2014 UT App 295

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

CLARENCE EARL BRADLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20130921-CA

Filed December 18, 2014

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Michael D. DiReda

No. 121902783

Samuel P. Newton, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and

KATE A. TOOMEY concurred. 

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Clarence Earl Bradley challenges his prison 

sentence of one to fifteen years for possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to distribute. He claims that his sentence 

was excessive in that it “failed to account for the substandard 

medical care [he] would receive in prison as well as his 

advanced age.” We affirm. 

¶2 At sentencing, the judge asked an officer representing 

Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to address “what will 

happen at the prison in terms of *Bradley’s+ care and the burden 
State v. Bradley

20130921-CA 2 2014 UT App 295

that will be placed upon the Department of Corrections to make 

sure that . . . his needs are being looked after.” The AP&P officer 

then described the prison’s medical assessment at intake, 

asserted that some prisoners with severe medical conditions “are 

placed right into medical as part of their housing,” described the 

prison’s medical program as “incredible,” and said that prison 

officials “contract with the University of Utah” and “frequently 

take people up there to have their care and testing things done.” 

Neither Bradley’s counsel nor anyone else at sentencing 

questioned or contradicted this assessment.

¶3 But on appeal, Bradley challenges the prison 

representative’s assertions. He argues that the standard of 

medical care in American prisons falls well below that of the 

nonincarcerated population. He asserts that effective pain 

management is often withheld, that prison medical practitioners 

and facilities are substandard, and that prison life can be 

especially degrading and difficult for the elderly who are sick. 

He supports these criticisms with citations to scholarly literature 

assessing prison medical care in the United States.1 But he cites 

no record facts or any information specific to Utah.

¶4 Bradley’s claim fails because he did not preserve it in the 

trial court. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present 

it “to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 

opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 

2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Bradley maintains that his counsel preserved 

the claim by seeking probation “given Mr. Bradley’s current 

 

1. See, e.g., Michael S. Vaughn & Linda G. Smith, Practicing Penal 

Harm Medicine in the United States: Prisoners’ Voices from Jail, 16 

Just. Q. 175, 217–19 (1999); Molly Fairchild James, Note, The 

Sentencing of Elderly Criminals, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1025, 1026–

27 (1991).
State v. Bradley

20130921-CA 3 2014 UT App 295

situation, especially his medical and health situation.” But an 

assertion that Bradley needed medical attention would not have 

brought to the trial court’s attention Bradley’s appellate claim—

that the AP&P officer inaccurately described the prison’s 

medical services. On the contrary, the judge stated, “Well, if I 

thought for a minute that I was imposing a sentence that would 

leave Mr. Bradley without any sort of medical assistance or 

services, I certainly wouldn’t do that.” No one at sentencing 

gave the judge reason to think otherwise. 

¶5 But even if Bradley had preserved his claim on appeal, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to 

prison. An appellate court will reverse a trial court’s sentencing 

decision only when it is “clear that the actions of the *trial+ judge 

were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” 

State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 18, 191 P.3d 17 (alteration in 

original) (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under this standard we reverse only if “no reasonable 

[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” State v. 

Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 36, 299 P.3d 892 (alteration in original) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶6 Bradley’s extensive criminal history spans nearly six 

decades, in the course of which he failed supervised release at 

least twice—the very sentencing option he seeks here. 

Furthermore, the AP&P officer’s uncontroverted testimony 

asserted that the Department of Corrections would conduct a 

medical assessment of Bradley upon intake, that he would 

receive his prescribed medications, and that he would be housed 

in accordance with his medical condition. Indeed, even if 

Bradley had brought to the sentencing court’s attention the 

scholarly literature he brings to ours, it would not alter our 

conclusion; none of the national studies Bradley cites on appeal 

speak directly to the current state of medical care in Utah 

prisons. Given the facts available to the sentencing court, we 

cannot conclude that “no reasonable *person+ would take the 
State v. Bradley

20130921-CA 4 2014 UT App 295

view adopted by the trial court.” See id. (alteration in original) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶7 The trial court’s order is accordingly affirmed.