# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 13-0861

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



# C A N T E Y 

# H A N G E R 

# , L L P
, P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v

.

P H IL IP 

# G R E G O R Y 

# B Y R D 

# , L U C Y 

# L E A S IN G 

# C O



# . , L

. L

. C

. , A N D 

# P G B A IR 

# , I N C



# . , R E S P O N D E N T S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## S E C O N D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## J U S T I C E 

## G R E E N 

## joined by C H I E F 

## J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## , dissenting.

The Court holds that Cantey Hang er conclusively established its aff irmative defe nse of

attorney immunit y beca

use its alleg ed conduct occur red withi n t h e scope of its repr esenta tion of

Simenstad in the divorce proce eding

. ___ S.W .3d ___, ___. Whil e I ag ree with much of the Court’s

descr iption o f the attorney immunit y doctrine and the purposes underly ing it, I think the Court

overlooks an importa n t el em en t of the form of attorney immunit y at issue in this case —that the

attorney ’s conduct must have occur red in litigation—and applies the attorney immunit y doctrine in

a manner that results in a much broade r, more expansive liability protec tion. I would h o l d t h at

Cantey Hang er’ s summary judgme nt evidenc e f a il e d to c o n c lu s iv e ly e s ta

b li s h that its alleg ed conduct

## occur

red in litigation and that summary judgme nt was there fore improper. I would aff irm the court

of appe als’ judg ment.

The circ umstances in w hich lawy ers may be subject to c ivil liability to nonc lients a re wide

and varie d. See, e.g. , R E S T A T E M E N T 

## (T H I R D 

## ) O F T H E 

## L A W 

## G O V E R N I N G 

## L A W Y E R S 

## § 56 (2000) (“[A]

lawy er is subject to liability to a client or nonclient wh en a n o n l awy er would be in simil ar

circ umstances.” ). To ensure that attorney s may prac tice their pr ofession ef fec tively and zealously

advo ca t e for their clients without subjecting themselves to claims from nonclients, rules have

develope d to protec t cer

tain attorney conduct from civil liability

. To fully understand these rules and

the eff ect of the Court’s opinion on them, it is important to revie w the development of the attorney

immunit y doctrine.

I n Texas, the attorney immunit y doctrine, as it applies to litigation or other rela ted

proce eding s, has develope d under two closely rela ted leg al theories. The first, on which the Court 1



## purports t o rely

, orig inated more than a centur y ag o with the broad decl ar at i o n that “attorne y s are

authorized to prac tice their profe ssion, to advise their clients and interpose any defe nse or supposed

defe nse, wit hout making themselves li able for damage s.” Kruegel v. M urphy , 126 S.W

. 343, 345

T h e r e a r e a d d i t i o n a l l e g a l t h e o r i e s t h a t p r e c l u d e l i a b i l i t y f o r a n a t t o r n e y ’ s o t h e r w i s e a c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t

. F o r 1

e x a m p l e , t h e r u l e o f

p r i v i t y g e n e r a l l y p r e v e n t s t h i r d p a r t i e s f r o m s u i n g a n a t t o r n e y f o r l e g a l m a l p r a c t i c e i n a n y c o n t e x t

. S e e M c C a m i s h

, M a r t i n , B r o w n & L o e f f l e r v

. F

. E

. A p

p l i n g I n t e r e s t s , 9 9 1 S

. W

. 2 d 7 8 7
, 7 9 2 ( T e x

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h e
g e n e r a l r u l e a n d a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e b a s e d o n a n a t t o r n e y ’ s n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) ; B a r c e l o v

. E l l i o t t , 9 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 5
, 5 7 7

– 7 9 ( T e x

. 1 9 9 6 )

. M o r e o v e r , a t h i r d p a r t y ’ s r e l i a n c e o n a n a t t o r n e y ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m a d e i n c e r t a i n

a d v e r s a r i a l c o n t e x t s m i g h t b e u n j u s t i f i e d a s a m a t t e r o f

l a w

. S e e C h u v

. H o n g , 2 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 4 1
, 4 4 6 n

. 1 9 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 8 ) ; M c C a m i s h

, M a r t i n , B r o w n & L o e f f l e r , 9 9 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 7 9 4 ( “ G e n e r a l l y , c o u r t s h a v e a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t a t h i r d p a r t y ’ s

r e l i a n c e o n a n a t t o r n e y ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o t j u s t i f i e d w h e n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e i n a n a d v e r s a r i a l c o n t e x t

. ” )

. F o r o t h e r p o s s i b l e e x a m p l e s o f i m m u n i t i e s o r d e f e n s e s a v a i l a b l e t o a n a t t o r n e y , t h e c o m m e n t s t o t h e R e s t a t e m e n t ( T h i r d )

o f t h e L a w G o v e r n i n g L a w y e r s s e c t i o n 5 6 a n d t h e e n t i r e t y o f s e c t i o n 5 7 a r e i n s t r u c t i v e

. B e c a u s e t h e r e a r e m u l t i p l e l e g a l

t h e o r i e s t h a t m i g h t p r e c l u d e a n a t t o r n e y ’ s l i a b i l i t y , I b e l i e v e t h a t p a r t i e s a n d c o u r t s s h o u l d c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e t h e t h e o r y

a n d a u t h o r i t y o n w h i c h t h e y r e l y b e c a u s e t h e l a b e l “ a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y ”

— a s C a n t e y H a n g e r a s s e r t e d h e r e

— i s i m p r e c i s e

.



### 2

## (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref ’d). Be caus e t h e courts of appea ls analy zing attorney

immunit y under Kruegel g ener ally require the attorney ’s conduct to ha ve occur red in the litigation

context, I ref

er to this theory as “lit igation i m m u n i t y

. ” See, e.g.
, Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs.
, 947

S.W .2d 285, 287–88 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, writ denied) ; Bradt v. W est , 892 S.W .2d 56, 72

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994); Morris v. B a i l ey , 398 S.W .2d 946, 947–48 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Austin 1966, writ ref ’d n.r.e.)

. Under the second theory

, althoug h not raised expressly here

but never theless important to the context of attorney immunit y in Texas, any statement made in the

due course of o r i n serious contemplation of a judicial or quasi-judicial proce eding is absolutely

privileg ed and cannot serve as the basis for a defa mation lawsuit. Shell Oil Co. v. W ritt
, ___ S.W .3d

___, ___ (Tex. 2015); Jame s v. Brown
, 637 S.W .2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (per curia m). I ref er to this

theory as the “ judicial proce eding s privileg e.”

Nea rly thirty y ear s befor e Kruegel

, this Court adopted the Texas Commi ssion of Appeals’

opinion in Poole v. Houston & T.C. Railway Co.
, 58 Tex. 134 (1882). I n that case , a seller soug ht

to stop th e s hipment of g oods that had been sold on cre dit to an insolvent buy er. Id. at 135. The

buy er and i t s at t orney then eng ag ed in a fra udulent scheme desig ned to preve nt the seller from

stopping the shipment. See id. at 135, 137. I n its sim plest form, the sche me re quired the buy er to

fra udulently assig n a bill of lading to the attorney , the attorney to interce pt the g oods by prese nting

t h e fr au dulent bill of lading to a railroa d station ag ent, and the attorney to return the g oods to t h e

bu y er

. S ee id. Following the succe ssful execution of the scheme

, the seller sued the attorney for

fra ud and tried the lawsuit to a jury

. See id. The trial court char g ed the ju ry “that, to make the

defe ndant [attorney ] liable, it must be shown by the evidenc e that he was acting

, not as ag ent of [hi s

3

## client], but for himself.” Id. This Court held that the trial court’s char g e was err oneous beca use it

stated that the attorney could not be liable for fra ud committed at the behest of his principal. Id. at

1 3 7

– 3 8

. M o re important to the issue prese nted today

, the Court held that the attorney was no t

immune from civil liability beca use his fra

udulent scheme was “entire ly fore ign to the duties of an

attorney .” Id. at 137.

The opinion in Kruegel was authored aga inst this backdr op. I n Kruegel , the plaintiff sued

a law firm for “conspira cy , fra ud, and perjury of defe ndants and their counsel

. . . by which plaintiff

wrong fully and unlawfully suffe red an adver se judgme nt wholly bey ond his control.” Kruegel

, 126

S.W

. at 344. Specifica lly

, the pl aintiff allege d that the attorney s and other defen d an t s “knew that

plaintiff had a g ood, leg al, valid, and meritorious cause of action,” and that the defe ndants defe ated

t h e plaintiff’s underly ing cause of action throug h “conc erte d action and undue influence and

unlawful misuse and u s u rp at i on of power of a court.” Id. The plaintiff further alleg ed that the

defe ndants, knowing that the plaintiff would pursue an appea l, “unlawf ully conspired

. . . to de fea t

plaintiff’s appea l.” Id. The trial court sustained the law firm’s specia l exceptions, and the court of

appea ls aff

irmed. Id. at 344–45. I n doing so, the court of appea ls held that “attorne y s are authorized

to prac tice their profe ssion, to adv i se t heir clients and int erpose any defe nse or supposed defense,

without making themse lves liable for damag es.” Id. at 345.

A compar ison of Kruegel and Poole is critica l t o u n d erstanding the context in which

litigation immunit y applies. I n both case s, the attorney or law firm alleg edly eng ag ed in conduct that

would be actionable without attorney immunit y

. The only meaning ful disti n ct i o n b et wee n the

outcomes is the context in which that conduct occur red. I n K

r u eg el

, the conduct occur red in

4

## litigation, while in Poole the conduct occur red outside of any litigation. I n my view, the only way

to rec oncile these case s and g ive meaning to the purpose behind attorney immunit y is to require the

defe ndant–attorne y ’s conduc t to have occ urre d in liti g ation.

Despite clea

rly announcing litigation immunit y ’s exis tence , the court in Kruegel did littl e to

define its scope and this Court has not , u n t i l t o d ay , rea ddresse d the issue. The courts of appea ls,

howeve r, have ag ree d with my view of Kruegel and Poole and g ener ally require the attorney ’s

condu ct t o h av e occur

red in litigation for litigation immunit y to apply

. See, e.g. , Renfroe

, 947

S.W .2d at 287–88; Bradt

, 892 S.W .2d at 72; Morris
, 398 S.W .2d at 947–48. Moreove r, the courts

of appea ls require the attorney ’s conduct to involve the provision of leg al service s. See, e.g. , Gaia

Envtl., Inc. v. Galbraith

, 451 S.W .3d 398, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)

(noting t h at l itigation immunit y would not apply if an attorney wer e to phy sically assault the

opposing par t ing during trial); Bradt

, 892 S.W .2d at 72 (same)

. To addre ss the ty pe of conce rn

raised in Gaia Environmental, Inc.
, fede ral courts apply ing Texas law require the attorney ’s conduct

to involve “the office

, profe ssional training

, skill, and authority of an attorney .” See, e.g. , Miller v.

Stonehenge

/Fasa–Tex., JDC, L.P.
, 993 F. Supp. 461, 464 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (citing Taco Bell Corp.

v. Cracken

, 939 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996)). The courts of appea ls have extended litigation

immunit y to both an attorney ’s conduct and statements. See, e.g. , Alpert v. Crain, Caton & Jame s,

P.C.
, 178 S.W .3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2 0 0 5
, pet. denied) (statements and

conduct) ; Morris , 398 S.W .2d at 947 (c onduct).

The policy rea sons be hind litig ation immunit y compel the conclusion that, to be entitled to

litigation immunit y , the defe ndant–attorne y ’s conduct must have occur red in litigation. One of the

5

## most well-known maxi ms of the leg al profe ssion is that attorney s must zealously advocate for their

clients. See Bd. of Law Exam’ rs v. Steve ns , 868 S.W .2d 773, 780 (Tex. 1994) (desc ribing how the

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct require attorney s to ze al o u s ly repr esent their

clients). The courts of appea ls have universally rea soned that litigation immunit y further s this g oal.

See, e.g. , Alpert

, 178 S.W .3d at 405; Renfroe

, 947 S.W

. 2 d at 2 8 8

. Wit hout this immunit y , an

attorney ’s zealous advoca cy at trial would be diluted beca use the attorney would be forc ed to balanc e

her o wn i n t er es t s ag ainst those of her client. See, e.g. , Renfroe

, 947 S.W .2d at 288; Bradt

, 892

S.W .2d at 72. Ultimately

, litigation immunit y promotes the ends of justice by ensuring that attorney s

can fully develop their clients’ case s and pursue all of their clients’ rig hts at trial. See Morris
, 398

S.W .2d at 947–48. L imiti ng the application to statements or conduct in litigation serve s this ultimate

go al without being overly broad and immuniz ing attorney s for conduct arising from fra udulent

business scheme s. See Poole

, 58 Tex. at 137. A limit ed application of litigation immunit y also has 2



## the benef it of maintaining proce dural safe g uards that apply only in litigation. See, e.g. , T E X



## . R. C I V



## .

P. 13 (re quiring all of the pleading s, motions, and other paper s attorney s file in the lawsuit be signe d,

cer tify ing tha

t the attorney has read them and believes that they are not g roundless and broug ht in

bad faith or t o hara ss, and authoriz ing sanctions for an attorney ’s vi olation of t he ru l e); T E X



## . C I V



## .

P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## §§ 9.001–.014, 10.001–.006 (allowing for sanctions and the offe nded par ty ’s

rec overy of expenses).

I a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e i s n o “ f r a u d e x c e p t i o n ” t o l i t i g a t i o n i m m u n i t y

. T h e i m m u n i t y e i t h e r 2

a p p l i e s b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t

– a t t o r n e y ’ s c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d i n l i t i g a t i o n , o r i t d o e s n o t a p p l y a t a l l

.



### 6

## The Court rec og nizes that this form of attorney immunit y tr a d it io n a ll y a p p li es in the litigation

context and purportedly require s Cantey Hang er’ s alleg ed conduc t to have occ urre d in the divorce

proce eding

. See

___ S.W .3d at ___ n.6. But the C ourt conducts very littl e analy sis to deter mine 3



## whet h er Cantey Hang er’ s alleg ed conduct actua lly occur red in litigation. I nstead, the Court

summarily conclude s that Cantey Hang er’ s “alleg ed conduct was within the s cope of its

repr esenta tion of Simenstad in the divorce proce eding s, was not fore ign to the duties of an attorney ,

and is thus protec ted by attorney immunit y .” Id. at ___. This concluso ry an al y s is constitutes no

an al y sis at all, and is, in actua lity

, mere ly a scope- of-r epre sentation test. This s co p e- o frepr esenta tion test cannot be the law, or almost any thing an attorney does would be protec ted from

civil liability

. T h i s is not the law in Texas and is inconsistent with the approa ch the Restatement

T h e C o u r t a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s f o r m o f a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y a p p l i e s o u t s i d e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n c o n t e x t

.

_ _ _ 3
S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ _ n

. 6

. I t h e r e f o r e b r i e f l y a d d r e s s t h e i n a d e q u a t e b a s i s f o r t h e C o u r t ’ s s u g g e s t i o n

. T h e t w o u n p u b l i s h e d

c a s e s t h e C o u r t c i t e s a r e e i t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e o r w e r e e r r o n e o u s l y d e c i d e d

. T h e f i r s t , C a m p b e l l v

. M o r t

g a g e E l e c t r o n i c R e g i s t r a t i o n S

y s t e m , I n c

. , N o

. 0 3

- 1 1

- 0 0 4 2 9

- C V
, 2 0 1 2 W L 1 8 3 9 3 5 7 ( T e x

. A p p

. — A u s t i n M a y 1 8
, 2 0 1 2
, p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( m e m

. o p

. )

, h e l d t h a t a n a t t o r n e y w a s e n t i t l e d t o l i t i g a t i o n i m m u n i t y f o r h i s c o n d u c t r e l a t i n g t o h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a l e n d e r i n a n o n

-

j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e e d i n g

. S e e i d

. a t * 6

. H o w e v e r , t h e C a m p b e l l c o u r t ’ s s t a t e m e n t o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w r e l i e d o n c a s e s t h a t l i m i t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i m m u n i t y t o “ l i t i g a t i o n , ” “ l a w s u i t s , ” o r s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e a t t o r n e y

m a y b e s a n c t i o n e d b y a c o u r t

. S e e i d

. a t * 5 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. T h e C a m p b e l l c o u r t t h e n i m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d l i t i g a t i o n i m m u n i t y ’ s c o n t e x t u a l r e q u i r e m e n t w h e n i t c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ [ n ] e i t h e r t h e C a m p b e l l s ’ p e t i t i o n n o r t h e i r r e s p o n s e t o t h e

m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a l l e g e d t h a t t h e A t t o r n e y D e f e n d a n t s c o m m i t t e d a n y w r o n g f u l a c t s o u t s i d e o f t h e f o r e c l o s u r e
p r o c e e d i n g s

. ” S e e i d

. a t * 5

– 6 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. T h e w o r d i n g o f t h e c o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e e d i n g s e m p l o y s p e c i f i c n o t i c e a n d p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s a n d m a y b e c o m e h i g h l y a d v e r s a r i a l

, d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t t h e C a m p b e l l c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d l i t i g a t i o n i m m u n i t y ’ s c o n t e x t u a l r e q u i r e m e n t

. S e e T E X

. P R O P

. C O D E § 5 1

. 0 0 2 ( m a n d a t i n g t h a t a n y f o r e c l o s u r e m u s t i n v o l v e n o t i c e t o t h e b o r r o w e r , o c c u r a t a s p e c i f i c t i m e a n d p l a c e ( o f

t e n a

c o u r t h o u s e )

, a n d p r o v i d e n o t i c e o f t h e s a l e t o t h e p u b l i c )

. T h e s e c o n d c a s e t h e C o u r t r e l i e s o n , R e a g a n N a t i o n a l
A d v e r t i s i n g o

f A u s t i n , I

n c

. v

. H a z e n , N o

. 0 3

- 0 5

- 0 0 6 9 9

- C V
, 2 0 0 8 W L 2 9 3 8 8 2 3 ( T e x

. A p p

. — A u s t i n J u l y 2 9
, 2 0 0 8
, n o
p e t

. ) ( m e m

. o p

. )

, i s a l s o u n a v a i l i n g

. T h e r e , t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s s t a t e d t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y d o c t r i n e w a s n o t

“ l i m i t e d t o [ t h e l i t i g a t i o n ] s e t t i n g , ” b u t t e m p e r e d i t s s t a t e m e n t b y h o l d i n g t h a t t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t e v i d e n c e

e s t a b l i s h e d t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s a l l e g e d c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d i n “ a n a d v e r s a r i a l d i s p u t e i n w h i c h l i t i g a t i o n w a s c o n t e m p l a t e d

, i m p e n d i n g o r a c t u a l l y o n g o i n g

. ” I d

. a t * 8

. T h e H a z e n c o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g h a r k e n s t o t h i s C o u r t ’ s j u r i s p r u d e n c e a d d r e s s i n g
t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e , w h i c h a p p l i e s o n l y i n l i m i t e d c o n t e x t s

. S e e S h e l l O i l C o

. ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ _ ; J a m e s , 6 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t 9 1 6

– 1 7 ; s e e a l s o d i s c u s s i o n i n f r a a t

_ _ _ . T h e r e f

o r e , t h e H a z e n c o u r t ’ s s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e i m m u n i t y ’ s

a p p l i c a t i o n w a s n o t “ l i m i t e d t o [ t h e l i t i g a t i o n ] s e t t i n g ” p r o v i d e s n o s u p p o r t a t a l l

.



### 7

## adopted. See Chu

, 249 S.W .3d at 446 (Tex. 2008) (“A n attorney who persona lly steals g oods or tells

lies on a client’s behalf may be li able for conversion or fraud i n some case s.”); cf. R E S T A T E M E N T



## (T H I R D 

## ) O F T H E 

## L A W 

## G O V E R N I N G 

## L A W Y E R S 

## § 56 cmt. c (2000) (“[A] lawy er is not alway s fre e o f

liability to a nonclient for assisting a client’s act solely beca use the lawy er was acting in the course

of a r epre sentation.”).

The outcome of this case is dictated by its proce dural posture. This case comes to the Court

on revie w of the trial court’s g rant of Cantey Hang er’ s motion for traditional summary judgme nt on

its aff irmative defe nse of attorney immunit y

. The Court corr ectly states that a party moving for

traditional summary judgme nt has the burden to conclusively prove its aff irmative defe nse, and that

revie wing court s “t ak e as true all evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant, and

. . . indulge ever y

rea sonable infere nce and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor .”

___ S.W .3d at

___ (quoting

Valence Operati n g C o

. v. Dorsett
, 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). Howeve r, a corr ect

application o f t h i s standard of revie w to the summary judgme nt evidenc e befor e us require s a

differ ent re sult.

Cantey Hang er supported its motion with the aff idavits of two of its attorney s who swore that

Cantey Hang er was “re tained to repr esent Ms. Simenstad in her divorce proceed i n g, ” including

pursuing post-judgme nt reme dies and claims ag ainst By rd’s estate in bankruptc y , and that all of its

actions “were made in the course and scope of repr esenting Ms. Sim enstad.” Cantey Hang er also

included the d i v orce decr ee in the summary judgme nt rec ord. The divorce decr ee awa rded

Simenstad three airc raf

t, made Simenstad responsible for the ad valore m taxes, liens, or assessments

8

## associate d with the airc raf t, and require d Si me n s ta d ’ s a tt o r n e y s

— b y th e n Ca

n te y Hang er—to prepa

re

any documents nec essar

y to effe ctuate the transfe r of the a irplanes within ten day s of its entry

.

I n response to the motion for summary judgme n t , t h e plaintiffs submitt ed an aff idavit in

which By rd swore that Simenstad had never been an o wn er , office r, m anag er, or direc tor of L ucy

L easing or PGB A ir. He a lso swore that “ Cantey Hang er w as to draf

t the documents to eff

ectua te

the transfe r of the airplane for me to sign on behalf of L ucy L easing ,” and that “Simenstad sold one

of the airplane s that was awa rded to he r in the Divorce Dec ree ” over one y ear afte r the entry of the

divorce decr ee. Fur

ther, By rd swore that Simenstad sig ned the bill of sale as a “mana g er” of L ucy

L easing , which made L ucy L easing liable for the sales tax incurred by the transa ction.

This summary judgme nt evidenc e is lacking

. The divorce deg ree was a final judgme nt that

terminated the underly ing divorce litig ation, see Lehm ann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W .3d 191, 195

(Tex. 2001) (stating that final judgme nts dispose of all pending p ar ties and claims), and mere ly

establishes that the parties had litigated a divorce that resulted in e ach party being awa rded cer tain

proper ty

. Although di v o rc e litigation arg uably could be extended by pursuing post-judgme nt

reme dies or an a

ppeal or even by executing doc uments require d by a divorce decr ee, the summary

judgme nt evidenc e here does not conclusi v el y es tablish that Cantey Hang er’ s alleg ed conduct

occur red in an y such extended litigation. The aff idavits reve al nothing about whether Cantey 4



## Hang er’ s actions rela ted to any post-judgme nt reme dies or enfor ceme nt actions. Even assuming that

prepa ration and execution of documents as provided for in a divorce decr ee cou l d co n t i n u e the

B e c a u s e o f m y v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e , I n e e d n o t a d d r e s s w h e t h e r o r t o w h a t e x t e n t s u c h p o s t

- j u d g m e n t a c t i o n s 4

m i g h t e x t e n d t h e l i t i g a t i o n

.



### 9

## litigation, Cantey Hang er’ s alleg ed draf ting of the bill of sale was not the ty pe of transfe r document

the divorce decr ee contemplated. The divorce decr ee contemplated a transfe r from L ucy L easing (a

company awa

rded to By

rd under this decr ee) to Simenstad within ten day s of its entry

. Although the

trial court struck the bil l of sale and we may not consider it, it is uncontrove rted in the summary

judgme nt evidenc e t h at the airplane was sold more than a y ear later and the purchaser was a third

party

. I t is also uncontrove rted that Simenstad signe d the bill of sale, althoug h she may have signe d

under the By

rd surname and as a manag er of L ucy L easing

. The fac t rema ins that the divorce decr ee

contemplated only documents to tr ansfe r owner ship of the plane from L ucy L easing to Simenstad,

not documents to eff

ectua te a sale from Simenstad to a third party

. That the alleg edly fra udulent sale

m ay have potential tax implications for a company awa rded to By

rd under the divorce decr ee i s

inconseque ntial be cause , under this re cord, the litigation had ended and the decr ee did not addre ss

the subsequent sa le to third parties of pr operty awa rded in the divorc e dec ree

. 5



## Viewing this evidenc e in the light most favor able to and in d u lg in g ever

y rea sonable infere nce

in favor o f t h e plaintiffs, I cannot conclude

, as the Court does, that Cantey Hang er conclusively

established that its alleg ed conduct occur red in litigation. Rather, the summary judgme nt evidenc e

allows for the rea sonable infere nce that Cantey Hang er’ s draf ting of the bill of sale, if it occur red as

the plaintiffs allege

, constituted participa tion in a fraudulent business sche me that took place well

afte r the divorce litigation ended. I there fore conclude that this case is simil ar to Poole

, under which

I n m y v i e w , i t i s n o n s e n s i c a l t o h o l d t h a t C a n t e y H a n g e r m e t i t s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t b u r d e n t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t 5
i t s c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d i n l i t i g a t i o n b a s e d o n t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ r e s p o n s e t o C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t a n d

t h e a t t a c h e d a f

f i d a v i t a l l e g i n g t a x c o n s e q u e n c e s a s a r e s u l t o f t h e a l l e g e d c o n d u c t

. C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s m o t i o n a n d e v i d e n c e d i d n o t m e n t i o n t a x e s o r a s s e r t a n y s u c h c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e d i v o r c e l i t i g a t i o n

.



### 1 0

## the Court held that an attorney was not immune for his involvement in a fra udulent business scheme

that arose out of an arg uably adver sarial rela tionship betwee n a seller and an insolvent buy er. See 6



## Poole , 58 Tex. at 135, 137.

My conclusion t hat Cantey Hang er f ailed to conc lusively

establish that its alleg ed conduct

occur red in litigation is supported by a compar ison to the context in which the judicial proce eding s

privileg e applies. The judici al p roceeding s privileg e is not raised direc tly

, but beca use Cantey 7



## Hang er’ s motion for summary judgme nt raised attorney immunit y g ener ally

, it is helpful to consider

T h e C o u r t f

a u l t s t h i s a p p r o a c h

, a r g u i n g t h a t i t i m p r o p e r l y f o c u s e s o n w h e t h e r t h e c o n d u c t w a s m e r i t o r i o u s

. 6
S e e

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ _ . W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e f o c u s m u s t b e o n t h e t y p e o f c o n d u c t , a n d n o t w h e t h e r t h a t c o n d u c t w a s

m e r i t o r i o u s , t h i s p r i n c i p l e g u i d e s c o u r t s o n l y i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e a l l e g e d c o n d u c t i n v o l v e d t h e p r o v i s i o n o f l e g a l

s e r v i c e s , n o t w h e t h e r t h e c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d i n l i t i g a t i o n

. S e e B r a d t , 8 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 7 2 ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t i f a n o p p o s i n g

a t t o r n e y a s s a u l t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f d u r i n g t r i a l

, t h e a s s a u l t “ w o u l d n o t b e p a r t o f t h e d i s c h a r g e o f t h e a t t o r n e y

– a p p e l l e e ’ s d u t i e s i n r e p r e s e n t i n g a p a r t y i n t h e l a w s u i t ” )

. L i m i t i n g t h e t y p e

- o f

- c o n d u c t p r i n c i p l e t o t h i s p u r p o s e f i n d s s u p p o r t i n
t h i s C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n i n P o o l e

. I n t h a t c a s e , t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b i l l o f l a d i n g

— a d o c u m e n t o f l e g a l

s i g n i f i c a n c e

— w a s c e r t a i n l y s q u a r e l y i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t w a s n e v e r t h e l e s s d e t e r m i n e d t o b e p a r t o f a f

r a u d u l e n t b u s i n e s s s c h e m e

. S e e P o o l e , 5 8 T e x

. a t 1 3 5
, 1 3 7

. I l o o k t o a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e s u r r o u n d i n g C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s a l l e g e d d r a f

t i n g o f t h e b i l l o f s a l e

— a l s o a d o c u m e n t o f l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e

— a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a l l e g e d d r a f t i n g o c c u r r e d o u t s i d e o f l i t i g a t i o n

. I d o n o t i n f

e r o r c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a l l e g e d d r a f t i n g d i d n o t i n v o l v e t h e p r o v i s i o n

o f l e g a l s e r v i c e s , a n d t h e r e f o r e d o n o t r u n a f

o u l o f t h e t y p e

- o f

- c o n d u c t p r i n c i p l e

.

I n o t e t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y r e c o g n i z e d a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y b a s e d o n t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e 7

o n l y f o r d e f a m a t i o n c l a i m s , a c l a i m n o t b r o u g h t i n t h i s c a s e

. H o w e v e r , s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e e x t e n d e d t h e

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i r j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e t o b o t h s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o n d u c t

. S e e , e

. g

. , E c h e v a r r i a , M c C a l l a , R a y m e r , B a r r e t t & F r a p p i e r v

. C o l e , 9 5 0 S o

. 2 d 3 8 0
, 3 8 0

– 8 1 ( F l a

. 2 0 0 7 ) ; P r i c e v

. A r m o u r , 9 4 9 P

. 2 d 1 2 5 1
, 1 2 5 8 ( U t a h
1 9 9 7 )

. M o r e o v e r , o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s a l l o w t h e i r j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e t o s h i e l d a g a i n s t c a u s e s o f a c t i o n o t h e r
t h a n d e f a m a t i o n

. S e e , e

. g

. , M e h a f f y , R i d e r , W i n d h o l

z & W i l s o n v

. C e n t

. B a n k D e n v e r , N

. A

. , 8 9 2 P

. 2 d 2 3 0
, 2 3 5
, 2 3 7 ( C o l o

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n e x c e p t f o r m a l i c i o u s c o n d u c t , f r a u d

, a n d n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) ; S i m m s v

. S e a m a n , 6 9 A

. 3 d 8 8 0
, 8 9 0

– 9 1 ( C o n n

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n e x c e p t f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , a b u s e o f p r o c e s s ,
a n d v e x a t i o u s l i t i g a t i o n ) ; E c h e v a r r i a , M c C a l l a , R a y m e r , B a r r e t t & F r a p p i e r , 9 5 0 S o

. 2 d a t 3 8 0

– 8 1 ( a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n ) ; P r i c e , 9 4 9 P

. 2 d a t 1 2 5 8 ( i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d n o t i n g i n d i c t a t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e s h o u l d

a p p l y t o a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n ) ; C l a r k v

. D r u c k m a n , 6 2 4 S

. E

. 2 d 8 6 4
, 8 7 2 ( W

. V a

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n e x c e p t f o r

m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n a n d f r a u d )

. T h e e f

f e c t o f t h e C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n i n t h i s c a s e m a y b e a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e j u d i c i a l

p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e t o p o s t

- p r o c e e d i n g c o n d u c t

.



### 1 1

## the context in which the privileg e applies an d t h e p o l i cy underly ing it. Reg arding context, the

8



## judicial proce eding s privileg e require s the attorney ’s or law firm’s statements to have been made in

the due course of or in serious contemplation of a judicial proce eding or quasi-judicial proce eding

.

S ee S h ell Oil Co.
, ___ S.W .3d at ___. This can be established with proof that the statement was

made: (1) in the due cour se of a ny aspec t of a judi cial procee ding, including “ open cour t, pre-tr ial

hear ings, depositions, aff

idavits and any of the pleading s or other paper s in the case ,” see Jame s , 637

S.W .2d at 916–17; (2) in the due course of “proc eeding s befor e executive office rs, and boards and

commissions which exercise quasi-judicial power s,” Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
, 166 S.W .2d

909, 912 (Tex. 1942); or (3) in serious contemplation of a judicial or quasi-judicial proce eding

, Shell

Oil Co.
, ___ S.W .3d at ___. Her e, Cantey Hang er’ s aff idavits do not indicate whether there was an

ong oing judicial or q u asi-judicial proce eding

, nor do they indicate that Cantey Hang er’ s conduct

occur red in “open court, pre- trial hear ings, deposi t i o ns, aff idavits[ ,] any of the pleading s or other

paper s in the case ,” or any other aspec t of a proce eding

. See Jame s , 637 S.W .2d at 916–17. Nor do

the aff idavits indicate that Cantey Hang er’ s conduct occur red in serious contemplation of a judicial

or quasi-judicial proce eding

. See Shell Oil Co.
, ___ S.W .3d at ___. Cantey Hang er did not establish

the applicability of the judicial proce eding s privileg e, just as it did not establish the applicability of

litigation immunity

.

The Court holds that attorney immunit y shields Cantey Hang er fro m l i ab i lity arising from

its alleg ed dra fting of the bill of sa le more tha n a y ear afte r entry

of the divorc e dec ree . I nstead of

A s i t r e l a t e s t o a t t o r n e y s , t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e “ i s b a s e d u p o n a p u b l i c p o l i c y o f s e c u r i n g t o 8

a t t o r n e y s a s o f

f i c e r s o f t h e c o u r t t h e u t m o s t f r e e d o m i n t h e i r e f

f o r t s t o s e c u r e j u s t i c e f

o r t h e i r c l i e n t s

. ” R E S T A T E M E N T ( S E C O N D ) O F T O R T S § 5 8 6 c m t

. a ( 1 9 7 7 )

.



### 1 2

## limit ing this form of attorney immunit y to the context of litigation, the Court’s cursor y analy sis

implicitl y adopts a test in whi ch at torney s are shielded from civil liability to nonclients if their

conduct mere ly occur s in the scope of client repr esenta tion or in the discharg e of duties to the client.

This holding enlarg es t he scope of l itigation im munity in a manner t hat d oes not comport wit h its

purpose and protec ts attorney s from liabili t y fo r conduct involving a transac tion fore ign to the

plaintiffs and the di v o rc e court and outs ide t he contex t of l itigation. This test is not supported by

Pool e o r K

r uegel

, is contra

ry to ever y published court of appea ls opinion on the subject, and has

been flatly reje ct by the Restatement. See R E S T A T E M E N T 

## (T H I R D 

## ) O F T H E 

## L A W 

## G O V E R N I N G



## L A W Y E R S 

## §§ 56 cmt. c, 57 (2000)

. 9



## Moreove r, the Court’s holding that Cant e y Hang er’ s alleg ed conduct is not actionable cre ates

a troubling jurisdictional dichotomy on rema nd. On one hand, the court of appea ls’ holding that the

plaintiff s ’ fra ud claims ag ainst Simenstad for “conspir[ing ] with Cantey Hang er to falsify an airplane

bill of sale

. . . are not claims attempt i n g t o en fo rc e the t erms of the decree ” and are there fore not

within the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the divorce court, 409 S.W .3d at 776, rema ins intact

beca use it was not challeng ed on appea l. On the other hand, the Court holds that the plaintiffs’ fra ud

claims ag ainst Cantey Hange r, which are based on the same transac tion, are barr ed beca use the

alleg ed conduct was within the scope of its repr esenta tion of Simenstad in the divorce proce eding

.

___ S.W .3d at ___. Ba sed on the Court’s opinion today and the unc halleng ed portion of the court

T e x a s h a s n o t a d o p t e d s e c t i o n s 5 6 o r 5 7 o f t h e R e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e L a w G o v e r n i n g L a w y e r s , b u t t h e s u b s t a n c e 9

o f t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h C h u , K r u e g e l

, a n d P o o l e

. S e e C h u , 2 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 4 6 ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a t t o r n e y s

m a y b e h e l d l i a b l e f

o r c o n v e r s i o n a n d f

r a u d i n s o m e c a s e s ) ; K r u e g e l

, 1 2 6 S

. W

. a t 3 4 5 ( r e c o g n i z i n g a c i r c u m s t a n c e w h e n

a n a t t o r n e y i s n o t l i a b l e f o r f r a u d ) ; P o o l e , 5 8 T e x

. a t 1 3 5
, 1 3 7 ( r e c o g n i z i n g a c i r c u m s t a n c e w h e n a n a t t o r n e y i s l i a b l e f o r f r a u d )

.



### 1 3

## of appea ls’ judgme nt, Simenstad’s alleg ed conduct reg arding the sale of the plane is separ ate from

the divorce proce eding for purposes of the trial court’s jurisdiction, but her attorne y s ’ al l eged

conduct reg arding the same transac tion is a part of the divorce proce eding for purposes of attorney

immunit y

. This inconsistent results beg s the question of whether the trial court on rema nd actua lly

has jurisdiction over the claims ag ainst Simenstad, as the court of appea ls held, or wheth er those

claims are within the divorce c ourt’s continuing , exclusive jurisdiction.

For its alleg ed conduct to be protect ed by attorney immunit y , Cantey Hang er must have

conclusively established that its alleg ed conduct occur red in litigation. I wou l d h o l d t h at Cantey

Hang er did not meet its summary judgme nt burden and, on this rec o rd

, t h e attorney immunit y

doctrine provides Cantey Hang er no protec tion from the plaintiffs’ fra ud, conspirac y , and aiding and

abetting claims ste m m i n g from the alleg edly falsified bill of sale. I would aff irm the court of

appea ls’ judgme nt.

_______________________________________ Paul W. Green J ustice

OPI NI ON DEL I VERED: J une 26, 2015

1 4