J-S11008-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

DARRYL ENGLISH 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 792 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0006223-2017 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2024

Darryl English appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

The PCRA court offered the following factual history underlying 

Appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault, persons not to possess 

firearms, and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”): 

On February 22, 2017, Philadelphia Police received a report of a 

911 call regarding a shooting on the 2400 block of North Patton 

Street in the city and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 

911 call reported a male gunshot victim being dragged by “a black 

male offender” toward a vacant lot. At the location the shooting 

victim, Lamont Randell (“[the victim]”), was [lying] on the 

sidewalk, his face covered in blood. He was transported to Temple 

University Hospital where he was treated for gunshot wounds to 

his face and back. 

Police recovered six . . . live .22 caliber bullets in front of 2443 

Patton Street and one live .45 caliber bullet in front of 2434 Patton 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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Street. Officers also observed blood smears on the steps and 

sidewalk in front of 2434 Patton Street, and blood on the sidewalk 

beside the vacant lot near 2434 Patton Street. 

[The victim] testified that at the time of the shooting he had been 

walking to Erie Avenue after having left the home where his 

children resided. Upon reaching Patton Street, he encountered a 

male and a female standing together in the front doorway of a 

residence. [The victim] asked the female, who was smoking a 

cigarette on the step, if he could buy a cigarette from her. At this 

point the male stepped forward and said, “What the eff you said 

to my girl?” A confrontation ensued in which [the victim] called 

the male a “pussy.” [The victim] turned back to the male and 

then heard two gunshots. He was shot in his left cheek and his 

spine. While hospitalized, [the victim] identified Appellant as the 

shooter in a photo array on March 9, 2017, and he provided a 

statement to detectives on March 14, 2017. [The victim] testified 

that he saw Appellant standing in the doorway holding a black 

handgun in his right hand and pointing the weapon at [the victim]. 

The streetlights were lit and [the victim] could clearly see 

Appellant’s face and hear the two gunshots. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/17/23, at 2-3.

Appellant was convicted following a jury trial and received an aggregate 

sentence of twenty to forty years’ incarceration. We affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence on direct appeal and Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. The Commonwealth 

filed an answer and the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss, to 

which Appellant did not respond. The PCRA court thereafter dismissed the 

petition and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the 

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court filed an 

opinion in response and Appellant raises the following issues for our 

consideration: 
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A. Whether the PCRA court was in error in not granting relief 

on the issue that counsel was ineffective[.] 

I. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to properly raise the issue of the trial court 

erring by improperly inserting itself into the trial 

and criticizing Appellant’s trial counsel. 

II. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise . . . Appellant regarding the proceeding 

regarding the charge of persons not to possess 

firearms, 18 Pa.C.S § 6105 and not handling the 

proceeding effectively. 

III. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the trial prosecutor’s closing argument in 

which she improperly (a) stated as fact that she 

“knows” that the primary police witness for the 

Commonwealth is “not lying”; bolstered the 

credibility of the primary police witness with the 

argument that he would not “risk his pension” and 

had “everything to lose” by lying, and implored the 

jury to convict in order to “give [the victim] 

something back” by giving him “justice.” 

IV. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to conduct a proper 

pre-trial investigation which would have uncovered 

exculpatory evidence. 

V. Whether the cumulative prejudicial effect of the 

errors described in this petition denied Appellant 

due process and the effective assistance of 

counsel. 

B. Whether the PCRA court was in error in failing to grant an 

evidentiary hearing on the above issues[.] 

Appellant’s brief at 7. 

“Our standard of review is well settled. When reviewing the denial of a 

PCRA petition, we must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is 
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supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 447 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). We apply a 

de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011). 

All of Appellant’s claims challenge his attorneys’ stewardship. 

“Counsel’s performance is presumed constitutionally adequate, and will be 

deemed ineffective only upon a petitioner’s three-pronged showing[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 954 (Pa. 2008). In 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987), our Supreme Court 

recast the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984), and requires a PCRA petitioner to show that: “(1) his underlying 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action 

or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result.” 

Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 452 (Pa.Super. 2018). “A court 

is not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any 

particular order of priority; instead, if a claim fails under any necessary 

element of the ineffectiveness test, the court may proceed to that element 

first.” Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014). 

Appellant’s first claim quotes six exchanges between the trial court and 

his trial counsel, Mary Maran, Esquire, which he alleges are “instances where 

the trial court improperly inserted itself into the trial and criticized . . . trial 

counsel.” Appellant’s brief at 20. Appellant argues that direct appeal counsel 

was ineffective for failing to properly present the claim to this Court. The 
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Commonwealth counters that Appellant has not met his burden as he fails to 

discuss prejudice. 

We begin with our direct appeal decision. Appellant raised the following 

issue in his unitary appellate brief: “Did the trial court err when it 

inappropriately inserted itself into the trial and criticized Appellant’s trial 

counsel?” Commonwealth v. English, 248 A.3d 478, 2021 WL 101052 

(Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up). We pointed out 

that Appellant’s concise statement only cited the trial court “stopping multiple 

witnesses while testifying” without any objection by the defense counsel. Id. 

at *5. We therefore concluded that any issue “concerning the trial court’s 

alleged criticism of trial counsel . . . [wa]s waived.” Id. We then addressed 

the preserved portion and deemed it waived for vague development in the 

concise statement. 

Presently, Appellant contends that direct appeal counsel was ineffective 

for failing to properly present the claim for our review. The Pierce/Strickland 

prejudice prong requires the petitioner to establish “a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had appellate 

counsel pursued the issues he currently proffers.” Commonwealth. v. 

Staton, 120 A.3d 277, 295 (Pa. 2015). Applied here, Appellant is required to 

develop the meritorious arguments appellate counsel should have made.

Here, Appellant simply quotes parts of the transcript followed by the 

conclusory assertion that he “was prejudiced due to the hostility between [his] 

trial counsel and the trial court.” Appellant’s brief at 21. We agree with the 
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Commonwealth that Appellant has failed to carry his burden under the PCRA. 

“Critically, even now on appeal, [Appellant] still fails to develop his argument.” 

Commonwealth’s brief at 9. The bald claim of prejudice does not satisfy 

Appellant’s burden. 

Appellant’s second issue involves his conviction for carrying a firearm as 

a person not to possess pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. The trial court 

bifurcated that charge since it entailed proof that Appellant had previously 

been convicted of a felony. See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 418 A.2d 702, 

704 (Pa.Super. 1980) (holding that severance of § 6105 charge from other 

charges was required where the previous conviction was for a violent crime). 

Immediately prior to trial, the trial court announced, “we are bifurcating out 

the 6105.” N.T., 10/30/18, at 9. While Appellant was present for this 

statement, it does not appear that he discussed the issue with his attorney, 

as corroborated by the following discussion, which occurred immediately prior 

to jury instructions: 

THE COURT: Did you explain to your client the bifurcation of 

6105? 

MS. MARAN: I have not. 

. . . . 

THE COURT: Okay. Well, all I’m talking about is colloquying your 

client on the fact that the 6105 is not going to be submitted to the 

jury. However, it doesn’t mean it goes away. It still stands as a 

separate charge -- 

MS. MARAN: That’s right. 

THE COURT: -- that we will deal with after the trial is over. 
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MS. MARAN: And does the [c]ourt have a standard practice how 

to deal with that? 

THE COURT: You know, it depends on every case, really. If it’s a 

guilty, you know, I ask the parties to do a stipulated trial on it. If 

it’s not guilty, then the Commonwealth has to state its intention 

what it wants to do with it. 

MS. MARAN: Okay. I just suppose the trickiness is if it’s guilty 

on the PIC -- 

THE COURT: Well, if it’s guilty on the PIC -- 

MS. MARAN: -- and not on -- I mean, when we cross that bridge. 

THE COURT: -- if they still find him with a gun -- 

MS. MARAN: We can cross the bridge. I’m just musing, guilty on 

PIC but [not guilty] on the -- 

THE COURT: Okay. 

N.T., 11/2/18, at 11-12. 

The jury acquitted Appellant of the charges of carrying a firearm without 

a license and carrying a firearm within Philadelphia’s city limits, but convicted 

him of PIC. The parties then discussed how to handle the § 6105 charge, with 

the discussion centering on the jury’s not guilty verdicts: 

THE COURT: It’s an inconsistent verdict. 

[COMMONWEALTH]: That might be based off the fact that maybe 

they didn’t think he was on the streets of Philadelphia as opposed 

to being in a house, but if you have a firearm, you’re not allowed 

to have a firearm inside of [the] house. 

THE COURT: . . . . I mean, they wouldn’t be confused with him 

being in the street in Philadelphia. They had the map. So it is an 

inconsistent verdict in regard to that. How would you like to 

proceed on the 6105? 

N.T., 11/2/18, at 52. 
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 The trial court suggested, among other possibilities, that if Appellant 

wanted the jury to decide the charge, the parties could stipulate to the prior 

conviction. Attorney Maran stated: “I’m just trying to think about it. This 

was the -- this was the dilemma that I was concerned we could be facing.” 

Id. at 53. Counsel further remarked, “I need to consult with my client, Your 

Honor. In my [seventeen] years, I have never seen this.” Id. at 54-55. 

Counsel then spoke with Appellant off the record. 

Once back on the record, Attorney Maran informed the court that 

Appellant wished to have the jury consider the charge. The jury reconvened 

and was briefly instructed on the charge, as well as a stipulation that Appellant 

had previously been convicted in 2009 of an unspecified felony charge. The 

jury found him guilty after a short deliberation. 

Appellant now contends that trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to 

advise” him regarding this proceeding. Appellant’s brief at 22. He cites 

counsel’s comment that this was the first time she encountered this scenario 

in her seventeen years of practice, characterizing this statement as 

establishing that counsel “was unable to effectively communicate what was 

occurring to . . . Appellant. This resulted in . . . Appellant unknowingly and 

unintentionally agreeing to a decision that objectively hurt his chance at a fair 

trial.” Id. at 24. As a legal basis for relief, Appellant simply maintains that 

“an accused is entitled to a trial.” Id. He continues: “He may waive his right 

to a jury and proceed to a non-jury trial or he may waive his right to a trial 

altogether and plead guilty, but he is entitled to a fair judicial proceeding to 
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determine whether he is guilty or not.” Id. Additionally, “Appellant asserts 

that the trial court did not instruct the jury that . . . [he] was presumed 

innocent of this charge, that the jury could not draw an adverse inference 

from the fact that . . . [he] did not testify, or that the standard of proof was 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 25.1 

The flaw in Appellant’s presentation is that he does not identify how 

counsel provided ineffective assistance. Appellant is of course “entitled to a 

fair judicial proceeding” to determine guilt, but he fails to explain how 

submitting the charge to the jury deprived him of a fair proceeding. More 

importantly, Appellant’s claim that he did not consent to having the jury decide 

the charge is belied by the record. As previously quoted, trial counsel 

consulted with Appellant off-the-record, followed by this exchange: 

MS. MARAN: All right, Your Honor. We have reached a decision. 

THE COURT: Okay. And that is? 

MS. MARAN: To let the jury deliberate on the 6105 charge. 

N.T., 11/2/18, at 55. 

Accordingly, contrary to his representation that he “never consented to 

this procedure and did not understand his rights,” Appellant’s brief at 24, 

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1

 We reject Appellant’s derivative complaints concerning the trial court’s failure 

to repeat these basic jury instructions when the jury considered the person 

not to possess charge. In addition to Appellant’s failure to specifically plead 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, Appellant does not 

address the principle that, “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, the jury is 

presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions.” Commonwealth v. 

O'Hannon, 732 A.2d 1193, 1196 (Pa. 1999). The jury was given these 

instructions during the first half of the bifurcated trial. 
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Appellant did consent to a jury trial. To the extent Appellant attempts to 

present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to whatever counsel 

told him during their consultation, he fails to state what counsel said, let alone 

how those comments led him astray. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 

A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000) (holding that claim of erroneous advice 

concerning right to testify requires proof that “counsel gave specific advice so 

unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his 

own behalf”). Appellant cannot simply cite counsel’s statement that she had 

never encountered this scenario in her career.2 His failure to supply further 

discussion and development of this claim renders it waived.3

Appellant’s third issue alleges that trial counsel ineffectively failed to 

object to the Commonwealth’s argument in closing that the police officers 

should be found credible as they risked their careers and pensions by lying. 

Appellant submits that these comments inappropriately vouched for the 

officers’ credibility. Appellant’s brief at 28. Citing several of our sister 

jurisdictions in support, he argues that there is no evidence of record to 

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2

 The comment presumably referenced the jury acquitting Appellant of two 

firearms charges while convicting him of PIC. 

3

 Appellant’s current counsel requests that we consider additional points that 

he has declined to brief, which Appellant listed in his pro se PCRA petition. 

“Appellant has asked PCRA counsel to also add the following problems with 

the proceeding on the § 6105 proceeding.” Appellant’s brief at 25. We may 

not do so. “Counsel’s attempt to incorporate by reference, without any further 

explanation or elaboration upon the legal validity of such claims, amounts to 

hybrid representation, which is not permitted.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2018). 
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suggest that their pensions or employment were at risk. Id. at 27-29. 

Moreover, he posits that the comment detracted the jury from considering the 

facts of the case in favor of whether the officers’ careers would be adversely 

affected by its verdict. The Commonwealth disagrees, relying on 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 728 A.2d 923 (Pa. 1999), to establish that the 

prosecutor’s comments were unobjectionable as fair response to Appellant’s 

closing argument. We agree and therefore conclude that the claim lacks 

arguable merit. 

Appellant’s closing argument focused on the victim’s credibility, which 

included an attack on the reliability of the photo array. He suggested that the 

victim’s story for approaching Appellant made no sense and that Appellant 

had no reason to be hanging out in his own doorway with a gun. On that 

point, counsel highlighted that the array was presented less than twenty-four 

hours after the shooting. “[T]he photograph was pulled the day after the 

shooting and just coincidentally, right, it’s a photograph of the guy who lives 

right there. Coincidentally.” N.T., 11/1/18, at 197. Counsel continued: 

Let’s talk about this double[-]blind procedure that’s so important, 

that’s so important that one person develops the array and 

somebody else delivers the array, you know, just like that. 

Testimony is so important to not taint, which is why we sequester 

witnesses, which didn’t happen here. 

Now, the photo array, you heard Detective Repici tell you, you 

know, oh, I don’t know. He first said the detectives went in first. 

I don’t know when in the day they went in. I went in after. Oh, 

no, wait. We traveled there together. We traveled there together. 

That’s the identification in this case. That’s the only identification 

in this case. This is [a] one witness ID case where the physical 

evidence doesn’t match the story, a one witness identification case 
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where the physical evidence doesn’t match the story. I’ll say it 

again. A one witness identification case, one civilian, one ID 

witness, where his story doesn’t match the physical evidence. It’s 

a one witness identification case where the identification was 

taken in a suggestive manner, where the physical evidence 

doesn’t match the story. 

Id. at 198-99. The Commonwealth responded in its closing as follows: 

At no point does Detective Keppol have any skin in this game. He 

told you he doesn’t know [Appellant]. He doesn’t know [the 

victim]. He doesn’t have any special connection to the 2400 block 

of Patton Street. So there’s no reason for him to have to say that 

it’s this man right here and risk his pension, embarrassment, 

prosecution for someone he doesn’t know and for [the victim], 

who he doesn’t know. Uh-uh, no way. No way. He puts him in 

the photo array just to make sure he gets it right and Detective 

Repici shows the photo array to the victim and also he’s got no 

skin in the game. He has no connection to the investigation, so 

he’s just going to show it to him to make sure they get it right and 

they do everything by the book one by one. Why? To make sure 

they’re getting this right. 

Id. at 216-17. 

Citing Cox, the PCRA court concluded that the prosecutor’s response 

was fair comment on Appellant’s closing argument. We agree. In Cox, 

defense counsel in closing “repeatedly argued that the police officers lied when 

they testified that they did not promise [Cox] anything in exchange for his 

confessions,” and also “claimed that the police fabricated” Cox’s statements. 

Cox, 728 A.2d at 932. “In response to this theory, the prosecutor explained 

the police would be subject to charges of perjury,” and argued that the police 

would not put “their pensions” on the line “just to frame [Cox].” Id. The Cox 

Court held that a prosecutor’s statements “must be considered in the context 

in which they were made” and that the comments were “an appropriate 
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response to defense counsel’s argument that the police had lied and fabricated 

[Cox]’s confession.” Id. 

Trial counsel’s closing argument suggested that the police chose 

Appellant as a convenient scapegoat due to the police finding a bullet and 

bloodstains right outside his home, and then unduly pressured the victim to 

select that photograph. The prosecution was entitled to fairly respond to these 

accusations. Therefore, the claim that trial counsel was ineffective lacks 

arguable merit as any objection would have been meritless. 

Appellant’s fourth claim alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to discover during pre-trial investigation that the victim posted videos 

on his Facebook account wherein he blamed someone else for the shooting. 

We begin with some background material. During trial, Appellant’s counsel 

informed the court that one of Appellant’s family members had provided her 

with an unspecified number of videos obtained from Facebook showing the 

victim holding a gun. Counsel stated: “The videos as I receive them lack a 

soundtrack. . . . I can’t hear the contents of what is said.” N.T., 11/1/18, at 

145. Appellant submits that “counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

video footage of the complainant admitting that he did not know who shot 

him, contrary to his trial testimony.” Appellant’s brief at 29. Additionally, 

“PCRA counsel spoke with . . . Appellant’s girlfriend, Brenda Bryant[,] who told 

PCRA counsel that she discovered the posting during the trial and that it was 

too late to bring in as trial had begun.” Id. at 29-30. 
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As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “counsel has a duty to make 

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 

particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. We 

accept arguendo that trial counsel’s knowledge of the victim’s social media 

posts would require further investigation under these circumstances. 

However, as explained infra, Appellant failed to meet his procedural and 

substantive obligations concerning what the videos purportedly show. 

Accordingly, any claim premised on counsel's failure to uncover said videos 

fails. 

In Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa. 2014), Reid filed a 

timely PCRA petition attaching sworn declarations from several witnesses, all 

of whom would purportedly offer exculpatory evidence. Reid alleged that his 

trial counsel ineffectively failed to discover these witnesses and that he was 

prejudiced by that failure. The PCRA court declined to hold an evidentiary 

hearing. The Reid Court cogently summarized the applicable principles of 

law: 

There are two requirements for relief on an ineffectiveness claim 

for a failure to present witness testimony. The first requirement 

is procedural. The PCRA requires that, to be entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must include in his PCRA petition 

a signed certification as to each intended witness stating the 

witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance of 

testimony. The second requirement is substantive. Specifically, 

when raising a claim for the failure to call a potential witness, to 

obtain relief, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the witness 

existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) counsel was informed 

or should have known of the existence of the witness; (4) the 

witness was prepared to cooperate and would have testified on 
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defendant’s behalf; and (5) the absence of such testimony 

prejudiced him and denied him a fair trial. 

Id. at 438 (cleaned up). 

Reid did not comply with the procedural requirements before the PCRA 

court and neglected to address the omission in his brief. “These failures are 

fatal to his claim.” Id. On that basis alone, Reid was not entitled to relief. 

The Court proceeded in the alternative to examine each of the witnesses and 

concluded that the PCRA court did not err in denying the petition without a 

hearing. 

As in Reid, Appellant is not entitled to relief due to both procedural and 

substantive deficiencies. First, as a procedural matter, Appellant did not 

include any kind of certification from Bryant concerning the content of her 

proposed testimony. We acknowledge that PCRA counsel represented that 

Bryant informed PCRA counsel that she found the video during trial. Sworn 

affidavits are not necessary, see Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 

641 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), but PCRA counsel’s statement does not 

indicate that Bryant would testify to any particular facts. It merely confirms 

that Bryant would say that she discovered “the posting” during the trial. That 

does not tell us anything else about the video, and it is not clear whether her 

statement is referencing the one discussed at trial or some other video that 
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Bryant found.4 Nor does the petition detail anything else about the recording. 

For this procedural reason alone, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Appellant’s claim also fails on substantive grounds. Even accepting that 

Bryant would testify that the victim posted a video to his Facebook page 

saying that someone else shot him, her testimony would be hearsay and 

inadmissible concerning what the victim said. Appellant does not argue that 

said hearsay would be subject to any exception and claims premised on pure 

hearsay do not entitle a petitioner to substantive relief. See Commonwealth 

v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 592 (Pa. 1999) (“A claim which rests exclusively 

upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the afterdiscovered evidence exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such 

a claim, even if timely, entitle [Yarris] to relief under the PCRA.”). The PCRA 

court therefore did not err in dismissing this claim. 

Appellant’s final ineffectiveness issue seeks relief based on the 

cumulative prejudice of all issues raised. Claims which are rejected for lack 

of arguable merit may not be accumulated; however, where the disposition is 

“grounded in lack of prejudice” a court may assess their cumulative impact. 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012). Charitably 

accepting that our alternative analysis of Appellant’s first issue constitutes a 

____________________________________________ 

4

 It seems that Appellant is discussing a separate video, as trial counsel 

confirmed that the material she viewed did not contain audio. Moreover, the 

video referenced at trial apparently only showed the victim holding a gun, 

whereas Appellant alleges that the victim in this video claims that someone 

else shot him. 
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determination that Appellant was prejudiced to some degree, that is the only 

issue which was resolved on prejudice grounds. Therefore, there can be no 

cumulative prejudice. 

Lastly, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing. “To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss 

a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine 

issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, 

or that the PCRA court otherwise abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 735 (Pa. 2014). The foregoing analysis 

demonstrates that there are no factual issues to resolve and the PCRA court 

did not err in dismissing the petition without a hearing. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant has failed to establish 

that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition. No relief is due. 

Order affirmed. 

Date: 7/15/2024