## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 21

- 00115

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1690859 R
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wallach, JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Justice Birdw ell



### T RAVIS 

### W ADE 

### F RAZIER 

### , Appellant

V



### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Intro duct i on Ap pellan t Travis Frazier appeals his conviction of continuous sexual assault of
a chil d younger than fourteen years of age. O n appea l , he raises thre e points

. F irst , Frazier argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for ne w t rial after improperly d eeming a jur or “ disabled ” because he was not vaccinated for COVID

- 19
and therefore was required to remain in quaranti ne for t en days after another juror tested positive

. Next, Fra z ier con tends that the t rial court abused i ts discret ion by admitting ce rtain expert testi mony because it was irrelevant and cumulat ive and served
onl y to imp roperly “ bolster ” previou s testimony

. Finally, Fra z ier asserts that the trial

co urt improperly allowed t wo different out cry witn esses to testify regarding the same
outcry statemen t. We will a ffirm. II. Backgroun d
A. Fra z ier ’ s Family
Frazier a nd his wi fe Pam 1 have been married for over th i r ty

- five years. They
have tw o sons, Zan e and Art. In August 20 18, Zane and h is wife Amy lived just
down the road from h is parent s with Amy ’ s daughter V alerie , age seven, Zan e ’ s daughter Sophia, age fiv e, and their child tog ether Annie, a ge one.

1 Ali ases consistent with those used i n the parties ’ briefs have been used for th e names of the victims and t heir family mem bers , other than the de fendan t. See Tex. R. App . P. 9 .10( a )(3).3 Zane , Am y , and their girls were v ery close to Fra zier and Pam , w hom the girls
called Paw Paw and Nona. Frazier and Pam of ten hosted family events at their house , and from 2014 to 2018 th ey regularly babysat Valeri e and Sophia on the weekends.
B. First I ndicat ion of Abuse: Sophia ’ s Accident al Disclosure
In March 2018 , d u ring a tick le fight with her other grandmother M artha ( Amy ’ s step

- mo ther ) , Sop hia po inted to her pri vates and said , “ [ T

] ickle me there , like Paw
P aw does , ” clarifying that by “ P aw Paw ” she meant Fr azier. Martha told S o phia that
no one should ever touch her t here except he r mother or a doctor

. She th en asked
Val erie i f Frazier had ever tick led her there , and Val erie re p lied that he had not.
Martha told A my what Sophia had said, and Zan e and Amy de cided to contact Chi ld Prot ective Services (CPS). In the interview wi th CPS, So phia “ cl ammed up ”
and did not verify the claim of ab use . As a result, CPS deter mined th at it co uld not
substantia te the claim

. Because the abuse was unsubstantiated , Zan e a nd Amy
continue d to allo w the girls to visit F razier and P am ’ s house.
C. Valeri e ’ s O utcry
In October 2018, Val erie told her mother A my t hat Frazier had been abusing
her. Valeri e de scribed ho w Fra zier had “ show [ n

] her his p riv ates and ma [de] her play
wit h t hem

. . . with her hands and mout h. ” Valerie stated t hat this had be en happ ening since she was in kindergar ten, usually while Pam was aslee p on the co uch

. Valerie sa id tha t Fraz ier h ad wa rned her not to tell anyone because Nona and her4 parents would b e mad at her. Amy recorded Valeri e ’ s account on her phone , and the next day she and Zane reporte d the a buse to t he police

. Alexis Harrison , a forens ic interviewer at Alliance for C hildren, conduc ted
Valerie ’ s forensic interview. Valer i e told Harrison th at Frazier had a ske d he r to play with his pri vate part an d had kept aski ng until she complied

. Valerie t old Harrison
about additional act s of abuse not previously disclosed to her mother, inclu ding Frazier touching Valerie ’ s g en itals with h is hand, pen etr at ing h er vagina wi th his finger, and performing oral sex on her

