### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry , 25, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KIRK WILLIAM S

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 244455 Rebec ca J. Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2004-01452-CC A-M R3-CD - F iled April 5, 2005

The defenda nt, Kirk W illiams, was indicted for driving unde r the influenc e and obstruc ting tra ffic. After g ran ting a

motion to s uppress a ll evidence obtained fr om the traff ic stop, the trial court permitted the state a n application for a discre tionary

appea l under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Proc edure

. Be ca u se the e ffe ct of the r uling wa s a dismissal of the cha rg es, this court

acc epted the a

ppeal unde r Rule 3 and waived t he ti mely filing of notice of appea l by the state. The issue prese nted for r eview is whether the t rial court err ed byg ranting the motion to suppress. The jud g me nt i s r e ve rs e d a ndthe c a us e is r e ma nd e d f or a tr ia l on the me ri ts.

Tenn. R. App . P .3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Re verse d and Rem anded f or Trial

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; J ohn H. B ledsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Boy d Patterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.

Donna Robinson Miller, Assistant Publ ic Def ender , for the a

ppellee, Kirk Wil liams.

OP IN ION

On July 12 , 2 00 2, Chatta noog a

Pol ic e Of

fi c e r C hr ist op he r S ims , w hil e on ro uti ne pa tr ol, observe d a 1978 Oldsmobile stopped on E ast 18th Street in Chattanoog a, blocking a lane of trave l on a two-la ne re sidential street. The eng ine was idling, but the vehicle was not moving . Acc ording to Office r Sims, he stopped behind the vehic le and tu rn ed o n h i s blue lights; he e x plained at the suppression hea

ring that he ac tivated his emerg ency lights to signa l to t h e o ccupa nts that he was
prese nt and then wa lked towar d the vehicle in order to de termine why it was stopped. As Off

icer Sims app ro a c he d th e dri ver' s si de wi nd ow , h e sme lle d a lc oh ol o n th e de fe nd a nt a nda sk e d h im t o perf orm field sobriety tests. The defenda nt performed one test but re fused to do the one -leg stand, claiming he wa s injured. He w as subseque ntly arr ested for

obstructing traff

ic and driving unde r the influence

.-2-

J ason B rooks, who wa s an employ ee of the def endant, testified f

or the de fense at the suppression hea

ring . A passeng er in the c ar on the day o f t h e ar re s t , he cla imed that he and the defe ndant wer e on the way to the defe ndant' s residenc e when they saw the of

fice r appr oach the ir ca

r from the f ront instead of the rea

r, as asserted by Offic er Sims. He conte nded that the of fice r blocke d the path of their car and then t urned on his blue l ights. Br ooks testified t hat t he defenda nt was not sto pp e d b ut c on c e de d th a t he ha d b e e n d ri vin g ve ry slo wl y wh e n th e of

fi c e r tur ne d o nto the str e e t. Acc ording to Brooks, the defen d an t m er el y p ulled his car ove r to let the off icer drive by . He acknow ledg ed that the of fice r stepped out of

his patrol car , approa ched the ir vehicle
, and asked, "Wh y [ are] y ou st op ped in th e mi dd le o f t he ro ad o r pu ll ed o ver? "

At the hea

ring , the def

endant de nied that he wa s stopped but admitted th at h e wa s driving toward his r esidenc e "ve ry slowly " w hen he sa w the off icer turn onto the stree t in front of him and activate hi s blue lights. He claimed that he pulled over a s a courtesy to the office r and c ontended
t h at t h e o ff

i ce r s t o p p ed i n h i s p at h

. Ac co rd i n g t o t h e d ef en d an t , t h e o ff

i ce r a p p ro ac h ed t h e d ri v er 's door and asked "why [t hey wer e] stopped in the middle of the stree t." The defe ndant testified that he fi rs t a sk e d th e of

fi c e r wh y he ha d b e e n s top pe d a ndthe n e xpla ine d th a t he ha d p ull e d h is v e hic le over to the side of

the stree t to allow him to pass.

At the conc lusion of the h ea ring on the motion to suppress, the trial court obse rved a s fo llo ws :
The police office r testified it was a two lane road . . . and that [ the def endant] was not blocking any

traff ic. I find under e ither sce nario, e ither the S tate' s version or the defe ndant' s version of the fac ts, tha t the re is no rea sonable and articulable suspicion that a c r im e h a d o c c u rr e d
, w a s o c c u rr in g , o r w a s ab o u t t o o c c u r

in th is c a s e

. T he motion to s uppress is sustained.

