### FILED March 8, 2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,


### v. ADRIAN SUTLEJ SAMALIA, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 

### 31611-4-111

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KORSMO,J. -Adrian Samalia appeals his conviction for first degree robbery, arguingthat the evidencewas insufficient and that several errors deprivedhim ofa fair trial. Concludingthe evidencewas sufficient, and the trial courtproperly dealt withthe other issues, we affirm. FACTS This case has its genesis in the theft ofpackages from a United Parcel Service (UPS) truckparked in an alley in Yakima on December 9, 

### 2011. A delivery driver left the doorto the storage area ofhis truck open while he went inside a business topickup
somepackages. When the driverreturned, he sawtwo males insidethetruck; each ran offwith apackage whenthey heardhim speak out.No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
The men fled down the alley with the driver andthe business owner inpursuit. The second man dropped his package andpulled out a gun. Hepointed it at the business
owner and both pursuers stopped. The two men got into a vehicle and left. The business
ownerreported the license plate ofthe vehicle. OfficerTarin Miller located and stopped the vehicle. A passenger in the backseat fled; the officerpursueduntil the suspect discarded a gun. The officerthen securedthe weapon and called in the fleeing suspect's direction to otherresponding officers. A dog tracked the suspectto a carport where the police arrested Mr. Samalia. While Officer Millerpursued Samalia, the car fled. Police located it later that night. A search ofthe vehicle revealed Mr. Samalia's identification card in the back seat. Mr. Samaliawas chargedwith first degree robbery as both a principal and as an accomplice. 1 Also charged with first degree robbery were Travis Cliett and Stacey Melton. Mr. Cliett was identified as the first robberwho got away with thepackage, while Ms. Melton, the owner ofthe vehicle used in the escape, was accused ofbeingthe get-away driver. Mr. Cliett's case was tried separately.2 In exchange for her agreement to testify, Ms. Melton was allowed to plead guilty to a gross misdemeanor offense of

1Mr. Samaliawas also charged with unlawful possession ofa firearm out ofthe incident. That charged was heard bythe bench. Mr. Samaliawas acquitted. 2 Mr. Cliettwas convicted ofthe robbery and othercharges. His appeal is pending in this court. See Court ofAppeals no. 32253-0-III. 2No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia rendering criminal assistance. Theprosecutor would recommend that she be sentencedto the 22 days she had already served in custody. The matterproceededtojurytrial in the Yakima County Courthouse, a building that generally closes at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Samalia's trial ran laterthan 4:00 p.m. on at least three occasions. On those days, the courthad security keep the doors to the courthouse unlocked. However, the sign by the front door and the court's website both still indicated the court closed at 4:00 p.m. Issues in this appeal arise from the trial testimony oftwo ofthe witnesses. Officer Chris Taylortestified that he searched the Melton vehicle at thepolice garage and found Mr. Samalia's identification card in a wallet in the back seat. Defense counsel crossexamined OfficerTaylor at length on the fact that he had not observed the vehicle priorto the search. Counsel then gotthe officerto admit that he "assumed" Mr. Samaliahad left the identification in the car. A series ofquestions ensued which confirmedthatthe officer did not knowwhenthe wallethadbeenplaced in the car. Counsel then asked the officer ifhe only assumed that Mr. Samalia leftthe wallet in the carbecause it advanced the State's case. The court sustained the prosecutor's objectionto the question. Counsel then asked why the officerwould assume it. The officer answered: Because another officer stopped that car. SawMr. Samaliarun from it. He was detained shortly thereafter in a very immediateproximity to where the carwas. Based on my training experience I know these officers aren't lying. 3 Tr. ofProceedings (TP) at 333. 3No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
Defense counsel objected to the answer and the court struck the final sentence. TP at 334. However, unchastened by the experience, counsel then confirmed thatthe officer
was familiar with the rules about testifying before stating "you'rewilling to break those rules ifyou think it will help get a conviction." TP at 334. The court sustained an objection and counsel ended his cross-examination. Ms. Melton later testifiedto her involvement in the day's activities. She stated that Cliett and Samalia had run to her car. Cliett carried apackage and Samalia sat in the back seat. Samilia fled when the officer stopped the vehicle. Defense counsel began his cross-examination by getting Ms. Melton to admit that she initially had lied to the police concerning her car and being with Mr. Samaliathat day. Counsel had her confirm that she originally had been charged with first degree robbery and asked herwhat the penalties were for that crime. TP at 393. An objection was raised and thejurywas excused. During the ensuing argument, defense counsel insistedthat he was permitted to question the witness concerningthe fact that the robbery charge carried a maximum sentence oflife in prison. The court believed it would be prejudicial for thejuryto know that fact. The court indicatedthat counsel could examine the witness about how she faced substantially less punishment for the rendering offense. Counsel then got Ms. Melton to agree that her expected punishment was much less significantthanthe robbery punishmentwould have been, "almost infinitesimal by comparison." TP at433. She also 4No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia agreed that she received an "incredible benefit" for her testimony. TP at 434. She told jurors that the new charge was a gross misdemeanor offense and that she would only receive the "twenty-something" days she had already served. TP at 437. The court instructed thejury on accomplice liability. The court rejected two defense instructional requests that would have amended the "intent" and "use offorce" instructions. The defense argued the case to thejurythat the State had not shownthat a robbery occurred orthat his client was involved. Nonetheless, thejury found Mr. Samalia guilty offirst degree robbery. Immediately afterthe verdict was read, the defense sought a new trial on the basis ofOfficerTaylor's testimony and the prosecutor's use in closing argument ofone PowerPoint slide stating that the defendant was "GUILTY." The court denied the motion, reasoning that its actions in strikingthe challenged testimony was sufficient and that the slide did not amount to misconduct. The court ultimately imposed a standard range sentence. Mr. Samaliatimely appealed to this court. ANALYSIS Mr. Samaliaraises six challenges. We first consider his evidentiary sufficiency challenge. We then address whetherthejury was instructedproperly, whether crossexamination ofMs. Melton was unduly restricted, whether the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial, and whetherthe courtroom was erroneously closed to the public. 

### 5No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
In light ofour conclusion that there were not multiple errors, we do not address the cumulative error claim. Evidentiary Sufficiency Mr. Samalia argues that there was insufficient evidence ofrobbery for two reasons-hehad already dropped his package before pulling outthe gun and there was no evidence that he knew Cliett had retained his package. Properly viewed, the evidence did supportthejury's determination. Well settled standards govern our review ofthis issue. Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict ifthe trier offact has a factual basis for finding each element ofthe offenseproved beyond areasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-222, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). The reviewing court will considerthe evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221. "Aperson commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person ofanother or in his or herpresence against his or her will by the use or threatened use ofimmediate force, violence, or fear ofinjury to thatperson orhis orher property or the person orproperty ofanyone." RCW 9A.56.190. This statute reflects a transactional view ofthe crime rather than the former common law standard that force used during arobbery neededto be contemporaneous with the taking. State v. Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d 284, 830 P.2d 641 (1992). Underthe transactional view, a taking 6No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia

can occur outside the presence ofthe victim, and the necessary force to constitute robbery
can be found in the forceful retention ofstolen property that was peaceably taken. Id. Washington's robbery statute simply requires that the force be used either to obtain or retain property, orto overcome resistance to the taking. State v. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d 609, 611, 121 P.3d 91 (2005). To convict Mr. Samalia on a theory ofaccomplice liability, the State had to prove that (1) "Withknowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission ofthe crime" he (2) "Aids
... such otherperson in planning or committing it." RCW 9A.08.020. The knowledge requirement is general knowledge ofthe crime: '"Specific knowledge ofthe elements ofthe coparticipant's crime need not be proved to convict one as an accomplice.'" State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 512, 14 P.3d 713 (2000) (quoting State
v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 125, 683 P.2d 199 (1984)). Because ofthis, the person must be generally aware ofthe type ofcrime charged, but not necessarily the degree ofit. In re Pers. Restraintof Sarausad, 109 Wn. App. 824, 836, 39 P.3d 308 (2001). Where the elements ofa crime are split between accomplices, all ofthe participants are guilty ofthe crime. See State v. Haack, 88 Wn. App. 423, 427-428, 958 P.2d 1001 (1997). Mr. Samalia first argues that because he abandoned his purloined property before pulling aweapon, he was not guilty ofrobbery underJohnson. While his view of Johnson is factually accurate, it does not aid him here. InJohnson, a man stole items from a store, but abandoned them when chased by a security guard. He then used force 7No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia

to escape from the guard. 155 Wn.2d at 610. The court ruled that force used after abandonment ofproperty is not force used to take or retain property underthe terms of the statute. Id. at 611. Johnson did not involve an accomplice. Because Mr. Cliett retained his stolen package afterMr. Samaliapulled a gun on the pursuers, the evidence supported the view that Mr. Samalia was guilty as an accomplice to that taking. To counterthis argument, Mr. Samalia contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he aided Mr. Cliett because he did not know Cliett had retained the property since they were out ofsight ofeach other. The facts, however, supported a contrary view ofthe evidence. The business ownertestified that the two men ran offon the same side ofthe truck with one a little ahead ofthe other. There was no evidence that Cliett dropped his package or that Samaliahad any reason to believe he did. Further, Ms. Meltontestified that Cliett had apackage with him when the two men returned to her car. Ajury could infer from this testimony that Mr. Samaliaknew that Mr. Cliett still retained his package when he pulled out his gun. There was no reason for him to believe otherwise. Properly viewed, the evidence supported thejury'sverdict. It was sufficient. Jury Instructions Mr. Samalia argues that the court erred by failing to give his two requested instructions, resulting in the court's instructions misstating the law. The court's

8No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
instructions were proper and allowed the defense to argue its theory ofthe case. There
was no error. Long settled standards also govern this argument. Jury instructions are sufficient if they correctly state the law, are notmisleading, and allowthe parties to argue their respective theories ofthe case. State v. Dana, 73 Wn.2d 533, 536-537, 439 P.2d403 (1968). The trial court also is granted broad discretion in determining the wording and number of juryinstructions. Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 440, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). The elements instruction accurately stated the law ofrobbery. It read: To convict the defendant ofthe crime ofFirst Degree Robbery, each ofthe following elements ofthe crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about December 9, 2011, the defendant or an accomplice unlawfully took personal property of Vernon Place and/or UPS in the presence ofVernon Place; (2) That the defendant or an accomplice intended to commit theft of the property; (3) That the taking was against Vernon Place's will by the defendant or an accomplice's use or threatened use of immediate force, violence or fear ofinjury to thatperson; (4) That force or fear was used by the defendant or an accomplice to obtain or retain possession ofthe property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; (5) That in the commission of these acts or in immediate flight therefrom the defendant or an accomplice (a) was armed with a deadly weapon; or
9No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia (b) displayed what appeared to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; and (6) That the acts occurred in the State ofWashington. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 89. The above instruction mirrors the robbery statutes. Cf RCW 9A.56.190 and RCW 9A.56.200. 3 This instruction also allowed Mr. Samalia to argue his theory ofthe case that because he abandoned the property priorto pulling out the gun he did not commit robbery. The instruction's fourth element requires that "force or fear was used
...to obtain or retainpossession of theproperty or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking." CP at 89 (emphasis added). Mr. Samalia was free to use this language to argue that because he had dropped the box, he was not using force to "retainpossession ofthe property." Id. In fact, defense counsel made this argument in closing. TP at 621. Mr. Samalia also proposed an additional instructionthatread: The force used must relate to the taking or retention ofthe property, either as force used directly in the taking or retention or as force used to prevent or overcome resistance "to the taking." Force usedmerely in an attempt to escape after abandoning theproperty is nota robbery. CP at 72 (emphasis added). The trial court rejected this instruction because the final sentence could confuse thejury. Specifically, the court believed that due to the accomplice instruction, the proposed last sentence on abandonment would cause

3 Elementtwo contains the nonstatutory element ofintent to committheft. In re Pers. Restraintof Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 255, 111 P.3d 837 (2005) (robbery includes the nonstatutory element ofspecific intent to steal). 10No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
confusion. Because Mr. Samalia was still able to argue his theory ofthe case absent this instruction, the instructions were sufficient and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Mr. Samalia's next argument is that the accomplice liability instruction was improperbecause it would allow thejuryto convict him even ifhe only had the intent to committheft. For accomplice liability, the person must have knowledge that his orher conduct will aid in the commission ofthe crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3); State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 513. In this case, the accomplice liability instruction stated in relevantpart: A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission ofthe crime of First Degree Robbery, he either: (1) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to committhe crime; or (2) Aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing the crime. CP at 82. This instruction also mirrors the accomplice liability statute. See RCW 9A.08.020(3). 

### It accurately stated the law ofaccomplice liability. Mr. Samalia argues that this instruction and the to-convict instruction allowed the juryto convict a person ofrobbery even ifhe only intended to commit theft. He compares this situation with State v. Grendahl, 110 Wn. App. 905, 908, 43 P.3d 76 (2002). The comparison fails because ofa critical factual difference betweenthe two
cases.

11No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia
In Grendahlthis court concluded that identicaljury instructions were erroneous because the defendant, who was driving the get-away car while an accomplice was stealing a woman's unattended purse, was unaware ofthe fact that the accomplice actually used force to accomplish the theft, thereby elevating the crime to robbery. Id. at 906-910. Since the two defendants did not share the same intent, the instructions were
erroneous as to Mr. Grendahl who had agreed to take part only in a theft. Id. at 910-911. This case, however, is in the opposite fact pattern. Here it was Mr. Samaliawhose actions elevated the planned theft into arobbery. There was no possibility that he erroneously could be convicted as an accomplice to robbery due to Mr. Cliett acting beyond the mutually agreed upon theft. Instead, he was the one who used force and converted the package theft into arobbery. The court's instructions were correct. There was no error in denying the defendant's requested instructions because the defense was still able to argue its theory of the case. Cross-examination of Ms. Melton Mr. Samalianext argues that he was deprived ofhis right to cross-examine Ms. Melton effectively because he was not permitted to ask her the maximum penalty for the original charge offirst degree robbery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter, nor was the defense harmed by the limitation.

12No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
An accused has the right underthe Sixth Amendmentto the United States Constitution to confrontthe witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 51, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). This right, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, necessarily speaks to a defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-405, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). However, the right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute; the subject-matter ofthe crossexamination is "limited by general considerations ofrelevance." State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002) (citing ER401 and ER403). Washington follows a three-pronged approach to determine the limitations ofa defendant's confrontation clause right to cross-examination. Id. at 622. First, the evidence sought must have at least minimal relevance. Id. Second, ifrelevant, the burden is on the State to show thatthe evidence is "soprejudicial as to disrupt the fairness ofthe fact-finding process at trial." Id. Third, the court must balance the State's interest in excluding prejudicial evidence against the defendant's need for the information; "only ifthe State's interest outweighs the defendant's need can otherwise relevant information be withheld." Id. Ultimately, restrictions on cross-examination are within the discretion ofthe trial court. This court reviews for abuse ofdiscretion. State
v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 752, 202 P.3d 937 (2009).

13No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
Bias evidence is generally relevant. State v. Tate, 2 Wn. App. 241, 247, 469 P.2d 999 (1970). Further, a defendant enjoys more latitude to expose the bias ofa key witness. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619. In situations where the accomplice has entered a plea ofguilty, but not yet been sentenced, it is even more importantthat the trial court give counsel "great latitude in cross-examination" to ascertain whether the witness expected favorable treatment as aresult ofhis testimony. Tate, 2 Wn. App. at 247. Mr. Samalia argues that he should have been able to ask about what sentence Ms. Melton faced under the original charge in orderto expose thejuryto her motivations and biases for testifying. The initial problem with this argument is thatthe defense never attempted to ask Ms. Melton what sentence she faced nor did the trial courtprohibithim from doing so. Underthe Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A. RCW, a felon will be sentenced within a specified sentence range dependent on the seriousness of the offense and the offender'sprior criminal history unless aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. RCW 9.94A.505(2)(x), .530(1), .535; see generallyState v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231, 236-237, 149 P.3d 636 (2006); State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 516, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). An exceptional sentence may only exceed the standard range if the prosecutorprovides notice and proves the existence ofan aggravating factor. RCW 9.94A.535-.537; State v. Siers, 174 Wn.2d 269, 277, 274 P.3d 358 (2012). There is no indication that the prosecutor ever sought an exceptional sentence against any ofthe robbery suspects. 14No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
There was no effort to identify the standard range sentence Melton faced for the first degree robbery charge. Instead ofcomparing the high end ofher range to the actual sentence she anticipated receiving, thereby showing exactly what she gained from testifying, defense counsel sought to ask about the statutory maximum sentence facing a person convicted offirst degree robbery. That information simply was not relevant to Ms. Melton's situation.4 She did not face apotential maximum sentence. The information also was potentially prejudicial to both Mr. Samalia and to the State. Althoughjurors are told they have no role in punishment decisions, somejuror could be misled by the maximum sentence information and consider it to eitherthe benefit or detriment ofMr. Samaliawhen adjudging the case. The potential for prejudicial misuse ofthe information was a tenable reason for excluding it. Exclusion ofthe maximum sentence also was not prejudicial to Mr. Samalia. He
was allowed to do what he professed he wanted to do--showthat Ms. Melton was getting
a good deal. He had hertestify to the "twenty-something" days she expected to serve on

4 Priorto the SRA the information would have been relevant. Under the prior indeterminate sentencing scheme, the courtwas required to sentence a felon to the maximum sentence and the parole board would impose a minimum term. Afterthe minimum term was served, the parole board would then determine·whetherthe offender would be released at some pointpriorto serving the maximum sentence. See RCW 9.95.001, .010, .040. After enactment ofthe SRA, the trialjudgetook on the function of setting a minimum term for anyone sentenced underthe indeterminate sentencing act. RCW 9.95.011.

15No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
the amended charge and obtained her agreementthat the sentence was "almost infinitesimal by comparison" with the robbery charge. TP at 433. Counsel was then able to argue that her good deal was areason to discredit Ms. Melton's testimony. 5 The defense was notprevented from doing what it wanted to do. As noted inFisher, examination ofthe reasons for a witness's bias is differentthan examining thefacts underlying those reasons. 165 Wn.2d at 752-753. The defendant is allowed to getthe
reasons for bias into the record, but not the factual basis. Id. at 753. Thatwas done here. The trial courtproperly excluded the irrelevant and potentially prejudicial information. The defense was left with alternative ways ofobtaining similar information and did so. There was no error. Motionfor aNew Trial Mr. Samalia also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Once again the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to declare a mistrial or grant a new trial for abuse ofdiscretion. E.g., State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158, 166, 659 P.2d 1102 (1983) (mistrial); State v. Marks, 71 Wn.2d 295, 302, 427 P.2d 1008 (1967) (new trial).

5 While Ms. Melton did help identify Mr. Samalia as one ofthe actors in this criminal drama, she was not the only one to do so. Betweenthe shop owner's testimony, that ofOfficerTarin Smith, the identification card, and the tracking ofMr. Samaliaby the dog, he was tied to the offense.

16No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia
"The question is not whether this court would have decided otherwise in the first instance, but whetherthe trialjudgewasjustified in reaching his conclusion." State v. Taylor, 60 Wn.2d 32, 42, 371 P.2d 617 (1962). Mr. Samalia argues that the testimony ofOfficer Taylorvouched for other witnesses and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in concluding a PowerPoint presentation during closing argument with a slide that said "GUILTY". In each instance, the trial court struck the challenged conduct from the record. In ruling on the motion, the court concluded that its previous actions had adequately addressed the respective situations. That was a tenable rationale. With respect to the testimony ofOfficer Taylor, it was arguable whetherthe
answer to counsel's question was error. One witness may not vouch for another. E.g., State v. Jones, 117 Wn. App. 89, 91, 68 P.3d 1153 (2003). Nonetheless, defense counsel asked whythe officer believed as he did and the officertold him-he relied on fellow officers who he knew from his own experience were not lying to him. The answer was offered to answer the question asked, not to bolsterthe testimony ofothers. There was no good reason for asking the officerwhy he believed as he did, but once the question was asked, the defense was bound by the answer. Assuming error, however, this was not such egregious errorthat the court's direction to strike the testimony failed to cure the prejudice. Itis unlikely that thejury

17No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia

was unduly influenced by the non-surprising testimony that an officer relied on information from other officers and believed it credible. The issue ofprosecutorial misconduct is even clearer. Use ofa single slide with the word "GUILTY" does not amount to misconduct. State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463, 341 P.3d 976, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2844 (2015). There the court clarified an earlier decision and determined that mere use ofthe word "guilty," even in all capital letters, does not always constitute an improper expression ofthe prosecutor's personal opinion. Id. at 480 n.6. Moreover, the court's decision to strike the slide certainly cured any error arising from the briefdisplay. Jurors being asked by the prosecutorto find the defendant "guilty" cannot be surprised when the prosecutor actually uses the word "guilty" in closing argument. Itwas not an impermissible expression ofpersonal opinion. Itwas the action the prosecutor asked thejuryto take after deliberating on the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. Courtroom Closure Finally, Mr. Samalia argues that the courtroom was improperly closed by a sign stating that the building would close at 4:00 p.m. This argument is one appellate courts have addressed on several occasions and is controlled by a decision ofthe Washington Supreme Court on virtually identical facts.

18No. 31611-4-III 

### State v. Samalia
A defendant has a right to public trial. Const. art. I, § 22. This court reviews an alleged public trial violation de novo. 

### State v. Easterling, 157 Wn.2d 167, 173-174, 137 P.3d 825 (2006). The defendant has the burden ofshowing that a courtroom closure occurred. 

### State v. Koss, 181 Wn.2d 493, 503, 334 P.3d 1042 (2014). Here, nothing in records suggests there was a courtroom closure. While the courthouse normally closed at 4:00 p.m., the trial court continually commented onthe record that it was keeping the courthouse unlocked when trial ran laterthan 4:00 p.m. to
ensurepublic access. Mr. Samalia movedto supplementthe record in this case with the record from a reference hearing in 

### State v. Andy, No. 31018-3-III, another Yakima County case. 

### See Commissioner's Ruling, 

### State v. Samalia, No. 31611-4-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2014) (granting motion). There, the trial court made findings offact regarding the openness ofthe Yakima County Courthouse after 4:00 pm in Andy's trial. The trial court found that in spite ofthe sign, "members ofthe public will
...try the door before walking away." Verbatim Report ofProceedings (May 22, 2013) at 1 79. Further, the court found that "no member ofthe public was barred orprevented from enteringthe courthouse and attending the
...trial ifthey so desired because ofthe existence of[the sign]." Id. Andy's case eventually reached the Washington Supreme Court. The court held that there was no public trial violation. 

### State v. Andy, 182 Wn.2d 294, 302, 340 P.3d 840 (2014). Specifically the court relied on the trial court's finding that "the sign did not 19No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
deter any member ofthe public from accessing the courtroom." 

### Id. While the trial court's findings in theAndyrecord are specific to that trial, the general finding that members ofthe public will try the doorbefore being deterred by the sign is equally applicable here. Given that finding and the holding inAndy, these facts are insufficient to demonstrate that the courtroom was closed. Accordingly, there was no public trial violation. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public recordpursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

I CONCUR:

20No. 31611-4-111 FEARING, J. (concurring)- I concur in the affirmation ofthe first degree robbery conviction ofappellant Adrian Samalia. I write separately because I disagree with the majority's analysis in two importantrespects. Cross-Examination ofStacey Melton Defense counsel asked the State's cooperative witness, Stacey Melton, at trial: SCOTT [Defense Counsel]: Ultimately, you were charged with First Degree Robbery. Were you not? MELTON: Yes. SCOTT: You and Adrian Samaliaboth? MELTON: Yes. SCOTT: And do you recall whatthe penalties for FirstDegree Robberies are? CHEN [State's Counsel]: Objection. JUDGE: Sustained. 3 Tr. ofProceedings (TP) at 393. Note that defense counsel asked Melton ifshe "recalled"the penalties, not what were the penalties. Ofcourse, most witnesses do not understand the subtleties ofquestions, suchthat Stacey Melton may not have answered the question with a simple yes orno, but, ifshe recalled, testified to herrecollection of thepenalties. Thus, we ask whetherthe trial court erred in excluding evidence oftheNo. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia possiblepenalties, including the maximumpenalty, the State's witness faced ifshe refusedto testify againstAdrian Samalia. The majority writes thatthe maximum sentence for first degree robbery was irrelevantto Stacey Melton's "situation" and that she did not face a potential maximum sentence. Majority at 15. The majority does not disclose any basis for this observation. We know nothing about StaceyMelton's criminal history. For all we know, the State would have requested andthe trial courtwouldhave imposedthe highestpossible sentence. Assuming the majority holds or impliedly holds thatthe maximum sentence ofthe cooperating witness is always irrelevant or always inadmissible, I disagree. No earlier Washington decision addresses this weighty issue. Cases from foreignjurisdictions primarilyhold suchevidenceto be relevant andrule a bar ofsuchtestimony to require a
newtrial. I collate those decisions inthe appendix. ER401 declares: "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence ofany fact that is ofconsequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or less probablethan it wouldbewithoutthe evidence. (Emphasis added.) Thethreshold to admitrelevant evidence is very low. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). Even minimally relevant evidence is admissible. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 621. A defendant enjoys more latitude to expose the bias ofa State'skey witness. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619.
2No. 31611-4-III State 

### v. Samalia
One who faces a life sentence ifone does not cooperate with the State has more
reason to collaborate withthe State than one who faces a five-year sentence. Therefore, the precisepunishment, including the maximum amount ofpunishment one originally encountered before turning State's witness, holds some relevance to one'sbias. The latitude afforded defendant in cross-examining a witness bolsters the admissibility ofthe maximum penalty confrontingthe witness before the agreement with the prosecution. The majority only tangentially mentions the basis on which the trial court excluded the evidence ofthe possible sentence facing Stacey Melton ifshe refusedto oblige the State. The majority also omits that the trial court ruled the evidence germane. Contrary to the majority's ruling, the trial court ruled thatthe evidence was relevant. The trial court, nonetheless, excludedthe evidence based onprejudice to Adrian Samalia, the State, orboth parties. The State charged Stacey Melton, like Adrian Samalia, with first degree robbery. Thus, thejurywould have heard the sentence also faced by Adrian Samalia. No Washington case weighs the prejudice resulting from thejuryhearingthe defendant's sentence range withthe inability ofthe defendantto questionthe State's witness about the length ofsentence she avoided. Cases from foreignjurisdictions disagree with one another on this significant question. I include a description ofthose decisions in the appendix. Some ofthose cases base the rightto questionthe State's witness on herpossible sentence on the United States Constitution's confrontation clause. I would reserve for another day the question ofwhetherthe defense may question the State's collaborating witness as to the maximum sentence orrange ofsentence faced 3No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia

on the charge dismissed bythe State in exchange for the witness'stestimony regardless ofwhetherthe defendant faces the same charge. We need not answerthese questions in this appeal because ofa lack ofprejudice to Adrian Samaliain beingbarred from asking these precise questions. In response to other questioning by defense counsel, Stacey Melton testifiedthat the State had filed a very serious charge againsther, thatthe State would dismiss the very serious charge for hertestimony, thatthe State would reduce the robbery charge to a gross misdemeanor ofrendering criminal assistance, thatthe State would permitherto plead to a charge infinitely less in seriousness, that her sentencing abided hertestimony, that the low sentence depended on hertestimony, that she believedthe State connected the lower sentence to hertestimony againstAdrian Samalia, that she needed to testify favorably for the State, thatthe prosecution bestowedher an incrediblebenefitbyher testifying, and that she would receive approximately a twenty-day sentencethat she already served. In short, defense counsel completed an effective cross-examination. More importantly, other evidence overwhelmingly supported Adrian Samalia's conviction. A dog tracked Adrian Samalia as a fleeing suspect. Law enforcement found Samalia's identification on the backseat ofthe car. Samaliapresented no alibi. He called
no witnesses. One decision suggests thatprecludingthe questioning ofthe State'switness as to the maximum sentence ofa conviction she avoided is neverharmless. State v. Bennett, 550 So. 2d201, 205 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Other cases employ a harmless error analysis. 4No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia
UnitedStates v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1989);Jackson v. State, 37 So. 3d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 571 S.E.2d 752 (2002). I know ofno reason why a harmless error analysis should be appliedto other errors, even constitutional errors, butnotto this error that implicates the constitution's confrontation clause. Under Washington law, a constitutional error is harmless ifthe appellate court is assured beyond areasonable doubt that thejuryverdict is unattributable to the error. State v. Anderson, 171 Wn.2d 764, 770, 254 P.3d 815 (2011). This court employs the "overwhelminguntainted evidence" test and looks to the untainted evidence to determine ifit is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding ofguilt. Anderson, 171 Wn.2d at 770 (quoting State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985)). The untainted evidence against Adrian Samalia is overwhelming. Adrian Samalia also assigns errorto the trial court's refusal to admit his proposed Exhibit 5to impeach Stacey Melton. In his assignment, Samalia does not identify the nature ofthe exhibit. Presumably, the exhibit is the information filed by the State against Stacey Melton, which information includedthe potential sentence for first degree robbery. Samalia includes no argument in the body ofhis briefas to why exclusion of the exhibit constituted error. This court does not review issues not argued, briefed, or supported with citation to authority. RAP 10.3(a); Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d 857, 858, 447 P.2d 589 (1968);Avellaneda v. State, 167 Wn. App. 474, 485 n.5, 273 P.3d 477 (2012).

5No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia
Slide ofGuilt The majority writes that a single slide withthe word "GUILTY" does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. The majority cites State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463, 341 P.3d 976, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2844 (2015) for this proposition. Walker, like other
cases preceding it, approvedthe use ofvisual aids during closing statements. The Walker court did not hold or even suggestthat one slide using the word "GUILTY" does not constitute misconduct.

Fearini,i

6No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
APPENDIX Federal Cases In UnitedStates v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2002), the trial court allowed defense counsel to ask cooperating government witnesses about, and the witnesses testified to, the maximum and minimum sentences they faced before reaching an agreement with the government. The defendant appealed because the trial court disallowed questioning about sentencing guidelines. The appellate court affirmed, in part, because ofthe testimony concerning the maximum and minimum sentence. In UnitedStates v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1989), the defendant complained about the trial court forbidding ofdefense counsel from questioning the government's witness aboutthe details ofherpleabargain. Thereviewing court concluded the limitation was error, despite the trial court's concern thatthejurywould speculate as to whetherthe defendant faced a similar sentence. The courtnotedthatthe details ofthe plea are relevant to ajury assessingthe credibility ofthe witness. The court, nonetheless, held the errorto be harmless because the cooperatingwitness's testimony did little to incriminate the defendant. In UnitedStates v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), the defendants argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allowtheir counsel to cross-examine the government's chiefwitness concerning his beliefas to whathis maximum sentence could have been had he not cooperatedwith the government. The appeals courtrecognizedthat
awitness's understanding ofwhatbenefits he will receive as a result ofhis cooperation 7No. 31611-4-111 State v. Samalia
with the government is relevant and that the defendant is constitutionally entitled to explore this subject during cross-examination. The court affirmed the convictions, nonetheless, because defense counsel thoroughly examined the witness regarding his understanding ofthe use immunity he was granted for his grandjurytestimony and his understanding ofthe implications ofhis plea agreement. The decision does not disclose whetherthe witness testifiedto the maximum sentence he faced. State Cases In Jackson v. State, 37 So. 3d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), the trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning State witnesses as to the maximum and minimum sentences they avoided by testifying against the defendant. Thereviewing court agreed with the defendantthat the trial court committed error. The trial court affirmed the conviction, however, becausethe error was harmless. In State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 571 S.E.2d 752 (2002), thejuryheard thatthe State's witness reached an agreement withthe State to testify againstthe defendant in exchange for the State recommending a sentence often years. The trial courtprecluded, however, defense counsel from asking the witness about his understanding ofthe disparity between the sentence the State would recommend in exchange for his cooperation and the sentence he would have received withoutthat cooperation. The Georgia Court ofAppeals reversed and the Supreme Court affirmedthe Court of Appeals. The State argued that such evidence was prejudicial because thejurymight conclude that the defendant would receive the same sentence the witness faced without 8No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia cooperation. The Peach State Supreme Court answered thatthis problem could be addressed by the trial court giving a limiting instruction. The state high courtheldthat the defendant's confrontation clause rights were infringed and, afterreviewing other evidence, the court concludedthe error was harmful. In State v. Brown, 303 S.C. 169, 399 S.E.2d 593 (1991), the trial court sustained the State's objectionto defense counsel asking the State's witness as to the mandatory length ofpunishment for the dropped charge. The reviewing court, relying on the United States Constitution's confrontation clause, held that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination. The reviewing court remandedthe case for a new trial. The courtheld thejury should be free to weigh the sentence the witness would have received with the sentence actually received. The witness's evidence was crucial to the prosecution. The reviewing court rejected the State's argumentthatthejurywould have learned the defendant's ownpotential sentence ifconvicted. Defendant's right to a meaningful cross-examination outweighedthe State's interest in shielding evidence ofthe defendant's prospective sentence from thejury. In State v. Bennett, 550 So. 2d 201 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the reviewing court reversed the defendant's conviction for solicitation ofmurder. The court heldthatthe trial court erred in refusing the defendant the opportunity to ask the collaboratingwitness
as to the maximum sentence he could have received ifhe failed to cooperate withthe State. The court suggested that impermissibly curtailing cross-examination couldnever be harmless. 9No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
In Meyer v. State, 498 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), the reviewing court upheld the trial court's barring ofquestioning ofthe State's witness as to the maximum and minimum sentence he faced with his deal withthe State. The court considered sufficientthejury'shearing that the witness received a reduced sentence in exchange for testifying. Meyer v. State may conflictwithJackson v. State. In State v. Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 587 P.2d 236 (1978), the reviewing court reversed the defendant's conviction for first degree murder. The courtheldthatthe trial court committedreversible error in precluding defense counsel from attacking the credibility ofajuvenile witness who had participated in the torture ofthe victim by showing the punishmentthejuvenile mighthave received had he not agreed to testify against the defendant. The trial courtprecludedthe testimony onthe groundthatthejury would hear the possible sentence faced by the defendant. Thereviewing court held that this factor did not outweigh the defendant's right to examine the witness as to the penalty he would have faced ifhe had not agreed to testify. In State v. Larrabee, 377 A.2d 463 (Me. 1977), the reviewing court noted that defense counsel should be free to question the State's witness as to the existence ofan agreement and the extentofthe benefits the witness will likely obtainby cooperative testimony. Nevertheless, the court refused to reverse the trial courtbecause the State charged the defendant with the same crime thatthe witness avoided withthe agreement. The rule that thejury should not know the sentence thatthe defendant faced prevailed. The court also rejected the salutary effect ofa limiting instruction. 10No. 31611-4-III State v. Samalia
In State v. Alston, 17 N.C. App. 712, 195 S.E.2d 314 (1973), the trialjudgebarred questioning ofthe State's witness as to the maximum sentence the witness confrontedbut for his cooperation with the State. The reviewing court heldthe restrictionto violate defendant's right to show bias ofa witness and ordered a new trial.

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