FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL, 

AKA Santa Ysabel Band of 

Diegueno Mission Indians, AKA 

Santa Ysabel Band of Diegueno 

Mission Indians of the Santa Ysabel 

Reservation; SANTA YSABEL 

INTERACTIVE, a tribal economic 

development entity; SANTA YSABEL 

GAMING COMMISSION; SANTA 

YSABEL TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT 

CORPORATION; ANTHONY BUCARO;

DAVID CHELETTE; MICHELLE 

MAXCY; VIRGIL PEREZ; BRANDIE 

TAYLOR; DAVID VIALPANDO,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 17-55150

D.C. Nos.

3:14-cv-02724-

AJB-NLS

3:14-cv-02855-

AJB-NLS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 16, 2018

San Francisco, California
2 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

Filed August 2, 2018

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Julio M. Fuentes,*

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

SUMMARY**

Tribal Gaming

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the State of California and the United 

States in their action seeking injunctive relief prohibiting 

Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel from continuing to operate 

Desert Rose Casino.

Desert Rose Casino is exclusively a server-based bingo 

game that allows patrons to play computerized bingo over 

the internet. Iipay Nation is a federally recognized Indian 

tribe with tribal lands located in San Diego County, 

California.

The panel held that Iipay Nation’s operation of Desert 

Rose Casino violated the Unlawful Internet Gambling 

Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”). The panel held that the Indian 

Gaming Regulatory Act protected gaming activity 

conducted on Indian lands, but the patrons’ act of placing a 

 * The Honorable Julio M. Fuentes, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 3

bet or wager on a game of Desert Rose Casino while located 

in California, violated the UIGEA, and was not protected by 

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The panel further held 

that even if all of the “gaming activity” associated with 

Desert Rose Casino occurred on Indian lands, the patrons’ 

act of placing bets or wagers over the internet while located 

in a jurisdiction where those bets or wagers were illegal 

made Iipay Nation’s decision to accept financial payments 

associated with those bets or wagers a violation of the 

UIGEA.

COUNSEL

Scott D. Crowell (argued), Crowell Law Office-Tribal 

Advocacy Group, Sedona, Arizona; Little Fawn Boland, 

Ceiba Legal LLP, Mill Valley, California; Kevin C. Quigley, 

Foley & Quigley PLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota; for 

Defendants-Appellants.

Glen F. Dorgan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, 

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San 

Diego, California; William P. Torngren, Deputy Attorney 

General; Sarah J. Drake, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney 

General, Sacramento, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
4 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

This case presents an issue of first impression: Does the 

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., 

permit an Indian tribe to offer online gaming to patrons 

located off Indian lands in jurisdictions where gambling is 

illegal? Because we conclude that the Unlawful Internet 

Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361, et seq., bars 

the activity at issue in this case, we affirm the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment to the State of California 

and the United States.

I

The Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel (“Iipay”) is a federally 

recognized Indian tribe. Iipay’s tribal lands are located in 

San Diego County, California. Iipay operated a traditional, 

brick-and-mortar casino on its tribal lands, but the casino 

failed and Iipay no longer conducts traditional gambling 

activity at the casino.

In an effort to revitalize its gaming revenue stream, Iipay 

launched Desert Rose Bingo (“DRB”). DRB is a serverbased bingo game that allows patrons to play computerized 

bingo over the internet. Like traditional bingo, participants 

in DRB purchase cards labeled with a grid of numbers. 

Numbers are then drawn and, if the numbers drawn 

correspond with the numbers on the player’s card, the 

numbers on the card are covered or “daubed.” A player wins 

by daubing numbers on the card in a pre-determined pattern.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 5

Iipay operated DRB through its wholly owned 

subsidiary, Santa Ysabel Interactive (“SYI”), on a set of 

servers that are located in Iipay’s now-defunct casino on 

tribal lands. Unlike other computerized bingo games, Iipay 

does not provide any physical computer terminals located on 

Iipay’s tribal lands at which patrons can play DRB. Instead, 

Iipay offered DRB to all California residents over 18 years 

of age exclusively through the internet.1

A patron must access DRB by navigating to 

desertrosebingo.com using a web browser on a computer or 

other internet-enabled device, such as a tablet or cell phone. 

The patron must then register, create an account, and fund 

the account (either via a credit card or an electronic funds 

transfer).

After a patron has funded his account, he can select a 

bingo game in which to participate, ranging in value from 

$.01 to $1.00. Once the patron selects a denomination of 

game in which to participate, the patron is presented with a 

“Request Form” popup window. In the Request Form 

window, the patron selects the number of games he would 

like to participate in (up to five games), the number of cards 

per game the patron would like to play (up to 500 cards per 

game), and the “playback theme” the patron would like the 

post-game video to appear.2

After the patron is satisfied with his selection of 

denomination of game, number of games, and number of 

 1 Iipay limited the game to California residents who were in state at 

the time of logging on by using a geolocation server and geolocation 

software to identify and verify the location of users who accessed DRB.

2 For instance, in a demonstration DVD provided by the parties, the 

playback video is shown in a “Jurassic theme” and features a dinosaur.
6 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

cards, the patron clicks the “Submit Request!” button on the 

Request Form. The patron is then presented with a “System 

Message” stating that the request has been submitted and 

“accepted” by DRB. After the Request Form is submitted, 

the patron’s account is debited for an amount equal to the 

denomination of game the patron chose, multiplied by the 

number of games and cards per game the patron selected.

After the patron’s request is accepted, the patron can 

view the request under the “Requested” tab on DRB’s main 

page. The Requested tab shows the information from the 

Request Form—denomination of game, number of games, 

number of cards per game, and playback theme. The 

Requested tab also displays the number of “proxies,” which 

corresponds with the number of patrons registered to 

participate in the game, and a timer. Once the number of 

patrons participating in the game reaches the pre-determined 

minimum number of participants set by DRB, the timer 

begins to count down.

When the timer reaches zero, the patrons’ wagers are 

logged as “completed,” and the outcome of the game is 

determined. Technically, by submitting the Request Form, 

the patron has appointed an individual located at the casino, 

on Iipay’s tribal lands, as the patron’s “proxy.” There is 

always one SYI employee located at the casino that serves 

as the “Patron’s Legally Designated Agent” and is 

responsible for representing all patrons.3

Serving as a Patron’s Legally Designated Agent does not 

require any affirmative action, such as actually daubing the 

 3 SYI also employs approximately a half-dozen “proxy monitors” 

who assist in monitoring the operation of the software and hardware 

components of DRB.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 7

bingo card, by the proxy. Instead, the proxy is a passive 

observer and the DRB software automatically conducts all 

aspects of gameplay, from drawing the numbers to daubing 

the cards. Thus, the “playing” of the game requires no actual 

action on the part of the patron, the Patron’s Designated 

Agent, or any other human. The last human action in a game 

of bingo conducted through DRB occurs when the patron 

clicks the “Submit Request!” button.

Shortly after the game is completed, the patron can 

navigate to the “Completed” tab and view the results of the 

bingo game. Under the completed tab, the patron can choose 

to view a video replay of the completed bingo game, which 

is presented in the selected graphical theme (e.g., Jurassic). 

The replay video shows the bingo card the patron purchased 

and a video recreation of the numbers being drawn and 

daubed. At the end of the video, the patron is informed 

whether and how much the patron won. The patron’s 

account is then credited with any winnings.

Iipay launched DRB on November 3, 2014. On 

November 18, 2014, the State of California and the United 

States (collectively, the “Government”) sued Iipay seeking 

injunctive relief prohibiting Iipay from continuing to operate 

DRB. On December 12, 2014, the district court issued a 

temporary restraining order prohibiting Iipay from 

continuing to operate DRB during the pendency of this 

litigation. DRB has remained dormant ever since.

After discovery, the State of California and the United 

States filed separate motions for summary judgment. The 

State of California sought summary judgment on two 

grounds. First, California claimed that Iipay’s operation of 

DRB violated the tribal-state compact between California 
8 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

and Iipay regarding Class III gaming.4 The district court 

rejected this argument, finding that DRB was a Class II game 

that was not subject to the tribal-state compact.5

Second, California and the United States jointly argued 

that Iipay’s operation of DRB violated the Unlawful Internet 

Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), 31 U.S.C. § 5361, 

et seq. Iipay argued that the UIGEA did not apply to its 

operation of DRB because DRB was conducted on tribal 

lands and, as a result, was legal under the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. The 

district court ruled that DRB violated the UIGEA and 

entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Iipay from 

operating DRB. Iipay appealed the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo and may affirm on any ground supported 

by the record. Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 

1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). Statutory interpretation presents 

a question of law, which we also review de novo. Id.

 4 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act categorizes various forms of 

gambling into three different “Classes.” Bingo is ordinarily a Class II 

game, which can be conducted on tribal lands without approval from the 

state where the tribal lands are located. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(7)(A)(i), 

2710(a)(2). However, California argued that features of DRB rendered 

it an “electronic facsimile” of bingo, making DRB a Class III game, 

which cannot be conducted on tribal lands unless it is permitted by a 

tribal-state compact. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(7)(B)(ii), 2703(8), 2710(d).

5 California did not cross-appeal the district court’s denial of its 

motion for summary judgment based on its tribal-state compact claim. 

As a result, that issue is not before us on appeal.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 9

III

This case presents an issue of first impression regarding 

the interrelation between IGRA and the UIGEA. No other 

circuit has opined on whether an Indian tribe can offer online 

gaming to patrons located off Indian lands in jurisdictions 

where such gambling is illegal. The issue hinges on the 

interpretation of the key provisions of IGRA and the 

UIEGA. Thus, to analyze this issue, it is helpful to review 

the statutory framework of IGRA and the UIEGA.

A. The Statutory Framework

IGRA was passed to provide a regime for regulating 

gaming on Indian lands. It provides that “[a]ny class II 

gaming on Indian lands shall continue to be within the 

jurisdiction of the Indian tribes.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). 

As discussed above, DRB (like other forms of bingo, 

generally) is a Class II game. See discussion supra at 8 n.4. 

Thus, if DRB takes place on Indian lands, it is under Iipay’s 

jurisdiction, provided Iipay complies with certain regulatory 

requirements that are not at issue here.6

 6 We note that Congress passed IGRA in 1988—a few years before 

the internet became publicly available. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 

2467 (1988). Congress made clear that this was “[a]n Act to regulate 

gaming on Indian lands” because “Federal law d[id] not provide clear 

standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands.” Id.

(emphasis added). Befitting the technology of the time, IGRA 

envisioned bingo with “electronic, computer, or other technologic aids.” 

Id. at 2468. But the statute nowhere referenced the internet, or other 

networking capabilities that reach beyond Indian lands.
10 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

The UIGEA was passed to regulate online gambling.7 

See 31 U.S.C. § 5361. Unlike IGRA or other gambling 

regulations, the UIGEA does not make gambling legal or 

illegal directly. Instead, the UIGEA makes it illegal for a 

“person engaged in the business of betting or wagering” 

knowingly to accept certain financial payments from an 

individual who is engaged in “unlawful Internet gambling.” 

31 U.S.C. § 5363. Unlawful internet gambling occurs when 

an individual places or receives a “bet or wager by any 

means which involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet 

where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable 

Federal or State law in the State or Tribal lands in which the 

bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.” 

31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (emphasis added). A “bet or 

wager” includes “staking or risking” something of value, 

purchasing a lottery ticket, or transmitting “any instructions 

or information pertaining to the establishment or movement 

of funds by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account 

with the business of betting or wagering.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5362(1).

Thus, the UIGEA does not prohibit otherwise legal 

gambling. But the UIGEA does create a system in which a 

“bet or wager” must be legal both where it is “initiated” and 

where it is “received.” This requirement makes sense in 

light of how the internet operates. If a bet merely had to be 

legal where it was received, a bettor could place an illegal 

bet (on a game of poker, for instance) from anywhere in the 

 7 When Congress passed UIGEA in 2006, it found that “[n]ew 

mechanisms for enforcing gambling laws on the Internet [we]re 

necessary because traditional law enforcement mechanisms are often 

inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or regulations on the 

Internet, especially where such gambling crosses State or national 

borders.” 31 U.S.C. § 5361.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 11

United States, so long as the bet was legal in the jurisdiction 

hosting the servers for a game (Las Vegas or Atlantic City, 

for instance, in the case of online poker). In effect, the 

UIGEA prevents using the internet to circumvent existing 

state and federal gambling laws, but it does not create any 

additional substantive prohibitions.

B. Iipay’s Operation of DRB Violates the UIGEA

The parties’ main point of contention is whether the 

“gaming activity” related to DRB occurs exclusively “on 

Indian lands” and, thus, under Iipay’s jurisdiction.8 Iipay 

contends that the “gaming activities” related to DRB consists 

of the operation of the servers on Iipay’s lands, which 

determine the patterns on the bingo cards, draw the numbers, 

and daub the cards. Iipay argues that any activity conducted 

by the patrons outside of Iipay’s lands—such as selecting the 

denomination and number of games the patron would like to 

participate in and submitting the patron’s request through 

DRB’s website—are merely pre-game communications 

between the patron and the Patron’s Designated Agent. 

Finally, Iipay argues that, to the extent the terms “gaming 

activities” or “on Indian lands” are ambiguous, they must be 

 8 Both parties refer to “gaming activity” throughout their briefing. 

This is likely due to the fact that most IGRA cases, including Michigan 

v. Bay Mills Indian Community., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014), the leading 

Supreme Court case, address Class III gaming. The provisions related 

to Class III gaming use the phrase “gaming activities . . . on Indian 

lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). The provisions related to Class II 

gaming, which is the relevant topic in this case, refer to “Class II gaming 

on Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). There does not appear to be 

a difference between the meaning of “gaming” and “gaming activity” in 

the context of the statute. For consistency with the parties’ briefing, we 

also refer to “gaming activity.” “Gaming” is the gambling industry’s 

preferred term for “gambling.”
12 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

construed in Iipay’s favor. See Cty. of Yakima v. 

Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 

502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (stating that statutes are to be 

construed liberally in favor of Indian tribes and ambiguities 

should be resolved in their favor).9

The Government argues, consistent with the district 

court’s opinion, that “gaming activity” is not ambiguous. 

Citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community., 134 S. Ct. 

 9 Iipay acknowledges that there are no cases directly on point. 

However, it argues that this court’s decision in AT & T Corporation v. 

Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2002), can provide 

“guidance.” Coeur d’Alene is not helpful in this case. In Coeur d’Alene, 

an Indian tribe established a national telephone lottery, which would 

allow participants to purchase lottery tickets for a lottery held on tribal 

lands over the telephone from anywhere in the country. Id. at 901. The 

tribe contracted with AT&T to provide toll-free telephone service for the 

lottery. Id. The tribe’s agreement with AT&T was approved by the 

National Indian Gaming Commission (the “NIGC”). Id. at 902. Despite 

the approval of the NIGC, several states informed AT&T that they 

viewed the lottery as illegal and threatened legal action. Id.

AT&T brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court 

seeking a determination that it was not required to provide toll-free 

telephone service for the lottery. Id. at 903. The tribe argued that the 

lottery was protected under IGRA. Id. The district court granted 

summary judgment to AT&T, concluding that IGRA did not protect the 

lottery because patrons purchased lottery tickets from off Indian lands. 

Id. We reversed the district court, but did so without reaching the merits 

of the IGRA argument. Id. at 905–10. Instead, we held that AT&T did 

not have standing to bring the suit because the legality of its contract 

with the tribe was subject to the NIGC’s approval and that approval 

constituted a final agency action which had to be challenged under the 

APA. Id. Because we did not address the merits of the IGRA issue 

presented by Coeur d’Alene, and Iipay does not contend that the NIGC 

has approved DRB, Coeur d’Alene does not provide a precedent we must 

follow.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 13

2024 (2014), the Government contends that “gaming 

activity” under IGRA is “the gambling in the poker hall,” as 

opposed to “off-site licensing or operation of the games.”10 

Id. at 2032–33. The Government argues that the “gambling” 

in this instance, is the patron’s decision to wager money on 

the bingo game, which occurs off Indian lands.

We reject Iipay’s argument that the patron’s decision to 

submit a requested wager of a particular monetary 

denomination is merely a pre-gaming communication with 

the patron’s designated proxy. The district court found that 

it was uncontested that the act of clicking “Submit Request!” 

by a patron was a “bet or wager” within the meaning of the 

UIGEA. The district court based this finding on the fact that 

the patrons were staking something of value on the outcome 

of the bingo game, but the court could have just as easily 

found that the patrons were giving “instructions or 

information pertaining to the establishment or movement of 

funds by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account 

with the business of betting or wagering.” See 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5362(1). Additionally, the district court found that DRB’s 

patrons were located in California when they clicked the 

 10 In Bay Mills, a tribe with its tribal lands located in the state of 

Michigan opened a casino in Michigan, but off of its tribal lands. 134 S. 

Ct. 2028–30. In order to avoid the tribe’s sovereign immunity defense, 

Michigan attempted to sue the tribe under IGRA, arguing that the tribe’s 

operation of the casino fell within the statute’s scope. Id. Specifically, 

Michigan argued that although the casino was located off of Indian lands, 

the tribe licensed the casino and completed administrative functions from 

its headquarters on its tribal lands. Id. at 2030–35. Michigan contended 

that these actions were “gaming activity” and could be enjoined through 

IGRA. Id. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to 

Michigan, the tribe appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the 

injunction. 134 S. Ct. 2028–30. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding 

that the administrative actions that occurred on tribal lands were not 

“gaming activity” and thus were not subject to IGRA. Id. at 2030–35.
14 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

“Submit Request!” button and that betting on bingo violates 

California law. See Cal. Penal Code § 330 (prohibiting 

“percentage games”). Iipay does not contest these findings 

on appeal.

Two key conclusions can be drawn from these 

uncontested findings. First, as the Government argues, the 

patrons are engaging in “gaming activity” by initiating a bet 

or a wager in California and off Indian lands. Consistent 

with the Supreme Court’s holding in Bay Mills, the act of 

placing a bet or wager is the “gambling in the poker hall,” 

not “off-site licensing or operation of the games.” 134 S. Ct. 

at 2032–33. As a result, it seems clear that at least some of 

the “gaming activity” associated with DRB does not occur 

on Indian lands and is thus not subject to Iipay’s jurisdiction 

under IGRA.11

Second, these uncontested facts undermine Iipay’s 

position that IGRA can shield DRB from the application of 

the UIGEA. Iipay has admitted that patrons initiate bets or 

wagers within the meaning of the UIGEA while located in 

California, where those bets are illegal. Even if DRB is 

completely legal in the place where the bet is accepted, on 

 11 Iipay argues that if the term “gaming activity” is ambiguous, it 

must be construed in favor of Iipay. See Cty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269. 

Although this is true, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bay Mills undercuts 

Iipay’s argument that the phrase is ambiguous. Justice Sotomayor, 

writing for the Court, held that gaming activity “means just what it 

sounds like . . . the gambling in the poker hall, not the proceedings of the 

off-site administrative authority.” 134 S. Ct. at 2032–33. The Court also 

made clear that IGRA “regulate[s] gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere 

else.” Id. at 2032. Iipay provides no basis to depart from this common 

sense, straightforward analysis. Additionally, as discussed below, even 

if this court accepts Iipay’s definition of “gaming activity,” the UIGEA 

still applies to DRB. See discussion, infra at 14–17.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 15

Iipay’s lands, the bets are not legal in the jurisdiction where 

they are initiated, in this case California.12 Thus, when Iipay 

accepts financial payments over the internet as part of those 

bets or wagers, Iipay violates the UIGEA.

In this respect, Iipay’s argument regarding proxies 

actually works against Iipay’s position. Iipay argues that the 

patron’s action in selecting a wager amount and clicking 

“Submit Request!” is pre-gaming communication with the 

proxy, not “gaming activity.” But if clicking “Submit 

Request!” is not “gaming activity” within the meaning of 

IGRA, but merely an administrative issue, it cannot be 

protected by IGRA. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2032–33 

(holding that IGRA’s provisions do not apply to 

administrative activities that are unrelated to the “gambling 

in the poker hall”). That conduct is, however, subject to the 

provisions of the UIGEA as a “bet or wager” initiated 

through the internet.13 As a result, whether Iipay is correct 

that no “gaming activity” occurs off Indian lands or not, 

Iipay’s operation of DRB violates the UIGEA.

Iipay argues strenuously that this analysis is flawed 

because any determination regarding the legality of DRB 

 12 Iipay argues that the location of a bet or wager should be 

determined under contract principles and that a contract (including a 

wager) is formed in the place of acceptance. But Iipay’s argument 

ignores the plain statutory text of the UIGEA, which prohibits bets or 

wagers that are illegal in either the jurisdiction where the bet or wager is 

initiated or where the bet or wager is received. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10).

13 As noted above, even if the court accepts Iipay’s argument that no 

“bet or wager” in the traditional sense has occurred when the patron 

clicks the “Submit Request!” button, the patron has certainly provided 

“instructions or information pertaining to the establishment or movement 

of funds by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account with the 

business of betting or wagering.” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1).
16 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

must be made exclusively through examining IGRA, 

without reference to the UIGEA. This is so, Iipay contends, 

because the UIGEA does not contain any substantive 

prohibitions on previously legal gambling and expressly 

provides that “no provision” of the UIGEA “shall be 

construed as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or 

State law or Tribal-State compact prohibiting, permitting, or 

regulating gambling within the United States.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5361. Thus, Iipay argues, if DRB would have been legal 

in the absence of the UIGEA, it must remain legal after the 

UIGEA’s passage.

On this point, Iipay’s argument fails for two reasons. 

First, absent a direct conflict, courts should give effect to coexisting federal statutes. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 

503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). Here, there is no direct conflict 

between IGRA and the UIGEA and, thus, we give effect to 

the provisions of both statutes.

Second, although Iipay is correct that the UIGEA does 

not alter IGRA, that does not mean that the UIGEA did not 

outlaw certain financial transactions associated with gaming 

on Indian lands facilitated by the internet, a topic on which 

IGRA is silent.14 Indeed, Congress clearly contemplated 

that the UIGEA might apply to games played on Indian lands 

 14 That Iipay’s interpretation of the UIGEA’s scope is unworkable 

is demonstrated by applying Iipay’s logic to other potential situations. 

For instance, because the UIGEA specifies that it does not alter either 

federal or state laws regarding gambling, a state like Nevada could 

theoretically make the same argument advanced by Iipay to justify 

accepting wagers over the internet made by residents of other states. 

Effectively, Nevada could argue that accepting wagers in its jurisdiction 

was legal before the UIGEA and, thus, must be legal after its passage as 

well. Given the realities of the internet, this interpretation would render 

the UIGEA all but meaningless.
CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL 17

because it specifically exempted certain intra- and intertribal games from the UIGEA’s scope. See 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5362(10)(C) (exempting bets or wagers “initiated and 

received or otherwise made exclusively” on a single tribe’s 

land or multiple tribal lands, provided that the relevant tribal 

ordinances and regulations permit such bets or wagers).

What Iipay’s arguments fail to acknowledge is that the 

UIGEA does not have to make DRB the game illegal in order 

to make Iipay’s operation of that game—specifically, its 

decision to accept wagers and financial payments over the 

internet from patrons located in California—illegal. 

Whether DRB is permitted by IGRA or not, Iipay’s 

operation of DRB violates the UIGEA’s requirement that 

bets placed over the internet be legal both where they are 

initiated and where they are received. Thus, it can be true 

that the UIGEA did not alter IGRA, and it can also be true 

that DRB is subject to and violates the UIGEA.15

In summary, Iipay is correct that IGRA protects gaming 

activity conducted on Indian lands. However, the patrons’ 

act of placing a bet or wager on a game of DRB while located 

in California constitutes gaming activity that is not located 

on Indian lands, violates the UIGEA, and is not protected by 

IGRA. Further, even if Iipay is correct that all of the 

“gaming activity” associated with DRB occurs on Indian 

lands, the patrons’ act of placing bets or wagers over the 

internet while located in a jurisdiction where those bets or 

wagers is illegal makes Iipay’s decision to accept financial 

 15 We take no position on whether Iipay would violate the UIGEA 

by accepting DRB bets or wagers exclusively from patrons located in 

jurisdictions where bingo is legal.
18 CALIFORNIA V. IIPAY NATION OF SANTA YSABEL

payments associated with those bets or wagers a violation of 

the UIGEA.

Because Iipay’s operation of DRB violates the UIGEA, 

we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to the Government.