08- 5368- cv

K uck v. D anahe r

1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF APPEAL S 2 F OR THE S ECO ND C IR C U IT 3

_____________________ 4 5 August Term, 2009 6 7 (Argued: September 17, 2009 Decided: M arch 23, 2010) 8 9 Do ck et N o. 08 -53 68 -cv 10 11

_____________________ 12 13 M. P ETE R K UCK , individual ly and on behalf of others si milarly situat ed, 14 15 Plaintif f-Appellant , 16 17 — v .— 18 19 J OHN A. D ANA HER III, C OM MI SS I ONER , CT S TATE D EPT . OF P UBLI C S AFET Y , A LBERT J. M ASEK , 20 J R ., C OMMANDI NG O FF I CER , CT S TATE D EPT . OF P UBLI C S AFET Y , 21 22 De fen da nts -A

pp ellees . 23 24 25 Be fo re: S TR AUB , B.D. P ARKER , AND L I VI NGS TO N , Ci rcu it J ud ges . 26 27

___________________ 28 29 Ap pe llant c ha lle ng ed , o n d ue pro ces s g rou

nd s, the fi rea

rm pe rm it r en ew al p roc ed

ure s em plo ye d 30 by the ConnecticutDepartment of Public Safety and the Board of Firearms Perm it Examiners. 31 The United States DistrictCourt for the Distr ict of Connecticut(Bryant, J. ) dismissed the 32 complaint. Se eFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Affirmed in part, vacated and r emanded in part. 33

___________________ 34 35 Rachel M. Baird, Law Office of Rachel M. Baird, 36 Torrington, CT, for Plainti ff-Appellant M. Pete r 37 Ku ck

. 38 39 Clare E. Kindall, Assi stant Attorney General, for 40 Ri ch ard Bl um entha l, S tat e o f C onne cti cut A tto rne y 41 General, Hartford, CT, for De fen da nts -A

pp ellees 42 John A. Danaher III, et al

. 43

________________________________________________________________________ 44K uck’s com pl ai nt nam es as def endants J oh n A

. D anaher I I I , D P S C om m i ss i on er , i n his of f i ci al 1 a nd i ndi vi dua l c a pa c i t i e s , a nd A l be r t J

. M a s e k, J r . , D PS C om m a ndi ng O f f i c e r , i n hi s of

f i c i a l a nd in d iv id u al ca p ac it ies. T h e p ro p o se d am en d ed co m p lain t an d m o ti o n to jo in see k to a d d : G o v ern o r M

. Jodi R el l , i n her i nd i vi du al and off i ci al ca paci t i es ; B ar bar a M at t son, D P S D et ect i ve, i n her i nd i vi du al c a p a c ity ; T h o m a s K a ra n d a , D P S D e te c tiv e , in h is in d iv id u a l ca p a c ity ; R o n a ld A . B a stu ra , D P S S e rg e a n t, i n hi s i ndi vi dua l c a pa c i t y; Sus a n M a z z oc c ol i , Exec ut i ve H e a d, C onne c t i c ut St a t e D e pa r t m e nt of A dm i ni s t r a t i ve Ser vi c e s , i n he r i ndi vi dua l a nd of f i c i a l c a pa c i t i e s ; a nd C hr i s t ophe r R

. A da m s , C onne c t i c ut St a t e Boa r d o f

Fi r e a r m s Pe r m i t Exa m i ne r s , i n h i s i nd i vi du a l c a pa c i t y. 2 1 B ARR I NGT ON D. P ARKER , C I RCUI T JUDGE : 2 3 Pl aintif

f- Ap pe llant M . P ete r K

uc k ap pe als fr om

a ju dg m ent of

the Un ite d S tat es D istric t 4 Court for the District of Connecticut ( Bryant, J .) di smissing his complaint. Kuck’s claims arise from 5 his ef

fo rts to r en ewhis perm it to carr y a fi rearm

with the C onne cti cut D ep artm ent of Pu bli c S af ety 6 (“D PS ”). Hi s p rin cip al c lai m is a proc ed ura l du e p roc ess ch all en ge all eg ingthat D PS – in tan de m 7 with the Board of Firearms Perm it Examiners (“the Board”) – has a practic e of improperly denying 8 permits, unnecessari ly prolonging t he appeals that follow, and then quietly resol ving disputes at the 9 last minute. In addit ion, Kuck claims that his fir earm perm it appeal was de li be ra te ly dela yed by 10 state official s in retaliation for his outspoken criticism of DPS and Board practices, in violation of 11 his FirstAm endment rights. 12 Based, in part, on this Court’s int ervening deci sion in Sp ine lliv. Cityof N ew Yo rk, 579 F.3d 13 160 (2d C ir. 2009), we conclude that Kuck has stated a procedural due process cl ai m. I t r emains 14 to be seen , ho we ve r, whe the r Ku ck has nam ed , or w ill be abl e to nam e, the a pp rop riate d ef

en dants 15 fo r t

his c ase to p roc eed

. Whil e he atte m pte d to am en d h is c om

pla int to a dd ad dit ion al d ef

en dants , 1 16 that m oti on

wa s d en ied

as f uti le b y th e dis tri ct c ourt. W e re m an d s o th at the dis tri ct c ourt m ay 17 consider, i n the first i nstance, whetherany re lief i s avai lable to Kuck or any putat ive class in light 18 of

the pro po sed

am en de d c om

pla int

. 19T h e b a c k g ro u n d fa c ts a re tak e n fro m K u c k ’ s c o m p la in t, th e a lle g a tio n s o f w h ic h a re a ss u m e d to 2 b e t rue for pu rpo ses of adjud i cati n g D efend an t s- A p p el l ees’ m o t i o n t o dism i ss. S e e K i rs c h n e r v . K P MG LLP , 5 9 0 F .3d 1 8 6 , 1 8 8 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 9 ).

I n f act , A pp el l ant cl ai m s t hat hi s pre vi ou s po ss es si on of a val i d f i r ear m per m i t i t se l f

const i t ut ed 3 p roo f o f ci t i zen ship su ff i ci en t t o sat i sf

y t h e D P S r eq u i rem en t f o r renew al s. 3 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In M arc h 2 00 7, Ku ck ap pli ed to D PS to r en ewhis pe rm it t o c arr y a fi rearm . H e w as 3 su bs equ entlyco nta cte d b y D ef en dant A lbe rt J . M ase k, anem plo ye e o f D PS , who req

ue ste d th at 4 Ku ck

prov ide a U.S . pa ssp ort , bir th ce rti fi cat e, or vot er re gis tratio n car d in su pp ort of h is r en ew al 5 applicat ion. Se eC om pl. ¶ 36

. In

re sp on se, K

uc k inq uir ed int o th e b asi s f

or t he req ue st. He wa s 2 6 tol d th at, bystatut e, the St ate co uld no t is su e a f

ire arm pe rm it t o any“al ien

ill eg all y o r un law fu lly 7 in the United States,” and therefore DPS w as required to verify his ci tizenshi p. Se e Co nn . G en . S tat . 8 §§ 2 9-2 8(b ), 29 -28 (f), 29-29(d ); cf. Co nn . C on st. art . I, § 1 5 (l im iti ngthe rig ht t o b ear arm s to 9 “ci tiz en s”) . K

uc k o bje cte d to the req

uir em ent, argu ingthat he ha d s ub m itt ed pro of of cit ize ns hip 10 wh enhe fi rst

ap pli ed fo r a p erm it i n 1 98 2 and , ov er t he su bs eq ue nt 2 5 y ear s, ha d n ev er b ef ore be en 11 ask ed

to p rov ide s uc h pro of

w itha re ne wa l a

pp lic ati on. Se e Am. Com pl. ¶¶ 36-37. He cla im ed

3 12 the n, as he do es no w, that the D PS req

uir em ent w as arbi trary, de sig ne d to haras s, an d, in anyev ent, 13 no t autho riz ed

bystate l aw . U lti m ate ly, he ref us ed to pro vid e the requ est ed

doc um ents. As a

res ult , 14 DPS denied his renewal applicati on. 15 Ku ck

the n fi led anap pe al w iththe Bo ard , s eekinga h ear ingon wh eth er h is r ef

us al t o s ub m it 16 a U.S. passport or birth c ertificat e provided “j ust and propercause” for the deni al of his applic ation. 17 Se eConn. Gen. Stat. § 29-32b(b). Ho we ve r, h is appeal he aring was not sc heduled to occurfor 18 eig hte en

m onths , d

uri ngwh ich time he was d ep riv ed of a p erm it t o c arr

y a fi rearm . In

Oc tob er 19 2008, after this s uit was filed, Kuck finall y re ce iv ed his heari ng. Shortly before the hearing, he4 1 pro vid ed

a v ote r r eg istrat ion

ro ll su pp ort ingh is cit ize ns hip and re sid en cys tat

us ; a s the result, his 2 renewalap plication was grant ed. Despite thi s resolut ion, he continue s to seek damages from various 3 state official s under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violati ons of his due pr ocess and Firs t Amendm ent 4 rig hts

. 5 Notably, at the time of his renewal applica tion, Kuck was t he S ec re tary of the Board. 6 Members of the Board are appointe d by the Governor and i nclude indivi duals nominated by gun 7 clubs in Connecti cut. Se e Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-32b(a). I n 1998, Kuck was nom inat ed by Ye 8 Co nn ect icut Gun

Gu ild , In c. to t

he seat on the Bo ard

res erv ed fo r it s re pre sentat ive

. 9 Ku ck

all eg es t hat, s inc e h is a

pp ointm ent, t

he est im ate d w ait ing -pe rio d f or a hear ingha s 10 inc rea sed

dram ati cal ly, an d th at the Bo ard Ch air m an , Christop he r A dam s, op po sed his ef fo rts to 11 speed up the appea ls process

. Se e Co mpl . ¶¶ 78-118. He conte nds that DPS and the Board have 12 act ed

to b urd engu

n-o wn ers ’ ab ili ty t o o bta in c arr y p erm its byim

pro pe rlydenyin g a

pp lic ati on s in 13 the fi rst

ins tan ce and

the n s ub jec tin g a pp lic ants t o unju sti fi ed

an d p rol on ge d a

pp eal s. 14 Kuck asserts t hree consti tutional claims: (1) a viol ation of procedura l due process, based on 15 the all eg ed ly arbi trary d en ial of his fi rearm pe rm it and

ex ces siv e d elay in

ob tai nin g an a

pp eal 16 hearing; ( 2) a violati on of substant ive due proces s on the same grounds; and (3) a First Amendm ent 17 ret ali ati on

cla im , a lle gin g th at D PS , a cti ngthr ou ghon e o f i ts d ete cti ve s, thr eat en ed an d h arassed 18 Kuck after he cr itici zed DPS a nd the appeals process. Se eCo m pl. ¶¶ 7 8-9 6. Ku ck

