1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### SC HWAB v . REILLY

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08–5 38. Ar g u ed Nov e mber3, 2009 —Dec ided Ju ne 17, 201 0 Respondent R e illy filed for Chapter 7 ba nkruptcy whe nhe r catering

bu sin e ss f a ile d. Sh e su ppor t ed h e rpetitio nw i th , int er a lia, Sc h e du le B, on whic h d e btor s must l i s t their asse ts, and Schedu l eC , o nw h i c h theymust lis t the pr oper tytheywish to r e c l aim as ex empt. Her Schedule B assets included cookin ga n d o t her kitche n e q uipment, to wh ic h sh e assig n ed anestimate d mar k et v a lu e of $10,718. On Schedule C, she claimed two exem pt i n terests in t h is “bus ines s equipment”: a “tool[s] of the trad e” exe m ption for the statutory

max i mu m “$ 1,850 inv a lu e,” 11 U. S. C. §522(d)(6); an d $ 8 ,868 u n d er the statutory provisions allowing miscellaneous, or “w ildcard,” ex

emption s u p t o$1 0,225 inv a lu e. The clai med exemptio ns’ totalvalue ($10,7 18) e q ualed Re illy ’s e s tim a te of the equipment’s market v a lue. Property claimed as exemp twill be excluded from the b a nkruptcy es

tate “[u ] n l es s a par t yinin ter e st” objec t s, §522( l), with ina c e r t ain30

- dayper i od, se e Fed. Ru le B k r t c y . Pr oc . 4003(b). Absen t anobjec t ion , the property will be excluded from the estate even if the exemption’ s value exceeds what the Co de permit s. See, e.g. , §522( l); Taylorv. Freela nd &Kronz , 503 U. S. 638, 64 2– 64 3.

Alth ou ghana ppr aisa l r e v e a l ed tha tthe e q uipment’ s tot a l m a r k et
v a lu e c o u l d be as mu c has$17,20 0, peti tion erSc h w ab , th e ban k

r u ptc yestate’ s tr ustee, did not object to the claimed exemptions be

cause the doll ar value Reill y assignedto each fell within the limits of §§522(d)( 5 ) an d (6). Sc h w ab mov e d th e Ban k r u ptc yCou r t forper miss ion to auc t ion the e q uip m ent so Reilly could receive t h e $ 1 0 , 7 18 she claimede x empt and the estatecould dist rib u t e t h e rem a ining value to her creditors. Reilly counte r ed that by equating on Schedule C the total value of he r claimed exemptio ns in the equi pment with the equipmen t’s estimated marketv a lu e, sh e h a d pu t Sc h w ab an d2 SCHWA B v. REILLY Sy llabu s her creditors on notice that she in tended to exempt the equipment’s full value, eve nif it turned out to be mor ethan the amounts she de

c l ar ed an d that th e Code al lowed. She a sserted that the estate had for f eited its c l aim to an ypo r t ionof th at v a lu e bec a u s e Sc h w ab h a d
n o t objec t ed with inth e Ru le 4003(b) per i od, an d th at she wou l d dis

miss herpetiti on r a therthan sell herequipment.

The Bankruptcy Court deni ed Schwab’s motion and R e illy’s condi

tional mo tion to dism is s. The Dist rictCourtdenied S c hwab relief, re

j e cting his a r gu ment tha tne ither the Code nor Rule 40 03 (b ) req u ires a tr ustee to o bjec t to ac l ai med ex empt io n wher e the amount the debtordec l ar es as th e exemption’s value is with in the limits the Cod e prescribes. Affirming, theThird Ci rcuit a g reed that Reilly’s Schedule C entr ies indi c a ted herintent to ex empt the equipment’s full value. Relying on T a

ylor, it heldthat Sc hwab’ s failur eto objec tentitl e d Reilly to exempt the full value of her equipment, ev en though that value exceeded the a m ounts tha t Re illy declared and the Code per

mitted. Held: Because Reilly gave “t he value of [her] claimed exemption[s]” on

Schedule C dollar amounts within th e range the Code allows for what it defines as t h e “property claime d as exempt,” Schwab was not re

quired to obje ct to the exemptions in order to preserve the estate’ s r i gh t to r e tai nanyv a lue in the equipment beyond the value of the
ex empt in ter e st. Pp. 6–23.

(a) Reilly’s co mplicatedvie wof the trus tee’s s t atutory obliga t ion,
a n d her rea d ing of S c hedule C, does not a ccord wit ht h e Code. Pp. 6– 15. (1) Th e par t ies ag r ee th at t h is c a se is g o v e r n ed by§522( l), whi c h sta t es th at a Ch apter 7 de b t or mu st “file a li st of pr ope r tythat the debtorc l aim s as ex empt u n dersu bs ection (b) of this section,” and th at “[u ] n l ess a par t yinin t e r e st objects, the propertycl aimed as ex

empt on such list i s exempt.” Reilly a sserts th at t h e “property
c l aimed as ex e m pt” r e fer s to all of the information on Schedule C, in

c l udingthe estim a ted mar k et v a lu e of each asset. Schwab and amicus United States counter that be cause the Code defines such pr oper tyas a ninter e st, not to ex ceed acert a i n dolla r a m ount , in a par t ic u l arass e t, notas the asse t it self, th e value of the property claimed exempt should be judged on the dollar value the debtor as

sig n s th e in te r e st, noton the value the debtora ssig n s th e a sse t

. Pp. 6–9. (2) Schwab and the United States are correct. The po rtion of §522( l) that re solves this ca s eis not, as Re illy as serts, th e provision sta t ingthat t h e “pr o per t yclaimed as exempt on [Schedule C] is ex

empt” unless an interested party obje cts. Rather, it is the portion that defines t h e objec t ion’ s tar g et, namel y , the “list of pr oper tythat3 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s th e debtorc l a i ms a s ex emp tu n d ersu bsec tion(b).” Se c t ion522(b) does not define the “pr o per t yc l aimed as e x empt” byr e fer e nc e to the estim a ted mar k et v a lu e. It refer s on lyto pr oper tydefin e d in§522(d), wh ic hi ntu r n list s 12 c a teg o r i es of pr oper tyth at a debto rmayc l ai m as exempt. M o st of these categori es and all the ones ap plicable here define “property” as the debtor’s “interest”—up to a specified dollar
a m ount—in the a s s e ts des crib e d in t h e ca t e gory, not as th e a sset s themselves. Schwab had no duty to object to the property Reilly claimed as exempt because i t s stat ed va lue was within the limits th e Code allows. Reilly’s contrary vie wdoes not withstandscrutiny be

cause it def i nes the target of a tr ustee’s objection base d on Schedule C’s la ngua ge and dictiona ry definition s of “ p roperty” at o dds with the Code’s definiti on. TheThird Circuitfa iled t oa ccountf o r t h e Code’s definition and for p r ovisions that permit debtors to exempt certain property in ki nd or in full regardless of value. See, e.g
. , §522(d)(9). Sc hwab was entitled to ev al uate the claimed exemptio ns’ propriety based on three Schedule C entries: the description of the business equipment inwhich Reilly claimed the exempt interests; the Code provisions governing the claimed ex emptio ns; and the a m ounts Reil ly listedin the c o lumn titled“v alue of claim e d exemption.” This conclu

sion does not render Reilly’s marketvalue esti mate su perfluous. It simplyc o nfines tha te s ti mat eto its pr operr o le: aiding t h e tr ustee i n adminis t er ingthe est a te b yhelpinghi m identifya s s ets that may have va lue b e yond the a m ount the de btor claims as exempt, or whose fu ll v a lu e m a yn o t be av ai lable forex empt ion. This inte rpretation i s cons is tent with the his t orica ltr eatment of bankrup tcy exemptions. Pp. 9–15.

(b) Taylordoe s notdict a t e a cont ra ry con c lus i on. While b o t h Tay

lor a n d this cas econcern thecons eq uences of a trus tee’s fa ilure to ob

jec tto a c l aim e d ex emptionwith inRu le 4003’ s t i me per i od, Taylor es tabl ish e s an dapplie s th e str a igh t for w ar d pr oposit i o nth at an interested p a rty must objec tto a claimedexemption if the amoun t the debtorlist s as the “v alue c l aimed ex empt” i s not within statutor y limit s. In Taylor, the value listed in Schedule C (“$ unknown”) was not plainlywithin those li mits, bu t h e r e , th e v a lu es ($8,86 8 an d $1,85 0) ar e wi th inCode li mi ts an d th u s do n o t r a ise th e war n in gflag present in Ta ylor

. Departing f r om Taylo rwo uld not o n ly ig nore the presumption t h at partie s actlawfullyand with knowledge of the law; it would also r e quir e the Cour t to expand the statutory definition of “property claimed as exemp t” and the universe of information an in

t e res t ed pa rt y m u s tcons ider in e v aluating an e x emption’s validity. Even if the Co de al lowed such expans ions, they would be illadvise d. Basing the definition of “property claimed exempt,” and thus an in

ter e sted par t y ’ s oblig at ionto objec tu n d er §522( l), on inferences that4 SCHWA B v. REILLY Sy llabu s party must draw from preprinted ban kr uptc ysc h e du les th at ev olv e over time, rather than on the facialval i d i ty of the valu e the debtor
ass i g n s the “pr o per t y c l aimed as ex empt” as definedbythe Code, would under mine the predictab i lity the statute i s de signed to pro

v i de. Pp. 16–1 8.

(c) Reilly’s argument threate n s to convert the Code’s goa lof giving debtor s a fr eshstar t in to a fr ee pass. B yper m ittin g a debtor“t o withdr aw fr om the es ta te c e r t ain inter e st s in pr oper ty , . . . up to c e r tain values,” Rouseyv. Jac o way , 544 U. S. 320, 325, Con g r e ss bal

a n ced t h e difficultchoices t h a tex emptionlimit s i m pose on debtors with the economic harm th at exem pt ions vis i t on credit o rs
. This Cou r t sh ou ld n o t al terth at balan c e byr e q u ir ingtr ustees to objec tto claimed exem ptions based o nform ent r ies b e yond t h os e gover n ing a n exemption’s validi t y under the Code. In rejecting Reilly’s approach, the Cour t does not c r e ate inc e ntiv es for tr ustees and c r e ditor s to sleep on their rights. The d e cisionr e ac h e d h e r eenc o urag es a debtor
w i sh in gto exempt anasse t ’ s fu ll mar k et v a lu e or th e a sset it self t o declare the value of the claimed ex emptio n in a way that m a kes it s scope clear. Such declarations w ill enco urage thetrustee to object promptly and preserve for th e esta te anyv a lue in the asse t bey o nd relevant sta t utory limit s. If the trus tee fai l s to o bject, or his objection is overruled, the debtor will be en titled to exclude the asset’s ful l value. If the o bjection is sus t ained, the debtor will be required either to forfeit the portion of the exem ption exceeding the statutory allow

ance or to revise other exemptions or a rrangem ent s with credit o rs t o permit the exe m ption. See Rule 10 09( a). Either result will facili tat e the expeditious and final disposi t io nof asset s , an d th us en able th e debtor and cr editors to achieve a fr esh s t art free of R e illy’s finali ty an d c l ou ded-title c o n c ern s
. Pp. 19–2 2. 534 F. 3d 17 3, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

T HOMAS , J., d e livered the opinion of the Court, in whi c h S TEVENS , S CALIA , K ENNEDY , ALITO , and S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., filed a dissen t ing opinion, in which R OB ERTS , C. J., a n d B REYER , J. , join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–5 38 

### WILLIAM G. SCHWAB, PETITI ONER v. NAD E JD A REILLY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [Ju n e17, 2010 ] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. When a deb t or files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, all of the debt or’s assets become property of the bankruptcy estate, see 11 U. S. C. §541, subject to the de btor’s righ t to reclaim certain property as “exempt,” §522( l). The Bankruptc y Cod e specifies the ty pes o f property debtors may exempt, §522(b), as well as the maximum value of the exemptions a debtor m a y claim incertain ass e ts, §522(d). Property a debtor clai ms as ex empt will be excluded from the bankru ptcy estate “[u]nless a party in interest” objects. §522( l). This case presents an oppo rtunity for us to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals about wh at constitutes a claim of exemption to which a ninterested party mus t object under §522( l). The issue i s whether an interested party mus tobject to a claimed exemption where, as here, the Co de defines the property the debtor is authorized to exempt as an interest, the value of which may not exceed a certain dollar amount, in a particular type of asse t, and the d e btor’s sche dule of exempt property accurately describes the asset an d declares the “value of2 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### [the] claimed exemption” in that asset to b e an amou nt within the limits that the Code prescribes. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Pro c . Official Form 6, Schedule C (199 1) (hereinaf

ter Schedule C). We hold that, in cases such as this, an interested partyneed not object t o an exemp t ion claimed in this manner in order to preserve the estate’s ability to recover value in the asset beyond the dollar value the debtor expressly declared exempt. I Respondent Nadejda Reilly filedfor Chapter 7 bankruptc y when her cater i ng business failed. S h e supported her petition with various schedules and state m ents, two of which are relevant her e : Schedule B, on whic h the Bankruptc y Rules require debtors to l i st their as sets (most of which become property of the estate), and Schedule C, on which the Rules require debtors t o list the property they wish to reclaim as exempt. The assets Reilly listed on Schedule B included an itemized list of cooking and other kitchen equ i pment tha tshe descri bed as “bus iness equipment,” and to whi c h she assigned an estim a ted market value of $10 ,718. App. 40a, 49a–55 a. On Schedul e C, Reilly claimed two exempt i n terests in this equipment pursua nt to differe nt sections of the Code. Reilly claimed a “tool[s] of the trade” exemption of $1,850 in the equip m ent under §522(d)(6), which perm its a debtor to exempt his “aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,850 in value, in a n y impleme n ts, professional b ook s, or tools, o f [his] trade.” See also 69 Fed. Reg. 8482 (2004) (Table). And she claimed a miscellaneou s exemption of $8,868 in the equipment under §522(d)(5), which, at the time she filed for bankruptcy, permitted a debtor to take a “wildcard” exem ption equal to the “debtor’s aggregate interest in any pro p erty, not to exceed” $10,225 “in value.” 1 

### See

——————

1 Th e 1994 v e r s ionof 11 U. S. C. §522(d)(5) allowed debtor s to ex empt3 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### App. 58a. The total value of these claimedexemptions ($10,718) equaled the value Reilly separately listed on Schedules B and C as the equipment’s estimated market value, see id

. , at 49a, 58a. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the Federal Rules of Bankrup tcy P r ocedure require interested parties to object to a debtor’s claimed exemptions within 30 day s after the conclusion of the creditor s ’ meeting held pursuant to Rule 2003(a). See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4003(b). If an interested part yfails to object within the time a l

lowed, a claimed exemption will exclude the subject pro p erty from the estate e v en if the e x emption’s value excee d s what the Code permits. See, e. g. , §522( l); Taylor v. F ree land & Kronz , 503 U. S. 638, 642–6 43 (1992). Petitioner William G. Schwab, the trustee of Reilly’s bankruptcy estate, did not object to Reilly’s claimed exemptions in her business equip m ent because the dollar value Reillyassigned each exemption fel lwithin the limit s that §§522(d)(5) and (6) prescrib e
. App. 163a. But because an appraisal revealed that the total market value of Reilly’s business equip m ent could be as much as $17,200, 2 

### Schwab mo ved the Bankrup tcy C o urt for permission to auction the equipment so Reilly could receive the $10,718 she claimed as exempt, and the est a te could distribute the equipment’s remainin g value (approximate l y $6,500) to Reilly’s creditors. App. 141a–143a

.

—————— an “aggregate interest in an y property , no t to exceed in value $800 pl us u p to $7,500 of an yun u s ed amou n tof th e [h omestead orbu r i al plot]
ex emptionpr ov ided u n d er [§522(d)(1)]. ” In2004, pu r s u a n tt o §104(b)(2), th e Ju dic i al Co n f er enc eof th e Un ited St ates pu bl ish e d
n o tic eth at §522(d)(5) wou l d impose th e $9 75 an d $9,25 0 ($10,2 25 tot a l) limit s that g o v e rned Reilly ’s April 20 05 pet i tion. See 69 Fed. Reg

. 8482 (Table). In2007 an d 201 0 t h e limits wer eag ainin cr eased. See 72 id ., at 70 82 (Tab le ); 75 id ., at 87 48 (Tab le).

2 Sc h w ab c o n c edes th a tth e a ppr aisa l oc c u rr ed befor eRu le 40 03(b)’ s 30-day window for objecting to the cl aime d exemptions had passe d. See Brief for Petitioner 15.4 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### Reilly opposed Schwab’s motion. She argued that by equating on Schedule C the total value of th e exemptions she claime d in the eq uipment with the equi pment’s estimated market value, she had put Schwab an d her creditors on notice that she intended to exempt the equipment’s full value, even if that amount turned out to be more than the dollar a m ount she declared, and more than the Code allowed. Id ., at 165a. Citing §522 ( l), Reilly asserted that because her Schedule C notified Schwab of her intent to exempt the full value of her business equip m ent, he was obliged to object if he wished to preserve the estate’s right to retain any value in the equipment in excess of the $10,718 she estimated. Because Sch w ab did not object within the time prescribed by Rule 4003(b), Re illy asserted that the estate forfeited its claim to such value. Id ., a t 165a. Reilly further informed the Bankru ptcy Court tha t exempting her busines s equipmen t from the e s tate was so important to her that she would dismiss her bankru ptcy case if doing so was th e only way to avoid the equipment’s sale at auction. 3 

### The Bankruptcy Court deniedboth Sch w ab’s motion to auction the equipment and Reilly’s conditional motion to dismiss hercase. See In re Reilly , 403 B. R. 336 (Bkrtcy. Ct. MD Pa. 2006). Schwab sought relief fromthe District Court, arguing that neither the Code nor Rule 4003(b) requires a trustee to object to a claimed exemption where the amoun tthe debtor declares as the “value of [th e

——————

3 Reilly’s desire to avoid the equi pment’s a u ction is und erstandab l e because the equipment, which Re illy’s parents purchased for her despite their o w n financial difficulties, has “ ‘ext ra ordina ry s e nt im ent a l value.’ ” Br ief forRespon de n t5 (qu o t i n gApp. 1 5 2 a–1 53a). Bu t th e sentimental value of the property canno t dr ive our decision in this case, b e ca us e s e ntimenta l value is not a ba s i s for cons truing the Ba nkruptcy Code. Because the Code imposes lim its o nexemptions, many debtors who seek to take advantage of the Code are, no doubt, put to t h e s i m i la rly difficultchoice of pa rt ing wit hpropert yof “ e xt ra ordina ry sentimenta l value.” Id ., at 152 a − 15 3a; se e infra , at 19– 23.5 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### debtor’s] claimed exemption” in certain property is an amount within the lim its the Code prescribes. The District Cour t rejected Sc hwab’s arg u ment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See In re Reilly , 534 F. 3 d173 (CA3 2008). The Court of Appeals agreed with the Bankru ptcy Cour t that by equating on Schedule C the total value of h e r exemptions in her bu siness equipment with the equipment’s market value, Reilly “indi c ate[d] the intent” to exempt the equipment’s full value. Id. , at 17 4. In reach

ing this co nclusion, the Court o f Appeals r e lied on our decision in Taylor: “[W]e believe this case to be controlled by Taylor

. Just as we perceive it was important to the Taylor Court that the debtor meant to exempt the full amount of the property by listing ‘unknown ’ as both the value of the property and the value of theexemption, it is important to us that Reilly valued the business equip m ent at $10,718 and claimed an exemption in the same amount. Such an identical listing pu t Schwab on notice that Reilly intended to exempt the property fully.

. . . . .
“ ‘[A]n unstated premise’ of Taylor was ‘that a debtor who exempts the entire reported value of an asset is claiming th e “full amount,” wha t ever it tu rn s out to be.’ ” 534 F. 3d, at 178

− 179. Relying on this “unstated premise,” the Court of Appeals held that Schwab’s failure to object to Re illy’s claimed exemptions entitled Reilly to the equivalent of an in-kind interest in her busines s equipment, even though the value of that exemption exceeded the amount that Reilly declared on Schedule C and the amount that the Code allowed her to withdraw from the bankruptcy es tate. Ibid

. As noted, t h e Court of Appeals’ decision adds to dis­6 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### agreement among the Circuits ab out what c o nstitutes a claim of ex emption to which an interested party mu st object under §522( l). 4 

### We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. See 556 U. S. ___ (200 9). We concl u de that the Court of Ap peals’ appr oach fails to account for the text of the relevant Code pro visions and misinterprets our decision inTaylor
. Accordi n gly, we re verse. II The startin gpoint for our analysis is the pro p er interpretation of Reilly’s Schedule C. If we read the Schedul e Reilly’s way, she clai med exem ptions in her business equipment that could exceed statutory limits, and thus claimed exemptions to which Sch w ab should h a ve objected if he wished to enforce those limits for the benefit of t h e estate. If we read Sche dule C Schwab’s way, Reilly claimed valid exemptions to which Schwab ha d no duty to object. The Courtof Ap peals construed Sche dule C Reilly’s way an d interpret e d her claimed exemptions as improper, an d therefore objectionable, even though their declared value was f a cially within the ap plicable Code limits. In s o doing, the Court of Appeals held that trus t ees evaluating the validity of exemptions in cases like this cannot take a debtor’s claim at face value, an d specificall y

——————

4 Compare In re Williams , 1 04 F. 3d 6 88, 690 (C A4 19 97) (h oldin g that inter e ste dpar t ies hav eno dutyto objec tto a c l ai med ex emptio n where the dollar amount th e debtor assig n s the exemp t ion is f a ciall y within the r a ng e the Code al lows fo r the type of property in issue); In re Wick , 276 F. 3d 41 2 (CA 8 200 2) (employ i n gr e ason in g simi larto Wi l

liams , but stoppingshor t of ar tic u latinga c l earrule), wi th InreGr ee n , 31 F. 3d 1 098 , 1100 (C A11 199 4) (“A de b t orwh o ex empts th e en tir e r e por t ed v a lu e of anasset is c l aimin gth e [asse t’ s] ‘ f u ll amou n t ,’ wh atev erit tur n s out to be ”); In re A n derso n , 377 B. R. 86 5 (Bkr tc y
. App. Pan e l CA6 20 07) (si m il ar); an d In re Bar roso-He rran s , 524 F. 3d 34 1 , 344 ( CA1 2 0 0 8) (foc u sin gon“h ow a r e ason able tr u s t ee wou l d h av e understood the filings unde rthe circumstances”); In re Hyman , 967 F. 2d 131 6 (CA9 19 92) (apply i n ganan alog ou s tota lity

- of-t h e circum s t a nces a pproa ch).7 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### cannot rely on the fac tthat the amount the debtor declares as the “value of [the] claimed exemption” is within statutory li mits. Instead, the trustee’s duty t o object turns on whether the interpl a y of vario u s schedule entries supports an inference that the debtor “intended” to exempt a dollar value different than the on e she wrote on the form. 534 F. 3d, at 178. Th is complicated view of the trus t ee’s statutory o b ligation, a n d the strained reading of Schedule C on which it rests, is inconsistent with the Co de. 5 

### The parties agree that this case is governed by §522( l), which state s that a Chapter 7 de btor must “file a list of property th at the debtor cl aims a s exempt under subsection (b) of this section,” and fur t h e r states th at “[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exemp t on such li st is exempt.” The partie s further agree that the “list” to wh ich §522( l) refers is the “list of property .

. . claim[ed] as exempt” currently known as “ S chedule C.” See Schedule C. 6

### The parties, lik e the Courts of Appeals, disagree about what information on Schedule C defines the “proper t y claimed as exempt” for purposes of evaluating an exemption’s propriety under §522( l). Reilly asserts that the “pr o perty clai med as exempt” is defi ned by refe rence to all the information on Sc hedule C, including the estimated market value of each asset in which the debto r claims an exempt interest. Schwa b and the United State s as amicus curiaeargue that the Code specifically defines the “proper t y claimed as exempt” as an interest, the value of which m a y not e x ceed a certa in dollar amount, in a particular a sset, notas the asset itself. Accordingly, they

——————

5 Th e for m s, ru les, tr eatise ex c e r p ts, and policy considerations on
w h ic hth e dissen tr e lies, see post , at 4

− 1 6 , must be read in light of th e Bankruptcy C o de provisions that go vern th is ca s e , a n d m u s tyield to those provisions in the e v ent of conflict.

6 Ban k r u ptc yRu le 4003 spec ifies th e time with inwh ich th e debtor must file Schedule C, as well as the time within whic h inter e sted par t ies mus tobjec tto the exemptions clai med thereon.8 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### argue that the value of the prope rty claimed exempt, i.e ., the value of the debtor’s exempt interest in the asset, should be judged on the value the debtor assigns the interest, noton the value the debtor assigns the asset. The point of disagreement is b e st illustrated by the relevant portio nof Reilly’s Schedule C: Schedule C

─Property Claimed as Exempt Description of Prop erty Specify L a w Providing Ea ch Exem ption Valu e of Claimed Exem ption Current MarketValue of

Prop erty Wi th ou t De du ctingExe m ptio ns Schedule B Personal Prop erty

. . . . See attach ed list of bu sin e ss equ i p m en t. . . . . 11 U. S. C. §522(d) (6) 11 U. S. C. §522(d) (5) . . . . 1,850 8,868 . . . . 10,718



### According to Reilly, S c hwab was required to treat the estimate of mark et value sheent e red in col u mn four a s part of her claimed exemption in identifying t h e “propert y claimed as exempt” un der §522( l). See Brief for Respondent 22–28. Relying on this pre m ise, Reilly argues th at where, as here, a deb t or equates the total value of her claimed exemptions in a certain as set (column three) with her estimate of the asset’s market value (column four), she establishes the “prope rty claimed as exempt” as the full value of the asset, what ever that tu rns out to b e
. Seeibid

. Accordingly, Reilly argues thather Schedule C clearly put Schwab on notice that she “intended” to clai m an exemption for the full value of her business equipment, and that Schwab’s failure to oppose the exemption in a timely manner placed the full value of the equipmentoutside the estate’s reach

. Schwab does not dispute that co lumns three and four apprised him that Rei lly equated the total value of her claimed exemptions in the equipm ent ($1,850 plus $8,868)9 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### with the eq uipment’s market value ($10,718). He simply disagrees with Reilly t hat this “identical listi ng put [him] on notice that Reilly intend ed to exempt the property fully,” regardless whether it s value exceede dthe exemption limits the Code prescribes. 534 F. 3d, at 1 78. Schwab and amicus United States instead contend that the Co de defines the “property” Reillyclaimed as exempt unde r §522( l) as a n“interest” whose value cannot exceed a certain dollar amount. Brief fo r Petiti oner 20–26; Reply Brief for Petitioner 3–6; Brief for United State s as Amicus Curiae12–18. Construing Reilly’s Schedule C in light of this statutory definition, they contend that Reilly’s claimed exemption was facially unobjectionable becau s e the “proper t y claimed as exempt” ( i.e ., tw o inter e st s in her business equipment worth $8,8 68 and $1,850, respectively) is property Reilly was cle a rly entitled to exclude from her estate under the Code provisions sh e reference d in column 2. See sup ra , at 8 (citing §§522(d)(5) and (6)). Accordin gly , Sch w ab a n d the Unit ed Sta t es c o nclude that Schwab ha d no obligation to object to the exemption in order to pre s erve for the estate an y value in Reilly’s business equ i pment beyon dthe total amount ($10,718) Reilly properly claimed as exe m pt. We agree. The portion of §522( l) t hat resolves this case is not, as Reilly asserts, the provision stating that the “propert y cl aimed as exempt on [Schedule C] is exempt” unless an interested p a rty objec t s. Rather, i tis the por

tion of §52 2 ( l) that defines the target of the objection, namely, the portion tha tsays Sch w ab has a du ty to object to the “list of propertythat the d e btor claims as exemp t under subsection (b) .” (Emphasis added.) That subsection, §522(b), does not define the “propertyclaimed as exempt” byreference to the estimated mar k et value o n which Reilly and the Court of Appeals rely. Brief for Respondent 22–23; 534 F. 3d, at 178. Se ction 522(b) refers only to property defined in§522(d), which in turn10 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### lists 12 cat e gories of property tha ta debtor may claim as exempt. As we have recognized, most of the s e categories (and all of the categories applicable to Reilly’s exemptions) define the “ p roperty” adebtor ma y “ c lai[m] as exempt” a s the debtor’s “interest”—up to a s p ecified dollar amount— in the assets describe d in the ca tegory, no t as the assets themselves. §§522(d)( 5 )–(6); see also §§522( d)(1)–(4), (8); Rouseyv. Jacoway , 5 44 U. S. 320, 325 (2005); Owen v. Ow en , 500 U. S. 305, 310 (1991). Vie w i n g Re i l l y ’s fo rm entries in light of this defi n i tion, we agree with Schwab and the Un ited States that Schwab had no d u ty to objec t to the prop erty Reilly claim e d as exempt (two inter e sts in her bus i nes s equ i pmen t worth $1,850 and $8 , 868) beca us e the stated value of e a ch interest, and thus of the “property claime d as exemp t ,” was within the lim its the Cod e allows. 7 

### Reilly’s contrary view of Schwab’s obligations under §522( l) does not withstand scrutin ybecause it defines th e target of atrustee’s o bjection—t he “propert y claimed as exempt”—b a sed on language in Schedule C and dictionary definitions of “property,” s ee Brief for Respondent 24–25, 40–41, that the definition in the Code itself overrides. 8

——————

7 Sc h w ab’ s stat u t or ydu tyto objec t to the exemptions in this case turns solely o nwhether the value of the property clai med as exempt exceeds statutory limits because the par t i e s ag r ee th at Sc h w ab h a d no cause to object to Reilly’s att e mpt to claim exemptions in the equipment at issue, or to the applicabi lity of the Co de provisions Reilly cited in support of her exemptions.

8 Th e dissen t ’ s appr oac hsu ffer s fr om a similarflaw , an d misst ate s our holding in critiquing it. See post , at 1

− 2 (as s er tin gth at byr e fu sin g to subjec t “c halleng es to th e debtor ’ s val u ation of exempti b le assets” to t h e “ 3 0

- da y” obj e ct ion period in Federa l Rule of Ba nkrupt cy Pro c edu r e 400 3(b), we “d r a stic al lyr e duc [ e] Ru le 4003 ’ s g o v e rn an c e ” )

. Ch allen g e s to the v a luation of what the dissent ter m s “ex e mptib l e asse ts” ar e not
c o v e r e d byRu le 4 003(b) in th e fir s t plac e
. Post , at 1. Ch allen g es t o “property claimed as exem pt” as definedby the Code are covered b y Ru le 400 3(b), bu t inth is c a s eth at pr oper tyis n o t objec t ion able, so th e lack of an obje ction did not v i olate the Rul e
. Our holding is confined to11 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### Although we may look to dictionar ies and the Bankru ptc y Rules to determine the meaning of words the Code does not define, see, e.g. , Rousey , supra , at 33 0, the Code’s definition of the “property clai med as exempt” in this case is clear. As noted above, §§522( d)(5) and (6) define the “property cl aimed as exempt” as an “interest” in Reilly’s business eq uipment, notas the equipment per se
. Sections 522(d)(5) and (6) further and plainly state that claims to exempt such interests are st atu t orily perm issible, and thus unobjectionable, if the value of the claimed interest is below a par t icular dollar amount. 9 

### That is the case here , and Schwab was entitled to rely upon these provisions i n evaluating whether Re illy’s exemptions were objectionabl e under the Code. See Lamiev. U n ited States Trus tee , 54 0 U. S. 526, 534 (2004); Ha rtfordUnder w ri te rs Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A. , 530 U. S. 1, 6 ( 2000). Th e Court of Ap peals’ contrary hold ing not only fails to account for the Code’s definition of the “property clai med as exempt.” It a l so fails to account for the provisions in §522(d) that permitdebtors to exempt cert ain property in kind or in full rega rdless of value. See, e. g
. , §§522(d)(9) (professionally pr escribed health aids), (10)(C) (disability ben e fits), (7) (un m atured lif e insurance contra cts). We decline to construe Reilly’s claimed exem ptions in a manner tha t

—————— this point. Accordingly, o u r hold in gdoes n o t “r edu c [e] Ru le 400 3’ s g o v e rn an c e ,” n o rdoes it e x pr ess an yju dg men tonwh at c o n s tr ain s objec t ions to the ty pe of “ m ar ket v a lue” estim a te s, post , at 1, the dissen te q u a t e s w i thth e dollarv a lu e a debtoras sig n s th e “pr o per t y claimed as exe m pt” as defined by the Code, see, e. g. , post , at 2, 6.

9 Tr eatingsuc hc l aims as unobjec tionab le i s c o nsistent w i th ourpr ecedents. See, e.g ., Rou sey , 544 U. S., at325. It also ac c o r d s with ban kr u p tc yc o u r t dec i sion s h o ldin gth at wh er e, as h e r e , a deb t orc l aim s a nexemption purs ua nt to provis ionsthat (like §522(d) (6)) permit the debtor to excl ude from the estate on ly an “interest” in ce rtain property, th e “pr o per t y” th at bec o me s ex empt ab se n tobjec t ion , §522( l), is only the “par ti alinter e st” c l aime d as ex empta n d not “the as set as a whole , ” e.g ., In re Soost , 262 B. R. 68, 72 (Bkr tc y
. App. Pan e l CA8 2001).12 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### elides the di stinction between these provisio ns and provisions suchas §§522( d)(5) and (6), see, e.g. , Duncan v. Walke r , 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001), particularly based upon an entry on Schedule C—Reilly’s estimate of her equip

ment’s mar k et value—to which th e Code does not refer i n defining the “propert y c l aimed as exempt.” 10 

### For all of these reason s, we conclude that Schwab was entitled to evaluate the propriety of the clai med exemptions based on three, and only three, entries on Reilly’s Schedule C: the description of the business equipment in which Reilly claimed the exempt i n terests; the Code provi­

——————

10 The dissent’s approach does not av oid these concerns. The dissent in sist s th at “a debtor ’ s m a r k et v a lu at ion [o f the equipme n t in which she
c l aims an ex e m pt in ter e st] is an essent ia l factor in de termining the nature of the‘interest’ [the] debtor list s as ex empt” (and thus in deter

mining whether the clai med exempt i o nis o bjec t i o n able), bec a u s e “without compa r ing [the deb t or’s ] ma rket valuation of the equipment to the value of h e r claimed exe m ption” the tr ustee “c ould n o t c o mpr e hend wh eth e r[th edebtor] c l aimeda mon e t a r yor an in-kind ‘interest’ in [the ] equipment.” Post , at 9, n

. 9. Th is ar g u me nt overlooks the fact that there is another way the t r ustee co uld discern from the “face of the debtor’s filings,” post , at 7, n
. 6, wh eth e r th e debtorc l aimed as ex emp t a “mon e t a r yoranin -kin d ‘ i nterest’ in” her equipment, post , at 9, n

