In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2694

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RICHARD REED,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 99-CR-30065--Richard Mills, Judge.

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2001--DECIDED November 30, 2001

 Before CUDAHY, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges. 

 ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury found

Richard Reed guilty of the manufacture of

methamphetamine and the district court

sentenced him to 168 months in prison. At

the trial, the court allowed into

evidence incriminatory statements that

Reed made to Illinois State Police

Officer Carl Carpenter during pre-trial

interrogation. Although the government

had agreed to provide Reed with

conditional immunity as to the direct use

of his statements, the court found that

Reed had breached the agreement by lying.

Reed appeals his conviction, contending

that the district court clearly erred in

concluding that Reed materially breached

the immunity agreement and that the

admission of his statements was

prejudicial. We conclude that the

district court committed no clear error

in holding that Reed materially breached

the agreement. The admission of Reed’s

statements to Officer Carpenter was

therefore proper, and we affirm Reed’s

conviction.

I.

 Richard Reed lived in Pana, Illinois,

where he manufactured methamphetamine in

his home. On May 18, 1999, law

enforcement agents searched his residence
and confiscated several items needed for

the production of this drug, including:

filters, large numbers of pseudoephedrine

tablets (a precursor to methamphetamine),

a rubber hose with a brass fitting that

had been in contact with another

precursor chemical, and glass objects

that contained liquid methamphetamine.

During a post-search interview, Reed

admitted to being involved in the

manufacture and distribution of

methamphetamine and identified several of

the objects that had been seized.

Approximately eleven weeks after the

search, a grand jury returned a one-count

indictment against Reed charging him with

manufacturing methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. sec.sec. 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(B). Shortly thereafter,

Reed was arrested on the federal charge

while he was in state custody at the

Macon County Jail in Decatur.

 While in custody and after conferring

with his attorney, Reed entered into a

conditional direct use immunity agreement

with the government. This agreement

prohibited the government from using any

of Reed’s statements as direct evidence

against him so long as he provided the

authorities with "complete and truthful

information." The agreement provided,

inter alia:

1. The government agrees that no statement

made or information provided pursuant to

this agreement may be used directly as

evidence against you in any criminal case

. . . .

2. In return, you agree that you will

provide complete and truthful information

to law enforcement officials regarding

your criminal conduct and everything you

know or have reason to believe about the

criminal conduct of others. . . .

* * *

4. You further acknowledge and agree that

the government’s grant of use immunity

herein is entirely conditioned upon your

complete compliance with paragraph[ ] 2 .

. . . Should you knowingly make any

materially false statement or omission in

providing information under this

agreement, the government will be

entitled to use your statements and

evidence you provide, directly and

indirectly, to institute and support a

criminal prosecution for any offense . .
. .

5. [Y]ou must neither conceal [n]or

minimize your own actions or involvement

in any offense, nor conceal, minimize,

fabricate, or exaggerate anyone else’s

actions or involvement in any offense.

You must be completely truthful about the

facts whatever those may be.

* * *

11. Any material breach of any provision

of this agreement by you will void this

agreement in its entirety and will

release the government from any

obligation under this agreement.

R.30, Ex. A at 1-2 (emphasis in

original).

 After Reed entered into the agreement,

he was interviewed by Officer Carpenter.

During the interview, Reed made a number

of statements inculpating himself in the

manufacture of methamphetamine. However,

Reed also stated, among other things,

that he had not manufactured

methamphetamine in three months, that he

had not been staying at the residence of

George Diggs in Decatur, Illinois, and

that he did not have any knowledge of nor

was involved in any way with the

manufacture of methamphetamine at Diggs’

home. Officer Carpenter knew the latter

statements were false based on prior

interviews with other potential

witnesses.

 During Reed’s appearance at a pre-trial

hearing, the Assistant United States

Attorney ("AUSA") advised Reed and his

attorney that because Reed had violated

the immuni-ty agreement by providing

false information to Officer Carpenter,

the government planned to use Reed’s

statements against him at trial. The AUSA

repeated his statements at another

hearing a few weeks later. Neither Reed

nor his counsel made any attempt to

contact the AUSA regarding this issue.

Similarly, the government did not

initiate further discussion with Reed or

his attorney regarding this issue. In

November of 1999, the district court

granted Reed’s motion to replace his

counsel. The AUSA subsequently notified

Reed’s new attorney that Reed had

violated the immunity agreement and that

the government planned on using Reed’s
statements against him in court.

 On December 29, 1999, Reed filed a

motion in limine to exclude from trial

the inculpatory statements he had made to

Officer Carpenter. Reed never claimed not

to have lied to Officer Carpenter, but

rather argued that the government was

"reneging on the cooperation agreement

simply because the Defendant ha[d]

refused to plead guilty and [wa]s putting

the Government through the burden of

preparing for trial." R. 30 at 2. In

response to this motion, the government

elaborated on Reed’s falsehoods and

further noted that Reed had failed to

make any good-faith effort to rectify his

relationship with the government and

satisfy the conditions of the immunity

agreement. R. 85 at 93-94. 

 At trial, the court held an evidentiary

hearing outside of the jury’s presence to

determine whether Reed had, in fact,

breached the immunity agreement. Officer

Carpenter testified to the details of his

interview with Reed. Carpenter explained

that prior to his interview with Reed, he

had interviewed a potential witness,

Annette Rafeeny, in anticipation of

obtaining a search warrant for the Diggs

residence in Decatur. During this

interview, he obtained evidence of Reed’s

involvement and activities with Diggs.

Carpenter went on to describe the search

of the Diggs residence and the various

items seized from the methamphetamine lab

in the home. Carpenter used the

information he had gathered in the

Rafeeny interview and the Diggs search as

a litmus test for truth-telling during

his interview with Reed. Specifically,

Carpenter posed questions to Reed to

which he already knew the correct answers

in order to determine whether Reed was

being honest. Carpenter explained that he

did not know what Reed’s response to the

questions would be before he asked them,

but once answered, he knew that Reed was

lying about his involvement in the

manufacture of methamphetamine at the

Diggs residence. Carpenter also testified

that the purpose of Reed’s

immunityagreement was to further the

investigation, but that Reed had provided

no information that aided the

government’s inquiry. R. 85 at 63-95.

 Reed argued that his false statements

did not amount to a material breach of
the use immunity agreement. He reasoned

that because Carpenter knew he was lying,

none of his lies had caused the

government to waste resources chasing

down false leads or had otherwise

hampered the government’s investigation.

Indeed, in Reed’s view, it was

inappropriate for the government to seek

release from the immunity agreement based

on lies that he told in response to

questions designed solely to test his

veracity rather than to elicit

substantive information in pursuit of the

government’s investigation.

 Alternatively, Reed contended that even

if his lies did constitute a breach of

the immunity agreement, the government

nonetheless should not be permitted to

use his inculpatory statements at trial.

Because the prosecution had abundant

other evidence of his guilt, Reed argued,

the statements he had made pursuant to

the immunity agreement were cumulative,

and the government had no genuine need to

use them. "I think you could rule that my

client violated the cooperation agreement

and you probably will be . . . upheld on

appeal," Reed’s counsel conceded. R. 85

at 99. "But, I just don’t see where all

this is necessary." Id.

 Judge Mills concluded that Reed had

breached the immunity agreement and that,

consequently, the government was free to

use Reed’s statements against him.

"There’s no question that [Reed] violated

his cooperation agreement with the

government," the judge found. R. 85 at

102. The terms of that agreement were

straightforward, and proof that Reed had

given false information was sufficient to

establish a breach of Reed’s duty of

candor. See id. "[I]t’s clear, it’s clear

that he’s lied." Id. Judge Mills also

acknowledged that the government might be

able to make its case against Reed

without eliciting the statements that

Reed had made to Carpenter, but the judge

did not find that possibility a

sufficient basis on which to exclude the

statements. "Now [the prosecutor] may

agree with you that it’s cumulative or

that he can get in everything else and he

doesn’t really need this," the judge

observed. Id. at 101. "But we can’t

second-guess him. This is his decision to

make as to how he wants to present the

case . . . before the jury." Id. at 101-

02.
 Officer Carpenter subsequently took the

witness stand before the jury. The

government established that Carpenter had

interviewed Reed at the Macon County jail

and that Reed had made a number of

statements acknowledging his

participation in the manufacture of

methamphetamine. 

 At the conclusion of a two-day trial,

the jury convicted Reed.

II.

 Reed contends that the district court

erred in finding that he committed a

material breach of the use

immunityagreement. We review the factual

determination that Reed failed to comply

with his obligations under the immunity

agreement for clear error. See United

States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1078 (7th

Cir. 1998). "We will reverse only if,

after a comprehensive review of the

evidence, we are left with ’the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made.’" Id., quoting United States

v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir.

1996). There is no dispute that Reed lied

to Officer Carpenter. He argues only that

his lies were immaterial because

Carpenter knew that he was lying and

therefore his lies did not affect the

government’s investigation.

A.

 A proffer agreement, such as the one at

issue here, is considered to be a

contract. Therefore, it must be enforced

according to its terms. United States v.

Lopez, 222 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1601 (2001). Ac

cording to the exact terms of the

agreement, Reed was to provide the

government with "complete and truthful

information . . . regarding [his]

criminal conduct and everything [he]

kn[e]w . . . about the criminal conduct

of others." R. 30, Ex. A at 1 para. 2

(emphasis in original). Reed was

instructed to "be completely truthful

about the facts whatever those may be."

Id. at 2 para. 5 (emphasis added).

Finally, Reed was warned in the agreement

that "[a]ny material breach of any

provision . . . w[ould] void th[e]

agreement in its entirety and w[ould]

release the government from any
obligation under th[e] agreement." Id.

para. 11.

 Reed violated his immunity agreement

when he told Officer Carpenter that he

knew nothing of and was not involved in

the manufacture of methamphetamine at the

Diggs residence in Decatur. Reed was

clearly not being "completely truthful

about the facts" in accordance with the

agreement. When Reed failed to disclose

his activities at the Diggs residence he

"conceal[ed] or minimiz[ed] [his] own ac

tions or involvement in any offense," in

direct violation of paragraph 5 of the

agreement. See Lopez at 434. Reed’s

assertion that he knew nothing about the

activities occurring at the Diggs

residence also can be interpreted as an

attempt to deflect suspicion away from

another suspect (Diggs), an attempt that

was contrary to the very purpose of the

immunity agreement as well as the express

terms of paragraph 5, which also forbade

him from "conceal[ing] [or] minimiz[ing]

. . . anyone else’s actions or

involvement in any offense." 

 Moreover, after being repeatedly

notified that Reed’s lies were being

considered by the government to be a

material breach of the agreement, neither

Reed nor his attorney made any attempt to

rectify the situation and disclose the

complete truth before trial. Reed’s

falsehoods and the absence of an effort

to remedy them, indeed, his display of

utter apathy in cooperating with the

government at all, constituted an

unambiguous violation of his agreement.

See United States v. Mattison, 153 F.3d

406, 412 (7th Cir. 1998); Lopez at 434.

The violation rendered the agreement null

and void as per paragraph 11 and

destroyed any use immunity that Reed

otherwise might have enjoyed vis a vis

the statements that inculpated him.

B.

 Reed contends that his lies were

immaterial because Officer Carpenter knew

he was lying, and consequently, his lies

had no effect on the government’s

investigation. Reed relies on a Sixth

Circuit case in which the court concluded

that a defendant’s lies during

interrogation did not constitute a

"substantial material breach" of a

transactional immunity agreement. United
States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 575 (6th

Cir. 1992). Reed misinterprets Fitch,

however. The fact that his deceptions did

not derail the government’s investigation

does not render them immaterial.

 What was key to the Sixth Circuit’s

decision in Fitch was that the

defendant’s lies did not deprive the

government of the benefit of the immunity

agreement. Like Reed, Fitch provided

false information to the government after

entering into an immunity agreement; and

just as in this case, government agents

were not misled by Fitch’s lies. But so

far as the record in Fitch revealed, the

defendant’s lies amounted to nothing more

than a minimization of his own

involvement in the crime. See id. at 575.

Fitch had otherwise furthered the

government’s investigation considerably;

in fact, "Fitch supplied the government

with enough information to allow it to

secure a multi-count indictment against

numerous individuals . . . [and] assisted

the investigation in various other ways."

Id. In light of the substantial

assistance that Fitch had given the

government, the court concluded that "the

government received the benefit of its

bargain" and that the immunity agreement

should therefore be enforced. Id. Fitch,

of course, is not binding on this court;

but even as persuasive authority Fitch

does not suggest that the district court

clearly erred in finding that Reed

breached his agreement with the

government.

 Contrary to Reed’s assertions, the court

in Fitch did not rule as it did simply

because the lies that the defendant had

told turned out to be benign. The

harmlessness of his statements was but

one factor in the Sixth Circuit’s

analysis of the asserted breach. Unlike

the instant case, the government in Fitch

was able to use other information

provided by the defendant to further the

investigation. By contrast, not only did

Reed seek to minimize his own wrongdoing,

but he also attempted to avert the

government’s suspicions from Diggs.

Reed’s violation thus denied the

government the very benefit that the

agreement was intended to secure--

information that would aid in the

identification and prosecution of other

methamphetamine traffickers.

Reed’sagreement, intended to be
representative of a symbiotic

relationship between a defendant and the

government, had beenreduced to a useless

piece of paper that served only one of

its parties. Even applying the Fitch

analysis, Reed materially breached his

immunity agreement.

 Additionally, the immunity agreement in

Fitch provided no remedy for the

government in the event that the

defendant breached the agreement. 964

F.2d at 575. The court in Fitch held that

even if there had been a breach in the

agreement, the government would have been

"limited to those remedies specified in

the agreement." Id.; see also id. at 576.

 Reed’s agreement, unlike the one in

Fitch, expressly provided for its

nullification in the event of a breach.

R. 30, Ex. A at 2 para. 11. Because

Reed’s agreement specifically provided

for that remedy, upon Reed’s breach, the

government was not obligated to provide

Reed with immunity. Once the district

court determined that the agreement had

been violated, then, the government was

free to use Reed’s statements against him

at trial.

III.

 We hold that the district court did not

clearly err in finding that Reed

materially breached his immunity

agreement. That holding makes it

unnecessary for us to address Reed’s

other arguments. Reed’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.