1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LUE CINDY TERRY, 

Plaintiff

v. 

MICHAEL DEWINE, et al., 

Defendant

Civil Action No. 14-1112 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(December 17, 2014) 

Lue Cindy Terry,1 proceeding pro se, brought this action against Defendants Michael 

DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio; Judge Kimberly Cocroft of the Franklin County, Ohio, 

Court of Common Pleas; Zach Scott, Franklin County, Ohio, Sheriff; and Ron O’Brien, Franklin 

County, Ohio, Prosecutor. (The Court refers to all Defendants but DeWine as the Franklin 

County Defendants.) While the precise nature of the challenges is far from clear from the 

pleadings, Plaintiff attempts to challenge actions surrounding the foreclosure of a property in 

Ohio. See Compl. at 2. Presently before the Court is the Franklin County Defendants’ [7] Motion 

to Dismiss, as well as Plaintiff’s first [4] Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award 

and second [10] Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award. Upon consideration of the 

pleadings,2

 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court GRANTS the 

 

1 It is not entirely clear whether Lue Cindy Terry is the sole plaintiff in this action or whether 

Richard N. Terry is proceeding against Defendants in this action, as well. Although the 

complaint references Richard Terry in its body, its caption refers only to Lue Cindy Terry, and 

the subsequently filed documents refer only to Lue Cindy Terry, as well. The Court accordingly 

refers to Lue Cindy Terry as the sole plaintiff.

2

 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: 

• Original Civil Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”); 

• Pl.’s Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award, ECF No. 4 (“First Default 

Judgment Motion”); 

• Defendants The Honorable Judge Kimberly Cocroft, Zach Scott and Ron O’Brien’s 

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7 (“Franklin County Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss”);
2 

Franklin County Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court concludes that there is no personal 

jurisdiction over the Franklin County Defendants. The Court also concludes that, under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it does not have jurisdiction over this action effectively challenging a 

state-court final judgment. Because the Court has no jurisdiction over any of the claims in this 

action, the Court does not address any of the Franklin County Defendants’ arguments pertaining 

to the merits. Although Defendant DeWine has not appeared in this action, the Court also 

concludes that there is no jurisdiction over the claims against him for the reasons described 

below. Therefore, the Court sua sponte dismisses the claims against DeWine. For these and 

related reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s first and second default judgment motions, as well. 

The Court DISMISSES this action in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 

The facts of this case are far from clear, and Plaintiff’s filings subsequent to the 

complaint do little to dispel the absence of clarity. At core, this action appears to pertain to the 

foreclosure of a property in Ohio state court. See Compl at 1 (“[T]his proceeding seeks to 

challenge the alleged free and clear title awarded to [the bank] in Civil Foreclosure Case No. 13-

 

• Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opp’n of Pl.’s Mot. for Immediate Default 

Judgment, ECF No. 8 (“First Default Judgment Opp’n”); 

• Pl.’s Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award, ECF No. 10 (“Second Default 

Judgment Motion”); 

• Pl.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Granted Minute Order, ECF No. 12 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”); 

• Mem. of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Pl.’s Second Motion for Immediate 

Default Judgment, ECF No. 14 (“Second Default Judgment Opp’n”); 

• Pl.’s Mot. to Show Cause Under Complete Jur. over Michael DeWine; i.e. “Attorney 

General,” ECF No. 16 (“Pl.’s Show Cause Response”); and

• Pl.’s Nov. 29, 2014 Response Deadline, ECF No. 21 (“Pl.’ Service Response”).

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would 

not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
3 

CV-006485 in this Court”). Because the Court concludes, below, that it has no jurisdiction over 

any of the claims in this action and because Plaintiff has not conveyed them in a clear fashion, it 

is not necessary to recite the facts further at this point. Insofar as the facts of this case are 

essential to resolving the jurisdictional questions before the Court, the Court presents them 

below. 

B. Procedural History

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action, proceeding pro se. On July 7, 2014, Plaintiff 

filed an affidavit of service with the acknowledgment of service delivery via Certified Mail to all 

four defendants at their business addresses.

3

 As of July 8, 2014, no defendant had filed an 

appearance, and Plaintiff filed a [4] Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award.

4 On 

August 1, 2014, the Court “reluctantly” granted the Franklin County Defendants’ [6] Motion for 

Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Immediate Default Judgment. Those defendants complied with the deadline established by the 

Court’s order, filing both their [7] Motion to Dismiss and their [8] Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion of Immediate Default Judgment. Shortly 

thereafter, Plaintiff filed a second [10] Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award,5 and

the Franklin County Defendants filed an opposition. After the Court advised Plaintiff that, if 

 

3

 The Court concludes, below, that DeWine was only served in his official capacity and that, 

insofar as Plaintiff seeks to sue him in his individual capacity, proper service has not be effected.

4

 In her motion, Plaintiff makes no mention of any Defendants but DeWine but refers to 

“defendants,” using the plural form, at least once. See Mot. for Immediate Default Judgment and 

Award, ECF No. 4 (“First Default Judgment Motion”), at 1-4. The Franklin County Defendants 

responded to this motion. See Mem. of Points and Authorities in Opp’n of Pl.’s Mot. for 

Immediate Default Judgment, ECF No. 8 (“Franklin County Defs.’ Opp’n to First Default 

Judgment Motion”). Accordingly, the Court treats the motion as addressing all four defendants. 

5 Once again it is unclear whether the motion is directed at all defendants. Cf. supra, note 4. The 

Court treats it as if it were directed to all defendants in an abundance of caution. 
4 

Plaintiff did not respond to the Franklin County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court may 

grant the motion as conceded, Plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion. Defendant DeWine has 

yet to file a response to the complaint or to file any other papers in this action. 

Subsequent to the completion of the aforementioned briefing on the motions before the 

Court, the Court issued an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause as to why this Court has 

jurisdiction over the claims against DeWine. See Order, dated October 14, 2014, ECF No. 15. 

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s response appears to be that Plaintiff is not suing Defendant DeWine 

in his official capacity, and that therefore the Court’s concerns with respect to jurisdiction are of 

no moment. See Pl.’s Show Cause Response at 2. Plaintiff also claims, for the first time, that 

there is diversity jurisdiction over this action as well. Id. at 4-5. In response to Plaintiff’s 

responsive filing, the Court issued an order informing Plaintiff of the Court’s conclusion that 

Plaintiff had not yet served Defendant DeWine in his individual capacity and requiring Plaintiff 

to file proof of service of DeWine in that capacity. See Order, dated November 17, 2014, ECF 

No. 17. Plaintiff filed a response but did not file any additional proof of service. See Pl.’s Service 

Response. The gravamen of her response appears to be that there is no difference between suing 

DeWine in his individual capacity and suing him in his official capacity such that additional 

service is necessary in order to proceed against DeWine in his individual capacity. See id. at 1.6

 

6 Plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint by filing an amended complaint without an 

accompanying motion. The Court denied leave to file that amended complaint because it did not 

comport with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The Court informed 

Plaintiff that 

if Plaintiffs seek to file an amended complaint, Plaintiffs must file a motion 

requesting to do so with the Court. That motion shall include a statement 

indicating whether the opposing parties consent to the amendment and shall 

include a copy of the proposed amended complaint. In the motion, Plaintiffs must 

also explain the reasons for seeking to amend the complaint, including a 

description of any of the original claims that now being dropped, any new claims 

that are now being added, or any claims being modified.
5 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Franklin Country Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

them, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over Judge Cocroft because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Moreover, the Court is obligated to assure itself of its jurisdiction “whether or not the parties 

challenge it.” Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1007, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2013); accord

Fogo De Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 

2014). 

When personal jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing a factual basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See

Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To establish that personal 

jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff cannot rest on bare allegations or conclusory statements but 

“must allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant with the forum.” Second Amendment 

Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “To make such a showing, the plaintiff is not required to adduce evidence that 

meets the standards of admissibility reserved for summary judgment and trial[;]” but rather, the 

plaintiff may “rest her arguments on the pleadings, ‘bolstered by such affidavits and other 

written materials as [she] can otherwise obtain.’ ” Urban Inst. v. FINCON Servs., 681 F. Supp. 

2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In the 

case of a pro se plaintiff, although the Court is required to construe the pro se complaint 

liberally, see Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006), “[p]ro se plaintiffs 

 

Order, dated November 17, 2014, ECF No. 18. Plaintiff has not subsequently filed an 

amended complaint. 
6 

are not freed from the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims.” 

Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted). 

 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and can adjudicate only those cases 

entrusted to them by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Court begins with the presumption that it does not have 

subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 

over its claim. Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In 

determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may “consider the complaint supplemented 

by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 

F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).7

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, the Franklin County Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. They also move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to timely and 

properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

 

7

 “Generally, a court must convert a motion under Rule 12 into a Rule 56 motion for summary 

judgment when it considers matters outside the pleadings. A court need not do so, however, if 

the outside material is considered to determine jurisdictional questions.” Winston & Strawn LLP 

v. Law Firm of John Arthur Eaves, No. 1:13-CV-01940 (JDB), — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 WL 

2598748, at *2 (D.D.C. June 11, 2014) (citations omitted). Because all of the questions that the 

Court considers are jurisdictional, the Court need not convert the motion to dismiss into one for 

summary judgment even inasmuch as the Court considers limited materials outside of the 

pleadings. 
7 

Generally, courts must evaluate a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal 

jurisdiction prior to considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., 

Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts should ordinarily 

satisfy jurisdictional concerns before addressing the merits of a civil action.”); Combs v. Bakker,

886 F.3d 673, 675 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding the district court’s decision to first address 

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion “awkward” and that the “proper course of review” required 

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) motion to be considered first). Although this rule need not be 

mechanically applied, as this Court has previously observed: 

Not only does logic compel initial consideration of the issue of jurisdiction over 

the defendant—a court without such jurisdiction lacks power to dismiss a 

complaint for failure to state a claim—but the functional difference that flows 

from the ground selected for dismissal likewise compels considering jurisdictional 

and venue questions first. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue 

does not preclude a subsequent action in an appropriate forum, whereas a 

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted can be 

granted with prejudice. 

IMark Marketing Servs., LLC v. Geoplast S.p.A, 753 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(quoting Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1963)). In view of these 

considerations, and because this Court concludes that it plainly lacks both personal jurisdiction 

over the Franklin County Defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims 

against those defendants, the Court does not reach the Franklin County Defendants’ remaining 

arguments for dismissal.

In addition, while Defendant DeWine has not appeared in this case, this Court must raise 

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against him sua sponte. See NetworkIP, 

LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Indeed, [federal courts] must raise [the issue], 

because while arguments in favor of subject matter jurisdiction can be waived by inattention or 

deliberate choice, [federal courts] are forbidden—as [ ] court[s] of limited jurisdiction—from 
8 

acting beyond [their] authority, and ‘no action of the parties can confer subject-matter 

jurisdiction upon a federal court.’ ” Id. (quoting Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 

971 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 

The Court addresses the multiple jurisdictional bases for dismissing the claims in this 

action in turn. Lastly, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s two motions for default judgment. 

A. No Personal Jurisdiction over Franklin County Defendants

The Franklin County Defendants argue both that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient 

contacts with the District of Columbia to give this Court personal jurisdiction over them and that, 

irrespective of the allegations themselves, such contacts do not exist. See Franklin County Defs.’ 

Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4. While Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff did

not respond to any of the Franklin County Defendants’ arguments with respect to jurisdiction.8

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-4. The Court agrees with the Franklin County Defendants that this Court has 

no personal jurisdiction over them, requiring dismissal of all claims against them.

 

8 In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff primarily relies on an opinion from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Ohio, In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1 (N.D. 

Ohio Oct. 31, 2007). Plaintiff is correct that “[i]n that case, Judge Boyko dismissed 14 

foreclosure actions at one time with scathing footnote comments about the actions of the 

Plaintiffs and their attorneys.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. But Plaintiff misses the fundamental distinction 

between those cases and the case before this Court: Judge Boyko was considering a series of 

foreclosure actions brought in federal court in the first instance while this action is a collateral 

attack on a foreclosure judgment in Ohio state court. See 2007 WL 3232430, at *1-2. Plaintiff’s 

reliance on Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 

reconsideration denied sub nom. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 347 

(Ohio 2012), is similarly unavailing. In Schwartzwald, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 

plaintiff has no standing in a foreclosure action when it “failed to establish an interest in the note 

or mortgage at the time it filed suit.” Id. at 1220. The Ohio Supreme Court also held that the 

“Real-Party-in-Interest Rule” does not allow a litigant to cure the absence of standing by actions 

subsequent to the filing of a suit. Id. at 1223. While these cases illuminate Ohio substantive 

foreclosure law, none of them help demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction in this action. To 

the contrary, Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases confirms that she is trying to challenge a statecourt foreclosure judgment in this action. As discussed below, this Court has no jurisdiction over 

such an attempt.
9 

To determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction over a particular defendant, a court in 

this district must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine that the relevant 

District of Columbia statutes authorize either general jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-423, or 

specific jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-423. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. 

Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (even when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated 

on a federal question, plaintiffs must rely on the D.C. long-arm statute to assert personal 

jurisdiction over out-of-district defendants). If a defendant’s contacts within the forum are 

“continuous and systematic,” a court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant with 

respect to a suit arising out of any subject matter unrelated to the defendant’s activities within the 

forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). A 

court may exercise specific jurisdiction to entertain controversies based on acts of a defendant 

that “touch and concern the forum.” Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(citing Steinberg v. Int’l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Second, the 

court must find that its exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of constitutional 

due process. See GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347. 

General jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any claims brought against a defendant. 

See Steinberg v. Int’l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d at 929. The D.C. Code grants a District of 

Columbia court general jurisdiction over a person who is “domiciled in, ... or maintaining his ... 

principal place of business in, the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-422. But the Franklin 

County Defendants are not residents of the District of Columbia, Franklin County Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss at 3, and Plaintiff does not allege that they conduct any business in the District of 
10 

Columbia; to the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that they are officers of Franklin County, Ohio.9 They 

are accordingly not subject to general jurisdiction under section 13-422. 

Specific jurisdiction arises where a defendant engages in certain kinds of conduct 

enumerated in the District’s long-arm statute. 10 See D.C. Code § 13-423(a). A court with 

specific jurisdiction may only adjudicate those claims that arise out of the conduct that triggered 

its jurisdiction. Id. § 13-423(b). Plaintiff does not specifically allege that the Franklin County 

Defendants engaged in any of the conduct listed in section 13-423(a). Indeed, there is no 

connection to the District of Columbia – of any sort – alleged.11 Because Plaintiff failed to allege 

any conduct satisfying any of the prongs of section 13-423(a), this Court lacks specific 

jurisdiction over the Franklin County Defendants. 

Even if the Court concluded that the statutory provisions of the D.C. Code supported 

jurisdiction, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction unless it comported with the requirements 

 

9

 The Court takes judicial notice that Franklin County, Ohio, is approximately 400 miles from 

Washington, D.C. 

10 The D.C. long-arm statute provides that a District of Columbia court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a person as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s (1) transacting any 

business in the District of Columbia; (2) contracting to supply services in the District of 

Columbia; (3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the 

District of Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or 

omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any 

other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, 

or services rendered, in the District of Columbia; (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing 

real property in the District of Columbia; (6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any 

person, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed 

within the District of Columbia at the time of the contracting, unless the parties otherwise 

provide in writing; or (7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia 

(subject to certain enumerated conditions). D.C. Code § 13-423. 

11 Indeed, in a similar case in this district, Bradley v. DeWine, another judge in this district 

concluded that the court had no jurisdiction over local Ohio officials on the basis of any tortious 

injury caused in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside of the District of 

Columbia even though the plaintiff in that case lived in the District of Columbia—whereas 

Plaintiff here lives in Ohio. See Bradley v. DeWine, No. 14-cv-110 (JDB), — F. Supp. 2d —, 

2014 WL 3056513, at *5 (D.D.C. July 8, 2014). 
11 

of due process. The Court concludes that it would not comport with due process. This 

determination turns on whether a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia 

establish that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Such minimum contacts must arise from some act by which the 

defendant “purposefully avails” himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

District of Columbia, invoking the “benefits and protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 

v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987). Put differently, the court “must 

insure that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum ‘are such that he should 

reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there.’ ” Marshall v. Labor & Indus., State of 

Washington, 89 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Because Plaintiff does not allege that the Franklin County 

Defendants engaged in any conduct whatsoever in the District of Columbia, there is nothing to 

suggest that these defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the protections of D.C. 

law. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 109. Nothing about the underlying events, relating 

to a foreclosure proceeding in Ohio, would lead these three county officials to expect that 

participating in the foreclosure process would open them to suit in a D.C. federal court. 

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would allow this Court to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the Franklin County Defendants. As a result, this Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over these defendants, and the Court will grant their Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims against them.
12 

B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Claims Against All Defendants

The Franklin County Defendants argue that there is no subject matter jurisdiction “to the 

extent Terry challenges the decisions of Judge Cocroft” because of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Franklin County Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4. In her opposition, Plaintiff does not 

respond to the Franklin County Defendants’ argument based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-3. Because the Court concludes that all claims in this action either challenge 

the decisions of Judge Cocroft or are inextricably intertwined with that state-court judgment, the 

Court concludes that all claims in this action, against all defendants, are barred by this doctrine. 

The Court addresses this doctrine with respect to all defendants, including DeWine, because the 

Court is “obligated to assure [itself] that [subject matter] jurisdiction exists.”12 Fogo De Chao, 

769 F.3d at 1138. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 

“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a judge-made corollary of section 1257, makes this jurisdiction 

exclusive. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (quoting Dist. of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents the 

lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ 

challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’ ” 

Id. at 460 (citations omitted). “The doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances,’ where a 

 

12 In the Court’s order dated October 14, 2014, ECF No. 15, the Court informed Plaintiff that it 

“question[ed] whether it has jurisdiction over the claims against DeWine because of, first, the 

principles of state sovereign immunity and, second, the doctrine barring collateral attacks on 

state-court judgments in federal court,” citing several doctrines that might deprive the Court of 

jurisdiction, including the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause 

“that this Court has jurisdiction against DeWine notwithstanding the cases cited above.” In her 

response, Plaintiff did not provide any legal arguments about why the cited doctrines did not bar 

jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Show Cause Response at 1-5. 
13 

party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal 

court.” Id. at 466 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal court 

from exercising jurisdiction over a claim only if three criteria are met. See id. at 462. 

First, “[t]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party 

to the prior state-court judgment.” Id. Here, the prior state-court judgment at issue is the 

foreclosure decree issued against Plaintiff in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. See

Franklin County Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2; Compl. ¶ 1. Indeed, Plaintiff describes her 

participation in the underlying foreclosure action in order to explain why she is seeking relief in 

this action. See id. (“In this particular instance, Richard and Lue Cindy Terry ... was fraudulently 

foreclosed on in the case of 13-CV-006485 and seeks to hold Defendants accountable to 

readdress in the matter with this court.”) (emphasis omitted). The first prong of the RookerFeldman doctrine is satisfied.

Second, “the claim raised in the federal suit must have been actually raised or

inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 462. Because it is 

unclear exactly what Plaintiff is claiming in this action, other than generally seeking redress with 

respect to the foreclosure judgment, it is unclear whether Plaintiff actually raised the claims in 

this action in the foreclosure action. But claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior statecourt judgment unless their “core” is “independent” of that judgment. See Stanton v. Dist. of 

Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Kenmen Eng’g v. City of 

Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e [ask] whether the state-court judgment 

caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.”). 

Insofar as the Court can make sense of the complaint, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to 

allege that defendants conspired to abuse the judicial process in order to unlawfully deprive her
14 

of her property. See Compl. at 3 (“Each Defendant KNOWINGLY and INTENTIONALLY 

engaged in a Conspiracy to commit and did commit the act of conducting a PONZI SCHEME, 

INSIDER TRADING, INSURANCE FRAUD, REAL ESTATE and MORTGAGE FRAUD, 

WIRE FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING, STRAW BUYING and TAX EVASION as on going 

criminal enterprise”). Far from being “independent” of the Franklin County Court judgment, the 

“core” of Plaintiff’s claims is that the judgment of foreclosure was invalid. Indeed, among other 

relief, she seeks to overturn that judgment. See Compl. at 3 (“Any foreclosure decree, public sale 

or Sheriff’s auction is demanded as Cease and desist upon filing of this complaint”); id. at 20 

(“Plaintiff Moves this Court ... to hold each individual Defendant liable for the crimes stated and 

to enforce the Possession and Revenue Recovery of the property in question”). Plaintiff’s claims 

are therefore “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court judgment, satisfying the RookerFeldman doctrine’s second requirement.

13

The third and final requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that “the federal claim 

must not be parallel to the state-court claim.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 462. A federal claim is parallel 

to a state-court claim if it is filed after the state-court claim, but before the state court enters 

judgment. See Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 289-91 (2005). Therefore, the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction over a claim only if it was 

brought in federal court after judgment was entered in a state court. Id. In this proceeding, 

Plaintiff “seeks to challenge the alleged free and clear title awarded to [the bank] in Civil 

foreclosure Case No. 13-CV-06485.” Compl. at 1. While the date of the foreclosure decree 

issued in that action is not clear from the complaint, the complaint effectively acknowledges that 

 

13 Federal claims are independent of state-court judgments when they lodge a federal law 

challenge to a state rule. Stanton, 127 F.3d at 76 (“Applying Rooker-Feldman requires us to draw 

a line between permissible general challenges to rules and impermissible attempts to review 

judgments.”). Plaintiff does not lodge such a challenge here.
15 

the decree was issued prior to this lawsuit by referring to that judgment multiple times. In 

addition, the Court takes judicial notice of the state-court docket in Franklin County Case No. 

13-CV-006485,14 which shows that the foreclosure order was issued on June 9, 2014. The 

complaint in this action was filed on June 25, 2014 (and signed by Plaintiff the previous day)—

after the Franklin County judgment issued. A foreclosure decree is “a final judgment of [an 

Ohio] state court.” In re Hoff, 187 B.R. 190, 193 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). Given that Plaintiff 

filed her complaint in this Court after a final judgment was issued in the state-court foreclosure 

proceeding, which she seeks to challenge, the federal court claims are not parallel to the statecourt proceeding. This sequence of events satisfies the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s third and final 

requirement. 

The claims in this action meet all three of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s criteria: 

Plaintiff was a party to the state-court foreclosure proceeding, the claims in this action are 

inextricably intertwined with that proceeding (if not actually raised in that proceeding), and this 

action was filed after the state-court final judgment. Although the Franklin County Defendants 

raise this defense only with respect to Judge Cocroft, this analysis is applicable to all three of the 

Franklin County Defendants, as well as to Defendant DeWine. None of the prongs of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine depend on the identity of the defendant. As long as the claims satisfy 

the three criteria of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as they do, this Court has no jurisdiction. 

 

14 A copy of the docket was filed in a related case before this Court, Richard C. Terry v. First 

Merit National Bank. See Terry v. First Merit National Bank, 14-cv-1197-CKK (D.D.C), Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 13, Ex. 2. The Court also confirmed the sequence of events by visiting the 

public docket of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. See Franklin County Clerk of 

Court website, 

http://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/caseSearch?cu1q93XzzT432wCeXcTB, 

last visited December 16, 2014. 
16 

Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against every 

defendant in this action. 

C. Jurisdiction Over Claims Against DeWine

Despite the Court’s determination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all claims 

against DeWine, the Court reviews several other jurisdictional bases for dismissing the claims 

against DeWine in the interest of thoroughness and given the lack of clarity in Plaintiff’s filings.

Because it is less than clear what relief Plaintiff seeks from DeWine and whether she is 

proceeding against him in his official capacity or his individual capacity, the Court considers 

those multiple possibilities. 

1. Nature of Claims Against DeWine 

It appears that Plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief in this 

action.15 See Compl. at 8 (“The amount of this Civil Complaint is set at One Hundred NinetyFive Thousand ($USD195,000.00) Dollars”); id. at 20 (“Plaintiff Moves this Court, through 

supervision of the United States Attorney General to refund the Civil Demand to herein 

Association and Plaintiff and to hold each individual Defendant liable for the crimes stated and 

to enforce the Possession and Revenue Recovery of the property in question.”). Plaintiff does not 

distinguish among the defendants with respect to her claim for these monetary damages. See

 

15 While Plaintiff stated in her complaint that she sought $195,000, she appears to seek a vastly 

higher amount in the default judgment motions. See Pl.’s Second Default Judgment Motion at 1 

(“...Move this Court for an Immediate Default Judgment in the amount of the Demand, or 

($104,799,000.00) for the Superseding government entity of the Federal Reserve Association of 

Fite & Co. Holdings”). The Court notes that this is approximately the amount claimed in a 

separate action in this district brought by 180 East Broad Street Partners, LLC doing business 

“by and through” the Federal Reserve Association of Fite & Co. Holdings, demanding damages 

in the amount of $104,799,059.54. See 180 East Broad Street Partners LLC v. Ohio Department 

of Taxation, 13-cv-1285-RJL (D.D.C.), Compl., ECF No. 1, at 6. The Court is unclear whether 

that similarity suggests a drafting error in this action. In any event, the amount of the demand has 

no relevance because the Court has no jurisdiction over any claims in this action. 
17 

Compl. ¶ 8 (“making each individual Defendant liable...”). Insofar as Plaintiff seeks injunctive 

relief with respect to the foreclosure and sale of the subject property, as well as seeks to compel 

investigations about alleged fraud surrounding the foreclosure, Plaintiff appears to seek such 

relief from Defendant DeWine. See, e.g., Compl. at 2-3 (“Although this instant matter is filed 

separate from the evidentiary foreclosure case; all consolidated directly implicates the Attorney 

General for the State of Ohio.”) 

In response to the Court’s October 14, 2014, Order requiring Plaintiff to show cause why

this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against defendant, Plaintiff clarified that she 

was only suing DeWine in his individual capacity:

Defendant DeWine was not sued in the capacity of “Attorney General”, as that 

would create a conflict of interest with the U.S. Government that would result in a 

dismissal of the herein case against Plaintiff. Defendant DeWine being sued in his 

individual capacity does not insulate or protect this Defendant from direct suit in 

this venue for not protecting the consumer credit rights of Plaintiff that resulted in 

a foreclosure decree being placed against Plaintiff in the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas. 

Pl.’s Show Cause Response at 2. Because Plaintiff does not explain how she seeks any such 

injunctive relief from DeWine in his personal capacity when all such relief appears to pertain to 

his role as a government official,16 the Court addresses the relief sought with respect to both 

DeWine’s individual and official capacities.

2. No Jurisdiction Over Claims for Money Damages Against DeWine in Official Capacity 

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to recover money damages from the State of Ohio by suing 

DeWine in his official capacity, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in 

 

16 Ultimately, however, the Court need not dwell on this puzzle because of the conclusion below 

that Plaintiff has not properly served DeWine in his individual capacity. 
18 

this action because of state sovereign immunity.17 “[A]n unconsenting State is immune from 

suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” 

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 

protects state officials sued in their official capacities, as well. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 167 (1985). 

“Although a state can waive its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, 

waiver is the exception rather than the rule.” Bradley v. DeWine, 2014 WL 3056513, at *4; see

also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671-74 (“The mere fact that a State participates in a [federal] program 

... is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.”); 

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment prevents 

congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”). While 

Plaintiff claims that the State of Ohio has waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to the 

Eleventh Amendment, see Compl. at 2, she provides no support for the conclusion that Ohio has 

waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Indeed, it appears that none exists. See Bradley v. 

DeWine, 2014 WL 3056513, at * 4; Lee Testing & Eng’g v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 855 F. Supp. 

2d 722, 726 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (“Ohio has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from 

suits for money damages in federal court.”); cf. Turker v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 157 

F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998) (Ohio has not waived immunity with respect to suits for violations 

of state law in federal court). Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of showing that Ohio has 

waived its sovereign immunity and that, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over a money 

 

17 Even though DeWine never filed an appearance in this action and, therefore, made no 

arguments about sovereign immunity, DeWine raised precisely this defense in another case in 

this district. See Bradley v. DeWine, 2014 WL 3056513, at *3 (“DeWine first argues that he is 

immune from Bradley’s claims for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment.”). In that 

case, the district judge concluded that the sovereign immunity of the State of Ohio deprived the 

court of subject matter jurisdiction over the money damages claim. See id. at *4. 
19 

damages claim. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (concluding that burden of demonstrating Court’s 

jurisdiction falls on Plaintiff). The Eleventh Amendment deprives this Court of subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s money damages claim against DeWine in his official capacity. 

3. Insufficient Service of Process on DeWine in Personal Capacity 

As an initial matter, whether DeWine was properly served is a jurisdictional issue. 

Winston & Strawn LLP, 2014 WL 2598748, at *1 (“ ‘[F]ederal courts lack the power to assert 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the procedural requirements of effective service of 

process are satisfied.’ ”) (quoting Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). “It is 

well established ... that ‘before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there 

must be more than notice to the defendant.’ ” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum 

Exporting Countries, 766 F.3d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. 

Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)). Indeed, notice “ ‘cannot by itself validate an 

otherwise defective service.’ ” Id. (quoting Grand Entertainment Grp. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 

988 F.2d 476, 492 (3d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court considers sua sponte whether there 

was proper service of process on DeWine in his personal capacity.18

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 

120 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the 

plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service 

be made within a specified time.” The 120 day period allowed by Rule 4(m) elapsed on October 

23, 2014. But Rule 4(m) also requires the Court to “extend the time for service for an appropriate 

period” if “the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In response to 

 

18 Indeed, the fact that DeWine did not raise this issue as a result of not filing an appearance is 

consistent with—rather than contrary to—the conclusion that he was not properly served. 
20 

the Court’s Order dated October 14, 2014, asking Plaintiff to demonstrate why the Court has 

subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine, 

Plaintiff responded that she had not sued DeWine in “in the capacity of ‘Attorney General,’ ” but 

rather had sued him in his individual capacity. In a subsequent order, dated November 12, 2014, 

the Court informed Plaintiff that “[i]nsofar as Plaintiffs are suing DeWine in his individual 

capacity, the docket does not reflect that they have effectively served him in this capacity.” The 

Court extended the deadline for filing proof of service on the docket, and informed Plaintiff that 

she must file proof of proper service by November 29, 2014, to avoid dismissal of the claims 

against DeWine in his individual capacity. Plaintiff responded but did not file any additional 

proof of service on the docket. Instead, she first appears to argue that there is no distinction 

among the various capacities in which one could sue DeWine. See Pl.’s Service Response at 1

(“The matter deal with process of service upon the ‘individual MICHAEL DEWINE as opposed 

to the public office of ‘ATTORNEY GENERAL’. ... Plaintiff wishes to point out that this Court 

cannot argue that MICHAEL DEWINE was in fact ‘Elected’ to the position of ‘ATTORNEY 

GENERAL’; ‘OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL’; or ‘ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 

STATE OF OHIO’. All of these titles are essentially the same, despite being referenced to as 

‘individual’. ...”). Although she does not present any legal arguments, Plaintiff also appears to 

claim that the prior service was proper. See id. at 3 (“Lastly, process of service was delivered to 

the office of MICHAEL DEWINE or ‘ATTORNEY GENERAL’ by United States Certified 

Mail, Return Receipt Requested.”) This response does not demonstrate that DeWine was 

properly served in his individual capacity.

Ultimately, Plaintiff has yet to effectively serve DeWine in his individual capacity. The 

only proof of service filed on the docket is an affidavit of service and return receipt card, 
21 

showing receipt of the mail delivery addressed to Michael DeWine, at 30 E. Broad Street, 16th

Floor, Columbus, OH 43215. The Court takes judicial notice that this is the address of the office 

of the Attorney General of Ohio. Although service by mail is not one of the methods of service 

generally allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, Rule 4(e) also allows service “following 

state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state 

where the district court is located or where service is made.” Both the District of Columbia and 

the State of Ohio allow service by mail in certain circumstances. But Plaintiff has not effectively 

used this method of service to serve DeWine in his individual capacity. 

With respect to D.C. law, Plaintiff has not provided the requisite proof that the individual 

that received the service of process was “authorized to accept service on behalf of defendant[] in 

their individual capacity[y].” Anderson v. Gates, No. CV 12-1243 (JDB), — F. Supp. 2d —, 

2013 WL 6355385, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2013); see also Toms v. Hantman, 530 F. Supp. 2d 

188, 191 (D.D.C. 2008) (no proper service under D.C. law by sending the summons and 

complaint by certified mail to defendant’s business address). Although the signature of the 

person who signed on behalf of the delivery to the Ohio Attorney General’s office is not entirely 

legible, it is a fair inference that it was someone authorized to receive business mail only.19

There is no reason to assume that such a person was authorized to receive service of process 

upon DeWine in his individual capacity, and Plaintiff has not even attempted to show that the 

recipient was so authorized. 

With respect to Ohio law, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure allow service by certified or 

express mail “evidenced by return receipt signed by any person.” Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.1(a)(1)(A). 

 

19 While the exact name is not clear, it is clear that it is not Defendant DeWine’s signature. The 

first name appears to be Harvey and the last name appears to begin with a “W.” See Affidavit of 

Service, ECF No. 3, at 2. 
22 

The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged the risks in service by certified mail because of “the 

oftentimes numerous intermediate, and frequently uninterested, parties participating in the chain 

of delivery.” Akron-Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 406 N.E.2d 811, 813-14 (Ohio 

1980). “[T]he best course of action, however, is not to entirely foreclose service to individuals at 

their business address, but rather to examine each case upon its particular facts to determine if 

notice was reasonably calculated to reach the interested party.” Id. at 814. In these 

circumstances, the Court concludes that service to Attorney General DeWine at his work 

address, as represented by Plaintiff, was not reasonably calculated to give him notice that he is 

being sued in his individual capacity.20 Neither the way in which the delivery was addressed nor 

the complaint itself makes it clear that it was being sent to DeWine in his individual capacity. 

With that delivery in hand, a named-but-unidentified person signed for the delivery containing 

the complaint, but Plaintiff has provided no evidence that such an individual was authorized to 

accept the package as an agent for Defendant DeWine in his individual capacity. Cf. id. (service 

by certified mail must comport with the requirements of due process); Mullane v. Central 

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental 

requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 

of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”) 

Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to proceed in this action against DeWine in his 

personal capacity, those claims are dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process.

* * * 

 

20 The Court informed Plaintiff of this very conclusion in its November 12, 2014, Order, but 

Plaintiff did nothing to remedy the ineffective service.
23 

In sum, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages by suing DeWine in his 

official capacity, those claims are dismissed because the Court has no jurisdiction over them as a 

result of state sovereign immunity. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks any relief from DeWine in 

his personal capacity, those claims are dismissed because of insufficient service of process. In 

addition, as discussed above, all claims against the Franklin County Defendants are dismissed 

because of the lack of personal jurisdiction over them, and all claims in this action are dismissed 

because of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

D. Motions for Default Judgment 

Plaintiff filed an initial [4] Motion for Immediate Default Judgment and Award before 

any Defendant had filed an appearance in this action. Pursuant to the schedule set by the Court in 

response to the Franklin County Defendants’ request for an extension to respond to the complaint 

and to that default judgment motion, the Franklin County Defendants filed a [7] Motion to 

Dismiss and an [8] opposition to Plaintiff’s first Default Judgment Motion. Five days after the 

Franklin County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a second [10] Motion for 

Default Judgment and Award.21 The Court’s conclusion that all the claims in this action must be 

dismissed for the several jurisdictional reasons discussed above all but resolves Plaintiff’s first 

 

21 Insofar as the second default judgment motion was directed against the Franklin County 

Defendants, it was improper because they had entered an appearance and filed a motion to 

dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief 

is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or 

otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”); Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. 

Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2013) (“To obtain a default 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, a plaintiff must undertake two steps. First, 

the plaintiff should request that the Clerk of the Court enter a default ... . Once default has been 

entered, the plaintiff may move for default judgment.”) (citations omitted). Insofar as this motion 

was directed against Defendant DeWine, Plaintiff should have moved the Clerk of the Court to 

enter a default prior to moving the court for a default judgment. But these procedural flaws have 

no impact on the outcome because the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims in this action in the 

first instance.
24 

and second default judgment motions. The Court cannot enter a default judgment when it lacks 

jurisdiction over an action. See Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 

(D.D.C. 2013), reconsideration denied (July 12, 2013). Given that the Court lacks jurisdiction 

over all of the claims in this action, as the court concludes in the previous sections of this 

opinion, a default judgment in this case, against any of the defendants, would be improper. Only 

brief additional discussion is warranted in the interest of completeness.

Even though the Court did not analyze whether it had personal jurisdiction over DeWine 

with respect to the motion to dismiss,22 that analysis is proper with respect to the motions for 

default judgment. The Court “should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering 

judgment against an absent defendant.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d at 6. However, “[i]n the 

absence of an evidentiary hearing, although the plaintiffs retain ‘the burden of proving personal 

jurisdiction, [they] can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing.’ ” Id. at 7 (quoting 

Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 

Although “plaintiffs are not limited to evidence that meets the standards of admissibility required 

by the district court” and “may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such 

affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain,” id., Plaintiff here has not 

done so. 

Plaintiff has not made any allegations, nor provided any other affidavits or documents, 

suggesting that there is general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over DeWine pursuant to the 

 

22 The Court did not analyze its personal jurisdiction over DeWine above with respect to its 

dismissal of the claims in this action because “a court may not sua sponte dismiss for want of 

personal jurisdiction, at least where a defendant has entered an appearance.” Kapar v. Kuwait 

Airways Corp., 845 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although this is a case where Defendant 

DeWine has not entered an appearance, the Court need not decide whether this would be an 

appropriate circumstance to consider dismissing claims against Defendant DeWine, sua sponte, 

based on personal jurisdiction given that there are other grounds that require dismissal of those 

claims.
25 

laws of the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code §§ 13-422, 13-423. Plaintiff has not alleged that 

DeWine has contacts with the District of Columbia that are “continuous and systematic” 

supporting general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 415-16. 

Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged that DeWine either lives or works in Washington, D.C.23 

Nor has Plaintiff alleged that DeWine has any connections to the District of Columbia 

with respect to this action in particular. Plaintiff’s two sole references to connections between the 

Attorney General of Ohio and litigation in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia are insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. See Compl. at 17 ([E]ffective October 

28, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued Exemplified 

certificated documents to Plaintiff as part of a Non-Judicial proceeding against the Ohio 

Department of Taxation and Attorney General Jim Petro of the Revenue Recovery Enforcement 

Collection Section, supervised by Michael DeWine; Attorney General for the State of Ohio.”); 

id. at 7. (“The Ohio Department of Taxation and Attorney General Jim Petro of the Revenue 

Recovery Enforcement Collections Section was involved in a direct suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia; Case No. 1:14-CV-00110-JDB.”). Being hauled into 

court as a defendant, as DeWine was in the case that Plaintiff references, is far from enough to 

establish that Defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the protections of D.C. law. See Asahi 

Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 109. Ultimately, Plaintiff has not suggested any basis for the Court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over DeWine in this action. For this reason, in addition to all of 

the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s first and second default judgment motions are denied. 

 

23 The Court notes that it would be unusual if DeWine did work or live in Washington, D.C., 

given that he is currently serving as the Attorney General of Ohio. 
26 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Franklin County Defendants’ [7] Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. The Court concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over the Franklin 

Country Defendants and that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against 

those defendants as a result of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court sua sponte dismisses all 

the claims against Defendant DeWine. Not only are those claims barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine as well, but the Court concludes that there is no jurisdiction over money damages claims 

against DeWine in his official capacity because of Ohio’s sovereign immunity and that all the 

claims against DeWine in his personal capacity fail because of ineffective service of process. In 

addition, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES both Plaintiff’s first [4] Motion for 

Immediate Default Judgment and Award and Plaintiff’s second [10] Motion for Immediate 

Default Judgment and Award. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action in its entirety. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Dated: December 17, 2014 

/s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 

United States District Judge