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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 21, 2022

MYRON LORENZO JOHNSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2006-A-396 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge

No. M2021-01420-CCA-R3-PC

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Myron L. Johnson, of first degree 

premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, and 

the trial court sentenced him to confinement for life plus sixty years. State v. Myron L. 

Johnson (“Johnson I”), No. M2008-02198-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 521028, at *1 (Tenn. 

Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 12, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2010). The 

Petitioner subsequently filed and adjudicated multiple post-conviction petitions and a 

habeas corpus petition, for all of which he was not granted relief. In his appeal of his most 

recent filing, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily 

dismissing his post-conviction petition. He contended below that his convictions could not 

stand because there was no fingerprint evidence to corroborate the eyewitness testimony. 

After review, we conclude the post-conviction court properly summarily dismissed the 

petition and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR. and J. ROSS DYER JJ., joined. 

Myron Lorenzo Johnson, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn E. Funk, District Attorney General; and Janice Norman, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Background

A. Trial

06/23/2022
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This case arises from the death of Eugene “Juan” McAdams, who was found by 

Nashville Metropolitan Police Department (“Metro”) officers in the bed of an abandoned 

truck in 2001. Years later, Metro officers developed the Petitioner as a suspect. Thereafter, 

for the victim’s death, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner and two codefendants for first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially 

aggravated robbery. The jury convicted the Petitioner as charged. 

This court summarized the facts presented at trial as follows:

On July 22, 2001, Detective Brad Corcoran with the Nashville 

Metropolitan Police Department was called to the scene of an abandoned 

truck off Old Hickory Boulevard. The body of the victim, Eugene “Juan” 

McAdams, was discovered in the bed of the truck covered with a white sheet; 

his ankles and wrists had been duct-taped. Following an autopsy, the cause 

of death was determined to be asphyxia and blunt force trauma to the head.

Initially, investigators were unable to develop a suspect. Several 

years later, Alvin Stokes, aka “Brother Gold,” was facing federal drug 

trafficking charges. In the hopes of receiving favorable consideration on his 

sentence, Stokes provided Detective Derry Baltimore with the names of the 

[Petitioner], Christopher Nunley, and Paul Anderson as the possible 

perpetrators of the killing of the victim. Detective Baltimore interviewed 

Nunley on February 17, 2005. Nunley took Det. Baltimore to the house 

where the murder occurred, and Det. Baltimore also verified Nunley’s phone 

number. After interviewing Nunley, Det. Baltimore proceeded to interview 

Anderson on May 12, 2005. Anderson provided details about the murder of 

the victim.

Anderson testified against the [Petitioner] at trial. Anderson stated 

that he met the [Petitioner] in 2000, and the two became good friends. 

Anderson moved into the [Petitioner’s] girlfriend’s house, and Anderson 

confirmed that he was drug addict during this time. He had also met Nunley 

on at least two occasions prior to the murder and knew him as “Skinny.” 

According to Anderson, the [Petitioner] and Nunley were involved together 

in the sale of drugs, and they often went to Stokes to get drugs.

On July 20, 2001, around 10:00 a.m., the [Petitioner] came over to the 

place where Anderson was temporarily residing. The [Petitioner] made a 

proposition to Anderson: In exchange for $500 and an ounce of cocaine, 

Anderson was to set up a drug deal with the victim and rob him of his drugs 

and money.

Anderson stated that the [Petitioner] and Nunley were angry with the 
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victim because he had tried to go around them in the drug trade; normally, 

they would purchase cocaine from the victim for $22,000 and then sell it for 

$26,000. However, the victim had slipped a note into the cocaine, providing 

a cell phone number and stating to the second buyer to deal with the victim 

directly. Anderson did not know the victim prior to July 20.

Nunley called the victim and arranged the deal. The plan was for 

Anderson to arrive to purchase four ounces of cocaine from the victim, but 

instead he would rob everyone. They were to later split the drugs and money. 

The [Petitioner] arrived in his truck with Nunley around 7:00 p.m. that 

evening to pick up Anderson, and they went to Nunley’s house. However, 

the [Petitioner] and Nunley stated that they wanted to change the amount to 

eighteen ounces, “a half of key.” Anderson no longer wanted to participate 

because he feared that there would be repercussions for stealing such a large 

amount of cocaine. The [Petitioner] instructed him to be quiet and sit down; 

Anderson complied. Nunley phoned the victim requesting the increased 

amount of cocaine.

While they were waiting on the victim to arrive, the [Petitioner] went 

out to his truck and retrieved a shotgun and a white bag. Inside the bag was 

a box of latex gloves. The [Petitioner] placed the bag and the gloves on the 

top of the refrigerator. The victim then entered the house and asked 

Anderson, “Do you want to buy some dope?” According to Anderson, the 

[Petitioner] then jumped up from the table and hit the victim in the head with 

the butt of the shotgun, rendering the victim unconscious. As soon as the 

victim fell to the floor, Nunley put on a pair of gloves and began wrapping 

duct tape around the victim’s head. The [Petitioner] also put on gloves. They 

taped the victim’s head “completely up,” also taping his hands and feet. 

When the victim started to come to, he was unable to breathe and began 

“flopping around just like a fish dying . . . .” The victim soon ceased moving.

The [Petitioner] then removed a gold necklace from around the 

victim’s neck. The [Petitioner] went outside to the victim’s truck; 

meanwhile, Nunley was cleaning up blood on the floor. Thereafter, they 

carried the victim to a bedroom window and pushed him out the window into 

the bed of the victim’s truck. Nunley handed the [Petitioner] a sheet, which 

he wrapped around the victim. The men then left the house; Nunley driving 

the victim’s truck, and the [Petitioner] driving his truck with Anderson as a 

passenger. They drove to Old Hickory Boulevard near Blueberry Hill and 

left the truck on the side of the road. The [Petitioner] took the victim’s 

compact disc case out of his truck. Nunley got into the [Petitioner’s] vehicle, 

and they returned to the [Petitioner’s] girlfriend’s house. The [Petitioner] 

and Anderson showered, and the [Petitioner] collected their clothes. Nunley 
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then left after receiving his share of the cocaine; the [Petitioner] took 

Anderson back to Anderson’s place. The next day, the [Petitioner] gave

Anderson cocaine and money and rented [Petitioner] a room in a local motel. 

[Petitioner] later told Stokes about the murder.

In September 2007, the [Petitioner] and Anderson were being 

transported on a bus together. Anderson was in protective custody, separated 

from the [Petitioner] by a cage. The [Petitioner] yelled threats at Anderson, 

warning him not to testify against him. Inmate Timothy Flener was present 

on the bus and heard these threats. He was also placed in a cell with the 

[Petitioner] following the bus ride, and the [Petitioner] told Flener that he 

and Anderson were involved in a murder together.

The [Petitioner’s] wife and former girlfriend in July 2001, Tammi 

Renee Battle, was shown a box of gloves. She confirmed that the box in the 

photograph was the same type of gloves that she had brought home from 

work.

Medical Examiner Dr. Thomas Deering testified as to the victim’s 

cause of the death. He also stated that, when a person was losing the ability 

to breathe, they might start thrashing around.

A check of Nunley’s phone records showed that Nunley phoned the 

victim on the day of his murder. The victim’s phone records revealed that 

the victim had phoned Nunley several times the evening he was murdered.

Jafton Richardson, an inmate serving a sentence for practicing law 

without a license, testified that, while incarcerated, the [Petitioner] told him 

he was involved in a homicide at Nunley’s house. The [Petitioner] relayed 

that there was a phone call to the victim, and he was to meet with them at the 

house for a drug deal. However, they intended to rob him of his drugs and 

weapons, but instead the victim was hit in the head with the butt of a shotgun 

and died. The [Petitioner] also stated that he wore gloves during the robbery 

and that he got the gloves from his wife who worked at a hospital. According 

to Richardson, the [Petitioner’s] attitude about the murder was “nonchalant.”

Later, the [Petitioner] came to Richardson in jail and asked him to sign 

an affidavit that the [Petitioner] had never spoken to him about the murder. 

Richardson complied because he feared for the safety of his family.

The [Petitioner] testified on his own behalf, asserting that he had no 

involvement in the murder of the victim. He denied that he ever knew the 

victim, asserted that he never sold drugs, and claimed that he never owned a 
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shotgun.

Following the conclusion of the proof, the jury found the [Petitioner] 

guilty as charged. The trial court merged the felony murder and premeditated 

murder counts. The [Petitioner] was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 

murder plus sixty years for especially aggravated robbery. 

Johnson I, 2010 WL 521028, at *1-3. The Petitioner appealed his convictions based upon 

evidentiary grounds, and this court affirmed his convictions. Id. at *1.

B. Habeas Corpus Filing

In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the 

validity of his sentences. Myron L. Johnson v. State (“Johnson II”), No. M2013-02314-

CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 3696261, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 24, 2014), 

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2014). We dismissed the appeal, filing a Rule 20 

memorandum opinion. In it we stated:

The Appellant’s sentences have not expired, and there is nothing on the face 

of the judgments or the record to suggest that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to sentence the Appellant to life imprisonment for his first degree 

murder conviction and sixty years at 100% as a career offender for his 

especially aggravated robbery conviction.

Id.

C. Post-Conviction Filings and Facts

Later, the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief based upon an allegation of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. 

Myron L. Johnson v. State (“Johnson III”), No. M2016-01361-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 

1427254, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 21, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

Aug. 16, 2017). The post-conviction court denied his petition, and the Petitioner appealed. 

Id. On appeal, this court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court, and the 

supreme court denied him permission to appeal. Id.

In 2020, the Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis 

Act of 2001. Myron L. Johnson v. State (“Johnson IV”), No. M2020-01734-CCA-R3-PC, 

2021 WL 4521082, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 4, 2021), perm. app. denied 

(Tenn. Jan. 14, 2021). He alleged that the State had not offered forensic evidence to bolster 

or substantiate the testimony of its key witness. Id. He attached evidence reports showing 

that the MNPD had gathered duct tape with pieces of latex and separated the latex with 

liquid nitrogen but no fingerprints were found. Id. 
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The post-conviction court summarily denied the petition finding that the Petitioner 

“has not made clear which evidence he wishes to have tested.” Id. at *2. The postconviction court noted that the Petitioner attached evidence reports to his petition and that 

the reports referred to latex gloves and duct tape. Id. The post-conviction court also noted 

that, according to the testimony at trial, latex gloves and duct tape were used during the 

victim’s murder. However, the post-conviction Court stated that the Petitioner “has not 

alleged what DNA found on any of these items would indicate.” Id. The court concluded 

that given that the evidence against the Petitioner primarily consisted of eyewitness 

testimony, “[t]here is no reason whatsoever to believe that the analysis of any of the items 

. . . would exonerate Petitioner.” Id. Accordingly, the post-conviction court denied the 

petition. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed the findings of the post-conviction court, and 

our supreme court denied review. Id. at *3, *1.

In September 2021, the Petitioner filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal. 

The post-conviction motion was based upon the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act 

of 2021. The Petitioner alleged that the evidence against him was based on “an admitted 

drug addict whose testimony was that the defendant was a friend who gave him shelter and 

a place to live.” He noted that there was no fingerprint evidence that substantiated the 

witnesses’ claims. He noted that there were items gathered by the police that should have 

had his fingerprints on them, namely a white plastic bag that was put on the victim’s head, 

a box of latex gloves, and a roll of duct tape. The Petitioner said that the record showed 

that the case against him was not based on physical evidence “but rather coerced testimony 

from a highly incredible [sic] witness.” He requested that analysis of the items be 

conducted. 

The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. It found:

The Court of Criminal Appeals has already upheld Petitioner’s 

conviction, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support this 

conviction. This evidence consisted primarily of testimony of several 

eyewitnesses, and the proof at trial showed that there were multiple 

individuals involved in the murder. There is no reason to believe the absence 

of Petitioner’s fingerprints on these items would exonerate Petitioner. 

Additionally, the appellate court recently upheld the decision of this court to 

deny testing of possible DNA evidence based on the same argument.

(citations omitted).

It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis
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On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it 

denied his petition because fingerprint testing would exonerate him of the charged offenses. 

The State responds that the post-conviction court properly denied relief to the Petitioner 

because the post-conviction court correctly determined that the Petitioner did not satisfy 

the requirements of the Fingerprint Analysis act. We agree with the State. 

The Fingerprint Analysis Act provides that:

(a) Notwithstanding part 1 of this chapter, or any other law governing 

post-conviction relief to the contrary, any appropriate party may, at any time, 

file a petition requesting the performance of fingerprint analysis of any 

evidence that is in the possession or control of the prosecution, law 

enforcement, laboratory, or court, and that is related to the investigation or 

prosecution that resulted in a judgment of conviction and that may contain 

fingerprint evidence.

(b) As used in this section, “any appropriate party” means:

(1) A court on its own motion;

(2) A district attorney general; or

(3) A person convicted of and sentenced for the commission 

or attempted commission of:

(A) First degree murder;

(B) A Class A felony;

(C) A Class B felony;

(D) Any lesser included offense of an offense in 

subdivisions (b)(3)(A)-(C); or

(E) Any other offense, at the direction of the court.

T.C.A. § 40-30-403.

The trial court may order fingerprint analysis if, after notice to the prosecution and 

an opportunity to respond, the court finds that:

(1) A reasonable probability exists that analysis of the evidence will 

produce fingerprint results that would have rendered the petitioner’s verdict 

or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding 

leading to the judgment of conviction;

(2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that 

fingerprint analysis may be conducted;
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(3) The evidence was not previously subjected to fingerprint analysis, 

was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve 

an issue not resolved by previous analysis, or was previously subjected to 

analysis and the person making the motion under this part requests analysis 

that uses a new method or technology that is substantially more probative 

than the prior analysis; and

(4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of 

demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of 

sentence or administration of justice.

T.C.A. § 40-35-405. Compare T.C.A. § 40-30-404(1) (the court shall order analysis if “[a] 

reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or 

convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through fingerprint analysis”).

This court recently interpreted the Fingerprint Analysis Act. Oscar Smith v. State,

No. M2021-01339-CCA-R3-PD, 2022 WL 854438 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 

23, 2022), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. When so doing, it stated: 

This Court concludes the Fingerprint Act’s text is clear and unambiguous; 

thus, we need not look beyond the statute itself to ascertain its meaning. To 

that end, because the language of the Fingerprint Act mirrors, for the most 

part, the wording of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 

(hereinafter “DNA Act”), the trial court looked to case law discussing the 

DNA Act for guidance in ruling on the instant petition. Compare T.C.A. §§ 

40-30-301 to -313 with T.C.A. §§ 40-30-401 to -413. We agree with that 

logical decision. The appellate courts of this state have had ample 

opportunity over the last twenty years or so to interpret the meaning of the 

DNA Act.

Id. at *13. 

The Smith court went on to note that:

[A] trial court is not required to hold a hearing to determine whether a petition 

for [fingerprint] analysis should be granted or denied. See Charles Elsea v. 

State, No. E2017-01676-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 2363589 at *3 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. May 24, 2018), no perm. app filed. Similarly, a petitioner must satisfy 

all four elements of Section 405 before the trial court will order [fingerprint] 

analysis. See [Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 48 (Tenn. 2011)]. 

Id.
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In the case under submission, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err 

when it dismissed the Petitioner’s petition because he has not satisfied all four elements of 

section 405. The first requirement of section 405 is that: (1) “A reasonable probability 

exists that analysis of the evidence will produce fingerprint results that would have 

rendered Petitioner’s verdict or sentence more favorable if the results had been available 

at the proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction.” T.C.A. § 40-30-405(1). “The 

definition of ‘reasonable probability’ has been well-established in other contexts, and is 

traditionally articulated as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome’” of the prosecution. Powers, 343 S.W.3d at 54 (quoting Grindstaff v. State, 297 

S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 

Any testing on the items mentioned by the Petitioner would have revealed one of 

three results: it would show his fingerprints, it would not show his fingerprints, or it would 

be inconclusive. The most favorable outcome to the Petitioner would be that his 

fingerprints would not be on any of the aforementioned items. The absence of his 

fingerprints, however, would not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the case. 

There was ample evidence corroborated by multiple witnesses that was sufficient to convict 

the Petitioner. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude the postconviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. In 

accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the judgment of the 

post-conviction court.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE