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Case 2:15-cv-01937-SRB Document 13 Filed 11/23/15 Page 1 of 1
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EXHIBIT
32.1








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of eMagin Corporation (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Andrew G. Sculley,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section  350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or
after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such
filing.





Dated: November
      12, 2009
            By:
            /s/ Andrew
      G. SculleyAndrew
      G. SculleyChief
      Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

CERTIFICATIONS

 

I,Ron Hadani, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewed thisquarterly report on Form 10-Q of Vision-Sciences, Inc.;

 

1.               Based on my knowledge, thisreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.               Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in the report;

 

4.               Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant andhave:

 

a)              Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

b)             Evaluated the effectivenessof the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

 

c)              Disclosed in this report anychange in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, oris reasonable likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and

 

5.               Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)              All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

b)             Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
|   |                   | /s/ Ron Hadani          |
|--------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Dated: | February 19, 2008 | Ron Hadani              |
|   |                   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

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 WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Darren Cleveland, 

Defendant. 

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CR-15-50150-PHX-DGC

ORDER OF DETENTION

Defendant appeared before this Court on a Petition for Revocation of Supervised

Release. The issue of detention was submitted to the Court. The Court considered the

Petition and file in determining whether defendant should be released on conditions set by

the Court.

The Court finds that defendant has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he

does not pose a serious flight risk or danger to any other person or to the community pursuant

to Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Court concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is a serious

flight risk and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably

assure his appearance at future proceedings.

The Court also concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is a

danger and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure

the safety of the community.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant be detained pending further

proceedings.

DATED this 15th day of March, 2018
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Leah KING, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-10070.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 8, 2004.

Decided Feb. 11, 2005.

*772Before: B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Leah King appeals the district court’s denial of her Motion to Suppress, which preceded King’s guilty plea for Possession of Stolen Mail Matter. We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we will not recount it here.

The only question on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying King’s motion to suppress the stolen mail found in the bag in her hotel room. The district court did not err in denying the suppression motion. The detention of King was a permissible *Terry*stop, grounded in reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. *See Terry v. Ohio,*392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (permitting brief investigatory stops when, based on totality of the circumstances, police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). She was observed by police entering a car that was known to have been stolen.

Although she was handcuffed and placed in a police car, she was detained only five minutes before Detective Shay spoke with her. When questioned, she mentioned methamphetamine pipes in her hotel room and consented to the search of her room. Considering all the circumstances surrounding the encounter between King and the police, and evaluating the intrusiveness of the stop and the methods employed by the police, *see Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles,*308 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.2002), we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the investigatory stop was reasonable and that King’s otherwise voluntary consent to the search of her room was not tainted by an unlawful detention.

King denied ownership of the bag in which the stolen mail was found. A denial of ownership during a search constitutes abandonment for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. *United States v. Veatch,*674 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.1981). King had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an item which she abandoned. *Id.*

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained from the seized bag.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Mary Hubert *v.*Peter Hubert.

Divorce — Abandonment for One Year — Weight of Evidence.

Where the weight of the evidence shows an abandonment of the wife by the husband for one year before the commencement of an action for divorce, it is sufficient to entitle the wife to the relief sought.

APPEAL PROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT..

November 21, 1867.

Opinion op the Court by

Jud&e Peters:

. The evidence in this case is certainly conflicting and irreconcilable, but taken by the appellant is. more consistent, and presents a more rational; and therefore a more credible, history of the domestic troubles which ultimated in a separation of the parties, than does that of the appellee.

There is some apparent difficulty on account of the discrepancy of the testimony as to the time when appellant was-abandoned by her husband, but the preponderance of the evidence fixes the time in October, 1865; a witness who lived with appellant states that she and her husband lived together about 8 months, that they were *409married the 16th of February, 1865, that he left about the middle of October of the same year; two other witnesses prove that he left in September or October, 1865, and others prove he left some time in the fall of that year. Appellee’s brother and his wife prove that he brought his trunk to their house on the 28th of November, 1865, and Mrs. Becker proves it was the 8th of the last named month; he might have separated from his wife a month or more before he took his trunk to his brother’s. This action was brought on the 9th of November, 1866. The abandonment, according to the weight of the evidence, had been one year before the commencement of this action by appellant. Which according to the statute on the subject entitles her to a divorce.

Greene, *for appellant.*

*Stirman, for appellee.*

The judgment of the chancellor must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded, ■ with directions for the court below to render judgment divorcing appellant from appellee.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed August 16, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-1876

Lower Tribunal Nos. CS No. 2001608837, 06220011645CA 

________________

Keon Kersaint,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Department of Revenue, 

Child Support Program, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Child 

Support Program.

Keon Kersaint, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General (Tallahassee), for appellee Department of 

Revenue.

Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-7190

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JESSE ROWLAND, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CR-94-251, CA-00-1116-1) Submitted: November 21, 2002 Decided: December 2, 2002 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jesse Rowland, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. David Bernard Smith, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Jesse Rowland, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a proceeding under § 2255 unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2255 motion solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F. 3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Rowland has not made the requisite showing. SeeUnited States v. Rowland , Nos. CR-94-251; CA-00-1116-1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2001). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
#### Margaret M. E. Phelan et al., appellants, v. Sarah M. Phelan et al., respondents.

[Argued November 28th, 1913.

Decided March 16th, 1914.]

On appeal from a decree of the prerogative court made by the ordinary, whose opinion is reported *ante p. S16.*

*Mr. William B. Gourley*and *Mr. Albert Comstoclc,*for the appellants.

*Mr. Peter*Baches, for the respondents.

Per Curiam.

The decree appealed from will be affirmed, fo.r the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by the ordinary.

*For*affirmance—Trenchard, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisci-i, Congdon,' White, PIeppenheimer—7.

*For*reversal—The Chief-Justice, Swayze, Parker, Bo-GERT, VREDENBURGH—5.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Crispin Granados,

Petitioner,

v. 

State of Arizona, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00492-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

On August 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended this Court dismiss Petitioner,

Crispin Granados’, Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 110. In the R&R, 

Judge Markovich notified the parties that they had fourteen (14) days from the date of the 

R&R to file any objections. No objections have been filed.

Where neither party objects to the magistrate judge’s R&R, this Court is not 

required to review the magistrate judge’s decision under any specified standard of review. 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). However, the statute for review of a magistrate 

judge’s recommendation “does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua 

sponte, or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas, 474 

U.S. at 154.

The Court has reviewed and considered the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 110), the State of Arizona’s Response (Doc. 119), the additional attachments 

(Doc. 120), and Judge Markovich’s R&R (Doc. 133). The Court finds the R&R well-
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reasoned and agrees with Judge Markovich’s conclusions. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY 

ORDERED that the R&R is ADOPTED. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 110) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall docket 

accordingly and close the case file in this matter. 

Dated this 11th day of September, 2019.
<PAGE>


                                  EXHIBIT 99.1

               CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Penwest
Pharmaceuticals Co. (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, Tod R. Hamachek, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Jennifer L. Good, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated: August 12, 2002                    /s/ Tod R. Hamachek
                                          --------------------------------
                                          Tod R. Hamachek
                                          Chief Executive Officer



Dated: August 12, 2002                    /s/ Jennifer L. Good
                                          --------------------------------
                                          Jennifer L. Good
                                          Chief Financial Officer
#### Beveridge, Brown et al v. John Chaudit.

New Trial — Agreement With Attorney to Set Cause For a Certain Time.

An affidavit of defendant that an agreement was made to set a cause for the second week of a term, and that the case was called the first week in his absence, is sufficient to justify a new trial.

Same.

An unexpected adjournment of the court at the end of the first week, would be no justification of a violation of the agreement.

APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT.

November 23, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

If appellee had not agreed that the case should stand over until the second week of the circuit term, on the appeal of Brown for him to’ do so in order that he, Brown, might go to Indiana to attend some important business, he could easily have counterváiled Browns’ affidavit of this fact by his own.

Brown’s affidavit,, on motion for a new trial, to this fact, must be taken as true in the absence of any countervailing affidavit of Chaudit, or other person, and on this fact alone entitled him to a new trial, inasmuch as the trial was had the first week of the term, and in Browns’ absence.

The unexpected adjournment of the term at the end of the first week was no justification of the violation of this agreement, and though this motion was made on Saturday of the first week, the *332last day the court would sit at that term, it should have prevailed.

Husbands, *for appellants.*

*Palmer &*Gilbert, *for appellee.*

Judgment reversed for a new trial.