NO. 4-02-0513

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re:  Estate of MARLIN L. SNODGRASS, Deceased,

CHRISTOPHER PARR, a/k/a CHRISTOPHER

SNODGRASS, and CRAIG PARR, a/k/a CRAIG

SNODGRASS,

          Petitioners-Appellees,

          v.

LARRY SNODGRASS, Executor,

          Respondent-Appellant.

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)	Appeal from 

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 00P330

Honorable

Harry E. Clem,

Judge Presiding.

		JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

		Petitioners, Christopher and Craig Parr, a/k/a

Snodgrass, allege they are the natural children of decedent,

Marlin L. Snodgrass.  Their mother, Kaye Parr, was never married

to decedent.  Carl E. Parr (not a party to this lawsuit) is

petitioners' adoptive father.  Respondent, Larry Snodgrass, is

decedent's brother and the executor of his estate.  

		Petitioners filed an amended complaint contesting

decedent's will.  As executor, respondent filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that because Carl Parr had adopted

petitioners, they were not decedent's children within the meaning

of section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) 

(755 ILCS 5/2-4(d)(1) (West 2000)) and they therefore lacked standing to contest decedent's will.  After denying the motion

for summary judgment, the trial court granted respondent's motion

to certify the following question for interlocutory review

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

			"When the mother of an illegitimate child marries someone other than the father

of the child, and the spouse of the mother

then adopts the illegitimate child, is the

child still the child of his or her natural

father for purposes of inheritance under

[section 2-4(d)(1)]?"

We answer yes to the question and remand this case for further

proceedings. 

	I. BACKGROUND

		Decedent executed his will on January 23, 1990, and

died on October 8, 2000.  The will named neither of the petition

ers as a beneficiary.  On April 4, 2001, petitioners filed an

amended complaint contesting the will, alleging they were dece

dent's natural children, he had lacked testamentary capacity, and

the beneficiaries of the will had unduly influenced him.

		On December 14, 2001, respondent filed his motion for

summary judgment.  In addition to affidavits averring that

decedent had a sound mind and free will, respondent presented

certified copies of petitioners' birth certificates as well as

records of a paternity case and an adoption case from the De Witt

County circuit court.  According to the birth certificates,

Christopher Parr was born on September 25, 1967, and Craig Parr

was born on March 15, 1969, and Carl Parr was their father.  In the paternity case, petitioners' mother, Kaye Pitchford (now

Parr), had sought to establish that decedent was petitioners'

father.  The De Witt County circuit court had dismissed the case for lack of prosecution.  In the adoption case, Carl Parr adopted

petitioners on September 21, 1972, with decedent's consent. 

		On January 7, 2002, petitioners filed a response to the

motion for summary judgment.  As part of their response, they

submitted Kaye Parr's affidavit that she was petitioners' natural

mother, her grandparents were petitioners' great-grandparents,

and she was married to Carl Parr when he adopted petitioners.    

		On April 10, 2002, the trial court denied respondent's

motion for summary judgment, because if petitioners proved the

averments in their mother's affidavit, they would have standing

under section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act.  We granted respon

dent's petition for leave to appeal.

	II. ANALYSIS

		This appeal requires us to interpret section 2-4(d) of

the Probate Act.  We interpret statutes de novo--that is to say, without any deference to the trial court's interpretation. 

Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000).  When interpreting a statute, we

strive to ascertain the legislature's intent.  Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1997).  The best

evidence of that intent is the language the legislature used in

the statute, and we should give the language its plain and

ordinary meaning.  Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177, 688 N.E.2d at 139.  If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we should

discern the legislative intent from that language alone, without

resorting to other tools of statutory construction, such as

legislative history.  People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).

		Section 2-4(d)(1) of the Probate Act provides as fol lows:

			"(d) For purposes of inheritance from or

through a natural parent and for determining

the property rights of any person under any

instrument, an adopted child is not a child

of a natural parent, nor is the child a de

scendant of a natural parent or of any lineal

or collateral kindred of a natural parent,

unless one or more of the following condi

tions apply:

				(1) The child is adopted by a

descendant or a spouse of a descen

dant of a great-grandparent of the

child, in which case the adopted

child is a child of both natural

parents."  755 ILCS 5/2-4(d)(1)

(West 2000).

		The parties agree that unless petitioners are children

of decedent within the meaning of the statute quoted above,

petitioners lack standing to contest decedent's will.  Only an

"interested person" has the right to contest the admission of a

will to probate.  755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2000).  An "interested

person" includes "[o]ne who has *** a financial interestt[] [or]

property right *** which may be affected by the action ***,

including[,] without limitation[,] an heir ***."  755 ILCS 5/1-2.11 (West 2000).  "Heirs" are those whom the law designates to

receive an intestate estate.  Gridley v. Gridley, 399 Ill. 215, 222, 77 N.E.2d 146, 150 (1948).  Natural children of a decedent

are descendants of the decedent and are, therefore, the dece

dent's heirs.  755 ILCS 5/2-1(a), (b) (West 2000).  Only by

virtue of their alleged status as children of decedent would

petitioners have any interest in the estate.

		Petitioners reason as follows.  They are the natural

children of Kaye Parr and decedent.  When Carl Parr adopted

petitioners, he was the spouse of Kaye Parr.  As their natural

mother, Kaye Parr was, of course, a descendant of a great-grand

parent of petitioners (on their mother's side):  her paternal and

maternal grandparents were petitioners' great-grandparents. 

Petitioners conclude they are decedent's children under the

exception in section 2-4(d)(1).  Respondent considers petition

ers' interpretation and application of section 2-4(d)(1) to be

"strained" and "convoluted."  We disagree.  The language of the

statute is clear and unambiguous, and if petitioners prove the

facts in their rationale, they will fit neatly within the terms

of the statute.

		Respondent interprets the statute to mean that the

adopted child remains a child of both natural parents only if the

adopting parent is a descendant, or spouse of a descendant, of a

grandparent of the parent who no longer is a legal parent.  Thus, under respondent's interpretation, if Carl Parr were decedent's

brother or brother-in-law, petitioners would remain children of

both natural parents--but not if Carl Parr were merely the spouse of petitioners' mother.  Respondent interprets the statute as

follows:

		"The child is adopted by a descendant or a

spouse of a descendant of a paternal great- grandparent of the child, in which case the

adopted child is a child of both natural

parents."

If the legislature intended the statute to mean what respondent

argues it means, the legislature could have easily said so by

inserting a single but highly significant qualifying word: 

"paternal."  The statute does not so read, however, and we will

not insert conditions or limitations into a statute that are

absent from the text (Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999)).

		While denouncing petitioners' interpretation as a

"clever sleight of hand," respondent concedes their interpreta

tion "falls within the letter of the statute."  Quoting In rethe Matter of the Estate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 346, 70 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1946), he urges us, however, to accept his own interpretation as being

"'within the object, spirit[,] and meaning of [the] statute[,]

*** although not within the letter.'"  He argues:  "Given the

number of children who are adopted by the spouse of a natural

parent, [petitioners'] interpretation would have the absurd

result of preserving the inheritance rights of adopted children

from their natural parents in a staggering number of cases." 

		The supreme court said, in Abell, 395 Ill. at 347, 70 N.E.2d at 257:  "If the language of a statute employed admits of two constructions, one of which makes the enactment mischievous, if not absurd, and the other renders it reasonable and wholesome,

the construction leading to an absurd result should be avoided." 

(Emphasis added.)  As we explained, respondent's interpretation

has no basis in the plain and unambiguous language of section 2-

4(d)(1), and therefore the statute does not "admit of" his

interpretation.

		Moreover, unlike respondent, we perceive no "absurdity"

in an adopted child's inheriting from both of the parents who

brought him or her into the world.  Traditionally, courts re

garded "the adoption statute [as leaving] the rights of inheri

tance between the adopted child and his natural parent the same

as though no adoption had taken place."  In re Estate of Tilliski, 323 Ill. App. 490, 499, 56 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1944), aff'd, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945).  As the supreme court said, in a passage that petitioners quote:

			"The statute authorizing adoption of

children is remedial.  It was unknown to the

common law.  Primarily, it is beneficial to

the adopted child.  It gives to it rights it

did not have before.  It does not purport to

lessen any of its natural rights, but gives

additional rights.  The same right of heir

ship from blood parents enjoyed by a natural

child should not be taken from an adopted

child unless clearly required by statute." 

In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. at 285, 61 N.E.2d at 29.

On its face, section 2-4(d)(1) does not "clearly require" us to

hold that petitioners have no right of heirship from decedent. 

Rather, it "clearly requires" us to hold they are his heirs, if

indeed they are his natural children and the averments in Kaye

Parr's affidavit are true.

		Even if we agreed with respondent that section 2-

4(d)(1), as petitioners literally interpret it, is inconsistent

with sound public policy, we would not interpret it as saying

something other than what it plainly says.  We will not effec

tively amend the clear and unambiguous language of statutes to

eliminate what we consider bad public policy (conveniently

labeled as "absurdities the legislature could not have

intended").  If the statute, as written, seems a bad idea, the

appeal is to the legislature, not to us.  People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 476, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).

		Just as we should not allow considerations of public

policy to lure us away from the clear language of the statute, we

should not allow legislative history to do so, either.  Therefore

we decline the parties' invitation to consider the legislative

history of section 2-4(d)(1).  As the supreme court recently

said:

		"Only if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construc

tion, such as legislative history, to deter

mine legislative intent.  In the absence of

ambiguity, we must rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words chosen by the

legislature."  (Emphasis added.)  Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, No. 92837, slip op. at 8 (November 21, 2002), ___202 Ill. 2d ______414, ____426___, _______ N.E.2d ___, ___

(2002).

Because the statutory language is clear, we will rely on its

plain and ordinary meaning, without an unnecessary foray into

legislative history.

	III. CONCLUSION

		For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified

question in the affirmative and remand this case for further

proceedings.

		Question answered; cause remanded.

		KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.