### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 1, 200 5
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JO HNNY ISS AC LAW

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Lin coln County Nos. S0300118, S0300119, S 0300070 Charles Lee, Judge

No. M2004- 01031-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 30, 2005

The de fenda nt pled g uiltyin the L incoln CountyCircuit Court to ele ven counts of for g ery , eleve n counts of tra nsfer

ring a for g ed instrument, sale of more than .5 g rams of cocaine, delivery of more than .5 g ra ms o f

c o c a in e , a n d a g g r a v a te d p e r ju r y
. T h e tria l c o u r t m e r g e d th e f o r g e r y c o n v ic tions wi t h t h e tr an s fe rr i n g a fo rge d i n s tru m en t co n v i ct i o n s an d s en t en ce d t h e de fe n d an t as a R a n g e I, standard of

fende r to one y ear

on eac h count, to be ser ved conc urre ntly . He wa s s entenced to ten y ear s for the sa le of cocaine conviction, which the trial court merg ed with the delivery conviction, to be s er ved conc urre ntly with the forg ery

sentenc e, and f

our y ear s for the a g g ravated per jury conviction, to be served conse cutively to the sale of coca ine s entenc e, for a tot al effec tive sentenc e of fo urte e n y e ars
. On app e a l, he alleg es the trial court err ed in applying se vera l enhanc ement fa ctors in violation of the rec ent United States Supreme Court c ase, B lakely v. Washington , an d in not sentenc ing him to the community corr ections prog ram. F oll owing our re view, we aff irm the sentenc es but rema nd for e ntry of cor rec ted jud gm en t s in all three c ases to re flec t the conviction offe nses, which we re omitted, and to re flec t the corr ect of fense date in Case N o. S0300119.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded f

or Entry of Corre cte d Jud gm ents

A LA N E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Merrily n Fe irman, Na shville, Tennessee (on appe al); Donna L

. Har g rove, D istrict Publi c De fende r; and A. Jackson Dea

ring , I I I , Assistant Public Def ender (at trial), for

the appe llant, J ohnny

I ssac L aw.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi stant Att orne y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Weakley E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.A ltho u g h the re c o rd o n a p p e a l d o e s n o t i n c lud e a c o p y o f an o rd e r se tti n g a sid e the d e fen d a n t’s p le a s o f gu ilt y, 1
t he part i es ha ve procee ded i n t hi s mat t er as i f s uch an order ex i s t s , an d we s hal l do l i kew i s e. -2- OP IN ION

F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

Th e de fe nd a nt, John ny I ssa c L a w, wa s in dic te d inCa se No . S0 30 00 70 by the L inc olnCou nty Gra nd J ury

on J uly 22, 2003, on eleve n counts of for g ery and ele ven counts of transfe rring a for g ed instrument. The forg ed instruments were chec ks drawn w ithout permission on a chec king a ccount maintained by

the def endant’ s g randpa

rents at the F irst National B ank of Li ncoln County . The defe ndant orig inally

pled g uilt y o n November 4, 2003, to six counts of tra nsfer ring a for g ed instrument, a Cla s s E felony , and the r emaining counts wer e nolle prosequied by the State. Howeve r, on Nove mber 20, 2003, the State f iled a motion to set aside the g uiltypleas be cause “the Def endant misrepr esente d his criminal history i n b o t h the neg otiated disposition and at the submissi on hearing g ivi n g b o t h the State and the Court the f alse impression that he ha d no prior convictions.” Subsequently , the def endant wa s indicted on Dec ember 9 , 2 0 0 3, for a g g ravated 1 perjury in Case No. S0300118 and for the sale and the delivery

of m o re than .5 g rams of c ocaine , in connec tion with an underc o v er dr ug transac tion that occurr ed on May 30, 2003, in Case No. S0300119.

On Ma rc h 1 6, 20 04 , th e de fe nd a nt ple d g uil ty to the of fe ns e s a s c ha

rg e d in a ll thr e e c a se s. The trial court merg ed the forg ery convictions into the transfe rring a forg ed instrument convictions and sente nced the defe ndant to concur rent term s o f one y ear

for e ach c ount. For the ag g ravated pe rj ury c on vic tio n, the tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d the de fe nd a nt t o f ou r y e ars , to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th the fo rg e ry

se nte nc e . T he tria l c ou rt me rg e d th e de liv e ry

of c oc a ine c on vic tio n in to the sa le conviction and imposed a ten-y ear sentenc e, to be se rved c onsecutively to t h e aggr avated perjury sentenc e, for

an ef fec tive sentenc e of f

ourtee n y ear s.
AN AL YSI S

Th e de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s h is s e nte nc e s, a r g u i n g th at

th et ri a l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

app lie d c e rt a in statutory enhanc ement fa ctors in violation of Bla kely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Ac cording to the defe ndant, h i s sentenc es “must be a ppropriate ly

reduc ed to re flec t the absenc e of the impermissible enhanc ement fa ctors.” H e also arg ues that the trial court e rre d in not
se nte nc ing him

to c ommun ity

c or re c tio ns
. When an ac cused challeng es the leng th and manner of ser vice of

a sente nce, it is the duty

of this court to conduct a de novo revie w on the re co rd wi t h a p resumption that “the de terminations made by the court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ec t

. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). This pre sumption i s “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial
c o u r tc o n s i d e r e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s
. ” S t a t e v
. A s h b y, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The presumption does not a pply to the leg al conc lusions reac hed-3-

by the trial court in sentencing the ac cused or to the determinations made by the t rial court which ar e predic ated upon unc ontroverte d fac t s
. S t at e v. B utler, 900 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smit h, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) , overr uled on other g rounds by

State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000)

. I n co n d u ct i ng a de novo revie w of a sentenc e, this court must consider ( a) any evidenc e rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencing hearing, ( b) the pre sent en ce report, (c) the principles of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg uments o f counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of the off

ense, ( f) a ny

mitigating or enhancing fac tors, (g ) any statements made by

the
acc used in his own behalf , and (h) the acc used’s potential or lac k of potential for reha bilitation or tr e a tme nt. Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 40 -3 5- 10 3, -2 10 ; State v. Sc ott , 7 35 S.W. 2d 82 5, 82 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1987). The party

challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the trial court h as t he burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Cmts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

The de fenda nt was convicted of ag g ravated per jury , a Class D fe lony , and wa s sentence d as a Rang e I , s t an d ar d o ff

en der. The sentenc e rang e for a Class D fe lony , as a Rang e I , standard offe nder is tw o to f

o u r y e ar s
. T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 2 ( a ) ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. A d d it io n a ll y , h e w as c on vic te d o f s a le of

mor e than . 5 g rams o f c ocai ne, a Cl ass B f e lon y . T he se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss B felony , as a Rang e I , standard offende r i s eig ht to twelve y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)( 2) (2003). The re is no mathematical formula for evaluating the enha nceme nt fac tors to calculate the appropriate sente nce. See gene rally State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. “Rather , the weig ht to be aff orded an exis ting factor is left t o the trial court’s discretion so long as the court complies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act and its findings ar e adequately

supported by

the re cord.” I d. at 475-76 (c itations omi tted).

J erry Grohowski, a pr obation and parole office r with the Tenne ssee De partment of Probation
a ndParo le , te sti fi e d at th e se nte nc ing he ari ng that he pr e pa re d the de fe nd a nt’ s p re se nte nc e re po rt

. He state d that the def

endant ha d two char g es for driving on a s u s p en d ed driver’ s license in the L inc oln Cou nty Ge ne ra l Sess ion s Court, w hic h w e re bo th ame nd e d to drivi ng wi tho ut a lic e ns e in his possession, and that a notice ha d been se nt to the State on July 29, 2003, due to the defe ndant’s f a il u r e to c o mp ly w ith th e te r ms o f h is s e n te n c e s
. T h e d e f e n d a n t w r o te in h is r e s p o n s e to the pr e se nte nc e inv e sti g a tio n th a t hi s c ri min a l a c tiv ity wa s du e to his “ ne e d to pay his c hil d s up po rt ;” ho we ve r, he la te r t oldGr oh ow sk i th a t he wa s u nd e r n o c ou rt ob li gati on to pay

c hil d s up po rt

. Grohowski also testified that the defe ndant pled g uiltyto speeding on J une 21, 2001, and a lso pled g uilty to driving without a license in his possession on September 13, 2000. On Octobe r 29, 1998, the defe ndant was convicted of passing a worthless chec k, and on J uly 27, 1998, h e w as “f o u nd g uiltyin absentia” of two counts of failure to use a safe ty belt or child re straint. The latter incident involved the def

endant’ s daug hter being ejec ted from a pic k-up truck during an acc ident and take n to the hospital. The defenda nt also had a “seatbelt violation and a lig ht bulb violation” in 1999. The defe ndant also re ported to Grohow ski that his alcohol use was spora dic, but when he did drink, he typically drank a “ca se of be er a nd a fifth of liquor.” He told Grohowski that he first used marijuana-4-

wh e n h e wa s sixte e n a nd his la st us e ha d be e n tw o or thr e e y e ars a g o. Th e de fe nd a nt “ de sc ri be d h is usag e as he smoked a joint when he took a notion.” The de fendant had worke d “off and on” f or four and a ha lf y ear s at Wells and Tate in Huntsville, Alabama

. Richard Tuc ker, a

Fay etteville Police D epartment narc otics detec tive, testified that he ha d be e n in la w e nf

or c e me nt f

or sixte e n y e ars a ndha d w or ke d e xclu siv e ly in narc oti c s f or the la st e ig ht. He state d that he had w orked hundr eds of c ases in Lin co ln Countyinvolving powde r coc aine a nd that th e sa le a ndde liv e ry

of po wd e r c oc a ine in the are a wa s a g ro wi ng pr ob le m.
Th e thi rt y -y e ar- oldde fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d tha t prior to be ing inc arc e rate d, he ha d li ve d w ithhis brother, mother , and g randpa rents, both of whom we re “ rea l sick” and had been depende nt on the defe ndant for he lp for eig ht to ten y ear s. The def endant state d that he had a problem with powder
cocaine in May

and June 2003 when he forg ed his g randf ather ’s name on sever al che cks, thoug h he char acte rized it as “not a re al bad pr oblem.” The money he re ceive d from t h e forg ed che cks wa s used to “pa y

[hi s] ex -wife child support and drug s.” He testified that he drank alc ohol every four or five months, and on those oc casions, he w ould drink “a c ase of beer and a f ifth of liquor,” usually startin g ar o u n d 10:00 a.m. He state d that his curre nt convictions and inca rce ration had taug ht him “not to do drugs no more and write chec ks. And to g et out and g et a job and pay my own bills and stuff.”

On cr oss-examination, the defendant admitted he failed to tell Grohowski about his coca ine usag e be c a u s e “ [i ]t d id n ’ t c o me u p , ju s t ab o u t th e ma r ij u a n a is th e o n ly th in g th a t c o me up.” He boug ht coca ine from “James,” a friend in Tone y , Alabama , “[t] wo or thre e times a month,” a nd the
cocaine he sold the c onfidential informa nt in May 2003 was c ocaine he had boug ht from J ames. The de fe nd a nt a lso ha d a n a g re e me nt w ith his e x-w if e to p a y he r $ 50 e ve ry

tw o w e e ks fo r c hil d s up po rt , but he “missed a lot of times.”

At the conc lusion of the s entenc ing hearing, the trial court a pplied three enhanc ement fa ctors to the sale of c ocaine and for g ery convictions: (2), the defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convictions or beha vior in addition to those ne cessa ry to e stablish the r ang e; (9), the defe ndant has
a pr e vio us his tory

of un wi lli ng ne ss t o c omp ly wi th the c on dit ion s o f a

se nte nc e inv olv ing re le a se into the communi ty ; and (21), the defe ndant was a djudicated to have committed a delinquent ac t or acts a s a juvenile that would c onstitut e a f elony if committed by

an adult. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 11 4( 2) , ( 9) , ( 21 ) ( 20 03 ). I n a dd iti on to tho se thr e e fact ors , th e c ou rt app lie d a

fo urth
e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor to the a g g ra vate d pe rj ury c on vic tio n: (1 4) (A ), the fe lon y wa s c omm itt e d w hil e on a ny of the fo llo wi ng fo rm s o f re le a se status if su c h re le a se is fr om a prior fe lon y c on vic tio n: b a il. I d. § 40- 35 -1 14 (1 4) (A ). Al tho ug h the tr ia l cou rt de te rm ine d th a t on e mit ig a tin g fa c tor app lie d to a ll but th e s a le o f

