### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 50475 Summary Calendar

EMILY JANE GALLIOS , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.
WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION , Defendant

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:13

- CV

- 830

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Emily Jane Gallios, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of her diversity suit against Wells Fargo Bank National Association (Wells Fa rgo). The district court denied h er IFP motion and certified that the appeal was legally frivolous. By moving for IFP

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 2, 2015 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-50475 Document: 00513291353 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/02/2015No. 14

- 50475

2 status, Gallios is challenging the district court’s certification. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Gallios doe s not challenge the district court’s determination that Wells Fargo was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on her suit to quiet title
and her claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ; the Texas Business and Comm erce Code ; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. ; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ; and § 51.002 of the Texas Property Code. These issues are therefore abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy She riff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Instead, Gallios contends that the district court violated her constitutional right s by denying her motion to discharge attorney Oscar Cantu and proceed pro se. She also contends that the district court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to remand because, absent the claims raised in the unauthorized supplemental petition, the jurisdictional amount in controversy was not met. According to Gallios, had t he district court allowed her to discharge Cantu, proceed pro se, and present her arguments regarding the unauthorized supplemental petition, her motion to r emand would have been granted. Gallios has not shown that she will raise a nonfrivolous issue for a ppeal with respect to th ese claim s

. Gallios’s contention that the district court forced her to retain Cantu is belied by the record. The day after Gallios filed her motion to discharge Cantu, the district court sought a response from Cantu and then permi tted him to withdraw. Althou gh the district court denied Gallios’s motion to proceed pro se and ordered her to obtain new counsel, Gallios was allowed to enter an appearance and proceed pro se for the duration of the case. Finally, Gallios did not file h er motion to discharge Cantu, proceed Case: 14-50475 Document: 00513291353 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/02/2015No. 14

- 50475

3 pro se, and voluntarily dismiss the case until December 26, 2013, more than four months after the filing of the supplemental petition and nearly two months after the district court’s denial of her motion to remand. Alt hough Gallios ha s shown that she is financially eligible to proceed
IFP , she has not shown that “ the appeal involves legal points arguable on their
merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotatio n marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Gallios’s IFP motion is DENIED , and h er appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See id. ; 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 14-50475 Document: 00513291353 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/02/2015