- 833 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

301 Nebraska Report

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK v. WATSON

Cite as 301 Neb. 833

Mutual of Omaha Bank, appellee, v. Robert W. Wa

appellant, and Shona Rae Watson, appellee, fo

husband and wife, and Community 

Lincoln, Trustee and benef

et al., appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 7, 2018. No. S-17-1332.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional issue that 

does not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law, which an 

appellate court independently decides.

2. Judgments: Words and Phrases. A judgment is the final determination 

of the rights of the parties in an action.

3. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2016), the three types of final orders which may be reviewed 

on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which 

determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting 

a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order 

affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action 

after judgment is rendered.

4. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential 

legal right.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Joh

A. Colborn, Judge. Appeal dismisse

Robert Watson, pro se.

Eric H. Lindquist, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Mutual of 

Omaha Bank.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/14/2018 01:10 AM CST
- 834 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

301 Nebraska Report

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK v. WATSON

Cite as 301 Neb. 833

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stac

Papik, and Freudenberg, 

Papik, J

Robert W. Watson appeals from an order of the district court 

denying his request for a stay of an order of sale in a judicial 

foreclosure action. Watson claims he was entitled to such a stay 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1506 (Reissue 2016). We conclude 

that the order denying the request for a stay was not appealable 

and therefore dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

This is not the first time this matter has come before this 

court. After the district court determined that Watson and 

his former spouse owed Mutual of Omaha Bank (Mutual) 

$533,459.36, ordered an execution sale, and foreclosed Watson 

and his former spouse from asserting any interest in the relevant property, Watson perfected a timely appeal. We affirmed. 

See Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Watson, 297 Neb. 479, 900 

N.W.2d 545 (2017).

After our opinion was issued, Mutual applied to the district 

court for and received a supplemental decree. In the supplemental decree, the court stated that Mutual paid sums connected to the mortgaged property that were not included in 

the initial decree and ordered that those amounts be added to 

the amount due Mutual. Watson requested a stay of the order 

of sale. The district court issued an order denying Watson’s 

request for a stay. Watson appeals from this order.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Watson assigns one error on appeal: The district court erred 

by denying his request for a stay of the order of sale.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual 

dispute presents a question of law, which an appellate court 
- 835 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

301 Nebraska Report

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK v. WATSON

Cite as 301 Neb. 833

independently decides. In re Interest of Tyrone K., 295 Neb. 

193, 887 N.W.2d 489 (2016).

ANALYSIS

Mutual contends that this appeal should be dismissed for 

lack of appellate jurisdiction. For reasons set forth below, 

we agree.

[2] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) gives appellate 

courts jurisdiction to review “[a] judgment rendered or final 

order made by the district court . . . for errors appearing on the 

record.” For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, “[a] judgment is 

the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.” 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Reissue 2016). As there is no 

question that the district court’s order denying Watson’s request 

for a stay did not finally determine the rights of the parties in 

an action, that order is not a judgment and thus is only appealable if it qualifies as a final order.

[3] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), the 

three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal 

are (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action that, 

in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an 

order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding; and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on 

summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. 

Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 

774 (2018). Because all three types of reviewable final orders 

affect a substantial right in the action, it is not necessary to 

evaluate each of the three categories individually in cases in 

which the order from which an appeal is taken does not affect 

a substantial right. See, e.g., Deines v. Essex Corp., 293 Neb. 

577, 581, 879 N.W.2d 30, 33 (2016) (“in this appeal, it is not 

necessary to decide whether the order [at issue] fits into any 

of the three categories, because the dispositive issue here is 

whether the order affects a substantial right in the action”). 

This is such a case.
- 836 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

301 Nebraska Report

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK v. WATSON

Cite as 301 Neb. 833

Watson contends that he had a substantial right to a stay 

under § 25-1506 and that the district court’s order denying 

his request for a stay affected that right. The relevant portion 

of § 25-1506 provides as follows: “The order of sale on all 

decrees for the sale of mortgaged premises shall be stayed . . . 

after the entry of such decree, whenever the defendant shall, 

within twenty days after the entry of such decree, file with the 

clerk of the court a written request for the same.”

A decree was issued in the foreclosure action in September 

2016. Watson did not seek a stay within 20 days after the 

entry of that decree. He instead filed his first appeal. Watson 

acknowledges that he would ordinarily not be entitled to a stay 

at this point given his failure to ask for a stay within 20 days of 

the decree. He contends that he is nonetheless entitled to a stay 

in this case, because the district court entered a supplemental 

decree after his appeal was decided and he requested a stay 

within 20 days of its entry.

Watson’s argument, however, is inconsistent with our precedent. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nethaway, 127 Neb. 330, 255 

N.W. 26 (1934), after a foreclosure decree was issued and a 

defendant requested and received a stay, the plaintiff sought 

and obtained a supplemental decree. Like the supplemental 

decree in this case, the supplemental decree only had the effect 

of increasing the amount the plaintiff owed the defendant. 

The defendant responded by requesting another stay. We held 

that the defendant was not entitled to a stay following the 

supplemental decree. We explained that “[t]he modification 

of the decree merely increased the personal liability of the 

defendants” and “did not affect the decree of foreclosure of the 

mortgaged property.” Id. at 331, 255 N.W. at 27.

Watson contends that Nethaway merely stands for the proposition that once a party has requested and obtained one stay, 

they may not obtain a second stay following the entry of a 

supplemental decree. We do not believe this is a correct reading of Nethaway. Our rationale for holding that the defendant 
- 837 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

301 Nebraska Report

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK v. WATSON

Cite as 301 Neb. 833

in Nethaway was not entitled to a stay had nothing to do with 

the fact that the defendant had already received one stay. 

Rather, our decision rested on the nature of the supplemental 

decree, specifically that it was not a new decree but a modification of the existing one. For that reason, we understand 

Nethaway to hold that the issuance of a supplemental decree 

that merely increases the amount due from a defendant does 

not give rise to a right to seek a statutory stay.

[4] A substantial right is an essential legal right. Shawn 

E. on behalf of Grace E. v. Diane S., 300 Neb. 289, 912 

N.W.2d 920 (2018). Because a supplemental decree like the 

one at issue in this case does not give rise to a right to seek 

a statutory stay, we find that the district court’s order denying 

Watson’s request for a stay did not affect any right, much less 

an essential legal right. The order is therefore not final, and 

we lack jurisdiction to decide the appeal.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s order denying Watson’s request for a 

stay was not an appealable order. Lacking appellate jurisdiction, we are obligated to dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed