IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0805

Filed June 16, 2021

DESIREE NICOLE BENDA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TRAVIS JAMES STREIF,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, Linda M. Fangman, 

Judge.

Travis Streif appeals the imposition of a protective order pursuant to Iowa 

Code chapter 236 (2020). AFFIRMED.

Judith O’Donohoe of Elwood, O’Donohoe, Braun & White, LLP, Charles 

City, for appellant.

Desiree Benda, Cresco, self-represented appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ.
2

MULLINS, Judge.

Travis Streif appeals the imposition of a protective order pursuant to Iowa 

Code chapter 236 (2020). Travis argues the district court erred in considering a 

prior chapter 236 action that was ultimately dismissed and in finding the allegations 

against him rose to the level of assault.1 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Travis and Desirée Benda share two children and were never married. The

relationship has been tumultuous since the parties first began to live together in 

2015. Travis was charged with simple misdemeanor domestic abuse assault in 

2015, following an incident when he struck Desirée on the face with an open hand. 

A protective order was issued but was dismissed at Desirée’s request four days 

later. Following the birth of the parties’ first child, Travis was convicted of the 2015

domestic abuse charge and was sentenced to seven days in jail, with five days 

suspended. Travis petitioned for visitation with the parties’ child, case ending 

7022. In December, the parties entered into a temporary visitation agreement.

Desirée alleges that throughout 2016 and the spring of 2017, she was 

routinely afraid for the safety of her and the child during visitation. One incident in 

October became physical, and resulted in Desirée biting Travis’s face. The parties 

periodically resumed a sexual relationship and Desirée became pregnant with a 

second child. The following year was similarly contentious. Travis sought 

continued court intervention to secure more visitation and Desirée made more 

claims that Travis’s conduct placed her in fear of abuse at his hands. Desirée 

 

1 Travis acknowledges one incident in 2015 led to his conviction of simple 

misdemeanor domestic abuse assault, first offense.
3

sought intervention of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) based on 

an allegation that Travis spanked the parties’ child, resulting in bruising. DHS 

completed their investigation and the 2018 complaint was not confirmed. The 

parties’ second child was born, and Travis was proved to be the father following 

court-ordered paternity testing. 

In early 2019, Travis hit Desirée’s car when he pulled into her driveway to 

retrieve the oldest child for visitation. No damage resulted, and Travis admitted to 

the accident in his testimony. In February, Desirée filed a petition for relief from 

domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2019). A protective order 

issued but was dismissed approximately six weeks later. In April, the parties 

agreed to mutual protective orders in a new chapter 236 (2020) case with minimal 

exceptions allowing the parties to exchange custody of the children. In May, Travis 

was arrested for violating a mutual protective order for speaking to Desirée while 

the couple exchanged custody. Desirée continued to report Travis to DHS for 

allegations of drug use and physical abuse. Following investigation, both reports 

were returned as not confirmed. An agreement was reached in the fall of 2019, 

allowing visitation to be supervised by third-party representatives of both Travis 

and Desirée. 

Desirée filed another petition for relief from domestic abuse in April 2020, 

the case now before us on appeal. The parties appeared for hearing on the petition 

later that month. The district court granted the petition and entered a protective 

order. Travis filed a motion to amend pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 

1.904(2), which was denied. Travis then filed a motion to clarify the protective 

order. The order was granted in the following respects:
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a) [Travis] and [Desirée] may be present for exchanges of 

the children for visitation purposes but may not address one another.

b) The parties may communicate regarding matters 

involving the children in writing in the custodial notebook.

c) Other communications regarding the children may be 

made between [Travis’s half-brother], and Desirée and/or her agent 

through email.

d) [Travis] shall provide a third party for the exchanges 

when they are to be picked up and [Desirée] shall provide a third 

party for the exchanges when they are to be dropped off to [her].

Desirée filed a motion to modify the order, objecting to the extent that Travis would 

be allowed “to be personally present at custodial exchanges.” The court ordered 

that Travis was permitted to be present at the exchanges but “the actual exchange 

shall be by a third person as noted in the Order.” Travis appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Civil domestic-abuse cases are equitable in nature and are reviewed de 

novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). 

We consider the entire record anew but give weight to the trial court’s

determinations of fact and credibility. Id. “The plaintiff must prove the allegation 

of domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Code § 236.4(1). 

“The quantity of evidence required of a party having the burden of proof in a civil 

action is ‘no more than will outweigh the evidence of the other side.’” Marcinowicz 

v. Flick, No. 17-0039, 2017 WL 6039997, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017) 

(quoting Hall v. Wright, 156 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Iowa 1968)). 

III. Analysis

Travis argues the district court erred in considering a prior chapter 236 

petition that was dismissed. He also argues the court erred in finding the alleged 

conduct amounted to an assault or demonstrated a current credible threat to 
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Desirée’s physical safety, particularly in light of the fact that the protective order in 

case ending 8890 already existed. Neither party disputes the applicability of 

chapter 236 based on their status as parents of the same child. See Iowa 

Code § 236.2(1)(c), (2).

A. Prior Chapter 236 Petition

Travis argues the district court erred in considering conduct described in a 

prior chapter 236 petition Desirée filed in February 2019. Travis insists that since 

prior protective orders were dropped and the couple continued to have contact, 

including a sexual relationship that resulted in two children, the district court should 

have ignored the prior petition. He also argues the conduct Desirée complained 

of is too remote in time to be considered in the present petition. 

The petition filed in February 2019 alleged violations of a protective order 

that was then in force. But, that petition and resulting protective order were 

dismissed shortly thereafter. Travis insists that the district court considered the 

dismissed petition in error. On our review, the conduct described in the petition 

was corroborated by in camera testimony, including some admissions to the

conduct from Travis. To the extent the district court made credibility 

determinations after receiving conflicting testimony, we defer to the district court’s 

findings. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594.

Travis takes issue with the fact that the district court considered conduct 

that took place between 2015 and the present. He argues the conduct is too 

remote in time to show a credible present threat to Desirée. Travis supported his 

argument in briefing with a citation to this court’s opinion in Thompson v. 

Thompson, No. 03-2052, 2004 WL 1396336, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 23, 2004). 
6

The standard proposed by Travis is alleged to be applied as a credibility-finding 

standard. However, our review of Thompson reveals that the proposed standard 

has nothing to do with the timing of a complainant’s statements pursuant to a 

chapter 236 petition, but is actually the standard applied in consideration of the 

excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. See id. We find our 

supreme court’s statements on the lack of a specific timing requirement in chapter 

236 controlling on this argument.

Iowa Code chapter 236 has no provision that requires a petition to 

be filed within a specific time after an alleged assault. It is true . . . 

that an elapse of time between an alleged assault and the filing of 

the petition may have a bearing on what specific relief a court might 

grant. 

Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1994). Furthermore, “[b]ecause 

‘chapter 236 is protective rather than punitive in nature,’ we employ ‘a reasonable 

or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose.’” Marcinowicz, 2017 WL 

6039997, at *2 (quoting Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 

1991)). We find no error in the district court’s consideration of the allegations as 

provided by Desirée, including prior petitions and conduct that occurred in the past,

to decide whether the elements of an assault were satisfied.

B. Domestic Abuse Assault

Travis argues the district court erred in finding that any incident, other than 

the 2015 assault resulting in his conviction, amounted to an assault. Travis then 

argues that the district court also erred in finding any incident demonstrated a 

credible threat to Desirée’s physical safety, particularly because the mutual 

protective orders in case ending 7022 were in effect. 
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In order to succeed on her petition, Desirée needed to prove that domestic 

violence occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 

at 596. An assault occurs when:

2. A person . . ., without justification, . . . does any of the 

following:

a. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which 

is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or 

offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the 

act.

b. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of 

immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, 

or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.

c. Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays 

in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another.

Iowa Code § 708.1(2). 

The district court acknowledged that Travis engaged in domestic abuse in 

2015 and was convicted the following year. The district court then noted that the 

parties have an extensive history of conflict, resulting in several calls to law 

enforcement. The district court said that although the last incident of physical 

assault was in 2015, a high level of conflict continues to exist between the parties 

as was observed by the court during the hearing. The court specifically discussed

an incident in January 2019 where Travis pulled into Desirée’s driveway and hit 

her car2 and another incident where Travis screamed and verbally threatened 

Desirée following a report of child abuse to DHS. Although Travis argues that the 

court ignored the fact that the parties were subject to mutual protective orders, our 

review of the hearing transcript reveals the court was well aware of that fact. The 

district court asked Desirée if she would prefer to proceed pursuant to the existing 

 

2 Travis argued the collision was an accident and resulted in no damage, but he 

did not contest its occurrence. 
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protective order and dismiss the chapter 236 petition she filed in giving rise to this 

appeal. 

Travis argues that there has been no assault pursuant to section 708.1 to 

support this chapter 236 petition. We acknowledge that Desirée has not always 

followed through with protective orders in the past. Travis’s conduct in 2015 was 

the only assault that resulted in conviction. However, Desirée alleged multiple 

instances where Travis was in her home and engaged in unwelcome physical 

contact, with one incident resulting in Desirée biting Travis on the face. Desirée 

alleged Travis provoked her, forcing her to defend herself. Desirée has also 

enlisted the assistance of law enforcement to remove Travis from her home. She 

has consistently alleged he engaged in verbal threats against her and, at times, 

Travis’s yelling would cause Desirée to feel physically ill. Desirée also testified 

that Travis made gestures that made her fearful for her safety. On our de novo 

review of the record, we agree with the district court that Desirée proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there was a current threat to her physical 

safety in satisfaction of section 236.4(1). 

AFFIRMED.