N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RPORATION , AND RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES , INC., Plaintiffs

- Cross

- Appellants

,

v.

CAMTEK, LTD., Defendant

- Appellant

.

______________________

2012

- 1681, 2013

- 1023

______________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in No. 05

- CV

- 1396, Judge John R. Tunheim.

______________________

Decided: November 18, 2013

______________________

R ACHEL C. H UGHEY , Merchant & Gould P.C., of Mi nneapolis, Minnesota, argued for plaintiffs

- cross

appellants. With her on the brief were D ANIEL W. M C D ONALD and W ILLIAM D. S CHULTZ

.

W AYNE O. S TACY , Cooley LLP, of Broomfield, Color ado, argued for defendant

- appellant. With him on the brief

were S ARAH J. G USKE ; L ORI R. M ASON of Palo Alto, Cal i-AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

. CAMTEK , LTD

. 2

fornia; and T HOMAS J. F RIEL , J R ., of San Francisco, Cal ifornia.

______________________

Before M OORE , L INN , and O’M ALLEY , Circuit Judges.

O’M ALLEY , Circuit Judge

. August Technology Corporation and Rudolph Tec hnologies, Inc. (collectively, “August Tech”) filed suit against Camtek , Ltd. (“ Camtek”) in the United States Distri ct Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that Camtek infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,826,298 (“the ’298 patent”). August Tech is the assignee of the ’ 298 patent, which is directed to an automated semiconductor wafer inspection system. Camtek counterc laimed for declarat ory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity.

A jury found that Camtek’s Falcon device literally i nfringed the asserted claims of the ’298 patent. The di strict court entered judgment and a permanent injunction preventing Camtek from s elling the Falcon machines in the United States. Camtek appealed the district court’s final judgment to this court . On appeal, w e vacated the judgment of infringement and the permanent injunction

, and remanded for further proceedings. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd. , 655 F.3d 1278, 1282

- 86 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“ Original Appeal ”).
After the jury’s verdict, but before the injunction was in place, Camtek sold an infringing Falcon machine. August Tech moved for enhanced damages on grounds that Camtek’s post

- verdict infringement was willful. Although the district court found willfulness, it denied August Tech’s request for enhanced damages. Order, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek Ltd ., No. 05

- cv

- 1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732.

While the o rigi nal a ppeal was pending, Camtek e ntered into negotiations that led to two additional sales ofAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

. v. CAMTEK , LTD

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Falcon machines. The district court held Camtek in contempt for violating the injunction and ordered it to pay double damages as a sanction. August Tech. Corp. v

. Camtek, Ltd ., No. 05

- cv

- 1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40771, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012). Camtek subs equently filed a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from the contempt order and sanctions award

, and a separate motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 seeking r elief from the court’s willful infringement finding. In deciding those motions, t he district court reiterated that Camtek was in contempt, but granted the Rule 60(b) motion in part, reducing the sanctions awarded

. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd

. , No. 05

- cv

- 1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2012). The court also denied Camtek’s motions requesting that it vacate the post

verdict willful infringement finding

. Camtek appeals from the district court’s judgment: (1) granting

- in

- part an d denying

- in

- part Camtek’s Rule 60 motion for relief from the contempt order and san ctions award; and (2) denying Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 motion for relief from the order finding willfulness. See Judgment in a Civil Case, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd ., No. 05

- cv

- 1396 (D. Minn . Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 914. It also appeals from the underlying opinions and orders giving rise to that judgment. Because we find that the district court’s contempt order and its willfulness finding are not final appealable o rders, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this ap peal. Accordingly, we dismiss Camtek’s appeal pending final resolution of all claims in this case.

I. B ACKGROUND On March 5, 2009, a fter a three week trial, a jury found that Camtek’s accused Falcon wafer inspection

mac hines infringed the ’ 298 patent but that the infring ement was not willful. The jury awarded $6,782,490 in lost profit damages . A few days later, Camtek notified itsAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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sales force of what it characterized as a “preliminary verdict,” urgin g them to “emphasize [to customers] that this process is not over and no judgment has been made.” August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek

, Ltd., No. 05

- cv

- 1396, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011) (“ R&R Finding Contempt ”)

. Camtek also issue d a press release stating that there was no infringement and that the “unjust verdict” would be vacated or reversed. Id . at *3.
Roughly five weeks after the jury verdict, Camtek o ffered to sell , and eventually sold, a Falcon machine to a California customer: Infinera. August Tech sought to have damages on the Infinera sale enhanced, arguing that Camtek’s post

- verdict infringement was willful. Internal communications revealed that Camtek sold the machine to Infinera at a “rock bottom price” in an effort to “hurt ” August Tech. Order, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd.

, No. 05

- cv

- 1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732 at 2. On August 28, 2009, the district court entered jud gment and issued a permanent injunction t hat prevented Camtek from “ communicating with third parties (in person, via phone, via email, or by any other means) located in the United States for the purposes of offering to sell Falcon machines or machines that are colorable imitations thereof, notwit hstanding where the third pa rty intends to use the machines. ” Order on Final Judgment and Injunctive Relief, August Tech. Corp. v. Camte k, Ltd

., No. 05

- cv

- 1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2009), ECF No. 547 at 8. The parties filed another round of post

- trial motio ns, most of which were ultimately denied. Meanwhile, Camtek continued to communicate with customers in the United States about selling its Falcon machines overseas. Those communications lead to two post

- injunction Falcon sales

— one for use in China and th e other for use inAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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Malaysia. While the negotiations were ongoing, Camtek filed a Rule 60 motion asking the district court to clarify and revise the injunction to delete phrase “notwithstan ding where the third party intends to use the machines” so that it could communicate with customers in the United States who intended to use the machines overseas. R&R Finding Contempt , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *5. The district court denied Camtek’s motion to modify the injunction , and Camtek appealed the district court’s final judgment to this court on August 10, 2010.

On March 9, 2011, while the Original Appeal was pending, August Tech filed two motions with the district
court : (1 ) a motion for enhanced damages stemming from Camtek’s post

- verdict Falcon sale to Infinera; and (2) a motion to hold Camtek in contempt for violating the terms of the injunc tion. Both motions were referred to the magistrate judge fo r preparation of a R eport and Recommendation (“R&R”)

. On August 11, 2011, the magistrate judge issue d a n R&R finding that Camtek was in contempt. The court found it undisputed that, in 2009, Camtek “communicated with Morgan and Cree representatives in the United States and offered to sell Falcon machines for delivery overseas” in violation of the injunction. R&R Finding Contempt

, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154357, at *10

- 11. Consistent with the jury’s verdict and the court’s prior damages determination, the magistrate judge reco mmended that Camtek be ordered to pay August Tech double damages in the amount o f $1,291,892 as a sanction for contempt.
With respect to August Tech’s motion for enhanced damages, the magistrate judge issued a separate order finding that August Tech “proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Infinera sale was willful infringement.” Order, August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd. , No. 05

- cv

- 1396 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 732 at 6. Although itAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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found willful inf ringement , the court concluded that enhanced damages were not appropriate because: (1) there was no evidence of deliberate copying; (2) the misconduct involved a single sale which was completed within three months of the verdict; and (3) Camtek’s

“ failure to timely and accurately inform plaintiffs of the Infiner a sale may be attributed to mist akes and inadver tence, rather than a deliberate intent to conceal.” Id . at 9

- 10. Shortly after the magistrate judge issued his R&R finding Camtek in contempt and Orde r denying enhanced damages, this court found that the district court erred in its claim construction of the term “wafer.” Original Appeal , 655 F.3d at 1 286. Given this error, we: (1) vacated the judgment of in fringement; (2) remanded for a limited trial on infringement; an d (3) vacated the district court’s award of damages and grant of injuncti ve relief . With respect to the injunction, we noted this the court had recently issued Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc

. , 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We expressed “no opinion . . . regarding the effect of Transocean on the now

- vacated injunction

, ” but remanded with instructions for the di strict court to “take into account the effect, if any, Transocean has when craftin g an appropriate injunction.” Id

. at 1290

- 91.

Several months later

— in M arch 2012

— the district court adopted the R&R finding Camtek in contempt for violating the now

- vacated injunction. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd. , No. 05

- cv

- 1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40771, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012). In its order, the district court found that Camtek “knowingly and in bad faith violated the Court’s clear and unambiguous injun ction.” Id . at *4. The court agreed that double damages were warranted, and ordered Camtek to pay $1 ,291,892 as a sanction for contempt

. In that same order, t he di strict court denied C amtek’s request that the court setAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

. v. CAMTEK , LTD

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aside the finding of willful infringement in the order denying enhanced damages. Specifically, the court “d ecline[d] the invitation to meddle with a factual finding contained within an order favorable to [Camtek].” Id . at *8.
At this point, t he original district court and magi strate judges recused themselves

, and the case was rea ssigned. In April 2012, Camte k filed the two motions giving rise to this appeal : (1) a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from the contempt order and sanctions award; and (2) a motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60, challenging the willfulness finding

. On August 17, 2012, the new district c ourt judge a ffirmed the contempt finding but concluded that the award of double damages was a criminal sanction for which “Camtek did not receive adequate due process.” August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd ., No. 05

- cv

- 1396, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2012) (“ O rder on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions ”)

. Accordingly, the court relieved Camtek from half of the sanctions award and ordered it to pay $645,946. In the same order, the court denied Camtek’s motion with respect to willfu ln ess . Specifically, the c ourt concluded that Camtek: (1) lacked “standing to appeal the March 2012 Order because it was the prevail ing party ”; and (2) “has not shown a concrete and particularized or imminent injury resulting from the willful infringement finding.” Id . at

* 12

- 13. The court entered judgment with respect to those orders on August 30, 2012 , and Camtek timely appealed that judgment to this court

. After this court’s remand from the Original Appeal

, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on infringement under the modified claim construction

. Those motions remain pend ing at the district court, and thus the litigation between the parties is ongoing.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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II. D ISCUSSION At this stage in the proceedings, i t is undisputed that Camtek viol ated a court

- ordered injunction. 1 On appeal

, C amtek argues that the district court erred when it : (1) award ed $645,946 in sancti ons for civil contempt; and (2) f ound that a post

- trial sale constituted willful i nfringement.
August Tech responds that: (1) Camtek has not demonstrated that this court has jurisdiction; (2) Camtek fails to show any error in the district court’s damages award; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 motions on the merits.

The threshold issue before us is whether we have j urisdiction over this appeal. This court applies its “own law and not the law of the regional circuit to issues co ncerning our jurisdiction.” Ultra

- Precision Mfg. Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co. , 338 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

. Because the district court’s civil contempt order i s not a final appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Likewise, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the court’s willfulness finding because: (1) as the prevailing par ty, Camtek lacks standing to appeal the court’s decision denying enhanced damages ; and (2) there is no final judgment on willfulness

. A. The Contempt Order is Not a Final Appealable Order

Camtek asserts that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 1295(a)(1). Section 1291 grants

1 Counsel for Camtek conceded as much at oral a rgument: “I’m not justifying the conduct. The order was there, we should have obeyed it.” Oral Argument at 10:46, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral

argument

- recordings/2012

- 1681/all

.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts” and provides that this
court “shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 12 92(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.” 2 Under § 1295(a)(1)

, we have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals “from a final decision of the district courts” in patent disputes. § 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added).
August Tech maintains that we lack jurisdiction to review Camtek’s appeal because: (1) the district court’s contempt san ction is civil and is not immediately appea lable; and ( 2) Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for an immediate appeal in certain circumstances, does not appl y here. For the reasons explained below, we agree

. 1. T he Contempt Order i s Civil, Not Criminal
On appeal , the parties dispute whether the district court’s con tempt order is civil or criminal. In general

, “civil contempt orders are not final judgments” and thus are not immediately appealable. Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp. , 490 F.3d 1340, 1347

- 48 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “deem[ed] it settled” that a civil contempt order issued durin g “ the progress of the case . . . is regarded as interlocutory and to be reviewed only upon

2 Camtek has not asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Nor could it under our case law, which provides that jurisdiction under § 1292(b) and (c)(1) requires certification from the district court “that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differenc e of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Ultra

- Precision , 338 F.3d at 1357. Because the district court has not certified its contempt determination for appeal, we lack jurisdiction under § 1292.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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appeal from a final decree in the case.” Doyle v. London Guar. & Accident Co. , 204 U.S. 599, 603 (1907) (citation omitted). In contrast, “an adjudication of criminal co ntempt is a final order appealable prior to final judgment.” Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus ., 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pro

- Choice Network of W. New York v. Walker , 994 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1993)).

Given this dichot omy, when assessing our jurisdi ction, we must determine whether the contempt order at issue here wa s civil or criminal in nature. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc. , 539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, to ascertain its jurisdi ction, a court of appeals ‘must decide whether the order before [it] [i]s one for civil contempt or one for criminal contempt.’” (quoting Bingman v. Ward , 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9 th Cir. 1996)). While August Tech argues that the contempt sanctions imposed are civil, Camtek maintains that they are criminal, and that it has a right to an immediate appeal. Camtek further argues that it was entitled to criminal due process protections.

Whether a co ntempt determination is civil or criminal turns on the “character and pur pose of the sanction involved.” Int’l Union v. Bagwell , 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that “a contempt sanction is con si dered civil if it ‘is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the se ntence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.’” Id. at 827

- 28 (citation omitted). Criminal contempt “seeks to pu nish past acts of disobedience and may be mai ntained only with the court’s approval.” Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steel Workers , 545 F.2d 1336, 1343 (3d Cir. 1976).
A contempt sanction is civil and remedial if it “either ‘coerces the defendant into compliance with the court’s order, [or] . . . compensates the complainant for lossesAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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sustained.’” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of Am. , 330 U.S. 258, 303

- 4 (1947)). In other words, there are two subcategories of civil contempt: c om pensatory and coercive. C ompensatory sanctions are backward looking and are designed to compensate the complainant for damages “caused by past acts of disobedience,” whereas coercive sanctions “look to the future and are designed to aid the plaintiff by brin ging a defiant party into compliance with the court order.” Latrobe Steel , 545 F.2d at 1344. On this record, we conclude that the contempt order here is civil and compensatory. Although the district court initially ordered Camtek to pay double damag es as a sanction for contempt, the new district court judge reduced that award by half. In doing so , the court found that

, “to the extent the doubling of the damages was intended to enforce the Court’s authority, rather than to compensate [August Tech], t he sanction was criminal, and it appears that Camtek did not receive adequate due process.” Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions

, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *8. The court ordered Camtek to pay $645,946 “to compensate [August Tech] for the prof its they lost due to Camtek’s violation of the Court’s injunction.” Id . at *11.

Th e district court specifically considered the distin ction between civil and criminal contempt and explained that the sanctions imposed here were compensatory. Although the district court’s characterization of the sanctions is not controlling, it is one factor we can consi der

. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co ., 221 U.S. 418, 443 ( 1911 ) (noting that “the purpose of the punis hment could be examined with a view to determi ning whether it was civil or criminal”). The sanction s awarded

are payable directly to August Tech

— not the court

— and

are calibrated to August Tech’s actual lost profits for the sales that violated the injunction. Both of these facts support our conclusio n that the fine imposed is civil , notAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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criminal. See United Mine Workers , 330 U.S. at 304 (noting that, “[w]here compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the complainant . . . [and is] based upon evidence of complainant’s actual loss”).

Given these circumstances, we conclude that the co ntempt sanctions awarded are civil and compensatory. 3 Accordingly, the district court’s contempt order is not subject to an immediate appeal

. 2. There is No Final Judgment on the Merits

Given our conclu sion that the contempt order is ci vil

— not criminal

— and thus is not immediately appealable,

we turn to Camtek ’s argument that the order is noneth eless appealable as a final judgment. Specifically, Camtek asserts that the “contempt adjudication is a final j ud gment as to all issues involved in the contempt proceed ing and is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ” Reply at 4. W e disagree.
As noted, § 1295(a)(1) provides that we have jurisdi ction only over appeals from “final decision [s] of the district courts.” Given this statutory limitation , we are obligated to consider whether the district court’s order is, in fact, a final judgment. Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods

.,

3 Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction, we do not address the issue of whether the compensatory civil contempt survives where the underlying injunction is vacated. See Coleman v. Espy , 986 F.2d 1184, 1190 (8 th Cir. 19 93) (“Compensatory civil contempt actions do not survive if the underlying injunction is vacated be cause it was issued erroneously. . . . However, compensatory civil contempt proceedings may continue when the underlying injunction abates for a reason that does not go to the jurisdiction of the issuing court.”) (citations omitted)

. The parties have not briefed this issue, and we leave it to the district court to address it in the first instance.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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320 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A district court’s “ju dgment” or “decision” is final where “it ends the litig ation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Ultra

- Precision , 338 F.3d at 1357 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If a case is not fully adjudicated as to all claims for all parties, there is no final decision and therefore no juri sdiction.” Pandrol , 320 F.3d at 1362 (citation and quotation omitted). The finality requirement “is a statutory ma ndate and not a matter of discretion.” Ultra

- Precisi on , 338 F.3d at 1357 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Camtek cites a number of cases for the proposition that a post

- judgment contempt order is considered final

4 Neither party has argued that we have jurisdi ction under the collateral order doctrine. That doctrine, which is a “narrow exception” to the final judgment rule, permits the appeal of “trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an imm ediate appeal.” Richardson

- Merrell , Inc. v. Koller , 472 U.S. 424, 430

- 31 (1985). “To fall within the exception, an order must at a minimum satisfy three conditions: It must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id . at 431 (citation and quotation omitted). Because civil contempt is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment, the collateral order doctrine does not apply. See Entegris, 49 0 F.3d at 1346 (“The Supreme Court precedent dictates that civil contempts arising during the trial of related litigation are not appealable if adjudged against a party litigant, although such co ntempts are reviewable on appeal from the final judgment in t he related litigation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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and appealable under § 1291. See

, e.g., Consumers Gas & Oil , 84 F.3d at 370 ( finding that, because the “district court made a finding of contempt in the ‘postjudgment stage’ . . . the contempt order is appealable regardless of whether it is more properly characterized as criminal or civil”) ; Berne Corp

. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands , 570 F.3d 130, 136 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Post

- judgment orders of contempt are within an appellate court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as final and appealable orders.”); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos , 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9 th Cir. 1996) (“ The post

- judgment orders of contempt appealed here are within this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as final and appealable orders.” ). Those cases

— which are not binding on this court

— involve post

judgment contempt or ders, and ar e distinguishable from the instant case

, where the district court has not entered final judgment

. Although the district court’s August 2009 judgment was final, that judgment was vacated on appeal and the

case was remanded for further proceedings. There i s thus no final judgment in this case as to which an appeal under § 1295 could be filed. Nothing in the district court’s judgment relating to the contempt order and willfulness finding evinc es intent to resolve or dispose of any claims in this case. And, because this litigation is ongoing in the district court, Camtek’s reliance on the fact that the district court’s August 30, 2012 order is entitled “Jud gment in a Civil Case” is misplaced. 5 The mere fact that it is captioned as a “ judgment ” does not transform an ot herwise interlocutory order into a final judgment for pu rposes of appeal.

5 At oral argument, counsel for Camtek maintained that “[t]he order, it’s titled ‘Judgment.’ We have a clear form from the district court in Minnesota. It’s titled ‘Judgment.’” Oral Argument at 4:39.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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Camtek also argues that the district court’s contempt order is final and appealable because “the contempt proceeding is separate and independent of the oth er, ongoing proceed ings.” Reply at 4. While Camtek is correct that criminal con tempt charges that develop from an underlying civil case are treated as a separate action, we have already concluded that the contempt order at issue here is civil. See Latro be Steel , 545 F.2d at 1343 (“If a criminal contempt action develops from a civil procee ding, it bears a separate caption apart from the civil suit.”)

. It is well established that civil contempt proceedings “are between the original parties and are institu ted and tried as a part of the main cause.” Gompers , 221 U.S. at 445. We therefore decline Camtek’s invitation to treat the civil contempt proceeding as a separate action

. Because th e district court’s contempt order did not end the litigation on the merits , it is not a final judgment

. Accordingly, it cannot provide this court with subject matter jurisdiction under § 1295

. See Entegris , 490 F.3d at 1348 (finding no jurisdiction where the district court’s contempt order did not end the litigation on the merits and the underlying litigation was ongoing). Camtek will, however, have the opportunity to appeal the contempt sanctions imposed after the district court enters final judgment on the merits in this case.

3

. Rule 54(b) is Inapplicable
August Tech also argues that this court lacks jurisdi ction under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proc edure , which provides an exception to the rule of finality and allows for an immediate appeal in certain circu mstances where the action “presents more th an one claim for relief .” Specifically, Rule 54(b) states that a district court may “direct entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason forAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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delay and up on an express direction for the entry of judgment.” A judgment “is not final for purposes of Rule 54(b) u nless it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Ultra

Precision , 338 F.3d at 1357 (ci t ation and internal quot ation marks omitted). “Whether an order is sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction under Rule 54(b) is a que stion of Federal Circuit law.” iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc.

, 550 F.3d 1067, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . In iLOR , this court stated : While we have never directly addressed the que stion, the consensus view, which we hereby adopt, is that the bare recitation of the “no just cause for delay” standard of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by itself, to properly certify an issue for immed iate appeal . . .

. * * *
Rather, it must be apparent, either from the di strict court’s order or from the record itself, that there is a sound reason to justify departure from the general rule that all issues decided by the di strict court should be resolve d in a single appeal of a final judgment.

Id.

Camtek has not alleged that we have jurisd iction pu rsuant to Rule 54(b). In fact, Camtek argues that August Tech’s citation to Rule 54(b) is misplaced because the contempt adjudication is not a judgment “as to one or more, but fewer than all , claims or part ies.” We agree
t hat Rule 54(b) does not confer jurisdiction here

. First, t here is no evidence that either party asked the district court to certify its August 30, 2012 judgment for immediate appeal pursu ant to Rule 54(b). And, b ecauseAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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the court’s contempt order does not dispose of any claims in this case, the requirements for certification under Rule 54(b) are not satisfied

. See Ultra

- Precision , 338 F.3d at 1358 (concluding that there was “no final reso lution of

any one claim , as required by Rule 54(b)”). In any event, because the district court did not certify t he contempt issue

— and there is no indication that the court conte mplated an immediate appeal on this issue prior to the resolution of the claim s in this case —we conclude there is no appealable judgment under Rule 54(b).

B. Willfulness
We turn next to Camtek’s challenge to the district court’ s willfulness finding. As noted, the magistrate judge found that Camtek’s post

- verdict (but pre

- injunction) sale to Infinera was willful, but denied August Tech’s request for enhanced damages stemming from that sale. After this court vacated the infringement judgment in the O riginal A ppeal, Camtek objected to court’s willful i nfringement finding

. Specifically, Camtek argued that, absent an infringement finding, there can be no liability for willful infringement. The district court found that Camtek lacked stan ding to appeal the order denying enhanced damag es because it was the prevailing party

. The court also found that Camtek had “ not shown a concrete and particularized or imminent injury resulting from the willful infringement finding.” Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1160 40, at *13.
On appeal, Camtek argues that it has standing to challenge the willful infringement finding because it is false and “has caused Camtek to suffer injury in fact, including actual injury to Camtek’s reputation.” Appe llant Br. 46. August Tech re sponds that : (1) Camtek does not have standing to challenge a factual finding contained in an order that was decided in its favor; and (2) there isAUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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no final judgment on willfulness. We agree with August Tech on both points.
First, Article III, § 2 of the Constitution limits the j urisdiction of federal courts to “cases” or “controversies.” “Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case

- or

controversy requirement.” Samsung Elec. Co. v. Rambus, Inc. , 523 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To meet the standing requirements of Article III, the party must demonstrate, among other things , that it has “ suffered a n

‘ injury in fact ’— an inv asion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypoth etical’

. . . .” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
“A party that is not adversely affected by a judgment lacks standing to appeal.” See Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft C orp ., 374 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). As such, a prevailing party generally lacks standing to appeal from a judgment in its favor. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper , 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (“A party who receives all that h e has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it.”). Where the appellant lacks standing, we lack j urisdiction to hear the appeal. Typeright Keyboard , 374 F.3d at 1156.
Here, the district court found t hat Camtek’s post

verdict infringement was willful , but denied August Tech’s request for enhanced damages. Camtek was, therefore, the prevailing party. Although Camtek spec ulates that the willfulness finding will damage its business reputation, we agree with the district court that such speculation is insufficient to demonstrate injury in fact. See Deposit Guar. , 445 U.S. at 351 (“[U]nador n ed specul ation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power.”) ( citation and quotation marks omitted).AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP

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On appeal, Camtek complains that the district court’s language has branded it a “willful infringer.” Reply at 35. But f ederal appellate courts “review [] judg ments, not statements in opinions.” See California v. Rooney , 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also United States v. Accra Pac, Inc

., 173 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Unwelcome language in a substantively favorable decision is not the kind of adverse effect that meets the requirement of actual inj ury.”)

. It is well established that “ [a] party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to support the decree.” Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co

. , 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939); see also Bierle v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co ., 992 F.2d 8 73, 876 (8th Cir. 1993)

. Because the “finding that Camtek was a willful infringer was not necessary to support the Order’s denial of enhanced damages,” Camtek cannot appeal it. See Order on Camtek’s Rule 59 and 60 Motions , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116040, at *14, n.5.
We also lack jurisdiction for the separate reason that there is no final judgment on willfulness. Although Camtek argues in its reply brief that we have jurisdiction to review the willfulness finding under Rule 54(b), the requirements for certification under that rule are not satisfied. Specifically, the district court’s order denying enhanced damages is not a final resolution of any claims i n this case. See Ultra

- Precision , 338 F.3d at 1358 ( decli ning to find jurisdiction based on its con clusion that there was “no final resolution of any one claim , as required by Rule 54(b)”). As such, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s non

- final willfulness finding.

III. C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons

, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal at this stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, we are required to dismiss it.AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CO RP . v

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DISMISSED