Opinion issued December 31, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00701-CV

———————————

ANAHID PRIGMORE, Appellant

V.

TINA S. MANTOOTH, Appellees

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 449332

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a probate proceeding concerning the estate of Vahak A. Khoikan.

Appellant Anahid Prigmore is Khoikan’s sister. Appellee Tina S. Mantooth was 

Khoikan’s common-law wife, and she is the mother of Khoikan’s only child, J.K., 

a minor. Mantooth argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because 
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the notice of appeal was untimely filed. We agree, and we dismiss this appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

Background and Procedural History

Vahak Khoikan died intestate on May 24, 2016, leaving an estate worth 

approximately $10 million. He was survived by his common-law wife, Mantooth; 

his son, J.K.; and his sister, Prigmore. Mantooth filed an application for 

determination of heirship and for letters of administration. The trial court 

appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the interest of any heirs who were 

unknown or under a legal disability, including J.K. 

Prigmore filed a cross-application for letters of administration, seeking to be 

appointed administrator of the estate and asserting that, as J.K.’s paternal aunt, she 

was a person “interested” in his welfare. See TEX. EST. CODE § 22.018. Prigmore 

also filed an answer in “the interest of the decedent’s minor son and for his 

protection as the sole heir” of Khoikan’s estate. She specifically denied that 

Mantooth was Khoikan’s spouse, but she admitted that J.K. was Khoikan’s son and 

that she had no pecuniary interest in her brother’s estate.

Mantooth filed a motion in limine challenging Prigmore’s standing. She 

argued that Prigmore is not her brother’s legal heir and that Prigmore was not 

otherwise an “interested person” because she did not represent J.K. in any capacity 

and she had no pecuniary interest in the estate or in J.K.’s welfare. On April 6, 
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2018, the trial court granted Mantooth’s motion, dismissed Prigmore’s crossapplication for letters of administration, and struck Prigmore’s pleadings from the 

record.

Also on April 6, the trial court signed: (1) a judgment declaring heirship and 

finding that Mantooth is Khoikan’s surviving spouse and J.K. is his son; (2) an 

order approving a family settlement agreement and mutual release and appointing a 

permanent dependent administrator; (3) an order setting aside J.K.’s house as his 

homestead and ordering that it may not be used to satisfy any debts of the estate; 

(4) an order denying Prigmore’s motion for discovery via subpoenas; and (5) an 

order denying Prigmore’s motion for genetic testing of J.K.1 On April 19, 2018, the 

trial court withdrew the April 6, 2018 judgment declaring heirship in order to 

correct an error, and it signed a new judgment declaring heirship. On May 4, 2018, 

Prigmore filed a motion for new trial, which was denied on May 15, 2018. On July 

31, 2018, Prigmore filed a notice of appeal.

In her brief, Prigmore asserts that she is appealing from all the orders signed 

on April 6, 2018, as well as the April 19, 2018 judgment declaring heirship and the 

 

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In her brief, Prigmore asserts that she is appealing from the order granting

Mantooth’s motion in limine as well as the following orders: (1) order setting 

aside homestead; (2) order denying motion for genetic testing; (3) order denying 

motion for limited discovery via subpoenas; (4) order approving family settlement 

agreement and mutual release and appointment of permanent dependent 

administrator; (5) judgment declaring heirship; and (6) order denying motion for 

new trial. 
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May 15, 2018 denial of her motion for new trial. In her brief, Prigmore argues that 

there is a disputed question of fact about whether Mantooth was Khoikan’s 

common-law wife. Prigmore also argues that the trial court erred by holding that 

she lacked standing, and by “holding categorically that a blood relative without a 

pecuniary interest lacks standing” under section 22.018 of the Texas Estates Code. 

Jurisdiction

Mantooth asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction because the notice of 

appeal was untimely filed. In particular, Mantooth argues that the April 6, 2018 

order granting the motion in limine, dismissing Prigmore’s claims, and striking her 

pleadings was a final order for the purpose of appeal and that the July 31 notice of 

appeal was untimely. We agree.

Ordinarily, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. 

Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). “Probate proceedings are an 

exception to the ‘one final judgment’ rule; in such cases, ‘multiple judgments final 

for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.’” De Ayala v. 

Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192).

Because not every interlocutory order in a probate case is appealable, the Texas 

Supreme Court has adopted the following test for determining finality:

If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship 

judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final 

and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a 

proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered 
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a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise 

issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is 

interlocutory.

Id. at 578 (quoting Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995)). An 

order that dismisses a probate application because the applicant lacks standing “is 

in no sense interlocutory.”

