1 The effective date for the ver sion of Rule 61 in effect at the time of the filing of the motion was May 6, 2013. 1 SUPERI OR COURT OF T HE STATE OF DELAWARE RICHARD F. STOKES SUSSEX COU NTY C OUR THO USE

JUDGE 1 THE CIR CLE, SU ITE 2 GEORGET OWN, DE 19947 TELEPHON

E (302) 856-5264

April 8, 2015

John F. Brady, Esquire Connections CSP Legal De partment 20163 Off

ice Circ le Georgetown, DE 19947 Leon tay T. Smith SBI # 007 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977 State of De laware v. Leontay S mith , Def. ID# 1206002919 (R-1) Dear Mr. Brady

and Mr. Smith: Defendant Leonta

y Smith (“defenda

nt”) filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61"), asserting vague claims of ineffective assistance of counse l. 1 A superc eding in

dictment d

ated Fe bruary 4, 2013, charge d defend

ant with 15 0 crimes, including multiple counts of burglary in the second degree, attempted burg lary in the sec onddegree, attempted burglary in the third deg ree, conspiracy

in the second degree, theft g reater than $1,500.00, attempted theft less than $1,500.00, theft under $1,500.00, theft less than $1,500.00 of a senior, criminal mischief, theft of a firearm, a ttempted theft of a firearm, and possession of burgla r’s tools. On April 3, 2013, defendant pled guilty to four counts of burglary in the second degree, nine counts of theft of a firearm, two counts of burglary in the third deg ree, and three counts of conspiracy

in the second degree. During the plea colloquy, de fendant affirmed that he understood the nature of the offenses to which he was plea ding guilty ; he understood the maximum sentence he was facing; he knew he must serve a minimum of four year

s in jail; he had reviewed his trial rights s et forth i

n the Trut h-in-Sen tencing Guilty Plea for m; he had d

iscussed those rig hts with his attorney; he understood those rights and waived them by entering the plea; no one had force d him to ente

r the ple a or prom

ised him an

yth ing in exchange

for it; he committed

the offe nses to which he was pleading guilty ; he was satisfied with his attorney ’s representation of him; and he wished to enter a plea of guilty to the charges. A presentenc e investigation was undertaken and defendant confessed to committing the crimes, as he did whe n the police interviewed him at the time of one of his arrests. The Court imposed its sentence on May 10, 2013. This sentence was modified o

n June 3, 201 3, to ref

lect restitution amounts. I t was cor rected on April 8, 2015, to reflect he was sentenced on a the ft of a firearm charg e rather than a possession of burglar’ s tool charg e. I mportantl y, d efenda nt must ser

ve 11 y ears at Leve l 5 befor

e he will s erve va

rious lev els of probation. Defendant did not appeal his sentence. He filed his motion for postconviction re lief on October 18, 2013. He alleges trial counse l was ineffective on two grounds. His support for these 22 2015 WL 301982 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2015). 3 claims ar e: “Plea deal” a nd “unfu lfilled pl ea ag

reemen t”. Mr. B rady

was appo inted as c ounsel to repres ent de fendan t in t his p ostco nvict ion p roceed ing. In a September 29, 2014, letter to postconviction counse l, the Court noted the inadequacy of defendant’s claims. Postconviction counsel thereafter move d to withdraw, asserting that he reviewed the record and trial counse l’s file and he could not pursue an ineffective assistanc e of counsel claim. Defendant was given the oppor tunity to present further a rguments, but he did not do so. There are no procedural ba rs. However, because defe ndant fails to meet the standard require d to estab lish an ine ffective assista nce of c ounsel cl aim, the c laims fai l. As explai ned in State v. Hohn : 2 ***To successfully a

rticulate an ineffective assistance of c ounsel claim, a claimant must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.” FN19 To prove counsel' s deficie

ncy , a defe

ndant must

show that c ounsel' s repre sentation fell below an objectiv e standa

rd of re asonable

ness. FN20 Moreove

r, a def endant mu st make con crete a llegat ions of actual pre

judice a nd substan

tiate the m or risk summary dismissal. FN21 *** FN 19 Albury v. State , 551 A .2d 53 , 60 (D el. 19 88) (ci ting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U .S. 5 2 (198 5)) (ap plying sec ond pr ong Strickland analy sis in the c ontext of a

guilty plea); See also Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). FN 20 Albury , 551 A.2d at 60. FN 21 Wrigh t v. State , 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). Defendant has not met this standard. Furthermore, a review of the record in this case, including the file, plea colloquy , and presentence report, establishes no basis for a n ineffectiveassistanc e of coun sel claim

.

For the foregoing r

easons, the postconviction motion is DENIED and postconviction counsel’ s motion to withdraw i s deemed moot. IT I S SO ORDERED. Very truly you rs, /s/ Richard F. Stokes Richard F. Stokes cc: Prothonotary’s O ffice Martin J. Cosgrove, Jr., Esquire Michael R. Abram, Esquire

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