alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jimmie Saunders,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-04587-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Tautfest Bond, PLLC

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 12/12/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: December 20, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9453 Filed 12/22/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9453 Filed 12/22/17 Page 2 of 2
Order filed August 24, 2021

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 21

- 00303

- CV

____________ RICHARD D. DAVIS L.L.P., A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ; AND RICHARD D. DAVIS, L.L.P., A TEXAS

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP , Appellants

V.

A NDY KNOTT ; BILL GREEN ; DEMPSEY GEAREN ; JIM PHILLIPS ; PHIL BIRKELBACH ; PAUL KATES ; DANNY LANGHORNE ; HANS VAN DER VOORT ; GENE MORTON ; AND STANLEY

HOFFPAUIR , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 506th Judicial District Court

Waller County, Texas Trial Court Cause N o. 08

- 12

- 19600



### O R D E R
Appellant’ s brief was due August 13, 202 1. No brief or motion for extension
of time has been filed.
Unless appellant files a brief with this court on or before September 23,
2021 , the court will dismiss the appeal for want of p rosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM
Panel Consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William A. Jackson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC 

Civil Action No. CV-17-03473-PHX-DGC 

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

To: Freese & Goss PLLC - Birmingham, AL 

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff) 

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. 

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. 

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. 

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/26/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent. 

Date: November 6, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr. 

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party 

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons 

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599) 

Printed Name 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363 

Address 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

E-mail Address 

(404) 322-6155 

Telephone number 

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8820 Filed 11/10/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8820 Filed 11/10/17 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6274
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CURTIS D. DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (CR-99-55) Submitted: April 17, 2003 Decided: April 24, 2003 Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Curtis D. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Timothy Richard Murphy, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2002). 2 PER CURIAM: Curtis D. Davis appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his motion for amendment and correction of the pleadings and denying reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. SeeUnited States v. Davis , No. CR-99-55 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2002; Jan. 21, 2003). We decline to consider Davis’s claim, asserted for the first time on appeal, that he was improperly sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines. * See Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp. , 181 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1999) (issues not raised in district court will generally not be considered on appeal). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-51172

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

REGINALD GENE ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:03-CR-201-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Reginald Gene Adams, federal prisoner # 35858-180, has moved for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this appeal of the denial of his motion for

a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied

Adams leave to appeal IFP and certified that his appeal was not taken in good

faith. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a).

Adams argues that his appeal is not frivolous because the district court

abused its discretion by relying on sentencing factors that were not considered

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 19, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-51172 Document: 00511926678 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/19/2012
No. 11-51172

at his original sentencing, by failing to consider his conduct while incarcerated,

and by not considering the unjustifiable 100-to-1 sentencing ratio for crack

cocaine. Adams has shown no error with respect to the court’s consideration of

his history and characteristics, the nature of the offense, and the need to protect

the public from future crimes, as these are factors that the court was required

to consider in determining whether to grant his motion. See § 3582(c)(2).

Adams did not specifically raise the issue of his postconviction conduct

before the district court, but the district court stated that it had considered the

factors in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in denying the motion. Thus, its consideration of

this factor was implicit. See United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672-73 (5th

Cir. 2009).

Finally, the district court’s consideration of the sentencing disparity for

crack cocaine is implicit in the court’s consideration of his motion for a reduction

of sentence since this disparity is the basis for the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

which resulted in Guidelines Amendment 750, and is the basis for Adams’s

motion. See United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Adams’s argument essentially seeks to make a sentence reduction requested

pursuant to the crack cocaine amendments mandatory, a suggestion that we

have previously rejected. See United States v. Smith, 595 F.3d 1322, 1323 (5th

Cir. 2010).

Adams has not shown that the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion presents

a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP

is denied, and his appeal is dismissed. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

2

Case: 11-51172 Document: 00511926678 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/19/2012
#### Andrew Broadus *v.*James Tuggle et al.

Pleadings — Defective Petition Cured by Necessary Facts Stated in Answer Cause of Action.

Where a petition is not good, for failure to set forth with certainty the particular execution a sheriff had in his hands, of a replevy of property thereunder, failure to take sufficient surety in the bond, etc., it is cured by an answer that specifically describes all the details in connection therewith, and the petition and answer together, will be sufficient 'to constitute a cause of action.

Pleading — Judgment Creditor — Actions—Officers Negligence.

