Filed 6/25/14 P. v. Taghilou CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
FARAMARZ TAGHILOU,
Defendant and Appellant. B248510
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A708409)

APPEAL from an order of the S uperior Court of Los Angeles County, Harvey Giss, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, State Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________ ___________________2 INTRODUCTION More than 25 years ago, Faramarz Taghil ou (Taghilou) entered a no contest plea to one count of oral copulation with a child under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (c) 1 and agreed to submit to a diagnostic study (§ 1203.03) in exchange for a “three-year lid,” meaning he would be sentenced to no more than three years in prison. At the time, the prosecut or acknowledged she had “witness problems”— “problems of proof.” Taghilou was not advised that, as a consequence of his plea to this offense, he would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290 and that this registration requirement wa s for the duration of his life. At Taghilou’s sentencing hearing a fe w months later, based on the diagnostic study as well as the probation officer’s report, the trial c ourt credited Taghilou for the time spent with the Department of Corrections for purposes of the diagnostic study and sentenced Taghilou to formal probation for th ree years, expressly concluding probation was the “appropriate” sentence for Taghilou, not prison. In r eciting a list of conditions of Taghilou’s probation, the trial court told him he had to “register within the next brief period of time as an offender.” In 1992, after satisfactory completion of his probationary period without further offense, Taghilou wa s permitted to withdraw his no contest plea and to enter a plea of not guilty, with the case against him dismissed. (§ 1203.4.) In 1997, Taghilou applied for and the tr ial court granted him a certificate of rehabilitation. (§ 4852.01.) In 2012, Taghilou filed a motion to vacate his 1989 conviction and to be relieved of his obligation to register as a sex offende r. According to Taghilou, he was notified in 1996 he was obligated to c ontinue to register as a se x offender and did so without

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 incident. In the 25 years si nce the entry of his no contes t plea, he had never had any other “problems of this nature.” In 20 11, however, a neighbor discovered Taghilou’s
status as a convicted sex offender on the Me gan’s Law web site and publicized his status to the community. As a result, Taghilou sa id, he, his wife and his two children were harassed and forced to stay inside their home, and the children had to attend schools outside the community where th ey lived. He submitted a declaration stating that, if he
had been informed of the lif etime registration requirement at the time of his plea and sentencing, he “would never have pled to th e charge but would have gone to trial and asserted [his] defense.” The trial court denied Taghilou’s mo tion, stating the court would grant the motion if it had discretion to do so , but believed it lacked discretion because of the particular Penal Code violation underlying Taghilou’s conviction. Taghilou argues due process and equitable contract principles empowered the trial court to enforce his “bargained-for exch ange” which did not include the lifetime registration requirement. He also says the trial court erred in determining it lacked
discretion to relieve him of his obligation to continue to regist er as a sex offender (§ 290)
because a defendant convicted of sexual inte rcourse with a minor may be excused from the registration requirement and it would violate his constitutional right to equal protection to deny him the same opportunity as he is similarly situat ed to one convicted
of such offense. Because we agree with Taghilou on the first issue he raises, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY In 1987, Taghilou was charged with oral copulation of a minor under the age of 14 and more than 10 years younge r than Taghilou at the time in violation of section 288a,4 subdivision (c). The crime was alleged to have occurred on or ab out January 16, 1987 (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. A708409). 2 August 1988 Plea Hearing. On August 22, 1988, Taghilou entered a plea of no contes t to a violation of section 288a, subdivision (c). 3 The trial court (Hon. Meredith C. Taylor) observ ed that, except for this particular count (count 1), the “remai ning counts indicated that this case does fall within . . . section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(6).[ 4 ] Within the meaning of that provision,” the trial court asked the prosecutor (Candace Foy-Smith), “what is the basis for the proposed agreement?” The prosecutor resp onded: “Your Honor, the basis for the proposed agreement would be witn ess problems . . . . Problems of proof[.]” Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor said Tagh ilou would “plead no contest for three year lid with a [section] 1203.02 [ sic , 1203.03 (‘Confinement of de fendant in Department of Corrections facility; Procedure; Disposition’)] study.” 5

2 According to the record, Ta ghilou was 26 at the time.

3 Taghilou was represented by attorney J.D. Sacks.

4 At the time, subdivision (c)(6) of secti on 1192.7 identified “lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years” among a lis t of specified “serious felon[ies]” within the meaning of this statute.
Pursuant to subdivision (a) of sec tion 1192.7 as it read at that time, “ Plea bargaining in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony . . . is prohibited , unless there is insufficient eviden ce to prove the people’s case, or testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained , or a reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change in sentence.” (Italics added.)

5 Section 1203.03 provides: “(a) In any ca se in which a defendant is convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the stat e prison, the court, if it concludes that a just disposition of the case requires such di agnosis and treatment services as can be provided at a diagnostic fa cility of the Department of Corrections, may order that defendant be placed temporarily in such facility for a period not to exceed 90 days, with the further provision in such order that the Director of the Department of Corrections5 Taghilou was given numerous advisement s regarding his cons titutional rights and other consequences of his decision to enter a plea, but there was no mention of section 290 or the obligation to register as a sex offender—for life or at all. The prosecutor then asked Taghilou: “[I]n Case Number A 708409, how do you plead to count 1 occurring on or about January the 16th , 1987, to violation of . . . section 288[]a[,] subdivision [(]c[)], oral copulation of a person under 14 by the name of [the
victim’s name was stated on the record] who was also more than 10 years younger than you at the time?” “No contest [,]” Taghilou answered. Asked whether he “join[ed] in the waiver and concur[red] in the plea and stipulate[d] to a fact ual basis[,]” defense counsel responded, “Yes, I do.” The trial court then stated: “Mr. Taghilo u, the court does find that your waivers are knowingly, intelligently, and understandingl y made, that there is a factual basis for

