### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00691- CR

Ez r a P le as ant , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 30202 20, H ONO RAB LE MICH AEL LYNCH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ur y c on vic te d E zra

Ple a sa nt o f a g g ra

vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d, i n d e c e nc y

wi th a child by

contac t, and indece ncy with a child by

exposure. See Tex
. P en . C o d e Ann. §§ 22.021(a) (1)( B) , 21.11(a) (1 ), (2) ( West 2003). The district court imposed sente nce f or ea ch conviction. Pleasant raises t hree points of error on appea l. First, he c omplains of the district court’s submissi on of an instruction that “ sexual c ontact” c ould include touching throug h clothing. Sec ond, he complains of the court’s f ailure to submit an instruction under r ule of e vidence 201(g ) re g arding its taking judicial notice of the date the indictment was prese nted. Third, Pleasa nt contends that the judgme nt misst ates the se ntence the district court a ctually imposed for his c onviction of indece ncy with a child by exposure. We modify the judgme nt to ref lect that the sentenc e the dis t ri ct co urt imposed for Pleasa

nt’s indece ncy

with a child by

exposure conviction was f or ten y ear s, not fifteen, but otherwise ove rrule Plea sant’s points of err or and a ffirm the judg ment as modified.2 BACK GR OUND On D.P’s twenty -first birthday , Dec ember 21, 2001, she divulg ed to her mother that her father , Ezra P leasa

nt, had sex ually molested her over several y ear s beg inning in 1991, whe n she
was a pproxi mately

ten y ear s old. E z ra Pl easa nt was subseque ntly

indicted for a g g ravated sexual assault of a child, indece ncy with a child by contac t, a nd indece ncy with a child by exposure. The first count, ag g ravated sexual a ssault of a child, alleg ed in re levant par t that Pleasant had c aused the pe ne tr a tio n o f D .P. ’s fe ma le se x org an w ith his fi ng e r an d ca us e d he r se xua l org an to “ c on ta c t” his
s ex u al org an while she was young er tha n 14 y ear s of ag e. See T e x. Pe n. Code Ann. § 22.021(a) (1)( B)
. The second count, indece ncy with a child by contac t, alleg ed that Pleasa nt had eng ag ed in “se x ual contac t” by touching D.P.’s brea sts and g enitals, and by causing D.P. to touch Pleasant’s g en i t al s , wh ile she wa s less than 17 y ear s of ag e. Id. § 2 1. 11 (a )( 1) . T he thi rd c ount, indece ncy with a child by exposure, alleg ed that Pleasant had exposed his genitals to D.P. while she was less than 17 y ear s of ag e. Id. § 21.11(a) (2).

At trial, the jury

hear d D.P.’s testimony

descr ibing e pisodes in which Pleasant g roped
and fo nd le d h e r b re a sts , r

ub be d h is p e nis a g a ins t he r v a g ina thro ugh clothin g , ma de he r t ou c h h is pe nis thr ou g h clo thi ng wi th he r h and , p e ne tr a te d h e r v a g ina wi th h is f

ing e r, and e xpos e d h is p e nis and rubbe d it on her bar e buttocks and leg s. She stated the incidents of se x ual abuse occur red e very time she was a lone with Pleasant until she was a pproxi mately

thirteen y ear s old. At the close of evidenc e, the State asked the district court to take judicia l notice that the indictment had been pr esente d on Marc h 20, 2002. Be cause D.P. was unce rtain re g ardingthe exact dates on whic h she wa s molested, the State had attempted to prove the date of the of fense s by demonstrating that they

had occ urre d within the statute of limitations , i.e. , befor e the indictment wa s3

prese nted and within ten y ear s of D.P .’s eig hteenth birthday
. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 12.01(5) (West 2005)
. The State’s reque st f or judicial notice of the indictment pre sentment date w as part of that proof. Pleasa

nt did not object, and the district cour t took judicial notice of that fa ct. The dis tr ic t c ourt

su bs e qu e ntl y

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that th e State wa s n ot re qu ir e d to pr ov e the e xac t da te of the off ense but c ould prove it occur red be fore the indictment was pre sented a nd within ten y ear s of D.P.’s eig hteenth birthday , and that “the date of the presentment of the indictment in this case w as Marc h 20, 2002.” Pleasa nt did not object to this instruction. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso instru cte d th e jur

y that to uc hin g thr ou g h c lot hin g c ou ld constitute “sexual contact.” Pleasant objec ted to this inst ruction, and the district court ove rruled the objection. Duringclosing argument, the State ar g ued that both the pene tration of D.P.’s vag ina with Pleasant’s fing er a

nd the contac t of his penis with her vag ina throug h cl o t h ing c onstitut ed
a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult . T he State a sse rt e d that Ple a sa nt’ s tou c hin g D. P.’ s br e a sts and g e nit a ls i n a sexual manner , and his havingher touc h his penis with her hand through his underwe ar, c onstitut ed ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t. Ad dit ion a lly , the State arg ue d th a t Ple a sa

nt’ s e xpos inghis pe nis and rubbingit ag ainst D.P.’s buttocks and leg s constituted indecenc y with a child by

exposure. The jury found Pleasant gui l t y

of all three counts alleg ed in the indictment. The district court sentenc ed Pleasa nt to twenty

y ear s’ c o n fi n em ent for ag g ravated sexual assault and twenty y ear s’ conf

inement for inde cenc y

with a child by

con t ac t
. T h e judgme nt also states that Pleasant re ceive d a fifte en-y ear sentenc e fo r i n d ecency

with a child by

exposure, but the rec ord otherwise r efle cts that the district court a ctually imposed a ten-year

sentenc e. This appe al ensue d.4 DI SCU SSIO N On appeal, P leasa

nt raises three points of error. I n his first point of error, Pleasa nt claims that the district court e rre d in overr uling his objection t o the cour t’s char g e re g ardingsexual
c on ta c t thro ug h c lot

hin g . I n his se c on d point of er ro r, Ple a sa

nt m a int a ins the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in failing to give a permissive instruction reg ardingjudicial notice of the indictment presentment date. Finally , in his thi rd p oint of err or, Pleasant a sserts that the judg ment misstates his sentence f or indece ncy with a child by

exposure as fifte en y ear s, rather than ten. Jury instruction regar din g sexual contact

Th e purp os e of

a jur y char ge is to ins tr

uc t th e jur

y on the a pp lic a ble law a nd mus t include an a ccur ate statement of t he law. SeeTe x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . a rt . 3 6. 14 ; Ab dn or

v . S tate , 871 S. W
. 2 d 7 2 6 , 7 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Moreove r, the district cour t must apply

the law to the fac ts adduce d at trial. Gray v . S tate , 1 52 S.W.3d 12 5, 127 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Abdnor , 871 S.W. 2d a t 73 1 (n ot fu

nc tio n of c ha

rg e me re ly to a vo id mis le a din g or c on fu sin g jur y , f un c tio n is to p r e v en tco n fu s i o n ) ( qu o t i n g W ill iam s v . S

tate , 5 4 7 S. W. 2 d

1 8 , 2 0 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p . 1 9 7 7 ) )
. T he district court has br oad discre tion in subm itting prope r def initions and explanatory

phras es t o the jury
. Ro isev . S

tate , 7 S.W .3d 225, 242 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d), cert. de nied , 5 31 U. S. 895 (2000). Whil e jurors are presumed to know and apply the common and or dinary meaning s of
wo rd s , t h e c h ar ge m u s ti n cl u d e t h e de fi n i t i o n o f wo rd s o r t erm s t h at d o n o th av e c o m m o nm ea n i n gs the jury can be pres u m ed t o k n o w an d apply
. Cue v as v . S tate , 7 42 S.W. 2d

33 1, 34 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ); Mu rp hy

v . S tate , 44 S.W .3d 656, 662 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2001, no. pet.). This applies to terms which have a known a nd established leg al meaning , or which ha ve ac quired a

peculiar and5

appropr iate mea

ning in the la

w, such as a

well-known c ommon-law mea ning. Me dfo rd

v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rti n s t r

u c t e d t h e j u r y:
“Sexual contact” me ans an y t ouchingof the a nus, brea st, or any

part of the gen i t al s of another

person with intent to arouse or g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person. Sex ual contac t or touching may be throug h clothing a

nd does not requir e s k i n -t o -s k i nco n t ac tb u td o es i n cl u d e ap er ce p t i o nb y a s en s e o f f

ee l i n g. Pleasant objec ted that the last sentenc e of this instruction was e rrone ous and amounted to a comment on the weig ht of the evide nce.

Pleasant empha siz es that at the time of the alleg ed offenses, the pe nal code did not expli citly define sexual contact t o include touchingthroug h clothing. Prior to 2001, se ction 21.11 contained no de finition of sex ual contac t. “Sexual contact” wa s defin ed i n p en al code se ction 21.01(2) as “any touching of the anus, brea st, or an part of the g enitals of anothe r per son with intent to arouse or

g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person.” Act of Ma

y 29, 1993, 73d L eg ., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, sec. 21.01( 2), 1993 Tex
. Gen. L aws 3586, 3615 (a mended 2001) (cur

rent ve rsion at Tex. Pen. Cod e A n n . § 2 1
. 0 1 ( 2 ) ( We s t 2 0 0 3 ) )
. Pl e a s an t p o in ts o u t th a t th e le g is latu r e in 2 0 01 added a d ef i n i t i o no f “ s ex u al co n t ac t ” t o s ec t i o n2 1
. 1 1 t h at ex p l i ci t l y i n cl u d edt o u ch i n g t h ro u ghcl o t h i n g:
I n thi s s ection, “se x ual contac t” means the following acts, if c ommitt ed with the intent to arouse or

g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person: (1 ) any tou c hin g by

a pe rs on , in c lud ing to uchingthr ou g h c lot hin g , o f t he anu s, brea st, or any

part of the g enitals of a c hild; or (2 ) an y t o u ch i n g o f a n y p a r t o f t h e b o dy o f ach i l d , i n cl u d i n g t o u ch i n g t h ro u gh clothing, w ith the anus, brea st or any part of the g enitals of a pe rson.6

See Act of May

23, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 739, § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 1463 (T ex. P en. Code Ann. § 21.11(c )(2) (West 2003)). Pleasa nt contends that in the abse nce o f an ex p l i cit statutory d i re ct i v e a tt h e t i m e o f h i s o ff en s es s t at i n g t h at s ex u al co n d u ct co u l d i n cl u d e t o u ch i n g t h ro u gh clothing, the district c ourt’s instruction ina ccur ately stated the law and amounted to a c omment on the evidenc e. He also sug g ests that the leg islature’s subseque nt amendment of the provision to add expli cit lang uag e fur

ther de monstrates that, under prior law, se x ual contac t did not include touching throug h clothing. We disag ree .

The wor d “touching” ha s develope d a spec ific mea ning in the c ontext of “se x ual contac t.” Even be fore the 2001 amendme nts, se ction 21.11 had bee n repe atedly construed to a llow the State to prove se x ual contac t with ev i d ence of non-skin-to-skin touching , including touc hing throug h clothing. Se e Re sn ic k v . S tate , 574 S.W .2d 558, 559-60 (Te x . Crim. App. 1978) (mer e interposition of lay er o f fa b ri c b etween per son’s hand a nd g enitals of anothe r did not preve nt
occur renc e of se x ual contact beca use touchingwill sti ll eng ender sense of fee ling pe rce ived by pe rs on tou c he d) ; Ste inb ac h v . S

tate , 979 S.W .2d 836, 839-40 (Te x . App.—Austin, 1998, pet. ref ’d) (abse nce of flesh upon flesh contact di d not preve nt finding that evidence was suff icient to support
c on vic tio n o f p ro sti tut ion ); Cru z v . S tate , 742 S.W .2d 545, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, no pet.) (fa ct there was no evidence of flesh- to-flesh c ontact did not preve nt finding that evidence was sufficie nt to support conviction of indece ncy with child); Gu ia v. Sta te , 7 2 3 S. W. 2 d 7 6 3 , 7 6 6 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 1986, pe t. ref’ d) (i f lay er of fabr ic did not preve nt occur renc e of se x ual contac t for public lewdness in Resnick, it doe s not pr event oc curr ence of sexual contact f or off ense of indece ncy7

wit h a ch i ld). I n light of the se authorities, we cannot c onclude that the district c ourt’s instruction
wa s an in a c c ur a te state me nt o f t he c on tr oll inglaw at th e tim e of Ple a sa nt’ s o ff e ns e s. Al tho ug h th e le g isl a tur e la t e r c h o s e t o a d d

a d e f i n i tio n o f s e xua l c on ta c t th a t e xplic itl y included touchingthroug h clothing, w e ar e to pre sume that t h e l egislature w as aw are of the background law w hen it made that c hang e. See Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 311.02 3 (W es t 2 0 05); Gr un sfe ld v . S

tate , 8 43 S.W. 2d

52 1, 52 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ) (whe n e xami nin g a me ndme nts to exis ting legislation, presume that leg islature wa s awa re of case law af

fec ting or relating to statute). And, consistent with that presumption, the leg islative hist o ry o f t he ame ndment indicates that the chang e wa s intended to be non-substantive and solely for c larification. SeeSe nate Com m. o n Cr im. J ustice, B ill Analy sis, Tex. S.B. 92, 77th L eg ., R.S. (2001). I n any event, we do not infer the intent and conte mporary

meaningof for

mer sec tion 21.11 from the ac tions of a subsequent leg islature. See Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 3 11 .0 23 ; Boniface v . Boniface , 65 6 S.W. 2d 13 1, 13 7 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1983, writ. denied)
.

The district cour

t did not err in de fining “sexual contac t” and “ touching ” in its charg e. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Plea sant’s first point of er ror. Jury instruction regar din g ind ictm ent prese ntm ent date

I n h is s e c on d p oint of

e rr or , Pl e a sa

nt a rgue s tha t the dis tr ic t cou rt e rr e d in f

a ili ngto g ive a pe rmissive instruction reg arding its judicial notice of the indictment presentment date. See Tex. R. Evi d. 201(g ) (in cr im i nal ca ses, the cour t shall instruct the jury

that it may , but is not require d to, a cce pt a s conclusive a ny fac t judicially

noticed). The district court instructed the jury
a s f oll ow s:8

You ar e fur

ther c harg ed as a

part of the law in this case that the state is not require d t o p r o v e t h e e x a c td a t e a l l e g e d i nt h e i n d i c t m e n tb u tm ay p r o v e t h e o f f e n s e , i f an y, to h a ve be e n c omm itt ed at any tim e pr ior

to t he pr e se ntm e nt o f t

he ind ic tme nt s o long as the indictment was re turned within 10 y ear s of the 18th birthday of the alleg ed victim. You ar e instructed that the date of the pre sentment of the indictment in this case wa s Marc h 20, 2002.
Pleasant states he was ha

rmed by this inst ruction bec ause the court’s e rror had the e ffe ct of lesse ning the State’s burde n of proof
. Our disposition of this i ssue turns on whethe r the dat e of pr esentment wa s an “adjudicative fac t” fo r wh ich the district cour t would have be en re quired to g ive a pe rmissive instruction under rule 201(g ). See id. Adjudicative f acts a re r eleva nt to the ul timate issue in dispute, but are not themselves the subjec t of controve rsy . W att s v . S tate , 9 9 S. W.3 d 6 04 , 61 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2003). The indi ctment presentment date is not an adjudicative fact in this case beca use i t is not rele vant to a

ny issue in dispute. Pl easa nt did not assert a statute of limit ations defe nse at trial, a nd the cha rg e did not condition a g uilty verdic t on a

finding that the offe nse wa s committed before the indictment was pre sented a nd within the limi tations period. Fur ther, Pleasa

nt failed to ob

j ec t when the State a sked the district cour t to take judicia l no tic e of

the pr e se ntm e nt d a te and did no t ob je c t to the ins tr

uc tio n th e c ourt

g a ve . T hu s, even if the district court ha d err ed in g iving t h e ins truction, we w ould reve rse only if there was fundame ntal err or. Al

ma nz a v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on re h’g ). We c ann ot c on c lud e that any ha rm fr om the ins tr

uc tio n, e ve n if

e rr on e ou s, wo uld

ri se to t hat le ve l. We overrule Pleasant’s sec ond point of err or.9

Sentence for indecency with a chil d by expos ure

I n his third point of error, Plea sant urg es this Court to modi fy t h e d i s t ri ct cour

t’s jud g me nt i mpo sin g a

fi ft e e n- y e ar s e ntenc e fo r i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y e xpos ur e to a c c ur a te ly ref lect the ten- y ear

sentenc e the c ourt imposed, as demonstrated by the re cord. We may

corr ect a nd ref orm a trial c ourt judg ment to make the judgme nt “cong ruent with the re cord.” SeeTex. R. App. P. 4 3. 2( b) ; Bi

gle yv . S tate , 8 6 5 S
. W
. 2 d 2 6 , 2 7 ( T e x. C r i m . Ap p. 19 93 ); St . J uli an v . S tate , 132 S.W. 3d 512, 51 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 04 , p e t. r e f’ d) . We mod if y the jud g me nt t o show that Pleasant wa s sentence d to ten y ear s on his conviction for indec ency with a child by exposure.
CO NC LU SION

We modify

the judg ment to ref

lect that the di strict court imposed a te n-y ear sentenc e for indec ency

with a child by

exposure, and af

firm the judg ment as modified.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: De cembe r 9, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh