No. 85-163 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

PEARL E. MARTIN, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

ROBERT M. MARTIN, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Baiz & Olson; Thomas A. Baiz, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Alexander & Baucus; Nancy P. Cory, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 25, 1985 

Decided : September 10, 1985 

Filed: SEP 10 1985 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The marital estate of Robert i?!. Martin and Pearl E. 

Martin was distributed in the Eighth Judicial District Court 

by decree dated January 31, 1985. Robert Martin appeals, 

alleging that the property division is inequitable and 

results in substantial injustice to him. F7e disagree and 

affirm the decree of the District Court. 

Robert and Pearl were married on August 1-2, 1972. She 

is presently 53 years of age. He is 60 years of age. Though 

both parties had children by prior marriages, no chi-Idren 

were born of their marriage. 

Pearl is a 1-egal secretary. Her gross income is $14,800 

a year, with take home pay of $844 per month. Her expenses 

total $1,430 per month. Robert owns and operates Great Falls 

Cleaning Service. His net monthly income is approximately 

$1200, excluding tax consequences from the depreciation of 

his business. His personal expenses total $850 per month. 

The parties testified and the trial judge found that the 

parties contributed their respective incomes to their joint 

benefit and that the parties' nonfinancial contributions to 

the marriage were equal. 

The trial judge found the net marital estate to consist 

of the following: 

REAL PROPERTY 

Family residence - 2271 Beech Drive, 

Great Falls, Montana. (Equity increase 

since date of marriage). $21,600.00 

Rental Property - 807 and 809 6th 

Street SW, Great Falls, Montana 46,831.80 

Residence - 1546 Meadowlark Drive, 

Great Falls, Montana 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 

1978 Ford Van 

1976 Ford LTD 

1966 GMC Van 

1983 Buick 

Stocks and bonds 

Furniture, etc. 

Petitioner's IRA Acct. 

Respondent's LC1 Acct. 

Petitioner's Gov't. pension 

Respondent's savings acct. 

Respondent's checking account 

Petitioner's checking account 

Petitioner's savings account 

Respondent's IRA account 

Cash in safe (American) 

(Canadian) 

Husband's coin collection 

Joint coin collection 

Finding of Fact VII. 

Notably, the trial judge omitted Robert's cleaning 

business from the net marital estate, choosing instead to 

permit Robert to retain it in its entirety. The business is 

worth $81,000: $27,500 for the building; $8,500 for the 

equipment; and $45,000 for its good will. 

The trial judge divided the net marital. state between 

the parties as follows: 

PETITIONER 

Residence - 1546 Meadowlark 

Drive 

Stocks and bonds 

1983 Buick 

Petitioner's IRA Account 

Petitioner's Government Pension 

Petitioner's Checking Account 

Petitioner's Savings Account 

Cash in safe (American) 

(Canadian) 

Coin collection 

Cash (to be paid by the 

Respondent within 

sixty (60) days 
RESPONDENT 

Residence - 

2211 Beech Drive 

Rental - 807 & 809 6th St. SW 

Personal property - 

2211 Beech Drive 

1978 Ford Van 

1976 Ford LTD 

1966 GMC Van 

Respondent's LC1 Account 

Respondent's Savings Account 

Respondent's Checking Account 

Respondent's IRA Account 

Respondent's Coin collection 

Finding of Fact VIII. 

Robert objects to his $45,000 cash obligation to Pearl, 

claiming that Pearl then receives 61% of the net marital 

estate while he receives only 39%. However, Robert fails to 

consider that he was allowed to retain. his cleaning business, 

despite Pearl's substantial contributions to its success. 

The Court notes that the Petitioner set up a 

bookkeeping system for the business, prepared 

income tax returns and answered phone calls, filled 

in for the secretary's vacations for 11 years and 

saved some business accounts in 1978. Petitioner 

terminated her employment with the law firm of 

Alexander & Baucus in 1978 to accomodate [sic] the 

Respondent. As a result she lost fringe benefits 

and a Keogh Plan interest, having been employed by 

that firm since 1961. The Court notes this because 

she is not being awarded any interest in that 

business. 

Finding of Fact IX. This finding supports the $45,000 

payment. 

Robert also complains that the trial judge failed to 

properly consider the $11,000 in property he brought into the 

marriage and the $16,000 he inherited from his parents. 

Again we must disagree. The $11,000 consists of the cash 

value of an insurance policy on Robert's life and the profit 

realized when Robert sold rental property he brought into the 

marriage. Robert testified at trial that these proceeds were 

used to purchase the rental. property owned by the parties at 
the time of their dissolution. That property was included in 

Robert's portion of the marital estate. 

There is no specific rule concerning how an inherited 

asset is to be treated when marital property is divided. 

"Each case has to be decided on its own facts." Vivian v. 

Vivian (2978), 1.78 Mont. 341, 344, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074. 

However, 5 40-4-202(1), MCA, does require consideration of 

the "contributions of the other spouse to the marriage . . ." 

Pearl and Robert testified that Pearl assisted in the upkeep 

of the home, the rental property and the business. She 

willingly quit a long term job, forfeiting substantial 

retirement security, in order to assist her husband in 

improving his own life. Again, we find no abuse of 

discretion by the trial. judge. 

In determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion, the reviewing court does not substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial court. The 

standard for review is whether the trial court 

acted arbitrarily without employment of 

conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

reason resulting in substantial injustice. 

[Citations ommitted.] 

Creon v. Creon (1981), 195 Mont. 254, 257, 635 P.2d 1308, 

1309. Not only has the trial judge not acted arbitrarily nor 

exceeded the bounds of reason, he has achieved a 

well-reasoned, exceedingly fair distribution of the marital 

property. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: 

.-' 

hief Justice