NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 18-2976

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STANLEY E. KORNAFEL, PRO SE LAYMAN,

Appellant

v.

SCOTT D. GALLOWAY, ESQ.; G. MICHAEL GREEN, J.; CHRISTINE F. GANNON, 

J.; SPIROS E. ANGELOS, J.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-03241)

District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 26, 2018

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 15, 2020)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Stanley Kornafel, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights complaint. For 

the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Kornafel filed a complaint against his landlord, Dorothy Gallagher, his landlord’s

attorney, Scott Galloway, and three Delaware County Court of Common Pleas judges. 

Kornafel claimed violations of his constitutional rights arising from a state court lawsuit 

that Gallagher successfully brought against him. Kornafel alleged that the judges were 

biased against him, precluded him from presenting his case, and conspired against him 

with Galloway. Kornafel sought a “jury trial outside of Media where a reasonable fair 

and equal hearing may be had or adjudicate the case based on the merits.” Compl. at 14. 

The District Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

To the extent Kornafel claimed that the defendants conspired to discriminate against him 

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the District Court ruled that he did not allege the 

requisite race- or class-based discrimination to state a claim. The District Court also 

ruled that Kornafel had not stated a conspiracy claim under § 1983 because he did not 

allege facts supporting a plausible conspiracy, that his § 1983 claims against the judges

are barred by absolute judicial immunity, and that Gallagher and Galloway are not state 

actors subject to liability under § 1983. The District Court dismissed the complaint 

without prejudice and allowed Kornafel to file an amended complaint, with the exception 

of his claims against the judges, which were dismissed with prejudice.
3

Kornafel filed an amended complaint naming Galloway and the three judges as 

defendants. He disputed the District Court’s decision and reiterated and expanded the 

allegations in his original complaint. The District Court stated that the amended 

complaint made clear that Kornafel’s federal case was predicated on his dissatisfaction 

with the handling of his state court case and his belief that the judges and opposing 

counsel conspired against him. The District Court ruled that, to the extent Kornafel asked 

it to review and vacate the state court’s judgment or rulings, it lacked jurisdiction to do so 

under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. The District Court also ruled that Kornafel had 

failed to state a claim for the same reasons stated in its prior decision. The District Court

dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice and this appeal followed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review is 

plenary. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

Kornafel’s complaints are not very clear. To the extent his claims are not barred 

by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, he did not state a plausible conspiracy claim for the 

reasons stated by the District Court. We also agree with the District Court that 

Kornafel’s allegations do not support a conclusion that Gallagher and Galloway are state 

actors subject to liability under § 1983. In addition, the record reflects that Kornafel’s 

claims against the judges are based on their actions in their judicial capacities. The 

1Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
4

judges are thus absolutely immune from any suit for damages and Kornafel does not seek 

injunctive relief that might be available under § 1983. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 

302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

Kornafel argues on appeal that the District Court omitted from its decision certain 

factual allegations, including allegations that the state court failed to adjudicate his 

counterclaim against Gallagher and enforce its pre-trial order, and that these allegations 

support his conspiracy and due process claims. Although the District Court summarized 

Kornafel’s complaints without setting forth all of his allegations of wrongdoing, Kornafel 

has not shown that the District Court erred in dismissing them for the reasons stated 

above.

2

 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Kornafel’s request 

in his brief for oral argument is denied. 

2We will not address the questions presented for review that Kornafel lists in his brief, 

which, to the extent understandable, either are not relevant to the District Court’s reasons 

for dismissing his complaints or are conclusory.