# FILED May 6, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE,

AT NASHVILLE

_______________________________________________________ ) BATSON EAST-LAND CO., INC. , ) Montgomery County Chancery Court ) No. 94-74-434 Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) VS. ) C.A. No. 01A01-9708-CH-00387 ) RONNIE D. BOYD, as Assessor of ) Property of Montgomery County , ) Tennessee , ) ) Defendant/Appe

llant, ) ) ASSESSMENT APPEALS ) COMMISSION OF THE STA TE ) OF TENNESSEE and TENNESSEE ) BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) ) Defendants. )

______________________________________________________________________________ From the Chancery Court of Montgomery County at Clarksville. Honorable Alex W. Darnell, Chancellor

Robert Clive Mar

ks , MARKS, SHELL, MANESS & MARKS, Clarksville, Tennessee Attorney fo

r Defendant/App

ellant. David E. Cypress , Nashville, Tennessee. Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.

OPINION FIL

ED: AFFIRMED AND

REMANDED FARMER, J. HIGHERS, J. : (Concurs) LILLARD, J. : (Concurs)Ronnie D. Boyd, the Assessor of Property of Montgomery Count

y, Tennessee, appealsthe trial court’s judgment which ruled that eighty-nine perce nt (89 %) of

a parcel of real property owned by Pe

titioner/Appellee Batson Ea st-Land Compa ny, Inc ., was entitled to “

Greenbelt” status for the ta

x year 1 991. We

conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling a

nd, thus, we affir

m the trial court’ s judgment.

This dispute began when the Assessor for Montgomery County assessed Batson’s property as commercial rather than agricultural land based on the Assessor’s determination that the property was not entitled to “Greenbelt” status for the 1991 tax year. Batson acquired the subject property in 1985 when it purch

ased a farm cons

isting of approxima

tely 300 acres. In 1986, Batson,
or its agent, successfully applied for a change in zoning for a portion of the property which fronted Highway 79. After the zoning change, the majority (244 acre s) of the farm, known as Parce l 13, continuedto be zoned as agricultural property, while the affec ted portion of the farm, which bec ame known as Parcel 13.02, was rezoned as commercial property. I n connection with its re zo ning application, Batson sold thirty-two acres of Parcel 13.02 to a third par

ty for deve

lopment of a WalMart shopping center. This appeal invol v es the remaining twenty-three or twenty -four acres of Parcel 13.02, which prope rty lies alon

g either side of

the Wal-Mart deve

lopment and is still

owned by Batson.

After

the county board

of equalization upheld the Assessor’s determination that the property was not entitled to Greenbelt status, Batson appealed the county board’s assessment to the StateBoard of

Equalization. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1412(a) (Supp. 1991) (granting aggrieved taxpay er right to appeal from any action of county board of equalization to

State Board of Equalization). The administrative law judge hearing the appeal found in favor of Batson and ru led that the subject property should be classifi

ed as agricultu

ral land for the 1991 tax year. Accordingly , the administrative law judge enter ed an initial decis

i on o rdering that the property be assessed as agricultural land for 1991.

In August 1992, attorney Robert Clive Marks, pur porting t o represent both the Assessor and Montgomery County, appeale d the ad ministrat ive law judge’s decision to the Assessment

Appeals Commission. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1501(c) (Supp. 1991). The notice of appealspecifically stated that both the Assessor andthe County were appealing the initial decision. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the As sessment Appeals C o mmission reversed the initia l decision and order of

the administrative law judge and denied Batson’s application for Greenbelt status for the 1991 tax year. In support of its decision, the Commission found that the subject property “was notbeing used on the

assessment date a

t issue and its imm ediate most suitable economic use was for commercial development.” The Commission’s decision became final after the State Board of Equalizati on opted not to hear the appeal, and an official certificate to that effect was enter ed on January 3, 1994. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1502(j)(1) (1989) (providing that action taken by Assessment AppealsCommission shall be final unless State Board of Equalization requires re view of a ction within forty-five days).

On February 8, 1994, within sixty day s after the State Board of Equa lizat ion’s decision became final, B atson filed a pe tition for review in the chancery court of Montgomery Cou nty. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1511(b) (1989) (providing that judicial review o

f Board’s actio

n shall be in chancery

court of Davidson

County or county where disputed assessment was made). I n the petition’s caption, Batson named a s respondents the Asses sor, the Assessment Appeals Commission, andthe State Board of Equalization. The petition did not specifically name Montgomery County as
a party; however, the petition was served on Robert Clive Marks, the attorney of record for th

e Cou nty.

The Assessor r espond ed by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable

party. The Assessor’s motion ar gued, inter alia , that Montgomery County, as the taxing jurisdiction affected by Batson’s petition for review, was an indispensable party to the action and that Batson’s failure to join the County required dismissal of the petition. The State Attorney General,on behalf of the Assessment Appeals Commission and the State Board of Equalization, subsequently joined in the Assessor’s motion to dismiss.

The trial court denied the Respondents’ motions to dismiss and proceededto conduct
an evidentiary hearing on the meri ts of Batson’s petition for review. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1511(b)1 In accordance with this court’s opinion in Richardson v. Assessment Appeals Commission , 828 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. App. 1991), section 67-5-1511(b) now specifies that the judicial review “shall consist of a new hearing in the chancery court based upon the administrative re

cord and any

additional or suppl

emental evidenc

e which either pa

rty wishes to adduce relevant to any issue.” T.C.A. § 67-5-1511(b) (1994). (1989) (providing that judicial reviewshall be de novo appeal to chancery court). 1 After conducting the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree ruling that eighty-nine

percent (89%) of the subject property was entitled to Greenbelt status for the 1991 tax ye ar.

On appeal from

the trial court’s final decree, the Assessor raises the following issues for this court’s review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in not di smis sing the petition for review for l

ack of subject ma

tter jurisdiction b

ecause Mon tgom ery C oun ty wa s no t jo ine d as an i ndi spe nsa ble part y. 2. Wh ether the tria

l court erred in [qualifying] 89% of the property for Greenbelt status.

We first reject the Assessor’s argument that the trial court erred in not dismissing Batson’s petition for review for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because Montgomery County wa s notjoined as an indispen sable party. Batson filed its petition for review pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Pro

cedures Act (AP

A), which, as per

tinent, contains th

e following prov

isions:
(1) Proceedings for review are instituted by fi ling a petition for review in

the chancery court

of Davidson County

, unless another court is specified by statute. Such pe tition shall be filed within sixty (60) days after the entry of the agency’s final order thereon. . . . (2)
. . . Cop ies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all part ies of record, including the attorney gener al and reporter, in accordance

with the provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure pe

rtaining to serv

ice of process.
T.C.A. § 4-5-322(b) (1991).

In construing the f

oregoing stat

utory provis

ions, this court recently

held that a party obtaining judicial review of a dec ision of the State B oard of Equalizati on is not required to name theapplicable county in the petition for review. In Schering-Plough Healt hcare Products, Inc

. v. State Board of Equalization , No. 02A01 -9703-CH -00058, 19

98 WL 23127 (Tenn. App. Jan. 23, 1998), perm. app. filed

(Tenn. Mar. 25, 1998), we explained that section 4-5-322(b) of the APA imposes only two requirements upo n the petitioner. First, the petitioner must file the petition for review within sixty days after the entry

of the Board’s final order. Second, the petitioner must serve copies of the petition upon the Board a nd upon all

parties of record in accordance with the provisions of the Tennessee Rul es o f Civil Procedure p ertaining to ser

vice of process.

After enumerat

ing these requirements,

we observed that

“ nowh ere in the ordina

ry langua ge of [section] 4-5-322(b) is it required that all parties of record be named in the petition for review.” Schering-Plough , 1998 WL 23127, at *4 (emphasis added).

In support of this construction, we noted that the petition for review m erel y was a continuation of the administrat ive proceeding

s in which the parties already had been determined and were of record. Schering-Plough , 1998 WL 23127, at *4. Thus, we reasoned that “parties to the administra tive proceedings remain parties to the judicial review of those proceedings if t h e requirements of [section] 4-5-322(b) are met.” Id . We alsocompared the petition for review to a complaint in an origi n al action, as well as to a notice of a

ppeal, wherein t

he failure to cor

rectly identify a party in th

e caption would not

constitute a fata

l defect. Id ., at **4-5 (citing Goss v. Hutchins , 751 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tenn. 1988); T.R.C.P. 10.01; T.R.A.P. 3(f)).

In the p resen t case, Batson me t the requiremen

ts of section 4-5- 322(b) when it (1) filed its petition for review in the chancery court of Montgomery

County within s

ixty days after entry of the Board’s final order, and (2) served copies of the petition upon the attorney of record for the Assessor and the County. Inasmuch as Batson met both require ments of section 4-5-322(b), the County remained a party to the judicial review proceeding s in chancery court, and Batson’s failure to separately name the County as a pa rty in the petition for review was not fatal to the petition.

We now turn to the merits of the Assessor’s appeal, wherein he contends that the trial court erred in ruling that eighty-nine (89%) of the subjec tproperty was entitled

to Greenbelt status for the 1991 tax yea

r. In revi ewing the action of the State Board of Equalization, the trial court properly conducted a new hearing during which it permitted the parties to introduce additional or2 See supra note 1.

supplemental evidence relevant to the issue of the property’s entitlement to Greenbelt status. See T.C.A. § 67-5-1511(b) (198 9 & 1994). 2 Our review of the trial court’s dec

ision, therefore

, is governed by the provisions of

rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Richardson v. Assessment Appeals Comm’n , 828 S .W.2 d 403, 407 (T enn. A pp. 19 91). In accorda nce with rule 13(d), we revie w the trial court’ s findings of fac t de novo upon the record,
acco mpa nie d by a presumption of correctness of such findings, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See T.R.A.P. 13(d).

In Marion County v. State Board of E qualization , 710 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. App. 1986), this court discussed the Legislature’s purpose in passing the “Agricultural, Forest, and Open Space Land A

ct of 1976:”

In 1976, the Legislature, concerned about the threatto open land posed by urbanization and high land tax es , passed an act to enc ou rage landowners to keep their property open. T.C.A. § 67-5-1002. If their open land had tak en on an inflated value because of its locatio n and its potential use for residential or commercial development, the a ct, known gener

ally as the “

Greenbelt Law,” allowed the owner to apply to the tax assessor of the county for a classificati

on of the property as agricultural, forest, or open spac e land. T.C.A. § 67-5-1007. When the property has been so classified, the value for assessment purposes is to be calculated as if t hat w ere its highest and best use. T.C.A. § 67-5-1008. Thus, the value of the l andused for assessment purposes is not what a willing buyer in a n arm’ s length t ransaction would pay for the property if it were not restricted in use . . . but is to be based on farm income, soil productivity or fertility, topography , etc. T.C.A. § 67-5-1008(a)(2). If the use changes, the owner is required to pay the taxes that would have been paid on the full unrestricted value of the land, going back three y ears on agricultural and forest land and five ye ars on open space land.
Marion County , 710 S.W.2d at 522.

Under the “Greenbelt

Law” as it exist

ed in 1991, proper

ty was entitl

ed to Greenbelt status if it met the Law’s definition of agricultural land. To that end, the Legislature provided the following defin

ition for the term “

agricultural la

nd:”“Agricultural land” means a tract of land of at least fifteen(15) acres including woodlands and was telands which for

m a contiguous p art thereof, constituting a fa

rm unit engage

d in or held for the production or g rowi ng of crops, pla

nts, animals, nurse

ry, or flor

al products. “Agricultural

land” also means two (2) or more t ra cts of land including woodlands andwastelands, one (1) of which is greater than fifteen(15) acres and

none of which is not

less than te n (10) acres, andsuch tracts

may not be co

ntiguous but shall

constitute a farm

unit being held and used for the production or grow ing of agricultural products.

T.C.A. § 67-5-1004(1) (1989)
. The Legisla ture also provided the following guidance to tax assessors to determine whet

her land was ag

ricultural:

In determining whether any land is agricultural land, the t a x assessor shall take into account, amon g oth er things, the acreage of such land, the produ ctiv ity of such la nd, and the portion

thereof in actual use for farming or held for farming or agricultura l operation.
T.C.A. § 67-5-1005(a)(3) (1989).

The foregoing statutes established that, in order to be classified as agricultural land under the Greenbelt L

aw in effect in 1991, property need not have been “in ac tual use for farmi ng”
or “engaged in

. . . the production

or growing of

crops, plants,

animals, nursery, or floral products.” T.C.A. §§ 67-5-1005(a)(3), 67-5-1004(1) (1989). Instead, it was sufficient if the property

was “ held for farming or

agricultural o

peration” or if th

e property was “ held for the production or growing of crops, plants, animals, nursery, or floral products.” Id. (emphases added). Accordingly, this appeal requires us to review the record to determine if the evidence preponderates against the finding that the subject property was being held for farming or agricultural operation, i.e. the p roduction or growing of cr

ops, plants, animal

s, nursery,

or floral produc

ts.

After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the subject property was entitled to Greenbelt status for the 1991 tax year. At the hearing below, the A ssessor acknowledged

that there were no roads, fence lines, or other boundaries separating Parc el 13.02 from Parcel 13. (Tr. 2/20/96, pp. 28-29). Nevertheless, the Assessor testified that he refused to assess the subject property as agricultura

l land based prima

rily on two fa

ctors: (1) Prior to the as sessment date of January 1, 1991 , Batson had not actually planted crops or cultivated the land; and (2) afte r3 The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service of the United States Department

of Agriculture. acquiring the property

in 1985, Batson suc

cess fu lly applied to rezone the property as commerc ial pro pert y. The Assessor also noted that Batson had advertised the subject property f

or sale prior to January 1991.

Batson’s vice president, Robert R. Batson, Sr., acknowledged that Batson did n o t actually cultivate the property prior to January 1991. Robert Batson maintained, however, that he intendedto cultivate the property in 1991 and in the y

ears prior to

1991. Prior to 1991, Batson had participated

in various ASCS 3 programs, such as price support and production adjustm

ent programs andan optional diversion program for wheat and feed grains. I n addition, Robert Batson had asked George Kennedy, II

I, to farm the property in 1991, and Batson had pur chased crop insurance for that purpose. George Kennedy, I II, corroborated this t estimony, stating that, beginning in 1987 and ending in 1991, Robe rt Bat son asked him to farm the subject property. Kennedy already was working another farm owned by Batson, and he told Robert Batson that he “would get to it if [he] could.” Ken ned y did not act ual ly fa rm t he p rop ert y, however, and be ginning in 1992, Batson leased the lan d to ano the r far mer , Ri char d Co nro y.

Based on the f or egoing evidence, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s ruling that

most of the subject property was entitled to Greenbelt status for the 1991 tax year. Although it was undisputed that Ba tson did not actually farm or cultivate the property prior to 1992, Batson produ ced evidence from which the tri al court could hav

e found that, at the

time of its assessment,the subject prope rty was bein

g “held for the

production or gr

owing of crops”

as required by the Greenbelt Law. T.C.A. § 67-5-1004(1) (1989).
According ly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed, and this cause is remanded fo r further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Assessor, for whi ch ex ecut ion may i ssu e if nece ssa ry.

____________________________________ FARMER

, J.______________________________

HIGHERS, J. (Conc

urs)

______________________________ LILL ARD, J. (Concurs)