Filed 2/16/22 P. v. Robles CA2/3

Opinion on remand from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).

This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARMANDO ROBLES, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B308432

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA390804

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, James R. Dabney. Reversed and remanded 

with directions.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 

Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Eric J. Kohm,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Armando Robles, Jr. (Robles) was convicted of two counts of 

attempted murder and one count of shooting at an occupied 

vehicle. After Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437) was enacted

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), Robles filed a petition for resentencing of 

his attempted murder convictions under Penal Code1 section 

1170.95. We affirmed the trial court’s order denying Robles’s 

petition because, at the time, attempted murder wasn’t listed as 

an offense eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. (People 

v. Robles (June 29, 2021, B308432) [nonpub. opn.].) After we 

issued our original opinion, the California Legislature enacted 

Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 775), making 

attempted murder an offense eligible for resentencing under 

section 1170.95. The California Supreme Court granted Robles’s 

petition for review and ordered us to reconsider his appeal in 

light of S.B. 775. We now reverse the order denying Robles’s 

resentencing petition and remand the matter with directions for 

the court to appoint counsel to represent Robles and to reconsider 

his petition under the newly amended section 1170.95. 

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Robles and a codefendant of two counts 

each of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder 

(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one count each of shooting at an 

occupied vehicle (§ 246). The jury also found true that Robles and 

the codefendant committed the crimes for the benefit of a street 

gang and, as to Robles, that a principal personally used a 

firearm. The court sentenced Robles to a total term of 63 years to 

life in prison.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

In June 2020, Robles filed a petition for resentencing under 

section 1170.95. Among other things, Robles alleged that he was 

convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony 

murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine 

and that he couldn’t now be convicted of first or second degree 

murder due to recent changes to sections 188 and 189 following 

the enactment of S.B. 1437. Robles did not state in his petition 

that he was convicted of attempted murder. Robles asked the 

court to appoint counsel to represent him.

The court denied the petition without appointing counsel to 

represent Robles or requesting briefing from Robles or the 

People. The court found Robles was ineligible for relief because 

he was convicted of attempted murder, which at the time wasn’t 

listed as an offense eligible for resentencing under section

1170.95.

Robles appealed.

DISCUSSION 

S.B. 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019, changed 

the law of murder to ensure a “person’s culpability for murder [is] 

premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens 

rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) The legislation limited 

accomplice liability for murder. Under prior California law, every 

accomplice to an enumerated felony could be convicted of first 

degree murder if a death occurred during the commission of that 

felony—regardless of whether the accused killed or intended to 

kill. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 462–472.) 

Similarly, “a defendant who aided and abetted a crime, the 

natural and probable consequence of which was murder, could be 

convicted not only of the target crime but also of the resulting 

murder”—regardless of whether he acted with malice 

aforethought. (In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144.)
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Now, however, a person may be convicted of murder only if: 

(1) he was the actual killer; or (2) with the intent to kill, he aided 

and abetted the actual killer’s commission of murder; or (3) he 

acted as a “major participant” in a felony listed in section 

189 and acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, 

subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; § 188, subd. 

(a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

S.B. 1437 also abolished second degree felony murder. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, amending § 188, subd. (e)(3).) Thus, 

the felony murder doctrine now applies only to those felonies

listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and to accomplices who meet 

the requirements in section 189, subdivision (e).

In addition to changing the law of murder prospectively, 

S.B. 1437 gave people who had been convicted of murder under 

one of the now-invalid theories the opportunity to petition for 

resentencing under section 1170.95. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

Effective January 1, 2022, S.B. 775 amended section 1170.95 to 

provide, among other things, that a person convicted of 

attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences 

theory may also be eligible for resentencing relief. (§ 1170.95, 

subd. (a).)

The People did not file a supplemental brief after the

California Supreme Court transferred the cause back to us for

reconsideration in light of S.B. 775. In his supplemental brief, 

Robles asks us to reverse the order and direct the trial court to 

appoint counsel and reconsider the petition under S.B. 775.

In light of the trial court’s summary denial of Robles’s 

petition on the grounds Robles was not convicted of murder, 

remand is appropriate to allow the court the opportunity to 

conduct further proceedings under section 1170.95, subdivision 

(c), and if necessary, under subdivision (d). On remand, Robles, 

with the assistance of appointed counsel (People v. Lewis (2021) 
5

11 Cal.5th 952, 970), and the People shall be entitled to file their 

respective briefs. “After the parties have had an opportunity to 

submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine 

whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If 

the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is 

entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If 

the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall 

provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) In the event the court issues an order to 

show cause, the court shall conduct further proceedings in 

accordance with section 1170.95, subdivision (d), as amended.
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DISPOSITION

The order denying Robles’s section 1170.95 petition is 

reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with 

directions to appoint counsel to represent Robles and to conduct 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

EGERTON, J.

LIPNER, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.