2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-21-2005

Howard Hess Dental v. Dentsply Intl Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-1979

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"Howard Hess Dental v. Dentsply Intl Inc" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 465.

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-1979

 

HOWARD HESS DENTAL LABORATORIES

INCORPORATED;

PHILIP GUTTIEREZ, *d/b/a Dentures Plus, on behalf

of themselves and all other similarly situated,

 Appellants

 v.

DENTSPLY INTERNATIONAL, INC.

*Amended per Clerk's Order dated 4/30/04

 

No. 04-1980

 

JERSEY DENTAL LABORATORIES, f/k/a Howard 

Hess Dental

Laboratories Incorporated; PHILIP GUTTIEREZ, *d/b/a

Dentures Plus, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

 Appellants
2

 v.

DENTSPLY INTERNATIONAL, INC.; 

A. LEVENTHAL & SONS, INC.;

ACCUBITE DENTAL LAB, INC.; ADDIUM DENTAL

PRODUCTS;

ARNOLD DENTAL SUPPLY COMPANY; 

ATLANTA DENTAL SUPPLY COMPANY;

BENCO DENTAL COMPANY; BURKHART DENTAL

SUPPLY COMPANY;

DARBY DENTAL LABORATORY SUPPLY CO., INC.;

DENTAL SUPPLIES

AND EQUIPMENT, INC.; EDENTALDIRECT.COM, INC.,

as successor to

Crutcher Dental, Inc.; HENDON DENTAL SUPPLY, INC.;

HENRY SCHEIN, INC., and its affiliates including, without

limitation, Zahn Dental Co., Inc.; 

IOWA DENTAL SUPPLY CO.;

JAHN DENTAL SUPPLY COMPANY; JB DENTAL

SUPPLY CO., INC.;

JOHNSON & LUND CO., INC.; KENTUCKY DENTAL

SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.

a/k/a KDSC Liquidation Corp.; MARCUS 

DENTAL SUPPLY CO;

MIDWAY DENTAL SUPPLY INC.; MOHAWK DENTAL

CO., INC.; NASHVILLE

DENTAL, INC.; NOWAK DENTAL SUPPLIES, INC.;

PATTERSON DENTAL

COMPANY, its subsidiaries, predecessors, successors,

assigns,

affiliates and related companies; PEARSON DENTAL
3

SUPPLIES, INC.;

RYKER DENTAL OF KENTUCKY, INC.; THOMPSON

DENTAL COMPANY

*Amended per Clerk's Order dated 4/30/04

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 99-cv-00255 / 01-cv-00267)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

 

Argued April 7, 2005

Before: BARRY, AMBRO and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed September 21, 2005)

Thomas A. Dubbs, Esquire (Argued)

Richard T. Joffe, Esquire

Goodkind, Labaton, Rudoff & Sucharow

100 Park Avenue, 12th Floor

New York, NY 10017

Pamela S. Tikellis, Esquire

Robert J. Kriner, Jr. Esquire

Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP

One Rodney Square, Suite 500
4

P.O. Box 1035

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellants

Richard A. Ripley, Esquire

Margaret M. Zwisler, Esquire (Argued)

Kelly A. Clement, Esquire

Eric J. McCarthy, Esquire

Charles R. Price, Esquire

Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

Brian M. Addison, Esquire

Dentsply International, Inc.

Susquehanna Commerce Center

221 West Philadelphia Street

York, PA 17405

W. Harding Drane, Jr., Esquire

Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP

1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor

P.O. Box 951

Wilmington, DE 19899

C. Scott Reese, Esquire

Cooch & Taylor

824 Market Street Mall, Suite 1000

P.O. Box 1680

Wilmington, DE 19899
Hess Dental changed its name to “Jersey Dental” during 1

the period between the two suits.

5

James J. Maron, Esquire

Maron Marvel & Wilks, P.A.

1300 North Broom Street

P.O. Box 288

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellees

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

We consider consolidated appeals involving the same

parties in two antitrust suits, Howard Hess Dental Laboratories,

Inc. v. Dentsply Internationl, Inc. (“Hess”) and Jersey Dental

Laboratories v. Dentsply International, Inc. (“Jersey Dental”).1

Plaintiffs are dental laboratories who have brought these

antitrust class actions on behalf of themselves and a class of

similarly situated labs. Defendant Dentsply International, Inc.

(“Dentsply”) markets artificial teeth used by the dental labs to

make dentures. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, an

exclusive-dealing conspiracy and a retail price-fixing conspiracy

among Dentsply and its dealer-middlemen.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person 2

who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of

anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover

threefold the damages by him sustained.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)

(emphasis added). Illinois Brick determined that direct

purchasers are the only parties “injured” in a manner that

permits them to recover damages. 431 U.S. at 729, 735. It thus

held that indirect purchaser plaintiffs do not have statutory

standing to recover damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.

Id. 

6

The District Court denied Plaintiffs standing to recover

damages in both suits based primarily on Illinois Brick Co. v.

Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), which held that indirect purchaser

plaintiffs do not have statutory standing to recover damages for

“passed-on” overcharges. We hold that Plaintiffs may not 2

recover damages in Hess (a) under the “co-conspirator”

exception to Illinois Brick, (b) under the “control” exception to

Illinois Brick, (c) under a non-overcharge theory of damages, or

(d) for “drop shipments.” While Plaintiffs may not recover

damages under either the control exception or a lost profits

theory in Jersey Dental, they do have statutory standing under

the co-conspirator exception to pursue an action for overcharge

damages (including for drop shipped teeth) caused by the

alleged retail price-fixing conspiracy, although not for the

alleged exclusive-dealing conspiracy. 
7

Background

Plaintiffs allege the following in one or both of the

complaints.

(1) Manufacturers of artificial teeth need to distribute

through dealers in order to compete effectively. Dealers are the

primary source of distribution to dental labs, which use the teeth

to produce dentures. Dentsply uses a network of authorized

dealers. 

(2) Plaintiffs have purchased Dentsply’s teeth both

indirectly through Dentsply’s dealers and directly through “drop

shipping.” Drop shipping occurs when a dealer does not have

certain teeth in stock or cannot fulfill a lab’s order for some

other reason and asks Dentsply to ship the teeth directly to a lab.

When teeth are drop shipped, the dealer never has physical

custody of them, but it does bill the lab for the teeth, collect

payments from the lab, and pay Dentsply. 

(3) Dentsply has foreclosed its competitors’ access to

dealers by explicitly agreeing with some dealers that they will

not carry certain competing brands of teeth and by inducing

other dealers not to carry those competing brands of teeth.

Pursuant to its written policy called “Dealer Criterion Number

6,” Dentsply threatens to terminate, and does terminate, dealers

that add to their inventory teeth made by Dentsply’s competitors.

Thus, unless Dentsply’s dealers were already selling another
8

manufacturer’s teeth before Dentsply imposed its exclusivedealing policies, its dealers cannot sell other manufacturers’

teeth unless they give up the opportunity to continue to sell

Dentsply’s teeth. No rational dealer would be likely to make

such a switch because, given Dentsply’s monopoly position (it

has a 75-80% market share on a revenue basis), losing the ability

to sell Dentsply’s teeth would hurt a dealer more than gaining

the ability to sell Dentsply’s competitors’ teeth would help a

dealer. By explicitly agreeing with some dealers that they will

not carry certain competing brands of teeth and by enacting

Dealer Criterion Number 6, Dentsply has foreclosured its rivals’

access to adequate channels of distribution, and competition has

been restricted. This has caused Dentsply’s market share to

increase, the price of Dentsply’s and other manufacturers’ teeth

to increase, and the availability of rival teeth to decrease. 

(4) Furthermore, by agreement among Dentsply and its

dealers, Dentsply sets the dealers’ resale prices. It distributes a

list of “suggested” prices for its dealers to charge dental labs.

Before a dealer can charge a lower price, Dentsply must approve

this “price deviation.” Price deviations have been granted only

when a lab has been buying, or is thinking of buying, a

competitor’s teeth because they are being sold for less than those

of Dentsply. In those instances, Dentsply negotiates with the lab

to allow it to buy teeth from the dealer at a price below

Dentsply’s suggested price. The dealer then agrees to the price

negotiated by Dentsply.
9

(5) Dentsply’s foreclosing of its competitors’ access to

dealers and setting of the dealers’ resale prices have caused

Plaintiffs to purchase Dentsply’s teeth at artificially high prices

and lose profits from unrealized sales of Dentsply’s competitors’

teeth. 

Procedural History

In 1999, Plaintiffs filed the Hess suit against Dentsply

alleging conspiracy to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, and

maintenance of monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and restraint of trade in violation

of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. Plaintiffs asked

for both damages and an injunction. Dentsply moved for

summary judgment, claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing

under Illinois Brick. The District Court granted Dentsply’s

motion on Plaintiffs’ damages claims. The Court reasoned that:

(1) a co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick did not apply

because Plaintiffs had not joined Dentsply’s dealers as codefendants; (2) the control exception to Illinois Brick did not

apply because Dentsply does not own its dealers; (3) Plaintiffs

could not recover on a non-overcharge theory of damages

because they had not articulated any such theory; and (4)

Plaintiffs could not recover for drop shipments because they had

specifically alleged that they were not direct purchasers, and

even if they had alleged they were direct purchasers, they were

indirect purchasers of drop shipments. 
10

In 2001, Plaintiffs filed the Jersey Dental suit, this time

naming as Dentsply’s co-defendants twenty-six of its then

twenty-eight authorized dealers. Plaintiffs made substantially

the same allegations as they did in Hess with one key addition:

they claimed they were not only indirect purchasers but also

direct purchasers. As in Hess, Plaintiffs asked for both damages

and an injunction. Dentsply moved under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims for damages, citing

Illinois Brick. The District Court granted the motion. The Court

reasoned that: (1) Plaintiffs could not recover under a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick because the suit still

implicated Illinois Brick’s policy concerns; (2) in Hess it had

already rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that they could recover

under the control exception to Illinois Brick; (3) Plaintiffs could

not recover damages for lost profits because their complaint

sought only overcharge damages and because, as Plaintiffs were

indirect purchasers, Illinois Brick would bar recovery of lost

profits anyway; and (4) in Hessit had already rejected Plaintiffs’

argument that they could recover for drop shipped teeth.

Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint.

Among the proposed additions to the complaint were allegations

that “[t]he Dealer Defendants agree wiith Dentsply and and with

each other” to abide by suggested retail prices and that “the

prices at which the Dealer Defendants sell to dental laboratories

are controlled by Dentsply and agreed to by the Dealer

Defendants.” The District Court denied leave to amend because

the amended pleading would not withstand a motion to dismiss.
11

It reasoned that: (1) the co-conspirator exception to Illinois

Brick did not apply because the dealers could still sue Dentsply;

(2) the control exception to Illinois Brick did not apply because

the dealers were not subsidiaries of Dentsply; and (3) Illinois

Brick barred recovery of lost profits damages because Plaintiffs

were indirect purchasers.

Plaintiffs moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for

certification of appealability of the orders dismissing the

damage claims in Hess and Jersey Dental and the order denying

their motion for leave to amend in Jersey Dental. The District

Court granted these motions and certified the following

question:

Whether, under the circumstances here,

application of Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977),

McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842

(3d Cir. 1996), or other Third Circuit opinions

dealing with Illinois Brick, prevents Plaintiffs

from being able to recover damages against

Dentsply International, Inc.

Plaintiffs then petitioned our Court for permission to appeal,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the three orders certified by the

District Court. We granted the petition and consolidated the

appeals. In a Section 1292(b) appeal, our review is not limited

to the specific question certified by the District Court. We may

“consider all grounds which might require a reversal of the order
We note that the Government has also sued Dentsply for 3

alleged antitrust violations. See United States v. Dentsply Int’l,

Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). There we reversed the

District Court’s judgment in favor of Dentsply and granted

injunctive relief. In so doing, we determined that Dentsply had

monopoly power (i.e., the power to exclude competitors) and

that its exclusionary practices, particularly Dealer Criterion

Number 6, had an anticompetitive effect. Id. at 188-97.

12

appealed from.” Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713

F.2d 958, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983). We “may address any issue

fairly included within the certified order because it is the order

that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by

the [D]istrict [C]ourt.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.

Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996) (emphasis in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted).3

Standard of Review

As the Hess order partially granted Dentsply’s motion for

summary judgment, our review is de novo. Mass. Sch. of Law

at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997).

The first Jersey Dental order granted Dentsply’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Review of this order also

merits de novo review. Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343

F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003). The second Jersey Dental order

denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint on

the ground that “the proposed amended complaint would not
13

survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).”

Dist. Ct. Mem. Ord. at 7 (Aug. 27, 2002). Where, as here, “the

[D]istrict [C]ourt has based its decision to deny leave to amend

on a legal conclusion that the amended pleading would not

withstand a motion to dismiss, we review such a decision de

novo.” Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 518 (6th

Cir. 2001). Thus we review all three orders de novo. 

Discussion

Illinois Brick lays many of the markers for our decision.

In that case, the Supreme Court established the general rule that

only direct purchasers from antitrust violators may recover

damages in antitrust suits. The plaintiffs alleged that concrete

block manufacturers conspired to fix the prices at which

concrete blocks were sold to masonry contractors. They in turn

“passed on” overcharges to the general contractors, who then

passed them on to the plaintiffs, who had purchased buildings

made from the concrete block. The plaintiffs, therefore, were

“indirect purchasers” of concrete block, which “passe[d]

through two separate levels in the chain of distribution before

reaching” them. 431 U.S. at 726. 

Before the Court was whether the indirect purchaser

plaintiffs could use this pass-on theory to state a damages claim

against the alleged antitrust violators upstream. It had

previously held that an antitrust defendant could not argue that

a plaintiff who had purchased a product directly from the
14

defendant was not injured because it had passed on the illegal

overcharge to its own customers. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United

Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). To maintain

consistency, the Court held in Illinois Brick that direct

purchasers are the only parties “injured” in a manner that

permits them to recover damages. 431 U.S. at 729, 735. The

indirect purchaser plaintiffs were thus ineligible to recover

damages for the passed-on overcharges.

The Court gave three policy reasons for its holding: (1)

a risk of duplicative liability for defendants and potentially

inconsistent adjudications could arise if courts permitted both

direct and indirect purchasers to sue defendants for the same

overcharge; (2) the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties

involved in ascertaining the portion of the overcharge that the

direct purchasers had passed on to the various levels of indirect

purchasers would place too great a burden on the courts; and (3)

permitting direct and indirect purchasers to sue only for the

amount of the overcharge they themselves absorbed and did not

pass on would cause inefficient enforcement of the antitrust

laws by diluting the ultimate recovery and thus decreasing the

direct purchasers’ incentive to sue. Id. at 730-35 & n.11, n.12,

737 & n.18, 740-43 & n.23, n.27, 745. 

I. May Plaintiffs recover damages in Hess?
15

a. May Plaintiffs recover damages in Hess

under a co-conspirator exception to

Illinois Brick?

Although the Hess complaint alleged that Dentsply’s

dealers conspired with Dentsply by agreeing to the exclusivedealing arrangements, Plaintiffs did not name any of the dealers

as co-defendants. We have rejected attempts to invoke a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick’s bar on indirect

purchaser standing when plaintiffs have not named the coconspirators immediately upstream as defendants. See

McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 854 (3d Cir.

1996); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 933 (3d Cir.

1986).

In Link, for example, Mercedes car owners sued

Mercedes-Benz for allegedly requiring dealers to purchase parts

exclusively from it. 788 F.2d at 929. Plaintiffs had purchased

parts from the dealers, whom they named as co-conspirators but

not as defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that Illinois Brick did not

bar their vertical conspiracy claims because “the intervening

parties in the distribution process [were] co-conspirators.” Id.

at 931.

We concluded that, unless the dealers were joined as

parties, plaintiffs’ suit implicated the policy concerns of Illinois

Brick and was barred. We explained that if a jury found that

Mercedes and its dealers were co-conspirators, but the dealers
16

were not parties to the suit, that determination would not have

any collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent suit by a dealer

against Mercedes. Id. at 932. Therefore, because the dealers

were not named as defendants, the risk of duplicative liability

identified in Illinois Brick remained. Similarly in Hess, because

the dealers may also sue Dentsply, the risk of duplicative

liability looms.

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Hess from Link by

pointing to stipulations they entered into with most of

Dentsply’s dealers. As part of Plaintiffs’ opposition to

Dentsply’s motion for summary judgment in Hess, they executed

stipulations with twenty-two of Dentsply’s dealers. In each

stipulation, the dealer agrees “to release [Dentsply] from any

and all claims for antitrust violations” set forth in the complaints

in Hess or United States v. Dentsply (the Government’s suit

against Dentsply), and Plaintiffs agree to “refrain[] from filing

suit” against that dealer for the same antitrust violations. The

parties to each stipulation agree that “Dentsply is a third party

beneficiary of this stipulation” and that the stipulation “may be

specifically enforced by the parties hereto or by Dentsply.”

Plaintiffs’ expert calculated that the group of dealers who

executed these stipulations “represents approximately 95% of

the gross sales” of Dentsply’s artificial teeth. Plaintiffs argue

that the stipulations give Dentsply a safe harbor from dealer

suits, thus eliminating the risk of duplicative liability. 

Many problems attend Plaintiffs’ argument. First, while
Even if Plaintiffs had not sued the dealers, Dentsply may 4

not be able to enforce the stipulations in any event. The

stipulations state that “Dentsply is a third party beneficiary of

this stipulation” and that the stipulations “may be specifically

enforced by the parties hereto or by Dentsply.” However, “only

intended beneficiaries of a contract made between two or more

other parties have enforceable rights under the contract.” 13

Williston on Contracts § 37:8, at 67 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th

ed. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302). In

this case, the contracting parties arguably did not intend that

Dentsply benefit from the stipulations, as their purpose was to

allow Plaintiffs to sue Dentsply. 

17

in the stipulations Plaintiffs expressly agree not to sue the

dealers, they did sue the dealers in Jersey Dental. Thus, the

stipulations are likely unenforceable by Plaintiffs or Dentsply.4

Furthermore, in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497

U.S. 199 (1990), the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that

the absence of a particular Illinois Brick concern in an individual

case would remove its bar on an indirect purchaser claim. 497

U.S. at 217. “[E]ven assuming that any economic assumptions

underlying the Illinois Brick rule might be disproved in a

specific case, we think it an unwarranted and counterproductive

exercise to litigate a series of exceptions.” Id. Thus, Plaintiffs

would not necessarily have standing even if the stipulations did

eliminate Illinois Brick’s duplicative liability concern.

In addition, in Merican the indirect purchasers argued
18

that there was no danger of duplicative recovery because the

direct purchaser had executed an affidavit that said it had not

suffered injury from the policy that was alleged to violate the

antitrust laws. 713 F.2d at 968. We nevertheless held that

plaintiffs were barred from seeking damages under Illinois

Brick, recognizing the remaining potential of a direct purchaser

suit. Id. at 968-69; see also Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309

F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying Illinois Brick despite

argument that “there is no danger of duplicative recovery

because the [direct purchasers] apparently have elected not to

sue [the defendant].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

As our Court has expressly refused to adopt a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick absent the joinder as

defendants of the alleged co-conspirators immediately upstream,

Plaintiffs in Hess lack standing to pursue claims for monetary

relief. Before the applicability of that exception may be

considered, the dealers must be joined.

b. May Plaintiffs recover damages in Hess

under the control exception to Illinois

Brick?

The “control exception” to Illinois Brick “might” permit

an indirect purchaser to sue an initial seller when the initial

seller “own[s] or control[s]” the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick,

431 U.S. at 736 n.16. In Hess, Plaintiffs argued that they come

within this exception because “Dentsply exerts virtual control
19

over its . . . dealers.” Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 30 (March 30,

2001). 

We have applied the control exception only when the

initial seller owned the direct purchaser. See In re Sugar Indus.

Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18-19 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1978)

(holding that, in certain circumstances, the “first noncontrolled

purchaser” has standing to sue when it has purchased from a

subsidiary of the violator);see also Mid-West-Paper Prods. Co.,

v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589 (3d Cir. 1979)

(indicating that control exception may apply “when the parent

dominates and controls the subsidiary to such an extent that the

subsidiary is deemed to be an agent of the parent.”). But

Dentsply does not own any interest in its dealers. 

Courts that have extended the control exception beyond

a parent-subsidiary relationship still require “relationships

involving such functional economic or other unity between the

direct purchaser and either the defendant or the indirect

purchaser that there effectively has been only one sale.” Jewish

Hosp. Ass’n v. Stewart Mech. Enter., 628 F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir.

1980); see also Fisher v. Wattles, 639 F. Supp. 7, 9 (M.D. Pa.

1985) (to fall within the control exception, plaintiffs must show

“such significant control” that the two companies are “virtually

the same entity”). Modes of control that might qualify for the

control exception include “interlocking directorates, minority

stock ownership, loan agreements that subject the wholesalers

to the manufacturers’ operating control, [or] trust agreements.”
20

In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d

599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.). Plaintiffs in Hess,

however, do not allege that Dentsply exerts any of these modes

of control over its dealers. 

Furthermore, even assuming that Dentsply does exert

some degree of control over its dealers, Illinois Brick’s policy

reasons for denying standing remain. Nothing about Dentsply’s

“control” over its dealers would prevent the dealers from suing

Dentsply, thus creating a risk of duplicative liability for

Dentsply and potentially inconsistent judgments. Also, if

Plaintiffs wanted to recover overcharge damages, they would

still have to demonstrate the portion of the overcharge dealers

had passed on to them, leaving intact the evidentiary

complexities and uncertainties of concern in Illinois Brick.

Moreover, permitting Plaintiffs to sue for damages would

potentially lead to inefficient enforcement of the antitrust laws,

because the ultimate recovery for the dealers would be diluted

(assuming that, rather than the dealers being permitted to

recover the entire overcharge, it was apportioned among the

dealers and the labs), thereby decreasing the dealers’ incentive

to sue.

In sum, Plaintiffs do not come within the control

exception because Dentsply does not own any interest in its

dealers and no functional unity exists among them and Dentsply.

Notwithstanding whatever lesser degree of control Dentsply may

exert over its dealers, Illinois Brick’s policy reasons for denying
21

standing apply. 

c. May Plaintiffs recover non-overcharge

damages in Hess?

In their opposition to summary judgment in Hess,

Plaintiffs argued that, even if Illinois Brick barred them from

proving overcharge damages, they might still be able to present

a non-overcharge theory of damages after further discovery.

The District Court rejected this claim “[b]ecause the Hess

plaintiffs have failed to articulate any theory of damages that

would be anything other than overcharges.” Dist. Ct. Mem. Op.

at 31 (March 30, 2001). We agree, and thus Plaintiffs’ claim

was properly dismissed at summary judgment. 

d. May Plaintiffs recover damages based

on drop shipments in Hess?

Plaintiffs in Hess claimed that, for teeth drop shipped

directly from Dentsply to the labs, they were direct purchasers

not subject to Illinois Brick. However, the Hess complaint

limited the plaintiff class to “all dental laboratory purchasers of

any Dentsply products who purchased such products through

Dentsply Dealers.” (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cannot avoid

Illinois Brick by claiming they were direct purchasers of drop

shipments when their complaint specifically alleges that they did

not directly purchase from Dentsply. 
22

Furthermore, the fact that some of the teeth are drop

shipped directly from Dentsply to Plaintiffs does not affect the

economic substance of the transaction. That is, the dealers still

make the sale to Plaintiffs and Dentsply makes the sale to the

dealers. Plaintiffs pay the dealers their usual price, the dealers

take their profit, and then the dealers pay Dentsply. See Dist. Ct.

Mem. Op. at 29 (March 30, 2001). While it is true that the

dealers do not take physical possession of the teeth, this is

nothing but a formal difference from the typical transactions. 

Thus, even as to teeth drop shipped directly from Dentsply to the

labs, Plaintiffs are indirect purchasers potentially subject to

Illinois Brick. 

 II. May Plaintiffs recover damages in Jersey

Dental?

a. May Plaintiffs recover lost profits

damages caused by their lost

opportunities to purchase and resell

Dentsply’s competitors’ products?

Plaintiffs argue that, even if they do not have standing to

recover damages for overcharges they paid to dealers for

Dentsply’s teeth, they have standing to recover lost profits

damages caused by their lost opportunities to purchase and resell
If Dentsply’s exclusionary conduct enabled it to raise its 5

prices, thereby reducing (at least in theory) the demand for its

own products, Plaintiffs might also have claimed lost profits

damages caused by their lost opportunities to purchase and resell

Dentsply’s products. However, we would reject such a claim for

the same reasons we reject Plaintiffs’ claim for lost profits

damages caused by their lost opportunities to purchase and resell

Dentsply’s competitors’ products. 

Members of the distribution chain usually mitigate this 6

harm by passing on some of the overcharge to their buyers.

However, much of this harm is not actually avoided, but rather

takes the form of the second type of harm—lost profits from the

23

products of Dentsply’s competitors. Plaintiffs allege that, as a 5

result of Dentsply’s exclusive-dealing, its competitors are denied

adequate access to a necessary means of distribution—the

dealers. Thus Dentsply’s competitors’ products are not

available. Plaintiffs are theoretically correct that, “but for

[Dentsply’s] exclusion of more efficient rivals, purchasers

would have shifted at least some of their business to the rivals.”

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages:

Legal and Economic Issues 194 (1996). 

When antitrust violators cause prices to increase through

monopolization, a price-fixing conspiracy, or exclusionary

conduct, the harm they cause members of the distribution chain

comes in two ways: (1) overcharges paid for goods actually

purchased; and (2) lost profits resulting from the lost 6
lost opportunity to buy and resell a greater volume of goods.

This is because, as members of the distribution chain pass on the

overcharge (i.e., raise their prices), their volume of sales

theoretically decreases. 

Like the second type of harm, the overcharge paid minus

the overcharge passed on for goods actually purchased and

resold are a form of “lost profits.” The overcharge paid minus

the overcharge passed on for goods actually purchased and

resold is one component of the loss an antitrust violation causes

to the bottom line (i.e., the profits) of members of the

distribution chain. However, because Illinois Brick precludes

indirect purchasers from recovering overcharge damages,

Plaintiffs do not seek in their lost profits claim the component

of their lost profits that includes the overcharge paid minus the

overcharge passed on for teeth they actually purchased and

resold.

24

opportunity to buy and resell a greater volume of goods. Jeffrey

L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price

Enhancement Cases, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 753, 770-772 (1980)

(“[T]he gross overcharge measure [of damages] ignores the

impact that the enhanced price has had on the volume of the

final good eventually produced.”); see also ABA Section of

Antitrust Law, supra, at 195 (“It is the fundamental law of

demand that as the price of a product increases the amount

purchased decreases. A collusive price increase, therefore, will

result in a reduction of the quantity of the good purchased.”). 

Thus, as some scholars see it, when antitrust plaintiffs
We note that Professor Areeda, who gained recognition 7

for his scholarly work in antitrust law, is deceased, and that the

treatise is now the responsibility principally of Professor

Hovenkamp.

25

claim that anticompetitive behavior caused prices to increase,

two measures of damages could theoretically be used: (1) the

overcharge (i.e., the difference between the price paid for goods

actually purchased and the price that would have been paid

absent the illegal conduct), or (2) lost profits (i.e., the

overcharge paid minus the overcharge passed on for goods

actually purchased and resold, plus lost profits from the lost

opportunity to buy and resell a greater volume of goods). See

Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & Roger D. Blair,

Antitrust Law ¶ 394, at 521 (2d ed. 2000).7

A court might potentially use a lost profits measure of

damages, as “[t]he Supreme Court has not explicitly held that

any particular measure of damages is required or precluded.”

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra, at 184 (citing Thomsen

v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917)); see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S.

at 733 n.13, 743 n.27 (observing that even if the “pass-on

[defense] were permitted . . . [and] the defendant show[ed] that

as a result of the overcharge the direct purchaser increased its

price by the full amount of the overcharge, the direct purchaser

m[ight] still claim injury from a reduction in the volume of its

sales caused by its higher prices”).
26

However, the standard method of measuring damages in

price enhancement cases is overcharge, not lost profits. See

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra, at 172 (“The typical

measure of damages is the difference between the actual price

and the presumed competitive price multiplied by the quantity

purchased. This was the calculation that the Supreme Court

approved in Chattanooga Foundry [& Pipe Works v. Atlanta,

203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906)].”); id. at 193-94 (Where “a group of

suppliers conspires to drive a more efficient competitor out of

the market or, equivalently, prevent a more efficient supplier

from entering the market,” the excluded supplier (competitor)

“would have a claim for antitrust damages based on lost profits”

and “purchasers from the conspirators would also have antitrust

claims because they pay higher prices as a result of the

exclusionary practice.” The purchasers’ damages would be

based on the overcharge they paid measured by “the difference

between the price actually paid and the price that would have

been paid absent collusion, multiplied by the quantity.”);

Areeda, supra, ¶ 394b, at 529 (observing that “[i]n spite of the

(arguably) theoretical superiority of lost profits as a measure of

damages in a price-enhancement case, nearly all plaintiffs claim

damages on the basis of an overcharge calculation”); Harrison,

supra, at 755-56 (“[W]hen the specific activity at issue [is] price

enhancement, courts consistently allow[] recoveries based on the

gross overcharge instead of lost profits.” (footnote omitted)).

Lost profits damages are disfavored, at least in part

because they are more difficult to prove than overcharge
27

damages. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra, at 171

(“The overcharge measure has the virtues of conceptual

simplicity . . . and relative ease of calculation.”); Roger D. Blair

& William H. Page, “Speculative” Antitrust Damages, 70 Wash.

L. Rev. 423, 433-34 (1995) (“Overcharge damages . . . were

recognized by the Supreme Court [in Chattanooga Foundry]

primarily because of the difficulty of proving lost profits in

price-fixing cases. Rather than require the complex netting

associated with lost profits, and thus practically deny recovery,

the Court permitted plaintiffs to prove damages by showing a

price enhancement.”); Harrison, supra, at 756 (“The advantage

to plaintiffs of using a gross overcharge measure is that it is less

speculative and therefore easier to prove than lost profits.”).

Furthermore, overcharge damages, unlike lost profits,

may induce antitrust plaintiffs to make arguments that will

protect rather than injure consumers. See Frank H. Easterbrook,

Treble What?, 55 Antitrust L.J. 95, 96-97, 100-01 (1986). Judge

Easterbrook argues that the overcharge to consumers, not lost

profits, “should be the basis of all [antitrust] damages.” Id. at

101. He reasons that

[t]he lure of damages for lost profits induces firms

to make arguments that will injure rather than

protect consumers. Profits get lost primarily from

hard competition or from the elimination of

monopoly. . . . The more competitive the market,

the more profits are ‘lost.’ . . . [Because] it is hard
28

to tell competition apart from exclusion, [] we

must be wary of remedies that give the victims of

hard competition a strong incentive to sue.

Id. at 100-01. 

But most importantly, Plaintiffs may not recover lost

profits damages because they are indirect purchasers. The

District Court concluded that “[t]he intermediate dental dealers

suffer the direct harm from any lost opportunity to sell a greater

volume of Dentsply products or to sell competitive product lines

and profit therefrom. Any harm suffered by plaintiffs remains

indirect.” Dist Ct. Mem. Op. at 24 n.9 (Dec. 19, 2001). We

agree.

Even commentators who advocate for indirect purchaser

standing and a lost profits measure of damages admit that their

position is currently precluded by Supreme Court case law. As

Professor Harrison concedes in his article arguing for indirect

purchaser standing and a lost profits measure of damages, “[t]he

Illinois Brick decision seems absolutely to foreclose the

possibility of indirect-purchaser standing in price enhancement

suits,” even if the indirect purchaser plaintiffs seek lost profits

as opposed to overcharge damages. See Harrison, supra, at 777;

see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746 (“[I]n elevating direct

purchasers to a preferred position as private attorneys general,

[our case law] denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who

may have been actually injured by antitrust violations.”).
29

Harrison also acknowledges that 

the legal precedents and policy arguments relied

on by the [Hanover Shoe] Court in rejecting the

pass-on defense do not support even the

theoretical appropriateness of the lost profits

measure. In addition, the Court hinted that it was

actually rejecting the very notion that damages

should be apportioned among various layers of

buyers and sellers. . . . [T]o the extent that the

apportionment process has been rejected by the

Court, it would be inappropriate to infer that the

lost profits measure has received even implicit

approval.

Id. at 764-65 (footnotes omitted) (citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S.

at 489-90 & n.8, 494, 498). Similarly, while Professors Areeda,

Hovenkamp and Blair argue that “the correct solution is to

permit damages actions based on lost profits to all

intermediaries,” they concede that their position “is at variance

with the case law.” Areeda, supra, ¶ 346a, at 359-60. Finally,

the ABA’s Antitrust Section recognizes that “if a cartel sells to

an intermediate purchaser who resells to another, both

purchasers are likely to lose profits as a result of the price fix,”

but concedes that “[u]nder the Illinois Brick rule, the second

intermediate purchaser, or the indirect purchaser from the cartel,

cannot recover damages.” ABA Section of Antitrust Law,

supra, at 183-84.
30

If we were to hold that indirect purchaser plaintiffs could

recover lost profits from their decreased volume of purchases

and resales, we would be implying that (1) past indirect

purchaser plaintiffs who have been denied standing based on

Illinois Brick could have recovered if only they had framed their

claim as one for lost profits rather than for overcharge damages,

and (2) that the Illinois Brick Court—which was concerned with

simplifying and controlling the costs of antitrust litigation and

with conserving judicial resources—really meant that indirect

purchasers do have standing to sue, but for lost profits rather

than overcharge damages. We find both of these propositions

untenable.

For all of these reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs do not

have statutory standing to recover lost profits damages caused

by their lost opportunities to purchase and resell Dentsply’s

competitors’ products. 

b. May Plaintiffs recover damages caused

by the alleged retail price-fixing

conspiracy in Jersey Dental under a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick?

In Jersey Dental, Plaintiffs claim that they come within

the “co-conspirator exception” to Illinois Brick because their

purchases from Dentsply’s dealers were made from members of

a retail price-fixing conspiracy. Other circuit courts have

adopted a co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick that applies
31

in retail price-fixing cases. See Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co.,

729 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that purchasers

from down-stream conspirators may sue up-stream conspirators

for damages and noting that “[n]umerous other courts have

found Illinois Brick inapplicable to claims against remote sellers

when the plaintiffs allege that the sellers conspired with

intermediates in the distribution chain to fix the price at which

the plaintiffs purchased”); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper

Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook,

J.) (holding that Illinois Brick does not bar suits for damages by

plaintiffs against an initial seller when it is alleged to have

conspired in violation of the antitrust laws with the seller

directly upstream from plaintiffs); Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d

at 604 (same); see also Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1980) (approving co-conpirator

exception in dicta).

Our Court has not explicitly adopted a co-conspirator

exception to Illinois Brick. In McCarthy, we neither adopted

nor rejected the exception because it was inapplicable to the

case, but we did explain its “nature”: “In order to fall within the

exception, plaintiffs here would have to allege that the

intermediaries immediately upstream . . . colluded with the

defendants to overcharge plaintiffs . . . . Moreover, plaintiffs

would be obliged to join the [intermediaries] as defendants . . .

.” 80 F.3d at 855 (emphasis omitted). In our case, Plaintiffs

allege that they made purchases from Dentsply’s dealers (the

intermediaries immediately upstream from Plaintiffs) and that
Plaintiffs may not recover from Dentsply for teeth 8

purchased from the two non-joined dealers under a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick because, as previously

mentioned, our Court has expressly refused to adopt a coconspirator exception when the alleged co-conspirators

immediately upstream have not been joined.

32

Dentsply and its dealers are co-conspirators. In addition, in

Jersey Dental Plaintiffs sued not only Dentsply, but also joined

as defendants twenty-six of Dentsply’s then twenty-eight

authorized dealers. Thus, under McCarthy, Plaintiffs 8

potentially qualify for the co-conspirator exception. 

Furthermore, Professors Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Blair

approve of the co-conspirator exception. They explain that

Illinois Brick does not limit suits by consumers

against a manufacturer who illegally contracted

with its dealers to set the latter’s resale price. . . .

There is no problem of duplication or

apportionment, because the consumer is the only

party who has paid any overcharge. . . . The court

simply computes the retail price that would have

prevailed absent the illegal contract fixing the

price. Further emphasizing that Illinois Brick

does not apply is that a dealer challenging resale

price maintenance imposed upon itself would not

base its damages on an “overcharge” at all. Its
“Resale price maintenance”—the term used by Areeda,

9

et al.—is simply another way of describing the vertical price

fixing in which Plaintiffs allege Dentsply and its dealers

engaged. In resale price maintenance, the initial seller dictates

the dealers’ resale price.

33

action is not based on a higher product price to

itself, but rather on the constraint on its resale

price; its damages would be for lost profits

resulting from the reduced volume of sales. As

that case illustrates, lost profits damages for the

intermediary and overcharge damages for the

consumer are not in any way duplicative; they are

both losses caused by the unlawful resale price

maintenance.

Areeda, supra, ¶ 346h, at 369-70.

In fact, a recent supplement to their treatise analyzed

Jersey Dental and concluded that the District Court “incorrectly

refus[ed] to apply a co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick .

. . .” Areeda, supra, ¶ 346a, at 88 n.1 (2003 Supp.). It reasoned

that, to the extent that Dentsply imposed resale price

maintenance on its dealers, they 9

might have their own damage action against the

supplier, but if so, it would be an action for lost

profits, not for an overcharge; the dealer’s injury
In fact, Areeda implies that even the alleged exclusive- 10

dealing could not have caused the dealers to be overcharged.

Areeda, supra, ¶ 346a, at 88 n.1 (2003 Supp.). This appears to

be incorrect, for if the exclusive-dealing led to exclusion of

Dentsply’s competitors, Dentsply may have been able to

overcharge its dealers. 

We are, of course, not saying that the dealers could 11

prevail on any particular claim. Rather, we merely point out that

if the dealers proved that Dentsply imposed resale price

maintenance on them, their measure of damages would be based

on the lost profits from their decreased volume of purchases and

34

would accrue from the profits lost by . . . lost

output resulting from being required to sell at the

maintained price; as a result, there was nothing to

pass on . . . .

Id.10

Not only are overcharge pass-on calculations not a

concern, the other two Illinois Brick policy justifications are also

inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ price-fixing conspiracy claim. First,

there is no risk of duplicative liability or potentially inconsistent

judgments because Plaintiffs and Dentsply’s dealers would not

be suing for the same injury. To the extent that Dentsply

imposed resale price maintenance on the dealers, the dealers’

claim against Dentsply would be for lost profits, not for an

overcharge. Lost profits would be caused by lost output, 11
resales. This lost profits harm is different from, and thus not

duplicative of, the overcharge harm that any resale price

maintenance would have caused Plaintiffs.

35

which in turn is caused by resale price maintenance. Areeda,

supra, ¶ 346a, at 88 n.1 (2003 Supp.). Second, permitting

Plaintiffs to sue would not cause inefficient enforcement of the

antitrust laws by diluting the ultimate recovery and thus

decreasing direct purchasers’ incentive to sue. Dealers would

still recover the same amount on their hypothetical lost profits

claim even if Plaintiffs recovered on their separate price-fixing

claim.

Finally, we have found no precedent holding that

plaintiffs, who purchase from dealers who are part of a pricefixing conspiracy with the initial seller, may not recover

damages from the initial seller.

In this context, we hold that Plaintiffs in Jersey Dental

have statutory standing to recover damages from Dentsply for its

alleged price-fixing conspiracy with its dealers.

c. May Plaintiffs recover damages caused

by the alleged exclusive-dealing

conspiracy in Jersey Dental under a coconspirator exception to Illinois Brick?

In Jersey Dental, Plaintiffs also claim that they come
We recognize that one might ask why would it not 12

always be unprofitable for a direct purchaser to join such a nonRPM conspiracy and effectively agree to be overcharged (as

input costs increase, profits decrease). Further, if economics

predicts that such overcharge conspiracies will never arise, why

consider adopting an exception for them?

As an initial matter, because Jersey Dental is at the

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stage, we must take as

true Plaintiffs’ allegations that Dentsply and its dealers have

conspired to fix, and have fixed, the prices that dealers charge

Plaintiffs and that there was an exclusive-dealing conspiracy

between Dentsply and its dealers to exclude Dentsply’s

competitors. We may not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims because we

determine the alleged facts likely did not occur.

In fact, however, we can imagine how the exclusivedealing conspiracy, in combination with the RPM conspiracy,

could have been profitable to the dealers. As previously

mentioned, it would presumably not have been profitable for the

dealers to have joined a conspiracy in which they were

overcharged (the exclusive-dealing conspiracy). However, the

36

within the “co-conspirator exception” to Illinois Brick because

their purchases from Dentsply’s dealers were made from

members of an exclusive-dealing conspiracy. Thus, we must

decide whether there is—in addition to a co-conspirator

exception for RPM (resale price maintenence, i.e., vertical pricefixing) conspiracies—a co-conspirator exception for non-RPM

conspiracies, such as exclusive-dealing or price-fixing at the

manufacturer level (“the general co-conspirator exception”).12
dealers might have joined such a conspiracy if they were

compensated in some fashion. Plaintiffs argue that Dentsply

conspired to fix the prices that its dealers charge. This is

effectively a horizontal price fixing conspiracy at the dealer

level (which could presumably be profitable to the dealers) that

is policed by Dentsply. Thus, the RPM conspiracy could be the

mechanism by which Dentsply compensates its dealers in

exchange for the dealers’ agreement (1) not to deal with

Dentsply’s competitors and (2) thus to be overcharged by

Dentsply.

In addition, in Prescription Drugs Judge Posner rejected

a similar argument that it would not have made sense

economically for the wholesalers in that case to have joined

what was arguably a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy at the

manufacturer level. 123 F.3d at 614. He explained that “[t]he

theory is that the wholesalers were the manufacturers’ catspaws. There is nothing new about the idea that a cartel might

‘hire’ a customer to help police the cartel.” Id. He also implied

that, because drug wholesalers appeared to be “an endangered

commercial species” and the manufacturers could have cut them

out altogether and sold directly to buying groups for pharmacies,

it was in the wholesalers’ self-interest to join the conspiracy. Id.

Finally, “summary judgment for a defendant is proper,

even if there is some evidence of an antitrust violation, if

plaintiff’s theory of violation makes no economic sense.”

Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 614 (citing Matsushita Electric

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);

Eastman Kodak Co. v.Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S.

37
451, 467-69 (1992)). Thus, there is already a mechanism in

place for courts to dismiss before trial claims of a conspiracy

that would make no economic sense.

38

We hold that such an exception would only exist in

circumstances where the middlemen would be barred from

bringing a claim against their former co-conspirator—the

manufacturer—because their involvement in the conspiracy was

“truly complete” (i.e., if the middlemen would be barred from

suing by the “complete involvement defense” of a

manufacturer). See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts

Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968) (expressly “not decid[ing] . . .

whether . . . truly complete involvement and participation in a

monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis . . . for barring a

plaintiff’s cause of action”).

1. Why we adopt a “limited”

general co-conspirator exception.

If there is a general co-conspirator exception, why do we

limit it? To begin, we examine whether Illinois Brick’s policy

justifications suggest we should adopt (1) a general coconspirator exception that would permit indirect purchaser

standing when the middlemen conspired with the manufacturers

even if the middlemen were not barred by the complete

involvement defense from suing their former coconspirator—the manufacturer (the “unlimited exception”), or

(2) an exception that would permit indirect purchaser standing
The Seventh Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to 13

engage head-on the general co-conspirator exception, and it has

adopted it. See Paper Systems, 281 F.3d at 631-32 (“The right

to sue middlemen that joined the conspiracy is sometimes

referred to as a co-conspirator ‘exception’ to Illinois Brick, but

it would be better to recognize that Hanover Shoe and Illinois

Brick allocate to the first non-conspirator in the distribution

chain the right to collect 100% of the damages.”); Prescription

Drugs,123 F.3d at 604; Fontana Aviation, 617 F.2d at 481. However,

we do not discern an explanation by the Court why it did so or an

explicit delineation of the exception’s scope (i.e., whether it is

unlimited or limited).

39

only if the middlemen were barred by the complete involvement

defense from suing the manufacturer (the “limited exception”).13

Illinois Brick’s first policy concern—the risk of

duplicative liability—cuts against the unlimited exception, but

in favor of the limited exception. For example, imagine the

dealers had already sued and recovered overcharges from

Dentsply for the exclusive-dealing conspiracy. If there was an

unlimited exception, presumably nothing would stop the labs

from then suing Dentsply to recover the duplicative portion of

the overcharge that the dealers had passed on to them. Even

under the conditions of this case (with the labs suing first and

the dealers joined), duplicative recovery is a possibility. If the

labs prove Dentsply engaged in an exclusive-dealing conspiracy

with the dealers, the dealers could potentially sue Dentsply for

duplicative damages the conspiracy caused them. See Link, 788
Because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for 14

damages of treble the amount a plaintiff is injured, presumably

indirect purchaser plaintiffs would only be permitted to recover

treble the amount of the manufacturer’s overcharge that the

40

F.2d at 932 n.12 (analyzing an alleged conspiracy analogous to

our case and noting that, even if the dealers were joined and

were co-conspirators, they could still potentially sue the

manufacturer for overcharges caused by the exclusive-dealing

conspiracy). However, under the limited exception, the risk of

duplicative liability is alleviated because that exception is only

applicable if the middlemen are barred from recovery. 

Illinois Brick’s second policy concern—avoiding the

need to ascertain the portion of an overcharge that was passed

on—cuts against both exceptions. Unlike vertical conspiracies

involving RPM, other vertical conspiracies are designed to

distort the wholesale market for a particular good. For example,

assume that Dentsply and its dealers only engaged in an

exclusive-dealing conspiracy. The effect of that conspiracy

would be to deny Dentsply’s competitors access to its authorized

dealers. The absence of competition for these dealers’ business

would allow Dentsply to charge its dealers a supra-competitive

price at wholesale. This overcharge would then be passed on (at

least in part) to the dealers’ customers, the dental laboratories.

The damages that the laboratories could recover from Dentsply

would thus be the treble portion of the overcharge that the

dealers passed on to them. Thus both exceptions, which apply 14
direct purchasers passed on to them and would not be able to

recover the portion of the manufacturer’s overcharge that the

direct purchasers absorbed because the indirect purchasers

would not have been injured by that portion. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 15(a) (Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person

who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of

anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover

threefold the damages by him sustained.”) (emphasis added).

But see Paper Systems, 281 F.3d at 631-32 (“The right to sue

middlemen that joined the conspiracy is sometimes referred to

as a co-conspirator “exception” to Illinois Brick, but it would be

better to recognize that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick allocate

to the first non-conspirator in the distribution chain the right to

collect 100% of the damages.”) (emphasis added); cf. Hanover

Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 (holding that an antitrust defendant could

not argue that a plaintiff who had purchased a product directly

from the defendant was not injured because it had passed on the

illegal overcharge to its own customers, thus creating a regime

under which plaintiffs can arguably recover more than

“threefold the damages by him sustained”). Of course, if under

the limited exception (where direct purchasers are barred from

recovering) indirect purchaser plaintiffs were allowed to recover

the entire overcharge that the manufacturers imposed on the

direct purchasers (even though the direct purchasers absorbed

some of that overcharge and did not pass on that absorbed

portion to the indirect purchasers), then the portion of the

overcharge that was passed on from the direct purchasers to the

indirect purchasers would not need to be ascertained and Illinois

Brick’s second policy justification would cut in favor of the

41
limited exception.

Technically speaking, there would be no need to 15

“apportion” damages between direct and indirect purchasers

under the limited exception. This is because, as we have

explained, the limited exception would only permit indirect

purchaser standing in circumstances where the direct purchaser

would be barred from bringing suit against the manufacturer.

As such, there would be no need to apportion any damages to

the direct purchasing middleman.

Nevertheless, even under the limited exception, the finder

of fact would be required to ascertain the amount of the

overcharge that had been passed on by the middleman. After

all, an antitrust plaintiff (whether he be a direct or an indirect

purchaser) is only entitled to recover “threefold the damages by

him sustained.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added).

Therefore, to the extent that the middleman retained (i.e. did not

pass on to the indirect purchaser) a portion of any overcharge

imposed upon him, the damages actually sustained by the

indirect purchaser would be reduced by that amount.

42

to conspiracies that attack the wholesale market, potentially

create the problems of apportionment that underlie Illinois

Brick. 

15

Illinois Brick’s third policy concern—risk of inefficient

enforcement of the antitrust laws because the ultimate recovery

for the dealers would be diluted, thereby decreasing the dealers’

incentive to sue—cuts against the unlimited exception, but in
43

favor of the limited exception. Under the unlimited exception,

when middlemen were not completely involved, their recovery

would be diluted and their incentive to sue would decrease

(assuming that, rather than the middlemen being permitted to

recover the entire overcharge, it was apportioned among the

middlemen and the indirect purchasers). However, under the

limited exception, when middlemen were not completely

involved, their recovery would not be diluted and their incentive

to sue would not decrease. As the indirect purchasers would not

have standing in this instance, no recovery by them could dilute

the middlemen’s recovery. 

Thus, all three of the Illinois Brick policy justifications

argue against adopting the unlimited exception, while the first

and the third favor adopting the limited exception and only the

second (the desire to avoid ascertaining the portion of an

overcharge that was passed on) cuts against it. Further, while it

is true that adopting the limited exception creates the need to

ascertain the portion of an overcharge that was passed on, we

think the alternative, adopting no general co-conspirator

exception, is less desirable. Cf. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore

Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1169 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]hile

complex apportionment problems are implicated here, we do

not hold that litigation must be avoided solely because it might

be difficult to ascertain damages. Injured parties cannot be

penalized and left without recourse because measurement of

their damages is difficult.”). The Illinois Brick Court was

concerned with promoting “the longstanding policy of
The Court explained that “[a]lthough in pari delicto 16

literally means ‘of equal fault,’ the doctrine has been applied .

. . in a wide variety of situations in which a plaintiff seeking

damages or equitable relief is himself involved in some of the

same sort of wrong doing.” Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138.

44

encouraging vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws.”

431 U.S. at 745. We are unwilling to hold that if initial sellers

and “completely involved” direct purchasers conspire, then no

plaintiff outside the conspiracy may sue the initial seller for

damages. 

2. Is th e r e a “ c o m p lete

involvement” defense?

 We hold that a general co-conspirator exception would

only exist if the complete involvement defense barred the

middlemen from bringing a claim against their former coconspirator—the manufacturer. However, our Court has not

decided where the complete involvement defense even exists.

We thus examine this question.

In Perma Life, the Supreme Court held that “the doctrine

of in pari delicto . . . is not to be recognized as a defense to an

antitrust action.” 392 U.S. at 140. But as previously 16

mentioned, the Court expressly did “not decide . . . whether . .

. truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic

scheme could ever be a basis . . . for barring a plaintiff’s cause
See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring) 17

(“I would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear

substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of

[the co-conspirators] . . . .”); id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring)

(Suit should be barred when “the fault of the parties is

reasonably within the same scale.”); id. at 149 (Marshall, J.,

concurring) (“I would hold that where a defendant in a private

antitrust suit can show that the plaintiff actively participated in

the formation and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is

substantially equally at fault, the plaintiff should be barred from

imposing liability on the defendant.”); id. at 153 (Harlan, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Stewart, J., joining)

(“[P]roperly used[, in pari delicto] refers to a defense that

should be permitted in antitrust cases.”). 

45

of action.” Id. Further, in concurrences, five members of the

Perma Life Court favored barring suit by antitrust plaintiffs who

were involved in a conspiracy at a high enough level.17

Further, every Court of Appeals that has decided the

issue has held that antitrust plaintiffs who were involved in a

conspiracy at a requisite level are barred from suing. See, e.g.,

Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 34 F.3d 1091, 1107 (1st Cir. 1994);

Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 16 (4th

Cir. 1971); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n,

830 F.2d 716, 720-23 (7th Cir. 1987); Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal,

Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1976). But cf. Greene v. Gen.

Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 646-47 (1975) (“seriously

question[ing]” whether antitrust plaintiffs should ever be barred
46

from suing because of their “unclean hands”). In Link, our

Court recognized that co-conspirators who were completely

involved in a conspiracy might be barred from suing. 788 F.2d

at 932. However, we did not decide the issue because we

concluded that the co-conspirators in that case were not

completely involved in the conspiracy. Id.

We recognize that the weight of authority favors barring

suit by antitrust plaintiffs who were involved in a conspiracy at

a high enough level. We also recognize, however, the strong

policy argument in favor of allowing suits by co-conspirators

even when their involvement in a conspiracy was large. The

Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he formulation of the

‘complete involvement’ defense reflects a somewhat uneasy

balance between the compelling policy of enforcement of the

antitrust laws and the natural desire of any court to recognize the

equities as between parties.” THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First

Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1980). It is

notable, however, that, while the courts who have adopted the

complete involvement defense have struck the

“enforcement/equities balance” in favor of equities, the Supreme

Court in the holdings of Illinois Brick and Perma Life struck the

balance in favor of enforcement.

In Illinois Brick, the Court

conclude[d] that the legislative purpose in

creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to
See Areeda, supra, ¶ 346k, at 378 (“The obvious 18

difficulty with denying damages for consumers buying from an

intermediary is that they are injured, often more than the

intermediary, who may also be injured but for whom the entire

overcharge is a windfall. The indirect purchaser rule awards

greatly overcompensate intermediaries and greatly

undercompensate consumers in the name of efficiency in the

administration of the antitrust laws.”).

47

enforce the antitrust laws under § 4 [of the

Clayton Act] is better served by holding direct

purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the

overcharge paid by them than by attempting to

apportion the overcharge among all that may have

absorbed a part of it.

431 U.S. at 746 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus

the Illinois Brick Court made the balancing decision to deny

(some might argue inequitably ) injured indirect purchasers 18

standing to recover while granting direct purchasers the windfall

of the entire overcharge in order to further efficient antitrust law

enforcement.

In Perma Life, the Court believed that allowing the in

pari delicto defense in an antitrust action would “threaten the

effectiveness of the private action as a vital means for enforcing

. . . antitrust policy.” 392 U.S. at 136. It noted that it had “often

indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law
48

barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public

purposes.” Id. at 138. It concluded that

[t]he plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble

damages may be no less morally reprehensible

than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit

to further the overriding pubic policy in favor of

competition. A more fastidious regard for the

relative moral worth of the parties would only

result in seriously undermining the usefulness of

the private action as a bulwark of antitrust

enforcement.

Id. at 139 (emphases added). Thus, the Court chose to allow the

inequity of letting plaintiffs, though as “morally reprehensible”

as defendants, sue in order to foster antitrust law enforcement.

We further point out that a rule prohibiting antitrust

plaintiffs who were completely involved in a conspiracy to sue

co-conspirators need not be absolute and could be crafted to

maximize antitrust enforcement and cartel instability. For

example, the law might allow the first, but only the first,

completely involved co-conspirator the right to sue its fellow coconspirators. This would give each co-conspirator incentive to

be the first to defect from a cartel and enforce the antitrust laws

because (1) each would want to be the one and only coconspirator to gain the right to recover treble damages and (2)

each would be afraid that if it did not defect, another would, and
49

it would then be liable for treble damages. Under such a rule,

the incentive to defect and cartel instability would increase, and

cartel breakdown and failure should become more common.

Further, if potential co-conspirators knew their potential cartel

had a decreased chance of succeeding, they would be less likely

to form a cartel in the first place. 

Regardless, as we will explain, it turns out that we need

not resolve whether there is a complete involvement defense to

antitrust actions in order to determine whether Plaintiffs come

within a general co-conspirator exception. 

3. Could Plaintiffs come within a

general co- cons p i rat o r

exception? 

If there is a general co-conspirator exception, it would

only apply if the middlemen were barred from bringing a claim

against their former co-conspirator—the manufacturer—because

their involvement in the conspiracy was “truly complete.”

However, in our case, Plaintiffs could not qualify for such an

exception because the District Court concluded, and Plaintiffs

have conceded, that the dealers’ involvement in the alleged

conspiracy with Dentsply was not “truly complete.” The District

Court concluded that there was “no way to construe the facts

alleged such that the dental dealers could be considered

‘substantially equal’ participants in the alleged conspiracy . . . or

that their participation was ‘voluntary in any meaningful
Plaintiffs also allege in Jersey Dental that—as to teeth 19

Dentsply drop shipped to them—they were direct purchasers not

subject to Illinois Brick. Further, the Jersey Dental complaint

does not have the Hess complaint’s defect, as it specifically

alleges that Plaintiffs were direct purchasers. As we hold that

50

sense.’” Dist Ct. Mem. Op. at 20-21 (Dec. 19, 2001) (citation

omitted). Further, Plaintiffs acknowledged in their brief that

they “have not based any part of [their] appeal on any argument

that the dealers’ involvement was ‘substantially equal’ to

Dentsply’s.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 23 n.16. Thus, Plaintiffs

may not recover damages caused by the exclusive-dealing

conspiracy under a general co-conspirator exception to Illinois

Brick.

Conclusion

We thus hold that Plaintiffs may not recover damages in

Hess (a) under the “co-conspirator” exception to Illinois Brick,

(b) under the “control” exception to Illinois Brick, (c) under a

non-overcharge theory of damages, or (d) for “drop shipments.”

In Jersey Dental, however, while Plaintiffs may not recover

damages under the control exception or under a lost profits

theory, they do have statutory standing under the co-conspirator

exception to pursue an action for overcharge damages (including

for drop shipped teeth) caused by the alleged retail price-fixing

conspiracy, although not for the alleged exclusive-dealing

conspiracy.19
the Jersey Dental Plaintiffs have standing to recover damages

from Dentsply for its alleged price-fixing conspiracy with its

dealers under the co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick,

Plaintiffs may potentially recover on the drop-shipped teeth

under that theory.

Finally, as in Hess, Plaintiffs in Jersey Dental do not

come within the control exception to Illinois Brick because, as

already noted, Dentsply does not own any interest in its dealers,

there is no functional unity among Dentsply and its dealers, and

all of Illinois Brick’s policy reasons for denying standing apply.

51