II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2681 

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iran. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 16, 2004 

Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy 

in Iran. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Freedom and 

5 Support Act of 2004’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The people of the United States have long 

9 demonstrated an interest in the well-being of the 

10 people of Iran, including through the work of mis-
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1 sionaries whose work in Iran dates back to the 

2 1830s. 

3 (2) Famous Americans such as Howard Bas4 kerville, Dr. Samuel Martin, Jane E. Doolittle, and 

5 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., made significant contribu6 tions to Iranian society by furthering the educational 

7 opportunities of the people of Iran and improving 

8 the opportunities of the less fortunate citizens of 

9 Iran. 

10 (3) Iran served as a key ally of the United 

11 States following World War II and through the late 

12 1970s serving as an important regional ally and a 

13 key bulwark against Soviet influence. 

14 (4) In November 1979, following the arrival of 

15 Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in the United States, 

16 a mob of students and extremists seized the United 

17 States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, holding United 

18 States diplomatic personnel hostage until January 

19 1981. 

20 (5) Following the seizure of the United States 

21 Embassy, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of 

22 the repressive revolutionary movement in Iran, ex23 pressed support for the actions of the students in 

24 taking American citizens hostage. 
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1 (6) Despite the historic victory of Mohammad 

2 Khatami in the presidential election of May 1997, 

3 an election which Khatami won with 69 percent of 

4 the vote and in which an estimated 91 percent of the 

5 electorate participated, control of the internal and 

6 external affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 

7 still exercised by the courts in Iran and the Revolu8 tionary Guards, Supreme Leader, and Council of 

9 Guardians of the Government of Iran. 

10 (7) The election results of the May 1997 elec11 tion and the high level of voter participation in that 

12 election demonstrate that the people of Iran favor 

13 economic and political reforms and greater inter14 action with the United States and the Western world 

15 in general. 

16 (8) Despite the election of President Khatami 

17 and the outreach of the Clinton administration to 

18 ease sanctions and to promote people-to-people ex19 changes, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah 

20 Ali Khamenei, the Militant Clerics’ Society, the Is21 lamic Coalition Organization, and Supporters of the 

22 Party of God have all opposed efforts to open Ira23 nian society to Western influences and have opposed 

24 efforts to change the dynamic of relations between 

25 the United States and Iran. 
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1 (9) For the past two decades, the Department 

2 of State has found Iran to be the leading sponsor of 

3 international terrorism in the world. 

4 (10) In 1983, the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah ter5 rorist organization conducted suicide terrorist oper6 ations against United States military and civilian 

7 personnel in Beirut, Lebanon, resulting in the 

8 deaths of hundreds of Americans. 

9 (11) Intelligence analysts and law enforcement 

10 personnel have linked Iran to attacks against Amer11 ican military personnel at Khobar Towers in Saudi 

12 Arabia in 1996 and to al Qaeda attacks against ci13 vilians in Saudi Arabia in 2004. 

14 (12) Iran has provided a safe haven and a base 

15 of operations for terrorist groups, including al 

16 Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, and Ansar al Islam, and to 

17 terrorist leaders, including Abu Musab al Zarkawi, 

18 Zayman al Zawahiri, and members of the bin Laden 

19 family. 

20 (13) Iran currently operates more than 10 

21 radio and television stations broadcasting in Iraq 

22 that support violent actions against United States 

23 and coalition personnel in Iraq. 

24 (14) The current leaders of Iran, Ayatollah Ali 

25 Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani, have repeatedly 
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1 called upon Muslims to kill Americans in Iraq and 

2 install a theocratic regime in Iraq. 

3 (15) The United States intelligence community 

4 believes the Government of Iran is pursuing a clan5 destine nuclear weapons program. 

6 (16) The Government of Iran has failed to meet 

7 repeated pledges to arrest and extradite foreign ter8 rorists in Iran. 

9 (17) The United States Government believes 

10 that the Government of Iran supports terrorists and 

11 extremist religious leaders in Iraq with the clear in12 tention of subverting coalition efforts to bring peace 

13 and democracy to Iraq. 

14 (18) The Ministry of Defense of Iran confirmed 

15 in July 2003 that it had successfully conducted the 

16 final test of the Shahab-3 missile, giving Iran an 

17 operational intermediate-range ballistic missile capa18 ble of striking both Israel and United States troops 

19 throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan. 

20 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY 

21 TOWARD IRAN. 

22 It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy 

23 of the United States to support regime change for the Is24 lamic Republic of Iran and to promote the transition to 

25 a democratic government to replace that regime. 
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1 SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT TRANSITION TO DEMOC2 RACY IN IRAN. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to 

4 provide assistance to foreign and domestic pro-democracy 

5 groups opposed to the non-democratic Government of 

6 Iran, including the award of grants to qualified pro-de7 mocracy radio and television broadcasting organizations. 

8 (b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Financial assist9 ance may only be provided under this section to individ10 uals, organizations, or entities that have— 

11 (1) officially renounced the use of terrorism; 

12 (2) pledged to adhere to nonproliferation re13 gimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 

14 and materiel; 

15 (3) pledged to support the destruction of all 

16 prohibited stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction 

17 in Iran; and 

18 (4) supported the adoption of a democratic 

19 form of government in Iran. 

20 (c) POLITICAL ASSISTANCE.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized 

22 to provide assistance to support foreign and domes23 tic pro-democracy groups opposed to the non-demo24 cratic Government of Iran that— 

25 (A) are dedicated to democratic values; 
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1 (B) show a commitment to human rights, 

2 equality of women, and freedom of religious 

3 worship; 

4 (C) demonstrate a commitment to fos5 tering equality of opportunity; and 

6 (D) support freedom of the press, freedom 

7 of speech, and freedom of association. 

8 (2) FUNDING.—The President may provide as9 sistance under paragraph (1) using— 

10 (A) funds available to the Middle East 

11 Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and National 

12 Endowment for Democracy (NED); and 

13 (B) amounts authorized to be appropriated 

14 under subsection (g). 

15 (d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The President 

16 shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Ap17 propriations of the Senate and the Committees on Inter18 national Relations and Appropriations of the House of 

19 Representatives at least 15 days in advance of each obliga20 tion of assistance under this section in accordance with 

21 the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assist22 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–l). 

23 (e) COORDINATION OF POLICY.—In order to ensure 

24 maximum coordination among Federal agencies, the Presi25 dent shall appoint a senior member of the National Secu-
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1 rity Council as special assistant to the President on Iran 

2 matters. 

3 (f) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC ASSIST4 ANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) contacts should be expanded with opposition 

6 groups in Iran that meet the criteria under sub7 section (b); 

8 (2) support for transition to democracy in Iran 

9 should be expressed by United States representatives 

10 and officials in all appropriate international fora; 

11 (3) official meetings with representatives of the 

12 Government of Iran should be terminated; 

13 (4) efforts to bring a halt to the nuclear weap14 ons program of Iran, including steps to end the sup15 ply of nuclear components or fuel to Iran, should be 

16 intensified, with particular attention focused on the 

17 cooperation of the Government of Russia with that 

18 nuclear weapons program; and 

19 (5) officials and representatives of the United 

20 States Government should strongly and unequivo21 cally support indigenous efforts in Iran to call for a 

22 national referendum on the form of government in 

23 Iran, including drawing international attention to 

24 the violations by the Government of Iran of human 
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1 rights, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and 

2 freedom of the press. 

3 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

5 $10,000,000 to carry out activities under this section. 

6 SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ORGA7 NIZATIONS. 

8 (a) INITIAL DESIGNATION.—It is the sense of Con9 gress that, not later than 90 days after the date of the 

10 enactment of this Act, the President should designate at 

11 least one democratic opposition organization as eligible to 

12 receive assistance under section 4. 

13 (b) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—At least 15 days 

14 before designating a democratic opposition organization as 

15 eligible to receive assistance under section 4, the President 

16 shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Ap17 propriations of the Senate and the Committees on Inter18 national Relations and Appropriations of the House of 

19 Representatives of the proposed designation. 

20 SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

21 Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize 

22 or otherwise approve of the use of the Armed Forces of 

23 the United States in carrying out activities under this Act. 

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