IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 17, 2019 Session

J. PHILIP HARBER v. MARGUERITA ANNETTE DIXON, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Anderson County

No. 14CH6451 M. Nichole Cantrell, Chancellor

No. E2019-00028-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from an acrimonious dispute between former friends over real 

property. William M. Pruitt and his wife Shirley J. Pruitt (“the Pruitts,” or “Mr. Pruitt”

and “Mrs. Pruitt”) live in a house next to three parcels of land once owned variously by 

Mr. Pruitt’s stepfather and mother, both of whom died intestate. J. Philip Harber (“Mr. 

Harber”), former attorney for the Pruitts, paid Mr. Pruitt’s fellow heirs for quitclaim 

deeds with the aim of acquiring their interests in the subject parcels. Mr. Harber then 

filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to 

determine the interests of the parties and sell the three parcels. The Trial Court found in 

favor of Mr. Harber and ordered a partition by sale for division. The Pruitts appealed to 

this Court. On appeal, the Pruitts rely on several theories to argue that Mr. Harber never 

acquired an interest in the land. The Pruitts argue further that, even if Mr. Harber 

acquired an interest, the Trial Court should have applied the doctrine of unclean hands to 

deny him his requested relief because he sued them out of spite. We find and hold, inter 

alia, that Mr. Pruitt is but one of many heirs to his deceased parents’ land; that the other 

heirs never lost their interests in the land; and, that the other heirs were at liberty to sell 

their interests in the land to Mr. Harber, which they did. Although there is considerable 

evidence that Mr. Harber was motivated by spite in bringing this action, that alone does 

not compel application of the unclean hands doctrine, particularly as fraud is not alleged. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Gerald L. Gulley, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William M. Pruitt.

12/12/2019
-2-

Philip R. Crye, Jr., Clinton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shirley J. Pruitt.

Mark N. Foster, Madisonville, Kentucky, for the appellants.

J. Philip Harber, pro se appellee.

OPINION

Background

Mr. Harber and the Pruitts, formerly friends for many years, are neighbors with a 

long and tangled history. Mr. Pruitt is a mechanic and tow truck driver. Mr. Harber, a 

lawyer and businessman, represented the Pruitts in various legal matters over the years. 

The parties’ friendship collapsed in 2007. In the feud that followed, three parcels of land 

historically belonging to Mr. Pruitt’s family came to the forefront. While the Pruitts 

contend that they own the subject parcels solely, the controversy over who else may have 

an interest in the land—and thus a right to sell that interest—is at the center of this 

appeal. A review of the parcels is necessary.

The Pruitts live in Clinton, Tennessee. The properties at issue are parcels 24, 26, 

and 36. The Pruitts’ home is located on parcel 24.01, a small lot that once was a part of 

parcel 24. Parcel 36 was owned solely by J.R. Harris, Mr. Pruitt’s stepfather. Parcels 24 

and 26 were owned by both J.R. Harris and his wife Juanita Harris, Mr. Pruitt’s mother. 

J.R. Harris died in 1992, and Juanita Harris in 2003. Both died intestate. The last 

recorded deeds for the parcels are as follows: (1) Parcel 26: a quitclaim deed dated 

September 11, 1980 from Baby Boy Harris to J.R. and Juanita Harris; (2) Parcel 24: a 

quitclaim deed dated December 15, 1982 from Joe E. Magill and Elizabeth Ann Magill to 

J.R. and Juanita Harris; and, (3) Parcel 36: a warranty deed dated July 27, 1960 from 

John and Laura Young to J.R. Harris. Parcel 24.01 was conveyed to the Pruitts from J.R.

and Juanita Harris by warranty deed dated November 11, 1983. Mr. Pruitt purportedly 

purchased parcel 24 for $3,000 in 1983. In 1999, Mr. Pruitt borrowed $61,200 secured 

by his home on parcel 24.01 and used some of the money, again purportedly, to pay his 

mother $10,000 apiece for parcels 36 and 26. No deeds were exchanged in these 

transactions, however. Parcel 26 was the site of an old house once occupied by J.R. and 

Juanita Harris. The Pruitts used parcel 36 as a garden. In 1984, Mr. Pruitt moved his 

mother to his house on parcel 24.01. The old house on parcel 26 remained standing but 

empty for 15 years until Mr. Pruitt demolished it in 1999.

Upon J.R. Harris’s death in 1992, title to parcel 36 vested in his heirs, including 

Juanita Harris but also his four children, Donna Leigh Harris Sanders, John Robert 

Harris, Beulah Harris Pannell, and Eugene Rod Harris. Title to parcels 24 and 26 vested 
-3-

solely in Juanita Harris as surviving tenant by the entirety. Juanita Harris had nine 

children, six of whom were living at the time of the proceedings below. In addition to 

Mr. Pruitt himself, these living children of Juanita Harris included Mary Ann Pruitt, Babe 

Ruth Pruitt, Donna Lee Harris Sanders, John Robert Harris, and Beulah Harris Pannell. 

Three of Juanita Harris’s children are deceased. They are Charles William Washington, 

who died before his mother; Bobby Washington, who died before his mother; and, 

Eugene Rod Harris, who died after his mother. Charles William Washington had the 

following children: (1) Rodney Lee Washington, (2) Joseph Franklin Washington, (3) 

Charlotte Denise Washington, (4) Charles William Washington, Jr., (5) Anna Marie 

Bunn, (6) Robert Anthony Washington, (7) Samantha Jo Washington, and (8) Charles 

Adrian Washington. Bobby Washington had the following six children: (1) Marguerita 

Annette Dixon, (2) Bobbie Yvonne Washington Rowe, (3) Shenea Washington, (4) Gail 

Washington, (5) Kristie Leavette Washington, and (6) Mable Jeanette Washington 

Moore. Gail Washington is deceased. Eugene Rod Harris was married to Patty Harris 

when he died. Eugene Rod Harris had one child, Patrick Harris. 

