[Cite as Pratte v. Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860.] 

PRATTE, APPELLANT, v. STEWART, APPELLEE.

[Cite as Pratte v. Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860.] 

Statute of limitations — Childhood sexual abuse — R.C. 2305.111(C) — 

Retroactivity — Discovery rule inapplicable. 

(No. 2009-0953 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided May 5, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 08-CA-95, 

2009-Ohio-1768. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

1. The 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action 

arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective 

date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed 

and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effective 

date of that subsection. 

2. Pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of 

childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches 

the age of majority. 

3. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories 

of childhood sexual abuse. The discovery rule does not apply to toll the 

statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 

memories of that abuse. (Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 

N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.) 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, J. 

{¶ 1} This appeal requires a determination of the appropriate statute of 

limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse in which the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

claimant alleges that memories of the abuse were repressed. Appellant, Amy 

Pratte, asserts that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C), which 

became effective on August 3, 2006, cannot be applied retroactively to her claim 

that she suffered childhood sexual abuse, because her memory of the abuse was 

repressed until after the limitations period expired. Pratte argues that pursuant to 

this court’s decision in Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, 

the statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse does 

not accrue until the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that she was sexually 

abused. Pratte therefore contends that repressed memory continues as a tolling 

mechanism after the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). 

{¶ 2} Conversely, appellee, Rodney Stewart, contends that R.C. 

2305.111(C) unambiguously applies retroactively to Pratte’s claim and that the 

statute does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood 

sexual abuse. Stewart therefore maintains that Pratte’s claim, which was filed 

beyond the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), is time-barred. 

{¶ 3} We hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 

applies to all civil actions arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior 

to the effective date of the enactment of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no 

prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired 

before the effective date of that subsection. We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 

2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse 

asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date 

on which the victim reaches the age of majority. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not 

contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. 

The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations while a victim 

of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse. (Ault v. Jasko 

(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, 

abrogated by statute.) 
January Term, 2010 

3

{¶ 4} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Relevant Background

{¶ 5} On April 14, 2008, Pratte filed a lawsuit against Stewart alleging 

that he sexually assaulted her on three occasions when she was a child, the most 

recent occasion happening in the fall of 1984. Pratte was 33 years old at the time 

she filed the lawsuit. She alleged that she had repressed memories of the sexual 

abuse until April 20, 2007, when a news event triggered the recovery of the 

memories. 

{¶ 6} Stewart moved to dismiss Pratte’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. More 

specifically, Stewart argued that Pratte’s complaint was time-barred by R.C. 

2305.111(C), which requires that a claim of childhood sexual abuse be brought 

within 12 years after the cause of action accrues. Stewart relied upon the statute’s 

specification that a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues when the 

alleged victim attains the age of majority. Because Pratte reached the age of 

majority on July 13, 1992, Stewart argued that her claim must have been filed by 

July 13, 2004, and was untimely because it was not filed until April 14, 2008. 

{¶ 7} Pratte countered that this court’s holding in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870—that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of 

limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that 

abuse—remains viable despite the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). Because her 

memories of the alleged abuse were repressed until April 20, 2007, Pratte 

maintained that her claims were timely filed within one year of her recovery of 

the memories. 

{¶ 8} The trial court granted Stewart’s motion to dismiss, finding that the 

legislative intent in granting a minor 12 years after reaching majority in which to 

bring an action for childhood sexual abuse was to permit the minor a period of 

time to recall repressed memories. The trial court therefore rejected Pratte’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

arguments and held that her claim was filed beyond the time permitted by R.C. 

2305.111(C). 

{¶ 9} On Pratte’s appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, the 

court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Second District found that “the 

legislature by enacting R.C. 2305.10(G) states that the twelve-year limitation 

period applies regardless of the previous rule of law established in Ault.” 2009-

Ohio-1768, at ¶ 17. The court of appeals further concluded that the legislature 

intended to apply R.C. 2305.111(C) retroactively. Id. 

{¶ 10} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary 

appeal. 122 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2009-Ohio-4233, 912 N.E.2d 107. Pratte asserts 

four propositions of law for our consideration: 

{¶ 11} (1) “R.C. 2305.111(C) does not apply retroactively to deprive a 

repressed memory childhood sexual abuse victim of her cause of action.” 

{¶ 12} (2) “Repressed memory as a tolling mechanism of the civil statute 

of limitations remains viable after the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C).” 

{¶ 13} (3) “The statute of limitations period for sexual abuse in Ohio 

begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was 

sexually abused, or when through the exercise of ordinary diligence, the victim 

should have discovered the abuse.” 

{¶ 14} (4) “The statute of limitations is tolled where a victim of childhood 

sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.” 

Analysis 

A. History of the Statute of Limitations for Claims of Childhood Sexual 

Abuse 

{¶ 15} A discussion of the history of the limitations period applicable to 

claims of childhood sexual abuse is useful to our resolution of Pratte’s appeal. 

{¶ 16} Prior to the enactment of the statute at issue, the General Assembly 

had not enacted a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood sexual 
January Term, 2010 

5

abuse. In Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 

N.E.2d 402, this court was asked to determine what statute of limitations applied 

to such actions. We concluded that a cause of action premised upon acts of sexual 

abuse was subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery in 

former R.C. 2305.111. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} Having determined the relevant limitations period, we went on to 

address when a claim for childhood sexual abuse accrues. The defendants in Doe

argued that such a claim accrued on the victim’s 18th birthday, while the plaintiff 

sought application of the discovery rule. This court found that the facts of the 

case before it did not require us to consider whether to apply the discovery rule to 

toll the limitations period in cases involving childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 541. 

The court ultimately held, “A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has one 

year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims 

against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the 

identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has 

occurred.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 18} In Ault v. Jasko, however, we were presented with facts requiring 

us to determine whether to apply the discovery rule in cases alleging childhood 

sexual abuse. The plaintiff, Kathy Ault, filed a complaint when she was 29 years 

old, alleging that she had been sexually abused as a child by her father. Ault v. 

Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d at 114, 637 N.E.2d 870. Her father moved to dismiss the 

complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. Ault responded that her cause 

of action did not accrue until she was able to verify that she had been sexually 

abused and that her father was responsible for that abuse. 

{¶ 19} This court held: “The discovery rule applies in Ohio to toll the 

statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 

memories of that abuse until a later time.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

Thus, this court held: “The one-year statute of limitations period for sexual abuse 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

in Ohio begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she 

was sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 

victim should have discovered the sexual abuse.” Id. at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 20} Both Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Wright dissented from the 

majority’s creation of “a rule of law that would permit a person at any age after 

any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and the revived memory of 

such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages.” Id. at 120. Chief 

Justice Moyer emphasized that “[i]f that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General 

Assembly that should declare it as such rather than this court.” Id. Chief Justice 

Moyer further explained: 

{¶ 21} “The proper forum to determine such issues is in the General 

Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all scientific data, and all 

empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debated by those who have an 

interest in the issue. That process did not occur, nor could it have occurred, in the 

case before us. 

{¶ 22} “There probably will be a day, as there has been regarding the 

forensic use of DNA, when courts can be given reliable, competent information 

on the issue of repressed memory. That day is not here. We should dispose of 

this case with a strong dose of judicial restraint. Until the General Assembly acts 

on the issue, we should apply our holding in Doe v. First United Methodist 

Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, and hold that Kathy Ault’s 

cause of action for assault and battery against John Jasko should have been filed 

within one year after the date of her eighteenth birthday.” Id. 

{¶ 23} Justice Resnick concurred in the majority’s decision in Ault but 

agreed with the dissenters’ view that the General Assembly is the most

appropriate body to establish a discovery rule for cases of childhood sexual abuse. 

Id. at 119, 637 N.E.2d 870. However, Justice Resnick believed that until the 
January Term, 2010 

7

General Assembly chose to act, this court could interpret the relevant statute of 

limitations to allow potentially valid claims to proceed. Id. 

{¶ 24} This court next examined the availability of the discovery rule in 

cases of childhood sexual abuse in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268. We followed our holding in Doe v. 

First United Methodist Church and declined to apply the discovery rule to toll the 

statute of limitations in a case of childhood sexual abuse against the employer of 

an alleged perpetrator when the victim knew the identity of the perpetrator and the 

employer of the perpetrator and knew that a battery had occurred. Id. at syllabus. 

The majority found the Ault ruling to be inapplicable because Doe had not alleged 

that he had repressed his memory of the alleged abuse. Id. at ¶ 25. However, we 

stressed that the remedy sought by Doe required a legislative response to create an 

exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations and endorsed Chief Justice 

Moyer’s dissent in Ault. Id. at ¶ 51. 

{¶ 25} Shortly before the decision in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati

was released, on March 29, 2006, the General Assembly enacted a statute of 

limitations expressly for causes of action resulting from childhood sexual abuse, 

in 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 17. S.B. 17 became effective on August 3, 2006, and 

amended former R.C. 2305.111 to create a 12-year statute of limitations for 

actions for childhood sexual abuse. It is the construction and applicability of R.C. 

2305.111, and the viability of the discovery rule adopted in Ault, that we must 

consider today. 

B. Retroactive Application of R.C. 2305.111(C) 

{¶ 26} In her first proposition of law, Pratte challenges the retroactive 

application of R.C. 2305.111(C) to her claim against Stewart. Pratte argues that 

this court must presume that the legislature did not intend to apply the 12-year 

statute of limitations to repressed-memory victims who do not recover their 

memories before the age of 30 years. Otherwise, Pratte contends, the statute runs 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

afoul of her constitutional guarantee to a remedy and open courts in Section 16, 

Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

1. Retroactivity 

{¶ 27} Although neither party nor the lower courts address retroactivity 

correctly, the proper analysis for determining whether a statute can be applied 

retroactively is summarized in State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167: 

{¶ 28} “It is well-settled law that statutes are presumed to apply 

prospectively unless expressly declared to be retroactive. R.C. 1.48; Van Fossen 

v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 522 N.E.2d 489. It is 

also settled that the General Assembly does not possess an absolute right to adopt 

retroactive statutes. Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the 

retroactive impairment of vested substantive rights. See State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 13. However, the General 

Assembly may make retroactive any legislation that is merely remedial in nature. 

See State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 537, 542, 8 O.O. 

531, 9 N.E.2d 505.” (Plurality opinion.) Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 29} With these principles in mind, this court reiterated its two-part test 

for evaluating whether a statute may be applied retroactively: 

{¶ 30} “First, the reviewing court must determine as a threshold matter 

whether the statute is expressly made retroactive. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d at 181, 

772 N.E.2d 1172, citing Van Fossen,36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, at 

paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. The General Assembly’s failure to 

clearly enunciate retroactivity ends the analysis, and the relevant statute may be 

applied only prospectively. Id. If a statute is clearly retroactive, though, the 

reviewing court must then determine whether it is substantive or remedial in 

nature. LaSalle at 181, 772 N.E.2d 1172.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

2. Express Designation of Retroactivity 
January Term, 2010 

9

{¶ 31} We begin our analysis by ascertaining whether the General 

Assembly expressly made the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 

retroactive. As part of S.B. 17, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.10(E), 

which states, “An action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting 

any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined in section 2305.111 

of the Revised Code, shall be brought as provided in division (C) of that section.” 

{¶ 32} Uncodified Section 3(B) of S.B. 17 states: 

{¶ 33} “The amendments to section 2305.111 of the Revised Code made 

in this act shall apply * * * to all civil actions brought by a victim of childhood 

sexual abuse for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or 

after the effective date of this act * * * and to all civil actions brought by a victim 

of childhood sexual abuse for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse that 

occurred prior to the effective date of this act in relation to which a civil action for 

that claim has never been filed and for which the period of limitations applicable 

to such a civil action prior to the effective date of this act has not expired on the 

effective date of this act.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 34} In Hyle v. Porter, 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 

899, we discussed two examples of clear expressions of retroactivity. We first 

referred to our holding in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio 

St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, where we found a clearly expressed legislative intent 

for former R.C. 4121.80 to apply retroactively based on the following passage: “ 

‘This section applies to and governs any action * * * pending in any court on the 

effective date of this section * * * notwithstanding any provisions of any prior 

statute or rule of law of this state.’ ” Hyle at ¶ 15, quoting former R.C. 

4121.80(H). We also cited our determination in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio 

St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, that the General Assembly specifically made former 

R.C. 2950.09 retroactive by making the statute applicable to anyone who “ ‘was 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense prior to the effective 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

date of this section, if the person was not sentenced for the offense on or after’ 

that date.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting former R.C. 2950.09(C)(1). 

{¶ 35} Similar to former R.C. 4121.80 and 2950.09, Section 3(B) of S.B. 

17 expressly makes the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 

applicable to acts of sexual abuse committed prior to the effective date of S.B. 17. 

Thus, we conclude that the statute includes strong, unequivocal declarations of 

retroactivity. 

3. Substantive v. Remedial 

{¶ 36} Because R.C. 2305.111(C) was expressly made retroactive, we 

must next determine whether the statute retroactively impairs a vested substantive 

right or is merely remedial in nature. Van Fossen, supra. 

{¶ 37} It is well established that a statute is substantive if it impairs or 

takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or 

additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction, or 

creates a new right. Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489. 

Remedial laws, however, are those affecting only the remedy provided, and 

include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the 

enforcement of an existing right. Id. A purely remedial statute does not violate 

Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, even if applied retroactively. Id. 

{¶ 38} Prior to the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C), the common law, 

as expressed in Ault, permitted a victim of childhood sexual abuse to file a cause 

of action within one year from when he or she recalled or otherwise discovered 

that he or she had been sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the sexual abuse. Pratte 

maintains that she had not discovered that she had been sexually abused prior to 

S.B. 17’s enactment. Because Pratte’s cause of action had not yet accrued under 

the law existing prior to the enactment of S.B. 17, Pratte, or any victim with 

repressed memories, did not have a vested right or an accrued substantive right to 
January Term, 2010 

11

file a lawsuit. Thus, R.C. 2305.111(C) did not impair vested rights or affect an 

accrued substantive right. 

{¶ 39} Pratte’s argument that the retroactive application of R.C. 2305.111 

violates the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution is not persuasive and does not establish that the statute is substantive 

and not remedial.1

 

{¶ 40} “Any constitutional analysis must begin with the presumption of 

constitutionality enjoyed by all legislation, and the understanding that it is not this 

court’s duty to assess the wisdom of a particular statute.” Groch v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 141. In Groch, 

this court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. 

(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 199, 551 N.E.2d 938, that the right-to-a-remedy 

provision of Section 16, Article I applies only to existing, vested rights, and it is 

state law that determines what injuries are recognized and what remedies are 

available. Id. at ¶ 117–119 and 148. Moreover, “[a] person has no property, no 

vested interest, in any rule of the common law. * * * Indeed, the great office of 

statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to 

adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.” Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 

U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77; see also Groch at ¶ 117. Thus, as we affirmed in 

Groch, “ ‘[t]his court would encroach upon the Legislature’s ability to guide the 

development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule 

enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the 

courts. * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances 

between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the 

healthy growth of the law.’ ” Id. at ¶ 118, quoting Freezer Storage, Inc. v. 

Armstrong Cook Co. (1978), 476 Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715. 

