[Cite as State v. Atkins, 2013-Ohio-2583.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 12-CA-91 

 : 

HOLLY ATKINS : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County 

Municipal Court, Case No. 12CRB00543 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED 

 AND REMANDED IN PART 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 14, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

AMY S. WEEKS WILLIAM T. CRAMER 

40 West Main Street 470 Olde Worthington Road, Suite 200 

Newark, OH 43055 Westerville, OH 43082 

 

 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 2 

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Holly Atkins appeals from the November 21, 2012 judgment 

entry of the Licking County Municipal Court convicting her upon one count of criminal 

damaging. Appellee is the state of Ohio. 

 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} This case arose in the early morning hours of March 18, 2012 on Riley 

Street in the city of Newark, Ohio when Devin Lehman and his wife Angela McCullough 

awakened around 1:30 a.m. to the sound of someone pounding on their front door. 

Lehman discovered it was appellant, McCullough’s stepsister. Appellant was yelling 

and demanding to speak to McCullough. 

{¶3} McCullough came into the front porch area or “Florida room” as appellant 

attempted to push open the louvered jalousie windows and force her way into the 

house. Lehman and McCullough claimed appellant attacked McCullough, so they 

pushed her out the door. Appellant again pushed against the glass windows and broke 

out four of the louvers. 

{¶4} Appellant then ran to her car and drove off. Lehman and McCullough 

called police, who took a report and photographed the damage to the windows. 

{¶5} Appellant was charged with one count of assault pursuant to R.C. 

2903.13, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of criminal damaging 

pursuant to R.C. 2909.06, a misdemeanor of the second degree. Appellant entered 

pleas of not guilty and the case proceeded to jury trial. Appellant was acquitted of 

assault and found guilty of criminal damaging. The trial court sentenced appellant to a 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 3 

suspended jail term of 30 days, a fine of $175 plus court costs, placed her on probation 

for a period of one year, and ordered her to pay restitution. 

{¶6} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of her conviction and 

sentence. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶7} Appellant raises two assignments of error: 

{¶8} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHTS TO THE 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 10, BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL 

INTRODUCED IRRELEVANT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE REGARDING 

HER LIFESTYLE.” 

{¶9} “II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED R.C. 2929.28 BY ORDERING 

RESTITUTION IN AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT.” 

ANALYSIS 

I.

{¶10} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because defense trial counsel “introduced” prejudicial evidence of 

her lifestyle. We disagree.

{¶11} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a 

two-prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. 

See, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing 

such claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 4 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant 

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158 (1955). 

{¶12} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 

case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in 

the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted 

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. 

{¶13} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant 

must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice” 

prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

{¶14} Appellant complains of two instances of alleged ineffective assistance by 

defense trial counsel. Upon direct examination, McCullough testified her sons were 

afraid appellant might return or have “one of her crazy boyfriends come back” which 

had happened in the past. Defense trial counsel objected, but appellant now asserts 

this was ineffective because counsel should have sought a ruling on the objection or 

asked for an instruction to disregard the testimony. We find this to be a matter of trial 

strategy, however, and not error by trial counsel. 

{¶15} The second instance highlighted by appellant is more problematic. Upon 

cross examination, defense trial counsel asked McCullough to specify what she didn’t 

like about her stepsister’s lifestyle, which gave McCullough the opportunity to state “* * 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 5 

*[s]he runs around with really bad people and she is on drugs and she is a stripper * * 

*.” Rather than move away from this area, defense counsel further inquired whether 

appellant had ever done these things in front of McCullough, and she replied that she 

has seen appellant do drugs and has seen her strip. Defense trial counsel then 

elicited testimony from McCullough that she would like to see appellant get help. 

{¶16} We find the cross examination of McCullough to be questionable 

because not only did defense trial counsel elicit the damaging testimony, but he then 

invited the witness to expound upon the appellant’s behaviors even further. Pursuant 

to Strickland, supra, even if defense trial counsel was ineffective, appellant has not 

shown that the testimony prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The jury was clearly able 

to distinguish the relevant evidence and acquitted her of the more serious assault 

charge, but appellee had stronger evidence of the criminal damaging charge. 

{¶17} In short, appellant has not established that the result of the trial would 

have been different but for the problematic cross examination of McCullough. 

{¶18} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶19} In appellant’s second assignment of error, she argues the trial court 

erred in ordering her to pay restitution in an unspecified amount. Because we find the 

trial court did not order restitution in a specified amount, we agree. 

{¶20} R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) states the following in relevant part with regard to 

restitution in misdemeanor cases: 

In addition to imposing court costs pursuant to section 2947.23 of 

the Revised Code, the court imposing a sentence upon an 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 6 

offender for a misdemeanor * * * may sentence the offender to any 

financial sanction or combination of financial sanctions authorized 

under this section. If the court in its discretion imposes one or 

more financial sanctions, the financial sanctions that may be 

imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, the 

following: 

* * * [R]estitution by the offender to the victim of the offender's 

crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the 

victim's economic loss. * * * *. If the court requires restitution, the 

court shall order that the restitution be made to the victim in open 

court or to the adult probation department that serves the 

jurisdiction or the clerk of the court on behalf of the victim. 

If the court imposes restitution, the court shall determine the 

amount of restitution to be paid by the offender. If the court 

imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution it 

orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a 

presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating 

the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other information, 

provided that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not 

exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as 

a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. If 

the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold an 

evidentiary hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 7 

disputes the amount of restitution. If the court holds an evidentiary 

hearing, at the hearing the victim or survivor has the burden to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of 

restitution sought from the offender. 

* * * *. 

{¶21} Appellant asserts the trial court erred in “ordering restitution in an 

unspecified amount,” and we note the trial court entry orders restitution but fails to set 

forth a specific amount. Although the record establishes the victims testified at 

sentencing that the broken window cost six dollars to replace, this amount is missing 

from the trial court’s sentencing entry. 

{¶22} This Court has consistently held that an order of restitution must specify 

the amount. State v. Castaneda, 168 Ohio App.3d 686, 2006-Ohio-5078 (5th Dist.); 

State v. Church, 161 Ohio App.3d 589, 2005-Ohio-2984 (5th Dist.). 

{¶23} Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained. 
Licking County, Case No. 12-CA-91 8 

CONCLUSION 

{¶24} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed in part 

and reversed and remanded in part for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

By: Delaney, J. and 

Wise, P.J. 

Baldwin, J. 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

HON. JOHN W. WISE 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

PAD:kgb