IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 147

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2014

November 18, 2014

COURTNEY C. BOUTELLE,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

CLINTON T. BOUTELLE,

Appellee

(Defendant).

S-14-0060

Appeal from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Larry B. Jones and Colin M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, The 

Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C., 

Cody, WY. Argument by Mr. Jones.

Representing Appellee:

Curtis B. Buchhammer of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be 

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

HILL, Justice.

[¶1] Courtney Boutelle (Sister) filed a negligence action against her brother Clinton 

Boutelle (Brother) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Park County, Wyoming, for 

injuries sustained in a single-vehicle accident that occurred in Montana. Applying 

Wyoming’s borrowing statute, the district court found that Sister’s action was barred by 

Montana’s three-year statute of limitations and granted Brother’s motion for summary 

judgment. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Sister states the issues on appeal as follows:

I. In applying Wyoming’s “Borrowing Statute”, Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (LexisNexis 2013) and holding that 

Montana’s three-year statute of limitations for personal 

injuries applied in this instance, the lower court failed to 

correctly apply the relevant Montana case law and statutory 

provisions.

II. This Court should adopt an interest analysis in 

determining “where the cause arose,” which analysis would 

result in a determination that it arose in Wyoming and the 

cause of action is timely.

FACTS

[¶3] On February 28, 2009, Sister and Brother were in a single-vehicle accident. 

Brother was driving the vehicle and there were three passengers in addition to Sister. 

Brother and Sister were both residents of Cody, Wyoming at the time of the accident, 

which occurred on I-90 in Sweet Grass County, Montana, as the group of five was

returning from a hockey game in Missoula, Montana.

[¶4] On February 27, 2013, Sister filed a Complaint against Brother in the Fifth 

Judicial District Court, Park County, Wyoming. Sister alleged that Brother’s negligent 

operation of the vehicle caused the February 28, 2009 accident and that, as a result of 

Brother’s negligence, Sister sustained injuries, damages, and losses. With respect to the 

claimed negligence, Sister alleged that Brother encountered fog on the highway and hit 

the brakes, causing the back end of the vehicle to slide sideways into the median and the 

vehicle to roll 1.25 times. More specifically, Sister alleged that Brother’s negligence 

included:

a. failing to maintain a proper lookout;
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b. failing to maintain control of the vehicle he was 

driving;

c. driving too fast for conditions;

d. driving at an excessive speed for the circumstances;

e. driving carelessly;

f. driving in a manner that was not reasonable under the 

circumstances;

g. violating the traffic laws of the state of Montana.

[¶5] On September 9, 2013, Brother moved for summary judgment, contending that 

Sister’s negligence action was barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Brother 

asserted that because the accident occurred in Montana, Wyoming’s borrowing statute 

required application of Montana’s three-year statute of limitations, rather than 

Wyoming’s four-year statute, and Sister’s action was therefore barred. On January 15, 

2014, the district court issued a decision letter granting Brother’s summary judgment 

motion. The court concluded that the damage and all of the elements necessary for 

Sister’s cause of action occurred in Montana and therefore the cause of action arose in 

Montana and Montana’s statute of limitations applied. On February 6, 2014, the court 

issued its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and on February 

11, 2014, Sister filed her Notice of Appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶6] We review an order granting summary judgment using the following standard of 

review:

We review a summary judgment in the same light as the 

district court, using the same materials and following the 

same standards. [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1083 

(Wyo. 1999) ]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 

(Wyo. 1998). We examine the record from the vantage point 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give 

that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 

fairly be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one 

which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or 

refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 

asserted by the parties. Id. If the moving party presents 

supporting summary judgment materials demonstrating no 

genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is shifted to 

the non-moving party to present appropriate supporting 

materials posing a genuine issue of a material fact for trial. 

Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999); Downen 

v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). We 
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review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question of 

law de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s 

ruling. Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d at 156; Blagrove v. JB 

Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).

Inman v. Boykin, 2014 WY 94, ¶ 20, 330 P.3d 275, 281 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Moats v. 

Prof’l Assistance, LLC, 2014 WY 6, ¶ 17, 319 P.3d 892, 896 (Wyo. 2014)).

[¶7] “Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law that 

this Court reviews de novo.” Inman, ¶ 21, 330 P.3d at 281 (citing Hoke v. Motel 6 

Jackson, 2006 WY 38, ¶ 6, 131 P.3d 369, 373 (Wyo. 2006)).

DISCUSSION

[¶8] Wyoming has a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2013). Montana has a three-year statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204 (2014). The 

question presented by this appeal is whether Wyoming’s borrowing statute makes 

Montana’s shorter statute of limitations applicable to Sister’s action, or whether 

Wyoming’s longer statute of limitations applies. We conclude that the district court 

correctly ruled that pursuant to Wyoming’s borrowing statute, Montana’s three-year 

statute of limitations was the applicable statute.

[¶9] Wyoming’s borrowing statute provides that “[i]f by the laws of the state or 

country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state.” 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (LexisNexis 2013). The borrowing statute was a legislative

effort to eliminate the confusion created by choice of law determinations that depended 

on whether a limitation period was classified as substantive or procedural:

At common law, the limitation period of the forum 

jurisdiction, the lex fori, generally controlled the time within 

which causes of action had to be pursued, regardless of the 

fact that the cause itself in all its elements may have accrued 

outside the forum jurisdiction. Only when the limitation of 

action statute of the foreign jurisdiction in which the cause 

arose could be deemed substantive law rather than procedural 

would the foreign statute be applied by the forum court. 

Parish v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 1975, 395 Mich. 271, 235 

N.W.2d 570; Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 161 (1962); 

Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws; 

Borrowing Statutes, 32 Rocky Mtn.L.Rev. 287 (1960). In 

order to avoid the confusion and problems associated with 

attempting to determine when a foreign limitation of action 
4

statute was substantive or procedural, a majority of states, 

including Wyoming, enacted what are referred to as 

“borrowing” statutes. Section 1-3-117, W.S.1977, which we 

find to be controlling in this regard, is simple and clear:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of 

action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this 

state.”

Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341-42 (Wyo. 1979) (footnote omitted).

[¶10] The “bottom line purpose” of Wyoming’s borrowing statute is to bar a suit “if the 

right to sue had already expired in another jurisdiction where the crucial combination of 

circumstances giving the right to sue had taken place, the existence of which affords a 

party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.” Duke, 589 P.2d at 342-43 (citing 

Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 1343, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1947)). We have 

explained:

The limitation of action statute of the foreign 

jurisdiction in which the cause in question arose is applied by 

the forum court irregardless (sic) of whether or not the 

foreign limitation could be characterized as substantive or 

procedural. Thus, in almost all instances, if a plaintiff’s cause 

of action is time-barred in the jurisdiction in which the cause 

of action arose, it would be barred by the passage of time in 

the forum court as well. Such a rule not only clears up any 

substantive procedural conflict problem, but eliminates as 

well the possibility of the plaintiff shopping for a favorable 

forum in which to revive a dead claim.

Duke, 589 P.2d at 344.

[¶11] The district court concluded that because the vehicle accident and Sister’s injuries 

occurred in Montana, her cause of action arose in Montana. The court thus ruled that, in 

accordance with Wyoming’s borrowing statute, Montana’s three-year statute of 

limitations applied and barred Sister’s cause of action. Sister does not dispute that if 

Montana’s three-year statute of limitations applies, then her action was not timely filed. 