The state initially

soug ht and re ce i v ed permission to appea l under Te nnessee Rule of Appellate Proc edure 9 beca use the trial c ourt had not ac tually dismiss ed the underly ing indictment fo l l o wi ng the orde r of suppre ssion. By virtue of a

miscommunication betwee n the District Attorney ’s Off

ice a nd the Attorney Gene ral’s Offic e, the state , howeve r, fa iled to file an a pplication for a ppeal unde r Rule 9 within 30 day s, as re quired, a nd later c hose t o proce ed under Rule 3. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9(b). I t s ra tionale was tha t the substantive eff ect of the trial court's or der of

su pp re ssi on of

the e vid e nc e wa s a

dis mis sa l of

the ind ic tme nt:

I n criminal actions an appea l a s of rig ht by the state lies only from an or der or judg ment enter ed by

a trial c ourt from which an appea l lies to the Supre me Court

or Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls: (1 ) the s ub sta nti ve e ff e c t of wh ic h r e su lts in dismiss ing a n indictment, information, or complaint; . . . .

Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3( c ). Af te r de te rm ini ng that the or de r of su pp re ssi on wa s, in f a c t, d isp os iti ve , th is

c ou rt app ro ve d th e Rul e 3 app e a l a nd wa ive d tim e ly fi lin g in the int e re sts of jus tic e . Se e Te nn . R.-3-

App. P

. 4(a) ; See, e.g., State v. Br own, 898 S.W .2d 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Stephen Udzinski , J r., No. 01C01-9212-CC-00380 (T enn. Crim. App., at Na shville, Nov. 18, 1993).

I n this appeal, the state arg ues that the stop w as n o t unlawful be cause the def endant ha d alre ady stopped his vehicle whe n the offic er a rrive d

. Further, the state arg ues that the off icer had

a re asonable suspicion to believe that the de fenda nt was obst ructing traff ic and that, there fore any incidental investig ation was wa rra nted. Fina lly , the state arg ues that a police off icer does not nee d

rea sonable suspi cion t o approa ch a stopped car beca use i t is part of their " community car e taking or public safe ty

function." See State v. Ha wkins, 969 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

Both the state and fe dera l constituti ons protect indivi duals from unreasonable sear ches a nd seizures; the g ener al rule is tha t a war rantless sear ch or seizure is pr esumed unre asonable and any evidenc e discov er ed s u bject to suppression. U.S. Const. amend. I V; Tenn. Const. art. I , § 7; Coolidge v. N ew Ha mpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bridge s, 963 S.W .2d 487, 490 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . N e ith e r, ho we ve r, lim its a ll c on ta c t be tw e e n c iti zen s a ndla w e nf or c e me nt a ndbo th

are desig ned, instead, " ' to preve nt arbitrary and oppre ssive interfe renc e withthe privac y and per sonal

s e c u r it y o f in d iv id u a ls

. ' " I N S v

. D e lg a d o , 4 6 6 U

. S. 2 1 0
, 2 1 5 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ( q u o ti n g U n ited States v. Martinez-F uerte , 428 U.S. 543, 55 4 (1 9 7 6 )). Our courts have rec og nized three ty pes of police-c itiz en intera ctions: (1) a f ull scale a rre st, which must be supported by probable cause ; (2) a brief inve stiga tory

stop, w h i ch mus t be supported by rea sonable suspicion; and (3) a brie f
po lic e -c iti zen e nc ou nte r, wh ic h re qu ir e s no ob je c tiv e jus tif

ic a tio n. Se e F lorida

v. B os tic k, 50 1 U .S. 42 9, 43 4 ( 19 91 ); B ro wn v. I lli no is, 42 2 U .S. 59 0 ( 19 75 ); Te rry v. Oh io, 39 2 U .S. 1 ( 19 68 ). " On ly when the office r, by

means of phy sical for ce or show of authority , has in some way restra ined the liberty of a c itiz en may

we c onclude that a

' seizure' has occ urre d." T erry , 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.

An a ut om ob il e sto p c on sti tut e s a " se izur e " wi thi n th e me a nin g of bo th the F ou rth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and Article I
, section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution. Michig an De p' t of S tate P olice v. Sitz
, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); De lawar e v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 65 3 ( 19 79 ); Sta te v. B ini on , 9 00 S.W. 2d70 2, 70 5 (T e nn . Crim . App . 1 99 4) ; State v. Wes tbr oo ks
, 594 S.W .2d 741, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). The fac t that the detention may be brie f and limited in scope doe s not alter that fa ct. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; State v. Pulley
, 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993); Binion, 900 S.W.2d at 705; Westbrooks, 594 S.W .2d at 743. The ba sic question, as ind ic a te d, is w he the r the se izur e wa s " re a so na ble ." B ini on , 9 00 S.W. 2da t 70 5 (c iti ng Sitz, 49 6 U .S. at 444). I n Pulley
, our supreme court ruled that "the rea sonablene ss of seizures less intrusive than a full-sc ale a

rre st is judge d by weig hing the g ravity of t he public conc ern, the deg ree to which the seizure adva nces that conce rn, and the s everity of t he int rusion into indivi dual privac y ." 863 S.W.2d at 30.

Our determination of t he re asonable ness of a stop of a vehic le depe nds on whether the offic er ha d e ith e r p ro ba

ble c a us e or

a n " art ic ula

ble a ndre a so na

ble su sp ic ion" t hat the ve hic le or its
occupa nts were subject to seizure for violation of the law. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; State v. Coleman, 791 S.W .2d 504, 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) . Whil e p ro b able c ause is not nec essary for a n investigative stop, it i s a re quirement that the of fice r' s rea sonable suspicion be supported by-4-

" sp e c if ic a ndart ic ula

ble fa c ts w hic h, take n together wi th r a tio na l in fe re nc e s f ro m th os e fa c ts,

rea sonably

war rant that intrusion." Terry , 392 U.S. at 21; Pulley
, 863 S.W .2d at 30; Coleman, 791 S

. W .2d at 505; see a lso St ate v. Watkins, 827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (apply ing T erry doctrine in c ontext of vehic ular st o p ). I n determining whe ther re asonable suspicion exi sts, an important fac tor in the ana ly sis is t hat re asonable suspi ci o n i s a less dema nding sta ndard tha n probable cause not only

in the sense that r easona

ble suspicion c an be established with information that is differe nt in quantityor conte nt than that require d to establish probable cause , but also in the

se ns e that r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion c a n a

ri se fr om inf

or ma tio n that is le ss r e lia

ble tha n th a t r e qu ir e d to show p r o b ab le c a u s e

. Pu ll e y , 8 6 3 S. W. 2 d a t 3 2 ( c it in g A la b a ma v

. Wh it e , 4 9 6 U .S. 325, 330 (1990))

. Courts considering the issue of re asonable s uspicion must look t o the totality of the circ umstances. Those circ umstances include t h e p ersonal observations of the police office r, information obtained f

rom other of

fice rs or a g encie s, information obtained fr om citiz ens, and the
p a tt e r n o f o p e r a ti o n o f

c e r ta in o f f e n d e r s

. Wa tkin s , 8 2 7 S. W. 2 d a t 2 9 4 ( c it in g U n it e d St a te s v

. Co r te z, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981))

. Ob j ec t i v e st andar ds apply

rathe r than the subjec tive beliefs of the office r making the stop. State v. Norwor d, 938 S.W .2d 23, 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. The scope of re view i s l i m i t ed . When the trial court make s a finding of fa cts at the conclusion of a

suppression hea

ring , the fa cts are acc orded the weig ht o f a j u ry verdic t. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). The tria l court' s findings of fac t are binding upon this court unless the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) ; see a lso Stephe nson, 878 S.W .2d at 544; State v. Goforth, 678 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) . Questions of cr edibilityof witnesses, the w ei gh t an d v alue of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t

. T h e p ar ty

preva iling in the trial c ourt is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the evidenc e adduc ed at the suppr ession hearing as well as all reasona ble and leg itimate infere nces tha t

ma y be dr a wn fr om the e vid e nc e

. Od om, 92 8 S.W. 2d a t 23 . T he app lic a tio n o f the la w t o th e fa c ts, howeve r, re quires de novo r eview. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423-24 (Tenn. 2000) . L ikewise, if the evide nce doe s not involve a cre dibilit y assessment, the revie wing court must examine the

rec ord de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness. State v. Yea

rg an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

I nU n it e d

States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2002), the Supre me Court determined that the re is no Fou rth A me nd me nt v iol a tio n w he n a n o ff ic e r s imp ly

app ro a c he s a

pe rs on in a

pu bli c pla c e a ndpo se s a

qu e sti on . E ven whe n th e re is n o b a sis to s us pe c t a c ri me , o ff

ic e rs ma y a sk questions, a sk for identification, and ask for consent to conduct a se arc h, so long a s the means use d to induce the c ooperation are not c oerc ive. I d.; see Da niel, 12 S.W .3d at 4 2 5

. A revie wing court must ex amine "a l l t he cir cumstance s surrounding the enc ounter" in determining whether the law enfor ceme nt conduct would have indicated a l ac k of fr eedom " to decline the of fice rs' reque sts or otherwise te rminate the e ncounter ." B ostick, 501 U.S. at 439. As indicated
, the subjective intent of the off icer is not controlling. State v. Johnson, 980 S .W.2d 414 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).-5-

He re , th e tr ia l c ou rt

imp lic itl y fo un d tha t the c ar wa s stop pe d but co nc lud e d tha t no tr a ff ic

wa s b e ing blo c ke d a t th e tim e th e of fi c e r a rrive d a t th e sc e ne . O the rw ise , th e re we re no fi nd ing s. Although the re w as some dispute as to w hether the office r approa ched the defe ndant’s vehic le from be hin d o r f

ro m th e fr on t, tha t w a s a pp are ntl y no t a fa c tor c on sid e re d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e . I n it s decision, the trial c ourt ruled that unde r " either sc enario" ( whether the offic er a

rrived f rom the fr ont or the re ar) , its conclusion would have be en the sa me. I t appea rs that the trial c ourt suppresse d the evidenc e bec ause the defe ndant was on a two-lane roa d and wa s not blocking a ny traff ic; there fore
, the trial court concluded that the office r had no rea sonable or articula ble suspicion that a crime had

occur red or was oc curring.

As indicated, how ever , an off icer need not suspec t a crime in order to a pproac h a citizen and ask questions. Further, it is well settled that an off icer , as a part of his communi ty car etaking or public safe ty

function, may

approa ch a c itiz en in a parke d car

. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); State v. Ha wkins, 969 S.W .2d 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. J ames De wey J ensen, J r., No. E2002- 00712-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, Nov. 15, 2002). In Cady , the United States Supreme Court made the following observa tion:

Becaus e of

the e xten siv e re g ulatio n o f m oto r v e hic le s a ndtr a ff ic , a nda lso be c a us e of

the fr e qu e nc y

wi th w hic h a

veh ic le c a n b e c omedis able d o r i nv olv e d in

an ac cident on p u b l ic hig hway s, the extent of police-c itiz en conta ct involving automobiles will be substantiallyg reater than police -citizen contac t in a home or office

. Some such conta cts will occur be cause the offic er ma y believe the operator has violated a

criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature

. L ocal police office rs . . . fre quently

investigate vehicle acc idents in wh i ch t h ere is no claim of criminal liability and eng ag e in w hat, for want of a better term, may

be desc ribed a s community car etaking functions, totally divorce d from the detec tion, investigation,

or ac quisiti on of evide nce r elating to the violation of a criminal statute.

413 U.S. at 441.

I n this inst ance , Offic er Sims testified that he approa ched the vehicle in or der to f ind out why it w a s st op pe d a lon g the c ity re sid e nti a l str e e t. Th e tr ia l c ou rt app e ars to ha ve fo un d th a t th e ve hic le was stopped. Even if the c ar ha d been moving "ve ry slowly ," how ever , as testified to by the defe ndant, the same rationale would apply . I n our view, the trial court e rre d by rea ching the conclusion that the off

icer was re quired to have had a r easona ble suspicion in order to approa ch the idl ing ve hic le

. F ro m the lim ite d fi nd ing s ma de by the tr ia l jud g e , thi s c ou rt c a nn ot c on c lud e that th is

was a seizure of the de fenda nt requiring rea sonable suspicion. I nstead, the proof sug g ests that the of fi c e r' s a pp ro a c h o f the de fe nd a nt w a s mor e lik e ly a pa rt of his c omm un ity

c are takin g a ndpu bli c safe ty function to investigate a c ar stopped or appea ring to be stopped in a lane on a city street.

I n J e ns e n, a pa ne l of this c ou rt po int e d out that whil e the a c tiv a tio n of blu e lig hts or din ari ly signa ls a stop or arr est, citing State v. Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 330, 338 (Tenn. 2002) , “it is not unusual for a police off

icer to a ctivate the blue lights on his or her patrol car for safe ty purposes.” J ensen,-6-

slip op. at 3. I n this instance
, Offic er Sims explained tha t he did so to identify himself beca

use the defe ndant’s vehic le was a lrea dy stopped in the street. Ty pically , community

car etaking functions qualify as neither

full scale a

rre sts nor investigatory

stops because they

i n v o l ve no coe rcion or detention. United States v. B erry , 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982). The encounters are c onsensual and have been a

pplied to individuals i n parke d vehicles. 3 Way ne R. L aF ave, Sea rch a nd Seizure § 9.2(h) ( 2d ed. 1987). The totalityof the c ircumstance s in l i gh t of the time and plac e of the
encounte r and the conduct of the individuals involved must cont ro l . United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).

The c ircu m s t an ce s , here , whether the offic er ha d approa ched f rom the fr ont or the re ar,

wa rr a nte d th e e nc ou nte r. Th e re c or d est abli sh e s tha t the ve hic le wa s eithe r sto pp e d or tr a ve lin g so slowly as to ma

ke it diff icult to tell the differ ence

. The photogr aphs docume nt the width of the stree t and the unmar

ked lane s of traf

fic.

Acc ording ly
, the j udg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a nd the cause is rema nded for a trial on the merits.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE