J-S20001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RALPH SKUNDRICH

Appellant No. 1433 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012621-2010

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2016

Appellant, Ralph Skundrich, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County after a jury 

convicted him of five counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and 

other related offenses. After careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. At 

approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 25, 2002, D.W. awoke on her living room 

couch to find an intruder standing above her. D.W. described him as a 

Caucasian male with salt and pepper hair, between five foot six and five foot 

eight inches tall, with a medium to stocky muscular build. Further, she 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20001-16

- 2 -

indicated that the intruder wore a mask during the entire incident. Once the 

intruder noted D.W. was awake, he pointed a gun at her, demanded she 

give him money, and threatened to kill her if she screamed. He ordered 

D.W. into her bedroom. When she attempted to scream, he punched her in 

the face and stomach and removed her clothing.

The intruder proceeded to perform oral sex on D.W., penetrate D.W. 

anally with his penis, and force her to perform oral sex on him. He led D.W. 

into the bathroom and forced her to urinate while he watched. While in the 

bathroom, he again forced D.W. to perform oral sex on him and ejaculated 

onto her face and chest. The intruder used a towel to clean D.W. off before 

anally penetrating her for the second time. He led D.W. back into her 

bedroom, demanded to know the location of her money, and instructed D.W. 

to wait for five minutes before leaving the room. Upon leaving D.W.’s 

residence, the intruder disconnected her phone and removed her phone 

handset. 

After ten minutes, D.W. contacted the police and was transported to a 

hospital where DNA evidence was collected. In 2010, police obtained a 

search warrant to collect DNA evidence from Skundrich to test against the 

DNA evidence taken in relation to D.W.’s assault. Subsequent testing 

confirmed a match and Skundrich was arrested and charged with D.W.’s 

sexual assault. 
J-S20001-16

- 3 -

On January 13, 2014, a jury convicted Skundrich of burglary,1five 

counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,2two counts of sexual 

assault,3indecent assault,4terroristic threats,5simple assault, and false 

imprisonment.6 Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Skundrich to an 

aggregate term of 65 1⁄2 to 131 years’ imprisonment. Skundrich 

subsequently filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This 

timely appeal follows. 

On appeal, Skundrich raises two issues for review. In his first issue, 

Skundrich argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

evidence of a sexual assault committed by Skundrich seven weeks prior to 

D.W.’s sexual assault. Specifically, Skundrich contends that the prior sexual 

assault was not sufficiently similar to D.W.’s sexual assault to constitute a 

common plan or scheme, and therefore was unduly prejudicial and 

improperly admitted under the common plan or scheme exception to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). We disagree.

“[T]he admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will only be reversed upon a showing that the trial court clearly 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(c)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123. 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.

5 19 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2903(a). 
J-S20001-16

- 4 -

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106 

(Pa. Super. 2012). Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible at a trial when 

that proof is introduced solely to show the defendant’s bad character or 

criminal propensities. See Commonwealth v. Keaton, 729 A.2d 529, 537 

(Pa. 1999); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of other crimes 

is admissible in certain circumstances, such as when offered to prove 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and 

absence of mistake or accident. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Additionally, such 

evidence is admissible “to show a common plan, scheme, or design 

embracing commission of multiple crimes, or to establish the identity of the 

perpetrator, so long as proof of one crime tends to prove the others.” 

Keaton, 729 A.2d at 537 (citation omitted). 

When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the 

common plan exception, the trial court must first examine the 

details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident 

to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is so 

distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of 

the same perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding will be the 

habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the 

perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time, place, and 

types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator. Given this 

initial determination, the court is bound to engage in a careful 

balancing test to assure that the common plan evidence is not 

too remote in time to be probative. If the evidence reveals that 

the details of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact 

that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely 

prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is 

excessive. Finally, the trial court must assure that the probative 

value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential 

prejudicial impact of the evidence with such factors as the 

degree of similarity established between the incidents of criminal 

conduct, the Commonwealth’s need to present evidence under 
J-S20001-16

- 5 -

the common plan exception, and the ability of the trial court to 

caution the jury concerning the proper use of such evidence by 

them in their deliberations. 

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 389-39 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super. 

2007). 

Upon review of the facts surrounding the previous sexual assault 

admitted under the common plan or scheme exception, it is clear that there 

are striking similarities between the two sexual assaults. The assaults 

occurred in neighboring counties, seven weeks apart. Both victims, who 

were female, awoke at approximately 2:30 in the morning to find a masked 

man standing over them as they slept. In both cases the intruder forced the 

victim to undress and perform various sex acts. Both of the victims complied 

with the intruder’s commands because he brandished a deadly weapon 

throughout the assault. The intruder alternated between sexual acts that he 

forced the victim to perform. At some point during both assaults, the 

intruder ejaculated on the victim’s face and upper body, and proceeded to 

use a towel or cloth to wipe the victim’s face. Finally, in both cases, before 

he left, the intruder disconnected the victim’s telephone access and 

instructed her to wait a specified period of time before leaving the room. 

We find that the relevant details and circumstances surrounding each 

of the sexual assaults indicate criminal conduct that is sufficiently distinctive 

as to constitute a common plan or scheme. While Skundrich highlights 
J-S20001-16

- 6 -

differences between the two cases, i.e., different masks in each case, 

different deadly weapons used, and different descriptions of the intruder’s 

hair color, we find that these differences are insignificant compared to the 

evidence of “criminal conduct which is so distinctive and so nearly identical 

as to become the signature of the same perpetrator.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 

389-39. Contrary to Skundrich’s arguments, there is no requirement that 

crimes have to be carried out in an identical fashion to be considered an 

exception under the common plan or scheme doctrine. See 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 399 A.2d 123, 126, n.6 (Pa. 1976) (noting 

that the requirement of an “identical modus operandi is not required under 

the common plan or scheme exception”). Additionally, we do not find that 

the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value 

of Skundrich’s prior sexual assault outweighed its potential for undue 

prejudice. Given the substantial similarities between the two sexual assaults, 

it was reasonable to find the previous assault highly probative in determining 

the identity of D.W.’s intruder and that the description of Skundrich’s prior 

assault alone did not render it unduly prejudicial. See Tyson, 119 A.3d at 

361. Accordingly, Skundrich’s challenge to the admission of P.J.’s testimony 

is without merit. 

In his final issue, Skundrich argues that the sentence imposed by the 

trial court was manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable. Skundrich 

relies upon two arguments to support this contention. First, Skundrich 
J-S20001-16

- 7 -

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him outside 

the guidelines to the statutory maximum on every count and running the 

sentences consecutively, essentially creating a life sentence for a nonhomicide offense. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12, 22. Second, Skundrich argues 

that the sentence imposed was improper because the trial court imposed a 

sentence outside the guidelines without “meaningful consideration of the 

statutory factors.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18. Skundrich concedes that both 

arguments constitute challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

See Appellant’s Brief, at 11. 

We find that Skundrich preserved his arguments concerning the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence through a post-sentence motion. Thus, 

he is in technical compliance with the requirements to challenge the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to 

appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” 

Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). “Two requirements must be met before we will review this 

challenge on its merits.” Id. (citation omitted).

“First, an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of 

the reasons relief upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the 

appellant must show that there is a substantial question that the sentence 
J-S20001-16

- 8 -

imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. (citation 

omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a specific provision of the 

sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). 

We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. See id. “Our inquiry must focus on 

the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts

underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the 

merits.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). In the present 

case, Skundrich’s appellate brief contains the requisite Rule 2119(f) concise 

statement. 

First, Skundrich argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the trial 

court abused its discretion by sentencing him outside the guidelines and to 

the statutory maximum on every count and running the sentences 

consecutively, essentially creating a life sentence for a non-homicide 

offense. Essentially, through this argument, Skundrich is objecting to the 

consecutive nature of his sentence. 

“Although Pennsylvania’s system stands for individualized sentencing, 

the court is not required to impose the ‘minimum possible’ confinement.” 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). The sentencing court “has the discretion to impose sentences 
J-S20001-16

- 9 -

consecutively or concurrently and, ordinarily, a challenge to this exercise of 

discretion does not raise a substantial question.” Id. (citation omitted); see 

also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). “The imposition of consecutive, rather than 

concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most 

extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly 

harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171-72 (citation omitted). 

Skundrich argues that the length of his sentence indicates that 

“extreme circumstances” are present here, and therefore the trial court’s 

imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences raises a 

substantial question. Skundrich bases this contention solely upon our holding 

in Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011). In 

Coulverson, we found that the trial court abused its discretion by 

sentencing a sex offender to the statutory maximum on each count and 

imposing the individual sentences consecutively, creating a virtual life 

sentence. See id. at 148. Based upon the similarities of this case to the 

facts in Coulverson, Skundrich argues that the mere fact that the trial court 

imposed a life sentence renders the trial court’s aggregate sentence 

unreasonable. See Appellant’s Brief, at 23. 

Coulverson is plainly distinguishable. Our finding that the trial court 

in Coulverson abused its discretion was based upon the trial court’s failure to 

adequately explain its reasons for imposing its sentence. See Coulverson, 
J-S20001-16

- 10 -

34 A.3d at 143. Here, as discussed below, we find that the trial court 

provided a lengthy and comprehensive explanation of Skundrich’s aggregate 

sentence, and demonstrated that it fully considered the requirements of the 

Sentencing Code. 

We do not find that an “extreme circumstance” is present here. The 

trial court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 

Although the aggregate sentence is lengthy, it is nonetheless a legal 

sentence. Given the egregious nature of the sexual abuse in this case, and 

the resultant emotional harm that Skundrich inflicted on D.W., we agree 

with the trial court’s conclusion that a sentence of 65 1⁄2 years to 131 years 

imprisonment is reasonable under the circumstances and not excessive. 

Therefore, Skundrich’s first challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence is without merit; it does not even raise a substantial question for 

our review. 

Finally, Skundrich argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the trial 

court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence outside of the sentencing 

guidelines without a meaningful consideration of the statutory factors.7

Specifically, Skundrich alleges that the trial court’s sentence was improper 

because his sentence only reflected the seriousness of the crime, 

____________________________________________

7 We note that while Skundrich’s sentences for burglary and terroristic 

threats fall outside of the statutory guidelines, his sentences for involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, false imprisonment or simple 

assault are guideline range sentences. 
J-S20001-16

- 11 -

Skundrich’s criminal history, and the impact on the victim. A claim that a 

sentencing court imposed a sentence outside of the guidelines without 

specifying sufficient reasons presents a substantial question for review. See 

Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2008). Therefore, 

we will review Skundrich’s arguments on the merits. 

In imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider relevant 

statutory factors, including “the protection of the public, gravity of an 

offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). A sentencing court has 

broad discretion in fashioning its sentence. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 

926 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Pa. 2007). A sentencing court is required to consider 

the sentence ranges set forth in the sentencing guidelines, but it is not 

bound by them. See Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111, 1118 

(Pa. 2007). Moreover, a sentencing court may depart from the guidelines, 

“if necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into account the protection 

of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of 

the particular offense as it related to the impact on the life of the victim and 

the community.” Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa. Super. 

2001). 

Initially we note that the trial court reviewed the pre-sentence 

investigation report. See N.T., Sentencing, 4/17/14 at 11. Where the trial 
J-S20001-16

- 12 -

court had the benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report, we 

must 

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. 

In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of 

engaging in an effort of legal publication, we state clearly that 

sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any 

extended or systematic definitions of their punishment 

procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence 

report, the sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed. 

This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where 

it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will 

presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the 

position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to 

apply them to the case at hand. 

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988)). As the trial court 

in this case had the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we must presume that 

it considered all relevant sentencing factors and did not impose an 

unreasonable sentence based solely on a limited number of factors. 

Further, after review of the trial court’s statements at sentencing, we 

are satisfied that the trial court adequately stated its reasons for imposing 

the sentence as follows.

We have to determine how to sentence you. Do we 

sentence you to [a] single sentence for each count, or do we 

sentence you on each count, to run them concurrent or 

consecutive; and we make that determination by looking at all of 

the factors that are involved in this particular case, the facts in 
J-S20001-16

- 13 -

this brutal assault, your despicable conduct, and the damage you 

have done to any innocent victim. 

We look at the Guidelines; and, fortunately, the Guidelines 

are advisory. They’re not mandatory. I don’t have to stick to 

those guidelines. I can deviate from those Guidelines. There is 

no question that this is a criminal that requires total 

confinement, since you are a risk to society should you be free. 

That, also, demonstrated that any sentence that I would 

give you other than the one I am now would defalcate [sic] the 

nature of the offenses that have been committed in this 

particular violent act. 

I’ve reviewed the Pre-sentence Report. I’ve reviewed the 

Sexual Offender’s Report. I’ve reviewed the transcript; and I 

remember this case vividly for the terror that you inflicted on 

that particular victim; and in going further through the PreSentence Report, I note that your criminal activity started in 

1987. 

 . . . . .

You’re also, awaiting trial in Broward County Florida, 2012, 

for kidnapping and sexual battery. Not a very good history, is it? 

All of these factors make it clear that the sentence that I’m going 

to impose upon you is correct, because you are needed [sic] to 

be removed from society, and you are incapable of being 

rehabilitated. 

You have had the opportunity to be supervised by County 

facilities and State facilities; and none of that has done anything 

to curb your criminal behavior. 

In light of all of these factors, I’m going to advise you that 

your days of torturing women have now come to an end, as your 

decades of incarceration are about to begin. 

N.T., Sentencing, 4/17/14 at 10-14. 

While it is clear that the trial court noted the seriousness of the crime, 

Skundrich’s criminal history, and the impact on the victim in fashioning a 

sentence, this is far from definitive proof that the court relied exclusively 
J-S20001-16

- 14 -

upon such findings in imposing sentence. In fact, we note that the court 

remarked that it considered Skundrich’s rehabilitative needs and the 

protection of the public in fashioning a sentence. Similarily, it is clear that 

the court did not rely upon one reason for the departure from the sentencing 

guidelines, but rather relied upon the seriousness of the crime, Skundrich’s 

low probability of rehabilitation, Skundrich’s criminal history, and the impact 

upon the victim and the community. These factors are permissible reasons 

for deviating from the guideline ranges. See Eby, 784 A.2d at 206. 

Therefore, we find that Skundrich’s final challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence merits no relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2016