J-A06039-20

2020 PA Super 71

BRIANNA PASQUINI

v.

FAIRMOUNT BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 

SYSTEM & UHS OF FAIRMOUNT, 

INC. 

Appellants

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2017 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 14, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 170802950

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: March 25, 2020

Fairmount Behavioral Health System & UHS of Fairmount, Inc. 

(Appellants) appeal from the Order entered on May 14, 2019, in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting Brianna Pasquini’s (Appellee) 

Motion to Strike Objections to Requests for Admission and requiring Appellants 

to admit or deny whether they knew a non-party patient was a registered sex 

offender in January of 2016. After careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant procedural history herein as follows: 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2017, [Appellee] filed the instant litigation 

alleging a personal injury action arising out of the preventable 

rape and sexual assault suffered by Appellee while she was 

receiving inpatient addiction treatment at [Appellants’] facility. 

Appellee alleges in January, 2016, she was raped and assaulted 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A06039-20

- 2 -

by Montezz Hewlett, a fellow patient at the facility who, at the 

time, had a documented history of violent sexual crimes- including 

a rape conviction- and was a registered sex offender. Appellee 

alleges that Appellants knew or should have known of Hewlett's 

history and sex offender status, yet they allowed him unfettered 

and unmonitored access to Appellee, resulting in her rape and 

sexual assault.

While conducting discovery, Appellee served a request for 

admissions stating: “It is admitted that Defendant, Fairmont 

Behavioral Health System, knew that Mr. Hewlett was a convicted 

sex offender in January 2016.” Mr. Hewlett's status as a sex 

offender is publicly available information via the internet due to 

the requirements of Pennsylvania's Registration of Sexual 

Offenders Act (“Megan's Law”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9799.10, et seq. 

Appellants objected, claiming that the information sought was 

“privileged” because Hewlett was a patient at their facility. 

Appellee moved to strike this objection, noting the request sought 

Appellants’ knowledge of publicly available information.

Following briefing and oral argument before this [c]ourt, 

Appellee’s motion to strike Appellants’ objection was granted, 

requiring Appellants to respond to the request for admission.

Appellants, in response, filed a motion for reconsideration, or in 

the alternative, certification to appeal the May 14, 2019 Order. 

Appellants also filed two motions seeking to stay the case. 

Appellants argued that responding to the request would require 

disclosing privileged information about Hewlett, therefore, the 

Order should be vacated. This [c]ourt denied all of Appellants’

motions.

On June 12, 2019, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal, 

claiming the May 14 order is collateral under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) 

because it violates the confidentiality provisions of the Mental

Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. §7101, et seq. and the psychiatrist 

-patient privilege. Subsequently the Superior Court denied 

Appellee's Motion to Quash.[1]

____________________________________________

1 The trial court’s assertion is partially correct. On August 5, 2019, Appellee 

filed her Application to Quash with this Court, and Appellants answered the 

Application on August 19, 2019. In a Per Curiam Order entered on September 

6, 2019, this Court denied Appellee’s motion to quash without prejudice to 

Appellee’s right to raise the issue again in her appellate brief or in a new 

application that may be filed after the appeal has been assigned to a merits 

panel. Appellee has not done so. 
J-A06039-20

- 3 -

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/26/19, at 1-2. 

On July 8, 2019, Appellants filed their Concise Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal which is a four-page narrative. Therein, Appellants

contend they cannot readily discern the basis for the trial court’s decision, and

therefore, they “generally challenge” the court’s finding that they must 

respond to Appellee’s request for admission at issue. Concise Statement of 

Errors Complained of on Appeal, 7/8/19, at 2. Appellants further state that 

“this statement of errors includes every subsidiary issue [Appellants] raised 

in [their] Response to Appellee’s Motion to Strike and in [their] Motion for 

Reconsideration submitted following the entry of the May 14, 2019, Order.” 

Id.

2 On September 26, 2019, the trial court filed is Opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

____________________________________________

2

In light of Appellants’ deficient concise statement, we could find any claims 

raised on appeal waived for failure to present them properly in the concise

statement in violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. As 

this Court recently stated:

[I]ssues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed 

waived for review. An appellant's concise statement must properly 

specify the error to be addressed on appeal. In other words, the 

Rule 1925(b) statement must be “specific enough for the trial 

court to identify and address the issue [an appellant] wishe[s] to 

raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 956 

(2007). “[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the 

court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional 

equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Id. The court's 

review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when the court 
J-A06039-20

- 4 -

In their brief, Appellants present the following Statement of the 

Questions Involved:

1. Does a request for admission asking a mental health 

treatment provider to reveal information learned from a 

patient during treatment violate the Pennsylvania 

psychotherapist-patient privilege, 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 

STAT. ANN.§ 5944 (West 2019)? 

2. Does a request for admission asking a party to reveal the 

contents of privileged medical records violate the 

Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 PA. STAT. 

AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7111 (West 2019)? 

Brief of Appellants at 3. 

It is axiomatic that “[a]n appeal lies only from a final order, unless 

permitted by rule or statute.” Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 471 

(Pa.Super. 2013). As previously noted, this Court’s September 6, 2019, Per 

____________________________________________

has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is 

too vague, the court may find waiver. Commonwealth v. Scott, 

212 A.3d 1094, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Sexton, 2019 WL 5540999, at *4 n. 3 (Pa.Super. Oct. 

28, 2019).

Herein, Appellants’ inarticulate framing of their concise statement and 

attempt to incorporate “subsidiary issues” arguably resulted in a concise

statement that is not specific enough for the trial court to identify and consider 

the related issues Appellants have raised on appeal. However, because this 

has not fatally impaired the trial court's legal analysis in its Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion, we will not deem the two issues Appellants include in their appellate 

brief to be waived for failure to preserve them properly in the concise 

statement.
J-A06039-20

- 5 -

Curiam Order, denied Appellee’s motion to quash the instant appeal without 

prejudice to her right to raise again the issue before the merits panel. 

Although Appellee has not done so, “since we lack jurisdiction over an 

unappealable order it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when 

necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.” Gunn v. 

Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 971 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we begin

by addressing whether we possess jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. 

In order to be appealable, an order must be a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341-

42; an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

702(a)-(b), Pa.R.A.P. 311-12; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.3 When 

considering the appealability of a discovery order concerning one’s mental 

health records and a report pertaining thereto, this Court recently stated: 

“The courts of Pennsylvania have uniformly held that, if an 

appellant asserts that the trial court has ordered him [or her] to 

produce materials that are privileged, then Rule 313 applies.” 

Farrell v. Regola, 150 A.3d 87, 95 (Pa.Super. 2016), citing

Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian, 119 A.3d 1012, 1016 n. 1 

____________________________________________

3 Pa.R.A.P. 313 provides as follows:

(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral 

order of an administrative agency of lower court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and 

collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is 

too important to be denied review and the question presented is 

such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, 

the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa. R.A.P. 313(a), (b). 
J-A06039-20

- 6 -

(Pa.Super. 2015) (“When a party is ordered to produce materials 

purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under 

Pa.R.A.P. 313....”), Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 549 (Pa. 

1999) (holding that when a trial court refuses to apply a claimed 

privilege, the decision is appealable as a collateral order, and 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 248 (Pa. 2011) 

(distinguishing federal law and reaffirming Pennsylvania law that 

“orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are 

immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313”). Based on the 

foregoing, it is clear that this order is appealable as a collateral 

order.

Commonwealth v. Segarra appeal of: Complainant Witness, D.G., a 

minor, 2020 WL 611132, at * 3 (Pa.Super. Feb. 10, 2020).

Applying the above analysis to the case at bar, we reach the same 

conclusion. We are able to examine the issues of privilege raised by Appellants 

without analyzing the underlying issues in the case, i.e. Appellants’ alleged 

negligence, gross negligence, carelessness and recklessness. In addition, 

Appellants allege the requested material is subject to various privileges and 

that the potential revelation of this sensitive mental health information

implicates the “importance” prong of the collateral order doctrine, as such 

privacy rights are deeply rooted in public policy. Finally, our failure to review 

the propriety of the trial court’s discovery order at this juncture would result 

in Appellants’ claim of privilege being irreparably lost, as they could be forced 

to disclose sensitive information in conformance with the trial court’s discovery 

order, and such compliance could not be undone in a subsequent appeal. See

T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2008). 
J-A06039-20

- 7 -

Having determined that the requirements of the collateral order doctrine 

have been met and that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we now 

proceed to examine the issues Appellants have raised. “In reviewing the 

propriety of a discovery order, we determine whether the trial court committed 

an abuse of discretion and, to the extent that we are faced with questions of 

law, our scope of review is plenary.” Id. 

Appellants contend the trial court’s May 14, 2019, Order requires them

“to disclose [their] knowledge of information obtained from a non-party 

patient in furtherance of providing mental health treatment to him.” Brief for 

Appellants at 8. Appellants urge this Court to reverse based on either the 

“psychotherapist-patient privilege,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 59444 or the “Pennsylvania

____________________________________________

4

[T]he psychiatrist/psychologist-patient privilege is absolute and 

the statute contains no exceptions for disclosure. 

Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120, 125 (Pa. Super. 1987); 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5944. The privilege “is designed to protect 

confidential communications made and information given by the 

client to the psychotherapist in the course of treatment, but does 

not protect the psychotherapist’s own opinion, observations, 

diagnosis, or treatment alternatives.” Farrell, 150 A.3d at 97-98 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Segarra is 

attempting to uncover statements D.G. made during the course of 

her mental health treatment at the Horsham Clinic, “which falls 

squarely within the parameters of the privilege.” Id. at 98.

The privilege applies not only to psychiatrists and 

psychologists, but to any member of a patient’s treatment team. 

Id. at 100, quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 

343 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“[A]ny oral communication by [patient] in 

private to any member of the treatment team and used by the 

team for the purpose of psychotherapeutic evaluation is 
J-A06039-20

- 8 -

Mental Health Procedures Act” (MHPA), 50 P.S. § 7111.5 Id. In this regard, 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that: 

____________________________________________

privileged. Additionally, any reference to such a communication in 

[the facility’s] files is privileged as well.”) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, “[i]n cases where the [section] 5944 privilege has 

been found to apply, case law has precluded material from being 

subjected to even in camera review by the trial courts[.]” 

Simmons, 719 A.2d at 341; see also Kyle, 533 A.2d at 131 

(“Subjecting the confidential file to in camera review by the trial 

court (as well as the appellate courts and staff members) would 

jeopardize the treatment process and undermine the public 

interests supporting the privilege. Simply stated, an absolute 

privilege of this type and in these circumstances requires absolute 

confidentiality.”).

Segarra, supra, at * 7. 

5

 [T]he MHPA is to be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 

595 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Pa. Super. 1991). Section 7103 of the MHPA 

specifies that “[t]his act establishes rights and procedures for all 

involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or 

outpatient, and for all voluntary inpatient treatment of mentally ill 

persons.” 50 P.S. § 7103. Section 7103.1 defines “inpatient 

treatment” as “[a]ll treatment that requires full or part-time 

residence in a facility.” Id. § 7103.1 “Facility” is defined as “[a] 

mental health establishment, hospital, clinic, institution, center, 

day care center, base service unit, community mental health 

center, or part thereof, that provides for the diagnosis, treatment, 

care or rehabilitation of mentally ill persons, whether as 

outpatients or inpatients.” Id.

Section 7111 of the MHPA “mandates that all documentation 

concerning persons in treatment be kept confidential, in the 

absence of patient consent, except in four limited circumstances.” 

Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 31 (Pa. 2003); see also 

In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 220 A.3d 

558, 566-67 (Pa. 2019). Section 7111 provides as follows.

(a) All documents concerning persons in treatment shall 

be kept confidential and, without the person’s written 
J-A06039-20

- 9 -

“evidentiary privileges are not favored.” Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (observing 

“[e]xceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not

lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in 

derogation of the search for truth.”). Courts should permit 

utilization of an evidentiary privilege “only to the very limited 

extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good 

transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all 

rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Id. (quoting In re 

Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990)). 

BouSamra v. Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 975 (Pa. 2019).

____________________________________________

consent, may not be released or their contents disclosed 

to anyone except:

(1) those engaged in providing treatment for the person;

(2) the county administrator, pursuant to [50 P.S. § 

7110];

(3) a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized 

by this act; and

(4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes and regulations 

governing disclosure of patient information where 

treatment is undertaken in a Federal agency.

In no event, however, shall privileged communications, 

whether written or oral, be disclosed to anyone without such 

written consent. This shall not restrict the collection and analysis 

of clinical or statistical data by the department, the county 

administrator or the facility so long as the use and dissemination 

of such data does not identify individual patients. Nothing herein 

shall be construed to conflict with section 8 of the act of April 14, 

1972 (P.L. 221, No. 63), known as the “Pennsylvania Drug and 

Alcohol Abuse Control Act.”

50 P.S. § 7111(a) (footnotes omitted).

Commonwealth v. Segarra appeal of: Complainant Witness, D.G., a 

minor, 2020 WL 611132, at * 4-5 (Pa.Super. Feb. 10, 2020). 
J-A06039-20

- 10 -

Herein, during discovery in her underlying action, Appellee sought to 

determine whether or not Appellants knew of Mr. Hewlett’s sexually violent 

past at the time he allegedly attacked Appellee on January 21, 2016. Appellee 

served upon Appellants a request for admission, and Appellants responded as 

follows: 

Q. It is admitted that Defendant, Fairmount Behavioral 

Health System, knew that Mr. Hewlett was a convicted sex 

offender in January 2016. 

ANSWER: Objection. The [c]out previously determined 

that all inquiries regarding patients other than Plaintiff were not 

properly part of discovery of this case.

See Responses of Defendants, Fairmont Behavioral Health System and UHS 

of Fairmont, Inc., to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, at ¶ 5. 

 Appellants maintain that an answer to the above-cited request for 

admission would affect Mr. Hewlett adversely by requiring a review of his 

medical records, since Appellants do not obtain Megan’s Law reports or 

perform medical background checks on their patients. Appellants observe that 

Appellee served the disputed request only after the trial court had denied her 

attempt to discover Mr. Hewlett’s medical records and posits that in doing so 

she sought to bypass MHPA’s privileges and the “broadly defin[ed]” 

psychotherapist-patent privilege to obtain the same information she 

attempted to glean from the records themselves. Brief for Appellants at 9-

10. In arguing that Appellee’s “overbroad” request “plainly seeks” privileged 

information, Appellants reason that: 
J-A06039-20

- 11 -

 [Appellants] learn[] of a patient’s criminal history, such 

as a patient’s status as a sex offender, directly from that patient 

during interviews by treating providers for purposes of providing 

mental health care. Accordingly, to respond to [Appellee’s] 

request, [Appellants] must review a non-party patient’s medical 

records and then disclose information its providers asked a nonparty patient to provide as part of the treatment process without 

that patient’s consent. 

Id. at 13-14. 

 While they acknowledge that “Hewlett’s criminal history is public 

record[],” Appellants analogize the instant matter to this Court’s holdings in 

cases pertaining to attorney-client privilege and conclude that “[a]bsent his 

consent, however, [Appellants] may not divulge whether Hewlett 

communicated this fact to any treating provider at Fairmount. That 

communication (to the extent it even occurred) falls squarely within the 

psychotherapist-patient privilege.” Id. at 17-19. Appellants posit that the 

trial court erred in finding an application of the privilege would disrupt Megan’s 

Law, for the information Appellee seeks- whether Appellants knew in 2016

that Hewlett is a sex offender- differs from the information that Megan’s Law 

requires to be disclosed- the fact that Hewlett is a sex offender. Id.at 22. We 

disagree. 

 In rejecting Appellants’ privilege claims, the trial court reasoned as 

follows: 

Appellants state that the MHPA explicitly precludes a mental 

health facility from disclosing the “contents” of a patient's medical 

records. 50 Pa. Stat. §7111. The PA Superior Court held that 

testimony regarding privileged documents receives the same 

protections as the documents themselves. Commonwealth v. 
J-A06039-20

- 12 -

Moyer, 595 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). Appellants claim the 

only way to reveal its knowledge of a particular patient's criminal 

background is by reviewing its intake and initial assessment forms 

and disclosing the information contained therein, therefore, 

violating the MHPA.

Furthermore, Appellants claim this [c]ourt's orders require 

they violate the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which states 

“no psychiatrist or [psychologist] shall be, without the written 

consent of his client, examined in any civil or criminal matter as 

to any information acquired in the course of his professional 

services in behalf of such client.” 42 Pa. Stat. §5944. Appellants 

claim the only way to answer the request is by revealing 

information acquired in the course of providing psychotherapy 

services to a patient who has not consented to the release of this

information. Lastly, Appellants claim this [c]ourt erred in its Order 

because [Appellants] cannot possibly waive a privilege that its 

patients, and only its patients, possess.

Appellants are correct in that the MHPA explicitly precludes 

a mental health facility from disclosing the “contents” of a 

patient's medical records. However, the request for admission in 

question is not asking Appellants to disclose any information from 

a patient's medical records. The request asks Fairmount to confirm 

or deny whether “[Appellants] knew that Mr. Hewlett was a 

convicted sex offender in January of 2016.” Although it may be 

possible that this information would be included in a patient's 

medical records, the information is also available to the general 

public as required by Megan's Law.

“Looking to the purposes of the privilege as addressed in 

such cases as Kyle and In re Subpoena No. 22,

[6]

it is clear that 

the privilege is designed to protect confidential communications 

made and information given by the client to the psychotherapist 

in the course of treatment. The psychiatric file is imbued with the 

privilege because it might contain such confidential information.”

Commonwealth. v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. Super. 

1998) (emphasis added). Mr. Hewlett's status as a registered sex 

offender does not qualify as the type of information the MHPA 

intended to make privileged. In fact, it directly counters the entire 

purpose of Megan's Law to make the identity of a known sex 

offender available to the public.

Even if, as purported by Appellants, the only way to reveal 

its knowledge of Mr. Hewlett's criminal background is by reviewing 

____________________________________________

6 The trial court omits a complete citation for this caselaw. 
J-A06039-20

- 13 -

its intake and initial assessment forms and disclosing the 

information contained therein, his status as a sex offender is not 

the type of information protected by the MHPA. Including the sex 

offender status of a patient in a medical file and thereafter 

asserting privilege would circumvent Megan's Law. Furthermore, 

the request for admission in question is not whether Mr. Hewlett 

disclosed this information to Appellants, but whether they were 

aware of Mr. Hewlett's publicly available status as a sex offender. 

The request does not include asking how or when exactly they 

became aware of this fact, only asking if they were aware of a fact 

available to the public as of January 2016. Just because the 

documentation of their knowledge that Mr. Hewlett was a 

registered sex offender may be located in his medical files does 

not automatically make Appellants knowledge of that fact 

privileged. Accordingly, Appellant's claim is misguided. 

As such, admitting whether or not Appellants knew of Mr. 

Hewlett's status as a sex offender in January 2016 would not 

qualify as a violation of the psychotherapist -patient privilege. 

Appellants cite 42 Pa Stat. §5944, which states “no psychiatrist or 

[psychologist] shall be, without the written consent of his client, 

examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any information 

acquired in the course of his professional services in behalf of such 

client.” However, 42 Pa. Stat. §5944 also goes on to say the 

following: “the confidential relations and communications between

a psychologist or psychiatrist and his client shall be on the same 

basis as those provided or prescribed by law between an attorney 

and client.” (Emphasis supplied) The focus is again on the alleged 

“confidential” nature of Mr. Hewlett's status as a sex offender. Mr. 

Hewlett has absolutely no right to keep his status as a sex offender 

concealed. In fact, doing so would be in direct opposition to 

Megan's Law.

Appellee is not asking for any information regarding the 

actual treatment of Appellants’ patient. Additionally, [she] did not 

ask for any private thoughts of Mr. Hewlett that may have been 

discussed with his psychotherapist or observations or analysis the 

psychotherapist made in relation to these discussions. We again 

emphasize, all that was asked is whether they were aware of Mr. 

Hewlett's status as a sex offender in January 2016. Appellants 

make the argument that they are unable to disclose whether they 

knew of this information without disclosing contents of privileged

communications and medical records due to the placement of a 

patient's legal history alongside his medical records. At no point 

in Appellee’s request for admission was there a request for 

production of Mr. Hewlett’s medical records or privileged 
J-A06039-20

- 14 -

communications. Knowledge of information, which is mandated to 

be made available to the general public, does not require the 

disclosure of any of the privileged content that may be found in 

these records.

Appellants assert they do not obtain publicly available 

background information on its patients and that any knowledge of 

such comes from the patient himself or collateral contacts. Dep. 

Of Nicole Vandermay 219:17-220:2; 222:15-16. However, just 

because the source of knowledge of this information may be the 

patient does not automatically correlate to that information being

considered privileged. As stated previously, the purpose of 

Megan’s Law is so that the identity of a sex offender is to never 

be concealed from the general public. Appellants cannot assert 

psychotherapist-patient privilege as it pertains to a patient's 

registration as a sex offender. Furthermore, Appellee [is] merely 

requesting knowledge as to whether or not they knew, as of 

January 2016, of Mr. Hewlett's status, which is available to the 

general public. Again, [she is] not asking how they were made 

aware or for any information regarding treatment as a result of 

his status. Accordingly, Appellants claim that patientpsychotherapy privilege would be violated if they answer the 

request for admission is misguided.

Likewise, since this is not privileged information, there is no 

issue of a non-party patient losing privilege based on Appellants 

answering this request for admission. Appellants claim that the 

MHPA gives absolute confidentiality privilege to the patient, and 

only the patient may waive that privilege and allow protected 

information to be released. Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 70

(3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Once again, Appellants are 

mistaken in that Mr. Hewlett's status as a registered sex offender 

qualifies as protected and privileged information which would 

require consent by the patient. Appellants cannot claim merely 

because a patient may have disclosed this information in the 

course of a medical intake inquiry that it should be treated as 

confidential and privileged information. It is mandated that Mr. 

Hewlett's status as a registered sex offender be attainable by the 

general public. As a result, Mr. Hewlett has no right of privilege to 

his status as a sex offender, therefore, there are no waiver rights 

for him to lose as a result of this discovery request. Likewise, 

Appellants do not require a waiver to indicate whether or not they 

knew of information available to the general public in January of 

2016, regardless of the source of that information.
J-A06039-20

- 15 -

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/26/19, at 3-6 (unnumbered) (footnote omitted)

(emphasis in original). 

 Utilizing the same rationale, we reach the same conclusion. Appellants’

claim to the contrary, the MHPA is to be strictly construed, and the 

psychiatrist-patient privilege protects only confidential communications and 

information relayed by a patient to his psychiatrist or psychologist in the 

course of his or her treatment. See Segarra, supra. The information 

Appellee seeks does not require the exposure of confidential communications

kept by Appellants in Hewlett’s treatment record; rather, the request for 

admission seeks to determine whether Appellants had knowledge of an 

undisputed and publicly available fact- Hewlett’s sex offender status. As 

Appellee notes, “[a] simple ‘admit’ or ‘deny’ sheds no light on when, why, 

where or from whom the information was (or was not) gleaned. In other 

words, [Appellants’] actual answer to the request reveals nothing beyond 

their awareness of a publicly-promulgated fact. That is all.” Brief for 

Appellee at 9 (emphasis in original). 

 Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s May 14, 2019, Order, 

affirming Appellee’s Motion to Strike Objections to Requests for Admission. 

 Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 
J-A06039-20

- 16 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/25/20