Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed January 19, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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Nos. 3D21-0019, 3D21-123 & 3D21-124

Lower Tribunal No. 14-0944

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IMC Group, LLC and 

InterAmerican Medical Center Group, LLC,

Appellants/Appellees,

vs.

Outar Investment Company, LLC, 

Appellee/Appellant.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark 

Blumstein, Judge.

Herrera Law Firm, P.A., and Jose-Trelles Herrera, for 

appellants/appellees.

Hernandez Lee Martinez, LLC, and Jermaine A. Lee and Eric 

Hernandez, for appellee/appellant.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and HENDON, JJ. 
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PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Outar Investment Company, plaintiff 

below, appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of defendant 

below, InterAmerican Medical Center Group, LLC, on its claim for breach of 

contract and declaratory judgment. In turn, InterAmerican appeals final 

judgment on the pleadings on its claim for specific performance. Lastly, 

InterAmerican and non-party IMC Group, LLC appeal the trial court’s denial 

of IMC Group’s motion to substitute as a real party in interest or, alternatively, 

motion to intervene.1 We affirm. 

In 2013, InterAmerican contracted to purchase the commercial 

shopping center it was subletting from Outar. In exchange for $1.55 million, 

Outar agreed to deliver marketable title. In the event InterAmerican 

breached, the parties agreed that Outar could either terminate the contract 

and retain the deposit of $5,000 as liquidated damages or seek specific 

performance. After the parties failed to close, Outar filed suit against 

InterAmerican. 

In its operative complaint, Outar asserted a claim for breach of contract 

for actual damages and declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages 

1 “An order denying a motion to intervene is final as to the movant and 

appealable by the movant.” F.Y.E.S. Holdings, Inc. v. House Golden Rule, 

LLC, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1157 (Fla. 3d DCA May 19, 2021).
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provision of $5,000 was unconscionably low and therefore unenforceable.2 

In its operative answer, InterAmerican asserted a compulsory counterclaim 

for specific performance. However, the counterclaim did not expressly state 

that Outar had breached. 

In 2014, InterAmerican moved for summary judgment on Outar’s 

complaint. At the hearing, the trial court noted that the only issue for it to 

resolve was whether the liquidated damages provision was enforceable, 

stating:

There’s a clause in the contract that provides for remedies 

upon a buyer defaulting or not going forward with the contract 

that provides for either payment of the deposit of $5,000.00 or 

specific performance . . . . And the Defendant, at this point, has 

admitted that Plaintiff may seek specific performance. So, the 

issue is, is the $5,000.000 a penalty—well, not is it a penalty, but 

is it unconscionably low? 

Both parties assented to the trial court’s recitation of the issue. The 

trial court held that the provision was not unconscionable and entered final 

summary judgment in favor of InterAmerican.3

 

2 Outar initially sought damages and specific performance. But after 

InterAmerican amended its answer to the complaint and admitted Outar was 

entitled to specific performance, Outar amended its complaint and dropped 

its claim for specific performance.

3 Outar appealed the trial court’s ruling which this Court dismissed as 

premature because InterAmerican’s counterclaim was pending below. Outar 

Inv. Co., LLC v. InterAmerican Med. Ctr. Grp., LLC, 300 So. 3d 617 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2019).
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In 2019, IMG Group moved to substitute as the real party in interest or 

to intervene pursuant to a 2016 assignment agreement with InterAmerican. 

There is no transcript of that hearing for our review. 

Then in December 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Outar’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings on InterAmerican’s counterclaim for 

specific performance. The trial court granted the motion because 

InterAmerican’s counterclaim failed to allege that Outar had breached. The 

parties all timely appealed.

We affirm without further discussion the trial court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of InterAmerican. See Volusia County v. 

Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) 

(“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).

We also affirm the trial court’s order granting Outar judgment on the 

pleadings on InterAmerican’s counterclaim for specific performance because 

it failed to allege a breach. “The standard of review for an order granting a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings is de novo. This is the same legal test 

that governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.” Buade 

v. Terra Grp., LLC, 259 So. 3d 219, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citations 

omitted). “Upon a breach of contract by the buyer on his contract to 
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purchase land, the seller generally has two alternative remedies available: 

1) he may sue to compel specific performance and, as an incident to such 

relief, may be awarded damages for the injuries he has suffered or 2) he may 

retain the property and sue for breach of contract.” Frank Silvestri, Inc. v. 

Hilltop Devs., Inc., 418 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). To assert 

either claim, a buyer must adequately plead: “(1) a valid contract; (2) a 

material breach; and (3) damages.” Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 985 

So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The record before us clearly 

demonstrates that InterAmerican failed to allege a breach, so its 

counterclaim for specific performance fails as a matter of law. 

Lastly, because there is no transcript for our review, we cannot say 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying IMC Group’s motion to 

intervene. See Charry v. Torres, 263 So. 3d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); 

Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) 

(“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption 

of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.”). 

Affirmed.