J. A25040/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

ERIC R. WILLIAMS, :

:

Appellant : No. 3495 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 25, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-23-CR-0001773-2014

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2015

Appellant appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Following a non-jury trial, 

Appellant was found guilty of possession of firearms prohibited1and firearms 

not to be carried without a license.2 Appellant contends the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence seized as a result of 

his illegal detention. We affirm.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
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We adopt the facts as set forth by the trial court’s opinion.3 See Trial 

Ct. Op., 10/15/14, at 1-5.4 At the suppression hearing, Trooper Colon 

testified as follows regarding Appellant’s criminal history:

[The Commonwealth]: . . . So, Trooper, you’re back in the 

car. You’re reviewing [Appellant’s] criminal history?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is that standard practice?

A: Yes.

 * * *

Q: Possession with Intent in ’95, . . . Resisting in ’96, is 

that right, Robbery RSP, acquitted in Robbery in ’98?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Acquitted in ’01?

A: Yes. 

Q: Acquitted in ’02?

A: Correct.

Q: Gun charge, ’03?

A: Yes.

 

3 Appellant does not contest the legality of the motor vehicle stop. See

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

4 We note that there is no reference to the notes of testimony in the trial 

court’s recitation of certain findings of fact. Our review of the record 

indicates that the court had the benefit of a video of the traffic stop. N.T., 

7/25/14, at 7. The court viewed the video, which was not part of the 

certified record. See id. at 21, 24, 25, 33, 63.
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Q: Two acquits in ’04?

A: Yes.

Q: Gun charge in ’05?

A: Yes.

Q: Tampering with Evidence and Possession with Intent to 

Distribute in 2010?

A: Yes.

Q: Driving while suspended, 2012?

A: Yes.

Q: And a possessing (inaudible) charge?

A: Yes, sir. Those are all the things that were revealed.

 * * *

Q: . . . [D]id you check [Appellant’s] licensing status?

A: Yes, and it was found to be suspended.

Q: So he’s a suspended driver at this point with an 

unregistered vehicle?

A: That is correct.

 * * *

Q: . . . You asked [Appellant] if he’d ever been arrested 

before, right?

A: Yes, sir, I did.

A: And how did he respond?

A: He contradicted what was revealed to me on the earlier 

query of his RAP sheet by relating that he had only 
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been─his most recent arrest was in 2008, which as we saw 

earlier was not true. . . . Furthermore, he related that 

arrest specifically in 2008 was for a domestic charge, 

to─which again contradicted what was revealed in that 

query.

Q: And he gave you a story about being shot five times?

A: Yes, for . . .

Q: As part of that domestic situation?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you ask him about that or did he just offer that 

information?

A: He had just offered that information stating that he was 

a victim, yet he was arrested in ’08, which I didn’t 

understand.

N.T. at 25-28, 40. 

Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the firearms 

seized as a result of the search of his vehicle. On July 25, 2015, the trial 

court held a hearing and denied the motion. Following a stipulated non-jury 

trial, Appellant was sentenced to five to ten years’ imprisonment for 

possession of firearms prohibited and a consecutive term of seven years’ 

probation for firearms not to be carried without a license.5 This timely 

appeal followed. Appellant filed a court ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

 

5 Appellant misstates the court’s sentence for firearms not to be carried 

without a license. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. At sentencing, the court 

stated: “On Count 2, Firearms Carried Witihout a License, the Court 

sentences [Appellant] to seven years’ State Probation consecutive to Count 

1 and payment of Court costs.” N.T., 11/25/14, at 14.
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statement of errors complained of on appeal and the trial court filed a 

responsive opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] 

Motion to Suppress when subsequent to a lawful stop by 

law enforcement for a motor vehicle violation and 

subsequent issuance and delivery of a warning by law 

enforcement to [Appellant], [Appellant] was unlawfully reengaged and detained by law enforcement in violation of 

his constitutional rights?

Did [sic] trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion 

to Suppress when upon completion of a motor vehicle 

stop, [Appellant] was unlawfully directed out of his motor 

vehicle which was an unlawful and illegal seizure and 

detention of [Appellant] and therefore any subsequent 

action of the [sic] law enforcement including a search, 

consensual or otherwise, would be a violation of 

[Appellant’s] constitutional rights?

Did [sic] trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion 

to Suppress when after an illegal and unlawful seizure and 

detention of [A]ppellant, [A]ppellant was searched?6

Appellant’s Brief at 4.7

 

6 Appellant does not address issue three in his brief. Therefore, it is 

abandoned on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 

1218 (Pa. Super. 2011).

7 Our Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth the required contents of 

appellate briefs. The argument section of Appellant’s brief does not comply 

with Rule 2119(a) which provides that “[t]he argument shall be divided into 

as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the 

head of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the 

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Following a two 

page recitation of facts, Appellant states: “Therefore the pivotal question 

before the suppression court was whether there was [sic] any actions of 

[A]ppellant subsequent to his being told he was free to go which would 
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Appellant contends that the investigative detention that followed his 

lawful traffic stop was unlawful and therefore the court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of his 

vehicle. Appellant argues that 

[i]n the instant case the trial court incorrectly establishes 

reasonable suspicion for the second illegal detention on 

facts that were known to the officer at the time he 

released [Appellant], advised him he was free to leave and 

concluded that he was not going to search the vehicle 

based on those facts. The trial court cites no facts that 

occurred subsequent to that release that would warrant 

[sic] justify a second re-engagement and unlawful 

detention.

This is directly contrary to the holding in [Commonwealth 

v.] Ortiz[, 786 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 2011).8]

 

lawfully justify the second investigative detention. This is whether the 

officer had new or additional information for a basis for reasonable suspicion 

to establish a subsequent investigation detention of [A]ppellant.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. 

8 As will be discussed infra, Appellant’s reliance on Ortiz is unavailing as it 

has been overruled for the proposition cited by Appellant in 

Commonwealth v Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc). We note that Appellant baldly asserts “that consent to search that 

followed the unlawful investigative detention was clearly a product of the 

illegal detention and therefore not a valid consent to search.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 13. Appellant cites to Ortiz, supra, at 266-267. See id. In 

passing, we note that Appellant concedes he “consented to the search of the 

vehicle at the second re-engagement.” Id. at 6. Furthermore, there is no 

indication in the record, and does Appellant does not claim, that the consent 

was “the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will 

overborne—under the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. 

Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 901 (Pa. 2000). At the suppression hearing, 

Trooper Sergio Colon testified, inter alia, as follows:
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Appellant’s Brief at 12. 

Our review of the suppression court’s denial of a motion to suppress is 

governed by the following principles:

 

Q: Did you ask [Appellant] if he would consent to search of 

the vehicle?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: And he gave you verbal consent?

A: Yes, he did.

Q: And is it your policy or the State─is it the State Police 

policy or is it your policy to get written consent as well?

A: It’s─yes, this is a department form that is required to 

be filled out by us.

Q: Okay. When you . . .

A: When searching a vehicle.

Q: When you verbally asked [Appellant] if he [sic] could 

search the vehicle, did he hesitate?

A: He blighted (ph) [sic] away from me and, no, he said, 

go ahead, sir, you can do whatever you like and kind of 

backed up.

Q: And when you put the form in front of him to sign, 

similarly did he hesitate to sign the form?

A: No, he slightly─he read it over, didn’t have any 

questions . . . .

N.T., 7/25/15, at 41-42.
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[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited 

to determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because 

the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, 

we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations 

of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted).

This Court enunciated the test for determining the nature of the 

encounter when the police continue to question an individual following a 

traffic stop as follows:

In Commonwealth v. Strickler, [ ] 757 A.2d 884 

([Pa.] 2000), our Supreme Court analyzed under what 

circumstances a police interdiction can devolve into a mere 

encounter following a traffic stop when police continue to 

question the person after the reason for the traffic stop 

has concluded. The Supreme Court in Strickler ruled that 

after police finish processing a traffic infraction, the 

determination of whether a continuing interdiction 

constitutes a mere encounter or a constitutional seizure 

centers upon whether an individual would objectively 

believe that he was free to end the encounter and refuse a 

request to answer questions.
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Our Supreme Court adopted a totality-of-thecircumstances approach. It delineated a non-exclusive list 

of factors to be used in making this assessment. Those 

factors include 1) the presence or absence of police 

excesses; 2) whether there was physical contact; 3) 

whether police directed the citizen’s movements; 4) police 

demeanor and manner of expression; 5) the location and 

time of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions 

and statements; 7) the existence and character of the 

initial investigative detention, including its degree of 

coerciveness; 8) “the degree to which the transition 

between the traffic stop/investigative detention and the 

subsequent encounter can be viewed as seamless, . . . 

thus suggesting to a citizen that his movements may 

remain subject to police restraint,” and 9) whether there 

was an express admonition to the effect that the citizensubject is free to depart, which “is a potent, objective 

factor.” Our Supreme Court also observed that when an 

individual has been subjected to a valid detention but 

police continue to engage the person in conversation, the 

person is less likely to reasonably believe that he is 

actually free to leave the scene.

Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1253 (citations omitted). Furthermore,

[w]e are required to apply a “totality of the circumstances” 

test in assessing whether police had reasonable suspicion 

to conduct an investigatory detention. Therefore, we 

overrule Ortiz and [Commonwealth v.] Johnson[, 833 

A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. 2003)] to the extent that they hold 

that facts gathered during a valid traffic stop cannot be 

utilized to justify an investigatory detention occurring after 

a police officer has indicated that a defendant is free to 

leave. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d 368, 377 n. 

9 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Superior Court, sitting en banc, can 

overrule panel decision by three judges).

Id. at 1260.

In Commonwealth. v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120 (Pa. Super. 2012), this 

Court found there was reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory 

detention and opined:
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In the present case, Trooper Jones gave [Yashera 

Renee] Veras a citation for speeding, returned her license 

and insurance card, and told her that she was free to 

leave. As Veras returned to her car, Trooper Jones asked 

if she would answer a few more questions. At the start, 

she answered the Trooper’s questions, but then indicated 

that she “was ready to go.” As she returned to her car, 

Trooper Jones told her to “hold tight” while he questioned 

[Waldemar] Caban. Based upon this factual scenario, we 

conclude that Caban and Veras were subjected to an 

investigatory detention. . . . 

We also conclude, however, that the facts adduced by 

Trooper Jones by the time he told Veras to “hold tight” 

provided him with sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify 

the investigatory detention. To establish reasonable 

suspicion, the officer must “articulate specific observations 

which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived 

from those observations, led him to reasonably conclude, 

in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot 

and that the person he stopped was involved in that 

activity.” To determine whether the officer had reasonable 

suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be 

considered. In this regard, we must give “due weight ... 

to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is 

entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” 

 * * *

When considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

need not limit our inquiry to only those facts that clearly 

and unmistakably indicate criminal conduct. Instead, 

“even a combination of innocent facts, when taken 

together, may warrant further investigation by the 

police officer.”

Id. at 128-29 (citations omitted and emphases added). 

In the case sub judice, the trial court opined:

An interaction amounts to an investigatory detention 

where the officer, following a valid traffic stop, instructs 

the individual to exit the vehicle, issues a warning, tells the 

individual “to have a nice day,” allows the individual to 
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proceed back towards vehicle, and then subsequently reengages the individual with further questioning.

Therefore, based upon Kemp, in the case sub judice, the 

interaction amounted to an investigatory detention[9]

where the Trooper, following a valid traffic stop, instructed 

the individual to exit the vehicle, issued a citation and 

warning, tells the driver that he is free to leave, allowed 

the individual to proceed back towards his vehicle, and 

then subsequently re-engaged the individual with further 

questioning.

 * * *

The Trooper testified to reasonable suspicion beyond the 

original reasonable suspicion which led to the traffic stop. 

The Trooper provided the [c]ourt with unrebutted, credible 

testimony. The facts adduced by the Trooper during the

valid traffic stop provided him with sufficient reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot justifying the 

investigatory detention. The facts included:

Initially, the Trooper noted that [Appellant] appeared 

extremely nervous; [his] hands were physically shaking 

when he handed over his documents to Trooper Colon. 

He barely made eye contact with the Trooper.

[Appellant] provided Trooper Colon with a myriad of 

unsolicited information . . . .

Trooper Colon found that there was a discrepancy 

between the address listed on the vehicle’s registration, 

the address on [Appellant’s] license, and the 

information [Appellant] provided him about where he 

lived. Further, [Appellant] also stated that he was 

unaware that the registration for the vehicle was 

expired.

 

9 We note Appellant makes the following statement: “In the present case, 

the suppression court properly denied the second re-engagement with 

[A]ppellant as an investigative detention. (Trial Ct. Opinion P. [)]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10.
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During their exchange, [Appellant] asked Trooper Colon 

if he could light a cigarette, to which Trooper Colon 

replied yes.

During the initial traffic stop, the Trooper learned that 

[Appellant] had an extensive criminal history . . . . 

When the Trooper asked [Appellant] if he had ever been 

arrested before, he replied that his most recent arrest 

was in 2008 for a domestic charge. The Trooper 

testified that [Appellant’s] RAP sheet established that 

[Appellant] was not being truthful. His most recent

charge was from 2012 and did not involve a domestic 

charge. After re-engagement, [Appellant] continued to 

offer unsolicited information i.e., that he was the victim 

in the domestic charge and also that he was involved in 

a shooting and had to have a colostomy bag.

While he was writing out the citation and the warning in 

his patrol vehicle, Trooper Colon noticed that 

[Appellant] was staring back at him the entire time. . . .

[Appellant] asked Trooper Colon several questions 

regarding how to remedy the expired registration and 

where to take the citation, and how to take care of 

paying for it. [Appellant] also told Trooper Colon that 

he was on a payment plan, and that was why his license 

was suspended, which conflicted with what [Appellant] 

had said earlier in the encounter, about not knowing 

that his license was suspended.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6-8. The trial court concluded that, based upon the totality 

of the circumstances, “Trooper Colon had reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity was afoot, justifying the investigatory detention.” Id. at 8.

We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in 

denying the motion to suppress. See Jones, 121 A.3d at 526-27. Based 

upon the totality of the circumstances, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion 
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to justify the search of Appellant’s vehicle. See Caban, 60 A.3d at 128-29; 

Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1260. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2015