1

Filed 4/7/21 In re T.M. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

J.P. and J.D., 

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE 

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT,

Respondent;

HUMBOLDT COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD 

WELFARE SERVICES,

 Real Party In Interest.

 A160097, A160289

 (Humboldt County

 Super. Ct. No. JV180169)

T.M. was declared a dependent child after his parents died in a 

murder/suicide. After initially being placed in emergency foster care, he was 

placed with his maternal grandmother (Grandmother), who was also caring 

for his half-brother, J.D. (Brother). This placement continued for over a year, 

during which adoption was selected as the permanent plan and Grandmother 

indicated her desire to adopt T.M.
2

After the Humboldt County Department of Health & Human Services, 

Child Welfare Services (Department) learned T.M. was, to a significant 

degree, being cared for by other individuals and had been for a substantial 

amount of time, it filed a notice of intent to remove him from placement with 

Grandmother. The juvenile court issued an order to temporarily maintain 

the status quo, leaving T.M. where he was at the time, with his nanny.

Following a contested hearing, the court granted the petition for removal and

denied Grandmother’s request for prospective adoptive parent (PAP) 

designation.

Grandmother, by appeal and writ petition, challenges these orders, as 

does Brother.

1

BACKGROUND

T.M. was detained by the Department in August 2018, when he was 

seven months old, after his father killed his mother and then himself. T.M. 

was found at the scene and transported to a local hospital.

T.M. was taken into protective custody, and the Department filed a 

petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g)2, 

alleging T.M.’s parents were deceased, and he was left without provision for 

support. 

Law enforcement confirmed that Brother, then 12 years old, was not at 

the home, but was staying with Grandmother in Santa Cruz. Grandmother, 

68 years old at the time, told the Department she was planning to move to 

1 We issued an order to show cause, consolidated the proceedings, 

deemed the writ petitions to also be Grandmother’s and Brother’s opening 

briefs, and stayed any final order of adoption. 

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

Humboldt County. She also told the Department she was “unable to handle a 

baby on top of the move.” T.M. was placed with foster parents. 

In an addendum report submitted in advance of the combined 

jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the Department indicated Grandmother 

would move to Humboldt County by September 24, 2018. She “agreed [T.M.] 

should remain in foster care until she has relocated to Humboldt.” 

Grandmother’s “plan is to raise the two children together in the same home.”3

The Department reported “no concerns” about Grandmother’s ability to care 

for the siblings other than her age. Concerns about T.M. included his

eczema, a “severe allergy to eggs” and “a reaction to bananas as well.” 

The Department filed a second addendum report addressing visitation 

with paternal grandmother. The Department recommended up to six hours 

of supervised visitation and indicated paternal grandmother would notify the 

social worker a week before she came to Humboldt County to arrange a visit.

The Department also recommended supervised visits with “family and 

friends upon request.” The Department investigated other potential 

placements for T.M., including family members and non-related extended 

family members. 

The court sustained the petition and declared T.M. a dependent child. 

The court ordered the “care, custody and control” of T.M. be vested with the 

Department, and authorized placement of the child in a suitable foster home, 

or with a suitable relative or non-relative extended family member. It 

ordered a section 366.26 hearing to be held within 120 days. 

In its section 366.26 report, the Department indicated T.M. had been

placed with Grandmother and Brother since October 2018. T.M. was being 

3 Grandmother is Brother’s legal guardian, although the record does 

not indicate when that occurred. 
4

treated for eczema, and testing indicated he was allergic to nuts, mold, and 

dust. He “experience[s] skin rashes after eating eggs and bananas.” 

As to the placement with Grandmother, the Department reported T.M. 

was “thriving,” after initially exhibiting signs of depression in his foster 

placement. It recommended adoption as the permanent plan and stated 

Grandmother “moved to Humboldt County in October to care for her two 

grandsons. [She] is willing and able to provide [T.M.] with permanency in a 

safe and stable environment.” The report indicated Grandmother “has many 

friends of her daughter who assisted in getting a home set up for the family.” 

Following the section 366.26 hearing, the court did not terminate 

parental rights, noting both parents were deceased. It found placement of 

T.M. with Grandmother was necessary and appropriate, and that it was 

likely he would be adopted. 

The Department subsequently filed an adoption assessment addendum 

to the section 366.26 report. It stated T.M. “appears to be a happy and 

healthy child who has been in the care of his current Substitute Care 

Provider (SCP) since 10/10/2018. The care provider is his maternal 

grandmother. [T.M.’s] 12[-]year[-]old half[-]brother also resides in the home.

The maternal grandmother moved to Humboldt County in October to care for 

her two grandsons. She is willing and able to provide [T.M.] with

permanency in a safe and stable environment. [T.M.] is thriving in his 

current placement.” Grandmother “made the informed decision that it was in 

her and the child’s best interest to proceed with adoption. The care provider 

was screened for criminal history and prior Child Welfare Services (CWS) 

history and none was found.” 

In January 2020, the Department prepared a section 366.3 post 

permanent plan status review report. The report stated T.M. “remains 
5

placed with his maternal grandmother and maternal [Brother] in Humboldt 

County. [T.M.] has a strong support system not limited to his grandmother 

and half-brother. [T.M.] attends an in-home daycare on weekdays and 

appears to benefit from the social stimulation. [T.M.] also has a nanny 

[Nanny] who has been in his life since birth.” The Department noted T.M. 

has eczema and allergies to some foods and dust mites. He has a “prescribed 

Epi-Pen. [T.M.] is a healthy toddler.” T.M. also had a periodic dental exam 

in June 2019. The report concluded T.M. “is getting his medical and dental

needs met. He is in a stable placement with family and embraced by other 

adults who love and care for him on a consistent basis.” 

The court ordered adoption as the permanent plan and set a postpermanency planning review hearing for July.

In March, the Department filed a “Notice of Action” rescinding 

Grandmother’s Resource Family Approval certification. A few days later the 

Department filed a notice of intent to remove T.M. Grandmother filed an 

objection to removal and a request for PAP designation. 

In an attachment to its notice of intent to remove T.M., the Department 

detailed the reasons for removal. There were three primary areas of concern. 

The Department’s first concern was Grandmother’s attitude towards 

men and fathers in general, and T.M.’s father in particular. Grandmother

suffered from “pervasive grief and anger” regarding the murder of her 

daughter, who is the mother of both T.M. and his half-brother. The 

Department stated Grandmother “has had significant trouble reconciling that 

the man who murdered her daughter is [T.M.’s] father. . . . [¶] [Grandmother] 

has participated in mental gymnastics in order to help her make sense of who 

[T.M.] is. . . . [She] has difficulty with the concept of [T.M.] knowing of his 

father and is especially anxious about the fact that who his father is will 
6

affect [T.M.] in several ways.” The Department indicated Grandmother “was 

informed that [T.M.] will benefit from hearing positive aspects about his 

father that he can then relate to himself. Although what his father did was 

egregious, people are not in all totality bad.” The Department suggested 

Grandmother make positive statements about T.M.’s father, such as “ ‘you

run fast, your dad ran fast too.’ ” The Department noted that “Around age 

four, [T.M.] will likely start asking questions about his biological father.” It 

also noted Grandmother’s discourse “illustrates an overall disdain for men in 

general,” and “her own ideology dismisses the importance of fathers.” 

The Department further indicated “Although [T.M.] is a light skinned, 

red headed child, he has African American ancestry from his biological 

father.” It noted that, although Grandmother “appears to be a person who is

very accepting of humanity and unbiased . . . she does not seem to 

understand the importance of her grandchildren having a broad 

understanding of their own ethnicity.” “In dismissing this child’s father as 

irrelevant, [Grandmother] is also dismissing the rich African American 

heritage that makes up half of the half[-]siblings[’] genetic history.” 

The Department’s second area of concern was that Grandmother was 

“providing less than 51% of the child’s care and appears to be unable or 

unwilling to provide more than that.” Grandmother is “overly reliant on 

other individuals to provide for [T.M.] financially, physically, 

developmentally, and emotionally.” Grandmother raised Mother in “a 

cooperative community in which many of the adults, travelers, and 

permanent residents shared in the parenting of the children.” 

“[Grandmother] has attempted to create the same environment in which she 

raised her daughter. [She] is ensuring that [T.M.’s] needs are met by relying 

on individuals who are volunteering their time and resources. . . . Especially 
7

involved are Jordyn [the nanny] and Roxana. Upon the death of [Mother],

these individuals stayed involved in order to support [Grandmother] in 

providing for [T.M.’s] and his half-brother’s needs.” The Department was 

concerned that Grandmother “did not communicate with the Department 

regarding how much time [T.M.] was being cared for by others.” 

Grandmother believed “she and the individuals who have been helping to 

raise [T.M.] will continue to do so on some sort of shared property.” The 

Department was concerned that Grandmother believes “the best 

circumstances in which to raise [T.M.] . . . is by a committee, not by a parent.”

The Department “spoke with [Grandmother] about how [she] needs to be the 

‘primary caregiver’ for [T.M.]”

The third area of concern was regarding T.M.’s health care, which was 

partially related to the concern about Grandmother relying on others to help 

care for T.M. T.M. had been diagnosed with a number of allergies, had “an 

anaphylactic reaction to eggs at his previous foster home,” and was 

prescribed an EpiPen. Grandmother initially asserted T.M. did not need an 

EpiPen. Later, she stated she did not know T.M. had an anaphylactic 

reaction and filled the EpiPen prescription. 

Grandmother allowed a “friend of the family named Mary Jane” to care 

for T.M. on “multiple weekends” and come to T.M.’s medical appointments.

Mary Jane supplied incorrect medical information, which was not corrected 

by Grandmother, at those appointments. Nanny also accompanies 

Grandmother to medical appointments because Grandmother is “squeamish.” 

“[D]espite being told that she needs to be the primary person when it comes 

to [T.M.’s] medical care, [Grandmother] has signed documents allowing 

[Nanny] to seek medical treatment for [T.M.], and [Nanny] has taken [T.M.] 

to the doctor without [Grandmother] present.” At a “Child and Family Team 
8

meeting, the social worker spoke with [Grandmother] about . . . making ‘the 

medical and dental appointments’ and knowing all the information regarding 

[T.M.] so that she can keep [T.M.] safe.” 

Grandmother filed an Objection to Removal form on April 10. She 

indicated T.M. was bonded with her and Brother. She stated she had allowed 

T.M. to live with Nanny as a “calculated choice . . . based on a fiction that 

these people were ‘family.’ ” 

In late April, the Department filed a report in support of the change in 

placement, which included information about past events not included in 

previous reports. The new report noted that in November 2018, the 

Department received a “[m]onthly [c]ontact form” from Grandmother which 

stated: “child is still living with them, is in good health, and is too young to 

attend school regularly. Per Care Provider: He is only 11 months old. Glad I 

have to tell you this. What are you talking about-in school? How old do you 

think he is and why don’t you know this information. I need a reply by Nov. 

20, 2018.” The Department indicated “This contact letter is one of the first 

indicators of many that conveys [Grandmother’s] feeling regarding working 

with the Department.” The January 2019 monthly contact form from 

Grandmother indicated “This is still not legal and completed + signed under 

duress W [&] I does not pertain.” The following month, Grandmother stated 

“Leave us alone, we do not come under WIC 300 because I am his maternal 

grandmother and there was never abuse or neglect.” The Department noted 

“Subsequent Monthly Contact Letters were not noted to be adversarial and 

were without additional comment.” 

The report also stated the current social worker was “introduced to the 

family” in April 2019. The social worker indicated she noticed “some of 

[T.M.’s] behaviors warranted watching over time. Although [he] seemed 
9

comfortable in his environment, [he] was not babbling or making sounds that 

are typical of children his age and he had moments where he seemed to be 

dissociated.” Grandmother reported she had many people supporting her 

with “financial help and childcare.” When the social worker visited the 

following month, she spoke to Grandmother while Nanny fed him dinner.

When the social worker contacted Grandmother in June, Grandmother 

expressed “frustration over how long the adoption process was taking, stating 

. . . ‘I have complied with every step of this bullshit process but I am getting 

ready to lawyer up and if that cost gets added in it will be in a legal 

complaint and be described as ‘damages.’ ” During the home visit that 

month, the social worker provided Grandmother with the “required forms 

and information regarding adoption.” T.M. had a “significant” rash on his 

face and elbows. Nanny was at the home and told the social worker T.M. had 

“sensitive skin and food allergies, and had had spaghetti for lunch at daycare 

that day which [Nanny] attributed to the breakout.” The social worker was 

concerned that T.M.’s dental care was not up to date and that prior 

appointments had been cancelled. Grandmother stated he had seen a dentist 

a few days before and showed her paperwork from a dental practice. The 

social worker asked about payment because the practice did not accept 

MediCal, but Grandmother said she “did not know anything about that.” 

The following month, the social worker spoke with Nanny, who told her 

Grandmother was out of town and would return in three days. The social 

worker noted T.M. “might have hives on his neck, and a possible secondary 

infection in the eczema on his face.” Grandmother had been sending T.M. to 

her friend Mary Jane’s house “most weekends,” and when he returned his 

eczema was “significantly exacerbated.” The social worker told Nanny she 

was concerned about T.M.’s allergies, including an anaphylactic response to 
10

eggs in his previous placement necessitating an EpiPen prescription, and 

asked if T.M. had an EpiPen at daycare and at the Willow Creek friend’s 

house. Nanny stated T.M. did not have an EpiPen. A public health nurse 

confirmed with T.M.’s physician that he had been prescribed an EpiPen, but 

no one had picked up the prescription. 

The Department then received a referral alleging T.M. “was 

experiencing neglect due to not having life[-]saving medication that was 

prescribed to him and being left with inappropriate caregivers who were not 

providing care for [his] medical needs.” 

On April 23, 2020, the juvenile court issued a temporary order of 

“removal,” which maintained the status quo because T.M. was not living with 

Grandmother.

4 The court set a contested hearing for May 1 and ordered the 

Department to file an updated report.

Grandmother then filed a section 388 petition asking the court to nunc 

pro tunc recognize her as T.M.’s prospective adoptive parent and requesting 

an order recognizing the sibling relationship between T.M. and Brother, 

which the court also set for hearing on May 1. Attached to the section 388 

petition was a typed, unsigned 2-page statement by Brother, stating he loved 

and missed T.M., that Grandmother had moved to Arcata to adopt T.M., and 

he did not understand why Nanny “should have any control over my 

brother. . . .” Also attached to the writ petition were two photographs, 

apparently of Brother and T.M. together.

The Department’s report in support of the change in placement

indicated a “childcare schedule provided by [Roxana] showed that in 2019 

4

 Grandmother filed a premature notice of intent to file a writ petition 

from the April order, which we deemed to be from the subsequent May 21, 

2020 removal order. 
11

[T.M.] was out of [Grandmother’s] care for a minimum of 222 days,” and 

during January and February 2020, was out of Grandmother’s care

“approximately 50% of the time.” The report stated Nanny, without 

Grandmother, had taken T.M. to his pediatrician on December 19, 2019

because of concerns he was having “absence seizure[s].” One episode 

occurred when Grandmother and Nanny were present, but only Nanny was 

concerned. T.M.’s medical chart indicated his pediatrician “will be referring 

[T.M.] to neurology ‘for evaluation for seizures versus staring spells.’ ” A few 

weeks later, Nanny again took T.M. to his pediatrician, who diagnosed him 

with “acute viral syndrome including congestion and rhinorrhea.” Again, 

Grandmother did not attend. About six weeks later, T.M. had a scheduled 

“Child Health and Disability Prevention” exam, but Grandmother “was a noshow.” T.M.’s immunizations were not up to date. 

At the hearing, which took place on May 1 via Zoom, Grandmother’s 

attorney stated the attachment to the section 388 petition was “a text 

message that I received from [Brother] in order to support his request.” 

Counsel further stated, “It’s my understanding that in lieu of testimony, the 

Department was willing to submit on that statement being taken as his 

declaration. And he is here available today if the Court needs to have him

sworn in and have any cross-examination.” The Department’s attorney did 

not disagree and stated she “would like [Brother] to be available for crossexamination throughout the hearing today.” 

The court, in turn, stated “I did have a chance to read and consider 

[Brother’s] statement that was attached to his grandmother’s 388 request to 

change Court order.” The parties raising no objections to Brother’s written 

statement, the court admitted it and the two photographs into evidence.

Brother appeared at the hearing but was excluded during Grandmother’s 
12

testimony since he was a potential witness. Ultimately, Brother was not 

called as a witness.

The social worker testified she received the case from another social 

worker in the summer of 2019. During that summer, the Department 

received a referral regarding T.M.’s placement with Grandmother. At a 

family team meeting, the social worker spoke with Grandmother about 

“concerns about [T.M.’s] health and whether or not he was safe, whether or 

not he had proper medications available . . . in case he had an allergic 

reaction.” The social worker told Grandmother she had “concerns . . . this 

happened because other people were taking charge of certain portions of 

[T.M.’s] care.” The social worker testified “at that time I started to become 

aware that . . . other people were engaging in normal parenting activities 

with [T.M.] and [Grandmother] was either not engaging and allowing other 

people to do it, or she was there but she wasn’t necessarily present for the 

information that was being disseminated.” The social worker was specifically 

concerned about Grandmother allowing T.M. to spend weekends with her 

daughter’s friend Mary Jane, because T.M. would return from her home “a 

mess in terms of he had broken out in eczema, [which was] painful; there 

w[ere] hives, there appeared to be sometimes secondary infection 

starting. . . .” The social worker told Grandmother T.M. should have no more 

weekend visits with Mary Jane, and that Grandmother should be “the 

primary parent.” The outcome of the referral was that Grandmother picked 

up the Epi-Pens, “reported she distributed them to his school and to [the

Nanny]; everyone who cared for [T.M] had one. And she agreed not to let 

[T.M.] go to Mary Jane’s.” The social worker “made clear” to Grandmother 

that she had to take charge of T.M.’s medical care. 
13

The social worker explained that under the Resource Family Approval 

process, if foster parents are using respite care, they need to notify their 

Resource Family Approval social worker. Grandmother did not follow those 

guidelines. 

After the family team meeting, there was still “a clear pattern of other 

people taking charge of things.” In particular, Nanny was making 

appointments and taking T.M. to the doctor. Nanny also made arrangements 

for circumcision surgery for T.M. to occur and was the one who contacted the 

social worker to see if a court order was needed. Nanny also relayed concerns 

to the social worker about T.M. having “absence seizures.” 

Despite the social worker’s discussions with Grandmother about the 

need for her “to be [T.M.’s] person, . . . main attachment, and the person that 

cares for him the most,” Grandmother continued to rely on others to be 

collectively the primary caregiver. The social worker learned Nanny “was 

coming over every morning, five days a week, and getting the child up, 

feeding his breakfast, taking him to daycare, picking him up from daycare 

between four and five, and bringing him home.” She often observed Nanny 

“put him in his high[-]chair and she would feed him dinner.” “[I]t became 

very apparent that [T.M.] was really only with [Grandmother] . . . 12 to 20 

hours a week. . . . It was pretty significant.” 

By the end of January 2020, the social worker felt “someone is not 

telling me what’s really going on.” She learned Nanny and her partner had

been caring for T.M. during December. Grandmother, however, had told the 

social worker she could not see T.M. that month because she was taking T.M. 

with her to Santa Cruz for Christmas and would not be back until January. 

The social worker started the adoption assessment process, but “came 

to [her] supervisor and . . . said, ‘I can’t do this.’ ” An adoption assessment 
14

involved a “way higher” standard than reunification. The social worker 

would have to explain “why this should be sanctioned as a forever home and 

forever relationship in terms of parent-child. And [she] couldn’t write it . . . 

honestly and say that’s true.” 

Grandmother testified that Nanny, who had been T.M.’s nanny when 

his Mother was still alive, was caring for T.M. at the time of the 

Department’s notice of intent to remove him. Two other people besides 

Nanny also took care of T.M; her daughters’ friends Roxanna and Mary Jane. 

Both T.M. and Brother often stayed with Roxanna, until she moved away in 

January 2020. Grandmother never notified the social worker about T.M. 

staying with Roxanna, but “she was aware of the situation.” T.M. also stayed 

with Mary Jane a “[c]ouple of weekends a month.” Grandmother did not 

“officially notify” the Department about those stays, either. 

Grandmother acknowledged that in July 2019, the social worker had 

warned her it “was a problem for [T.M.] to stay with Mary Jane.” This came 

about because Grandmother had gone to Santa Cruz, leaving T.M. and 

Brother in Nanny’s care. Nanny called her and said Mary Jane wanted to 

pick up both boys, but she did not want Mary Jane to do that, and said she 

would call the police. Grandmother told her to call the social worker instead, 

which she did. After that, the social worker told Grandmother that T.M. 

should not spend the night with Mary Jane. 

Grandmother testified she let T.M. stay overnight at Nanny’s house 

“[o]nce or twice a month,” but sometimes for more than one night at a time. 

On February 27, 2020, T.M. started staying with Nanny. According to 

Grandmother, this was because he was having a medically needed 

circumcision at Stanford Hospital. She met Nanny and her family at the 

hospital after driving there from Santa Cruz. Grandmother explained she 
15

was “terrible with wounds and blood,” but Nanny told her she and her family 

would “ ‘take care of this, so you don’t even have to see the wound . . . [or] 

take care of it.’ ” She and Nanny had a conversation with the doctor about 

caring for T.M. After the surgery, T.M. continued to stay with Nanny 

because Grandmother was ill and hospitalized with what she thought was 

Covid-19. When she returned home, Brother also was ill and Grandmother

vacillated between sickness and health. She asked Nanny to continue caring 

for T.M. while she was ill. Nanny brought T.M. to visit one time during that 

period, a few days before the March 24 family team meeting. Brother had a 

cough at the time, so “we made the decision [T.M.] would just go back” to 

Nanny’s home. Grandmother did not report this to the Department. She did 

not start to feel better until about a week before the May 1 hearing.

Grandmother did not agree T.M. was cared for by others for as many 

days as the Department claimed. She explained the calendar which had the 

names of Mary Jane, Roxanna, and the Nanny on particular days, simply 

indicated their availability, not days on which they were necessarily caring 

for T.M. Grandmother testified that Roxanna paid for baby supplies to be 

shipped to Grandmother’s house. Grandmother did not pay Nanny for caring 

for T.M., although she provided food when she was there and gave her 

“doggie bags for her boyfriend.” Grandmother testified Nanny was 

“adamant” about not being paid, and she was surprised to discover Roxanna 

had been paying her. 

Grandmother acknowledged she had sent a text to the Nanny that 

stated, “ ‘[t]he reason you got to have [T.M.] . . . for 220 days [was] because I 

thought of you as family.’ ” She sent the Nanny another text that said “ ‘We 

were six inches away from adoption, at which point you could have had him 

as much or as little as you wanted.’ ” 
16

Grandmother agreed that during October and November 2019, she left 

T.M in someone else’s care for “about a 27-day stretch.” She testified she 

often went to Santa Cruz because she had “renters. That was kind of my 

business.” When she traveled to Santa Cruz, she stayed a minimum of four 

days “because it[ ] takes a whole day to drive down . . . and then a whole day 

to drive back.” She did not spend Christmas in 2019 with T.M. because 

Nanny asked to have T.M. and Brother with her family for a Hanukah 

celebration, and the boys “had a plan” and wanted to go. Brother ultimately 

spent Christmas with Grandmother, but not T.M., who was cared for by 

Nanny for “[f]our or five days.” 

Grandmother explained that, although she had stated in the past she

would not see T.M. if he was adopted by someone else, she still would want to 

be “connected” to him and “be there in any way I can.” She questioned 

whether “just [doing] . . . videos for another couple of years and then he’s 

going to get jerked back” was in T.M.’s best interests. 

Grandmother believed she was capable of caring for T.M. full-time but 

explained, “I’m going to try to find some help. I mean, I’m not going to lie. 

You know, I thought I had a really sound support system. I love [Nanny] like 

family. And I thought we were all on the same page. And she was very 

helpful. And I’m going to have to fill that gap absolutely. If he comes back, 

I’m going to need some help.”

Counsel for T.M. joined in the request to remove him from 

Grandmother and to deny her request for PAP or de facto parent status.5

5 We grant the Department’s previously deferred request for judicial 

notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (d), 459.)
17

On May 21, the court issued an order denying Grandmother’s request 

for PAP or de facto parent status.

6 It also concluded the Department “did not 

abuse its discretion when [T.M.] was removed from his grandmother” and 

found a change of placement was in T.M.’s “best interest.” The court further 

found Nanny “has become the primary care provider for [T.M.], she has been 

raising the child, and [T.M.’s] primary attachment is to [the Nanny] and her 

partner.” The order did not address Grandmother’s request in the section 

388 petition for recognition of a sibling bond. 

DISCUSSION

Legal Background

Before addressing the issues raised by Grandmother and Brother, we 

explain briefly why the removal provisions set forth in subdivision (n) were

added to section 366.26.

“In 2005, to strengthen the juvenile court’s oversight and to protect the 

stability of children after parental rights are terminated, the Legislature 

enacted Senate Bill No. 218. (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.). (§ 366.26, subd. (n); 

Stats. 2005, ch. 626, p. 4666, eff. Jan. 1, 2006.) Section 366.26, subdivision 

(n) represent[ed] ‘a paradigm shift in the standards to be applied to agency 

decisions in the narrow category of posttermination removal of children from 

designated prospective adoptive placements and gives to the court the wide 

discretion previously afforded the adoption agencies to determine whether 

the placement is in the best interest of the child.’ [Citations.] [¶] In enacting 

section 366.26, subdivision (n), the Legislature intended to ‘limit the removal 

of a dependent child from his or her caretaker’s home after parental rights are 

terminated, if the caretaker is a designated or qualified as a prospective 

adoptive parent, as defined, in order to “protect the stability and best 

6 Grandmother’s request for de facto parent status was made orally. 
18

interests of vulnerable children.” ’ (Assembly Com. on Judiciary, com. on 

Sen. Bill No. 218 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 2005, p. 5.) The 

legislation was designed to correct the ‘ “nearly complete, unchecked 

authority” ’ appellate courts had given to a child welfare agency to decide a 

dependent child’s adoptive placement after termination of parental rights. 

(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 218 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) 

as amended Apr. 7, 2005, p. 2, citing In re Harry N. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 

1378. . . .) [¶] The juvenile court has the authority and responsibility to 

determine whether removal from the home of a prospective adoptive parent is 

in the child’s best interests. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) If a prospective 

adoptive parent objects to the child’s removal from the home, the Agency 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that removal from the 

prospective adoptive parent is in the child’s best interests. . . . [T]he juvenile 

court determines whether the proposed removal of the child from the home is 

in the child’s best interests, and the child may not be removed from the home 

unless the court makes that finding. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).)” (T.W. v. 

Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 30, 44–45 (T.W.), italics added & 

italics omitted.)

To effectuate its purposes, section 366.26, subdivision (n)(3) provides in 

pertinent part: 

“(3) Prior to a change in placement and as soon as possible after a 

decision is made to remove a child from the home of a designated 

prospective adoptive parent, the agency shall notify the court, the 

designated prospective adoptive parent or the current caretaker, if that 

caretaker would have met the threshold criteria to be designated as a 

prospective adoptive parent pursuant to paragraph (1) on the date of 

service of this notice . . . of the proposal in the manner described in 

Section 16010.6. 

“(A) Within five court days or seven calendar days, whichever is longer, 

of the date of notification, the child, the child’s attorney, the child’s 
19

tribe, or the designated prospective adoptive parent may file a petition 

with the court objecting to the proposal to remove the child, or the 

court, upon its own motion, may set a hearing regarding the 

proposal. . . . A caretaker who would have met the threshold criteria to 

be designated as a prospective adoptive parent pursuant to paragraph 

(1) on the date of service of the notice of proposed removal of the child 

may file, together with the petition under this subparagraph, a petition 

for an order designating the caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent 

for purposes of this subdivision.

“(B) A hearing ordered pursuant to this paragraph shall be held as soon 

as possible. . . . At the hearing, the court shall determine whether the 

caretaker has met the threshold criteria to be designated as a 

prospective adoptive parent pursuant to paragraph (1), and whether 

the proposed removal of the child from the home of the designated 

prospective adoptive parent is in the child’s best interest, and the child 

may not be removed from the home of the designated prospective 

adoptive parent unless the court finds that removal is in the child’s best 

interest. If the court determines that the caretaker did not meet the 

threshold criteria to be designated as a prospective adoptive parent on 

the date of service of the notice of proposed removal of the child, the 

petition objecting to the proposed removal filed by the caretaker shall 

be dismissed. . . . 

“(C) A determination by the court that the caretaker is a designated 

prospective adoptive parent pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph 

(B) does not make the caretaker a party to the dependency proceeding 

nor does it confer on the caretaker any standing to object to any other 

action of the department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption 

agency, unless the caretaker has been declared a de facto parent by the 

court prior to the notice of removal served pursuant to paragraph (3). 

“(D) If a petition objecting to the proposal to remove the child is not 

filed, and the court, upon its own motion, does not set a hearing, the 

child may be removed from the home of the designated prospective 

adoptive parent without a hearing. [¶] (4) Notwithstanding paragraph 

(3), if the State Department of Social Services, county adoption agency, 

or licensed adoption agency determines that the child must be removed 

from the home of the caretaker who is or may be a designated 

prospective adoptive parent immediately, due to a risk of physical or 

emotional harm, the agency may remove the child from that home and 
20

is not required to provide notice prior to the removal. . . .” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (n)(3)(A)–(D).)

Subdivision (n) also sets forth the threshold criteria for qualifying as a 

PAP, specifying:

“(N) Notwithstanding Section 8704 of the Family Code or any other 

law, the court, at a hearing held pursuant to this section or anytime 

thereafter, may designate a current caretaker as a prospective 

adoptive parent if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least 

six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to 

adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to 

facilitate the adoption process. In determining whether to make 

that designation, the court may take into consideration whether the 

caretaker is listed in the preliminary assessment prepared by the 

county department in accordance with subdivision (i) of Section 

366.21 as an appropriate person to be considered as an adoptive 

parent for the child and the recommendation of the State 

Department of Social Services, county adoption agency, or licensed 

adoption agency.” (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1).)

With this background in mind, we turn to the issues raised by 

Grandmother and Brother.

Grandmother’s Challenge

Grandmother contends the juvenile court had no legal authority to

issue the April 23 temporary “removal” order that maintained T.M. in 

Nanny’s home pending the contested hearing on removal. While 

acknowledging she had not, at the time of the notice of removal, been 

designated a PAP, Grandmother claims she met the “threshold criteria” to 

qualify for such and therefore absent the “ ‘emergency’ provisions of section 

366.26,” T.M. could not be removed prior to a noticed hearing. 

As we have recounted, on April 2, the Department gave notice to 

Grandmother, with whom T.M. had been placed, of its intent to remove the 

child. Grandmother filed both an objection to removal and a request for PAP
21

status, which she requested be entered nunc pro tunc. The court promptly 

set a hearing. 

At the hearing, held on April 20, the court appointed counsel for 

Grandmother. Appointed counsel then met with Grandmother and indicated 

to the Court, “[I]t was my understanding that the child is not physically 

placed in [Grandmother’s] home. . . . It’s my understanding that the child 

has not been residing with [Grandmother] due to concerns of illness, but that 

is a plan that [Grandmother] put in place . . . [¶] . . . placement has not 

changed.” Counsel requested, and the court granted, a short continuance. 

At the continued hearing, on April 23, counsel for the Department 

stated it “has not removed the child from the grandmother. . . . The 

grandmother has been told multiple times she can pick up the child. 

Obviously not when she is sick but prior to that and after that, and she has 

not done so.” 

Counsel for T.M stated the child was “doing quite well with what 

[Grandmother’s] attorney is referring to as ‘the nanny.’ ” Counsel noted “it is 

currently my understanding [Grandmother] has never provided for this child 

without extensive domestic help,” and therefore she “would be uncomfortable 

with his immediate return today unless I had some assurances that this 

elderly woman is able to cope with the small child in her home with the 

distinct possibility that she will be caring for him by herself.”

The court then issued a “temporary order” to remove T.M. “and not 

order the immediate return,” set a contested hearing for May 1, and ordered 

the Department to file an updated report. 

Although the April 23 order is phrased as one of temporary “removal” of 

T.M. from Grandmother’s home, T.M. had, in fact, not been living in 

Grandmother’s home for almost two months. Indeed, Grandmother’s 
22

attorney conceded at the hearing that T.M. was not living with her, asserting

“[Grandmother’s] position is she arranged for the child to be cared for by the 

nanny.” Thus, under these unusual circumstances, the juvenile court did not 

“remove” T.M. from Grandmother’s home. Rather, the court maintained the 

status quo that Grandmother, herself, had established, pending a full 

contested hearing.

As the Department observes, “courts have inherent powers which 

enable them to carry out their duties and ensure the orderly administration 

of justice. The inherent powers of courts are derived from article VI, section 1 

of the California Constitution and are not dependent on statute. [Citations.] 

These powers entitle courts to ‘ “. . . adopt any suitable method of practice, 

both in ordinary actions and special proceedings, if the procedure is not 

specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council.” [Citation.]’

[Citation.] Thus, a trial court has the inherent authority to create a new 

form of procedure in a particular case, where justice demands it.” (In re 

Amber S. (1993) 15Cal.App.4th 1260, 1264.)

But even if the temporary “removal” order was improperly issued,

Grandmother has not demonstrated prejudice flowing from such error. 

In her briefing, Grandmother asserted the temporary order “kept T.M. 

apart from Grandmother and the sibling” from April 2 (when the Department 

filed its notice of intent to remove T.M.) to May 20 (the day before the court 

issued the removal order7). But given that T.M. had not been with 

Grandmother for the prior two months, we fail to see how this additional 

separation was prejudicial, particularly in light of the fact that, as the 

7 The contested hearing was held on May 1, and the removal order was 

issued on May 21, 2020. 
23

evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing showed, T.M. had not resided 

with Grandmother some 222 days during the prior year. 

At oral argument, counsel for Brother expanded on the asserted 

prejudice of the temporary order leaving T.M. in Nanny’s care. Counsel 

maintained the temporary order precipitated the court’s denial of 

Grandmother’s request for PAP status because Grandmother, as a result of 

the temporary order, was no longer the “current caretaker.” The denial of 

PAP status led, in turn, said counsel, to the court applying the wrong 

standard at the contested removal hearing—whether the Department abused

its discretion in removing T.M.—rather than the court, itself, finding removal 

from Grandmother’s custody was in T.M.’s “best interest,” as is required 

when a PAP objects.

To begin with, we disagree with counsel’s assertion that the court based 

its denial of PAP status on the temporary order leaving T.M. with Nanny 

pending the evidentiary hearing. The court did not rule on Grandmother’s 

status at the time it issued the temporary order, but did so following the 

evidentiary hearing. And based on the evidence presented at that hearing, 

the court found that “with the passage of time, [Nanny] has become the 

primary care provider for [T.M.], she has been raising this child, and [T.M.’s] 

primary attachment is to [Nanny] and her partner.” Indeed, the evidence 

showed T.M. had not resided with Grandmother for even a total of six months 

during the prior year, spending at least 220 days living with others. In short, 

the record does not support the assertion the court denied PAP status 

because of its temporary order. 

We also reject Grandmother’s claim that she met the threshold 

requirements for PAP status and therefore the court “lacked discretion” to

deny her request for such. 
24

First, Grandmother is mistaken in claiming a caretaker seeking PAP 

status is entitled to such if she or he makes a threshold showing under 

subdivision (n)(1). Subdivision (n)(1) provides as follows: “Notwithstanding 

Section 8704 of the Family Code or any other law, the court, at a hearing held 

pursuant to this section or anytime thereafter, may designate a current 

caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent if the child has lived with the 

caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a 

commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step 

to facilitate the adoption process. In determining whether to make that 

designation, the court may take into consideration whether the caretaker is 

listed in the preliminary assessment prepared by the county department in 

accordance with subdivision (i) of Section 366.21 as an appropriate person to 

be considered as an adoptive parent for the child and the recommendation of 

the State Department of Social Services, county adoption agency, or licensed 

adoption agency.” (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1), italics added.) The plain language 

of the statute thus states a court “may” designate a current caretaker a PAP, 

not that a court “must” or is “required” to do so. (See Seiser & Kumli, Cal. 

Juvenile Courts Practice & Procedure (2021), § 2.171[5][i]) [“The decision to 

designate the current caregiver as a prospective adoptive parent is one 

committed to the discretion of the court.”].)

Further, as we have recited, while Grandmother was T.M.’s placement, 

she was not his actual caretaker on the date the Department filed its notice 

of intent to remove the child. T.M. had not lived with Grandmother for 

almost two months, and, as the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 

showed, he had not lived with her for 222 days of the prior year.8 The court 

8 Although section 366.26, subdivision (n) provides the court “may 

designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent if the child 

has lived with the caretaker for at least six months,” it does not specify 
25

accordingly found, based on the evidence presented at the contested hearing,

that “with the passage of time, [Nanny] has become the primary care 

provider for [T.M.], she has been raising this child, and [T.M.’s] primary 

attachment is to [Nanny] and her partner.”9 We understand that the instant 

case presented an unusual situation, where Grandmother was the designated 

placement for T.M., but was in actuality not his “current caretaker,” nor was 

she his caretaker for much of the preceding year. But this circumstance was 

attributable solely to Grandmother, and given the record before it, the court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Grandmother’s request for PAP status.

In any event, Grandmother was accorded the procedural rights 

accorded to a PAP. Had she been designated as such, she would have been 

statutorily entitled to notice, an opportunity to object to the proposal to 

remove T.M., and a hearing on whether removal of T.M. was “in the child’s 

best interests.” The Department gave Grandmother notice of the proposed 

removal, the juvenile court appointed counsel for her,

10 and she objected to 

the proposed removal.

whether the six months must be immediately preceding the request, and we 

have identified no case discussing this requirement. Although T.M. may 

have lived with Grandmother for a combined total of at least six months, he 

did not live with her for the full six months preceding the notice of removal, 

nor did he live with her for at least six total months in 2019, given that he 

spent at least 222 days living with others. 

9 Although the court stated in its order issued after the evidentiary 

hearing “Neither prospective adoptive parent status nor de facto parent 

status is, at this time, appropriate for the maternal grandmother, as she is 

not now the child’s placement,” it explained Grandmother had not been 

T.M.’s caretaker since well before the temporary order. 

10 In fact, the court was not required to appoint counsel. “Nothing in 

the language of section 366.26, subdivision (n) or in the legislative history 

indicates the Legislature intended to provide that, in addition to the rights to 

receive notice, to object and to participate in the hearing, the prospective 
26

Grandmother insists, however, she did not receive a hearing at which 

the court applied the “child’s best interest” standard.

The juvenile court’s written order stated in part: “Based upon the 

evidence presented . . . the Court makes the following findings: [¶] . . . [¶] 2) 

The Court respectfully denies grandmother’s request to immediately return 

[T.M.] to her care given that [the Department] did not abuse its discretion 

when [T.M.] was removed from his grandmother. The Court affirms the 

decision of [the Department] to change the placement of the child, and such 

change was in the best interest of [T.M.] [¶] . . . The Court concurs with 

minor’s counsel that, with the passage of time, [the Nanny] has become the 

primary care provider for [T.M.], she has been raising this child, and [T.M.’s] 

primary attachment is to [the Nanny] and her partner. It was gratifying, 

however, to receive evidence that [the Nanny] is very focused on [T.M.] 

having a continuing connection to his grandmother and brother. [¶] 4) The 

grandmother’s request that the Court make alternative orders to rectify the 

issues or concerns raised by [the Department] is denied, as it would be 

detrimental to [T.M.] if these proceedings are further protracted. This young 

child needs and deserves permanence. Nonetheless, it is the Court’s sincere 

hope and desire that [T.M.] be afforded the love and support of his 

grandmother . . . and his brother . . . to the greatest possible extent.” (Italics 

added.)

adoptive parent also has the right to appointed counsel. If the Legislature 

had intended to provide to prospective adoptive parents the right to 

appointed counsel, it could have stated so in the statute. It did not. From 

this we conclude the Legislature did not intend to extend this right to 

prospective adoptive parents.” (R.H. v. Superior Court (2012) 

209 Cal.App.4th 364, 373.)
27

Grandmother points to the statement “the [Department] did not abuse 

its discretion when [T.M.] was removed from his grandmother” and 

maintains this shows the juvenile court applied only an “abuse of discretion” 

standard. However, this reads the statement out of context and ignores the 

court’s subsequent, express finding that removal is “in the best interest of 

[T.M.].” 

Grandmother further maintains the court’s express finding can, and 

should, be ignored because the “[m]ere recitation of the words ‘best interest’ 

in the final ruling did not cure the error” We cannot agree that the court’s 

finding that the Department had not abused its discretion in seeking removal 

is inconsistent with, and vitiates the court’s subsequent, express finding 

removal was in T.M.’s “best interest.” Furthermore, and contrary to 

Grandmother’s assertion that a “detriment” finding is “what section 366.26, 

subdivision (n) requires, in essence,” what a juvenile court is, in fact, required 

to determine is whether removal is in the child’s “best interests.” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (n)(3)(B); T.W., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 44–45.)

The “best interest” standard is multi-dimensional, encompassing more 

than just detriment. “The ‘finding of detriment standard’ and the ‘best 

interest standard’ are not legal equivalents. In general, under the detriment 

standard, . . . the party who is opposing placement has the burden to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed. . . .” (In re 

Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1256.) “The concept of best 

interest ‘is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to 

maximize a child’s opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.’ 

[Citations.] A primary consideration in determining the child’s best interest 

is the goal of assuring stability and continuity of care.” (State Dept. of Social 

Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 273, 286–287.) “[I]n 
28

deciding what is in the child’s best interest, the court properly considers the 

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, as well as the child’s future 

physical, mental, and emotional needs. [Citation.] In this sense, the best 

interest standard is necessarily forward looking.” (In re L.M. (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 898, 911.) The court properly considers the child’s current 

circumstances, which includes any sibling bond. (Ibid.) Given the evidence 

that was presented during the contested hearing, we certainly cannot say the 

juvenile court erred in finding removal from Grandmother was in T.M.’s “best 

interest.”11

In sum, there is no merit to the claim of prejudice Grandmother

elaborated on at oral argument, which ultimately turns on the assertion the 

juvenile court applied the “wrong standard” in ordering T.M.’s removal. No 

such error appears from the record.

Brother’s Appeal and Writ Petition

Brother also challenged the May 21 order by way of both an appeal and 

a writ petition. In his writ petition he alleged the juvenile court “impliedly 

denied [his] request to have his sibling relationship with [T.M.] formally 

recognized so as to enable him to fully participate in the proceedings on the 

Notice of Intent to Remove [T.M.]” and also joined in “the arguments 

presented in the petition . . . filed by [Grandmother].” In his reply brief, 

however, Brother “recognize[d] that he lacks standing to challenge the 

juvenile court orders denying Grandmother’s request for prospective adoptive 

parent status and removing [T.M.] from Grandmother’s custody,” thus 

11

 Indeed, Grandmother asserts only that the juvenile court applied the 

wrong standard in ordering removal, not that no substantial evidence 

supported the order of removal. 
29

leaving only his complaint that his sibling relationship was not formally 

recognized. 

As we have discussed, Brother did not file any request or pleading on 

behalf of himself. Rather, Grandmother attached to her section 388 petition 

his typed, unsigned 2-page statement that he loved and missed T.M., that 

Grandmother had moved to Arcata to adopt T.M., and that he did not 

understand why Nanny “should have any control over my brother . . . ,” as 

well as two photographs, apparently of Brother and T.M. together. We 

therefore have some doubt that Brother qualifies as an aggrieved party in 

any respect.

In any case, no appeal lies from the challenged order. (§ 366.26, subd. 

(n)(5) [“Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 366.28, an order by 

the court issued after a hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall not be 

appealable.”].) Indeed, Brother does not dispute that the only way he can 

challenge the May 21 order is by writ petition, and he further concedes he did 

not file a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition.12

12 California Rules of Court, rule 8.454, subdivision (e)(1) provides that 

the required writ proceeding is initiated by the filing with the juvenile court 

clerk of “a notice of intent to file a writ petition and a request for the record.”

(Rule 8.454, subd. (e)(1).) The “notice of intent” must be “signed by the party 

or the attorney of record for that party.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).) The rule 

thereafter contains explicit and detailed directions concerning notice, the 

preparation of the record, the content and filing of the writ petition itself, the 

disposition of the writ proceeding, and other related subjects. (Id., subds. 

(e)(4), (g)–(i).) To ensure expeditious resolution of the challenged ruling, the 

rule prescribes numerous, successive time limits applicable to the initiation 

and progression of the writ proceeding. (Id., subd. (e)(4), (h)(2), (j)(2); see Karl 

S. v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402–1403.) Included 

among these limits is a seven-day period from “the date of the 

posttermination order” within which the challenger must file the notice of 

intent and request for record. (Rule 8.454, subd. (e)(4).) All the time limits in 

the rule are mandatory. (Karl S., at p. 1404.)
30

He maintains, however, that “this court should construe [his] notice of 

appeal as a timely filed notice of intent to file a writ petition,” asserting the 

juvenile court’s “failure to provide timely and correct notice of its ruling and 

the proper avenue by which [to] seek appellate relief constitutes good cause” 

to excuse his failure to file a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition. 

Brother relies on In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, in which 

“the juvenile court, through no fault of the mother, failed to discharge its 

duty to give her timely, correct notice, as required by [former] California 

Rules of Court, rule 1462(c)(3)(I).” (Cathina W., at p. 722.) The court clerk 

belatedly mailed the advisement to the mother four days after the order 

setting the section 366.26 hearing and misstated the date of that order by 

months, which effectively misinformed her of the deadline for filing the 

required notice of intent to file a writ. (Id. at pp. 722–723.) In addition, the 

clerk failed to resend the advisement after the mailing was returned to the 

court with a dated “ ‘Return to Sender’ stamp” and “a label setting forth a 

new address” for the mother. (Id. at p. 723.) Under those circumstances, the 

Cathina W. court held relief was warranted. (Id. at p. 722.)

Cathina W. does not aid Brother. Even had Brother been a party to the 

dependency proceedings or filed the section 388 petition, “[n]either . . . 

[section] 366.28 nor the Rules of Court implementing [section] 366.28 contain 

any mandate that the juvenile court expressly advise the parties of the writ 

petition requirement. Therefore, noncompliance with the [section] 366.28 

writ requirement is not excused by the juvenile court’s failure to give minor’s 

counsel such an advisement. [A.M. v. Sup.Ct. (San Bernardino County

Children & Family Services), supra, 237 [Cal.App.4th] at 514-515. . . .].”

(Eisenberg, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeal and Writs (The Rutter 

Group 2020) ¶ 2:164.18, italics omitted.)
31

In sum, the fact that the juvenile court did not give notice to Brother of 

the May 21 order does not constitute good cause for his failure to file a timely 

notice of intent to file a writ petition. 

We therefore dismiss Brother’s appeal and writ petition.13

DISPOSITION

The May 21, 2020 order is AFFIRMED. Grandmother’s writ petition is 

denied. Brother’s appeal and writ petition are DISMISSED. The previously 

ordered stay of adoption proceedings is lifted.

13 We note, however, that the record reflects that the juvenile court 

considered Brother’s submission in support of Grandmother’s objection to 

removal and section 388 petition. 
32

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Sanchez, J.

A160097/160289, In re TM