NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. NEUROPATHY SOLUTIONS, INC., DBA Superior Health Centers,

Defendant

- Appellee,
and RIGOBERTO BERNAL, an individual; et al.,
Defendants. No. 22

- 55272
D.C. No. 8:21

- cv - 00607

- DOC

- JDE

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 17, 2023 Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BRESS, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. In this diversity action under California law, Massachusetts Bay Insurance

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

APR 3 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Company (MBIC) seeks reimbursement of $2 million that it paid under a reservation of rights to settle litigation brought against its insured, Neuropathy Solutions , Inc. (Neuropathy). On cross

- motions for judgment on the pl eadings, the district court held that MBIC had a duty to defend and indemnify Neuropathy in the underlying case (the Bernal action), and that MBIC was thus not entitled to any reimbursement

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. W e review the dist rict court’s ruling
de novo

. Webb v. Trader Joe’s Co ., 999 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) . W e

reverse. 1
1. MBIC satisfied the prerequisites for seeking reimbursement of the amount it paid to settle the Bernal action on Neuropathy’s behalf

. To seek reimbursement
under California law , an insurer must provide (1) a timely and express reservation of rights; (2) an express notification to the insured of the insurer ’ s intent to accept a proposed settlement offer; and (3) an express offer to the insur ed that it may assume
its own defense in the event that the insured does not wish to accept the proposed
settlement. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen , 22 P.3d 313, 32 0

– 21 (Cal. 2001)

. MBIC provided a timely and express reservation of rights in its letter of February 25, 2021. In its letter of May 13, 2021, MBIC informed Neuropathy of its
intention to settle the claims for the $2 million policy limit, subject to Neuropathy’s approval and MBIC’s reservation of rights. T his letter also informed Neur opathy of

1 MBIC appeals only the district court’s ruling on the duty to indemnify.3

its “right to assume the further handling of this matter going forward” if Neuropathy
did not w ish to settle the claims for $2 million. Neuropathy signed the settlement agreement on May 28, 2021. Contrary to Neuropathy’s argument, MBIC gave
Neu ropathy sufficient time to consider the proposed settlement. See id. at 315 (indicating that insurer provided notice on June 4 and requested a response by June 10, where the settlement offer was to expire on June 12).
2. Under California law, “ [t] he insu rer’s duty to indemnify runs to claims that are actually covered, in light of the facts proved.” Buss v. Superior Ct. , 939 P.2d 766, 773 (Cal. 1997)

. “By contrast, the insurer’s duty to defend runs to claims that are merely potentially covered, in light of facts alleged or otherwise disclosed.” Id. Thus, “the insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.” Id. The
district court erred by invoking the broader duty

- to

- defend standard (potentiality of coverage) to require MBIC to cover not just the cost of defending the underlying
Bernal suit but also the $2 million paid to settle it

. We thus proceed to evaluate
whether the Bernal action actually fell within the MBIC policy as written

. 3. T o the extent that the underlying Bernal action f alls within the coverage provisions of the insurance policy (i.e., to the extent Neuropathy’s liability arose out of an accidental “occurrence”), coverage is excluded under the policy’s
“Professional Se rvices” exclusion. That provision exclude s:

“ Bodily injury ” , “ property damage ” , [ and ] “ personal and advertising injury ” caused by the rendering of or failure to render any professional4

service, advice or instruction: (1) By [the insured] ; or (2) On [the insured’s] behalf; or (3) From whom [the insured] assumed liability by reason of a contract or agreement, regardless of whether any such service, advice or instruction is ordinary to any insured’s profession. Additionally, the insurance pol icy provides that professional services include , among other things, “ [l] egal, accounting or advertising service s,” “ [m] edical

. . . or nursing services treatment, advice or instruction ,” and “ [a] ny health or therapeutic service treatment, advice or instru ction

. ” 2 In addition, under California law governing commercial general liability policies , “ [p] rofessional services are defined as those arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill,
and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.” Tradewinds Escrow, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch. , 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 568 (Ct. App. 2002) (quotation omitted). This “is a broader definition than ‘profes sion,’ and encompasses services performed for remuneration.” Id. (quotation

2 The policy extended this exclusion to wrongdoing by agents:
This [professional services] exclusion applies even if a claim alleges negligence or other wrongdoing in the supervision, hiring, employment, training or monitoring of others by an insured, if the “occurrence” which caused the “bodily injury” or “property damage”, or the offense whic h caused the “personal and advertising injury”, involved the rendering of or failure to render any professional service.5

omitted). The “unifying factor” is “whether the injury occurred during the performance of the professional services, not the instrumentality of injury.” Id.
Based on California case law , the insurance policy’s text, and the operative complaint in the Bernal action , Neuropathy’s liability in Bernal fell within the
“P rofessional S ervices ” exclusion. Starting from the very first sentence of the
Bernal complaint , it is evident that Neuropat hy incurred liability as a result of the professional services it provided: “This complaint arises from a series of falsely advertised, recklessly administered, non

- FDA approved ‘stem cell’ injections Mr. Bernal received that nearly killed him and left him a permanent paraplegic from the waist down.” The entire gravamen of the Bernal complaint was that Neuropathy engaged in deceptive and illegal advertising and business practices in connection with the provision of medical services. Neuropathy was thus li able for providing “advertising services,” “[m]edical

. . . or nursing services treatment, advice or instruction,” or “[a]ny health or therapeutic service treatment, advice or instruction , ”
all of which are excluded under the “P rofessional S ervices ” exclus ion.
It does not matter that Elite Medical Group (EMG) , not Neuropathy , allegedly employed the medical professionals who performed the injection , nor does it matter
that Neuropathy’s contract with EMG purported to assign to Neuropathy only
administrative duties. As we noted, t he “Professional Services” exclusion extends

to wrongdoing in the supervision and monitoring of others in the provision of6

professional services, and Neuropathy incurred liabilit y because of its provision of professional advertising and medical services, not inadequate recordkeeping or poor
customer service. Finally, the complaint’s allegation that Neuropathy engaged in discriminatory “marketing techniques and high

- pressure sales tactics” falls within the “Professional Services” exclusion for advertising services and health advice or
instruction. Neuropathy’s liability in the Bernal action was thus excluded from coverage, and MBIC is entitled to reimbursement of the $2 million it paid to settle that lawsuit

. REVERSED.