In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 

No. 15-0942V 

Filed: November 15, 2016 

TO BE PUBLISHED 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

LEIGHA ROMIG, * 

 * 

 Petitioner, * 

v. * Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; 

 * Appropriate Hourly Rate; Rate for 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Travel; Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * 

 * 

 Respondent. * 

 * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Isaiah Kalinowski, Maglio, Christopher & Toale, PA, Washington, DC, for petitioner. 

Michael Patrick Milmoe, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master: 

On August 28, 2015, Leigha Romig (“petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation 

under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et 

seq.,

2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she received a Tetanus-Diphtheriaacellular Pertussis (“Tdap”) vaccine on August 2, 2014, and thereafter suffered a 

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (“SIRVA”). Petition at 1, 3. On 

March 21, 2016, the undersigned issued a decision awarding $82,000.00, in 

compensation to petitioner based on respondent’s proffer to which petitioner agreed. 

(ECF No. 24). Judgment entered on March 25, 2016. (ECF No. 26). 

 

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned 

intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012). 
2 

On September 21, 2016, petitioner filed a motion requesting $16,006.00, in 

attorneys’ fees and $804.65, in attorneys’ costs for a total amount of $16,810.65 in 

attorneys’ fees and costs. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Pet. Motion”) at ¶¶ 2-

3 (ECF No. 30). Petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses.3 Thus, petitioner seeks 

a total award in the amount of $16,810.65. 

For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned reduces this amount and 

awards $14,642.30, in attorneys’ fees and $804.65, in attorneys’ costs for a total award 

of $ 15,446.95 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

I. Procedural History 

Petitioner filed her petition and medical records on August 28, 2015. See 

Exhibits 1-6 (ECF No. 3). Approximately two weeks later, she filed her affidavit and 

statement of completion. See Exhibit 7; Statement of Completion (ECF Nos. 9-10). An 

initial status conference was held on October 22, 2015. 

During the call, respondent’s counsel indicated that respondent was likely to 

concede the case but asked for updated records to establish petitioner’s current 

condition and future prognosis. See Order, issued Oct. 22, 2015 (ECF No. 13). 

Petitioner filed her updated records on November 5, 2015. See Exhibits 8-10 (ECF No. 

14). Approximately three weeks later, respondent filed her Rule 4 report. (ECF No. 15). 

A Ruling on Entitlement, finding compensation appropriate in the case, was issued on 

December 1, 2015. (ECF No. 16). 

Over the next three to four months, the parties informally discussed the 

appropriate amount of damages in this case. A proffer was filed on March 21, 2016. 

(ECF No. 22). The same day, petitioner filed a notice indicting she accepted 

respondent’s proffer. (ECF No. 23). The undersigned awarded compensation in the 

amount proposed in the proffer, $82,000.00. (ECF No. 24). Judgment entered on 

March 25, 2016. (ECF No. 26). 

 Petitioner filed his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on September 21, 2016. 

(ECF No. 30). Respondent filed her response approximately three weeks later. See 

Respondent’s Response to Pet. Motion (“Res. Response”), filed Oct. 11, 2016 (ECF No. 

31). Respondent’s response contains standard language that she has included in 

numerous vaccine cases since early February 2016, arguing that “[n]either the Vaccine 

Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a 

request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent 

adds, however, that she “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. Respondent further “asserts 

that a reasonable amount for fees and costs in the present case would fall between 

 

3 In compliance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating she incurred out-ofpocket expenses in the amount of $588.76. See Exhibit 13, filed as an Attachment to Pet. Motion. 

Additionally, in accordance with General Order #9, petitioner’s counsel indicated in the motion for 

attorneys’ fees and costs that petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. See Pet. Motion at ¶ 4. 
3 

$12,000.00 to $14,000.00” but provides little basis or explanation for how she arrived at 

this proposed range. Id. at 3. 

 

On October 20, 2016, petitioner filed a reply, disagreeing with respondent’s 

assertion that she has no role in the resolution of attorneys’ fees and costs and 

criticizing the range of fees and costs proposed by respondent as meaningless. (ECF 

No. 58). Petitioner contends that “[t]he Respondent’s position has caused the Court to 

occasionally, sua sponte, conduct its own inquiry into petitioners’ motions for fees and 

costs [which] puts the Court in the problematic position of serving as inquisitor as well 

as the finder of fact.” Id. at 2. Petitioner argues that “this scenario can deny petitioners 

the opportunity to address specific issues with the requested fees and costs . . . [u]nless 

the Court requests clarification from petitioner before issuing a decision.” Id. 

The matter is now ripe for adjudication. 

II. Legal Standard for Determining the Amount of Fees and Costs 

 

Since petitioner was awarded compensation for her injury, she is entitled to an 

award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. § 15(e)(1) (emphasis added). As the 

Federal Circuit noted, attorneys’ fees and costs were “not expected to be high” due to 

the “no-fault, non-adversarial system” set forth in the Vaccine Act. Saxton ex rel. v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP.

NO. 99-908, at 36 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6377). Reasonable attorneys’ 

fees are calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of 

hours expended on litigation, the lodestar approach. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 

886, 888 (1984)); Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521. 

A petitioner’s counsel in the Vaccine Program is paid the forum rate unless the 

bulk of the work is performed in a locale other than the forum (District of Columbia) and 

the local rate is very significantly lower than the forum rate. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. If 

these two requirements are met, the Davis exception applies, and that petitioner’s 

counsel is paid according to the local rate. Id.; see Davis County Solid Waste 

Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District v. United States 

Environmental Protection Agency, 169 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

Although not explicitly stated in the statute, the requirement that only reasonable 

amounts be awarded applies to costs as well as fees. See Perriera v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

Reasonable expert costs are calculated using the same lodestar method as is used 

when calculating attorneys’ fees. Masias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-

697V, 2009 WL 1838979, at *37 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 12, 2009). 

Special masters have “wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both 

attorneys’ fees and costs.” Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 

753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). They are entitled to rely on their prior experience and, based on 
4 

experience and judgment, may reduce the number of hours to an amount reasonable 

for the work performed. Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521. A line-by-line evaluation of the billing 

records is not required. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 

(Fed. Cl. 1991) aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed.Cir.1993) (per curiam). 

The petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended, the rates 

charged, and the expenses incurred.” Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484. She “should present 

adequate proof [of the attorneys’ fees and costs sought] at the time of the submission.” 

Id. at 484 n.1. Petitioner’s counsel “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a 

fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a 

lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee 

submission.” Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). 

III. Appropriate Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

A. Appropriate Hourly Rates 

Petitioner seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $16,006.00 which reflects the 

following hourly rates: $341 for work performed in 2015, and $349 for work performed in 

2016 by petitioner’s counsel, Isaiah Kalinowski, $295 for work performed in 2015 by 

Danielle Strait, another attorney at Mr. Kalinowski’s firm, $300 for work performed in 

2015 by Diana Sedar, an attorney at the Sarasota office of Mr. Kalinowski’s firm, and 

$95 to $145 for work performed by various paralegals at petitioner’s counsel’s firm, 

Maglio, Christopher & Toale, PA (“the Maglio firm”). Exhibit 11 at 1-15, filed as an 

Attachment to Pet. Motion. 

To support the hourly rates sought, petitioner has filed numerous documents, 

including declarations from Mr. Kalinowski and Altom Maglio, the managing partner at 

his firm. See Exhibits 14-19, filed as Attachments to Pet. Motion. 

1. Hourly Rate for Petitioner’s Counsel, Isaiah Kalinowski 

According to Mr. Kalinowski’s declaration, he was admitted to practice in New 

York on October 31, 2005. Exhibit 14 at ¶ 2. Following roughly eighteen months at a 

litigation firm specializing in areas other than vaccine law, he worked as a law clerk in 

the Office of Special Masters, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, for almost four years. Id. at 

¶ 6. After leaving the court in late 2010, he joined the Maglio firm as the first full-time 

employee of the Washington, DC office. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. His practice consists primarily of 

Vaccine Program cases, and he has presented CLE-accredited programs at the three 

most recent judicial conferences of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10. 

As explained in Mr. Maglio’s declaration, Mr. Kalinowski’s rates were set by the law 

firm’s fees committee in light of the court’s recent decision in McCulloch.

4 Exhibit 15 at 

¶ 13-14. 

 

4 McCulloch v. HHS, No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). Although the 

parties in McCulloch did not seek review, much of the reasoning of the McCulloch decision was later 
5 

In the McCulloch case, Special Master Gowen exhaustively examined the 

question of appropriate hourly forum rates in the Vaccine Program following the 

breakdown of respondent’s long standing agreement with petitioner’s counsel in that 

case. See McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *3-4 (for background information regarding 

these events). Special Master Gowen determined the appropriate rates for the 

attorneys at that firm but also established tiered ranges of appropriate forum rates 

based on years of legal experience. The reasoning and hourly rates set in McCulloch 

have since been widely followed. 

After discussing the potential approaches to setting a forum rate and reviewing 

cases and material from both within and without the Vaccine Program, Special Master 

Gowen concluded in McCulloch that the following factors should be considered when 

determining the appropriate hourly rate: (1) the prevailing rate for comparable legal work 

in Washington, DC; (2) the prevailing rate for cases in the Vaccine Program; (3) the 

experience of the attorney(s) in question within the Vaccine Program; (4) the overall 

legal experience of the attorney(s); (5) the quality of work performed by the attorney(s) 

in vaccine cases; and (6) the reputation of the attorney(s) in the legal community and 

community at large. McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *17. He calculated the following 

ranges for reasonable forum rates in Vaccine Program cases: 

$350 to $425 per hour for attorneys with 20 or more years of experience; 

$300 to $375 per hour for attorneys with 11 to 19 years of experience; 

$275 to $350 per hour for attorneys with eight to ten years of experience; 

$225 to $300 per hour for attorneys with four to seven years of experience; and 

$150 to $225 per hour for attorneys with less than four years of experience. 

Id. at *19. Special Master Gowen noted that “[t]he higher end of the range should be 

awarded to those with significant Vaccine Program experience who perform high quality 

legal work in vaccine cases.” Id. He added that an attorney’s level of experience may 

be increased for legal work performed during law school such as an internship in the 

Vaccine Program or prior judicial clerkship, especially for attorneys with experience of 

less than four years. Id. The undersigned finds the McCulloch decision, which is 

extensively reasoned, to be highly persuasive and adopts its reasoning, as well as the 

above ranges, for the instant analysis. 

Since Mr. Kalinowski is located in the forum, Washington, DC, he is 

unquestionably entitled to forum rates. Thus, it is only necessary to determine his years 

of experience and hourly rate within the appropriate range considering the factors 

described by Special Master Gowen. Mr. Kalinowski had ten years of experience in 

2015 and did not reach the 11 year level until 2016. Although the rate requested by 

petitioner, $341 for years 2015, is within the range proposed in McCulloch for an 

attorney with eight to ten years, $275 to $350 per hour, the undersigned finds $325 is 

 

examined approvingly in Garrison v. HHS, No. 14-762V, --- Fed. Cl. ---, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1274, 

(Fed. Cl. Aug. 17, 2016). 
6 

an appropriate hourly rate for Mr. Kalinowski’s work in this year. The undersigned 

recently awarded this rate for work performed by Mr. Kalinowski in 2014-15 in a 

reasoned decision in McGrath v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-275V (Fed. 

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 27, 2016). As noted in that decision, the hourly rate of $325 is 

consistent with the rate paid in McCulloch for work performed by several associates with 

only two to three years less experience than Mr. Kalinowski.5 Furthermore, an 

examination of fee decisions for other attorneys being paid at forum rates reveals that a 

rate of $325 for work performed in 2015 is appropriate given the rates awarded 

attorneys with greater legal experience, including substantial experience in the Vaccine 

Program. See, e.g., Al-Uffi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 

6181669, at *11 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015) (awarding an hourly rate of $350 

for Andrew Downing, an attorney with 19 years of legal experience). 

Two of my colleagues recently addressed the issue of Mr. Kalinowski’s rate for 

work performed 2012-14. See Scharfenberger v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 

11-221V, 2015 WL 3526559 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 15, 2015), aff’d 124 Fed. Cl. 224 

(2015); O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-243V, 2015 WL 2399211 

(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). In Scharfenberger, the special master determined 

that attorneys’ fees should be awarded based upon an hourly rate of $305 for Mr. 

Kalinowski’s work performed in 2014. 2015 WL 3526559, at *10. In O’Neill, the special 

master determined that it was appropriate to award a slightly higher rate of $325 per 

hour for work performed by Mr. Kalinowski in 2012-13. 2015 WL 2399211, at *7. The 

undersigned agrees that Mr. Kalinowski’s 2015 work should be compensated at a rate 

of $325 per hour which falls in the upper half of the applicable McCulloch range. 

For work performed in 2016 by Mr. Kalinowski, petitioner requests an hourly rate 

of $349. In 2016, Mr. Kalinowski moved into the next higher McCulloch range, 11 to 19 

years of experience.6 The McCulloch range for this level of experience is $300 to $375. 

 

5 Specifically, the following rates were awarded in the McCulloch decision: 

Kevin Conway (45 years legal experience, 26 years vaccine experience) $415 

Ronald Homer (24 years legal experience, 22 years vaccine experience) $400 

Sylvia Chin-Caplan (30 years legal experience, 22 years vaccine experience) $400 

Christine Ciampolillo (6 years vaccine experience) $300 

Amy Schwader (7 years vaccine experience) $285 

Joseph Pepper (6 years legal experience, 5 years vaccine experience) $290 

Meredith Daniels (5 years vaccine experience) $280 

Law Clerks $145 

Paralegals $135 

McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19-21. 

6 Although Mr. Kalinowski reached this 11 year mark on October 31, 2016, the undersigned declines to 

penalize him for providing more accurate information than is often provided in these cases, i.e. the exact 

date of his licensure rather than simply the year. Exhibit 14 at ¶ 2. Going by the year of his licensure, Mr. 

Kalinowski is considered as being in the 11 to 19 year range for work performed in 2016. 
7 

Thus, the rate requested for Mr. Kalinowski’s work in 2016 is within the appropriate 

McCulloch range, though in the upper half of this range. Again, Mr. Kalinowski’s time as 

a law clerk and extensive experience in the Vaccine Program warrant a higher hourly 

rate within his corresponding McCulloch range. The undersigned finds the requested 

rate to be appropriate. 

In support of the requested hourly rates, petitioner has filed declarations from 

numerous attorneys and one paralegal in other law firms, some of which have been filed 

in other cases, an order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs in a Florida civil case, and 

expert reports regarding attorneys’ fees and curricula vitae from William Murphy and 

Steven Tasher, filed previously in Scharfenberger and O’Neill, respectively. See 

Exhibits 37-39. None of these individuals appear to have experience in the Vaccine 

Program. Like the special master in Scharfenberger, the undersigned does not find this 

evidence particularly helpful. See Scharfenberger, 2015 WL 3526559, at *8. 

Considering Mr. Kalinowski’s skill, experience, quality of work, and reputation 

and the undersigned’s experience evaluating fee applications in Vaccine Act cases, the 

undersigned finds that the appropriate hourly rate for Mr. Kalinowski’s work performed 

in 2015 is $325 and in 2016 is $349. 

2. Hourly Rate for Other Attorneys at the Maglio Firm 

The billing records show that .4 hours of attorney work was performed by two 

other attorneys at the Maglio firm. See Exhibit 11 at 1, 5 (entries dated 11/3/14 and 

7/27/15). Diana Sedar, an attorney in the firm’s Sarasota office billed .2 hours of work 

performed in 2014 at an hourly rate of $300. This hourly rate has been widely accepted 

as reasonable for any of the attorneys in the main office of the Maglio firm, and the 

undersigned has awarded this rate for Ms. Sedar’s work in 2014 in other SPU cases, for 

example, Cirillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-801V (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. 

Sept. 29, 2016). Similarly, the rate requested for Ms. Strait’s work performed in 2015 

was the same rate awarded in O’Neill. 2015 WL 2399211. The undersigned just 

awarded this rate for work performed by Ms. Strait in a reasoned decision in another 

SPU case, Steffens v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-59V (Fed. Cl. Spec. 

Mstr. Oct. 7, 2016). The undersigned finds both these rates to be reasonable. 

3. Discounted Rate for Hours Spent Traveling 

Petitioner seeks payment for travel time expended by Mr. Kalinowski to visit 

petitioner. See Exhibit 11 at 8. In his declaration, Mr. Maglio emphasizes the firm’s 

policy of visiting petitioners in all cases, including contingency cases as well as vaccine 

cases. Exhibit 15 at ¶ 9. According to the billing records, Mr. Kalinowski spent 6.6 

hours driving to and from his visit with petitioner. See Exhibit 11 at 8 (1st and 3rd entries 

dated 10/9/15). The undersigned finds this amount of time to be appropriate. However, 

petitioner seeks Mr. Kalinowski’s full hourly rate for his travel time. The undersigned 

finds that he should be awarded one-half of his normal rate for these hours. 

 
8 

In the Vaccine Program, special masters traditionally have compensated time 

spent traveling when no other work was being performed at one-half an attorney’s 

hourly rate. See Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 

3705153, at *24 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011); Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & 

Human Servs., No. 06-559V, 2009 WL 2568468, at *21 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jul. 27, 

2009); English v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-61V, 2006 WL 3419805, at 

*12-13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 9, 2006). However, special masters should not use 

this rule as standard practice but rather “[e]ach case should be assessed on its own 

merits.” Gruber v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 773, 791 (2010). “Even 

an automatic 50% award may be too high for an undocumented claim, given the 

possibility that an attorney may use the travel time to work on another matter or not to 

work at all while traveling.” Id. 

The billing records in this case do not indicate that Mr. Kalinowski performed any 

work during the time he was traveling. In fact, the activity performed, driving a car, is 

not the type to allow for simultaneously performed substantive work. See e.g.,

Rodriguez, 2009 WL 2568468, at *21 (compensating at one-half the attorney’s rate 

when traveling by car). Since all travel occurred in 2015, petitioner will be awarded fees 

at a rate of $162.50 for this time, representing one-half of Mr. Kalinowski’s 2015 rate, 

already reduced to $325. 

4. Paralegal Rates 

As indicated in Mr. Maglio’s declaration, the paralegals who are Florida 

Registered Paralegals bill at a rate of $135 per hour, those who do not have this 

designation bill at a rate of $95 to $105, and paralegals working in the Washington, DC 

office bill at a rate of $145 per hour. Exhibit 15 at ¶¶ 22-27. In this case, the paralegal 

work was billed at all of these rates, depending upon the particular paralegal performing 

the work. 

In the same decisions cited above, Scharfenberger and O’Neill, my colleagues 

also addressed the issue of paralegal rates for the Maglio firm. See Scharfenberger, 

2015 WL 3526559, aff’d 124 Fed. Cl. 224 (2015); O’Neill, 2015 WL 2399211. The 

special master in Scharfenberger found the rates up to and including $125 to be 

appropriate but reduced all higher rates to that maximum amount. 2015 WL 3526559, 

at *10. The special master in O’Neill accepted all rates as reasonable, but the highest 

rate billed in that case was $135 per hour. 2015 WL 2399211, at *14. 

The undersigned finds that the rates billed for paralegal work in this case are 

reasonable and will compensate petitioner at those rates. 
9 

B. Appropriate Amount of Costs 

Petitioner seeks payment for costs totaling $804.65. See Exhibit 12, filed as an 

Attachment to Pet. Motion. Petitioner has included the receipts or other documentation 

for the majority but not all of these costs. See id. at 2-21. 

 “It is petitioners’ burden to substantiate costs expended with supporting 

documentation such as receipts, invoices, canceled checks, etc.” Ceballos v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., No. 99-97V, 2004 WL 784910, at *13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. 

Mar. 25, 2004). Special masters, however, have awarded compensation for costs 

without documentation when “satisfied that the costs incurred were related to the 

proceedings . . . and were reasonable.” Erickson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

No. 96-361V, 1999 WL 1268149, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 10, 1999); see also 

Ceballos, 2004 WL 784910, at *13; English v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-

61V, 2006 WL 3419805, at *14-15 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 9, 2006). 

 In this case, petitioner has failed to provide receipts for two items, involving the 

cost of shipping and postage. See Exhibit 12 at 1 (entries dated 9/23/15 and 5/5/16). 

The total cost for these two items is $26.84. 

 

The undersigned finds the undocumented amounts in this case to be reasonable 

and related to the proceedings in this case. Petitioner is awarded the full amount of 

costs requested. 

C. Amount Deducted 

Petitioner billed 18.2 hours of time for work performed in 2015 at a rate of $341 

by Mr. Kalinowski. The undersigned has determined that an appropriate rate for Mr. 

Kalinowski’s work in 2015 is $325. Thus, petitioner’s award is reduced by $291.20 to 

reflect the reduction in the 2015 rate. 

The undersigned also has determined that petitioner shall be paid for Mr. 

Kalinowski’s time spent traveling at one-half of his normal hourly rate. The undersigned 

calculates 6.6 hours of travel time for Mr. Kalinowski. Thus, petitioner’s award is further 

reduced by $1,072.50 to reflect the reduction in hourly rate from $325 to $162.50. The 

total amount deducted from the amount of attorneys’ fees requested by petitioner is 

$1,363.70. 

The specific reductions and amounts paid are as follows: 
10 

Attorneys’ Fees: 

Category of 

Hours 

Hours 

Sought 

Hours 

Paid 

Rate 

Sought 

Rate 

Paid 

Amount 

Deducted 

Amount 

Paid 

2015 Work by Mr. 

Kalinowski 18.2 18.2 $341 $325 $291.20 $5,915 

2016 Work by Mr. 

Kalinowski 11.3 11.3 $349 $349 $0 $3,943.70 

Further Deduction 

for Travel Time 6.6 

Included 

in 18.2 

above

$341 but 

already 

reduced 

to $325 $162.50 $1,072.50 

Already 

included in 

$11,732.50

above

2015 Work by 

Diana Sedar .2 .2 $300 $300 $0 $60 

2015 Work by 

Danielle Strait .2 .2 $295 $295 $0 $59 

Paralegal Work 

$95 

to 

$145 

$95 

to 

$145 $0 $4,664.60 

 

Total for Fees $1,363.70 $14,642.30

Attorneys’ Costs: 

Description Amount 

Billed 

Amount of 

Receipt 

Amount 

Deducted 

Amount Paid 

Documented Costs $777.81 $777.81 $0.00 $777.81 

Postage and Document 

Access $26.84 ---- $0.00 $26.84 

 

Total for Costs $0.00 $804.65

 

IV. Conclusion 

The undersigned has determined that an appropriate hourly rate for petitioner’s 

counsel in this case, Mr. Kalinowski of Maglio, Christopher & Toale, PA is $325 for work 

performed in 2015 and $349 for work performed in 2016. Additionally, the undersigned 

finds that counsel should be paid one-half of his normal rate for time spent traveling. No 

other deduction is warranted. 
11 

The undersigned awards $14,642.30 in attorneys’ fees and $804.65 in attorneys’ 

costs for a total award of $15,446.957 payable jointly to petitioner and petitioner’s 

counsel, Isaiah Kalinowski. 

 The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.8

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

s/Nora Beth Dorsey 

 Nora Beth Dorsey 

 Chief Special Master 

 

7 This amount is intended to cover all legal expenses incurred in this matter. This award encompasses all 

charges by the attorney against a client, “advanced costs” as well as fees for legal services rendered. 

Furthermore, § 15(e)(3) prevents an attorney from charging or collecting fees (including costs) that would 

be in addition to the amount awarded herein. See generally Beck v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

924 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir.1991). 

8 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice 

renouncing the right to seek review.