1

Filed 9/25/15 Diana S. v. Super. Ct. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DIANA S.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY 

AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondent;

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY, ET AL.,

Real Parties in Interest.

 A144879

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. JD143247)

This is a petition for an extraordinary writ, as authorized by rule 8.452 of the 

California Rules of Court. The petitioner is Diana S., a mother who seeks to have 

overturned the order of respondent Superior Court setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 366.261at which her parental rights may be terminated with 

respect to her infant son. She contends substantial evidence does not support the findings 

made by respondent court that (1) real party in interest San Francisco Human Services 

Agency (Agency) provided adequate reunification services, and (2) there was a 

substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety and well being if he was restored to 

petitioner’s custody. We conclude both contentions are without merit, deny the petition 

on the merits, and dissolve the stay previously issued.

 

1

 Statutory references are to this Code.
2

BACKGROUND

The points and authorities supporting the petition, and the Agency’s response 

thereto, establish that both parties are thoroughly conversant with the record. Most of the 

salient events and details are not controverted. There is consequently no need to reiterate 

them all here. The following narrative is tailored to the issues presented for decision, and 

viewed most favorably to the order being challenged. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 

773.)

The relevant timeframe begins when petitioner and the very young Jeremiah* were 

living with petitioner’s aged and infirm mother. After attacking her mother, and forcing 

her out of her own home, petitioner was found wandering the street with Jeremiah. The 

Agency took Jeremiah into custody, while petitioner underwent a psychiatric examination 

under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5150). The mother told police that petitioner 

was “bipolar and violent when she is off her medication.” Jeremiah was detained and 

placed with his paternal grandmother. After petitioner threatened Jeremiah’s presumed 

father and attacked the paternal grandmother, counsel for Jeremiah secured a restraining 

order directing petitioner to stay away from Jeremiah, his father, and the paternal 

grandmother.2Petitioner’s mother had her own restraining order against petitioner. (See 

fn. 4, post.)

At the unreported combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held in August 

2014, petitioner submitted to the four allegations of the Agency’s amended dependency 

petition, as recited on the Judicial Council JV-190 form “on the basis of the social 

worker’s . . . report . . . and other documents.”3 Three of the four allegations concerned 

 

*

[Jeremiah was almost eight months old. (CT 1, 3)]

2

 The father was involved in the dependency, but he is not a party to this proceeding.

3

 “[I]t is not uncommon in dependency proceedings for a parent to ‘submit’ on a social 

services report. [Citations.] By submitting on a particular report or record, the parent 

agrees to the court’s consideration of such information as the only evidence in the matter. 

Under such circumstances, the court will not consider any other evidence in deciding 

whether the allegations are true. [Citation.] [¶] Notwithstanding a submittal on a 

particular record, the court must nevertheless weigh evidence, make appropriate 

evidentiary findings and apply relevant law to determine whether the case has been 
3

failings and conduct by petitioner.

4

 Jeremiah was declared a dependent child, and his 

care and custody entrusted to the Agency for placement with a relative. The minutes 

recite that “Reunification requirements attached as to both parents.” The attachment for 

petitioner stated:

“[T]o be considered for reunification, the mother . . . must complete the following 

service plan:

 

proved. [Citation.] In other words, the parent acquiesces as to the state of the evidence 

yet preserves the right to challenge it as insufficient to support a particular legal 

conclusion. [Citation.] Thus, the parent does not waive for appellate purposes his or her 

right to challenge the propriety of the court’s orders.” (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 

Cal.App.4th 580, 588-589.) “Only when a parent submits on a social worker’s 

recommendation does he or she forfeit the right to contest the juvenile court’s decision if 

it coincides with that recommendation.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 136; 

accord, Rosa S. v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1186-1187.)

4

 The three allegations read in relevant part:

 “The mother has mental health issues and is not receiving treatment; as a result on 

07/08/2014, San Francisco Police Department transported the mother to psychiatric 

emergency services at San Francisco General Hospital for a 72 hour mental health 

detention and there was no appropriate care providers available to provide care for the 

infant which places the infant at risk of harm and/or neglect.”

 “The mother is unable to provide proper care, shelter, and supervision for the child. 

On 07/08/2014, an emergency protective order was issued . . . protecting the infant’s 

maternal grandmother who was the infant’s prior childcare provider . . . against the 

mother. The mother was residing with the maternal grandmother however the mother is 

currently homeless which places the infant at risk for harm and/or neglect.”

 “The minor is at risk of harm in that on July 16, 2014, . . . the mother attacked paternal 

grandmother (PGM). While PGM had the minor in a stroller, the mother lunged at PGM 

to grab the minor. PGM had to duck in order to avoid the minor getting hit by mother. 

Mother was screaming and yelling, and as a result the minor cried uncontrollably for an 

hour and a half. The mother continues to harass father and PGM, making false reports to 

C.P.S. [Child Protective Services] and the police . . . . As a result of mother’s threatening 

and harassing behavior, a temporary restraining order was issued on July 17, 2014 

protecting minor, PGM, and . . . father from the mother. The mother is continuing to 

violate the TRO by sending PGM harassing text messages, making baseless referrals to 

C.P.S., and going to the PGM’s home.”

 The fourth allegation was “The father has failed to protect the child from abuse and 

neglect from the mother. The father has mental health issues and is unable to provide for 

the child.”
4

“1. That the mother remains under the care of a qualified mental health 

professional and complies with the mental health professional’s recommendations for 

psychotherapy and/or prescribed medication.

“2. That the mother undergo a psychological evaluation and follow any 

recommended treatment. The evaluation should address:

“a) The mother’s ability to adequately protect and parent the child. 

“b) Recommendations for therapy and/or medication.

“3. That the mother successfully completes a parenting education program 

focusing on parenting skill building for a first time parent.

“4. That the mother complies with appropriate restraining orders.

“5. That the mother obtains and/or maintains suitable housing for herself and the 

child for a reasonable period of time prior to reunification. The parent’s responsibility 

will be to locate and apply for housing. The responsibility of the [Agency] will be to 

provide housing referrals when needed.

“6. That the mother visits the child on a regular basis prior to reunification and 

maintains other contact and involvement, as arranged by the Child Welfare Worker.” 

Two weeks later, the father renewed the restraining order protecting him, his 

mother, and Jeremiah from petitioner. The order was good for five years. 

Three months later, long before the six-month review hearing was set to be heard, 

petitioner moved “the court to terminate its jurisdiction” and order immediate 

reunification with Jeremiah. The court summarily denied the motion as not in the 

minor’s best interest.

The six-month review hearing was eventually held over the course of three days in 

March 2015. On the first and second days, the court heard testimony from the two 

caseworkers who had handled petitioner’s case. The initial caseworker, who handled the 

case for only 11 days, testified about how she was assaulted by petitioner. Petitioner 

followed it up with “several text messages saying, ‘F’ CPS and ‘F’ you. I hate you and 

welfare trash . . . I hope you rot in hell. You need to take responsibility. It’s your fault.” 

The case worker reported the incident to police. Petitioner had previously made 
5

disparaging remarks about the paternal grandmother. She denied having any mental 

problem (“There’s nothing wrong with me”). And she made a not so veiled threat that 

was heard by the case worker (“I could kill you and get away with it. [It’s] one of the 

perks of having a mental health diagnosis”). Petitioner did not want referrals for services, 

and told the caseworker she did not want visits with Jeremiah. As a result of the assault, 

a new caseworker was assigned, something rarely done by the Agency. 

The replacement caseworker, Allan Cohen, had prepared the Status Review Report

and the Addendum Report, both of which were received into evidence at the start of the 

hearing. The gist of those reports, and Mr. Cohen’s testimony, may be summarized as 

follows:

Petitioner initially refused to participate with her case plan, and refused to meet 

with Cohen because “she felt I was against reunifying her with her son.” There was some 

subsequent involvement, but it was ineffectual. Cohen testified that petitioner’s attitude 

was “very uncooperative,” and her compliance with the case plan was “minimal.” 

Petitioner met with Cohen only once, at the end of December 2014, “when she realized 

that that the Agency was recommending termination of family reunification and that 

Jeremiah could be adopted . . .” At that meeting, petitioner “made it very clear from the 

outset that she would need services that would fit into her schedule so she would not miss 

any work. She repeatedly remarked that the services are set up for unemployed people on 

welfare.” 

Petitioner had seen a therapist (one recommended by the Agency), who told 

Cohen that there was no “medical necessity” for petitioner to have further treatment.

Cohen did not agree with this conclusion, and he discounted it, because he felt it was 

made as the result of financial considerations. Another professional told Cohen he had 

not seen petitioner “in quite some time.” In December 2014, petitioner told Cohen “not 

to send her any more referrals, which she says she throws away.” In his Addendum 

Report, Cohen informed the court that he “asked Ms. S[.] to request a new therapist 

through her Kaiser Health Care Plan that she is now receiving from her employer. I have 

yet to hear . . . if she has followed through with requesting a therapist.” 
6

Petitioner’s general belief was that she had no mental health issues. As Cohen put 

it in his Status Review Report: “Ms. S[.] denies that she has any mental health problems 

and is adamant that her mental health diagnosis is a mistake and therefore has no impact 

on her son.” In fact, “Ms. S[.]’s psychological assessment does . . . include a diagnosis of 

bi-polar disorder and a personality disorder not otherwise specified with borderline 

features.” When Cohen pointed this out to petitioner (over the phone because petitioner 

“refused to sit down with me”), “she flatly dismissed them as outrageous and she asserted 

that the psychologist who performed the assessment was incompetent.” 

That psychologist also recommended that petitioner “be monitored closely for 

medication compliance,” but Cohen received only one, partial, report, done in December 

2014. Although at the hearing Cohen testified that petitioner “is currently taking 

medication to manage her mental illness, . . . she has repeatedly stated to me that she 

wants to get off of medication and have her diagnosis changed because she says she is not 

mentally ill” and “does not believe she needs the medication.” Cohen believed this 

attitude “is highly typical of someone with no insight with bipolar disorder and . . . highly 

likely that she’s going to have another mental health crisis and . . . to need hospitalization 

again.” 

On the occasions petitioner admitted a problem, she blamed it on her mother. 

Petitioner is estranged from her family. Her mother is still afraid of her, as is the paternal 

grandmother. Petitioner has been “very evasive” about providing confirmation that she 

was taking her prescribed medications. Cohen had such confirmation only starting in 

January 2015, two months before the hearing. Cohen reported in his Status Review 

Report that petitioner “says that she takes her psychotropic medication but initially 

refused to sign a release for me to speak with her mental health case manager and 

psychiatrist. Eventually she did sign releases but it turned out that she had hardly met 

with either provider . . . .” 

Petitioner eventually told Cohen that she had housing, but, as of the hearing, she

had refused to let Cohen inspect it. Before that “she refused to provide her address.” 
7

According to Cohen, petitioner “has exhibited bizarre, inappropriate and difficult 

behavior,” including aggression, “rage, volatility and poor impulse control from the 

outset of the case.” She has no remorse about assaulting the first case worker. She also 

assaulted her husband at a court hearing because “the hearing was for her and [the father] 

and his mother had no right to be present.” Petitioner believed that both assaults were 

justified. Petitioner continues to make groundless allegations against the paternal 

grandmother. “Insulting” and cursing are frequently directed at Cohen and other Agency 

personnel speaking with petitioner. So are “verbally abusive daily phone calls.” “On at 

least two occasions” petitioner told Cohen “that she could kill someone and . . . not go to 

jail because of her mental health diagnosis.” 

There are two restraining orders, but petitioner has violated them “on multiple 

occasions.” Petitioner told Cohen she could violate the orders with impunity “because 

she has a diagnosis, so . . . if the police come, they’re not going to do anything to her.” 

She also told Cohen in effect that she would go on flouting the orders because “there’s a 

higher power, and she’s got a right to see her son.” Petitioner bombards Cohen, and 

other Agency personnel, with text and e-mail messages, and misrepresents to others what 

occurs in conversation with Cohen. On one occasion petitioner telephoned the Agency, 

stated “she was the paternal grandmother and that her grandson was dead, which really 

horrified the staff . . . .” 

Petitioner refused to visit Jeremiah, giving a variety of reasons: “because the two 

visitation sites . . . were in dangerous neighborhoods which would put Jeremiah at risk,” 

“she could not tolerate having anyone supervise her visits,” “having a time limited visit 

and then being separated would be too emotionally difficult for her and Jeremiah.” 

Petitioner agreed to start visitation when she finally met with Cohen. There were only 

three visits when Cohen submitted his Addendum Report on March 6, 2015. One of the 

psychologists who examined petitioner concluded that “all visits with Jeremiah should be 

supervised at all times.” Cohen observed the second visit. Petitioner brought toys for 

Jeremiah, but took them with her when she left. Cohen had the impression that what she 
8

was saying to Jeremiah was “totally inappropriate” and really intended for him. Cohen 

thought Jeremiah “looked a little distressed at his mother’s intensity.” 

The incident that started this dependency “resulted in her [petitioner’s] eighth 

psychiatric hospitalization.” The commitments “occur about twice a year,” most have

lasted two weeks, “which is unusual in mental health” and “speaks to . . . how out of 

control she can be, and so that really concerns me.”

Petitioner did complete a “parent education program,” but Cohen did not believe 

petitioner had benefitted from it. 

Cohen concluded that petitioner “has not gained any insight into her mental health 

issues and this has prevented real safety planning . . . [H]er extremely poor insight 

means that Jeremiah would remain at great risk if he were returned to her care.” The 

recommendations of Cohen and the Agency were that the court end reunification services 

to petitioner, and schedule a permanent plan selection hearing. 

Petitioner submitted a written trial brief in which she argued that (1) “Jeremiah 

must be returned to Ms. S[.] because the Agency failed to show that Jeremiah will suffer 

substantial detriment if returned,” and (2) “the court must order six more months of 

reunification services because there is a substantial probability that Jeremiah may be 

returned to Ms. S[.] by the 12 month review hearing.” 

At the hearing, petitioner’s counsel had the following exchange with Cohen:

“Q. . . . I’d . . . now like to shift and talk a little bit about things that weren’t 

ordered. [¶] So prominent through this case, as you look at it, are concerns about Ms. 

S[.]’s volatility; correct?

“A. Yes. 

“Q. And her impulse control; correct?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And yet there was no recommendation that Ms. S[.] engage in any kind of 

anger management; correct?

“A. Yes. I mean, I guess that’s true. It’s not part of her case plan.” 
9

“Q. My point, Mr. Cohen, is that in a case where volatility and impulse control 

factor so large, was it not considered that service that might be helpful to Ms. S[.] might 

be anger management?

“A. I don’t know that I ever thought of actually sending her to an anger 

management group, and I still wouldn’t consider that for her because I don’t think she 

would cooperate with that kind of group. She would be in there with couples who 

potentially have domestic violence histories.

“She was extremely critical of anyone who was on welfare, had any criminal 

record; so the thought of her—she berated me about everything that I referred her to. 

That parenting was all set up for unemployed welfare recipients, and she shouldn’t have 

to be in there with those people.

“So I would have tried to get her to do anger management with a therapist.

“Q. But you didn’t?

“A. Well, I would actually say yes, I did, because I repeatedly tried to get her to 

go into therapy, and she immediately went in and told them, ‘I don’t have any problems.’ 

“And, you know, that is one of the difficulties with, you know, deep denial about a 

mental health issue is it becomes—it’s not—this isn’t a court-ordered treatment that—

where she’s going to be hospitalized and, you know, forced to sit through therapy. So 

there’s not a whole lot I could do.” 

Petitioner testified that “I have been diagnosed” with “Bipolar I.” She is seeing 

her doctor once a month since December; and “taking my medication as prescribed.” Her 

doctor has twice reduced the dosage of one of those medications. She is employed, has

her own housing (she lives in a room in a house in Contra Costa County with a single 

mother and her son), and visits Jeremiah once a week. “I am ready to take my son home 

and celebrate Palm Sunday this weekend.” 

Petitioner testified on cross-examination that she has not “looked into” what 

“individual therapy services” are available to her through Kaiser. She did not attack her 

mother, or the paternal grandmother, and only “shoved” the first caseworker. The reason 
10

she takes Jeremiah’s toys at the end of a visit is the fear that the paternal grandmother 

will throw them away. 

Petitioner’s testimony was marked by her sparring and splitting hairs when being 

questioned. But the most notable aspect of petitioner’s testimony was her dogged refusal 

to admit that she has anything beyond a mental health “diagnosis,” and even that she 

disagreed with that conclusion. Counsel for Jeremiah was the first to try to elicit such an 

acknowledgement, but gave up after getting nothing but “a nonresponsive answer.”

When the court took over, it too gave up in frustration, stating, “We will have the record 

reflect that the witness is declining to answer.”

Counsel for Jeremiah supported the Agency’s recommendations. To the question 

of whether petitioner has “made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to 

the child’s removal,” he argued “the answer is absolutely zero, no, none whatsoever.” 

After petitioner yelled “not true,” counsel continued that she “sabotaged therapy by selfreporting in her own words that everything is fine . . . .” “[W]hatever meds she’s been 

taking are, have not resolved the issues. They haven’t even helped . . . .” “[A]ny plan 

that the Agency wanted her to engage in was out the window. She would throw the 

envelopes away, she would hang up on the worker, she would yell. This agency has gone 

above and beyond any type of . . . reasonable efforts . . . . I would say it’s incredible 

efforts.” “I believe that given the law and given the facts, the Court has no choice but to 

terminate services because I don’t think the Court can make the findings under 366.21.”

Counsel for the father concurred. 

Petitioner’s counsel made an extensive, and impassioned, argument on her behalf, 

making the points of the trial brief. Yet even he felt compelled to concede that petitioner 

“is a difficult client” and “is confounding in not wanting to engage and the reasons that 

she gives for not wanting to engage.” He faulted the Agency for not responding to the 

psychological evaluation of Dr. Parsons (which is not in the record submitted in support 

of the petition): “On the issue of reasonable services, there was no implementation of the 

recommendations of Amy Parsons, despite the fact that those recommendations were in 

the Agency’s hands on December 17th. Specifically and most significantly is Amy 
11

Parson’s observation that for the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise 

specified, that Ms. S[.] is not amenable to treatment for this, but she will likely be 

responsive to behavioral modification techniques. So that recommendation was not 

addressed in any serious way to specifically tailor a case plan to meet that diagnosis.” 

On the last day of the six-month review hearing, the court stated its decision:

“The Court finds that conditions still exist which would justify [the] initial 

assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or such conditions are likely to exist were 

supervision withdrawn. And that a return of the child to his parents would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. 

And the facts upon which the decision that a return of the child would be detrimental is 

based were set out in some detail in the reports that were received in evidence, as well as 

the testimony that was heard at trial.

“But the Court will summarize it by saying that mother is unable to acknowledge 

her mental health issues. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . and unable to deal with them such that she can 

safely parent her child.

“Similarly, father has mental health issues which he has acknowledged prevent 

him from being able to parent the child safely.

“The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . mother has failed to 

participate regularly in the court-ordered treatment plan, and I cannot on the basis of the 

evidence that was presented to me find that there is a substantial probability of return of 

the child to her in the next six months. And the Court hereby orders reunification 

services terminated.

“The Court finds that the child’s placement is necessary and appropriate.

“That the Agency has complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to 

return the child to a safe home, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize 

the child’s permanent placement.

“And the extent of progress . . . towards alleviating or mitigating the causes 

necessitating placement has been minimal to moderate.
12

“By clear and convincing evidence reasonable services were provided to the 

parents.

“The Court will renew dependency status. The child will remain in the care and 

custody of the [Agency] for placement, planning and supervision.

“The Court approves the continuing placement of the child with the grandparent. 

And the likely permanent plan, which will be determined in a different hearing, will be 

adoption by the grandparent.

“And the Court will set a .26 hearing . . . .” 

REVIEW

The Adequacy Of Services Finding

“The court may not order that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 be held unless 

there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or 

offered to the parent . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.708(m).)

“[W]henever a child is removed from a parent’s . . . custody, the juvenile court 

shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s 

mother . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) “It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the 

importance of reunification in the dependency system. With but few exceptions, 

whenever a minor is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court is required to 

provide services to the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family. 

[Citation.] Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the parent’s circumstances. 

[Citations.] The plan should be specific and internally consistent, with the overall goal of 

resumption of a family relationship. [Citations.] The agency must make reasonable 

efforts to provide suitable services, ‘in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects 

of success.’ [Citation.]” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678.)

“ ‘The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s efforts to 

provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case.’

[Citations.] . . . ‘[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the 

problems . . . maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the 
13

service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance 

proved difficult . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 

996, 1011.) But the reunification services offered have only to be reasonable; perfection 

is not expected or required. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 425; Elijah R. v. 

Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

“In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided 

more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not 

whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but 

whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 

2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The reasonableness of reunification services is to be 

determined in light of all relevant circumstances, which include “the mental condition of 

the parent, her insight into the family’s problems, and her willingness to accept and 

participate in appropriate services.” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)

The reunification process is a collaborative effort. “Reunification services are 

voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan 

R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) “Once a parent has been located, it becomes the 

obligation of the parent to communicate with the [the social services agency] and 

participate in the reunification process.” (In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 

441.) If the parent believes that the reunification services are inadequate or misdirected, 

the parent cannot remain silent about such deficiencies during the reunification period, 

and then complain as the period is about to end, or raise the perceived deficiencies on 

appeal. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services v. Superior Court (1997) 60 

Cal.App.4th 1088, 1092-1093; In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)

“The requirement that reunification services be made available to help a parent 

overcome those problems which led to the dependency . . . is not a requirement that a 

social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or 

counseling sessions. A parent whose children have been adjudged dependents of the 

juvenile court is on notice of the conduct requiring such state intervention. If such a 

parent in no way seeks to correct his or her own behavior or waits until the impetus of an 
14

impending court hearing to attempt to do so, the legislative purpose of providing safe and 

stable environments for children is not served by forcing the juvenile court to go ‘on 

hold’ while the parent makes another stab at compliance.” (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 

Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.)

The juvenile court is required to have clear and convincing evidence when it finds 

that the reunification services offered were adequate, but that finding is reviewed on 

appeal for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re 

Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039.)

 An appellate court conducting an examination for substantial evidence has a very 

constrained scope of operation: “ ‘The issue of sufficiency of the evidence in 

dependency cases is governed by the same rules that apply to other appeals. If there is 

substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those 

findings. [Citation.] We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the 

evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in 

support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, 

and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports 

a contrary conclusion. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or 

order is not supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]’ ” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 

Cal.App.4th 942, 947; see Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 

1346 [regarding a “reasonableness of services” finding].)

The two particulars identified in the petition are that “anger management classes 

were not offered,” and “the Agency never attempted to visit [petitioner] at her house

between December [2014] and March [2015].”

It is not clear whether petitioner means to continue attacking the adequacy of the 

case plan because it made no provision for anger management. If this is her intent, it 

cannot succeed. The time to point out problems with a case plan is when it is proposed, 

and before it is adopted by the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing and, if that 

objection was overruled, to raise the issue by appeal from the dispositional order. She 

made no such objection at the hearing and did not appeal. This court has held that “ ‘A 
15

challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency . . . may not challenge prior 

orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ ” (In re Jesse W. 

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) The issue was therefore not preserved for review.

(V.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 521, 527-528; In re Precious J. (1996) 

42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476.) 

Thus, no argument can be made based on what was in Dr. Parson’s psychological 

evaluation, because it was not developed until after petitioner’s case plan had already 

been adopted. And the Agency cannot be criticized for failing to visit petitioner, when it 

is clear petitioner herself was refusing to provide the Agency with her address. It is even 

more apparent that for an extended period of time petitioner had in essence voluntarily 

and largely withdrawn from the reunification process. Petitioner will not now be heard to 

complain about the adequacy of the services she spurned.

As for what services the Agency did offer, “the record should show that [it]

identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to 

remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parent[] during the 

course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parent[] in areas 

where compliance proved difficult . . . .” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 

414.) This record so shows.

The Detriment Finding

“At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing, the 

court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or 

legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return 

of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child . . . . 

In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker’s 

report and recommendations . . . , and shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, 

demonstrated by the parent or legal guardian and the extent to which he or she availed 

himself or herself to services . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) In order to find a substantial 

probability of return, the court must find the parent regularly visited the child, made 
16

significant progress in resolving the problem prompting removal of the child, and 

demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the case plan and 

provide for the child's safety, protection, and well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1); see Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.710(b).) This finding is also reviewed for substantial evidence. (In 

re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966; James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 

Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020.)

Caseworker Cohen’s characterizations of petitioner’s attitude as “very 

uncooperative,” and her compliance with the case plan as “minimal” (the latter being 

adopted by court), are fully supported by the record. She consistently minimizes the 

harm and damage she causes others while euphemizing what is legitimately attributable 

to her. Four people—including Jeremiah—have sought judicial protection against 

petitioner’s aggressive impulses. The use petitioner made of the reunification services 

offered was spotty, and did not commence until she accepted the imminent likelihood of 

losing Jeremiah. Until that acceptance, petitioner had not paid a single visit to her son. 

This record leaves no doubt that petitioner has not yet conquered the forces that have 

impaired her full enjoyment of life and prevented her from the unsupervised exercise of 

parental responsibilities. In the circumstances, there was ample proof that Jeremiah’s 

safety and well-being could not be assured if he was returned to petitioner’s custody. In 

other words, the detriment finding is supported by substantial evidence.

DISPOSITION

The petition is denied on the merits. This opinion is final forthwith. (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The stay heretofore issued is dissolved.
17

_________________________

Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P. J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.

A144879; Diana S. v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco