NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, AND 

RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants, 

v.

CAMTEK, LTD.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________ 

2012-1681, 2013-1023

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Minnesota in No. 05-CV-1396, Judge John R. 

Tunheim.

______________________ 

Decided: November 18, 2013

______________________ 

RACHEL C. HUGHEY, Merchant & Gould P.C., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued for plaintiffs-crossappellants. With her on the brief were DANIEL W.

MCDONALD and WILLIAM D. SCHULTZ. 

WAYNE O. STACY, Cooley LLP, of Broomfield, Colorado, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief 

were SARAH J. GUSKE; LORI R. MASON of Palo Alto, Cali-
2 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

fornia; and THOMAS J. FRIEL, JR., of San Francisco, California. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, LINN, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

August Technology Corporation and Rudolph Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “August Tech”) filed suit 

against Camtek, Ltd. (“Camtek”) in the United States 

District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that 

Camtek infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,826,298 (“the ’298 

patent”). August Tech is the assignee of the ’298 patent, 

which is directed to an automated semiconductor wafer 

inspection system. Camtek counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity.

A jury found that Camtek’s Falcon device literally infringed the asserted claims of the ’298 patent. The district court entered judgment and a permanent injunction 

preventing Camtek from selling the Falcon machines in 

the United States. Camtek appealed the district court’s 

final judgment to this court. On appeal, we vacated the 

judgment of infringement and the permanent injunction, 

and remanded for further proceedings. August Tech. 

Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1282-86 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (“Original Appeal”). 

After the jury’s verdict, but before the injunction was 

in place, Camtek sold an infringing Falcon machine. 

August Tech moved for enhanced damages on grounds 

that Camtek’s post-verdict infringement was willful. 

Although the district court found willfulness, it denied 

August Tech’s request for enhanced damages. Order, 

August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396 (D. 

Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732. 

While the original appeal was pending, Camtek entered into negotiations that led to two additional sales of 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD . 3

Falcon machines. The district court held Camtek in 

contempt for violating the injunction and ordered it to pay 

double damages as a sanction. August Tech. Corp. v. 

Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

40771, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012). Camtek subsequently filed a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from the 

contempt order and sanctions award, and a separate 

motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 seeking relief from 

the court’s willful infringement finding. In deciding those 

motions, the district court reiterated that Camtek was in 

contempt, but granted the Rule 60(b) motion in part, 

reducing the sanctions awarded. August Tech. Corp. v. 

Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

116040 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2012). The court also denied 

Camtek’s motions requesting that it vacate the postverdict willful infringement finding. 

Camtek appeals from the district court’s judgment: 

(1) granting-in-part and denying-in-part Camtek’s Rule 

60 motion for relief from the contempt order and sanctions award; and (2) denying Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 

motion for relief from the order finding willfulness. See

Judgment in a Civil Case, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, 

Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 

914. It also appeals from the underlying opinions and 

orders giving rise to that judgment. Because we find that 

the district court’s contempt order and its willfulness 

finding are not final appealable orders, this court lacks

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss 

Camtek’s appeal pending final resolution of all claims in 

this case. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2009, after a three week trial, a jury 

found that Camtek’s accused Falcon wafer inspection 

machines infringed the ’298 patent but that the infringement was not willful. The jury awarded $6,782,490 in lost

profit damages. A few days later, Camtek notified its 
4 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

sales force of what it characterized as a “preliminary 

verdict,” urging them to “emphasize [to customers] that 

this process is not over and no judgment has been made.” 

August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396, 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011) 

(“R&R Finding Contempt”). Camtek also issued a press 

release stating that there was no infringement and that 

the “unjust verdict” would be vacated or reversed. Id. at 

*3. 

Roughly five weeks after the jury verdict, Camtek offered to sell, and eventually sold, a Falcon machine to a 

California customer: Infinera. August Tech sought to 

have damages on the Infinera sale enhanced, arguing that 

Camtek’s post-verdict infringement was willful. Internal 

communications revealed that Camtek sold the machine 

to Infinera at a “rock bottom price” in an effort to “hurt” 

August Tech. Order, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 

No. 05-cv-1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732 at 

2. 

On August 28, 2009, the district court entered judgment and issued a permanent injunction that prevented 

Camtek from “communicating with third parties (in 

person, via phone, via email, or by any other means) 

located in the United States for the purposes of offering to 

sell Falcon machines or machines that are colorable 

imitations thereof, notwithstanding where the third party 

intends to use the machines.” Order on Final Judgment 

and Injunctive Relief, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 

No. 05-cv-1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2009), ECF No. 547 at 

8.

The parties filed another round of post-trial motions, 

most of which were ultimately denied. Meanwhile, 

Camtek continued to communicate with customers in the 

United States about selling its Falcon machines overseas. 

Those communications lead to two post-injunction Falcon 

sales—one for use in China and the other for use in 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD . 5

Malaysia. While the negotiations were ongoing, Camtek 

filed a Rule 60 motion asking the district court to clarify 

and revise the injunction to delete phrase “notwithstanding where the third party intends to use the machines” so 

that it could communicate with customers in the United 

States who intended to use the machines overseas. R&R 

Finding Contempt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *5. 

The district court denied Camtek’s motion to modify the 

injunction, and Camtek appealed the district court’s final 

judgment to this court on August 10, 2010. 

On March 9, 2011, while the Original Appeal was 

pending, August Tech filed two motions with the district 

court: (1) a motion for enhanced damages stemming from 

Camtek’s post-verdict Falcon sale to Infinera; and (2) a 

motion to hold Camtek in contempt for violating the 

terms of the injunction. Both motions were referred to 

the magistrate judge for preparation of a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”). 

On August 11, 2011, the magistrate judge issued an 

R&R finding that Camtek was in contempt. The court 

found it undisputed that, in 2009, Camtek “communicated 

with Morgan and Cree representatives in the United 

States and offered to sell Falcon machines for delivery 

overseas” in violation of the injunction. R&R Finding 

Contempt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *10-11. 

Consistent with the jury’s verdict and the court’s prior 

damages determination, the magistrate judge recommended that Camtek be ordered to pay August Tech 

double damages in the amount of $1,291,892 as a sanction 

for contempt. 

With respect to August Tech’s motion for enhanced 

damages, the magistrate judge issued a separate order 

finding that August Tech “proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Infinera sale was willful infringement.” 

Order, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396

(D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732 at 6. Although it 
6 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

found willful infringement, the court concluded that 

enhanced damages were not appropriate because: 

(1) there was no evidence of deliberate copying; (2) the 

misconduct involved a single sale which was completed 

within three months of the verdict; and (3) Camtek’s 

“failure to timely and accurately inform plaintiffs of the 

Infinera sale may be attributed to mistakes and inadvertence, rather than a deliberate intent to conceal.” Id. at 9-

10.

Shortly after the magistrate judge issued his R&R 

finding Camtek in contempt and Order denying enhanced 

damages, this court found that the district court erred in 

its claim construction of the term “wafer.” Original 

Appeal, 655 F.3d at 1286. Given this error, we: 

(1) vacated the judgment of infringement; (2) remanded 

for a limited trial on infringement; and (3) vacated the 

district court’s award of damages and grant of injunctive 

relief. With respect to the injunction, we noted this the 

court had recently issued Transocean Offshore Deepwater 

Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 

1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We expressed “no opinion . . . 

regarding the effect of Transocean on the now-vacated 

injunction,” but remanded with instructions for the district court to “take into account the effect, if any, Transocean has when crafting an appropriate injunction.” Id. 

at 1290-91. 

