alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John A. Eaton, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc., 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC 

Civil Action No. CV-17-03540-PHX-DGC 

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

To: Freese & Goss PLLC - Birmingham, AL 

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff) 

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. 

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. 

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. 

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/30/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent. 

Date: November 6, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr. 

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party 

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons 

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599) 

Printed Name 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363 

Address 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

E-mail Address 

(404) 322-6155 

Telephone number 

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8721 Filed 11/08/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8721 Filed 11/08/17 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Ventana Medical Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), Nicholas Malden, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Secretary of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

April 28, 2006



|                                                             
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                             
|                                                             
|/S/ NICHOLAS MALDEN                                          
|Nicholas Malden                                              
|Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Secretary
No. 03-14-00397-CV ____________________________________________________ 

In the Court of Appeals for the Third Judicial District

Austin, Texas ______________________________________________________________________________

American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v. 

Glen Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 

____________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 200th Judicial District Court

Travis County, Texas 

____________________________________________________ 

NOTICE OF AUTOMATIC SUBSTITUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(a), Appellees give notice that 

Glenn Hegar succeeded Susan Combs as Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State 

of Texas on January 2, 2015, and Ken Paxton succeeded Greg Abbott as Attorney 

General of the State of Texas on January 5, 2015. 

Accordingly, the Appellees now should be designated as “Glenn Hegar, Comptroller 

of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State 

of Texas.”

Respectfully submitted,

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

1 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00397-CV

4019469

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

2/4/2015 1:44:34 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 2/4/2015 1:44:34 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
CHARLES E. ROY

First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES E. DAVIS

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

ROBERT O’KEEFE

Division Chief, Financial Litigation, Tax, and

Charitable Trusts Division

/s/Charles K. Eldred 

CHARLES K. ELDRED

Attorney in Charge

Financial Litigation, Tax, and

Charitable Trusts Division

State Bar No. 00793681

P.O. Box 12548

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

512-475-1743

512-477-2348 (fax)

charles.eldred@texasattorneygeneral.gov

Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 4, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

Notice of Automatic Substitution of Public Officers was sent to the Appellant’s 

attorney of record via e-service and/or electronic mail as follows: 

Doug Sigel Doug.sigel@ryanlawllp.com

RYAN LAW FIRM, LLP

100 Congress Ave., Ste. 950

Austin, Texas 78701

/s/Charles K. Eldred 

CHARLES K. ELDRED

2
#### John Richards *v.*Wesley Cofer et al.

Alteration of Instruments — Bills and Notes — Release of Maker.

Adding the words “interest from the date” to a note after signature and delivery, and without the knowledge or authority of the maker, constitutes such an alteration as will release the maker from the whole amount of the debt. .

APPEAL EROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 23, 1868.

Wilson, *for appellant.*

*Cofer, for appellee.*

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Robertson :

It appears satisfactorily that $700 was the amount loaned, and that the note for $770 was given for the loan and ten *per cent,*on it for a year. It also appears that, when signed by the appellee as surety, the note was complete for $770 at the end of one year, without any blank. And it also appears that the words, *“interest from the date ”*were added by the creditor, after the full execution and delivery of the note, and without the authority of the appellee.

The legal conclusion is that this material alteration destroyed the appellee’s obligation to pay any portion of the note.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court to that effect was right, and is therefore affirmed.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

         We consent to the use in this  Registration  Statement on Form 10-SB of
our report on YouthLine USA, Inc. and Subsidiary  dated February 22, 2000 on our
examinations  for the years ended December 31, 1998 and 1999. We also consent to
the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts".

MICHAEL C. FINKELSTEIN

Morganville, New Jersey
Certified Public Accountant
March 27, 2000
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1



               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG, LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following registration
statements of Quovadx, Inc. and in the related prospectuses of our report dated
February 8, 2002, except for Note 10, as to which the date is March 1, 2002,
with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Quovadx,
Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31,
2001:


     1.   Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-30356) pertaining to the
          Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Plan, 1999 Employee Stock Purchase
          Plan, 1999 Director Option Plan and 2000 Non-Statutory Option Plan

     2.   Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-67436) pertaining to the
          Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Plan, 1999 Employee Stock Purchase
          Plan, 1999 Director Option Plan and 2000 Non-Statutory Option Plan

     3.   Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form
          S-4 on Form S-8 (No. 333-67650) pertaining to the Healthcare.com
          Corporation Stock Option Plan, Healthcare.com Corporation
          Non-Qualified Stock Option Plan, Healthcare.com Corporation
          Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan, and Healthcare.com
          Corporation Employee Stock Purchase Plan

     4.   Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-81210) pertaining to the
          registration of 201,794 shares of Quovadx, Inc. common stock


Denver, Colorado
March 25, 2002
#### R. Lee Crawford *v.*W. J. Clark.

Bills and Notes — Fraudulent Sale to Hinder and Delay Creditors.

Two notes were given to Benton, by A. M. and Z. C. Merrill. Benton then placed both notes in the hands of Richardson for collection and then assigned the receipt of Richardson to Crawford. In the absence of proof of a valid sale for a valuable consideration, or a ’satisfactory , explanation as to the different transfers, it is held that creditors of Benton could attack the attempted collection of the notes by Crawford, as having been transferred to defraud creditors.

APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT.

June 6, 1868.

Opinion of the Oourt by

Judge Eobertson:

*595Burnam, *for appellant.*

Cardwell, *for appellee.*

Benton, as first and principal defendant, being party to tbe issue and apparently interested therein was, as adjudged by the circuit court, incompetent as a witness for his volunteer co-deft.

The execution of A. M. Merrill’s note to Benton in discharge of Z. C. Merrell’s note to him, and also of Z. 0. Merrell’s note to Townsend implied *prima*facie, that Benton then owned both of those notes. Townsend neither offered to become a party nor was apparently a necessary party to this suit, attaching the comprehensive note to Benton as his own exclusive property, and, without proof that the appellant, B. L. Crawford, held a beneficial interest in it, he had no right to intervene as a party. Even Benton’s rejected deposition would not, if admitted as competent, prove that Z. 0. Merrell’s note to Townsend was executed through mistake to him alone, nor why it was so executed, if Crawford was equally interested as joint owner of the consideration of it, nor would it show satisfactorily why Benton was in possesion of the note to Townsend, nor why, so soon after his delivery of that note as well as Z. 0. Merrell’s note to himself to Bichardson for collection, he assigned to Crawford Bichard’s receipt to him for both notes. He does not state that he *sold*those notes to Crawford or received from him a valuable consideration, for that assignment.

Nor does either Benton or Bichardson attempt to explain why Benton thus assigned Townsend’s interest, nor wñy, after the assignment, A. M. Merrell’s note for the amount of both notes was executed, not to Crawford, but to Benton, if Crawford, and not Benton, was the beneficial owner of all. Nor is there any explanation of Benton’s urgent attempt to collect the amount of A. M. Merrell’s note about the time of the *Us mote*in this case.

Altogether it seems quite clear to us that Crawford has no just cause to complain of the decree subjecting A. M. Merrell’s note to Benton to the payment of Benton’s debt.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Betty Johnson,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04143-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Marc J Bern & Partners LLP

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 11/13/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: November 27, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8937 Filed 11/29/17 Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2285 Referred in House (RFH)]

  2d Session
                                S. 2285

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 17, 2004

                 Referred to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey a parcel of real 
                    property to Beaver County, Utah.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE TO BEAVER COUNTY, UTAH.

    (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall, without consideration 
and subject to valid existing rights, convey to Beaver County, Utah 
(referred to in this Act as the ``County''), all right, title, and 
interest of the United States in and to the approximately 200 acres 
depicted as ``Minersville State Park'' on the map entitled ``S. 2285, 
Minersville State Park'' and dated April 30, 2004, for use for public 
recreation.
    (b) Reconveyance by Beaver County.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (a), Beaver 
        County may sell, for not less than fair market value, a portion 
        of the property conveyed to the County under this section, if 
        the proceeds of such sale are used by the County solely for 
        maintenance of public recreation facilities located on the 
        remainder of the property conveyed to the County under this 
        section.
            (2) Limitation.--If the County does not comply with the 
        requirements of paragraph (1) in the conveyance of the property 
        under that paragraph--
                    (A) the County shall pay to the United States the 
                proceeds of the conveyance; and
                    (B) the Secretary of the Interior may require that 
                all property conveyed under subsection (a) (other than 
                the property sold by the County under paragraph (1)) 
                revert to the United States.

            Passed the Senate September 15, 2004.

            Attest:

                                             EMILY J. REYNOLDS,

                                                             Secretary.
```
#### STATE v. FRYE

No. 511A93-3

Case below: Catawba County Superior Court

Motion by defendant for stay of execution denied 22 August 2001. Petition by defendant for writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Catawba County, denied 22 August 2001.
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2503 

To make permanent the reduction in taxes on dividends and capital gains. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 3, 2004 

Mr. KYL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To make permanent the reduction in taxes on dividends 

and capital gains. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT REDUCTION IN TAXES ON DIVI4 DENDS AND CAPITAL GAINS. 

5 Section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Rec6 onciliation Act of 2003 (relating to sunset of title) is re7 pealed. 

Æ
#### Iris Ahmed, Plaintiff, v City of New York, Respondent, and Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[788 NYS2d 91]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered May 13, 2004, which, inter alia, denied the motion of defendant Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. dismissing the complaint as against it.

*389Supreme Court denied Lehrer McGovern’s summary judgment motion as premature because defendant City purportedly needed additional discovery. This was error. It is uncontroverted that Lehrer McGovern’s work at the Ramaz School was completed more than three months prior to plaintiffs alleged trip and fall on a sidewalk abutting the school’s premises. It is also uncontroverted that the block plaintiff allegedly tripped over was, at the time of the accident, used as a door stop at the Ramaz premises. The City has failed to articulate any colorable claim against Lehrer McGovern, nor has the City demonstrated that it either conducted or sought discovery from Lehrer McGovern prior to Lehrer McGovern’s motion. Accordingly, Lehrer McGovern’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unopposed by either plaintiff or defendant Ramaz, should have been granted. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Williams, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
Exhibit 32.3


CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Kurt Adzema, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Finisar Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended April 30, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated: June 28, 2011


/s/ Kurt AdzemaKurt AdzemaExecutive Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM E. JONES.

July 2, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;
 b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reportings to be designed under our supervision to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;
 c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and
 d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
and
 b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/  Ian T. BothwellIan T. Bothwell, Acting President andActing Chief Executive Officer