Orlando Figueroa - IRB Chair

Shea Kearns – Review Manager

Nathan Boll – Review Manager

Jeffrey Elbel – Technical Editor

Mars Sample Return (MSR)

Independent Review Board-2 Final Report

September 1, 2023
Table of Contents

• MSR IRB-2 Members 

• MSR IRB-2 Charter

• Review Methodology 

• Background

• The Imperative and Value of Returned Samples from Mars

• Recognition of Strengths

• Key Takeaways from All Findings

• Key Takeaways from All Recommendations

• Findings and Recommendations 

• Additional Important Findings and Recommendations

• Appendix
MSR IRB-2 Members

Orlando Figueroa, Chair

Steve Battel

Jon Bryson

Anders Elfving

Vicky Hamilton

Michele King*

Gentry Lee

Daniel Limonadi

Jonathan Lunine

Todd May*

Heather McDonald

Adm. Mike Mullen

Keith Parrish*

Lisa Pratt*

Gary Rawitscher

Janet Vertesi

Programmatic Consultants

• Louis Fussell

• Mark Jacobs

• Andy Prince

• Jahi Wartts

* IRB Subpanel Leads
The IRB was able to address the elements of the charter thanks to the extraordinary level of expertise and 

commitment from a broad and diverse membership. The following two elements are addressed indirectly (i.e., 

they have no specific Findings/Recommendations), but are reflected in one or more findings. 

Outsourcing: Evaluation by the IRB focused on the adequacy of the plans, required expertise (i.e., skills and 

experience), and the risks associated with implementation of existing contracts. MSR is a very complex mission 

that requires unique and proven expertise for successful development. The IRB took the validity of the two NASA 

Acquisition Strategy Meetings (ASM) at face value in this approach. Alternate architectures may offer an 

opportunity to revisit the acquisition strategy for some of the elements or components of the architecture. 

Evaluation of the possible sources must show credible and assured availability for mission success as part of a 

NASA ASM-level review.

Lessons learned: lessons such as assembling a team of the best people talent available, and actions to deal with 

long lead hardware and critical path items to reduce risk are being applied effectively. The latter is more 

important now than ever to deal with supply chain and lingering post pandemic issues. The larger and most 

consequential lessons noted in the Large Mission Study conducted by NASA/SMD have not or were not applied, 

specifically: Unacknowledged or undeclared uncertainties associated with early estimates, Ineffective system of 

checks and balances, Underestimated impact of recurring system design changes. 

MSR IRB-2 Charter

• Are the scope and cost/schedule understood and aligned?

• What is the likely range of probable cost and schedule, drivers, and risks?

• What is the funding profile required for the execution of the mission, and how sensitive is 

the mission to less than optimal funding profile guidelines?

• Are there outsourcing, descope, or architectural options that should be considered in 

order to reduce technical risks, and/or to improve schedule and/or cost margins?

• Does the current distribution of work across NASA centers best position the program for 

technical/schedule/cost success?

• Are the management approach and structure adequate, including the international 

partnership for a program of this scope and complexity? 

• Are lessons from Mars 2020, JWST, or other flagship missions of comparable scope being 

considered and applied?
The IRB spent considerable time and effort in formal and informal settings in order to 

develop deep and common understanding of issues within the scope of the Charter. The 

complexities of MSR as a large, highly constrained, high-priority science flagship mission led 

the IRB to create subpanels in order to organize and be able to penetrate specific areas of 

concern ahead of discussions at Plenary sessions with the full IRB. 

Individual members were also given specific assignments for follow-through on issues, and to 

develop thorough understanding on potential recommendations for discussion with the 

broader IRB. 

Review Methodology

• Full IRB meetings or “plenaries”

• Interviews with stakeholders, key personnel, and community members

• Meetings of IRB subpanels

• Programmatic/Implementation Strategy

• Present End-to-End System Design/Architecture

• Planetary Protection/Sample Science

• Governance/Risks and Opportunities

• Follow-up discussions with Program and Project personnel 

• IRB deliberations and discussions 

• IRB period of performance: May to Aug 2023

• See detailed timeline in Appendix
Acquisition strategy meetings were held by NASA in July 2019 (pre KDP-A) and May 2021 

(post KDP-A).

MSR Background: Pre-Phase A to Present

• NASA acquisition strategies included multiple NASA Centers and a European Space Agency (ESA) partnership 

from the beginning of pre-Phase A, with ESA providing a Sample Fetch Rover (SFR)/Sample Transfer Arm and 

the Earth Return Orbiter (ERO)/Ariane launch vehicle. The US cost was constrained to less than $3B.

• Industrial pre-development contracts for ERO, the SFR, and the Ariane Launch Vehicle began shortly after the 

first (2019) of two NASA acquisition strategy meetings. 

• NASA/SMD chartered an MSR IRB-1 in 2020 to inform Key Decision Point A (KDP-A). The IRB found the total 

program plans to be virtually non-executable. 

• Re-baselining MSR to deal with mass and other issues highlighted by IRB-1 included consideration for a 

second lander for the SFR. This option was eventually rejected because of added complexity/cost. 

• An opportunity for Italy to contribute a second lander was eliminated because of the need to re-baseline the 

ESA Rosalind Franklin Mars mission due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

• The success of the Ingenuity helicopter on Mars resulted in the baseline placing higher reliance on the 

Perseverance rover, with support by helicopters as backups. The SFR was descoped.

• A variety of mounting issues with the evolving baseline including technical, schedule, and cost concerns led 

to the creation of IRB-2.
The MSR campaign spans two important programmatic efforts: the Mars Exploration Program 

and the Mars Sample Return. 

The MSR Campaign

Mars 2020/Perseverance

• Collect samples of rock, regolith, and 

atmosphere

• Cache samples on the surface for 

retrieval

Sample Receiving Project

• Recover and transport contained 

samples to receiving facility

• Safety assessment and sample 

containment

• Initial sample science and curation

Earth Return Orbiter (ERO) and

Capture Containment and Return 

System (CCRS)

• Capture and contain samples in Mars 

orbit

• Decontamination, Back Planetary 

Protection (BPP)

• Safely return samples to Earth for 

recovery at landing site

Sample Retrieval Lander (SRL) 

and

Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV)

• Retrieve samples cached onboard Mars 

2020 rover or from sample depot

• Launch samples into orbit around Mars

MEP MSR MEP

MEP – Mars Exploration Program

MSR – Mars Sample Return

MSR
NASA started conceptualization of a surface MSR idea after the successful Viking landers and what those landers 

discovered in the first two years of surface operations (1976-1978). 

From 1988 through 1997, multiple concepts for a Mars rover sample return mission were considered as a flagship 

to follow orbital and surface exploration by Mars Observer and multiple spacecraft in the Mars Surveyor Program.

The Mars 1998 failures of MCO and MPL led NASA to charter an independent review of the Mars Program just as a 

National Academy of Sciences study commissioned by NASA called for multiple MSRs. The NASA response to the 

failures led to a new Mars Exploration Program and architecture as a standalone Program Office reporting to the 

NASA Science Associate Administrator. 

The new Mars Exploration Program included MSR as a step beyond the initial core program composed of orbital 

reconnaissance orbiters/in-situ reconnaissance and sampling and preparations for eventual sample return. Over 

$20B has been invested across more than four decades to arrive at this moment.

“Soft power” or “getting what you want [in international relations] through attraction rather than coercion” is a 

benefit of NASA’s human spaceflight programs.” This is also true for dramatic planetary missions. [Pathways to 

Exploration (NRC, 2014)] 

By abandoning return of Mars samples to other nations, the US abandons the preeminent role that JFK ascribed to 

the scientific exploration of space in his 1962 Rice U speech: “We set sail on this new sea because there is new 

knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all 

people.”

The Imperative of Mars Sample Return

• MSR represents the critical next step in a strategic program of Mars Exploration spanning the past four decades. 

US and European orbiters and US rovers have found promising sites where life might once have existed. Samples 

are now being collected from one of those promising sites for return to Earth. 

• MSR returns scientifically-selected samples of Mars to address key scientific and existential questions using our 

most sensitive laboratories: Did Mars harbor life in the past and if so, when? Mars was once the most Earth-like 

planet in the Solar System; what transformed it into the uninhabitable world that it is today? 

• MSR is a top priority of the last two surveys of the National Academies Decadal Survey of Planetary Science, a 

consensus report that is respected and followed by Congress and the President.

• MSR will inform the USA’s Moon-to-Mars strategy by characterizing environmental conditions, by validating 

backward planetary protection assurance, and by demonstrating launch from the surface of Mars.

• Leadership in space exploration is a hallmark of USA’s soft power in the world. Peaceful exploration of space 

serves to demonstrate US technological expertise and willingness to complete what it sets out to accomplish, no 

matter how difficult. NASA is succeeding at doing the seemingly impossible.

• China has announced plans for a Mars sample return mission (Tianwen-3) that they claim will be launched in 

2028 or 2030. These plans challenge the USA’s technical, engineering, and scientific leadership in Mars 

exploration.

• Mars has engaged human imagination for centuries. It is time “to organize and measure the best of our energies 

and skills” (JFK, 1962) for the next giant leap to return samples now.
“Origins, Worlds and Life,” the NAS Decadal Strategy for Planetary Science and Astrobiology, 

says “key scientific objectives for Mars and, more broadly, for planetary and astrobiological 

science, can only be achieved via study of carefully selected Martian samples in terrestrial 

laboratories ... Certain types of measurements (e.g., phase-specific stable and radiogenic 

isotopes, trace elements, nanometer-scale composition and texture, and precise organics 

characterization) cannot be done remotely because they require sample preparations and 

analytical precisions only possible in specialized laboratories.” (p. 22-7) The Decadal Strategy 

goes on to say (p. 22-8) “In addition, sample return will allow for future analyses by 

instruments and techniques not yet developed. As has been the case with the Apollo samples 

from the Moon, future analyses are expected to yield profound results for many decades 

after sample return.”

The key science investigations enabled by improved and novel measurements of returned 

samples include (summarized from Decadal Strategy text 22-7, 22-8): the identification of 

potential biosignatures that are difficult to detect or are not accessible to in-situ 

measurements; a history of liquid water (where, how long?) at the Jezero site, and 

determining the absolute chronology of key events in the formation of Jezero from 

radioisotopic dating. 

The Value of Returned Samples from Mars

• Return of lunar samples during Apollo established the present paradigm of an impact-dominated early solar 

system and provided an absolute chronology for early events in the vicinity of Earth. MSR will similarly 

revolutionize our understanding of the inner solar system from a vantage point beyond Earth. 

• Mars Sample Return is the next step in a carefully crafted, science-based strategy for Mars Exploration: 

“Follow the Water – Habitability – Search for Life.”

• Whether there was or is life elsewhere in our solar system is one of the most important scientific questions 

we can answer. This question is the pinnacle of a decades-long NASA program of strategic Mars exploration. 

The question has informed the highest scientific priority flagship mission in the last two planetary science 

decadal surveys.

• The samples currently being collected by the Perseverance rover are from a delta/lake deposit that is thought 

to have formed in an Earth-like environment early in Mars’ history. This makes the samples of very high value 

in the search for ancient life beyond Earth. 

• State-of-the-art laboratory facilities are needed in order to engage the best technological and scientific 

capability to detect faint, difficult-to-detect signatures. This work is impossible to do on Mars with the 

limitations in mass and power of robotic instruments that can be brought to the Martian surface.

• China is planning to return Mars samples on a similar timetable, but lack similar scientific rigor. MSR will bring 

back carefully-selected samples that the international Mars science community has deemed are of the 

greatest value.
The image on the left is colorized by elevation (red = high, blue = low) around the western 

rim of Jezero crater. The delta fan, Perseverance’s approximate current location, and the 

Three Forks depot are located at top right. White dotted lines and “X”s indicate possible 

future drive paths and SRL landing sites.

A zoomed-in view of the delta fan and adjacent crater margin and rim is shown at right. The 

image is colorized according to the different geologic units that have been mapped in the 

area, revealing the tremendous diversity available for Perseverance to sample as it continues 

driving towards the west. The orange star indicates Perseverance’s location.

Three Forks Crater Margin

Crater Rim

 = possible SRL landing site 

 = Perseverance location

 = planned traverses 

Geologic map from orbit data for the Jezero 

Crater field site (Stack et al., [2020]). Each 

color indicates a distinct geologic unit.

Crater Margin

Crater Rim

Region of crater margin and rim, with possible landing sites (low slopes, few 

rocks) for SRL, identified from orbit for future certification by Perseverance.

Diversity of Geologic Units on Crater Margin and Rim
This slide shows the relative scientific value of the Martian samples that would be returned to Earth based on the 

distance traveled by Mars 2020’s Perseverance rover, categorized as: on the crater floor and delta fan, on the 

crater rim, and beyond the crater rim.

The 10 samples deposited at the Three Forks depot, which represent only the geology of the crater floor and front 

of the delta, are the only samples that would be returned to Earth in the first scenario. In this scenario, no 

additional value to Mars Sample Return is achieved from the continued exploration and collection of samples by 

Perseverance. 

In all other scenarios, the samples to be returned to Earth are the ones that are already onboard and yet to be 

secured by Perseverance. The collection of additional samples yields increasing science value as Perseverance 

continues its trek along the delta top, across the crater margin, and then out of Jezero onto the crater rim. The 

differences in the lines on the graph lie in the scientific value assigned to each new sample — whether the value is 

equivalent to (“equal science”) or greater (“high science value”) than the samples already collected. Mars 

scientists suspect that the crater margin and rim contain material of exceptional diversity. The science value may 

hence increase more substantially in that part of the mission. 

Once Perseverance reaches the region beyond the crater rim, there are ambiguities in our understanding of what 

Perseverance will encounter. The increase in science value may therefore be less than expected, but we will not 

know this until Perseverance gets there.

10

CRATER RIM

BEYOND 

THE 

CRATER 

RIM*

OC

LB

MC

mB Notional Science Value Versus Distance Traveled

Why is the Crater Rim So Exciting?

Map Legend

LB Layered Basement – material in which the crater was formed that has been lifted and 

folded over to create the rim

mB megaBreccias – possibly from before the formation of the regional basin within which 

Jezero lies; some may even be mantle material (the bulk interior lying below Mars’ crust)

MC Mafic Caprock – remnants of an eruption that covered a region of Mars five times the size 

of the Yellowstone super-eruption in North America

OC Olivine-Carbonate – the North end of the rim hosts a possible remnant of a beach

* Beyond the crater rim requires additional mileage and contains additional exposures of the above units
Two key lessons learned from JWST and other efforts of similar magnitude point to two 

crucial factors for mission success:

• World class talent

• Strong systems engineering 

The MSR program showed strong irrefutable evidence of both factors.

Recognition of Strengths

• Interviews with NASA and ESA personnel reflected a strong commitment to a partnership of world leadership in 

Mars exploration and to mission success.

• The campaign has made substantial progress since the start of formulation in 2020, despite the many external 

constraints and the challenging pandemic and geo-political circumstances. 

• Progress and maturity from the concept reviewed by IRB-1 demonstrates an impressive level of commitment by a 

team with world-class talent. 

• The team has recognized the challenge of a program with such diverse partners and is developing the crosscultural understanding necessary to accomplish the program.

• The Mars 2020 science team has done an excellent job of operating the Perseverance rover as the fundamental 

first element of MSR.

• An early depot of returnable samples has been placed on the crater floor at Three Forks. 

• Additional samples from the delta top have been collected by Perseverance. Samples from the margin and 

rim of Jezero Crater are anticipated. These samples significantly increase the scientific value above the 

samples at Three Forks.
MSR an exceptionally challenging campaign due to the many intrinsic and extrinsic 

constraints that need to be simultaneously balanced for the technical and programmatic 

solutions to close. 

The qualitative assessment related to the orbital assets and M2020 shown on the slide are 

consistent with NASA practice for assessment of risk: 

Green (G) - Status is Satisfactory

Yellow (Y) - Status is Cautionary

Red (R) - Status is Unsatisfactory

MSR: A Highly Constrained and Challenging Campaign

• Unrealistic budget and schedule expectations from the beginning

• Tight mass margins, uncertainties in launch vehicles’ performance 

and/or contracts

• Restricted launch period opportunities/Mars arrival times 

• Dust storm season complicates launch periods

• Time limitations for surface operations and safe launch of the MAV 

• Orbiting Sample (OS) design/requirements, orbital 

detection/retrieval, protection of samples

• Certification of safe landing sites beyond Three Forks

• Longevity and reliability of Perseverance as the primary sample 

transfer vehicle

• Backward Planetary Protection requirements 

• Aging Mars telecommunications infrastructure

• Multiple system handoffs to return samples from Mars to Earth

• Expertise to meet these challenges is spread among multiple 

organizations, technical elements, and cultures.

2020 2030 2040

Science/Safety Site Cert

MMRTG Below 80%

ODY (2001)

MRO (2005)

MVN (2013)

TGO (2016)

Samples Key

Decision Point (TBD)

Qualitative State of M2020 and Mars Telecom Assets

Sustained science community and Agency support will be needed for success.

Launch Dates

Exposure to Qualification Limitations

And Random Failure Issues

State of Health 

or Applicability

During Late 2020

to 2030’s
The focus of the IRB was to explore broadly and deeply in keeping with its charter, in order to 

increase the probability of mission success. The IRB arrived at a total of twenty findings 

reflecting the areas of greatest concern. In most cases more than one finding will be 

traceable to the Key Takeaways. The intent of the Key Takeaways is to summarize where the 

biggest challenges exist for the MSR Program.

Key Takeaways From All Findings (1 of 2)

• The strategic and high scientific value of MSR is not being communicated appropriately.

• MSR is a deep-space exploration priority for NASA, in collaboration with ESA. However, MSR was established 

with unrealistic budget and schedule expectations from the beginning. MSR was also organized under an 

unwieldy structure. 

• As a result, there is currently no credible, congruent technical, nor properly margined schedule, cost, and 

technical baseline that can be accomplished with the likely available funding.

• Technical issues, risks, and performance-to-date indicate a near zero probability of ERO/CCRS or 

SRL/MAV meeting the 2027/2028 Launch Readiness Dates (LRDs). Potential LRDs exist in 2030, given 

adequate funding and timely resolution of issues.

• The projected overall budget for MSR in the FY24 President’s Budget Request is not adequate to 

accomplish the current program of record. 

• A 2030 LRD for both SRL and ERO is estimated to require ~$8.0-9.6B, with funding in excess of $1B per 

year to be required for three or more years starting in 2025.

• Decoupling the LRDs of SRL and ERO, as well as consideration of alternate architectures in combination with 

later LRDs, can yield an MSR Program that is potentially able to fit within the likely annual funding 

constraints.
Key Takeaways From All Findings (2 of 2)

• MSR is a very complex Program and campaign with multiple parallel developments, interfaces, and 

complexities that are beyond the experience base of the Science Mission Directorate and the 

participants. 

• The organizational arrangement greatly amplifies cultural differences and dynamics.

• The MSR campaign (i.e., MEP and MSR) is not arranged to be led effectively. 

• Program management is impeded by the following:

• The structure of MSR as a hybrid Single-Program/Tightly-Coupled Program

• Deficiencies in the organizational and programmatic oversight structure

• Unclear roles, accountability, and authority

• Mars 2020 has been successful in acquiring samples of high scientific value, with a potentially 

substantial increase in science value in the samples that are yet to be collected on the crater margin 

and rim.

• The lack of a well-defined Orbiting Sample (OS) design continues to impact and constrain many MSR 

systems, with implications that affect UltraViolet (UV) decontamination and robust containment for 

backward planetary protection.
The IRB performed an independent programmatic assessment of MSR’s current plan that 

reflects the ERO/CCRS 2027 and SRL/MAV 2028 Launch Readiness Dates (LRDs). Several 

different methodologies were used including analogous growth factors, Independent Cost 

Estimating (ICE), and Joint Confidence Level (JCL) analysis. The JCL analysis indicates that the 

currently planned LRDs are not feasible, with the earliest probable LRDs for both ERO and SRL 

in 2030. The ICE for the delayed 2030/2030 LRD scenario combined with the JCL results 

suggest a probable $8B-9.6B lifecycle cost range. The IRB also analyzed a range of alternate 

architectures with varied launch scenarios to cover the potential solution space for a 

replanned, robust and resilient MSR program, with several options constrained to fiscal year 

costs of $850M to $1B. The alternate architecture analysis estimates the probable lifecycle 

cost range of alternative architectures to be approximately $8.4-10.9B. Overall, the IRB 

analysis suggests the alternate architecture solution space has an LCC range of $8.4-10.9B, 

with various LRD combinations in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

Summary of Programmatic Assessment

• The IRB’s independent programmatic assessment shows that $8-11B is the probable range (50%-80% confidence level) for the total MSR Program Life 

Cycle Cost (LCC) – range for IRB ICE ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) and various alternate architectures

• The IRB’s independent programmatic assessment shows that $8.0-9.6B is the probable range (50%-80% confidence level) for the total MSR Program LCC, with the earliest 

probable Launch Readiness Dates (LRDs) for both ERO and SRL in 2030.

• There exist a variety of potential alternate architectures that the program may choose to consider in order to add robustness and resiliency to the Program and/or operate within the constraints of a fiscal year budget cap. IRB analysis suggests the alternate architecture solution space has an LCC range of $8.4-10.9B, with various LRD 

combinations in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

• The probable cost range demonstrates the uncertainty based on the various scenarios estimated by the IRB.

$7.2

$7.4 $8.4

Probable MSR LCC 

range: $8.0 - 11B $9.1

$8.2 $8.6

$8.0 $9.6

$8.4 $10.9

Based on growth from SRR (MSL & M2020)

Various scenarios – decoupled, disaggregated, constrained/unconstrained budget

ERO (2027)/SRL (2028)

ERO (2027)/SRL (2028) à pushed to ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) w/risks

ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) – scenario for comparison w/JCL results

Current Plan 2027/2028 LRDs are not feasible

Assessment of 

Current Plan

$6.2

SRR/MDR ($5.9)

$5.9

NASA’s Current MSR 

Budget Estimate ($5.6) 

PPBE-25 ($7.2)

KDP-B

ERO (CCRS)/SRL: 2027/2028

2030/2030 Various LRD combinations 

from 2030-2035

Expected Range of Growth 

from SRR based on Analogies:

50% 70%

50th

ICE Percentiles:

70th

Program Estimates:

SRR/MDR (7/2022)

KDP-B (12/2022)

PPBE-25 NOA (5/2023)

Current MSR Budget 

(Q2FY23)

Alternate Architectures:

Various Scenarios – decoupled, 

disaggregated, constrained / 

unconstrained budget

Low/50th
In most cases, more than one finding will be traceable to the Key Takeaways in a similar 

fashion to the Key Takeaways from All Findings.

Key Takeaways From All Recommendations 

(1 of 2) 

• NASA must do a much better job at engaging and communicating the importance of MSR as a priority for the 

nation, and as the culmination of a long-term Mars exploration strategy in partnership with ESA. [R2, R4, R5]

• Leadership at NASA HQ must properly organize and staff the Mars Exploration Program and the MSR 

Campaign with a clear and unified reporting structure and a well-defined chain of command. Leadership 

must also strengthen community and stakeholder engagement and provide the expertise necessary for 

proper programmatic control and assessment. [R2, R3, R4, R12, R18, R19, R20]

• The entire management and organizational structure for MSR should be revisited in order to reduce 

overhead and to delegate authority and accountability to key contributing partners and Project elements. 

This effort should include reintegrating the MEP and MSR into a single office that reports to the SMD 

Associate Administrator (SMD AA) and NASA Associate Administrator (NASA AA) and retaining integrative 

engineering leadership at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) through effective cross-functional teaming. [R3, 

R15, R16, R17, R19, R20] 

• The OS needs immediate attention in order to finalize its design. Design should include more focus on 

concerns about UV decontamination and robust containment for backward planetary protection. [R6, R7, R8, 

R9, R10, R16, R17] 
Key Takeaways From All Recommendations 

(2 of 2) 

• The most important sample science may lie ahead on the crater rim, and this material should be included in 

the returned sample set. [R1]

• NASA should establish MSR as a Tightly-Coupled Program with separate Standing Review Boards (SRBs) for 

SRL, MAV, and CCRS. This approach should include in-depth programmatic assessment (including JCLs) to be 

reconciled at the Program level by an SRB similarly to what the IRB did. [R3, R4, R9, R10, R11]

• NASA and ESA should collaborate more closely in order to better integrate the ERO spacecraft and CCRS 

teams into a one-team approach wherein ESA plays a larger role in order to provide greater programmatic 

resilience to the overall campaign. [R3, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10]

• Alternate architectures should be examined under clear guidelines provided by NASA HQ for yearly budget 

constraints, while acknowledging that the lifecycle cost will likely be in the $8 to $11B range regardless of 

architectural choices. [R9, R10, R13, R14]

• NASA should not baseline the MSR campaign until credible congruent technical and programmatic plans are 

developed with demonstration of proper technical margins, robustness, and resilience. These values should 

be consistent with plans for an annual budget that ensures mission success. [R1 to R20]
The slight distinction between “Findings and Recommendations” versus “Additional 

Important Findings and Recommendations” is as follows: 

• Findings and Recommendations are those entries with broad, all-encompassing 

implications to the MSR Campaign and inter-Center/Inter Agency agreements.

• Additional Important Findings and Recommendations are those entries with system-level 

design or execution implications. These entries includes findings such as Verification and 

Validation, Launch Vehicles, Workforce Capacity and Expectations post COVID, and Supply 

Chain. 

Organization of Findings and Recommendations

Findings and Recommendations

F1 Collecting the Right Samples

F2 Communicating the Importance of MSR 

F3 Overall Organizational Structure

F4 Agency-level Leadership and Engagement

F5 ERO/CCRS and the NASA/ESA Partnership

F6 OS Impact Across MSR Elements

F7 UV Decontamination of Possible Biohazards

on the OS Exterior

F8 NASA Coordination with US Regulatory Agencies 

on Backward Planetary Protection

F9 Architectural Robustness and Resiliency

F10 Programmatic Assessment

F11 Independent Review Structure

F12 Culture and Communication

Additional Important Findings and Recommendations

F13 Verification and Validation 

F14 Cross-Organization Engineering Management

F15 Telecommunications Infrastructure

F16 Helicopter Accommodation Risk Balance

F17 Technical Baseline Management and Change Control

F18 Launch Vehicles

F19 Workforce Capacity and Expectations Post COVID-19

F20 Supply Chain
Findings and 

Recommendations

CUI
A carefully considered, science-based rationale for the return of 500 g (~1.1 pound) of Martian sample material 

has been documented in the peer-reviewed scientific literature several times over more than a decade. The 

scientific justification for returning 500 g of Martian sample material is based in part on in the types of expected 

analyses and the quantities of sample material needed to conduct these analyses. The sample tubes are estimated 

to hold at the most 15-16 g each. This design results in the planned capacity of the OS to return ~32 tubes. Not all 

of the tubes will be filled to capacity, and only a portion of the returned material will be made available to 

researchers in the years immediately following the tubes’ arrival on Earth. A yet-to-be-determined quantity of the 

returned samples will be placed in long-term storage for future generations, as was done for Apollo lunar samples 

and will be done for the asteroid sample planned for return by OSIRIS-REx. 

Perseverance's cache is the primary cache for return to Earth, representing the broadest diversity of samples and 

geological diversity of Mars. It is therefore important to strike the right balance between the largest number and 

the diversity of samples as the OS design is settled.

A reduction in the capacity of the OS to only 18 tubes could yield approximately 288 g (~0.64 pounds) of the 

desired 500 g. Given that some of this mass will go into long-term storage for future generations, even less than 

~288 g would be available initially for analysis at US institutions and across the international scientific community.

F1: Collecting the Right Samples (1 of 2)

The cache of samples deposited at Three Forks is return worthy but is not an optimal sample set because it does 

not represent the full diversity of geologic environments along the rover’s traverse that could preserve signs of 

life. The 20 samples now collected by and carried on Perseverance are of very high scientific value – higher than 

the cache at Three Forks. The science value is expected to increase even more as Perseverance collects 18 

additional samples from the crater rim and beyond. 

• A backup set of 10 return-worthy samples has been dropped at the Three Forks depot. However, we do not know in 

advance how evidence for Martian life could be preserved in the geologic record. The diversity, number, and value of 

additional samples increases substantially as Perseverance continues its traverse.

• Driving up and out of Jezero Crater will allow sampling of highly diverse geologic units on the margin, rim, and possibly 

beyond, enabling the return of an optimized sample suite. 

• Such a traverse requires that there be a certifiable site for landing SRL relatively nearby the samples to be returned. Also 

required is a clear plan for M2020 to operate with a focus on direct transfer to SRL or placing one or more additional depots.

• Drivers on the OS design include the number of samples to be returned and the surface timeline for retrieval of samples 

from Perseverance or a depot.

• A case can be made that the specific number of samples returned is less important than the diversity and scientific 

richness of those samples, if the returned samples expand the MSR scientific objectives that can be realized.

• Any reduction in returned sample mass will limit the number and, possibly, types of analyses that can be performed on 

Earth using state-of-the-art laboratory instrumentation, potentially deferring the realization of the full scientific return 

of MSR. 

• It is not evident that deliberations around a reduction in the number of tubes carried by the OS have accounted for the 

above considerations or have taken place via an independent assessment of the risk to the mission versus the impact 

to MSR science.
R1: Collecting the Right Samples (2 of 2)

Recommendations:

• (R1.1) The relative science merit of the 10 samples on the ground at Three Forks should be independently 

evaluated against additional samples currently on Perseverance and samples that may be collected during 

continued science operation of the Perseverance rover. Science merit should be a key input to landing site 

selection for MSR and operational strategies for the Perseverance rover, Sample Retriever Lander (SRL), and 

Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV).

• (R1.2) NASA should develop and implement a formal, metrics-based and timeline-based plan for operating 

Mars 2020 with a focus on direct transfer to the SRL or placing one or more additional depots. 

• Whether Perseverance 1) remains at the second certified landing site, 2) conducts sorties from that site, 

or 3) drops a second cache and is permitted to continue along its traverse towards a third certifiable 

landing site should depend on factors including the science value of the samples collected to date, the 

health of the rover, the mission architecture, and arrival dates of future flight elements.

• (R1.3) NASA should direct Mars 2020 to certify a landing site outside Jezero Crater as soon as feasible. 

• (R1.4) Mars 2020 and MSR should develop a joint plan that balances the risk of degradation or failure of 

Perseverance against obtaining the highest value samples near the crater rim and beyond. The plan should be 

appended to the existing memorandum of agreement between MEP and MSR.

• (R1.5) NASA should revise the MSR Program requirement (6.1.1) related to the capability to return 30 sample 

tube assemblies and implement a requirement that is based on science value, the MSR timetable, and other 

factors relevant to successfully achieving the optimum science from MSR, including total sample mass.
The planetary science community is substantially larger and more diverse now than when MSR was first 

conceived decades ago. We have made many new discoveries throughout the Solar System in those intervening 

years. The number of high-priority scientific targets of exploration has justifiably expanded, particularly since the 

inception of the Decadal Surveys.

However, the growth and ambition of planetary science does not change the fact that MSR remains a 

longstanding, two-time Decadal priority for legitimate scientific, technological, and geopolitical reasons. Now that 

this mission has begun with the collection of scientifically selected samples, and NASA/ESA are on the verge of 

being able to return those samples, it is important to establish deeper, meaningful communication about the 

scientific value of this longstanding goal as well as the ways in which it will benefit NASA beyond planetary 

science and as part of NASA’s Moon-to-Mars strategy. A particular and understandable concern from the 

community is the impact that MSR may have on the rest of the Planetary Science Division and SMD flight mission 

portfolio. NASA must address this concern while clarifying and dispelling the notion that cancelling MSR 

necessarily means greater budgets for everybody else in the Planetary Science Division or even the Mars 

Exploration Program. Cancellation may also call into question the feasibility of other ambitious sample return 

efforts envisioned by the planetary science community.

It is worth adding that leadership in space exploration is a hallmark of USA’s soft power in the world. Peaceful 

exploration of space serves to demonstrate United States’ technological expertise to deliver, no matter how 

difficult. These efforts inspire the nation and the world community in the journey, opening the door to significant 

international collaborations in space. Communicating the importance of MSR as a priority for US scientific and 

technological reasons is important, particularly in light of China’s plans for preeminence in the world stage. 

F2 and R2: Communicating the Importance 

of MSR

The societal, technological, and scientific significance of MSR makes it a mission of the highest importance in 

NASA’s long-term exploration strategy, and this is not being communicated consistently and clearly with the 

public and stakeholders .

• A successful MSR campaign will revolutionize our understanding of the history of Mars, the Solar System, and 

the potential for life beyond Earth.

• The exploration of Mars and the return of samples are integral parts of NASA’s Moon-to-Mars initiative and 

our commitment to US space leadership in partnership with ESA.

• The technical challenge and audacity of MSR will inspire the next generation.

• NASA is not sending a consistent and unified message to Congress, the scientific community, and to the public 

regarding MSR’s scientific and strategic importance to the nation.

Recommendation: 

• (R2.1) NASA should develop a strategy and implement a compelling communication plan that reflects MSR as 

an Agency priority and as a priority for the nation that historically has dared to do the seeming impossible in 

space. NASA’s senior leadership should vigorously participate in the execution of that plan.
The current programmatic workforce at NASA HQ consists of a senior civil servant Deputy 

Program Director and one support contractor.

The MSR HQ office has provided guidance to the JPL MSR Program office regarding 

programmatic analysis and reporting and is being reflected in including the draft program 

and business plans. However, much work remains to implement these plans consistently with 

standards that are commensurate with a flagship mission.

The need for experienced programmatic staff increases and acquisition of assessment tools 

for MSR has been acknowledged by the respective institutions that are contributing to MSR.

The cultures at JPL, MSFC, GSFC, and ESA differ in multiple ways, particularly in the degree of 

structure in their decision, documentation, and Project control processes. A key part of NASA 

HQ’s Program Office role is to be able to normalize the inputs and metrics against plans.

F3: Overall Organizational Structure (1 of 2) 

The success of Mars exploration is critically dependent upon the technical and programmatic success of the MSR 

campaign. MEP and MSR are currently operated and managed separately, even though MSR depends on MEP assets. 

This arrangement is creating unnecessary silos, and potentially pits MEP against MSR in terms of attention given by 

senior HQ management. Furthermore, the current MSR program structure and management results in an unnecessarily 

complex organization. This structure results in multiple communication pathways and unclear lines of accountability and 

authority between HASA HQ, its field centers and labs, and ESA.

• Mars science and management advocacy at HQ is split between the Planetary Science Division/MEP and MSR 

programs. This arrangement lacks the single champion that is required at this critical phase of the program.

• NASA has not established an appropriate programmatic reporting structure as required for a program of this 

significance and complexity.

• MSR has not demonstrated an adequate level of maturity in its execution of programmatic management at JPL and 

the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) due to inadequate staffing, processes, and tools that are specific to 

programmatic analysis.

• JPL’s role of complete programmatic management over multiple and extremely complex activities and NASA field 

centers is an enormous task that distracts from developing SRL and managing critical MSR campaign (Level-1.5) 

interfaces.

• The current MSR management structure and approach does not enable the very different engineering and 

management cultures of the participating organizations to collaborate for efficient resolution of issues.
NASA would need to augment the integrated MEP programmatic staff above the combined levels in the current 

MSR and MEP in order to ensure that there is sufficient program planning and control (e.g., cost and schedule 

planning, maintenance, tracking, assessment, analysis, forecasting and risk analysis).

To enable SRL and MAV to analyze and report cost and schedule status effectively, both of their programmatic 

teams will need to be augmented with 3-4 highly qualified FTE/WYEs.

The JPL campaign-level technical role includes providing key technical support to the MEP office at HQ.

Definition of full responsibility for the individual MSR Projects entails the following:

• JPL retains full responsibility and authority for SRL.

• Goddard Space Flight Center assumes full responsibility and authority for the CCRS payload contribution to 

the ESA-provided ERO mission, along with authority for JPL-provided hardware.

• Marshall Space Flight Center assumes full responsibility and authority for the MAV payload contribution to 

the JPL-provided SRL.

• Push responsibility for programmatic controls to the particular MSR project.

R3: Overall Organizational Structure (2 of 2)

Recommendations:

• (R3.1) Combine the current MEP and MSR programs and establish an integrated Mars Exploration Program office at NASA 

HQ, reporting directly to the SMD AA and encompassing all the activities within the Mars enterprise.

• (R3.2) Unify and strengthen the scientific and programmatic leadership and advocacy within this new, integrated Mars 

Exploration Program in order to enhance communication with senior NASA leadership, the planetary science community, 

and other stakeholders. 

• (R3.3) Establish full programmatic responsibility and authority within the Mars Exploration Program office at HQ, separating 

the budget from the Planetary Science Division and creating a properly-staffed Program Planning and Control (PP&C) group 

within the new HQ program office.

• All Projects within the integrated MEP should report programmatically to the HQ MEP PP&C group.

• The HQ MEP PP&C should set project analysis and reporting standards and should conduct independent monthly 

programmatic assessments based on Project-provided data. 

• (R3.4) Have JPL retain its MSR campaign-level technical role of leading cross-functional technical teams that provide 

integrative support to the MSR campaign.

• (R3.5) Give full technical responsibility and authority for the individual MSR projects to their respective labs/field centers with the directors held fully accountable for their organization’s contribution.

• (R3.6) Enhance project business office PP&C staffing and capabilities (e.g., tools, processes) in order to ensure the 

implementation of the depth and breadth of programmatic management necessary for a large complex mission (e.g., 

planning, maintenance, tracking, assessment, analysis/forecasting, schedule cost/risk analysis, control).
MSR represents a greater than ~$20 billion investment to date and a very challenging mission in the $8-11B class. 

All the components must work with narrow margins for error. The end-to-end effort requires a heightened level 

of attention, risk management, and reassurances.

Programs of this magnitude and complexity, particularly those with multiple centers and international 

partnerships (e.g., ISS, JWST, Shuttle, Hubble, Artemis) have historically had direct and regular access, interaction, 

and accountability with the HQ A-suite. Each of these programs have had very challenging phases where top-level 

attention and actions were key to their success.

This finding also relates to agency-level proactive advocacy in terms of public interactions (speeches, social media, 

outreach events, conferences) and congressional interactions (testimony, Hill visits, talking points, industry 

alignment). These same programs have also faced difficult gauntlets in terms of public and 

administration/congressional support. During these challenging times, advocacy made the difference between 

success and failure.

MEP deserves world-class leadership with proven records of success. Strong leadership is required to:

- Create a team culture that is aligned around the mission objectives and mission success

- Communicating strategy and vision, keeping stakeholders onboard

- Keep all of the partners and projects aligned

- Making and communicating well-considered, integrated, and sometimes difficult decisions

F4 and R4: Agency-level Leadership and 

Engagement

MSR follows many decades of strategic investment. The mission has been identified as the top priority of the Decadal Survey. 

However, leadership at the SMD AA level and above has not been adequately engaged at a level that is commensurate with a 

mission of such importance to NASA, the nation, and NASA’s international partners.

• MSR has not been treated as a mission of such technical boldness and international visibility that requires a highest-priority 

mindset within the top leadership at NASA in conjunction with its partner ESA. 

• MSR Program leadership lacks sufficient access to NASA executive leadership.

• NASA has not established an appropriate organizational and reporting structure at the highest levels as required for a 

program of this significance and complexity.

Recommendations:

• (R4.1) NASA senior leadership should manage and advocate for MSR as a priority for the nation’s space exploration goals.

• (R4.2) The director of the integrated MEP must be a world-class Science Program Directorship and Community leader who is 

responsible for prioritizing sample return from Mars utilizing current assets, coordinating with ESA, and meeting overall 

science goals that are consistent with the recommendations of the Planetary Science and Astrobiology Decadal Survey. 

• (R4.3) The director of the integrated MEP should report on the status of MSR to the NASA Associate Administrator at no less 

than a bi-weekly cadence. 
The MSR campaign architecture requires tight operational, scheduling, and design coordination between JPL, 

Goddard, ESA, and ESA’s spacecraft vendor Airbus. This arrangement introduces notable communication and 

coordination challenges, especially when addressing the intricate engineering issues tied to the ERO mission. 

ERO’s design is highly impacted by the MSR campaign design, which subsequently affects the CCRS design. CCRS 

has significant componentry provided by JPL, which is also in charge of the overall campaign design. These 

dynamics create circular interconnected dependencies on top of difficult engineering challenges.

The timing of ERO's Mars orbit arrival to support SRL’s EDL and surface operations results in an intricately linked 

development and launch schedule dependency between ERO and SRL. This dependency influences costs and 

introduces complexities into engineering design decisions. When evaluating the primary objectives of each 

mission, there are opportunities to streamline these interactions at the highest level, particularly in relation to 

the recovery of the OS in Mars orbit. This recovery could occur at an unspecified time, obviating the necessity for 

a specific order and timing of SRL and ERO launches.

The fixed-price and contract management approach with Airbus requires ESA to be understandably guarded 

regarding interactions between CCRS and Airbus engineering. With the spacecraft bus design well ahead of CCRS, 

the GSFC team has had to design CCRS to accommodate the spacecraft bus and a highly prescribed set of 

interfaces. The complexity is further compounded by uncertainty regarding the choice of the launch vehicle for 

ERO. Interactions and technical interchange between ESA, CCRS, and Airbus have not been adequate given the 

complex nature of the ERO mission.

F5: ERO/CCRS and the NASA/ESA Partnership 

(1 of 2)

The tight technical and programmatic coupling of ERO to MSR and the early schedule phasing for ERO has 

created unique and untenable organizational, schedule, and technical issues for both the ESA/Airbus ERO team 

and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) CCRS team.

• Both SRL and ERO are ambitious and technically challenging standalone Projects with clean interface 

boundaries, yet they are being technically managed as coupled elements of a single mission.

• The organizational construct between JPL, ESA/ERO, and GSFC/CCRS leads to confusion regarding 

responsibility and accountability for overall management of the ERO mission.

• JPL personnel supporting CCRS and providing CCRS hardware report to the MSR program office, not to the 

CCRS Project Office. This arrangement contributes to the confused lines of authority and communications 

between the GSFC and JPL CCRS elements, as well as between GSFC management of CCRS and the Program.

• The ESA contract for the spacecraft adds a program-level interface that has complicated ERO/CCRS/MSR 

Program Office interactions and has created tensions between the teams.
The MSR campaign should be approached as two distinct missions. Both missions rank among 

the most challenging endeavors ever undertaken by NASA and its partner ESA. SRL's mission 

involves recovering samples from Perseverance and placing them into a well-defined and 

stable Mars orbit. ERO retrieves these samples from Mars orbit and returns them to Earth. 

Consequently, the primary interplay between the two missions revolves around the OS 

design, encompassing considerations such as mass, volume, shape, Mars orbit, and reverse 

planetary protection for all phases of the MSR campaign. By centering the interaction 

between the two missions on OS recovery and planetary protection, each organization can 

devote its resources entirely to its MSR campaign contribution and can assume complete 

accountability for its success.

Given the intricacies of both the ERO spacecraft and CCRS, coupled with the separation of the 

ERO and CCRS missions, it becomes imperative for NASA and ESA to closely align their Airbus 

and CCRS teams. This alignment is crucial to provide each team with essential insights into 

the other's designs, allow collaborative solutions to each other’s issues, and to establish a 

unified approach to agreed-upon verification methods.

R5: ERO/CCRS and the NASA/ESA 

Partnership (2 of 2)

Recommendation:

• (R5.1) Decouple the ERO and SRL development schedules by transferring full responsibility for the integrated 

ERO mission to ESA. This arrangement will allow GSFC to work with ESA and Airbus without going through JPL. 

• Focus the NASA/JPL efforts on the elements and infrastructure that are required to get the OS into a 

defined and stable Mars orbit through all available assets (in collaboration with ESA for Trace Gas Orbiter 

(TGO) relay communications), while ESA focuses on OS retrieval and OS return to Earth.

• JPL should continue to lead overall campaign technical integration and management of Level 1.5 

requirements including backward planetary protection, in proper coordination with ESA.

• Accept ESA’s ability to successfully accomplish ERO, recognizing ERO’s importance to ESA and its goals in 

Mars exploration.

• Give GSFC full responsibility and authority for leading the CCRS development (including the JPL 

components) as a deliverable payload to ESA. 

• ESA should provide adequate visibility into driving technical parameters and margins and should help 

facilitate closure of the CCRS design.

• NASA and ESA should collaborate more closely in order to better integrate the ERO spacecraft and 

CCRS teams into a one-team approach that incorporates contractual considerations into a modified 

interagency agreement.
The OS is a critical element of any Mars Sample Return architecture, serving as the primary containment vessel for 

the samples and their launch into Mars orbit. The OS must be discoverable in Mars orbit for an extended period, 

captured, contained, decontaminated, and secured into the Earth return vehicle for landing after the return 

journey to Earth. 

Various systems and organizations interface through the OS. OS design interfaces with, and thus is constrained by 

and impacts, all parts of the MSR system. 

- The OS is implemented by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

- The mass and volume of the OS is driven by the number of sample tubes it needs to contain, sample integrity 

and planetary protection requirements, as well as robotic manipulation related interfaces with the Sample 

Transfer Arm (STA, supplied by the European Space Agency)

- In turn, the mass and volume of the OS drives the size of the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV; managed by Marshall 

Spaceflight Center). MAV in turns drives the size and mass of the Sample Return Lander (SRL; managed by the 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and its launch vehicle.

- The exterior optical properties of the OS are critical for detectability by the Earth Return Orbiter (ERO; 

supplied by the European Space Agency).

- The OS also drives the Capture Containment and Return System in several ways (CCRS; managed by Goddard 

Space Flight Center with some elements contributed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory). The CCRS is 

accommodated on the ERO.

F6 and R6: OS Impact Across MSR Elements

The OS is the critical element that is central to the entire MSR mission. Failure to converge upon an acceptable 

and stable OS design will continue to produce significant design uncertainty throughout the elements of any MSR 

Program architecture. 

• The OS problem is uniquely complex because the OS is not only highly constrained due to mission 

requirements, but the OS also touches multiple systems in every MSR project element. 

• Finalizing the OS design is critical to establishing a technical and programmatic baseline, as well as for helping 

settle backward planetary protection issues.

• Key partners at NASA Centers and ESA report cost impacts, schedule delays, and the stress of personnel that 

are caused by repeated redesign of OS accommodations and interfaces.

Recommendation:

• (R6.1) Close the OS design and all associated interfaces before the Program’s preliminary design review 

season. Even if there are changes in the overall MSR Program plans, and these changes cause changes in the 

OS, the necessity of closing the OS design as soon as possible (and before other elements’ designs are 

finalized and reviewed) remains undiminished. 
At the CCRS PDR in December 2022, thermal welding to close and sterilize the seal on a 

container enclosing the OS was presented as meeting success criteria. The IRB did not hear a 

compelling explanation for why subsequent to PDR, the thermal plan was deemed too 

complex and was replaced with a plan for UV treatment. Being new, the UV treatment plan 

requires extensive testing of effective biological kill and the flight readiness of the UV source.

F7 and R7: UV Decontamination of Possible 

Biohazards on the OS Exterior

Over the past year, efforts to simplify the CCRS design and to save mass resulted in changes to the plan for 

backward planetary protection. Thermal sterilization or fitting of the seal on the container enclosing the OS was 

replaced by use of UltraViolet (UV) illumination to decontaminate possible Martian biohazards on the OS 

exterior. 

• In December 2022 at the CCRS PDR, a baseline design with heat sterilization of the weld for the Primary 

Containment Vessel was presented as compliant to requirements and feasible to implement.

• In February 2023, ESA and NASA OSMA expressed concerns about the risk of going forward with an emerging 

proposal for UV as an alternative to thermal methods. 

• In June 2023, a restructuring agreement was signed by ESA for Level-1.5 requirements. This agreement made 

clear mention that it is not an endorsement of UV treatment but allows NASA to proceed at risk. 

• JPL’s proposed UV treatment dose and wavelength for decontamination of the OS exterior are currently being 

quantified, but much work remains. Independent validation of the UV design is planned during the next year.

Recommendation: 

• (R7.1) Results of JPL’s ongoing microbiological testing of the proposed UV treatment should be reviewed by 

NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance as well as relevant US regulatory agencies. If the results are 

accepted as preliminary validation of the UV design, then the reviewing organizations should select an 

independent laboratory for additional decontamination testing and final validation of compliance with 

backward planetary protection requirements. NASA should work closely with ESA on review and validation of 

the MSR design for UV decontamination.
F8: NASA Coordination with US Regulatory Agencies 

on Backward Planetary Protection (1 of 2)

The Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) coordinated an Independent Scientific Review of the potential use of an 

active UltraViolet (UV) treatment to minimize or eliminate possible Martian biohazard contamination on the 

exterior of the OS. This study was an important step toward interagency coordination on MSR. The review 

recommendations include substantial additional work to confirm dust-load models, to evaluate the effectiveness 

of UV for microbiological and macromolecular decontamination, and to develop a mechanism for verification 

that the UV illumination system will operate as planned during capture and containment of the OS in orbit at 

Mars.

• There is a risk that without an interagency agreement on the subjects of effective biohazard decontamination 

and intact containment, there will be a failure to approve transfer of the Martian samples to NASA. 

• Planetary Protection coordination for Apollo was accomplished by establishing the Interagency Committee on 

Back Contamination (ICBC).

• MSR currently has no similar interagency coordinating organization or process. The IRB is not aware of any 

formal contact between NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as needed to 

begin work on the protocols for decision-making and the interagency chain-of-command on safety decisions 

during MSR landing at the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR).

• OCS has proposed lunch-and-learn activities with key interagency representatives for the coming year.
When the samples from Mars’ Jezero Crater land on Earth, multiple regulatory agencies will 

participate in deciding if all unsterilized Martian material is contained and safe for transfer to 

a receiving facility. Although Jezero Crater is not considered to be currently habitable, there 

are other locations on Mars where environmental conditions could possibly enable carbonbased life to survive and replicate. Consequently, any samples returned to Earth from Mars 

must adhere to backward planetary protection requirements that are focused on breaking 

the chain of contact and utilizing robust containment of all unsterilized material. NASA's 

technical standards are rigorous and compliant with international standards for planetary 

protection as established by the Committee on Space Research. 

R8: NASA Coordination with US Regulatory Agencies 

on Backward Planetary Protection (2 of 2)

Recommendations:

• (R8.1) All aspects of the MSR design for compliance with backward planetary protection requirements should be 

reviewed and accepted by NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance as well as the relevant US regulatory 

agencies.

• In addition to UV decontamination of possible Martian biohazards, safety reviews should cover models and 

testing for breaking the chain of contact and robust containment of non-sterilized material from Mars.

• (R8.2) NASA should initiate engagement with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and 

relevant regulatory agencies in order to establish protocols for decision-making and chain-of-command structure 

during safety inspection of the Earth Entry System at the UTTR landing site. 
The current architecture is intelligently constructed but is also highly constrained. The 

current architecture is based on an assumed budget and schedule plus other parameters 

including technical margins that do not seem realistic at this point in the lifecycle. The 

architecture should be reexamined with respect to all parameters and constraints in order to 

assure that the mission is both robust and resilient to schedule and other mission constraints. 

Resilience, in particular schedule resilience, must be a fundamental part of the architecture 

assessment. Resilience also comes through agility within each element and between 

elements. This agility requires enough decoupling such that the individual projects are 

functionally coupled at the mission level but are otherwise fundamentally independent from 

a developmental perspective.

Robustness should follow from the architecture. Architectural robustness comes through 

making each system element as individually robust as practical within the constraints 

imposed by the system-level requirements. Robustness does not necessarily require a blind 

application of a Class A approach or redundancy mandates. The goal should be a design that 

is well matched to the systems’ requirements and is focused on resilience that is specific to 

the mission goals and mission success without added features or complexity.

F9: Architectural Robustness and Resiliency 

(1 of 2)

The current MSR architecture is highly constrained and is not sufficiently robust or resilient to delays in the 

launch periods of the main architecture elements.

• SRL and CCRS have inadequate technical margins and have limited opportunities to find additional technical 

resources.

• A delay of SRL past the 2030 launch period greatly reduces the likelihood of mission success using the present 

architecture because of the aging Perseverance rover and the surface mission timeline challenges.

High-level analysis suggests that other architectures may be more robust and more resilient to schedule risk. 

These architectures may fit within yearly funding constraints, although at higher lifecycle costs due to the 

element schedules being extended with less-than-optimal funding profiles. 

• Such architectures might include a separately-landed fetch rover/MAV lander, nuclear power, and additional 

telecommunications assets.

The current outsourcing strategy is consistent with the proven level of contractor expertise. 

• Rearrangement of responsibilities among these proven NASA, NASA partner ESA, and industry players might 

be warranted if the architecture is changed.
R9: Architectural Robustness and Resiliency 

(2 of 2)

Recommendations:

• (R9.1) NASA should examine other potential architectures or variants of the current architecture in order to 

determine whether there are options that offer greater technical robustness and schedule resilience to 

launch phasing or launch delays, while fitting within annual budget constraints and lowering programmatic 

risk.

• Actively seek and analyze alternatives that might provide larger technical margins than the current 

architecture while also being technically simpler at the individual project, system, and subsystem levels. • The mindset should be simplicity in design, taking advantage of heritage design and approaches, 

examining mission classification specific to each project element, and execution of a robust cross-cutting 

V&V program. • Enlist independent programmatic analysts to assess each technically viable alternative in order to 

determine whether the alternative can be implemented with high confidence and lower cost and 

schedule risk within the annual budget constraints imposed by NASA. • Examine which path forward best balances technical and programmatic constraints, given the current 

status of the Program and the recommendations made in this report. • Alternate architectures should be carefully compared to variants of the existing architecture in terms of 

technical, schedule, and cost risk. • (R9.2) If a significantly different alternate architecture is determined to be the best way forward for the 

Program, the MSR Program should consider reallocating responsibilities among participants or adding other 

experienced and qualified sources when developing an acquisition strategy for the alternatives. 
The MSR Program is currently managing to one Management Agreement (MA) and one 

Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) as part of the hybrid Single-Program/Tightly-Coupled 

Program structure. This structure complicates the management of programmatics by limiting 

responsibility, accountability, and authority for budget and schedule performance to only the 

program level (not the project level), thus limiting visibility into cost and schedule 

performance of the projects against budget and schedule commitments recognized by SMD 

and the Agency. Given the size, complexity, and cost of each project, SMD and the Agency 

need separate budget and schedule commitments at the project level.

The program is not ready to be baselined due to continued technical issues that have yet to 

be resolved and anticipated fiscal year funding streams that are out of line with Programestimated funding requirements. The earliest feasible launch opportunities will occur in 2030. 

However, utilizing these opportunities is only possible with adequate fiscal year funding and a 

total lifecycle cost on the order of $8-11B.

F10: Programmatic Assessment (1 of 3)

The management of MSR as a hybrid Single-Program/Tightly-Coupled Program impedes effective management, limits insight, and introduces inefficiencies and inaccuracies.

• The management structure requires excessive effort to establish and maintain programmatic insight into the 

individual hardware elements, where most of the budget resides.

• Element managers have limited control over budgets and Unallocated Future Expenses (UFE).

The program is not ready to be baselined, technically or programmatically. 

• From the start, the program plan has been over-constrained in terms of budget, schedule, and workforce.

• Program performance to date has been inadequate and has been hampered by unclear responsibility, accountability, 

authority, and organizational complexity. 

The IRB assessment shows that both lifecycle cost and annual funding requirements exceed current estimates in the 

2024 President’s Budget Request.

• The Program’s anticipated annual funding requirements are significantly higher than the PBR (FY24-FY28). 

• Analysis shows that the earliest feasible launch opportunities are in 2030, but that assumes an annual allocation of 

more than $1B during FY25-FY28.

• The current reference architecture is not viable within the likely available funding profile.

Analysis shows that an MSR Program for the present or alternate architectures within the launch dates under 

consideration, and with the current division of work between NASA and ESA, will:

• Cost NASA at least $8B and as much as $11B.

• Require on the order of $850M-$1B per year during the development period. 
The IRB developed a programmatic assessment of potential MSR Program cost and schedule scenarios, including 

the program’s current plan. While the ICE for the current plan shows a range of costs for the ERO/2027 and 

SRL/2028 LRDs, the JCL indicates a very low probability of achieving the current LRDs. The earliest likely LRDs for 

both ERO and SRL are in 2030. The subsequent IRB ICE for the delayed (2030/2030) scenario illustrates a rephased 

cost plan for comparison. This scenario, combined with potential alternate architectures, provides a probable 

lifecycle cost range of approximately $8-11B. 

The alternate architectures considered were not detailed concepts and were intended only to represent a 

potential solution space for programmatic analysis. The alternate architectures included decoupled projects 

(where launches are not dependent on one another) with fiscal year budget scenarios that are either constrained 

(up to $850M, $950M, or $1B/fiscal year) or unconstrained. Scenarios included: 

• The “All In” approach, which prioritized SRL to launch as soon as possible with helicopters removed but 

retaining the arm. 

• The “Robust and Resilient (R&R)” approaches, which disaggregated the landed systems into two missions: 1) 

MSR Fetch Rover (MFR), which includes a 2xMER rover carrying the OS, scaled-down Skycrane EDL, and STHS, 

and 2) MSR MAV Lander (MML), which includes the MAV and a MAV landing/launch system using a scaled-up 

Skycrane EDL. The helicopters and the arm were removed from the MAV lander due to the addition of the 

MFR. One option launched ERO/CCRS first, with a constrained funding level of $950M/year. Another set of 

options launched the landed systems first and examined the impact of two constrained funding levels –

$850M/year and $1B/year. 

Overall, the IRB analysis suggests the alternate architecture solution space has an LCC range of $8.4-10.9B with 

various LRD combinations in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

Programmatic Assessment (2 of 3)

• The IRB’s independent programmatic assessment shows that $8-11B is the probable range (50%-80% confidence level) for the total MSR Program Life 

Cycle Cost (LCC) - Range for IRB ICE ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) and Various Alternate Architectures

• The IRB’s independent programmatic assessment shows that $8.0-9.6B is the probable range (50%-80% confidence level) for the total MSR Program LCC with the earliest 

probable Launch Readiness Dates (LRDs) for both ERO and SRL in 2030.

• There exist a variety of potential alternate architectures that the program may choose to consider in order to add robustness and resiliency to the Program and/or to operate within the constraints of a fiscal year budget cap. IRB analysis suggests that the alternate architecture solution space has an LCC range of $8.4-10.9B with various 

LRD combinations in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

• The probable cost range demonstrates the uncertainty based on the various scenarios estimated by the IRB.

$7.2

$7.4 $8.4 Probable MSR LCC 

range: $8.0B - $10.9B

$9.6

$8.2 $8.6

$9.5

$8.0

$8.4

$10.9

Based on growth from SRR (MSL & M2020)

ERO (2027)/SRL (2028)

ERO (2027)/SRL (2028) à pushed to ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) w/risks

ERO (2030)/SRL (2030) – scenario for comparison w/JCL results

Current Plan 2027/2028 LRDs are not feasible

Assessment of 

Current Plan

$6.2

SRR/MDR ($5.9)

$5.9

NASA’s Current MSR 

Budget Estimate ($5.6) 

PPBE-25 ($7.2)

KDP-B

ERO (CCRS)/SRL: 2027/2028

2030/2030 Various LRD combinations 

from 2030-2035

$8.8

$10.4

$9.1 $10.2

$9.1

Delayed MFR (2030)/MML (2033)/CCRS (2034) – constrained FY budget (<$1B/yr)

CCRS (2030)/MFR (2032)/MML (2035) – constrained FY budget (<$950M/yr)

Launch SRL ASAP: ERO (2032)/SRL (2030) – constrained FY budget (<$1B/yr

w/lower than recommended HQ UFE)à unconstrained FY budget

Delayed MFR (2030)/MML (2032)/CCRS (2034) – constrained FY budget (<$850M/yr)

Expected Range of Growth 

from SRR based on Analogies:

50% 70%

50th

ICE Percentiles:

70th

Alternate Architectures:

“All In”- Launch SRL ASAP, SRH 

Descope

Robust & Resilient (R&R) 

Descope, Mars Fetch Rover, 

MSR MAV Lander

Constrained 

($850M/$950M/$1B per 

year w/low HQ UFE)

Unconstrained

(UFE @30%/yr)

50th 70th 80th

70th 50th 80

Program Estimates:

SRR/MDR (7/2022)

KDP-B (12/2022)

PPBE-25 NOA (5/2023)

Current MSR Budget 

(Q2FY23)
Allowing SRL, MAV, and CCRS to be managed as separate projects under a revised, TightlyCoupled Program structure will enable each project to have responsibility, authority, and 

accountability over its portion of the program work. The Tightly-Coupled Program structure 

will also enable each project to manage to its own MA/ABC with individual project control 

over budgets, reserves/UFE, and schedules, while reporting to the MSR Program Office as 

appropriate and in accordance with NPR 7120.5F. Schedules for each project should be 

managed separately but cooperatively, and should be carefully integrated at the Program 

level. Baselines for each project should not be set until budgetary constraints are aligned with 

credible technical baselines that have been carefully studied through an analysis of 

alternative architectures that add robustness and resiliency for the enhancement of mission 

success. 

R10: Programmatic Assessment (3 of 3)

Recommendations:

(R10.1) Establish MSR as a Tightly-Coupled Program consisting of three projects (SRL, MAV, and ERO/CCRS). 

(R10.2) Set separate programmatic baselines (i.e., Management Agreements, Agency Baseline Commitments) for 

SRL, MAV, and CCRS, reporting to the MSR Program Office (according to NPR 7120.5). 

(R10.3) UFE must be re-established at a minimum of 30% for each project in order to manage risks (i.e., SRL, 

CCRS, and MAV should be given UFE at the project level in order to manage risks to a 70% confidence level).

(R10.4) If the most important budgetary constraint is annual cost, NASA HQ should provide commitments for 

annual cost ceilings in order to guide the development of the go-forward program, while de-emphasizing lifecycle 

cost as a critical measure of MSR programmatic success. 

(R.10.5) To increase the probability that the MSR program can succeed within the directed annual budgetary 

constraints, the Program should consider a range of options including launch delays and alternate architectures 

that provide greater architectural robustness and resiliency.

(R10.6) Conduct the Program PDR only after all of the projects have demonstrated at their PDRs/KDP-Cs that they 

have congruent technical, schedule, and cost baselines 

(R10.7) Postpone programmatic baselines (MAs/ABCs) for SRL, MAV, and CCRS until credible technical baselines 

can be achieved for the present architecture or alternative architectures that add greater robustness and 

resiliency. Programmatic baselines must then be established with robust reserves in order to ensure that the 

projects have the resources required for mission success
The current program has struggled with performing independent reviews in a way that is 

consistent with the NPR 7120.5F requirement such that all of the key program elements 

receive thorough and independent review. Despite best intentions, IRTs at the institutional 

level are necessary but not sufficient to assure comprehensive and uniform review. For 

example, SRL, MAV, and CCRS are not presently subject to a review process that meets the 

standards that are expected of a Class A mission of this magnitude and complexity. 

A key step in addressing the shortcomings of the review structure is to create a tightlycoupled program that accommodates SRL, MAV, and CCRS as separate projects such that 

each project has an SRB functioning within the requisite 7120.5F framework while also 

supporting the Program-level MSR integration requirements. In this way, all key elements of 

the project will be subject to a uniform standard of review and will be subject to a uniform 

level of programmatic reporting and analysis that can then be effectively rolled up into the 

Program-level assessment.

F11: Independent Review Structure (1 of 2)

The Independent Review structure lacks visibility into the integrated technical and programmatic plan, and the 

structure is not consistent with the scope of the three major Projects (SRL, MAV, ERO/CCRS).

• In the present approach, SRL, MAV, and CCRS conduct separate (i.e., not integrated) technically-focused gate 

reviews in coordination with the MSR SRB Chair and in concert with the respective Institutional Directors.

• ERO conducts independent gate reviews that are chartered by ESA.

• At the lower-level PDRs, an institutional JCL was conducted for SRL only. No independent JCL analyses were 

conducted for any of the Projects.

• The lower-level PDRs conducted were not uniform and did not include an independent assessment of an 

integrated technical and resources baseline.
R11: Independent Review Structure (2 of 2)

Recommendations: 

• (R11.1) As a Tightly-Coupled Program, establish separate SRBs for SRL, MAV, and CCRS that provide 

independent programmatic assessment (including JCLs) and adhere to conflict-of-interest and independence 

screening as described in the NASA SRB Handbook.

• (R11.2) The program SRB should comprise a cross-cut of independent program-level experts combined with 

the Chairs and a subset of other relevant members from the individual projects SRBs. 

• (R11.3) Each MSR Independent Review Team (IRT) activity should be retained with the addition of SRB crosscutting support but with the traditional focus of supporting the needs of the executing institution.

• (R11.4) Perform SRB-chaired PDRs and establish individual baselines for each of the Projects. 

• (R11.5) In accordance with NPR 7120.5F, JCL analysis is required at KDP-C for the Projects (SRL, MAV, CCRS) 

with the Program-level SRB integrating those analyses into a broader programmatic assessment of the end-to- end effort at KDP-II. 

• (R11.6) PDR entrance and success criteria leading to KDP-C should include an assessment of the integrated 

technical and resources baseline.

• (R11.7) The Program and each MSR Project (SRL, MAV, and CCRS) should report to their respective SRBs on a 

quarterly basis. 
MSR team members understand the importance of culture to their mission. Many team 

members are meeting the challenges of working across the cultures of their respective 

organizations. These findings highlight areas where a deeper understanding of the cultural 

differences can dramatically improve MSR’s response to these challenges.

F12: Culture and Communication (1 of 2)

Each of the contributing organizations has a dramatically different engineering and management culture as well as a strong 

basis to their historical mission experience. This influences the organizations’ approaches to risk management, communications, 

testing, and verification and validation. Miscommunication can arise frequently across these cultural lines. 

• The Program introduced what it calls a “Federated Model” for collaboration in order to give each organization autonomy 

over its engineering, assurance, and management processes. The Program’s intent was to avoid the perception that one 

organization is controlling another. However, this arrangement has exacerbated miscommunications by reifying distinctions 

between organizational cultures. This arrangement has limited penetration into shared technical issues.

• Amid so many convoluted partnerships, members of MSR have a limited ability to develop deep cross-cultural literacy and 

the understanding that is necessary to work effectively across institutional lines.

• Certain elements of the MSR organizational structure are exacerbating cultural differences and miscommunications. Issues 

include multi-institutional politics, confusing phase and domain reporting pathways (i.e., cross-organizational phase leads 

with limited authority), and limited interactions between engineers in the ranks across these organizations.

• A shared mission culture can help to ease miscommunications. Currently, there is no shared “MSR mission” identity across 

all members. It is noted that the ESA team has shown the emergence of a shared “MSR subculture,” and JPL-SRL/MSFC-MAV 

are developing deeper understanding.

• The co-located nature of the Program Office, the SRL development, and CCRS components at JPL are creating additional 

confusions and limitations on communicating directly with their appropriate chain of command.

• The team normalized the limited in-person interactions experienced during COVID-19 such that it has persisted post- lockdown. The MSR team has never met in person. Most team members we spoke with have not visited the institutions and 

individuals with which they are collaborating most closely (i.e., MSFC and JPL). Limited in-person interactions limits the 

development of cross-cultural visibility and understanding.
R12: Culture and Communication (2 of 2)

Recommendations: Clarifying the organizational structure, simplifying programmatic partnerships, investing in cultural interfaces 

with depth, enabling visibility and exchange across organizations, and providing intercultural training will go a long way toward 

resolving these issues and providing technical penetration on shared issues from campaign planning to shared V&V plans.

• [R.12.1] Establish SRL/MAV and ERO/CCRS as individual programmatic partners in order to allow each grouping to focus on 

building intercultural bridges between organizations.

• [R.12.2] Clarify the domain and phase structures, enable multi-institutional group members to communicate directly and 

make decisions across institutions, and empower those groups to resolve conflicts. This approach will develop cross-site 

visibility and shared understanding.

• [R.12.3] Invest in periodic and sustained in-person interactions between engineers working on parallel or related tasks across 

programmatic partners (i.e., the domains). The MSR Program Office should fund and facilitate team members visiting their 

collaborators in other institutions as part of developing intercultural fluency and inter-organizational visibility. In-person 

gatherings of sub-groups with multi-institutional representations should occur at a regular cadence in order to supplement 

online meetings.

• [R.12.4] The MSR Program should facilitate intercultural training among team members in order to facilitate conflict resolution and better understanding of engineering and management issues.

• [R.12.5] Place team members on location at a collaborating institution, as ESA has done at Goddard Space Flight Center.

• [R.12.6] Document multi-organizational decisions and changes in order to ensure robust multi-institutional communication, 

baseline control, and flowdown.
Additional Important Findings 

and Recommendations

CUI
F13: Verification and Validation (1 of 2)

The MSR Verification and Validation (V&V) program is not sufficiently mature. Evidence indicates that the 

integrated V&V program is underscoped and underfunded.

• MSR has highly-coupled and complex elements (SRL, ERO, MAV), which require carefully considered and 

possibly unique approaches to V&V.

• MSR appears to be following the precedent of past programs in underscoping V&V, including the development 

of a robust V&V plan for fault management.

• Examples of V&V concerns:

• No integrated test is planned for CCRS capture and orientation of the OS in Mars orbit.

• The SRL/MAV interface test (VECTOR plus ignition test) is not well defined.

• Only one funded test is planned for SRL parachute deployment, even though this is the largest and most 

complex parachute ever flown on a planetary mission.

• FM CCRS has no dynamic environmental tests with the ERO spacecraft after final integration. Concerns 

include dynamic couplings and workmanship verification.

• The Sample Transfer and Handling System requires a V&V plan (including test and closed-loop verification 

at different physical locations) that is very complex, poorly defined, and resides under split 

responsibilities.
R13: Verification and Validation (2 of 2)

Recommendations: 

• (R13.1) Develop integrated and detailed V&V plans (with credible schedules and costs) to a level of confidence 

that is appropriate for this flagship mission prior to completion of preliminary design review activities. 

• (R13.2) Ensure that each integrated V&V activity has properly recognized and scheduled the development of 

all required ancillary elements including flight software, ground software, ground support equipment, 

hardware-in-the-loop, testbeds, and simulations.

• (R13.3) Ensure clear system V&V leadership and coordination across elements. Ensure reasonable time and 

staffing allocations to complete proper V&V of the integrated systems. 

• (R13.4) Address fault management and contingency planning in the development of detailed V&V plans.
The phase-lead model is intended to have a single person with responsibility and authority 

for the success of a specific part of the mission. This model has been expanded with three 

program-level phase positions created to oversee operational planning and mission design, 

where there are interface handoffs and overlap between ERO/CCRS and SLR/MAV. 

Additionally, there are now nested or sub-phase leads reporting to these program leads, with 

co-leads at contributing organizations. This requires significant coordination and 

communication, resulting in a potentially unproductive workload on team members. Unlike 

the phase lead model of prior JPL missions, MSR’s multi-mission architecture and multilayered phase organization have also put phase leads in the difficult position of having 

responsibility but no real authority to direct phase team members who are from outside 

organizations.

The phase lead structure also overlaps with and is at odds with the domain working groups. 

These groups were created with the intention of handling the cross-organization and 

engineering interfaces between the Projects. The roles and responsibilities between phase 

leads and domain leads are also poorly defined and create additional organizational 

confusion.

F14: Cross-Organization Engineering 

Management (1 of 2)

A multi-layered phase-lead engineering approach was intended to provide oversight for the entire MSR campaign 

and to overlap with the cross-organizational/project domain engineering working groups. The approach has 

resulted in a large and complex engineering organization with multiple paths of communication and reporting, 

unclear lines of responsibility and authority, and a significant amount of coordination required among the various 

teams.

• For example, the launch, rendezvous, and capture phase organization includes multiple sub-phases due to the 

complex integrated and time-dependent operations of SRL and ERO.

JPL’s phase-lead engineering organization approach has proven to be an excellent model for complex functional 

mission development and operational planning for JPL-run missions. However, the model has been expanded greatly for MSR to also include the ERO/CCRS mission. This expanded model adds an extra layer of phase leads at 

the Program layer. This additional layer was introduced with the intention of eliminating gaps between mission 

phases at the campaign level. However, this structure is causing more confusion and adding extra layers of 

required review, communication, and coordination. Additionally, this structure further dilutes accountability and 

in sum will have a negative impact on both the project and mission's overall success.
The phase and domain lead organization should be restructured according to the 

recommended decoupling of the ERO and SRL missions. This recommendation aims to ensure 

thorough consideration of the existing organizational structure's ramifications, encompassing 

both the negative and positive aspects of the structure’s overlapping roles and 

responsibilities.

The program needs to adopt alternative phase/domain structures that are more easily 

communicable within the team, entail fewer leaders and team members needing constant 

updates, and involve fewer review and coordination meetings while still effectively covering 

the necessary mission phases. This approach will allow JPL to focus on managing and 

stabilizing campaign-level cross-project interfaces, with individual Projects having the 

autonomy and clear authority to manage their phases and design. Cross-organizational 

working groups need to have representation from all contributing organizations, regardless 

of technical and programmatic coupling. This representation will efficiently increase 

awareness of technical issues and solutions. For the updated organization, the decisionmaking authority, accountability, and responsibility of each phase and domain element at the 

Project and Program level should be clearly documented and communicated internally to 

Project and Program team members and also to external stakeholders.

R14: Cross-Organization Engineering 

Management (2 of 2)

Recommendations:

• (R14.1) Restructure the engineering organization by removing overlapping layers in the phase-lead 

organization and by strengthening cross-project-domain working groups. 

• (R14.2) Transition the phase lead role from the Program Office to the Project Offices so there is only one layer 

of phase leadership.

• (R14.3) Elevate the responsibility of the two cross-project domains (backward planetary protection, OS) so 

that these domains are integrating all activities associated with their domain across the program. 

• (R14.4) MSR must continue to retain strong cross-organizational engineering management of the integrated 

system’s functionality, operations, and interfaces. 

• All system elements must be represented, independent of the schedule relationship between the 

individual Projects.
Orbit knowledge is a function of the initial state knowledge and the time of propagation. 

These parameters do not change meaningfully after delivery of the OS to orbit by the MAV. 

The key is the observation of the MAV beacon by orbital telecommunications assets to 

confirm adequate orbit parameters. This knowledge will confirm a ~10 year orbital lifetime of 

the OS.

F15 and R15: Telecommunications 

Infrastructure

There is risk inherent in limiting the telecommunication architecture to ERO, which is a single, new orbital relay asset.

• Alternative telecommunication relay assets would allow decoupling of ERO and SRL launch dates, and would 

substantially reduce schedule dependencies.

• Determination of the initial OS orbital parameters, through ranging of the MAV beacon at orbital insertion by an 

active orbital asset, is essential to the ability of the ERO to find and capture the OS in a timely manner.

• Telecommunications capability directly affects the efficiency of the surface mission to retrieve the samples, which is 

a critical factor because of the tight surface operations timelines.

• A High Gain Antenna (HGA) on SRL would provide the ability to increase operational efficiency and resiliency. 

Recommendations:

• (R15.1) Formally include other (existing and future) orbital assets in the baseline concept of operations, and plan on 

managing those assets in order to maximize MSR robustness. 

• (R15.2) Extend the NASA-ESA agreement to include use of TGO as a telecommunication relay link for SRL. 

• (R15.3) Add back the HGA on the SRL for robustness and resiliency.
The sample return helicopter (SRH) helicopter accommodation on the Sample Return Lander 

(SRL) is very different from Mars Perseverance and Ingenuity heritage since the only viable 

location for the helicopters on SRL is on top of the lander. The aerodynamics associated with 

this location is quite different from the flat surface take-off that Ingenuity has demonstrated 

to date on Mars. The location is also significantly volume and mass constrained location, 

creating a new initial take-off environment with complex local geometry. 

F16 and R16: Helicopter Accommodation 

Risk Balance

The current architecture includes helicopters as a backup capability to deliver samples to the SRL out of concern for 

Perseverance’s reliability and longevity. This backup adds cost and poses accommodation challenges that add risk to SRL.

• The need for a backup sample delivery capability to SRL is clear in the present architecture. While direct delivery of samples by Perseverance provides more samples and is lower risk because it is a more controlled operation, the long-term viability of 

Perseverance cannot be assured.

• If Perseverance loses its ability to deliver samples:

• A single helicopter is currently enough to deliver the backup Three Forks 10 sample cache (although with less 

than desired unencumbered timeline margin). One helicopter alone provides most of the benefit to the overall 

MSR reliability.

• Two helicopters are required in order to meet Class B equivalent reliability via the redundant helicopters, and to allow 

full surface timeline margin to be maintained early in development.

• Helicopter capability is limited by Mars atmosphere and site safety conditions. Accommodation on SRL is significantly 

constrained by the small amount of volume and mass available and by unique initial release and takeoff challenges.

Recommendation: 

• (R16.1) If mass and accommodation complexity of two helicopters are driving the SRL design in a way that jeopardizes 

design closure of the system and/or creates significant risks (to SRL in general, or helicopter accommodation in particular), a single higher-reliability helicopter accommodation solution is better than two compromised helicopters (or no helicopter) in 

order to preserve the capability as part of the present architecture.
All MSR organizations must operate under a common set of assumptions and possess 

comprehensive awareness of the trades and issues that affect all stakeholders. Technical 

trades, issues, and decisions that impact fundamental assumptions should be swiftly 

communicated and mutually agreed upon before more formal and time-consuming 

modifications are made to configuration-controlled documentation.

MSR campaign and project systems engineering should establish an agile and efficient 

method for documenting and disseminating design and interface assumptions and decisions. 

This process should evolve to be fully in alignment with NASA standards by the Preliminary 

Design Review (PDR). For example, a baseline description document can serve as a rapid 

means of conveying the current baseline before the more formal configuration control 

change process is initiated. Disciplinary analysis teams and design teams could then cite this 

document as the foundation for their modeling and analysis outcomes. Any potential trades 

or deviations from the baseline would have a clearly defined reference design as a starting 

point. The baseline control process needs to consider partner organization processes and any 

MSR organizational changes related to the recommended decoupling of the ERO and SRL 

missions.

F17 and R17: Technical Baseline Management 

and Change Control

The technical baseline is not yet formally controlled, proposed changes are not thoroughly coordinated with all affected parties, and changes are implemented without full understanding of cost and schedule ramifications. 

• The differences in the standard change control processes at participating organizations create additional confusion as well as a latency in the processing of the changes. 

• The result is that not all affected parties define the baseline in the same way at the same time.

Recommendations:

• (R17.1) As a large program with multiple partners, MSR must have a rigorous and thorough baseline management and 

change control process at the top level in order to ensure that all interfaces and associated high-level requirements are fully 

socialized, documented, and controlled. 

• Starting now, the Program needs to establish a mechanism to document and communicate the working baseline (e.g., 

a Baseline Description Document [BDD]) for each Project and at the Program level. The contents should at a minimum 

include those issues that drive system schedule, cost, and impact to partner organizations. There should also be an 

effective baseline management process and change control process (including impact assessment).

• The formal baseline management and change control process that rigorously follows the standard NASA guidelines 

should be implemented by PDR.

• A key goal of decoupling is to enable agility at the lower levels due to the rigor and stability that are induced by formal 

control of the higher-level requirements. 

• In coordinating the various change control processes at the different MSR organizations, focus should be placed upon 

maintaining common baselines.
The Launch Services Program (LSP) Office at NASA/KSC provides launch and payload 

processing services for NASA robotic missions, including launch vehicle mission assurance. 

LSP partners with USSF and NRO to fulfill its role. This role includes commercial Acquisition, 

Program Management, Analysis (including targeted IV&V), Launch Vehicle Certification, 

Engineering (Fleet insight @ Design and Production centers including targeted RO locations), 

Mission Integration (including independent requirement verifications), and Launch 

Operations.

LSP has provided Mission Design planning for the past two years. This planning was done 

under the assumption of NLS launch vehicle capabilities without consideration of missionunique impacts to launch vehicle performance requirements. Initial reports from all LV 

providers as part of the Coupled Loads Analysis (CLA) are that challenging mission 

requirements include mass, components below the separation plane, and potential thermal 

control needs. Backup 2030 opportunities are equally or more challenging. 

F18 and R18: Launch Vehicles

The mass margins against launch vehicles’ performance are insufficient or lack adequate understanding to 

support the SRL/MAV and ERO/CCRS.

NASA/LSP:

• Mass growth of SRL has or will impact the launch vehicle competitive procurement plans. 

• LSP has provided Mission Design planning under the assumption of using the NLS contract for launch vehicle 

capabilities without a full understanding of SRL mission-unique requirements.

• Initial reports show that mass and other requirements are at the upper end of available LV performance.

ESA/Ariane:

• Ariane is evolving to the Ariane 6.4, a variant of the Ariane 6 commercial launch vehicle family.

• Uncertainty in the Ariane 6.4’s induced environments and the resultant margins are impacting the ERO/CCRS 

structural interface.

• Performance and other driving interface requirements and considerations are not visible to NASA.

• The Ariane 6 certification process is not visible to NASA.

Recommendations: 

• (R18.1) SRL is encouraged to increase the interactions with LSP in order to keep the trade space open to 

options as the mission requirements including mass and performance are settled. 

• (R18.2) The NASA/ESA agreement should provide visibility into development and certification of the vehicles.
The Psyche IRB (2022) revealed communication and coordination challenges imposed by the 

pandemic lockdown circumstances and the lack of collocated work. While MSR is in an earlier 

phase of development, decisions have been made with poor visibility. This situation 

establishes a cultural pattern of collaboration under poor communication practices. Research 

has repeatedly shown that repetitive, singular, or solo-authored tasks are best done 

remotely, but integrative projects and planning phases require in-person time for effective 

and efficient completion. At the time of writing of this report, center work-from-home 

capabilities vary and are influenced by local labor negotiations as opposed to a result of 

attending to the requirements of the job at hand or broader workplace reforms.

F19 and R19: Workforce Capacity and 

Expectations Post COVID-19

Post COVID return to work policies for on site work are uneven.

• COVID had a significant impact during the formulation phase.

• JPL has defined policies for onsite presence that are adaptable by the PM to specific Project needs.

• The GSFC and MSFC Center Directors have communicated a sense of urgency for onsite presence for flight 

projects and other commitments but are subject to bargaining agreements for implementation.

• ESA has defined policies for onsite presence that are adaptable to needs. Execution of policy is not considered 

an issue by ESA.

Recommendation: 

• (R19.1) The MSR Program will require a commitment for onsite presence in order to enable the monitoring of 

progress, delivery of hardware, and prompt disposition of risks and issues. Plans seem to have accounted for 

the inefficiencies of the current hybrid approach, but expectations should be clearly stated for the many 

functions that require an onsite presence. NASA and ESA should be proactive and prepare for a sustained 

onsite effort of highly-skilled personnel beyond the present levels (possibly 10-15% higher) during 

implementation.
F20 and R20: Supply Chain

Supply chain issues continue to plague the industry post-pandemic at the part/component level, and in the cost 

and availability of qualified contracted labor.

• There is a shortage in manufacturing capacity and skilled/experienced personnel throughout the industry, 

particularly in avionics, flight software, and composite structures. These shortages make it difficult to meet 

commitments.

• JPL’s ability to hire key personnel has been impressive, but onboarding and training adds inefficiencies.

• NASA, JPL, and ESA have accounted for higher costs and inefficiencies in plans to deal with personnel, parts 

and manufacturing. However, uncertainties remain, and inflation is expected to remain high.

• ESA reliance in US parts providers is an added complexity because of priorities given to procurements 

originating in the US.

Recommendation: 

• (R20.1) Simplifying and finalizing designs and procurements are important in order to adapt to the changing 

market. Supply chain management should be specifically added as a responsibility to designated existing 

Program and Project personnel, or new positions should be added in order to address issues and to ensure 

critical review so surprises are minimized.
Appendix
MSR IRB-2 Detailed Schedule