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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fidelity National Financial, )

Inc., a Delaware )

corporation, Fidelity )

Express Network, Inc., a )

California corporation, )

 )

 Plaintiffs, ) No. MC 11-00072-PHX-RCB 

 )

 vs. ) O R D E R

 )

Colin H. Friedman, et al. )

 )

 Defendants. )

 )

This dispute, now in its second decade, pertains to the

latest attempt by plaintiffs, Fidelity National Financial,

Inc. and Fidelity Express Network, Inc. (“Fidelity”), to

enforce a judgment. Fidelity obtained that judgment which,

with interest, now totals over $10 million dollars, against

defendants Colin H. Friedman, Hedy Kramer Friedman, Farid

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1 More specifically, that judgment was rendered against “Colin H.

Friedman, individually and as trustee of the Friedman Family Trust UDT,

..., Hedy Kramer Friedman, individually and as trustee of the Friedman

Family Trust UDT, . . . , Farid Meshkatai, and Anita Kramer Meshkatai,

individually and as trustee of the Anita Kramer Living Trust . . . , and

each of them, jointly and severally[.]” Certification (Doc. 1) at 2-3. 

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Meshkatai, and Anita Kramer Meshkatai1 following a trial in

the United States District Court for the Central District of

California (the “California judgment”). California, as the

rendering court, entered that judgment on July 12, 2002. As

28 U.S.C. § 1963 allows, Fidelity registered its California

judgment in this Arizona district court. The Certification

of Judgment issued by the California court, along with an

order of that court allowing Fidelity to register its

judgment in this district court, although the action was on

appeal, was entered here on November 18, 2002 (the “First

Arizona Registered Judgment”). In accordance with A.R.S. 

§ 12-1551(B), that judgment would “become[] unenforceable

after five years from the date of entry unless action [wa]s

taken to renew it.” Fidelity National Financial, Inc. v.

Friedman, 855 F.Supp.2d 948, 963 (D.Ariz. 2012) (“Fidelity

V”) (quoting In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637) (other

citation omitted). Put differently, absent renewal, the

Arizona registered judgment would have expired on November

18, 2007. 

Fidelity attempted renewal on April 5, 2007, by filing

what this court has previously referred to as “the 2007

Certification[.]” Fidelity V, 855 F.Supp.2d at 954. 

Eventually, this court vacated that 2007 Certification,

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2 This designation is for convenience only and it shall not be

accorded any legal significance. 

3 Again, this designation is for convenience only and it shall not

be accorded any legal significance.

4 For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers of docketed

items are to the page assigned by the court’s case management and

electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system.

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holding that although Fidelity permissibly re-registered the

First Arizona Registered Judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963, that re-registration was not timely under Arizona

law. See id. at 968-979. 

In the interim, on May 26, 2011, Fidelity filed a

certification of the California Judgment in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Washington (the

“Washington Registered Judgment”2). Fidelity Nat. Financial,

Inc. v. Friedman, No. 2:11-mc-0072 (W.D.Wash.). Several

months later, on July 7, 2011, Fidelity filed the Washington

Registered Judgment in this court (the “Second Arizona

Registered Judgment”3). Currently pending before the court is

defendants’ “motion . . . for relief from judgment pursuant to

Rule 60(B) [sic] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

and/or to vacate the certification of judgment for

registration in another district[,]” Mot. 9 at 1:14-17

(emphasis omitted), “and relieve the[m] . . . from any

judgment created as a result of that filing.” Id. at 9:21-

23.4

Background

The long and somewhat convoluted history of Fidelity’s

attempts to enforce the California judgment have been

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chronicled in prior decisions of this court and others,

familiarity with which is presumed. More recently, as just

mentioned, on May 26, 2011, in the Western District of

Washington, Fidelity filed a “Certification of Judgment For

Registration In Another District[.]” Fidelity, No. 2:11-mc0072 (W.D.Wash.) (Doc. 1) That Certification, dated March 7,

2011, was issued by the Clerk of the California court, and

indicated that a certified copy of the California judgment was

attached thereto. Id. The defendants were not served with

the Washington Registration until nearly nine months later –

on December 1, 2011. See Jike Decl’n (Doc. 16-1) at 2, ¶ 4,

and exh. A thereto (Doc. 16-2) at 2-3. 

Thereafter, on July 7, 2011, in this Arizona district

court, Fidelity filed the exact same Certification of

Judgment, attaching the California judgment, which it had

previously filed in the Washington Court. That particular

certification was certified by the Clerk of the Court for the

Western District of Washington, however. Certification (Doc.

1) at 1. Again, there was a delay in service upon the

defendants. They were not served with the Second Arizona

Registered Judgment until nearly five months later, on

December 1, 2011. See Jike Decl’n (Doc. 16-1) at 2, ¶ 4, and

exh. A thereto (Doc. 16-2) at 2-3. Fidelity has not executed

upon either the Washington Registered Judgment or the Second

Arizona Registered Judgment as against defendants’ property,

id. at ¶¶ 2 and 3; and, it is not attempting to do so at this

juncture. 

In the meantime, Fidelity timely renewed the California

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5 Fidelity, No. 11-mc-00072 (W.D.Wash.), “Ex Parte Order Extending

Judgment” (Doc. 3) at 2.

6 Given the court's intimate familiarity with this action and because the

issues have been fully briefed, in its discretion the court denies the parties’

request for oral argument as it would not aid the decisional process. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

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judgment in that rendering court,5 extending the period of

enforceability for ten years. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 

§ 683.120(b). Consequently, Fidelity’s California judgment

still is enforceable there. In reliance upon the renewed

California judgment, the Washington court granted Fidelity’s

ex parte application to extend the Washington Registered

Judgment. See Fidelity, No. 11-mc-00072 (W.D.Wash.), Ord.

(Doc. 3). It thus appears that Fidelity has “an additional

ten years during which an execution, garnishment, or other

legal process may be issued[]” as to the Washington Registered

Judgment, RCW 6.17.020(3), whereas the First Arizona

Registered Judgment is no longer enforceable here. 

Summary of Arguments6

The primary thrust of defendants’ motion is that the

court should vacate the Second Arizona Registered Judgment

because the “Washington [Registered] Judgment . . . is not a

‘new’ Judgment capable of re-registration” in this court. 

Mot. (Doc. 9) at 8:13-14. Relatedly, defendants argue that

the Washington Registered Judgment “is void for lack of due

process and personal jurisdiction over” them, and hence it

cannot be registered here. Id. at 4:1-2, ¶ 12. 

Relying solely upon Del Prado v. B.N. Dev. Co., 602 F.3d

660 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Del Prado II”), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1963, Fidelity counters that it properly successively

registered the Washington Registered Judgment in this court. 

Moreover, Fidelity asserts that “any perceived deficiency” in

the Washington Registered Judgment should be resolved by that

court. Resp. (Doc. 16) at 2:21. 

Discussion

I. Requests for Judicial Notice

Before addressing these substantive arguments, the court

must consider the parties’ separate Requests for Judicial

Notice (“RJN”) made pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201. Although

the parties cite to subsection (d) of that Rule, clearly that

was not their intent. Rule 201(d) governs the timing of when

a court may take judicial notice, not the substantive basis

for such a request. From the content of their respective

requests, clearly the parties intended to rely upon Rule

201(b)(2). That Rule allows a court to take judicial notice

of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because

it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources

whose accuracy cannot be reasonably question.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(2). 

Here, the sources of the parties’ RJNs are all court

filings in this or several closely related actions. Because

these filings are all matters of public record, they are

properly the subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Terenkian

v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted) (granting RJNs “of certain pleadings and

court filings in the New York litigation submitted” by the

parties); Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d

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741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“court filings and other matters

of public record” were “readily verifiable and, therefore, the

proper subject of judicial notice[]”); Kourtis v. Cameron, 419

F.3d 989, 994 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“court

records from related proceedings can be taken into account

without converting a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment

motion[ ]”), overruled on other grounds, Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008). 

Therefore, the court grants the parties’ respective RJNs

(Docs. 14 and 17).

II. Second Arizona Registration

First, the defendants broadly contend that the court must

vacate the Second Arizona Registered Judgment because “Arizona

law does not allow for re-registration of the same judgment.” 

Mot. (Doc. 9) at 12:8-9; at 14:17-18 (emphases omitted). 

Arizona law does not apply, Fidelity counters, because the

issue is not one of execution upon a judgment. Rather, from

Fidelity’s perspective, the issue pertains to registration

under federal law, and 28 U.S.C. § 1963 in particular. Thus,

Fidelity argues that the Second Arizona Registration is

governed strictly by federal law. 

A. Governing Law 

The court agrees with the defendants that Rule 69(a)

“provid[es] that the procedure on execution is to be in

accordance with the procedure of the state in which the

district court is located at the time the remedy is sought.” 

See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 536 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir.

2008). The court cannot agree, however, with defendants’

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extrapolation from that Rule -- that “Arizona law governs all

proceedings with respect to the [Second] Arizona” Registered

Judgment. Mot. (Doc. 9) at 12:15-16 (emphasis added). 

There is nothing in the plain language of Rule 69 to

support such an expansive reading of that Rule. In fact, Rule

69(a)(1) carefully limits its application to execution of

judgments, stating in pertinent part:

The procedure on execution—and in 

proceedings supplementary to and in 

aid of judgment or execution—must 

accord with the procedure of the 

state where the court is located[.] 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a)(1). The issues herein do not pertain to

such proceedings. 

Moreover, Rule 69(a)(1) is equally clear that “a federal

statute governs to the extent it applies.” Id. In the

present case, the primary issue is whether the Washington

Registered Judgment “create[d] a wholly new judgment that can,

in turn, be re-registered to create a wholly new judgment” in

this jurisdiction, despite the expiration of the First Arizona

Registered Judgment and its untimely re-registration. See De

Leon v. Marcos, 742 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1172 (D.Colo. 2010) (“De

Leon I”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 659 F.3d 1276

(10th Cir. 2011) (“De Leon II”). Resolution of that issue

implicates section 1963 - the federal registration of

judgments statute. Thus, there is no merit to the defense

argument that based upon Rule 69(a), Arizona law governs “all

proceedings” as to the Second Arizona Registered Judgment. 

See Mot. (Doc. 9) at 12:16. 

In addition, the court fails to see defendants’ perceived

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7 Nor has the court’s independent research unearthed any Ninth

Circuit case law applying state law when dealing with federally registered

judgments. 

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inconsistency between section 1963's provision that “[t]he

procedure prescribed under this section is in addition to the

other procedures provided by law for the enforcement of

judgments[,]” and Fidelity’s argument that only federal law

applies here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (emphasis added). The

defendants are overlooking section 1963's unequivocal

“enforcement” language, just quoted, which is not an issue at

this juncture. 

Likewise, there is no merit to defendants’ contention

that this Court must apply Arizona law in reviewing the issues

on this Motion[,]” because purportedly “the Ninth Circuit has

unequivocally recognized the applicability of state law in

dealing with the registration, renewal and enforcement of

judgment in the district in which the judgment is sought to be

enforced.” Reply (Doc. 20) at 7:18; and 7:3-5 (emphasis

added). Significantly, in not one of the cases to which the

defendants cite or mention did the court apply state law in

“dealing with registration[.]”7 See id. at 7:4. Those courts

dealt, instead, with the application of state law in the

context of execution, and “proceedings supplementary to and in

aid of judgment or execution[,]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a)(1), such

as enforcement of judgments. See Fidelity Nat. Financial Inc.

v. Friedman, 602 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis

added) (certifying to the Arizona Supreme Court two issues

regarding whether Fidelity’s actions “were sufficient under

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Arizona law to renew the prior registration of a judgment”);

Hilao, 536 F.3d at 987-988 (emphasis added) (Rule 69(a)

“provid[es] that the procedure on execution is to be in

accordance with the procedure of the state in which the

district court is located at the time the remedy is sought.”);

Gagan v. Sharar, 376 F.3d 987, 988 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis

added) (“This case concerns execution in a community property

state of a judgment obtained in a common law state.”); and

Mantanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358, 359-60

(9th Cir. 1966)(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (“[T]he

enforcement of a judgment of a sister state may be barred by

application of the statute of limitations of the forum

state.”) Thus, especially with no case authority to support

the defendants’ contrary argument, the court is not convinced

that Arizona rather than federal law applies to the

registration issues herein. 

B. Federal Law

Section 1963 states, in relevant part:

 A judgment in an action for the recovery of 

money or property entered in any . . . district 

court, . . . may be registered by filing a 

certified copy of the judgment in any other 

district[,] when the judgment has become final 

by appeal or by expiration of the time for 

appeal[.]. . . A judgment so registered shall 

have the same effect as a judgment of the district 

court of the district where registered and 

may be enforced in like manner. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1963. Here, the issue is whether a judgment

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8 There is nothing on the face of either the May 26, 2011,

Certification of Judgment filed in Washington, or on the Certification of

Judgment filed in this court on July 7, 2011, indicating the bases for

those filings. The court adopts the parties’ operating assumption that 28

U.S.C. § 1963 was the statutory basis for both. 

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registered in a federal court pursuant to that statute8

creates a new judgment that can, in turn, be “re-registered”

in a second federal court, although that “re-registered”

judgment previously had been registered in that second court,

where it had expired and was not timely re-registered. This

novel issue appears to be one of first impression. 

With conflicting results, three other courts have

addressed the narrower issue of whether “registration of a

judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 create[s] a wholly new

judgment that can, in turn, be re-registered to create wholly

new judgments in other jurisdictions[.]” See De Leon I, 742

F.Supp.2d at 1172 (noting that this issue “is the same one

faced by the Northern District of Texas [in Del Prado v. B.N.

Dev. Co., 4:05-CV-234-Y (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009) (“Del Prado

I”)] and the 5th Circuit [in Del Prado II]”). The district

courts in De Leon I and Del Prado I, answered in the negative,

but the Fifth Circuit answered in the affirmative in Del Prado

II. 

The Fifth Circuit’s Del Prado II decision is the sole

basis for Fidelity’s argument that section 1963 permits what

that Court has termed “‘successive registration.’” See Del

Prado II, 602 F.3d at 662. Strenuously opposing application

of Del Prado II, the defendants argue that Fidelity’s reliance

thereon is “misplaced[]” because that case is distinguishable. 

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Mot. (Doc. 9) at 14:22. Thus, regardless of whether this

court finds the Del Prado II reasoning “persuasive,” the

defendants contend it simply has no applicability here. See

id. at 16:27. Additionally, the defendants point to De Leon

I, where the district court found, inter alia, that Del Prado

II “incorrectly applied prior precedent[.]” De Leon I, 742

F.Supp.2d at 1176. Moreover, from defendants’ viewpoint, the

court’s rationale in De Leon I is consistent with Arizona

law, which requires strict compliance with renewal of judgment

statutes. 

With equal vigor, Fidelity argues that Del Prado II is

sufficiently analogous to the present case such that its

reasoning should apply here. Fidelity thus maintains, based

upon the Fifth Circuit’s Del Prado II decision and section

1963, that it permissibly “successively” re-registered its

Washington Registered Judgment in this Arizona district court. 

The parties’ divergent views of Del Prado II, especially

when coupled with the conflict between Del Prado II and De

Leon I, warrant a close examination of each. The court will

also look to the district court’s decision in Del Prado I. 

Ordinarily, this court would not consider such a case because

of its reversal on appeal. Given the paucity of relevant case

law, however, and because the Del Prado I’s reasoning aligns

with what this court finds to be the thorough and thoughtful

analysis in De Leon I, Del Prado I also is noteworthy.

The genesis for both Del Prado and De Leon was a class

action commenced in the District of Hawaii, claiming human

rights violations by now deceased Ferdinand Marcos, the former

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president of the Philippines. Following a trial, in 1995, the

Hawaii District Court entered a nearly $2 billion judgment in

favor of the class. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, in early

1997, the class registered the Hawaiian judgment in the

Northern District of Illinois. In the meantime, because the

class did not timely extend the judgment rendered in Hawaii,

by operation of Hawaiian law, that judgment was extinguished

on February 2005. Hilao, 536 F.3d 980. 

In April 2005, evidently following the transfer of the

Hawaii judgment to the Northern District of Texas, the class

commenced the Del Prado action. It sought a declaration that

certain real property located in Texas was beneficially owned

by the Marcos estate. The class also sought to execute and

foreclose upon that property in partial satisfaction of the

judgment rendered in Hawaii. During the pendency of that

Texas enforcement proceeding, the Illinois registered

judgment became dormant. See 735 ILL. Comp. Stat. 5/12-

108(a). Because of that, and having no enforceable judgment

in Hawaii, pursuant to Illinois law, the class filed a

petition for revival of the Illinois registered judgment. The

petition was granted and on September 4, 2008, the Clerk of

the Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered the

revived judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. 

Shortly thereafter, on October 7, 2008, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1963, the class registered the revived Illinois

judgment in the District of Colorado. Likewise, the next day,

in the Del Prado action, the class registered the revived

Illinois judgment in Texas. On September 16, 2009, the class

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commenced an action in Colorado seeking partial satisfaction

of the Hawaii judgment against Colorado real property which

allegedly had been beneficially owned by the Marcos estate

(“the De Leon action”). 

1. Del Prado I

The district court in Del Prado I rejected plaintiffs’

argument that although the statute of limitations had run in

Hawaii, the rendering court, the Illinois registered judgment

created a new, independent judgment that could be reregistered in the Texas district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963. In rejecting that argument, the court looked first to

the “plain language” of that statute. Del Prado I, Doc. 237

at 7. More specifically, the Del Prado I court found section

1963, which on its face “allows for the registration of a

‘judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property

entered’ in any district court, after ‘such judgment has

become final by appeal or expiration of the time for

appeal[,]’” . . . demonstrates that it is the initial

judgment on the merits from the rendering court – i.e., the

‘judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property’

– that may be registered.” Id. at 7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

Shifting from the text of section 1963, the Del Prado I

court also discussed the “scant . . . interpretative case law

surrounding” that statute. See Euro-American Coal Trading,

Inc. v. James Taylor Mining, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 705, 707 n. 7

(E.D.Ky. 2006). Factoring prominently in that discussion was 

Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.),

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the seminal case construing section 1963, as well as Home Port

Rentals, Inc. v. Int’l Yachting Group, Inc., 252 F.3d 399 (5th

Cir. 2001), and the Ninth Circuit’s Hilao decision. After

examining those cases, the Del Prado I court recognized that

“[u]ltimately, § 1963 may in fact allow registration of the

rendering court’s judgment in more than one district.” Del

Prado I, Doc. 237 at 11 (emphasis added)(citing Board of

Trustees v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.

2000)). At the same time, however, as the Del Prado I court

was quick to point out, “the Stanford, Home Port Rentals, and

other courts to have addressed the issue acknowledge ‘[t]hat

the registered judgment might not be congruent with a new

judgment of the registration court for every purpose other

than enforcement.’” Id. (citation omitted). Buttressed by the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hilao, the district court

concluded Del Prado I was “such a case.” Id. 

Hilao and Del Prado I did raise different issues. The

issue in Hilao was “whether registration extended the statute

of limitations that was applicable in the rendering court[,]”

whereas the issue in Del Prado I was “whether a registered

judgment may itself be registered despite the running of the

statute of limitations in the rendering court[.]” Id.

Nonetheless, the Del Prado I court found that those issues

raised the “same . . . concern[.]” Id. In particular, either

way, adopting plaintiffs’ position would mean “‘that a federal

judgment is free of state limitations and can be enforced

forever.’” Id. at 11-12 (quoting Hilao, 536 F.3d at 987). 

“Absent clear language in . . . section [1963] or binding

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9 More accurately, the Court was reading the final sentence of the

first paragraph of section 1963, as opposed to the final sentence of that

whole statute. 

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precedent requiring it to do so[,]” the district court in Del

Prado I declined to give “such an unbounded effect[]” to that

statute. Id. at 12. 

2. Del Prado II

Reversing Del Prado I, and approving of “successive

registration,” the Fifth Circuit held: “Because the Illinois

registered judgment was equivalent to a new federal judgment

with the same status as a judgment on a judgment, it was also

capable of being successively registered and enforced under §

1963 in the Northern District of Texas.” Del Prado II, 602

F.3d at 661 and 669. The Fifth Circuit, like the district

court, looked to the text of section 1963. But, unlike the

district court, the Fifth Circuit selectively read in

isolation only a small part of section 1963. Not surprisingly

then, the Fifth Circuit’s statutory interpretation differed 

from the district court’s. More specifically, the Fifth

Circuit read part of “[t]he final sentence of § 19639 [as]

“clearly stat[ing] that “a registered judgment has ‘the same

effect as a judgment of the district court of the district

where registered and may be enforced in like manner[,]’ . . .

to mean that once the Hawaiian judgment was registered in

Illinois in 1997, [it] had the same effect as any judgment

rendered in the Northern District of Illinois and could be

enforced as a judgment rendered in the Northern District of

Illinois.” Id. at 665 (footnote omitted and footnote added). 

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The Fifth Circuit, likewise, interpreted cases such as

Stanford, its own earlier Home Port Rentals decision, and

Hilao, differently than did the district court. The Fifth

Circuit found that those cases, like section 1963, “support

the principal [sic] that a registered judgment has the same

effect as a rendered judgment.” Id. at 666. Lastly,

“reinforce[d]” by Full Faith and Credit concepts, the Del

Prado II Court rejected defendants’ argument that the Illinois

registered judgment should be “treated differently than [a]

judgment on a judgment[.]” Id. at 668. The Court rejected

that argument, inter alia, because defendants did not show

lack of notice or that they were impeded from raising any

defense when the Illinois registered judgment was successfully

registered in Texas. 

Putting aside for the moment the Fifth Circuit’s

rationale, the court agrees with the defendants that given the

distinctions outlined below between Del Prado II and the

present case, Del Prado II does not control here. The first

and most critical distinction is that unlike Fidelity, before

it attempted to register the Illinois judgment in Texas, the

judgment creditor in Del Prado II had not validly registered

the original Hawaii judgment in Texas, and allowed it to

expire there. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit had no reason

to address the specific issue confronting this court: whether

the Washington Registered Judgment created a new judgment that

can, in turn, be successively re-registered even though the

First Arizona Registered Judgment expired and it was not

timely re-registered here. In fact, “[n]o case cited by Del

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Prado [II] involves,” as here, “a foreign judgment, registered

in one state, and an attempted registration in yet a third

state.” See De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1175 n. 6. 

Del Prado II is distinguishable on another basis. There,

the defendants argued that the revived Illinois registered

judgment did not “qualify as an independent judgment because

it was not ‘entered’” in the Illinois district court in

accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Del Prado II, 602 F.3d at

665. Finding “no merit” to that argument, the Fifth Circuit

pointed out that “the revived Illinois registered judgment was

entered by the Clerk of the Court in the Northern District of

Illinois as a separate document entitled ‘Judgment in a Civil

Case.’” Id. 

Fidelity cannot avail itself of that logic, however,

because the Western District of Washington Court did not

separately enter any such document. Rather, as the docket

sheet reflects, the predicate filing in that court was the

“Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another

District[]” issued by the rendering California court. See

Defs.’ RJN (Doc. 14), exh. G thereto (Doc. 14-7) at 3. Nor,

as more fully explained herein, did Del Prado II raise the

specter, as does this action, that successive registration

would conflict with state law. These differences demonstrate,

once again, “that Fidelity’s reliance upon Del Prado [II] is

misplaced.” See Fidelity V, 855 F.Supp.2d at 970 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

3. De Leon I

Even overlooking those distinctions (which it is not),

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the court flatly rejects Fidelity’s argument that Del Prado

II’s “reasoning . . . applies here.” Resp. (Doc. 16) at 5:19. 

The court rejects that argument because it, too, “respectfully

disagrees with the [Fifth] Circuit’s reasoning[]” in Del Prado

II. De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1172. Fidelity suggests that

this court should disregard De Leon I because “it has been

reversed[,]” and the Tenth Circuit found that decision to be

“void.” Resp. (Doc. 16) at 6:26-27, n. 3 (citation omitted). 

Actually, because the Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits,

it did not reverse the district court. Rather, it vacated and

remanded.

Regardless, this court is acutely aware that the Tenth

Circuit found De Leon I to be “void” because it was issued

after the parties’ filing of a stipulation of dismissal, “and

therefore in the absence of jurisdiction.” De Leon II, 659

F.3d at 1284 (citation omitted). Despite the foregoing, and as

previously noted, this court concurs with De Leon I’s rigorous

and sound analysis, wherein it found that the judgment

creditor could not re-register the Illinois revived judgment

in Colorado so as to support that enforcement action. 

 Several aspects of De Leon I heavily inform this court’s

conclusion that, likewise, the Washington Registered Judgment

cannot be successively re-registered in this Arizona district

court. Briefly, they are: (1) the nature of a judgment which

can be registered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963; (2) the

attributes of a judgment registered under that statute; and

(3) the reasons why registered and domestic judgments are not

equivalent for all purposes. The court will discuss these

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seriatim. 

The first persuasive aspect of De Leon I is its

conclusion “that only an original judgment, issued by a court

upon the substantive merits of an adversarial dispute, can be

registered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963[.]” De Leon I, 742

F.Supp.2d at 1172. The starting point for that conclusion was

“the fundamental legal axiom that a judgment is ‘the final

determination of an action,’ that embodies a court’s

adjudication of ‘a claim pressed and resisted (or the

opportunity for resistance) by adversaries’[.]” Id. (10

Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil

3d Ed., § 2651, quoting In the Matter of Fidelity Tube, 167

F.Supp. 402, 404 (D.N.J. 1958)) (other citation omitted). 

Scrutinizing the text of 1963, the court in De Leon I

explained, the language “authoriz[ing] registration of a

‘judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property

entered in any court of appeals, district court, bankruptcy

court, or in the Court of International Trade[]’ . . .

anticipates two requirements.” Id. at 1173. The first is

“that a judgment has been entered by a court (as compared to a

‘judgment’ that comes into effect by being registered)[.]” 

Id. (emphasis in original). The second requirement is that

such a judgment “be entered in an action for the recovery o[f]

money or property (in essence, reflecting the adjudication of

a claim for tangible, not simply declaratory, relief).” Id.

(emphasis in original). That construction of section 1963, as

the De Leon I court persuasively reasoned, “is consistent with

the fundamental nature of a judgment —- a document reflecting

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the determination of a claim on its merits.” Id. 

In juxtaposition, a registered judgment “is simply the

perfection of an existing judgment in another jurisdiction so

as to permit foreign enforcement.” Id. This court agrees

that “[i]nterpreted in this way, [section 1963] would appear

to provide that only an original judgment resolving an

adversarial proceeding for tangible relief can be registered

in another jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).

The district court in Del Prado I did not so closely parse

section 1963; but, as mentioned earlier, it similarly construed

the plain text of that statute, finding that only the original

judgment of the rendering court, “in an action for the recovery

of money or property[,]” may be registered. Del Prado I, Doc.

237 at 7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

court in Del Prado I bolstered that reading of section 1963 by

astutely observing that “it could not seriously be contended

that when a clerk enters the judgment of another district court

on the docket of his own court he has created a final judgment

that may be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Id. at 8

(citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1963) (allowing registration

only after the rendering court’s judgment is final).

 Based upon the straightforward and unequivocal language of

28 U.S.C. § 1963, this court agrees with the De Leon I and Del

Prado I courts: that statute permits registration in another

district only of judgments which have been entered by the

rendering court, and which were entered following the

“adjudication of a claim for tangible . . . relief[.]” See De

Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1173. The Washington Registered

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Judgment fits neither requirement. There was no entry of a

judgment in the Western District of Washington, as previously

explained. 

Additionally, the Washington Registered Judgment is not

“an original judgment, issued by a court upon the substantive

merits of an adversarial dispute[.]” See id. at 1172. Rather,

the original judgment was issued and entered in the California

Court following a jury trial. Consequently, the Washington

Registered Judgment is “simply the perfection of [the] existing

[California] judgment in another jurisdiction so as to permit

foreign enforcement.” See id. Thus, regardless of defendants’

due process and personal jurisdiction concerns, the Washington

Registered Judgment cannot be re-registered in this court

because it is not a judgment capable of registration within the

meaning of section 1963. 

The De Leon I court’s analysis of the “attributes” of a

registered judgment is just as compelling as its textual

argument, and further convinces this court that the Washington

Registered Judgment cannot be successively re-registered in

this court. See id. The Fifth Circuit in Del Prado II held

that the registration of a judgment under section 1963 creates

a new judgment that has “all of the attributes of a judgment

rendered by [the jurisdiction of registration],” that, in turn

“may be re-registered” in other jurisdictions. Del Prado II,

602 F.3d at 667 (emphasis added). Disagreeing, the court in De

Leon I recognized that “although one might equate a registered

judgment with a domestic judgment for purposes of enforcement

in the state of registration, there is no particular reason to

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conclude that a registered judgment has all of the collateral

features of a domestic judgment, such the ability to be

(re-)registered in yet another jurisdiction.” De Leon I, 742

F.Supp.2d at 1175. 

The court arrived at that conclusion after dissecting

Stanford, “[t]he seminal case grappling with the issue” of

“what attributes [a] registered judgment has[,]” and also

looking to the Fifth Circuit’s “own prior reasoning” in Home

Port Rentals. Id. at 1173 and 1175. In Stanford, the Court

held that if a judgment is properly registered in one state

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, it may be enforced within the

limitations period of that registration state, despite the

running of the time for enforcement in the rendering state. 

Explicitly “not[ing] by way of caveat that § 1963 presents much

to be answered in the future[,]” then Judge Blackmun

“emphasize[d] that [its] conclusion . . . is one having

application to the fact situation in this case.” Stanford, 341

F.2d at 271 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Stanford Court

deliberately left unanswered a “string of hypothetical

questions[,]” De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1174, the most

significant of which, for present purposes, is whether “a

registered judgment itself [is] subject to registration

elsewhere?” Stanford, 341 F.2d at 271. In carefully limiting

its holding, the Stanford Court circumspectly stated that it

was “not . . . go[ing] so far as to say that registration

effects a new judgment in the registration court for every

conceivable purpose; nor do we say that it fails to do so for

any particular purpose.” Id.

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Despite that careful limitation, as the De Leon I court

astutely pointed out, the Fifth Circuit in Del Prado II, 

“cited Stanford and other cases . . . , for a broader

proposition that ‘a registered judgment is equivalent to a new

federal judgment.’” De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1174 (quoting 

Del Prado II, 602 F.3d at 666, citing Stanford, 341 F.2d at

269-270). In particular, the Fifth Circuit “fail[ed] to

acknowledge that prior precedent equates registered and

domestic judgments only for purposes of enforcement in the

state of registration.” Id. at 1175 (emphasis added). As the

court in De Leon I cogently explained:

Cases such as Stanford and Home Port Rentals

make clear that, although one might equate a 

registered judgment with a domestic judgment 

for purposes of enforcement in the state of 

registration, there is no particular reason 

to conclude that a registered judgment has 

all of the collateral features of a domestic 

judgment, such [as] the ability to be (re-)

registered in yet another jurisdiction.

Id. In light of the foregoing, and the other persuasive

reasons more fully set forth in De Leon I, this court agrees

with its assessment that Del Prado II “incorrectly applied

prior precedent.” See id. at 1176. Thus, borrowing the De

Leon I rationale, this court finds that the Washington

Registered Judgment does not have “all of the collateral

features of a domestic judgment, such [as] the ability to be

(re-) registered in yet another jurisdiction[,]” such as this

Arizona District Court. See id. at 1175. 

Not satisfied with simply explaining its perceived flaws

in the Del Prado II analysis, the court in De Leon I

“proceed[ed] to examine . . . anew[]” the issue of whether

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“registration of a judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1963

create[s] a wholly new judgment that can, in turn, be reregistered to create wholly new judgments in other

jurisdictions?” Id. at 1176; and at 1172. That examination

provides equally compelling reasons why this court is guided by

De Leon I and not Del Prado II, as Fidelity urges. 

As “[c]ases such as Stanford and Home Port Rentals . . .

wisely note,” and the court further explained in De Leon I,

section 1963’s “statutory language does not compel the

conclusion that a registered judgment is the equivalent of a

domestic judgment for all purposes.” Id. at 1175; and at 1176

(emphasis in original). The De Leon I court provided several

well-founded “reasons why it is logical to differentiate

registered judgments and domestic judgments for purposes of

determining which can, in turn, be registered elsewhere.” Id.

at 1176. “First, and perhaps most obviously,” the De Leon I

court expressed understandable concern that “a rule equating

registered and domestic judgments for all purposes allows

judgment creditors to avoid any application of statutes of

limitation and repose applying to judgments.” Id. “The

practical effect” of such “serial registration . . . is that no

judgment could ever expire, and that creditors could simply

criss-cross the nation, registering and re-registering their

judgments in perpetuity.” Id. 

The present case shows all too vividly how “serial

registration” would conflict with Arizona’s statute of

limitations pertaining to actions on foreign judgments, thus

“mak[ing] a mockery out” of that statute. See id. In Fidelity

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10 Section 12–544(3) requires that an action “[u]pon a judgment 

. . . rendered without the state” be “commenced ... within four years after

the cause of action accrues [.]” A.R.S. § 12–544(3).

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V, this court held that “Fidelity permissibly re-registered

[the] Arizona [registered] judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 by

filing a second Certification of Judgment in this court[.]” 

Fidelity V, 855 F.Supp.2d at 973 (footnote omitted). 

Significantly, however, this court also found that reregistration to be untimely under A.R.S. § 12-544(3)10 because

“Fidelity’s [First] Arizona [Registered] [J]udgment became

enforceable On December 3, 2002[,] . . . ten days after its

entry[,]” but “Fidelity did not even attempt to ‘re-register’

its judgment until April 5, 2007[.]” Id. at 978 and 979. 

Consequently, allowing Fidelity to register the Washington

Registered Judgment in this court, where its First Arizona

Registered Judgment has been vacated because it was not timely

“re-registered,” would be allowing Fidelity to circumvent

Arizona’s statute of limitations - a result this court cannot

condone. 

Furthermore, allowing Fidelity to register the Washington

Registered Judgment in Arizona under the facts of this case

would “create the possibility of a cascading fountain of reregistered judgments[,]” which the De Leon I court warned

against. See De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1176. As that court

rightly foresaw, “[w]hatever uncertainties and difficulties

arise from allowing a judgment in one jurisdiction to be

registered and enforced in another will be magnified —-

potentially exponentially -— when the registered judgment can,

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in turn, be re-registered and enforced elsewhere, independently

of the original judgment.” Id. The court went on to

illustrate how that “complexity” would “be further compounded

by the sale of certain judgments to different holders, all of

whom may be seeking to collect against the assets of the

judgment debtor.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

“Plaintiff’s version of the rule,” i.e., allowing reregistered judgments to be re-registered and enforced

elsewhere, independently of the original judgment[,]” would

necessitate “a lengthy, imprecise, and potentially recursive

untangling” of such judgments. Id. By way of example, the

court hypothesized that “a Georgia-registered judgment in

dispute” would have to be “traced back to a Vermont-registered

judgment, which itself derived from a Virginia-registered

judgment, which may be traceable to a different Georgiaregistered judgment, etc.” Id. (emphasis in original). Like

the De Leon I court, this court also cannot condone such a “a

web of interlocking and recursive registration, reregistration, and re-re-registrations[,]” id. at 1177,

especially where, as here, the First Arizona Registered

Judgment was not timely re-registered under Arizona law. 

In contrast, one clear advantage of “a scheme in which

only the original judgment can be registered, [is that] every

re-registered judgment relates back to a single source by a

single transaction.” Id. This means that “[a] party or court

having concerns about the validity of a registered judgment

need only trace back the matter one level —- from the

registration state to the original judgment.” Id. (footnote

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11 The last issue addressed in De Leon I was plaintiff’s suggestion

that the revived Illinois judgment was equivalent to “a ‘judgment on a

judgment.’” De Leon I, 742 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Fidelity is not making a

similar suggestion in this case. Hence, the court need not consider whether

the Washington Registered Judgment is equivalent to a judgment on a

judgment. The court observes, however, that the same reasons which

prevented the De Leon I court from treating the Illinois judgment as a

judgment on a judgment preclude treating the Washington Registered Judgment

as a judgment on a judgment. More specifically, as in De Leon I, because

the Washington Registered judgment “did not include a Summons, Certificate

of Service, or any other indication” that at the time of registration

Fidelity gave notice to defendants of that registration, this court could

not find that such judgment was equivalent to the Washington court “having

duly adjudicated an adversarial proceeding and issued a ‘judgment on a

judgment.’” See id. at 1178 (footnote omitted). 

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omitted). “Satisfaction or partial satisfaction of the

registered judgment can be reflected by a notation on the

original judgment, supplying notice of partial satisfaction to

anyone reviewing the registration of that original judgment in

another jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, “a scheme that treats

registered judgments and domestic judgments similarly for instate enforcement purposes –- thus satisfying the statutory

requirements of § 1963 -- but denies registered judgments the

capability of being re-registered elsewhere[,]” avoids “[t]he 

mischief of recursive registration and judgment creation[.]”11

Id.

For all of these reasons, the court finds that Fidelity

impermissibly filed the Washington Registered Judgment in this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Accordingly, the court

hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to “vacate the certification

of judgment for registration in another district[,]” Mot. (Doc.

9) at 1:16-17 filed in this court on July 7, 2011. The

granting of this motion renders moot defendants’ secondary

argument that because the Washington Registered Judgment “is

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void for lack of due process and personal jurisdiction, it

cannot be the basis for the registration of a new judgment in

Arizona.” See id. at 19:17-18. 

DATED this 9th day of April, 2013.

Copies to counsel of record

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