Filed 1/11/22 In re Ale.M. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Ale.M. et al.,

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B311540

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. 20CCJP06043B-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALEJANDRO M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________

Defendant and appellant Alejandro M. (father) appeals 

from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders requiring him to 

participate in parenting classes. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. The Family

Father and T.A. (mother) are the parents of Ale.M. (born 

2009) and Ala.M. (born 2018).1 Mother also has three older 

children, including S.A. (minor half-sibling, born 2008) and Z.T.

(adult half-sibling).

II. Referral and Initial Investigation

On October 2, 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging 

general neglect by mother with concerns raised regarding 

mother’s alcoholism.

In response, a DCFS social worker made an unannounced 

visit to the motel where mother was staying. Ala.M. was 

observed with mother; Ale.M. mostly resided with father, but 

father brought her to mother almost every day while he was 

1 We refer to Ale.M. and Ala.M., collectively, as minors. 

Minors are the only subjects of this appeal. Mother is not a party 

to the appeal.
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working. Mother denied any history of or current drug use. 

Mother drank alcohol about three times per week. Although 

mother denied having a current alcohol problem, she admitted 

that she did “‘in the past[.]’” Mother stated that she sometimes 

drank because she felt sad and overwhelmed.

Mother stated that she had been the subject of prior DCFS 

investigations because father “repeatedly call[ed] DCFS on her.” 

Mother wished father would be supportive instead. Mother 

reported a history of unreported domestic violence with father.

Mother submitted to an on demand drug test, which 

returned negative for all substances.

The social worker also interviewed minor half-sibling and 

adult half-sibling. Minor half-sibling denied witnessing any 

physical incidents of domestic violence, but she reported seeing a 

lot of arguing between mother and father. Adult half-sibling 

expressed concern about father, who had been verbally abusive 

toward mother in the past.

An unannounced visit by the social worker was also made 

to father’s home. Father reported his concerns that mother 

drank regularly and was financially unstable. According to 

father, mother became aggressive when she drank and, on 

multiple occasions, he had verbal arguments with her because 

she was irritable and angry. Mother was not drinking or 

intoxicated in the mornings when he dropped Ale.M. off, but she

would be under the influence when father picked Ale.M. up.

Ale.M. told the social worker that her parents used to argue 

about five years ago because father did not like mother drinking.
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III. Dependency Petition

On November 12, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition 

seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over minors 

and minor half-sibling. Brought pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to 

protect),2 the b-1 count in the petition alleged that mother had a 

history of and was a current user of alcohol, which rendered her 

incapable of providing the children with regular care and 

supervision.3 Father was nonoffending.

IV. Detention Hearing

At the detention hearing on November 17, 2020, the 

juvenile court found that a prima facie showing had been made 

that minors were persons described by section 300. Minors were 

released to the parents under DCFS supervision.

V. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report

According to the March 2021 jurisdiction/disposition report, 

mother stated, “‘I am not a current user of alcohol. Years ago, I 

would drink. I would drink when I had problems. . . . 

[F]ather . . . keeps calling in referrals on me. I am pregnant right 

now. I am not drinking. I take care of my kids.’” Mother 

reported that she had a relationship with father for eight years. 

They would argue and father pushed her one time. She had no 

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

3 The petition also included a b-2 count regarding minor halfsibling based on drug abuse by her father, I.R. Because minor 

half-sibling is not a subject of this appeal and I.R. is not a party 

to the appeal, we do not discuss the background or adjudication of 

the b-2 count further.
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intention of reunifying with father. She reported that father was 

very hard working and responsible for Ale.M.

VI. Adjudication Hearing

The adjudication hearing was held on March 15, 2021.

Mother pled no contest to the dependency petition.

Father’s attorney, noting that father was nonoffending, 

submitted. The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared 

minors dependents of the court, and placed minors home-ofparents under DCFS supervision.

As for the disposition pertaining to father, the juvenile 

court discussed DCFS’s proposed case plan, reflecting “parenting, 

fatherhood class, family preservation.” Father’s counsel objected 

to father “do[ing] a program at this time since he’s not offending.” 

The court responded, “I think the parenting classes are a good 

idea. So I will order that, and I signed that case plan.”

Later in the hearing, father’s counsel repeated his objection 

to the case plan. Father’s counsel stated: “I don’t think it’s 

narrowly tailored to eliminate any risk. Because he had nothing 

to do with anything on the petition. It doesn’t really seem 

necessary for him to be enrolled in any parenting classes. . . . He 

did nothing wrong in this whole case.” Unswayed, the juvenile 

court explained, “But [a] parenting class can make him aware of 

the issues that the children are dealing with and that are 

relevant in the case. So [a] parenting class will benefit . . . the 

children as well indirectly.”

This timely appeal ensued.
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DISCUSSION

Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion by ordering him to participate in parenting 

classes.

A. Relevant Law

A juvenile court has broad authority to “make any and all 

reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of” a dependent child. (§ 362, 

subd. (a); see also In re Carmen M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 

486 (Carmen M.) [section 362, subdivision (a), has “been broadly 

interpreted to authorize a wide variety of remedial orders 

intended to protect the safety and well-being of dependent 

children”].)

“At disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the 

content of the sustained petition when it considers what 

dispositional orders would be in the best interests of the children. 

[Citations.] Instead, the court may consider the evidence as a 

whole.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 

(Briana V.).) Thus, “there need not be a jurisdictional finding as 

to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a 

dispositional order” (ibid.), and the court may “order a 

nonoffending parent to participate in services” (In re D.L. (2018) 

22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148).

B. Standard of Review

Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a 

dispositional order. (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 311.) “A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its 

determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. The 

appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of 

reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
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C. Analysis

We find no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion in 

ordering father to participate in parenting classes.

As the juvenile court explained, such classes could increase 

father’s awareness of the issues faced by minors as a result of 

mother’s drinking and, by implication, improve his response to 

those issues.

Although father was nonoffending in the dependency 

petition, the record discloses several concerning aspects of his

behavior that could be addressed, at least in part, through 

parenting classes. Father reported that mother drank regularly 

and would be under the influence when he picked Ale.M. up from 

her home, yet he still elected to leave Ale.M. with mother on a 

nearly daily basis. This raises questions about his ability to 

protect minors. Parenting classes could help father better 

understand ways of protecting minors from the behavior of 

mother that gave rise to the assumption of dependency 

jurisdiction. Additionally, there were multiple reports, including 

by Ale.M. and minor half-sibling, that father and mother argued 

a lot, and adult half-sibling claimed that father had been verbally 

abusive toward mother. Parenting classes could also educate 

father on the negative impact of arguing in front of minors.

Father relies on In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

177 (Jasmin C.), which is factually distinguishable from the 

instant case. In Jasmin C., dependency jurisdiction was 

exercised based on an isolated, violent rampage perpetrated by 

the father. (Id. at pp. 179–181.) The mother was nonoffending: 

“She did not abuse her children, fail to protect them, or engage in 

any other inappropriate behavior.” (Id. at p. 181.) Rather, she 

responded to the incident by “immediately interced[ing], 
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physically restrain[ing] and calm[ing] [the father], and direct[ing] 

another to call the police.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court in 

Jasmin C. nevertheless ordered the mother to attend parenting 

education “without making any findings or giving any 

explanation.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed, explaining 

that “nothing in the record supported the order, which apparently 

was based on a rote assumption that [the] mother could not be an 

effective single parent without parenting classes, something 

belied by common sense and experience in 21st-Century 

America.” (Id. at pp. 181–182.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile 

court provided an explanation and the record discloses a 

reasonable basis for imposing the parenting class requirement.

Given the broad discretion of the juvenile court when

fashioning orders for the well-being of dependent children (§ 362, 

subd. (a); Carmen M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 486) and the

court’s authority to look beyond the contents of the sustained 

petition to the evidence as a whole (Briana V., supra, 

236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311), we cannot say that the court here 

acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.
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DISPOSITION

The March 15, 2021, dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT