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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cliff St. Brice, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-1852-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Cliff St. Brice filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court challenging 

his convictions and sentences arising out of his involvement in a marijuana trafficking 

operation. St. Brice alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Respondents argue that he did not. As described below, the Court recommends that St. 

Brice’s Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Background

 In 2009, after St. Brice was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court for 

multiple felony counts arising out of a marijuana trafficking operation, he received a plea 

offer for a 3.5 year sentence. (Doc. 9, Exs. A, GG) Through counsel, he notified the 

Court that he intended to reject that offer. (Doc. 9, Ex. GG at 3:21) The Superior Court 

then discussed with St. Brice the possible consequences of rejecting that offer pursuant to 

State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. App. 2000). (Doc. 9, Ex. GG at 5-6) During the 

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Donald colloquy, the Court told St. Brice that the maximum prison sentence he faced was 

106 years. (Id. at 6:9) After St. Brice confirmed that he understood the possible prison 

terms and still wanted to reject the plea offer, the Court found that St. Brice had 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily rejected the plea offer. (Id. at 6:23) 

 In 2011, St. Brice stood trial and a jury found him guilty of ten felony counts. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. B) The Court then sentenced St. Brice to nine presumptive, concurrent 

sentences totaling seven years to be followed by one mitigated sentence of 2.25 years.1

 

(Doc. 9, Ex. C) 

 On appeal, St. Brice argued that his trial had included several reversible errors. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. D, E) At the conclusion of briefing, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 

St. Brice’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 9, Exs. F, G, H) The Arizona Supreme 

Court then denied St. Brice’s petition for review. (Doc. 9, Exs. I, K) 

 St. Brice timely petitioned the Superior Court for post-conviction relief alleging 

that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.2

 (Doc. 9, Ex. O) His courtappointed counsel found no colorable claims and, pursuant to the Court’s order, St. Brice 

filed a pro per petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. P, Q, R, S, T) Among other things, St. Brice 

argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him to reject the 

plea offer. (Doc. 9, Ex. S) At the conclusion of briefing, the Court found that St. Brice 

did not establish that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and 

summarily dismissed his petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. U, V, W) As relevant here, the Court 

noted that St. Brice’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because “the Case 

Management Judge engaged [St. Brice] in a person to person colloquy about the terms of 

the State’s plea offer and the possible ramifications of a trial conviction and his 

 

1

 Based on his sentencing transcript, it appears that St. Brice was sentenced under 

A.R.S. § 13-3419(A)(4) (presumptive term of seven years for Class Two felony). (Doc. 12-1 at 24) See also State v. Francis, 231 P.3d 373 (Ariz. App. 2010) (even if state does not separately allege Section 13-3419, trial court does not abuse its discretion when 

sentencing defendant under that statute). 

2

 This was St. Brice’s second attempt at post-conviction relief; he filed his first notice during the pendency of his direct appeal and so it was dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 9 at Exs. L, M, N) 

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contemporaneous insistence on his innocence. [St. Brice] fully understood the State’s 

offer and the scope of the risk of a trial. The fact that he wishes he could re-boot does not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 9, Ex. W at 2-3) 

 St. Brice timely petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals to review the Superior 

Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9, Exs. X, Y, Z) After 

the petition was fully briefed, the Court of Appeals adopted the Superior Court’s ruling, 

granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 9, Exs. AA, BB, CC) 

 Subsequently, St. Brice timely filed his Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1) His Petition raises only one ground, namely that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel advised him to reject the plea offer. (Id. at 6) 

Specifically, he alleges that trial counsel told him he would receive no more than five 

years if convicted at trial and that the worst possible outcome would be five years in 

prison. (Id.) Respondents argue that St. Brice is not entitled to relief. (Doc. 9) In his 

reply, St. Brice alleges that he would have accepted the plea offer if his trial counsel had 

advised him to do so. (Doc. 10) 

Analysis 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). This is a “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ which demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). 

 Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, St. 

Brice needs to show that his trial counsel’s performance was both (a) objectively 

deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

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(1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine which 

Strickland prong to analyze first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 

1998). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 St. Brice received objectively deficient representation if his counsel “‘fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness’ such that it was outside ‘the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice, St. 

Brice “must show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 St. Brice alleges that he meets the prejudice prong of Strickland because he relied 

on his counsel when rejecting the plea offer, and, after he stood trial, received a sentence 

longer than the plea offer. (Docs. 1, 10) Cf Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) 

(habeas petitioner prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in advising him to reject 

plea offer and go to trial); but see Buenrostro v. U.S., 697 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(Lafler did not decide a new rule of constitutional law). However, as the Superior Court 

noted, St. Brice did not simply rely on his trial counsel; he also discussed his decision to 

reject his plea offer with the Court so that he could make an intelligent and knowing 

decision as required by State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. App. 2000). (Doc. 9, Ex. 

W) At his Donald hearing, the Superior Court informed St. Brice of the possible 

consequences of his rejection of the plea offer and he chose to proceed to trial. To the 

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extent that he relied on his trial counsel, the information presented during his Donald 

hearing was intended to disabuse him of any misleading information: he was told he 

could face up to 106 years; he was ultimately sentenced to 9.25 years.

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found that St. Brice did not “suffer[] a 

constitutional injury [by] los[ing] a favorable plea bargain as a result of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Donald, 10 P.3d. at 1205, ¶ 46. Because this Court cannot say 

that that conclusion was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, St. Brice is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Cliff St. Brice’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the petition 

and amended petition are justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would 

not find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

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order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2015. 

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