J-A08002-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

FRED DENIG, JR., 

 Appellee 

 v.

501 GRANDVIEW, INC., A 

PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, AND 

501 GRANDVIEW ASSOCIATES, LP, A 

PENNSYLVANIA LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, 

 Appellants 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

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: No. 1081 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 6, 2013, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Civil Division, at No. G.D. 09-21205. 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and WECHT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014 

 501 Grandview, Inc. and 501 Grandview Associates, LP (collectively, 

“Grandview”) appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Fred Denig, Jr. 

(“Denig”) following a non-jury trial. We affirm. 

 Denig performed contract work as an architect for Grandview. 

Pursuant to a contract dated March 28, 2006, Denig provided drawings and 

supervisory services for the construction of a five-story, eleven-unit, 

condominium/apartment building for a flat fee of $150,000.00 (“the 

Project”). As the Project developed, Grandview requested that Denig 

prepare revisions, as well as additional drawings and plans. Denig 
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performed some of the additional work for which he was paid; he performed 

other portions of the additional work for which he was not paid. Eventually, 

Grandview and Denig ended their relationship. Grandview claimed the last 

day Denig furnished services under the contract was April 30, 2009. Denig 

maintained his last performance of contract work was a site visit on May 18, 

2009. Denig’s invoiced but unpaid fees totaled $17,710.00, including 

$9,000.00 for contract administration. 

Denig filed a mechanics’ lien on November 16, 2009. Mechanic[s’] 

Lien Claim, 11/16/09, at Exhibit C. Damages were based, in part, on two 

invoices: one dated March 31, 2009, for unpaid work totaling $8,710.00 

(Trial Exhibit 30), and one dated April 30, 2009, for contract administration 

services totaling $9,000.00 (Trial Exhibit 31). According to an AIA 

application certificate (Trial Exhibit 32), Denig approved payment by the 

bank and agreed that construction had reached 35% as of April 30, 2009. 

However, through testimony at trial, Denig claimed an additional $1,000.00 

for contract administration performed in April 2009 and disputed that the 

Project was only 35% complete as of April 30, 2009. Denig further testified 

that the Project was almost 50% complete at the time of his termination. 

Denig’s mechanics’ lien claim resulted in a verdict in his favor on 

March 18, 2013, for $17,710.00. Grandview filed post-trial motions, which 

the trial court denied. Order, 6/3/13. Judgment was entered on June 6, 
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2013. Grandview timely appealed. Both Grandview and the trial court 

subsequently complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 On appeal, Grandview presents the following issues for our 

consideration: 

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT [DENIG] HAD

COMPLETED 50% OF HIS CONTRACTED WORK? 

2. DID THE TRIAL [COURT] DISREGARD CLEAR LAW AND 

EVIDENCE THAT [DENIG] HAD FAILED TO MEET THE 

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT IN THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN THE PARTIES? 

Grandview’s Brief at 3.1

Initially, we note that the issues presented in Grandview’s appellate 

brief differ from those raised in its Rule 1925(b) statement. Upon 

examination of the various issues, however, we conclude that the questions 

presented on appeal are fairly subsumed in the third error raised in 

 

1

 According to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), “[t]he argument shall be divided into as 

many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head 

of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the 

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.” We note that Grandview’s Brief 

violates Rule 2119(a) in that it contains two questions but only one 

argument section. Nonetheless, because this violation does not hamper our 

review, we shall address Grandview’s issues. We also note, however, that 

Grandview attempts to argue in its brief that the trial court improperly 

awarded damages for extra work beyond the scope of the contract. We 

agree with Denig that Grandview has waived this issue by failing to include it 

in its Statement of Questions Involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No question 

will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved 

or is fairly suggested thereby.”).
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Grandview’s Rule 1925(b) statement. Because Grandview’s two questions 

presented are inter-related, we shall address them in tandem. 

Here, the trial court sat as the finder of fact. Appellate review in nonjury cases implicates the following general principles: 

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial 

verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the 

trial court are supported by competent evidence and 

whether the trial court committed error in any 

application of the law. The findings of fact of the 

trial judge must be given the same weight and effect 

on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict 

winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its 

findings of fact are not supported by competent 

evidence in the record or if its findings are premised

on an error of law. However, [where] the issue... 

concerns a question of law, our scope of review is 

plenary. 

The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal 

originating from a non-jury trial “are not binding on 

an appellate court because it is the appellate court’s 

duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied

the law to the facts” of the case.

Wyatt Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 976 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (quoting Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 568 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citations omitted)). 

In the case at hand, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to Denig, the verdict winner. Stratford v. Boland, 452 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 

Super. 1982) (citation omitted). Moreover, we will not disturb the trial 

court’s credibility determinations. See Atlantic LB, Inc. v. Vrbicek, 905 
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A.2d 552, 557 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (“Concerning questions 

of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial, we will not substitute 

our judgment for that of the finder of fact.”).

The genesis of this matter is Denig’s mechanics’ lien claim. The 

Mechanics’ Lien Law, 49 P.S. §§ 1101–1902 (the “Act”), allows a contractor 

to assert a lien “for the payment of all debts due by the owner to the 

contractor or by the contractor to any of his subcontractors for labor or 

materials furnished in the erection or construction, or the alteration or repair 

of the improvement.” 49 P.S. § 1301. The Act includes in its definition of 

contractor: “architects . . . who, by contract with the owner, express or 

implied, in addition to the preparation of drawings, specifications and 

contract documents also superintends or supervises any such erection, 

construction, alteration or repair.” 49 P.S. § 1201(4).

We have explained that: 

[t]he statutory basis for a mechanics’ lien expressly limits the 

lien to amounts owed for labor and materials only. The 

mechanics’ lien law is “intended to protect the prepayment labor 

and materials that a contractor invests in another’s property, by 

allowing the contractor to obtain a lien interest in the property 

involved.” Matternas v. Stehman, 434 Pa.Super. 255, 642 

A.2d 1120, 1124 (1994). 

A mechanics’ lien cannot be made the basis of recovery of

unliquidated damages for breach of contract. Alan Porter Lee, 

Inc. v. Du-Rite Products Co., 366 Pa. 548, 79 A.2d 218 

(1951). Moreover, a mechanic’s lien proceeding is not intended 

to settle the contractual obligations of the parties. Matternas, 

supra. See also TCI Const. Corp. v. Gangitano, 403 

Pa.Super. 621, 589 A.2d 1135, 1137 (1991) (housing and 
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feeding of employees, in addition to costs of equipment, labor 

and materials, were costs that were incurred solely for the 

particular project and were necessary for the work to go forward 

and were properly lienable in mechanics’ lien action; claim was 

not an attempt to recover unliquidated damages for breach of 

contract); Halowich v. Amminiti, 190 Pa.Super. 314, 154 A.2d 

406 (1959) (mechanics’ lien can be sustained only for work done 

or materials furnished and not for unliquidated damages for 

breach of contract). 

Instead, the mechanics’ lien law authorizes a special 

remedy in favor of a unique class of creditors and the liens are 

thus generally reviewed with a strict construction of the statute 

that created them. Sampson-Miller Assoc. Companies v. 

Landmark Realty Co., 224 Pa.Super. 25, 303 A.2d 43 (1973). 

Any questions of interpretation of the mechanics’ lien law should 

be resolved in favor of a strict, narrow construction. Denlinger 

v. Agresta, 714 A.2d 1048 (Pa.Super.1998). 

Artsmith Development Group, Inc. v. Updegraff, 868 A.2d 495, 496–

497 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Grandview challenges the award of contract administration fees 

totaling $10,000.00 to Denig. Grandview argues that 50% completion of the 

Project was a condition precedent to Denig receiving one-half of his contract 

administration fees. According to Grandview, because Denig submitted an 

application certificate for payment (Trial Exhibit 32) that indicated the 

Project was 35% complete as of April 30, 2009, he did not fulfill the 

condition precedent and, consequently, was not entitled to payment for 

contract administration. Grandview’s Brief at 13. Therefore, Grandview 

complains, the trial court erred in finding that Denig was entitled to contract 

administration fees of $10,000.00. Grandview’s Brief at 12. 
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In response, Denig argues that he completed contract administration 

services valued at $10,000.00, which he was entitled to receive from 

Grandview. Denig’s Brief at 6. Denig further contends that the contract 

administration provision refers to when Denig would bill for those fees; it 

was not a condition precedent to receipt of the contract administration fees. 

Id. at 7. 

The contract language regarding contract administration appears in 

the context of billing for fees: 

The fee for our services is One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars 

($115,000.). Prints will be billed separately at cost, however we 

will provide you with two sets of prints at each stage of the 

design work at no cost. Building permits and other inspect fees 

are not included in our fee. Fees are due within fourteen 

(14) days of invoice and will be billed as follows: 

 $8,000.00 initial payment 

 $25,000.00 for the design phase (architectural, and 

structural, basic MEP, with outline specifications) 

 $53,000.00 for the contract documents phase 

 $6,000.00 for the bidding/negotiation phase 

 $23,000.00 for contract administration, half at 

50% completion and half at completion of 

construction. 

Preliminary Objections, 12/17/09, at Exhibit F (emphasis supplied). 

Applying a strict, narrow construction of the Mechanics’ Lien Law, we 

disagree with Grandview that 50% completion of the Project was necessary 

for Denig to secure payment for contract administration he completed as of 
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May 18, 2009, through a mechanics’ lien. Denig’s mechanics’ lien was not 

intended to settle the contractual obligations of the parties, but to secure 

payment due from Grandview for contracted work that Denig completed. 

Furthermore, the trial court found, and the record supports, that adequate 

work had been performed to justify the $10,000.00 for contract 

administration services. 

The trial court addressed the topics of contract administration and 

completed work as follows: 

I concluded that at the time of [Denig’s] termination as the 

architect for the [P]roject, he had performed work under the 

written contract for which he had not been paid in the amount of 

$17,710.00. While the testimony and evidence on this issue is 

complicated and at times confusing, [Grandview] does not 

appear to be vigorously challenging this substantive contention. 

Rather, [Grandview] appears to challenge only whether an 

obligation to pay this amount had been triggered under the 

terms of the original contract, sufficient to support a mechanics’ 

lien claim at this time. [Grandview] relies upon terms and 

conditions in the written contract which indicated that certain 

lump sum payments are to be made to [Denig] upon the

completion of certain percentages of work within certain 

categories of work. For instance, with respect to [Denig’s] claim 

for payment for contract administration work the contract states 

that [Denig] shall be paid “$23,000.00 for contract 

administration, half at 50 percent completion and half at 

completion of construction.” [Grandview] offered into evidence 

documents including representations by [Denig] indicating that 

the [P]roject at or about the time of his termination was 

approximately 35 percent complete. These documents, 

however, do not constitute the entire universe of evidence with 

respect to the question of the percentage of completion of any 

particular category of work. [Denig] himself testified at trial that 

notwithstanding representations and documentation generated 

pursuant to the contract, he believed that adequate work had 
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been completed on the written contract as to specific categories 

of work sufficient to trigger payment obligations in the total 

amount of $17,710.00. While the Court is cognizant of the fact 

that there exists a material factual dispute as to this finding, the 

Court finds [Denig’s] testimony credible and competent and 

capable of supporting the relief being sought as to this issue and 

concludes that [Denig] has met his burden with respect to this 

contention. Accordingly, I find that the evidence supports the 

factual finding that at the time of his termination [Denig] was 

owed $17,710.00 for work completed under the original written 

contract with [Grandview]. (Again, as noted above, without 

respect for any available counterclaims or setoffs that 

[Grandview] may assert in subsequent proceedings). 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/13, at 2–3. 

Given the record before us and our deferential standard of review, we 

discern no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial court’s conclusions 

that Denig was entitled to $10,000.00 for contract administration services. 

The Act allows Denig to assert a lien “for the payment of all debts due by 

[Grandview] to [Denig] . . . for labor or materials furnished in the erection or 

construction, or the alteration or repair of the improvement.” 49 P.S. 

§ 1301; Stratford, 452 A.2d at 825. Denig testified and presented 

documentary evidence that he had performed $10,000.00 worth of contract 

administration services as of April 2009. N.T., 3/8/13, at 51–54, 129–131, 

136–137; Trial Exhibit 31 (4/30/09 Invoice). The trial court was free to 

accept Denig’s unrebutted testimony as credible in concluding that 

$10,000.00 was due by Grandview to Denig for contract administration 

services completed as of April 2009. We will not disturb the trial court’s 
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credibility determination. Atlantic LB, Inc., 905 A.2d at 557. Grandview’s 

contrary arguments do not warrant relief. 

Judgment affirmed. 

WECHT, J., files a Concurring Memorandum. 

OLSON, J., Concurs in the Result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/22/2014