J-S06024-23

2024 PA Super 127

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ISAIAH SCOTT NEWTON

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1283 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-19-CR-0000310-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2024

The Commonwealth appeals from an order granting, in part, the habeas 

corpus motion of Appellee, Isaiah Scott Newton, and dismissing the charge of 

first-degree murder on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to present 

prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent. The evidence adduced 

during the habeas corpus hearing demonstrates that following an altercation 

on the street, Appellee entered a nearby residence, retrieved a large kitchen 

knife, returned to the street, and stabbed the victim so deeply in his left arm 

that his brachial artery and vein were completely severed, resulting in the 

victim’s death. Accepted as true, the totality of this evidence constitutes 

prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill the victim and entitles 

the Commonwealth to proceed to prosecute Appellee for first-degree murder. 

Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order dismissing the first-degree 

murder charge and remand for further proceedings.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On February 12, 2022, Appellee was arrested and charged with 

homicide, aggravated assault, and tampering with physical evidence. 

Following a preliminary hearing on April 12, 2022, Appellee was held for court 

on all charges. 

On May 19, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information. 

Count 1 of the information charged Appellee with an open count of homicide, 

that is, a count including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, thirddegree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. On 

June 22, 2022, Appellee filed a habeas corpus motion seeking dismissal of 

Count 1 of the information.

1

 

On August 22, 2022, the court convened an evidentiary hearing on 

Appellee’s habeas corpus motion. The evidence demonstrated that at 

approximately 11:26 p.m. on Friday, February 11, 2022, Berwick Borough 

police officers were dispatched to 1542 Fairview Avenue for a report of 

potential shots fired. N.T., 8/22/22, at 5-6. Upon their arrival, they 

discovered a large amount of blood at the intersection of Eaton Street and an 

unnamed alley, with a fresh blood trail leading behind the rear of 1542 

Fairview Avenue. Id. at 7. Patrol officers removed six occupants from the 

house at this address, including Appellee. Id. at 10-11. None of these 

individuals had any apparent injuries. Id. at 19. As the officers attempted to 

identify the source of the blood, they received notice that an injured male had 

____________________________________________

1 Appellee did not move to dismiss the charges of aggravated assault or 

tampering with physical evidence.
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arrived in an emergency room at a nearby hospital. Id. at 12. The victim, 

Frederick James McConnell, died despite attempts to save him. Id. at 40. 

An autopsy determined that the cause of death was a stab wound to the 

victim’s left bicep that “completely severed” the brachial artery and vein, 

causing blood loss, and that the manner of death was homicide. Id. at 27-

29. The brachial artery is a major artery that is part of the circulatory system, 

which is necessary for life. Id. at 37.

Detective Greg Martin responded directly to the hospital and observed 

the deceased victim as well as Jamal Butler, who had driven the victim to the 

hospital. Id. at 47. Detective Martin observed large amounts of blood inside 

and around the outside of the vehicle. Id. at 48. Butler stated that the victim 

was unable to drive himself to the hospital, and that he, Butler, helped the 

victim from the driver’s side of the car to the passenger’s side and drove the 

victim to the hospital. Id. at 54.

Appellee received Miranda warnings at the police station and consented 

to a recorded interview by Detectives Martin and Rafferty. Id. at 50. Appellee 

stated that there had been an altercation outside; he did not state what the 

altercation was about. Id. Appellee admitted that after the altercation, he 

went inside the house, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, returned outside, 

and stabbed the victim one time. Id. He said that the knife had a red handle 

and that he placed it in the kitchen sink after the stabbing. Id. at 51-52. The 

police found a knife fitting this description in the sink. Id. There were no 

visible signs of blood on the knife, and its tip appeared to be broken off. The 
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tip was not located, id. at 52, and the knife later tested positive for the 

presence of blood.

Detective Martin testified that upon subsequent inspection of the vehicle 

at a secured location, he observed a puncture on the metal roof above the 

driver’s door consistent with the knife blade. Id. at 55-58; see id. at 58 (“the 

size of the impact with the roof line is well within the realm of the knife . . . 

recovered from the scene”). Based on the detective’s blood spatter training, 

he testified that the distinctive blood pattern around the puncture appeared

to be “cast” or high velocity spatter different from the other blood that came 

directly from the victim’s injury. Id. at 57-58. This indicated to him that 

there were at least two stabbing motions: the first that struck the victim and 

the second that struck the car where blood already on the knife was 

transferred onto the roof near the puncture. Id. at 58-59. The section of the 

roof with the puncture was cut off, and at the time of the hearing, it was being 

tested for tool marks in comparison with the knife. Id. at 58.

On the same day as the hearing, the court entered an opinion and order 

granting Appellee’s habeas corpus motion in part and dismissing the charges 

of first- and second-degree murder.2 On September 9, 2022, the 

Commonwealth appealed to this Court, certifying in the notice of appeal that 

the court’s order will substantially handicap the prosecution of this case. 

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2 The Commonwealth does not appeal the portion of the order dismissing the 

second-degree murder charge.
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Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

311(d).

On September 13, 2022, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within the next thirty 

days. On October 9, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a concise statement 

arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was sufficient to proceed to trial on firstdegree murder. On October 11, 2022, the court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion 

incorporating its August 22, 2022 opinion by reference. The court further 

observed:

[I]t is clear that this court’s dismissal of the first-degree murder 

charge was primarily based on the uncontradicted evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth at the hearing that the victim 

died as a result of a single stab wound to the upper left arm, that 

a layperson like [Appellee] would not have been aware of the 

anatomy which included the bariatric artery and vein, and that the 

upper arm is not a “vital organ” (See: Discussion regarding 

Commonwealth v. Predmore, [] 199 A.3d 925 (2018) [(en 

banc)]). Absent the use of a deadly weapon on a vital organ, the 

Commonwealth had no evidence of a specific intent to kill. 

Retrieving a knife from a kitchen, as [Appellee] did, in itself, does 

not evidence a specific intent to kill any more than the defendant 

in Predmore bringing a gun to that altercation.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, 10/11/22, at 1.

The Commonwealth raises the following issues in this appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the first-degree murder

charge by failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth when, in a habeas corpus hearing, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that [Appellee] retrieved a 

large kitchen knife from inside a residence, returned to the 

victim’s location, and fatally stabbed the victim?
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2. Did the trial court err in permitting defense counsel, over the 

Commonwealth’s objections, to question Commonwealth 

witnesses regarding inadmissible hearsay statements of 

[Appellee] and on matters beyond the scope of direct 

examination?

3. Did the trial court err in concluding in its opinion that “there 

was a claim of self-defense” at the habeas corpus hearing where 

no competent evidence supported such a finding, and the 

affirmative defense of self-defense is immaterial in a habeas 

corpus hearing?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. 

In its first issue, which we find dispositive, the Commonwealth asserts 

that the court erred in granting Appellee’s habeas corpus petition and 

dismissing the charge of first-degree murder due to lack of evidence of specific 

intent. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the correct method for testing 

whether the Commonwealth has, prior to trial, established a prima facie case. 

Commonwealth v. Karlson, 674 A.2d 249, 251 (Pa. Super. 1996). The 

prima facie hurdle is less demanding than the Commonwealth’s burden at trial 

of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. McBride, 

595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). “[A] prima facie case exists when the 

Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the 

crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the 

accused committed the offense.” Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 

1102 (Pa. 2021). “Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if 

presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in 

permitting the case to be decided by the jury.” Id. When determining 
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whether a prima facie case has been established, we must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving effect to all inferences 

reasonably drawn from the evidence to support a verdict of guilt. 

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2002). 

The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is a 

question of law over which our standard of review is de novo and the scope of 

review is plenary. Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102. We review a decision to grant 

the defendant’s habeas corpus petition by examining the evidence and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en 

banc). 

An individual commits first-degree murder when he intentionally kills 

another human being; an intentional killing is defined as a “willful, deliberate 

and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501, 2502(a), (d). To sustain a 

conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a 

human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the accused was responsible for the 

killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. 

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013). Specific intent 

may be formed in an instant, Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 313 

(Pa. Super. 2010), and it can be discerned from the conduct and attending 

circumstances that show the perpetrator’s state of mind. Commonwealth v. 

Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004). 
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A factfinder may presume the intent to kill “based on the accused’s use 

of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body,” Ballard, 80 A.3d at 

390, or in the “general area in which vital organs are located.” 

Commonwealth v. Padgett, 348 A.2d 87, 88 (Pa. 1975). The deadly 

weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, 

since “one does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s 

body unless he intends to kill.” Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 

37 (Pa. 1976). As a presumption of fact, the deadly weapon presumption “is 

nothing more than a prima facie inference” of intent. Id. 

We caution, however, that while a specific intent to kill may be inferred 

using a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body, the absence of the 

use of a deadly weapon against a vital part of the victim’s body does not 

necessarily preclude a finding of specific intent to kill; it only precludes the 

use of the deadly weapon presumption. Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d 

398, 402 (Pa. 1939). In the absence of the presumption, the Commonwealth 

may still prove specific intent through other evidence. “The only requirement 

is that there be sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s verdict which imports 

a finding of specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Gidaro, 70 A.2d 359, 

362 (Pa. 1950) (citing Commonwealth v. Logan, 63 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1949)). 

This point is amply demonstrated in Commonwealth v. Wyche, 467 A.2d 

636 (Pa. Super. 1983).
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In Wyche, two men began shooting at the victim and his friend while 

they were on their way to pick up pizza. They successfully ran away, but a 

short time later were confronted by another man, the defendant. As they 

began to run again, the defendant shot at them. The victim was shot three 

times, once in the right thigh, once in the right hand, and once in the pelvic 

area through the right buttock. He died of bleeding caused by the latter bullet,

which damaged major blood vessels and internal organs after entry. The 

defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of 

first-degree murder, since no specific intent to kill could be inferred from a 

bullet shot into the buttocks. We rejected this argument, stating that all direct 

and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom,

accepted as true, revealed that the defendant aggressively attacked the 

victim, shooting four shots, three of which hit their target. Although the fatal 

slug entered the victim through the buttock, the jury could properly infer the 

specific intent to kill from these circumstances. Id., 467 A.2d at 637 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Padgett, 348 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1975)). Thus, without 

deciding whether the deadly weapon presumption was applicable, we still 

concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a specific intent to kill.

Presently, the trial court granted habeas relief on the charge of firstdegree murder on the following grounds: (1) the uncontradicted evidence was

that the victim died as a result of a single stab wound to the upper left arm, 

(2) a layperson like Appellee would not have been aware of the anatomy of 
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the upper arm, which included the bariatric artery and vein, and (3) the upper 

arm is not a “vital organ”. The court concluded that absent the use of a deadly 

weapon on a vital organ, there was no evidence of a specific intent to kill. Our 

discussion above demonstrates that the court erred by not fully considering 

the totality of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The law provides that even in 

the absence of the presumption, a specific intent to kill may be inferred when 

the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom are

properly considered. Gidaro, Wyche, supra.

In this case, the evidence adduced during the habeas corpus hearing, 

accepted as true, demonstrates that Appellee fatally stabbed the victim with 

a kitchen knife in his left arm, severing the brachial artery, during the second

confrontation on the street. Plausibly, the deadly weapon presumption may 

apply on the ground that the brachial artery was a vital part of the victim’s 

body. Even assuming that the deadly weapon presumption does not apply, 

other evidence introduced during the habeas corpus hearing, viewed in its 

totality, constitutes prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill. 

First, the sequence of events leading up to the fatal attack indicates that 

Appellee harbored the intent to kill the victim. After Appellee and the victim 

had their initial confrontation on the street, Appellee then walked into the 

house and retrieved a deadly weapon (the kitchen knife), returned to the 

street, and then confronted the victim for a second time and inflicted the fatal 

wound. When, as here, the defendant procures a deadly weapon and brings 
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it from some distance to the scene of a fatal attack, the factfinder may infer 

that the defendant planned to commit murder. See Commonwealth v. 

Pursell, 495 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. 1985) (“[s]ince the victim was assaulted with 

a rock [that the defendant] carried two hundred feet from its natural resting 

place, the jury could conclude that the killing was premeditated”). 

Second, Appellee killed the victim by stabbing him at close range. As 

our Supreme Court recently observed, “the intimacy involved in stabbing one’s 

victim to death clearly indicates malice and specific intent.” Ballard, 80 A.3d 

at 390. 

Third, Detective Martin testified that the puncture on the roof appeared 

consistent with the knife blade used to kill the victim. He stated that the 

distinctive blood pattern around the roof puncture appeared to be “cast” or 

high velocity spatter different from the other blood that came directly from 

the victim’s injury. From these facts, the detective deduced that Appellee 

made at least two stabbing motions: the first that struck the victim and the 

second that transferred the victim’s blood from the knife blade to the car. The 

fact that Appellee made multiple stabbing motions is indicative of his intent to 

commit murder. Accepted as true, the detective’s testimony of two stabbing 

motions and blood on the roof puncture demonstrates that Appellee first 

stabbed the victim and then pierced the roof in a second attempt to stab the 

victim.
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Fourth and finally, after the stabbing, Appellee exited the scene, cleaned 

off the knife, and left it in the kitchen sink inside the house, details that show 

Appellant’s consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2021 WL 

4453459, *4 (Pa. Super., Sep. 29, 2021)3 (where defendant fatally stabbed 

victim, left their apartment, and threw murder weapon onto roof of apartment 

building, such evidence was consciousness of guilt and may form basis of 

conviction along with other evidence from which guilt may be inferred); 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(actions that attempt to conceal crime or destroy evidence are admissible to 

prove malice in first degree murder case and to show consciousness of guilt). 

Notably, Appellee also was held for court at the preliminary hearing on a 

charge of tampering with evidence of crime which the trial court did not 

dismiss after the habeas corpus hearing. 

The totality of evidence presented against Appellee distinguishes this 

case from Predmore, a decision relied upon by the trial court in its Rule 1925 

opinion and in this Court by the learned dissent. In Predmore, a woman’s 

current and former boyfriends had an argument in a parking lot outside the 

woman’s residence. The current boyfriend (the defendant) retrieved a gun 

from his vehicle in the parking lot and fired three shots at the former 

boyfriend, two of which struck his calves. This Court affirmed the trial court’s 

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memoranda of Superior Court filed 

after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).
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order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of attempted 

murder for failure to present prima facie evidence of specific intent. The 

majority reasoned, despite vigorous dissents:

When we review evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we are not obliged to outright ignore undisputed 

evidence so as to strengthen the reasonableness of inferences we 

draw from the remaining evidence. Instead, we review all of the 

evidence, and ascertain whether certain inferences suggested by 

the Commonwealth are reasonable; that is, whether it is 

reasonable to permit a jury to conclude that Appellee possessed 

the specific intent to kill [the former boyfriend] in the unique 

circumstances of this case. In this regard, the Commonwealth 

essentially asks this Court to ignore: the victim’s unprovoked 

instigation of a confrontation with the new boyfriend of his exgirlfriend, the complete lack of any verbal expression of intent to 

kill by Appellee despite the scuffle that occurred before the 

shooting, and the near impossibility of Appellee’s missing any area 

near a vital portion of the victim’s body from the range at which 

he fired, but for an intent to scare or harm that fell short of specific

intent to kill. To ask a jury to find that Appellee possessed the 

specific intent to kill in these circumstances is tantamount to 

asking them to rest a verdict on mere speculation or conjecture 

that Appellee just happens to be the world’s worst shot, or that 

the victim only escaped more serious injury due to divine 

intervention. While not impossibilities in the strictest sense, such 

inferences are simply not reasonable in the unique circumstances 

of this case.

Id., 199 A.3d at 934. 

Multiple distinctions exist between the present case and Predmore. All 

events in Predmore took place in the same location, a parking lot, and in 

rapid sequence. In the present case, the events were more drawn out and at 

more than one location. An initial confrontation between Appellee and the 

victim took place in the street. Then, Appellee left the street, went into the 

residence, procured a knife from the kitchen, returned to the street, and 
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stabbed the victim. Given this more protracted chain of events, Appellee’s 

decision to attack the victim could be deemed more deliberate and coldblooded, raising a stronger inference of specific intent than in Predmore. 

Further, unlike in Predmore, Appellee committed a stabbing at close range. 

As we said above, “the intimacy involved in stabbing one’s victim to death

clearly indicates malice and specific intent.” Ballard, 80 A.3d at 390. 

Additionally, Predmore expressly acknowledged that damage to a major 

blood vessel by a deadly weapon constitutes a wound to the victim’s vital part 

for purposes of the intent presumption. Id. at 934. While that injury did not 

occur in Predmore, it is precisely what took place here. Finally, in 

Predmore, there was no evidence that the defendant fled from the scene or 

discarded the weapon. Here, Appellee fled from the scene of the stabbing, 

wiped blood off of the knife to conceal its use as the murder weapon, and 

discarded it in a sink. In view of these many differences, Predmore does not 

govern the outcome of this case.

Respectfully, for the reasons discussed above, the learned dissent 

misapplies Predmore but moreover, does not consider all the prima facia 

evidence presented against Appellee. 

The dissent fails to give the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences from its prima facia evidence and instead engages in its own 

weighing of the evidence. The dissent insists that the fact Appellee left the 

initial altercation and returned with a kitchen knife, does not prove specific 
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intent absent “further evidence concerning the circumstances of the initial 

altercation, Appellee’s involvement, or the nature of any conflict between 

Appellee and the victim.” Dissent at 3; see also id. at n.1 (“in the absence 

of other evidence reflecting Appellee’s specific intent to kill, I cannot conclude 

that by bringing a kitchen knife to the scene of an altercation, Appellee had a 

conscious purpose to bring about death”). The dissent overlooks that there 

indeed was considerable additional prima facie evidence of specific intent after 

Appellee’s return (the stabbing, Appellee’s flight, the puncture on the car roof, 

and Appellee’s cleaning and abandonment of the knife) that the dissent does 

not consider. Under this totality of the circumstances, the Commonwealth 

was entitled to a logical inference from Appellee’s conduct under Huggins

that Appellee’s reason for leaving the initial altercation and returning to the 

scene with a kitchen knife was to engage in deadly violence against the victim. 

The dissent only reaches a contrary conclusion by impermissibly weighing the 

evidence. 

The dissent also engages in impermissible weighing when it claims the 

fact that the stabbing took place at close range does not constitute prima facie 

evidence of specific intent. The dissent seems to suggest that firing a gun at 

close range is indicative of specific intent, but stabbing the victim at close 

range is not. This distinction is unpersuasive; there is simply no reason why

use of a knife at close range may not be as indicative of specific intent as use 

of gun at close range. Moreover, the dissent’s attempt to downplay use of a 
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knife at close range flies in the face of our Supreme Court’s pronouncement 

in Ballard that the “intimacy involved in stabbing one’s victim to death clearly 

indicates . . . specific intent.” Id., 80 A.3d at 390. 

The dissent, again by impermissibly weighing the evidence, further 

insists that the police detective’s testimony about the puncture on the car roof 

demonstrates nothing, because “none of the witnesses testified that anyone 

had stabbed the vehicle . . . nor was there any evidence that the knife or 

object used to strike the vehicle was specifically directed towards the victim, 

who was not the driver.” Dissent at 6 (emphasis in original). The dissent fails 

to interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. The detective testified that the 

puncture was both bloody and consistent with the knife used to stab the 

victim. This testimony, conjoined with the fact that Appellee stabbed the 

victim, establishes prima facie evidence of specific intent by demonstrating 

that Appellee repeatedly thrust his knife during the altercation. 

Finally, with regard to Appellee’s conduct after the stabbing, the dissent 

contends that cleaning the knife and returning it to the sink only indicates 

“consciousness of guilt with respect to the stabbing, rather than evidence of 

Appell[ee]’s intent to commit first-degree murder.” Id. We read the dissent 

to mean that the evidence shows Appellee’s consciousness of guilt only for 

aggravated assault (a charge for which he was held for court but did not seek 

to dismiss in his habeas corpus motion) but not for first-degree murder. This 
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attempt to draw a line between consciousness of guilt for aggravated assault 

and consciousness of guilt for murder is wholly unconvincing, given our duty 

at this stage of the case to construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth. Appellee’s acts of flight, washing the blood off the 

knife and abandoning the knife in the kitchen, read collectively with the other 

evidence, constitutes prima facie evidence of his consciousness of guilt for 

both aggravated assault and first-degree murder. Taylor, Gonzalez, supra.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence adduced during 

the habeas corpus hearing constituted prima facie evidence of Appellee’s 

specific intent to kill to support a charge of first-degree murder. Accordingly, 

the court below erred by concluding that the Commonwealth failed to present 

prima facie evidence of specific intent and by dismissing the charge of firstdegree murder. We, therefore reverse the portion of the trial court’s order 

dismissing the charge of first-degree murder from count 1 of the information 
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and remand with instructions to hold Appellee for trial on that charge as 

well.

4,5

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth raises two additional issues in its brief: whether the 

court erred by (1) permitting defense counsel to question Commonwealth 

witnesses during the habeas corpus hearing with regard to Appellee’s 

inadmissible hearsay and (2) concluding in its opinion that there was a claim 

of self-defense at the habeas corpus hearing. According to the 

Commonwealth, both of these issues demonstrate that the court below 

allowed evidence that fell outside the bounds of habeas corpus proceedings 

and failed to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. We need not consider these issues given our decision that 

the evidence during the habeas corpus hearing permits the Commonwealth to 

proceed to trial on the first-degree murder charge.

5 We affirm the portions of the order that dismissed the charge of seconddegree murder and that left intact the remaining charges in Count 1, thirddegree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. 
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Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for further 

proceedings to include a charge of first-degree murder. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the Opinion.

Judge Nichols files a Dissenting Opinion. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/17/2024