### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II HENRY C. REITZUG, as his separate estate; No. 53519

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- II a nd MARK HADMAN and LISA HADMAN, h usband and wife and the marital community c omprised thereof, Respondent s. UNPUBLISHED OPINION v. SKIPPER KUZIOR, Appellant.

S UTTON , A.C.J.

— Skipper Kuzior appeals the superior court ’s three orders related to a dispute over the ownership of Henry Reitzug ’s and Mark and Linda Hadmans ’ properties . Reitzug and the Hadmans filed this lawsuit after Kuzior moved the fence separating their properties without their permission , and then removed the Hadmans’ hay from their propert y . The superior court granted the first motion for partial summary judgment in July 2018 for quiet title, ejectment, and trespass to establish the property line . The court granted a second partial sum mary judgment motion in March 2019 on Reitzug’s and the H ad mans ’ amended quiet title claims

. Th e court granted a third partial summary judgment in June 2019 , awarding treble damages and attorney fees and litigation costs. Kuzior appeals and argues that t he superior court erred by granting the orders for partial summary judgment and awarding treble damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs to Reitzug and the Hadmans

. Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two January 26, 2021No. 53519

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We affirm the superior court’s orders 1 and grant Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ request for reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
FACTS Henry Reitzug and his wife are the titled owners of real property in Graham, Washington. Mark Hadman and Lisa Hadman are the titled owners of adjacent property. Skipper Kuzior is the titled owner of property adjacent to both Reitzug ’ s and the Hadmans’ properties

. In September 2017, Kuzior moved the wire fence separating his property from Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ properties without consulting either Reitzug or the Hadmans. Mark Hadman attempte d to speak with Kuzior, to no avail. Through counsel, Reitzug and the Hadmans sent a demand letter to Kuzior on December 4, 2017, but Kuzior did not respond

. Because these efforts

were fruitless, Reitzug and the Hadmans filed a complaint on February 15, 2018, seeking quiet title and ejectment , and claiming trespass

. On June 15, 2018, Reitzug and the Hadmans moved for partial summary judgment on their claims of quiet title, ejectment , and trespass. As evidence, they presented a declaration from a profe ssional land surveyor and their attorney. In response, Kuzior filed his declaration and included photographs, surveys, an unsworn letter from a professional land surveyor stating that two buildings were within Kuzior’s property boundaries, a declaration o f annexation from 1978 regarding easements and covenants, and the various deeds.

1 The superior court’s partial summary judgment orders at issue are dated July 13, 2018, March 1, 2019, and June 1, 2019. Clerk’s Papers at 23

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The superior court granted Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ first motion for partial summary judgment for quiet title, eje c tment , and trespass in July 2018 . The court’s order quieted title to the area Kuzior claimed by relocation of the fence on Reizug’s and the Hadmans ’ properties, and ordered that the fence be returned to its prop er location

. The court order ed Kuzior to “remove all fencing and other structures, livestock, and personal property that he has placed on [Reitzug’s and
the Hadmans ’ ] properties . . . and replace the boundary

- line fence.” Clerk’s Papers ( CP ) at 24. During the time period between when Kuzior first moved the fence and when the court ordered him to move it back, Kuzior allowed his livestock to graze on the Hadmans’ land and
mowed it without their permission . Due to this, the Hadmans were unable to cut their hay and either use or sell it, as they normally would do. The Hadmans estimated that the am ount of hay they lost was about 50 bales, which they would have sold for $10 each. After Reitzug and the Hadmans filed their first motion for partial summary judgment, their counsel discovered i n August 2018 that Kuzior had “ re - record ed ” a statutory war ranty deed to his property. On the cover sheet, Kuzior listed the tax parcel numbers for Kuzior’s, Reitzug’s , and the Hadmans’ properties. Kuzior attached the December 2015 statutory warranty deed whereby the grantor purportedly granted Kuzior’s property to him . Kuzior also attached the declaration of annexation, which expands application of certain easements and covenants. In order to ensure proper title over their properties, Reitzug ’s and the Hadmans’ counsel sent a letter to Kuzior demanding that he remove or render void the re

- record ed deed , but he did not respond . Reitzug and the Hadmans then amended their complaint to incorporate a second claim to quiet title, as well as a claim for treble damages under RCW 4.24.630 and an award of attorney fees and litigation costs

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In January 2019 , Reitzug and the Hadmans filed their second motion for partial summary judgment on their amended quiet title claims and for trespass violation s under RCW 4.24.630. As evidence, they included two decla ration s from their attorney, a declaration from Mark Hadman, and a declaration from Chicago Title Insurance Company. They attached as exhibits to these declarations the statutory warrant y deeds for their properties , Kuzior’s re

- record ed deed, and the lett er sent to Kuzior. Kuzior did not meaningfully respond. The superior court ruled that Kuzior’s “re

- record” of the statutory warranty deed to his property “creates no title, interest , or other right in any portion of [Reitzug’s or the Hadmans’] propertie s. CP at 28. The court also ruled that Kuzior violated RCW 4.24.630 when he removed hay and caused damages to Reitzug’s and the Hadmans ’ properties during the time he occupied portions of their properties. Because there was no genuine issue of material fact and Reitzug and the Hadmans were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, i n March 2019, t he court granted Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ second partial summary judgment motion , reserving the issue of damages

. 2 On May 23, 2019, Reitzug and the Hadmans filed a third motion for summary judgment requesting an award of treble damages and attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630 and RCW 4.84.185, and CR 11 sanctions

. They sought $1500 in treble damages ( $500 tripled under RCW
4.24.360 ) for the value of the hay Kuzior removed from the ir propert y . Their counsel filed a declaration detailing her attorney fees and costs

.

2 Kuzior filed a motion to reconsider, which the superior court denied. He then sought discretionary review, which we denied and ordered $500 in sanctions after finding his motion was frivolous. Ruling Denying Review, Re i tzug v. Kuzior , No. 53119

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The superior court granted the third partial summary judgment motion on June 21 , and ordered the following: 8. [Reitzug and t he Hadmans] are entitled to treble damages and an award of reasonable attorney [] fees and litigation expenses pursuant to RCW 4.24.630. [Their] RCW 4.24.630 claim arises from the same nexus of facts as [their] trespass and first quiet

- title action. Attor ney fees and litigation expenses incurred relating to the RCW 4.24.630 cannot be reasonably segregated from fees and expenses relating to the other claims. 9. [Reitzug and the Hadmans] are entitled to reasonable attorney [] fees and litigation expenses pu rsuant to RCW 4.84.185, as [Kuzior’s] defenses against [their] claims were frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.

. . . . 12. The billing rates for the various attorneys and legal staff that performed work for [Reitzug and the Hadmans], as more fully set forth in [their] [m]otion and supporting [ d ] eclaration

... are reasonable. 13. The [c]ourt has reviewed the billing record s and believes that the time expended by [Reitzug and the Hadmans] in defending this case were reasonable. 14. The litigation expenses incurred by [Reitzug and the Hadmans] are reasonable.
CP at 476

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T he superior court entered an award of treble damages in the amount of $1,500 , attorney fees in the amount of $29,715.99, and litigation expenses in the amount of $1,736.49. Kuzior appeals the superior court’s three partial summary judgment orders

. ANALYSIS
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. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW We review a sup erior court’s summary judgment order de novo, performing the same inquiry as the superior court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Lake Cushman Maintenance Co. , 5 Wn. App. 2dNo. 53519

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765, 777, 425 P.3d 560 (2018). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Johnson , 5 Wn. App. 2d at 777. To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain; instead, it must set forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party’s
contentions. Woodward v. Lopez , 174 Wn. App. 460, 468, 300 P.3d 417 (2013).

II. F IRST M OTION FOR P ARTIAL S UMMARY J UDGMENT Kuzior argues that the superior court erred by granting Reitzug’s and t he Hadmans ’ first summary judgment motion for quiet title , ejectment , and trespass related to the property line and the fence line . We hold that the superior court properly granted quiet title and ejected Kuzior from Reitzug’s and the Hadmans ’ properties , and ordered him to put the boundary fence back on the actual property line

. A

. Q UIET T ITLE Washington law provides in a quiet title action that “[t]he plaintiff . . . shall set forth in his or her complaint the nature of his or her estate, claim, or title to the property, and the defendant may set up a legal or equitable defense to plaintiff’s claims; and the superior title, whether legal or equitable , shall prevail.” RCW 7.28.120. A quiet title action is equitable and “‘designed to resolve competin g claims of ownership’ to property.” Bavand v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B. , 176 Wn. App. 475, 502, 309 P.3d 636 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. , 176 Wn. App. 294, 322, 308 P.3d 716 (2013) ) , abrogated on other grounds by Merry v. Northwest Trustee Serv., Inc. , 188 Wn. App. 174, 352 P.3d 830 (2015) ; see RCW 7.28.010. “AnNo. 53519

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action to quiet title allows a person in peaceable possession or claiming the right to possession of real property to compel others who assert a hostile right or claim to come forward and assert their right or claim and submit it to judicial determination.” Kobza v. Tripp , 105 Wn. App. 90, 95, 18 P.3d 621 (2001). Here, the evidence establishes that Reitzug and the Hadmans have statutory warran ty deeds establishing title and ownership o f their properties and that Kuzior had no authority to move the boundary fence line separating their properties

. Kuzior r elie d on speculation and conjecture , which cannot be considered on summary judgment

. See W oodward , 174 Wn. App. at 468. Kuzior presented no evidence that contradicted Reitzug ’s and the Hadmans ’ valid titles

. Because Kuzior failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact and Reitzug and the Hadmans were entitled to judgment as a matter of law , we hold that the superior court properly granted partial summary judgment in its July 2018 order on their quiet title claims

. B. E JECTMENT RCW 7.28.010, governing actions in ejectment and to quiet title, specifically confers the right of action on persons having a valid subsisting interest and a right to possession. “Encroachment occurs when one builds a structure on another’s land; it is a form of trespass.” Proctor v. Huntington , 169 Wn.2d 491, 496, 238 P.3d 1117 (2010). Kuzior wrongfully move d the boundary fence and trespassed onto Reizug’s and the Hadmans’ properties. The superior court ordered Kuzior to move the boundary fence back to its actual location and ejected Kuzior from Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ properties

. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact as to ejectment or trespass , and Reitzug and the HadmansNo. 53519

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were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the superior c ourt properly granted their partial summary judgment motion on their claims of ejectment and trespass

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II I. S ECOND M OTION FOR P ARTIAL S UMMARY J UDGMENT Kuzior argues that the superior court erred by granting the seco nd partial summary judgment motion on Reitizug’s and the Hadman’s amended claims of quiet title, arising from Kuzior’s “ re - reco r ding ” of his statutory warranty deed on his property

. We hold that the superior court properly granted the second partial summary judgment motion on Reitzug ’s an d the Hadmans ’ amended claims of quiet title on their properties

. “RCW 64.04.010 requires that conveyances of an interest in property must be by deed.” OneWest Bank, FSB v. Erickson , 185 Wn.2d 43, 69, 367 P.3d 1063 (2016). And “[e]very deed
shall be in writing, signed by the party bound thereby, and acknowledged by the party before some person authorized by this act to take acknowledgments of deeds.” RCW 64.04. 02 0 (reviser’s note omitted)

. Here, Kuzior filed a document which he titled “ re - record to co rrect legal.” CP at 247. On the cover sheet, he listed the tax parcel numbers for Kuzior’s, Reitzug’s, and the Hadmans’ properties. He attached the December 2015 statutory warranty deed whereby the grantor granted Kuzior’s property to Kuzior. Kuzior also attached a declaration of annexation, which describe d certain easements and covenants. Kuzior fails to explain or establish how the “re

- record” of the statutory warranty deed on his property gives him title to any portion of the propert ies o wned by Reitzug or the Hadmans.
T he declaration of annexation he filed merely describes certain easements and covenants.No. 53519

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Because Kuzior failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and Reitzug and the Hadmans are entitled to a judgment as a matt er of law, we hold that the superior court properly granted the second partial summary judgment motion on Reit zug ’s and the Hadmans ’ amended claims of quiet title.
IV. T HIRD M OTION FOR P ARTIAL S UMMARY J UDGMENT A. T REBLE D AMAGES

— RCW 4.24.630 Kuzior argues that the superior court erred by awarding treble damages under RCW
4.24.630 to the Hadmans

. We hold that the superior court properly award ed $1500 in treble damages under RCW 4.24.630 for the value of the hay

. RCW 4.24.630 (1) provides for an award of tr eble damages and states that [e]very person who goes on to the land of another and who removes timber, crops, minerals, or other similar valuable property from the land, or wrongfully causes waste or injury to the land, or wrongfully injures personal prope rty or improvements to real estate on the land, is liable to the injured party for treble the amount of the damages caused by the removal, waste, or injury. For purposes of this section, a person acts “wrongfully” if the person intentionally and unreasona bly commits the act or acts while knowing, or having reason to know, that he or she lacks authorization to so act.

. “RCW 4.24.630 requires a showing that the defendant intentionally and unreasonably committed

one or more acts and knew or had reason to k now that he or she lacked authorization.” Clipse v. Michels Pipeline Co n st r ., Inc. , 154 Wn. App. 573, 580, 225 P.3d 492 (2010). The superior court ruled that Kuzior had wrongfully removed the fence separating the parties’ properties, and ordered that it to be returned to its original location

. The superior court also ruled that Reitzug and the Hadman s had valid titles and ownership of their properties and that Kuzior had no interest, claim, or ownership in these properties. The court ruled that it wasNo. 53519

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undisputed that f

or the time period that Kuzior wrongfully moved the fence , he mowed and removed hay from the Hadmans’ propert y and allowed his animals to graze there

. Kuzior trespassed onto the Hadmans’ propert y and wrongfully removed the hay. Kuzior knew or had reason to know that he did not have authorization to use the Hadmans’ property for his benefit. Clipse , 154 Wn. App. at 580. Kuzior should have known that he was using the Hadmans’ p ropert y without their authorization because the title to the ir propert y established that he was on their propert y . Because Kuzior failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact and the Hadmans were entitled to judgment as a matter of law , we hold that the superior court properly found Kuzior

was liable for violations under RCW 4.24.630 and awarded $500 as the value of the hay, which amount it tripled for a total of $1500 in treble damages.
B. A TTORNEY F EES AND C OSTS Kuzior argues that the court erred by awarding Reitzug’s and the Hadman s’ reas onable attorney fees and costs in the third partial summary judgment order

. We hold that the superior court properly awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630 and RCW
4.84.185

. If a person is found liable under RCW 4.24.630, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs of litigation. RCW 4.24.630 (1) states that [d]amages recoverable under this section include, but are not limited to, damages for the market value of the property removed or injured, and for injury to the land, including the costs of restoration. In addition, the person is liable for reimbursing the injured party for the party’s reasonable costs, including but not limited to investigative costs and reasonable attorney s’ fees and other lit igation

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“If . . . an attorney fees recovery is authorized for only some of the claims, the attorney fees award must properly reflect a segregation of the time spent on issues for which attorney fees are authorized from time spent on other i ssues.” Hume v. American Disposal Co. , 124 Wn.2d 656,
67 2 , 880 P.2d 988 (1994). Segregation of attorney fees is not required where the claims are related.
See Hume , 124 Wn.2d at 67 3

. RCW 4.84.185 provides that a court may order the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party’s reasonable expenses incurred if the nonprevailing party’s argument was frivolous. The decision to impose costs is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Kilduff v. San Juan County , 194 Wn.2d 859, 876

- 77, 453 P.3d 719 (2019). Kuzior wrongfully moved the property boundary fence and unlawfully removed the Hadmans’ hay by mowing it and allowing his animals to graze there. The superior court properly determined the hay’s value to be $500, which amount it tripled as t reble damages under RCW 4.24.630 . Because the Hadmans had to show they had title to the land in order to prove trespass, their quiet title, ejectment, and trespass claims were so related that segregation of the attorney fees was not necessary. Kuzior h ad no factual or l egal basis to move the boundary fence or trespass onto Reitzug’s
and the Hadman s’ properties

. Kuzior failed to present any material facts or l egitimate arguments to support his argument that he had ownership over Reitzug’s and the Hadmans’ properties. Based

on Kuzior’s actions, Reitzug and the Hadmans were forced to undergo e xtensive and costly litigation.No. 53519

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Because Kuzior’s actions and defe nses were frivolous and resulted in extensive and costly litigation, we hold that the superior court properly awarded reasonable attorney fees to Reitzug and the Hadmans in the amount of $29,715.99, and litigation expenses in the amount of $1,736.49
under RCW 4.24.360 and RCW 4.84.185.
V. A PPELLATE A TTORNEY F EES AND C OSTS We grant Reitzug ’s and the Hadmans ’ request an award of appellate attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630 and RCW 4.85.185

. RAP 18.1(a) authorizes this court to grant an award of re asonable attorney fees and costs if authorized by applicable law. A court may award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party under RCW 4.24.630. If the opposing party’s claims or defenses were frivolous or meritless, a court may award reasonable a ttorney fees and sanctions under RCW 4.84.185

. On appeal, we agree with Reitzug and the Hadmans that Kuzior fails t o make any cognizable argument and thus , his claims and defenses are frivolous. Because they are frivolous,

we hold that Reitzug and the Hadmans are entitled to an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
CONCLUSION We affirm the superior court’s three partial summary judgment orders , and we grant Reitzug ’s and the Hadmans ’ reasonable appellate atto rney fees and costs.No. 53519

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

S UTTON , A.C.J. We concur:

G LASGOW , J.

C RUSER , J.