SUMMARY

Date January 21, 2021

2021COA4

No. 20CA0859, People in the Interest of R.J.B. — Juvenile 

Court — Dependency and Neglect — Termination of the ParentChild Legal Relationship — Appearance by Electronic Means; 

Constitutional Law — Due Process

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother appeals 

the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship 

following a remote termination hearing via Webex. She claims that 

the court should have granted her a continuance so an in-person 

hearing could have been held, and the remote hearing didn’t afford 

her due process or equal protection of the law.

The division concludes that the court didn’t abuse its 

discretion in denying the continuance. The court’s need to conduct 

the termination hearing via Webex didn’t establish good cause to 

continue the hearing when a judge presiding over a hearing held via 

Webex can address any technical difficulties with sound, video feed, 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
or broadband issues as they arise; any delay in making an objection 

can be redressed by the court disregarding improperly admitted 

evidence; the court had extensively tested the virtual lobby and 

didn’t allow a sequestered witness to hear any of the proceeding; 

Webex, as a real-time videoconference platform in which all 

participants may view one another, allows the court and all counsel 

to observe a witness’s demeanor, determine if the witness is relying 

on documents or other information, and view admitted exhibits as 

well as other documents that may be used for impeachment; and 

the court ensured that an official record of the hearing was made in 

the same manner as during an in-person hearing.

The division also rejects mother’s assertions that the remote 

hearing procedure failed to afford her due process and equal 

protection of the law. The division concludes that the juvenile court

ensured that mother was provided substantially similar and 

fundamentally fair procedures as would have been available at an 

in-person termination hearing. So conducting the termination 

hearing via Webex afforded mother due process. The division didn’t 

consider mother’s equal protection claim because it is merely a bald 

assertion without argument or development.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA4

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0859

City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 19JV225

Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of R.J.B., a Child,

and Concerning R.B., 

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*

Bernard, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

Announced January 21, 2021

Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, 

Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Barry Meinster, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for 

Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020. 
1

¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.B. (mother) 

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child 

legal relationship with R.J.B. (the child) following a remote 

termination hearing conducted via the Webex remote videoconference platform. Mother claims that (1) the court should have 

granted her a continuance so an in-person hearing could have been 

held; (2) the remote hearing didn’t afford her due process or equal 

protection of the law; and (3) there was a less drastic alternative to 

terminating her parental rights.

¶ 2 We conclude that the court’s need to conduct the termination 

hearing via Webex didn’t establish good cause to continue the 

hearing. We also reject mother’s assertions that the remote hearing 

procedure failed to afford her due process and equal protection of 

the law. And, the juvenile court didn’t err in determining that there 

was no less drastic alternative to termination. So we affirm the 

judgment.

I. The Dependency and Neglect Case

¶ 3 In late January 2019, the Denver Department of Human 

Services learned that mother had been arrested on an outstanding 

warrant and the home that the child shared with mother and the 
2

maternal grandmother was unsanitary and unsafe. Mother also 

admitted that she used methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol 

on a regular basis. And she agreed to place the three-year-old child 

in his godmother’s care. But the Department was unable to keep in 

contact with mother and it initiated a dependency and neglect case 

the next month.

¶ 4 The juvenile court granted custody of the child to the 

Department for continued placement with the godmother. And it 

granted a default judgment adjudicating the child dependent and 

neglected.

¶ 5 Mother personally appeared at a hearing while she was 

incarcerated in July 2019. At that time, the court set aside the 

default judgment and adjudicated the child dependent and 

neglected based on mother’s admission. It also adopted a treatment 

plan for mother.

¶ 6 Mother was released from custody less than two months later. 

Shortly after that, she stopped all contact with the Department. 

And she didn’t personally appear at any further court hearings.

¶ 7 In March 2020, the Department filed a motion to terminate the 

legal relationship between mother and the child. About that same 
3

time, the judicial department began implementing measures to 

mitigate the public health risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

See Office of the Chief Justice, Order Regarding COVID-19 and 

Operation of Colorado State Courts (Mar. 16, 2020), 

https://perma.cc/85XJ-9WG7. As part of these measures, the 

Chief Judge of the Denver Juvenile Court issued a directive that all 

hearings — including termination hearings — would be conducted 

on an electronic platform such as Webex. See Presiding Judge, 

Denver Juvenile Court Order (Mar. 27, 2020), 

https://perma.cc/ZX8D-MMNV.

