This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0406

In the Matter of the Welfare

of the Children of:

A.D., Parent

Filed August 3, 2015

Affirmed

Chutich, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File Nos. 62-JV-14-1418, 62-JV-14-1419, 62-JV-14-2152,

62-FA-11-535, 62-FA-11-2648; 62-DA-FA-13-661

Nicole S. Gronneberg, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant A.D.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Stephen P. McLaughlin, Assistant County 

Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Community Human 

Services Department)

John Jerabek, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent guardian ad litem Chuck Oesterlein)

J.F. (pro se respondent father of C.F.)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and Reyes, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CHUTICH, Judge

Appellant A.D. challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights. 

Because respondent Ramsey County Community Human Services Department (the 

county) provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family, a statutory 
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condition for termination existed, and termination is in the best interests of the children, 

we affirm.

FACTS

A.D. is the mother of three children: C.L., born in 2005; A.L., born in 2006; and 

C.F., born in 2010. Since 2011, the county has worked with A.D. and the children many

times to address issues relating to educational neglect, A.D.’s chemical dependency, 

A.D.’s mental health, and domestic violence involving A.D. The county first 

encountered A.D. and the children following a 911 hang-up in 2011. Police found A.D. 

in an argument with L.L., the father of C.L. and A.L.1L.L. was arrested for violating an 

order for protection. Because A.D. was too intoxicated to care for the children, they were 

placed with their maternal grandmother. The family later came to the county’s attention 

twice in 2012 for educational neglect. 

On May 31, 2013, the children were seen at Children’s Hospital; they were 

brought via ambulance with A.D., who was coming to receive a mental health evaluation. 

C.L. reported that the day before, A.D. thought an intruder was in the house. A.D. called 

the police several times, but officers were unable to take a report because A.D. took the 

children to a hotel. The family then drove around in a car, and while driving, A.D. 

thought they were being followed, complained that there was an odd smell in the car, and 

stopped in the middle of the road. During her mental health evaluation, A.D. left the 

hospital. Police located her and transported her in handcuffs to Region’s Hospital on 

June 1. The children were placed in a shelter the same day. C.L. and A.L. were placed in 

 

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L.L.’s parental rights were terminated by default in 2014. 
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foster care with their paternal grandparents later in June, and the youngest child, C.F.,

was placed in foster care with his father, J.F., shortly thereafter. At the preliminary 

hearing, all were found to be doing well in these out-of-home placements.

On June 5, 2013, a petition was filed in Ramsey County District Court alleging 

that the children were in need of protection or services and requesting that the children be 

placed under the emergency protective care of the county. On September 5, 2013, the 

children were adjudicated in need of protection or services and legal custody was 

transferred to the county. 

On June 18, 2013, the county intake worker made a maltreatment determination of 

neglect as to the children and found that A.D.’s care threatened their safety. A county 

social worker developed a case plan for A.D. that identified four concerns and issues: 

mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, and day-to-day parenting. It also 

identified several tasks for A.D. to complete, including: complete a psychological 

assessment and follow recommendations; complete a chemical use assessment and follow 

recommendations; participate in domestic violence services; participate in in-home 

parenting services; and abstain from drug use and provide clean urinalyses. The county 

identified specific providers and made referrals for A.D. A.D. refused to sign the case 

plan. At no point did A.D. ever provide a urinalysis or complete a chemical dependency 

evaluation.

In August 2013, A.D. attempted to remove C.L. and A.L. from their foster home 

and forcibly removed C.F. from his home. She was later convicted of deprivation of 
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parental rights. All visitation was temporarily suspended and left to the county’s 

discretion. 

In December 2013, while A.D. was incarcerated, a new child protection worker 

was assigned. He met with A.D. in prison to review the original case plan and create an 

updated one. He also informed A.D. that she needed to contact him upon her release in 

January 2014. A.D. failed to so, and the case worker was unable to meet with her until 

February 2014. 

At the February 2014 meeting, the child protection worker and the guardian ad 

litem explained the updated case plan, which identified similar issues and tasks as the 

earlier version, and informed A.D. of what she needed to do. At that time, A.D. had 

made no progress in addressing any of the issues that led to the children’s out-of-home 

placement. 

The child protection worker had A.D. submit to hair follicle testing in February 

2014. The results tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine use within the 

last 90 days. Following these February 2014 meetings, the child protection worker began 

meeting with A.D. on a weekly, rather than monthly, basis. A third case plan was filed 

with the court in September 2014. This case plan identified the same issues and tasks as 

the previous two, and it was submitted without A.D.’s signature as her whereabouts were 

unknown. 

A.D. was subsequently incarcerated. In October 2014, over 15 months after the 

county initially referred A.D. to the conducting psychologist, it arranged for a 

psychological examination. 
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The psychological examination showed that A.D. failed to express any insight as 

to how or why the children were removed and took no personal responsibility for the 

current issues. The psychologist identified numerous factors impairing A.D.’s capacity to 

parent, including:

 thinking disturbances, including atypical mental content and mental 

disorganization

 rigid thinking patterns, including perseverating on reuniting with her children and 

no awareness of her personality or mental health deficits

 minimizing substance abuse

 little capacity to understand the perspectives of others, to perceive or to understand 

basic needs of others, and to respond to others’ needs

 limited common sense reasoning and judgment, likely causing a lack of basic 

understanding of children’s needs at various development stages and the 

possibility of placing children in dangerous or inappropriate situations

The psychologist diagnosed A.D. with psychosis, possible bipolar disorder with 

psychotic features, and likely post-traumatic stress disorder. He concluded that she could 

not provide a safe, nurturing, structured, or appropriate environment for the children and 

that she will not be able to take care of the children independently in the future. 

In May 2014, the county filed a petition to terminate A.D.’s parental rights as to 

C.L. and A.L. and to transfer physical and legal custody of C.F. to the child’s father, J.F. 

In August 2014, the guardian ad litem filed a petition seeking alternative relief, asking the 

court to terminate A.D.’s parental rights to C.F. as well. 

A hearing convened in January 2015. The child protection worker, the 

psychologist, C.L. and A.L.’s paternal grandmother, J.F., and the guardian ad litem
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testified. The district court found their testimony credible and persuasive, and it noted 

that the children have benefitted greatly from foster care. The district court found A.D. to 

be combative, non-responsive, and argumentative and her testimony to be neither 

credible nor persuasive.2

The district court terminated A.D.’s parental rights to the three children. It 

determined that the county provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate A.D. and to reunify 

her with her children and that the services provided were appropriate, adequate, and 

relevant; any further efforts would be futile. The district court also found that A.D.’s 

increasing criminality caused the circumstances leading to out-of-home placement to 

further deteriorate. It also concluded that: (1) A.D. substantially, continuously, and 

repeatedly refused and neglected to comply with the duties imposed on her by the parentchild relationship; (2) A.D. was palpably unfit to parent; and (3) reasonable efforts by the 

county failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s placement. See Minn. 

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2014). 

The district court further concluded that terminating A.D.’s parental rights was in 

the best interests of the children. It found that any interest the children may have in 

preserving the parent-child relationship was far outweighed by their competing interest in 

having a safe, stable, loving, and nurturing home that A.D. was unable and unwilling to 

provide. It further found that delaying permanency was contrary to their best interests. 

The district court added that the children need a safe, stable home with a parent who was 

 

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Following numerous outbursts by A.D. and warnings by the district court, it removed 

A.D. after she began cursing at the child protection worker while he testified and then 

threatened J.F. 
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willing to protect them from abuse and neglect and meet their basic needs on a daily and 

consistent basis, and their needs far outweighed A.D.’s desire to parent them. It found 

that A.D. could not provide for those needs then or in the foreseeable future and that 

termination was in the children’s best interests. A.D. appealed.

