### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Jul y 27, 200 4 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MICHAE L LEE McCORMI CK

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty

No. 167205 Douglas A. Meye r, Judge

No. E2003-02689-CC A-R9- DD - F iled Novem ber 15, 2004

The De fenda nt, Michael L ee McCormick, was convicted i n 1987 of t he first deg ree murder of Donna J ean N ichols. The De fenda nt was sentenc ed to death for the murde r. The De fenda nt’s conviction and sente nce w ere aff

irmed on di rec t appea l. See S tate v. McCormick, 778 S.W .2d 48 (Tenn. 1989)

. Subsequently , the Defenda nt filed for post-conviction relief on the g rounds of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l and a ne w trial wa s awa rded. See Michae l L ee Mc Cormick v. State, No. 03C01-9802- CR- 00 05 2, 19 99 WL

39 49 35 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , K no xvill e , Jun e 17 , 1 99 9) . In c on jun c tio n w ith the new trial, defe nse counsel filed a motion to suppress st atements the Def endant made to police office rs prior to his 1987 arr est. The tria l court g rante d the De fenda nt’s motion. The State now appea ls by

permission. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We aff irm in part and r ever se in part.
Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Crim inal Cou rt

Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Rem anded

D A VI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Mike Ri c h ar d s o n a n d M ar y A n n G r e e n , Ch a tt a n o o g a , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll a n t, M ic h a e l L ee McCormick.

P aul G. S um mer s, At to rneyGen eral and Re po rt er; Mi chael E. Mo ore, S ol ici to r Gen eral ; J os eph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor Ge nera l; Bill C o x , District Attorney Gene ral; and J. Michael Tay lor, District Attorney

Gene ral Pro-Te m, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

A brief revie w of the f

act s ad d u ce d at the Def

endant’ s first trial will be helpful. See g ener ally State v. McCormick, 778 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1989). During the early morning hours of F e br ua ry 14 , 198 5, Do nn a Jea n N ic ho ls’ bo dy wa s f ou ndin a pa rking are a a lon g B raine rdRoa d in Chattanoog a. The victim had been shot in the he ad at c lose rang e. I n a bac k pocket of the victim’s-2-

jeans, p o l i ce f

ound a blank sig ned che ck made out for $20. The ensuing police investig ation

reve aled no witnesse s to the crime.

The De fenda nt w as a friend of the victim’s y oung er brother Hap. The Def endant a nd Hap had committed a bur g lary at Dalton Colleg e in Georg ia and stolen elec tronic equipment. Some of this equipment was stored at the apartment that the victim shared with Ha p. When the victim learne d

abo ut the bu rg lary , s he ins ist ed tha t th e sto le n g oo ds be re mov e d a ndthat he r b ro the r e ndhis relationship wit h the Def

endant. Ha

p told the Defe ndant about the victim’s conc erns.

Detec tive Charles D u d le y

o f th e Ch att an o o g a

Po li c eD e p a

r tm ent bec ame the le ad investig ator
on the c a se ; it

wa s th e fi rs t hom ici de c a se in w hic h h e se rv e d a s le a d d e te c tiv e . T hr ou g h h is investigation, he discovere d that the Def endant ha d told his ex -wife that he had se en the victim on t h e n i g h ts h e w a s m u r d e r e d

. A c c o r d i n g l y , D e t

. D u d l e y d e c i d e d t o t a l k

w i t h t h e D e f

e n d a n t

. In revie wing arr est reports on the morning of Fe bruary 22, 1985, Det. Dudley

discovere d that the Def endant ha d been a

rre sted for D UI

. Be cause the Def endant was alre ady in c ustody , Det. Dudley reque sted that the De fenda nt be broug ht to his office for an intervie w.

De t. Du dle y ob ta ine d a

wa ive r o f rig hts fr om t

he De fe nd a nt andthe De fe nd a nt a g re e d to ta lk with the detec tive a

b o u t t h e mu r d er inve stigation. This conversation wa s tape-r ecor ded and a dmitted into evidence at the suppression hearing . The De fenda nt told Det. Dudley that he had know n the vic tim fo r thr e e to fo ur y e ars

. Th e y ha d me t a t Da lto n Junio r Col le g e in Ge or g ia wh e re the vic tim

was a student and the Defendant was a media technician. The victim ’s brother Hap worked with the Def endant a s a student aide.

T h e D e f e n d a n t t o l d t h e d e t e c t i v e t h a t h e h a d n o t s e e n t h e v i c t i m s i n c e s h e h a d r e tur ne d to Chattanoog a. He said that on the nig ht she was murde red, he we n t t o Be n n igan’s re staurant on B ra ine r d R o a d a t ab o u t 6 : 0 0 o r 6 : 3 0 p

. m

. H e h ap p e n e d u p o n a f r i e n d t h e r e , a n d t h e y w e nt t o Br ainer d Be ach Club. The D efe ndant danc ed with a couple of wome n and then we nt home at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. The Def endant wa s living with his pare nts at the time.

The De fenda nt stated that he ha d spoken to his ex -wife on the morning of either the 14th or 15th of Fe bruary

and told her tha t he had dated the victim once or twice and was ve ry upset at her death. He told his ex -wife t h at h e h ad s een the victim on the night of he r death, had boug ht her dr ink s, a ndwa s g oin g to c a sh a c he c k f or he r. Th e De fe nd a nt t oldDe t. D ud le y that he tol d th is

“ fa br ic a t[io n]” to h is e x-wif e in an a tte mpt

to g a in h e r s y mpathy

be c a us e sh e wa s c omp la ini ng to him about being late on his c hild support. He told the detec tive that he had not se en the victim on the nig ht of her de ath, nor ha d he spoken to he r, nor ha d he eve r date d her. He said that he had never been in he r ca

r. The D efe ndant stated that he first learned about the victim’s de ath over the ra dio.

As the i nterrog ation prog resse d, the Defenda nt repe atedly asserted t hat he ha d nothing to do with the victim’s de ath. Eventually , the following exchang e betwe en the De fenda nt and Det. Dudle y
occur red:-3-

Det. Dudley : All rig ht. I n the very beg inning, I told y ou there wer e some tests that

we could take. There ’s a series of tests here , which would consist of

some per s o n a l t e s ts w h ic h w o u ldr e q u ir e a h a ir f r o m y o u , a

b lo od sample fr om y ou, which y ou have the rig ht to refuse

.
De fe nd a nt: I ’m

wi lli ng to d o it

.
D e t. D u d le y : I f

y o u ’ r e w il li n g to d o th is a n d s ig n a f o r m, w e ’ ll h a v e th e te s t. We also have the poly g raph operator here . Now, a poly g raph c annot be used for y ou or ag ainst y ou. I t g ives us basica lly an idea. Would y ou be willing to submit to a poly g raph e x amination?

Def endant: Yes, sir.

De t. D ud le y : An d y ou wo uld n’ t ha ve a ny qu a lms abo ut i t?

Def endant: No, sir.

Det. Dudley : The thing that I ’m curious about, Mike, and like I say , this is my job. I t’s hard f or us to sit down and tal k t o a t o tal strang er that we don’t know and that doesn’t know us, y ou know. Over a period of time y ou can de velop a little bit of trust. But, see , we de al in fa ct s , and our main conce rn in this job is to s epar ate f act f rom fanta sy . And, y ou know, just from eve rything that y o u ’v e told me and incide nts that have been rela ted to me , it’s ve ry hard for me to sit down and re alize. I have g ot a per son that can te ll me the type of c lothing that y ou wer e
we ari ng that ni g ht. No w, wh a t I wo uldlik e to d o -- y ou liv e wi th y ou r p are nts , r ig ht?

Def endant: Yes, sir.

De t

. Du d l ey : Do y o u p ayan y k i n d o f r en tt h er e o r a n y t h i n g?

De fe nd a nt: I

didpa y wh e n I ha d it

. Det. Dudley : So y ou just try to help them out as best y ou can?

Def endant: Ye ah.

Det. Dudley : I would like to g et in touc h with y our pare nts a nd g et

that clothing th at y ou wer e we aring that night f or
e xami na tio n. I

wo ulda lso like to e xami ne bo th-4- vehicles that y ou wer e oper ating . Would y ou be willing to coope rate th at fa r?

Def endant: Sure.

Det. Dudley : And y ou fee l that no way , shap e, fo rm or fa shion that y ou can be

c on ne c te d in to this ?

Def endant: I

didn’t have any thing to do with it, no, sir. I ’ve done a lot of we ird things, but I

didn’t have a ny thing to do with that.
Det. Dudley : What do y ou mean by “we ird things” ?

Def endant: Well, the incidents fabric ating stories and, that we discussed, y ou

know. I ’ve ha d my

problems, but I

-- Det. Dudley : Have y ou ever soug ht any

help, I mean se rious help?

Def endant: At one time I was g oing to AA meeting s. I t didn’t last too long. I ’m

definitely an alc oholic.

. . .
De t. Du dle y : I no tic e se ve ra l sc ratc he s he re on y ou r arm

. I ’m g oin g to a sk y ou , if

y ou wo uld , to sta nd up a nd re mov e y ou r sh irt fo r me a ndle t me jus t take a look.

De fe nd a nt: Al l ri g ht.

De t. D ud le y : Cou ld y ou te ll m e ho w y ou g ot the se sc ratc he s o n y ou r a rm ?

De fe n d an t : J u s two rk i n g, I gu es s

. I ’v e go ta d o g.

De t. D ud le y : Wou ld y ou sli de that sh irt of f? Wha t ki ndof

do g y ou g ot?

De fe nd a nt: I t’ s a n A us tr a lia n s he ph e rd wi th a pu g fa c e . ( I naud ibl e ). I thi nk the se ri g ht h e re are the ha nd c uf fs

.
D e t. D u d le y : That right t her e , th a t’ s w h a t I ’ m t a lkin g ab o u t. T h e r e ’ s r ig h t h e re

loo ks lik e sc ratc h ma

rk s o n th a t.

Def endant: Yeah, just wo rk i n g, I g uess, may be, and I deal with a lot of

e qu ipm e nt, y ou kn ow , a ndsti c kin g my arm s a ndstu ff

wi th i t.-5-

Det. Dudley : What kind of equipment? Computer (inaudible)?

De fe nd a nt: An d p ho toc op ie rs

. Det. Dudley : Turn around here just a littl e bit. Yeah, h er e’ s a s cratch mark he re

behind y our ea

r. Do y ou rec all how that happe ned?

Def endant: Not offha nd, no, sir.

Det. Dudley : Do y o u h av e an y s cr at ches or any scratch marks on y our leg s or any wher e?

Def endant: Not to my

knowledg e. Det. Dudley : Have y ou g ot on underwe ar?

De fe nd a nt: No , s ir , I

do n’ t.
Det. Dudley : Well, Ihate to tell y ou to do this, but I need to look.

D e f e n d a n t : O k a y.

De t. D ud le y : Yo u d on ’t ha ve to a llo w m e to d o th is.

De fe nd a nt: I ’m

wi lli ng to do an y thi ng I c a n to pro ve my inn oc e nc e . I do n’ t r e c a ll any there

.
Det. Dudley : Turn around. Would y ou have any objection if I g ot our I .D. man up

here to take photog raphs of y ou -- g o ahea d and pull y our pants up -- ph oto g ra ph y ou wi th y ou r sh irt on a nda lso take a ph oto g ra ph of tho se
sc ratc he s o n y ou r a

rm s?

De fe nd a nt: I

wo uld n’ t ha ve a ny

qu a lms a t a ll.

Det. Dudley : Okay

. As of now, I ’m g oing to g o ahea d and terminate the interview

and explain to y ou some things a nd we will turn the tape back on. I

wa nt t o s ho w y ou a

fo rm that w e ha ve to colle c t e vid e nc e . A nd , in fac t, before I

do cut the tape off, it looks like we do ha ve a f ew seconds of

tape lef t to ge t this. L et me read thi s to y ou. I f y ou would, just read a long right he re w ith me. I f y ou’ll notice, it’s authorized consent to collec t phy sical evide nce. “I ,” y our name would g o rig ht here , “have been i n formed of my rig ht not to subm it to the proce dures” -- excuse me -- “as pr escribed below f or the purpose of-6- collecting phy sical evide nce. T hese pr ocedur es consist of the collection of blood specimen by a license d medical tec hnician.” T hat means y ou’ll g o to a hospital, we won’t even attempt to draw it here. “The collection of a

head and pubic hair samples and a collection of

a s al i v a s am p l e. I au t h o ri z e, ” t h at wo u l d b e m e, “o f t h e C h at t an o o ga Police Depa

rtment, to arr ang e for

the c o l l ec t ion of these items and fu rthe r a g re e that th e y

ma y be us e d a s material evid e nc e in the ir investigation. This permission is g iven” to me, given to me, “to the office rs named volun t ar i l y , and no thre ats and promises ha ve bee n
ma de a g a ins t me .” Yo u d o u nd e rs ta ndthat y ou ’r e no t r e quir ed to sig n th is f or m?

Def endant: Yes, sir.

De t. D ud le y : An d th a t y ou do thi s o n y ou r o wn fr e e wi ll?

Def endant: Yes, sir.

De t. D ud le y : An d y ou are wi lli ng to s ub mit to this ?

Def endant: I ’d be w illing to do it. I ’d like to have a lawy er -

- Det. Dudley : You would like to have -

-
De fe nd a nt:

-- a t th is p oin t.

D e t

. D u d l e y:

- - a n a t t o r n e y?

De fe n d an t : Bu tI ’m wi l l i n g t o d o an y t h i n g.

Det. Dudley : Well, see, we’ ve go t t o k n o w. Do y o u wa n t to consult with an

attorney or do y ou want to g o ah ea d and wor k with us? I t’s y our choice now.

Def endant: L ike I

say , I ’ll do anything, but I still think I , y ou know, like to have a lawy er w ith me, and I ’ll be g lad to do that.

De t. D ud le y : Ok a y . N ow ba c k to the po ly g ra ph e xami natio n. Ar e y ou wi lli ng to submit t o a poly g raph?

Def endant: Sure.
Det. Dudley : Do y ou want a la wy er pr esent a t the poly g raph?-7-

Def endant: Yes, sir, I ’d like to, y ou know. I think it’s mybest i n t er es t

. I ’m willing to do anything that will help y ou in this case, but I --
Det. Dudley : As I told y ou in the very beg inning, if y ou wer e innocent, y ou had no

qu a lms

.
Def endant: I ’m --

De t. D ud le y : No wo rrie s.

Def endant: -- c ompletely

innocent of this murder

.
De t. Du dle y : An d I

c a n te ll y ou , if y ou do wan t a n a tto rn e y pr e se nt, he wo uld probably ad v i s e y ou ag ainst taking these tests if he f eels a ny i n c l i n a t i o n a ta l l t h a tyo u ’ r e g u i l t y.

De fe nd a nt: Ok a y . Se e I ’m , I ’m in o ve r m y

he a d. I do n’ t kn ow -- I ’m wi lli ng to do anything to prove my

innocenc e bec ause I know I ’m innocent of this murder.

Det. Dudley : What I ’d like to do then, if y ou are innocent of th i s m u rd er , i s g et

the se sa mpl e s to da y

a ndjus t g e t y ou on ou t of the pic tur e . I ’v e g ot t o eliminate people.

D e f e n d a n t: Tha t’ s f

in e

. Su r e

. B u t c a n w e s ti ll g o a h e a d g e t me s et up? Ican’ t aff ord a la wy er. I

don’t, see, I

don’t know what to do.

D e t

. D u d l e y: O k a y.

De fe n d an t : Yo u u n d er s t an d wh at I ’m s ay i n g?

De t. Du dle y : An att orn ey , as far as us app oin tin g y ou a n a tto rn e y , if y ou ’r e in

c u s t o d y a n d u n ab l e t o m ak e b o n d , t h e y w i l l ap p o i n tyo u a n a t t o r n e y. I f y ou wi sh to ha ve a n att orne y pr e se nt, y ou are makin g bo ndon thi s DUI char g e, then the Court will proba bly req u i re y ou to retain y our
own. (Sound of tape c utting off )
(E mph a se s a dd e d. ) D e t. Dud ley a dmi tte d at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng that he c on tin ue d h is

conver sation with the Defe ndant whil e t h er e was no tape in the rec order . When the rec ording resumes, D et. Dudley

is r eviewing with the Def endant the r eleva nt forms for the taking of phy sical

e vid e nc e . F oll ow ing thi s, De t. D ud le y re turn ed to th e top ic of

the De fe nd a nt’ s c on ve rs a tio n w ith-8-

his ex -wife about the victim’s m urder

. Det. Dudley told the Defe ndant that this conversation was “very important” and r equeste d the Def endant to re call it “wor d for wor d, exactly what y ou told her.” The De fenda nt replied,

Something to t he ef

fec t that I met J eannie [t he victim] t here to cash a chec k. I don’t reme mber the amount. Twenty dollars s tands out in mymind, but Idon’t, y ou know, I can’ t be positive of that. You know, how sad I was, y o u k n o w, co u l d n ’t be lie ve it. Yo u k no w, I

ma de it re a lly so un d lik e I wa s, wa s inv olv e d w ith the g ir l, t ry i n g t o m ak e m y

ex -w i fe fe el s o rr y

fo r m e a n d t h i s s o rt o f t h i n g. Following this int err og ation, Det. Dudley obtained phy sical evidence from the Defenda nt’s person

a nda lso se arc he d th e De fe nd a nt’ s h ome a ndve hic le s. Th e po lic e didno t arr e st the De fe nd a nt, ho we ve r. Th e De fe nd a nt le ft tow n fo r a pe ri od of tim e a nd the n re turne d. He was su bs equ ent ly convicted of

the burg lary of Dalton College and serve d some time in a Ge org ia prison. He w as later rele ased on pa

role.

The De fenda nt remaine d the key suspect in the victim ’s m u rd er . Acc ording ly , the police decide d to conduct an underc over operation in an attempt to elicit incriminating information about the mur de r f

ro m th e De fe nd a nt. To thi s end , with the c oo pe ratio n o f the De fe nd a nt’ s G e or g ia pa ro le office r, Chattanoog a Police De partment unde rcove r off icer Eddie Cooper pose d as a fellow pa rolee

a ndme t th e De fe nd a nt at th e De fe nd a nt’ s Ge or g ia pa ro le of fi c e on Janu ary

21 , 1 98 7. Ac c or din g to his te sti mon y

a t th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng , D e te c tiv e Coo pe r’ s g oa l wa s to “ fo rg e a frie nd sh ip” wi th the Def endant a nd g ain his trust and confide nce. T o that end, De t. Cooper struck up a conve rsation with the Def

endant a nd the Def

endant sug g ested they meet for a beer at a local bar. The two men met there , wher e the De fenda nt drank some b ee r, an d t h ey met there ag ain the next day , with the Def endant a g ain drinking beer . The men discusse d why they had been i ncar cer ated with Det. Cooper te lli ng the D e f

e n d a n tt h a th e h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f c ar t h e f t

. T h e m e n a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h e p ar ole of fi c e r’ s su g g e sti on that th e y g o to wo rk

a t a loc a l c arp e t mil l. Th e De fe nd a nt w a s n ot e nth us ia sti c about this prospect. De t. Cooper t old the Def endant that he could ar

rang e to have someone “ cover ”

a ndre po rt

fa lse ly that the De fe nd a nt w a s w or kin g a t th e mil l. M e a nw hil e , D e t. C oo pe r c ou ld involve the Def

endant in seve ral transac tions purporting to involve stolen car s. For his participation in the se “ c ri me s, ” the De fe nd a nt w ou ld b e pa id $ 10 0 pe r tr a ns a c tio n. De t. C oo pe r a rr a ng e d th e fi rs t of these tr ansac tions on J anuary 24 and paid the D efe ndant $100 as a g ree d.

At some point during the ir ea rly discussions, Det. Cooper aske d the Def endant if he might be intere sted in a contra ct murder involving a lot of mone y . The De fenda nt indicated that he w as interested. D et. Cooper late r told the Def endant that he was wor

king on a contra ct to kill som eone in Knox ville for $20,000, and of fer ed to split the proceed s with the Def endant if the Def

endant would participa te in the killing. Ac cording to Det. Coo p er , t he De fenda nt was enthusiastic a bout thi s p ro sp e c t.
When Det. Cooper f

irst met the Def

endant, th e De fe n dant was living with his parents and

wo rking fo r a

c omp ute r c omp a ny . T he De fe nd a nt t oldDe t. C oo pe r th at he wa s h a vin g pr ob le msA p p arent l y , t he D efend ant ’ s p res ence i n a b ar i n C hat t ano o ga i n t he p res ence o f a know n “ fel o n” wo ul d have 1
b een ground s f o r a paro l e vi o l at i o n.
-9- stay ing w ith his parents. Det. Cooper confirme d this re port with the Def endant’ s parole of

fice r who told Det. Cooper that the Def endant’ s problems with his pare nts stemmed f rom his drinking. A s part of her cooper ati o nw it

hth e u n d e rcove r oper ation, the Def endant’ s parole of

fice r told the Def

endant’ s mother that, in order

for the D efe ndant to addre ss his drinking proble m, she should k i ck the Def endant out of he r house. The Def endant’ s mother took this advice a nd to l d the Def endant he would have to leave her residenc e. Meanw hile, Det. Cooper sug g ested to the De fenda nt that they sh are a n a pa rt me nt, to wh ic h the De fe nd a nt a g re e d. Th e De fe nd a nt the n le ft tow n f or se ve ra l day s. Whe n h e re turne d, the tw o me n e ng a g e d in the ir se c on d “ sto le n” ve hic le tr a ns act io n, with D e t. Cooper ag ain paying the Def endant $100. De t. Cooper testified that they eventua lly conducte d five or six of these “ crimes.”

On Fe bruary

2, Det. Cooper rented a motel suite in Chattanooga for the two me n to share a s an apa rtment. Det. Cooper

paid all of the rent char g ed for this lodging . Det. Cooper stated that he and the De fenda nt both stay ed ther e “some ” nig hts, with the Defe ndant s o m et imes spending the ni gh t el s ew h ere with a g irlfriend. The Def endant did move his possessions into the suite. The Def endant a lso broug ht liquor into t he re sidence ; Det. Cooper state d that he neve r broug ht any in.

On Fe bruary

9, the two men participated in another “stolen” c ar de al and then w ent to a bar

. De t. C oo pe r h a d a

rr a ng e d f or De t. D ud le y

to a rrive a t th e ba

r w hil e the y we re the re a ndpr e te ndto
arr est someone. De t. Cooper was hoping this event would trig g er some conver sation betwee n he and the Def endant about the Nichols murde r: an e vent the two men ha d not y et discussed. De t. Cooper tes ti f ie d th a t, a f

te r D u d le y “ arr e s te d ” th e ir a c c o mp li c e , D u d le y w a lk e d o v e r to th e D e fenda nt and told him, “I

haven’ t forg otten y ou.” The Def endant b ecame conc erne d about this, fearing that he would be found in violation of his parole

. 1
At this point , Det. Cooper turned on the tape rec order he was secr etly wea

ring and re corde d the conve rsation he ha d with the Def endant a fter the y

left the bar, a tra nscript of whic h was a dmitted at t he suppression hearing. During that conver sation, Cooper aske d the Def endant, “ [w] hat in the he ll’ s g oin g on ? ” Th e De fe nd a nt r e pli e d th a t he kn e w Du dle y be c a us e Du dle y ha d q ue sti on e d h im

abo ut the vic tim ’s mur de r. Coo pe r a sk e d, “ [w]ho kil le d the da mn wo ma n?” a nd the De fe nd a nt t old him that the m u rd er wa s “unsolved.” Cooper expressed c oncern that Dudley had now se en them toge ther, stating , “Son, this’s got me ne rvous.” Cooper ag ain aske d who murder ed the victim, and the Def endant a g ain told Cooper that it was unsolved. The Def endant e x plained that he ha d been questioned bec ause he had g otten some of the property that the victim’s br other had stolen fr om the colleg e.

Re fe rring to the plann e d “ hit ” in Kno xvill e , Co op e r ag ain told theDe fe nd a nt, “ I ’v e g ot t o know what in the hell’s g oing on.” The Defendant repe atedly denied any involvement in the murder. Neve rtheless, Cooper

stated, “Well, y ou know, hell, here we are talking a bout wasting that son-ab i t c h i n K n o x v i l l e a n d t h e n h e r e y o u c o m e u p i n v o l v e d i n a d a m n m u r d e r

. ” C o o p e r

c o n t i n u e d : “ If-10-

y ou’re involved in something like that, g osh dam n i t , b e s t ra i gh t up and tell me so, so we c an do

s o m e t h i n g ab o u ti t

. ” T h e D e f e n d a n tr e p e a t e d l y

d e n i e d a n y

i n v o l v e m e n t , e v e n a f

t e r C o o p e r s a i d , “ If y ou killed the heife r, fine and dandy .”

Cha ng ing ta c tic s, Coo pe r ask ed the D e fe nd a nt, “ Wha t if [Du dle y ] ta g s u s a ndg oe s to Knoxvi lle with us? What do we do then? We take that son-of-bitch out, kill his ass. What do we do the n?” T he De fe nd a nt the n to ld C oo pe r that the be st thi ng fo r Coo pe r to do wo uld be to c omp le te the Kn oxvil le job by

him se lf, o r w ith so me on e e lse , becaus e he (the De fe nd a nt) didno t w a nt t o “ca use no shit.” The D efe ndant told Cooper that the onlyrea l trouble they fac ed wa s his being

arr ested for

violating his par ole and be ing pla ced ba ck in j ail. He told Cooper he would spend the next few nig hts with his girlfrie nd so as to avoid C o o p er ’s b ei n g tied up with him. L ater in the

conver sation the Def

endant sa id, “You know, if it take s it, hell, I ’ll, y ou know, find another place for a couple of wee ks, y ou know.”
Cooper testified that, afte r he had turned the rec order off, he had further discussions with the Def endant a bout the Nichols murder . Cooper st ated that during this later, unre corde d conver sation, the Def endant told him he had be en appr oache d about committing it, had dec lined t h e off er, but knew who did it. C ooper testified the Defenda nt stated t hat he told whoeve r appr oache d him that “he w ouldn’t do it but he would tell them how t o do it.” The Defendant told Cooper that the victim’s death had something to do with drug s. The De fenda nt also told Cooper that the victim had bee n shot thr e e tim e s. Det. Cooper se cre tly

rec orded a nother c onversation he had with the De fenda nt on Febr uary 11, a tra nscript of which wa s admitted at the suppre ssion hearing . During this discussion, t he Def endant a g ain broug ht up the possibili ty of hi s leaving town. Det. C ooper replied, “I t’s kinda har d to, ah, bre ak a pa

rtnership up, y ou know, t hat’s working, y ou know what I mean? ” The Def

endant responde d, “B ut what I ’m say ing is onc e I , y ou know, I g et re established [in Georg ia] , we c an continue to make mone y , and continue to stay in contac t, or we can hit the road, jack, e ither wa y we want to do it. I

mean, it’s entire ly

up to y ou.” Shortly

there afte r, the following discussion occurr ed in refe renc e to the propose d Knoxvi lle “hit”:

De t. C oo pe r: I - I ’m ‘o nn a be, I ’m ‘on na be ho ne st wi th y ou

. Al l

that damn mess about that f_ _ king gir l, I could g ive a shit less about that heife r. You know what I mean?

Def endant: Yeah, I

know what y ou mean. Det. Cooper: But, what I ’ve sa id, and I , and, honestly , I think y ou’re bullshit ting me a

bout it, Mi ke.

Def endant: They

ain’t no bullsh i t

. They

ain’t a bit of a

f_ _king bullshit . I

don’t know no m ore w ho done it than any body did.-11-

De t. C oo pe r: Wel l, s e e , h uh , th e re a g a in, y ou g o fr om o ne thi ng to

another . You te--, y o u said one thing and then now y ou say another

.
Def endant: Well, Iknow that
Det. Cooper: B ut I

don’t know what

De fe nd a nt: the rewa s so me mon e y of fe re d o n it , a nd , th a t’ s a

bo ut a ll

D e t

. C o o p e r : A n d I,

Def endant: I

know.

D e t. Co o p e r : and I don ’ t kn o w w h a t to th in k , b u d

. A n d w h a t I ’m

sa y ing is, wh a t w e ’r e fi xing to b ite of f i s b ig bu sin e ss. An d w he n it

a ll co mes do wn to the nu t c utt ing , me and y ou g onna have t o be st anding there toge ther, by ourself, no ma tter what comes up. Are y ou rea dy for that?

Def endant: I ’m rea dy

for that pa

rt. The only

part I see wi t h the problem i s, is y ou convincing y ourself. I f y ou, like I told y ou, I

t o l d y ou when we was riding back in the truck the othe r nig ht, I

said l o o k, y ou do what y ou fe e l’ s r ig ht, I

sa id, the re a in’ t go nn a be no ha ir of f m y
a ss i f y ou want, c ut m e ou t of thi s o r w hate ve r, it do n’ t matte r t o me , o ne way or the oth e r. I c a n ta

ke it

on e way , o r I

c a n ta ke it the oth e r. I ’m

re ady fo r m y pa rt of it.

D e t

. C o o p e r : W e l l , t h a t ’ s , t h a t ’ s j u s t w h a t I’ v e b e e n tr yi n g t o s a y.

We’ve g ot, y ou know, hey , I , ah huh, al l that mess, I wish y o u h ad. That’d make me f eel a hell lot better

abo ut i t. Y ou kn ow . B ut,

D e f e n d a n t : W e l l , e v e n i f

I h a d , I w o u l d n ’ ts e ta n d a d m i ti tt o a n yb o d y.

L ater , th e De fe n d an t s aid, “[M] e and y ou both are survivors. We’re g onna make it one way or another . You know. I f we have to do it tog ether , that’s gre at. That’s the way I ’d like it. I f we have to do it apart, hell, that ain’t no ha ir off my ass.”-12-

Det. Cooper did not se e the Def endant ag ain until severa l day s later, on F ebrua ry 16. On that da y , th e De fe nd a nt a ndDe t. C oo pe r w e re in the mo tel roo m wi th ano the r m a n n a me d Jay L e wi s. Mr. L ewis was in f

act a confide ntial inf

ormant working for Det. Cooper. While the thre e men we re toge ther, Co o p er p aid $2,000 in cash to Mr. L ewis in the De fenda nt’s prese nce. D et. Cooper testified that he did this in order to “lea ve an impression [t ]hat may be L ewis had done something for [hi m] and, and [he] was paying him.” Coope r did not tape re cord this transa ction.

The De fenda nt and Det. Cooper wer e ag ain in the motel room tog ether on the nig ht of Fe bruary 17. Although D et. Cooper wa s “wire d,” he ha d not turned the rec order on. Det. Cooper testified that, during his “g ener al” c onversation with th e De fendant, “[h] e just out of the blue, he turns around to me a nd said, ‘I killed the g oddamn bitch.’” At this point , Det. Cooper turned on the

rec order

.
The De fenda nt is then recor ded stating , “I wasted tha t goddamn bitch. And it wa dn’t for no f_ _king thousand.” The Def endant t o ld Det. Cooper that he hadn’t a dmitted the killi ng befor e beca use he ha d been sc are d and told Cooper that he was the only person he had admitted it to. The Def endant sa id, “I t’s been in the ba ck of my mi n d s i nce the night it happe ned. Te n thirty seven.” The De fenda nt said that he’d be en at the club with the victim that nig ht, “and she decide d she wa nted to leave a nd I

left with her, me t her out in the par king lot, and wasted her a ss and dumped her out in Eastg ate. Par

ked her car back here at the B eac h Club, got in my damn van a nd drove of

f.” The Def endant c laimed to have be en paid $3,500 to c ommit the killing. The De fenda nt also stated that he took the murde r we apon apa rt and thre w the piec es i n “four or five dif

fer ent river s.” The D e f e n d a n tw a s arr e s t e d f

o r t h e v i c t i m ’ s m u r d e r

t h e n e x td a y.

Dr . M ur ray Wilto n Smith te sti fi e d on be ha lf of the De fe nd a nt as a ph y sic ia n s pe c ia lizin g in the pra ctice of

addiction medicine. Dr. S mith revie wed numerous medical and other recor ds of the Def endant’ s history

and conduc ted a c linical interview w ith the D efe ndant. Dr. Smit h also revie wed the taped c onversations between the Def endant and Det. C ooper. As a re sult of this i nvestig ation, Dr . Sm ith op ine d th a t th e De fe nd a nt “ meets a ll the c ri te ri a fo r c hr on ic a lc oh oli sm. ” Dr . Sm ith testified that his review indicated that the Def endant “was a daily heavy drinker.” As an a lcoholic, Dr . Sm ith state d th a t th e De fe nd a nt “ wo uldsa y a nythi ng , d o a nythi ng , w hate ve r i t ta ke s to ob ta in his alcohol is what he would do, be cause it’s the most im portant thing in his li fe.”
Dr. Smith was of the opinion that Det. Cooper “cle arly co erced” the Def endant’ s incriminating statements. Dr. Smith ex plained:

[Det. Cooper] threatene d to remove the most im portant thing that [t he Def endant] had in his life: an easy supply of l iquor, a plac e to live wher e he didn’ t ha ve a ny bo dy loo kin g ov e r his sh ou lde r andsa y ing no , I do n’ t w a nt y ou do ing that,
a nda fr e e pla c e to liv e

. Th a t, that’ s a pre tty big thr e a t. F or a n alc oh oli c , it’ s a big threa t.-13-

Dr. Smith stated that, “for the alcoholic . .

. the threa t of losing the a lcohol to them is li ke a thr eat of death.”

Dr . K e ith Al le n Ca

ru so a lso te sti fi e d o n b e ha lf of the De fe nd a nt a s a n e xpe rt in f or e ns ic psy chiatry . Dr. Car

u s o i n t er v i ew ed the Def

endant on f

our occ asions for a

total of about nine a nd

on e -h a lf ho ur s. Dr . Ca

ru so a lso lis te ne d to the tape d c on ve rs a tio ns be tw e e n th e De fe nd a nt andDe t. Coo pe r. Dr . Ca

ru so a dd iti on a lly

re vie we d n umero us oth e r r e c or ds a ndre po rt s. Dr . Ca ru so conclude d that, in his medical opinion, the Defe ndant suffe red f rom “a lcohol depende nce, poly substance a

buse, [and] nar cissistic pe rsonality disorder with antisocial features.” A s a re sult of the se c on dit ion s, the De fe nd a nt is, a c c or din g to Dr

. Caru so , “ pr e dis po se d to m ake fa lse state me nts , but also predisposed to make an invol untary statement.” Dr. Caruso stated further that “ther e wa s
a deg ree of, of c oerc ion or induceme nt in that [ the Def endant] felt that this lifesty le [being pr ovided by De t. Coo pe r] wa s g oin g to be c ut o ff , th a t he wa s g oin g to b e re pla c e d b y Jay L e wi s, ” a ndthat,
wer e he to c onfess to murdering the victim, “there seeme d to be induceme nts of future bounty and being able to continue this lifesty le or e ven improve upon this lifesty le.”

On cr oss-examination, Dr. Caruso acknowle dg ed that the De fenda nt’s I .Q. was “ better tha n
aver ag e” a nd that he was, at l east in part, using De t. Cooper as a “pig g y -bank” and could ha ve bee n ly ing to the unde rcove r off icer

. He also acknow ledg ed that the Defenda nt could have been te lling the truthto D e t. C oo pe r b e c a us e the De fe nd a nt t ru ste d h im a ndvie we d th e re la tio ns hip a s a partne rship.

Be rtha McCormick, th e Def endant’ s mother, testified that, af ter he was re lease d from the Geor g ia prison on par ole, the De fenda nt came to live with her and her husband. She stated that the Def endant ha d had an a lcohol problem since a g e fourteen a nd that, while he wa s living wit h them wh ile on pa

ro le , h e dr a nk “ a ll the tim e .” Ms. Mc Cormic k e xpla ine d th a t sh e de ve lop e d a frie nd sh ip wi th the De fe nd a nt’ s p aro le of fi c e r, De bb ie Simp so n. She tho ug ht that Ms. Simps on wa nte d to he lp the Def endant overc ome his drinking pr oblem. Ms. McCormick testified that Ms. Simpson t old her that “the only

way he’d e ver g et help wa s that [she] would put him out on his own, t hat t here was -- he ’dne ve r b e a ny bet ter if [she ] did n’ t pu t hi m ou t on his ow n. ” Ms. Mc Cormic k f oll ow e d th is advice and told the Def

endant that he would have to move out. As far as she kne w, the De fenda nt left her house and move d in with Det. Cooper (w hom she knew only as Eddie Cooper ).

Ms. McCormick did not know how much m oney the Defenda nt was making at the time, but he did not pay

her a ny rent an d s h e p ai d fo r his food while he was living with her. She acknow ledg ed that the De fenda nt had bee n employ ed while on pa role.
Prior to trial, the Def

endant moved to suppress the statements he ma de to Det. Dudle y afte r stating that he wanted a lawy er. H e also moved to suppre ss the statements he madeto Det. Cooper. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted bot h of the De fenda nt’s motions. The State now

app e a ls.-14- STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

Ou r su pr e me c ou rt ha s se t fo rth ou r sta nd ard of re vie w f or mot ion s to su pp re ss a s f

oll ow s:
Questions of cr edi b i l i t y o f the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and resolution of conflicts in the evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judge as the trier

of fa ct. The pa

rty pre v ai l i n g i n the trial court is entitl ed to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a dd uc e d at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng a s w e ll

a s a ll r e a so na

ble a ndle g iti ma te inf

e re nc e s that ma y be dr a wn fr om that e vid e nc e . So lon g a s th e g re a te r w e ig ht o f the e vid e nc e su pp orts the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s, tho se finding s shall be upheld. I n other wor ds, a trial court’s finding s of fa ct in a suppression hea

ring will be upheld unless the evide nce pr eponder ates other wise.
State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Howeve r, the trial court’ s application of law to the fac ts is a question of law which this C ourt revie ws de novo. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000)

.

AN AL YSI S I. Statem ents to De tec tive Dudley

The De fenda nt moved to suppress all of the statements he made to Det. Dudley subsequent to h is r e qu e st f

or a la wy e r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

su sta ine d th e De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n, fi nd ing a s f oll ow s:

. . . when De tective Dudle y s t arted talking w ith the [ D]efenda nt about a poly g raph examination and taking va rious samples of items from the [D]efenda nt, the [D]e fe nd a nt c le arl y in di cat e d s e ve ra l ti me s th a t he fe lt this wa s a lit tle ou tsi de his

are a of kn ow le dg e a ndthat he wa nte d a la wy e r. Th e [D]e fe nd a nt c on tin ue d to state that he wa nted a law y er u n t il the tape ende d. When the tape r estarte d, the [D] efe ndant was c onsenting to various things w ithout any further men t i o n or explanation of why

a lawy er w ould not be neede d.

. . . After

car efully r e v iewing the evidenc e, this court holds that the [D] efe ndant’s reque sts for an attorney

wer e unambig uous and that questioning should have c ease d. Th e re fo re , th e [D]e fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n is GR AN TE D i n th a t a ll s ta tem ents ma de to Detec tive Dudley

on 2/22/85 after the first reque st for an attorney are suppressed.

I n a footnote, the court a dded:

Even i f t h i s court had f ound that the [D] efe ndant’s initial reque st was ambig uous, the rema ining portion of the i nterview establishes that the [D]efendant continued to re quest an a ttorney . The off icer stated that he f

elt the initial re quest was
a mbi g uo us a ndthat is wh y he fo llo we d u p w ith fu rthe r q ue sti on s a bo ut the re qu e st.A r t i cl e one , s ect i on ni ne of t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on provi des , i n per t i nen t par t , t ha t “in al l cr i mi nal 2

p ro se c u tio n s, the a c c u se d

. . . sha ll n o t b e c o m p e lled to giv e e v id e n c e a g a ins t him se lf. ”

T h e F ift h A m e n d m e n t t o the U n ites S ta te s C o n stitutio n p ro v id e s, in p e rtine n t p a rt, tha t “N o p e rs o n

. . . sha ll 3
b e c o m p e lled in a n y c rim ina l ca se to b e a w itne ss a g a ins t him se lf. ”
-15- Th e [D]e fe nd a nt, ho we ve r, c on tin ue d to state that he wa nte d a la wy e r. I t w a s o nly afte r the tape went off

and ca me bac k on that a lawy er wa s n o l ong er me ntioned. Th is c ou rt

fi nd s th is t o b e hig hly

su sp e c t a ndfi nd s th e of

fi c e r’ s t est im ony

on thi s
ma tte r i ns uf

fi c ie nt.
(empha sis added).

The State now a

rg ues on appeal t h at t h e trial court err ed in suppressing any portion of the De fe nd a nt’ s st a te me nts to D e t. Du dle y

. Th e Sta te c on te nd s that the De fe nd a nt wa s n ot i nv oking his rig ht t o have c ounsel prese nt during any further interrog ation, but was instead mer ely “re questing to consult with an attorney about his consent to the collec tion of phy sical evide nce and the taking of a po ly g ra ph e xami na tio n. ” As su c h, the Sta te arg ue s th a t D e t. D ud le y wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to c e a se questioning the Def

endant a bout the murder. We r espec tfully disag ree

.
I n Edwar ds v. Arizona, 4 5 1 U.S. 477 (1981), the United States Supre me Court held that police off icer s must im mediately cea se questioni ng a suspect once the suspect clearly asserts his or her right to have counsel pre sent during custodial interrog ation. See id. at 484-85. The suspect’ s reque st for an attorney

during any

further questioning must be articulated “sufficiently clea rly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement t o be a reque st for

a n a tto rn e y .” Da vis v. Un ite d Stat e s, 51 2 U.S. 45 2, 45 9 ( 19 94 ). I f the a c c us e d’ s st a te me nt f a ils to meet the r equisite level of c larity , the offic ers a re not re quired to stop the interrog ation. See id.
Our supre me court ha s held that “[t] he standa rd for a valid invocation of the rig ht to counsel is the same under

both Article I , Section 9 [of the Tenne ssee Constit ution ] and the Fif th Amendment 2 [t o the United States Constitut ion ].” St ate v. Say lor, 117 S.W .3d 239, 246 (Tenn. 2003). Whether 3 a suspec t makes an e quivocal or an unequivoca l reque st for an attorney is a question of fa ct. See State v. Fa

rmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 594 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 1996). And, a s set forth above , “a trial court’s f indings of f

act in a suppr ession hearing w ill be upheld unless the evidenc e pre ponderates oth e rw ise .” Od om, 92 8 S. W.2 d a t 23

. He re , th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t “ the [D]e fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e sts for a n attorney

wer e unambig uous . . . .”

The e v id e n c e b e f

o r e u s d o e s n o t p r e p o n d e r a te a g a in s t th e tria l c o u r t’ s f in d in g tha t the D e f e n d a n t m a d e a n u n e q u i v o c a l r e q u e s t f o r a l a w ye r

d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e rr o g a t i o n b y D e t

. D u d l e y. Our re view of the detec tive’s custodial interview of the Def endant indicates that, afte r De t. Dudley initially revie wed with the Def endant the form by which the Def endant could consent to t he

c oll e c tio n o f e vid e nc e , th e De fe nd a nt s ta te d, “ I ’dbe wi lli ng to do it, I ’dlik e to h a ve a la wy e r at th is point.” (Emphasis added.) When D et. Dudley then asks if the Def endant wants to consult with an attorney or “go ahea d and work with us,” t he Defenda nt reiter ates, “I ’ll do any thing, but I still think-16-

I , y ou know, like to have a lawy er wi t h m e, and I ’ll be g lad to do that.” (Empha sis added.) The Def endant is cle arly and unambigously reque sting the prese nce of a lawy er before he coope rate s any fu rthe r i n the inv e sti g a tio n: wh ic h in c lud e s th e c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n th e n b e ing c on du c te d b y De t. Dudley . At that point, the interrog ation should h av e ce as ed

. Be cause it did not, t he trial c ourt
c or re c tly su pp re sse d a ll of the De fe nd a nt’ s state me nts to De t. Du dle y ma de su bs e qu e nt t o h is r e qu e st fo r a la wy e r. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Statem ents to De tec tive Cooper

Th e De fe nd a nt m ov e d to su pp re ss h is s ta te me nts to D e t. C oo pe r on th e grounds tha t hi s invocation of his rig ht to counsel during his inte rr o g ation by Det. Dudley

rema ined in eff

ect a nd binding upon Cooper ; that the tape r ecor dings ma de by Cooper during certain conver sations betwee n Cooper and the Def

endant violated the Def

endant’ s Fourth Amendment rights; that the Def endant’ s statements to Det. C ooper were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); that the Def

endant’ s statements to Det. C ooper constituted an involuntary confe ssion; and that the Def endant’ s statements to Det. C ooper w ere elicited in such a manner as to violate the De fenda nt’s due proc ess rig hts. The trial court denied the Def endant’ s claims that Det. Cooper’s actions violated his Fourth A m en d m ent rights and further de nied his claim that Det. Cooper violated his Miranda rig hts. Howeve r, the trial c ourt g rante d the Defenda nt’s motion on the basis that law enf orce ment’s conduct during the u n derc over ope ration constituted coe rcive misconduct violative of the Def endant’ s due proc ess rig h t s , wh ich re sulted in an involuntary , and ther efor e inadmissible,

c on fe ssi on . T he Sta te no w co nte nd s tha t the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in gr a nti ng the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to
su pp re ss.

As ac knowledg ed by

the Supreme Court in Dicker son v. United S tates, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the c ou rt s o f this na tio n h a ve lon g re c og nize d th a t “ c oe rc e d c on fe ssion s are inh e re ntl y
un trus tw orthy .” I d. a t 433. Th e fe de ra l con sti tut ion pr ov ide s two ba se s f or the re qu ir e me nt tha t a confe ssion be voluntary in or der to be admissible at trial: the Fifth Ame ndment rig ht ag ainst selfinc ri min a tio n a ndthe Du e Pr oc e ss C laus e of the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt. Se e id. Un de r the F if th Amendment, to be a dmissibl e a c onfession must be “f ree and volu n t ar y ; that is, [ it] must not be extracted by

any sort of threa ts or violence, nor obtained by any direc t or implied pr omises, however slight, nor by

the ex ertion of any

improper influe nce.” Br am v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). Due proce ss jurisprudence determines the voluntariness of a confe ssion by

examining whether the acc used’s will was overborne by the circ umstances surr ounding his or he r conf ession. Se e Di cker son, 53 0 U .S. a t 43 4. “ Th e du e pr oc e ss t e st t ake s in to c on sid e ratio n ‘ the tot a lit y of a ll the surroun d i n g ci rc umstances - - both the cha rac teristics of the a ccuse d and the de tails of the interrog ation.’” I d. (quoting Schneckloth v. B ustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
The Supreme Court expl ained the r epug nance of involuntary confe ssions in R og ers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961):

Our de cisions under [the Fourteenth] Am endment have made c lear that convictions following the admission int o evidence of c onfessions which a re-17-

involuntary , i.e., the produc t of coe rcion, e ither phy sical or psy cholog ical, cannot stand. This is so not because such c onfessions ar e unlikely to be true but be cause the methods used to extract them offe nd an under ly ing principle in the enf orce ment of

our criminal law: that ours is an ac cusatoria l and not an inquisitorial sy stem -- a sy ste m in wh ic h th e Sta te mus t e sta bli sh g uil t by

e vid e nc e ind e pe nd e ntl y

a ndfr e e ly

secur ed and may not by coer cion prove its char g e against an acc used out of his own mouth.

I d. at 540-41. Thus,

The a ttention of the trial judg e should [be] focused, for pur poses of the F eder al Constit ution, on the question whether the behavior of the S t at e’ s l aw e nforc ement officia ls was such a s to overbea r [the acc used’s] w i l l t o resist and bring about confe ssions not freely

self-de termined . . . .

I d. a t 54 4. Sig nif

ic a ntl y , “ c oe rc ive po lic e a c tiv ity is a ne c e ssary

pr e dic a te to the fi nd ing that a
c on fe ssi on is n ot ‘ vo lun tary ’ w ith in the me a nin g of the Du e P roc e ss C laus e of the F ou rt e e nth Amendment.” Colora do v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
Criminal suspects in Tennessee are g rante d even gr eate r protection than that aff orded unde r the Fe dera l Consti tution: “The test of voluntariness f or conf essi o n s u n d er Article I , § 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution i s broade r and more protec tive of individual rig hts than the test of

v o l u n t ar i n e s s u n d e r

t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t

. ” S t a t e v

. S m i t h , 9 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 0 , 4 5 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 )

. “ In Tenne ssee, the pa

rticular c ircumstance s of ea ch ca se must be examined as a w hole. A def endant’ s subjective pe rce ption alone is not sufficie n t t o j u s t ify a conc lusion of involuntariness in the

c on sti tut ion a l se ns e . Rathe r, ‘c oe rc ive po lic e a c tiv ity is a ne c e ssa ry pr e dic a te to f

in din g that a confe ssion is not voluntary

. . . .’” I d. (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W .2d 75, 79 (Tenn. 1994)). Our supreme court continued: “The critica l que stion is whether the behavior of the state’s la w enf

orce ment officia ls was such as to ove rbea r [t he acc used’s] will to resist and bring about conf

essions not free ly

self-de termined.” I d. (quotation marks omi tted). That i s, “[t] o rende r a subseque nt statement involuntary , the tactics of the state actor must be so coer cive a s to overbea r the de fe nd a nt’ s w ill .” I d. a t 45 6. Th us , a s thi s Cou rt ha s pr e vio us ly re c og nize d, “ ‘A c on fe ssi on is inv olu nta ry on ly if the re is (1 ) po lic e c oe rc ion or ov e rr e a c hin g wh ic h (2 ) ov e rb or e the a c c us e d’ s w ill and (3) cause d the confe ssion.’” State v. Ann Marie Thornton Kelly , No. M2001-01054-CCA-R3- CD, 2002 WL

31730874, at *15 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nasvhill e, De c. 5, 2002) (quoting Hill v. Ander son, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002))

.
The trial c ourt determined that t h e u n d erc over ope ration involving the Def endant wa s
coer cive a nd that the Def

endant’ s confe ssion to Det. Cooper was involuntary . I n so doing, the trial

c ou rt re lie d o n th e Sup re me Cou rt ’s opin ion in A ri zon a v. F ulm inante , 4 99 U. S. 2 79 (1 99 1) , in

rea ch in g it s c o n c lu s io n th a t th e D e f e n d a n t’ s c o n f

e s s io n h a d b e e n c o e r c e d

. I n F u lm in a n te , the defe ndant was inc arc erated in fede ral prison. The Supreme Court describe d the Def endant a s possessing low a vera g e to ave rag e intellige nce; a drop-out in the fourth gr ade; a nd short and slig ht-18-

in build. During a

previous incarce ration, he had felt threa tened by the ot her inmates and re quested pr ote c tiv e c us tod y

. On c e the re , he ha d b e e n u na ble to c op e wi th the iso la tio n a ndwa s a dmi tte d to a psy chiatric hospital.

Th e de fe nd a nt w a s b e friende d in pris on by a ma n n a me d Sa

ri vo la wh o w a s w or

kin g a s a
c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt. Sari vo la be c a me a wa

re of a priso n r umo r tha t the de fe nd a nt ha d kil le d h is stepdaught er

. Sarivola beg an questioning the def endant a bout the murder. T he def endant de nied inv olv e me nt; Sari vo la ’s su pe ri or s in str uc te d h im t o c on tin ue pr e ssi ng the de fe nd a nt.

Sari vo la app ro a c he d th e de fe nd a nt and tol d him that he kn e w the de fe nd a nt w a s st art ing to g et some “toug h trea tment” from the ot her inmates beca use of the rumor. Sarivola offe red to prote ct the defe ndant, but only

if the def endant told him about the murder . The de fenda nt then confe ssed to having killed his stepdaug hter. Prosec ution by the State of Arizona ensued, re sulting in the defe ndant’s convic tion. The Arizona Supreme C o u rt subsequently found the de fenda nt’s confe ssion to Sarivola to have been the product of coer cion and ruled it should theref ore ha ve bee n suppressed. Th e Arizon a

Sup re me Cou rt

state d: “ ‘[T ]he c on fe ssi on wa s o btaine d a s a dir e c t r e su lt o f e xtre me
c oe rc ion a ndwa s te nd e re d in the be lie f that th e de fe nd a nt’ s li fe wa s in je op ard y if he didno t c on fe ss. This is a true coer ced confe ssion in every sense of the word.’” 499 U.S. at 286 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 262, 778 P .2d 602, 627 (1988))

. The Supreme Court ag ree d:

Al tho ug h the qu e sti on is a c los e on e , we a g re e wi th the Ari z on a S upre me Cou rt ’s c on c lus i o nth at

Fulm inante ’s c on fe ssi on wa s c oe rc e d. Th e Arizon a Sup re me Court found a c redible thre at of phy sical violence unless Fulminante confesse d. Our

case s have made clea

r that a finding of coer cion need not de p en d u p o n actua l violence by

a g overnme nt ag ent; a cr edible thre at is sufficient. As w e h av e said, “coe rcion c an be me ntal as we ll as phy sical, and . . . the blood of the ac cused is not the only hallmark of a n unconstitutional inqui sition.” As in Pay ne v. Ar kansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), whe re the Court found that a confe ssion wa s coer ced be cause the interrog ating police off

icer had promised that if the acc used conf essed, the of

fice r would protec t the ac cused f rom an a ng ry

mob outside the jailhouse door, so too here , the Arizona Supreme Court f ound that it was fea

r of phy sic al vi olence , absent protec tion from h i s friend ( and Gove rnment ag ent) Sarivola, w hich motivated F ulm ina nte to c on fe ss. Ac c e pting th e Arizon a c ou rt ’s fi nd ing , p e rm iss ibl e on thi s
re c or d, that th e re wa s a

c re dib le thr e a t of

ph y sic a l vi ole nc e , w e a g re e wi th i ts
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t F u l m i n a n t e ’ s w i l l w a s o v e r b o r n e i n s u c h a w a y a s t o r e nd e r h is confe ssion the product of c oerc ion.
499 U.S. at 287-288 (f

ootnotes omitt ed) ( citations omitt ed).T h e D ef en dan t ’ s s t at eme n t s t o D r s

. Smi t h a n d Car u s o, i f r el i ed u pon t o pr ov e t h e t r u t h of t h e mat t er s a s s er t ed, 4

wer e h ear s ay

. See T enn

. R. E vi d. 8 01 ( c)

. T enn es s ee R ul e of E vi dence 803 ( 4) pr ovi des for t he adm i s s i bi l i t y of he ar s ay
s t at eme n t s r en der ed f or pu r pos es of m edi ca l di ag n os i s an d t r ea t men t

. Se e T en n

. R

. E v i d. 803(4) ; St at e v

. M cL eod, 937 S .W .2d 8 6 7 , 8 7 3 (T en n. 1 9 9 6 ) (ho l d i ng t ha t st atem en t s m ad e f o r t he p urp o se of m ed i ca l ev alua t i o n, as o p p o sed t o t ho se made for me di ca l t r ea t men t , a r e n ot a dmi s s i bl e pu r s u an t t o T en n es s ee Rul e of Evi den ce 803( 4) )

. T h e s t at eme n t s ma de by t he D ef

endan t t o D r s

. Smi t h a nd Caru s o wer e n ot made f or t he pur po s e of hi s ob t ai ni ng med i cal t r eat ment , but r at her fo r e v a lua tio n s. A lso , o u r c o u rts h a v e g e n e ra lly h e ld th a t th e R u le 8 0 3 (4 ) e x c e p tio n a p p lies o n ly wh e n the sta te m e n ts

(c o n tinu e d ...)
-19- With the se pr e c e de nts in m ind , w e turn n ow to the t ri al cou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c ts a ndits

re su lti ng de te rm inatio n th a t th e a c tio ns of De t. C oo pe r andhis c oh orts co e rc e d the De fe nd a nt i nto g iving a n involuntary , and ther efor e inadmissible, confe ssion to murdering the victim.

I nitially , the trial court found that “[t] he evide nce w as undisputed that at the time of the underc over ope ration De tective Cooper paid all of the [D]efend ant’s li ving e x penses a nd paid for

so me me a ls a nda lc oh ol w he n th e y we nt o ut. ” Whil e the re c or d d oe s supp ort th e fi nd ing that D e t. Cooper paid f

or some mea ls and alcohol whic h he consumed with the Def endant, it does not support the finding that Det. Cooper paid for “a ll” of the de fe n d an t ’s l i v i ng expenses. The unde rcove r operation beg an on January 21, 1987. Det. Cooper did n o t rent the motel suit e until Febr uary 2, 1987, twelve day s later. Whil e the rec ord indicates that Det. Cooper paid all of the re nt for this suite, and paid f or some of the Def

endant’ s meals and bever ag es, there is no proof that he paid for a ny of the De fe nd a nt’ s o the r l ivi ng e xpe ns e s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso pu t mu c h e mph a sis on the fa c t th a t D e t. Coo pe r p a id the De fe nd a nt at le a st $40 0 for the “ sto le n” c ar tr a ns a c tio ns . How e ve r, the re c or d a lso contains proof

that the Def

endant wa s g ainfully

employ ed during the underc over ope ration. Ther e is no proof in the re cord a bo u t t h e amount of money the Def endant e arne d from his employ ment during this ti me, or how he spent it, other than that the Def endant br oug ht alcohol into the premises he shar ed with Det. Cooper . We also note that, during the latter pa rt of January , the Def

endant took a f iv e

- d a y trip to M ia mi

. T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e f le c t h o w th is trip w a s f

u n d e d , b u t it is clear that Det. Cooper did not ac company the Def endan t there . We further note as sig nificant that the underc over operation laste d a total of twenty -eig ht day s, with the Defe ndant being arr ested on Day 2 9

. D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , t h e D e f e n d a n th a d c o n t a c tw i t h D e t

. C o o p e r o n o n l y f o u r t e e n o f

t h e t w e n t yeig ht day s. Be tween the renta l of the motel suite on Febr uary 2 and the De fenda nt’s arr est, there was
no c on ta c t be tw e e n th e tw o me n du ri ng se ve n o f s ixte e n d a y s. Th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t the trial court’s finding that the Def endant wa s financia lly

depende nt upon Det. Cooper.

Th e t ri al court also found that the De fenda nt “fe are d being repla ced by ” the c onfidential informant Jay

L ewis, an d that the Def endant “ believed that if he did not tell Cooper he ha d committed the murder, that his acce ss to alcohol would be shut off.” Sig nificantly , the Def endant did not testify

at the suppre ssion hearing . Rather, the trial court’s f i n d i n gs of these “ fac ts” wer e appar ently

based solely

on the diagno s t i c his tories collec ted by Drs. Smith and Caruso, who g ave the ir op ini on s o f the De fe nd a nt’ s psy c ho log ic a l mak e up ba se d, in part , on w hat th e De fe nd a nt t old them. I g noring the hea

rsay implicit in these opinions, we note that Dr. Caruso also testified that the 4(

. . . con t i n u ed) 4

r el at e t o a medi cal or phy s i cal problem . See, e. g. , St at e v

. B ar one, 852 S. W

. 2d 216 , 220 ( T enn

. 199 3) ( hol di ng t hat st at em ent s ad m i ss i b l e p urs uant t o T enness ee R ul e o f E vi d ence 8 0 3 (4) are l i m i t ed t o t ho se conce rni n g phys i cal co nd i t i o ns
as d i st i ngui shed f

rom m ent al o r p sy cho l o gi cal i njuri es)

. Fo r t hese reasons, t he st at em ent s gi ven b y t he D efend ant t o t he p h ysic ia n s in th is c a se w e re no t ad m issib le to sh o w the tru th o f t h e m a tter s a sse rte d

. -20- Def end an t has a “ persona litydisorder c ommonlyassociate d with boasting, e x ag g eration,

ma nip ulatio n a ndde c e itf

uln e ss. ” Ob vio us ly , a nythi ng the De fe nd a nt tol d th ese doc tor s a bo ut h is subjective re actions to Det. Cooper is highly suspect. We re cog nize, of course , that the trial court
ma de a sp e c if

ic fi nd ing abo ut the hig h c re dib ili ty of the se tw o p hy sic ia ns . We do no t se c on d- g ue ss the trial court’s finding s of thei r cr ed i b i l ity or their since rity . Neve rtheless, their opinions we re larg ely informed by

the same information available to this Court: the rec orded c onversations betwee n the Defenda nt and C ooper. Although the experts (and the tria l court) r epeatedly ref err ed to Coope r’s “thre ats” to e nd the rela tionship, the rec ord of the transcripts of the co n v ersations betwee n Cooper and the Def endant doe s not support a finding of this “misconduct” by the detec tive. The re cord contains statements by the Def endant that be lie the experts’ finding s. After the “f ake”

arr est in the bar by

Det. Dudley

on Fe bruary

9, which trig g ere d the first di s cu s s i o n b etwee n the Def endant a nd Cooper about the vic tim’s murder, the De fenda nt volunteere d to abandon the Knoxvi lle “job” a nd further volunteere d to make himself sca rce so that Cooper would not be see n with him. The Defenda nt repe ated his offe r t o leave a few day s later. The recor d certainly does not

su pp ort th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion that th e De fe nd a nt w a s “ a fr a id” of los ing his re la tio ns hip wi th Cooper.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

su mme d u p it s f

ind ing s a ndc on c lus ion s a s f oll ow s:

Th is c ou rt

fi nd s th a t th e po lic e c on sp ir ed wi th th e Ge or g ia pa ro le of fi c e to p l ac e t h e k n o wn al co h o l i c [ D] ef en d an t i n a m an i p u l at i v e l i v i n g s i t u at i o n

. Al t h o u gh the environme nt was non-violent in nature, the police cle arly and intentionally

place d the [D] efe n d ant in a psy cholog ically coer cive e nvironment. I nstead of he lping the [D] efe ndant with h i s alcohol problem, the pa role off icer and the Te nnessee authorities moved th e [ D]efenda nt into a situation where he was de pendent on underc over of

fice r Cooper f

or his place to live and his acc ess to funds for c ontinuous alcohol consumption. The police knew the [D]efenda nt was an a l co h o l i c with an

a lr e a d y e s t ab l i s h e d h i s t o r y o f t e l l i n g u n tru e s t o r i e s t o m ak e h i m s e l f s e e m b e tte r t o those around him. The experts very cre dibly testified re g ardi n g the circ umstances and how they

wer e i n terpre ted by

the [D] efe ndant, as a n alcoholic. The persistent pu sh ing by

De te c tiv e Coo pe r f

or the [D]e fe nd a nt t o “ tel l the t ru th” abo ut h is involvement in the murder and that Cooper would fee l be tter if the [D] efe ndant had done the murde r we re me ant to and did over bear the [D] efe ndant’s will. The alcoholic [D] efe ndant believed that if he did not tell Coope r he had committe d t he murder, that his a cc ess to alcohol would be shut off . This court ag ree s with Dr. Smit h that such a threa t is the equivalent to a threat to life for a non-a lcoholic. The [D]e fe nd a nt h a d co ns ist e ntl y de nie d a ny

inv olv e me nt u nti l th e a uth oriti e s ma de him depende nt upon them for his alcohol. Under all these circumstance s, it is clear that-21-

the cr ucial motivating f

actor behind the [D]efendant’s st atements we re the police misconduct in question.
(footnotes omitted). W ith respe ct t o the s pecif ic findi ng that “[t] he per sistent pushing by Detec tive Cooper for

the [D] efe ndant t o ‘tell the truth’ about his involvement in the murder and that Cooper would fee l better if the [D]efenda nt had done the mur der w ere mean t t o an d did overbe ar the [D] efe ndant’s will,” we simply do not f ind suf ficient support in the rec ord for this c onclusion. The tape r ecor ding of the conversation between C ooper a nd the Def endant on F ebrua

ry 17 indicates that the Def endant f elt g uiltyabout not telling Cooper earlier about the murde r, not that he told Cooper in or der to sta y in Coope r’s g ood g rac es. The Def endant also told Cooper that he had not c onfesse d

e arl ie r b e c a us e he ha d b e e n “ sc are d. ” Th e imp lic a tio n of the se state me nts is that th e De fe nd a nt t old Cooper that he ha d killed the victim because he had come to tr ust Cooper

and value d him as a friend, not because he w as af

raid of losing a f

re e ride. Similarly , the trial court’s conclusion that “the alcoholic De fenda nt believed that if he did not tell C ooper tha t he had committed the murder, that his acc ess to alcohol would be shut off,” is not supported by the rec ord. As rec og nized by one of our fe de ra l c ou rt s,

Tricke ry , dece it, even impersonation do not render a confe ssion inadmi s s ible , c e rt a inl y in n on c us tod ia l si tu atio ns a ndus ua lly in c us tod ia l on e s a s w e ll, un le ss g ov e r n me n t a g e n ts ma

k e th r e a ts o r p r o mi s e s

. . . . N o th in g is mo r e c o mm o n in the

no nc us tod ia l se tti ng of po lic e inv e sti g a tio ns than f or a n u nd e rc ov e r p oli c e of

fi c e r t o extract a da mag ing a dmission from a criminal s u s p ec t simpl y by prete nding to be another criminal. The a dmissio n is useable in evide nce a g ainst the suspect e ven though he would never

have spilled the be ans to the of fi ce r h ad he known the office r’s status.
United States v. Kontny , 238 F.3d 815, 817 ( 7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

Th e tr ia l cou rt acce pte d D r. Smith’ s th e ory that th e De fe nd a nt v ie we d th e los s o f h is

re la tio ns hip wi th C oo pe r a s a thr e a t of de a th, he nc e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s re lia nc e on F ulm inante . T his theory was ba sed on the fac t of the Def endant’ s alcoholism and Cooper’s alleg ed threa ts to withdraw from his partne rship with the Def endant, ther eby

leaving the Def

endant without ac ce ss to the substance he (alleg edly ) so desper ately cra ved. Howe ver, the Def endant ha d been ma nag ing w ithout Cooper prior to January 21 and manag ed without Cooper for fully half of the time of the unde rcove r operation. Moreover , it was t h e Defenda nt who repe atedly offe red to withdra w from Cooper ’s prese nce and from the supposed contra ct hit in Knoxvill e. The rec ord simply does not support the

c on c lus ion that th e De fe nd a nt w a s d e pe nd e nt u po n Co op e r to the e xten t e nv isa g e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

. Rather, t h e record supports the conclusion that the De fenda nt is an opportunist who was manipulating Coope r as we ll a s being manipulated by him. Unlike the defe ndant in Fulminante, the De fe nd a nt i s n ot be low -a ve ra g e in int e lli g e nc e , no t a fo urth- g ra de dr op -o ut, a nd wa s no t su bje c t to be a tin g s b y

larg e r i nmate s f

ro m w ho m he c ou ld n ot e sc ape . T hat is , th e un de rc ov e r o pe ratio n in thi s
c a se didno t pl a c e the De fe nd a nt i n a situatio n w he re by , if

he didno t c on fe ss, he wo uldbe lik e ly to fac e phy sical harm. Fulminante is simplynot controlling of this case.-22-

We a g r e e w ith th e tria l c o u r t th a t th e Ch a tt a n o o g a p o li c e d e p ar tm e n t d e c e iv e d a nd manipulated the De fenda nt. Dece it and manipulation are , howeve r, the hallmarks of an unde rcove r op e ratio n. Whil e pe rh aps dis ta ste fu l, w e do no t a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt that th e po lic e c on du c t in this case a mounted to coer cion suffic ient to ov er b ear the Def endant’ s will. The evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding s in this reg ard. A ccor dingly , we r ever se that portion of the trial c ourt’s orde r suppre ssing the D efe ndant’s stateme nts to Det. Cooper.

CO NC LU SION

We affirm the trial court’ s suppression of the De fenda nt’s statements to Det. Dudley made subsequent to the De fenda nt’s reque st for a la wy er. We re verse the trial court’s suppr ession of the Def endant’ s statements to Det. Cooper. This matter is re m an d ed to the trial court f or further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE