[Cite as State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., 136 Ohio St.3d 298, 2013-Ohio-3686.] 

THE STATE EX REL. SIGLER, APPELLEE, v. LUBRIZOL CORPORATION ET AL.,

APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., 136 Ohio St.3d 298, 

2013-Ohio-3686.] 

Workers’ compensation—Mandamus—Hearing before commission—Due 

process—Commissioner not required to attend hearing in order to vote on 

matter being heard—Commissioner required only to make meaningful 

review of evidence from hearing—Due process not violated when voting 

commissioner was apprised of evidence and arguments by commission 

employee who attended hearing and referred to handwritten notes taken 

during hearing—Writ denied. 

(No. 2011-1902—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided August 29, 2013.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-255, 

2011-Ohio-4917. 

____________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellants, the Industrial Commission and the Lubrizol 

Corporation, appeal the judgment of the court of appeals granting the request of 

appellee, Terry Sigler, for a writ of mandamus requiring the commission to vacate 

its order that overturned a staff hearing officer’s award of permanent-totaldisability compensation. 

{¶ 2} Appellants object to the court of appeals’ determination that the 

commission’s hearing did not comport with the due-process standards set forth in 

State ex rel. Ormet Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 54 Ohio St.3d 102, 561 N.E.2d 920 

(1990). The court so held because one of the two commissioners voting to 

overturn had not attended the hearing, but had relied on an oral summary of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

evidence from a commission hearing officer who had attended the hearing and 

taken handwritten notes. 

{¶ 3} We agree with the dissenting opinion from the appellate court that 

Sigler failed to demonstrate that the commission’s voting procedures violated due 

process. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ. 

{¶ 4} Terry Sigler was employed by Lubrizol as a maintenance mechanic 

when he was injured on September 21, 2001. His workers’ compensation claim 

was allowed for acute myofascial strain lumbar, bulging discs, and radiculopathy. 

{¶ 5} On April 13, 2006, Sigler applied for permanent-total-disability 

compensation. A staff hearing officer approved the award, but the court of 

appeals ordered the commission to reconsider Sigler’s application. State ex rel. 

Lubrizol v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-204, 2008-Ohio-463. 

After a hearing on November 5, 2008, a staff hearing officer again awarded Sigler 

permanent-total-disability compensation. 

{¶ 6} Lubrizol filed a motion for reconsideration before the threemember commission. Following a hearing, the commission issued an order dated 

August 12, 2009, in which it granted the motion for reconsideration to correct “a 

clear mistake of law,” vacated the award, and denied Sigler’s application. 

Commissioner Kevin R. Abrams did not attend the hearing. On the order, above 

the signature of Commissioner Abrams, the order states: 

On 08/12/2009, I discussed this matter with Bob Cromley, 

who was present at the 07/28/09 hearing. Mr. Cromley 

summarized the testimony, evidence and arguments presented at 

[the] hearing. After this discussion and a review of all the 

evidence contained within the claim file, I vote to find jurisdiction 

and grant the Employer’s request for reconsideration, filed 

12/26/2008. I further vote to vacate the Staff Hearing Officer 
January Term, 2013 

3 

order issued 11/20/2008, and to deny the Injured Worker’s IC-2 

Application for Permanent Total Disability. 

 

{¶ 7} Sigler filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion 

when it issued the reconsideration order because 

the decision was made by a Commissioner who was not present at 

the hearing, who did not hear the evidence, and who relied upon a 

recitation of the evidence by an individual who was present, but 

who did not record the proceedings nor was a court reporter 

present to transcribe the arguments or the testimony. 

{¶ 8} A magistrate permitted the parties to file affidavits to clarify what 

had occurred at the hearing. The commission submitted the affidavit of Bob 

Cromley, who attested that he has been employed by the commission as a hearing 

officer since 1985 and that at times, he assisted the commissioners at hearings. 

Cromley further attested that he attended the hearing on July 28, 2009, took 

handwritten notes, and used those notes as a reference when he later met with 

Commissioner Abrams on August 12, 2009, to discuss the case. Cromley stated 

that he “summarized the testimony, evidence and arguments from the hearing,” 

including the testimony of Sigler. 

{¶ 9} Glen Richardson, Sigler’s attorney, submitted an affidavit in which 

he stated that Sigler’s testimony “included a recitation of his complaints and 

symptoms, his efforts at attempting to go through vocational rehabilitation and his 

anticipated second surgical procedure on his back.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

{¶ 10} Michael J. Spisak, Lubrizol’s counsel, attested that “the testimony 

offered by Mr. Sigler on July 28, 2009, was consistent with, and was substantially 

similar to, the testimony he offered” at previous hearings. 

{¶ 11} The magistrate concluded that Sigler had failed to prove that he 

was deprived of due process when Abrams reviewed the claim file and was orally 

apprised of the evidence and testimony by Cromley, who used his handwritten 

notes as a reference. The magistrate recommended that the court deny the writ. 

{¶ 12} Sigler filed objections to the magistrate’s report. A divided court 

of appeals concluded that Abrams was unable to evaluate the credibility of 

Sigler’s testimony in the absence of a complete record of the testimony presented. 

The court sustained Sigler’s objections, granted the writ of mandamus, and 

ordered the commission to rehear Sigler’s application. State ex rel. Sigler v. 

Lubrizol Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-255, 2011-Ohio-4917. 

{¶ 13} This cause is now before the court on an appeal as of right.

{¶ 14} A commissioner is not required to attend a permanent-totaldisability hearing in order to participate in the decision. State ex rel. Dayton 

Walther Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 71 Ohio St.3d 105, 107, 642 N.E.2d 349 (1994). 

In addition, reviewing a transcript is not the only method by which an absentee 

commissioner can review the evidence in order to satisfy a party’s due process 

rights. State ex rel. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio 

St.3d 351, 353, 603 N.E.2d 1026 (1992). However, a commissioner’s failure to 

consider any evidence from the hearing destroys the presumption of regularity 

that attaches to the administrative proceeding and violates the claimant’s due 

process rights. State ex rel. Ormet Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 54 Ohio St.3d at 107, 

561 N.E.2d 920. 

{¶ 15} In Ormet, we held that the due process requirement of a full and 

fair hearing means that the decisionmaker must, in some meaningful manner, 

consider and appraise all the evidence to justify the decision. Id. The method of 
January Term, 2013 

5 

review is secondary. Id. at 104-105. For instance, we approved the use of 

subordinates to analyze the evidence and prepare a summary for the absent voting 

member to use to consider and appraise the evidence presented. Id. at 105-106. 

In State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.3d 329, 626 

N.E.2d 678 (1994), we held that there was no due process violation when the 

absent commissioner had an audiotape of the hearing, a summary of the hearing 

prepared by a legal advisor, and additional discussion with the other 

commissioners who were present at the hearing. 

{¶ 16} Here, Abrams stated that he had reviewed the claim file and talked 

with Cromley, a longtime commission hearing officer, who summarized the 

hearing testimony, evidence, and arguments for him. Cromley’s affidavit 

supported Abrams’s statement that Cromley orally summarized the proceeding, 

using as a reference the handwritten notes he took during the hearing. 

{¶ 17} The affidavits from counsel indicated that Sigler’s testimony was 

not extensive or complicated. The claim file contained transcripts from earlier 

hearings in which Sigler had testified. Sigler presented no evidence to contradict 

these statements, but merely questioned the lack of a hearing transcript or written 

summary of the evidence. 

{¶ 18} The court of appeals cited Ormet and Ohio Bell as controlling 

authority, yet the court did not discuss what Abrams had done and whether his 

review met the Ormet standard. Rather, the appellate court offered what it 

believed was the better practice for the commission to follow: 

With today’s technological capabilities, there is no reason 

the commission cannot have a complete record, even a video 

record, of the testimony before it. An absent commissioner could 

then make the appropriate decision without risking a violation of 

Due Process of Law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

2011-Ohio-4917, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 19} The dissent acknowledged that the best practice may be for a 

voting commissioner to either attend the hearing or to review a transcript or other 

verbatim recording of the proceeding; however, that practice is not required by 

law. Id. at ¶ 15 (Sadler, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent noted, 

The record indicates that Commissioner Abrams considered the 

“testimony, evidence and arguments” from the hearing through 

Cromley’s post-hearing summary; however, the majority failed to 

explain how that summary did not constitute “meaningful” review 

under Ormet. * * * 

Because relator has presented no evidence to contradict the 

statements of Commissioner Abrams and Cromley, I find that 

relator failed to sustain his burden of showing that the 

commission’s voting procedure violated due process under the 

standard articulated in Ormet. 

Id. at ¶ 22- 23 (Sadler, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 20} There is a presumption of regularity that attaches to commission 

hearings. State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 68 Ohio St.3d at 333, 626 N.E.2d 678; 

State ex rel. Ohio Bldg. Restoration, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 188, 

189, 593 N.E.2d 1388 (1992). Sigler challenged that presumption when he 

challenged the regularity of the voting procedure, raising due process concerns. 

Under these circumstances, the burden was on Sigler to prove noncompliance 

with Ormet. Ohio Bell at 333. 

{¶ 21} We agree with the dissenting opinion that Sigler failed to prove 

that he was deprived of due process when Abrams reviewed the claim file, 
January Term, 2013 

7 

including Sigler’s testimony from prior hearings, and was orally apprised of the 

evidence by Cromley, who had attended the hearing and who used his 

handwritten notes as a reference in his discussion with Abrams. 

{¶ 22} Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 

deny the writ. 

Judgment reversed 

and writ denied. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would affirm the judgment of 

the court of appeals. 

____________________ 

Bentoff & Duber Co., L.P.A., and Glen Richardson, for appellee. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Colleen C. Erdman and Patsy A. 

Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 

Weston Hurd, L.L.P., and Michael J. Spisak, for appellant Lubrizol 

Corporation. 

________________________