rendered its decision on the other counts. McDonald was acquitted of 

counts 1-3 and was convicted of count 4. 

First, McDonald contends that insufficient evidence supports 

his conviction. We disagree because, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. See Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 

192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008); see also Deueroux v. State, 96 Nev. 388, 391, 610 

P.2d 722, 724 (1980) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence alone may sustain a 

conviction."). Accordingly, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. 

Second, McDonald contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to dismiss count 4 because the charging 

document did not provide adequate notice of the date he was alleged to 

have committed the crime. We review a district court's decision regarding 

a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. See Hill v. State, 124 Nev. 

546, 550, 188 P.3d 51, 54 (2008). "The indictment or the information must 

be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged." NRS 173.075(1). "Unless time is an 

essential element of the offense charged, there is no absolute requirement 

that the state allege the exact date, and the state may instead give the 

approximate date on which it believes the crime occurred." Cunningham 

v. State, 100 Nev. 396, 400, 683 P.2d 500, 502 (1984). Here, the charging 

document alleged that McDonald possessed a firearm between June 3 (the 

date Gomez was shot) and August 1 (the date he was apprehended). 

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McDonald concedes that he understood these dates "as potential dates for 

asserting that [he] violated NRS 202.360." We conclude that the charging 

document provided sufficient notice to enable McDonald to defend against 

the charges and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying his motion to dismiss. See Simpson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 88 Nev. 654, 660, 503 P.2d 1225, 1229-30 (1972). 

Third, McDonald contends that the State violated Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to obtain the results of a DNA 

test conducted on the firearm discovered in the vehicle. Relatedly, 

McDonald contends that the district court erred by forcing him to choose 

between the DNA test results and his right to a speedy trial. We conclude 

that no relief is warranted because McDonald fails to (a) demonstrate that 

the State withheld favorable evidence in its possession, see Mazzan v. 

Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000), (b) explain how he was 

inappropriately forced to choose between his rights, or (c) establish that he 

was prejudiced by the district court's actions. 

Fourth, McDonald contends that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct by arguing that the jury could consider the evidence presented 

during the first phase of trial when determining whether he was guilty of 

count 4. When considering allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we 

first determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper and then 

consider whether the improper conduct warrants reversal. Valdez v. 

State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). We conclude that 

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this claim lacks merit. The State followed the procedure approved of in 

Morales and its argument did not constitute misconduct. 

Fifth, McDonald contends that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct by arguing that he was guilty of possessing a firearm even if 

he took it from Gomez in self-defense. Because McDonald did not object, 

we review for plain error. Id. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477. Even assuming 

that self-defense is a defense to felon in possession of a firearm, McDonald 

fails to demonstrate plain error because the prosecutor simply argued that 

he was guilty of possessing a firearm on August 1 even if he acted in selfdefense on June 3. 

Sixth, McDonald contends that the district court erred by 

admitting his statements that he would speak with detectives so long as 

the conversation was not recorded because they were more prejudicial 

than probative and unfairly commented on his right to remain silent. We 

review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). 

We disagree with McDonald's assertion that admission of these 

statements, and the prosecutor's argument regarding these statements, 

was a comment on his right to remain silent. See Deutscher v. State, 95 

Nev. 669, 682, 601 P.2d 407, 416 (1979) ("The established test is whether 

the language was manifestly intended or was of such character that the 

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the 

failure of the accused to respond." (internal alteration and quotation 

marks omitted)). We also disagree that these statements implied that "not 

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only is [McDonald] a felon but that he has been to prison previously." 

Even assuming that these statements had no probative value, we conclude 

that any error in admitting the statements was harmless because 

McDonald was acquitted of counts 1-3 and substantial evidence was 

presented to support count 4. 

Seventh, McDonald contends that cumulative error entitles 

him to relief. Having considered the appropriate factors, see Valdez, 124 

Nev. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481, we conclude that no relief is warranted. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.' 

Pickering 

'McDonald's appendix fails to comply with NRAP 30(b) because it 

contains numerous documents which are "not essential to the decision of 

issues presented by the appeal." See NRAP 3C(e)(2)(c) (requiring appendix 

to comply with the provisions of NRAP 30). For example, the appendix 

contains over 500 pages of documents which merely explain the 

qualifications of the State's potential experts. We remind counsel for 

McDonald that brevity in the appendix is required and "the court may 

impose costs upon parties or attorneys who unnecessarily enlarge the 

appendix." NRAP 30(b). 

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cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Law Offices of Martin Hart, LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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