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Edmundo P. Robaina (No. 018125) 

Thomas T. Griffin (No. 022475) 

ROBAINA & KRESIN PLLC

5343 North 16th Street, Suite 200 

Phoenix, Arizona 85016 

Telephone: (602) 682-6450 

Facsimile: (602) 682-6455 

epr@robainalaw.com 

ttg@robainalaw.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Cleopatria Martinez 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Cleopatria Martinez, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Maricopa County Community College 

District, et al., 

 Defendants. 

No. CV 15-01759 NVW 

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO 

DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE AND 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

AND COSTS 

Plaintiff Cleopatria Martinez (“Martinez”), by and through the undersigned 

counsel, hereby responds to Defendants’ Notice and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs. Because she is not a vexatious plaintiff and her claims are not unreasonable, 

frivolous or meritless, Martinez respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendants’ 

Motion. 

I. The Standard for Attorneys’ Fees 

A district court may award attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to a 

prevailing civil rights defendant if the plaintiff’s action was unreasonable, frivolous, 

meritless or vexatious. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 

2007). An action becomes frivolous when the result appears obvious or the arguments 

are wholly without merit. Id. (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 

412, 422 (1978). The fact that a plaintiff loses on summary judgment does not render a 

case per se frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. at 667. Moreover, a case 

is less likely to be considered frivolous when there is very little case law directly on 

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point. See Karem v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 

Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir. 1995) (even though the law 

had been clearly established not only by the Supreme Court but by seven other courts of 

appeal, because the Ninth Circuit had not spoken on the issue, the appellant’s argument 

could not be characterized as “wholly without merit.”). 

II. Martinez is Not A “Vexatious” Plaintiff and She Did Not Bring Her Claims 

in Bad Faith 

In its Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Defendants argue that Martinez is a 

vexatious plaintiff and that without an award of attorneys’ fees, she is likely to continue 

filing vexatious lawsuits against MCCCD. (Doc. 95 at 2 of 14). Defendants are 

incorrect for the following reasons: 

Martinez is a Hispanic single woman with a Ph.D. in mathematics, who has over 

40 years of teaching experience and has worked as a mathematics professor for 

MCCCD since 1985. (Declaration of Cleopatria Martinez (“Martinez Dec.” ¶¶ 1-2, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1). Prior to April 2, 2012, Martinez had never been involved 

in any type of litigation other than divorce proceedings in the late 1980s. (Id. at ¶ 3). 

In November of 2009, Martinez submitted an internal “Discrimination Complaint 

Form” to MCCCD’s Human Resources Department in relation to, among other things, 

her concern that Phoenix College had failed to appoint any person of Hispanic origin 

from the Math Department to serve as a member of the College’s Title V advisory 

committee. (Id. at ¶ 4). Prior to her internal complaint, Martinez had never received 

any disciplinary actions. (Id. at ¶ 5). 

In January of 2010, MCCCD accused Martinez of potentially violating copyright 

laws because she used mathematics problems from copyrighted textbooks, a widespread 

practice at MCCCD and in academia at large. (Id. ¶ 6; and Doc. 72-5, 2-3 of 9, at ¶¶ 6, 

7 and 16). MCCCD also restricted Martinez’s copying privileges, issued her a 

disciplinary action, issued her a poor evaluation, and began hyperscrutinizing her work. 

(Martinez Dec. ¶ 7). Martinez, for instance, was not allowed to provide her own 

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teaching notes to students, even though the contents of those notes did not come from a 

copyrighted source, and she was not allowed to use math words or symbols that were 

not found in the textbook. Id. At one point, Martinez was reprimanded for putting a “+” 

sign at the front of the infinity symbol because the author had not done so; and she was 

told that she could not use the words “highest” and “lowest” to describe estrema 

because the author had not done so, even though other authors and instructors used 

those words. Id. 

On June 28, 2010, Martinez filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) alleging national origin 

discrimination and retaliation. (Id. ¶ 8; and June 28, 2010 Charge of Discrimination, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 2). On August 19, 2011, the EEOC found “reasonable cause” 

to believe that MCCCD had retaliated against Martinez by accusing Martinez of 

violating copyright laws, restricting and suspending her copying privileges, issuing her 

disciplinary action, and issuing her a poor evaluation. (Id. ¶ 9; and EEOC Reasonable 

Cause finding, attached hereto as Exhibit 3). 

On April 2, 2012, Martinez filed a lawsuit against MCCCD alleging Title VII 

claims for national origin discrimination and retaliation, and a claim for race 

discrimination, harassment and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 

10, attached hereto as Exhibit 1; and Complaint dated April 2, 2012, attached hereto as 

Exhibit 4 at ¶¶ 27-49). 

