United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 23-1496, 23-1497

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOEL DUDLEY,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Rikelman, Lynch, and Howard,

Circuit Judges.

Luke Rosseel, with whom Rosseel Law was on brief, for 

appellant.

Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee.

April 29, 2024
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Appellant Joel Dudley challenges 

the 2023 revocation of his supervised release and his sentence of 

two terms of two years of incarceration, to be served 

consecutively, followed by supervised release for life. The 

revocation at issue is the second revocation from his prior 

convictions in 2014 for possession of child pornography and making 

a false declaration before the court. See United States v. Dudley, 

804 F.3d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 2015). This revocation was based on 

the district court's finding that he had violated five conditions 

of his supervised release, including by sharing images of himself 

sexually abusing his daughter C.D. when she was approximately four 

years old and engaging in sexual contact with, exchanging sexually 

explicit messages with, and receiving and possessing a 

pornographic video of C.D. when she was seventeen years old. We 

hold that the district court judge did not err or abuse his 

discretion in revoking Dudley's supervised release and that 

Dudley's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable and 

affirm. 

I.

We "must interpret the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government" when reviewing a finding that a 

defendant has violated the terms of his supervised release under 

the clear error standard. United States v. Oquendo-Rivera, 586 

F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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A. 2014 Original Criminal Conviction

In August 2012, agents from U.S. Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) found two CDs containing child pornography at 

Dudley's residence in Westbrook, Maine, while executing a search 

warrant based on information that someone at that address was 

sharing child pornography files online. Dudley, 804 F.3d at 508-

09. In an interview with the HSI agents, Dudley admitted to

downloading 500-600 child pornography videos. When asked "whether 

he had ever videotaped or photographed local children," Dudley 

"stated that he had taken a picture of his daughter in the bathtub" 

and "that he had made the picture a 'hidden' file on his computer." 

He was arrested and indicted on one count of possession of child 

pornography. Id. at 509. Before trial, Dudley filed a motion to 

suppress statements he made to the HSI agents. Id. He testified 

at the hearing on his motion. Id. The district court denied the 

motion, and the government further charged Dudley with one count 

of making a false declaration before the court based on his 

testimony at the suppression hearing. Id.

Dudley was found guilty on both counts at two separate 

jury trials. Id. Although the guideline range was 235 to 293 

months, the district court sentenced him to a lesser total combined 

sentence of ninety-six months, followed by ten years of supervised 
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release,1 after expressing the concern that a long prison sentence 

would leave a then-young Dudley "hardened to [his] prior conduct"

and that it "may well increase the likelihood of recidivism."

Dudley appealed, contesting the district court's denial of his 

motion to suppress in the possession matter and arguing that the 

court erred by allowing the government to play two short video 

excerpts obtained from Dudley containing child pornography for the 

jury during the trial. Id. at 508, 515-16. This court affirmed 

his conviction, rejecting both arguments. Id. at 515, 518, 520.

On April 20, 2019, Dudley was sent to a residential 

reentry center ("RRC") in Portland, Maine, to finish serving his 

initial period of imprisonment. Dudley was returned to the Bureau 

of Prisons after RRC staff seized from him a cell phone containing

two images of nude prepubescent minors and a typed document 

describing in graphic detail Dudley sexually abusing his three 

minor daughters. 

B. 2019 First Supervised Release

On July 19, 2019, Dudley was placed on supervised 

release. Within two months he violated the conditions of his 

release by failing to update his sex offender registration, as 

1 This sentence was imposed for Dudley's possession 

of child pornography conviction. He was also sentenced to sixty 

months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release 

on his perjury conviction, to be served concurrently with the 

possession conviction. 
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required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act,

and having other individuals access the internet on his behalf in 

violation of the Computer and Internet Monitoring Program. Based 

on this information, Michael Barker, Dudley's probation officer at 

the time, filed a petition to revoke Dudley's supervised release 

on September 23, 2019. Barker testified that Dudley's ex-wife had

told him that Dudley had attempted to contact their daughter C.D., 

then age fourteen, while at the RRC in order to get her to "meet 

up" with him, even though Barker had informed Dudley that he was 

not allowed to have any face-to-face contact with his minor 

children. Barker also testified that a Department of Health and 

Human Services investigation was "able to substantiate that Mr. 

Dudley abused his daughter by forcing her to watch child 

pornography." Dudley's supervised release was revoked at a 

November 13, 2019, hearing, and he was sentenced to fifteen months 

in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. 

C. 2020 Second Supervised Release

On October 16, 2020, Dudley was once again placed on 

supervised release after serving this additional sentence. On 

September 12, 2022, Dudley's new probation officer Kate Phillips 

petitioned to revoke his supervised release for the second time

after learning that Dudley had unapproved contact with C.D., then

age seventeen; had exchanged sexually explicit messages with her;

and had been using an unreported cell phone number and Facebook 
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account under a false name. On the morning of September 12, 2022, 

Dudley informed Phillips that C.D. had spent the night with him in 

his camper after she had a violent altercation with her mother. 

Also on September 12, 2022, C.D.'s mother showed Phillips messages 

on C.D.'s cell phone that Dudley had sent to C.D. via Facebook 

Messenger under the alias "John Smith" using an unreported cell

phone. In these messages, which date to as early as September 8, 

2022, Dudley discussed viewing inappropriate sexual photos and

videos of C.D. and his desire to engage in digital penetration, 

oral sex, and intercourse with his daughter.

On September 14, 2022, after learning that Dudley had 

instructed his then-girlfriend Roxann Arnett to give C.D. his

unreported cell phone, law enforcement authorities recovered the

cell phone from C.D. The cell phone was logged into two Facebook 

accounts, one belonging to "John Smith," which was linked to the

sexual messages. Also on September 14, 2022, officers from the 

probation office and HSI searched Dudley's camper, truck, and 

primary residence and discovered additional unreported electronic 

devices, including a tablet. 

On January 5, 2023, Phillips filed an amended petition 

to revoke Dudley's supervised release. The amended petition

charged Dudley with additional violations after a forensic 

examination of Dudley's and C.D.'s cell phones revealed a video of 

a minor who appeared to be C.D. masturbating, and reports by a
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cooperating witness ("CW") revealed that Dudley had shown the CW

images of himself sexually abusing C.D. as a young child in March 

2022, and that the CW had witnessed Dudley engaging in

inappropriate sexual contact with C.D. in April 2022.

D. 2023 Revocation Challenged on Appeal

Dudley's revocation hearing took place on June 5, 8, and 

12, 2023. The CW testified on June 5, 2023, as described below. 

The CW and Dudley had become friends while they were participating 

in a sex offender treatment group in Maine in 2021. At the time 

of the hearing, the CW had pled guilty in the Maine federal 

district court to one count of possession of child pornography and 

had signed a cooperation agreement with the government, and he 

testified in the hope of receiving a lesser sentence for this 

crime. 

In the spring of 2022, Dudley showed the CW photos stored

in a "locked," password-protected file on his tablet which depicted

Dudley sexually abusing C.D. when she was approximately four years 

old. Dudley told the CW "the story about what he was doing" as he 

showed him "[e]ach picture." Dudley also told the CW to take his 

electronic devices for him "when his probation officer would show 

up" so that she wouldn't find the images. Later that spring, the 

CW went to the Maine Mall with Dudley. The men went inside the 

mall, met C.D., and then all three returned to Dudley's van. In

the van, Dudley "started touching [C.D.]'s breasts" and "put his 
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hand underneath her dress and said, oh, I don't see no underwear 

on you." C.D. then "said my mom went and took me and put me on 

birth control," and Dudley said, "oh, okay." At that point, the 

CW left the van and waited outside for half an hour. When the CW 

returned, C.D. left the van. The CW asked Dudley "did you have 

fun," and Dudley "said[] yeah." 

Dudley testified in his own defense at the revocation 

hearing and denied that he possessed the unreported cell phone or 

tablet, claiming they were exclusively used by Arnett for their 

business, although admitting the cell phone was registered in his 

name. Dudley denied that he used the "John Smith" Facebook account 

to contact C.D. but admitted that he attempted to contact C.D. 

through Facebook Messenger before his probation conditions 

prohibited such contact and that he did not receive a reply. He 

also denied that he had ever shown the CW child pornography or 

engaged in sexual activity with any minors, including his daughter. 

On June 12, 2023, the district court found that the 

government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Dudley had violated five conditions of his supervised release.2 

2 In addition to the violations Dudley contests on 

appeal, the court found that Dudley had violated the conditions of 

his supervised release by having unapproved contact with a minor 

(C.D.), using and possessing unapproved electronic devices, 

failing to update the State of Maine Sex Offender registry about 

his employment change within three business days, operating a 

vehicle without a valid driver's license and resisting arrest, 

communicating with a felon without prior permission, and testing 
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During sentencing, Dudley allocuted on his own behalf and stated 

"whatever [the CW] has said about me is a lie" and "I don't know 

anything about the John Smith texts." The court revoked Dudley's 

supervised release for the second time and sentenced him to the 

statutory maximum of two terms of two years of incarceration to be 

served consecutively, followed by supervised release for life.3 

Dudley timely appeals, challenging the court's findings

that he had shown child pornography to the CW in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (a Grade A violation), that he had engaged 

in sexual contact with C.D. in his van in violation of Me. Stat. 

tit. 17-A, § 260(1)(G) (a Grade C violation), and that he had 

received and possessed child pornography of seventeen-year-old 

positive for marijuana. He does not challenge these findings on 

appeal.

3 The maximum prison term that a court may impose at 

supervised release revocation is set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3) and is based on the class of the defendant's 

underlying offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Dudley was convicted 

under Docket 2:13-CR-116 of a Class D felony and Docket 2:13-CR04 of a Class C felony, and accordingly could be sentenced to up 

to two years imprisonment on each docket. Under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(h), the court may also impose a term of supervised release 

to follow imprisonment after revocation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). 

For Docket 2:13-CR-116, the maximum term of supervised release 

that could be imposed was twenty-one months, less the term of 

imprisonment imposed for the revocation, and for Docket 2:13-CR04, the maximum term of supervised release that could be imposed 

was life. 
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C.D. on his unreported cell phone in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (5)(B) (a Grade A violation). 

II.

"We review the district court's ultimate decision to 

revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion, and the 

underlying finding of a violation of supervised release for clear 

error." United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2016). 

Clear error is an "'exceedingly deferential'" standard of review, 

and a reviewing court "will not 'disturb either findings of fact 

or conclusions drawn therefrom unless the whole of the record 

compels a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made.'" 

United States v. Munera-Gomez, 70 F.4th 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2023) 

(quoting United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir. 

2003)). 

A.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that 

Dudley had violated his supervised release based on the evidence 

presented and did not abuse its discretion in revoking his term of 

supervised release. First, the court did not clearly err by 

crediting the CW's testimony. "[I]t is always permissible for a 

judge, acting in his capacity as a factfinder, to use his knowledge 

and experience to assess the credibility of witnesses and to 

evaluate the evidence." United States v. Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10, 

19 (1st Cir. 2023). Credibility determinations may be reversed 
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only when the reviewing court is "definitely and firmly convinced 

that a mistake has been made." United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 

962 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. OquendoRivera, 750 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2014)). While a credibility 

determination may be clearly erroneous where "objective evidence 

. . . contradict[s] the witness'[s] story; or the story . . . [is] 

internally inconsistent or implausible on its face," OquendoRivas, 586 F.3d at 67 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 

U.S. 564, 575 (1985)), a credibility determination based on live 

testimony that is "not internally inconsistent, can virtually 

never be clear error," United States v. Rivera-Carrasquillo, 933 

F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575)),

because the district court "judge heard the witnesses from both 

sides and eyed their manner," id. The record well supports the 

district court's findings.

Here, the CW's testimony is corroborated by other 

evidence that Dudley sexually abused C.D. both when she was a young 

child and a teenager, including C.D.'s aunt's testimony that C.D. 

had told her that Dudley sexually assaulted C.D. when she was 

"about eight years old" and "when he got out of jail," C.D.'s 

written statement that "my father. . . . hurt me as a child and I 

don't want anything to do with him" (emphasis added), and messages 
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Dudley sent to his daughter under the alias John Smith,4 which 

reference C.D. not remembering "some of the things that we did 

growing up," and in-person contact between Dudley and C.D. in 

September 2022. 

The CW's testimony is neither inconsistent nor 

implausible. Dudley has fallen far short of "definitely and firmly 

convinc[ing]" us "that a mistake has been made." See MendozaMaisonet, 962 F.3d at 16 (quoting Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d at 16). 

Further, Dudley's argument that the CW was motivated to falsely 

testify against Dudley "to decrease his sentence in his own 

criminal case" both fails to undermine the credibility finding and 

is itself implausible. The CW informed his probation officer, 

4 While Dudley has repeatedly denied that he sent the 

John Smith messages, the government provided ample evidence that 

he did. Dudley used this alias during a phone call with the South 

Portland Police Department on September 11, 2022, during which he 

told the police that he was on his way to pick up his daughter, 

C.D. Phillips also found sexual messages that were from "John 

Smith" on a tablet recovered from Dudley's property and that were 

sent from a Facebook account logged into on his cell phone. The 

verified phone number connected with the John Smith Facebook 

account was (207) 450-0956, which is the phone number of Dudley's 

unreported cell phone. Phillips also testified that she had no 

doubt in her mind that Dudley was the "John Smith" messaging with 

C.D. and that the messages "indicate a father and daughter 

relationship." C.D. repeatedly calls Dudley "Dad" in the messages, 

and Dudley refers to "daddy daughter time", references "pre[y]ing 

on my daughter," and writes, "[i]f I wasn't your dad I could hit 

more buttons th[a]n you even know lol." The messages also include 

references to Dudley's fiancée Arnett and his two former wives,

C.D.'s friend, and Dudley's job, and in one message Dudley 

misspells "choke" as "chock," which is the same misspelling Dudley 

used in a sexually explicit letter he wrote to C.D.'s friend. 
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Chuck Grenier, about Dudley showing him the child pornography on 

his tablet in March 2022, and Grenier shared this report with 

Phillips on May 11, 2022, before a search warrant for the CW's 

electronic devices was issued on May 12, 2022, and well before the 

CW was arrested in July 2022 and signed a cooperation agreement 

with the government. Because the court's credibility finding was 

not clearly erroneous, Dudley's argument that "it was an abuse of 

discretion to revoke supervised release based on" the CW's

testimony because a "revocation of supervised release based on [a]

clearly erroneous violation finding amounts to an abuse of 

discretion," also fails. 

The district court also did not abuse its discretion by 

revoking Dudley's supervised release based on the evidence that he 

had received and possessed child pornography on his cell phone. 

Dudley argues that only hearsay evidence was offered for this 

violation, and that by admitting this alleged hearsay "without an 

adequate excuse for failing to produce the declarant," the court 

abridged his "limited confrontation right" in a supervised-release 

revocation hearing. This argument fails even if Dudley had 

presented it to the trial court, which he did not.5

5 Because Dudley raised this issue for the first time 

on appeal, we would ordinarily review it only for plain error, see

United States v. Dávila-Reyes, 84 F.4th 400, 417 (1st Cir. 2023),

meaning he must "show '(1) that an error occurred (2) which was 

clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the [appellant's] 

substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, 
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Dudley has failed to show any abuse of discretion here. 

Dudley argues that the revocation petition and report written by 

Phillips and Phillips' testimony that HSI agents found "numerous 

videos and images of [C.D.] masturbating" on Dudley's and C.D.'s 

phones were hearsay statements. He argues these statements were 

hearsay because Phillips did not testify that she had personally 

viewed the video on Dudley's cell phone. He also argues for the 

first time in his reply brief that "there was no cause for relying 

on the hearsay note that was attributed to [C.D.], rather than the 

government calling her to testify." Even if these statements were

hearsay,6 the court would not have erred by admitting them. 

Supervised release revocation hearings are not subject to the 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United 

States v. Márquez-García, 862 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2017) 

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 

F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)). Dudley made no effort to argue the

plain-error standard in his opening brief, so his claim could be 

considered waived. See United States v. Ponzo, 853 F.3d 558, 574

(1st Cir. 2017). Despite this, we review this claim because his 

opening brief did "make apparent his theory of the district court's 

plain error, and he did squarely address the plain error factors 

in his reply brief," United States v. Facteau, 89 F.4th 1, 44 n.29

(1st Cir. 2023). "Moreover, '[w]here a defendant's claim would 

fail even if reviewed for plain error, we have often simply 

proceeded to the merits.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

United States v. Grullon, 996 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2021)). 

Further, because Dudley's claim would fail even if he had not 

raised it for the first time on appeal, we bypass plain error and 

review the argument for abuse of discretion.

6 Defense counsel never asked Phillips for the basis 

for her knowledge, so the record is silent regarding whether 

Phillips had personal knowledge from viewing the child pornography 

video found on Dudley's cell phone herself.
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Federal Rules of Evidence. See Teixeira, 62 F.4th at 17. Hearsay 

is admissible if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability, as 

was true here. United States v. Franklin, 51 F.4th 391, 396-97 

(1st Cir. 2022). A defendant at a supervised release revocation 

hearing also "has only a limited right of confrontation, which 

requires a court to . . . 'weigh both the apparent reliability of 

the hearsay evidence and the government's proffered reason for not 

producing the declarant.'" United States v. Rodriguez, 919 F.3d 

629, 635 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Fontanez, 845 

F.3d 439, 443 (1st Cir. 2017)). 

Because Dudley did not object to this evidence on 

confrontation grounds before the trial court, the government never 

had the opportunity to explain why it did not produce the HSI 

agents, or C.D., and the district court had no reason to engage in 

the balancing analysis. Yet the record shows Phillips' statements 

are supported by sufficiently strong indicia of reliability.7 They

are highly detailed and are independently corroborated by other 

evidence, most notably by C.D.'s message to Dudley's "John Smith" 

account stating, "you just watched a video of me mast[u]rbating,"

7 Even if the government had offered only a weak 

explanation, the district court would not have abused its 

discretion in crediting Phillips' report and testimony. "In the 

Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) context, strong evidence of reliability can 

counterbalance a weak reason for not producing the declarant."

Fontanez, 845 F.3d at 443; see also United States v. Marino, 833 

F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2016).
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as well as the CW's testimony and C.D.'s aunt's testimony that 

Dudley had sexually assaulted C.D. and C.D.'s written statement 

that her father had "hurt" her and caused her "tra[u]ma and pain." 

See Franklin, 51 F.4th at 396-97. 

Further, Dudley does not dispute the accuracy of C.D.'s 

written statement (other than claiming its "vague language could 

apply equally to allegations of emotional abuse as it could to 

physical abuse"), and a good explanation for why C.D. was not 

called to testify is evident from C.D.'s aunt's testimony and 

C.D.'s written statement: the concern that she would not be able 

to testify truthfully because of pressure from Dudley to lie. 

B.

Dudley attempts an illogical and ill-conceived argument 

that the district court judge should have recused himself because 

he was biased or could be thought to be biased against Dudley based 

on a ruling the judge had made during the trial that resulted in 

Dudley's original conviction, which this court affirmed on appeal. 

See Dudley, 804 F.3d at 516-18. It is difficult to understand how 

a ruling, affirmed on appeal, could possibly provide any basis for 

a recusal argument. A recusal decision "is committed largely to 

the discretion of the trial court, and we review it solely to 

evaluate whether the decision below amounted to an abuse of 

discretion." United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1034 (1st 

Cir. 1988). "[A]n abuse of discretion will be found only if a 
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reasonable reading of the record fails to support the conclusion 

that the judge's impartiality was not subject to question." United 

States v. Torres-Estrada, 817 F.3d 376, 380 (1st Cir. 2016) 

(quoting In re Bulger, 710 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2013)). A judge's 

"alleged bias and prejudice . . . must be personal and it must 

stem from an extrajudicial source." In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 

838 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). "[L]itigants are not 

entitled to have a judge disqualify himself merely because they

fear an adverse decision." United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 

265 (1st Cir. 1976). Further, the judge's alleged observation 

that Dudley was "always playing games with [the] court" "do[es] 

not constitute disqualifying bias and prejudice" because it was 

"formed on the basis of the evidence." See Cooper, 821 F.2d at

838.

The district judge also did not, as Dudley contends,

express bias or partiality by questioning Dudley during his 

testimony. Judges have a "well-established" right to "participate 

actively in the trial proper," United States v. Laureano-Perez, 

797 F.3d 45, 70 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. OfrayCampos, 534 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2008)), including by "asking 

questions 'to elicit facts to facilitate a clear presentation of 

the issues,'" id. (quoting United States v. Meléndez-Rivas, 566 

F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2009)). They "are to be given the 'widest 

possible latitude' in making judgements about the need to clarify 
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testimony." United States v. Rosario-Peralta, 199 F.3d 552, 560-

61 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 

F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)). Here, the district court judge's 

questions were permissible because they "facilitate[d] a clear 

presentation of the issues," Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d at 70

(quoting Meléndez-Rivas, 566 F.3d at 50), and "analyze[d], 

dissect[ed], . . . and comment[ed] on the evidence," United States

v. Raymundí‐Hernández, 984 F.3d 127, 146 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997)). Although 

Dudley argues that the questions showed bias by "seeking to elicit 

otherwise unstated inculpatory testimony," "the concern with 

judicial interrogation is not with 'the damaging truth that the 

questions might uncover,'" and if the "court's questioning of a 

witness exposes bad facts, inconsistences, or weaknesses in the 

case itself, the exposure itself is not . . . worrisome prejudice." 

United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 761 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 

2014) (quoting United States v. Martin, 189 F.3d 547, 554 (7th 

Cir. 1999)). 

C.

The sentence imposed by the district court is well 

justified and neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

1.
- 19 -

We review Dudley's sentence only for abuse of 

discretion, a highly deferential standard.8 Dudley first argues 

that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the CW's 

testimony should not have been credited, an argument we have 

rejected. His argument that the district court "fail[ed] to 

adequately explain the sentence" also fails. The sentence was 

well explained. "When imposing a supervised release revocation 

sentence, a district court is obliged to consider the various 

factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)," a list which 

borrows heavily from the factors enumerated in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and includes the nature 

and circumstances of the offending conduct; 

the need to deter further criminal 

misbehavior; the need to protect the community 

from "further crimes of the defendant"; and 

the need to consider the policy statements 

promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. 

8 "Review of the reasonableness of a sentence is for 

abuse of discretion if the objection was preserved or for plain 

error if the challenge was raised for the first time on appeal." 

United States v. Acevedo-Vázquez, 977 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2020). 

Although we would ordinarily review Dudley's procedural error 

claim for plain error because he failed to argue that his sentence 

was procedurally unreasonable before the district court, see

United States v. Rodriguez-Monserrate, 22 F.4th 35, 40 (1st Cir. 

2021), given that his argument fails under both the plain error 

and abuse of discretion standards, we assume favorably for Dudley 

that the abuse of discretion standard applies. We also review 

Dudley's substantive error claim for abuse of discretion because 

Dudley asked the sentencing court for a lower sentence than he 

received, thereby preserving his "objection to his sentence on the 

ground of substantive reasonableness." United States v. JuradoNazario, 979 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2020).
- 20 -

United States v. Daoust, 888 F.3d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 2018) 

(internal citations omitted). 

