In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3508

Robin Hoffmann,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRIMEDIA Special Interest Publications, f/k/a

PJS Publications, Inc., a Foreign

Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division.

No. 98 C 1077--Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

Argued April 13, 2000--Decided June 21, 2000

 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Flaum, and Diane

P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Robin

Hoffmann sued Primedia Special Interest

Publications ("Primedia") under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),

29 U.S.C. sec. 621 et seq. The district

court granted the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment and denied the

plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend that

judgment. For the reasons stated herein,

we affirm.

Background

 Hoffmann was a Circulation Marketing

Manager at Primedia, responsible for

developing strategies to meet Primedia’s

revenue and expense objectives and

forimproving performance of Primedia’s

circulation department. In July 1997,

Steven Elzy became President of Primedia,

with the objective of turning around the

poor performance of the company. On

August 22, 1997, Hoffmann was discharged

on the instruction of Elzy. She was 42

years old at the time of her discharge. 

 Hoffmann brought an action against

Primedia under the ADEA, alleging that

she had been discharged because of her

age. Primedia contended that Elzy let
Hoffmann go because of her negative

attitude, and Primedia filed a motion for

summary judgment claiming that Hoffmann

failed to establish a prima facie case of

age discrimination. Among other things,

Primedia pointed to the fact that

Hoffmann’s replacement was 39 years old--

only three years younger than Hoffmann.

 On July 20, 1999, the district court

granted Primedia’s motion for summary

judgment. The court found insufficient

Hoffmann’s direct evidence of age

discrimination. It then went on to reject

Hoffmann’s attempt to shift the burden to

Primedia under a McDonnell Douglas

analysis, finding that Hoffmann failed to

make out a prima facie case because

Hoffmann was not replaced by someone

significantly younger. Hoffmann filed a

Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment, which the district court

denied. Hoffmann now appeals.

Discussion

 The ADEA prohibits an employer from,

among other things, discharging an

employee over 40 years old because of

that individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. sec.sec.

623(a), 631(a). Rather than pressing a

claim based on direct evidence of

agediscrimination, at this stage Hoffmann

relies on the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting method of proof. See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 2000

WL 743663, at *9 (U.S. June 12, 2000).

Under this method, to establish a prima

facie case of age discrimination under

the ADEA and thereby shift the burden to

the defendant to put forth a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment

action, Hoffman must show that: (1) she

was in the protected age group of persons

40 or older; (2) she was performing her

job satisfactorily; (3) she was

discharged; and (4) substantially younger

employees were treated more favorably.

See Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d

723, 728 (7th Cir. 1999); Hartley v.

Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 892

(7th Cir. 1997). The district court found

that Hoffmann did not meet the fourth

requirement.

 In contexts such as this, where a single

employee is let go and another individual

is hired instead, the fourth requirement

means showing that the discharged worker

was replaced with someone substantially
younger. See Richter v. Hook-SupeRx,

Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1998)

("a plaintiff must show that she was

replaced by someone ’substantially

younger,’ although not necessarily

outside the protected class") (citations

omitted). This rule stems from the simple

premise, articulated recently by the

Supreme Court, that "an inference [of age

discrimination] cannot be drawn from the

replacement of one worker with another

worker insignificantly younger." O’Connor

v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517

U.S. 308, 313 (1996). Contrary to the

assertions of Hoffmann’s counsel that

this rule has not been applied to

situations like Hoffmann’s, this Court

has specifically instructed that: 

In situations involving the simple

termination of a single employee,

normally the employee must establish that

the employer sought a younger replacement

for him. . . . [A]n employer who

discharges a protectedemployee and either

hires or retains younger employees "to

fill positions for which the older

employee was qualified" bears the burden

of explaining its actions. The younger

employees "need not be outside

theprotected class, i.e., under the age

of forty," but they should be

substantially--i.e., at least ten years--

younger than the terminated employee.

Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 313

(7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

 As this statement of the prima facie

burden for cases such as this makes

clear, "we consider a ten-year difference

in ages (between the plaintiff and her

replacement) to be presumptively

’substantial’ under O’Connor," Hartley,

124 F.3d at 893, and conversely consider

a difference of less than ten years

presumptively insubstantial. See id.

(holding that a six-to-seven year age

difference was insufficient); see also

Richter, 142 F.3d at 1029 (holding that

the seven-year age difference between a

52-year-old and 45-year-old replacement

was a presumptively insubstantial gap).

There may be situations where a

difference of less than ten years is

substantial, and we have also previously

made clear that "[i]n cases where the

disparity is less, the plaintiff still

may present a triable claim if she

directs the court to evidence that her
employer considered her age to be

significant." Hartley, 124 F.3d at 893.

Hoffmann, however, presents no such

evidence to overcome the presumption./1

 Based on the record in this case, the

three-year age difference between

Hoffmann and her replacement fails the

fourth requirement of a McDonnell Douglas

showing under the ADEA. We agree with the

district court that there is no evidence

from which a reasonable inference may be

drawn that age was the determinative

factor in the decision to let her go. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 2000 WL 743663, at *5 (U.S. June

12, 2000); Richter, 142 F.3d at 1027 ("To

succeed in an ADEA claim, a plaintiff

must establish that he would not have

received adverse treatment but for his

employer’s motive to discriminate on the

basis of his age."). Because Hoffmann has

failed to make out a prima facie case of

age discrimination, we need not proceed

further. See Cianci, 152 F.3d at 728.

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM

the decision of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

/1 Hoffmann argues that the district court failed to

give credence to "statistical evidence" she had

submitted to the district court in an attempt to

show that Primedia employees under the age of 40

were systematically treated better than those

over 40. In its order granting summary judgment

in favor of Primedia, the court stated that this

proffer was insufficient to create a disputed

issue of material fact because Hoffmann failed to

identify any baseline against which her figures

should be measured. Hoffmann subsequently filed

a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,

which the district court denied, concluding that

"there is absolutely no way that a reasonable

trier of fact could conclude that Hoffmann’s

’statistical evidence’ indicated intentional

discrimination on the part of Primedia." We agree

that not only do Hoffmann’s figures fail to raise

the inference that workers over 40 are

discriminated against at Primedia, but they fail

to overcome the contrary presumption--created by

the fact that her replacement was almost the same

age--that age had nothing to do with Primedia’s

actions.