### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. GU STA VO CHA VEZ

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Dec atur County No. 03-CR -140 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2004-01154-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 17, 2005

D AVI D G. H AYES , J u d ge, d i s s en t i n g.

The majority conclude s that modification of the defe ndant’s sente nce is re quired in lig ht of Blakely v. W

ashington , 5 42 U. S. _

_, 12 4 S. Ct. 25 31 (2 00 4) . I mus t r e sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.

Any sentenc ing challeng e available to the defe ndant under Bl ake ly is n ow wa ive d b e c a us e the def endant did not object at trial to what he now contends is a c onstitut ionally invalid sentencing scheme

. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) . Our rule s of appellate procedure provide that an is sue may not be ra ised for the first time on appea l. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36( a). I see no valid rea son to carve out an Ap pre nd i/B lake ly exception to this e stablished rule. I n United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 631- 34, 122 S. Ct . 1781, 1785-87 (2002)
, the Supreme Court he ld, a fter its de cision in Apprendi , that the defe ndant’s cla im of rig ht to a trial and finding by a jury on a fact used to enha nce the defe ndant’s
sentenc e wa s forfe ited beca use i t was not raise d at trial. Simil arly , I find the Supreme Court’ s ruling in Cotton applicable to the revie w of Bl ake ly claims raise d on appea l in this State.

Review and modification of t he defenda nt’s sentenc e for the first time on appea l not only has the ef fe ct o f re m o ving the trial court a s the primary sentenc ing c ourt, it also denies the State the opportunity

to be hea rd in the sentenc ing de cision. Be cause the i ssue i s waived, it is revie wable on appea l only

under the discretionary

authority of plain er

ror. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

An appe llate court is permitted to corre ct plain er ror, or in this case Blakely err or, only when the error is “of such a gre at m ag nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of the trial.” State v. Adkisson
, 899 S.W .2d 626, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Clearly
, this wa s the import of t he Supreme Court’s re cent holding in U. S. v. Booker , 543 U. S. _____, 125 S. C t. 738, 769 (2005),

w h e r e i n i to p i n e d t h a tn o t“ e v e r y [ Blakely /Booker] ap p ea l wi l l l ea d t o a n ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. That is beca

use we expect revie wing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether

the issue was r aised be low and whe ther it fails the ‘pla in-err or’ test.” The-2-

Supreme Court’s e x pectations in Booke r are ignor ed by

the majority

as the “ plain-er

ror test” is not employ ed.

The re cord supports application of enha ncing fac tor ( 1 6 )
, th at t

he def endant a bused a position of trust. The majority reje cts fac tor (16), not be cause it doe s not e x ist, but becaus e i t v i olates Blakely

. I ndeed, on appea l, the defendant does not contest t he fact t hat the mother of the victim, the vic tim , a ndthe de fe nd a nt sh are d the sa me ho me , a nd the de fe nd a nt se rv e d a s a “ pa re nta l f ig ur e ” to the five- y ear -old victim. I find, howeve r, under plain-er ror r eview, tha t had a jury hear d the proof with reg ard to fa ctor (16) , its verdict would have been the same. Ac cording ly , the def endant ha s fa ile d to e sta

bli sh pr e jud ic e in or de r to s a tis fy

the “ a ff e c tin g su bs ta nti a l r ig hts ” re qu ir e me nt o f R ule 52(b). See Cotton , 535 U.S. at 1786, 122 S. Ct. at 633 (af firming enhanc ement of the defe ndant’s
sentenc e following plain err or ana ly sis notw it h s ta n d in g p rese nce of Apprendi err or). The distinction betwee n harmless e rror

analy sis and err or assig ned on appe al ca nnot be over looked. See U . S. v. Mo n roe , 3 5 3 F

. 3 d 1 3 4 6 ( 1 1 Ci r

. 2 0 0 3 )

. I t is th e d e f e n d a n t, n o t th e St a te , w h o h a s the burde n of th establishing how the Bl ake ly err or cha ng ed the outcome of the sente ncing decision. See id. C l e ar l y, the def endant ha s not met this burden. For these re asons, I

would aff

irm the trial court’s imposit ion of the ten- y ear

sentenc e.

_____________________________ Da v i d G. Ha y es , J u d ge