. 9: The tr ustee c o uld simplyc o nsult the Cod eprovisions the debtor liste d as governing the exempti o n in qu estio n
. Here, those provisions, §§522(d)( 5 ) a n d (d)(6), ex pr esslydesc r ibe th e ex empt in ter e st as a n “interest” “not to exceed” a s p ecified doll ar amount. Accordingly, it was entirely appropriate for Schwab to view Reilly’s schedule entries as exempting an interest in he r busine ss equipment in the (declared an d
u n o bjec tion abl e) amou n t s of $1,85 0 an d $ 8 ,868. Viewi n gth e en tr ies otherwise, i.e. , as exemptingthe equipment inkind or in full no matter wha tits dolla r va lue, wo uld unne ces s a rily trea t th e exemption a s violating the limit s impose dby the Co de provisions that govern it, as well as ignore the distinctio n betw een tho s e provisio ns and the provis i ons t h a t“a ut horiz[e] recla m a t ion of the property infull without any cap on value,” post , at 7, n

. 5. An d it wou l d do all of th is ba sed o n information (identical dolla r amount s in columns three and four o f Schedule C) that Schwab and one of his amicisayofte nr e su lt fr om a default se ttingin c o mmer c i al bankr uptc ysoftwar e
. See ReplyBr ief fo r Petitioner15; Br ief forNat. Assn. of Ba nkruptcy T r us tees 1 3 , n. 1 5

.13 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### sions governing the claimed exemptions; and the amounts Reilly listed in the col u mn titled “value of cl aimed exemption.” In reaching this conclusion, we do not render t h e mark et value estimateon Reil ly’s Schedule C superfluous

. We simply confine the estimate to its proper role: aiding the trustee in admini stering the estate by helping him identify assets that may have value beyond the dolla r amount the debtor claims as exempt, or whose full value may not be available for exemption because a portion of the in te restis, for e x a m ple, encumbere dby an unavoidable lien. S e e , e. g
. , 3 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice §56:7 (3d ed . 2009) ; Brief for United States as Am icusCu riae 16; Dept. of Justice, Executive Office for U. S. Trustees , Handbook f o r Chapter 7 Trustees, p. 8– 1 (2005), http:// www.justice.g o v /ust/ e o/pr ivat e_tr u stee/librar y/chapt e r07 / d o c s / 7han dbook1008/Ch7_ Han dbo ok. p df ( a s vi s i t e d June 14, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). A s noted, mos tassets become pr operty of the estate upo n commencement of a bankruptcy case, see 11 U. S. C. §54 1 , and exempt ions represent the deb t or’s at tempt to reclaim those assets or, more often, cer t ain interests in those assets, to the creditors’ detrime nt. Accordi n gly, it is at least useful for a trustee to be ab le to compare the value of the claimed exemption (which t y pically re presents the debtor’s interest in a particu lar asset) with the asset’ s estimated market val u e (whichbelongs to the estate subject to anyvalid exemption) without having to consult separate schedules. 11

——————

11 The dissent’ s ar g u ment that the estim a te play s a g r eat e rr o le, and is “vita l ,” post , at 8, to deter m in in gwh etherth e v a lu e a debtorassig n s the “property claimed as exempt” (here, anin ter e st inc e r t ainbu sin e s s equipment) i s objectionable, see post , at 8

− 9, lac k s st a t u t or ysu ppor t b e ca us e t h e governin g C o de provis ions phrase the exemp t ion limi tas a simple dol l aramou n t

. Th e dissen t ’ s v i ew , see post , a t7

− 9, migh t be plau si ble if th e Code stated th at th e debto rco uld exemp tan interest in her equipment “not to exceed” a certain perc entageof the equipment’ s14 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### Our interpretation of Schwab ’s statutory obligations is not only co nsistent with the go verning Code provisions; it is also con s istent with the historical treatment of ba nkruptc yexe m ptions. Congress h a s permitte d debtors t o exempt certain property from thei r bankruptcy estates for more than two centu r ies. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 1 9 , §5, 2 Stat. 23. 12 

### Throughout these periods, debtors have validly exe m pted property bas ed on forms that required the debtor to list thevalue of a clai med exemption without also estimating the market value of the asset in which the

—————— market value, because then it migh t be nec e ssar yto “c ompar [ e] [the debtor’s] mark et valuation of the equipmen t to the value of her claimed exemption” to determine th e exemption’s propriety. Po s t , at 9, n
. 9

. Butt h e Code does notphras et h e exem ption ca p in s u ch t e rm s
. Moreover, eve naccepting that the equiva lent S c hedule C entries the di ssen t relies upon represent a claim to ex em pt anas set’ s full value, the dissent does not explain wh y this equival e nce precludesa trustee from relying o nthedollar amount the debtorex pr esslyassig n s bothen tr ies. Ac c o r d ingto the dissent, a tr ustee fac e d w i thsu c hen tr ies sh ou ld assume not o n lythat the debtorr e c l aims fr om the esta te what s h e believes to be the full value of an as setin which the Code allows her to exempt an interest “not to exceed” a certain dollar amount, e. g
. , §522(d)( 6 ), bu t alsothatthe debtorwould c o ntinue to c l aim the a sse t’ s full value as e x empt even if that va lue exceeds her esti mate to a poi n t tha twould caus e her cla i m to violat e the Code. The schedule entrie s themselv es do not c o mpel t h is as sumptio n , and the Code pr ov ision s they invoke undercut it. The eviden c ethat the de bto rin this c a se would have c h os en tha tcours eis externa lto her exemption s c hedule. See, e.g. , sup ra , at 4 (cit ing sta t ements i nReilly’s mot i on to dis m is s ) ; post , at 4, n

. 3, 6 (sa m e). An d inth e or din a r yc a se, par t ic u l ar lyif th e equivalent entries the dissent relies u p onr e su lt fr oma softw a r edefa ult, s ee n. 1 0 , supra, ther e is no r e ason to assume that a deb t orwould want to violate the Code or jeopardi ze oth e r exemptions if her market
v a lue estima te tur n s out to b ewr ong
.

12 See also Ac t of Au g
. 19, 184 1, c h . 9, §3, 5 Sta t . 442; Ac tof M a r
. 2, 186 7, c h

. 176, §11, 14 St at. 521, amen dedbyAc t of Ju n e22, 18 74, 1 8 Sta t ., Pt. 3, p. 182; Ban k r u ptc yAc t of Ju ly1, 18 98, c h . 54 1, §6, 3 0 S t a t

. 548, 11 U. S. C. §24 (19 2 6 e d .); Ch an dl erAc t, c h . 575, § 1 , 52 St at. 84 7, 11 U. S. C. §2 4 (1 934 ed., S u pp. IV); §52 2 (1 976 ed., S u pp. II); §522 (200 0 ed. an d Su pp. V).15 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### debtor claimed the exempt inte re st. See Bri e f for Respo n dent 46, n. 7 (citing Sup. Ct. Bkrtcy. Form 20 (1877)). 13 

### Indeed, it was not un til 1991 th at Schedule B–4 was redesignated as Schedule C and amended to require the estimate of market val u e on whic h Reilly so heavily reli es. See Schedule C. This amendment was not occasioned by legislative changes th at altere d the Code’s definition of “the proper ty claimed as exempt” in this case as an “interest,” not to exceed a certain dollar amount, in Reilly’s business eq uipment. 14

### Accordingly, we agree with Sch w ab and the United States that this recent amendment to the exemption form does n o t compel Reilly’s view of Schwab’s statutory obligations, or renderthe claimed exemptions in this case objectionable under the Code. See Reply Brief for Petition er 9–11; B r ief for Un ited States as Amicu s Curiae16– 17. 15

——————

13 S ee a l s oGene ra l Form s in Ba nkrupt cy, Officia lForm 1 , S c hedule B. (5) (1898); Fed. Rule Bk rtcy. Pr o c . Of ficial Form 6, S c hedule B–4 (197 1).

14 The pre c ise re ason for the amendm ent is unclea r
. S ee Communica

tion from T HE C HI EF J US TI CE of the United State s Transmi tti ng Amendments to the FederalRules of Ba n k rupt cy P r oce d ure Pres crib e d b ythe Court, Purs ua nt to 2 8U. S

. C. 207 5, H. R. Do c. 102 –8 0, p. 558 , r e pr in ted in1 1 Ban k r u ptc yRu les Doc u m e n t ar yHistor y(1990– 199 1) (referencing o n ly the fact of the amend m ent). It may have been to
cons olida t e a n d reconcile t h e s e pa rat eform s deb t ors w e re previous ly
r e qu ir ed to fi le inCh a p ter7 an d Ch a p t e r13 c a ses, s ee, e.g. , In re Beshirs , 236 B. R. 42, 46

− 47 (Bkr tc y
. Ct. Kan

. 1999), orsimplyto make it easier for trustees to evaluatewhet her ce rt a i n a s s e t s were viab l e candidates for liquid a tion. Whateverthe c a se, i tdidnot r e sult fr o m statutory changes to the Code provis ions t h a tgovernt h is dis p ut e.

15 Because the Code provisio ns we relyu p o nt or e s o l v et h i s c a s ed o n o t oblig ate tr u s tees to objec tu n d erRu le 4003(b) to a de btor ’ s esti mat e of the market value of an asset in which the debtor claims an exempt interest, our analysis doe s not depend on whethe r th e schedule o f

“ p ropert y cla i m e d a s exem pt” (current ly S c hedule C) ca lls for s u ch an estim a te or not. We engage the po int only because Reillysuggests that th e 199 1 sc h e du le r e v i sion s r e qu ir in g debtor s to pr ov ide su c han estimate on the scheduleof “prope r t yc l ai med as ex emp t” means tha t16 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### III The Court of Appeals erred inholding that our decision in Taylor dictates a contrary concl u sion. See 534 F. 3d, a t 178. Taylor does not rest on wh at the debt or “meant” to exempt. 534 F. 3d, at 178. Rather, Taylor a p plies to the face of a debtor’s claimed exemption the Code provisions that compel reversal here. The debtor in Taylor , like the debtor here, filed a schedule of exem ptions with the Bank ruptcy Court on which the debtor described the propertysubject to the claimed ex

emption, identified the Code provision supporting the exemption, and listed the dollar value of the exemption. Critically, however, the debtor in Taylor did not , like the debtor here, state the value of the claimed exemption as a specific dollar amount at or below the limits the Code allows. Ins t ead, the debtor in Taylor listed the value of the exemption itself as “$ unknown”: Schedule B-4.

─

### Property Claimed Exempt Ty pe of Prop erty Location, Description, and, So Far As Relevant to th e Claimof Ex emp tion , Presen t U s e of Prop erty Sp ecif yt h e Statute Creatin gt h e Exem ption Value Clai med Exem pt

Proceed s f r om lawsuit Win nv. T W A Claimf o r lost wag e s 11 U. S. C. 522(b) (d) $ unk no w n 

### The interested parties in Taylor agreed tha tthis entr y

—————— the estima te must be v i ewed as par tof the exemption and is therefore subject to the Rule. See Brief for Respondent 40

− 41

. The di ss ent ranges far beyond even this unavailin g argument in suggesting that the market value estimate served as “an essen t ial factor in determining the nature of the ‘interest’ a debtor lists as e x empt,” post , at 9, n

. 9, ev en befor e199 1 wh enth at es tima te di d not appear on the schedule of

“ p ropert y cla i m e d a s exempt” (form er Schedule B

− 4), bu t r a th era p peared on former “Schedule B–2,” post , at7, n. 6, which merely liste d the debtor’s “ p ersonal property” as of the date of the petit i on filin g. Int e rimFed. Rule Bkrt cy. Proc. Officia lForm6 , S c hedules B– 2 , B–4 (197 9).17 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### rendered th e debtor’s claimed exemption objectionable on its face because the exemption concerned an asset (lawsuitproceeds) that the Code did not permit the debtor to exempt beyond a specific dollar amount. See 503 U. S., at 642. Accordingly, although this case and Taylor both concern the consequenc es of a trustee’s failure to object to a claimed exemption within the time specified by Rule 4003, the question ar ose in Taylor on starkly differe nt facts. In T a

ylor , the q u estion con c erned a trustee’s obl i g ation to obj e ct to the debtor’s entry of a “v alue claimed exempt” th at was not plainly within the lim its the Code allows. In this case, t h e opposite is true. T h e amounts Reilly listed in the Schedule C column titled “Value of Claimed Exemption” arefacially within the limits th e Code prescr ibes and raise no warni n g flags tha twa rranted an objection

. 16 

### See supra, at 8. Taylor supports this conclusion. In holding otherwise , the Court of Appeals focused on what it described as Tay

lor’ s “ ‘unstated premise’ ” that “ ‘a debtor who exempts the entire reported value of an asset is claiming the “full amount,” whatever it turns out to be.’ ” 534 F. 3d, at 179. But Taylordoes not r e st on this premise. I testablishe s and applies the straightforward proposition th at an interested partymust object to a claimed exemption if the

——————

16 See, e.g
. , Barroso-Herrans , 524 F. 3d, a t 3 45 (ex p la in in gth at Sc h e dule C entries list i ng the value of acla i med exemption a s “unknown,” “to be deter m i n ed,” or“10 0 % ” ar e “ ‘ r ed fl ag s to tr ustee s and c r e ditor s ,’ and therefore put them onnotic ethat if theydo not objec t , the whole value of the asse t—whatever it mi gh t l a tertur nout to be—wil l b e exempt” (quot i ng 1 Collier on Bankrupt cy ¶8.06[1][c][ii] (15th ed. rev. 200 7); c i tatio nan d some in ter n al qu otationmar k s omitted)). Th e dissent concedes that a debtor’s ex emption sc hedule “must giv enotic e suffic i ent to c u e the tr ustee that anobj e ction may be in order,” and rightly observes that the sufficien cyof a pa rt icula rcue , or “ ‘ war n in g flag,’ ” may lie “in the eye of the beholder.” Post , at14. Inth is c a se, howeve r, the Code itse lf breaks th e tie between what might otherwise be two equally tenable views.18 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### amount the debtor lists as the “value claimed exempt” i s not within statutory limits, a test the value ($ unknown) in Taylor failed, and the values ($8 , 868 and $1,850) in this case pass. We adhere to this test. Doing oth e rwise would not only depart f r om Taylor a n d ignore the presumption that pa rties act la wfully and with kno w ledge of the la w, cf. Uni t ed Sta t es v. Budd , 144 U. S. 154, 163 (1892); it would also require us to expand the stat utor y definition of “p ropert y claimed as exempt” a n d the universe of information an interested partymustconsider in evaluating the validi t y of a claim e d exemption. Even if the Code allowed suc h expansions, they would be ill advis e d. As evid enced by the differences between Reilly’s Schedule C and the schedule in Taylor , preprinted bankruptcy schedules change ove r time. Basi ng the definition of the “propert yclaimed a s exempt,” a n d thus a ninterested part y’s obligation to object unde r§522( l), on inferences that pa rty must dra w from evolving forms, rather than on the facial validity of the value the debtor assigns t h e “propert y claimed as exempt” as defined b ythe Code, would un dermine the predictability the statute is designed to provide. 17 

### For all of these rea s ons, we take Reilly’s exemptions at face val u e and find them unobjectionable under the Code, so the

——————

17 Reilly insis t s that our conclusionshould nonetheless be avoided b e ca us e “ p roc e dures t h a t burden t h e debtor’s exemptio n entitlements, like those that impair a de btor’s dis c ha rge gene ra lly, a r e t ob econs t rued na rro wly.” Brief for Res p ondent3 3 (citing Kawaauhauv. Geiger , 523 U. S. 57, 62 (1 9 98)). Th is ar g u men tmisse s th e mar kfo r two reasons. First, the onl yburd ens our conclusion imposes are burdens the Cod eitse lf prescribes, specific ally, the burdens the Cod e places on debtors to state their cl aimed e x emptions accurately and to conforms u chcla i ms t o s t at ut ory lim its. Second, and in any event, Geigerand the other cases Reil ly cites emphasi z e i nthe discharge context the importance of limit ing ex c e p t ions to disc h a r g e to “thos e plainly expressed,” a principle th atsuppor t s our approach here

. Ibid

. (interna l q u ota t ion ma rks omitted).19 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### objection deadline weenforced i n Taylor is inapplicable here. IV In a final effort to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment, Reilly asserts that her approach to §52 2 ( l) is necessary to vin d icate the Code’s goal of giving debtors a fresh start, and t o further it s policy of discouragingtrustees and creditors fr om sleeping on their r i ghts. See Brief for R e spondent 21, 55–68. Although none of Reilly’s policy arguments can overco me the Co de provisions or the aspects of Taylor that govern this case, our decision fully accords wi t hall of the policies she identifies. We agree that “exemptions in bankrup tcy c a ses are part and parc el of the fund amental ba nkruptcy co ncept of a ‘fresh start.’ ” Brief for Respondent 21 (quoting Rousey , 544 U. S., a t 325); see Marram av. Citizen s Bank of Mass. , 549 U. S. 365, 367 (2007). We disagree that this policy required Schwab to object to a f a cially valid claim of exemption on pain of forfeiting his ability to pre s erve for the estate any value in Reilly’s busin ess equipm ent beyond the value of the interest she declar ed exempt. This approach threatens to convert a fresh start into a f r ee pass. As we emphasized in Rousey , “[t]o help the debtor obtain a fresh start, the Ban k rup tcyCo de permits him to with

draw from the es ta tec e rtain inter ests inprop erty, such as his car or home, up to cer tain v a lues .” 544 U. S., a t3 2 5 (emphasis added). The Code l i m its exem ptions in t h is fashion bec ause every asset the Code permits a debtor to withdra wfr om the estate is an asset that is not available to his creditors. See §522(b)(1). Congress balanced the difficult choices that exemption limits impose on debtors with the ec onomic harm that exe m ptions visit on creditors, and it is not for us to alter this balance by req u iring trus

tees to obje ct to claimed exemptions based onform entries beyond those that govern an exemption’s va lidity unde r20 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### the Code. See Lamie , 540 U. S., at 534, 538; Har t fo rd , 5 30 U. S., at 6; United Sta t esv. Lock e , 471 U. S. 84, 95 (1985). Reilly nonetheless con t ends that our approach creates perverse incentives fortrustees a n d creditor s to sleep on their rights

. See Brief for Respondent 64, n. 10, 67–6 9. Again, we disagree. Where a debtor intends to exempt nothing more than aninterest worth a specified dollar amount in an asset that is not subject to an unlimited or in-k ind exe m ption under the Code, our approach will ensure clear and efficient reso lution of compet ing claims t o the asset’s value. If a ninterested par t ydoes not objectto the claimed interest by the tim e the Rule 4003 periodexpires, title to the asset will remain with the estate pursuant to §5 41, and the debtor will be guaranteed a pa yment in th e dollar amount of the exemption. If an inte rested party timely objects, the court will rule on the objection and, if it is improper, allow the debtor to mak e appropriate adjustments. 18 

### Where, as here, it is important to the debtor to exempt the full ma rk et value of the ass e t or the ass e t itself, ou r decision will encourage the debtor to declare the value of her claimed exemption in a manner that ma kes the scope of the exem ption clear, for example, by listing the exempt value as “full fair m a rket valu e (FMV)” or “100% of

——————

18 We disagree that Reil ly’s ap proachto exemptions woul d more efficiently dispos e of competing claims to the asse t. On Reilly’s view, a trus tee would b eenco ura g ed (if not obliged) to object to claims to exempt a spec ific dollar amount of interest in an asse t wheneve rthe value of the exempt interest equaled the de btor’s estimate of the asset’s market value. Where the d e btor ge nuinely intended to cla i m nothing more than theface value of the exemptint e res t(which is ra t i ona lif a debtor wishes to ensure that his aggregate exemptions remain within sta t u t or ylimits), su c hana ppr oac h wo uld enge nder nee d less objection s and lit igation, particularly i f the equationthat would p r ecipitate the objection ofte n results from a defaul t software entry. See Reply Bri e f for Petitioner 15; Brief for N a t. Assn . of Bankruptc yTr us tees 13, n. 15.21 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### FMV.” 19

### Such a declaration will encourage the trustee to object promptly to the exemption if he wishes to challenge it and preserve for the estate an y value in the asset b e yond relevant statutory limits. 20 

### If the trustee fails to object, or if the trustee objects a n d the obje ction is overruled, the debtor will be entitled to exclude the full valu e of the asset. If the t r ustee objects and the objection is sustained, the debtor will be req u ired eitherto forfeit t h e portion of the exemption thatexceeds the statutory allowance, or to revise other exem ptions or arrangements with her credito rs to perm it the exemption. S ee Fed. Rule

——————

19 The dissent’s observations about the poor fit between our admonition and a form entry calling for a dollar a m ount, see post , at 15, sim p ly
r e flec t the ten s ion be tween the Code’ s def i nition of “pr o per t yc l aime d as exemp t” ( i. e ., a nint e res t , nott oexceed acert a i n dolla r am ount , in Reilly’s busin e ss equip m ent) and Reil ly’s at temp t to conve r t into a dollar value a nimproper cl aim toexemp tthe equipment itse lf, “ ‘wha t

ev er[its v a lue] tur n s out to be.’ ” In re Reilly , 534 F. 3d 173, 178

− 1 79 (CA3 2 008). As th e dissen tc o n c edes, “[s]ec tion522(d) c a talog s ex emp tions of two types.” Post , at 7, n. 5. “Most exemptions— a nd all of those Reilly invoked—place a monetary limit on the value of the property the debtormayr e c l aim,” and suc hex empt ions are distinct from those mad e pursuant to C o de provisions that “ a uthoriz[e] reclamati o n of the proper tyin full wi thout any cap on value.” Ibi d

. Nothing about Reil ly’s Sc hedule entr ies es tabli s hes thatSc hwab should have t r eated Rei lly’s
c l aim for$10, 718, anu n o bj ec tion able am ou n tu n d erthe Code pr ov ision s sh e ex pr esslyin v o ked, as an objectio nable clai m fo r thousands of dollar s mor et h anth ose pr ov ision s allow, oras a c l ai m f o ranu n c a pped exemption under Code provisions sh e didnot invoke and the dissent admi ts are “not at issue here .” Ibid

.

20 A tr ustee willnot alway s fi le an objectio n. As the United States observ es, Sc hwab did not do so in this c a se with r e spec t to c e r t ai n asse ts (perish able food stuff s from Reil ly ’ s c o mmer c i alkitc hen) that could not be readily sold. S ee Brief for United St ates a s Am icus Curi ae 28, n. 7 (explaining that Schwab could have objected to R e illy’s claim of a wildc a r dex emptionforanin ter e st inth e food totalin g $2,03 6 bec a u s e t h is cla i m , com b ined wit h her wildca rd c l a i ms for a nint e res tof $ 8 , 86 8 inh e r bu sin e ss equ i pmen tan d in ter e sts tota lin g$26 inh e r ban k accounts, placed the total v a lue of the in terests she cl aimed exempt
u n d erth e wildc a r dpr ov ision $975 ab ov e th en -applic able l i mit s ).22 SCHWA B v. REILLY Opinion of theCourt 

### Bkrtcy. Proc. 1009(a). Either result will facilitate the expeditious and final disposition of assets, and thus enabl e the debtor (and the de btor’s creditors) to achieve a fresh start free of the finality and clouded-title concerns Reilly describes. See Brief for Respondent 57–59 (arguing th at “[u]nder [Schwab’s] interpretati on of Rule 4003(b), a debtor would never have the certainty of k n owing whether or not he orshe may k e ep her exe m pted property until the case had ended”); id. , at 66. 21 

### For all of these reason s, the polic y considerations Reilly cites support our app r oach. Where, as here, a debt or accurately describes an asset s ubject to an ex empt interest and on Sch e dule C declares the “value of [the] claimed exemption” as a dollar amount within the ran g e the Code allows, interested par t ies are entitled to rely upon that value as evidence of the claim’s validity. Accordingly, we hold that Schwab was not re quired to obje ct to Reilly’s claimed exemptions in her busines s equipmen t in order to

——————

21 Reilly’s cloude d-title argume nt arises only if one accepts her flawed conception of th e exemptions in this case. According to Reilly, “once the thir ty -daydeadline pa ssedwithout obj e ct ion” t oher cla i m , s h e wa s “entitled to know that she would emerge from bankruptcy with he r cooking equipment intact.” Brief for Respondent 57. There are two pr oblems withthis ar g u ment. Fir s t, it as sumes that the pr oper tyshe claimed as exempt was the full value of th e equipment. That assumpt i on is incorr ectfor t h ere a s ons we exp l a i n. S e cond, hera r gum e n t
assume s tha t a c l ai m to ex empt the full value of the e q uipment would, if unopposed, entitle her to the equipmen t itself as opp o sed to a payment equal to the equip m ent’s full valu e. Th at as su mp tionis a tle as t qu estion ab le. Sec t ion541 i s c l earth at title to th e equ i pm en t passed to Reilly ’s est a te at the comm encement of her case, and §§522(d)( 5 ) and (6 ) a r e eq ua llyclea r t h ather recla m a t ion rightis lim it ed t oexem pt ing an inter e st in the equipment , not th e equipment it self. Accordingl y, it is far from ob vious that the Code would “ e ntitle” Reilly to clear tit l e i n the equipment even if she cl aimedas ex e m pt a “full” or“1 00%” inter e st in it (which s h e did not). Of cours e , it is li kely that a tr ustee who fail s to objec tto suc ha c l aim would hav elittle inc e ntiv e to d oany t hingbut pass ti tle in t h e asse t to th e debtor

. Butthatdoes notest abl ish the sta t utory entitlement Reilly claims.23 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### preserve t h e estate’s right to r e tain any value in the equipment beyond the value of t h e exempt interest. I n reaching th is conclusion, we express no judgment on the merits of, and do not foreclose the courts from entertaining on remand, proceduralor other measures that may allow Reilly to avoid auction of her busin ess equipm ent. * * * We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circu it and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–5 38 

### WILLIAM G. SCHWAB, PETITI ONER v. NAD E JD A REILLY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [Ju n e17, 2010 ] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G 

### , with whom T HE 

### C HIEF 

### J USTICE 

### an d J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### join, dissenting. In Chapter 7 bankruptcies, debtors must su rrender to the trustee -in-bankruptcy all their assets, 11 U. S. C. §541, but may reclaim for themselves ex empt prope rty, §522. Within 30 days after the m eeting of creditors, the trustee or a creditor may file an objection to the debtor’s designation of property as exempt. Fed. Rule Bk rtcy. Proc. 4003(b). Absent timely objection, “property claimed [by the debtor] as exempt . . . is exempt.” §522( l).

The trustee in this cas e , petitioner William G. Schwab, maintains that the obligation pro m ptly to obj e ct to exem ption claims extends only to the qu alification of an asset a s exemptible, not to the debtor’s valuation of the asset. Respondent Nadejda Reilly, the debtor-in-bankruptcy, urges that the timely objection requirement applies no t only to the debtor’s designation of an asset as exempt; the requirement applies as well, she asserts, to her estimate of the asset’s market val u e. That is so, she rea s ons, becau s e the asset’s current dollar value is critical to t h e determination whe t her she may k eep the property intact and outside ban k r uptcy, or whethe r the trustee, at any time during the course of the proceedings, may sell it. The Court holds that challenges to the debtor’s valuation of exemptible assets need no t be made within the 30­2 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### day period allowed for “objecti on[s] to the list of property claimed as exempt.” Rule 4003(b). Instead, according to the Court, no time limit constr ains the tr ustee’s (or a creditor’s) prerogative to pl ace at issue the debtor’s evaluation of the property as fully exempt. The Court’s decision drastically reduces Rule 4003’s governance, for challenges to val uation have been, until today, the most common type of objection leveled agains t exemption claims. See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4003.04 , p. 4003–15 (rev. 15th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Collier) (“Normally, objections to exemptions will focus primarily o n issues of v a luation.”). In addition to departing from theprevailing understanding and practice, the Court’s decision exposes debtors to protracted uncertaintyconcerning their right to retain exempt p r op erty, there b y impeding the “fresh start” exem ptions are designed to foster. In accord withthe courts below, I would hold th at a debtor’s valuation o f exempt propertycoun ts and becomes conclusive absent a timely objection. I Nadejda Reilly is a cook who operated a one-person catering bu siness. Unable to cov e r her debts, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition appending all required schedules and state m ents. Relevant here, her filings included a form captio ned “Schedule B - Personal Property,” which called for enumeration of “all p e rsonal property of the debtor of whatever k i n d

. ” Ap p
. 4 0 a
. O nt h a t all-encomp assing schedule, Reillylisted “business equip

ment,” i.e. , her kitchen equipment, witha cu rrent marke t value of $10 ,718. Id. , at49a. Reilly also filed the more particular form captione d “Schedule C - Property Claimed as Exempt.” Id. , at 5 6a.Schedule C contained four columns, the first headed “Description of Propert y”; the second, “SpecifyL a w Providi n g Each Exem ption”; the third, “Value of Claimed Exemp­3 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### tion”; and the fourth, “ C urrent M a rket Valu e of Proper ty Without Deducting E x emptions.” Id. , at 5 7a. Inthe firs t column of Schedule C, Reilly wrote, as she did in Schedule B’s descrip t ion-of-property colum n : “See att a ched list of business eq uipment.” Id. , at 58a. On the list appended to Schedules B and C, Re illy set out by hand a 31-item inventory of her restaurant-plus-catering-venture equipment

. Next to e a ch item, e.g ., “ D oughMixer,” “Gas stove, ” “H ood,” she specified, first, the purchase price and, next, “Today’s M a rket Value,” which added up to $ 10,718 for t h e entire inventory. Id. , at 51a–55a. 1 

### As the laws securing exemption of her kitchen equipment, Reilly specified in the second Schedul e C column, §552(d)(6), the exemption covering tra de tools, and §552(d)(5), the “wildca rd” exemption. Id. , at 58a. 2 

### I nt h e value-of-claimed-exemption colu mn, she l i sted $1,85 0, then the maximum trade-tools exemption, and $8,868, drawn from her wildcard exemption, amount s adding up to $10,718. Ibid. An d in the fourth, cur r ent-marke t

value, colu mn, she rec o rded $10,718, corresponding to the total marke tvalue she had set out in her inventory an d reported in Schedule B. Ibid. Before the 30-day clock on filing o bjections had begun to run, an appraiser told Schwab that Reilly’s equipment was worth a tleast $17,000. Brief for Petitioner 15; App. 164 a. Nevertheless, Schwab did not object to the $10,718 marke t value Reilly attribute dto her business equipment in

——————

1 Reilly’s Schedules B and C, and the inventory she atta ched to the forms, are rep r oduced in an Appendix to this opinion.

2 Unlike exemptions that de s cribe the specific property d e btors may preserve, e.g ., 11 U. S. C. §522(d)(6) (de b to rmayex empt h e r“ag g r eg ate in ter e st, n o t t oex c eed [$1,850] inv a lu e, inan yimplemen ts, pr ofessional book s, or tool[s] of [her] tr ade”), the “wildc a r d” ex emption per

mits a de btorto shieldher“ag g r eg ate inter e st in an ypr oper ty” she chooses, up to a stated dollar limit, §522(d)(5); In re S m ith , 640 F. 2 d 888, 89 1 (CA 7 198 1).4 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Schedule C and the a ttached in ventory. In stead, he a l

lowed the limitations period to lapse and then moved, unsuccessfully, for permission to sell the equipment at auction. Id. , at 141a–143a. 3 

### From Reilly’s filings, the Bankruptcy Judge found it evident that Reilly had claimed the property i t self, not its dollar value, as exempt. Id ., at 168 a–169a (“I know there ’ s an argument . . . that . . . the property identified as exempt is really the [valuation] column, [ i.e., $10,718,] but that’s not what th e forms say. The forms say property declare d as exempt and to see attached list. So, they’re exempting all the property.

. . . If the Trustee believes tha t

. . . all the property ca nnot be exempt, [he] should object to it.”). The Distric tCourt an d Court of Appeals similarly concluded that, by listing the identical amount, $10,718, as the property’s mark et value and the value of the claime d exemptions, Reilly had signaledher intention to safeguard all of h e r kitchen equipment from inclusion in the bankruptc yesta te. In re Reilly , 403 B. R. 336, 338–339 (MD Pa. 2006); In re Reilly, 534 F. 3d173, 178 (CA3 2008). Both courts looked to §522( l) and Federal Rule of Ban k

ruptcy Procedure 4003(b), which state, respectively: “The debtor shall file a list of property th at the debtor clai ms as exempt .

. . . Un less a partyin interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exem pt.” §522( l).

——————

3 Schwab informed Reilly at the meetin g of creditors that he planned to sell a ll of h e rbu sin e ss eq u i pmen t. App. 137a. Sh e pr omptlymov e d to dis m is s herbankr uptc y petition, s t at i n gthat her“business e q ui pment .

. . is necessary to he r livelih ood an d ar t, an d was a gi ft to h e r from herpa re nts

. ” Id. , at 138a. Sh e “d[id] n o t desir eto c o n t in u ewith the b a n kruptcy,” s h e a dded, b e ca us e “she wis h e[d] to continue in
res t a u ra nta n d ca t e ring a s her occ u pa t i on.” Ibid. The Bankruptcy Court denied Reilly’s dism i ssa l mo tion si multaneousl y with Schwab’s motion to sell Reilly’s equip m ent. Id. , at 149 a– 170 a.5 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### “A par t y in interest may file an obj e ction to the list of property cl aimed as exempt only within 30 days afterthe meeting of creditors held under §341(a) is concluded .

. . . The court may, for ca use, extend the time for filing objections if, befo re the time to object expires, a party in interest files a request for an extension.” Rule 4003(b). 4 

### Schwab ha ving filed no objection within the allowable 30 days, each of the tribunals below ruled that the entire inventory of Reilly’s business equipment qualifiedas exempt in full. App. 168a; 403 B. R., at 339; 534 F. 3d, at 178. The leading treatise onba nkruptcy, the Court of Appeals noted, id. , at 180, n. 4, is in accord: “Normally, if the debtor lists property as e x empt, that listingis interpreted as a cla i m for exemption of the debtor’s entire interest in the property, and the debtor’s valuation of that interes tis treated as the amount of the exemption claime d. Were i totherwise—that is, if the listing were c o nstrued to claim as exempt only that portion of the property having the value stated—the provisions fina lizing exemptions if no objection s are filed would be rendered meaningless. The trustee or creditor s could [anytime] claim that the debtor’s interest in the property was greater than the value claimed as exempt and [then] object to the debtor exempting his or her en tire interest in the property af t e r the deadline for objections had passed.” 9 Collier ¶4 003.02[1], pp. 4003–4 to 4003–5. Agreeing wi th the courts bel o w, I w o uld holdthat Reilly, by her precise identification of the exempt property, and her specification of $10,718 as both the cu rrent market value of h e r k i tchen equipmen t and the value of t h e

——————

4 In2008, th i s pr esc r i ptionwas r e c o difiedwith ou t ma t e r i al c h an g e an d desig n ate dRu le 4003(b) (1).6 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### claimed exemptions, had made her position plain: She claimed as exempt the listed property itself—not the dollar amount, up to $10,718, that sale of the property by Schwab mi ght yield. Because n e ither Schwab nor any creditor lodged a timely objection, the listed prope r t y became exempt, reclai med as property of the debtor, and therefore outside the bankruptcy estate the trustee is charged to administer. II A Pursuant to §522( l), Reilly filed a list of property she claimed as exempt from the estate-in-bankruptcy. Her filing left n o doubt that her exemption claim encompassed her entire inventory of kitchen equipment. Schwab, in fact, was fully aware of the nature of the claim Reilly asserted. At the meeting of cre d itors, Reilly reiterate d that she sought to kee p the equipment in her possession; she would rather discontinue the bankruptcy proceeding, she made plain, than lose her equ i pment. See supra , at 4,
n. 3. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) requires the trustee, if he contests the debtor’s exemption claim in whole or part, to file an objection within 30 days after the meeting of creditors. Absent a timely objection, “ t he propert yclaimed a s exempt .

. . is exempt.” §522( l); Ru le 4003. That prescription should be dispositiv e of this case. The Court holds, however, that Schwab was not obliged to file a ti mely objection to the exemption Reilly claimed, and indeedcould auction off her cooking equipment an ytime prior t o her discharge. In so holding, th e Court decrees that no objection need be made to a debtor’s valuation of her property. To support the conclusion that Rul e 4003’s ti mely objection requirement does not encompass the debtor’s estimation of her property’s mark et value, the Court homes in on the language of exemption prescri ptions that are subject to7 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### a monetary cap. 5

### Those prescripti o ns, the Court points out, “define the ‘property’ a debtor may ‘clai[m] as exempt’
as the de btor’s ‘interest’—up to a speci f ied dollar amount—in the assets described in the cate gory, no tas the assets themselves.” Ante , at 1 0

. So long as a debtor values her claimed exemption at a dollar a m ount below the statutory cap, the Court reasons, the claim is on-itsface permissible no matter the market value she ascribes to the asset. To evaluate the propriety of Reill y’s declared “interest” i nher kitch en equi pment, the Court concludes, Schwab was obliged promptly to inspect “th r ee, and only three, entries on Reilly’s Schedule C: the description of the business eq uipment .

. . ; the Code provisions governing the claimedexemptions; and the amounts Reilly li sted in the column titled ‘value of claimed exemption.’ ” Ante, at 12–13. 6

——————

5 Sec t ion522(d) c a talog s ex em ption s of two t y pes. M o st exemption s

— and all of tho s e Reilly invoked—place a m o netary limit on the value of the property the debtor may reclaim. See, e.g., §522(d)(2) ( “moto r v e h i c l e”); §522(d)(3) (“h o u s eh old fu r n ish i ng s, h o u s eh old g oods, wear ing appar e l, appl i a n c es, books, an imal s, c r o ps, ormu sic a l in str u men t s”); §522(d)( 4) (“je welr y” ). For c e r t ainex emption s n o t at i ssu e h e r e , the Ba nkrupt cy Code a u t h orizes recla m a t ion o f the property in full without any cap on value. See, e.g., §522(d)(7) (“u n m atu r ed life in su r a n c e c o n t r a c t”); §522(d)( 9 ) (“[p]r ofession allypr esc r ibed h e althaids”); §522(d)( 11)(A) (“awar d u n d era cr ime v i c t im’ s r e par a tionlaw”).

6 I ns u p p o r to f i t s v i e wt h a tm a r k e tv a l u ei s n o tr e l e v a n tt od e t e r m i n ing t h e “ p ropert y cla i m e d a s exem pt” fo rpu r p oses of Ru le 40 03(b)’ s timelyobjec t i o n mandate, t h e Cour t observ es that Sc hedule C did not
r e qu ir e th e debtorto list th is in for m ationu n t il 1991. Ante , at 14– 15

. Prior t o1 9 9 1 , however , deb t ors recorded m a rketva lue on adifferent
s c hedule. S ee Int e rimFed. Rule Bkrt cy. Proc. Officia l Form6 , S c he dule B–2 (1979) (requiring debtor to lis tthe “[m]ar ket v a lue of [her] interest [in personal property] with out deduction for .

. . exemptions
c l aimed”). T r ustees as ses s ingth e “property claimedas exempt,” therefore, have always been able, from the face of the de b t or’s filings, to compare the value of the claimed exem pti o n to the prop erty’s declared market value. See Brief for Nation al Ass o cia t ion of Cons umer Ba nkrupt cy At t o rn eys eta l . a s Amici Curiae34.8 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### B The Court’s account, ho wever, shuts from sight the vita l part playedby the fourth entry o nSchedule C—cur r ent mark et value—when a capped exemption is claimed. A debtor who estimates a mark et value below the cap, andlists an identical amount as the value of her claimed exemption, thereby signals that her aim is to keep the listed property i nher possession, outside the estate-inbankruptcy. In contrast, a debtor who estimates a market value abovethe cap, and above the value of her claimed exemption, thereby recognizes that she cannot shelter th e property itself and that the trustee may seekto sell it for whatever it is worth. 7 

### Schedule C’s final colu mn, in other words, alerts the trustee whether the debtor i s claiming a right to ret a in the listed propert yitself as her own, a righ t secured to her if the trustee files no timely obj e ction. 8 

### Because an asset’s market value is key to determining

——————

7 By aut h o r i z ing exemptio n of assets th at a debtorwou l d wa n tto keep in kin d , su ch as her jew e lry a n d car, but limiti n g t h e exemptible
v a lue of t h is pr oper ty, C o ngr e ss st r u ck a balanc e b e t w een debtor s’
an d cr editor s’ in terests: Debtor s c a n r e c l aim items h e lpfu l to t h ei r fr es h sta r t afterba n k ru pt cy , bu t on ly if those items are of mo dest
v a lue. Assets of la rg er worth, however, ar e s u bjec t to liquidati on s o that credit ors may obtain a port i o n o f the item’s val u e
. Cf. In re Pr i c e , 370 F. 3d 362 , 378 (CA3 200 4) (“[B]a n k ruptcylaw is bil a ter a l , replet e with pr ot ec ti on s an d poli cy c o n s i d er ations fav o r i ngbot h debtor s an d
cr editor s
. ”).

8 The significance of market value is what differentiate s capped exemptions fro muncapped ones that per m it de btors to exempt certain property in kind regardless of its worth. See supra , at 7, n

. 5. Fo r uncapped exe m ptions, the nature of the property thedebtor has r e cla i m e d is clea r: If t h eexe m pt ion is vali d, the debtor gets the asset in full every time. For cappe d exemptio ns , howeve r, ma rket va lue is a cru cia lcom p onentin det e rm ining wh ether the debtor gets the ite m itself or a su m of money re presentinga share of the ite m ’s liquidatio n v a lu e. Readin gBan k ru ptc yRu le 4003(b) to r e qu ir e objec t ion s to
va lua t ion thus does not, a s the Court cont ends , “ elid[e] th e distinction” between capp ed and uncapped exempti o ns, ante , at 12 (emph a s i s added), but instead accounts forthat distinction.9 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### the charact e r of the interest the debtor is asserting in tha t asset, Rule 4003(b) is properly rea dto require objections to valuation within 30 days, just as the Rule req u ires timely objections t o the debtor’s descripti o n of the property, th e asserted legal basis for the exemption, and the claimed value of th e exemption. See 4 C o llier ¶52 2

. 05[1], p. 522– 28 (rev. 15th ed. 2005) (“[T]o ev aluate the propriety of thedebtor’s claim of exemption,” trustees need the information in all four columns of Schedule C; “[market] value” is “essential” to judging whether th e claim is proper because “[e]xemption provisions often are limited according to .

. . [the property’s] value.”). 9 

### C

Requiring objections to market val uation notably facilitates the debtor’s fresh start, and thus best fulfills th e prime purpose of the exemption prescriptions. See, e.g., Burlingh am v. Crous e , 228 U. S. 459, 473 (1913) (Bankruptc ypro v isions “must be construed” in light of policy “to give the bankrupt a fresh start. ”). See also Rouseyv.

——————

9 Suggesting that this inte r p r e tationof Ru l e400 3(b) “l ac ks sta t u t or y support,” ante , at 13, n

. 11, th e Cou r t r e peatedlyemph asize s th at th e Bankruptcy Code defines th e “property claimed as exe m pt,” to which a tr ustee mus t objec t , a s “ t he debtor’s ‘inte r est’—up to a specified dol l ar a m ount—in the a s s e ts describ e d in [ c apped exemptio n] categor[ies] ,” ante , at 10; se e, e.g
. , ante , a t 11; ibid. , n. 9; ante , at 21, n
. 19. Bu t th e commonly understood definition of a pr oper ty“inter est” is “[ a] leg a l share in something; all or p a rt of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property.

. . . Collective l y, th e word includes any aggregation of [su c h ] r i gh ts.” Blac k’ s Law Dic t ion a r y828 (8thed. 2 004). Sc h w ab , therefore, co ul d not comprehend whether Reilly clai meda monet a ry or an in-kind “inter est” in her kitc he n equip m ent without c o mpar ingher market valuation of the equipment to the value of he r cl aimed exemption. See supra , at 8– 9. I nlin e withth e statu t or yt e x t , a debtor ’ s market valuat ion is an e ssen t ial f a ct orin d e ter m iningthe natur eof the “inter est” a de btorlis ts a s e x empt. Bankr u ptc y“for ms, r u les, tr eatis e excerpts, and policy considerations,” ante , at 7, n. 5, corroborate, rather than c o nflic t with, this r e adingof the Code.10 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Jacoway , 544 U. S. 320, 325 (200 5); United Sta t esv. Sec u rity Industrial Bank , 4 59 U. S. 70, 72, n. 1 (1 982); ante , at 19. The 3 0 -day deadline for objections, this Court has recognized, “prompt[s] parties to act and .

. . produce[s] finality.” Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz , 503 U. S. 638, 644 (1992). As “there can be no possibility of further objecti on to the exemptions” after this period elapses, the principal bankruptcy treatise observes, “i f the debtor is not yet i n possessi on of the property claimed as exempt, it should be turned ove rto [her] at this tim e to effectuate fully t h e fresh start purpose of the exemptions.” 9 Colli er ¶4003.03[3], p. 4003–13. With the b e nefit of closure, and t h e certaint yit b r ings, the debtor may, at the end of the 30 days, plan for her future secure in the knowle dge that the possession s sh e has exempted in their entirety are hers to k e ep. See53 4 F. 3d, at 18 0. If she has reclaimed her car from the estate, for example, she may accept a job not within walkin g distance. See Brief for National Association of Consumer Bankru ptc yAttorneys et al. as Amici Curi ae2–3 (hereinafter NACBA Brief). Or if she has exempted her kitch e n equipment, she may launch a new catering venture. See App. 138a (Reilly “wis he[d] to continue in restaurant and catering as her occupa tion” postbankruptcy.). By permitti ng trustees to challeng e a debtor’s valuation of exempted property anytime before discharge, the Court casts a cloud of uncertainty over the debtor’s use of ass e ts reclaimed in full. If th e trustee ga ins a different opinion of an item’s value months, even years, after th e debtor ha s filed her bankruptcy petition, 10

### he may seek to repossess the asset, auction it off, and hand the debtor a check fo r

——————

10 Sc h w ab states th at “[c ] ases i nwh i c hth er e ar e asset s to a d min i ster

. . . c a n take ‘one to four y e ar s’ to c o mplete.” Br ief for Petitioner32 (quoting Dept. of Jus t ice, U. S

. Tr ustee Program, Preliminary Report o n Ch apter7 Ass e t Case s 19 94 to 200 0, p. 7 (Ju n e2001)).11 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### the dollar a m ount of h e r claimed exemption. 11 

### With this threat looming until discharge, “[h]ow ca n debtors reasonably be expected to restructu re their affairs”? NACBA Brief 25. See In re P o lis , 217 F. 3d 899, 903 (CA7 200 0) (Posner, J.) (“If the as sets sought to be exempted by the debtor were not valued at a da te early in the bankruptcy proceeding, neither th e debtor n o r the cre ditors woul d know who h a d the rightto them.”). III The Court and Sch w a b raise three concerns about reading Rule 4 003 to requ ire timely objection to the debtor’s estimate of an exempt asset’s mark et value: Would trustees face a nuntoward administrative burden? Wou ld trustees lack fair notice of the need to object? And would debtors be tempted to undervalue their property in an effort to avoid the monetary cap on exemptions? In my judgment, a ll three questions should be answered no. A The Court s u ggests tha trequiring timely objections to a debtor’s valuation of e x empt property would saddle trustees with a nunmanageable load. See ante , a t18 (declin

ing to “expand .

. . the universe of information an inter

ested party must consi d er in eval uating the validity of a claimed exemption”). See also Brief for Petitioner 32–33; Brief for United State s as Amicus Curiae 24

. 12 

### But trus­

——————

11 M o n e yg e n e rated byli qu id ationof ana sset wil lofte nbe of less utility to a de btor, who will have to pay more to replace the item. See H. R. Rep. No. 95 –59 5, p. 1 2 7 (1 977) (n otin gth at “h ou seh o ld g oods h av e little r e s a le v a lue” but “r ep lac e mentcosts of the goods are gene rally high”).

12 This conce r n i s questionab le in light of the prevailing p r actice, for,
as e a rlier noted, valuationobjections a r e the mos t common Rule 400 3(b) c h alle n g e. See su pra , at 2. By loppin goff v a lu ationdisag r ee ments fr om the timelyobje c t ion requirement, see, e. g
. , an t e , at 10–11 , n. 8 , th e Court so sev e r e lysh r i n k s th e Rule’ s r e alm tha tthis ques tio n12 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### tees, sooneror later, m u st attemp tto ascer t ain the mar k et value of exempted assets. They must do so to determine whether sale of the it ems would lik ely produce surplus proceeds for the estate above the value of the claimed exemption, see §704(a)( 1 ); the only question, th en, is when this marketvaluation must occur

— (1) withi n30 days or (2) at any time before discharge? Removing valuation from Rule 4 003’s governance thus does little t o reduce the labors trustees must undertake. The 30-day objection p e riod, I note, does not impose on trustees any additional duty, but rather guides the exercise of existing respo n sibiliti e s; under Rule 4003(b), a trustee must rank eval uation of the debtor’s exemptions as a priority item in his superintendence of the estate. 13

### An d if the trus t ee entertains any doubtabout the accurac yof a debtor’s estimation of mark et value, the p r ocedure for interposing objections is hardly arduous. The trustee need only file with the cour t a si mple declaration stating th at an item’s value exceeds the amount listed by the debtor. 14

—————— ar ises: Wh yar e tr u s tees g r an ted a full 30 days to lo dge objections? Underthe Cour t’ s r e ading of the Ru le, trustees need only compare a debtor ’ s Sc hed u le C to the te x tof the exemption prescriptions to asse ss an exemption claim’s facia lvalidit y, with no furthe r investigation
nec e ssar y
. That c o mpar isonshould take no mor ethan minutes, sur e ly not amonth.

13 Trus tees , it b e a r s noting, historica lly had v a luation dut i e s far more onerous than they have today. Ru le 400 3’ s pr edec es s o r req u ired tr ustees in the fir s t insta n c e , r a th er th an debtors, to estimate the
mar k et v a lu e of pr oper tyc l aimed as ex e m pt. See Ru l e403(b) (19 7 5 )

. Tr ustees had to pr ov ide this v a luation to the c o ur t within 15 day s o f theirappointment. See ibid.

14 The leading b a nkruptcy t r e a tise supplies an illustrativ evaluation objection:

“[Name of Trustee] , the duly qualifiedand acti ng trustee of the estate of the debtor, would show the court the following:

“1. The deb t o ris not entit l e dunder[the automobile ex e m ption] to an in ter e st of mor eth an$3,225 inanau tomobile. Th e au tomobile c l ai me d bydebtoras ex empt . . . h a s a v a lu e su bsta n t iallyg r eaterth an$3,225.13 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### If the trustee needs more than 30 days to ass e ss market value, moreover, the time period is eminently extendable. Rule 4003(b) prescribes that a tru stee may, for cause, as k the courtfor an ex tension of the objection peri od. Alterna

tively, the trustee can postpone the conclusion of t h e meeting of creditors, from whichthe 30-day clock run s , simply by adjourning the meeting to a future date. Rule 2003(e). A trustee also may examine the debtor under oath at the creditors’ m eeting, Rule 2003(b)(1); if he gathers information impugning her exemption claims, he ma y ask the bankruptcy co urt to ho ld a hearing to determine valuation issues, Rule 4003(c). See Taylor , 503 U. S., at 644 (“If [th e trustee] did not know the value of [a claimed exemption], he could have sought a hearing on the issue

. . . or .
. . asked the Bankrup tcy Court for an extension of time to object.”). See a l so NACBA Brief 19, 2 1–23 (listing ways trustees may enlarge the limitation s period f o r objections). Trustees, in sum, have ample mechanisms at their disposal to gain the time and information they need to lodge objections to valuation. B On affording trustees fair notice of the need to object, the Court emphasizes that a debtor must list her claimed exemptions “in a manner that makes the scope of the exemption clear.” Ante , at 20. If a debtor wishes to exempt prope rtyin its en tirety, forexample, the Court counsels her to write “full fair ma rket value (FMV)” or “100% of FMV” in Schedule C’s value-of-claimed-exemption colum n
.

——————



### . . . . . “WHEREFOR E Trustee pray s that the court determine that deb t or is not entitled to

. . . the ex em ptio[n] c l aime d byhim, tha tthe [pr o per t y claimed as exempt] which [i s] disal l ow ed be tur n ed ov erto the t r ustee herein as property of the estate, a n d tha the have s u ch other a n d fu r t h e rr e lief as i s ju st.” 13 A Coll ier§CS 17.14, p. C S 1 7–2 2 (r ev . 15t h ed. 2009). See also Ru les 9 0 13– 90 14.14 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Ante , at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 6 –7, 26–29; In re Hyma n , 967 F. 2d 1316, 1319–1320, n. 6 (CA9 1992) (Trustees must be ab le to assess the validity of an exemption from the face of a debtor’s sch e dules.). Our decision in Taylor v. Freeland& Kronz , the Court notes, is instr u ctive. In Taylor , the debtor reco rded the te rm “$ unkn own” as the value of a claimed ex emption, which, the Court observes, raised a “warning fl a[g]” becau s e the valu e “was notplainly within the limits the Code all o ws.” Ante , at 17. True, a deb t or’s schedu les mu st gi ve notice s u fficient to cue the trustee that an objection may be in order. But a “warning fl ag” is in the eye of the beholder: If a debtor lists identical amounts as the mark et value of exempted property and the value of her claimed exemption, she has, on the face of her sched ules , reclaimed the entire asset jus t as surely as if she had recorded “100% of FMV” in Sch e dule C’s value-of-claim ed-exemption column. See Brief for Respondent 36. See also 9 Collier ¶4003.03[3], p. 4003–14 (“ Only when a debtor’s schedules specifically value the debtor’s interest in the property at an amount highertha n the amount claimed as exempt can it be argued that a part of the debtor’s intere st in property has not been exempted.” (emphasis added)). In this case, by specifying $10,71 8 as both the curren t mark et value of her kitchen equipment and the value of her claimed exemptions, Reilly gave notice that she had reclaimed the listed property in full. See supra , at 2–6. To borrow the Court’s termin ology, Reilly waved a “warning flag” th at should have prompted Schwab to object if he believed th e equipmen t could not be reclaim e d in its en tirety because its val u e exceede dthe statutory cap. 534 F. 3d, at 179. See 4 Collier ¶522.0 5 [2][b], p. 522–33 (“Normally, if a debtor lists an asset as having a particul a r value in th e schedules and then exempts that value, t h e schedules s h ould be read as a claim of exemp t ion for the15 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### entire asset, to whichthe t r ustee should object if the trustee beli eves the ass e t has been undervalued.”). Training its attention on trustees’ needs, moreover, the Court overlook s the debtor’s p light. As jus tnoted, th e Court coun sels debtors wishing to exempt an asset in fu ll to write “100% of FMV” or “full FMV” in the value-o f

claimed-exemption column. But a debtor following the instructions that accompany Sch e dule C would consider such a response nonsensical, for those instructions direc t her to “stat e the dollar value of the claimed e x emption in the space provided.” Fed. RuleBkrtc y. Proc. Official For m 6, Schedul e C, Instruction 5 (1991) (emphasis added). Chapter 7 debtors are often unre p resented. How a r e th ey to know they must ignore Schedule C’s inst ructions and employ the “warning fl ag” describ e d today by the Court, if they wish to trigger t h e trust ee’s obligation to object to their market valuation in atim e ly fashion ? See Inre Anderson , 377 B. R. 865, 875 ( B krtcy. App. Panel CA6 2007). 15 

### C Schwab fin a lly urges that requiring timely objections to a debtor’s mark et-value estimati ons “would give debtors a perverse incentive to game the s y stem by undervaluing their assets.” Brief for Petitioner 35; see Brief for United States as Ami c u sC u r i a e27. The Court rejected an argu

ment along these lines in Taylor , and should follow suit here. Multiple meas ures, Taylor explained, discourage undervaluation of property claimed as exempt. 503 U. S. ,

——————

15 Tr u s tees, incon t r a st, ar e r e peat play er s i nban kr u p tc y c o u r t; if th is Cour t r e quir ed timelyobjec t ions to ma rket va lua t ion, trus tees would,
no doubt, m o dify their practices in response. See 1 Collier ¶8.06[1][c ][ii], p. 8–75 (r ev . 15thed. 200 9) ( “ Sin c e Taylor[v. Fre e land & Kronz , 503 U. S. 638 (19 92) ], tr u s tees r a relyfail to c l oselysc r u tin i ze vague exemption claims.”). Moreove r , because valuatio n objections a r e already the n o rm, see supra , at2, an d 1 1 , n
. 12, few tr u s tees wou l d have to adjus ttheir behavior

.16 SCHWA B v. REILLY

G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### at 644. A m o n gth o s e m e a s u r e s : Th e d e b t o rfi l e s h e r exemption cla i m und er pena lty of perj ury. See Rule 1008

. Sh e risks j u dic i al sanct i onfor sig n in g docum e nt s not we l l ground ed in f a ct. Ru le 9 011

. And p r oo f of frau d subj ects her to cr iminal pr os ec ut ion, 18 U. S. C. §1 52 ; extends the limitat i ons per i odfor filing objections to Sch e dule C, Rul e 4 003 (b ); an d au th o r i z e s de ni al of di scharge, 11 U. S. C

. §727(a)(4)(B). See also NACBA Brief 29–3 3 (det ailing add i t i ona l ch eck s aga i n s t inadequ a te or inacc u rat e fil i ng s). Furthermore, the obje ction procedure is its e lf asafeguard a g ainst debtor undervaluation. If a trustee sus

pects that the mark et value of pro p erty claimed as exem pt may exceed a debtor’s estimate , he should do just what Rule 4003(b) prescribes: “[F]ile anobjection .

. . within 30 days after t h e meeting of creditors.” * * * For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Third Circuit’s judgment.G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 17 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.


### APPENDIXG IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 18 SCHWA B v. REILLY
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 19 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 20 SCHWA B v. REILLY
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 21 Cite as: 56 0 U

. S. ____ (2010)
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 22 SCHWA B v. REILLY
Appendix to opinion of G IN S B U R G , J.