IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

STEVEN PAUL WHITE,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 36559-0-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Steven White appeals his conviction for third degree 

assault, predicated on RCW 9A.36.031(1)(k). He argues the State failed to prove various 

elements of that subsection. Here, White assaulted a fellow inmate in a waiting area 

immediately adjacent to the district/municipal court video conference room. But because 

that room was not being used for court proceedings at the time of the assault, we reverse 

and remand for entry of judgment and resentencing for fourth degree assault.

FACTS

The Spokane County Jail contains two video conference rooms that are connected 

to the Spokane County Courthouse by closed circuit television, a district/municipal court 

video conference room, and a superior court video conference room. Judges regularly use 

FILED

FEBRUARY 6, 2020

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

2

video conferencing to preside over court hearings taking place in the jail. This process 

reduces the cost and security risks for transporting restrained prisoners to courthouses. 

Before bringing inmates into the superior court video conference room, the 

corrections staff brings them into a holding room where they wait for their cases to be 

called. Inmates take an indirect route from the holding room to the superior court video 

conference room. Corrections staff escort inmates from the holding room down a 

hallway, around a corner, down another hallway, through a door into the 

district/municipal court video conference room, and then make a left turn through a door 

that opens into the superior court video conference room. A common wall is shared by 

the holding room and the district/municipal court video conference room. Opposite that 

common wall, another common wall is shared by the district/municipal court video 

conference room and the superior court video conference room. 

Required signage is posted in the holding room, the entrance to the 

district/municipal court video conference room, and within the superior court video 

conference room. The signs read:
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

3

ASSAULT IN THE COURTHOUSE IS A FELONY

WARNING: A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she 

assaults a person located in a courtroom, jury room, judge’s chamber, or any

waiting area or adjacent corridor that is being used for judicial purposes

during court proceedings. It is also an aggravating circumstance for 

sentencing purposes that a felony crime against a person occurs in such a 

location when being used for judicial purposes during court proceedings. 

RCW 9A.36.031.

Exs. P1—P6.

In January 2018, White and Freddie Thompson were in the holding room waiting 

for their superior court video conference hearings. While there, White accused 

Thompson of raping someone. White approached Thompson and told him to stand up. 

As Thompson began to stand, White punched him multiple times in the head and face. 

Corrections staff came in and stopped the fight. The fight occurred between 8:58 a.m. 

and 8:59 a.m. Superior court video conference proceedings were not scheduled to start 

until 9:00 a.m. 

The State charged White with assault in the third degree, citing RCW 

9A.36.031(1)(k). That subsection elevates fourth degree assault to third degree assault, 

provided that various requisites are met. 
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

4

The case proceeded to trial. After the State rested, White moved to dismiss the 

charge on various bases, including those argued on appeal. The trial court denied White’s 

motion. 

The court instructed the jury on third degree assault and the lesser included offense 

of fourth degree assault. During closing, White conceded he committed fourth degree 

assault. The jury found White guilty of third degree assault. White timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

White argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he committed 

third degree assault under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(k), which provides in relevant part:

(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under 

circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree:

. . . . 

(k) Assaults a person located in . . . any waiting area . . . immediately 

adjacent to a courtroom . . . . This section shall apply only . . . [d]uring the 

times when a courtroom . . . is being used for judicial purposes during court 

proceedings [and] if signage was posted in compliance with RCW 2.28.200 

at the time of the assault.

White argues the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove the superior court 

video conference room was a courtroom. He also argues the State’s evidence was 

insufficient to prove the assault occurred immediately adjacent to a courtroom being used 

during court proceedings. We agree with his second argument and decline to reach his 

first.
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

5

Statutory construction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. CortezKloehn v. Morrison, 162 Wn. App. 166, 170, 252 P.3d 909 (2011). Statutes are construed 

by applying well settled principles. Id. The purpose of statutory construction is to give 

effect to the legislature’s meaning and intent. Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 91, 969 

P.2d 446 (1999). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, it does not need interpretation. 

State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). Thus, we always begin with the 

statute’s “‘plain language and ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Elec. Contractors 

Ass’n v. Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)). When interpreting a statute 

with undefined terms, this court will give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning, 

unless there is contrary legislative intent. State v. Connors, 9 Wn. App. 2d 93, 95-96, 442 

P.3d 20, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1041, 449 P.3d 656 (2019). This court may use a 

standard, English dictionary to help guide it to a word’s plain and ordinary meaning. Id. 

at 96.

THE HOLDING ROOM WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO A COURTROOM BEING 

USED FOR COURT PROCEEDINGS

White does not dispute that the jail holding room is a waiting area, as contemplated

by the statute. Instead, he argues the statute requires the waiting area to be immediately 

adjacent to a courtroom being used for court proceedings, and the State failed to prove 

this. We agree.
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

6

The plain language of the statute required the State to prove that the holding room

was “immediately adjacent” to an area such as a courtroom. The legislature did not 

define the term “immediately adjacent.” A common dictionary definition for “adjacent” 

is “not distant: NEARBY.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 16 (11th ed.

2014). A common dictionary definition for “immediately” is “in direct connection or 

relation.” Id. at 621. Taken together, the phrase “immediately adjacent” means nearby 

and directly connected. 

The State proved that the holding room is nearby and directly connected to the 

district/municipal court video conference room. Although the two rooms are not 

immediately accessible, they share a common wall. 

But this does not end our inquiry. The statutory subsection applies only “[d]uring 

the times a courtroom . . . is being used for judicial purposes during court proceedings

[and] if signage was posted in compliance with RCW 2.28.200 at the time of the assault.” 

RCW 9A.36.031(1)(k). Here, the State presented no evidence that the district/municipal

court video conference room was being used for court proceedings at the time of the 

assault. 

The State implies that the waiting area need not be immediately adjacent to the

courtroom being used for court proceedings, as long as it is immediately adjacent to a
No. 36559-0-III

State v. White

7

courtroom. Consistent with this argument, the statutory phrase quoted in the paragraph 

above speaks of “a” courtroom, not “the” courtroom. 

But were we to accept the State’s implied argument, this would produce results 

inconsistent with other statutory language. For example, the statute requires signage to 

warn potential offenders of the increased penalty for assaults occurring in certain areas. 

But if signage in any courtroom was sufficient, a defendant could be convicted of third 

degree assault without receiving the specific warning required by the statute. We,

therefore, construe RCW 9A.36.031(1)(k) as requiring the “immediately adjacent” 

courtroom to be the same courtroom as the one being used for court proceedings at the 

time of the assault. 

The State and White agree that reversal of White’s third degree assault conviction 

should result in remand for entry of judgment and resentencing for fourth degree assault. 

See In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari, 174 Wn.2d 288, 294, 274 P.3d 366 (2012) (court 

reversing conviction may remand for entry of judgment and resentencing on lesser 

included offense, if jury was explicitly instructed on lesser offense). We accept their 

agreement, and so order.

Reversed and remanded.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 
No. 36559-0-III 

State v. White 

Reversed and remanded. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. 

8 

' r f. 

f 

J 

I

' 

' 

I 

l 

f 

I l