fi led his su it a s 19 a p utativ e cl ass act ion , s eek ingto r ep res ent a c las s o f i nd ividuals whose pe rm its have be en 20 err on eo us ly d en ied byDP S and

have su bs eq ue ntl y b een

su bje cte d to a lon g-d elaye d ap pe al b ef ore 21 the Board.5 1 Defendants moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, contendi ng 2 that K

uc k h ad fa ile d to state c lai m s u

po n whic h re lie f c ou ld be g ranted

. T he dis tri ct c ourt a gre ed 3 and dismissed the suit , holding thatthe heari ng delay was not so l ong as to make the availabi lity of 4 rev iew“m ean ing les s o r no ne xis tent.” Se e Ku ck v . D an ah er , No. 3:07-cv-1390, 2008 WL 2902032, 5 at * 3 (D . C onn. Ju ly 2 5, 20 08 ). I n li ght of this de ter m inatio n, the dis tri ct c ourt d en ied Ku ck ’s 6 motion to am end his complaint as futil e. This appeal foll owed. 7 II. DI SC US SI ON 8 A

. St an da rd of R ev iew 9 A districtcourt’s de cision gra nting a mot io n to di smiss is subject t o de novo review. Se e 10 Le ibo wi tz v . C

or ne ll U niv

. , 445 F.3d 586, 590 (2d Cir. 2006). As a matter of substance , “[t]o survive 11 a m oti on to dism iss , a co m pla int m us t co nta in s uf

fi cie nt f act ua l m att er, acc ep ted

as t rue , to ‘st ate 12 a cl aim

to r eli ef that is plau sib le o n it s f ace .’” Ashcroft v. I

qbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) 13 (quoting Be ll A tl. Co rp . v . T wo mb ly , 5 50 U. S. 54 4, 57 0 (2 00 7))

. 14 B. Pr oc ed ur al D ue Pr oc ess Cl aim 15 1. Ap pli cab le L aw 16 Ku ck ’s m ain co nte nti on

is that th e ei ghteen-m onth p eri od he wa ite d to rec eiv e an

ap pe al 17 hearing before the Board was, in light of the liberty i nterestat stake, e xcessive and unwarranted, and 18 thus violat ed due process. Se e Cleve lan d Bd

. of E du c. v. Lo ud

erm ill , 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (“At 19 so m e p oint, a delay i n th e p os t-t erm inatio n h ear ingwo uld be co m e a c on sti tut ion al v iol ati on .” ). 20 Ku ck

fu rth er a lle ge s th at, as a

m att er o f p rac tic e, DP S deli beratel y s eek s to pro lon g th e ap pe als 21 process in or der to unlawfully depr ive citi zens of pistol permits. Se eCom pl. ¶¶ 53-69.6 1 Appellees conce de t hat Kuck possesses a libert y interes t, creat ed by the Connectic ut 2 Constituti on, in his ri ght to carry a firearm. Se eConn. Const. art. I, § 15; Ben jam in v . B ailey , 662 3 A. 2d

12 26 , 1 23 1-3 2 (C onn. 19 95 ). Th eydisp ute , ho we ve r, th at th e ti m e re qu ire d to res olv e K uc k’s 4 ap pe al v iol ate d d

ue pro ces s. Th is w ait ing -pe rio d, they argu e, is the prod

uc t of a su bs tantia l ca sel oa d 5 an d the St at e’ s a cu te in te re stinen suri ng th atfi re arms are bo rn e o nl y b y tho se fi t t o c arryth em. 6 Our proce dural du e p roc ess an aly sis is c ontro lle d b y th e three -f act or t est pre scr ibe d in 7 Mathews v. Eldri dge , 4 24 U. S. 31 9, 335 (197 6). Th is te st re qu ire s that we balanc e: “( 1) t he pri vate 8 int ere st at st ak e; ( 2) t he ri sk o f ane rro ne ou s de pri vatio n of that inter est

thr ou ghthe pro ced

ure s u sed 9 and the probabl e value (if any) of alternati ve procedures ; (3) the government’s intere st, includi ng 10 the pos sib le burde ns of alt ern ati ve pro ced

ure s. ” O’Connor v. Pierson , 4 26 F. 3d 18 7, 19 7 (2 d C ir. 11 20 05 ); seeals o F DI C v . Ma lle n , 4 86 U .S

. 23 0, 2 42 (1 98 8). In Ku ck ’s vie w, h is pri vate int ere st i n 12 law fu llypo sse ssi nga f ire arm car rie s the day , at le ast

at the mo tio n to d ism iss sta ge , p art icu lar ly i n 13 light of his al legations that DP S routi nely denies pe rmits arbitra rily only t o reverse c ourse on the 14 eve of the appeal hea ring. Se eCom pl. ¶¶ 60-61. 15 Broadly speaking, a delay amounts to a due proce ss violat ion only where itrenders the 16 prescri bed procedures meaningless in rela tion to the private interestat stake. “[T]he m ere assertion 17 that st ate rem ed ies are len gthy . . . wi ll n ot r en de r st ate rem ed ies ina de qu ate [u nd er the Du e P roc ess 18 Cl au se] un les s th eyare ‘in ad eq uate t o th e p oint th at [ the y are] m ean ing les s or n on ex ist ent.’ ” Gyadu 19 v. Wor

ker s' C om p. Co mm 'n , 129 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1997) (table) (quot ing Ea ste r H ou se v . F eld er , 20 91 0 F .2 d 1 38 7, 14 06 (7t h C ir. 19 90 ) ( enb an c))

. W e, a s we ll as oth er cir cu its , h av e ac kn ow led ge d 21 that ad

m ini str ati ve de ter

m inatio ns m ayreq

uir e a n on -tr ivi al am ount o f t im e to c om ple te, esp eci all y 22 where ca seloads ar e heavy. “Regrett ably, delay i s a natural concomitant of our administrative7 1 burea

uc rac y. ” Isa acs v. Bo we n , 8 65 F. 2d 46 8, 477 (2d Ci r. 1 98 9) ( up ho ldi nga n ine tee n-m onth 2 de lay

in r eso lvi ngdis puted

Med icare P art

B cla im s). Ul tim ate ly, d ete rm ini ngthe m om ent at wh ich 3 state p roc ed

ure s b eco m e so untim ely

that th eybecome m ean ing les s is a m att er o f c ontext, d riv en 4 bythe Mat

he ws factors. Se e Ma lle n , 48 6 U. S. at 24 2 (n oti ngthat “the sig nif icanc e o f s uc h a

de lay 5 canno t be ev alu ate d in a v acu um ”); Connecticut v. Doehr , 50 1 U. S. 1, 10 (19 91 ) (“ [D ]u e p roc ess , 6 un lik e so m e leg al rul es, is n ot a tec hn ica l c on cep tio n wi th a f ixe d c ontent unrel ate d to tim e, pla ce 7 an d c irc um stanc es. ” (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed )). 8 In p rec ise ly t his way, we have rec entlyhe ld t hat de pri vatio ns m ayno t be ind ef ini te, 9 parti cu lar ly whe re d elay c anno t be att rib ute d to any c lear st ate int ere st o r th e ri sk of erroneous 10 deprivati on is significa nt. In Kr im sto ck v . K ell y , 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002) , forexample, we 11 co ns ide red

N ewY ork

C ity ’s civ il fo rf

eit ure p roc ed

ure s f or v eh icl es i nv olv ed

in a lle ge d c rim es s uc h 12 as d

riv ingwh ile int ox icated

. Un de r c itypo lic y, the Ci ty w ou ld s eiz e v eh icl es i mm ed iat ely af ter an 13 arr est , b ut f

orf eit ure he ari ng s aw ait ed

the co m ple tio n of the un de rly ingcri m ina l pr oc eed ing s. Th is 14 pra cti ce fr eq

ue ntl y m eant t

hat o wn ers w ere d ep riv ed o f the ir ve hic les f

or a ye ar or m ore be fo re the y 15 had any opportunit y to challe nge the seiz ure. See id. at 4 4-4 6. W e co nc lud ed that this int erv al w as 16 simply too long in lightof the private i nter es ts at s take. “[T]o say that the forfeiture proceedi ng, 17 wh ich

of ten oc curs m ore than a

ye ar a ft er a ve hic le' s sei zure, rep res ents a m ean ing fu l op po rtunit

y 18 to be heard ata meaningful time on the issue of continued impoundm ent is to s tr et ch t he s ense of 19 that ve ne rab le p hra se t o the break ingpo int .” Id. at 53. The seizur e of real property, especia lly a 20 vehicle use d for daily tra nsportati on, called for a more timely opportun it y to challe nge the 21 deprivati on. See id. at 50, 60-62.8 1 Ev enm ore rec ently , we con clu de d th at a gun s ho p o wn er’ s d

ue pro ces s ri ghts w ere vio lat ed 2 when New York City suspended her l icense withouta prompt post-deprivat ion hearing. Se e S pin ell i 3 v. Ci ty o

f N ew Yo rk, 579 F.3d 160, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2009). The c ity conceded that the inve stigati on 4 an d h ear ingpro ces s f or s us pe nd ed

gun deal er l icense s o ft entoo k “ m onths or y ear s” t o c om ple te. 5 Id. at 17 1. Aw are of the lik ely de lay , S pin ell i hi red

a lawy er who se s uc ces sf

ul n eg oti ati on s w ithcity 6 of fi cia ls r esu lte d in

rei ns tat em ent of

the su sp en de d li cen se a ft er onl y 5 8 d ay s. But gi ve n th at 7 Spinelli’ s business and l ivelihood were at stake, we hel d that even this delay “e xceeded the bounds 8 of du e p roc ess .” Id. at 174 . The se de cis ion s inf orm our ap pli cat ion

of the Mathews fa cto rs i n th is 9 cas e. 10 2. Mathews An aly sis 11 a. First factor : The privat e intere st at st ake 12 W ithres pe ct t o th e f irs t Mathews fa cto r, K

uc k’s stake in t

he fi rearm

license is a libe rty 13 interes t tied t o the rightto bear arms re co gni zed by state law. Se eConn. Const. art. I, § 15. As 14 noted, the defendants concede that K uck possesses such an interes t. Unli ke in Sp ine lli , h ow ev er, 15 th is in te re stis no t d ir ec tl y t ie d t o Ku ck ’s ec on omi c l iv el ih oo d, an d thu s l ac ks so me of th e s ame 16 urgency ident ified by our opinion i n th atcase and others. Se e S pin ell i , 579 F.3d at 171 (“The 17 Su

pre m e C ourt h as ‘ rep eat ed ly r eco gn ize d th e se ve rity of d ep riv ingso m eo ne of his or h er 18 liveli hood.’”) (quot ing Mallen , 486 U. S. at 2 43 ); Go ldb erg v. Ke lly , 3 97 U. S. 25 4, 26 4 (1 97 0). 19 Nonetheless, the intere st here r emains substant ial, protecte d as it is by the Connecti cut Constitut ion 20 and decisions of that state ’s highe stcourt . Se e B en jam in , 6 62 A. 2d

at 1 23 1-3 2 (i de nti fy ingstate 21 co ns tit

uti on al r ight to be ar ar

m s fo r se lf

-de fe ns e, but de cli nin g to inv ali date a ssa ult we ap on s b an ).9 1 Whil e th is r ight is cle arl y s ub jec t to state r egulatio n –

inc luding lic ensingpro vis ion s su ch 2 as those her e – these proc edures must com port with due process. See id. ; Sta te v . B ailey , 551 A.2d 3 12 06 , 1 21 8 (C onn. 19 88 ) (“ It i s b ey on d s eri ou s d isp ute that th e leg isl ature ha s the a uth ori ty to p lac e 4 rea so na

ble res tri cti on s o n a

cit ize n’s rig ht t o b ear

arm s. ”); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos , 807 F.2d 6, 5 8 (1 st Ci r. 19 86 ) ( wh ere “a f ourte enth am en dm ent li be rtyint ere st i s im pli cat ed

. . . th e st ate the ref

ore 6 m us t ad he re t o rigorous pro ced

ura l sa fe gu ard s”) . C ontrary t o d ef en dants ’ su gg est ion , th e st ate ’s 7 ab ili ty t o regulate f ire arm s d oe s n ot e xti nguis h th e li be rtyint ere st at st ak e o r el im inate the ne ed to 8 afford due process. In Connecti cut, a permit to carry a fir ea rm may onl y be revoked by the 9 Commissioner of DPS “for cause,” or undercertai n statutor ily enumerated cir cumstances requiri ng 10 revocati on. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-32(b), ( c). Much the s ame, denial or revocat io n must be 11 su

pp ort ed on ap pe al b y “

jus t an d p rop er cau se. ” C onn. G en . St at. § 2 9-3 2b (b) . B y c ontra st t o o the r 12 states ’ re gu lat ory sch em es, the Com

m iss ion er d oe s n ot h av e unf ett ere d d isc ret ion

to r ev ok e p erm its 13 under stat e law. S e eB a c h v . Pa tak

i , 408 F.3d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) ( describi ng the “wide 14 dis cre tio n” p os ses sed b y lic en sin g of

fi cer s und er N ewYo rk l aw ); Gross v. Norton , 120 F.3d 877, 15 87 8 (8 th C ir. 19 97 ) (f ind ingno co ns titutiona llypro tec ted int ere st i n gun

pe rm it und er M inn eso ta 16 law). As a resul t, permit renewal appl icants ar e entitl ed to basic due process prot ections, i ncluding 17 a meaningful opportunity to be hea rd after a deni al or revoc ation. Se e S pin ell i , 579 F.3d at 169. 18 Al l in

all , d ep riv ati on

of a f ire arm pe rm it m ayno t re pre sent t he s am e d ay -to -day h ard sh ip 19 occasioned by the seizure of a vehicle used for dai ly transportation, as in Kr im sto ck, 306 F.3d at 44- 20 46, or inter ference with a busi ness-pers on’s livel ihood, as in Sp ine lli , 579 F.3d at 174-76. Yet the 21 Co nn ect icut C on sti tut ion es tablishes a cle ar l ibe rtyint ere st i n a pe rm it t o c arr

y a fi rearm – an 22 interes t that i s highl y value d by many of the state’s c itizens

. Se e Co nn . C on st. art . I, § 1 5 (“ Ev ery10 1 citize n has a rightto bear arms in defense of him self and the state.”) . Though not overwhelming or 2 ab so lut e, we co nc lud e th at the pri vate i nte res t at stake rem ain s si gn if

icant. 3 b. Second factor: The ri sk of erroneous depri vation 4 Th e s ec ond Mat he ws factor – the ri sk of erroneous depri vation and the probable val ue of 5 alterna tive proce dures – requi res a clos e analysis of Kuck’s complaint. Se e Ma thews , 424 U .S . at 6 335. Kuck, as we have seen, all eges that DPS frequentl y denies p er mitappli cations for bogus or 7 frivolous reas ons, thereby subj ecting qual ified applica nts to a le ngthy appeals process , only to grant 8 the permit m onths or years later, just before the appeal hearing. Se eCo m pl. ¶¶ 2 -3, 53 -69 . In

his 9 cas e, Ku ck

cla im ed that D PS wa s n ot e nti tle d und er s tat e la w to requ ire pro of of cit ize ns hip wi th 10 his 20 07 ren ew al a pp lic ati on , and

that hi s p erm it s hould not have be ende nie d f or l ack of su ch 11 do cum entat ion

. Whil e thi s req uir em ent a

pp ear s em ine ntl y rea so na ble to u s, it i s n ot o ur p rov inc e 12 here to r esolve the s pe cif ic i ssu e o f s tat e law on

wh ich Ku ck ba sed his ap pe al t o th e B oard. The 13 via

bil ityof K

uc k’s due proc ess clai m

doe s n ot t

urn on the m eri ts o f h is i nit ial ch all en ge ; rathe r, i t 14 concerns whether he receive d the process he was due. Se e Pos t v. Ha rp er , 9 80 F. 2d 49 1, 49 4 (8 th 15 Cir. 1992) (“We review the proc ess a ffo rd edt o th e plainti ff; we do not review the merits of the 16 de cis ion

ren de red .” ); Tor re s- Ro sa do v. Rotger-Sabat , 335 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003) ( “We do not 17 rev iewthe su

bs tan ce o f decisionm akingun de r th e ru bri c o f p roc ed

ura l du e p roc ess an aly sis .” ). 18 Thus, the focus of this second pr ong remains on (1) the over all ri sk of erroneo us d ep ri vation for 19 permit applicants , and (2) the t ime-period requir ed to corre ct such depri vations. 20 In s up po rt o f h is a lle gatio ns , K uc k o ff ers fi gures su ggesting that the num be r of ap pe als 21 “resolved” without a hear ing is indee d far grea ter than those ac tually heard by the Board. Se eAm. 22 Com

pl. ¶¶ 195-197 (allegi ng, for example, that 249 appeals wer e “resolve d” in fiscal yea r 2006-07,C o m p a ra b le fig u re s fo r th e p re c e d in g y e a rs a re a s fo llo w s: 4 F isca l y ea r A p p ea ls reso lv ed A p p ea ls h ea rd 2005- 06 281 72 2004- 05 265 76 2003- 04 166 52 2002- 03 150 43 2001- 02 109 39 K u ck , w e a lso rec o g n ize, i s in an u n u su al p o sit io n to d es crib e th e p ro ce ss b y w h ich ap p ea ls are 5 re so lv e d . B e c a u se h e sits o n th e B o a rd itse lf, h is a lle g a tio n s h a v e so m e a d d itio n a l p la u sib ility a t th is e a rly sta g e o f th e p ro c e e d in g s. Se e I qbal , 12 9 S

. C t . at 19 5 0 ( “D et erm i n i n g w h et h er a co m p l ai n t st at es a p lau sib le claim fo r reli ef w il l .

. . b e a co n tex t-sp ec ifi c task ”). T h is p ro n g g e n e ra lly re q u ire s th a t w e a lso c o n sid e r th e p ro b a b le v a lu e o f a lte rn a tiv e p ro c e d u re s. 6 S e e Ma t h e ws , 424 U

. S. a t 335. Bec a us e i t i s c l e a r t ha t r e duc i ng t he t i m e t o obt a i n a n a ppe a l he a r i ng w o u ld c o n sid e ra b ly d im in ish th e im p a c t o f th e se a lle g e d ly e rro n e o u s d e n ia ls, w e n e e d n o t ex p lo re th is f a c t or i n de pt h. 11 1 wh ile o n ly

4 0 a p p e a ls c am e b e f

o re th e B o ard

f o r ah e ari n g ). T h is d ata i s c o n s is te nt w ith h is 4 2 allegat ion that many permits are grant ed or reins tated shortly be for e the Board is due to hear the 3 ap pli cant’s ap pe al. At the mo tio n to di sm iss stag e, we cre dit the inf ere nc e th at this lar ge dis parity 4 rep res ents a

sig nif icant n um be r of un fo un de d p erm it d eci sio ns byDPS. See Spagnola v. Chubb 5 Corp. , 5 74 F.3 d 64 , 67 (2d C ir. 20 09 ) (Whe n rev iew inga mo tio n to di sm iss , we acce pt “ all we ll- ple d 6 factual all egations as true and dra w all reasonable inferences in the plai ntiff's f avor”). In addi tion,

5 7 Kuck alleges that the re sulting del ay is far from trivial. Accordi ng to the complaint, unsuccessful 8 applicant s m

ust regularly wait fourteen to twenty m onths to receive an appeal heari ng. Se eCo m pl. 9 ¶¶ 4 7-4 8, 6 1. T og eth er, the se a lle gatio ns pla us ibl y a lle ge a st ate pra cti ce o f d elayin g a pp eal s, on ly 10 to moot them at the very last m inute, after the applicanthas waited more than one yearfor a hearing. 11 See Iqbal , 1 29 S. Ct . at 19 49 -50 . B eca us e th is pra cti ce a

pp ear s to have af

fe cte d a sig nif icant n um be r 12 of applicants, and the delay is considerable, the second Mat he ws fa cto r we igh s in f

av or o f K uc k at 13 thi s st ag e o f t

he pro cee din gs . 612 1 c. Third factor: The gove rnmental interes t at sta ke 2 The third Mat he ws factor requir es us to examine the strength of the state’ s intere st in the 3 ch all en ge d p roc ed ure s. Co nn ect icut cl ear ly h as a str on g and

co m pe lli nginteres t in

en surin g th at 4 fi rearm

pe rm its are no t is su ed

to t ho se “ lac kin g th e essentia l ch ara cte r or tem pe ram ent ne ces sar

y 5 to b e entru ste d w itha w eapon.” Dw yer v. Fa rre ll , 4 75 A. 2d

25 7, 26 0 (C onn. 19 84 ) (i nte rna l 6 qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ). Y et the state’ s le git im ate int ere st i n p ub lic saf ety does little to e xp lai n 7 why it

req uir es u p to tw enty m onths to a dd res s ap pe als . For

the purpo ses of a

du e p roc ess an aly sis , 8 the s tat e m

us t arti cu lat e so m e re aso n, tie d to thi s inter est , th at j us tif ies the len gthy p eri od

ne ces sar y 9 to resolve these appeals. Se e Ma lle n , 486 U.S. at 242 (di recting c ourts to exa mine “the justificat ion 10 of

fe red bythe Go ve rnm ent f

or d elay and

its rel ati on

to t he un de rly inggo ve rnm ental int ere st” ). 11 He re, the state’ s acc ount is far f rom o ve rwhe lm ing : t

he d ef en dants argu e that th e p rol on ge d 12 wait is si mply a funct ion of the Board’s cas eload and backl og. Yet, on the pleadi ngs, there i s no 13 ind icatio n th at this tim e is req uir ed to gathe r evi de nc e, perf

orm ad dit ion al i nv est igatio n, or f orm all y 1 4 co ns id e r t

h e ap p e a l. In s te a d , th e c o m p la int s u g g e s ts th at t

h e a p p e a l s it s g ath e ri n g d

u s t f o r n e arl y 15 all of the int erim period, awaiting t he s cheduled hear ing date. Mor eover, the amended complaint 16 states that th e B oard he ld on ly 40 app ealhear ing s in f isc al ye ar 20 06 -07 – or le ss t han f our ap pe als 17 per month. Se e Am . C om pl. ¶¶ 1 95 -19 7. Thus , the plea din gs them sel ve s d o n ot s up po rt a cle ar c ase 18 of routine adm inistr ative delay or overburdened bureauc racy. Se e Is aa cs v . B ow en , 865 F.2d 468, 19 47 7 (2 d C ir. 19 89 ). A ll i n a ll, the St ate ’s argum ent bo ils do wn to an asse rti on that pu bli c sa fe ty i s 20 important and appeals ha ve gotten backe d up. Butt he dela y has litt le apparentconnection t o the 21 pu

bli c interest i nvoke d b y d ef en dants . T he St ate giv es n o a cco unt of ho w o r whypu

bli c sa fe ty 22 requires unsuccessful appli cants to waita year-and- a-half for an appeal he aring.13 1 While we are often s olicit ous of governmental interest s, partic ularly t ho se r elated t o the 2 pu bli c’s saf ety , w e canno t acc ep t, at

lea st w ith out ad dit ion al f act ua l su pp ort , th e m onths -lo ngde lay 3 that Connecticut attempts to justify in this c ase. Se e S pin ell i , 579 F.3d at 173. This inte rest is not 4 a li cen se f

or i nd ef ini tel y d enyin g p erm it a

pp lic ants a post-deprivatio n o pp ort un ityto c ontes t an 5 adverse finding by DPS. Se e al so Sto ra ce v. M

ariano , 391 A.2d 1347, 1348 (Conn. C.P. 1978) 6 (co ns tru ingthe statut e g ov ern ingpe rm it a pp eal s, Co nn . Ge n. Stat . § 29 -32 b(c ), and statin g “ [i ]t

is 7 clear fr om

a re ad ingo f the s tat

ute th at tim e is of

th e ess en ce” ). F or the p urp os es of the present 8 m oti on

to d ism iss , w e f

ind th at K uc k h as s tat ed

a p roc ed ura l du e p roc ess cla im . Whe the r di sco ve ry 9 will bear outhis clai m is a m atter for the distri ct court t o determine on remand. 10 C. Su bs tantiv e D ue Pr oc ess Cl aim 11 Ku ck

als o a sse rts a su

bs tantiv e d

ue pro ces s claim

ba sed on the DP S p rac tic es d esc rib ed 12 ab ov e. He cla im s th at DP S ha s im po sed arb itr ary req uir em ents c ontrary t o s tat e law whic h, wh en 13 combined with the lengthy appea ls process , denied him substantive due proces s. Se eCom pl. ¶¶ 14, 14 84 -88 . T he dis tri ct c ourt d ism iss ed the cla im , holding that D PS ’s a lle ge d m isc on du ct w as n ot s o 15 “egregious, out rageous, or shoc king to the cont emporary conscienc e” t hat it vio lat ed su bs tantive due 16 process. Se e Ku ck v . D an ah er , No. 3:07-cv- 13 90 , 20 08 WL 2902032, at *3 (D. Conn. July 25, 17 20 08 ). W e co nc lud e th e d istric t co urt wa s co rre ct. 18 Generally spe aking, “[f]or state acti on to be taken i n violati on of the requirements of 19 su

bs tantiv e d

ue pro ces s, th e de nia l m

us t have oc curre d und er c irc um stanc es w arr antin g th e la be ls 20 ‘ar

bit rar y’ and ‘outra ge ou s. ’” Na tale v. To wn of R idgefi eld, 1 70 F. 3d 25 8, 26 2 (2 d C ir. 19 99 ). Y et 21 no thi ngin t

he co m plaint “s hoc ks the co ns cie nc e” o r su gg est s a “ gro ss a bu se o f g ov ernm ental 22 autho rity. ” Ro ch in v . C ali for nia , 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), overruled on other grounds by Mapp14 1 v. Oh io , 3 67 U. S. 64 3 (1 96 1); Na tale , 1 70 F. 3d at 2 63 (2 d C ir. 19 99 ). W he the r autho riz ed

or n ot, 2 the fa ct th at s tate o f f ic ia ls r e qu ir e d

K u c k t o p ro d u c e p ro o f o f c it iz e n s h ip o r le g a l re s id e nc y in 3 co nn ect ion

wi th h is p erm it r en ew al a pp lic atio n is hardl y o utrageous or sho ck ing . E ve n m ore , 4 su bs tantiv e d

ue pro ces s d oe s n ot e nti tle fe de ral co urt s to ex am ine ev ery alleged vi olatio n o f s tat e 5 law , e sp eci all y o ne s th at, while pe rha ps ve xatio us , are m ore routin e th aneg reg iou s. Th at i s 6 esp eci all y s o b eca

us e, un de r Co nn ect icut law , Ku ck and othe r cl ass m em

be rs h av e re co urs e to state 7 forum s to chall enge the merits of DPS decisions. Se e Co nn . Ge n. Stat . § 29 -32 b(b ), ( f) . T he dis tri ct 8 court’s di smissal of Kuck’s substantive due process cl aim is consequently affirmed. 9 D. Fi rst Am en dm ent R eta liatio n C lai m 10 Fi na lly , K uc k c lai m s th at h is Fi rst

Am en dm ent r ights w ere vio lat ed wh enhe wa s threaten ed 11 and harassed by aDPS off icer, al legedly on acc ount of his outspoken cr itici sm of the agenc y and 12 the appeals board. Se e Co m pl. ¶¶ 7 6-7 7. Th e d istric t co urt dis m iss ed

thi s cl aim , re aso nin g th at 13 Kuck had not ade quately alleged that his speech caused any adverse action by DPS. Se e Kuck, 2008 14 W L 2 90 20 32 , at *3 . A ga in, we ag ree that di sm iss al w as p rop er. 1 5 Ino rd e r to s tate a r e ta li ati o nc la im , w e r e qu ir e a p ri v ate c it iz e nt o s h o w : “ (1 ) h e h as an 16 int ere st p rot ect ed bythe Fi rst

Am en dm ent; (2 ) def

en dants ' acti on s w ere m oti vated or s ub stanti all y 17 caus ed

b y his e xe rci se of

th at rig ht; and

(3 ) d ef en dants ' a cti on s ef

fe cti ve ly ch ill ed

th e ex erc ise of 18 his Fi rst

Am en dm ent ri ght.” Cu rle y v. Vi lla geof S uff ern , 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). 19 Whil e Ku ck has a de qu ate ly a lle ge d th at h e en ga ge d in pro tec ted sp eec h, he ha s n ot p lea de d 20 facts that sugge st he was actua lly thre ate ne d by any of the defendants . At most, the allegati ons 21 su gg est

that th e D PS of

fi cer int en de d to str ict ly e nf

orc e laws lim iti ngthe sal e o f f ire arm s at 22 up coming gun shows. Se e Co m pl. ¶¶ 7 3-7 7. It go es wi tho ut say ingth at ret ali ati on cannot be15 1 establi shed where no adverse action has bee n all eged. See Dillon v. Morano , 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d 2 Ci r. 2 00 7); Gill v. Pidly pchak, 389 F.3d 379, 382-84 (2d Cir. 2004) ( requiri ng an adverse ac tion by 3 de fe nd ants an d a cau sal c onne cti on b etw een th e adve rse a cti on

and th e pro tec ted

speech). Ev en 4 more, nothing in the complaint suggest s that Kuck’s s peech was “actua lly chil led” as a resul t of the 5 DPS off

icer’s statements. See Will iams v. Town of Greenburgh , 5 35 F. 3d 71 , 7 6, 78 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 8); 6 Cu rle

y , 268 F.3d at 73. Consequently, Kuck’s First Amendm ent reta liati on cla im fai ls on the 7 ple ad ing s an d w as p rop erl y d ism iss ed bythe dis tri ct c ourt. 8 III . CO NC LU SI ON 9 W e re m an d to the dis tri ct c ourt f or fu rth er co ns ide rat ion

o f Ku ck ’s pro ced

ura l d ue pro ces s 1 0 cla im

. Wh il e K

u c k h a s r e c e iv e d

h is r e n e w a l p e rm it

i nth e i nte ri m , wh ic hm o o ts anype rso na l 11 injuncti ve relie f, he has also sued for damages and on behalf of a putat iv e cl as s of pl aintiffs who 12 may still be awaiti ng hear ings be fore the Boar d. See Comer v. Cisneros , 3 7 F .3 d 7 75 , 7 99 (2d Ci r. 13 19 94 ) (“ Whe re the cla im s o f t he nam ed pla int if fs b eco m e m oo t p rio r t o cla ss c ert if icatio n, the re are 14 sev era l w ay s in

wh ich m oo tne ss i s n ot h ad .” ). It remain s to be see n, ho we ve r, whe the r K uc k h as 15 named an appropriat e defendant for this case t o proceed as an i ndividual damages suit ora putative 16 cla ss- act ion . B eca us e the dist

ric t co urt pre vio us ly f

ound that th e ei ghtee n-m onth h ear ingde lay 17 co uld

no t su pp ort a p roc ed ural due p roc ess cla im , it de nie d b oth

Ku ck ’s m oti on

to j oin an d h is 18 m oti on

to am en d a s f

uti le. W e d o n ot r eac h th ese iss ue s or the state’ s v ari ou s d ef en ses at p res ent; 19 on remand, the distric t court shoul d consider the merit, vel non, of these motions. We af firm the 20 dis m iss al o f C lai m T wo (s ub stanti ve d

ue pro ces s) and

Cl aim Three (F irs t Am en dm ent re tal iat ion ). 21