Filed 11/30/23 In re A.C. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F086452

(Super. Ct. No. 13CEJ300087-2)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Amythest 

Freeman, Judge.

Brian C. Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Ashley N. McGuire, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
2

Appellant T.B. (mother) is the mother of A.C., who is the subject of this 

dependency case. Mother challenges the decision of the juvenile court to terminate her 

parental rights following a contested hearing addressing the permanency plan for A.C.,

submitted by the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) under

Welfare and Institutions Code1section 366.26. Mother contends the court’s refusal to

approve and fund the preparation of a bonding study calls into question the court’s 

conclusion the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply in this case. 

We affirm the decisions of the court terminating mother’s parental rights and denying 

mother’s request for the preparation of a bonding study. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

On March 9, 2022, the department filed a petition alleging A.C. came within the 

jurisdiction of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) because of mother’s history of substance 

abuse. The petition further alleged section 300, subdivision (j) also applied because 

mother had previously failed to reunify with A.C.’s sibling C.B., who was removed from 

mother’s care in 2013 and placed into long-term foster care in 2015, due to similar 

substance abuse issues.2

The petition resulted after the department received a referral on March 6, 2022, 

alleging general neglect of A.C. The referring party indicated mother appeared to be 

under the influence and was homeless, sleeping on the floor of an aunt’s house with A.C.

The day before the referral was made, local police conducted a child welfare check after 

which mother agreed to a safety plan leaving A.C. in the custody of her aunt while 

mother slept in a car in front of the house. However, after it was reported mother was 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated. 

2 This petition was amended on March 14, 2022, to correct an error but not the 

substance of the allegations. 
3

difficult to reach because she had disabled her cell phone, the aunt requested A.C. be 

placed in the custody of the referring party.

3

 

The resulting detention report detailed interviews with the aunt and A.C.’s former 

foster father. These individuals expressed concern about mother’s recent change in 

behavior and possible drug use. On March 7, 2022, mother agreed to take a drug test, 

however, she did not follow through with the test on that day. After mother took the drug 

test the following day, it was discovered she had methamphetamine in her system. A.C. 

was taken out of mother’s custody on March 9, 2022, and placed with a foster family.4 

The record shows mother visited with A.C. on a weekly basis through the department. 

At the end of a jurisdictional hearing held on May 16, 2022, the juvenile court 

found A.C. was a minor coming within the description of section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) 

and (j). A disposition hearing was then continued to August 15, 2022. At the August 15 

hearing, the court declared A.C. a dependent and removed her from her mother’s care and 

custody. Mother was not offered reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(10), and instead the court set a section 366.26 hearing for December 7, 

2022. This meant reunification was no longer possible unless changed circumstances 

could be established, and that a more permanent plan would now have to be prepared for 

A.C.’s placement. 

On August 23, 2022, mother filed notice of her intent to file a statutory writ

petition. Mother’s notice of intent, however, was not filed in a timely manner, and on 

October 5, 2022, this court dismissed mother’s petition as abandoned after mother failed 

to establish “extraordinary good cause” to permit a late filing. 

3 While there is no real clarification in the record, the referring party appears to be 

A.C.’s foster father, J.L.

4 This placement was in the same foster home A.C. had been placed in following an 

earlier dependency petition process when she was 18 months old. 
4

A.C. reportedly bonded to her foster parents and referred to them as “ ‘momma’ ”

and “ ‘daddy,’ ” and her foster parents reported that they loved A.C. as if she were their 

own child and “would like to provide her a permanent plan of adoption.” While A.C.

was physically healthy and meeting developmental milestones, she was receiving mental 

health services because “she was experiencing sadness, emotional dysregulation, tantrum 

behaviors and poor interactions with peers[,] all impacting her functioning.” Specifically, 

A.C.’s foster parents reported she was displaying separation anxiety when leaving for day 

care. They also reported that A.C. had difficulty potty training, was hoarding food, and 

was fighting going to sleep at night because she was frightened of “ ‘monsters.’ ” The

foster parents reported these behaviors increased after visits with mother. 

Sometime after the August 15, 2022 hearing, A.C. and mother participated in 

video visits because mother was enrolled in a drug program. The foster parents described

these visits as “ ‘hit or miss,’ ” as A.C. seemed to be triggered by them, explaining A.C.

would have bedwetting incidents “without fail” following these visits. Mother and A.C.

had an in-person visit on September 23, 2022. When A.C. arrived, she greeted her 

mother and then pointed to her foster father and asked, “ ‘Mom is this is my dad[?]’ ” 

Later in that visit, A.C. said, “ ‘[T.], I’m so glad you’re here today.’ ” Mother responded 

by saying, “ ‘I’m mommy, please don’t call me by my name babe.’ ” 

In the section 366.26 report prepared by the department, there was an

acknowledgment mother had visited A.C. consistently, that the visits were generally 

positive, and that A.C. “appears happy before visitation and the transition to the visitation 

room and does well with the transition after the visit ....” The department further 

acknowledged that A.C. still referred to mother as “ ‘momma’ ” and that the interactions 

between mother and A.C. were often positive. However, the department ultimately did 

not believe severing the relationship between mother and A.C. would be detrimental 

because “only two hours out of [A.C.’s] month are dedicated to a visit with [mother].” 
5

1. The Request for a Bonding Study

Again, in preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, the department recommended 

the juvenile court terminate parental rights so that a permanent plan of adoption could be 

implemented for A.C. At the section 366.26 hearing held on December 7, 2022, mother’s 

attorney requested a contested hearing, which was set for February 22, 2023. In addition, 

her attorney stated, “[m]other is requesting to contest this under the grounds of bond—

bonding, and plans on requesting a bonding expert.”5 Thereafter, in a brief submitted to 

the court on February 15, 2023, in preparation for the contested hearing, mother listed a 

bonding expert as a possible witness. 

On February 10, 2023, mother submitted an ex parte application seeking 

authorization to release information, pursuant to section 827, for the preparation of a 

bonding study. On the same day, mother submitted a second ex parte application

requesting funding for a bonding expert pursuant to sections 218 and 317. Both requests 

were denied by the juvenile court on February 14, 2023, for lacking a memorandum of 

points and authorities. 

On February 22, 2023, the date set for the contested section 366.26 hearing, 

mother made a request through her attorney for a continuance so that a bonding study 

could be completed. The juvenile court concluded it was not prepared to move forward 

with the contested hearing and continued the hearing to April 17, 2023, to assess the 

request for a bonding study.

On March 20, 2023, during a settlement conference held prior to the contested

section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court stated it had considered mother’s request for a 

bonding study and was denying that request pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The 

5 During the hearing, the court noted that a bonding study may have been requested 

on behalf of mother during the August 15, 2022, dispositional hearing. We have not been 

provided a copy of a transcript for that hearing and cannot verify the accuracy of the 

statement by the court at this time. 
6

court expressed its belief that the department had done an “adequate job describing in 

detail the bond between the mother and the minor in this case[.]” In addition, the court

noted that “evidence prepared by an expert would take a considerable amount of time, as 

that bonding study [had] not even been done yet” and “would prolong the [c]ourt coming 

to some decision about a permanent plan for the minor in this case.” The court clarified 

its ruling, stating mother was not prevented from presenting evidence on bonding during 

the contested hearing, but that there would be no continuance of the matter to allow an 

expert to observe the interactions between mother and A.C., especially because the court 

already had the social worker’s observations to consider. 

On April 13, 2023, mother filed a request pursuant to section 827, seeking 

permission to release the social worker’s reports to a bonding expert prior to the 

contested hearing.

6 The juvenile court granted mother’s section 827 request on April 27, 

2023. 

2. The Section 388 Petition

On May 19, 2023, mother filed a petition pursuant to section 388 requesting she be 

provided with reunification services. In support of this petition, mother provided 

documentation she had earned a one-year sobriety chip in a 12-step program, completed a 

residential drug treatment program, and had been receiving mental health treatment since 

January 2023. 

On May 22, 2023, the date set for the contested hearing on the 366.26 petition, the 

juvenile court noted mother’s petition demonstrated only changing, but not changed,

circumstances. However, the court went on to state it would permit mother to present 

additional evidence and continued the matter for a contested hearing to May 26, 2023, 

6 The contested hearing originally set for April 17, 2023, had to be continued due to 

the unavailability of mother’s guardian ad litem. The new date for the contested hearing 

was now May 22, 2023. 
7

which would now coincide with the contested section 366.26 hearing, which was also 

continued “due to lateness of day.” 

3. The May 26 Contested Hearing on Both Matters

Both the contested section 366.26 hearing and the hearing on mother’s section 388 

petition took place on May 26, 2023, and June 2, 2023. The juvenile court first addressed 

the section 388 petition and took testimony from mother. Mother testified she no longer 

had a drug problem, was attending 12-step meetings daily, working with a sponsor, and 

living in a halfway house. While the court commended mother on her progress, it

concluded mother continued to minimize the issues that brought A.C. before the court,

indicating mother’s circumstances were changing, not changed, citing family issues and 

mental health concerns. 

The juvenile court then turned its attention to the contested hearing for the 

section 366.26 permanency plan. Maribel Castellanos, the department social worker 

assigned to A.C.’s case, started her testimony by addressing her education and areas of 

study. Castellanos stated she had been assigned A.C.’s case in September 2022, and had 

personally observed six visits between mother and A.C. Castellanos also noted she had

reviewed the visitation logs for the visits that occurred before she was assigned the case. 

Castellanos characterized mother’s visits with A.C. as “very playful” and described their 

interactions between periods of play. In Castellanos’ opinion, mother had difficulty 

focusing on the visits and would sometimes start conversing with her instead of focusing 

on A.C. When asked about A.C.’s relationship with her foster parents, Castellanos

testified that A.C. viewed them as her parents and referred to them as “mama and daddy.” 

Castellanos’ testimony also addressed her belief that A.C. would regress in certain 

developmental ways after visiting her mother. While Castellanos believed mother and 

A.C. had a “friendly” relationship, she did not believe the two had a positive relationship 

“because of the kind of behaviors we see after the visits.” Castellanos concluded, “[A.C.]
8

would be okay if the parental rights were terminated.” Castellanos also explained she did 

not believe A.C. had a secure attachment to her mother, which required “safety, 

protection provided by the parent, or a caregiver.” 

A.C.’s foster father, J.L., also testified, offering his conclusion that adoption was 

in A.C.’s best interest because, in his opinion, mother was still unstable and therefore 

unable to provide A.C. with the stability she needed. J.L. described an incident when

mother stated she would kill herself if A.C. were adopted. 

Before ruling, the juvenile court noted it considered all the testimony offered, as 

well as the over 140 pages of “logs and reports.” The court initially stated it could not 

conclusively connect A.C.’s behavioral issues to her interactions with her mother. When 

considering the possible termination of parental rights, the court then stated:

“As I sit here today I have to follow the law with the prongs that were 

stated by counsel and not consider anything besides because most things 

were stipulated to. I don’t know if the regular visitation and contact was 

stipulated to, but I will find that there was regular visitation and contact and

that it is perfectly understandable that in the midst of these proceedings that 

it can be confusing. The schedule was changed a bunch of times of the 

visitation and I do not fault mother for missing those last couple of visits 

nor do I fault her for a lot of things that were pointed at her in the chronos. 

“Prong two, a relationship; the continuation of which would benefit the 

child. The child has a substantial positive emotional attachment to parent. 

The kind of attachment that implies that a child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship. I agree that [A.C.] would benefit from 

continuing the relationship with her mother; she’s five years old. Like 

[mother’s attorney] said[,] she knows who her mother is.” 

After discussing various concerns raised by mother’s attorney, the court returned to its 

consideration of the relevant test:

“I believe that this [c]ourt is allowed and should consider the stability of the 

mother when deciding if the risk—excuse me, if the detriment of severing 

the relationship outweighs the benefit of adoption because I believe if a 

[c]ourt is saying that the relationship is so important that I should not 

terminate parental rights I think the flip side of that is that if there is 
9

instability in that relationship and [A.C.] is harmed by that instability later 

when I don’t terminate parental rights that I can consider stability as a 

factor on whether or not [A.C.] is going to be harmed or whether the 

detriment of severing the relationship outweighs the benefit of adoption, I 

think that’s the flip side.” 

The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the recommendation 

A.C. would be adopted, and that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for A.C. 

Parental rights were then terminated. 

DISCUSSION

The focus of mother’s challenge in this appeal asks whether the evidence before 

the juvenile court supported the termination of her parental rights without the benefit of a 

bonding study, which could have illuminated whether the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception applied in this case. 

I. Evaluating Mother’s Request for a Bonding Study

Mother contends the juvenile court failed to properly consider A.C.’s views on the 

termination of mother’s parental rights. Mother believes a bonding study was necessary 

to evaluate the depth of the relationship she shared with A.C. The court denied the 

request for a bonding study partly due to mother’s failure to pursue such a study earlier in 

the proceedings. 

A. Applicable Law

Bonding studies are considered helpful in some cases, and even indispensable in 

others, when considering the types of bonds addressed in section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B). (See In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1018

[addressing sibling bonds specifically], disapproved on statutory grounds as stated in 

In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537, fn.5.) However, when there is extensive evidence 

in the record of the relationship between parent and child, a bonding study could be 

considered unnecessary. “There is no requirement in statutory or case law that a court 
10

must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to” terminating parental rights. (In 

re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 (Lorenzo C.).)

It should be noted, in the case of In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), 

our Supreme Court stated in a footnote that “[t]rial courts should seriously consider, 

where requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant expert 

testimony.” (Id. at p. 633, fn. 4.) Earlier cases have held, “[t]he applicable standard of 

review is whether, under all the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile 

court’s action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a 

bonding study.” (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) Absent a showing of 

clear abuse, the exercise of a court’s discretion in granting or denying a request for a 

bonding study will not be overturned. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–

319; Lorenzo C., at p. 1341.)

Case law has also cautioned that a bonding study pursued late in the process could

require a delay in permanency planning, contrary to the goals of the legislative scheme

involving dependency. In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197 (Richard 

C.).) “While it is not beyond the juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding study late 

in the process under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated request for such a 

study is fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due 

process.” (Ibid.) 

B. Analysis

Mother believes a bonding study, prepared by a third party, could have explored 

A.C.’s actual wishes for a continuing relationship with her mother, which might have 

impacted the juvenile court’s decision on the termination of her parental rights.

7 To 

7 Arguments made on behalf of mother suggest the evidence in the record provided 

by and through the department employees was not entirely objective and needed to be 

countered with evidence from another source. We note, the purpose of the dependency 
11

support her position, mother cites this court’s opinion in In re Leo M. (1993) 

19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591 for the proposition the court was required to consider A.C.’s 

wishes when deciding whether to terminate parental rights. The court in Leo M.

considered whether “direct” evidence from a minor was necessary at the section 366.26 

permanency planning hearing. This court ultimately concluded there was “reasonable 

and compelling” inferences that could be drawn from the evidence already in the record

on the minor’s wishes. (Leo M., at p. 1594.) In her reply brief, mother also cites 

four cases discussed by respondent to argue that in those cases, the courts emphasized the 

importance of extrinsic evidence on the issue of a parent/child bond. However, neither 

Leo M. nor any of the four cases cited by respondent reached the conclusion that a 

bonding study is a necessary part of the analysis, something mother seems to 

acknowledge. In fact, even the Caden C. court stopped short of requiring a bonding 

study, stating such requests should be seriously considered where appropriate. (See 

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4.) 

Again, the denial of a request for a bonding study is reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard. (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) As noted in 

Richard C., there are practical reasons for the juvenile court to decline ordering a bonding 

study, such as those presented when there are last minute efforts to delay decisions on 

permanent placements, something not encouraged by the statutory scheme. (Richard C.,

supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.) 

Mother was arguably on notice in August 2022 that her parental rights could be 

terminated when she was denied reunification services.8 The record shows a bonding 

process is to protect the child, not to punish the parent. (27A Cal.Jur.3d (2023) Nature of 

Juvenile Dependency Proceedings, § 5.) 

8 Again, there is some suggestion in the record mother may have raised the 

possibility of a bonding study at the August 2022 hearing. 
12

study was proposed by mother’s attorney in December 2022, when funding for that study 

was raised as an issue. However, no ruling was asked for or made at that time. The 

record reveals mother submitted ex parte applications for a bonding study and the 

necessary funding in early February 2023, which were both denied for lacking a 

memorandum of points and authorities. The juvenile court then addressed the issue again 

later in February 2023, in the context of a motion for continuance, noting mother had not 

moved forward with making a request for a bonding study in any significant way. During 

a hearing held on March 30, 2023, the court effectively denied a request for a bonding 

study, citing its belief it would cause an unnecessary delay. The court then reminded 

counsel for mother that while a study was not being approved, witnesses could be called 

who had observed the bond between mother and A.C. Finally, another request for a 

bonding study was made at the time initially set for the contested hearing on May 22, 

2023. In response to this final request, the court cited the evidence already available on 

the issue and concluded, “[I]n order to have an additional expert testify on that subject, it 

would require a continuance that I believe and I am finding today is contrary to the best 

interest of the minor.” 

Based on this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion 

and exceeded the “ ‘ “bounds of reason” ’ ” when denying the request for a bonding 

study. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.) The denial of this 

request also did not violate mother’s right to due process. (See Richard C., supra,

68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.) 

II. The Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

A. The Applicable Law and the Standard of Review

“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and 

implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have 

failed. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also § 366.26, 

subd. (b).) At that stage, ‘the welfare agency’s focus shifts from 
13

monitoring the parents’ progress toward reunification to determining the 

appropriate placement plan for the child.’ (In re Marilyn H., at p. 305.)”

(In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.) 

Because the overriding concern is to protect the child, if the designated time period has 

expired and the efforts to reunify the family have failed, a juvenile court must move 

toward selecting and implementing a permanent plan for the child under section 366.26. 

(Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008–1009.) However, relevant to the 

argument presented by mother, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an 

exception “where ‘[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the 

child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (In re J.D., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) This is often referred to as the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception. 

The leading authority defining this exception is the opinion in Caden C., which

states a parent has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence three elements 

to justify the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception:

(1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the 

extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a substantial, positive, 

emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that 

the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and 

(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even 

when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.”

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633, 636.) 

The first element of this test asks the “straightforward” question of whether the 

parent visited the child consistently and to “ ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus of this element is on the best interest 

of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding a parent for good behavior in 

maintaining contact. (Ibid.)

The second element of the test asks “whether ‘the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child 
14

relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the 

portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect 

of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid., 

quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus 

should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child 

relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)

As to the third element, juvenile courts are required to ask “how the child would 

be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the 

child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severing the relationship might 

include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in 

school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) In contrast, an adoptive home might 

provide a new source of stability that alleviates “emotional instability and 

preoccupation,” making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under 

this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way: 

it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the 

sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception using a “ ‘hybrid’ ” standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 639.) The substantial evidence test applies to the first two elements of regular 

visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) 

The court’s decision on whether to terminate parental rights or not to because it would be 

detrimental to the child, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) “Review 

for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the 

application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court 

has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
15

absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) On appeal we “ ‘ “indulge in every 

presumption to uphold a judgment,” ’ ” as it is the appellant’s burden “ ‘ “to affirmatively 

demonstrate error—it will not be presumed.” ’ ” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131,

1161 (A.L.).) 

B. Analysis

Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence supports the first 

two elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception in this case. (See 

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As to the first prong of Caden C., the record 

shows mother had regular visits with A.C., given the circumstances posed and the 

visitation permitted. We also find substantial evidence supports the second prong that

there is a positive relationship between A.C. and mother that could benefit A.C. in the 

future. 

The more difficult resolution, however, concerns the third prong of the Caden C.

test. When considering this portion of the test, we must consider how A.C. would be 

affected by the loss of her relationship with her mother, and how not having a consistent 

relationship with her mother would impact her life in the adoptive home. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) A juvenile court can rely on the opinions of a social worker, 

who is an “expert qualified to testify concerning risk assessment and permanent 

placement issues,” when balancing the various factors relevant to the third prong of the 

Caden C. test. (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.) Again, courts’ findings on this 

prong are not reviewed for substantial evidence, but instead are reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. (Caden C., at p. 640.) Using this standard of review, we would have to 

conclude the court “ ‘ “ ‘ exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) We cannot reach this 

conclusion based on the evidence that was before the court. 
16

When discussing this prong, the juvenile court noted the significant time A.C. had 

spent in the same foster home during her five years, the progress she had made during 

this most recent placement, and the instability she encountered while in her mother’s 

care. The court acknowledged it considered all the testimony provided in the contested 

hearing on the permanency plan.

9

 The court also noted it reviewed over 140 pages of

notes and logs created by the department addressing the period from when A.C. was

again placed in the foster home to the point of the hearing. The notes and logs

documented, among other things, the visits that occurred between A.C. and her mother. 

A review of all this evidence reveals the court had access to information on the 

relationship between A.C. and her mother, as well as the quality of their interactions.10 

We, therefore, cannot conclude the court abused its discretion when considering the third 

prong of the Caden C. test and finding the detriment to A.C. of terminating mother’s 

parental rights did not outweigh the benefits provided by the stability of adoption. 

Mother failed to meet her “affirmative” burden to prove the beneficial parent-child 

exception prevented the termination of her parental rights. (See A.L., supra, 

73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161.) 

DISPOSITION

The order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed. 

9 The juvenile court even stated it considered the testimony of mother who testified 

only during the portion of the hearing devoted to her section 388 petition seeking the 

reinstatement of reunification services. 

10 We reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court improperly considered her

alleged failure to address the “root causes of dependency.”