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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Camaro Sue Sim-Reisewitz,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan and Attorney General of 

the State of Arizona, 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-08146-PCT-DJH

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

issued by United States Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett (Doc. 18) on August 3, 2016. 

In an even-handed and well-reasoned R & R, Judge Willett recommended denial of this 

Petition and dismissal with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge “further recommended that a 

certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied 

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right in h[er] claims for relief. (Id. at 16:24-26 6:12-15) (emphasis omitted). Thereafter, 

the R & R expressly informed the parties that they were entitled to "file specific written 

objections with the Court[]" within fourteen days from the date of service of that R & R. 

(Doc. 18) at 17:3) (citations omitted). 

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 On August 11, 2006, Petitioner timely filed what she titled a “Reply to Report and 

Recommendation.” (Doc. 19 at 1). Given the time frame within this was filed, and the 

fact that Petitioner has not filed any other documents, the Court is construing Petitioner’s 

“Reply” as her objections to the R & R. 

I. Standard of Review for Report and Recommendation 

 The relevant provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), 

“does not on its face require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1989); see also United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) ("Neither the Constitution 

nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations 

that the parties themselves accept as correct."). Conversely, a "district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 

objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

emphasis added) ("A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report . . . or recommendations to which objection is made.") “Although 

the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the matter, other circuits and district courts within 

the Ninth Circuit have held when a petitioner raises a general objection to an R & R, 

rather than specific objections, the Court is relieved of any obligation to review it.” 

Martin v. Ryan, 2014 WL 5432133, at *2 (D.Ariz. 2014) (citing See, e.g., Warling v. 

Ryan, 2013 WL 5276367, at *2 (D.Ariz. 2013) (“[A] general objection ‘has the same 

effect as would a failure to object.’”); Gutierrez v. Flannican, 2006 WL 2816599 

(D.Ariz. 2006) (citing Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984); Lockert v. Faulkner, 

843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir.1988); Howard v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 932 

F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F .3d 1057, 

1060 (10th Cir.1996)). 

II. Petitioner’s Failure to Make Specific Objections 

 This line of precedent is persuasive, especially taking into account the purpose of 

the specific objection requirement. The “obvious purpose” of this requirement “is 

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judicial economy—to permit magistrate judges to hear and resolve matters not 

objectionable to the parties.” Warling, 2013 WL 5276367, at *2. (citing Thomas, 474 

U.S. at 149; Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121). “Because de novo review of an entire R & 

R would defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection “has the same 

effect as would a failure to object.” Id. (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 509; Haley v. 

Stewart, 2006 WL 1980649, at *2 (D.Ariz. 2006)). 

 In the present case, in her two-page Reply, Petitioner did not specifically object to 

any part of the R & R, such as its factual recitation or legal conclusions. Rather, her 

Reply can best be characterized as a general objection wherein Petitioner merely 

reiterates her view that, among other things, she did not voluntarily consent to the search 

of her home, and that her trial attorney was ineffective because he did not move to sever 

her trial from that of her husband, a co-defendant.1

 In other words, Petitioner’s Reply is 

nothing more than a reassertion of the merits of her Petition. Thus, absent any specific 

objection, the Court has no obligation to and will not review Petitioner’s general 

objection. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Willett’s R & R (Doc. 18) is accepted 

and adopted as the order of this Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

 

1

 The R & R thoroughly analyzed both of these issues and soundly reasoned that they were without merit. See Doc. 18 at 9-16. Representative of this sound analysis is the Judge’s own review of the transcript from the evidentiary hearing which the trial court conducted on Petitioner’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever her trial from that of her co-defendant husband. See id. at 13:13-14:11. 

Based upon such review, the Judge correctly found that “trial counsel’s decision not to 

file a motion to sever was based on a ‘carefully considered, deliberately undertaken strategy, the likes of which [a court] cannot second-guess on federal habeas review.’” Id. (quoting Ayala v. Chappell, --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 3913446, at *10 (9th Cir. July 20, 2016)). 

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on appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

Dated this 9th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge 

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