T h e T en n . R. App. P. 10 appl i ca t i on , t h e an s we r , t h e r ec or d, an d t h e s u ppl eme n t al br i ef s f u l l y s et f o rt h t he 1 p art i es’ po si t i o ns and the m at eri al fact s. T herefo re, pursuant t o T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 2, we s uspend t he ap p l i cat i o n of T enn. R . A p p . P . 2 9 , a n d fin d o ra l a rg u m e n t to b e u n n e c e ssa ry p u rs u a n t to T e n n . R . A p p . P . 3 5 (c ). See H am m ock v. Sum ner Co. , N o. 01A01- 9710- CV

- 00600, 1997 W L 749461 ( T en n . Ct

. App. D ec . 5, 1997) ( N o T en n . R. App. P. 11 a ppl i ca t i on f i l ed ). 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE STA TE EX REL 

### KARL F. DEAN v. J OHN AARON NELS ON, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 3564 Steve R. Dozie r, Judge

No. M2004- 02509-COA-R 10-CV - F iled Novem ber 18, 2004

This ext raor dinary

appea l involves the eff

orts of the Metr opolitan Governme nt o f Na s h v i lle and Da vid so n Co un ty

to cl os e a n ad ult bu sin e ss wh e re a c ts of pr os tituti on a ndle wd ne ss w e rea lle g e dly oc c urr in g. At theCity ’s re qu e st, the Cr imi na l Co urt f or Da vid so n Co un ty

iss ue d a n e x part e temporary

restraining or der immediate ly padlocking the bus iness. Following a hea ring one we ek late r, thetria l c ou rt

e nte re d a se c on d or de r statin g that the te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng or de r w ou ld “ re ma in binding and in effe ct pending a trial.” The owne r of the a dult business filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have c oncluded that the trial court departed from the ac cepte d and usual course of j udicial proceeding s in two respe cts. First, the c ourt violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-106(a ) (2000) by

issuing the tempor ary

restraining or der w ithout five day s written notice. Second, thetr ia l c ou rt

vio la te d T e nn . R. Civ . P. 65 .0 3( 5) by a llo wi ng the te mpo ra

ry re str ain in g ord e r t o rema in in effe ct pending t he trial. Ac cording ly , we g rant the ow ner’ s Tenn. R. App. P. 10 app lic a tio n a ndva c a te theor de r p a dlo c kin g thepr e mis e s. 1 Tenn. R. App . P . 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt V acate d W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., W I L L I AM B. C A IN , and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., delivere d the op ini on of

the c ou rt

. J ohn E. Her

bison, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or John Aaron Nelson and 1231 Corpor ation. Karl F. De an and J. Doug las Sloan, I I I , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the State of T ennesse e. OP IN ION I. J ohn Aar on Nelson and 1231 Corpor ation operate an adult business called Madam X at 701 Twelfth Ave nue, S outh in Nashville. On S eptember 21, 2004, Kar l F. De an, the Dir ector of L aw f orM r . N el s on ’ s a n d 1231 Cor por at i on ’ s m ot i on f or l ea v e t o fi l e t h ei r s u ppl eme n t al br i ef on e day l at e i s h er eby 2 g r an t ed. -2- the Metropolitan Gove rnment of Na shville and Davidson County , filed a pe t i t i o n in the Criminal Court for Davidson County to a bate Madam X as a public nuisance under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-3- 101, -115 (2000 & Supp. 2004). The petition and supporting af fidavits asserted that Mr. Ne lson and 12 31 Cor po ratio n w e re pe rm itt ing a c ts o f p ro sti tut iona ndoth e r l e wd a c ts to oc c ur on the ir bu sin e ss premises. At the City ’s re quest, the trial court consider ed t h e petition ex parte and issued a temporary

restraining or der dire cting the authorities to pa dlock the pre mises immediately pending a hea ring on September 28, 2004. OnSe pte mbe r 2 7, 20 04 , M r. Ne lso n a nd12 31 Cor po ratio n mo ve d to dis so lve thee x part e restraining or der or , in the alternative, to modify the or d er to exempt t he re tail sales ar ea of the pr e mis e s w he re bo ok s, ma g a zine s, a ndoth e r i te ms w e reso ld. T he tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e ir motion during the Septe mber 28, 2004 he aring , and on Oc tober 4, 2004, e ntere d an order direc ting that its S eptember

21, 2004 temporary restraining order “rema in binding and in effe ct pending a trial in this m atter.” Mr. Nelson a nd 1231 C o rp o ration subseque ntly filed this Tenn. R. App. P. 10 app lic a tio n f

or a n e xtra or din ary

app e a l. OnOc tob e r 2 6, 20 04 , w e or de re d th e City to f ile a n ans we r t o th e app li cat io n pur su a nt t o Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d) a nd direc ted the criminal court cler k to prepa re and file a r ecor d. Following the re ceipt of the rec ord and answer, w e dire cted both parties to file suppl emental briefs addr essing thefo llo wi ng iss ue s:

(1) Whe t h er the trial court e rre d by g ranting the Metropolitan Government an ex parte t em porary restraining or der on September 21, 2004, imm ediately padlocking the pre mises at 701 Twelfth Avenue, Sout h, when Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-3- 106(a) (2000) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.07 required the Metropolit an Go vernme nt to give Mr . Nelson and 1231 Corporation five day s written notice of its application. (2 ) Whe the r Mr . Ne lso n an d the 12 31 Cor po ratio n h a ve c ur

re ntl y sustained a lega lly

cog nizable injury

from the e ntry

of the September 21, 2004 or der w hen the trial court, following notice and a

hearing, issued a

second or der o n Oc t ober 4, 20 04 , maint a ini ng the e a

rl ie r o rd e r i n e ff

e c t. The supplementa l briefs we re f iled on November

5 and Nove mber 8, 2004. 2 II. Procee dings to a

b at e a nuis ance are g overne d by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29- 3-101 to -115. When a petition to abate a nuisance has bee n filed, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-105(a) pe rmits the courtT en n . R. Ci v . P. 65. 03( 1) pr ov i des : “ A r es t r ai n i n g or der may be g r an t ed at t h e comme n ce men t of t h e ac t i on 3

o r d u rin g the p e n d e n c y the re o f with o u t no tice , i f i t i s c le a rly sh o w n b y ve rified c o m p la int o r a ff id a v it tha t t h e a p p lica n t’s rig h ts a re b e ing o r will b e v io la te d b y the a d v e rs e p a rty a n d the a p p lica n t w ill su ff e r i m m e d ia te a n d irre p a ra b le inj u ry, lo ss o r d a m a g e b e fo re no tice c a n b e se rv e d a n d a he a rin g ha d the re o n .” -3- to “awa rd a te mporary

writ of injunction, enjoining and restraining the f urther c ontinuance of

such nuisance , and the c losing of the building o r p l ace wher ein the same is conducted until the further order of th e c o u r t, ju d g e , o r c h a n c e ll o r . ” H o w e v e r , T e n n . Co d e A n n . § 2 9

- 3

- 1 0 6 ( a ) r e q u ir e s that “five (5) day s’ notice in writing shall be g iven the def endant of the hea ring of the application [for the tempora

ry writ of injunction].” The Cityacknow ledg es the re quirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-106( a) but c ontends that the statute is inapplicable in this case bec ause the September 21, 2004 order was a

temporary

restraining or der, not a

temporary

injunction. The Cityinsists that Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 6 5

. 0 3 ex p ressly permits the issuance of ex parte tempor ary restraining or ders without no tic e to the de fe nd a nts

. 3 We ag ree that the court’s September 21, 2004 order is properly char acte rized as a tempor ary restraining or der r ather

than as a temporary

injunction. We do not, howeve r, ag ree that temporary restraining ord ers issued in ac tions to abate a public nuisanc e ar e not subject to the notice require m en t i n T en n . Code Ann. § 29-3- 106(a) . Both Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-3- 105(a) and Te nn. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 3- 10 6( a ) w e re e na c te d p ri or to the pr omu lg a tio n o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e. Thus, their r efe renc es t o a “temporary writ of injunction” we re not intende d to draw the te c hn ic a l di sti nc tio n b e tw e e n te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng or de rs a ndte mpo ra ry inj un c tio ns dr a wn in tod a y ’s ru le s. The clea r intent of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-106( a) is to require notice to a defe ndant bef ore an orde r may

be ente red “ enjoining and restrai n i n g” a nuisance or eff ecting “the c losing of the building or pla ce w here in the same is conduc ted.” The subsequent adoption of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65 did not alter this notice re quirement. Te nn. R. Ci v . P. 65.07 specifica lly provides that “[t]he provisions of this Rul e shall be subjec t to any co n t ra ry statutory

provisions gove rning restraining order s or injunctions.” The City ’s i n t er p retation would make the five -day notice re quirement functionally

meaning less, while the cle ar intent of T enn. R. Civ. P

. 6 5

. 07 was to pre serve such statutory provisions. Accor dingly , we hold that the rig ht to obtain a temporary restraining or der abating a nuisanc e pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 65 is subject t o the five-day notice re quirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-106(a ). We are likewise unper suaded by the City ’s ar g ument t hat the five -day notice re quirement leave s it powerless to stop illega l activities for at least five day s. I f i lleg al ac tiviti es ar e occ urring on the premises, the C ity may immediately arr est the individuals involved. The City rema ins free to enforc e the c riminal laws. I t simpl y may not padlock the business a s a nuisance without giving prior writt e n n oti c e . We a lso no te that, d e sp ite theur g e nc y e xpre sse d intheCity ’s pe tit iona ndits filings be fore this c ourt, it a ppear s from the aff

idavits in support of the pe tition t hat the City knew of the a lleg ed illeg al ac ts for seve ral we eks or e ven months befor e it filed its petition.H ad t he O ct o b er 4, 2 0 0 4 ord er not vi o l at ed T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 6 5

. 0 3 (5), w e wo ul d st i l l ha ve d et erm i ned t hat t he 4 l at er heari ng and ord er di d not rende r t he b usi ness ow ner’ s co m p l ai nt s ab o ut t he Se p t em b er 21 , 20 0 4 ord er mo o t

. T he cour t s may det er mi ne t hat a c as e r emai ns j us t i ci abl e wh en i t i nvo l ve s an i s s ue t hat i s ca pabl e of r epet i t i on y et ev ades re v ie w . B e m is P e n te c o sta l C h u rc h v . S ta te , 7 3 1 S .W .2 d 8 9 7 , 9 0 3 (T e n n .1 9 8 7 ); N a tio n a l L o a n s, In c . v. T e n n e sse e D ep t. of Fi nanci al Ins t i t ut i ons , No

. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 5 0 6

- CH- 00 24 1 a t n . 3 , 1 9 9 7 W L 1 9 4 9 9 2 ( Te n n . C t

. A p p . A p r . 2 3 , 1 9 9 7 ) ( No T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 11 ap p l i cat i o n f i l ed ). I t i s unl i kel y t hat a busi ness ow ner ad vers el y af fect ed b y an ex p art e t em p o rary res t rai ni ng ord er i ss ued i n vi o l at i o n o f T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 3

- 1 0 6 (a) co ul d ob t ai n ap p el l at e revi ew o f t he o rder b ef o re t h e en t r y of

a l at er t empor ar y i n

j u n ct i on i s s u ed i n a cc or dan ce w i t h T en n . R. Ci v . P. 65. 04.

-4- Mr. Nelson a nd the 1231 Corporation sustained a leg ally cog nizable injury

as a r esult of the entry of t he S eptember 21, 2004 order , notwithstanding the tria l court’s e ntry of the sec ond order

on Oc tob e r 4, 20 04 , f

oll ow ing no tic e a nda

he ari ng . T he e x part e or de r d e prive d th e m of fi ve day s u se of the ir pr e mis e s. I t de prive d th e m of the op po rtun ity

to a sse mbl e pr oo f t o r e fu te the a lle g a tio ns in the City ’s petition. Moreover , had prope r notice be en g i v en , t h e t ri al court would have ha d an opportunity

to write a moreprec ise order defining what rig hts, if any , the business owner s may have ha d to re mov e pr e su mpt ive ly pr ote c te d mate ri a l f

ro m th e pr e mis e s. III . The City also insists that any possible injury cause d by the entry of the Septembe r 21, 2004 temporary

restraining or der ended when the t rial court conducte d a hearing and then entere d an orde r on October

4, 2004, dir ecting that its temporary restraining or der “ rema in binding and in e ffe ct pending a trial in this matter.” This arg ument overlooks the f act that the trial court’s O ctober 4, 2004 order does not comply

with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 65.03(5). Th e tr a ns c ri pt o f the Se pte mbe r 28 , 20 04 he ari ng re fl e c ts that it s c hie f p ur po se wa s to pe rm it the business owner

to present his motion either to dissolve or to modif y t h e September

21, 2004 te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng or de r. At

no tim e du ri ng the hear in g d id the City re qu e st the tria l c ou rt

to g rant it a tempora

ry injunction closing the bu s i n ess pending the trial. Ac cording ly , rathe r than issuing a temporary injunction in acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 65.04, the trial court’s October 4, 20 04 or de r s imp ly

dir e c te d th a t th e Se pte mbe r 2 1, 20 04 temp or ary re str a ini ng or de r “ re ma in binding a nd in effe ct pending a trial in this matter.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03(5) provides that a temporary restraining order issued without notice e x p i r e s w i t h i n f

i f t e e n d a y s a f

t e r i t s i s s u a n c e u n l e s s t h e tr i a l c o u r te x t e n d s i td u r i n g t h a tp e r i o d

. If a trial c ourt dec ides to ext end a te mporary restraining or der, it may do so for only fiftee n additional day s. Th e tria l c ou rt ’s Se pte mbe r 2 1, 20 04 te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng or de r c ou ld h a ve re ma ine d in e ff e c t un til Oc tob e r 2 1, 20 04 . T hu s, the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y dir e c tin g that it

“ re ma in b ind ing a ndin eff ect” past that date. I t f

ollows, the ref

ore, that the trial court’s order , to the extent that it continued its temporary

restraining order past Octobe r 21, 2004, is contra ry to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 65.03(5) a nd must be vacated. 4-5- IV. The business owne rs’ a

pplication for a n extraordinary appea l is here by g rante d, and the tria l court’s Septe mber 21, 2004 a nd October 4, 2004 order s are vacated wit hout prejudice to the City ’s seeking a new temporary

injunction after g iving proper notice as require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-106(a ). The c ase is re manded to the tria l court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. T he costs of this appe al ar e taxed to the Metropolitan Government of Na shville and Davidson Countyfor whic h execution, if nece ssary , may issue.

PER C URI AM