alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, John Carrozza, ChiefFinancial Officer of PSB Bancorp, Inc., certify that:

 

1.  I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PSB Bancorp, Inc.;

 

2.  Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.  Based on my knowledge,the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisreport, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

 

4.  The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I am responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e) and we have:

 

(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the caseof an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonable likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

 

5.  The registrant’sother certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent function):

 

1

----

 

(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 

Date:  May 16, 2005

 
|   | /s/John Carrozza               |
|--------|--------------------------------|
|   | John Carrozza                  |
|   |  Chief  Financial Officer |

 

2

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benny Lavern COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-11052.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided March 23, 2005.

Benny Lavern Collins, Amarillo, TX, pro se.

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Benny Lavern Collins, Texas prisoner # 1171866, has filed a motion for certificate of appealability (COA) seeking to appeal the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence following his federal convictions of a Hobbs Act robbery and of using a firearm while committing that robbery. To the extent that Collin’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenged errors that occurred at his sentencing his motion was properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See Ojo v. INS,*106 F.3d 680, 683 (5th Cir.1997). Collins argues that there is a question as to whether, in sentencing him, the district court had jurisdiction to im*629pose his federal sentence to run consecutively to his California sentence given that, at the time he was sentenced by the district court, Texas had lodged a detainer against him. Collins has failed to show “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Thus, COA is DENIED.

To the extent that Collins asserted a claim regarding the execution of his federal sentence, that claim should have been brought as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *See Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir.2000). Because at the time that Collins filed his June 2004 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion he was incarcerated in the Northern District of Texas, we construe Collins’s motion, to the extent that it challenges the execution of his sentence, as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. *See United States v. Tubwell,*37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir.1994); *see also United States v. Weathersby,*958 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir.1992). A prisoner proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is not required to obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. *See Jeffers v. Chandler,*253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir.2001).

Collins argues that, because his federal judgment stated that his federal sentence was to run consecutively to his California sentence, he is illegally or unconstitutionally currently incarcerated by the State of Texas. Collins’s claim regarding the execution of his sentence fails because whether he is incarcerated first for the Texas convictions or for his federal convictions is a matter of comity between the state and federal governments “and not a personal right of the prisoner.” *Cf. Floyd v. Henderson,*456 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). Consequently, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Collin’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to the extent that it challenged the execution of his sentence. *See United States v. McSween,*53 F.3d 684, 687 n. 3 (5th Cir.1995).

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Isaac and Peter Stephens *v.*W. S. Bishop assignee &c.

Gifts — Not Subject to Bankruptcy Proceedings.

A gift by a father to his “son and his heirs,” is held to enure to the use and benefit of them alone, and not subject to proceedings in bankruptcy to subject same to the debts of the son.

Same — Creditors.

As creditors have no right to prescribe the terms of a gift, a condition that property deeded to the debtor and his heirs, free from his debts, is held to be both moral and 'legally right.

Same — Answer—Demurrer.

An answer setting up such grounds of defense, is not snbjeet to demurrer.

APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT.

November 30, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson:

Whatever vendible interest, if any, held by the bankrupt in the land sued for in this case passed to the appellee as the appellant’s assignee in bankruptcy. And the circuit court had equitable jurisdiction to adjust the title, require a surrender of possession, and sell the bankrupt’s interest under the deed of trust by his father to his brother. Had he himself owned the legal title and conveyed it in trust or had he bought it and had it conveyed in like manner as the owner and donor did, his creditors, might have subjected his beneficial interest which could not, by any provision in the deed, have been availably exempted from their demands.

But his father, as owner of the land gave it to him and his children, and had a right, both moral and legal, to secure it to their use as a home against the claims of creditors who have no right to object to or prescribe-the terms of the gift and have not been injured by them as fixed by the donor as fundamental conditions of his bounty.

The spirit and context of the conveyance show that the word “heirs” was intended to mean children, and that the donor’s *352purpose was to secure a home for the appellant and his children. And, to that end, he expressly provides, as he had a right to do, that creditors should never touch it, and conveyed the title for the joint use of father and children as a home for the family.

Rodman, *for appellant.*

*White &*Bishop, *for appellee.*

The answer, relying’ on these grounds, presents and effectual bar to the asserted equity of the appellee for the benefit of creditors to sell any inseparable interest in the land and thereby frustrate the benevolent object of the donor who rightfully chose the terms and conditions of his gratuity.

The circuit court therefore erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer and decreeing a sale of the land.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4749 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4749

  To approve a governing international fishery agreement between the 
               United States and the Republic of Estonia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 8, 1998

   Mr. Saxton (by request) introduced the following bill; which was 
                 referred to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To approve a governing international fishery agreement between the 
               United States and the Republic of Estonia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENT WITH ESTONIA.

    Notwithstanding section 203 of the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1823), the governing 
international fishery agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Estonia, as 
contained in the message to Congress from the President of the United 
States dated October 5, 1998, is approved as a governing international 
fishery agreement for the purposes of such Act and shall enter into 
force and effect with respect to the United States on the date of 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report of The Newark Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form10-Q for the quarter ended July 31, 2007 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert H. Mullen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934;and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financialcondition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented. 

Dated:September 12, 2007 

 

This certification has been furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure statement. 

A signed original of this written statement required bySection 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Carlton *v.*Litton.

In error.

*Monday, May*25.

EVIDENCE not relevant to the issue is inadmissible.

The contents of an instrument of writing cannot be proved by oral testimony, unless the absence of the instrument be first accounted for (1).

If a party wish to introduce a written instrument in evidence, *2which is in the hands of a third person, he must take out a *subpoena duces tecum*(2).

(1)

 With respect to the *modes*of *proof,the first*anti principal rule is, that the *best evidence*of which the nature of the caso admits must bo adduced; and that a party must not attempt to rely on what is termed *secondary evidence,*at least without proving that the former *cannot*Be adduced, and *why;*as on account of *actual destruction*of an original deed, or *loss, after most diligent search,*and *subpoenaing*every person wl^o is at all likely to have the *best*evidence in his custody or power to produce the same; and even then a jury will sometimes suspect that the best evidence is withheld, and will find a verdict against the party entirely on that account; and, consequently, in adducing *secondary evidence,*the utmost attention must be given to satisfy the jury that there is no suppression of, or want of exertion to obtain, the best description of proof. 3 Chitt. Gen. Prac. 809. See *Coman et al.*v. *The State, Nov.*term, 1836, *post.*

(2)

 It is of no avail merely to serve a third person, who is a stakeholder, with notice to produce a document; but ho must be *subpoenaed*to produce the same. *Parry*v. *May,*1 Mood. & Rob. 279.
#### C. H. Burks *v.*John Burks.

Pleading — Demurrer—Sufficiency of Petition.

A petition is not demurrable, that fully sets out a prior suit, assigning as a reason for not filing the papers, that they had been burned in the clerk’s office. Nor would the giving of each specific date of each step taken be necessary.

APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT.

February 3, 1870.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Peters:

After a careful examination of the original and amended petitions in this case we have been unable to discover any material *541.omission, ox defect, for which the demurrer should have been sustained, especially after filing the amendment.

Read, *for appellant.*

*Burnett & Edwards, for appellee.*

It is alleged that suit was brought in the county of the residence of the obligor, to the first term of the court after the assigmnent, and judgment obtained at that term of the court, that an execution was issued thereon as soon after judgment as it could issue, directed to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resided and placed it in the hands of said sheriff *"immediately"*after it issued, which was returned by him in due and proper time in substance, no property found. And assigned as a reason for not filing a transcript of the record and proceedings, as parts of the petition, that they were burned with the clerk’s office, and he cannot in consequence thereof, procure them. It would seem unreasonable to require appellee to state the date of each step in the case; if he brought suit against the obligor in the note and obtained judgment against him at the first term of the circuit court of the county of his residence, had an execution issued thereon as soon as it could have been done, and placed it in the hands of the sheriff immediately after it issued, and it was returned by him in proper time, appellee has done all that he was required by law to entitle him to his recourse on his assignor.

Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.2


                       CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




William H. Hardman, Jr., the Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
Treasurer and Secretary of Delta Mills, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies
that to the best of his knowledge:

     1.   The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 2, 2005
          of the Company (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
          section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.

The foregoing certification is made solely for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.
1350) and may not be relied upon by anyone for any other purpose. The
undersigned expressly disclaims any undertaking to update such certification
except as required by law.







Date     May 17, 2005                    By: /s/ W. H. Hardman, Jr.
      -------------------------          ------------------------------------
                                         W.H. Hardman, Jr.
                                         Chief Financial Officer



A signed copy of this written statement required by section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00295-CV

Marc Saenz, Shannon Saenz, and Armendina Saenz, Appellants

v.

Mark Anthony Labate, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-09-002198, HONORABLE JOSEPH H. HART, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The clerk’s record in this appeal was due in this Court on June 24, 2010. On

September 2, 2010, appellants were notified that no clerk’s record had been filed due to their failure

to pay or make arrangements to pay the district clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record. The

notice requested that appellants make arrangements for the clerk’s record and submit a status report

regarding this appeal by September 13, 2010. Appellants have not filed a status report or otherwise

responded to this Court’s notice.

If the trial court clerk fails to file the clerk’s record due to appellants’ failure to pay

or make arrangements to pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the record, the appellate court may dismiss

the appeal for want of prosecution unless the appellants were entitled to proceed without payment

of costs. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). Because appellants have failed to pay or make arrangements to

pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record, this appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution.
__________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Patterson and Henson

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: November 19, 2010

2
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. HORACE COOPER.

June 27, 1989.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KEITH FINNEY.

September 6, 1989.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Fred Schur et al *v.*Susan M. Schur.

Fraudulent Conveyance — Court of Equity Will Not Aid.

Property conveyed or transferred by a tfiutual arrangement of parties, for the purpose of defrauding the-creditors of the real owner, cannot be recovered, by the aid of a couit of equity, from either party by the other.

Descent and Distribution — Legatee’s Suit for Recovery of Property Fraudulently Transferred.

A distributee, suing for the- recovery of property transferred by the deceased under a fraudulent agreement with the defendant, cannot occupy a more favorable position in respect to the fraudulent transaction, than the deceased himself.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

January 26, 1869.

*45
      *Coke &*Arbegast, *for appellants.*

Bullitt, *for appellee.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:

Whether or not the chancellor erred in sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiff to the defendant’s answer is the only question to be determined on this appeal.

The answer alleges in substance that the property for which, or its proceeds, the action was brought, was conveyed by the defendant and his wife by deed to John Schur with the fraudulent purpose and intent to cheat and delay the creditors of the defendants, and that John Schur acquiesced therein, and participated in the fraud, and that although the deed was recorded, it was without consideration, and John Schur never acquired the possession of any of the property which remained, as it was before, in the possession of the defendant.

The principle is too well settled to require argument or the citation of authority, that where, as it alleged by the answer in this case, property is conveyed or transferred by mutual arrangement of the parties, for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the real owner, a court of equity will not lend its aid to enable either party to recover from the other the property or its proceeds, but will leave them to abide the consequences of their - own fraud on the rights of others.

As the chancellor would not have relieved the appellant if he had parted with the possession of the property under the fraudulent arrangement, neither should the court have aided John Schur to recover the possession of the property or its proceeds, if the facts were as alleged in the answer and admitted by the demurrer; and we do not perceive how the appellee, suing as a distributee of John Schur, can occupy a more favorable attitude, than he did himself, in respect to the consequences of his participation in the fraudulent transaction on which the plaintiffs claim was founded.

It seems to this court, therefore, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer of the defendants, and in rendering the judgment against them.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-14-00273-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.G.C., a Child

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-CI-00323

Honorable Janet P. Littlejohn, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. Costs of 

the appeal are taxed against appellant.

SIGNED October 29, 2014.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
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