IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 8, 2015

QUENTIN ELLIOTT LAWRENCE v. JESSICA MARCEL BROADNAX

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County

No. 110698 Hon. W. Neil Thomas, III, Judge

No. E2015-00214-COA-R3-CV-FILED-JULY 31, 2015

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother‟s notice of intent to relocate with the 

parties‟ minor child. The father responded by filing a petition in opposition to the 

requested relocation. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the father‟s petition.

The mother appeals. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further 

proceedings regarding the best interest of the minor child.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Reversed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Charles G. Wright, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jessica Marcel 

Broadnax.

Jillyn O‟Shaughnessy, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Quentin Elliott 

Lawrence.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Jessica Marcel Broadnax (“Mother”) and Quentin Elliott Lawrence (“Father”) 

were married in December 2004. One child (“the Child”) was born of the marriage in 

August 2009. Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) were divorced by final decree 

in April 2012. The divorce decree incorporated a parenting plan in which Mother was 

designated as the primary residential parent of the Child, while Father was awarded 104

days of co-parenting time. 
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On October 14, 2014, Mother provided Father with a notice of intent to relocate to 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, citing a possible employment opportunity as the reason for 

the relocation. She later amended her notice to include Trenton, New Jersey, as another 

possible place of relocation due to a different employment opportunity. Father responded 

by filing a petition in opposition to the requested relocation, asserting that the relocation 

was not in the Child‟s best interest when his extended family lived in Chattanooga. He 

asserted that Mother‟s work history was unstable and claimed that he feared for the 

Child‟s safety if the relocation were approved. Mother responded by asserting that her 

proposed relocation was in the best interest of the Child given the employment 

opportunity. She also noted that she had family outside of the Chattanooga area. Father 

filed an amended petition in which he asserted that the proposed relocation was not for a 

reasonable purpose, was proposed in a vindictive manner, and would cause irreparable 

harm to the Child. He stated that the Child relied upon him and his family in the area for 

emotional support, nurturing, and development. He claimed that the relocation was also 

not in the Child‟s best interest. He filed a proposed parenting plan, requesting his 

designation as the primary residential parent. Mother denied Father‟s allegations and 

filed a proposed parenting plan that provided him with 100 days of co-parenting time. 

At the trial, held on December 16, 2014, Mother testified that she has lived in 

Chattanooga, Tennessee, since the time of the divorce in April 2012. She related that she 

allowed Father to exercise co-parenting time at his convenience because he lived in 

Georgia at the time of the divorce. She acknowledged that Father‟s co-parenting time

increased when he relocated to Chattanooga. She currently allows him to exercise coparenting time every other weekend from Friday night to Monday morning. She claimed 

that Father failed to maintain health insurance for the Child as agreed. 

Mother testified that she obtained an undergraduate degree from Austin Peay State 

University and a master‟s degree in education from the University of Texas, Arlington. 

She provided a brief employment history, starting with her employment as a family 

literacy coordinator for the Dallas Independent School District in Dallas, Texas, with an 

annual salary of approximately $45,000. Following the divorce in April 2012 and her 

move to Chattanooga, Tennessee, she worked as a financial counselor with an annual 

salary of approximately $50,000. She later worked for the Chattanooga Girls Leadership 

Academy as a special education teacher with an annual salary of approximately $43,000, 

then for the City of Chattanooga with their online literacy program with a salary of 

approximately $20 per hour, and then for the Chattanooga Public Library with an annual 

salary of approximately $50,000. 

Mother testified that she immediately began searching for new employment when 

her employment with the library ended in August 2014. She initially looked for 

employment in Tennessee and Georgia in the area of education. She submitted five or six 
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applications but was not granted an interview for any of the positions. She broadened her 

employment search to include New Jersey, Philadelphia, and New York after her efforts 

were unsuccessful in Tennessee and Georgia. She sent approximately 40 applications for 

positions with an annual salary of $55,000 or more. She later received two invitations for 

an interview, one in Philadelphia and one in New Jersey with Scholar Academies, which 

operated schools in Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Trenton, New Jersey. She did 

not receive an offer from the employer in Philadelphia, but she was still in contact with 

Scholar Academies for a teaching position with an approximate annual salary of $55,000 

or more in Trenton, New Jersey. 

Mother testified that she would provide Father with co-parenting time in 

accordance with the Child‟s school schedule if her proposed relocation were approved. 

She noted that they could easily exchange the Child in North Carolina. She had enrolled 

the Child in Faith Christian School because she was unfamiliar with the school lottery 

system in New Jersey. She planned to revisit his school placement once she had time to 

research the school systems. 

Mother admitted that she only pursued employment opportunities in Tennessee 

that provided an annual salary of $50,000 or more. She abandoned her search because 

she believed she could not obtain her desired salary in the Chattanooga area. She agreed

that the cost of living was higher in New Jersey than in Chattanooga. She stated that a 

comparable rental residence would cost $1,000 per month as opposed to her current rent 

of $725 per month. She acknowledged that the Child currently attended school for free. 

She estimated that his tuition in New Jersey would cost in excess of $500 per month. 

Mother admitted that the majority of her family and Father‟s family lived in 

Chattanooga. Relative to other family members, the following colloquy occurred: 

Q. And let me ask you about that. You don‟t include any reasons such 

as family in your letters for your move to Trenton, New Jersey or 

Philadelphia. 

A. I have family surrounding New Jersey.

Q. You don‟t include that in your letters?

A. I don‟t need to.

Q. I‟m asking you a question. Did you include that you have family in 

the surrounding areas of Trenton, New Jersey?
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A. It didn‟t require me to.

Q. So you did not include –

A. No.

Q. When is the last time you visited any of that family that‟s in 

surrounding New Jersey?

A. I went to New Jersey – I have family in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; I 

have family in Massachusetts; I have family in North Carolina. And it‟s 

irrelevant how often I visit my family. 

Q. Please answer the question. When is the last time –

A. I can‟t recall.

Q. Have you visited them since [the Child] was born?

A. I can‟t recall. 

Mother admitted that the Child enjoyed a loving relationship with her family in 

Chattanooga and that he visited with them on a weekly basis. 

Father testified that he moved to Chattanooga a few years after the divorce to be 

closer to the Child and his extended family, including his mother, grandmother, sister, 

several aunts and uncles, and numerous cousins. He exercised co-parenting time every 

other weekend and often kept the Child until Monday morning instead of returning him 

on Sunday. He claimed to enjoy a loving relationship with the Child and characterized 

his co-parenting time with the Child as “very significant.” He asserted that the Child also 

enjoyed a great relationship with his extended family. 

Father testified that he was currently employed with an annual salary of 

approximately $45,000 per year. He claimed that he was able to provide for the Child‟s 

needs. He regularly provided clothing for the Child, and he and his family assisted 

Mother on a regular basis in caring for the Child when she was unable. He opined that 

the Child often stayed with Mother‟s family or his family. He noted that the Child wore 

clothing that was often too little and soiled while in Mother‟s care. He claimed that the 

Child‟s hair was also disheveled and unbrushed. He asserted that he regularly remitted 

payment for the Child‟s medical expenses and that he maintained an insurance policy for 
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the Child. He agreed that his insurance policy changed from time to time but claimed 

that he always provided Mother with current proof of his insurance. 

Father testified that his relationship with Mother was “very strained, very tense.” 

He had very little interaction with her when exchanging the Child, and at times, she was 

“belligerent” and uncooperative when they interacted. He stated that Mother refused to 

communicate with him regarding the Child‟s educational and medical needs and that he 

often learned the Child was sick after the Child had already received treatment. He 

recalled taking the Child to the emergency room on one occasion after he retrieved the 

Child from Mother. He claimed that he heard Mother physically abuse the Child on one 

occasion and that he learned that she had spanked the Child on another occasion for 

talking about her to Father. 

Father was concerned about Mother‟s proposed relocation because she had trouble 

maintaining employment for an extended period of time. He questioned the availability 

of family support when she had never mentioned the presence of any family in that area 

prior to her decision to relocate. He feared that the relocation would disrupt the Child‟s 

school relationships and those significant relationships already established with family, of 

both Mother and Father in Chattanooga. 

Father feared that Mother would not encourage the Child to maintain a healthy 

relationship with him. He agreed that he often exercised co-parenting time beyond that 

which was required by the parenting plan but provided that her newly proposed parenting 

plan did not provide for the same amount of co-parenting time. He noted that exercising 

additional co-parenting time would be costly if she relocated. He claimed that she often 

interfered with his telephone conversations with the Child and that she refused his right to 

co-parenting time on at least two occasions. 

Father acknowledged that Mother sought to obtain an order of protection against 

him and that he was arrested as a result of her allegations. He noted that he served less 

than 24 hours in jail and that he was never charged with an offense. 

Father testified concerning numerous job postings in the area in Mother‟s field of 

employment. He noted that he found the postings in less than 30 minutes. 

The paternal grandmother, Marsh Ella Lawrence, testified that she observed a 

loving relationship between the Child and Father. She provided that she visits with the 

Child when Father exercises co-parenting time. She explained that her side of the family 

meets every Sunday to visit. She related that Mother also asked her to care for the Child 

on occasion. She acknowledged that the relationship between Mother and Father was 

estranged but asserted that she never heard Father speak poorly of Mother. She agreed 
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that the Child often appeared “scruffy” when retrieved from daycare after being in 

Mother‟s care during the week. 

The maternal grandmother, Sarah Broadnax, testified that her side of the family 

also gathers together on Sundays to visit and that she spends time with the Child on a 

weekly basis. She provided that Parents often exchange the Child at her residence. She 

stated that she observed a loving relationship between the Child and Mother and between 

the Child and Father. She recalled only one occasion in which Father was asked to leave 

her residence following the exchange of the Child. She related that she never observed 

either parent physically abusing the Child. She testified that she was excited for 

Mother‟s job opportunity and believed that it was in the Child‟s best interest to remain 

with Mother. 

Shortly after the trial, Mother presented an affidavit with supportive 

documentation establishing that she had been offered a teaching position in Trenton, New 

Jersey, with an annual salary of $60,000. The court considered the evidence over 

Father‟s objection but then ultimately granted Father‟s petition, finding that the proposed

relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. This timely appeal followed.

II. ISSUES

The parties raised a plethora of issues that we consolidate as follows: 

A. Whether the trial court erred in considering evidence of Mother‟s job 

offer after the close of the proof.

B. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Mother‟s stated purpose 

for relocating was unreasonable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 36-6-108(d)(1)(A). 

C. Whether the trial court erred in granting the petition in opposition to 

the proposed relocation without conducting a best interest analysis pursuant 

to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(e). 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded a presumption of 

correctness and will not be overturned unless the evidence preponderates against them. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court‟s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo 

review with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 

(Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo with no presumption of 

correctness; however, appellate courts have “great latitude to determine whether findings 

as to mixed questions of fact and law made by the trial court are sustained by probative 

evidence on appeal.” Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995). “„Because 

[c]ustody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle factors, including the 

parents‟ demeanor and credibility during . . . proceedings,” appellate courts “are reluctant 

to second-guess a trial court‟s decision.‟” Hyde v. Bradley, No. M2009-02117-COA-R3-

JV, 2010 WL 4024905, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010) (quoting Johnson v. 

Johnson, 169 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

Father argues that the trial court erred in considering evidence of Mother‟s job 

offer after the close of the proof. He notes that he did not have the opportunity to crossexamine Mother concerning the job offer and that some of the documents submitted to 

establish her offer were inadmissible hearsay documents. 

Rulings on admissibility of evidence are within a trial court‟s discretion, and an 

appellate court will set aside such decisions “when the trial court has misconstrued or 

misapplied the controlling legal principles or has acted inconsistently with the substantial 

weight of evidence.” White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 222-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1999). Likewise, “[p]ermitting additional proof, after a party has announced that proof is 

closed, is within the discretion of the trial court.” Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit 

Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tenn. 1991) (citing State v. Bell, 690 S.W.2d 879, 882 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)). “[U]nless it appears that its action in that regard has permitted 

injustice, its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.” Id. 

We agree that the supportive documentation offered by Mother was inadmissible 

as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 

801(c). However, she also attested in her affidavit that she had accepted an offer of 

employment in Trenton, New Jersey. This statement was admissible. Moreover, the 
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central issue of the case concerned whether the proposed relocation was for a reasonable 

purpose, namely Mother‟s anticipated employment in New Jersey. Father knew that 

Mother was awaiting notice of the outcome of her interview and diligently submitted 

proof in opposition to her proposed relocation if she were to receive a job offer. With 

these considerations in mind, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in considering the fact that Mother had accepted an offer of employment in New Jersey

as she attested in her affidavit. 

B.

The parental relocation statute, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

6-108 governs this action. The statute creates a mechanism for determining whether a

parent may relocate outside the state or more than 100 miles from the other parent within 

Tennessee. Parents agreed that they were not spending substantially equal intervals of 

time with the Child; thus, the issue at trial was whether Mother should be permitted to 

relocate with the Child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(d)(1), 

which provides:

(d)(1) If the parents are not actually spending substantially equal intervals 

of time with the child and the parent spending the greater amount of time 

with the child proposes to relocate with the child, the other parent may, 

within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice, file a petition in opposition 

to removal of the child. The other parent may not attempt to relocate with 

the child unless expressly authorized to do so by the court pursuant to a 

change of custody or primary custodial responsibility. The parent spending 

the greater amount of time with the child shall be permitted to relocate with 

the child unless the court finds:

(A) The relocation does not have a reasonable purpose;

(B) The relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious 

harm to the child that outweighs the threat of harm to the 

child of a change of custody; or

(C) The parent‟s motive for relocating with the child is 

vindictive in that it is intended to defeat or deter visitation 

rights of the non-custodial parent or the parent spending less 

time with the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1). The parent opposing the relocation bears the burden 

of proof to establish one of these three grounds. Clark v. Clark, No. M2002-03071-
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COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094000, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2003). The relocation 

shall be permitted if the opposing parent fails to prove any of the three grounds. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1). If the court finds one of the grounds to be present, then “the 

court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based on the best 

interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(e). 

In this case, the trial court based its determination on whether the proposed 

relocation was for a reasonable purpose. In finding that the proposed relocation was not 

for a reasonable purpose, the court first cited the relevant statutory provisions and then 

stated, 

In this case, there is no evidence to show that the motive for relocation is 

intended to defeat or deter visitation rights, and the six subsections of 

section (2) with respect to serious and specific harm to the child are not 

implicated. Thus, the issue is whether relocation is reasonable. 

The most contested issue with respect to reasonableness is the job 

opportunity of [Mother]. Although [Mother] made initial requests for 

employment with the State of Tennessee and local governments, she made 

no efforts to obtain employment in the area for jobs paying $40,000 or less. 

One job for which application was made outside the geographic area of 

Chattanooga was to Scholar Academies whose headquarters are located in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Although the offer does not indicate it is for 

employment in Trenton, New Jersey, testimony of the [Mother] is that 

Trenton is the location. The offer was for a “10-month Position,” and it did 

not indicate that there would be any possibility of renewal. Although, as 

indicated above, [Mother] testified that she has family in the area (New 

York and Washington, D.C.), she was noncommittal as to whether she has 

ever visited them. On the other hand, there is evidence that the family of 

both the mother and the father live in the geographic area of Chattanooga 

and that the grandparents spend significant amounts of time with their 

grandson. 

[Mother] testified that [the Child] would be placed in a private school for 

six months in Trenton in order to give [her] an opportunity to investigate 

the public school system of Trenton. Thus, no definite decision has been 

made with respect to his education in order to guide the Court. Under the 

circumstances, therefore, there is simply too much uncertainty associated 

with [Mother‟s] proposed move, and the Court cannot conclude that there is 

a reasonable basis for [the] move to Trenton, New Jersey. 
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Mother first questions the court‟s phrasing of the issue as whether the proposed 

relocation was reasonable. She notes that the pertinent issue at trial was whether the 

proposed relocation was for a reasonable purpose, not whether it was reasonable in 

general. A review of the order reveals that the court cited the relevant statutory 

provisions before determining that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(d)(1)(A) 

was the only ground at issue. The court then determined that the proposed relocation was 

not for a reasonable purpose. This argument is without merit. 

Next, Mother notes that the court erroneously stated that she had family in New 

York and Washington, D.C., when she testified that she had family in Pennsylvania, 

Massachusetts, and North Carolina. We agree that the trial court misstated her testimony; 

however, this misstatement had no bearing on the ultimate ruling when Mother never 

submitted proximity to family as a reason supporting her proposed relocation. This 

argument is without merit. 

Finally, Mother argues that her proposed relocation was for a reasonable purpose 

as evidenced by two factors, namely an increase in pay and the opportunity for career 

advancement. She claims that any argument concerning the increased cost of living for 

her proposed relocation is offset by the fact that she did not have any job prospects in 

Chattanooga and the fact that her potential employment provides an increased earning 

potential that is unavailable in Tennessee. Father argues that the relocation was 

unreasonable when Mother did not perform an adequate search for employment 

opportunities in Tennessee and when the cost of living and lack of family support in New 

Jersey offset any increased earning potential. 

“[D]eterminations concerning whether a proposed move has a reasonable purpose 

are fact-intensive and require a thorough examination of the unique circumstances of 

each case.” In re Spencer E., No. M2009-02572-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 295896, at *11 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011) (citation omitted). “[A]n increase in pay is but one of 

several economic factors that should be considered. Other relevant economic factors that 

are typically considered include, without limitation, the relative significance of the 

increase, the cost of living in the proposed location compared to the present location, the 

firmness of the job offer, opportunity for career advancement and economic betterment of 

the family unit.” Slaton v. Ray, No. M2004-01809-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2756076, at 

* 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2005) (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. M2004-00849-COAR3-CV, 2005 WL 1521850, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2005)); O’Bannon v. 

O’Bannon, No. E2002-02553-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22734673, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Nov. 20, 2003)). Additionally, “the „reasonable purpose‟ of the proposed relocation must 

be a significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the 

non-custodial parent‟s ability „to participate fully in their children‟s lives in a more 

meaningful way.‟” Webster v. Webster, No. W2005-01288-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 
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3008019, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006) (quoting Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 

623, 631 (Tenn. 1996)). 

Mother cited Goddard v. Goddard, No. E2011-00777-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 

601183, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012) and Butler v. Butler, No. M2002-00347-

COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 367241, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2003) in support of her 

position. In Goddard, this court upheld the trial court‟s ruling that the mother‟s proposed 

relocation had a reasonable purpose because it was based upon a number of factors, 

including her “financial condition, employment situation, family support and desire to 

relocate to Florida.” 2012 WL 601183, at *8. In Butler, this court upheld the trial court‟s 

ruling that the mother‟s proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose when she 

offered nothing “except a belief and a hope that she can secure better employment.” 

2003 WL 367241, at *4. The court noted that “relocation because of a better job 

opportunity, greater salary, and career advancement opportunities, establishes a 

„reasonable purpose‟ within the meaning of the statute” but that the proof offered did not 

“sustain the allegations of such increased salary and increased opportunities.” Id. at *2. 

Here, Mother did not claim that she was unable to pursue any employment 

opportunities in Tennessee. She merely claimed that she could not obtain a comparable 

salary in Tennessee. She does not account for what she admitted at trial was an increased 

cost of living in New Jersey as evidenced by the tuition for the Child‟s schooling and 

increased rent. Her testimony concerning the opportunity for career advancement is also 

unsubstantiated and subjective when considered with the fact that she only submitted 

“five or six” applications in Tennessee and the fact that her employment history has been 

largely unstable as evidenced by her employment at four different institutions in the past 

four years. Additionally, the record reflects that the Child enjoyed a loving relationship 

with Father and his extended family in Tennessee. With all of the above considerations 

in mind, we affirm the trial court‟s determination that Mother‟s purpose for relocating 

was unreasonable when weighed against the Child‟s loss of Father‟s ability to participate 

fully in his life. 

C.

Mother argues that the trial court failed to conduct a best interest finding before 

granting Father‟s petition in opposition to her requested relocation. Father responds that 

the court implicitly found that the proposed relocation was not in the Child‟s best interest 

by granting his petition. 

Once the trial court determined that Mother‟s purpose for relocating was 

unreasonable, it was then tasked with determining whether the proposed relocation was in 
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the best interest of the Child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(e), 

which provides as follows:

If the court finds one (1) or more of the grounds designated in subsection 

(d), the court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the 

child based on the best interest of the child. If the court finds it is not in the 

best interests of the child to relocate as defined herein, but the parent with 

whom the child resides the majority of the time elects to relocate, the court 

shall consider all relevant factors including those factors found in § 36-6-

106(a)(1)-(15).

(Emphasis added). In determining whether a proposed relocation is in the best interest of 

the Child, the court must consider the following factors: 

(1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child‟s relationship with each 

parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of 

parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;

(2) Each parent‟s or caregiver‟s past and potential for future performance of 

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of 

the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing 

parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child‟s parents, 

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness 

of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and 

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the 

child‟s parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and 

caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and 

rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or 

any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court 

order;

(3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be 

considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;

(4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, 

medical care, education and other necessary care;

(5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as 

the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental 

responsibilities;
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(6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and 

the child;

(7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;

(8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it

relates to their ability to parent the child. The court may order an 

examination of a party under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure and, if necessary for the conduct of the proceedings, order the 

disclosure of confidential mental health information of a party under § 33-

3-105(3). The court order required by § 33-3-105(3) must contain a 

qualified protective order that limits the dissemination of confidential 

protected mental health information to the purpose of the litigation pending 

before the court and provides for the return or destruction of the 

confidential protected mental health information at the conclusion of the 

proceedings;

(9) The child‟s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other 

relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child‟s involvement 

with the child‟s physical surroundings, school, or other significant 

activities;

(10) The importance of continuity in the child‟s life and the length of time 

the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;

(11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other 

parent or to any other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any 

issues of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;

(12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or 

frequents the home of a parent and such person‟s interactions with the 

child;

(13) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or 

older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. 

The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight 

than those of younger children;

(14) Each parent‟s employment schedule, and the court may make 

accommodations consistent with those schedules; and
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(15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

We agree that trial courts need not articulate each factor and its application to the 

case at hand. However, the court must at least consider the factors to make a proper

decision regarding the Child. Our review of the court‟s order in this case reveals that the 

court failed to make a comprehensive best interest analysis. Accordingly, we remand the 

matter for consideration of the appropriate factors in compliance with Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-6-108(e). 

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We remand this case to the trial court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and in compliance with Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 36-6-108(e). Costs of the appeal are taxed one-half to the

appellant, Jessica Marcel Broadnax, and one-half to the appellee, Quentin Elliott 

Lawrence.

_________________________________ 

JOHN W. McCLARTY, JUDGE