UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1786

JOHN D. WOOTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CL, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company; TERRENCE 

COYLE, Individually and as Manager/Member of CL, LLC, a 

Florida Limited Liability Company; JAY ROBERT LUNDBLAD; 

PETER CHICOURIS; ANDERSON MIDGETT; STOCKTON MIDGETT; MIDGETT 

REALTY, INCORPORATED,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Louise W. 

Flanagan, District Judge. (2:09-cv-00034-FL)

Argued: December 4, 2012 Decided: January 10, 2013

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge Gregory and Judge Agee joined.

ARGUED: David Hart Nelson, DAVID HART NELSON, ESQUIRE, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey Douglass 

McKinney, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Robert H. Merritt, Jr., BAILEY & DIXON, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. 
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns procedural issues that arose after 

Plaintiff John D. Wooton brought an action seeking damages 

related to his investment in a condominium project. In that 

action, Wooten sued companies and individuals connected with the 

project alleging fraudulent inducement of contract, negligent 

misrepresentation, gross negligence, conversion, civil 

conspiracy, violation of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive 

Trade Practices Act, violation of the North Carolina Securities 

Act, violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 

and breach of contract. The district court barred Wooton from 

amending the pleadings and extending discovery, ultimately 

dismissing Wooton’s suit. Wooton challenges these decisions on 

appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I.

In the underlying action, Wooton contended that he invested 

$400,000 in a condominium project that was never built, and that

his investment was not returned. Wooton sought damages from 

Defendants—Anderson and Stockton Midgett (the “Midgetts”), their 

company Midgett Realty, Inc., and Peter Chicouris—alleging that
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they misrepresented and concealed material facts to induce 

Wooton to invest in the project.1

After the Midgetts and Chicouris filed motions to dismiss, 

Wooton moved to amend his Complaint, seeking to add “only four 

sentences: two providing more detail regarding [his] negligent 

misrepresentation claim against all defendants and two providing 

more detail on the gross negligent misrepresentation claim.”

Wooton v. CL, LLC, No. 2:09-CV-34-FL, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2010) 

(“Order I”).2

The district court found that even with Wooton’s 

amendments, the Complaint failed to survive the Midgetts’ and 

Chicouris’s motions to dismiss because the Complaint contained 

“conclusory allegations and mere rephrasing[s] of the cause[s]

of action;” failed to allege any contact with the Midgetts and

Chicouris prior to Wooton’s investment in the project such that 

it was impossible for them to have induced Wooton to invest; and 

failed to show that they owed Wooton duties of care. Order I at

7. Accordingly, the district court denied Wooton’s first Motion 

to Amend the Complaint and dismissed his claims against the 

Midgetts and Chicouris. Midgett Realty then moved for judgment 

 1 Wooton also brought claims against the project’s owner, 

CL, LLC, and CL, LLC partners Terrence Coyle and Jay Lundblad, 

none of whom are involved in this appeal.

2 Order I is found at J.A. 326-43.
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on the pleadings or dismissal, contending that Wooton’s claims 

against it were premised on the actions of the Midgetts and thus 

failed as a matter of law after the district court had dismissed 

the claims against the Midgetts.

On October 25, 2010, nearly a month after the district 

court issued Order I, Wooton moved for leave to alter judgment 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and to amend his 

Complaint under Rule 15(a), attaching a Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint containing significant alterations. Then, on December 

16, 2010, Wooton moved for an additional sixty days of extended 

time to complete discovery and file dispositive motions.

On December 29, 2010, the district court granted Midgett 

Realty’s Motion to Dismiss and denied Wooton’s various motions. 

Wooton v. CL, LLC, No. 2:09-CV-34-FL (Dec. 29, 2010) (“Order 

II”).3 The district court entered final judgment on July 12, 

2011, adopting in full Orders I and II.

II.

On appeal, Wooton contends that the district court erred in

denying his second Motion to Amend the Complaint. This Court 

reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to amend for abuse 

 3 Order II is found at J.A. 559-68.
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of discretion. Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 

298 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Although district courts should freely give leave to amend

pleadings “when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), 

“after the deadlines provided by a scheduling order have passed, 

the good cause standard [of Rule 16] must be satisfied to 

justify leave to amend the pleadings,” Nourison Rug, 535 F.3d at 

298. Here, the district court determined that Wooton’s second 

Motion to Amend the Complaint was not timely under the 

scheduling order and that Wooton failed to show good cause for 

filing late. Order II at 6. 

Wooton devotes much of his argument on appeal to the 

additional facts contained in his Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint instead of the facts that allegedly prevented him from

presenting his averments in the Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint before the scheduling order had expired. Indeed, 

Wooton did not even address the untimeliness of his motion 

before the district court. Wooton has showed no abuse of 

discretion on the part of the district court, and we therefore 

affirm the decision to deny Wooton’s second Motion to Amend the 

Complaint.

Wooton also contends that the district court erred in 

denying as moot his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment as to

Order I, which dismissed Wooton’s claims against the Midgetts 
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and Chicouris based on the insufficiency of the pleadings. 

Because Wooton’s motion to alter or amend was premised entirely 

on the additional facts alleged in his Proposed Second Amended 

Complaint, he can prevail on this argument only if the district 

court should have allowed him to amend the pleadings. Having 

already determined that the district court did not err in 

denying Wooton’s second Motion to Amend the Complaint, we 

conclude the district court did not err in also denying Wooton’s

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.

Wooton next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to extend the timeline for 

discovery. This Court gives district courts “‘wide latitude in 

controlling discovery’” and will not disturb discovery orders 

“‘absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.’” Rowland v. 

Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 

1986)). 

Here, the district court determined that Wooton had “failed 

to diligently use the additional time allowed [by an earlier 

extension of discovery] to complete the necessary discovery.” 

Order II at 9. The reasons Wooton offers for needing additional 

discovery—such as to review discovery materials and take 

additional depositions—are insufficient to show that the 

district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his 
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motion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

Wooton’s Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines.

Finally, Wooton argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claims. Because this argument is premised on the 

acceptance of the facts included in Wooton’s Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint, which the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in rejecting,4 we affirm the dismissal of Wooton’s 

Complaint.

III.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of Wooton’s motions to amend his Complaint, alter 

judgment, and extend discovery. Further, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Wooton’s Complaint.

AFFIRMED

 4 We decline to consider whether, as Wooton argues, this 

Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule for accepting an 

unsubstantiated version of the facts on appeal to review a 

motion to dismiss. See Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 

1143, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2010).