2 Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 298 (1960). An 

order dismissing a party because she is not an interested person and therefore lacks 

standing is a final, appealable order. Id. at 297; see In re Estate of Adams, No. 14-

12-00064-CV, 2013 WL 84925, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that order granting plea to the jurisdiction was 

 

2 To file or contest a probate proceeding, a person must be “a person interested in 

the estate.” Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 297–98 (Tex. 1960). A person 

who is not interested in the estate would be “an interloper” or a “mere 

meddlesome intruder,” whose presence could “deprive real parties at interest of 

the right of partitioning their estates and of compromising and settling their 

controversies in or out of court.” Logan v. Thomason, 202 S.W.2d 212, 217 

(1947); see In re Estate of Adams, No. 14-12-00064-CV, 2013 WL 84925, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In the 

absence of such an interest, a contestant is a mere meddlesome intruder, and it is 

not the policy of the State of Texas to permit those who have no interest in a 

decedent’s estate to intermeddle therein.”).

The Estates Code defines “interested person” or “person interested” as “(1) an 

heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim 

against an estate being administered; and (2) anyone interested in the welfare of an 

incapacitated person, including a minor.” TEX. EST. CODE § 22.018. The Texas 

Supreme Court has held that for a person to have standing in a probate matter, she 

must have a “pecuniary interest” in the estate that will be affected by the outcome 

of the proceeding. See Ferreira v. Butler, 575 S.W.3d 331, 334–35 (Tex. 2019); 

Logan, 202 S.W.2d at 216; Estate of Adams, 2013 WL 84925, at *3 (“[T]he only 

interest that confers standing to contest a will is a pecuniary one that will be 

affected by the probate or the defeat of the will.”).
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an appealable order); In re Estate of Chapman, 315 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (“An order dismissing a will contest because the 

contestant lacks standing is generally considered an appealable order.”); Rosin v. 

Berco & Leja Rosin Tr., No. 04-08-00601-CV, 2009 WL 1956386, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio July 8, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Cunningham v. Fox, 

879 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“A 

determination that the applicant lacks interest in the estate ‘is in no sense 

interlocutory,’ and is a final judgment.”). 

Prigmore argues that her notice of appeal was timely because the trial court 

finally adjudicated her claims on April 19, 2018. We disagree. The trial court 

granted the motion in limine, which determined that Prigmore lacked standing 

because she was not interested in Khoikan’s estate, on April 6, 2018. That was a 

final judgment for the purposes of appeal. Within 30 days, Prigmore filed a motion 

for new trial, which extended the appellate deadline to 90 days from the date of the 

trial court’s judgment, or Thursday, July 5, 2018. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a) (time 

for filing motion for new trial); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a) (extending time for filing 

notice of appeal). Under Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 615 (Tex. 1997), we 

imply a motion for extension of time, which extended the time for filing the notice 

of appeal to Friday, July 20, 2018. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3 (authorizing 15-day

extension of time to file a notice of appeal). Prigmore filed a notice of appeal on 
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July 31, 2018, eleven days after the latest date on which she could have timely 

filed her notice of appeal. Our appellate jurisdiction was, therefore, not invoked to 

challenge the motion in limine. 

Prigmore maintains that she is challenging the April 19, 2018 judgment 

declaring heirship in addition to the orders entered on April 6, 2018. She contends 

that her notice of appeal was timely based on the April 19 judgment date. 

Prigmore’s notice of appeal was filed 103 days after April 19, which is within the 

period of 90 days plus a 15-day extension. But the order granting the motion in 

limine was not timely appealed, and therefore the trial court’s judgment that 

Prigmore lacked standing became final and conclusive. See French v. Brown, 424 

S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967) (“Respondent permitted the judgment to become 

final by his failure to invoke the right of appeal.”); Kendrick v. Tidewater Oil Co., 

387 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The portion 

of a judgment awarding a recovery to one party from which no appeal is taken is 

final on the appeal and all subsequent litigation.”); Shamburger v. Glenn, 255 S.W. 

815, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1923, no writ) (failure to appeal renders 

judgment final as to all parties not appealing). Although the notice of appeal was 

timely as to the April 19 judgment, Prigmore lacked standing to challenge it. 
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Conclusion

We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Prigmore’s appeal of the April 6, 

2018 order granting the motion in limine because she failed to timely appeal, and 

we further conclude that we lack jurisdiction over any challenge she has raised to 

orders or judgments entered after April 6, 2018 because she lacked standing to 

appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Peter Kelly

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Lloyd, and Kelly.