1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references to

sections other than secs. 6320 and 6330 are to the Internal

Revenue Code of 1986 in effect for 1999 and 2001, the taxable

years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court

Rules of Practice and Procedure.

T.C. Summary Opinion 2006-35

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

OMAR URBINA PINEDA, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 3081-05S. Filed February 27, 2006.

Omar Urbina Pineda, pro se.

Gavin L. Greene, for respondent.

ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to

the provisions of sections 6330(d) and 7463(f)(2) of the Internal

Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 The
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decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and

this opinion should not be cited as authority.

This case arises from a petition filed in response to a

Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under

Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) for the

taxable years 1999 and 2001 (years in issue). After the parties’

concessions concerning the amounts of earned income credit (EIC)

to which petitioner is entitled for the years in issue, the

issues for decision are:

(1) Whether respondent abused his discretion in failing to

abate interest for the years in issue. We hold that he did not.

(2) Whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax for

the years in issue. We hold that he is.

(3) Whether respondent abused his discretion in failing to

consider an installment agreement. We hold that he did.

Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so

found. We incorporate by reference the parties’ stipulation of

facts and accompanying exhibits.

At the time that the petition was filed, petitioner resided

in Burbank, California.

During the years in issue, petitioner was going through a

divorce and paying child support.
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2 On Oct. 28 and Nov. 11, 2002, respondent partially abated

interest for reasons unexplained in the record.

A. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 1999

On October 17, 2000, petitioner timely filed a Form 1040,

U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the taxable year 1999.

Petitioner attached, inter alia, to the return a Schedule C,

Profit or Loss From Business. On Schedule C, petitioner

identified his business name as “Alfonsos of Hollywood” and his

principal business or profession as “other leather and allied

product mfg”. Petitioner reported net profit from his business

on Schedule C of $4,254. On the return, petitioner reported

adjusted gross income (AGI) of $3,953, zero taxable income, and

self-employment tax of $601. He also claimed an EIC of $1,590

and a refund of $989.

On May 28, 2002, petitioner filed an amended return for the

taxable year 1999. On the amended return, petitioner reported

AGI of $29,487, taxable income of $14,887, self-employment tax of

$4,483, and total tax of $5,714. He also claimed a child tax

credit of $1,000 and an EIC of $233. He did not remit payment

with the amended return.

On the basis of petitioner’s 1999 amended return, respondent

assessed additional tax plus statutory interest and an addition

to tax for failure to timely pay under section 6651(a)(2).2
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B. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2001

On May 20, 2002, petitioner timely filed a Form 1040 for the

taxable year 2001. Petitioner attached, inter alia, to the

return a Schedule C on which he reported net profit from his

business of $39,313. On the return, petitioner reported AGI of

$37,486, taxable income of $24,986, self-employment tax of

$5,555, and total tax of $8,398. He also claimed a child tax

credit of $1,200. He then reported an amount owed of $8,730,

which included an estimated tax penalty of $332. Petitioner did

not remit payment with the return, and he did not make any

estimated tax payments for 2001.

On the basis of petitioner’s return, respondent assessed the

tax shown on the return plus statutory interest, an addition to

tax for failure to timely pay under section 6651(a)(2), and an

addition to tax for failure to pay estimated tax under section

6654(a).

On December 13, 2002, petitioner filed an amended return for

the taxable year 2001. On the amended return, petitioner

reported AGI of $29,580, taxable income of $16,330, selfemployment tax of $4,353, total tax of $5,302, and an estimated

tax penalty of $188. He also claimed child tax credits of $1,500

and an EIC of $557. He did not remit payment with the amended

return.
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3 We note that only taxable years 1999 and 2001 are in

issue in the present case.

Respondent accepted petitioner’s amended return and abated

petitioner’s tax accordingly.

C. Final Notice Of Intent To Levy

On January 21, 2003, respondent sent petitioner a Final

Notice Of Intent To Levy And Notice Of Your Right To A Hearing

with respect to petitioner’s outstanding tax liabilities for 1999

and 2001. See sec. 6330(a).

On February 19, 2003, petitioner timely filed a Form 12153,

Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (CDP hearing). On

the Form 12153, petitioner stated:

The IRS filed a Notice of Levy on 01/21/03, and

actually mailed it on 01/31/03. In the interim, I

requested for more time to file amended returns for

1999, 2000 & 2001 because of errors.[3]

On April 2, 2003, respondent’s collection office forwarded

the Form 12153 to respondent’s Appeals Office. The Appeals

Office received the case on April 7, 2003, and assigned the case

to Appeals Officer Michael M. McDonnell on June 26, 2003.

On July 24, 2003, the Appeals officer sent petitioner a

letter acknowledging that the Appeals Office had received

petitioner’s case and informing petitioner that the Appeals

officer would be “unable to work your case for 90 to 120 day

[sic].”
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The Appeals officer sent petitioner a letter dated June 29,

2004, scheduling a hearing for July 12, 2004. The letter further

directed petitioner to file his 2002 tax return and to provide

proof of estimated tax payments for the taxable years 2002, 2003,

and 2004. On July 12, 2004, the Appeals officer received the

June 29, 2004 letter, which was returned to him marked “not

deliverable as addressed, unable to forward”.

On that same day, the Appeals officer telephoned petitioner

at which time petitioner expressed an interest in an installment

agreement. The Appeals officer directed petitioner to (1) file

petitioner’s 2002 and 2003 returns by July 28, 2004; (2) make

estimated tax payments for 2004; and (3) complete Form 433-A,

Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and SelfEmployed Individuals. The Appeals officer then scheduled another

hearing for July 21, 2004. On July 13, 2004, the Appeals officer

sent petitioner a letter documenting the terms established in

their conversation.

On July 14, 2004, petitioner telephoned the Appeals officer

to reschedule the hearing for July 16, 2004.

D. Petitioner’s CDP Hearing

On July 16, 2004, petitioner attended a hearing with the

Appeals officer. At the hearing, petitioner again expressed an

interest in entering into an installment agreement. He requested
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4 The Appeals officer calculated total income by dividing

the net profit reported in petitioner’s 2003 return by 12, and he

increased living expenses by $350 for estimated tax payments.

additional time to pay estimated tax payments for 2004 and to

complete Form 433-A by August 4, 2004.

On July 29, 2004, petitioner submitted to the Appeals

officer a completed Form 433-A and petitioner’s returns for the

taxable years 2002 and 2003. Form 433-A reported monthly income

of $1,800 and total living expenses of $1,674. The Form 433-A in

the record also contained the Appeals officer’s handwritten

notations indicating total income of $2,199 and total living

expenses of $2,024.4 The Appeals officer indicated in his notes

that Form 433-A showed that petitioner “had very little ability

to make installment payments”. Petitioner did not make estimated

tax payments by August 4, 2004, but the Appeals officer extended

the deadline for the payments until August 9, 2004.

On July 30, 2004, the Appeals officer sent petitioner a

letter acknowledging receipt of Form 433-A and petitioner’s 2002

and 2003 returns and directing petitioner to submit proof by

August 16, 2004, that petitioner’s 2004 estimated tax payments

were current.

On August 9, 2004, petitioner informed the Appeals officer

that he could pay only one-half of the 2004 estimated tax

payments with the balance payable in September 2004. On August

12, 2004, petitioner sent the Appeals officer a letter enclosing
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a check of $1,075 for one-half of petitioner’s 2004 estimated tax

payments. The letter further indicated that petitioner would pay

the balance in full on or before September 16, 2004.

On September 29, 2004, petitioner sent the Appeals officer a

letter stating, inter alia, that he would be mailing the balance

due for his 2004 estimated tax payment on October 4, 2004.

On October 4, 2004, petitioner sent the Appeals officer a

letter enclosing a check of $1,074 for the remaining balance of

petitioner’s 2004 estimated tax payments.

By October 15, 2004, petitioner was in compliance with his

tax obligations sufficient for consideration of a collection

alternative such as an installment agreement. The Appeals

officer determined, however, that there was an income discrepancy

of $175 between Form 433-A and petitioner’s 2003 return. The

Appeals officer requested petitioner to submit additional

financial information by November 4, 2004. On November 5, 2004,

petitioner requested additional time. At a time not disclosed in

the record, petitioner submitted bank and expense statements,

business and rent invoices, and utility invoices. On November

16, 2004, the Appeals officer closed petitioner’s case because

petitioner failed to provide the requested information by the

deadline.
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E. Notice of Determination

On January 19, 2005, respondent’s Appeals Office issued to

petitioner a notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s

outstanding liabilities for the years in issue. In the notice of

determination, respondent sustained the proposed levy because

petitioner “failed to provide financial information requested.”

F. Petition

On February 17, 2005, petitioner filed with the Court a

petition under section 6330(d) disputing respondent’s

determination. Paragraph 4 of the petition states:

I am petitioning the US Tax Court for relief of all

accrued interest for 12/1999 & 12/2001 tax periods. On

02/13/03, I submitted a “Request For A Collection Due

Process Hearing” Form 12153, for 12/1999, 12/2000, &

12/2001 tax periods. I did not hear from the IRS

appeals office until 07/04, 17 months from the time I

first filed Form 12153. As a result of this unfair

delay, the IRS appeals office caused the IRS to accrued

[sic] additional interest on my 12/1999 & 12/2001 tax

returns. Finally, the IRS appeals office mismanaged my

collection due process.

Discussion

Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot

proceed with the collection by levy on a taxpayer’s property

until the taxpayer has been given notice of, and the opportunity

for, an administrative review of the matter (in the form of an

Appeals Office hearing) and, if dissatisfied, with judicial

review of the administrative determination. See Davis v.
- 10 -

Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114

T.C. 176, 179 (2000).

Section 6330(c) prescribes the matters that the taxpayer may

raise at an Appeals Office hearing. In sum, section

6330(c)(2)(A) provides that the taxpayer may raise collection

issues such as spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the

Commissioner’s intended collection action, and alternative means

of collection. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) further provides that the

taxpayer may challenge the existence and amount of the underlying

tax liability if the taxpayer did not receive a notice of

deficiency for the tax in question or did not otherwise have an

earlier opportunity to dispute the tax liability. See Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner,

supra at 180-181; see also Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488,

492 (2002); Wooten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-113. Section

6330(d) provides for judicial review of the administrative

determination in the Tax Court or a Federal District Court, as

may be appropriate.

It is well settled that where the validity of the underlying

tax liability is properly at issue in a collection review

proceeding, the Court will review the matter de novo. Goza v.

Commissioner, supra at 181-182. Where the validity of the

underlying tax liability, however, is not properly at issue, the
- 11 -

Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative determination

for abuse of discretion. Id.

In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we generally consider

“only arguments, issues, and other matter that were raised at the

collection hearing or otherwise brought to the attention of the

Appeals Office.” Magana v. Commissioner, supra at 493; Miller v.

Commissioner, 115 T.C. 582, 589 n.2 (2000), affd. per curiam 21

Fed. Appx. 160 (4th Cir. 2001); Sego v. Commissioner, supra at

612.

A. Interest Abatement

If, as part of the CDP hearing, a taxpayer makes a request

for abatement of interest, the Court has jurisdiction over the

request for abatement of interest that is the subject of the

Commissioner’s collection activities. Katz v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 329, 340-341 (2000).

Clearly, petitioner raised the issue of interest abatement

in the petition. Respondent contends, however, that petitioner

did not raise interest abatement at the CDP hearing. Petitioner,

on the other hand, contends that he did. Therefore, we must

first decide whether petitioner properly raised interest

abatement at his CDP hearing.

Petitioner testified at trial that he discussed interest

abatement with the Appeals officer. The Appeals officer,

however, testified that there was no discussion at the CDP
- 12 -

5 We note that Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments,

Payments, and Other Specified Matters, shows that respondent

abated interest for 1999 on Oct. 28 and Nov. 11, 2002, for

reasons unexplained in the record.

hearing relating to interest abatement. Moreover, there is no

reference in the notice of determination that petitioner

requested interest abatement. Other than his own testimony, the

record does not establish that petitioner raised interest

abatement in his CDP hearing such that it would be subject to

review in this collection proceeding. See Magana v.

Commissioner, supra; Miller v. Commissioner, supra; see also sec.

301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the record established

that petitioner raised interest abatement at the CDP hearing,

that we have jurisdiction under section 6404 to consider

petitioner’s request for interest abatement, see Washington v.

Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114, 123-124 (2003); Katz v. Commissioner,

supra at 340-341, and that respondent’s workload priorities may

have constituted a managerial act, see sec. 301.6404-2(b)(1),

Proced. & Admin. Regs.,5 we conclude that petitioner failed to

establish that respondent abused his discretion in failing to

abate interest under section 6404.

Essentially, petitioner failed to demonstrate that he would

have (or could have) paid his tax liabilities if the Appeals

officer had begun working on petitioner’s case as early as
- 13 -

February 13, 2003 (the date of Form 12153), or July 24, 2003 (the

date of the Appeals officer’s letter informing petitioner that

the Appeals officer could not work on petitioner’s case for 90 to

120 days). Indeed, petitioner candidly admitted at trial that he

did not have the financial resources to pay his outstanding

liabilities at the time he filed his returns and at all relevant

times throughout this collection action. It is well settled that

if, notwithstanding respondent’s error or dilatory act or

omission, no earlier payment would have been made, then no

abatement is called for. Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2004-69, affd. 125 Fed. Appx. 547 (5th Cir. 2005); see Hawksley

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-354. Accordingly, we conclude

that respondent did not abuse his discretion in failing to abate

interest.

B. Additions to Tax

The income tax assessments against petitioner include

additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) for the years in issue

and section 6654(a) for 2001. At trial, petitioner contested his

liability for the additions to tax. This issue was not raised in

the petition, see Rule 331(b)(4); however, respondent did not

object. We therefore regard this issue as having been tried by

consent as if it had been raised in the petition. See Rule

41(b).
- 14 -

6 Respondent has the burden of production with respect to

additions to tax. Sec. 7491(c); see Swain v. Commissioner, 118

T.C. 358, 363 (2002); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.

438, 446 (2001). Respondent, however, does not have the burden

to introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause or substantial

authority. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446-447. On the

basis of the record, we are satisfied that respondent has met his

burden of production.

Petitioner did not receive a notice of deficiency and did

not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the additions to tax

relating to his income tax liabilities; therefore, he can

challenge them during the section 6330 proceeding. Sec.

6330(c)(2)(B); Katz v. Commissioner, supra at 339. We review de

novo respondent’s determination with respect to these additions

to tax.6 See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 181-182.

We first address the addition to tax under section

6651(a)(2). Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for

failure to pay tax shown on a return on or before the payment due

date. The addition to tax is one-half percent of the amount

shown as tax on a return for each month or fraction thereof

during which the failure to pay continues, not exceeding 25

percent in the aggregate. Sec. 6651(a)(2). The addition to tax

under section 6651(a)(2) does not apply, however, if the failure

is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Sec.

301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see United States v.

Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985); Jackson v. Commissioner, 864
- 15 -

F.2d 1521, 1527 (10th Cir. 1989), affg. 86 T.C. 492 (1986);

Crocker v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 899, 912 (1989).

Petitioner may demonstrate reasonable cause for late payment

by showing that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence

in providing for payment of his tax liability and was

nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an

undue hardship if he paid the tax by the due date. Sec.

301.6651-1(c), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see United States v.

Boyle, supra at 246. To constitute “undue hardship”, the

hardship must be more than an inconvenience to the taxpayer, and

it must appear that substantial financial loss would result to

the taxpayer from making payment by the due date. Sec. 1.6161-

1(b), Income Tax Regs. “Willful neglect” is defined as a

“conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference.” 

United States v. Boyle, supra at 245.

At the time that petitioner filed his returns, he failed to

remit the amount shown as tax. Petitioner contends that he did

not remit payment for the years in issue because of financial

hardship due to his personal expenses related to his divorce and

child support payments and his business expenses. Specifically,

petitioner argues that he had substantial legal bills and that

his business was struggling. Although we are mindful that his

personal and business circumstances constrained his financial

resources, petitioner has nevertheless failed to establish that
- 16 -

he would have suffered substantial loss if he had paid his taxes

by the due date. We also observe that adverse economic

conditions do not necessarily constitute reasonable cause because

almost every nonwillful failure to pay taxes is the result of

financial difficulties. See Wolfe v. United States, 612 F.Supp.

605, 607-608 (D. Mont. 1985), affd. on other grounds 798 F.2d

1241 (9th Cir. 1986).

We therefore conclude that petitioner failed to demonstrate

that his failure to timely pay tax shown on his returns was due

to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. See sec. 301.6651-

1(c), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; sec. 1.6161-1(b), Income Tax Regs. 

Accordingly, petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under

section 6651(a)(2) for the years in issue.

We next address the addition to tax under section 6654 for

the taxable year 2001. Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to

tax for failure to make timely estimated income tax payments. 

Section 6654(e) contains several computational exceptions to

application of the addition to tax. As relevant herein, there is

no addition to tax under section 6654(a) if the tax shown on the

return is less than $1,000, sec. 6654(e)(1), or the taxpayer did

not have any liability for tax for the preceding taxable year,

sec. 6654(e)(2).

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that he paid

estimated tax or that any of the exceptions excuse him from
- 17 -

paying estimated tax. See Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner,

116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). The addition to tax for failure to pay

estimated tax is mandatory, unless petitioner can show that he

qualifies for one of the exceptions. Grosshandler v.

Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20-21 (1980) (citing Estate of Ruben v.

Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1071, 1072 (1960)).

Petitioner did not pay estimated tax for the taxable year

2001. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that his failure to

timely pay estimated tax qualifies for one of the exceptions

under section 6654(e). See Rule 142(a). Accordingly, petitioner

is liable for the addition to tax under section 6654(a) for 2001.

C. Installment Agreement

Petitioner contends that respondent abused his discretion by

mismanaging his “collection due process”. Respondent, on the

other hand, contends that there was no abuse of discretion

because petitioner failed to provide the necessary information

for an installment agreement, such as a monthly payment amount

and pertinent financial information.

We review this matter for abuse of discretion. See Orum v.

Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1, 12-13 (2004), affd. 412 F.3d 819 (7th

Cir. 2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when respondent takes

action that is arbitrary or capricious, lacks sound basis in law,

or is not justifiable in light of the facts and circumstances. 

Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988).
- 18 -

7 Sec. 6159(c), an exception not herein presented, requires

the Commissioner to enter into an installment agreement in

certain circumstances (generally involving tax liabilities of

less than $10,000). 

As relevant herein, section 6159 authorizes the Commissioner

to enter into an installment agreement with taxpayers to satisfy

their tax liabilities if the Commissioner determines that such

agreements will facilitate the collection of the liability.7

Sections 301.6159-1, 301.6320-1, and 301.6330-1, Proced. & Admin.

Regs., together with the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), provide

the procedures for determining whether an installment agreement

will facilitate collection of the liability. See, e.g., Orum v.

Commissioner, supra at 13 (upholding Commissioner’s determination

because the taxpayers failed to timely provide requested

information regarding their current financial condition in

accordance with IRM guidelines); see also 2 Administration,

Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), pt. 5.19.1.5.4.1, (July 1, 2002).

For an installment agreement to be approved, a taxpayer must be

in compliance with all filing requirements. Internal Revenue

Manual (CCH) pt. 5.14.1.4.1(5) (July 1, 2002); see Rodriguez v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-153 (a determination that a

taxpayer is not entitled to a collection alternative such as an

offer-in-compromise does not constitute an abuse of discretion if

the taxpayer was not currently in compliance with Federal tax

laws).
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Throughout the CDP hearing, petitioner clearly expressed an

interest in a collection alternative such as an installment

agreement. The Appeals officer testified that he first had to

ensure that petitioner was in current compliance with

petitioner’s tax obligations before he could consider a

collection alternative such as an offer-in-compromise or an

installment agreement. He further required petitioner to submit

Form 433-A in order to consider collection alternatives. 

Pursuant to the Appeals officer’s directives, petitioner

submitted a completed Form 433-A and became compliant with his

tax obligations by October 15, 2004.

Thereafter, the Appeals officer determined that there was an

income discrepancy of $175 between information reported on

petitioner’s 2003 return and Form 433-A. To clarify this

discrepancy, the Appeals officer requested petitioner to submit

additional financial information, such as business receipt and

expense information, by November 4, 2004. At a time not

disclosed in the record, petitioner submitted several documents,

including bank and expense statements, business and rent

invoices, and utility bills. The Appeals officer closed the case

on November 16, 2004.

The Appeals officer determined that he could not consider an

installment agreement largely on the basis that he did not have

the required financial information to reconcile the $175 income
- 20 -

8 We note, in contrast, that on July 29, 2004, the Appeals

officer indicated in his notes that Form 433-A showed that

petitioner had “very little ability to make installment

payments.”

discrepancy between Form 433-A and petitioner’s 2003 return.8

The record, however, does not reveal the basis for this finding. 

At trial, the Appeals officer could not identify what specific

document he was seeking to reconcile the $175 discrepancy, but he

acknowledged that petitioner submitted several personal and

business financial documents. The Appeals officer testified, in

relevant part, that he was

trying to seek current business receipt information and

current business expense information to determine the

actual net income that he [petitioner] was receiving so

that I could determine, you know, compare it with the

expenses, actually verify the expenses and then verify

the current income to determine if there could be an

installment agreement and what that amount would be, if

there could be.

We find the $175 income discrepancy to be de minimis in

amount. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the Appeals

officer may not have received the “financial information

requested” that was necessary to reconcile the $175 amount,

especially in light of the fact that at trial he was unable to

specify what document he was seeking. At the very least, the

record demonstrates that, notwithstanding the de minimis amount,

petitioner had complied with the Appeals officer’s directives

sufficient for the Appeals officer to make a financial analysis
- 21 -

of petitioner’s monthly income and expenses and ability to pay in

considering an appropriate collection alternative.

We found petitioner to be a conscientious taxpayer trying to

fulfill his Federal income tax obligations, and, in light of the

facts and circumstances of this case, respondent’s failure to

fully consider an installment agreement or other collection

alternative was not justifiable. Accordingly, we hold that it

was an abuse of discretion to issue the notice of determination

under these circumstances.

We shall remand this matter to the Appeals Office for the

sole purpose of considering an installment agreement or other

collection alternative. Petitioner may not further challenge

respondent’s determination not to abate interest or the

imposition of the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(2) and

6654(a) or raise any new or additional issues beyond offering a

collection alternative.

Conclusion

We have considered all of the other arguments made by the

parties, and, to the extent that we have not specifically

addressed them, we conclude that they are without merit.
- 22 -

Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case

Division.

To give effect to the foregoing,

An appropriate order will

be issued.