### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00612- CR

Jo hn A dam Cha ndle r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. CR-96- 404, HO NORAB LE JACK H . ROB ISO N, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
J ohn Adam Chandler

appea ls from the re vocation of his def err ed-adjudication community

supervi s i o n

t er m an d ad j u d i ca t i o n o f gu i l tfo r a ggra v at edas s au l t
. C h an d l er co n t en d s t h at thi s a dju dic a tio n w a s im

pr op e r b e c a

us e he ha d a lr e a dy

be e n a dju dic a te d guil ty

for th is of

fe ns e in 2001 when he was a djudicated guilty on a companion count of deadly conduct. We w ill affirm the jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND

Chandler’ s appea l follows a serie s of pleas, r evocations, and adjudicat i o n s arising fr om c ha rg e s fi le d in 19 96
. He wa s o ri g ina lly ind ic te d f or thr e a te nin g a

pe rs on wi th i mmi ne nt b od ily2

inj ur y by us inga fi re a rm , f

or dis c ha rg inga fir e a rm

a t a pe rs on , a nd fo r d isc ha

rg inga fi re a rm a t a habitation with disreg ard f or the substantial risk that the ha bitation was occ upied. I n 1997, Chandler pled g uilty to one count of ag g ravated assault and two counts of d e a d l y c o n d u c t
. T h e c l e r

k ’ s r e c o r d

c o n t a i n s t w o o r d e r s o f

d e f e r r e d a d j u d i c a t i o n c omm un ity
su p e r v is io n s ig n e d o n Se p te mb e r 4 , 1 9 9 7
. B y s e p a r a te o r d e r s , th e c o u rt d e f e r r e d a d judic ation of g uilt for ag g ravated assault and f or dea dly conduct, a

nd place d Chandler on community supervision for six y ear s. Although the term of the communi ty supervision was one y ear longe r than Chandler ha d a g re e d to a c c e pt, the re is n o in dic a tio n in the re c or d th a t he c ha lle ng e d th is t e rm . On Marc h 9, 1999, the State moved to adjudicate Cha ndler g uilty

on the ag g ravated assault cha

rg e. The State alleg ed that Chandler violated the terms of hi s community supervision by fa ili ngto o be y

a ll the ord ers of

the c ourt

a nd his su pe rv isi on of fi c e r, fa ili ngto r e po rt

to h is supervision offic er onc e, fa iling seve ral times to make r equire d p ay ments, and fa iling to per form require d community

service . Chandler a dmitted these violations and wa ived his rig ht to appeal the conviction and sentenc e conce rning his a g g ravated-a ssault of fense . By order dated July

15, 1999, the cour t ext ended Chandler’ s period of supe rvision by two y ear s throug h September 3, 2005, althoug h the orde r does not spec ify the cha rg e for which the supe rvision is im posed. On Janu a ry 18 , 2 00 0, th e S ta te mov e d to a dju dic a te Cha nd le r guil ty

on the de a dly conduct c harg e. The State alleg ed failings si milar to those Chandler admitted in 1999. On J une 15, 2000, the State filed a

n amende d motion to adjudicate the deadly conduct c harg e, citing an incident of the ft . In a

jud g me nt d a te d N ov emb er 14, 20 00 , th e c ourt re vo ke d Ch a nd le r’ s c omm un ity3

supervision, adjudicated him guilty of the offe nse of dea dly conduct, a

nd assessed se ntence at five y ear s in prison. On Marc h 20, 2001, Chandler moved to have execution of his prison s entence suspended a

nd to be place d on community supervision. I n the body of the motion, he asse rted that he ha d b e e n c on vic te d f or the of fe ns e of a g g ra vated ass aul t and

wa s e lig ibl e fo r c omm

un ity supervision afte r havingserve d 180 day s in prison pursuant to the court’ s sen t en ce . T h e o rder of commitment attached to Chandle r’s motion, h o we ver, r ecited that he had be en adjudg ed g uilty of deadly conduct. The court g rante d the motion and place d Chandler on c ommunity supervision for five y ear s. I n its order g ranting community supervision afte r a se ntence of inca rce ration, the c ourt did not specify

for wha t offense this term was asse ssed. There a f te r , th e St a te f

il e d a s e r ie s o f d o c u me n ts s e e k in g to r e v o k e th e d if f e r ent
comm u n it

y s u p e r v is io n te r ms . O n Ja n u a r

y 8 , 2 0 0 3 , th e St a te mo v e d to r e v o k e Ch a n d le r ’s community

supervision for the deadly conduct offe nse for which he had been sentenc ed to f ive y ear s in prison in November 2000; the State f iled an amended mot ion to revoke on the s ame of fense on Apr il 7 , 2 0 0 3
. O n Ju ly 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 , th e St a te f il e d a mo ti o n f

o r th e c o u rt to ta

k e ju d ic ia l n o ti c e of Chandler’ s conviction on J uly 1, 2003 for a

differ ent offe nse of a g g ravated assault. The motion
re c ite d th a t Cha nd le r s too d c ha rg e d w ith“ vio la tin g the te rm s o f h is D e fe rr e d A dju dic a tio n in
c on ne c tio n w ithhis Ag g ra vate d A ssa

ult pr os e c uti on

a s w e ll [ as] violatin g the te rm s o f h is Communi ty

Supervision in connection with his D eadly Conduct prosec ution unde r the above sty led
cause number.” On that same date, the State filed a motion to adjudicate C h andler g uilty of the orig inal ag g ravated-a ssault char g e.4 B y jud g me nt sig ne d Sep te mbe r 29, 20 03 , th e c ourt re vo ke d Ch a nd le r’ s c omm un ity supervision term for

the orig in al aggr avate d-assa ult offense and adjudicated him guilty of that of fe ns e . T he c ourt

a sse sse d sen te nc e a t twe nty y e a rs in pr iso n. Cha nd le r fi le d a n oti c e of

a pp e a l, but the d is tr ic t c o u rt c e rti f ie d th a t th is “ is a p le a b a r g a in c a s e , a n d th e d e f e n d a n t h a s N O rig ht of appea l.” There is no indication in this rec ord of whether the district c ourt took any action re g arding the motion to revoke on the de adly conduct of

fense
.
DI SCU SSIO N Chandler c ontends that, in its November 2000 j u d g me n t, th e d is tric t c o urt adjudicated him guilty

of both the dea dly

conduct a

nd the ag g ravated -a s s au l t offe nses. He c ontends that the district court there fore could not ag ain adjudicate his g uilt and sente nce him on the a g g ravateda ssa ult of fe ns e in S e pte mbe r 2 00 3. He a rgue s th a t, d e sp ite the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s re fu sa l to c e rt if

y his rig ht of appe al, this wrong ful re- adjudication and r e-se ntencing is appea lable.

Ap pe a ls f ro m g uil ty

ple a s are li mited . A de fe nd a nt w ho ple a ds g uil ty a nd wh os e punishment does not e x cee d that which he ag ree d to acc ept ca n appea l only

those matters ra ised by
wr itt e n mo tio n f

ile d a nd ru le d o n befor e tr ia l or

a ft e r g e tti ngthe tr ia l c ourt ’s pe rm iss ion . T e x. R. App. P. 25.2(a)( 2). When a defe ndant is c harg ed with violation of a ter m of defe rre d-adjudication community

supervision, h e i s “e n titled to a hear ing limited to the deter mination by

the cour t of whether i t p ro ce ed s wi th an adjudication of g uilt on the origina l char g e. No a ppeal may

be take n from this determination.” T ex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 42.12, § 5(b) ( West S upp. 2004-05).R a t h e r t h a n o r d e r t h e t r i a l c o u rt t o p r e p a r e a n d f i l e a n a m e n d e d c e rt i f

i c a t i o n a t t his la te 1 stag e in the appe llate proc ess, the certification in the record shall be deeme d amende d so as to cer tify that this “ is not a plea- barg ain case , and the defe ndant has the rig ht of appea l.” See Te x. R. A pp . P. 25.2 comment (West 2003) (c ontaining pr escr ibed ce rtification for m). 5 B ut t he se lim itatio ns do no t ba r a pp e a l in thi s c a se . Ru le 25 .2 (a)( 2) do e s n ot l imi t a def endant’ s rig ht to challeng e the proce ss by which he w as sentenc ed. Se e Vi da urri v . S tat e , 49 S.W .3d 880, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Chandler doe s not challeng e the or i gi n al 1997 order 1 de fe rr inga dju dic a tio n, bu t c on te nd s th a t th e dis trict c ourt ha d n o p ow e r t o a dju dic a te him in Se pte mbe r 2 00 3 b e c a

us e he ha d a lr e a dy be e n a dju dic a te d g uil ty in N ov e mbe r 2 00 0. Ne ith e r t he ru le nor the statute limits a defe ndant’s rig ht to appeal a judgme nt that the court lac ked powe r to rende r. Se e Nix v . S tat e , 6 5 S. W.3 d 6 64 , 6 68 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Ed war ds v . S tat e , 106 S.W .3d 377, 379 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, no pet.) (post-revoc ation assessment of se ntence in exce s s of statut or y lim it i s a pp e a la ble ); see also Ex

parte Bec k, 922 S.W .2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The nature of Cha

ndler’s c halleng e make s his appeal pe rmissible. Chandler c o n t en d s t h at the district cour t had no power

to adjudicate him g uilty

of
a g g ra vate d a ssa ult in 2 00 3 b e c a

us e it ha d a lr e a dy do ne so thr e e y e a rs e a rl ie r wh e n it a dju dic a te d h im g uilty expres s l y o n l y

of dea dly

conduct. He makes this argument despite the languag e in the Novemb e r 2 0 0 0 ju d g me n t th a t me n ti o n s th e d e a d ly c o n d u c t o f f e n s e b u t d o e s n o t me n ti o nthe
a g g ra vate d a ssau lt. He no te s th a t, w he n mu lti ple c ha rg e s f or of fe ns e s ari sin g ou t of

the same
c ri min a l epi so de a re pr os e c ute d in a sin g le c ri min a l a c tio n, the se nte nc e s im po se d f or the se pa rate6

convictions must be serve d concur rently
. See Tex. P en. C ode Ann. § 3.03(a) (West 2003). He c ites lang uag e from the court of criminal appea ls that this amounts to “treating the sepa rate offe nses as one for sentenc ing pur

poses.” Se e Ha lib ur ton v . S tat e , 578 S.W .2d 726, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 79 ); se e als o Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 42 .0 8( a ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 4- 05 ) ( “ Whe n th e same de fe nd a nt h a s b e e n c on vic te d in tw o or mor e c a se s, jud g me nt a nd se nte nc e sh a ll b e pr on ounc e d in
eac h case in the same manner as if there had been but one conviction.”)
. He argues that the district court tre ated these offe nses as one when initially imposing the c ommunity sup er v i s i on: he sig ned
on e ple a a g re e me nt a

nd re c e ive d a

sin g le se t of c on dit ion s fo r c omm un ity su pe rv isi on un de r a

sin g le
cause number. He urg es that the district c ourt had no power to impose a sentenc e for the a g g ravatedassault conviction that excee ds the sentenc e pre viously imposed for the de adly

conduct c onviction, ci t i n g Kim ba ll v . S

tat e , 119 S.W .3d 463, 465 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2003, no pet.). I n that case , the district court init i al l y i m p osed a te n-y ear sentenc e, suspende d execution of that sentenc e and assessed c ommunity

supervision, and then r evoked the co m m unity supervision and imposed a fi ft e e n- y e a r s e nte nc e ; the B e a umo nt c ourt c on c lud e d that the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d e xce e de d it s a uth or ity by imposing a f

ifteen- y ear

sentenc e bec ause that ex ceeded the te n-y ear sentenc e it had imposed orig inally
. Id
. But we find nothing pr eventin g co u rt s fr o m i mp o s i n g d i ff er en tt er m s o f i mp risonment at diffe rent times on sepa rate convictions for w hich identical t er m s o f def err ed-a djudication community

supervision wer e orig inally imposed. Unlike in Kim ba ll , no sentenc e wa s pronounce d in this case when the orig inal defe rre d-adjudication c ommunity supervision was a ssessed, so there is n o d isc re pa

nc y be tw e e n th e or ig ina l and the c ur re nt se nte nc e . A lth ou g h th e c ourt in t his c a se7

ini tia lly imp os e d id e nti c a l c omm un ity su pe rv isi on ter

ms f or the a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult and de a dly conduct of

fense s, they

rema in separa

te offe nses. The r equire ment in article 42.08( a) that the court pronounce judgme nt and sentenc e for multipl e re lated convic tions “as if” the re we re o nly one conviction does not mea

n that there is but one conviction. See Tex
. Co de Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 42 .0 8( a ). I f t

he c on vic tio ns a c tua lly

me lde d in to a

sin g le con vi cti on , the re wo uld be no ne e d to require concur

rent sen t en ce s b ec ause there would be only one sente nce; we will not reduce the
concur rent sentenc e re quirements to surplusag e. We also find no re quirement that sente nces se rved
concur r e n tl y b e of identica l leng th, even if the y arise f rom simultaneously

defe rre d adjudications that
are later a djudicated se parately
. Se e id .; Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 3.03( a). N or do we find any imp e dim e nt t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt separat ely

re vo kin g te rm s o f d e fe rr e d- a dju dic a tio n c omm un ity supervision that wer e initially imposed at the same time. The only appar ent limitation i n addition to the concur

renc e re quirement is the ra ng e of punishment contained in the statutes. See Tex. P en. Code §§ 12.33 (sec ond-deg ree felony punishable by

two to twenty

y ear s in prison) and 12.34 (thirdde g re e fe lony punis ha

ble by tw o to te n y e a rs in p ri so n) ; se e als o id . §§ 22.02(b) ( standard a g g ravated
a ssa ult is s e c on d- de g re e fe lony

) a nd 22 .0 5( b), (e) ( de a dly

c on du c t of

dis c ha rg ingfi re a rm

a t or in direc tion of people or building wit h re ck l essness reg ardingits occupation is third-deg ree felony ). B oth punis hme nts a sse sse d a

re wi thi n th e se ra

ng e s. Our c onclusion mi gh t b e d i fferent if the State w ere attempting to manipulate the sy ste m to e ff

e c tiv e ly sta c k th e se nte nc e s f

or the se se pa

rate of fe ns e s— i.e. , by

waiting to revoke the deadly conduct of

fense until after the twe nty -y ear sentenc e for

ag g rava te d a s sault is served—in orde r to impose a long er a g g reg ate period of imprisonment than could have been imposed at the time of8

the orig inal g uilty

plea. Se e O’

Ha ra v . S tat e , 626 S.W .2d 32, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“c ourt has
no po we r to c umu la te a ny se nte nc e no t or ig ina lly or de re d to b e se rv e d c umu la tiv e ly ” ); see also Ex parte Sims , 868 S.W .2d 803, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 3 ). B ut there is no evide nce of such manipulation here . I nstead, the State and the courts have given Chandler the bene fit of an a

rra y of community

supervision options. Chandler has violated the terms o f his community supervision, beg inning with his failure to c omply with te chnica l pr ovisions of his c ommuni t y s u p er v i sion (re porting to his supervision officer and pay ing r equire d fee s), and pr og ressing throug h additional of fe ns e s o f m isa

pp ro pr ia tio n o f p ro pe rt

y , d ri vin g wh ile int oxic a te d, a nd a no the r a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult
. Chandler may have the rig ht to seek cre dit a g ainst the sentenc e for this ag g ravated-a ssault conviction based on pr e-shoc k-probation prison time serve d on the dea dly conduct se ntence , but that question is n ot b e fo re us .

The district cour

t acted w ithin it s power in a djudicating Chand l er ’s guilt for ag g ravated assault and se ntencing him to twenty y ea rs . The 2000 a djudication of g uilt for the
o ff en s e of de adly

conduct did not constitute an a djudication of g uilt for the re lated off ense of ag g ravated assault. Chandler was still under defer red- adjudication community supervision for the ag g ravated-a ssault offense in 2003. The cour t did not er

r by revokingthat term of supe rvision and adjudicating his guilt for a g g ravated assault in 2003.
CO NC LU SION Concluding that the district court had the power to re v o k e the term of def err edadjudication community

supervision imposed for the a g g ravated-a ssault o f f e n s e d e s p it e h a

v in g three9

y ear s ear lier re voked a similar ter m for a c ompani o n offe nse of de adly conduct, we aff

irm the judgme nt.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Mar ch 24, 2005 Pub lis h