COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT WAYNE HICKSON, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2482-97-3 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 NOVEMBER 17, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 

 Dutton Olinger (Attorneys & Counselors at Law 

of America, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Robert Wayne Hickson, Jr. was convicted in a bench trial of 

arson. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

BACKGROUND

 On the morning of August 10, 1995, Michelle Nicole Price 

observed a white car stop in front of a trailer home owned by 

Michael Eastridge. Eastridge's trailer home was located next to 

Price's house. Price saw a man exit the car and overheard 

yelling and what appeared to be rocks hitting a sign. She saw 

the man return to the car, in which a passenger remained seated, 

and drive away. 

 That evening, Robert Wayne Hickson, Jr., appellant, and Gary 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Hall Spence met at a campsite in Radford, Virginia. Hickson and 

Spence talked with a group of five or six other men. Spence 

testified that he overheard Hickson mention that "somebody owed 

him money." 

 Spence and Hickson left the campsite together between 8:30 

and 9:00 p.m. in Hickson's car, and proceeded toward Elliston. 

While driving on Route 460, Spence testified that Hickson stopped 

the vehicle by the side of the road and exited the car. Spence 

assumed that Hickson was "getting out to relieve hisself [sic]." 

 However, Spence stated that he then heard the "hatch rattling." 

 Spence testified that Hickson left the area of the car, but he 

did not see where Hickson went. Spence stated that he next heard 

an explosion. He observed flames off to the left of the car. 

After Spence heard the explosion and saw the flames, Hickson 

returned to the car and made a reference to "fire," but said 

nothing further. Spence admitted he had consumed approximately 

twelve beers that evening, although he said he was not drunk. 

 At approximately 11:15 p.m. that evening, Deputy Sheriff 

Investigator Norman Croy, a specialist in fire investigation, 

responded to a call from Michael Eastridge's mobile home, located 

in the Elliston area of Montgomery County. When he arrived at 

the scene, he found that the home was still partially on fire. 

Croy found a red gasoline container at the rear of the trailer, 

approximately six feet from the porch steps. Croy noticed random 

patterns of gasoline both on and beneath the steps, which 
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indicated that gas had been thrown quickly. He testified that 

the fire "was started on the back porch with gasoline." Croy 

stated that a fire set in this manner would cause a "flash" and 

then an audible "whooshing sound." Through his investigation, 

Croy determined that at the time of the fire, Hickson was 

"associated" with a white car with a "hatch" rather than a trunk. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 Hickson claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for arson because the Commonwealth failed to prove he 

was the person who started the fire. Where the sufficiency of 

the evidence is an issue on appeal, an appellate court must view 

the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Cheng 

v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990). On 

appeal, the decision of a trial court sitting without a jury is 

afforded the same weight as a jury's verdict and will not be 

disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 604, 231 S.E.2d 312, 315 

(1977). 

 The Commonwealth may prove the commission of the crime of 

arson through circumstantial evidence if that evidence excludes 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and points unerringly to 

the defendant. Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 309 S.E.2d 325 

(1983). Cook appealed his conviction for arson involving the 

burning of an apartment leased to him, arguing in part that the 
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Commonwealth's use of circumstantial evidence failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he had started the fire. See id.

at 431-32, 309 S.E.2d at 328. 

 The Cook Court noted that "[a]rson is a crime of stealth. 

The perpetrator is seldom observed, seldom confesses, and if 

skillful, leaves few traces of his presence. The proof is often 

necessarily circumstantial." Id. at 432, 309 S.E.2d at 328-29. 

Thus, "[w]here circumstantial evidence is sufficient to exclude 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, it is sufficient to 

support a conviction. The hypotheses which must be thus excluded 

are those which flow from the evidence itself, and not from the 

imaginations of defense counsel." Id. at 433, 309 S.E.2d at 329. 

 In support of his claim of innocence, Cook cited the 

accessibility of others to the apartment at the time of the fire 

and the presence of a key to the apartment beneath the doormat. 

The Virginia Supreme Court held that "the jury considered these 

facts and rejected, as it was fully entitled to do, the 

inferences Cook contends it should have drawn. It is the 

province of the jury to determine the inferences to be drawn from 

circumstantial evidence." Id. at 432, 309 S.E.2d at 329. Among 

the facts the Court noted in support of its affirmation of the 

conviction were: 

 1) As a result of delinquent rent, Cook's personal 

property in the apartment was subject to a 

sheriff's levy; 

 2) Cook procured renter's insurance five days before 

the fire; 
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 3) Although delinquent on his rent, Cook made sure 

the premium on his fire insurance policy was paid; 

 4) Cook was the only person present at the apartment 

on the night of the fire; 

 5) Cook lied about ownership of some of the personal 

property; 

 6) Expert testimony excluded any reasonable 

hypothesis of accidental cause; and 

 7) Cook was seen driving by the apartment immediately 

after the fire was extinguished. 

The Court found this circumstantial evidence in its entirety 

sufficient to uphold the conviction. 

 In the matter now before us, Price testified that on the 

morning of the fire, she saw a man in a white car approach 

Eastridge's mobile home and heard yelling. That evening, Spence 

testified that he overheard Hickson say someone owed him money. 

Spence then accompanied Hickson to an area located within a 

half-mile of the trailer home and heard Hickson open the rear 

hatch of the vehicle. After Hickson walked away from the car, 

Spence heard a small explosion and saw flames. Spence testified 

that after hearing the explosion and seeing the flames, Hickson 

returned to the car, making a reference to "fire." Deputy Croy 

testified that the trailer home of Michael Eastridge was severely 

damaged by a fire that was started with gasoline. Croy also 

testified that at the time of the fire, Hickson was "associated" 

with a white car that had a "hatch" rather than a trunk. 

 In testing the credibility and weight to be 

ascribed in the evidence, we must give the 

trial court . . . the wide discretion to 

which a living record, as distinguished from 
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a printed record, logically entitles them. 

The living record contains many guideposts to 

the truth which are not in the printed 

record; not having seen them ourselves, we 

should give great weight to the conclusions 

of those who have seen and heard them. 

Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 379, 382 S.E.2d 258, 259 

(1989) (quoting Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 1136, 86 

S.E.2d 828, 834 (1955)). 

 Based upon the evidence, we cannot say the trial judge was 

plainly wrong or that no credible evidence supports the 

conviction. Additionally, we find that the circumstantial 

evidence introduced excluded every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.