NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 18

- 2976

______ ____ STANLEY E. KORNAFEL , PRO SE LAYMAN , Appellant

v. SCOTT D. GALLOWAY, ESQ.; G. MICHAEL GREEN, J.; CHRISTINE F. GANNON, J.; SPIROS E. AN GELOS, J.

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ( E. D. Pa . Civil Action No. 2

- 18

- cv - 0 3241 ) District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II

_____________________________ _______ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 26, 2018 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO an d FUENTES , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 15, 2020 )

___________ OPINION *

___________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding preced ent.2

Stanley Kornafel , proceeding pro se , appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights compla int. For the reasons that follow, w e will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Kornafel filed a complaint against his landlord , Dorothy G allagher, his landlord’s attorney , Scott Galloway, and three Delaware County Court of Common Pleas judges

. Kor nafel claim ed violations of his constitutional rights arising from a state court lawsuit that Gallagher successfully brought against him. Kornaf el alleged that the judges were biased against him, p recluded him from presenting his case , and conspired again st him with Galloway. Kornafel sought a “jury trial outside of Media where a reasonable fair and equal hearing may be had or adjudicate the case based on the merits.” Compl. at 14. The District Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915( e)(2) (B)

. To the extent Kornafel claimed that th e defendants conspired to discriminate against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Distric t Court ruled that he did not allege the requisite race

- or class

- based discrimination to state a claim. The D istrict Court also ruled that Kornafel had not stated a conspiracy claim under § 1983 because h e did not allege facts supporting a plausible cons piracy , that his § 1983 claims against the judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity, and that Gallagher and Galloway are not state
actors subject to liability under § 1983. The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed Ko rnafel to file an amended complaint , with the exception of his claims against the judges, which were dismissed with prejudice.3

Kornafel filed an amended complaint naming Galloway and the three judges as defendants . He disput ed the District Court’s decisi on and reiterated and expanded the allegations in his original complaint . The District Court stated that the a mended complaint made clear that Kornafel’s federal case was predicated on his dissatisfaction with the handling of his state court case and his belief that the judges and opposing counsel conspired against him. The District Court ruled that, to the exten t Kornafel ask ed
it to review and vacate the state court’s judgment or rulings, it lacked jurisdiction to do so under the Rooker

- Feldman 1 doctrin e. The District Court also ruled that Kornafel had failed to state a claim for the same reasons stated in its prior decision . The District Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice and t his appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standa rd of review is plenary. Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Kornafel’s complaints are not very clear. To the extent his claims are not barred by the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine, he did not state a plausible conspiracy claim for the reasons stated by the District Court. We also agree with the District Court that
Korn afel’s allegations do not support a conclusion that Gallagher and Galloway are state actors subject to liability under § 1983. In addition, the record reflects that Kornafel’s claims against the judges are based on their actions in their judicial capaciti es. The

1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983).4

judges are thus absolutely immune from any suit for damages and Kornafel does not seek injunctive relief that might be available under § 1983. See Azubuko v. Royal , 443 F.3d 302, 303

- 04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Kornafel argues on appeal that the District Court omitted from its decision certain factual allegations, including allegations that the state court failed to adjudicate his

cou nterclaim against Gallagher and enforce its pre - trial order, and that these allegations support his conspiracy and due process claims. Although the District Court summarized Kornafe l’s complaint s without setting forth all of his allegations of wrongdoing, Kornafel has not shown that the Dis trict Court erred in dismissing them for the reasons stated above

. 2
Accor dingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Kornafel’s request in his brief for oral argument is denied.

2 We will not address the question s presented for review that Kornafel lists in his brief , which , to the extent understandable, e ither are not relevant to the District Court’s reasons for dismissing his complaint s or are conclusory

.