UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4860

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JORGE PATLAN, a/k/a X The Bear, a/k/a Jorge C. Patlan, a/k/a 

Jorge Patlan Sauceda,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00214-JCC-1)

Submitted: May 14, 2010 Decided: June 17, 2010

Before NIEMEYER and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Geremy C. 

Kamens, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael L. 

Whitlock, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jorge Patlan appeals his conviction after a bench 

trial for illegal reentry of a deported alien in violation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006). On appeal, Patlan contends that the 

district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 

indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation 

of the Speedy Trial Act, and we review the court’s related 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. RodriguezAmaya, 521 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2008). The Speedy Trial Act 

provides “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual 

with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty 

days from the date on which such individual was arrested or 

served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2006). “Offense” means “any Federal criminal 

offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is 

triable by any court established by Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3172(2) (2006). If the thirty-day time limit is not met, the 

charge “shall be dismissed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (2006).

Patlan was served with the arrest warrant charging him 

with the instant criminal offense and taken into custody by the 

United States Marshal on April 9, 2009. He was indicted twentyeight days later on May 7, 2009. Patlan argues, however, that 

the thirty-day period under the Speedy Trial Act began on April 
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1, 2009, while he was detained in the custody of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials who were processing his 

administrative deportation back to Mexico. 

We have held that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply 

to ICE administrative detention, since the plain language of the 

Act limits its coverage to persons detained in connection with a 

federal criminal arrest. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d at 441. 

However, we have also held that the Speedy Trial Act includes a 

ruse exception, such that the Act’s time limits are triggered 

when the primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention was 

to hold a defendant for future criminal prosecution. Id. at 

442. We have further held that civil detainees bear the burden 

of proving the exception applies in a given case. Id. 

In this case, Patlan argued that the thirty-day time 

limit was triggered on April 1, 2009, when his case was referred 

to the United States Attorney’s office for criminal prosecution, 

contending the purpose for his detention at that point was for 

future criminal prosecution. However, as the district court 

noted, there was no evidence that work on his administrative 

deportation ceased on that date. Nor were there any allegations 

of collusion between ICE and the Government for the purpose of 

bypassing the Act’s requirements. If the United States Attorney 

had declined to pursue this case, Patlan would still have been 

held by ICE until he was deported. We thus conclude that the 
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district court did not clearly err in finding Patlan failed to 

prove that the primary or exclusive purpose of his detention by 

ICE was to hold him for future criminal prosecution.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED