ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

 

 Kelly A. Loy 

 Andrew A. Kobe 

 Deputy Attorneys General 

 Indianapolis, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court _________________________________ 

No. 82S00-1610-LW-576 

CARLTEZ TAYLOR, 

Appellant (Defendant),

v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

Appellee (Plaintiff). 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, No. 82C01-1512-MR-7498 

The Honorable David D. Kiely, Judge 

The Honorable Michael J. Cox, Magistrate 

_________________________________ 

On Direct Appeal 

_________________________________ 

December 5, 2017 

Rush, Chief Justice. 

Seventeen-year-old Carltez Taylor was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit 

murder, and sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”). He appeals his convictions, arguing that 

the State’s references to his nickname “Looney the Shooter” led to fundamental error, that the 

State untimely amended the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and that insufficient evidence 

supports his conspiracy to commit murder conviction. He also argues that his LWOP sentence is 
2

inappropriate, violates the United States and Indiana Constitutions’ proportionality requirements, 

and violates the Sixth Amendment because a jury never found a qualifying aggravator beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We reject his first three arguments, revise his sentence from LWOP to an 

aggregate eighty-year term, and decline to address his other challenges to LWOP. 

Facts and Procedural History 

On the night after Thanksgiving in 2015, seventeen-year-old Carltez Taylor went with a 

friend to hang out at D.G.’s house. D.G. and one of her friends—both teenage girls—were home 

on weekend passes from a juvenile detention center. D.G. knew Taylor as “Looney,” and 

introduced him that way to her mother, Lyn. Uncomfortable with Taylor and his friend, Lyn 

ordered the boys to leave. They went outside and smoked cigarettes, but soon snuck back into the 

house and to the basement. 

Later that night, another teenage boy arrived, bringing a 9mm Hi-Point handgun. He 

handed it to one of the other boys, who removed the magazine and handed the gun to Taylor. 

Taylor then put the magazine back in the gun and stuck the Hi-Point into his waistband. 

As the night wore on, D.G. texted J.W. (a recent fling) about hanging out and having sex. 

When Taylor found out, he called J.W. a “b****” and said he “wasn’t s*** [and] wasn’t about 

nothing.” The three boys plotted about “b ing him” or “punking him out,” which D.G. 

described as fighting someone who does not want to fight. 

The rhetoric escalated. Taylor threatened to beat up D.G. unless she got J.W. to come over. 

Afraid, D.G. began enticing J.W.—who was suspicious, repeatedly asking if it was a setup. But 

after D.G. lied that she was alone, J.W. ultimately agreed to meet her at the corner near her house. 

J.W. and his nephew, T.S., met her there shortly thereafter. 

D.G. asked J.W. and T.S. if they were “strapped” (had guns on them)—they did not. Then, 

D.G. kept them waiting at the corner for about ten minutes, supposedly for her “sister.” But instead 

of a friend, a figure wearing black emerged from between two houses, with a hood snugly tied 

around his face. Seeing him, J.W. and T.S. walked the other way. 

As the hooded person approached, D.G. recognized him as Taylor and watched him pull 

out the 9mm Hi-Point. When shots started flying—five or six in total—J.W. and T.S. took off 
3

running. They ran toward an alley, but when T.S. got there, he realized that J.W. was no longer 

with him. He returned to the street and found J.W. lying on the sidewalk, shot in the back. 

T.S. then watched the shooter run past, recognizing him as Carltez Taylor, an acquaintance 

he knew from playing basketball. As Taylor ran by J.W., he said “CTK b** **.” J.W. and his 

friends were known as the “cream team,” and “CTK” means “cream team killer.” Within minutes, 

J.W. died on the sidewalk from a single gunshot wound to the back. 

Before learning J.W.’s fate, D.G. and Taylor ran back to her house. As they arrived, Taylor 

grabbed D.G., put the still-hot gun to her head, and told her that if she said anything he would kill 

her. They returned to D.G.’s basement, where Taylor asked D.G. if he hit J.W. She told him that 

he did. 

Taylor then removed his hoodie and texted a friend to pray for him. He and the other 

teenage boys hid the gun and magazine in separate parts of the basement’s ceiling and made a 

large hole in the wall to hide inside. 

The next day, T.S.’s family told police that Taylor was the shooter, and D.G. led detectives 

to the hoodie and the murder weapon. After DNA from the hoodie matched Taylor—leading to a 

warrant for his arrest—he turned himself in to police. Months later, when D.G. saw Taylor at 

juvenile court, he called her “the police” and said he “should have killed [her] when he had the 

chance.” 

The State charged Taylor with murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit 

murder. The State filed a sentencing enhancement for all three offenses based on Taylor’s use of 

a firearm, and sought LWOP based on the “committing murder by lying in wait” aggravator. 

Just two days before trial, the State amended the conspiracy count to say that another 

teenager, not Taylor, supplied the handgun. Taylor objected that the amendment was untimely, but 

was overruled. 

Taylor also asked the trial court to prevent the State’s witnesses from using his nickname 

“Looney the Shooter” because of its undue prejudice. The court preliminarily agreed, but offered 

to reconsider at trial. During trial, Taylor did not object when a detective referred to him as 

“Looney the Shooter,” nor when the State used the nickname in its closing argument. 
4

The jury found Taylor guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and not guilty 

of attempted murder. It also found him eligible for an enhanced sentence for using a firearm. 

At sentencing, the jury was specifically directed to consider Taylor’s age as a mitigating 

factor. Ultimately, the jury recommended a sentence of life without parole. The court accepted the 

recommendation, sentencing Taylor to LWOP on the murder conviction plus fifteen years for the 

firearm enhancement, and to a concurrent thirty-five-year sentence on the conspiracy to commit 

murder conviction. It then merged the enhancement and concurrent sentence into LWOP. 

Taylor now directly appeals both his convictions and his sentence to this Court, raising six 

issues. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a). 

Discussion and Decision 

I. The State’s References to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” Did Not Lead to 

Fundamental Error. 

Taylor first argues that his trial was unfair because a State’s witness said that Taylor’s 

nickname was “Looney the Shooter” and because the State used that nickname to argue that he 

shot J.W. Taylor didn’t object to either one of these uses at trial, so he argues fundamental error. 

The State responds that fundamental error review doesn’t apply because Taylor may have decided 

not to object for strategic reasons. 

The State is right that we will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when 

appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 

670, 678–79 (Ind. 2013). But that did not happen here. Taylor did not agree to the State’s use of 

his “Looney the Shooter” nickname; he simply said nothing. Without evidence that this silence 

was strategic, we review for fundamental error. See id. at 679; Hitch v. State, 51 N.E.3d 216, 219 

(Ind. 2016). 

To prove fundamental error, Taylor must “show that the trial court should have raised the 

issue sua sponte due to a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, undeniable harm or 

potential for harm, and prejudice that makes a fair trial impossible.” Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 

137, 140 (Ind. 2017). 

Before trial, Taylor asked the trial court to bar the State’s witnesses from calling him 

“Looney the Shooter.” He acknowledged that “Looney” was relevant to his identity, but argued 
5

that “Looney the Shooter” was too prejudicial. The trial court granted Taylor’s request. 

Nonetheless, at trial the State asked its lead detective what Taylor’s nickname was, and he told the 

jury “Looney the Shooter.” 

The State then used the nickname during closing argument. It argued that “Carltez Taylor 

began firing bullets at [J.W.] and [T.S.]. . . . Carltez Taylor refers to himself as Looney the Shooter, 

that is for your consideration.” And later: “Is it reasonable to believe that someone who identifies 

themselves as Looney the Shooter would even let someone pull the trigger[?]” 

These references to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” were improper. True, calling him 

simply “Looney” was appropriate to prove Taylor’s identity—D.G. knew him only as “Looney,” 

that’s how she introduced him to her mother, and Taylor had “Looney” tattooed on his forearm. 

See McAbee v. State, 770 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ind. 2002). But “Looney” sufficed for that purpose, 

so adding “the Shooter” merely ratcheted up the prejudice. See id. (questioning the admissibility 

of nicknames that carry an “implication of wrongdoing”). Then, the State used the nickname in 

closing to argue that Taylor acted in accordance with his “unsavory or lawless character or 

reputation”—a prohibited use under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(a)(1). See id. 

But despite their impropriety, the State’s references to Taylor as “Looney the Shooter” did 

not lead to fundamental error. Of the State’s eighteen witnesses, only one included “the Shooter” 

in Taylor’s nickname. The State did bring up “Looney the Shooter” four times in its closing 

argument, but avoided the “repeated reliance” that could lead to fundamental error. Rosales v. 

State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 16 (Ind. 2015) (finding fundamental error after the State repeatedly relied on 

an inaccurate statement of law). 

Plus, the other evidence against Taylor was strong, minimizing the danger that the jury 

found him guilty based on his nickname. The only two witnesses to the murder identified Taylor 

as the shooter; he was closely tied to the murder weapon and the clothes the shooter wore; and he 

made incriminating threats afterwards. This compelling evidence militates against fundamental 

error. See Blaize v. State, 51 N.E.3d 97, 102–03 (Ind. 2016). 

The strong evidence against Taylor, considered as a whole, also undercuts Taylor’s reliance 

on Oldham, where the Court of Appeals found fundamental error when the State used business 

cards and a novelty photograph “to paint Oldham as a dangerous criminal.” Oldham v. State, 779 

N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. As the court noted in Oldham, evidentiary 
6

errors like these are not fundamental error “when there is overwhelming evidence of the 

defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 1173. 

Again, eliciting Taylor’s “Looney the Shooter” nickname violated the trial court’s order in 

limine, and the State’s closing argument was inappropriate under Evidence Rule 404. But these 

uses did not create undeniable harm or potential for harm, or make a fair trial impossible. Harris, 

76 N.E.3d at 140. We thus see no fundamental error arising from the State’s references to Taylor 

as “Looney the Shooter.” 

II. The State’s Amendment to Taylor’s Conspiracy Charge Was Not Untimely. 

Taylor’s second contention is that the State violated Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5 (2014) 

by amending the conspiracy to commit murder charge just two days before trial. Specifically, the 

State amended one of its twelve alleged overt acts to say that another teenager, instead of Taylor, 

supplied the handgun used to murder J.W. Taylor argues that because this amendment was 

substantive, the State had to make it at least thirty days before the omnibus date. The State responds 

that the amendment was formal rather than substantive and was permissible because it did not 

prejudice Taylor’s substantial rights. We agree with the State.

Our recent precedent shows that this amendment was a matter of form, not of substance. 

In Erkins v. State, we held that simply amending which conspirator performed an overt act was a 

formal amendment, because any conspirator’s overt act satisfies the element. 13 N.E.3d 400, 406 

(Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2); see also Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 

(Ind. 2007) (“[A]n amendment is of substance only if it is essential to making a valid charge of the 

crime.”). And that is exactly what happened here: the amendment’s only change was alleging that 

a co-conspirator, instead of Taylor himself, brought the gun. 

Since the amendment was one of form, the trial court could allow it as long as it did “not 

prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.” I.C. § 35-34-1-5(c). These substantial rights 

“include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge.” Erkins, 

13 N.E.3d at 405. “Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity 

to prepare for and defend against the charges.” Id. at 405–06. 
7

We see no indication that the amendment threatened Taylor’s substantial rights. While the 

State offered the amendment only two days before trial, Taylor needed little notice because the 

amendment merely alleged that another teenager instead of Taylor supplied the handgun. 

Nor did the amendment prejudice Taylor’s defense. The State alleged twelve separate overt 

acts and had to prove only one beyond a reasonable doubt; it’s unsurprising that Taylor declined 

to contest the overt act element at trial. Instead, he challenged identity, arguing that someone else 

pulled the trigger—a defense the amendment didn’t hurt, and perhaps even helped. See Roush v. 

State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Notably, Taylor has not explained on appeal what 

he would have done with more time or how this amendment hindered his defense. See Ramon v. 

State, 888 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

In sum, because the amendment was neither untimely nor prejudicial, it was not error for 

the trial court to allow it. 

III. Sufficient Evidence Supports Taylor’s Conspiracy to Commit Murder Conviction. 

Taylor next contends that the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Our standard of 

review is deferential to the factfinder: “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness 

credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). We will reverse only if no reasonable 

factfinder could find Taylor guilty. See id. 

The State’s burden was to prove that Taylor, with the intent to commit murder, agreed with 

another person to commit murder and that Taylor or an accomplice performed an overt act in 

furtherance of the agreement. I.C. § 35-41-5-2 (2014); Russell v. State, 743 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 

2001). A formal agreement to kill J.W. is not required; circumstantial evidence implying such an 

agreement is enough. Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 2000). 

Here, ample circumstantial evidence implied a conspiracy to murder J.W. When D.G. 

started texting J.W., Taylor and the other boys spoke of “b****ing him” or “punking him out.” 

They also told D.G. to persuade J.W. to come over or else she would get beat up instead. This 

threat came shortly after the boys passed around a handgun, with Taylor loading the gun and 
8

tucking it into his waistband. These facts show the seriousness of the situation, allowing the jury 

to infer that Taylor conspired with the other boys to murder J.W. 

The jury also could have inferred that Taylor and D.G. agreed to murder J.W. When Taylor 

wanted D.G. to get J.W. to come over, D.G. didn’t merely ask J.W. to drop by. Instead, she 

practically begged him to come, lying that she was alone and enticing him with offers of sex. When 

J.W. finally agreed and they met, D.G. immediately asked whether he and T.S. had guns. After 

finding out they did not, she kept them waiting in the open street for ten minutes, ostensibly waiting 

for her “sister.” Taylor took that opportunity—created by D.G. at his behest—to emerge from an 

alley between two houses and gun down J.W. 

The teenagers’ actions after the shooting further support an agreement to murder J.W. See 

Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 397 (Ind. 1999) (upholding a conspiracy to commit murder 

conviction in part because the defendant helped dispose of the murder weapon). After shooting 

J.W., Taylor ran back to D.G.’s house, and D.G. followed only steps behind. Taylor rejoined the 

other boys in the basement while D.G. threw off the police by describing the shooter as the “exact 

opposite” of Taylor. Together, the boys then hid the Hi-Point and its magazine in the basement’s 

ceiling tiles and ripped out drywall so they could hide in the wall. 

This circumstantial evidence is enough to show an agreement to murder J.W. See Bonds 

v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ind. 1999); Isom v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1074, 1075 (Ind. 1986). 

And it is more than in Seketa v. State, where the Court of Appeals reversed a conspiracy to commit 

aggravated battery conviction because the most that could be inferred was “an agreement to 

humiliate [the victim] or even to rough him up a little.” 817 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

Sufficient evidence thus supports Taylor’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. 

IV. We Revise Taylor’s LWOP Sentence to the Maximum Term of Years for Murder. 

Fourth, Taylor argues that his LWOP sentence is inappropriate and should thus be reduced 

to a term of years. 

Under Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution, we “have, in all appeals of criminal 

cases, the power to . . . review and revise the sentence imposed.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Wilkes v. 

State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 693 (Ind. 2009). We have implemented this power through Appellate Rule 
9

7(B), which allows us to revise sentences that are “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” See Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 215 (Ind. 2016). 

Our “principal role” under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven outliers.” Id. We thus reserve our 7(B) 

authority for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015), and have 

revised sentences only six times in the last five years. See Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633, 635 

(Ind. 2017); Eckelbarger v. State, 51 N.E.3d 169, 170 (Ind. 2016); Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 

555–56 (Ind. 2014); Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 659 (Ind. 2014); Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 

8 (Ind. 2014); Kucholick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 351, 351–52 (Ind. 2012). 

While we apply our power under Rule 7(B) sparingly, we may revise sentences “when 

certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 947 (Ind. 2014). Sentence 

appropriateness thus turns on “myriad . . . factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). We begin this analysis with “substantial deference to 

the trial court’s sentence,” then “independently examine” the defendant’s offenses and character. 

Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). 

Taylor’s LWOP sentence was lawful. During the sentencing phase, the State argued only 

one aggravating circumstance—that Taylor committed the murder by lying in wait. See Ind. Code 

§ 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Supp. 2015). Taylor argued, and the State admitted, that his young age was a

mitigating circumstance. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(7). The jury found that the State had proven the 

lying-in-wait aggravator and recommended LWOP, and the trial court accepted that 

recommendation.

But “[e]ven where a trial court has not abused its discretion in sentencing, the Indiana 

Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court’s sentencing 

decision.” Eckelbarger, 51 N.E.3d at 170. This includes sentences where—as here—“the trial court 

has been meticulous.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079–80 (Ind. 2006). Ultimately, our 

constitutional authority to review and revise sentences “boils down to [our] ‘collective sense of 

what is appropriate.’” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225).

LWOP is the harshest punishment the Constitution permits against any child. See Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition 

of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were 

committed.”). It’s a denial of hope, a killer of behavior and character improvement, and a 
10

guarantee—regardless of future potential—of a death behind bars. See Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8. As 

such, it “is reserved for use in only the most heinous of crimes that so shock our conscience as a 

community.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 880 (Ind. 2012). 

Indeed, only four other juveniles in the State of Indiana have ever received such a sentence. 

Id. at 880 nn.6–8 (collecting cases). One of those juveniles, Daniel Boyd, never appealed his 

sentence. Id. at 880 n.6. Two more, Larry Newton and Gregory Dickens, never challenged the 

appropriateness of their sentences under Rule 7(B). See Newton v. State, 894 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. 

2008); Newton v. State, 83 N.E.3d 726, 744 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Dickens v. State, 754 

N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2001); Dickens v. State, 997 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We 

have thus upheld the appropriateness of LWOP for a juvenile only once. Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 

880. With this background in mind, we consider Taylor’s offenses and character. 

For the nature of the offenses, Taylor recognizes that his crimes were tragic and senseless 

but argues that they were not the most heinous of offenses. For his character, Taylor admits that 

he has a juvenile record and relies primarily on his youth as a mitigating factor. The State responds 

by pointing to Taylor’s planning, manipulation, murder of a defenseless victim, and lack of 

repentance. We agree with the parties that Taylor’s crimes were both senseless and heinous. He 

lay in wait and murdered another juvenile by shooting him in the back as he ran away. 

Still, we consider many factors in weighing 7(B) revisions. “[M]ost significantly” here, 

Taylor was only seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. See Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6. As this 

Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, “children are different.” Id. (quoting 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)). “[J]uveniles are less culpable than adults and 

therefore are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Id. at 7 (citing Graham v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 

Three reasons bear this out. First, as compared to adults, children lack maturity and have 

“an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). Second, they are 

more vulnerable to negative influences and pressures—including peer pressure—and thus lack 

control over and the ability to escape from crime-producing environments. Id. And third, their 

character is less developed than that of adults, so their actions are less likely to show “irretrievable 

depravity.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). 
11

We see these factors’ influence on Taylor. He knew every part on a car and had moves on 

the basketball court, but he was still growing up and trying to find his identity. As he fell out of 

church, he fell in with bad influences—other juveniles who, as already explained, were heavily 

involved in J.W.’s murder. Taylor also grew up fatherless, “lacking the all-important direction” a 

father provides. See Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 383–84, 254 N.E.2d 319, 324 (1970). And the 

neighborhood he’d always known as home had changed, with rising gang activity and alcohol and 

drug abuse. 

Taylor’s life story certainly does not absolve him of responsibility for his heinous and 

senseless crimes. But LWOP “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 

8 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 473); see also Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18 (“The penal 

code shall be founded on the principles of reformation . . . .”). It takes away from Taylor the 

opportunity to emulate his adopted uncle Chavis Jefferson, who described himself at seventeen as 

the good Dr. Jekyll around his parents but the evil Mr. Hyde around his friends. Mr. Jefferson was 

incarcerated at a young age, but has since “straightened up,” becoming a productive member of 

society for over forty years. 

Along with Taylor’s offenses and character, we consider our caselaw in line with our 

principal role of leavening outliers. See Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 2010). While we 

have been clear that LWOP sentences are not always inappropriate for juveniles, see Conley, 972 

N.E.2d at 876–77, we also have “not been hesitant to reduce maximum sentences for juveniles 

convicted of murder,” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 7–8 (collecting cases). 

In Fuller and Brown, two juvenile codefendants received 150-year sentences for a double 

murder. Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 655; Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 3. We unanimously revised fifteen-year-old 

Fuller’s sentence to eighty-five years and sixteen-year-old Brown’s sentence to eighty years 

because, while their crimes were “senseless and reprehensible,” no evidence showed “that the 

victims were tortured, beaten, or lingered in pain.” Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Brown, 10 

N.E.3d at 5). And “most significantly,” we considered their ages, as “[s]entencing considerations 

for youthful offenders—particularly for juveniles—are not coextensive with those for adults.” Id. 

(quoting Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 6); see also Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. 1999) 

(reducing a sixty-year sentence for murder to fifty years because of the defendant’s “very youthful 

age”); Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Ind. 1995) (reducing a sixteen-year-old’s double-
12

murder sentence from 120 to eighty years); Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind. 1995) 

(reducing seventeen-year-old’s felony murder sentence from sixty to fifty years). 

Compare these cases with Conley, where we did not reduce Conley’s LWOP sentence after 

he murdered his ten-year-old brother with his bare hands. Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 869–70, 880. 

Rather than “nearly instantaneous death by a bullet,” Conley committed “a drawn out crime” of 

“unimaginable horror and brutality.” Id. at 876. 

Revising sentences by placing crimes “along a spectrum of heinous to horrific in no way 

diminishes the seriousness of any particular offense or the suffering of any particular victim.” 

Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. 2011). But it does uphold important distinctions by 

reserving the harshest punishments for the most heinous crimes, see id.; Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 

190, 204 (Ind. 2014)—as shown by the exceptional rarity of LWOP sentences for Indiana children, 

see Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 880 nn.6–8. 

Our collective judgment is that Taylor’s character and the nature of his offense—grievous 

as it was—do not warrant making him Indiana’s fifth juvenile sentenced to a guaranteed death in 

prison. Instead, we revise his sentence to an aggregate eighty years: sixty-five years—the 

maximum term of years—for murder, plus a fifteen-year enhancement for using a firearm. See I.C. 

§§ 35-50-2-3, -11. We leave intact Taylor’s concurrent thirty-five-year conspiracy to commit 

murder sentence.1

Conclusion 

 We affirm Taylor’s convictions and remand to the trial court to enter a sentencing order 

consistent with this opinion. 

David and Goff, JJ., concur. 

Slaughter, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins. 

 

1

 Because of this revision, we do not address Taylor’s final two arguments: that his LWOP sentence was 

constitutionally disproportionate and that the jury failed to make required special findings supporting 

LWOP. 
Slaughter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to reduce Taylor’s sentence from life 

without parole to a term of years. There can be no doubt that reducing Taylor’s sentence is within 

the Court’s power. But sometimes the better use of power is to withhold its exercise. I would affirm 

Taylor’s LWOP sentence because he does not satisfy our longstanding test for granting relief under 

Appellate Rule 7(B), which looks to both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. 

On this record, Taylor fails both prongs.

Taylor’s offense was the lying-in-wait murder of another seventeen-year-old, J.W., whom 

Taylor gunned down by shooting him in the back as the victim tried to run away. It was, as the 

Court observed, a “tragic and senseless” crime. But it was more than that. It was also a depraved 

and heinous crime, perpetrated against an unarmed and vulnerable juvenile who was lured into a 

death trap, where Taylor ambushed him. His crime reflects an utter disregard for human life. Had 

it been an adult, and not Taylor, who shot J.W. in the back as he ran away, we would have no 

occasion to find the offender deserving of a more lenient sentence; indeed, the adult offender would 

be eligible for the death penalty. 

Nor, despite Taylor’s age when he murdered J.W.—seventeen years, nine months, sixteen

days—is Taylor entitled to 7(B) relief under the character-of-the-offender prong. Taylor had a 

significant juvenile history that, as the State says, “escalated in violence” over time. He was 

adjudicated a delinquent for criminal trespass; for battery resulting in bodily injury; and for theft 

of a firearm, dangerous possession of a firearm, and carrying a handgun without a license. Taylor 

was sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction and placed at a juvenile boot camp. He 

was released from the boot camp in November 2015, only weeks before killing J.W. later that 

month. Moments after killing J.W., Taylor threatened D.G. by pointing a gun at her head and 

telling her that she would face the same fate if she squealed: “bitch[,] if you say anything I’ll kill 

you.” Later, after Taylor had been implicated, arrested, and was being held on J.W.’s murder, 

Taylor encountered D.G. at the same juvenile facility where they were both being detained. He 

told D.G. he should have killed her when he had the chance. Taylor’s communicated threats and 

“regrets” to D.G. are not the words of a remorseful, repentant offender with a redeeming character 

deserving of judicial mercy.
2

After hearing all the evidence, including evidence of Taylor’s age and upbringing, the jury 

unanimously recommended life without parole. The trial court then imposed that sentence, see I.C. 

35-50-2-9(e)(2), and made findings amply supported by the record underscoring why Taylor is 

undeserving of 7(B) relief today, including:

• Taylor’s “true nature ... reflects irreparable corruption.”

• His “criminal history and his behavior before, during and after he shot the 

victim, is [sic] indicative of one who lacks conscious [sic], who is 

unrepentant and who, if given another opportunity, would do exactly the 

same thing to another unwary victim.”

Although I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the LWOP issue, I am not 

unsympathetic to its concern with leaving intact a sentence that guarantees an offender will die in 

prison for acts committed as a juvenile. But Taylor is only the fifth juvenile in state history to 

receive an LWOP sentence. The infrequency with which these sentences are given to minors

suggests that both prosecutors and juries take their responsibilities seriously and proceed 

cautiously before seeking and recommending what for juveniles is the ultimate punishment. As 

the Court notes, we upheld an LWOP sentence in Conley v. State, a case we described as involving 

“‘a drawn out crime’ of ‘unimaginable horror and brutality.’” 972 N.E.2d at 876. I agree with that 

characterization. But I disagree that Conley set a floor below which any juvenile whose offense is 

thought to be any less monstrous will obtain 7(B) relief. That is the trend and, I fear, the implication 

of today’s decision. As the Court recognizes, the point of Rule 7(B) is to “leaven outliers”, not to 

achieve some perceived correct sentence, whatever that means. Four other juvenile-LWOP 

sentences are an insufficiently small sample size from which to draw any meaningful conclusions 

about which juvenile-murder sentences are outliers and which are in the mainstream.

The Court acknowledges that Taylor’s LWOP sentence was “lawful”, and that our 7(B) 

review of a sentence “boils down to [our] ‘collective sense of what is appropriate.’” I would affirm 

Taylor’s LWOP sentence both because it was lawful and because I prefer the jury’s “collective 

sense of what [sentence] is appropriate” to our own. From the Court’s decision to reduce Taylor’s 

sentence to a term of years, I respectfully dissent.

Massa, J., concurs.