FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 29, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-15869

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-21566-CV-ASG

NOEL DOORBAL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Walter A. McNeil, Secretary,

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(June 29, 2009)

Before BIRCH, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a spree of murder and mayhem so heinous and bizarre

that one would expect to see it only in a crime drama on television, but the only

issue of law presented by this appeal borders on frivolous. Noel Doorbal was

sentenced to death in Florida following his convictions of armed robbery,

racketeering, armed kidnapping, first-degree arson, grand theft, burglary of a

dwelling, and murder. Doorbal appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. The district court ruled that Doorbal’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel was barred from federal review because the Supreme Court

of Florida had applied a state rule of procedure to refuse to adjudicate his claim on

collateral review. Because that procedural rule was an adequate and independent

ground under state law for refusing to adjudicate Doorbal’s claim, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

We divide our discussion of the background in two parts. We first discuss

Doorbal’s crimes. We then discuss the procedural history of Doorbal’s appeals in

state and federal court. 

A. Doorbal’s Crime Spree

 Doorbal’s convictions stemmed from extortion plots aimed at two

individuals: Marc Schiller and Frank Griga. In 1994, Marc Schiller, a wealthy

businessman in Miami, hired Jorge Delgado to work for his company, which

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provided services reimbursed by Medicare. Doorbal v. State (Doorbal II), 983

So.2d 464, 469 (Fla. 2008). Delgado later purchased the portion of the business

that received Medicare reimbursements. Id. In October 1994, Daniel Lugo, a

friend of Delgado who often performed the billing for the Medicare business,

convinced Delgado that Schiller had cheated them out of money they were owed

in connection with the business. Id. Delgado asked Lugo to do whatever was

necessary to recover the money due them. Id. Lugo contacted Doorbal and two

other individuals and devised a plot to kidnap Schiller and force him to sign over

his assets to settle the alleged debt. Id. at 469–70. 

On November 15, 1994, Doorbal and his accomplices abducted Schiller by

shocking him with a stun gun and forcing him into a van. Id. at 470. The

kidnappers handcuffed and blindfolded Schiller and took him to a warehouse at

gunpoint. Id. Lugo, Doorbal, and the other kidnappers demanded Schiller make a

list of his assets, and when he refused, they slapped him, shocked him with a stun

gun, and beat him with a firearm. Id. When he continued to refuse to list his

assets, they threatened him with a game of Russian Roulette and threatened to

abduct his wife and rape her in his presence. Id. 

Schiller eventually agreed to comply with the demands of his captors if his

wife and children were allowed to leave the country unharmed. Id. Over the

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following days, Schiller signed a quitclaim deed for his home and various

documents that granted access to his checking, savings, and IRA accounts, and he

changed the beneficiaries on his insurance policies, which were worth millions of

dollars. Id. While the kidnappers held Schiller captive, Doorbal and Lugo went to

Schiller’s home and removed furnishings and other items. Id. Doorbal and the

others used Schiller’s credit cards to charge thousands of dollars in expenses. Id. 

The kidnappers also stole money from Schiller’s home safe. Id. 

After three weeks, Delgado and Doorbal convinced Lugo that Schiller could

likely identify his kidnappers and should be killed. Id. They forced Schiller to

drink alcohol, drove his vehicle into a utility pole on a Miami street, and placed

Schiller in the front seat of the vehicle so that it would appear that he had been

involved in a drunk driving accident. Id. Doorbal and Lugo then poured gasoline

on the vehicle and set it on fire. Id. 

Schiller escaped the vehicle and was staggering in the roadway when

Doorbal and Lugo persuaded another kidnapper to drive a car over Schiller. Id. 

Doorbal and the other kidnappers then fled the scene. Id. Schiller survived and

was taken to a Miami hospital, where he received treatment for a broken pelvis,

ruptured bladder, bruises and burns, and temporary paralysis. Id. at 470–71. 

When the kidnappers learned that Schiller had survived the attack, they

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visited the Miami hospital with the intent to suffocate Schiller with a pillow. Id. at

471. Schiller was not at the hospital because, based on fears for his safety, he had

arranged to be airlifted to a New York hospital. Id. After they discovered that

Schiller was no longer in Miami, Doorbal and the others ransacked Schiller’s

home and pillaged the remainder of Schiller’s furnishings and valuables, but

Doorbal’s crime spree did not end there. Id. 

In 1995, Doorbal learned from his girlfriend about Frank Griga, a wealthy

Miami businessman, and became “enthralled” with Griga’s wealth and

possessions, including a yellow Lamborghini car. Doorbal v. State (Doorbal I),

837 So. 2d 940, 948 (Fla. 2003). Doorbal targeted Griga for kidnapping and

extortion, recruited Lugo, and arranged a business meeting with Griga under the

guise of discussing Griga’s interest in investing in telephone lines in India. Id. 

Griga showed little interest, but Doorbal and Lugo persisted and visited Griga’s

home twice in May of 1995. On the second visit, they invited Griga to dinner and

lured Griga and his girlfriend, Krisztina Furton, to Doorbal’s apartment. Id. 

The next day, Delgado met Lugo and Doorbal at Doorbal’s apartment, and

Lugo informed Delgado that Doorbal had killed Griga following a scuffle. Id. at

949. During the scuffle, Furton began to scream when she realized that Griga was

injured. Id. Lugo subdued her with an injection of Rompun, a horse tranquilizer,

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handcuffed her, and Doorbal and Lugo then questioned her about the security code

for Griga’s home. Id. When Furton refused to answer, Doorbal injected her with

more Rompun, and Furton eventually died. Id. 

Doorbal and the others then transferred the bodies to a warehouse, where

they dismembered the bodies using a chain saw and hatchet. Id. at 950. They

attempted to burn the heads, hands, and feet of Griga and Furton, but were

unsuccessful. Id. They disposed of the bodies, which were later recovered and

identified. Id. at 950–51. 

B. Procedural History

Doorbal was arrested and, at trial, was convicted of two counts of firstdegree murder, conspiracy to commit racketeering, racketeering, two counts of

kidnapping, armed kidnapping, attempted extortion, two counts of grand theft,

attempted first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, first-degree

arson, armed extortion, and conspiracy to commit a first-degree felony. For each

murder, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four, and the

trial court sentenced Doorbal to death for each murder.

Doorbal unsuccessfully raised several issues in his direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences, including the erroneous admission of character

evidence. Id. at 954. Doorbal argued “that harmful error occurred when various

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witnesses for the State made statements” about Doorbal’s bad character. Id. 

Because Doorbal failed to object to the testimony at trial, the Supreme Court of

Florida reviewed the admission of the testimony under the standard for

“fundamental error, . . . which requires that an offending comment ‘reach[ ] down

into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury

recommendation of death could not have been obtained without the assistance of

the alleged error.’” Id. at 954–55 (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501,

505 (Fla. 1999)). The court stated that it “doubt[ed] the[] relevancy” of the

statements, but their admission was not fundamental error because the comments

were “relatively isolated” and other evidence of guilt was “overwhelming.” Id. at

956. 

The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected Doorbal’s challenges to the

prosecutor’s closing arguments during the guilt and penalty phases. Doorbal

challenged arguments by the prosecutor in the guilt phase that commented on

Doorbal’s right to remain silent. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that

the arguments were not fundamental error because they “did not affect the jury’s

verdict” in the light of the “magnitude of physical and testimonial evidence” of

Doorbal’s crimes. Id. at 957. Doorbal also argued that arguments by the

prosecutor “violated the prohibition against ‘Golden Rule’ arguments, [which]

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asked jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim.” Id. The court

concluded that, in the light of the “mountain of . . . evidence [that] established

Doorbal’s responsibility for the crimes,” the remarks did not “affect the jury’s

verdict” and did not rise to the level of fundamental error. Id. Doorbal also

argued that arguments by the prosecutor during the penalty phase that urged the

jury to show “no mercy” constituted fundamental error, but the court disagreed

and stated that, “while erroneous, the prosecutor’s ‘no mercy’ comments do not

rise to the level of error such that the jury’s recommendation of death could not

have been made without reliance upon them.” Id. at 958–59. The Supreme Court

of Florida affirmed Doorbal’s convictions and sentences. Id. at 963. 

Doorbal then filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.851 and raised 21 grounds, including a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing

arguments that were the subject of the direct appeal. Doorbal II, 983 So. 2d at 473

& n.2. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on one claim that involved

trial counsel’s failure to obtain a mental health evaluation. Id. at 474. The trial

court “denied the other claims as either meritless, procedurally barred, or

insufficiently pled.” Id. 

The trial court rejected Doorbal’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

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about the failure to object to the closing arguments of the prosecutor. The trial

court ruled that the claim about the prosecutor’s arguments during the guilt phase

was foreclosed because the standard for prejudice, under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 691–92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066–67 (1984),

was the same as that for fundamental error and the Supreme Court of Florida had

ruled on direct appeal that the prosecutor’s arguments were not fundamental error. 

The court also rejected Doorbal’s claim about the failure to object to the

prosecutor’s “no mercy” argument during the penalty phase.

An evidentiary hearing was held on Doorbal’s claim about counsel’s failure

to obtain a mental health evaluation, but Doorbal declined to present witnesses. 

Doorbal II, 983 So. 2d at 475. The trial court “concluded that Doorbal had failed

to produce a primary basis for relief on [the mental health] claim . . . and denied

the claim.” Id. On February 16, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying

Doorbal’s amended motion. Id. 

Doorbal appealed the denial of postconviction relief to the Supreme Court

of Florida and “present[ed] six claims on review,” including the denial of his

claims without an evidentiary hearing and the form of the order of the trial court. 

Id. at 475–89. As to the merits of Doorbal’s claims, the Supreme Court of Florida

“conclude[d] that this issue [wa]s insufficiently pled” because Doorbal failed to

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“state[] the substance of any of the claims that were summarily denied [and failed

to] provide[] an explanation why summary denial was inappropriate or what

factual determination was required.” Id. at 482. Because Doorbal also failed to

preserve the underlying claim for review on appeal, the “claim [wa]s waived.” Id.

at 482–83. The Supreme Court of Florida stated that “[v]arious claims raised by

Doorbal in this 3.851 proceeding were plagued by a lack of sufficiency in that

Doorbal failed to allege a specific omission or overt act upon which his claim of

ineffective assistance was based.” Id. at 483. The court even went so far as to use

Doorbal’s pleading deficiencies as a warning for other counsel who represent

postconviction movants sentenced to death:

[T]he rule 3.851 proceedings in the trial court, and on appeal before this

Court, have been plagued by generality and lack of specificity. . . . We

strongly reiterate to those who represent capital defendants in

postconviction proceedings that claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel must comply with the pleading requirements enunciated by this

Court . . . to be legally sufficient under the rule.

Id. at 484. 

Doorbal argued that “the form of the order denying relief fails to provide

[the Florida Supreme] Court with guidance for appellate review because it does

not reference hearings, transcripts, or any portion of the record[,]” but the Supreme

Court of Florida rejected this argument. Id. at 489. The Supreme Court of Florida

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concluded that the order of the trial court “provide[d] a specific basis why the trial

court denied each claim without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The court also stated

that “the adequacy of the summary denial order is arguably moot” because the

court had determined that Doorbal failed to preserve that claim and it was waived. 

Id. at 489 n.12. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying

postconviction relief. Id. at 500.

Doorbal then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district

court and presented, among others, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel based on the failure to object to the closing arguments by the prosecutor. 

The district court rejected Doorbal’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

because the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida that the claim was waived

was an independent and adequate ground under state law that barred federal

review. The district court stated that, because “the Florida Supreme Court

imposed a procedural bar to Doorbal’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel,

this claim [wa]s not properly before [the district court] for habeas review.” The

district court also ruled alternatively that Doorbal’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel failed on the merits. The district court concluded that the decision of

the state trial court on collateral review that Doorbal failed to prove prejudice

because he failed to establish fundamental error on direct appeal was not contrary

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to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691–92, 104 S.

Ct. at 2064, 2066–67. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1298

(11th Cir. 2008). The district court nevertheless granted a certificate of

appealability for Doorbal’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In habeas proceedings, this Court reviews the findings of the district court

for clear error and “its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de

novo.” Parker v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 2003).

“[W]hether a particular claim is subject to the doctrine of procedural default . . . is

a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.” Judd v. Haley, 250

F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION

“It is well established that federal courts will not review questions of federal

law presented in a habeas petition when the state court’s decision rests upon a

state-law ground that ‘is independent of the federal question and adequate to

support the judgment.’” Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2009) (quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (1991)). The

Supreme Court has “held that when a petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in

compliance with relevant state procedural rules, the state court’s refusal to

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adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and adequate state

ground for denying federal review.” Id. The adequacy of the procedural bar is not

a matter of state law, but “is itself a federal question.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

We apply a three-part test to determine whether the state decision rested

upon an “independent and adequate” ground under state law:

First, the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must clearly

and expressly state that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve

the federal claim without reaching the merits of that claim. Secondly,

the state court’s decision must rest solidly on state law grounds, and may

not be “intertwined with an interpretation of federal law.” Finally, the

state procedural rule must be adequate; i.e., it must not be applied in an

arbitrary or unprecedented fashion [or be manifestly unfair]. 

Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

In his brief and at oral argument, Doorbal urged us to consider first the

merits of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but in Lambrix v.

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1523 (1997), the Supreme Court

explained that we are ordinarily bound to consider first any issue of procedural

default:

A State’s procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly

administration of its criminal courts; when a federal court permits them

to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice system. We do

not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be

resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.

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The district court concluded that it could not review Doorbal’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel because of his procedural default in his appeal before the

Supreme Court of Florida, and Doorbal fails to provide a sound reason for varying

from the ordinary rule of reviewing that issue first. 

Doorbal presents two arguments about his procedural default. First,

Doorbal argues that the procedural rule applied by the Supreme Court of Florida to

bar his claim was not “firmly established and consistently applied.” Second,

Doorbal argues that he appealed only the sufficiency of the order by the trial court

that denied his postconviction motion and did not address the merits of the issues

he alleged in that motion. Both arguments fail.

The Supreme Court of Florida followed its well-established rule when it

concluded that Doorbal’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was waived

because he failed to present an argument about the merits of that issue on appeal. 

Doorbal II, 983 So. 2d at 482. The court cited Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 800

(Fla. 2006), for the procedural rule “that vague and conclusory allegations on

appeal are insufficient to warrant relief” and concluded that Doorbal’s attack on

the merits of the order of the trial court was waived because he “neither state[d]

the substance of any of the claims that were summarily denied, nor provide[d] an

explanation why summary denial was inappropriate or what factual determination

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was required on each claim.” Doorbal II, 983 So. 2d at 482–83. That procedural

rule has been applied regularly in Florida courts. Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d

1100, 1111 n.12 (Fla. 2006) (“We also find that Simmons’ claim that the

prosecutor made improper remarks concerning the mtDNA evidence on Simmons’

car seat is waived because Simmons’ counsel did not properly brief this issue for

appeal.”); Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121, 133 (Fla. 2002) (“Because

Lawrence’s bare claim is unsupported by argument, this Court affirms the trial

court’s summary denial of this subclaim.”); Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 609

n.7 (Fla. 2002) (“Carroll alleges that the trial court erred in summarily denying

claims . . . in his amended 3.850 motion as being procedurally barred or without

merit. On appeal, however, Carroll fails to assert any definitive argument as to

this issue. Thus, we find this issue is insufficiently presented for review.”); Shere

v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999) (Because “Shere did not present any

argument or allege on what grounds the trial court erred in denying [his] claims[,

w]e find that these claims are insufficiently presented for review.”); Duest v.

Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990) (“Merely making reference to arguments

below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these

claims are deemed to have been waived.”); Denmark v. State, 116 So. 757, 759

(Fla. 1928) (“[A]ssignments of error . . . may likewise be treated as abandoned . . .

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because the brief contains no argument, principle of law, or citation of authority in

support of the assignments.”). The rule satisfies the requirement that it be “firmly

established and regularly followed” to be an independent and adequate ground

under state law. See Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Doorbal fails to present any argument that would allow him to overcome his

procedural default. “Because [the procedural] rule was an independent and

adequate state ground, we are barred from habeas review of [Doorbal’s]

ineffective-trial-counsel claim[] unless he shows cause and prejudice to overcome

[Florida’s] procedural bar.” Id. at 1314. If Doorbal cannot prove cause and

prejudice, “he . . . must show that but for constitutional error at his sentencing

hearing, no reasonable juror could have found him eligible for the death penalty

under [state] law.” Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Doorbal has failed to allege cause and

prejudice or actual innocence that would excuse the procedural default of his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and “[h]e is therefore barred from

raising it now.” See Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 810 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Doorbal’s alternative argument that he did not default under the state rule of

procedure because he did not appeal the merits of the order of the trial court fares

no better. Doorbal argues that he “elect[ed] to pursue an appeal that attacked the

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sufficiency of the order rather than the merits,” but if that is true, then Doorbal

failed to exhaust his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his petition still

is barred from federal review. A state prisoner may not seek federal habeas review

unless he has “exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1781 (“A claim is procedurally

barred when it has not been fairly presented to the state courts for their initial

consideration . . . .”). “[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an

opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court

in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728,

1731 (1999). The Supreme Court has explained that exhaustion requires a round

of appellate review: 

Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a

full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before

those claims are presented to the federal courts, we conclude that state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.

Id. at 845, 119 S. Ct. at 1732. If Doorbal failed to appeal the denial of his claim of

ineffective assistance on the merits, then he failed to exhaust his state remedies. 

Doorbal faces a double-edged sword. Either argument he advances leads to

the same conclusion: His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred from

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federal review. The district court did not err when it denied his petition. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The denial of Doorbal’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

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