19 - 01042 - C R JOE ANGEL RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXA S, Appellee On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s. F 18 - 17189 - R , F18 - 76663 - R , F18 - 17190 - R ORDER Before th e Court are appellant’s March 6, 2020 motion s for extension of time to file his brief in these a ppeals and to supplement the records

. In the latter, appellant asks that we order supplemental clerk’s record s for each of these cases to include a bill of cost

. Our review shows that bills of cost are in the October 24, 2019 clerk’s record s for each of t he above appeals (pp. 75

- 76, pp. 64

- 65, pp. 83

- 84 ,respectively ) . Therefore, we DENY appellant’s mot ion to supplement the record s

as moot . We GRANT the motion for extension and ORDER the brief received by the Court on March 6, 2020 , filed as of the date o f this order

. /s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE