Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-CR-2258 | August 9, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ellen M. O’Connor

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mark Anthony Patterson, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 9, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1610-CR-2258

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1504-MR-12984

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial in Marion Superior Court, Mark Patterson (“Patterson”)

was convicted of murder and determined to be a habitual offender. Patterson 

appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited his
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opportunity to impeach a key witness for the State by excluding evidence 

regarding two of the witness’s prior convictions and by excluding evidence that 

the witness was incarcerated at the time of trial. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In March 2015, Patterson was driving his Dodge Durango on the east side of 

Indianapolis when he saw a man, Stanley Edmonson (“Edmonson”) walking to 

work. Patterson gave Edmonson a ride and asked if he needed work. 

Edmonson told Patterson that he already had a job. When Patterson dropped 

Edmonson off at work, he stated that he could supply Edmonson with “pills,”

meaning prescription drugs, if he ever needed any, and provided Edmonson 

with his telephone number. Tr. Vol. II, p. 57-58. At this time, Edmonson was 

dating Destiny Asher (“Asher”). Asher and her friend Renetta Marcum 

(“Marcum”) were users of various illicit drugs. 

[4] Approximately two weeks later, Marcum claimed to have been beaten by her 

husband and in need of painkilling drugs. Remembering Patterson’s claim to be 

able to provide “pills,” Edmonson facilitated a conversation between the 

women and Patterson. Edmonson sent a text message to Patterson stating, “this 

is Stan.” Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 128. Asher and Marcum, who were already under 

the influence of heroin, then used Edmonson’s phone to send Patterson text 

messages and voice mail messages, and the parties eventually agreed that 

Patterson would provide Asher and Marcum with thirty pills in exchange for 
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$120. The parties also agreed to meet at a gas station located at 21st Street and 

Arlington Avenue in Indianapolis to conduct the transaction.

[5] Marcum drove her Chevrolet Blazer with Asher in the front passenger seat and 

Edmonson behind Asher in the rear seat. They arrived first, and as they waited 

for Patterson, Edmonson got out of the car to smoke a cigarette. Patterson 

arrived a few minutes later and parked his Dodge along the passenger side of 

the Blazer. Edmonson was standing between the vehicles. Patterson asked who 

was there to buy the pills, and Edmonson responded that it was the woman 

driving the Blazer and indicated Marcum. Patterson then quickly exited his 

vehicle and placed his left hand on Edmonson’s shoulder and told him not to 

move. Patterson pointed a 9 mm caliber rifle into Marcum’s vehicle and struck 

Asher in the head with the barrel and said that he “just want[ed] the money.” 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 69. Asher held up her right arm to protect her face, and Patterson 

told the women he was “not playing around” and wanted the money. Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 70. 

[6] Marcum told Patterson not to hit Asher again and stated that she would give 

him the money. She then reached down by her left side. Instead of getting the 

money, Marcum grabbed a .40 caliber handgun that she had placed in the 

pocket of the driver’s side door of her vehicle. Although no witness testified that 

they saw what happened next, Edmonson testified that he first heard a gunshot 

from his right side, where Patterson was located. Edmonson fled into the gas 

station as he heard several more shots being fired behind him. He also heard the 

sound of screeching tires. Edmonson called 911.
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[7] As a result of the shooting, Asher was shot through her right forearm and in the 

right side of her head. Marcum fled the scene and rushed Asher to the hospital, 

where she was pronounced dead. Patterson was shot in the chin. 

[8] Officer Nathaniel Schaller (“Officer Schaller”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department (“IMPD”) was on patrol nearby and heard the sound of 

gunshots. He hurried to the scene of the shooting and found Patterson 

stumbling on Arlington Avenue, bleeding from his face. Patterson’s rifle was 

lying in the street, with two unfired rounds jammed in the firing chamber. 

Patterson was also taken to the hospital, where he underwent surgery to remove 

a bullet fragment that was located near his right carotid artery and to stabilize 

his fractured jaw. 

[9] Edmonson remained at the scene and gave a statement to the police. Although 

he at first attempted to hide the illicit nature of the transaction, he quickly told 

the police that they had arrived to buy narcotics from Patterson. Edmonson 

identified Patterson from a photographic lineup as the man involved in the 

shooting. IMPD Detective Shawn Looper spoke with Marcum at the hospital,

and she showed him the money, $210 in cash, that she had brought to the gas 

station to purchase pills from Patterson. 

[10] Subsequent investigation recovered no pills at the scene, although an empty pill 

bottle was recovered from Marcum’s Blazer. The rear passenger window of the 

Blazer had been shot out, and the vehicle contained shattered glass from the 

window, spent shell casings, and bullet fragments. The police also discovered
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inside the Blazer a small bag of cocaine and a glass pipe containing

methamphetamine residue. In Patterson’s Dodge, the police found a cell phone, 

shattered glass, and bullet fragments, but they found no pills or money in the 

vehicle. 

[11] The State charged Patterson on April 17, 2015, with felony murder and 

attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The State subsequently

alleged that Patterson was a habitual offender. Marcum died of unrelated 

causes prior to trial, leaving Edmonson as the State’s only witness to the events 

of the shooting. 

[12] Prior to trial, Patterson filed a notice of intent to impeach Edmondson with 

evidence of three of his prior convictions, i.e., a 2009 conviction for theft; a 

2013 conviction for failure to register as a sex offender; and a 2016 conviction 

for obstruction of justice. In response, the State filed a motion in limine seeking 

to limit the admission of any of Edmonson’s prior convictions other than one 

for theft. The State also sought to limit the admission of evidence that 

Edmonson had been on parole at the time of the shooting and that he was 

currently incarcerated. The trial court held a hearing on these pending motions 

immediately before the beginning of trial. The court determined that 

Edmonson’s 2013 and 2016 convictions were not for crimes of dishonesty and

that evidence regarding these convictions was therefore inadmissible for 

impeachment purposes. The court also determined that Edmonson’s parole 

status and current incarceration were inadmissible. 
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[13] A two-day jury trial began on August 8, 2016. Although Patterson did not 

testify on his own behalf, his theory of defense was that Marcum tried to rob 

him. Patterson acknowledged that Asher had been killed in the exchange of 

gunfire but argued that it was impossible to tell by whom she had actually been 

shot. The jury rejected this defense and found Patterson guilty as charged. 

Patterson then waived his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender issue, and 

the trial court found that he was a habitual offender. 

[14] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 9, 2016, and merged the 

attempted robbery conviction into the felony murder conviction for sentencing 

purposes. The court then imposed the advisory sentence of fifty-five years on 

the felony murder conviction in addition to the twenty-year habitual offender 

enhancement. Thus, Patterson was sentenced to an aggregate term of seventyfive years. Patterson now appeals. 

Standard of Review

[15] All of Patterson’s arguments on appeal involve the trial court’s decision to 

exclude certain evidence. Questions regarding the admission of evidence are 

generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Wells v. State, 904 

N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. On appeal, we review the 

trial court’s evidentiary rulings only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial 

court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted 

the law. Id. 
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I. Indiana Evidence Rule 609

[16] Patterson first argues that the trial court erred by limiting his use of Edmonson’s 

prior convictions to impeach him as a witness. Indiana Evidence Rule 609(a) 

provides: 

(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of 

a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime 

or an attempt of a crime must be admitted but only if the crime 

committed or attempted is (1) murder, treason, rape, robbery, 

kidnapping, burglary, arson, or criminal confinement; or (2) a 

crime involving dishonesty or false statement, including perjury.

[17] Patterson argues that Edmonson’s prior convictions for obstruction of justice 

and failure to register as a sex offender were admissible for impeachment 

purposes because these crimes involve dishonesty or false statement. Neither 

party cites any Indiana case directly on point, nor has our research revealed 

any. 

[18] However, we need not decide today whether obstruction of justice and failure 

to register as a sex offender are crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. 

Even if we assume arguendo that Patterson is correct and that the trial court 

should have admitted evidence regarding Edmonson’s prior convictions for 

impeachment purposes, we conclude that any error was harmless. 

[19] Errors in the admission of evidence are ordinarily disregarded as harmless error 

unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Remy v. State, 17 N.E.3d 396, 

401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 
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2012)). In determining whether a party’s substantial rights have been affected, 

we consider the evidence’s probable impact on the jury. Id. Improper admission 

of evidence is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial 

independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no 

substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. 

[20] In addressing this issue, we are mindful that Patterson was convicted of felony 

murder, not knowing or intentional murder. That is, the State was required to 

prove that Patterson killed Asher while attempting to commit the offense of 

robbery. Patterson argues that there was a question as to whether he attempted 

to rob Asher and Marcum or whether Marcum attempted to rob him, and that 

Edmonson’s testimony was the key piece of evidence proving this. While we do 

not doubt the importance of Edmonson’s testimony, there was further evidence 

to support the State’s case. Notably, no pills were found at the scene, only an 

empty pill bottle. If Patterson had come to deliver pills, it might reasonably be 

expected that he would have had pills in his possession. Moreover, Patterson 

was armed with a rifle. And Asher was shot in the head on the side where 

Patterson was standing and shot through her forearm, indicating that she was in 

a defensive position. All of this points to Patterson robbing Asher and Marcum, 

not vice versa. 

[21] We further observe that Patterson was permitted to impeach Edmonson’s 

credibility by referring to his prior conviction for theft. Thus, the jury was aware 

that Edmonson had a criminal history that involved a crime of dishonesty. See 

Newman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that theft is a 
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crime of dishonesty), trans. denied. Thus, the jury was well aware that 

Edmonson had been convicted for a crime of dishonesty. We are unable to say 

that permitting Patterson to introduce evidence that Edmonson had been 

convicted of other crimes involving dishonesty would have swayed the jury to 

discredit Edmonson’s testimony. Put differently, we do not think that excluding

evidence of Edmonson’s other convictions contributed to the jury’s verdict. 

[22] Indeed, Patterson would not have been permitted to delve into the details of 

Edmonson’s prior convictions and could have only asked Edmonson whether 

he had been convicted of the crimes. See Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 

(Ind. 2002) (under Evidence Rule 609(a), the witness may generally be 

questioned only about whether he had been convicted of a particular crime and 

the details may not be explored). 

[23] Accordingly, we hold that any error in the trial court’s exclusion of evidence 

regarding Edmonson’s other prior convictions for impeachment purposes was 

harmless. See Sisson v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1, 17-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding 

that any error in trial court’s exclusion of witness’s prior conviction for mail 

fraud was harmless where there were many other reasons to doubt the witness’s 

credibility), trans. denied. 

II. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Edmonson’s Status as a Parolee or 

Inmate

[24] Patterson also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted 

the State’s motion in limine to prevent Patterson from introducing evidence 
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regarding Edmonson’s status as a parolee on GPS monitoring or that he was 

incarcerated at the Indiana Department of Correction. At the time of the 

shooting, Edmonson was on parole as a result of a prior conviction for 

strangulation, and at the time of the trial, Edmonson was incarcerated. 

Patterson wished to cross-examine Edmonson on these issues to show his bias, 

i.e., that he had a motive to cooperate with the State to gain some benefit. 

[25] Indiana Evidence Rule 616 provides that “[e]vidence that a witness has a bias, 

prejudice, or interest for or against any party may be used to attack the 

credibility of the witness.”1 As with most evidentiary matters, the trial court has 

wide discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination. Tolliver v. State, 

922 N.E.2d 1272, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In addition, our 

supreme court has held that any beneficial agreement between an accomplice 

and the State must be revealed to the jury. Id. This rule allows the jury to better 

assess the reliability and credibility of the witness. Id.

[26] Here, Patterson presented no evidence in his offer of proof that there was an

express or implied promises of leniency to Edmonson in exchange for his 

testimony. In fact, Patterson admitted to the trial court that there was no 

evidence of any promised or implied leniency to Edmonson in exchange for his 

testimony. Tr. Vol. II, p. 14. Instead, Patterson argued only that, if Edmonson

 

1 Although Rule 616 provides for the admission of evidence showing bias or prejudice of a witness without 

any qualifications, our supreme court has held that Rule 616 should be read in conjunction with Rule 403’s 

required balancing of probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 

407 (Ind. 1999). 
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were given the opportunity for early release or parole, “he would certainly say 

that I testified truthfully in a murder trial. That is a benefit he could receive, and 

therefore it’s a bias.” Id. However, a witness’s mere hope or expectation of 

receiving a benefit is insufficient to permit impeachment for bias. See Tolliver, 

922 N.E.2d at 1285 (holding that disclosure to the defendant is not required if 

the witness testifies favorably only with the hope or expectation of leniency). 

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

excluded evidence regarding Edmonson’s status as an inmate. 

Conclusion

[27] Any error in the exclusion of Edmonson’s prior convictions for obstruction of 

justice and failure to register as a sex offender was harmless. Although a key 

witness, Edmonson’s credibility had already been impeached by admission of 

evidence that he had been previously convicted for a crime of dishonesty. The 

exclusion of further impeachment evidence is unlikely to have contributed the 

jury’s verdict. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding 

evidence of Edmonson’s status as an inmate at the Indiana Department of 

Correction. Patterson provided no evidence that Edmonson had reached any 

agreement with the State in exchange for his testimony and argued only that 

Edmonson may have hoped to benefit from his testimony in the future. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

[28] Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.