(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 17–5639. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 18, 2018 

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to first 

identify the recommended Guidelines sentencing range based on certain offender and offense characteristics. The judge might choose a 

penalty within that Guidelines range, or the judge may “depart” or

“vary” from the Guidelines and select a sentence outside the range. 

See United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 258–265. Either way, the 

judge must take into account certain statutory sentencing factors, see 

18 U. S. C. §3553(a), and must “state in open court the reasons for

[imposing] the particular sentence,” §3553(c). But when it comes to 

how detailed that statement of reasons must be, “[t]he law leaves

much . . . to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Rita v. United 

States, 551 U. S. 338, 356. The explanation need not be lengthy, especially where “a matter is . . . conceptually simple . . . and the record

makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 

arguments.” Id., at 359. 

Here, petitioner pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine

with intent to distribute. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, determined the range to be 135 to 168 months, and imposed a sentence at

the bottom of the range. The Sentencing Commission later lowered 

the relevant range to 108 to 135 months, and petitioner sought a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2). Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to the bottom of the new range, but the judge reduced petitioner’s sentence to 114 months instead. The order was 

entered on a form certifying that the judge had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a) factors and 

the relevant Guidelines policy statement. On appeal, petitioner argued the sentencing judge did not adequately explain why he rejected

petitioner’s request for a 108-month sentence. The Court of Appeals 
 

2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

affirmed. 

Held: Because the record as a whole demonstrates the judge had a reasoned basis for his decision, the judge’s explanation for petitioner’s 

sentence reduction was adequate. Pp. 5–10.

(a) The Government argues petitioner was not entitled to an explanation at all because the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not expressly require a sentencing judge to state his reasons for imposing a particular sentence. See §3582(c)(2). It is 

unnecessary to go as far as the Government urges, however, because, 

even assuming the District Court had a duty to explain its reasons

when modifying petitioner’s sentence, what the court did here was

sufficient. Pp. 5–6.

(b) Petitioner contends that a district court must explain its reasoning in greater detail when the court imposes a “disproportionate”

sentence reduction—that is, when the court reduces the prisoner’s

sentence to a different point in the amended Guidelines range than

the court previously selected in the original Guidelines range. That 

argument is unconvincing. As a technical matter, determining “proportionality” may prove difficult when the sentence is somewhere in

the middle of the range. More importantly, the choice among points 

on the Guidelines range often reflects the belief that the chosen sentence is the “right” sentence based on various factors, including those 

found in §3553(a). If the applicable Guidelines range is later reduced, it is unsurprising that the sentencing judge may choose a nonproportional point in the new range. Pp. 6–7.

(c) Even assuming that a judge reducing a prisoner’s sentence must 

satisfy the same explanation requirement that applies at an original

sentencing, the District Court’s explanation was adequate. At the 

original sentencing, petitioner asked for a downward variance from

the Guidelines range, which the judge denied. The judge observed 

that petitioner’s sentence was high because of the destructiveness of 

methamphetamine and the quantity involved. The record from the 

original sentencing was before the judge—the same judge who imposed the original sentence—when he considered petitioner’s sentence-modification motion. By entering the form order, the judge certified that he had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en]

into account” the §3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy 

statement. Because the record as a whole suggests the judge originally believed that 135 months was an appropriately high sentence in 

light of petitioner’s offense conduct, it is unsurprising that he considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced 

range to be appropriate as well. That is not to say that a disproportionate sentence reduction never may require a more detailed explanation. But given the simplicity of this case, the judge’s awareness of 
 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Syllabus 

the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing factors,

and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the new range, his explanation fell within the scope of lawful 

professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing 

judge. Pp. 7–10. 

 854 F. 3d 655, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–5639 

ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA, PETITIONER v. 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 18, 2018] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally 

sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission 

lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the 

offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the

lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original 

sentence from 135 months’ imprisonment to 114 months’. 

The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet 

greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not

adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 

months rather than a lower sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the judge’s explanation was adequate. 

And we agree with the Court of Appeals. 

I 

A 

The Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to 

consider certain listed characteristics of the offender and 

the offense for which he was convicted. Those characteristics (and certain other factors) bring the judge to a Guidelines table that sets forth a range of punishments, for 
 

2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

example, 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. A sentencing

judge often will choose a specific penalty from a Guidelines 

range. But a judge also has the legal authority to impose

a sentence outside the range either because he or she

“departs” from the range (as is permitted by certain

Guidelines rules) or because he or she chooses to “vary” 

from the Guidelines by not applying them at all. See 

United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 258–265 (2005) 

(holding the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). The 

judge, however, must always take account of certain statutory factors. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) (requiring the judge 

to consider the “seriousness of the offense” and the need to 

“afford adequate deterrence,” among other factors). And, 

of particular relevance here, the judge “shall state in open

court the reasons for [the] imposition of the particular 

sentence.” §3553(c). If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range (whether because of a “departure” or a “variance”), the judge must state “the specific reason for the 

imposition of a . . . different” sentence. §3553(c)(2). If the 

sentence is within the Guidelines range, and the Guidelines range exceeds 24 months, the judge must also state 

“the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point

within the range.” §3553(c)(1). 

B 

We here consider one aspect of the judge’s obligation to 

provide reasons. In an earlier case, we set forth the law 

that governs the explanation requirement at sentencing. 

In Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338 (2007), the offender 

sought a downward departure from the Guidelines. The 

record, we said, showed that the sentencing judge “listened to each argument[,] . . . considered the supporting

evidence[,] . . . was fully aware of defendant’s various 

physical ailments[,]” imposed a sentence at the bottom of

the Guidelines range, and, having considered the §3553(a)

factors, said simply that the sentence was “‘appropriate.’” 
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Id., at 358. We held that where “a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes 

clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence

and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the 

judge to write more extensively.” Id., at 359. 

We also discussed more generally the judge’s obligation

to explain. We wrote that the statute calls 

“for the judge to ‘state’ his ‘reasons.’ And that requirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial 

decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a 

judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the

judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that 

creates that trust.” Id., at 356. 

But, we continued, 

“we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, 

when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to

every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a

judge simply writes the word ‘granted’ or ‘denied’ on 

the face of a motion while relying upon context and

the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons 

clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the

judge’s own professional judgment.” Ibid. 

At bottom, the sentencing judge need only “set forth 

enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Ibid. 

When a judge applies a sentence within the Guidelines 

range, he or she often does not need to provide a lengthy 

explanation. As we said in Rita, “[c]ircumstances may 

well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the 
 

 

4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence

is a proper sentence (in terms of §3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the

judge has found that the case before him is typical.” Id., 

at 357. 

We have followed this same reasoning in other sentencing cases, including Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38 

(2007), which we decided the same year as Rita. Cf. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 109 (2007) (suggesting a district judge’s decision to vary from the Guidelines

range may be entitled to greater respect when the judge

finds a particular case “‘outside the “heartland”’” of the 

Guidelines). Indeed, the case before us differs from the 

Guidelines cases that Rita describes in only one significant 

respect. It concerns a limited form of resentencing. 

C 

The relevant lower court proceedings are not complicated.

In 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to a federal crime,

namely, possessing methamphetamine with the intent to

distribute it. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, determined that the applicable range was 135 to 168 months’ 

imprisonment and imposed a sentence at the bottom of 

that range: 135 months. Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the

relevant Guidelines range from 135 to 168 months to 108 

to 135 months. United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012–

Nov. 2016) (USSG); see also 28 U. S. C. §994(o). Petitioner 

then sought and obtained a sentence modification. See 18 

U. S. C. §3582(c)(2); USSG §1B1.10. He asked the judge to

lower his sentence to the bottom of the new range, namely 

108 months. But the judge instead lowered it to 114 

months, not 108 months. The order was entered on a form 

issued by the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts. The form certified the judge had “considered” 
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

petitioner’s motion and “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a)

factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement. App.

106–107 (under seal).

Petitioner appealed, claiming that the judge did not 

adequately explain why he rejected petitioner’s 108-month 

request. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument. 854 

F. 3d 655 (CA10 2017). In its view, “absent any indication 

the court failed to consider the §3553(a) factors, a district 

court . . . need not explain choosing a particular guidelines-range sentence.” Id., at 659. Petitioner sought 

certiorari, and we granted his petition. 

II
 

A 

The Government, pointing out that this is a sentencemodification case, argues that this fact alone should secure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, 

unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute

governing sentence-modification motions does not insist 

that the judge provide a “reason for imposing a sentence at 

a particular point within the range.” Compare §3553(c)(1)

with §3582(c)(2). It adds that sentence modifications also 

differ procedurally from sentencing in that the offender is

not entitled to be present in court at the time the reduced

sentence is imposed. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. 

817, 828 (2010) (citing Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(b)(4)). As 

we have said before, “Congress intended to authorize only 

a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and 

not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon, supra, at 

826. These procedural features, the Government asserts,

mean that “the court has no duty” to provide an “on-therecord explanation” of its reasons. Brief for United States 

12, 19. 

We need not go so far. Even assuming (purely for argument’s sake) district courts have equivalent duties when 

initially sentencing a defendant and when later modifying 
 

6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

the sentence, what the District Court did here was sufficient. At the original sentencing, the judge “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review.” 552 U. S., at 50; see also Rita, 551 

U. S., at 356 (“The sentencing judge should set forth

enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority”). Just 

how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we have said, upon the circumstances of the

particular case. Id., at 356–357. In some cases, it may be

sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge

simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he 

or she has considered the parties’ arguments and taken 

account of the §3553(a) factors, among others. But in 

other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depending, perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentencing, see id., at 357). That may be the case even when

there is little evidence in the record affirmatively showing

that the sentencing judge failed to consider the §3553(a) 

factors. If the court of appeals considers an explanation

inadequate in a particular case, it can send the case back 

to the district court for a more complete explanation. Cf. 

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) 

(slip op., at 15) (“[A]ppellate courts retain broad discretion 

in determining whether a remand for resentencing is

necessary”). 

B 

Petitioner argues that the judge should have explained 

more here because there is, or should be, some kind of 

presumption that the judge will choose a point within the 

new lower Guidelines range that is “proportional” to the

point previously chosen in the older higher Guidelines 

range. We are not aware of any law or any convincing 

reason, however, suggesting that this is so. 
 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

As a technical matter, determining just what “proportionality” means in this context would often prove difficult 

when the sentence is somewhere in the middle of the 

Guidelines range. The Sentencing Table calculates punishments according to a logarithmic scale. Take petitioner’s original and amended Guidelines ranges, for example. 

The original range was 135 to 168 months, a difference of 

33 months. The amended range, by comparison, is 108 to 

135 months, a difference of 27 months. And viewed logarithmically, what may seem the middle of a new lower 

range is not necessarily proportionate to what may seem

the middle of the old higher range. Nothing in the Guidelines, or elsewhere, encourages arguments about such 

matters among lawyers or judges who are not experts in 

advanced mathematics. 

More importantly, the Guidelines ranges reflect to some 

degree what many, perhaps most, judges believed in the

pre-Guidelines era was a proper sentence based upon the 

criminal behavior at issue and the characteristics of the 

offender. Thus, a judge’s choice among points on a range

will often simply reflect the judge’s belief that the chosen 

sentence is the “right” sentence (or as close as possible to 

the “right” sentence) based on various factors, including

those found in §3553(a). Insofar as that is so, it is unsurprising that changing the applicable range may lead a 

judge to choose a nonproportional point on the new range. 

We see nothing that favors the one or the other. So, as is 

true of most Guidelines sentences, the judge need not 

provide a lengthy explanation if the “context and 

the record” make clear that the judge had “a reasoned 

basis” for reducing the defendant’s sentence. Rita, supra,

at 356, 359. 

C 

Turning to the facts of this case, we find that the District Court’s explanation satisfies the standard we used in 
 

 

8 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Rita and Gall, assuming it applies to sentence modifications. In Rita, as we earlier said, we upheld as lawful a

sentencing judge’s explanation that stated simply that the 

Guidelines sentence imposed was “‘appropriate.’” 551 

U. S., at 358. We noted that, in respect to the brevity or 

length of the reasons the judge gives for imposing a particular Guidelines sentence, the “law leaves much” to “the 

judge’s own professional judgment.” Id., at 356. We 

pointed out that the sentencing judge in that case had “set

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he ha[d]

considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned

basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Ibid. The same is true here. 

At petitioner’s original sentencing, he sought a variance

from the Guidelines range (135 to 168 months) on the 

ground that his history and family circumstances warranted a lower sentence. The judge denied his request. In 

doing so, the judge noted that he had “consulted the sentencing factors of 18 U. S. C. 3553(a)(1).” He explained

that the “reason the guideline sentence is high in this 

case, even the low end of 135 months, is because of the 

[drug] quantity.” He pointed out that petitioner had “distributed 1.7 kilograms of actual methamphetamine,” a

“significant quantity.” And he said that “one of the other 

reasons that the penalty is severe in this case is because of

methamphetamine.” He elaborated this latter point by

stating that he had “been doing this a long time, and from

what [he] gather[ed] and what [he had] seen, methamphetamine, it destroys individual lives, it destroys families, it can destroy communities.” App. 25.

This record was before the judge when he considered

petitioner’s request for a sentence modification. He was 

the same judge who had sentenced petitioner originally.

Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to 108 

months, the bottom of the new range, stressing various 

educational courses he had taken in prison. The Govern-
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

ment pointed to his having also broken a moderately 

serious rule while in prison. The judge certified (on a

form) that he had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and 

had “tak[en] into account” the relevant Guidelines policy

statements and the §3553(a) factors. Id., at 106–107 

(under seal). He then reduced the sentence to 114 months. 

The record as a whole strongly suggests that the judge

originally believed that, given petitioner’s conduct, 135 

months was an appropriately high sentence. So it is unsurprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat

higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate. As in Rita, there was not much else for the judge 

to say.

The dissent would have us ignore the record from the 

initial sentencing and consider only what the judge said 

when modifying petitioner’s sentence. See post, at 4-5 

(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). But, as we have made clear 

before, a sentence modification is “not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon, 560 U. S., at 826. We therefore 

need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at petitioner’s initial sentencing. The dissent suggests the

judge’s failure to grant petitioner a proportional reduction 

“limits the relevance of the initial sentencing proceeding.” 

Post, at 5. To the contrary, the record of the initial sentencing sheds light on why the court picked a point slightly

above the bottom of the reduced Guidelines range when 

it modified petitioner’s sentence. Our decision is not (as

the dissent claims) based on mere “speculation.” Post, at 

7. Rather, we simply find the record as a whole satisfies 

us that the judge “considered the parties’ arguments and 

ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, supra, at 356. 

This is not to say that a disproportionate sentence reduction never may require a more detailed explanation. It 

could be that, under different facts and a different record, 

the district court’s use of a barebones form order in re-
 

 

 

10 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

sponse to a motion like petitioner’s would be inadequate. 

As we said above, the courts of appeals are well suited to 

request a more detailed explanation when necessary. See 

supra, at 6. The dissent asserts that appellate courts

would not need to remand for further explanation if district courts provided an additional “short statement or 

check[ed] additional boxes” on the form order. Post, at 8. 

That may be so, and nothing in this decision prevents

judges from saying more when, in their professional judgment, saying more is appropriate. Providing a more detailed statement of reasons often serves “a salutary purpose” separate and apart from facilitating appellate

review. Rita, 551 U. S., at 357. But our task here is to 

decide the case before us. And given the simplicity of this 

case, the judge’s awareness of the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the new range, the judge’s explanation (minimal as 

it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional

judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge.

See Id. at 356. 

The Court of Appeals concluded the same. Its judgment 

is therefore affirmed. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–5639 

ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA, PETITIONER v. 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 18, 2018] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

When the District Court reduced petitioner Adaucto

Chavez-Meza’s sentence, it entered its order on a terse 

“AO–247” form. An example of this form is attached as an 

Appendix, infra. On the form order, the District Court 

checked a box next to preprinted language stating that it

had “considered” Chavez-Meza’s motion for a reduced 

sentence and that it had “tak[en] into account the policy

statement set forth at USSG §1B1.10 and the sentencing

factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), to the extent that 

they are applicable.” App. 106–107 (under seal). The 

District Court checked another box indicating that 

Chavez-Meza’s motion was granted, and the court stated 

that it was reducing his sentence to 114 months. Ibid. 

But the District Court did not explain why it chose that

particular sentence or why it had not sentenced ChavezMeza to the bottom of his Guidelines range, as it had done 

at his original sentencing. Under these circumstances, in 

my view the District Court’s order was insufficient to 

allow for meaningful appellate review, a conclusion that 

requires this respectful dissent.

My disagreement with the majority is based on a serious 

problem—the difficulty for prisoners and appellate courts

in ascertaining a district court’s reasons for imposing a 
 

 

2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

sentence when the court fails to state those reasons on the 

record; yet, in the end, my disagreement turns on a small 

difference, for a remedy is simple and easily attained.

Just a slight expansion of the AO–247 form would answer the concerns expressed in this dissent in most cases,

and likely in the instant one. If the form were expanded

to include just a few more categories covering the factors 

most often bearing on a trial court’s sentencing determination, the objections petitioner raises likely would be met. 

The statute would be satisfied; district judges would have 

a helpful form that might well reduce the time for consideration of cases—and even if not would help ensure the 

full consideration which tends to result in uniformity and

fairness; the Courts of Appeals, from the outset, would

have far more assistance in determining whether appeals 

have merit; and this in turn would yield judicial efficiencies that the sentencing system must have to be effective 

and that Courts of Appeals must have to ensure that the 

relevant statute can be administered and applied in an

efficient, fair, and uniform way. The Court today, however, gives its full approval to a conclusory order. Its resulting holding is detrimental to the judicial system and to 

prisoners alike. 

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes a district

court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when he “has been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 

Sentencing Commission.” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). Congress specified that district courts may reduce a defendant’s sentence only “after considering the factors set forth

in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if 

such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Ibid. 

In United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 336 (1988), 

this Court addressed a statutory scheme that, like

§3582(c)(2), required district courts to consider specific 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

statutory factors when they exercised their discretion.

The Court held that “[w]here, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of 

particular factors, a district court must carefully consider 

those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to 

permit meaningful appellate review.” Id., at 336–337. 

Here, the form order fails to provide sufficient information either to give adequate and efficient instruction to 

the trial court or to permit meaningful appellate review.

The form order discloses no basis for determining why the

District Court did not sentence Chavez-Meza to the bottom of his new Guidelines range, as it had when it imposed his original sentence. 

The Court points out that there is no presumption in

favor of a proportional reduction when a judge reduces a

prisoner’s sentence pursuant to §3582(c)(2). Ante, at 6–7. 

That is true, as far as it goes. The issue here, however, is 

not whether district courts must grant proportional reductions; rather, the issue is what explanation should be

required to permit meaningful review of a trial court’s 

resentencing order.

The amount of necessary explanation might be different 

when a district court grants a proportional reduction—for

example, when it sentences a defendant to the top or the

bottom of his Guidelines range for both the initial and 

reduced sentence. In that circumstance, in most instances, an appellate court properly can infer that the district court’s reasons were the same as those it gave when it

imposed the initial sentence. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 

6–11 (explaining that district courts typically grant proportional reductions and that the Sentencing Commission 

often assumes they will do so). Less explanation is necessary, not because proportional reductions are favored as a 

legal matter but because the initial sentencing proceeding 
 

 

4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

provides a record from which an appellate court can make 

prompt and reliable inferences as to the reasons that 

informed the trial court’s decision to resentence a defendant to the same relative point on his amended Guidelines 

range. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, furthermore, 

one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics, 

much less a calculator, to draw this reasonable inference. 

District courts, as a matter of routine, regularly grant 

proportional reductions; and it seems unlikely that they

conduct intricate logarithmic computations before doing 

so. 

In contrast to a proportional reduction in a prisoner’s

sentence, a nonproportional reduction suggests that the 

district court’s reasons for choosing a particular sentence

might be different from those it gave when it imposed the

sentence in the first instance. Accordingly, a more specific

explanation—but by no means an elaborate one—is necessary for an appellate court to determine why the district

court chose a new point on the revised Guidelines range.

The Court’s analogy to Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 

338, 356 (2007), fails as well. See ante, at 7–9. In Rita, 

the District Court imposed the defendant’s sentence at a 

hearing. The record made clear that “the sentencing judge 

listened to each argument,” “considered the supporting

evidence,” and then determined that a 33-month sentence 

was “appropriate.” 551 U. S., at 357–358. But here there 

was no hearing when the District Court reduced ChavezMeza’s sentence in light of the amended Guidelines. The 

District Court’s reasoning must be surmised from its terse, 

largely uninformative order. At Chavez-Meza’s initial 

sentencing there was a hearing similar to the one in Rita. 

But the fact that the District Court did not grant ChavezMeza a proportional reduction when it later reconsidered

his sentence limits the relevance of the initial sentencing 

proceeding.

The District Court may well have had a legitimate 
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

reason for reducing Chavez-Meza’s sentence to 114 

months instead of 108 months. And even a brief explanation stating that reason likely would have sufficed, for 

district courts need not write at length each time they rule

upon a §3582(c)(2) motion. 

The Court is quite correct to point out that a trial judge

“need only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court

that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a 

reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 

authority.’” Ante, at 3 (quoting Rita, supra, at 356). It is 

likely that even a checkbox form would suffice in most 

cases, provided the form lists enough of the common reasons so that an appellate court, in most cases, can easily 

ascertain why the district court chose a particular sentence. Here, for example, the District Court simply could 

have added a sentence or two to the AO–247 form’s “Additional Comments” box. Or, perhaps preferably, trial

courts could use an expanded version of the AO–247 form

that allows judges to indicate, even by checking a box, the

reason or reasons for choosing a particular sentence.

In this case, however, the District Court’s reasons remain a mystery. The Court today speculates that the

District Court sentenced Chavez-Meza to 114 months 

because he distributed a large quantity of methamphetamine. Ante, at 8. For its part, the Court of Appeals speculated that the reason might have been “an incident of 

misconduct while in prison.” See 854 F. 3d 655, 660 (CA10 

2017). But there is no basis for these assumptions in the

District Court’s order. The sort of guesswork the Court

relies upon in today’s decision is insufficient to provide 

meaningful appellate review of a district court’s exercise of

its discretion under §3582(c)(2). See Taylor, 487 U. S., at 

342–343. 

According to the Court of Appeals, the relevant provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act must be read to allow a 

trial court not to give or state any reasons at all for a 
 

 

6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

resentencing order. 854 F. 3d, at 658. This was error. 

The Court of Appeals reached its conclusion by comparing 

the provisions that relate to original sentencing—

§3553(c)—with the provisions that pertain to the resentencing process—§3582(c)(2). It reasoned that, because 

the former has an express requirement to state reasons

while the latter does not, the statutory structure eliminates any requirement for reasons upon resentencing.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis, however, ignores the scope 

of the statutory text in §3553(c). That section pertains to

a procedure that is a full-scale adversary proceeding,

where the defendant and counsel are present. As part of 

that procedure, the statute states: “The court, at the time 

of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its 

imposition of the particular sentence.” §3553(c).

The statute does not require a full-scale adversary 

proceeding when resentencing is being considered after a 

Guidelines reduction. But it is incorrect to conclude that 

the absence of all those requirements forecloses the necessity to make a record that allows an appellate court to

exercise meaningful review of the reasons for the resentencing order. This conclusion follows from this Court’s 

decision in Taylor, holding that courts must “clearly articulate” their reasoning “in order to permit meaningful

appellate review,” even without any specific statutory

command. 487 U. S., at 336–337. So the fact that Congress adopted a detailed explanatory requirement in

another part of the statute does not displace Taylor’s 

background rule that district courts must provide enough 

reasoning for appellate courts to review their decisions 

when they exercise discretion under a statute like

§3582(c)(2).

The Court quite correctly rejects the Government’s 

invitation to adopt the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. 

See ante, at 5–6. The Court’s ensuing analysis, however,

is, in my respectful view, still incorrect. On the one hand, 
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

the Court holds that appellate courts may determine on a

case-by-case basis whether a form order like the one here

provides enough explanation. See ante, at 6, 9–10. Thus, 

any prisoner can appeal and argue that the order was

insufficient in his case. On the other hand, the Court does 

not impose any serious requirement that a district court

state its reasons on the front end—that is, before the 

appeal, when the district court rules on the §3582(c)(2) 

motion. Thus, in cases like this one, appeals will often be 

based on speculation that requires the prisoner, the Government, and the Court of Appeals to hypothesize the

potential reasons for the prisoner’s sentence when a reduction is weighed and considered.

This is an unwise allocation of judicial resources. District courts, to state the obvious, are best positioned to 

explain their reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 

Under the majority’s opinion, however, appellate courts 

will often lack clarity as to a district court’s reasoning and 

will be forced to either speculate (as the Court does today) 

based on their own view of the record, or remand the case 

for further explanation, likely followed by another appeal.

What could have taken a sentence or two at the front end 

now can, and likely will, produce dozens of pages of briefs,

bench memoranda, orders, and judicial opinions as the

case makes its way first to the appellate court, then back 

down to the trial court and perhaps back to the appellate

court again.

A better, more efficient rule would require trial courts in

cases like this one to provide their reasons in their initial

decisions either by giving a short statement or checking 

additional boxes. We must be conscious of the fact that 

retroactive amendments to the Guidelines can result in 

thousands of resentencings. That is all the more reason 

the inefficiencies resulting from today’s decision ought to

be avoided. And given the uncertainty that will ensue 

from today’s decision, district courts would be wise to say 
 

 

8 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

more than the court said in this case, even in the absence 

of a holding requiring it to do so on the specific facts at

issue here. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

 

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

Appendix to opinion of KENNEDY, J. 

APPENDIX
 
 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

10 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES 

Appendix to opinion of KENNEDY, J.