alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 202 (Monday, October 20, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 62618]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-24973]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD


Sunshine Act; Notice of Meeting

TIME AND DATE:  8:30 a.m. October 27, 2014.

PLACE:  10th Floor Board Meeting Room, 77 K Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20002.

STATUS:  Parts will be open to the public and parts closed to the 
public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Parts Open to the Public

1. Approval of the Minutes of the September 29, 2014 Board Member 
Meeting
2. Thrift Savings Plan Reports
    a. Monthly Participant Activity Report
    b. Quarterly Investment Policy Report
    c. Legislative Report
3. BlackRock Account Review
4. Quarterly Reports
    a. Vendor Financials
    b. Audit Status
    c. Budget Review
5. Internal Audit Charter
6. Annual Review of Capital Markets and L Funds (Mercer)

Parts Closed to the Public

1. Procurement
2. Personnel

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:  Kimberly Weaver, Director Office 
of External Affairs, (202) 942-1640.

    Dated: October 16, 2014.
James Petrick,
 Secretary, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.
[FR Doc. 2014-24973 Filed 10-16-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6760-01-P
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Nirobia G. Bracy, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Phoenix, City of, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-02347-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for screening pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e) which includes an argument for why this Court should dismiss this case 

at the screening stage. Because the filing fee was paid before the Federal Court, and 

because Plaintiff is not in custody, this Court finds no basis to screen the complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Accordingly, the motion will be denied. Defendants 

shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint (including filing a motion to dismiss 

on the same or different grounds as those identified in the motion for screening if they 

deem that to be the appropriate course) as set forth below. 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for screening (part of Doc. 4) is denied. The 

motion to dismiss (part of Doc. 4) is denied without prejudice. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:15-cv-02347-JAT Document 8 Filed 12/23/15 Page 1 of 2
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond 

to the complaint by January 12, 2016. 

 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-02347-JAT Document 8 Filed 12/23/15 Page 2 of 2
NUMBER 13-19-00458-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

DELORES HELEN VASQUEZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 156th District Court

of Bee County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes

Order Per Curiam

Appellant, Delores Helen Vasquez, has filed a notice of appeal with this Court from 

his conviction in trial court cause number B-18-2154-0-CR-B. The trial court's 

certification of the defendant's right to appeal shows that the defendant does not have the 

right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

On September 20, 2019, we ordered appellant's counsel, Sandra A. Eastwood, to, 

within thirty days, review the record and advise this Court as to whether appellant has a 
2

right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3, 44.4. No response to this Court's order has 

been received. Therefore, we ABATE this appeal and REMAND this cause to the trial 

court for a hearing to determine why counsel has failed to comply with this Court's order. 

The trial court's findings and conclusions shall be included in a supplemental clerk's 

record. The trial court shall file the supplemental clerk's record and reporter's record, if 

any, with the Clerk of this Court within thirty days of the date of this order.

If the trial court determines that counsel is unable to represent appellant in this 

matter, the trial court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant desires to 

prosecute the appeal, whether appellant is indigent, and whether appellant is entitled to 

appointed counsel. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1988); Stafford v. State, 

813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We further direct the trial court to issue 

findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding these issues. Should the trial court find 

that appellant desires to pursue this appeal, is indigent, and is entitled to appointed 

counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel. If counsel is appointed, the name, address, 

email address, telephone number, and state bar number of said counsel shall be included 

in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

5th day of November, 2019.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

tk/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEROY WILLIS, Jr.,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

W. BILL KOLLENDER; et al.,

 Defendants.

No. 08-56879

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00844-JAHJMA

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 16, 2010 ** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Leroy Willis, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that sheriff’s

FILED

MAR 02 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
tk/Research 2 08-56879

deputies used excessive force against him. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Willis’s action was time-barred. 

See Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal

injury claims); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (“For actions

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for

personal injury actions.”). Contrary to Willis’s contentions, the statute of

limitations began to run when the wrongful act results in damages, not when the

full extent of those damages are understood. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

391 (2007).

AFFIRMED.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF
VINCENT J. deSOSTOA, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
OF SEABULK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350 AND EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(b)
(Adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) The undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Seabulk International, Inc. (the Company) hereby
certifies that: 1. The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2004, to which
this certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: April 20, 2005 /s/ VINCENT J. deSOSTOAVincent J. deSostoaApril 20, 2005
National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546-0001

February 3, 2021

Reply to Attn of: Office of Chief Information Officer

TO: Officials in Charge, Center Directors, CIOs, CISOs

FROM: NASA Chief Information Officer and Senior Agency Official for 

Controlled Unclassified Information

SUBJECT: NASA Controlled Unclassified Information Internal Marking Waiver

The Office of the Chief Information Officer is establishing policy pertaining to Controlled 

Unclassified Information (CUI). In accordance with Executive Order 13556, the CUI program 

standardizes the way the Federal Government handles how sensitive information is marked, managed, 

and shared, while ensuring the information remains appropriately protected.

NID 2810.135, Controlled Unclassified Information, outlines the NASA CUI program 

implementation. Implementation of the CUI program will be a major change to our operations and 

will take some time to adjust. Therefore, the existing Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) and the new 

CUI programs will co-exist until October 1, 2021. 

During this transition period from SBU to CUI, NASA personnel have the option to use either the 

SBU or CUI unclassified information control programs. It is strongly recommended that 

organizations examine the CUI program to understand how it will impact their operations and begin 

to use CUI only as soon as practical. CUI is required to be fully implemented at NASA by December 

31, 2021. 

Please direct any questions about this waiver or CUI safeguarding requirements to the NASA CUI 

Program Manager, Stayce Hoult, at 256.544.7705, stayce.d.hoult@nasa.gov and/or NASACUI@mail.nasa.gov.

_________________________ ___________________________

Jeffery M. Seaton Date

NASA Chief Information Officer

cc: CUI Program Manager
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6442

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SOLOMAN HAM,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

(CA-97-2)

Submitted: September 9, 1999 Decided: September 14, 1999

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Soloman Ham, Appellant Pro Se. Marcus John Davis, Assistant United

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Soloman Ham appeals the district court’s order denying relief

on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See

United States v. Ham, No. CA-97-2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 1999). We deny

Ham’s motion for general relief. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
registrant's condensed consolidated financial statements for the fiscal quarter
ended March 28, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-27-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-28-1998
<CASH>                                           6,607
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,633
<ALLOWANCES>                                       219
<INVENTORY>                                     66,345
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               180,528
<PP&E>                                         197,063
<DEPRECIATION>                                  76,929
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 317,631
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          116,200
<BONDS>                                        150,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      35,577
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   317,631
<SALES>                                        262,739
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               262,739
<CGS>                                          216,211
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  228,790
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,135
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,806
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,823
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,983
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (25,909)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (13,926)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  119,830
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  259,090
        

</TABLE>
#### Doe, on the Demise of Morris, *v.*Himelick.

The purchaser of real estate for taxes must prove, *inter*alia, in making out his title, that the precept required by the statute had been received *by the*collector, authorising him to collect the taxes.

An agent is generally admitted as a witness, from necessity, to prove his delivery of goods or payment of .money for his principal.

Wednesday, *May*30.

APPEAL from the *Franklin*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

Ejectment. Plea, not guilty. There was a special verdict, which, so far as it is necessary to state it, is as follows: That the land in question was, in 1826, liable to assessment for taxes, and was assessed accordingly; that the owner of the land, by -his agent, paid to the .collector, before the sale in 1826, all the taxes which were required of him, but did not pay the taxes on the land described in the declaration; that the collector sold the land to the lessor of the plaintiff at the time and in the manner stated in the collector’s deed. The vei’dict then'sets out the collector’s deed, and states that the defendant is in possession under a conveyance executed to him by the patentee of the land. Upon this verdict, the Court gave judgment for the defendant.

The facts set out in this special verdict do not show that the *495plaintiff is entitled to recover. There is no statement by the jury, that the precept required by the statute had been received by the collector, authorising him to collect the taxes. The verdict, to be sure, sets out the collector’s deed; and that deed is *prima facie*evidence under the statute, that the collector after the receipt of the precept, had done his duty relative to the sale. *Parker*v. *Smith, May*term, 1835. But the deed is no evidence that the collector had authority to sell the land. The existence of the precept, authorising him to act in the premises, should have been proved aliunde. This case may be compared to the evidence required of a purchaser of real estate at a sheriff’s sale under execution. It is settled in such case, that the judgment and execution must be produced as well as the sheriff’s deed, in order to show the authority of the sheriff to sell. *Armstrong*v. *Jackson, November*term, 1822. The judgment on the special verdict is therefore correct.

*J. Ryman,*for the appellant.

*G. Holland,*for *the*appellee.

There is one other question raised in the cause. The defendant at the trial offered to prove by his agent, that the witness had paid the taxes. The witness was objected to as being interested, but the objection was overruled. The case, however, does not require an opinion respecting the admissibility of the witness, as the jury have found the payment not to have been made. It may be observed, however, that an agent is generally admitted, from the necessity of the case, to prove the delivery of goods of the payment of money by him for his principal. 1 Stark. Ev. 120.

Dewey, J. was absent.

*Per*Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed. To be certified, &c. Judgment for costs against the lessor of the plaintiff.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Salil Dhaumya, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of Pan American Goldfields****Ltd. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1)

the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended August 31, 2010 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  October 15, 2010

/S /Salil Dhaumya

_________________________________ 

Salil Dhaumya

Title: Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

** **

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with theaccompanying Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A ofFerrellgas Partners Finance Corp. for the year ended July 31, 2009, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on the datehereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacity and on the dateindicated below, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.             The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “ExchangeAct”); and

 

2.             The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofFerrellgas Partners Finance Corp. at the dates and for the periods indicatedwithin the Report.

 

The foregoing certificationis made solely for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is subject to the “knowledge” and “willfulness”qualifications contained in 18 U.S.C. 1350(c).

 

Thiscertification is being furnished to the SEC and is not to be deemed “filed”with the SEC for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwisesubject to the liability of Section 18. In addition, this certification isnot to be incorporated by reference into any registration statement ofFerrellgas Partners Finance Corp. or other filing of Ferrellgas PartnersFinance Corp. made pursuant to the Exchange Act or Securities Act of 1933, asamended, unless specifically identified as being incorporated therein byreference.

 

 
| Dated:  November 6, 2009 |                                       |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                               |                                       |
|                               | /s/ Stephen L. Wambold                     |
|                               | Stephen L. Wambold                         |
|                               | Chief Executive Officer and  President     |
|                               |                                       |
|                               |                                       |
|                               | /s/ J. Ryan VanWinkle                      |
|                               | J. Ryan VanWinkle                          |
|                               | Chief  Financial Officer and Sole Director |

 

----

***Asrequired by 18 U.S.C. 1350, a signed original of this written statement hasbeen provided to Ferrellgas Partners Finance Corp.**

 

----
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 613

To designate the Federal building located at 100 Alabama Street NW.,

in Atlanta, Georgia, as the ‘‘Sam Nunn Federal Center’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 5, 1997

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia (for himself, Mr. BISHOP, Mr. CHAMBLISS, Mr. DEAL

of Georgia, Mr. KINGSTON, and Mr. NORWOOD) introduced the following

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To designate the Federal building located at 100 Alabama

Street NW., in Atlanta, Georgia, as the ‘‘Sam Nunn

Federal Center’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The Federal building located at 100 Alabama Street

5 NW., in Atlanta, Georgia, shall be known and designated

6 as the ‘‘Sam Nunn Federal Center’’.

7 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

8 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

9 paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal
2

•HR 613 IH

1 building referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be

2 a reference to the ‘‘Sam Nunn Federal Center’’.

Æ
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2883

AN ACT

To amend the International Child Abduction Remedies Act

to limit the tort liability of private entities or organizations that carry out responsibilities of the United States

Central Authority under that Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevention of Child

5 Abduction Partnership Act’’.
 †

2

S 2883 ES

1 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY.

2 Section 7 of the International Child Abduction Rem3 edies Act (42 U.S.C. 11606) is amended by adding at the

4 end the following new subsection:

5 ‘‘(f) LIMITED LIABILITY OF PRIVATE ENTITIES ACT6 ING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE UNITED STATES

7 CENTRAL AUTHORITY.—

8 ‘‘(1) LIMITATION ON LIABILITY.—Except as

9 provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a private entity

10 or organization that receives a grant from or enters

11 into a contract or agreement with the United States

12 Central Authority under subsection (e) of this sec13 tion for purposes of assisting the United States Cen14 tral Authority in carrying out its responsibilities and

15 functions under the Convention and this Act, includ16 ing any director, officer, employee, or agent of such

17 entity or organization, shall not be liable in any civil

18 action sounding in tort for damages directly related

19 to the performance of such responsibilities and func20 tions as defined by the regulations issued under sub21 section (c) of this section that are in effect on Octo22 ber 1, 2004.

23 ‘‘(2) EXCEPTION FOR INTENTIONAL, RECK24 LESS, OR OTHER MISCONDUCT.—The limitation on

25 liability under paragraph (1) shall not apply in any

26 action in which the plaintiff proves that the private
†

3

S 2883 ES

1 entity, organization, officer, employee, or agent de2 scribed in paragraph (1), as the case may be, en3 gaged in intentional misconduct or acted, or failed to

4 act, with actual malice, with reckless disregard to a

5 substantial risk of causing injury without legal jus6 tification, or for a purpose unrelated to the perform7 ance of responsibilities or functions under this Act.

8 ‘‘(3) EXCEPTION FOR ORDINARY BUSINESS AC9 TIVITIES.—The limitation on liability under para10 graph (1) shall not apply to any alleged act or omis11 sion related to an ordinary business activity, such as

12 an activity involving general administration or oper13 ations, the use of motor vehicles, or personnel man14 agement.’’.

Passed the Senate October 1, 2004.

Attest:

Secretary.
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2883

AN ACT

To amend the International Child Abduction Remunder that Act. ities of the United States Central Authority ties or organizations that carry out responsibil- edies Act to limit the tort liability of private enti-
#### JOHN G. VAN DALEN, ETC. v. WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP, ETC.

September 6, 1989.

Cross-petition for certification granted. (See 232 *N.J.Super.*205).