1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Garrett D. Hall, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Summit Fire District, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-08189-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Plaintiff Garett D. Hall’s Motion to Exclude Opinions and Testimony 

of Dr. John Beck (Doc. 87, Mot.), to which Defendants Summit Fire District, Summit 

Fire District Board, Howard Nott, Jim Doskocil, Rick Parker, Bill Stoddard, and Don 

Howard filed a Response (Doc. 96, Resp.), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 97, Reply). 

The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs and finds this matter appropriate for decision 

without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for the 

reasons set forth below. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence tasks the trial court with ensuring that 

any expert testimony provided is relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The trial court must first 
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

assess whether the testimony is valid and whether the expert’s reasoning or methodology 

can properly be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. Factors to 

consider in this assessment include: whether the methodology can be tested; whether the 

methodology has been subjected to peer review; whether the methodology has a known 

or potential rate of error; and whether the methodology has been generally accepted 

within the relevant professional community. Id. at 593-94. “The inquiry envisioned by 

Rule 702” is “a flexible one.” Id. at 594. “The focus . . . must be solely on principles and 

methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id.

 The Daubert analysis is also applicable to testimony concerning non-scientific 

areas of specialized knowledge. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 

(1999). A qualified expert may testify in the form of opinion if the offered experiential 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand evidence or determine a fact in issue, 

as long as the testimony is based on sufficient data, is the product of reliable principles, 

and the expert has reliably applied the principles to the facts of the case. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. The advisory committee notes on the 2000 

amendments to Rule 702 explain that Rule 702 (as amended in response to Daubert) “is 

not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every 

expert.” See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 

appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 

(citation omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff moves to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert witness, Dr. John 

Beck, arguing that Dr. Beck’s testimony opinions are “unreliable” because they have no 

basis in fact or data and Dr. Beck’s testimony will not assist the trier of fact because he is 

not a qualified expert on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). (Mot. at 1-2.) 
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

A. Dr. Beck’s Qualifications to Offer Expert Testimony on PTSD and 

Reasonable Accommodations

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Beck is not qualified to provide expert testimony 

regarding reasonable accommodation because he lacks relevant professional experience. 

(See Mot. at 13-14.) Courts evaluating admissibility of “technical” or “specialized” 

knowledge determine first, whether the technical or specialized knowledge will assist the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue; and second, whether 

or not the proposed witness has the requisite qualifications in his area of expertise. United 

States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds 

recognized by United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 

702 contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications, approving qualification by 

“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 

42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 This case involves issues regarding Hall’s PTSD, whether it precludes his ability 

to work, reasonable accommodations available to him, and other related issues. (See

Doc. 23, 2d Am. Compl.) Plaintiff confuses “relevance” with “qualification” under the 

Daubert inquiry. (See Mot. at 13.) Defendants properly contend that Dr. Beck’s expert 

testimony will help explain to the jury the nature of Hall’s PTSD condition, its impact on 

Hall’s work as a firefighter, his treatment, and whether any reasonable accommodation is 

available to him. (Resp. at 6-7.) The Court agrees that Dr. Beck’s offered opinions are 

relevant because they present specialized knowledge regarding Hall’s claims. See 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 

 With regard to his qualifications, Dr. Beck is a board certified psychologist with 

over 30 years of experience. (Resp. Ex. 2, Beck Curriculum Vitae (“CV”) at 4-5.) He has 

treated hundreds of PTSD patients, including evaluations of police officers and veterans. 

(Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 56:22-57:9, 59:5-16.) Dr. Beck also has 16 years of experience 

as a human resources director, providing reasonable accommodation recommendations 

and receiving feedback from employees. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 150:8-151:13, 169:19-
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

170:1.) Dr. Beck’s education, knowledge, and experience are well established by the 

record and demonstrate his qualifications to provide expert testimony regarding the 

viability of reasonable accommodations and its effect on Hall and other employees. 

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Beck’s primary specialty in mild traumatic brain injury, 

his insufficient work experience with public safety officials with PTSD, and his 

unfamiliarity with experts in the field of PTSD demonstrate a lack of qualification to 

testify in this matter. (Mot. at 14-15.) However, Dr. Beck has performed psychiatric 

fitness-for-duty evaluations of police officers and evaluated veterans for PTSD. (Resp. 

Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 39:18-42:13, 174:7-11.) Also, his secondary area of expertise in PTSD 

has allowed him to provide expert testimony for the past five years for PTSD-related 

issues. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 16:14-17:1.) Therefore, Dr. Beck has the qualifications to 

provide testimony regarding reasonable accommodations and PTSD. 

 B. Sufficiency of the Facts and Data Dr. Beck Relied On 

 Plaintiff next argues Dr. Beck fails to demonstrate proper methodology and data to 

support his conclusions about the availability of reasonable accommodations, thus failing 

the reliability prong of Daubert. (Mot. at 6, 11.) Experts of all kinds may draw 

conclusions from “general truths derived from . . . specialized experience.” Kumho Tire, 

526 U.S. at 148. As a result, the original Daubert factors, at times, may not be applicable 

to testimony that relies on knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than 

methodology or theory. Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1169. Where an expert fails to provide more 

than qualifications, conclusions, and assurances of reliability to support his testimony, the 

testimony fails to be sufficiently based on facts and data. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, Dr. Beck personally conducted a clinical interview of Hall, administered a 

variety of psychological and personality tests, and completed a forensic psychological 

examination. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 163:21-25.) Dr. Beck also reviewed Hall’s 

psychiatric and therapy records, the results of a prior independent medical examination, 

and the report completed by Hall’s own expert witness. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 164:1-
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

165:14.) Dr. Beck thus based a portion of his opinions regarding Hall’s PTSD condition 

on information derived from these psychological tests and records. 

 Regarding his opinions of Hall’s PTSD and the availability of reasonable 

accommodation, Dr. Beck cited his 16 years of experience as a human resources director, 

making decisions about reasonable accommodations and hardships for a large hospital 

system. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 169:19-23.) He also referenced his consultations with 

police departments, banks, and other industry leaders in the implementation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 169:22-170:1.) Dr. Beck also 

based his opinions about schedule modifications and public safety work on feedback he 

had previously received from police officers on light duty and their colleagues. (Resp. Ex. 

1, Beck Dep. 150:8-151:13.) Furthermore, Dr. Beck hinged his opinions regarding stimuli 

that may trigger Hall’s PTSD on his experience with public safety officials with PTSD and 

his psychological evaluation of Hall. (Resp. Ex. 1, Beck Dep. 149:8-12, 170:2-9.) 

 Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Beck based his conclusions on “logic,” without 

providing data to support them, and assumptions, not facts about Pinewood Fire 

Department, Hall’s current employer. (Mot. at 11.) Courts act as a gatekeeper under 

Daubert, but do not supplant the adversary system or role of the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. 

at 596. The district court does not evaluate the persuasiveness of the offered evidence, but 

leaves it to “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 

instruction on burden of proof” to attack admissible evidence. Id. Dr. Beck cited his 

extensive experience as a human resources director and his review of Hall’s 

psychological evaluations as support for his opinions. The Court thus finds Dr. Beck has 

sufficiently relied on proper data, methods, and experience to formulate his opinions and 

leaves it to the Plaintiff to dispute the strength of his credentials or weight of his opinion 

through cross-examination. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that Dr. Beck’s testimony as to Hall’s PTSD condition and the 

availability of reasonable accommodation is relevant to Hall’s legal claims; that Dr. Beck 
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is qualified to offer his testimony; and that his testimony is reliable based on his 

referenced experience and his review of Hall’s psychological evaluations. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the 

Opinions and Testimony of Dr. John Beck (Doc. 87). 

 Dated this 30th day of March, 2018. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge