UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARCELINA MARTINEZ; GILBERT 

ROMERO, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

JULIAN GONZALES; ELOY GRIEGO; 

PENNY ELLIS-GREEN; DANIEL 

MAYFIELD; SANDRA K. MIERA; 

RACHEL BROWN; EDWARD G. WEBB, 

JR.; BRIAN NISSEN; ROBERT GARCIA; 

STEPHEN ROSS; JUSTIN R. WOOLF; 

FERMIN ARAGON; ERNEST GARCIA; 

PHILIP A. SANCHEZ; COUNTY OF 

SANTA FE; MINO’S TOWING; 

ROBERT SHILLING, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-2227 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00922-RHS-KK) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 20, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 1 
2 

I. BACKGROUND

Appellants Marcelina Martinez and her husband, Gilbert Romero, attempted to 

construct a garage on their property without the necessary building permits. Their 

efforts culminated in state court judge Sandra K. Miera’s issuing a bench warrant for 

Ms. Martinez’s arrest; sheriff deputies Edward G. Webb and Brian Nissen’s 

unsuccessfully attempting to execute the warrant; and New Mexico State Police 

Officer Ernest Garcia’s finally arresting Ms. Martinez—and in the process 

Mr. Romero as well. 

Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero subsequently brought this pro se action, 

alleging multiple claims and naming the individuals listed above and a host of other 

defendants (including a tow-truck company) who had been involved in the 

building-permit dispute and the resulting criminal proceedings. The other defendants 

were dismissed or granted summary judgment and are not implicated in this appeal. 

As for Judge Miera and the officers identified above, the district court issued 

multiple separate orders granting them summary judgment on the basis of absolute or 

qualified immunity. 

Specifically, the district court determined that Judge Miera was entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity for her role in issuing a bench warrant for Ms. Martinez’s 

arrest and presiding over her criminal proceedings after she failed to appear for her 

arraignment. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (“[J]udges of 

courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 2 
3 

judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged 

to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Similarly, the district court determined that Deputies Webb and Nissen were 

entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their role in attempting to execute the 

facially valid bench warrant. See Valdez v. City & Cty. of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 

1286 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[O]fficial[s] charged with the duty of executing a facially 

valid court order enjoy[] absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit 

challenging conduct prescribed by that order.”). 

The court concluded that Officer Garcia was also entitled to quasi-judicial 

immunity to the extent he was charged with stopping and arresting Ms. Martinez 

pursuant to the warrant, see id., and to qualified immunity to the extent he was 

charged with using excessive force and falsely arresting Mr. Romero, see Coen v. 

Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 377 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Qualified immunity is an affirmative 

defense that protects government officials from personal liability unless their actions 

violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 

Finally, the court rejected appellants’ claim that Officer Garcia had unlawfully 

searched and seized Mr. Romero following his arrest. It reasoned that, because his 

arrest was lawful, the search and seizure incident to his arrest were lawful as well. 

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that where there is 

a lawful arrest supported by probable cause, “a search incident to the arrest requires 

no additional justification”). 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 3 
4 

II. DISCUSSION

Under our de novo review, United States v. Dillard, ___ F.3d ____, 2015 WL 

4540551, at *4 (10th Cir. July 28, 2015), we affirm the district court’s judgment 

because Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero raise only one issue that is relevant to the 

district court’s immunity rulings: that the bench warrant was invalid. 

To show that Judge Miera, Deputies Webb and Nissen, and Officer Garcia are 

not entitled to absolute immunity, Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero must establish that 

Judge Miera issued the bench warrant in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 

Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). They cannot do so. As the district court correctly explained, Rule 6-207 of 

the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate Courts expressly 

provides that “[i]f any person who has been ordered by the magistrate judge to appear 

at a certain time and place . . . fails to appear at such specified time and place . . . the 

court may issue a warrant for the person’s arrest.” NMRA 6-207(A). Ms. Martinez 

was ordered to appear for her arraignment and failed to do so. Judge Miera therefore 

issued the bench warrant for her arrest. She clearly had jurisdiction to do so, and 

thus she and the other officers are all entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial 

immunity.1

 

 1

 We reject appellants’ meritless argument that the warrant was invalid because 

the notice of Ms. Martinez’s arraignment was signed by the magistrate court clerk, 

rather than Judge Miera. See Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 

664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[N]o court can discharge its judicial duties 

without the aid of clerks, servants and agents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

(continued) 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 4 
5 

Apart from attacking the validity of the warrant, Ms. Martinez and 

Mr. Romero advance no argument addressing the district court’s immunity rulings. 

Instead, pages 3 through 26 of their opening brief lament defendants’ conduct—

alleged due process violations in the underlying criminal proceedings and violations 

of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. None of this discussion tells us why the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment on immunity grounds. See Nixon v. City 

& Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The first task of an 

appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s decision was wrong. Recitation 

of a tale of apparent injustice may assist in that task, but it cannot substitute for legal 

argument.”). 

The remainder of their brief fares no better. After articulating our standard of 

review and summarizing their arguments, Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero elaborate, 

on pages 28 through 37 of their opening brief, on the alleged due process violations 

in the underlying criminal proceedings. But these arguments suggest no error with 

the district court’s immunity rulings. On pages 38 through 42, Ms. Martinez and 

Mr. Romero repeat their arguments that the warrant was invalid, all of which we have 

 

We similarly reject appellants’ assertion that Judge Miera lacked personal knowledge 

of Ms. Martinez’s failure to appear for her arraignment. It is undisputed that 

Ms. Martinez was ordered to appear for her arraignment before Judge Miera on 

April 19, 2013, see Aplee. App. at 770, that Ms. Martinez wrote back to the court, “I 

do not consent to this action,” id. at 772, and that on the day of the arraignment, 

Ms. Martinez failed to appear and Judge Miera accordingly signed the bench warrant, 

see id. at 765 (Judge Miera’s affidavit indicating that Ms. Martinez failed to appear 

for her arraignment), 780 (bench warrant signed by Judge Miera). 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 5 
6 

already rejected. And on pages 42 through 48, they challenge Officer Garcia’s 

actions,2

 claiming he lacked “official knowledge of a bench warrant,” and did not 

possess the warrant at the time of the arrest. Aplt. Br. at 42. But it is undisputed that 

Officer Garcia stopped Ms. Martinez after running a license-plate check on her car 

and finding the outstanding warrant. See Aplee. App. at 641-42 (Garcia Aff.). 

Finally, on pages 48 and 49, Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero argue that the 

County of Santa Fe is not entitled to immunity as a municipal corporation, but the 

district court never made such a ruling and, once again, appellants fail to explain how 

this argument addresses the district court’s grant of judicial and quasi-judicial 

immunity to Judge Miera, Deputies Webb and Nissen, and Officer Garcia. 

Because Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero are proceeding pro se, we construe 

their filings liberally. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 

2009). So construed, “we make some allowances for [their] failure to cite proper 

legal authority, [their] confusion of various legal theories, [their] poor syntax and 

sentence construction, or [their] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements, [but we] 

cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [their] attorney in constructing 

arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 

425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, we have consistently required pro se litigants to follow the same procedural 

 2

 Appellants suggest on pages 46 through 48 that Officer Garcia was 

unreasonable in his use of force to arrest them, but this argument is premised on their 

erroneous assertion that the warrant was invalid. 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 6 
7 

rules as other litigants. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007). 

Because the only pertinent issue they raise on appeal is unavailing, the judgment of 

the district court is affirmed. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 14-2227 Document: 01019478444 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 Page: 7