J-S48042-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Y.V.K., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

V.S.K.,

Appellee No. 540 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Domestic Relations at No.: 384 S 2016

PACSES No. 946115925

BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017

Appellant, Y.V.K. (Mother), appeals pro se from the trial court’s child 

and spousal support order, which adopted the recommendation of the 

support master and set forth the child and spousal support owed by V.S.K. 

(Father).1 Specifically, Mother challenges the court’s determination of 

Father’s net income. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although Mother challenges the court’s order for child and spousal support, 

spousal support orders are interlocutory and not appealable when entered 

during the pendency of divorce claims. See Leister v. Leister, 684 A.2d 

192, 193 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc); see also Capuano v. Capuano, 823 

A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[During the pendency of a divorce 

action,] the portion of a trial court order attributable to child support is final 

and immediately appealable; however, the portion of an order allocated to 

spousal support is interlocutory.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial 

court’s March 6, 2017 order is appealable only as it relates to child support.
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We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from the trial 

court’s April 19, 2017 opinion, and our independent review of the certified 

record. Mother and Father were married in March 2006, and are the parents 

of two children, M.V.K., born in December 2006, and J.V.K., born in June 

2008. Mother is the primary custodian of the children. The parties 

separated on April 29, 2016. On May 12, 2016, Mother filed a complaint 

seeking both child and spousal support. The court appointed a support 

master, who conducted a hearing de novo on August 26, 2016. 

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Mother’s monthly gross 

income was $3,068.28. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/26/16, at 5). Mother testified 

that she is the primary custodian of the children; however, they spend three 

nights out of every two weeks with Father. (See id. at 6-7). She explained 

that she hired her mother (Maternal Grandmother) to watch the children 

before and after school at a rate of $500.00 per week while she worked.2 

(See id. at 11, 15).

Father testified that he works for The CSI Companies, Inc. (CSI), as a 

consultant and makes ninety dollars an hour and works forty hours per 

week; he does not receive overtime. (See id. at 35). Father introduced 

____________________________________________

2 Mother commutes from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, to Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania where she works from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday 

through Friday. (See N.T. Hearing, at 15-16). The children get on the bus 

to go to school at 8:00 a.m. and get off the bus after school at 4:05 p.m. 

(See id. at 26-27). Maternal Grandmother is paid to watch the children 

from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (See id.).
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both his pay stub and travel reimbursement. (See id.). He explained that 

CSI reimburses his out-of-pocket expenses that he pays to travel to the 

client’s site. (See id.). Additionally, CSI pays him a set per diem rate of 

fifty-six dollars per day for meals while he is traveling. (See id. at 35-36). 

Father also testified that, prior to the parties’ separation, they had planned 

on using a before and after school childcare program offered at the 

children’s school, which cost $670.00 per month. (See id. at 40).

On September 15, 2016, the master issued a report and 

recommendations with respect to Mother’s complaint for support. The 

master calculated that Father’s gross annual income, taking into account 

both his salary and per diem pay, is $198,200.00. (See Master’s 

Recommendation, 9/15/16, at 4-5). The master then determined that 

support for the children could be maximized if each parent claims one child 

as a dependent. Based upon that deduction, the master calculated Mother’s 

net monthly income as $2,322.57 and Father’s net monthly income as 

$11,899.42, resulting in a combined monthly income of $14,221.99 and a 

basic support of $2,457.00. (See id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-3)). After 

adjusting for health insurance and childcare,3the master concluded that 

Father’s monthly child support obligation is $2,881.57. (See id. at 7). 

____________________________________________

3 The Master concluded that $670.00 per month, the cost of the before and 

after school program, was a more reasonable childcare amount than the 

$500.00 per week paid to Maternal Grandmother. (See Master’s

Recommendation, at 6-7).
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On October 4, 2016, Mother, pro se, filed exceptions challenging 

several findings of the support master.4 On March 6, 2017, the trial court 

entered an order overruling the exceptions and adopting the master’s 

recommendations in their entirety. (See Trial Court Opinion, 3/06/17, at 1). 

Mother timely appealed. On March 31, 2017, Pursuant to the trial court’s 

order, Mother filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal.5 See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court entered an opinion on April 19, 2017, in 

which it relies, in part, on its March 6, 2017 opinion adopting the master’s 

recommendations. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Mother raises one question on appeal: “Whether the court may award 

child support absent full disclosure of a high net worth obligor[?]” (Mother’s 

Brief, at 5).6, 7 

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4 As noted by the trial court, Mother’s exceptions do not contain a summary 

or list of specific exceptions. (See Trial Ct. Op., 3/06/17, at 1).

5 Mother’s statement consists of nineteen allegations of error. (See Concise 

Statement of Errors, 3/31/17, at 1-4; Trial Ct. Op., 4/19/17, at 1-2).

6 Mother’s brief contains argument concerning the court’s order with regard 

to the justness of the amount of child support and spousal support, 

dependency exemptions for income taxes, and the court’s calculation of 

daycare expenses. (See id. at 9-11). However, because these issues are 

neither “stated in the statement of questions involved [nor] fairly suggested 

thereby[,]” we do not consider them. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

7

In his brief, Father claims that although “the [trial] court did not err in 

calculating his income based off the information provided at the de novo 

hearing,” this Court should remand to the trial court for it to calculate his 

income based on Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2), which considers involuntary 

reductions of income. (Father’s Brief, at 4; see id. at 4-6). Father did not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In her issue, Mother contends that the court erred in finding “that the 

introduction of a copy of [Father’s] most recent paystub and previous two 

months of bank statements along with his testimony that he received per 

diem and reimbursement for travel is sufficient under the law to calculate 

child . . . support.” (Id. at 12) (emphasis omitted). We disagree.

Our standard of review in child support cases is well-settled:

Appellate review of support matters is governed by an 

abuse of discretion standard. When evaluating a support order, 

this Court may only reverse the trial court’s determination where 

the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. An abuse of 

discretion is [n]ot merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching 

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of 

record. The principal goal in child support matters is to serve 

the best interests of the children through the provision of 

reasonable expenses.

J.P.D. v. W.E.D., 114 A.3d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 130 

A.3d 1290 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion “will be 

found where there is insufficient evidence to sustain the award or where the 

law is overridden or misapplied.” Lampa v. Lampa, 537 A.2d 350, 352 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (citation omitted). 

Here, Mother claimed that the trial court erred because it did not 

consider income received from Father’s business entities. (See Mother’s 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

raise this issue before the trial court either at the de novo hearing or by 

filing exceptions to the master’s recommendation. Furthermore, Father has 

not supported his argument with any legal authority. Therefore, we decline 

to address Father’s concern here.
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Brief, at 7). However, our review of the record discloses that during the de 

novo hearing, Father expressly denied receiving any income from the LLC 

that he has created in his name, and Mother did not provide any evidence of 

this income. (See N.T. Hearing, at 62, 69). The trial court could not include 

income that was not before it. 

Furthermore, with respect to Father’s salary and per diem

reimbursements, the trial court explained: 

At the hearing, Father introduced evidence of [two pay stubs, 

one for regular earnings, and one for reimbursements,] and two 

months of bank statements. Father is a salaried worker, 

meaning his income does not vary from paycheck to paycheck. 

Consequently, a single paycheck, combined with two months of 

bank statements, is sufficient to determine Father’s income. 

Regarding Father’s receipt of a per diem and reimbursement for 

business expenses, the [s]upport [m]aster correctly did not 

include travel expenses as part of Father’s income but did 

include the per diem amount. Father’s per diem is received to 

help pay for meals and is not a direct reimbursement, and 

therefore constitutes income. Father’s travel expenses are not 

income. Father is required to travel and his employer 

reimburses those travel expenses. As these amounts constitute 

expenses for which Father pays and is directly reimbursed, they 

do not constitute income. As a result, the [c]ourt did not err in 

finding that there was sufficient evidence to determine Father’s 

income.

(Trial Ct. Op., 4/19/17, at 2; see N.T. Hearing, 35-36, 58-59, Defendant’s 

Exhibits No. 2, 3). 

We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s 

calculation of Father’s income, where the court based its calculation on 

uncontroverted evidence of Father’s salary and per diem reimbursement as 
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represented in his pay stubs. See J.P.D., supra at 889; Lampa, supra at 

352. Mother’s issue does not merit relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2017