¶ 8 Shortly before the termination hearing in late-April 2020, 

mother filed three motions asking the court to (1) find that an 

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to the godmother was a 

less drastic alternative to termination; (2) enter an APR order; and 

(3) continue the termination hearing.

¶ 9 The court denied mother’s request for a continuance. And,

following a contested termination hearing via Webex, the court 

determined that there was no less drastic alternative and 

terminated mother’s parental rights.
4

II. Continuance

¶ 10 Mother first contends that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by denying her request to continue the termination 

hearing because the need to hold the hearing via Webex constituted 

good cause. We disagree.

A. The Legal Standard

¶ 11 The Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with all 

possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best 

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2020. When ruling 

on a motion to continue a termination hearing, the court should 

balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration of 

justice against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need 

for permanency. C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638 

(Colo. 2004).

¶ 12 Because the child was under the age of six when the 

dependency and neglect petition was filed, the expedited 

permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 

19-1-123, C.R.S. 2020. In EPP cases, the court shall not delay or 

continue the termination hearing unless good cause is shown and 
5

the delay is in the child’s best interests. §§ 19-3-104, 19-3-602(1), 

C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 13 A motion to continue is addressed to the court’s discretion and 

we won’t disturb its ruling on appeal absent a showing of an abuse 

of that discretion. C.S., 83 P.3d at 638. A court abuses its 

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or 

unreasonable. People in Interest of C.Y., 2018 COA 50, ¶ 13.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Initially, we note that mother relies on language from the 

Denver District Court’s COVID-19 directive. As pertinent here, that 

directive provides that all necessary participants in civil proceedings 

must appear remotely through telephone or teleconferencing 

options, but that any proceeding that the attorneys feel aren’t 

capable of remote presentation can be continued at the court’s 

discretion. See Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District, 

Amended Administrative Order Regarding Court Operations Under 

COVID-19 Advisory (Mar. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/RC3GRME8.

¶ 15 But this case was heard in Denver Juvenile Court, which is 

constitutionally separate from the Denver District Court. See §§ 13-
6

8-101, 13-8-102, C.R.S. 2020. So, the Denver District Court’s 

COVID-19 directive is inapplicable to this proceeding. See § 13-8-

115, C.R.S. 2020 (providing that the juvenile court has power to 

make rules for conducting its business to the extent that such rules 

don’t conflict with supreme court rules or state laws).

¶ 16 In her motion, mother claimed that conducting the hearing by 

Webex would create a fundamentally unfair proceeding because of 

difficulties with

 hearing other parties;

 the video feed cutting in and out or freezing;

 the parties’ broadband capabilities;

 making contemporaneous objections;

 effectuating a sequestration order while a witness waited in a 

virtual lobby;

 ascertaining whether witnesses were using documents or were 

in private communication with counsel or other parties;

 using documents to impeach a witness;

 offering exhibits;
7

 allowing the court and counsel to observe a witness’s 

demeanor; and

 ensuring there was an adequate record of the hearing.

¶ 17 However, as the juvenile court recognized, for several reasons, 

these concerns were either unfounded or could be addressed at the 

hearing. 

¶ 18 First, a judge presiding over a hearing held via Webex can 

address any technical difficulties with sound, video feed, or 

broadband issues as they arise.

¶ 19 Second, any delay in making an objection can be redressed by 

the court disregarding any slight delay in making the objection or 

disregarding improperly admitted evidence. Indeed, we presume

that all incompetent evidence is disregarded by the juvenile court. 

See People in Interest of M.M., 215 P.3d 1237, 1249-50 (Colo. App. 

2009).

¶ 20 Third, the court indicated that the virtual lobby had been 

extensively tested and didn’t allow a sequestered witness to hear 

any of the proceeding. 

¶ 21 Fourth, Webex is a real-time video-conference platform in 

which all participants may view one another. See White v. State, 
8

116 A.3d 520, 541 n.29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015). As such, it 

allows the court and all counsel to observe a witness’s demeanor, 

determine if the witness is relying on documents or other 

information, and view admitted exhibits as well as other documents 

that may be used for impeachment.

¶ 22 And fifth, the court indicated that it would ensure that an 

official record of the hearing was made in the same manner as 

during an in-person hearing.

¶ 23 Also, mother’s request to continue made no showing that

delaying the hearing was in the child’s best interests. Mother now 

claims that continuing the hearing would have served the child’s 

best interests because he was in a permanent home and neither she 

nor any other party were seeking to move him from that home. But 

she didn’t present this argument to the juvenile court.

¶ 24 For these reasons, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its 

discretion in denying mother’s request to continue the termination 

hearing.
9

III. Termination Hearing by Webex

¶ 25 Mother next contends that the juvenile court violated her right 

to due process and equal protection of the law by conducting the 

termination hearing via Webex. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Due Process

¶ 26 We review a procedural due process claim de novo. People in 

Interest of C.J., 2017 COA 157, ¶ 25. To establish a violation of due 

process, one must first establish a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest that warrants due process protections. Id.

¶ 27 A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, 

custody, and control of his or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 

U.S. 57, 66 (2000). To protect the parental liberty interest, due 

process requires the state to provide fundamentally fair procedures 

to a parent facing termination. A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28; see 

also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). These 

procedures must include a parent receiving notice of the hearing, 

advice of counsel, and the opportunity to be heard and defend. 

People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 40. The opportunity to 

be heard must be provided at a meaningful time and in a 
10

meaningful manner. Patterson v. Cronin, 650 P.2d 531, 537 (Colo. 

1982).

¶ 28 Mother was afforded each of these procedures during the 

termination proceeding. She received ample notice of the 

Department’s intent to seek termination of her parental rights at 

the April 2020 hearing. The record also shows that mother was 

represented by court-appointed counsel throughout the proceeding 

and given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and defend against 

the termination motion.

¶ 29 Even before the hearing, counsel filed motions urging the 

court to find that an APR to the godmother was a less drastic 

alternative to termination. And counsel appeared on mother’s 

behalf at the termination hearing. During the hearing, the court 

offered counsel the opportunity to (1) give an opening statement; (2) 

cross-examine each of the witnesses called by the Department and 

guardian ad litem; (3) present additional evidence; and (4) make a 

closing argument.

¶ 30 The court also ensured that counsel’s representation of mother 

wasn’t hindered by holding the hearing via Webex. Counsel had the 

ability to observe each witness’s demeanor by using the video 
11

platform. The court also used the virtual lobby to ensure that 

sequestered witnesses were unable to hear other portions of the 

hearing. And, on the few occasions when mother’s counsel or the 

court had been unable to hear a question or a witness’s response to 

a question, the court asked the reporter to read back that portion of 

the record.

¶ 31 At one point, the court indicated that it was having difficulty 

hearing mother’s counsel. But it immediately recessed to allow 

counsel to appear telephonically. The court could then easily hear 

counsel for the remainder of her cross-examination and closing 

argument.

¶ 32 Finally, mother claims that she wasn’t given the opportunity to 

be heard and personally participate in the termination hearing 

because she was struggling with homelessness and lacked access to 

resources to appear via Webex. But at no point did mother alert the 

court that she faced this problem. Indeed, the court observed that 

if mother had indicated that she wanted to personally participate in 

the hearing, it would have made accommodations to ensure that 

mother was able to do so either by telephone or Webex. And in this 
12

appeal, mother hasn’t articulated how conducting the hearing via 

Webex diminished the effectiveness of her case.

¶ 33 We conclude that the juvenile court ensured that mother was 

provided with substantially similar procedures as would have been 

available at an in-person termination hearing. So conducting the 

termination hearing via Webex afforded mother due process. Cf.

Clarington v. State, No. 3D20-1461, 2020 WL 7050095, at *11, ___ 

So. 3d ___ (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. Dec. 2, 2020) (holding that 

conducting a probation hearing by remote technology does not 

violate the defendant’s due process rights).

B. Equal Protection

¶ 34 Mother also contends that holding the termination hearing via 

Webex denied her equal protection of the law. The right to equal 

protection of the law guarantees that parties who are similarly 

situated receive like treatment by the law. But mother doesn’t 

explain how she received disparate treatment compared to other 

parties who are similarly situated. See People in Interest of M.M., 

726 P.2d 1108, 1117 (Colo. 1986). 

¶ 35 In fact, mother’s equal protection claim is merely a bald 

assertion without argument or development. So we won’t consider 
13

it. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. 

App. 2010) (a bald legal proposition presented without argument or 

development won’t be considered on appeal); see also United States

v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (a party may not merely 

mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the 

court to be mind-readers and do counsel’s work).

IV. Less Drastic Alternative to Termination

¶ 36 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining 

that an APR to the child’s godmother wasn’t a less drastic 

alternative to termination. Again, we disagree.

A. The Legal Framework

¶ 37 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated 

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an 

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan wasn’t 

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or 

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2020; People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 

(Colo. App. 2007).
14

¶ 38 When considering termination under section 19-3-604(1)(c), 

the court must also consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives 

to termination. M.M., 726 P.2d at 1122. This determination is 

implicit in, and thus intertwined with, the statutory criteria for 

termination. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. As a 

result, it is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for his or her 

child. Id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 39 And, as with all termination criteria, the court must give 

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional 

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); L.M., ¶ 29. Thus, for 

example, the court may consider whether an ongoing relationship 

with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child and 

the child’s need for permanency when determining whether there is 

a viable alternative to termination. L.M., ¶ 29.

¶ 40 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights 

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves 

applying the termination statute to evidentiary facts. Id. at ¶ 17; 

see also In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72, ¶ 16 (a juvenile court’s 

decision to terminate parental rights under section 19-5-105, 

C.R.S. 2020, presents mixed questions of fact and law). However, 
15

we won’t disturb the court’s factual findings if they have record

support. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 

2010).

B. The Record

¶ 41 The record reveals that the child was thriving in the 

godmother’s care. And, as mother points out, the court had 

previously determined that this was a permanent home for the 

child.

¶ 42 Even so, the record shows that mother hadn’t maintained any 

relationship with the child. Although the Department tried to 

arrange visits for mother through two different caseworkers as well 

as an external agency, mother failed to engage with any of the 

professionals. Mother didn’t attend any visits with the child during 

the fourteen months the case was open, which negatively impacted 

the child. He had initially been upset and showed “a lot of 

backtrack in his behavioral outbursts” when scheduled visits didn’t 

occur. The caseworker also observed that the child no longer 

referred to mother as “mom” and instead called her by her first 

name.
16

¶ 43 Mother was also unfit to care for the child. She had made no 

effort to engage in substance abuse treatment to address her 

methamphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana use. And she hadn’t 

participated in a mental health evaluation or treatment to address 

her bipolar and depression diagnoses.

¶ 44 Also, the godmother testified that she had difficulty 

establishing appropriate boundaries with mother. For example, 

during a chance encounter in the community, mother became upset 

when the godmother would not give her money. The godmother 

also explained that mother had gone onto her Facebook page and 

copied a picture of the child with other members of the godmother’s 

family. Mother had then posted the picture on her own Facebook 

page and became belligerent when the godmother asked her to 

remove it.

¶ 45 Finally, the record shows that the child needed the 

permanency provided by adoption. The godmother explained that 

adoption would allow the child to continue in the stable home 

environment that she and her family had provided for him. And she 

wanted to be able to make key decisions for the child, such as when 

he should have contact with mother. The godmother also 
17

adamantly opposed caring for the child under a custody 

arrangement because mother would have the ability to return and 

ask the court to take the child away from her care.

¶ 46 The caseworker similarly opined that an APR would not 

provide the child with the permanency and stability that he needed. 

She explained that it was imperative that the child’s progress made 

while in the godmother’s care not be disrupted.

¶ 47 On this record, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s 

determination that there was no less drastic alternative to 

termination.

V. Conclusion

¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.