RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3944-14T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.C.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF A.T.M.,

Minor.

______________________________________________

Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided June 1, 2017

Before Judges Yannotti, Fasciale and 

Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FN-07-0389-14.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Lora B. Glick, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3944-14T4

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Merav 

Lichtenstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Olivia Belfatto 

Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

T.C. appeals from an order of the Family Part dated April 29, 

2014, which found that she abused or neglected her minor child, 

A.T.M. We affirm.

T.C. is the biological mother of A.T.M., who was born on 

August 2, 2013. On January 6, 2014, the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (Division) conducted an emergency 

removal of the child because T.C. had been admitted to a hospital,

and N.M., who was thought to be the child's biological father,

could not be located. A.T.M. was found in the care of J.K., who 

was using an open oven and an electric fan to heat the apartment. 

On January 8, 2014, the Division filed a complaint in the 

Family Part against T.C. and N.M., seeking care, custody, and 

supervision of A.T.M., and applied to the court for temporary

relief. T.C. and N.M. appeared at the initial hearing and T.C. 

identified N.M. as the child's father; however, J.K. had informed

the Division that he believed he was the child's father. The court 

granted the Division's application. The court determined that the 
3 A-3944-14T4

child could not remain in a home that lacked heat. The court found 

that T.C. did not have appropriate housing, and T.C. had mental 

health issues. The court ordered T.C. to show cause why the child 

should not remain in the Division's care, custody, and supervision.

Thereafter, the Division amended its complaint and added J.K. as 

a defendant.

On February 24, 2014, the return date of the order to show 

cause, the Division presented the court with T.C.'s psychiatric 

evaluation, which recommended medication and individual therapy. 

The Division had referred T.C. for mental health services, but she 

did not attend the services consistently and had been discharged 

from the program. The Division also had scheduled T.C. for 

parenting skills classes and anger management therapy. The court

ordered that A.T.M. would remain in the Division's care, custody,

and supervision. The court also ordered T.C. to attend mental 

health services. 

On April 29, 2014, the court entered an order dismissing the 

complaint as to N.M., because paternity tests ruled him out as the 

child's biological father. On that date, the court also conducted 

a fact-finding hearing in the matter. T.C. did not attend. 

At the hearing, the Division's caseworker testified that she 

spoke with T.C. at the hospital after A.T.M. was born. T.C. said 

she, N.M., and A.T.M. were going to reside with N.M.'s brother in 
4 A-3944-14T4

his one-bedroom apartment in Irvington. T.C. denied that she used 

controlled substances or had any mental health issues or learning 

disabilities. She claimed she had recovered from a period of 

depression following her mother's death. 

The Division conducted a background check and determined that 

T.C. was receiving $741 per month in social security benefits, of 

which $250 went towards rent. On August 5, 2013, a Division worker 

visited the apartment and determined that T.C. and N.M. could 

appropriately care for the child. T.C. agreed to participate in a 

psychological evaluation and expressed an interest in receiving 

counseling. 

T.C., N.M., and A.T.M. remained in the Irvington apartment 

for about one month, when N.M.'s brother locked them out. T.C. 

claimed that she gave rent money to N.M., but he never gave the 

money to his brother. T.C., N.M., and A.T.M. moved in with one of 

N.M.'s other relatives in an apartment in East Orange. In October 

2013, a Division worker informed T.C. she could not remain with 

the child in that apartment during the winter, because it did not 

have functioning heat. The worker also told T.C. she could not use 

an electric heating fan to heat the apartment.

T.C., N.M., and A.T.M. then moved into an apartment with 

T.C.'s brother in Newark, but T.C.'s brother told them to leave 

because T.C. refused to contribute $200 toward the rent. In early 
5 A-3944-14T4

December 2013, T.C., N.M., and A.T.M. moved in with N.M.'s mother; 

however, they could not remain there. N.M.'s mother was living in 

senior citizen housing, and she was only permitted to have N.M. 

and T.C.'s other two children stay there with her.

T.C., N.M., and A.T.M. relocated to another relative's home 

in Newark. The relative told them to leave because they would not 

contribute to the rent. Thereafter, N.M. went to live with a 

brother in Pennsylvania, and T.C. and A.T.M. moved in with J.K., 

her new boyfriend. It appears that T.C. had been dating J.K. about 

three months. 

In December 2013, the Division's worker met with T.C. and 

told her that she should contact the welfare department for housing 

assistance. T.C. signed a family plan, in which she agreed to take 

A.T.M. to a pediatrician, attend scheduled appointments at the 

Family Services Bureau (FSB), and explore all housing options. The 

worker told T.C. that A.T.M. would be removed from her care if she 

became homeless. T.C. did not attend the scheduled appointments

at the FSB. 

On January 5, 2014, T.C. was transported by ambulance to a 

hospital, after she complained of chest pains. Persons at the

hospital contacted the Division, and the Division's workers met 

with T.C. to inquire about A.T.M. Initially, T.C. said she left 

the child with a family friend, specifically, J.K. She claimed the 
6 A-3944-14T4

child was at a location on Avon Avenue in Newark. T.C. later said 

she, J.K., and A.T.M. had been living at that location. 

The workers were unable to find a residence at the address 

T.C. had provided. They contacted the hospital and learned of 

another address on Jeliff Avenue in Newark. The workers went to 

the house at that address; however, it appeared to be abandoned. 

The workers called T.C.'s relatives and other persons, but no one 

knew where A.T.M. could be located. 

On January 6, 2014, the Division's workers went to the Jeliff 

Avenue address. At first, the workers were unable to gain access, 

but thereafter spoke to T.C.'s friend, who said that T.C. had been 

living at that address with her new boyfriend. The workers returned 

with officers from the Department of Human Services. They were 

admitted to the residence, and J.K. met them at the door to the 

apartment. 

One of the workers found A.T.M. sitting unstrapped in a car 

seat on the sofa. The child was dressed in dirty clothes and 

appeared disheveled. The worker noticed that J.K. was using an

open oven and an electric fan to heat the apartment. She explained 

to J.K. that it was dangerous to heat the apartment in that manner

due to the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning. The worker also told 

J.K. the Division would have to remove the child because she could 

not remain in an apartment without functioning heat. 
7 A-3944-14T4

J.K. told the worker that he, T.C., and the child slept 

together in a twin bed, and one of the workers said the child 

required a bassinette or crib. J.K. stated he did not know what 

happened to A.T.M.'s bassinette. A worker asked J.K. about the 

child's food, and J.K. showed her a half-full can of baby formula. 

The workers determined that the child had to be removed on an 

emergency basis. 

T.C. and the Law Guardian did not offer evidence or present 

any witnesses at the hearing. The court placed an oral decision 

on the record, finding that T.C. had abused or neglected A.T.M. 

The court noted that T.C. had resided in several different homes, 

and she and the child eventually moved into an apartment that was 

being heated by an open oven and an electric fan, even though the 

Division's worker previously told her she could not have the child 

in a home without functioning heat during the winter.

The court noted that while T.C. was in the hospital, she had 

initially been evasive about the child's location, because she 

knew the Division would not find the residence to be acceptable 

for a child. The court also stated that T.C.'s decision to leave 

A.T.M. with J.K. was troubling, because he was a person she had 

only recently met. The court found that A.T.M. could have been 

left with other relatives or friends, but T.C. decided to leave 

the child with J.K. in an unsuitable residence. 
8 A-3944-14T4

The court concluded that considering the totality of 

circumstances, T.C. had abused or neglected A.T.M. by placing the 

child at substantial risk of harm. The court cited the use of an

open oven as a source of heat; sleeping with the child and J.K. 

on a twin bed; dressing the child in unclean clothes; leaving the 

child with J.K.; failing to secure suitable housing; moving in 

with various relatives and friends until she was told to leave 

because she did not contribute toward the rent; and failing to 

maintain her welfare and social security benefits. 

The court entered an order dated April 29, 2014, which stated

that T.C. abused or neglected A.T.M. On January 5, 2015, the court 

approved the Division's permanency plan, which called for the 

termination of T.C.'s parental rights and the child's adoption. 

The court entered an order on January 14, 2015, which dismissed 

the complaint as to J.K. because paternity tests showed he was not 

the child's biological father. On March 16, 2015, the court 

dismissed this action, after the Division filed its guardianship 

complaint. This appeal followed.

On appeal, T.C. argues that the trial court erred because it 

based its findings of abuse or neglect entirely upon her poverty. 

She contends that a parent or caretaker's poverty cannot support 

a finding of abuse or neglect, and the court erred by relying upon 

what she says were mischaracterizations of the record by the 
9 A-3944-14T4

Division's attorney. She also argues that the court erred by 

failing to convert the matter to a Title 30 action because this 

case did not involve abuse or neglect.

The scope of our review in an appeal from an order entered 

by the Family Part in an abuse or neglect matter is limited. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 112 (2011). 

We must uphold "factual findings undergirding the trial court's 

decision if they are supported by 'adequate, substantial and 

credible evidence' on the record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting In re 

Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).

An "abused or neglected child," is defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4), as a child who is less than eighteen years of age and

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition 

has been impaired or is in imminent danger 

of becoming impaired as the result of the 

failure of his parent or guardian . . . to 

exercise a minimum degree of care (a) in 

supplying the child with adequate food, 

clothing, shelter, education, medical or 

surgical care though financially able to do 

so or though offered financial or other 

reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing 

the child with proper supervision or 

guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or 

allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial 

risk thereof[;] . . . or by any other acts 

of a similarly serious nature requiring the 

aid of the court[.]
10 A-3944-14T4

"'Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care' in protecting a child is determined on a 

case-by-case basis and 'analyzed in light of the dangers and risks 

associated with the situation.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 614 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting G.S. 

v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 181-82 (1999)). "'[M]inimum 

degree of care' refers to conduct that is grossly or wantonly 

negligent, but not necessarily intentional." G.S., supra, 157 N.J.

at 178. 

This standard "implies that a person has acted with reckless 

disregard for the safety of others." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. S.I., 437 N.J. Super. 142, 153 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting 

G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 179). Moreover, a parent may be found to 

have abused or neglected a child when the parent creates a 

substantial risk of harm, since a court "need not wait until a 

child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or 

neglect." In the Matter of the Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J.

365, 383 (1999).

Here, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the 

trial court's finding that T.C. abused or neglected A.T.M. by 

failing to provide the child with the minimum degree of care. As 

the record shows, A.T.M.'s physical, mental, or emotional 

condition was in imminent danger of becoming impaired because T.C. 
11 A-3944-14T4

did not provide the child with a safe and stable home. At the time 

of the child's removal, T.C. was living with the child in an 

apartment that was being heated with an open oven and an electric 

fan. T.C. had previously been told the child could not be kept in 

an apartment without functioning heat in the winter months.

Moreover, A.T.M. did not have adequate sleeping arrangements, 

lacked clean clothing, and appeared to lack sufficient food. 

T.C. argues that the court's finding that she abused or 

neglected A.T.M. should be reversed because she was not financially 

capable of providing the child with a safe and stable home. She 

contends that the court erred by finding that she abused or 

neglected the child due to poor choices. She contends her temporary 

housing arrangements were driven solely by poverty. These 

arguments are without merit. 

The record shows that at various times, T.C. had been 

receiving food stamps, welfare payments, and social security 

benefits. At times, T.C. was forced to leave homes where she was

staying because she failed to contribute to the rent even though 

she was then receiving social security benefits. The record also 

shows that the Division instructed T.C. to explore all options for 

housing assistance, and she signed a family agreement, in which 

she committed to doing so. T.C. did not take the necessary steps 
12 A-3944-14T4

to obtain such assistance. Eventually, T.C. elected to move in 

with J.K., in a residence that was clearly unsafe. 

In support of her appeal, T.C. relies upon New Jersey Division

of Child Protection and Permanency v. L.W., 435 N.J. Super. 189 

(App. Div. 2014). In that case, the trial court found that the 

parent neglected her two young children by failing to provide them 

with housing. Id. at 191. The parent moved with her fiancé to 

Georgia, after a fire destroyed her New Jersey housing. Id. at 

193. The family returned to New Jersey after a death in the 

fiancé's family, but did not have funds to return to Georgia. 

Ibid.

They lived for a while with a relative, and moved to a 

shelter, but were forced to leave. Ibid. The parent did not 

qualify for welfare benefits, and was not eligible for housing 

assistance. Ibid. Eventually, the parent brought her children to 

the Division's office, so they would not become homeless. Ibid. 

The trial court determined that the parent's lack of housing was 

due to "unbelievably poor planning." Ibid. 

We reversed the trial court's finding of neglect. Id. at 197. 

We noted that "poverty alone is not a basis for a finding of abuse 

or neglect." Id. at 195 (citation omitted). We observed that the 

parent's "poor planning" was "in part a side-effect of poverty."

Id. at 196. We concluded that the evidence did not support the 
13 A-3944-14T4

trial court's decision because the parent sought housing 

assistance and employment "to no avail." Ibid. We noted that the

parent's fiancé could not provide housing, and the parent 

ultimately did "the responsible thing" by seeking assistance from 

the Division. Ibid. 

We are convinced that T.C.'s reliance upon L.W. is misplaced. 

The record does not support T.C.'s contention that the trial 

court's finding that she abused or neglected A.T.M. was based on 

poverty alone. Rather, in this case, the court found that, although 

T.C. had the ability and resources to secure appropriate housing, 

she elected instead to reside in an apartment that was being heated 

in the winter months by an open oven and an electric fan. The 

record supports the trial court's finding that, by doing so, T.C. 

placed the child at substantial risk of harm.

T.C. also argues that the court's decision lacked details and 

was confusing. She asserts that the decision does not accurately 

reflect the Division's testimony and evidence. She contends that, 

in making its decision, the court relied upon "inflammatory 

misstatements of the evidence" by the Division's attorney. These 

arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). As stated previously, the court's decision is 

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
14 A-3944-14T4

T.C. further argues that the trial court should have converted 

this case to an action under Title 30, because there was no 

evidence that she abused or neglected the child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C12 permits the Division to seek care, custody, and supervision of 

a child without a finding of abuse or neglect, if the court 

determines that such an order would be in the child's best 

interests. 

In this matter, the Division's complaint sought relief under 

both N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. After completing its 

investigation, the Division sought a finding of abuse or neglect. 

The trial court properly found that, in light of the evidence 

presented, the Division had established by a preponderance of the 

evidence that T.C. had abused or neglected the child. Under the 

circumstances, the court did not err by refusing to convert the 

matter to an action under Title 30. 

Affirmed.