J-S10038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MITCHELL RYAN BILLS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1160 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 29, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-62-CR-0000387-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: May 14, 2024

Mitchell Ryan Bills (“Bills”) appeals from the order denying his petition 

for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 

Additionally, Bills’ court-appointed counsel, Tatiana E. Malys, Esquire 

(“Attorney Malys”), has filed a motion to withdraw from representation and a 

brief styled pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2 We

grant Attorney Malys’ motion and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed not 

under Anders but under Commonwealth v. Turner, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (en banc) (collectively, “Turner/Finley”). Although Anders and

Turner/Finley are close cousins, bearing similarities in that counsel is

required to examine the record, present issues, and request permission to

withdraw, there are also significant differences, as explained infra. See

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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In August 2021, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers Corey Knepp and 

Joshua Tassone responded to a report from a property owner of an unknown

male who had parked on his property and appeared to be passed out in his 

vehicle, which was still running. The male, later identified as Bills, became 

verbally combative as the troopers approached the vehicle and tried to wake 

him. Bills’ speech was thick and slurred, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, 

and there was an odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. The troopers 

informed Bills he was under arrest for driving under the influence (“DUI”). 

Bills refused to comply with the instruction to exit his vehicle and kicked 

Trooper Tassone. Trooper Tassone deployed his taser to gain control of Bills. 

Bills continued to kick and punch both troopers. Both troopers deployed their 

tasers and ultimately had to tackle Bills to the ground. Bills was arrested and 

charged with numerous offenses following the incident. 

On March 10, 2022, with the assistance of Charles Rosen, Esquire (“plea 

counsel”), Bills pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, DUI, and summary 

charges for careless driving and restrictions on alcoholic beverages.3 The 

Commonwealth nolle prossed six additional related charges.4 The trial court 

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3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3714(a),

3809(a).

4 Bills was also charged with an additional count of aggravated assault, as well 

as simple assault, illegally operating a vehicle without ignition interlock with a 

blood alcohol content above .025, illegally operating a vehicle not equipped 

with ignition interlock, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and 

harassment.
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scheduled the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation 

report (“PSI”). 

On May 20, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the 

hearing, Bills learned that there was a discrepancy between the prior record 

score (“PRS”) that his plea counsel had calculated and the PRS provided in the 

PSI. Whereas plea counsel calculated Bills’ PRS as a three, the PSI indicated 

that it was, in fact, a five, which increased the standard sentencing range

guidelines for the charges to which Bills pleaded guilty. The trial court gave 

Bills and plea counsel time to discuss the implications of the correct PRS and

Bills did not indicate a desire to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, the trial court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty to sixty months in prison.

Bills filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider sentence, in which plea 

counsel again explained his error in calculating Bills’ PRS. The motion further 

averred that Bills wished to present mitigating factors on his aggravated 

assault charge; however, plea counsel was unprepared to present such 

evidence at the sentencing hearing due to his calculation error. The trial court

denied the motion. Bills did not file a direct appeal.

On September 16, 2022, Bills filed the instant timely pro se petition, his 

first.5 The PCRA court appointed Attorney Malys who filed an amended 

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5 Bills had thirty days in which to file an appeal in this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a). As Bills opted not to do so, his judgment of sentence became final 

upon the expiration of time for filing an appeal on September 6, 2022. See

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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petition. In the amended petition, Bills requested leave to withdraw his guilty 

plea based on the ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Bills claimed that 

plea counsel ignored evidence of a viable defense to the criminal charges and

incorrectly advised him regarding his sentencing exposure. The PCRA court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Bills and plea counsel testified. 

Plea counsel explained that he made the aforementioned error in calculating 

Bills’ PRS. See N.T, 8/25/23, at 17. Plea counsel testified that he advised 

Bills of his belief, based on the evidence, that Bills would be found guilty if he

proceeded to trial. See id. at 26. Bills testified that he was under personal,

financial, and physical stress at the time he entered his plea. See id. at 75. 

Bills indicated that he consulted a different attorney to obtain a second opinion

when plea counsel informed him that he would withdraw if Bills chose to 

proceed to trial. See id. at 83. Bills stated that he hoped the Commonwealth 

would offer him a deal to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge instead of a 

felony due to his non-violent history. See id. at 80. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the PCRA court denied Bills’ PCRA petition. Bills filed a timely notice 

of appeal, and both he and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that a judgment of sentence becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the United State Supreme Court, or upon 

the expiration of time for seeking such review). Bills had one year from that 

date, or until September 6, 2023, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (providing that any petition shall be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment becomes final). Thus, Bills’ pro se petition, 

filed on September 16, 2022, was timely filed.
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Attorney Malys noted her intent to file a Turner/Finley brief in the Rule

1925(b) statement. In this Court, Attorney Malys filed a motion to withdraw 

from representation and an accompanying brief styled pursuant to Anders.

At the outset of our review, we note that this case does not implicate

Anders. As explained above, Anders applies to direct appeals whereas

Turner/Finley applies to PCRA cases. This Court has explained the

differences between the requirements imposed by Anders and

Turner/Finley, as follows:

Anders counsel is not permitted to withdraw unless the appeal is

wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley counsel is permitted to do so

if the case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed

wholly frivolous. Also, Anders counsel must not argue against

the client’s interests while Turner/Finley counsel must do so,

articulating why the client’s claims have no merit.

The heightened protection afforded to Anders appellants as

compared to Turner/Finley petitioners/appellants arises because

the right to counsel on direct appeal and the right to the direct

appeal itself are constitutional ones. By comparison, a first-time

PCRA petitioner’s right to counsel is born of rule, namely

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), and that right does not spring from the

federal or state constitutions.

Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 722 (citations omitted).

Because an Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant,

this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley “no merit”

letter. See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super.

2011). However, prior to addressing the merits of the issues raised for our

review, we must assess whether counsel’s filings satisfy the technical

requirements of Turner/Finley. See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d
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509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that “prior to addressing the merits of

the appeal, we must review counsel’s compliance with the procedural

requirements for withdrawing as counsel”).

Pursuant to Turner/Finley, independent review of the record by

competent counsel is required before withdrawal on collateral appeal is

permitted. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009),

overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381,

401 (Pa. 2021) (abandoning Pitts’s approach as the sole procedure for

challenging PCRA counsel’s effectiveness). In Pitts, our Supreme Court 

explained that such independent review requires proof of:

1. A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and 

extent of [counsel’s] review;

2. The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the 

petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3. The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation,” in the “no-merit” letter, of 

why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4. The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of the 

record; and

5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was

meritless.

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). Further, counsel must also send a copy

of the “no-merit” letter to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to

withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or to retain

new counsel. See Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721. Substantial compliance with

the requirements to withdraw as counsel will satisfy the Turner/Finley
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criteria. See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa.

Super. 2003). If the brief meets these requirements, we then conduct an

independent review of the petitioner’s issues. See Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 511.

Our review discloses that Attorney Malys has substantially complied with

the above requirements. In the Anders brief, Attorney Malys detailed the

nature and extent of her review of the case, listed each issue that Bills wished

to have reviewed, and explained counsel’s reasoning for concluding that each

of the issues are meritless. See Anders Brief at 5-6, 13-17. Attorney Malys

has provided this Court with a copy of a letter dated November 24, 2023, that

she sent to Bills informing him of her belief that the appeal was frivolous. See

Letter, 11/24/23, at unnumbered 1. Attorney Malys also advised Bills of his

rights to retain replacement counsel or proceed pro se. Id. The letter does

not indicate that a copy of the petition to withdraw or a copy of the Anders

brief was attached to the letter. Id. However, the petition to withdraw and

the Anders brief both contain a certificate of service which indicates that a 

copy of the document was sent to Bills on January 16, 2024. See Motion to

Withdraw, 1/17/24, at 4; see also Anders Brief, 1/17/24, at 21. Thus, we

conclude that Attorney Malys has substantially complied with the requirements

necessary to withdraw as counsel. See Karanicolas, 836 A.2d at 947. We 

now independently review Bills’ claims to ascertain whether they entitle him 

to relief.
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In the Anders brief, Attorney Malys listed the issues that Bills wished 

to raise, as follows:

I. Whether the denial of the PCRA relief was merited when 

Attorney Rosen failed to obtain taser documents as part of 

discovery, even t[h]ough . . . Bills asked Attorney Rosen to 

see the taser documents prior to entering a plea.

II. Whether the denial of the PCRA relief was merited when 

Attorney Rosen failed to inform . . . Bills of the correct [PRS] 

and the standard ranges applicable at his sentencing, and 

by doing so affect[ed] . . . Bills’ possibility of entering a plea 

knowingly and intelligently.

Anders Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is wellsettled:

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence 

of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is 

supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This 

Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

In both of his issues, Bills claims that plea counsel was ineffective. “A 

criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea process as 

well as during trial. A defendant is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea under 

the PCRA if ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary plea of guilty.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 
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(Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). “The voluntariness of the plea depends 

on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (citation omitted). Counsel is presumed 

effective and the person claiming ineffectiveness must prove otherwise. See 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 178 (Pa. 2012). To succeed on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must plead and prove 

three things: “(1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s 

actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted 

from counsel’s act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 

865, 880 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). If the petitioner fails to meet 

any one of these prongs, the ineffectiveness claim fails. See id. 

In the Anders brief, Attorney Malys explains that the first issue that 

Bills wished to raise is that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain 

taser documents as part of discovery despite Bills’ request to see the taser 

documentation prior to entering his negotiated plea. Bills wished to see the 

taser documentation because he thought it might contain favorable evidence. 

Bills claims that plea counsel refused to request the taser documents because, 

in plea counsel’s opinion, the evidence of Bills’ guilt was overwhelming and 

any attempt to deny his guilt at trial would be contradicted by the two state 

troopers. Bills testified at the evidentiary hearing that he would rather have 

entered a no contest plea, but felt pressured to enter his guilty plea because 
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plea counsel informed him that he would not represent Bills if he wished to 

proceed to a trial of the matter. 

Attorney Malys indicates her belief that this issue is frivolous because, 

at the time of the evidentiary hearing, all of Bills’ concerns regarding his plea, 

and whether it was made knowingly and intelligently, were addressed through 

testimony and argument. Attorney Malys notes that, at the evidentiary 

hearing, the PCRA court refused to allow the troopers to testify about the taser 

documents because Bills waived the right to additional discovery when he 

entered his guilty plea. Additionally, Attorney Malys explains that plea counsel 

testified at the evidentiary hearing that Bills was colloquized prior to entering 

his guilty plea and at his sentencing, and on both occasions confirmed that he 

was informed about all of the rights he would be giving up if he entered a 

guilty plea. In Attorney Malys’ estimation, the record in the case is clear that 

Bills waived any additional rights he might have had regarding discovery when 

he entered his guilty plea. 

The PCRA court considered Bills’ first issue and determined that it lacked 

merit. The court reasoned:

This court opines that [Bills’] underlying claim has no 

arguable merit as his plea did not include conduct that occurred 

after the taser was deployed. Thus, documentation of the taser 

deployment after the officer has been punched is not relevant in 

any way to the aggravated assault charge. [Plea] counsel 

effectively advised [Bills] that taser evidence in this case would 

not address his conduct BEFORE the taser was fully deployed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/22/23, at 5 (emphasis in original).
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Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

we conclude that the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record

and legally sound. The record reflects that Bills was both driving while 

intoxicated and physically combative with the troopers before they first 

deployed their tasers. Bills has failed to show that the taser documentation 

would have been of any evidentiary value, let alone of relevance, to the 

criminal charges pending against him. To be sure, the taser documentation 

would not provide any exculpatory evidence to aid in his defense. Thus, Bills 

cannot show that his claim is of arguable merit. Moreover, given the 

overwhelming evidence of Bills’ guilt and the number of charges that were 

nolle prossed as part of the plea agreement that plea counsel was able to 

negotiate on Bills’ behalf, he has failed to demonstrate that plea counsel had 

no reasonable basis for recommending that Bills enter a negotiated plea. 

Accordingly, based on our independent review, it is clear that Bill cannot 

satisfy all three prongs of the test for ineffectiveness. Therefore, we conclude 

that Bills’ first issue is meritless. 

In the Anders brief, Attorney Malys explains that the second issue that 

Bills wished to raise is that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 

him of his correct PRS. Attorney Malys explains that, at sentencing, plea 

counsel requested a time-served sentence based on a PRS of 3. The mistake 

in plea counsel’s PRS calculation prompted a discussion on the record about 

the miscalculation as well as the correct calculation of Bills’ PRS of 5. Bills 

claims that, due to plea counsel’s mistake, he failed to inform Bills of the 
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correct standard range sentences applicable to his guilty pleas, and thereby 

affected the basis of his plea. 

Attorney Malys indicates her belief that this issue is frivolous because 

the PCRA court concluded that plea counsel’s mistake regarding the PRS

calculation was dealt with properly at the time of sentencing. Attorney Malys 

explains that, while still on the record at the sentencing hearing, Bills was 

informed of the correct PRS and the correct standard range sentences 

applicable to the charges to which he had pled guilty. Attorney Malys points 

out that the PCRA court concluded that, but for the mistake made by plea 

counsel, the result of the sentencing would not have changed because a PRS 

is what it is. Anders Brief at 16-17 (citing N.T., 8/25/23, at 96).

The PCRA court considered Bills’ second issue and determined that it 

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

In the instant case the court did consider that [Bills] had a 

[PRS] of five and that counsel had informed him that his [PRS] 

was three. When counsel received the [PSI], he acknowledged he 

was in error and that changed the standard range from nine to 16 

months to 21 to 27 months. [Plea counsel] argued at time of 

sentence and in the motion to reconsider that [Bills] had not been 

in trouble for [ten] years and had mental health issues that could 

be attributed to his violent response to the officers. [Bills] also 

was permitted to address the court[,] as well[,] and the court 

properly sentence[d] [him] within the standard range based upon 

the facts and circumstances of this case. All of those statements 

were addressed at the time of sentencing. The court gave [plea 

counsel] an opportunity to discuss the mistake in the calculation 

prior to sentencing so that [Bills] was aware of the changes in 

sentencing guidelines. At no time did [plea] counsel or [Bills] 

suggest that he wanted to withdraw his plea based upon the 

discovery that his [PRS] was a five rather than a three. Counsel 

was in error but he properly advised [Bills] of the correct prior 
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record score prior to sentencing. . . . [Bills] appeared to 

acknowledge that his prior criminal history was factually accurate 

at the time of sentencing and the court properly sentenced him 

within the standard range. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/22/23, at 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

we conclude that the PCRA court’s determination is supported by evidence of 

record and is free of legal error. The sentencing record reflects that the PCRA 

court accurately described plea counsel’s mistake and ensured that Bills knew 

his correct PRS and the increased standard range sentences which would apply 

before Bills was sentenced. See N.T., 5/20/22, at 11. The sentencing record 

further reflects that, when informed of the correct PRS and increased 

penalties, Bills voiced no indication that this information altered his desire to 

plead guilty or that he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas. Given that Bills 

was informed of counsel’s mistake and provided with accurate information 

prior to being sentenced, and made no indication that he wished to withdraw 

his guilty plea, Bills has not shown that he suffered prejudice from counsel’s 

miscalculation of his PRS. Accordingly, based on our independent review, Bills 

cannot satisfy all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test. Therefore, his 

second issue is meritless.

Having found no merit to Bill’s issues, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Bills’ petition.

Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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5/14/2024