ENGINES 

AND 

INNOVATION 
PROBLEWS OF FLIGHT WITH A VIEW TO THEIR 

PRACTICAL SOLUTION . .. ACT Of COMGRESS. APPROVED loiARCH l . 191§ 
ENGINES 

AND 

INNOVATION 

Lewis Laboratory 

and American 

Propulsion Technology 

Virginia P. Dawson 

The NASA History Series 

Nl\51\ National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Office of Management 

Scientific and Technical Information Division 

Washington, DC 1991 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Dawson, Virginia P. (Virginia Parker) 

Engines and innovation : Lewis laboratory and American propulsion 

technology I Virginia P. Dawson. 

p. em. -- (NASA SP ; 4306) (The NASA history series) 

Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no.: NAS 1.21:4306 

I. Propulsion Laboratory (U.S.)--History. I. Title. II. Series. 

III. Series: The NASA history series. 

TL568.P76D38 1991 

629.4'06'<J79493--dc20 90-20747 

CIP 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
I (( 

~Ill CONTENTS 

Pa

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 1. Aircraft Engines for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 2. Trouble-Shooting: The Wartime Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 3. Jet Propulsion: Too Little, Too Late . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 4. Testing Their Mettle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 5. New Educational Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 6. Operations Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 7. Pushing Innovation and Industry Resistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 8. Seizing the Space Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 9. The Apollo Era: Opportunities and Dashed Hopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 10. Down-to-Earth Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Essay on Sources 2

Appendices 

A. Land Acquisitions and Name Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

B. Facilities (1942-1987) .................. . ... . ......... .. ...... ... . . ... .. ..... 2

C. Management Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

D. Budget (1942-1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

E. Lewis Research Center Personnel (1941-1983). . . .......................... . .... 2

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

v 
I 
I 

~ ~//1 PREFACE 

When Francis Bacon wrote the New Atlantis in the early 17th century, he envisioned a st

supported research institution in which knowledge could be applied to "enlarge the bound

Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible." 1 Among the research facilities to incre

the protection and material comforts of the inhabitants of his imaginary island, Bacon imagi

an Engine House to study all types of motion, including flight. National aeronautical resea

laboratories in Europe and the United States in the early 20th century reflected Bacon's visio

science applied to the practical problems of flight. Commitment to innovation accompan

Bacon's belief in progress. His utopia honored inventors, not politicians or academics. 

In 1941 the same commitment to innovation and industrial progress won federal funding 

a laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Local and national leaders expected the new laboratory to p

mote innovations in aircraft engine technology to help win the war against Germany. Contri

tions to the development of superior engines for military and passenger aircraft after World W

II justified the large federal investment in research facilities and personnel. Today this laborat

is the NASA Lewis Research Center. In contrast to the isolation of the ideal research institu

of Bacon's vision, Lewis took shape in a flesh-and-blood world of personalities, national secu

concerns, and postwar capitalism. 

1\vo transitions, both precipitated by advances in propulsion technology, provide the str

ture for my history: the revolution in jet propulsion during World War II, and the launch 

Sputnik in October 1957. Each had significant national political, military, and economic reperc

sions. Each forced the laboratory to restructure its research program and to redefine its relati

ships with its three constituencies-the military, industry, and academia. Within this framew

I have distinguished one theme that recurs throughout the laboratory's history-the tens

between fundamental or basic research and development. In the process of writing my histo

found that these terms could not be defined in any absolute sense. Their meaning is enmes

in the history of Lewis, and the definitions of research and development changed as Lewis ev

ed. As an institution, Lewis engaged in a continuing reevaluation of its role within the Ameri

propulsion community and, after the formation of NASA in 1958, within a vastly expan

federal bureaucracy. 

My book is neither an administrative history of Lewis nor a chronicle of its techn

achievements. This type of history would have been impossible to write, had I wished, beca

of the serious lack of raw material out of which to craft a history. Lewis does not have a laborat

archives. Few administrative records survived the periodic review and disposal by conscienti

Vll 
NACA Main Committee and Power Plants Committee are stored. John Sloop's Liquid Hydrogen 

a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959 and Alex Roland's Model Research: The National Advisory Commi

for Aeronautics 1915-1958 provided me with useful background for the NACA period.

2 I also u

technical papers produced by Lewis staff. For the period 1958 to 1977, I found brief referen

to Lewis in books about the space program. 

Inevitably, I have passed over much interesting and significant work at Lewis. Neverthele

the paucity of documents may also have liberated me to ask broad questions and to dig 

historical context. Thus, the chapter entitled Jet Propulsion: Too Little, Too Late focuses on 

national strategy to develop a gas turbine engine in the United States. By understanding decisi

reached at a national level, I was better able to tackle the subsequent transition of the laborat

from research on piston engines to jet propulsion. James R. Hansen's original research in Engin

in Charge contributed to my understanding of the NACA's early efforts in jet propulsion. Edw

W. Constant's The Origins of the Thrbojet Revolution was important in framing some of the qu

tions I asked in this chapter. Moreover, his essay and others in The Nature of Technolog

Knowledge stimulated me to think about shifts in technological knowledge shared by a commun

of practitioners both within and outside Lewis. 

3 The chapter entitled Seizing the Space Initiat

focuses on the crisis precipitated by Sputnik. I found the role of Abe Silverstein and his team fr

Lewis significant in shaping the early years of NASA. Moreover, I traced the roots of some 

Lewis's future problems to the organizational structure conceived during T. Keith Glennan's ye

as NASA's first administrator. 

I hope that my book is a contribution to the current effort among historians of technolo

to understand technological innovation as a social activity or process.' I was interested in 

&trategies developed by the engineering community at Lewis in response to the new theoreti

demands of the gas turbine engine and how the laboratory acquired new engineering knowled

When I looked at the relationship of Lewis with Case Institute of Technology, I was surprised 

find that in the early postwar era, Case was on the receiving end of Lewis's expertise in gas t

bine and rocket technology. Later, as Case Institute of Technology developed graduate program

this scenario was reversed. 

Bruno Latour's article, "Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World," stimulated 

to consider the question of the laboratory's leverage or destabilizing influence on constituenc

outside its gates. 5 Latour's analysis seemed particularly cogent with respect to the laborator

relationship with the intensely competitive engine companies. Instead of focusing on specific 

novations, I considered innovation in the context of the laboratory's role within the American p

pulsion community. What were the mechanisms of technology transfer from the governmen

the private sector in the NACA era? How did this relationship change under NASA? 

Some former Lewis staff may wonder why I included an entire chapter on Lewis's ope

tions research. No doubt this work occupied one of the lower rungs in the research hierarchy, 

I thought general readers might find icing and crash fires of greater interest than more recond

areas of engineering. I used the chapter to demonstrate why the government undertakes cert

types of research, the leverage of federal safety regulations, and the response of industry. I am 

debted to the late William Olsen for some of the documents and insights in this chapter. 

I wrote two thirds of the book between 1984 and 1987 under a contract funded through 

NASA History Office. It took me two more years to complete and revise the manuscript. 

Vlll 
evidence and my speculations clearly indicated. Beyond the requirement to submit forty rep

I was left alone. In general, there was no restriction on my access to documents. However, 

not see a portion of the NACA collection on nuclear propulsion in the National Archives bec

it has not been declassified. Two professional historians, Clayton Koppes and James Hansen, 

two former NACA-NASA Lewis staff, John Sloop and Seymour Himmel, reviewed the manusc

Their critical reading helped to improve the technical details of the book and to sharpen 

arguments. At no time did I feel pressure to change my interpretations. Despite their car

review, I am sure that my work is both imperfect and incomplete, for which I bear 

responsibility. 

Many people at Lewis and elsewhere willingly submitted to taped as well as less forma

terviews. I would like to thank them most heartily for their cooperation. They are too nume

to name individually, although a list of formal interviews can be found in my essay on sou

In addition, Clinton Brown, Robert English, John Evvard, Bruce Lundin, Hans von Ohain, 

Moore, Ben Pinkel, and Abe Silverstein commented on some of my early drafts. I cannot ref

from mentioning the support and enthusiasm of Louis Chelko, Melvin Hartmann, the late Ge

Mandel, Walter Olson, Irving Pinkel, Warren Rayle, Roger Luidens, John Stanitz, Ernest Wa

Isidore Warshawsky, and Alan Willoughby. Lynn Bondurant and the staff of the Educati

Services Division were my official link with Lewis and provided me with office space 

graciously assisted me in myriad ways. I also received extensive and timely support from the 

of the NASA Lewis Technical Library, especially Evelyn Carnahan, who cheerfully provided 

cess to Lewis records stored at Plum Brook and elsewhere. 

I am indebted to Richard Wood and his successor, John Butler, at the National Archives 

Records Service, Suitland, Md.; Lee Saegesser of the NASA History Office, Washington, 

Richard Leyes of the National Air and Space Museum, Washington, D.C.; Richard Layma

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.; and Donald Hess and Janet Kovacevich, Johnson S

Center, Houston, Tex. I would like to thank Richard Hallion, Albert Misenko, Marvin Stibich, 

Lois Walker for their assistance at various archives at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Day

Ohio; also, Helen Near, FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Ann Sindelar, Western Res

Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio; Dennis Harrison, Case Western Reserve University Arch

Cleveland, Ohio; Anne Millbrooke and Harvey Lippencott, United Technologies Archives, 

Hartford, Conn. 

I am especially grateful to Sylvia Fries and the staff of the NASA History Office for 

professionalism, confidence, and forbearance. Fellow historians Michal McMahon, Edwin Lay

Walter Vincenti, and John Mauer generously agreed to comment on individual chap

Colleagues in NASA history Elizabeth Muenger, James Capshew, and Craig Waff supp

documents and encouragement. I received many insights, practical advice, and strong sup

from James Hansen of Auburn University, Auburn, Ala. I do not know how to express 

gratitude to Clayton Koppes of Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, who shared the adventure 

guided and inspired me. LaVaughn Craig improved my style with grace, wit, and efficiency. F

ly, my thanks to Dave, Jeff, and Emily, who supported the enterprise from beginning to end, 

to my father, Alfred Parker, for stimulating my interest in engineers and engineering. 
Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis and The Great Instauration. Jerry Weinberger, ed. (Arlington Heights, 

Harlan Davidson, 1989), p. 71. 

2 John L. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959 NASA SP-4404 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1978); Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee 

Aeronautics 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). 

3 James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958, NA

SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987); Edward W. Constant II, The Ori

of the 'Thrbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); The Nature 

Thchnological Knowledge: Are Models of Scientific Change Relevant? Rachael Lauden, ed. (Boston: 

Reidel, 1984). 

4 See, for example, Andrew Jamison, "Technology's Theorists: Conceptions of Innovation in Relation 

Science and Technology Policy," Thchnology and Culture 30:505-533. 

5 Bruno Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World," in Science Observed, Karin D. Kn

Cetina and Michael Mulkay, eds. (London: Sage, 1983), p. 141-170. 

X 
J 

.;({ AIRCRAFT ENGINES 

~Ill FOR WAR 

On January 23, 1941 George Lewis, the Director of Aeronautical Research for the Nati

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), drove a special nickel-plated pick into the fro

Ohio earth. Standing huddled in a semi-circle around him, representatives of the military, 

aeronautical community, and Cleveland city officials watched Lewis break ground for the 

NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory. This laboratory would one day bear his name. Le

paid tribute to Cleveland as a ''beautiful site, ideally located, adjacent to one of the finest airp

in the world, with all the desirable facilities that the city of Cleveland offers.'' He remarked 

it was appropriate that the laboratory was only an hour's flight from Dayton, where Wilber 

Orville Wright had constructed their first airplane-including the engine. The Wright brothers 

not tackled the job of constructing their 12-horsepower engine by choice. It was an "honor 

was forced upon them" because no engine company was willing to accept the unusual jo

adapting an automobile engine to power an aircraft. 1 

The predicament of the Wright brothers in 1903 foreshadowed the attitudes of the airc

engine industry on the eve of America's involvement in World War II. Conservative managem

and the drive for profits of the two major aircraft engine companies-Wright Aeronautical 

Pratt & Whitney-made them reluctant to accept radical changes in existing engine designs. 

piece of machinery as complex and precisely put together as an aircraft engine, innovations co

compromise an engine's reliability. Commercial airlines adopted the rugged radial engines 

duced by the two American companies because they were dependable and conserved f

However, the Europeans, particularly the Germans, had begun to develop engines capabl

greater speeds and higher altitudes. Indeed, a British technical mission to the United State

1940 informed military leaders of a radical new form of aircraft engine based on jet propulsi

Regardless of whether jet propulsion proved feasible, no one doubted that for the first tim

history air power would be among the technical factors to determine victory or defeat. To m

the accelerated development of European aircraft technology, the U.S. government would hav

invest in aeronautical research during World War II on an unprecedented scale. 

Cleveland's new NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory had a role to play in the 

tion's preparedness. Government engine research represented an investment in innovation. 

assuming the costs of research and testing, the government could pursue promising 

technology, regardless of blind alleys and false starts. NACA engineers could determine 

technical feasibility of an engine design or component before handing it over to the en

1 
The frozen ground required both pick and shovel at the ground-breaking ceremony for the new Aircraft Eng

Research Laboratory next to the Cleveland Municipal Airport. Left to right in the foreground are William 

Hopkins, former city manager who developed the airport; john Berry, Airport Commissioner; Frederick 

Crawford, President of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce; General George Brett, Edward Warner, 

Captain Sidney Kraus of the NACA Main Committee; Edward Blythin, Mayor of Cleveland; and George 

Lewis, NACA Director of Aeronautical Research. 

companies for development. In theory, government research took the risk out of innovati

Future practice, however, would determine whether the laboratory fulfilled this ideal. It was cl

that building rapport with the intensely competitive aircraft engine companies would not be ea

Only the war could force them to suspend their historic distrust of government interference

NACA: Anomaly Among Government Institutions 

Clevelanders who read the newspapers the day after the 1941 ground-breaking ceremo

had probably never heard of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, usually refer

to as the NACA. It was a small, civilian research organization, highly regarded within the wo

aviation community, but unknown to the general public. The 1915 Naval Appropriations Bill t

had created the NACA during World War I mandated its close relationship with the aircraft 

dustry. It was charged with the supervision and direction of ''the scientific study of the proble

of flight, with a view to their practical solution." 3 The Advisory Committee, which directed 

NACA's research program, consisted of 12 prominent members of the American aeronautical co

munity: two each from the Army and Navy; one representative from the National Bureau of St

dards, the U.S. Weather Bureau, and the Smithsonian Institution; and five additional at-la

2 
dustry or affiliated with a university, they were expected to rise above politics and narrow 

mercial or professional interests to serve the aeronautical needs of the country as a whole. It 

a mark of professional achievement to serve the NACA in this advisory capacity. 

Because government funding of scientific or engineering research in the pre-World W

period was unusual, constant vigilance was necessary to prevent the NACA from being swallo

up by larger institutions within the federal bureaucracy. According to one author, the NACA 

''a political freak, riding on the glamour of aviation to escape the prewar pattern of governm

relations with research.' '

4 Although at times its very existence seemed precarious, in the y

between the two world wars, the NACA established itself as an enduring institution. It was 

the glamour of aviation alone that allowed government-sponsored research in aeronautic

flourish while federal funding in other scientific and technical areas languished. The NA

technical achievements and careful stewardship of its finances earned the NACA respect w

the Washington bureaucracy. Always an anomaly because of its unique committee struc

which was more like the board of directors of a company than a government agency, the NA

significant role in the development of aeronautics in the 1920s and 1930s ensured its survi

More than any other individual, credit belongs to George William Lewis (1882- 1948

building the fledgling agency into a respected and enduring federal institution. Lewis serve

Director of Aeronautical Research from 1923 to 1947. A 1908 graduate of Cornell University 

a master's degree in mechanical engineering, Lewis taught mechanical engineering at Swarthm

College from 1910 to 1917. He then became head of research for Clarke Thomson, a private f

dation established in Philadelphia, Penn., to promote aviation, especially advances in aircraft 

pulsion. One of the problems Lewis investigated during his tenure at Clarke Thomson was 

potential of gas turbines to power aircraft. This early experience with gas turbines may have 

Lewis pessimistic about the future of jet propulsion, a factor of considerable significance in pl

ing the Cleveland laboratory in 1940.5 

Lewis's work at Clarke Thomson during World War I brought him to the attention o

NACA, and he served on the NACA Power Plants Committee. Originally the NACA had inte

to appoint a scientist to organize and direct its aeronautical research, but the first three candid

rebuffed the NACA. As the new Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton

neared completion in 1919, the NACA recruited Lewis to become its first Executive Off

Although Lewis lacked scientific credentials, he proved to be an excellent administrator an

inspiring technical leader. The rest of his life would be devoted to the NACA. He aggress

recruited scientific and engineering talent to staff the Langley Laboratory. He obtained fundin

the expensive tools of research. By the late 1920s the NACA's research facilities, such as 

Variable Density Thnnel and the Propeller Research Thnnel, were as advanced as any in the w

Lewis kept a close watch over NACA research programs during those early years, vis

Langley as often as once a week. He did not believe in rigid chains of command expresse

elaborate organization charts. He set a tone of congenial informality and flexibility to encou

engineering creativity and, above all, teamwork. He paid scrupulous attention to every deta

the research program to the point of personally reviewing every procurement order. U

Lewis's direction in the 1920s and 1930s, the NACA made solid contributions to aeronautics. 

NACA cowling (which partially covered the engines to reduce drag and allow engines to cool m
The NACA's family of airfoil shapes for wings, tails, and propellers expressed what w

meant by the NACA's duty to use scientific knowledge in the design of aircraft. To develop an a

foil shape, for example, required a 

theoretical understanding of the science 

of fluid dynamics, but to make this 

knowledge of practical use to industry, 

designers needed engineering research. 

Each shape had to be tested in the wind 

tunnel to determine its actual lift and 

drag. With the characteristics of each 

shape defined through testing, it was a 

simple matter for industry designers to 

select a particular airfoil to satisfy specific 

design requirements. 6 

George Lewis served as the liaison 

between the Advisory Committee and the 

Langley Laboratory. He testified at Congressional hearings at which NACA appropriations were considered. His 

associates on Capitol Hill trusted his 

technical judgment, for he had the ability 

to translate complex scientific and 

engineering language into plain English. 

Lewis was also skilled in his dealings with 

the military, which funded a substantial 

George W Lewis, NACA Director of Aeronauti

Research from 1924 to 1947. 

portion of the NACA's research. This was an important aspect of his job, for without the co

fidence of the Army and Navy, the NACA, in his own words, would have been a "dead duck

Innovations suggested in NACA research reports often became specifications in the design 

military aircraft. 

John Victory, the NACA's first salaried employee, served as George Lewis's right-hand m

in the NACA's small Washington office. With political savvy he attended to the administrati

detail required of federal institutions-even one as unencumbered with bureaucratic structure 

the early NACA. To keep the NACA within the bounds of its enabling legislation, Victory kept 

copy of the 1915 bill in his breast pocket, ceremoniously drawing it out to arbitrate questions 

policy. On the eve of World War II, the personalities of Lewis and Victory reflected the image 

the NACA. It was a responsible, competent, if somewhat conservative organization that had ear

ed the respect of its two constituencies, the military and the aircraft industry. Yet by the la

1930s, the NACA seemed to be resting on its laurels. The development of aeronautical resear

in Germany began to shake it out of its complacency. 

8 

FROM INERTIA TO ACTION 

At first the NACA watched European developments in engine technology without fu

awareness of their implications for American national security. In September 1936, George Lew

4 
staffed on a grand scale hardly dreamed of in the United States. Baeumker reported direct

Hermann Goering, Hitler's Air Minister, and there seemed to be no limit to the funds avai

to finance Baeumker' s grandiose scheme of aeronautical laboratories. The Germans, he w

were contemplating a long-range research program. Its major emphasis was to increase the sp

of airplanes, regardless of the expense. 

Lewis pointed out that, prior to Chancellor Adolf Hitler's rise to power, funding fo

Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fiir Luftfahrt (DVL) at Adlershof near Berlin, the German counte

of Langley Laboratory, had been limited. Hitler apparently made unlimited funds availab

Baeumker. For military reasons, the Germans had decided not to concentrate all their aeronau

research and development at one location; therefore, Adlershof was to be supplemented by 

additional stations, one entirely devoted to engine research at Stuttgart, the other for more 

damental aerodynamic research at Braunschweig. A large and elaborate pressure-type wind 

nel had been completed at the University of Goettingen under the direction of the fam

aerodynamicist Ludwig Prandtl. Lewis noted the extensive facilities for aircraft engine rese

and testing at the DVL, in particular, altitude test facilities for both air-cooled and liquid-co

engines. Research in fuels and lubricants, stimulated by the impending acute shortages of fu

Germany, took place in a special room containing an array of single-cylinder test engines

pointed out, slightly disparagingly, that the electric dynamometers and other gadgets made 

wonder whether he was. "in an engine-testing laboratory or a small edition of the Licke o

vatory."9 Although Lewis considered NACA facilities superior to those in Germany, the nu

of personnel and the advanced level of their training worried him. He estimated that in the 

future there would be about 1000 employees engaged in aeronautical research at four sep

sites compared to a mere 350 at Langley Laboratory. Even more serious was the superior tech

training of German scientists and engineers. Graduate engineering education in the United S

would become increasingly important as the theoretical demands of aeronautical engine

increased. 

Lewis's report on his 1936 trip to Germany was the first intimation that the NACA's La

Laboratory might be inadequate for the nation's future research needs. In response to Le

report, the NACA set up a special committee under General Oscar Westover, then Chief o

Army Air Corps. It took three years for the committee to address the question of the relati

the NACA to defense of the United States in the event of war.

10 

Meanwhile, military aeronautical technology in Germany was rapidly overtaking that o

United States. As early as 1937 John Jay Ide, the NACA's technical assistant in Europe, wa

of the results of German advances. He reported that Germany was producing extraord

airplanes and engines that had enabled them, with their ally Italy, to set a "holocaust of reco

Ide noted that in the development of aircraft engines there had been no specta

breakthroughs. Steady incremental improvements were nevertheless pushing European en

development to new heights. Both England and Germany had developed liquid-cooled en

with two-speed superchargers to power fighter aircraft. By 1939 Ide had concluded that, so 

was the German emphasis on the development of new technology, the next war would be a 

of workshops.'' The country able to develop the most advanced aircraft would have a strategi

vantage. Ide emphasized that for the Europeans it was speed above all that was important. 
In letters to the NACA from England, Charles Lindbergh also described European advanc

in aircraft propulsion. In his letter of August 1937 he expressed mild concern: "As Dr. Ames sa

in one of his letters, American aviation is, generally speaking, still well ahead of European av

tion. However, I believe we must work very much harder in the future in order to maintain o

leadership." 12 Lindbergh was especially impressed by the new facilities at the Junkers a

Heinkel aircraft companies in Germany, built at government expense. The British also seemed 

be pushing ahead of the United States with new engine types. He noted that Europeans we

developing rockets and urged the NACA to begin work in rocket development. He recommend

that the NACA contact America's lone rocket pioneer, Robert Goddard, about future cooperatio

Unlike Wernher von Braun, the architect of the Nazi's fearsome V-2 rocket who closely scru

nized Goddard's papers, the NACA considered Goddard too visionary.l3 

As Europe moved closer to war, Lindbergh's increased sense of urgency drove him hom

from Europe in 1939. He went straight from his steamship to a meeting with the future chief 

the Army Air Corps, Henry Harley Arnold. Arnold recalled, "Nobody gave us much useful inf

mation about Hitler's air force until Lindbergh came home in 1939." 14 Mter the slow-movi

Westover committee recommended a second laboratory for research in aerodynamics and aircr

structures (the future Ames Aeronautical Laboratory in Sunnyvale, Calif.) Lindbergh agreed 

chair a Special Committee on Aeronautical Research Facilities. Lindbergh was convinced that t

United States needed better aircraft engines.

15 As Hitler's September Blitzkreig swept throu

Poland, Lindbergh's committee urgently recommended the construction of an engine resear

laboratory in a location accessible to the engine companies. Lindbergh was convinced that t

development of liquid-cooled engines was not receiving sufficient attention in the United Stat

Other high-level aviation experts shared his view. The periodical Science warned that the nati

needed research facilities above all because of ''the superiority of foreign liquid-cool

engines.' '

16 

The recognition of the gravity of the engine situation coincided with the strengthening 

the leadership of the NACA. The same day that Lindbergh made his recommendations, the NAC

elected Vannevar Bush to take charge of forging a wartime research program. A former Dean 

Engineering and Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bush appreciat

the value of research. He greatly admired the NACA and looked upon its organization as a mod

for the mobilization of science. Known as both a scientist and a hard-headed practical engine

he considered the best engineering to be applied science. For him, the NACA exemplified th

ideal. 17 

The NACA elected George Mead, former Vice President of United Aircraft and one of t

country's most respected engine designers, Vice Chairman. Shortly afterwards he replaced Bu

as head of the Power Plants Committee. He would oversee the design of the new NACA Aircr

Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Mead's experience with engine development w

long and impressive. From engineer-in-charge of the Army's Power Plants Laboratory in Dayto

Ohio, Mead had become chief engineer for the Wright Aeronautical Corporation. In 1925 he l

Wright with Frederick B. Rentschler to found the Pratt & Whitney Company in East Hartfo

Conn. Mead's engineering genius was responsible for the successful design of the Wasp a

Hornet engines, which turned the fledgling company into a formidable competitor of Wrig

Aeronautical. 18 

6 
of Pratt & Whitney had created a bitter rivalry between the two companies in the comme

development of air-cooled engines. Neither company, however, had taken great interest in 

development of engines with liquid cooling. Profits for both companies clearly lay in the 

tinued development of the air-cooled, or radial, engine. In a country with vast distances to co

the air-cooled engine was more rugged, lighter, and consumed less fuel than its liquid-co

counterpart. It could be maintained easily, and it did not require a radiator, which might be p

tured by enemy fire. To increase the power of the radial engine during World War II, up to 

additional banks of cylinders were added behind the initial nine, making the engine more diff

to cool. 

By the early 1930s the military concluded that for strategic reasons the United States sh

not depend exclusively on air-cooled engines, despite their dominance of both the military 

commercial markets. For military applications, where speed and high altitude were important

liquid-cooled engine had great advantages. The sleek in-line arrangement of its cylinders m

that the engine could be placed in the wings, rather than up front in the fuselage behind the 

peller, where the bulky engine could obstruct the vision of the pilot. The Army supported 

development of liquid-cooled engines by several companies. However, by 1940 only the Al

V-1710, made by the Allison Division of General Motors, was ready to be mass-produced 

fighter aircraft. Before 1943 the Allison was inferior to comparable European liquid-co

engines like the British Merlin, but to power fighter aircraft it was superior to the best air-co

engines produced by Wright Aeronautical and Pratt & Whitney. 19 

Among the executives of the two established engine companies, only George Mead 

taken a strong interest in the development of a liquid-cooled engine. In 1937 he returned fro

trip to England impressed with a British liquid-cooled engine with an H-type sleeve valve

urged Pratt & Whitney to make the investment in the new engine type. 20 The corporate lea

ship of the company, however, was cool to the idea, although design studies were initiated. In 

1939 the company decided to concentrate its efforts on the development of superior air-co

engines. This seems to have precipitated Mead's resignation, making him available to serve 

NACA on the eve of America's entry into World War II. One of his first accomplishments w

reform and strengthen the Power Plants Committee. He insisted that all three engine compa

Wright Aeronautical, Pratt & Whitney, and Allison, as well as the petroleum industry 

representation. 

21 

The job of the Power Plants Committee was to figure out how to encourage innovation

engine design. The first step toward this goal was to implement as quickly as possible Lindber

recommendation for the new federally funded engine research laboratory. Mead formed a Sp

Committee on New Engine Research Facilities to hammer out the design of the prop

laboratory. Gaylord W. Newton represented the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Comma

Rico Botta, the Navy, and Major E. R. Page, the Army Air Corps. Carlton Kemper, head of 

Engine Research Division at the Langley Laboratory, and George Lewis were the NACA memb

Although membership was balanced among the engine companies the military, and the NACA

engine companies, wielded considerable power. In addition to Mead, Ronald Hazen, Preside

the Allison Company, and Arthur Nutt, Vice President of Engineering for Wright Aeronaut

were key members. 

Sam D. Heron, an executive of the Ethyl Corporation in Detroit, Mich., served as a valu

link between the NACA and the petroleum industry. Mter work on the design of air-co
on Heron to persuade the engine laboratory planners to include a fuels and lubricants facil

Heron emphasized that, despite the large amount of research being carried on by the petrole

industry, "it was impossible to do too much work toward improving fuels." Heron presente

detailed proposal for an elaborate facility that was adopted without opposition.22 This comm

ment to fuels research would some day bear fruit in the future laboratory's role in the devel

ment of liquid hydrogen as a high-energy rocket fuel. 

It was decided immediately that research on both liquid- and air-cooled engines would 

conducted at the new NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory. Testing would be carried 

on models and full-scale engines, as well as on the various components, such as supercharge

carburetors, instruments, and both fuel injection and fuel ignition systems. To implement 

basic plan of the engine laboratory, the NACA formed a design group at Langley that consis

of a nucleus of 15 seasoned men and 11 enthusiastic recent engineering graduates. The gro

worked feverishly at Langley under Smith DeFrance, who was responsible for the early desig

for both the new aircraft structures laboratory at Sunnyvale, Calif., and the new engine laborato

When DeFrance was sent to Sunnyvale, Ernest G. Whitney took over. While DeFrance took w

him the problem of the aerodynamic design of the engine laboratory's wind tunnels, Whitn

faced the formidable task of coordinating all the elements in the complex design, as well as sup

vising the early construction of the new laboratory. 

23 

An item that raised considerable debate among the laboratory planners was the decision 

include a wind tunnel. Only three facilities existed in the United States for altitude testing of a

craft engines: the Bureau of Standards, the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Penn., and 

Army's Power Plants Laboratory at Wright Field. None of the three could test engines at su

ciently high altitudes. George Mead argued strongly in favor of a wind tunnel. He was critical 

the limited facilities for engine testing at Langley. 

24 

The inclusion of a wind tunnel in the plan became a bone of contention because wind tu

nel tests could be construed as development. The NACA did not approve of "mingling resear

and development work in the same organization," but how this principle applied to eng

research was not clear.25 The established engine companies, Pratt & Whitney and Wri

Aeronautical, argued that an altitude wind tunnel would allow the NACA to compete with 

dustry in engine development, but the Allison Division of General Motors supported the wi

tunnel because it needed help in developing its liquid-cooled engine. The two established co

panies feared that more vigorous competition from a wider field of engine companies would aff

their ability to continue to reap large profits on commercial engines. The issue of the relationsh

of the new laboratory to industry remained one of the thorny problems left to be tackled on

peace was restored. The nation, however, could no longer afford to leave engine development 

clusively in the hands of industry. 

At the January 1940 meeting of his planning committee, Mead called for the opinion 

Frank W. Caldwell, a man he respected for his expertise in developing the variable pitch propel

for Hamilton-Standard Propellors Company. Caldwell argued strongly in favor of an altitude wi

tunnel to study the influence of engine vibration on the propeller. Mter his presentation, Mea

committee reached the long-sought consensus that an altitude wind tunnel, capable of testi

engines up to 3000 horsepower, be included in the plan. Caldwell also suggested that the eng

laboratory include a propeller research laboratory, a proposal that was also adopted. George Me

8 
future success of our commercial aviation.

26 

The role of the new government engine research laboratory was carefully described by 

nevar Bush when he testified before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations in 

U.S. House of Representatives. Bush asked for an appropriation of $8,400,000. He stressed tha

engine research facilities at Langley were extremely limited, that private industry did not con

the necessary research, and that government would not compete with industry. Both Gen

Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Corps, and Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautic

the Navy Department, strongly supported the proposed legislation.27 Called on to describe 

nature of the proposed laboratory in detail, George Lewis estimated that it would have a sta

220 and an annual operating cost of $650,000. The single most expensive item, the altitude w

tunnel, Lewis called "very, very desirable." Such a facility did not exist anywhere in the world

estimated that, at a simulated altitude of 30,000 feet, the speed of the wind tunnel would be 

miles per hour. In the proposed tunnel the engine, supercharger, and propeller could be stu

at full scale both separately and as a unit, so that months of flight testing could be eliminate

A congressman's question gave Lewis the opportunity to emphasize the importanc

government research and the void that it was intended to fill: ''There is no governmental rese

of engines being done in the United States now? It is all done by the private establishments, is 

Lewis's response was terse: "There is very little scientific research being done on eng

in this country. Private establishments are concerned chiefly with development problems rela

to their own engines. The aircraft engine research work that is being done at Langley F

represents the major portion of all fundamental research on aircraft engines in this country

Lewis continued to be pressed by the congressman: "And that is very limited?" 

Lewis replied that, although the Army and Navy had research facilities for engine test

this was only development work. The Army's Power Plants Laboratory at Wright Field in Day

Ohio, and the Navy's Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Penn., were used to evaluate engines 

duced by a particular company to determine whether they met military specifications. This 

not fundamental research-the purpose of the new laboratory.

28 

Although Lewis was not asked to define fundamental research, it would have been an 

propriate question. Did congressmen understand the difference between fundamental rese

and development? What could the government do that industry would not, or could not, do

was clear that the engine companies were not happy that such vast sums would go to a 

government laboratory. In early June, in a final attempt to prevent the authorization of gov

ment engine research, they proposed that, instead of spending $8,400,000 for the new laborat

the government give each company $3 million to do its own research. The NACA responded 

memo that the essence of a government research laboratory was to tackle problems commo

the entire industry and to see that the information was equally accessible to all companies 

given field. This is what the NACA called fundamental research. Competition prevented the 

change of information, so that each company had to work independently "to solve problems c

mon to them all," an unnecessary duplication of research effort. Moreover, if the engine c

panies were given money directly, they would focus their research on immediate problems 

perhaps low fundamental significance but of high specific interest to that individual compa

Thus, research would be too closely tied to development. Moreover, the NACA memo pointed 

research on components would be neglected, because the engine companies bought these p
With the forced evacuation of the Allied Forces at Dunkirk and the fall of France in ea

June 1940, could Great Britain resist invasion? Alarmed by the implications for the natio

security of the United States and already committed to supplying aircraft to Great Britain, C

gress approved the funding for a new NACA aircraft engine research laboratory in June 1940 

part of the First National Defense Appropriations Act. 30 A site for the new laboratory remain

to be chosen. 

CLEVELAND WINS THE BID 

At this point the efforts of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce moved into high ge

Cleveland's location, industrial base, and particularly the connections and active involvement 

Frederick C. Crawford, President of Thompson Products, won the new laboratory for Clevela

Crawford worked with energy, determination, and tact to make sure that the NACA ch

Cleveland. His motivation was simple. The new laboratory would be good for his compa

Thompson Products made automotive and aircraft engine parts and was just beginning its w

time expansion. [Thompson Products became Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation (TRW) 

1958.] 

Crawford's behind-the-scenes action began in 1939, as soon as he heard that the NACA w

considering a second laboratory to supplement or possibly replace the one at Langley. He ask

Clifford Gildersleeve, the Industrial Commissioner on the staff of the Chamber of Commerce, 

prepare an invitation to the NACA in August. 

Selling Cleveland was not new to Gildersleeve. His job was to attract new industries to 

city, and he was well aware of the opportunities for industrial expansion created by the war 

Europe. With the infusion of federal funds for new plants and the modernization of old o

already under way, a large government research facility would make the city all the more attr

tive to industryY 

The invitation that Gildersleeve prepared for the NACA described Cleveland in allur

terms typical of Chamber of Commerce brochures. Located in the nation's industrial heart, 

city stood as the industrial nexus between the Pennsylvania coal fields and the iron of the Mes

Range in Minnesota. The great coal-fired open hearth furnaces of the mills in the Flats along 

Cuyahoga River processed the iron ore into steel. Gildersleeve's invitation pointed out that h

of the population of the United States and more than half of the country's manufacturing w

located within 500 miles of the city. Cleveland was also a hub of transportation. The airport h

dled a daily average of 100 planes, making it among the busiest airports in the country. In addit

to highway connections, six major railroads served Cleveland, and the Great Lakes were used 

industries like Republic Steel to transport iron ore cheaply. Electric power in Cleveland, suppl

by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, was "plentiful and dependable." In additi

Cleveland owned and maintained its own water system. 32 What the invitation did not state w

that the city, still recovering from the Depression, desperately needed jobs for its workers. T

city's reputation for tightly organized unions made new industries reluctant to locate 

Cleveland. To cope with 87,000 poor relief cases, the city received federal assistance, but it s

faced a large poor relief deficit of over $1 million. 33 

Clevelanders, however, loved aviation. The city's sponsorship of the enormously success

National Air Races had first brought Crawford into contact with the NACA through his associat

10 
each year, and his enthusiasm for aviation was well known. Although the manufacture of p

for automobile engines was the major business of Thompson Products, the company also 

sodium-cooled valves to the two giants in the aircraft engine field, Wright Aeronautical and P

& Whitney, a business that flourished during World War I with the production of valves for 

Liberty engine. 

Other Cleveland companies were in the parts business. In 1940 Cleveland boasted no 

than 80 to 90 companies "catering directly to aviation." 34 Eaton Industries also produced sodi

cooled valves, and Cleveland Pneumatic had pioneered the development of pneumatic land

gears. With a new plant for Wright Aeronautical's engines under construction outside Cincinn

Crawford saw that Cleveland aircraft parts industries could anticipate substantial expansion 

result of the war in Europe. What could be more appropriate for the city than a major resea

laboratory for aircraft engines? 

The city's identification with both the romance and commercial potential of aviation 

begun during World War I, when a group of Cleveland investors persuaded a gifted, if somew

eccentric, aircraft designer, Glen L. Martin, to locate his aircraft company in Cleveland. Du

its years in Cleveland, Martin's company produced the important Martin GMB-1 bomber and 

tracted some of the most talented airplane designers in the country: Dutch Kindelber

Lawrence Bell, and Donald Douglas. When Martin moved his company to Baltimore in 1929

left as his legacy to the city his role in spearheading the development of Cleveland's munic

airport.

35 

The large size and careful design of Cleveland's airport made it a natural site for 

National Air Races. The Air Races brought Crawford and the NACA together. Held in Cleve

8 of 11 years between 1929 and World War II, the races provided the opportunity to push bey

the existing speeds of aircraft. Prominent Cleveland industrialists like Crawford and Lewis 

Greve, President of Cleveland Pneumatic, supported them enthusiastically. Many of the en

improvements first demonstrated on racing aircraft were later adopted by the aircraft engine c

panies. 36 What could be more natural than a new federal laboratory to continue to encou

engine innovation? 

Cleveland lost out to Sunnyvale, Calif., as the location for the Ames Aeronautical Rese

Laboratory because Sunnyvale was close to the California aircraft industry, which exercised 

political clout on Capitol Hill. Nevertheless, when Congress authorized funds for an airc

engine laboratory, Cleveland was ready to push for its selection. Gildersleeve and Walter I. Be

the Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, had already convinced Cleveland's l

officials of the desirability of the city as a site for a government research laboratory. As an in

tive, the city had agreed to make nearly 200 acres of land next to the Cleveland Airport avail

for $1 an acre, as well as raise $550,000 locally for power facilities. 37 

The NACA was determined that the competition for the site for the new engine labora

be properly and impartially administered. Mter the engine laboratory was funded, the NA

selected a blue ribbon committee, chaired by Vannevar Bush, to recommend a site.

38 The c

mittee sent letters to all interested congressmen, Chambers of Commerce, and other interested 

dividuals stating the requirements to enter the competition. Because the new laboratory would 

quire facilities for flight testing, the city had to be able to make available title to 100 acres ei

on or adjoining an airport owned by a municipality or already owned by the federal governm
George Lewis explains the plan for the new engine research laboratory to top NACA staff 

With a large wind tunnel planned, the site also needed adequate power as well as ample wa

for cooling. The city should be an industrial center, accessible to the engine companies locat

either on the East Coast or in the Midwest. The site also had to be near "centers of scientific a

technical activity." Another factor to be considered was "strategic vulnerability." Since there w

a perceived danger that the United States might be attacked on either coast, where the NACA

other two laboratories were located, there was a general feeling that the Midwest offered t

safest location. The NACA used an elaborate point system, originally devised for the Sunnyv

site selection, to judge the contenders for the new engine laboratory. 

39 

In July the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce issued a formal bid to the NACA for the ne

laboratory, responding directly to the list of criteria. The Chamber of Commerce enlisted the su

port of the local Society of Automotive Engineers to impress the NACA with the city's engineeri

community. In addition, the presidents of the Case School of Applied Science and Weste

Reserve University wrote letters that described in glowing terms the excellence of the education

resources of the city. 

Cleveland faced stiff competition. Of the 72 sites in 62 cities that submitted bids, 14 citi

offering a total of 20 sites, met the stipulated criteria. A Special Committee on Site Inspecti

visited the top-ranking cities. The major contenders, as presented at the September meeting of t

Bush Committee on Site Selection, were Cleveland, Ohio; Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Mic

12 
provide a superior research environment. The drawbacks of the Cleveland site were the unusu

high rates for electric power charged by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and 

spectator stands for the National Air Races on the proposed site. Would the continued opera

of the races interfere with the plans for the new engine laboratory? Because the Material Divi

of the Army Air Corps was already located at Wright Field near Dayton, where the Army ha

own power plants laboratory for testing engines, the Army urged the NACA to consider 

Dayton site. Not surprisingly, Orville Wright, a prominent member of the NACA, put his we

behind his home town.

40 

Nevertheless, John Victory and Rudolf Gagg, a Wright Aeronautical consultant retaine

the NACA, favored Cleveland over the other cities under consideration and were willing, w

keeping a public stance of impartiality, to go out of their way to help Cleveland win the bid. 

was no doubt due to the "personal relationships of long standing" between Frederick Craw

and the NACAY Not only had Crawford "gone to Washington for a number of conferences, 

conferred with people in New York, and had given up much time to Cleveland's effort to ob

the laboratory," but he had also taken a personal hand in the negotiations between the NACA 

the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. In order for the Illuminating Company to avoid 

capital investment involved in building new generating plants to supply the proposed en

laboratory, Crawford came up with the idea that the company could offer reduced rates if 

NACA were willing to run its large testing facilities at night. 42 This was a shrewd move on 

part of Crawford, although at first the conservative Illuminating Company resisted the prop

arrangement. 

To discuss the problem of the power rates and the city's intentions as far as the Nati

Air Races were concerned, Victory, Gagg, and Russell Robinson visited Cleveland on Octobe

Their trip had an extremely favorable outcome. As Victory recalled, "one fly in the ointment" 

the skepticism of Evan Crawford, the President of the Illuminating Company. Evan Craw

doubted that the wind tunnel could be run on an off-peak basis. Victory remembered: 

The electrical rates he offered were considered prohibitive,--Into-this breach stepped 

Fred Crawford, just in time to prevent the collapse of negotiations. I shall never forget 

the final scene in Evan Crawford's office when he yielded and then promised that, if 

Cleveland were selected, his company would ''ooze cooperation from every pore.' '

43 

The Illuminating Company agreed to a substantial reduction in the monthly electric r

From a minimum annual charge of $120,000 in the original proposal, the power company ag

to a minimum charge of $50,000. This clinched the choice for Cleveland. In addition to the 

cessions of the electric company, Major John Berry, superintendent of the airport, reported 

the park commissioners had agreed to offer part of the park adjoining the airport to the NA

This would create a buffer around the new laboratory of a mile on every side. Crawford indic

the likelihood that the operation of Cleveland's National Air Races would be suspended and 

willingness of the National Air Race Association Committee to have the stands removed.

44 

The selection of Cleveland as the site was formally announced to the press on Novem

25, 1940 by Vannevar Bush. After political maneuvers to avoid objections over whether 

municipal government could turn over the land at less than the fair price, the Mayor of the 

of Cleveland, Harold H. Burton, sold 200 acres of land for $500 to the federal government. 
Photograph courtesy of the Cleveland Public L

A squadron of U.S. Marine planes flies over the site of the future Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory du

the National Air Races, 1935. The Brookpark Road Bridge is at the right. 

NACA was granted the right to use the airport free of charge, and it was agreed that neither 

airport nor the NACA would erect buildings that would interfere with the operations of the oth

If the laboratory's activities ceased, the land would revert to the City of Cleveland. 

Soon the stands for the spectators would be pulled down to make way for the new buildi

of the NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory. Roscoe Thrner carried off the Thomp

Trophy for the last time in 1939. The air races had kept interest in aviation alive through 

Depression. They had contributed to increasing the speeds of aircraft through the tinkering 

talented mechanics. With the most advanced engine research facilities the country could mu

about to be built at the edge of the airport, engine innovation would become more rational 

systematic. People with professional training in engineering and science would take over from 

racing buffs the job of increasing the speed of aircraft. Nevertheless, the role the laboratory wo

play in engine innovation was not entirely clear. Over the objections of the engine compan

which feared that government research might interfere with healthy competition, Congress 

funded the NACA's new engine laboratory. Vannevar Bush and George Lewis had used their c

siderable prestige to assure the Congress that fundamental research would foster innovation. T

argued that the NACA would tackle engine problems common to the entire industry. The devel

ment of new engine prototypes would remain the province of the engine companies. Yet the c

struction of a wind tunnel belied these assurances. Testing full-scale engines in a wind tun

14 
development. 

As he stood in the frigid wind on that January for the ground-breaking ceremony, Craw

may have reflected that the heyday of the National Air Races was about to end. Military airpla

had reached speeds beyond those of any plane ever entered in the air races. These new mach

of war had "out-raced the races." 45 
Lewiss talk at groundbreaking ceremonies, 23 January 1941, NASA Lewis Records, 298/110411.

2 A British technical mission, headed by Sir Henry Tizard, visited the United States in September 1940. 

a general discussion of the mission, see Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York: Vantage Books, 197

p. 302-303. Specific reference to the disclosure of British advances in jet propulsion made by Tizard 

found in Bush to Arnold, 2 July 1941, 47/208, and Papers of H. H. Arnold manuscript Division, Libr

of Congress. Arnold to Tizard, 4 June 1941, 47/208. 

3 Jerome Hunsaker, "Forty Years of Aeronautical Research," Smithsonian Report for 1955, p. 246. For the 

ministrative history of the NACA, see Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee 

Aeronautics, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), vol. 1. 

4 Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (New York: The New American Library, 1967), p. 10

5 James R. Hansen, "George W. Lewis and the Management of Aeronautical Research," in Aviations's Gol

Age: Portraits from the 1920s and 1930s, William M. Leary, ed. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Pre

1989), p. 93-112. See also Jerome C. Hunsaker, "George William Lewis (1882-1948)," in Year Book 

the American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1948.) 

6 For the history of Langley Laboratory and the NACA's pre-World War II technical contributions, see Jam

Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958, NASA SP-43

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). For the NACA methodology of testing airf

shapes, see Walter Vincenti, "The Air-Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Stu

in Technological Methodology," Technology and Culture 20:712-751. 

7 Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 160. 

8 Roland, Model Research, vol. 1, p. 147. 

9 Lewis's report on his 1936 trip, George Lewis biographical file, NASA History Office, Washington, D.

10 The Special Committee on the Relation of the NACA to National Defense in Time of War, chaired 

General Oscar Westover, Chief of the Army Air Corps, made its recommendations in August 1939. T

Special Committee on Future Research Facilities, chaired by Rear Adm. Arthur B. Cook, recommend

the Sunnyvale, Calif. site in December. For the full story, see Roland, Model Research, vol. 1, 154 

11 John J. Ide Report appended to Minutes of 7 January 1937 Meeting of the Executive Committee and "No

on European Aeronautical Developments in 1938," 10 January 1939, Minutes of the Execut

Committee, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 7. 

12 Lindbergh to Lewis, 26 August 1937, Lindbergh biographical file, NASA History Office, Washington, D

13 Lindbergh to Lewis, 23 September 1937, Lindbergh biographical file, NASA History Office, Washingt

D.C. The Navy assigned Robert Truax to evaluate Robert Goddard's work. Truax reported that Godd

was "visionary and without any definite purpose or proposal to submit to the Bureau." Memo fr

C. C. Helms to Lewis, 19 June 1941, Records of NACA Committees and Subcommittees, National 

chives, Record Group 255, 117.15. 

14 Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Row, 1949), p. 169. Charles Lindbergh, The Warti

journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1970), p. 254. 

15 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 19 October 1939, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 7. 

16 Science, 12 January 1940. 

17 Daniel Kevles, The Physicists (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 296. Bush's idea of technology as appl

science has been mentioned by several authors. See, for example, Edwin T. Layton, "Technology 

Knowledge," Technology and Culture 15:34; see also articles on the science-technology relationship 

Technology and Culture, vol. 17. 

18 See Robert Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 1

19 Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 50. 

20 Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 285. 

21 Alex Roland (Model Research, p. 163 ff.) views the chairmanship of Mead as indicative of the increasing 

dustry influence over the NACA. He is correct that during World War II the NACA was "dependent 

industry expertise to launch its engine-research program,'' but dependency did not continue in 

postwar period. 

16 
pg

Group 255, Lewis Research Authorizations 123.22. 

23 Rudolf F. Gagg, "State of the Work on the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory of the National Adv

Committee for Aeronautics," 11 February 1941, NASA Lewis Records, 34/110. See also Eliz

Muenger, Searching the Horizon, NASA SP-4304 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O

19851, p. 9. 

24 Mead to Lewis, 13 November 1939, National Archives, Record Group 255, Power Plants Committee 

25 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 19 October 1939, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 

26 Minutes of Special Committee on New Engine Research Facilities, January 1940, National Archives, R

Group 255, Lewis Research Authorizations 123.23. 

27 Appendix to the Congressional Record, 11 June 1940, vol. 86, pt. 16, p. 3778. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Memorandum, 11 June 1940, National Archives, Record Group 255, Lewis Research Authorizations 12

30 Appendix to the Congressional Record, 11 June 1940, vol. 86, pt. 16, p. 3779a. 

31 John Holmfeld, "The Site Selection for the NACA Engine Research Laboratory: A Meeting of Science 

Politics," Master's Essay, Case Institute of Technology, 1967, p. 27. Holmfeld's essay is an exc

example of primary research. However, he overestimates Gildersleeve's role and fciils to recogniz

behind-the-scenes work of Crawford described in the records of the Chamber of Commerce, Ms 

container 55, vol. 108, Minutes 1940-1941, Greater Cleveland Growth Association Records, We

Reserve Historical Society. 

32 Cleveland Chamber of Commerce Invitation to the NACA, 29 August 1939, NASA Lewis Rec

298/116.1. 

33 Chamber of Commerce, Greater Cleveland Growth Asso. Records, Ms 3471, vol. 105, 11 October 

Minutes 1939-40, Western Reserve Historical Society. 

34 Cleveland Chamber of Commerce Invitation to the NACA, 29 August 1939, 298/116.1, NASA L

Records. 

35 "Wings over Cleveland, A summary of the development of aviation in Cleveland," pamphlet publishe

Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 1948, 1, NASA Lewis Records 298/116/1 and Western Re

Historical Society. On Glen L. Martin Co., see also Lois E. Walker and Shelby E. Wickam, From Huf

Prairie to the Moon: The History of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern

Printing Office, 19871, p. 186. 

36 Bob Hull, A Season of Eagles (Cleveland: Bob Hull Books, 19841, p. 13. 

37 Holmfeld, "Site Selection," p. 42. 

38 Other members of the Site Selection Committee, chaired by Vannevar Bush, included Dr. Lyman J. B

Director of the National Bureau of Standards, Captain Sidney M. Kraus of the Navy Bure

Aeronautics, and Major General George H. Brett, Acting Chief of the Air Corps. See John Holm

"Site Selection," p. 21. 

39 Holmfeld, "Site Selection," p. 27. 

40 Ibid., p. 80. 

41 Chamber of Commerce, Greater Cleveland Growth Association Records, M. 3471, container 55, vol. 

24 October 1941, Minutes, 1940-41, Western Reserve Historical Society. 

42 Interview with Frederick C. Crawford, 2 October 1985. 

43 Speech by Victory to Chamber of Commerce, 23 January 1951, NASA Lewis Records 298, 116.1. 

44 Holmfeld, "Site Selection," p. 85. 

45 "Statement by Frederick C. Crawford, President of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce," 13 Dece

1940, National Archives, Records Group 255, Engine Research Lab., Box 1, 23-1. 
1 - -
- TROUBLE-SHOOTING

~ - THE WARTIME 

~Ill MISSION 

As the country's aircraft engine needs intensified during World War II, fundamental eng

research took a back seat to trouble-shooting to solve the problems of engines in production. 

wartime mission of the new engine laboratory was simple. It had to assist the engine compan

to make their engines more powerful and reliable. General Arnold wanted engines that were c

parable to the best European models. He ordered Pratt & Whitney and Wright Aeronautica

develop fuel injection systems within 12 months to make their engines comparable to the Germ

BMW-801, at that point the world's best aircraft engine. 1 

Arnold blamed the engine companies for the country's dismal aircraft engine situation, 

he expected the NACA to correct it. On October 14, 1942 he issued an official directive that 

NACA must "do everything practicable to improve the performance of existing engines." 

engine companies had failed to provide the nation with "small, light, high performance, hig

supercharged engines'' suitable for fighter airplanes. Their exclusive focus on large, heavy, 

cooled radial engines reflected their drive for profits at the cost of preparedness. "Our engi

were nearly all built as all-purpose engines, with an eye on the world market, and not specific

for fighter aircraft.''2 The United States could not enjoy the luxury of fundamental research u

the problems of reciprocating engines then in production-the Wright 2600 and 3350, the Pra

Whitney 1830 and 4360, and the Allison V-1710 had been resolved. 

Arnold's directive that the NACA concentrate on improving existing engines was made 

the context of his knowledge of a radically new propulsion technology: the development of 

turbojet engine. Days before his letter to the NACA, Lawrence Bell's Airacomet (P-59A), powe

by a turbojet developed by General Electric, had flown successfully for the first time over Mu

Dry Lake in California. Seasoned Langley veterans in charge of overseeing the design and c

struction of the new Cleveland laboratory had no inkling of the impending revolution in jet p

pulsion. They assumed that the improvement of the aircraft piston engine would continue 

follow the evolutionary pattern of the past. They worked with energy and determination to b

a laboratory to assist in winning the war. 

FROM BLUEPRINT 10 LABORA10RY 

The miles of 36-inch blueprint paper produced by Langley's design group began to take 

form in the winter of 1941. In February Charles Herrmann, Chief Inspector, was transferred 

Cleveland from Hampton, Va. He was accompanied by Helen G. Ford, a secretary from the NA

19 
building owned by the Cleveland airport. The Airport Commissioner allowed the NACA to st

new equipment temporarily in the air races grandstands awaiting demolition. Ford attended 

myriad of pressing administrative details and threw coal into the furnace, while Herrmann sup

vised the building of the hangar and engine propeller research building by the laboratory's f

contractor, the R. P. Carbone Construction Company. 

The intense grind of daily routine was broken by occasional visits from officials from 

Washington office and Langley staff who "spurred us on when we felt isolated and primitive 

forgotten.'' Ford and Herrmann processed applications from the Cleveland community, and 

July the staff had outgrown the two rooms of the Radio House. They moved to the Farm Hou

a white clapboard structure overlooking the Rocky River. "As the Langley Field people began 

arrive they were squeezed in wherever we could find room," wrote the intrepid Ford to a fri

at City Hall. 3 

From the time of the ground-breaking ceremony in January 1941 to the following win

construction work proceeded at an agonizingly slow pace. It was difficult to obtain an adequ

supply of labor because the fixed-price contract negotiated by the NACA with its original cont

tors did not allow overtime pay. Buildings could not be completed on schedule or within bud

because of the extremely high labor costs in Cleveland and the rising costs of materials and c

struction.4 To take firm control of construction, in August 1940 Lewis called Edward Raym

Sharp back to Langley from Ames to serve as Construction Administrator for the new eng

laboratory. 

After Pearl Harbor, the pace quickened. In mid-December Ray Sharp moved with Ern

Whitney and his design group from Langley to Cleveland. They occupied temporary offices in 

Farm House and the recently completed hangar. Charles Stanley Moore took responsibility for 

thousands of drawings for the Engine Research Building. In the hectic days when one decis

after another had to be made, a Kipling verse posted in Moore's office seemed to express th

sense of teamwork as they struggled to plan each building and to supervise contractors. No 

dividual or army, but the "everlasting team work of every blooming soul" would allow them 

accomplish the impossible. 5 

Ray Sharp charted the course of the laboratory's construction. He reviewed contra

established rapport with city officials, smoothed relations with the engine companies, and k

Wright Field and the NACA Washington office informed of progress. Named Manager of 

laboratory in 1942 and Director in 1947, he remained at the helm of the Cleveland laboratory 

til his retirement in 1960. 

Sharp had an amiable and gracious style of management that earned him the affection 

loyalty of those who worked under him, but he was not an engineer. At Langley and Ames 

laboratory head was the "engineer-in-charge." The Cleveland laboratory functioned differen

Sharp created an atmosphere that encouraged cooperation among the staff, but he wisely left 

technical questions to the engineers. As one engineer explained, "Since he did not have 

background in engineering, he left us alone. His idea was to provide us with the equipm

money, and the space and made it easier for us to work."6 

Born on a farm in Elizabeth City, Va., in 1894, Sharp had enlisted in the Navy in W

War I. His connection with the NACA began when he was employed by the Army to assemble 

Italian airship Roma, accepted as partial payment of the Italian war debt. In 1922, u

20 
boss to construction administrator. After earning a law degree from the College of William 

Mary through a correspondence course, he became a member of the Virginia bar in 1924. 

Sharp's first duty upon arrival in Cleveland was to use his legal skills to negotiate a cont

with a different construction company, the Sam W. Emerson Company. This was the first c

plus-fixed-fee contract for the NACA, authorized by an act of Congress on December 17, 19

This type of contract, used extensively by the Army and Navy, made it easier to get contrac

to agree to undertake risky new ventures for the federal government. The government agreed 

pay a fixed fee, or guaranteed profit, to the contractor and assumed all the costs of the proj

With the country at war, the federal government moved unusually quickly. The cost of 

remaining buildings was estimated on December 24; after Christmas, Sharp took on Emerso

lawyer, an experience that Sharp described as "fight all the way." 7 He had a 47-page cont

typed, and by the evening of December 31 the contract was signed. One week later the Emer

Company began construction on the Engine Research Building, planned to house a variety 

laboratories to cover the gamut of authorized research projects: multicylinder and single-cylin

test facilities, supercharger rigs, and laboratories for research on exhaust turbines, heat trans

carburetion, fuel injection, ignition, automatic controls, and materials. The building covered m

than four acres of floor space, designed so that the areas were flexible enough to be converte

other uses as research needs changed. The Emerson Company also rapidly constructed the 

ministration Building, the Gatehouse, and the service and office buildings for the wind tunn

With a solid reputation in Cleveland, Sam W. Emerson was active in the Cleveland Cham

of Commerce. The Emerson Company specialized in industrial construction, but had also w

bids for buildings at the Case School of 

Applied Science, where Emerson had 

studied engineering and served on the 

Board of Trustees. As the Cleveland Plain 

Dealer described Emerson, "Many of the 

substantial buildings ·he has erected in 

Cleveland seem to reflect his 

personality-unadorned, capacious, 

usable, plain and adequate." 8 These were 

the very qualities reflected in the 

buildings Emerson constructed for the 

laboratory. Carefully set at intervals along 

the roads of the former air races parking 

area, their low-slung tan brick exteriors 

gave the laboratory a college campus 

atmosphere. 

While construction proceeded, in 

May 1942, when the staff numbered 399, 

research was officially initiated in the 

recently completed Engine Propeller 

Research Building. The fruits of the 

cooperation between the N ACA and the 

The intrepid Helen G. Ford braves her first Cleve

winter. 
While the Administration Building was 

under construction, staff squeezed into 

the old Farm House. 

city of Cleveland could be seen in the group of dignitaries who attended the formal ceremon

George Lewis and John Victory from the NACA; Walter I. Beam, Executive Vice President of 

Chamber of Commerce; Mayor Frank J. Lausche; Major John Berry, Commissioner of the Airp

and William A. Stinchcomb, Director of Civilian Defense for Cuyahoga County. Huddled in 

control room, they waited in suspense until, with the push of a button, George Lewis se

motion the huge propeller of a 14-cylinder R-2600 Wright Cyclone engine mounted in a test c

While it roared, a battery of instruments produced a graphic record of various resea

parameters needed to evaluate lubricating oils. This was an appropriate engine on which to dir

the laboratory's most concerted effort, because it was plagued with undefined problems. Bene

the hearty congratulations offered on the occasion must have been the nagging question, could 

laboratory find the flaws that eluded the manufacturer? Could they be fixed in time? T

laboratory's first technical report on lubricants tests of the Wright R-2600 by members of 

Fuels and Lubricants Division, Arnold Biermann, Walter Olson, and John Tousignant, showed 

promise of the youthful staff. How government research could be transformed into concr

engine improvements remained to be demonstrated. 9 

22 
Plants Division at Langley had not earned him the expected position of engineer-in-charge of 

new laboratory. Why Sharp was chosen to take the helm of the Cleveland laboratory, rat

than Kemper, is not clear. As the construction of the Cleveland laboratory went 

forward, Kemper stayed behind at 

Langley to contribute to the NACA's secret 

jet propulsion project-a project that 

failed to provide the country with a practical and timely jet propulsion system. 

Kemper, a 1923 graduate of the University 

of Pennsylvania in mechanical engineering, had joined a handful of power plants 

engineers at the NACA after two years 

with the Packard Motor Car Company. 

Four years later, when he took charge of 

the division, his staff numbered 20. After 

1934, when a new power plants laboratory was built at Langley, his staff worked 

in cramped offices above the roar of 

engines being tested on the floor below. 10 

Kemper would never regain his role as a 

leader of power plants research. In 1945 

the NACA sent him Europe to join the 

Alsos mission as its expert on aircraft 

Edward Raymond Sharp {1894-1961/, Director of Le

Laboratory through 1960. 

engines. Addison Rothrock became Chief of Research, and it was he who would oversee 

laboratory's difficult transition from the piston engine to jet propulsion. 

LANGLEY'S POWER PLANTS DIVISION MOVES TO CLEVELAND 

In the research hierarchy at Langley, engine research occupied one of the lower run

Aerodynamics, experimentally studied in wind tunnels, expressed the research heart of the 19

NACA. Even the famous NACA cowling that allowed airplanes to go faster and cool more effici

ly had more to do with aerodynamics than power plants. The two major engine companies, Wr

Aeronautical and Pratt & Whitney, were fiercely competitive and jealous of their propriet

rights. They did not welcome government interference. Through an agreement reached in 19

the government left engine development to the engine manufacturers, although a limited amo

of engine research was carried on by the National Bureau of Standards. 

Technical judgment as well as the attitudes of the engine companies may have influen

the NACA Power Plants Division to focus on the diesel, or compression-ignition engine. M

power plants experts of the 1930s thought that aircraft engine advance would occur in the di

engine, which did not have the problems that held back the development of the air-cooled eng

ignition, knock, and the metering of fuel into the carburetor. After the first flight of a Packard 

craft engine in 1928, the diesel seemed to be the aircraft engine to overcome the limitations of 
of its weight, proved to be a dead en

Because of its decision to focus 

the diesel engine, the NACA was left 

of the dramatic development of the 

cooled spark-ignition engine in the 19

Its improvement came unexpectedly f

fuels research by the petroleum indu

on the branched paraffin, octane. Thi

crease in performance spurred su

charger development to keep eng

from starving for air at high altitu

However, the problems of knock and 

ignition (faulty combustion within 

engine's cylinders) remained. W

increased supercharging, effective en

cooling was also a problem. 

Carlton Kemper, Executive Engineer. 

Gradually, in the late 19

research on the diesel engine decli

and the NACA began to be pulled into 

mainstream of engine development. With the formation of a Subcommittee on Aircraft Fuels 

Lubricants in 1935, research at Langley was initiated on the knocking characteristics of var

fuels, although this research played only a peripheral role in the rapidly evolving understand

of hydrocarbons. 

To advance the NACA's research on combustion, Cearcy D. Miller invented a high-sp

camera that could take pictures of the combustion process within the cylinder of an engine at 

rate of 40,000 frames per second. With this new high-speed photography, the exact point at wh

the engine began to knock could be determined for the first time. It was an exci

breakthrough. 

11 

Miller's work is an example of what the NACA meant by fundamental research. He to

problem common to all air-cooled radial engines and invented a method to analyze it. Publica

of Miller's reports put this new knowledge in the hands of industry designers-the point o

NACA research. The Army's fuels agenda for the Cleveland laboratory included study of the 

additives xylidine and triptane to increase the performance of combat aircraft. The labora

tackled the problem of replacement cylinders worn down by sand from unimproved airstrip

Africa. Oil foaming, which drained the engine's oil during flight, also received attentionY 

In 1940 the NACA was pushed back into supercharger development, a field in which it 

pioneered in the late 1920s. A supercharger section, with Oscar Schey as its head, launched a 

program with strong backing from the Army and direction by the Power Plants Committee. W

known for his early work on the Roots supercharger, Schey had made outstanding contribut

to power plants engineering throughout his career, beginning at Langley in 1923 after gradua

with a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Minnesota. His advocacy of v

overlap and fuel injection in the piston engine resulted in lower supercharger requirements, 

24 
valve overlap idea, and especially fuel injection. Shortly before the war, when George Le

visited Germany, he was surprised to see Schey's reports on the desks of his German counterp

at the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fiir 

Luftfahrt (DVL). 14 During the war Schey 

advocated abandoning the NACA Rootstype supercharger, which he believed 

would not be as effective at high altitudes 

as the turbosupercharger designed by 

Sanford A. Moss at General Electric. 15 He 

was correct. 

Schey's group was the last of the 

four sections of the Langley Power Plants 

Division to transfer to Cleveland, in July 

1943. Interviewed at that time by the 

laboratory's newspaper, Wing Tips, Schey 

declared unequivocally that the supercharger was so essential that his division 

was "looking forward to a not distant 

future when they will be asking you not 

'What kind of supercharger have you got 

on your engine?' but 'What kind of engine 

have you got on your supercharger?' " 16 

Ben Pinkel, one of the NACA's Oscar Schey, Chief of the Supercharger Division. 

leading propulsion experts, directed the 

NACA's research on the exhaust gas turbine, another name for the turbosupercharger. Pinkel 

come to the NACA in 1931 from the University of Pennsylvania with a degree in electr

engineering. In 1938, when Pinkel was appointed head of the Engine Analysis Section, it ha

staff of three. By 1942, Pinkel's division had expanded to over 150 people. Although facilities w

lacking at Langley, as soon as the Cleveland Laboratory was ready, Pinkel's Thermodynam

Division launched a strong program to improve exhaust gas turbines. In a talk to the staff, al

whom, he humorously remarked, demonstrated the principle of "heat in motion," Pinke

luminated the importance of their work to the war effort. Adding a turbosupercharger to 

engine of the B-17 "Flying Fortress," once thought obsolete, had made it a high-speed, h

altitude airplane. "This caused considerable excitement at the time because there wasn't a pur

ship in the airforce that could keep up with it." 17 Testing in 1939 by Ben Pinkel, Richard 

Thrner, and Fred Voss confirmed the predictions of a German, Hermann Oestrich, who sugge

that the horsepower of an engine could be increased by the redesign of the nozzles of 

airplane's tailpipes. The Power Plants Division became an advocate of ''exhaust stacks'' adde

the tailpipes of aircraft. Once they were adopted by the aircraft manufacturers, they led 

dramatic increases in performance fighter planes, including the North American P-51 and 

British Spitfire. 

18 

Laboratory staff was less enthusiastic about its work on the Allison liquid-cooled eng

Although many of their research programs were simply a carryover of work begun at Lang
Chief of the Army Air Forces, counted on the Cleveland laboratory to assist in the redesign of 

Allison supercharger and intercooler.20 Three engines were sent to the laboratory. Schey's d

sion investigated the supercharger to give it better performance. Rothrock's division explored 

limitations in terms of knock; Finkel's division took on the problem of cooling. Moore's Eng

Components Division improved the distribution of fuel and air in the carburetor. 

The Allison engine, however, never met the expectations of the Army Air Forces. T

Cleveland Laboratory's work on the Allison engine increased its horsepower through the 

of water injection and supercharging. However, from Ben Finkel's point of view, this w

A technician readies the Allison V-1710 for test on one of the dynamometer test stands in the Engine Resea

Building. 

26 
finally have a fighter for highaltitude flight. 

THE ALTITUDE WIND TUNNEL 

As the Altitude Wind Thnnel neared completion in October 1943, Abe Silverstein tra

ferred to take over as the head of the new Engine Installation Division. Of those who made 

trek from Langley during World War II, it was Silverstein, the aerodynamicist, not a membe

the original Power Plants Division, who would leave an indelible mark on the technical hist

of the laboratory. A native of Terre Haute, Ind., Silverstein had graduated from Rose Polytech

Institute in 1929 with a degree in mechanical engineering. When the NACA hired him, he w

assigned to work on the design for the full-scale tunnel. Silverstein quickly immersed himsel

the project that launched his career. With the tunnel completed, Silverstein landed the job as h

of the tunnel's research program, largely devoted to measuring the drag and performa

characteristics of specific airplanes. His first paper, published in 1935, tackled the problem 

wind tunnel interference with reference to wing placement and downwash at the tail. 23 

Hap Arnold wanted the new Altitude Wind Thnnel pressed into service at the earliest po

ble moment.24 Had better German facilities for altitude research contributed to their eng

superiority during the early years of the war? Wright Aeronautical and Pratt & Whitney w

developing increasingly powerful engines, but the achievement of adequate engine cooling elu

the efforts of the overburdened engine companies. Only through full-scale testing in the new w

tunnel could these problems be analyzed and solved. With the amount of electricity required 

operate the tunnel for a single test equivalent to the daily needs of a small city, no single eng

company could have afforded to build and operate it Yet full-scale engine testing thrust the NA

squarely into development, heretofore the bailywick of industry. With such a large and expens

facility, would the NACA be able to return to fundamental research at the end of World War 

While the aerodynamics of the tunnel were worked out at Ames, A. W. Young and L

Monroe took charge of overall design and construction, an undertaking that presented unus

engineering challenges.25 Steel shortages delayed the fabrication of the nickle-steel shell of 

tunnel. Even after a review of the original plans by Beverly G. Gulick reduced the structural s

requirements by 250 tons, it was difficult to pry steel loose from the federal procurement sys

until the tunnel's rating was changed to priority. One of the fruits of the cordial relations that 

Sharp had established with the Chamber of Commerce was the temporary assignment to 

NACA of Clifford Gildersleeve. When procurement reached a crisis in April 1942, Gildersle

was able to expedite delivery, and construction was begun in July 1942 by the Pittsburgh-D

Moines Steel Company. 

Part of the expense and complexity of the tunnel resulted from its requirement for an ex

sive refrigeration system to serve both the Altitude Wind Thnnel and a smaller Icing Resea

Thnnel, added to the plan during construction. Although the NACA excelled in wind tun

design, the refrigerating equipment and heat exchanger for the tunnel were beyond its techn

expertise. More comfortable approaching the problem from the point of view of aerodynam

rather than heat transfer, NACA engineers originally proposed a scheme of cooling coils consist

of streamlined tubes. When progress on the design faltered, the NACA turned to the Carrier C

poration and its founder Willis H. Carrier. Carrier, the "father of air conditioning," was at f
Tbp: The Altitude Wind Thnnel urgently needed for full-scale engine testing. Bottom: Innovative Carrier c

pressors chill the tunnel's airstream. 

reluctant to let his already overburdened company undertake yet another war-related task, bu

finally agreed. When the job was finished, he had no regrets. He viewed the NACA project as 

life's greatest engineering achievement. Not only did it break new ground in terms of a large-s

engineering feat, but it enabled Carrier to put his skills to work for his country. He proudly w

that "because of its success, high officials in the Air Force told me that World War II was shor

ed by many months." 26 

28 
into the tunneL

Thrning vanes were added on the downstream surface to straighten the f

To get the NACA to accept his design for the heat exchanger, Carrier went straight to Vann

Bush, who was then Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD

special agency created by President Roosevelt to tap the scientific talent of the country. B

called a luncheon with Jerome Hunsaker, the new NACA Chairman, and Lewis. Carrier reve

a low opinion of the NACA's initial design: 

Dr. Lewis asked me if I thought the tests on the streamline coils at Langley Field had 

value. My answer was not polite, and I'm afraid I scared our representative by my 

outburst. I told Dr. Lewis that the boys conducting the tests did not know what it was 

all about, and that too much money and, of more importance, too much time had been 

wasted already. ''Heat transfer experts should be called in,'' I told him and suggested, 

among others, Professor William H. McAdams of Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology. 28 

So unusual was the NACA project that the Carrier Corporation had to use many ent

original components, which they built and tested themselves. Although Carrier gave little c

to the NACA, the sometimes heated give-and-take that occurred between the NACA staff and 

representatives of the Carrier Corporation contributed to the design of the remarkable hea

changer and compressor. Carrier decided to use freon-12 as a refrigerant and redesigned 

famous Carrier centrifugal compressor to be used with it. Carrier realized that, although the w

tunnel was a one-of-a-kind installation, the new compressor might have commercial applicat

after the war. In fact, it later became one of the company's standard products. Moreover, Ca

recognized that gains in terms of prestige in the engineering community more than made up 

the headaches. Postwar Carrier publicity featured the tunneL29 

While construction slowly proceeded, problems with the Wright R-3350 Duplex Cyc

became criticaL Development qf the R-3350 had been troublesome from the start. Its powe

supercharger, an indication of Wright Aeronautical's advanced work in this area, caused the 

buretor to malfunction. The attempt to switch to fuel injection in 1941 did nothing to solve 

carburetor problems. The engine's ignition was faulty; oil leaked excessively; cylinder heads b

almost a:; soon as the engine turned over. Worst of all, the engine overheated and caught fir

flight. 

Arnold was counting on the B-29 Superfortress, powered by the Wright R-3350, for 

strategic bombing of Japan from the China mainland. When the engine caused the crash of a 

totype in February 1943, it placed Arnold's plans in jeopardy. In October, with the problems 

yet solved, Arnold informed President Roosevelt that the bomber would not be ready to be 

to China until March or April of the next year because of a "holdup in production of engine

Roosevelt was furious. He wrote to General George Marshall that this was the "last straw." 31 

engine situation was now at the point of crisis. Still the Altitude Wind 'funnel was not ready 

full-scale testing of the Wright R-3350. 

Engineers at the Cleveland laboratory knew only that the perplexing problems of this c

plex engine had to be untangled. The group under Stan Moore discovered that, with a new s

bar, fuel and air mixed more efficiently in the carburetor, and cooling improved. However, t

was no time to redesign components for engines in production. The Engine Research Divi

supervised by John Collins, studied the valves of the engine and discovered that an extensio
A representative from Wright Aeronautical instructs staff on the principles of the radial engine. 

the cylinder head by the addition of a small amount of metal avoided the excessive heat t

sometimes caused the valve to collapse. This was a ''fix'' that parts manufacturers like Thomps

Products, which supplied Wright Aeronautical, could implement immediately.32 

As tunnel construction slowly inched forward, engine technology was about to 

transformed by a new propulsion system. Ironically, when the elaborate Altitude Wind Thn

was at last ready for its first test run in February 1944, the 1-16, a turbojet secretly developed 

the General Electric Company, took priority over the Wright R-3350. The entire fuselage of 

Bell Aircraft P-59A, with its wings sawed off into stubbs, was squeezed into the tunnel's caverno

space.

33 This secret test of the 1-16 foreshadowed the laboratory's radical transition to jet prop

sion after World War II. 

Technicians prepared the Wright R-3350 for the tunnel's first official tests in May. Test

solved many of the engine's problems. Abe Silverstein's group, in charge of engine installation a

testing, found that when they adjusted the cowHng of the engine and extended the baffles t

30 
in ten days of testing the entire cost of the tunnel was recaptured during this brief period o

operation." 34 

By spring 1943, it was apparent that the program laid out by the Army for the Cleve

laboratory was ''calculated to solve detailed difficulties rather than furnish foundations for 

progress." At least one member of the Power Plants Committee bemoaned this exclusive con

tration on "trouble shooting." He urged the NACA to develop "a program promising new prog

rather than mopping up ground already covered." 35 The laboratory did find the "quick fix

needed to keep engine production moving, but it is one of history's ironies that jet propul

would render obsolete most of the facilities so carefully planned by George Mead's special c

mittee. It is symbolic that America's first turbojet, rather than a piston engine, had the hono

the first test in the Altitude Wind Thnnel. In 1944, with victory in sight, the limited focus of NA

wartime engine work was clear. George Mead, with perhaps a twinge of remorse, wrote to 

Heron: "This war has certainly been a vindication of the two-row, air-cooled radial engine an

the two-speed, two-stage supercharger, so that I feel the work done here was not in vain." 36 

the facilities they designed were obsolete by the end of the war. 

BUILDING AN ESPRIT DE CORPS 

Almost without exception, the staff of the new laboratory came from outside Clevel

Addison Rothrock and Ben Pinkel took advantage of their long and lonely evenings in a new 

to expose new personnel to the nature of engineering research-not only the specific urgent p

lems that they would be required to solve during the war, but also the nature of fundame

engineering research in the NACA tradition. Just as the NACA had created an aeronau

research community at Langley in the years between World Wars I and II, they hoped to s

new propulsion community put down roots in this midwestern industrial city. 

On Wednesdays at 5:00 sharp, the research staff met to hear lectures on various aspec

engine research. New staff members were expected to take an active part in the discussions 

followed each formal presentation. One of Rothrock's first lectures illuminated the purpose of 

laboratory. He defined the common values shared by members of the government research c

munity and what distinguished the NACA engineer, who identified with the engine commu

as a whole, from the more narrow loyalty to his company of an engineer employed in indu

He pointed out that, in terms of equipment for engine research, the laboratory was prob

superior to any found in the world; but, he warned, no matter how good the facilities, it was 

quality of the staff that counted. No amount of investment in facilities could make up 

mediocrity. He advised the "fresh outs," who far outnumbered experienced engineers, that 

way to get ahead was to become an authority on one aspect of an aeronautical problem "so 

when anyone thinks of this particular phase of the field of aeronautics, he thinks of your nam

Teamwork was more important than the genius of one particular individual-"no one of us, or 

group of us, has any corner on the brains of this organization.'' Honest technical disagreem

were inevitable and usually demonstrated a lack of data, not a lack of expertise. 

Rothrock advised the young engineers to respect the technicians who worked for them. 

them know that you want your job accomplished, but don't try and bulldoze them into doing 
Rothrock stressed that what he looked for in an engineer was the ability to think logic

and to plan step-by-step tests to yield accurate and concise data. Joined to the ability to conce

a test was the need to analyze the data. Anyone could report data, but few could take the n

information and draw broad conclusions to show the way "this small group of pieces fits into 

main picture.'' Finally, the new knowledge had to be published in a report that could 

understood and used by industry. 37 

Because knowledge is the end product of a research laboratory, the preparation of 

research report received special emphasis in the orientation of new engineers. Pearl Yo

described the role of the Editorial Office in assisting engineering authors to present their d

"tactfully, strategically, and with telling force." 38 These were the words of an editor who kn

that the readership for the NACA report was the aircraft industry. Unless the report was accur

and well organized, innovations carefully proposed by the government researcher after labori

testing would go no farther than the bookshelf. Young had high editorial standards. She brou

the traditions of the Langley Editorial Office to Cleveland and trained its new staff-among th

Margaret Appleby, a woman of grace and efficiency, who later headed the office from 1951 u

her retirement in 1987. 

The preparation of a NACA report was a long process-so long that some industry repres

tatives complained that they did not always receive them in time to be useful. First, a report w

reviewed carefully by a committee composed of the writer's engineering peers. After revisi

authors were assigned to an editorial clerk, responsible for reading rough drafts and checking 

curacy. Young described the painstaking labor of preparing a report, which was ''checked a

rechecked for consistency, logical analysis, and absolute accuracy." 39 The point of publish

reports was to communicate new knowledge to industry to be used to improve engine desig

However, the shop tricks, instruments, or techniques developed to analyze a problem were no

be shared with industry. "Antonio Stradivari," George Lewis warned, "made a success by mak

the world's finest violins and not by writing articles on how others could construct such 

struments."40 The NACA made its music by honing and keeping the unique knowledge of inst

ment specialists like Robert Tozier and Isidore Warshawsky within its walls. Later, when 

NACA became part of NASA, this in-house philosophy would change. 

Although the shaping of the professional staff had the highest priority, careful attention w

also given to the training of the support personnel by Ray Sharp himself. To recruit alert and a

young men from Cleveland area technical high schools, he created an "Apprenticeship Scho

modeled on the one he had started at Langley. Apprenticeship offered an avenue to learn a tra

such as carpentry, forging, casting, and other skills necessary in a laboratory. The apprenti

developed their own esprit de corps. In addition to on-the-job training, some 80 youths were giv

formal courses in physics and mathematics, and careful records of each apprentice's progr

were kept. Apprenticeship was ''the process of passing manual skills and necessary rela

knowledge from one person to another." This continuity guaranteed that this proud NACA sh

tradition transmitted from Langley through James Hawkins, and later carried on by people l

William Harrison, would continue. However, the apprenticeship program could not preven

serious wartime shortage of skilled machinists and tool makers because NACA employees co

32 
inactive status. 

As Cleveland's industrial plants expanded, the NACA had to compete for personnel w

companies such as Thompson Products, Eaton Industries, and Cleveland Pneumatic. A new p

to be operated by the Fisher Body Division of General Motors near the airport created an a

tional need for no fewer than 25,000 skilled workers. As the draft claimed 80 of 85 original 

prentices in the program, the head of Technical Services summed up the laboratory's prob

when he wrote plaintively in the laboratory newspaper that "idle equipment pleads for men

So acute was the shortage of skilled machine operators, electricians, metal workers, and 

strument technicians that the laboratory made a strong effort to hire women for jobs norm

taken by men. However, women generally worked in a support capacity, not one of di

engineering responsibility. A few women with college degrees in physics and chemistry mana

to enter the professional ranks, but at a time when technical schools were producing few wom

graduates, women with degrees in mechanical engineering were extremely rare. With a short

of engineers to solve pressing technical problems in aircraft propulsion, women were viewe

useful for relieving the engineer of his more repetitiv.e tasks. "Behind the research engineers w

are working on these problems must be ready hands-women's hands," a press release stat

The laboratory offered a one-year training program for women with "mechanical aptitu

with starting salaries of $1752 per year. This was the same salary paid to "junior aviators' !....

under 18 who built model airplanes for the NACA. Although the machine shop was staffed larg

by men, about 25 women were employed to work the lathes and drills. 

The staff had strong reservations about the long-term benefits of employing female work

who were expected to return to homemaking after the war. One employee commented in 

laboratory's newspaper that the trouble with the female worker was that she lacked "aptitu

ambition and perseverance' ' and changed jobs ''with no consideration of the valuable time ski

journeymen spent in training her." Men, he argued, chose nonrepetitive work because it "fe

the ambition," while women preferred "repetitive piecework" to spare themselves me

effort.42 

The utilization of women in their supporting role was carefully documented. In 1943 th

were 232 women employees at the Engine Laboratory; in 1944 their number had increased to 4

"indicative of the desire of the management to replace men with women where they can be u

at their highest skill." The laboratory made an effort to recruit women chemists, engineers, 

mathematicians, but few professional women were attracted to the laboratory during the 

years. However, there was a place for women without special training to relieve engineer

"routine, detailed work." The engineer did the brainwork: he planned his tests and made 

preliminary designs for his test equipment. Once he had broken down the job into a logical se

of small steps, women could take over. This was particularly true in the Computing Sect

which employed about 100 women. Women were used during wind tunnel testing as "d

takers.'' Probes affixed to the object under test to measure pressures provided data recorde

mercury-filled glass manometer tubes mounted on a wall near the tunnel. During the test a tu

pinching technique trapped the mercury in the manometer tubes when the desired opera

point was reached. Another method to garner test data was to photograph the manometer bo

Female "computers" then plotted the data on graphs for analysis by the engineer. The NA
labor during World War II set the pattern for the future. With few exceptions, women remai

"computers" or secretaries until the 1960s, when the demand for skills in computer science m

salaries more competitive, and men were hired in this area for the first time. It is no coincide

that Margaret Yohner, the first female division chief, came not from the traditional male divisi

but from the ranks of the "computers." 

The newspaper Wing Tips bound the laboratory community together. Engineer and appr

tice, women and men, new arrivals and old hands from Langley, all eagerly awaited this liv

amateur production. The first issue, distributed in October 1942, was turned out on a mimeogr

machine by employees with a sense of mission as well as humor. It was used to acquaint n

employees with the rich tradition inherited from Langley. Pearl Young wrote a series of artic

devoted to "The Place of NACA in American Aviation." She pointed out that in five years the s

had grown from 400 to 4000. She explained that, while the NACA was well known in aeronaut

circles, it was nearly unknown to the general public. This was by choice. "A research organizat

not in business to make money, gains nothing by blowing its own horn, and the results of a s

accumulation of fundamental knowledge does not often produce spectacular results." Nev

theless, the NACA cowling and the family of low-drag air foils developed by Eastman N. Jac

were impressive contributions to aeronautics. Young spurred the new recruits to identify with 

tradition as they were assimilated into the organization. ''There are just as many aeronaut

research problems for you to solve by the application of brains and hard work as there were 

the day Orville Wright piloted the first airplane at Kitty Hawk in 1903."44 This remark w

Staff in the machine shop. 

34 
Wartime social life centered around the laboratory. 

prophetic of the engineering challenges of jet propulsion that awaited these young engineers 

the war. 

Wing Tips combined employee education with interesting quasi-gossip in the form of "

by Lines," by Mary Lou Gosney. Her central post as receptionist in the lobby of the Admini

tion Building made her an information crossroad. In addition to devoting space to articles on 

ministrative changes, specific research projects, and social and sporting events, the newsp

portrayed the colorful Langley personalities as they assumed leadership after the "trek" f

Langley. The pages of Wing Tips reflected a "do-it-yourself" attitude when materials were sc

and the hours long. Enthusiasm for hard work and cooperation overcame the problems 

critical housing shortage, rationing, and forced car-pooling. 

Because of the youth of the staff, most of whom came to the laboratory unmarried, 

hours socials and sports clubs were important in creating an esprit de corps. There were eno

displaced New Yorkers from the City College of New York to support an alumni group. Not 

prisingly, the laboratory celebrated a large number of marriages among employees in its e

years. NicNACA, a volunteer group elected by the staff, put on dances and parties. The 

marked the completion of each new building with a social event. When the Machine Shop 

ready, it was transformed for one evening into a roller rink. The laboratory provided plots for 

tory Gardens and organized enormously successful War Bond and Red Cross fund drives. 

Although the Langley contingent shaped the engineering culture of the new en

laboratory, their NACA traditions took root in urban soil. Unlike the contempt of native Hamp

ians for Langley's "NACA nuts," Clevelanders regarded the new federal facility as a feather in 

city's cap. The staff participated in community activities from leadership of Boy Scout troop

variety show benefits. The cordiality of the city-laboratory relationship was due in no s

measure to the efforts of Ray Sharp, who promoted the involvement of local, state, and fed

officials in the well-being of the laboratory-a vital link sorely missed in the 1970s, when 

laboratory could no longer take Congressional support for granted. 
new buildings, the whole laboratory turned out for the outdoor dedication. They were regaled 

speeches by NACA and military representatives on the laboratory's future role in advancing av

tion. Mayor Frank J. Lausche hoped that the laboratory would be a boon to Cleveland's industri

"We were the cradle of the auto industry, but we lost it," he lamented. "We don't intend to ha

the same thing happen again!' At the climax of the ceremony William T. Holliday, head 

Standard Oil, solemnly presented the American flag to John Victory on behalf of the Clevela

Chamber of Commerce. Victory l~id it in the hands of Ray Sharp. As a recording of the S

Spangled Banner was played, the flag was solemnly raised. Orville Wright, who attended t

ceremony with other members of the Main Committee, wryly commented to the Cleveland Pr

that some 40 years ago he and his brother had worked in a "mite smaller lab."45 

The enduring legacy of the war years was the creation of a new propulsion research co

munity that cut its teeth on the piston engine, and through its participation in solving wartim

engine problems, absorbed NACA traditions that would continue their hold on the laboratory w

into the space age. The piston engine provided a solid apprenticeship. Combustion, heat transf

and the perplexing aerodynamic problems of the supercharger offered a strong foundation 

which to tackle future problems of jet propulsion. A young and eager staff, led by a few season

Langley hands, stood poised on the edge of a new era. 

When the laboratory was dedicated on May 20, 1943, the NACA Main Committee met in Cleveland. Left 

right: Charles G. Abbott, Major General Oliver P. Echols, William F. Durand, Orville Wright, Jerome C. Hu

saker, Theodore P. Wright, Rear Admiral Ernest M. Pace, Francis W Reichelderfer, and Lyman ]. Briggs

36 
H- H. Arnold to Mr. Lovett, Fuel Injector Directive, 3 November 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 4

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. For a guide to the H. H. Arnold Papers, see Marvi

McFarland, "The H. H. Arnold Collection," LC Quarterly journal of Current Acquisitions, IX (4):171

At the time of the Lindbergh interview, Arnold was Assistant Chief of the Army Air Corps. He suc

ed Westover as Chief of the Army Corps in September 1939. He was named Chief of the Arm

Forces in 1941, Commanding General in 1942, and Full General in 1943. 

By the end of the war, the performance of Pratt & Whitney's R-2800 was equal to that of the BMW

but not before six complete engine failures and 26 partial failures had caused P-47 fighters to c

Arnold urged that "drastic measures be taken to remedy such a terrible situation." General Arno

General Echols, "Engine Failures of P-47's," 17 April 1943, H. H. Arnold Papers, 42/76, Manu

Division, Library of Congress. See also Robert Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines (Bo

Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1950). p. 230; note 21, p. 523. 

2 Arnold to Hunsaker, 14 October 1942, National Archives, Record Group 255, 62-A-411. Copy in N

History Office Archives. Debate over the engine situation in the Power Plants Committee result

a stinging response to Arnold's charges by Arthur Nutt of Wright Aeronautical and Leonard S. H

of Pratt & Whitney. Hobbs went so far as to insist that a long rebuttal be inserted in the revised mi

of the meeting. The Army Air Forces, he argued, had demanded speed "to the exclusion of 

qualities, and as far as he knew, they had obtained it." He felt that there was a basic fallacy in Arn

assessment of the nation's engine needs. Small engines would never be superior to large ones, an

believed that reliance on "small engines to eventually get the initiative and step above the German

simply the continuation of a basic error which could not be corrected by any kind or amount of co

trated laboratory work." Minutes of the Power Plants Committee, 11 December 1942, Nat

Archives, Record Group 255, Power Plants Committee Files. For an example of prewar NACA 

damental engine research, see Oscar W. Schey, Benjamin Pinkel, and Herman H. Ellerbrock, Jr., 

rection of Temperatures of Air-Cooled Engine Cylinders for Variation in Engine and Cooling C

tions," NACA Technical Report 645, 1939. 

3 Helen Ford, "From Historical Viewpoint." Letter to Miss Scott, 23 December 1942, in History loos

NASA Lewis Records. 

4 Rudolf F. Gagg, "State of the Work on the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory of the National Adv

Committee for Aeronautics," 11 February 1941, NASA Lewis Records, 34/110. 

5 Interview with the author and notes courtesy of Charles Stanley Moore, 9 August 1984. 

6 Transcript of interview with Ben Pinkel, 4 August 1985, p. 4. 

7 Letter from Ray Sharp to Vera Sharp, 28 December 1941, Private Papers of Mrs. Edward R. S

Biographical information on Sharp from Roland, Model Research, p. 175; Cleveland Press, 23 Septe

1942; miscellaneous clippings and press releases from Sharp biography file, NASA History O

Robert Graham, "Four Giants of the Lewis Research Center," NASA TM-83642. On the cost-p

fixed-fee, see Richard Polenberg, War and Society (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1972), p. 12-13

8 Boys Grown Thl/, A Story of American Initiative, a book privately published by the Cleveland Plain D

1944, p. 41-42. Case Western Reserve University Archives. 

9 The Wright R-2600 engine was produced at the company's new Lockland plant near Cincinnati, Ohio. 

lems may have been caused by supercharger development begun in 1937 after the engine was in 

duction. In addition, Wright had to switch to the Holley carburetor around 1941 because of co

problems. See Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 525, note 23. However, its problem

pear ultimately to be traceable to production, not design. An investigation, carried out 5 April 194

R. A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War, concluded that management was not competent, especia

the lower echelons; defective materials caused corrosion and rust of cylinders; and inspections 

faulty. A second investigation carried out by Senator Harry Truman resulted in a shift in producti

the Lockland plant from the R-2600 to the R-3350 on 26 February 1944. Documents can be foun

the ASC History Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. 

10 Biographical information on Carlton Kemper from Wing Tips, 8 January 1942, NASA Lewis Tech

Library. 
in a Spark-Ignition Engine," NACA Report 704, 1941; and Cearcy D. Miller, "A Study by High-Spe

Photography of Combustion and Knock in a Spark-Ignition Engine," NACA Report 727, 1942. (Mi

changed his name to Carl David Miller in the late 1940s.) 

The best discussion of the NACNs focus on the diesel is Ira H. Abbott, "A Review and Comment

of a Thesis by Arthur L. Levine Entitled 'United States Aeronautical Research Policy, 1915-1958

Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,' dated 196

NASA History Office HHN-35, 1964, p. 129-133. A review of introductions to Annual Reports of 

NACA, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) from 1936 to 1940 revealed that by 19

the NACA was no longer concentrating exclusively on the diesel but did not give it up entirely un

1940. It was noted by C. S. Moore that NACA research on fuel sprays and combustion chambers h

been incorporated into diesel engines built today. 1930s NACA fuel-spray technology can be found 

the combustors of current turbojet engines. See also Hartley A. Soule, "Synopsis of the History of 

Langley Research Center (1915-1939)," typescript, Langley Research Center Archives, p. 74; S. 

Heron, Development of Aviation Fuels (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harv

University, 1950). p. 555-558, 618. In 1937 the NACA, the Army Air Corps, and the Navy Bureau 

Aeronautics supported the creation of a petroleum laboratory at the National Bureau of Standards 

which paraffin hydrocarbons were studied intensively. 

12 George Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 244-252; interview by author with Edmund Bisson, 22 March 1985. 

terview with Irving Pinkel by Walter Bonney, 22 September 1973, p. 4, NASA History Office Archiv

Washington, D.C. 

13 Wing Tips, 16 July 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. 

14 Interview by author with John C. Sanders, 7 April 1986. Sanders may have mistakenly recalled that Sch

had gone to Germany. Other conversations have led me to conclude that it was on Lewis's 1936 t

that he saw the Schey reports. 

15 Wing Tips, 16 July 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. Why the NACA neglected to focus on superchar

development, a field in which it had pioneered, in the 1930s is a question to which no one has giv

a definitive answer. However, it is possible that the NACA thought that the supercharger served mer

to give better fuel distribution, rather than to squeeze greater performance out of the engine at h

altitudes. By default, it appears that the geared centrifugal supercharger, originally developed in Gr

Britain at the Royal Aircraft Establishment and manufactured in the United States by General Elect

had become standard on most aircraft engines. However, the NACA was not alone in its neglect 

research on the supercharger. Robert Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 501-502, 

tributes the relatively late development of the supercharger to a general failure on the part of the eng

community to "realize what was to be gained by it, and this in turn was due to a rather astonish

lack of detailed information about what existing superchargers were actually doing." He credits Wri

Aeronautical with recognizing that improvement of the supercharger depended on a more thorou

understanding of fluid mechanics. 

16 Wing Tips, 9 July 1943. NASA Lewis Technical Library. 

17 Ben Pinkel, "Smoker Thlk," Thermodynamics Division, 24 May 1944, History looseleaf, NASA Le

Records. 

18 Ibid. Also Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 268. 

19 A complete list of Research Authorizations through 2 April 1945 can be found in 34/376, NASA Le

Records. 

20 On the checkered history of the Allison V-1710 see Major J. H. Doolittle to H. H. Arnold, "Allison Engine

19 January 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 42/76, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. See also "C

History of the V-1650," W-61348, History Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson 

Force Base, Dayton, Ohio; and Alexander De Seversky, Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon a

Schuster, 1942), p. 235. 

21 Interview with Ben Pinkel by the author, 2 August 1985. 

22 See discussion by Robert Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, comparing the Allison V-1710 a

the Merlin, p. 309-313. 

38 
, 

g, 

g, py

journal of the Aeronautical Sciences 16:197-226. Silverstein also gave the 49th Wilbur Wright Mem

Lecture, "Researches in space flight technology," journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 65:779-

24 H. H. Arnold to J. C. Hunsaker, 2 December 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 44/123, Manuscript Divi

Library of Congress. 

25 Ernest Whitney speech in History looseleaf, NASA Lewis Records. See also: A. W. Young and L. L. Mon

"Design and Performance Specifications for Altitude Wind Thnnel," revised ed., 15 June 1943. 

26 Margaret Ingels, Father of Air Conditioning: Willis Haviland Carrier (New York: Arno Press, 1972, repri

Doubleday, 1952 ed.), p. 97. For further information on Willis Carrier, see Robert Friedman, "The 

Conditioned Century," American Heritage, August-September 1984, p. 20-33; Cloud Wampler, Dr. W

H. Carrier; Father of Air Conditioning (New York: The Newcomen Society of England American Bra

1949). I am also indebted to Mr. E. P. Palmatier, former employee of the Carrier Corporation, fo

letter of 29 May 1987, which describes Carrier's achievement in detail. 

27 Ingels, Father of Air Conditioning, p. 99. See also memo by L. L. Lewis, 26 September 1956, "Carrie

World War II Wind Thnnel Air Conditioning," United Thchnologies Archives, East Hartford, Con

28 Ibid, p. 98. 

29 Memo by L. L. Lewis, "Carrier in World War II Wind Thnnel Air Conditioning," United Technolo

Archives. 

30 Thomas M. Coffey, Hap (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), p. 334. See also Steve Birdsall, Saga o

Super{ortress (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980). 

31 MichaelS. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale Univ

ty Press, 1987). p. 160. 

32 Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 251-253. Also interviews with John C. Sanders, 6 April1986, and Charles Sta

Moore, telephone interview, March 1985. On Wright R-3350 engine problems, see Schlaifer, Dev

ment of Aircraft Engines, p. 503-504, 525-526, and 539. 

33 The fact that the Bell P-59A (G.E.I-16) and not the Wright R-3350 for the B-29 was the first engine te

in the Altitude Wind Thnnel appears to have been kept secret even from the Carrier employees 

worked on the tunnel project. It has been documented by consulting the first volume of the orig

AWT log and confirmed by Ronald J. Blaha, "Completed Schedules of NASA Lewis Wind Thn

Facilities and Aircraft; 1944-1986" (February 1987). See also G. Merritt Preston, Fred 0. Black, Jr., 

James M. Jagger, "Altitude-Wind-Thnnel Thsts of Power-Plant Installation in Jet Propelled Figh

NACA Wartime Report, MR ESL 17, February 1946. NASA Lewis Technical Library. 

34 Memo by L. L. Lewis, "Carrier in World War II Wind Thnnel Air Conditioning," United Technolo

Archives. 

35 H. C. Dickinson, National Bureau of Standards, to George Lewis, 12 March 1943, 34/376, NASA L

Records. 

36 Mead to Heron, 21 December 1944, quoted in Cary Hoge Mead, Wings Over the World (Wauwatosa, W

Swannet Press, 1971), p. 275. 

37 Addison M. Rothrock, "Address Made to Research Staff at AERL," 30 December 1942. History loose

NASA Lewis Records. 

38 Wing Tips, 3 September 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. 

39 Ibid. 

40 George Lewis to Cleveland, "Reports on Instruments and Subjects for Bulletins," 4 October 1944, 34/3

NASA Lewis Records. 

41 Wing Tips, 2 April 1943; 24 December 1942; 22 January 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. See 

"NACA Apprenticeship Manual," 1 October 1954, NASA Lewis Photo Lab Collection. 

42 Wing Tips, 12 February 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. 
44 Wing Tips, 14 May 1943 and 28 May 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Library. Also, memos from Langley 

chives, courtesy of James Hansen. See also Hansen's discussion of women at Langley, particularly P

Young, in Engineer in Charge NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19

p. 206-207. 

45 Cleveland Press, 20 May 1943 and 21 May 1943; Wing Tips, 21 May 1943, NASA Lewis Technical Libr

40 
-}ET PROPULSION: 

~ - Too LITTLE, 

~111 Too LATE 

Late in 1943, when the first turbojet engine was brought to the Cleveland laboratory, the 

tire subject of aircraft jet propulsion was so secret that only eight members of the laboratory 

were aware that the British and the Germans had actually flown aircraft powered by this radic

new type of engine. Ben Pinkel, Chief of the Thermodynamics Division, recalled that he 

seven other members of his division were summoned to the Administration Building to a spe

meeting with Ray Sharp and Colonel Donald Keirn of Wright Field. They were sworn to sec

and told the remarkable story of how the United States had obtained a valuable piece 

technology from the British-the plans for the Whittle turbojet engine.

1 

Keirn reported that in April 1941 General Arnold had learned during a visit to Englan

the development of a turbojet engine by Air Commodore Frank Whittle. At a meeting at L

Beaverbrook's estate outside London, Arnold was surprised when his host, Churchill's mini

of aircraft production and one of his most intimate advisors, turned to him and said, ''What wo

you do if Churchill were hung and the rest of us in hiding in Scotland or being run over by 

Germans, what would the people in American do? We are against the mightiest army the w

has ever seen.'' Those present at the meeting agreed that Germany could invade England ''anyt

she was willing to make the sacrifice.' '

2 This was the context in which Great Britain agree

turn over the plans for the Whittle turbojet engine, provided utmost secrecy were maintained 

a strictly limited number of persons were involved in its development. Arnold personally 

spected the Whittle engine several weeks before its first flight and arranged to have Gen

Electric's Supercharger Division at West Lynn, Mass., take on the American development of W

tle's prototype. Arnold selected Bell Aircraft of Buffalo, N.Y., to work concurrently on an airfr

for a fighter, or pursuit-type aircraft. 3 

Arnold dispatched Keirn to England in August. He returned two months later with the p

for the Whittle WZB (an improvement of the original model), and an actual engine, the W1X

addition to the plans and the engine itself, Keirn arranged to bring to the United States on

Whittle's engineers and several technicians. Frank Whittle himself, the new engine's desig

visited the project during the time of intense development at General Electric's Supercha

Division at West Lynn, Mass. So new was the concept of a compressor-turbine combination 

pelling an airplane that, even with the plans and the reassembled engine, the supercharger exp

remained skeptical. The British engineer recalled that ''until we pushed the button and sho

this thing running, the Americans wouldn't believe it would work." 4 The General Electric gr

41 
Arnold's selection of the General Electric Supercharger Division was no coincidence

1917, at a time when there was a general lack of interest in superchargers, Sanford M

pioneered the development of a turbosupercharger, a turbine that utilized the waste gases in 

engine exhaust, a concept first advanced by the Frenchman Auguste Rateau. At General Electr

West Lynn Plant this work continued under Army sponsorship until Moss retired in 1937. Par

the success of the General Electric turbosupercharger must be attributed to the developmen

materials for the turbine. Special alloys, such as Hastelloy B for the turbine blades, Timkin all

and later Vitallium for the turbine disks, enabled the turbine to withstand the extre

temperatures of the gases that passed through it. 5 

Colonel Edwin R. Page, Chief of the Power Plant Branch at Wright Field from 1926 to 19

played an important role in encouraging Moss's work. Page calmly kept faith, despite w

appeared to be an enormous waste of goverment funds, while turbines at General Electric expl

ed to the right and left of him. 6 Because of his association with the development of Gene

Electric's supercharger, the Army called on Colonel Page to nurture the relationship betw

General Electric and the fledgling NACA laboratory in Cleveland. He was appointed 

laboratory's first Army liaison officer in May 1943. 

So secret was the development of the Whittle engine that only after the classification of 

project was downgraded from "super-secret" to "secret" early in the summer of 1943 was Ke

allowed to inform the NACA of this important project-over two years after Arnold's visit 

England. Keirn furnished the select group at the meeting in Sharp's office with a set of plans 

General Electric for a Jet Propulsion Static Test Laboratory, which was begun in July. Pin

picked Kervork K. Nahigyan to head the new Jet Propulsion Section. 

In September contractors had hastily completed an inconspicuous one-story building at 

Cleveland laboratory. It was surrounded by a barbed wire fence at the edge of the airport's r

way. A heavily guarded truck delivered the General Electric I-A for testing. 7 The Static T

Laboratory consisted of spin pits lined with wood to protect workers from the dangers of bla

flying off in all directions when engine compressors reached their limits during endurance testi

The secret work carried on in this modest structure, set apart from the carefully designed perm

nent laboratory buildings for the investigation of the piston engine-would, after the war, beco

the major effort of the entire laboratory. 

If the success of the Whittle engine was news to the group in Sharp's office, the jet prop

sion concept was not. Pinkel and Nahigyan had assisted work at Langley on a jet propuls

device, inspired and directed by one of the NAC/t s outstanding aerodynamicists, Eastman Jaco

The Army had unceremoniously canceled this project the previous February. 

Before World War II, many experts throughout the world shared the assumption that be

aircraft engines would result from small improvements of the components of the piston 

reciprocating engine. Because the aircraft engine was an adaptation of the automobile engi

radical innovations were expected to appear first in the automobile engine. Roy Fedden, then 

engineer for the Bristol Aeroplane Company, wrote in an article ironically titled, "Next Decad

Aero Engines Will Be Advanced But Not Radical," published in the 'Iransactions of the Society 

Automotive Engineers in 1933: "I do not anticipate any radical changes in the type of four-cy

internal-combustion engine as used today ... When the present form of gasoline engine 

superceded by a radically different power unit, it seems logical that this development will m

42 
into aircraft.

Fedden s prediction was 

wide of the mark, for it was precisely 

Whittle's independence from the 

automotive background of traditional 

power plant experts that enabled him to 

seek a new engine uniquely suited for 

flight. 

In 1940 the sections within 

Langley's Power Plants Division reflected 

the conventional, incremental approach to 

the reciprocating engine. Unconventional 

power plants, radically new means of aircraft propulsion, had no place in the 

research of the division. Typical of the 

evolutionary rather than revolutionary, 

approach to engine development during 

the 1930s was the study of the fin 

geometry necessary to cool individual 

cylinders. NACA research suggested 

methods to improve the baffles and 

cylinder shrouds to direct air around the 

Arnold appointed Colonel Edwin R. Page to be the Ar

liaison with the laboratory in 1943 because of his expe

in turbosupercharger development. 

cylinder for better cooling. One of the important reports issued by the NACA in 1939 conce

a method for predicting how much engine temperatures would fluctuate as the ambient 

temperature changed. Cylinders from seven engine types were compared to establish this pre

tion method.9 

The architects of the turbojet revolution, however, did not inherit the evolutionary appro

of automotive engineers. Whittle and Hans von Ohain (who developed a turbojet independe

in Germany) were able to look at aircraft propulsion with a freshness lacking among the en

experts in Europe and the United States. The positive qualities of flying the gas turbine mad

for the deficiencies observed in stationary industrial turbines. Whittle wrote: "There seeme

be a curious tendency to take it for granted that the low efficiencies of turbines and compres

commonly cited were inevitable. I did not share the prevalent pessimism because I was convin

that big improvements in these efficiencies were possible, and, in the application of jet propul

to aircraft, I realized that there were certain favourable factors not present in other app

tions.' '

10 The first positive factor that he singled out was that low temperatures at high altitu

actually made the engine more efficient. More energy was available to power the airpl

Second, Whittle thought the forward speed of the aircraft created a ram effect, which incre

the efficiency of the compressor; third, only a portion of the energy released into the turbine 

to be used to drive the compressor-the rest could be used for propulsive thrust. These were 

criteria of an engineer-test pilot. Although Whittle also had a strong background in aerodynam

it did not play a significant role in his early thinking. 

Jet propulsion was not a new idea when Frank Whittle and Hans von Ohain took up the 

turbine problem. 

11 Every airplane, in fact, is propelled by a stream of air. The forward motio
air that rushes backward to drive the aircraft forward. In a jet engine, however, the air is funne

into the engine, compressed, and heated. The air stream has reached a high velocity by the ti

it is ducted out the back end. Jet propulsion devices were conceived as early as c. 150 B.C. wh

Hero of Alexandria designed an aeolipile that produced jets of hot steam to rotate a spherical b

In the late 18th century a British inventor patented the first gas turbine design, and by the ea

20th century, through the innovations of Charles Parsons and others, industrial steam turbi

were in general use for power generation. However, until the early 1930s few dreamed that 

heavy turbines then in industrial use could be made light enough to be flown. Between the c

cept of a gas turbine and a successful aircraft engine lies the pitted terrain of development. 

Successful development involves a combination of technical ingenuity and determination 

the part of the inventor. A less tangible factor, the role of scientific theory in invention, is m

difficult to determine. 

12 In the case of the turbojet, the theoretical understanding of the scien

of fluid mechanics was far ahead of the ability to design practical machines. Although Americ

and German theorists had directed attention to an understanding of the aerodynamics of b

axial and centrifugal superchargers for aircraft, there is little evidence that this understand

played a direct role in the development of the turbojet. 

When Whittle began to consider the idea of using a gas turbine to propel an airplane ab

1928 to 1929, many engineering experts had already concluded that jet propulsion had no futu

The report prepared at the National Bureau of Standards by Edgar Buckingham at the request 

the engineering division of the U.S. Air Service in 1923 was typical of generally accepted opini

Buckingham's report concluded that at the highest speeds (which at the time were not more th

250 miles per hour) a jet engine would consume five times the amount of fuel of a conventio

engine-propeller combination. He thought that its weight and complexity would make flying 

possible. Buckingham recommended against any further research on jet propulsion, conced

only that if thrust augmenters could be made workable, there might be some future for a jet p

pulsion device as a prime mover. 

13 

This suggestion may have encouraged Eastman Jacobs to take up the problem of thr

augmenters in 1926. Although this work had no practical application at the time, "this stu

stirred in Jacobs the beginnings of a strong interest in high-speed aerodynamics." 14 As early 

1935, at the Fifth Volta Congress in Rome, Italy, the world's leading aerodynamicists gave serio

consideration for the first time to the theoretical feasibility of flight at speeds at or faster than 

speed of sound. A German aerodynamicist, Adolf Busemann, suggested in his Volta paper tha

sweptback wing could solve some of the compressibility problems that aircraft would encoun

at extremely high speeds. 15 However, in the 1930s aerodynamicists and propulsion experts 

not see how their fields complemented each other. Although theoretically it seemed possible 

fly faster than the speed of sound, a propeller-driven aircraft could never reach the necess

speeds. The engine manufacturers were oblivious to the implications of the high-speed c

ference. According to von Ohain, "it should have scared the hell out of them ... because t

showed that the airplane, sooner or later, could easily break the supersonic barrier.' '

16 That wo

render the piston engine obsolete. 

However, contrary to Edward W. Constant's thesis in The Origins of the Thrbojet Revoluti

Whittle and von Ohain revolutionized aircraft propulsion, not because of a knowledge 

aerodynamics superior to that of American engineers, but through their insight that 

44 
have influenced Whittle and von Ohain, there is little evidence that this relatively unstu

phenomenon in the 1930s was a factor in their decision to look for a radically new type of po

plant for aircraft. Rather, it appears that both were drawn to the turbojet because of its simpl

and potential as a power plant specially adapted to aircraft. It was their independence from 

automotive-aircraft engineering tradition that enabled them to think outside the paths of acce

practice. When they began their work, the aircraft reciprocating engine had become a m

boggling example of mechanical complexity. To attain higher speeds, designers added cylinde

increase power. To compensate for the decreased density of the air at higher altitudes that redu

power, they added superchargers. With added cylinders and superchargers, cooling becam

problem solved by the addition of yet another component, the intercooler. In contrast to the 

ficult to maintain array of components and subcomponents, the turbojet offered the possibilit

a light-weight engine of extraordinary simplicity. The engine, as conceived by Whittle and 

Ohain, potentially could perform better at the higher altitudes that caused problems for 

reciprocating engine, and its efficiency was likely to increase with speed. 

Like Whittle, von Ohain started with the idea that flight required a power plant spec

adapted to motion through the air. His enthusiasm stemmed from the insight that an engine 

burned continuously was "inherently more powerful, smoother, lighter and more compat

with the aero-vehicle" than the clumsy four-stroke cycle of a piston engine. His first idea wa

''accomplish this process without employing moving machinery by bringing the inflowing f

air in direct contact with the expanding combustion gas,'' a kind of ram jet. 18 However, he s

realized that in order to get an efficient engine he needed to separate the two phases of comp

sion and expansion. He finally arrived at a turbojet configuration similar to that of Whittle, wh

1930 patent he did not discover until after the development of his own design. 19 Von Oha

engine powered the first flight of a turbojet plane in August 1939 from the Marienehe Airfiel

Germany. 

Although the turbojet created a revolution in aircraft propulsion, it was not as radic

break with the technology of the reciprocating engine as the word revolution might imply. 

technology of the supercharger, a component added to the reciprocating engine, provided the 

tinuity between the old technology and the new. The supercharger was, in fact, a compres

However, in the turbojet, the compressor took its place as an intrinsic part of the engine sys

For the inventors, the choice of the compressor was significant, and it was not by chance that b

Whittle and von Ohain chose a centrifugal compressor; the centrifugal supercharger was in c

mon use in conventional engines. In contrast, axial superchargers were extremely demanding 

perimental devices. Both von Ohain and Whittle knew that the centrifugal compressor w

"brute force device" and that eventually they would "go axial," but they started with the 

trifugal compressor because it was simpler to build.20 In the same year that von O

demonstrated the feasibility of the turbojet concept, Anselm Franz, Germany's expert on su

chargers, designed the first turbojet with an axial-flow compressor. 

INDEPENDENT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A TURBOJET 

Sir Henry Tizard, science advisor to the British Ministry of Aircraft Production, visited 

United States in September 1940. Although it is well known that Tizard informed his Amer

allies of British technical advances in radar and opened discussions concerning Br
and George Lewis, but he revealed very little except the seriousness of British efforts in jet prop

sion. Bush later recalled: "The interesting parts of the subject, namely the explicit way in wh

the investigation was being carried out, were apparently not known to Tizard, and at least he 

not give me any indication that he knew such details.' '

21 

In February General Arnold became aware of new and unforeseen developments in airc

propulsion from German intelligence sources. At first Arnold appears to have identified jet p

pulsion with rocket-assisted take-off, and he encouraged the setting up within the NACA of a s

committee on auxiliary jet propulsion. However, on February 25, 1941, after hearing reports 

European developments of jet-assisted take-off and, more ominous, as a primary source of pow

engine research took on new urgency. He asked Vannevar Bush, then Chairman of both 

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and the NACA, to form a jet propulsion commit

with a much wider mandate. He was concerned that the Germans' experimental use of rock

to assist take-off would make existing fighter planes obsolete. Arnold considered the Arm

supported work at the California Institute of Technology inadequate. He did not expect this gro

led by the irrepressible Frank Malina and advised by aerodynamicist Theodore von Karman

yield "practical results" in the near future. Arnold stressed the urgency of giving the problem 

a "large group of able scientists.''22 

In his response to General Arnold, Bush firmly disabused him of any wishful thinking t

jet propulsion research should be undertaken by the NDRC rather than the NACA. He pointed 

that, while rockets as weaponry could legitimately come under the purview of the NDRC, airc

propulsion was the province of the NACA, an organization he greatly admired and may have u

as his model when the country called upon him to mobilize science. 23 He acknowledged that 

well-known physicist from the California Institute of Technology, Richard C. Tolman, was 

vestigating "certain aspects of rocket propulsion," but he anticipated that the research in jet p

pulsion would be long and expensive. He did not think that it was "proper for NDRC to dev

its funds to aircraft propulsion problems.'' Bush therefore recommended the formation o

special committee that would act independently but under the general umbrella of the NA

Power Plants Committee. 

24 

Before deciding on the composition of the committee and a suitable chair, Bush consul

with Rear Admiral John H. Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Towers agreed with B

that the committee should be composed of "personnel other than those who deal with conv

tional power plants" and focused on high-level scientists. He looked on Hugh L. Dryden of 

Bureau of Standards as ''particularly suitable for such a committee, where practicability sho

be combined with theoretical considerations."25 

Mter canvasing several prominent members of the aeronautical community, Bush selec

Stanford University's emeritus professor, William Frederick Durand, still vigorous at the age 

82, to head the new committee. Durand was a man of intellect and professional integrity, "ca

tolerance and the driving power of a will to work.'' 26 Durand had served as Chairman of 

NACA from 1917 to 1918. He had made his reputation in the field of aeronautics throug

systematic presentation of propeller performance data (with Everett Parker Lesley), a stand

reference work relied on by early aircraft designers. Durand's reputation as a scientist w

enhanced through his role as editor of a definitive multivolume work on aerodynamics in 

1930s. In urging Durand to assume leadership of the committee, Bush wrote: "The matter is 

46 
dent judgment of a high order, that I 

believe it is worthy of your attention as 

chairman, no matter how much you might 

be relieved on the details of the work." 

The scope and the authority of this new 

committee was to be extremely wide. 

Bush wrote that after consultation with 

Arnold, they agreed that if the committee 

concluded that "full-scale experimentation was in order,'' they would find 

"several million dollars" to fund it.27 

The new Special Committee had a 

broad responsibility to investigate all 

aspects of jet propulsion. Even members 

of the NACA would be asked to serve only 

in an ex officio capacity: "The backbone 

of the committee should be men of independent background and with them 

should be joined men of special 

capabilities in the process of evaluaWilliam F. Durand, chairman of the NACA's Spe

Committee on jet Propulsion. 

tion.''28 Pratt & Whitney, Wright Aeronautical, and Allison, the major manufacturers of pis

engines, were deliberately excluded from participation on the committee, despite the interest 

each company had shown in early jet propulsion schemes. For example, Pratt & Whitney had s

ported the development of a design by Andrew Kalitinsky of the Massachusetts Institute 

Technology and by December 1941 had learned of the successful flight of Whittle's engine fr

a friend of the pilot "who flew the British straight propulsion machine."29 Wright Aeronaut

may have learned of the Whittle engine during Tizard's visit and attempted in 1941 to negot

for the American license from Whittle's Company, Power Jets, Ltd. 

Representation by industry was limited to three manufacturers, all with prior experie

not with aircraft engines, but in industrial steam turbine design: Allis-Chalmers, Westinghou

and the General Electric Steam Thrbine Division at Schenectady, N.Y. The rationale for exclud

the engine companies from membership on the committee was not that they were too o

burdened with war-related work, because the steam turbine manufacturers were in the sa

situation. What Bush seems to have meant by the euphemism, "special capabilities in the proc

of evaluation," was that the engine companies, with a vested interest in maintaining the sta

quo, should not be included. Bush knew that engineers who worked with steam turbines had 

perience with the aerodynamics of compressors and turbines. In addition to these manufactu

and representatives of the military, Bush recommended three scientists: Professor C. Rich

Soderberg of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an authority on turbines who shoulde

the duties of vice-chairman; A.G. Christie of The Johns Hopkins University, and Hugh Dryd

The deliberate omission of the aircraft engine manufacturers may have led the committee 

underestimate what a demanding undertaking it would be to develop a new aircraft engine. M
companies had been included, they would have been more likely to favor a design with a c

trifugal compressor because of their experience with superchargers. In hindsight, it would h

been wise to include at least one design based on the centrifugal compressor. 

By April 1941 the Special Committee was ready to get to work, but the minutes show h

far they were from the turbojet concept. Still sharing Arnold's impression that jet propulsion 

volved rockets, the committee considered and dismissed Goddard's rocket experiments. By c

sensus, the committee decided that the problem of jet-assisted take-off was of greatest importa

and "the most immediately practical." Obviously, Arnold had made information on the strik

results of the California Institute of Technology's JATO (jet-assisted take-off) rockets availabl

the group. 30 

Eastman Jacobs was invited to give a full report on the progress of the jet propulsion pro

that the NACA had begun at its laboratory at Langley. No doubt Jacobs's invitation to make 

presentation to the committee was due in part to the enthusiasm that Vannevar Bush had alre

developed for the NACA scheme. In the letter he wrote to Durand asking him to chair the comm

tee, he revealed that, of the many jet propulsion proposals already submitted to the Army, 

Navy, and the NACA, the Jacobs project seemed to hold the most promise. "The group at Lang

Field and Jacobs, in particular, have been very active in developing one jet propulsion schem

which I have acquired a large amount of interest and perhaps even enthusiasm, for it seem

have great possibilities and I cannot find any flaw in their arguments." 31 

Jacobs's scheme for a ducted fan, nicknamed "Jake's Jeep" by his NACA colleagues, 

among several embryonic efforts to develop a gas turbine power plant for aircraft in the Un

States prior to the importation of the Whittle engine. 

32 Jacobs received the high-level suppor

Bush and Durand. As a result of his prestige, the designs that the industry representatives on 

Durand Committee later developed owed a great deal to preliminary studies made at Lang

Jacobs was riding a crest of prestige for the development of NACA laminar-flow airfoils. 

reputation as an aerodynamicist made the NACA effort more credible than other proposals. 

About 1931 the Italian Secondo Campini had first conceived a ducted-fan engine design, 

Jacobs may have learned of this scheme when he attended the Volta Congress in Rome in 19

The ducted fan, a hybrid scheme consisting of a conventional piston engine and compres

lacked the simplicity of the turbojet. Air entered a long cylindrical nacelle through a duct, wh

it was compressed. The section of the nacelle in back of the compressor served as a combus

chamber. Fuel was injected into the chamber and ignited. The heated gases, directed out the b

through a high-speed nozzle, produced thrust to drive the engine forward. The Campini eng

had a two-stage centrifugal compressor; Jacobs modified Campini's design. He chose an axial c

pressor with two stages. Jacobs had problems not only with the compressor, but also with 

combustor, which failed to function properly.

33 Nevertheless, in the view of Clinton E. Bro

who worked on the project, the Jeep was a sound idea. Jacobs proved the feasibility of his duct

fan concept. 34 However, compared to Whittle's far simpler design for a turbojet, its developm

in 1941 was embryonic. 

In April 1941, prior to Arnold's return from England, the Jacobs engine looked promis

enough to win the backing of the country's gas turbine experts. In its early stages, the project 

consisted of a "simple program of burning experiments." It was only after Durand placed the 

weight of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion behind the project that Jacobs expanded 

48 
At the April 22 meeting, members of the Special Committee also heard summaries of Br

reports on the development of axial-flow compressors, probably those of A. A. Griffith and Ha

Constant of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, who had been working for many years, with lim

success, on axial compressors. Their goal was a gas turbine engine to drive the aircraft's 

pellers. What the Special Committee could not know was that Whittle had chosen not to use 

more complicated axial configuration for his turbojet engine. 

By the May 8 meeting, Arnold had returned to the United States, and the Special Comm

expected to be briefed on the latest developments. Instead, because of the British impositio

a "most secret" classification on the project, the committee was merely asked to suggest 

names of two engineers to be sent to England to "make contact" with British developments i

propulsion. Durand, betraying his mistaken belief that the new British propulsion system used 

axial compressor, suggested D.R. Shoults of General Electric, ''an expert in matters relatin

axial-turbo compressors, which type of equipment forms the core of the British developmen

At the same meeting, Lewis, sharing the same prejudice in favor of the axial-flow compres

referred to the the eight-stage compressor developed by Eastman Jacobs and Eugene Wasielew

intended primarily as a supercharger. He revealed that General Electric "was intereste

developing this compressor to its full capacity since the Committee's tests had been limited to 

speeds and the use of only six of the eight stages which had been provided.'' At this point, all 

signs indicated that an axial compressor would be a significant component of any jet propul

scheme, a presumption shaped by the influence of Jacobs and the knowledge of the publicat

of the British aerodynamicists, Griffith and Constant. Future engineering practice would vindi

this decision, since the axial compressor did eventually prevail over the centrifugal.37 For sh

term wartime needs, however, Jacobs underestimated the axial-compressor's recalcitrant p

lems. The NACA would pay dearly in terms of lowered prestige for its early commitment to a

compressor development and its failure to recognize the definite advantage of the compres

turbine combination embodied in Whittle's turbojet. 

In early June Arnold sent a brief but significant memorandum to Bush. It containe

attachments a picture of the Whittle engine and a short description that had been sen

diplomatic pouch from Lieutenant Colonel J. T. C. Moore-Brabizon of the Ministry of Aircraft 

duction. Item one of the description stated: "The Whittle jet propulsion engine consists of 10 c

bustion chambers (equivalent to the cylinders of a normal engine), an exhaust gas turbin

supercharger, and an exhaust jet or nozzle." 38 Notably absent from the description was a key 

ment. Was the "supercharger" (i.e., the compressor) axial or centrifugal? 

By the end of the month, Arnold appears to have recognized the possible superiority of 

compressor-combustor-turbine combination to the hybrid piston engine-compressor-combu

combination of Jacobs's conception. In a letter dated 25 June 1941, Arnold wrote to Bush, 

cerning the Jacobs project: "As regards the 'Jacobs' engine, the Air Corps will stand ready to a

this project to the maximum extent possible; however, further conferences with N.A.C.A. per

nel and further investigation of the project as a whole indicate that this development is far f

ready for a test installation.'' Speaking in the context of his personal knowledge of the British 

cess with the Whittle engine, Arnold urged the Special Committee to consider not only jet-assi

take-off, but also jet engines as "primary sources of power." 39 
The NACA eight-stage axial-flow compressor designed by Eastman Jacobs and Eugene Wasielewski. 

In June Durand informed the committee of the Whittle project, but only in general ter

because of the classification of the project. The inquiries of Wright Aeronautical to obtain 

license to the Whittle engine from Power Jets, Ltd., however, caused a brief diplomatic flur

since it created the impression that the British-American agreement on the Whittle was comm

knowledge. As a memorandum from Bush to Arnold indicated, they had been extremely care

about what had been communicated: 

I have checked with Dr. Durand this morning. Neither he nor I have communicated 

any of the explicit [sic] information regarding the Whittle engine to any individual. Dr. 

Durand in particular tells me that when his Jet Propulsion Committee met he told 

them only that the British had a development along jet propulsion lines without giving 

them any explicit [sic] information. In fact, he did not have this information at the 

time himself. . . I am quite sure that explicit information placed in the hands of Dr. 

Durand and myself has not gone elsewhere. 

40 

It now began to dawn on Bush that development of the Whittle engine was far ahead of 

NACA project. In July he wrote to Arnold: "It becomes evident that the Whittle engine i

satisfactory development and that it is approaching production, although we yet do not know j

how satisfactory it is. Certainly if it is now in such state that the British plans call for large prod

tion in five months, it is extraordinarily advanced and no time should be lost on the matter.'' Bu

recommended that arrangements for production of the British engine in the United States sho

be expedited by the selection of a suitable company. He suggested either A.R. Stevenson 

General Electric or R.G. Allen of Allis-Chalmers, both of whom had representatives on Duran

Special Committee. The choice would depend on which company they selected to develop 

Whittle. The committee as a whole, Bush reminded him, "on account of British wishes," could 

be privy to full information about the Whittle engine. Bush now qualified his support for 

Jacobs project. If the Whittle engine was as advanced as it appeared, it deserved to be expedit

regardless of the promise of the Jacobs project over the long term: 

50 
p

y , y 

produce a relatively inexpensive power plant for pursuit craft which can be rapidly 

put into production, I feel that no time should be lost in expediting the matter. 41 

By July Arnold had selected General Electric to copy the Whittle engine. D. Roy Sho

then in England to oversee the British use of General Electric's turbosupercharger, bec

General Electric's representative, assisted by Alfred J. Lyon, the Army's technical liaison off

in Great Britain. In August Colonel Donald Keirn, the engineer from Wright Field who brou

the news to the Cleveland laboratory two years later, took off for England to bring back the W

tle engine. Later Keirn joined the Special Committee so that he was fully informed of all the 

propulsion projects, both the "most secret" Whittle project and the "secret" projects of 

Special Committee. 

While Bush and Durand steadfastly supported the NACA project, from the time of his v

to England in April, Arnold had become a believer in the future of the Whittle engine. His le

to Colonel Lyon, 2 October 1941, reveals the first discussions of a possible future Army effor

preempt the jet propulsion field and thereby end the NACA hegemony over basic aeronaut

research. However, with characteristic restraint, he refused to commit himself on this is

Clearly, he saw the turbojet as a possible answer to the problem of obtaining higher speeds 

pursuit aircraft, but he stopped short of predicting that the piston engine would be obsolete in 

years. The letter reveals Arnold's astute assessment of the possible dawning of a new era o

propulsion. 

I was told in England in April that in ten years there wouldn't be any more 

poppet valves or, as a matter of fact, any type of gas [piston] engine as we now have 

in pursuit airplanes, and another five years would see the end of that type of engine 

in all types of aircraft. I must admit that I was not as enthusiastic about such a proposition as the advocates in England were. In my 30 years in aviation I have seen too 

many of these things come up that are going to completely revolutionize everything 

and do away with all heretofore existing forms of aircraft, so while I am enthusiastic, 

I am not super-enthusiastic .. . 

I do not believe that we are ready at this time to start a development program 

tending towards the production of the jet propulsion engine on the same scale as we 

now have for the conventional type of gas engine. I am of the opinion, however, that 

it will be much easier to reach the 4,000 to 5,000 horsepower with the jet propulsion 

and gas turbine than it will be with the conventional type of engine. Everything points 

in that direction. The turbine has everything to its advantage. 

42 

Although not privy to the full Whittle story, the Durand committee had enough informa

on the Whittle engine to see the potential of the compressor-turbine combination. The commi

set up a Special Compressor-Thrbine Panel, chaired by R. C. Allen, manager of the Allis-Chalm

Steam-Thrbine Department. It should be noted that Jacobs and his team were obviously inform

of the conclusion of the panel, but persisted in their belief that the hybrid scheme would w

A letter to the panel from Henry Reid, Engineer-in-Charge at Langley, indicated that "jet pro

sion can better be accomplished at present with the use of the conventional engine."43 Reid c

ceded that a more radical approach to aircraft propulsion might prevail in the long run. 
sidered at all is difficult to determine, since all the minutes for the compressorturbine panel h

not been found. The axial compressor, because of its smaller frontal area and higher poten

pressure ratio, looked more promising on paper. However, if the axial compressor was lighter 

more compact, it demanded a knowledge of aerodynamics. The complex movement of air acr

the blades of several stages presented a challenge to the designer. The fabrication of the c

plicated compressor was a nightmare. Vibrations created the danger that compressor blades mi

fly off in all directions. The simpler solution found by Whittle and von Ohain-the centrifu

compressor-eluded the steam turbine experts on the committee. 

The same month that the compressor panel was formed, representatives of Allis-Chalm

visited Langley. "Their particular interest was the axial-flow compressor, which has been c

structed at Langley Field,'' George Lewis wrote to Durand. Lewis revealed that the results o

joint investigation with General Electric would be made available. This was obviously a refere

to the eight-stage axial-flow compressor of Jacobs and Wasielewski. All three of the compan

selected axial-flow compressors, but they decided not to attempt as many stages.44 Although 

NACA directly influenced the axial compressors in the General Electric and Allis-Chalm

designs, influence on the Westinghouse turbojet is less clear. The Westinghouse design team m

have decided to use a Brown-Boveri compressor as its model. In any case, the company w

familiar with the axial configuration through experience with axial compressors in Navy surf

vessels. 45 

When the Durand Committee met at Langley Field in September, they recommended t

Jacobs begin design studies to explore "the most suitable means for applying this system of 

propulsion to actual aircraft.'' They also decided that the preliminary studies of the compan

could be made into actual proposals for submission to the Army or Navy.

46 The Navy appro

designs for a turbojet by Westinghouse and for a type of ducted fan by Allis-Chalmers. The Ar

agreed to support General Electric's proposal for a turboprop. 

Up to the time of the submission of the proposals, the committee had allowed considera

cooperation and exchange of information among the three companies, and the NACA was a cl

inghouse for information. After the September meeting each company began to work 

dependently, and although the upper management of each company represented on the Spe

Committee was aware of the parallel development of General Electric's Whittle turbojet, 

design teams actually working on the respective projects were kept in the dark. Moreover, t

were not allowed to exchange information with designers working on the other projects sponso

by the Special Committee until Durand wrote to General 0 . P. Echols for permission for gre

cooperation. In recalling the "helpful attitude regarding mutual conference and interchange 

data and suggestions" that the companies had enjoyed prior to the awarding of specific des

contracts, he urged that it be allowed to continue.47 

While the members of the Special Committee knew about the "Whittle matter," as did sel

ed high-level individuals at General Electric, Arnold would not allow the Whittle engine to 

tested at Langley Field because of the British "most secret" classification. Nevertheless, Olive

Echols, Chief of the Material Division, was aware of the development problems that the West Ly

team was encountering and urged Arnold to let General Electric send the Whittle engine for test

in NACA wind tunnels. In a memorandum addressed to General Arnold, 13 November 1941, 

wrote: "As we get deeper into the Bell XP-59A and GE Type I Supercharger Projects, we find t

52 
16-foot tunnel at Moffet Field (Ames) or the 19-foot pressure tunnel at Langley. Noted in larg

ters on the memo was "Decision is NO!" with the appended note: "General Echols advised 

he had discussed this matter with Gen. A, this date, and that Gen. A did not wish to tunne

at NACA in view of the 'secrecy' of project. Therefore it will be necessary to proceed without 

nel tests planning on testing for 2nd attack if first attempt is a 'bust'. " 48 

If the committee had encouraged at least one American design based on the centri

compressor, more rapid progress would have been apparent. Kept in the dark, those makin

initial decisions did not know that part of the success of the Whittle engine depended on its 

ple centrifugal compressor. Progress on all four of the projects of Durand's Special Comm

was slow. In June 1942, Vannevar Bush raised doubts.about the wisdom of exclusive relianc

the axial compressor. Referring to ''the secret development being carried on by the Ge

Electric Company on compressors for use in jet propulsion,'' he wanted to know whethe

special panel that "had previously provided for the interchange of information on compr

design" should be reconvened. Durand responded that A. R. Stevenson, Jr., General Elec

representative on the committee "had expressed the view that the time had passed for suc

interchange of views." 49 In November Stevenson reassured the committee that, although it 

behind schedule, their "troubles" were routine. These "troubles" were directly related to 

compressor: "We are becoming quite worried about vibration of the blades on the axial-flow 

pressor." He reported that their experimental four-stage compressor, like the one at Langley

lost its blades. "We believe it was due to fatigue caused by pulsating air force." 50 Ge

Electric's turboprop, the TG-100/T31, reached the test stand by 1943. Although a turboprop 

vides more efficient propulsion at modest speeds, the gearing to connect the gas turbine to 

propeller adds mechanical complexity. The simplicity of the turbojet probably induced Ge

Electric engineers to design the succeeding model, the TG-180/J35, as a turbojet. Nevertheles

tricky axial compressor made significant progress slow. Support for the Allis-Chalmers desig

a ducted fan with double paths of cool and hot air was dropped by the Navy in 1943, whe

company obtained the license to build a British Havilland-Halford jet propulsion unit. 

Centrifugal compressor. 

Of the three designs sub

ted by the steam turbine man

turers, only the Westinghouse 

turbojet actually reached f

testing before the end of W

War II. The company pro

called it the "Yankee" becau

was the product of Amer

engineerir.g. It appears that 

Kroon, head of the team tha

tually built the ''Yankee,'' did 

know of the British developm

prior to 1943. However, even i

Westinghouse unit, a British 

for a ring of individual combu

around the central shaft of 
design, Stuart Way mentioned their problems in a meeting of a NACA combustion subcommi

"It so happened that a GE man said that the problem was very simple_!all you have to do 

take a tin can and punch some holes in it and you will have a combustion chamber.' " 51 

story also belies the view that the two divisions within General Electric worked in comp

ignorance of what the other was doing. At some point the engineers at West Lynn and Schenec

may have exchanged information, because the TG-100, the General Electric project at Schenect

also used multiple combustor cans. Glenn Warren, one of its designers, called the idea one of 

most important aspects of British-American cooperation.

52 

Jacobs never had the benefit of the British solution to the combustion problem. Unaw

that turbojets had already passed their bench tests in England and Germany, Langley engin

struggled to perfect Jacobs's hybrid scheme. The problem of achieving stable combustion in a 

tinuous airstream without creating a flame that was so hot it would melt the metal sides of 

apparatus was particularly recalcitrant. Jacobs tried to get the fuel to vaporize within a tub

boiler. However, he could not get his system to operate satisfactorily, and he agreed to enlist 

assistance of Kemper' s Power Plants Division. The ''burner'' problem was turned over to 

Pinkel's Engine Analysis Section. Durand strongly supported the idea that a series of fuel 

should be tried. Pinkel assigned Kervork Nahigyan the task of redesigning the burner. Dur

noted on a visit to Langley in March 1942 that both Jacobs' s approach and that of the Power Pl

Division appeared promising. He encouraged the rivalry between the two groups and s

deadline for an actual demonstration to the entire committee for July 15.

53 The demonstrat

featuring Jacobs's solution, looked promising enough for the committee to encourage the wor

be continued. 

While Durand still strongly supported the Jacobs project, he realized that the NACA h

great deal at stake. As the first test flight of the General Electric 1-A engine neared, he bec

apprehensive. If Jake's Jeep failed, it would seriously affect the prestige of his committee, perh

that of the entire NACA. In late September, he revealed his anxiety over the NACA projec

George Lewis. In a letter to Lewis from California, written several days before he was to wit

the flight over Muroc Dry Lake, Durand urged Lewis to "feel quite free to take hold of and d

the work of Jacobs along the lines agreed upon earlier." There was not a great deal that they c

do about the projects that were in the hands of the private companies, but, he wrote, "I h

Schematic view of General Electric's 1G-180 shows the axial compressor influenced by the NACA eight-

compressor. 

54 
p

p

General Electric 1-A engines powered the Bell Airacomet (P-59A) into the sky several days l

There can be no question that once the Whittle engine was successfully flown, it bec

clearer that the outlines of future development would favor the far simpler compressor and 

bine combination over the unwieldy piston engine and fan combination of Jacobs's concep

Durand was enthusiastic about the "splendid results" of the tests at Muroc. He wrote to K

"It really begins to look as though a definite start has been made along the lines we have b

thinking about so long." 55 

Durand informed members of the Special Committee that ''resulting from entirely diffe

causes" a meeting had been called "on the initiative of Army aviation" to take plac

Washington, D.C., on November 13. Although no direct reference was made to the Whittle pro

there could have been no question in any member's mind as to what Durand was talking a

when he wrote that representatives of the Army, Navy, the Chairman of NACA, and the Chair

of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion "take a broad general view, with an attemp

evaluate its significance as a factor in our present war effort, and, if possible, to reach some 

sion as to the extent to which the subject merits immediate support and development." H

vealed that a report on the Langley project would be presented at that time. 56 Thus, the com

tee was placed for the first time in a position to judge the relative merits of the two syst

Jacobs's ducted fan and Whittle's turbojet. Obviously, the Whittle turbojet was the wi

because it was at a point of development well beyond that of the NACA project. Although it 

not clear at the time, ultimately the complexity and the excessive amount of weight in compar

to its low thrust meant that the ducted fan could not compete with the simplicity, efficiency, 

low maintenance of future turbojets. The Jeep, nevertheless, played an important role in fu

American turbojet development because it stimulated both axial-compressor research 

pioneering work on afterburners-work that was continued after the move of the Power P

Division to Cleveland. 

There is little doubt that after the November meeting of the Special Committee, as far a

Army was concerned, the NACA project was dead. The failure of the Jeep to win the contin

support of the Army directly affected the research program of the Cleveland laboratory. 

Pinke! recalled that some time prior to his departure for Cleveland in December 1942, he 

called to Henry Reid's office, where George Lewis reported that "officers of the military eche

had informed him that ''the war would be fought'' with five reciprocating engines currently u

production and ''that all work on jet propulsion should be stopped in order that all effort sh

be directed toward those reciprocating engines." 57 

Even after the Army's decision, Jacobs continued to believe in his ducted-fan design

January 1943, after his transfer to Cleveland, Nahigyan perfected his design for a burner emp

ing a series of liquid-injection spray nozzles, located within bell-shaped flame holders. 58 Thi

perience made him the natural choice to head the Jet Propulsion Section when Keirn brough

plans for the Static Test Laboratory from General Electric. 

In late January, Jacobs himself visited the Cleveland Laboratory and, accompanied 

Henry Reid, called on the Army officers at Wright Field. In a memorandum written after this v

Reid noted the apparent lack of general overview of the jet propulsion situation. It was impos

to compare the various schemes to decide which ones were worthy of vigorous developm
A technician uses a micrometer to determine possible distortion of the turbine blades of General Electr

turbojet engine. The ring of combustor cans, immediately behind the turbine, was Whittle's solution to t

bustion problem. 

because no one individual, with the exception of Durand, was fully informed of bo

American and British developments. 59 Clearly, Reid and Jacobs still believed that the N

project was viable. However, the successful test flight of the General Electric 1-A engines 

Bell Airacomet the previous fall had sealed the fate of the Jacobs project. On 15 April 19

Special Committee officially resolved to drop "without prejudice" the project they 

wholeheartedly supported.60 As Alex Roland has cogently argued in Model Research, the 

56 
Viewed in the context of the abortive effort to develop the Jeep at Langley, Arnold's deci

to assign the Cleveland laboratory the task of solving the mechanical problems of existing pi

engines takes on new meaning. He had lost confidence in the NACA's technical leadership in 

propulsion field. The cancellation of the Jeep took the creative, experimental work on jet pro

sion away from the NACA for the duration of the war. Arnold chose to promote General Elec

a company previously only marginally involved in the development of aircraft engines, to a p

on the cutting edge of jet propulsion development in the United States. Although the piston en

companies bore the brunt of Arnold's wrath for the dismal engine situation, he also punished 

NACA for its belated and rather minimal efforts prior to 1941 to develop a jet propulsion sche

Arnold's decision to focus on developing existing piston engines to fight the war was a g

ble. By 1944 the Germans were mass-producing a turbojet with an axial-flow compressor, 

JU.mo 004 for the Messerschmitt 262. Fortunately, Hitler did not appreciate the strategic im

tance of the superior speed of the turbojet, and production of the Jumo 004 came too late to m

a difference in the outcome of the war. The Germans made only limited use of jet aircraft to s

down Allied reconnaissance planes and to attack bomber missions. How close the jet engine c

to making the difference in the war is revealed by a remark in a memo from Arnold in May 1

''The jet propelled airplane has one idea and mission in life and that is to get at the bombers, 

he is going by our fighters so fast that they will barely see him, much less throw out a sky h

and slow him up." 62 

When Colonel Donald Keirn unveiled the plans for a Jet Propulsion Static Test Labora

for the Cleveland laboratory, the Army again assigned a role in the development of jet propul

to the NACA. This visit, however, clearly underscored the Army's intention to limit this invo

ment to the testing of engines already developed by private companies such as General Ele

and Westinghouse. Jacobs's Jeep briefly gave the NACA license to develop a jet prototype. 

Cleveland laboratory would continue to feel the repercussions of its cancellation. 

By August 1943 it was clear to the leaders of the Cleveland laboratory that jet propul

would play an increasingly important role in the future. After a survey of existing facili

George Lewis pointed out that "when the Committee's Cleveland laboratory was laid out

thought was given to the provision of facilities for testing jet propulsion units." 63 This omis

revealed an astounding lack of vision. 

Jacobs himself spent several months at the laboratory in 1944 and made such an impres

on several clean-shaven young engineers that they grew beards in his honor. The precise na

of Jacobs's work in Cleveland is not clear. It appears that he continued work on his jet propul

scheme despite the Army's cancellation. It was now ''bootleg'' work, carried on without off

sanction. "Nothing was so secret," one of the technicians at the laboratory recalled, "as Jaco

jet rotor.'' His friend Henry Melzer cut the blades for a turbojet in the machine shop. He was 

that Jacobs designed the engine from information gathered by two agents in a German Bava

Motor Works plant. Melzer recalled that Jacobs often came to the shop to watch his painsta

labor, cutting the blades to conform to the so-called German configurations. One afternoon Jac

called Meltzer to let him know that they were going to start the unit in a test cell. ''While it 

running, we stepped over it and felt for vibrations. About a year later, we heard that ano

engine had exploded, and the blades had gone off in all directions. We were lucky taking 

chance.'' 64 
Secret jet propulsion tests of General Electric's I-16 were carried out in the Static Test jet P

Laboratory, completed in September 1943. 

By March 1944 Lewis reported on the "change in character of the Committee's rese

gram" brought about by the "success of the Whittle jet-propulsion engine.''65 Staff 

under Kervork Nahigyan in the special Jet Propulsion Static Test Laboratory built and te

first afterburner in October 1943, a direct result of the earlier work on the burner for Jak

Abe Silverstein's group adapted the Altitude Wind Tunnel to test the new jet propulsi

General Electric and Westinghouse sent experimental models of their engines for tests in 

tunnel. Although denied work on their own experimental engine of NACA design, the st

Cleveland laboratory acquired a unique, hands on, experience in jet technology. They wo

on this early experience to become the government's experts injet propulsion in the early 

years. 

58 
1 Letter from Ben Pinkel to V. Dawson, 2 September 1984. 

2 'Ifip to England, 9 April-1 May 1941, Container 271, H. H. Arnold Papers, Manuscript Division, Librar

Congress. Lord Beaverbrook's full name was William Maxwell Aitken Lord Beaverbrook. 

3 The best primary source for the history of the General Electric Whittle project is "Case History of Wh

Engine," Historical Study no. 93, Air Force Logistical Command History Office, Wright Patterson 

Force Base. This consists of Army correspondence and contains a wealth of information waiting to 

mined. General Electric's company history, Seven Decades of Progress (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publish

Inc., 1979) is somewhat disappointing. An unpublished study by William 'Ifavers, The General Ele

Aircraft Engine Story, is more detailed. General Electric Company papers from the West Lynn p

have recently been acquired by the National Air and Space Museum. "Jet Propulsion Engine Techn

Data," Colonel Donald Keirn's Personal Data, Book, 1945, Part I, Air Force Central Museum, Day

Ohio, includes the performances of all of the American turbojet projects. 

4 Statement by Dan Walker, An Encounter Between the jet Engine Inventors, Sir Frank Whittle and Dr. Hans 

Ohain, 3-4 May 1978, History Office, Aeronautical Systems Division Air Force Systems Comm

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Historical Publication, 1978, p. 47. 

5 On turbosupercharger development, see Robert Schlaifer, Development of Aircraft Engines (Boston: Grad

School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1950),p. 328-329. Also, Leslie E. Neville 

Nathaniel F. Silsbee, jet Propulsion Progress: The Development of Aircraft Gas Thrbines (New Y

McGraw Hill, 1948), p. 98-102. 

6 Ben Pinkel, "Smoker Thlk to AERL Staff," History looseleaf, NASA Lewis Records. 

7 Ben Pinkel to V. Dawson, 2 September 1984. 

8 A. H. R. Fedden, "Next Decade's Aero Engines Will Be Advanced But Not Radical." Transactions of 

Society of Automotive Engineers 28(1933):379. 

9 Oscar W. Schey, Benjamin Pinkel, and Herman H. Ellerbrock, Jr., "Correction of Temperatures of 

Cooled Engine Cylinders for Variation in Engine and Cooling Conditions," Technical Report 645, NA

1939 Annual Report. 

1

° Frank Whittle, "The Early History of the Whittle Jet Propulsion Gas Thrbine," Inst. Mech. Engr. Proceed

152(1945):419. 

11 In addition to studies mentioned in note 5, for the history of jet propulsion, see Edward W. Constan

The Origins of the Thrbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). See 

G. Geoffrey Smith, Gas Thrbines and jet Propulsion (London: Iliffe & Sons, 1955), 6th ed., and Walt

Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, The jet Age: Forty Years of jet Aviation (Washington, D.C.: National Air 

Space Museum, 1979). 

12 On the science-technology relationship, see Edwin Layton, "Mirror-Image '1\vins: The communitie

science and technology in 19th-Century America." Technology and Culture 12:562-580. 

13 Edgar Buckingham, "Jet Propulsion for Airplanes," Technical Report 159, NACA 1923 Annual Repor

75-90. Buckingham's scheme probably consisted of a compressor with afterburner, the compre

driven by a reciprocating gasoline engine. (Comments courtesy of Hans von Ohain, 5 June 1987.) 

also Rexmond C. Cochrane, Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards (

Department of Commerce, 1966), p. 282-283. 

14 James Hansen, Engineer in Charge, NASA SP-4305, 1987, p. 225; and John Becker, The High-Speed Fron

NASA SP-445 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 30. 

15 See Theodore von Karman's description of the conference in The Wind and Beyond (Boston: Little, Br

and Co., 1967), p. 216-218. 

16 "Walker, An Encounter Between the jet Engine Inventors, Sir Frank Whittle and Dr. Hans von Ohain, p. 

17 See Edward Constant's analysis, The Origins of the Thrbojet Revolution, p. 15-18 and chapter 7. To an ea

draft of this chapter, Dr. Hans von Ohain responded by letter 5 June 1987: "I fully agree with you 

the first success of jet engines was more a result of the simplicity of a radial jet engine with res

to structure, performance characteristics of the engine components and matching, rather than supe
, ppy,yp, j

p. 29. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Interview with Hans von Ohain, 11 February 1985, at the National Air and Space Museum. 

21 Bush to Arnold, 2 July 1941, 47/208, Papers of H. H. Arnold, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 

the Tizard mission, see Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists INew York: Vantage Books, 1979), p. 302-3

22 Arnold to Bush, 25 February 1941, Records of NACA Committees and Subcommittees, National Archiv

Record Group 255, 117.15. On the rocket work of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, Califo

Institute of Technology, see also Clayton Koppes, The ]PL and the American Space Program !New Hav

Yale University Press, 1982). 

23 Kevles, The Physicists, p. 296. 

24 Bush to Arnold, 10 March 1941, Records of NACA Committees and Subcommittees, National Archiv

Record Group 255, 117.15. 

25 Towers to Bush, 17 March 1941, NACA Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Record Gr

255, 117.15. 

26 Frank B. Jewett, President of the National Academy of Science, on the occasion of Durand's 85th birthd

National Archives, Record Group 255, Durand biographical file. See also Walter G. Vincenti, "The 

Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological Methodolog

Technology and Culture 20:712-751. 

27 Bush to Durand, 18 March 1941, Records of Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Rec

Group 225, 117.15. 

28 Ibid. This opinion was also shared by Towers. See Tower's letter to Bush, 17 March 1941, and Bush 

Charles Abbot, 29 March 1941, National Archives, Record Group 225. The full committee consiste

Durand, Soderberg, R. C. Allen IAllis-Chalmers), L. W. Chubb !Westinghouse), A. G. Christie, Hugh 

Dryden, Brig. Gen. 0 . P. Echols, Jerome Hunsaker lex officio). Capt. S. M. Kraus, U.S.N., G. W. Le

lex officio). and A. R. Stevenson, Jr. !General Electric). 

29 L. S. Hobbs to Jerome Hunsaker, 12 December 1941, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C., copied fr

J. C. Hunsaker Papers, Smithsonian Institution. See also Schlaifer, Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 4

30 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, 10 April 1941, NASA History Office. 

discussion relies on the minutes of the Special Committee April 10, 22, May 2, 8, 28 IJuly 25 missin

Compressor-Thrbine Panel: July 25, September 22, 1941, February 3, 1942; Compressor-Thrbine Pa

February 3, 1942, July 31, 1942, and December 1, 1942, located in the NASA History Office. Minu

of February 20, 1942, July 31, 1942, April 2, 1943, August 18, 1943, October 29, 1943 are in Natio

Archives, Record Group 225. See also correspondence and Durand's reports in Records of NA

Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Record Group 225, 117.15. My account is s

plemented by correspondence between Bush, Durand, and Arnold found in H. H. Arnold Pap

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. For information on the Westinghouse project, I have 

consulted the New Papers and the Westinghouse file, National Air and Space Musuem, Washingt

D.C. Goddard's rocket work is compared to the far more practical work of the group at the Califo

Institute of Technology by Clayton Koppes, ]PL and the American Space Program jNew Haven: Y

University Press, 1982). chapter 1. 

31 Bush to Durand, 18 March 1941, Records of Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Rec

Group 225, 117.15. 

32 James Hansen has shed new light on the NACA project at Langley in Engineer in Charge, chapte

60 

Hansen's account relies on extensive documents in the Langley archives. See also Brian J. Nichels

"Early Jet Engines and the Transition from Centrifugal to Axial Compressors: A Case Study 

Technological Change," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1988. The work of the Dur

committee is discussed briefly in Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines, p. 457-460. The Jac

project received only a passing reference in George Gray's Frontiers of Flight INew York: Alfred 

Knopf, 1948), p. 278, a work commissioned by the NACA. For a reliable account of early jet propuls
Jacobs enlisted the aid of Eugene Wasielewski (a member of the Supercharger Section of 

the Power Plant Division) in the design of the compressor, and it proved to provide good performance. They built a vaporizing type burner for this system on the assumption that vaporization 

of the fuel was required to achieve efficient combustion. 

Jacobs could not get the burner to function properly. The "jeep," as this system was called, 

was turned over to the Engine Analysis Section for further development and testing. I assigned 

K. K. (Nick) Nahigyan the task of designing the burner. He employed about 40 spray type liquid 

injection nozzles each located at the apex of individual bell-shaped shells. The bells were 

oriented with their open ends down-stream and served as flame holders. 

The engine cycle consisted of the following steps. Air entered the front of the nacelle, was 

compressed by the engine-driven compressor, then passed into the combustion chamber where 

fuel was injected and ignited and finally, the products were discharged through the variable area 

nozzle. 

34 Clinton E. Brown to V. Dawson, 11 September 1989. On the ducted fan, see James Hansen, Engine

Charge, p. 222. See also Jonathan W. Thompson, Italian Civil and Military Aircraft 1930-1945 (Fallb

Calif.: Aero Publishing, 1963), p. 95-96. 

35 Macon C. Ellis, Jr., and Clinton E. Brown, "NACA Investigation of a Jet-Propulsion System Applicab

Flight." Technical Report 802, NACA 1943 Annual Report, p. 491-501. This is the only published N

report on the Jeep. 

36 Durand to Arnold, 9 May 1941, 43/102, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. The work of H

Constant and A. A. Griffith led to an agreement in 1937 between the Royal Aircraft Establishment 

Metropolitan Vickers Company to design an engine with an axial compressor. This engine was f

tested 13 November 1943. For further information on the development of British turbojet engines

Harold Roxbee Cox, "The Beginnings of Jet Propulsion." The Royal Society of Arts journal, Septem

1985, p. 705-723. 

37 Minutes of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, 8 May 1941, p. 4, NASA History Office. The re

on Jacobs's compressor work was published after he left Langley by John T. Sinnette, Jr., Osca

Schey, and J. Austin King, "Performance of NACA Eight-Stage Axial-Flow Compressor Designed on 

Basis of Airfoil Theory," Technical Report 758, NACA 1943 Annual Report. For a case study of early a

compressor development, see Brian J. Nichelson, "Early Jet Engines and the Transition 

Centrifugal to Axial Compressors: A Case Study in Technological Change," Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ

ty of Minnesota, 1988. 

38 Arnold to Bush, 2 June 1941, Picture and description have no date and were separated from the m

routed from Bush to Durand and then returned. H. H. Arnold Papers, 47/208, Manuscript Divi

Library of Congress. 

39 Arnold to Bush, 25 June 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 44/124, Manuscript Division, Library of Congre

40 Bush to Arnold, 2 July 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 47/208, Manuscript Division, Library of Congres

41 Bush to Arnold, 11 July 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 47/208, Manuscript Division, Library of Congre

42 Arnold to Alfred J. Lyon, 2 October 1941, H. H. Arnold Papers, 43/102, Manuscript Division, Libra

Congress. 

43 Minutes of Meeting of Thrbine Panel of Jet Propulsion Committee, 25 July 1941, p. 2, NASA History Of

A company history of General Electric, Seven Decades of Progress (Fallbrook,Calif.: Aero Publis

1979), p. 41, says that by June all three companies were committed to the axial compressor. 

44 Alan Howard, who worked on General Electric's turboprop, the TG-100, based his design for an axial-

compressor on a 1934 NACA paper by O'Brien and Folsom, "The Design of Propeller Pumps and F

He gave the specifications based on data relating to airflow over a NACA airfoil to the Peerless P

Company (now part of Food Machinery Corporation) "with the proviso that the pump be built ex

to the design calculations." Letter to the author from William Travers, 22 August 1985. However, a 

company history relates that Howard, Glenn Warren, and Bruce Buckland, who worked on the pro

were convinced by tests of an axial compressor carried out in Cleveland, undoubtedly a referenc
45 Neville and Silsbee, jet Propulsion Progress, p. 147. The Brown-Boveri compressor, mentioned in the W

New Papers, National Air and Space Museum, may have been the basis for their compressor desi

See also Kroon to Durand, 24 April1944, Records of NACA Committees and Subcommittees, Natio

Archives, Record Group 225, 117.15 

46 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the NACA, 24 October 1941, National Archives, Record Group 2

Box 8. 

47 Durand to Echols, 27 February 1942, Records of NACA Committees and Subcommittees, Natio

Archives, Record Group 225, 117.15. 

48 "Case History of Whittle Engine," Historical Study no. 93, vol. I, document 24, AFLC History Off

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Classification of the Whittle project was downgra

from "supersecret" to "secret" in summer 1943. 

49 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the NACA, 16 June 1942, National Archives, Record Group 2

Box 8. 

50 A. R. Stevenson to Durand, 27 November 1942, NACA Committees and Subcommittees, National Archiv

Record Group 225, 117.15. 

51 For the development of the Westinghouse "Yankee" engine, see "The History of Westinghouse in the W

Aviation Gas Thrbine Division, Engineering Department, Westinghouse, in the W. R. New Pap

Special Collections of Air and Space Museum, Washington, D.C., p. 20. Charles Edward Chapel, 

Aircraft Power Plants ed, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 353-363. See also Neville and Silsbee, 

Propulsion Progress, p. 145-50; John Foster, Jr., "Design Analysis of Westinghouse 19-B Thrboj

Aviation, January 1946, p. 60-68; Robert B. Meyer, Jr. "Classic Thrbine Engines," in Casting Ab

(Howmet Thrbine Components Corp. magazine, 1985), p. 12-15. 

52 Neville and Silsbee, Seven Decades of Progress, p. 55. Arnold authorized discussion "of the Whittle matt

with Glenn Warren, one of G.E.'s designers at Schenectady. Arnold to D. R. Shoults, 27 August 19

reproduced in Seven Decades of Progress, p. 45. 

53 Durand's "Notes on Visit to Langley Field," 31 March 1942, and Minutes of Executive Committee 

NACA, 16 June 1942, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 8; Ben Pinkel to author, 

October 1984. 

54 Durand to Lewis, 29 September 1942, National Archives, Group Record 255, 117.15. 

55 Durand to Stevenson, 16 October 1942; Durand to Keirn, 29 October 1942, National Archives, Rec

Group 255, 117.15. Hansen discusses the continuation of the Campini project, in Engineer in Cha

p. 238-247. 

56 Durand to Members of Special Committee on Jet Propulsion: Soderberg, Allen, Chubb, Christie, Dryd

Keirn, Kraus, Spangler, Stevenson, Thylor, 6 November 1942, Records of NACA Committees 

Subcommittees, National Archives, Record Group 255, 117.15. 

57 Letter to V. Dawson, 2 September 1984. Pinkel did not give the author an exact date. Arnold's letter to 

NACA informing it of his decision to fight the war with the piston engine is dated 14 October 1942

was reported in the Minutes of the Power Plants Committee, 11 December 1942, Records of NA

Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Record Group 255, 112.02. This seems consist

with Pinkel's recollection that he heard of Arnold's decision prior to his departure for Cleveland. 

not entirely clear what tests on the Jeep he is referring to here. 

58 Pinkel to V. Dawson, 2 September 1984. A sketch of Nahigyan's design can be found in Records of NA

Committees and Subcommittees, National Archives, Record Group 255, 117.15. 

59 Memorandum for files, "Visit to Wright Field to discuss NACA jet-propulsion airplane design," 20 Janu

1943, Jacobs file, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 131, 23-25. 

60 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, 2 April 1943, National Archives, Rec

Group 255, 117.15. 

61 Roland, Model Research, p. 185. 

62 
y 

py g ygf y 

Symposium, 10-12 October 1984, Office of Air Force History, p. 123-153. 

63 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, 18 August 1943, National Archives, R

Group 255, 11. 

64 Telephone conversation with Henry Meltzer, 17 September 1984. Meltzer later became head of the tu

blade section. Also interview with Rudy Beheim, 11 July 1984. 

65 Report to the Executive Committee, 16 March 1944, NACA Executive Committee Minutes, Nat

Archives, Record Group 255, Box 9. 
L I I 
~(C TESTING THEIR 

~//1 METTLE 

When journalists who belonged to the Aviation Writers Association visited the Cleve

laboratory in June 1945, they witnessed a carefully orchestrated display of the arcane wor

aircraft propulsion. This was the laboratory's public debut-the first time the NACA could pa

ly pull back the shroud of wartime secrecy. The writers for the country's major newspa

gawked at demonstrations of methods used to cool the cylinders of radial engines, "sniffed ne

developed fuels," and saw how a new spray bar for the carburetor of the huge B-29 "Su

fortress" could prevent overheating. 

The laboratory's contributions to the old piston engine technology, however, told only 

of the story. Demonstrations of jet propulsion, now suddenly part of aviation's new vocabu

held the writers spellbound. They experienced the earsplitting roar of a ramjet and other ''jet 

pulsion performances,'' presented by ''a staff of efficient and capable-looking engineers.'' The 

point of the tour was the first press showing of the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, powered by 

General Electric I-40 turbojet engine, reputed to be the fastest plane in the world. The staff's l

explanations convinced the writers, as well as special guest, Frances P. Bolton, Ohio's 2

District Congresswoman, of the need for continuing government support for engine resea

Bolton "urged the tour be made a 'required subject' for every person having anything to do 

research appropriations.' '

1 

The journalists came away impressed that research at the Cleveland laboratory was b

''carried on by the best aeronautical brains available, provided with the best equipment 

tainable."2 This was, in fact, an overstatement. More than 62 percent of its engineers had 

than two years experience; the laboratory's research staff was young and untried. 3 In addi

although the laboratory had hastily shifted gears in 1944 to add turbojets, rockets, and ramje

its research arsenal, its major facilities had been designed to meet the needs of the piston en

The wartime technology of jet propulsion represented peacetime opportunity. 

laboratory's leaders were ready to take charge of the research agenda. They were impatient to 

minate work on short-term development problems. They could not wait for the slow-mo

Washington office to set their priorities. 'frouble-shooting for the engine companies had serve

an apprenticeship for the laboratory's youthful staff. Now they were ready to harness their en

and intelligence to tackle problems of a more fundamental nature. It was clear that the staff w

need to hone its analytical skills. They were eager to launch a strong program in the new 

of jet propulsion. 

65 
bojet was late and on a considerably smaller scale than in Germany and Great Britain. Compan

in Great Britain had benefited from the exchange of information facilitated by the Gas Thrb

Collaboration Committee. They included Armstrong Siddeley, Bristol, De Havillan

Metropolitan-Vickers, Power Jets, Rolls Royce, and Rover. In the United States, secrecy h

prevented the fruitful technical exchanges enjoyed by the British. With the American aircr

engine companies, Wright Aeronautical and Pratt & Whitney, kept out of the picture altoget

and the Allis-Chalmers project dropped, the only American companies involved in turbo

development at the end of the war were General Electric and Westinghouse. What impressed 

American Delegation to Great Britain in early 1944 was the "magnitude of the British effor

With as many as 30,000 British workers in the general field of jet propulsion, it was clear that 

British had a "strong faith in the future of the turbine as a prime mover," a sentiment that see

to have come as a surprise to the American visitors.

4 With the aircraft engine industry in G

many eliminated, competition in the commercial development of the turbojet would come fro

the British. 

When military technical missions to Europe revealed the extent of the German commitm

to jet propulsion, it became increasingly clear that the policy of concentrating most of 

American technical resources on the piston engine had been dubious, and possibly dangerous. 

1944, as Germany was falling, the Alsos Mission under Lieutenant Colonel Boris Pash and Sam

Goudsmit, its civilian scientist, gathered information on all aspects of Germany's advanc

technology, particularly the development of atomic energy. The mission found that the Germa

working on an atomic bomb under Werner Heisenberg were far behind the United States. Th

reports also revealed the strong emphasis on jet propulsion in Germany. An early report describ

the gas turbine research at the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fiir Luftfahrt (DVL), near Berlin, and th

of the Junkers and Heinkel-Hirth Companies. The DVL had concentrated on thermodynamics a

the metallurgy of turbine blades, while intensive aerodynamics studies were carried out by oth

government laboratories. "Germany was literally sprinkled with high Mach number wi

The FBO Shooting Star powered by the General Electric I-40 

set up for testing in the Altitude Wind Thnnel. 

66 

tunnels" that appeared "to have be

used extensively for jet work." In t

field of jet propulsion, the report blun

stated, "we are very much behind t

Nazis." The report revealed that the G

mans had developed jet engines w

both centrifugal (von Ohain's turboj

and axial compressors (the Jumo 0

designed by Anslem Franz). 5 

In 1945 the NACA dispatch

Russell Robinson and Henry Reid fro

the Langley Laboratory to join the Al

mission with the specific objective to u

cover and assess the extent of Germ

aeronautical advances during World W

II. They were joined by William Ebe

also of Langley, and Carlton Kemp
research, describing two proposed wind tunnels near Innsbruck, Austria, as ''the only rese

equipment and plans that have come to light that are definitely beyond our own.'' The first 

to be used for testing full-scale propellers, jet engines, rockets, and model aircraft ''up to s

velocities." The other tunnel, he guessed, was to be a supersonic tunnel. In addition, the Germ

had planned a "propulsion laboratory for research at full scale on the elements of jet and gas 

bine propulsion." No doubt reflecting on the innovative design of the Altitude Wind Thnnel a

Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory, he reported that the Germans had only begun to realize 

they would need some way to produce low pressures and refrigerated air in their alti

facilities. 

6 

The impressive facilities of Nazi Germany were only part of the story. When Robi

presented his final report to the NACA, he described in greater detail the research contribut

that the Germans had made to the field of high-speed aerodynamics and jet propulsion. He stre

the "emphasis and liberal support that had been given to aeronautical research by the Ger

Government, as measured by the number of workers, the number of laboratories, and the mo

nature of their equipment, and particularly the construction under way to provide rese

facilities in advance of those possessed by any other nation." 7 In addition to the extensive 

man laboratory for applied research, the DVL (not visited by the Alsos Mission because Berlin 

under the control of the Russian Army), the Germans had built a laboratory for advanced rese

on aerodynamics, engines, solid mechanics, and armaments-the Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt (

at Braunschweig. The laboratory and the nearby Technical Institute at Braunschweig shar

fruitful exchange of personnel, among whom were Adolf Busemann, Herman Schlichting, 

Theodor Zobel, renowned for their work in supersonic aerodynamics. In the engine research 

sion at Braunschweig, pioneering work in heat transfer by Ernst Schmidt and his student, E

Eckert, had resulted in some of the first efforts in turbine cooling, an area that would receive 

siderable emphasis at the Cleveland laboratory in the late 1940s. 

In addition to the physical evidence of these German research centers, the quantity 

quality of research reports indicated the advanced nature of the German aeronautical rese

program. The Alsos team also interrogated hundreds of German scientists and employees of 

craft and engine companies, summarized in short NACA reports. 8 Members of the Alsos 

other technical missions confiscated tons of German documents. They were sent to Wright F

where the laborious process of cataloging and translating began immediately. The Cleve

laboratory hired an extremely able translator, Sam Reiss, to expedite the process of assimila

of German research, and the laboratory assisted the Army in the preparation of an ind

George Mandel and Dorothy Morris helped to create a technical library to put the most up-to-

reports and information in the hands of the laboratory's staff. The library became an impor

support of engineering activity, a change from the days when George Lewis thought engin

should spend their time monitoring tests, not reading articles in the library stacks. 

Even before they had digested the wealth of information gathered by the Alsos Mis

Cleveland engineers had the opportunity to study captured enemy hardware sent from W

Field. The first jet-propelled device that Cleveland engineers encountered was the Ger

"pulse~jet," also called the V-1, or "buzz bomb." The Germans had shot this ingenious and ter

ing pilotless .aircraft across the English Channel to bomb the civilian population. In Cleveland

buzz bomb was carefully taken apart. It consisted of a single cylinder with a system of organ
explosion of the fuel, the valves closed. As the hot gases were pushed out the rear, the loss 

pressure caused the valves to open to receive a new charge of air. During testing, this work co

hardly be kept secret. The noise rattled the windows of nearby houses like that of the Gue

family, who lived in the valley below the laboratory on what is now the southwest portion of 

laboratory property. 

Shortly after the first explorations of the pulse jet carried out by a group under Euge

Manganiello, the laboratory launched an effort with General Electric to develop simpler j

propelled devices called ramjets. 10 The ramjet, known as the "flying stovepipe," consisted o

tube or cylinder open at both ends. Thrust was created by the combustion of fuel within 

cylinder. Conceived by the Frenchman Rene Lorin in 1913, it was at first viewed as impracti

because it only became efficient at high speedsY 

The Army also made available for study the Junkers Jumo 004-the engine that h

powered the Messerschmidt 262. With Anselm Franz, the Jumo 004's designer, available for c

sultation at Wright Field, this engine received close scrutiny. Clearly impressed by evidence 

German work in jet propulsion and by British postwar plans gleaned through the visits of Brit

missions to Cleveland, the laboratory's leaders recognized the need to reorganize its ent

research program. 

German buzz bomb {V-1} set up in the Engine-Propeller Research Building. 

68 
caught not only the staff, but also the lower-level supervisors, completely by surprise. As 

engineer recalled, he went home one evening in late September "deeply engaged in writi

report on spark plug fouling" to discover upon his return the next morning that his desk had b

moved to another building and that henceforth he was to be engaged in rocket-engine coo

research. 12 However, if the institutionalization of the revolution in jet propulsion may h

seemed abrupt and revolutionary to individuals at the lower levels of the laboratory's man

ment, to leaders seasoned from their years at Langley, it was liberating and not unexpected

early as 1944 they had looked forward to the time when they could lay aside the immediate 

pressing development problems of existing engines and return to the basic problems that 

characterized NACA research before World War II. 

The staff forwarded to the Washington office in December 1945 its "Survey of Fundame

Problems Requiring Research.'' The survey was the product of a careful analysis of the pre

utility and future purpose of the laboratory. It showed that the laboratory's leaders were eag

expand research into new swaths freshly cut by wartime propulsion advances: the imma

technologies of turbojets, ramjets, and rockets, and the virgin territory of aircraft nuclear pro

sion. They rued the European origins of jet propulsion and the peripheral role that the NACA 

played in its development. The "Survey of Fundamental Problems" reflected the frustration o

staff with the wartime program of research focused exclusively on trouble-shooting: 

While there is no doubt that the developmental work carried forward at the laboratory 

during the war was of great value to the military services, the effort put forth in this 

work was at the expense of fundamental research. The stringent requirement for accomplishing certain types of specific tests within a minimum period of time made it 

impossible to obtain basic data which are sorely needed for the continued development and improvement of aircraft propulsion systems. 

Lewis staff intensively 

studied the axial compressor of the German 

jumo 004. 
of jet-reaction power systems has suddenly placed the aeronautical engineer in position to atta

supersonic speeds, but as yet only the outer fringes of research on this mode of transportati

have been touched.'' 13 Postwar research would return to fundamental problems in aircr

propulsion. 

In the December 1945 plan, there were nine research categories, each devoted to a speci

engine type and assigned a percentage of effort: 

Thrbojet engines (20 percent); turbo-propeller engines (20 percent); continuous ramjet 

engines ( 12.5 percent); intermittent ramjet engines (5.5 percent); rocket engines (4.0 

percent); reciprocating engines (13 percent); compound engines (15 percent); icing 

research (5 percent); and engines for supersonic flight (5 percent). 

The proposed reduction of piston engine effort from about 95 percent to 28 percent w

pared down even further in the revised plan of May 1946 to a mere 5 percent. In response 

criticism by the engine companies that the projected research was not fundamental enoug

general categories, such as compressor, turbine, combustion, fuels, materials, lubrication, sup

sonics, and nuclear, were substituted for specific engine types. Two new categories that appear

in the revised plan-nuclear energy and "unconventional engines'~revealed the laborator

eagerness to practice on the frontiers of propulsion technology. The turbojet-a compressor driv

by a turbine-had not yet emerged as the clear winner among jet propulsion schemes. In the ne

research plan the compressor-turbine-propeller (turboprop) combination and the turbojet ea

commanded 20 percent of the research effort, with the compound engine (reciprocating engi

plus turbosupercharger) claiming 15 percent. 14 

In the context of the 1946 "Survey of Fundamental Problems," fundamental research d

not refer to science or theoretical work as opposed to engineering. Rather, fundamental resear

covered a spectrum of research stretching from basic scientific investigations to applied resear

in the form of testing and component development investigations. Engineering remained the he

of the NACA research. Funding depended on the laboratory's ability to demonstrate its substa

tive contributions to aviation. Theoretical research often complemented the more practic

aspects of a particular engine problem, but it could never be viewed as an end in itself. What t

NACA regarded as fundamental research was the opportunity to tackle general problems comm

to a particular class of engines. The new program envisioned by the Cleveland staff symboliz

their liberation from narrow development problems of existing engines. They were determined 

transcend current technical practice and to keep the demands of industry for immediate answe

to their development problems at a minimum. This ordering of priorities was consistent with t

National Aeronautical Research Policy approved in March 1946. Neglect of fundamental resear

before World War II had created an opportunity for aggression the Germans had exploited. T

NACA's mandate included basic scientific investigations and testing of both components and fu

scale engines. Development of specific hardware for production models would remain the respo

sibility of industry. 15 

The swing of the laboratory away from wartime trouble-shooting to long-term fundamen

research goals was not unique among government research organizations after the war. The J

Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology and the Naval Resear

Laboratory, despite their explicit ties to the military, made similar efforts to redefine th

70 
Coceoveatoasecuty payed a oe pootg udaetaeseacgov

ment laboratories. The drive for profits made it unlikely that private corporations would be 

ing to invest in research whose long-term benefits were not sufficiently clear. Because nati

security required advanced technology, the government's role was to assume the risk for 

vestigations in which there was chance for failure. Fundamental or basic research was, in 

view of Vannevar Bush, ''the pacemaker of technological progress.'' It was the intellectual ca

on which future applications were drawn. Government research institutions had to be able to 

out of the straight-jacket of current technical practice. They needed the freedom to pursue pro

ing technology regardless of cost. "New products and new processes do not appear full-grow

Bush stressed. ''They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn 

painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science." 17 

When British Air Ministry representative F. Rodwell Banks visited the laboratory in sum

1945, he projected a "healthy obsolescence of reciprocating engines." Nevertheless, the Br

still planned to allocate roughly one-quarter of their research to the piston engine. Half of t

research would be directed to developing the turbine-propeller combination, with the remai

25 percent to be devoted to the turbojet. 18 The Cleveland laboratory paid close attentio

British postwar planning, and its 1945 plan was roughly equivalent. 

The strong commitment to jet propulsion shown in the reorganization of the Cleve

laboratory contrasted with the more conservative attitudes of university, military, and en

company representatives expressed at a meeting of the NACA Power Plants Committe

September 1945. Edward Thylor of the Massachusetts Institute of the Technology warned that 

reciprocating engine should not be made artificially obsolete by cutting off research prematu

Seemingly unimpressed with the success of the P-80 Shooting Star, he claimed that there was 

yet one successful airplane flying with a turbine engine.'' Colonel Donald Keirn, who rema

in the thick of issues relating to the application of gas turbines to aircraft, felt that, while gas 

bines would "undoubtedly come into their own," they were not at that point yet. He observed 

"the manufacturers of really excellent reciprocating engines could hardly be expected to bear 

cost of developing turbines with a view to making their present products obsolete.' ' Pra

Whitney's representative, Leonard Hobbs, claimed that his company planned to invest 50 per

of its funds for research and development of jet engines. Nevertheless, he wanted research on 

piston engine to continue. After considerable debate, the members passed a resolution that pi

engine research should not be terminated. 19 

Laboratory leaders ignored the Power Plants Committee's hesitant pronouncements. W

Executive Engineer Carlton Kemper in Europe on the Alsos Mission, Addison Rothrock 

responsibility for the technical leadership of the laboratory. The other division heads 

thusiastically supported his decision to move strongly into the field of jet propulsion. The nat

choice to implement the reorganization, he became the new Chief of Research. He created 

new research divisions to reflect the new reality of jet propulsion. Ben Pinkel became the h

of Fuels and Thermodynamics. John Collins took over as chief of Engine Performance 

Materials. Underscoring the continuity between the supercharger and the turbojet, Oscar S

assumed leadership of the Compressor and Thrbine Division, while Abe Silverstein became c

of a consolidated Wind Thnnels and Flight Division. With the new division heads solidly beh

the decision, Ray Sharp informed the Washington office. One of the important transitions in 
gg y g, 

laboratory level and communicated to the Washington office, not imposed from above. 20 T

early expression of the laboratory's autonomy left an indelible impression on the character of 

laboratory. Autonomy became a permanent aspect of its institutional identity. 

The big switch assumed the flexibility of engineers to respond to the demands of a n

technology. Nevertheless, for some engineers the transition was painful, particularly for tho

whose major research interests had been shaped by the piston engine. Despite the difficulty of 

justing to a new technology, the choice was simple-either fall into step or leave. As Walter Ols

recalled: 

Any of our reorganizations cause a certain amount of trauma. There were people who 

wouldn't give up the piston engine. They were extruded out. Some of them stayed 

here and they were pushed down into the lower regions of the center and weren't 

allowed much help. They were out of step.21 

The new technology forced a realignment of power relationships in the management stru

ture. Oscar Schey's Compressor and Thrbine Division became the premier division of 

laboratory, claiming the largest number of staff and the highest output of research papers. Becau

the jet engine could run on almost any fuel, knowledge of chemistry was less important than 

understanding of aerodynamics-how air flowed into and through the engine. When the octa

sensitive piston engine had been the focus of laboratory research, Addison Rothrock's Fuels a

Lubricants Division had commanded the greatest resources in terms of facilities and personn

Mter the reorganization, fuels no longer occupied the top of the research hierarchy. Many s

soned engineers from Rothrock's division left during the trauma of the reorganization. Cearcy 

Miller, for example, whose reputation rested on his high-speed camera to study the phenomen

of knock in the piston engine, left to go to the Battelle Institute in Columbus, Ohio, where 

could continue his work on fuels. Nevertheless, the camera techniques that he pioneered wo

become standard research tools of the laboratory.

22 Young engineers hired by Rothrock dur

World War II moved into positions of greater responsibility. John Evvard, Walter Olson, Irv

Pinkel, Wolfgang Moeckel, Edmond Bisson, all future leaders of the laboratory, learned the tra

tions of the NACA under Rothrock. 

STAKING OUT A PLACE IN SUPERSONICS 

Mter the flight of the V-2 at speeds greater than the speed of sound, superso

aerodynamics could no longer be viewed as a visionary enterprise more suited to Buck Rog

than a responsible government research organization. Supersonic flight now fit securely with

the province of the NACA's duty to find practical solutions to the problems of flight. Because 

nature of the aerodynamics changes dramatically and the drag of an object in flight greatly 

creases as its speed passes beyond the speed of sound, flight at supersonic speeds created n

engine problems that researchers at the Cleveland laboratory were eager to explore. For Clevela

staff from Langley, it was through a course taught by the Italian Antonio Ferri, once in charge 

the high-speed tunnel at Guidonia, that they first learned of European advances in supersonics

George Lewis, at last fully aware of the importance of the European research in supersonics, co

vened an interlaboratory High-Speed Panel to coordinate new research in this area. Lew

declared that he "wanted the panel to be the most forward-thinking group in this field." NA

72 
Robert Littell (secretary) attended the first 

meeting of the panel, held at Langley in 

March 1944. Shortly afterwards, probably 

by 1945, Abe Silverstein had joined the 

panel as the representative from 

Cleveland; in January 1946 the panel met 

in Cleveland.24 

In April 1945, possibly unaware of 

the High-Speed Panel, Cleveland engineer 

Bruce Ayer went over the heads of his 

superiors. He wrote directly to George 

Lewis to point out the inadequacy of the 

NACA's wind tunnels for supersonic 

research. He proposed a large national 

supersonic facility to be located in the 

West near one of the new hydroelectric 

dams. Ayer' s grandiose scheme for an 

''Altitude and Supersonic Research 

Laboratory'' was not taken seriously at 

first, but when the Alsos mission returned 

with reports of a water-driven 100,000-

Addison M. Rothrock, Acting Executive Engineer, 

charge the "big switch" from the piston engine to je

pulsion in 1945. 

horsepower supersonic tunnel under construction near Munich, the NACA set in motion plan

a large-scale supersonic facility. 25 In November Ray Sharp submitted a formal proposal for a

tional high-speed laboratory. He urged the Committee to "preempt this field of high-s

research."26 Rather than preempting the field, however, the NACA slowly became awar

similar ambitious plans on the part of the Army Air Forces for a large-scale "engineering deve

ment center.'' This competition with the Army Air Forces for scarce postwar resources ende

1949 in the Unitary Wind 'funnels Plan. The plan enabled the NACA to build supersonic tun

at each of its three centers, with a lion's share of the appropriations going to the Air Force's Ar

Engineering Center in Thllahoma, Tenn. Plans for a NACA supersonic research center n

materialized. 

Silverstein's approach to supersonic research facilities was far more down to earth. On 

of George Lewis's weekly trips to Cleveland in the last months of World War II, Silver

broached the subject of a large supersonic tunnel. Lewis encouraged early design studies for 

$9 million, 8-foot x 6-foot supersonic tunnel completed in 1949.27 

Silverstein wanted research in supersonics to begin at once. In spring 1945 he called De

quis D. Wyatt, a bright, articulate, but inexperienced engineer, into his office. He bluntly a

him if he would be interested in working on a supersonic wind tunnel. Wyatt admitted he 

not the slightest idea what supersonics was, but he agreed with youthful bravado to head 

design team to build several small supersonic tunnels. 

28 

Given Abe Silverstein's background in the design and running of wind tunnels at Lan

the speed with which these tunnels were built was not surprising. If Wyatt was yet a no

Silverstein brought a solid background in wind tunnels from Langley. Silverstein's collea
wasnt right. .. If it is good, sound, proper design, your eye will detect it as good design.

anecdote reflects what is often referred to as Silverstein's engineering intuition. One of his you

engineers assigned to design a supersonic tunnel had reached an impasse. With knowledge 

supersonics still in its infancy, he had calculated the shape for the upstream, subsonic side of 

throat and for the downstream, supersonic part, which expands beyond the throat into the 

section, but he lacked equations for the transonic section between these two parts, where the fl

passed from subsonic to supersonic. Silverstein "eyeballed" the design. Picking up a pencil, 

pared the shape of the curve. Despite the freehand addition, the tunnel worked perfectly. Jam

Hansen has pointed out in Engineer in Charge that this ability to visualize an engineering probl

was typical of some of the best engineers at Langley. It was an aspect of a unique engineer

creativity encouraged by the NACA. 30 However, Silverstein's ego sometimes interfered with 

engineering judgment. He had little patience for any point of view but his own. 

This did not matter to the young Wyatt, for whom Silverstein was a model and an insp

tion. Wyatt and his group groped empirically for the best configuration to explore the unchar

territory of supersonics. They built two tunnels, an 18-inch x 18-inch square tunnel and a 20-in

diameter round tunnel, both capable of speeds up to about Mach 2. Called the "stack tunnel

they were built one on top of the other above the Altitude Wind 'funnel and shared its exha

system. They were run at night when the Altitude Wind 'funnel was not in operation. Additio

supersonic wind tunnels, called "duct tunnels," were built in an underground passage connect

the Altitude Wind 'funnel and the Engine Research Building. The research program for th

tunnels focused on the study of inlets and diffusers for supersonic ramjets. 31 

As soon as they ran tests in the new tunnels in summer 1945, researchers under Silverst

encountered shock waves, typical of supersonic aerodynamics. The discovery of shock wa

The NACA's High-Speed Panel met in Cleveland on January 21, 

1946. Left to right: Addison Rothrock, John Stack, Langley; H. 

julian Allen, Ames; Russell G. Robinson, Washington office; Abe 

Silverstein, and Carlton Kemper. 

74 

experimentally in the stack t

nels coincided with the grou

first awareness of outstand

theoretical work by the British a

Germans in supersonics. Memb

of Silverstein's division stud

papers published in British jo

nals as well as the work of Ad

Busemann, Klemens Oswatits

Albert Betz, and Hermann Ku

weg, translated and published 

NACA Memoranda. Later th

would have more direct access 

Busemann, when the Arm

Operation Paperclip assigned h

to Langley. 32 

With the new superso

tunnels in operation, Silverst

reorganized his Wind 'funnels a

Flight Division. He placed Jo
duct tunnels, 1949. 

Evvard in charge of a Special Projects Panel. The use of ''panels'' to cross division and disciplin

lines was one of the distinguishing marks of Silverstein's management style. By drawing ta

from the entire laboratory, Silverstein encouraged greater flexibility and interaction betw

groups. Demarquis Wyatt became the section head in charge of the stack tunnels, and John Dis

took charge of the development of an unconventional ramjet concept carried out on the han

apron. 

THE ROCKET FRONTIER 

Like the group in supersonics, members of the small rocket section at the Clevel

laboratory started with little knowledge of previous work in rocketry. In the 1930s the Clevel

Rocket Society had nurtured an enthusiastic group of amateurs, but it had vanished without tra

Reports of the firing of the V-2 across the English channel in summer 1944 awakened a m

serious and lasting interest in rockets among the laboratory staff. In December the Navy c

plained that "progress being made on high-speed research is not as rapid as military neces

now demands'' and urged that jet-propelled aircraft and missiles be given the ''highest practica

priority."33 Cleveland researchers were eager to comply. While the NACA debated how bes

coordinate work on guided missiles, the laboratory's rocket group jumped into research on sm

solid-fuel rockets.34 After some "prodding" by the Army Air Forces in 1944, George Le

authorized the Cleveland laboratory to build four rocket test cells. 35 Responding particularly 

new information on the V-2, in June 1945 the Cleveland laboratory submitted a formal prop

that included research on turbojets, ramjets, and rockets for applications as power plants 

guided missiles. The mood among government engine researchers was "to catch up and not e

fall behind again in advanced propulsion." 36 

Walter Olson brought back news of successful rocket experiments at the Jet Propuls

Laboratory UPL) in Pasadena, Calif. Olson's reports fired the imaginations of members of 

Fuels and Lubricants Division. Late in World War II, the NACA had sent Olson to the Santa A

Air Force Base to recruit men with technical backgrounds as they returned from active duty. W

a Ph.D. in chemistry, Olson did not like to let his analytic skills grow dull. He took the opportu
jet, JPL s commercial spinoff, where these JATOs were mass-produced. Olson recognized the r

Malina's small band of rocket enthusiasts had taken before the war when they mixed asphalt 

the fertilizer ammonium nitrate at CalTech's primitive rocket facilities. The NACA was too con

vative to have allowed dangerous tests like the ones carried out in the Arroyo Seco, the future 

of JPL. Olson could hardly wait to get back to Cleveland to discuss this new work, which 

mediately fired the imaginations of the young staff in the Fuel and Lubricants Division. 37 W

the laboratory reorganized shortly after Olson's return, Ben Pinkel selected Olson to head 

Combustion Branch within the new Fuels and Thermodynamics Division. The Rocket Sec

headed by Joseph Dietrich took shape under Olson's enthusiastic leadership. 

At first the laboratory's rocket program had to be disguised as "high-pressure combusti

because the chairman of the NACA's Main Committee, Jerome Hunsaker, did not approve 

rocket research. He thought that rocket research was outside the NACA's mandate to improve 

craft. Undaunted, the rocket group intensely studied the Alsos reports of German work and 

publications of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. John Sloop, later head of the Rocket Section, 

called that they were acutely aware that they "had a lot of catching up to do." Because of t

feeling that they were latecomers, they decided to direct their attention to ' 'lesser ploug

fields" of rocketry. Research on solid rockets they could leave to others. 

38 

With minimal support for personnel, the section decided to focus on high-energy liquid p

pellants. The group studied combustion and rocket-engine cooling and evaluated the performa

of these propellants both theoretically and through experiments. A team working under V

Huff developed a method to calculate theoretical performance that greatly simplified the proc

of propellant selection. Riley Miller and Paul Ordin made a systematic study of various comb

tions of hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen atoms. Despite the lack of official sanction, work 

rocket fuels slowly increased, pushed by the technical interests of the group rather than exte

demands for specific applications. With the same spirit shown by those who were pushing 

frontiers of supersonics, the members of the rocket section enjoyed the adventure of an enti

new field. They took great risks to obtain small quantities of exotic chemicals. One determi

researcher brought pure hydrogen peroxide from Buffalo, NY., on the all-night train clamped 

a container between his legs. The potential of hydrazine and diborane also received close scrut

In the late 1940s, experiments on diborane, which was also being studied as a potential h

performance fuel for jet engines, revealed that it left oxide deposits that impaired performan

When diborane was combined with fluorine, the deposits disappeared, but no satisfactory met

of cooling could be found. Researchers studied the effects of using pentaborane as a fuel by tes

it in the five-foot diameter Navaho ramjet in the Propulsion Systems Laboratory. By 1948 

group had formed a high opinion of liquid hydrogen. 39 

The initiative for the laboratory's work in rockets came from the staff in the Fuels and Th

modynamics Division. This work was neither inspired nor encouraged by the Washington of

and received surprisingly little support from Addison Rothrock, then in charge of the laborato

research program. Understaffed, underfunded, but undeterred, the rocket group slowly bui

technical competence in rocketry that would serve as an important base for future achieveme

in liquid propellants. However, the group would wait many years for adequate facilities for th

research. 

76 
of a nuclear power plant for aircraft was the potential for long-range flight without refuel

Former Langley staff were no doubt familiar with the work of Eastman Jacobs and Arthur K

trowitz at Langley, where they made the first attempt in the United States to achieve a contro

fusion reaction. 

40 Engineers at the Cleveland laboratory immediately connected 

breakthrough in jet propulsion with the potential of nuclear-propelled aircraft and missiles. If 

feasibility of a new propulsion system for aircraft could be demonstrated, it would represen

''breakthrough'' in propulsion similar to that of jet propulsion during World War II. 

Although nuclear propulsion received only a brief statement in the "Survey of Fundamen

Problems,'' serious thinking in Cleveland about nuclear propulsion began two months prior to 

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bruce Hicks, a physicist, and Sidney Simon, a chemist, b

recent Ph.D.s, were unaware of the Manhattan Project. However, they were both certain of 

technical feasibility of splitting the atom. They urged headquarters to allow them to begin to 

plore the potential of nuclear energy for aircraft propulsion. They pointed out in a memo to 

Washington office that before the war the process of nuclear fission was beginning to 

understood. They stated that in the early years of the war a great deal of work had focused 

producing a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. Publication had then ceased. "It is a matter of c

mon belief among physicists," they wrote," that every major power in the world has been devot

a tremendous amount of effort to the solution of this and similar problems.'' They stressed 

need to train a team from the Cleveland laboratory. They thought that it would take 12 mon

for a physicist or chemist with a Ph.D. to become a nuclear physicist and about two to three ye

to turn an outstanding individual with an undergraduate degree in physics or chemistry into 

expert in nuclear fuels. Hicks and Simon suggested that the laboratory hire three nuc

physicists who had worked on wartime projects to assist in setting up the program. Drawing 

their expertise, the laboratory could then hire about 50 new staff to design, construct, and oper

nuclear equipment, such as cyclotrons.41 

Several days after the announcement that the United States had dropped two nuclear bom

on Japan, laboratory personnel suggested that four or five NACA scientists be sent to the "in

sanctum" of Los Alamos, N.M. John Evvard pointed out the new vulnerability of the United St

in a world with long-range, possibly nuclear, rockets for the delivery of nuclear bombs. As a po

to be raised in discussions of nuclear propulsion in Washington, he wrote: 

The Germans had a modified V-2 rocket on the drawing boards equipped with collapsible wings. Using a skipping technique in the outer atmosphere, this rocket was 

reported to be capable of bombing New York from Germany within a radius of ten 

miles from the point target. Combine this implement of war with the potential applications of the atomic bomb principles, and you get a missile which could destroy 

any point on the earth's surface from any other point. THERE IS NO SUCH THING 

AS SAFETY OF DISTANCES!42 

Access to the nuclear inner circle proved difficult for the NACA. Vannevar Bush, Direc

of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, suggested they wait until Congress had 

up the Atomic Energy Commission. Six months later, a Cleveland memo warned headquar

that "unless the Committee sets up an active and farsighted group in this field, we will be 

at the post: " 43 
my Air Forces initiated the Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Aircraft (NEPA) under Donald Ke

now on the staff of Leslie Groves, former director of the Manhattan Project. Although denie

leading role in this work, the NACA was placed on a board of consultants for NEPA along w

nine companies and the Navy. Soon the Army was anxious to tap its growing nuclear expertis

The Cleveland laboratory staff persevered in the pursuit of a larger piece of the natio

nuclear propulsion program and succeeded in winning the support of Farrington Daniels, hea

the metallurgical laboratory at the University of Chicago and a key member of the Manhattan 

ject. They proposed a program of basic research in high temperature-heat transfer and mater

to support the development of Daniels' design for a gas-cooled nuclear reactor.45 By the next y

the NEPA project was foundering. It was clear that the Army project needed the NACA. And

Kalitinsky, Chief Engineer of the NEPA division of Fairchild, was anxious to use NACA resea

data. For example, after a meeting with Cleveland laboratory engineers, he wrote: 

In the course of these discussions it became apparent that the analytical and experimental heat-transfer studies now under way at Cleveland may be of great immediate value to NEPA. In the analytical studies, a method of calculating heat transfer 

and pressure drop has been devised which appears to be far simpler and more accurate than anything we now have available.46 

With increased emphasis on heat-transfer problems related to nuclear propulsion 

members of Ben Pinkel's Fuels and Thermodynamics Division, the NACA and the Atomic Ene

Commission came to a formal agreement on a joint research program on 15 July 1948. Var

Lewis personnel were assigned to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for training, the beginnin

a long and, in hindsight, misdirected commitment to nuclear propulsion that continued until19

when the dismantling of the nuclear effort would nearly bring about the closing of the laborat

THE ENGINE INDUSTRY AND THE NACA 

It was critical that the Cleveland laboratory find and occupy a niche in the transform

economic and political environment of the early post-World War II period. Even wit

TURBOJET EHGIHE TURBOJET ENGINE 

1\.vo approaches to aircraft nuclear propulsion. 

78 
however, unlike disinterested university research, scientific and engineering knowledge gener

by a government laboratory had to serve the national interest. 

Historically, the NACA had prided itself on its contributions to the kinds of basic knowle

that took concrete expression in the design of aircraft. Basic research, made available to the en

aircraft industry, stimulated innovation. The NACA did research that industry could not affor

undertake. Between the two world wars the air-frame industry had come to rely on the NA

Small innovations like the change in the configuration of wing, tail, or propeller-discove

through testing in the NACA's wind tunnels-could dramatically improve aircraft performan

Often redesign of a particular component could be introduced without major revamping of 

assembly line. In contrast, even a small change in an engine usually affected the entire syst

Engine innovations were costly because of the watch-like precision and interrelationship of 

engine's complex components. 

Would the new laboratory ever enjoy the same easy relationship with the engine compa

the NACA had enjoyed with air-frame designers? Conservative, intensely competitive, and re

tant to any kind of government interference, the engine companies were not sure whe

development of the turbojet would ever be profitable. The existence of the new engine labora

seemed to threaten their independence. With sufficient expertise in the new field of jet pro

sion, the laboratory could influence the demands the Inilitary put on the engine compan

Government research could assist the United States in catching up and surpassing the Britis

turbojet development, but only if the engine companies would accept government research 

the government's right to disseininate it as widely as possible to competitors. Because of the 

tense rivalry among the engine companies, the laboratory found itself in a delicate posit

Research in the national interest could not benefit a single company, but must be freely avail

to the entire industry. 

In 1945 the turbojet was by no means a finished, or mature, technology. Moreover, it 

not clear whether the turbojet could be mass-produced for a commercial market. For fighter 

craft, where speed outweighed other considerations, such as fuel consumption and length of 

vice, the compressor-turbine combination held great promise, but how much emphasis sho

military hardware receive in peacetime? Many design questions remained to be solved. Would 

axial or centrifugal compressor prevail? What form should the combustor take, and how wo

the designer overcome the problem of the high temperatures of the combustor and turb

Would it require the development of new materials? Should methods of turbine cooling be 

vestigated? Mechanically, the gas-turbine engine was simpler than the piston engine, but the c

plexity of the physical processes involved in passing air through a compressor, combustor, 

turbine required a level of theoretical sophistication far above what had been necessary du

World War II. To grapple with these problems demanded more formal training for engineers 

a gradual accumulation of experience. 

The first opportunity for the Cleveland laboratory to demonstrate the potential benefi

government engine research in the new field of jet propulsion came in May 1945. Ben Pin

Oscar Schey, Abe Silverstein, and William Fleining from Cleveland and John Becker from Lan

attended the first American conference on aircraft gas turbine engineering, sponsored jointly 

General Electric and the Army Air Forces. Held in Swampscott, Mass., the conference attra

nearly 200 members of the aeronautical community, including representatives from G
1954 cartoon refers to the NACA's role in aircraft nuclear propulsion. Reproduced by permisszon of T

Cleveland Plain Dealer. 

80 
, 

haust capacity of the tunnel from 8 pounds per second to 80 pounds per second. Testing 

enabled General Electric to improve its prototype from the balky I-16 to the more reliable I

By the end of the war, the I-40 was actually superior to Rolls Royce engines based on Whit

design, although this superiority was not to last. 

Silverstein's paper used a valuable comparative perspective to evaluate the engine per

mance of five different engines.48 In addition to data on General Electric I-16 and the I-40, w

their centrifugal compressors, the laboratory made available comparable data for other Ameri

designs-the General Electric TG-180 and the Westinghouse 19-B and 19-XB, with their axial c

pressors. Silverstein's paper symbolized the laboratory's new commitment to defining and solv

problems for the benefit of the entire engine industry. For example, he described "combus

blowout" at low speeds and the effect of Reynolds number, which might impair the efficienc

the compressor and turbine at high altitudes. 49 

The NACA paper demonstrated the developing expertise of the laboratory in the new f

of jet propulsion. However, winning the cooperation of the engine companies would not be e

As early as 1944, Jerome Hunsaker, Chairman of the NACA, anticipated trouble with 

established engine companies, Pratt & Whitney and Wright Aeronautical. In a "Memorandum 

Postwar Research Policy for NACA," he reported that one of the questions that industry had ra

during his trip across the country in mid-1944 was "whether or not the Cleveland laboratory c

stitutes a potential threat to the engine industry." He explained, "The idea here is that priv

enterprise has already developed very superior engines and fuels and does not need governm

competition in research, invention, and development." 50 Hunsaker reported that indu

management argued that they could make better use of public funds than a governm

laboratory and wanted government engine research stopped. In particular, the engine compa

complained that the Cleveland laboratory's extensive work on the Allison engine interfered w

the impersonal forces of the market. They were also bitter about the Army's decision to set 

the Packard Company in the aircraft engine business through their license from the Rolls Ro

Company to manufacture the British Merlin engine. However, their major complaint was that 

NACA was taking the lead in jet propulsion "in collaboration with firms previously outside 

aeronautical engine field." 51 

The engine companies had reason to worry. General Electric appeared to be a potenti

powerful new competitor, with a head start in the gas-turbine field, and Westinghouse, tasting 

first success with its small turbojet for use on aircraft carriers, had captured the Navy's inte

and investment. Moreover, the Army had licensed the Allison Division of General Motors to 

over the manufacture of the 1-40. Pratt & Whitney and Wright Aeronautical still dominated 

piston-engine field, but, in the postwar environment, how long would the piston engine conti

to be commercially viable? The engine companies were aware of their precarious position in 

new peacetime economy. As a result of the war, they had enormously expanded facilities. N

they were faced with the possibility that the market for their engines might cease to exist. 

very day that President Harry S. Truman announced victory over Japan, the government canc

more than $414 million in contracts with Pratt & Whitney, and the machinery of its vast prod

tion empire fell silent. 52 With a radically new power plant on the horizon, the engine compa
Vannevar Bush and other members of the NACA

s Executive Committee, however, had li

sympathy for the plight of the companies that made piston engines. Bush retorted, "Inasmuch 

the Germans have just sprung a clever, new engine on us, which our industry never thought 

their attitude does not strike me forcibly." 53 Bush blamed not the NACA but the engine co

panies for the tardiness of the American effort to develop the turbojet. Recalling with displeas

their predictable attitudes toward developing any unusual engine, he commented, "If we brou

new people into the engine field I think we have done a public service." 54 The new compan

ended the domination of Pratt & Whitney and Wright Aeronautical. 

Competition encouraged innovation. Once a strong company prevailed over its weaker co

petitors, innovation ceased. It was always more profitable 1o market a production engine than 

undertake the costly development of new ideas. Another NACA Executive Committee memb

commented that, although the aircraft industry might be just as able to conduct fundamen

research as the NACA, it was not interested in the "general progress of the art." What indus

objected to and feared was the publication of new knowledge, thus eliminating the competit

advantage a company might win through its own efforts. The committee thought that governm

research would encourage competition. It would force industry to keep up by performing 

higher technical levels. This research dynamic needed to be sustained because the industry co

anticipate strenuous competition with the British, who were looking forward to the expansion 

the aircraft industry and were proposing to build new facilities. Hunsaker observed: 

They are going throughout the United States, and they are frank in saying that what 

we have now is what they propose to build, only larger and better. We have a 20-footaltitude wind tunnel at Cleveland. They will have a 25-foot-altitude tunnel. Their program now calls for the construction of 12 wind tunnels, which will constitute a great 

national research organization for the British empire. 

55 

In the same way that the Russian Sputnik raised national security fears almost 15 years la

and galvanized public opinion for the outlay of tax money for technology research, the superior

of British engines and the perceived danger of this technology in the hands of the Russians w

a recurring theme in the late 1940s to justify expansion of government facilities. 

THE COMPOUND ENGINE 

Ben Pinkel, respected for his analytic ability, led the laboratory's effort to evaluate 

potential of the different types of propulsion systems in terms of weight, altitude, range, and f

consumption. The results of this analysis were first presented at the second annual Flight Prop

sion Meeting of the Institute for Aeronautical Sciences held in Cleveland in March 1947.

56 T

type of systems analysis was an important aspect of the work of the laboratory because it was 

one institution in the United States that could attempt an overview of the entire propulsion p

ture. The group evaluated six engines: the compound engine by Eugene J. Manganiello and Le

V. Humble; the turbine-propeller engine by John C. Sanders and Gerald W. Englert; the turbo

engine by Newell D. Sanders and John Palasics; the turbo-ramjet engine by Bruce T. Lundin; 

ramjet engine by George F. Klinghorn; and the rocket engine by Everett Bernardo, Walter T. Ols

and Clyde S. Calvert. By weighing different parameters, such as thrust in relation to eng

weight, engine frontal area and the rate of fuel consumption, speed, and altitude, Pinkel's gro

82 
Ben Finkel, chief of the Fuels and Thermodynamics Division, sits with staff who presented papers at the 

pulsion meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences (I.A.S.J March 28, 1947. Left to right: Everett Be

do, Newell D. Sanders, Bruce Lundin, Benjamin Finkel, George F. Klinghorn, john C. Sanders, and Eu

]. Manganiello. 

assessed the advantages and disadvantages of each system. On the basis of the NACA's anal

engine companies could more realistically plan development of different engine types. 

In the late 1940s, the turbojet seemed an unlikely candidate for commercial developm

because of its high fuel consumption and lack of reliability. As Ben Pinkel recalled, the airc

industry could not imagine a passenger airplane flying at speeds of 500 miles per hour bec

of the buffeting the aircraft would receive. "There was a general feeling that the human body 

could not stand to go that fast. It was just beyond the point of human endurance." Few could 

agine pressurization of passenger cabins to make flight at high altitudes in less turbulent air p

ble. Pinkel, who served on the NACA Subcommittee for Propulsion Systems with William 

tlewood, director of research for United Aircraft, vividly recalled Littlewood's assertion tha

company had decided, after considerable study, that the jet engine had no future for comme

applications. 57 

There seemed little doubt that for military applications, the turbojet would remain a st

candidate for continued development. However, the engine companies had their eyes on the c

mercial market where fuel consumption was an important consideration. The group under Pi

concluded that the compound engine and the turboprop were about equal in terms of altitude 

range. Because of their relatively lower fuel consumption, both were superior to the turboj

speeds of less than 550 miles per hour. For commercial applications, they concluded 
of the current domination of the turbojet for all aircraft engine applications, between 1945 a

the early 1950s the compound engine seemed to hold great promise for commercial planes. It co

sisted of a piston engine and propeller with an exhaust gas turbine to drive an auxiliary sup

charger. The turbine delivered excess power to the engine shaft through gearing. There may ha

been a hint of national pride in its short popularity. While the turbojet was a European develo

ment, the compound engine had secure roots in American turbosupercharger innovations. B

Pinkel's analysis encouraged the engine companies to develop the compound engine, whi

became for a short time the engine of preference for long-range passenger flight. The developme

of the compound engine was the beginning of a new positive working relationship between t

NACA and Pratt & Whitney.

58 

The reorganization of the laboratory in 1945 to emphasize fundamental research reflect

the assumptions of leaders like Vannevar Bush that research was the key to national survival, bo

from a military point of view and in the commercial arena. World War II was waged in t

research laboratory as well as on the battlefields of Europe. Planning for the next war on the p

of the Army Air Forces began before World War II had ended. This planning emphasized the ne

for continued support for science and technology. Technical superiority could be a deterrent 

future enemy aggression. 5

9 By carefully distinguishing fundamental research-the presumed p

vince of the government-from development-the arena of private enterprise-Nation

Aeronautical Research Policy expressly avoided leaving the nation's aircraft-engine requireme

exclusively in the hands of private industry. But where was the line between research a

development to be drawn? The supposed connection between fundamental research and nation

defense in the event of future wars mandated close ties between the Cleveland laboratory and t

Army, Navy, and later the Air Force. These ties strengthened in the postwar period. 

With the reorganization, the basic outline of the management structure of Lewis was fix

until the advent of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958. The "Survey 

Fundamental Problems" set the research course of the laboratory through the mid-195

Gradually the superiority of the turbojet over the turboprop and the compound engine w

demonstrated. The turbojet demanded focus on the problem of developing materials such 

alloys and ceramic and metal compounds to withstand the temperatures of the hot gases. The e

ly effort in high-energy liquid propellants for rockets and missiles would later culminate in t

success of the Centaur rocket. Work on the supersonic ramjet played an important role 

stimulating basic research in aerodynamics and heat transfer. The ramjet work was applied in t

Navaho program, the Bomarc program, and the so-called "T" series of missiles for the Navy, 

cluding the Terrier and Talos missiles. The early promise of nucle.ar propulsion, never realiz

nurtured basic research in materials. 

In April 1947 the Cleveland laboratory was renamed the Flight Propulsion Resear

Laboratory to mark its transition from an engine laboratory, charged with assisting industry w

its wartime development problems, to a laboratory with the freedom to explore areas in prop

sion research that seemed to hold promise for the future. The following year, after the death 

George W. Lewis, the laboratory became the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. Lewis's nam

more than any other, had stood behind the NACA's reputation for basic research in the prew

period. He had guided its work from the 1920s through World War II, winning the backing of k

members of Congress through the force of his personality and his single-minded dedication to t

84 
was in engineering, his approach to the problems of aviation had been practical and down

earth. In his view, testing was the path to useful knowledge-the careful gathering and interpr

tion of data-to save industry designers unnecessary steps. Wind tunnels, not libraries, w

where NACA staff did basic research. However, World War II and the turbojet revolution 

George Lewis had only belatedly recognized had changed the practice of engineering. 

dramatic breakthroughs of World War II in jet propulsion, nuclear fission, radar, and gu

missiles increased the need for engineering more firmly grounded in science. The NA

engineering traditions, nurtured by Lewis, would have to be leavened with a stronger dos

analytical talent. 
, 

2 Quotations from Aviation News, 25 June 1945, and New York Mi"or, 24 June 1945. The articles w

reproduced in Wing Tips, 18 July 1945. 

3 "Memorandum for Manager, Report of trip by C. T. Perin, January 19 to January 28, 1946," 18 Febru

1946, NASA Lewis Records, 34/200. 

4 Minutes of the Executive Committee, January-June 1944, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 9

5 Alsos Mission Report, 4 March 1944, National Archives, Intelligence Division Alsos Mission File 1944-19

Entry 187, Box 137. On the Alsos Mission, see Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos (Los Angeles: Toma

History of Modern Physics Series, 1947); Clarence Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and 

Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971); and Boris T. Pash, The Alsos Mission (New York: Award Hou

1969). Less reliable are Tom Bowler, The Paperclip Conspira~.-y: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Bos

Little, Brown, 1987); and Michel Bar-Zohar, The Hunt for the German Scientists (New York: Hawthor

1967). 

6 Russell Robinson to George Lewis, 14 May 1945, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 490, 

tional Archives, Intelligence Division Alsos Mission File, 1944-1945, Entry 187, Box 138. 

7 Minutes of the Executive Committee, January-June 1945, National Archives, Record Group 255, Box 9

8 Kemper's Alsos reports are listed in the Langley file, although not all were obtainable through NA

Technical Services and may have been destroyed. The Langley file is an index of NACA reports k

at Langley Research Center and obtainable on microfilm at the Lewis Technical Library. To use it 

quires clearance. "Report upon the war work of the institute for the development of instruments 

of the department for measuring instruments," by Kemper and Betz-Klein (Translation of a Germ

report) 23 July 1946, 53011174. "Inspection of the jet engine test stands and interrogation of the ch

test pilot, Ing. Kuhn, at the Walter Werke, Keil," 27 July 1945, 7818, 01113, Walter/2. "Visit to dispe

plants of the Dornier Company at Brieurichshafen/Lowenthal, Ravensberg ... ," 25 May 1945, KR/1

"Report on Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt, Munchen (LFW) ... " 13 May 1945, KR/174. "Report on in

rogation of Peter Dornier. . . ," 24 May 1945, KR/178. "Report on Flugtechnisches Institute of 

Techn. Hochschule, Stuttgart . . . ," 26 May 1945. "Report on aircraft engines and jet propuls

research at Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt (LFA) Herman Goering," 22 June 1945, CK/215. "Report on 

spection of mock-up Junkers 262 .. . " 22 June 1945, CK/212. "Interrogation of Ing. Hans Becker 

inspection of the reciprocating engine research and test facilities of the Junkers Flugseug and Motor

Werke, Dessau," 27 July 1945, CK/245. "Interrogation of Dr. Heinz Schmitt in charge of the jet eng

research and development of the Junkers works at Dessau," 6 June 1945, CK/233. "Interrogation of 

Ing. Alfred Grumbt in charge of Flugs. Trauen and inspection of the laboratory equipment," 14 Aug

1945, CK/263. "Inspection of Daimler-Benz dispersal plant at Kulbermoor," 27 July 1945, CK/243. "G

man establishment for aerodynamic research on missiles; cover names Wasserbau Versuchsans

(WVA)," 23 May 1945, RK/180. 

9 Although this index is listed in Cunliffe and Godlbeck, "Special Study on the Records of the National 

visory Committee for Aeronautics," p. 35, it could not be located in National Archives, Record Gro

255. See Lois Walker and Shelby Wickham, From Huffman Prairie to the Moon (Washington, D.C.: U

Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 169-170. Many of the reports prepared at Wright Field by 

Material Command are still not available to historians. For example, I was unable to obtain the rele

of Fritz Zwicky's, "Report on Certain Phases of War Research in Germany," 1947, ADB-953510. 

10 See Russ Murray, "The Navaho Inheritance." American Aviation Historical Society joumal19:17-21; Kenn

P. Werre!!, "The Cruise Missile: Precursors and Problems." Air University Review 32:36-50. John Evv

to V. Dawson, 18 March 1985. 

11 Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive Committee, 18 May 1944, January-June 1944, National Archiv

Record Group 255, Box 9. 

12 John Sloop, "NACA High Energy Rocket Propellant Research in the Fifties," AIAA 8th Annual Meeti

Washington, D.C., 28 October 1971. The reorganization occurred 1 October 1945. 

13 "A Survey of Fundamental Problems Requiring Research at the Aircraft Engine Research Laborator

December 1945. NASA Lewis Records, 34/376. 

86 
For text of National Aeronautical Research Policy, see Alex Roland, Model Research, vol. 2, NASA SP-4

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 693-695. 

16 Bruce Hevly, "Basic Research Within a Military Context: The Naval Research Laboratory and the Fou

tions of Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray," Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1

University Microfilms 8716611, p. 73. See also Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: Nati

Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960." Historical Studies in the Phy

and Biological Sciences 18(1):149-229. For analysis of the contributions of JPL, see Clayton Koppes, 

and the American Space Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 

17 Vannevar Bush, Endless Horizons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 52

Quoted in Edwin Layton, "Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in 1

Century America." Thchnology and Culture 12:563. 

18 Power Plants Committee Minutes, 20 September 1945, National Archives, Record Group 255, 112.02

19 Ibid. 

20 Interview by V. Dawson with Abe Silverstein, 5 October 1984; letter from John Evvard to V. Daw

February 1987. 

21 Interview with Walter Olson by V. Dawson, 16 July 1984. 

22 Interview with Carl David Miller (Cearcy D. Miller) by V. Dawson, 12 October 1984. 

23 Interview with Carl Schueller by V. Dawson, 12 October 1984. 

24 Minutes of High-Speed Panel, National Archives, Record Group 255, 111.52. Cleveland was 

represented and did not receive copies of the minutes of the first meeting. Minutes of meetings betw

1944 and 1947 are missing from National Archives, Record Group 255. 

25 Roland, Model Research, vol. 1, p. 211. 

26 Quoted by Roland, Model Research, vol. 1, p. 212. 

27 W. T. Bonney interview with Abe Silverstein, transcript, 20 September 1973. 

28 Transcript of interview with D. D. Wyatt by Eugene Emme, 21 June 1973, NASA History Of

Washington, D.C. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. Also interview with W. Olson, 16 July 1984. In Engineer in Charge, NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), James Hansen connected this visual, intuitive approac

design to a discussion by Eugene S. Ferguson in "The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technolo

Science 197:836. Hansen's insightful discussions can be found principally on p. 311, 334-335, 341, 

in note 2 (chapter 4), p. 526, and note 2 (chapter 11), p. 556. 

31 See Carlton Kemper to NACA, "Outline of research projects for the 18- by 18-inch and 20-inch supers

tunnels at the Cleveland laboratory," 4 October 1946, 34/521, NASA Lewis Records. Lewis researc

also applied ramjet technology to the improvement of afterburners in turbojet engines. See Russ M

ray, "The Navaho Inheritance." American Aviation Historical Society Journa119:17-21; Kenneth P. W

rell, "The Cruise Missile: Precursors and Problems." Air University Review 32:36-50. 

32 Interview with D. D. Wyatt by Eugene Emme, 21 June 1973. On Busemann at Langley see Hansen, Engi

in Charge, p. 282, 285, and 322. 

33 Chief, BuAer to NACA, December 1944, National Archives, Record Group 255, 118.25. 

34 Interview with Paul Ordin by V. Dawson, 19 March 1986. 

35 John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, NASA SP-4404 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978

74. 

36 Ibid, p. 3. 

37 Transcript of interview by V. Dawson with Walter Olson, 16 July 1984, p. 38. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p
pg, 

39 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 74-75. 

40 On the work of Jacobs and Kantrowitz, see Hansen, Engineer in Charge, p. 39. 

41 Hicks and Simon to Acting Executive Engineer (Rothrock), "Nature of AERL Research on Nuclear Ene

Fuels," 11 June 1945, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records. 

42 John Evvard to Acting Engineer, "Points Which Might Be of Interest to You for Your Washington Dis

sions," 9 August 1945, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records. See also J. F. Victory to Cleveland, "Utiliza

of Atomic Energy," 10 December 1945, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records; J. R. Dietrich to Execu

Engineer, "Atomic-Power Aircraft Engines," 7 August 1945, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records. 

43 Cleveland to NACA, "Recommendations Concerning the Application of Nuclear Energy to Aircraft Po

Plants," 24 May 1946, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records. 

44 Robert Seldon to Manager, "Comments on Nuclear Energy Aircraft Propulsion Laboratory,"21 Septem

1946, 34/17112, NASA Lewis Records. Under NEPA, the Air Force studied both nuclear aircraft 

rocket propulsion between 1946 and 1951 when NEPA was superseded by a joint program with 

Atomic Energy Commission called the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program (ANP). See Richard 

Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the United States Ato

Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1969), p. 70-78. See also R. 

Bussard and R. D. DeLauer, Fundamentals of Nuclear Flight (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 

45 E. R. Sharp to Director of Aeronautical Research, 29 October 1946, 34/376, NASA Lewis Records. 

46 A. Kalitinsky Memo, 1 October 1947, Transactions/Communications 63 A 250, National Archives, Rec

Group 255, Box 14, C-2-8. I have requested declassification of the Addison Rothrock files, Record Gr

255, believed to contain detailed information on the NACA nuclear program. 

47 The proceedings of the conference were published by General Electric in Aircraft Gas Thrbine Enginee

Conference, 1945; the conference is also mentioned in Neville and Silsbee, jet Propulsion Progress, p. 

48 Abe Silverstein, "Investigations of Jet-Propulsion Engines in the NACA Altitude Wind 'funnel," in Airc

Gas Thrbine Engineering Conference (West Lynn, Mass.: General Electric Company, Limited edition, 

538, 1945), p. 255-270. 

49 Interview with William Fleming by V. Dawson, 19 November 1986. 

50 Jerome Hunsaker, "Memorandum on Postwar Research Policy for NACA,' ' full text in Roland, M

Research, vol. 2, appendix H, p. 684-686. 

51 " 'Notes on discussion at meeting of NACA,' July 27, 1944,'' 8 August 1944, in Roland, Model Research, 

2, appendix H, p. 689. 

52 The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Story (West Hartford: Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft C

poration, 1950). p. 152. 

53 " 'Notes on discussion at meeting of NACA,' July 27, 1944," 8 August 1944 in Roland, Model Research, 

2, appendix H, p. 687. 

54 Ibid, p. 688. 

55 Ibid, p. 689. 

56 Cleveland Laboratory Staff, "Performance and Ranges of Application of Various Types of Aircr

Propulsion System," Technical Note 1349, August 1947. 

57 Interview with Ben Pinkel by V. Dawson, 4 August 1985. 

58 This is evident in Eugene Manganiello, "Visit to Wright Field on February 20, 1946 in Connection wi

Proposed Investigation of Composite Operation of the Pratt & Whitney R-4360 Engine," NASA Le

Records. As late as 1948 the compound engine was considered an "outstanding development" in Nev

and Silsbee, jet Propulsion Progress, p. 101. 

59 See Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 128. 

88 
(( NEW EDUCATIONAL 

~Ill DEMANDS 

Although the NACA had very capable engineers, it had few men and women with advan

training in science and engineering. The disparity between the NACA professional staff, genera

with undergraduate degrees in mechanical engineering, and the availability of superior resea

facilities had increased with the physical expansion of the NACA during World War II. T

relatively low salaries paid to civil servants made it difficult to attract staff with advanced degr

in science and engineering, who found their skills in high demand after the war. Edwin 

Hartman, head of the NACA's Coordinating Office on the West Coast, wrote to headquarters 

prod it to action. To Hartman, the construction of new facilities seemed profligate without a co

parable effort to recruit scientific talent. ''While spending millions of dollars and exerting 

highest scientific skill in the design and construction of modern research facilities,'' Hartm

stated, ''the Committee appears penurious and juvenile in its apathetic efforts to provide resea

brains." 1

. Between 1945 and 1958 the NACA would struggle with the problem of recruit

highly trained individuals in a particular field and retaining its most experienced staff. 

Hugh L. Dryden, named in 1947 to succeed George Lewis, symbolized the postwar ef

on the part of the NACA to recruit outstanding scientific talent. He had formidable qualificatio

After earning two Ph.D.'s at The Johns Hopkins University-one in physics in 1919 and the ot

in mathematics in 1920-he had spent the first 30 years of his career as head of the Aerodynam

Section of the National Bureau of Standards. He had published widely on boundary layer the

and wind tunnel turbulence. As one of the country's leading aerodynamicists, he had attended 

Volta Congress on High-Speed Aeronautics in 1935 with Eastman Jacobs. During World War II 

had been appointed to both the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and to Will

Durand's Special Committee on Jet Propulsion. Deputy to Theodore von Karman on the Scie

Advisory Board's technical mission to Europe at the close of the war, he was well acquainted w

the British and German contributions to basic research in high-speed aerodynamics and 

propulsion. 2 

Dryden shared Vannevar Bush's presumption that technology was applied science. Bush h

emphatically stated in Science, the Endless Frontier: '11 nation which depends upon others for its 

basic scientific knowledge will be slow in its industrial progress and weak in its competitive position 

world trade, regardless of its mechanical ski/1."3 This statement was made with the awareness of 

enormous contributions of British and German theoreticians before World War II. It was this 

tellectual capital which Americans, in both universities and government laboratories, were beg

ning to tap in the postwar period. Dryden knew that it was not enough to live off Europ

89 
of the NACA laboratories had to be protected from undue influence from industry, whose d

for profits required them to focus on short-term problems. Dryden was a quiet, religious man 

NACA Director Hugh L. Dryden succeeded the ailing 

George Lewis in 1947. 

believed intensely that his job was to 

tect the creativity and independenc

the NACA laboratories under 

stewardship. 

Dryden knew that, without hi

trained staff, it would be difficult to 

tinue the NACA's commitment "to su

vise and direct the scientific study of 

problems of flight with a view to t

practical solution.'' Missile developm

the atom bomb, and radar had creat

new generation of scientists. It 

brought into being new national lab

tories, like Oak Ridge and Los Alamo

well as the important university-affili

laboratories-the Radiation Laborator

the Massachusetts Institute of Techno

and the Applied Physics Laborator

The Johns Hopkins University. A

World War II, many of the national lab

tories began to lose staff, who w

attracted to prestigious positions 

universities or higher paying job

industry. With a national shortage of scientists and engineers, the NACA found it hard to comp

In the 1920s and 1930s the mystique of flight had attracted talented engineers. During the Dep

sion the security of a civil service position gave the NACA the leverage to select the cream o

applicants. Neither aviation nor the civil service had the same appeal after the war. 

Addison Rothrock and other NACA staff worried about the implications of these chan

In a 1946 memo Rothrock informed Sharp that the Ford Motor Company, Standard Oil of N

Jersey, General Motors, DuPont, and other companies had announced large-scale expansio

their research facilities. Locally, entry-level salaries were comparable to those of Cleveland-

firms, such as Standard Oil of Ohio, Brush Development Company, Dupont, Thompson Prod

(later TRW), and the Weatherhead Company. However, these companies could offer appreci

better salaries to attract NACA engineers in the higher professional grades.4 Between 1945 

1956 this problem would plague their efforts to recruit and retain personnel. In 1951 John Vic

submitted the first draft bill to the Bureau of Budget to alleviate this problem by exempting 

NACA from some Civil Service regulations. The response of the Civil Service Commission was 

sympathetic. It argued that the preferential treatment of the NACA would allow it to pirate 

sonnel from industry and other agencies, a practice that might jeopardize the programs of 

Department of Defense. In 1955 Dryden gained the support of the Industry Consulting Comm

by pointing out that the staffing of NACA wind tunnels (completed under the Unitary W

90 
the NACA, which was losing key personnel and could not find replacements without salaries 

mensurate with those of industry. Not until 1956, as the NACA period was drawing to a c

would the NACA finally obtain legislation for competitive compensation.5 

In the early postwar period the laboratory had to cope with this shortage of research br

by falling back on its own resources. Its strategy was to ferret out talent from within. The 

switch" of 1945 to research in jet propulsion hastened the exodus of experienced staff, but 

were the very men who had been tied to the old piston engine technology. Because turb

nuclear, and rocket propulsion required the shaping of a new community of practice, the rel

inexperience and youth of the remaining staff was an advantage. They were flexible and eag

prove themselves, and reorganization caught their imaginations. Walter Olson recalled

number of us did not think that we were even going to stay and work for the government. 

war was over. What were we going to do now? But then we reorganized. You get a new res

sibility and some new challenges and you say, 'Well, I will try that.' Next thing you know yo

spent a lifetime.' '

6 

Jet propulsion represented an educational challenge. Surprisingly, in the early pos

years, the Case School of Applied Science, located on the east side of Cleveland about 20 m

from the laboratory, played only a minor role in the effort to prepare the staff for the 

theoretical demands of jet propulsion. The reputation of Case (renamed Case Institut

Technology in 1947) had been one of the selling points in the NACA's acceptance of the Cleve

Chamber of Commerce invitation in 1940. However, unlike the close connection between 

California Institute of Technology (CalTech) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, or the NACA A

laboratory with Stanford University, the intended bonding between Case and Lewis Labora

had only partial success. Work in aeronautics had begun auspiciously at Case in the 1930s u

Paul E. Hemke, a Ph.D. from The Johns Hopkins University. He came to Cleveland from Lan

after the unpleasant experience of attempting to work under the autocratic German theoreti

Max Munk. During Hemke's tenure in Cleveland, Case had built a low-speed subsonic wind 

nel. In 1935 Hemke recruited John R. Weske to found a graduate program stressing 

mechanics and aeronautics. Weske, a student of Lionel S. Marks at Harvard University, 

worked with his professor to produce the first axial-flow compressor based on the isolated ai

design theory, an approach that later came into standard use by American designers. 

7 Du

World War II, Hemke left Case to found Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute's program in aerona

and later became Dean of Faculty. Weske hung on at Case with minimal support for new faci

until 1~44, when Case temporarily abandoned work in aeronautics because of the loss of stud

and faculty swept up by the draft or lured by new opportunities offered by the expansio

industry and government laboratories. 

The Cleveland laboratory could not wait for Case to rebuild its aeronautics program. W

the Wind Thnnels and Flight Division, Abe Silverstein created a Special Projects Panel to at

badly needed analytical talent from other divisions. Although theoretical aerodynamics could 

be strictly viewed as related to propulsion, Silverstein recognized that the problems of jet eng

were also related to supersonic aerodynamics, where the design of the inlet was particu

susceptible to the special conditions created by flight at supersonic speeds. According to fo

staff member Eli Reshotko, who later joined the Case faculty, Silverstein strongly believed 
Silverstein asked John Evvard to head the Special Projects Panel because he was one of 

few staff with an advanced degree in physics. Evvard had written his Ph.D. thesis at CalTech 

ion bombardment using mass spectroscopy. Within the division, Silverstein organized stu

groups that met weekly, often on Sunday evenings. One group humorously called itself Bruts

the reverse abbreviation of gas turbine. The other group claimed the name of Cinosrepus, or sup

sonics spelled backward. A staff member selected a research topic and reported to the others 

that he could bring the others up to the level that he had reached." 9 

Silverstein asked Evvard to begin his work in supersonics by preparing a report on All

Puckett's linearized theory for three-dimensional supersonic wings. When Evvard objected that 

did not know anything about supersonics, Silverstein replied that it was new to everyone else t

He handed Evvard a copy of Pucketts' paper as Evvard left for a laboratory-sponsored trip. Evv

read it on the plane. After the presentation of his report to the members of the Special Proje

Panel, Evvard continued to think about Puckett's theory. It appeared to be superior to that of 

German aerodynamicist Ackeret, who had dealt with two-dimensional wings at angle of atta

Puckett's supersonic wing theory allowed the wing to be contoured; it could have any pl

shape, but required supersonic leading edges. Evvard thought that the theory could be extend

to include wing tip regions with subsonic leading edges. He was able to set up an integral equat

that greatly simplified the original theory. This paper established his reputation and was the fo

dation for the future work of Lewis Laboratory in supersonic aerodynamics. "After I came 

with my wing tip theory for supersonic wings,' ' Evvard recalled, ''we mustered a sizeable eff

in supersonic aerodynamics to capitalize on the breakthrough.' '

10 

Evvard's simple but elegant solution to the problem of thin, finite wings stimulated ot

members of the division. Wolfgang Moeckel, who later took charge of the Theoretical Section 

the Supersonic Propulsion Division, tackled the design of a supersonic inlet. What was the b

aerodynamic shape to ensure the smooth passage of air into the engine? He carefully studied 

work of Herman Oswatitsch on the spike inlet before beginning his own work, which soon w

beyond that of the Germans. In general, early supersonic work at Lewis Laboratory focused 

various types of diffusers and the inlets for supersonic ramjets.U By 1947 the workers h

developed from a group of novices in the field into a research team that made significant contri

tions to supersonic wing theory, despite complaints from Langley that the Cleveland laborat

should stick to propulsion. 

In the late 1940s, through its own efforts, the laboratory had established a reputation in ar

such as supersonic aerodynamics. In 1949 Evvard was able to persuade Franklin K. Moore to j

his staff. Moore had worked at CalTech under William Sears, one of Theodore von Karma

outstanding students. Moore's contributions to three-dimensional and unsteady boundary la

theory stimulated others to tackle theoretical problems. By the early 1950s, papers by Le

Thrner, Herbert Ribner, William Perl, Clarence B. Cohen, Wolfgang Moeckel, Harold Mirels, a

others established Lewis Laboratory's reputation for basic work in supersonic aerodynamics. 

The basic outlines of some fields necessary to advance engine development were only beg

ning to take shape in the 1940s. For example, tribology-the study of friction, lubrication, a

wear-did not yet exist as an engineering discipline when Langley hired Edmond Bisson in 19

Bisson moved with the Power Plants Division to Lewis Laboratory in 1943. During World War 

work focused on quick fixes for piston rings and cylinder barrels. However, in 1945 Bisson a

92 
pp

pp

ply by coating a surface and testing to see how it worked. He needed people who would ask, w

is physically occurring when two metal 

surfaces, separated by a thin film, 

interact? His staff needed knowledge of 

boundary layer theory and chemistry to 

understand the problems of lubrication, 

friction, and wear. Most of the group who 

made the transition from the piston 

engine to the gas turbine engine had 

degrees in mechanical engineering. Bisson 

saw the need to make the Division of 

Lubrication, Friction, and Wear more 

interdisciplinary. He looked for people 

with different backgrounds in science, 

and he hired carefully. 

We usually had to get someone from another field and 

train him in our field: what 

we were doing, why we were 

doing it and what was involved technically. We were always looking for the creative 

types. . . My own philosophy 

was that you hire the creative 

john C. Evvard, appointed Chief of the Supersonic Pro

sion Division in 1949, took charge of the Lewis Non-C

Graduate Study Program. 

people, the people who have 

inquisitive minds, and you encourage them to come up with ideas. You tell them, now 

here is the problem. Now what can we do to solve it? ... Again the interdisciplinary 

concept was all important because we would kick around some of these ideas with 

[people with] different backgrounds and it is amazing what the comments would be 

from the other people and the contribution that the other people could give to such 

an idea . . . We had tremendous morale and tremendous output. 12 

Bisson's division had two branches, one for lubrication fundamentals headed by Rober

Johnson and the other to study bearings and seals under William J. Anderson. They approac

lubrication problems using both analysis and experiment. From the late 1940s through the 19

this division worked to establish the basic outlines of tribology. The publication of one of the 

texts in the field, Advanced Bearing Technology, in 1965 by Bisson and Anderson marked tribolo

coming of age as an engineering discipline. 13 

LEWIS LABORA10RY AND CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

Between 1946 and 1952, the very years that the new fields of supersonics and jet propul

made the Cleveland laboratory's educational needs most pressing, the aeronautics program 
research at Lewis Laboratory. In 1947, to compensate for the weakness of its program, C

offered evening extension courses leading to a masters degree. These courses were taught 

Harding Junior High School in Lakewood, a suburb on Cleveland's west side close to 

laboratory. This saved NACA employees the trip to the Case campus. The courses were taught 

either laboratory personnel (who were designated as adjunct professors) or by Case facu

members. So highly regarded were these extension courses that some Case students w

motivated to drive to the west side to attend. Research for masters theses (and in a few cases 

doctoral dissertations) was done using the superior facilities that Lewis Laboratory could provi

Evening courses were offered on the Case campus in mathematical foundations of fl

mechanics, taught by one of the members of the mathematics department. Eugene Manganie

assumed a strong role in the organization and teaching of these courses. Manganiello had earn

his bachelors degree in electrical engineering from the City College of New York (CCNY) in 19

and his masters degree in 1935, at a time when the CCNY was extremely selective. He was typi

of the bright and articulate engineering students from middle- and lower-income families that 

NACA attracted in the late 1930s. 

The inadequacies of the Case offerings in aeronautics were not unusual by American st

dards. In contrast to German technical institutes, only a handful of American universities offe

formal courses in either aircraft gas turbine technology or supersonics during World War 

Suitable English texts for these subjects were not available until the late 1940s. Introduction 

Aerodynamics of a Compressible Fluid by W. H. Liepmann and A. E. Puckett was published in 19

about the time that courses in supersonics in a few universities (like CalTech) began to be offer

For the study of gas turbine technology, Aurel Stodola's Steam and Gas Thrbines, published 

translation in 1927 and reprinted many times up to 1945, was all that was available. This wa

comprehensive work on all facets of steam turbine technology; it included some theoreti

discussion of the subject, but focused on turbines made by specific companies in the field. T

section on gas turbines was short because of the lack of interest at the time the book was writt

Despite its limitations, before 1948, when the Principles of jet Propulsion and Gas Thrbines by 

J. Zucrow of Purdue University filled this gap, Stodola was a basic reference for engineers. A

Silverstein recalled studying Stodola, and a well-thumbed copy of this two-volume work in 

laboratory library attests to its usefulness to the first generation of jet propulsion students. Th

taught themselves what they needed to know. 

The continuing national shortage of engineers in the early 1950s tantalized Case Institute 

Technology with the promise of new opportunities in graduate education. Case had a so

undergraduate program in engineering, but to become a first-rate engineering institution, it ne

ed to strengthen its graduate offerings. This new direction affected its relationship with Le

Laboratory. In 1947 the university trustees chose T. Keith Glennan to take the reins of 

presidency. From humble origins, Glennan had a solid engineering and business background. T

son of a train dispatcher, Glennan attended elementary, high school, and college at the state n

mal school in Eau Clair, Wise. With the railroad in his blood, he aspired to a career as a railro

electrical engineer. He transferred to the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale University, where 

married the daughter of a well-known professor of economics. Mter graduation cum laude in 19

Glennan worked for the motion picture industry for ten years as an operations and stu

manager. During World War II, he concentrated on the development of sonar as head of 

94 
Glennan's presidency transformed Case from a small regional technical school focuse

undergraduate training to a major engineering institution with strong graduate programs. H

in motion plans to overhaul the engineering curriculum and sparked a drive for faculty that e

in a 60 percent increase. Hard driving, gregarious, with a retentive memory for facts and fig

he raised $40 million for ten additional academic buildings, as well as additional dormitori

Glennan's vision included a strong program in the humanities to supplement the more na

engineering disciplines. He supported interdisciplinary programs, including graduate program

the history of science and the history of technology, and the founding of the journal Techn

and Culture by former Case professor Melvin Kranzberg. To attract an impressive faculty for t

programs, he won a substantial grant from the Ford Foundation. 

In 1950 Glennan recruited Ray Bolz from Lewis Laboratory to head an Aeronautics Div

to be set up within the Department of Mechanical Engineering. A graduate of Case, Bolz 

begun his career with the NACA in 1940, first at Langley and later in Cleveland. In 1946 h

rolled in the Ph.D. program at Yale University. He taught under Hemke at Rensselaer whil

was completing his dissertation. Bolz was the first of several Lewis staff to be drawn to the 

faculty, a group that included Louis Green, Paul Guenther, Stan Manson, Alexander Mendelss

Harry Mergler, Simon Ostrach, and Eli Reshotko. The presence of the NACA laborator

Cleveland thus contributed to raising Case's standards and reputation in aeronautics. By 1

Case had awarded 25 degrees to Lewis employees, and Lewis had provided employment for 

graduates of Case. 

In 1951, to upgrade the graduate program in aircraft propulsion, aerodynamics, and ge

fluid mechanics, Bolz and others at Case decided that their program could not depend on 

time students, provided to a large extent by the NACA. 17 Bolz worked to build a resident prog

centered on the Case campus with full-time faculty teaching full-time students. Requirement

the Ph.D. were to include one year of residency. 

To continue to teach extension courses on the west side would have divided the effor

the small faculty, since any course would have to be taught twice. The Case faculty in charg

planning the new propulsion curriculum criticized the past practice of using Lewis Labora

personnel to teach courses: "The men teaching were competent, but full-time research job

little time for development of good graduate courses." 18 This statement requires some scru

Evvard, a Ph.D. from CalTech, for example, had credentials equal or superior to those of the 

faculty. Lewis Laboratory personnel could teach the new principles of jet propulsion with 

benefit of specialized knowledge acquired through the study of theory and experimentally in 

laboratory's wind tunnels. NACA engineers and scientists had studied the German docum

available through Wright Field, and they had the benefit of interaction with the German pion

of the caliber of Hans von Ohain and Anselm Franz. In contrast to this large and suppo

engineering community at Lewis Laboratory, in 1952 Case had an Aero Division that consist

only three full-time faculty members. Facilities for research were also lacking until the late 1

when Case completed a Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

Although it wanted to drop the west side extension courses, Case hoped to keep its tale

pool of part-time students from Lewis Laboratory. It instituted a program of late afternoon cl

on the Case campus that full-time resident students, as well as NACA, Thompson Products, 

other industry employees could attend after work. The laboratory personnel who had previo
of the school's dependence on the NACA for the most advanced knowledge in the field. "This 

an example where the schools, partially because of the national security restrictions, were una

to keep pace with a rapidly advancing technology. Our efforts in this regard were designed 

assist the college until such time as it was able to incorporate this advanced material into its o

curricul urn.' '

19 

On a graduate level, Case now could offer five courses in incompressible, compressible, a

viscous flow theory; three aircraft propulsion courses: aircraft propulsion principles, compres

and turbine theory, and advanced gas turbine power plant design; and one course on the dynam

of aircraft and missiles.

20 The new arrangement meant that Lewis employees now had 

45-minute commute after a day of work. Although some laboratory personnel did make 

journey to the Case campus to complete their degrees, the new, more stringent Case policies h

the effect of encouraging Lewis personnel to look to more prestigious institutions when they c

sidered graduate work. When a division head encouraged a staff member to go to graduate scho

he (or, in very rare cases, she) often passed over Case in favor of Brown, Columbia, CalTe

Rensselaer, Cornell, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or Cambridge University 

England to spend the required year of residency. They brought the benefits of contact with facu

in these schools back to Lewis Laboratory. 

