Opinion issued August 15, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-17-00689-CV

———————————

DIANE PEREZ AND RICKY PEREZ, Appellants

V.

GREATER HOUSTON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY D/B/A AND/OR 

A/K/A YELLOW CAB COMPANY AND/OR YELLOW CAB, AND 

DELWENDE NIKIEMA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2016-32437

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Diane and Ricky Perez sued appellee Greater Houston 

Transportation Company d/b/a and/or a/k/a Yellow Cab Company and/or Yellow 

Cab (GHTC) for personal injuries Diane suffered in a collision with a cab driver, 
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asserting a cause of action for negligence under respondeat superior and jointenterprise theories. The trial court granted no-evidence summary judgment in favor 

of GHTC and ordered that the Perezes take nothing by their claims against GHTC.

In their sole issue on appeal, the Perezes assert that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of GHTC on their claim for negligence under a 

respondeat superior theory. Because we conclude that the Perezes presented 

evidence raising a fact question on the challenged elements of their claim, we 

reverse and remand.

Background

Delwende Nikiema was driving a taxicab to pick up a passenger when he

collided with Diane Perez’s vehicle. The Perezes allege that Nikiema caused the 

crash after he ran a stop sign while speeding and that Diane sustained injuries as a 

result of the accident. GHTC owned the taxicab, and it held the taxicab’s permit 

issued by the City of Houston. Nikiema leased the taxicab from GHTC through an 

“Independent Contractor License and Vehicle Lease Purchase Option Agreement.”

The Perezes filed a personal injury suit against Nikiema and GHTC.1In their 

suit against GHTC, the Perezes alleged that the company was negligent due to 

inadequate training and policies for its drivers. They also alleged that GHTC was 

 

1 The Perezes nonsuited their claim against Nikiema following the trial court’s 

granting of GHTC’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Nikiema is not a 

party to this appeal.
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liable for Nikiema’s negligence under theories of respondeat superior and joint 

enterprise, among others. 

GHTC filed a no-evidence and a traditional motion for summary judgment. 

In relevant part, it contended that the Perezes had no evidence to support their 

claim that GHTC was vicariously liable for Diane’s injury under a theory of 

respondeat superior or joint-enterprise liability. GHTC asserted that Nikiema was 

not an employee of GHTC and that he was not acting within the course and scope 

of his “alleged” employment with GHTC at the time of the accident. GHTC’s

summary-judgment evidence included, among other documents, the independent 

contractor and vehicle lease agreement between Nikiema and GHTC and the 

affidavit of Ed Kargbo, the Director of Marketing and Driver Services for GHTC.

2

The agreement between GHTC and Nikiema stated that it was an 

“Independent Contractor License and Vehicle Purchase Option Agreement.” It 

granted Nikiema a license to operate GHTC’s taxicab, obligating Nikiema to pay a 

set weekly fee to lease the taxicab and the specialized taxicab equipment installed 

in it. The agreement also established an independent-contractor relationship 

between GHTC and Nikiema. The agreement stated that GHTC “does not have the 

right to control the details of how [Nikiema] will acquire and transport Passengers 

 

2 Also included were Nikiema’s City of Houston taxi license issued August 6, 2013, 

and records indicating that GHTC pulled Nikiema’s driving records on August 1, 

2013, December 16, 2013, and March 24, 2014. 
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under this Agreement, and that [GHTC] gives no instructions as to how, when, 

where, or even if the Licensee utilizes the Goods and Services or operates the 

Taxicab.” Nikiema received his revenue from passengers. GHTC provided 

Nikiema with specified amounts of indemnification liability coverage, and it 

recommended he obtain additional insurance coverage. Under the terms of the 

agreement, GHTC was not obligated to provide driver training, but the agreement 

did provide, “Before [GHTC] is willing to execute this Agreement, [Nikiema] is 

encouraged to complete the Business Orientation Program provided by [GHTC.]”

Under the agreement, Nikiema also granted GHTC the right to sell advertising on 

and in the taxicab and the right to collect all revenue from such advertisements, 

and in exchange he received a weekly lease rebate.

Kargbo’s affidavit likewise stated that: Nikiema was an independent 

contractor; GHTC did not have the right to control the details of Nikiema’s work

or the right to control Nikiema in any manner; GHTC provided a computerized 

dispatch system, but Nikiema was not required to use it, and if he did use it, he was 

not required to accept the fare. Kargbo averred that the City of Houston passed 

ordinances that controlled Nikiema’s performance of his duties as a taxicab 

operator, and GHTC did not control his work beyond what it was required to do 

under City ordinances.
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The Perezes responded to GHTC’s motion for summary judgment and 

asserted that the agreement relied upon by GHTC was “a mere sham or subterfuge 

designed to conceal the true legal status of the parties” and that extrinsic evidence 

provided “more than a scintilla of evidence” that GHTC had an actual right to 

control Nikiema. In support of its argument, they offered the depositions of 

Nikiema and Kargbo.

During his deposition, Nikiema testified that he entered into the independent 

contractor agreement with GHTC, but he was not provided with a copy of the 

contract to review before signing the agreement, and he was not given time to 

review its terms. GHTC instructed him where to sign or initial the contract and 

where not to. He considered GHTC to be his employer. 

Nikiema testified that, as part of his agreement with GHTC, he paid a set 

weekly fee to lease the taxicab, and he had an option to purchase the vehicle at the 

end of the agreement. The taxicab was outfitted with specialized equipment,

including a credit-card swiper, stool light, taxi meter, GPS system, and dispatch 

system. The equipment belonged to GHTC, and GHTC was responsible for the 

maintenance of the equipment, as well as maintenance and repairs on the vehicle. 

Nikiema testified that he was responsible for gas, tolls, any traffic tickets, and the 

cost of oil and transmission changes. 
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Nikiema further testified that, before contacting GHTC, he did not have a 

taxi license, nor did he have any experience driving a taxicab or operating any 

specialized equipment for taxicabs. He attended a course with GHTC over several 

days in which he received training on how to operate the specialized taxicab 

equipment. GHTC instructed him on how to deal with passengers, identified safety 

precautions to follow while driving, and provided him with study materials to 

prepare for the taxi license exam. Kargbo also testified during his deposition that 

Nikiema completed GHTC’s business orientation program and a defensive driving

course at GHTC. 

In his deposition, Nikiema indicated that, although he was not required to 

use GHTC’s dispatch system, he obtained all, or 99%, of his fares through the 

company’s dispatch system, and he had no customers of his own. GHTC 

monitored the location of its vehicles, and it would send information about 

potential fares to drivers based on the driver’s proximity to the passenger pick-up

location. Nikiema acknowledged that he was free to accept or reject any potential 

fares generated through the GHTC dispatch system, but he understood that he was 

expected to accept fares and that it was his “duty” to do so. He stated that GHTC 

had penalized him on numerous occasions for rejecting fares. If he rejected a fare 

for an “important customer,” or if there were no other available vehicles in the 

area, GHTC dispatch would call his mobile phone and order him to accept the fare. 
7

When he rejected fares under those circumstances, the vehicle’s computer system 

would be shut down and the stool light would deactivate. Nikiema testified that he 

determined his own shifts, but if the taximeter was off for two or three hours 

during the shift, GHTC would give him “downtime.”

Nikiema testified in his deposition that he generally was entitled to keep all 

cash payments and all credit card payments, minus a processing fee, that he 

received from passengers. He was required to provide receipts to customers, and 

the receipts were branded with GHTC company information. When he accepted a 

METROLift account fare, however, he did not receive any payment from the 

passenger. Instead he would complete the trip and provide the ride information to 

GHTC, which would then pay him directly. 

At the time the accident with Diane Perez occurred, Nikiema was on his way 

to pick up a METROLift account passenger who he had accepted through the 

GHTC dispatch system. He testified that he contacted GHTC dispatch immediately 

after the accident “seeking advice,” as he had been trained by GHTC to do. GHTC 

contacted the police. Nikiema’s testimony also established that he was prohibited 

from working for anyone but GHTC; GHTC had instructed Nikiema to take the 

shortest route to pick up and to drop off passengers; and this route was provided to 

him by the GPS device installed in the taxicab.
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The trial court granted GHTC’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, 

but it did not rule on GHTC’s traditional motion for summary judgment.

Analysis

On appeal, the Perezes argue in their sole issue that the trial court erred in 

granting GHTC’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment because they 

presented evidence raising a fact question on GHTC’s liability for negligence 

based on their respondeat superior claim. They assert that they presented 

“substantial evidence” that GHTC had the right of control of Nikiema’s work and 

that the accident occurred in the course and scope of his employment with GHTC, 

making the company vicariously liable for his negligence. 

A. Standard of Review

After an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move for

summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential 

elements of a claim or defense on which the nonmovant would have the burden of 

proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The motion must state the elements as to 

which there is no evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The reviewing court must grant 

the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary-judgment evidence raising a 

genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 

572, 582 (Tex. 2006). If the nonmovant produces evidence “that would enable 
9

reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions,” a genuine issue of 

material fact exists. See Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).

A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a directed 

verdict granted before trial. Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 581–82. We apply the 

same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as 

we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. See id. at 582. Accordingly, we review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every 

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence 

Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Evidence that favors 

the movant’s position will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. Great Am. 

Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 

1965).

B. No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Respondeat Superior

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously 

liable for the negligence of its employee who was acting within the scope of his 

employment, even though the employer has not personally committed a wrong. St. 

Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 541–42 (Tex. 2002); Wilson v. Davis, 305 

S.W.3d 57, 66–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). An entity that 

hires an independent contractor, however, is generally not vicariously liable for the 
10

negligence of the independent contractor. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 

969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998).

1. Right of Control

Whether Nikiema is an employee or an independent contractor of GHTC 

turns on the question of GHTC’s right to control Nikiema’s work. Whether one is 

an independent contractor or an employee is measured by the amount of control the 

employer exerts, or has the right to exert, over the details of the work performed.

Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tex. 1964).

When, as here, a contract establishes an independent-contractor relationship 

and does not grant control over the details of the work to the principal, evidence 

outside the contract must be produced to show that despite the contract terms, the 

true operating agreement vested the right of control in the principal. Id. at 592;

Farrell v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 908 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Absent extrinsic evidence indicating that the contract 

was a subterfuge or sham, that the hiring party exercised control in a manner 

inconsistent with the contract provisions, or that the contract has been modified by 

a subsequent express or implied agreement, the contract is determinative on the 

nature of the parties’ relationship. Love, 380 S.W.2d at 592; Weidner v. Sanchez, 

14 S.W.3d 353, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Evidence of 

“[s]poradic action directing the details of the work” or an “occasional assertion of 
11

control” is not sufficient to override the contract. Farrell, 908 S.W.2d at 3. The 

assumption of an exercise of control must be “so persistent and the acquiescence 

therein so pronounced as to raise an inference that at the time of the act or 

omission giving rise to liability, the parties by implied consent and acquiescence 

had agreed that the principal might have the right to control the details of the 

work.” Love, 380 S.W.2d at 592. 

Courts measure the right to control by considering factors such as: (1) the 

independent nature of the worker’s business; (2) the worker’s obligation to furnish 

necessary tools, supplies, and materials to perform the job; (3) the worker’s right to 

control the progress of the work except as to final results; (4) the time for which 

the worker is employed; and (5) the method of payment, whether by unit of time or 

by the job. Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 

(Tex. 2002); INA of Tex. v. Torres, 808 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). It is not required that all five factors be present to make a 

finding on the right to control. Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co. of R.I., 789 

S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1990); see McClure v. Greater San Antonio Transp. Co., 

SA-08-CA-112-FB, 2009 WL 10670178, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009). That a 

“person is normally an independent contractor does not preclude a finding of 

agency as to the particular transaction at issue.” Weidner, 14 S.W.3d at 373–74.
12

The Perezes argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 

favor of GHTC on the theory of respondeat superior because they presented 

“overwhelming” summary judgment evidence that, despite the terms of the 

agreement between GHTC and Nikiema, GHTC nevertheless exercised a level of 

control over Nikiema that indicated he was an employee rather than an 

independent contractor. They argued that this extrinsic evidence was sufficient to 

create a fact issue on their respondeat superior claim.

Examining the summary-judgment evidence on GHTC’s right to control 

Nikiema’s work, and hence his status as an independent contractor or employee, 

we agree with the Perezes that they produced evidence raising a genuine issue of 

material fact on their respondeat superior claim.

The first measure of the right to control, the independent nature of the 

worker’s business, relates to who has the right to control the details and methods of

the work. White v. DR & PA Deliverance, Ltd., No. 01-12-00227-CV, 2014 WL 

767218, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2014, no pet.) (citing 

Limestone, 71 S.W.3d at 312, and Wolff, 94 S.W.3d at 542). Uncontroverted 

summary-judgment evidence established that Nikiema generally controlled the 

days and hours he worked. However, in contradiction to the terms of the agreement

and GHTC’s assertions that Nikiema was not required to accept any fare if he 

chose to use their dispatch system, Nikiema testified that his dispatch system was
13

shut off when he refused certain rides, and he was given “downtime” when his 

taximeter was inactive for two or three hours during his shift. The Perezes also 

point to Nikiema’s deposition testimony indicating that he did not have his own 

customers and that he relied entirely or almost entirely on GHTC’s dispatch system 

for fares. 

As to the second factor, the worker’s obligation to furnish necessary tools, 

supplies, and materials to perform the job, the summary-judgment evidence

established that GHTC owned the taxicab, including all of the specialized 

equipment installed in it, and Nikiema paid GHTC to lease these items. See, e.g.,

Tirres v. El Paso Sand Products, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 672, 674, 676 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 1991, writ denied) (worker’s agreement to use equipment furnished by 

principal was not evidence of right to control); see also White, 2014 WL 767218, 

at *6 (although employer provided worker some materials, worker was obligated to 

pay for the materials, which supported conclusion he was independent contractor). 

Although the contract indicated that training was not included as part of the 

agreement, Nikiema testified GHTC trained him on how to operate the specialized 

taxicab equipment. It also instructed him on certain procedures and safety 

precautions and provided him with study materials to prepare for the taxi license 

exam. 
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Regarding the right to control the progress of Nikiema’s work except as to 

final results, the Perezes contend that the evidence shows that GHTC, not Nikiema, 

controlled the progress of his work. They point to evidence that GHTC had control 

over the advertising and promotion of the cab operation, but the summaryjudgment evidence established that Nikiema sold advertising rights of the cab to 

GHTC. Nikiema also testified in his deposition that GHTC had instructed him to 

take the shortest route to pick up and to drop off passengers and this route was 

provided to him by the GPS device that GHTC owned and had installed in the 

taxicab.

The Perezes also presented some evidence regarding the time that Nikiema 

was employed by GHTC. Perez testified that he considered GHTC his employer. 

Nikiema further testified that, before working for GHTC, he did not have a taxi 

license, nor did he have any experience driving a taxicab or operating any 

specialized equipment for taxicabs. He attended a training course with GHTC on 

how to operate the specialized taxicab equipment, and GHTC instructed him on 

how to deal with passengers, identified safety precautions to follow while driving, 

and provided him with study materials to prepare for the taxi license exam. Kargbo 

also testified during his deposition that Nikiema completed GHTC’s business 

orientation program and a defensive driving course at GHTC. The evidence also 

established that Nikema first entered into an agreement with GHTC approximately 
15

eleven months before the accident and that, at the time of the accident, the parties 

had entered into an agreement that would expire at the end of one year but could be 

cancelled at any time.

Finally, regarding the method of payment, it is undisputed that Nikiema was

paid by the job, and for typical fares he was paid directly by his customers. 

However, Nikiema testified that he did not receive payment from customers for 

METRO Lift account fares, such as the one he had taken at the time of the accident 

in this case. According to his deposition testimony, he received compensation for 

these fares from GHTC directly. See Weidner, 14 S.W.3d at 374–75 (holding that 

fact that “[a] person is normally an independent contractor does not preclude a 

finding of agency as to the particular transaction at issue”).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Perezes, as we must, 

we conclude that they raised a material fact issue on their respondeat superior 

claim. Although GHTC presented evidence of the agreement between itself and 

Nikiema that expressly stated that Nikiema was an independent contractor, the 

Perezes presented evidence outside the contract from which a factfinder could 

determine that the true operating agreement vested the right of control in GHTC. 

See Love, 380 S.W.2d at 592, Farrell, 908 S.W.2d at 3. The evidence produced by 

the Perezes—namely, Nikiema’s deposition testimony—constitutes some evidence 

that GHTC exercised control over Nikiema in a manner inconsistent with the 
16

agreement’s provisions or that the agreement had been modified by a subsequent 

implied agreement. See Love, 380 S.W.2d at 592, Weidner, 14 S.W.3d at 373.

GHTC asserts that its contract provided that Nikiema was an independent 

contractor and that the summary-judgment evidence presented by the Perezes 

failed to establish that GHTC took any actions beyond those required for 

compliance with ordinances of the City of Houston. GHTC argues that the facts of 

this case are akin to those presented to this court in Farrell, 908 S.W.2d 1. In 

Farrell, this court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a cab company and 

held, as a matter of law, that a cab driver was an independent contractor. 

Like Nikiema, the cab driver in Farrell had entered into an independentcontractor agreement with the cab company, Yellow Cab. Id. at 3. The summaryjudgment evidence in that case established that: Yellow Cab provided a 

computerized dispatch system, but the driver was not required to use it, or to 

accept any fares if he did; the driver paid a fee to operate to Yellow Cab to be 

licensed under its cab operating permit and to use its radio and dispatch system; 

and the driver’s total compensation came from payments by customers. Id. The 

summary-judgment evidence in Farrell also established that: Yellow Cab did not 

monitor how, where, or when the driver worked, and it did not know where or if he 

was operating his taxicab; the driver determined the route he took when delivering 

a customer; although the title to the cab listed Yellow Cab, the driver was listed as 
17

the vehicle’s “beneficial owner” and stated that the driver could have title assigned 

to him if the cab left the Yellow Cab fleet; the driver was responsible for all 

maintenance expenses on the cab; and the driver was covered under Yellow Cab’s 

self-insurance certificate. Id. at 3–4.

Farrell, therefore, is distinguishable in several key ways. Here, GHTC 

presented evidence that it provided a dispatch system, but Nikiema was not 

required to use it. Nikiema presented contradictory testimony, asserting that he got 

all, or nearly all, of his fares through the dispatch system and that, despite the 

terms of the agreement, he was pressured by GHTC to take fares under certain 

circumstances. Nikiema also testified that, contrary to the terms of the agreement, 

GHTC required him to take the shortest routes when picking up and dropping off 

fares and that the route was set by the GPS device owned by GHTC and installed 

in the taxicab. He also testified that GHTC was aware of when his meter was 

running and would give him “downtime” when his taximeter was off for two or 

three hours during his shift. There is a further key difference between this case and 

Farrell in relation to the nature of Nikiema’s business and GHTC’s right to control

his work. In Farrell, uncontradicted evidence showed that the driver controlled 

how, when, where, and if he worked. 908 S.W.2d at 4. Here, by contrast, 

Nikiema’s testimony is some evidence that GHTC penalized him for rejecting fares 
18

or for periods of inactivity during a shift. Although GHTC denies this activity, we 

conclude that this evidence raises a material question of fact on the right to control. 

GHTC correctly notes that at least some of its supervision and direction of 

Nikiema’s work was required for it to comply with City ordinances. See HOU.

ORD. §§ 46-11(c) (requiring permittees of vehicles equipped with GPS to “collect, 

maintain, and provide to the director . . . all real-time tracking information . . . 

including . . . GPS location data, and whether or not the licensee is engaged with a 

passenger”); 46-18 (permittee required to submit written lease contract, certificate 

of title, and self-insurance); 46-114 (requiring driver to take the shortest route). 

The evidence nevertheless raises a fact question regarding whether GHTC’s 

control over Nikiema’s work rendered him an employee rather than an independent 

contractor. In addition to the evidence of things GHTC did to comply with City 

ordinances, there is at least some evidence that GHTC provided training and study 

materials to Nikiema and penalized him for rejecting fares or remaining idle during 

his shifts. Nikiema relied almost exclusively on GHTC’s dispatch system at the 

time of the accident and, when he struck Diane’s vehicle, he was on his way to 

pick up a METRO Lift fare for which he would be compensated directly by 

GHTC. See McClure, 2009 WL 10670178, at *15.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Perezes, and 

construing all reasonable inferences and resolving any doubts in their favor, we 
19

conclude that they produced evidence that would enable reasonable and fairminded factfinders to conclude that GHTC exercised a right to control Nikiema’s 

work such that he was an employee of GHTC at the time of the accident, and not 

an independent contractor. Thus, the trial court erred in granting GHTC’s noevidence motion for summary judgment on this element of their respondeat 

superior claim.

2. Course and scope of employment

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must establish not 

only that the negligent party was an employee but also that the employee was 

acting within the scope of his employment. See Wolff, 94 S.W.3d at 541–42. To 

establish that a party was acting within the scope of his employment, a plaintiff 

must show only that the act was: (1) within the general authority given to the 

employee; (2) in furtherance of the employer’s business; and (3) for the 

accomplishment of the object for which the employee was employed. Leadon v. 

Kimbrough Bros. Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972); Drooker v. 

Saeilo Motors, 756 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ 

denied). 

It is uncontroverted that at the time of the accident, Nikiema was driving a 

taxicab owned by and permitted to GHTC. It is also uncontroverted that he was on

his way to pick up a passenger for a METRO Lift account fare that he had received 
20

and accepted through the GHTC dispatch system. Nikiema was following the route 

provided by GHTC’s GPS device that it had installed in the taxicab, and, if he had 

completed the trip, GHTC would have been responsible for compensating him for 

the fare. Accordingly, the Perezes’ summary-judgment evidence raises a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether Nikiema was operating the taxicab within the 

course and scope of his alleged employment with GHTC at the time of the 

accident. 

We conclude that the Perezes produced summary-judgment evidence raising 

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether GHTC actually exercised control 

over Nikiema’s work at the time of the accident, such that he was acting as an 

employee and not an independent contractor, and whether Nikiema was acting 

within the scope of that alleged employment at the time of the accident. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting GHTC’s no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment on the Perezes’ repondeat superior claim.

We sustain the Perezes’ sole issue on appeal.
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Conclusion

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial 

court for further proceedings. 

Richard Hightower

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Goodman, and Hightower.