In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1024

SUGIARTO HALIM,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Attorney General of

the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A098-919-014

ARGUED MAY 23, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2014

Before BAUERandEASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and ST.EVE,

District Judge.*

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Sugiarto Halim, an Indonesian citizen,

came to the United States in 2000 and overstayed his temporary visa. He filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and

The Honorable Amy J. St. Eve, of the United States District Court for the *

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 14-1024

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)

stating that he feared he would be persecuted if he were

sent back to Indonesia due to his status as a Chinese Christian.

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Halim’s application for

asylum because he failed to apply within the one-year statutory limit, and denied Halim’s otherrequests for relief because

he failed to show past persecution or establish a well-founded

fear of future persecution. Halim appealed to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); it affirmed the IJ’s decision and

dismissed the appeal. Halim now petitions this court for

review of his application for withholding of removal. We

conclude that the orders of the IJ and BIA are supported by

substantial evidence and deny Halim’s petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Halim, a native and citizen of Indonesia, came to the United

States on a visa in March 2000, and was authorized to stay for

six months. After his visa expired, he stayed in the United

States without applying for any type of legal residency. In

2005, the Department of Homeland Security detained Halim

and initiated removal proceedings against him for overstaying

his visa in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).

Halim sought asylum, withholding of removal proceedings

under § 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and

protection under the CAT. Halim contended that if he was

forced to return to Indonesia, he would be subject to persecution because of his Chinese ethnicity and Christian beliefs.

In his removal proceedings, Halim testified about discrimination he and his family faced in Indonesia due to their

Chinese descent. Halim testified that because his sister was
No. 14-1024 3

earlier denied enrollment in an Indonesian university, he

speculated that he would be rejected as well. Therefore, he left

his hometown of Medan in 1988 to attend university in

Germany.

On a trip home to visit his family in 1994, Halim witnessed

a riot fueled by ethnic and labor issues. The riot targeted

Chinese-owned stores and was at a shopping mall where his

sister owned a store. Halim and his sister were not injured and

the rioters did not enter or damage his sister’s store.

In 1998, violent racial riots targeting people of Chinese

ethnicity broke out again throughout Indonesia. In Halim’s

hometown of Medan, rock-throwing rioters swarmed the

streets in his family’s neighborhood. Halim’s family members

were not targeted or injured in the riot. At the time, Halim was

in Germany.

Additionally, Halim recounted several occasions when he

thought that he was harassed because of his ethnicity. He

claimed that when he traveled from Germany to Medan,

Indonesian airport personnel took his passport, searched his

luggage, and demanded money from him before they returned

his possessions. Halim alleged that the airport personnel

treated only ethnic Chinese in this manner. Halim said that he

complained about the crooked practice one time to an office at

the airport, but nothing came of his complaint. Halim also

testified about a hostile incident he had with a taxi driver when

he accidently stepped on the taxi driver’s foot. The driver told

Halim that if he had his friends with him, they would have

killed Halim.
4 No. 14-1024

Halim returned home for a year after completing his

master’s degree in 1999. Halim testified that people came to his

home and would “knock at the door, asking for money,

throwing rocks and saying Chinese likes to eat pork.” Halim

was never detained, arrested, prosecuted, or beaten because of

his ethnicity during the year he lived in Indonesia. He flew to

Los Angeles, California, in 2000. 

Halim learned about Christianity when he lived and

studied in Germany, but was not baptized until 2005. He fears

returning to Indonesia as a practicing Christian because he

read articles about churches being bombed in Indonesia and

some were Christian churches. Halim, however, did not

personally experience any discrimination on account of his

Christian beliefs while he lived in Indonesia.

Halim also submitted documentation to the IJ about the

turmoil that existed in Indonesia after his departure. The

United States Department of State’s 2010 HumanRightsReport

for Indonesia (“2010 HumanRights Report”) indicated that the

Indonesian government officially promoted racial and ethnic

tolerance; yet, a number of laws, regulations, and decrees still

had discriminatory effects on ethnic Chinese citizens. The

United States Department of State’s 2010 Religious Freedom

Report for Indonesia (“2010 Religious Freedom Report”)

described the religious, legal, and political framework of the

country and documented several of the religious abuses which

occurred between 2008 and 2010. Various internet articles

detailed religious attacks on Christians and the continued

discrimination against ethnic Chinese throughout Indonesia.
No. 14-1024 5

At the time of Halim’s removal proceedings, his father and

four of his five siblings still lived in Medan. His four siblings

owned their own businesses in Indonesia.

The IJ deniedHalim’s requests and ordered his deportation.

First, the IJ determined that Halim’s asylum application was

untimely because he filed it more than one year after his arrival

in the United States. Next, the IJ determined that Halim did not

qualify for withholding of removal, finding that the evidence

did not demonstrate that Halim had personally suffered past

persecution or that he would face a clear probability of future

persecution if he returned to Indonesia. The IJ also found that

the evidence did not support Halim’s claim that a pattern or

practice of persecution against Chinese Christians as a group

existed in Indonesia. Finally, the IJ determined that Halim did

not qualify for protection under the CAT.

On appeal to the BIA, Halim challenged the IJ’s denial of

withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Halim

did not contest the IJ’s finding that his application for asylum

was untimely. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Halim failed to

meet his burden of showing past persecution or a clear

probability of future persecution in order to qualify for

withholding of removal. The BIA also concluded that Halim

failed to establish that he faced a clear probability of torture, a

requirement for CAT protection. The BIA upheld the IJ’s order

and dismissed the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Halim now argues only that he is entitled to

withholding of removal. He does not contest the BIA’s denial

of his application for asylum or protections under the CAT in
6 No. 14-1024

his brief and he has waived his right to review of these issues.

Asere v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2006). Halim

focuses his appeal on the legal standards required for withholding of removal that this Circuit discussed in Salim v.

Holder, 728 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013). Halim contends that he has

a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the “pattern

and practice” of persecution in Indonesia against groups of

similarly-situated ethnic Chinese and/or Christians. As an

alternative, Halim contends that he met his burden of proof

and showed that he faces an individualized risk of persecution

if he is forced to return to Indonesia. Halim does not argue

that he experienced past persecution, which under 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(b)(1)(i) would entitle him to a presumption that he

would face future persecution upon his return to Indonesia.

When the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision and adds

its own analysis, as it did here, we review both decisions. See

Bathula v. Holder, 723 F.3d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 2013); Familia

Rosario v. Holder, 655 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2011). We apply the

principles of Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of

the immigration laws. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, No. 12-930

(U.S. June 9, 2014), Slip. Op. 13 (plurality opinion); see Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842–844 (1984). Thus, we apply a statute’s plain meaning

if the statute is clear, or we defer to the BIA’s reasonable

interpretation if the statute is unclear. Id. When the issue

requires a review of the BIA’s factual findings, as is the case

here, we review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. See

Bathula, 723 F.3d at 897–98; Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 912

(7th Cir. 2010). We will affirm the BIA’s determination to deny

eligibility for withholding of removal if its determination “is
No. 14-1024 7

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence

on the record considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Vahora, 626 F.3d at 912. We reverse only if

the record “is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could

fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. at 483–84.

To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant

must prove a past orfuture “threat to life orfreedom.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(b)(1)-(2); Yi Xian Chen v. Holder, 705 F.3d 624, 628 (7th

Cir. 2013). A threat to life or freedom is synonymous with

persecution, which this Circuit defines as “detention, arrest,

interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches,

confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, torture,

behavior that threatens the same, and non-life-threatening

behavior such as torture and economic deprivation if the

resulting conditions are sufficiently severe.” Yi Xian Chen, 705

F.3d at 629 (internal citations omitted). “‘Persecution’ does not

include the actions of private citizens ‘unless the government

is complicit in those acts or is unable or unwilling to take steps

to prevent them.’” Bitsin v. Holder, 719 F.3d 619, 628 (7th Cir.

2013) (quoting Chakir v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir.

2006)).

If an applicant did not suffer past persecution, he must

prove that it is “more likely than not” that he faces future

persecution “on account of his race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b); Bitsin, 719 F.3d at 628. An applicant can

prove a future threat to life or freedom in one of two ways:

(1) establish that the country to which the applicant is to be
8 No. 14-1024

removed has a “pattern and practice of persecution” against “a

group of persons similarly-situated to the applicant,” or (2)

establish that the applicant faces a personal risk of persecution

if he is forced to return home. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2)(i)-(ii);

Salim, 728 F.3d at 722–23.

A. Halim’s Pattern or Practice of Persecution Claim

An applicant for withholding of removal faces a difficult

burden to prove that a country has a pattern or practice of

persecuting a group similarly-situated to himself. Mitreva v.

Gonzales, 417 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2005). To establish a

country’s pattern or practice of persecution, an applicant must

prove the existence of a “systematic, pervasive, or organized

effort to kill, imprison, or severely injure members of the

protected group, and this effort must be perpetuated or

tolerated by state actors.” Ingmantoro v. Mukaskey, 550 F.3d 646

(7th Cir. 2008). Pattern or practice cases require an extreme

level of persecution because “once the court finds that a group

was subject to a pattern or practice of persecution, every

member of the group is eligible.” Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d

669, 675 (7th Cir. 2006). 

1. Whether a Pattern or Practice of Persecuting Ethnic

Chinese Exists in Indonesia

This Circuit denied the petitions of Chinese Christians

being deported to Indonesia in three prior cases because

petitioners could not prove that Indonesia’s government had

a pattern or practice of persecuting members of similarlysituated racial or religious groups. See Salim, 728 F.3d 718;

Ingmantoro, 550 F.3d 646; Kaharudin v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 619

(7th Cir. 2007). These cases do not foreclose Halim’s petition
No. 14-1024 9

because each application for withholding of removal is

independently reviewed to ensure that human rights conditions have not deteriorated to an extreme level of persecution. 

Ingmantoro, 550 F.3d at 651. However, they do present a

significant hurdle for him to overcome.

Halim submitted the 2010 HumanRights Report to the IJ to

support his argument that a pattern or practice of persecution

of ethnic Chinese exists in Indonesia. He argues that the

evidence we reviewed in Ingmantoro and Kaharudin is now

outdated and does not reflect the current conditions in Indonesia. The 2010 Human Rights Report stated that the Indonesian

“government officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance”

and that ethnic Chinese “increasingly participated in politics.”

However, the report also stated that “[a] number of articles of

law, regulation, or decree discriminated against ethnic Chinese

citizens” and “public servants still discriminated against them

when issuing marriage licenses and in other services.” The 1

2010 HumanRightsReport, however, is insufficient to establish

a pattern or practice of persecution: the “systematic, pervasive,

or organized effort to kill, imprison, or severely injure” ethnic

The 2013 Human Rights Report, the most recent report, does not include

1

the statement “[a] number of articles of law, regulation, or decree discriminated against ethnic Chinese citizens.” Instead, the 2013 report only

concludes that “[t]he government officially promotes racial and ethnic

tolerance.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Indonesia 2013 Human Rights Report,

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=

2013&dlid=220196. Contrary to Halim’s argument, the Human Rights

Reports support the conclusion that conditions for ethnic Chinese in

Indonesia are improving since the riots of the 1990s. See more at:

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
10 No. 14-1024

Chinese in Indonesia. While the report alluded to discrimination against ethnic Chinese, “[g]eneral conditions of hardship

that affect entire populations, however, are not persecution.”

Ahmed, 467 F.3d at 673. We agree with the IJ and BIA that the

evidence did not rise to the level necessary to establish a

pattern or practice of persecution.

2. Whether a Pattern or Practice of Persecuting Christians Exists in Indonesia 

To establish that he faces a likelihood of future persecution

based on his Christian faith, Halim testified before the IJ and

presented evidence of the religious tensions in Indonesia.

Halim now relies on an article about attacks at Christian

churches in Indonesia and the 2010 Religious Freedom Report.

The article mentioned a report that chronicled religious

attacks on Christians, but a researcher for the report said 

“‘[t]he dominant actors who committed violence are vigilante

groups,’” not the Indonesian government. In the article, the

Minister of Religious Affairs for Indonesia downplayed the

existence of religious discrimination and said that the “main

cause of religious tensions was that some groups did not want

to meet legal requirements for establishing houses of

worship.” The Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, a

2

non-government organization which promotes human rights

in Indonesia, also appreciated the steps the local police took

against the perpetrators of a violent attack at a Christian

The legal requirements for establishing a house of worship require the 2

approval oflocal community members, which can be difficult for Christians

to obtain in neighborhoods with a Muslim majority.
No. 14-1024 11

church in which the pastor and an elder were stabbed. The

Indonesian Supreme Court also upheld an administrative

court’s ruling to allow the building permit of a Christian

church. The article did conclude, however, that Indonesian

politicians and police should take further steps to resolve

religious conflict.

