VICE PRESIDENTS 

SPACEPOLICY ADVISORYBOARD 

A POST COLD WAR 

ASSESSMENT OF 

U.S. SPACE POLICY 

A TASK GROUP REPORT 

DECEMBER 1992 
Vice President’s 

Space Policy Advisory Board 

December 17, 1992 

The Honorable Dan Quayle 

Vice President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. Vice President: 

On August 31, 1992 you charged a special task group of the Space Policy Advisory 

Board to review the nation’s space policies in the context of the end of the Cold War and 

other developments. We were directed to report to you by December 20, 1992. We are 

pleased to present you with our report, A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space 

Policy. 

Our Task Group was comprised of individuals with considerable space policy experience 

including a former Congressman, a former Secretary of the Air Force, the current 

Chairman of the Defense Science Board, former leaders of the national security space 

program, a former director of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, current and former 

industry executives, and other space policy experts. Because of the limited time available 

for our task and the nature of your charge, our Task Group relied heavily on its own 

expertise augmented by two recent reports of the Space Policy Advisory Board, The 

Future of the U.S. Space industrial Base and The Future of the U.S. Space Launch 

Capability; the 1990 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space 

Program; and a series of briefings by senior Administration officials from departments 

dealing directly and indirectly with the U.S. space program. Every effort, including the 

composition of the Task Group, was taken to ensure that its results were non-partisan. 

Our report focuses on four recommendations. While we have identified implementing 

actions for each recommendation, we recognize that the incoming administration may 

wish to re-validate these suggested actions and measure them against their own policy 

goals before acting. However, we note that the world’s political and economic situation 

as it affects space programs is evolving rapidly and that our own domestic and military 

agendas are also changing. So action is needed sooner rather than later. Failure to act 

will result in continued inefficiencies, higher costs than necessary, slower progress in 

using and understanding space, less competitiveness, and further uncertainty in our 

space industry. 

Our four principal recommendations are that: (1) major changes be made in the way 

government space activities are organized and managed, eliminating duplication and 

fostering synergism among civil, military, intelligence, and commercial space programs; 

(2) the government seek to reduce, and where possible eliminate, security constraints 

associated with national security space programs; (3) the government take a series of 
actions on an urgent basis to create a more cooperative and productive relationship with 

the U.S. space industry; and (4) the United States take the initiative in shaping a common 

international agenda in selected areas of civilian and national security space activity to 

address global problems and to maintain U.S. influence. 

Finally, we unanimously urge that discussions begin immediately between the current and 

incoming Administration and with the Congress on these recommendations in order to 

enable timely actions by affected agencies. 

/adLaurel L. Wilkening 

James A. Abrahamson 

Joseph P. Allen 

d John S. Foster, Jr. 

Don Fuqua L/ 

Edward C. Aldridge 

Daniel J. Fink 

Edward Frieman 

Donald J. Kutyna 

I 

John M. Logsdon Bruce Murray v 
Table of Contents 

Summary............................................... v 

The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Programs ............... 1 

Leadership as the Overriding Goal of U.S. Space Policy ........ 1 

The Origins of Separate Civil and Military Programs .......... 2 

The Evolution of Commercial Space Activities ............... 7 

The Evolution of International Space Cooperation ............ 9 

The Changing Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

The New Meaning of Space Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

Federal Government Space Activities ........................ 17 

New Opportunities and Constraints ....................... 17 

Organization and Management .......................... 21 

Security and Classification .............................. 23 

Federal Acquisition Regulations .......................... 25 

Findings ............................................ 26 

The Relationship Between Government and Industry ............ 29 

Findings ............................................ 31 

International Cooperation ................................. 33 

Basis For Future Cooperation ............................ 34 

Military and Civil Opportunities ......................... 35 

Findings.. .......................................... 36 

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 

Appendix I - Task Group Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-l 

Appendix II - Task Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1 

Appendix III - Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space 

industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-1 

Appendix IV - Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space 

Launch Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-1 

Appendix V - A Summary of Recommendations from the 1990 Report 

on the Future of the U.S. Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-l 
List of Figures 

Figure 1. “Stovepipe” Organizational Structure ................. 5 

Figure 2. National Space Spending .......................... 6 

Figure 3. Agency Functions and Responsibilities ............... 22 
Summary 

The fundamental principles which have guided U.S. space activities 

were established nearly 35 years ago in the aftermath of the 1957 launch 

of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union. These principles provided for two 

separate space programs: one aimed at civil, peaceful purposes; the other 

aimed at using space systems and capabilities to enhance national security. 

Each program was to be carried out by a separate organization with its 

own research and development, acquisition, launch, and operations 

capabilities. Coordination between the civil and military space programs 

was to occur at several levels, including a presidential-led policy 

organization, the National Aeronautics and Space Council. 

Since that time, the U.S. civil and national security space programs have 

evolved within a policy framework that reflected the international tensions, 

as well as the economic and technological constraints and alliance 

relationships of the Cold War period. A separate, highly classified, 

organization to develop and operate the U.S. space reconnaissance program 

was created in the early 1960’s. More recently, a distinct non-governmental 

commercial space sector achieved policy recognition. 

The U.S. space program now functions in a profoundly changed 

context. Space offers opportunities to address global problems on a global 

scale and its frontier challenges the scientific, technological, and problemsolving genius of humans. The end of the Cold War, advances in 

technology, and other developments present new opportunities for 

cooperation and progress in space. The continuing budget deficit and 
vi A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

changes in the aerospace industrial base associated with lessened defense 

spending impose new constraints on such progress. 

Recognizing these changes and knowing that, more than ever before, 

the United States must ensure that it gets maximum return from its 

investments in space Vice President Dan Quayle, on August 31, 1992, 

asked his Space Policy Advisory Board to conduct a broad review of 

current national space policy. He charged the Board with making policy 

recommendations that would: (1) increase the efficiency of federal 

government space activities to enable the best space program possible for 

the funds available; (2) maintain U.S. leadership and competitiveness for 

the 21st century; and (3) sustain an industrial base capable of supporting 

future national security, civil, and commercial space requirements. 

The Task Group has completed this review and found that space 

systems and missions remain important, and in some instances vital, 

elements of government activity. The Task Group also found that the 

dramatic changes in the geopolitical environment, the heightened 

sensitivity to issues affecting U.S. economic and technological 

competitiveness, increasing concerns about the global environment, the 

world-wide proliferation of space technologies, systems, and capabilities, 

and, not least, increased budgetary constraints have seriously changed the 

context for the U.S. space program. 

Among the specific findings of the Task Group are that: 

- The current U.S. government organization of space activities is not 

appropriate for the post Cold War era. A strong, cross-agency 

coordinating function is needed at the White House level. Additionally, 

significant institutional and structural changes are required. 

- The economic competitiveness of the U.S. space-related industrial sector 

promotes the civil and national security interests of the nation and 

government actions are needed to foster its continued well being. 

- Enhanced international cooperation in both the civil and military space 

sectors presents a strategic opportunity for the United States which 

should be pursued; but, the U.S. approach toward cooperation should 

be modified to better suit post Cold War interests. 
Summary vii 

Based upon these findings, the Task Group’s four principal policy 

recommendations are that the U.S. government: 

- Change the way space activities are organized and managed. The need 

to maintain distinct civil and national security space sectors remains 

valid but planning should be centralized across sectors and its 

execution streamlined within the respective sectors, thereby eliminating 

duplication and fostering synergism among civil, military, intelligence, 

and commercial programs. 

- Reduce, and where possible eliminate, security constraints associated 

with national security space programs. 

- Revitalize, on an urgent basis, a more productive cooperative 

relationship between the U.S. government and the space industry to 

meet the increased challenge of international competition and cope with 

reductions in defense spending. 

- Take the initiative in shaping a common international agenda in 

selected areas of civil and national security space activity to address 

global problems and to maintain U.S. influence. 

These recommendations provide a strategic direction and should guide 

policy makers as they transform the U.S. space program to meet the 

challenges of the new post Cold War era. The Task Group has also 

identified a number of specific implementing actions which are described 

in the recommendation section of this report. 

While the recommendations and accompanying implementing actions 

might benefit from additional fact-finding and review, the Task Group 

urges that at least the initial steps toward broad, sweeping change be taken 

soon. The magnitude of these changes will almost certainly make them 

institutionally unpopular and difficult to implement. However, business 

as usual will not serve the country well. Failure to take prompt action 

along the lines identified in this report will undermine the U.S. space 

program and deny its potential benefits to future generations of Americans. 
1 

The Evolution of U.S. Space 

Policy and Programs 

Leadership as the Overriding Goal of U.S. Space Policy 

The goals set for the U.S. space program were initially a product of the 

Cold War. Early Soviet successes, culminating in April 1961 with the first 

orbiting of a human, galvanized the U.S. political leadership to confront 

the appropriate response to this powerful Soviet challenge to U.S. global 

leadership. In May 1961, President Kennedy accepted the recommendation 

of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, NASA Administrator James Webb, 

and Secretary of Defense McNamara that the United States not only be “a 

leader in space,” as was mandated by the 1958 Space Act, but that it 

become the leader in all areas of space exploration. A centerpiece of this 

recommendation was that the United States enter and win the race for 

spectacular space achievement. Webb and McNamara argued that: 

“Dramatic achievements in space, therefore, symbolize the technological 

power and organizing capacity of a nation... 

It is for reasons suck as these that major achievements in space contribute 

to national prestige. Major successes, suck as orbiting a man as the 

Soviets have just done, lend national prestige even though the scientific, 

commercial, or military value of the undertaking may by ordinary 

standards be marginal or economically unjustified. 
2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

This nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue space projects 

aimed at enkancinq national prestige. Our attainments are a major 

element in the international competition between the Soviet system and 

our own. The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific but “civilian” 

projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of 

the battle along the fluid front of the cold war. Suck undertakings may 

affect our military strength only indirectly if at all, but they have an 

increasing effect upon our national posture.“’ 

Two weeks later, President Kennedy initiated the Apollo program 

which culminated in the first lunar landing on July 20, 1969. In parallel, 

the United States successfully flew the first robotic expeditions to Mars and 

Venus and began robotic efforts that reached Mercury and Jupiter in the 

1970’s and Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune in the 1980’s. 

In the 1960’s, and for most of the next two decades, space leadership 

clearly meant besting the USSR in visible, challenging space exploration 

endeavors. Each statement of national space policy issued since 1961 has 

identified leadership as a major goal of U.S. space policy; for example, the 

November 1989 space policy approved by President George Bush noted 

that “a fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has 

been, and continues to be, space leadership.” 

The Origins of Separate Civil and Military Programs 

Heated debate followed the launch of Sputnik 1 regarding the best way 

to organize the U.S. space program. In those years, all U.S. space capability 

resided within the various military services and their laboratories and 

contractors. As a temporary measure to minimize interservice rivalry for 

the new space mission, the Secretary of Defense in February 1958 

established an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as the central 

organization for space projects. 

’ Memorandum from Robert McNamara and James E. Webb to Vice President Lyndon Johnson, 

Recommendations for Our National Space Program, May 8, 1961. 
The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Programs 3 

President Eisenhower initially favored centralizing space efforts within 

the Department of Defense (DOD) on the grounds that he wanted to avoid 

needless duplication of activities and capabilities and that the most 

pressing space requirements were military in character. His advisors 

subsequently persuaded him of the benefits of a U.S. posture of openness 

- conducting as much of its program as possible openly under the 

auspices of a civilian agency, while also continuing a strong, yet less 

public, military space program within the Department of Defense. A bill 

proposing that a civilian space agency be created was sent to Congress in 

April. Following extensive debate in both houses of Congress, the 

President signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 into law 

on July 29, 1958. Even in this founding legislation, Congress was 

particularly concerned about the need for policy and program coordination 

between separate civil and military space programs and included in the bill 

a White House National Aeronautics and Space Council, chaired by the 

President, to oversee such coordination2 

Between 1958 and early 1961, existing and planned space projects, 

facilities, and personnel were allocated to the new agency, the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), if they were 

predominantly civil in character, and retained within the Department of 

Defense if their primary application was national security. Most military 

programs were assigned to the individual services and ARPA quickly lost 

its role as a central DOD space organization. In the early 1960’s a National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was established within DOD to manage the 

country’s highly classified reconnaissance satellite programs. In 1961 the 

Air Force was designated the executive agent for most DOD space efforts. 

These organizational developments created a powerful, but expensive, 

national space program with overlapping programs and duplicate facilities. 

Such duplication was tolerated because: 

- The foreign policy value was recognized of having an open, 

unclassified civil program that other countries could cooperate with, in 

contrast to the closed, secretive Soviet program. 

2 The 1958 Space Act was revised in April 1961 to make the Vice President the Chairman of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Council. 
4 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

- Protecting against Soviet knowledge of the character of U.S. military 

and intelligence space efforts through a high level of security 

classification was a key consideration. 

- For the first decade or so, America’s accomplishments in space were 

limited more by the availability of technology than by funding 

constraints. Overlapping programs (at least at the technology level) 

were thought to further desirable technical progress. 

The policy decisions made in the early years of the space age resulted 

in the establishment of separate and distinct space sectors within the U.S. 

government: 

- A civil space program managed by NASA and focused on 

demonstrating America’s technological leadership through human space 

exploration and new scientific knowledge. 

- A military space program focused on supporting strategic deterrence 

and an evolving role in supporting tactical forces. 

- An intelligence space program focused on providing comprehensive 

surveillance of areas of the world closed to normal observation and on 

providing strategic indications and warning to National Command 

Authorities. 

- In addition, a commercial sector emerged as private industry became 

involved in space programs. 

Each of these sectors evolved under separate organizational structures 

for management, budgetary control, and policy oversight: Each of these 

separate “stovepipe” organizations contained within itself most or all 

capabilities required to perform its mission. Not surprisingly, the lack of 

strong coordination among these organizations encouraged both different 

solutions to similar problems and overlap in capabilities, particularly in 

areas such as technology development, launch, and support services. 

Though successful, this “stovepipe” organizational structure has grown 

large and has spawned excess bureaucracy and as new applications of 

space have been developed, new “stovepipes” have been created (Figure 1). 
The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Programs 

Organization 

the U.S. 

Figure 1. “Stovepipe” Organizational Structure 

Increasing layers of policy oversight and review have been added. 

Congressional review has increased; as many as ten congressional 

committees now have jurisdiction over some portion of the three 

government space sectors, with each committee enforcing its own 

priorities. Each space organization has carried out its acquisition, 

operations, technology development, command and control, and other 

functions in a manner optimized for the missions it was charged with 

conducting. In short, each space organization now has its own institutional 

culture. 

The scope and character of government space activities have changed 

significantly during the past 35 years. These changes have been reflected 

in annual spending levels for space (Figure 2). Three major factors have 

had an overarching effect on funding levels. 

The first was the Apollo program, which entailed a very large effort 

over a relatively short time and clearly dominated space spending through 

the 1960’s. Apollo, together with an aggressive planetary science program, 

led to an early surge of funding for NASA that at its peak constituted 

approximately 1 percent of the nation’s gross national product. This was 
6 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

FY93 

DOLLARS 

(Billions) 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0-I::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :’ 

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 

Years 

Figure 2. National Space Spending 

an extraordinary investment which established the NASA institutional 

structure still in existence today. 

The second was the Space Shuttle program which has had a pervasive 

effect on space spending over the past two decades. Beginning in the mid1970’s acquisition of national security satellites to perform new missions 

and necessary improvements to satellites performing existing missions 

were deferred until such time as they could be designed to take advantage 

of the Shuttle’s unique capabilities. This deferment created a “bow wave” 

of unfunded requirements, suppressing DOD space spending in the 1970’s 

and driving up spending in the early 1980’s. The Challenger failure in 

1986 and the actions necessary to recover from that failure added more 

than $12 billion in new funding requirements to the country’s space 

budget, including, a new Shuttle (Endeavour), restoring expendable launch 

vehicle (ELV) production lines, developing and procuring the Titan IV, 

Delta II, and Atlas II launch vehicles, and redesigning satellites from 

configurations optimized for the Shuttle to configurations that could be 

launched on ELVs. The economic effect of the Shuttle is still being felt in 
The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Programs 7 

terms of the continuing high cost of Shuttle operations, currently 

consuming approximately one third of the total NASA budget. 

The third major factor affecting space spending is DOD’S increasing 

reliance on space to perform essential national security missions formerly 

accomplished using terrestrial or aircraft systems. This reliance, 

demonstrated during Desert Storm, is discussed in other sections of this 

report. As space has become the preferred means to accomplish essential 

military functions, the cost of additional space systems has been largely 

offset by phasing non-space alternatives such as terrestrial communications 

systems and reconnaissance aircraft out of the military inventory. 

It is important to note that to date civil and national security space 

programs have not competed directly against one another for funds. 

Instead, each competes within its own sphere against other, non-space, 

alternatives for furthering U.S. national security, scientific, technological, 

economic, and political goals. 

The Evolution of Commercial Space Activities 

During the earliest years of the U.S. space program, the government 

played a catalytic role in bringing into being the first commercial 

application of space, using satellites to relay voice and video signals 

around the globe. The government agreed to launch any communications 

satellite developed by the private sector, thereby enabling the initial 

commercializing of space activity without requiring the private sector to 

bear the burden of developing its own launch capability. The government 

also funded research, development, and demonstrations of possible uses 

of communications satellites. Finally, the government took the initiative in 

developing the policy and institutional framework, both domestic and 

international, for operating communications satellites. The result of these 

farsighted government actions was the creation of a major new area of 

economic activity in which the United States has had, from the start, the 

dominant market share. 

Indeed, satellite technology has revolutionized communications not just 

in the U.S. but throughout the world. The capacity and speed of domestic 

and international telecommunications have increased by orders of 
8 A Post Cold War Assessment of US. Space Policy 

magnitude, and the cost of an individual call has decreased substantially. 

Governments, the military, industry, and the individual consumer have all 

benefited. The communications satellite industry - satellites, launches, 

ground stations, and services - in the United States is nearly five billion 

dollars per year and is growing at a rate of about 20 percent per year. 

The government also took the lead in facilitating a commercial industry 

built around the capability to sense the Earth from space for a variety of 

both public and private applications. The first Landsat satellite was 

launched in 1972, and Landsat 6 is scheduled for launch in 1993. There 

have been continuing policy challenges to finding the appropriate 

framework for bringing the benefits of remote sensing into widespread 

commercial use and a notable lack of success to date in demonstrating the 

economic viability of such an application. Nevertheless, the government 

devotes resources to technologies that, in the long run, could have 

substantial economic payoffs. 

It was not until the 1980’s that the overall commercial potential of space 

received specific policy attention. A series of policy and organizational 

initiatives over the past decade have made the government crucial to U.S. 

industry in developing new profit-making applications of space capabilities 

and services. The existence of a separate commercial space sector was first 

acknowledged in a 1988 statement of national space policy. The need to 

plan government space activities so that they enhance U.S. industrial 

competitiveness and to oversee commercial space activity in order to 

protect the public interest has added new complexities and new 

participants to the space policy process. 

Other countries, recognizing the economic potential of space, are 

competing, often successfully, with the United States for a share of this 

growing market. U.S. taxpayers, through funding government’s civil and 

national security space programs, and U.S. industry have spent large 

amounts of money to develop the knowledge, technology, manufacturing 

skills, and systems that underpin U.S. space competitiveness. U.S. policies 

and practices need to safeguard these investments and to facilitate 

continued U.S. competitiveness. In particular, as the United States 

contemplates enhanced international space cooperation, attention should 

be devoted to making sure that such cooperation does not compromise 

U.S. competitive advantage in the commercial space arena. 
The Evolution of U.S. Space Policy and Programs 9 

The Evolution of International Space Cooperation 

From the earliest days of the space program, international cooperation 

has been a prominent feature of the U.S. approach to space, particularly in 

the civil sector. The United States invited its allies to participate in space 

science and applications programs and, after 1970, in its human space 

flight program. While there have, on occasion, been problems between the 

United States and its partners, on balance the benefits of cooperation 

clearly outweighed its costs and risks. 

In both the civil and national security sectors, the United States has 

always approached international cooperation from a position of strength, 

at its own initiative, largely on its own terms, and usually as a 

discretionary, “value-added” activity that complemented core U.S. elements 

of a particular mission or capability. The size of the U.S. space program 

and the preeminence of U.S. space capabilities made such an approach 

possible. International partners were willing to accept American 

dominance in cooperative undertakings as the price of associating 

themselves with the recognized leader in space. This approach may not 

always be achievable in today’s changed environment. 
2 

The Changing Environment 

Several factors are having a profound impact on U.S. space activities 

including the dramatically changed geopolitical environment, the 

heightened sensitivity to issues affecting U.S. economic and technological 

competitiveness, increasing concerns about the global environment, the 

world-wide proliferation of space technologies, systems, and capabilities, 

and, not least, increased budgetary constraints. 

More and more space programs such as the Space Shuttle and Space 

Station Freedom have faced tough competition for resources from other 

discretionary civil needs. Now, with the Cold War over and the Soviet 

Union itself gone, President Bush’s goal of returning humans to the Moon 

to stay and human exploration of Mars has not yet received Congressional 

support. These are indications of the United States’ changed view of the 

role of space programs as political tools. 

While one powerful enemy may have disappeared, and with it much 

of the original motivating force for our past space efforts, competition in 

space has by no means disappeared as a legitimate and important factor 

driving our present and future efforts. Political concerns are being 

replaced by economic concerns. 

Foreign nations, particularly in Europe and Japan, have targeted space, 

and indeed the entire aerospace industrial sector, as an area of strategic 

importance to their economic future. A similar emphasis on space 

industries is evident in many countries, notably the People’s Republic of 
12 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

China, Russia, and other former Soviet republics, where space systems are 

one of the very few areas in which these countries can field technologies 

capable of competing on the world market. 

The commercial competitiveness of the U.S. private sector is 

increasingly challenged in terms of helping the nation’s trade balance. The 

challenge is aggravated by the negative effects of reduced government 

spending for defense in the aerospace sector. 

Another significantly changed circumstance is the economic and 

financial condition of the United States. The United States is burdened 

with a large debt, a large trade deficit, and increasing foreign ownership 

of business assets. Previous reports such as those of the National 

Commission on Space (Paine report) and the Augustine Committee 

assumed that increased federal support of the U.S. space programs was 

likely. However, U.S. fiscal problems cast considerable doubt on the 

assumptions that more funding will be available. Current budget 

projections for civil and military programs show little or no growth. 

This new context for the U.S. space program is so dramatically 

different, that a comprehensive reexamination of the fundamental premises 

and principles upon which U.S. space policy and organization have been 

based is warranted. This report is a first step toward such a reexamination 

and focuses on four major policy questions: 

- Whether leadership should remain “the fundamental objective guiding 

United States space activities,” as specified in current national space 

policy; 

- Whether the government is appropriately organized for the space 

programs of the next decade and beyond; 

- Whether the way that the federal government interacts with the U.S. 

private sector is the most productive approach to ensuring the growth 

of the commercial space sector and future U.S. competitiveness in the 

global marketplace, and; 

- Whether the U.S. approach to international cooperation in civil and 

national security space activities requires revision. 
3 

The New Meaning of Space Leadership 

As noted previously, the quest for leadership has been a fundamental 

objective of the U.S. space program. For at least the past half century, U.S. 

ability to influence the shape and flow of events around the world has 

been a core national interest, and Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower have 

recognized the contributions that the U.S. space program made to the 

perception of the United States as a leading nation; one whose influence 

is exercised for the common good. 

The measure of space leadership was straightforward when the United 

States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a bilateral contest for primacy 

in areas of highly visible space accomplishment. But with the end of the 

Cold War and the increased significance of economic competition among 

the industrial nations, the term “space leadership” takes on new meaning. 

To remain a leading nation in space continues to be in the U.S. interest as 

leadership creates a shared pride among Americans regarding their 

country’s place on the cutting edge of accomplishment and also adds to 

this country’s ability to influence the actions and opinions of others around 

the world. In addition, future economic benefits from being the leader in 

private sector space efforts could be substantial. 

However, to desire leadership does not assure it. Space leadership 

must be earned. By maintaining unsurpassed technological capacities in 

key areas and using those capacities effectively and efficiently, the United 

States will have the capability to act independently, visibly, and 

impressively when and where it chooses. 
14 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

In the future, the United States must be perceived as using its space 

capabilities effectively in addressing global environmental problems, 

managing renewable resources, supporting regional military operations, 

and verifying compliance with international agreements - both civil and 

military. As part of the United States’ continuing post Cold War 

leadership, space achievements must be widely viewed as a key to an 

improved world future. 

Another facet of future U.S. leadership is the ability of the U.S. space 

industry, working in a productive partnership with the federal 

government, to compete successfully in the global space marketplace. 

Fostering and supporting this industry through minimizing regulation, 

acquiring government systems using commercial-like practices, and 

protecting proprietary and government-provided technology and knowhow are examples of the sort of actions the government can and should 

take to stimulate the competitiveness of U.S. industry in this area of 

growing economic importance. 

The United States cannot maintain an appropriate level of technological 

leadership in space without the continuing influx of well educated 

scientists and engineers. Historically, many of the best young people have 

been drawn to the space program and have found in its challenges the 

inspiration to undertake the long and difficult years of education needed 

to make significant contributions to the field. The United States must 

signal to today’s aspiring youth that it intends to continue to conduct a 

preeminent space program. 

If the United States is to maintain its leading position in space, it must 

invest in diverse mission-oriented space research and development (R&D). 