Several months later—in March 2012—the district 

court adopted the R&R finding Camtek in contempt for 

violating the now-vacated injunction. August Tech. Corp. 

v. Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

40771, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012). In its order, the 

district court found that Camtek “knowingly and in bad 

faith violated the Court’s clear and unambiguous injunction.” Id. at *4. The court agreed that double damages 

were warranted, and ordered Camtek to pay $1,291,892 

as a sanction for contempt. In that same order, the district court denied Camtek’s request that the court set 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD . 7

aside the finding of willful infringement in the order

denying enhanced damages. Specifically, the court “decline[d] the invitation to meddle with a factual finding 

contained within an order favorable to [Camtek].” Id. at 

*8. 

At this point, the original district court and magistrate judges recused themselves, and the case was reassigned. In April 2012, Camtek filed the two motions 

giving rise to this appeal: (1) a Rule 60 motion seeking 

relief from the contempt order and sanctions award; and 

(2) a motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60, challenging the 

willfulness finding. 

On August 17, 2012, the new district court judge affirmed the contempt finding but concluded that the award 

of double damages was a criminal sanction for which 

“Camtek did not receive adequate due process.” August 

Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., No. 05-cv-1396, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions”). Accordingly, 

the court relieved Camtek from half of the sanctions 

award and ordered it to pay $645,946. In the same order, 

the court denied Camtek’s motion with respect to willfulness. Specifically, the court concluded that Camtek: 

(1) lacked “standing to appeal the March 2012 Order 

because it was the prevailing party”; and (2) “has not 

shown a concrete and particularized or imminent injury 

resulting from the willful infringement finding.” Id. at 

*12-13. The court entered judgment with respect to those 

orders on August 30, 2012, and Camtek timely appealed 

that judgment to this court. 

After this court’s remand from the Original Appeal, 

both parties filed motions for summary judgment on 

infringement under the modified claim construction. 

Those motions remain pending at the district court, and 

thus the litigation between the parties is ongoing.
8 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

II. DISCUSSION

At this stage in the proceedings, it is undisputed that 

Camtek violated a court-ordered injunction.1 On appeal, 

Camtek argues that the district court erred when it: 

(1) awarded $645,946 in sanctions for civil contempt; and 

(2) found that a post-trial sale constituted willful infringement. 

August Tech responds that: (1) Camtek has not 

demonstrated that this court has jurisdiction; (2) Camtek 

fails to show any error in the district court’s damages 

award; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 motions on the merits.

The threshold issue before us is whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. This court applies its “own 

law and not the law of the regional circuit to issues concerning our jurisdiction.” Ultra-Precision Mfg. Ltd. v. 

Ford Motor Co., 338 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Because the district court’s civil contempt order is not a 

final appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to consider 

this appeal. Likewise, we do not have jurisdiction to 

consider the court’s willfulness finding because: (1) as the 

prevailing party, Camtek lacks standing to appeal the 

court’s decision denying enhanced damages; and (2) there 

is no final judgment on willfulness. 

A. The Contempt Order is Not a 

Final Appealable Order

Camtek asserts that we have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and § 1295(a)(1). Section 1291 grants 

1 Counsel for Camtek conceded as much at oral argument: “I’m not justifying the conduct. The order was 

there, we should have obeyed it.” Oral Argument at 

10:46, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralargument-recordings/2012-1681/all. 

 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD . 9

courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “final 

decisions of the district courts” and provides that this 

court “shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in 

sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.”2 Under 

§ 1295(a)(1), we have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 

“from a final decision of the district courts” in patent 

disputes. § 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

August Tech maintains that we lack jurisdiction to

review Camtek’s appeal because: (1) the district court’s 

contempt sanction is civil and is not immediately appealable; and (2) Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, which allows for an immediate appeal in 

certain circumstances, does not apply here. For the 

reasons explained below, we agree. 

1. The Contempt Order is Civil, Not Criminal

On appeal, the parties dispute whether the district 

court’s contempt order is civil or criminal. In general, 

“civil contempt orders are not final judgments” and thus 

are not immediately appealable. Entegris, Inc. v. Pall 

Corp., 490 F.3d 1340, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Indeed, 

the Supreme Court has “deem[ed] it settled” that a civil 

contempt order issued during “the progress of the case . . . 

is regarded as interlocutory and to be reviewed only upon 

2 Camtek has not asserted jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1292. Nor could it under our case law, which 

provides that jurisdiction under § 1292(b) and (c)(1) 

requires certification from the district court “that the 

order involves a controlling question of law as to which 

there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 

that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 

Ultra-Precision, 338 F.3d at 1357. Because the district 

court has not certified its contempt determination for 

appeal, we lack jurisdiction under § 1292. 

 
10 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

appeal from a final decree in the case.” Doyle v. London 

Guar. & Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 603 (1907) (citation 

omitted). In contrast, “an adjudication of criminal contempt is a final order appealable prior to final judgment.” 

Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., 84 F.3d 

367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pro-Choice Network of 

W. New York v. Walker, 994 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1993)). 

Given this dichotomy, when assessing our jurisdiction, we must determine whether the contempt order at 

issue here was civil or criminal in nature. See Koninklijke 

Philips Elecs., N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, to ascertain its jurisdiction, a 

court of appeals ‘must decide whether the order before [it] 

[i]s one for civil contempt or one for criminal contempt.’” 

(quoting Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 

1996)). While August Tech argues that the contempt 

sanctions imposed are civil, Camtek maintains that they 

are criminal, and that it has a right to an immediate 

appeal. Camtek further argues that it was entitled to 

criminal due process protections. 

Whether a contempt determination is civil or criminal 

turns on the “character and purpose of the sanction 

involved.” Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 

(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme 

Court has explained that “a contempt sanction is considered civil if it ‘is remedial, and for the benefit of the 

complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.’” 

Id. at 827-28 (citation omitted). Criminal contempt “seeks 

to punish past acts of disobedience and may be maintained only with the court’s approval.” Latrobe Steel Co. 

v. United Steel Workers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1343 (3d Cir. 

1976). 

A contempt sanction is civil and remedial if it “either 

‘coerces the defendant into compliance with the court’s 

order, [or] . . . compensates the complainant for losses 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 11

sustained.’” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (quoting United 

States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-4 

(1947)). In other words, there are two subcategories of 

civil contempt: compensatory and coercive. Compensatory 

sanctions are backward looking and are designed to 

compensate the complainant for damages “caused by past 

acts of disobedience,” whereas coercive sanctions “look to 

the future and are designed to aid the plaintiff by bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court order.” 

Latrobe Steel, 545 F.2d at 1344.

On this record, we conclude that the contempt order 

here is civil and compensatory. Although the district 

court initially ordered Camtek to pay double damages as 

a sanction for contempt, the new district court judge 

reduced that award by half. In doing so, the court found 

that, “to the extent the doubling of the damages was 

intended to enforce the Court’s authority, rather than to 

compensate [August Tech], the sanction was criminal, and 

it appears that Camtek did not receive adequate due 

process.” Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *8. The court ordered 

Camtek to pay $645,946 “to compensate [August Tech] for 

the profits they lost due to Camtek’s violation of the 

Court’s injunction.” Id. at *11. 

The district court specifically considered the distinction between civil and criminal contempt and explained 

that the sanctions imposed here were compensatory. 

Although the district court’s characterization of the 

sanctions is not controlling, it is one factor we can consider. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 

418, 443 (1911) (noting that “the purpose of the punishment could be examined with a view to determining 

whether it was civil or criminal”). The sanctions awarded 

are payable directly to August Tech—not the court—and 

are calibrated to August Tech’s actual lost profits for the 

sales that violated the injunction. Both of these facts 

support our conclusion that the fine imposed is civil, not 
12 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

criminal. See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304 

(noting that, “[w]here compensation is intended, a fine is 

imposed, payable to the complainant . . . [and is] based 

upon evidence of complainant’s actual loss”). 

Given these circumstances, we conclude that the contempt sanctions awarded are civil and compensatory.3 

Accordingly, the district court’s contempt order is not 

subject to an immediate appeal. 

2. There is No Final Judgment on the Merits

Given our conclusion that the contempt order is civil—not criminal—and thus is not immediately appealable,

we turn to Camtek’s argument that the order is nonetheless appealable as a final judgment. Specifically, Camtek 

asserts that the “contempt adjudication is a final judgment as to all issues involved in the contempt proceeding

and is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Reply at 4. 

We disagree.

As noted, § 1295(a)(1) provides that we have jurisdiction only over appeals from “final decision[s] of the district 

courts.” Given this statutory limitation, we are obligated 

to consider whether the district court’s order is, in fact, a 

final judgment. Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., 

3 Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction, we 

do not address the issue of whether the compensatory civil 

contempt survives where the underlying injunction is 

vacated. See Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1190 (8th 

Cir. 1993) (“Compensatory civil contempt actions do not 

survive if the underlying injunction is vacated because it 

was issued erroneously. . . . However, compensatory civil 

contempt proceedings may continue when the underlying 

injunction abates for a reason that does not go to the 

jurisdiction of the issuing court.”) (citations omitted). The 

parties have not briefed this issue, and we leave it to the 

district court to address it in the first instance. 

 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 13

320 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A district court’s 

“judgment” or “decision” is final where “it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 

but execute the judgment.” Ultra-Precision, 338 F.3d at 

1357 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If 

a case is not fully adjudicated as to all claims for all 

parties, there is no final decision and therefore no jurisdiction.” Pandrol, 320 F.3d at 1362 (citation and quotation 

omitted). The finality requirement “is a statutory mandate and not a matter of discretion.” Ultra-Precision, 338 

F.3d at 1357 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).4

Camtek cites a number of cases for the proposition 

that a post-judgment contempt order is considered final 

4 Neither party has argued that we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. That doctrine, 

which is a “narrow exception” to the final judgment rule, 

permits the appeal of “trial court orders affecting rights 

that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal.” Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 

424, 430-31 (1985). “To fall within the exception, an order 

must at a minimum satisfy three conditions: It must 

conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an 

important issue completely separate from the merits of 

the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from 

a final judgment.” Id. at 431 (citation and quotation 

omitted). Because civil contempt is reviewable on appeal 

from the final judgment, the collateral order doctrine does 

not apply. See Entegris, 490 F.3d at 1346 (“The Supreme 

Court precedent dictates that civil contempts arising 

during the trial of related litigation are not appealable if 

adjudged against a party litigant, although such contempts are reviewable on appeal from the final judgment 

in the related litigation.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

 
14 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

and appealable under § 1291. See, e.g., Consumers Gas & 

Oil, 84 F.3d at 370 (finding that, because the “district 

court made a finding of contempt in the ‘postjudgment 

stage’ . . . the contempt order is appealable regardless of 

whether it is more properly characterized as criminal or 

civil”); Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 570 F.3d 

130, 136 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Post-judgment orders of 

contempt are within an appellate court’s jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as final and appealable orders.”); 

Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“The post-judgment orders of contempt appealed 

here are within this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 as final and appealable orders.”). Those cases—

which are not binding on this court—involve postjudgment contempt orders, and are distinguishable from 

the instant case, where the district court has not entered 

final judgment. 

Although the district court’s August 2009 judgment 

was final, that judgment was vacated on appeal and the 

case was remanded for further proceedings. There is thus 

no final judgment in this case as to which an appeal 

under § 1295 could be filed. Nothing in the district court’s 

judgment relating to the contempt order and willfulness 

finding evinces intent to resolve or dispose of any claims

in this case. And, because this litigation is ongoing in the 

district court, Camtek’s reliance on the fact that the 

district court’s August 30, 2012 order is entitled “Judgment in a Civil Case” is misplaced.5 The mere fact that it

is captioned as a “judgment” does not transform an otherwise interlocutory order into a final judgment for purposes of appeal. 

5 At oral argument, counsel for Camtek maintained 

that “[t]he order, it’s titled ‘Judgment.’ We have a clear 

form from the district court in Minnesota. It’s titled 

‘Judgment.’” Oral Argument at 4:39. 

 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 15

Camtek also argues that the district court’s contempt 

order is final and appealable because “the contempt 

proceeding is separate and independent of the other, 

ongoing proceedings.” Reply at 4. While Camtek is 

correct that criminal contempt charges that develop from 

an underlying civil case are treated as a separate action, 

we have already concluded that the contempt order at 

issue here is civil. See Latrobe Steel, 545 F.2d at 1343 (“If 

a criminal contempt action develops from a civil proceeding, it bears a separate caption apart from the civil suit.”). 

It is well established that civil contempt proceedings “are 

between the original parties and are instituted and tried 

as a part of the main cause.” Gompers, 221 U.S. at 445.

We therefore decline Camtek’s invitation to treat the civil 

contempt proceeding as a separate action. 

Because the district court’s contempt order did not 

end the litigation on the merits, it is not a final judgment. 

Accordingly, it cannot provide this court with subject 

matter jurisdiction under § 1295. See Entegris, 490 F.3d 

at 1348 (finding no jurisdiction where the district court’s 

contempt order did not end the litigation on the merits 

and the underlying litigation was ongoing). Camtek will, 

however, have the opportunity to appeal the contempt 

sanctions imposed after the district court enters final 

judgment on the merits in this case. 

3. Rule 54(b) is Inapplicable 

August Tech also argues that this court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides an exception to the rule of finality 

and allows for an immediate appeal in certain circumstances where the action “presents more than one claim 

for relief.” Specifically, Rule 54(b) states that a district 

court may “direct entry of final judgment as to one or 

more but fewer than all the claims or parties only upon an 

express determination that there is no just reason for 
16 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 

judgment.” 

A judgment “is not final for purposes of Rule 54(b) unless it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim 

entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” UltraPrecision, 338 F.3d at 1357 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether an order is sufficient to 

confer appellate jurisdiction under Rule 54(b) is a question of Federal Circuit law.” iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 

550 F.3d 1067, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In iLOR, this court 

stated: 

While we have never directly addressed the question, the consensus view, which we hereby adopt, 

is that the bare recitation of the “no just cause for 

delay” standard of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by 

itself, to properly certify an issue for immediate 

appeal . . . . 

* * * 

Rather, it must be apparent, either from the district court’s order or from the record itself, that 

there is a sound reason to justify departure from 

the general rule that all issues decided by the district court should be resolved in a single appeal of 

a final judgment.

Id. 

Camtek has not alleged that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 54(b). In fact, Camtek argues that August 

Tech’s citation to Rule 54(b) is misplaced because the 

contempt adjudication is not a judgment “as to one or 

more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” We agree 

that Rule 54(b) does not confer jurisdiction here. 

First, there is no evidence that either party asked the 

district court to certify its August 30, 2012 judgment for 

immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). And, because 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 17

the court’s contempt order does not dispose of any claims

in this case, the requirements for certification under Rule 

54(b) are not satisfied. See Ultra-Precision, 338 F.3d at 

1358 (concluding that there was “no final resolution of 

any one claim, as required by Rule 54(b)”). In any event,

because the district court did not certify the contempt 

issue—and there is no indication that the court contemplated an immediate appeal on this issue prior to the 

resolution of the claims in this case—we conclude there is 

no appealable judgment under Rule 54(b).

B. Willfulness 

We turn next to Camtek’s challenge to the district 

court’s willfulness finding. As noted, the magistrate judge

found that Camtek’s post-verdict (but pre-injunction) sale 

to Infinera was willful, but denied August Tech’s request 

for enhanced damages stemming from that sale. After 

this court vacated the infringement judgment in the 

Original Appeal, Camtek objected to court’s willful infringement finding. Specifically, Camtek argued that, 

absent an infringement finding, there can be no liability 

for willful infringement. The district court found that 

Camtek lacked standing to appeal the order denying 

enhanced damages because it was the prevailing party. 

The court also found that Camtek had “not shown a 

concrete and particularized or imminent injury resulting 

from the willful infringement finding.” Order on Camtek’s 

Rule 59 and 60 Motions, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040, 

at *13.

On appeal, Camtek argues that it has standing to 

challenge the willful infringement finding because it is 

false and “has caused Camtek to suffer injury in fact, 

including actual injury to Camtek’s reputation.” Appellant Br. 46. August Tech responds that: (1) Camtek does 

not have standing to challenge a factual finding contained 

in an order that was decided in its favor; and (2) there is 
18 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

no final judgment on willfulness. We agree with August 

Tech on both points. 

First, Article III, § 2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” or “controversies.” 

“Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-orcontroversy requirement.” Samsung Elec. Co. v. Rambus, 

Inc., 523 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To meet the

standing requirements of Article III, the party must 

demonstrate, among other things, that it has “suffered an 

‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest 

which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual 

or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ . . . .” 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 

(internal citations omitted). 

“A party that is not adversely affected by a judgment 

lacks standing to appeal.” See Typeright Keyboard Corp. 

v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(citations omitted). As such, a prevailing party generally 

lacks standing to appeal from a judgment in its favor. See 

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 

(1980) (“A party who receives all that he has sought 

generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the 

relief and cannot appeal from it.”). Where the appellant 

lacks standing, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

Typeright Keyboard, 374 F.3d at 1156.

Here, the district court found that Camtek’s postverdict infringement was willful, but denied August 

Tech’s request for enhanced damages. Camtek was, 

therefore, the prevailing party. Although Camtek speculates that the willfulness finding will damage its business 

reputation, we agree with the district court that such 

speculation is insufficient to demonstrate injury in fact. 

See Deposit Guar., 445 U.S. at 351 (“[U]nadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power.”) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 19

On appeal, Camtek complains that the district court’s 

language has branded it a “willful infringer.” Reply at 35. 

But federal appellate courts “review[] judgments, not 

statements in opinions.” See California v. Rooney, 483 

U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also United States v. Accra Pac, Inc., 

173 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Unwelcome language 

in a substantively favorable decision is not the kind of 

adverse effect that meets the requirement of actual injury.”). It is well established that “[a] party may not appeal 

from a judgment or decree in his favor, for the purpose of 

obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous which 

are not necessary to support the decree.” Elec. Fittings 

Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939); see

also Bierle v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 873, 876 

(8th Cir. 1993). Because the “finding that Camtek was a 

willful infringer was not necessary to support the Order’s 

denial of enhanced damages,” Camtek cannot appeal it. 

See Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *14, n.5. 

We also lack jurisdiction for the separate reason that

there is no final judgment on willfulness. Although 

Camtek argues in its reply brief that we have jurisdiction 

to review the willfulness finding under Rule 54(b), the 

requirements for certification under that rule are not 

satisfied. Specifically, the district court’s order denying 

enhanced damages is not a final resolution of any claims

in this case. See Ultra-Precision, 338 F.3d at 1358 (declining to find jurisdiction based on its conclusion that there 

was “no final resolution of any one claim, as required by 

Rule 54(b)”). As such, we do not have jurisdiction to 

consider the district court’s non-final willfulness finding. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction to hear 

this appeal at this stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, 

we are required to dismiss it. 
20 AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. CAMTEK, LTD. 

DISMISSED