This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1555 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Gary Lee Hanson, Jr., Appellant. Filed July 5, 2016 Affirmed Schellhas, Judge Cottonwood County District Court File No. 17-CR-15-76 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County A ttorney, Lori A. Buch heim, Assistant County Attorney, Windom, Minn esota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Richar d Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minne sota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Reyes, Presidi ng Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHELLHAS , Judge Appellant argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion in denying his presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pl ea to felony domestic assault. We affirm.2 FACTS On February 20, 2015, appellant Gary Lee Hanson Jr. was arguing with his mother in their shared residence when he threw a bla nket and raised his arm as though threatening to hit his mother, intending to “put fear in her.” Police interv ention in the argument led to Hanson’s arrest, and responde nt State of Minnesota charge d Hanson with felony domestic assault due to Hanson’s prior convictions of qualified offenses. On April 21, Hanson pleaded guilty as charged in ex change for the state’s agreemen t to a stay of imposition of sentence and two years of unsupervised proba tion; the district court accepted Hanson’s plea and set a sentencing hearing for May 26. On May 20, Hanson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that the resulting conviction “has had unforeseen disastrous consequences on [his] empl oyment prospects.” The st ate opposed Hanson’s pleawithdrawal motion. After hearing argument a nd testimony, the court denied Hanson’s motion, adjudicated his guilt, and stayed imposition of se ntence under the plea deal. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N “A defendant has no absolu te right to withdraw a gu ilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). “[A] court must a llow withdrawal of a guilty plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). And “a court may al low withdrawal any time before sentencing if it is ‘fair and just’ to do so.” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2). “The ‘fair and just’ standard requires district courts to gi ve ‘due consideration’ to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support with drawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion3 would cause the State given reliance on the plea.” Id. at 97 (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2). “A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support withdrawal,” while “[t]he State bears th e burden of showing prejudice caused by withdrawal.” Id. “[Appellate courts] review a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, re versing only in the rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted). Hanson does not argue here, nor did he argue to the distri ct court, that withdrawal of his guilty plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Instead, he argues that he has established that withdrawal of his plea is fair and just, that the state has failed to show that withdrawal would cause prejudice to it, and th at the district court therefore abused its discretion by denying his presentencing plea -withdrawal motion. According to Hanson, because he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that the resulting conviction would interfere with his out-of-state job prospect s, withdrawal of his plea is fair and just. Hanson’s claim is faulty in at least two re spects. First, Hanson did not argue to the district court that his guilty plea hinged on th e resulting conviction’s lack of impact on his future employment. The argument ther efore is not properly before us. See State v. Johnson , 851 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. 2014) (“Generally , we will not consider arguments that are made for the first time on ap peal.”). Second, the di strict court found th at Hanson did not show that the conviction has prevented him from obtaining employment and that “there are many reasons why [Hanson] has had difficulty finding a job.” These findings have ample support in the record, and we wi ll not disturb them on appeal. See State v. Byron , 683 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating th at “[o]n questions of fact, if there is4 sufficient evidence to support th e district court’s findings, they will not be disturbed” on review of district court’s plea-withdrawal decision), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). At most, the evidence suppor ts a finding that Hanson’s newest conviction has had an incremental negative effect on his ability to secure desired employment. But the district court made no such finding. Even if it had, a finding of negative employment consequences would not have compelled th e court to grant Hanson’s plea-withdrawal motion. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (“ In its discretion the court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fa ir and just to do so.” (emphasis added)); Butala
v. State , 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003) (stati ng that “[t]he ultimate decision of whether to allow withdrawal unde r the ‘fair and just’ standard is left to the sound discretion of the trial court” (quotation omitted)). In sum, the district court gave “due consideration to the reasons advanced by [Hanson] in support of the [p lea-withdrawal] motion,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2, but it determined that those reasons were lacking. Accordingly, although the court acknowledged that withdrawal would result in “r elatively minimal” prejudice to the state, the court was not persuaded to exercise its discretion to permit withdrawal. Hanson pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault after re ceiving a favorable plea deal; acknowledging and waiving his trial rights; stati ng that defense counsel “did a nice job” representing him; and affirming that, “with a knowledge and understanding of all of [his] rights,” he still wanted to plead guilty. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making the finality-preserving deci sion not to allow Hanson to withdraw his plea. See Kaiser v.
State , 641 N.W.2d 900, 9 03 (Minn. 2002) (“Pub lic policy favors the finality of judgments5 and courts are not disposed to encourage accu sed persons to play ga mes with the courts by setting aside judgments of conviction based upon pleas made w ith deliberation and accepted by the court with cau tion.” (quotations omitted)). Affirmed.