 

1. Pratte did not raise this constitutional challenge in any of the lower court proceedings. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12

{¶ 41} In accordance with the constitutional principles espoused in Groch, 

the retroactive application of the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C) 

does not violate Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Pratte did not have 

a vested right in the common-law discovery rule announced in Ault, and we would 

offend the separation-of-powers doctrine by invalidating the legislature’s decision 

to impose a reasonable statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse. 

{¶ 42} In so holding, we observe that if Pratte’s view prevailed, any 

statute of limitations that does not afford explicit discovery tolling provisions 

would violate the right-to-a-remedy provision, irrespective of whether it is applied 

retroactively or prospectively. Furthermore, the adoption of Pratte’s position 

would discount the axiom that statutes of limitation serve a gate-keeping function 

for courts by “(1) ensuring fairness to the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt 

prosecution of causes of action, (3) suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and 

(4) avoiding the inconveniences engendered by delay—specifically, the 

difficulties of proof present in older cases.” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 

109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 10. Justice is not served 

in such cases. 

{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of 

limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) can be applied retroactively and does not violate 

the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article of the Ohio Constitution. 

R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood sexual abuse 

that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no 

prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired 

before the effective date of that subsection. 

C. Construction of R.C. 2305.111(C) and Viability of the Discovery Rule 

{¶ 44} Having determined that R.C. 2305.111(C) can be applied 

retroactively, we now turn to Pratte’s remaining propositions of law, which aver 
January Term, 2010 

13

that the repressed-memory tolling mechanism in Ault remains viable after the 

enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). We disagree. 

{¶ 45} The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give 

effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-

Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. In interpreting statutes, this court has long held 

that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language 

employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express 

plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no 

occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 

66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. “A court is neither 

to insert words that were not used by the legislature nor to delete words that were 

used.” Cleveland Mobile Radio Sales, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, 113 Ohio St.3d 

394, 2007-Ohio-2203, 865 N.E.2d 1275, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 46} R.C. 2305.111(C) provides: 

{¶ 47} “[A]n action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse 

asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, shall be brought within 

twelve years after the cause of action accrues. For purposes of this section, * * * 

a cause of action for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, accrues upon 

the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. If the defendant in an 

action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting a claim resulting 

from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or after the effective date of this act 

has fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff facts that form the basis of the claim, 

the running of the limitations period with regard to that claim is tolled until the 

time when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence should have 

discovered those facts.” 

{¶ 48} We find that the language of R.C. 2305.111(C) is plain and 

unambiguous. It is beyond dispute from the unambiguous statutory language that 

R.C. 2305.111(C) governs a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse. The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14

statute clearly provides that a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood 

sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood abuse accrues upon the 

date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. 

{¶ 49} The only exception to the accrual of the cause of action on the date 

the victim reaches the age of majority is when the defendant fraudulently conceals 

facts from the plaintiff.2

 While R.C. 2305.111(C) explicitly sets forth a tolling 

provision for cases involving fraudulent concealment, the statute does not contain 

a tolling provision for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual 

abuse. The legislature could have included a tolling provision for repressed 

memory, but it chose not to do so. That decision is a legislative prerogative that 

we are not permitted to overrule. Pratte is asking this court to disregard that rule 

and to contravene established axioms of statutory construction by inserting words 

in the statute that were not used by the General Assembly. 

{¶ 50} Our rationale in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati is particularly 

germane to the issues herein: 

{¶ 51} “The remedy Doe seeks requires a legislative response to create 

such an exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations. The dissent of 

Chief Justice Moyer in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114 [120], 637 N.E.2d 870, is 

on point with the situation we consider today: 

{¶ 52} “ ‘The majority opinion announces a rule of law that would permit 

a person at any age after any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and 

the revived memory of such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages. 

If that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General Assembly that should declare it as 

such rather than this court. * * * 

{¶ 53} “ ‘We simply do not have in the record in this case sufficient 

scientific, empirical or other information from which to craft a rule of law that 

 

2. Pratte does not rely on the tolling provision for fraudulent concealment. 
January Term, 2010 

15

will protect those accused of being abusers and those who have been abused or 

believe they have been abused as children. The proper forum to determine such 

issues is in the General Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all 

scientific data, and all empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debated 

by those who have an interest in the issue.’ ” Id., 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 51–53. 

{¶ 54} Like the plaintiff’s argument in Doe, Pratte’s argument asks this 

court to step into the role of the legislature and extend the limitations period for 

claims of childhood sexual abuse. Our basis for rejecting Doe’s argument has 

even greater weight herein, given that the legislature has now created a specific 

limitations period and considered tolling provisions. We are cognizant of the 

proposition that some victims of childhood sexual abuse may not recover their 

memories of the abuse prior to the expiration of the 12-year statute of limitations, 

and we are not without compassion for those victims. But this court would invade 

the province of the legislature and violate the separation of powers if it rewrote 

the statute to include a tolling provision for repressed memory. See Arbino v. 

Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21. 

This court will not engage in such a practice and must leave it to the General 

Assembly to rewrite the statute if it deems it necessary. 

{¶ 55} Pratte’s reliance on the discovery rule adopted in Ault to extend the 

statute of limitations is improper. Ault was an equitable rule of law created at a 

time when the legislature had not enacted a limitations period for claims of 

childhood sexual abuse and this court had adopted a one-year limitations period 

for claims of childhood sexual abuse. That case is patently and materially 

different from the situation with which we are now faced, in which the General 

Assembly has responded by establishing a substantially longer limitations period 

of 12 years. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16

{¶ 56} We can reasonably infer that the General Assembly considered 

repressed memory by increasing the limitations period for claims of childhood 

sexual abuse from one year to 12 years. It is further reasonable to infer that the 

legislature was reacting to Ault’s adoption of a discovery rule for repressed 

memory in enacting R.C. 2305.111(C). The fact that the legislature did not 

expressly denounce Ault is of no consequence. When the legislature amends an 

existing statute, the presumption is that it is aware of our decisions interpreting it. 

Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719. 

{¶ 57} We therefore presume that when the legislature amended R.C. 

2305.111(C) to include a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood 

sexual abuse, it was aware of our decision in Ault. It is reasonable to conclude 

that the legislature had Ault in mind when it increased the limitation period from 

one year to 12 years and sought to afford victims a greater period of time in which 

to recover their repressed memories. 

{¶ 58} For these reasons, we hold that effective August 3, 2006, the 

statute of limitations for a cause of action of childhood sexual abuse is governed 

by R.C. 2305.111(C). The General Assembly did not include a tolling provision 

for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, and it is not our 

province to add such a provision where one plainly does not exist. In light of the 

legislature’s unambiguous enactment, the discovery rule for repressed memory 

announced in Ault is no longer viable and has been abrogated by R.C. 

2305.111(C). Because Pratte did not file her claim against Stewart within the 12-

year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), and the fraudulent-concealment 

tolling provision is inapplicable, the court of appeals soundly affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment dismissing Pratte’s claim. 

Conclusion

{¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of 

limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood 
January Term, 2010 

17

sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 

2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not 

expired before the effective date of that subsection. 

{¶ 60} We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of 

action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting 

from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches 

the age of majority. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for 

repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The discovery rule does not apply 

to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 

memories of that abuse. 

{¶ 61} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 

concur. 

 BROWN, C.J., not participating. 

__________________ 

 Kircher Law Office, L.L.C., and Konrad Kircher, for appellant. 

Matan, Wright & Noble and Scott E. Wright, for appellee. 

 Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Catherine G. Hoolahan, urging reversal 

for amici curiae, National Association to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of Children, 

Survivors’ Network of Those Abused by Priests, and National Center for Victims 

of Crime. 

______________________