Volume 40, Number 1 Spring 2023

NASA HISTORY

NEWS&NOTES

20 YEARSAFTER STS-107

THE COLUMBIA TRAGEDY AND 

LESSONS ON SAFETY AND RISK

6 Remembering Columbia: NASA Leaders 

Reflect on Their Experiences

10 Columbia’s Impacts Today: How the 

Lessons Learned from the Tragedy 

Continue to Shape NASA’s Choices

14 How the STS-107 Accident Enabled a Path for 

Human Spaceflight Beyond Low-Earth Orbit

18 Langley Research Center: Key Player 

in Shuttle Return to Flight Effort

21 Lessons from Columbia: Building 

a Knowledge Sharing Culture

24 A Safety Lesson from an Early NACA Leader

27 Learning from NASA’s Launch Failures 

2 From the Chief Historian • 29 News from NASA’s Centers

31 Other Aerospace History News • 33 Apollo Astronaut 

Walter Cunningham Dies at 90 • 35 Remembering Douglas 

Mudgway, Engineer and Author • 36 Upcoming Meetings

The STS-107 mission patch featuring the names of the 

crew members who perished on 1 February 2003 is superimposed on a photo of the sunrise as seen from Space Shuttle 

Columbia during the STS-107 mission. (Photo credit: NASA)

NASA HISTORY OFFICE

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

1 FEBRUARY 2003, 8:59AM (CT)—

LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM COLUMBIA. 

The following hours, days, months, 

years were painful for NASA. Moving 

on was difficult. Learning the lessons 

from the accident was critical. As this 

year marks the 20th anniversary of the 

tragedy, we look back in remembrance 

of the loss of the crew, identify the 

key lessons learned, and consider how 

those lessons and their historical context resonate today. 

The essays in this issue of News & 

Notes explore the historical context and 

legacy of the Columbia accident from 

several perspectives. Earlier this year, I 

spoke with several NASA leaders to get 

their thoughts on what they believed to 

be the most critical points of this history as well as how that history should 

be applied to NASA’s current missions. 

A few important themes came up consistently in those conversations: the 

importance of remembering the lessons 

of the past, the central role of diversity 

and inclusion to safety culture, a concern about a potential “communication 

gap” between younger and experienced 

engineers, and the critical part played 

by Agency leadership. 

Serving as pilot for both STS-92 and 

STS-112, NASA Deputy Administrator 

Pam Melroy is no stranger to spaceflight 

or the Columbia tragedy. In the aftermath of the accident, Melroy was part 

of the Columbia Reconstruction Team 

as lead for the crew module and Deputy 

Project Manager for the Columbia 

Crew Survival Investigation Team.1

Melroy remembers the moments after 

the accident when it became evident 

that the crew of STS-107 was indeed 

lost. “There is a mental barrier you cross 

when you realize there is something 

that seems so terrible, you can’t even 

think [it] can actually happen.”2

Melroy points to the importance of the 

Agency’s Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, 

and Accessibility (DEIA) efforts. 

Melroy remarks, “the importance to 

Flowers frame the names of the Columbia crew carved onto 

the black granite surface of the Astronaut Memorial Mirror at 

the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex as seen on the first 

anniversary of the accident. (Photo credit: NASA) 

From the Chief Historian

2
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

safety culture [is] that everyone feels 

safe speaking up and... welcome to 

have their voices heard.... I think Bob 

[Cabana] has done a great job, especially with our governance councils, to 

make sure that people’s voices are heard 

or that he is expecting people to ask 

hard questions and have that kind of 

culture in place.”3

Much like Melroy, NASA Associate 

Administrator and former astronaut 

Bob Cabana remembers STS-107 all 

too well.4

 Cabana came to NASA seven 

months before the 28 January 1986 

Challenger accident—an experience 

that also left a lasting impact on him. 

From his time as a test pilot in the 

Marine Corps, Cabana understood the 

inherent risks involved in this line of 

work, that this was “part of our business 

that we are in...this is gonna happen. 

But the truth is, it wasn’t acceptable. 

When you go back and read through 

the Rogers Commission report, it 

could have definitely been avoided.”5

Both Melroy and Cabana noted the 

importance of maintaining an institutional memory of the accident. 

Standing 20 years from STS-107, little of the management and leadership 

structure from 2003 remains at the 

Agency. Cabana noted a moment from 

his time as Center Director at Kennedy 

Space Center in which he asked the 

audience how many of them were 

there for the last Shuttle mission, 

“About a third of the auditorium raised 

their hands. How do we teach them 

this lesson?”

Echoing Melroy’s comments, Cabana 

noted the importance of clear channels 

of open communication and the right 

to speak up to voice potential concerns:

It’s really important. Every new 

SES [Senior Executive Staff ] 

that we onboard, I talk to them 

about the importance of communication, the importance 

about creating an environment 

in your meetings that is inclusive, where everybody feels free 

to contribute without fear, retribution, and how important it 

is that when you’re running a 

meeting not to tell people what 

you think, but to get their input 

first, so that when we make our 

decisions, we’re making our 

decisions with the best information that we have. We’re making informed decisions, and 

it’s really important to have an 

inclusive, diverse team so you 

get all the data to make that 

informed decision.6

Talking with NASA leadership about 

the Columbia tragedy invited me to 

reconsider a few seminal works on the 

issues of design and accidents. There 

exists a vast literature on the topic of 

design, risk, and characterization of 

accidents. Three in particular offer 

analyses and frameworks useful to contextualizing the lessons of STS-107 and 

Standing 20 years 

from STS-107, little of 

the management and 

leadership structure 

from 2003 remains at 

the Agency.

Astronaut Pam Melroy spoke to members of the Columbia Reconstruction Team during 

transfer of debris from the Columbia Debris Hangar to its permanent storage site in the 

Vehicle Assembly Building in September 2003. More than 83,000 pieces of debris were 

shipped to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) during search and recovery efforts in East Texas. 

(Photo credit: NASA) 

From the Chief Historian (continued)

3
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

are reflective of the common themes 

that emerged in the conversations with 

leadership. 

Professor of Engineering at Duke 

University, Henry Petroski, argues that 

“design is Janus-faced, looking always 

backwards and forwards.” In his formulation, the past serves as both a 

source of inspiration and imperfection 

to be improved upon. Petroski’s key 

insight is that this “repository of downright failures, monuments to ignorance, 

excessive optimism, and hubris” offers 

the engineer a choice: “If heeded, the 

past thus provides caveats and lessons 

for future designs. If shunned, it will 

still haunt the future, always lurking in 

the shadows of success.”7

One of most impactful contributions 

of sociologist Diane Vaughan to the 

topic is the concept normalization of 

deviance. Here, Vaughan contends that, 

over time, an unsafe practice becomes 

“normalized” or accepted as its continued manifestation in performance 

does not bring about failure. Vaughan 

began from the premise that “risk is not 

a fixed attribute of some object,” but 

something “constructed by individuals 

from past experience and present circumstance” that was then “conferred 

upon the object or situation.” Since risk 

was filtered through an individual’s 

worldview, understanding it was subject to different experiences, assumptions, and expectations. For Vaughan, 

the problem is that a “particular object 

or situation with a readily ascertainable 

capacity for harm (like a knife) can be 

interpreted differently by different people.” This problem leads ultimately to 

uncertainty when the risks associated 

with the technology were “no longer 

an immediately knowable attribute of 

the object.”8

Like “blow by” and erosion of the Solid 

Rocket Booster (SRB) O-ring leading 

to the Challenger accident, foam debris 

from the External Tank was representative of Vaughan’s normalization of 

deviance. Design requirements were 

violated by debris strikes similar to 

what was experienced with O-ring failures on the SRB joint. Even though 

requirements spelled out that, “no 

debris shall emanate from the critical 

zone of the External Tank,” foam debris 

persisted throughout the program.9

 In 

fact, during the launch of STS-112 on 

7 October 2002—just months before 

STS-107—a substantial bipod-foam 

debris strike occurred. Pam Melroy 

was the pilot for STS-112 and noted an 

occurrence from that Shuttle mission: 

During my second flight, a 

piece of foam hit the skirt of the 

SRB and dented it. That should 

have been a red flag. There was 

just a belief that foam would 

disintegrate and couldn’t damage anything.10

Petroski adds an additional layer 

to Vaughan’s thesis pointing to the 

contention of Phil Sibly and Alastair 

Walker, who argued that roughly every 

30 years, one generation of engineers 

replaced another. Using the analogy 

of bridge design, Petroski argues that 

new designs usually present a novelty 

and challenge to engineers. But when 

older designs or technologies become 

“commonplace,” younger engineers 

consider them “normal technology,” 

forgetting the “assumptions and challenges” at the foundations. In this 

success paradigm, engineers develop 

“no great respect or fear of it.” What 

emerges is a communication gap 

between one generation of engineers 

and the next. Petroski makes this 

explicit to the NASA context, noting 

that at the time of the Columbia accident, a quarter of the NASA workforce 

Astronaut Bob Cabana, Director of Flight 

Crew Operations at Johnson Space Center 

at the time, spoke on 6 February 2003 at a 

special memorial ceremony at the 

Washington National Cathedral, honoring 

the Space Shuttle Columbia crewmembers. 

(Photo credit: NASA) 

From the Chief Historian (continued)

...when older designs 

or technologies become 

“commonplace,” 

younger engineers 

consider them “normal 

technology” forgetting 

the “assumptions and 

challenges” at the 

foundations.

4
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

were nearing retirement age and most 

of the engineers who remembered the 

hard learned lessons of Challenger had 

moved on to management positions.11

A third, but critically important argument for remembering tragedy was 

made more recently by Hal Brands and 

Charles Edel. While their focus is on 

creating stability in the geopolitical 

order, Brands and Edel offer lessons 

equally valuable to NASA’s workforce. 

Exploring the theatrical tragedy in 

ancient Greece, the authors argue that, 

for its Greek audiences, “dramatic 

representations of tragedy were public 

education” intended “to serve as both a 

warning and a call to action.”12 Brands 

and Edel contend that by experiencing the negative lessons of their shared 

history as a community, “the tragedies 

pushed the Greeks to grapple with 

their own frailty and fallibility,” forcing “discussions of what was needed to 

circumvent such a fate.”13

Each year at the end of January, the 

Agency recognizes the sacrifices of 

Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia. 

Reflecting on these three tragedies 

offers a moment to stop, examine, and 

refocus our priorities in human spaceflight. As Brands and Edel contend, 

the Greeks understood that the value 

of theatrical tragedy was to keep the 

hard-learned lessons and experiences 

of the past in the forefront of the viewer’s mind—that to forget the painful 

past only increased the likelihood of its 

recurrence. 

