1 Filed 11/26/14 P. v. Smith CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. WINFRED LEE SMITH, Defendant and Appellant. C071695 (Super. Ct. No. 11F07664)

A jury convicted defendant Winfred Lee Smith of possession of a firearm by a felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1 ) [now § 29800, subd. (a)(1) (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)] [count 1]; unless st ated otherwise, statutory refe rences that follow are to the Penal Code), carrying a conceal ed weapon (former § 12025, subd. (a)(2) [now § 25400, subd. (a) (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)] [count 2], and possessi on of ammunition by a felon (former § 12316, subd. (b)(1) [now § 30305, subd. (a)(1) (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)] [count 3]. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the enhancement allegations2 that defendant had suffered three strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b) - (i), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)) and served seven separate prison terms. (§ 667.5.) Defendant was sentenced as a third st riker to 25 years to life on count 1, a concurrent term of 25 years to life on count 3, and seven years for each of the prior prison terms. The court stayed a 25-year-to-life se ntence on the count 2 conviction pursuant to section 654. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence that he was carrying a gun and ammunition as the fruit of an unlawful detention and search; (2) adm itted evidence of defendant’s in -custody statements over his Miranda objection; and (3) allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence that he was on methamphetamine and carrying a knife on the day of the incident even though he was not charged with any crimes rela ted to that conduct. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

F ACTS A ND P ROCEEDINGS Around 3:30 p.m. on November 7, 2011, Sacramento Co unty Deputy Sheriff Shaun Hampton was on routine patrol in th e area of 37th Avenue and Nina Way, which borders a well-known high crime area wher e prostitution, narcotics activity, and gang violence are prevalent. After seeing defendan t walking down the street away from him, Deputy Hampton parked his pa trol car and got out of the car and approached defendant from behind. The officer did no t turn his emergency lights on. Defendant turned around to face the officer. At that point, Deputy Hampton saw defendan t was carrying a black nylon bag approximately 6 by 12 inches wide with two zippered pouches, a smaller one in the front and a larger co mpartment in the back. Deputy Hampton began talk ing to defendant in a casual manner, asking him how he was doing and where he was going. In re sponse, defendant immediately jumped back and blurted out that he was not on probation or parole. Defe ndant’s hands were fidgety.3 After telling him to relax and that it was okay, Deputy Hampton asked defendant for his identification. Defenda nt handed his wallet to Deput y Hampton and then began to reach inside one of the black bag’s zippere d pouches. Upon se eing defendant reaching into the bag, Deputy Hampton handed the wa llet back to defendant and asked him to remove his identification himself. Defendant tucked the black bag under his arm, found his identification and gave it to Deputy Hampton. While writing down defenda nt’s information, Deputy Hampton saw defendant acting in a strange manner. Defendant was ve ry fidgety and was speaking rapidly. He was also sweating profusely even though it was a relatively cool afternoon in November. Given defendant’s rapid speech pattern, his excessive sweating, and his extremely fidgety behavior, Deputy Hampton believed defendan t might be under the influence of a controlled substance. Defendant began pulling what appeared to be a computer cord out of the bag’s larger compartment, which by that time was partially opened. While doing so, defendant was attempting to unzip the la rge compartment even further. Although Deputy Hampton repeatedly asked defendant to stop touching the black bag, defendant continued pulling on the computer cord until he removed it co mpletely and dropped it on the ground. Defendant then began to reach inside the bag. Concerned for his safety due to the bag’s unknown contents, Deputy Hampton told defendant to stop reaching into the bag. Defendant, however, conti nued to reach into the bag and repe atedly stated, “I just want to show you what I got.” He also kept clai ming, “I ain’t got nothing.” Deputy Hampton asked defendant between five and eight tim es to stop reaching into the bag. When defendant continued to reach into the bag, Deputy Hampton began backing up to put some distance between them given their close proximity. Defendant was acting very erratically and then reach ed into the bag with an open hand. Th e deputy drew his service weapon and ordered defe ndant to drop the bag, which he did. Deputy Hampton asked defendant to turn around and place his hands behind his head. Defendant began4 rapidly looking around in all directions as if to run, but he even tually complied and was handcuffed. After handcuffing defendant, Deputy Hamp ton asked defendant whether he had anything illegal on him. Defenda nt responded that he had a methamphetamine pipe in his pants pocket. Deputy Hampton re trieved the pipe and placed de fendant in the back of the patrol car. Deputy Hampton checked for law enforcem ent records relating to defendant. He then picked the black bag up, tu rned on his in-car camera, a nd searched the bag. In the bag, Deputy Hampton found a large knife, a loaded semi-a utomatic .22 caliber handgun, and 30 rounds of .22 caliber a mmunition. The in-car camerarecorded the conversations between defendant and Deputy Hampton whil e defendant was handcuffed in the back seat of the patrol car. Defendant’s blood was later drawn at the county jail to determine whether he was under the influence of any narcotics or othe r controlled substances . Defendant’s blood sample tested positiv e for methamphetamine; the sample amount indicated that defendant had likely used the narcotic with in the preceding 24 hours. Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and being a felon in possession of both a firearm and ammunition. At the preliminary hearing, defendant moved under section 1538.5 to suppress the gun and ammunition evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention and sear ch in violation of the Four th Amendment. The People opposed the motion arguing that neither Deputy Hampton’s initial cont act with defendant nor his request to see defendant’s identifi cation constituted a dete ntion, that Deputy Hampton had reasonable suspicion to detain de fendant, and that the search of defendant’s bag was incident to his lawful arrest. The tr ial court judge, sitting as a magistrate, denied the motion, deemed th e complaint an information, and held defendant to answer. Defendant raised the suppression issu e again in a motio n to dismiss the information under section 995, arguing the magistrate erred in denying his previous5 motion to suppress because he was unlawfully detained from the moment the officer stopped to talk to him. The People op posed the motion, argui ng defendant was not detained until the officer drew his gun, that the detention was lawful, and that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant fo r being under the infl uence of a controlled substance, and later, probable cause to arrestdefendant for carryin g a concealed weapon and being a felon in possessi on of the weapon and ammuniti on. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion. During trial defendant moved to exclude certa in pretrial statements he made while sitting in the patrol car which were record ed on Deputy Hampton’ s in-car camera. According to defendant, th e recorded statements were the result of a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings. After hearing argument, the court denied the motion. Defendant also tried to exclude evidence that a knife was found in the black bag and that he had tested positive for methampheta mine on the day of his arrest because he was not charged with any offens es based on such evidence. The court denied the motion to exclude the evidence. The jury convicted defendant on all counts, and the court later found all enhancement allegations true. Following sentencing, defendant timely appealed.

D ISCUSSION

I Motion to Suppress Gun and Ammunition Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the gun and ammunition were discovered after he wa s unlawfully detained and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendm ent. In defendant’s view, he was illegally detained almost from the moment Deputy Ha mpton contacted him, and certainly when the officer asked him not to touch the zippered bag. We disagree.6 A. Standard and Scope of Review A criminal defendant may challenge the reasonableness of a search or seizure by moving to suppress evidence at a prelim inary hearing as defendant did here. ( People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 528 (McDonald); § 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) If unsuccessful, he may raise the issue again befo re the superior cour t by way of a section 995 motion. ( McDonald at p. 529; § 1538.5, subd. (m ).) In a section 995 proceeding, “[t]he superior court merely reviews the evid ence; it does not substitute its judgment on the weight of the evid ence nor does it resolve factual conflicts.” ( McDonald at p. 529.) On appeal from the section 995 ruling, we review the magistrate’s determination at the preliminary hearing. ( McDonald, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 529; see People v.
Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718, superseded by statute on other grounds [on appeal from section 995 review of motion-to-suppress denial “the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior cour t and directly reviews” the magistrate’s determination holding the defe ndant to answer].) “We must draw all presumptions in favor of the magistrate’s factual determina tions, and we must uph old the magistrate’s express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” ( McDonald at p. 529.) “We judge the legality of the search by ‘measur[ing ] the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional st andard of reasonableness.’ ” ( Ibid. ) We exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable. ( Ibid. ) “We may sustain the trial court’s decision without embracing its reasoning .” ( McDonald, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) Thus , we may affirm the ruling on defendant’s motion to su ppress if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling is ba sed on an incorrect reason. ( Ibid. [citing People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972].)7 B. Fourth Amendment Principles There are generally three types of police contact with persons, only two of which implicate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ( In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1237.) That amendment gua rantees the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures . (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The first type of contact “ ‘is referred to as a “consensual encounter” in which there is no restraint on the person’s liberty. There need be no objec tive justification for such an encounter. The second type, calle d “detention,” involves a seizure of the individual for a limited duration and for limit ed purposes. A constitutionally acceptable detention can occur “if there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” The third type invol ves seizures in the nature of an arrest, which may occur only if the police have probab le cause to arrest the person for a crime. [Citations.]’ ” ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237.) “[T]o determine whether a particular enco unter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the en counter to determin e whether the police conduct would have communicate d to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or othe rwise terminate the encounter.” ( Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439 [115 L.Ed.2d 389, 401-402].) Ci rcumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: th e presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physi cal touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. ( United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509].) We must decide where on the spectrum defendant’s contact with Deputy Hampton falls, keeping in mind that wh ile police contact may be consensual initially it may later escalate into a detention or an arrest de pending on the circum stances. With these concepts in mind, we examine de fendant’s encounter with police.8 C. Defendant’s Initial Poli ce Encounter was Consensual Based on the evidence pres ented on the motion to supp ress, the magistrate found defendant had not been detain ed within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Deputy Hampton contacted him, asked for his identification, or wh en the officer asked him not to place his hands in the bag. Instea d, the court found a de tention occurred when Deputy Hampton pulled his gun, and that the detention was reasonable given defendant’s repeated attempts to put his hand in the ba g after Deputy Hampton, for safety reasons, asked him not to touch the bag. The court’ s findings are amply supported by the record and case law. We agree that the totality of the circumstances s hows defendant was not detained until Deputy Hampton drew his firearm and pointed it at defendant. We note at the outset that a police offi cer may approach an individual in a public place and ask questions without implic ating the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309.) “The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions . [Citation.] As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the enco unter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is re quired on the part of the offi cer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur.” ( In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) Deputy Hampton, then, need ed no justification to appr oach defendant on a public street and ask him some questi ons. And the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting Deputy Hampton exhibited coercive or author itative behavior in approaching defendant. He was alone, did not activate his lights, and pulled up behind defendant without blocking his path. ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1237-1238 [use of overhead lights or a siren may constitute a gesture of authority]; People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 940 [“Certainly, an officer’s parking behind an ordinary9 pedestrian reasonably would not be construed as a detention. No attempt is made to block the way”] ( Franklin ).) Although defendant’s statement that he wa s not on probation or parole suggests he “may have believed he was under official sc rutiny, the objective indicia of a detention were absent.” ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1238.) We can glean nothing from the record suggesting that the deputy’s tone or actions suggested defendant was not free to leave. Deputy Hampton simply aske d defendant where he was going. He told defendant to relax and that everything was okay. The deputy himself testified that he struck up a casual conversation with defendan t. Given the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not detained upon his in itial contact with Deputy Hampton. Asking to see defendant’s identifica tion did not transform the consensual encounter into a detention. Where a consensual encounter has been fo und, as in this case, police may ask for identification. ( Franklin, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 941.) Likewise, defendant’s compliance in handin g over his identification does not mean he was detained. ( People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 353 [“ a voluntary relinquishment of one’s identification card does not constitute a seizur e as long as the encounter is consensual under the totality of th e circumstances”].) And, unlike defendant argue s, Deputy Hampton’s repeated requests that defendant refrain from reaching into the bag did not escalate the contact to a detention. ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1238 [orderin g defendant to remove his hands from his pockets did not transform a cons ensual encounter in to a detention]; Franklin,

supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 942 [a sking defendant to take hi s hands out of his pockets cannot reasonably be construe d as a show of authority sufficient to transform the encounter into a detention].) “We are sensi tive to the delicate balance between Fourth Amendment rights and a police officer’s safety.” ( In re Frank V. at p. 1238.) Requesting defendant to keep his hands in sight was the least intrusive me ans of neutralizing a perceived danger to Deputy Hampton’s safety. ( Id. at pp. 1238-1239.) “ ‘What is at most10 a mere inconvenience cannot prev ail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.’ ” ( Id. at p. 1238.) Once Deputy Hampton drew his firearm, however, we believe, like the trial court found, that defendant was detain ed for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The act of drawing his weapon conveyed a sufficient de gree of authority over defendant to constitute a detention. ( United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544 at p. 554 [64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509] [offi cer’s display of a weapon indicativ e of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment].)

D. Defendant’s Conduct Justified his Detention Having concluded defendant was detained when Deputy Hampton displayed his weapon, we must decide whether defendant’s conduct justified the detention as the trial court so found. We find that it did. A suspect may be detained if an officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the su spect is connected with it. ( Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911] ( Terry ).) In determining whether a detention was justified, reviewing courts “ ‘must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particul arized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. [Citation.] This proce ss allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information av ailable to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” ’ ” ( People v. Osborne (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058 ( Osborne ).) Applying this standard, we find Deputy Hampton’s detention of defendant was more than reasonable. A person’s conduct of placing his hands back in his pockets, after an officer has instructed him to take them out, has been found to constitute reasonable grounds to detain. ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240.) Continually reaching into a bag that is large enough to conceal a weap on, the contents of which are unknown, is11 analogous. ( People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 680 [“Un questionably, the work of a police officer in the field is often fraught with danger. At any given moment, a seemingly safe encounter or confrontation with a citizen can suddenly turn into an armed and deadly attack on the officer”].) Moreover, defendant’s fidgety and strange demeanor and his physical appearance were other factors contributin g to Deputy Hampton’s reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct had occurred, or was about to occur. Deputy Hampton testified that defendant’s mannerisms and profuse sweating on a cool No vember day were indicative of someone under the influence of a controlled subs tance. His opinion was based on his approximately 11 years as a p eace officer during wh ich time he underwe nt extensive drug training and handled hundreds of drug related arrests. “ ‘[C]ircumstances and conduct which would not excite the susp icion of the man on the street might be highly significant to an officer who had had extens ive training and experience.’ ” ( In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240.) Defendant’s presence in a high crime area , and specifically a well-known narcotics area, was likewise an additional factor cont ributing to a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention. While an area’s reputation fo r criminal activity alone may not justify an investigative detention, it is appropriate to consider with other factors when assessing whether a detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 240; In re Frank V., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1241.) Based on the totality of the circumst ances, including the lo cation, defendant’s demeanor, and defendant’s repeated attempts to place his hand in the bag after Deputy Hampton asked him not to, Deputy Hampton had reasonable articulable suspicion to temporarily detain defendant.12 E. Handcuffing Defendant was not a De Facto Arrest Deputy Hampton placed defendant in handc uffs after ordering him to drop the bag and prior to asking him whethe r he had anything illegal. Ha ndcuffing the defendant did not change the detention into a de facto arrest as defendant impliedly argues. “[T]he handcuffing of a detained indi vidual does not necessarily convert the detention into a de facto arrest.” ( Osborne, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) For example, in People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1 517-1519, the court deemed police to have conducted a lawful temporary detention and not a de facto arrest where they ordered occupants of a vehicle out of th eir car at gunpoint, handcuffed them, placed them in a patrol vehicle, drove them th ree blocks away, and detained them for 30 minutes. Under the circumstances, we find not hing unreasonable about the officer’s conduct in handcuffing defend ant. Defendant was described as a large man, weighing approximately 230 pounds. De puty Hampton further testifie d that he feared for his safety. Given defendant’s large stature and his agitated behavi or, Deputy Hampton’s safety concerns were fully justified. Th e officer, moreover, testified that he observed defendant rapidly looking left to right with hi s eyes and head. Based on his training, the officer recognized this as indicative of someone intending to flee. ( People v. Stier (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21, 27 [handcuffing during detention generally sanctioned in cases where officer has a reasonable basis for belie ving the suspect poses a present physical threat or might flee] ( Stier).) Briefly placing defendant in handcuffs to safely effectuate the investigatory detention and to deter his flight fro m the scene was reasonable. F. Questioning During Detention Wi thout Miranda Warnings was Appropriate Because Deputy Hampton reasonably deta ined defendant, he was entitled to “ ‘investigate the circumstances th at provoke[d] suspicion.’ ” ( Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 439 [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 334] ( Berkemer).) These circumstances13 included defendant’s location in an area known for narcotics activity, his bizarre demeanor, erratic behavior, rapid speech pattern, profus e sweating, and incessant attempts to place his hand in the bag af ter the officer asked him to stop. Deputy Hampton was permitte d to ask defendant a “mode rate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obt ain information confir ming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” ( Berkemer , supra , at p. 439 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 334]; People v.
Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 663 ( Manis ) [“brief questioning of a suspect temporarily detained by the police for inves tigation is constitutionall y valid”].) Before doing so, he was not required to info rm defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] ( Miranda ). ( Manis, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at p. 669 [“persons temporarily detained for br ief questioning by police officers who lack probable cause to make an arrest or brin g an accusation need not be warned about incrimination and their right to counsel, un til such time as the point of arrest or accusation has been reached or the questioning has ceased to be brief and casual and become sustained and coercive”].) Under the circumstances, we percei ve nothing inappropriate with Deputy Hampton asking defendant a single question about whether he had anything illegal. ( Stier, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 25 [noting that officer asked individual whether she consented to a search and wh ether she had anything illegal ].) Defendant was not obliged to answer. ( Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 439 [82 L.Ed.2 d at p. 334].) But once he did, stating he had a methamphetamine sm oking pipe in his pocke t, the officer had probable cause to believe defendant had comm itted a drug-related offense. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11550, subd. (a) [punishing th e use of certain controlled substances, including methamphetamine]; 11364 [unlawful possession of narcotics paraphernalia].) This is especially so given defendant’s rapid speech, profuse sweating and erratic behavior, which, based on his training, Deputy Hampton testif ied were recognized symptoms of being under the influe nce of a controlled substance.14 “Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a crime.” ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1037; § 836 [warrantless arrest ju stified where officer has pr obable cause to believe a misdemeanor was committed in his presence].) In cases involving na rcotics, “ ‘probable cause “should not be unders tood as placing the ordinary man of ordinary care and prudence and the officer experien ced in the detection of narcotics offenders in the same class. Circumstances and co nduct which would not excite the suspicion of the man on the street might be highly si gnificant to an officer who had had extensive training and experience in the devious and cunning devices used by narcotics offenders to conceal their crimes.” ’ ” ( People v. Rich (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 115, 121 ( Rich ) [quoting People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970) 3 Cal.3d. 807, 827].)
In Rich , the officer had extensive narcotics training and recogniz ed the suspect’s swaying, deliberate speech and droopy eyelids as physical symptoms of being under the influence of an opiate. ( Rich, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at pp. 118-121.) This was sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant for viol ating Health and Safety Code section 11550. ( Rich at pp. 121-122.) The same is true here. G. Defendant’s Bag was Searched Incident to a Lawful Arrest Defendant contends that regardless of whether the detention was reasonable, Deputy Hampton was limited under Terry v. Ohio to patting down the outside of the bag to determine whether it contained a weapon. ( Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24 [20 L.Ed.2d 908].) Because Deputy Hampton failed to cond uct a limited patdown search before opening the bag, defendant argues the challe nged evidence should have been suppressed. We disagree, finding the officer searched the bag incident to a lawful arrest. ( McDonald,

supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 28 [denial of motion to su ppress affirmed on a ground15 advanced by the People in their opposition to defendant’s secti on 995 motion but not relied upon by the trial court].) Following a lawful arrest, an officer may generally conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s person and the area within his or her immediate control. ( People v. Flores (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 221, 229 ( Flores ) [citing Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 6 93-694]].) The “search incide nt to arrest rule” includes “an arrestee’s personal articles[,] such as a purse, wallet or coat act ually in use--though not necessarily on his person--at the moment of arrest,” because such items serve as possible sources of concealed weapon s or other evidentiary items. ( Id. at pp. 228, 230 [warrantless search of canvas shoulder bag valid as being incident to a lawful arrest]; People v. Brocks (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 959, 963-965 [upholding search of suspect’s closed coin purse incident to arrest wh ere officer reasonably believed item contained marijuana].) Because probable cause existe d to arrest defendant , Deputy Hampton could lawfully search the black bag defendant had been carrying throughou t the encounter even though it was no longer on his person. Given our conclusion that Deputy Hampto n lawfully detained defendant, his statement alerting the officer to the methamph etamine pipe in his pocket during the brief detention was admissible. So, too, was th e gun and ammunition evidence, which were discovered incident to his lawful arrest. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant’s moti on to suppress.

II Admissibility of Defendant’s Pretrial Statements Defendant argues that his statements to Deputy Hampton while seated in the patrol car were inadmissible b ecause they were obtain ed in violation of Miranda . ( Miranda,

supra, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].)16 Miranda requires that any person wh o is suspected or accus ed of a crime and who has been taken into custody may not be interrogated by the police unless he first knowingly and intelligently waives his right to silence, to th e presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel if indigent. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 336 ( Ray ) [citing Miranda at pp. 444-445, 458, 4 67, 476].) “Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible to prove the accused’ s guilt in a criminal prosecution.” ( Ibid. ) Miranda warnings are only implicat ed when a suspectis subjected to a custodial interrogation. ( Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 336; Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-302 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-308] [ Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either expr ess questioning or its f unctional equivalent].) For purposes of Miranda , custodial interrogation involves “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inhere nt in custody itself.” ( Ray , supra , at p. 336.) Interrogation includes subjecting a person to “ ‘words or actions . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ ” ( Ibid. ) “No interrogation occurs where the purpose behind Miranda is not implicated--preven ting government officials from exploiting the ‘coercive nature of confin ement to extract confessions that would not [otherwise] be given.’ ” ( Id. at pp. 336-337.) Not all statements from a c onfined suspect are the prod uct of police interrogation, however. ( Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 337.) “Any st atement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” ( Ibid. ) When reviewing whether a trial c ourt improperly admitted a defendant’s statements over his Miranda objection, we are bound to acce pt the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and infere nces if supported by substa ntial evidence, but we must independently determine whether the challeng ed statements were illegally obtained. ( People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263, di sapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn.1.)17 After acknowledging the absence of ev idence showing Deputy Hampton read defendant his Miranda rights at any time before defendant made the challenged pretrial statements, the court nonethel ess concluded defendant’s st atements were volunteered rather than the product of a custodial interrogation. Thus, despite the lack of any Miranda warnings, the court ruled the statements admissible. On appeal, defendant focuses on two que stions by Deputy Hampton in particular as evincing an intent to e licit an incriminating response: (1) “you made a really bad decision, didn’t you?” and (2) “[i]s that w hy you were reaching in to the bag?” We conclude defendant’s statemen ts, even those responding to the above questions, were not elicited as the result of interrogation. Th e statements, therefore, did not violate Miranda and were admissible during trial. First, the record shows defendant and not Deputy Ha mpton initiated the challenged conversation and directed its course. ( Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 338 [confession valid where suspect initiated contact with police] .) Deputy Hampton’s question about defendant’s reason for reaching into the bag was simp ly in response to defendant’s statement that he was “not ch allenging” the officer. At one point Deputy Hampton even told defendant, “I got nothing to say to you.” Later, the officer told defendant that he could “talk to the jury.” The requisite coercive activity by Deputy Hampton is decidedly absent. Second, defendant’s statements were es sentially given in a narrative, almost rambling form the purpose of which was to ju stify, explain, or at least excuse his problematic behavior. That Deputy Hampto n interposed some comments and questions to clarify matters does not mean defendant was interrogated while in custody. ( Ray,

supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 338 [officer not required to sit silently and listen to suspect’s rambling narrative; officer can ask neutral inquiries and clarif ying questions].) And, even assuming, for the sake of argum ent, that the court erred in admitting the statements, we conclude any error was not prejudicial. ( People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th18 405, 447-448 [admission of confession or statements obtained in violation of Miranda requirements subject to harmless be yond reasonable doubt standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 7 10].) In other words, the error, if any occurred, did not contribute to the verdict. Former section 12021 make s it a crime for a convicted felon to own, purchase, receive, or have “in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm.” (Former § 12021, su bd. (a)(1) [now § 2 9800, subd. (a)(1) (S tats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)].) Similarly, former section 12316 pr ohibits a convicted felon, who cannot own or possess a firearm under section 12021, from ow ning, possessing, or having under his or her custody or control any ammunition or re loaded ammunition. (Former § 12316, subd. (b) [now § 30305, subd. (a)(1) (S tats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)].) Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony. And, it was uncontested that Deputy Hamp ton observed defend ant holding and reaching into the bag that contained the loaded gun and ammuniti on. Given defendant’s stipulation and the uncontested evidence that defe ndant possessed the bag with the gun and the ammunition, we are convinced be yond a reasonable doubt the ju ry still would have convicted defendant even if the statemen ts had not been admitted.

III Admissibility of Knife and Methamphetamine Use Evidence Defendant contends it was prejudicial e rror to admit eviden ce showing the bag contained a knife and that defendant tested positive for using methamphetamine within the preceding 24 hours of his encounter with Deputy Hampton. He reasons as follows: (1) evidence of the knife and drug use were ir relevant to the charges, and (2) the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code secti on 1101, subdivision (a), as evidence of uncharged offenses. We disagree.19 As far as we can discern from the reco rd, no specific objection was made on the latter basis that the ev idence violated the rule limiting admission of prior bad acts under Evidence Code section 1101. “The failure to state the sp ecific ground upon which an objection rests waives appellate review of the objection.” ( People v. Dorsey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 959; Evid . Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Defense counsel did, however, request that such evidence be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as being “inheren tly damaging” to defendant. In making the argument, defense counsel stated: “To suggest that these other things inclusive, with my client’s not even being charged for them, they are very prejudicial, they give the jury some indication that, oooh, he’s a druggy, oroooh, he has a knife, he’s more probably-- probability is he’s more likely to know he was carrying a gun. ” To the extent counsel’s argument could possibly be characterized as raising an objection under Evidence Code section 1101, we find the section inapplicable. The drug use evidence was received on the issue of Deputy Hampton’s credibility- -an obviously important issue. Nothing in Evidence Code section 1101 “affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the cred ibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c); People v. Stern (2003) 111 Cal.App.4t h 283, 296 [Evidence Code section 1101 did not bar evidence of prior unchar ged stabbing because evidence was relevant to believability of victim’s testimony].) And, th e knife evidence was received as circumstantial evidence that de fendant knew the entire contents of the bag when reaching into the bag afte r repeatedly being instructed to stop. Defense’s closing argument: “My side is, you know, I didn’t kn ow the gun was in th e bag because I found it over there.” Again, nothing in Evidence C ode section 1101 “prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civ il wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as . . . knowledge . . . ).” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) The restrictions on character evid ence in Evidence Code secti on 1101, then, simply do not apply.20 For similar reasons, we reje ct defendant’s contention th at the knife and drug use evidence was irrelevant. Eviden ce is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove a disputed material fact. (Evid. Code, § 210 .) That standard is easily met here. As set forth above, the drug use ev idence was relevant to establish the believability of Deputy Hampton’s testimony that defendant’s conduct was symptomatic of being under the influence of a narcotic. The fact thatdefendant tested positive for methamphetamine tended to prove that Depu ty Hampton was justified in suspecting defendant of being under the influence of a c ontrolled substance when he detained him. As the People point out, and we agree, th at the court ultimately determined whether defendant was legally detained does not mean, as defendant ar gues, that the jury was not entitled to know why Deputy Hampton reacted in th e manner he did to defendant’s conduct. And, contrary to defendant’s contention, the function of the knife evidence was not to suggest that defendant was a “killer.” Instead, as the trial c ourt noted, the knife evidence tended to prove that defendant had knowledge of the bag’s contents, including the gun and ammunition, which he repeatedly offered to show Deputy Hampton. Even the defense conceded during its closing that “knowledge” was the crux of the case. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence over defendant’s relevance objection. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113 [abuse of discretion standard of review applies to any ruling by a trial c ourt on the admissibility of evidence], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151].) But even if it erred, no miscarriag e of justice occurred given the uncontested evidence that defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. It is not reasonably probable that a result mo re favorable to defend ant would have been reached if the drug us e and knife evidence ha d been excluded. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Evid. Co de, § 353, subd. (b).)21 D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HULL , Acting P. J.

We concur:

BUTZ , J.

HOCH , J.