The country cannot be a leader by slowing down the pace of its R&D or 

by broadly seeking to restrict the dissemination of R&D results. The most 

effective means of both ensuring that the best students are attracted to the 

space arena and of guaranteeing continuing scientific and technological 

advance is through undertaking a series of technologically demanding 

space missions on a timescale consistent with the pace of university 

training. This implies programs that are both small enough and 

inexpensive enough so that they can be developed and launched on a time 

scale of fewer than five years. 
The Nm Meaning of Space Leadership 15 

Future space leadership, then, requires combining challenge, openness, 

quality of execution, and productive application of results. Proceeding 

ahead with a well-conceived, successfully executed national space program 

aimed at concrete objectives that are scientifically, economically, and 

socially beneficial, and that serve important U.S. interests, is the best way 

to ensure leadership in space. Leadership, in this sense, becomes both a 

goal in itself and the result of excellence in formulating goals for space and 

achieving them as planned. 

It is this concept of leadership that should guide future U.S. activities 

in space. 
4 

Federal Government Space Activities 

The changed circumstances brought on by the end of the Cold War 

present new opportunities to achieve efficiencies in the way government 

space activities are organized and conducted. Realizing these efficiencies 

could increase the purchasing power of the funds available, thus 

substantially offsetting the effects of no-growth budgets. In assessing 

possible efficiencies, the Task Group has considered the structural 

relationships among different government space activities, regulations and 

procedures including those related to security classification of national 

security space activities, and opportunities to streamline the acquisition of 

space systems. 

New Opportunities and Constraints 

Federal government spending on space and space-related activities has 

increased significantly during the past decade. Many factors contributed 

to this increase, among them the technical advances enabling space systems 

to compete successfully with non-space approaches for addressing 

important needs in areas ranging from military support to environmental 

monitoring. There has also been some recognition of the fact that 

investments in space contribute to important national objectives, such as 

furthering educational goals by inspiring our youth and enhancing U.S. 

economic competitiveness in the international marketplace. 
18 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

The federal government will invest approximately $30 billion in all 

space-related activities this year and funding is projected to remain 

relatively constant at this level for the foreseeable future. While $30 billion 

per year is relatively high when compared with past spending levels, these 

funds are increasingly committed to the continued development and 

operation of currently approved programs. No-growth budgets will 

increasingly preclude new initiatives and curtail investments needed to 

maintain space leadership and the nation’s competitive, technological edge 

in the future unless efficiencies can be achieved. 

For NASA, the effect of a no-growth budget is severe. In 1990, a 

comprehensive review of NASA’s civil space activities was undertaken by 

the Augustine Committee. That Committee’s recommendation, which was 

broadly endorsed by the Administration and the Congress, was that the 

United States should conduct a balanced space program composed of a 

strong space science component, two mission oriented undertakings - 

Mission To Planet Earth aimed at understanding the Earth’s climate and 

related physical and biological systems and Mission From Planet Earth 

focused on human and robotic exploration of space - an enhanced 

technology program to support future endeavors, and development of a 

new launch system to off-load tasks from the Space Shuttle. In the 

judgement of our Task Group, these goals remain valid. 

To support this agenda, the Augustine Committee recommended a 

number of management reforms. It also recommended increases in 

NASA’s budget of approximately 10 percent per year throughout the 

decade of the 1990’s, leveling off at about 0.4 percent of GNP. The 

management recommendations appear to have been taken seriously and 

the Task Group supports the actions that are being taken by NASA’s 

current leadership to implement them. However, it is now probable that 

the recommended increases in funding for NASA will not be available in 

the near future. 

At the same time, NASA is becoming increasingly committed to 

conducting routine, repetitive activities associated with operating and 

maintaining existing systems. This includes operation of Space Shuttle 

flights, which consumes nearly one third of the NASA budget, as well as 

operation of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), the 

Deep Space Network, the Hubble Space Telescope and other observatory 
Federal Government Space Activities 19 

programs, and the institutional cost of maintaining a large government 

infrastructure. Future operational commitments include the Earth 

Observing Sys tern, Landsat, and Space Station Freedom. These 

commitments are the result of NASA’s pursuing large, complex systems 

that require years to develop and entail sustained high operating costs. 

The situation in the DOD is similar in terms of operational 

commitments. While overall defense spending is being very substantially 

reduced, expenditures for space are actually projected to increase slightly. 

But this level of funding will probably be inadequate to meet current needs 

and to support required improvements in infrastructure. 

The end of the Cold War has brought a change in the focus of national 

security space activities. For the past 35 years national security space 

requirements were focused on the strategic threat posed by the USSR. The 

technologically sophisticated, closed society which was the Soviet Union 

had the capacity to threaten directly the existence of the United States. To 

counter this threat U.S. space systems focused on strategic warning and on 

understanding the threat posed by the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. 

Tactical forces, during the Viet Nam conflict and later, relied little on space 

systems, depending instead on conventional capabilities such as remotely 

piloted vehicles for weather information, reconnaissance aircraft, 

troposcatter communications systems, and TACAN navigation systems 

which were under the direct control of the combat commands. Today, 

while strategic needs remain important, the demise of the Soviet Union has 

made reconnaissance aimed at it less critical. But, the changing 

environment has created important new needs. Systems designed in 

response to the threat formally posed by the Soviet Union are now 

contributing to decisions regarding Yugoslavia, Somalia, and other areas. 

At the same time, tactical support has grown to be a significant mission. 

As demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm, space support to tactical 

forces is now an essential element of the nation’s ability to wage war. The 

conventional systems on which tactical forces previously relied have, by 

and large, been phased out. 

In addition to supporting national security needs, space systems have 

application for an increasing variety of non-defense uses. For example, the 

Air Force Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation of navigation 

satellites was designed from the start to accommodate civil users. Today, 
20 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

this system assists surveyors, geologists, large and small boat owners, 

hunters, and campers. The system is used for automobile and truck fleet 

management and is already in use for air navigation. 

The demonstrated capability of the U.S. GPS system and its Russian 

counterpart system, GLONASS, has caused the international air traffic 

control community to undertake numerous studies of ways to utilize 

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to improve efficiency and 

safety. The International Civil Aeronautical Organization has estimated 

that GNSS will provide billions of dollars of savings. At the request of the 

FAA Administrator, an industry task force has just completed its study on 

how to move to GNSS-based air traffic control with initial steps starting 

this year and next. The United States has committed to free international 

use of our GPS system for air traffic control for the foreseeable future. 

There are additional examples of the potential civil benefits of military 

space systems. For example, geodetic as well as surface feature data 

gathered for security purposes could revolutionize both terrain and feature 

mapping as appropriate data is released. Other space derived security 

data can add significantly to civil scientific earth observation efforts, such 

as NASA’s EOS program. The U.S. Space Command also routinely 

provides space debris data to U.S. and international space activities. 

Conversely, civil programs will increasingly benefit our security efforts. 

During Operation Desert Storm, commercial communications satellites 

were used extensively by the military forces of many nations allied with 

the United States. Some scientific and commercial earth observing 

satellites also provided useful low resolution data for military mapping 

and broad area surveillance. Finally, exchanges of space derived weather 

data has long been a practice between the DOD and the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and could become even more 

important in the future. 

Investments in new capabilities are needed to support both military and 

civil requirements, particularly to improve space transportation. A Space 

Policy Advisory Board Task Group recently completed a comprehensive 

assessment of the nation’s space launch capabilities and shortfalls. The 

conclusion of that assessment was that investments are needed both to 

upgrade current facilities and to develop a new generation space launch 
Federal Government Space Activities 22 

vehicle. The new vehicle would serve civil and military needs, provide a 

basis for replacing the Space Shuttle for human spaceflight in the future, 

and enhance U.S. commercial competitiveness in the international market. 

A new management arrangement was also recommended to coordinate 

activities in this important cross-cutting area. The recommendations of the 

Advisory Board report on The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability 

should be implemented. 

Achieving the existing civil and military space agendas without 

increases in funding will be very difficult. Risks will have to be carefully 

weighed against savings as such changes are considerable. For example, 

it might be possible to free some funds through merging of now separate 

but similar civil and military programs such as meteorological satellites. 

It might also be possible to reduce space budgets somewhat by slipping 

acquisition schedules for replacement satellites. But, the risks and 

consequences of gaps in coverage that could result from such cutbacks are 

substantial. And, historically, the inefficiencies induced by such schedule 

adjustments increase the total cost of programs. 

Organization and Management 

Development and operation of space missions and systems have 

historically been the responsibility of the government organization utilizing 

the space system or mission. Thus, civil weather satellites are acquired 

and operated as an element of the weather service (now NOAA), naval 

communications satellites are the responsibility of the Navy, and so forth. 

Each organization employing space systems has evolved the management, 

budgetary control, and many of the technical support capabilities required 

to conduct space activities in support of its mission. This situation was 

depicted earlier as a series of “stovepipes.” As opportunities to use space 

assets to accomplish diverse missions have increased, so have the number 

of government organizations involved in the conduct of space activities. 

Figure 3 displays the current dispersion of space-related functions across 

the government. 

For civil and commercial space, in addition to NASA, the Department 

of Transportation, the Department of Commerce (including NOM), the 

Department of the Interior, and most recently the Department of Energy 
22 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

’ Launch includes regulation or procurement of commercial launch services 

Figure 3. Agency Functions and Responsibilities 

have evolved space-related functions. Within the national security 

community, the Air Force (with separate development and operational 

elements), the NRO, the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), and the 

Army, Navy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) are all actively involved in the development and operation of 

space systems. Each organization has a distinctly different culture. 

Technical requirements, acquisition procedures, and technical operations 

differ. Institutional arrangements encourage overlap and discourage 

cooperation and synergism. 

A number of actions have been taken over the years to coordinate some 

of these diverse activities. For example, one approach has been the 

establishment of joint programs, managed and funded partially by DOD 

and partially by NASA, as a mechanism for gaining synergism when needs 

were similar or overlapped. The Space Shuttle was intended to support all 

government launch needs. While the core program was managed and 

funded by NASA, the Department of Defense added its performance 

requirements and was responsible for developing and operating a West 

Coast launch facility and a new upper stage (the Inertial Upper Stage or 

IUS) to support all users of the Space Shuttle. More recent examples of 
Federal Government Space Activities 23 

joint programs have included the National Aero-Space Plane Program, the 

New Launch System, and the Landsat remote sensing satellite system. 

These joint programs have proven difficult to implement and have often 

become a source of conflict among agencies. Differing agency priorities 

have often resulted in budget mismatches. Another factor complicating 

joint programs is the need for support from several different congressional 

committees, each of which with its own priorities. The process through 

which Congress allocates funds also complicates the execution of joint 

programs because subcommittees have tended to cut “their” agency’s 

requests for a joint program in the hope that the subcommittee with 

jurisdiction over other participating agencies will make up the difference. 

Within the DOD, a Unified Space Command has been created with 

responsibility for the use of military space assets. However, its 

responsibilities encompass only a segment of the national security space 

systems and even within that segment it is limited to operational matters. 

To date, joint programs and umbrella organizations have not been 

effective in coordinating the broad range of national security space 

activities. 

Security and Classif ication 

The security classification requirements created to protect U.S. space 

and intelligence capabilities during the Cold War contribute to 

inefficiencies in the conduct of the nation’s space program and limit the 

broader utility of certain systems. The objectives of national security 

systems have evolved over time, and the number of people allowed access 

to classified information relating to them has increased substantially. With 

the end of the Cold War, the original rationale for many of the current 

security safeguards is less compelling and the potential benefits from 

removing many security constraints are substantial. 

In addition, many of the technical capabilities subject to security 

protection have proliferated despite their being subject to classification. 

For example, Russia is marketing imagery with a spatial resolution of 

approximately two meters. In the coming decade, the cutting edge in 
24 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

technologies and systems designed to sense the Earth may increasingly be 

found in NASA’s unclassified Earth Observing System (EOS). 

Security constraints drive up the cost of U.S. government space 

programs in many ways. Physical and personnel requirements and their 

administration necessitate special building construction, extensive 

background checks, and systems for producing, processing, and storing 

material. They restrict the transfer of technical knowledge within the 

government and to and within industry. For industry, security 

requirements encourage the creation of separate facilities and a dedicated 

workforce, thus contributing to costly duplication and overlap. 

U.S. industrial competitiveness in the world marketplace is also affected 

because, for the most part, foreign sales and commercial spin-offs of highly 

classified space capabilities are not allowed. This contrasts with other 

sophisticated military equipment such as fighter aircraft where foreign 

purchases offset a portion of U.S. investment costs thus helping to maintain 

a production base in this country and contributing positively to the U.S. 

balance of trade. 

There have been some benefits of classification. Because of the sensitive 

aspects of high security systems, a more streamlined management structure 

was employed for overseeing their acquisition and operation. This 

streamlining reduced overhead costs, eliminated unnecessary paperwork, 

reduced decision time, and yielded high quality, high performance 

systems. These practices should be preserved and could be applied more 

broadly across the U.S. space program to reduce the cost and shorten the 

development time for other civil and military space programs. 

While many potential benefits could be gained by reducing security 

requirements, it remains important to protect certain sensitive national 

security space capabilities. Because of increased threats posed by 

proliferation of the technologies associated with weapons of mass 

destruction, stemming the proliferation of ballistic missile technology 

remains a major concern. 
Federal Government Space Activities 25 

The Task Group endorses recent actions by the Administration to 

reduce security requirements including the declassification of some 

information concerning the NRO and the launch of national security 

satellites. Relaxing additional security constraints could: 

- enable industry to more easily move employees between civil and 

national security development programs 

- ensure that technology and experience developed for one government 

application are easily transferable to other government or private sector 

applications 

- reduce the overhead costs associated with maintaining strict physical 

and personnel security 

- increase the data available to support public benefit applications 

- provide an opportunity for U.S. industry to market systems or 

capabilities, either through some form of foreign military sales or 

through sale of information. The export of some advanced satellite 

technologies and systems would strengthen the competitiveness of the 

U.S. private sector in the international marketplace. 

Federal Acquisition Regulations 

A third area of possible savings relates to the processes and procedures 

associated with the acquisition of space systems by the government. 

Current acquisition rules create a burden on space programs - adding 

cost and time to everything. Many previous advisory group reports have 

contained specific recommendations for improvements in this area. 

Implementing the recommendations put forward by the Packard 

Commission, the Augustine Committee, and recently by the Vice 

President’s Space Policy Advisory Board Task Group report on The Future 

of the U.S. Space Industrial Base could yield substantial savings in the cost 

of conducting the space programs of the nation. 
26 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

Findings 

1. The U.S. government’s organization of space activities is not 

appropriate for the post Cold War era. 

- Government resources committed to space are not being efficiently 

used. Government space-related organizations have proliferated and 

they have too many facilities and too many employees focused on 

redundant oversight and operational activities. 

- No process exists to ensure: that agency space efforts utilize other 

agency-developed capabilities and technologies; that programmatic and 

facility redundancies are removed; or, that other synergism is gained 

among diverse space efforts when possible. 

- Space launch capabilities are required by all users of space. Current 

launch capabilities cost too much, lack responsiveness and flexibility, 

and are not sufficiently safe or reliable. A coherent national effort to 

improve launch capabilities is desperately needed. 

- No coordinated national effort currently exists to encourage the sharing 

of government-sponsored space technology among U.S. government 

agencies or between the government and the private sector. 

- With the overall decline in general defense spending, procurement 

practices and acquisition decisions related to any single program will 

effect the industrial capacity for other programs. No mechanism exists 

to ensure cooperation and consultation among the space sectors prior 

to individual agency actions affecting the space industrial base. 

2. A focus specifically on space issues within the Executive Office of the 

President is required to develop policies and strategies for coordination of 

civil, commercial, and national security space activities. 

3. The demands on space budgets associated with operating and 

maintaining successful ongoing programs will increasingly consume 

available resources. Without significant management adjustments, 

focussed on reducing the operational costs of missions, the nation will not 
Federal Government Space Activities 27 

be able to develop the advanced technologies and capabilities which form 

the underpinnings of space leadership in the future. 

4. Current government guidelines regarding the classification of national 

security space activities, including secrecy surrounding organizational and 

contractual relationships, the existence and capabilities of space programs, 

operating procedures, and technology increase costs, restrict coordination 

and cooperation, and limit opportunities for productive synergism. 
Federal Government Space Activities 27 

be able to develop the advanced technologies and capabilities which form 

the underpinnings of space leadership in the future. 

4. Current government guidelines regarding the classification of national 

security space activities, including secrecy surrounding organizational and 

contractual relationships, the existence and capabilities of space programs, 

operating procedures, and technology increase costs, restrict coordination 

and cooperation, and limit opportunities for productive synergism. 
5 

The Relationship 

Between Government and Industry 

The U.S. government accomplishes its space goals in cooperation with 

industry. It is through industry that policies and plans are transformed 

into the hardware and software of actual space programs. In turn, the 

space industry in this country is almost totally dependent on the 

government. The civil space sector and the military space sector combined 

spend $30 billion per year of federal funds in pursuit of space goals. The 

U.S. commercial space sector represented $5 billion in 1992 sales and is 

growing at double digit rates. However, of these commercial sales, 

approximately 30 percent are made directly to the federal government. 

The remainder are heavily influenced by the government through 

regulatory processes, export controls, financial incentives, and licensing 

requirements. 

U.S. government space programs benefit from commercial sales by the 

industry. For example, sale of commercial space launch services enables 

stable production rates thus reducing unit costs and increasing reliability. 

The same is true for production of satellite components which can be used 

for both commercial and government satellites. Other examples include 

value-added processing for meteorological and remote-sensing data and 

ground terminals for communications and navigation systems. 

However, the United States no longer dominates the international 

marketplace for space hardware and services. 60 percent of all commercial 

space launches are performed by Europe’s Ariane rocket. A decade ago, 
30 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

the United States had more than an 80 percent share of the worldwide 

commercial communications satellite market. The U.S. share of that market 

for the 1990 to 1993 time period is estimated to be just over 50 percent. 

French firms have captured about 20 percent of this important and 

growing market. In addition, Japan has the worldwide lead in providing 

large satellite ground stations. These shifts in market share are largely the 

result of focused decisions by other industrial nations to pursue 

commercial space activities. Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan take 

justifiable pride in considering their space industries to be the “Crown 

Jewels” of their industrial base. 

Government and industry are indeed partners in space. But factors 

resulting from the changed domes tic and international circums tames are 

straining this partnership and the relationship between industry and 

government is perceived by industry to be less cooperative than it was in 

the past. This relationship is governed by a myriad of complex laws and 

frequently changing policies, processes, regulations, restrictions, and 

requirements some of which were established to foster expanded 

competition. The need for simplification and reform to these laws and 

regulations is accentuated by the ongoing contraction in the aerospace 

industry. Without question, the efficiency of the contraction process is 

adversely affected by current government regulatory practices. 

Additionally, the government’s interest in protecting commercially 

valuable proprietary information is probably greater now than in the past 

because of the heightened economic implications of space industry 

competitiveness in the international marketplace. 

The Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board report, The Future of 

the U.S. Space Industrial Base, recently addressed these and other issues 

affecting the relationship between the U.S. government and its industrial 

partners. In preparing that report, the task group solicited the views of a 

broad spectrum of industrial firms, both large and small, that provide 

space systems and services in the civil, military, and commercial space 

sectors. One of the recurring themes in these presentations was that the 

government is not a particularly good partner and that friction between 

partners becomes more critical in an era of restructuring and contraction. 

Fifteen specific recommendations were presented in six generic categories. 

Many of these recommendations dealt directly with improving the efficacy 
The Relationship Between Government and industry 37 

of the partnership between government and industry; including easing 

antitrust laws to permit efficient consolidation within industry, 

implementing many previously recommended improvements to the 

acquisition process, and actively promoting a robust commercial space 

industry. Other significant recommendations included maintaining a 

strong emphasis on research and technology by both DOD and NASA 

during this period of contraction; stressing the importance of DOD and 

NASA working more closely together; and emphasizing the need for a 

modern and cost-effective expendable launch system. The industrial base 

report, released in November 1992, should be considered a companion 

piece to this policy assessment. 

Findings 

1. The continued international competitiveness of the U.S. space industry 

strengthens the U.S. space program and promotes the civil and national 

security interests of the nation. 

2. For over a decade, the government fostered expansion of the space 

industrial base resulting now in substantial overcapacity in many segments 

of the industry. A number of current government laws and regulations 

serve as disincentives for effective industry contraction. 

3. Government acquisition laws and regulations continue to foster 

inefficiencies and to contribute unnecessarily to the cost and complexity of 

space programs. 

4. Government procedures and security regulations deter use of 

government-funded space systems and technologies for commercial 

applications, adversely effecting the global economic competitiveness of 

U.S. industry. 

5. The DOD budget strategy for general defense programs is to reduce 

production while maintaining a robust research and technology base. 

However, DOD acquisition policies do not encourage the industry to invest 

in or otherwise support research and development. 
32 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

6. Security constraints inhibit U.S. industrial competitiveness resulting in 

lower foreign sales of security-related space hardware and services and, 

thus, increased costs to the U.S. government. 

7. Restrictions surrounding industrial proprietary information should be 

respected by government as they are needed to safeguard U.S. industrial 

competitiveness. 
6 

International Cooperation 

Current national space policy states that “the United States will conduct 

international cooperative space-related activities that are expected to 

achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits 

to the nation.” This policy makes clear that international cooperation is a 

means to achieve additional benefits from the U.S. space program, not an 

end in itself. 

The United States cooperates with many countries in both civil and 

national security space efforts. Such cooperation takes a wide variety of 

forms, depending both on the character of the cooperative activity and on 

the identity of the international partner. Among the approaches to 

cooperation that have been employed are: 

- Data exchange (e.g., U.S.-USSR in life sciences, SCUD warning to allies 

in Desert Storm); 

- Providing technical assistance or services (e.g., foreign use of the Deep 

Space Network; reimbursable launches of non-U.S. spacecraft 

supporting civil and military needs); 

- Joint projects with the United States in control of the critical path for 

mission success (e.g., Space Station Freedom; Cassini); 

- Joint projects with shared control of the critical path (e.g., ApolloSoyuz, satellite tracking, telemetry, and control systems); 
34 A Post Cold War Assessment of US. Space Policy 

- Joint projects with others in control of the critical path (e.g., 

Topex/Poseidon). 

Throughout the space age, the United States has been, by and large, 

forthcoming in sharing its space expertise with other nations. While 

avoiding unwarranted technology transfer, the United States has been 

willing to provide its partners access to scientific data, services, and 

capabilities. For this reason, the United States has been the partner of 

choice for most countries, and this has given the U.S. space program 

significant influence and prestige. 

Basis For Future Cooperation 

There is, thus, already substantial experience with a wide variety of 

cooperative mechanisms, and it is reasonable to expect more opportunities 

to emerge in the future. Because the challenge of competition exists along 

with opportunities for cooperation, an overall strategy is needed to 

determine how best to obtain substantive benefits for the United States 

while minimizing the added complexities and risks that are unavoidable 

in cooperative agreements. 

Increasing budgetary pressures have, not surprisingly, heightened U.S. 

interest in benefitting from the capabilities and resources of other countries 

in achieving objectives in space. The United States will want to continue 

to cooperate with its traditional partners and to initiate cooperation with 

some newer ones like the former Soviet republics and emerging 

spacefaring countries such as Korea and Taiwan. 

Other nations are also experiencing funding pressures, thus increasing 

their interest in collaborative ventures in space with the United States. 

Indeed, the country with perhaps the most to offer as a cooperative partner 

- Russia - is the one faced with the most daunting financial challenges. 

A consequence thereof is Russia’s intense interest in collaboration with the 

United States. 

Like the choice of a cooperative mechanism, the choice of a partner or 

partners for the United States should be approached from a strategic 

perspective. Engaging other countries in cooperative ventures is an 
International Cooperation 35 

effective demonstration of space leadership provided that the United States 

is able to sustain its part of the cooperative agreement. 

Military and Civil Opportunities 

Although the realities of the Cold War and the classification boundaries 

surrounding national security space systems have placed constraints on 

cooperation, the benefits of many U.S. military capabilities in space are 

provided today to the United States’ closest allies. Additional opportunity 

now exists in the post Cold War environment to extend U.S. national 

security capabilities to many other countries. These opportunities include 

use of military space assets - navigation, communication, meteorological, 

and surveillance systems - for non-defense applications such as search 

and rescue assistance, environmental monitoring, emergency 

communications, and disaster warning and relief coordination. Peacetime 

uses by other countries of U.S. national security space systems could 

include tactical or strategic missile warning, navigation, weather 

forecasting, and routine communications. In times of conflict space support 

to U.S. allies could include defense against ballistic missiles, surveillance, 

intelligence, highly precise navigation, targeting, and other applications. 

In addition to the obvious benefits of such cooperation, a U.S. initiative 

in this direction would allow U.S. industry to compete with others around 

the world who are already marketing space systems and technologies with 

security capabilities. Inviting other countries to cooperate with the United 

States in the national security space arena might also discourage the 

proliferation of independent military space capabilities and provide 

incentives for countries to comply with the Missile Technology Control 

Regime and related measures to make the world a safer place. 

NASA, operating in a very different context, has included some degree 

of international participation in almost every project it undertakes. The 

result is a vigorous and largely successful range of cooperative 

undertakings with both spacefaring and other countries. As suggested 

above, civil space cooperation covers a wide range of activities, from 

simple data exchanges to the largest ever cooperative undertaking in the 

technological sector, Space Station Freedom. Civil space cooperation has 

been structured in accordance with a set of principles that were established 
36 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

early on by NASA to reduce risks such as unwanted technology transfer 

and U.S. dependence on others for mission success, as well as to protect 

other U.S. interests. Key elements of the NASA approach include clean 

technical and managerial interfaces, limited technology transfer, no 

exchange of funds, and, in most cases, U.S. management control and 

provision of critical path hardware. These principles are likely to require 

revision or flexible interpretation if there is to be enhanced civil space 

cooperation in the future and if the United States is to take full advantage 

of the capabilities of its international partners. 

For example, other countries have developed various advanced space 

capabilities, and they argue that making those capabilities available to the 

United States in a cooperative undertaking needs to be accompanied by a 

significant role in the control and execution of that undertaking. The 

United States needs to give careful consideration to ways that non-U.S. 

capabilities can be more effectively used, together with those of this 

country, to achieve more than would be possible without cooperation. 

However, the United States must also recognize that at least one 

motivation of foreign governments in developing their own space 

capabilities will continue to be to enhance their own technological and 

economic competitiveness. Further, a strong motivation for engaging in 

cooperative ventures with the United States is gaining access to U.S. 

technologies and know-how that complement and improve their own 

indigenous capabilities. 

Findings 

1. Expanded international cooperation presents strategic opportunities for 

the United States. 

- All space-faring countries are feeling political and financial pressures 

that limit their space aspirations. By taking the lead in shaping future 

cooperative undertakings so that working together in the civil and 

military aspects of space becomes more common and widespread, the 

United States can enhance its foreign policy, economic, and national 

security interests, as well as advance its programmatic objectives in 

space. 
Infernnfional Cooperation 37 

- Expanded cooperation in military uses of space, could dampen the 

proliferation of independent space launch, warfighting, and support 

systems while offering a new set of opportunities for the United States 

to take a leading role in shaping cooperative undertakings that provide 

economic, political, and security benefits to this country. 

2. U.S. approaches to international cooperation in the civil and national 

security uses of space should be modified to better suit U.S. interests. 

- It is becoming increasingly difficult to create and sustain productive 

cooperation when U.S. projects extend over long time spans and are 

very expensive, requiring international partners to make lengthy, 

expensive commitments. Cooperation is likely to be more feasible and 

productive when it is focused on undertakings that can be 

accomplished in a relatively short time and with modest budgetary 

requirements. 

- Increasing cooperation will proliferate technical knowledge and may 

enhance others nation’s ability to challenge U.S. industry in the 

international marketplace. 

- Future cooperative projects will more often be developed and 

implemented on a multilateral basis, rather than the bilateral basis that 

has characterized much cooperative activity in the past. 

- Certain future projects can only be pursued through significant reliance 

on international cooperation and many others can benefit from such 

cooperation. 

- Although a comprehensive strategy should guide the development of 

the U.S. approach to collaboration, there is also a need for a case-bycase approach to developing specific cooperative agreements. 

- If U.S. partners make significant financial and technical contributions 

to future cooperative undertakings, they will expect some revision in 

the traditional U.S. demands for control over critical path items and 

management arrangements. 
38 A Post Cold WUY Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

3. The United States has developed a range of space assets that have the 

potential for broad public service applications. Sharing these assets can 

save lives and otherwise improve the quality of life on this planet; doing 

so would add to U.S. prestige and the perception of the United States as 

a worthy leader in other global undertakings. 
7 

Recommendations 

Policy Recommendation 1 

Major changes should be made in the way government space 

activities are organized and managed. The need to maintain distinct 

civil and national security space sectors remains valid but planning 

should be centralized across sectors and its execution streamlined 

within the respective sectors. 

Implementation 

1. Strengthen the Executive Office coordinating function currently being 

performed by the National Space Council to oversee the actions called for 

in this report and to develop cross-sector strategies in areas such as space 

technology, environmental monitoring and other applications, international 

relationships, design commonality and standards, and the sharing of 

systems and data among agencies. 

2. Create a national space launch management arrangement led by an 

individual with responsibility and authority for planning and coordinating 

U.S. space launch capability as recommended by the Vice President’s Space 

Policy Advisory Board’s Task Group Report, The Future of the U.S. Space 

Launch Capability. 
40 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

3. Begin the process of reducing overlap and duplication by centralizing 

the technical management of space systems (i.e., development, acquisition, 

launch, and spacecraft control functions) into fewer organizations with the 

long term goal of having two space organizations, one civil and one 

military. Continue to expand the use of space by encouraging broad 

agency involvement in the definition of system requirements and the 

identification of applications for space-derived products. 

4. Establish a non-partisan commission modeled after the Base Closure 

Commission to recommend actions to “right-size” U.S. government space 

infrastructure, whether government or contractor operated. This review 

should include all DOD, NASA, and DOE laboratories and centers. 

5. Support ongoing reform efforts within NASA. Additionally, NASA 

should be encouraged to establish success milestones and objectives for 

major programs and supported in phasing out programs promptly upon 

completion of those objectives. More generally, NASA should improve the 

efficiency of its programs in order to create opportunities within projected 

level budgets for new initiatives. New initiatives should be designed in 

ways which minimize operations costs and should include smaller, shorter 

duration, less expensive missions which can be developed and launched 

within fewer than approximately five years. 

Policy Recommendation 2 

Seek to reduce, and where possible eliminate, security constraints 

associated with national security space programs. 

Implementation 

1. The President should establish policy guidance which limits the 

classification of all but the most sensitive technologies, systems, and 

information concerning space-related activities. 

2. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should 

develop a plan for implementing the new policy guidance. The plan 

should identify cost savings, opportunities for synergy, and the minimum 
Recommendations 41 

level of classification needed to safeguard the national security interests of 

the nation. 

3. This plan should be independently reviewed prior to its implementation 

to assess the appropriate balance between national security needs and the 

benefits to civil and commercial space of synergism and cost efficiencies. 

4. Recognizing the continuing sensitivity of certain space-derived 

information, as well as its potential civil and scientific benefits, a 

mechanism should be established to facilitate access to unclassified 

versions of sensitive data for public use. 

Policy Recommendation 3 

Revitalize, on an urgent basis, a more productive cooperative 

relationship between the U.S. government and the space industry to 

meet the increased challenge of international competition and cope 

with reductions in defense spending. 

Implementation 

1. Implement the recommendations contained in the Vice President’s 

Space Policy Advisory Board’s Task Group Report, The Future of the U.S. 

Space Industrial Base. 

2. The Administration and Congress should take additional actions to 

improve the relationship between government and industry in at least the 

following areas. 

- Appropriate interpretations of existing antitrust regulations as an aid 

to efficient contraction by industry. 

- Extension of antitrust exemptions to include consortia engaged in 

production. 
42 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

- Implementation of the backlog of procurement reform 

recommendations to improve acquisition efficiency and reduce 

burdensome procurement procedures. 

- Review of research and development recoupment policies to eliminate 

disincentives to commercialization of DOD-developed technologies. 

- Seek to strengthen incentives for industry to conduct mission oriented 

research and development. 

- Review policies such as munitions lists, export controls, and security 

restrictions that inhibit the competitiveness of U.S. industry. 

- Review the federal tax code to identify and eliminate disincentives to 

industry downsizing. 

Policy Recommendation 4 

The United States should take the initiative in shaping a common 

international agenda in selected areas of civil and national security 

space activity. One goal is to find ways to use the space capabilities 

of the world for common objectives. Enhanced international 

cooperation should be sought not only for its programmatic benefits, 

but also because it is the preferred way for the United States to 

influence the direction of future space undertakings around the world. 

Broader national security, political, technological, and economic 

benefits for the United States can flow from a carefully crafted 

“cooperative strategy” which balances the realities of economic 

competition with the potential benefits of cooperation. 

Implementation 

1. The United States should develop a “cooperative strategy” as a central 

element of its future approach to overall space policy. This strategy should 

balance the benefits of cooperation with the recognition that other countries 

often cooperate with the United States to enhance their own future 

capabilities by gaining access to U.S. technology and know how. 
Recommendations 43 

2. The United States should be selectively willing to be dependent on 

foreign suppliers for essential components or systems, but should retain 

control over systems integration in cooperative missions for which it 

provides the majority of funding and maintain a technology base that will 

reduce risks associated with foreign dependence. 

3. In the course of structuring cooperative relationships, care must be 

taken not to distort the programmatic content of cooperative programs, 

endanger U.S. industrial competitiveness, or compromise the objectives of 

the Missile Technology Control Regime and other non-proliferation regimes 

in order to achieve policy objectives not related to space. 

4. The United States should employ the existing space assets and 

capabilities of the former Soviet Union on a selective basis when they offer 

unique programmatic benefits, and should encourage collaboration 

between U.S. industry and the privatizing space organizations of the 

former Soviet Union in developing future space capabilities. 
Acknowledgements 

We are grateful to the following individuals who provided the perspectives of 

various government agencies engaged in space-related activities: 

Hon. Brian D. Dailey 

Hon. Donald Atwood 

Amb. Frank Weisner 

Hon. Martin Faga 

Hon. Marc Stanley 

Hon. Aaron Cohen 

Amb. Henry Cooper 

Mr. Jimmey Hill 

Dr. John Boright 

Michelle Van Cleave, Esq. 

Lt Gen Thomas Moorman 

Executive Secretary, National Space Council 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of State for National Security Affairs 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and Director, 

National Reconnaissance Office 

Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce 

Acting Deputy Administrator, NASA 

Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Office 

Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and 

Technology Affairs 

General Counsel and Assistant Director for National 

Security, Office of Science and Technology Policy 

Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command 

We are indebted to the members of the National Space Council staff who supported 

this study; Dr. Joe Scifers, Gerald Musarra, Esq., and special thanks to lead staffer, Col. 

James R. Beale, USAF. 

We enjoyed truly outstanding service from our support contractor, ANSER, 

employees; Stephen M. Hopkins and Kip Stacy. 

Each of us is grateful to the individuals in our respective offices and homes for 

supporting this activity. 

Finally, we wish to express our gratitude to Tom Paine, a pioneering leader and 

innovator, whose recent passing has cost the nation his sound counsel as we move 

toward a new era of space achievement. 
Appendix I 

Task Group Members 

Laurel L. Wilkening 

Dr. Wilkening is the chair of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory 

Board and is Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs of the 

University of Washington, where she is also Professor of Geological 

Sciences and Adjunct Professor of Astronomy. In 1985, President Reagan 

appointed her Vice Chairman of the National Commission on Space. In 

1990, she served as Vice Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Future 

of the U.S. Space Program (the Augustine Committee). Prior to going to 

the University of Washington,‘she was Vice President for Research, Dean 

of the Graduate College, and Professor of Planetary Sciences at the 

University of Arizona. She also served as Director of the Lunar and 

Planetary Laboratory there from 1981 - 1983. She is a fellow of the 

Meteorological Society and the American Association for the Advancement 

of Science. As a planetary scientist, her areas of research are meteorites, 

asteroids, and comets. The book Comets, which she edited in 1982, is a 

widely used reference on the topic. Dr. Wilkening earned a Ph.D. in 

chemistry from the University of California, San Diego, and a B.A. in 

chemistry from Reed College, Portland, Oregon. 

James A. Abrahamson 

Lieutenant General Abrahamson, USAF (Ret.), is Chairman of the Board, 

Oracle, Corporation. Prior to joining Oracle, he served as Executive Vice 

President for Corporate Development of the Hughes Aircraft Company. 

After a 33-year career, he retired in 1989 while serving as the first Strategic 

Defense Initiative director, where he provided policy direction and 
Appendix I 

Task Group Members 

Laurel L. Wilkening 

Dr. Wilkening is the chair of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory 

Board and is Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs of the 

University of Washington, where she is also Professor of Geological 

Sciences and Adjunct Professor of Astronomy. In 1985, President Reagan 

appointed her Vice Chairman of the National Commission on Space. In 

1990, she served as Vice Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Future 

of the U.S. Space Program (the Augustine Committee). Prior to going to 

the University of Washington,‘she was Vice President for Research, Dean 

of the Graduate College, and Professor of Planetary Sciences at the 

University of Arizona. She also served as Director of the Lunar and 

Planetary Laboratory there from 1981 - 1983. She is a fellow of the 

Meteorological Society and the American Association for the Advancement 

of Science. As a planetary scientist, her areas of research are meteorites, 

asteroids, and comets. The book Comets, which she edited in 1982, is a 

widely used reference on the topic. Dr. Wilkening earned a Ph.D. in 

chemistry from the University of California, San Diego, and a B.A. in 

chemistry from Reed College, Portland, Oregon. 

James A. Abrahamson 

Lieutenant General Abrahamson, USAF (Ret.), is Chairman of the Board, 

Oracle, Corporation. Prior to joining Oracle, he served as Executive Vice 

President for Corporate Development of the Hughes Aircraft Company. 

After a 33-year career, he retired in 1989 while serving as the first Strategic 

Defense Initiative director, where he provided policy direction and 
1-2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

supervised key research and development programs and the acquisition 

process. Prior to that, he served as Associate Administrator for NASA’s 

Space Transportation System and was responsible for the Space Shuttle 

Program. He also directed the F-16 consortium for the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization co-production of this aircraft. He is a Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology graduate with a B.S. in aeronautical engineering 

and an M.S. in the same field from the University of Oklahoma. He was 

the 1986 recipient of the Goddard trophy. 

Edward C. (“Pete”) Aldridge 

Mr Aldridge is currently President and CEO, Aerospace Corporation. He 

chaired the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board Task Group 

which prepared The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability.” Prior to 

joining the Aerospace Corporation, Mr. Aldridge was President, McDonnell 

Douglas Electronic Systems Company, in McLean, Virginia. From 1986 to 

1988, Mr. Aldridge served as Secretary of the Air Force. He joined the 

Reagan Administration in 1981 as the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in 

which one of his key responsibilities was coordinating the Air Force and 

national security space activities. Mr. Aldridge was in astronaut training 

before the Challenger accident. He has held numerous management 

positions in government (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of 

Management and Budget) and the aerospace industry (System Planning 

Corporation, LTV Corp and Douglas Aircraft Co.) Mr. Aldridge was an 

advisor on the Strategic Arms Limitation Task (SALT I) in 1970-72. He 

holds a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from Texas A&M University and 

an MS. in Aeronautical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of 

Technology. 

Joseph P. Allen 

Dr. Allen is President and Chief Executive Officer, Space Industries 

International, Inc., in League City, Texas. From 1967 until 1988, Dr. Allen 

served as an astronaut with NASA. His management duties involved 

astronaut candidate selection and training and he additionally served as a 

ground support crewman and CAPCOM for Apollo 15, Apollo 17 and STS1. He flew as a prime crew member on STS5, the first Shuttle flight to 

deploy cargo in space, and on STS 51-A, the first space flight to salvage 

equipment from space. Dr. Allen also served at NASA Headquarters as 

Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs from 1975-1978. He is the 

author of “Entering Space”, a ‘personal account of the space flight 
Task Group Members 1-3 

experience, and has published widely in the fields of science education and 

nuclear physics research. Dr. Allen received an undergraduate degree in 

mathematics and physics from DePauw University and holds Masters and 

Ph.D. degrees in physics from Yale University. 

Daniel J. Fink 

Mr Fink is President of D. J. Fink Associates, Inc., which provides 

management consulting to technology based industries. He chaired the 

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board Task Group which prepared 

“The Future of the U.S. Space Industrial Base.” Mr. Fink’s over 40 years in 

aerospace engineering and management include service in the DOD as 

Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering, Strategic & Space 

Systems. Following his government service he joined the General Electric 

Company in 1968. He was Vice President of that company where he first 

led GE’s Space Division, then its Aerospace Group, and later was Senior 

Vice President Corporate Development and Planning. Mr. Fink served on 

the Defense Science Board and is a former Chairman of the NASA 

Advisory Council. He is a Member of the National Academy of 

Engineering and was Chairman of the NRC Space Applications board and 

its Board on Telecommunications and Computer Applications. His honors 

and awards include the DOD Distinguished Service Award, the NASA 

Distinguished Public Service Medal and the Collier Trophy (for his work 

on Landsat). He is an Honorary Fellow of the American Institute of 

Aeronautics & Astronautics and a former President. He received his B.S. 

and M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology. 

John S. Foster, Jr. 

Dr. Foster is a former Director of Livermore Laboratory and Associate 

Director of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. He served at the 

University of California’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 

1952 through 1965. In 1965, Dr. Foster was named Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense and served in 

that position for eight years. After leaving DOD, Dr. Foster joined TRW 

where he served for 15 years retiring as Vice President, Science and 

Technology. He has served on the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board for 14 years and is presiding Chairman of the Defense 

Science Board. He is a member of the Industrial Advisory Committee on 

SDI, the National Advisory Board of the American Security Council, and 
1-4 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

the Committee On The Present Danger. Dr. Foster earned his Ph.D. in 

physics from the University of California, Berkeley. 

Edward Frieman 

Dr. Edward Frieman is Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography 

of the University of California at San Diego and is Vice Chancellor of 

Marine Science. Prior to his appointment at Scripps, he was Executive Vice 

President of Science Applications International Corporation in San Diego, 

California. He served as director of energy research with the U.S. 

Department of Energy and as the department’s Assistant Secretary during 

1979-81. Dr. Frieman was professor of astrophysical sciences and Deputy 

Director of the Plasma Physics Laboratory at Princeton University from 

1952 to 1979. He is a member of the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board, 

the White House Science Council, the President’s Science Council, the 

Planning and Steering Group of the Advanced Technology Panel for the 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the National Academy of Sciences Ocean 

Studies Board, the California Council on Science and Technology, and is 

chairman of the Secretary of Defense’s Task Force on Anti-Submarine 

Warfare. Dr. Fireman earned his bachelor’s degree in engineering from 

Columbia University in New York and received Master’s and Doctoral 

degrees in physics from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, New York. 

Don Fuqua 

Mr. Fuqua is President and General Manager of the Aerospace Industries 

Association and serves as a leading spokesperson for the U.S. aerospace 

industry. Before joining AIA, Mr. Fuqua served 12 terms as a U.S. 

Congressman, representing Florida’s Second Congressional District. He 

was elected Chairman of the House Science and Technology Committee in 

1979 after serving on the Committee since joining Congress in 1963. He is 

a member of the NASA’s Advisory Council and is a founding member of 

the Challenger Center for Space Science Education. Mr. Fuqua has 

received numerous awards including the Rotary National Award for Space 

Achievement in 1988, and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration Distinguished Public Service Medal and the National 

Science Foundation Distinguished Public Service Award, both in 1986. Mr. 

Fuqua graduated from the University of Florida with a degree in 

agriculture economics. He also has honorary doctorates from the 

University of Notre Dame, Florida Institute of Technology, Florida State 

University, Florida A&M University, and the University of Florida. 
Task Group Members l-5 

Donald J. Kutyna 

General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF (Ret.), retired after 35 years in the Air 

Force after having served as commander in chief of the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the United States Space 

Command. His military assignments include command of the Air Force 

Space Command, Vice Commander of the Space Division of Air Force 

Systems Command where he oversaw all space system acquisitions, with 

particular emphasis on programs associated with the Strategic Defense 

Initiative, and Director Space Systems and Command, Control, and 

Communications within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Air Force 

Research and Development. General Kutyna served on as a member of the 

presidential commission investigating the Challenger accident in 1986. He 

is a qualified command pilot with more than 4,500 flying hours in 26 

different fighters and bombers. He received the National Geographic 

Society’s General Thomas D. White United States Air Force Space Trophy 

in 1987 and the Air Force Associations’s Schriever Award in 1991. General 

Kutyna earned his B.S. from the United States Military Academy and a 

M.S. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

John M. Logsdon 

Dr. Logsdon is Director of the Center for International Science and 

Technology Policy and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington 

University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he is also 

Professor of Political Science and International Affairs. He is author of The 

Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, and has 

written numerous articles and reports on space and science and technology 

policy. He is a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, the 

Board of Advisors of The Planetary Society, the Board of Directors of the 

National Space Society, and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board 

of the National Research Council. He is a former chairman of the 

Committee on Science and Public Policy of the American Association for 

the Advancement of Science and of the Education Committee of the 

International Astronomical Federation. Dr. Logsdon is the first holder of 

the Chair in Space History of the National Air and Space Museum. He 

earned a B.S. in physics from Xavier University and a Ph.D. in political 

science from New York University. 
Task Group Members 

Donald J. Kutyna 

1-5 

General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF (Ret.), retired after 35 years in the Air 

Force after having served as commander in chief of the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the United States Space 

Command. His military assignments include command of the Air Force 

Space Command, Vice Commander of the Space Division of Air Force 

Systems Command where he oversaw all space system acquisitions, with 

particular emphasis on programs associated with the Strategic Defense 

Initiative, and Director Space Systems and Command, Control, and 

Communications within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Air Force 

Research and Development. General Kutyna served on as a member of the 

presidential commission investigating the Challenger accident in 1986. He 

is a qualified command pilot with more than 4,500 flying hours in 26 

different fighters and bombers. He received the National Geographic 

Society’s General Thomas D. White United States Air Force Space Trophy 

in 1987 and the Air Force Associations’s Schriever Award in 1991. General 

Kutyna earned his B.S. from the United States Military Academy and a 

M.S. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

John M. Logsdon 

Dr. Logsdon is Director of the Center for International Science and 

Technology Policy and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington 

University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he is also 

Professor of Political Science and International Affairs. He is author of The 

Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, and has 

written numerous articles and reports on space and science and technology 

policy. He is a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, the 

Board of Advisors of The Planetary Society, the Board of Directors of the 

National Space Society, and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board 

of the National Research Council. He is a former chairman of the 

Committee on Science and Public Policy of the American Association for 

the Advancement of Science and of the Education Committee of the 

International Astronomical Federation. Dr. Logsdon is the first holder of 

the Chair in Space History of the National Air and Space Museum. He 

earned a B.S. in physics from Xavier University and a Ph.D. in political 

science from New York University. 
I-6 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

Bruce C. Murray 

Dr. Murray is Professor of Planetary Science and Geology at the California 

Institute of Technology. From 1976 to 1982, he was Director of the 

NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory. As JPL Director, he oversaw the 

Viking landings on Mars (1976 - 1980) and the Voyager flybys of Jupiter 

and Saturn (1977 -1980). Dr. Murray was co-investigator on Mariner 4 

which flew by Mars in 1965, the first television probe to another planet. 

His involvement in both the science and technology of spacecraft imaging 

increased successively with the Mariner 6 and 7 Mars flybys (1969), the 

Mariner 9 Mars Orbiter (1971-72), and the Mariner 10 flyby of Venus and 

Mercury (1974-75), for which he was Imaging Team Leader. Dr. Murray 

is author or co-author of over 100 papers dealing with earth and space 

science and technology, and of six books; The Viezufrom Space (1971); Mars 

and the Mind of Man (1973); Navigating the Future (1975); Earthlike Planets 

(1981); and journey Into Space (1989). He is a member of the American 

Astronomical Association, a fellow of The American Academy of Arts and 

Sciences, and the American Geophysical Union. Dr. Murray earned his 

Ph.D. in Geology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Appendix II 

Task Statement 

A Task Group of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board is 

being formed to conduct a broad review of current U.S. national space 

policies in the context of the end of the Cold War and other factors. 

The fundamental principles which have guided the conduct of U.S. 

space activities were initially established nearly 35 years ago. The civil, 

commercial, and national security space programs of the United States 

have evolved within a policy framework that reflected the international 

tensions, as well as the economic and technological constraints and other 

factors of the time. 

The situation has now changed. The end of the Cold War, the 

revolution in electronic and other space-related technologies; the 

international demand for space capabilities along with the proliferation of 

space technology to other nations, the lessons learned concerning the 

military use of space during Desert Storm, and other factors present new 

opportunities for cooperation and progress. The budget deficit and 

changes in the aerospace industrial base associated with lessened defense 

spending impose new constraints. More than ever before, the United 

States must ensure that it gets maximum return from its investments in 

space. 
II-2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

The Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board recently assessed two 

critical areas that are building blocks for a successful space program. One 

Task Group examined ways that America’s critical space-related iibdustries 

are being affected by the defense build-down. A second Task Group 

sought to defy the limits of scarce resources by identifying ways to provide 

the nation with low cost launch systems that are safer and more reliable 

than the aging systems of today and more responsive to military and civil 

needs. The findings and recommendations of these assessments will 

provide a solid foundation for this comprehensive policy review. 

In considering the affect of the new opportunities and constraints on 

U.S. national space policies, the Task Group should make policy 

recommendations which would have the affect of increasing the efficiency 

of federal government space activities to enable the best space program 

possible for the funds available; maintaining U.S. leadership and 

competitiveness for the 21st century; and, maintaining an industrial base 

capable of supporting future national security, civil, and commercial space 

requirements. 

The following policy areas should be among those considered. 

a. Policies affecting the synergism between civil, commercial, and 

military space activities in areas such as: 

- Cooperative development and sharing of new technology; 

- Greater use of common infrastructure such as launch facilities 

and ground tracking and data relay capabilities; 

- Greater use of common components, possibly adopting the 

commercial practice of using standard design satellites with 

mission unique payloads or establishing common design 

standards; 

- Shorter acquisition timelines that might be achieved by 

adopting the best attributes of commercial, military, and civil 

government procedures; 
Task Statement 11-3 

- Improved industrial productivity and accelerated transfer of 

technology and experience among space programs, possibly 

through some prudent adjustments in security and 

classification requirements and procedures; 

- Enhanced international competitiveness of the U.S. private 

sector through the easing of government restrictions on the 

export of satellites and space technology; and, 

- Increased use of commercial services to support federal 

government space requirements. 

b. Policies affecting international space cooperation including: 

- The potential for achieving U.S. space goals at lower cost or 

at higher levels of performance and reliability; 

- The potential for the U.S. private sector to benefit from 

technologies developed in other countries; 

- The potential implications for the US. domestic aerospace 

industry sector of federal government use of foreign 

suppliers to achieve U.S. space missions; and, 

- The potential risks associated with dependence on foreign 

governments and their private sector industries for 

components, sys terns, or the development of advanced 

technologies essential for U.S. space missions. 

c. Policies effecting the organization and management of 

government space activities which would enable faster, better, 

and less expensive programs. Considerations may include: 

- Institutional roles and responsibilities; 

- Acquisition oversight, particularly with regard to joint 

programs; 

- Space operations; and, 
11-4 A Post Cold War Assessment of US. Space Policy 

- The appropriate role of state and local governments and the 

private sector in the conduct of federal government space 

activities. 

d. Policies affecting the relationship between government and 

industry with a focus on ways to foster technological 

competitiveness and strengthen the overall U.S. trade stance in 

international markets. 

In carrying out its assessment, the Task Group should review 

current space policy guidance and assess the current applicability of those 

fundamental principles and assumptions that have historically guided the 

U.S. space program. It should build on the findings and recommendations 

of the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board Task Groups currently 

assessing space launch and industrial base-related issues, and should 

consider recent reviews of U.S. space policy and program, when applicable, 

including the 1990 report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the 

U.S. Space Program. 

The Task Group should complete its assessment of U.S. space policy 

and provide a written report and briefing on its findings and 

recommendations by December 20, 1992. 

-- _..““” 

----1 -.- .-.___ --.-. .._ I_---. l___l _-. ..- .-- _ L-.. 
Appendix III 

Recommendations from 

The Future of the U.S. Space Industrial Base 

Competency to Achieve National Objectives 

Recommendation 1: To achieve the greatest leverage in maintaining the 

U.S. space industrial base, the DOD must be successful in implementing its 

policy to strongly support research and advanced technology; NASA 

should increase its efforts in space technology and work more closely with 

industry on technology transfer. 

Recommendation 2: The government should promptly re-examine those 

laws and regulations that can inhibit efficient industry restructuring and 

“righ tsizing” including areas such as antitrust regulations and tax 

treatment of excess facilities. 

DOD/NASA Coordination 

Recommendation 3: The DOD and NASA should address space 

industrial base issues in a closely coordinated format. This should be a 

continuing effort to enable appropriate government action when critical 

capabilities are threatened. 

Recommendation 4: The DOD and NASA should jointly review the 

availability and capabilities of unique government and private space test 

facilities with the objective of developing a management plan for the 
111-2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

rational “rightsizing” of the facility base consistent with projected needs. 

A revitalized AACB would be an appropriate vehicle for such an effort. 

Individual Agency Measures 

Recommendation 5: The DOD and NASA should accelerate their 

adoption of the many past recommendations that have been made to 

increase the value received from contracted efforts. These should include 

minimizing unique requirements, using performance rather than design 

specifications, and greater use of commercial business practices and 

components. 

Recommendation 6: The decision criteria for contract awards should 

give higher weighting to the preservation of critical capabilities through 

measures such as evaluation of past performance, available facilities and 

skills, and the potential industry restructuring that could result from the 

award. 

Recommendation 7: Greater emphasis should be given to managing 

and reducing the operating costs of space systems. Minimizing such costs 

should be a major design criterion for new systems. 

Recommendation 8: Government agencies should promptly assess the 

commensurate downsizing of the in-house and support contractor base in 

light of industry restructuring and the efficiencies that can be achieved by 

the adoption of more commercial procurement practices. 

Space Launch 

Recommendation 9: The United States should implement a fair-trade 

agreement to provide interim insulation of the U.S. commercial launch 

industry from unrestricted market access by NMEs and define a 

“rules-of-the-road’ agreement with other governments. 

Recommendation 10: Through a coordinated NASA and DOD effort, the 

United States should improve existing launch vehicles and upgrade the 

operating infrastructure in order to drive launch costs down with 

improved reliability. 

I---‘ - 

I____ --_ - .--.---. -- .l_l_“- .” -__- --.-- -. - 
Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space industrial Base 111-3 

Recommendation 11: The United States must develop and make 

operational a modern low-cost launch system in order to reduce the cost 

of government space missions, provide the nation with a highly 

competitive commercial launch capability, and stimulate the increased use 

of space by lowering the cost of access. 

Commercial Space 

Recommendation 12: The government should take action to remove 

impediments and implement policies in areas such as export regulations, 

trade financing, and market-opening measures in order to improve the 

competitiveness of U.S. firms. 

Recommendation 13: Government agencies should seek procurement 

opportunities that promote the development of a robust commercial space 

industry through anchor tenancy, buying services and data rather than 

hardware, and using risk-shared technology demonstration programs. 

Recommendation 14: Government agencies should encourage multiple, 

small programs in developing space technology and systems in order to 

encourage innovation and accelerate the translation of ideas into useful 

products. 

Engineering Education 

Recommendation 15: The government should initiate a study by the 

National Research Council to assess the effect of the current defense 

drawdown on the selection by undergraduates of future technical career 

paths and the impact on our future ability to accomplish national objectives 

in space. 
Appendix IV 

Recommendations from 

The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability 

1. Revalidate the 1991 National Space Launch Strategy and establish 

a national policy and goal to remain internationally competitive in the 

space launch marketplace. The National Space Policy Directive 4, which 

establishes the National Space Launch Strategy continues to be valid 

guidance for developing the space launch system for the United States and 

the implementation of that strategy to remain internationally competitive 

should continue to receive priority within the affected government 

agencies. Alternatives to the strategy to either a) forgo new vehicle 

development and maintain existing launch vehicles, or b) attempt to “leapfrog” existing launch vehicle capability with reusable, and high-risk 

technology, we reject as inconsistent with maintenance of an effective, 

competitive, and high confidence space program. 

2. Create a more formal “national” space launch management 

arrangement led by an individual with responsibility and authority 

for the plannin g and coordination of U.S. space launch capability. 

There is a need to provide a more centralized planning, integration, and 

coordination function for implementing the National Space Launch 

Strategy and associated programs. Several management models could 

achieve the desired results. The Task Group recommends the following 

actions. First, establish an Executive Committee consisting of the heads of 

major agencies involved in space launch (DOD, NASA, and the Space 

Council) to provide overall space launch guidance, review and approve 
IV-2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

plans and program guidance, and adjudicate disputes among agencies 

involved. Second, designate a single authority (a “space launch authority”) 

responsible to the Executive Committee for planning, coordinating, and 

integrating U.S. space launch capabilities. This individual should: 1) be an 

Executive-Level appointee assigned within either NASA or DOD who 

reports directly to the agency head 2) have the authority to recommend an 

overall plan and agency funding allocations to the Executive Committee 

and, within the guidance provided by the Executive Committee, provide 

program direction to each organization or agency acquiring or operating 

space launch systems, and oversee program execution 3) be responsible 

for planning and coordinating space launch technology programs for both 

existing and new launch vehicles 4) be a focal point for factoring the 

interests of the U.S. commercial launch industry into government space 

launch plans, and 5) be responsible for government support of a small 

launch vehicle program. 

3. The space launch range modernization program being planned 

in the Air Force, known as the Range Standardization and Automation 

(RSA) project and related activities, should receive the highest priority 

in the space launch strategy implementation. Without the RSA 

modernization effort and other improvements that will support both the 

existing and future space launch vehicles, it is doubtful the necessary and 

desirable safety, reliability, and cost reduction improvements in space 

launch operations can be achieved. Furthermore, these improvements will 

enhance the competitiveness of commercial launches that share these 

facilities. 

4. Terminate the NLS development within the government agencies 

and establish a new space launch capability program within the 

United States, consistent with the revalidated strategy, and under the 

plannin g responsibility of the new “space launch authority.” The NLS 

program was oriented to develop a family of vehicles and design concepts 

that would lead to an ultimate heavy-lift launch vehicle. The Task Group 

rejects the near-term requirement for such a vehicle and believes that 

almost all of the government and commercial space launch requirements 

for the foreseeable future can be achieved with a vehicle in the lower range 

of payload performance being considered in the NLS program. 
Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability W-3 

5. A single “core” space launch vehicle should be pursued that, 

through modular performance improvements, can meet &l the 

medium and heavier lift requirements (20,000 to 50,000 pounds to low 

earth orbit) of civil, DOD, and commercial users. The new space launch 

vehicle program, to be known as “Spacelifter,” should have the following 

characteristics: 

- employ applicable NLS technology and operational concepts that 

would reduce its hardware and launch costs and increase its 

reliability to the maximum extent reasonable and affordable 

- compatible with both cargo and manned payloads, and have a 

performance capability that ranges from 20,000 pounds to 50,000 

pounds to LEO with modular concepts (such as strap-on boosters or 

other innovative modular approaches to achieve the range of 

performance desired) 

- a new high-energy upper stage to satisfy the full range of payload 

requirements 

- a “design-to-launch-cost” goal of a factor-of-two below existing U.S. 

launch vehicles 

- utilize appropriate commercial practices for the acquisition and 

operation 

- extensively instrumented to minimize down-time if failure should 

occur 

- man-rateable 

- a very desirable goal is to be as nearly “environmentally clean” as 

possible 

- Initial Launch Capability planned for the 2000 period to be consistent 

with depletion of comparable performance launch vehicle inventories 

and satellite block changes (such as the Follow-on Early Warning 

System (FEWS), or planned commercial satellites) required at that 

time 
IV-4 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

- a transition plan to the new launch vehicle that continues technology 

applications to improve near-term launch vehicle capabilities, reduces 

costs, improves reliability, and maintains high confidence in existing 

launch vehicles and supporting infrastructure until cost and 

performance of a new space launch vehicle has been demonstrated. 

The Spacelifter vehicle will establish U.S. commercial competitiveness, 

reduce government launch costs, and provide the momentum to move 

modern technology and operations concepts from the drawing board to 

real operations. Higher priority should be placed on the design of launch 

base facilities using improved operational concepts. 

If the United States is to depend on the Spacelifter/PLS for all future 

manned space flight and a majority of the unmanned space missions, the 

launch vehicle must have attributes that minimize the impact of potential 

launch failures. The probability of failure must be reduced and the return 

to operational space flight after the failure must be as quick as possible. 

6. The Air Force should be designated as the manager of the 

Spacelifter vehicle development and operations. Since the first 

payloads to transition to this vehicle will be those produced by DOD, it is 

more appropriate that the Air Force manage the development of this 

vehicle. With the termination of NLS, the Air Force should develop a 

revised acquisition strategy based on performance rather than design 

specifications. It should encourage the widest application of technology, 

new contractor arrangements to preserve the space industrial base, and the 

application of the appropriate commercial practices to the development 

and operation of the new vehicle. 

The acquisition model the Task Group suggests for Spacelifter has three 

phases. First, competition for Spacelifter would be open to all interested 

U.S. companies and these companies would be asked to submit conceptual 

designs, either individually or in teams. Companies would be permitted to 

incorporate the STME or any other technologies in their design. Second, 

the Air Force would select at least two organizations or teams to continue 

the competition for a short period of time, finalizing their vehicle design 

and operations concept. Finally, at the competition’s conclusion, the Air 

Force would select the winning concept and industrial organization or 

team to complete the Spacelifter development and procurement. 
- The second phase would utilize a man-rated version of the 

Spacelifter, a Personnel Launch System (PLS), and a Cargo 

Transfer and Return Vehicle (CTRV) to augment and then 

replace Shuttle support for the sustained operation of the Space 

Station. The Spacelifter/PLS/CTRV would become the primary, 

long-term support to the Space Station. Funding within NASA for 

the PLS and CTRV developments needs to be provided immediately 

if these systems are to be available to support Space Station 

operations after the year 2000. In order to minimize the negative 

impact of down-load requirements on CTRV, NASA should undertake 

a study of options to dispose of non-essential materials from the 

Space Station. 

Recommendations from The Future of the US. Space Launch Capability IV-5 

7. NASA should immediately initiate and manage a two-phased 

space launch program to deploy and sustain the Space Station. 

- The first phase would continue to utilize the Shuttle for the 

deployment and man-tended phases of the Space Station. 

Developing a heavy lift expendable vehicle based on Shuttle 

components to launch the Space Station would significantly increase 

the risk to the deployment schedule for the Space Station, divert 

resources from a more effective long term “national” solution to 

efficient launch operations, and be “dead-ended” in its application to 

future manned and unmanned heavy lift requirements. The Task 

Group questions whether the development of the heavy lift vehicle 

would be cost effective relative to continuing with the Shuttle to 

deploy and resupply the Space Station during the early phases of 

deployment and notes the difficulty and risks of transitioning the 

Space Station design, optimized for the Shuttle, to a new launch 

configuration associated with the heavy lift vehicle. Therefore, the 

Task Group does not recommend the development of a heavy lift 

launch vehicle based on Shuttle components for deployment of the 

Space Station. NASA should investigate the feasibility of introducing 

contingency plans to mitigate the effects of failures during the initial 

deployment and operation of the Space Station. 
IV-6 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

8. To offset some of the development costs of the Spacelifter 

components and vehicles and to demonstrate the commitment to the 

Spacelifter development, plan for the following changes: 

- a major near-term reduction in the costs of Shuttle operations by 

contract incentives, reduction in Shuttle flights at the earliest 

opportunity, and the reallocation of personnel from Shuttle to the 

PLS, ACRV, and CTRV programs; 

- plan to phase out the Shuttle at the earliest opportunity after the 

introduction and operational demonstration of the 

Spacelifter/PLS/CTRV capability; 

- termina te MLV III, avoiding the potential of an additional U.S. 

launch vehicle, and continuing with the existing medium lift 

vehicles until Spacelifter becomes available; 

- review the IELV competition and modify it to account for the 

transition of appropriate NASA payloads to a Spacelifter 

configuration; 

- slow Titan IV production to about 3 per year and terminating 

further production upon transition of Titan IV payloads to a 

Spacelifter configuration; 

- terminate the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor program; 

- terminate the procurement of Shuttle structural spares and 

mothball the production tooling. 

A substantial part of the near-term investment to develop the Spacelifter 

vehicle can be offset by these reductions and the redirection of NASA 

personnel from Shuttle support to planning for the PLS and CTRV. The 

Task Group recognizes that some of these offsets will be controversial but 

it believes investments which add only marginally to current capabilities 

while diverting resources and attention from the required fundamental 

improvements just cannot be supported. The Task Group also believes 

MLV III will neither substantially reduce cost nor increase responsiveness 
Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability TV-7 

and may add to an already overcrowded infrastructure base. With regard 

to the ASRM program, there is considerable doubt that it will provide 

significant improvements in safety or reliability. Since Shuttle would be 

phased out shortly after ASRM became operational, ASRM development 

costs would not be recovered. Further, ASRM is not environmentally 

clean. The Task Group also suggests that the existing Shuttle solid rocket 

motor recovery system and associated refurbishment operations be 

eliminated at an appropriate point prior to Shuttle system final phase out. 

9. Establish a government-supported, small pavload launch 

program, using low cost launch vehicles, to encourage and promote 

space research and experimentation that will have a positive long term 

benefit to the overall national space program. Military satellite 

technology, civilian space research, university space research projects, and 

commercial space applications are focusing more and more on small 

satellites and associated small launch vehicles. Yet, as in the case of the 

larger launch vehicles, there is a lack of centralized planning for the use of 

small launch vehicles resulting in performance gaps and redundancy. The 

Task Group believes the government should establish a centralized small 

launch vehicle program that would better plan, integrate, and coordinate 

government-wide efforts for this class of vehicle. The planning for this 

program would be the responsibility of the “space launch authority,” but 

management would remain within the agencies utilizing these capabilities. 

10. To augment the small payload launch program, the 

Administration should permit the use of excess ballistic missiles for 

use as space launch vehicles for government sponsored research or 

commercial applications under specifically controlled conditions. The 

Task Group recognizes the controversial nature of this issue but believes 

that the long-term benefit to the space program and ultimate positive 

impact on the overall space launch industry in the future justifies use of 

these assets under certain conditions. Space research and experimentation 

and new mission concepts will be encouraged and “enabled” by the use of 

very inexpensive launch vehicles of the class represented by excess ballistic 

missiles. The use of these assets should be permitted when the following 

conditions are met: 1) the missions and payloads for such launch vehicles 

are for government authorized or sponsored research, technology 

development and test, experimentation and/or education and training, 2) 

there are no commercially available U.S. space launch vehicles that meet 
IV-8 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

the performance and cost requirements of the mission, 3) the use of more 

expensive commercially available launch vehicles in lieu of the excess 

missiles would have precluded the accomplishment of the mission, and 4) 

the conversion of the excess missiles and all of the launch services are 

performed by commercial companies selected under competitive processes. 

The “space launch authority” would determine if these conditions were 

being met on a case-by-case basis and, if so, recommend that DOD release 

the assets. The affected government agencies should be encouraged to 

develop arrangements that would facilitate use of these assets and that 

would minimize government exposure and liability. 

11. Within the context of the overall approach outlined by these 

recommendations, the “space launch authority” should continue to 

plan technology efforts to: @improve performance, decrease cost, and 

improve reliability, safety, responsiveness, and competitiveness of 

existing space launch vehicles GRMU, new low pressure engine 

concepts, materials, avionics, electronics, testing, etc.), and 2) provide 

for the next generation of low cost, reliable space launch vehicles that 

would fully exploit the value of reusabilitv (NASP, SSRT, and HSCT). 

Our existing space launch vehicle fleet should continue to receive reliability 

and cost reduction improvements until the cost and performance goals of 

Spacelifter are demonstrated. This will provide a hedge against failure to 

achieve Spacelifter’s performance and cost goals and maintain a viable 

contractor base to support the existing launch vehicle fleet. The Ten Year 

Space Launch Technology Plan, currently in coordination within the 

government, would form an acceptable baseline for budget planning and 

implementing this recommendation. NASA should continue to study 

heavy lift options for future application to manned and unmanned lunar 

and planetary missions. The Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (SNTP) 

program is an enabling technology for future manned exploration missions 

and should be continued to validate the feasibility, cost, and performance 

consistent with this future requirement. 

12. A vigorous effort must be undertaken to reach a consensus with 

all government agencies and Congress to pursue and fund the 

recommended space launch program. If the restructuring efforts, 

including termination of on-going programs, are accepted without the 

full commitment to pursue and fund the new Spacelifter efforts, the 

entire military and civilian space program could be seriously damaged 
Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability W-9 

with unacceptable gaps in space system operations. As stated 

previously, failure to fund this plan is equivalent to an implicit policy 

decision to forgo U.S. competitiveness in space launch and increase the 

long-term cost to the government. Once government funding stability can 

be achieved, industry will be encouraged to invest its own resources, 

leveraging government funds and further enhancing launch vehicle 

capabilities and competitiveness. 

13. While the use of Russian space components might be 

appropriate on a one-time basis for technology assessment and 

transfer, or for a very few unique space missions, the Task Group 

does not recommend the use of Russian manufactured equipment on 

multiple, routine, or critical space missions. Russian equipment in the 

form of engines, space qualified components, and launch vehicles appears 

to be capable, effective, reliable, and available at competitive prices. This 

equipment may provide opportunities for positive technology transfer and 

licensing agreements, and could, in limited situations, advance the U.S. 

launch industry in technology and capability. However, the uncertainty 

of a sustained industrial base in Russia and the Ukraine (as well as access 

to launch facilities in Kazakhstan), the uncertainty of a stable long-term 

political relationship between the United States and Russia, and the 

detrimental impact such an arrangement could have on the U.S. industrial 

base and U.S. competitiveness demand caution and restrictions on 

cooperative arrangements. 

14. Create a mechanism for downsizing both the space launch 

industry and supporting government infrastructure while continuing 

to satisfy future space launch requirements of the United States and 

taking into account commercial competitiveness of U.S. industry. 

Industry has indicated the government has certain impediments to the 

proper “right-sizing” of U.S. industry (e.g., antitrust laws) and political 

pressures will inhibit government from taking necessary steps to reduce or 

eliminate unnecessary government organizations or facilities that support 

launch development and operations. Participation of the launch vehicle 

industry in determining cost-sharing options and unique management 

arrangements to facilitate a new launch vehicle development should be 

solicited and encouraged. Since it is expected that industry would benefit 

from the introduction of a highly competitive Spacelifter, there should be 

some incentive for industry to share in the development cost. 
Appendix V 

A Summary of Recommendations from the 

1990 Report on the Future of the U.S. Space Program 

The following are the recommendations of the Augustine Committee as 

summarized in the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. 

Space Program issued in December, 1990. 

Principal Recommendations 

This report offers specific recommendations pertaining to civil space 

goals and program content as well as suggestions relating to internal 

NASA management. These are summarized below in four primary 

groupings. In order to fully implement these recommendations and 

suggestions, the support of both the Executive Branch and Legislative 

Branch will be needed, and of NASA itself, 

Principal Recommendations Concerning Space Goals 

It is recommended that the United States’ future civil space program 

consist of a balanced set of five principal elements: 

l a science program, which enjoys highest priority within the civil space 

program, and is maintained at or above the current fraction of the 

NASA budget (Recommendations 1 and 2); 
v-2 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

l a mission to Planet Earth (MTPE), focusing on environmental 

measurements (Recommendation 3); 

l a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE), with the long-term goal of human 

exploration of Mars, preceded by a modified Space Station which 

emphasizes life sciences, an exploration base on the Moon, and robotic 

precursors to Mars (Recommendations 4,5, 6, and 7); 

. a significantly expanded technology development activity, closely 

coupled to space mission objectives, with particular attention devoted 

to engines (Recommendation 8); 

l a robust space transportation system (Recommendation 9). 

Principal Recommendations Concerning Programs 

With regard to program content, it is recommended that: 

l the strategic plan for science currently under consideration be 

implemented (Recommendation 2); 

l a revitalized technology plan be prepared with strong input from the 

mission offices, and that is be funded (Recommendation 8); 

l Space Shuttle missions be phased over to a new unmanned (heavy lift) 

launch vehicle except for missions where human involvement is 

essential or other critical national needs dictate (Recommendation 9); 

l Space Station Freedom be revamped to emphasize life sciences and 

human space operations, and include microgravity research as 

appropriate. It should be reconfigured to reduce cost and complexity; 

and the current time limit on redesign should be extended if a thorough 

reassessment is not possible in that period (Recommendation 6); 

l a personal module be provided, as planned, for emergency return from 

Space Station Freedom, and that initial provisions be made for two-way 

missions in the event of unavailability of the Space Shuttle 

(Recommendation 11). 

c-- -’ --. ---- . 
Summay of Recommendations from The Future uf the U.S. Space Program 

Principal Recommendations Concerning Affordability 

v-3 

It is recommended that the NASA program be structured in scope so as 

not to exceed a funding profile containing approximately 10 percent real 

growth per year throughout the remainder of the decade and then 

remaining at that level, including but not limited to the following actions: 

redesign and reschedule the Space Station Freedom to reduce cost and 

complexity (Recommendation 6); 

defer or eliminate the planned purchase of another orbiter 

(Recommendation 10); 

Place the Mission from Planet Earth on a “go-as-you-pay” basis, i.e., 

tailoring the schedule to match the availability of funds 

(Recommendation 5). 

Principal Recommendations Concerning Management 

With regard to management of the civil space program, it is 

recommended that: 

l an Executive Committee of the Space Council be established which 

includes the Administrator of NASA (Recommendation 12); 

l major reforms be made in the civil service regulations as they apply to 

specialty skills; or, if that is not possible, exemptions be granted to 

NASA for at least 10 percent of its employees to operate under a 

tailored personnel system; or, as a final alternative, that NASA begin 

selectively converting at least some of its centers into universityaffiliated Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 

(Recommendations 14 and 15); 

l NASA management review the mission of each center to consolidate and 

refocus centers of excellence in currently relevant fields with minimum 

overlap among centers (Recommendation 13). 
v-4 A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy 

It is considered by the Committee that the internal organization of any 

institution should be the province of, and at the discretion of, those bearing 

ultimate responsibility for the performance of that institution. Hence, the 

following possible internal structural changes are offered for the 

consider a tion of the NASA Administration: 

l That the current headquarters structure be revamped,...disestablishing the 

positions of certain existing Associate Administrators in order that: 

- an Associate Administrator for Human Resources be established, 

whose responsibilities include making NASA a “pathfinding” agency 

in acquisition and retention of the highest quality personnel for the 

Federal Government (Item K); 

- an Associate Administrator for Exploration be established, whose 

responsibilities include robotic and manned exploration of the Moon 

and Mars (Item C); 

- an Associate Administrator for Space Flight Operations be 

established, whose responsibilities include Space Shuttle operations, 

existing expendable launch vehicle operations, and tracking and 

data functions (Item E); 

- an Associate Administrator for Space Flight Development be 

established, whose responsibilities include Space Station Freedom 

and other development projects such as the Advanced Solid Rocket 

Motor and the new Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (Item D); 

l an exceptionally well-qualified independent cost analysis group be 

attached to headquarters with ultimate responsibility for all top-level 

cost estimating including cost estimates provided outside of NASA 

(Item B); 

l a systems concept and analysis group reporting to the Administrator 

of NASA be established as a Federally Funded Research and 

Development Center (Item A); 

l multi-center projects be avoided wherever possible, but when this is not 

practical, a strong and independent project office reporting to 

headquarters be established near the center having the principal share 

of the work for that project; and that this project office have a systems 

engineering staff and full budget authority (ideally industrial funding, 

- i.e., funding allocations related specifically to end goals) (Item G). 
Summay of Recommendations from The Future of the U.S. Space Program v-5 

In summary, we recommend: 

1) Establishing the science program as the highest priority element of the 

civil space program, to be maintained at or above the current fraction 

of the budget. 

2) Obtaining exclusions for a portion of NASA’s employees from existing 

civil service rules or, failing that, beginning a gradual conversion of 

selected centers to Federally Funded Research and Development 

Centers affiliated with universities, using as a model the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory. 

3) Redesigning the Space Station Freedom to lessen complexity and reduce 

cost, taking whatever time may be required to do this thoroughly and 

innovatively. 

4) Pursuing a Mission from Planet Earth as a complement to the Mission 

to Planet Earth, with the former having Mars as its very long-term goal 

- but relieved of schedule pressures and progressing according to the 

availability of funding. 

5) Reducing our dependence on the Space Shuttle by phasing over to a 

new unmanned heavy lift launch vehicle for all but missions requiring 

human presence.