alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                       6,340,614
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,944,535
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (225,615)
<INVENTORY>                                    618,583
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,030,637
<PP&E>                                       1,348,145
<DEPRECIATION>                               (722,813)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,312,576
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,278,300
<BONDS>                                      1,279,764
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       145,206
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,619,213
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,312,576
<SALES>                                      3,122,801
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,122,801
<CGS>                                        1,252,872
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,741,637
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (33,777)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             136,784
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,905,485)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,905,485)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,905,485)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.13)


</TABLE>
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#### KAREN A. D’AMICO (BOCKER) v. RONALD LOUIS D’AMICO.

September 11, 1989.

The parties having stipulated to a dismissal of this matter, it is ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed. (See 117 *N.J.*88).
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Robert H. Mullen, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Newark Group, Inc.;
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: December 14, 2005



/s/ Robert H. MullenRobert H. MullenChief Executive Officer




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 302 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2824 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2824

To exclude from income certain wages of spouses of members of the Armed 
                    Forces serving in combat zones.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 21, 2004

  Mr. Schumer introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To exclude from income certain wages of spouses of members of the Armed 
                    Forces serving in combat zones.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCLUSION FOR CERTAIN WAGES OF SPOUSES OF MEMBERS OF ARMED 
              FORCES SERVING IN COMBAT ZONES.

    (a) In General.--Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to certain combat zone compensation of members of the Armed 
Forces) is amended by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as 
subsections (d) and (e), respectively, and by inserting after 
subsection (b) the following new subsection:
    ``(c) Spouses.--Gross income does not include qualifying wages 
received by the spouse of a person described in subsection (a) or (b) 
for any month during any part of which such person--
            ``(1) served in a combat zone, or
            ``(2) was hospitalized as a result of wounds, disease, or 
        injury incurred while serving in a combat zone; but this 
        paragraph shall not apply for any month beginning more than 2 
        years after the date of the termination of combatant activities 
        in such zone.''.
    (b) Qualifying Wages.--Subsection (d) of section 112 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to definitions), as 
redesignated by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the 
following new paragraph:
            ``(6) The term `qualifying wages' means wages (as defined 
        in section 3121(a)) and self-employment income (as defined in 
        section 1402(b)).''.
    (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2201(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``section 112(c)'' and inserting 
``section 112(d)'' each place it appears.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2003.
                                 <all>
```
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Anthony Robert Jackson,

Defendant.

No. CR-15-01082-PHX-SPL

DETENTION ORDER

On July 30, 2021, Defendant appeared before this Court on a petition for revocation 

of supervised release. The issue of detention was submitted to the Court. The Court 

considered the petition and file in determining whether Defendant should be released on 

conditions set by the Court.

The Court finds that Defendant, having previously been convicted and placed on 

supervised release, and having appeared before the Court in connection with a petition to

revoke his supervised release, has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of the community if released pursuant 

to Rule 46(d), and Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 18 U.S.C. §

3143.

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant be detained pending further 

proceedings. 

Dated this 30th day of July, 2021.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cr-01082-SPL Document 34 Filed 07/30/21 Page 1 of 1
#### John Critcher *v.*Alexander & Bentley.

Costs — Suit to Settle Partnership.

Adjuding all costs against á plaintiff, in a suit for settlement of a partnership, where he succeeds in showing profits made, as against a denial by co-partners, is held to be an abuse of sound judicial discretion.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

April 23, 1869.

Opinion oF the Court by

Judge Williams:

This suit by Crutcher was brought against Alexander and Bentley to settle the accounts between the parties as partners in a hog speculation for one season only; the plaintiff alleging that a large profit had been made and that defendants had done all the selling and' collecting, and refused to pay him his part.

The defendants denied that any profit had been made, but asserted a loss, and this was the only issue save as to a set-off of $100, for money loaned the plaintiff.

After a protracted litigation and three several reports by the commissioner, it was ascertained that a net profit of $31 had been made, which the court adjudged and allowed Crutcher a credit for his third on the set-off of $100, and adjudged against him the remainder of the sum claimed by defendants, and also adjudged against him the entire costs of the suit, including an allowance of $350.00 to the commissioner, from which Crutcher has appealed.

We think the evidence and accounts as taken from the books,’ authorized the last report and approve the judgment confirming it, but we do not see the justice or legality of making Crutcher pay all the costs; he certainly succeeded in showing there was a profit, though small, which the defendants denied, and so far as costs grew out of that litigation he should at furthest be compelled to pay only his pro *rata*portion.

As to the costs which was occasioned by the set-off, the defendants should’ unquestionably recover, but this does not carry all the *41costs, hot, indeed, any part on *the*main litigation and issue of profit or no profit.

Wintersmith, Farleigh, *for appellant.*

*Harris &*Hagan, *for appellees.*

By Section 14, Chapter 25, 1 Stant, Revised Statutes, 289, in “suits to settle partnerships,” “courts shall have judicial discretion in decreeing or not decreeing costs.” To adjudge all the costs against Crutcher was an abuse of sound judicial discretion. We tbiulr that the legal costs of the litigation should be divided according to the respective interest of the parties in the partnership, and this including the costs of both sides so far as it was incurred to •settle the partnership.

Judgment reversed for further proceedings as indicated.
Case 2:15-mj-01749-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/14/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01749-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/14/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01749-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/14/15 Page 3 of 3
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Donna L. Stypeck, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

City of Clarkdale, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-08163-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 The Court has dismissed all Defendants against whom Plaintiff asserted claims 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiff confirmed during a hearing on November 9, 

2016, that the only claims remaining in this case are the assault and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress claims against Defendant Calvert. 

 With Plaintiff’s federal claims eliminated, the basis for this Court’s federal 

question jurisdiction no longer exists. Under the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), 

a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court has 

instructed that “‘if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should 

be dismissed as well.’” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988) 

(quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). While 

not a hard-and-fast rule, that statement has come to mean that “in the usual case in which 

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. 

Case 3:15-cv-08163-DGC Document 101 Filed 11/10/16 Page 1 of 2
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 This is such a case. Plaintiff and Defendant Calvert have litigation pending in 

state court that arises from the same event as this case. In addition, Arizona courts have a 

greater interest and expertise in resolving Arizona state law claims than this Court. 

Finally, remand will benefit the federal system by allowing this Court to devote its scarce 

resources to resolving federal issues. 

IT IS ORDERED that the remaining claims in this case are dismissed without 

prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 10th day of November, 2016. 

Case 3:15-cv-08163-DGC Document 101 Filed 11/10/16 Page 2 of 2
Case 2:15-mj-01843-JFM Document 3 Filed 11/17/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01843-JFM Document 3 Filed 11/17/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01843-JFM Document 3 Filed 11/17/15 Page 3 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Neptune,

Plaintiff,

v.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03766-PHX-DGC

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

Date: November 27, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Attorney's signature

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed name and bar number

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6000

Telephone number

(404 322-6050

FAX number

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9208 Filed 12/06/17 Page 1 of 1
#### Yoram Ben-Amram, Respondent, v Miriam Hershowitz, Appellant.

[789 NYS2d 313]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated December 3, 2003, as granted her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) to vacate a judgment of the same court entered October 23, 2002, upon her default in answering the complaint, only to the extent of allowing her to serve her answer but preventing her from asserting any affirmative defenses relating to, inter alia, personal jurisdiction.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the judgment entered October 23, 2002, is vacated, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) to vacate the judgment entered upon her default in answering the complaint only to the extent of allowing her to serve an answer but preventing her from asserting any affirmative defenses relating to, inter alia, personal jurisdiction *(see Community State Bank v Haakonson,*94 AD2d 838, 839 [1983]; Siegel, NY Prac § 430, at 698 [3d ed]). Since it was undisputed that the defendant did not reside at the address where personal service was attempted, and the address was not alleged to be the defendant’s place of business, any purported service pursuant to CPLR 308 was ineffective, and the complaint should have been dismissed *(see*CPLR 308; *Perdomo v Chau*
      *639
      *Shing Wong,*275 AD2d 357, 358 [2000]). H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 55

To amend the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972

relating to the dumping of dredged material in Long Island Sound,

and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 7, 1997

Mr. FORBES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To amend the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries

Act of 1972 relating to the dumping of dredged material

in Long Island Sound, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Long Island Sound

5 Preservation and Protection Act’’.
2

•HR 55 IH

1 SEC. 2. DUMPING OF DREDGED MATERIALS IN LONG

2 ISLAND SOUND.

3 Section 106(f) of the Marine Protection, Research,

4 and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1416(f)) is

5 amended to read as follows:

6 ‘‘(f) DUMPING OF DREDGED MATERIAL IN LONG IS7 LAND SOUND.—

8 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—No dredged material from

9 any Federal project, or from any non-Federal

10 project, that contains any of the constituents prohib11 ited as other than trace contaminants (as defined by

12 the Federal ocean dumping criteria set forth in sec13 tion 227.6 of title 40 of the Code of Federal Regula14 tions) may be dumped in Long Island Sound or

15 Block Island Sound, except in cases in which it is

16 demonstrated to the Administrator, and the Admin17 istrator certifies by publication in the Federal Reg18 ister, that the dumping of the dredged material con19 taining such constituents will not cause significant

20 undesirable effects, including the threat associated

21 with bioaccumulation of such constituents in marine

22 organisms.

23 ‘‘(2) FEDERAL PROJECTS EXCEEDING 25,000

24 YARDS.—In addition to other provisions of law and

25 notwithstanding the specific exclusion relating to

26 dredged material in the first sentence in section
3

•HR 55 IH

1 102(a), any dumping of dredged material in Long

2 Island Sound from a Federal project (or pursuant to

3 Federal authorization) by a non-Federal applicant

4 exceeding 25,000 cubic yards shall comply with the

5 criteria established pursuant to the second sentence

6 of section 102(a) relating to the effects of dumping.

7 ‘‘(3) RELATION TO OTHER LAW.—Subsection

8 (d) shall not apply to this subsection.’’.

Æ