In the early years of the 21st century, the Pruitts were experiencing tax problems. 

In 2004, parcels 24, 26, and 36 were sold because of delinquent taxes. Mr. Pruitt later 

paid to redeem the parcels. The order of redemption for parcel 36 stated: “the property 

shall be considered redeemed by William M. Pruitt, heir to J.R. Harris, and title is thereby 

restored to him as of the date of this order [November 8, 2005].” In turn, the order of 

redemption for parcel 24 stated: “The property shall be considered redeemed by J.R. 

Harris and Juanita Harris, and title is thereby restored to them as of the date of this order 

[November 1, 2005].” Finally, the order of redemption for parcel 26 stated: “the property 

shall be considered redeemed by J.R. Harris and Juanita Harris, and title is thereby 

restored to them as of the date of this order [November 1, 2005].” At one point, the 

Pruitts’ home was foreclosed on. In 2006, Mr. Pruitt consulted with his then-friend and 

attorney, Mr. Harber, regarding parcels 24, 26 and 36. When they were temporarily 

evicted from their home on parcel 24.01, the Pruitts built a small house on parcel 26 to 

live in. Mr. Pruitt later repurchased his property, parcel 24.01, and moved back home. 

In 2007, Mr. Harber’s friendship with the Pruitts fell apart completely. While the 

incident causing the split was not explored in depth at trial, as the Trial Court deemed it 

irrelevant, it involved Mr. Harber’s dog getting killed. Mr. Harber blamed Mr. Pruitt. 

The next day, Mr. Harber left Mr. Pruitt a package containing his case files with a note 

stating: “Bill: I will NOT represent you again—EVER. Don’t come on my property or 

call me again—EVER! You’re on your own.” Tensions continued to escalate as time 

passed. Mr. Harber allegedly made some defamatory statements about Mr. Pruitt’s 

business practices. In 2012, Mr. Pruitt filed a civil warrant for defamation against Mr. 

Harber in general sessions court. In January 2013, the defamation case was dismissed,

and no appeal was taken. 
-4-

After the defamation case, the feud escalated further still. Beginning in February

2013, Mr. Harber obtained 14 quitclaim deeds from people he believed were members of 

Mr. Pruitt’s family and heirs of Juanita Harris. The deeds describe parcels 24, 26, and 

36. Mr. Harber paid cash to each signer. Mr. Harber traveled around as far as southwest 

Virginia to obtain these quitclaim deeds. In June 2014, Mr. Harber filed a petition in the 

Trial Court against the Pruitts, and anyone else he believed had an interest in the land,

seeking the appointment of a special master to determine the respective interests of the 

parties in the three parcels and to sell the parcels. Mr. Pruitt filed an answer asserting

that Mr. Harber failed to acquire an interest in the land through the quitclaim deeds. Mr. 

Pruitt also raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands. Mrs. Pruitt filed her own 

separate answer, as well as a counterclaim. Mrs. Pruitt relied upon the statute of 

limitations found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-101, et seq. to contend that the quitclaim 

deeds were champertous and void pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-4-201, et seq. In her 

counterclaim, Mrs. Pruitt asserted that the quitclaim deeds were void and should be 

stricken on grounds of adverse possession and ouster.

The matter was bifurcated. First, in November 2016, a hearing was held on the 

Pruitts’ affirmative defense of unclean hands. Mr. Harber testified that he undertook his 

quest for the quitclaim deeds because he wanted to prevent development on a vacant lot 

near his home. The Pruitts pressed Mr. Harber further on his motivations in filing the 

lawsuit. Mr. Harber was asked why, in February 2013, he posted copies of the deeds on 

Mrs. Pruitt’s Facebook page and wrote: “What are these? Are you moving?” Mr. Harber 

testified:

Q. Why did you write in the Facebook message to Shirley Pruitt; are you 

moving?

A. Because I just did. I just did. I don’t have a reason.

Q. That is your honest answer sitting here that you had no reason, your 

fingers just tripped over those letters on the keyboard?

A. That is your characterization.

Q. I mean, the answer is you have no excusable reason for having done it 

but you were angry, is that right?

A. Sure, I was angry at them.

A number of Mr. Pruitt’s family members testified to the interactions they had 

with Mr. Harber. Mr. Harber had approached them and offered them money for 

quitclaim deeds, which they signed. The thrust of the relatives’ testimony, at this hearing 

and subsequent ones, was that they did not know or believe they had any interest in the 

subject parcels. They just went along with the transaction. 
-5-

Mr. Pruitt also was a witness, and he testified as to his 2006 discussions with Mr. 

Harber regarding the subject parcels: 

Q. But during your discussion with Mr. Harber, what did he say about your 

brothers and sisters’ interest in the property?

A. That’s when he was telling me about the legal claim and claim. He said, 

they can claim it but they got to have a legal claim which they do not have. 

He said, did they offer to pay you your money back. I said, no. He said, 

did you make them aware. I said, yes, I called my sister and I told her, I 

said, look, we lost our property, I said, even though I lost it as well. If you 

all want to claim interest in it, you all can reimburse me my money and we 

can all have a legal claim in it again.

Q. That money you paid after the tax sale; was that your money or 

everybody’s money?

A. My money.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mr. Harber and declined to apply the unclean 

hands doctrine. In its November 2016 order, the Trial Court stated, in part:

The Court notes that no one is alleging that Petitioner’s transactions 

with other heirs were fraudulent in nature. Many of the persons testifying 

at the hearing in this matter where those who had participated in the 

transactions for the purchase of their interest in the real property by Mr. 

Harber. None of these heirs have stepped forward to declare that these 

transactions needed to be set aside because they were fraudulent in nature. 

The Court concludes that there has been no proof offered to show that 

Petitioner committed any fraud or wrongdoing in the present litigation 

before the Court related to the transactions by which he obtained in lots 

#24, #26 and #36.

***

The Court concludes that the Respondents are not entitled to the 

application of doctrine of unclean hands as an affirmative defense in the 

action. The Court finds that there has been no fraudulent action or 

misconduct on the part of the Petitioner that rises to the level to warrant the 

application of the maxim of unclean hands. The anger that exists between 

the parties is simply not sufficient proof of unclean hands. Any other 

alleged misconduct by the Petitioner is not related to the cause of action 

that is currently before the court. The Court also concludes there has been 

no proof of damages by the Respondents. Therefore, the Court concludes
-6-

that the Respondents are not entitled to relief based on their defense of 

unclean hands.

The next phase of trial was conducted in July of 2017 and it concerned the Pruitts’ 

theories of title by prescription, adverse possession based on color of title for at least 

seven years, common law adverse possession of twenty years, and champerty. Mr. Pruitt 

took the stand and testified that his relatives knew the land was his. In 1999, he 

discussed the issue with his sisters Mary Ann and Donna and his brother Rod. Mr. Pruitt 

stated that he had paid the taxes on the subject parcels since 1992. Mr. Pruitt testified 

that around the time he faced foreclosure, he consulted with Mr. Harber about ownership 

of the property, especially parcel 26. According to Mr. Pruitt, Mr. Harber asked him if 

any family members had helped pay taxes on the parcels. Mr. Pruitt told Mr. Harber they

had not. Mr. Pruitt testified that Mr. Harber then stated: “well, technically it’s yours.” 

When Mr. Harber came to the stand, he testified: “I never discussed the title of—[Mr. 

Pruitt’s] chain of title to his property. I never looked at the title to any of these properties 

until 2013—or late 2012, I guess.” After overruling a motion by the Pruitts for a directed 

verdict, the Trial Court ruled that because evidence of a previously unknown heir had 

emerged and the Guardian ad Litem was not present, the hearing would have to be

continued to a later date. 

In April 2018, the hearing resumed. Mrs. Pruitt took the stand. Mrs. Pruitt, age 

59, testified that she had lived at her home near the disputed land with her husband for 

approximately 40 years. Since Juanita Harris died, no one else lived there other than the 

Pruitts and their children and grandchildren. Mrs. Pruitt testified that in the 40 years she 

has lived there, no family member has ever challenged her or her husband’s right to the 

property. Mrs. Pruitt stated that neither she nor her husband ever sought permission from 

any family member to build anything on the subject parcels. 

Another potential heir, Quenelle T. Frazier (“Mr. Frazier”), testified. Mr. Frazier, 

age 29, was unsure exactly how he was related to Mr. Pruitt, but he had been served with 

an amended petition. Mr. Harber had asked him to sign a quitclaim deed but he refused

to do so. Mr. Frazier did not claim any of the land, which he had last seen when he was 

much younger. 

Mr. Pruitt testified. Mr. Pruitt stated that he had lived on the property since 1958. 

In 2005, Mr. Pruitt learned that the subject parcels had been sold at a tax sale because of 

delinquent taxes. Mr. Pruitt paid to redeem the parcels. On cross-examination, Mr. Pruitt 

was asked about the level of contact he had with his family over the years, and whether 

he had held out that he owned the land exclusively:
-7-

Q. Do you recall saying in your deposition that you-all lost it? Not “you” 

lost the property; “you-all” lost the property? You told Mary Ann, “Look 

here, we all lost the property. If you want to claim an interest in it, I’m 

trying to get it back.”

A. Well, let me clarify that. Based on the way it was sold in my mother and 

them’s name, yes, that would show there. But in reality I owned it. I just 

didn’t get it taken out of my parents’ name.

Q. Okay. Did you have a written contract with your parents to purchase 

this property?

A. A written contract?

Q. Written contract?

A. Why should I?

Q. Well, did you or didn’t you?

A. No. I put my house up for collateral to get the old house dozed down in 

’99 and made a loan for $61,000. And what -- the agreement was between 

me and my mother.

Q. Okay. But you didn’t have a written contract?

A. Like I said, I didn’t need one.

Q. Okay.

A. We only had a verbal contract.

Q. Did you ever record a deed?

A. The $61,000 deed, yes, trust deed.

Q. That’s a trust deed. Did you ever record a warranty deed, a deed of 

ownership? You just -- all you have is a trust deed to show?

A. I paid the money, didn’t I?

Q. I don’t know if you did or not.

A. Okay, then.

***

Q. Do you recall taking the deposition back in December across the street --

A. Yes, I do.

Q. -- at Mr. Pruitt’s [sic] office, and I asked you questions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. I’ll start at Page 22, Line 5. I asked you “How often do you see 

your family?” You answered “Not often.”

A. That’s correct; I did.

Q. Okay. And then I went through several of the people and asked you 

when you had seen them. I asked you when the last time you’d seen 

Ronnie Lee Washington, and you said it’d been years; is that correct?

A. That’s correct.
-8-

***

Q. Okay. I asked you -- do you recall me asking about Charlotte Denise 

Washington?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And I asked you if you had seen or talked to her since your mother --

you said no. And then you said -- I asked you since your mother’s death. 

You said about two times. I asked you if you discussed the lawsuit with 

her. You said no, and I asked if you discussed the property with her, and 

you said when you first got the deed. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. In fact, most of these people had said you didn’t discuss any of these --

this property with them until the deed, until I -- until I had a deed, and then 

you started making contact to them; is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Or maybe some of them contacted you.

A. They contacted me.

Q. You started having contact with them.

MR. HARBER: That’s all I want to ask him, your Honor.

After this second round of hearings, the Trial Court again ruled in favor of Mr. 

Harber. The Trial Court rejected each of the Pruitts’ theories as to their sole ownership 

of the subject parcels. In its May 2018 order, the Trial Court stated, in part:

[Adverse Possession]

Shirley Pruitt claims that she has had possession for a period of 

twenty years. However from January 1, 2003 until this suit was brought on 

June 20, 2014 does not amount to the necessary period of 20 years and 

therefore the Respondent Shirley Pruitt has failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence a twenty year period of adverse possession.

***

By the testimony of William Pruitt it is clear to this court that there 

was little contact between the Pruitt’s and the other cotenants such that the 

court concludes that there was never notice to the other cotenants sufficient 

to establish an ouster of the other cotenants. There was no notice given to 

the other cotenants that they were excluded from possession.

Several other heirs testified at trial that they did not believe they had 

any interest in the property and that the property in their opinion belonged 
-9-

to William and Shirley Pruitt, this is not demonstrative of an actual ouster. 

Ignorance and or lack of notice of one’s right of entry and possession for 

the three lots does not amount to an ouster. Specifically, there was 

testimony that neither William nor Shirley Pruitt ever told them “to get off 

their land.” The testimony of those other heirs was that it was their belief 

that the property belonged to William and Shirley Pruitt, is more in line 

with permissive use and not actual ouster between cotenants. This also 

brings the adverse nature of the Pruitt’s possession into question if some of 

the other cotenants in common had given their implied permission for the 

Pruitts to use the three lots. 

For these reasons this court concludes that the Respondent, Shirley 

Pruitt has failed to meet her burden of proof by clear and convincing 

evidence that there has been adverse possession by William and Shirley 

Pruitt under the common law theory of uninterrupted and continuous 

possession of the land for twenty years and that the possession was (1) 

actual and exclusive (2) open, visible and notorious (3) continuous and 

peaceable (4) hostile and adverse.

***

[Color of Title, Seven Years]

The court has considered all the documents which were brought 

forth during trial which might create color of title. The court would also 

note again that Mr. Pruitt continues to state that he owned all of lot 24, 

alleging he purchased it from his mother, Juanita Harris in 1999. However 

there is no deed or any other writing transferring lot 24 to Mr. William 

Pruitt or Shirley Pruitt. Therefore this alleged purchase does not qualify as 

color of title.

The Pruitts point to the November 11th, 1983 [deed] which 

transferred lot 24.01 to William M. Pruitt and Shirley Pruitt from J.R. 

Harris and wife Juanita Harris to show color of title. (Exhibit 3) This deed 

transferred a small section of lot 24 to the Pruitts but retained the remainder 

of lot 24 in the name of J.R. Harris and wife Juanita Harris. The Pruitts 

argue that the clause in the deed which reads “This being the same property 

conveyed to J.R. Harris and wife, Juanita Harris from Joe E. McGill and 

Elizabeth Ann Magill, his wife by deed date December 15, 1982, of record 

in Deed Book X page 15, 334, in the Register’s Office for Anderson 

County, Tennessee” creates color of title. This court rejects that argument 

as the description of the property given in the deed makes it absolutely 
-10-

clear that this is not a conveyance of the entire Lot 24, but instead a small 

portion of Lot 24 which became lot 24.01.

The Pruitts also point to a series of Trust deeds that they execute to 

secure a loan as proof of color of title. All of the trust deeds refer to lot 

24.01, and therefore cannot be said to create color of title for any other lot. 

The only deed that contained an error was the Special Limited Warranty 

Deed executed by Econohomes, LLC to William Pruitt registered on 

3/24/2008 which listed lot 24 in the deed; however a corrective deed was 

registered on 12/08/2008 correcting the lot number to reflect lot 24.01. 

Therefore any color of title the Pruitts may have claimed under this 

Warranty Deed could no longer be claimed once the correction deed was 

issued and registered. (Exhibits 7 and 20) Therefore this court concludes 

that these deeds do not create color of title upon which the Pruitts may 

assert a defense or a claim of title by adverse possession.

Finally [the] Pruitts assert that color of title was created when Mr. 

William Pruitt redeemed the three lots following a delinquent tax sale of all 

the lots in question as proof of color of title. As discussed in detail above 

all three lots were sold at a delinquent tax sale in 2004. The order 

confirming sale was entered on October 25th, 2004 confirming the sale of 

Lots 24, 26 and 36. (Exhibit 15) The order confirming the sale amounted to 

a break in any claim of adverse possession by color of title prior to that 

date. After the sale the only right that belonged to the cotenants in common 

was the right of redemption.

***

Finding No document that creates color of title, this court concludes 

the Respondent Shirley Pruitt has failed to meet her burden of clear and 

convincing evidence and that there is no basis for title to be conveyed to 

William and Shirley Pruitt pursuant to T.C.A. §28-2-105. In addition this 

court concludes that the Respond[ent] Shirley Pruitt has fail[ed] to meet her 

burden of clear and convincing evidence to assert the affirmative defense of 

adverse possession under T.C.A. §28-2-102 and §28-2-103.

***

[Title by Prescription]

This court finds that the Pruitts claim of title by prescription fails 

because there is no twenty year period of time that the Pruitts can claim 

exclusive and uninterrupted possession. As was discussed above, the 
-11-

earliest time in which the Respondent Shirley Pruitt could begin to claim 

possession of the property in question was upon the death of Juanita Pruitt 

on January 1, 2003. Juanita Harris continued to reside at 531 Broad Street, 

the street address of the property in question, until her death and therefore 

retained her possessory rights until her death. Juanita Pruitt lived on the 

property with her son and daughter and there is no proof offered that 

William Pruitt and Shirley Pruitt did not have permission of Juanita Pruitt 

to reside on the property with her until her death. William Pruitt and 

Shirley Pruitt cannot claim that their possession of the land at any time 

prior to the death of Juanita Pruitt on January 1, 2003 was exclusive as 

Juanita Harris was in possession of the property.

***

Secondly, the Pruitts have failed to show that none of the cotenants 

were not under a disability to asse[r]t their rights to the property during this 

time frame. Disability in this case can include the disability of minority 

during the requisite twenty year period of time. One of the cotenants that 

testified on the second day of trial was Quenelle T. Frazier. His testimony 

was brief but included his statement that he was 29 years old. That in and 

of itself is sufficient to show that at least one of the tenants in common had 

the disability of minority during some portion of the requisite twenty years 

period of time.

Thus this court concludes that the respondents, William and Shirley 

Pruitt have failed to prove two of the essential elements of title by 

prescription.

***

[Champerty]

By the testimony of William Pruitt it is clear to this court that there 

was little contact between the Pruitt’s and the other cotenants such that the 

court concludes that there was never notice to the other cotenants sufficient 

to establish an ouster of the other cotenants. There was no notice given to 

the other cotenants that they were excluded from possession. Several other 

several heirs testified at trial that they did not believe they had any interest 

in the property and that the property in their opinion belonged to William 

and Shirley Pruitt. This is not demonstrative of an actual ouster. Ignorance 

and or lack of notice of one’s right of entry and possession for the three lots 

does not amount to an ouster. The testimony of those other heirs was that it 
-12-

was their belief that the property belonged to William and Shirley Pruitt, is 

more in line with permissive use and not actual ouster between cotenants. 

This also brings the adverse nature of the Pruitt’s possession into question 

if some of the other cotenants in common had given their implied 

permission for the Pruitts to use the three lots.

Therefore this court concludes that the deeds conveying interest in 

the real property to Phillip Harber are not void due to the Champertous 

statutes as the Pruitt’s possession of the property at the time of the deeds 

was not adverse to the other tenants in common by descent as there was no 

action taken that can amount to an ouster of the other cotenants.

***

The land cannot feasibly be partitioned in kind and therefore, the 

property must be partitioned by sale.

As a final matter below, the Trial Court found it necessary to determine whether 

additional proof was necessary regarding certain other heirs. In December 2018, the 

Trial Court entered its final order, stating as relevant: “The prior order entered on May 8, 

2018 shall be amended to provide[] that those parts of the order indicating that additional 

proof was necessary regarding the interests of Rod Harris and Charles Washington are 

deleted, there being, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient evidence previously in the 

record regarding the succession of their interests in the property.” The Pruitts timely 

appealed to this Court.

Discussion

We restate the issues the Pruitts raise on appeal as follows: 1) whether the Trial 

Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of title by prescription; 2) whether the Trial 

Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of adverse possession based on color of title for 

at least seven years; 3) whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of 

common law adverse possession; 4) whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ 

claim of champerty; and, 5) whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of 

unclean hands.

Our review is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of 

correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the 

evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 

(Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no 

presumption of correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 

S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).
-13-

We first address whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of title 

by prescription. The Pruitts raise this issue with respect to parcel 36 only. In their 

appellate brief, the Pruitts summarize their argument on this issue:

(a) first, the prescriptive period did not begin on the death of Juanita Harris 

on January 1, 2003, as found by the Chancellor, but rather on January 16, 

1992, when J.R. Harris died; and

(b) second, even if Quenelle T. Frazier held an interest in the property and 

was under the disability of minority during the prescriptive period—a fact 

not established by the record—then his disability does not strengthen the 

plaintiff’s title for the simple reason that Mr. Frazier never signed a 

quitclaim deed.

Our Supreme Court has identified the three elements to title by prescription as 

follows: 

(a) The prescriptive holder must have been in exclusive and uninterrupted 

possession of the land for a period of twenty years or more, claiming the 

land as his own without any accounting to his cotenants[;] 

(b) The prescriptive holder’s cotenants must have been under no disability 

to assert their rights during the prescriptive period of twenty years[; and] 

(c) The prescriptive holder’s occupancy must have been without the 

permission, actual or implied, of the other cotenants.

Roberts v. Bailey, 470 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting England v. England, No. 

E2011-02094-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4503434, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012), 

Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied Feb. 13, 2013). Unlike the doctrine of adverse 

possession, title by prescription does not require the actual ouster of cotenants. Id. at 41. 

As to what constitutes ouster, “[a]n ouster does not necessarily mean a physical expulsion 

of one party by another, but it requires the party claiming adversely to perform some act 

that makes it clear to his cotenant that she is being excluded from ownership.” Nesmith v. 

Alsup, No. 01-A-01-9809-CH00509, 1999 WL 557620, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 

1999), no appl. perm. appeal filed.

The Pruitts argue that when J.R. Harris died in 1992, the prescriptive period began 

to run as to parcel 36 against the other heirs of J.R. Harris. Mr. Harber acquired the 

quitclaim deeds in 2013, more than twenty years after Juanita Harris and the Pruitts 

began their exclusive possession. The Pruitts assert that Juanita Harris’s exclusive 

possession may be tacked on to that of the Pruitts, which began with Juanita Harris’s 

death in 2003, to reach the necessary twenty years. Successive possessory periods may 

indeed be tacked on for purposes of title by prescription. Roberts, 470 S.W.3d at 40
-14-

(agreeing with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the parents’ possession of the 

subject tract could be tacked onto their children’s subsequent possession). Nevertheless, 

it is unclear that Juanita Harris’s possession ever was “exclusive.” There is no evidence 

that she excluded, or failed to account to, any other cotenant.

Even if we accept the Pruitts’ contention that the prescriptive period began in 

1992, the third element of title by prescription, although not addressed by the Trial Court,

requires that the prescriptive holder’s occupancy be without the actual or implied 

permission of the cotenants. The Pruitts state that “[Mr. Harber] presented no proof of 

permission or open indulgence of Mr. and Mrs. Pruitts’ possession in rebuttal to the 

presumption.” However, The Trial Court found in its May 2018 order that “there is no 

proof offered that William Pruitt and Shirley Pruitt did not have permission of Juanita 

Pruitt to reside on the property with her until her death.” The Trial Court found 

elsewhere in its order that “[t]he testimony of those other heirs was that it was their belief 

that the property belonged to William and Shirley Pruitt, is more in line with permissive 

use. . . .” We agree with the Trial Court’s characterization of the Pruitts’ occupancy of 

the disputed property. That the Pruitts once tended a garden on parcel 36 is not 

inconsistent with their cotenancy with the other heirs.

Regarding disability of other cotenants, the Trial Court found that Mr. Frazier, the 

29-year old named in the amended petition as an heir of Juanita Harris via the deceased 

Gail Washington, was of minority age during the prescriptive period. The Trial Court 

correctly found that Mr. Frazier’s being 29 at the 2018 hearing “in and of itself is 

sufficient to show that at least one of the tenants in common had the disability of minority 

during some portion of the requisite twenty years period of time.” The Pruitts argue that 

Mr. Frazier’s alleged disability is irrelevant because he never signed a quitclaim deed. 

However, the prescriptive period could not run while Mr. Frazier remained legally 

incompetent to assert his interest whether Mr. Harber ever obtained a quitclaim deed 

from Mr. Frazier or not. Thus, Mr. Frazier’s age was relevant to an essential element of 

the Pruitts’ claim. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion that the Pruitts failed to 

establish title by prescription to parcel 36.

 

We next address whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of 

adverse possession based on color of title for at least seven years. As with the previous 

issue, the Pruitts make this argument with respect to parcel 36 only. The Pruitts contend

that the governing seven year statute of limitations found at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-

101 and 102 “began to run when the order of redemption [as to parcel 36] was recorded 

on December 8, 2005 and extinguished the interests of the other heirs of Juanita Harris in 

parcel 36 seven years later, before the quitclaim deeds were signed in February 2013.” 

Color of title has been defined as “‘something in writing which at face value, professes to 

pass title but which does not do it, either for want of title in the person making it or from 
-15-

the defective mode of the conveyance that is used.’” Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. 

Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 376 n. 3 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting 10 Thompson on Real Property § 

87.12, at 145).

This issue requires us to consider the effect a cotenant’s redemption of property 

sold at a tax sale has on other cotenants. As discussed by this Court:

In holding that the Clerk & Master was not authorized to give the 

plaintiff a deed conveying a fee simple title, we rely, in part, upon a 

doctrine that appears to have been first pronounced by the Supreme Court 

in the case of Tisdale v. Tisdale, 34 Tenn. 596, 599 (1855). That doctrine 

was described in a later case as providing that tenants in common “cannot 

buy in the common property at a tax sale, or foreclosure sale, or buy in an 

outstanding title or other overhead claim, except for the benefit of all.” 

State v. Allen, 27 Tenn. App. 357, 181 S.W.2d 375, 376 (1944) (quoting 

Perkins v. Johnson, 178 Tenn. 498, 160 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1942)). It 

logically follows from the Tisdale doctrine that a joint tenant who redeems

property is doing so “for the benefit of all.” Allen, 181 S.W.2d at 376. The 

plaintiff’s act of redemption was correctly regarded by the trial court and 

the Clerk & Master as an act for all. The doctrine of Tisdale v. Tisdale has 

long been cited with approval in this state:

Tenants in common by descent, are placed in a confidential 

relation to each other, by operation of law, as to the joint 

property, and the same duties are imposed as if a joint trust 

were created by contract between them, or the act of a third 

party. . . . Being then interested with, and for each other, in 

the property, each one is prohibited from acquiring rights in 

it, antagonistic to the others. Being associated in interest as 

tenants in common by descent, an implied obligation exists to 

sustain the common interest. This reciprocal obligation will 

be vindicated and enforced in a court of equity, as a trust. 

These relations of trust and confidence bind all to put forth 

their best exertions, and to embrace every opportunity to 

protect and secure the common interest, and forbid the 

assumption of a hostile attitude by either; and therefore, the 

purchase by one of an outstanding title, or an incumbrance 

upon the joint estate, in his own name, will enure to the equal 

benefit of all, but they will be compelled to contribute their 

respective ratios of the consideration actually given.
-16-

Allen, 181 S.W.2d at 377 (quoting Tisdale, 34 Tenn. at 599) (citations 

omitted). From a legal standpoint, the acts of the plaintiff in this case were 

clearly for the benefit of all of the owners of the property.

Jones v. Anderson, 250 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

When Mr. Pruitt redeemed parcel 36, he did so for the benefit of all of the

cotenants, not just himself. We, as did the Trial Court, find nothing in the record to 

support Mr. Pruitt’s contention that his paying to redeem parcel 36 coincided with an 

ouster of his fellow heirs and cotenants. The language of the redemption order reflects

the fact that Mr. Pruitt was acting in his capacity as an heir rather than buying the 

property for himself. We find no evidence that the Pruitts ousted their cotenants at any 

point, by word or deed. Rather, the Pruitts simply went on living on the property as they 

had done before. We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to find adverse possession 

based on color of title for at least seven years.

We next address whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of 

common law adverse possession. This argument is made with respect to parcels 24 and 

26. Our Supreme Court has explained common law adverse possession as follows:

In our state, common law adverse possession rests upon the proposition 

“that, where one has remained in uninterrupted and continuous possession 

of land for 20 years, a grant or deed will be presumed.” Ferguson v. 

Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 552 (Tenn. 1916); see also Webb v. 

Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958). 

Color (or assurance) of title is not required. Keel v. Sutton, 142 Tenn. 341, 

219 S.W. 351, 352-53 (Tenn. 1920); Hallmark v. Tidwell, 849 S.W.2d 787, 

792-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In order to establish adverse possession 

under this theory, or in any statutorily based claim, the possession must 

have been exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious for 

the requisite period of time. Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932, 

935 n. 2 (Tenn. 1983); cf. Menefee v. Davidson County, 195 Tenn. 547, 260 

S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tenn. 1953). Adverse possession is, of course, a 

question of fact. Wilson v. Price, 195 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2005). The burden of proof is on the individual claiming ownership by 

adverse possession and the quality of the evidence must be clear and 

convincing. O’Brien v. Waggoner, 20 Tenn. App. 145, 96 S.W.2d 170, 176 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1936). The actual owner must either have knowledge of 

the adverse possession, or the possession must be so open and notorious to 

imply a presumption of that fact. Kirkman v. Brown, 93 Tenn. 476, 27 

S.W. 709, 710 (Tenn. 1894). When an adverse possessor holds the land for 
-17-

a period of twenty years, even absent any assurance or color of title, the 

title vests in that possessor. Cooke v. Smith, 721 S.W.2d 251, 255-56 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Successive possessions, or tacking, may be utilized to establish the 

requisite period of years if there is no hiatus. Ferguson, 190 S.W. at 552;

Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 545-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). What is 

required for tacking is that “the adverse possessor intended to and actually 

did turn over possession of . . . [the] land.” 10 Thompson on Real Property

§ 87.14, at 178; see also Derryberry v. Ledford, 506 S.W.2d 152, 156 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). . . . .

Cumulus Broad., Inc., 226 S.W.3d at 376-77 (footnote omitted).

The Pruitts cite the following facts in support of their claim of common law

adverse possession: (1) Mr. Pruitt paid all the taxes on parcel 24 since 1983 and all the 

taxes on parcels 26 and 36 since 1992; (2) the Pruitts used some of the money they 

borrowed in 1999 to tear down the old homeplace on parcel 26 without seeking 

permission from any family member; (3) in 2006, the Pruitts built a small house on parcel 

26 and moved in it temporarily after their home on parcel 24.01 was foreclosed, again 

without obtaining permission from any family member; (4) the Pruitts later demolished 

the small house without any permission; (5) Mr. Pruitt conducted his towing business 

from parcels 24 and 26; (6) parcels 24 and 26 were used for the driveway to access the 

Pruitts’ home on parcel 24.01; and, (7) the Pruitts used parcels 24 and 26 as a yard and 

playground for their children and grandchildren.

To be sure, the record contains evidence that Mr. Pruitt’s extended family believed 

the land belonged to him. The Pruitts also are correct in that they lived on the property 

and more or less did as they pleased on it without seeking permission from family 

members. Crucially, however, the Pruitts never held out that they possessed the property 

in a manner adverse to the other cotenants. Indeed, Mr. Pruitt testified to having 

relatively little contact with his family. In our judgment, the facts recited by the Pruitts 

are insufficient to establish adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. That 

their cotenants were unaware of their own interests did not mean they actually lacked 

interests, or that they were ousted. In fact, the cotenant family members never were 

ousted; they simply were passive regarding their interests. Their position was, as found 

by the Trial Court, “more in line with permissive use and not actual ouster between 

cotenants.” We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to find common law adverse 

possession.
-18-

We next address whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ claim of 

champerty. Regarding champerty, this Court has explained:

Champerty originated in English Common Law; it was designed to 

prevent the “trafficking of dormant titles.” See 14 Am.Jur.2d Champerty,

Maintenance, Etc. § 12 (2010). Historically, a conveyance of real estate 

was considered champertous and void if the deed was conveyed when the 

real property was in the adverse possession of someone other than the 

grantor. Id.

Foust v. Metcalf, 338 S.W.3d 457, 462-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). As provided by 

statute:

Any such agreement, bargain, sale, promise, covenant or grant shall 

be utterly void where the seller has not personally, or by the seller’s agent 

or tenant, or the seller’s ancestor, been in actual possession of the lands or 

tenements, or of the reversion or remainder, or taken the rents or profits for 

one (1) whole year next before the sale.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-4-202 (2015). However, “a finding of adverse possession is a 

prerequisite to a finding of champerty.” Vincent v. Johnston, No. E2013-00588-COAR3-CV, 2014 WL 279682, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014), no appl. perm. appeal 

filed.

As we have discussed, the Pruitts failed to establish adverse possession. The

Pruitts’ cotenants never were ousted. The Pruitts simply continued to live on the land as 

they had done before, without ever communicating to the others by word or deed that

they were to get, or stay, out. The fact that the cotenants never possessed the land, by 

itself, does not render the quitclaim deeds champertous. We affirm the Trial Court on 

this issue, as well.

The final issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred by denying the Pruitts’ 

claim of unclean hands. The Pruitts argue that, even if Mr. Harber obtained some interest 

in the land, his purpose in filing this suit was spiteful and the Trial Court, as a court of 

equity, should have applied the unclean hands doctrine to deny him his requested relief. 

As this Court explained in In re Estate of Boote:

The doctrine of unclean hands is a fundamental tenet of the courts of 

equity. Segal v. United Am. Bank, No. W2004-02347-COA-R3-CV, 2005 

WL 3543332, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 

11 application filed). It is intended to protect the courts, and it is based on 
-19-

the principles that he who seeks equity must do equity and that he who has 

done inequity cannot have equity. Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 197-98, 

17 S.W.2d 8, 9 (1929); Segelke v. Segelke, 584 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1978); Thomas v. Hedges, 27 Tenn. App. 585, 592, 183 S.W.2d 14, 

16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); See generally William H. Inman, Gibson’s Suits 

in Chancery § 2.09, at 2-9 to 2-11 (8th ed. 2004). When the doctrine 

applies, it provides the court with a basis to decline to grant relief to parties 

who have willfully engaged in unconscionable, inequitable, immoral, or 

illegal acts with regard to the subject matter of their claims. Hogue v. 

Kroger Co., 213 Tenn. 365, 371, 373 S.W.2d 714, 716 (1962); C. F. 

Simmons Med. Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 93 Tenn. 84, 94, 23 S.W. 165, 

168 (1893); Goodwin v. Hunt, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 124, 126 (1832); Prism 

Partners, L.P. v. Figlio, 1997 WL 691528, at *6; Cont’l Bankers Life Ins. 

Co. of the S., Inc. v. Simmons, 561 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

***

The evidentiary standard when assessing the evidentiary foundation for an 

argument that the unclean hands doctrine should be applied is the 

preponderance of the evidence standard. Town of Bartlett v. Beaty, 59 

Tenn. App. 406, 417-19, 440 S.W.2d 831, 837 (1967); Estes v. Morris, 4 

Tenn. App. 120, 122 (1926).

***

Decisions regarding the proper application of the doctrine of unclean 

hands are heavily fact-dependent and are addressed to the considerable 

discretion of the trial court.

In re Estate of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 417-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (footnotes omitted).

The Pruitts point out, first, that Mr. Harber is their former attorney. The Pruitts 

argue that Mr. Harber abused his fiduciary and confidential duties by using information 

he gleaned from the representation to try to force them off their land. Second, the Pruitts 

note that by his own testimony, Mr. Harber was angry with the Pruitts. Finally, the 

Pruitts assert the inequity of Mr. Harber, a well-educated and prosperous man, trying to 

force the Pruitts, a couple of modest means, off of their family land.

The Pruitts make cogent and compelling arguments about Mr. Harber’s spiteful 

motivations. We are not unsympathetic to the Pruitts’ predicament. We also are mindful 

that Mr. Harber is a former attorney for the Pruitts, making his zeal in pursuing this case 
-20-

especially unfortunate. Notwithstanding all of this, we disagree with, and find no

Tennessee authority to support, the Pruitts’ position that bad motivations alone are a 

proper basis for applying the unclean hands doctrine. Parties to lawsuits frequently 

dislike each other for a host of reasons, or perhaps for no rational reason at all. Often that 

personal dislike is at least a part of the reason a lawsuit is filed. Courts cannot dismiss 

lawsuits solely because the plaintiff’s dislike of the defendant was a motivating factor in 

the lawsuit being filed. If the courts did as requested by the Pruitts, parties would have 

no means of resolving their conflict in court, leaving parties to resolve their conflict by 

more direct and personal means. The “unclean hands” of the namesake doctrine refer to 

those unconscionable, inequitable, immoral, or illegal acts—actions relating to the 

litigation, not thoughts. It is, after all, not the “unclean mind” doctrine. The Pruitts make 

no argument on appeal that the heirs somehow were cheated or duped, or that the Trial 

Court was misled. The transactions between Mr. Harber and the heirs were freely entered 

into. There was nothing illegal about the transactions, even if they were highly 

distasteful. Likewise, we, as did the Trial Court, cannot find the transactions 

unconscionable, inequitable, or immoral.

At the end of the day, Mr. Pruitt was but one of many heirs with an interest in the 

subject parcels. The other heirs were at liberty to sell their interests to Mr. Harber if they 

so wished. They did so. For better or worse, Mr. Harber became a cotenant with the 

Pruitts. We find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s decision to refrain from applying 

the doctrine of unclean hands and in its ordering the land to be sold. To hold otherwise 

would leave Mr. Pruitt and Mr. Harber as cotenants in the property, a truly unworkable 

situation and one that the court-ordered partition is designed to alleviate. We affirm the 

judgment of the Trial Court. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the 

Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the 

Appellants, William M. Pruitt and Shirley J. Pruitt, and their surety, if any. 

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE