In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3560

PHILIP I. WARREN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RICHLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

and JON LITSCHER, Secretary, Wisconsin 

Department of Corrections,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 99-C-234--Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

Argued March 30, 2000--Decided August 4, 2000

 Before Bauer, Diane P. Wood, and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Philip Warren petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

sec.2254. He claims that the Wisconsin Circuit

Court and Department of Corrections violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when it

revoked his probation. The District Court denied

Warren’s petition for habeas relief. Warren v.

Richland County Circuit Court, et al., No. 99-C234 (W.D.Wis. Sept. 15, 1999). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 Warren does not challenge the Wisconsin state

courts’ statements of fact. Those facts are

entitled to a presumption of correctness and we

adopt them here. Kines v. Godinez, 7 F.3d 674,

677 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1200,

114 S.Ct. 1314, 127 L.Ed.2d 664 (1994). 

 Philip Warren was charged with two counts of

sexually assaulting the ten year old daughter of

his former live-in girlfriend. The girl testified

at the preliminary hearing that Warren touched

her "in the wrong places" while she and her

mother were living with him. She explained that

Warren touched her breasts and crotch on two

occasions and that the touching was not "like
tickling." Officer Virginia Cupp also testified

at the preliminary hearing, relating statements

made by the child during an interview with the

investigating authorities. The court found

probable cause and bound Warren over for trial.

 In a deal reached with the prosecutor, Warren

entered an Alford/1 plea to one of the charges

against him, and the State dismissed the

remaining charge and recommend that Warren be

placed on probation. Before accepting the plea,

the court reminded Warren of the important rights

he was waiving, questioned defense counsel as to

the voluntariness of the plea and cautioned

Warren that his probation would be revoked if he

failed to complete the terms of his probation.

Satisfied that there was strong evidence of guilt

despite Warren’s claims of innocence, the court

then accepted the Alford plea and entered a

judgment of conviction against Warren for sexual

assault of a child. 

 The court sentenced Warren to five years in

prison, but stayed that term and placed Warren on

eight years probation. One of the court-ordered

conditions of probation was that Warren cooperate

with and complete any counseling ordered by the

Department of Corrections. Warren did so for five

years, participating on three separate occasions

in sex offender treatment programs. He attended

every session and participated in the group

discussions. But, he consistently refused during

his counseling sessions to admit he had committed

a sexual offense, a requirement for

rehabilitation and successful completion of the

program. Warren was repeatedly warned of the

implications of his behavior, including the risk

of revocation, yet he persisted and five years

after he began probation, the Department of

Corrections issued a notice of violation. After

a hearing, Warren’s probation was revoked and he

was ordered to begin serving his five year

sentence.

 Warren sought review of the Department’s

revocation decision by petitioning the circuit

court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Wis.

Stat. sec.781.01. He argued that the Department’s

requirement that he admit his guilt during sex

offender counseling violated his due process

because it was inconsistent with the State’s

acceptance of his Alford plea in the criminal

proceeding. The court found no merit to Warren’s

argument and affirmed the Department’s decision

to revoke Warren’s probation. The Court of

Appeals affirmed and the Wisconsin Supreme Court

agreed. See State ex rel. Warren, 211 Wis.2d 710,

566 N.W.2d 173 (1997); State ex rel. Warren v.

Schwartz, 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).

Following an unsuccessful petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin, Warren v. Richland

County Circuit Court, et al., No. 99-C-234

(W.D.Wis. Sept. 15, 1999), Warren appealed to us,

claiming that his Alford plea was

constitutionally defective because the court did

not advise him that he would not be able to

maintain his claim of innocence during counseling

and that his ignorance of that fact rendered his

plea unknowing and involuntary. He also claims

that the State breached the plea agreement by

seeking to imprison him for his failure to admit

guilt during the sex offender treatment

counseling. We affirm the District Court. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Federal courts may grant a writ of habeas

corpus when a person is held in custody under a

state court judgment in violation of the United

States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. sec.2254; Kavanagh

v. Berge, 73 F.3d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 1996). In

order to merit federal habeas relief, a

petitioner must establish that the state court

proceedings resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28

U.S.C. sec.2254(d)(1). See also Lindh v. Murphy,

96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) rev’d on

other grounds 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Otherwise, a

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court

decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts, given the evidence

presented during the state court proceedings. 28

U.S.C. sec.2254(d)(2). Where, as here, the

District Court denied habeas relief, we review

the District Court’s findings of fact under a

clearly erroneous standard and its legal

conclusions de novo. Neumann v. Jordan, 84 F.3d

985, 987 (7th Cir. 1996).

 A. Due Process Challenge

 Due process requires that a trial court inform

the defendant of the "direct consequences" of his

plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755

(1970). Warren argues that due process was denied

him because he was not informed at the time he

entered his plea that the State would not permit

him to continue to maintain his innocence during

mandatory sex counseling sessions. He maintains

that the court’s failure to so inform him

rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary.

 Brady defines a "voluntary" plea as:

A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of

the direct consequences, including the actual

value of any commitments made to him by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, . . .

unless induced by threats (or promises to

discontinue harassment), misrepresentation

(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable

promises), or perhaps by promises that are by

their nature improper as having no proper

relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.

bribes).

Id. at 755 (citation omitted). The Wisconsin

Supreme Court, analyzing Wisconsin cases,

determined that Warren’s plea met this

definition. It found that there was no coercion

or fraudulent inducement and that the trial court

did not need to inform Warren that his probation

could be revoked if he did not admit his guilt

because that consequence was only a "collateral"

consequence of his plea. 219 Wis. 615, 637-38,

579 N.W.2d 698, 708-09.

 The Wisconsin court’s finding is in accord with

federal law which also holds that a defendant is

entitled to be informed of the direct, but not

collateral, consequences of his plea. See e.g.,

United States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 525 (7th

Cir. 1985). "Direct consequences are the

’immediate, and automatic consequences of the

guilty plea.’" United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d

1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The

possibility that Warren’s probation might be

revoked because he refused to admit to sexual

contact with a child does not meet this test. As

the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said, the chance

of revocation was:

(1) not definite, since some defendants who are

unwilling to admit their guilt at the plea stage

might conceivably be amenable to treatment at the

rehabilitation stage; (2) not immediate, either

in time or impact, since the revocation was

contingent upon intervening circumstances; and

(3) not automatic, since the ability to abide by

the conditions or probation was well within

Warren’s control.

219 Wis.2d at 638. Having analyzed the same

factors in its inquiry that this court would

examine to determine whether Warren’s right to

due process was violated, and having reached the

same result, we cannot say that the Wisconsin

court’s determination was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law" or was "based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts." 28

U.S.C. sec.2254(d).

 Warren takes umbrage with the court’s ruling

that the revocation of his probation for failure

to admit his guilt during counseling was a

collateral consequence. He argues alternatively
that it is a "direct" consequence according to

the Brady definition of voluntary, ("Brady

requires that a defendant be advised of the

’direct’ consequences of his plea, which are

defined as ’including the actual value of any

commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor,

or his own counsel."), and that a plea is not

voluntary unless it is made with full awareness

"of the direct consequences, including the actual

value of any commitments made to him by the

court, prosecutor, or his own counsel." Under

either formulation, the argument is based upon

the representations made to him by his counsel

before sentencing that he would be able to

maintain his innocence, which turned out to be,

according to Warren, "worthless."

 During the post-conviction hearing on Warren’s

motion to withdraw his plea, Warren’s attorney

testified that he told Warren that he would be

allowed to continue to assert his innocence after

sentencing and it was his own personal belief

that the State had implicitly promised, because

it accepted the Alford plea, that Warren could

maintain his innocence without consequence. He

also told the court that it never occurred to him

that Warren might have to admit guilt during

probationary counseling or face revocation and,

therefore, he never discussed that with Warren.

 By resting his fate solely on what he believes

are the uncontradicted assurances of his counsel,

Warren glosses over several other important

facts. First, at the time he entered his Alford

plea, the trial court advised Warren:

In the event that the Court grants probation,

probable or very likely one item that is going to

be ordered is counseling, and you will be

expected to enter into good faith counseling as

part of the term of probation, and that carries

with it--I realize that you, by making your plea

of no contest, are not admitting anything in

court, but you still would have an obligation to

enter into counseling in good faith with the

counselor, psychiatrist, or doctor, whoever, so

that’s something you should realize.

And, second, at the sentencing hearing, the trial

court ordered that Warren attend any counseling

sessions ordered by the department and "that he

follow all the recommendations that any study or

counselor comes up with." Although these are not

definite statements by the court that Warren

would have to acknowledge responsibility for his

conduct during counseling, we believe that these

statements, combined with the fact that Warren

was counseled at the sentencing hearing by a

psychiatrist who specialized in sex counseling,

should have alerted him that the possibility
existed. Furthermore, Warren was repeatedly

advised by his probation officers that his

refusal to acknowledge inappropriate sexual

contact with a child during therapy might lead to

revocation. 

 Considering all of this other evidence, we

cannot agree with Warren that he had no

information contrary to his attorney’s

representations. For the reasons stated above,

even if we consider the attorney’s advice as a

component of what makes up a "direct" consequence

(which we do not), we believe that the

possibility of probation revocation for failure

to admit guilt during mandatory counseling is a

collateral consequence of which Warren need not

be informed. And, even after considering his

attorney’s statements to him as a component of

the Brady definition of voluntary, we believe the

Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that

Warren’s plea was knowing and voluntary. As its

decision was a correct application of the legal

principles established in Brady, we find that

Warren is not entitled to the habeas relief he

seeks. The judgment of the District Court,

denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

is therefore affirmed. 

 B. Breach Of The Plea Agreement 

 When "a plea rests in any significant degree on

a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that

it can be said to be part of the inducement or

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

Warren believes that the State breached the

Alford plea agreement by imprisoning him for

refusing to admit his guilt during counseling.

However, as his argument rests merely upon his

own subjective belief and the post-conviction

testimony of his trial lawyer, and not upon any

action or representation of the prosecutor or the

court, his argument is unpersuasive.

 If a prosecutor breaches an explicit promise of

an executed plea agreement, the defendant’s plea

cannot stand because it was entered on a false

premise. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509

(1984). There is, however, nothing in the record

before us which suggests that the prosecutor or

the court promised Warren that he would not have

to admit guilt at the counseling sessions which

were ordered as a condition of probation. The

evidence shows that the prosecutor agreed to

recommend probation and he did so at the

sentencing hearing. There was, then, no breach of

an explicit promise.

 Warren argues that the prosecutor impliedly
promised, by agreeing to let him enter an Alford

plea, that he would be allowed to continue

asserting his innocence and that the court, by

accepting the plea, promised the same. As the

Wisconsin Supreme Court said, "Warren’s argument

is based upon the faulty premise that an Alford

plea is a promise that a defendant will never

have to admit his guilt." 219 Wis.2d at 644. We

agree, but note that the Supreme Court has never

addressed the issue. Therefore, Warren has not

met his burden under 28 U.S.C. sec.2254 of

showing that the state court’s judgment is

contrary to or involves an unreasonable

application of federal law as defined by a

decision of the United States Supreme Court. The

judgment of the District Court, denying the

petition for habeas corpus, is therefore

affirmed.

III. CONCLUSION

 Warren believes that the acceptance of an

Alford plea is an assurance that a defendant will

not have to admit guilt during either conviction

or punishment. He is wrong. He can maintain his

innocence at the drug store, the grocery store

and any other public place he desires. But, when

in the private setting of sex offender counseling

that is ordered as a condition of probation, and

his admission is necessary for rehabilitation, he

must admit responsibility for his conduct. We do

not worry that our ruling will force insincere

admissions of guilt from defendants during

counseling as there are trained counselors

evaluating the admissions and they will be able

to differentiate between the sincere and the

insincere. Nor do we believe that our ruling

forces innocent defendants to confess to crimes

they did not commit, as there must be a

sufficient indication of the defendant’s guilt

before an Alford plea is accepted. We believe

that here, Warren got the bargain to which he

agreed.

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

District Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

/1 An Alford plea allows the defendant to enter a

guilty plea while maintaining his innocence, a

practice approved by the Supreme Court in North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27

L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).