alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4853 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4853

 To modify retroactively the residence requirement for transmission of 
   citizenship to certain individuals born abroad before 1953 to one 
                  citizen parent and one alien parent.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 19, 1998

 Mrs. Mink of Hawaii introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To modify retroactively the residence requirement for transmission of 
   citizenship to certain individuals born abroad before 1953 to one 
                  citizen parent and one alien parent.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSMISSION OF 
              CITIZENSHIP.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 201(g) of the Nationality 
Act of 1940 (providing for citizenship for a person born outside the 
geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions 
of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the 
United States who, prior to the birth of such person, resided in the 
United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods 
totaling not less than 10 years, at least 5 of which were after 
attaining the age of 16 years), the residence requirement in such 
section shall be considered to be satisfied by a citizen who otherwise 
satisfies the requirement, but who, after attaining the age of 16 
years, resided in the United States or its outlying possessions only 
for a period or periods totaling 3 years (or more).
    (b) Retroactive Application.--The immigration and nationality laws 
of the United States shall be applied to persons born before the date 
of the enactment of this Act as though subsection (a) had been in 
effect as of the date of their birth.
                                 <all>
```
#### Robert Balz *v.*State of Indiana.

[No. 2-874A204.

Filed December 10, 1974.

Rehearing denied January 15, 1975.]

*348*Palmer K. Ward,*of Indianapolis, for appellant.

*Theodore L. Sendalc,*Attorney General, *John H. Meyers,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Lybrook, J.

Defendant-appellant Balz challenges his conviction for sale of marijuana on the ground that at the time of his alleged unlawful conduct there was no statute in Indiana making possession or sale of marijuana a criminal act.

Balz was charged with violating the Dangerous Drug Act1 by selling marijuana to a member of the Indianapolis Police Department on August 1, 1973. He argues that marijuana was deleted from those substances controlled by the Dangerous Drug Act by Acts 1973, P.L. 144, p. 754, which became effective on July 31, 1973. Balz further maintains that it was not until October 1, 1973, the date on which the Controlled Substances Act2 became effective, that possession and/or sale of marijuana was again statutorily proscribed in Indiana.

In response, the State urges that although there appears to have been a lapse in the statutory proscription of sale of marijuana from July 31, 1973, to October 1, 1973, such is not the case. The State points out that under the Dangerous Drug Act, the definition of dangerous drug included “any substance which the state board of pharmacy, after reasonable notice and hearing, shall by promulgated rule determine has qualities similar to that of any dangerous drug.” The State *349maintains that since the Board of- Pharmacy, pursuant to its rule-making power, had on June 26, 1973, issued Rule • 27 which declared marijuana to be a dangerous drug, possession and sale of marijuana remained unlawful during the above hiatus.

Although the State’s argument is not without merit, we find it unpersuasive in the case at bar. A close examination reveals that the above rule of the board of pharmacy was not mentioned or referred to at any point in the proceedings. Such a defect is fatal. *State*v. *Jennings*(1974), 262 Ind. 443, 317 N.E.2d 446.

Judgment reversed.

Robertson, P.J. and Lowdermilk, J., concur.

Note. — Reported at 319 N.E.2d 650.

1

. IC 1971, 16-6-8-1 (Burns Code Ed.).

2

. IC 1971, 35-24.1-1-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3558 (Bums Supp. 1974).
Document Headings

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###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary

# AGENCY:

DoD.

# ACTION:

Termination of Federal Advisory Committee.

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing this notice to announce that it is terminating the Defense Legal Policy Board, effective September 30, 2014.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jim Freeman, Advisory Committee Management Officer for the Department of Defense, 703-692-5952.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This committee is being terminated under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (5 U.S.C. Appendix), 41 CFR 102-3.55, and the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (5 U.S.C. 552b), effective September 30, 2014.

Dated: October 21, 2014.

Aaron Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register, Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 2014-25315 Filed 10-23-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Mario D. ALFORD, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-3407.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 16, 2005.

Decided March 16, 2005.

Michael D. Wellman, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mario D. Alford, Federal Correctional Institution, Grand Marsh, WI, pro se.

David R. Stickman, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Omaha, NE, Michael J. Hansen, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lincoln, NE, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BYE, HEANEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant in this case was sentenced prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in *United States v. Booker,*— U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The defendant raised and preserved error as to the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines at the time of sentencing. The defendant was also sentenced to the minimum possible sentence under the applicable federal sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, we cannot say that the error in this case was harmless. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). *See, United States v. Haidley,*400 F.3d 642 (2005).
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2417

To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs to furnish care for newborn children of women veterans receiving 

maternity care, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 13, 2004

Mr. COLEMAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs to furnish care for newborn 

children of women veterans receiving maternity care, and 

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CARE FOR NEWBORN CHILDREN OF WOMEN 

4 VETERANS RECEIVING MATERNITY CARE. 

5 (a) AUTHORITY TO FURNISH.—Subchapter VIII of 

6 chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, is amended 

7 by adding at the end the following new section: 
2

•S 2417 IS 

1 ‘‘§ 1786. Care for newborn children of women vet2 erans receiving maternity care 

3 ‘‘The Secretary may furnish care to a newborn child 

4 of a woman veteran who is receiving maternity care fur5 nished by the Department for up to 14 days after the birth 

6 of the child if the veteran delivered the child in a Depart7 ment facility or in a non-Department facility pursuant to 

8 a Department contract for the delivery services.’’. 

9 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

10 at the beginning of chapter 17 of such title is amended 

11 by adding at the end following new item:

‘‘1786. Care for newborn children of women veterans receiving maternity care.’’.

Æ
Case 2:15-mj-01723-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/02/15 Page 1 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01723-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/02/15 Page 2 of 3
Case 2:15-mj-01723-JFM Document 3 Filed 10/02/15 Page 3 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Abbie Rowe,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04075-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Curtis Law Group

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 11/27/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: December 8, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9249 Filed 12/11/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9249 Filed 12/11/17 Page 2 of 2
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LUIS GARCIA.

May 8, 1989.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Samuel Quinton BONNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. SULLIVAN, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-16051.

D.C. No. CV-01-06013-OWW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 7, 2005.*

Decided Feb. 10, 2005.

*287Samuel Quinton Bonner, Crescent City, CA, pro se.

Robert R. Anderson, Depty Atty Gen, Benjamin T. Rice, Esq., Office of the California Attorney General Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for RespondentAppellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Samuel Quinton Bonner appeals pro se the district court’s order denying his post-judgment motion to clarify the record. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Bonner contends that the district court erred in denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We lack jurisdiction to review the underlying judgment denying Bonner’s § 2254 petition because he did not file a timely tolling motion nor did he file a notice of appeal within 30 days. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). Accordingly, the scope of Bonner’s appeal is limited to the denial of his motion to clarify the record.

However, because Bonner failed to raise any issues in his opening brief regarding the denial of his motion to clarify the record, he has waived those issues on appeal. *See Mendoza v. Block,*27 F.3d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief results in waiver of the issue on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk April 28, 2009

0420 

# Order

April 28, 2009

138046-7

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138046-7 COA: 281464, 281465 Wayne CC: 07-007661-01 GARRY JONES, 07-007660-01 Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the December 23, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<PAGE>
Exhibit 99.1



                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                                  AS ADDED BY
                   SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002


    In connection with the Annual Report of Royal Bancshares ("Royal") on form
10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Joseph P. Campbell, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
               13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


        2.     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of Royal as of the dates and for the periods
               expressed in the Report.



                                                         /s/ Joseph P. Campbell
                                                        Chief Executive Officer
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANIEL DAVID EGLI,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4140

(D. Utah)

(Nos. 2:14-CV-00699-TC and 

2:04-CR-00577-TC-1)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Daniel David Egli, a federal prisoner incarcerated in Louisiana, apparently was 

convicted of a federal offense in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 

He filed in that court a motion for relief from his conviction under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60. Relying on our opinion in United States v. Triplett, 166 F. App’x 362, 

 

* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. 

P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 10, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-4140 Document: 01019413846 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 1 
2 

365‒66 (10th Cir. 2006), the district court denied the motion because Rule 60 does not 

apply to criminal cases. Mr. Egli appeals from the denial. We AFFIRM, because the 

district court was correct. If there were any colorable merit to Mr. Egli’s arguments, we 

might be tempted to recategorize his district-court pleading. But there is no temptation 

here. Appellant’s motion to “Certify Constitutional Question” is denied. Appellant’s 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied and appellant is ordered to pay the filing 

fee to the district court forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 14-4140 Document: 01019413846 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 2
#### L. L. Zowell *v.*L. C. Graves et al.

Pleadings — Amendment Changing Issue After Proof Taken.

After issue thereon has been furnished and the facts stated disproved, to permit amended pleadings after a lapse of four years would be a practice wholly incompatible with the administration of justice and a due regard for the rights of the parties.

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT.

April 26, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

We make the following suggestion in addition to the facts set out in the opinion of the judge who adjudicated this case.

1. There is no written contract between Willis Graves, appellee’s ancestor, and Zowell set up by Huey’s heirs in their answer to the cross petition but only a *“valid contract”*which is not equivalent to setting up a written one, especially as Zowell, under whom they claim, says in his pleading the contract was by parol.

2. House having filed his answer in 1861, to the pleading of his vendees and assignees of Zowell’s bond, which he held for 130 acres of this land, and in which they charged that he represented that Graves and Buckner and wife, to whom the title had descended from Willis Graves, would make the title, and which he conceded was true should not be permitted four years thereafter to change the issue especially as Buckner’s deposition had been taken in the mean time disproving that Thomas O. Graves had ever agreed to make the title and that he had only done so' on condition that the purchase price promised by Zowell should be paid and Buckner also having died.

House knew whether he had so represented or not when he swore to the answer and if he permitted erroneous statements to go into it, it was his own negligence and folly.

However innocent such mistakes may be after issues thereon have been formed and then the facts stated disproved, to pemit amended pleadings after such lapse of time under such circum*616stances would be a practice wholly incompatible with the administration of justice and a due regard for the rights of the parties. It would be far better that the person committing such errors under such circumstances should suffer them a policy so detrimental to the administration of justice and the rights of litigants should be introduced.

*Stevenson & Meyers, Carlisle & O’Hara, for appellant.*

*Craddock, Pryor & Chambers, for appellee.*

Approving the judgment as we do it is *affirmed.*
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

April 18, 2013

N o. 04

- 13

- 00013

- CV

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

, Appellant

v.

GREATER SAN ANTONIO BUILDERS ASSOCIATION and Indian Springs LTD.,

Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012

- CI

- 19727

Honorable David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appe llant ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED. The

appellant ’ s brief is due on May 2, 2013.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 18 th day of April, 2013

.

____________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of CourtVOL. _____ PAG E _______ MINUTES

Court of Appeals

Fourth Court of Appeals Dis trict

San Antonio, Texas

April 18, 2013

N o. 04

- 13

- 00013

- CV

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

, Appellant

v.

GREATER SAN ANTONIO BUILDERS ASSOCIATION and Indian Springs LTD.,

Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012

- CI

- 19727

Honorable David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appe llant ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED. The

appellant ’ s brief is due on May 2, 2013.

/s/ Rebeca C. Martinez

Rebeca C. Martinez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 18 th day of April, 2013.

/s/ Keith E. Hottle

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

ENTERED THIS 18 TH DAY OF April, 2013

.