The district court fulsomely satisfied all of these 

criteria. It first stated that it had "reviewed and applie[d] 

each of the factors set forth in 3553(a)," and "take[n] into 

account the history and personal characteristics of this 

defendant," with whom the court had been "involved . . . going 

back to 2014 and then his first revocation in 2019." The court 

then stated that "the most important factors" to its decision were 

"just punishment for what [Dudley] did, the fact that deterrence 

of this defendant simply does not work, there's nothing that deters 

his conduct," and the "need to protect the public from this 

defendant." The court also noted that Dudley had "lied to the 

Court, both in his testimony and his allocution." Dudley argues 

that because the court imposed the statutory maximum penalty in 

each of his two cases, to run consecutively, an effective upward 

variance from the twenty-four to thirty-month guideline range, see

U.S.S.G § 7B1.4(a),9 "this explanation was inadequate." Not so.

9 U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) provides guideline ranges for 

imprisonment after revocation of supervised release based on a 

defendant's violation grade and criminal history category. 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The most serious violation Dudley was found 

by the district court to have committed was a Grade A violation. 

Dudley's criminal history category is IV, which is the criminal 

history category applicable to him at the time he was originally 

sentenced to a term of supervision. His guideline imprisonment 

range was thus twenty-four to thirty months. 
- 21 -

"[A]fter considering the relevant sentencing factors," a district 

court revoking a defendant's supervised release "can sentence the 

offender to a prison stint within the applicable statutory 

maximum." United States v. Tanco-Pizarro, 892 F.3d 472, 476 (1st 

Cir. 2018). Although the court's burden to "explain . . . why it 

chose a particular sentence . . . . certainly increases the more 

the court drifts away from the advisory-sentencing range . . . .

'a variant sentence' is often 'based on a complex of factors whose 

interplay and precise weight cannot . . . be precisely 

described,'" and in such cases, the court need only "'identif[y]

the primary reasons underpinning its decision.'" Id. at 482

(alteration and fourth omission in original) (quoting United 

States v. Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2017)). 

2.

Dudley's sentence was also not substantively 

unreasonable given this fact record, his demonstrated 

incorrigibility, his recidivism despite being given a lower 

sentence at his original conviction, and the harm he inflicted on 

others. In reviewing substantive reasonableness, we consider only 

"whether the sentence, in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, resides within the expansive universe of reasonable 

sentences." United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 308 (1st Cir. 

2014). Since 2019, Dudley has flagrantly and repeatedly violated 

the conditions of his supervised release by engaging in prohibited
- 22 -

and sexually inappropriate contact with his own minor daughter, 

using and possessing prohibited electronic devices to view child 

pornography, failing to update his registration with the sex 

offender registry, and consorting with known felons, among other 

violations. As the trial judge cogently noted, the prior 

revocation and incarceration did not deter Dudley in the least 

from violating the conditions of his supervised release again. 

Upwardly variant sentences in cases involving egregious violations 

of supervised release "based on . . . the need to achieve adequate 

deterrence, to protect the community, and to promote respect for 

the law" are reasonable. See United States v. Flores-Quiñones, 

985 F.3d 128, 134-35 (1st Cir. 2021) (rejecting challenges to 

procedural and substantive reasonableness where the appellant 

demonstrated "repeated and flagrant disrespect for the terms of 

his supervised release"); see also Daoust, 888 F.3d at 577-78 

(affirming an upwardly-variant sentence for a revocation of 

supervised release as substantively reasonable); Tanco-Pizarro, 

892 F.3d at 484 (affirming a sixty-month sentence after revocation 

as substantively reasonable even though it was "well above the 

nonbinding range of 6 to 12 months, and right at the statutory 

maximum").

For the above stated reasons, we affirm.