report to the court his diagnosis and recomme ndations concerning the defendant within the 90-day period.
“(b) The Director of the Department of Corrections shall, within the 90 days, cause defendant to be observed and examined and shall fo rward to the court his diagnosis and recommendation concerning the disposition of defendant’s case. Such diagnosis and recommendation shall be embodied in a written report and copies of the report shall be served only upon the defendant or his counsel, the probati on officer, and the prosecuting attorney by the court receiving su ch report. After delivery of the copies of the report, the information contained therein shall not be disc losed to anyone else without the consent of the defendant. After disposition of the case, all copies of the report, except the one delivered to the defendant or his counsel, shall be filed in a sealed file and shall be available thereafter only to the defendant or his counsel, the prosecuting attorney, the court, the probation officer, or the Department of Corrections.
“(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), the probation officer may retain a copy of the report for the purpose of supervision of the defendant if the defendant is placed on probation by the court. The report and info rmation contained therein shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone else without the written consen t of the defendant. Upon the completion or termination of probati on, the copy of the report shall be returned by the probation officer to the sealed file prescribed in subdivision (b).”6 your plea, that it is freely a nd voluntarily given. The cour t does accept your plea of no contest, sir; and on the basi s of your plea, the court do es find you guilty. . . .” Continuing, the trial court indicated, “we will first order a probation and sentencing report[,]” and when that is re ceived, pursuant to the plea agreement, “we will refer Mr. Taghilou for a report pursuant to [section] 1203.03 . . . .” January 1989 Sentencing Hearing. On January 5, 1989, the trial court su mmarized the proceedings of August 22, 1988, when Taghilou entered his no contest plea to count 1 with a “three year lid” as the agreed disposition and it was an ticipated that coun ts 2 through 4 would be dismissed at sentencing. The trial court further noted fe lony probation had not been precluded. The trial court further stated that, in the interi m, the court had received and considered the probation officer’s report as we ll as the section 1203.03 report. 6 The trial court then stated: “Mr. Taghilo u, the Court does have an open plea
before it to the extent of a three-year lid. Three years is the low term for a violation of . . . section 288[a, subdivis ion] (c). I have carefully re viewed the probation officer’s report, and the [section] 1203.03 report, and I am prepared to place you on felony probation, believing that it is reasonable an d appropriate to the circumstances.” When asked if counsel wished to put anything more on the record, defense co unsel (Sachs) said: “I will just submit it on the basis of the report s, the letters, and th e conference we had in chambers.” The prosecutor (F oy-Smith) indicated she had noth ing further, “except to put on the record that the People will also be requesting a six-week supplementary, nonappearance report as proof of regi stration as a sex offender.”

6 Although the pagination of the record on appeal is cons ecutive, it appears a page of the reporter’s transcript for January 5, 1989, is mi ssing from the record. (The reporter’s transcript for the January 1989 da te was submitted as E xhibit 2 to Taghilou’s motion to vacate his conviction.) Page 36 of the clerk’s transcri pt in this appeal is page 2 of the reporter’s transcript of the proceedin gs on January 5, 1989, but page 37 of the clerk’s transcript in the appeal is page 4 of the January 5, 1989 repo rter’s transcript and we do not find it elsewhere in the record.7 The trial court continued: “Then, Mr. Ta ghilou, if you are prepared to accept the terms and conditions that I am going to state to you, you will be placed on three years formal probation to the court and the Proba tion Department. [¶] You are to spend the first 116 days in custody, and you are receivi ng credit for 77 days actually spent, plus 39 days good time/work time credits for total credits of 116 days. [¶] You are ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $100 to the restitu tion fund pursuant to . . . section 1203.04 [as the trial court confirmed the prosecutor kn ew of no restitution ow ed to the identified victim for any treatment].” The court furt her advised Taghilou he was “required to cooperate with his probation officer in a plan for continuing coun seling to deal with whatever problems you do have including th e underlying offense.” The court noted defense counsel had requested counseling with a particular counselor (Lilla Hashemi), the probation officer had agreed she was “an appr opriate court counselor for [Taghilou]” and indicated the court had no objection to su ch counseling “at such frequency as your probation officer will direct[.]”
The trial court further orde red Taghilou to seek and main tain training, schooling or employment as approved by his probation office r as well as a reside nce approved by him or her; to obey all laws and orders of the Co urt as well as the rules and regulations of the Probation Department; and to pay the cost of his probation services, including the reports that had been prepared. “You are not to associate with young wo men under the age of 16. You are not to be in their presence unless there is another adult present with you. “You are to engage in week ly outpatient psychotherapy. This will be as part of the counseling program that I have stated. The minute order sha ll reflect that that will be weekly outpatient psychotherapy fo r a minimum period of two years.8 “It may be, Mr. Taghilou, that two years is longer than is necessary. Apparently, however, the persons who engaged in the 1203.0 3 study do believe that it will be at least that amount of time that you should have th at counseling. Should your treating psychotherapist and your probation officer agree that less than two years is appropriate, you may request a modification, but without a modification, it must be for a minimum of two years. “You must register within the next brie f period of time as an offender, and I am requesting a six-week report from the probati on officer. You will ha ve to show him or her proof that you have register ed and do so in a timely fashi on, so he or she can have a report to the Court in six weeks time. We will make that report due on February 16 . . . .” The trial court ordered a supplemental repor t “on all terms and conditions” due on June 28, 1989, at which time Taghilou was to return to court. “The supplemental report will be on a ll terms and conditions , Mr. Taghilou, but I’m advising you very strongly at this time th at I think the most important term is your on-going treatment of therapy both for your own benefit and for the benefit of the rest of society, so if you should fail to observe that term and condition, I will take that as a very serious failing. [¶] I will be considering at that time imposition of custody as may be appropriate . . . .” Taghilou indicated he unde rstood, he agreed and he had no questions. After extending “[b]est wishes” to Taghilou and thanking counsel on both sides “for [their] excellent work in this matter[,]” the trial court gran ted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss counts 2 through 4. July 1992 Dismissal of Case (§ 1203.4). On July 24, 1992, pursuant to section 1203.4, as his probationa ry period had expired without further offens e, Taghilou was permitted to w ithdraw his no contest plea and enter a plea of not guilty, and the trial cour t, in turn, dismissed the case against him pursuant to section 1203.4, me aning “except as noted [in th at statute,]” Taghilou was released “from all penalties and disabilities re sulting from the offense of which he [had]9 been convicted.” 7 According to the trial court’s or der, although the copy in the clerk’s transcript is difficult to read, it appears that “S . Baron” was the deputy district attorney in court that day along with private counsel on behalf of Taghilou—perhaps Sacks.

7 In 1992, section 1203.4 (change of plea and dismissal of charges after termination of probation; release from pe nalties and disabilities; subse quent offenses) stated as follows: “(a) In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to th e termination of the period of probation, or in a ny other case in which a cour t, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defe ndant should be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time after the termination of the period of probation, if he or she is not then serving a sentence for any offens e, on probation for any offense, or charged with the commission of any offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he or she has b een convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; a nd, in either case, the cour t shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as noted below, he or she shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilitie s resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code. The probationer shall be informed, in his or her probatio n papers, of this right and privilege and his or her right, if any, to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The probationer may make the applica tion and change of pl ea in person or by attorney, or by the probation o fficer authorized in writing; however, in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for any other offense, the pr ior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information dismis sed. The order shall state, and the probationer shall be informed, that the order does not relieve him or her of the obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct que stion contained in any questionnaire or application for public office, fo r licensure by any state or local agency, or for contracting with the California State Lottery.

“Dismissal of an accusation or informati on pursuant to this section does not permit a person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person or preven t his or her conviction under Section 12021.
“This subdivision shall apply to all applic ations for relief under this section which are filed on or after November 23, 1970.10 August 1997 Certificate of Rehabilitation. On August 25, 1997, Taghilou applied for and was granted a “certificate of rehabilitation[,]” which ordered and decreed that Taghilou ha d been “rehabilitated and is
fit to exercise all the civ il and political rights of citiz enship (except as provided in . . . [s]ection 4852.15 [(which addressed on ly the effect of the chapter on the power to regulate the practice of a profession or occupation—without any mention of the obligation to register as a se x offender or section 290)].” 8 According to the trial court’s

“(b) Subdivision (a) of this section doe s not apply to any misdemeanor which is within the provisions of subd ivision (b) of Section 42001 of the Vehicle Code, or to any infraction.
“(c) A person who petitions fo r a change of plea or setting aside of a verdict under this section may be required to reimburse the co unty for the cost of services rendered at a rate to be determined by the county board of supervisors not to exceed sixty dollars ($60), and to reimburse any city for the cost of serv ices rendered at a rate to be determined by the city council not to exceed sixty dollars ($60). Ability to make this reimbursement shall be determined by the court using th e standards set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (f) of Section 987. 8 and shall not be a prerequi site to a person's eligibility under this section. The court may order reim bursement in any case in which the petitioner appears to have the ability to pay, without undue hardship, a ll or any portion of the cost for services established pursuant to this subdivision.
“(d) No relief shall be granted under th is section unless the prosecuting attorney has been given 15 days' notice of the petition for relief. The pr obation officer shall notify the prosecuting attorney when a petition is filed, pursuant to this section.
“It shall be presumed that the prosecuting attorney has received notice if proof of service is filed with the court.
“(e) If, after receiving notice pursuant to subdivision (d), the prosecuting attorney fails to appear and object to a petition for dismissal, the prosecut ing attorney may not move to set aside or otherwise appeal the grant of that petition.”

8 According to the Certificate of Rehabilita tion, signed and filed with the trial court (Hon. John H. Reid) on August 25, 1997, on a “form prepared under the direction of the office of the Attorney Genera l of the State of California[,]” Taghilou’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation was heard that day, “in open court” an d “proof having been11 August 25, 1997 minute order, Deputy Distri ct Attorney N. Montrose appeared along with J. Barnes, private counsel on behalf of Taghilou. 9

made to the satisfaction of the Court that not ice of the time of hearing has been regularly given as required by law; and from satisfacto ry proof taken at said hearing the Court finds that all allegations of said petition are true, and that the required period of rehabilitation has elapsed sinc e petitioner’s date of discha rge from custody due to his completion of the term to which he was se ntenced, or upon his release on parole or probation on July 24 , 1992, that, where appropriate, petitioner has obtained relief pursuant to Penal Code secti on 1203.4, and that petitioner ha s demonstrated by his course of conduct his rehabilitation and fitness to ex ercise all the civil and political rights of citizenship (except as provid ed in Penal Code section 4852.15 [regarding professional licensing and privileges; see footnote 12, post ]); and that petitioner has been (once) convicted of a felony: WHEREFORE, It Is Ordered, Adjudged an d Decreed, And this Court does hereby order, adju dge and decree that petitioner has been rehabilitated and is fit to exercise all the civil and political rights of citizen ship (except as provided in Penal Code Section 4852.15), and by virtue thereof this court recommends that the Governor of the State of California grant a full pardon to said petitioner.”

We note the case number on both the August 25, 1997 minute order and the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is BA109489, a different number than the original case number. (The minute order for the July 24, 1992 di smissal pursuant to section 1203.4, however, is the same as Ta ghilou’s original case number (and the case number identified on his motion to vacate his conviction).)

9 Section 4852.15 (effect of chapter on po wer to regulate practice of profession or corporation) provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be c onstrued to abridge or impair the power or authority conferred by law on an y officer, board, or tribunal to revoke or suspend any right, privilege, or franchise for any act or omission not involved in his or her conviction, or to require the reinstatement of the right or privilege to practice or carry on any profession or occupatio n the practice or conduct of which requires the possession or obtaining of a license, permit, or certificat e. Nothing in this ch apter shall affect any provision of Chapter 5 (commencing with Se ction 2000) of Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code or the power or author ity conferred by law on the Board of Medical Examiners therein, or the power or authority conferred by law upon a ny board that issues a certificate permitting any person to practice or apply his or her art or profession on the person of another. Nothing in this chapte r shall affect any provision of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 6000) of Division 3 of the Busine ss and Professions Code or the power or authority in rela tion to attorneys at law and th e practice of the law in the State of California conferred by law upon or otherwise possessed by the courts, or the12 June 2012 Motion to Vacate Conviction. Fifteen years after obtaining a certificat e of rehabilitation, on June 11, 2012, Taghilou filed a motion to vacate his 1989 conviction for viol ating section 288a, subdivision (c), on the ground he was not adequa tely informed by the court of the direct consequence of his plea of no contest to the char ge that he would have to register as a sex offender for life pursuan t to section 290. Citing the reporter’s transcript of his entry of a no contest plea on August 22, 1988, he noted he was never advised that, as a direct consequence of his plea, he would have to register as a sex offender, and furt hermore, that this registration requirement would continue for life pursuant to section 290. Citing the reporter’s transcript of his sentencing on January 5, 1989, Taghilou noted the trial court relied on the probation report and the report from his section 1203.03 diagnostic study in sentencing him to formal probation for a period of three years; in informing him of his conditions of probation, the trial cour t told Taghilou: “you must register within the brief period of time as an offender, and I am requesting a six-week report from the probation officer. You will have to show him or her proof that you have registered and do so in a timel y fashion, so he or she can ha ve a report to the court in six weeks time.” Taghilou added: “There was nothi ng in the record to sh ow that the court at the time of sentencing advised [him] he would ha ve to register as a sex offender and that this registration was re quired for life.” Citing the trial court’s docket entries and order of July 24, 1992, Taghilou said his
1988 conviction had been set aside and the case dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4. Finally, citing the August 1997 document, he noted he had obtained a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to section 4852.01.

power or authority conferred by law upon th e State Bar of Califor nia or any board or committee thereof.” (§ 4852.15.)13 In support of his motion to vacate his conviction, Taghilou al so submitted his own declaration, stating as follo ws: He came legally to the United States from the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1983 when he was 23, “a stranger to the ways, customs and laws of the United States.” Shortly thereafter, he b ecame a green card ho lder with permanent resident status in 1985 and eventually beca me a successful licensed electrical contractor,
married an American citizen in 2004 and had two young children, an d they had all lived together as a family in the Santa Clarita Valley area. When he entered his no contest plea, Ta ghilou testified, I wa s “still relatively new
to the United States and was not that familiar with its customs and la ws and had difficulty with English as a second language since [h is] native tongue is Far[s]i. Before his no contest plea, neither the court nor his probati on officer ever advised him he would have to register as a sex offender and that this obligation wa s for the rest of his life. Because of this lack of knowledge, Taghilou said, he did not register duri ng the course of his probation. After completing probation, his conviction was “expunged pursuant
to . . . section 1203.4.” 10 “It was only after I was contacted by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 1996 that I was first informed of my duty to register as sex offender each year. After being so informed I have register ed as required and have done so through the present. The following year 1997 I petiti oned for and obtained a Certificate of
Rehabilitation from the court.”

10 As explained in People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, the “release[ ] from all penalties and disabilities” described in section 1203.4 is sometimes referred to as “expungement” of the convicti on. Strictly speaking, howev er, section 1203.4 does not “expunge” the conviction nor render it “a legal nullity.” (See People v. Frawley (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 791.) For example, char ges dismissed under se ction 1203.4 may be treated as convictions for some purposes, su ch as impeachment through the use of the prior conviction in a future prosecution. Ho wever, the “release[ ] from all penalties and disabilities” is a “palpable benefit, such that the conviction may be treated as if it were not a conviction for most purposes.” ( People v. Holman, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.)14 In his declaration, Taghilou further stated he was unaware of the legal defect in the court’s failure to inform him of the duty to regi ster as a sex offender for life at the time he pled no contest to the charge on which his conviction was based, and later at sentencing, he took no action to remedy so mething about which he was ig norant. “Over the 25 years since the alleged offense took place on Januar y 16, 1987,” he had “never had any other sexual violations or problems of this nature. Since registering as a sex offender in 1996, [he] had never experienced any repercu ssions or problems which arose from his registration pursuant to . . . section 290 until re cently.” Taghilou testified: “During 2011 a neighbor . . . who is a retired Los Angeles County [Deputy] Sheriff . . . became aware of my sex offender registrant status and bega n publicizing this to the other neighbors and to the school . . . my two young children attend. She has told all of the other parents who
have children in class with my children about my past offe nse. As a result of this situation my children have to go to [a] sc hool which is over 10 miles away from our
home rather than to the local school and we cann ot let our children play in either the front or backyards to our home because they are traumatized by the harassment.” Taghilou said he then “sought the advice of counsel to see if anything could be done to remedy this situation.” It was only after counsel reviewed the record that it was
revealed to him that at the tim e he entered his plea and late r at sentencing the trial court failed to advise him that as a result of pl eading no contest and being sentenced on the charge of which he was convicted that he woul d be obligated to regist er as a sex offender and this required him to register for the rest of his life. “If I had been informed of this lifetime registration requirement at the time of my plea to th e charge and sentencing for this conviction I would never have pled to th e charge but would have gone to trial and asserted my defense. Even th ough at the time of my plea to the charge it was revealed by the prosecution that they had witness and pr oof problems with thei r case I followed my attorney’s advice of taking the offer of exposure of only 3 ye ars in prison with a possible probation sentence after a diagnostic study. It was after learning last year about the15 court’s failure to follow the responsibility it had to info rm me of the registration requirement as a sex offender an d that I would have to do th is for life under . . . section
290 that I decided to seek the re medy of vacating my conviction.” Taghilou’s motion was originally set for hearing on July 12, 2012. However, the
motion was continued several ti mes over the next nine months (to September 21, then to November 9, then to January 7, 2013, then to February 15, then to March 22), with the trial court’s minute orders indicating: “***NO LEGAL FILE ***PENDING RECEIPT
FROM ARCHIVES***” On March 22, the trial court noted Taghil ou had filed an additio nal brief “in regard to the court’s indicated [ruling] that was ma de on February 15” and continued the hearing
to March 27. 11 Taghilou filed a document entitled “aut hority for the court to order that the defendant is no longer required to register as a sex offender pursuant to . . . section 290,” arguing the remedy for violation of a plea bargain is either specific enforcement of the plea bargain or allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea. Although it appears the district attorney had not filed any opposition or response to Taghilou’s motion—in advance of the original hearing date or at all, on March 27, the deputy district attorney (Kar en Tandler) told the court she had been “able to obtain the D.A. file; and there was a paralegal who had been working on this case prior to her transfer. [¶] She obtained some documentation that may be helpful for the court. One of
the documents that she obtained was a ce rtified four-page doc ument showing the defendant requesting a registra tion change of address, a 29 0 PC registration change of

11 There is no minute order or tentative ru ling for February 15, 2013 in the record on appeal. At the March 27, 2013 hearing, the trial court indicated it “want[ed] to refer to the transcript of February 15, 2013 where if this matter goes up that that is part of the record because the court gave its reasons in great detail as to an indicated.” Again, however, there is no reporter’s transcript of proceedings conducted on that date (February 15, 2013).16 address.” 12 The significance, she said, was that Ta ghilou had registered for years, and he was fully aware of his duty and requirement to register.” She said she also had a “[section] 290 printout” s howing registration from 1991 th rough 2012, which she argued “shows this was not a surprise . . . .” 13 Defense counsel (Sacks, Taghilou’s counsel at the time of his plea and sentencing) said “it show s that he was advised by some way three years into his probation.” The trial court resp onded: “The problem is that in 1996 when he started registering as a sex offender he kn ew then. [¶ O]ne can easily infer from the fact that he started reporting every year th ereafter after the sheriff gave him notice you better start registering that it was lifetime; and he waited 16 years before he moved to vacate, which deprives the People if I vacate the conviction on the plea and the sentence of any success of retrying him. [¶] In other words, he’s prejudiced the prosecution’s case with his untimely and stale motion. [¶] Ther e was never any prejudice in this court’s opinion to the defendant . . . if he wasn’t told of lifetim e registration because he got a deal that he would never have gotten had no t Judge Taylor sent it out for a diagnostic under [section] 1203.03 and then put him on probation. [¶] So he wanted that deal; and I’m saying the [section] 290 registration would have never been an impediment. [¶] He wanted to stay out of prison[;] he wasn’t worried about the regist ration by virtue of his
conduct.”
The trial court continued: “I’m maki ng a comparison, an analogy to [section] 1061.5, where a person isn’t told of the conse quences of his plea, his deportation, denial of reentry and naturalization and amnesty. [¶] The case law in that particular area says

12 She later identified this four-page documen t as Exhibit 2, stating that it contained Taghilou’s fingerprints, date of birth and id entifying information, demonstrating, she said, that as early as June 22, 1990, he s ubmitted a “[section] 290 registration change of address.” The trial court admitted the exhibi t into evidence, but it is not part of the appellate record.

13 She referred to this document as Exhibit 1, the trial court admitted it as well, but it is not part of the appellate record either.17 that the defendant must show prejudice, and that a reasonabl e probability exists that but for not being informed he would have no t pled guilty and woul d have insisted on proceeding to trial. [¶] Whether there is pr ejudice in a given case varies depending upon the individual facts of each case. [¶] The defe ndant wanted to stay out of prison and he
did because of the successful efforts of his present counsel Mr. Sacks. Defense counsel responded that, “Just to get an issue of prejudice . . . the transcript shows that one of the reasons for this [‘]supe r deal[’] was that the prosecution did have witness problems and problems of proof.” He then read from th e August 22, 1989 plea hearing transcript. The trial court interjected: “We all know that once the trial starts the case takes on
a life of its own and it resolves one way or the other.”
Defense counsel continued: “I think there is an issue that deals with prejudice, but
we have the time factor that I don’t think fo r the vacation of the pl ea we can overcome because the People are prejudiced at this late date. [¶] Th ey had witness problems back then. How are they go ing to get the witnesses now? [¶ ] That’s why I ca me in with my second thrust of argument dealing with sp ecific performance limiting this court—” Again, the trial court interjected: “I can’t do it, though. I would do it if I could

. [¶] Registration for someone who has sex with a child under the age of 14 is mandatory.
I don’t have the discretion in my opinion.” (Italics added.) When the prosecutor cited to the fourth page of the reporter’s transcript for Taghilou’s sentencing hearing when “proof of registration” was mentioned, the trial court agreed “he was told that he’d have to report[, and] ther e was no objection at that time, but it didn’t say lifetime . . . . I don’t think that’s an impediment to the court’s ability to rule that there is no prejudice to the defendant and the prosecution is prejudiced by the defendant waiting 25 years to va cate a plea.” Later, after further discussion about when he first knew to register, the trial court re iterated: “So the defe ndant knew he had to18 register for life, and he waited 25 years to come to this court and vacate his judgment after he knew he had to register.” Defense counsel responded: “ I’m not arguing with that.” The trial court: “That’s a tremendously untimely staleness issue.” Defense counsel: “I’m just trying to focus on limited performance because of the
court’s failure to advise him of the direct consequence of his plea.”
The trial court: “I read the case law on that subject matter, and I cited those cases for you that were the exceptions made on equa l protection and so forth with registration; and I cannot find a case that says I have the di scretion to excuse that as a condition to the plea. It’s mandatory if it’s a child under 14, which it was in th is case. [¶] Do you have a case on point?”
Defense counsel said he had cited to People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 (overruled in part by People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 183) which dealt with a restitution fine, not registration. Again, the trial court indicated: “I believe that that subject ma tter of a child under
14 is so serious that the court does not have the discretion to in any way at this late stage strike it as a condition of his orig inal plea. (Italics added.) “So I’m going to deny your request; and to be more specif ic it’s stale. “The defendant did have scienter rega rding registration a nd waited 25 years to vacate it; and he was told to register and the issue should have been raised then, register when, how often, and so forth, pl us there is no prejudice. “The defendant got a deal that you will neve r see for the type of fact situation that
existed in this case. “He got a diagnostic report and he was put on probation after he came back from the [section] 1203.03 and never ha d to do time in state prison. “So the motion is respectfully denied.19 “Take it up. Maybe they’ll make an excep tion and say in a rare fact situation like
this the court does have discretion to exercise and strike that as a requirement, but I’m not going to do it until a court of higher jurisdiction orders me to do so. “Everything I’ve read—I have a sex crim e manual four inches thick that covers everything and it’s kept current . It says it’s mandatory. “So that’s the reason for my ruling.” Taghilou appeals. 14 DISCUSSION The Trial Court Erred in Concluding It Lack ed Discretion to Enforce the Terms of the Plea Agreement Entered into By the Prosecutor on Behalf of the People and Defense Counsel on Taghilou’s Behalf and Approved by the Trial Court at that Time. First, Taghilou argues, he should be relie ved of his obligation to register as a sex
offender for life because he was not advised of this burden at the time he entered a plea in the underlying case, and lifetim e registration was not a part of the plea agreement. “[T]his is an issue of enfo rcing a binding agreement—a le gal offer made and accepted, with each side receiving certain and specif ic consideration,” and his “detrimental rel[iance] on the terms of the plea agre ement”—terms which Taghilou says did not include registration as a sex offender.

14 In People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4t h 330, 339-340 ( Picklesimer ), our Supreme Court explained that the proper procedural mechanism for challenging a lifetime sex offender registration obligation is by petition for writ of mandate filed in the trial court, rather than the motion to vacate Taghilou filed (and after filing this appeal, Taghilou also filed a petition for writ of ma ndate (B249670), but we dismissed that petition in light of this pending appeal). In any case, we address Ta ghilou’s challenge to his mandatory obligation to register as a sex o ffender for life on its merits. “[E]very right must have a remedy,” ( id . at p. 339) and “[t]he label given a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative; rather, the true nature of a petition or cause of action is based on the facts alleged and reme dy sought in that pleading.” ( Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.)20 As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4t h 921, “the process of plea negotiation ‘contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court.[ 15 ] (§§ 1192.1, 1192 .2, 1192.4, 1192.5; People v.
West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604–608 [91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].) Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty [or no cont est] in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged. ( People v. West, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 604.) This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the imposition of such clemen t punishment (§ 1192.5), by the People’s acceptance of a plea to a lesser o ffense than that charged, e ither in degree (§§ 1192.1, 1192.2) or kind ( People v. West, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 608), or by the prosecutor’s
dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-co unt indictment or information. Judicial approval is an essential conditi on precedent to the effectiven ess of the “bargain” worked out by the defense and pros ecution. (§§ 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5; People v. West,

supra , 3 Cal.3d at pp. 607–608.) Bu t implicit in all of this is a process of “bargaining” between the adverse parties to the case—the Pe ople represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his counse l on the other—which bargaining results in

15 “Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and ‘integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to th e expeditious and fair administration of our courts.’ ( In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933 [8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 830 P.2d 747]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79–80 [51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061] ( Panizzon ).) Plea agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments. ( Panizzon, supra , at p. 80; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 16 58 [17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445]; see also In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 5 [134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54, 68 P.3d 347] [noting judgments based upon plea agreements ‘represent the vast majority of felony and misdemeanor dispositions in criminal cases,’ and citing statis tics indicating that less than 5 percent of felony cases are disposed of through felony convictions re sulting from a court or jury trial].)” ( People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 929.)21 an agreement between them. (See People v. West, supra , 3 Cal.3d at pp. 604–605.)’ . . . .” ( People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 929-930, ad ditional citations omitted.) “‘“When a guilty [or nolo co ntendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified
benefits such as the dismissal of other c ounts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.”’” ( People v. Segura, supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 930–931, original br ackets.) “Thereafter, material terms of the agreement cannot be modified without the parties’ consent.” ( People v. Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75, 80.) “A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract princi ples. [Citations.] ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give eff ect to the mutual inte ntion of the parties. [Citation.]’” ( People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)
In Swenson v. File (1970) 3 Cal.3d 389, 393 ( Swenson ), our Supreme Court stated: “‘“all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made, which laws the parties are presumed to know and to have had in mind, ne cessarily enter into th e contract and form a part of it, without any stipulation to that eff ect, as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated,”’” and “laws enacted subsequent to the execution of an agreement are not ordinarily deemed to become part of the agreement unless its language clearly indicates
this to have been the inten tion of the parties.” Conseque ntly, “to hold that subsequent changes in the law which impose greater bur dens or responsibilities upon the parties become part of that agreement would result in modifying it without their consent . . . .” ( Id . at p. 394.) Recently, in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 ( Doe ), our Supreme Court
addressed this rule from Swenson in the context of a plea agreement. At issue was whether the defendant’s plea agreement wa s violated by applying a retroactive
amendment to California’s Sex Offender Registration Act, section 290 et seq. 16 ( Id. at p.

16 In Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 54, the plaintiff ha d filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court, asserting th at requiring him to comp ly with the public notification provisions of “Meg an’s Law” (§ 290.46, added by Stats. 2004, ch. 745, § 1,22 65.) Responding to a question certified by th e United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Doe court drew a distinction between Swenson , supra, 3 Cal.3d 389, which involved a change in law not in tended to apply retroactively, and People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065 ( Gipson ), in which the court applie d a retroactive change in recidivism sentencing notwithstanding the pa rties’ plea agreement under prior law. ( Doe , supra , at pp. 69-70.) In contrast to Swenson , the Gipson court applied the following rule: “‘When persons enter into a contract or tran saction creating a relationship infused with a substantial public interest, subject to plenar y control by the state, such contract or transaction is deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of pub lic policy . . . .’” ( Doe , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 70, quoting In re Marriage of Walton (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 112.) As explained by the Doe court, both of these cases re cognize “that the Legislature, for the public good and in furtherance of public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and state Constitutions , has the authority to modify or invalidate the terms of an agreemen t. Our explanation in Swenson that, as a general rule, contracts incorporate existing but not subsequent law, does not mean that the Legislature lacks authority to alter the terms of existing cont racts through retroactive legislation. Nor should it be interpreted to mean that the parties, although d eemed to have existing law in mind when executing their agr eement, must further be d eemed to be unaware their contractual obligations may be affected by later legislation made expressly retroactive to

pp. 5798-5803), would violate his 1991 plea agreement. ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 67.)
In responding to the Ninth Circuit’s reque st for clarification of California law on the subject, our Supreme Court framed the question presented as follows: “Under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the interpretation of plea agreements, does the law in effect at the tim e of a plea agreement bind the parties or can the terms of a plea agreement be a ffected by changes in the law?” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66.)23 them, or that they are implicitly agreeing to avoid the effect of valid, retroactive legislation. Gipson explains that the parties to a plea agreement—an agreement unquestionably infused with substantial public interest and subject to the plenary control
of the state—are deemed to know and understand that the state, again subject to the limitations imposed by the fe deral and state Constitutions , may enact laws that will affect the consequences attending the conv iction entered upon the plea.” ( Doe, supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 70, italics added.) Emphasizing that both holdings reflected California law and were not inconsistent, the Doe court concluded: “ Gipson . . . applies here, while
Swenson does not[,]” noting the amendments to the Sex Offender Registration Act at
issue in Doe were expressly made retroac tive by the Legislature while Swenson
considered the effect on a commercial contr act of a change in the law that was not intended to apply retroactively. ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 70.)
The Doe court also reasoned: “[T]he parties to a particular plea bargain might affirmatively agree or implicitly understand the consequences of a plea will remain fixed despite amendments to the relevant law,” noting this inquiry “presents factual issues that generally require an analysis of the represen tations made and other circumstances specific to the individual case .” ( Doe, supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 71, italics added.)
The Doe court had emphasized preliminarily: “O ur task is limited. . . . For present purposes, we assume the Legislature’ s decision to make the amendments to the sex registration requirements retroactive com ports with federal and state constitutional requirements, including due process, the proh ibition against ex post facto laws, and the federal and state contract clauses that proh ibit states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
“We also do not assess the merits of the parties’ fact ual assertions or consider whether the district court’s factual findings, as explained to us by the Ninth Circuit, are supported by the evidence. [C itation.] We accordingly accept as true the Ninth Circuit’s representation that neither the parties’ nego tiations nor the express terms of the plea agreement addressed whether Doe’s identity would remain forever confidential or24 included an affirmative promise that Doe would be exempt from changes in the law affecting persons convicted of his offense.” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, 68.) We note
that in Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, the written change of plea form Doe had signed at the time of his plea “recited that the maximu m penalties for Doe’s conviction would be probation, participation in a work furlough program, fines, testing as required by former section 290.2, and registration as a sex o ffender under section 290 .” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66, italics added.)
The Doe court clearly stated the “general rule in California” is that “requiring parties’ compliance with change s in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failu re of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the st atutory consequences attending his or her conviction. To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be aff ected by changes in the law.” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 73-74.) However, the Doe court also recognized that “the parties to a particular plea bargain might affirmatively agree or implicitly understand the consequences of a plea will re main fixed despite amendments to the relevant law. [Citations.] [¶] Whether such an understand ing exists presents factual issues that generally require an analysis of the repr esentations made and other circumstances specific to the individual case.” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 71.) Therefore, we must turn to the issue of whether the reco rd shows the parties in this case “affirmatively agreed or implicitly understood” Taghilou’s obligation to “register . . . as an offender” was, as he argued, limited in durati on. Constitutional due process requires that “‘when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promis e must be fulfilled.’” ( People v. Arata [ , supra, ] 151 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 786 ( Arata ), quoting Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262.) Furthermore, “due process requirements apply not only to the taking of the plea, but also to implementation of the bargain.” ( Arata, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 786,25 citing People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860 [spe cific performance of omitted term of plea bargain calling for diagnostic stud y].) “‘It necessarily follows that violation of the bargain by an officer of the state ra ises a constitutional right to some remedy.’ ( Ibid. ) ‘This does not mean that any deviation from the terms of the agreement is constitutionally impermissible.’ ( People v. Walker [, supra ,] 54 Cal.3d [at p.] 1024, original italics.) Rather, the variance must be ‘“significant” in the context of the plea bargain as a whole to violate the defendant’s rights.’ ( Ibid. ; see Santobello v. New York,

supra, 404 U.S. at p. 262.)” 17 ( Arata, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 786-787.) Here, rather than evaluating the nego tiated plea agreement in this case and interpreting it according to general contract principles as our Supreme Court has described ( People v. Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767), the trial court found itself constrained by the mandatory lifetime regist ration requirement under section 290 for violation of section 288a, subdivision (c ), the offense to wh ich Taghilou pled. Accordingly, we conclude remand is necessa ry to allow the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determ ine whether there was “an affi rmative agreement or implicit understanding [otherwise] between the parties” ( Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 71) as to the consequences of Taghilou’s plea pursuant to the plea agreement in this particular case, notwithstanding the language of the statute to which Taghilou entered his no contest plea as well as subsequent st atutory amendments. As explained in People v. Shelton, supra , 37 Cal.4th at page 767, “‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to th e mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.] If contractual la nguage is clear and explicit, it governs.

17 In Arata, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pa ge 787, the issue was whether “denial of section 1203.4 relief would be a ‘significant ’ variation in the context of the entire plea bargain so as to violate a de fendant’s constitutional rights” ( id . at p. 787), such that the defendant may be entitled to sp ecific performance despite s ubsequent changes in the law that made the promise statutorily unauthorized. (See id . at pp. 782, 786-788 [state must comply with section 12 03.4 promise despite subsequent amendment to statute excluding sex offender defendant from statute’s coverage]; see also Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 414, fn. 7.)26 [Citation.] On the other hand, “[i]f the term s of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interp reted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee underst ood it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; th e object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent co nduct of the parties.”’ According to the record in this case, however, at the ti me of Taghilou’s plea, there

was no mention of section 290 or the obligation to register as a sex offender or the fact this obligation would last for the duration of Taghilou’s life. 18 Failure to advise the defendant of his statutory obligation to regi ster as a sex offender constitutes error. ( People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 379.) In McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pages 377-378, the court determined such error was harmless because the defendant had failed to object to the imposition of the registrati on requirement at the time of his sentencing
and had failed to demonstrate prejudice arising out of the error. Here, however, Taghilou

was not informed that he would be obligated to register as a sex offender for life at the time of his plea or at sentencing; to the contrary, in fa ct, according to th e record, the first mention of any obligation to register (wit hout mention of section 290) was at the sentencing hearing and further, he was told—in the context of a recitation of the various
terms and conditions of his probation -- he would have to regist er “within the next brief period of time” as an offender. (See People v. Martin, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 80

18 “A negotiated plea of guilty or no contes t requires the defendant to waive his or her constitutional rights re lated to trial. ( Panizzon, supra , 13 Cal.4th at p. 80.) Prior to accepting the plea, the trial cour t must inform the defendant of the constitutional rights being waived and the direct consequences of the plea . ( Panizzon, supra , at p. 80; Walker, supra , 54 Cal.3d at p. 1022.)” ( People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 931, fn. 6, italics added.)27 [“Thereafter, material terms of the agreement cannot be modified without the parties’ consent”].) In fact, at sent encing, the trial court was more careful in specifying that Taghilou would have to pay a restitution fine in the amount of $100 pursuant to section 1203.4 and repeatedly stressed that Taghilou’s obligati on to attend counseling during his probation was the most important co mponent of the plea agreement. Indeed, at the hearing on Taghilou’s motion for relief from the registration requirement, the trial court expressly agreed Taghilou was never told he was obligated to register as a sex offender under section 290 for the duration of his life. As in People v.
Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 , and unlike the mere “ assertion ” of prejudice noted in McClellan, supra , 6 Cal.4th at page 378, original italics, Taghilou presented evidence of prejudice—he submitted his own declaration stating he never would have plead as he did
had he known he would be su bject to a mandatory lifetime registration requirement as a
result and instead would have asserted his de fense at trial. “Sex offender registration imposes a ‘substantial’ and ‘onero us’ burden on the registrant.” ( People v. Zaidi, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483, citation omitted.) “[T]he ignom iny and the duration of the registration requirement makes it a particularly harsh sanction, and only if a defendant is apprised of the duration can he or she fully appreciate the gravity of the consequence of the plea, so as to make the plea voluntary and intelligent .” ( Id. at p. 1482, italics added.) Furthermore, notwithstanding the inte rvening (and retroactively applied) amendments to the statutory scheme, at the time of Taghilou’s plea , dismissal under section 1203.4 was a prerequisite to obta ining a certificate of rehabilitation; and a certificate of rehabilitation (§ 4852.01 et seq.) was a prerequisite to relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender pursu ant to section 290 et seq. Indeed, an examination of the “objective manifest ations of the parties’ intent,” ( People v. Shelton , supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767), including the par ties’ own subsequent conduct establishes that Taghilou sought and obtained dismissal of his conviction under section 1203.4--with proper notice to but without opposition from the prosecutor. Similarly, he sought and
obtained a certificate of rehabilitation from the trial court with notice to but no opposition28 from the prosecutor. To the extent the terms of Taghilou’ s “promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain,” the trial court must interpret that promise “in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of maki ng it, that the promisee understood it.” ( Ibid. ) ‘“When a guilty [or nolo c ontendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified
benefits such as the dismissal of other c ounts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.”’ ( People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 930-931, citations omitted.) At the time of Taghilou’s plea and ind eed until 1997 (when Ta ghilou obtained his certificate of rehabilitation), the statutory sc heme including sections 1203.4 and 4852.01 et seq. contemplated an offe nder such as Taghilou could w ithdraw his plea of no contest, enter a plea of not guilty and have the case against him dismissed upon demonstrating his satisfaction of the prerequisites for su ch relief set forth in section 1203.4 19 and, furthermore, in turn, could then petition for a certificate of rehab ilitation upon meeting all of the conditions of sections 4852.01 et seq. Indeed, as our Supreme Court emphasized
in People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, pursuant to section 4851.13, subdivision (a),
“To enter an order known as a certificate of rehabilitation, the superior court must find that the petitioner is both rehabilitated and fit to exercise the rights and privileges lost by reason of his conviction.” ( Id. at pp. 875-876.) Furtherm ore, “‘No certificate of rehabilitation shall be granted to a person conv icted of any offense specified in Section 290[, the sex offender registration statute,] if the court determines that the petitioner presents a continuing threat to minors of co mmitting any of the offenses specified in Section 290.’” ( Id. at p. 876 and fn. 12.) Here, not only did Taghilo u meet all of the requirements imposed on him pursuant to sections 4852.01 through 4852.15 as they existed in 1997, but acc ording to the record,

19 Indeed, pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 1203.4, no relief may be granted unless the prosecuting attorney receives 15 da ys’ notice of the petiti on, and pursuant to subdivision (e), where (as here) the prosecuting attorney has received notice and fails to object, the prosecuting attorney may not move to set aside or otherwise appeal the grant of that [section 1203.4] petition.”29 the district attorney’s office received notice thr oughout the proceedings and appeared on
each occasion but never voiced an y objection to the relief gr anted. In other words, recognizing the seriousness of the offense to which he originally pled, in the 25 years since his plea, Taghilou has not only committe d no further offense but has affirmatively
demonstrated the unlikelihood of further offense by the means the Legislature had previously made available—even to o ffenders such as Taghilou. (See Lewis v. Superior
Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 70, 79.) In this case, the trial court stopped short of interpreting the negotiated plea agreement involved in this particular case. Consequen tly, we remand the case to allow the court to conduct an evidentiary hear ing and determine wh ether there was an affirmative agreement or im plicit understanding between the parties regarding the consequences of defendant’s plea, notwith standing subsequent amendments to the statutory scheme. ( Doe v. Harris, supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 71.) Given this remand, we need not address Ta ghilou’s alternative claim that denial of
his motion violates his constitutional right to equal protection. (See People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185.)

DISPOSITION The order denying Taghilou’s motion is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent w ith this opinion.

WOODS, Acting P. J.
We concur:

ZELON, J. SEGAL, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.