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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 22 4- CV Amparo NIERA , Appellant
v . THE FROST NATIONAL BANK ,

Appellee Fr om the 225th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2009-CI -01386 Honora ble Soloman J . Casseb I I I , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Marialy

n Ba rnar d, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: March 10, 2010 AFF I RMED Appellant Ampar o Niera filed suit ag ainst L y dia Sanche z and The F ros t Na t i o nal B ank (“F rost”), a lleg ing nume rous ca uses of a ction relating to pay ment of a r eal estate not e. Fr ost filed tr a dit ion a l and

no e vid e nc e mot ion s for summa ry jud g me nt, a s w e ll a s a

mot ion fo r s anc tio ns a g a ins t Niera ’s attorne y , Richard Wag ner. The trial court enter ed an order g rantingFr ost’s motions. Niera appea ls, alleg ing in se ven issues that the trial court err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Fr ost, and in g rantingFr ost’s motion for sanctions. We aff irm.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND I n 2007, Niera

filed suit ag ainst L y dia S anche z as t he independent ex ecutr ix of the e state of Jess e L op e z Sanc he z. Th e su it wa s ba se d on Ni e ra ’s purc ha se of c e rt a in re a l pr op e rt y fr om J esse L opez Sanchez in 1980. As part of the transac tion, Niera e x ecute d a promissory note, sec ured by a dee d of trust. The f

irst pay ment on the note wa s due Janu ar y 1 , 1981. Eventually , Sanchez
a tte mpt e d to fo re c los e on the pr op e rt

y , c la imi ngNi e ra

ha d f a ile d to make t he r e qu ir e d n ote pa y me nts . Ni e ra c la ime d the re wa s no de fa ult , and su e d to pr e ve nt the foreclo su re, suc c e ssf ull y
e njo ini ngthe fo re c los ur e . Ni e ra su bs e qu e ntl y a me nd e d he r su it, a dd ing F ro st a s a de fe nd ant. F ro st was not a party

to the note, but collecte d Niera ’s pay ments on behalf of

Sanchez. As to Fr ost, Niera
asser ted claims for

violation of t he Fair Debt Collection Act, usury , and misrepr esentation or fra ud. Fr ost filed both traditional and no evide nce motions for summar y judgme nt. Frost also filed a motion for sanc tions ag ainst Niera ’s attorney , Richard Wag ner, pur suant to section 10.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and R emedies Code and rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure. A fter a summary

judgme nt hear ing, a s well as an evidentiary hear ing on the m otion for sanc tions, the trial court g rante d Fr ost’s motions for summary judgme nt and mot ion for sanctions. The sanc tions were soug ht ag ainst, and imposed solely ag ainst, Niera ’s attorne y , Richard W ag ner. The trial cour t then g rante d Fr ost’s motion for sever ance , cre ating a fina l appea lable judg ment as betwe en Niera a nd Fr ost. Niera f

iled a notice of

appea l.04
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- 3- A N A L Y SIS Sanc tio ns I n her f irst point of er

ror, Nie ra c ontends the trial cour t erre d in gr anting Fr ost’s motion for sanctions beca

use Fr ost “ had no standing .” The argument portion of this first point consists of the fo llo wi ngtw o s e nte nc e s:

Fr ost Bank w as not a pa

rty when the aff

idavit w as filed. They

should not be allowed to punish other pa rties; t h i s could ca

use a va liantly

[si c] rampag e and vio late s F ourt e e nth

pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss. Contrary to Niera ’s asser

tion, it i s not Frost that lac ks standing w ith reg ard to the sa nctions iss ue ; r a the r, it i s N ie ra

tha t la c ks sta nd ingto c omp la in of the imp os iti on of sanc tio ns . “ Te xas c ourt s have longheld t hat an appea ling party may not complain of err ors t hat do not injuriously aff ect it or t h at m erely

aff ect the r ights of othe rs.” Torringt on Co. v. Stutzman , 4 6 S
. W
. 3 d 8 2 9 , 8 4 3 ( T e x. 2000). An a

ppellant is not harmed whe n sanctions ar e imposed solely ag ainst t he appe llant’s attorney . See M

atbon, Inc. v . Gries , 2 8 7 S
. W.3d 739, 740 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) (c i t i n g W ill iam s v . Co lth ur

st , 253 S.W .3d 353, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastlan d 2 0 0 8, no pet.)). Acc ording ly , such an a

ppellant lacks standingto challeng e the sa nctions on appea l. Id. Her e, F rost soug ht sanctions ag ainst Niera ’s attorne y , not Niera , and sanc tions were imposed solely ag ainst the attorney . Acc ording ly , Niera has no standing to c omplain a bout the imposit ion of sanctions ag ainst her attorney . As the injured party , the attorne y had standingto complain about the trial court’ s imposit ion of sanctions. Mr. Wagne r, howeve r, failed to pe rfe ct an appea l on his own behalf
. A party seeking to alter a trial court’s judgment or other appeala ble order m ust file a notice of appe al. T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.1( c). The notice of appea l f iled in this case was f

i l ed o n Ni era’s behalf , stating “ Plaintiff, A mparo Niera , here by g ives her N otice of A ppeal to the F ourth Court of04
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1 ... T h e T e x a s S u p re m e C o u rt h a s e x p re ssly d e c line d to d e c id e w h e the r a n a tto rn e y m u st p e rfe c t a se p a ra te a p p e a l ap a rt fro m tha t p e rfe c te d b y his c lien t. B r ad en v. D ow ney , 8 1 1 S .W .2d 9 2 2 , 9 2 8 n .6 (T ex . 1 9 9 1 ) (“W e e xp ress n o o p inio n o n the q u e stio n s w h e the r, in o rd e r to se e k re v ie w o f san c tio n s b y a p p e a l, a n a tto rn e y m u st p e rfe c t a se p a ra te a p p e a l ap a rt fro m tha t p e rfe c te d b y his c lien t.”)
.

- 4- Appea ls of San Antonio, Texas from J udg e Casseb ’s Or d er fo r Sanctions.” The notice of a ppeal does not list Mr. W ag ner a s an appe llant, and he did not file a notice of appea l on his own behalf. Be cause Mr. Wag ner ha s failed to invoke our jurisdiction by filing a notice of a

ppeal, a nd Niera has no standing to complain about the imposition of sanctions, we over rule the f irst point of error
. Howeve r, eve n if we w ere to hold that by filing the notice of a ppeal on be half of his c lient Mr. Wag ner ha d invoked this c ourt’s jurisdiction, we would still find no merit to the point of err or. 1 I t appea rs from he r brief

argument that Niera

believes F rost lacke d standing to seek sanc tions beca use F rost based its motion for sanctions on an aff idavit attached to the or igina l petition, which was filed be fore Fr ost became a defe ndant. Niera contends the aff idavit was “amende d out” when sh e a me nd e d h e r o ri g ina l pet iti on . Ev e n if the a ff ida vit wa s “ a me nd e d o ut, ” Ni e ra ’s c la ims a g a ins t Fr o s t we re still based on a lleg ations included in the orig inal petition and Niera ’s af fidavit, which
wer e ca rried into the amended pe tition i n which Nier a sued F rost. Acc ording ly , the basis for
sanc tio ns sti ll e xiste d de sp ite ame ndme nt of the or ig ina l pe tit ion
. We the re fo re ov e rr ule Ni e ra ’s fi rs t point of err or. Summ ar y Jud gment Fr ost f iled both tr aditional and no evidenc e motions for summary judgme nt. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 66 a (c ), (i ). Th e sta

nd ards of r e vie w f

or bo th t ra dit ion a l and

no e vid e nc e mot ion s are we llestablished. Courts revie w traditional and no e vidence m otions for summary judgme nt de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). A trad i t i o nal motion for summary j u d gm en t is gra nted only when the mova

nt establishes there are no g enuine issues of04
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- 5- mate ri a l f a c t and it i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw o n the g ro un ds e xpre ssl y se t f or th i n the motion. Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W .3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2005). When review ing a n order g rantinga tra ditional moti on for summary judgme nt, courts take e vidence favor able to nonmovant as true a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable inferenc e from the evidence in favor of t he nonmovant. Am. Tob ac c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). A no evide nce motion for summar y judgme nt should be g rante d if t h e n o n -m o vant fa ils to present more than a scintilla of probative
e v id e n c e to r a is e a g e nu in e is s u e o f mate r ia l f a c t o n th e c h a ll e n g e d e le ment. F o r d Mo tor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). Ab se nc e of D isc ov e ry Niera next arg ues the trial c ourt err ed in g ra n t i n g Fr ost’s motions for summary judgme nt “bec ause the re w as no discover y .” Rule 38.1 of the Te x as Rules of Appe llate Proce dure se ts forth those things that must be included in an appe llant’s brief. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1. Rule 38.1(i) re quires that an a ppellant’s br ie f “ c on ta in a c le ar and c on c ise argume nt fo r t he c on te nti on s ma de , w itha pp ro pr iate c itatio ns to

. . . the re cord.” Id. R. 38.1(i). The a ppellate c ourt has no duty to brief issues for

an appe llant. Huey v. Hue y , 2 00 S.W. 3d

85 1, 85 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 6, no pe t.) . T he fa ilure to p ro vid e a pp ro pr iate
rec ord citations or a

substantive analy sis waives an a ppellate issue. See id. ; W

orldPeace v. Comm’n for Law yer D iscipline , 183 S.W .3d 451, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (providing that failure to offe r arg ument, citations to rec ord, or a uthority waives a ppellate r eview) ; Med. Specialist Group, P.A. v. Radiology Assocs., L.L.P. , 171 S.W .3d 727, 732 (Tex. App.—Corpus Chr ist i 20 05 , p e t. d e nie d) (s ame ); see also Fredonia S tate Bank v . Gen. Am . Life Ins. Co. , 88104
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2 ... W e no te tha t t h e b rie f un d e r re v ie w , t h o u g h d e sig n a te d b y N ie ra a s a “su p p le m e n ta l” b rie f, is N ie ra ’s am en d ed b rief

. A f t er N i era f

i l ed he r o rigi na l b rief

, she wa s o rd ere d b y t his co urt t o reb rief b ec au se, am o ng o t he r t hings, h e r o rig ina l b rie f d id n o t c o n ta in a p p ro p ria te c itatio n s to the re c o rd
. See T EX . R. A PP . P
. 38
. 1 (i ). N i era was t heref o re g ive n a n o p p o rtu n ity to c o rr e c t t h is d e ficie n c y.

- 6- S.W .2d 279, 284-85 (Te x . 1994) (holding appe llate cour t has discre tion to deem points of error waived due to inadequate briefing ). Although a

ppellate c ourts are to construe br iefingrequire ments rea sonably and liberally , a party asser ting e rror on appea l must put forth some spec ifi c ar gument and ana ly sis, and provide
rec ord citations and authority in support thereof
. Sa n S ab a E ne rg y , L. P. v . Crawf

or d , 171 S.W .3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Nie ra includes case law providingthe standard of

revie w for adequate t ime for discove ry in the summary

judgme nt context, and case la w setting f orth the substantive law use d to determine whether there ha s been a dequate time for discovery
. Howeve r, she does not include a ny citation to the rec ord, nor pr ovide any argument or application of the cited law to the f acts of this ca se. 2 I n the abse nce of leg al ana ly sis supported by
rec ord citations, Nier a has pr esente d nothing f or our r eview. S

e e H u ey , 2 0 0 S.W .3d at 854; W orldPeace , 183 S.W .3d at 460; Med. Spe cialist Group , 1 71 S.W. 3d a t 73 2. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld Niera has wa ived her

second point of e rror . Us ur y Niera contends in her

third p o i n t of err or that the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingFr ost’s tr a dit ion a l and

no e vid e nc e mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n h e r c la ims fo r u sury . A c c or din g to Niera , Fr ost is liable for usury beca use i t committed a per se vi olation of t he Te x as F inance Code. We disag ree . Texas law pre scribes the amount of intere st that may be cha rg ed. SeeT EX . F IN . C ODE ANN . § 302.001 (Ve rnon 2006). I f a c redi t o r ch ar ges an oblig or intere st at a rate g reater than that04
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- 7- presc ribed by

law, it is “usurious,” and subje ct to penalty
. Id . §§ 301.002(a) (17), 302.001( b). The Financ e Code de fines “c reditor” as one who loans money or o t h er wise extends cre dit. Id . § 301.002(a) (3). “F or usury to apply there must be an ove rcha rg e by a lende r for

the use, for

bear ance or dete ntion of the lender ’s money .” Stedman v. G eorgetown Sav. &Loan Ass’n , 595 S.W .2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1979). Acc ording ly , a cla im for usury is one that lies ag ainst the cre ditor, i.e., the one who loaned money

or extended cr edit to the obligor
. F ro st’ s summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , s pe c if ic a lly Ni e ra ’s de po sit ion

te sti mony , p ro ve s a s a matter of la

w that Fr ost never loaned Niera any money , nor di d they extend any ty pe of c redit to her: Q. [Frost Attorney ] I think we established this be fore
. Fr ost ne ver made a loan to y ou of any kin d; i s th a t c or

re c t? A. [Niera] No. Q. [F ro st A tto rn e y ] F ro st n e ve r m a de a loa n; c or re c t? A. [Nie ra ] Ine ve r g ot a

loa n f ro m F ro st. Q. [Frost Attorney ] Okay . And they never extended cre dit to y ou of any kind; is t hat c or re c t? A. [Niera] No, sir. Q. [F ro st A tto rn e y ] An d th e y did n’ t make the loa

n to y ou in t his c a se ; c or

re c t? A
. [ N i e r a ] N o , i tw a s j u s tana c c o u n tt h a t t h e l a dy h a d ; r i g h t . T h a t ’ s t h e y w ay I understood it. Acc ording ly , as to Fr ost, the usury laws are not implicate d beca use Fr ost was not a cr editor; it never loa

ned money

or extended cr edit to Niera . We theref ore ove rrule N iera ’s third issue. Br e ac h o f F idu c iar yDu ty I n her f o u rt h an d fi fth points of err or, Nier a ar g ues the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingFr ost’s motions for summ ary

judgme nt as to her c laim for bre ach of fiduciar y duty , which she a sserts was04
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- 8- based on Fr ost’s failure to pa y proper ty insurance and taxes. We ha ve revie wed Nie ra’ s live petition, wh ic h e xce e ds fi ve hund re d p a g e s, and

fi nd no c la im f

or br e a c h of fi du c iary

duty a g a ins t F ro st. Mo re ov e r, Ni e ra

fa ile d to lis t br e a c h o f f idu c iary duty a s a le g a l th eory or claim i n r e sp on se to Fr ost’s reque st for disclosure, nor did she mention it in he r response to F rost’s motions for summary jud g me nt. B e c a

us e no su c h c la im wa s a lle g e d, Ni e ra ’s fo ur th po int of e rr or is wi tho ut m e ri t and is
overr uled. Conversion Niera asser ts in point of er

ror six t hat the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingFr ost’s mo t i o ns for
summa ry jud g me nt a s to he r cl a im fo r co nv e rs ion
. Th e re are a t lea st two re a so ns fo r o ve rr uli ngthi s point of err or. First, as w ith her four

th and fifth points of er

ror, Nie ra ne ver ple d co n v er s i o n. Her live pe tit ion c on ta ins no me nti on of

c on ve rs ion , a

nd he r r e sp on se to F ro st’ s r e qu e st f or dis c los ur e a s to leg al theorie s and cla ims makes no mention of thi s ca u s e o f action. Second, this point of er ror contains nothing more than a citation to a case listi ng the elements of conve rsion, and a statement that “[a]ll of the re cords show that Appellant paid money to A ppellant and Appellant did not make any pay ments on behalf of

Appellant.” T h i s d o es n o t co nstitut e leg al ana ly sis, and there is no citation to the rec ord to advise this court a s to “the re cords” Niera contends support he r conte ntion. We hold this point is i nadequa tely bri ef ed , an d t h ere fore waived. See H uey , 200 S.W .3d at 854; W orldPeace , 183 S.W .3d at 460; Med. Spe cialist Group , 171 S.W .3d at 732. Fair Debt Collection Act Niera argues in he r final point of err or that the trial cour t erre d in gr anting Fr ost’s traditional and no evide nce motions for summar y judgme nt as to her c laims under the F air De bt Coll ection Ac t04
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- 9- (“the Act”)
. See 15 U. S.C. § 1 69 2 ( 19 77 ). She se e ms t o a rgue that F ro st v iol a te d th e Ac t be c a us e its collection notes “do not contain a ny mandatory

lang uag e re g ardingvalidation of debt.” Section 1692g of the Act require s a “debt c ollector” to send the consumer a wr itten notice containing cer

tain information in or der to va lidate the debt. Id
. § 1692g . The Ac t defines a “debt collector ” as “ any

person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerc e or the mails in a ny business the principal pur pose of whic h is the collection of a ny debts, or who re g ularly

collects or attempts to c ollect, direc tly or indirectly , debts owed or due or asser ted to be owed or

due anothe r.” Id. § 1 69 2a (6 ). Ho we ve r, the Ac t th e re a ft e r e xclu de s c e rt a in p e rs on s f ro m th e de fi nit ion , s pe c if

ic a lly those who collec t or attempt to collect a ny debt owed or

due a third pe rson to the extent the collection conc erns a

debt that wa s n o t i n d efa ult at the time it was obtained for collection. Id. § 1692a(6) (F )(iii). Ac cording ly , a debt collector does not include a

mortg ag e ser

vicing company

or simil ar individuals, “a s long a s the debt wa s not in de fault at the time it was a ssigne d.” CA Par tne rs
v . S pe ar s , 2 7 4 S
. W
. 3 d 5 1 , 7 9 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n[ 1 4 t hDi s t . ] 2 0 0 8 , p et . d en i ed ) ( qu o t i n g Pe rry v. Stewart Titl e Co. , 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 ( 5th Cir. 1985), reh’g granted in part on other grounds , 761 F.2d 237 ( 5th Cir. 1985)). I n this case, the summary judgme nt evidenc e shows that on Dec ember 18, 1980, Fr ost signed a contr act with Jesse Sanchez to collect the note pay ments due fr om Niera

to Sanchez for the purcha se of the r eal pr operty . Niera conce ded in a response to a re quest for a dmission propounded by Fr ost that as of Decembe r 18, 1980, there was no de fault on the note. This a dmission, which was pa rt of F ro st’ s summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , e sta

bli sh e d a s a matte r of law that the re wa s n o d e fa ult
on the note at the time F rost ag ree d to c ollect pay ments on behalf

of Sanche z. SeeTe x. R. C iv. P. 198.3 (stating that a matter admitted in response to reque st for admission is conclusively established04
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- 10- as t o p arty

ma k in g a dmi s s io nu n le s s c o u rt p e r mi ts p arty

to w it h dr aw o r ame n d a dmi s sion). Acc ording ly , Fr ost established as a matter of law it was n o t a “d ebt collector” for purposes of the Act, and there fore not require d to comply with the validation provisions of section 1692g
. Se e CA Pa rt ne rs , 2 7 4 S. W. 3 d

a t 7 9
. We h o ld

th e tr ia l c o u rt d id

n o t e r r in g r an ti n g F r o s t’ s mo ti o n s f or
s u mm a r y ju d g me n t o nN ie r a ’ s v a li d a ti o nc la im u n d e r th e A c t, an d

o v e r r u le N ie r a ’ s s e v e n th

p oint of er ror. C ONCL US I ON Having overr

uled all of Niera’ s issues, either substantively or base d on waiver , we a ffirm the trial court’ s judgme nt in favor of Fr ost, including the a

war d of sanc tions in favor of F rost.
Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice