If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 21, 2023

v No. 365294

Ingham Circuit Court

CHAD MICHAEL VANEPPS, LC No. 21-000255-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a plea of guilty to one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSCII), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) and (2)(b) (sexual contact with victim less than 13 years of age; defendant 

17 years of age or older), defendant was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 

769.11, to serve 365 days in jail, followed by 60 months of probation. After defendant violated 

the terms of his probation, the trial court revoked defendant’s probation and resentenced defendant 

to serve 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment, a 12-year upward departure from the applicable guidelines 

range. Defendant appeals his sentence by leave granted.1 We conclude that the trial court failed 

to articulate why the sentencing guidelines did not adequately account for the penetration that 

occurred, the victim’s psychological injuries, and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental 

disabilities, and we remand for the trial court to either resentence defendant or further articulate 

its reasoning for imposing the departure sentence.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The victim in this case was defendant’s former girlfriend’s 11-year-old daughter, who is 

mentally challenged and has learning disabilities. From 2018 to 2019, the victim lived with 

 

1 People v VanEpps, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 18, 2023 (Docket 

No. 365294). 
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defendant and her mother. After the victim’s mother passed away, the victim went to live with her 

father. 

In November 2020, the victim disclosed to family members that defendant had sexually 

abused her by penile-vaginal penetration on several occasions. A forensic interview was 

completed, and the victim reported that defendant raped her several times when she was sleeping. 

In the first incident, the victim woke up, on her back, with a sharp pain in her stomach from 

“defendant putting his ‘thingy inside’ her.” The victim noted that her mother found defendant in 

her bedroom the next morning, and defendant stated that he was giving the victim “a tickle-itch.” 

The victim reported that defendant would come into her room and “put his thingy in her a lot.” 

The victim clarified that “thingy” was a reference to a boy’s private part, and that “inside me” 

meant “inside my stomach.” When defendant was initially interviewed, he denied engaging in 

sexual activity with the victim. However, during a later polygraph examination, defendant 

admitted that he touched the victim’s bare vagina twice, in her bedroom. 

Defendant was originally charged with two counts of CSC-II as a third-offense habitual 

offender. In exchange for defendant pleading guilty to one count of CSC-II and to the third-offense 

habitual offender enhancement, the prosecutor dismissed one count of CSC-II and agreed to a 

minimum guidelines range of 12 to 36 months with a “county-jail cap.” At the sentencing hearing, 

the trial court sentenced defendant to 365 days in jail, followed by 60 months of probation. The 

court explained the conditions of defendant’s probation and explained to defendant that he “must 

not have verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with any individual age 17 or under or 

attempt to do so either directly or through another person.”

Defendant violated his probation by having contact with two minor children, by being in 

the company of someone who had a felony record, and by having video contact with a minor child 

while in jail. Defendant entered a guilty plea to the probation violations concerning contact with 

minor children, and the additional probation violation charge was dismissed. The trial court 

revoked defendant’s probation, departed from the recommended guidelines range of 12 to 36 

months, and sentenced defendant to serve 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the CSC-II conviction. 

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by departing from the advisory 

guidelines range of 12 to 36 months and imposing a minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment on 

the basis of factors that were given adequate weight by the guidelines. We conclude that the trial 

court did not sufficiently justify its sentencing decision and, therefore, we remand for the trial court 

to either resentence defendant or further articulate its justification for the sentence imposed.

We review a sentence that departs from the applicable sentencing guidelines range for 

reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[T]he standard 

of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness on appeal is 

abuse of discretion.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (Steanhouse

II). “A trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances involving the offense and the offender.” 

People v Dixon-Bey, 340 Mich App 292, 296; 985 NW2d 904 (2022) (Dixon-Bey II). Additionally, 

“[t]he existence of a departure factor is a factual question reviewed for clear error on appeal.” Id. 
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Clear error is present when this Court “is left with a definite and firm conviction that an error 

occurred.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

When a trial court imposes a departure sentence, it must “justify the sentence imposed in 

order to facilitate appellate review,” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, and explain “why the sentence 

imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have 

been,” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (Dixon-Bey I) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing a departure sentence, this Court “must 

evaluate whether reasons exist to depart from the sentencing guidelines and whether the extent of 

the departure can satisfy the principle of proportionality.” People v Steanhouse (On Remand), 322 

Mich App 233, 239; 911 NW2d 253 (2017) (Steanhouse I) (emphasis omitted), vacated in part on 

other grounds 504 Mich 969 (2019). 

In this case, the trial court identified several appropriate factors for the departure sentence. 

The trial court referred to defendant’s criminal history for CSC offenses, and the court opined that 

defendant did not take advantage of or benefit from previous programming. The court concluded 

that it would not be protecting society if it let defendant out. A defendant’s extensive criminal 

history and likelihood to reoffend are appropriate considerations supporting a departure sentence. 

See People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 318; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). Furthermore, “a trial court 

has been given broad discretion, within limits fixed by law, to tailor a sentence to the circumstances 

of each case and each offender, in an effort to balance society’s need for protection against its 

interest in rehabilitation of the offender.” People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 

656, 661; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). 

Next, the trial court considered defendant’s probation violations, and the court determined 

that defendant needed more punishment and more help. Our Supreme Court has determined that 

“a defendant’s conduct while on probation” may constitute an appropriate justification for 

departing from the applicable guidelines range. People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 565; 697 NW2d 

511 (2005). The trial court also properly considered the need to deter others who want to take 

advantage of little girls. See People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 392; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), 

aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by Steanhouse II, 500 Mich 453 (2017). See also 

People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972) (“the deterrence of others from 

committing like offenses” is a proper consideration in determining an appropriate sentence). 

However, the trial court also identified several additional factors that are contemplated by 

the sentencing guidelines, but the court did not explain why the guidelines did not adequately 

account for those factors, and, further, the court did not assess points for one of the relevant offense 

variables. The trial court justified defendant’s departure sentence, in part, on the fact that 

defendant penetrated the victim several times but was not charged with CSC-I. OV 11 addresses 

“criminal sexual penetration.” MCL 777.41(1). A trial court is required to assess 25 points for 

OV 11 if “[o]ne criminal sexual penetration occurred,” MCL 777.41(1)(b), while 50 points are 

assessed if “[t]wo or more criminal sexual penetrations occurred,” MCL 777.41(1)(a). “Even 

though the guidelines ranges are now advisory, the scoring of the guidelines themselves is 

mandatory, and the OVs must be assigned the highest number of points applicable.” People v 

Geddert, 500 Mich 859, 859; 884 NW2d 575 (2016). The trial court did not score points for OV 

11, as it was required to do if applicable, but instead imposed a departure sentence on the basis 
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that defendant had sexually abused the victim by penile-vaginal penetration on several occasions. 

In addition, the justification provided by the court does not explain why OV 11 would not 

adequately account for the criminal sexual penetration, or penetrations, that occurred.

Furthermore, the trial court did not address why OV 4 and OV 10 did not account for the 

victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental disabilities. In 

this case, 10 points were assessed for OV 4, “psychological injury to a victim,” MCL 777.34(1), 

and 10 points were assessed for OV 10, “exploitation of a vulnerable victim,” MCL 777.40(1). 

Ten points are assessed for OV 4 if “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment 

occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a). Ten points are assessed for OV 10 if “[t]he offender 

exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic 

relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). The trial court 

failed to explain why the victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s 

mental disability were not adequately accounted for by defendant’s OV score. 

We conclude that remanding is necessary for the trial court either to resentence defendant 

or to articulate appropriate reasons supporting imposition of a sentence that exceeded the top end 

of the guidelines range by 12 years, and to address the proportionality of the extent of the particular 

departure sentence imposed. Although defendant’s criminal history, his failure to comply with the 

terms of his probation, the need to protect society from defendant’s likelihood to reoffend, and 

deterrence of others from committing similar offenses constituted appropriate factors supporting a 

departure sentence, the trial court failed to articulate why the sentencing guidelines did not 

adequately account for the penetration that occurred, the victim’s psychological injuries, and 

defendant’s exploitation of the victim’s mental disabilities. When a trial court’s reasons for 

departing from the sentencing guidelines range are unclear, this Court “cannot substitute its own 

judgment about why the departure was justified.” People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 304; 754 NW2d 

284 (2008). “Nor may [this Court] speculate about conceivable reasons for departure that the trial 

court did not articulate or that cannot reasonably be inferred from what the trial court articulated.” 

Id. at 318. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has directed that, when “[not all] reasons articulated 

by the trial court for departing from the sentencing guidelines w[ere] valid, . . . it [is] unclear 

whether it would have departed solely [on the basis of the valid reasons], and . . . its reasoning for 

the extent of departure [is] difficult to ascertain,” this Court should remand “for the trial court to 

either resentence or to further articulate its reasons for departure.” People v Steanhouse, 504 Mich 

969, 969 (2019). 

Accordingly, we remand this case for the trial court to either resentence defendant or 

further articulate its reasoning for the out-of-guidelines sentence imposed. We retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Noah P. Hood

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

People of MI v Chad Michael Vanepps

Docket No. 365294

LC No. 21-000255-FH

Noah P. Hood

Presiding Judge

Kathleen Jansen

Kathleen A. Feeney

Judges

Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 56 days of the Clerk’s 

certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated 

in the accompanying opinion, we remand this case for the trial court to either resentence defendant or 

further articulate its reasoning for the out-of-guidelines sentence imposed. The proceedings on remand are 

limited to this issue.

The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within 

seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after 

completion of the proceedings.

Presiding Judge

November 21, 2023