Sister instead contends that Montana’s three-year statute of limitations should not apply, 

offering two arguments to support her position. First, Sister contends that when a 

Wyoming court applies Montana’s statute of limitations, it must also apply Montana’s 

choice of law statutes, and those choice of law statutes in turn dictate that it is 

Wyoming’s statute of limitations, not Montana’s, that must be applied. Alternatively, 

Sister urges this Court to revise its test for determining where a cause of action arises for 

purposes of the borrowing statute, and based on that revised analysis, hold that Sister’s 
5

cause of action arose in Wyoming, making the borrowing statute and Montana’s threeyear statute of limitations inapplicable. We will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Application of Montana’s Choice of Law Statutes

[¶12] Wyoming’s borrowing statute operates by “fixing the statute of limitations of this 

state to be the same as that of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose.” Duke, 

589 P.2d at 342; see also BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. v. Texaco Exploration and 

Prod., Inc., 1 P.3d 1253, 1256 (Wyo. 2000) (under Wyoming’s borrowing statute, 

resolution of statute of limitations question controlled by determination of where cause of 

action arose). In determining where the cause of action arose, we look to the substantive 

law where the wrong occurred:

It is thoroughly established as a general rule that the lex loci

delicti, or the law of the place where the tort or wrong has 

been committed, is the law that governs and is to be applied 

with respect to the substantive phases of torts or the actions 

therefor, and determines the question of whether or not an act 

or omission gives rise to a right of action or civil liability for 

tort.

Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 894 (Wyo. 1995) 

(quoting Ball v. Ball, 269 P.2d 302, 304 (Wyo. 1954)); see also Duke, 589 P.2d at 342; 

Tolman v. Stryker Corp., 926 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1258 (D. Wyo. 2013).

[¶13] Because the vehicle accident occurred in Montana, we look to Montana law to 

determine when and where the cause of action arose. Under Montana law, “a cause of 

action grounded in negligence accrues when the negligent act or omission occurs.” 

Bekkedahl v. McKittrick, 2002 MT 250, ¶ 20, 58 P. 3d 175, 179 (Mont. 2002). Here, the 

alleged negligent act was Brother’s operation of the vehicle resulting in the accident, all 

of which occurred in Montana. Thus, the cause of action arose in Montana. See also

Beedie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713, 716 (Mont. 1980) (holding that statute of limitations for 

negligence cause of action began running on date of vehicle accident).

[¶14] Sister acknowledges for purposes of her first argument that under Montana law the 

cause of action did indeed arise in Montana. Sister contends, however, that this does not 

resolve the matter because a further step must be taken when a foreign jurisdiction’s 

statute of limitations is applied under Wyoming’s borrowing statute. Sister argues that 

when a Wyoming court applies a foreign jurisdiction’s statute of limitations pursuant to 

Wyoming’s borrowing statute, that Wyoming court must also consider and apply the 

foreign jurisdiction’s applicable choice of law statutes or case law. Sister asserts that 

when that step is taken and Montana’s choice of law statutes are consulted, the result is a 

referral under Montana law back to Wyoming’s statute of limitations. Specifically, Sister 
6

argues that under these circumstances, where two Wyoming residents are involved in a 

vehicle accident in Montana and an action is thereafter filed in Wyoming, Montana’s 

applicable choice of law statutes direct that Wyoming’s statute of limitations be applied.

[¶15] It is true that when a foreign jurisdiction’s statute of limitations is applied pursuant 

to Wyoming’s borrowing statute, that statute must be applied with its surrounding 

framework of statutes and case law:

But when such [limitational] statute is so borrowed, it is 

not wrenched bodily out of its own setting, but taken 

along with it are the court decisions of its own state 

which interpret and apply it, and the companion statutes 

which limit and restrict its operation. This we think is 

the general law. (Bracketed material added, footnote 

omitted.)

Thus, in applying a “borrowed” statute, we must consider not 

only the borrowed limitation of action statute itself, but also 

any applicable tolling or other statutes as well as pertinent 

court cases. In effect, plaintiff’s cause must be viewed as if 

filed in the state where under the laws of that state a cause of 

action accrued.

Duke, 589 P.2d at 345 (quoting Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Mo. App. 1958)) 

(footnote omitted).

[¶16] We do not agree, however, that this reference to the statute of limitations and its 

surrounding framework requires that we apply the foreign jurisdiction’s choice of law 

statutes or case law. Instead, we will adhere to the majority rule, which is captured as 

follows:

The general view is that where a question comes 

before a court which, according to the law of the forum as to 

conflict of laws, is to be determined by the law of another 

jurisdiction, the question is determined by the law of such 

other jurisdiction applicable to the precise question; the law 

of such other jurisdiction as to conflict of laws is not taken 

into consideration.

The “renvoi doctrine” provides that when the forum 

court’s choice-of-law-rules would apply the substantive law 

of a foreign jurisdiction to the case before the forum court, 

the forum court may apply the whole body of the foreign 
7

jurisdiction’s substantive law including the foreign 

jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules. The doctrine of renvoi has 

been repudiated by many American authorities on the basis 

that it is likely to result in the court’s pursuing a course 

equivalent to a never-ending circle. Additionally, it has even 

been referred to as “the dreaded renvoi doctrine.” It has been 

claimed, however, that the precise limits of the applicability 

of the renvoi principle are as yet undefined and that, at least 

under some circumstances, the courts of the forum in 

referring to the law of another state or country should look at 

the “whole law” of such other state or country, including its 

conflict of laws rules.

16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 6 (2014) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); see 

also James P. George, Stephanie K. Marshall, Lisa A. Goodman, Conflict of Laws, 65 

SMU L. Rev. 391, 422, n.106 (2012) (“Although commentators defend the limited use of 

renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of acceptance in the United States except in 

limited circumstances, usually found in statutes directing the use of renvoi.”); Hobbs v. 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 195 F.Supp. 56, 63 (N.D. Ind. 1961) (Kentucky auto 

accident case in which court rejected renvoi doctrine when applying Indiana’s borrowing 

statute and observed that renvoi “is not a part of the law of the United States”).

[¶17] Wyoming’s borrowing statute is itself a choice of law statute. As this Court 

explained in Duke in rejecting application of a conflicts analysis to the statute of 

limitations question in that case, “Any conflict has been erased by the legislature by 

enactment of the ‘borrowing’ statute fixing the statute of limitations of this state to be the 

same as that of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose.” Duke, 589 P.2d at 

342. Were we to apply not only Montana’s statute of limitations but also its choice of 

law principles, we would undermine the very choice of law made by Wyoming’s 

legislature. Moreover, application of Montana’s choice of law statutes would result in 

precisely the type of circular reasoning that has led to a majority rejection of the renvoi 

doctrine. If we were to apply Montana’s choice of law statutes, those statutes would refer 

us back to Wyoming’s law governing the statute of limitations, which presumably would 

include Wyoming’s borrowing statute, which would refer us again to Montana law, and 

so on in a continuous looping fashion. For these reasons, we hold that when applying a 

foreign jurisdiction’s statute of limitations pursuant to Wyoming’s borrowing statute, a 

Wyoming court should not also consider or apply that foreign jurisdiction’s choice of law 

statutes or case law.

B. Application of Interest Analysis to Determine Where Action Arose

[¶18] Sister has made two arguments on appeal. In Sister’s first argument, which we 

addressed above, Sister accepted the premise that her cause of action arose in Montana 
8

and that Wyoming’s borrowing statute required application of Montana’s statute of 

limitations. In other words, Sister worked from the premise that Montana’s statute of 

limitations applies, but in applying the Montana limitations statute, she contended that 

Montana’s choice of law statutes were also implicated and mandated a loop back to make 

the Wyoming statute of limitations controlling. Perhaps anticipating this Court’s 

rejection of that argument, as we did above, Sister offers a second argument, which she

presents in the alternative.

 

[¶19] In Sister’s second argument, Sister changes course and contends that Wyoming’s 

borrowing statute should not apply at all because her cause of action arose in Wyoming, 

not in Montana. To reach this end, Sister asks this Court to abandon its established test 

for determining where a cause of action arose and instead adopt an interest analysis to 

make that determination. Specifically, Sister invites this Court to adopt the interest 

analysis defined by the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, which Sister argues 

would require that the determination of where a cause of action arose be based on which 

state has the more significant interest in applying its statute of limitations. We conclude 

that Sister’s proffered interest analysis is essentially a misplaced conflict of laws analysis, 

and we therefore decline her invitation.

[¶20] This Court has described the Second Restatement approach to a conflicts question 

as follows:

The Second Restatement method is constructed around 

the principle that the state with the most significant contacts 

to an issue provides the law governing that issue. See

[Ingersoll v. Klein,] 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d [593] at 594-95

[Ill.1970]. A court therefore conducts a separate choice-oflaw analysis for each issue in a case, attempting to determine 

which state has the most significant contacts with that issue. 

International Adm’rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 

753 F.2d 1373, 1376 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985). The Second 

Restatement enumerates specific factors that identify the state 

with the most significant contacts to an issue, and the relevant 

factors differ according to the area of substantive law 

governing the issue and according to the nature of the issue 

itself. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) at §§ 6, 145, 188. To 

properly apply the Second Restatement method, a court must 

begin its choice-of-law analysis with a characterization of the 

issue at hand in terms of substantive law. Id. at § 7. By 

prescribing this analytical approach, the Second Restatement 

follows the principle of depecage, which has been long 

applied in connection with various methods for choice of law. 
9

See Willis L.M. Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon 

in Choice of Law, 73 Colum. L.Rev. 58 (1973).

Act I, LLC v. Davis, 2002 WY 183, ¶ 10, 60 P.3d 145, 149 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Ruiz v. 

Blentech Corporation, 89 F.3d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1996)).

[¶21] We also observed in that same case, however, that before this Court or any court 

may engage in a conflict of laws analysis of an issue, there must first be a conflict to 

address.

When parties dispute the applicable law, there must be an 

actual conflict between the laws or interests of Wyoming and 

the laws or interests of another state. In the absence of a 

conflict, there is no need for the court to engage in a conflict 

of laws analysis.

Act I, ¶ 10, 60 P.3d at 149.

[¶22] Certainly there is a conflict between Wyoming’s four-year statute of limitations 

and Montana’s three-year statute of limitations. Sister’s argument in favor of adopting 

the Second Restatement analysis is not, however, directed at that conflict, because, of 

course, Wyoming’s borrowing statute has resolved the conflict by choosing the statute of 

limitations of the state where the cause of action arose. Sister’s argument instead 

proposes using a Second Restatement interest analysis to address the discrete issue of 

where the cause of action arose. In so advocating, Sister is doing precisely what this 

Court cautioned against in Act I—arguing for a conflicts analysis where no conflict 

exists.

[¶23] In asking this Court to engage in a Second Restatement analysis of Wyoming’s 

and Montana’s competing interests in determining where the cause of action arose for 

purposes of applying Wyoming’s borrowing statute, Sister presumes that a conflict exists 

between the laws of Wyoming and Montana on this question. In fact, no such conflict 

exists. As discussed above, under Montana law, a cause of action for negligence arises 

when and where that negligence takes place. The law is virtually the same in Wyoming. 

Under Wyoming law, a “cause of action accrues when the forces wrongfully put in 

motion by the defendant produce injury.” Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 930 

(Wyo. 2000) (citing Duke, 589 P.2d at 343)).

[¶24] The negligent operation of the vehicle alleged by Sister occurred in its entirety in 

Montana; the accident occurred in Montana; and Sister’s injuries occurred in Montana. 

Under either Wyoming or Montana law, Sister’s cause of action arose in Montana. We 

thus have no conflict of laws on the question of where Sister’s cause of action arose and 

no need to resort to the Second Restatement interest analysis to resolve a conflict on that 
10

issue. Because the cause of action arose in Montana, Wyoming’s borrowing statute made 

Montana’s three-year statute of limitation the governing statute, and the district court 

correctly applied that limitations period in barring Sister's action.

CONCLUSION

[¶25] The district court correctly rejected application of Montana’s choice-of-law 

statutes in applying Wyoming’s borrowing statute, correctly determined that Sister’s 

cause of action arose in Montana, and correctly applied Montana’s three-year statute of 

limitations to bar Sister’s cause of action. Affirmed.