Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES E. AYERS BRYCE H. BENNETT, JR.

Wernle, Ristine & Ayers BRANDON J. ALMAS

Crawfordsville, Indiana Riley Bennett & Egloff, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

.

SMITA RADHAKRISHNAN, )

)

Appellant-Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1303-PL-202

)

ACCESS THERAPIES, INC., )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable S.K. Reid, Judge

Cause No. 49D14-0711-PL-50819

January 21, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge
2

Access Therapies, Inc. (“Access”) filed a complaint against its employee Smita 

Radhakrishnan (“Radhakrishnan”), a foreign national, alleging that she had breached her 

employment contract. Radhakrishnan filed a counterclaim for costs and attorney fees,

contending that Access’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Following a 

bench trial, Radhakrishnan appeals the trial court’s order finding that she breached the 

contract and ordering her to pay damages in the amount of $32,237.60 plus costs and 

interest. Radhakrishnan also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her counterclaim. 

Accordingly, Radhakrishnan raises the following consolidated and restated issues for our 

review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Radhakrishnan had 

breached the contract; and

II. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Radhakrishnan’s 

counterclaim.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Access provides physical therapists and occupational therapists as temporary 

employees in hospitals and nursing homes throughout the United States. As part of its

business, Access provides job placement opportunities to foreign nationals. 

Radhakrishnan, a trained physical therapist from India, moved to Canada in 1999 

and became a Canadian citizen in 2003. In 2003, Radhakrishnan also came to the United 

States as a foreign national on an H-4 dependent visa, which she obtained through her 

husband who was working in California on an H-1B Visa (a Federal work visa for 
3

individuals working in a specialty occupation). To work as a therapist in the United States,

Radhakrishnan needed a physical therapy license for the state in which she was to work 

and either a valid Federal work visa or an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”). 

In 2005, Radhakrishnan obtained a license to work as a physical therapist in Michigan. 

On April 23, 2006, Radhakrishnan contacted Access by email, expressing her 

interest in obtaining employment as a physical therapist for Access. On May 5, 2006,

Radhakrishnan entered into a contract with Access (“the Contract”). Under the Contract, 

Access stated its desire to sponsor Radhakrishnan to work in the United States for a “period 

of not less than 18 months after Employee receives [her] work permit.” Appellant’s App. 

at 14. To begin the process of obtaining Radhakrishnan’s EAD and green card (permanent 

resident status), Access’s attorney, Felix Vinluan (“Vinluan”), filed the following 

documents with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on 

June 22, 2006: (1) Immigration Petition for Alien Worker on Form I-140; (2) Application 

to Adjust to Permanent Resident Status on Form I-485; and (3) Application for 

Employment Authorization on Form I-765.

1

 Joint Stipulated Ex. 4 at 1-3.

2

 A USCIS

Notice of Action, dated August 2, 2006, informed Vinluan and Radhakrishnan that the 

 

1 A Green Card holder is a permanent resident of the United States who has permission to live and 

work in the United States. http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last visited Dec. 17, 2013). The steps to 

become a permanent resident vary by category and depend on whether you live inside or outside the United 

States. Id. Most individuals are sponsored by a family member or employer in the United States. Id. Other 

individuals may become permanent residents through refugee status or other humanitarian programs. Id. 

Access filed documents on Radhakrishnan’s behalf so that she could work for Access, and hopefully 

become a permanent resident.

2 The Joint Stipulated Exhibits contain no internal numbering. For ease of reference, however, we 

have included pinpoint citations that refer only to the page numbers as manually counted.
4

application for employment authorization (Form I-765) had been approved and that 

Radhakrishnan would receive her EAD in a separate correspondence. Id. The notice stated

that Radhakrishnan was authorized to work in the United States “during the dates on the 

card,” i.e., from July 28, 2006 to July 27, 2007. Id. Vinluan’s office informed 

Radhakrishnan that, since the EAD was valid for only twelve months of the eighteen-month 

Contract, Radhakrishnan should contact Vinluan ninety days before the EAD expired in 

order to renew it. Tr. at 97.

Radhakrishnan’s first assignment for Access commenced on August 29, 2006; 

accordingly, the term of the Contract ended on February 29, 2008. In this assignment, 

Radhakrishnan worked with Transitional Health Services in Fremont, Michigan; she 

successfully completed her six-week obligation on October 6, 2006. Id. at 81.

Radhakrishnan’s second assignment was with Eaton County Medical Care Facility 

(“Eaton Care”) in Charlotte, Michigan. Pursuant to a contract (“Employer Contract”) 

between Access and Medical Connections, Inc.—the company that oversaw the staffing 

needs for Eaton Care—Access agreed that Radhakrishnan would work as a physical 

therapist for a period of thirteen weeks, from January 23, 2007 through April 20, 2007. Tr. 

at 81; Joint Stipulated Ex. 6 at 4. Radhakrishnan successfully completed this assignment 

and, at the end of the thirteen-week assignment, Access consented to Radhakrishnan’s 

request that the assignment with Eaton Care be renewed for an additional thirteen weeks—

her third assignment. Tr. at 81.
5

The details of the third assignment were set forth in Exhibit A-1 of the Employer 

Contract, which provided that Radhakrishnan would work for thirteen weeks during a

sixteen-week period that ran from April 23, 2007 through August 10, 2007.3 As part of the 

Employer Contract, three weeks in May were designated as pre-approved, unpaid leave 

that Radhakrishnan was granted to attend a family wedding in India. Joint Stipulated Ex.

6 at 5. 

More than ninety days prior to the July 27, 2007 expiration of her EAD, 

Radhakrishnan contacted Vinluan’s office to ensure that the renewal process of her EAD 

was timely commenced. Around July 18, 2007, when Radhakrishnan had still not received 

the renewed EAD, she contacted Vinluan to clarify her working status. Vinluan confirmed 

that “working without a valid EAD” was “an illegal status.” Tr. at 83. On July 23, 2007,

Radhakrishnan sent an email to the Chief Operating Officer for Access, Harvinder Dhani 

(“Dhani”), which stated:

This is to reiterate that my current EAD expires on July 27, 2007 and I will 

not be able to continue working on the current contract after July 27 in an 

invalid EAD status. The lawyer at Vinluan’s office had clearly stated that 

working without a valid EAD is illegal and is a chance that some people are 

taking. With 2 RFEs4 already issued on my I140/485 case so far, I am not 

 

3 Exhibit A-1 of the Employer Contract lists Radhakrishnan’s pre-approved days of unpaid leave 

as May 4, 2007 through May 29, 2007—a period of about three-weeks plus the Memorial Day holiday. 

Joint Stipulated Ex. 6 at 5. While the Employer Contract lists the end date of the third assignment as August 

10, 2007, inexplicably, both parties note in their briefs that the end date was August 16, 2007. Appellant’s 

Br. at 4; Appellee’s Br. at 3.

4 An RFE—“Request For Evidence”—is a formal response from USCIS that is issued when 

insufficient or suspicious data is found in a pending petition for an immigration benefit. RFEs are 

significant because, “[b]ased upon the response from the attorney or the petitioner, USCIS subsequently 

makes a decision to adjudicate or deny the petition.”

http://www.visajourney.com/wiki/index.php/Request_for_Evidence (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
6

willing to take such a chance. The lawyer had advised to wait for interim 

EAD approval and has secured a USCIS inforpass appointment for it.

I will be leaving Michigan on July 31 to attend the USCIS appointment on 

Aug[ust] 3 in California.

I would like to state that I have been a hard-working employee of Access 

Therapies and I understand that this move is inconvenient for Access

Therapies, but unfortunately this is a question of working on an illegal status 

(which the lawyer has confirmed) and so this is a step I am forced to take. 

As soon as I get my EAD renewal, I will promptly inform your office so that 

I can be assigned immediately and continue working on a legal status.

I have only 10 days left on this contract and the client facility is already aware 

of the need to replace my position. If Access intends to send another 

Therapist as my replacement, I shall do my best to help him/her take over.

As soon as I receive my interim EAD/renewed EAD card, I will inform your 

office so that Access Therapies can be able to find me a placement in 

California. (I am expecting my California license in a couple of weeks as 

well.

Joint Stipulated Ex. 8. The record contains no evidence that anyone from Access 

responded. On July 27, 2007, about two weeks before her third assignment was complete, 

Radhakrishnan, still without a valid EAD, stopped working for Eaton Care. 

On August 3, 2007, Radhakrishnan attended an appointment at the USCIS office in 

California to obtain an Interim EAD. Appellant’s App. at 64. Radhakrishnan was not 

issued an Interim EAD at the appointment; instead, she was directed to wait for the pending 

EAD renewal. While Radhakrishnan waited in California for news about the renewal, she 

received word from Vinluan’s office that her Form I-485 application had been approved 

on August 21, 2007, and that she had been granted permanent resident status.

Radhakrishnan later learned from the USCIS’s online system that her EAD renewal had 
7

been approved as of August 12, 2007; however, Radhakrishnan never received notice to 

that effect from either USCIS or Vinluan. Tr. at 88. Under the authority of either the EAD 

or her permanent resident status, Radhakrishnan was again entitled to work in any state for 

which she held a valid physical therapist license, which at that point was only Michigan. 

On November 29, 2007, Access filed a Verified Complaint for Damages,

contending that Radhakrishnan had breached the Contract when she stopped work on July 

27, 2007. Appellant’s App. at 9-17. More than a year later, Radhakrishnan received an 

email from Access on January 30, 2009, stating, “[W]e will be withdrawing your I-140 

petition as you are not working with us anymore.” Joint Stipulated Ex. 10. A CCS entry

dated March 21, 2009 reveals that an alias summons was not served on the November 2007 

complaint until March 2009. Appellant’s App. at 2. Radhakrishnan filed her Answer and 

her Counterclaim on June 1, 2009. Id. at 18-21. Access filed its Answer to 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff’s Counterclaim on July 21, 2009. Id. at 22-25. A bench trial 

was held on December 17, 2012, after which Radhakrishnan filed a Motion for Special 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On December 20, 2012, the trial court entered 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment Entry in Favor of Plaintiff, concluding 

that Radhakrishnan had breached the Contract, and Access was entitled to recover damages 

in the amount of $32,237.60, plus costs and interest. Radhakrishnan filed her Motion to 

Correct Error on January 18, 2013, which the trial court denied on January 31, 2013. 

Radhakrishnan now appeals. Additional facts will be added where necessary.
8

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Breach of Contract

Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), our standard of review is two-tiered. First, we determine whether 

the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. 

Briles v. Wausau Ins. Co., 858 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We will not disturb 

the trial court’s findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Walsh & Kelly, 

Inc. v. Int’l Contractors, Inc., 943 N.E.2d 394, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable 

inference from the evidence to support them. Briles, 858 N.E.2d at 212. A judgment is 

clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. Id. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses, but will consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. Although we defer to the trial court’s factual 

findings, we evaluate questions of law de novo. McCauley v. Harris, 928 N.E.2d 309, 313

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “Construction of a written contract presents a pure 

question of law; accordingly, our review is de novo.” Gold v. Cedarview Mgmt. Corp., 

950 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Harrison v. Thomas, 761 N.E.2d 816, 

818 (Ind. 2002)). 

In its complaint, Access alleged that Radhakrishnan “materially breached the 

[C]ontract by, among other things, failing and refusing to work for the agreed duration of 
9

eighteen (18) months.” Appellant’s App. at 10. Following a bench trial, the trial court 

made the following pertinent conclusions:

3. This is an action for breach of contract. To support a claim for breach 

of contract, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

(1) a contract existed, (2) the defendant breached the contract, and (3) the 

plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the defendant’s breach. Duncan v. 

Greater Brownsburg Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 967 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012)[, trans. denied]. 

4. The agreement dated May 5, 2006 is a valid and enforceable contract 

between Plaintiff, Access Therapies, Inc., on the one hand, and Defendant, 

Smita Radhakrishnan, on the other (the “Contract”).

5. The Contract required Defendant to work for Access as a physical 

therapist for a period of 18 months beginning upon the start of work.

6. In exchange, the Contract required Access to provide Defendant with 

assignments, pay her for the work she performed, and provide a housing 

allowance while Defendant was on assignment.

7. Because Defendant commenced work for Access on August 29, 2006, 

Defendant was contractually obligated to work through February 29, 2008.

8. When Defendant stopped working on July 27, 2007, Defendant 

breached her Contract with Access.

9. It was Defendant’s obligation to ensure that her EAD renewal 

paperwork was timely submitted so she could continue working on her 

Contract.

10. Accordingly, the Defendant’s breach of the Contract was unexcused.

Appellant’s App. at 66-67. 

On appeal, Radhakrishnan agrees that the Contract was “a valid and enforceable 

contract between [herself] and Access Therapies.” Tr. at 80. She also agrees that “the term 

of the agreement was for eighteen (18) months beginning on the start of work,” which 
10

meant that the Contract ran from August 29, 2006 to February 29, 2008. Id. at 80-81. 

Radhakrishnan, however, disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that she breached the 

Contract, contending, instead, that to continue working without valid federal working 

papers would have been “unlawful and put her at ultimate risk of deportation,” and that it 

was Access’s attorney who was responsible for obtaining and maintaining the work visa. 

Appellant’s Br. at 15. Additionally, she contends that Access prevented her from 

completing the Contract when it only offered her jobs in California, a state Access knew 

she was not licensed to work in.

Access drafted the Contract, which was an agreement between a national company 

and a foreign national who was not represented by an attorney. All parties agree that 

Radhakrishnan would not have been legally allowed to work in the United States without 

a green card or a working visa. Therefore, an integral provision of the Contract was the 

manner by which Radhakrishnan, a foreign national, would obtain the proper 

documentation to be authorized to work for Access in the United States. In accordance 

with the rules of contract interpretation, any ambiguity in the contract is construed against 

the party who drafted it. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 892 

(Ind. 2004). 

Here, the body of the Contract contained no terms addressing the key issue of whose 

responsibility it was to obtain and maintain proper documentation for Radhakrishnan. 

While recitals do not ordinarily form a part of the agreement, they shed light on the 

intention of the parties and may be referred to “in determining the intent of the parties 
11

where its operative parts are ambiguous.” Ohio Valley Gas, Inc. v. Blackburn, 445 N.E.2d 

1378, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Lacking guidance from the body of the Contract, we turn 

to the Recitals. 

The Recitals of the Contract provided as follows:

Employee is a foreign national who has immigrated to the United States and 

wishes to be employed as a professional Physical Therapist with Employer. 

In order to work in the United States as a PT, Employee must have a valid 

Employment–based Visa. Employer shall sponsor the Employee for an 

Employment-based Visa with USCIS, as well as employment with 

Employer. 

Employer is desirous of hiring Employee as a full time [e]mployee to work 

in Employer’s Client facilities as a PT [physical therapist] for a period of not 

less than 18 MONTHS after Employee receives his/her work permit. In order 

to help the Employee to accomplish those goals, Employer will complete and 

submit to the USCIS the Employee’s petition paperwork (I-140 Petition) and 

other necessary documents, employ Employee, and for this and other 

consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Employee hereby 

agrees to these additional terms and conditions of [e]mployment.

Appellant’s App. at 14. The above language conveys that, while Radhakrishnan wished to 

work for Access, it was Access who wanted to hire Radhakrishnan as a full time employee 

for a period of not less than eighteen months after Radhakrishnan received her work permit. 

The Recitals continued that, in order to help Radhakrishnan accomplish the goal of working 

for Access for eighteen months, “Employer will complete and submit to the USCIS the 

Employee’s petition paperwork (I-140 Petition) and other necessary documents . . . .” Id. 

Access acknowledges that it agreed to arrange for the initial working papers. As 

such, on June 22, 2006, Access’s attorney, Vinluan, filed with the USCIS: (1) an 

Immigration Petition for Alien Worker on Form I-140; (2) an Application to Adjust to 
12

Permanent Resident Status on Form I-485; and (3) an Application for Employment 

Authorization on Form I-765. Joint Stipulated Ex. 4 at 1-3. The parties disagree, however, 

regarding whose responsibility it was to renew the documents required to enable 

Radhakrishnan to legally work. 

Radhakrishnan contends that she provided Vinluan with the appropriate information 

in a timely fashion. Access agrees that it put Radhakrishnan in touch with Vinluan to renew 

her working papers, but, attempting to distance itself from Vinluan, Access contends that 

Vinluan was not working on Access’s behalf. We are not persuaded. During the trial, 

Dhani himself admitted that Vinluan was Access’s attorney when he made the following 

statements:

[Defense Attorney]: Okay. . . . [W]ith regard to the defendant and other 

persons in her position, was [Vinluan] acting for the business when he 

did the things he did for them?

[Dhani]: Just like any attorney would do that you know he works as an 

outside attorney for us you know we would pay for his fee for his 

work.

[Defense Attorney]: For the business?

[Dhani]: Yes.

[Defense Attorney]: Okay. Now, he’s operating for the business and did you 

then consider him to be your attorney?

[Dhani]: . . . [I]f we are paying his fee I’m hoping that he’s our attorney.

Tr. at 47. 

Here, the Contract does not specify whose obligation it was to renew the EAD; 

however, the Recitals state, “Employer will complete and submit to the USCIS the 

Employee’s petition paperwork (I-140 Petition) and other necessary documents.” 

Appellant’s App. at 14. We find that the evidence does not support the trial court’s 
13

conclusion that it was Radhakrishnan’s obligation to ensure that her EAD renewal 

paperwork was timely submitted so she could continue working on her Contract.”

Appellant’s App. at 67. Interpreting the terms of the Contract against the drafter, as we 

must, we conclude that the obligation to ensure the timely renewal of the EAD fell to 

Access as a precondition to Radhakrishnan’s continued employment. Because it was 

illegal for Radhakrishnan to work without a renewed EAD, we find that, Radhakrishnan 

did not breach the contract when she refused to work from July 27 through the time she 

learned that she could, again, legally work in the United States.

That leaves the question of whether Radhakrishnan breached the Contract at any 

time after July 27, 2007 but before Access filed its complaint in November 2007. On 

August 8, 2007, prior to Radhakrishnan having obtained her working papers, Access 

Recruiter Suresh Kammath (“Kammath”) emailed Radhakrishnan saying, “Please let me 

know about your license in CA. I have a couple of openings there.” Joint Stipulated Ex.

9. The next day, Radhakrishnan responded, “I have applied but haven’t received my CA 

license yet. The process usually takes a few weeks if it goes smoothly. Once I receive it, 

I will inform you promptly.” Id. On October 16, 2007, Kammath again emailed 

Radhakrishnan, saying, “Any updates on your CA license?” Id. Radhakrishnan responded 

the next day, “I haven’t received the license yet. There were some further requirements 

they had, which I am in the process of submitting.” Id. In response to a telephone call 

from Access employee Advhi Jain (“Jain”), Radhakrishnan emailed him on November 13, 

2007 to say that she was awaiting her California license, but that she would inform Access 
14

“once [she] received it.” Id. Jain responded, “[P]lease keep us updated so that we could 

have something in hand for you.” Id. In the emails, Access did not offer Radhakrishnan 

any positions in Michigan. Between July 27, 2007, the last day Radhakrishnan worked for 

Eaton Care, and February 29, 2008—the end of the Contract—Radhakrishnan did not 

receive any pay nor was she provided any housing or expenses. Access filed its breach of 

contract action on November 29, 2007, thus terminating the Contract. 

Access knew that Radhakrishnan was awaiting her California license. It appeared 

to be taking longer than expected, and yet, Access voiced no concerns nor did it register

any complaints.5 Pursuant to the Contract, it was not Radhakrishnan’s responsibility to 

obtain work; instead, Access was the one who contracted with care centers to provide them 

with Radhakrishnan’s physical therapy services. Furthermore, Radhakrishnan could not 

have known that her lack of work was being deemed to be a breach of contract. Under the 

Contract, Radhakrishnan was not obligated to work each week during the eighteen months. 

In fact, Radhakrishnan was idle for fifteen weeks between the end of her first assignment 

and the start of her second even though she made efforts to be assigned.6 Based on this 

evidence, we cannot say that Radhakrishnan breached her Contract with Access. 

 

5 Radhakrishnan’s California physical therapist license was not approved until September 8, 2008, 

about seven months after Radhakrishnan’s February 29, 2008 obligation under the Contract would have 

expired.

6 On October 31, 2006, Radhakrishnan both called and sent an email to Access Recruiter Kammath, 

asking him about a position in Ann Arbor, Michigan, which Kammath had spoken to her about. No 

assignment arose from this inquiry. On November 21, 2006, Radhakrishnan sent an email to Kammath to 

alert him about a thirteen-week assignment in a skilled nursing facility in Three Rivers Michigan. Again, 

no assignment came of this lead. Access did not offer Radhakrishnan another assignment until January 23, 

2007—more than fifteen weeks after she had completed her first. Joint Stipulated Ex. 7. 
15

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of $32,237.60 plus 

costs and remand for action consistent with this opinion. 

II. Counterclaim

Radhakrishnan filed a counterclaim against Access seeking costs and attorney fees. 

Radhakrishnan contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her counterclaim for lack 

of evidence. In essence, Radhakrishnan contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying her request for attorney fees and costs because Access’s suit was frivolous. We 

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Radhakrishnan maintained that Access’s complaint contained averments that were 

known to be untrue and, as such, the claim was frivolous under Indiana Code section 34-

52-1-1. Specifically, Radhakrishnan maintained that the following statements were untrue: 

(1) that Access paid for Radhakrishnan’s certification as a physical therapist; (2) that 

Access paid for Radhakrishnan’s license in Michigan; (3) that Radhakrishnan immigrated

to the United States seeking employment opportunities; (4) that Radhakrishnan refused to 

work; and (5) that the cause of action against Radhakrishnan would involve more than 

$10,000. Appellant’s App. at 20-21. The trial court determined that because the

counterclaim was “asserted in such general terms,” evidence pertaining to the counterclaim 

would be heard and considered throughout the trial. Tr. at 17.

At the close of trial, the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and made the 

following findings:

Okay. The Court is going to find for the plaintiff and against the defendant on 

the defendant’s counterclaim. There’s literally been no evidence presented by 
16

the defendant in support of the counterclaim. Now, I understand there’s been 

responses by the defendant to plaintiff’s allegations. Understand that perfectly, 

but the defendant would have the burden of proof on her allegation that, and 

I’m reading from her counterclaim that the claims are frivolous, unreasonable, 

groundless, and made in bad faith and I have no evidence to support that 

allegation.

Id. at 110. As such, the trial court effectively denied Radhakrishnan’s request for attorney 

fees and costs. 

“‘The trial court’s decision to grant or to deny attorney[] fees will not be disturbed 

absent an abuse of discretion.” Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002) (quoting Kovenock v. Mallus, 660 N.E.2d 638, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. 

denied). The trial court found that no evidence was presented to support Radhakrishnan’s 

counterclaim. We agree. Radhakrishnan’s claims—questioning the veracity of statements 

regarding who paid for licenses and fees and whether Radhakrishnan immigrated seeking 

employment—were of no moment in the determination of whether Radhakrishnan 

breached the Contract. Additionally, the question of whether Radhakrishnan refused to 

work, and if so what damages should be imposed, were questions properly before the trial 

court on the breach of contract claim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing Radhakrishnan’s counterclaim requesting attorney fees and costs.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.