D E C I S I O N

I. Reasonable Efforts

A.D. first contends that the district court incorrectly concluded that the county 

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify A.D. with her children. This argument 

lacks merit.

Before parental rights may be terminated, clear and convincing evidence must 

show that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Children of 

T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). To determine whether reasonable efforts 

were made, considerations include “whether services to the child and family were: 

(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child[ren]; (2) adequate to meet the needs 

of the child[ren] and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; 

(5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 260.012(h) (2014). The children’s best interests, health, and safety are of paramount 

concern. Id. (a) (2014). 

Whether a county has provided reasonable efforts depends on the problems 

presented, In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996), including the length 

of time the county was involved and the quality of the effort given, In re Welfare of H.K., 
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455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). Services 

must go beyond matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance. Id.

The district court here determined that the county provided A.D. with reasonable 

efforts to rehabilitate and to reunite the family and that the services were appropriate, 

adequate, and relevant to facilitate a reunion. Clear and convincing evidence supports 

this finding. 

Here, child protection services completed and filed three case plans with the court 

to address A.D.’s issues. The plans all focused on four main areas: mental health, 

chemical dependency, domestic violence, and parenting skills. These plans, particularly 

the areas of mental health and chemical dependency, addressed the problems presented. 

And the plans offered genuine assistance by requiring mental health and chemical 

dependency evaluations. The ultimate assistance A.D. needed could not be provided 

until the county knew the type and amount of help that she needed—knowledge it could 

not obtain without completed evaluations. Nevertheless, A.D. never completed a 

chemical dependency evaluation and only submitted to a mental health evaluation after 

she was incarcerated. 

The length of time and quality of the effort given also support the district court’s 

findings. The county worked with A.D. for child care issues beginning in 2011. The 

current case began in May 2013, and the petition to terminate parental rights was filed a 

year later. After completing a second case plan, the child protection worker’s visits with 

A.D. increased from monthly to weekly. Despite these increased efforts, A.D. failed to 
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participate in the meetings and eventually could not be located by the child protection 

worker. 

A.D. offers In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2008), in 

support of her argument that the county did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the 

family, but this reliance is misplaced. In T.R., a father challenged the efforts provided by 

the county to reunite him with his son. 750 N.W.2d at 664. The county’s plan for the 

father focused on his drug use and required him to submit to drug assessments and tests. 

Id. at 659. On appeal, the father argued that the plan did not provide reasonable efforts 

because it offered no services; instead, he was merely tested for chemical use. Id. at 664-

65. The supreme court agreed, noting that despite three chemical dependency evaluations 

and his admitted drug and alcohol use, the county failed to offer the father any actual 

chemical treatment options. Id. at 665. The county further failed to visit the father’s 

home to decide if it complied with the requirement of suitable housing. Id. at 666. And 

the county made no effort to assist the father with understanding the proceedings, despite 

his lack of verbal skills, low I.Q., and his acknowledged difficulty with understanding the 

proceedings. Id. Because of these failures by the county, the supreme court determined 

that it did not provide reasonable efforts. Id.

The facts of T.R. stand in stark contrast to those present here. In both instances, 

the county did not provide chemical dependency treatment options. But the father in T.R.

submitted multiple positive urinalyses, had three chemical dependency evaluations, and 

admitted his drug and alcohol use, yet the county failed to offer treatment options. Id. at 

659-60, 665. Unlike T.R., A.D. never provided a urinalysis sample, never completed a 
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chemical dependency evaluation, and continually minimized her substance abuse. We 

cannot say that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts to address A.D.’s 

substance abuse when she provided no evidence for the county to use to determine what 

type and amount of treatment was necessary.

Furthermore, “once a case plan has been approved by the court, the appropriate 

action for a parent who believes some aspect of the case plan to be unreasonable is to ask 

the court to change it, rather than to simply ignore it.” In re Welfare of Children of 

S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 388 (Minn. 2008). No evidence suggests that A.D. ever asked 

the court to modify her three case plans because they were unreasonable. 

A.D. finally argues on this point that the district court’s finding that future efforts 

would be futile was erroneous because evidence suggested that her medical illness is 

curable and could be mitigated. But the district court’s futility determination was not 

premised solely on A.D.’s mental illness. Instead, the district court found that further 

efforts would be futile because A.D. “has demonstrated limited to no effort in correcting 

her parenting deficiencies or addressing the issues” and “has refused to make any 

significant change in her lifestyle,” despite “[e]very reasonable community based

resource [that] was utilized to enable [her] to work her case plan [and] to assist [her] in 

rectifying the conditions that led to child protective involvement.” Accordingly, this 

argument lacks merit.
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II. Statutory Criteria for Termination

A.B. next argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that 

three required statutory conditions existed to terminate parental rights. We are 

unpersuaded by this contention.

On appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review 

the district court’s findings of the underlying and basic facts for clear error, but its 

determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating 

parental rights exists is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of 

J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). 

A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds that a condition listed in 

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b) (2014) exists. A district court 

need only find that one condition exists to terminate parental rights. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 

661.

The district court determined that A.D. substantially, continuously, and repeatedly 

refused and neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child 

relationship. Minnesota law provides that this condition supports terminating parental 

rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Failure to satisfy key elements of a 

court-ordered case plan can provide “ample evidence of [a] lack of compliance with the 

duties and responsibilities of the parent-child relationship.” In re Child of Simon, 662 

N.W.2d 155, 163 (Minn. App. 2003). 

Here, the evidence shows that A.D. failed to satisfy key elements of her case plan. 

She never completed a chemical dependency evaluation, submitted urinalyses, refrained 
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from using chemicals, followed through with in-home parenting services, or adequately 

addressed her mental health issues. These failures demonstrate that the district court 

properly exercised its discretion by finding that this condition was satisfied. See id.

Because a district court must only find that one of the statutory conditions exists to 

terminate parental rights, T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661, we need not address A.D.’s remaining 

arguments on this point. But we have examined A.D.’s other contentions and determine 

that the district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that the other statutory 

conditions existed.

III. Best Interests of the Children

A.B. finally argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that 

termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. This argument also 

lacks merit.

If a district court concludes that a statutory basis exists to terminate parental rights, 

it then considers the best interests of the children. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 

(2014). The best interests of the children are paramount. Id. In analyzing the best 

interests, “the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the 

parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child 

relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child[ren].” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 

492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). Competing interests include a stable environment, 

health considerations, and the child’s preferences. Id. The ultimate determination of 

whether termination is in a child’s best interests is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. 
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Here, the district court found that any interest the children may have in preserving 

the child-parent relationship was “far outweighed by their competing interest in having a 

safe, stable, loving, [and] nurturing home.” It further found that A.D. is unable and 

unwilling to provide this environment or even a safe and stable home that protects the 

children from abuse and neglect. It also found that A.D. cannot meet the children’s basic 

and special needs on a daily and consistent basis. The district court finally found that 

A.D. cannot meet these needs now or in the foreseeable future. 

A.D. does not argue that the factual findings supporting these ultimate findings are 

clearly erroneous. Instead, A.D.’s argument on this point claims that these ultimate 

findings reflect an abuse of discretion because the county failed to provide reasonable 

efforts. But as discussed above, this contention lacks merit. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by ultimately finding that termination 

was in the children’s best interests. The district court carefully weighed the various 

interests, and the record supports the underlying findings. Without alleging or showing 

an alternative basis for demonstrating that termination was not in the children’s best 

interests, other than contending that the county did not provide reasonable efforts, A.D.’s 

argument fails. Accordingly, because the county provided reasonable efforts, the district 

court properly exercised its discretion in terminating A.D.’s paternal rights. 

Affirmed.