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*********************************************** 
WILLIAM L. ROACH v. TRANSWASTE, INC.

(SC 20718)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Ecker and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for the allegedly

wrongful termination of his employment, in violation of public policy

and the statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 31-51q) prohibiting an employer from

retaliating against an employee for exercising constitutionally protected

speech. The plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant as

a commercial truck driver, alleged that the defendant terminated his

employment after he raised complaints concerning the safety of its

vehicles. At trial, the plaintiff testified that, following the termination

of his employment, he was out of work for approximately 6 months,

the defendant had paid him at a rate of 46 cents per mile, he had driven

a little more than 2000 miles per week, and he had driven approximately

230,000 miles during his 2 years with the defendant. The plaintiff’s

testimony was the sole evidence presented with respect to his lost

wages, and the defendant offered no evidence to impeach his testimony.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded him $24,288

in damages for lost wages. The jury interrogatories indicated that the

jury had found that the plaintiff was owed wages corresponding to 2200

miles per week at a rate of 46 cents per mile for a period of 24 weeks.

The defendant filed a motion for remittitur, seeking to reduce the damages award to zero. The defendant asserted that there was no evidence

to support the damages award because the plaintiff had failed to provide

tangible evidence or to testify with sufficient specificity as to his lost

wages. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for remittitur,

concluding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support

the damages award and that, in light of the specific figures in the jury

interrogatories, the award was a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s

lost wages. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment for the plaintiff

in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff appealed and the

defendant cross appealed to the Appellate Court. In its cross appeal,

the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had erred by failing

to set aside the damages award. The Appellate Court upheld the trial

court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for remittitur, concluding that

the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to set aside the

damages award. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed

to this court.

Held that the Appellate Court did not err in upholding the trial court’s denial

of the defendant’s motion for remittitur:

Although the Appellate Court, in upholding the trial court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion for remittitur, relied on the trial court’s characterization of the damages award as a reasonable estimate without citing the

applicable reasonable certainty standard of proof, this court’s case law

links the reasonable certainty standard to the ability to make a reasonable

estimate, the reasonable estimate benchmark has consistently appeared

in this court’s cases assessing damages awards, and the term ‘‘reasonable

certainty’’ in this context requires only evidence that is sufficient to

enable the fact finder to arrive at a reasonable estimate and thereby

remove the award from the realm of speculation.

Contrary to the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff did not prove his lost

wages with reasonable certainty because the only evidence he offered

was his own generalized and nonspecific testimony, the fact that the

damages award was premised exclusively on testimonial evidence did

not, in and of itself, render the evidence insufficient to meet the reasonable certainty standard, and the plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to

remove the damages award from the realm of speculation, as the plaintiff

proved to the jury’s satisfaction that the defendant wrongfully terminated

his employment, that the defendant owed him lost wages for the subsequent period of approximately six months when he was unemployed, and
that the distances and per mile amounts to which he testified accurately

represented his former workload and compensation, and the jury used

these proven facts to calculate a reasonable estimate, consistent with

the evidence before it, of the amount of the plaintiff’s lost wages.

Moreover, there was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the damages

award was improperly speculative because it required the jury to guess

at the number of miles that the plaintiff had driven for the defendant,

the duration of his unemployment, and how any inclement weather could

have affected his workload because, although the plaintiff could have

provided a greater degree of specificity as to how many weeks he was

unemployed, the jury apparently awarded damages on the low end of

the range of a reasonable estimate, and the two year average from which

the jury calculated the weekly mileage for lost wages was a sufficiently

lengthy period to account for variances in the weather.

Furthermore, this was not a case in which it could not be determined

how or why the jury arrived at its damages award or in which the award

had been based on an unresolved contingency, as the jury based its

award on figures drawn directly from uncontroverted testimony, and

the method the jury employed for its calculations was set forth in its

interrogatories form.

Accordingly, it was clear that the damages award was not based on

speculation or guesswork, and the plaintiff proved his damages to a

reasonable certainty by providing nonspeculative evidence from which

the jury derived a fair and reasonable estimate.

Argued April 26—officially released August 1, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the allegedly

wrongful termination of the plaintiff’s employment, and

for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before

Noble, J.; verdict for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court,

Noble, J., denied the defendant’s motion for remittitur

and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict,

and the plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross

appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and

Suarez and Vertefeuille, Js., which reversed the trial

court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for

further proceedings, and the defendant, on the granting

of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Glenn L. Formica, for the appellant (defendant).

James V. Sabatini, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal

is whether the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to award the plaintiff, William L. Roach, lost

wages in this wrongful termination action. The defendant, Transwaste, Inc., claims that the Appellate Court

improperly upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for remittitur. We disagree with the defendant and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history relevant to the damages issue

in the present appeal.1 The plaintiff was employed by

the defendant as a commercial truck driver from 2013

through 2015. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s

employment after the plaintiff raised several complaints

to the defendant about the safety of its vehicles. The

plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action, claiming that his employment was wrongfully terminated in

violation of public policy and General Statutes (Rev. to

2015) § 31-51q.2

At trial, the sole evidence relating to lost wages was

adduced through the plaintiff’s testimony. The plaintiff

testified that he had been out of work for ‘‘[a]bout six

months’’ following the termination of his employment.

He also testified that the defendant had paid him at a

rate of 46 cents per mile, that he always had driven a

little more than 2000 miles per week, and that he had

driven approximately 230,000 miles during his two years

with the defendant. The defendant offered no evidence

to impeach this testimony.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff

and awarded him $24,288 in damages for lost wages.

The jury interrogatories reflected that it had found that

the plaintiff was owed wages corresponding to 2200

miles per week at a rate of 46 cents per mile for a

period of 24 weeks.

The defendant filed several postverdict motions,

including a motion for remittitur, seeking to reduce

the award of damages to zero dollars. The defendant

contended that there was no evidence to support the

award because the plaintiff had neither provided tangible evidence nor testified with sufficient specificity

about his lost wages. The trial court denied all of the

defendant’s postverdict motions.

With regard to the motion for remittitur, the trial

court concluded that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support the award. The trial court

pointed to the specific figures in the jury interrogatories

and drew the following inferences. The jury had arrived

at the 2200 mile per week figure by dividing the 230,000

miles that the plaintiff had driven in his 2 years with

the defendant by the number of weeks in 2 years and

rounding down the resulting figure of 2211 miles. The

jury then had multiplied this weekly mileage by the
payment rate of 46 cents per mile to yield a weekly

income of $1012. By multiplying $1012 by 24 weeks (the

trial court assumed that the jury had used an estimate

of 4 weeks per month for a period of 6 months), the

jury reached the final amount of $24,288 in damages

for lost wages. The trial court determined that, although

the calculations of damages were ‘‘not reflective of

absolute precision, they nevertheless arrive at a reasonable estimate derived from the trial evidence.’’

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

to the Appellate Court. The defendant cross appealed,

claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred

by failing to set aside the jury’s damages award.3 See

Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., 210 Conn App. 686, 694, 697,

270 A.3d 786 (2022). The defendant argued that the

plaintiff had not produced any evidence to support his

claim of lost wages because his testimony was speculative, and, thus, the jury’s award of damages was not

supported by sufficient evidence. Id., 697.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the

award. Id., 698. The Appellate Court cited the deferential standard of review of denials of motions for remittitur and the ‘‘clear evidence in the record from which

the jury could have arrived at its verdict and the amount

of the award of damages to the plaintiff.’’ Id. The court

also concluded that the trial court, ‘‘having observed

the trial and evaluated the testimony firsthand,’’ was

in a better position to determine ‘‘that the jury could

reasonably and legally have reached the verdict that it

did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 698–99.

This certified appeal followed.4

On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that

the Appellate Court erred in upholding the trial court’s

denial of its motion for remittitur. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff did not prove his lost wages

with reasonable certainty because the only evidence

he offered was his own ‘‘generalized and nonspecific’’

testimony. The defendant argues that, if we were to

affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment, we would be

lowering the established legal standard for proving economic damages. The defendant asserts that the Appellate Court departed from the requirement that damages

be proven with reasonable certainty by applying the less

stringent standard of a reasonable estimate.5 We disagree.

Our review is guided by the following principles. In

considering the trial court’s decision whether to order

remittitur, a reviewing court must be mindful that ‘‘[t]he

court’s broad power to order a remittitur should be

exercised only when it is manifest that the jury [has

awarded damages that] are contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court’s explicit and

unchallenged instructions.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Ashmore v. Hartford Hospital, 331 Conn. 777,
782, 208 A.3d 256 (2019). ‘‘[T]he decision whether to

reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter

of law . . . rests solely within the discretion of the

trial court. . . . [Consequently], the proper standard

of review . . . is that of an abuse of discretion. . . .

[T]he ruling of the trial court . . . is entitled to great

weight and every reasonable presumption should be

given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 783.

In the present case, the trial court’s denial of the

motion for remittitur was based on its determination

that the evidence was sufficient to support the damages

award. The law governing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency in this context is well settled. ‘‘Damages are

recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords

a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money

with reasonable certainty. . . . [T]he court must have

evidence by which it can calculate the damages, which

is not merely subjective or speculative . . . but which

allows for some objective ascertainment of the amount.

. . . This certainly does not mean that mathematical

exactitude is a precondition to an award of damages,

but we do require that the evidence, with such certainty

as the nature of the particular case may permit, lay

a foundation [that] will enable the trier to make a fair

and reasonable estimate.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v.

Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 253–54, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014);

see also Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249

Conn. 523, 554, 733 A.2d 197 (1999) (‘‘[d]amages are

recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords

a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money

with reasonable certainty’’ (emphasis added)).

Although the Appellate Court relied on the trial

court’s characterization of the damages award as a ‘‘reasonable estimate’’ without citing the reasonable certainty standard of proof; (emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted) Roach v. Transwaste, Inc.,

supra, 210 Conn. App. 698; as the preceding discussion

demonstrates, our case law links the standard of reasonable certainty to the ability to make a reasonable estimate. See, e.g., Weiss v. Smulders, supra, 313 Conn.

253–54 (using both terms); Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn.

375, 441, 78 A.3d 76 (2013) (same); American Diamond

Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 510–11, 28

A.3d 976 (2011) (same); see also Connecticut Civil Jury

Instructions 4.5-4, available at https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/

Civil.pdf (last visited July 26, 2023); Connecticut Civil

Jury Instructions, supra, 4.5-8. The ‘‘reasonable estimate’’ benchmark has consistently appeared in our

cases assessing damages awards since the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421,

463, 948 A.2d 982 (2008); Hedderman v. Robert Hall of

Waterbury, Inc., 145 Conn. 410, 414, 144 A.2d 60 (1958);

Ball v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549,

551, 143 A. 855 (1928). The term ‘‘reasonable certainty’’
in this context therefore requires only evidence that is

sufficient to enable the fact finder to arrive at a reasonable estimate and thereby remove the award from the

realm of speculation. See, e.g., Carrano v. Yale-New

Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 650, 904 A.2d 149 (2006)

(‘‘[p]roof of damages should be established with reasonable certainty and not speculatively and problematically’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. State v.

Nunes, 260 Conn. 649, 672, 800 A.2d 23 1160 (2002)

(term ‘‘reasonable medical certainty’’ means ‘‘reasonable medical probability standard,’’ which is standard

that is applied to ensure that expert opinions are not

based on mere speculation or conjecture).

The fact that a damages award is premised exclusively on testimonial evidence, as it was in the present

case, does not, in and of itself, render the evidence

insufficient to meet the reasonable certainty standard.

Rather, ‘‘testimonial evidence is sufficient to support

an award of economic damages, provided the jury’s

reliance on this evidence is reasonable.’’ Carrano v.

Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 279 Conn. 647. ‘‘[E]xcept

in rare instances, there is no requirement that a [witness’]

testimony be corroborated by other evidence.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘We [have seen] no reason

why the traditional tests of credibility, testimony under

oath and cross-examination, coupled with the claimant’s burden of proof, are insufficient to measure the

accuracy and reliability of testimonial evidence concerning economic damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 647–48; see also Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 37, 60 A.3d

222 (2013) (concluding that it was reasonable for jury

to credit plaintiff’s unsubstantiated testimony on loss

of earning capacity); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Raffile, 225

Conn. 223, 236–37, 622 A.2d 564 (1993) (testimony without corroborating evidence was sufficient to recover

uninsured motorist benefits).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue

of whether the plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to

remove the damages award from the realm of speculation. We agree with the Appellate Court’s endorsement

of the trial court’s explanation as to why the jury had

sufficient evidence before it to meet this standard. See

Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., supra, 210 Conn. App. 698–

99. The plaintiff proved to the jury’s satisfaction that

he was wrongfully terminated from his employment,

that the defendant owed him lost wages for the subsequent period of roughly six months when he was unemployed, and that the distances and per mile amounts

to which he testified accurately represented his former

workload and compensation. The jury used these

proven facts to calculate a reasonable estimate, consistent with the evidence before it, of the amount of the

plaintiff’s lost wages.

The defendant argues that the damages award was
improperly speculative because it required the jury to

guess at the number of miles that the plaintiff drove

for the defendant, the duration of his unemployment,

and how the weather may have affected his workload.

We disagree. We make two additional comments to

supplement the trial court’s detailed explanation for

how the jury likely arrived at the damages amount

awarded. First, although it may have been possible for

the plaintiff to have provided a greater degree of specificity as to how many weeks he was unemployed, rather

than his approximation of six months, the jury appears

to have awarded damages on the low end of the range

of a reasonable estimate. The jury awarded lost wages

for twenty-four weeks, whereas six months equates to

twenty-six weeks. Second, the two year average from

which the weekly mileage for lost wages was calculated

was a sufficiently lengthy period to account for variances in the weather.

This is not a case in which ‘‘we cannot know how

or why the jury arrived at its determination of damages.’’

Caruso v. Quickie Cab Co., 48 Conn. App. 459, 462,

709 A.2d 1154 (1998). Nor is the award based on an

unresolved contingency, as the defendant contends.6

Given that the plaintiff’s pay was based on factors such

as mileage that varied from week to week, it was not

feasible to ascertain the exact amount he would have

earned if not for the wrongful termination of his employment. The jury, however, based its award on figures

drawn directly from uncontroverted testimony, and the

method it employed for its calculations is set forth in the

jury interrogatories form. Consequently, the damages

award was not based on speculation or guesswork. But

cf. Bronson & Townsend Co. v. Battistoni, 167 Conn.

321, 326–27, 355 A.2d 299 (1974) (rejecting claim for

damages when there was no formula for calculating

claimant’s bonus and claimant ‘‘failed to allege or even

to submit any testimony as to what constituted a reasonable bonus, leaving the trial court without basis by

which to accord him relief’’). Rather, the plaintiff proved

his damages to a reasonable certainty by providing nonspeculative evidence from which the jury derived a fair

and reasonable estimate.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 A more comprehensive discussion of the merits of the underlying case

is set forth in the Appellate Court’s decision. See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc.,

210 Conn. App. 686, 688–91, 697–99, 270 A.3d 786 (2022).

2 General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 31-51q provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any

employer . . . who subjects any employee to . . . discharge on account

of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment

to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the

Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or

materially interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the

working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable

to such employee for damages caused by such . . . discharge, including

punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs of

any such action for damages. . . .’’

3 The plaintiff’s appeal challenged the trial court’s calculation of attorney’s
fees. The defendant’s cross appeal challenged the judgment on the merits

and as to damages. See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., 210 Conn App. 686,

688–89, 270 A.3d 786 (2022). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s

calculation of attorney’s fees but affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to

liability and damages. See id., 689. Only the defendant’s claim regarding

damages is at issue in this appeal.

4 This court granted certification, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the

Appellate Court correctly conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow

the jury to award the plaintiff future lost damages?’’ Roach v. Transwaste,

Inc., 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 1212 (2022). Although the plaintiff, in his brief

to this court, challenges the framing of the issue in terms of ‘‘future’’ lost

damages, we need not address this contention in light of our conclusion

that the defendant cannot prevail on appeal.

5 The reasonable estimate language set forth in the Appellate Court’s

decision was a direct quote from the trial court’s memorandum of decision.

See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., supra, 210 Conn App. 698. The defendant

made no claim in its cross appeal to the Appellate Court that the trial

court had applied an incorrect legal standard. The defendant’s insufficient

evidence claim nonetheless requires us to assess the evidence against the

proper legal standard.

6 The defendant argues that, because the plaintiff acknowledged that the

weather influenced the amount he drove from week to week and subsequently the amount he was paid, the award was impermissibly predicated

on a contingency. The contingency cases that the defendant cites in support

of its argument, however, are distinguishable from the present case because

they involved questions whose unresolved outcomes necessarily required

speculation as to damages. See, e.g., Leisure Resort Technology, Inc. v.

Trading Cove Associates, 277 Conn. 21, 36, 889 A.2d 785 (2006) (rejecting

award of damages based on market values that assumed incomplete sales

agreement would be consummated); Lewis v. Hartford Dredging Co., 68

Conn. 221, 234–37, 35 A. 1127 (1896) (rejecting award of damages based on

projected market value of oyster beds, which, in turn, assumed successful

cultivation thereof).