c o c a in e c o n v ic ti o n , n a me ly th e d e f e n d a n t’ s c o n d u c t n e ith e r

c a u s e d n o r

th r e a te ned serious bodily

injury , see id. § 40-35- 113(1), the c ourt place d “little weig ht” on that mitigating fac tor. The tria l court sentenc ed the defendant to four y ear s, the m axim um within the ra ng e, for the ag g ravated per

jury conviction, and ten y ear s, the midpoint i n t he rang e, for the sale of

cocaine conviction. Pursuant to Rule 32(c) (3 )( C ) of the Tennesse e Rules of Criminal Procedur e, the sentenc es we re or dere d to be serve d consec utively , as the de fendant was release d on bail when heT here are two p res ent ence rep o rt s i n t he reco rd, d at ed N o vem b er 12 , 20 0 3 , and A p ri l 5, 20 0 4

. I n t he 2
N o v e m b e r re p o rt, th e p r io r c r im ina l re c o rd p o rtio n ind ic a te s tha t t h e d e fen d a n t wa s c h a rg e d w ith a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, wh i ch oc cu r r ed on M ay 25, 2003, an d wh i ch wa s ame n ded t o a con v i ct i on of fen s e of s i mpl e as s au l t on Au g u s t 11, 2003. T h is c o n v ic tio n is no t re flec te d in the A p ril re p o rt. T h e re c o rd c o n ta ins no e x p la n a tio n fo r th is d isp a rity.
-5- c omm itt e d th e a g g ra vate d p e rj ury
. Th e tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t “ the Cou rt e a sil y in this c a se could max the Defe ndant out on all of the c ases, a nd then just g o back and add them toge ther.” The court stated, howeve r, that it did “not f eel that would be appropriate” and sentenc ed the de fendant to one y ear, t h e minimum within the rang e, for eac h of the tra nsfer

ring a for g ed instrument
c o n v i c t i o n s , t o b e s e r v e d c o n c u rr e n t l y.
The S upreme Court in Blake ly clarified its ear lier holding in Apprendi v. Ne w J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. C t. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), c oncluding that “[o] ur pre cede nts make cle ar . . . that th e ‘s ta tut ory

ma ximum ’ f

or Ap pr e nd i pu rp os e s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a jud g e ma y imp os e solely on the basis of the facts reflecte d in the jury ve rdict or admitted by the defe ndant

. ” B l ak e l y, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. Under the Appre ndi/Blake ly

scheme , prior adult convic tions may sti ll b e u s e d to e n h a n c e a d e f e n d a n t’ s s e n te n c e
. Se e St a te v
. Ro b b ie Ch e t Wa ll e y , No. W2003- 02987-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2255255, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2004). I n the pre sent ca se, the de fe nd a nt h a s th e fo llo wi ng prior a du lt c on vic tio ns : tw o c ou nts of drivi ng wi tho ut a lic e ns e in 2003; speeding in 2001; driving without a license in 2000; a se atbelt and lig ht law violation in 1999; passing worthless che cks a n d two counts of failure to use saf ety belt/child restra int in 1998. 2 Although e nhance ment fac tors (9), ( 14), and ( 21) may no t h ave been a

pplicable in this matter beca use of B lakely , we de em application of fac tor (2) to be suffic ient alone to justify the sentenc es imposed by

the trial court. Accor d i n gl y , t h e Blakely decision does not af

fec t the defe ndant’s sentenc ing, w hich, we c onclude, is supported by the re cord.

The de fenda nt also arg ues he should have been se ntence d to the Communi ty Correc tions Prog ram, a s he met all of the criteria set f orth in Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-36-106(a ). The S t at e responds that the trial court properly denied a lternative se ntencing based on the defe ndant’s “la ck of c andor.”

Th e de fe nd a nt, ha vin g be e n c on vic te d o f a Cla ss B fe lon y , is no t pr e su me d to be a fa vo ra ble
c a n d i d a t e f

o r a l t e r n a t i v e s e n t e n c i n g
. S e e T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 6 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, beca use of the le ng th of his sentence , the def endant is not elig ible for pr obation. See Te nn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (a ) (2 00 3)

. Ho we ve r, the de fe nd a nt can still be c on sid e re d eli g ibl e fo r c ommun ity
corr ections if he satisfies the m i n i m u m el i g ibilit y criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36- 106(a) (1). See State v. Grig sby , 957 S.W .2d 541, 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“The Communi ty

Correc tions A c t p e rmi ts tr ia l c o u r ts to be cr eative in se ntencing certain nonviolent felony of fe nd e rs , w ho are e ith e r n ot e lig ibl e fo r p ro batio n o r n ot g oo d c a nd idates for pr ob a tio n, to pa rt ic ipate in c ommun ity -b a se d a lte rn a tiv e s to inc arc e ratio n. ” ). Th os e c ri te ri a are a s f oll ow s: (A) Person s w h o , w ith o u t th is o p ti o n , w o u ldb e in c ar c e r a te d in a c o rr e c ti o n al instit ution;-6-

(B ) Persons who a

re c onvicted of pr o p er t y -related, or dr ug /alcohol-re lated fe lony offe nses or other

felony offe nses not involving crimes ag ainst the person as provided in titl e 39, cha

pter 13, pa

rts 1-5; (C ) P e rs on s w ho are c on vic te d o f n on vio le nt f e lon y of fe ns e s; (D) Per sons who are convicted of felony offe nses in w hich the use or posse ssion of
a we apon wa s not involved;
(E) Persons who do not demonstrate a prese nt or past pattern of beha vior indicating violence;
(F ) P e rs on s w ho do no t de mon str a te a patte rnof

c omm itt ing vio le nt o ff

e ns e s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 36-106(a )(1)

. We a g re e that th e de fe nd a nt m e e ts the min imu m cr ite ri a of the Com mun ity Cor re c tio ns Ac t. Se e T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 6

- 1 0 6 ( d ) ( “ T h e e li g ib il it y c r it e r ia e s ta b li s h e d in th is s e c tion sha ll be interpre ted as minimum state standards, g uiding the de termination of elig ibilit y of off ender s under this chapter.” ). Even thoug h an off ender meets these mi n i m u m elig ibilit y require ments for
c omm un ity corr ect io ns , an off

end er i s n otaut om ati cal lyent it led to ser ve h is sen ten ce i n t he p rogram. Se e Sta te v. Ke nd ri c k, 10 S.W. 3d 65 0, 65 6 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( statin g that “ the de fe nd a nt i s not nece ssarily

entitled to be sentenc ed under the Act a s a matter of

law o r ri gh t ” even w hen he meets the minimum requireme nts) (c i t i ng State v. Tay lor, 744 S.W .2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); State v. Gra ndberry , 803 S.W .2d 706, 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). I n the pre sent ca se, the trial co u rt s t at ed that the def endant’ s conduct in ly ing to the c ourt conc erning his prior criminal convictions “strikes at the very heart of the criminal justice sy stem.” We have pr eviously held that a def endant’ s lack of candor is a proper consideration in the trial court’s determination of whether a def endant should re ce i v e an alternative sentenc e. See State v. T homas J are d Richardson, No. M2000-01976-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 501420, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. M ay 11, 2001) (stating that a def endant’ s “lac k of ca ndor or untruthful testimony ref lects poorly upon the defendant’s pote ntial fo r r e ha bil itatio n” a ndthu s may

be a pr op e r b a sis fo r the de nia l of a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing ); se e a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(5) . At t h e o rig inal plea submission hearing held on Novembe r 4, 2003, when a sked by

the court if he had “ ever been c onvicted of any thing be fore ,” t h e def endant responde d, “No, sir.” That response was the basis for the origina l plea ag ree ment being set aside,
as we ll as the defe ndant’s convic tion for ag g ravated perjury

. The prese ntence report, a s well as the testimonyof Jerry

Grohowski, esta

blished a history

of prior c riminal convictions, contra dicting the defe ndant’s earlier response under oath to the court. There fore , we conclude that the de fendant was ap p ro p ri at el y

d en i ed al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.-7- CO NC LU SION

We conclude that the defe ndant was a p p ro p riately sentenc ed both as to leng th of sentenc e and manne r of se rvice

. The judgments of the t rial court are aff irmed. Howe ver, w e re mand for e ntry of cor rec ted j udg ments in all three c ases to re flec t the defe ndant’s convic tion offense s, which we re omitted, and to refle ct the cor rec t offense date in Case N o. S0300119.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE