If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

January 28, 2020

v No. 345607

Kent Circuit Court

DAPHELIN SEON TRIPLETT, LC No. 17-010166-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM. 

A jury convicted defendant, Daphelin Seon Triplett, of assault with a dangerous weapon 

(felonious assault), MCL 750.82. The trial court sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail followed 

by 6 months on tether and 60 months of probation. Defendant now appeals his conviction as of 

right. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This case arose out of two incidents of domestic violence in September 2017, between 

defendant and the victim, his wife. The first incident occurred in the early evening as the victim 

was leaving a friend’s home, at which time defendant drove to the home along with his and the

victim’s son. Defendant grabbed the victim by the arm, threatened to flatten the tires on her car, 

held the victim up by the neck of her shirt, and loudly engaged in profanity and verbal abuse and 

threats. There were several children present in addition to the victim’s and defendant’s son. The 

incident ended when the police arrived.

The second incident occurred later in the same evening. The victim and her sister entered 

defendant’s and the victim’s home, because the victim intended to retrieve some clothes and the 

son, and then spend the night at the sister’s home. The victim was carrying mace, which she had 

acquired as a self-defense measure. Defendant, using vulgar language, informed the victim that 

he refused to permit the victim to take their son. Defendant and the victim argued, and then 

defendant pulled a machete from underneath the sofa, removed it from its sheath, and informed 

the victim that he would “slaughter” the victim’s entire family. The sister asked defendant if she 

could remove the child, who was scared and crying, from the situation, but defendant refused. 
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The sister then left the residence and called the police. The victim produced her mace, but she 

testified that she would not have deployed it because of the presence of the son. Defendant 

placed the blade of the machete on the victim’s chest and threatened to decapitate her if she 

moved. Defendant insisted that he was acting in self-defense because the victim had a 

pocketknife in addition to the mace. The victim denied having any weapons other than the mace, 

and the victim’s friend denied seeing the victim with a knife. The victim left the home, followed 

by defendant. Again, the incident ended when the police arrived.

Although the first incident is relevant to a full understanding of the context of the second 

incident, defendant’s charges were based only on the second incident. The victim also testified 

that defendant had previously engaged in other threatening or violent behavior toward her, 

including destroying her phone, choking her, and “sl[i]ng[ing] [her] over” their third-floor 

balcony. However, the victim stated that defendant had never pulled a knife on her before.

As noted, the jury found defendant guilty of felonious assault, MCL 750.82. The jury 

acquitted defendant of a misdemeanor charge of domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2). On appeal, 

defendant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay testimony into evidence. 

Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court improperly permitted a police officer who 

had responded to both domestic violence incidents to testify as to out-of-court statements made 

by the victim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court’s decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion, but preliminary legal determinations of admissibility are reviewed de novo; it is 

necessarily an abuse of discretion to admit legally inadmissible evidence. People v Gursky, 486 

Mich 596, 606; 786 NW2d 579 (2010). Otherwise, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the 

court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” 

People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). An evidentiary error “is not a 

ground for reversal unless, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear 

that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 

Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999) (quotation omitted).

III. LEGAL BASIS FOR ADMISSION

As an initial matter, defendant’s argument on appeal appears to be premised on having 

received an incomplete copy of the lower court file. Appellate counsel asserts that the trial court 

erred by “presumably” allowing the challenged testimony under an improper statute; specifically, 

MCL 768.27b rather than MCL 768.27c. Appellate counsel claims that the file defendant

received did “not contain any copy of, nor reference to, a timely filed notice.” However, the 

lower court record does contain a proper and timely notice by the prosecutor, date-stamped as 

having been received on July 2, 2018. The notice states in relevant part:

This serves as notice that the People intend to call Officer Nathan Turmell, 

Kentwood PD, to testify as to the statements made by the victim[.] These 

statements are contained in police report number [redacted] and [redacted] and 

will be used as substantive evidence, pursuant to MCL 768.27c.
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This also serves as notice that the People intend to introduce evidence of 

Defendant’s other acts of domestic violence as substantive evidence under MCL 

768.27b. A copy of the police report(s) containing the evidence is attached . . ., 

and has already been provided to Defense Counsel[.]

Nevertheless, no reference to the notice appears in the lower court register of actions, and the 

notice is filed in the “Confidential” portion of the file, which states “please remove before public 

inspection.” If the “Confidential” portion of the file was not given to appellate counsel, then 

appellate counsel would indeed not have received a copy of the notice or discovered any 

reference to the notice in the file. Furthermore, in responding to defendant’s objection to the 

testimony, the trial court did not explicitly specify which statute applied, and the prosecutor 

referred to having “noticed this under 768.27.” Nevertheless, appellate counsel does concede 

that trial counsel made no claim that he failed to receive the notice, despite several opportunities 

to do so.

Therefore, the record does not support defendant’s presumption that the trial court 

incorrectly permitted the police testimony of the victim’s statements under MCL 768.27b. The 

record establishes, albeit not as clearly or directly as might be hoped, that the court and the 

attorneys understood that MCL 768.27c was at issue. The police officer’s testimony was 

properly admitted pursuant to the appropriate statute.

IV. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER MCL 768.27C 

Defendant does not make any substantive argument on appeal pertaining to MCL 

768.27c, so we could deem any further challenge to the testimony abandoned. See People v 

Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). However, under the circumstances, we 

cannot fault defendant for any such omission. Therefore, we choose to exercise our discretion to 

address the issue under the appropriate law, see Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-209; 649 

NW2d 47 (2002), and assess the propriety of the admission of the challenged testimony under 

MCL 768.27c. 

Hearsay is generally not admissible at trial, unless an exception applies. MRE 802. 

MCL 768.27c offers one such exception. “In MCL 768.27c, the Legislature determined that 

under certain circumstances, statements made to law enforcement officers are admissible in 

domestic violence cases.” People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 445; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). 

MCL 768.27c provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

(1) Evidence of a statement by a declarant is admissible if all of the 

following apply: 

(a) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or 

threat of physical injury upon the declarant. 

(b) The action in which the evidence is offered under this section is an 

offense involving domestic violence. 
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(c) The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of 

physical injury. Evidence of a statement made more than 5 years before the filing 

of the current action or proceeding is inadmissible under this section. 

(d) The statement was made under circumstances that would indicate the 

statement's trustworthiness. 

(e) The statement was made to a law enforcement officer. 

The statute also provides definitions of a “declarant” and “domestic violence.” MCL 

768.27c(5)(a)-(b). It also provides some examples of “circumstances relevant to the issue of 

trustworthiness,” such as whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending or 

anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested; whether the declarant has a bias or 

motive for fabricating the statement, and the extent of any bias or motive; and whether the 

statement is corroborated by other evidence. MCL 768.27c(2). 

As discussed, the evidence admitted pursuant to MCL 768.27c consisted of a police 

officer’s testimony regarding statements made by the victim to him after each of the incidents of 

domestic violence. The officer testified that defendant found the victim at her friend’s home, 

swore at her, threatened to flatten her tires, and physically assaulted her. The police officer also 

testified that he spoke to the victim when he arrived on the scene of the second assault, moments 

after it occurred. According to the officer, the victim stated that “she came to where they were 

living to pick up her son,” but that defendant “refused to give up his son.” The victim also told 

him that defendant “got more upset and flipped the couch up and then grabbed the machete that 

was underneath the couch, unholstered it, and stated that he was going to kill her and her family 

one-by-one.” The officer further testified that the victim told him that defendant approached her 

and put the machete to her chest. In sum, the officer’s testimony almost completely mirrored the 

victim’s testimony at trial. 

There can be no dispute that the victim was a “declarant,” meaning “a person who makes 

a statement.” MCL 768.27c(5)(a). We conclude that the statements complied with the statute 

because: (a) they were admitted to narrate, describe, or explain the threat of physical injury to the 

victim; (b) they were admitted at defendant’s trial in which he was accused of domestic assault 

of the victim, MCL 750.81(2); (c) they were made “moments” after the assault occurred; (d) they 

were made under circumstances indicative of the statements’ trustworthiness because there was 

no evidence of pending or anticipated litigation in which the victim was interested, the victim

had just left the scene of the assault, her sister had also witnessed defendant threaten the victim

and her family’s lives with the machete, the statements were corroborated by testimony from 

several witnesses, and there was no evidence showing bias or motive; and (e) they were made to 

a law enforcement officer. See MCL 768.27c(1)-(2). We find no error in the trial court’s 

statement, in response to defendant’s objection, that “there is a statutory provision which comes 

into play that allows the testimony . . . and the statute has been complied with[.]” The trial court 

correctly found the testimony admissible under MCL 768.27c. 

Defendant contends that the evidence was improperly prejudicial because it improperly 

bolstered the victim’s testimony. Defendant observes that there were no other witnesses to the 

part of the second domestic violence incident where he touched the victim’s chest with the 
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machete. Defendant properly observes that “[i]n a trial where the evidence essentially presents a 

one-on-one credibility contest between the victim and the defendant, hearsay evidence may tip 

the scales against the defendant, which means that the error is more harmful.” Gursky, 486 Mich 

at 620-621. However, even if the trial court had incorrectly found the evidence admissible, this 

was not a simple credibility contest between only himself and the victim.

The essential elements of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, are, in relevant part, a person 

assaulting another person with a knife without intending to commit murder or to inflict great 

bodily harm less than murder. “Felonious assault is defined as a simple assault aggravated by 

the use of a weapon.” People v Jones, 443 Mich 88, 100; 504 NW2d 158 (1993). “A simple 

assault is either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places another in 

reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Terry, 217 Mich App 

660, 662; 553 NW2d 23 (1996). A battery is “an intentional, unconsented and harmful or 

offensive touching of the person of another, or of something closely connected with the person,” 

and an attempted battery constitutes an assault. People v Starks, 473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 

136 (2005) (quotation omitted). Put another way, “[a] battery is the consummation of an 

assault,” so the commission of a battery necessarily includes the commission of an assault. 

Terry, 217 Mich App at 662-663. No actual injury to the victim is required. Id. at 662. 

However, felonious assault is a specific-intent crime; the defendant must actually intend to 

commit a battery or to place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery. See 

Id. at 662-663; see also People v Johnson, 407 Mich 196, 210; 284 NW2d 718 (1979).

We conclude that the jury could have found the essential elements of felonious assault 

established from defendant’s own testimony. Defendant testified that he brandished the machete 

at the victim and actually touched the victim with the blade. Defendant insisted that he was 

acting in self-defense, that the victim threatened him with the mace first, and that he did not 

threaten her at all.1 However, defendant admitted that he was not seriously afraid of the mace 

because he believed he could block it with his arm; and there was police testimony that mace 

was not a lethal weapon, but a machete was a lethal weapon. Defendant testified that the victim 

produced a “little” pocketknife that he regarded as a serious danger, but also that the victim did 

not produce the alleged knife until moments before she left the home and long after defendant 

had already produced and brandished the machete. Defendant admitted that the machete touched 

the victim’s chest. When directly asked whether he might have cut the victim’s head off, 

defendant admitted that he “c[ould]n’t say what [he] would have done at that moment,” citing the 

“heat of” the moment. 

Defendant’s own testimony establishes that he committed a battery against the victim 

with the machete, and when he did so, he at least intended to place the victim in apprehension of 

an imminent battery. Thus, even if the police officer’s testimony had not been admissible, which 

it was, we are unpersuaded that the testimony was likely outcome-determinative. Therefore, no 

 1 We note that the victim’s sister was present until well after defendant had already produced the 

machete, so whether the victim threatened defendant first was not a pure one-on-one credibility 

contest between defendant and the victim. 
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reversal would be proper. See Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496. In conclusion, we find that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the police testimony under MCL 768.27c. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola