alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Etrice Dukes, Appellant.

[788 NYS2d 229]

Lahtinen, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of *733Schenectady County (Hoye, J.), rendered April 21, 2003, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree.

Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to charges of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree in exchange for a sentence (as a second felony offender) to consecutive prison terms of eight years and five years for the respective crimes, with five years of postrelease supervision. He also waived his right to appeal. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement and now appeals.

Defendant argues that he was improperly sentenced as a second felony offender. A challenge to the legality of a sentence survives despite a waiver of the right to appeal (see *People v Miller,*284 AD2d 724, 725 [2001], *lvs denied*97 NY2d 678, 685 [2001]). At sentencing, defendant initially questioned that part of the People’s statement made pursuant to CPL 400.21 indicating that the prior felony, which was from Delaware, involved possession of heroin. He recalled it was marihuana. After consultation between defendant and his counsel, defense counsel stated that defendant waived any objection regarding the unlawful substance involved in the Delaware crime. Thereafter, in response to specific questioning by County Court, defendant acknowledged a prior felony conviction and declined the court’s invitation for a hearing on the issue. To the extent that there was any error in the People’s CPL 400.21 statement, “defendant waived strict compliance by acknowledging the prior felony conviction in open court and not objecting to County Court’s finding as to the prior conviction” *(People v Kennedy,*277 AD2d 814, 815 [2000], *lv denied*96 NY2d 760 [2001]; *see People v Crippa,*245 AD2d 811, 812 [1997] [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 850 [1998]).

Defendant asserts that the order of commitment imposes five years of postrelease supervision on each of the two crimes, whereas the sentence required only one such five-year period. While the order of commitment may not be free from ambiguity on this issue, the sentence imposed by County Court was clear and the People acknowledge in their brief submitted to this Court that defendant is required to serve only one five-year term of postrelease supervision. Moreover, Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) provides that “[w]hen a person is subject to two or more periods of post-release supervision, such periods shall merge with and be satisfied by discharge of the period of post-release supervision having the longest unexpired time to run.” Under such circumstances, there is no need to remit for clarification *(cf. People v Jenkins,*300 AD2d 751, 753-754 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 615 [2003]).

*734The remaining arguments, to the extent they survive the waiver of appeal, have been considered and found unpersuasive.

Mercure, J.P., Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla Mewborn,

Plaintiff,

v.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04359-PHX-DGC

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

Date: February 1, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Attorney's signature

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed name and bar number

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6000

Telephone number

(404 322-6050

FAX number

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9978 Filed 02/06/18 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 99.1


                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Net Lease Income &
Growth Fund XX Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form 10-
QSB  for  the period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with  the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission on  the  date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I, Robert P. Johnson, President of AEI Fund Management
XX,  Inc.,  the  Managing  General Partner  of  the  Partnership,
certify,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C. 1350, as  adopted  pursuant  to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Partnership.


                           /s/ Robert P Johnson
                               Robert P. Johnson, President
                               AEI Fund Management XX, Inc.
                               Managing General Partner
                               November 1, 2002
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ISTVAN FARKAS.

September 5, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6674

ERIC BERNARD HOPE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus EMSA CORRECTIONAL CARE; JIM PENDERGRAPH, individually and as Sheriff of the Mecklenburg County Jail; JANE DOE, individually and as the Head Nurse of the Mecklenburg County Jail (Spector North); JOHN DOE, individually and as the Medical Doctor for the Mecklenburg County Jail; SERGEANT EASON, individually and as Sergeant of the Mecklenburg County Jail; MECKLENBURG COUNTY JAILS; SERGEANT MACK, individually and as Sergeant of the Mecklenburg County Jail; DEPUTY OFFICER PUGH, individually and as Deputy Officer of the Mecklenburg County Jail, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CA-01-334-3-2-MU) Submitted: October 10, 2002 Decided: October 17, 2002 Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Eric Bernard Hope, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Eric Bernard Hope appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Hope v. EMSA Correctional Care , No. CA-01-334-3-2-MU (W.D.N.C. filed July 10 & July 11, 2001; entered July 12, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

April 24, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 132902 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, EDNA J. MEDLEY and SCOTT MEDLEY, Justices 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 132902 

 COA: 261087 
 Monroe CC: 02-014269-NI 

BEN BERGMAN and ENTERPRISE LEASING 

COMPANY OF DETROIT, INC., a/k/a

ENTERPRISE RENT A CAR, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

CRYSTAL K. FISH, RONALD EBY, JR., and 

ANTHEM BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD, 

Defendants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 5, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0416 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 24, 2007 

 Clerk
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ERNEST HOWARD.

June 19, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
II 

Calendar No. 663 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2682 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

222 West 8th Street, Durango, Colorado, as the ‘‘Ben Nighthorse Campbell Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 16, 2004 

Mr. ALLARD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Governmental Affairs 

JULY 22, 2004 

Reported by Ms. COLLINS, without amendment 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 222 West 8th Street, Durango, Colorado, as 

the ‘‘Ben Nighthorse Campbell Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL POST OFFICE 

4 BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 222 West 8th Street, Durango, 
2 

•S 2682 RS 

1 Colorado, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Ben 

2 Nighthorse Campbell Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Ben Nighthorse 

7 Campbell Post Office Building’’. 

Calendar No. 663 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2682 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postbell Post Office Building’’. rango, Colorado, as the ‘‘Ben Nighthorse Camp- al Service located at 222 West 8th Street, DuJULY 22, 2004 

Reported without amendment
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tanya L. Turner,

Plaintiff,

v.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04382-PHX-DGC

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

Date: February 1, 2018 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Attorney's signature

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed name and bar number

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6000

Telephone number

(404 322-6050

FAX number

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9946 Filed 02/05/18 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements included in the Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended August
31, 1998, of Endogen, Inc. to which this exhibit is a part and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
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<SALES>                                    2,492
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           2,517
<CGS>                                        985
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              2,466
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               49
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           31
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#### Samuel E. Cottrill *v.*George W. Kinser.

Actions — Failure to Prosecute Suit — Damages—Sufficient Evidence — Breach of Bond.

In an action in equity on the bond of the plaintiff in a replevin suit for his failure to prosecute same, the loss the defendant therein might have sustained for a breach of the bond was a subject of proof, and he must show that he had been deprived of his property, and the extent of the loss therefrom by proving the value of the property replevied. A mere judgment for the face of the bond, for the alleged breach, is not sufficient.

APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT.

June 8, 1868.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Peters:

Prior to the institution of this action, one John Norrell brought an action against appellee for a black horse of the alleged value *410of one hundred dollars, and having made the affidavit and executed bond as provided in *See.*208 *Civ. Co.,*with appellant his surety, procured an order for the delivery of the horse to him.

*Herndon,'for appellant.*

In the bond thus executed the obligors covenanted that Norrell should duly prosecute the action, and perform the judgment of the court therein, by a return of the horse if restitution should be adjudged, and by paying Kinser such sums of money as might be adjudged to him not exceeding $120 and his costs expended.

This action was brought in equity on the bond of Norrell and appellant for a failure to prosecute said action with effect, to return the horse sued for, and it is alleged that Norrell dismissed his action after having obtained possession of the horse under the order for delivery, and in the answer.it is admitted that the action was dismissed, but the judgment of dismissal is not found in the record.

On final hearing judgment was rendered by the court below against Oottrill for $100, and he has appealed.

From the evidence it appears that Norrell went with the sheriff to Kinser, who then had the horse in his wagon taking a load of salt to Tennessee, and there, in the presence of the sheriff, he without taking the horse from the wagon, agreed with Kinser, that he should work the horse to Tennessee, and it is admitted in the answer the horse was then delivered to Norrell.

It is not alleged, or shown that, in dismissing the action, there was a judgment for a return of the horse to Kinser, or for his value, or for any damage for his detention; the breach of the bond consequently consists in the failure of Norrell to *“duly prosecute'”*his action — what loss Kinser sustained thereby, was a subject of proof, and if he was deprived of his property in the horse, he should have shown the extent of his loss, by proving the value of the horse, which was not done; and the evidence was insufficient to authorize the judgment.

The action was brought in equity, and as there was no motion to transfer it to the ordinary docket the judge could properly try. it. Upon the return of the cause the parties should be permitted to amend their pleadings, and make additional preparations if they should propose to do so in reasonable time. But for the reasons stated the judgment is *reversed,*and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SAAD AKMED, ETC.

June 27, 1989.

Petition for certification denied.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northwest Bancorporation, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Christopher C. Jurey, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (a) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered
by the Report.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to Northwest Bancorporation, Inc. and will be retained by Northwest Bancorporation, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



By

/s/ Christopher C. JureyChristopher C. Jurey, Chief Financial Officer




Date: August 5, 2004
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Simmy Hill,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-16-00518-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Shaw Cowart, LLP

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 2/26/2016, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: March 2, 2016 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc.

Printed name of party waiving service

of summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 940 Filed 03/04/16 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 940 Filed 03/04/16 Page 2 of 2