The first engineers to seek advanced training did not receive any financial support from 

NACA. They took leaves of absence and paid their tuition out-of-pocket, with the expectation 

a higher civil service grade when they returned. In 1950, with the passage of the NACA-Gradu

Study Leave Act, it was possible to partially compensate employees for their loss of sala

However, tuition still had to be paid by the employee. In the first year the act went into effe

the laboratory had a training budget of $10,000 for seven participants. By 1958 it had 51 p

ticipants and a budget of $31,000. Other personnel took graduate courses at their own expen

During the same period the Department of Defense could offer much more generous financi

for the training of its scientists and engineers. The laboratory had to wait until Sputnik forced 

passage of the government Employees Training Act in July 1958. This act provided a unifo

government-wide training program. Only then was it possible to cover all the expenses of gradu

education for Lewis employees.21 

When Case discontinued its extension courses on the west side, Lewis formalized 

seminar approach practiced since the days of Brutsag and Cinosrepus. It began a program of fr

non-credit, in-house courses. These courses had the advantage of focusing on areas related 

general aspects of current work at the laboratory. They fostered communication among divisio

thus strengthening an interdisciplinary approach to common problems. "Courses taught at t

Lewis Center,'' Manganiello pointed out, ''also offered an excellent means of communicati

advanced concepts developed by one particular research group to others whose research activit

were in broadly related fields.'' 22 . 

In its first year the course attracted 150 employees. John Evvard took charge of the c

riculum. In 1951 the laboratory offered courses on heat transfer, taught by Robert Deissler a

Simon Ostrach, who later joined the Case faculty. John Livingood, a Ph.D. from the University 

Pennsylvania, taught mathematical analysis. Dr. Robert B. Spooner's course in theoretical physi

originally a Case course, also became part of the non-credit offerings. Members of the staff of t

Compressor and Thrbine Division used a team approach in their courses in that subject, a

96 
courses were regarded as an important supplement to the experimental work of the labora

They were rigorous, with required mid-term and final exams. 23 

The imprimatur of an advanced degree did not necessarily guarantee that a particula

dividual could be useful to the laboratory. As Walter Olson, then chief of the Combustion Bra

explained, "A professor nurtured in academia would likely not have encountered and diagn

the physical problems involved in the new types of propulsion systems." 24 Educated at Ca

the end of the Depression, Olson had gone to work for Lubrizol, a Cleveland-based company 

made oil additives. Since much of the Lubrizol research was being carried on at Case in Carl P

ton' s laboratory, Olson remained at Case to earn his Ph.D. in chemistry and chemical enginee

in 1941. He was well acquainted with the pace and prerogatives of academe. When he lo

back on the engine situation after World War II, he explained that a formal degree program 

not always meet the needs of those who were deeply immersed in the perplexing problems o

propulsion. His remarks highlight the sense of urgency and impatience to get results in the 

War atmosphere of the late 1940s. National security concerns shaped the research program

government laboratories. ''We were trying to get into specialties fast. We needed to get out to 

cutting edge and sometimes it was more useful to bring in a specialist in a particular field

ERNST ECKERT AND THE HEAT TRANSFER FRONTIER 

Ernst Eckert was just such a specialist in heat transfer-a scientist who had worked a

Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt (LFA), the German laboratory for basic research at Braunsch

during World War II. Presented with the opportunity to bring him to Lewis Laboratory, 

Silverstein, the laboratory's new Chief of Research, lost no time in seizing it. Eckert accept

generous offer from the NACA and left Wright Field for Cleveland in 1949. He brought to L

Laboratory knowledge and experience of basic work in Germany in jet propulsion and, more 

portant, a new approach to the problems of heat transfer. It was through his role as a teach

the laboratory and later at the University of Minnesota that Eckert personally reinforced 

American synthesis of advanced German work in heat transfer begun by Wilhelm Nusselt an

successor, Ernst Schmidt, at the University of Munich.26 

By training and experience, Eckert's background contrasted with that of his American 

leagues, who struggled to find ways to acquire advanced training comparable to that availab

Germany before World War II. He completed a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering at the Ger

-Institute of Technology in Prague in 1931. Intrigued by photographs of turbulence and separa

of flow of heat, in 1934 he chanced upon Abriss der Stromungslehre, Ludwig Prandtl's introduc

to fluid mechanics. This was a turning point in his intellectual development. It required a lea

the imagination to see that Prandtl's boundary layer theory could be applied not only to the 

of air over the wing of an airplane but also to the complex processes involved in the transf

heat. After study with the well-known expert in radiative heat transfer, Ernst Schmidt, at 

Institute of Technology in Danzig, in 1937 Eckert followed Schmidt to Braunschweig, w

Schmidt was head of engine research. 

In Germany basic and applied research were kept physically separate. Applied research 

carried on near Berlin at the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fur Luftfahrt (DVL). The concentratio

more basic research at Braunschweig allowed considerable interaction between theoretician

volved in engine research and those in other disciplines, particularly fluid mechanics. In cont
and Ludwig Prandtl (at nearby Goettingen) were his colleagues. These associations reinforced h

awareness of the importance of fluid mechanics in the study of heat transfer. His book, Wiirm

und Stoffaustausch, applied Prandtl' s 

boundary layer concept to heat transfer 

problems; it was not published in 1944 as 

he had expected, because Allied bombing 

repeatedly destroyed the plates for the 

book. In 1940, almost immediately after 

Hans von Ohain had demonstrated the 

feasibility of jet propulsion, Eckert's 

Division of Thermodynamics dropped 

piston engine research and began to focus 

on the problems of turbojet engines. 

Through his research using an optical instrument developed in the late 19th century-the Mach-Zehnder interferometerto study heat transfer, Eckert began to lay 

the theoretical basis for turbine cooling.27 

Eckert was among the 260 scientists 

and engineers invited by the Army Air 

Forces to come to the United States under 

"Operation Paperclip" in 1945.28 At 

Wright Field Eckert joined Hans von 

Ohain, Theodor Zobel, Anselm Franz, 

Helmut Schelp, Alexander Lippisch, 

"We are trying to get into specialties fast," declared Wal

T. Olson, Chief of the Combustion and Fuels Division. 

Eugen Ryschkewitsch, and others who had been doing advanced work in high-spe

aerodynamics and jet propulsion in Germany. At the expiration of his one-year contract with t

Army in 1946, it was renewed for an additional five years. 

Because Eckert was the first to recognize the usefulness of the Mach-Zehnder interferomet

for basic studies of heat transfer, he was anxious to have one built at Wright Field so that he cou

continue work begun in Germany.29 The success of the American-built interferometer made i

model for other interferometers at universities such as Rutgers, Ohio State, and the University 

California at Berkeley in the late 1940s. 

The Air Force appears to have viewed Eckert as too valuable to lose prematurely to a unive

sity. Eckert was denied permission to join L. M. K. Boelter's heat transfer group at the Universi

of California at Los Angeles. 

30 However, the Air Force had a keen interest in assisting t

research in jet propulsion in Cleveland, and with the funds for expensive experimental apparat

more available to the NACA than the Power Plants Laboratory at Wright Field, Eckert was allow

to become a consultant for the Cleveland laboratory. He was assigned to the Thrbine Cooli

Branch under Herman Ellerbrock to complete the last two years of his contract. Eckert's presen

stimulated the group in turbine cooling to move beyond the foundations of heat transfer laid 

W. H. McAdams in his book Heat 'lransmission, published in 1933.31 

98 
Heat had to penetrate the metal blade to reach to cooling air in the interior, a slow and ineffic

process. He encouraged the laboratory to consider other methods of turbine cooling. 

Braunschweig he had begun to explore potentially more effective approaches like transpirat

film, and natural convection liquid cooling. At Lewis Laboratory he continued this work

developed, together with members of the Thrbine Cooling Branch [at Lewis], the theory of th

cooling methods by analysis and furthered their development by experiments." 32 Film cool

now in general use, particularly attracted him, and he spent much of his time advocating fur

basic research on this method. While at Lewis Laboratory, he also worked out the theories 

transpiration cooling and natural convection liquid cooling. He had begun to experiment w

various methods of applying these new theories. 

33 

ADVOCACY OF BASIC RESEARCH 

Eckert's efforts to turn the opinion of the Viscous Flow Panel in favor of basic research w

only partly successful. He suggested that more precise values of Prandtl numbers were neces

for high-temperature investigations and proposed a method to measure these numbers based 

work he had done at Braunschweig. In a memo prepared for the panel, he suggested that a 

set-up, based on the analytical relation for a flat plate, could use a cylinder to investigate 

temperature relations in the gas flow. After considerable discussion, the panel agreed that Eck

proposal demonstrated a "pressing" need, but recommended that this research be undertake

a university. 

34 Exactly why Eckert failed to receive support for this basic work is unclear, b

appears that Lewis's leadership was skeptical that research at such a fundamental level w

yield tangible results. 

Eckert chafed at the emphasis on applications at Lewis Laboratory. Unlike the clear

German organization of research, which kept basic research and applications separate, at L

there was a shifting, never quite defined, line between them. Those who practiced on the m

analytic levels were never allowed to lose sight of the connection of their research to the impr

ment of American engine technology. The organizational structure, which usually included 

damental and applied branches within divisions, reflected this supposition. 

Testing of full-scale turbojet engines was, in Eckert's view, less valuable than work 

isolated problems using scale models of components. He advocated a careful, system

approach, working from simple to more complex experimental rigs. Eckert viewed Silverstei

a man "too eager for quick results, and not patient or meticulous enough" to allow researc

proceed in a careful and rational manner from simple turbine wheels consisting of one st

through models of several stages up to full-scale testing.

35 Silverstein was willing to skip step

reach the hardware stage, where full-scale testing took over. He could never see research a

end in itself. Eckert did not feel that the role of a research laboratory was to design engine

components. Although Eckert was allowed to set his own research agenda, he did not have an 

tirely free hand. He was frustrated in his desire to address the entire range of basic heat tran

problems. For example, Eckert could not work on the problem of aerodynamic heating, an inte

that he had developed at Braunschweig in connection with the supersonic flight of the V-2

Silverstein appears to have preferred Eckert to work on calculations, rather than b

expensive experimental apparatus, although he did authorize the construction of several large 

bine wheels for Eckert to continue his work on natural convection liquid cooling after Eckert 
Test rig to study film cooling in the rocket laboratory, 1952. 

100 

An engineer expla

apparatus for study

how to air cool hol

turbine blades, 1946
it seems that Eckerts personal research interests were viewed by Silverstein as subordinate t

role as mentor to the capable, but not as highly trained staff at Lewis. Robert Deissler, a 

giant in the heat transfer field who spent his professional career at Lewis, recalled Eckert's he

attitude and his ability as a teacher to make extremely complex subjects appear simple. 

36 Ge

Low, later Deputy Administrator of NASA, worked with Eckert on a heat transfer problem in 

nection with the design of nuclear reactors. 

37 

Eckert stimulated the work of others both directly through work on specific problems 

through his course in heat transfer. He used his text, Introduction to the Transfer of Heat and M

translated at Wright Field with the help of Robert Drake, to teach a seminar in heat transf

Mter Eckert left in 1952, his book continued to serve as a text for courses in heat transfer

Why Eckert did not press to have a Mach-Zehnder interferometer built for heat tran

studies at Lewis is not clear, but it seems that Eckert's energies were directed toward foste

analytical talent. Members of the Instruments Division built an interferometer for studie

supersonic aerodynamics, but Eckert had no contact with this work. Donald R. Buchele 

Walton Howes recalled that they used the early papers of H. Shardin as a guide in building 

first interferometer. By the time they could take advantage of the presence of Eckert and Z

at Wright Field, they had perfected their instrument to a point that rivaled Zobel's German-

interferometer. 39 

Eckert's impatience with the applied emphasis of the laboratory, his interest in teach

and his desire to see the field of heat transfer established as a coherent body of knowledge pu

him toward university research. When he left Lewis in 1952, after turning down an offer o

endowed professorship at Case, he established his own heat transfer laboratory at the Unive

of Minnesota. There he built his second Mach-Zehnder interferometer. 

Although his tenure at the laboratory was brief, Eckert's association laid the foundatio

an extremely creative and productive group in the field of heat transfer. By the 1960s Ger

work in heat transfer had become integrated into the general curricula of the best schools. W

the strength of the heat transfer group at Lewis Laboratory was at its height, graduate schools 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell, and Purdue had active programs in 

transfer, and Lewis staff were recruited from these programs. Robert Siegel, for example, wo

under Warren Rohsenow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He wrote, with 

Howell, Thermal Radiation and Heat Transfer; this basic text, now in its second printing, has 

translated into twelve languages. 

In terms of basic research, the heat transfer group seems to have come close to 

Braunschweig model. Robert Deissler recalled that it remained the philosophy of the group in 

damental heat transfer that problems should be ''approached in such a way that results m

have some lasting value, independent of a particular application." Although the group too

problems that could apply to aircraft nuclear propulsion, "the fact that nuclear propulsion n

quite materialized as a viable scheme did not lessen the value of the research, which aide

understanding heat transfer in a variety of situations."40 The Analytical Section at L

Laboratory became a center for basic research on the problems of radiation, convection, and 

duction, a distinction it held until the early 1970s, when government support was drasti

reduced.

41 
research within an institutional framework whose main focus was the improvement of turbo

engines. Ostrach graduated from the University of Rhode Island with a degree in mechani

engineering in 1944. At Lewis Laboratory he went to work under John Sanders to find quick fix

for the burned-out pistons of the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 and the exhaust valves of the Wri

R-3350. William Perl, a theoretical aerodynamicist who transferred from Langley in 1944, was 

laboratory's "resident genius." He served as the role model for aspiring theorists like Ostrach. P

had designed one of the early supersonic duct tunnels at the laboratory. In 1946 he took a lea

of absence to study under Theodor von Karman at CalTech. By chance, Alexander Mendelssoh

a branch chief, noticed his analytical ability. In 1947 Sanders suggested that Ostrach get a Ph

Ostrach went to Brown University to study in the Graduate Division of Appl

Mathematics, at that time one of the outstanding programs in the country. George F. Carrier w

his thesis advisor and mentor. He studied fluid mechanics under Sydney Goldstein, C.C. Lin, a

Wallace D. Hayes. Ostrach recalled that his professors rejected one thesis topic after another un

he heard about the thesis topic of a fellow student: the problem of gas bubbles dispers

throughout a solid material. It was a problem in heat transfer by natural convection, an individu

bubble treated as a horizontal cylinder of circular cross-section and infinite length. Ostrach su

gested a second approach to the problem, allowing him to treat it as a boundary layer proble

This appealed to his professors because boundary layer theory was only beginning to be appl

in the study of heat transfer. 42 Ostrach completed his thesis, ''A Boundary Layer Problem in t

Theory· of Free Convection," in 1950. 

After graduation he was offered an assistantship at Harvard University, but the salary w

low. Abe Silverstein promised him a double jump in civil service professional grade if he wou

come back to Lewis Laboratory. Ostrach was assigned to work under John Evvard, who inform

him that workers with doctoral degrees were expected to produce 2.34 reports per year, whi

filled Ostrach with trepidation. Evvard gave Ostrach permission to work on buoyancy flows, s

virgin territory for theoretical investigation in the United States. He decided to simplify the pro

lem he had tackled in his thesis by examining free convection about a vertical flat plate. He solv

the problem deductively with the help of a colleague from another division, Lynn U. Albers, usi

a Card Programmed Electronic Calculator. 

At one of the periodic research reviews, Ostrach presented a summary of his flat-pl

theory; Silverstein exploded, "Hell, man, we're not interested in home heating!" Evvard was ha

ly more sympathetic. He never missed the opportunity to scoff good naturedly that Ostrach w

"becoming the world's expert in a field in which no one was interested."43 Fortunately, Eck

was making his weekly visits to Lewis Laboratory at this time. Eckert encouraged Ostrach to co

tinue. He told him that Ernst Schmidt and W. Beckmann had solved the identical problem in 193

Ostrach needed a justification for his work, and Eckert may have told him that Ernst Schmidt h

used natural convection to circulate a fluid to cool turbine blades. Ostrach began to refer to t

paper he was preparing as ''natural convection parallel to a generating body force'' to imply a re

tionship to turbine cooling. "But anyhow," Ostrach recalled, "I started making all this noise abo

the importance of it, and I tried like hell to justify it.' '

44 Shortly afterward, the American Soci

of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) accepted Ostrach's paper describing work on buoyancy flow

Coincidentally, Ernst Schmidt, then on a visit to the United States, planned to attend the meetin

Eckert asked Ostrach to accompany Schmidt on the train from Cleveland to Chicago. Ostra

102 
commented on the soundness of Ostrachs calculations and his approach to the problem. 

Chicago meeting, Ostrach recalled, was the "beginning of a long, friendly, and stimulating 

tionship between us." 45 

Fortunately, Ostrach found another justification for his work when Ben Pinkel flagged 

down for a ride on his way to the laboratory when Pinkel had a flat tire. Since Pinkel knew 

Ostrach was working on heat transfer problems, he invited Ostrach to attend a meeting 

Admiral Hyman Rickover. Rickover described how the early sodium-cooled nuclear reacto

submarines produced greater heat transfer in the control rods than they had expected. Thin

over the problem, Ostrach suggested that natural convection could be the cause. " I was tol

no uncertain terms, that that could not be the case since natural convection was an innocuous 

cess and could not possibly result in such large heat transfer." 46 Knolls Atomic Power Labora

later verified Ostrach' s prediction. Rickover' s reactor problem provided Ostrach with materia

his next paper, "Laminar Natural-Convection Flow and Heat Transfer of Fluids With and Wit

Heat Sources in Channels with Constant Wall Temperatures." 47 

Few people were interested in natural convection in the early 1950s. However, Ephraim 

Sparrow, a young Harvard University student working at the Raytheon Corporation, had no

some of Ostrach's papers and wrote that he was interested in verifying some of his solu

experimentally. Ostrach encouraged him to come to Lewis Laboratory to work with him. Spa

returned to Harvard for a Ph.D. and later joined Eckert and another former Lewis colleague, P

Blackshear, at the University of Minnesota. 

In the mid-1950s Silverstein created the Applied Mechanics Group within Evvard's divi

This group consisted of Ostrach, Steven Maslen, Franklin Moore, and Harold Mirels, who sh

the same office. Moore and Ostrach contributed to three-dimensional, unsteady boundary 

theory. Mirels and Maslen focused on acoustic screaming. In 1987 all four had achieved 

highest professional distinction conferred on an engineer, membership in the National Acad

of Engineering.48 

Although they were generally left alone to pursue their own work, from time to time 

Silverstein would call on his "academicians" to tackle a problem related to the real worl

engines, where problems were still generally approached empirically. For example, in the 

1950s research had turned to helicopter ramjets. 

So, of course, the first thing that they did was build them. And they were having a lot 

of trouble with them. Frank (Moore] and I asked for a briefing or something. We asked 

what was the problem? They answered that they were getting very bad combustion. 

So Frank and I went back (it was primarily I, because I was looking for justification 

for doing these buoyancy kind of flows) ... and we showed that the flow would break 

up in these big vortices. It is most likely the finest piece of work that Frank and I did, 

but I don't think that anybody knows about it. And shortly thereafter they stopped 

building those helicopter ramjets for a long period of time. 49 

It is doubtful that the theoretical work of the Special Projects Panel, the Applied Mecha

Group, and the Heat Transfer Group had a great impact on the work of the laboratory as a w

Commitment to basic research was probably never more than 5 to 10 percent of the laborat

resources. 5° Relative to the costs of testing, which took a lion's share of the laboratory's bu
The influence of these men lay outside the laboratory through their NACA reports a

papers in the 'Iransactions of the ASME. Their presence at the laboratory was due in no sm

measure to Abe Silverstein's commitment to basic research. Like Dryden and Vannevar Bush, 

believed that basic research was the nation's technical capital. Although Silverstein was m

comfortable with creativity expressed in tangible objects-a new compressor or afterburner-

usually recognized the value of the theoretical contributions of people like Ostrach. A new theo

was like a new piece of hardware, something on the shelf, ready if it was needed in the futu

Our function is to lead the military services into the most favorable set of actions that 

we can. They're always interested in an airplane that will fly faster, farther, higher. 

And they are always looking for this, and they come initially to you to see whether 

you have something in your pocket now that you have created that would make 

something possible that wasn't possible before.51 

The significance of the laboratory's theoreticians in the history of the laboratory does 

lie in what they contributed to on-going work. During this period the bread and butter of 

laboratory still remained full-scale testing of turbojet engines and components. Rather, what 

laboratory provided to young theoreticians at a formative time in their careers was incentive 

continue their educations and a nurturing environment for creative work. They stimulated ea

other. Beyond the publication of their papers and the recognition of their engineering peers, th

were free from the demands of teaching or tangible product. Their theoretical skills were co

plemented by comparable mechanical ingenuity on the part of the laboratory's support servi

personnel. They could build a small supersonic tunnel or a test rig, or modify a computer to t

their results experimentally. They were at Lewis Laboratory at a time when engineering w

becoming more scientific. Ernst Eckert had modestly written in the preface to his important te

"It is the opinion of the author that a physical process is understood thoroughly only where i

possible to calculate the occurrences from basic knowledge and when these calculated results 

checked by experiments." 52 American engineers did not yet have sufficient theoretical tools 

understand what happens inside engines as predictable physical processes. Innovation in gas t

bine engines in the 1950s still came more from systematic testing of full-scale engines than 

theoretical approach of Lewis Laboratory's academicians. 

104 
Edwin P. Hartman to R. G. Robinson, NACA Personnel Program, 6 May 1946, NASA Lewis Records

34, file 200. The problem of a shortage of engineers between 1949 and 1955 is documented in 

Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the U

States, 1940-1960." Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, vol. 18, part 1, p. 166

2 See discussion of NACA's effort to strengthen science influence in Arthur L. Levine, "United S

Aeronautical Research Policy, 1945-1958: A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the Nat

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1963, p. 92-103

biographical information on Dryden, see Alex Roland, Model Research, NASA SP-4103 (Washin

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), vol. 1, p. 225-226. 

3 Quoted by Edwin T. Layton, Jr., "American Ideologies of Science and Engineering." Technology and C

17:689. 

4 Addison Rothrock to Manager, "Comparison of Professional Salaries at Cleveland Laboratory of N

with Corresponding Industrial Salaries," 12 February 1946, NASA Lewis Records 34/200. "Mem

dum for Manager, Report of Trip by C. T. Perin, January 19 to January 28, 1946," 18 February 

PB 34/200. See also Robert Seldon for Manager, "Comments on Nuclear Energy Aircraft Propu

Laboratory," 21 September 1946, NASA Lewis Records, Box 34. Overall, national laboratories lost 

ly 20 percent of their staffs. See Clarence Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold 

(New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 150 and note 8, p. 308. 

5 Documents describing the effort for legislation for Competitive Compensation Proposals can be fou

a carton designated "NACA Documents 1913-1960," located in the NASA History Office, Washin

D.C. 

6 Interview with Walter Olson, 16 July 1984. I am indebted to Edward Constant, The Origins of the Th

Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) for defining an engineering "

munity of practice," and for calling attention to the discontinuity between the piston engine and t

jet engine communities. 

7 Brian J. Nichelson, "Early Jet Engines and the Transition from Centrifugal to Axial Compressors: A 

Study in Technological Change," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1988. On Hemke

James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing O

1987) p. 93. 

8 Eli Reshotko, telephone interview, 30 January 1987. 

9 Interview with Abe Silverstein, 5 October 1984. Interview with Irving Pinkel, 30 January 1985. 

10 Letter from John Evvard to V. Dawson, 18 March 1985. See John C. Evvard, "Distribution of Wave 

and Lift in the Vicinity of Wing Tips at Supersonic Speeds," NACA TN 1382, 1947, and "Use of S

Distributions for Evaluating Theoretical Aerodynamics of Thin Finite Wings at Supersonic Spe

NACA TR 951, 1950. See also Allen E. Puckett, "Supersonic Wave Drag of Thin Airfoils."]. Aero

13:475-84 and papers by Lewis personnel L. Thrner, Clarence B. Cohen, Wolfgang Moeckel, and H

Mirels, among others 

11 Carlton Kemper to NACA, "Outline of Research Projects for the 18- by 18-inch and 20-inch Super

'funnels at the Cleveland Laboratory," 4 October 1946, NASA Lewis Records. 

12 Interview with Edmond E. Bisson by V. Dawson, 22 March 1985. See also Tribology in the 80s, N

Conference Publication 2300, 1984 

13 Edmond E. Bisson, Advanced Bearing Technology, NASA SP-38, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Pri

Office, 1965). For a detailed description of Lewis Laboratory's contributions to the field of tribology

"LeRC Contributions to Aeronautics in the Field of Tribology," undated typescript. Files of the au

14 "Planning and Goals for Instruction and Research in the Fields of Aircraft Propulsion, Aerodynamics

General Fluid Mechanics at Case Institute of Technology," 1952, Case Western Reserve Unive

Archives, Case Institute of Technology Engineering Department Records, 19FL, 2:1. 

15 C.H. Cramer, Case Western Reserve: A History of the University, 1826-1976 (Boston: Little Brown 

Company, 1976). p. 262, Glennan served as President of Case from 1947 to 1966. He took a lea
16 Cramer, Case Western, p. 63-70 

17 Telephone interview with Ray Bolz, September 1987. See also "Planning and Goals for Instruction a

Research in the Fields of Aircraft Propulsion, Aerodynamics, and General Fluid Mechanics at Ca

Institute of Technology," 1952, CWRU Archives, CIT Engineering Department Records, 19FL, 2:1 

18 "Planning and Goals," CWRU Archives, 19FL, 2:1. 

19 Eugene J. Manganiello and Vincent F. Hlavin, "Post University On-the-Job Training for Engineers." Prese

tation at 1961 Annual Meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, 11 January 1961. 221, NA

Lewis Records. 

20 "Planning and Goals," CWRU Archives, 19FL, 2:1. 

21 Manganiello and Hlavin, "Post University On-the-job Training." 

22 Ibid. 

23 Syllibi for courses between 1952 and 1957, 296/116.1, NASA Lewis Records. 

24 Telephone conversation with Walter Olson, 12 September 1986. 

25 Ibid. 

26 On Ernst Eckert, see V. Dawson, "From Braunschweig to Ohio: Ernst Eckert and Government H

Transfer Research," in History of Heat Transfer, Edwin T. Layton, Jr., and John H. Lienhard, eds. (N

York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 19881, p. 125-37. 

27 See Dawson, "From Braunschweig to Ohio: Ernst Eckert and Government Heat Transfer Research," 

125-137. E. R. G. Eckert, "Gas Thrbine Research at the Aeronautical Research Center, Braunschwe

during 1940-1945," Atomkerenergie (ATKEI Bd. 23 (19781 Lfg 4: 208-211. Braunschweig is described 

Leslie E. Simon, German Research in World War II: An Analysis of the Conduct of Research (New Yo

John Wiley & Sons, 19471. 

28 For the story of the importing of German scientists, see Clarence Lasby, Project Paperclip and the Cold W

Lasby incorrectly identifies Eckert as an "expert in jet motor fuels," (p. 291. Tom Bower, The Paperc

Conspiracy (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 19871 also contains inaccuracies. 

29 E. R. G. Eckert, R. M. Drake, Jr., and E. Soehngen, "Manufacture of a Zehnder-Mach interferomete

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Thchnical Report 5721 (19481. 

30 On L. M. K. Boelter, see John H. Lienhard, "Notes on the Origins and Evolution of the Subject of H

Transfer." Mechanical Engineering 105(61:26. 

31 William H. McAdams, Heat Transmission, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 19421. Nine NACA memoran

on turbine cooling were published as RM E7Blla-h and RM E8H03. Authors included W. B. Brow

Lincoln Wolfenstein, Gene Meyer, John Livingood, and John Sanders. 

32 Anselm Franz, the designer of the Jumo 004, used hollow blades in which the cooling air was duct

through passages in the blade. His Cromadur sheet metal blades contained less than five pounds 

chromium and no nickel at all, an achievement that particularly pleased him. They reached producti

in Germany in 1944 in the Jumo 004B. See Anselm Franz, "The Development of the 'Jumo 004' Thrbo

Engine," in The jet Age: Forty Years of jet Aviation, Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, e

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 19791, p. 7:3. 

E. R. G. Eckert, "Comments to the Draft by Dr. Virginia Dawson on the History of Lew

Research Center," 9 January 1987; and E. R. G. Eckert's notes appended to "Interview with Dr. Ern

Eckert," 13 January 1987,by Edwin T. Layton, Jr. 

33 See E. R. G. Eckert and John N. Livingood, "Method for Calculation of Heat Transfer in Laminar Regi

of Air Flow Around Cylinders of Arbitrary Cross Section (Including Large Thmperature Differences a

Transpiration Coolingl," NACA TN 2733, June 1952. See also E. R. G. Eckert, Martin R. Kinsler, a

Reeves P. Cochran, "Wire Cloth as Porous Material for 'franspiration-Cooled Walls," NACA R

E51H23, November 1951. 

34 This work, carried out with W. Weise, was published in Forschung auf dem Gebiete des Ingenieurwesens, v

13 (19421. See "Memorandum to Dr. John Evvard, Chairman of the Viscous Flow Panel at the Lew

Laboratory," 1950, 295/100.71, NASA Lewis Records. 

106 
37 E. R. G. Eckert and George M. Low, "Temperature Distribution in Internally Heated Walls of H

Exchangers Composed of Noncircular Flow Passages," NACA Report (1951)1022, superseded TN 2

38 Ernst Eckert, Introduction to the Transfer of Heat and Mass (New York: McGraw-Hill1950); published in G

man in 1949; revised English edition, 1963. 

39 Interview with Donald Buchele and Walton Howes, 8 July 1986. I am indebted to Mr. Howes for provid

me with a copy of "Visit to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on April26, 1949 to Discuss Interferog

Evaluation in Supersonic Airflow." See also H. Shardin, "Theorie und Anwendungen 

Mach-Zehnderchen Interferenz-Refraktometers," Zeitschrift fUr instrumentenkunde, vol. 53, p. 396-

and 424-436. 

40 Personal communication from Robert Deissler, October 1986. 

4 1 See J. H. Lienhard, "Notes on the Origins and Evolution of the Subject of Heat Transfer." Mechan

Engineering 105(6):20-26. See work by C. B. Cohen, Robert Deissler, Patrick L. Donoughe, Ma

Goldstein, John Howell, John Livingood, George M. Low, F. K. Moore, Simon Ostrach, Eli Resho

Robert Siegel. and Maurice Thcker. 

42 Simon Ostrach, "Memoir on Buoyancy-Driven Convection," unpublished manuscript, 1989, p. 2. 

43 Ibid, p. 4. 

44 Interview with Simon Ostrach, 29 September 1987. 

45 Ostrach, "Memoir on Buoyancy-Driven Convection," p. 3. 

46 Interview, 29 September 1987. 

47 NACA TN 2863, 1952. 

48 In 1987 the National Academy of Engineering had 1285 members in 12 fields of engineering and 

foreign associates. Ohio had 34 members; New York, 110; California, 328; and Maryland, 34. 

Franklin Moore's papers, see NACA TR 1124, TR 1132, TN 2279, and TN 2521. 

49 Interview with Simon Ostrach, 29 September 1987. 

50 This is based on a statement made by Abe Silverstein to the author and Arthur L. Levine, "United St

Aeronautical Research Policy, 1915-1958: A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the Natio

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," unpublished Ph.D. dissection, Columbia, 1963, p. 97. 

51 Transcript of interview with Abe Silverstein, 5 October 1984, p. 11. 

52 Eckert, Introduction to the Transfer of Heat and Mass. 
I 
~ CHAeTH S>X 

~(( OPERATIONS 

~Ill RESEARCH 

Operations research fell at the applied end of the research spectrum. It concerned whe

certify an airplane for take-off and landing. It was an opportunity to save lives. Even in an 

so close to applications or development, the NACA shaped its research to illuminate general p

lems to benefit the entire industry. During World War II icing research was unquestion

"development," as distinct from fundamental research. The anti-icing hardware developed 

military aircraft during the war was only a short-term solution to the icing problem. A fundam

tal understanding of what constitutes the icing cloud was necessary. In 1944 the NACA beg

program to compile statistical data to define icing conditions, culminating in the 1950

guidelines for the design of ice-protection systems, which became the basis for federal regulat

in certifying these systems. As it evolved, icing research became a discipline that combined b

theoretical and experimental approaches. 

Icing on aircraft is caused by flight through an icing cloud consisting of small superco

droplets that strike the aircraft surfaces and freeze into a porous white mass called rime ic

larger supercooled droplets strike the aircraft, not all of the water freezes on impact. As w

accumulates and enough heat is dissipated, the water freezes into a clear, hard mass called g

ice, a much more serious problem because it is difficult to remove. Ice adds weight and imp

the aerodynamic efficiency of an airplane, often leading, in severe conditions, to a crash. 1 A

the bombing of Pearl Harbor, military planners suggested that the most promising route for an 

vasion of Japan was across Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Anticipating severe aircraft i

problems, the Army asked for a broad attack on many fronts. General Electric, the Massachu

Institute of Technology (MIT). and all three NACA laboratories joined the effort to find way

protect aircraft from this silent enemy. 

In aircraft powered by piston engines during World War II, ice accumulated on the 

pellers and the plane's leading edges, blocked the air intakes of the engines, and choked the 

buretor. Icing of windshields cut down pilots' visibility. Before the war aircraft manufactu

used a simple, inexpensive, mechanical method to remove ice. An inflatable rubber boot 

fitted over the leading edges of the wings and tail. When ice began to build up, the boots w

inflated and deflated to knock off the ice. However, the boots impaired the aerodynamic effect

ness of the aircraft's surfaces and increased drag. These clumsy and increasingly ineffec

de-icing methods had to be replaced with a more aerodynamically efficient system of ice prev

tion. Heat to prevent ice build-up seemed to promise a more satisfactory method to conquer 

icing problem.2 

109 
the engine's exhaust to the leading edges of the wings and tail was not new, prior to the war, 

craft manufacturers were unwilling to incur the additional production costs required by a ther

anti-icing system. Under Army auspices, engineers at Langley, led by Lewis A. Rodert, desig

and installed a thermal system in the wings of a Lockheed 12 airplane, the NACA's first so-ca

"flying laboratory." Rodert continued this work at Ames. Mter flight testing the new system

1941 Rodert's group issued its first report demonstrating the feasibility of using exhaust-hea

wings to protect against icing. 3 

During construction of the Altitude Wind Thnnel at Lewis Laboratory, an Icing Resea

Thnnel was added to the original plan to take advantage of its extensive and sophistica

refrigeration system. It was hoped that the new icing tunnel in Cleveland would be usefu

assisting in the development of Rodert's thermal system. Proposed in 1942 and completed 

spring 1944, the icing tunnel was not part of the original plan for the laboratory. However, i

one of the few facilities built during the war still used for its original function. Because 

designers of the icing tunnel, Alfred Young and Charles Zelanko, thought that the icing prob

would be solved within a short time, they proposed a tunnel suitable also for aerodynamic test

of engine components. 

Young and Zelanko were aware that the design of an icing tunnel was far more comp

than that of a simple wind tunnel. The need to simulate the atmospheric conditions of an ic

cloud presented them with an extremely demanding engineering problem. In hindsight, i

apparent that neither the science of meteorology nor the state of engineering knowledge was a

quate for the job at hand. As Zelanko later recalled, they knew how to design ordinary wind t

nels, but the problems of creating icing conditions were almost without precedent. "Logic, theo

and speculation were the only design tools that were available.' '

4 Only when the tunnel's sp

system was replaced in the early 1950s could tunnel tests yield accurate icing data. Until th

flight research provided more reliable information on the phenomenon of icing. 

Icing tunnels were not entirely unknown before the proposed Cleveland tunnel, but t

were smaller and did not have the advantage of the extensive refrigeration system Carrier 

created. However, Young and Zelanko studied the tunnel of the B. F. Goodrich Company (Ak

Ohio), which manufactured rubber pneumatic de-icing boots, and MIT's special icing wind t

nel. They proposed a tunnel with a maximum speed of about 400 miles per hour with a 7-

x 10 foot test section, later scaled down to a 6-foot x 9-foot test section. To simulate icing con

tions in the tunnel, air was cooled to -30° F by passing it over the fins of the heat exchanger

spray system introduced an atomized stream of water into this refrigerated airstream. The 

naturally large size of the water droplets remained the problem that defied solution. 

5 

As the tunnel began to take shape, Wilson H. Hunter took charge of the Icing Resea

Section. A 1930 graduate of Yale in mechanical engineering, Hunter brought firsthand experie

in the design of rubber de-icers from the B. F. Goodrich Company. However, by June 1944, w

Hunter supervised the tunnel's first test, the era of the mechanical de-icing had passed. The w

tunnel testing program focused on testing components of Rodert's thermal protection system. T

work was unabashedly hardware development. More basic research would have to wait until 

feverish activity of meeting wartime demands could yield to a more measured step. 

The NACA made extensive use of a simple instrument to measure ice accumulation. It c

sisted of rotating metal cylinders of graduated diameters. By measuring the thickness of the 

110 
the characteristics of the icing cloud using a statistical approach. What range of liquid water 

tent, drop size, and temperature defined an icing encounter? The Ames project under Alun Jo

was strengthened by the additional talent of William Lewis, a meteorologist on loan from the 

Weather Bureau. J. K. Hardy, on loan during the war from the British Royal Aircraft Establishm

at Farnsborough, tackled the problems of heat transfer in a heated wing, a study that culmin

in an important paper published in 1945, "An Analysis of the Dissipation of Heat in Condit

of Icing from a Section of the Wing of the C-46 Airplane." 6 

In 1946 Lewis Rodert took charge of the icing program at the Cleveland laboratory. 

March 1947 memo, Rodert stressed the importance of gathering statistical data on icing clo

These data would allow the Civil Aeronautics Administration to craft regulations to certify 

aircraft if they met guidelines in providing ice-protection equipment. Reliable data were nee

because of the "general disagreement over what constitutes a safe design basis for the he

wing." 7 The Cleveland and Ames laboratories collaborated on this program. 

Wilson Hunter, Head of the Icing Research Section, demonstrates the dangerous icing of the propellers 

P-39 after a wind tunnel test. General Arnold (left) and George Lewis (far left) listen attentively. 
Harry S. Iruman presents Lewis A. Rodert with the 1946 Collier Irophy for the wartime development of a th

mal ice protection system. 

By 1948 the program had logged a total of 249 icing encounters and had taken about 10

measurements of liquid water content and droplet diameter. This was a collaborative fli

research program carried out by the Air Force in the upper Mississippi Valley, by Ames in 

West, and by Lewis Laboratory in the Great Lakes area. John H. Enders, an intrepid pilot fr

Cleveland's Flight Research program, flew the dangerous missions over Lake Erie, bringing ba

his Consolidated bomber encrusted with ice. In October the NACA group presented a tentat

table of design conditions to the NACA Subcommittee on Icing Problems. This report defined 

parameters for which icing protection was necessary for safe operation. 

8 The statistical data 

this NACA report became the basis for the design criteria for federal requirements for aircr

icing protection adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Administration in the mid-1950s. In reflect

on the success of this effort, William Lewis wrote in 1969, "Considering the fact that we had d

from 167 encounters in layer clouds and 73 in cumulus, statistical extrapolation to a probabil

of 1/1000 was more than daring, it was down right foolhardy: ' Nevertheless, more recent resea

using a much larger data base confirmed the conclusions of the 1949 report. 9 

In 1949 Abe Silverstein asked Irving Pinkel to take over as the new associate chief of 

Physics Division. Supervision of icing research fell among Pinkel's duties. It appeared that NA

work in icing had reached a natural point of termination. Ames closed down its program a

112 
development and should be phased out, but in Pinkels view the icing group was very able 

much maligned.'' Previously, Pinkel had worked with the icing group as a member of the W

Thnnels Analysis Panel to encourage a more analytical approach to the problems of icing. B

in Gloversville, N.Y., he graduated with honors from the University of Pennsylvania in 19

Pinkel began his government service in Pittsburgh, Penn., as a physicist with the Bureau of Mi

where he worked on synthesizing liquid fuels from coal. In 1940 he joined his older brother 

at Langley, where he focused on the nonstationary aerodynamic forces of airplane flutter. 

transferred to Cleveland in 1942 to work on the hydraulics problems of engine lubrica

systems. A member of Silverstein's Special Projects Panel after World War II, he contribu

pioneering papers on lift and thrust developed by heat addition to the supersonic flow bene

an airplane wing. 10 

Pinkellistened attentively to his staff's arguments for the continuation of icing research. 

engineer's sixth sense told him that terminating it was premature. "I saw that the people w

were involved in it were, in fact, trying to create an engineering discipline out of it, which seem

the correct thing to do.'' 11 Instead of closing down the division, he broadened it. 

But what did it mean to make an engineering discipline out of the work? The cut-and

testing of components had characterized most of the NACA's prewar and wartime icing resea

Postwar engineering demanded analytic skills. Testing without analysis as a guide was expen

and time consuming. The icing group at Lewis was composed of men with mechanical engin

ing degrees, the majority of whom took their first jobs with the NACA immediately after grad

tion. Women with a mathematical bent, but usually only high school graduates, assisted the m

as computers and data takers. As a whole, the staff at Lewis lacked the analytic skills that b

engineering research demanded. After the war, a process of self-selection took place. As the m

power of the icing division was reduced, the engineers who remained began to form a co

A NACA pilot measure

on a turbojet engine's i

Until 1950 (light into 

clouds provided m

reliable data than test

the Icing Research Th.n
Like many of their colleagues in other areas, such as supersonic aerodynamics, they tau

themselves what they needed to know. With ties to the National Research Council of Canada 

the Mt. Washington Research Station and access to Soviet data, they were in the mainstream 

world icing research. 

Under Pinkel's direction, the icing group focused o extending the basic understandin

the icing cloud. They launched a new research program with the commercial airlines and the 

Force to gather statistical icing data from areas throughout the world. They developed a simpli

pressure-type icing rate meter that could record the frequency and intensity of icing conditi

automatically. The meter was installed in about 50 commercial and military aircraft that flew o

the North Atlantic, the Continental United States, Alaska, the Pacific and parts of Asia. Ov

period of five years, data were gathered for 1800 icing encounters. The icing meter was supe

to the rotating multicylinder method, not only because it did not require the constant atten

of research personnel, but, more important, because of the far greater number of encounters 

range of conditions that it was now possible to record. The rotating multicylinder provided d

for a small number of flights into deliberately sought, abnormally severe, conditions. Now rou

flights into all degrees of severity could be monitored. In addition, weather reconnaissance in

mation gathered over a two-year period by the Air Weather Service and the Strategic Air C

mand was made available to the icing group at Lewis. All these data were entered on IBM pu

cards for analysis using one of the first IBM computers at Lewis. 12 In general, the data suppo

the findings of the laboratory's original study, adding, in particular, new knowledge about the 

tical and horizontal extent of icing encounters. Because of difficulties in the calibration of 

meter, the results were not entirely consistent for the icing rate and liquid water content. 13 

Another problem the icing research group tackled was the complex analysis of the pat

a water droplet. As an aircraft moves through an icing cloud, only a small percentage of the su

cooled droplets actually strike an aircraft and freeze. The majority of the droplets fol

streamlines that move around the leading surfaces of the airplane. With the knowledge of 

water content and droplet size (determined by the rotating multicylinder technique), it was 

sible to calculate the droplet trajectory. The rate of icing on a given surface or shape of a com

nent could then be predicted. 14 The Lewis group extended the available data over a range of 

foil shapes and thicknesses through the use of a differential analyzer. Harry Mergler of the Ins

ment and Computing Division adapted this early computer designed at MIT by Vannevar Bus

meet the needs of icing research. Although calculating the trajectory of a droplet was sti

laborious process, the differential analyzer reduced the time it took for a single calculation fr

weeks to about four days. Women who had formerly worked the problems on simple mechan

calculators made the transition to the gargantuan differential analyzer with comparative e

Often they were given the distinction of having their names appear as co-authors of the rep

of these studies, no doubt because their contribution went beyond the sheer drudgery of "num

crunching." In addition to reducing the time for arduous calculations, the differential analy

was a potential teacher of higher mathematics. The calculus unfolded mechanically through 

gearing and shafts; the chart recorders taught the operators "to grasp the innate meaning of 

differential equation." The machine trained them to think in the same logical steps that 

machine ground through in making a calculation. Through the back door, women assigned to 

114 
pg , 

nel engineering staff set about the redesign of the spray system for the icing tunnel, long re

nized both within the NACA and by outside authorities as inadequate. 16 The droplet size wa

times larger than the statistical definition derived from actual icing encounters, and instrume

tion for measuring the properties of the artificial icing cloud was lacking. Vernon Gray, know

''Mr. Icingologist,'' took this problem under his wing. He directed the efforts of Halbert Whit

a fluid systems engineer, to develop a system that would produce an atomized spray. Day 

day, through trial and error, the team perfected the design, which consisted of a battery of app

imately 80 spray nozzles mounted on six horizontal bars. The system produced an icing clou

approximately 4 feet by 4 feet. To verify whether tests in the tunnel accurately reproduced a

flight conditions, the heat transfer data obtained by J. K. Hardy at Ames in his famous stud

the heated wing were compared to tests on the same wing mounted in the icing tunnel. The 

were in agreement. 17 

The spray system was a complex engineering achievement. It was now possible to run 

that were much closer to natural icing conditions. At this point the tunnel became a valu

research tool, and a group that included Dean Bowden, Thomas Gelder, Uwe von Glahn, Ve

Gray, and James P. Lewis inaugurated a new program to test cyclic de-icing systems. As the 

of high-speed, high-altitude turbojet fighters and transports dawned in the early 1950s, it bec

clear that thermal anti-icing systems required an excessive amount of heat. Bleeding this 

from the engine severely impaired performance. In a cyclic system, ice is permitted to form 

aircraft surfaces. This ice is melted and removed by aerodynamic forces at intervals by shor

tense heating periods. The new program at Lewis Laboratory may have been stimulated by 

research on intermittent heating by L. M. K. Boelter's heat transfer group at the Universi

California at Los Angeles. 18 The study of thermal cyclic de-icing systems required a lev

sophistication in the field of 

heat transfer and aerodynamics unknown in the wartime 

era. 19 

Between 1949 and 1955 

flight research also continued. 

In addition to checking the 

results of tests in the tunnel 

with the performance of the 

new systems during actual icing encounters, the flight 

research group evaluated the 

rotating multicyinder method 

for determining droplet size, 

distribution, and liquid water 

content with a view to understanding both the strengths of 

the technique and, more important, its limitations. This 

It took a few days for women "computers" to mechanically calc

the trajectory of a water droplet across an airfoil on the gears 

cams of the huge differential analyzer, acquired in 1949. 
Vernon Gray investigates the new spray system, completed in 1950, for the Icing 

Research Thnnel. 

was "normal engineering" in the sense that it involved no dramatic scientific or techni

breakthroughs, but an extension and refinement of previous knowledge and practice. For exa

ple, using dimensionless parameters, Rinaldo J. Brun, William Lewis, Porter Perkins, and Jo

Serafini produced a technical report that calculated the impingement rate of cloud droplets on 

rotating multicylinder. The report shows a solid command of boundary layer theory, heat transf

experimental physics, and instrumentation that sets it strikingly apart from the simple empirici

of the reports of the mid-1940s. The discipline had indeed been placed on a rational basis.20 

Ironically, the steady improvement of the jet plane contributed to the phasing out of ic

research at Lewis Laboratory in 1957. By the late 1950s, the turbojet engine had come into gene

use for commercial flights. In contrast to the more recent development of the turbofan engi

early turbojets were overdesigned. They were not affected by the "bleeding off" or diverting 

compressor air, which was piped through the wings for icing protection. The aircraft manuf

turers could tailor inexpensive icing protection systems to specific designs without compromisi

the performance of the airplane. Moreover, since turbojet engines provided greater power th

116 
dangerous icing situations. However, as Irving Pinkel pointed out, With new technology 

ideas can get a breath of life again.'' Problems solved for one set of conditions recur as technol

advances in other areas. When the more efficient turbofan engine revolutionized engine desig

the mid-1960s there was less compressor bleed air available for ice protection. Production 

helicopters and small general aviation aircraft increased in the late 1950s and 1960s. Because t

fly at lower altitudes, these aircraft are much more sensitive to icing. Even though the I

Research Thnnel at Lewis Laboratory was officially closed in 1957, a few tests of hardware un

development by industry were permitted. In 1978, in response to increased industry dema

NASA officially reinstituted the tunnel testing program after the icing tunnel was renovated 

its instrumentation updated. The tunnel now runs more tests than other wind tunnels of NASA

However, the nature of the work has changed. Industry now contracts with NASA to run test

hardware under development. 

THE CRASH FIRE PROGRAM 

In 1947, the Committee on Operating Problems, chaired by the charismatic 

executive of American Airlines, William 

Littlewood, debated the question of 

whether the NACA should enter a new 

area of aircraft safety-the control or 

prevention of fires after a airplane 

crash.22 The Committee directed Lewis 

Laboratory to make a preliminary study of 

the crash fire problem. At the same time, 

it took steps to form a new Subcommittee 

on Aircraft Fire Prevention. The crash fire 

issue was of direct concern to the aircraft 

industry-to the aircraft manufacturers 

and to increasingly successful commercial 

airline operators like American, United, 

Trans World (TWA), and Pan American. 

They pushed for a greater involvement 

with the crash fire problem on the part of 

the NACA. 

The previous year the problem of air 

crash fires received wide publicity. Of a 

surprisingly high total of 121 air carrier 

1Wo instruments to measure icing rates during (

through an icing cloud are calibrated in the Icing Rese

Thnnel. The lower device is Langmuir's rotating m

cylinder. The upper u-tube device is the NACA press

type icing meter used to gather statistics on the dura

and severity of icing encounters in the early 1950s. 

accidents during that year, 22, or 18 percent, involved fire. Of that number, 5 percent were a

buted to fires in the air; the remaining 13 percent were due to fires following a crash.23 A new g

eration of commercial passenger planes made by Martin, Douglas, Lockheed, and Convair made 

travel more reliable and comfortable. Even more important, the volume of travelers increa

and air travel, once only for the wealthy elite, became affordable. Yet, from the industry p
Aircraft manufacturers tended to be more concerned with fires in the air because they w

often caused by design flaws, but fires after a crash resulted in greater loss of life. Their caus

however, could not always be determined, and they were often blamed on pilot error or airl

operating practices. 24 Thus, the operators of commercial airlines were especially concerned t

the crash fire problem be studied systematically. The airplane of the late 1940s had becom

complex system whose very design contained inherent fire hazards. The new commercial airlin

traveled long distances without refueling. To achieve maximum seating density, large fuel ta

were placed in the wings. For stability and aerodynamic efficiency, designers favored mount

the engines at the center of the wings. This design, however, brought ignition sources and f

into dangerous proximity. In a crash, if the wings broke apart, a spark from the engine or the 

gases from the engine's exhaust quickly ignited the fuel. In addition to the danger of the wi

engine configuration, there were numerous other potentially dangerous ignition sources: ca

heating and ventilation, pressurization systems, and hot gas de-icing equipment. Electr

systems required miles of wires, often packed together next to other lines carrying extrem

flammable hydraulic fluids or lubricating oils. 

25 

If less theoretical than high-speed aerodynamics or heat transfer, nevertheless the study 

crash fires bore directly on the NACA's charter to find practical solutions to the problems of av

tion. The crash fire problem excited the imaginations of a panel on "Reduction of Hazards D

to Aircraft Fires'' set up at Lewis Laboratory. Chaired by Abe Silverstein, with Lewis Rodert se

ing as the coordinator of the fire research program with outside agencies, the panel consisted 

fuels experts R. F. Selden, Louis C. Gibbon, and W. T. Olson, as well as Henry C. Barnett a

Gerald J. Pesman.

26 

In their preliminary report, members of the panel recommended a research program t

would tackle the crash fire problem from many points of view. The main focus of the program w

the investigation of the origin and rate of propagation of fires in actual crashes. The system

study of full-scale airplane crashes had previously been carried out by the U.S. Army Air Corp

a study of single-engine fighter aircraft between 1924 and 1928 and in England by W. G. Glendi

ing. However, there was no precedent for the scale and complexity of the research program 

visioned by the NACA panel. Members of the panel argued that full-scale crash tests were justif

because unknown scale effects made data from simulated crashes of models unreliable. They p

posed basic research on the ignition characteristics of various inflammable liquids-fue

hydraulic fluids, and lubricants-along with a study of fire-extinguishing agents. Factors invol

in general layout would also be considered. Was the placement of engines on the tips of the win

as far from the fuel tanks as possible, feasible? Could better fuel tanks be designed? What ab

developing a safety fuel that was less volatile than the gasoline-type fuels currently in use? Like 

point of icing research, the ultimate aim of the crash fire program was to provide the fede

government with reliable data to establish codes for the design of safer aircraft. 27 

This ambitious plan raised the hackles of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In addit

to gathering information on accidents, the CAA also conducted a limited research program t

involved crash testing components at its Experimental Station in Indianapolis, Ind. With this p

gram now regarded as inadequate, Harvey L. Hansberry of the Civil Aeronautics Administrat

objected that a similar full-scale program now under consideration had been proposed by the C

in 1946 and turned down because of its excessive expense. 28 However, the NACA program h

118 
Administration was partly responsible for the public perception of the dangers of air transpo

tion and the financial losses due to recent crashes. Lewis Rodert pointed out after a visit to 

West Coast aircraft industries, "The CAA is presently being blamed for the present situa

because, in the opinion of many aircraft engineers, the CAA research has not been adequa

broad nor penetrating and the airworthiness requirements relating to the fire hazard have 

been realistic." 29 

TESTING AT THE RAVENNA ARSENAL 

In 1949, when Irving Pinkel inherited the icing program, he also assumed leadershi

Lewis's Crash Fire Program. His background in fuels made him a natural choice for leader

of the program. However, at first the work did not particularly appeal to him. He was told 

the request to the NACA had come directly from President Truman. 30 The main players on 

crash fire team were Dugald 0. Black, Arthur Busch, Gerard]. Pesman, G. Merritt Preston, 

Sol Weiss. They were backed by an intrepid group of pilots and technicians in the hangar 

worked closely with William Wynne, Ernest Walker, and other members of the photogra

branch. 

The NACA obtained about 50 twin-engine cargo planes from the Air Force. These pla

had been used in the Berlin airlift and were so service weary that they were flown to Cleve

with their doors open so that the pilot could jump, if necessary. The Army granted the NACA 

mission to use the grounds of one of its World War II arsenals in Ravenna, Ohio, as the site 

the full-scale crash tests. John Everett designed and supervised the construction of a 2000-

runway. 

The crashes were carefully choreographed. They were to be survivable, assuming that a 

could be prevented. A plane was sent down the runway at take-off and landing speeds by rem

control. It ran into a barrier that tore off the landing gear and damaged the propellers. The eng

however, had to remain attached to the main body of the aircraft. The plane then slid throug

set of poles to rip open the wing tanks before sliding into an open field. The airplane was pai

white and the fuel dyed red for ease of photography. 

Each airplane carried various instruments to record temperatures, fire location, distribu

of combustible mixtures, and times at which various failures occurred. These instruments 

verted the data into electric signals recorded on meters located in a fireproof, insulated box on 

airplane. Seven additional motion-picture camera stands were located at various points near 

runway. To correlate the exterior photographs with the data simultaneously photographed in

the box, a timing light on the top of the fuselage flashed at intervals of one second or less. 

The program's goal was to uncover the mechanism of the crash fire and the exact natur

the structural breakup of the airplane. What was the rate, pattern, and area over which the liq

fuel spread? Did it form into a spray? What, if anything, could be done to prevent it? One by 

the old myths tumbled before the facts: the mistaken idea of pilots that turning off the igni

before a crash prevented fire; the belief that fuels with low volatility were safer than conventi

gasoline. 

By 1957 the group under Pinkel, now chief of the Fluid Systems Division, had exten

their careful engineering analyses from piston engine aircraft to planes powered by turboj

They received strong support from the airlines, particularly United, for work on a design fo
In the crash fire 

program at the 

Ravenna Arsenal, 

a service-weary 

cargo plane {C-82) 

was run down a 

launching track 

into a crash barrier. Engineers 

studied the crash 

fire to determine 

ignition sources. 

inerting system, despite a projected weight penalty of 1200 pounds. Pratt & Whitney was less 

thusiastic. Representatives objected that over 50 holes drilled into the engine case of the J-57 

a spray system might affect the engine's reliability. 32 The team designed an inerting system t

could cool the hot exhaust system and cut off the fuel and electrical systems within this short 

terval. With the inerting system to prevent the ensuing crash fire, all but the most severe cras

were survivable. 

However, the NACA had no political clout to force the airframe and engine manufactur

to install the new system. Despite the desire of some of the airline operators to purchase airc

with crash fire protection, the manufacturers were under no obligation to provide this ad

equipment. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, possibly alienated by the NACA's strong sho

ing in a field that it had previously dominated, did not take up the cause to force complia

through regulation. Unlike the icing criteria, which became the basis for federal design standar

for fire safety the NACA had to rely on persuasion, and the manufacturers were not ready to m

the investment. Although the Crash Fire Program had provided convincing evidence that the 

erting system could prevent crash fires, the added weight of the system forestalled acceptan

Even with a motion-picture film, convincingly narrated by David Brinkley, the NACA failed to 

tice the manufacturers to incur the added expense of the system. 33 

Although the aircraft manufacturers did not adopt the NACA inerting system in 

mid-1950s, gradually designers incorporated safety features similar to those recommended by 

NACA. 34 Fires following crashes became rare. 

Concern with safety continued to shape operations research programs at Lewis Laborato

From the Crash Fire Program, Pinkel and his group moved into the investigation of the cra

worthiness of airline seats, restraining harnesses for passengers, design of seats to reduce imp

forces, maximum seating density, and lightning hazards. In the late 1950s, when NASA's Merc

Program required engineers with experience in protecting human beings from the buffeting 

crash landings, Lewis was ready with an experienced cadre of individuals. 

120 
Irving Pinkel receives the NACA Distinguished Service Award in June 1957 from James Doolittle, Chai

of the NACA, as Ray Sharp looks on. 

CONTINUITY UNDER NASA 

As the Mercury Program got under way at Langley, some of the members of Pinkel's 

sion became the nucleus of the Flight Operations Division at Cape Canaveral, Fla. G. Me

Preston, who had authored many of the reports on the Crash Fire Program, became the Divis

first manager.35 Other early members of the Space Thsk Force who transferred to Langle

work under Robert Gilruth were Elmer Buller, A. M. Busch, W. R. Dennis, M. J. Krasnican, G

S. Lunney, AndreJ. Meyer, W. R. Meyer, W. J. Nesbitt, Gerard J. Pesman, Leonard Rabb, and S

Simkinson. Simkinson, whose background at Lewis was in testing full-scale engines, perhap

emplified what Lewis-trained individuals could contribute to the space program. He knew h

ware and could "smell a problem a mile away.'' 36 

Other members of Pinkel's division contributed their expertise to the group at Lew

charge of the Mercury capsule's instrumentation, automatic separation from the Atlas rocke

stabilization and control systems, and its retrorockets for reentry into Earth's atmosphere. T

first assignment, the altitude control system for Big Joe (the test vehicle to precede manned fli

presented the first opportunity to apply their knowledge of aviation to flight beyond the 

mosphere. Substituting a safer fuel, cold-gas nitrogen, for the hydrogen peroxide rocket thru

used in the X-15, Harold Gold, Robert R. Miller, and H. Warren Plohr worked with Minneap

Honeywell to design a system that automatically moved the capsule into the desired alignm

after separation from the Atlas booster. 37 

Testing this new control system required the engineering ingenuity of a score of L

engineers. David S. Gabriel conceived a gigantic tinker-toy-like simulator called MASTIF (Mul

Axis Space Test Inertia Facility), which could turn and tumble a 3000-pound space capsul
"gimbal rig" was placed in Lewis's vacuum chamber, actually the old Altitude Wind Thnnel, c

verted by a team of engineers working under William Fleming to the new task of simulating 

mospheric conditions up to 80,000 feet. 38 

In mid-1959, with engineering imaginations conditioned by issues involving human safe

James W. Useller, a mechanical engineer, and JosephS. Alg:ranti, a test pilot, saw the potential 

the gimbal rig for astronaut training. They enlisted several local physiologists and ten test pil

(including several women) to test the effect of roll, pitch, and yaw on human physiology. In 19

beginning with astronauts Gus Grissom and Alan Shepard, each Mercury astronaut submitted 

a ride of a tolerable limit of 30 revolutions per minute. They learned how to activate the nitrog

jets that acted as brakes to bring them out of their dizzying spin while the external cages c

tinued to whirl about them. 39 

122 

The gimbal rig at Lewis was used to teach Mercury astronauts how to bring a capsule tumbling in space under control. 
1967. Irving Pinkel joined the investigation panel and spent tension-filled days and nights at C

Canaveral. The panel concluded that the fire did not originate in the pure oxygen atmospher

the astronauts' suits, as people had first surmised, but was caused by a short circuit that b

in the cabinet that housed the environmental control unit. Wires of the electrical system 

under the door to the cabinet. Every time the door was opened, it chafed on the wires placed 

to a combustible nylon netting. In short, the capsule had been poorly designed by NASA's con

tor, North American Aviation. The fire had been entirely preventable. However, there was 

blame to be assigned to NASA. One author called the disaster "murder on pad 34," citing slo

management practices and a hurried atmosphere that precluded high engineering standards 

careful supervision of its contractors by NASA. 40 

In response to the tragedy, James Webb asked Irving Pinkel to create and head an inte

agency called the Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute to serve as a clearinghouse 

safety information, primarily for NASA and its contractors. The role of the government as a c

inghouse for information was not a new idea to Pinkel. That was the NACA's forte in the 

when NACA reports put the latest innovations in engine technology within the reach of indus

engine designers. Located at Lewis Laboratory, the institute's functions were to organize exi

safety information, to find gaps, and to fill them with appropriate research. The information 

computerized to facilitate access and quick responses to requests. Within four years the inst

had fallen prey to the 1972 cuts in appropriations. 
G. M. B. Dobson, Exploring the Atmosphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). p. 84. 

2 George Gray, Frontiers of Flight (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). p. 307-329. 

3 Lewis A. Roder!, William H. McAvoy, Lawrence A. Clausing, "Preliminary Report on Flight Tests of 

Airplane Having Exhaust-Heated Wings. NACA Wartime Report A-53, 1941. In 1946 President Trum

presented the prestigious Collier Trophy to Roder! for his wartime thermal de-icing work. 

4 In 1987 the Icing Research Thnnel was designated an Internatio a! Historic Mechanical Engineering La

mark by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Extensive documentation from Natio

Archives Record Group 255 and NASA Lewis Records on the design and construction of the Ic

Research Thnnel is available as part of the application submitted by William Olsen to the ASME. T

quotation is from the booklet prepared for this occasion. 

5 Alfred W. Young and Charles N. Zelanko, "Memorandum for the Construction Administrator," Natio

Archives, Record Group 255, Box 131. For a full description of the icing tunnel prior to 1986 ref

bishing, see Uwe von Glahn, "The Icing Problem-Current Status of NACA Techniques and Researc

NASA TM-81651, August 1981, appendix A. For accounts of NACA wartime icing research, see Geo

Gray, Frontiers of Flight, p. 307-329; Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research, NASA SP-4

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). p. 69-77; Elizabeth Muenger, Searching 

Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1976, NASA SP-4304 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gove

ment Printing Office, 1985). p. 19-22; James Hansen, Engineer in Charge, NASA SP-4305 (Washingt

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). p. 110-111. See also comments on current use by 

Richard Tobiason, "Overview of NASA's Programs," in Meteorological and Environmental Inputs to A

tion Systems, NASA Conference Publication 2388, 1983, p. 35. 

6 NACA Report 831 (1945). See discussion by Hartmann, Adventures in Research, p. 76. British stud

indicated that for bombing missions the increased weight of icing protection systems meant that 

bomb load would have to be reduced. See R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intellige

1939-1945 (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1978). p. 387-388. The first report describ

the rotating multicylinder method was Bernard Vonnegut, A.A.F. Tech. Report, No. 5519, 1946. 

Mount Washington Monthly Research Bulletin , val. II, no. 6, June 1946, published an anonymous desc

tion. See also Victor F. Clark, "Conditions for Run-Off and Blow-Off of Catch on Multicylinder Ic

Meter." Harvard-MI. Washington Icing Research Report 1946-7, AF Tech. Rep. 5676, p. 190-218. 

also Irving Langmuir, "Super-Cooled Water Droplets in Rising Currents of Cold Saturated Air," Rep

No. RL-223 (1943-1944) in The Collected Works of Irving Langmuir, vol. 10 (New York: Pergamon Pr

1961). p. 199. Biographical information can be found in Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New Y

Scribners, 1973). vol. 8, p. 22-25. 

7 Lewis Rodert to Chief of Research, 12 March 1947, NASA Lewis Records, 34/Icing. The Civil Aeronau

Authority and Air Safety Board were established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. In 1940 t

were reorganized into the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board. T

Federal Aviation Administration was set up in 1958. 

8 Alun R. Jones and William Lewis, "Recommended Values of Meteorological Factors to Be Considered 

the Design of Aircraft Ice-Prevention Equipment." NACA TN 1855, March 1949. 

9 William Lewis, "Review of Icing Criteria," p. 3. From Aircraft Ice Protection, Federal Aviation Adminis

tion, April 1969 (typescript). I am indebted to the late Dr. William Olsen for providing me with a c

of this paper. These data are now the basis of icing certification in Federal Aviation Regulation (F

25), Appendix C. The exact date for the adoption of these regulations by the Civil Aeronau

Administration is unclear. Copies of correspondence (courtesy of William Olsen) indicate that as 

as 1956 the regulations, although proposed, had not yet become law. NACA data were used 

"Engineering Summary of Airframe Icing Technical Data," Federal Aviation Administration ADS

1963 (known throughout the world as the " Icing Bible"). and "Engineering Summary of Powerplant 

ing Technical Data," FAA RD-77-76, 1977. 

10 Transcript of interview with Irving Pinkel by Walter T. Bonney, 22 July 1973, NASA History Of

Archives, Washington, D.C., p. 13-14. Transcript of interview with author, Lewis Research Center, 

January 1985, p. 19. 

11 Ibid. 

124 
Routine Aircraft Operations,

 NASA RM 1

1959E, 1959. For an extremely helpful overview of N

icing research see Uwe von Glahn, "The Icing Problem-Current Status of NACA Techniques 

Research", reprinted in Selected Bibliography of NACA-NASA Aircraft Icing Publications, Lewis Rese

August 1981, NASA TM-81651. I am not certain whether the IBM computer referred to in von Gl

report is the IBM 601, a system with mechanical storage used between 1954 and 1956, or the IBM 

the first electronic computer in use between 1955 and 1957. 

13 See William Lewis, "Review of Icing Criteria," p. 4. The meter is described in detail in Porter J. Pe

Stuart McCullough, and Ralph D. Lewis, "A Simplified Instrument for Recording and Indic

Frequency and Intensity of Icing Conditions Encountered in Flight" NACA Research Memoran

E51E16, 1951. 

14 Irving Langmuir and Katherine B. Blodgett, "A Mathematical Investigation of Water Droplet Trajecto

Technical Report No. 5418, Air Materiel Command, AAF, 19 February 1946. 

15 See, for example, Rinaldo J. Brun, Helen M. Gallagher, and Dorothea E. Vogt, "Impingement of W

Droplets on NACA 65A004 Airfoil at go Angle of Attack," NACA Technical Note 3155, 1954. 

description of how the differential analyzer worked, see Larry Owens, "Vannevar Bush anq 

Differential Analyzer: The Text and Context of an Early Computer." Technology and Culture 27:6

The quoted passage is on p. 85-86. 

16 See "Progress Report Submitted by Professor H. G. Houghton (MIT], for Meeting of Subcommitte

De-Icing Problems, April 9, 1947." National Archives, Record Group 255, 115.24. 

17 Thomas F. Gelder and James P. Lewis, "Comparison of Heat Transfer from Airfoil in Natural and Simu

Icing Conditions," NACA TN 2480, 1951. Hardy's original paper is cited in note 14. See also Uwe 

Glahn, "The Icing Problem," note 5. 

18 See Myron Tribus, "Intermittent Heating for Aircraft Ice Protection," Ph.D. Dissertation, Universi

California at Los Angeles, 1950. 

19 See, for example, Vernon H. Gray and Dean T. Bowden, "Comparison of Several Methods of Cy

De-Icing of a Gas-Heated Airfoil," NACA Research Memorandum E53C27, 1952. 

20 R. J. Brun, William Lewis, Porter Perkins, and John Serafini, "Impingement of Cloud Droplets 

Cylinder and Procedure for Measuring Liquid-Water Content and Droplet Sizes in Supercooled C

by Rotating Multicylinder Method," NACA Report 1215, 1955, p. 1-43. 

21 The first sign of the reawakened interest in icing research by the Federal Aviation Administration wa

republication of old NACA data in "Engineering Summary of Airframe Icing Technical Data," 

ADS-4, 1963; and "Engineering Summary of Powerplant Icing Technical Data," FAA RD-77-76. 

22 Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee on Aircraft Fire Prevention, 3 February 1948. National Arch

Record Group 255, 115.35. 

23 "Preliminary Survey of Existing Data on Aircraft Fire Problem and a Suggested Research Program

December 1947. National Archives, Record Group 255, 115.35. 

24 Minutes of the Meeting of Subcommittee on Aircraft Fire Prevention, 3 February 1948. National Arch

Record Group 255, 115.35. 

25 Allen W. Dallas, "Views of the ATA on the Aircraft Fire Problem." National Archives, Record Group 

115.35. 

26 Minutes of Meeting of Panel on "Reduction of Hazards due to Aircraft Fires," 31 October 1947. Nat

Archives, Record Group 255, 115.32. 

27 Preliminary Survey, 10 December 1947. National Archives, Record Group 255, 115.35. 

28 Minutes of the NACA Subcommittee on Aircraft Fire Prevention, 3 February 1948. National Arch

Record Group 255, 115.32. 

29 Lewis A. Roder! to Director, "Visit of Mr. Lewis A. Rodert to West Coast Aircraft Industry in Rega

Fire Problem," 12 March 1948. National Archives, Record Group 255, 115.35. 

30 Transcript of interview with Irving Pinkel by V. Dawson, 30 January 1985, p. 13. 
of the photographic branch, authors files. 

32 Irving Pinkel to Associate Director, "Visit of Airline and Airframe Personnel to NACA-Lewis on January 

1958." NASA Lewis Records, Box 297, 116.9. 

33 Film TF-26: G.M. Preston and I. I. Pinkel, "NACA Crash Fire Research," 1953. Cited in NACA F

Catalogue, Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. Available at NASA Lewis Photo Laboratory. 

34 Correspondence from R. S. Sliff, Federal Aviation Administration, Larry H. Hewin, U.S. Army Air Mobi

Research and Development Laboratory, Marc P. Dunnam, Air Force Aero Propulsion Laborat

(ASFC). and Franklin W. Kolk, American Airlines, to Irving Pinkel supports this conclusion. 

35 In May 1963 G. M. Preston received a medal for outstanding leadership in the Mercury Program. The ro

of Scott Simkinson, Joe Bobik, and others at Cape Canaveral are discussed in Charles Murray a

Catherine Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989). 

36 Murray and Cox, Apollo, p. 48. 

37 Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean, NASA SP-42

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 201. 

38 Ibid, p. 44. 

39 Ibid, p. 244-245. 

40 Eric Bergaust, Murder on Pad 34 (New York: Putnam, 1968). See also Murray and Cox, Apollo, p. 189-2

Transcript of interview with Irving Pinkel by V. Dawson, 30 January 1985, p. 18. 

126 
PUSHING INNOVATION 

~ AND INDUSTRY 

~Ill RESISTANCE 

In 1958, when the NACA became part of NASA, NASA became its own principal custo

It supervised contracts with industry to provide NASA with hardware for space exploration. 

ing the NACA period Lewis Laboratory's relationship with industry was substantially diffe

The laboratory's role was to stimulate innovation in engine design. There was no legal mecha

to facilitate the transfer of technology generated through government research to industry. Ex

how the ideas in a NACA report took concrete form in the design of an engine could neve

determined. It was part of the unwritten rules of this interaction that the government did no

for credit or receive patents. No engine company liked to admit that innovation did not come 

within its own laboratories or from the shop floor. 

In the early post-World War II period, the engine industry was fearful that the NACA w

interfere in the development of engine prototypes. In 1946 and 1947 the Industry Consu

Committee, composed of aircraft and engine manufacturers, criticized the laboratory's rese

plans for not being fundamental enough. Oscar Schey remarked that the manufacturers did 

object to the NACA's research in principle, but there was no agreement over what exactly 

stituted fundamental research. Industry defined fundamental research as ''anything that ca

done with a pencil and slide rule and such facilities as the industry does not have." 1 If rese

were limited to the more theoretical aspects of the aircraft engine-problems solved with p

and slide rule-the laboratory might be accused of duplicating the work of the universities.

2 

laboratory valued its intermediate position between industry and academia. The heart of its w

was to prod industry to innovate, but it had to avoid being used by industry to clean up imme

development problems. At the same time, it could not allow its research to become so adva

that it was of no practical use. The balance was never easy. 

Although testing engine prototypes could be construed as development, it seemed esse

to the laboratory's mission. The laboratory could only promote innovation if it had a thor

knowledge of existing engines. Through testing in the Altitude Wind 'funnel and later in the "

burner'' area, engineers learned the mysteries of all types and makes of gas turbine engines. 

machine itself was a teacher, and expertise came, in Bruce Lundin's view, from "run

engines." Lundin, who graduated from the University of California in 1942 with an enginee

degree, reflected, "The reason you have the expertise is that you learn in the facilities. You 

get your expertise by a slide rule or running a computer . .. You get your expertise by wor

with real hardware and real conditions." 3 

127 
The Industry Consulting Committee and members of the NACA Executive Committee at the Clevela

laboratory, September 26, 1945. Vannevar Bush is second from left. 

Although testing isolated components like cylinders in the piston engine could provide d

to predict engine performance, the jet engine as a dynamic system was far more complex. It 

quired full-scale testing, in either a wind tunnel or a special propulsion systems laborato

Although the jet engine's components-the compressor, combustor, and turbine-were also tes

in special "rigs," some problems were apparent only when the entire system was "bol

together.' ' On the importance of the systems approach, one engineer reflected: 

An engine constitutes a dynamic system and how it reacts and behaves to external and 

internal changes and disturbances is of vital significance to safe flight. For example, 

too rapid a throttle advance can cause a compressor to go into "stall" and trigger a 

"surge" in the engine system. This can result in physical damage and/or combustor 

flame-out. How and why such phenomena occur and developing analytical means to 

describe and predict such events from component data are legitimate research objectives. The theories that are developed can only be verified by running a variety of 

systems at full scale over a range of flight conditions.

4 

One of the goals of basic research in gas turbine engines was to isolate and define proble

common to them all. This required knowledge of all types of existing engines. In the early po

World War II years, the engine companies had no choice but to allow the Cleveland laborato

to test their engines; neither the military nor the engine companies had adequate engine faciliti

They had to rely on the NACA to test military engine prototypes. Through an understanding w

the military services, after the completion of a particular company's test program, the laborato

kept the engine for an additional six months. The engine was completely disassembled 

128 
, gg

NACA engineers welcomed the increased interaction with industry brought about by 

testing program. The new relationship with the engine industry had begun with the reform o

Power Plants Committee in 1940, when the engine companies won representation. Ben Pi

who represented the NACA on many of the subcommittees during the war and early pos

period, recalled this reform as a positive step in the creation of an effective relationship 

industry. "We worked in the dark down at Langley. We did what we thought was good, bu

weren't sure." There was no system for getting information about the kinds of problems indu

needed solved. Contact between engine manufacturers and NACA engineers was limited 

yearly conference. ''After each talk, we would ask them, 'Well, what are your problems?' 

engine company people would not talk in front of an audience that contained its competit

Although representatives of the airframe manufacturers made many follow-up visits to Lan

to communicate their requirements confidentially, the engine manufacturers remained secre

Power Plants engineers at Langley were never able to duplicate the productive working rela

ship between the NACA and the airframe industry. It took the new committee structure, cre

by George Mead, to foster the development of trust between the proprietary engine industry 

government researchers. In Ben Finkel's view, service on various NACA committees "allowe

to get an insight, a very intimate insight'' into the problems of the engine companies and 

military. Government and industry engineers formed strong working relationships. For the 

time, when information or a piece of equipment was needed, a phone call could bring immed

results. "The idea of this personal contact, of knowing the people in the field," Pinkel reca

"I don't know if everybody appreciated that, but it was great." 5 

Although the results of research were published by the NACA, industry engine desig

had no obligation to use the knowledge made available to them. More than the availabilit

advanced research was necessary to encourage innovation, which was costly, and the pote

benefit of a small change had to be weighed against problems that it might cause in other p

of the complex engine system. To become an instrument in the transfer of advanced en

technology to industry, Lewis Laboratory had to create a market for its expertise through 

building of a network of personal contacts with the growing and highly competitive indust

PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND THE BRITISH NENE 

Theodore von Karman, often critical of the NACA, aptly called it "skeptical, conserva

and reticent." 6 von Karman could speak with the relative freedom of the academician; he c

never appreciate the constraints placed on the government researcher. The practice of restric

the flow of information from the NACA originated at Langley in the 1930s through the effor

the NACA's fastidious Executive Secretary, John Victory. All correspondence was reviewed a

branch level and signed by the engineer-in-charge. Incoming mail went first to the enginee

charge, and phone calls were strictly monitored. Although national security considerations 

have influenced the retention of these practices after World War II, it is most likely that 

originated from the need to protect secret or proprietary information. Given the traditional n

phobic concern of the engine industry about proprietary matters, NACA engineers had t

extremely careful about what information they shared with the aeronautical community ou
This need for reticence, however, presented the NACA with a dilemma. The purpose of t

laboratory was to encourage innovation and to stimulate competition among the engine co

panies by making information freely available to its entire constituency. Industry allowed public

tion of certain basic research, but new knowledge that could be used to make a profit w

considered proprietary, the property of the company. Innovations made by industry scientists a

engineers were either protected by patents or kept secret or proprietary to prevent competito

from reaping the fruits of the arduous and expensive development? It became apparent that, 

preserve its relationships with the engine industry, Lewis Laboratory had to be willing to prot

the proprietary interests of individual companies by respecting limitations on the free publicati

of its research. 

In the testing of full-scale engines, the Cleveland laboratory ran into the teeth of the p

prietary rights issue. The laboratory existed to promote competition among the engine compani

not to become a competitor itself. The government was not supposed to participate directly 

development; its role was to provide basic research to support the development of engines 

private industry. In practice, as long as the laboratory had facilities superior to those of the engi

companies, its work could legitimately shade off into development. Industry needed the NACA 

test its engines and was willing to listen to suggestions for their improvement. However, since t

engine companies were in the process of building their own facilities, this aspect of its work mig

be curtailed in the near future. Without early access to state of the art engines, the laboratory w

in danger of losing its place on the cutting edge of propulsion research. 

Carlton Kemper, Executive Engineer of Lewis Laboratory, expressed this dilemma in 

memo to Headquarters, November 1, 1946: "It is realized that fundamental research can be co

ducted on obsolete and obsolescent models of a given aircraft powerplant, but interest is alwa

at a low ebb unless results are presented for the latest aircraft-engine models." 8 He suggest

that the laboratory should "cooperate wholeheartedly with these manufacturers" and that part 

a successful relationship would depend on working out a mutually satisfactory policy on p

prietary rights. Only this would ensure a continuing supply of engines in the development stag

General Electric, stung by the Army Air Forces award of the production contracts for the I-40 a

the TG-180 engines to the Allison Company, was the first to voice its concerns to the NACA. T

company admitted that Allison could produce engines more cheaply because of its governme

owned factories. Nevertheless, General Electric was determined that in the future "engineeri

knowledge will not be turned over to a competitor at no cost, as was done in this case." 9 Kemp

warned that General Electric's productive relationship with the laboratory was in jeopardy unle

a satisfactory solution to the problem of proprietary rights could be found. Specifically, Kemp

reported, General Electric did not object to the release of wind tunnel data as long as t

laboratory refrained from discussing how improved efficiencies in the turbine or compressor, f

example, were obtained. "Since the war is over and they are now in a highly competitive fie

they request that the Committee refrain from releasing their engineering designs to th

competitors.' ' 

Kemper revealed that General Electric's decision to stay in the aircraft engine busine

would mean "real competition" for Wright Aeronautical, Pratt & Whitney, and the Allis

Division of General Motors. That was all to the good. The more players in the engine busine

the more likely they were to feel pressure to innovate. In Kemper's view, General Electric h

130 
engines. 

This strategy by General Electric had implications for the future research role of 

laboratory. Kemper stressed that, with its new policy, General Electric would be all the more i

tent that the laboratory concentrate on fundamental problems in jet engines, particularly 

improvement of specific components. 

To maintain our position in the research field we must concentrate on the fundamental problems of the compressor and turbine, on the design of NACA combustion 

chambers that incorporate the fundamental information gained by the Committee on 

combustion, controls, metallurgy, operating cycles, and on methods of designing more 

efficient compressors and turbines. It is only by having better ideas than industry that 

we can maintain our outstanding position in the jet-engine field. 

10 

Despite Kemper's warning, a collision course over the proprietary rights issue had alr

been set. The NACA came into conflict, not with General Electric, but with Pratt & Whi

when the company took its first step in the new field of jet propulsion. An article in F

Magazine in spring 1946 first called attention to the superiority of the British Nene to Gen

Electric's 1-40. From the same design in less time and with inferior facilities for testing, 

Royce had produced a superior engine. Development of the Nene, initially ten months behind 

of the 1-40, had continued after World War II.

11 

Exactly what precipitated the Navy's interest in the Nene is unclear, but it may be rel

to the problems that Westinghouse was encountering in the development of the 19XB and 

24C, its turbojet with an axial-flow compressor. Toward the end of 1946, the Navy Burea

Aeronautics had obtained two Nene engines and tested them at the Navy's engine laboratory 

Philadelphia, Penn. In a hurry to develop the Nene, the Navy invited Pratt & Whitney to ta

the job, betting on the company's solid engineering reputation to carry it off despite limited 

perience with turbojet engines. 

12 Interservice rivalry may have played a role in this deci

With the Army Air Forces committed to the I-40, the Nene represented an opportunity to ups

the Navy's rival. However, satisfaction in having a superior engine was no doubt tempered by 

sobering knowledge that Great Britain, as a goodwill gesture under a Labor Government, 

allowed Rolls Royce to sell the license to the Nene to the Soviet Union in 1946Y A sup

engine in the hands of a potential enemy made the production of the Nene a high national prio

Prior to its purchase of the license to manufacture the Nene from Rolls Royce, Pra

Whitney lacked experience in the new jet propulsion technology. The company realized tha

new companies in the aircraft engine field-General Electric and Westinghouse-had the ad

tage of a head start. Pratt & Whitney's strategy was to leap frog over its competition, buildin

the solid engine expertise of the British. However, from a national security point of view

setting up of Pratt & Whitney in the production of a foreign engine had a negative side. W

the superiority of the Nene, produced by a strong and experienced engine company, squeeze 

the fledgling aircraft engine efforts of Westinghouse and General Electric? 

The same recognition of the superiority of British gas turbine engines that made Amer

companies eager to obtain licenses for their manufacture made Cleveland engineers anxiou

test all types of British turbojet and turboprop engines. They needed experience. They knew 

strengths and weaknesses of American prototypes and were in an ideal position to point out w
that the Nene engine is reported to have higher thrust, lower specific weight, and lower fuel co

sumption than current American service engines." 14 Exactly why the NACA was unable to obta

the Nene directly from the Navy is unclear, but the NACA took the unusual step of purchasi

an engine directly from the Thylor Thrbine Corporation, which owned the American license pr

to its sale to Pratt & Whitney. 

The Army Air Forces stood behind the NACA's decision to test the Nene and to dissemin

the results to all the companies that manufactured gas turbine engines. In the view of Colonel 

Z. Bogert, the Army Liaison Officer at the Cleveland laboratory, to limit the distribution 

research results hindered the ability of the United States to compete with the British. With t

Nene also in the hands of the Soviet Union, the issue went beyond protecting commercial righ

to issues of national security. However, even within the Army, there was no consensus on t

correct policy to follow. Should distribution be limited to the five companies already involved 

turbojet engine development? The civilian engineers employed at Wright Field argued that t

government did not have the right to violate the proprietary rights of individual companies, sin

the Army paid only about 15 percent of the expenses for research and development. Kemp

however, took Bogert's side and argued for a wide distribution of research results. He thought th

"it was poor policy to spend large sums in operating the Altitude Wind Thnnel and then to ma

the pertinent information available to only five companies because of the proprietary informati

in the report." 15 

After Pratt & Whitney began negotiations in April1947 to acquire manufacturing and sa

rights to the Nene, it became concerned over what role the NACA would play in allowing co

petitors to share the results of the NACA study. In December, with the acquisition of the licen

from Thylor Thrbine complete, Pratt & Whitney informed the NACA that they held exclusive righ

to the Nene and Derwent series of turbojet engines. They were, as of that date, actively engag

in production for the Navy, and the engines were therefore "in the same competition category 

other Pratt & Whitney Aircraft engines.'' They did not object to the testing of the engine, b

requested that the results be kept entirely confidential. 16 

There was no question that, with a good jet engine, Pratt & Whitney would be able to co

pete very effectively against Westinghouse, General Electric, and Allison without the help of t

NACA. Moreover, with a projected date of 1950 for the completion of its Wilgoos Thrbi

Laboratory in West Hartford, Conn., Pratt & Whitney would soon have facilities for testing co

parable to those of the Cleveland laboratory. The debate over the Nene would have importa

implications for any future relationship that the laboratory might develop with Pratt & Whitn

and the rest of the engine industry. 

In May 1948 Cleveland engineers completed the preliminary report of the tests of the Ne

in the laboratory's new Altitude Chamber, designed by Ben Pinkel. Located in the "four burn

area" of the West Wing of the Engine Research Building, these "burner rigs" were the fo

runners of the Propulsion Systems Laboratory completed in 1952. The NACA sent the report 

Pratt & Whitney, Rolls Royce, and the military services. At the same time it expressed the des

to make the report available to other American manufacturers "who may need this research info

mation to facilitate fulfillment of military contracts.' '

17 

Perhaps anticipating a problem with Pratt & Whitney over the distribution of the repo

Hugh Dryden, Director of the NACA, brought up the general issue of reports involving speci

132 
Cutaway view of the Nene engine. 

engines in a meeting of the Power Plants Committee in May 1948. Dryden pointed out tha

NACA did not want to undermine the "competitive free enterprise system," but "it was nece

to reconcile the interests of the military services, the engine manufacturer involved, and 

engineering profession, which is interested in establishing a general body of knowledge on air

engine research." 18 Besides, Dryden pointed out, Pratt & Whitney had never objected to re

ing reports summarizing the performance of the engines of its competitors, namely, All

General Electric, Packard, and Westinghouse. 

19 

Pratt & Whitney's response was an unequivocal, if not unexpected, no. W. P. Gwinn

General Manager of the company, responded, "From our point of view the information ceas

be confidential once it is given to competitive firms, either directly or indirectly. Whil

excellent report, in our judgment, it does not contain research information." 20 Research info

tion, in Pratt & Whitney's view, should be more general. Pratt & Whitney objected to the rep

careful record of data relating to performance and design characteristics. 

Pratt & Whitney's commercial interest in the engine could not be protected. The Nen

the hands of the Soviet Union made it imperative that American engines surpass the standa

had set. Because of the N ene' s challenge to the American jet engine community, it became kn

as the "Needle engine."21 The role of the Cleveland laboratory was analogous. Its rese

became a prod or needle that kept industry from returning to its prewar path of extremely co

vative (if profitable, in the short term) engine production. 

The urgent need for a policy statement on the "release of information on specific engi

was brought up in December in the meeting of the Power Plants Committee, where it was deb

at length. Dryden pointed out that "it would be uneconomical for the NACA Lewis Flight Pr

sion Laboratory to construct engines for conducting research in comparison with obta

engines built by the engine manufacturers." In general, specific engines were "supplied by 
it would consider itself responsible to the industry as a whole. In other words, results of testi

would be published freely, and proprietary rights would not be protected. With the prese

system, it was only after a certain time lapse that design improvements made by a particular co

pany were disclosed to other manufacturers. While the total number of reports involved w

relatively small, Dryden admitted that a policy that would provide a satisfactory definition of pr

prietary information was necessary. 22 

The question of why Lewis Laboratory had to test specific engines at all, although n

actually raised, was pertinent. Why did the laboratory appear to go out of its way to engage 

work so close to development? If the laboratory was doing fundamental research, why should 

test the engine prototypes of a particular company? There were two reasons: first, the laborato

performed a service to the Air Force by testing aircraft engines prior to their purchase; secon

in a field that was changing so rapidly, without experience with actual engines, Lewis enginee

could not be sure that their work would be relevant to the engine problems that needed urge

solution. The development of the gas turbine engine was directly related to the security of t

nation. Competition could not be protected if it meant that in the event of a war the United Stat

might have to rely on inferior engines. As one of the military members of the Power Plants Co

mittee stated during the debate over the Nene, "One problem from the Government point of vie

Four burner area in the Engine Research Building. 

134 
The problem with an open market system at a time of heightened concern over nati

security was the conflict between national interest and what would be most beneficial to 

individual companies. The NACA Power Plants Committee itself was a reflection in microcos

this larger problem. As the minutes of the meeting in which these issues were discussed repo

"The Power Plants Committee is responsible to the nation as a whole, while the members o

committee from industry are responsible to the stockholders of their companies.'' Proprie

rights were necessary to preserve competition, but ''the question is how much compromise t

should be in the best interest of the country.''24 

The debate revealed that, in general, there appeared to be two classes of information w

release industry found objectionable. The first type involved defects and limitations of a partic

engine that could be used to damage the reputation of a company. The second type could invo

for example, a superior component like a combustor. Pratt & Whitney's representative, Leo

S. Hobbs, observed, ''A man is not improved by turning over to him what a good man did.'' W

enough information a competitor could deduce what made the combustor superior and m

similar improvements. The innovating company could lose the fruits of its investment in deve

ment. In response to Hobbs's objection, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Profe

Edward S. Thylor pointed out that improved performance "is an excellent stimulus to every

else to obtain similar improvements.'' Edward P. Warner, former chief scientist at Langley, 

professor at MIT and editor of Aviation, lent his prestige to the government side of the argum

''Everyone recognizes the desirability of releasing information that stimulates the other man t

as well.'' 25 

Although Lewis Laboratory won the privilege to distribute its report on the Nene bec

the engine was purchased prior to Pratt & Whitney's license, the policy hammered out in deb

in the Power Plants Committee, the NACA Executive Committee, and the Industry Consu

Committee restricted a wide range of information from open dissemination. The policy appro

in June 1949 stated that, to preserve a manufacturer's competitive position, technical informa

on models or components under active development would be withheld unless a specific ag

ment were reached with the manufacturer. Information on production models could onl

furnished after review by the manufacturer. In addition, the manufacturer was to be furni

with the list of companies and individuals to whom the NACA intended to send informa

Finally, any oral communication by the NACA before a report was issued was subject to revi

This strict policy on proprietary rights prevented free dissemination of knowledge gle

at government expense. However, the NACA could not refuse to agree to it. Without a satisfac

relationship with industry, the Cleveland laboratory would lose its central position in 

mainstream of jet engine development. The cardinal rule of the laboratory became discre

When representatives of engine companies arrived to follow the tests on a particular engine 

by their company, their movements on the laboratory grounds were strictly limited to pre

them from obtaining information about an engine of a competitor undergoing tests at the s

time. The staff learned to choose their words carefully. They mastered the elaborate choreogr

of "who gets what information.'' This discreet behavior of NACA engineers contributed to 

growing respect for the laboratory on the part of the engine companies. However, the NACA 

a price. Capitulation to the engine companies kept the NACA in the mainstream of en
The unfavorable outcome of the debate over proprietary rights reveals the vulnerability 

the NACA as the tensions of the Cold War increased. Although military planners looked on 

USSR as a possible enemy in the event of World War III as early as 1945, this threat did not se

immediate because of the perceived inferiority of Soviet technology.

26 The Nene design in Sov

hands began to change that perception. Oscar Schey, head of the Compressor and Thrb

Division, pointed out in a 1948 memo that, in contrast to the engine situation in the late 193

when they had more than 20 years of experience in reciprocating engines, the engine commun

had barely four years of experience in jet technology. ''As Dr. Lewis often pointed out at the beg

ning of World War II," he wrote, "we had to fight the war with the five engines that had alrea

been developed and were in production." In 1948 the United States mass produced only o

turbojet engine, the Allison J-33 (General Electric's I-40)_27' Knowledge of the limitations of 

General Electric 1-40 compared to the Nene heightened the concern of all knowledgeable eng

experts. So great was the pressure to improve existing engines that Schey advocated an extens

of the work week to 48 hours. When Congress passed the Unitary Wind Thnnel Plan Act 

following year, the Air Force received funding for the Arnold Development Engineering Cen

in Thllahoma, Tenn. With extensive wind tunnels and other facilities for testing engines projec

for Thllahoma, the facilities at the Cleveland laboratory would lose their unique value to the p

pulsion community. Moreover, the Act stipulated that the Unitary Plan tunnels built by the NA

were to be made available to industry for testing programs. 

28 The Cold War threatened to pu

the laboratory back into development-its wartime role of mopping up for the engine compani

WHY ARE BRITISH ENGINES SUPERIOR? 

The focus on the Nene raised the question, why did the British produce superior engi

when their facilities were markedly inferior to those of the United States? Not only did the Uni

States have better facilities, but American engines were made of better alloys developed to wi

stand the higher temperatures of the combustor and turbine. A consensus emerged that 

superiority of British engines was the result of meticulou:; engineering and closer cooperat

between members of the propulsion community. For example, John Collins, Chief of the Eng

Performance and Materials Division, believed that British superiority could be ''attributed t

large extent to refinements in the details of the engine design and construction."29 Dryden w

more blunt. He observed after a trip to England at the height of the proprietary rights debate t

the "lack of money for facilities has forced them to make the best use of their brains." 30 In ad

tion, the British had been able to foster "a much closer collaboration between the engine co

panies in technical matters." Dryden called the attitude of Rolls Royce executives on the rele

of information, "in refreshing contrast to those of Pratt and Whitney, for example.' 131 

Dryden's perceptions correctly reflected the more cooperative approach of British eng

companies. The British Gas Collaboration Committee, established in November 1941 to spur 

development of the turbojet, encouraged engineers to share information. Frank Whittle recal

that the committee "helped a lot to decide in what order things should be done." About ten grou

involved in jet engine development met monthly, and, although the meetings were stuffy a

formal, at the parties in the evenings, "we really found out what each other was doing." 32 T

rationale for the Collaboration Committee was the belief that good ideas should be made availa

136 
In the United States competition was regarded as the key to a healthy economy. The sha

of technical innovations was prohibited by American anti-trust laws. 33 As late as 1948, 

general lack of coordination and communication among research laboratories and industry 

was noteworthy to P. F. Martinuzzi, an Italian 

gas turbine expert employed by the British. He 

remarked, on a trip sponsored by the 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 

that within the American industry "the 

general trend is to tackle the problems independently of past experience and of what 

competitors are doing.'' Available data were 

neglected by designers. The author had high 

regard for the research of the Cleveland 

laboratory, but it was hardly a clearinghouse 

for information. Companies engaged in 

development of jet engines did not pay much 

attention to what the NACA or any other 

laboratories were doing. 34 

Despite the availability of NACA 

research, the engine companies resisted new 

ideas on the technological frontier. Hans von 

Ohain, then a research scientist at Wright 

Field, recalled that when they were invited to 

the Cleveland laboratory to hear the results of 

the laboratory's latest research, "it was almost 

1b develop afterburners required full-scale en

testing. Here a system consisting of twin exhau

tried on General Electric's I-40, 1949. 

a festival because they had such interesting and good things to say." The Air Force was "all e

but the work at Lewis was so advanced that "industry fought it to the teeth." 35 This was 

ticularly true in the compressor area, where fundamental work on the transonic compressor 

eventually incorporated into the design of the turbofan. Von Ohain credits Silverstein with 

vision to persevere with compressor research, despite the attitudes of the engine companie

Gradually, the research of the Cleveland laboratory won respect and assisted in the tran

of new ideas from the realm of the research report to the design of an engine. In additio

published reports, technical transfer occurred through personal contacts between governm

engineers and scientists and their counterparts in industry. The most effective avenues for 

exchange were special conferences to which selected individuals were invited. In addition, 

laboratory held triennial inspections to show off its facilities and explain the latest resea

Employees who were selected to give talks at various laboratory "stops" prepared their t

carefully. NACA engineers learned to be articulate, personable, and lucid in explaining com

material. Laboratory tradition also encouraged after-hours socializing with industry repre

tatives. Gradually Lewis engineers became valued colleagues to their counterparts in industry. 

the engine designer, being able to associate a report with a face and knowing the history of a 

ticular piece of research through personal conversations created a general climate for accepta
the Cleveland laboratory, and representatives from the laboratory went abroad. The Arm

organized one of the first American postwar tours, which came to be called by the British, "T

American Gas Thrbine Mission." Walter T. Olson represented the Cleveland laboratory on 

nearly month-long tour in June 1947, visiting the major British engine manufacturers, as well 

the British government laboratories, the National Gas Thrbine Establishment at Whetstone, t

National Physical Laboratories at Teddington, and the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Fa

borough. The tour ended with visits to American engine companies to educate them concerni

the latest British advances. 

The mission drew no general conclusions about the reasons for continued British superio

ty. Nevertheless, an example cited by Olson showed the advantage of greater coordination and 

sharing of information. The development of a "universal" combustor by the Lucas Company h

led to its adoption by a number of British companies, thereby saving them the trouble of repeati

work that had already been done. Olson wrote: 

The main advantage in combustion that England enjoys is that virtually all new gas 

turbine engines start off with a reasonably well developed combustor. In the United 

States the engines now under development have a variety of styles of combustor, 

many of them quite unproven. This is because in the United States there has been no 

one organization with the manpower, the money, and a clear mandate to develop a 

"universal" combustor for the industry, that is no counterpart of the Lucas 

Company.

36 

While the general superiority of British engineering, combined with a spirit of grea

collaboration, could be seen in the Nene, British work on engines with axial-flow compresso

however, appeared to be behind that of General Electric's TG-180 and the various models of t

Westinghouse "Yankee" engine U34/24C). In compressor design, the strong emphasis by t

NACA on the development of an axial compressor eventually allowed the United States to p

ahead of the British. Testing the Nene, in fact, contributed to the Cleveland laboratory's growi

confidence that the Nene's centrifugal compressor had limitations that would soon be overco

by the more efficient axial design. Nevertheless, the British were also pushing the developm

of an engine with axial compressors. Rolls Royce's Avon engine was "without question the 'bl

chip' project" because, Olson reported, many British aircraft companies with projects in t

design stage planned to use the Avon engine. 

37 The first major departure from the Whit

design, the Avon was used in the Canberra Bomber and other important British planes. It w

selected for the De Haviland Comet, intended to be the world's first passenger jetliner. 

38 

Clearly with the knowledge of the Cleveland laboratory's work on the axial compressor 

mind, Olson noted, "It is quite generally appreciated among compressor research and design p

sonnel that some theory for the effect of the boundary layers in compressors and cascades 

urgently needed. Only trivial progress has been made on this problem to date."39 Great Brit

was at a disadvantage because it lacked altitude chambers to test full-scale engines and facilit

to test components, such as compressors, at high speeds.

40 The National Gas Thrbine Establi

ment was the only organization in Great Britain conducting large-scale cascade tests over a wi

range of conditions, but Olson revealed, "The cascade results are inaccurate because of bounda

layer effects in the cascade test rig itsel£." 41 

138 
ugal and axial compressors. John Stanitz applied a relaxation solution to the problem of 

dimensional compressible flow in a centrifugal compressor with straight radial blades

achievement that established him as an expert in centrifugal compressors.

42 However, the c

pressor staff always had greater enthusiasm for the axial compressor-a legacy of the NACA's 

eight-stage axial compressor designed by Eastman Jacobs and Eugene Wasielewski in 1938 

tested in 1941. The smaller frontal area of the axial compressor made it more compact and be

suited aerodynamically for flight than the more cumbersome centrifugal compressor. Howe

the greater aerodynamic complexity of the axial compressor presented enormous scientific 

engineering challenges. An axial compressor had to be designed so that air moved smoothly ac

each of the rows of compressor blades. Research initiated in 1944 with the transfer from Lan

of work on the Jacobs-Wasielewski eight-stage compressor laid the basis for the laboratory's fu

achievements in the compressor field. Jacobs and Wasielewski had approached compressor de

by applying the theory for an isolated airfoil. This became the standard approach of Amer

designers until the mid-1950s. 43 

Frank Whittle, for example, looked with bemused superiority at what he considered 

Cleveland laboratory's misplaced emphasis on the axial compressor. On a visit to the labora

in 1946, he asserted that the centrifugal compressor would continue to be preferred for its rug

dependability. In 1948 the abandonment of the centrifugal compressor by American designers 

called a "pity" by the Italian expert P. F. Martinuzzi (at that time working for the British) "beca

it appears that the axial compressor types which have replaced the earlier centrifugals are 

more reliable, are heavier and 'several times' more expensive." Martinuzzi speculated 

American emphasis on the axial compressor might reflect ''a desire to disclaim Br

influence.' '

44 

Between 1945 and 1950 the relative merits of the centrifugal versus the axial compre

were debated in Great Britain.

45 However, in the United States few engineering voices w

raised in support of the centrifugal compressor. The main effort among American engineer

cused in the early postwar period on developing the axial compressor. American indu

designers came to rely on NACA-generated data based on the isolated airfoil approach. As B

Nichelson pointed out in his recent Ph.D. dissertation: 

It made sense for the Americans to rely on the isolated airfoil method in light of the 

wealth of data available from the NACA on the performance of a large family of airfoil 

profiles. Whereas the Germans had rejected the isolated airfoil approach because it 

would have required a great deal of experimental data, the Americans already had 

such data available, courtesy of the NACA. It also made sense in another respect: 

Americans had long used a blade element design technique based on airfoil theory in 

designing propellers and single-stage fans and blowers. As a result, American 

designers not only felt comfortable using this type of design theory, they also began 

to view the time and energy spent in developing it as an investment. Thus the isolated 

airfoil approach became the main American axial compressor design theory during 

the 1940s. 46 

The isolated airfoil approach was not precise enough to give accurate predictions of c

pressor performance. The limitations of the isolated airfoil approach were first recognized 
However, American compressor designers, reluctant to abandon old approaches and hab

ignored the British cascade method until the mid-1950s. 47 

It is difficult to determine exactly what role members of the Lewis Compressor Divis

played in initially promoting the isolated airfoil approach and later coaxing the engine manuf

turers to give it up. Industry designers never liked to admit they picked up useful informat

from NACA reports and conferences. From the early postwar years, members of the Compres

and Thrbine Division had concentrated on developing a supersonic compressor based on the wo

initiated by Arnold Redding at Westinghouse and Arthur Kantrowitz at Langley during World W

II. British cascade studies received increased attention as this work expanded. In the area of thr

dimensional flows, the research of Frank Marble, Chung-Hua Wu, and Lincoln Wolfenstein bu

on Howell's work and that of German researchers Walter 'fraupel and Richard Meyer. Mar

described the flow of an ideal incompressible fluid through an axial compressor. Wu and W

stein tackled the problem of a compressible fluid flowing across stages of an infinite number 

blades.48 

In 1952 efforts at Lewis Laboratory were directed by Robert 0. Bullock to the developm

of a transonic compressor. Bullock headed a group that included William K. Ritter, William 

Benser, Harold B. Finger, John F. Klapproth, Melvin J. Hartmann, Arthur A. Medieros, Seym

Lieblein, and Irving A. Johnsen. Hartmann and others developed a flow model for estimating 

shock losses that could be anticipated as the air flowed through the compressor. Seymour Liebl

developed the diffusion factor, D, now universally accepted as a measure of blade loading. T

years of single- and multi-stage investigations culminated in the development of an experimen

eight-stage axial-flow transonic compressor.49 

To verify theories developed analytically, the compressor staff designed and built co

plicated facilities, called single- and multi-stage compressor test rigs. The data they provided w

essential to industry designers. Without this verification of mathematical predictions, no eng

company would have had the temerity to undertake the expensive development of a n

The ]acobs-Wasielewski eight-stage axial compressor 

perfected in the 1950s. 

140 

compressor. Results, made available to 

entire industry through NACA reports, beca

the "Compressor Bible" to members of 

engine community. Eventually the Co

pressor Division prepared a manual that su

marized the entire corpus of compres

knowledge. This manual, issued in 1956 a

three-volume NACA Confidential Resea

Memorandum edited by Irving Johnsen a

Robert 0. Bullock, marked the culmination 

NACA c mpressor research.50 

The NACA may have played a role in 

development of compressors similar to that 

the British Lucas Company for combusto

The laboratory concentrated on generic co

ponents for application in a variety of engin

produced by different manufacturers. Wh
of the art through dissemination of information, thereby saving individual companies the cost 

time of doing this research themselves. At the same time, by making knowledge freely avail

to the entire engine community, it discouraged one company from locking in a compet

advantage. 

HOW VALUABLE ARE FACILITIES? 

For the NACA, maintenance of elaborate research facilities cut into the time that coul

devoted to actual research, and, at first, the British maintained their lead in the new field o

propulsion. As Ben Pinkel recalled, a member of a British delegation once asked him, ''Whe

you have time to brood?" However, in the long run these facilities paid off. In the absenc

superior facilities, the British government funded basic research by the engine companies 

was carried on independently of the development of specific engines. 51 Not only did the Br

differ in the way that research was funded, but also in styles of approach to the developmen

specific engines. The British used a cut-and-try approach that depended on building and tes

successive models of a particular engine. As Ray Sharp observed on a lengthy trip to Eu

in 1951: 

Instead of concentrating first upon acquiring the tools, the equipment, best suited for 

use in investigating powerplant problems and developing more powerful engines, the 

One of the unique compressor rigs used to test axial compressors, 1948. 
with a very good end-product, but the cost is greater, I believe, than our system in 

which we first study the problems involved, using our equipment, and then go ahead 

and build only two or three of a new model. 52 

So respected was the resultant engineering from the British system that in 1953, w

Westinghouse needed help with its foundering 24C turbojet engine, the company signed a mut

assistance agreement with Rolls Royce to share afterburner technology in order to benefit fr

British turbojet expertise. On a visit to the Cleveland laboratory after the signing of this agr

A Westinghouse axial-flow turbojet fitted with NACA 

variable area nozzle for afterburner studies in the 

Altitude Wind Thnnel, 1951. 

142 

ment, the Rolls Royce representative confi

that he had been "dil;ected by Lord Hives 

follow through on the collaboration betw

the two companies and see if Rolls Ro

could 'make an engine company out of 

bloody buggers.' " 53 However, while 

British approach yielded short-term benef

by the early 1950s British domination of 

aircraft engine field had begun to slide. 

The key to the postwar Americ

approach to engine development was the 

volvement of government engineers. T

Cleveland laboratory built the necess

facilities for testing complete engine syste

but its expertise went beyond full-scale test

to the study of individual components. NA

engineers developed theories to predict eng

performance and verified these theories 

special "rigs." The NACA tackled speciali

areas of research, such as components, co

bustion and fuels, lubricants and se

materials, and heat transfer. Through publi

tion and interaction between industry a

government engineers, the laborato

encouraged innovation while saving 

engine companies some of the costs 

development. Government research promo

innovation. A designer could not ignore a p

ticular innovation if it was likely that his co

pany's competitors were going to incorpor

it into their latest engine prototypes. 

The Korean War (1950-1953) marke

turning point in the development of 

American turbojet industry, and the end 

British dominance. Before the Korean W
with jet planes. 54 During the war, Pratt & Whitney was the licensee for the production of 

Rolls Royce Thy, or J48, the most powerful engine produced by either the United States or G

Britain. The Thy, however, was the last British engine to reflect the superiority of British engi

When Wright Aeronautical bought the license for the British Armstrong Siddeley Sapp

(designated the J-67 by the United States Air Force), a turbojet with an axial compressor, the c

pany found that its thrust was too low for the aircraft it was intended to power. The failur

Wright's development of the Sapphire contributed to its demise. 

Ironically, Pratt & Whitney, many years behind Westinghouse and General Electric 

acquiring turbojet expertise, began to dominate the turbojet industry after its development of 

JT3 (J57). The JT3 initially had better fuel economy and more than double the thrust of its c

petitors. The innovative design feature of Pratt & Whitney's engine was an axial compressor w

a double shaft (also called a dual-rotor or two-spool), a feature that dramatically increased 

efficiency of the compressor. This engine placed the company in the forefront of aircraft pro

sion development. 55 General Electric's answer to Pratt & Whitney's JT3 was the J79 with 

innovative compressor with variable stators. 56 

By the mid-1950s the American turbojet industry had matured and narrowed to two c

panies: Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. British aircraft engine companies found it incr

ingly difficult to compete against their American counterparts. 1\vo tragic crashes of the Co

in 1954left the De Haviland Company in an unfavorable competitive position. The crashes w

caused by metal fatigue brought on by the cyclical pressurization of the cabin, not by the aircra

Avon engines. Before the Comet regained its Certificate of Airworthiness, De Haviland had 

the commercial market to Boeing's 707 and the Douglas DC-8, powered by Pratt & Whitn

JT3. 57 The British had set the stage for the turbojet revolution, but they could not sustain t

early lead. 

The development of superior 

NACA facilities for testing engine prototypes played a role in American 

dominance in the engine field. This view 

is supported by remarks made by Rolls 

Royce representatives on a visit to Lewis 

Laboratory in 1955. They lamented that 

the company ''has been 'led up the 

garden path' by the Labor and Conservative governments which have promised 

to provide full-scale test facilities for the 

British gas turbine industry since 

1945." 58 Since these promised facilities 

still had not materialized, Rolls Royce 

planned to spend the equivalent of $15 

million to build two small wind tunnels 

and two altitude test chambers. In addition, in 1955 the British made plans to 

Pratt & Whitney's dual spool turbojet engine {]T3/P57

the Altitude Wind Thnnel for nozzle studies as part of 

NACA's aircraft noise suppression research, 1957. 
lead. Rolls Royce continued to send its engines to Cleveland for testing. As late as 1956, reco

from the log of the Altitude Wind Thnnel indicate that the NACA tested the Rolls Royce A

engine. 

The Cold War justified the continued sharing of British engine technology with the Uni

States-an exchange heavily weighted in favor of the United States. Lewis engineers developed 

intimate knowledge of British engines they could share with Pratt & Whitney and General E

tric. American engine companies received a financial boost from large defense contracts necess

because of the dominant role of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat

(NATO). The early 1950s also marked a decline in the influence of Lewis Laboratory in the airc

engine field. The military services and industry had begun to develop facilities comparable 

superior to those of the laboratory. The era of the air-breathing engine research at Lewis seem

to be reaching a natural point of termination. It was time to reassess Lewis's future role in 

nation's propulsion research. 

144 
Memo from Oscar Schey to the Washington office, Survey of Fundamental Research of the N'ACA~Airc

Industries Association Comments," 19 November 1946, NASA Lewis Records, 34/376. See also Min

of the Industry Consulting Committee, 3 December 1947, Committees and Subcommittees, Nat

Archives, Record Group 255. 

2 Memo for the Chief of Research from Eugene Manganiello, 25 February 1946, NASA Lewis Records, 34

3 Interview with Bruce Lundin, 15 July 1986. Also interview with Carl Schueller, 12 October 1984. 

4 Seymour C. Himmel, personal communication. 

5 'Iranscribed interview with Ben Pinkel, 3 August 1985, p. 17. 

6 Quoted by Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 16

7 See George Wise, Willis R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of U.S. Industrial Research (New Y

Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 106. 

8 Memo from Carlton Kemper to NACA, 1 November 1946, NASA Lewis Records, 34/317.7. 

9 Memo from Carlton Kemper to Director of Research, "Visit"to General Electric River Works, Lynn, M

with Colonel Bogert to Discuss Their Objections to the Method of Handling Proprietary Materi

NACA Reports," 3 February 1947, NASA Lewis Records, 34/317.76. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Flight, 18 April 1946, p. 389-393. Note: Because at the time the Nene was developed, the British ha

suitable airframe, the Rolls Royce Company built a scaled-down version, the Derwent series of eng

to power the Meteor, one of the few airplanes able to fly fast enough during World War II to shoot d

the V-1. Development of the Nene was actually started ten months after the I-40, but, unlike Ge

Electric, which stopped development at the end of the war, Rolls Royce engineers continued to pe

the Nene. See Robert Schlaifer, The Development of Aircraft Engines (Boston: Graduate Schoo

Business Administration, Harvard University, 1950), p. 373 and 476. 

12 The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Story (West Hartford: Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft 

poration, 1950), p. 168. 

13 Sir Stanley Hooker stated in Not Much of an Engineer (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1984), p. 98, "Wit

Stafford Cripps at the Board of 'Irade, the left-wing British Government appeared perfectly happy to 

our latest engine to the Russians, and in September 1946 clinched a deal for 25 Nenes and 30 Derw

the first few of which the team took back to the Soviet Union and copied exactly in double-quick 

They were produced in colossal numbers for the MiG-15 and -17, 11-28, Th-14 and many other airc

These aircraft were also supplied to the Soviet satellite countries, and North Korea! Over 20 years 

I saw VK-1s (Soviet Nenes) being overhauled in Romania." For a discussion of British labor policy

also Keith Hayward, Government and British Civil Aerospace (Manchester: Manchester University P

1983), p. 12-27. 

14 Carlton Kemper to NACA, "Investigation of Rolls Royce Nene jet-propulsion engine," 9 December 

NASA Lewis Records, 34/623. 

15 Carlton Kemper, "Conference Called by Colonel Bogert at Wright Field, January 23, 1947, Regar

Proprietary Material in NACA Reports for the Army Air Forces," NASA Lewis Records, 34/317.7

16 W. P. Gwinn to NACA, 3 December 1947, Power Plants Committee, National Archives, Record Group 

4/112.05. 

17 Zelmar Barson and H. D. Wilsted, "Preliminary Results of Nene II Engine Altitude-Chamber Perform

Investigation, !-Altitude Performance Using Standard 18.75-Inch-Diameter Jet Nozzle," NACA Rese

Memorandum E8E12, 25 May 1948. J. W. Crowley to L. S. Hobbs, 25 May 1948, National Arch

Record Group 255, 4/112.05. 

18 Power Plants Committee Minutes, 21 May 1948, National Archives, Record Group 255, 112.02, p. 9

19 Hugh L. Dryden toW. P. Gwinn, 2 August 1948, National Archives, Record Group 255, 4/112.05. 

20 W. P. Gwinn to J. W. Crowley, 9 July 1948, National Archives, Record Group Z55, 4/112.05. 
22 Power Plants Committee Minutes, 10 December 1948, National Archives, Record Group 255, 112.02, p

23 Power Plants Committee Minutes, 10 December 1948, National Archives, Record Group 255, 112.02, p

24 Ibid. 

25 Ibid, p. 12. 

26 Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 169-219. 

27 Oscar Schey, "Memorandum for the Director," 11 March 1948, NASA Lewis Records, 34/376. 

28 Alex Roland, Model Research, vol. I, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of

1985) p. 215-219. 

29 John Collins to Director of Aeronautical Research, 29 January 1947, NASA .Lewis Records, 34/376. 

30 Minutes of the NACA Executive Committee, 9 September 1948, National Archives, Record Group 

14/112.05. 

31 Hugh L. Dryden to John Victory, 29 August 1948, NASA Lewis Records, 232/150. 

32 An Encounter Between the jet Engine Inventors, History Office, Aeronautical Systems Division Air F

Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Historical Publication, 1978, p. 97. 

33 Abe Silverstein's comment to the author, September 1986. 

34 P. F. Martinuzzi, "Gas Thrbines in the United States," Flight, 7 October 1948, p. 439-441. 

35 Interview with Hans von Ohain by V. Dawson, 11 February 1985, National Air and Space Muse

Washington, D.C. 

36 Walter T. Olson to Executive Engineer, "Tour of Aircraft Gas Thrbine Industry in England," 22 Au

1947, NASA Lewis Records, 34/621. 

37 Ibid. 

38 See Michael Donne, Leader of the Skies, Rolls-Royce: The First Seventy-five Years (London: Frederick Mu

Limited, 1981), p. 68; Keith Hayward, Government and British Civil Aerospace: A Case Study in Post-

Technology Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 19-22. 

39 Walter T. Olson, "Tour of Aircraft Gas Thrbine Industry in England," p. 5. 

40 Ibid, p. 87-88. 

41 Ibid, p. 4. 

42 See John D. Stanitz, "1\vo-Dimensional Compressible Flow in Conical Mixed-Flow Compressors," NA

TN 1744, 1948. 

43 Brian J. Nichelson, "Early Jet Engines and the Transition from Centrifugal to Axial Compressors: A C

Study in Technological Change," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1988, p. 115. Joh

Sinnette, Jr., Oscar W. Schey, and J. Austin King, "Performance of NACA Eight-Stage Axial-F

Compressor Designed on the Basis of Airfoil Theory," NACA TR 758, 1943. This report was 

published as NACA Wartime Report E4H18 in August 1944. NACA TR 758 was actually publishe

1945. John T. Sinnette, Jr., and William J. Voss, "Extension of Useful Operating Range of Axial-f

Compressors by Use of Adjustable Stator Blades," NACA TR 915, 1948. It seems likely that NACA d

on the use of variable stator compressor blades contributed to the design (begun in 1951) of Gen

Electric's enormously successful J79. 

44 P. F. Martinuzzi, "Gas Thrbines in the United States," Flight, 7 October 1948, p. 439. Frank Whittle's c

ment was reported in an interview with the author by John Sanders, 6 April 1985. The Whittle vis

described in Wing Tips, 19 July 1946, NASA Lewis Technical Library. 

45 Brian Nichelson, "Early Jet Engines," p. 162-208. 

46 Ibid, p. 115-116. 

146 
pgg 

American approaches. Silverstein appears to have advocated the isolated airfoil approach as late as 

in the Twelfth Wright Brothers Lecture, "Research on Aircraft Propulsion Systems." journal of 

Aeronautical Sciences 16:197-226. 

48 Chung-Hua Wu and Lincoln Wolfenstein, "Application of Radial Equilibrium Condition to Axial-F

Compressors and Thrbines Design," NACA TN 1795, 1949. 

49 For a summary of this work, see Seymour Lieblein and Irving A. Johnsen, "Resume of Transo

Compressor Research at NACA Lewis Laboratory." 'Iransactions of the ASME journal of Engineering 

Power, offprint 60-WA-97, 1960. 

50 Members of the Compressor and Thrbine Research Division, "Aerodynamic Design of Axial-F

Compressors," vol. 1-3, NACA RM E56B03, E56B03a, E56B03b, 1956. A revised declassified edition 

published as Aerodynamic Design of Axial-Flow Compressors, NASA SP-36, 1965. Reference to 

"Compressor Bible" was made in an informal talk with the author by Marvin A. Stibich, Aero Pro

sion Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. The division disbanded in 1957, w

the laboratory shifted into nuclear and space-related projects. It was brought back to life in the 

1960s, when the laboratory returned to aeronautics work. 

51 Hugh L. Dryden to John Victory, 29 August 1948, NASA Lewis Records, 34/300. 

52 Interview with Sharp and J. J. Haggerty, American Aviation Magazine, December 1951, and E. R. S

biography file, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 

53 John H. Collins, Jr., "Visit of Messrs. L. Dawson of Rolls-Royce, Ltd. and R. P. Kroon, V. V. Schloesser, 

M. Norton of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, on June 5, 1953," NASA Lewis Records, 232/15

54 Charles D. Bright, The jet Makers: The Aerospace Industry from 1945 to 1972 (Lawrence, Kansas: The Reg

Press of Kansas, 1978), p. 15. 

55 In 1952 Pratt & Whitney received a Collier Trophy for the JT3, the first award for a power plant in 

years. See booklet, "Presentation of 1972 Elmer A. Sperry Award to Leonard S. Hobbs and Perry 

Pratt," AIAA Ninth Annual Meeting, Courtesy of United Technology Archives, East Hartford, C

The dual-spool concept may originally have been British. 

56 Development of General Electric's J79, headed by Gerhard Neumann, began in 1951. It was flight te

in 1955. See Seven Decades of Progress: A Heritage of Aircraft Thrbine Thchnology (Fallbrook, Calif.: A

Publishers, 1979), p. 84-91. 

57 Keith Hayward, Government and British Civil Aerospace: A Case Study in Post-War Thchnology P

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), explores some of these issues, although his discus

of the aircraft engine industry is limited. 

58 Carlton Kemper, "Visit of Personnel from Rolls Royce Ltd. England to Lewis on January 10 and 11, 19

19 January 1955, NASA Lewis Records, 232/150. 

<( SEIZING THE SPACE 

~Ill INITIATIVE 

There appears to be a strong parallel between the NAC/>:s transition from aircraft pis

engines to jet propulsion and the transition from air-breathing engines to rocket propulsion. 

both cases the NACA failed to anticipate the revolutionary change in the nation's propulsion 

quirements. However, the historical context in which these transitions occurred was differ

The American propulsion community in the late 1930s ignored jet propulsion because they w

caught up in the peacetime development of commercial engines. Just the opposite was true in 

early 1950s. The same rocket intended to be lobbed at the Soviet Union could propel a sate

into orbit around Earth, but national security dictated the nation's propulsion priorities. U

1955, when planning for the International Geophysical Year began, space was dismissed 

science fiction. The military focused its energies during this period on missile development, 

the NACA remained, willingly or unwillingly, on the sidelines. The launch of Sputnik by 

Soviet Union in 1957 caught the nation, including the NACA, off guard. 

Why the NACA stayed out of the mainstream of large rocket development may be as m

a political question as a technical one. Hugh Dryden never went to Congress without a caref

conceived, down-to-earth program. He was all the more conservative when it came to ask

Congress for funding outside of the NAC/>:s specific aeronautics mandate. In the political clim

of the early 1950s it was increasingly difficult to get the budget-minded Congress to supp

science and technology appropriations. The military requested and obtained funding for resea

folded into large budgets justified on national security grounds. This generous funding enab

the Air Force to build new research facilities at Wright Field and an array of the latest in w

tunnels at Arnold Engineering Center in Thllahoma, Tenn. 

The Army, Navy, and Air Force found themselves with ample financial resources for mis

development. Given the constraints on NACA funding prior to Sputnik, from the point of view 

one NACA engineer the NACA "would have stood as much chance of injecting itself into sp

activities in any real way as an icicle in a rocket combustion chamber."2 Yet the ques

remains. Could an earlier and more sustained attention to rocket research have positioned 

NACA on the propulsion frontier before space missions captured the nation's imagination 

forced Congress to open its pocketbook? 

Between 1945 and the early 1950s research at Lewis Laboratory focused on improving 

turbojet, a bulky, roaring, fuel-thirsty engine, to a quiet, dependable, commercially viable prop

sion system. However, this program in support of existing technology did not preclude m

advanced work. Beyond the duty to respond to specific requests from the military and indus

149 
gy y

ppj

in a few well-chosen areas. If a particular project won the attention of Abe Silverstein, it rece

support. Silverstein's "pet projects" may have had only a small percentage of the total budg

the laboratory, but he assigned some of his most talented staff to these projects and watched 

their progress with an attentiveness that the more routine projects did not receive. The prob

for the members of the rocket section was how to win the attention of Lewis's upper man

ment. At first, they were frustrated by the lack of support for their work. 

Since 1945, when the Cleveland laboratory established its rocket section, its small staff 

co:itinued to study rocket fuels despite the general attitude of headquarters and Lewis up

management against a strong NACA role in rocket development. The group's work was limite

the study of propellants, particularly high-energy fuels, thrust chambers of rocket engines, c

bustion, and cooling. By 1948, the rocket group had produced calculations on the performanc

a number of propellants. Among liquid propellants worthy of experimental study, liquid hydro

appeared to hold greatest promise because of its high specific impulse. 3 The rocket group bec

convinced that the potential of liquid hydrogen to produce greater thrust than conventional f

could offset the disadvantages of its low density. However, the use of liquid hydrogen as a ro

fuel presented enormous technical problems. Liquid hydrogen is a cryogenic fuel, dangerou

handle and difficult to store. To verify predictions, laboratory facilities were needed. In addit

it was difficult to obtain an adequate supply of the fuel for experiments. The study of li

hydrogen had to be passed over in favor of fuels like hydrazone and diborane to be used w

oxidizers like hydrogen peroxide, chlorine trifluoride, liquid oxygen, nitrogen tetroxide, and li

fluorine. 4 

When Abe Silverstein became Chief of Research, he allowed the rocket group more res

sibility and visibility. In 1949 the rocket section became a branch within the Fuels and Com

tion Research Division, headed by Ted Olson. John Sloop, head of the new branch, recalled

was moved up one level in the organizational hierarchy, named for what it was, and given m

personnel." 5 However, in the early 1950s, rocket research remained a small fraction of the w

of Olson's division, which focused on the combustion problems and fuels of turbojets and ram

Silverstein's interest was limited to encouraging the group to establish the criteria for prope

selection. Silverstein also became mildly interested in liquid hydrogen, perhaps in connec

with nuclear rocket propulsion. A 1947 secret report by physicists at the Applied Phy

Laboratory at The Johns Hopkins University had proposed hydrogen as the preferred prope

for a nuclear rocket.6 Interest in hydrogen-fueled rockets thus dovetailed with the increa

emphasis on nuclear aircraft and rocket propulsion on the part of the Air Force. Liquid hydro

also had possibilities as a fuel for high-altitude aircraft such as the U-2. Silverstein, however, 

not lend any muscle to support requests for additional facilities. Without facilities, the experim

tal side of the research suffered. 

Members of the rocket branch realized that, to change the attitude of Lewis managem

from polite tolerance to firm commitment, they had to do more than produce their quot

research papers. They became advocates for increased attention to rocket research to audien

both within and outside the laboratory. Although they were careful not to push the space app

tions too hard, other Lewis staff could not resist kidding them for becoming "Buck Rogers typ

Sloop, for example, gave two lectures in 1949 as part of the Case extension course (ME 

offered at Harding Junior High School. The first lecture tackled the general problems of ro

150 
Goddard, Maurice Zucrow, Willy Ley, and Frank Malina. Sloop indicated that, beyond m

applications, step rockets could be used to escape Earth's gravity. He went so far as to sugges

establishment of a space station. 

7 At local, regional, and national meetings of the Socie

Automotive Engineers (SAE), Kiwanis Clubs, and American Legion Posts, Sloop and his staff 

mered away at the same themes: the potential of rocket-powered missiles both as mil

weapons and as research tools to gather "basic scientific data about the upper atmosphere 

interstellar space." They advocated "a vigorous, large-scale research and development progra

In 1951, possibly in response to intelligence reports of Russian advances in rocketry

NACA authorized a formal Subcommittee on Rocket Engines within the Power Plants Comm

That same year Lewis Laboratory received its first formal appropriation for rocket rese

However, the number of personnel assigned to the rocket branch was still small, less than 3 

cent. The experimental facilities consisted of four rocket test cells constructed during World 

II and four larger test cells put up by an ad hoc laboratory construction group, paid for 

laboratory operating funds. The laboratory still lacked adequate facilities for production, sto

and testing of liquid hydrogen rockets. 9 

Members of the rocket branch staff paid close attention to Army missile policy, whic

1952 was beginning to swing away from air-breathing propulsion systems. The rocket group b

to plan a large rocket engine test complex for a remote location in the West, later scaled dow

a single facility appropriate for a site at Lewis. In 1953 the laboratory acquired a hydr

liquefier, but it had to wait until 1957 for the new high-energy rocket propellant test facili

be ready for operation. 

In its quest for a large-scale rocket facility, the rocket group seems to have received gr

encouragement from the new NACA rocket engine subcommittee than it did from either Dr

or Lewis management. John Sloop lamented: 

Ironically, it was the special subcommittee on rockets set up in 1951 and 

managed by NACA headquarters that 

was the most influential in prodding 

both headquarters and laboratory 

management into doing more 

research on rocket engines. The 

recommendations of the subcommittee, and particularly those of Chairman Maurice Zucrow, were crucial in 

getting the $2.5 million rocket propulsion laboratory for high-energy propellants, with construction beginning 

in 1953.

10 

It is possible that the tarnished reputation 

of the NACA in the early 1950s made Dryden 

reluctant to push for an expanded role in the 

national program of rocket research. In 1951 the Rocket Test Cell, 1952. 
PAYLOAD 

OXIDANT 

PROPELLANT 

NOZZLES 

TURBINE -------., 

GAS 

GENERATOR 

TURBINE 

PROPELLANT 

INJECTION 

PUMPS 

Diagram of a Liquid Propellant Rocket, 1953. 

NACA was jolted by the arrest of William Perl. Perl, a brilliant theoretician, had worked 

Langley before his transfer to Lewis. The previous year he had completed his Ph.D. un

Theodor von Karman. He was accused of perjury in connection with the sensational trial of Ju

and Ethel Rosenberg. Perl had denied to a Grand Jury that e knew the Rosenbergs when, in f

during his year as a graduate student at Columbia University, he had sublet an apartment ren

to one of the alleged conspirators. The FBI suspected that Perl had communicated sensit

aerodynamic information, including national plans to develop a nuclear-powered airplane, to 

Soviet Union through the Rosenbergs. These allegations were never proved. Perl was convicted 

perjury and sentenced to five years in prison. Whether there is a connection between the Perl c

and the NACA's funding difficulties after the Korean War is pure speculation. At the height of 

nightmare of McCarthyism, it does not seem surprising that the NACA might have been c

sidered a security risk. 11 

The NACA's woes were compounded in January 1952 when Albert Thomas, Chairman 

the House Appropriations Subcommittee, demanded an investigation of the NACA by the Gen

Accounting Office (GAO), the first such scrutiny the NACA had ever experienced. Thomas thou

that the agency had too many civil service employees and possible duplication of research ef

among the three laboratories. In September the GAO sent its auditors, followed by a visit fr

Congressman Thomas himself. One can imagine the trepidation with which laboratory mana

ment prepared for his visit. Mter an extensive tour, including stock rooms and new facilities, 

Thomas, it seems, went away favorably impressed. 

152 
pyy , 

p y 

to support turbojet development. He reported to Dryden: 

He was impressed by the possibility of getting information on these engines before 

they went into production, and I think he realized for the first time the potentialities 

of this work since he commented that it was obvious that large savings could be made 

if the engines were proven before they were put into production. Over lunch Silverstein turned the discussion to the NACA's future research. He stressed "the need for 

more intensive research and development on the rocket engine in this country in a 

connection with the long-range missile." He let Thomas know that a request for new 

facilities for rocket development was part of the 1954 budget requestY 

FROM MACH 4 TO INFINITY 

In July 1955 President Dwight Eisenhower announced that the United States would p

ticipate in the International Geophysical Year (to begin in 1957). The United States planned 

launch a satellite. The idea of space exploration now caught the imaginations of men higher 

in the laboratory hierarchy-John Evvard, George Low, and Wolfgang Moeckel. Aware of the w

in hypersonics at Langley and Ames, they thought that both space flight and propulsion proble

related to aerodynamic heating should be explored. 

Preparations for the International Geophysical Year sparked a new awareness and comm

ment within the scientific community to the peaceful development of space sciences. Possi

because of its scientific imprimatur and the fact that it was to be managed by a team 

Americans, the relatively weak joint proposal by the Vanguard group at the Naval Resea

Laboratory and the National Academy of Sciences beat a proposal by the more experienced v

Braun team. 

Lewis Laboratory's preparations were more modest. To prepare the staff for the proble

of flight beyond Earth's atmosphere, they began to consider what courses to offer the follow

year in the non-credit system that flourished under the direction of John Evvard. Because 

course system served as a bellwether for new research initiatives and future reorganizations of 

laboratory, Evvard carefully laid the groundwork through discussions with possible instructo

With considerable trepidation Evvard went to see Silverstein. In describing the proposed cou

Evvard predicted that it could ''change the thinking of the people who take the course,'' someth

that might not be desirable because of the dissatisfaction it could cause with more rout

workY They planned to call the course "From Mach 4 to Infinity." Without hesitation Silv

stein gave Evvard his support. ''From Mach 4 to Infinity'' created a strong impression on th

who took it in 1956. The second year it was offered, the course was enormously popular. 

A respected group composed mainly of the laboratory's theoreticians-Melvin Gerste

George Low, Roger Luidens, Stephen Maslen, and Harold Mirels-developed the part of 

course that dealt with the concepts of hypersonic flight. Some basic research in heat transfer 

Clarence B. Cohen, Eli Reshotko, and Ernst Eckert provided a useful starting point. 14 Wolfg

Moeckel began to explore the idea of possible flights to the planets using unconventional prop

sion systems. As part of his lecture ''Earth Satellites and Interplanetary Travel,'' Moeckel review

the literature on rocket propulsion. He recalled that he had first come across a description 
space travel, rocket thrust could be produced by the flow of electrically charged particles. 

The chemical rocket was limited by the enormous amounts of propellant required to 

carried into space for flight to distant planets. Although chemical rockets produced far gre

thrust, they had to carry large quantities of fuel into space. Electric rockets got their power fr

a generator in space providing very small amounts of thrust over very long periods of time. T

suggested to Oberth, as it had to Robert Goddard in 1906, that electric rockets might be use

for long-distance travel between planets. However, neither Oberth nor Goddard tackled 

practical questions involved in the development of a power source. The electric rocket was c

signed to the category of intriguing but impractical technical ideas. 16 

Moeckel's colleagues received his first lecture with considerable interest. Expanding th

lectures later the same year, he came across two papers by Ernst Stuhlinger, who had worked 

the V-2 at Peenemunde under Werner von Braun. 

17 Moeckel may have heard about Stuhling

work at the semi-annual meeting of the American Rocket Society held in Cleveland in 1956 wh

Krafft Ehricke, also of the Peenemunde group, lectured on "The Solar-Powered Space Ship." 

Stuhlinger had become intrigued with the possibilities of electric propulsion as early as 1

at the Army Camp at Fort Bliss when von Braun asked him to restudy Oberth's rocket wo

Stuhlinger's first paper, published in 1954, tackled the question that Oberth had left unanswer

how to generate the necessary electric power in space. He suggested a solar turbogenerator t

consisted of a system of mirrors and boilers. In his second paper, published in 1955, Stuhlin

took a more radical approach. He suggested a nuclear fission reactor as the power source. 

reasoned that ''a vehicle designed for a Mars mission would be lighter and somewhat faste

powered by a nuclear reactor than if it were powered by solar energy." 19 

Stuhlinger's papers impressed Moeckel because they were "much more concrete, comp

hensive and realistic than previous work." Once Stuhlinger had suggested that electric propuls

was within the realm of technical feasibility, Moeckel set enthusiastically to work. "I immediat

began a study of low-thrust trajectories, and the capabilities of such low-thrust systems for 

terplanetary travel." 20 If headquarters had been apprised of Moeckel's work, it might have b

discouraged as "space-cadet" enthusiasm. Indeed, it has yet to find application in space explo

tion. However, like the analytic work done on liquid hydrogen before large experimental facili

were authorized, or the theoretical work on hypersonics, there was no need to inform Washing

at this point. Moeckel received the strong support of his division chief, John Evvard, then h

of the Supersonic Propulsion Division, who gave him the necessary freedom to think through 

ideas. 

Meanwhile, Walter Olson began to make a concerted effort to influence Dryden to tak

more aggressive approach to NACA rocket research. In "A Suggested Policy and Course of Act

for NACA with Regard to Rocket Engine Propulsion (1955)," Olson advocated "advancing 

engine art" by experimental work on rocket engines of 250,000 to 1,000,000 pounds thru

Although missile applications are clearly intended in the document's careful wording, Ols

almost apologetically, urged the NACA to also consider satellite flight "which still seems vision

to many minds now." Nuclear-powered aircraft, he suggested, might serve as launching pads 

flight beyond the atmosphere. Rockets could also be used for auxiliary thrust to increase the sp

of lumbering nuclear-powered aircraft.

21 

154 
Air Force, interested in liquid hydrogen to fuel turbojet engines for high

altitude reconnaissa

aircraft, supported an experimental test program at Lewis Laboratory called Project Bee. Sil

stein put Paul Ordin in charge of the project and made Donald Mulholland his assistant. This 

exactly the kind of hands-on engineering project that Silverstein found most challenging. At 

the work of the rocket branch in high-energy propellants had gained his full attention. He se

a room in the basement of the Administration Building directly below his office for the pro

so that he could personally direct it. The project staff modified a B-57B bomber equipped w

two Curtiss Wright J-65 engines so that one engine could burn either jet fuel or hydrogen. A

extensive ground testing of the hydrogen system, it was flight tested over Lake Erie. When 

pilot switched the modified engine to hydrogen fuel, it worked perfectly. The program reso

the questions of insulation, structure, and pumping of liquid hydrogen in flight. 

Project Bee validated the work of the rocket team, as well as proving the feasibility of liq

hydrogen as a fuel for aircraft. Through Project Bee, Lewis researchers received important p

tical experience in the handling and storage of liquid hydrogen that would later prove cru

when the laboratory took charge of the development of the Centaur rocket. Abe Silverstein, w

Eldon Hall, wrote the final report: "Liquid Hydrogen as a Jet Fuel for High-Altitude Aircraf

The laboratory set up an engine design group led by William D. Ritter to study liquid hydro

turbojet engines for supersonic flight. 23 

In July 1956 Dryden at last began to reconsider his opposition to increased NACA partic

tion in rocket research. He took the belated initiative to canvas the opinion of the NACA ro

subcommittee to determine the NACA's long-term research agenda. This conservative appro

was typical of headquarters when entering a new area of research. Dryden's cautious mo

operandi was to "solicit opinions and build a broad base of national support so that it wo

appear the agency was practically pushed into the new work.'' 24 For five years, Dryden had 

nored both the rocket subcommittee's recommendations and pressure from Lewis Laborator

allow more effort in rocket research. On the behalf of frustrated members of the NACA ro

subcommittee, Richard Canright (employed by Douglas Aircraft after leaving the Jet Propul

Laboratory) wrote in July 1957: 

We have constantly spurred the NACA on to tests on a larger scale. We have urged 

them to become familiar with complete engines rather than work only on component 

R&D. We have tried to emphasize the importance of rocket technology to this country's defense effort and urged that the NACA devote a greater portion of its personnel 

and funding to this important field. 25 

On the eve of Sputnik, Dryden still hesitated to take up the recommendations of the ro

subcommittee, roll up his sleeves, and challenge a tight-fisted Congress for a larger NACA rol

rocket development. Nevertheless, Lewis management was now solidly behind the work of 

rocket group. 

TRANSITION TO SPACE 

Late in 1956 Abe Silverstein was ready to leave the problems of the turbojet engine to 

dustry. 'IWo new facilities under construction-the rocket engine test facility and the nuclear r

tor at Plum Brook-required a rethinking of the laboratory's research program. Silverstein be
Silverstein selected some of the Compressor and Thrbine Division's most versatile engine

and scientists to attend a "nuclear school." Eight additional engineers were plucked from oth

divisions of the laboratory and invited to drop their curre t projects and prepare for leadersh

in the anticipated reorganization by learning the principles of nuclear physics. They were taug

by the small core of researchers at the laboratory who had been engaged in nuclear work 

almost a decade and professors invited from Case Institute of Technology. In all, 24 engineers h

no duties other than to attend the school for six months. The rationale for the nuclear sch

appears to have been to single out individuals with leadership qualities and teach them the fu

damentals of new areas Silverstein believed would become the major focus of research in 

future. Presumably, these individuals would be the division and branch chiefs after 

reorganization. In January 1957 six engineers chose not to continue in the nuclear field. T

remaining 18 were divided into three groups. Harold Finger headed a group to work on a nucl

rocket. In 1960 he would be selected by Silverstein to become project director of the joint Atom

Energy Commission-NASA nuclear projects at headquarters. Eldon Hall formed a group to stu

aircraft nuclear propulsion. He would also go to Washington with Silverstein after NASA w

organized. Robert English focused the energies of his group on a design study for a nuclear spa

power system. With the imagined goal of sending eight people to Mars, they proposed a nucl

reactor with the potential to act as the power source for an electric rocket under consideration 

Moeckel's group.26 Robert Graham, head of the Rocket Fl id Dynamics Section, took charge 

planning the laboratory's first seminar on rocket propulsion to train additional staff in roc

technology. 27 

In March 1957 Silverstein's first act in shifting the laboratory's research priorities was 

establish a research planning council. He abolished the Compressor and Thrbine Division, lo

one of the premier divisions of the laboratory. Many of the aerodynamicists who had worked 

the axial compressor were assigned to a new Fluid Systems Division to study the mechanics 

flow within rocket systems. At the same time Silverstein created a Nuclear Reactor Division 

direct new research connected with the reactor then under construction at Plum Brook. 

A B-57 aircraft had one engine fueled with liquid hydrogen. 

156 
gpgp

pulsion systems, as well as more conventional subjects, such as turbojets and ramjets. Never 

to avoid considering unconventional technical concepts if there were a possibility they m

ultimately prove feasible, Silverstein agreed to give them one afternoon session. With the imag

tion of many staff now sparked, research groups worked up sessions on liquid hydrogen, nuc

rockets, and space power systems. As Moeckel recalled, "The studies for this conference for

the foundation for the rapid expansion of our research in the fields of electric propulsion, po

generation, and nuclear rockets." The paper submitted by Moeckel's group on "Satellite and S

Propulsion Systems" contained a distillation of the advanced thinking of the laboratory-fli

to the Moon and Mars, with the focus on electric propulsion systems.28 

As preparations for the propulsion conference moved into high gear in September 1

Silverstein called a meeting of the Research Planning Council, whose members included Eug

Manganiello, John Evvard, Bruce Lundin, Walter Olson, Irving Pinkel, and Newell Sanders. 

expressed the consensus of the group that ''existing problems on the air-breathing turbojet en

were not of sufficient laboratory interest for the continuation of a large-scale program."29 

proposal that rocket research be expanded, while proportionately reducing turbojet en

research, effectively marked Lewis Laboratory's transition to space research. However, as 

November conference approached, Silverstein became increasingly nervous about poss

criticism by Headquarters of the inclusion of a discussion on space propulsion. Would 

laboratory be perceived as an amateur group of space-cadets? Not willing to eliminate the ses

entirely, he cut the panels from a full afternoon to several hours. 

RESPONSE TO SPUTNIK 

The tension between the foot-dragging of headquarters and the gathering momentum of 

Cleveland laboratory toward space-related research mounted in September when representat

from headquarters visited the laboratory to evaluate its rehearsal for the finely orchestr

NACA Triennial Inspection. The theme of the inspection was to be a celebration of the t

anniversary of the X-1, the first aircraft to fly faster than the speed of sound.30 Unlike 

anticipated more specialized propulsion conference directed toward a technical audience, NA

inspections were intended to convey its work in layman's terms to a group made up largel

politicians and industry executives. At one of the "stops," the rocket group proudly showed J

Victory the new rocket laboratory from a small platform next to the huge new scrubber, pa

the silencing and exhaust gas disposal system. During the prepared talk, Victory bristled whe

heard references to space. Always on the lookout for anything that might offend potential C

gressional sponsors, he ordered all references to space deleted from the presentations. As 

member of the rocket group explained, "The climate in Washington in the fall of 1957 was 

negative towards space." It was acceptable to mention the "slow-paced" Vanguard sate

managed by the Navy under the aegis of the International Geophysical Year, but "anyt

beyond it was considered 'space cadet' enthusiasm." 31 Nevertheless, Addison Rothrock, who 

also in the headquarters contingent, was able to convince Victory to allow one of the first ele

propulsion experiments-a rail accelerator-to be included in the presentations. 

The intended celebration of ten years of supersonic flight caught the NACA loo

backwards. On October 4 the question of whether to discuss space-related work was m
like ancient history. Sputniks flight beyond the atmosphere marked the dawn of the space a

a new era of discovery. However, to Americans, Sputnik also seemed ominous. Politically, the n

satellite was a symbol of the rising technical competence of an enemy. In the context of the C

War, Sputnik represented the Russian triumph in the first round of what immediately began 

be perceived as a space race. Victory's earlier resistance to references to space put the cons

vative attitudes of headquarters in sharp relief. When the inspection began several days la

Lewis engineers proudly unveiled their work on chemical rockets and more visionary space p

pulsion systems. 

The presentations on high-energy rocket propellants were the highlight of the inspecti

Participants could admire a rocket engine capable of 20,000 pounds of thrust ready for exp

ments with liquid fuels when they visited the new rocket engine test facility. 32 Sputnik at l

riveted the attention of the laboratory on work of the small contingent of "Buck Rogers type

They could describe with impunity an idea for a winged satellite, similar to the shuttle, lof

beyond the atmosphere by a multi-stage rocket booster. It was a day that vindicated their lo

commitment to rocket engines and fuels. They found themselves besieged by their colleagues 

air-breathing propulsion for briefings on rocket fundamentals. 

The most detailed consideration of Lewis Laboratory's work in space propulsion was 

served for the classified NACA-Industry Conference, held the following month. Once again, 

rocket researchers held center stage. The presentation by John Sloop, A. S. Boksenbom, S. Gord

R. W. Graham, P. M. Ordin, and A. 0. Tischler discussed propulsion requirements for specific m

sions, including surface-to-surface missiles, Earth satellites, and Moon missions. They conside

both circumnavigation of the Moon and an ambitious Moon landing, using an orbiting Ea

satellite as a base, probably the first detailed discussion of a Moon landing in NACA literatu

Frank E. Rom, Eldon W. Sams, and Robert E. Hyland's paper, "Nuclear Rockets," and the pa

"Satellite and Space Propulsion Systems," by W. C. Moeckel, L. V. Baldwin, R. E. English, 

Lubarsky, and S. H. Maslen, were equally visionary.33 John Sloop and his colleagues had at 

found a receptive audience for their stubborn and lonely advocacy. 

THE SPACE DEBATE 

During the national soul searching that followed the Russian triumph in space, Lewis st

began to consider their role in the charged political and technical environment. Some engine

looked forward to abandoning air-breathing engines to tackle the problems of engines in z

gravity. For others, to exchange the familiar roar of the wind tunnel for the silence of the vacu

chamber seemed a travesty. Bruce Lundin recalled that half the laboratory was afraid of gett

"sucked" into space and the other half was afraid of being left out. "And there was some conc

among people, whose views I did not personally share at the time, that if we got into space w

be into an operating mission agency and the good things that they were doing in research wo

be lost." 34 

Discussion of the NACA's role in space dragged on through meetings of the Lewis Resea

Planning Council and in informal debates in the cafeteria. This prompted the scholarly Wa

Olson to draft a document in support of space flight research. He pointed out that space flight h

important scientific and military applications. Space missions would benefit meteorology a

astronomy by yielding new data on radiation, meteorites, gas composition, electromagne

158 
demonstrate the technical superiority of the United States-the importance of having 

"technological capability of massive retaliation'~but it would also keep "both friend and pote

foe convinced that such is the case."35 Olson listed 15 specific problem areas in which he thou

the NACA could make immediate contributions to a new space initiative. Most would be 

laborative efforts with other NACA centers or existing government agencies. They included sp

propulsion systems such as chemical rockets, nuclear rockets, and the study of ion, plasma, 

photon jets; auxiliary power systems; and materials for space vehicles and exploration equipm

He advocated a new NACA laboratory to launch and manage a manned, orbiting, space platfo

In his view this manned platform should be the main focus of NACA activities in space. 

This plan was not bold enough for Bruce Lundin, although many of Olson's ideas w

incorporated into Lundin's plan. Lundin thought that the NACA should aim at nothing less t

leadership of an entirely new national space agency. At home on a quiet Sunday afternoon in e

December, he produced a memo for Abe Silverstein that he called "Some Remarks on a Fu

Policy and Course of Action for the NACA." He argued against the collaborative approach, w

he thought "weak and ineffective." 36 He advocated a "bold, imaginative, aggressive, 

visionary" program. He warned that if the NACA focused on a specific project, like a man

space platform or placing a dye marker on the Moon, this might "dangerously limit our go

restrict the range of our thinking, and give us nothing to grow on.'' Aeronautical research, 

directly controlled by the military and directed to national goals, had been the traditional rol

the NACA. In tones resonating with Cold War rhetoric, Lundin declared that space research 

a matter of national survival: 

The Rocket Engine 'lest Laboratory completed in 1957. 
respect (or at least allegiance). and that will gradually assume world leadership. If 

Russia does this, eventually their way will be the way and we will have lost the struggle without knowing just when and how it occurred. The final victory in the struggle 

may well go to the country that offers mankind the greatest scientific 

achievements. 

37 

The memo suggested that the NACA coordinate all American space-related research, b

within the government and by industry. To have a successful space program, new knowledge h

to be generated. Lundin took a shot at the "skeptical Congressmen and budget keepers." Even 

however, was not bold enough to suggest a development or a mission role for the new agency

Silverstein shared Lundin's enthusiasm for a strong leadership role for the NACA in spa

research. He set up an informal committee to begin to formulate plans for an additional laborato

to be devoted to space flight research. 

On December 18, Dryden called a meeting of the directors and associate directors of 

laboratories to discuss the future role of the NACA. In preparation for this meeting, Silverst

honed Lundin's ideas into a memo called "Lewis Laboratory Opinion of a Future Policy a

Course of Action for the NACA." At Headquarters, when Dryden called on Henry Reid and Flo

Thompson of Langley, they showed little enthusiasm for the idea of taking on a large role i

national space effort. Smith DeFrance of Ames emphatically opposed a NACA space initiat

because he feared that the NACA would lose its identity.

39 Silverstein, last to speak, pulled 

"Lewis Laboratory Opinion" from his briefcase. Not only did he argue for a central coordinat

role for the NACA, but . also he strongly advised that a new NACA space flight laboratory 

authorized by Congress. Silverstein's strong advocacy swung the opinion of the meeting in fav

of a new space agency. The ideas expressed in the ''Lewis Laboratory Opinion'' became the ba

for NACA space policy, known as the "Dryden Plan." 40 

That evening, Dryden and James Doolittle, the Chairman of the NACA Main Committ

hosted the long-remembered "Young Thrks Dinner" in the California Room of the Statler Ho

in Washington, D.C. The hosts intended to give the middle management of the three laborator

a chance to express their views on whether and how to redirect the goals of their venera

research organization. Silverstein selected Walter Olson, Eugene Manganiello, and Demarq

Wyatt to represent Lewis Laboratory. The sober Dryden gracefully accepted the barbs flung 

him by some of his inebriated staff, who called him too cautious. He would encounter the sa

criticism after he testified in the House of Representatives that placing a man in a space caps

was like shooting a lady out of a cannon. John Stack of Langley Laboratory went so far as to c

Dryden an "old fogey." The Young Thrks of the three laboratories were enthusiastic about jump

into the space arena.

41 

Two days later the seven members of the Lewis Research Planning Council met to formal

the appointment of a special committee to plan the new space flight laboratory recommended 

the ''Lewis Opinion'' document. The members of the committee were Howard Childs, Chairm

Edgar M. Cortright, Robert E. English, Edmund R. Johash, Bernard Lubarsky, Phillip N. Mill

and Isidore Warshawsky. William Mickelson served as secretary. They were given two months 

produce the plan. On February 10, 1958, they submitted ·'A Program for Expansion of NA

Research in Space Flight Technology." Not surprisingly, given that it was conceived at Lew

Laboratory, the document defined the mission of the new laboratory in terms of laun

160 
year. Notably absent from this early planning document was a consideration of the mechani

how missions would actually be carried out, and there was almost no mention of manned s

flight. The document recommended that the NACA staff be increased from 8000 to 17,000 

a three-year period. It called for a budget increase from $80 million to $180 million.42 

By NACA standards, this was a bold and visionary plan, but in hindsight it reveals 

tenacious grip of the NAC.Ns past practice. The new space laboratory would generate 

knowledge, the technical know-how, necessary to make space flight missions possible. 

development of the actual hardware to be sent into space and the operation of those miss

would be left as it had in the past, to industry and to the military, respectively. There may 

however, have been a clear laboratory consensus on this last issue. Bruce Lundin later rec

that he ''definitely thought that we should be responsible for the building and operation of lau

vehicles and spacecraft just as we had always built and operated test models in our wind tunn

In Lundin's view, the members of Silverstein's special committee represented the ideas of 

group "that was afraid of getting 'sucked up' into space and who preferred the comfortable h

of their research beds." 43 

The significance of the February 10 document in the evolving plans for the new s

agency is not entirely clear. In 1965, when he was interviewed by Mercury historians Lloyd S

son, James Grimwood, and Charles Alexander, Dryden recalled what is unmistakably 

February 10 document as "Lewis Labs' bid for a lot of propulsion-nuclear propulsion-all 

of things and a launch site." Dryden criticized Lewis planners for neglecting manned space fl

He recalled his own past opposition, as well as the opposition of the von Braun group at Hu

ville, Ala., to NACA participation in the "big rocket business." 

Now their principle problem was that Huntsville would have nothing to do with them, 

and they did get into the rocket business on a small scale, but I always resisted their 

building up big facilities for Thors, and that sort of thing. So this [the plans expressed 

in the February 10 document] represented a sort of culmination of many efforts of the 

propulsion laboratory to get into rocket propulsion on a big scale, just as they were 

in engine-jet engine-propulsion.

44 

Dryden claimed that the Lewis document had no status and never went further than 

desk drawer. This is doubtful, since the document was later cited in the significant mem

March 5 from President Eisenhower as evidence of the NAC.Ns competence to direct the 

space agency. 

45 

Initially it was not at all clear that the NACA would become the government agency aro

which the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration would be built. The exte

perceptions of the NACA after Sputnik, expressed both by the nation's scientific community 

members of Congress, was that the NACA was too conservative to lead the exploration of sp

Presumably, what made the NACA conservative in the eyes of the scientists was that it did app

research, an activity with a lower status than the work of the Navy's Vanguard grou

university-based space science studies. To lawmakers, the NACA was a small agency wit

experience in the management of the huge budgets typical of defense contracts. The Cold War 

accustomed Washington to think in terms of large-scale technology development. Firm centra

control of all three elements of the proposed space program-research, development, 
research organization, but to avoid having the new agency become an instrument for 

militarization of space and greater Cold War competition. Eisenhower favored building NA

around the NACA because he wanted a civilian agency to direct the conquest of space. "Su

reasoning," according to historian Walter McDougall, "made elevation of the innocuous NACA 

attractive answer to the question of what to do about outer space.''46 

There is no doubt that, as a small federal agency in the national security state of the 195

the NACA had taken a conservative approach to funding. 1echnically, however, the NACA co

be quite daring. Dryden had encouraged the staff at all three laboratories to explore advanc

technical concepts. National aeronautical policy had stipulaled that fundamental research was 

province of the NACA. Development was industry's prerogative. Operations belonged to 

military.47 During the so-called "lean years" between 1952 and 1957, the organizational struct

of the NACA allowed its three laboratories-Langley, Ames, and Lewis-considerable autonom

Many of the technical and scientific problems the laboratories tackled during these years belie 

label of conservative. Obviously, each laboratory had to respond to the needs of the military a

industry, but the NACA also prided itself on anticipating the technical needs of the nation 

laying a base of knowledge on which to build future development. 

Although it was understood that all NACA research would ultimately be applied to advan

aircraft technology, projects whose immediate commercial applications were not clear alw

attracted considerable interest at the three NACA laboratories. Ames Laboratory's long and s

tained interest in the problem of aerodynamic heating culminated in Harvey Allen's blunt bo

theory, later applied to the shape of the Mercury reentry capsule. In Engineer in Charge Jam

Hansen describes the audacious reach of Langley's X-15 program to the edge of space.48 T

X-series of research aircraft, a joint program with the Air Force and the Navy, involved build

aircraft prototypes. As applied research, the program came close to the line separating resea

from development, but it yielded valuable technical and scientific data. 

Three examples of NACA research at Lewis Laboratory belie the label of conservative: hi

energy rocket fuels, nuclear rocket propulsion, and electric .rocket propulsion. Technically, two 

the three areas of research-nuclear rocket propulsion and electric propulsion-have yet to f

applications. They were too visionary rather than too conservative. The third, liquid hydrog

contributed substantially to the ability of the United States to land human beings on the Mo

Because of the momentum that these space-related projects had developed prior to the launch

of Sputnik in October 1957, the transition to space was not as dramatic as the transition from 

piston engine to jet propulsion. Lewis was already primed for space. Sputnik took the lid off 

pent-up desire for more funding and recognition for areas that were already receiving consid

able emphasis. As Business Week reported, Lewis Laboratory "leaped over to space" because 

had begun its jump well before Sputnik.

49 Nevertheless, in the context of the total resea

program, these efforts prior to Sputnik were small. Like the transition from the piston engine 

jet propulsion, it was late. The NACA stayed too long in air-breathing engine technology. Silv

stein missed the early opportunity to throw his full weight behind the efforts of the rocket gro

to develop high-energy rocket propellants. 

162 
agency around the NACA. In his memo justifying the decision in favor of a civilian agency

cited three documents to underscore the interest and competence of the NACA for leadersh

the space program: the so-called "Dryden Plan," based on the ideas found in Silverstein's "L

Opinion," the February 10 plan for the new Space Flight Laboratory generated at Lewis, and 

January 16 resolution of the Main Committee (drafted by the NACA's Special Committee on S

Technology, chaired by H. Guyford Stever). This resolution endorsed the role of the NACA a

national coordinator of space research. 50 

Between March and July, when the Space Act that authorized the National Aeronautics 

Space Administration became law, a very different organization than the one envisioned by L

planners took shape. Although they had proposed a role for the NACA that they consid

radical, because of the public furor raised in the wake of Sputnik, the new space agency c

not be organized according to the old NACA model. Mter considerable debate within 

Congress, the new agency was given extensive responsibility for development and operation

missions), in addition to research.51 Moreover, the NACA had to give up its flexible comm

structure and the autonomy of its laboratories in favor of a more centralized managem

Although it is often stated that the NACA became the nucleus for NASA, this is not entirely 

rect, because the NACA purpose and way of doing business was entirely transformed. 

Once the NACA's mandate was clear, Dryden asked Silverstein to assist him in the crea

of the new space agency. Silverstein turned down Dryden's first invitation to relocat

Washington, D.C., but when asked a second time in spring 1958, he complied. Among the lea

of the NACA, Silverstein was the best suited to take on the job of pulling together the div

elements of the new space flight development programs. He had drive and organizational ab

For the first three years of the agency, Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Programs had 

responsibility for the Mercury Program and NASA's unmanned satellite programs. Silver

named the Apollo program, and his office also laid the early groundwork for the manned l

landing. Because of Silverstein's technical competence, the force of his personality, and the qu

of the staff he selected to serve under him, power at Headquarters was concentrated in his h

until Headquarters reorganized in mid-1961.52 

When Dryden was passed over in favor ofT. Keith Glennan as NASA's first administr

Glennan took a leave of absence from the Presidency of Case Institute of Technology. Ha

served as a Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1950 to 1952 and on the B

of the National Science Foundation, he had good Washington connections. Glennan wisely ins

that Dryden remain as NASA's Deputy Administrator. Both he and Dryden were sworn i

President Eisenhower on August 19, 1958. He was catapulted from a job managing an opera

budget at Case of $6 to 7 million, to one of $615 million. Glennan approved the NACA plan

the Mercury Program with an enthusiastic "Let's get going and don't spare the horses! " 53 

Silverstein had assembled an impressive group of former Lewis staff in his Office of S

Flight Programs. He was used to fostering innovation in engines at Lewis Laboratory. At H

quarters, his innovations would be administrative. Nevertheless, Silverstein's people had a fee

the technology they supervised. Demarquis Wyatt, a former Assistant Chief in charge of Le

supersonic wind tunnels, knew how to keep day-to-day operations running smoothly. Mter a 

weeks in Washington, Silverstein asked Wyatt to become his Technical Assistant in charg

budgets, personnel, and trouble shooting. Wyatt faced a significant problem in figuring out 
Wyatt devised a financial control system for project management to streamline the unwiel

accounting system inherited from the NACA. 

Silverstein selected Harold Finger, who had taken part in Lewis's "nuclear school," 

become chief of NASA's nuclear programs. Francis C. Schwenk, also from Lewis, set to wo

under Finger to develop nuclear rocket concepts. Newell D. Sanders, who had first served und

Silverstein in the Wind 'funnels and Flight Research Division, became Assistant Director 

Advanced Technology. Edgar M. Cortright, Jr. , and George Low, fraternity brothers at Renssel

Polytechnic Institute, also took important positions in the fledgling agency. Both had come 

Lewis Laboratory in 1949 with masters degrees in aeronautical engineering. Cortright, on

Branch Chief for the 8-foot x 6-foot supersonic tunnel, had also taken part in the nuclear scho

He had supervised some of the early planning to develop electric propulsion concepts. At He

quarters, Silverstein put Cortright in charge of Advanced Technology Programs in the Office 

Space Flight. He headed NASA's meteorological satellite program, which included TIROS a

Nimbus. Later he became Assistant Director for the Unmanned Lunar and Planetary Progra

George Low became Silverstein's deputy in charge of Manned Space Flight Programs. 

shuttled tirelessly between Robert Gilruth at Langley and Silverstein to keep communicatio

open and Mercury operations running smoothly. John Disher and Warren North, also spiri

away from Lewis Laboratory, took key posts in Low's operation. They became early advocates 

a lunar landing. In 1959, when Low served on NASA's Research Steering Committee on Mann

Space Flight, chaired by Harry Goett, he pressed the committee to consider the Moon as a g

to follow after the Mercury program. By October 1960, Low had the green light from Silverst

to set in motion the first formal planning for a manned luna program. Low's memo to Silverst

tersely stated, ' 'It has become increasingly apparent that a preliminary program for manned lun

landings should be formulated. This is necessary in order to provide a proper justification 

Apollo, and to place Apollo schedules and technical plans n a firmer foundation." Low advis

the formation of a working group consisting of Oran Nicks, Eldon Hall, and John Disher. Silv

stein's curt response, "O.K., Abe," hurriedly scrawled at the bottom of the memo, set in moti

the careful technical planning that culminated nine years later in the "giant leap for mankind

the historic lunar landing. 54 

Silverstein also took charge of the initial planning of Goddard Space Flight Center. Work

with speed and informality, Silverstein chose the site for Goddard and suggested its name. 

played a major role in negotiations with the Navy to bring the Vanguard team to Goddard. Silv

stein stepped in to serve as acting director of the Space Flight Center until its mission with

NASA was sorted out and he was able to prevail upon Harry Goett from Ames to become its n

director. 

Like the generation from Langley in the early 1940s who shaped the Cleveland laborato

the team from Lewis imprinted the new NASA organization with NACA traditions as th

attempted to modify old ways in response to the new goals of NASA. The pervasive NA

influence was not always appreciated by new NASA employees recruited from outside the NAC

At Goddard, where the core staff came from the Naval Research Laboratory, a disgruntl

employee circulated cards embossed with the message "Help Stamp Out NACA 'JYpes." Althou

NACA influence at Headquarters gradually diminished, during the first four years of the fledgli

agency, Silverstein was the "lynchpin in the whole effort." 1

;

5 

164 
NACA's Special Committee on Space Technology, called the Stever Committee after its chairman, Gu

Stever, meets at Lewis, May 26, 1958. Left to right: Edward R. Sharp, Director of Lewis Laboratory; Co

Norman C. Appold, U.S. Air Force, Assistant to the Deputy Commander for Weapons Systems, Air Rese

and Development Command; Abraham Hyatt, Research and Analysis Officer, Bureau of Aeronautics, De

ment of the Navy; Hendrik W. Bode, Director of Research-Physical Sciences, Bell Telephone Laboratorie

Randolph Lovelace II, Lovelace Foundation for Medication Education and Research; S. K. Hoffman, Ge

Manager, Rocketdyne Division, North American Aviation; Milton U. Clauser, Director, Aeronautical Rese

Laboratory, The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation; H. Julian Allen, Chief, High-Speed Flight Research, N

Ames; Robert R. Gilruth, Assistant Director, NACA Langley; ]. R. Dempsey, Manager, Convair-Astrona

Carl B. Palmer, Secretary to Committee, NACA Headquarters; H. Guyford Stever, Chairman, Associate D

of Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Hugh L. Dryden (ex officio), Director, NACA; Da

Corson, Department of Physics, Cornell University; Abe Silverstein, Associate Director, NACA Lewis; We

von Braun, Director, Development Operations Division, Army Ballistic Missile Agency. 

One of Glennan's chief objectives was to supplement the core NACA personnel and faci

by acquiring the cream of the nation's science and engineering talent in satellite and ro

development. In his view, although the NACA staff was "composed of reasonably able peo

they lacked "experience in the management of large affairs." 56 He met his first objectiv

December 1958, when the Army transferred to NASA its contract for the management of th

Propulsion Laboratory UPL). Mter a faltering start, the JPL staff became NASA's exper

planetary and lunar probes. 57 

In Glennan's view, launch vehicles were the "limiting factor in the development of 

nation's space program.'' 58 The Mercury astronauts were lofted into space by rockets 

payload capacities well below those of Russian rockets. Glennan knew that the only way to tr

the Russians in the space race was to acquire the large rocket expertise of the von Braun t

at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Ala. The Army, however, resisted giving u
ENGINEERING, PLUMBING, AND PLAIN HOPE: 

SATURN V AND CENTAUR 

The development of the Saturn rocket was a technical gamble because it went well beyo

the existing rocket technology of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Glennan called 

''one of the most amazing combinations of engineering, plumbing and plain hope that anyo

could imagine." 60 NASA policy makers thought that it was the key to leap-frogging the Russia

early successes in space.

61 They were counting on a continuation of the strong ties with t

American aerospace industry established by the missile program. 

In December 1959 Silverstein assembled a committee to evaluate the proposed Satu

vehicle. The committee's specific charge was to decide on the configuration of the upper stag

for Saturn, the vehicle that would power the astronauts to the Moon. Saturn had the potential 

loft a heavy payload into space, but the configuration of its upper stages was a question w

important implications. An upper stage fueled by liquid hydrogen could produce approximate

40 percent more payload per pound of lift-off weight than conventional propellants. 

Silverstein's commitment to liquid hydrogen was a product of his experience with resear

on unconventional fuels at Lewis Laboratory. Project Bee had convinced Silverstein that hydrog

could be used safely. von Braun, however, did not share Silverstein's sanguine view of liqu

T. Keith Glennan, the new NASA Administrator; and Hugh L. Dryden (left}, Deputy Administrator; are 

sworn in August 19, 1958, as President Eisenhower looks on. 

166 
Senior staff and secretaries ring down the curtain on the NACA, September 30, 1958, in Director 

Sharp's office. 

hydrogen. Fearing risks involved in the storage and handling of liquid hydrogen, von Braun ur

the use of conventional kerosene-based fuels for the first two stages, with liquid hydrogen 

served only for the third stage. Actually, it is doubtful that von Braun thought that liquid hydro

would ever prove itself. In Silverstein's view, 

The von Braun team was apparently willing to take on the difficulties of the 15 

million-pound thrust-booster stage rather than the hazards which they contemplated 

in the use of hydrogen as a fuel. The Lewis team of NASA had pioneered in the use 

of hydrogen oxygen and had operated small rocket engines with hydrogen as a fuel for 

ten years prior to the time of the decision on Saturn. We had become very accustomed 

to its use and its safety. 62 

Silverstein came to the meeting of the Saturn Evaluation Committee armed with data f

a NASA study on the feasibility of liquid hydrogen by Eldon Hall, Adelbert 0 . Tischler, and 

Hyatt. He argued that conventional upper stages were too heavy for the required payload. F

week the NACA team and the von Braun group debated, until von Braun at last capitulated. 

two upper stages of Saturn would use liquid hydrogen. "What led him to this final decision

never know," Silverstein recalled, "but it was certainly the correct one ... I believe that the d

sion to go with hydrogen-oxgyen in the upper stages of the Saturn V was the significant techn

decision that enabled the United States to achieve the first manned lunar landing. The Rus

effort to accomplish this mission without high-energy upper stages was doomed to failure." 
and Robert Goddard also discussed its potential. A group at Ohio State University tested a roc

using liquid hydrogen in 1945. By 1954, the rocket section at Lewis Laboratory had developed 

nation's first regeneratively cooled liquid hydrogen-liquid fluorine rocket with 5000 pounds 

thrust. 64 

Centaur originated in a proposal of Krafft Ehricke for using a liquid hydrogen upper sta

for the Atlas missile developed by General Dynamics/Astronautics for the Air Force. Ehricke, on

part of the Peenemiinde group, had locked horns with von Braun over the practicality of liqu

hydrogen in the face of the mind-boggling technical problems associated with using t

unconventional fuel. The tragic explosion in the 1930s of the Hindenberg dirigible, lifted 

gaseous hydrogen, had created an understandable prejudice against hydrogen in general. Roc

pioneers like von Braun had concrete reasons for doubting the feasibility of using liquid hydrog

as a fuel. Because hydrogen in its liquid state is cryogenic, it must be stored at very l

temperatures. The temperature of liquid hydrogen at 1 atmosphere is -420° F. When it abso

heat, it boils and expands rapidly. Thnks must be protected from all sources of heat, such as roc

engine exhaust, air friction during flight, and even radiant heat from the Sun. Because of liqu

hydrogen's extreme cold and chemical reactivity with many metals, metal containers for hydrog

tend to become brittle and lose strength after exposure to hydrogen. Another serious drawba

is that liquid hydrogen's low density requires light, but bulky, structures to contain the rocke

propellant. The von Braun group preferred heavy, solid structures-an approach Ehricke derisi

ly compared to the conservative engineering of the Brooklyn Bridge. As John Sloop pointed o

in Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, ''This conservative design philosophy mitigated against 

use of liquid hydrogen which, more than conventional fuels, depended upon very light structu

to help offset the handicap of low density." 65 

Ehricke, who had moved from Huntsville, Ala., to General Dynamics in San Diego, Cal

had tried to convince the Air Force to back his proposal for a liquid hydrogen upper stage on 

Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile. The Air Force was not interested. In the post-Sput

panic, Ehricke had more luck. He called on Silverstein in Washington in June 1958, during 

transition from NACA to NASA. He wanted $15 million to initiate work at General Dynamics 

a liquid hydrogen rocket. Silverstein shared Ehricke's enthusiasm for liquid hydrogen, but NA

had not yet received funding. He suggested that Ehricke present his proposal to the Advanc

Research Projects Agency (ARPA). 66 

Shortly after NASA's formal creation in July 1958, Silverstein had set up a committee 

define NASA's propulsion needs. By August this committee had concluded that, for laun

vehicles requiring high-performance upper stages, the liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen combinati

appeared to show the greatest promise. The consensus reached in this NASA committee coincid

with ARPA' s acceptance of Ehricke' s proposal. Pratt & Whitney, already versed in liquid hydrog

as a fuel for a gas turbine engine through its work on the Suntan project for the Air Force, agre

to undertake the development of the Centaur engine. Pratt & Whitney personnel had develop

a good working relationship with Lewis engineers on this project when they visited Lewis seve

times to study injector designs for the RL-10 engine. One of the important steps in the develo

ment of this hydrogen engine was the use of regenerative cooling, ltmg an interest of Lewis rock

researchers. Experimental heat transfer studies, carried out by a group working under Rob

Graham in the Cryogenic Heat Transfer Section, proved the feasibility of hydrogen as a coolant

168 
g 

upper stages of the Saturn rocket ought to be fueled with liquid hydrogen, the developme

Centaur and Saturn V became inextricably intertwined. As an intermediate step NASA inten

to use Centaur as the upper stage for an Atlas rocket to launch a probe to soft land on the M

No one was sure of the composition of the Moon's surface. Before astronauts could set foot th

NASA had to program this probe, named Surveyor, to land and photograph the Moon's sur

More important, the success of Centaur to launch Surveyor would prove the feasibility of u

liquid hydrogen in Saturn's upper stages to power the astronauts to the Moon. 

THE LUNAR DECISION AND NASA'S RESTRUCTURING 

In May 1961 President John Kennedy announced the national goal of landing American

the Moon within a decade. Kennedy's commitment to a race with the Soviet Union transfor

NASA. Its budget suddenly expanded from $1 billion in 1961 to a peak of $5.1 billion in 1964. 

staff increased by a factor of ten, and Congress funded a new Manned Spaceflight Cente

Houston, Tex. It was a bonanza for aerospace contractors and selected American universities, 

able to develop new programs as a result of NASA's generous funding. 

At Headquarters Silverstein had acted with the zest and informality necessary to get N

off the ground. He had transformed an extremely capable and loyal team of engineers into e

tive NASA administrators. By 1961, Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Programs had become 

operational hub of NASA. However, when James E. Webb became NASA Administrator in Jan

1961, he took steps to impose a more rational, hierarchical structure on Silverstein's seat-of

pants operation. 

In June 1961 Webb set up a new Office of Programs under Demarquis Wyatt to re

directly to Associate Administrator Robert Seamans. The creation of this office was designe

reduce the disproportionate concentration of power in Silverstein's Office of Space Flight 

grams.68 All the NASA centers would report directly to Seamans, a "frank recognition tha

lunar landing decision had made manned spaceflight the dominant activity within the agenc

Webb invited Silverstein to head the Apollo Program under the new centralized regime, 

Silverstein resisted the organizational changes, arguing for a semi-autonomous status of the Ap

Program. He would agree to head the Apollo Program only if the centers directly responsibl

the success of the program-Goddard, Marshall, the new Manned Space Flight Center in Hou

and Cape Canaveral-were placed directly under his supervision. In Silverstein's view, having 

directors of these centers report to both the Apollo Program Director and to Associate 

ministrator Seamans would divide authority and generate misunderstandings 

disagreement. 70 

One of the reasons Webb decided on this new management structure could have been 

well-known friction between Silverstein and von Braun. With strong technical backgrounds 

equally strong opinions, each had operated within separate spheres of NASA. Initially, when 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency became Marshall Space Flight Center in March 1960, it was pl

under the newly created Launch Vehicles Programs. However, if Silverstein were to direct 

Apollo Program under the decentralized, semi-autonomous structure he favored, von B

would become his subordinate. With von Braun and Silverstein "at loggerheads," the situa

would have been intolerable. 71 von Braun protested that he would not have his center run 
On a more fundamental level, the September 1961 reorganization of Headquarters was 

effort to cut NASA loose from the old NACA practice of decentralized administration. During 

years as Director of the NACA, Dryden had served merely to coordinate the activity of the NA

laboratories. The locus of power, the real decision making, took place in the three laboratori

which received suggestions, not orders. The laboratories told Headquarters what "made sense 

didn't make sense.' 173 Under the new regime, both technical and administrative decisions wo

originate from the top, in Washington. 

Dryden urged Silverstein to take over the Apollo Program despite his misgivings. He r

soned that, once the management structure proved unworkable, it would be changed to the o

Silverstein favored. To Silverstein this was a waste of time and money. Since he could not ag

with the new policy, he felt he had no choice but to resign. With the helm of Lewis Laborat

unoccupied after the retirement of Ray Sharp the previous winter, Silverstein accepted 

appointment. It was both an opportunity to return to research and a solution to his increasin

untenable position at Headquarters. Webb persuaded D. Brainerd Holmes from RCA, form

manager of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, to head the Apollo Program.74 

Abe Silverstein returned to Cleveland in November with the Mercury Program on the br

of success. Alan Shepherd's short flight beyond Earth's atmosphere had restored confidence 

American technology. Now with a fellow Ohioan, John Glenn, scheduled to orbit Earth, Silv

stein stepped out of the maelstrom of decision making at Headquarters to return to managem

and technical problems at the laboratory level. 

170 
See Arthur L. Levine, United States Aeronautical Research Policy, 19151958: A Study of the Major P

Decisions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia Un

sity, New York, N.Y., 1963. 

2 Ira H. Abbott, "A Review and Commentary of a Thesis by Arthur L. Levine Entitled, U.S. Aeronau

Research Policy 1915-1958: A Study of the Major Policy Decisions of the National Advisory Comm

for Aeronautics' Dated 1963," HHN-35, 1964, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C., p. 197. 

Roland has explored the conservatism of NACA Headquarters in Model Research, NASA SP-

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19851. 

3 R. 0 . Miller and P. M. Ordin, "Theoretical Performance of Rocket Propellants Containing Hydro

Nitrogen, and Oxygen," NACA RM E8A30, 1948, cited by John Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propu

Fuel, 1949-1959, NASA SP-4404 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19781, p. 80

4 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 75. 

5 Ibid. 

6 R. W. Bussard and R. D. DeLauer, Fundamentals of Nuclear Flight (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1

p. 2. 

7 John Sloop, Lectures 8 and 9 for ME 221, "Aircraft Propulsion Principles." Case Institute of Techno

fall, 1949. In Lecture 9, "Solid Propellant Rockets," Sloop discussed the range and orbital and es

velocities for satellites, p. 12-16. Private papers courtesy of John Sloop. 

8 John Sloop, "Rocket Engines," American Legion Public Square Post, 12 June 1952, p. 6. Between 1948 

1957 Sloop presented at least 15 papers at both professional and public meetings to urge ro

development for both missile and space applications. These papers, both published and unpublis

are available through Mr. Sloop, 8311 Melody Court, Bethesda, Md. 20034. 

9 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 78. 

10 John Sloop, Comments on Manuscript History of the Lewis Research Center by Virginia Dawso

September 1989. 

11 On William Perl, see Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth (New Y

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19831, p. 123-129, 202-207, and passim. I also consulted the Perl 

(65-593121 at the FBI Headquarters, J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, D.C. Although the 

revealed nothing beyond the inconclusive evidence of Perl's guilt reported in Radosh and Milton

interviews are interesting for their descriptions of the laboratory's work during that period. Muc

the text of the files is still heavily censored. 

12 Memorandum for Director, NACA, from E. R. Sharp, "Visit of Congressman Albert Thomas and Mr. A

Skarin, Friday, Oct 3, 1952." NASA Lewis Records, 279/116.1-63. 

13 Interview with John Evvard, 14 June 1987. 

14 Notes from the Noncredit Graduate Study Course (19571, "Concepts of Hypersonic Flight," were obta

courtesy of George M. Prok, NASA Lewis Research Center. 

15 Moeckel to Stuhlinger, 2 June 1964, personal papers of Moeckel. 

16 Ernst Stuhlinger, Ion Propulsion for Space Flight (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 19641, p. 6. 

17 Moeckel to Stuhlinger, ibid. 

18 K. A. Ehricke, "The Solar Powered Space Ship," ARS Paper No. 310-356. 

19 Stuhlinger, Ion Propulsion for Space Flight, p. 6. 

20 Moeckel to Stuhlinger, 2 June 1964, personal papers of Moeckel. 

21 Walter Olson, "A Suggested Policy and Course of Action for NACA with Regard to Rocket En

Propulsion," 6 May 1955, p. 21-22 of "A Suggested Policy and Course of Action for NACA on S

Flight," 2 December 1957, part of communication to Eugene Emme from Walter Olson, 31 Jan

1972, Propulsion file, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 
23 Interview with Robert English by V. Dawson, 11 July 1986. William Ritter's group (including Merl

Moseson, Robert Ziemer, and Wilfred Sculll transferred to Goddard Space Flight Center. 

24 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 84. 

25 Quoted by Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 85. 

26 Interview with Robert English, 11 July 1986. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the curriculum of 

nuclear school among what has survived of Lewis administrative records. Members of the Nuc

School were (list courtesy of Robert English!: 

From the Compressor and Thrbine Division 

Thrbines: Hubert Allen, Art Hansen, Howard Herzig 

Fundamental Thrbines: R. Cavicchi, E. Davison, Robert English 

Compressors: Dan Bernatowicz, Ted Fessler, Harry Finger, Sy Lieblein, Carl Schwenk 

Thrbine Cooling: Tony Diaguila, Pat Donoughe, Herman Ellerbrock, John Livingood, 

Henry Slone 

From other divisions: Edgar Cortright, Tom Dallas, Irving Goodman, Eldon Hall, Jim Kramer, 

Herb Heppler, Bill Phillips, Lou Rosenblum 

27 Syllabus of Seminar on Rocket Propulsion, 28 February 1957; Memorandum for Personnel Thking Ro

Seminar and for Instructional Staff, 4 March 1957. Papers of John Sloop. 

28 Moeckel to Stuhlinger, 2 June 1964, personal papers of Moeckel. See Wolfgang Moeckel, L. V. Baldw

Robert English, Bernard Lubarsky, and Steve Maslen, "Satellite and Space Propulsion Systems," NA

TN D-285, June 1960. Declassified paper presented at NACA Flight Propulsion Conference, 

November 1957, previously published as NASA TMX 61622. Some of the Lewis work in the early 19

is summarized in Electric Propulsion for Spacecraft, NASA SP-22, 1963. 

29 Research Planning Council (established 8 March 19571, 6 September 1957, NASA Lewis Records 298/

30 "10 Years After X-1: Supersonic Anniversary Puts Flight Laboratory Here in Spotlight," Cleveland P

Dealer Magazine, 6 October 1957. 

31 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 90-91. 

32 Triennial Inspection, Lewis Laboratory, 7-9 October 1957. "High-Energy Rocket Propellants," perso

papers courtesy of John Sloop. 

33 Papers of the NACA 1957 Flight Propulsion Conference were published in two parts. NASA TM-X-67

(19711 contains six papers on air-breathing propulsion systems, three on rocket systems, includ

"Propellants," by E. A. Fletcher, H. W. Douglass, R. J. Priem, and G. Vasu; "Thrbopumps for H

Energy Propellants," by Ambrose Ginsburg, Ward W. Wilcm:, and David G. Evans; and "Performa

and Missions," by J. L. Sloop, A. S. Boksenvom, S. Gordon, R. W. Graham, P. M. Ordin, and A

Tischler. The papers published as TM-X-61622 (19721 include the paper cited in note 28; Paul 

Johnson, James W. Miser, and Roger L. Smith, "Nuclear Logistic Carrier," and Frank E. Rom, Eldon 

Sams, and Robert E. Hyland, "Nuclear Rockets." 

34 Interview with Bruce Lundin by Eugene Emme, 5 June 1974. See discussion in Sloop, Liquid Hydrog

p. 180. 

35 Walter Olson, "Suggested Policy and Course of Action for NACA on Space Flight," 2 December 1957, p

of a communication to Eugene Emme from Walter Olson, 31 January 1972. Propulsion file, NA

History Office, Washington, D.C. 

36 A copy of the original memo, dated 9 December 1957, was obtained from Lundin, with Silverstein's ha

written comments. The typed Silverstein version called, "Lewis Laboratory Opinion of a Future Po

and Course of Action for the NACA," was found in NASA Lewis Records, 2211115.1-71, 

37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 180. 

172 
original document that, with modifications and input from the other two laboratories, became 

A 

Study of the NACA," dated 14 January 1958. This was further refined into a four-page document c

"A National Research Program for Space Technology," referred to by later commentators as 

"Dryden Plan." 

41 See Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 181; Hugh L. Dryden to Eugene Emme, "The NACA-NASA 'Iransition

September 1965, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 

42 Silverstein attended meetings on January 6 and 27 of the Lewis Special Committee on Space F

Laboratory. From the personal papers of I. Warshawsky, I obtained the complete minutes of 

meetings. The 10 February document is reproduced in toto by Alex Roland in Model Research, vo

document 46, p. 732 ff. The final version, somewhat condensed and called "Summary of a Program 

Expansion of NACA Research in Space Flight Technology," was found in NASA Lewis Rec

295/117.71. From the 27 January 1958 minutes, it is clear that Langley and Ames offered sim

proposals, but Headquarters decided to use the Lewis proposal for a brochure to be presented to 

NACA Special Committee on Space Technology (Stever Committee). The final version is also attrib

to Lewis senior staff by L. Swenson, Jr., et a!., This New Ocean, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 76 and 533, note 7. This is presumably the earliest plan for G

dard, a laboratory completely different from the original Lewis conception. 

43 Letter from Bruce Lundin to V. Dawson, 27 May 1987. 

44 "Dryden Interview by Mercury Historians," 1 October 1965, Dryden file, Johnson Space Center Arch

Houston, Tex. 

45 Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958#1963, NASA SP-4101, (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1966). 

46 Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: B

Books, 1985), p. 166. See also Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, NASA SP-4211 (Washing

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p. 90-91. 

47 For the postwar statement of "National Aeronautical Research Policy," approved 21 March 1946, see 

Roland, Model Research, vol. 2, document 36, p. 693-695. For distinctions between fundamenta

basic), applied, and specific developmental research, see Ira Abbott, p. 5-6 and 186 (cited in not

Arthur L. Levine (cited in note 1) placed the so-called "fundamental or basic research" at abou

percent of total NACA research. 

48 See James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge, NASA SP-4305 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Prin

Office, 1987), p. 353-367. 

49 "How an Aircraft Lab Leaped Over to Space," Business Week, 4 June 1960, p. 98-102. 

50 Robert Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, p. 35. Although set up in November 1957, the S

Committee did not actually meet until January 1958. It seems that by this time most of the NACA p

had been formulated, and the committee merely ratified already formulated NACA plans at that t

51 For the metamorphosis of the NACA into NASA, see especially Rosholt, An Administrative History of NA

p. 37-70; Swenson, This New Ocean, p. 75-106. 

52 Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, p. 206-207. See also transcript of D. D. Wyatt interview 

Eugene Emme, 21 June 1973, NASA History Office. 

From Lewis Laboratory Silverstein selected Demarquis D. Wyatt, Assistant to the Director of 

Space Flight Development; Edgar M. Cortright, Chief, Advanced Technology Program; Harold B. 

Finger, Chief, Nuclear Engines Program; Eldon W. Hall, Chief, Analysis and Requirements Program; N. Philip Miller, Chief, Plant and Facilities Construction Program, Space Flight Program. 

Also George M. Low, Chief, Manned Space Flight Program; Warren J. North, Chief, Manned 

Satellite Program; Adelbert 0. Tischler, Chief, Liquid Fuel Rocket Engines Program; Francis C. 

Schwenk, Nuclear Program (title unknown); Newell Sanders, Assistant Director, Advanced 

Technology Program; William Fleming, Chief, Project Review Division (chaired task group to 

prepare the "Fleming Report," the first study of the feasibility of manned flight to the Moon). 
, y

y, y, y, , , 

Leonard Robb. Commuters to Langley from Lewis were John Disher and Kenneth Weston. 

53 Transcript of speech by Abe Silverstein, Kennedy Space Center Writers Conference, Cocoa Beach, Fla., 

September 1977. NASA History Office. 

54 Memo from George Low to Abe Silverstein, 17 October 1960, Personal files of Abe Silverstein, 

reproduced in Charles Murray and Catherine Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New York: Simon 

Schuster, 1989). p. 57-58. Their discussion confirms John Logsdon's view that, by 1959, at least 

years prior to Kennedy's dramatic announcement of the Apollo Program, policy committees wit

NASA had set a manned lunar landing as NAS~s long-range goal. See John M. Logsdon, The Decis

to Go to the Moon:, Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19

p. 56-57; see also discussion in Roger Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of 

Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Off

1980), p. 48-50. See also Richard J. Weber to Chief, Propulsion Systems Analysis Branch, "Visit o

J. Weber to Headquarters on Feb. 17, 1960 for ABMA briefing on lunar projects," files of R. J. We

NASA Lewis Research Center. 

55 Wyatt interview with Emme, p. 99. 

56 T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration," 19

unpublished diary, vol. 1, p. 6-7. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kan. 

57 See Clayton R. Koppes, The ]PL and the American Space Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19

See also remarks of T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years," p. 17. 

58 T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years," vol. 1, p. 18. For a history of Project Mercury, see Swenson, This N

Ocean. 

59 Herbert York, Making Weapons, 1b.lking Peace (New York: Basic Books, 1987). p. 174-175. 

60 T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years," vol. 2, p. 15. 

61 Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 117. 

62 Abe Silverstein, "How It All Began," Speech at Kennedy Space Center Writers Conference, Cocoa Bea

Fla., 1-3 September 1977, NASA History Office Archives, file marked Lewis Research Center. 

63 Abe Silverstein, "How It All Began." See also Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 232-235, and Logsdon, The D

sion to Go to the Moon , p. 58. Members of the Saturn Evaluation Committee were Silverstein, Chairm

Abraham Hyatt, NASA; George P. Sutton, ARPA; T. C. Muse, ODDR&E; Norman C. Appold, U.S. 

Force; Wernher von Braun, ABMA; Eldon Hall, NASA, Secretary. For key documents, see "Report to 

Administrator, NASA on Saturn Development Plan by Saturn Vehicle Team," 15 December 1959, NA

History Office, Silverstein biographical file . 

64 Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen, p. 91-93. 

65 Ibid, p. 208. 

66 Ibid, p. 191-197. Interview with Abe Silverstein by V. Dawson, 6 June 1987. 

67 1\vo classic papers on hydrogen heat transfer that grew out of the work with Pratt & Whitney are Rob

C. Hendricks, Robert W. Graham, Yih-yun Hsu, and Robert Friedman, "Experimental Heat Tran

and Pressure Drop of Liquid Hydrogen Flowing Through a Heated Thbe," NASA TN D-765, May 19

"Experimental Heat Transfer Results for Cryogenic Hydrogen Flowing in Thbes at Subcritical 

Supercritical Pressures to 800 psi Absolute," NASA TN D-3095, March 1966. 

68 Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, p. 206-207. 

69 Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, NASA SP-4102 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governm

Printing Office, 1982), p. 36. 

70 Interview with Abe Silverstein, 6 June 1987, not recorded. 

71 Transcript of D. D. Wyatt interview with Eugene Emme, p. 96. 

72 Interview with Bruce Lundin by V. Dawson, 28 May 1987. 

174 
to head the proposed Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, but he felt that Robert Gilruth had ea

that. Charles Murray and Catherine Cox, Apollo, note p. 126, report that Silverstein opposed Gilru

appointment. Dryden's prediction that the new management structure would ultimately be change

the one Silverstein favored proved correct. The centers were later placed under program offices, ins

of reporting to Associate Administrator Seamans. After Sharp retired in December 1960, Eu

Manganiello served as Acting Director until Silverstein returned. 

THE APOLLO ERA: 

~ OPPORTUNITIES AND 

~Ill DASHED HOPES 

Abe Silverstein returned to Lewis Laboratory optimistic that the success of the Apollo P

gram would be a major stepping stone in America's exploration of the cosmos. Trips to Mars 

beyond would require new propulsion systems. Lewis Laboratory was poised to take the lead 

NASA's program in electric propulsion. Silverstein also envisioned a major role for the laborat

in the proposed $1 billion program to develop nuclear rockets. If funded, Lewis would beco

the hub of NASA's nuclear propulsion program. NASA Administrator James E. Webb confirm

this commitment in a speech at a gala dinner at Cleveland's Auto and Aviation Museum hos

by the laboratory's loyal advocate, Frederick C. Crawford. 1 Yet the promise of 1961 did 

become reality, and eight years later Silverstein would leave NASA bereft of his earlier sense 

optimism for either Lewis or the space agency as a whole. 

Four years in Washington had not changed Silverstein's physical appearance or his ba

management philosophy. His compact build, slightly rounded shoulders, baggy suit, and carefu

groomed jet-black hair seemed no different than the day he had arrived from Langley Field 

1943. Part of the Langley nucleus that had carried NACA traditions from Hampton, Va., only 

title had changed. He was now Dr. Silverstein. In 1958 Case Institute of Technology had gran

him an honorary engineering degree. 

Silverstein had seen the facilities of the Cleveland laboratory rise from the flat fields t

skirted the edge of Rocky River ravine. He had participated in the transition from the pis

engine to jet propulsion and, as Chief of Research, had guided the laboratory through the thic

of turbojet propulsion problems from the late 1940s through the early 1950s. Silverstein liked 

have a personal sense of the projects under his supervision. During his short trips across the pa

ing lot to the Engine Research Building for unannounced visits, he could take in the metallic g

of the Altitude Wind Thnnel, a facility with its own distinguished but tortuous history. There Sil

stein and his staff had generated key data to redesign piston engine baffles so that cylinders wo

not overheat. After World War II, they had constructed small supersonic tunnels tied into 

Altitude Wind Thnnel's air intake and exhaust system to explore the aerodynamics of ramje

The overhead pipes that connected the tunnel with the laboratory's central air system sy

bolized the network of human connections that breathed life into its complicated facilities. Th

facilities embodied the creativity of Lewis personnel. While Silverstein was away, the tunn

cavernous space had been transformed into a vacuum chamber used to test the instrumentat

for Big Joe. After the Atlas-D rocket had lofted Big Joe into space, NASA knew the Mercury c

sule would be safe to carry humans. 3 

177 
NASA Administrator James Webb envisioned Lewis as the hub of NASA's nuclear engine project. Left to r

Abe Silverstein, Frederick C. Crawford, T. Keith Glennan, James Webb. (Photograph Courtesy of Reb

Photo.) 

Silverstein looked forward to working again at the laboratory level. He still had the ro

edges of an engineer, more at ease with hardware than lobbying. At Headquarters, T. K

Glennan had found Silverstein articulate, but stubborn. In Glennan's view the NACA mana

ment style had suited the NACA, but "hardly fits our needs today when we have so many relati

ships with industry and other elements of the government."4 Silverstein could be gruff, tactl

and impatient with mediocrity, hardly the way to win friends in Washington. His engineering 

leagues, however, recognized his leadership ability. In a New York Times interview, a NASA 

league called Silverstein a genius-!'not in terms of invention and discovery but in his breadth 

comprehension of technical matters and his remarkable facility for getting down to the fundam

tals in any field he tackles." 5 With an intuitive feel for technical detail, he often became 

involved when a project excited him. 

Silverstein knew how to build effective engineering teams by carefully knitting together p

sonalities and skills. He had a sure grasp of who moved best by being left alone and who had 

be prodded to action. He could appreciate both ends of the research spectrum-not only the s

of the technicians in the machine shop, who could create a delicate instrument from an engine

rough sketch, but also the analytic talent of the small group of research scientists at Le

Laboratory.6 During the NACA years, engineering applications had dominated the activity of 

178 
team at Goddard Space Flight Center because of the emphasis on applications of NACA

s wo

Glennan had not fully appreciated the NACA research tradition. The Space Act required 

NASA supervise industry contractors and manage space missions. The former college presid

a Republican, favored spending most of NASA's budget on contracts with the aerospace indu

and universities. 8 He disapproved of the NACA policy of "farming out to industry only 

repetitive and straight production items,'' saving the more challenging and creative projects 

the staff. 9 Although the "proper balance" between in-house research and industry contr

remained unresolved, as long as Glennan set a deliberate pace for space flight development, 

integrity and autonomy of the former NACA laboratories seemed secure. After Presid

Kennedy's announcement of the goal of a lunar landing, however, the tight schedules of 

Apollo Program threatened to compromise the independence of the former NACA laboratorie

do basic research. Under Webb's new administration, their role was no longer clear. 

WHITHER LEWIS LABORA10RY? 

Even before Silverstein returned to Cleveland, the laboratory had begun to struggle with 

implications of the new NASA organizational structure. Like the other former NACA laborator

Langley and Ames, it was now referred to as a research center to distinguish it from the n

development- and mission-oriented centers within NASA. It was clear that the NACA resea

ideal needed modification. In a speech to the staff the preceding year, Acting Director Eug

Manganiello revealed his anxiety about how the work of the center fit into the larger NASA 

ture. He summarized the history of Lewis to get a clearer sense of current practice and fu

goals. He pointed out that the amount of research in rockets and nuclear propulsion had remai

small until 1951, when these areas began to grow. In 1957 Lewis Research Center had dram

cally reduced research on air-breathing engines. By 1960 work on chemical rockets was at 35 

cent; nuclear propulsion, 20 percent; and electric propulsion and power generation, 14 perc

Air-breathing engine research was at a mere 7 percent, and was mainly in support of military 

jects such as the B-70 airplane. The remaining 24 percent included basic heat transfer, f

mechanics, radiation physics, and instrument and computing research. 10 

Manganiello considered the primary mission of Lewis Reseach Center to lie in th

research areas: advanced propulsion, including chemical, nuclear, and electric rockets; po

generation; and materials. He thought that the center should, as in the past, maintain a mix

of basic research, applied research, and what he called "specific research" related to developm

problems, such as the restart capability of the Centaur engine, the Saturn base heating probl

and the B-70 inlet control problemY 

In the NACA era, Lewis workers had responsibility only for the "research end of 

business.'' Industry had handled development and production, and the military had been resp

sible for operations. Now, however, the situation was different. Space exploration requ

national resources of a magnitude that precluded maintaining the distinctions between resea

development, and operations. "Our place as a research center is not as unique and sha

delineated as it was in the past." NASA had the responsibility not only for research, but also 

the development, procurement, and operation of space vehicles. Manganiello recognized 

some former NACA staff thought that research and development should be kept separate. ''
Manganiello thought that the sharp distinction between research and development did n

apply to current practice. ''Applied research" and "advanced development" had beco

indistinguishable. The development 

centers-Marshall, JPL, and Goddard-did 

both. The research character of the former 

NACA laboratories, however, could be 

preserved if short-term development problems were avoided. 

We at Lewis have no desire or 

intention to engage in the shortrange activity or get into the 

problems of the construction of 

flight hardware. We are not particularly intrigued with the battle of the '0' rings but we are, 

on the other hand, intensely interested in the advanced 

research and development end 

of the business, the nuclear 

rocket, electric propulsion and 

power generation, high-energy 

chemical rockets-their systems 

and components-where the 

scientific and engineering technology needs to be established 

Eugene Manganiello, Acting Director after Sharp retired 

1960. 

before useful and reliable propulsion can be created .. .. We cannot afford to permit 

our basic research or our conceptual research into new and better ideas to become 

submerged or deemphasized so that we have nothing left to grow on. 13 

Manganiello did not mention Lewis Research Center's contributions to the Mercury p

gram because exclusive focus on these types of projects-albeit necessary and valuable in ter

of the space race against the Russians-would leave the laboratory without research capital for t

future. A research laboratory was a place where unconventional new technology like nucle

electric, and high-energy chemical rockets could be incubated. This advanced work had to be n

tured while some of the laboratory's efforts could be diverted to assist in trouble-shooting wh

NASA needed their particular expertise. 

Abe Silverstein could appreciate the ideas in Manganiello's talk. For almost four years 

Washington, he had tasted the drama and excitement of large development projects. However, 

was also aware that the quickened tempo of the Apollo Program now threatened the balance b

tween research and development within NASA as a whole. Dryden had favored preserving t

research orientation of the former NACA laboratories. He had placed them under the· Office 

Advanced Research and Technology (OART) to protect them from the encroachments of t

development and operations side of NASA. The integrity of research was a cornerstone 

180 
Frontier he had warned, Research will always suffer when put in competition with op

tions."14 Manned space flight now gobbled up almost all of NASA's budget. Just as Webb's n

management structure had eased many former NACA staff out of Headquarters, the came

development and missions had begun to push Lewis Research Center, along with the other 

research centers, Ames and Langley, out of the mainstream of NASA. 

Silverstein's return rekindled the debate between staff committed to basic research 

those who favored a vigorous involvement in development and operations. Should the laborat

give up its pretensions as a research center and join the quickened pace of NASA centers m

closely identified with development? Most of the laboratory's work was done in-house. Silvers

felt that the strength of the laboratory lay in the organic, self-sufficient engineering environm

it provided. This environment provided the conditions for the growth of individual engineer

expertise and the freedom to cultivate areas of research beyond the secure arena of exis

technology. Within NASA as a whole, however, the concept of in-house research was disapp

ing. NASA began to contract out support services, such as janitorial, grounds-keeping, and sec

ty. Eventually, support service contracting would include basic technology research. A wind

for the aerospace industry, this policy threatened the mission of the former NACA laboratorie

perform basic and applied research. In 1961, 77 percent of NASA's employees were contract

By 1964, contractors would command 92 percent of NASA's employment total. 15 

Silverstein had not decided what direction the laboratory should take when he returne

Lewis. Increased involvement with the development and mission side of NASA would mean 

the laboratory would have to learn to deal with contractors. He also knew the danger of let

the camel of development into the research tent. How would he protect basic research? If Sil

stein protected the research character of the laboratory by refusing to participate in large-s

development projects, he was aware that he needed more staff with graduate educations. Lew

group of theoreticians was small. The majority of staff had degrees in mechanical engineer

When three members of the Applied Mechanics Group-Simon Ostrach, Stephen Maslen, 

Harold Mirels-called on him to discuss the laboratory's future, Silverstein took heed. Ostr

recalled Silverstein's surprise at their audacity in proposing that he transform Lewis int

laboratory for basic research. ''They sort of put us off in a corner and they thought that t

should have bright guys around, but Abe was flabbergasted that we wanted to have somethin

say about the direction that the lab was going." 16 

At a meeting of division chiefs Silverstein presented the idea of the Applied Mecha

Group to model Lewis on AT&T's Bell Laboratories in Murray Hill, N.J. He wanted to hire o

Ph.Ds. Although the general consensus was favorable, Bruce Lundin strongly opposed it. He 

spent most of his career testing full-scale engines. To Lundin, Dryden's often repeated admoni

that the NACA laboratories needed protection from the development and mission side of NA

had become a shibboleth. He argued that they were "really just a bunch of testing engineers.

transform the laboratory by adding a group of high-powered scientists would take ten ye

Lundin thought that NASA needed the laboratory's technical competence. He suggested a c

promise: divide the laboratory into two distinct parts, research and development. Silverstein

director, could "provide the balance between the two and can protect the one from the other

Lundin's plan seemed to offer the best of both worlds. With the backing of the other divi
The laboratory immediately began to experience the effect of strong Congressional supp

for the space program during the early Apollo years. Silverstein announced that Lewis Resea

Center would increase its payroll from $23.5 million to $28 million. He was authorized to hire 

new staff, a major expansion of personnel. In addition, a large Developmental Enginee

Building to house 1100 engineers was planned. 

The location of this large office building outside the main gates reflected Silverstein's c

mitment to keep research physically separate and untarnished by the contracting side of NA

Lundin's staff, many newly hired under NASA's more generous salaries, worked in 

Developmental Engineering Building, with its separate cafeteria and security. They would le

the new realities of dealing with industry as a customer rather than a provider of technology

first, the research side of the center was shielded from responsibilities connected with contra

People who worked under Evvard still came through the Main Gate in the morning to work 

their laboratories much as they had during the NACA era. However, even the research side of 

laboratory began to be affected by the pressure of increased NASA-wide contracting. 

TO THE MOON: DIRECT ASCENT OR RENDEZVOUS? 

In November 1961, when Silverstein returned, it appeared that Lewis Laboratory wo

become an important center for nuclear rocket propulsion. With a nuclear stage proposed as 

key to providing sufficient power to reach the Moon directly, Lewis Research Center was posit

ing itself to play a leading role in NASA. The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that Lewis Resea

Center looked forward to ''major participation in every manned space effort to follow the cur

Mercury Program and most future unmanned space exploits as well.'' 18 The Kenn

Administration was reluctant to approve costly expenditures for large technology developm

programs unless they could be justified in terms of specific applications. 19 The costs of 

nuclear programs were astronomical, but tied to future missions beginning with Apollo; NA

counted on obtaining generous funding for nuclear rocket research. 

The ambitious lunar mission called for a rocket that could provide enormous thrust, noth

less than von Braun's huge Saturn or an even larger rocket called Nova, first proposed by 

Saturn Vehicle Evaluation Committee, chaired by Silverstein, in 1959. No consensus was e

reached on Nova's configuration, but one proposal considered a first stage powered by conv

tional fuel, a liquid hydrogen second stage, and nuclear upper stages. 

20 The nuclear stages co

give this behemoth the necessary thrust for direct ascent to the Moon, which involved a scen

reminiscent of the science fiction of Jules Verne. A rocket consisting of several stages would 

fired directly at the Moon. It would need to brake against the Moon's gravity to land. For 

return journey to Earth, a final stage would blast off from the Moon's surface. The first stud

launch vehicle requirements for the lunar mission, chaired by William A. Fleming, formerly 

Lewis, supported the direct ascent concept. 21 Projected costs and time for the development 

rocket of the required magnitude made some NASA planners question the feasibility of di

ascent. 

Within NASA there were also strong partisans of a rendezvous method to reach the M

in two stages via a space platform placed in orbit around Earth. von Braun and the Marshall gr

favored what came to be called the Earth-orbit rendezvous method. 1\vo packages consisting 

modules for the assembly of the platform and lunar vehicle could be launched separately by 

182 
method was that instead of a single large rocket, which existed only in the imagination of NAS

rocket designers, the plan depended on the smaller Saturn rocket already under developmen

Marshall Space Flight Center. By June 1961, after a NASA study chaired by Bruce Lundin, opin

began to shift in favor of the rendezvous concept, with Earth-orbit rendezvous the "c

preference" among members of the evaluation committee. Nova development, however, was 

under serious consideration. 22 

A group at Langley Research Center favored a third approach-lunar-orbit rendezv

(LOR)-which at first seemed hopelessly complicated. It required three spacecraft: a comm

module occupied by the three astronauts, a service module for the propulsion and guida

systems, and a lunar excursion vehicle. These three vehicles would be fired into lunar orbit 

a single expendable three-stage rocket. Once in lunar orbit, the astronauts would park the co

mand and service modules in orbit. Two of the astronauts would don space suits and clamber i

the excursion vehicle for their trip to the Moon's surface. Later they would rendezvous with 

command module for the return trip to Earth, leaving the excursion vehicle behind. The adv

tages of this method were its lower fuel and weight requirements. 

Silverstein favored direct ascent. He objected that the engineering required for the dock

of two vehicles in space involved greater complexity and more risk to the astronauts shoul

component fail. 23 Although Silverstein returned to Lewis before NASA planners had hamme

out the final decision, no doubt it came as a disappointment. Webb's announcement of the se

tion of the lunar-orbit rendezvous method in July 1962 ended all hopes for the developmen

Nova and took some of the urgency away from Lewis's nuclear rocket program. Nuclear po

might be required for distant flights to Mars and beyond, but clearly, through the 1960s, NAS

energies would be directed to landing humans on the Moon. 

Lewis staff wanted to salvage something from the lunar rendezvous decision. Because of 

laboratory's expertise in propulsion, Lewis was the logical choice to design and monitor 

development of the second vehicle, called the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM), needed to take 

astronauts from the command module to the surface of the Moon. As early as December 19

Lewis staff had set its sights on the development of a "lunar soft-landing vehicle." E. W. Con

and Carl F. Schueller took up the idea at Headquarters with Cortright in 1959, long before NA

had decided on the details of the Apollo mission. Although no formal agreement was reach

Cortright gave them the go-ahead to begin to work up specifications. By 1960, the Analysis Bra

of the Propulsion Systems Division was at work on two types of vehicles for manned lunar-la

ing missions. The first was a small-scale vehicle for lunar exploration to carry two or th

astronauts, with a return capsule weight of about 10,000 pounds. A second larger vehicle 

deliver 50,000 pounds of material to a large-scale lunar base was also designed. However, w

Silverstein back at the helm of Lewis Research Center, this project had to be dropped. Th deve

the LEM would have required working with von Braun's group, in charge of the Saturn 

Although there may have been other considerations, in Bruce Lundin's opinion, Brainerd Holm

opposed creating this potentially abrasive situation. He was "not going to have Silverstein thr

sand into his machine."24 
associated with the development of nuclear propulsion. Interest at the laboratory in nuclear p

pulsion had developed steadily from the late 1940s under the leadership of Benjamin Pinkel 

his branch chief, Eugene Manganiello. In 1948 a prestigious group at the Massachusetts Instit

of Technology issued the secret Lexington Report, which concluded that development of nuc

rockets and ramjets presented nearly insuperable technical problems. Aircraft nuclear propulsi

however, was feasible, although development might take up to 15 years. To the American prop

sion community, led by Colonel Donald Keirn and D. R. Shoults of General Electric (both pri

players in the secret drama to import the Whittle engine), this was sweet music. They thought 

engine powered by nuclear energy could create a propulsion ''breakthrough'' comparable to 

turbojet. 25 

Silverstein envisioned increased cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission an

strong role for the Cleveland laboratory in NEPA (Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Aircraft). In 1

the laboratory acquired a cyclotron for basic research in materials. 

Carving out a role for Lewis in aircraft nuclear propulsion proved an agonizingly slow p

cess. Planning for a nuclear reactor began in 1954, and in 1955 Congress authorized its constr

tion. After a survey of 16 locations in Ohio and Pennsylvania, Lewis leased 500 acres of land n

Sandusky, Ohio, about 50 miles west of Cleveland. Originally known as the Plum Brook Ordna

Works, it had served as an explosives factory and storage a.rea during World War II. In 1956 

Atomic Energy Commission Safeguard Committee approved the design for the reactor. At the t

of the ground breaking for the new facility, aircraft nuclear propulsion appeared to be the prop

sion frontier. Silverstein called it "the 'shining hope' for increasing the range of aircraft at h

speeds and for increasing aircraft ranges to values unobtainable with conventional or spe

chemical fuels.' '

26 The laboratory hoped to contribute f ndamental studies on the effects 

radiation on materials. Only gradually did it become apparent that the nuclear airplane 

become a technical dead end. Its detractors called it a shitepoke-an enormous skinny bird, ha

ly fit for eating or for flying. Development by Pratt & Whitney and General Electric over 15 ye

cost the nation $880 million, but as late as 1960, how it would benefit the nation's defense rema

ed unclear. The weight of the shielding for the reactor, as well as a new awareness of environm

tal considerations, led to the national program's demise in 1961.27 

Ironically, as interest in the nuclear airplane waned in the late 1950s, enthusiasm fo

nuclear rocket waxed. In 1955 Robert W. Bussard of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory qu

tioned the conclusions of the Lexington Report. He argued that the key to nuclear rocket devel

ment was temperature-resistant materials. His advocacy convinced the Air Force and the Ato

Energy Commission (AEC) to set up a joint program at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 

develop Rover, a nuclear rocket intended to be launched from the ground.28 Because hydro

was the preferred propellant for nuclear rockets, the growing expertise of the Lewis staff in h

dling this fuel put them in high demand. They assisted in the design and testing of the KIWI se

of experimental reactors, managed jointly by the AEC and NASA, at Jackass Flats, Nev. 29 Fr

Rom, Chief of the Nuclear Propulsion Concepts Branch at I,ewis, served as the laboratory's ch

spokesman for its programs in materials, fuel element research, and hydrogen heat transfer. 

The AEC, however, controlled the nuclear field through tough licensing requirements

regarded NASA as an interloper in the nuclear field. T. Keith Glennan lamented that the Pl

Brook reactor was "proposed and accepted at a time when the aircraft nuclear propulsion w

184 
Anderson of New Mexico was determined to see that funding went to the AEC's laboratory at 

Alamos. When NASA and the AEC set up a joint office called the Space Nuclear Propulsion Of

(SNPO) in 1960, the two federal agencies began to enjoy a smoother relationship. The future 

Lewis's programs in nuclear propulsion looked brighter. Harold Finger took charge of both 

SNPO Office and NASA's Nuclear Systems Division. 31 

Despite the intensity of research on the part of NASA and AEC staff, the use of Rove

NASA's stable of launch vehicles was remote. Glennan asked the obvious question: "Just wh

one would launch such a beast with its ever present possibility of a catastrophic explos

resulting in the spreading of radioactive materials over the landscape is not clear." 32In 1961 

Rover project was renamed NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications). 33 M

Congress authorized a major three-year $40 million building program for Plum Brook in the 

of 1962, Silverstein set up a design group to plan a $15 million facility for testing a nuclear roc

engine at Plum Brook. Although a nuclear upper stage for the Saturn launch vehicle seemed 

creasingly unlikely, the feasibility of a nuclear rocket for post-Apollo missions had to 

demonstrated. 

RETURN TRIP 10 MARS 

Lewis planners believed that landing on the Moon was only the first step in space expl

tion. NASA's next destination would be Mars or another planet. Chemical rockets like Saturn

a nuclear rocket, could reach a near planet, but longer trips required different types of roc

systems. The advantage of an electric rocket was its low propellant consumption and continu

long-term operation. The group formed by Wolfgang Moeckel after the success of "From Mac

to Infinity'' began studies of electric propulsion and space power systems that involved plas

physics and magnetogasdynamic and thermionic systems. They also investigated the possible 

plications of controlled nuclear fusion for space propulsion. The group explored the possibili

of using high-intensity, large-volume electromagnets with the lowest possible mass for po

generation. In 1958 they initiated a small program on plasma heating to complement the stud

of magnetic fields. 34 

Initially, the electric propulsion systems under investigation consisted of two major c

ponents, the electric power generator and the thrust generator. The electric power generat

either nuclear or solar-converted energy into electric power. The thrust generator used 

power to accelerate the propellant out the back end in the form of thrust. The 1957 study o

nuclear turboelectric power plant indicated that sodium had the potential to make a good h

transfer fluid. By passing the fluid from the fission reactor through a neutron shield, a heat 

changer, and back to the reactor, the crew could be protected from radiation. The generator wo

provide a power output of 20,000 kilowatts, with 11,000 kilowatts of power in the form of thr

A round trip to Mars would require a vehicle weighing 350,000 pounds. In addition to the str

tural weight of the vehicle, the eight-man crew would need 50,000 pounds of equipment an

40,000-pound auxiliary rocket for landing part of the crew on Mars. 35 Admittedly fanciful, 

power system was the basis of more sophisticated design studies and hardware developm

related to nuclear-turboelectric systems. 

The enthusiasm and expertise of the group grew under the leadership of Howard Chi

William Mickelson, and Wolfgang Moeckel. Their work embodied Dryden's vision of advan
PUMP 

PROPELLANT 

TANK 

Nuclear Rocket. 

technology research as distinguished from development. Moeckel explained in a talk at He

quarters in 1961: 

The approach taken by the Lewis Research Center in its electric propulsion program 

is to undertake studies of problems common to all systems. This approach is in contrast to that of development organizations, which must generally concentrate their 

effort on perfecting a particular system, based on current state-of-the-art. There are, 

of course, many areas of overlap, but in general the Lewis effort is directed toward 

obtaining the fund of knowledge and the new approaches required to design specific 

systems for various applications, rather than to design or produce those systems 

directly. 

36 

The group worked with the AEC to develop the nuclear-turboelectric system, SNA

intended to provide 35 kilowatts of on-board power in space. The first solar project, Sunflow

a joint effort with Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW), yielded basic knowledge of dynamic s

power systems for spacecraft. 

The generous budgets for construction of facilities during the Apollo era enabled the s

to build a large vacuum tank for electric propulsion studies. Because of Lewis's new facilities 

the large number of staff involved, in 1961, shortly after Silverstein's return, NASA announ

that Marshall Space Flight Center's electric propulsion program would be transferred to Lew

186 
Water-filled quadrants surrounding the Plum Brook nuclear reactor, 1961. 
PUMP 

ABO-GENERATOR ROOM 

EXPLORATION ROCKET 

Diagram of electric space vehicle with nuclear power source for a round trip to Mars. 

The laboratory environment supported the interplay between theory and hardw

necessary to foster technical creativity. Technical support and relative freedom to pursue prom

ing ideas regardless of immediate application allowed Harold R. Kaufman to design a m

efficient and simpler electric rocket than Stuhlinger' s earlier cesium thruster. 37 Kaufman wa

member of the Mission Analysis Branch. He and a colleague, Wilbur Dobson, knew of Moeck

interest in Stuhlinger's work but were not members of his division. Kaufman took a differ

approach. His invention, the electron-bombardment ion thruster, used mercury vapor as a p

pellant. The vapor flowed into an ionizer chamber; the mercury ions were then propelled tow

a screen grid, which accelerated them to produce thrust. 

In 1964 the SERT I (Space Electric Rocket Test) tested both Stuhlinger's cesium engine, b

by Hughes Research Laboratories, and Kaufman's electron--bombardment thruster, designed 

built at Lewis. Kaufman's approach proved superior. It also demonstrated that a stream of i

from a thruster in space could be neutralized to avoid the buildup of a space charge that wo

shut down the thruster. This established that ion thrusters could be made to work in space. T

development of the ion-bombardment thruster culminated in 1970 in the successful launch 

SERT II after ten years of painstaking development of Kaufman's design. SERT II, however, rea

ed fruition at a time when the ability of NASA to support advanced technology was flagging

CENTAUR: ABE'S BABY 

Centaur, the third program that came to prominence during the Apollo era, was a legacy 

the laboratory's work on liquid hydrogen in the 1950s. Centaur was a development progr

urgently needed for the success of a lunar landing. It was originally funded through the Advan

Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and assigned to Marshall Space Flight Center after Presid

Eisenhower insisted that all space programs without direct military applications be taken over 

NASA. After NASA acquired the von Braun team, Centaur was designated the launch vehicle 

Surveyor, the unmanned lunar lander program. It was managed under NASA's Office of Lau

Vehicle Programs, clearly the development and operations side of NASA. Centaur came to Le

by default. It was an unwanted step-child at a time when all the efforts of von Braun's roc

group were focused on the development of Saturn. 

In September 1962 Edgar Cortright, then Deputy Director of the Office of Space Scien

at NASA Headquarters, remembered the keen interest in liquid hydrogen at Lewis. He as

Silverstein to come to Headquarters where he brandished a letter that his boss, Homer D. New

188 
fuel, despite his capitulation to Silverstein during the Saturn Evaluation Committee meeting

December 1959. He was also concerned about Centaur's structure. According to John Sloop

The von Braun team simply did not trust Karl Bossart's thin-wall, pressure-stabilized 

tanks first used by General Dynamics for Atlas and then for Centaur. Centaur had 

only a thin, common wall dividing the fuel and oxidant tanks, and at one time von 

Braun came to Washington to push a design change that separated the two tanks, a 

change that would delay the stage development. His request was denied by Robert 

Seamans. I believe that these structure concerns outweighed von Braun's concerns 

about using liquid hydrogen. 39 

von Braun recommended that the Saturn C-1/Agena D launch vehicle replace Centaur. 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), in charge of the Surveyor Program since 1960, concurred. 

Braun convinced JPL that Centaur could not be developed in time to provide the necess

knowledge of the Moon's surface prior to the Apollo landing. In a letter to Newell, Brian Spa

Deputy Director of JPL, cited "the deplorable situation in the current Centaur program" in s

port of cancellation. The development of a new rocket to use liquid hydrogen technology requ

too much time. To compete with the "doggedly determined effort of the Soviets," the exis

technology of kerosene-based fuels had a greater chance of success. He wrote: 

The Office of Manned Space Flight has said that data from a soft-landed Surveyor in 

1964 or 1965 would be an invaluable aid in Apollo design, and high-quality reconnaissance data from a lunar Orbiter in 1966 is desirable for Apollo flight planning. 

These objectives could be achieved on a C-1/Agena D but not on Centaur in this time 

scale.40 

Problems with NASA's contractors, General Dynamics and Pratt & Whitney, plagued 

development of Centaur. However, the supervision of these contractors by the von Braun te

had also played a role in its recent failures on the launch pad. On May 8, 1962, 54 seconds a

liftoff, the Centaur portion of an Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle had exploded. The investigation 

to this mishap revealed that an internal NASA report had predicted this failure: the insulat

panels could not withstand the anticipated pressure loads. The accident investigators conclu

that, although General Dynamics was responsible for the defective design, Marshall Space Fl

Center's supervision had been neither prompt nor adequate. In addition, the investiga

censured Marshall's supervision of Pratt & Whitney's development of the RL-10 liquid-hydro

engine. Three explosions of engines on Pratt & Whitney's test stands at its Research and Deve

ment Center in Florida had resulted in both delay and $1.2 million worth of damage. 

investigation concluded that these were preventable accidents. The company had failed to ins

standard safety devices that Marshall engineers, with extensive experience in the hazards 

rocket engine development, should have insisted on.

41 

Cortright informed Silverstein that the relationship between Marshall and Gen

Dynamics had reached an impasse. Both were aware that project management required a heal

give-and-take. Technical differences had created an adversarial relationship between Gen

Dynamics and Marshall.42 Marshall had accepted Centaur, but von Braun, never comforta

with liquid hydrogen or the Centaur tank design, did not assign his best engineers to the proj
In September 1962 the choice at Headquarters appeared to be either to drop the Cent

program entirely or find another NASA center willing to take over its management. When Ed

Harold R. Kaufman with his electron bombardment ion 

thruster. 

Cortright asked Silverstein if Le

wanted the Centaur program, Silverst

needed no arm-twisting. He believed t

liquid hydrogen would provide the key 

a successful lunar landing. The transfe

launch-base operations from Kurt Debu

group to the Goddard Field Proje

Branch at Cape Canaveral under Rob

Gray completed the decoupling of C

taur from Marshall. 

When Silverstein announced to 

division heads that NASA had assign

Centaur to Lewis, the response w

lukewarm.44 Although Lewis had tas

project management when NASA crea

the Nuclear Engines Project Office a

the Sunflower program, these were slo

paced programs. The management 

Centaur posed development proble

that needed immediate solutions. 

October, plane loads of boxes contain

books, drawings, spare parts li

unsatisfied change orders, and techni

directions were sent to Lewis fr

Marshall. For men and women accustomed to working in a research environment consisting 

blackboards, glistening hardware, and the roar of facilities, the silent mountain of governm

paper produced dismay. What did they know about the legal tangle of government contracts

Centaur forced its new project managers to leave the comfortable campus atmosphere of 

research laboratory to deal directly with industry. Silverstein picked a technical team to tackle 

Centaur Program that matched the Lewis administrative talent he had left in Washington. Da

J. Gabriel, a Lakewood native with a mechanical engineering degree from the University 

Akron, shouldered the responsibility of project manager. Cary Nettles, Russel Dunbar, Ed Jona

Jack Brun, and John Quitter, seasoned Lewis staff, formed the technical core of the proje

Although Centaur fell within Bruce Lundin's administrative bailiwick, Silverstein himself w

never far from what was going on in the Centaur project. 

Silverstein called on Lewis's small law department to bring order out of chaos. N

Hosenball, the laboratory's chief legal counsel, asked Len Perry, a vibrant attorney with boundl

energy and unusual powers of persuasion, to assume responsibility for the contractual aspects 

the Centaur Project. He hired Harlan Simon, an Ohio State Law School graduate in private pr

tice, to assist him. They attended all the Centaur team's technical meetings with Gene

190 
Pratt & Whitney's RL-10 hydrogen-oxygen engine is readied for testing, june 1963. 
It was Abe's baby, Abe's project. He made a promise not only to the world, but to 

himself. He selected the people. He is the one who chose the people for these various 

positions and he chose them, obviously, correctly. He was informed of every decision 

that was made of any significance. He participated in the decision making process. He 

argued with them. They argued with him. It was both dedication to the program and 

fear of Abe that made this program successful. You just didn't dare let him down. 

Otherwise, I don't know what would have happened. You almost felt as though you 

would have been disintegrated, if you ever let Dr. Abe down. 46 

The lawyers had a formidable challenge: to restructure the business arrangement w

General Dynamics to permit flexibility and mutual trust. They had to devise a contract that, abo

all, would not slow down the pace of development. 

The original contract with General Dynamics was a not a firm fixed-price contract, bu

cost-plus-fixed-fee contract of rather loose construction. It was not geared to the development 

new technology under the pressure of a tight deadline. Any technical change required not o

Centaur stage mated to Atlas booster at Plum 

Brook in the Dynamics Research Testing Stand, 

February 1964. 

192 

ponderous paperwork, but worse, an increase 

the costs of the vehicle even before the fi

design had been established. A liquid hydrog

rocket required a leap into the unknown. It w

a leap constrained by a tight schedule. 

Hosenball, Perry, and Simon devised t

types of contracts to cover the requirements 

technology development. The first was 

"hardware contract," which took "all t

knowns and entered into a contract which h

very definite boundaries in dollars and time.'' 

cover the unknowns-risks of developme

support for unexpected failure-they devised 

"management and engineering contract."47 I

rocket exploded on the launch pad, another t

could be done without waiting months for 

necessary government paperwork to be co

pleted. NASA could guarantee a profit to 

company regardless of the outcome. This u

conventional approach to government contra

ing could have left them open to criticism, b

they were betting on success. The Centaur te

worked at a frenzied pace, commuting 

California to oversee work by Gene

Dynamics and to Cape Canaveral to prepare 

launches. Their labor was crowned with a stri

of successful launches, culminating in t

flawless Surveyor mission in May 19
hydrogen in the upper stages of the Saturn V proved von Braun

s pessimistic view of this tr

fuel unjustified. He autographed a picture of the launch of Apollo 4, on November 9, 1967: 

Abe Silverstein whose pioneering work in liquid hydrogen technology paved the way to tod

success." 48 

What explains the intensity of this commitment? Why was the Centaur program so 

cessful? This extraordinary combination of energy, teamwork, and leadership cannot be expla

simply as the result of the ample funding that NACA received during the Apollo era. Nor can 

achievement of the Centaur program be dismissed as an attempt by Lewis staff to demons

that they could succeed where Marshall had failed. Rather, the explanation for the achievem

of the Centaur program lies within Lewis's institutional fabric. Unlike Marshall, Lewis w

research laboratory. The NACA research tradition had fostered the commitment to li

hydrogen through the 1950s as Lewis researchers gained expertise in the problems of this c

plicated and dangerous technology. Silverstein epitomized the breed of technical leader 

Arthur Squires has described as a "maestro of technology'!._someone who is thoroughly fam

with the technology, who knows his staff well enough to put together the right team for a spe

task, and who protects them from the aggravations of unnecessary bureaucracy.49 He inspire

example. His staff stayed through the night to untangle a technical problem because Silver

did the same. 

Beyond Silverstein were the extensive resources of a research laboratory. Lewis researc

faced a variety of problems in making liquid hydrogen usable as a rocket fuel. A research g

in materials headed by Merv Ault studied the degrading effects of liquid hydrogen on var

metals. Other Lewis staff examined how liquid hydrogen would behave in a weightless envi

ment. They investigated pumps, turbines, and other components of the rocket engine. Testin

the 85-foot drop tower, and later in the zero gravity facility, provided data useful in modif

designs. Centaur staff had Lewis expertise in heat transfer to call on, as well as an extrem

skilled group of technicians to build whatever part might be necessary to tease a recalcit

rocket engine to life. 

At the same time that Lewis inherited Centaur from Marshall, it acquired managemen

the Agena project. Agena was an upper-stage booster rocket usually coupled with a Thor o

Atlas rocket to launch spacecraft for NASA's planetary program. Unlike Centaur, Agena did 

have the constant attention of Silverstein. Seymour C. Himmel took charge as project mana

flanked by his deputies C. C. Conger and E. F. Baehr. Technical branches were headed by E

Davidson, M. Weston, and H. W. Plohr. They were all "NACA types" who had been at Lewis s

the 1940s. They had never worked on launch vehicles before, but their NACA backgrounds 

them the flexibility, management skills, and technical expertise they needed to organize the 

(supplemented with former military contractors for intercontinental ba.llistic missile progra

and to build relationships with contractors, the Air Force, and centers like Goddard and JP

charge of the spacecraft. Thirteen months after taking over the Agena project, the team launc

its first two spacecraft, Echo II and Ranger VI. Between 1962 and 1968, when Silverstein assig

the Agena's payloads to the Centaur rocket, they launched 28 missions, including several Rang

Mariner Mars '64 and Mariner Venus '67. The spacecraft launched by Agena sent back som

the first pictures of Mars and Venus. 50 

The Centaur and Agena Programs were the glamour programs of the laboratory. Job

launch vehicles had visibility, mobility, and drama. The NACA-trained researcher looked on 
f 

l!t • • 

Photograph of launch of Apollo 4 with Wernher von Braun's message "Tb Dr. Abe Silverstein whose pioneer

work in liquid hydrogen technology paved the way to today's success." 

194 
before, basic research lost status. The preparation of a research report, once the most respe

activity of the laboratory, no longer stimulated the same intense commitment. The roar of a ro

at liftoff had supplanted the polite applause of engineering peers elicited by a well-prese

paper. Some NACA-trained researchers like Harry W. Mergler, Simon Ostrach, Eli Reshotko, 

Arthur Hansen drifted off to positions in academia. Basic work in materials, heat transfer, 

tribology, the science of fuels and lubricants, quietly continued. 

CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE NASA BANDWAGO

If the transformation of the NACA into NASA was a mixed blessing for former N

laboratories like Lewis Research Center, universities stood to benefit from the sudden availab

of large NASA grants. The NACA sponsored some university research through the 1940s 

1950s, but the amount of university grants had remained small because NACA laboratories 

ferred to do their research in-house. 

The possibility of ample government funding infused Case Institute of Technology with 

enthusiasm for aerospace engineering and a greater interest in cultivating connections with L

Research Center. Both Glennan, who returned to Case's presidency at the close of the Eisenh

Administration, and his successor, James Webb, supported strong NASA-university connect

In addition to specific NASA-sponsored research, NASA's charter stipulated that one of the a

cy's goals was to promote science education. 

The first Case Institute of Technology proposal for an Interdisciplinary Materials Rese

Program in July 1960 described how its Cleveland location benefited Lewis Research Center. 

Institute's faculty had provided NASA with necessary additional training in materials in a re

in-house graduate course offered at Lewis. However, the former strains in the Case-NACA rela

ship may have influenced the proposal's rejection in favor of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institu

When Glennan returned to the presidency of Case Institute, he carefully laid the gro

work for an improvement in relations. In October 1962, he personally paid a call on Hugh Dr

and handed him a summary of the proposals awaiting action by NASA evaluators. In a mem

John Hrones, Vice President for Academic Mfairs, Glennan revealed that the Case faculty tho

it had been treated unfairly by NASA in the past: "I think that Dr. Dryden has protected th

tegrity of that memorandum which was rather critical of actions taken by one or more individ

in the NASA organization in the review of our proposals." 52 Case faculty claimed that its 

posals were still being turned down for reasons that had more to do with personalities 

technical quality in 1963, but by October 1964 the situation had improved dramatically. Case 

doing quite well. Its acceptance rate for the previous 12 months had reached 100 percent.

In 1963 Case caught a whiff of NASA's plans for a high-tech facility. It strongly backed 

city of Parma's bid for the site for a NASA Electronics Center. Not surprisingly, given the st

ties of the Kennedy Administration to Massachusetts, the city lost out to Cambridge. 

54 How

realistically, the Cleveland area had neither a cadre of Ph.D.s trained in electrical engineering 

strong industry support. Politics precluded two NASA facilities in the same city. Neverthe

Webb saw a role for Case Institute of Technology in the government, industry, university par

ship he envisioned. He hoped that Case would assist NASA in ferreting out Cleveland are

dustries that could use NASA-generated technology. He believed that space technology, turne

profits by industry, would mean a stronger American economy. 
from aerospace technology. Cleveland's economy, beginning to founder, depended on hea

industries like steel. It was increasingly clear that the role that Lewis had played in stimulati

innovation among the engine companies during the NACA years would be difficult to recast 

the utilization of space technology, despite the good intentions of Case and the Lewis Technolo

Utilization Program. A conference sponsored by Lewis to discuss new technology available to t

electric power industry as a consequence of the space program created interest but no real co

mitment to innovation. Lewis would discover in work with the automobile industry in the 197

the difficulties of pushing innovation on a reluctant industry. 55 

Although Case's involvement in the technology utilization program was minimal, it had b

ter success with an ambitious proposal for a Space Engineering Research Laboratory, submitt

in January 1965. The proposal for $2,580,000 in construction funds emphasized Case's strong p

grams in space-related disciplines: digital systems engineering; control of complex systems; b

and medical engineering; engineering synthesis; fluid, thermal, and aerospace scienc

mechanics; and plasma dynamics. It proposed concentrating some of these programs in o

building. The proposal indicated that the relationship with Lewis was beginning to flourish, w

new staff recruited from Lewis and over 100 Lewis staff currently in advanced degree program

17 of whom were Ph.D. candidates. When the new NASA laboratory was dedicated in 1969, it w

appropriately named the Glennan Space Engineering Building to honor Glennan' s dedication 

Case, NASA, and the AEC.56 

In 1966 NASA turned renewed attention to aeronautical research, neglected after Sputn

At Lewis, although the major effort remained in space-related activities, several new projects we

initiated. The return to aeronautics among NACA-trained staff meant a return to the intrigui

problems of compressors and turbines. The phenomenal growth of air travel had caused airp

congestion, overcrowding, noise, and chemical pollution. The development of quieter engines, 

well as aircraft that could take off and land on short runways, offered the promise of n

technical challenges. Lewis also took part in plans for a supersonic transport airplane to comp

with the Concorde under development by the British and the French. However, after a hiatus 

nine years, could the staff return to a position at the cutting edge of aircraft propulsi

technology? Lewis's facilities for propulsion research were no longer unique. Not only had the a

craft engine industries developed their own facilities, but the Air Force now had its state-of-the-

wind tunnels at the Arnold Engineering Development Center in Thllahoma, Tenn. 

Lewis had eliminated work on air-breathing engines when it shifted into space propulsio

Researchers at Ames and Langley never abandoned their work in aeronautics and did few spac

related projects in the 1960s. Lewis's space work, particularly its management of Centaur a

Agena, had swelled its budget in the 1960s, although a large portion of these funds went to co

tractors. In 1964 Lewis received $299.9 million for research and development, compared to $78

million and $40.3 million, respectively, for Langley and Ames. For construction of facilities, mo

of which were at Plum Brook, Lewis received $26.5 million, compared to $9.0 million for Langl

and $11.9 million for Ames. In 1965 Lewis's research and development budget continued to ri

It received a peak of $323.2 million, compared to $106.6 for Langley and $54.2 for Ames. Fundi

for construction of facilities again gave Lewis a substantial budget in 1965: $18.6 million 

Lewis, $7.2 for Langley, $13.6 for Ames.

57 However, the handwriting was on the wall. T

196 
next year, it dropped by another $87.2 million as NASA experienced its first major cuts. 

Hough riots in downtown Cleveland revealed the bitter incongruity of the expensive space 

and the problems of the inner city. Staff cuts began to bite into the morale of the laborato

In 1969, when Apollo 11 astronaut Neil Armstrong stepped onto the pocked surface o

Moon, Lewis Research Center took special pride in the fulfillment of Kennedy's promise to 

Americans on the Moon within a decade. Armstrong had started his career in Cleveland 

NACA test pilot. Lewis engineers had helped solve some of the problems of Saturn V's hug

engines, and tests in the Altitude Wind Thnnel's vacuum chamber had helped to pave the wa

the safe separation of the Apollo capsule from its boosters. 58 The Ranger spacecraft, the L

Orbiter, and Surveyor-launched by Agena and Centaur-had also contributed to the succe

Apollo, but the flight of Apollo across the Sun had cast a long shadow. The nation's inabili

deal with its social problems seemed to make a mockery of ambitious plans for space explora

For Silverstein 1969 marked not only the achievement of a manned lunar landing, but 

40 years of government service. Silverstein's technical leadership had shaped NASA's early y

but Headquarters was now in hands more attuned to the political winds than to charting a 

Apollo course to the planets. In his dealings with 

Headquarters, Silverstein became like a cactus 

with thorns.

59 True to the NACA ideal of cultivating expertise from within the laboratory, he 

fought NASA's increasing commitment to outside contracting at the expense of research. By 

1969 all three former NACA laboratories-Lewis, 

Langley, and Ames-were outside NASA's 

mainstream. With the exception of the 

laboratory's management of unmanned launch 

vehicles, which included Titan and Atlas in addition to Centaur, Lewis received its funding 

through the Office of Aeronautics and Space 

Technology (OAST, formerly OART). OAST 

commanded a mere 5 percent of NASA's budget. 

With manned missions dominating the agency, 

the camel had forced its research occupants 

nearly out of the tent. The research centers were 

looked down on by other parts of NASA as 

''hobby shops.' '

60 Asked to chair a study for the 

expansion of Hopkins International Airport into 

Lake Erie, Silverstein chose to retire. It was the 

end of an era. 

Abe Silverstein, Director of Lewis Laboratory 

1961 to 1969. 
g

, , yj,

presented at the NACA Conference on Supersonic Aerodynamics at AAL on 4 June 1946, NACA 194

1475-9. 

3 " 'Big Joe', Lewis' Part in the Project Mercury Story," Orbit, 22 May 1959. Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James 

Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-42

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 201 and 244-245. 

4 T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration," 1964, u

published diary, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kan., p. 84. 

5 New York Times, 12 March 1960. Silverstein biography file, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 

6 Interview with Simon Ostrach, 29 September 1987. 

7 See, for example, the description of the NACA by Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, NASA SP-42

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 90-91. 

8 T. Keith Glennan, "The First Years," vol. 1, p. 7. 

9 Ibid. 

10 E. J. Manganiello, "The Changing Trends in Our Activities," address to staff, 4 November 1960. RG 2

73A32, 116/1-52, Federal Archives and Record Center, Chicago, IL. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Quoted in Arthur L. Levine, "United States Aeronautical Research Policy 1915-1958: A Study of the Ma

Policy Decisions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Colum

University, 1963, p. 90. 

15 United States Civilian Space Programs, 1958-1978, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Scien

and Applications, Serial D, Volume I, January 1981, p. 72. 

16 Interview with Simon Ostrach, 29 September 1987. 

17 Interview with Bruce Lundin, 28 May 1987. 

18 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 13 December 1961. 

19 See Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (New York: The New American Library, 196

p. 258-259. 

2

° Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A History 

Manned Lunar Spacecraft, NASA SP-4205 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 197

p. 46-47. See discussion in Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, NASA SP-4206 (Washington, D.C.: U

Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 60-68. 

21 Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, p. 34. 

22 "Survey of Various Vehicle Systems for the Manned Lunar Landing Mission," Bruce Lundin, Chairman, 

June 1961. NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 

23 Interview with Abe Silverstein by V. Dawson, 6 June 1987. 

24 Interview with Bruce Lundin, 28 May 1987. On a lunar excursion vehicle, see Carl F. Schueller to Associ

Director, "Visit to NASA Headquarters on November 23, 1959 by Mssrs. E. W. Conrad and C. 

Schueller." See also Richard J. Weber to Chief, Propulsion Aerodynamics Division, "Lunar Missi

Studies by Analysis Branch, Propulsion Systems Division," 9 June 1960, personal files of R. J. Web

25 See discussion by Arthur M. Squires, The Tender Ship: Governmental Management of Technological Chan

(Boston: Birkhauser, 1986), p. 94-102. The classic study of nuclear propulsion in all its facets, bo

scientific and technical, was published in the open press by two British scientists, L. R. Shepherd a

198 
py 

p

26 NACA Press Release, 26 September 1956, NASA Lewis Records. 

27 See "Remarks of Melvin Price," Congressional Record Appendix, 26 August 1960. 

28 See R. W. Bussard and R. D. DeLauer, Fundamentals of Nuclear Flight (New York: McGraw Hill, 1

p. 1-4. 

29 For background seeR. E. Schreiber, "Kiwi Tests Pave Way to Rover." Nucleonics, vol. 19, No. 4, April1

11.77- 79. 

30 Glennan, "The First Years," p. 165. 

31 See Harold B. Finger, "Space Nuclear Propulsion Mid-Decade," Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 

The Plum Brook reactor went critical in 1961 and reached full capacity in 1963. The reactor was 

down on 30 June 1973. By the 1970s Plum Brook had a staff of 635 civil servants and 132 suppor

vice contractors. 

32 Glennan, "The First Years," p. 71. 

33 For background on NERVA, see W. H. Esselman, "The NERVA Nuclear Rocket Reactor Progr

Westinghouse Engineer, May 1965, vol. 25, p. 66-75. See also William R. Corless, Nuclear Propulsio

Space (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1967). See also James Arthur Dewar, "Project Rover: A S

of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program, 1953-1963," Ph.D. Dissertation, Kansas State Unive

Manhattan, Kansas, 1974, to be published by Smithsonian Institution Press. 

34 W. E. Moeckel, "Status of Electric Propulsion Systems for Space Missions," Cryogenic Engine

Conference, Boulder, Col., 23-25 August 1960, RG 255 73A32 116/1-52, Federal Archives and R

Center, Chicago, IL. 

35 R. E. English, H. 0 . Slone, D. T. Bernatowicz, E. H. Davison, and S. Lieblein, "A 20,000 Kilowatt Nu

Thrboelectric Power Supply for Manned Space Vehicles," NASA RM 2-20-59E, March 1959. 

36 W. E. Moeckel, "Lewis Research Center Electric Propulsion Program," NASA Headquarters Presenta

5 June 1961, RG 255 73A32 116/1-52, Federal Archives and Record Center, Chicago, IL. 

37 H. R. Kaufman, "Origin of Electron-Bombardment Ion Thruster,"]. Spacecraft, 18:289-292. 

38 "SERT II-A First for Lewis," Lewis News, 16 January 1970. 

39 John Sloop, "Comments by John L. Sloop on Manuscript History of the Lewis Research Center by Vir

Dawson," 5 September 1989. NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 

40 Brian Sparks to Homer Newell, 21 September 1962, Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle file, NASA Hi

Office. 

4 1 "Review of the Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle Development Program," Report to the Committee on Sc

and Astronautics, House of Representatives, March 1963, Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle file, N

History Office. 

42 See also files of Office of the Deputy Director 0100, Centaur Program, NASA Lewis Archives, Box 

43 Interview with Harlan Simon, 20 March 1985. 

44 Interview with Bruce Lundin, 28 May 1987. 

45 Interview with Harlan Simon, 20 March 1985. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Ibid. 

48 Photo from personal files of Abe Silverstein. 

49 Arthur M. Squires discusses "maestros of technology" in The Tender Ship, p. 13-46. See also Abe Silver

and Eldon W. Hall, "Liquid Hydrogen as a Jet Fuel for High-Altitude Aircraft," NACA RM E55 C

15 April 1955. 

5

° For greater detail on the Agena project, its management and significance, see Seymour Him

"Commentary" [on manuscript by V. Dawson], 28 August 1989. 
Asso. and Orgs. Gov. Gps. & Ind. Orgs., Case Western Reserve Archives. 

52 T. Keith Glennan to Dr. John Hrones, "NASA Support for Research Proposals," 8 October 1962, C

Central File 19 DC 27:2, Case Western Reserve Archives. Glennan also protected the integrity of 

memo. It was not to be found in the Case archives. 

53 R. H. Thomas to Dr. T. Keith Glennan, "Visit by Dr. T. L. K. Small," 1 October 1964; and R. H. Thom

to J. A. Hrones, "NASA Visitor-Sid Roth," Case Central File 19 DC 27, Case Western Reserve Archiv

54 "Conference on Proposed Electronics Center," 19 November 1963, Case Central File 19 DC 27:2, C

Western Reserve Archives. Also Abe Silverstein to Francis B. Smith, Area Survey Committee

December 1963, NASA Lewis Records, 0100/9. 

55 See Selected Technology for the Electric Power Industry, a conference held at Lewis Research Cen

Cleveland, Ohio, 11-12 September 1968, NASA SP-5057, 1968. 

56 "Proposal to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Case Laboratory for Space Engineer

Research," 27 January 1965, Case Central File 19 DC 27: 1, Case Western Reserve Archives. 

57 NASA Historical Data Book, NASA SP-4102 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19

vol. 1, p. 166 and 168. 

58 "Apollo Mans Moon," Lewis News, 18 July 1969. 

59 Interview with Robert E. English by V. Dawson, 11 July 1986. 

60 Ibid. 

200 
r( DOWN TO EARTH 

~Ill PROBLEMS 

Nothing in Bruce Lundin's background prepared him to preside over the most diff

period in the history of Lewis Research Center. The 1970s were a time of trouble for NASA. S

no longer riveted the nation's attention, and NASA, unlike the NACA, now depended on 

whims of public opinion to garner the votes of Congress. Lewis Research Center, increasi

vulnerable to staff reductions required by NASA's budget cuts, barely escaped closing. Rese

programs were expendable from the point of view of Headquarters, and projects carried out u

the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) were the easiest to cut. 

By 1971 Lewis had lost 700 civil service positions, but even larger cuts would be announ

in 1972, one of the darkest years in the center's history. In that year NASA slated the Plum B

Station for closing. The following year NASA terminated 400 staff in the areas of space nuc

power and propulsion systems. An additional 318 people, primarily in space research, rece

notices; at the same time at least 100 long-time employees chose retirement. 1 Many upper-l

staff chose to retire rather than witness the dismantling of an institution they had worke

create. They were among the cream of the NACA-trained civil servants. In summing up 

careers of the many staff who left during this period, a writer for the Lewis News found it imp

ble to describe ''the moments of jubilation and the moments of heartache, day-by-day dedica

hard work, and loyalty of these and other employees that have made Lewis what it is and 

tributed mightily to making the United States what it is today." The Lewis News, still a 

newspaper, not a slick management organ, captured the ethos of the laboratory by quo

America's longshoreman philosopher Eric Hoffer's definition of patriotism: ' 'To be honest is 

to allow anything shoddy to escape your hands." 2 

Lundin was unabashedly from the development side of the laboratory, and with the S

Shuttle the single most important project in NASA, development was what NASA administra

wanted. Except for 18 months at Headquarters in the Office of Advanced Research 

Technology, Lundin had spent the 26 years of his career at Lewis. In the early postwar perio

had worked on afterburners and thrust augmentation. From 1952 until 1957, as Chief of 

Engine Research Division, he directed testing of full-scale turbojet and ramjet engines. Lu

moved where the dominant activity of the laboratory had always been-amidst the roar of pro

sion systems under test. For him, to build something, test it to the breaking point, and mea

it expressed the ruling spirit of Lewis. 

Under Lundin, project management of launch vehicles had established an impres

record. Lewis was in charge of medium-class launch vehicles, Atlas-Centaur and Titan-Cen

201 
had scientific goals. Space probes carrying cameras photographed the planets Mercury, Ven

Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Uranus. '1\vo Viking missions, launched aboard a Titan-Centaur, s

Bruce Lundin, Director of Lewis Laboratory from 1969 to 

1977. 

landed on Mars. Nineteen launches p

communications satellites in orbit arou

Earth. 3 

The decision to develop the en

mously expensive Space Shuttle, a reusa

space transport plane, squeezed the b

gets of all the other programs. NASA stak

its future on this single development p

ject, the first step toward an ambitio

manned space station.

4 Lewis's resea

programs in the 1960s had helped lay 

technology base of the proposed shutt

main engine. It would use liquid hydrog

no longer considered an unconvention

dangerous fuel. The design of many of 

main engine's components depended 

Lewis research: pumps, seals, and be

ings, fuel injectors, cooled baffle eleme

to control pressure waves, and h

transfer data to determine the proper w

thickness for combustion chambers. T

mai engine's unique coaxial injec

element, developed and patented by Le

engineer Samuel Stein, allowed its co

bustor to achieve 99 percent efficiency

new record in rocket combustion. Desp

its engine expertise, Lewis Resear

Center had only a limited role in shuttle development. 5 Why Lewis did not play a more signific

part in the shuttle is a matter for speculation. Abe Silverstein had never given up the NACA's tra

tion of autonomy. He did not willingly take orders from Headquarters, and his attitude did not w

friends for Lewis. Lundin followed in Silverstein's footsteps. He is reputed to have opposed 

shuttle decision on technical grounds. 

Lundin's relationship with Headquarters became increasingly acrimonious as he was forc

to cut civil service positions and replace them with contractors. Janitorial and groun

maintenance, security, and clerical workers were the first to see their jobs turned over to contr

tors. Then technical services, jobs connected with running research facilities like wind tunnels a

constructing experimental hardware were contracted out. This was much more serious becaus

compromised the ability of the laboratory to do research. Drafting, library services, and other s

port services followed. 

Contracting fragmented the laboratory. The ideal of government service seemed comp

mised by the unwelcome introduction of new staff, which civil servants, rightly or wrongly, thou

202 
tecvsevce coutepats, tey wee aepedabe udecass. Cvsevce epoyees w

advised by the law office to avoid any taint of direct supervision of these contractors. Knowle

once shared freely among laboratory workers, became the prerogative of the civil servant. C

tractors kept in ignorance were less threat to a civil service job. As support services personne

creased, contractors and civil servants had to learn to work side by side. Nevertheless, the 

istence of two distinct classes of employees with different values and aspirations changed 

working atmosphere of Lewis. 

Once the entire laboratory had functioned like a symphony. The director set the tem

Although the engineers had played the themes, to make music, each section had contributed. N

there was a cacophony of themes. Not every employee followed the same conductor. C

pounding the division between civil servants and contractors were new relationships with H

quarters. NASA projects were often split up among several NASA centers and directed by a pro

director in Washington. The director was no longer the conductor, but a concert master who 

little influence over the orchestra's program. Through their management of launch vehic

smaller programs in electric propulsion, and the nuclear rocket engine, former NACA person

had learned effective project management. NASA had developed strict rules in dealing with 

tractors like General Dynamics and Lockheed. They supervised end-product contracts, wh

unlike support services contracts, did not involve personnel actually working at Lewis. E

product contractors came to Lewis only to consult and negotiate contracts. They were not 

same threat to civil service jobs, and cordial relationships developed. To uphold the governme

interest, to maintain the highest safety standards, and to prevent the delivery of shoddy hardw

NASA's relationship with contractors, however, had to be carefully defined. Contractors wer

be kept at arm's length. They could not share offices with civil servants. Lewis staff learned a 

choreography in their relationship with industry. Now that they had power to make decision

fecting millions of dollars, they had to be careful to avoid any appearance of conflict of inter

Given the unhealthy prognosis for a significant involvement in NASA's manned space 

grams, Lundin directed the laboratory's programs more strongly into aeronautics. Work expan

on the Quiet Engine Program, started under Silverstein. They would return to work on full-s

engines, this time not at the behest of the military, but in response to requests from the Fed

Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of Transportation. The FAA asked Lewi

design and build a demonstration engine. The engine would combine state-of-the-art turbo

technology with special acoustic materials to reduce noise. The goal of the program wa

develop a 22,000-pound-thrust engine that would be 15 to 20 decibels quieter than the cur

commercial jet transports. 

Noise suppression research at Lewis was not new. The NACA Subcommittee on Noise 

supported jet nozzle studies to make engines quieter as part of operations research at Lewi

1957. However, in the NACA era cooperation with the engine manufacturers never went so 

as a demonstration engine. While Lewis had been out of the air-breathing engine business in 

early 1960s, the engine companies had introduced the turbofan, a more efficient engine, since 

all of the air to produce thrust travelled through the compressor. Now Lundin hoped that Lew

competence in air-breathing engines could be used to advance turbofan design. General Ele

received a hefty government contract of $20 million to build three different fan designs an

mate them to an engine core. Lewis took charge of the test program to measure fan no
willing to adjust to new contractual obligations mandated by the government. 

Lewis a

cooperated with General Electric on a demonstration program, the QCSEE (Quiet, Clean, ST

[short take-off and landing aircraft), Experimental Engine). The new demonstration engine was 

an experimental transport plane that would be able to take off and land on short runways

solution to the congestion of the nation's airports. 

In another approach to the problem of a quieter engine for commercial transport planes

1973 Lewis, Pratt & Whitney, Boeing, and Douglas Aircraft negotiated a cost-sharing, no-fee c

tract for the test phase of what was called a refan program. The object of the program was 

modify existing technology rather than redesign an entirely new engine. A single-stage fan w

substituted for the two-stage fan of Pratt & Whitney's JT8D engine. The two airframe manuf

turers agreed to install acoustical material in the nacelles, or pods within which the engines 

housed, to muffle the noise of the engine. It was a simpler, less expensive, approach to 

problem.

7 

The strong return to research in air-breathing engine systems included work on helicopte

widely used in the Vietnam War. Lundin agreed to a joint research program in low-speed aviat

with the U.S. Army Material Command. This was the first time that civilian Army employees w

integrated into the Lewis workforce. Although the program involved only a handful of enginee

this arrangement broke new ground in the relationship between the military and NASA. In 

past, the Air Force Liaison Office had requested test programs carried out in NACA's wind t

nels, but the NACA had valued its independence. NASA of the 1970s did not have that luxury. T

Army established an Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory on Lewis grounds. 

research program is secret. 

LEWIS TURNS EARTHWARD 

The search for a new research agenda coincided with the national environmental conce

of the early 1970s. Louis Rosenblum and J. Stuart Fordyce formed the NASA Volunteer 

Conservation Committee to respond to the down-to-earth problem of air quality in the city 

Cleveland. In the early 1970s, before the closing of many steel plants, the location of Clevela

industry downtown in an area called The Flats produced heavy air and water pollution. In 19

an oil slick on the Cuyahoga River, which snakes through the industrial heart of downto

Cleveland, caught fire. The burning surface of the river caused the spectacular conflagration 

several wooden bridges. National media attention brought the city shame and increased comm

ment to clean up the air, the river, and Lake Erie. 

Local concern for the environment coincided with a new national awareness of the fragi

of our life-sustaining globe. The probes of the solar system lofted by Atlas-Centaur and Atl

Agena shattered illusions about life in outer space. The unmanned missions of Viking, Survey

and Mariner gave scientists a more precise understanding of the atmospheres and extreme surf

temperatures of the planets and the Moon. Photographs of the stark, lifeless outlines of the Mo

Mars, Mercury, and Venus made scientists aware that they shared Earth's interminable geolo

history. Life was unlikely to appear in the solar system for millions of years. 8 Popular argume

for extraterrestrial life were now balanced by the sobering thought that the biosphere might 

unique after all. Earth's atmosphere had limits. It was a fragile membrane, wrote the essay

Lewis Thomas. ''The color photographs of the earth are more amazing than anything outside: 

204 
In December 1970 several scientists and engineers at Lewis began to look into the a

ability of graduate courses related to environmental problems. They found that within the ce

there was sufficient expertise to begin to plan a course similar to Evvard's "From Mach 4 to In

ty." Robert Hibbard, a scientist in Lewis's Advanced Research Institute, took charge of c

dinating this informal graduate seminar. It drew an unexpected response of 100 students. 

course covered topics such as "Pollution and Legislation," taught by Kenneth Coffin, "Com

tion Fundamentals" by Sanford Gordon and Frank Belles, and "Fossil Fuels" by Robert Hibb

Other lectures by Albert Evans, Helmut Butze, Charles Blankenship, Marvin Warshay, F

Zeleznik, and Phillip Meng covered various potentially cleaner engine configurations. Gas 

bines, steam cars, and electric cars caught the imaginations of Harold Rolik, William Strack, 

Stuart Fordyce. Lester Nichols, Reese Roth, and Robert Rohal explored fission and fossil-fu

electric generating stations. These topics, which covered pollution caused by automob

airplanes, and nuclear and electric power generation, were the seeds from which an entirely 

effort would grow. 

10 

The following year, as grass roots support from within the laboratory strengthened, L

formed an Environmental Research Office to develop sensing techniques to identify and mon

trace elements and compounds in the city of Cleveland's air. Lundin worked out an agreem

with Mayor Carl B. Stokes to lend technical assistance to the city's Division of Air Pollu

Control. From 20 monitoring stations, the city would provide 50 samples a week for 

laboratory to analyze. The goal was to develop inexpensive methods to pinpoint the source 

particular pollutant. 11 To identify trace elements in the air, the Plum Brook reactor staff got 

the act. They developed a technique called neutron activation analysis to detect mercury, arse

cadmium, and nickel from substances in air samples. The center also initiated a project, fun

through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to study how treated wastes contribute

the pollution of Lake Erie, at that time choked with algae. A NASA program, directed from 

Manned Space Flight Center in Houston, Tex., used RB-57F aircraft carrying remote-sensing 

struments to photograph the effects of strip mining, crop diseases, and ice formation on the G

Lakes. In 1971 Lewis Research Center assisted in keeping track of the spread of corn blight 

the mid-western states. 12 

In 1972 Lewis staff began to monitor samples from eight new meteorological stations in 

city of Cleveland to study the effect of weather, particularly winds, on pollution levels. The 

tions were set up in Cleveland area schools, with students, supervised by a science teacher, ta

the readings. A solar-powered remote control station located in the five-mile crib in Lake 

tracked Lake Erie's effect on weather to show how pollution was spread in the Cuyahoga R

Valley. 

In 1970, to focus on pollution from automobiles, Lewis set up the Automotive Syst

Office funded through the EPA. They hoped to develop a gas-turbine automobile engine base

the potentially cleaner and more economical Brayton cycle. Could a car powered by a gas tur

get good performance, fuel economy, and meet or surpass the 1976 Federal Emission Standa

Pushed by the rising voices of the environmentalists, the American automobile industry see

poised to make the transition from the piston engine to the gas turbine. Lewis staff develop

type of thermal reactor to burn up carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons left from incomplete c

bustion. Members of the Materials and Structures Division tackled the problem of develo
electric-powered cars to their automotive expertise. 

THE ENERGY CRISIS 

Staff cuts and the new commitment to the environment coincided with the grow

awareness of the country's dependence on fossil fuels. Among the Lewis staff, Robert Grah

saw a potential opportunity for Lewis to develop technology for new approaches to energy p

duction. Graham argued in a memo to Bruce Lundin in October 1970 that Lewis had a uniq

capability to undertake energy research. "I know of no other major laboratory that incorpora

the pertinent capabilities in thermodynamics, fluid mechanics, heat transfer, materials, chemis

nuclear physics, plasma physics and cryo-physics under one organization.' '

14 He asked Lundin 

consider a long-range program to examine various power-producing systems. Graham sugges

that a special projects panel be formed to awaken interest in ground-based energy systems. 

Robert English independently reached the same conclusion after reading Alvin Weinbe

Reflections on Big Science. Weinberg, then the director of the Oak Ridge National Laborator

argued that government laboratories had an obligation to the country at a time of crisis. To f

the energy crisis the country needed the task or mission orientation of government laborator

not the "remote, pure and fragmented" approach of university science. 15 English thought Le

should "step forward" to offer its propulsion expertise. New work in ground-based ene

systems, in English's view, would also help solve Lewis's own crisis, brought about by the 1

staff cuts. 16 A graduate of the University of Minnesota, English had been at Lewis since 1944

thinking over the laboratory's past, he concluded that the essence of Lewis Laboratory was ene

conversion. The skills and traditions that Lewis personnel had perfected as they advanced the 

bojet were themselves a national resource. The same understanding of fluid dynamics, h

transfer, combustion, materials, turbine design, bearings and rotor dynamics, lubrication a

seals, turbine cooling, and controls formed the basis of their work in rockets and space pow

systems. As chief of the Space Power System Division, English had contributed to the technolo

of the Brayton-cycle systems-designed to be used with either a solar or nuclear power source 

heat the working fluid, a mixture of helium and xenon gases. In August 1972 this convers

system had completed more than 3200 hours of testing in Plum Brook's Space Power Facility. N

this work, conceived in 1957 and tested as early as 1966, was about to be shut down. English 

not think that this experience should be lost. Brayton-cycle technology, developed as a clo

system for continuous unattended operation in space, could be adapted for mass transportat

needs. Buses and trains with revolutionary new engines would be cleaner and more ene

efficient. 

Lundin began to work with the U.S. Department of Transportation and the EPA. Since c

was cheaper than oil, it seemed feasible to investigate ways to make coal burning cleaner a

more efficient. Knowledge of the potassium Rankine system in space power generation could 

applied to improve coal-fired electric power generation. The Rankine system had the potentia

wring more energy from coal through a topping cycle. 

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 brought home what should have come as no surprise. T

dependence of the industrialized West on oil made the United States strategically vulnerable

the decade after World War II many technical writers raised the spectre of dwindling oil reser

and their effect on both economic development and military preparedness. In 1952 Eugene Ay

206 
precious energy resources. Only after the aggravation of the long lines to purchase gasolin

1973 did the Nixon administration fully appreciate the urgency of the energy situation. N

asked Dixy Lee Ray of the Atomic Energy Commission to chair a task force to define the probl

and offer solutions. Ray set up 15 panels. English chaired the panel on energy conversion. Ma

U. Gutstein, Harvey Schwartz, and George Seikel from Lewis also served on this panel. L

representatives on the Solar Energy Panel included Ronald Thomas, Gerald Barna, Danie

Bernatowitz, Patrick Finnegan, George Kaplan, Warren Rayle, and Joseph M. Savino. Ge

Siekel served on the Fusion Energy Panel, and Thaddeus S. Mroz and Lloyd Shure on the 

vanced Transportation Systems Panel. 17 

Wind, because it is driven by the Sun, was among the alternative energy sources consid

by the Solar Energy Panel. The Lewis representatives on this panel were beginning to devel

unique expertise in wind turbine technology. In 1970, Cruz Matos, Secretary of the Interio

Puerto Rico, formally requested Lewis Laboratory to design a wind turbine to generate electr

for the Island of Culebra. Although no one knew if the wind turbine would actually be b

interest in wind as a substitute for fossil fuels began to grow. Louis Divone of the National Sci

Foundation, upon hearing of the Lewis design, decided to authorize the funds to construct 

operate an experimental 100-kilowatt wind turbine at Plum Brook. At average wind speeds o

miles per hour, the system was expected to generate 180,000 kilowatt hours per year in the f

of 440-volt, 3-phase, 60-cycle alternating current output. Later the wind turbine was upgrade

produce 200 kilowatts of electricity. In 1973 the National Science Foundation (NSF) and N

sponsored a joint workshop on wind power that brought together all existing information 

previous wind power development, including a full-scale wind turbine experiment carried ou

1940 by Palmer Putnam and the S. Morgan Smith Company at Grandpa's Knob, Vt. A pape

Ronald L. Thomas and Joseph M. Savino, "Status of Wind-Energy Conversion," presented 

symposium sponsored by the NSF in 1973, summarized the point to which work at Lewis had 

gressed.18 In 1974 Lewis received $1.5 million for its wind energy program from NSF and 

Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). A total of 13 experimental wind 

bines, funded under ERDA and its successor, the Department of Energy (DOE). were put in op

tion between 1975 and 1979. The most impressive of these was a 3.2-megawatt Mod-5B wind 

bine generator on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, now in commercial use. 

Drawing on experience in developing solar cells for space power systems, Lewis 

initiated programs to develop electric systems in remote areas of the country that could no

effectively serviced by the electric power industry. The village of the Papago Tribe at Schuch

Ariz. (about 120 miles from Thscon) was chosen as the site for the world's first solar-pow

village. A Lewis team, headed by Louis Rosenblum, designed and installed the system, which 

sisted of a solar cell array field of 192 photovoltaic power modules. Excess electrical energy, st

in a bank of lead acid batteries, provided power for lights and appliances in the evenings. 1

Lundin could not win the full cooperation of the electric power industry. The new s

technology threatened the power industry. It proved easier to develop the technology tha

achieve the hoped-for technology transfer. A memo from the Chief of Industrial Program

Bruce Lundin made the situation clear: 
overall solar program is viewed with reservation by much of the utility industry. This 

is because solar power devices used by their customers will reduce utility energy sales 

but will not reduce utility need for total generating capacity. The combination would 

add to their financial problems.20 

Lundin and his staff discovered the difficulties of developing new relationships with 

dustry. Industry's wary attitudes were similar to the initial reluctance of the aircraft engine 

dustry. For many years Lewis had carefully cultivated its good relations with General Electric a

Pratt & Whitney. The delicate interplay between the military, the NACA, and industry was m

sing in this ground-based energy venture. NASA had the capability to provide hardware based 

the most advanced technical concepts, but it was powerless to get industry to accept the n

technology. 

The year 1974 brought new disappointment. The center's program in communicatio

satellites, growing out of the revolutionary ''depressed collector' ' traveling wave tube invented 

1971 by Henry Kosmahl of the Space Technology Division, was cancelled. This traveling wa

tube dramatically increased the efficiency and reliability of satellite transmissions while it 

duced costs.21 

Despite emphatic denial by NASA Deputy Administrator George Low, rumors circula

that Lewis Research Center would sever what was now a very tenuous connection with NASA a

become part of ERDA, where the major part of its research programs were concentrated

Smarting from the devastating cuts in staff, Lewis professional staff unionized. Rather than 

filiate with the existing union-the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Lo

2182, organized in 1962 at Lewis-they created the Engineers and Scientists Association 

December 1974 under the leadership of Lyle Wright. They joined the International Federation 

Professional and Technical Engineers. 

Toward the end of Lundin's tenure as director, Congress authorized a NASA research a

technology program in 1976 to find ways to conserve aircraft fuel. As a result of the Arab oil e

bargo, between 1973 and 1975 the cost of aircraft fuel tripled. Compared to the 1950s, it had go

up 1000 percent. Fuel costs were now an important factor in keeping the U.S. airline industr

profitable. Under NASA's Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) program, Lewis took responsibil

for two projects: the Energy Efficient Engine (EEE). or E3 , and in 1978, the Advanced Thrbopr

Program (ATP). Through the E3 program, Lewis managed contracts with General Electric a

Pratt & Whitney to develop new designs to improve the efficiency of their engines. Both co

panies were eager for the financial and technical assistance that NASA could provide. Now thr

tend by Japanese and European engine makers, only through continued innovation could th

keep their dominance of the world engine market.23 

The Advanced Thrboprop Program was far more daring and innovative. A team of Lew

engineers had begun to cooperate with Hamilton-Standard, a division of United Technologies, 

early as 1973. Under a program called Reducing the Energy Consumption of Commercial A

'Iransportation (RECAT), they began work on the design for a prop-fan; an aircraft powered by 

propeller and gas turbine engine. Thrboprops had fallen into disfavor after 1955 because th

were slower and noisier than turbojets. In addition, they have complex gear boxes, making the

difficult to maintain. However, with the potential to reduce fuel consumption by 20 percent, 

208 
100-kilowatt wind turbine at Plum Brook. 
Henry Kosmahl's traveling wave tube made satellite transmissions cheaper and more reliable. In 1987 

center won an Emmy Award for contributions to television technology. 

seemed worth trying to resurrect the concept, despite formidable technical problems. Engine a

propeller acoustics, propeller efficiency and structures, and the problem of gearing to connect 

engine with the propeller were among the many areas of research continued at Lewis through 

1970s.

24 

THE OUTSIDER: DIRECTOR JOHN F. McCARTHY, JR. 

Lundin's skills were technical rather than administrative. He never learned to craft relatio

ships in Headquarters to win concessions for Lewis. In his wrangling over the issue of contract

and his determination to find work for the laboratory outside NASA, Bruce Lundin isolated Lew

from NASA and failed to solve the question of the laboratory's future. The creation of the Depa

ment of Energy in 1977 brought new insecurity. DOE planned to manage its contracts fro

Washington, D.C., calling on Lewis only for expert advice. That would hardly guarantee the c

tinuity of jobs at Lewis, which would depend on the year-to-year whim of the new agency. At 

same time NASA Headquarters imposed a 350-man limit on Lewis's involvement in energy p

grams. This was perhaps the final blow for Lundin. He retired in 1977. 

The post of director remained vacant, fueling speculation that Lewis would soon be clos

However, when NASA announced in late 1978 that John F. McCarthy, Jr., director of the Cen

210 
' '. . ' ••••• ... ' '. . . 

• •• • • •• • •• ••• ••• ••• • •• • ••••• •• • 

'Jesting the advanced turboprop. A team from Lewis won the Robert]. Collier Trophy for an outstanding 

tribution to aeronautics in 1987 for research begun in response to the energy crisis. 
aerospace industry. Headquarters probably counted on McCarthy to take orders from Washing

and to bring Lewis back into NASA's fold. 

McCarthy was the first leader of Lewis Research Center who was free of the NACA tra

tions that had given Lewis its character. No one at Lewis had ever met him. His first speech 

center director did little to win the allegiance of the staff, particularly its upper management. 

noted that one of the first things that needed work was Lewis's image. Lewis was perceived 

a laboratory "searching for an image and a mission." He tactlessly reminded the staff of the e

barrassment caused by the recent declaration of Cleveland's bankruptcy. Like the city 

Cleveland, McCarthy declared, the laboratory was "supposed to have a severe case of harden

of the arteries." However, McCarthy also noted some of Lewis's positive qualities. He was 

pressed with ''the expertise of the people, the caliber of the work, the facilities, and the f

workmanship." He also made it clear that Lewis had a poor record in the hiring of minorities a

women-something that he planned to change. With respect to the issue of the balance betwe

in-house expertise and contracting out support services, McCarthy was more sympathetic to 

Lewis point of view than many employees expected. He was concerned with keeping at leas

minimum of in-house expertise: 

As all of you know, we have tremendous pressure from Headquarters and the administration to contract work out. But the kind of work we do requires that we have 

a minimum level of capability in order to monitor contracts to do the kinds of expert 

work that we do ... When the thing becomes routine, boring, and mediocre, farm it 

out. If it is something that we cannot do on the outside, we should be able to do it 

in-house. And that balance will have to be looked at and monitored constantly.25 

McCarthy thought the center needed to work more aggressively to promote itself both o

side and within NASA. Sharp had reached out to the community beyond Lewis during his ye

as director. Silverstein and Lundin, more at home with technical problems, had failed to maint

these important connections, all the more important in the political agency that NASA h

become. 

In aeronautics, McCarthy set reduction of the center's reliance on full-scale testing as a go

one of the recommendations of a study by the National Research Council in 1977. With the co

try's premier test facilities now managed by the Air Force, Lewis's future contributions to eng

development would depend on basic research in components, accompanied by increased expert

in computing. 26 

McCarthy's appointment coincided with the funding of $6.14 million for the construct

of a new Research Analysis Center to consolidate existing computer equipment and to acquire 

ditional capacity. He reported that the center was perceived by Headquarters as weak in compu

tional mechanics and "testing for the sake of testing without doing the analytical work requi

to justify that test." 27 Computing had grown steadily from 1949, when Lewis acquired the clu

sy mechanical differential analyzer. In 1955 the first electronic system, the IBM 607, followed 

the Sperry Rand Univac 1103, was used to process experimental data. The Central Automa

Digital Data Encoder (CADDE) was the first centralized computer system and the first to rec

data on magnetic tape. In 1966 Lewis acquired the IBM 650/653. Much of this previous comput

capability was used to record the results of testing. McCarthy emphasized the potential 

212 
McCarthy fought hard to reverse the fortunes of Lewis. Much of his time was spen

Washington, D.C., rather than at the center, a change from the personal day-to-day involvem

in Lewis management by past directors. Upper management resented these frequent absen

Nevertheless, McCarthy laid the groundwork for strong connections with the Ohio Congressio

Delegation and never turned down an opportunity to speak at both local and national functio

Through McCarthy's advocacy, Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar came to play an increasin

strong role in promoting the interests of the center. For example, McCarthy spoke at public h

ings of the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits Committee conducted 

Oakar at the Cleveland Federal Building in July 1981. He described the reduction in staff over 

previous ten years from 4200 in 1971 to 2690 by the end of 1981, a reduction of 1510 positio

McCarthy pointed out that Lewis had a high attrition rate because of a pay ceiling for fed

workers and changes in the government retirement system that actually penalized senior peo

who did not choose to retire. "These individuals could not afford the economic penalty associa

with not retiring, even though many would have preferred to stay on at Lewis. Many of these 

dividuals have accepted positions in private industry at considerably higher salaries.'' 29 Of 1

scientists and engineers, less than 6 percent were under the age of 30. It was difficult to att

young scientific and engineering talent because of the instability of Lewis programs. 

The greatest blow to McCarthy's efforts to chart a new course for Lewis came with 

publication of a study funded by the conservative Heritage Foundation. Prepared for ne

elected President Ronald Reagan, the Agenda for Progress focused on ways to cut governm

spending. It included a short paragraph on aeronautical research and technology. The rep

called this research unnecessary because the aircraft and engine industries were mature eno

to do their own research and development. It recommended that all civil aeronautics progra

funded by NASA be abolished. With the 1983 aeronautics budget to be cut in half, it looked 

though this time Lewis would not be spared. 30 

The adversities of the 1970s had toughened the Lewis staff. They were ready to take Lew

future into their own hands. Mervin Ault organized the "Save the Center Committee" to w

with members of the Ohio Delegation to Congress. Senator John Glenn, the former Merc

astronaut who had received some of his Mercury training at Lewis, and indomitable C

gresswoman Mary Rose Oakar needed no convincing. They joined Howard Metzenbaum, Don

J. Pease, and Louis Stokes to pressure Congress to keep the center open. 

McCarthy chose this inopportune moment to resign. However, he left in place a group 

ten division chiefs, chaired by William "Red" Robbins and Joseph Sivo, charged with the 

strategic planning for Lewis. They had the 1982 Strategic Plan ready the first day that Andre

Stofan returned to Lewis from Headquarters to take over as director. Stofan had the charisma 

confidence of a former manager of the Titan-Centaur launch vehicle. He had directed the Lau

Vehicles Program from 1974 until called to Headquarters as Deputy Associate Administrator 

the Office of Space Sciences in 1978. The Office of Space Sciences was a locus of power wit

NASA. It put Stofan in a position to move Lewis away from its dependence on the weak 

underfunded Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) into the mainstream of NA

The Lewis planners recommended that Stofan go after five major programs: the po

system for the space station, the advanced turboprop program, refurbishing of the Altitude W

Thnnel for an expanded icing test program, the Advanced Communications Technology Sate
Management of major projects like Shuttle-Centaur and the power system for the space 

tion was new to Lewis. Although staff in the launch vehicles programs had managed large proje

like Agena and Centaur, they had never dealt with the Manned Space Flight Program, with 

strong political connections. Stofan saw that these large programs were the key to Lewis's fut

viability in NASA. He had the personal skills of persuasion that his predecessors had lacked. 

landed four of the five programs. In Red Robbins's view, "it was a damn miracle." 31 

Energy research was gradually phased out. Stofan exorcised the NACA research ghosts t

still haunted some of the facilities. He called past management autocratic and instituted "p

ticipative management" to heal some of the rifts between managers and staff caused by the p

longed trauma of the 1970s. Mter the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in January 1986, Sto

reluctantly agreed to return to Headquarters to head the space station project. The pres

Director, John M. Klineberg, sees Lewis as less a research laboratory and more a conduit for ide

technology, and funds to the private sector. In his view, Lewis's future rests with the large p

jects. With the center employing 2700 civil servants and 1200 support-service contractors, a ret

to the days when the laboratory functioned as a self-sufficient unit is unthinkable. 

Lewis Research Center has come full circle. It is no longer a research laboratory where 

majority of work is done in-house. It is now firmly established in NASA's mainstream: 

development and missions side of NASA. The power system for the proposed space station is 

key component. NASA administrators estimate that over the next ten years the country will sp

$1.6 billion on the development of this system. Lewis staff will manage this development throu

contracts with industry, principally Rocketdyne and its subcontractors, Ford Aerospace, Lockhe

and General Dynamics. Case Institute, now part of Case Western Reserve University, is among 

many universities that provide research to support the space station and other programs throu

contracts with NASA.32 

The plans for the space station represent the fulfillment of T. Keith Glennan' s vision 

NASA. NASA has become a conduit for the nation's tax dollars to industry and the universit

Hugh Dryden's concept of a government research laboratory to provide technical capital for 

nation's future in the form of ideas and innovations is no longer viable. The NACA research tra

tion, nurtured after World War II and brought to full flower from the late 1940s to the early 19

at Lewis, now has but a small corner of the camel's tent. Lewis Research Center's struggle to k

a measure of autonomy was an effort to preserve the independence and creativity of its techni

people. Although never free of Cold War pressure to improve existing engines, Lewis Laborat

kept its independence. While it served both the military and industry after World War II, it 

mained an autonomous institution. The success of liquid hydrogen as a rocket fuel is an exam

of a long-term commitment that began in the late 1940s. It was basic research. The developm

of this tricky fuel to the point of routine use over twenty years ago put the United States far ah

of the Soviet Union in the area of space propulsion. Only recently has the Soviet Union develop

the expertise to use liquid hydrogen in its space shuttle. 

NASA's contractual relationships with industry have supported short-term development, 

advanced technology. America has been living off the technical capital of the 1950s and ea

1960s, much of it the product of government in-house research. In 1988 the National Resea

Council criticized NASA's neglect of advanced technology research. For the preceding 15 yea

less than 3 percent of NASA's total budget has gone to research. Of that 3 percent, virtua

214 
cluding nuclear space power systems and electric propulsion for flights to Mars and more dis

planets'!._the very programs Lewis Research Center was forced to give up in the 1970s.

33 Le

Research Center in the 1990s is poised on the edge of a new era. One of its challenges is to 

whether a balance between research and development can be restored. 
See Cleveland Plain Dealer, 15 February 1973. See also internal Lewis Research Center document, H

Should NASA Conduct Research and Technology in Aeronautical Propulsion?" 27 January 1978. (C

in author's files.) The Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) managed the main progr

of the three former NACA laboratories, Langley, Lewis, and Ames, and Dryden. OAST budget items 

nuclear power and propulsion were reduced from $29.8 million in fiscal year 1972 to $17.1 millio

1973 to $4 million in 1974. 

2 "How Do You Measure a Person's Career?" Lewis News, 28 June 1974. 

3 These missions are detailed in a typescript by Walter T. Olson, "Some Highlights of Lewis Research Ce

Technical Achievements in the 1970s," January 1980. 

4 See shuttle accounts in Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction (New York: Doubleday, 19

and Joseph J. 'frento, Prescription for Disaster (New York: Crown Publishers, 1987). 

5 Lewis contributions to the shuttle are discussed in two documents: G. Mervin Ault to Director, "Le

Managed Technology Work for Space Shuttle," 9 June 19'75, and an unsigned, undated typescr

"NASA Lewis Research Center's Role in Space Shuttle." (Copies in author's files.) 

6 See "Center's Future Looks Promising," Lewis News, 30 January 1970. Aircraft Engine Noise Reduct

Proceedings of a conference held May 16-17, 1972, at the NASA Lewis Research Center, NA

SP-311, 1972. 

7 "Refan Program Aimed at Quieting DC-9s, 727s," Lewis News, 13 July 1973. 

8 Bruce Murray, Michael C. Malin, and Ronald Greeley, Earth/ike Planets: Surfaces of Mercury, Venus, Ea

Moon, Mars (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981), p. xi. 

9 Lewis Thomas, The Lives of the Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher (New York: Viking Press, 1974), p. 43

10 "Pollution Course Taught at Lewis," Lewis News, 31 December 1970. 

11 "Center Helps Curb Air Pollution," Lewis News, 15 January 1971. 

12 "Big Benefits Come Right from Lewis," Lewis News, 17 December 1971. 

13 "NASA Aids Gas Thrbine Car Study," Lewis News, 13 July 197:3. 

14 Robert W. Graham to Director, 1 October 1970. Across the top of this document someone wrote, "

received by Director." Graham sent a second more detailed memo, "Lewis Involvement in Elec

Power Research and Development," 14 June 1971. File marked Ground Based Electric Power. Ed

tional Services Office, NASA Lewis Research Center. 

15 Alvin M. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 156-160. 

16 Interview with Robert English by V. Dawson, 11 July 1986. 

17 The final report, The Nation's Energy Future, 1 December 1973 (WASH-1281) was submitted by Dr. Dixy 

Ray, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. See also Eugene Ayres and Charles Scarlott, En

Sources: The Wealth of the World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952). 

18 NASA TM X-71523, November 1973. See also Wind Energy Conversion Systems, Workshop Proceedin

NSF/RA/W-73-006, 1973. NSF's Research Applied to National Needs Directorate (RANN) had a s

power research program begun in 1971. See also "Solar Energy as a National Energy Resour

NSF/NASA Solar Energy Panel, December 1972. NTIS No. PB-221-659. 

19 "Solar Electric Replaces Kerosene and Diesel for Arizona Indian Village," Lewis News, 5 January 1979. 

system was dedicated in January 1959. 

20 James Burnett to Director, 11 October 1974. File marked Ground Based Electric Power, Educatio

Services Office, NASA Lewis Research Center. 

21 Henry Kosmahl's invention, the Multistage Depressed Collector (NASA TN D6093, 1971) was patente

1972. It is used in NASA's communications technology satellites like the ACTS. In 1987 NASA won 

Emmy Award for outstanding achievement in television engineering because of the improvement

television broadcasting brought about by the development of communications satellites. See L

News, 2 October 1987. 

216 
y

(, , , ) $

23 This program is discussed in detail in Jeffrey L. Ethell, Fuel Economy in Aviation, NASA SP-462 (Washing

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 29-42. 

24 Ethell, Fuel Economy in Aviation, p. 43-57. 

25 John McCarthy, "Meet the Director," 8 November 1978. 

26 The National Research Council Thrbine Engine Test Facilities Committee, Advanced Gas Thrbine En

Development: The Potential Role of the NASA Lewis Research Center (Washington, D.C.: National Acad

of Sciences, 1977). 

27 Ibid. 

28 A lengthy discussion of Lewis's transition to computer analysis can be found in the transcript of Interv

with William McNally by V. Dawson, 4 March 1985. 

29 "McCarthy Testimony Underscores Manpower Restraints at Lewis," Lewis News, 17 July 1981. 

30 Eugene J. McAllister, ed., Agenda for Progress: Examining Federal Spending (Washington, D.C.: The Heri

Foundation, 1981), p. 171-172. Some in Washington saw the Lewis closing as a fait accompli; 

example, a headline for the Defense Daily, "Budget Cuts Forcing NASA to Close Lewis Research Cen

FY '83 Aeronautics Budget Halved to $139 million." (vol. 119, no. 25, 9 December 1981). 

31 Transcript of Interview with William H. ("Red") Robbins by Michal McMahon and V. Dawson, 15 M

1986. 

32 See James R. Hawker and Richard S. Dali, "Anatomy of an Organizational Change Effort at the Le

Research Center," NASA Contractor Report 4146, April 1988. 

33 Joseph F. Shea, "NASA Short on Research Budgeting," The Cleveland Plain Dealer, 1 August 1988. S

chaired the Council's committee on space technologies to meet future U.S. needs. 

2
L_ 
~(~ ( 

~Ill ESSAY ON SOURCES 

For a general overview of NACA history, I relied on Alex Roland's Model Research: 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958 (NASA SP-4103, 1985), based on docum

from the Washington Office, and James R. Hansen's Engineer in Charge: A History of Lan

Memorial Research Laboratory (NASA SP-4305, 1987), which draws extensively on documents f

Langley's archives. I found many of the views in Arthur L. Levine's dissertation, "United St

Aeronautical Research Policy, 1915-1958" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 19

provocative, if not solidly documented. Levine's views should be supplemented by Ira H. Abb

''A Review and Commentary of a Thesis by Arthur L. Levine Entitled U.S. Aeronautical Po

1915-1958" (April1964, typescript, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C.). Jerome C. Huns

presents an uncritical review of NACA achievements in "Forty Years of Aeronautical Resea

1915-1955," Smithsonian Report for 1955 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 19

p. 241-271. See also the portrait of Lewis drawn by James R. Hansen in Aviation's Golden 

Portraits from the 1920s and 1930s, edited by William M. Leary (Iowa City: University of I

Press, 1989). Two histories of Ames Aeronautical Laboratory are also helpful: Elizabeth Mueng

Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1976 (NASA SP-4304, 1985) 

Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965 (N

SP-4302, 1970). Frontiers of Flight: The Story of NACA Research (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1

by George W. Gray is a concise descriptive history of the NACA to 1948; it contains some g

detail on the early years of the Cleveland laboratory. 

John Holmfeld's unpublished study, "The Site Selection for the NACA Engine Rese

Laboratory: A Meeting of Science and Politics" (Master's Essay, Case Institute of Technol

1967), presents a well-documented story of the influence of personalities over objective cri

in the selection of the Cleveland location. I supplemented Holmfeld's work with the Gre

Cleveland Growth Association Records, 1881-1971, Minutes of the Cleveland Chambe

Commerce, Ms. 3471. Also, Corporate Records of TRW, Inc. Ms 3942, Records 1900-1969, S

I: Corporate Records; Sub-series B: Loose Papers consisting of correspondence 1926-66 and S

II: Histories, Series V: outside activities. They provide a clearer picture of the role of Frede

Crawford, whom I also interviewed. 

The only published source for Lewis history is Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion F

1945-1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978) by John L. Sloop. It contains many revealing historical det

particularly about the period of the 1950s. Although Sloop focuses on the historical developm

of the use of liquid hydrogen as a propulsion fuel, he relates the work at Lewis on high-en

219 
I located Lewis records after consulting a log containing Records Transmittal and Rece

forms. These included boxes 220, 221, 231 , 257, 290, 295, 296, 297, 298, and 299 listed un

Code 1300. These records, although historical, are no longer complete, but the product of c

siderable consolidation by records managers. I refer to documents from these boxes in my tex

NASA Lewis Records, although I understand they will soon be shipped to the National Archi

and Records Service. The photograph collection is stored at Plum Brook. A chronological log 

photographs, with short descriptions, can be found in the Photography Laboratory. In additi

there is a Motion Picture Log and a separately prepared catalogue of NACA films, many of wh

are of considerable historical interest. 

The Lewis Library has nearly all the back issues (1942-present) of the Lewis newspap

called successively Wing Tips, Orbit, and Lewis News. In addition, the telephone directories fr

1943 to the present have been bound. These are helpful for lists of personnel and, in the la

years, organizational charts. The library has retained loose-leaf notebooks of NACA Inspecti

held every three years from 1947 to 1966. In addition, l used a loose-leaf notebook mark

"History" which contains the texts of the "Smoker Talks" given by visiting dignitaries and s

talks given by the division heads in the early 1940s. The notebook also contains additio

miscellaneous material, such as clippings and quotations from magazine and journal articles

I found the references in NACA technical papers to be valuable historical sources. I u

NACA Annual Reports, Wartime Reports, Memoranda, and Notes. In particular, the Langley file, 

index of NACA reports by author, was useful as reference. The Lewis Technical Library has a g

collection of aviation journals, most beginning in the 1940s; a few, such as the Society 

Automotive Engineering, go back to the 1920s and 1930s. I also consulted Lewis records stored 

the Federal Archives and Records Center, Chicago, Ill. The records consist of four boxes of NAC

Lewis Lectures, Speeches, Thlks, and Broadcasts (January 1944 through December 1954). Sim

records at the Federal Archives and Records Center in Dayton, Ohio, consist of 19 boxes 

speeches, talks, and papers by Lewis authors, filed alphabetically by author's name. These co

the period 1951 to 1954 and 1955 through 1966. A collection of Centaur program records is sto

in the vault of the Developmental Engineering Building at Lewis, for which Craig Waff an

prepared an inventory in September 1986. 

Documents from the NASA History Office, Washington, D.C., also proved invaluab

Biographical files contain miscellaneous correspondence, transcripts of interviews, speeches, a

photographs. An index to the Walter Bonney interviews was useful in locating these intervie

There are also interviews conducted by Eugene Emme of several key Lewis personnel. 

To study the transition from the aircraft piston engine to jet propulsion, I began with 

Origins of the Thrbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) by Edw

W. Constant II. Robert Schlaifer and S.D. Heron's The Development of Aircraft Engines; The Devel

ment of Aviation Fuels: 'IWo Studies of the Relations Between Government and Business (Cambrid

Mass.: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1950) was an invalua

source for factual information about aircraft piston engines and the early development of jet p

pulsion. For a glimpse of the role of George Mead on the Power Plants Committee, see Cary H

Mead, Wings Over the World (Wauwatosa, Wise.: The Swanset Press, 1971). Especially helpfu

Frank Whittle's "The Early History of the Whittle Jet Propulsion Gas Thrbine," Proceedings of 

Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 152 (1945), p. 419-435, and jet: The Story of a Pion

220 
Development of Jet Propulsion," in jet Propulsion Engines, edited by 0. E. Lancaster (Prince

Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 3-53, which includes discussions of rocket propulsion. I 

disappointed to find very little serious scholarly work on the transfer of German scientists 

their technology to the United States after World War II. It was clear to me from studying 

references in papers published by Lewis staff on various aspects of jet propulsion that Ger

work on turbine cooling, inlets, and compressors was often the starting point for much crea

work. Clarence G. Lasby's Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New Y

Atheneum, 1971) is helpful but superficial. I also perused the ALSOS files in the Nati

Archives, Record Group 165, Records of the War Department, General and Special Staffs, 

Intelligence Division, ALSOS Mission File, 1944-1945. At Wright-Patterson Air Force Bas

looked through sanitized ALSOS files in the History Office of the Logistics Command. 

I found my best sources in the National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md. I 

sulted "Preliminary Inventory of the Textual Records of the National Advisory Committee 

Aeronautics (Record Group 255)," compiled by Sarah Powell, June 1967, and "Special Study 

the Records of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," prepared by William 

Cunliffe and Herman G. Goldbeck, July 1973, to determine how to use this archive. An inde

the "Correspondence Files (Decimal File)" and "Correspondence of NACA Committees and 

committees,'' prepared by Richard Wood, proved invaluable. Among other records, I consu

those of the Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, which contained correspondence, but no

the minutes of the meetings. I found the missing minutes in the NASA History Office. I also fo

relevant documents among the H. H. Arnold Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Librar

Congress, Washington, D.C. 

At Wright-Patterson Air Force Base I looked for documentation to illuminate the relation

between Lewis and Wright Field, but I was unable to locate the records of the Army (later 

Force) Liaison Office. I consulted records relating to jet propulsion in the History Offices of 

Aeronautical Systems Division and the Logistics Command Division, ~nd in the Aero Propul

Laboratory. There are three catalogues of records: "Catalog of Histories and Source Materia

ASD Historical Division Files," AFSC Historical Publications Series 61-50-100, September 1

"Guide to Research Studies Prepared by Office of History Headquarters Air Force Logi

Command," 1984; and "Archival Holdings," ASD-HO, 20 June 1986. See also James St. P

"History of the Gas Thrbine Engine in the United States: Bibliography," WRDC-TR-2062. 

The importance of British theoretical contributions to fluid dynamics and compre

design is discussed in Brian Nichelson's excellent Ph.D. Dissertation, "Early Jet Engines and 

Transition from Centrifugal to Axial Compressors: A Case Study in Technological Chan

(University of Minnesota, 1988). I was not able to find any solid historical studies specific

devoted to American postwar engineering education and the importance of German and Br

science and technology in reshaping engineering curricula in the 1950s. In my discussion of L

Laboratory's relationship with Case Institute of Technology, I relied on documents from the w

managed archives of Case Western Reserve University. Records consulted there were loc

under the headings Associations and Organizations: Government Groups, NASA, 19 DC and C

Institute of Technology Engineering Department Records, 19 FL. C. H. Cramer's Case Wes

Reserve: A History of the University, 1926-1976 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976) prov

valuable background. In this chapter I incorporated parts of my article "From Braunschwei
Mechanical Engineers, 1988), p. 125-137. I am indebted to Edwin Layton, Ernst Eckert, and Sim

Ostrach for their contributions to this chapter, including an unpublished paper by Simon Ostra

"Memoir on Buoyancy-Driven Convection." 

Serious history of the commercial development of post-World War II jet engines is limit

History of the American Aircraft Industry: An Anthology, edited by G. R. Simonson (Cambrid

Mass.: MIT Press, 1968) is a collection of superficial essays that barely mentions the relation 

the NACA to industry. Charles D. Bright's The jet Makers: The Aerospace Industry from 1945 to 1

(Lawrence, Kan.: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), and The jet Age: Forty Years of]et Aviation, edi

by Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 19

are helpful, as is Keith Hayward, Government and British Civil Aerospace (Manchester: Manches

University Press, 1983). Quite amusing biographies include Sir Stanley Hooker, Not Much of 

Engineer: An Autobiography (Shrewsbury, England: A:irlife, 1984) and Gerhard Neumann, Herm

the German (New York: William Morrow, 1984). Company histories include Seven Decades 

Progress: A Heritage of Aircraft Thrbine Technology (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publishers for Gene

Electric Company, 1979); Michael Donne, Leader of the Shies, Rolls-Royce: The First Seventy-f

Years (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1981); and The Pratt & Whitney Story (Pratt & Whitn

Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, 1950). Several articles published by the Howm

Thrbine Components Corporation in the series "Classic 'Ihrbine Engines" edited by Robert 

Meyer, Jr., are useful. See, for example, Harvey H. Lippencott, "Pratt & Whitney Enters the 

Age," Casting About, 1985, and Part II, Casting About, 1986. I obtained materials relating to 

history of Pratt & Whitney and the Carrier Corporation from the United Technologies Archiv

West Hartford, Conn. 

NACA-NASA efforts in nuclear propulsion deserve a more detailed treatment than I w

able to provide. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the United States Atomic Ene

Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1969) by Richard G. Hewlett a

Francis Duncan is a valuable source. Unfortunately, I was unable to see a portion of the NA

collection in the National Archives (Record Group 255) that is yet to be declassified, despite a f

mal request. The best source for NASA's program in nuclear propulsion is James Arthur Dewa

"Project Rover: A Study of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program, 1953-1963" (Ph.D. Diss

tation, Kansas State University, 1974). This is to be published in the near future by the Smiths

ian Institution Press. 

On the transition from the NACA to NASA, Robert L. Rosholt's An Administrative History 

NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101, 1966) was dull but packed with information. I also gleaned i

portant insights about the debates prior to the formation of NASA from Enid Curtis B

Schoettle's chapter, "The Establishment of NASA," in Knowledge and Power, edited by Sanford 

Lakoff (New York: The Free Press, 1966). James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhow

A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Ma

MIT Press, 1977) also provides interesting background. Nancy Jane Petrovic, "Design for Decli

Executive Management and the Eclipse of NASA," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Marylan

1982, has a provocative thesis useful for perspective in understanding Lewis's eclipse. T. Ke

Glennan, "The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration," 1964, u

published diary, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kan., provided me with important insights into 

thinking about NASA's relationships with industry. 

222 
SP-4102, 1982). Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (N

SP-4211, 1980) provided me with a readable history of the early space program from the poin

view of someone without a NACA background. If NASA reflected the triumph of technocrac

Walter A. McDougall argues in . . . the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space 

(New York: Basic ·Books, 1985), I found little evidence of the impact of this thinking on Lew

management philosophy during the Apollo years. John Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the M

Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970) and Roger Bils

Stages to Saturn: A Thchnological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA SP-4206, 1

helped me to understand the strategy of leap-frogging the Russians in the development of lau

vehicles. Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Ap

A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (NASA SP-4205, 1975) contains a useful discussion of 

rendezvous decision, as does the recently published Apollo: The Race to the Moon by Ch

Murray and Catherine Cox (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). 

Interviews with present and former Lewis staff were often essential in helping m

understand complex technology. However, it was not always easy to weave events in indivi

careers into the larger story. These interviews can stand on their own as historical docum

They convey the enthusiasm of Lewis engineers for their work, and hopefully will provid

sights for other historians. Most of my interviews were conducted at Lewis and taped. Tho

transcribed are indicated by an asterisk. 

Harrison Allen 3/20/85 

G. Mervin Ault 

Rudy Beheim 7/11/84 

*Edmond Bisson 3/22/85 

Don Buchele and Walton Howes 7/8/86 

James Burnett 2/23/87 

*Frederick C. Crawford 4/10/85 (TRW, Cleveland, Ohio) 

*Robert English 7/15/86 

*John Evvard 6/14/87 (Gilford, N.H.) 

William Fleming 11/19/86 (Washington, D.C.) 

*Stuart Fordyce 3/3/87 

Robert Graham 2/27/85 

*Jesse Hall 7/3/85 

Melvin Hartmann 3/5/87 

Seymour Lieblein 5/14/85 

*Bruce Lundin 7/15/86 

*William McNally 3/5/85 (North Royalton, Ohio) 

*Herman Mark 3/12/85 

Carl David Miller 9/12/84 

*Wolfgang Moeckel 4/18/85 

Charles Stanley Moore 8/9/84 

James Modurelli 8/9/84 

*Hans von Ohain 2/11185 (Washington, D.C.) 
Paul Ordin 3/19/86 (Shaker Heights, Ohio) 

*Simon Ostrach 9/29/87 (CWRU, Cleveland, Ohio) 

*Ben Pinkel 8/4/85 (Santa Monica, Calif.) 

*Irving Pinkel 1/30/85 

Eli Reshotko (CWRU, Cleveland, Ohio) 

*William H. Robbins 5/15/86, with Michal McMahon 

*Larry Ross 2/3/87 

*John Sanders 4/7/86 

*Carl Schueller 10/12/84 

Abe Silverstein 10/5/84, 10/2/85 

*Harlan Simon 3/20/85 

Ed Richley 2/24/87 

John Stanitz (University Heights, Ohio) 

*Peggy Yohner 3/21/85 

224 
LAND ACQUISITIONS AN

NAME CHANGES 

./"''· 

(./ 

/ 

} . AREA 

---- CENTRAL AREA 

WEST AREA 

NASA Lewis Research Center is located on 351.32 acres of land in Cuyahoga County at 

southwest boundary of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, adjacent to Cleveland Hopkins Internati

Airport. Authorized by Act of Congress in June 1940, the National Advisory Committee 

Aeronautics acquired the original parcel of land comprising 199.7 acres from the city in 1940 

$500. Ground was broken for the NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory (AERLI on Janu

23, 1941. Research was initiated in May 1942. Formal Dedication Ceremonies were held on 

20, 1943. The laboratory was renamed the Flight Propulsion Research Laboratory on April 

1947, and the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory (LFPLI on September 28, 1948 in hono

George W. Lewis. who had been the NACA director of aeronautical research from 1924 to 1

225 
The Developmental Engineering Building (DEB) was constructed on this land in 1964. 

In 1958, upon the formation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, t

laboratory was renamed Lewis Research Center (LeRC). Between 1958 and 1962 the laborato

acquired an additional139.7 acres, known as the West Area, located in the Rocky River Valley a

jacent to the Rocky River Reservation, part of the Metro Parks System. Additional facilities we

built in this area in the 1960s. 

Between 1956 and 1977 Lewis managed the Plum Brook Station, near Sandusky, Ohio, abo

50 miles from the center. Plum Brook Station was established to provide a more remote locati

for major facilities and test operations that were potentially hazardous, such as nuclear rock

testing. Originally known as the Plum Brook Army Ordnance Works, approximately 500 acres 

land leased by the NACA from the U.S. Army in 1956 as the site for a nuclear reactor. By 19

NASA had acquired ownership from the U.S. Army of the original parcel and additional land us

for static tests of rocket systems. As of June 1968, NASA owned 5981 acres. Between 1969 a

1971 NASA purchased an additional 2100 acres to serve as a buffer zone. Because of the costs 

the space shuttle, long-range development projects like nuclear and electric propulsion had to 

curtailed. In 1973, NASA announced that Plum Brook, with its $200 million in facilities, wou

be closed. In 1977 Plum Brook was put on limited stand-by status, and the Space Power Comp

was leased to the Garrett Corporation. In April 1983, about 1500 acres of land on the perime

of the station were sold. 

226 
FACILITIES 

'1942-1987) 

The first five buildings (Hangar, Engine Propeller Research Building, Fuels and Lubric

Building, Administration Building, and the Altitude Wind Thnnel) were included in the firs

propriation by Congress in June 1940 (Appendix to Congressional Record, 11 June 1940, vol. 86

16, p. 3778). The entire appropriation was broken down as follows: 

Item 1: Power plant laboratory and shops 

Item 2: Power plant wind tunnel 

Item 3: Engine torque stands 

Item 4: Fuels, lubricants, and instruments laboratory 

Item 5: Hangar 

Item 6: Administration Building 

Item 7: Miscellaneous: heating, power, water supply, fences, 

fuel tanks 

$3,950,000 

$3,100,000 

$200,000 

$400,000 

$200,000 

$250,000 

$300,000 

$8,400,000 

The Icing Research Thnnel and the Jet Propulsion Static Laboratory were added during 

struction. The original seven buildings were completed by the end of World War II. Jet propu

and rocket facilities were added during the NACA period, and it is clear that the designs of 

of these facilities, many of which are currently in use, were developed from experience and ex

tise developed over time in smaller facilities. 

The second large-scale building program at Lewis took place during the Apollo years 

focused on nuclear rocket test facilities that were placed in operation at Plum Brook. In the 1

expansion of facilities and new construction were at a virtual standstill. The closing of al

facilities at Plum Brook (with the exception of the operation of the large wind turbine) refoc

attention on research facilities at Lewis in Cleveland. Further documentation of some of 

smaller facilities can be found by consulting Lewis Research Center: Master Facilities Plan 

(Whitley/Whitley, Inc.). 

227 
The hanger was built by the R. P. Carbone Construction Company to house various aircr

owned by or loaned to Lewis for flight research. The hangar is still in use. 

ENGINE PROPELLER RESEARCH BUILDING (1942) 

The contractor for the "Prop House" was also the R. P. Carbone Construction Compa

Research on engine cowling and cooling, engine and propeller vibration, fuels and lubricants, c

buretors, and engine installation problems was conducted in four 24-foot test cells, equipped 

test engines of up to 4000 horsepower at sea level conditions. This was the first research faci

to be completed. Research was formally initiated on May 8, 1942, in the "Prop House." 

After jet engine research became the dominant concern of the laboratory, the build

housed four test cells used for full-scale testing of jet engines. Under the supervision of 

Materials and Thermodynamics Division, the effects of stress rupture, fatigue, and thermal sho

were studied in alloys, cermets, and coatings under laboratory development. In 1958, it beca

the Electric Propulsion Research Building. 

FUELS & LUBRICANTS BUILDING (1942) 

Built by the James McHugh Company for research on aircraft engine fuels and lubrican

it originally consisted of 21 chemical laboratories, 16 physical laboratories and 13 small-scale t

engines. Basic research in fuels and lubricants never stopped at Lewis. The building is still in 

as the Chemistry Laboratory. 

ALTITUDE WIND TUNNEL (1944) 

This is historically the most important facility of the laboratory. Originally designed to t

aircraft piston engines under simulated altitude operating conditions, the tunnel was adapted 

test early turbojet and turboprop engines and ramjets. Tests provided data on the reliability a

effectiveness of engine controls and afterburners and on the flow characteristics of inlet ducts a

exhaust nozzles. Information could be obtained for the output, thrust, fuel consumption, a

temperatures of both components under test and complete engine-propeller and propulsion-u

installations. 

Contractor: Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.; Subcontractors: The Carrier Corp. (refrige

tion system and heat exchanger); Collier Co. (electric systems and installations); General Elec

Co. (drive motor and controls); York Ice Machine Co. (air dryer); Worthington Pump & Machin

Co. (exhausters); Toledo Scale Co. (balance equipment) 

The Altitude Wind Thnnel was a closed circuit tunnel with a test section 20 feet in diamet

The tunnel drive consisted of a fan 31 feet in diameter, with a drive motor of 18,000 horsepow

It was capable of producing an air velocity as high as 425 miles per hour at simulated altitu

of 30,000 feet, down to a low of 250 miles per hour at 1000 feet. The Refrigeration Plant hous

in a building next to the tunnel was designed and built by the Carrier Corporation. It contain

14 Carrier centrifugal compressors. A unique heat exchanger allowed the tunnel to be cooled 

a minimum temperature of -48°F using freon-12 as the refrigerant. To prevent exhaust gases fr

entering the tunnel air stream, the tunnel was designed with a special air scoop. The contamina

air was treated in a special exhauster building adjacent to the tunnel. 

228 
peller and engine mount, tests in the tunnel assisted in solving cooling problems on the en

for the B-29; the first wind tunnel tests on American jet engine prototypes were conducted 

Engines Tested 

Bell YP-59A (I-16 engine), February-May 1944 

Boeing B-29 (R-3350 engine), May-September 1944 

Westinghouse 19B and 19XB Thrbojet, September-November 1944 

Douglas XTB2D-1 (4360 Engine) November-December 1944 

GE TG-180 Engine and Afterburner Performance, January-February 1945; March-August 

September-December 1947 

Lockheed YP-80A (I-40 Engine), March-May 1945 

NACA Ram Jet (20"), May-June 1945; January-March 1946; August-November 1946 

Lockheed TP80S (I-40 engine), July 1945 

Republic YP-47M (Propeller Tests), August-October 1945 

Lockheed XR-60 (4360 engine), November-December 1945 

GE TG-100A Thrboprop, November-December 1945; January 1946 

Westinghouse X24C-4B engine, January-September 1947 

Johns Hopkins Ram Jet (18"), January-February 1948 

GE TG-180 (Engine and Afterburner Performance), February-April 1948 

GE TG-180G Engine and Afterburners, June-December 1948; January 1949 

NACA Ram Jet 16" Free Jet, January-_May 1949 

GE TG-190 High Altitude Starting Test, June-September 1949 

Armstrong-Siddeley Python Thrboprop, September-December 1949 

GE TG-190D, B-7, RX Engines Integrated Electronic Control Tests (347), January-June 1950 

Westinghouse 24C-7 and C-8 Engine and Afterburner Performance and Cooling Tests, 

September-December 1950 

Westinghouse 24 C-7 and C-8 Engine and Afterburner Performance and Cooling Tests, 

January-May 1951 

Westinghouse J-40-WE6, September-December 1951; January-September 1952 

Allison J-71, August-December 1952; January-February 1953 

Allison T-38, March-November 1953 

Pratt & Whitney J-57, November 1953-February 1955 

Wright J-65, March-June 1955 

Allison J-71, August-November 1955 

Avon, January-November 1955 

J-57 Noise Program, January-May 1957 

Ace Piloted Ram Jet, May 1957-January 1958 

Solid Rocket Test, February 1958; May 1958-February 1959 

Liquid Hydrogen-Oxygen Rocket Test, September 1958-June 1959 

One Axis Table, November 1958-June 1959 

Storable Propellant, 1959 (entire year) 
[Source: Ronald J. Blaha, "Completed Schedules of NASA-Lewis Wind Thnnels, Facilities and Ai

craft; 1944-1986" (February 1987)] 

After the formation of NASA, the Altitude Wind Thnnel was converted to a vacuum facili

to test rockets in 1958 and was used for spacecraft separation tests and the development of th

Mercury retro-rockets. A "Gimbal rig" was installed for astronaut training in 1959. In the ear

1960s the "space power chamber" was used to test the Centaur rocket. In the early 1980s, an e

fort to rehabilitate the tunnel for research on icing, and propeller-powered and vertical/stationa

takeoff and landing (V/STOL) vehicles failed. At present, the grand old lady stands empty. 

ICING RESEARCH TUNNEL (1944) 

The Icing Thnnel owes its existence to the much larger and no longer used Altitude Win

Thnnel. Designed to share the refrigeration system of the Altitude Wind Thnnel, its purpose w

and is to test various aircraft components under simulated icing conditions. The tunnel w

designed as an atmospheric tunnel, with an 4160-horsepower electric motor to simulate speeds 

300 miles per hour in a 6-foot wide by 9-foot long test section. Air temperature can be varied fro

30° to -45 °F. It has its own heat exchanger, similar to the one that was designed by the Carri

Corporation for the Altitude Wind Thnnel. Its spray system, designed to simulate natural icin

conditions, was inadequate until a unique vaporizing spray system was designed in about 1950 b

H. Whitaker, H. Christensen, and G. Hennings. With reliable testing possible in the early 1950

the tunnel contributed tci the development of the hot-air anti-icing systems now in general use o

jet aircraft. 

After NASA came into being, the tunnel narrowly missed being closed down. However, 

1978, with increased emphasis on helicopters and general aviation aircraft and concern over fu

conservation, interest in icing problems reawakened and the icing program was reactivated. Th

tunnel underwent a major renovation in 1986. 

It was designated an International Historic Mechanical Engineering Landmark by th

American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1987 for its unique heat exchanger and spra

system. [Sources: "Icing Research Thnnel" brochure produced for the American Society 

Mechanical Engineers landmark designation ceremony, 20 May 1987; George Gray, Frontiers 

Flight (New York: Knopf, 1948), p. 316.] 

ENGINE RESEARCH BUILDING (1942-1947) 

Throughout the NACA period, the Engine Research Building (ERB) was the research hea

of Lewis. The building consists of multipurpose flexible space covering 4.25 acres which can b

adapted to changing research priorities. It is still in use for basic research on engine systems, com

ponents, fuels, lubricants, and seals. 

At an initial cost of $9,033,000, the original equipment consisted of 30 single-cylinder te

engines, 4 multicylinder test engines, 6 supercharger test stands, 4. gas turbine test stands, a

altitude chamber for testing engine accessories, laboratories for the study of carburetors, ignitio

systems, automatic engine controls, piston rings, cylinder barrels, fuel injection systems, mixtu

ratio indicators, vibration and stress of engine parts, heat transfer, and waste heat recovery. 

230 
by Ben Pinkel. They were the prototypes for the test chambers later constructed at Lewis an

industry. They were 10 feet wide by 60 feet long, with an air supply of 80 pounds per sec

The first engine tested in this area was the Rolls Royce Nene to a simulated altitude of 64,000 

in 1947-1948. No data on succeeding tests until 1953 were available. 

The Sam W. Emerson Co. of Cleveland was responsible for the construction of the En

Research Building in addition to the Administration Building, the Altitude Wind Thnnel O

Buildings, and the Gatehouse. Subcontractors included: Feldman Bros., plumbing process pip

Martien Electric Co., electrical systems; Roots Connersville Co., exhaust evacuators; York 

Machinery Co., exhaust gas coolers; Buffalo Forge Co., cooling air fans; A.E. Magher 

refrigerated air systems; Westinghouse, G.E., and Midwest Dynamometer & Engineering C

dynamometers; Dravo Corp., air compressors; Hagan Corp. and Republic Flow Meter 

automatic controls. Charles Stanley Moore was the engineer in charge of its design. 

Research Programs in Southwest Wing 23 Four Burner Area 

J-65-B3 Inlet Airflow Distortion, December 1953-February 1954 

J-65-B3 Performance, March-May 1954 

J-65-B3 Inlet Airflow Distortion, May-August 1954 

J-65-B3 High Ram Investigation, August 1954 with engine changes 

J-47 Investigation with X-25 Fuel, September 1954 J-47-23; October 1954 J-47-17 

J-47 Thrbine Blade Temperature, October-December 1954 

J-47 and A. B. Investigation with X-25 Fuel, January-March 1955 

RA-14 Avon Investigation, March-October 1955 

J-65-W4 Thrbine Blade Investigation, November 1955-February 1956 

J-65-W4 Flight Performance and Surge Investigation, February-March 1956 

J-65-W5 X-35 Project Bee, April-November 1956 

J-65-B3 Thrbine Temperature Program, November 1956-February 1957 

J-65-W16A Short Combustor Test with X-35 and Propane, February-May 1957 

RE-3 Engine Combustor Tests, June 1957-March 1958 

5000 lb. JP-4-GOX Rocket Cooling Test, June 1958-July 1959 

Research Programs in Southwest Wing 24 Four Burner Area 

J-47 F9F Ejector Investigation, November 1953-January 1954 

J-47 Special Fuel Investigation, January-April 1954 

J-71-A2 Engine and Afterburner Investigation, April 1954-April 1955 

J-47 High Velocity Afterburner, April-September 1955 

J-47 Air Cooled Thrbine and X-35 Fuel, September-December 1955 

J-47 Air Cooled Plug Nozzle, December 1955-February 1956 

J-47-17 with x-35 Afterburner, March-September 1956 

J-65 Zip Program, July-September 1956 

J-65 W5 Bee Project Spare Heat Exchanger and Control, December 1956-February 1957 

J-65-W4 Mach 3 with Water Injection, May 1957-March 1958 

J-47 Hot Rod Engine, January 1957-March 1958 
At present 200 test installations support Lewis's work on both terrestrial and space prop

sion systems. The building houses laboratories for testing related to compressors, combusto

fuels, turbines, turboprops, bearings, seals, and lubricants. 

8 x 6 SUPERSONIC WIND TUNNEL (1949) 

The 8 x 6 Supersonic Wind Thnnel is used to study propulsion systems, including exter

studies of inlets and exit nozzles, combustion fuel injectors, flame holders, exit nozzles, and c

trols on ramjet and turbojet engines. It was originally designed as an open or non-return wind tu

nel. Because the exhaust gases, air, and noise were vented to the outside, it was described as "

87,000-horsepower bugle aimed at the heart of Cleveland!" [Donald D. Baals and William R. C

liss, Wind TUnnels of NASA (NASA SP-440, 1981), p. 53.] The noise from tunnel testing broke t

windows of the Guerin House in the Rocky River Valley next to the laboratory site. 

The name 8 x 6 refers to the size of the test section, which is 8 feet high, 6 feet wide, a

25 feet long. Speeds between Mach .55 and 2.1 (360 to 1387 miles per hour) with an altitude ran

from sea level to up to 40,000 feet are attainable. Flexible ~;ide walls alter the nozzle contour 

control the Mach number at which the tunnel is operated. A seven-stage axial compressor 

driven by three electric motors that yield a total of 87,000 horsepower. This compressor is loca

upstream from the test section. 

Because the 150,000 pounds of air per minute taken from the atmosphere contained lar

amounts of moisture, large beds of activated alumina are necessary to dry the air prior to testin

At the conclusion of each run, heating to reactivate the alumina is necessary. 

In 1950, because of excessive noise, resonator chambers were added to damp out sound f

quencies from 5 to 11 cycles per second. A reinforced concrete muffler structure attenua

sounds of higher frequencies. 

In 1956 a $2 million renovation made the tunnel capable of testing at transonic in additi

to supersonic speeds. The test section was modified by boring 4700 holes to allow the air 

"bleed" through the walls, thus eliminating the shocks and pressure disturbances at transon

speeds that caused "choking." (The concept of the slotted wall was pioneered at Langley.) 

A return leg was later added so that the tunnel could be operated as either an open syste

during propulsion system tests, with large doors venting directly to the atmosphere, or as a clos

loop during aerodynamic tests. In the late 1960s, a second 9 x 15 subsonic test section was add

for use in testing scale models or propulsion systems for vertical and short takeoff and landi

aircraft. For a list of tests conducted see Ronald J. Blaha, "Completed Schedules of NASA-Lew

Wind Thnnels, Facilities and Aircraft, 1944-1986" (February 1987). 

MATERIALS AND STRUCTURES COMPLEX (1949) 

This facility for basic research and development of materials has evolved with changi

research priorities. Initially it was used to investigate alloys and "cermets" (composites 

ceramics and metals) to be used in turbines of jet engines, where temperatures are the hotte

In conjunction with developing interest in nuclear propulsion, a cyclotron was acquired fro

General Electric in 1949 to investigate the problems of embrittlement of materials after radiatio

Research tools currently include a metallographic electron microscope, tensile and fatig

232 
ions to·variable energies to a maximum of 90 MeV. It is currently being used for cancer rese

and patient therapy through the Cleveland Clinic. 

PROPULSION SYSTEMS LABORATORY (1952, 1969) 

The purpose of the Propulsion Systems Laboratory is to test full-scale turbojet, ramjet, 

rocket engines under simulated altitude conditions. The prototypes for the test chambers o

Propulsion Systems Laboratory were designed by Ben Pinkel and placed in operation in 194

the Southwest Wing of the Engine Research Building, known as the four burner area. In 195

response to the need to test larger engines, the Propulsion Systems Laboratory (PSL) 1 and 2, 

24 feet long and 14 feet in diameter, were built on Walcott Road and were used between 1952 

1979. In 1969 PSL 3 and 4, 40 feet long and 25 feet in diameter, were added at the present 

of the Propulsion Systems Laboratory. The present laboratory can accommodate engines wi

much as 100,000 pounds of thrust. Unlike wind tunnel tests, only the engines, not the en

cowlings or mounts, can be tested in these chambers. 

PSL 3 and 4 had their own computer processing system between 1972 and 1983. It was 

around the SEL 8600 computer system, which could monitor 1600 voltage and pressure sca

inputs and 35 words of discrete inputs. The facility also supported five alphanumeric disp

Data were then carried to the IBM 360/370 for final processing. 

10 x 10 SUPERSONIC TUNNEL (1955) 

At a cost of $32,856,000, this tunnel was built under the National Unitary Wind 'fun

Plan, by Act of Congress, October 27, 1949. It was designed by Eugene Wasielewski 

continuous-flow tunnel to operate at speeds between Mach 2.0 and 3.5 (1320 to 2311 miles 

hour) at altitudes ranging from 50,000 to 150,000 feet. It can be used either as a closed-circuit 

nel for aerodynamic tests or an open-end cycle for combustion propulsion research. The m

compressor is driven by four 37,500-horsepower electric motors. A secondary compresso

quires three 33,334-horsepower motors. The flexible wall of the test section, composed of hi

polished stainless steel plates, 10 feet wide, 76 feet long, 1 3/8 inch thick, is controlled by a s

of hydraulic jacks. 

The 10 x 10 tunnel was intended to supplement the work of the 8 x 6 Supersonic W

'funnel at speeds between Mach 2 and 3.5. Altitude pressure simulation can be varied from 50

to 150,000 feet. It is particularly useful for testing full-size and scale models of supersonic ram

turbojets, and components for aircraft and missile applications. 

One of the problems that had to be overcome in the design of a supersonic tunnel to be 

for engine testing was that, as the air expanded in the nozzle during acceleration to supers

speeds, it cooled rapidly, causing condensation of the water vapor in the air. In addition to pas

the intake air over activated alumina to a dewpoint of -40°F in the air dryer, an air heater 

to be added upstream. Nevertheless, not all the problems unique to engine testing have 

solved: "The tunnel nozzle expands the air a bit too far at the higher Mach numbers, and it is 

possible to simulate altitudes below 55,000 feet where the air is more dense." [Donald D. B

and William R. Corliss, Wind Th.nnels of NASA (NASA SP-440, 1981), p. 70] 
Convair Division of the General Dynamics Corporation, wrote, "Almost needless to say, we c

sider this test a major milestone in the B-58 program. It has given us reasonable assurance t

there is no significant coupling of the engine and inlet automatic control systems. It has given 

dependable data on buzz limits of our inlet. And it has shown that the results should not 

severe, if the B-58 is inadvertently operated in the buzz region. Based on results of this test, 

have made some significant changes in the inlet control system. The net result of the above is t

we can proceed into supersonic flight testing of the B-58 with a great deal more confidence, a

with the knowledge that some very costly and time-consuming flight testing has been avoide

(Letter quoted in Wing Tips, 16 January 1957) 

The CADDE I (Central Automatic digital data encoder) was located in this tunnel. T

system translated the data from the test section to binary-coded decimal numbers, which W

recorded on magnetic tape, reduced by an electronic computer, and transmitted to the con

room of the tunnel. 

In the late 1960s the Quiet Fan Test Facility, an outdoor test stand capable of supporting 

aircraft engine fan that operates at speeds of up to 47,000 revolutions per minute, was adde

For a complete list of tests, see Roland J. Blaha, "Completed Schedules of NASA-Lewis W

tunnels, Facilities and Aircraft, 1944-1986" (February 1986). 

ROCKET ENGINE TEST FACILITY (1957) 

Because of the possible danger involved in the storage and handling of cryogenic liquid p

pellants, the Rocket Engine Test Facility Complex was built on 10 acres in the South Area, wh

it is separated by a buffer of empty land from what is called the "Central Area" of the center. T

purpose of the Rocket Engine Test Facility is to test full-scale hydrogen-fluorine and hydrog

oxygen rocket thrust chambers at chamber pressures to 2100 psia and thrust levels to 20,

pounds. Work on the design of the facility began in 1954 under the auspices of the Rocket Bra

of the Fuels and Combustion Research Division. 

As early as 1944, rocket testing had been carried on in four cinder block test cells. Th

were supplemented by four larger test cells built in the early 1950s. In 1952 the laboratory bou

a hydrogen liquefier, and a smaller prototype for the present facility was built in this area. 

The new Rocket Engine Test Facility, built at a cost of $2.5 million and completed in 19

includes two major buildings and several support service buildings. Test Stand A was designed 

sea-level testing of vertically mounted rocket engines that exhaust into an exhaust gas scrub

and muffler. The A stand has a capability of testing engines with chamber pressures up to 4

psia and thrust levels up to 50,000 pounds. 

Test Stand B, designed by Anthony Fortini and Vearl N. Huff in 1959 but not built at Le

until after 1980, can test horizontally mounted rocket engines exhausting into an exhaust diffu

cooler, and a nitrogen-driven two-stage ejector system. The B stand, for altitude testing in a sp

environment, has the capability of testing engines with chamber pressures up to 1000 psia a

thrust levels up to 1500 pounds. 

The support systems include storage dewars for cryogenic fuels and a large water reserv

Smaller buildings include a block house for observation, a puinp house, a helium compres

shelter, and a liquid hydrogen pump vaporizer shelter. In 1984 the facility was modified to p

vide the capability for testing extremely large area ratio nozzles (to 1000:1). 

234 
& Whitney RL 10 engine for the Centaur rocket and the J2 engine, with its 200,000pound thr

for the second stage of the Saturn V rocket. The hydrogen-oxygen engines currently used by 

Space Shuttle were also tested in this facility. 

For additional source information, see John L. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion F

1945-1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978); Wayne Thomas, "Description of the Rocket Engine Test Facil

(unpublished Report, Lewis Research Center, 1984); and James F. Connors and Robert G. H

man, "The Aerospace Technology Laboratory (A Perspective, Then and Now)," NASA Techn

Memorandum 82754. For information on the design of Test Stand B, see Anthony For

TNB-257-1959, TM 5-14-59E, May 1959, TMX-100, September 1959. 

DEVELOPMENTAL ENGINEERING BUILDING (1964) 

The Developmental Engineering Building was conceived and built during the Apollo 

According to laboratory lore, its K-shaped design honors John F. Kennedy. Completed in M

1964, it provided office space for 800 engineers. An L-shaped annex completed in October 1

could accommodate an additional 300 engineers. 

ELECTRIC PROPULSION LABORATORY (1961) 

The Electric Propulsion Laboratory, now in use, supplemented the early work on elec

propulsion carried out in the old Engine Propeller Research Building. Its purpose is to test elec

thrusters, spacecraft, and related equipment at an altitude range of several hundred miles w

simulated near vacuum space environmental conditions. 

It consists of two large vacuum chambers. The smaller is 63 feet long and 15 fee

diameter. This chamber can simulate environmental conditions encountered by a space vehicl

it travels from lift-off to altitudes of over 100 miles. The larger chamber is 70 feet long and 25 

in diameter and can simulate altitudes up to 300 miles. It is lined with cryogenic condensers 

operate at -300°F. 

ENERGY CONVERSION LABORATORY (1962) 

During the Apollo years, the Energy Conversion Laboratory was used for advanced st

of energy conversion and photovoltaic applications for space vehicles. In the 1970s, when 

energy crisis turned dominant research concerns away from space toward limited earth resour

research was directed toward ground-based energy systems, including improved solar cells 

electric vehicles, environmental monitoring systems for air and water pollution, and thermi

and heat pipe applications. 

ZERO GRAVITY RESEARCH FACILITY (1966) 

Designed for the study of components, combustion, and the behavior of liquids and g

under low acceleration or near zero gravity conditions, the present Zero Gravity Research Fac

was preceded by a series of experimental facilities, beginning with the elevator shafts of the 

minal Tower Building. The first so-called "drop tower" was constructed in 1956. At an initial 

of $3,370,000, the present facility consists of a concrete-lined shaft that extends 506 feet into 

ground, within which a steel vacuum test chamber 20 feet in diameter and 460 feet high has b
weightlessness. The second is to propel the object under experiment upward from the bottom 

the chamber, then let it fall back into the styrofoam bed at the bottom. This nearly doubles 

time of weightlessness to 10 seconds. 

In a study of significant landmarks in the development of manned space flight, H

Butowsky stated in "Man in Space National Historic Landmark Theme Study," May 1984: 

The Zero Gravity Facility is significant because it is the only such facility in NASA's 

inventory that can study the behavior of liquids in a low gravity environment ... Information concerning liquid sloshing which can change the center of mass of a space 

vehicle and thus effect vehicle stability and control is absolutely essential to the successful performance of liquid high-energy space vehicles such as the Centaur and 

Saturn upper-stages. The study of the effects of liquid sloshing on the performance of 

upper stage liquid rockets was therefore essential to the successful completion of the 

objectives of the American Space Program ... Research and data developed here involving the physics of liquids in a zero-gravity environment was indispensable to the 

successful development of these high-energy liquid fueled rockets. 

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CENTER (1979-1980) 

During the retrenchment period of the 1970s the Research and Analysis Center (RAC) 

the only major new facility to be built at Lewis. This centralized computer facility housed 

Univac 1100/42, purchased in 1975. Lewis acquired the IBM 370/3033 in 1980, the largest gen

purpose computer then available. This system, which replaced the IBM 360/67 in use since 1

made possible interactive calculations, graphics, and large analytical studies. Although interac

computing started in 1955, when the CADDE I system was placed in the 8 x 6 Supersonic W

'funnel, the RAC Building has facilitated the shift to the current emphasis on this "interactive

"open" computer philosophy, as opposed to the classical "batch" type or "closed shop" 

previous computer operations. 

The first computing equipment was a "differential analyzer" used to reduce icing data, 

bably acquired in 1949. Electronic, as opposed to mechanical, computing began in the mid-19

with the purchase of the IBM 604. Prior to the purchase of the CADDE system, test data w

processed from large manometer boards, which contained tubes of mercury to record pressu

Photographs were taken of the manometer boards, then the film was developed and the infor

tion transferred to IBM cards. The time lag between completion of testing and reduction of d

was usually three weeks. 

List of Batch-Type Computer systems (not inclusive) 

Differential Analyzer, 1949 

IBM 601, in use 1954-1956. A "mechanical" type system with mechanical storage, the IBM 

was programmed through a wire board with output to cards. It processed at a speed 

10 instructions per second. It was used in business data processing and later to proc

test data. 

236 
into a card reader. It was used in the 8 x 6 supersonic wind tunnel. 

Card Program Calculator (CPC), 1954-1956. Used to process scientific data, the CPC was 

grammed by cards, which eliminated the need for the wire board. 

OODAC (Our Own Doggone Automatic Calculator), 1956-1957. Designed at Lewis by the 

struments division to meet specific needs, it was a modification of an IBM 604 and was u

to process paper tape data. 

3 IBM 650 Magnetic Drum Data Processing Machines, acquired between 1955 and 1957, used 

til the early 1960s. They were used to handle analytical calculations and in a few cases 

reduction. The computer speed was 150 instructions per second. 

Sperry Rand Univac 1103, in use 1955-1966. A vacuum tube computer, input was by mean

paper tape, with output printed on flexiwriters. Because all experimental data proces

was handled by the Univac 1103, it was the most important system for the laboratory 

ing this period. Several languages for this system were developed at Lewis to adapt 

specific requirements. 

During the Apollo era, the laboratory acquired additional computing capability through the a

tion of the IBM 704, IBM 7090, and IBM 1401 and the addition of direct couple systems 

use in analytical processing. 

Cray 1S/2200, 1982-1985 

Cray X/MP-24, acquired 1985 

Interactive Systems (not inclusive) 

CADDE I (Central Automatic Digital Data Encoder). In use from 1955 to 1968, CADDE was 

first centralized computer system at Lewis and the first to record data on magnetic 

(quarter inch). It replaced the old system of processing data using banks of manome

which were then photographed and data reduced by female "computers." After the film 

developed, the information had to be transferred to IBM cards for processing. Althoug

had four tape drives, it could only record data from one facility at a time. It served 

10 x 10 Supersonic Wind Thnnel and four additional facilities. The system could pro

feedback of data during a test, making it possible to modify a test in progress. Computat

were available in the control room 30 seconds after the data were taken in the test sect

Data were recorded from Automatic Voltage Digitizers (AVDs) and from a Lewis-built Di

Automatic Multiple Pressure Recorder (DAMPR) system. 

CAD DE II, in use from 1968 to 1980, could record at rates up to 100 samples per second and c

record data from three facilities concurrently. It served 63 facilities. 

IBM 360/67, in use from 1966 to 1980 

IBM 370/3033, acquired 1980 
at Lewis since the RAC building was completed in 1980, the $6.1 million facility is intended 

research and development of the power system for the space station. This will include 

development and integrated testing of both photovoltaic and solar dynamic power systems. 

PLUM BROOK STATION, SANDUSKY, OHIO 

Located about 50 miles from Lewis, the facilities at Lewis's Plum Brook Station consis

of an Engineering Office Building and large facilities for full-scale testing of rockets (mai

nuclear) and their components. Various storage and pumping facilities for handling cryoge

fuels were also located here. 

The station included about twelve to fourteen smaller research facilities, for example, 

Cryogenic Propellant Research Facility, the High Energy Rocket Engine Research Facility, 

Nuclear Rocket Dynamics and Control Facility (1959; see description in Orbit, 31 July 1959), 

E Site Dynamics Research Facility (1960), and the Altitude Rocket Test Facility (B-1) (1961). Pl

Brook had a staff of approximately 500 people. 

Nuclear Research Reactor Facility (1956-1961) 

The original purpose of the reactor facility, designed by Ben Pinkel, was for resear

associated with aircraft nuclear propulsion. However, when the facility was completed in 19

the interest in aircraft nuclear propulsion had waned. Instead, research was directed to supp

the development of a nuclear rocket, in particular, the effect of radiation on materials. As Or

the laboratory newspaper, stated in its 14 August 1959 issue: 

The primary objective of the Nuclear Research Reactor Facility is to provide the 

means for making the various types of investigations needed to assist the development 

of the space vehicle reactor. These include pumped loop studies of the performance 

and behavior of fuel elements and other reactor components; effects of radiation on 

reactor materials and the interaction between reactor materials; the effect of radiation 

on vehicle structure, fluids, and equipment; shield studies; and nuclear physics and 

solid state physics experiments pertinent to the development of the space vehicle 

reactor. 

The 60-megawatt reactor was a modification of the Atomic Energy Commission's Materi

Testing Reactor at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. It is composed of a graphi

uranium core. The core is approximately a 30-inch cube, which holds 27 fuel elements of 

enriched uranium-aluminum alloy. The core is contained in a pressure tank shielded by spec

heavy-density concrete. Additional shielding is provided by a pool of water divided into fo

quadrants. Movable bridges permit access to the concrete platform near the top of the pressu

tank. Further containment is provided by a cylindrical steel tank. A system of water canals 25 f

deep were used to move radioactive test materials from the reactor to storage areas and to 

seven hot cells in the associated hot laboratory. 

Planning began in 1954. Authorized by Congress May 23, 1955 (P.L. 44, 84th Congress), 

selection of the site was announced on September 20, 1955, after a survey of 19 locations 

Nuclear Development Associates. Ground was broken on September 26, 1956. Construction w

238 
April 21, 1963. A ten-year operating license was granted by the Atomic Energy Commission 

April 12, 1965. The initial cost was $14,536,000. 

In 1973 the reactor was shut down. The facility is currently leased to the Gar

Corporation. 

(For specific accomplishments, see J. B. Barkley, Jr., "Significant Experiences of the NA

Plum Brook Reactor Facility," NASA TM X-52491 , 1968.) 

Hot Hydrogen Heat Transfer Facility (1966) 

Authorized in 1962 for research on nuclear rocket nozzles and their components, the faci

consisted of a heat exchanger to supply hot hydrogen gas to simulate the temperatures of a nuc

rocket reactor. It consisted of an induction-heated, graphite pebble bed heater capable 

temperatures of 3500°F. In 1971 the facility was converted to a hypersonic tunnel by the addi

of a heat ejector and three 42-inch water-cooled nozzles for Mach 5, 6, and 7 operation. [Sou

Donald D. Baals and William R. Corless, Wind Thnnels of NASA (NASA SP-440, 1981), p. 98-

Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility (1968) 

Intended for hot firings of full-scale launch vehicles under space vacuum and thermal c

ditions, the Spacecraft Propulsion Research (B-2) Facility simulated orbital altitudes of 100 m

for periods of up to two weeks. The test building is approximately 70 feet high and extends be

ground about 176 feet. It could accommodate launch vehicles 22 feet in diameter and 50 feet h

The first test in the facility was hot firing of two RL-10 engines to modernize the Centaur vehi

Testing of the NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application) propellant feed system 

also carried on here. In June 1974 it was placed on standby status. 

It was nominated for the National Register of Historic Places in May 1984. See Ha

Butowsky, "Man in Space National Historic Landmark Theme Study." 

Space Power Facility (1969) 

The facility is essentially a very large vacuum tank to provide a space environment for 

study of nuclear propulsion. At the time it was built, it was the largest in the world. The 

chamber itself is 100 feet in diameter and 122 feet high, making a high-vacuum volume of 800,

cubic feet available. It was designed to include the capability for the ground test of advan

nuclear-electric space power systems. For this reason it is surrounded by a concrete shell 6 

feet in thickness. Nuclear reactors at power levels up to 15 MW (thermal) can be safely opera

in the test chamber. Major programs: Skylab Shroud Separation Tests, Isoe Brayton Conver

Technology, Centaur/Viking Shroud Qualification, Reactor Brayton Conversion Technology, H

Voltage Solar Array and Spacecraft Technology. Placed on stand-by in 1975, the Space Po

Facility is currently undergoing rehabilitation for use in the space station program. 

MANAGEMENT 

STRUCTURE 

THE NACA PERIOD: 1942-1958 

George Lewis did not believe in organization charts, which he regarded as excessiv

bureaucratic. Lewis Laboratory during the NACA period had no formal organizational cha

although complete lists of personnel and their assigned jobs exist for January 1942 a

December 1949. 

In January 1942 the organizational structure was divided into two parts: administrati

under Edward R. Sharp, Construction Administrator, and construction under Ernest G. Whitn

Senior Mechanical Engineer. Sharp was named Manager in December 1942 and Director in 19

a position that he held through the transition to NASA. He retired in December 1960 and died 

July 1961. 

January 1943, four research divisions organized: 

Fuels and Lubricants Division, Addison Rothrock 

Thermodynamics Division, Ben Pinkel 

Engine Installation Division, E. G. Whitney 

Engine Research Division, C. S. Moore 

March 1943, Engine Research Division divided into: 

Engine Components Research Division, C. S. Moore 

Engine Research Division, John H. Collins 

April 1943, Engineering Services Division, Charles A. Herrmann 

Flight Research Division, Joseph Vensel 

July 1943, Supercharger Division, Oscar Schey 

October 1943, Engine Installation Division, Abe Silverstein 

First Major Reorganization, October 1945 

Manager: Edward Sharp 

Chief of Research: Addision Rothrock 

Executive Engineer: Carlton Kemper 

241 
Combustion, Ted Olson 

Thermodynamics, Eugene Manganiello 

Compressor and Thrbine Division, Oscar Schey 

Basic, Frank Marble 

Applied, Robert 0 . Bullock 

Engine Performance and Materials, John Collins 

Operation and controls, Arnold E. Biermann 

Engine Performance Branch, John C. Sanders 

Materials, Milton C. Shaw 

Wind Thnnels and Flight Division, Abe Silverstein 

Icing, Willson Hunter 

Flight, Joseph Vensel 

Altitude Wind Thnnel, Alfred W. Young 

Supersonic Wind Thnnels, Louis Monroe 

Assistants to Division Chief 

John C. Evvard 

William Perl 

Irv Pinkel 

Newell D. Sanders 

In August 1949 Abe Silverstein became Chief of Research to fill the vacancy created by 

transfer of Addison M. Rothrock to the NACA Headquarters office. Eugene J. Manganiello was 

pointed Assistant to Silverstein, and Jesse H. Hall was designated "Staff Assistant to the Chie

Research." Carlton Kemper, Executive Engineer, was reassigned to the Office of the Chief 

Research to report to Silverstein. All research divisions were placed under the immediate supe

sion of Silverstein. In a memo dated December 21, 1949, Silverstein stated, "To clarify the l

organization of the research divisions, the line of command for laboratory research operation 

authorized to pass through and only through the Chief of Research, Abe Silverstein, Assist

Chief of Research, Eugene J. Manganiello, and from there through the Division, Branch, Sect

and any group leadership.' ' 

John Collins was appointed Assistant Chief of Research for Coordination, Intelligence, a

Liaison. Ben Pinkel and Oscar Schey were also designated Assistant Chiefs of Research. 

Second Major Reorganization, October 1949 

Compressor and Thrbine Division, Oscar Schey, Chief 

Engine Research Division, Eugene Wasielewski, Chief 

Bruce Lundin, Assistant Chief 

Fuels and Combustion Division, Walter T. Olson, Chief 

Louis C. Gibbons, Associate Chief 

Henry Barnett, Assistant Chief 

242 
I. Irving Pinkel, Associate Chief 

Supersonic Propulsion Division, J. C. Evvard, Chief 

D. D. Wyatt, Assistant Chief 

Minor Reorganizations During the NACA Period 

The office of Chief of Research was abolished and Silverstein became Associate Directo

1952; Eugene Manganiello became Assistant Director. 

In December 1954, the Supersonic Propulsion Division was expanded to include the Sp

Projects Branch, 8 x 6 Supersonic Thnnel Branch, the Operations Branch, and the 10 x 10 Su

sonic Thnnel Branch. 

On December 22, 1955, the Flight Problems Research Division was created under I. Ir

Pinkel. I. A. Johnsen and E. E. Bisson were appointed Assistant Division Chiefs. 

Mter Ben Pinkel, Chief of the Materials and Thermodynamics Research Division, left to 

the Rand Corporation in August 1956, his division was divided into the Materials and Struct

Research Division and the Nuclear Reactor Research Division. 

Organization Under NASA: 1958-1977 

The first chart under the new NASA structure was prepared under Sharp as directo

March 1959. Although the laboratory was renamed Lewis Research Center, there was 

siderable continuity betw~en the NACA and NASA management structure until December 1

A new organizational chart prepared by Abe Silverstein after his return from Headquarters cle

shows the new division between research and development. The 1963 chart shows the proj

added to the development side. 

Bruce Lundin became Director in 1969, but the real organization changes do not show 

until 1973, when nuclear research was terminated. Charts for 1959, 1961, 1963, 1968, and 

are included to show changes in organization under the NASA structure. 
N 

+>-+>-

-

--

-

LJ 

NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CHAR

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER MAN

-

C. Kemper Adm. E. R. Sharp 

I 

CHIEF OF RESEARCH (DEPT) ADMINISTRATIVE DEPT 

A. M. Rothrock Adm. 

-

E. C. Braig, Jr. Adm 

-

BUDGET OFFICE 

----

w. J Mccann Adm. 

COMPRESSOR AND TURBINE 

RES. DIVISION 

OW Schey Adm. FISCAL DIVISION - 

----

C H Dawson Adm. 

ENGINE PERFORMANCE AND 

MATERIALS DIVISION 

J. H. Collins, Jr. Adm. -

FUELS AND THERMODYNAMICS 

-

RES. DIVISION 

B. Pinke! Adm. -

PROCUREMENT DIVISION 

-

J. R. Braig Adm. 

-

WIND TUNNEL AND FLIGHT DIVISION I LJ PERSONNEL DIVISION l _

i ' '' I 
N 

(.J1 

-

-

.... .... 

-

-

.... 

NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CHART 1952 (

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER DIRECTOR 

,...._ 

C. Kemper 

-

E. R. Sharp 

-

I 

CHIEF OF RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ENGINEERING 

A. Silverstein 

-

J. D. Tousignant 

-

W. J. McC

I I 

ASST CHEIF ASST FOR BUDGET OFFICE 

OF RESEARCH PLANNING & LIAISON 

E. J. Manganiello J. H. Collins, Jr. V. Gordon 

COMPRESSOR & TURBINE FISCAL DIVISION ENGINEERING D

RESEARCH DIVISION 

0. W. Schey 

-

E. J. Baxter 

.... 

L. J. St

ENGINE RESEARCH DIVISION CONTRACTOR & CONSTRUCTION ELECTRICAL ENGINE

- ADMINISTRATOR .... 

E. W. Wasielewski J. R. Braig K. D. Brum

FUELS & COMBUSTION CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DIVISION MECHANICAL ENGINE

RESEARCH DIVISION - .... 

W. T. Olson 

M. V. Organ H. Kotta

MATERIALS & THERMODYNAMICS PROCUREMENT DIVISION FACILITIES ENGINEE

RES. DIVISION - .... 

B. Pinkel W. Dey Jr. B. G. Gu

PHYSICS DIVISION PERSONNEL DIVISION 

- 

N. D. Sanders, I. I. Pinkel J. S. Brown 

SUPERSONIC PROPULSION DIVISION RESEARCH REPORTS DIVISION 

- 

J.C. Eward B. Mulcahey 
N 

-!'-

CJ) 

NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CHAR

DIRECTOR 

E. R. Sharp 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

BUDGET OFFICER 

E. J. Manganiello 

100 

V. Gordon 120 l 

I I 

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

CHIEF OF TECHNI

tt I. Lundin 9000 J. C. Edvvard 2000 

-

0. W. Schey 

PROPULSION CHEMISTRY ADVANCED PROPULSION PLANT 

DIVISION DIVISION DIV

- - - 

W. T. Olson 9100 W. E. Moeckel 2200 J.C. Everett 

PROPULSION AERODYNAMICS MATERIALS AND STRUCTURES TEST INST

DIVISION .... DIVISION - - DIV

C. F. Schueller 9500 S.S. Manson 2300 W. A. Egan 

PROPULSION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENT AND COMPUTING FACILITIES 

DIVISION .... RESEARCH DIVISION - - DIV

D. S. Gabriel 9600 J. H. Hall 2400 J. N. Vivian 

FUEL SYSTEMS DIVISION NUCLEAR REACTOR DIVISION FABRICATI

- - .... 

I. I. Pinkel 9700 L. V. Humble 2800 A. F. Reader 

H 

J 

I 

1 

.. _ ····--· .. . 

I 1 """"" "

l B. G. Gullick DIV
N 

+>-

-...:i 

I 

CHEMISTRY AND ENERGY 

CONVERSION 

W.T. Olson, Chief 

NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CHAR

DIRECTOR 

Abe Silverstein 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

E.J. Manganiello 

ASST TO THE DIRECTOR 

J.E. Connors 

PLUM BROOK ST

BUDGET OFFICER DIRECTOR 

V. Gordon 

A.O. Johnso

RESEARCH 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

E.J. Manganiello 

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

J.C. Eward 

RESEARCH PLAN AND DE

PROGRAMS 

S.C. Himmel, Chief 

INSTRUMENT AND MATERIALS ANO FLUID SYSTEM COMPONENTS COMPUTING STRUCTURES 

I.I. Pinkel, Chief J H Hall, Chief S.S. Manson, Chief 

E.E. Bisson, Asst. Chief R.E. Tozier, Asst. Chief G.M. Ault, Asst. Chief 

SYSTE

ANO 

H.M. 

I I 

ELECTROMAGNETIC ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL SERVICES 

PROPULSION ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

O.W. Schey, Chief 

WE Moeckel, Chief H.C. Barnett C.A. Herrm

1

ann, Assoc. Chie
248 

BUDGET OFFICE 

V. Gordo 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

FOR RESEARCH 

E. J. Manganiello 

DIRECTOR 

Abe Silverstein 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

E. J. Manganiello 

PLUM BROOK STA

A. D. Johnson 

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

FOR RESEARCH 

OFFICE OF RESEARCH 

PLANS AND PROGRAMS 

J. F. Connors, Chief 

NUCLEAR REACTOR 

DIVISION 

L. V. Humble, Chief 

MATERIALS AND 

STRUCTURES DIVISION 

S. S. Manson, Chief 

CHEMISTRY AND ENERGY 

CONVERSION DIVISION 

N. D. Sanders, Chief 

J. C. Evvard 

ELECTROMAGNETIC 

PROPULSION DIVISION 

W. E. Moeckel, Chief 

FLUID SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS DIVISION 

I. I. Pinkel, Chief 

INSTRUMENT AND 

COMPUTING DIVISION 

J. H. Hall, Chief 
I 

I I 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR CHIEF OF TECHNICAL 

FOR DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 

B. T. Lundin 0 . W. Schey 

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE 

DIRECTOR FOR ASSOCIATE CHIEF OF 

DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL SERVICES 

Vacant C. A. Herrmann 

I 

OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT 

PLANS AND PROGRAMS 

C. F. Schueller, Ch ief 

CENTAUR PROJECT 

D. S. Gabriel , Manager 

AGENA PROJECT 

S.C. Himmel , Manager 

CHEMICAL ROCKET 

SYSTEMS DIVISION 

I. A. Johnsen, Chief 

I I 

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ASSISTANT DIRECT

FOR ADMINISTRATION FOR PUBLIC AFFAI

H. C. Barnett 

OFFICE OF RELIABILITY 

AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 

R. R. Godman, Ch ief 

SPACE POWER SYSTEM 

DIVISON 

B. Lubarsky, Chief 

SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY 

DIVISION 

J. H. Childs, Chief 

ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT 

AND EVALUATION 

DIVISION 

H. M. Henneberry, Chief 

W. T. Olson 
DIRECTOR 

Abe Silverstein 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR --1 NASA REGIONAL AUDIT O

E. J. Manganiello 

ASST. TO THE DIRECTOR N. A. Crowe 

J. F. Connors 0100 

r 

""""''"~ PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFF

V. Gordon 0105 W. T. Olson 

~ EDUCATIONAL SERV

OFFICE 

C. W. Weiss 

1 TECHNOLOGY UTILIZ

OFFICE 

P. E. Foster 

I 

ADVANCED RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1 PUBLIC INFORMAT

OFFICE 

J. C. Evvard 3000 H. W. Harris 

RESEARCH 

1--· INSTALLATIONS BRANCH 

A. R. Steiner 3010 

I 

ELECTROMAGNETIC 

DIVISION 

PROPULSION c~,= ,. '"'""~ ... ., W. E. Moeckel 3100 C. Evvard 3200 

I 

AERONAUTICS DIVISIONS POWER DIVISIONS 

5000 J ROCKETS AND VEHICLES DIVISIONS 

E. J . M anganiello 2000 B. Luba rsky S. C . Himme l 9000 

~ AIRBREATHING ENGINES 4 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION J 1 LAUNCH VEHICLES DIVISION 

DIVISION DIVISION 

J. H. Childs 2100 L. Rosenblum 5100 E. A. Jonash 9300 

~ WIND TUNNEL AND FLIGHT ~ SPACE POWER SYSTEMS J 4 CHEMICAL ROCKET DIVISION I DIVISION DIVISION 

M. A. Beheim 2200 A. E. English 5200 LA. Johnsen 9500 

~ SPACE POWER SYSTEMS 1 NUCLEAR SYSTEMS DIVISION J 1 ADVANCED SYSTEMS DIVISION 

DIVISION 

S. S. Manson 2300 L. V. Humble 5200 H. V. Humble 5300 

~ INSTRUMENT AND COMPUTING 1 FLUID SYSTEMS COMPONENTS J 1 SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY 

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

J. H. Hall 2400 A. Ginsburg 5400 C. C. Conger 9700 1 SPECIAL PROJECTS DIVISION I N. D. Sanders 250Q 

250 

~ ----· " ~ ·-· 
PLANS AND PROGRAMS OFFICES 

L. J. Obery 0170 

I 

TECHNICAL SERVICES 

W. A. Egan 7000 

L 

I 

OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION 

AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW 

C. F. Schueller 0180 

1 TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEMS OFFICE 

W. F. Dankhoff 0181 

1 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEMS OFFICE 

W. H. Beckett 0182 '----------' 

RELIABILITY AND QUALITY 

ASSURANCE OFFICE 

S. M . Perrone 0183 

AEROSPACE SAFETY RESEARCH AND 

DATA INSTITUTE 

I. I. Pinkel 4000 

I I 

ENGINEERING SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

A. R. Godman 

B. G. Gulick, Asst. 

8000 H. C. Barnett 1000 

I 

PLUM BROOK STATIO

A. D. Johnson, Director 

J. A. Braig, Deputy Director 

J ROCKET SYSTEMS 

l G. Hennings 

J REACTOR DIVIS

l H. B. Barkley, Jr. 

1 SPACE POWER FA

DIVISION 

J. C. Nettles 

H ADMINISTRATION D

S. J. Protisk, Sr. 

u FACILITIES SERVICE 

l H. L. Hoover 
r------------""1-------Em r---A;;"c;~7v;.;e-;;; ---, r-- A;,;Y~R '; IT-;- -~ ----.--------' 

DIRECTOR 

-----..., 

I 

~-:,;A A;:G-;M ;

0100 

I COMMAND LIAISON OFFICE I I RESEARL~~~R~~bE~,;'PMENT I I U Col H l Staubs 0140 : I J Acuna. D1rector I 

L--------- -- ~ ~~:_~J_::~:I~If: :.~QO-~ 

252 

I 

DIRECTOR OF AERONAUTICS 

S. C H1mmel 

AIRBREATING ENGINES 

DIVISION 

J B Esgar J A Esterly . Asst Ch1el 

2000 

2100 

WIND TUNNEL AND FLIGHT 

DIVISION 

M A Behe1m 

J C Sanders. Asst Ch1el 

V STOL AND NOISE 

DIVISION 

W L Stewart. Act 

2200 

A W Schroeder Assoc Ch1et 2500 

FLUID SYSTEM COMPONENTS DIVISION 

A GinSburg 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

TECHNOLOGY 

B Lubarsky 0100 

I DIRECTOR OF 

SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS 

J H Ct"lllds 3000 

I 

CTS PROJECT OFFICE 

H 0 Stone 

SPACE FLIGHT SYSTEMS 

STUDY OFFICE 

J N SPJO 

3100 

3400 

SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY 

DIVISION 

H W Plohr 

E W 0110. Asst Ch1el 

E H Dav1son. Asst Ch1el 3300 

DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL 

SERVICES 

J F Connors 

B A Harr1son. Assoc D1r 7000 

SAFETY AND PROJECT INSTRUMENT APPLICATIONS PLANNING OFFICE OFFICE 

A A Maurer 7010 1--f- Vacan1 7020 A L Walker. Jr Deputy 

TEST INSTALLATIONS FACILITIES OPERA TtONS 

DIVISION AND MAINTENANCE 

f- f- DIVISION 

8 A HarriSOn 7200 A B Szuha1 7300 

FABRICATION DIVISION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY 

DIVISION 

F VanHoff 7400 f-~ L A Howe 7500 

--

I MIDWEST RE

I D T sm,lh 

L ______

I 

DIRECTOR OF 

SPACE TECHNOLOGY AND 

MATERIALS 

G M Ault 5000 

I 

DIRECTOR OF 

LAUNCH VEHICLES 

E A Jonash 

W A Dunbar. Deputy D1r 

W Dey . Jr Assoc 01r Bus 

ENERGY CONVERSION AND 

MATERIAL$ SCIENCE 

DIVISION 

L Ros~nblum 5100 

POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION 

A E English 

S J Kaufman . Asst Ch1el 

PHYSICAL SCIENCE 

DIVISION 

w E Moeckel 

H A Kautman . Ass! Ch1el 

5200 

5400 

MATt: AIALS AND STRUCTURES DIVISION 

S S Manson 

J C Freche. Assl Ch1el 

A w Hall Asst Ch1el 5500 

BUSINESS MANAGEM

OFFICE 

GDICA DIVISION 

RESIDENT OFFIC

A E Jumont 

ATLAS CENTAU

PROJECT OFFIC

0 J Shramo 

C 8 Wentworth Dep Mgt 

TITAN CENTAU

PROJECT OFFIC

A J Stolan 

CHEMICAL PROPUL

DIVISION 

H W Douglass 

DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING 

SERVICES 

H E Fnedman 8000 

ENGINEERING DESIGN 

DIVISION FACILITI

W J McCann 8500 -r-- H E Fnedma

CONSTRUCTION DIVISION 

D J Kellher 8700 

- "'"- ------
Vacant 

r DIRECTOR OF 

CENTER DEVELOPMENT 

CHIEF SCIENTIST 

DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE 

SAFETY RESEARCH AND 

DATA INSTITUTE 

0110 

0120 

F E Belles 0150 

I 

MANAGEMENT OFFICES 

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 

J M Earls 

SECURITY 

A W Ga.nes 

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 

AND PLANNING 

E A A1chley , Act 

PATENT COUNSEL 

N T Mus•al 

CHIEF COUNSEL 

w A Brahms 

LABOA·MANAGEMENT 

RELATIONS 

M B Gordon 

OCCUPATIONAL 

MEDICINE 

J J Gutan 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY 

1001 

1002 

1003 

1004 

1005 

1006 

1007 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

MANAGEMENT 

H C Barnell 0100 

I 

PERSONNEL DIVISION 

G Mac•an 

C E Forbes , ASS! Ch1el 

COMPUTER SERVICES 

DIVISION 

A K Everett 

1100 

1300 

I 

RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL 

MANAGEMENT DIVISION 

V Gordon 

PROCUREMENT DIVISION 

F H St•ckney 

H C Moore Jr Asst Ch•el 

MANAGEMENT SERVICES 

DIVISION 

J J Modarelll 1900 

1200 

1400 

QUALITY 

RELIAB ~~ ASSURANCE ILITY AND H Ferguson 1008 ~ 

W F Dankholt 0170 

DIRECTOR OF PLUM BROOK STATION 

A D Johnson 6000 

ROCKET SYSTEMS DIVISION SPACE POWER FACILITY 

DIVISION 

G Hennmgs 6100 -1-- D H Re1lly. Jr 6300 

ENGINEERING DIVISION ADMINISTRATION DIVISION 

A D Johnson Acl1ng 6soo t--1-- A J Koch 

FACILITIES SERVICE 

DIVISION 

l w Kr avse Ac1 6700 

6600 

TECHNOLOGY UTILIZA

PUBLIC AFFAIRS O

W T Olson 

INDUSTRIAL PROG

J E Bwnell 

-------

EDUCATIONAL SER

C W WeiSS 

TECHNOLOGY UTIL

P E Fosler 

PUBLIC INFORMA

H W Harfls 
N 

CJ1 NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CH

r---------------,--------

1 I 

DIRECTOR 

J F McCarthy, Jr 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

B Lubarsky 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

, ______ _! ________ l r ______ _J _______ S C Himmel 0100 

I NASA I I AIR FORCE I 

I OFFICE OF AUDIT SYSTEMS COMMAND I 

I NE REGION LeRC BRANCH J I LIAISON OFFICE I 

I R D Rhodes 0160 I I MaJ A J Willoughby 0140 I 

I 

OFFICE 

OF 

TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION 

AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

I 

OFFICE 

OF 

RELIABILITY AND QUALITY 

ASSURANCE 

------

r 

_____

I PROPU

I U S ARM

I 

I J Acur10, 

L 

_____

I 

CHIEF SCIENTIST 

W T Olson 0110 W F Dankhoff 0170 W E Moeckel 

I 

DIRECTOR 

OF 

AERONAUTICS 

I 

DIRECTOR 

OF 

SPACE SYSTEMS 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

I 

DIRECTO

OF 

ENGINEERING S

W l Stewart 2000 D J Shramo 6000 J B Esgar 

G M Ault 

DIRECTOR 

OF 

ENERGY PROGRAMS 

4300 

I 

MANAGEMENT 

R E English H 0 Slone L J Ross 

DIRECTOR 

OF 

LAUNCH VEHICLES 

9000 
NASA-LEWIS ORGANIZATION CH

r------------

I 

STAFF ADVISORS OFFICE 

CHIEF COUNSEL OF 

CHIEF SCIENTIST EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 

SPECIAL ASSISTANT 

FOR BUSINESS 

MANAGEMENT J E Burnett 

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR 

OF OF 

AERONAUTICS ENERGY 

M A Behe1m 2000 H 0 Slone 4000 

N 

CJl CJl 

0110 

L J Ross 

DIRECTOR 

A J Stofan 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

J M Kl1neberg 0100 

------,--

I 

OFFICE NASA OFFICE O

OF INSPECTOR GENE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT leRC FIELD OFF

OPPORTUNITY 

C E Bailey 0180 R D Rhodes 

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR 

OF OF 

SPACE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EN

6000 M J Hartmann 5000 

BUDGET 

'1942-1977) 

A comparison of the budgets of the three NACA laboratories shows that throughout 

NACA period, Lewis had an only slightly lower total budget than Langley. In contrast, A

received sometimes less than half that of the other two laboratories. This is because, even in 

NACA era, Lewis depended on large facilities for engine testing. They are expensive to build 

to run. 

During the NASA period, between 1959 and 1968, the Lewis budget was substantially la

than that of Langley or Ames, a fact that reflects the greater number of development proj

supervised by Lewis. Construction of the large rocket test facilities at Plum Brook was begu

this time. In 1963 funding for the construction of NASA facilities reached its height, with L

receiving $44.8 million. This figure can be compared to funds for the construction of facilitie

Langley at $9.8 million, Ames at $14.4 million, and Kennedy Space Center at $334 million

terms of the total NASA budget, Lewis had become a small fish in a very large pond. Neverthel

between 1959 and 1965, the year that Lewis received its largest appropriation, its budget 

increased from $39.19 million to $393.30 million. By 1968 it had declined to an all time 

of $199.64. 

257 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 

(in dollars) 

HEADQUARTERS LANGLEY AMES LEWIS WALLOPS DRYDEN 

1940 157,946 1,641,150 104,020 

1941 196,935 2,091,889 229,307 

1942 328,979 4,215,736 828,921 421,789 

1943 371,353 6,002,447 1,604,651 4,559,693 

1944 416,586 7,667,537 2,535,386 7,972,423 

1945 407,806 10,832,226 3,050,071 10,455,750 

1946 764,200 13,616,625 4,921,660 13,930,715 

1947 623,612 11,826,315 3,962,356 12,354,438 

1948 1,392,862 13,694,187 5, 134,140 12,708,420 

1949 788,356 15,327,202 6,126,230 14,315,302 643,376 326,922 

1950 895,124 16,705,748 6,990,932 16,043,756 466,407 685,072 

1951 1,081,842 17,631,974 7,535,318 16,416,186 803,904 919,281 

1952 1,200,616 19,692,928 8,277,495 18,381,205 777,545 1,208,163 

1953 1,137,088 19,261,787 7,794,571 17,292,736 594,371 1,368,065 

1954 1,340,524 19,503,862 7,980,951 17,598,976 756,093 1,437,368 

1955 1,338,752 20,117,456 8,498,011 18,207,519 687,925 1,705,182 

1956 1,541,237 22,083,125 11,269,561 21,996,415 910,217 1,913,134 

1957 1,623,981 27,976,270 13,267,350 25,662,580 1,001,005 2,117,607 

1958 1,958,201 32,774,912 20,312,089 30,461,848 2,323,465 2,565,353 

(Not including Western Coordinating Office, Wright-Patterson Coordinating Office, Paris Office) 

Sources: The Budget, 1940-1955; NACA Annual Reports, 1956-1958; Alex Roland, Model Research 

258 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (1958-19

(in millions of dollars) 

TOTAL LEWIS 

1959 330.9 39.19 

1960 523.6 44.85 

1961 964.0 58.14 

1962 1,825.3 108.28 

1963 3,674.1 345.70 

1964 5,100.0 381.81 

1965 5,250.0 393.30 

1966 5,175.0 317.16 

1967 4,968.0 244.88 

1968 <J-,588.9 199.64 

1969 3,995.3 183.7 

1970 3,749.2 207.5 

1971 3,312.6 245.3 

1972 3,310.1 257.4 

1973 3,407.6 331. 

1974 3,039.7 303. 

1975 3,321.2 283.9 

1976 3,551.8 303.6 

1977 3,819.1 340.1 

Thtals include Research & Development, Construction of Facilities, and Research and Project Manage

monies. 

NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, vol. 1, NASA Resources (NASA SP-4012, 1988). p. 384. Lewis Res

Center Financial Office. 

LEWIS RESEARCH 

CENTER PERSONNEL 

(1941-1983) 

In 1941, a nucleus of 150 staff was transferred from Langley Memorial Aeronaut

Laboratory to the new Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory. During the NACA period, the s

remained at a relatively constant level. In 1962 the staff began to expand rapidly, reaching 

highest level in 1965, with 4,815 employees. After 1966 the staff totals began to decline. The m

dramatic reduction in staff occurred between 1972 and 1974, reaching its lowest level in 19

Source: Lewis Research Center: Master Facilities Plan (Whitley/Whitley, 1985) 

STAFF PERSONNEL (1941-1966) 

1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 196

Permanent 

Employees 150 1,084 2,613 2,723 2,718 3,815 4,577 4,805 4,815 4,8

Temporary 

Employees N/A N/A 24 29 30 32 32 32 32 

Temporary 

Summer 

Employees 0 0 0 20 65 90 100 100 170 2

Service 

Contractor 

Personnel 0 N/A N/A N/A 30 50 145 115(C) 178(C) 191

115(PB) 118(PB) 127(

C = Cleveland 

PB = Plum Brook 

261 
Permanent 

Employees 4,676 4,452 4,269 4,200 4,036 3,796 3,343 3,089 3,042 3,02

Temporary 

Employees 59 28 44 45 36 27 25 49 63 7

Temporary 

Summer 

Employees 193 103 82 98 140 129 71 132 177 17

Service 

Contractor 233(C) 221(C) 247(C) 275(C) 371(C) 399(C) 392(C) 342(C) 101(C)b 142(C

Personnel 144(PBI 137(PBI 142(PBI 107(PBI 122(PBI 122(PBI 129(PBI 113(PBI 

C = Cleveland 

PB = Plum Brook 

STAFF PERSONNEL (1977-1983) 

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 

Permanent 

Employees 3,013 2,914 2,848 2,822a 2,690a 2,4B5a 2,629a 

Temporary 

Employees 78 88 99 105a su~a 181a nr 

Temporary 

Summer 

Employees 176 103 67 183a 180a 1'10a 159a 

Service 

Contractor 136(C)b 245(C)b 278(C)b 518 (C)a 307(C) 323(C) 770(C)a 

Personnel 

Data as of June 30, 1984, in each case except as follows: 

aMay 15, 1984 

bMarch 31, 1984 

C = Cleveland 

PB = Plum Brook 

262 
INDEX 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) (U.S.), 168, 

188 

Aeronautics textbooks, 94 

Aircraft engines, 1-15 

-air-cooled (radial) vs. liquid-cooled, 6, 7, 8, 23-24 

(photo: 100) 

- effects of Korean War, 142-143 

-fuel conservation, 208 

-industry vs. government R&D, 8-9, 127 

-innovations, 14 

-Quiet Engine Program, 203, 204 

-superchargers, 24-25 

Aircraft Industries Association, 119 

Aircraft safety, 109-123 

-crash fire research, 117-123 

-icing research, 109-117 (photos: 111, 113) 

-lightning hazards, 120 

-seats and seating, 120 

Airfoil shapes, 4, 139-140 

Air pollution, 204, 205 

Air Transport Association, 119 

Albers, Lynn U., 102 

Alexander, Charles, 161 

Algranti, Joseph S., 122 

Allen, A.G., 50, 51 

Allen, Harvey, 73, 162 

Allen, Julian, (photo: 74) 

Allis-Chalmers firm, 47, 50, 51 , 52, 53, 66 

Allison engine, see General Motors 

American Airlines, 117 

American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). 

208 

American Legion, 151 

American Rocket Society, 154 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). 102, 

104, 137 

Ames Aeronautical Research Laboratory (Sunnyvale CA). 

6, 53, 110, 111, 112, 114, 162, 164, 179, 181 , 196 

-transfers icing research to Lewis, 113 

Anderson, U.S. Sen. Clinton B. (NM), 185 

263 

Anderson, William ].. 93 

Apollo fire (1967), 123 

Apollo, Project, 163, 164, 169, 170, 177, 180, 182, 

186, 189, 193 (photo: 194) 

Appleby, Margaret, 32 

Applications research, 109, 161, 180 

Arab oil embargo (1973-74). 206, 208 

Armstrong, Neil A., 197 

Armstrong Siddeley firm, 66 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency, see Marshall Space F

Center 

Arnold, U.S. Army Gen. Henry Harold, 6, 9, 19, 25

41 , 48-49, 51 , 57 

-(photo: 111) 

-1942 directive, 19 

Astronaut training, 121-122, 213 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (U.S.). 77-78, 156, 

196, 207 

AT&T Bell Laboratories (Murray Hill NJ), 181 

Ault, Mervin, 193, 213 

Automobile engines, 42-43 

Aviation Writers Association, 65 

Axial-flow compressor, 52, 57, 66, 91 , 139-140 (ph

50, 69, 140, 141, 142) 

Ayer, Bruce, 73 

Ayres, Eugene, 206-207 

B-17 "Flying Fortress" (U.S.), 25 

B-29 "Superfortress" (U.S.), 29, 65 

Baehr, E.F., 193 

Baeumker, Adolf, 5 

Baldwin, L.V., 158 

Banks, F. Rodwell, 71 

Barna, Gerald, 207 

Barnett, Henry C., 118 

Battelle Institute (Columbus OH), 72 

Beam, Walter !., 11 

Becker, John, 79 

Bee, Project, 155, 166 
Benser, William A., 140 

Bernardo, Everett, 82 jphoto: 83) 

Bernatowitz, Daniel T., 207 

Berry, Major John, 13 

Betz, Albert, 7 4 

B.F. Goodrich Co. jAkron OH), 110 

Big Joe, 121, 177 

Bisson, Edmond, 72, 92-93 

Black, Dugald 0 ., 119 

Blackshear, Perry, 103 

Blunt body theory, 162 

Bolton, Rep. Frances P. jOhio). 65 

Botta, U.S. Navy Cdr. Rico, 7 

Boeing firm, 204 

Boelter, L.M.K., 98, 114 

Bogert, U.S. Army Col. H.Z., 132 

Boksenbom, A.S., 158 

Bolz, Ray, 95 

Bossart, Karl, 189 

Bowden, Dean, 114 

Bristol firm, 66 

British aviation, 5, 6, 7, 41, 49, 66, 71, 74, 81; 89, 118, 

131, 136-138, 139-142, 196 

-superiority of engines, 136-138 

Brooklyn Bridge, 168 

Brown University, 102 

Brun, Rinaldo J., 116 

Brush Development Co., 90 

Buller, Elmer, 121 

Bullock, Robert 0 ., 140 

Burton, Harold H., 13 

Busch, Arthur M., 119, 121 

Busemann, Adolf, 43, 67, 74 

Bush, Vannevar, 6, 9, 11, 14, 29, 46, 48, 50-51, 53, 77, 82, 

114 jphoto: 127) 

-on competition, 82 

-on fundamental research, 71, 84, 89, 180 

Business Week, 162 

Bussard, Robert W., 184 

Caldwell, Frank W., 8 

California Institute of Technology, 46, 48 

Calvert, Clyde S., 82 

Campini, Secondo, 48 

Canright, Richard, 155 

Cape Canaveral jFL). 121, 169, 190, 192 

Carrier Corp., 27, 28, 29 

Carrier, George F., 102 

Case School of Applied Science jlater Case Institute of 

Technology), 91 , 93-97, 150, 156, 163, 177, 195-196 

Centaur, see rockets 

Childs, Howard, 160, 185 

Christie, A.G., 47 

City College of New York, 35 

Civil Aeronautics Administration, 111, 112, 118-119 

Clarke Thomson !Philadelphia), 3 

264 

- -Hopkins International Airport, 197 

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 13 

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 21, 182 jcartoon: 80) 

Cleve-land Press, 36 

Cleveland Pneumatic firm, 11, 33 

Cohen, Clarence B., 92, 153 

Cold War, 97, 136, 144, 159, 161, 162, 213 

Collins, John, 71 , 136 

Columbia University, 152 

Communications satellites, 207 

Compound engines, 70, 82-85 

Compressor research, 139-141 

Concorde !British-French), 196 

Conger, C.C., 193 

Conrad, E.W., 183 

Constant, Edward W. , 44 

Constant, Hayne, 49, 140 

Contracts, 192, 202-203 

Corn blight, 205 

CorneU University, 101 

Cortright, Edgar M., 160, 164, 183, 188, 190 

Crash photography, 119 

Crawford, Frederick C., 10, 13, 177 

Crop diseases, 205 

Davidson, E.H., 193 

DeBus, Kurt H., 190 

DeFrance, Smith, 8 

De Havilland firm, 66, 138, 143 

Deissler, Robert, 101 

Dennis, W.R., 121 

Department of Energy jU.S.), 207, 210 

Department of Transportation jU.S.), 203, 206 

Deutsche Versuchsanstalt iDYL). 5, 25, 66-67, 97 

Diesel engines, 23-24 

Dietrich, Joseph, 76 

Differential analyzer, 114-115 jphoto: 115) 

Disher, John, 75, 164 

Dobso , Wilbur, 188 

Doolittle, James, 160 jphoto: 121) 

Douglas Aircraft firm, 155, 204 

Douglas, Donald, 11 

Draft, 32-33, 91 

Drake, Robert, 101 

Dryden, Hugh L., 46, 47, 89-90, 132-134, 136, 149

153, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 170, 180, 181

195 !photos: 90, 166) 

"Dryden Plan," 160, 163 

Dueled fan engine design, 48, 55 

Dunbar, Russel, 190 

Durand, William Frederick, 46-47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 

jphoto: 47) 

-visits Langley 11942), 54 

Dupont Co., 90 
Ebert, William, 66 

Echo project, 193 

Eckert, Ernst, 67, 97-98, 101, 103, 104, 153 

-heat transfer frontier, 97-99 

Ehricke, Krafft, 154, 168 

Eisenhower, U.S. Pres. Dwight D., 153, 161, 162, 163, 188 

jphoto: 166) 

Electric propulsion, 154, 156, 161, 162, 177, 179, 

185-186, 188, 203, 215 jphoto: 188) 

Emmy Award 11977). 210 

Enders, John H., 112 

Energy crisis, 206-210 

Energy research, 206-210, 214 

Energy Research and Development Administration !U.S. 

ERDA). 207 

Energy Sources: The Wealth of the World, 207 

Engineer in Charge, 162 

Engineers and Scientists Association, 208 

Engines, history of, 43 

Englert, Gerald W., 82 

English, Robert E., 156, 158, 160, 206, 207 

Environmental movement, 204 

Environmental Protection Agency !EPA) jU.S.). 204, 206 

Environmental research, 204-206 

Ethyl Corp. !Detroit), 7 

European aviation, 1, 4, 7, 72 

Everett, John, 119 

Evvard, John, 72, 74-75, 77, 92, 95, 96, 102, 153, 154, 

157, 182, 205 jphoto: 93) 

Fedden, Roy, 42 

Federal Aviation Administration jFAA), 203 

Federal Bureau of Investigation jFBI), 152 

Finger, Harold B., 140, 156, 164, 185 

Finnegan, Patrick, 207 

Fleming, William A., 182 

Flight Magazine, 131 

Ford Foundation, Ford, Helen G., 19-20, !photo: 21) 

Ford Motor Co., 90 

Fordyce, J. Stuart, 204 

Fleming, William A., 79 

Franz, Anselm, 45, 66, 95, 98 

Friction, 92-93 

Fuel economy, 205 

Fusion research, 77, 207 

Gabriel, Dabniel J., 190 

Gagg, Rudolf, 13 

Gas turbines, 3 

-Swampscott jMA) conference 11945). 79 

Gas Thrbine Collaboration Committee jU.K.), 66 

Gelder, Thomas, 114 

General Accounting Office jU.S. GAO). 152 

General Dynamics, 168, 189, 190, 192, 203 

fan design contract, 203204 

-Supercharger Division jWest Lynn MA), 41 

-Steam Thrbine Division !Schenectady NY), 47 

-selected to copy Whittle engine, 51 

General Motors !Allison Division). 7, 8, 46, 81 , 90, 

132, 133 

-Allison engine, 7, 26-27, 81 jphoto: 26) 

General Motors !Fisher Body Division). 33 

German aviation, 1, 4, 5, 6, 19, 25, 41 , 43, 46, 57, 66

74, 89, 92 

buzz bomb" IV-1 "pulse-jet" ). 67-68, !photo: 6

-education, 94, 95, 97 

Gerstein, Melvin, 153 

Gibbon, Louis C., 118 

Gildersleeve, Clifford, 10 

Gilruth, Robert, 121, 164 

Glendinning, W.G., 118 

Glenn, U.S. Marines Col./U.S. Sen. John H., 170, 21

Glennan, T. Keith, 94-95, 163, 165, 177, 179, 184-

195, 196, 214 jphoto: 166) 

Goddard, Robert H., 6, 48, 151 , 154, 168 

Goddard Space Flight Center !Greenbelt MD). 164, 

179, 180, 193 

Goett, Harry, 164 

Gold, Harold, 121 

Gordon, S., 158 

Gosney, Mary Lou, 35 

Graham, Robert W., 156, 158, 168, 206 

Gray, Robert, 190 

Gray, Vernon, 114 !photo: 115) 

Griffith, A.A., 49, 140 

Grimwood, James, 161 

Grissom, Virgil I. jGus), 122 

Groves, Leslie, 78 

Gutstein, Martin U., 207 

Gwinn, W.P., 133 

Hall, Eldon, 156, 164, 167 

Hamilton-Standard Propellers Company, 8 

Hansberry, Harvey L., 118 

Hansen, Arthur, 195 

Hansen, James, 162 

Harding Junior High School !Lakewood OH). 94, 15

Hardy, J.K., 111, 114 

Harrison, William, 32 

Hartmann, Melvin J., 140 

Harvard University, 91, 103 

Hawaii, 207 

Hayes, Wallace D., 102 

Hazon, Ronald, 7 

Hawkins, James, 32 

Heat transfer, 97-99, 101-103, 114, 168 

Heat Transmission, 98 

Hemke, Paul E., 91 

2
Herrmmn, Charles, 19-20 

Hibbard, Robert, 205 

Hicks, Bruce, 76 

High Speed Panel, 72-73 

High-speed photography, 24, 72 

Himmel, Seymour C., 193 

Hindenberg explosion 11937). 168 

Hitler, Adolf, 5, 6, 57 

Hobbs, Leonard S., 71 , 135 

Hoffer, Eric, 201 

Holliday, William T., 36 

Holmes, D Brainerd, 170, 183 

Honeywell !Minneapolis). 121 

Hosenball, Neil, 190, 192 

Howell, A.R., 140 

Hornet engines, 6 

Hrones, John, 195 

Huff, Vearl, 76 

Humble, Leroy V. , 82 

Hunsaker, Jerome, 76, 81 

Hunter, Wilson H., 110 jphoto: 111) 

Hyatt, Abe, 167 

Hyland, Robert E., 158 

Hypersonic flight, 153 

Ide, John Jay, 5 

International Federation of Professional and Technical 

Engineers, 208 

International Geophysical Year 11957-58), 149, 153, 157 

Introduction to the Transfer of Heat and Mass, 101 

Jackass Flats jNV). 184 

Jackson, Thomas W., 101 

Jacobs, Eastman N., 34, 42, 44, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57, 72, 77, 

89, 139 

Jet propulsion, 1, 23, 41-58, 65, 71 , 131, 161 

-educational challenge, 91 , 95 

-no commercial applications seen, 83 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL)jCalTech, Pasadena CA). 

70-71 , 76, 91 , 155, 180, 189, 193 

-rocket experiments, 75 

-transfers from U.S. Army to NASA j1958), 165, 179 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory jCase), 95 

Johash, Edmund R., 160 

Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, 

89, 90, 91 , 150 

Johnsen, Irving A., 140 

Johnson, Robert L., 93 

Jonash, Ed, 190 

Junkers and Heinkel-Hirth Cos., 66 

Jupiter exploration, 202 

Kalitinsky, Andrew, 47, 78 

Kantrowitz, Arthur, 77, 140 

Kaplan, George, 207 

Kaufman, Harold R., 188 

266 

Kindelberger, Dutch, 11 

Kiwanis Clubs, 151 

Klapproth, John F., 140 

Kline, DB., 113 

Klinghorn, George F., 82 jphoto: 83) 

Knocking research, 24 

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 103 

Korean War j1950-1953), see aircraft engines 

Kosmahl, Henry, 208 

Krasnican, M.J., 121 

Kroon, R.P., 53 

Kurzweg, Hermann, 74 

Lake Erie, 112, 155, 196, 204, 205 

Laminar flow airfoils, 48 

Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory !Ham

VA). 3, 7, 8, 52-53, 74, 92, 110, 121, 140, 160, 

164, 177, 179, 181, 196 

- fusion research, 77 

-LuGar Orbit Rendezvous !LOR) plan, 183 

-personnel switch to Lewis, 33-35, 72, 91, 92, 

Lausche, Mayor Frank J., 22, 36 

Lewis, George William 11882-1948), 1, 3, 14, 20, 22, 

49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 67, 72-73, 75, 136 jphotos: 2, 3

111) 

-Clevelmd lab named after, 84-85 

-testifies on budget 11940), 9 

-visits Germany 11936), 4-5, 25 

-visited by Tizard, 45 

Lewis Research Center !Cleveland) jsee also NACA) 

- aeronautics research renewed, 196 

-Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute, 

-Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory dedica

1 1943), 36, jphoto: 36) 

-Air Mobility Research and Developm

Laboratory jU.S. Army), 204 

-Altitude Chamber, 132 

-Apollo 1 fire 11967), 123 

- "Apprenticeship School," 32 

-basic research vs. applications, 99, 162, 178-

181, 193, 195, 215 

-budgets, 196-197, 202-203, 212, 213 

-Case Institute of Technology, 93-97, 195-196 

-CeGtaur/Agena project moved from Mars

11962). 190, 193 

- Editorial Office, 32 

-energy research, 206-210, 214 jphoto: 211) 

-environmental research, 204-206 

-first look by journalists 11945). 65-66 

-industry relations, 127, 208 

- groundbreaking j1941), 1, 20, 22 jphoto: 2) 

-Heritage Foundation backs closure, 213 

-IBM computers, 114, 212 

-Jet Propulsion Static Test Laboratory 11943), 42

jphoto: 58) 
possible transfer to ERDA, 208, 210 

-Project Mercury, 119, 180 !photo: 122) 

-propeller research ceremony, 21-22 

-reorganization 11945), 72 

-research agenda memo 11945), 69-70 

-rocket/space research, 151, 153, 154, 157, 159-161, 

168-169, 177, 183, 196-197 !photo: 151) 

-staff, 65, 89-91 , 164, 177, 182, 196, 202-203, 206, 

212, 213, 214 

-social life, 35 

-supersonic wind tunnel 11949). 73 

-technical library, 67 

-visit by Rolls Royce group 11955), 143 

Lewis, James P., 114 

Lewis, William, 111, 112, 114 

Ley, Willy, 151 

Liberty engine !World War IJ, 11 

Lieblein, Seymour, 140 

Lindbergh, Charles, 6 

-meets Arnold, 6 

Lippisch, Alexander, 98 

Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 168 

Littell, 73 

Littlewood, William, 83, 117 

Lockheed firm, 203 

Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, 65, 71 , !photo: 66) 

Lorin, Rene, 68 

Los Alamos iNM). 77, 90, 184 

Low, George, 101, 153, 164, 208 

Lubarsky, Bernard, 158, 160 

Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt iLFA). 67, 97 

Luidens, Roger, 153 

Lunar Excursion Module iLEMJ, 183 

Lundin, Bruce T., 82, 127, 157, 158-159, 161, 181-183, 

190, 201-203, 206, 207- 208, 210, 212 !photos: 83, 

202) 

-space research memo 11957), 159-160 

Lunney, Glynn S., 121 

Lyon, Alfred J., 51 

Malina, Frank, 46, 76 

Mach-Zehnder interferometer, 98, 101 

Malina, Frank, 151 

Mandel, George, 67 

Manganiello, Eugene, 68, 82, 94, 95-96, 157, 160, 

179-180, 184 !photos: 83, 180) 

Manhattan Project, 77, 78 

Manned Spacecraft Center !later renamed Johnson Space 

Center) !Houston TXJ, 169, 205 

Marble, Frank, 140 

Mariner project, 193, 204 

Marks, Lionel S., 91 

Martin, Glenn L., 11 

Martinuzzi, P.F., 137 

Mars exploration, 154, 156, 157, 177, 183, 185, 193, 202, 

215 !photo: 188) 

, , , , , 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology iMIT)/Radi

Laboratory, 6, 90, 101, 09, 114, 184 

-Lexington Report, 184 

MASTIF, 121-122 

Matos, Cruz, 207 

McAdams, Prof. William H., 29, 98 

McCarthy Jr., John F., 210, 212, 213 

McDougall, Walter, 162 

Mead, George, 6, 7, 8, 9, 31 , 129 

Medieros, Arthur A., 140 

Melzer, Henry, 57 

Mendelssohn, Alexander, 102 

Mercury !planet) exploration, 202 

Mercury, Project, 120, 121-122, 162, 163-164, 165, 

177, 180 !photo: 122) 

Mergler, Harry, 114, 195 

Metropolitan-Vickers, 66 

Metzenbaum, U.S. Sen. Howard !Ohio). 213 

Meyer, AndreJ., 121 

Meyer, Richard, 140 

Meyer, W.R., 121 

Mickelson, William, 160, 185 

Miller, Cearcy D., 24, 72 

Miller, Philip N., 160 

Miller, Riley, 76 

Miller, Robert R., 121 

Mirels, Harold, 92, 103, 153, 181 

Moeckel, Wolfgang C., 72, 92, 153-154, 156, 157, 

185-186, 188 

Mount Washington Research Station iNHJ, 114 

Moon !Earth's) exploration, 157, 158, 162, 164, 166, 

182-183, 188, 189, 204 

Moore, Charles Stanley, 20 

Moore, Franklin K., 92, 103 

Moore-Brabizon, British Lt. Col. J.T.C., 49 

Morris, Dorothy, 67 

Moss, Sanford, 42 

Mroz, Thaddeus S., 207 

Munk, Max, 91 

Muroc Dry Lake iCA), 19, 54, 55 

NACA Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory !Clevel

1, 8, 9 

-first budget, 9-10 

-site selection, 10, 11, 12, 13 

-renamed Flight Propulsion Research Labor

11947), 84 

-renamed Lewis Flight Propulsion Labora

11948), 84 

NACA Graduate Study Leave Act 11950), 96 

NACA Special Committee on Jet Propulsion !Du

Committee), 46-51, 53, 55, 89 

-special Washington meeting 11942), 55 

-drops Jacobs' Jeep project 11943), 56 

NACA Subcommittee on Rocket Engines, 151 
y j

1-15, 56-57 

-agreement on nuclear propulsion with AEC 11948). 

78, 156 

-Alsos mission 11945), 66-67, 71, 76 

-budget problems, 151-152, 162 

-creation 11915). 2 

-between the two world wars, 3, 79 

-McCarthism's impact on, 151-152 

-place in aviation, 34, 74, 79, 135 

-reports process, 32, 67, 74 

-space research, 149, 155, 157, 161 

-staff, 161 

-transition into NASA 11958), 163-166, 168, 170, 179 

-!'Young Thrks Dinner" 11957). 160 

National Aeronautical Research Policy 11946). 70, 84 

National Air Races, 11, 13, 14 jphoto: 14) 

National Bureau of Standards jU.S.J, 2, 23, 89 

-Buckingham report j1923). 43 

National Defense Research Committee jNDRC). 46, 89 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration jNASA). 

84, 121-123, 161, 162 

-budget, 169, 196-197, 201 

-relationship with military, 204 

-transition from NACA 11958). 163-166, 168, 170, 

179 jphoto: 167) 

National Aeronautics and Space Act 11958). 163, 179 

National Research Council of Canada, 114 

National Research Council jU.S.). 212, 215 

National Science Foundation jNSFJjU.S.J, 163, 207 

Naval Aircraft Factory !Philadelphia). 8, 9 

Naval Research Laboratory !Washington DC). 70-71, 153, 

164 

"Needle engine," 133 

Newell, Homer D., 188 

Nettles, Cary, 190 

Newton, Gaylord W., 7 

Newton's Third Law of Motion, 43-44 

New York Times, 178 

Nicks, Oran, 164 

Nixon, U.S. Pres Richard M., 207 

North American Aviation, 123 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization jNATOJ, 144 

North, Warren, 164 

Nuclear propulsion, 70, 77-78, 84, 154, 156, 158, 161, 

162, 179, 185 jphotos: 78; cartoon: 80) 

-at Lewis 11945-1972), 77-78, 156, 177, 182-185, 203, 

215 

-Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Aircraft jNEPA). 78, 

184-185 

-Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications 

jNERVAJ jRover). 185 

Nutt, Arthur, 7 

Oakar, U.S. Rep. Mary Rose !Ohio). 213 

Oberth, Hermann, 154, 168 

268 

y, 

, 

Ohio State Law School, 190 

Olson, Walter T., 72, 75-76, 91, 97, 157, 158, 160 !ph

98) 

-advocates rocket/space research, 154, 158-159 

-visits England jl947). 138 

Operation Paperclip, 74, 98 

Ordin, Paul, 76, 158 

Origins of the Thrbojet Revolution, 44 

Ostrach, Simon, 102-103, 181, 195 

Oswatitsch, Klemens, 74 

Oswatitsch, Herman, 92 

Packard Co., 81 

Page, U.S. Col. Edwin R., 7, 42 !photo: 43) 

Palasics, John, 82 

Pan Am, 117 

Pease, Donald. J., 213 

Perkins, Porter, 116 

Perl, William, 92, 102 

-arrested in Rosenbergs case, 151-152 

Perry, Len, 190, 192 

Pesman, Gerald J., 118, 119, 121 

Petroleum industry, 7 

Photos, 204 

Pinkel, Benjamin jBenj, 25, 26-27, 31, 41, 42, 55, 71, 

79, 82, 83, 84, 102-103, 113, 123, 129, 132, 141, 

jphoto: 83) 

Pinkel, Irving, 72, 112, 113, 117, 119, 121, 157 jph

121) 

Piston engines, 69, 81, 82, 102 

Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 27 

Plohr, H. Warren, 121, 193 

Plum Brook facility, see Lewis Research Center 

Prandtl, Ludwig, 5, 97-98 

Pratt & Whitney company jCTJ. 1, 8, 19, 23, 46, 66, 

81, 84, 119, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 143-

168-169, 184, 189, 204, 208 jphotos: 143, 191) 

Preston, G. Merritt, 119, 121 

Proprietary rights, 129-136 

Prutton, Carl, 97 

Puckett, Allen, 92 

Puerto Rico, 207 

Purdue University, 101 

Putnam, Palmer, 207 

Quitter, John, 190 

Rabb, Leonard, 121 

Rail accelerator, 157 

Ramjets !"flying stovepipes"). 65, 68, 70, 76, 92, 15

Ranger project, 193 

Ravenna ArsenaljOhioj crash tests, 119-120 jphoto: 

Ray, Dixy Lee, 207 

Rayle, Warren, 207 

Raytheon Corp., 103 
g, , 

Reflections on Big Science, 206 

Reid, Henry, 51, 55, 66, 160 

Reiss, Sam, 67 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 91, 164 

Rentschler, Frederick B., 6 

Reshotko, Eli, 91, 153, 195 

Ribner, Herbert, 92 

Rickover, U.S. Adm. Hyman, 103 

Ritter, William K., 140 

Robbins, William jRed), 213 

Robinson, Russell, 66-67, 73, jphoto: 74) 

Rockets, 6, 8, 48, 65, 69-70, 72, 75-76, 121-122, 149-151, 

154, 155, 158, 161, 164, 166-169 jphotos: 151, 152, 

158) 

-Agena, 193, 197 

-Atlas, 121, 168, 169, 177, 189, 197, 201 jphoto: 192) 

-Centaur, 84, 166-169, 179, 188-190, 193, 201 !photo: 

192) 

-fuels, 76, 84, 150, 151, 155, 162, 166-168, 193 

jphoto: 156) 

-Nova, 182, 183 

-Rover/NERVA, 184 

-Saturn, 166-169, 179, 182-183, 185, 189, 193, 197, 

201 

-Soviet, 151 

-Space Shuttle main engines, 202 

-Thor, 193 

-Titan, 197 

-V-2s, 6, 72, 75, 77, 99, 154 

Roder!, Lewis A., 110, 111, 118, 120 !photo: 112) 

Rohsenow, Warren, 101 

Rolls Royce Co., 66, 81 , 132, 136, 142, 143-144 

-Avon engine, 138, 144 

-Nene engine, 131, 132-135, 138 jphoto: 133) 

-Thy engine, 143 

Rom, Frank E., 158, 184 

Rosenbergs, Ethel and Julius, 152 

Rosenblum, Louis, 204, 207 

Rothrock, Addison, 23, 31-32, 71-72, 76, 90, 157 !photos: 

73, 74) 

Rover firm, 66 

R.P. Carbone Construction Co., 20 

Rutgers University, 98 

Ryschkewitsch, Eugen, 98 

Sam W. Emerson Co., 21 

Sams, Eldon W., 158 

Sanders, John C., 82, 102 jphoto: 83) 

Sanders, Newell D., 82, 157, 164 jphoto: 83) 

Saturn !planet) exploration, 202 

Saturn jrocket). see rockets 

Savino, Joseph M., 207 

Scarlett, Charles, 207 

Schey, Oscar, 24-25, 71-72, 79, 127, 136 

Schlichting, Herman, 67 

j), 

Science, the Endless Frontier, 181 

Schelp, Helmut, 98 

Schueller, Carl F., 183 

Seamans, Robert, 169, 189 

Sears, William, 92 

Selden, R.F., 118 

Serafini, John, 116 

Sharp, Edward Raymond jRay), 20-21, 27, 32, 35, 3

71, 73, 90, 141, 153, 166, 170, 212 jphotos: 22

Shepherd, Alan B., 122, 170 

Shoults, D. Roy, 49, 51, 184 

Shure, Lloyd, 207 

Siegel, Robert, 101 

Siekel, George, 207 

Silverstein, Abe, 27, 30, 58, 71, 73-74, 79, 81, 91-9

97, 99, 102, 112, 118, 137, 150, 153, 155-157, 

160, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169-170, 177

184-186, 188-190, 192-193, 197, 202, 203, 212 jph

74, 165, 194, 197) 

-retirement 11969), 197 

-landing landing "O.K." memo j1960), 164 

Simkinson, Scott, 121 

Simon, Harlan, 190, 192 

Simon, Sidney, 77 

Sloop, John, 76, 150-151, 158, 168 

Smithsonian Institution, 2 

S. Morgan Smith Co., 207 

Society of Automotive Engineers, 151 

Soderberg, C. Richard, 4 7 

Solar energy on Earth, 207-208 

Solar propulsion, 154, 186, 205 

-Sunflower, 186 

Soviet aviation research, 82, 132, 135 

Space age, 158 

Space debate jpost-Sputnik). 158-162 

"Space cadets," 157 

Space Task Force, 121 

Space Shuttle, 201, 202, 214 

Space Nuclear Propulsion Office jNASA-AEC). 185 

Space Station, 214 

Sparrow, Ephraim M., 103 

Spitfire !British), 25 

Sputnik, 149, 157-158, 162 

Squires, Arthur, 193 

Stack, John, 73, 160, jphoto: 74) 

Standard Oil of New Jersey, 90 

Standard Oil of Ohio, 90 

Stanford University, 91 

Stanitz, John, 139 

Stein, Samuel, 202 

Stevenson, Jr., A.R., 50, 53 

Stever, H. Guyford, 163 !photo: 165) 

Stever Committee, jphoto: 165) 

Stofan, Andrew J., 213 

Stokes, Louis, 213 
, , 

Surveyor program, 169, 189, 192, 204 

Supersonic flight, 70, 72-75, 92, 157, 196 

Swenson, Loyd, 161 

Taylor, Edward, 71, 135 

Thermal Radiation and Heat Transfer, 101 

Thomas, Lewis, 204 

Thomas, Ronald L., 207 

Thomas, U.S. Rep. Albert, 152-153 

Thompson, Floyd, 160 

Thompson Products (later TRW), 10, 30, 33, 90, 186, 196 

Tischler, A.O., 158, 167 

Tizard, Sir Henry 

-visits U.S. (1940). 45-46, 47 

Towers, U.S. Rear Adm. John H., 9, 46 

Tozier, Robert, 32 

Trans World (TWA). 117 

Traupel, Walter, 140 

Traveling wave tube, 208 (photo: 210) 

Treatise on Space Travel (1903), 168 

Tribology, 92-93 

Truman, U.S. Pres. Harry S, 81 (photo: 112) 

-orders crash fire program, 119 

Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin, 168 

Thrbofan technology, 203 

Thrbojet engines, 19, 30, 41, 65, 66, 70, 71, 79, 155, 157, 

177 (photos: 56, 143) 

-first flight (1939). 45 

-in commercial use, 116-117, 143 

Thrboprops, advanced, 208 (photo: 211) 

Thrner, Leroy, 92 

United Aircraft, 83 

United Technologies (Hamilton-Standard). 208 

U.S. Air Force, 84, 98, 112, 119, 134, 136, 137, 149, 155, 

162, 168, 184, 193, 196, 204, 212 

U.S. Army, 2, 55, 57, 81, 84, 119, 149, 151, 165-166, 204 

U.S. Army Air Corps./Army Air Forces, 73, 75, 78, 79, 84, 

118, 130, 131 , 132 U.S. Army Powe r Plants 

Laboratory (Dayton OH), 6, 8, 9 

U.S. Navy, 2, 53, 55, 81, 84, 131, 132, 149, 161, 162, 164 

-Terrier and Talos missiles, 84 

U.S. Weather Bureau, 2, 111 

University of Akron, 190 

University of California at Berkeley, 98 

University of California at Los Angeles, 98, 114 

University of Minnesota, 101, 103, 206 

University of Pennsylvania, 113 

University of Rhode Island, 102 

Uranus exploration, 202 

Useller, James W., 122 

Vanguard satellite program, 153, 157, 161, 164 

Venus exploration, 193, 202, 204 

Vermont, 207 

270 

g, j, 

Von B aun, Wernher (1912-1977). 6, 153, 161, 

166-170, 182, 183, 188-189, 193 (photo: 194) 

Von Glahn, Uwe, 114 

Von Karman, Theodore, 46, 76, 89, 92, 102, 129, 1

Von Ohain, Hans, 43-45, 66, 95, 97-98, 137 

V-2 rocket, see rockets 

Walker, Ernest, 119 

Warfare, 1, 15 

Warner, Edward P., 135 

War on Poverty, 196-197 

Warshawsky, Isidore, 32, 160 

Wasielewski, Eugene, 49, 139 

Wasp engines, 6 

Water pollution, 204 

Way, Stuart, 53 

Weatherhead Co., 90 

Weather satellites, 164 

Webb, James E., 123, 169, 177, 195 (photo: 178) 

Wege z r Raumschiffahrt (1929). 154 

Weinberg, Alvin, 206 

Weiss, Sol, 119 

Weske, John R., 91 

Westinghouse firm, 47, 52, 53, 54, 58, 81, 131, 132, 

137. 139, 142 (photo: 142) 

Weston M., 193 

Westover, U.S. Gen. Oscar, 5 

Whitaker, Halbert, 114 

Whitney, Ernest G., 8, 20 

Whittle Frank, 136, 139 

Whittle British Air Commodore Frank, 41, 43-45 

-Power Jets Ltd., 47, 50, 65 

Whittle engine, 49-5 1, 55, 56, 58 

Wind energy (turbines), 207 (photo: 209) 

Wind tunnels, 3, 4, 8, 12, 14-15, 53, 73-75, 90-91, 

113, 143, 163, 164, 202, 204 

-Altitude Wind Thnnel(Lewis) (opened 1944). 2

58, 73, 81-82, 110, 121-122, 127, 132, 144, 

213 (photos: 28, 66, 142, 143) 

-''duct tunnels" (Lewis), 74, 102 (photo: 75) 

-German, 66-67, 73 

- Icing Research Thnnel (Lewis) (1944-1957, reo

ed 1978), 27, 110 (photos: 116, 117) 

-' 'stack tunnels" (Lewis), 74 

-supersonic, 66-67, 72-75 

-Unitary Wind Thnnels Plan (1949). 73, 136 

Wing Tips (Lewis newspaper, later Orbit and L

News), 25, 33-35, 201 

Wolfenstein, Lincoln, 140 

Women workers, 33-34, 114-115 (photo: 115) 

Wright Aeronautical company (OH), 1, 6, 7, 8, 19, 23

50, 66, 81 , 130 (photo: 30) 

Wright Brothers (Wilbur and Orville). 1, 13, 34

(photo: 36) 

Wright Cyclone engine, 22, 29, 30 
Wynne, William, 119 

X-1, 157 

X-15, 162 

Yale University, 94, 110 

"Yankee" turbojet, 53-54, 137 

Zelanko, Charles, 110 

Zobel, Theodor, 67, 98 

Zucrow, Maurice, 151 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Virginia P. Dawson received her doctorate in the History of Science and Technology f

Case Western Reserve University in 1983. She has published numerous articles and review

well as a book on eighteenth c~ntury biology, Nature's Enigma (1987). In 1988 Dr. Dawson 

awarded the Robert H. Goddard Essay Award for her article on Lewis Laboratory's role in sha

the early years of NASA. She has taught the history of science and technology at Case Wes

Reserve University, Oberlin College, and Cleveland State University. She is currently an adj

professor at Cleveland State University. 

273 

THE NASA 

HISTORY SERIES 

HISTORIES 

Anderson, Frank W., Jr., Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1980 (NASA SP-44

2d ed., 1981). 

Benson, Charles D. , and William Barnaby Faherty, Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Ope

tions (NASA SP-4204, 1978). 

Bilstein, Roger E., Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 (NASA SP-4406, 198

Bilstein, Roger E., Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (NA

SP-4206, 1980). 

Boone, W. Fred, NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years (NASA HHR-32, 1970, multilith). 

Brooks, Courtney G., James M. Grimwood, and Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A History of Mann

Lunar Spacecraft (NASA SP-4205, 1979). 

Byers, Bruce K., Destination Moon: A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program (NASA TM X-3487, 1977, multilit

Compton, W. David, Where No Man Has Gone Before (NASA SP-4214, 1989). 

Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson, Living and Working in Space: A History of Skylab (NA

SP-4208, 1983). 

Corliss, William R., NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary (NASA SP-4401, 1971). 

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neumann Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978 (NA

SP-4212, 1984). 

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnerships: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz 'lest Proj

(NASA SP-4029, 1978). 

Green, Constance MeL., and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History (NASA SP-4202, 1970; also Washingt

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971). 

Hacker, Barton C., and James W. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini (NA

SP-4203, 1977). 

Hansen, James R., Engineer In Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 (NA

SP-4305, 1987). 

Hall, R. Cargill, Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger (NASA SP-4210, 1977). 

Hallion, Richard P., On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 (NASA SP-4303, 1984). 

Hartman, Edwin P., Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965(NASA SP-4302, 197

Levine, Arnold, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (NASA SP-4102, 1982). 

Muenger, Elizabeth A., Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1976 (NA

SP-4304, 1985). 

Newell, Homer E., Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA SP-4211, 1980). 

Pitt, John A., The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program, 1980 (NASA SP-4213, 1985). 

275 
fg y fg

Rosenthal, Alfred, Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA SP-4103, 1985). 

Rosholt, Robert 1., An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101, 1966). 

Sloop, John 1., Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978). 

Swenson, Llyod S., Jr., James M. Grimwood and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Pro

Mercury (NASA SP-4201, 1966). 

REFERENCE WORK 

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, annual volumes for 1975-1986. 

The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology (NASA SP-4009, vol. 1, 1969; vol. 2, 1973; vol. 3, 1976; vol. 4, 1978)

Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy, annual volumes with an ear

summary volume, Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1915-1960. 

Dickson, Katherine M., ed., History of Aeronautics and Astronautics: A Preliminary Bibliography (NASA HHR

1968, multilith). 

Ezell, Linda Neuman, NASA Historical Data Book, vol. II Programs and Projects 1958-1968 and vol. III Progr

and Projects 1969-1978 (NASA SP-4012, 1988). 

Hall, R. Cargill, Project Ranger: A Chronology (JPLIHR-2, 1971, multilith). 

Hall, R. Cargill, ed. Essays on the History of Rocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Third through the S

History Symposia of the International Academy of Astronautics (NASA CP-2014, 2 vols., 1977). 

Looney, John J., ed., Bibliography of Space Books and Articles from Non-Aerospace Journals, 1957-1977 (NA

HHR-51, 1979, multilith). 

Roland, Alex F., A Guide to Research in NASA History (NASA HHR-50, 6th ed., 1982, available from NA

History Office). 

Skylab: A Chronology (NASA SP-4011, 1977). 

Van Nimmen, Jane, and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, 

1, NASA Resources (NASA SP-4012, 1976). 

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie E. Karegeannes, Origins of NASA Names (NASA SP-4402, 19

276 

-1> U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991-292-