Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 15 , 2013.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14
- 11
- 00842
- CV

ANTHONY JOHNSON, Appellant

V. THE OFFICE OF THE AT TORNEY GENERAL OF TE XAS

AND JUDITH JOHNSON, Appellee s

On Appeal from the 247th District C ourt

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1992
- 12895

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A nthony Johnson (“ Johnson ”) appeals the trial court’s order den ying Johnson’s “ Motion to Terminate Child Support and Wage Withholding

. ” We affirm.2 I. B ACKGROUND In 1984, Johns on and Judith Johnson (“Judith”) were divorced. Johnson was ordered to pay support for the couple’s two minor children. T he obligation terminated in 1999 when the youngest child reached the age of major ity. I n 1999, The Office of the Attorney General of Texas (“the Attorney General”) brought an enforcement action relative to unpaid child support. T he trial court approved an

“ Agreed Order Enforcing Child Support Obligation” signed by Johnson, Judith, and the Attorney General, grant ing judgment against Jo hnson in favor of the Attorney General in the amount of $46,798.26 , plus interest , “for collection and distribution according to law.” The trial court ordered Johnson to pay th e judgment via monthly installments to the Harris County District Clerk Child S upport Division, until paid in full , and rendered a wage
- withholding order

. Between 2003 and 2009, Johnson filed a series of three “M otion [ s ] to T erminate C hild S upport and W age W ithholding

. ” Johnson attached to each motion an affidavit signed by Judith i n 2002, in which she requested the trial court and the Attorney General to release Johnson from “all back child support owed” because the children had become a dults and were no longer in school. J udith also averred, “I do not believe that I owe the Attorn ey General any money for any child support they have provided on my or the children’s behalf.”
The multiple motions over this six

- year period w ere apparently due , in part , to the fact that h earings on the motions were reset various times and Johnson filed an interim bankruptcy proceeding

. Johnson filed the operative motion, entitled “2nd Amended Motion to Terminate Child Support and Wage With h olding,” on July 21, 2009. In this motion, Johnson referenced Judith’s affidavit and asserted3

h e reasonably belie ves no money i s owed to the Attorney General and he is unable to pay child support.
After Johnson filed the original motion, Judith filed a “W aiver of Citation

. ” After Johnson fil ed the next motion , Judith was served with citation

. There is no indication in the record that Judith was served with the operative motion

. Although Judith asserted in her “Waiver of Citation” that she entered an appearance for all purposes, Judith did not file a separate answer to any of the motions or appear at any hearings. The Attorney General file d an answer to each motion.

I n 2009, the trial court held several hearings on th e operative motion . There is no record of the hearings. However, in the “Statement of Facts” section of his appellate brief, Johnson asserts , and the Attorney General does not dispute, that the following occurred at the last hearing, which was held on September 17, 2009 : Johnson cited Judith’s affidavit and previous waiver of citation ; Johnson testified Judith informed him she did not intend to appear at the hearing ; and the trial court orally denied Johnson’s motion to terminate without stating a reason

. See Tex. R. Civ. App. 38.1(g) (providing that, in civil case, court of appeals accepts as true facts asserted in the “Statement of Facts” section of an appellant’s brief unless controverted by another party). 1 On August 29, 2011, the trial court signed an order denying the motion to terminate. 2

1 Judith has not filed an appellate brief , but the Attorney General has filed a brief.
2 A fter the September 17, 2009 hearing, Johnson filed several “motion[s] for new trial” and a “notice of appeal,” but the trial court had not yet signed a written order when he filed these instruments. The trial court signed its written order about two years after the hearing.4 II. A NALYSIS
In two interrelated issues, Johnson contends the trial court erred by refusing to render a d efault judgment and terminate Johnson’s child

- support obligation because (1) Judith f

ail ed to answer or appear at any hearings , and (2) Judith executed the affidavit purporting to release Johnson from the arrearages judgment.

W e consider a trial court’s de nial of a motion for default judgment when the denial is challenged in an appeal from a final judgment or order. See Aguilar v. Livingston , 154 S.W.3d 832, 833 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. )

. We review the denial of a motion for default judgment under the abuse

- of

discretion standard. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operat ors, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241

– 42 (Tex. 1985)

. T he record does not contain a motion expressly request ing a default judgment on Johnson’s motion to terminat e his child

- support obligation, or an express ruling on any such request , although Johnson filed a “ Memorandum to Aid in the Judgment,” referencing his purported right to a default judgment

. However, Johnson’s recitation of facts suggests that he requested a default judgment at the September 17, 2009 hearing by inform ing the trial court of Jud ith ’s inte n t not to appear. We will assu me, without deciding, that Johnson sufficiently brought a request for a default judgment to the trial court’s attention and the court implicitly denied the request by denying the motion to terminat e . Nonetheless, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying any such request for default judgment and the motion to termin ate

.5

On appeal, Johnson focuses solely on Judith’s actions relative to Johnson’s motions to terminate. Johnson cites Judith’s failure t o file an answer and failure to appear at any hearings. However, the arrearages judgment was actually rendered in favor of the Attorney General, who brought the enforcement action , although Judith, as obligee, was a party to the agreed order containing th e judgment

. Irrespective of Judith’s actions , the Attorney General answered each motion to terminate

. T here is no record of the hearing finally held on the operative motion, but the Attorney General asserts on appeal , and Johnson does not dispute, that t he Attorney General appeared at the hearing. Thus, Judith’s failure to file a separate

answer or appear at the hearings does not entitle Johnson to release of the judgment in favor of the Attorney General.

T here is no indication in the record that the A ttorney General release d its judgment. On appeal, Johnson does not offer argument or authority demonstrating that Judith’s request that t he trial court and the Attorney General release Johnson from the arrearages judgment is binding on the Attorney Genera l. Moreover, Judith ’s aver ment in her affidavit that “I do not believe that I owe the Attorney General any money for any child support they have provided on my or the children’s behalf

” does not constitute proof that Johnson owes no money to the Attorney General on the arrearages judgment. Further, Johnson offers no argument or authority demonstrating that his unsupported statement in the motion to terminate that he is unable to pay child support entitles him to release from the judgment. Finally, we lac k a reporter’s record reflecting what evidence, if any, was offered by appellant at the hearing to support a request for release from the judgment in favor of the Attorney General. Therefore, we must presume that the evidence supports the tr i al court’s or der. See Parker v. Hunegnaw , 364 S.W.3d 398 , 409 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012 , no pet. ); Wilson v. Patterson ,6

No. 14

– 10

– 00943

– CV, 2011 WL 4924252, at *1

– 2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. Accordingly, w e overrule both of Johnson’s issues , and we affirm the trial
court ’s order

.

/s/ Margaret Garner Mirabal Senior Justice

P anel consists of Justices Boyce, McCally, and Mirabal. 3

3 Senior Justice Margaret Garner Mirabal sitting by assignment.