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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Maria Magdalena Ruiz-Celaya, 

Defendant. 

No. CR-15-01160-003-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Defendant Maria Magdalena Ruiz-Celaya has filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

and Offer of Proof urging the Court to allow her to present a duress defense at trial. 

(Docs. 105 and 113.) The Court now considers this motion, the government’s response 

(Doc. 114), and Ruiz-Celaya’s reply (Doc. 118). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The present motion stems from a criminal indictment charging Ruiz-Celaya with 

conspiring to export a firearm and possession of a firearm while present in the United 

States under a non-immigrant visa. (Doc. 1; Doc. 114 at 2.) The relevant events began 

on February 13, 2015, when Ruiz-Celaya’s husband was arrested by U.S. authorities for 

various weapons violations. (Doc. 105 at 4.) Ruiz-Celaya maintains that at the time of 

her husband’s arrest, her husband worked for a Mexican cartel and was tasked with 

obtaining a gun and transferring it to members of the cartel. (Doc. 105 at 4.) RuizCase 2:15-cr-01160-NVW Document 128 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 12
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Celaya further maintains that she herself had nothing to do with any of her husband’s 

weapons trafficking prior to that point. (Id.; Doc. 113, ¶ 3.) 

 By Ruiz-Celaya’s account, the day of her husband’s arrest she was contacted by 

Ruben Parada-Ortega, a member of her husband’s cartel.1

 (Doc. 105 at 4; Doc. 114 at 1.) 

Parada-Ortega and his associates initially did not have her contact information; to track 

her down they first showed up to her sister’s home in Mexico and warned her sister that 

“things would get very ugly for her family” if they could not get in touch with RuizCelaya. (Doc. 105 at 5; Doc. 113, ¶ 5.) This was apparently fruitful for them, because 

Parada-Ortega later called Ruiz-Celaya “demanding she produce either [a replacement] 

weapon or $20,000.” (Doc. 105 at 4.) Ruiz-Celaya maintains she did not have $20,000. 

(Doc. 113, ¶ 3.) By her account, Ruiz-Celaya received threats of “harm to [herself], her 

children and/or her family in Mexico if she did not comply.”2

 (Doc. 105 at 6.) In 

particular, Parada-Ortega brought up his visit to her family and his conversation with her 

sister “to highlight the people he would harm.” (Doc. 105 at 5.) Ruiz-Celaya claims that 

the cartel generally was “known for violence and could be expected to carry out their 

threats.” (Doc. 105 at 7.) 

On top of all this, Parada-Ortega told Ruiz-Celaya she had a limited amount of 

time to come up with a replacement weapon, though Ruiz-Celaya’s account leaves it 

unclear how much time she actually believed she had. At one point in her proffer, RuizCelaya asserts she “was given an hour to find” a replacement weapon. (Doc. 113, ¶ 4; 

Doc. 105 at 4-5.) However, as the government points out (and Ruiz-Celaya does not 

dispute), it was fully three days after her husband’s arrest that she finally purchased a .50 

 

1

 According to Ruiz-Celaya, Parada-Ortega identified himself at the time only as “R” leaving her unaware of his true identity, though she did know right away that “R,” whoever he was, also worked with her husband’s cartel. (Doc. 105 at 7.) 

2

 At oral argument on this motion, Ruiz-Celaya clarified that she was first called on February 13 shortly after her husband’s arrest and told that the cartel knew about his 

arrest and would be in touch with her again. She maintains she was called again the next day, and during the course of this phone conversation was instructed that if she did not 

purchase a replacement weapon, her children would be hurt. 

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caliber rifle from a local gun seller, the transaction underlying her present charges.3 

(Doc. 114 at 2.) In any case there is no dispute that Ruiz-Celaya, with the help of her codefendants, made the weapon purchase on February 16, 2015. (Doc. 114 at 1-2.) RuizCelaya does not offer many details about what took place in the interim, but she does 

contend that she was being closely monitored by Parada-Ortega, who, for at least some of 

the time, “kept calling her so that she could update him of what was happening.”4

 (Doc. 

105 at 5.) Moreover, she maintains that because her family lived in Mexico, and because 

she did not know the identity of Parada-Ortega at the time, she believed that contacting 

authorities “would result in harm to her or her family.” (Doc. 105 at 8.) 

After buying the weapon, Ruiz-Celaya received a call from a male who did not 

identify himself to her but was later identified by authorities as Miguel Angel RodeloCota. (Doc. 114 at 2.) Rodelo-Cota, apparently also involved with the same cartel, gave 

Ruiz-Celaya specific instructions for delivering the weapon to him, which she did. (Doc. 

105 at 9; Doc. 114 at 2.) In its motion to preclude, the government maintains that RuizCelaya herself “stated that Rodelo-Cota had provided [Ruiz-Celaya] the money to 

purchase the rifle.” (Doc. 114 at 2.) Ruiz-Celaya, however, contends in no uncertain 

terms “that she did not receive any money for buying the gun,” and insists “[h]er only 

motive for committing this crime was an immediate fear of death or serious injury to 

herself or family.”5

 (Doc. 105 at 9.) 

 On at least two occasions over the next six days, Ruiz-Celaya spoke with federal 

 

3

 The government acknowledges that the one-hour deadline Ruiz-Celaya was given may have been imposed on her at some point on the day of the weapon purchase itself—though Ruiz-Celaya’s account leaves it unclear whether this is the case. (See 

Doc. 114 at 6; Doc. 105 at 4.) 

4

 At oral argument, Ruiz-Celaya noted that shortly after her husband’s arrest, federal agents showed up at her house to investigate his alleged crimes—after which Parada-Ortega contacted her letting her know he was aware the authorities had come to 

her house. By Ruiz-Celaya’s account, this and other similar events suggested to her that she was being closely monitored during this time. 

5

 Ruiz-Celaya clarified at oral argument that just prior to the gun buy, she was in fact instructed to meet an unidentified individual who gave her cash to purchase the weapon. However, she contends that it was only enough for the purchase and that she did not receive any additional payment for completing it. 

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agents about the events that took place. Ruiz-Celaya contends that “Agent Reports dated 

February 16 and February 22, 2015, show that Mrs. Celaya-Ruiz [sic] immediately 

assisted in the investigation and told agents about what had happened.” (Doc. 105 at 8.) 

Ruiz-Celaya does not mention who initiated either of these encounters. The government, 

however, contends that agents conducted a non-custodial interview with her on February 

20, 2015, in which she allegedly stated that Rodelo-Cota gave her money to make the gun 

purchase. (Doc. 114 at 2.) The government also notes that Ruiz-Celaya took part in 

another interview with law enforcement agents on February 22, 2015, which the 

government points out is the basis for Ruiz-Celaya’s duress defense. (Id.) 

In her initial proffer of a duress defense, Ruiz-Celaya included as an exhibit a 

copy of an ICE Report of Investigation dated March 4, 2015, which notes two interviews 

with her conducted by ICE agents, one on February 20, 2015, and one on February 22, 

2015. (Doc. 85-1.) The report memorializes scant details of the February 20 interview in 

two short paragraphs, noting only that Ruiz-Celaya told agents she had been instructed by 

someone identifying himself as “R” to buy the .50 caliber rifle. (Id. at 3.) The report 

reveals she contacted authorities the next day, February 21, saying she was scared that 

this unknown individual kept contacting her. (Id.) The report makes no mention of 

Rodelo-Cota or whether Ruiz-Celaya was given any money to buy the gun. The report 

provides greater detail for the February 22 interview, including a lengthy written 

conversation between Ruiz-Celaya and “R” via WhatsApp. (Id. at 3-6.) Ruiz-Celaya 

told the agents she did not feel personally threatened by him, but that she was worried he 

would harm her family in Mexico since he knew where they lived. (Id. at 3.) The report 

states that after the interview, agents suggested Ruiz-Celaya move to a different location 

for a few days, but that Ruiz-Celaya insisted on remaining at her house. (Id. at 6.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

Duress is a common-law defense “that allows a jury to find that the defendant’s 

conduct is excused, even though the government has carried its burden of proof” at trial. 

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United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931, 947 (9th Cir. 2012). To be able to raise 

duress as a defense at trial at all, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing of 

duress in a pre-trial offer of proof. United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 

802 (9th Cir. 2008). This is to ensure the defense is relevant and does not merely confuse 

the jury; “the constitutional right to testify . . . does not authorize a defendant to present 

irrelevant testimony.” United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Duress requires a showing of three elements: “(1) an immediate threat of death or 

serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) 

lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.” Vasquez-Landaver, 527 

F.3d at 802 (quoting Moreno, 102 F.3d at 997). The government here only disputes 

elements (1) and (3). (Doc. 114 at 4.) 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Duress Elements 

1. Immediacy 

The first element of duress, immediacy, “requires that there be some evidence that 

the threat of injury was present, immediate, or impending.” United States v. ContentoPachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The threat must be “such that the defendant’s 

persecutors ‘figuratively held a gun to his head’ (or to his family’s heads) compelling the 

defendant to commit the illegal action.” Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 802 (quoting 

United States v. Shyrock, 342 F.3d 948, 988 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[T]o be immediate, a 

threat must be specific: ‘A veiled threat of future unspecified harm will not satisfy this 

requirement.’” Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d at 948 (quoting Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 

694). Compare Shyrock, 342 F.3d at 987 (rejecting immediacy element where 

persecutors told defendant he had “thirty days to straighten out and regularly attend 

[organized crime group’s] meetings, or else they would physically assault him”), with 

Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 694 (finding triable issue as to immediacy where 

defendant was being closely monitored and an experienced criminal obtained specific 

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details about the defendant’s family and personal life such that “the consequences [of 

noncompliance] would have been immediate and harsh”). 

Ruiz-Celaya has asserted that Parada-Ortega threatened harm to her family if he 

could not get in touch with her and that “[Parada-Ortega] and his associates asked [RuizCelaya] to conduct the deal in Phoenix by use of these threats.” (Doc. 105 at 5.) RuizCelaya consistently maintains that Parada-Ortega threatened to harm her family if she did 

not comply in the weapon purchase as instructed in the specified timeframe. 

The government, however, contests these assertions on two grounds. The 

government first contends that any purported threats made to her were non-specific, the 

closest thing being Parada-Ortega’s statement to Ruiz-Celaya’s sister that “things would 

get ugly for her family” if he could not get in touch with Ruiz-Celaya, a statement that 

itself was made only to Ruiz-Celaya’s sister. (Doc. 114 at 5.) The relevant legal 

question, however, is whether Ruiz-Celaya’s rendition of the facts provides “some 

evidence” that she faced an immediate threat. See Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 694. 

The Court is satisfied it does. Ruiz-Celaya maintains not only that Parada-Ortega made 

this threat to her sister, but also that when he subsequently spoke to Ruiz-Celaya, he 

ominously mentioned his visit to her family and extended these same threats to RuizCelaya herself. Her contentions may or may not be true, but resolving disputed factual 

questions goes beyond the scope of the present motion. 

Second, and somewhat related, the government raises doubts about how RuizCelaya characterizes certain key facts. The government points specifically to one 

statement, Ruiz-Celaya’s assertion that “[Parada-Ortega] mentioned this visit to my 

family’s home in Mexico and his conversation with [my sister] to highlight the people he 

would harm.” (Doc. 114 at 5.) On the government’s view, while Ruiz-Celaya states this 

“in a way to convey that it was a threat, it is unclear whether there was an actual threat or 

whether [Parada-Ortega] merely mentioned he had spoken to the family about her . . . ” 

(Id.) The government raises a legitimate question as to how best to interpret ParadaOrtega’s statement, but this again does not detract from Ruiz-Celaya’s prima facie case. 

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By Ruiz-Celaya’s account, Parada-Ortega’s mere mention of the visit to her family 

communicated a threat of harm to them if she failed to provide him with a gun. A 

persecutor’s ability to communicate concrete details about the defendant’s family can—

and often does—constitute an immediate threat, even where the threat is not explicitly 

articulated. See, e.g., Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d at 948 (finding prima facie case of 

immediacy where persecutor “knew [the defendant’s] family’s movements and other 

intimate details that demonstrated that his family was regularly monitored”); ContentoPachon, 723 F.2d at 694 (determining immediacy was a triable issue of fact where 

persecutor “had gone to the trouble to discover that [the defendant] was married, that he 

had a child, the names of his wife and child, and the location of his residence”). RuizCelaya’s interpretation suffices to establish a prima facie immediate threat. If the 

government interprets Parada-Ortega’s statements differently, it can offer its own 

interpretation in front of a jury at trial. 

The government, however, points to United States v. Houston, in which the Ninth 

Circuit held that immediacy was not present where the alleged persecutor, who had 

ordered the defendants to carry out several prison gang murders, testified at trial “that he 

would have killed [the defendants] if they hadn’t participated” in the murders as 

instructed. 648 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2011). The court characterized the persecutor’s 

testimony as “at most a threat of future harm,” and emphasized that the defendants twice 

refused his orders, yet did not in either case face immediate repercussions. Id. 

Accordingly the court held that such “[t]hreats of non-imminent, future harm do not 

support a duress instruction.” Id. The Houston court, however, omitted a key factual 

detail from the trial court’s findings below: while the persecutor and both defendants 

testified that the persecutor would have killed the defendants for refusing to assist, the 

trial court found “there is no evidence that [the persecutor] ever threatened either 

Defendant in any way before the killings. Defendants instead rely on a generalized 

threat, arguing that it was well known that the [prison gang] would kill those who refused 

to comply with its orders.” United States v. Slocum, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 (C.D. 

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Cal. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Houston, 648 F.3d at 820. 

Houston is not applicable here for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether RuizCelaya failed to comply with any of Parada-Ortega’s instructions. If she did and 

experienced no harm (to either herself or her family), Ruiz-Celaya would indeed struggle 

to show immediacy. But unlike in Houston, there is no allegation by either side that 

Parada-Ortega or any of his associates balked at any opportunities to make good on their 

threats. Ruiz-Celaya carried out her instructions as given and has reasonably alleged that 

the threats against her were both credible and continuous. Second, Ruiz-Celaya 

maintains that Parada-Ortega made a direct threat to her specifically. Whereas the 

defendants in Houston identified no more than a general (if “well-known”) threat 

applicable to all non-compliant gang members, Ruiz-Celaya has pointed to specific 

threats made to her and her family in particular. While the government disputes the 

extent to which these threats may have motivated her actions, this does not stand in the 

way of Ruiz-Celaya making a prima facie case of immediacy. A jury can hear the 

evidence and determine which version of the facts is most credible. 

2. Escapability 

 To make out the escapability element of a duress defense, a defendant must show 

that he or she lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. ContentoPachon, 723 F.2d at 694. “[T]he inability to seek help from the local police is a relevant 

factor in assessing the opportunity to escape.” Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d at 949. 

Likewise, “the possibility of packing up and moving out of the dangerous environment, 

abandoning one’s work and displacing one’s entire family, does not necessarily present a 

reasonable opportunity for escape.” Id. The relevant inquiry is “whether [the 

defendant’s] belief was objectively reasonable . . . taking into account her particular 

circumstances.” United States v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). 

 Ruiz-Celaya argues not only that she faced a short turnaround time in which to 

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obtain the gun, but also that Parada-Ortega kept a close watch on her by, among other 

things, contacting her repeatedly. Her rendition of events, if true, would suffice to show 

she could not have fled or otherwise withdrawn from the gun purchase conspiracy 

without risking harm to her family. Moreover, Ruiz-Celaya contends that because of 

entrenched corruption in Mexico, she did not trust Mexican authorities to protect her 

family there, and that she did not believe she could obtain protection from U.S. 

authorities even for herself because she did not know Parada-Ortega’s true identity. 

Under her circumstances, living in the United States with her family in Mexico, it was a 

reasonable belief that neither U.S. nor Mexican authorities could have guaranteed the 

protection of her family, especially given that she did not know Parada-Ortega’s identity 

at that point. There may of course be reason to doubt Ruiz-Celaya’s underlying claims. 

But the facts she alleges provide enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that she 

lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape. 

 The government nonetheless insists that the escapability prong of duress contains 

an additional requirement, namely that “in these circumstances, a defendant must present 

some evidence indicating that she ‘took the opportunity to escape the threatened harm by 

submitting to authorities at the first reasonable opportunity.’” (Doc. 114 at 6 (quoting 

Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 695).) The very case the government cites, however, notes 

that submission to authorities “seems to be required only in prison escape cases.” 

Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 694. Subsequent cases have confirmed this proposition 

more decisively. See Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d at 949 (“[W]e have not held that a 

defendant must surrender to authorities after reaching a place of safety, except in prison 

escape cases.”); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(noting that the submission requirement “has independent significance only in prison 

escape cases”); United States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); United 

States v. Jennell, 749 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).

But even if the government’s articulated rule were correct, by Ruiz-Celaya’s 

account she did not have a reasonable opportunity to submit to authorities between the 

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time she was recruited and the time she purchased the gun. A credible threat remained 

against her family in Mexico if she did not complete the gun purchase for whatever 

reason. By her account (and corroborated at least in part by the ICE agents’ reports), 

Ruiz-Celaya first came into contact with authorities shortly after the gun purchase—

possibly the same day—and when she did, she cooperated with federal agents and 

explained to them that she faced threats from an unknown member of her husband’s 

cartel. This is enough for a prima facie case of escapability. 

 The government also points to an additional case, Moreno, for the proposition that 

“a defendant has a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm by surrendering 

to authorities when confronted at a point of inspection even where the defendant asserts 

that they are being watched by the people who threatened them and that threats have been 

made against their family.” (Doc. 114 at 7 (citing Moreno, 102 F.3d at 997-98).) But 

Moreno is quite different from this case. In Moreno the court indeed rejected the 

defendant’s proffer of duress after the defendant asserted he attempted to smuggle drugs 

to Hawaii only because a persecutor threatened him and his family. Moreno, 102 F.3d at 

997-98. But the defendant there was approached by his persecutor fully three weeks 

prior to the date of the crime, and was not monitored or followed at all until two weeks 

had passed, at which time his persecutor articulated specific threats to the defendant and 

his family if he did not smuggle the drugs. Id. at 996. When confronted by law 

enforcement at the airport, the defendant did not submit but rather attempted to flee—and 

even proceeded to kick a police officer in the head multiple times in the process. Id. at 

998-99. 

 Contrast that, however, with this case, where the window of time is not three 

weeks but at most three days—during which Ruiz-Celaya maintains she was being 

closely monitored. Furthermore, the government does not dispute Ruiz-Celaya’s 

assertion that she fully cooperated with authorities after being apprehended. (See Doc. 

105 at 8.) Again, there might be reasons to doubt her rendition of events. But the only 

question here is whether she has asserted enough evidence to make out a prima facie case 

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that she lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape. The Court determines she has, the 

government’s arguments notwithstanding. 

B. FRE 401 and 403 

Finally, the government urges that, in light of its position that Ruiz-Celaya cannot 

make out a prima facie case, her duress defense should be deemed irrelevant and 

excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The government first points to Rule 401 

and argues that Ruiz-Celaya’s duress defense should be excluded on grounds of 

relevance. For the reasons discussed above, however, the Court finds that Ruiz-Celaya 

can make out a prima facie case of duress, and thus the defense is relevant to the charges 

against her. 

 The government goes on, however, and argues that even if the evidence of duress 

has “some minor probative value,” it should still be excluded under Rule 403. (Doc. 114 

at 7.) Under Rule 403, a court may exclude even relevant evidence if the “probative 

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The government raises 

concerns about a duress defense confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and posing 

unfair prejudice. 

 Because she has made a prima facie case of duress, evidence of Ruiz-Celaya’s 

defense is both relevant and highly probative as to her culpability for the crimes with 

which she was charged. There is of course some risk she could present particular items 

of evidence that are irrelevant or misleading. Permission to raise a duress defense 

certainly does not give her carte blanche to bring in otherwise inadmissible evidence. 

The government may still challenge—and the Court will duly consider—the admissibility 

of each piece of evidence Ruiz-Celaya seeks to introduce. Because the Court can (and 

will) exclude specific evidence as is appropriate, permitting Ruiz-Celaya to raise a duress 

defense at trial presents no general risk of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or 

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unfairly prejudicing the government. Accordingly, her defense will not be categorically 

excluded under Rule 403. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 

105) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Duress Defense 

(Doc. 87) is denied. 

 Dated this 30th day of September, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

Senior United States District 

Judge

 

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