Filed 7/24/24 Cuevas v. Centurion Protection Services CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

WALTER CUEVAS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CENTURION PROTECTION 

SERVICES et al.,

Defendants and 

Appellants.

 B333621

 (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

21STCV41627)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.

Briggs Law, Cory J. Briggs and Nora Pasin for Defendants

and Appellants.
2

Gutierrez Derham Law Firm and Matthew Gutierrez for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

After a former employee sent a text message to a former 

client asking to “meet up” to discuss the former employee’s 

pending lawsuit against his employer, the employer cross-claimed 

against the former employee for, among other claims, interfering 

with its contractual relations, interfering with prospective 

economic advantage, defamation, and libel. The trial court struck 

certain paragraphs from the employer’s claims after concluding 

that the text message at issue in those paragraphs constituted 

“protected activity” under our anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., § 

425.16)1 and that the employer had not made a showing that the 

four claims had minimal merit. Because this ruling was correct, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Employer Hires Then Fires Former Employee, and 

Employee Sues

A. Employment relationship

Centurion Protection Services (Centurion) is a “privatesecurity firm providing customized protection and bodyguard 

services to high-profile clients.” Centurion’s CEO is Richard Ray 

Dudgeon, and its secretary is Tom Rogers. 

In June 2019, Centurion hired Walter Cuevas as one of its 

bodyguards. Because Cuevas represented that he had worked as 

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

“SLAPP” is short for “strategic lawsuit against public 

participation.” 
3

a firefighter, Centurion “provided him access to its high-profile 

clientele and paid him at a higher rate of pay to reflect his 

alleged experience.” As part of his employment, Cuevas executed 

a nondisclosure agreement that prohibited him from disclosing 

information regarding Centurion or its clients. 

Cuevas provided services through Centurion to actorcomedian Kevin Hart and his wife. 

In November 2020, Centurion learned that Cuevas “had 

mispresented his experience as a firefighter.” Shortly thereafter, 

on November 15, 2020, Centurion terminated Cuevas’s 

employment. 

B. Employee’s lawsuit

In November 2021, Cuevas sued Centurion, Dudgeon, and 

Rogers. In the operative first amended complaint, Cuevas 

brought 10 claims for various violations of the Labor Code, for 

installing a tracking device on his personal vehicle, and for 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.2

II. Employee’s Post-Lawsuit Conduct, Prompting 

Employer to Cross-Claim

A. Employee’s post-lawsuit conduct

In January 2021, Cuevas “made various statements to 

third-parties” disclosing confidential information. 

2 More specifically, Cuevas alleged claims for (1) violation of 

the Private Attorney General Act (Lab. Code, § 2699 et seq.); (2) 

failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to reimburse or 

indemnify for work-related expenditures; (4) failure to provide 

meal and rest breaks; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) penalties 

under Labor Code section 1198.5, subdivision (k); (7) penalties 

under Labor Code section 226, subdivision (f); (8) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress; (9) violation of Penal Code section 

637.7; and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
4

On August 24, 2022, Cuevas attempted to call Kevin Hart. 

When no one answered, he sent a text message to Hart’s wife 

that stated:

“Hey ma’am sorry to bother, it’s walter [Cuevas]. I 

used to work for you guys. I was calling because there 

is a ongoing case with someone we both know that 

decided to put my family in danger. The issue is if it 

escalates anymore it will end up dragging kevin into 

it and ultimately that night. I apologize for dropping 

this out of no where on you. If you and kevin would 

like to meet up so I can explain the situation better 

please let me know. God bless you guys.” 

(Grammatical and punctuation errors in original.)

B. Employer’s cross-claims

In April 2023, Centurion and Dudgeon (collectively, 

Centurion) filed a cross-complaint against Cuevas. In the 

operative second amended cross-complaint, Centurion alleged 

four claims tied to the text message for (1) intentional 

interference with contractual relations, (2) intentional 

interference with prospective economic advantage, (3) 

defamation, and (4) libel.3 In a paragraph set forth as part of its 

general allegations and repeated four more times in support of 

each claim, Centurion alleged that Cuevas’s August 24, 2022 text 

“message referenced [his] pending lawsuit against [Centurion], 

made an outlandish and unfounded claim that [Centurion] had 

3 Centurion and Dudgeon also alleged claims for (1) breach of 

the nondisclosure agreement (arising out of Cuevas’s alleged 

disclosures of confidential information), and (2) intentional 

misrepresentation (arising out of Cuevas’s statement about being 

a firefighter). Because these claims are not implicated by the 

anti-SLAPP motion in this case, we do not discuss them further.
5

put his ‘family in danger’ and threatened to disclose personal, 

private information of the client that Cuevas had learned of 

during his employment unless the client and his wife met with 

him to discuss the litigation.” Centurion further alleged that the 

text message “was intended to essentially accomplish . . . three 

things . . .—(1) disrupt and interfere with [Centurion’s] ongoing 

business relationships, in particular with [Hart], (2) tarnish 

[Centurion’s] reputation with [Hart] in order to disrupt and 

interfere with [Centurion’s] future business relationships, and (3) 

coerce and leverage [Hart] to persuade [Centurion] to settle the 

underlying litigation and pay Cuevas.” 

III. Anti-SLAPP Litigation

In September 2023, Cuevas filed a motion under our antiSLAPP law asking the trial court to strike the five paragraphs 

from the cross-complaint regarding the text message. Centurion 

filed an opposition to the motion, which was accompanied by a 

declaration from Dudgeon that (1) explained Centurion’s 

business, (2) authenticated and attached the nondisclosure 

agreement, and (3) denied ever putting Cuevas’s family in 

danger. Cuevas filed a reply. 

After holding a hearing in October 2023, the trial court 

issued a ruling granting the anti-SLAPP motion and struck the 

text message-related paragraphs supporting Centurion’s claims 

for intentional interference with contractual relations, 

intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, 

defamation, and libel. The court ruled that the paragraphs all 

involved activity “protected” by the anti-SLAPP law because they 

“concern statements made in connection with pending litigation”;

specifically, the text message “was explicitly connected to 

Cuevas’s attempt to gather evidence in support of his pending 
6

claims in this action.” The court further ruled that Centurion 

had not carried its burden of showing that the four affected 

claims had minimal merit because it did “not present evidence” 

and merely relied on its “unverified pleading” and “argument.” 

Centurion filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Centurion argues that the trial court erred in granting 

Cuevas’s anti-SLAPP motion and striking the five paragraphs in 

its cross-complaint regarding Cuevas’s text message. We 

independently review a trial court’s grant of an anti-SLAPP 

motion. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ.

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)

I. Pertinent Anti-SLAPP Law

“The anti-SLAPP law ‘provides a procedure for weeding 

out, at an early stage, meritless claims [or allegations] arising 

from’ activity that is protected by the law. (Baral v. Schnitt

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Accordingly, a trial court tasked with 

ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion must ask two questions: (1) has 

the moving party ‘made a threshold showing that the challenged 

cause of action [or allegation] arises from protected activity’ 

(Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056), and, if so, (2) 

has the nonmoving party ‘established . . . a probability that [it] 

will prevail’ on the challenged cause of action by showing that the 

claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. 

Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 887; Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 

Cal.App.5th 705, 720-721; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 

82, 93-94; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

In assessing whether the challenged cause of action or 

portion thereof constitutes protected activity (the first question), 

a court must ask “two subsidiary questions: (1) What conduct 
7

does the challenged cause of action ‘arise[] from’; and (2) is that 

conduct ‘protected activity’ under the anti-SLAPP [law]?” 

(Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 

Cal.App.5th 686, 698.)

In evaluating the first subsidiary question, a cause of 

action “arises from” protected activity when it is “based on” or “its 

elements arise from” protected activity—that is, when the 

protected activity “itself” is the “‘“principal thrust or gravamen”’” 

or “‘core injury-producing conduct’” warranting relief. (City of 

Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78; Bonni v. St. Joseph 

Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009, 1015 (Bonni); Park, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060; Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community 

Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 134.) In 

evaluating this first subsidiary question, a trial court must 

consider “the ‘pleadings’” as well as the “‘supporting and opposing 

affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or [a] defense 

is based,’” although the pleadings are of primary importance 

because the plaintiff is the architect of their own complaint, such 

that the core injury-producing conduct at issue in a case is 

primarily a function of “‘“what is pled—not what is proven.”’” 

(Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 936-

937; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 942; § 425.16, 

subd. (b)(2).)

In evaluating the second subsidiary question, the antiSLAPP law itself defines four categories of protected activity. (§ 

425.16, subd. (e); City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 

409, 422.) One is pertinent here: “[A]ny written or oral 

statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 

consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial 

body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 
8

425.16, subd. (e).) Although “[n]ot all . . . conduct in connection 

with litigation . . . is protected” (California Bank Specialists 

Medical Group v. Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037; 

Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, 

1400), “‘“communications preparatory to or in anticipation”’” of 

litigation (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268

(Neville), quoting Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity 

(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115) and communications attendant to 

ongoing litigation—including formal discovery requests, more 

informal attempts to speak with potential witnesses to litigation, 

and missives notifying interested persons of ongoing litigation—

are “made in connection” with issues under judicial review 

(Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 

531, 538 [issuance of subpoena to obtain discovery in ongoing 

lawsuit]; Neville, at pp. 1267-1268 [communications with 

“potential witnesses”]; Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro, 

Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1053-1054 (Contemporary 

Services) [same]; Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation 

Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 3-6 [letter to nonparties advising 

them of ongoing litigation]; Contemporary Services, at pp. 1053-

1055 [same].)

II. Analysis

A. Do the challenged paragraphs involve 

“protected activity”?

We independently agree with the trial court that the five 

paragraphs Cuevas challenges from Centurion’s operative crosscomplaint arise from protected activity. As noted above, 

“protected activity” includes communications made to potential 

witnesses in litigation. (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1267-1268; Contemporary Services, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
9

1053-1054.) The five paragraphs at issue each allege that Cuevas 

sent a text message referring to his “pending lawsuit against 

[Centurion]” and urging Hart’s wife and Hart himself to “me[e]t 

with [Cuevas] to discuss the litigation.” Thus, the conduct 

alleged in these paragraphs—namely, sending a text message to 

potential witnesses to discuss the events at issue in ongoing 

litigation—constitutes protected activity. What is more, Cuevas’s 

act in sending the text message is the “core injury-producing 

conduct” underlying Centurion’s intentional interference and 

defamation-related claims because the content of that text 

message is what Centurion alleges damaged its relationship with 

Hart and with potential future clients, and is what Centurion 

alleges contains a false (and hence defamatory and libelous) 

statement about making threats to Cuevas’s family.

Centurion resists this conclusion with what boils down to 

three groups of arguments.

First and foremost, Centurion argues that what is most 

important about Cuevas’s text message is the harm it has done to 

Centurion’s current and future business arrangements and the 

harm attendant to the false representation that Centurion 

threatened Cuevas’s family; thus, Centurion urges, the text 

message’s “mention of litigation” is merely “passing” and hence 

“incidental background” rather than “core injury-producing 

conduct.” To be sure, courts applying the anti-SLAPP law 

continue to draw a distinction between acts that “supply the 

elements of a claim” on the one hand, and acts that “are 

incidental background” on the other. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 1012.) But that distinction is irrelevant here, where Centurion 

alleges a single act—that is, Cuevas’s act in sending the text 

message to Hart’s wife—which is the very act that causes the 
10

interference with its current and future business arrangements 

and that constitutes defamation and libel. Put differently, the 

fact that Centurion is suing Cuevas for what he communicated in 

parts of his text message does not somehow negate the fact that 

the text message is the basis for Centurion’s claims or the fact

that it is a communication connected to ongoing litigation (and 

hence activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law). Similarly, the 

fact that Centurion alleges that the content of the text message is 

economically harmful and false does not somehow remove it from 

the realm of protected activity; indeed, only conduct that is 

conclusively or concededly illegal is deemed to be removed from 

the ambit of the anti-SLAPP law’s protection (Flatley v. Mauro 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 319), and Centurion does not—and 

cannot—make any claim of such definitive illegality in this case.

Second, Centurion argues that the trial court erred in 

relying on the text message because it (1) did not explicitly spell 

out which lawsuit was pending between Cuevas and Centurion, 

and (2) was incomplete under Evidence Code section 356. These 

arguments border on the frivolous. The record only suggests a 

single lawsuit between Cuevas and Centurion, so Centurion’s 

insinuation that the text message could be referring to some 

other lawsuit between these parties is purely speculative. Along 

the same lines, nothing in the record indicates that there was 

some other part of the text message conversation that is missing; 

indeed, Centurion chose to rely on only that text message, so is 

not in a position to now complain that the message was part of 

some broader back-and-forth conversation.

Third and lastly, Centurion argues that this case is 

analogous to Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999 and 

Gazal v. Echeverry (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 34. These cases are 
11

inapt. In Starr, the court ruled that “[m]isconduct in the 

administration of a trust and preservation of trust assets” is not 

protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law (Starr, at p. 1021); 

in Gazal, the court ruled that a church homily is not protected 

activity when the damage caused to the plaintiff arose from 

fraudulent conduct occurring after the homily (Gazal, at pp. 37, 

41). Unlike Starr and Gazal, the harm Centurion complains of in 

its interference and defamation-related claims is harm arising 

from the very same text message sent to enlist aid from potential 

witnesses in ongoing litigation.

B. Has Centurion established that its four 

challenged claims have “minimal merit”?

We independently agree with the trial court that Centurion 

did not carry its burden of producing evidence to support each 

and every element of its four challenged claims. 

To prove intentional interference with contractual 

relations, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) a valid contract between a 

plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of th[e] 

contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a 

breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual 

breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) 

resulting damage.’” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55, italics added.) To prove intentional 

interference with a prospective economic advantage, the plaintiff 

must prove (1) “‘“‘an economic relationship between the plaintiff 

and some third party’”’”; (2) “‘the defendant’s knowledge of the 

relationship’”; (3)(a) “the defendant engaged in conduct that 

interfered with that relationship and (b) the defendant’s conduct 

was ‘independently wrongful’”; (4) “the defendant either intended 

to interfere with the relationship or ‘knew that the interference 
12

was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its’

conduct”; and (5) “the defendant’s acts ‘proximately caused’ 

‘economic harm to the plaintiff.’” (Drink Tank Ventures LLC v. 

Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528, 537-

538, italics added; Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 1130, 1141; Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1164-1165.) Here, Centurion adduced no 

evidence whatsoever indicating whether and how its current 

contracts or future business prospects were damaged by Cuevas’s 

text message. This omission is fatal.

To prove defamation or libel, a plaintiff must show “‘([1]) a 

publication that is ([2]) false, ([3]) defamatory, and ([4]) 

unprivileged, and that ([5]) has a natural tendency to injure or 

that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

683, 720; see Civ. Code, §§ 44, 45, 45a.) Here, Centurion adduced 

no evidence whatsoever on any element except the second element 

of falsity. These omissions are fatal.

Centurion makes two arguments in response. First, it 

argues that it is “not required to prove each cause of action to the 

trial court.” That assertion is legally incorrect. Second, 

Centurion argues that its opposition included Dudgeon’s 

declaration and a copy of the nondisclosure agreement. This is 

true, but these items of evidence—the only Centurion proffered—

do not respond to many elements of its challenged claims.
13

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Cuevas is entitled to his costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST