alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"NASA","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov","author_name":"Christian Gelzer","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/author\/christian-gelzer-1nasa-gov\/","title":"Lifting Bodies","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"LOuwQst2BW\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/aeronautics\/aircraft\/lifting-bodies\/\">Lifting Bodies<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/aeronautics\/aircraft\/lifting-bodies\/embed\/#?secret=LOuwQst2BW\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Lifting Bodies” — NASA\" data-secret=\"LOuwQst2BW\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/343998main_ECN-2353_full.jpg?w=600","thumbnail_width":600,"thumbnail_height":475}
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"NASA","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov","author_name":"Michele Ostovar","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/author\/michele-e-ostovarnasa-gov\/","title":"Skylab","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"5cdfhEvXqp\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/gallery\/skylab\/\">Skylab<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/gallery\/skylab\/embed\/#?secret=5cdfhEvXqp\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Skylab” — NASA\" data-secret=\"5cdfhEvXqp\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n"}
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 (AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002) In connection with the Quarterly Report of Perot Systems Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Russell Freeman, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify to my knowledge and in my capacity as an officer of the Company,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as
of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate,
effective as of August 3, 2004. /s/ RUSSELL FREEMANRussell FreemanVice President and Chief Financial Officer
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"NASA","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov","author_name":"Kelli Mars","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/author\/kelli-l-marsnasa-gov\/","title":"50 Years Ago: Apollo 16 Launches to the Moon","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"6r7NoPwLR5\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/50-years-ago-apollo-16-launches-to-the-moon\/\">50 Years Ago: Apollo 16 Launches to the Moon<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/50-years-ago-apollo-16-launches-to-the-moon\/embed\/#?secret=6r7NoPwLR5\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“50 Years Ago: Apollo 16 Launches to the Moon” — NASA\" data-secret=\"6r7NoPwLR5\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/s72-16660\/s72-16660~large.jpg?w=600&h=1797&fit=clip&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint","thumbnail_width":600,"thumbnail_height":1797}
#### L. R. Garvin *v.*William Free et al.

Judicial Sale — Warranty of Title.

The court having construed a deed, as being a mortgage and ordered a sale to liquiate the debt for which the deed was executed, the mortgagee cannot then be required to warrant the title to the purchaser at the forclosure sale. He can only be required to reconvey such title as he received from ,the grantor.

APPEAL PROM METCALPE CIRCUIT COURT.

October 9, 1868.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Harbin :

*609James, *for appellant.*

Harlan, Compton, *for appellee.*

It seems to us the circuit court rightly construed the conveyance from Free to the appellant, made on the 26th of May, 1862, as a mortgage to secure the payment of the appellants entire debt for money advanced to reduce the land and his medical account, in all then settled at $300.

The land was sold to Ferkin for $675, of which $150 was paid to Free and the residue of $525 was paid to the appellant. From this sum the court seems to have deducted the $300 and rendered judgment for the balance of $225 less $37.50. This judgment was, we think as favorable to the appellant as the facts would have authorized. And no error is perceived in the judgment for costs of the former suit.

But we do not concur in that part of the judgment which requires the appellant to convey and warrant the title to Ferkin. He was not bound to warrant the title to Ferkin or do more than reconvey such right as he received from Free, not to make himself responsible for Free’s title. For this error the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
#### R. E. Larkin *v.*John Millit.

Debtor and Creditor — Debts Purchased by Agent — Participation in Fraud-Equity Will Wot Relieve.

Equity will not relieve a debtor from the payment of debts purchased by his agent, where he has participated in the fraud committed on his creditors by his agent.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

November 23, 1867.

*Opinion of*the Court by

Judgke IJardin :

Although there is some contrariety of evidence as to the understanding between Larkin and Millit, under which Larkin purchased' the debts of Millit, it is proved, we think, by a decided preponderance of the evidence, that Larkin acted and premitted the .use of his ndme in buying up the debts as the friend and agent of Millit, and mainly by the use of his means.

Although it is shown that Larkin drew upon and used the greater part of a fund of $2,279.79 of his own money in the hands of Graham at Philadelphia, in payment for claims purchased by him on Millit, it appears from the evidence of Crabb, sustained by- other evidence, that he was reimbursed the amount so paid; but if on this or any other account Millit is, on a settlement, indebted to Larkin, the claim of the latter may yet be legitimate, and for that purpose he seems to be prosecuting a. cross petition in the suits in the Eulton Circuit Court. What we mean here to decide is, that Larkin is not in his own right the owner of the judgments and other claims enjoined by Millit, and is not therefore entitled to enforce them as such.

The objection of the appellant that Millit ought not to be relieved.in a court of equity, because according to his own theory he was guilty of participation in a fraud upon his creditors, is not, as- we .think well taken. While the principle thus attemped to be applied is undoubtedly correct, and there is evidence conducing to show that the real character of Larkin’s agency in buying the claims was not truly disclosed to a part of the creditors, it does not still appear that it was not true as professed and repre*27sented by both Millit and Larkin that tbe propositions made to and accepted by the creditors were not reasonable and just, in view of Millit’s large indebtedness compared with his means of paying. ^

^ The judgment is affirmed.
#### Morris *v.*The State.

*Saturday, January*10, 1846.

On the trial of an indictment under the act against fraudulent voting, the defendant’s statements made under oath at the polls on being challenged, are not admissible evidence for him; nor is the decision of the judges of the election in favour of his right to vote any defence.

The defendant’s right, in the case of an indictment, to challenge a juror peremptorily remains open until the juror is sworn.

ERROR to the *Marion*Circuit Court.

Sullivan, J.

— This was an indictment under the act of 1843, p. 153, against fraudulent voting. Plea, not guilty. Verdict of guilty, and judgment on the verdict.

On the trial, after the testimony on behalf of the state was closed, the defendant offered to prove that at the election held, on, &c., as stated in the indictment, he was challenged as not being a legal voter; that he was thereupon sworn by the inspector; and that the inspector and judges decided that he was a legal voter, tie also offered- to prove what his statements, made under oath, were when challenged at the polls. The Court permitted him to prove that he was challenged, that he was sworn, and that1 it was decided that he was a legal voter, but they would not allow him to give his statements in evidence. The defendant then asked a witness, who was one of the judges of the election, whether he, the defendant, affirmed his right to vote, or whether he merely submitted the matter to the inspector and judges, but the Court would not allow the question to .be asked.

We think the Court did not err on either point. It was competent for the defendant to prove the same facts, by disinterested witnesses, that he swore to at the polls, but he *608could not, by giving his own statements in evidence, make testimony for himself. Nor can the determination of the judges of the election in favour of the defendant’s right to vote, avail him as a defence in this case. The judges may have been imposed upon by the statements of the defendant, or they may have mistaken the law. If their decision under such circumstances was final, the statute, under which the defendant is indicted, would be a dead letter.

*O. H. Smith, W. Quarles,*and *J. H. Bradley,*for the plaintiff.

*A. A. Hammond,*for the state.

While the Court was impanelling the jury to try the case, a question arose, substantially the same as that which arose in the case of *Munly*v. *The State,*decided at this term, relative to the time at which the defendant’s right to challenge a juror peremptorily should cease. The defendant challenged a juror before he was sworn, but the Court would not allow the challenge. It is unnecessary to encumber this opinion with the facts stated in the bill of exceptions, they being substantially the same as those in the case referred to. The Court erred in refusing the challenge. In *Munly*v. *The State,*we decided that the right of a defendant charged with a criminal offence, to challenge a juror peremptorily, remains open until the juror is sworn. The judgment must therefore be reversed.

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is reversed. Cause remanded, &c.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, April 11, 2018.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, April 11, 2018

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A18D0377. IN THE INTEREST OF D. W., A CHILD (FATHER).

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

1700840
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of PODS, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB
for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Peter S.
Warhurst, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Thomas M. Calcaterra,
Chief Financial Officer certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.

/s/ Peter S. Warhurst

Peter S. Warhurst
Chief Executive Officer
December 27, 2002

/s/ Thomas M. Calcaterra

Thomas M. Calcaterra
Chief Financial Officer
December 27, 2002
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

IN RE: BARD IVC FILTERS 

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 

Denise Gill, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. R. Bard, Inc., and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc. 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. MDL-15-02641-PHX-DGC 

Civil Action No.: CV16-0110-PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 The parties have filed a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice. Doc. 877. 

IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation (Doc. 877) is granted. Case No. 16-0110 PHX 

DGC is dismissed without prejudice. 

 Dated this 2nd day of March, 2016. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 926 Filed 03/03/16 Page 1 of 1
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see

Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please

also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other

deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the

filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 NANCY ALLISON CARL,

3 Petitioner-Appellant,

4 v. No. 31,696

5 CHESTER CARL,

6 Respondent-Appellee.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF McKINLEY COUNTY

8 Robert A. Aragon, District Judge

9 John A. Chapela

10 Gallup, NM

11 for Appellant

12 Henry S. Howe

13 Gallup, NM 

14 for Appellee 

15 MEMORANDUM OPINION

16 BUSTAMANTE, Judge.
2

1 Summary dismissal was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of

2 proposed disposition. No memorandum opposing summary dismissal has been filed,

3 and the time for doing so has expired. 

4 Dismissed.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 

7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge

8 WE CONCUR:

9 

10 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

11 

12 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge

13
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MICHAEL DOSCH.

September 5, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
PORTAGE PARTNERS, LTD.
(A DEVELOPMENT STAGE COMPANY)
BALANCE SHEET

                                                                  June 30, 2004
ASSETS

Current assets:                                                        -
Total current assets                                                  -


LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDER'S EQUITY

Current liabilities:
Accounts payable - related party                                          3,152

Total current liabilities                                                 3,152

Stockholder's equity:
Common stock, $0.001 par value,
25,000,000 shares authorized,
4,500,000 shares issued and
outstanding as of 06/30/02                                                4,500
Additional paid-in capital                                                   75
(Deficit) accumulated during
development stage                                                       (6,922)
                                                              (2,347)
                                                                       $    -

The accompanying notes are an intregal part of these financial statements.

Page 1
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. CAROLE P. WILKINS.

May 30, 1989.

Petition for certification denied. (See 230 *N.J.Super.*261)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bobby Ray Curtis,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04377-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Bertram & Graf LLC

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 11/29/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: December 8, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9261 Filed 12/11/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9261 Filed 12/11/17 Page 2 of 2