### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Se pte m be r 20, 200 4 S es sio n
FIRST TENNESS EE BANK , N.A., EXECUTOR, ES TATE O F GLENN P. WEBB, SR ., and TR US TEE O F T HE R ESID UA RY TR US T U ND ER THE WIL L O F GL EN N P

. WE BB , S R

. , F /B /O D EB OR A H A N N WE BB , v. BAR BAR A WE BB ST AN FIEL D, PA UL W. S TAN FIEL D, JR. , A LICIA M. ST A N F IE LD , e t al.

Direc t Appeal fromthe Chancer y Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 02-0797 Hon. W. F rank Brow n, III., Ch ancellor

No. E2003-02756-COA- R3-CV - F ILED OCTO BER 13, 2004

Th e Cha nc e llo r c on str

ue d a wi ll a ndg rante d p la int if

f s umm ary

jud g me nt. De fe nd a nts ins ist the wi ll is a mbi g uo us . O n a

pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined.

St e v e n F

. D o b s o n , Ch a tta no o g a , T e n n e s s e e , f o r A p p e ll a n ts , B ar

b ar a We b b St a n f

ie ld , Pau l W

. Stanfield, J r., and A licia M. Stanfield.

David E. F owler a nd C. Euge ne Shiles, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for Appe llee, Patricia Webb.

OP IN ION

I n this construction of a Wil l action, the Trial C ourt found no ambig uity and ente red ju dgmen t for pe tition e r. B arb ara Web b St a nf

ie ld, Paul W. Sta nf

ie ld, Jr., a ndAl ic ia

M. Sta nf ie ld have a ppeale d the Chance llor’s ruling , insisti ng that dece dent’s Will i s ambig uous and t he Tria l Cou rt e rr e d in re fu sin g to c on sid e r e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e to d e te rm ine the te stator ’s int e nt.-2- The Chanc ellor filed a n excellent Memorandum Opinion, and w e adopt f rom the Me mor a nd um O pin ion a s p e rt ine nt t o o ur a na ly sis on app e a l:
Patricia Webb, who is one of the dec edent’ s four c hildren, filed a Motion for Sum mary Judgme nt

. P a tr ic ia

Web b c on te nd e d th a t th e L a st Wi ll a ndTe sta me nt, proper ly rea d, provided that she alone should r ece ive the property at issue. Ot her heirs disag ree d and filed the ir positions.

. . .

“ Th e c on str

uc tio n o f a

wi ll i s a qu e sti on of

la w f or the c ou rt a ndwi ll

c on str uc tio n c a se s a

re un iqu e ly

su ite d to the su mma

ry jud g me nt p ro c e du re be c aus e these c ases g ener ally

involve leg al i ssues only .” P resley v. Hanks, 782 S .W.2d 482, 48 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 9) . T he c a rd ina l rule fo r i nte rp re tin g a ndc on str uin g a wi ll is the asce rtainment of the intent of t he testator. Winni ng ham v. Winningham, 966 S.W. 2d48 , 5 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . In mo st w ill c on str uc tio n ca se s, the te stator ’s int e nt i s determined by

ref erring to the w ritten lang uag e of [sic] will itself, Wright v. Brandon, 863 S.W .2d 400, 402 (Tenn. 1993) ; I n re Tipler
, 10 S.W .3d 244, 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), and not fr om what it is supp osed the testator intended. B rig g s v. Estate of Brigg s, 950 S.W .2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Ordinarily , extrinsi c ev i d ence is not admissibl e for the purpose of

showing intention of the testator, a nd such i n t en t ion must be gathere d only from the f

our
c orne rs of

the wi ll. F ari ss v . B ry -B loc k Co
., 34 6 S

. W

. 2d 705, 705 (Tenn. 1961)

. Ex trinsic evidenc e may

be conside red w hen the will contains a latent, r ather than a patent, ambig uity . Holmes v. Roddy , 144 S.W .2d 788, 789 (Tenn. 1940) ; Estate of Bur chfie ld v. First United Methodist Church of Sevie rville, 933 S

. W

. 2 d 4 81, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Alatent ambig uity arises f rom an a mbiguous state of external circ umstances to which the words of the will r efe r. Estate of B urchf ield, 933 S.W .2d at 482. It ge nera lly

involves a question of identifying a person or subject mentioned in the will. Cobl e Sy s

. , I n c. v. Giffor d Co., 627 S.W .2d 359, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). . . . A patent ambig uity , on the other hand, stems from unce rtainty in the lang uag e itself, I n re Wil l of By bee, 896 S.W .2d 792, 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), and is appare nt on the fac e of the will. I t involves an am b i gu o u s term that cannot be clarified by

considering extraneous fac ts. Estate of B urchf ield, 933 S.W .2d at 482.

. . .
The ba sic fac ts of this case a re not in dispute. Rebec ca Webb, the dece dent’s wi fe , p re de c e a se d him

. Th e de c e de nt h a d f ou r c hil dr e n, a ll o f w ho m are a du lts : Debor ah Webb, P atricia Webb, Bar bara Webb Stanfield and Glenn P. Webb, J r., (“G lenn”) . All four childre n survived the de cede nt. Be cause his wife pre dece ased him, the entire re siduary

estate w as plac ed in two trusts. The first trust c onsisted of-3- two thirds (2/3) of the r esiduary estate and was he ld f

o r t h e u s e and bene fit of Debor ah Ann Webb by

First Te nnessee Bank, N.A., as truste e. The other one -third (1/3) of the residuary

estate was t o b e h eld i n trust by First Te nnessee Bank, N.A., trus te e fo r the us e a ndbe ne fi t of Pa tr ic ia Ma ri e Web b.

. . . Bo th trus ts we re to b e he ld pu rs ua nt t o Ite m V of

the de c e de nt’ s 1 98 6 Wil l.

Th e trus t f

or De bo ra h w a s to la st f

or he r l if e tim e . The de c e de nt’ s c od ic il provided that P atricia was to re ceive $1,000.00 per month fr om the trustee until she

rea ched 40 y ear s of ag e or the money was exhausted, whicheve r first o cc urre d. Patricia attained ag e 40 on Nove mber 11, 2001, a nd her trust ha s now ende d.

De bo ra h die d on Ma y 6, 20 02

. She wa s sin g le a ndha d n o c hil dr e n. She a lso died without a will. The question develope d as to the proper person( s) to t ak e t he ba la nc e le ft in De bo ra

h’ s tru st. Du e to co nf

lic tin g po sit ion s amo ng the he ir s, F ir st Tenne ssee B ank, N.A. f

iled the C omplaint to construe the dece dent’s will . All ag ree that the dis po sit ive pa

rt of the de c e de nt’ s will is I te m V(c ), wh ic h r e a ds a s f oll ow s:
(c) Upon the death of either da ug hter of mine during the term of he r trust, the trust f

or such dece ased daug hter shall devolve upon and pass to her living desc endants, pe r stirpes, but if none, then in e qual share s to my other children then living and the living desce ndants, per stirpes, of any dece ased

c hil d o f m ine ; pro vid e d, ho we ve r, no sh are sh a ll p a ss u nd e r this pr ov isi on to either my son, Glenn P. Webb, J r., or my daug hter, B arba

ra Webb Stanfield, and provide d further , that an y s h ar e passing to a minor g randc hild of mine (including the childre n of either my afor esaid son, Glenn, or daug hter, B arb ara , w ho ma y

the n b e de c e a se d) sh a ll b e su bje c t to the c on tin g e nt t ru st provisions set forth in Parag raph ( d) immediately below.

The re cord r efle cts that the three other c hildren of the dece dent are still alive. The surviving children a

re Patric ia, Glenn, a nd Ba rbar a. F urther, B ar b ara

has the following children: Paul W. St anfie ld, J r. , an d Al i cia M. Stanfield. Gle nn has the following ch i ldren: Thomas B lake Webb, Tristin Tanne r Webb, Rebec ca L y nn Webb, Wendy

L eig h Webb, Eliz abeth Ann Webb, Glen n Patterson Webb, I I I , and Teddy Guider L ocker

by . Thomas Blake Webb and Tristin Tanner Webb are minor children of

Glenn P. Webb, Jr., and ar e re prese nted her ein by Charles Hill Ander son
a s th e ir g ua rd ia n a d li te m. P a tr ic ia

ha s n o c hil dr e n o r d e sc e nd a nts

. At this point , the Chance llor opined that the issue thus become s whether the above qu ote d it e m is a mbi g uo us . T he Cha nc e llo r’ s O pin ionthe n a na ly zedI te m V (c ) a s f oll ow s:

A c ou rt mus t f indthe int e nti on of the te stator by g ivi ng the la ng ua g e us e d in the will the most easy , rea sonable, a nd natura l meaning , not a strained me aning by use of subtle or a

rtificial rule s of construc tion. Na t i o n al Bank of Commerce v.-4- Gre enber g , 258 S.W .2d 765, 768 (Tenn. 1953); Whit field v. Butler , 204 S.W .2d 537, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947). U sing this principle, the court now analy zes I tem V(c ). Th e ph ra se , “ e ith e r d a ug hte r o f m ine du ri ng the te rm of he r t ru st, ” in the fi rs t sentenc e of I tem V(c ) clearly ref ers to Debor ah and Patricia as they are the only two daug hters who ha ve a t ru s t

. T h e sec ond clause of the fir st sentence say s that the de c e a s e d d a u g h te r ’ s tr

u s t s h a ll “ p a s s to h e r li v in g d e c e n d a n ts , p e r s ti rp e s

. . . .” Howeve r, De borah ha d no living desc endants. So, we ha ve to g o further

.
Th e ne xt c laus e (s til l in the fi rs t se nte nc e ) p ro vid e s th a t th e trus t ba la nc e wi ll pass in equal share s to my other children then living and the living desc endants, pe r stirpes, of any

dece ased c hild of mine.” That c lause, standing alone, indicates that Debor ah’s two- thirds share w ould be d i v i d ed among the dec edent’ s three living

c hil dr e n - Pa tr ic ia , G le nn a ndB arb ara

. Ho we ve r, the de c e de nt the n a dd e d a pr ov iso stating that “no s hare shall pass under this provision to either my son Glenn P. Webb, J r., or my daug hter, B arba

ra Webb Stanfield. . . .” This proviso has the ef fec t of

e xclu din g Gl e nn a ndB arb ara a s b e ne fi c iari e s. Th e ir

e lim inatio n le a ve s o nly

Pa tr ic ia

a s a take r o f D e bo ra

h’ s tw o th ir ds . T he fi na l pr ov iso of the pa ra g ra ph sa y s:
[a] nd provided, further, that a ny share passing to a m inor g randc hild of mine ( includ ing the children of either m y aforesaid son, Gle nn, or dau ghter, Barbara, wh o m ay then be decease d ) sha ll be su bje c t to the c on tin g e nt t ru st provisions set forth in Parag raph ( d) immediately below.

Her ein lies the rub. Counsel for Patricia interpre ts the two provisos to mean that th e g rand c hil dr e n o f G le nn and B arb ara c a n o nly take pa rt of De bo ra h’ s tr us t est a te if th e ir r e s p e c ti v e p ar e n ts ( G le n n a n d/o r B ar b ar a ) p r e d e c e a s e D e b o r ah. Be cause both G lenn and B arba ra a re still alive, there fore , their childre n take no pa rt of Deborah’ s trust estate and Patricia ge ts it all. On t he other hand, counse l for the other De fenda nts interpre t the provisi on differ ently

. The Defendants content that the phrase “my

other c hildren” in the second c lause re fer s to Glenn and B arba ra a lone. Th e re fo re , the ph ra se “ my oth e r c hil dr e n, ” c omb ine d w ith the fi na l pr ov iso , is so ambig uous that extrinsi c evide nce should be admissible to show the testator’s intent reg arding whether

the childre n of Glenn and Ba rbar a can take a

share of De borah’ s tru s tes t at e i f G l en n an d Barb ar a a re s t i l l l i v i n g.
First, the c ourt is of the opi nion that I tem V(c ) i s not ambig uous. Be cause the will provision is not ambiguous, extrinsi c evidenc e is not admissi ble to determine the intention of the testator. (Cit ations omitted). Ba sed upon a plain and natur al re ading of Item V(c ), the c ourt construe s the provision to mean that Glenn and/or Ba rbar a had to prede cea se De borah i n o rd er for Gle nn and/or B arba ra’ s children to inherit any part of Deborah’s t rust estate. This interpre tation is further bolstere d by the phra se,

“ to my o th e r c h ildren th e n liv ing and the living desce ndants, per stirpe s, of any decease d child of mine,” a lso found in I tem V(c ). Ther efor e, because Glenn and-5- B arb ara are sti ll ali ve , the ir c hil dr e n ta

ke no pa rt of De bo ra h’ s tr us t e state un de r b oth of the c lauses quoted a

bove. Patricia

Webb takes the e ntire trust estate be cause she is the only

surviving c hild of the dec edent who w as not disinherited.

Th e c on str

uc tio n o f a

Will i s a qu e sti on of la w, a ndthe Cou rt in c on str uin g the Will de te rm ine s th e int e nt o f the te stator a nd wi ll g ive it ef

fe c t, unl e ss it con tr a ve ne s some la w o r p ub lic policy

. Se e , Third Nat ion al Ba nk of Nas hv ill e , v . F irs t A me ric an Nat ion al B an k of N as hv ill e , 596 S.W .2d 824, 828 (Tenn. 1980). The Chanc ellor cor rec tly pointed out the obvious lim itations which is that be fo re a

g rand c hil d c a n in he ri t, h is o r h e r p are nts mus t pr e de c e a se th e orig ina l tr us t benef iciary

. But appellants arg ue that the phrase “other children” is ambiguous and cla im that there

are a t lea st two oth e r “p laus ibl e ” int e rp re ta tio ns of I te m V(c ). Ho we ve r, the Chanc e llo r’ s a na ly sis rebuts these arg uments, and we likewise find this position t o be without merit.

Finally , appellants arg ue that the Chance llor should ha ve allowed them to introduce

e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e . B ut the Cha nc e llo r f ou nd the pr ov isi on wa s no t a mbi g uo us a nd the c ou rt s w ill not allow extrinsi c evide nce t o b e u s ed t o cre ate a n ambig uity

. See, F erris v. Bry- Block Co. , 346 S.W. 2d70 5, 71 2 ( Te nn . 1 96 1) . M or e ov e r, app e lla nts fi le d n o a ff ida vit s o n th is is su e pu rsu a nt t o Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the J udg ment of the Chanc el l o r and remand, with the cost of the a

ppeal a ssessed jointly

to appellants B arba

ra Webb Stanfield, Paul W. Stanfield, J r., and A licia M. Stanfield.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.