The effort of a judgment creditor to make his debt by causing another execution to issue, after the sheriff failed to execute the former one, will be no defense for the officer to an action against him for his official delinquencies.

APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT.

Opinion of the Oourt by

Judge Peters:

If tHe petition of itself should not be regarded as good, for failing to set forth with certainty what particular execution appellee had in his hands as sheriff of Knox county that was replevied and he failed to take sufficient surety in the replevin bond, or what executions he failed to return, the answer furnishes the remedy, and cures every defect by specifically describing them, and the two together stated all the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action.

In reply to the ingenious argument made by appellee’s counsel that there is no allegation in the petition that the defendants had no property in the county liable to the execution, by reference ’ to the answer it will be found to supply the omission *beautifully*as follows:

Defendant says, “That during the time he had said ‘execution’ (referring to the last one which issued on the replevin bond and was placed in his hands) he notified John G. Eve, the attorney for the plaintiff, that he had the same, and told him that if he levied it on the property of the defendants in the execution he could get no bidders, and wanted said attorney to go and bid for the same, and he refused and said he did not want the property, and in *353consequence thereof he did not make the levy and return the same.”

*Burnam, for appellant.*

*James, for appellee.*

And in another paragraph of the answer it is said the defendant had sufficient property to make the debt when the execution was in the hands of King, the successor of Tuggle, as sheriff of Knox county.

The efforts of appellant to make his debt out of the defendants in the execution by causing others to issue after appellee failed to make it, found no defense to the action against appellee for his official delinquencies while he had the execution in his hands. And the instruction asked for by him should have been overruled.

Wherefore, the judgment is *reversed,*and the cause remanded, with instructions to-award a new trial and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, either party, or both, should be permitted to amend their pleadings, if they ask to do so within proper time.
Exhibit 8


                                  SUBSIDIARIES



             Companies                          Jurisdiction of       Name
                                                 Organization

Ultragaz Participacoes S.A                         Sao Paulo        Ultragaz

     Cia. Ultragaz S.A                             Sao Paulo        Ultragaz

     Bahiana distribuidora de Gas Ltda             Sao Paulo        Brasilgas

     Utingas Armazenadora S.A                      Sao Paulo        Utingas

Ultraquimica Participacoes S.A                     Sao Paulo        Ultraquimica

     Ultraquimica Florestal Ltda                   Sao Paulo        Ultraquimica

     Melamina Ultra S.A Industria Quimica            Bahia          Melamina

     Oleoquimica do Nordeste Ltda.                   Bahia          Oleoquimica

     Oxiteno S.A Industria e Comercio              Sao Paulo        Oxiteno

         Oxiteno Overseas Co.                    Ilhas Virgens      Oxiteno
                                                  Britanicas

         Camacari Renovada S.A                     Sao Paulo        Camacari
                                                                    Renovada

         Oxiteno Nordeste S.A Ind e Com.             Bahia          Oxiteno

Ultracargo Participacoes Ltda                      Sao Paulo        Ultracargo

     Transultra S.A. Arm. e Transp. Espec.         Sao Paulo        Transultra

     Terminal Quimico de Aratu S.A - Teq.            Bahia          Tequimar

Ultratecno Participacoes Ltda                      Sao Paulo        Ultratecno

Ultradata S/C Ltda                                 Sao Paulo        Ultradata

Imaven Imoveis e Agropecuaria Ltda                 Sao Paulo        Imaven

     Imaven Importadora e Exportadora Ltda         Sao Paulo        Imaven
No. 15,497.

#### Dorsey *v.*The State.

Filed Oct. 10, 1890.

From the Clark Circuit Court.

*J. K. Marsh*and *A. Dowling,*for appellant.

*L. T. Miehener,*Attorney General, *G. H. Voight,*Prosecuting Attorney, and *J. B. Gillett,*for the State.

Elliott, J.

— Affirmed upon the authority of *Dugan*v. *Slate, ante,*p. 130.
#### A. B. Norwood et al *v.*W. H. Robinson.

Husband and Wife — Vountary Conveyance — Void as to Subsisting Debts.

A subsisting debt, founded on a valuable consideration, is held to be sufficient to authorize the cancellation of a deed from a husband to wife, made after the creation of the debt.

APPEAL PROM JEPPERSON CIRCUIT COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION.

September 29, 1868.

Brown, *for appellant.*

*Harrison*& Bennett, *for appellee.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Peters:

It appears in the supplemental record that the judgment of the 22nd of September, 1865, and from which this appeal is prosecuted, as the memorandum on the original record of counsel shows, was after its rendition set aside, and all proceedings under it. A summons was then sued out against the infant and executed on her defendant, and a guardian *ad litem*then regularly appointed, who filed an answer and the final decree pronounced the 27th of October, 1866, from which there seem in fact to be no appeal.

But it is deemed best to finally dispose of this case now as it may be, or must have been the intention of counsel to have this last decree reviewed.

The alleged error that final judgment was rendered against the infant defendant before service of process, as already noticed, was a misconception of the proceedings.

The commissioner’s report of the indebtedness of A. B. Nor-wood to appellee is fully sustained by the proof, and presents the correct state of the accounts between the parties.

The deed of A. B. Norwood to his wife, and daughter, was subsequent in date to the creation of the debt of $450, it was a subsisting debt, founded on a valuable consideration at, and before the making of said deed, and as it was merely voluntary, it was void under the statute as to prior creditors, hence the court below properly subjected the house and lot to the payment to that as well as the debts for which the mortgage was executed. Perceiving, therefore, no error in the judgment, the same is affirmed.
Exhibit 24.1

POWER OF ATTORNEY    FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2003

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that each person whose signature appears below constitutes and appoints Robert B. Goergen, Robert H. Barghaus and Bruce D.
Kreiger, and each of them, until July 31, 2003, his or her true and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents, with full power of substitution and revocation, for him or her and in his or her name, place
and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the Form 10-K Annual Report of Blyth, Inc. for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2003, and any amendments thereto, and to file the same with all exhibits
thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done, as fully to all intents and purposes as he or she might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact
and agents may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

|Name                                    |  | Title                                                                                   |  | Date         
|--------------------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | -------------
|/s/ROBERT B. GOERGENRobert B. Goergen   |  | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President, Director (Principal Executive Officer) |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/ROBER H. BARGHAUSRobert H. Barghaus  |  | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/ROGER A. ANDERSONRoger A. Anderson   |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/JOHN W. BURKHARTJohn W. Burkhart     |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/PAMELA M. GOERGENPamela M. Goergen   |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/NEAL I. GOLDMANNeal I. Goldman       |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/PHILIP GREERPhilip Greer             |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/CAROL J. HOCHMANCarol J. Hochman     |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/JOHN E. PRESCHLACKJohn E. Preschlack |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003
|/s/HOWARD E. ROSEHoward E. Rose         |  | Director                                                                                |  | April 1, 2003

---

QuickLinks
#### Jovan Rodriguez, Respondent, v Booth Memorial Medical Center et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[789 NYS2d 235]

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, (1) the defendant Booth Memorial Medical Center separately appeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of the same order as denied that branch of its cross motion which was to preclude the plaintiff from offering certain expert testimony at trial, and (2) the defendant Maria Finley appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.), dated September 29, 2003, as granted the plaintiff’s motion to restore the action to the trial calendar and denied *689those branches of her cross motion which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her or to preclude the plaintiff from offering certain expert testimony at trial.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

When a stipulation between parties is clear and unambiguous on its face, it will be enforced according to its terms and without resort to extrinsic evidence *(see Greenfield v Philles Records,*98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; *W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri,*77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]; *Charter Realty & Dev. Corp. v New Roc Assoc., 293*AD2d 438 [2002]). Here, the stipulation clearly and unambiguously provided that the defendants would not oppose a motion by the plaintiff to restore the case to the trial calendar. Contrary to the contention of the defendant Maria Finley, there was nothing in the language of the stipulation which required restoration of the action by a certain date or conditioned restoration upon the service of a “proper” expert disclosure. Furthermore, the stipulation was not unconscionable *(see Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63 [1977]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellants’ respective cross motions which were to preclude the plaintiff’s expert from testifying at trial to certain alleged departures from care. The plaintiff’s bill of particulars, which stated that the defendants failed to diagnose chorioamnionitis and that the plaintiff sustained, inter alia, cerebral palsy as a result of the defendants’ negligence, was sufficient to alert the appellants to the plaintiffs theory of liability and his injuries *(see Rivera v County of Suffolk,*290 AD2d 430 [2002]). Krausman, J.P., Luciano, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.