On or about August 9, 2013, MCCCD’s Chancellor notified Martinez of his 

intent to recommend termination of her employment in relation to alleged copyright 

violations, alleged violations of MCCCD’s cash handling policies, and alleged 

insubordination related to the cash handling allegation. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 11, attached 

hereto as Exhibit 1; and Doc. 72-3 at 95 of 125). Martinez hired a highly experienced 

employment attorney named Stephen Montoya to represent her in the hearing regarding 

her proposed dismissal. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 12, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 

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On October 16, 2013, MCCCD filed a motion for summary judgment in the 

Discrimination Lawsuit (Civil Docket for Case #:2:12-cv-00702-DGC, attached hereto 

as Exhibit 5). On November 12, 2013, Martinez filed a motion for extension of time to 

respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted on 

November 18, 2013, and extended the time to file her response to January 3, 2014. (Id.) 

Also on November 18, 2013, a hearing on Martinez’s proposed dismissal was 

held before the Hearing Committee. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 14; and Doc. 72-5 at 2 of 9). On 

December 9, 2013, the Hearing Committee issued binding findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, in which it found that MCCCD had not shown that Martinez had 

violated copyright law or MCCCD’s cash handling policies, but that Martinez had been 

insubordinate in relation to her failure to issue refunds to students who had reimbursed 

her for the copying costs of her course materials, which MCCCD had alleged violated 

MCCCD’s cash handling policies. (Doc. 72-5 at 7-8 of 9 and ¶¶ 55 and 63-69). The 

Committee further recommended that Martinez not be dismissed. (Id. at 9 of 9). 

Thereafter, Montoya recommended to Martinez that she end the Title VII 

litigation against MCCCD. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 16, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 

Martinez, hoping to end her problems with MCCCD, followed Montoya’s advice, and 

January 3, 2014, the parties agreed to dismiss the litigation with prejudice, each party to 

bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 17). However, on or about February 10, 

2014, the Chancellor notified Martinez that pursuant to his sole authority under RFP 

3.13,1

 he was suspending Martinez without pay from March 1, 20142 to May 15, 2015, 

and that her teaching responsibilities and pay would resume in the Fall of 2015 unless 

she chose to retire. (Id. at ¶ 18; Doc. 72-3 at 113 of 125). 

Martinez immediately filed for unemployment, which MCCCD fought. 

(Martinez Dec. ¶ 19) Martinez ultimately prevailed after a hearing. Id. 

 

1

 The letter actually refers to RFP 3.11.3, but throughout this document Martinez adopts 

the Court’s reference to 2013-14 RFP Section “3.13” regarding suspensions. 

2

 The suspension actually began in April of 2014. 

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In the meantime, in the absence of a mechanism to appeal or address the 

suspension, Montoya and Martinez attempted in various ways to seek some form of 

review of Glasper’s action from the Governing Board. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 20, attached 

hereto as Exhibit 1). Montoya, for instance, wrote a letter to the Governing Board in 

which he argued that Defendants’ actions violated Martinez’s due process rights 

because, among other things, the Chancellor’s new Statement of Charges contained 

allegations that were expressly considered and rejected by the Hearing Committee; the 

new Statement of Charges set forth allegations, Administrative Regulations 1.12.2 and 

1.12.3, that were not set forth in the original Statement of Charges and were never 

considered by the Hearing Committee; the Chancellor failed to allow Martinez any 

opportunity to present evidence refuting the new Statement of Charges before a neutral 

finder of fact; and a fourteen-month suspension is the economic equivalent of dismissal, 

and the Chancellor should not be allowed to de facto terminate employees without first 

obtaining approval by the Governing Board. (Id. at ¶ 21, and Attachment 1 thereto). 

Montoya and Martinez also attempted to bring the matter to the Governing Board’s 

attention during the “citizens’ interim” (or “call to the public”) portion of a Governing 

Board meeting,3

 and Martinez wrote letters to the Board, but she does not know if the 

Governing Board ever saw them. (Id. at ¶ 22). The Governing Board never responded 

in any way. (Id. at ¶ 23). 

Martinez was extremely distraught by the turn of events, which effectively left 

her without a substantial source of income, or benefits, from April 2014 to August of 

2015, when classes started again. (Id. at 24). She hired attorney Kevin Koelbel to 

review the matter. (Id. at ¶ 25). Koelbel associated Tod Schleier, one of the preeminent 

employment attorneys in Arizona, to review the matter and ultimately to act as the lead 

attorney in this case. (Id.) 

 

3

 Pursuant to Arizona law, the Board may not deliberate on issues not listed in its notice 

and agenda. A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H). 

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Schleier and Koelbel filed suit on Martinez’s behalf on September 2, 2015 (Doc. 

1), and filed a Verified Amended Complaint on November 4, 2015, in which they 

alleged that MCCCD and Glasper had violated Martinez’s due process rights, and 

requested declaratory relief regarding ongoing issues with MCCCD. (Doc. 14). For 

reasons unrelated to any concerns about the merits of the case, Martinez parted ways 

with Koelbel and Schleier in or about March of 2016. (Martinez Dec. ¶ 27, attached 

hereto as Exhibit 1). 

Martinez hired the undersigned counsel to review the matter in or about April of 

2016. (Id. at ¶ 28; Declaration of Edmundo Robaina (“Robaina Dec.”) ¶¶ 8 and 13, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 6). Based upon a thorough review of the facts related to the 

attempted dismissal and the suspension, and relevant caselaw, the undersigned counsel, 

also a long-time employment attorney, like the other attorneys who had previously 

reviewed this case, believed that Martinez has a meritorious case, and agreed to pursue 

the matter on her behalf. (Robaina Dec. ¶¶ 13-27, attached hereto as Exhibit 6). 

In sum, Martinez is not a vexatious plaintiff. She filed her first case against 

MCCCD because, bolstered by the EEOC reasonable cause finding, she reasonably 

believed she was victim of discrimination and retaliation. She ended the litigation based 

upon the advice of her lawyer after having received a recommendation from the Hearing 

Committee that she be retained. She has pursued her current case against MCCCD, not 

because of any desire to engage in another litigation with MCCCD, but because 

subsequent to her agreeing to dismiss the initial litigation, Defendants took a course of 

action that both she and the attorneys who have represented her believed was unjust, 

damaging, and meritorious under the law. 

III. Martinez’ Claims in This Case Were Not Unreasonable, Frivolous or 

Meritless

In this case, this Court found that Martinez does not have a valid due process 

claim for a number of reasons. This Court, for instance, noted that Martinez did not 

claim, nor could she show, a violation of state law, and that: “The District fully 

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complied with the District’s procedures.” (Doc. 91 at page 3, line 14 to page 4, line 10 

and p. 8, lines 19-20). With respect specifically to the suspension policy, Residential 

Faculty Policy, 3.13, this Court noted that: “The District did everything the Policy 

required.” (Id., at page 9, line 26, to page 10, line 5). This Court further noted that 

pursuant to MCCCD’s policy, if the Chancellor had invoked Policy 3.13 from the start, 

going to the Governing Board would not have been required. (Id., at page 12, lines 21-

24). While these are true statements, Martinez respectfully submits she could still 

reasonably believe the she had valid due process claims for several reasons: 

A. Pursuant to Loudermill, a Reasonable Plaintiff Could Believe That 

Even If Defendants Followed MCCCD’s Procedures, That Did Not 

Render Their Actions Appropriate for Due Process Purposes Under 

Federal Law 

In Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Supreme 

Court considered, and rejected, the argument that a property right is defined by, and 

conditioned on, the legislature’s choice of procedures for its deprivation. Id. at 539-41. 

The Court noted that in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980), it had previously 

“pointed out that ‘minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, 

they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures 

that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse action.’” The 

Court further noted that in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982), it 

had reversed the lower court’s holding that because the entitlement arose from a state 

statute, the legislature had the prerogative to define the procedures to be followed to 

protect that entitlement. Id. at 541. Finally, the Court noted that: “The right to due 

process ‘is conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the 

legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not 

constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without 

appropriate procedural safeguards.’” Id. (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 

(1974)). 

/// 

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In this case, the only process RFP § 3.13 provides is the opportunity to meet and 

discuss an impending suspension with the Vice Chancellor, who defendants admit has 

no authority to change the Chancellor’s decision.4

 The policy therefore has an 

insufficient procedural safeguard for due process purposes. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy 

Sheriffs v. County of L.A., 648 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The fact that Plaintiffs in 

the instant case were given an opportunity to respond makes little difference when their 

response could have had no effect on their suspension. Therefore...due process requires 

that Plaintiffs receive post-suspension hearings in addition to the limited procedures 

they received before their suspensions.”) Thus, a reasonable plaintiff could believe, and 

Martinez did believe, that the policy, on its face, violates due process. 

B. A Reasonable Plaintiff Could Believe That MCCCD’s Procedures, As 

Used in This Case, Violated Her Due Process Rights 

The question of whether an administrator who seeks to impose discipline against 

in an employee in one disciplinary process can then be considered an impartial 

decisionmaker in a related disciplinary process with the same employee and regarding 

the same set of facts, has not been determined by the Ninth Circuit. But a reasonable 

plaintiff could believe that this kind of situation would violate her due process rights. 

First, it is clear that an employee with due process rights is entitled to a neutral 

and detached decisionmaker. Clements v. Airport Auth., 69 F.3d 321, 333 (9th Cir. 

1995). In this case, Martinez could reasonably believe that Glasper was not neutral 

because he recommended her termination to the Governing Board. 

Second, a reasonable plaintiff could believe that other Ninth Circuit caselaw, 

although not directly on point, suggests that Martinez’s case had merit. In Walker v. 

Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1991); and in American General Insurance Co. v. 

Federal Trade Commission, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit found 

violations of due process in situations in which an attorney functioned as counsel for 

 

4 See Doc. 72-4 at 14 and 15 of 31. 

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one party in a federal court proceeding and later served as a decisionmaker in an 

administrative proceeding involving the same parties and the same underlying issue. 

A reasonable plaintiff could believe that the rule of impartiality is similarly 

applicable to other agents of an employer. In Grolier v. Federal Trade Commission, 

615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit had occasion to interpret the meaning 

of Administrative Procedures Act § 554 (d), which states: 

An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or 

prosecuting functions for an agency in a case many not, in that or a 

factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended 

decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title... 

Id. at 1218. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “in forbidding adjudication by persons 

‘engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions,’ Congress 

intended to preclude from decisionmaking in a particular case not only individuals with 

the title of ‘investigator’ or ‘prosecutor,’ but all persons who had, in that or a factually 

related case, been involved with ex parte information, or who had developed, by prior 

involvement in the case, a ‘will to win.’” Id. at 1220. See also Horne v. Polk, 242 

Ariz. 226, 230-31 (Ariz. 2017) (“[O]nce an official determines that a legal violation has 

occurred, that official can be expected to develop a will to win at subsequent levels of 

adjudication.”); and Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(upholding a district court order requiring that a post-termination hearing be held before 

a neutral third-party, and not persons working for the City with which the appellant had 

engaged in extensive litigation). 

In this case, a reasonable plaintiff could believe that an administrator, like other 

agents of an employer, could develop a will to win. Martinez could further reasonably 

believe that in light of Glasper’s apparent belief that Martinez violated copyright law 

and MCCCD’s cash handling policies; his recommendation of Martinez’s dismissal, 

which led to her disciplinary hearing; the fact that he had the opportunity to take the 

matter before the Governing Board to determine the propriety of a suspension but did 

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not do so; and the fact that he invoked a rule that he had never used before to suspend 

Martinez without pay for 14 months, that Glasper had developed a will to win, or was 

otherwise not a neutral decisionmaker for due process purposes. 

C. A Reasonable Plaintiff Could Believe That the Facts Pled in The 

Complaint in This Case Sufficiently Supported the Argument That 

Glasper Was Not a Neutral Arbiter for Due Process Purposes 

This Court found that Martinez’s summary judgment argument that Glasper was 

not an Impartial Decision maker for due process purposes was not properly before the 

Court. This Court noted that: “Beyond recounting Glasper’s actions, Martinez’s Reply 

Brief can only point to the blanket assertion in the Complaint that she had the right to 

due process free of bias.” (Order, Doc. 91, 15 of 18). 

Martinez respectfully submits that she could nonetheless reasonably believe that 

the issue was properly before the Court because: “Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the 

plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of his legal argument.’” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 

521, 530 (2011). A complaint need not pin a plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise 

legal theory. Id; Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038-39 

(9th Cir. 2016) (citing Skinner in deciding that where a plaintiff did not specifically 

mention the violation of a statutory provision in his complaint, but raised it in his 

opposition to a summary judgment motion, the court would nevertheless considered his 

argument because it was not so much a new claim as a more precise and accurate 

framing of the plaintiff’s original allegation). See also Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 

1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional 

basis for his claim, only the facts underlying it); and McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 

995 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992) (same). 

In this case, a reasonable plaintiff could, and Martinez did, believe that the 

detailed description of the underlying facts in the Verified Amended Complaint and the 

allegations that Defendants violated Martinez’s due process rights provided adequate 

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notice to the Defendants regarding the basis of Martinez’s claim that Glasper was not a 

neutral arbiter of her case as required for due process. 

D. A Reasonable Plaintiff Could Believe That the February 10, 2014 

Statement of Charges Included a New Allegation based on 

Administrative Regulation 1.12 

This Court rejected Martinez’s argument that Defendants raised a new allegation 

in the February 10, 2014 statement of charges. This Court’s Order noted that Martinez 

had previously encountered Administrative Regulation 1.12 in an October 18, 2012 

corrective action notice to Martinez. (Doc. 91 at p. 14, line 1-5, citing Doc. 73-2, Ex. 

21 at 245 of 266). 

This is true, however, the version of Administrative Regulation 1.12 the Court 

points to later became Administrative Regulation 1.17. (See Doc. 72-1, at 22 of 24.) 

Administrative Regulation 1.17 was the basis for MCCCD’s claim that Martinez had 

improperly transacted with students, which the Hearing Committee later determined to 

be unfounded. (See Doc. 72-3, at 97of 125 and Doc. 72-5, at 8 of 9, ¶ 63). 

The version of Administrative Regulations 1.12.2 and 1.12.3, which were cited in 

the February 10, 2013 Statement of Charges had never been raised before in any 

document, nor had the statement that “Phoenix College determined that your course 

materials charge was not included in the adopted budget or pre-approved by the 

Governing Board.” A reasonable plaintiff could also assume that this was done because 

the hearing committee rejected as unproven the allegation that Martinez had violated the 

cash handling policies in Administrative Regulation 1.17. 

The Court determined that, in any case, the violation Glasper was actually 

referring to was of Administrative Regulation 6.7.1 and 6.7.3. (Doc. 91 at 13-14 of 18). 

A reasonable plaintiff however, could believe that because 6.7.1 and 6.7.3 are general 

Administrative Regulations, e.g., Administrative Regulation 6.7.1 refers to: “Willful 

and intentional violation of any...MCCCD administrative regulation that affects the 

employee’s ability to perform his or her job”, and because the specific Administrative 

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Regulations referred in the Statement of Charges were 1.12.2 and 1.12.6, that the 

specific Administrative Regulations alleged to have been violated were 1.12.2 and 

1.12.6. 

A reasonable plaintiff could also believe that Defendants’ actions would violate 

her due process rights because as the Supreme Court wrote in Loundermill, “a tenured 

public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an 

explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 

story. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. 

IV. The Liberty Interest Claim 

Defendants argue that because Martinez conceded her liberty interest claims, 

those claims were frivolous. But a plaintiff may pursue alternative legal theories in a 

case, and ultimately determine that some are not worth pursuing. In this case, Martinez 

ultimately determined that the liberty interest claims were less important than the 

property interest claims, and that they were no longer worth pursuing. She therefore 

conceded them. That does not mean that a reasonable plaintiff could not have believed 

them to have been valid. 

V. The Reimbursement Issue

Defendants’ assertion that Martinez’s due process claim is unjustified because 

she still has not complied with the President Solley’s 2012 directive is a red herring. 

This issue has nothing to do with whether Defendants violated Martinez’s due process 

rights, nor was it ever raised as an affirmative defense in this case. Moreover, Martinez 

never had the opportunity to argue the severity of the penalty attached to this violation. 

VI. A Reasonable Plaintiff Could Believe That It Was Appropriate to Seek a 

Declaratory Judgment on The Continued Restrictions on Martinez’s 

This Court exercised its discretion not to adjudicate Martinez’s Request for 

Declaratory Judgment. Under the circumstances of this case, however, a reasonable 

plaintiff could believe that it was reasonable, and not frivolous, to seek declaratory 

relief. Without reasserting all of the facts and arguments here, the Hearing Committee 

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made binding findings that Martinez had not used the lecture notes that gave rise to the 

directive she sought to have relief from since 2010. Martinez further had a right to 

academic freedom both from the RFP and under federal law. Her request, properly 

denied in this Court’s prerogative, was neither baseless nor frivolous. 

VII. Conclusion 

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Cleopatria Martinez respectfully 

requests that the Court deny Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of December 2017. 

 ROBAINA & KRESIN PLLC 

 By /s/ Edmundo P. Robaina 

 Edmundo P. Robaina 

 Thomas T. Griffin 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff Cleopatria Martinez 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on the 15th day of December 2017, I caused the foregoing 

document to be electronically transmitted to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF 

System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following 

CM/ECF Registrants: 

Pavneet Singh Uppal 

Shayna H. Balch 

FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP 

3200 North Central Avenue, Suite 805 

Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2425 

puppal@laborlawyers.com 

sbalch@laborlawyers.com 

 Attorneys for Defendants 

By /s/ Gaynell Carpenter 

Case 2:15-cv-01759-NVW Document 107 Filed 12/15/17 Page 13 of 13