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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50). The 

motion is fully briefed, and oral argument has not been requested. As follows, the motion 

will be granted. 

 On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff Schaun Owens was hired as a full-time Cosmetology 

Associate Instructor for the Maricopa Skill Center, a division of a community college 

operated by the Maricopa County Community College District (“District”). Owens 

alleges that shortly after school began that fall, her supervisor, Lisa Hemming, directed 

her to tell students that they could not speak Spanish in the student lounge, to which 

Owens responded in opposition. On February 12, 2014, Owens was terminated. 

 On September 4, 2015, Owens, appearing pro se, filed a complaint initiating the 

instant action against Hemming and the District, claiming racial discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count One), racial discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two), and retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right 

Schaun Owens, 

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Maricopa County Community College 

District and Lisa Hemming, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-15-01769-PHX-SPL

ORDER 
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to free speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three). (Doc. 1.) Defendants have moved 

for summary judgment on all three claims, arguing that there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact of discrimination or retaliation by Hemming, or municipal liability for her 

alleged conduct. 

 Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment may also be entered “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 323. If the movant carries its initial burden of production, in response, the 

non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts,” and instead must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court views the evidence 

and draws reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). However, only 

disputes over facts that could affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of 

summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 

 Here, Defendants first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on 

Owens’s racial discrimination and equal protection claims. (Doc. 50.) In her response, 

Owens does not address these claims or replies to Defendants’ arguments. Owens having 

failed to establish, must less identify, any triable dispute of material fact as to these 
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claims, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment” on Counts One and Two 

of the complaint. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. See also Jenkins v. Cty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 

1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (claims not raised in opposition to summary judgment 

motion are abandoned). 

 Second, Defendants argue that Owens has failed to show that there is a genuine 

issue of material fact as to her claim of retaliation by Hemming and municipal liability 

under Monell. In their memorandum, Defendants discuss each element of Owens’s claim 

and address the lack of evidence in the record which demonstrates that there is no triable 

issue of unconstitutional retaliation. They have filed a detailed statement of facts and 

attached supporting evidence. (Doc. 51.) Owens responds by arguing that the following 

creates a genuine issue for trial: she engaged in protected speech by “expressing her 

opinions on the illegality of Hemming’s directive to ban the Spanish language in the 

student lounge,” (Doc. 53 at 2); the decision to terminate her was motivated by her 

speech because it was only “four or five months after Ms. Owens brought to light 

Hemming[’]s unfair treatment of Spanish speaking students,” (Doc. 53 at 5); and the 

District is liable because it “made a deliberate choice to approve of and ratify Hemming’s 

numerous acts of retaliatory harassment by making the decision to remove Ms. Owens 

[from] her position, and [] allow[ed] Hemming’s harassment of Ms. Owens to continue 

for months while she was still an employee” (Doc. 53 at 6). 

 Owens’s response fails to carry her burden to identify, with sufficient particularity, 

facts that create a genuine dispute necessitating trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

475 U.S. at 587. Owens’s cursory reference to vague facts in her brief, without any 

specific citation to or discussion of them, is insufficient to demonstrate that there is a 

triable dispute of fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (“Rule 56(e) [] requires the 

nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

F.T.C. v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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(conclusory, self-serving statements in briefs lacking detailed facts and any supporting 

evidence are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact). Owens does not 

address or cite to any specific fact regarding the alleged “directive to ban the Spanish 

language in the student lounge,” the “opinions” or statements she made in response to 

Hemming’s conduct, when and where the protected speech occurred, the alleged 

harassing conduct, or the circumstances leading up to or surrounding her termination. 

Absent such facts, Owens fails to make a sufficient showing regarding the essential 

elements of her case which she would have to prove at trial. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 

1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Indeed, Owens has not pointed to or submitted any evidence to demonstrate that 

there is a triable dispute. Owens has not filed a responsive separate statement of facts, as 

was directed in the Court’s Order and is required by the local rules. (Doc. 52.) Owens has 

not attached any documentary evidence or submitted a written declaration stating the 

factual basis that supports her claims. The unsworn allegations in the complaint are 

insufficient to create an issue of fact on summary judgment. See Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990) (“the purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a 

party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential to the other 

side’s case to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process 

of litigation continues.”). And, even if Owens could defeat summary judgment by merely 

citing to the allegations in her complaint, it would not yield a different outcome in this 

case because here, she did not do so. 

 Owens was provided with an ample opportunity to develop the record through 

discovery, and received sufficient notice of the requirements needed to defeat 

Defendants’ motion. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent 

any evidence on summary judgment from Owens setting forth, with sufficient specificity, 

her version of the events that support her claims, the Court is unable to conclude that 

there is a triable dispute of fact. The Court is not required to construct arguments and 

identify the material facts in search of a genuine dispute for trial when Owens has chosen 
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not to do so herself. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A 

district court does not have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual 

dispute” and “lacks the power to act as a party’s lawyer, even for pro se litigants”); 

Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The district 

court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, 

where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so 

that it could conveniently be found”); Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996) (the district court has no responsibility on summary judgment to “scour the record 

in search of a genuine issue of triable fact”); Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 

F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants are therefore also entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim in Count Three. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) is 

granted. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2017.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge