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SJC-11885

MARIA A. KITRAS, trustee,1 & others2 vs. TOWN OF AQUINNAH & 

others.3

Suffolk. December 8, 2015. - April 19, 2016.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.

Easement. Necessity. Real Property, Easement. Law of the 

Case.

Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on May 

20, 1997.

After review by the Appeals Court, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 285 

(2005), the case was heard by Charles W. Trombly, Jr., J.

 

1 Of Bear Realty Trust, Bear II Realty Trust, and Gorda 

Realty Trust.

2 James J. Decoulos, as trustee of Bear II Realty Trust and 

Gorda Realty Trust; Mark D. Harding; and Sheila H. Besse and 

Charles D. Harding, Jr., as trustees of Eleanor P. Harding 

Realty Trust.

3 The Commonwealth; Joanne Fruchtman; Jack Fruchtman; 

Benjamin L. Hall, Jr., as trustee of Gossamer Wing Realty Trust; 

Brian M. Hall, as trustee of Baron Land Trust; Caroline Kennedy; 

Edwin Schlossberg; Martha's Vineyard Land Bank; Vineyard 

Conservation Society, Inc.; David Wice; and Betsy Wice.
2

After further review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme 

Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

Jennifer S.D. Roberts for Vineyard Conservation Society, 

Inc.

Diane C. Tillotson for Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

Ronald H. Rappaport for town of Aquinnah.

Wendy H. Sibbison for Maria A. Kitras & another.

Leslie Ann Morse for Mark D. Harding & others.

Jennifer H. Flynn, Assistant Attorney General, for the 

Commonwealth, was present but did not argue.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Lawrence H. Mirel, of the District of Columbia, for 

Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association.

Andrew H. Cohn, Felicia H. Ellsworth, & Claire M. Specht

for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & 

another.

Nicole Friederichs, Lorie Graham, & Jeffrey Pokorak for 

Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah).

Michael Pill, pro se.

SPINA, J. In this case, we are asked to determine whether

easements by necessity were created as a result of an 1878 

partition of Native American common land in the town of Gay Head

(now known as Aquinnah).

4 Gay Head is located on the western 

coast of Martha's Vineyard, connected to the rest of the island 

by an isthmus. At the time of the 1878 partition, Gay Head was 

inhabited solely by members of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head 

(Tribe).5 When two commissioners appointed by the probate court 

 

4 The town of Gay Head officially changed its name to the 

town of Aquinnah in 1997. See St. 1998, c. 110.

5 The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Tribe) was federally 

recognized as a tribe on April 10, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 4193 

(1987).
3

pursuant to statute partitioned the common land into hundreds of 

lots to be held in severalty6 by members of the Tribe, they did 

not include express easements providing rights of access, 

leaving the lots landlocked. The plaintiffs are owners of 

several lots created by this partition and are seeking, over one

hundred years later, easements by necessity over the lots of the 

defendants. We conclude that the defendants presented 

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the 

commissioners intended to include rights of access and,

therefore, no easements by necessity exist.7

1. Procedural history. The plaintiffs initiated this 

action in 1997 by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment. 

In June, 2001, a Land Court judge allowed the defendants' 

motions to dismiss, concluding that the United States was an 

indispensable party because any easement by necessity found 

would burden the tribal lands held in trust by the United 

States. The plaintiffs appealed. In 2005, the Appeals Court 

decided that before addressing the issue whether the United 

 

6 "An estate in severalty is one that is held by a person in 

his own right only, without any other person being joined or 

connected with him, in point of interest, during his estate 

therein." Black's Law Dictionary 1374 (6th ed. 1990), citing 2

W. Blackstone, Commentaries *179.

7 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Aquinnah/Gay 

Head Community Association; The Real Estate Bar Association for

Massachusetts, Inc., and The Abstract Club; Michael Pill; and 

the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head.
4

States was an indispensable party, it first had to decide 

whether easements by necessity could be implied for all or some 

of the lots. Kitras v. Aquinnah, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 291 

(2005) (Kitras I). The court concluded that lots numbered 189 

and above were created by the partition of the common land and,

thus, had the requisite unity of title to establish an easement 

by necessity. Id. at 293-294. Lots 189 and below were deemed 

held in severalty by members of the Tribe, which foreclosed the 

possibility of an easement by necessity because there was no 

unity of title as to those lots.8 Id. at 292. The Appeals Court 

concluded that the United States was not an indispensable party 

because the lands in question were subject to a 1983 settlement 

agreement which provided that any land owned by the Wampanoag 

Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., a federally recognized Native 

American tribe, in the town of Aquinnah or in the Commonwealth, 

would be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. 

See id. at 297. See also Building Inspector & Zoning Officer of 

Aquinnah v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish Hatchery Corp., 443 

Mass. 1, 3, 14 (2004). The Appeals Court reasoned that because 

the Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity as to these lands in 

the 1983 settlement agreement, the need to join the United 

 

8 The record includes lot 189 with both land held in 

severalty and land in common. For clarity and because no issue 

turns on this fact, we will continue to designate lots 189 and 

above as the lots created from the common land.
5

States as a necessary party had been eliminated. Kitras I, 

supra at 298. Ultimately, the Appeals Court reversed and 

remanded the case to the Land Court to determine whether there 

was an intent to create easements affecting lots 189 and above 

and, if so, the scope of such easements. Id. at 301.

On remand, a Land Court judge bifurcated the trial,

addressing first whether rights of access were intended at the 

time of the partition in 1878, creating easements by necessity. 

If so, then the judge would decide the location and proper 

routes of such easements. The parties each submitted documents 

and their respective objections. The judge ruled that the 

parties' focus on lot 178 was not relevant because the Appeals 

Court had concluded that only lots 189 and above have the 

required unity of title for an easement by necessity. The judge 

decided the case on documentary evidence submitted by the 

parties, without testimony. The judge concluded that easements 

by necessity did not exist because there was sufficient evidence 

to rebut the presumed intent of the grantor commissioners to

create access easements. The plaintiffs appealed.

A divided panel of the Appeals Court reversed and remanded 

the case to the Land Court to determine the location of the 

easements by necessity. Kitras v. Aquinnah, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 

10, 18 (2015) (Kitras II). We granted the defendants' 
6

applications for further appellate review.9 The plaintiffs argue 

(1) that there was a presumed intent that the grantees had legal 

access to their lots and the defendants did not present 

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption; and (2) that lot 

178, like the plaintiffs' other lots, is entitled to an easement 

by necessity. The defendants argue that the trial judge (1) 

properly decided that no easements by necessity were created as 

a result of the 1878 partition; and (2) properly declined to 

reconsider whether lot 178 was included in the partition of the 

common lands. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

2. Facts. This case presents a unique set of facts in 

which we must examine a large-scale partition of Native American 

common land that occurred over one hundred years ago and 

ascertain the intent of the parties. The majority of the facts 

arise from several reports written by commissioners appointed by 

the probate court pursuant to statute who were ordered to visit 

and describe the condition and circumstances of the various 

Native American tribes located in Massachusetts. For much of 

the Nineteenth Century, a guardianship system managed the Native 

 

9 The Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc.; Martha's Vineyard 

Land Bank and the town of Aquinnah; and the Commonwealth 

submitted applications for further appellate review.
7

American tribes.10 St. 1828, c. 114, § 2. Under this system, 

Native Americans were designated "involuntary wards of the 

State" where they could not sue or be sued, enter into legally 

binding contracts, or sell land to people outside of their own 

tribe. Report to the Governor and Council, 1862 House Doc. No. 

215, at 39. See Report of the Commissioners, 1849 House Doc. 

No. 46, at 20; 2 C.E. Banks, The History of Martha's Vineyard 14 

(1966) (Banks); St. 1828, c. 114. In the mid-Nineteenth 

Century, the Legislature began to depart from a paternalistic 

system of governance and move toward granting Native Americans 

full citizenship. Report to the Governor and Council, 1862

House Doc. No. 215, at 7. Over the years, the Legislature 

appointed commissioners and committees to visit the Native 

American tribes and assess the tribes' condition, their way of 

life, and whether citizenship would be in their best interest. 

Id. at 6-7.

 

10 The Tribe at Gay Head was different. The Tribe grew 

dissatisfied with their guardians in the early Nineteenth 

Century, and the guardians subsequently resigned. Report of the 

Commissioners, 1849 House Doc. No. 46, at 20. The Tribe had an 

opportunity to accept an act of the Legislature in 1828 and have 

a new guardian appointed. However, the Tribe never accepted the 

act. See id.; St. 1828, c. 114. Therefore, for a majority of 

the Nineteenth Century, the members of the Tribe "[were] without 

any guardian, and the division of their lands, and indeed the 

whole arrangements of their affairs, except of the school money, 

[were] left to themselves." Report of the Commissioners, supra. 

Despite this, the Tribe members were still considered 

"involuntary wards of the State." Report of the Commissioners, 

1862 House Doc. No. 215, at 39.
8

In 1862, the Legislature established the district of Gay 

Head. St. 1862, c. 184, §§ 4, 5. Before the severance at issue 

in this case, Gay Head consisted of about 2,400 acres, of which

about 450 acres were held in severalty and the remainder was 

held by the Tribe in common. Report of the Committee of the 

Legislature of 1869 on the Condition of the Gay Head Indians,

1870 Senate Doc. No. 14, at 4 (Report of the Committee). At 

that time the prevailing custom of the Tribe admitted "that any 

native could, at any time, appropriate to his own use such 

portion of the unimproved common land, as he wished, and, as 

soon as he enclosed it, with a fence, of however frail 

structure, it belonged to him and his heirs forever." Report of 

the Commissioners, 1849 House Doc. No. 46, at 20. See R.L. 

Pease, Report of the Commissioner Appointed to Complete the 

Examination and Determination of All Questions of Title to Land 

and of All Boundary Lines Between the Individual Owners, at Gay 

Head, on the Island of Martha's Vineyard, at 22 (May 22, 1871) 

(Pease Report). The Tribe had another custom that allowed each 

member access, as necessary, across the common land and lands 

held in severalty.11 The Legislature appointed Charles Marston 

 

11 In the plaintiffs' reply brief, they argue for the first 

time that there was no evidence of such tribal custom. We 

decline to address this argument. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as 

amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). See Canton v. Commissioner of 

the Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 795 n.18 (2010).
9

to determine the boundary lines of the land held in severalty by 

Tribe members and the boundary line "between the common lands

. . . and the individual owners adjoining said common lands,"

and report the details and results of his efforts. St. 1863, 

c. 42. Due to "advancing age and sickness," Marston was unable 

to complete the task assigned, but he was able to prepare deeds 

and determine the boundary lines for a number of lots. Report 

of the Commissioner, 1866 House Doc. No. 219, at 3. The 

Legislature appointed Richard Pease to complete Marston's 

charge. See St. 1866, c. 67; Pease Report, supra at 3.

As the boundary lines were being determined in Gay Head, 

the Legislature granted Native Americans full citizenship. An 

Act to Enfranchise the Indians of the Commonwealth, St. 1869, 

c. 463. While other tribes were able to take full advantage of 

their citizenship status, the Tribe at Gay Head remained an 

aberration. Because Gay Head had not been incorporated as a 

town, the Tribe could not freely enjoy the newly acquired 

benefits of citizenship such as voting at town meetings or 

electing town officers. Pease Report, supra at 27-28; Report of 

the Committee, 1870 Senate Doc. No. 14, at 4; Banks, supra at 

17-18. Governor Claflin underlined this "political anomaly" 

during his annual address in 1869. Report of the Committee, 

1870 Senate Doc. No. 14, at 2-4. See Pease Report, supra at 27;

Banks, supra at 17-18. With the hope of resolving the 
10

situation, a committee of Massachusetts Senators and 

Representatives visited Gay Head to determine whether it should 

be incorporated as a town. Report of the Committee, supra. The 

committee concluded that the members of the Tribe were capable 

of self-governance, well qualified, and supportive of the 

prospect of becoming a town. Id. at 11. As a result, the 

committee unanimously recommended that the district of Gay Head 

be incorporated as a town. Id. The Legislature responded 

quickly and officially incorporated the town of Gay Head. St. 

1870, c. 213. The Legislature simultaneously established a 

process by which the members of the Tribe could choose to 

partition the common land. St. 1870, c. 213, § 6. "[A]ny ten 

resident owners of land" or, in the alternative, the selectmen 

of Gay Head may petition the probate court to initiate a 

division of the common land. Id. After notice and a hearing, 

if a probate judge determined that it was in the best interest 

of the parties for the common land to be divided, the judge 

would appoint commissioners to partition the land. Id.

In September, 1870, seventeen Gay Head residents petitioned

a probate judge in Dukes County to divide the common land for 

the residents to hold in severalty.12 Petition, Citation, and 

 

12 The selectmen and a group of other residents of Gay Head 

filed a petition in opposition, characterizing the partition as 

"premature and unsafe," adding that it would "be attended with 
11

Decree for Division and Setting Off Our Lands in Gay Head, 

Sept. 1, 1870. Court records reveal that after a hearing at 

which no one objected, Theodore Mayhew, a probate judge in Dukes 

County, concluded that the partition would be beneficial for the 

residents of Gay Head. Joseph L. and Richard L. Pease were 

appointed commissioners. In addition to partition, Richard 

Pease also was assigned to determine the boundary lines between 

the common land and the land held in severalty. St. 1866, 

c. 67. The commissioners completed the partition in 1878. The 

land was divided into more than 500 lots. Not one lot included 

an express easement of access. As a result, the majority of the 

lots divided from the common land were landlocked. The 

commissioners expressly included a right of access over three 

lots to a creek for the purpose of fishing. They also reserved 

to certain lots the right to remove peat from other lots.

At the time of the division, there was an existing road 

that provided access from the Gay Head lighthouse to Chilmark, 

the neighboring town to the east. Report of the Committee, 1870 

Senate Doc. No. 14, at 9. The road was in such "deplorable 

condition" that the committee in 1870 insisted that the 

 

disastrous consequences" to the inhabitants. Petition of 

persons in Gay Head for Division of Common Lands, Sept. 7, 1870. 

Subsequently, another petition was filed by various residents in 

support of the division of the common land. Petition in and of 

the Petition of Citizens of Gay Head for Division of Common 

Lands, Oct. 17, 1870.
12

Legislature repair the road. Id. However, the lots at issue in 

this case did not abut this road. Over the past one hundred 

years, the landscape of Gay Head has changed. There are other 

roads in existence, such as the Moshup Trail that was created 

decades after the partition of the common land. The plaintiffs' 

lots do not abut these roads and remain landlocked.

3. Standard of review. Generally, in a jury-waived case 

we review the trial judge's findings of fact for clear error. 

See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, 427 

(2014); Board of Registration in Med. v. Doe, 457 Mass. 738, 742 

(2010). However, "[w]here findings are predicated not on the 

assessment of witness credibility but, rather, on documentary 

materials, this highly deferential standard is inapplicable." 

Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 494-495 (2012). In this 

case, we are in the same position as the trial judge to view the 

evidence and therefore no special deference is shown. However, 

this case was not decided on documentary evidence alone. It was 

presumed and undisputed that there was a tribal custom that 

allowed the Tribe members to pass freely over each other's land 

as necessary. This presumed fact is the law of the case and 

with respect to this one issue. We will continue to treat it as

fact. We review the judge's conclusions of law de novo. U.S. 

Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 467 Mass. at 427.
13

4. Easement by necessity. An easement is a limited, 

nonpossessory interest in the land of another that can be 

created expressly, see Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 

605-606 (1992), by prescription, see G. L. c. 187, § 2 (easement 

by prescription), or by implication, see Kitras I, 64 Mass. App. 

Ct. at 291. An easement by necessity is a type of implied 

easement. "An implied easement is 'founded on the idea that it 

is the purpose of the parties that the conveyance shall be 

beneficial to the grantee,'" even if it had not been expressed 

in the instrument of conveyance. Ward v. McGlory, 358 Mass. 

322, 325 (1970), quoting Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 533 

(1918). An easement by necessity most often arises when a 

conveyance renders a parcel of land landlocked. It provides 

access over the parcel that is not landlocked, if the parties so 

intended. There is no public policy that creates an easement by 

necessity to make land accessible. Kitras I, supra at 298. 

Richards v. Attleborough Branch R.R. Co., 153 Mass. 120, 122 

(1891). It is a purchaser's "own folly" that he purchased land 

that had no access to some or all of the land "and he should not 

burden another with a way over his land, for his convenience." 

Orpin, supra at 533-534. Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49, 56 

(1817). "The law does not give a right of way over the land of 

other persons to every owner of land who otherwise would have no 

means of access to it." Richards, supra.
14

The party claiming an easement by necessity has the burden 

of establishing that the parties intended to create an easement 

that is not expressed in the deed. Mt. Holyoke Realty Corp. v. 

Holyoke Realty Corp., 284 Mass. 100, 105 (1933). The law has 

devised a presumption to assist the inquiry into the intent of 

the parties when a conveyance renders a parcel of land 

landlocked. It is the presumed intent of the parties that when 

a parcel of land becomes landlocked as a result of a conveyance

the land conveyed included rights of access. Orpin, 230 Mass. 

at 533. See Davis v. Sikes, 254 Mass. 540, 545 (1926); Schmidt

v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575, 576 (1884) ("for when land is conveyed 

which is inaccessible without trespass, except by passing over 

the land of the grantor, a right of way by necessity is presumed 

to be granted; otherwise, the grant would be practically 

useless"); Bedford v. Cerasuolo, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76-77 

(2004). It is a "pure presumption raised by the law" that an 

easement by necessity exists, and this presumption is construed 

with strictness. Orpin, supra. A presumption of easement by 

necessity arises upon a showing of the following elements: (1) 

unity of title; (2) severance of that unity by a conveyance; and 

(3) necessity arising from the severance, most often when a lot 

becomes landlocked. Kitras I, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 291. The 

necessity must have existed at the time of the division. See

Viall v. Carpenter, 14 Gray 126, 127 (1859).
15

The parties opposing the easement may rebut the presumption 

by presenting evidence that at the time of conveyance the 

parties did not intend to create rights of access. Orpin, 230 

Mass. at 531, 534 (presenting oral testimony of conversation 

between original parties to rebut presumption).13,14 The intent 

of the parties can be ascertained from the circumstances 

surrounding the conveyance, the information known to the parties 

of the conveyance, the language of the instrument, and the 

physical condition of the land. Dale v. Bedal, 305 Mass. 102, 

103 (1940); Davis, 254 Mass. at 545; Orpin, supra at 533.

 

13 Section 301(d) of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 

(2015) is applicable. That section states: "A presumption 

imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of 

production to rebut or meet that presumption. . . . If that 

party fails to come forward with evidence to rebut or meet that 

presumption, the fact is to be taken by the fact finder as 

established. If that party comes forward with evidence to rebut 

or meet the presumption, the presumption shall have no further 

force or effect. A presumption does not shift the burden of 

persuasion, which remains throughout the trial on the party on 

whom it was originally cast."

14 The defendants rely somewhat on the Restatement (Third) 

of Property (Servitudes) § 2.15 (2000) (Restatement) to describe 

the applicable law governing easements by necessity in 

Massachusetts. The Appeals Court determined that the 

Restatement was applicable. See Kitras v. Aquinnah, 87 Mass. 

App. Ct. 10, 16-17 (2015) (Kitras II). We decline to decide 

whether we should adopt the Restatement, as our result would be 

the same under our common law as well as the Restatement. The 

Restatement includes a broader range of issues than this case 

presents, and we reserve for another day the question whether to 

adopt that section of the Restatement.
16

5. Discussion. The Land Court judge assumed that the 

plaintiffs satisfied the elements of a presumption of an intent 

to establish an easement by necessity but concluded that the 

defendants submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed 

intent of the parties. The judge concluded that (1) tribal 

custom and usage of the land, (2) other rights granted, and (3) 

the condition of the land at the time of partition provided 

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed intent. We agree.

We first must determine whether the requisite elements 

exist that give rise to a presumption of an intent to create an 

easement by necessity. There is no dispute amongst the parties 

that, as to the first two elements, there was unity of title

(aside from lot 178) and a subsequent severance of that unity of 

title.15 The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not 

satisfied the third element of necessity arising from the 

severance. There is no question that the lots at issue are 

landlocked. However, we must look to the circumstances at the 

time of the conveyance to determine whether necessity existed. 

Mt. Holyoke Realty Corp., 284 Mass. at 104. Richards, 153 Mass. 

at 122. Schmidt, 136 Mass. at 576-577. At the time of the 

 

15 Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc. (VCS), argues that 

the plaintiffs' contention that title to the common land was 

owned by the town of Gay Head with the Commonwealth retaining 

the power to convey is contrary to the historical record. 

However, VCS acknowledges that "nothing turns on the dispute."
17

partition in question, the prevailing tribal custom was to allow

members of the Tribe to pass freely over the common land and 

land held in severalty when necessary. In other words, the lots 

already had access rights, rendering express rights of access 

unnecessary. Despite this question of necessity, where the lots 

in question appear to be landlocked because of the partition, we 

proceed under the assumption that the plaintiffs have 

established the three elements that give rise to the presumption 

of an intent to create an easement by necessity. The 

defendants' contention is more appropriately analyzed as 

rebuttal.

The primary question in this case is whether, at the time 

of partition, the parties intended to provide rights of access 

to the hundreds of lots divided from the common land. 

Admittedly, this case does not present circumstances that 

typically support the presumption of an easement by necessity. 

The typical situation involves one grantor and one grantee, and 

it is their intent that is dispositive. In this case, we have a 

large scale partition of Native American common lands that have 

multiple grantees, and the commissioners who were appointed by 

the probate court (as authorized by the Legislature) as the 

grantors. We look to the intent of these parties to determine 
18

whether they intended to create rights of access in the hundreds 

of lots partitioned.16

After analyzing the circumstances surrounding the 1878 

partition and the information known to the commissioners at the 

time of the partition, we conclude that at that time the parties

did not intend to create easements, and that therefore the 

defendants presented sufficient evidence to rebut the 

presumption. There was evidence that tribal custom provided 

access rights to members of the Tribe, other easements were 

created, and the land was in poor condition at the time of 

partition. This evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption 

that the grantor intended to include easements by necessity.

The plaintiffs argue that the historical context of the 

partition makes it clear the intention was to provide rights of 

access to the lots. According to the plaintiffs, one of the 

goals of granting Native Americans citizenship was to allow them 

to own and sell property and that is why the Legislature 

authorized the partition of the common land. The plaintiffs

 

16 It is not clear whether the plaintiffs are relying on the 

intention of the Legislature or the commissioners, or both, as 

they identified the grantor as the "General Court" who 

authorized the commissioners and the probate court to act on its 

behalf. We interpret St. 1870, c. 213, § 6, as the Legislature 

empowering the probate court to appoint commissioners to 

partition the land and leaving the details of the division to 

the appointed commissioners. It is the commissioners' intent 

that we view as dispositive.
19

maintain that if easements of access were not intended, the

Tribe members' lots would not be salable and this would 

undermine the Legislature's purpose of granting Native Americans 

citizenship. The plaintiffs are correct in saying that the 

Legislature considered the ability to exercise control over 

one's own property as a privilege of citizenship. See Report of 

the Committee, 1870 Senate Doc. No. 14, at 5. However, we do 

not glean from the record the Legislature's intention to create 

access rights for the purpose of dividing the common lands into 

salable property. See St. 1870, c. 213, § 6. The historical 

record demonstrates that it was for the members of the Tribe to 

determine whether to partition their common land because "[t]his 

. . . is a question of 'property,' which every 'citizen' should 

have the privilege of determining for himself." Report of the 

Committee, supra. The Legislature merely gave the Tribe the 

authority to choose to partition their common land and a method 

by which to do so. Furthermore, it was the commissioners who 

carried out the division of the common lands with input from the

Tribe.

At the time of the partition, the tribal custom admitted 

free access over all the land, as necessary. It is likely that 

the commissioners did not think that rights of access were 

necessary because it was provided by tribal custom. The 
20

plaintiffs argue that the Legislature knew that Indian title17

was nonexistent at the time of partition and that, even if it 

did not, the Legislature did not intend for tribal customs to 

prevail after partition. This argument fails. "[W]e see no 

reason why the common practice, understanding and expectations 

of those persons receiving title could not shed light on the 

parties' probable, objectively considered intent." Kitras I, 64 

Mass. App. Ct. at 300. The commissioners partitioned the common 

land after a lengthy process that took into consideration the

wants of members of the Tribe. We find evidence of this process 

in the reservation of the right to remove peat, and in the 

decision to leave the cranberry bogs and cliffs in common

ownership. We infer that the commissioners, upon learning of 

this tribal custom, determined that it was not necessary to 

include access rights for the partitioned lots. Also, whether 

the tribal custom continued after the partition is not relevant. 

We look to the condition and circumstances at the time of the 

partition and not subsequent events.

18 Mt. Holyoke Realty Corp., 

284 Mass. at 104. Richards, 153 Mass. at 122.

 

17 Indian title "gave Indians a 'right of occupancy.'" 

James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 

467 U.S. 1209 (1984).

18 In 1987, aboriginal title was extinguished retroactive to 

the date of transfer by a member of the Tribe. 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1771b(b) (2012). Title 25 U.S.C. § 1771 (2012) was passed in 
21

The Land Court judge also found persuasive the existence of 

reserved rights in a number of the deeds, and applied the rule

of construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (i.e., 

to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the 

other) when concluding that the omission of other rights of 

access was intentional. Joyce v. Devaney, 322 Mass. 544, 549

(1948). A number of deeds reserved rights to gather peat from 

another's land. There were also three instances where rights 

were reserved for access to a creek for purposes of fishing. 

The right to gather peat included in a number of deeds is known 

as a profit à prendre,

19 which the plaintiffs correctly observe 

is different from an easement. Although a profit à prendre does 

not specifically grant a right of access, some access is implied 

in order to go onto specific land to remove that which is 

 

response to the 1983 settlement when the Tribe agreed to 

extinguish all aboriginal claims. See Building Inspector & 

Zoning Officer of Aquinnah v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish 

Hatchery Corp., 443 Mass. 1, 3-7 (2004). Subsequent events that 

render a lot landlocked do not give rise to an easement by 

necessity. See New England Continental Media, Inc. v. Milton, 

32 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 378 (1992); Swartz v. Sinnot, 6 Mass. 

App. Ct. 838, 838 (1978). The necessity must have existed at 

the time of the division. Viall v. Carpenter, 14 Gray 126, 127

(1859).

19 A profit à prendre "is a right in one person to take from 

the land of another either a part of the soil, such as minerals 

of all kinds from mines, stones from quarries, sand and gravel; 

or part of its produce, such as grass, crops of any kind, trees 

or timber, fish from lakes or streams, game from the woods, 

seaweed, and the like . . . " (citation omitted). Gray v. 

Handy, 349 Mass. 438, 441 (1965).
22

described therein. See Gray v. Handy, 349 Mass. 438, 440 

(1965). More to the point, a profit à prendre indicates that

the commissioners knew how to reserve rights when drafting

deeds. The commissioners also clearly provided for a right of 

access to a creek "for the purpose of fishing and clearing the 

creek." The fact that the commissioners had the knowledge and 

foresight to reserve peat rights and expressly grant access to a 

creek for certain Tribe members is evidence that the omission of 

access rights to the rest of the land was intentional.

Additionally, the Chappaquiddick Tribe, located on a small 

island on the eastern coast of Martha's Vineyard, had their 

common lands divided. The commissioners who partitioned 

Chappaquiddick's common land included in their deeds express 

rights of access to roads. It is likely that the commissioners

of the Gay Head partition were well aware of the division of the 

common land at Chappaquiddick because Richard Pease, in his 

report written in 1871, frequently quoted and cited prior 

commissioners' reports that described the Chappaquiddick Tribe 

(as well as other tribes residing in Massachusetts).20 See Pease 

Report, supra at 22. See also Report of the Commissioners, 1849 

House doc. No. 46, at 8, 11; Report of the Commissioner, 1862 

 

20 One of the commissioners who divided the common land at 

Chappaquiddick was Jeremiah Pease. The relation, if any,

between Jeremiah and the brothers Richard and Joseph Pease is 

unknown.
23

House Doc. No. 215, at 16. The fact that an earlier partition 

of common land on Martha's Vineyard provided rights of access to 

Tribe members, known to the Gay Head commissioners, supports a 

finding that the absence of access easements in the conveyance 

flowing from the Gay Head partitions was intentional, thereby 

rebutting the presumption of easements by necessity.

The physical condition of the land in question also is a 

factor when determining the intent of the parties in this case. 

Dale, 305 Mass. at 103. The multiple reports authored by 

various commissioners provide detailed descriptions of the 

quality of the land and the landscape at Gay Head at the time of 

the partition in 1878. The plaintiffs rely on the many 

descriptions that praise the land of Gay Head, and assert that 

the Land Court unnecessarily focused on the few poor 

descriptions. The plaintiffs are correct in saying that there 

are some descriptions that praise the land at Gay Head. A group 

of commissioners described the land as containing "almost every 

variety of soil; a portion of the land is of the very best 

quality, and capable, under good culture, of producing most 

abundant harvests." Report of the Commissioners, 1849 House 

Doc. No. 46, at 19. John Milton Earle, an appointed 

commissioner in 1862, described the land as "a great variety of 

soil, some of it of excellent quality." Report to the Governor 

and Council, 1862 House Doc. No. 215, at 33. Commissioners 
24

further observed that the land could be "reasonably productive" 

if there were more money available to tend to the land. Report 

of the Committee, 1870 Senate Doc. No. 14, at 5.

Despite the intermittent praise, there were many contrary

descriptions of the land as desolate and deficient. One report 

described Gay Head as a "Sahara-like desolation" and implored 

the Legislature to provide a remedy to the poor condition of the 

Gay Head land, predicting that "unless some remedy is found, the 

whole will eventually become one cheerless desert waste."21

Report of the Commissioners, 1856 House Doc. No. 48, at 9. The 

special joint committee of Massachusetts senators and 

representatives who visited Gay Head in 1869, and whose 

assessment of the land the trial judge credited, thought it 

better for the common land to be held in common for the whole 

Tribe "as pasturage and berry lands," than for the land to be 

divided into lots that ultimately would "lie untilled and 

comparatively unused." Report of the Committee, 1870 Senate 

Doc. No. 14, at 5. The land also was described as "uneven, 

rough and not remarkably fertile." Id. As the descriptions 

 

21 The commissioners explained that the "sands of the beach, 

no longer covered, as formerly, with an abundant growth of 

beach-grass, become the sport of the breeze, and are every year 

extending inland, covering acre after acre of meadow and tillage 

land; many acres of which have, within the memory of our 

informants, been thus swallowed up, and now lie wholly waste and 

useless." Report of the Commissioners, 1856 House Doc. No. 48, 

at 9.
25

recited above indicate, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions,

the poor condition of the land was predominant and widely 

documented. It is likely that the commissioners, observing the 

poor condition of the land, reckoned that rights of access were 

not needed for land that would "lie untilled and comparatively 

unused."22

We agree with the Land Court judge's conclusions that (1) 

tribal customs, (2) the existence of other easements included in 

the deeds, and (3) the condition of the land provide more than 

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the 

commissioners intended to create access rights when they 

partitioned the common land, and that the "[p]laintiffs have 

failed to introduce evidence sufficient to carry their 

substantial burden of proving easements by necessity." See 

Kitras II, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31 (Agnes, J., dissenting). 

We conclude that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of 

establishing that the commissioners intended to create easements 

by necessity.

 

22 Although not contemporary with the partition at issue, a 

depiction of Gay Head in an 1887 photograph has been described 

as "little changed" from an 1844 description as "a level, 

desolate moor, treeless, shrubless, and barren of all 

vegetation, save coarse grass and weeds, and a profusion of 

stunted dog-roses" (citation omitted). P.W. Dunwiddle, Martha's 

Vineyard Landscapes: The Nature of Change (1994). Based on 

this information, we infer that the unfavorable condition of the 

land at Gay Head continued after the division of the common 

land.
26

6. Lot 178. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court 

erroneously excluded lot 178, owned by the plaintiff Maria 

Kitras (as trustee of Bear Realty Trust), from the remand 

proceedings. We disagree. In Kitras I, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 

293-294, the Appeals Court concluded that only lots 189 and 

above could possibly have an easement by necessity. The "law of 

the case" doctrine applies. "The 'law of the case' doctrine 

reflects this court's reluctance 'to reconsider questions 

decided upon an earlier appeal in the same case'" (citation 

omitted). King v. Driscoll, 424 Mass. 1, 7-8 (1996). An 

already decided issue should not be reopened "unless the 

evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, 

controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the 

law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly 

erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. at 8, 

quoting United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st 

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991). In this case, the 

issue only could have been reopened if the Appeals Court 

decision in Kitras I, supra, clearly was erroneous and would 

work a manifest injustice. We see no reason to reopen the issue 

regarding lot 178.

7. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

judgment of the Land Court.

Judgment affirmed.