The 2010 Religious FreedomReport mirrored much of what

was said in the article, but stressed that the Indonesian

government increased efforts to condemn religiously motivated attacks and promote human rights. For example, the

Indonesian government hosted its first-ever interfaith dialogue with United States delegates in 2010, which encouraged

interfaith participation and addressed community needs.

Religious organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama’s

Lakpesdam, developed scholarship programs to enable

Muslim students to study Christian theology at Christian

schools. Local governments prosecuted individuals suspected

of committing past religiously-motivated violence. And, local

police reportedly protected churches holding joint Christian

and Muslim religious services in Poso, an area “once the scene

of extreme tension and sectarian violence.”

Though religious conflict persists in Indonesia, its government has notably taken steps to protect its citizens and

promote religious tolerance. Respect for religious freedom in

Indonesia appears to have improved since 2004 when the Fifth

Circuit held that there was clear evidence that the Christian

petitioners had an objective fear of future persecution based on

their faith under the present conditions of civil unrest. Eduard

v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversed and

remanded because “[a] review of the record indicate[d] that
12 No. 14-1024

Petitioners’ fears of persecution were based on their Christian

faith in particular, and Indonesian civil strife in general.”). In

this case, the evidence indicates that the Indonesian government neither implemented nor permitted others to systematically and pervasively persecute Christians. To the contrary, the

evidence shows that local and national government took

actions to improve religious freedoms for Christians and other

faiths. Therefore, substantial evidence in the record supported

the IJ’s and BIA’s determinations that the Indonesian government does not allow a pattern or practice of persecuting

Christians.3

B. Halim’s Individualized Risk of Future Persecution

Claim

As an alternative, Halim argues that the record reflects that

he has a well-founded fear that he will be singled out and

targeted as a Chinese Christian upon his return to Indonesia.

He contends that the general reports of continued ethnic and

religious discrimination in Indonesia in conjunction with his

proximity to the violent riots in the 1990s justify his fear of

persecution.

Belonging to a disfavored group does not entitle Halim to

a lower standard of evidence to prove his individualized fear

of persecution. Salim, 728 F.3d at 723–24. The standard is

The 2012 Religious Freedom Report still documented abuses of religious

3

freedom in Indonesia, but conditions for Christians did not show a

drastic decline or improvement from the 2010 report. U.S. Dep’t of

State, Indonesia 2012 International Religious Freedom Report,

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012

&dlid=208232.
No. 14-1024 13

objective, and Halim must show “‘specific, detailed facts

supporting the reasonableness of [his] fear’” that it is more

likely than not that he “‘will be singled out for persecution’” if

deported. Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Bevc v. INS, 47 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1995)). A

petitioner may rely on past persecution to “‘imply a future

threat’”; however, “‘the focus remains on what is likely to

happen following an alien’s return home.’” Kaharudin, 500 F.3d

at 623 (quoting Kobugabe v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir.

2006)).

The specific facts highlighted by Halim fall short of showing that he has an individualized risk of being singled out for

persecution. Halim was an unscathed bystander of the 1994

riot that occurred near his sister’s shop. He was not targeted

nor was his sister’s shop damaged. Halim was in Germany

during the 1998 riot, his family was not injured, and his

family’s house was not damaged. Furthermore, the airport

personnel’s unusual treatment of Halim, the taxi driver’s

threatening comment, and the disgruntled people who came to

his house were merely anecdotes of “unpleasant and even

dangerous conditions [that] do not necessarily rise to the level

of persecution.” Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995);

see also Kaharudin, 500 F.3d at 623 (past encounters when native

Indonesians “called her derogatory names, spat upon her, hit

her with rocks and touched her buttocks” did not amount to

persecution). Further undermining Halim’s claim is the fact

that his family continues to operate businesses and reside in

Indonesia unharmed. The IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions were

supported by substantial evidence that Halim did not reason-
14 No. 14-1024

ably fear an individualized threat of persecution upon his

return home. 

III. CONCLUSION

Halim failed to meet the test required for withholding of

removal. He did not show a pattern or practice of persecution

of Chinese Christians in Indonesia, nor could he establish that

his personal fear of persecution was reasonable. For these

reasons, his petition for review is DENIED.