1 

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Donna Davis ) Docket No. 2021-06-0188 

) 

v. ) State File No. 28188-2021 

) 

Amazon.com, Inc., et al. ) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 

Compensation Claims ) 

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge ) 

Affirmed and Remanded

This interlocutory appeal arises from the denial by the Court of Workers’ Compensation 

Claims of the employer’s motion to deny the employee’s request for an independent 

medical examiner from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s Medical Impairment 

Rating Registry (“MIRR”). Following the employee’s knee injury and authorized medical 

treatment, the treating physician assigned no permanent impairment but placed permanent 

restrictions as recommended in the report of a functional capacity evaluation. The 

employee filed a petition for benefits and requested an MIRR examiner, contending there 

was a dispute as to the degree of medical impairment as defined in the applicable 

regulations. The employer objected and moved to disallow the employee’s request, 

contending there was not a dispute as to the medical impairment because the permanent 

restrictions imposed by the treating physician related to a condition that pre-existed the 

employee’s work-related injury. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied the 

employer’s motion, and the employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, 

we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case. 

Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined. 

W. Troy Hart and Adam C. Brock-Dagnan, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employerappellant, Amazon.com, Inc.

Keith Jordan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Donna Davis 
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Factual and Procedural Background

Donna Davis (“Employee”) was employed by Amazon.com, Inc. (“Employer”), and 

was working as a package handler when she struck her right knee against a conveyor on 

March 22, 2021. Employer accepted Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation 

benefits and provided a panel of physicians from which Employee selected Dr. Harold 

Nevels. Dr. Nevels subsequently referred Employee to an orthopedic physician, Dr. James 

Rungee. Dr. Rungee prescribed physical therapy as well as a corticosteroid injection that 

he later described as producing “equivocal” results. Thereafter, Employee underwent a 

functional capacity evaluation to determine the level of function she could expect from her 

knee. According to Dr. Rungee, the evaluation showed that Employee “could only work 

at a sedentary seated-type job with occasional walking, stooping and stair climbing and no 

lifting or pushing over 15 pounds.”

Employee last saw Dr. Rungee on June 16, 2021. He assigned Employee the 

permanent restrictions indicated in the functional capacity evaluation and noted Employee 

was working in a sedentary position with Employer at the time. Further, Dr. Rungee signed 

a June 16, 2021 report noting that Employee would not have any permanent impairment as 

a result of her March 2021 injury and stating that, “from her medical history, she does have 

posttraumatic arthritis that is all related to her remote injury in 1999 and would appear to 

be compensable under that injury if indeed the history is correct.”

On July 28, 2021, Employee filed a petition for benefit determination in which she 

indicated a dispute existed regarding her impairment rating, noting that Dr. Rungee had 

indicated she had no medical impairment but had imposed permanent restrictions. 

Employee requested a review by an MIRR examiner pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) and Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-20. On August 

17, the MIRR Program Coordinator issued a report stating, “it appears . . . the MIR Request 

does indeed meet the definition of a dispute, as defined in [Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs.]

0800-02-21-.01(7)(b).” The report noted that if a party disagreed, a petition for benefit 

determination could be filed. Employer filed a petition the following day in accordance 

with Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-20-.06(2), which indicated a dispute existed as to

each of the six categories on the petition, specifically noting a dispute of “MIR 

applicability.”

Employer subsequently filed a motion in limine requesting the court “to deny 

[Employee’s] [MIRR] request.”1

 Employer’s motion asserted there was no dispute as to 

the degree of medical impairment because Dr. Rungee had given his opinion that Employee 

had zero impairment and had indicated that the permanent restrictions he assigned were 

1 A motion in limine is a pretrial request that certain evidence not be referred to or offered at trial. See 

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Employer’s motion did not seek to exclude evidence but sought 

to have the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims deny Employee’s request for an independent medical 

examiner from the MIRR.
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related to Employee’s preexisting condition. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

denied Employer’s motion, reasoning that “Dr. Rungee did not give a permanent 

impairment rating but placed restrictions. Thus, by definition, a ‘dispute’ regarding 

impairment exists.” Employer has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing the order of the Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims presumes that the court’s factual findings are correct unless the 

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2021). 

While we give considerable deference to factual findings made by the court that are based 

on in-court testimony, Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 

2009), “[n]o similar deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon 

documentary evidence,” Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC,

2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the 

interpretation and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are 

reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. 

See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 

2013). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation 

statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory 

construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2021).

Analysis

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) (2021) provides that “[w]hen a 

dispute exists as to the degree of medical impairment, either party may request an 

independent medical examiner from the administrator’s registry.” The regulations 

promulgated by the administrator define “[d]ispute of degree of medical impairment” to 

include, among other circumstances, those where “[a] physician has issued an opinion in 

compliance with the Act that no permanent impairment exists, yet that physician has issued 

permanent physical or mental (psychiatric) restrictions to the injured employee.” Tenn. 

Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-20-.01(7)(b) (2018).

Employer raises a single issue on appeal, asserting no dispute as to the degree of

medical impairment exists “when permanent physical restrictions are assigned to a nonwork-related injury.” In his June 16 report, Dr. Rungee outlined Employee’s medical 

history concerning her right knee.

Her medical issue is a little bit more complex and she has had an injury to 

her right knee . . . at her former job with [Employer] in Memphis where she 

had also hit it on a conveyor system and was out of work for 2 months, going 

to therapy with that before moving to Nashville in March in her current job. 
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She had a work-related anterior cruciate ligament in 1999 when she was 

working loading [a] truck and twisted her knee. Workup had included an 

MRI, which showed no visualized ACL graft and her PCL appeared lax. As 

a consequence of [] having an ACL deficient knee, she had partial medial 

and lateral meniscectomies and grade 3 degenerative changes in all 

compartments of the knee, pronounced at the medial compartment with 

chondral defects and fissures.

Dr. Rungee also stated in the report that he had “counseled [Employee] that she has 

moderately severe posttraumatic arthritis of her knee and [] given that she has had 2 minor 

injuries with pain just in the preceding 6 months, [] she will consider [a] more sedentarytype job than her current job at [Employer].” Further, he noted that Employee “elected to 

undergo a functional capacity evaluation to determine with objectivity just what level of 

function she could expect from her knee,” relating that the evaluation showed that 

Employee “could only work at a sedentary-type job with occasional walking, stooping and 

stair climbing and no lifting or pushing over 15 pounds.” After noting Employee would 

not have any permanent impairment “assignable to her most current contusion of the knee,” 

he said Employee “does have posttraumatic arthritis that is all related to her remote injury 

in 1999.”

Employer argued in the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims that “[a] proper 

reading of Dr. Rungee’s medical records” leads to the conclusion that “Employee’s workrelated contusion did not induce any permanent medical impairment,” and that 

“Employee’s post-traumatic arthritis – not the knee contusion – gave rise to her permanent 

physical restrictions.” According to Employer, “[t]o put it differently, the non-workrelated injury is the genesis for the permanent restrictions, according to Dr. Rungee.” We 

disagree with Employer’s interpretation of Dr. Rungee’s report.

In analyzing Employer’s position, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 

noted that Dr. Rungee “did not give a permanent impairment rating but placed restrictions,” 

concluding that, “by definition, a ‘dispute’ regarding impairment exists.” Turning to 

Employer’s motion in limine, the court noted that the only issue was the merits of 

Employee’s request for an evaluation by a MIRR physician, “an issue that does not pose 

an evidentiary question.” While our analysis does not address whether filing a motion in 

limine under these circumstances was proper or appropriate, we nonetheless fail to discern 

any error in the court’s denial of Employer’s motion to deny Employee’s request for an 

independent examiner from the MIRR program.

The purpose of the MIRR program is to comply with and implement the statutes 

establishing a resource to resolve disputes regarding the degree of permanent medical 

impairment for injuries subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Tenn. Comp. R. 

& Regs. 0800-02-20-.02(1). The regulations clearly define a “dispute of degree of medical 

impairment” to include those circumstances in which a physician who has expressed an 
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opinion that no permanent impairment exits “yet that physician has issued permanent 

physical . . . restrictions to the injured employee” as Dr. Rungee did here. Unlike 

Employer’s interpretation of Dr. Rungee’s statements, we conclude the medical records

before us do not address the underlying source or cause of Employee’s permanent 

restrictions; rather, the records are silent in that regard and only attribute the existence of 

Employee’s post traumatic arthritis “to her remote injury in 1999.”

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims denying Employer’s motion and remand the case. Costs on appeal 

are taxed to Employer.
 

 

 

 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Donna Davis ) Docket No. 2021-06-0188 

) 

v. ) State File No. 28188-2021 

)

Amazon.com, Inc., et al. ) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 

Compensation Claims ) 

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced 

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 16th day 

of November, 2021. 

Name Certified 

Mail

First Class 

Mail

Via 

Fax

Via 

Email

Sent to: 

W. Troy Hart

Adam Brock-Dagnan

X wth@mijs.com

acbrock-dagnan@mijs.com

Keith Jordan X jordanlawoffice@comcast.net

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of 

Workers’ Compensation Claims

X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

 

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243 

Telephone: 615-253-1606 

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov