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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brittany Everts, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sushi Brokers LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-02066-PHX-JJT 

ORDER 

 At issue is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 104, Mot.), to 

which Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 106, Resp.) and Plaintiff filed a Reply 

(Doc. 108, Reply). No party asked for oral argument, and the Court finds this matter 

appropriate for resolution without such argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This case arises out of an employment discrimination claim filed by Plaintiff 

Brittany Everts in 2015. She alleged that her employer, Defendant Sushi Brokers, LLC, 

fired her upon learning of her pregnancy. The Court granted Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for 

Summary Judgment on the issue of Defendant’s liability in March 2017, and thereafter 

the parties reached a settlement. (Docs. 81, 102.) Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), requesting $71,821.50 for 

attorneys’ fees and $5,587.12 for costs. (Reply at 9.)1

 

 

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 Plaintiff initially requested $72,594 for attorneys’ fees and $5,647.12 for costs, 

but Defendant argued that 7.2 of the hours Plaintiff included under an attorney’s hourly 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 

party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 

Plaintiffs who prevail under Title VII are entitled to attorneys’ fees in “all but special 

circumstances.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978). In 

determining whether requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable, courts apply the lodestar 

method. See, e.g., Reed v. Purcell, No. CV-10-2324-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 5128142 at *4 

(D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2017). The lodestar approach consists of two steps. Welch v. Metro. 

Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the court establishes a lodestar 

by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable 

hourly rate,” excluding from the requested amount “any hours that are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Then, in rare cases, 

“the district court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a multiplier based 

on facts not subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

 Local Rule 54.2(c)(3) lists 13 factors this Court can consider to determine whether 

a requested award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable: 

(A) The time and labor required of counsel; (B) The novelty and difficulty 

of the questions presented; (C) The skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly; (D) The preclusion of other employment by counsel 

because of the acceptance of the action; (E) The customary fee charged in 

matters of the type involved; (F) Whether the fee contracted between the 

attorney and the client is fixed or contingent; (G) Any time limitations 

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (H) The amount of money, or 

the value of the rights, involved, and the results obtained; (I) The 

experience, reputation and ability of counsel; (J) The “undesirability” of the 

case; (K) The nature and length of the professional relationship between the 

attorney and the client; (L) Awards in similar actions; and (M) Any other 

matters deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 

 rate should have been billed as paralegal time. (Resp. at 6–8.) Plaintiff does not dispute this contention and modified her request accordingly. (Reply at 8.) 
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III. ANALYSIS 

 In the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Plaintiff argues and Defendant does 

not dispute that she is eligible for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 

entitled to attorneys’ fees because she is the prevailing party in this case. (Mot. at 6–8.) 

Plaintiff relies on the Local Rule 54.2(c)(3) factors to assert that her fee request is 

reasonable. In response, Defendant offers three reasons why the Court should deny the 

motion: 1) Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates are higher than the prevailing rates in the Phoenix 

legal market in 2015; 2) Plaintiff’s Motion does not comply with the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure; 3) Plaintiff’s attorney cannot bill for performing paralegal work. 

 The Court will thus examine the relevant factors in its determination of whether 

Plaintiff’s fee request is reasonable and the effect of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 

Local Rules in her Motion. 

A. Failure to Comply with Local Rules 

 Defendant first argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion because it 

does not comply with multiple provisions pertaining to attorneys’ fees applications in the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not 

attach a fee agreement, an affidavit indicating the method by which charges were 

established and community prevailing rates, receipts of work done, or a statement of 

consultation to the Motion. (Resp. at 2–3.)2

 Plaintiff does not dispute that she did not 

attach these documents to the Motion. However, Plaintiff attached the Revised Fee 

Agreement (Ex. 2) and Attorney Affidavits (Ex. 3) to the Reply, and the Statement of 

Consultation (Doc. 109 Ex. 5) and Receipts (Doc. 109 Ex. 4) as Additional Attachments 

in support of the Motion. Plaintiff remedied the Motion’s deficiencies by giving the Court 

the documents it requires in the format it requires. See Aviva USA Corp. v. Vazirani, No. 

CV-11-0369-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 4430921 at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that 

 

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 Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(b) by failing to number the pleading paper. While the Court advises Plaintiff’s counsel to 

follow this Local Rule in the future, this issue is not so serious as to warrant denying the Motion. 
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Local Rule violations were remedied when a party provided the required documents in a 

reply). Thus, the Court finds that Defendant’s argument does not warrant denying 

Plaintiff’s Motion. 

B. Reasonable Fees 

 Plaintiff asserts hourly rates of $280 per hour for a senior partner, $240 per hour 

for two associates, and $125 per hour for a paralegal.3

 Plaintiff then argues that four of 

the Local Rule 54.2(c)(3) factors support the reasonableness of her request: 1) time and 

labor required of counsel; 2) novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; 3) amount 

of money or the value of the rights involved and the results obtained; and 4) Defendant’s 

attempts to frustrate the judicial process. Defendant does not dispute any of these factors 

in Plaintiff’s Motion, and the Court finds these factors support the reasonableness of 

Plaintiff’s fee request. 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request is unreasonable because the hourly rates 

she provides are above the prevailing rates in the Phoenix market. (Resp. at 5.) However, 

the prevailing rates in the cases Defendant cites do not accurately represent the prevailing 

rates in the Phoenix market in 2015. See, e.g., Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire 

Ins. Co., No. CV-05-04220, 2007 WL 496766 at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2007) (finding that 

$200-$225 was the “comparable prevailing community rate” in 2007). Case law shows 

that the Phoenix market’s prevailing rates in 2011 were higher than Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

rate in 2015. See Reed, 2011 WL 5128142 at *3–5 (finding that rates of up to $446 per 

hour for attorneys and $127 per hour for paralegals were reasonable in 2011). The Court 

finds that Defendant fails to show the hourly rates in the Motion do not fall within the 

Phoenix legal market’s prevailing rates, and thus Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is 

reasonable. 

 

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 Plaintiff’s counsel recorded over 282 hours of work, and Defendant does not take 

issue with the amount of hours spent on this case. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable, and Defendant failed to 

demonstrate any special circumstance that would justify denying Plaintiff’s Motion. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Costs. (Doc. 104.) 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment 

in favor of Plaintiff Brittany Everts and against Defendant Sushi Brokers LLC in the 

amount of $71,821.50 for attorneys’ fees and $5,587.12 for costs, and dismissing 

Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. 

 Dated this 3rd day of August, 2018. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi 

United States District Judge