Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Goossens, 2014 IL App (3d) 120680

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

RAYMOND E. GOOSSENS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-12-0680

Filed September 30, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

In defendant’s appeal from his sentence of two years’ probation 

following his conviction for intimidation by threatening not to respond 

to certain 911 calls during his employment as a sergeant for a police 

department, the appellate court rejected defendant’s contention that 

the condition of his probation that he become current on child support 

was unauthorized, since section 5-6-3(b)(6) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections specifically provides that the trial court has the discretion 

to require defendant to support his dependents as a condition of 

probation, and in view of the specific enumeration of that condition, 

there is no requirement of a finding that the condition be reasonably 

related to the underlying offense.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 11-CF-785; 

the Hon. Michael F. Meersman, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Rikin Shah (argued), of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, 

for appellant.

John L. McGehee, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Dawn Duffy 

(argued), of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Wright specially concurred, with opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 The defendant, Raymond E. Goossens, appeals from his conviction for intimidation, 

challenging the condition of his probation order that he become current on child support. We 

affirm. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 The defendant, Raymond E. Goossens, was convicted of intimidation (720 ILCS 

5/12-6(a)(6) (West 2010)) after he, as a sergeant of the Cordova police department, threatened 

to not respond to 911 calls from the Cordova Dragway while two former police officers 

worked there. The defendant was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. The order of 

probation contained 21 conditions, one of which was that the defendant become current on his 

child support. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to 

include the child support condition in the probation order and asking this court to vacate that 

condition. 

¶ 4 ANALYSIS 

¶ 5 The defendant argues that the child support condition was unauthorized because it made 

the probation an indeterminate term, thereby in violation of the maximum 30-month term 

authorized by section 5-4.5-40(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-40(d) (West 2010)). The defendant also argues that the condition was not authorized 

under section 5-6-3 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3 (West 2010)) because child support 

payments did not reasonably relate to the offense of intimidation. The State argues that the trial 

court had specific statutory authority to impose the child support condition. Whether or not the 

sentence is authorized by statute is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. 

Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 22 (2004). 

¶ 6 The defendant was convicted of intimidation, a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(6) 

(West 2010). Section 5-4.5-40(d) of the Code provides that the period of probation or 

conditional discharge for a Class 3 felony shall not exceed 30 months. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(d) 

(West 2010). The defendant cites no case law in support of his position that a condition of 

probation somehow increases the term of probation. The defendant could make the same 
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argument with regard to any fines or fees imposed as conditions of probation that he fails or 

refuses to pay during the term of probation. The trial court has jurisdiction to revoke or modify 

during the term of the probation, but is generally limited to contempt proceedings to enforce 

unfulfilled conditions of probation after the probation period has expired. People v. Budzynski, 

333 Ill. App. 3d 433, 436 (2002). We find that the inclusion of the child support probation term 

did not convert the defendant’s probation term to an indeterminate term. 

¶ 7 Our goal in interpreting the language of a statute is to determine and give effect to the 

intent of the legislature. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement 

Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005). Legislative intent is best derived from the language of the 

statute itself, which, if unambiguous, should be enforced as written. Id.

¶ 8 Section 5-6-3(a) of the Code lists several mandatory conditions of probation. 730 ILCS 

5/5-6-3(a) (West 2010) (the conditions of probation and of conditional discharge “shall be”).

Section 5-6-3(b) of the Code lists other conditions that a court may impose at its discretion. 

730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b) (West 2010). Section 5-6-3(b)(6) of the Code provides: 

“(b) The Court may in addition to other reasonable conditions relating to the nature 

of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined for each defendant in 

the proper discretion of the Court require that the person: 

 * * * 

 (6) support his dependents[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West 2010). 

¶ 9 The State argues that this provision provided clear statutory authority to impose payment 

of child support as a condition of probation. We agree. We read section 5-6-3(b) of the Code as 

specifically allowing the enumerated conditions, but if the trial court seeks to impose 

additional, unlisted, conditions, they must be reasonably related to the charged offense. See 

People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997) (recognizing that section 5-6-3(b) of the Code 

contained several permitted conditions, but also gave the trial court discretion to impose 

additional conditions provided that they were reasonable and related to the nature of the 

offense or rehabilitation of the defendant; sign proclaiming the defendant a violent felon was 

unreasonable); see also People v. Whittington, 87 Ill. App. 3d 504 (1980) (probation condition 

not specifically enumerated in earlier version of section 5-6-3(b) of the Code was permissible 

because it was reasonably related to the underlying offense). In so holding, we acknowledge 

our disagreement with the Fourth District’s holding in People v. Campbell, 325 Ill. App. 3d 

569, 571 (2001), that the plain meaning of section 5-6-3(b) of the Code is that all conditions of 

a sentence of probation or conditional discharge must be related to the specific offense for 

which the defendant is sentenced. Thus, we hold that since the condition that the defendant 

support his dependents is specifically enumerated in section 5-6-3(b) of the Code, the trial 

court’s imposition of the condition that the defendant become current on his child support was 

authorized by statute, without a finding that the condition was reasonably related to the 

underlying offense. 

¶ 10 CONCLUSION 

¶ 11 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed. 

¶ 12 Affirmed. 
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¶ 13 JUSTICE WRIGHT, specially concurring. 

¶ 14 I agree with the majority and write separately to clarify that the trial court can order 

defendant to support his dependents beginning on the first day of the term of probation. 

¶ 15 If defendant is current in his support obligation on the last day of his probation term, 

probation would be successfully terminated. Therefore, the sentence is definite and not 

indeterminate. 

¶ 16 In the event defendant has not complied with his support obligation at any point during the 

original term of probation, he risks a violation of probation and the imposition of a new term of 

probation. Again, this does not make his sentence indeterminate. 

¶ 17 On the other hand, if defendant is not current in his support on the last day of the term of his 

probation and the State does not file a petition alleging a violation of probation, then as the 

majority notes, the trial court may require defendant to pay the mandated support which 

accrued during the term of probation by resorting to the court’s power of contempt. Again, this 

contempt process would not make the sentence indeterminate because the court can only 

exercise the powers of contempt with respect to the amount due during the term of probation.