SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4706-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FORREST THOMAS, a/k/a 

MALIK FOREST, THOMAS 

FORREST, FORREST MALIK,

FOREST THOMAS, and

TYRONE THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted April 2, 2019 – Decided May 17, 2019

Before Judges Yannotti and Natali.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 10-07-1771.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4706-17T1

Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on May 21, 

2018, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm. 

I. 

On July 23, 2010, an Essex County grand jury returned an indictment 

charging defendant with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2); and 

second-degree disturbing human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1). The alleged 

victim was Carol Spratt. 

Defendant was tried before a jury and, at the trial, evidence was presented 

which showed that in 2005, Spratt and her daughter Susan Rivas moved to an 

apartment at New Community Gardens on Morris Avenue in Newark.

Defendant, who was Rivas's boyfriend, moved into the apartment with Spratt 

and Rivas. Rivas died shortly thereafter, but defendant continued to reside in 

the apartment with Spratt.

Spratt suffered from emphysema and required an oxygen tank at all times. 

She also used a wheelchair and rarely left the apartment. Spratt claimed that at 

times defendant stole her rent money and food stamps, and also engaged in 
3

A-4706-17T1

abusive behavior. In January 2010, Spratt had defendant permanently banned 

from the building. Despite the ban, defendant returned a few days later. He was 

escorted out of the building and the building's manager told him he could return 

that day to collect his belongings. 

The State alleged that defendant returned to the apartment and killed 

Spratt. According to the medical examiner, the perpetrator grabbed Spratt by 

the wrists and compressed her neck with a significant, sustained force. That

force prevented Spratt from breathing, and stopped the flow of blood from her 

heart to her head. 

Defendant kept Spratt's dead body in the apartment for the next several 

days. On January 14, 2010, defendant called the aide who had provided care to 

Spratt, and told her that Spratt had fallen, broken her ribs, and was in the 

hospital. The aide went to the apartment the next day. Defendant exited the 

apartment, closed the door quickly behind him, and told the aide that Spratt was 

"okay."

Defendant disposed of Spratt's body several days later. He placed the 

body in two garbage bags, put the bags in a shopping cart, and covered the bags

with clothes and other items. At around 3:00 a.m. on January 18, 2010, 

defendant exited the building pushing the shopping cart. On his way out, 
4

A-4706-17T1

defendant told the security guard he had collected his possessions and would not 

be around anymore. 

Defendant discarded the body near a dumpster behind a building on South 

Orange Avenue, and two scrap collectors discovered the body. The following 

day, the building's superintendent saw a note on Spratt's door, which stated that 

she should not be disturbed because she was tired and sleeping. Later that day, 

defendant approached Spratt's neighbor and offered to sell him items from the 

apartment. Defendant said Spratt had fallen, was in the hospital, and was 

planning to move to Florida.

On January 20, 2010, investigators from the Essex County Prosecutor's 

Office went to Spratt's building and spoke with the manager, who identified 

Spratt from an autopsy photo. The investigators were proceeding to Spratt's 

apartment, when they encountered defendant. He told them he was going to visit 

Spratt at the hospital. He agreed to be interviewed.

At the police station, defendant was advised of his rights and provided a 

statement. He claimed that he returned to the apartment on January 13 or 14, 

2010, and found that Spratt had fallen. He claimed her oxygen cord was wound 

around her neck and she was gasping for air. 
5

A-4706-17T1

Defendant said he picked Spratt up, unwrapped the cord, and put her in 

bed. Spratt allegedly stated that she was all right. Several hours later, defendant 

found Spratt dead. He admitted that three days later, he placed Spratt's body in 

two garbage bags, put the body in a shopping cart, and left her near the dumpster 

where the body was found. 

When the detectives left the interview room, defendant removed Spratt's 

ATM and credit cards from his wallet and attempted to hide them behind the 

molding in the interview room. Defendant's actions were recorded by the 

surveillance system. 

The jury found defendant guilty of murder and disturbing human remains. 

The trial court thereafter sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for murder, 

with sixty three and three-quarter years of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the 

No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court also sentenced defendant 

to a concurrent ten-year term for disturbing human remains. Defendant appealed

from the judgment of conviction and argued:

POINT I

DAMAGING HEARSAY STATEMENTS BY THE 

DECEDENT WERE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 

INTO EVIDENCE OVER OBJECTION. WHILE THE 

DECEDENT'S STATEMENTS INDICATING 

SOLELY HER STATE OF MIND – I.E., HER INTENT 

TO HAVE [DEFENDANT] EVICTED – MAY HAVE 

BEEN ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE "STATE OF 
6

A-4706-17T1

MIND" HEARSAY EXCEPTION BECAUSE THEY 

PROVIDED A MOTIVE TO KILL, HER 

STATEMENTS DETAILING PRIOR BAD ACTS BY 

DEFENDANT WERE PLAINLY SIMPLY 

INADMISSABLE HEARSAY WHICH CLEARLY 

TAINTED THE JURY'S DELIBERATIONS ON 

GUILT.

POINT II

UNDER BOTH THE CONFRONTATION 

GUARANTEES OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (AS 

APPLIED TO THE STATES THROUGH THE DUE 

PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENT) AND THE STATE 

CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS UNDER OUR OWN 

STATE EVIDENCE RULES, THE ADMISSION IN 

THIS CASE, OF ONE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S 

FINDINGS THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF 

ANOTHER MEDICAL EXAMINER WAS THE 

MOST BASIC OF VIOLATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 

RIGHTS. (Not Raised Below)[.]

POINT III

WHEN THE JURORS REPORTED A DEADLOCK 

ON THE MURDER COUNT, THE JUDGE WAS 

OBLIGATED TO GIVE THE STATE v. CZACHOR[, 

82 N.J. 392, 1980)] DEADLOCK INSTRUCTION TO 

THEM. (Not Raised Below).

[State v. Thomas, No. A-2706-12 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 

2015) (slip op. at 2) (footnote omitted).]

We rejected these arguments and affirmed defendant's convictions. Ibid. The 

Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Thomas, 

223 N.J. 558 (2015). 
7

A-4706-17T1

In January 2016, defendant filed a petition for PCR. Defendant was 

assigned counsel who argued that: (1) PCR claims must be thoroughly 

investigated by counsel; (2) the court has authority to order discovery on a 

showing of good cause; (3) defendant was denied due process because he "was 

improperly excluded from . . . trial court proceedings"; (4) defendant was denied 

the "right to testify on his own behalf"; (5) defendant was denied a fair trial due 

to prosecutorial misconduct; (6) defendant was denied the right of confrontation 

by the admission of the medical examiner's findings through the testimony of 

another medical examiner; (7) the trial judge improperly handled the jury's 

questions and the response to the jury's reported deadlock; (8) defendant "was 

denied the effective assistance of trial counsel"; (9) defendant was denied a fair 

trial due to the cumulative effect of the errors complained of; (10) defendant

"was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel"; (11) an evidentiary 

hearing is required on his PCR petition; and (12) the claims in the petition are

not subject to any procedural bar. 

On May 21, 2018, the PCR court filed an order denying relief. In an

accompanying opinion, the court stated that claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 were 

barred by Rules 3:22-4 and 3:22-5 because they were raised or should have been 

raised on defendant's direct appeal and the exceptions in Rule 3:22-4 did not 
8

A-4706-17T1

apply. The court also found no merit in defendant's other claims, and determined 

that defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. This 

appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant's attorney argues: 

POINT I

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A COMPLETE 

DEFENSE AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE TRIAL 

COUNSEL, WHO FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE 

CASE ADEQUATELY.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A 

PROCEDURAL BAR TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION 

FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.

POINT III

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE 

HE HAD OFF THE RECORD COMMUNICATIONS 

WITH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE 

PROSECUTOR WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT AND 

HE FAILED TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT 

ABOUT THE NATURE OF THOSE 

COMMUNICATIONS.

POINT IV

THE DEFENDANT WAS COERCED INTO 

FORGOING HIS TESTIMONY DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.

POINT V

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING 

TO OBJECT TO EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT BY 

THE PROSECUTOR, AND APPELLATE COUNSEL 

WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO RAISE 
9

A-4706-17T1

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AS PLAIN 

ERROR.

POINT VI

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BEAUSE HE 

IMPROPERLY WAIVED THE DEFENDANT'S 

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION, PERMITTING THE 

STATE TO PRODUCE RESULTS FROM THE 

AUTOPY WITHOUT PRODUCING THE WITNESS 

WHO PERFORMED THE AUTOPSY.

POINT VII

TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE BY CONSENTING TO AN 

ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION AND FAILING TO 

OBJECT TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE TRIAL 

COURT RESPONDED TO JURY QUESTIONS.

POINT VIII

THE CUMULATION OF ERRORS BY TRIAL

COUNSEL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL 

RESULTED IN A FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR 

PROCESS.

POINT IX

THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

POINT X

THE DFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DE NOVO 

REVIEW AND NO DEFERENCE SHOULD BE 

GIVEN TO THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION 

BELOW. (Not Raised Below).
10 A-4706-17T1

II.

Defendant argues that the PCR court erred by finding that he was 

procedurally barred under Rules 3:22-4 and 3:22-5 from raising claims he was 

denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

Before the PCR court defendant claimed that: (1) trial counsel failed to 

object to the court's handling of a jury question, and appellate counsel should 

have raised this issue on appeal; (2) trial counsel failed to object to the court's 

response to the jury's reported deadlock; (3) trial counsel improperly excluded 

him from certain proceedings; (4) trial counsel improperly denied defendant of 

his right to testify on his own behalf; (5) counsel failed to object at trial to 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) counsel erred by failing to object to 

the State proffering testimony about the autopsy from Dr. Roger Mitchell, rather 

than Dr. John Stash, who performed the autopsy. 

Defendant contends these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could 

not have been raised on direct appeal. However, we need not address defendant's 

argument because the record is sufficient to address the merits of these claims 

in this appeal. 
11 A-4706-17T1

III.

As noted, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 

trial and appellate counsel. We disagree. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the 

two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 

and later adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 

Under the test, a defendant first "must show that counsel's performance was 

deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Defendant must establish that counsel's 

performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and "that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687-88. 

Defendant also must establish "that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense." Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the matter. 

Id. at 694.
12 A-4706-17T1

A. Spratt's Medical Records 

Defendant argues that his trial attorney was deficient because he did not 

obtain Spratt's medical records. Defendant contends the medical records would 

have supported an argument that Spratt's death was the result of her extremely 

poor medical condition, advanced age, and a possible accident.

Defendant argues that the medical records were vital to his argument that 

the State failed to prove causation. He argues that the PCR court erred by 

finding that his attorney engaged in a reasonable strategy when he elected not to 

obtain the medical records. 

We need not consider whether counsel reasonably elected, as a matter of 

trial strategy, not to obtain Spratt's medical records. Assuming that counsel 

erred by failing to obtain these records, defendant did not establish that he was 

prejudiced by counsel's error. 

Spratt's medical records showed that she was suffering from chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease, and required an oxygen tank to assist her 

breathing. At trial, Mitchell testified that the autopsy showed Spratt's neck had 

been compressed with a significant, sustained force, which stopped the flow of 

blood between her heart and head and caused her death. Defendant has not 

shown that if Spratt's medical records had been introduced into evidence, they
13 A-4706-17T1

would have led the jury to conclude that Spratt died as the result of some other 

cause. 

On appeal, defendant argues that the jury should have been permitted to 

consider whether Spratt's medical conditions were an "alternative theory of 

causation." However, in support of his PCR petition, defendant did not present 

an affidavit or certification of a qualified medical professional, with an opinion 

that Spratt died due to her medical conditions, rather than a neck compression

resulting from the application of a significant, sustained force. 

B. Exclusion of Defendant from Trial Proceedings

Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 

purportedly participated in conferences held in the judge's chambers without 

defendant. Defendant has not, however, presented any evidence that such 

conferences took place or what may have occurred during these conferences. 

Moreover, defendant's right to be present at trial only extends to the "'critical 

stage[s]' of the trial" court proceedings. See State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 

134, 149 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Zenquis, 251 N.J. Super. 358, 363 

(App. Div. 1991), aff'd, 131 N.J. 84 (1993)). Defendant has not shown that the 

alleged conferences were critical stages of his trial proceedings. He also has not 
14 A-4706-17T1

shown that his failure to be present at any in-chambers conference interfered 

with his right to maintain a defense. 

C. Defendant's Decision Not to Testify at Trial 

Defendant argues that his trial attorney coerced him to decide against 

testifying at trial. The record does not support defendant's argument. At trial, 

the judge questioned defendant on the record concerning his decision not to 

testify:

THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, [your attorney] 

indicated to me you're electing not to testify in this case.

Correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you had ample opportunity to 

confer with [your attorney] regarding that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And based upon your conversations 

with him and your full and complete consultation with 

him, you've come to the decision not to testify. Is that 

correct.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.

. . . .

THE COURT: Nobody's forced or coerced or 

threatened you to do this; you're doing this of you own 

free will?
15 A-4706-17T1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You've been represented by [your 

attorney] throughout these proceedings. Are you 

satisfied with his representation in all respects?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

As the record shows, defendant never asserted his attorney had coerced 

him to decide against testifying. Defendant also told the judge that he was

satisfied with his attorney's representation "in all respects[.]" Thus, the record 

provides no support to defendant's claim that his attorney coerced him to decide 

not to testify. 

D. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant claims his trial attorney erred by failing to object to alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct. He also contends appellate counsel was deficient 

because counsel did not raise prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. 

Defendant asserts that after certain witnesses answered questions, the 

prosecutor stated "okay," thereby suggesting that the prosecutor affirmed or 

concurred in the testimony. Defense counsel objected and the judge cautioned 

the prosecutor. Defendant contends the prosecutor continued to makes these 

improper comments. 
16 A-4706-17T1

Defendant also asserts that at one point, the prosecutor picked up items 

from counsel's table and threw them in the air, purportedly out of "disdain and

disgust." In addition, defendant states that the trial judge referred at some point 

to the prosecutor as "incorrigible." It is not clear from the record what prompted 

the judge to make that comment. 

Defendant's attorney may have erred by failing to repeat his objections to 

the prosecutor's comments, and by failing to object when the prosecutor threw 

certain items in the air. However, defendant has not shown the result here 

probably would have been different if his attorney had raised these objections. 

Defendant also has not shown that his appeal would have been decided 

differently if appellate counsel had raised the alleged prosecutorial misconduct 

on appeal. 

E. Failure to Object to Testimony Regarding Autopsy

Defendant further argues that his trial attorney erred by failing to object 

to Mitchell's testimony about the autopsy report on the ground that Mitchell did 

not perform the autopsy. In defendant's direct appeal, we held that defendant 

had waived his Confrontation Clause objection to Dr. Mitchell's testimony 

because he did not raise the objection at trial. Thomas, slip op. at 30. 
17 A-4706-17T1

In our opinion, we noted that on cross-examination, defense counsel had 

"attempted to obtain helpful testimony" from Mitchell that Spratt may have 

choked on her oxygen tube. Ibid. We also pointed out that defense counsel 

attempted to show that because Mitchell did not perform the autopsy, his 

testimony might not be reliable. Ibid. Defendant's attorney made the same point 

in his summation. Ibid. 

We stated that, "Defendant made a clear choice to pursue a trial strategy 

of attempting to cast doubt on Mitchell's conclusions by focusing the jury's 

attention on the fact he did not perform the autopsy in this case." Id. at 30-31.

We held that under the circumstances, defendant could not claim that Mitchell's 

testimony deprived him of his right to confrontation, and counsel's failure to 

object was not an error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid.

(quoting State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 99 (2014)). 

For essentially the same reasons, we reject defendant's claim that he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object 

to Mitchell's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds. Defense counsel 

pursued a reasonable trial strategy of attempting to discredit Mitchell's 

testimony because he did not perform the autopsy. Moreover, it is reasonable 
18 A-4706-17T1

to assume that if counsel had objected to Mitchell's testimony, the State would 

have presented testimony from the doctor who performed the autopsy. 

F. Failure to Object to the Court's Handling of Jury Question

Defendant asserts his trial attorney was deficient because he consented to 

an erroneous response to a question that the jury sent to the court during 

deliberations. The jury asked whether the shopping cart introduced into 

evidence was "the same cart used to hold the body." After consulting with 

counsel, the judge told the jury that the answer to the question was "Yes." 

Another note from the jury followed, and it included additional questions 

regarding the shopping cart. 

Defense counsel then asserted that the judge should not have responded 

"Yes" to the previous question. The judge agreed and instructed the jury that 

his previous answer was not complete. The judge stated

The answer is "yes" but . . . I can't answer 

questions . . . you pose to me because they're factual 

questions.

. . . .

[Y]ou have to listen to each other . . . and reach a 

decision as to whether or not [the] evidence . . . or lack 

of evidence . . . is sufficient information for you to 

make a decision as to guilt or innocence, fairly and 

impartially. 
19 A-4706-17T1

On appeal, defendant argues that the judge's instruction was confusing and 

erroneous because the answer to the jury's initial question should not have been 

"Yes," and the additional instruction was contradictory. He contends that 

because the instruction would have a prejudicial impact on the jury's findings of 

fact, his trial attorney should have raised a timely and specific objection. 

Defendant also contends the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof 

to defendant to produce evidence of his innocence. 

Again, we disagree. It appears the judge may have erred by responding

to the jury's first question by stating, "Yes." It seems that the assistant 

prosecutor and the judge also assumed that the shopping cart in evidence was 

the same shopping cart used to move Spratt's body. In any event, defendant has 

not shown that counsel's error prejudiced the defense. As noted, the judge 

corrected the mistake by providing a timely instruction. 

Moreover, the amended instruction did not shift the burden of proof to 

defendant. Defendant contends the instruction was in conflict with the earlier 

instruction in which the judge told the jurors that the State had the burden of 

proof on all elements of the charged offenses. The judge's instruction did not 

relieve the State of its burden of proof, which was clearly described in the court's 

final instructions. 
20 A-4706-17T1

G. Failure to Object to Judge's Response to Jury's Alleged Deadlock

In defendant's direct appeal, he argued that the judge erred by failing to 

give the jury a Czachor charge after the jury allegedly reported that it was 

deadlocked. Thomas, slip op. at 32. We noted that defendant had not objected 

to the charge that the trial court provided. Ibid. 

We pointed out that in Czachor, the Court approved an instruction to be 

used when a jury reports it is deadlocked, which directs the jury to continue 

deliberating but reminds the jurors they have an obligation to hold onto honest 

convictions. Id. at 34-35 (citing Czachor, 82 N.J. at 405 n.4). We reviewed the 

trial record and noted that the judge did not view the note from the jury as 

reporting "a true deadlock." Id. at 35. We stated that "[t]he court and counsel 

reasonably determined the jury could not be truly deadlocked after deliberating 

for two non-consecutive hours after hearing days of testimony in a murder trial."

Id. at 35-36.

We held that there was "nothing coercive about the trial court's 

supplemental instructions" and the judge "did not violate the core holding of 

Czachor[.]" Id. at 36. We stated the charge was not meant to address a jury 

deadlock, "but was more along the lines of a reminder to the jury to cooperate 
21 A-4706-17T1

and continue deliberating." Ibid. (citing State v. Adim, 410 N.J. Super. 410, 425 

(App. Div. 2009)). We held that the court's instructions were proper. Ibid.

In this appeal, defendant asserts that his trial attorney erred by failing to 

object to the instructions. We disagree. The judge properly instructed the jury 

to continue its deliberations, and there was no basis for an objection. Defendant 

has not shown that counsel erred by failing to object or that he was prejudiced 

by the manner in which counsel handled the issue. 

We therefore conclude that defendant failed to establish that he was 

denied the effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. 

IV.

Defendant argues that even if the errors he cites did not individually 

constitute reversible error, in the aggregate, they denied him of his constitutional 

right to a fair trial or required an evidentiary hearing. Our Supreme Court has 

held that "even when an individual error or series of errors does not rise to 

reversible error, when considered in combination, their cumulative effect can 

cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal." State v. Jenewicz, 193 

N.J. 440, 473 (2008) (citing State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 540 (2001)). The 

cumulative error principle does not apply in this case. As we have explained, 

there were no series of errors that, when considered in combination, cast 
22 A-4706-17T1

sufficient doubt on the jury's verdict to require a new trial or an evidentiary 

hearing.

V.

Defendant argues that the PCR court erred by failing to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing on his PCR petition. Such a hearing is only required if 

defendant presents a prima facie case in support of the petition, the court has 

determined that there are material issues of fact that cannot be resolved based 

on the existing record, and an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the 

claims presented. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-

10(b)). Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for PCR, and 

the existing record was sufficient to resolve his claims, an evidentiary hearing 

was not required.

VI.

Defendant filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he argues: (1) trial 

and appellate counsel were ineffective "in failing to conduct an adequate pretrial 

investigation[,]" by "fail[ing] to consult" with him, and by failing to object to 

Mitchell's testimony; (2) the PCR court improperly "applied a procedural bar" 

to his petition; (3) he was coerced into electing not to testify; (4) prosecutorial 

misconduct deprived him of a fair trial; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in 
23 A-4706-17T1

waiving his confrontation rights and failing to call the medical examiner who 

performed the autopsy; (6) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 

the trial court's instructions; (7) the cumulative error principle requires reversal 

of his conviction; and (8) an evidentiary hearing is required. To the extent these 

arguments have not been addressed previously, they lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.