[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-10915

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAYNALDO RAY QUIROGA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00066-SPC-NPM-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10915

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Disguised as a sheriff deputy, Raynaldo Ray Quiroga 

robbed a pawn shop and absconded with six firearms. One of those 

firearms was a Smith & Wesson M&P15-22, a semiautomatic 

weapon capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. A jury convicted Quiroga on four separate criminal counts, and the district 

court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment. Quiroga now 

appeals that sentence, arguing that because he did not use the 

Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 to commit the robbery, his crimes did 

not “involve[]” a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a 

large capacity magazine, as required by United States Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a). Quiroga also contends that the rule 

of lenity precluded the district court from relying on Section

2K2.1(a) because the term “involved” is ambiguous. Based on these 

alleged errors, Quiroga concludes that the district court imposed a 

procedurally unreasonable sentence. But Quiroga ignores the

Guidelines’ plain text and its application to his crimes. Moreover, 

because Section 2K2.1(a) is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. 

On May 19, 2021, Quiroga, dressed as a sheriff deputy, followed an accomplice into a local pawnshop and pretended to look 

for someone. He then drew a Glock 21 pistol from his duty belt, 

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22-10915 Opinion of the Court 3

racked it, and pointed it at the two shop clerks working that day.

After ordering the clerks to the floor and restraining them, Quiroga 

removed six firearms from the shop safe. He escorted his accomplice out of the shop and fled the scene with the firearms. One of 

the firearms taken was a Smith & Wesson M&P15-22, a semiautomatic weapon capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.

The government charged Quiroga with (1) Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; (2) brandishing a firearm in 

furtherance of the Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(1)(A)(ii); (3) possessing a stolen firearm in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2); and (4) possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). A 

jury convicted him on all four counts.

At sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement, 

which increased the base offense level to 22, because Quiroga’s “offense involved a [] semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine,” namely, the Smith & Wesson 

M&P15-22. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). Quiroga objected to the enhancement, arguing that he committed the crime at issue with the

Glock 21, which is not capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. After overruling the objection and considering factors not relevant to this appeal, the district court set Quiroga’s total offense 

level to thirty-eight and sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment. Quiroga filed a timely notice of appeal.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10915

II. 

We review questions of law arising under the Guidelines, as 

well as the district court’s application of the Guidelines, de novo. 

United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2005); United 

States v. Gordillo, 920 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019). “[B]y reviewing whether, among other things, the District Court miscalculated the guideline range,” we ensure the procedural reasonableness of an imposed sentence. United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275, 

1278 (11th Cir. 2019).

III. 

On appeal, Quiroga advances two principal arguments.

First, he argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the weapon used to commit the offense, the Glock 21, cannot 

accept a large capacity magazine. Second, Quiroga contends that 

Section 2K2.1(a)(3) is ambiguous because neither the Guidelines

nor decisions applying the enhancement at issue specify what it 

means for a crime to have “involved” a firearm capable of accepting 

a large capacity magazine—he therefore urges us to resolve the

supposed ambiguity in his favor based on the rule of lenity. We 

address each issue in turn.

A. The district court imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.

The crux of Quiroga’s appeal rests on the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. He argues that, because he used a Glock 

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22-10915 Opinion of the Court 5

21, a weapon incapable of accepting a large capacity magazine, to 

commit Hobbs Act robbery, the district court should not have considered the Smith & Wesson M&P15-22 during sentencing. We disagree.

This Court derives a guideline’s meaning “first from its plain 

language and, absent ambiguity, no additional inquiry is necessary.” United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Circ. 

2004). A base offense level of twenty-two is appropriate for unlawful possession of a firearm if “the offense involved a [] semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) (emphasis added).

We agree with Quiroga that the Guidelines nowhere define 

“involved,” and our case law has not squarely addressed the term’s 

scope. We thus defer to the word’s plain meaning. Mandhai, 375 

F.3d at 1247. To “involve” is to “include within its folds or ramifications; to contain, imply.” Oxford English Dictionary (online ed.).

In short, the definition is quite broad.

We need not address whether Quiroga’s robbery offense 

“involved” a gun with a large-capacity magazine because there is 

no question that the enhancement applied to his possession offenses. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (describing base offense level 

computation for offenses involving “Unlawful Receipt, Possession, 

or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition” and “Prohibited 

Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition”) (emphasis 

added) with id. § 2B3.1 (describing base offense level computation 

for offenses involving “Robbery”) (emphasis added). Here, 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10915

Quiroga stole the firearms that were the basis of his possession offenses, and one of those firearms was the Smith & Wesson M&P15-

22. The district court correctly applied Quiroga’s sentencing enhancement under Section 2K2.1(a)(3) because his firearms-possession crimes (counts three and four) undoubtedly “involved,” based 

on that term’s plain meaning, a semiautomatic firearm capable of 

accepting a large capacity magazine—the Smith & Wesson 

M&P15-22 that was the fruit of his robbery. Therefore, the district 

court did not miscalculate the guidelines advisory range and imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.

B. The rule of lenity does not apply.

Quiroga also argues that the rule of lenity applies to this case 

because the word “involved” in Section 2K2.1 is ambiguous and 

not defined in the Guidelines. Again, we disagree.

The rule of lenity is a substantive canon of statutory construction “requir[ing] courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly in favor of the accused.” United States v. Wright, 607 

F.3d 708, 716 (11th Cir. 2010) (Pryor, J., concurring). It applies both 

to statutes and the Guidelines. United States v. Jeter, 329 F.3d 1229, 

1230 (11th Cir. 2003).

But the canon presupposes ambiguity—none exists here. As 

previously noted, the district court applied Quiroga’s sentencing 

enhancement for his firearms-possession convictions, not the 

Hobbs Act robbery. Whether the robbery “involved” the Smith & 

Wesson M&P15-22 is immaterial because his ultimate criminal 

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22-10915 Opinion of the Court 7

possession of that firearm, for which a jury convicted him, unequivocally “involved a [] semiautomatic firearm that is capable of 

accepting a large capacity magazine.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. Accordingly, the rule of lenity is inapposite.

IV. 

To cinch the matter, the district court imposed Quiroga’s 

sentencing enhancement under Section 2K2.1 for his firearms-possession crimes. That enhancement comported with the Guidelines

and was procedurally reasonable. Moreover, the rule of lenity does 

not apply to this case because Section 2K2.1 is not ambiguous. The 

judgment below is AFFIRMED.

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