FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

JASON YOUNG:

JOHN C. TRIMBLE

SONIA C. DAS MATTHEW M. GOLITKO

Lewis Wagner, LLP Golitko & Daly, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

HOOD’S GARDENS, INC., )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 29A04-1201-PL-8

)

JASON YOUNG, CRAIG MEAD d/b/a/ )

DISCOUNT TREE EXTRACTION a/k/a D & E )

TREE EXTRACTION, )

)

Appellees. )

APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge

Cause No. 29D03-1008-PL-3192

September 4, 2012

OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Senior Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Hood’s Gardens, Inc. (“HG”)1appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its declaratory 

judgment action involving Craig Mead D/B/A Discount Tree Extraction a/k/a D & E Tree 

Extraction (“D & E”)2and Jason Young (“Young”).

We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing HG’s declaratory 

judgment action, thus rendering HG’s summary judgment motion 

moot.

FACTS

HG is a wholesale greenhouse located in Noblesville that entered into an oral 

contract with D & E, whereby D & E would remove an oak tree for the stated price of 

$600, with D & E to clear and haul away the wood and debris. Shortly thereafter, D & E 

sent Dennis Wyant, a subcontractor, to cut the limbs from the tree. On or about October 

6, 2009, Young arrived at the property and advised HG that Mead, D & E’s owner, had 

sent him to remove the remainder of the tree, which stood between ten and fifteen feet 

high. While he was removing the tree on HG’s premises, Young sustained severe 

injuries resulting in paraplegia. On or about October 27, 2009, an attorney representing 

Young made a demand that HG pay worker’s compensation benefits to Young. HG

 

1 We note that the complaint below and the Appellee’s brief refer to the plaintiff as “Hood’s Gardens,” 

while the appellant’s brief, reply brief, and appendix on appeal refer to the plaintiff as “Hoods Gardens.”

2 D & E did not file a brief in this appeal. 
3

became aware that it might be exposed to payment of Young’s worker’s compensation 

benefits under Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14(b), a statute that provides the following:

. . . [A]ny corporation . . . contracting for the performance of any work 

exceeding one thousand dollars ($1000) in value by a contractor subject to 

the compensation provisions of [the Worker’s Compensation Act], without 

exacting from such contractor a certificate from the worker’s compensation 

board showing that such contractor has complied with [worker’s 

compensation insurance statutes] shall be liable to the same extent as the 

contractor for compensation, physician’s fees, hospital fees, nurse’s 

charges, and burial expenses on account of the injury or death of any 

employee of such contractor, due to an accident arising out of and in the 

course of the performance of the work covered by such contract.

On August 26, 2010, HG filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the 

Hamilton County Superior Court. In its complaint, HG stated the following:

9. On or about October 6, 2009, [Young] and his helpers were 

removing the wood from [HG’s property] when Young sustained 

personal injuries.

10. Pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-15-1-2, [HG] is a person interested in 

having determined a question of construction or validity under the 

statute, and to obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 

relationships under the statute.

* * * *

14. Upon information and belief, on October 6, 2009, [D & E] did not 

have in place a policy of worker’s compensation insurance, nor had 

[D & E] been granted a certificate of exemption by the worker’s 

compensation board.

15. [HG] has reason to believe that [Young] may file a worker’s 

compensation claim against [D & E] for the injuries he sustained.
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16. To the extent [Young] may file a worker’s compensation claim 

against [D & E], [Young] and [D & E] may seek to hold [HG] liable 

for the payment of worker’s compensation benefits.

17. [HG] has no duty to pay worker’s compensation benefits on behalf 

of [Young] and is not liable for the injuries of [Young] under Ind. 

Code § 22-3-2-14 because the value of the work performed by 

[Young] did not exceed One Thousand Dollars ($,1000).

18. [HG] has no duty to pay worker’s compensation benefits on behalf 

of [Young] and is not liable for the injuries of [Young] under Ind. 

Code § 22-3-2-14 because the value of the work performed by [D & 

E] did not exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1000).

(App. 9-10).

On October 25, 2010, Young filed an answer to the complaint. D & E did not file 

a responsive pleading, and on April 6, 2011, the trial court issued an order of default

judgment against D & E.

On June 20, 2011, almost a year after HG filed its complaint for declaratory 

judgment, Young filed an application for adjustment claim with the Indiana Worker’s 

Compensation Board (“the Board”), naming D & E and HG as defendants. A single 

hearing member of the Board issued an order staying the proceedings pending resolution 

of HG’s declaratory judgment action “as it pertains to those issues which are or may be 

outcome determinative to the present action.” (HG’s Ex. 1 at 2).

On July 29, 2011, HG filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the 

trial court declare, as a matter of law, that there was no legal basis upon which HG could 

be found secondarily liable to pay worker’s compensation benefits to or on behalf of 
5

Young because the condition determining secondary liability—a contract exceeding 

$1000.00 in value—had not been met. Young timely filed a response to HG’s summary 

judgment motion.

On September 28, 2011, Young filed an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to 

dismiss the declaratory judgment action on the basis that the trial court did not have 

subject matter jurisdiction because the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the issues 

raised by HG. In an affidavit attached to the motion to dismiss; Young averred that he 

was “working for” D & E when he was injured on HG’s premises, that D & E was to 

keep the wood removed from the premises “[a]s part of [its] compensation”; and that the 

value of the wood removed from the premises “exceeded $400,” thereby making the 

value of the contract to be at least $1,000. (App. 54). 

After hearing argument on Young’s motion to dismiss and HG’s summary 

judgment motion, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court made no 

explicit finding of facts, instead concluding that the location of Indiana Code section 22-

3-2-14(b) in the Worker’s Compensation Act deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction 

and placed exclusive jurisdiction with the Board. The trial court concluded that HG’s

summary judgment motion was moot. 

DECISION

HG contends that the trial court erred in granting Young’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The standard of review for motions to dismiss for lack 
6

of subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on what happened at the trial level. Hatke v. 

Fiddler, 868 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Here, where the trial court ruled on a 

paper record without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our standard of review is de 

novo. GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction presents a threshold 

question concerning the trial court’s power to act. Curry v. D.A.L.L. Annointed, Inc., 966 

N.E.2d 91, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Actions taken by a court lacking 

jurisdiction are void. Id. The party challenging subject matter jurisdiction has the burden 

of establishing that jurisdiction does not exist. Id. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may consider not only the complaint and 

motion but also any affidavits or evidence submitted in support. GKN, 744 N.E.2d. In 

addition, the trial court may weigh the evidence to determine the existence of the 

requisite jurisdictional facts. Id. 

Two legislative acts are at issue here. The first is the Worker’s Compensation Act,

which provides in Indiana Code section 22-3-1-2 that the Board shall administer “the 

worker’s compensation law (IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6).” Indiana Code section 22-3-

1-3 grants and limits the authority of the Board, and it provides in part that the Board is 

authorized, among other things, to “hear, determine, and review all claims for 

compensation under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-7.” The “exclusivity provision” of the 

Act provides that the “rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to IC 22-3-2 
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through 22-3-6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other 

rights and remedies of such employee . . . .” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6. It is this exclusivity 

provision which may deprive a trial court of its jurisdiction. See Williams v. R.H. Marlin, 

Inc., 656 N.E.2d 1145, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Here, although Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14(b) falls within the broad 

provisions of the Act, the specific issue arising from the statute does not pertain to the 

“rights and remedies granted to an employee” that are the subject of the Act’s exclusivity 

provision. It is important to note that the exclusivity provision of the Act bars all other 

rights and remedies of the employee; it does not limit a trial court’s jurisdiction to make a 

threshold determination about whether an employer is subject to the Act’s rights and 

remedies provisions. 

The second important act is the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, which is 

intended to furnish an adequate and complete remedy where none before had existed. 

Ember v. Ember, 720 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Madden v. Hauck, 403 

N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). The test to determine the propriety of 

declaratory relief is whether the issuance of a declaratory judgment will effectively solve 

the problem involved, whether it will serve a useful purpose, and whether or not another 

remedy is more effective or efficient. Boone County Area Plan Comm’n v. Kennedy, 560 

N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. The determinative factor of this test 

is whether the declaratory action will result in a just and more expeditious and 
8

economical determination of the entire controversy. Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club 

Condominiums Phase I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 

Young made a demand for benefits less than thirty days after he sustained his 

injuries, yet he took no action against HG for nearly two years. Absent the Uniform 

Declaratory Judgment Act, HG had no legal remedy to have its contract with Mead 

construed to determine whether HG was at risk of liability. Further, HG had no 

expeditious remedy before the Board, which has not adopted Rules 12 or 56 of the 

Indiana Trial Rules.

Trial courts should exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act 

where it serves as a more judicious and economical way of resolving a controversy. In 

the present case, the issuance of a declaratory judgment serves the useful purpose of 

determining whether the value of the contract between D & E and HG is a statutory basis 

for changing HG’s legal status. Therefore, the Act is an appropriate vehicle for resolving 

the issue raised by HG in its complaint. 

CONCLUSION

The exclusivity provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act did not give the 

Board exclusive jurisdiction to decide the simple contract construction issue raised in the 

trial court by HG. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Young’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and in deciding that HG’s summary judgment motion was 

moot. 
9

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.