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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

SellPoolSuppliesOnline.com LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Ugly Pools Arizona Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-01856-PHX-BSB 

ORDER 

 Defendants, Ugly Pools Arizona, Inc., and Brian Morris (“Defendants”), have filed 

a motion for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. 

(Doc. 103.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 105, 107.) As set forth below, the Court 

denies the motion. 

I. Background 

 The facts of this case are explained in detail in this Court’s orders on the motions 

for summary judgment (Docs. 64, 95, 96), and are not repeated here. However, the Court 

notes that this case involved Plaintiff’s claims for (1) copyright infringement under the 

Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Count One), (2) unfair competition under Arizona law 

(Count Two), and (3) violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 

integrity of copyright management information under 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (Count Three). 

(Doc. 39.) Plaintiff described its business as licensing pre-made websites that it referred 

to as the Platform. (Doc. 78-1 at 1.) The Platform was described generally as computer 

programs, photographs, and writing. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s claims were based on its 
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allegation that Defendants had reproduced the copyrighted elements of the Platform 

“verbatim.” (Doc. 39 at ¶ 38.) The parties filed several motions for summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s claims. (Docs. 43, 45, 78, 79, 86.) The Court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims, entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action. (Docs. 64, 95, 96, 97.) Defendants then filed a 

motion for attorney’s fees and the pending motion for sanctions against Plaintiff. (Docs. 

102, 103). The Court considered the motion for attorney’s fees in a separate order. 

(Doc. 111.) 

II. Sanctions under § 1927 

 Defendants’ motion seeks sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927. (Doc. 103 at 3-10.) Section 1927 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny 

attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously 

may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ 

fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. To impose sanctions 

under § 1927, the court must find that the sanctioned party “knowingly or recklessly 

raise[d] a frivolous argument, or argue[d] a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing 

an opponent.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Additionally, sanctions under § 1927 may be used only to sanction the 

multiplication of proceedings, not the initiation of proceedings. Matter of Yagman, 796 

F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986). The section “applies only to unnecessary filings and 

tactics once a lawsuit has begun.” Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436 (internal quotations omitted). 

A “finding that the attorney recklessly or intentionally misled the court is sufficient to 

impose sanctions under § 1927, and a finding that the attorneys recklessly raised a frivolous 

argument which resulted in the multiplication of the proceedings is also sufficient to 

impose sanctions under § 1927.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). “[W]ith § 1927 as with other sanctions provisions, [d]istrict courts 

enjoy much discretion in determining whether and how much sanctions are appropriate.” 
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Haynes v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Defendants cite several instances of conduct by Plaintiff’s counsel that they allege 

warrant sanctions under § 1927. (Doc. 103.) As set forth below, the Court finds that 

counsel’s conduct, while inappropriate in some instances, did not “unreasonably and 

vexatiously” multiply the proceedings. 

A. Unreasonable Settlement Demands 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiff, through counsel, made settlement demands that 

were unreasonable and necessitated several years of litigation.1

 (Doc. 103 at 4-5.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s settlement demands greatly exceeded their claimed 

damages.2

 (Id. at 4.) Defendants argue that these settlement demands are evidence of 

counsel’s bad faith and support the imposition of sanctions. As explained below, the Court 

rejects Defendants’ argument. 

Defendants assert that the value of a license for Plaintiff’s website was about 

$15,000, and Defendants grossed about $3,000 from the allegedly infringing website. (Id. 

at 5.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s damages, including attorney’s fees, totaled $32,000 

on January 18, 2016. (Id. at 4 (citing Doc. 46-7 at 2 (stating that Plaintiff’s “damages to 

date” were “$32,000 including the cost of the platform, lost revenue from monthly rental 

of the platform, and legal fees.”)).) However, Plaintiff initially demanded $90,000 to settle 

 

1

 In their motion for attorney’s fees, Defendants argued that these unreasonable settlement 

demands were evidence of Plaintiff’s improper motive in bringing this suit. (Doc. 102.) 

The Court rejected that claim in its order denying the motion for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 110.) 

2

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ motion improperly disclosed settlement negotiations in violation of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 105 at 3.) Rule 408 provides that settlement communications are not admissible “either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(a). The Court, however, may consider settlement negotiations for the purpose of determining an attorney’s fee award. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district did not err in considering settlement negotiations for purposes of deciding a reasonable attorney’s fee award). Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants did not improperly present information concerning settlement negotiations to support their motion for sanctions. 
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this case, and later reduced that demand to $65,000 for a May 10, 2016 settlement 

conference. (Doc. 103 at 4; Doc. 102, Ex. F at 6.) 

Defendants, however, misstate Plaintiff’s calculation of the damages that it had 

incurred by the time of the May 10, 2016 settlement conference. Plaintiff asserted that it 

had suffered the following damages: lost licensing fees of $18,000, monthly maintenance 

fees totaling $1,199.88, and attorney’s fees through April 30, 3016 totaling $31,000. 

(Doc. 102, Ex. F at 4.) Therefore, at the time of the May 2016 settlement conference, 

Plaintiff asserted that it had suffered damages, including attorney’s fees, totaling 

$50,199.88. (See id.) Plaintiff also asserted that Defendants had offered $20,000 to settle 

the case and did not increase their offer. (Id., Ex. F at 6.) Defendants’ motion for sanctions 

and their reply in support of that motion do not address their offers to settle the case. 

However, Defendants’ reply in support of their motion for attorney’s fees states that they 

made a $20,000 settlement offer. (Doc. 109 at 2.) Therefore, the Court concludes that 

Defendants offered $20,000 to settle the case and did not increase that amount at any point 

during the litigation. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s rationale for its settlement demands, which they 

characterize as “far beyond” the amount of Plaintiff’s damages, was that “Defendants 

would be liable for more than that amount in attorney’s fees by the conclusion of the 

litigation.” (Doc. 103 at 4; Doc. 107 at 2 (stating that Plaintiff “insisted on being paid 

attorneys’ fees Plaintiff had not yet incurred”); Doc. 107 at 3 (“a settlement demand based 

upon attorney’s fees not yet incurred is plain extortion and unreasonable.”) (emphasis in 

original).) To support their argument for sanctions based on the allegedly unreasonable 

settlement demands, Defendants cite Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 

1482 (2d Cir. 1988), rev’d in part on other grounds by Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t 

Group, 39 U.S. 120 (1989). In Calloway, the district court awarded sanctions under § 1927 

because the plaintiff delayed in accepting a settlement offer that would have provided all 

the relief plaintiff could expect to recover from the defendant. Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1481. 

In that case, the plaintiff rejected the defendant’s settlement offer without explanation and 
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continued the litigation, eventually accepting the same offer several days after trial had 

commenced. Id. at 1482. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not consider the merits of the 

ruling on the motion for § 1927 sanctions. Id. Rather, the court reversed the award of 

sanctions because it concluded that the parties’ stipulation of dismissal had settled all their 

disputes, including the motion for sanctions that had been filed before trial. Id. 

Defendants’ reliance on Calloway is misplaced because the Second Circuit’s 

decision did not consider the merits of the sanctions award under § 1927.3

 Additionally, 

in contrast to the plaintiff in Calloway, Plaintiff did not reject an offer that would have 

provided all the relief it would have been entitled to recover from Defendants if it prevailed 

in the litigation. At the time of the parties’ May 2016 settlement conference, Plaintiff 

claimed it had incurred approximately $51,000 in damages, and Defendants offered 

$20,000 to settle the case. (Doc. 102, Ex. F at 4, 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s $65,000 

settlement demand may have exceeded its damages, but Defendants’ $20,000 settlement 

offers were not for the full amount of Plaintiff’s claimed damages. Although the Court’s 

analysis would differ if Defendants had offered the full amount of Plaintiff’s claimed 

damages (excluding any amounts for attorney’s fees that Plaintiff had not yet incurred), 

that is not the situation presented here. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

settlement demands did not unreasonably and vexatiously multiply the litigation. 

B. Delayed Disclosure of Correspondence with the Copyright Office 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel multiplied the proceedings in bad faith by 

failing to timely disclose correspondence with the copyright office that would have 

revealed Plaintiff’s changes to the author name and ownership of the work at issue in this 

dispute, and Plaintiff’s inconsistent representations about the content of the deposit. 

(Doc. 103 at 5-6, 9-10.) 

 

3

 Defendants also cite In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (10th Cir. 1985), for the 

proposition that a “[w]hen lawyers act unreasonably to appease clients ‘they must understand that their adversary’s fees become a cost of their business.’” (Doc. 103 at 5 

(quoting TCI Ltd, 759 F.2d at 446).) In that case, the court imposed sanctions based on an attorney’s filing of a “baseless pleading to appease a client.” TCI Ltd., 759 F.2d at 446. 

The court did not discuss unreasonable settlement demands as a basis for sanctions under 

§ 1927 and, therefore, this case does not support Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 
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1. Changes to Author Name and Ownership of the Work 

Defendants argue that on September 23, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel began amending 

the copyright registration application and authorized the copyright office to change the 

author name from SellPoolSuppliesOnline.com (“SPSO”) to the Hagens and to change the 

means of ownership from work for hire to assignment. (Doc. 103 at 5 (citing Doc. 56-6 at 

56).) Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not disclose these changes until November 29, 

2016, and that this failure “multiplied the proceedings” because Defendants raised the 

issues of authorship and means of ownership in their November 9, 2016 motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 103 at 6; see also Doc. 45 at 5-6, 10-12 (Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment); Doc. 53 at 8 (asserting that Plaintiff’s counsel provided the 

amended copyright registration to defense counsel on November 29, 2016).) Plaintiff 

responded to these arguments in its response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

filed December 13, 2016. (Doc. 49 at 7-9.) Defendants did not address these issues in 

their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 54.) The Court’s order 

on Defendants’ November 9, 2016 motion for summary judgment did not reach the issues 

of authorship or means of ownership. (Doc. 64.) 

Although Plaintiff’s alleged failure to timely notify Defendants of changes to its 

copyright registration application might have led to the inclusion of unnecessary issues in 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court concludes that the failure did not 

unreasonably or vexatiously multiply or prolong the proceedings in this matter. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1927. Defendants do not suggest that Plaintiff knowingly or recklessly raised a 

frivolous argument, or submitted unnecessary filings, or engaged in unnecessary tactics. 

See Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment raised multiple 

issues in addition to the issues of authorship and means of ownership. (Doc. 45.) The 

Court did not address those issues, but instead resolved the motion for summary judgment 

on other grounds. (Doc. 64.) Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to notify Defendants of changes to 

its copyright registration, which resulted in Defendants including the issues of authorship 
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and ownership in their November 2016 motion for summary judgment, did not multiply 

the proceedings. 

2. Correspondence with the Copyright Office 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad faith by intentionally 

attempting to conceal correspondence with the copyright office.4

 (Doc. 103 at 9.) 

Defendants state that on November 29, 2016 Plaintiff’s counsel forwarded to defense 

counsel the first page of the recently-issued copyright registration. (Doc. 103 (citing 

Doc. 53, Ex. B).) On December 1, 2016, defense counsel requested page two of the 

registration. (Doc. 103 at 9.) Upon receiving the second page of the registration, defense 

counsel noticed that the copyright registration referred to correspondence and requested 

that correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel. (Id. (citing Doc. 53, Ex. R).) Plaintiff’s 

counsel initially stated that he was “unclear on what correspondence you are referring to.” 

(Doc. 103 at 9-10 (citing Doc. 53, Ex. R).) On December 2, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel sent 

an email in which he asserted that the correspondence was protected under the work 

product doctrine and refused to produce it. (Doc. 103 at 10 (citing Doc. 53, Ex. S).) On 

December 4, 2016, Plaintiff disclosed the correspondence after Defendants threatened to 

file a motion to compel and counsel had a call to discuss the discovery dispute. (Doc. 103 

at 10 (citing Doc. 53, Ex. T).) 

As Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s counsel was not initially forthcoming about 

correspondence with the copyright office and improperly withheld that correspondence. 

However, the parties resolved the discovery dispute within a few days without Court 

intervention.5

 Thus, the Court concludes that the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel in this 

discovery dispute did not unreasonably or vexatiously multiply the proceedings. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1927. 

 

4

 The Court discussed the correspondence at issue in its June 9, 2017 Order. (Doc. 64 at 

5-8, 18-20.) 

5

 The Court also notes that sanctions for discovery abuses are governed by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not by § 1927. See Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 

1187 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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C. Inaccurate Information in Hagen’s Affidavit 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel multiplied the proceedings in bad faith by 

submitting a “false declaration” to the copyright office. (Doc. 103 at 6.) Defendants refer 

to the affidavit from one of Plaintiff’s principals, Aaron Hagen, that Plaintiff’s counsel 

submitted to the copyright office on November 14, 2016. (Doc. 103 at 6; Doc. 95 at 5.) 

As discussed in the Court’s September 24, 2018 Order, the Hagen affidavit stated that the 

Platform was first published on July 3, 2014. (Doc. 95 at 5 (citing Doc. 53, Ex. K at ¶ 4; 

Doc. 80 ¶ 38).) The Hagen affidavit further stated that the “[t]he sample of the Platform 

provided to the United States Copyright Office with SPSO’s Copyright application in 2015 

is the same as the website first appeared when published on July 3, 2014.” (Doc. 53, Ex. K 

at ¶ 5; Doc. 80 ¶ 39.) In an accompanying email, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that “[t]he 

Deposit that was submitted correctly represents the copy that was first published on July 

3, 2014. Counsel did not have sufficient facts at the time of application.” (Doc. 53, Ex. L; 

Doc. 80 ¶ 40.) 

 In its June 9, 2017 and September 24, 2018 Orders, the Court found that the 

copyright application included inaccurate information—the July 3, 2014 publication date 

for the deposit. (Doc. 64 at 17-25; Doc. 95 at 16.) The publication date was inaccurate 

because the deposit included content that appeared on the website after the alleged July 3, 

2014 publication date. (Doc. 95 at 16-17.) The Court found that Plaintiff knowingly 

included that inaccurate information in the copyright application in its correspondence with 

the copyright office. (Doc. 64 at 21-24; Doc. 95 at 19-24.) 

 In their motion for sanctions, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel multiplied 

the proceedings in bad faith by knowingly submitting the inaccurate information to the 

copyright office. (Doc. 103 at 6-7.) Defendants’ motion, however, does not explain how 

the proceeding were multiplied by this conduct. (Id.) In their reply, Defendants clarify 

that the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel during the copyright registration process multiplied 

the proceedings because the Court was required to invoke the § 411(b) process to submit a 

question to the copyright office. (Doc. 107 at 3.) The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s 
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counsel’s submission of inaccurate information to the copyright office as part of the 

copyright registration process multiplied the proceedings because the Court was required 

to submit an inquiry to the copyright office to determine whether that inaccurate 

information was material to the validity of the copyright registration, and this process 

resulted in additional motions for summary judgment. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b); (Doc. 95 at 

7-9; 24-25.) Therefore, the Court must consider whether this conduct is sanctionable under 

§ 1927. 

A party seeking the imposition of sanctions pursuant to § 1927 has the burden of 

demonstrating “bad faith,” which means either frivolity combined with recklessness or 

intentional harassment. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 

2002) (defining bad faith); Morris v. Wachovia Secs., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 284 (4th Cir. 

2006) (discussing the burden of showing bad faith). Among other circumstances, “bad 

faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument.” 

Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). An argument is frivolous if its resolution “is 

obvious” or the argument is “wholly without merit.” Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., 

Inc. v. Stanley (In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc.), 152 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Tactics undertaken with the intent to 

increase expenses, or delay, may also support a finding of bad faith.” New Alaska Dev. 

Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 

In its orders on the motions for summary judgment the Court found that, while this 

litigation was pending, Plaintiff knowingly submitted inaccurate information to the 

copyright office about the content and publication date of the deposit.6

. (Doc. 64 at 21-24; 

Doc. 95 at 19-24.) Plaintiff, however, did not “recklessly or intentionally mislead the 

court.” See In re Girardi, 611 F.3d at 1061. Instead, in its filings in this Court, Plaintiff 

 

6

 Defendants assert that the Court also found that Plaintiff’s counsel was “reckless” in 

failing to determine the veracity of the Hagen affidavit. (Doc. 103 at 7 (citing Doc. 95 at 21 n.11, 23).) The Court, however, in its September 24, 2018 Order noted that Plaintiff’s 

counsel delayed in his efforts to confirm the contents of the deposit that were submitted to the copyright office. (Doc. 95 at 21 n.11.) The Court did not find that counsel acted 

recklessly. (Id.) 
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admitted that the deposit contained material added after the claimed publication date. 

(Doc. 64 at 23 (citing Doc. 56 at 6).) Plaintiff argued that the additional material in the 

deposit was “of no moment.” (Doc. 64 at 24 (quoting Doc. 56 at 7).) The Court rejected 

this argument and concluded that the inquiry process of § 411(b)(2) was designed to clarify 

whether inaccurate information presented to the copyright office was material to its 

decision to issue a copyright registration. (Doc. 64 at 24-25 (quoting Palmer/Kane LLC v. 

Rosen Book Works LLC, 2016 WL 3042895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2016)).) 

In the briefing on the second motions for summary judgment, after the Court 

received a response to its inquiry from the Register of Copyrights, Plaintiff argued that it 

did not make fraudulent statements to the copyright office because § 411(b) requires a 

showing of fraudulent misrepresentation under state law. (Doc. 95 at 19-20 (citing Doc. 90 

at 2-3, n.1).) Plaintiff also argued that a party challenging whether a copyright registration 

meets the registration precondition for filing suit must meet the heightened pleading 

standards of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 95 at 20 (citing Doc. 

90 at 3-4).) Finally, Plaintiff argued that its counsel made inadvertent technical errors in 

the registration process. (Doc. 95 at 20 (citing Doc. 90 at 5).) Although the Court rejected 

these arguments, it did not find that these arguments were frivolous. (Doc. 95 at 20); see 

also In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d at 436 (the court must find that a party knowingly 

or recklessly raised frivolous arguments before imposing sanctions under § 1927). 

Additionally, the Court did not find that Plaintiff’s counsel’s actions taken in connection 

with the copyright registration process were taken with the “intent to increase expenses or 

delay.” See New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1306. Therefore, the Court concludes 

that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad faith for purposes of 

imposing § 1927 sanctions.7

 

7

 Although the Court declines to impose sanctions in this case, Plaintiff’s knowing presentation of inaccurate information to the copyright office during the registration process was not without consequences. The Court’s finding that this occurred triggered the inquiry process of § 411(b), which resulted in the Register of Copyrights advising the Court that it would have refused the registration with the claimed publication date if it had 

known of the inaccurate information, and the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s copyright registration was insufficient to support its copyright claim. (Doc. 95 at 24-25 (citing Doc. 72-1 at 8).) 
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D. Refusal to Withdraw the Copyright Registration 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel multiplied the proceedings in bad faith by 

refusing to withdraw the inaccurate copyright registration. (Doc. 103 at 8.) Defendants 

appear to speculate that withdrawing the copyright registration would have terminated the 

litigation on the copyright infringement claim and, therefore, failure to do so multiplied the 

proceedings by requiring continued litigation on that claim until it was dismissed in 

September 2018. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendants, however, do not cite any authority indicating 

that after Defendants alleged, or the Court found, that the copyright registration contained 

inaccurate information, Plaintiff was required to withdraw its copyright registration.8

 

Additionally, Defendants do not cite any authority describing the process for withdrawing 

a copyright registration, the timing of such a process, or the impact that withdrawing the 

copyright registration would have had on this litigation. (Doc. 103 at 8-9.) Thus, 

Defendants’ speculation that Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the copyright registration would 

have terminated the litigation on the copyright infringement claim does not support a 

finding that Plaintiff’s counsel’s multiplied or prolonged the proceedings by failing to 

withdraw the copyright registration. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

E. Unprofessional Behavior 

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in unprofessional conduct 

that justifies § 1927 sanctions. (Doc. 103 at 10.) Defendants cite several examples of 

counsel’s comments they consider disparaging. (Id.) Defendants assert without 

explanation that these disparaging comments, which they describe as “inappropriate 

conduct,” “vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in this case.” (Id.) Defendants do not 

explain how that conduct multiplied or prolonged the proceedings and do not identify any 

additional proceedings or delay in this case that was caused by counsel’s disparaging 

comments. Although the Court agrees that such conduct is inappropriate and 

 

8

 The Court notes that the Register of Copyrights has the primary jurisdiction to cancel a copyright registration. See Syvek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 

F.3d 775, 780-82 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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unprofessional, Defendants’ conclusory assertion does not satisfy their burden under 

§ 1927. 

III. The Court’s Inherent Authority to Impose Sanctions 

 Finally, Defendants ask the Court to exercise its inherent authority to sanction nonparty Aaron Hagen based on the inaccurate affidavit that he submitted to the copyright 

office. (Doc. 103 at 11); see Section II.C. Defendants cite Indiezone, Inc. v. Rooke, 720 

Fed. App’x. 333 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished opinion), to support their assertion that the 

Court has inherent authority to sanction a non-party for misconduct. (Doc. 103 at 11.) In 

that unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that a district court may use its inherent 

powers to sanction non-parties for abusive litigation practices. Id. at 337 (citing Corder v. 

Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court affirmed sanctions 

against several parties based on their “false and misleading declarations” and other conduct 

during the litigation that suggested the appellants had attempted to create a “sham 

plaintiff.” Indiezone, 720 Fed. App’x. at 337. The court also affirmed sanctions against a 

non-party who purported to be the CEO of the sham plaintiff, authored the declarations 

that the court found to be the primary source of the bad faith conduct, and disobeyed a 

court order that explicitly directed him to appear and testify at the hearing on sanctions. 

Id. 

 Unlike Indiezone, in this case the Court did not find that the Hagen affidavit 

supported a finding that Plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad faith and did not sanction Plaintiff’s 

counsel. Thus, unlike Indiezone, the Hagen affidavit that was filed with the copyright 

office was not the subject of a finding of bad faith conduct. Defendants do not allege that 

Hagen engaged in any other sanctionable conduct. The Court concludes that Defendants 

have not shown that sanctions against Hagen are justified. 

IV. Conclusion

 For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for 

sanctions. 
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Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for sanctions (Doc. 103) is DENIED. 

Dated this 11th day of March, 2019.