* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 6, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 06-50061

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHUONG NGUYEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal From the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

SA-05-CR-503-FB

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Chuong Nguyen submits a Memorandum for Bail Pending

Trial from the district court’s order denying his Motion to Revoke

the Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order. On August 3, 2005, Nguyen

was indicted on one count of aiding and abetting money laundering,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1956(a)(1)(A). On August 4,

2005, a detention hearing was held before the magistrate judge.

The Government argued, and the magistrate agreed, that Nguyen poses

a serious flight risk and that there are no release conditions to

sufficiently address the risk of his nonappearance for trial. The
No. 06-50061

-2-

question of Nguyen’s detention was reopened on August 29, 2005 to

allow Nguyen to present additional evidence regarding his risk of

flight. Again, the magistrate judge denied bail and ordered

pretrial detention. Nguyen appealed to the district court, which

summarily affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. 

“When a district court acts on a motion to revoke or amend a

magistrate’s pretrial detention order, the district court acts de

novo and must make an independent determination of the proper

pretrial detention or conditions for release.” U.S. v. Rueben, 974

F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992). Absent an error of law, this Court

must apply a deferential standard of review and uphold a district

court order “if it is supported by the proceedings below.” See id.

at 586, citing United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir.

1987). “On appeal, the question becomes whether the evidence as

a whole supports the conclusions of the proceedings below.” Id.

Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, a defendant should be

released pre-trial on personal recognizance or upon the execution

of an unsecured appearance bond “unless the judicial officer

determines that such release will not reasonably assure the

appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of

any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). This is

to be determined by a detention hearing. § 3142(e). Detention can

be ordered only in a case that involves one of the six

circumstances listed in § 3142(f). See United States v. Byrd, 969

F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). “A serious risk that the person
No. 06-50061

-3-

will flee” is one of those six circumstances that warrants

detention if there are no release conditions that will reasonable

assure appearance of the defendant when required. § 3142(f)(2)(A).

In this case, the evidence as a whole supports the

magistrate’s finding that Nguyen posed a serious risk of flight.

The magistrate’s use of the term “unacceptable risk of flight” does

not indicate that the magistrate applied the wrong legal standard.

Furthermore, the Government carried its burden of showing that

there are no release conditions which would sufficiently address

the risk of Nguyen’s nonappearance. As such, the district court

did not err in denying Nguyen’s motion to revoke the magistrate

judge’s detention order. See United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243

(5th Cir. 1985). 

The appellant’s request for bail pending trial is DENIED.