IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHAMINA YOUNG-ROGERS, :

:

: C.A. No. K23A-05-008 JJC

Appellant, :

:

v. :

:

DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF :

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES :

AUDIT AND RECOVERY, :

:

Appellee. :

:

Submitted: January 23, 2024

 Decided: April 11, 2024

OPINION & ORDER

Shamina Young-Rogers, Pro Se.

Renee L. Hrivnak, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for 

Delaware Department of Health and Social Services Audit and Recovery 

Management Services.

Clark, R.J.
2

Appellant Shamina-Young-Rogers (“Ms. Young-Rogers”) appeals a decision 

of the Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS” or “the Agency”). In her 

appeal, she challenges the Agency’s decision to disqualify her from the receipt of 

federally funded Supplemental Nutrition Assistance and Food Distribution Program 

(“SNAP”) benefits. The Division of Audit and Recovery Management Services 

(“ARMS”) investigated the matter and concluded that Ms. Young-Rogers committed 

an intentional program violation (an “IPV”).1 ARMS then presented the contention

to a DHSS Hearing Officer who found that Ms. Young-Rogers committed an IPV

because she failed to disclose that another individual resided in her household and 

earned income.2

Ms. Young-Rogers now appeals DHSS’s decision. She contends that the 

Agency denied her the opportunity to participate in a meaningful hearing to contest

her disqualification. She further contends that the other individual never lived in her 

home. In support, she offers documents on appeal to prove that he resided elsewhere. 

Here, the Court’s decision turns on whether the DHSS-provided hearing met 

requirements set by the federal regulations that controlled the Agency’s actions. For 

the reasons below, it did not. Namely, DHSS offered her a telephonic hearing with 

no opportunity to submit documentary evidence on her behalf. As a result, the 

Agency’s decision must be reversed with direction that the Agency provide her with 

a fair hearing where she is permitted to offer relevant evidence in her defense.

1

7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) (providing that an intentional program violation occurs when an individual 

intentionally misrepresents, conceals, or withholds facts to facilitate the unlawful acquisition or 

use of SNAP benefits).

2 Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Audit & Recovery Management Services Proposed 

Administrative Disqualification, Del. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Young-Rogers, No. 9003371395 (Del. 

Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Apr. 21, 2023) [hereafter “Disqualification Decision”].
3

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF RECORD

SNAP is a federal program designed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition by 

providing food benefits to low-income individuals and families.

3

 The federal 

government delegates the obligation to administer the program to state agencies. In 

Delaware, DHSS is the designated State-level agency.4 ARMS, which identifies 

itself as a Division of DHSS, investigates potential SNAP program violations. It 

also initiates administrative proceedings against alleged violators. 

The following facts are those contained in the administrative record below.5

Ms. Young-Rogers has received benefits from SNAP since 2006.6 Since then, she

has submitted multiple renewal requests for food benefits and medical assistance.7

In her 2019 and 2020 renewal forms, Ms. Young-Rogers represented that she resided 

at a house she owns in Magnolia with her three children.

8

 In 2022, she applied to 

renew her benefits. At that point, she represented that she shared her household 

with only her niece and her three children.9 She did not list Auburn Broadie, the 

father of the youngest of her three children, as a member of her household at any 

point between 2019 and 2023.

3 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., FACTS ABOUT SNAP (Jan. 24, 2024).

4

See 31 Del. C. § 512 (recognizing that DHSS must cooperate with the federal government 

regarding any federal acts concerning public welfare and adopt methods to administer those 

programs in the State); see also 7 C.F.R. section 271.4 (itemizing a state agency’s responsibilities 

when administering SNAP within the state).

5 The record submitted by the agency is somewhat disorganized. The facts cited herein are from 

the testimony and exhibits introduced during the Administrative Disqualification Hearing which 

took place on March 3, 2023. See Tr. of Admin. Disqualification Hr’g, Del. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. 

Young-Rogers, No. 9003371395 (Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Mar. 3, 2023) [hereafter 

“Hr’g Tr.”]. The exhibits ARMS introduced at the hearing are cited as “Hr’g Tr.,” followed by their 

exhibit number.

6 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 4.

7

Id.; see also Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.

8 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.

9

Id.
4

In 2019, Mr. Broadie separately submitted an application for public assistance 

with DHSS.

10 There, he represented that he lived at Ms. Young-Rogers’ house in 

Magnolia by listing her address as his.

11 He claimed to be the sole member of that 

household.12 Later, he completed and signed a six-month periodic report that 

confirmed that he remained at that address.13 In that filing, he represented himself 

to be the only member of that household.14 

Mr. Broadie did not apply for benefits again until 2021. At that point, he 

submitted a new application.

15 He again represented that he lived at Ms. YoungRogers’ house in Magnolia by, once again, identifying the home by address only.

16

ARMS compared Mr. Broadie’s 2022 application to Ms. Young-Rogers’s 

application and identified the discrepancy. As a result, a case worker interviewed

Mr. Broadie.

17

 During the interview, Mr. Broadie contradicted his written 

representation that he was the sole member of his household.

18

 Nevertheless, he 

confirmed that he lived with Ms. Young-Rogers and their mutual daughter in Ms. 

Young-Rogers’ home.

19

 ARMS then broadened the investigation by examining Ms. 

Young-Rogers’ conduct because she had not disclosed that Mr. Broadie lived with 

her.

On January 10, 2023, ARMS sent Ms. Young-Rogers a written notice 

informing her that it had formally opened an investigation regarding a potential 

10 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 6.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 7.

14 Id.

15 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 8.

16 Id. at 2.

17 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 10.

18 Id.

19 Id.
5

IPV.

20

 In the letter, ARMS invited her to participate in a phone interview to discuss 

the disqualification process, the availability of a hearing, and her options.

21 The 

letter also informed Ms. Young-Rogers that she need not participate in the interview, 

and that if she chose not to, she would retain the right to dispute her disqualification 

at a later hearing.

22

 Finally, ARMS’ letter explained that ARMS would present 

evidence to a Hearing Officer and request that she be disqualified from receiving 

SNAP benefits at the hearing.

23

On January 17, 2023, ARMS Investigator Jean Cenicola spoke with Ms. 

Young-Rogers by phone.

24

 According to the investigator, Ms. Young-Rogers 

acknowledged that she and Mr. Broadie had an amicable relationship and that he 

visited their daughter every other weekend.25 Ms. Young-Rogers denied, however,

that Mr. Broadie lived with her.26 Ms. Young-Rogers contends that the investigator 

told her that the hearing could only be conducted by telephone,

27 which the 

administrative record confirms.

28 Finally, the investigator informed her that she 

could nevertheless review ARMS’ evidence before the hearing.

29

 

DHSS then issued its formal hearing notice that set her case for a telephonic 

hearing.30 Neither the hearing notice nor the investigator explained how Ms. YoungRogers could present documentary evidence on her own behalf during such a 

20 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 2.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Hr’g Tr. at 18:2–5.

25 Id. at 18:6–10.

26 Id. at 18: 5–6.

27 Reply Br. (D.I. 19).

28 See Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1 at 4 (letter from DHSS to a USDA Senior Program Specialist) (discussing 

the fact that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all hearings have been changed to telephonic).

29 Hr’g Tr. at 10:2–12.

30 Notice of Administrative Disqualification Hearing Date and Time, Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. 

Serv., to Shamina Young-Rogers (Jan. 30, 2023) [hereafter “Hearing Notice”].
6

hearing. Nor did they explain how she could review ARMS’ documentary evidence 

during the hearing. 

The DHSS hearing occurred on March 3, 2023,

31

 but Ms. Young-Rogers did 

not participate. The transcript reflects that the Hearing Officer attempted to call Ms. 

Young-Rogers twice and received no answer.32 He then conducted the hearing 

without her. As a result, ARMS Investigator Cenicola, who administratively 

prosecuted the matter, submitted the only evidence of record.33 

The record included testimony and documents demonstrating that Mr. Broadie 

submitted three benefit applications between 2019 and 2022 and an interim report

that identified Ms. Young-Rogers’ home as his.34 The record also demonstrates that 

Ms. Young- Rogers submitted a benefit renewal request in 2022 and did not list Mr. 

Broadie as a household member.35 Furthermore, ARMS submitted evidence at the 

hearing from Accurint36 searches that, at best, supported an inference that both Mr. 

Broadie and Ms. Young-Rogers may have lived at the same Magnolia home in 

2022.37 Finally, the Hearing Officer relied upon ARMS’ documentary evidence that 

Mr. Broadie earned income that Ms. Young-Rogers’ did not disclose.38

The Hearing Officer’s written decision followed.

39

 He found that Ms. YoungRogers committed an IPV.40 As a result, DHSS disqualified Ms. Young-Rogers from 

receiving SNAP benefits for twelve months.41 He explained that 7 CFR § 

31 Id. at 6: 20–24.

32 Hr’g Tr. at 6:14–19.

33 Id.

34 Hr’g Tr. Exs. 6-9.

35 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.

36 Accurint is a service offered by LexisNexis which provides organizations with background and 

residence data extracted from a wide range of public and private sources.

37 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 14, 15.

38 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 12.

39 Disqualification Decision.

40 Id. at 5.

41 Id. at 6.
7

273.12(a)(1)(ii) required Ms. Young-Rogers to update DHSS if her household 

composition changed.42 The Hearing Officer found that she had misrepresented her 

household composition multiple times over a three-year span.43 As a result, he 

found that she committed a single IPV pursuant to 7 CFR § 273.16(c) for her multiple 

misrepresentations and omissions.44 Ms. Young-Rogers now appeals DHSS’s 

decision to this Court.45 

II. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

In Ms. Young-Rogers’ appeal, she contends that DHSS erred by finding that 

Mr. Broadie resided in her household.

46

 She further contends that Mr. Broadie used 

her address to procure food stamps in Delaware while he resided in Maryland

without her knowledge or consent.

47

 In her briefing, she includes several documents 

that she did not submit in the hearing below. 48 She contends that those documents

prove that Mr. Broadie did not live with her during any of the years in question.49

Ms. Young-Rogers concedes that she had sufficient notice of the hearing date 

and time.

50

 She nevertheless contends that she could not attend the telephonic 

hearing because she had no phone service.

51

 In other words, she contends that it 

42 Disqualification Decision at 4.

43 Id. at 5.

44 Id.

45 Appellant’s Notice of Appeal (D.I. 1).

46 Opening Br. (D.I. 13).

47 D.I. 19.

48 Id., Ex. 1–5. These exhibits include, inter alia, several background check authorizations listing 

addresses for herself and Mr. Broadie; mail sent to her by DHSS at her address in Dover in 2019 

and 2020; mail addressed to Mr. Broadie at his alleged address in Maryland; mail sent by the 

Wicomico County, Maryland Board of Elections to Mr. Broadie in 2022; and Mr. Broadie’s Form 

1099-R and W-2 tax statements for 2022, both of which were sent to Mr. Broadie’s alleged address 

in Maryland.

49 D.I. 13.

50 D.I. 19.

51 Id.
8

was not her fault that she could not participate. She asks the Court to reverse

DHSS’s decision, or to alternatively remand the case to the Agency to hold another 

hearing to provide her with the opportunity to prove that Mr. Broadie did not live 

with her.

52 More specifically, she requests what is referred to as a “fair hearing” in 

the SNAP regulations.

53

 She further requests that the Court assign her legal counsel 

to assist with her case because of her disability.54

ARMS contends that Ms. Young-Rogers received a fair hearing. It also 

contends that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing 

Officer’s finding that she committed an IPV on two bases.

55 Namely, ARMS 

contends that when she applied for SNAP, she (1) deliberately failed to identify Mr. 

Broadie as a member of her household in 2022, and (2) deliberately failed to report 

his income that year.

56

 In support, ARMS relies upon the exhibits and testimony that

its investigator submitted at the hearing. That evidence included: comprehensive 

Acccurint reports for Ms. Young-Rogers and Mr. Broadie showing that both parties 

may have resided at the Magnolia address between May 2018 and November 2022;57

a case summary and food benefit issuance report for Mr. Broadie;58 applications for 

benefits filed by Mr. Broadie using the Magnolia address in 2019, 2021, and 2022;59

wage statements for Mr. Broadie showing income he received from 2018 through 

52 D.I. 1.

53 Id.; see 7 C.F.R. § 271.7(a) (“Except as provided in § 271.7(f), each State agency shall provide 

a fair hearing to any household aggrieved by any action of the State agency which affects the 

participation of the household in the Program.”).

54 D.I. 1. The Court will not further address Ms. Young-Rogers’ request that it appoint her legal 

counsel because the Court is unable to appoint counsel on her behalf. The Hearing Notice notified 

her of her ability to contact Community Legal Aid for potential representation, however, and she 

remains able to do so pending the remand. 

55 D.I. 15 at 16.

56 Id. at 13, 16.

57 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 14, 15.

58 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 4.

59 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 6–9.
9

2022;60 and two address information requests sent to USPS by ARMS, offered to

show that Mr. Broadie had moved from the Maryland address during the relevant 

times that Ms. Young-Rogers contends he lived in Maryland.61

ARMS also stresses that Ms. Young-Rogers did not participate in the hearing 

and therefore offered no evidence to contradict ARMS’s evidence.

62

 ARMS 

maintains that the administrative hearing was the only venue where she could offer 

facts to contest her disqualification.63 To that end, ARMS relies on a basic principle

of administrative law: an aggrieved party cannot expand the record on appeal.

64

 

Finally, ARMS concedes in its Answering Brief that there is conflicting 

evidence as to where Ms. Young-Rogers lived during the first two of the three years 

of her disputed benefit payments.65 Accordingly, ARMS acknowledges that there is 

not substantial evidence in the record to support DHSS’s findings that she committed 

an IPV during those two years.66 Nevertheless, ARMS maintains that there is 

substantial evidence to support that she and Mr. Broadie lived together in the same 

household in August 2022, and that she falsely represented that he did not.

67

III. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s scope of review in this matter is controlled by 31 Del. C. § 520

(“Section 520”). Section 520 provides that recipients of public assistance may 

60 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 12.

61 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 11.

62 D.I. 15 at 14.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Id. at 15.

66 Id. at 15. Ms. Young-Rogers’ two benefit renewal applications from 2019 and 2020 list her 

address as one in Dover, rather in Magnolia. Additionally, the Accurint Report for Mr. Broadie 

shows Mr. Broadie as having lived at two addresses in Maryland and one address in Florida during 

the relevant time periods, which overlap with the time-period he is alleged to have lived at Ms. 

Young-Rogers’ address in Magnolia, Delaware.

67 Id.
10

appeal DHSS’s decision to the Superior Court if they (1) are subject to an adverse 

DHSS decision regarding their entitlement to benefits and (2) suffer financial harm 

as a result.

68

 The appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final administrative 

decision and “shall be on the record without a trial de novo.”69 

Section 520 further provides that the Court’s role on appeal is to “decide all 

relevant questions and all other matters involved, and [to] sustain any factual 

findings of the administrative hearing decision that are supported by substantial 

evidence on the record as a whole.”70 When determining whether there was 

substantial evidence to support the Agency’s decision, the Court must review the 

record while recognizing the heightened burden of proof placed upon ARMS below:

clear and convincing evidence.71

Delaware DHSS-appeal-specific case law provides the same benchmarks. 

Namely, the Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “the reviewing court must 

determine whether [DHSS’s] ruling is supported by substantial evidence and free 

from legal error.”72 Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind might accept such 

evidence as adequate to support the conclusion reached.73 Questions of law, on the 

other hand, are reviewed de novo.

74

68 31 Del. C. § 520.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6) (requiring DHSS to base its determination regarding IPVs “on clear 

and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the household member(s) committed, and 

intended to commit, intentional Program violations.”).

72 Prunckun v. Delaware Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv., 201 A.3d 525, 540 (2019).

73 Id.; see also Ringgold v. Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv., 2018 WL 7021956, at *1 (Del. 

Super. July 27, 2018) (“The Court is not to replace the trier of fact in an appeal of an administrative 

board decision.”).

74 Prunckun, 201 A.3d at 540.
11

IV. ANALYSIS

SNAP is a federal nutritional assistance program supported with primarily

federal dollars. As a result, federal regulations controlled the central aspects of Ms. 

Young-Rogers’ hearing below and control the disposition of this appeal.75 They 

define what conduct disqualifies her from receiving benefits, the notice she was due, 

the nature of the administrative hearing that DHSS needed to provide to her, and the 

appropriate penalty if she committed an IPV.

76

 

As an overview, DHSS committed legal error because her hearing violated 

federal regulations by not providing her a means to present documentary evidence 

in her defense. As a result, the Court declines to address whether the record 

contained substantial evidence to support DHSS’s findings because the structure of 

the hearing offered to Ms. Young-Rogers was fundamentally unfair. 

Ms. Young-Rogers challenges the Agency’s disqualification decision based 

upon her IPV. Federal regulation defines an IPV as follows:

[i]ntentional [p]rogram violations shall consist of having intentionally:

1. Made a false or misleading statement, or misrepresented, 

concealed or withheld facts; or

2. Committed any act that constitutes a violation of SNAP, SNAP 

regulations, or any State statute for the purpose of using, 

presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing, or 

trafficking of SNAP benefits or EBT cards.77

Here, ARMS sought to prove to the Hearing Officer that Ms. Young-Rogers

made false and misleading representations repeatedly over three years. On appeal, 

ARMS concedes that the evidence below did not support the Hearing Officer’s

75 See Gonzalez v. State, 207 A.3d 147, 149 (Del. 2019) (recognizing that federal law governs the 

Agency’s administration of the SNAP program in Delaware). In fact, federal law’s preemption of 

the issue is so pervasive, it preempts any State law civil fraud claim by DHSS against a benefits 

recipient. Id. at 154.

76 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.1–285.5.

77 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c)
12

finding that her conduct during the first two of the three years constituted an IPV. 

Notwithstanding this concession, ARMS emphasizes that the penalty would be the 

same regardless of whether the misrepresentations spanned three years or one year. 

Namely, a first IPV requires a one-year disqualification of benefits regardless of the 

bases for the IPV.78

The Agency proceeded to administratively consider Ms. Young-Rogers’ 

disqualification. It had the option to either refer the matter for criminal charges in 

a court of appropriate jurisdiction or to proceed administratively.79 When the 

Agency elected to proceed with an administrative hearing, it assumed the obligation 

to “conduct [a] hearing, arrive at a decision, and notify the household member . . . 

of the decision.”80 

The central question is how much process was due Ms. Young-Rogers. The 

United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) answered that question when 

adopting the controlling regulations. At the outset, an agency that lawfully adopts 

a regulation must follow its own regulations.81 Stated differently, “[w]here the rights 

of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own 

procedures.”82 This rule applies equally in this case because the USDA regulations 

at issue bind DHSS.83 If an agency action violates a regulation promulgated to 

78 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(1)(i).

79 Gonzalez, 207 A.3d at 150; see also 7 C.F.R. §273.16(a)(recognizing that the Agency has an 

either/or choice). Notably, DHSS’s hearing notice fails to comply with the regulation or the 

Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez. DHSS incorrectly states that its decision to 

proceed administratively against Ms. Young-Rogers does not bar State criminal prosecution. As 

recognized in Gonzalez, it does. Gonzalez, 207 A.3d at 150.

80 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(2). 

81 Dugan v. Del. Harness Racing Com’n, 752 A.2d 529, 531 (Del. 2000) (citing United States v. 

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979)).

82 Norwood v. Roxana Volunteer Fire Company, 2019 4267416 (Del. Super. Sept. 9, 2019) (citing 

Dugan, 753 A.2d at 531).

83 Gonzalez v. State, 207 A.3d at 149.
13

ensure due process through procedural safeguards, the agency’s action is invalid.84 

Notably, agencies are free to promulgate regulations requiring procedural safeguards 

that extend beyond constitutional due process requirements.85 Once they do, they, 

or an agency with the delegated responsibility to apply those regulations, cannot

disregard them.

86

 In this case, the federal regulations that bind DHSS’s actions 

guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers a “fair hearing” to contest her disqualification.

87

 

Those regulations further define what constitutes a “fair hearing” by including the 

procedural protections necessary to provide her with a meaningful hearing.88 

At the outset, the SNAP regulatory scheme provides for a two-tiered 

administrative hearing process – a “disqualification hearing,” and a subsequent “fair 

hearing.”89 The controlling regulations permit an agency, such as DHSS, to combine 

a disqualification hearing and a fair hearing into a single hearing provided the agency 

provides the higher level of protections in the combined hearing.

90 In this case,

DHSS permissibly offered Ms. Young-Rogers only one hearing and treated it as a

fair hearing.91 When doing so, DHSS met the notice requirements set by 

regulation.

92

 Accordingly, the Court’s focus turns to whether DHSS complied with 

the regulations meant to ensure that Ms. Young-Rogers had a meaningful hearing. 

In this case, the investigator informed Ms. Young-Rogers that her hearing 

would proceed telephonically and that she could arrange to view the evidence against 

84 Dugan, 752 A.2d at 531.

85 Id. 

86 Id. 

87 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a).

88 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(i), (l), (m), (p), and (q) (providing DHSS’s responsibilities in the hearing, 

specifying notice requirements, placing requirements on the Hearing Officer, specifying Ms. 

Young-Rogers’ rights during the hearing, and itemizing the requirements for a final agency 

decision). 

89 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a), § 273.16(a).

90 7 C.F.R § 273.16(e)(1).

91 See Disqualification Decision (stamped with “Fair Hearings April 21, 2023”).

92 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(3)(iii). 
14

her before the hearing.93 Separately, DHSS’s hearing notice informed Ms. YoungRogers of the following:

[a]n Administrative Disqualification Hearing telephone hearing has 

been scheduled for you. The Hearing Officer (HO) will call you at the 

telephone number we have on record for you as the date and time 

specified below. . . . If you fail to answer the phone, the hearing will 

continue and a decision will be made based on the information provided 

by ARMS.94 

Ms. Young-Rogers contends that she requested a live hearing during the 

ARMS interview, but the investigator told her that DHSS would not accommodate 

the request.

95

 DHSS does not contest that assertion. The record further confirms 

that DHSS provided her no option for an in-person hearing.96 The record also

confirms that DHSS put no procedures in place that would have enabled Ms. YoungRogers to present documentary evidence in her defense.

97 Namely, ARMS 

submitted an emailed opinion from an attorney into the hearing record.

98

 The 

attorney opined that DHSS’s decision to provide only telephonic hearings during the 

pandemic complied with federal regulations because DHSS provided respondents

the right to testify orally, cross-examine witnesses, and view the evidence prior to 

the hearing.

99

 

93 Hr’g Tr. at 10:2–12.

94 Hearing Notice. Of note, the notice identified the upcoming hearing as a “disqualification 

hearing.” The Disqualification Decision, however, had “Fair Hearing” stamped on it. 

95 D.I. 19.

96 See Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1 at 4 (letter from DHSS to a USDA Senior Program Specialist (discussing the 

fact that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all hearings have been changed to telephonic).

97 See Hearing Notice. While the hearing notice provided that Ms. Young-Rogers would be “given 

a chance to provide evidence of all important facts and circumstances of [her] case,” the notice did 

not identify any mechanism by which Ms. Young-Rogers could submit documentary evidence for 

the Hearing Officer to review. 

98 Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1.

99 See id. (“The regulation does not state that the client has to be sent the exhibits in order for the 

hearing to go forward, merely that they be given ‘adequate opportunity’ to do so. The State Agency 

... is required to notify the client of their rights and responsibilities and to offer them the chance 
15

The hearing structure offered to Ms. Young-Rogers violated four regulatory 

requirements promulgated to ensure respondents like her received due process.

100

 

First, 7 C.F.R § 273.15 required that the hearing be structured so as to permit the 

Hearing Officer to “[r]equest, receive, and make part of the record all evidence 

determined necessary to decide the issues being raised.”101 Here, the Agency

offered a hearing with no means for Ms. Young-Rogers to introduce documentary 

evidence in her defense. It follows directly that there were no means available for 

the Hearing officer to receive such evidence. 

Second, the record required the Hearing Officer to “[i]nsure that all relevant 

issues are considered [and to] [r]egulate the conduct and course of the hearing 

consistent with due process.”102 DHSS did not provide, and the Hearing Officer did 

not oversee, a hearing that enabled the Hearing Officer to consider all relevant issues. 

The one-sided hearing included ARMS’ submission of many documents and a near

total reliance on hearsay.

103

 In contrast, DHSS’s procedures offered Ms. YoungRogers, as a lay person, no mechanism to submit her own documentary evidence. 

Third, and separately, the regulations guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers the right 

to “[s]ubmit evidence to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances in the 

to examine the information prior to the hearing and to have the information available to them 

during the hearing.”).

100 Frankly, in this case, the record demonstrates another possible procedural infirmity that the 

Court declines to address both upon grounds of restraint and waiver because Ms. Young-Rogers 

did not participate in the hearing. See Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 895–96 (3d Cir. 1986) 

(explaining that while hearsay evidence is generally admissible in administrative hearings, 7 C.F.R 

§ 273.15(p)(5) precludes consideration of adverse statements from declarants who were not 

available for cross-examination at hearings).

101 7 C.F.R.§ 273.15(m)(2)(iii) (emphasis added).

102 7 C.F.R.§ 273.15(m)(2)(iv).

103 See Husbands v. Del. Dept. of Educ., 227 A.3d 558, 2020 WL 1814045, at *3 (Del. Apr. 7, 

2020) (TABLE) (“It is well settled in Delaware that hearsay evidence is permissible in 

administrative hearings, so long as that evidence is not the sole basis for the hearing officer’s 

decision.”).
16

case.”104 Again, while the telephonic hearing provided her the ability to testify and 

DHSS’s procedures provided her a notional opportunity to review ARMS’ evidence 

prior to the hearing, DHSS’s hearing procedure deprived her of a critical right 

guaranteed by the regulation – the opportunity to offer evidence to support her 

defense.105 

Fourth and finally, the regulations guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers the ability 

to examine all documents and records considered at the hearing at a reasonable time, 

both before the date of the hearing, “as well as during the hearing.”106 DHSS’s 

hearing procedure provided no mechanism to permit her to view the evidence offered 

during the hearing. 

The unfair prejudice to Ms. Young-Rogers is further aggravated in this case 

because Ms. Young-Rogers had documentary evidence available to support her 

defense.107 Although she did not participate in the phone hearing, the result in this 

case is no different. Namely, the Agency presented her with one hearing option – a 

hearing procedure that did not meet the abovementioned requirements. From the 

beginning, DHSS informed her that she would, in essence, have no right to a fair 

hearing as defined in the regulations. Accordingly, her inability to participate in 

what was a procedurally deficient telephonic hearing does not estop her from 

challenging the basic fairness of the only hearing offered her.

104 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(6) (emphasis added).

105 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(6) (providing that during a fair hearing, a household has the right to 

“submit evidence to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances in the case.”)

106 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(1) (emphasis added).

107 The Court recognizes its limited jurisdiction on appeal, and that it cannot consider the evidence 

Ms. Young-Rogers submits for the first time on appeal to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence.

Nevertheless, given the hearing structure provided to her, the Court cannot ignore that much of the 

documentary evidence she asks the Court to consider would support her defense that Mr. Broadie 

did not live with her during the relevant periods. DHSS should have provided her a hearing with 

a mechanism to consider such evidence, particularly given ARMS burden to prove its case by clear 

and convincing evidence. 
17

As a final observation, ARMS concedes that DHSS based its decision to 

disqualify Ms. Young-Rogers on insufficient evidence as to two of the three years

that formed the basis for the decision. This concession does little to alleviate the 

Court’s concern regarding the fairness of her hearing. In the one-sided hearing

below, the Hearing Officer found an IPV based in large part upon those two years 

of alleged conduct. Where ARMS now concedes there was not substantial evidence 

to support a significant part of the Agency’s findings, the concession reinforces the 

need for another hearing. 

In summary, the regulations cited above defined the process due Ms. YoungRogers. When DHSS failed to provide her a hearing that complied with those 

regulations, it failed to provide her a meaningful hearing.

108

 She must have a full 

and fair hearing with the chance to present documentary evidence to support her 

defense.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, DHSS’s disqualification decision must be REVERSED

as to Hearing Officer’s findings that Ms. Young-Rogers committed an IPV during 

the first two years. ARMS concedes a lack of substantial evidence in the record to 

support such a finding. The balance of DHSS’s decision as to the third-year alleged 

misrepresentations must be REVERSED and REMANDED. DHSS shall provide 

Ms. Young-Rogers a full and fair hearing that provides her the opportunity to (1) 

108 As a final note, nothing in this decision should be read to prohibit an agency from conducting 

a telephonic or virtual hearing, provided the agency provides adequate measures to permit a 

respondent to submit documentary evidence on his or her own behalf and otherwise complies with 

controlling regulations and due process requirements. In the telephonic context, however, it is 

markedly more difficult to do so, particularly if the respondent is a self-represented litigant. 

Nevertheless, whether DHSS ultimately provides Ms. Young-Rogers a telephonic hearing, a virtual 

hearing, or an in-person hearing, it must provide her with a reasonable procedure that permits her 

to submit documentary evidence on her behalf. 
18

present documentary evidence in her defense, and (2) review ARMS’ evidence 

during the hearing. While her rehearing is pending, SNAP regulations mandate that 

DHSS cannot interrupt an individual’s or household’s benefits.

109

 Accordingly, 

DHSS shall reinstate Ms. Young-Rogers’ SNAP benefits forthwith pending her fair 

hearing. Jurisdiction is not retained. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Jeffrey J Clark 

 Resident Judge

Via File & ServeXpress 

U.S. Mail to Appellant Shamina Young-Rogers

109 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)((5) (“A pending disqualification hearing shall not affect the 

individual’s or the household’s right to be certified and participate in the Program . . .. [T]he State 

agency cannot disqualify a household member for intentional Program violation until the hearing 

official finds that the individual has committed [an] intentional Program violation . . .”)