. V al er ie recounted for Harrison many specific
de tails of th e abuse, i ncluding where it occurred

— typical ly i n Fra zier ’ s bedr oom while
Pam wa s a sle ep , t he posi tions of Va leri e ’ s and F razier ’ s bo dies during the abuse, and
the “ frosting ” F razier used as lubricant

. Va l erie also chronicled th e timeline of the
ab use, te lling H arrison that it had started whe n Va ler ie was six y ears old and in th e first grade and that the last time it had happened was w hen she was six years old and
in the second grade.
D. Sophia ’ s Outcry
In March 201 9 , Sophia revealed to Zane that Fra zier had abuse d her a s well.
A fter Zane reported th is to the police, Harrison conducted a fo rensic interview

. 2 During t he interview, So p hi a described many details of the abuse , including that

2 H ar ris on had pr evi ously conducted a for ensic interview of Sophia in November 2018, but Sophia disclose d no sexual abuse at that time.5 Fra z ier had t ouched her private par t s o n many o ccas ions in his ba throom , that she had put her mouth on his private part , and that he had put h is private part on hers.
E
. Factual and E x pert Testimo ny Concerning Abuse At trial, Amy and Harrison both testif ied as outcry w itnesses for Val erie. Zane and Harrison both testified regarding Sophia ’ s outcry
. The sexual assau lt nurse examiners (SANEs) who examined the g irls also testified

. In addi tion to te stifying as a fact witn e ss, Harrison provi de d exper t testimony regarding the dynamics involve d when chil dr en disclose chronic s ex ual abus e by a family m ember

. Harrison expla ined th at children who ar e abu sed at a young ag e often experience con fusion and c o n flicting emotion s , which , comb ined with a tendency to see everythin g as their fa ult, can c ause them to delay reporting the abuse. She also explained th at children typically disclose sexual abus e gradually, sometimes engag ing
in “ to e

- dipping ” in which t he y reveal just enough to ma ke the abuse sto p and t hen

wa it to see what happens next. Harrison also describe d the nature of g rooming, the process by which an abuser m anipulates n o t on ly th e victim but als o th e adults in the
victim ’ s life to gain unfett ere d access to t he victim

. F inally, Har riso n describ ed the nature and goals of a forensic interview , par ticularly the importance of e liciting

sen sory and peripher al d etails, 3 which play a c rucial r ole in ev aluating a child ’ s credibi lity.

3 Sensory details reflect a child ’ s memo r y of something she saw, hea rd, felt, smelled , or tasted

. Examples of periphe ral deta ils include the temperature of the6 Lindse y Dula , Dir ec to r of Program Services at Alliance for Children, who ha d

neve r met Valerie, Sophia, or their parents but reviewed the victims ’ forensic
intervie ws , t estified as a n ex pert witness in th e fiel ds of fore n sic in terviewing and chil d

se xual abuse and its effe c t s . While Dul a e xplained some of the same concepts as
Harris on s uch as “ toe

- dipping ” and the impor tance of sensory and peri pheral det ail s, she als o hi ghlighted the si gn if icance of parti c ular details

— such as Valeri e ’ s recollection of conv ersations w ith Fraz ie r and par ticular instruction s he had given
her

— in a way th at Harrison ’ s testimony had not

. Mo r eove r , Dula ’ s te stimony als o covered areas t hat Har ris on had not addresse d at al l, such as the differen ce between a

true out c ry an d an accidental disc losure. Sh e also tes tified regarding the i mpact that
the thr ee

- year delay between the out cr ies and the trial might have had on the se vi ctims ’ testimony , explaining that children ’ s m emories deter iorate over time and that
children learn embarrassment as they get old er , whi ch can inhibit their ability to sp eak about p ast abuse.
F. F razier ’ s Defense
Frazier ’ s defense at trial involved attacki ng the cred i bility of the victims ’

accounts. Pam and Art both testified tha t they believe d that Zan e and Amy had

coa ched the g ir ls in t o maki ng up t h e allegat ions aga inst Frazier. Art stated that Zane and Amy had gotten into a big argument with his parents shortly before the outcries

room, the where abouts of other people in the house, or th e time of day. As Harrison expla ined, c hildren who have been coached typically cannot provide sensory or peripheral de tails

.7 and that he believe d that they were capable of coa chin g the ir gi rls to l ie. The defense also sug ge sted that the gir ls ’ accounts may have resulted from the girls ’ h aving been exposed to p ornography or o verhearing sexual conversat ions in their home.
G. Dismis sal of Jur or
On Monday , August 2, 2021, shortl y before closing ar guments were to begin,
the t ri al cou r t learned tha t on e jur or

— Juror No. 31

— had be en diagnosed with
COVID

- 19 bu t was asymptoma tic

. The tr ial c ourt contacted the Tarrant Coun ty Public Health Department , and the health department conducted rapid COVID

- 19

tests o n all the jurors

. The t ri al court postponed closing arguments until Thursday , August 5, 2021 , when Juror No. 31 ’ s fiv e

- day quara ntine period w ould be complete

. On Thurs d ay, the trial court informed th e parties that Jur or No. 31 had been medically cleared to continue and that th e remaining eleven ju rors had tested negative. However, beca use Juror No. 29 w as u nvaccinated, unde r the Ta rrant Co unty Public Health Department ’ s gu id elines , he was req ui red to remain in quarantine for ten days

. As a re sult , the trial court found Juror No . 29 to be “ disabled ” for purposes of A rticle
36.29 of the Texas Co de of Criminal Pro ced ure and ordered that the trial continue with the remaining eleven jurors. F razier objected to p roce eding without all twelve jurors 4 a nd then moved for a mistr ial on th e g rounds that the remaining jurors wou ld
rush throu gh their deli berations o ut of fear of be in g in contac t with someone who

4 Frazier provided no gr ounds for his o bje ct ion , statin g only t hat “ the Defense would object at moving forward at this point without the pres ence of the full [twelve] members of the jury. ”8 had tested positive for COVID

- 19. The trial court overr uled Fraz ier ’ s objectio n , denied his motion for a mistria l, and allowed th e trial to continue with the remaining
eleven jurors.
F. Trial Outcome an d Appeal
Fr a zier was convicted of continuous assa ult o f a child y ou nger than fourteen years of age and se nte nced to thirty

- five years in prison

. Frazier timely filed a motion
for n ew t rial, which was denied afte r a hear ing. T hi s appeal fo llowed.
III. Discussion On appeal, Frazier raises three point s . First, Fra z ier asserts that the trial co urt erred by denying his motion for new trial after i mproperly de eming a juror “ disabled ”
be c ause he was not vaccinated for COV ID

- 19. Secon d , F razier argues that the trial

cour t abused its discretion by admitting Dula ’ s exper t te stimony b ecause it was
redundant and cumulative of Harrison ’ s and constituted i mproper “ bolstering. ” Finally, Frazi er argues th at the trial court erred by a llowing t he testimony of two different outcry witnes ses on the same outcry statement. We will a ddress each of
th es e issues in turn.
A. Di smissal of Jur or No. 29 as “ Disabled ”
While t he right to a twelve

- person ju ry is not found in the United States
Cons titu tion, bot h the Texas constitution and the Texas Code of Cr iminal Procedure
requ ire a verdict ren dered by twelv e jurors in felo ny case s . Tex. Const. a rt. V, § 13;
Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. art . 36.29(a)

. H owev er , under both the c onstitution and9 the stat u te , if a juro r becomes “ di sabled ” from si tti ng, the judge may re move the j u ror and allow th e trial t o proceed with fewer than t welve jurors. Tex. Const. a rt. V, § 13 ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art . 36.29(a)

.

“ The determination as to whether a juror is disa bled is with i n the discretion of
the trial cou rt
. Absent an a buse of th at discret ion, no reversible error wil l be fo und. ”
Brooks v . State , 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 ( Te x. Crim. App. 1999). O ur role in r eviewing a fi nding of disabi lity is not “ to substitute [o ur] own judgm ent for that of the trial court, but rather, to assess whether, after viewing the evide nce in the light most favorable to
the trial court ’ s ruling, t he ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable

. ” Scal es v. State , 380
S .W.3d 780 , 784 (Tex . Crim. Ap p. 2012) (op. on reh ’ g)

. Th us, we will reverse a trial

court ’ s fin ding of disability only if it is outside the zon e of reasonable disagreement.
Id. The State argues that Frazier fa iled to p reserve the speci fic claim of error that
he makes on app eal

— that the t ria l cour t abused its discretion by finding Ju r or No. 29

“ disabled ” b ased upon the cou nty health de partment ’ s o rder that he remain in quarantine due to his unvaccinated sta tus
. 5 Th u s, as a thresh old mat ter , we must

co nsider whethe r Fra zier preserved this specific claim of error.

5 In his brief, Fra zi er not es tha t the quarantine peri ods promulgat ed by the Tarrant Count y P ublic Health D epa rtment and the f ederal Centers for Disease Control and Prevent ion ar e only suggested, not mandated. However, the trial court stated on the rec ord that J ur or No. 29 had been “ o rdered ” to quarantine for ten day s . In the absence of a ny evi dence in the re cor d to the contrary, we must defer to the trial court ’ s de termination

. See Oc on v. S tate , 284 S.W.3d 880 , 884 (Tex. Crim

. App. 2009)10 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that a specific a nd timely objection was made to the trial ju dge and that the judge ruled on
the objection. Tex

. R

. App . P. 33 .1(a); Lovill v. State , 319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Smith v. State , 256 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. “ The complaining party must have inf or med the trial judge what was wanted and why t he par ty was entitled to it. ” Lovill , 319 S.W.3d at 691. A complaint is not preserved “ if the legal b asis of the complaint rais ed on appeal varies
from the complai nt made at trial. ” Id.
After the trial co urt fo und Juror No. 29 to be “ disabled, ” Fra zie r rai sed a bare object ion to proceedin g wi th eleven jurors , stating no grounds. He then moved for a
mistrial on the ground s that th e jurors would rush through their deliberations o ut of
fe ar of COVI D

- 19 exposure. 6 However, at tri al Fraz ier never specifically ob j ec t ed to

( acknowledgin g that appellate cour ts must defer to a trial court ’ s resolution of historical facts )

. Mor eo ve r, at the tim e t he finding of disability was mad e, the trial court was o perating u nder directives c ontained in an emergency order of the Tex as Suprem e Court to , among other things, t ake reasonabl e action to avoid exposing court p roceeding s and part icipan ts to the threa t o f COVID

- 19. See Fortieth Emergency Order Regarding COVI D

- 19 State of Disaster , 629 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. 2021) (order)

. Thus, even a ssuming tha t th e ten

- da y quarant ine period was no t mandatory per se , dis regardi ng the county healt h depa rtment ’ s qu aran tin e guidelines could certainly be
v

iewed as a violation of th e supreme court ’ s emerg e ncy order.

6 As the S tate correctly point ed out i n its brief, beca use Fra zier ’ s mo tion for mistrial was based on his concern that t he entire jury wo uld be u n able to delibe r at e out of fear of being exposed to the C OVID

- 19 virus , far from being an o bjection to the trial court ’ s finding that Juror No. 29 wa s “ disabled, ” the motio n was , in essence, an assertion that all of the jurors were “ disabled

. ” See Reyes v . State , 30 S.W .3d 409, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ( re cog nizing that for purpos es of A rticle 36.29(a) ,11 the tri al court ’ s finding that Juror No. 29 w as “ di sabled

. ” R ather, t he first time he
raised this spe cifi c objection was i n his motion for new trial. While a motion for new trial may preserve a claim of error if the appellant did not have the op portun ity to object a t trial , where , a s here, the appella nt had the opportunity to object

— an d in fact
did so without stati ng specific g rounds

— a motion for new trial will not pr e se r ve the

error . See Lopez v. State , 96 S. W.3d 406, 414 (Tex. App.

— Aust in 2 002 , pet. ref ’ d) ( “ The use of a motion for new trial to preserve error is

. . . limited to the r are circumstances

. . . when there is no opportunity to object

. . . . ” ). B ecause Fra zier
fail ed to specifically object to the finding of disability at tri al , thi s point do es not appear to have be en preserved for appellate review

. Even setting aside the preserva t ion issue and a ssuming without deciding th at the claim of error was p reserved, 7 we overrule Frazier ’ s first point on the merits.
Fra z i e r ’ s claim that t he trial c our t a bused its discretion by finding Jur or No. 29 to be

“ disabled ” is grounded on the fa ct t hat Juror No. 29 was not actually sick

. However,

“ disability ” includes “any condi tion th at inhibits a juror from fully and fairly performing the functions of a juror ” ( quoting G riff in v. State , 486 S.W. 2d 948, 951 (Te x. Crim. App. 1972) ) )

. Thus, Fra zier ’ s motion for mistrial did not preserve the claim of error regarding J uror No. 29 ’ s “ disab ility

. ”

7 B ecause we overrule this issue on the merits, we need not decide whether it
wa s pre served

. See , e.g. , Br umit v. State , 206 S.W.3d 639, 644

– 45 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2006) (expressly declini ng to decide whether an objection was required to p reserve erro r on an issu e becau se it co uld be overruled on the merits ) ; Dawson v. State , No. 14

- 95

- 01 091

- CR, 1998 WL 1196 75, a t *1 n.4 (Tex. App

. — Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 19 98, pet. ref’d) (not design ated for publication) (“Because we overrule this po int of error on the merits, we do not address whether error was preserved.”).12 for p urpose s of A rti cle 36.29(a) , “ disability ” is not limited to physical illness but
includ es “ any con di t ion that inhibits a ju ror from fully and fairly performin g the
functions o f a juror. ” Reyes , 3 0 S.W.3d at 411 ( quoting Griffin , 486 S.W.2d at 951 ) ; see al

so Edwards v. State , 981 S.W.2d 359 , 366

– 67 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 1998, no p et.) ( affir m ing tri al c ou r t ’ s determination that jur or ’ s inability to find childcare made her

“ disabled ” ); Freem an v. Sta te , 838 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edin burg 1 992, pet

. ref ’ d) ( affirming trial court ’ s ruling that juror who was so
concerned about m issing wor k t hat he could not be att entive during trial was

“ disabled ” )

. Indeed, i ncarcerat ion has been hel d to be a “ disability ” fo r purposes of
A rticle 36. 29(a). Se e Griffin , 486 S.W.2d at 951 ( affirming the trial court ’ s de terminat ion that a juror who had be en arr ested for driving while intoxicated during
noon recess of trial was disabled because he was “i n jail, the jury was reassembled after noon recess, and court was about to reconvene ” ) ; Foyt v. State , 602 S.W.3d 23, 47 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dis t.] 2 02 0, pet . ref ’ d) ( holdin g the t rial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding jailed juror “ disabl ed ” ). With regard to their ability to
p erform their jur y fun ct ions , an incarcerated juror is no different from a juror under a quarantine order

— in b oth cas es, wh il e the juro r may be wi lling and phys ically able to

serve, his inability to be p resent in the courtroom prevents him from “ fully and fa irly
per forming the functions of a juror. ” Reye s , 30 S.W.3d at 411

. Because Juror No. 29
was unable to be physica lly pr esent in the courtroom without violating the Tarran t13 County Public Health Department ’ s directi ve s, the trial court did not a buse its
discretion by declarin g him “ disabled. ”
We overrule Frazier ’ s first point

. B. Dul a ’ s Expe rt Testimony
In h is seco nd po int , F razier asserts that the t rial cour t erred by admitting Dula ’ s

e xpert testimony. A ccording to F razier, Dula ’ s testimony was irrelevant because it

was cumulative and redundant of Harrison ’ s and constituted improper “ bolstering. ”
We review a trial cou rt ’ s decision to admit or exclude expert opinion testimony

un der an abuse of discretion standard

. Gallo v. Stat e , 239 S.W.3d 757, 7 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We review the trial court ’ s ruling in light of the evidence b efore the tri al
court at the time th e r uling was made. Weatherred v. State , 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 ( Tex

. Crim. App. 2000). We must uphold the trial court ’ s ruling if it w as within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id

. Pursuant to Rule 401 of the Texas R ules of E vide nce , relevant evidence is that
which has any tendency to make a fact of consequence to the determination of the

case more or less probable than it would be without the evidence

. Tex. R. Evid.
401 (a)

– (b ). “ In a case involving the sexual abuse of a chi ld, a fact of consequence t o

t he determination of the action includes whether the child was actually abused. ” Shaw
v. State , 329 S.W.3d 645, 65 1 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref ’ d) (citing C ohn v. State , 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1 993) )

. Expert t esti mony

e xpl aining that a child exhibits behavi oral characteristics c on sis tent with those14 commonly observed among sexually abuse d children is relevant and a dmissi ble

. See
Cohn , 849 S.W.2d at 818; Shaw , 329 S.W.3d at 651. However , s uch te stim ony would
cross the li ne into improper “ bolster ing ” if the expert d irectly opined on t h e child ’ s

tru thfulness. Yount v. State , 872 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. C rim. App. 1 993) ; Flores v. S tate , 513 S.W.3d 146, 162 (Tex . App.

— Houston [1 4th Dis t. ] 2 0 16, pet. ref ’ d).
I nsofar as it sur viv ed the codification of the ru le s of evidence, 8 “ bol sterin g ” is any evidence the sole purpose of which is to convince the factfi nder that a particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of credit, without substa ntively c ontr ibuting “ to make the exis ten ce of [ a ] fact that is of consequence to the de terminat ion of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evi dence

. ” Cohn , 849 S.W.2d at 819

– 20. Thus, evidence is not “ bolstering ” if it “ corroborat es anothe r wit ness ’ [s] story or enhan ces inferences to be drawn from another source of
evide nce, in t he sense that it has an incrementally further tendency to establi sh a fact of
consequence . ” Id. at 820.
Here , Fra zier doe s not assert that Dula imprope rly “ bols tered ” Harrison ’ s or the victi ms ’ testimony by directly opining on t heir truthfulne ss. I nst ead , he grounds
his “ bol s tering ” claim o n his assertion that Dula ’ s t estimony was redundant and
cumul ative of Harrison ’ s . Howeve r, w hile Dula ’ s and Harr i son ’ s testimony

8 See Cohn , 849 S.W.2d a t 821

– 22 (Campbell, J. , c oncurring) (dis cus sing the history of the “ bolsterin g ” objection and expressing the view “ that a ‘ bolstering ’ objection is no long er adequate to preserve erro r for review concerning the admission of evidence because no such groun d survived the Texas Rules of Criminal Evi den ce ” ) ; Prestiano v. State , 581 S.W. 3d 935, 945 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [ 1st Dist. ] 2019, pet. ref ’ d) (op. on reh ’ g) ( “ Whet her ‘ bolste r ing ’ remain s a va lid objection is in doubt. ” )

.15 overlapped to an extent, Du la also addressed topics t hat Harr i son did no t, including
the difference between a true outcry and a n accidental disclosure and the common pattern of beha vior in which a child deni es abuse d uring a n initi al forens ic interv iew
foll owing an accident al dis clo sure and then is later pre pared to make a more intentional disclosure. Thus, Dula ’ s te stimony was not redundant or cumulative

. The

m ere fact t hat porti ons of Du l a ’ s testim ony co rroborated Har rison ’ s o r the victims ’
does not make it inadmissible. See id

. at 820

. I n arguing that Dula ’ s testimo ny c onstituted improper “ bolstering, ” Fraz ier
makes much of the fact that Harrison ’ s credibility had not bee n attacked. However,
the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals has made clea r that expert testimony conc erning

co mmon behavior among sexually abused children need not s erve a rehabilitative
func t ion to be admissible. See id. at 819. Mo reover, e ven if this we re a requ irement,
Dula ’ s testimony did in fact serve a r ehabilitative function

. F razie r ’ s entire defense

was predicated on attacking the credibility of the vi c tims ’ accou nts. The defense

su ggested that the gir ls had been c oache d by Zane and Amy to lie or that the y had been exposed to pornography or othe r s exu al materials as a result of Zan e ’ s pornography add i ct ion or Amy ’ s work as an unlicensed massage therapist

. Thus,
Dul a ’ s testimony ex plaining t hat she saw no signs of coaching and highli ght ing the significance of sensory and periph eral details to specifically refu te the defense theory that the gir ls ’ ac co unt s were the result of b eing exposed to p ornography h elp e d the jury to better unde rstand th e victims ’ testimony and a i ded its asses sm ent o f their16 credibility. See Tex. R. Evid. 702 ; Weatherred , 15 S.W.3d at 542 ( stating th at under Rule
702 expert testi mo ny is admissible if it “ is sufficiently relevant and reliable to assi st the jury in accurate ly und erstanding other evidence or in determini ng a fact in issue ” ) ; cf.
Rober ts v. State , No. 08

- 19

- 00029

- CR, 2019 WL 7046756, at * 6 (Tex. App.

— El Paso
Dec

. 23, 20 19, pet. ref ’ d) (not designated for publication) (finding expert testimony

r e ga r ding com mon behavi o ral traits o f child sexual a buse vi ctims “ relevant and helpful to a ssist the jury in determining the credibility of [the victim ’ s] outcry ” )

. In sum, Dul a ’ s tes timony did not directly opine on the truthfulness of any
oth e r witness, wa s not red un dant of Harrison ’ s , and helped th e jury to b etter unders tand the victims ’ te stimo ny and to assess their credibility. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its dis cre ti on in admitting her testimony.
W e overrule Fra zier ’ s sec ond point

. C. Harri so n ’ s Testimony a s a n Outcry Witness
I n hi s third point , Frazier a rgues that th e trial court erred b y allowing Harrison

t o testify as an outcry wi tness regarding event s abou t w hich Amy had already testified.
We review a trial court ’ s deci sion to admit or exclude evid enc e under an a buse
of discretion standard

. Zuliani v. State , 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ; Montgo mery v. S tate , 810 S.W. 2d 372, 379 ( T ex. Crim. Ap p. 199 0). We will not reverse a
trial court ’ s decision to admit or exclu de eviden ce unless the record shows a clear

a buse of discretion. Zuliani , 97 S.W.3d at 595

. An abuse of discretion occurs only17 when the trial court ’ s decision was so c learly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons m ight disagree. Id.
A rti cle 38.072 o f the Texas Code of C riminal Procedure creat es a statutory

exce p tion to the general rule excluding hearsay. Te x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.072 , § 2 (b)

. Beca use it is often traumatic for children to testify in a c ourtroom setti ng, espec ially about sexual offenses com mitt ed against them, the Legislature enacted Ar ticle 38.072 to admit the testimony of the first adult a child confides in regarding th e abuse. Thi s w itness may recite the child ’ s out

- of

- court statements concerning th e offense , and that testimony is substan tive evidence of the crime. Martinez v. State , 178 S.W.3d 806, 810

– 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (footnote omitted). The proper outcry wi tness is the “ f irst person, 18 years o f age o r older, other than th e defendant, to whom t he child or person with a disa bility made a st atement ab out the
offense or extra neo us crime, wrong , or act. ” Te x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 , § 2 (a)( 3 ). T he c ourt of c rim ina l a ppeals has construed the phrase “ about the off ense ”

to mean a sta tement th at “ in some discernible manne r describes the a lleged off ense. ”
Garcia v. Stat e , 792 S.W.2d 88, 91(Tex. Crim . App. 1990). “ [T] he statement must be
more than

. . . a general al lus ion ” of sexual abuse. Id. Thus, t he proper outcry wi tness
is no t n ecessaril y the first adult to whom the c hild reve aled the abuse but , rather, the
first adult to whom the child revealed specific details concerning the off ense. Id. ; Thomas v. State , 3 09 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1 4 th Dist.] 2010, pet
. ref ’ d) ( a ffirming trial co urt ’ s determination tha t stepmother was proper outcry witness18 despite victim ’ s prior report o f abus e to mother because initial report to mother lacked speci ficity).
As the stat ute is ev ent

- specific, there may be more than o ne outcry witn ess provi ded that each testifie s about d ifferent events. See Brown v. State , 381 S. W.3 d 565 , 571 (Tex. App.

— Eas tland 2012, no pet.) ; Hernandez v. State , No. 02

- 08

- 00478

- CR,
2010 WL 18541 50 , at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 6, 2010, no pet.) ( mem. op.,

not designate d for publication)

. For exampl e, i n Josey v. State , the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting th e testimony of a sec ond outcry wit nes s. 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2003, no pet.)

. The

v

ictim fir st told his mother about being made to have oral contac t with the
defen dant ’ s g en itals and about being “fingered.” Id. Wh ile t he victim went into explicit detail with his mothe r a bout the a ct of oral contact , he gave no details abo ut being “fing ered.” I d. Two days later, however, th e victim provided, for the first time,
details about being “fingered” during an interview with a forensic interviewer. Id.
The cour t of appeals c onc luded the vict im ’ s first outcry regarding digital pe netration
did not occur until the interview. Id. ; c f

. Schuster v. State , 852 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.
A pp.

— Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref ’ d) (holding psychologist was proper outcry witness

even though complai nan t told mother fi rs t because no details were provided to mother ). Here, Fra zier asserts that Valerie ’ s out cri es to Amy and Harrison covered the

same even ts . However, Valerie ’ s statements to Harrison described separ ate instances19 of abuse n ot previously dis closed to Amy

. I n her initial stat ement to Amy, Val erie
stated th at Frazie r showed her his private part s on purpose and had her play with
them using her hands and mou th and that this had happened continuously since kindergarten

. Later, in her forensic in terview with Harrison, Valeri e described

nu merous ad dit i onal acts of abuse , inclu di ng Frazier touching her g en itals with his hand, pen etrating her vagina with his finger, and performing oral sex on her. Therefore, as in Josey , because Amy and Harriso n te s ti fied re gard ing different acts of abuse, the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion by allowing t hem both to serve as

out cry witnesses

. J osey , 97 S.W.3d at 693 ; see also Hernandez , 2 010 WL 1854150, at *3 ( affirming trial court ’ s decision to allow tw o o utcry wit ness es to testify where victim ’ s outcry to s econd witness alleged additional instances of a buse)

. We overrule Frazier ’ s third point

. I V. Conclus ion Having o verruled all of Fr azier ’ s points , we affirm the t rial court ’ s judgm ent. /s/ W ade Birdwell
Wade Birdwel l J ustice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 4 7.2(b)
Delivered : Octob er 6, 2022