Opinion issued December 31 , 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 18
- 00701
- CV

——————————— ANAHID PRIGMORE , Appella nt

V. TI N A S . MANTOOTH , Appell e e s
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4

Harris County, Texas T rial Court Ca se No. 449332

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a probate proceeding concerning the estate of Vahak A. K h oika n . Appellant Ana hid Prigmore is K h oikan ’ s s ister . A ppellee Tin a S. Mantooth wa s K h oikan ’ s common - law wife , and she is the mother of K h oikan ’ s only child , J.K. , a minor. Mantooth argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because2

the notice of appeal was untimely filed . We agree , and we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Background and Procedural History
V ahak K h oika n died intestate on May 24, 2016 , leaving an estate worth approximately $10 million

. He was survived by his common - law wife, Mant oo th ; his son, J.K.; and his sister, Prigmore. Mantooth filed an application for determination of heirship and for letters of a dministration

. The trial court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the interest of any heir s who were unknown or under a lega l di sability, including J.K. Prig more filed a cross

- application for letters of administration , seeking to be appointed adm inistrator of the estate and asser ting that , as J.K. ’ s paternal aunt, she

w as a p erson “interested ” in his welfare

. See T EX
. E ST
. C ODE § 22.018. Prigmore
also filed an answer in “ the interest of the decedent ’ s minor son and for his protection as the sole h eir ” of Khoikan ’ s estate

. She spe cifically denied that Mantooth was K

h oikan ’ s sp ouse , but she a dmitted that J.K. w as K h oikan ’ s son and that she had no pecuniary interest in her bro ther ’ s estate

. Mantooth filed a motion in limine challeng ing Prigmore ’ s sta nding . She argued that Prigmore is not her brother ’ s legal heir and that Prigmore was not otherwise an “ interested person ” because she did not represent J.K. in any capacity and she had no pecuniary interest in the estate or in J.K. ’ s welfare. On April 6,3

2018, the trial court granted Mantooth ’ s mo tion , dismissed Prigmore ’ s cross application for letters of administration, and struck Prigmore ’ s pleadings from the
record

. Also on April 6, the trial court signed : (1) a judgment declaring heirship an d
fin ding t hat Mantooth is K h oikan ’ s su rvivi ng spouse and J.K. is his son; (2) an order approvi ng a fa mily settlement agreement and mutual release and appointing a permanent dependent administrator; (3) an order setting aside J.K. ’ s house as his ho mest ead and ord erin g that it may not be used to sati sfy any debts of the estate ; (4) an ord er d enying Prigmore ’ s motion for discovery via subpoenas; and (5) an order denying Prigmore ’ s motion for genetic testing of J.K. 1 On April 19, 2018, the trial court withdrew the April 6, 2018 judgment dec laring heirship in order to
correct an error, and it signed a new judgment declaring heirship

. On May 4, 2018, Prigmore filed a motion for new trial, which was d enied on May 15, 201 8. On July 31, 2018, Prigmore filed a notice of appeal. In he r brief, Prigmore asserts that she is appealing from all the orders signed

on A pril 6, 2018 , as well as the April 19, 2018 judgment declaring heirship and the

1 In he r brief, Prigmore asserts that she is appealing from the order granting Mantooth ’ s motion in limine as well as the following ord ers: (1) order setting aside homestead ; (2) order denying motion for gen eti c testing; (3) or der denying motion for limited discovery via sub poenas; (4) order approving family settl ement agreement and mutual release and appointment of perman ent depend ent ad ministrator; (5) judgment declaring heirship; and (6) order denying moti on for new tri al.4

May 15, 2018 denial of her motion for new trial. In her brief, Prigmore argues th at there is a disputed qu estion of fac t about whether Mantooth was Khoikan ’ s

common - law wife

. Prigmore also argues that the trial court erred by holding that she lacked standing , and by “ holding categorically that a blood relative without a pecuniary int er est lacks standing ” under section 22.018 of the Texas Estates Code. Jurisdict ion Mantooth asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely filed. In particular, Mantoot h argues that the April 6, 2018 order granting the motion i n limine , dismissing Prigmore ’ s claims, and striking her pleadings was a final order for the purpose of appeal and th at the July 31 notice of appeal was untimely. We agree. Ordinarily, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v.
Har

– Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). “ Probate proceedings are an exception to the ‘ one final judgment ’ rule; in such cases, ‘ multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues. ’ ” De Ayala v. Mackie , 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 19 2 ).
Because n ot every interlocutory order in a probate case is appealable, t he Texas Supreme Court has adopted the following test f or determining finality:
If t here is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logical ly be considered5

a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory. Id. at 578 (quoting Crowson v. Wakeham , 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex

. 1995)). An order that dismisses a probate application because the applicant la cks standing “is in no sense interlocutory

. ” 2 Womble v. Atkins , 331 S.W.2d 294, 298 (1960)

. An order dismissing a party because she is not an interested person and therefore la cks standing is a final , appealable order. Id. at 297 ; see In re Estate of Adams , No. 14

- 12

- 00064

- CV, 2013 WL 84925, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that order granting plea to the jurisdiction was

2 To file or contest a probate procee ding, a person must be “a person interested in the estate. ” Womble v. Atkins , 331 S.W. 2d 294 , 2 97

– 98 (Tex. 1960). A p erson who is not i nterested in the estate would be “an interloper ” or a “mere medd les ome intruder, ” whose presence could “depri ve real parties at interest of the right of partitioning their estates and of compromising and settling their con troversies in or out of court. ” Lo gan v. Thomason , 202 S.W.2d 212, 217 (1947) ; see In re Estate of Ad ams , No. 14

- 12

- 00064

- CV, 2013 WL 849 25, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ In the absence of such an interest, a contestant is a mere meddlesome intru der, and it is not the policy of the State of Texas to permit th ose who have no interest in a decedent ’ s estate to intermeddle therein. ” )

. The Estates Code defi nes “ interested person ” or “ person in terested ” as “ (1) an heir, devisee, spouse, cred itor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estat e bei ng administered; and (2) an yone interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person, including a minor. ” T EX
. E ST

. C ODE § 22.018. The Texas Supreme Court has held that for a person to have standing in a probate matter, she must have a “ pe cuniary i ntere st ” in the estate that will be affected by the outcome of the proceed ing. See Ferreira v. Butler , 575 S.W.3d 331, 334

– 35 (Tex. 2019) ; Logan , 202 S.W.2d at 216 ; Estate of A dams , 2013 WL 84925, at *3 ( “ [T] he only interest that confers standing to contest a w ill is a pecuniary one that will be affected by the probate or the defeat of the will

. ” ).6

an appeal able order) ; In re Estate of Chapman , 315 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 20 10, no pet.) ( “ An order dismissing a will contest because the
contesta nt lacks standing is generally considered an appealable order. ”); Rosin v. Berco & Leja Rosin Tr. , No. 04

- 08

- 00601

- CV, 2009 WL 1956386, at *2 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio July 8, 2009, pet. de nied) (mem. op. ); Cunningham v. Fox , 879 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ( “ A determination that the applicant lacks interest in the estate ‘ is i n no sense interlocutory, ’ and is a final judgment

. ” ). Prigmore argues that her notic e of appeal was timely because the trial court finally adjudicated her claims on April 19, 2018. We disagree. The trial court
gran ted the motion in l imine , which determined that Prigmore lacked standing because she was not interested in Khoikan ’s est ate, on April 6, 2018. That was a final judgment for the purposes of appeal. Wit hin 30 days, P rigmore filed a motion for new trial, which extended the appe llate deadline to 90 days from the date of the trial court ’s judgment, or Thur sday, July 5, 2018. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329b(a ) (time for filing motion for new trial) ; T EX
. R

. A PP
. P. 26.1(a) (extending time for filing notice of appeal ). Under Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W .2d 615, 615 (Tex. 1997), we imply a motion fo r extension of time , which extend ed the ti me for filing the notice of appeal to Friday, July 20, 2018. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.3 (authorizing 15

- day extension of tim e to file a notice of appeal). Prigm ore filed a notice of appeal on7

July 31, 2018, el even days after the latest date on which she c oul d have timely filed her notice of ap peal. Our appellate jurisdiction was, theref ore, not invoked to challenge the motion in limine

. Prigmore maintains that s he is challenging the Ap ril 19, 2018 judg ment declaring heirship in addition to the ord ers ente red on April 6, 2018. She con tends that her notice of appeal w as timely based on the April 19 judgment date. Prigmore ’s notice of appeal was filed 103 days after April 19 , which is wit hin the period of 90 days plus a 15

- day ex te nsion. But th e or der grantin g t he motion in limine was not timely appealed, and therefore the trial court ’s judgment that Prigmore lacked standing became final and conclusi ve . See French v. Brown , 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967) ( “ Respondent permitted the judgment to become final by his failure to invoke the right of appeal

. ”); Kendrick v. Tidewater Oil Co. , 387 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Tyler 1965, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.) ( “The portion of a judgment awarding a recovery to one party from which no appeal is taken is final on the appea l a nd all s ubsequent litig ation

. ”) ; Shamburger v. Glenn , 255 S.W. 815, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Amarillo 1923, no writ) (failure to appeal renders ju dgment final as to all parties not appealing) . Although the notice of appeal was timely as to the April 19 judgm ent , Prigmo re lacked standing to challenge it.8 Conclusion We conclud e that we lack jur isdiction over Prigmore ’ s appeal of the April 6, 2018 order granting the motion in limine because she failed to timely appeal , and

we further conclude that we lack juris dic tion ove r any challenge she has raised to

or d ers or judgments entered after April 6, 2018 because she lacked standing to appeal.
Accor dingly, we di smiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Peter Kelly Justice
Panel consists of Chie f J ustice R adack and Justices Lloyd, and Kelly.