Taken together, these three works 

offer critical insight into the historical lessons offered by Columbia. The 

final conversation I had in this series 

of interviews was with Mike Ciannilli, 

Program Manager for the Apollo, 

Challenger, Columbia Lessons Learned 

Program (ACCLLP) at NASA. While 

discussing the mission of his critical 

program, Ciannilli reinforced the message from Melroy and Cabana as well 

as the purpose of this issue of News & 

Notes:

If you truly want to plan your 

course into the future, you have 

to have a clear understanding 

of where you’ve been and that 

is directly related to Columbia. 

Understanding the conditions 

and the circumstances that lead 

us to losing Columbia, we must 

authentically and clearly understand what those were. Going 

forward, NASA has a very exciting and challenging future. But 

to realize that, we must understand the significant challenges 

in getting there. When we look 

back to the past as our roadmap, 

we can see the missteps that 

came at a high cost.14 

Brian C. Odom

Chief Historian

Endnotes

1 Pa m Melroy NA SA Biography: 

https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasadeputy-administrator-pam-melroy/

2 Pam Melroy interview with the author, 

17 January 2023. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Bob Caba na NA SA Biography: 

https://www.nasa.gov/biographies/

associate-administrator-robert-cabana

5 Bob Cabana interview with the author, 

15 February 2023. 

6 Ibid. 

7 Henry Petroski, Success through Failure: 

The Paradox of Design. (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 2018, 2nd 

Edition), 163.

8 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch 

Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 

Deviance at NASA. (Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 1996), 62–63.

9 Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

Report Volume I. Washington, D.C., 

August 2003, 122. https://history.nasa.

gov/columbia/reports/CAIBreportv1.

pdf

10 Melroy, interview, 17 January 2023.

11 Petroski, Success through Failure, 

174–175. 

12 Hal Brands and Charles Edel, The 

Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World 

Order. (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2019), 8.

13 Ibid., 10.

14 Michael “Mike” Ciannilli interview 

with author, 16 February 2023. 

Reflecting on these three 

tragedies offers a moment 

to stop, examine, and 

refocus our priorities in 

human spaceflight.

From the Chief Historian (continued)

5
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Remembering Columbia

NASA Leaders Reflect on Their Experiences

» Interviews by Brian Odom, NASA Chief Historian

I

N JANUARY AND FEBRUARY of 

this year, I discussed the lessons 

from the loss of Space Shuttle 

Columbia on 1 February 2003 with 

several current and former members 

of NASA’s leadership, inviting their 

perspectives about the value of this 

history. During our conversations, I 

asked each of them about their own 

experiences during the Columbia accident, how those experiences impacted 

their careers moving forward, and 

about how the lessons of Columbia 

might inform our current missions. 

Jody Singer 

DIRECTOR OF THE 

MARSHALL SPACE 

FLIGHT CENTER 

Read her NASA biography

Personal Experience 

Columbia was my first launch as the 

Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) 

Project Manager. We had what we 

thought was a successful launch. The 

motors had performed as expected. 

What we didn’t realize was that the 

External Tank debris issue was more 

than a maintenance issue; it was a flight 

critical issue. I remember where I was 

and what I was doing that morning: I 

was at home, watching the Columbia 

landing on the TV. I watched in disbelief and listened for news about the 

fate of the astronaut crew. It seemed 

immediately that my world turned 

upside down. I began receiving calls 

about the accident and began calling 

my team into work to start the mishap 

investigation.

Moving Forward

Being new as the RSRM Project Manager, 

I had to rely heavily on the team, especially the NASA Chief Engineer, Steve 

Cash, my deputy Rick Burt, and my 

counterpart at the prime contractor 

(ATK), Cary Ralston. 

From a leadership perspective, 

Columbia helped reinforce for me the 

importance of having a team that feels 

empowered, trusted, and valued; creating an environment where the team 

feels free to speak up; the importance 

of knowing that not one person has all 

the information and expertise to get the 

best answer, rather it’s the combined 

efforts of a diverse and united team; and 

the importance of a well-trained team 

that pays the lessons learned forward.

Lessons for Current Missions

For me [the Columbia accident] reinforces the need to make sure we “pay it 

forward” to the team so that we don’t 

make the same mistakes. Not forgetting about the past helps remind us 

of how hard human space exploration 

can be: we can be more cost efficient, 

but can’t afford to make uninformed 

decisions. Human spaceflight and what 

we do is risky, but we can’t be so riskaverse that we sit on the ground. What 

we do is important for our Nation, our 

economic and technological growth, 

and for inspiring the next generation. 

I can’t imagine our lives without exploration, science, and the technological 

development benefits we get from 

pushing for the impossible. The importance of a clear understanding of roles, 

responsibilities, and accountability has 

always been critical, but it is even more 

critical today as we rely heavily on partners (commercial and international) 

and as the government is expected to 

be less involved.

W. Russ 

DeLoach

NASA CHIEF OF 

SAFETY AND 

MISSION ASSURANCE

Read his NASA biography

Personal Experience 

I was the Chief of the Shuttle Processing 

Quality Engineering Branch at the 

time of the accident. It was a beautiful 

Saturday morning, and I was coaching 

a soccer game when I got a call on my 

Blackberry. One of my folks was on the 

Shuttle Landing Facility and they told 

me that Columbia had not arrived as 

scheduled. It was a most surreal conversation. It was hard to imagine what 

was going on and where the vehicle was, 

but my mind did not first go to a catastrophic accident. I guess we wanted to 

believe there was some strange occurrence that would shortly be understood, 

and she would be landing soon. Of 

course, not long after that initial call, 

it became very clear that the worst had 

happened.

After the accident, we quickly shifted to 

a recovery operation, and it was intense. 

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NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

KSC Safety and Quality personnel 

were highly desired in the field in East 

Texas as we had hands-on experience 

and could recognize the hardware. My 

role was identifying people with the 

right expertise and managing rotations 

to field sites. Getting volunteers was 

not difficult, everyone wanted to “do 

something,” a way to deal with our 

grief. But the field work was both physically and emotionally demanding, and 

people could push themselves too far. 

Recognizing and managing the stress 

in others became a major focus of my 

role in Columbia recovery.

Moving Forward 

As I reflect on my experiences in the 

aftermath of the Columbia mishap, I 

would say two things stand out as lessons that have affected my approach 

to work. Firstly, be very careful about 

what you classify as “routine.” This 

is probably similar to the concept of 

normalization of deviance, but perhaps 

more subtle. Over time, as things go 

right, we can lose appreciation for the 

difficulty and risk associated with the 

mission. That is a mindset I am forever 

more conscious of avoiding. And number two, we have some incredibly talented and passionate people who work 

for this Agency, and sometimes they 

need help in not taking on too much. 

And the greater the pressure, the more 

important it is for leaders to recognize 

and manage our workforce’s stress.

Lessons for Current Missions 

We all know that space flight is hard 

and brings with it inherent risk. We 

work every day to make risk-informed 

decisions and mitigate and accept risks 

based on the information available. 

But with the Columbia accident—just 

like with Challenger before it—we 

see that it isn’t just the technical risk 

we need to guard against. Our missions are also impacted by human 

and organizational behavior. The root 

cause of the incident was a foam strike 

that breached Columbia’s left wing 

leading edge. The program had seen 

foam shedding on every Shuttle flight 

without any major consequences and 

therefore determined that foam wasn’t 

a problem. Normalization of deviance, a process where a clearly unsafe 

practice comes to be considered normal if it does not immediately cause 

a catastrophe, was occurring just as it 

had on Challenger with the O-rings. 

As an organization, we were repeating 

the same behaviors with Columbia 

as we did with Challenger. We start 

to think things are acceptable simply 

because they haven’t caused a problem, 

allowing success to blind us to the need 

to fully understand anomalies. There 

were people who recognized that a 

consequential foam strike occurred, 

but their concerns were dismissed 

as acceptable and never surfaced to 

higher levels of the organization. The 

same organizational silence factors that 

doomed Challenger were repeating 

themselves years later and contributing 

to the loss of Columbia and her crew. 

As an agency we must establish a culture of openness where everyone feels 

safe reporting concerns without fear of 

reprisal. We must work hard to listen to 

each other and speak up when we have 

concerns. And leaders need to guard 

against their own cognitive biases.

People put more emphases on safety 

or safe practices when a past experience has impacted them personally. 

The percentage of NASA’s civil servant workforce that did not work here 

during the Columbia or Challenger 

accidents is staggering. Over 60% of 

the current workforce was not here 

for Columbia and over 90% was not 

here for Challenger. That means the 

vast majority of our employees do not 

have those personal ties to those hard 

lessons, putting the onus on those of 

us that were, and on leadership, to 

keep those lessons alive. Only through 

our continued sharing of these stories 

can we prevent history from repeating 

itself. One way NASA aims to do this 

is through requiring all NASA civil servants to complete a case study focused 

on key lessons each year in conjunction 

with the Day of Remembrance. When 

you look back at the Challenger and 

Columbia accidents you can clearly 

see the similarities in their contributing factors. The NASA Safety Center 

lays out these lessons and others in 

the annual Day of Remembrance case 

studies to keep our workforce vigilant. 

Safety is NASA’s first core value—it is 

the cornerstone upon which we build 

mission success. We must all resist 

complacency. We cannot remain silent 

if we see something we feel is unsafe. 

And we have to allow people to come 

forward with their concerns without 

fear of repercussion. 

From a Safety and Mission Assurance 

perspective, programmatic changes 

came about as a result of the Columbia 

investigation. 

NASA implemented the Technical 

Authority (TA) model to ensure that 

engineering, health, and safety are able 

to maintain a level of independence. 

This creates a healthy tension between 

the three TAs and Programmatic 

Authority resulting in a strong system 

of checks and balances. Technical 

Authorities also support the Formal 

Dissent process, which provides a path 

outside of the program for substantive 

disagreement to be elevated in certain 

Remembering Columbia (continued)

7
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

cases all the way to the Administrator 

if necessary. And of course, the NASA 

Safety Reporting System, implemented after the Challenger accident, 

still provides a direct way to report 

concerns anonymously.

NASA also introduced the Safety 

Culture model. The model is based on 

five criteria, or factors, (reporting, just, 

flexible, learning, and engaged) that 

when implemented together result in 

an environment where safety is a priority and everyone works safely, feels 

comfortable reporting safety concerns, 

learns from mistakes and successes, 

and feels confident balancing challenges and risks while keeping safety in 

the forefront.

We have the opportunity to NOT repeat 

the mistakes of the past. We can create a safer and more successful future. 

However, to do so, it takes a great deal 

of focus, hard work and unwavering 

commitment on everyone’s part. 

Ralph Roe 

FORMER NASA 

CHIEF ENGINEER

Read his NASA biography

Personal Experience 

At the time of the accident, I was 

responsible for the Space Shuttle orbiter 

fleet and a member of the Space Shuttle 

Program leadership team. The important first-hand experience I would 

convey to future Program/Project 

Managers is the environment we were 

dealing with just prior to the accident 

is very similar to the environment that 

every program or project must deal 

with today. 

There was schedule pressure, the future 

of the Shuttle Program was uncertain 

at the time, and we were attempting to complete construction of the 

International Space Station (called 

Core Complete) by February 2004. 

This required a very aggressive manifest 

with little to no margin and we had to 

report to Headquarters every month 

on how well we were doing on that 

schedule. Someone even had the “great 

idea” of putting countdown clocks 

on our computers, so whenever your 

computer went to sleep you would see 

a countdown to February 2004. That 

was just a symbol (and a bad idea), but 

there definitely was schedule pressure. 

There was budget pressure. The Space 

Shuttle did not achieve the efficiency 

first envisioned for a reusable spacecraft, and many in Washington, D.C. 

felt the Space Shuttle Program was too 

expensive and should be terminated to 

free up budget for future programs. 

To reduce the cost of the Shuttle 

Program we spent much of the last 

half of the 1990s reducing the Shuttle 

workforce by 50%. We also studied Shuttle privatization, thinking 

a private company could operate the 

Shuttle less expensively. Just prior to 

the accident, we transitioned our 

prime orbiter contractor, Boeing, from 

Huntington Beach to Houston, Texas, 

again to reduce costs. Unfortunately, 

we only captured about 20% of the 

Boeing workforce and lost a great deal 

of experience and expertise. 

There were many technical challenges 

in the Space Shuttle Program. We even 

coined a term at the time, “Orbiter 

Scramble,” because it seemed our 

orbiter team was always scrambling to 

develop flight rationale for technical 

problems on our next flight, even while 

we were on the launch pad. The worst 

part is our normal processes didn’t seem 

to catch the problems, but rather technicians and engineers made “diving 

catches” and heroic efforts to uncover 

these technical problems. Every program will have similar schedule and 

cost pressure and will have to deal with 

many technical challenges. What is 

important is how you deal with those 

pressures. In hindsight, at the time of 

the Columbia accident our team did 

not deal with those pressures well, so 

we want future programs to learn to 

deal with those pressures better than 

we did.

Steve Stich, 

PROGRAM MANAGER

FOR NASA’S 

COMMERCIAL CREW 

PROGRAM

Read his NASA biography

Personal Experience 

At the time of STS-107 I was working 

as STS-107 Orbit-1 Flight Director 

in Mission Operations and Weather 

Flight Director for launch and landing. 

I was on the Flight Director console 

with LeRoy Cain when the accident 

happened. I knew the crew very well, 

having worked with them on the mission design and in preparing and training for the mission.

I participated in the accident investigation on a NASA scenario team that 

worked to determine the cause of the 

accident. We laid out 10 scenarios that 

could have been the initiating event 

for the events that unfolded during 

Columbia’s entry. We methodically 

attempted to match the data that we 

had from the recovered debris, the 

Remembering Columbia (continued)

8
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

telemetry data in real-time, and the data 

recovered from the MADS [Modular 

Auxiliary Data System] recorder. The 

team was able to determine that failure 

of the left wing leading edge Reinforced 

Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system (TPS) associated with 

the debris impact matched all the data.

Moving Forward

Columbia was a life-changing event for 

me. It was certainly one of the worst 

days of my life, and absolutely the worst 

day of my 35-year career at NASA. We 

had failed the crew as a team and as an 

organization. 

On a personal level as I contemplated 

the accident cause, I realized that 

I did not know as much about the 

Space Shuttle design as I should have 

in my operational roles in the Mission 

Control Center (MCC). I began to 

dig into problems outside my area of 

expertise to understand the vehicle 

better in terms of materials, stress 

analysis, and so on. This allowed me 

to become a better engineer, manager, 

and flight director and to gain experience such that I could evaluate on my 

own whether a risk was reasonable to 

fly with or whether hardware needed 

to be replaced, for example. I worked 

to learn more and more details on each 

and every problem that we encountered 

for the rest of my time on the Space 

Shuttle Program. 

I also learned that the Program and 

Engineering teams needed to give the 

operations team the best possible vehicle for flight. Although the operations 

team can remedy certain failures and 

develop workarounds, there are many 

elements of the vehicle (e.g., structure, tanks, propellant lines, thermal 

protection system) that must work as 

designed. I began to focus more on 

solving problems before flight versus 

building contingency procedures for 

second and third level failures. 

I left the operations area in 2008 to 

join the Space Shuttle Program. I have 

been in Program or Engineering organizations ever since. I have been in 

the Commercial Crew Program since 

late 2015.

Lessons for Current Missions

Human spaceflight requires constant 

attention to detail. Every aspect of the 

flight needs to be constantly examined, 

including in-flight data, post-flight 

inspections, imagery, and more. We 

need to continue to dig into items 

each flight that do not appear to be 

performing as designed. Loss of foam 

was occurring on many Shuttle flights, 

back to STS-1, yet little was done 

to understand, rectify, or bound the 

potential damage or in-flight impact. 

Sometimes we can see subtle signs of 

potential issues in the pre-flight testing phase when data is examined very 

carefully. When we find those items, 

additional testing, analysis, and in 

some cases a redesign may need to 

be performed. There is no substitute 

for understanding the hardware and 

systems that we are flying. We need 

to have a learning culture where we 

continuously evaluate how the vehicle 

is performing in flight. Many times, 

additional analysis and testing may not 

totally reflect the way that the vehicle 

is flying. There is no room for complacency and overconfidence in human 

spaceflight. 

Human spaceflight is inherently risky, 

and it is far from 100% safe even after 

all the years of U.S. and Russian flights. 

It is critical to maintain the right skills 

and experience within the contractor 

and NASA workforce to verify that 

the vehicles are flying as designed. 

Engineers with the right skills and attitude are critical to fly safely. They need 

to be hungry, dig into data, examine 

the hardware, and evaluate how the 

design is performing.

G. Reid 

Wiseman, 

FORMER CHIEF OF 

THE ASTRONAUT 

OFFICE

Read his NASA biography

Lessons Learned 

To me, we should always demand data, 

even when it seems obvious what the 

answer should be. Can foam insulation 

damage the orbiter? The simple answer 

seems to be “absolutely not.” But without data we should not jump to that 

conclusion. Additionally, the current 

review processes with program managers and tech authorities, to include the 

crew onboard, are absolutely critical 

and should always be held with complete openness, willingness to listen, 

and willingness to do the right thing.

Moving Forward

In the Astronaut Office, the Columbia 

crew and their patch are displayed frontand-center in our conference room. 

There is not a day that goes by that we 

don’t think of them, the Challenger 

crew, and the Apollo 1 crew. Whether 

working on a new vehicle design, sitting in Flight Readiness Reviews, or 

operating these spacecraft, we are 

constantly reminded of those who have 

gone before us and the knowledge we 

gain from their sacrifice. 

Remembering Columbia (continued)

9
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

I

N THE AFTERMATH of the 

Columbia accident, families of the 

STS-107 crew hoped that NASA 

would realize valuable lessons from the 

tragedy and remain vigilant in their 

responsibility to keep the crew safe so 

that no other loved ones would have 

to experience that pain of loss. Rona 

Ramon, wife of Payload Specialist Ilan 

Ramon, said, “A lot has to be changed 

so that it won’t happen again. Lessons 

will be learnt from this for the future.”1

Since the accident, the Agency retired 

the Space Shuttle in 2011 and is now 

preparing to return astronauts to the 

Moon for the first time since 1972. 

Even though more than 20 years has 

passed since this tragedy, a direct link 

can be drawn between the loss of the 

Columbia orbiter and its crew to the 

changes made by Agency management 

since that time. Leaders from Johnson 

Space Center (JSC) and Headquarters 

believe that the hard lessons learned 

following the accident and the subsequent changes put in place have 

permanently altered NASA’s perspective about flight safety and its Safety 

organization, reshaped the Agency’s 

communication style, and established 

the idea of an independent Technical 

Authority. The shock from the loss of 

Columbia was so tremendous that it 

influenced the design of both the next 

generation of crewed spacecraft, the 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

(MPCV), and the spacesuits to better protect the astronauts. So much 

has changed that Nathan Vassberg, 

Deputy Director of JSC’s Safety and 

Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate, 

believes that this “accident had more 

sticking power than either Apollo 1 

or the Challenger.”2 Recently Deputy 

Administrator Pamela A. Melroy told 

NPR, “We are very proud of the lessons 

that we’ve learned, and we’re incorporating them now.”3

Part of this change can be attributed 

to the willingness with which NASA’s 

leaders share their memories of the 

crew, the mission, and the deep scars 

they carry with them every day with 

employees who were not at NASA in 

2003. This year, employees learned 

how that loss still haunts some in the 

workforce. Across the Agency, those 

who worked on the f light openly 

shared their recollections of Saturday, 

Columbia’s 

Impacts 

Today

How the Lessons Learned 

from the Tragedy Continue 

to Shape NASA’s Choices

» By Jennifer Ross-Nazzal, 

Historian, Johnson Space Center

The STS-107 crew poses for their traditional in-flight crew portrait in the SPACEHAB 

Research Double Module aboard Space Shuttle Columbia. From the left (top row), wearing 

blue shirts, are astronauts David M. Brown, mission specialist; William C. McCool, pilot; and 

Michael P. Anderson, payload commander. From the left (bottom row), wearing red shirts 

are astronauts Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist; Rick D. Husband, mission commander; 

Laurel B. Clark, mission specialist; and Ilan Ramon, payload specialist, representing the 

Israeli Space Agency. On 1 February 2003, the crew was lost with the Space Shuttle 

Columbia over North Texas. This picture was on a roll of unprocessed film later recovered 

by searchers from the debris. (Photo credit: NASA)

10
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Columbia’s Impacts Today (continued)

1 February 2003, and the events as they 

remember them, so that no one will 

forget the heartbreak. Through tears, 

Melroy recalled that Saturday morning 

at Kennedy Space Center when she was 

serving as a Cape Crusader and waiting 

to welcome home the STS-107 crew 

and help them off the Shuttle, and the 

moment she first realized they weren’t 

coming home. Serving as Chief of the 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate at 

the time, Bob Cabana, also waiting on 

the runway in Florida, had the difficult 

job of informing the families that their 

loved ones had died.4 Former Chief 

Engineer Ralph Roe said, “If you’re 

blinded by the successes that you have, 

you don’t think critically enough about 

issues. That will stay with me 

forever,” when talking about 

the lessons acquired from 

the event.5 Others have wondered what else they could 

have asked about the foam 

strike that might have made a 

difference. The vulnerability 

of these individuals and the 

raw emotion with which they 

recount these memories is 

one way the Agency emphasizes the importance of doing 

everything possible to ensure 

everyone understands the 

need for flight safety.

Beyond hearing first-hand experiences 

of this fateful day, the decisions made 

and their repercussions pertaining to 

the Columbia accident remain front 

and center in the minds of employees 

through presentations at the NASA 

Centers and Headquarters, NASA’s 

annual Day of Remembrance, and 

employee training. SATERN, NASA’s 

online learning portal, offers an hourlong class on the accident, detailing the timeline of events and the 

changes made as a result. The Day of 

Remembrance is held every year across 

the Agency to remember the three flight 

crews who lost their lives in spacecraft 

accidents. Cabana emphasized its 

importance this year when he spoke 

at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor 

Complex. “Why do we have a NASA 

Day of Remembrance?” he asked. “It’s 

so we do not forget the hard lessons 

learned from Apollo, Challenger, and 

Columbia ... it’s so important that [the 

workforce] learn these lessons so they 

are not repeated again.”6 The Apollo, 

Challenger, Columbia Lessons Learned 

Program, established in 2016 to share 

“the invaluable lessons of NASA’s 

past to help ensure future success” is 

another way the Agency is schooling 

its workforce in the accidents and their 

consequences.7 But, talks, classes, and 

remembrances are just a few of the 

changes since the accident.

NASA’s Safety Program has changed 

since 2003, when the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 

described the organization’s “flawed 

safety culture” as “broken.”8 JSC SMA 

Director Willie Lyles and Deputy 

Director Vassberg found perceptions of 

the program have changed across the 

Agency. People used to see that function as an obstacle to launch; Safety 

halted the flow of preparation for liftoff 

as “a traffic cop” might stop cars on 

the freeway. Today, the Safety organization is a full partner with the space 

NASA Associate Administrator Bob Cabana recalled his 

experiences as Chief of the 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate during the Space Shuttle 

Columbia tragedy at the NASA 

Day of Remembrance Employee 

Safety Town Hall, on Tuesday, 

24 January 2023, at NASA 

Headquarters. (Photo Credit: 

NASA/Keegan Barber)

“If you’re blinded by the 

successes that you have, 

you don’t think critically 

enough about issues. That 

will stay with me forever,”

–Ralph Roe, 

Former Chief Engineer

11
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

programs and a trusted adviser when it 

comes to flying in space. Once viewed 

as an annoyance, something they had 

to deal with, program managers today 

see Safety as their partner, an entity 

that can help accomplish the mission.9

The CAIB Report criticized NASA 

for organizational barriers that stifled differences of opinion during the 

STS-107 flight and made it difficult 

for employees to draw attention to the 

risks that they saw. Since the release 

of that report, leadership across the 

Agency has made a point of stressing 

that everyone, even new employees 

and interns, has perspectives that are 

valuable. Across NASA, employees are 

urged to speak up if they see something that is not safe. Within meetings, 

leaders poll team members and ask 

for other ideas and thoughts on issues. 

People are encouraged to speak up 

and share their opinions, and diverse 

solutions are encouraged. Leadership 

is encouraged to be approachable and 

to include everyone. Management, JSC 

Engineering Director Julie Kramer 

White says, has an obligation to create 

an environment conducive to speaking 

up as well as raising a workforce that is 

willing to say when there is a problem. 

This is something that is important to 

her, and she has shared copies of her 

talk on “Combating Organizational 

Silence in Human Spaceflight” across 

the Center.10

One of the most significant changes 

attributed to the aftermath of the 

Columbia accident is the creation of 

a Technical Authority at NASA. The 

concept was put forward by the CAIB. 

NASA’s Technical Authority, originally 

its Engineering organization, was 

later expanded to include two other 

organizations: Safety and Health/

Medical. The board asserted that 

there was a need for an independent 

organization of engineering experts 

with an understanding of the design 

and development of the vehicle and 

its systems to maintain the technical 

standards for the program. These engineering experts, not the program managers, would review any flight waivers 

brought forward that were associated 

with the technical standards and would 

determine if those deviations were 

reasonable. In the case of “an anomalous event,” Engineering, Safety, and 

Health/Medical would provide an 

independent perspective from the program in determining forward action. 

Technical staff also would sign off on 

the launch vehicle certification. The 

primary responsibility of Engineering 

and the other authorities is technical 

excellence and characterizing risk, not 

being overly influenced by schedules 

outlined by the program or bowing to 

cost pressures.11

Beyond the organizational transformations mentioned above, Kramer 

White noted that the 2003 accident 

impacted decisions about the MPCV. 

In the design phase for Orion there 

were discussions about a top-mounted 

capsule vs. a side-mounted vehicle like 

the Space Shuttle and the possibility of 

damage from debris on launch. NASA 

specifically chose a front-mounted 

capsule because of the “difficulty in 

protecting a side-mounted vehicle from 

debris being shed” off the stack. To 

protect the Orion crew module from 

debris and the environment, the spacecraft is also launched under an aerodynamic shroud.12

Also, the new Orion spacesuit might 

look like the old launch and entry suit 

from the Shuttle flights—it’s orange—

but that’s the only similarity. Dustin 

Gohmert, Project Manager for Orion 

Crew Survival Systems, attributes the 

design and development of the Orion 

Crew Survival System spacesuit to the 

knowledge gained from the 2003 tragedy. Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons 

Learned from the STS-107 Columbia 

Space Shuttle Mishap, a book created 

to share the aeromedical aspects of the 

accident and the investigation, shaped 

how engineers thought about protecting the crew.

The Columbia crew suffered from 

hypoxia and injuries from the acceleration they experienced when the Orbiter 

tumbled. Spacesuit engineers knew 

they could solve those issues and set 

Columbia’s Impacts Today (continued)

The redesigned launch and entry suit for 

the Artemis program, the Orion Crew 

Survival System, prioritizes crew protection. 

(Photo credit: NASA)

12
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

about doing so. When the crew flew 

home, their visors were open, not closed. 

Space Shuttle astronauts usually flew 

home with their visors open because 

closing them for extended durations 

created a potential flammable environment, as suit gas vented out into the 

crew cabin. (Breathing in 100% oxygen, the crew would metabolize very 

little O2

, which would eventually create 

an oxygen-rich cabin, similar to what 

caused the Apollo 1 fire.) Orion crews 

will fly home with their visors closed 

thanks to a closed-loop Environmental 

Control Life Support System that recirculates the oxygen-rich air in the suits, 

allowing the crew to metabolize every 

drop without releasing it into the cabin. 

In this process, the CO2

 is removed and 

the air recirculated. The helmets worn 

by the crew have also been redesigned 

because the bubble helmet the Shuttle 

crews wore caused crew injuries. A 

redesigned seat and restraints also help 

to protect the astronauts. All of these 

changes came about from the lessons 

gleaned from the STS-107 aeromedical 

report. “I can’t overstate the influence 

that the Columbia accident had on the 

architecture that we evolved to.... It 

was, without question, the driving factor in the design and the decisions we 

made,” Gohmert said.13

As the recent anniversary made clear, 

many continue to ask what NASA has 

learned from the Columbia accident 

and if it is still relevant to those working 

on the Artemis Program. The trauma 

of that event has resulted in changes, 

many at the direction of the CAIB, and 

others advocated for by those who lived 

through the shock and resulting aftereffects of the disaster. Management 

continues to urge the workforce not to 

become complacent as they did in the 

years after the Challenger accident. The 

opportunity to design, develop, and 

test a new vehicle has also led to higher 

expectations to protect the crew and 

the vehicle. Across the Agency, leaders 

have prioritized improved communication, challenging employees to speak 

up and to put safety first. 

DIVE DEEPER with

NASA History Online Resources

Remembering Columbia 

STS-107 Mission website

The CAIB Report

Ralph Roe’s Oral History 

Interview

Endnotes

1 “Columbia families say ‘never again,’” 

NBC, 10 November 2003, https://

www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3475938.

2 Nathan Vassberg in discussion with 

author, 18 January 2023.

3 Rachel Treisman, “Twenty Years 

after the Columbia disaster, a NASA 

official reflects on lessons learned,” 

NPR, 1 February 2003, https://www.

npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150931/

columbia-space-shuttle-disaster-20thanniversary. 

4 NASA, “Safety Culture Town Hall 

for NASA Day of Remembrance, 24 

January 2023, https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=JHH1pMwCEbQ. 

5 Ralph R. Roe, interview by Rebecca 

Wright, 29 April 2008, transcript, 

JSC Oral History Project, https://

historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/

JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_

histories/SSP/RoeRR_4-29-08.htm. 

6 Marcia Smith, “Continued Vigilance 

Urged on 20th Anniversary of Space 

Shuttle Columbia Accident,” Space 

Policy Online, 26 January 2023, 

https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/

continued-vigilance-urged-on-20thanniversary-of-space-shuttle-columbiatragedy/. 

7 NASA Office of Safety and Mission 

A ssurance, “Apollo, Cha llenger, 

Columbia Lessons Learned Program,” 

https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/

accllp. 

8 Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board Report, Volume I, 2003, 184, 

190, https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/

reports/CAIBreportv1.pdf.

9 Willie Lyles in discussion with author, 

10 January 2023; Vassberg discussion.

10 Julie Kramer White in discussion 

with author, 13 January 2023; Lyles 

discussion. 

11 CAIB Report, 227. 

12 Kramer White discussion. 

13 Dustin Gohmert in discussion with 

author, 11 January 2022. 

“I can’t overstate the influence that the Columbia 

accident had on the architecture that we evolved to...

It was, without question, the driving factor in the design

and the decisions we made.”

–Dustin Gohmert, Project Manager for

Orion Crew Survival Systems

Columbia’s Impacts Today (continued)

13
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

How the STS-107 

Accident Enabled a Path 

for Human Spaceflight 

Beyond Low-Earth Orbit1

» By Stephen Garber, Historian, NASA Headquarters

T

HE COLUMBIA SPACE SHUTTLE

accident on 1 February 2003 presented the George W. Bush administration with difficult choices. Could 

NASA safely resume Shuttle flights to 

the International Space Station? If so, 

for how long? With two highly visible 

Shuttle tragedies and only three operational vehicles remaining, administration officials concluded on the day of 

the accident that major decisions about 

the space program could be delayed 

no longer. 

The STS-107 accident had deep technical and organizational culture roots. 

On the technical side, shedding foam 

from the External Tank had punctured 

a hole in a key spot on one of Columbia’s 

wings, leading to the destruction of the 

vehicle on reentry. While technicians 

and engineers were aware of this problem, there was simply no definitive 

way to stop all future foam shedding; 

instead, NASA’s solution was limited 

to devising a better system for observing foam strikes on ascent. An equally 

vexing issue was the “normalization of 

deviance” (a term coined by sociologist 

Diane Vaughan to describe the organizational culture that permitted the 

Challenger accident in 1986) in which 

personnel knew about previous foam 

strikes but assumed they were 

tolerable because none of these 

occurrences produced catastrophic effects before STS-107.

Given this situation, many 

observers inside and outside the 

Washington Beltway believed 

that NASA’s very existence was 

in peril. It wasn’t immediately 

clear that NASA could return 

the Shuttle Program to safe 

operations. If NASA couldn’t 

do this, then it had no human 

spaceflight program, which 

many saw (and still see) as its 

raison d’être. 

Soon after the accident, a handful 

of White House staffers who were 

knowledgeable about NASA and 

human spaceflight began meeting 

informally as the Columbia Accident 

Coordinating Group. A key factor, if 

not saving grace, in their deliberations 

to chart a way forward for NASA was 

that both President George W. Bush 

and Vice President Dick Cheney had 

spoken out publicly immediately after 

...many observers inside and outside the Washington 

Beltway believed that NASA’s very existence was in 

peril. It wasn’t immediately clear that NASA could return 

the Shuttle Program to safe operations.

This close-up shows Space Shuttle Columbia as it 

lifted off from Launch Pad 39A on mission STS-107 on 

16 January 2003. A piece of insulative foam from the 

External Tank struck the leading edge of the left wing 

(shown here) upon liftoff, leading to the loss of the 

vehicle and its crew on reentry on 1 February. (Photo 

credit: NASA)

14
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

spaceflight to honor the memory of the 

seven lost crew members. Such firm 

presidential support became a touchstone for these staffers whenever other 

colleagues skeptically questioned the 

value of human spaceflight. 

These staffers invited Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) colleagues to join their debates, forming a 

slightly larger so-called Splinter Group 

that deliberately did not include any 

NASA personnel. In May 2003, this 

group issued a white paper decrying 

the lack of a “compelling vision” for 

NASA for decades. The paper also 

called for strong presidential leadership 

to reverse the situation and chart a bold 

new direction for NASA.

In the spring of 2003, Steve Isakowitz 

(NASA’s comptroller, a confidante 

of Administrator Sean O’Keefe, and 

a former OMB official) began asking 

within NASA what kind of relevant 

long-range planning had been done 

already. It turned out that NASA had 

been supporting studies and honing 

plans for several years in preparation 

for an opportunity to propose a new 

mission for the space program. 

As early as April 1999, NASA 

Administrator Daniel Goldin had 

established the Decadal Planning 

Team (DPT) to provide a forum for 

future Agency leaders to begin considering goals more ambitious than sending humans on missions to near-Earth 

destinations and robotic spacecraft to 

far-off destinations, with no relation 

between the two. Goldin charged the 

DPT with devising a long-term strategy that would integrate the entire 

range of the Agency’s capabilities, in 

science and engineering and robotic 

and human spaceflight, to reach destinations beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). 

Isakowitz conferred with Gary Martin, 

the leader of the NASA Exploration 

Team (NEXT), the follow-on effort to 

the DPT, to find out more. Isakowitz 

also talked with Goldin’s successor, 

Administrator O’Keefe, about how 

such strategic planning might fit into 

that year’s federal budget cycle for 

NASA. Also in May 2003, Isakowitz 

and Martin gave a joint presentation 

to O’Keefe entitled “New Directions: 

Long-Term Goals for Human Space 

Flight,” in which they discussed sending astronauts beyond LEO, a goal 

O’Keefe supported in principle.

The next month, DPT/NEXT team 

members held a retreat that became 

known as the Three Teams Review. 

The first team looked at sending robotic 

spacecraft and then astronauts to the 

Moon as a steppingstone for sending 

humans to Mars. The second team 

examined the possibilities for having 

astronauts assemble large telescopes in 

space and then travel to Mars (sending 

only robotic spacecraft to the Moon.) 

Members of the third team focused 

exclusively on robotic exploration of 

space past LEO, but didn’t get much 

traction among their colleagues, understanding that human spaceflight was 

key to generating public enthusiasm for 

NASA and thus Congressional funding 

and White House support.

Meanwhile, the Splinter Group 

expanded to include NASA staff, and 

became known as the Rump Group. 

Early on, its members coalesced around 

a few core assumptions: NASA should 

return the Shuttle to safe flight operations, use it to complete assembly of 

the International Space Station (ISS), 

and then retire the Shuttle. Additionally, 

the administration should not raid the 

budgets of other NASA programs to pay 

for additional human spaceflight efforts.

In July, the Rump Group produced a 

white paper that posed several fundamental questions. What would be the 

final ISS configuration? When could 

the ISS reasonably be considered complete? What new human-rated launch 

vehicle would be developed to replace 

the Shuttle and how long would it 

take to develop? Relatedly, should the 

United States maintain an independent, continuous human spaceflight 

capability (or would we rely on Russia 

to launch astronauts to the ISS)? More 

ambitiously, should NASA pursue 

human spaceflight beyond LEO?

As early as April 1999, 

NASA Administrator Daniel 

Goldin had established the 

Decadal Planning Team 

(DPT) to provide a forum 

for future Agency leaders 

to begin considering 

goals more ambitious 

than sending humans on 

missions to near-Earth 

destinations and robotic 

spacecraft to far-off 

destinations, with no 

relation between the two.

How the STS-107 Accident Enabled a Path for Human Spaceflight Beyond Low-Earth Orbit (continued)

15
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

How the STS-107 Accident Enabled a Path for Human Spaceflight Beyond Low-Earth Orbit (continued)

In August 2003, the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board (CAIB) issued its 

much anticipated, multi-volume report. 

The clearly written report focused not 

only on technical details, but also on 

important policy issues. Specifically, 

the CAIB report pointedly noted that 

since the end of the Apollo program, 

NASA had lacked a compelling mission that engaged the public, Congress, 

or the White House. Technical experts 

generally concurred that in 2003, 

the Shuttle fleet was old and needed 

replacement. Yet previous attempts 

to replace the Shuttle represented a 

national failure of leadership or as the 

CAIB report bluntly stated, a “lack 

of vision.” This dearth of top national 

leadership on space policy meant that 

NASA had been severely underfunded 

for its challenging goals, echoing the 

Splinter Group’s sentiments. The report 

was a wake-up call to anybody who still 

thought that NASA could continue to 

muddle through with the Shuttle program indefinitely. 

The sausage-making of the interagency 

policy process to decide upon a new 

charge for NASA began in earnest 

shortly afterwards. Fall 2003 brought 

many meetings of relevant staffers 

throughout the Bush administration, 

as well as Deputies Committee (Deputy 

Cabinet officials such as the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary 

of State, etc.) meetings. Other senior 

White House personnel such as Bush’s 

science advisor, domestic policy advisor, and the deputy national security 

advisor weighed in on space policy in 

ways that were virtually unprecedented. 

Two key staff from the National 

Security Council and the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy collaborated tightly with key OMB staffers, 

as well as high-level NASA officials 

such as Isakowitz, O’Keefe, and John 

Schumacher, O’Keefe’s chief of staff. 

These and other NASA officials drew 

heavily from the work of the DPT and 

NEXT teams. The high-level staff work 

culminated with a briefing to President 

Bush on December 19, 2003. 

On 14 January 2004, Bush made 

an unusual presidential appearance 

at NASA Headquarters to announce 

the new Vision for Space Exploration 

(VSE), which included specific timelines for new programs, as well as a 

broader call for moving beyond LEO. 

The VSE called for safely returning the 

Shuttle to orbit, using it to complete 

ISS assembly by 2010, and then retiring the Shuttle. It also called for NASA 

to develop a new Crew Exploration 

Vehicle for astronauts to travel to the 

ISS, the Moon, and beyond. The VSE’s 

timetable aimed to put astronauts’ boots 

on the lunar surface by 2020. In a more 

sweeping fashion, Bush’s public VSE 

announcement proposed that sending 

humans back to the Moon would serve 

as a proving ground for putting astronauts on Mars, while letting robotic 

spacecraft lead the way. Much has been 

written about the human desire to go 

in person to the Red Planet but suffice 

to say this steppingstones approach 

clearly reflected the DPT and NEXT 

teams’ work.

Virtually all the staff and top leaders 

who helped create the VSE were also 

keenly aware of the seeming historical precedent of the ill-fated Space 

Exploration Initiative (SEI) proposed in 

1989 by Bush’s father, President George 

H. W. Bush. SEI called for humans to 

return to the Moon (after Apollo) and 

then to go to Mars, but the proposal 

The CAIB report was a 

wake-up call to anybody 

who still thought that NASA 

could continue to muddle 

through with the Shuttle 

program indefinitely. 

President George W. Bush announces his 

administration’s Vision for Space Exploration 

policy in the NASA Headquarters auditorium 

on 14 January 2004. (Photo credit: White 

House/Eric Draper)

16
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

was basically dead on arrival after its 

enormous price tag became public. 

The VSE crafters consciously avoided 

what they saw as the policy errors of 

15 years earlier. Overall, the VSE was 

big on presidential public support, but 

only called for a relatively small budget 

increase for NASA to make it happen.

Nevertheless, when the Bush administration initiated interagency discussions 

in 2003 to consider a new spaceflight 

strategy, NASA was prepared with 

technical and policy options, as well 

as a team of individuals who had 

spent years preparing for the moment. 

Although elements of the VSE policy 

differed from the plans developed by 

the DPT and NEXT teams, the benefits of preparation were unmistakable.

In less than one year, NASA had gone 

from seemingly routinely flying the 

Shuttle, to a major human spaceflight 

accident that claimed the lives of seven 

astronauts (as well as two debris search 

specialists working for the CAIB), to 

a major new national space policy 

designed to inspire and carry NASA 

forward for decades. Key decisions, 

such as setting a termination date 

for Shuttle flights and initiating the 

development of technologies for deep 

space exploration, heralded a paradigm 

shift, allowing both NASA and the 

U.S. space community to move beyond 

the infrastructure, technologies, and 

institutional arrangements that had 

sustained LEO operations for more 

than two decades. 

While the bureaucratic machinery of 

our nation’s capital often churns slowly, 

this time the process moved quite 

expeditiously. The tragic Columbia 

accident clearly spurred action that 

created the VSE, which led in turn to 

the Constellation and then Artemis 

programs. To paraphrase an experienced Washington hand’s comment 

in an entirely different context, never 

allow a crisis to go to waste, as it’s an 

opportunity to do bold new things.2 

Endnotes

1 This article is adapted from Glen R. 

Asner and Stephen J. Garber’s Origins 

of 21st Century Space Travel: A History 

of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and 

the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999-

2004 (NASA SP-2019-4415), especially 

Chapter 5, “The Columbia Accident 

and Its Aftermath.”

2 Rahm Emanuel, a former chief of staff 

to President Barack Obama and former Illinois Congressman, is credited 

as the originator of this quip that has 

been quoted using slightly different 

verbiage in different sources. Emanuel 

said this in the context of the global 

economic recession of 2008–2009, just 

after Obama had been elected, and his 

point was that this financial crisis meant 

that the new administration could or 

needed to respond very boldly with an 

enormous economic “bailout” package 

that likely never would have passed 

Congress in other circumstances. See, 

for examples, an op-ed he wrote at the 

beginning of the 2020 global pandemic

and another op-ed written by other 

authors in 2022.

How the STS-107 Accident Enabled a Path for Human Spaceflight Beyond Low-Earth Orbit (continued)

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Chief Historian, this book explores how and why aerospace technology took the course it did, discusses some of the key people who 

drove aerospace science and technology development, and explores 

the political, economic, managerial, international, and cultural contexts in which the events of flight have unfolded.

NEW RELEASE from the 

NASA HISTORY OFFICE

17
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

NASA’S LANGLEY RESEARCH

Center, located in Hampton, 

Virginia, contributed key engineering support to the Agency’s massive 

Space Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF) 

effort, which culminated in the successful launch of Shuttle Discovery in July 

of 2005. 

One of NASA’s four research centers, Langley had played a critical 

role in the development of the Space 

Shuttle in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 

1980s, including running a series of 

last-moment confidence-building tests 

of the glue that held tiles to the surface 

of the Orbiter in the months leading to 

the first Shuttle flight in 1981. 

After the Columbia tragedy in February 

of 2003, Langley immediately began 

to lend its expertise to help the NASA 

Space Shuttle Program Office understand what happened and how to avoid 

a similar tragedy in the future. Langley 

wind tunnel and computer-based studies of Orbiter aero-thermodynamics 

(aero-heating), for example, were 

especially helpful to understanding the 

condition of Columbia during its illfated atmospheric reentry.

Focus on Thermal 

Protection

Many of Langley’s technical discipline areas, including aerodynamics, 

aero-thermodynamics, structures and 

materials, systems analysis, and engineering, were tapped to safely return 

the Shuttle to flight. 

These technical strengths were primarily focused on achieving a better 

understanding of the Shuttle’s thermal 

protection system (TPS)—what can 

make the thermal protection system 

fail, how to inspect the thermal protection system without harming it, how 

to repair the thermal protection system 

on orbit, and when it was safe to fly 

even with minor damage.

Inspecting Without Harming

The Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board specifically called for developing 

a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) 

inspection plan for reinforced carboncarbon (RCC) areas of the Shuttle, to 

include the Orbiter’s wing leading edge. 

One of Langley’s aerospace engineers 

inspects a Shuttle scale model inside 

Langley’s 20-Inch Mach 6 Wind Tunnel on 

12 February 2003. Inserted into a hypersonic air stream, the model provided surface temperatures and heating rates. (Photo 

credit: NASA/LaRC)

Langley 

Research Center: 

Key Player in 

Shuttle Return to 

Flight Effort

» Submitted by Rob Wyman, History and Archives 

Program Manager, Langley Research Center. 

Adapted from a 2005 Langley Fact Sheet

Langley wind tunnel 

and computer-based 

studies of Orbiter aerothermodynamics...

were especially helpful 

to understanding the 

condition of Columbia 

during its ill-fated 

atmospheric reentry.

18
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

NDE produces critical information 

concerning the condition of a structure 

by using methods that can see beneath 

the surface without harming it, as 

opposed to destructive testing methods where the structure is damaged in 

testing and no longer usable. 

NDE methods pioneered by Langley 

were adopted for ground tests of RCC 

insulation material on each Orbiter 

between flights.

Researchers at Langley also helped 

with the development of a new NDE 

testing method known as Terahertz 

imaging used to detect voids and other 

flaws in the spray-on foam insulation 

on the External Tank to prevent the 

materials’ failure during flight. The 

system provided high-resolution, 

three-dimensional information in real 

time on the foam area being tested. 

Assessing Damage Effects 

at Reentry

NASA Langley used hypersonic wind 

tunnels in combination with advanced 

state-of-the-art computational fluid 

dynamics to assess the effects of damage to the Shuttle’s thermal protection 

system (TPS), designed to protect the 

vehicle from the extremely high temperatures encountered during reentry 

into the Earth’s atmosphere. 

Studying the effects of TPS damage 

included assessing the localized heating 

environment directly around the damage site and determining the impact 

the local damage would have on the 

global heating environment over the 

Shuttle’s entire TPS. 

A researcher places a sample of foam like that on the Shuttle External (fuel) Tank into a 

crushing device to determine how the foam reacts when it strikes something at high speed, 

as happened during the Columbia mission. (Photo credit: NASA/LaRC)

A bit of precisely sized and shaped tape is placed on the surface of a wind tunnel model 

for studies of aerodynamic heating during Shuttle reentry, simulating the effects of an 

on-orbit “plug” repair. (Photo credit: NASA/LaRC)

Langley Research Center: Key Player in Shuttle Return to Flight Effort (continued)

19
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Researchers developed a database to 

evaluate possible changes in the shape 

of the Shuttle surface due to TPS damage and their effects on reentry heating. This database, developed through 

extensive wind tunnel testing and computational analyses, included a close 

look at both vehicle surface cavities 

and surface bumps. The database was 

instrumental in helping to determine if 

TPS damage sustained during ascent or 

while in orbit required repair prior to 

the Shuttle returning to Earth.

Contributions, In Short

NASA Langley:

• Contributed to a better understanding of the material properties of the 

foam that fell from the Shuttle’s 

External (fuel) Tank.

• Contributed new ways of detecting 

problems in the thermal protection system for both the External 

Tank and the Shuttle Orbiter using 

advanced nondestructive examination techniques.

• Developed physics-based models 

describing the damage caused by 

debris striking the Orbiter’s tiles and 

wing leading edge.

• Developed concepts to inspect and 

repair the reinforced carbon-carbon 

panels on the Orbiter wing leading 

edge and supported efforts to repair 

tile damage.

• Ran wind tunnel tests to ensure that 

minor damage (cavities) and repairs 

to tiles or the wing leading edge 

would not cause a heating problem 

during reentry.

In all, more than 200 Langley personnel’s efforts to find the cause of the 

Columbia accident played an important 

role in the Agency’s successful efforts to 

return the Shuttles to flight. 

Langley researchers demonstrated non-destructive methods for detection of flaws in the Shuttle External Tank foam. (Photo credit: 

NASA/LaRC)

Langley Research Center: Key Player in Shuttle Return to Flight Effort (continued)

20
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

T

HE LESSONS NASA LEARNED

from the loss of Columbia 

and its crew were profound. 

Documentation, insights, and reflections from the accident are available 

via the NASA History Office2 and in 

a comprehensive new website from 

the Office of Safety and Mission 

Assurance’s Apollo, Challenger, and 

Columbia Lessons Learned Program.3

Although these lessons are often 

encapsulated in specific, actionable 

nuggets of information, the lessons 

that most inform our culture tend to 

be unwritten. After Columbia, much 

closer scrutiny was applied to NASA’s 

organizational culture, the echoes of 

which continue to resonate and shape 

the Agency’s ways of working and 

learning today.

While mourning the Columbia tragedy, NASA was prompted to reconsider 

its previously accepted organizational 

practices, a necessary introspection that 

was urged by the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board (CAIB). Chartered 

in the first two hours after loss of signal,4

 the 13-member CAIB worked for 

almost seven months with more than 

120 staff and 400 NASA engineers and 

reviewed thousands of documents and 

other inputs to analyze the factors that 

led to the accident.5 The CAIB intentionally expanded its purview beyond 

technical cause to make assessments 

on organizational culture, including 

historical factors, decision-making processes, and unintended consequences 

of organizational and management 

practices.6 Many of the Agency’s challenges had been acknowledged prior to 

the STS-107 Columbia flight but were 

not prioritized or resolved, while others 

were not sufficiently understood.7

The CAIB identified four problematic 

cultural elements that they linked to 

the Columbia accident: the assumption 

that prior success could be taken as 

evidence to expect continued success; 

organizational issues that inhibited 

candid communication; institutionally siloed management practices; and 

Lessons from Columbia

Building a Knowledge Sharing Culture1

» By Tiffany L. Smith, Chief Knowledge Officer and Director, 

APPEL Knowledge Services, NASA Headquarters

On 22 January 2003, the crew of STS-107 

captured this sunrise from the crew cabin 

during Flight Day 7. (Photo credit: NASA)

21
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

informal authority structures that 

worked outside the formal system.8

The CAIB compared these with best 

practices and made recommendations 

to correct the challenges they observed. 

Many of these recommendations have 

proven evergreen and remain in place 

as priorities for the Agency 20 years 

later. The establishment of NASA’s 

Technical Authorities,9 the creation 

of the Office of the Chief Engineer’s 

NASA Engineering and Safety Center10

as a source for independent assessment 

and expert knowledge, and the Office 

of Safety and Mission Assurance’s leadership to address organizational silence 

and reinforce safety culture are traceable to the CAIB report.

The CAIB also identified challenges 

with how NASA learned and applied 

its lessons,11 citing a 2001 report by the 

General Accounting Office (GAO).12

At this time, NASA’s approach to 

lessons learned concentrated on the 

use of information technology systems to collect and store lessons in a 

semi-structured format. While new 

technologies suggested new opportunities, the GAO subtitled one section of a 

later report, “Information Technology 

is Important, but Should Not Be the 

Only Mechanism for Knowledge 

Sharing.”13 The Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel reinforced the need 

for a more comprehensive strategy in 

2011 with a recommendation for the 

Agency to create a Chief Knowledge 

Officer to serve as a focal point and 

champion for knowledge sharing practices.14 Both my predecessors in the 

Agency Chief Knowledge Officer role 

noted the importance of taking a federated approach to this responsibility, 

recognizing that NASA needed to manage local knowledge in its own context, 

while building capacity to share critical knowledge across the Agency as 

appropriate.15 NASA has also expanded 

the lessons learned construct in recent 

years to include processes related to 

team review, recording, disseminating, 

and application of these lessons.16

In addition to lessons learned, oral 

histories, classroom discussions, mentoring, and other knowledge sharing 

activities are crucial to NASA, because 

much of what engineers and project 

teams must learn and apply on the job 

is impossible to capture in a database.17

As Steven R. Hirshorn, Chief Engineer 

for Aeronautics at NASA Headquarters, 

writes, engineering leaders at NASA 

need to know the “systems engineering 

process, oversee the process, and be an 

advocate for its value to the project. 

The Chief Engineer must also be able 

to use their experience and judgment 

to implement it appropriately for their 

project.”18 Competencies like these are 

crucial to any field, but the lessons of 

Columbia remind us that even those 

with the greatest technical acumen 

need to have a supporting culture 

to apply and share their knowledge 

effectively.

Space Shuttle Columbia was lit up at Launch Pad 39A on the night of 5 March 1981 as 

preparations for its maiden voyage, the STS-1 mission, were being made. (Photo credit: NASA)

...NASA needed to 

manage local knowledge 

in its own context, while 

building capacity to share 

critical knowledge across 

the Agency...

Lessons from Columbia (continued)

22
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

When tragedies occur, a healthy organization does not normalize the accident 

or shame the participants: it seeks to 

understand why the accident occurred 

and, if possible, to prevent it from happening again. The cultural lessons from 

Columbia continue to guide how we 

share knowledge and how we apply our 

expertise to our missions. As members 

of an organization that is committed to 

learning and improving, NASA’s people must combine the facts we know, 

the lessons we learn as a team, and the 

common values we practice together. 

In this way, NASA’s knowledge and 

organizational culture requires continued vigilance and maintenance. We 

must do this not only when it is easy, 

but when it is hard. 

Endnotes

1 Thank you to Stephen J. Angelillo, 

Michael Bell, Steven R. Hirshorn, 

Kevin Gilligan, and Zachary Pirtle for 

sharing their insights at different stages 

of this article’s development, and thank 

you to the NASA History Division for 

the kind invitation to participate in this 

issue.

2 https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/

Introduction.html

3 https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/

accllp/columbia#history

4 NASA, “Columbia: Investigation,” 

Of f ic e of Sa fet y a nd Mission 

Assurance, 2023, https://sma.

nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/accllp/

columbia#investigation.

5 Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

(CAIB), “CAIB Report”, Volume I, 

Washington, DC: August 2003, page 9.

6 CAIB Report Volume I, Part 2, p. 97.

7 One source that identified many 

organizational challenges similar to 

those identified by the CAIB was 

the NASA Integrated Action Team’s 

report, “Enhancing Mission Success 

– A Framework for the Future,” 21 

December 2000, https://history.nasa.

gov/niat.pdf.

8 CAIB Report Volume I, Chapter 7, p. 

177.

9 NASA, “NASA Policy Directive 

1000.0C: NASA Governance and 

Strategic Management Handbook,” 

effective date 29 January 2020, 

https://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/NPD_

attachments/N_PD_1000_000C_.pdf, 

section 3.5.1.

10 https://www.nasa.gov/nesc

11 CAIB Report Volume I, Chapter 7, p. 

189.

12 GAO Report, “Survey of NASA 

Lessons Learned,” GAO-01-1015R, 5 

September 2001, https://www.gao.

gov/assets/gao-01-1015r.pdf. The topic 

received a more detailed treatment in 

the 2002 follow-up: GAO Report, 

“Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing 

Lessons Learned,” GAO-02-195, 

January 2002, https://www.gao.gov/

assets/gao-02-195.pdf.

13 Ibid, p. 41.

14 NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel, “Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

Annual Report for 2011,” Washington, 

DC: 2011, https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/

asap/documents/2011_ASAP_Annual_

Report.pdf p. 12.

15 Forsgren, Roger. Lean Knowledge Management: How NASA Implemented a 

Practical KM Program, Business Expert 

Press, 2021; Hoffman, Ed and Jon Boyle, 

R.E.A.L. Knowledge at NASA, Project Management Institute, Newtown 

Square, PA, 2015, https://www.pmi.

org/-/media/pmi/documents/public/

pdf/white-papers/real-knowledge-nasa.

pdf.

16 https://appel.nasa.gov/lessons-learned/

17 See especially: Polanyi, Michael, 

Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy, University of 

Chicago: 2015 (1958); Collins, Harry, 

Tacit & Explicit Knowledge, University 

of Chicago, 2010; Vincenti, Walter G., 

What Engineers Know and How They 

Know It, Johns Hopkins, 1990, 198–

199; and Petroski, Henry, To Engineer Is 

Human: The Role of Failure in Successful 

Designs, New York: Vintage, 1982, p. 

81–83.

18 Hirshorn, Steven R. Three Sigma 

Leadership: Or, the Way of the Chief 

Engineer, Washington, DC: NASA, 

2019. https://www.nasa.gov/connect/

ebooks/three-sigma-leadership_detail

p. 51.

Bryan O’Connor, Amy Edmondson, Mike Ryschkewitsch, and Robin Dillon (left to right) 

share insight into organizational silence on a panel at Goddard Space Flight Center on 

31 July 2012. (Photo Credit: NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center)

Lessons from Columbia (continued)

23
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

A Safety Lesson from 

an Early NACA Leader

» By James Anderson, Historian, Ames Research Center

A PLANE CRASH at Langley 

Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in August 1924 killed one 

NACA engineer and seriously injured 

the 28-year-old pilot, Smith DeFrance, 

who lost his left eye and spent months 

recovering in Walter Reed Hospital. 

DeFrance had been piloting a Curtiss 

Jenny while his colleague observed from 

the rear seat. Both men worked at the 

Langley Laboratory in Virginia, where 

DeFrance was the assistant head of 

the flight research section. In that role, 

DeFrance helped define what it meant 

to be an experimental test pilot. He had 

earned a Silver Star flying biplanes in 

combat during World War I, but in the 

aftermath of the 1924 crash, DeFrance 

pledged to his wife that he would never 

fly again.1 It was a personal decision that 

still has a familiar resonance almost 100 

years later. Since then, there have been 

significant shifts in how organizations 

conceptualize matters of safety and how 

practices are implemented to address 

safety concerns. And while those procedures and frameworks probably seem 

more sophisticated today, the importance of sharing stories that capture our 

personal experiences with tragedy is evident in the recollections of people who 

worked with individuals like DeFrance. 

DeFrance’s experience gave him an 

enduring authority that transcended 

any specific policy or procedure.

Eight years before the fatal crash, in the 

very first annual report of the National 

Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics (NACA), the 

committee acknowledged a 

need to address safety concerns, specifically, the causes 

of accidents. Following a list 

of problems that the committee had identified as needing 

immediate attention, such as 

developing a practical form 

for determining an airplane’s 

stability mathematically 

“without necessarily requiring 

wind-tunnel tests,”2 problems 

not exclusively aeronautical 

in nature were considered. 

The lengthiest entry by far, causes of 

accidents, was saved for last:

While conditions have changed 

decidedly from the early days 

of aeronautics in this country, 

there is still evidence of carelessness in the design and operation 

of aeroplanes. It would appear 

as coming within the province 

of this committee that legislation should be enacted toward 

obtaining control of this feature 

at an early date. However, any 

such legislation should be most 

carefully considered and the 

views of those interested should 

be obtained. This is particularly 

necessary, as already a number 

of attempts have been made 

toward legislation in different 

States, with the result that in 

one State, at least, experimental 

work is practically prohibited, 

not because inventors and constructors can not comply with 

the law, but because the operation of the law requires facilities 

which do not exist in the State in 

which the laws have been passed. 

With a view toward determining 

the requirements of such legislation, it is proposed that a beginning be made by requesting that 

all accidents be reported to the 

advisory committee on forms to 

be published by the committee, 

embodying a set of categorical 

questions, the answers to which 

may lead to a determination of 

the principal causes of accidents. 

In cases where such accidents 

result in the maiming or killing of spectators or flyers, such 

A November 1941 portrait of Smith DeFrance, 

Engineer-in-Charge at Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, 

the same year that the first wind tunnel began operating 

at Ames. (Image credit: NACA)

24
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

questions should be answered 

by the investigating authorities. 

The word “request” is used in 

view of the possible conflicts 

of State and Federal authority 

and jurisdiction; and whereas it 

is very probable that both State 

and Federal authorities would 

be willing and glad to cooperate in this work in response 

to a request, it is not clear that 

such cooperation would follow 

legislation, unless carefully 

worked out.3

This challenge and the potential conflicts over jurisdiction inherent in federalism proved to be troublesome to 

the newly established NACA, at least 

superficially. In the next annual report, 

a single sentence seemed to close out 

the issue: “Although this problem is 

a serious one, the committee has not 

been able to inaugurate the work proposed.”4

 The item no longer appeared 

in subsequent NACA annual reports. 

That does not mean that safety was no 

longer important to the NACA, only 

that the form in which the NACA 

addressed safety concerns in its reports 

became dispersed across specific 

examples rather than encapsulated in 

one targeted effort. Key members of 

the NACA were, in fact, intimately 

involved with the burgeoning regulatory challenges facing civil and military 

aviation in its early years.

This was not the first time that federalism and the issue of conflicting 

jurisdictions had arisen with respect 

to safety or transportation. Congress 

had already passed legislation to regulate steamboats and the railroads 

in response to public safety concerns 

related to those modes of transportation that crossed state lines. In terms 

of aviation and the extension of its 

regulatory concerns to an international 

context—and the NACA’s involvement 

tackling those concerns and coordinating across civil, military, and industrial 

stakeholders—a recent book by Sean 

Seyer skillfully recounts what had been 

a previously neglected time and context in the history of aviation policy.5

In spite of regulatory and legal hurdles, however, much of the work the 

NACA undertook over its 43 years had 

direct benefits to safety even if “safety” 

was not overtly touted as the driving 

force. It’s difficult to argue with the 

obvious benefits of not crashing. The 

fundamental and applied research 

that the NACA conducted improved 

survivability from accidents through 

advancements in areas such as fire prevention, passenger and pilot restraints, 

and aircraft aerodynamic stability.

DeFrance, meanwhile, was not directly 

involved in the policy and regulatory 

discussions that some of the NACA 

committee members undertook in the 

committee’s early years. He was focused 

on his work as an NACA employee at 

the Langley facilities, where by the late 

1930s he was overseeing its four largest 

wind tunnels and leading the design 

efforts for facilities that would begin 

construction in 1940 at Moffett Field 

in California. Also in 1940, the same 

year that he was appointed Engineerin-Charge and the Moffett Field 

facilities were officially named Ames 

Aeronautical Laboratory, DeFrance 

was still honoring his pledge not to fly 

again and travelled to Ames by train. 

Rarely making the long journey back to 

Washington, DC, he led Ames for the 

next 25 years, continuing on through 

Ames’ transition to a NASA research 

center, until his retirement in 1965.

DeFrance’s 25 years at the helm left an 

impression on the Ames workforce. In 

a story told on several occasions years 

after his retirement, some of DeFrance’s 

colleagues recalled that he was present 

in the control room as a wind tunnel 

at Ames powered on for the first time.6

When he asked what a nearby switch 

was for, one of the engineers responded 

that it was for an emergency shutoff, so 

DeFrance reached over and engaged 

The first two Curtiss Jennies used in service at Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory 

were borrowed from the Army Air Service and began supporting NACA test flights at the 

laboratory in 1919. (Image credit: NACA)

A Safety Lesson from an Early NACA Leader (continued)

25
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

it. At first baffling those present, the 

act quickly earned their appreciation 

and respect for his somewhat dramatic 

insistence on testing such an important 

feature in an era when the action was 

not a required step to take, much less 

document.

Today, there is arguably less attention 

paid to the influence of any one individual on an entire center or agency 

as in the early NACA days. That does 

not mean that such influence should be 

discounted. Everyone in the workforce 

faces daily safety considerations, usually more aligned with occupational 

safety and ergonomics than the kind of 

safety measures that prevent catastrophe. While there’s almost never a literal emergency shutoff switch within 

our immediate grasp, when our colleagues tell personal, relatable stories 

that deliver a message that resonates, 

the abstract aspects of safety become 

actionable. Perhaps Smith DeFrance 

still has something to teach us. Ask 

yourself: What figurative emergency 

shutoff is within your grasp that you 

have not tested yet? 

The first operational wind tunnel at Ames on 

10 March 1941, three days before its fan was 

powered on and then promptly subjected to 

DeFrance’s impromptu emergency shut off 

check. (Image credit: NACA)

come from the story being retold among 

colleagues over the following years, captured in the interviews Muenger conducted as part of the book’s research. In 

the first history of Ames, Adventures in 

Research: A History of Ames Research 

Center 1940–1965 (NASA SP-4302), 

Edwin Hartman noted DeFrance’s loss 

of an eye in the crash, but did not give 

a detailed description of the accident 

nor mention the loss of life. And in 

Model Research: The National Advisory 

Committee for Aeronautics, 1915–1958

(SP-4103), Alex Roland wrote in a footnote that after the loss of the eye in the 

crash, DeFrance “carried the scars, both 

physical and emotional, through the rest 

of his days” (p. 364). Like Muenger’s 

account, this assertion does not appear 

to be directly rooted in specific primary 

documentation, but has emerged as 

something commonly known enough 

that it has become part of the retellings.

2 First Annual Report of the National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 

1915 (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1916), p. 13.

3 Ibid., p. 17.

4 Second Annual Report of the National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 

1916 (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1917), p. 15.

5 Seyer, Sean. Sovereign Skies: The Origins 

of American Civil Aviation Policy. Johns 

Hopkins University Press: 2021.

6 Two versions of the story have some 

endearing differences. The more detailed 

account, told shortly after DeFrance’s 

retirement appears in Adventures in 

Research (p. 35), where the emergency 

shutoff is described as a red button in 

the control room of the 7-by-10 foot 

#1, the first operational wind tunnel at 

Ames, which powered up on 13 March 

1941. The second account appears in 

Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years 

at the NASA Ames Research Center

(p. 24) and is attributed to an interview 

conducted with DeFrance’s colleague 

Walter Vincenti in 1999, 14 years after 

DeFrance had passed away. That account 

implies that the tunnel in question was 

the 12-foot Pressure Tunnel, and instead 

of a red button, it was a red lever. In 

spite of those differences, the point of 

the story remains the same.

Endnotes

1 This accident is often cited as a defining moment for DeFrance, but the 

details are difficult to pin down. The 

New York Times reported the crash the 

day after on 21 August 1924, noting 

that it was Steven Bromley, Jr. who had 

died and that DeFrance had suffered 

what were “probably fatal injuries.” 

Elizabeth Muenger’s Searching the 

Horizon: A History of Ames Research 

Center 1940–1976 (NASA SP-4304), 

recounts the incident with an unnamed 

Bromely as a “newcomer, in the copilot’s 

seat, [who] froze at the controls while 

De France was beginning a landing 

approach” (p. 14). While these details 

are not explicitly cited, they most likely 

A Safety Lesson from an Early NACA Leader 

(continued)

26
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Learning 

from NASA’s 

Launch 

Failures 

» By Robert Arrighi, Historian,

Glenn Research Center

T

HE CENTAUR UPPER-STAGE

rocket is one of the greatest 

achievements of the U.S. space 

program. Centaurs have sent scores of 

probes, satellites, and observatories into 

space over the past 60 years for both 

the government and private industry, 

including many high-profile NASA 

missions such as Surveyor, Viking, 

Voyager, and Cassini-Huygens. Despite 

the program’s remarkable success rate, 

there have been painful setbacks along 

the way. Examples include the 1970 

failure of a shroud to jettison properly 

resulting in the loss of the one-of-a-kind 

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-B; 

and a lightning strike 49 seconds after 

liftoff in 1987 that prevented a costly 

Navy communications satellite from 

reaching orbit.

Mission failures result in not only tremendous financial losses and impacts 

to upcoming launch schedules, but also 

a feeling of apprehension among teams 

that spent years preparing the launch 

vehicle and payload for the mission and 

the resulting disruption of their personal lives. Although these failures are 

extremely difficult to accept, they do 

offer excellent opportunities to learn 

and improve operations for future 

endeavors. In the mid-2000s, retired 

NASA managers Joe Nieberding and 

Larry Ross decided to collect and analyze data from past Centaur failures in 

an effort to provide lessons learned for 

current and future engineers.

Ross and Nieberding began their 

NASA careers in the mid-1960s working on the Centaur Program at the 

Lewis Research Center (today, NASA 

Glenn). The Center was responsible for 

integrating the payload into the launch 

vehicle, establishing the correct flight 

trajectories, and preparing the vehicle 

for launch. Ross contributed to the 

vehicle’s first missions sending Surveyor 

spacecraft to the Moon and helped 

transition the program to subsequent 

assignments. Nieberding specialized 

in developing flight trajectories and 

integrating payloads into the vehicle. 

As a member of the launch team, he 

was involved in 65 launches from Cape 

Canaveral. 

By the mid-1970s, Ross was managing 

all of Lewis’ launch vehicle activities. 

He subsequently served as Deputy 

Director and Center Director for the 

entire Center in the early 1990s. In 

1987 Nieberding was named head of 

the new group that analyzed a range 

of technologies and opportunities for 

future space missions, including the 

Joe Nieberding and Larry Ross (left) discuss the Centaur Program at Glenn Research 

Center in October 2013. (Photo credit: NASA)

Joe Nieberding and Larry 

Ross decided to collect 

and analyze data from 

past Centaur failures in an 

effort to provide lessons 

learned for current and 

future engineers.

27
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

use of Russian rockets to service the 

planned space station.1 The men retired 

in 1995 and 2000, respectively, but 

remained active with consulting and 

review board work.

The loss of Space Shuttle Columbia 

in February 2003 spurred a series of 

events that led to the termination of 

Shuttle activities and the introduction of a new effort to return to the 

Moon. The program, referred to as 

Constellation, included the development of a new family of Ares launch 

vehicles—“I” designated for humans 

and “V” for cargo. 

As a member of the Ares-I nonadvocate review board, Nieberding was 

asked to brief the panel in September 

2006 on his experiences with launch 

vehicle failures. The presentation was 

well-received but contained only a 

portion of the materials that had been 

gathered. Nieberding and Ross created 

a formal partnership and began formulating plans to present the information 

as a class for young NASA engineers 

with little hands-on experience. There 

had been a significant erosion of 

NASA’s vast expendable launch vehicle expertise since the agency Agency 

transitioned those activities to private 

industry in the 1980s and 1990s. 

Ross and Nieberding could discuss 

actual events, many in which they 

participated. 

The pair worked with the Glenn History 

Office and Records Management team 

to locate Centaur failure reports, film 

footage, and other factual information to bolster their presentation. In 

1 See, “Nieberding’s Missions to Post-Soviet Russia,” NASA History News & Notes (Fall 2020) Vol. 37, no. 3.

addition, they interviewed fellow subject matter experts and retirees.

The resulting class, which came to 

be known as “Mission Success First: 

Lessons Learned,” is structured along 

the lines of the Harvard Business 

School’s case study approach. After 

some preliminary background information, they drill down on a series of 

case studies. For each, they describe 

the incident, examine the causes of 

that specific failure, and then offer a set 

of lessons learned that can be applied 

to a range of activities. The ability of 

Nieberding and Ross to blend the analysis with humor and rare video footage 

made the class an immediate success.

Scott Graham, who managed Glenn’s 

Ares work, arranged for Nieberding and 

Ross to present their materials to his 

team in January 2007. Glenn’s training office sponsored several follow-on 

classes. The audience soon included 

representatives from other NASA 

Centers who arranged for additional 

presentations at their sites. Nieberding’s 

participation in the Agency’s annual 

Safety and Mission Assurance meetings led to more invitations. By 2009 

the class was incorporated into the 

NASA’s Academy of Program/Project 

& Engineering Leadership (APPEL) 

where it became one of their highest 

rated offerings.

Nieberding and Ross continued their 

engagements even after the cancelation 

of Ares-I in 2010. At the behest of 

NASA Headquarters, they presented to 

launch vehicle upstarts including Blue 

Origin and Space-X, as well as legacy 

firms such as United Launch Alliance 

(the current manufacturer of Centaur) 

and Boeing. The course was also conducted for international audiences in 

seven countries.

Over the years, Ross and Nieberding 

integrated more and more new case 

studies into their program, some of 

which were suggested by class participants. These included different types 

of failures such as a B-2 stealth bomber 

crash and the Interstate 35 bridge collapse. The information from more than 

50 failures was collected in a database 

so that the case material could be 

individualized for different audiences, 

which now includes non-aerospace 

organizations such as Sandia National 

Laboratories and Disney.

From this large body of information, 

Nieberding and Ross were able to 

identify trends that transcended time, 

location, and even type of activity. 

Human error was the root cause of 

almost every case, whether it was poor 

design, communication breakdowns, 

procedural errors, or insufficient testing. Nieberding recalls a number of 

Learning from NASA’s Launch Failures (continued)

(continued on page 30) »

From this large body of 

information, Nieberding 

and Ross were able 

to identify trends that 

transcended time, 

location, and even type 

of activity.

28
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

News from NASA’s Centers

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC

» By Michele Ostovar, Editor

In late January, the NASA History 

Office was pleased to welcome back 

Travis Frederick as our intern for the 

spring term. Travis, a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at Princeton 

University and a fellow at the Kennan 

Institute, previously served in our 

office in the Spring 2021 term. Travis 

became interested in becoming a 

NASA intern in 2015 when he met 

the NASA Russia Representative while 

working as a State Department intern 

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. His 

Ph.D. research focuses on how history, 

memory, and identity became part of 

Russia’s national security strategy 

during the post-Soviet memory wars. 

Over his internship, he will be assisting 

with preparations for the upcoming 

NASA’s Discovery Program book while 

doing a comparative study of U.S. and 

Soviet approaches to planetary science 

for his independent research project. 

February saw the much-anticipated 

release of the newest title in the NASA 

History Series, NACA to NASA to 

Now: The Frontiers of Air and Space in 

the American Century by former NASA 

Chief Historian Roger D. Launius. 

This concise history of the Agency and 

its predecessor, the National Advisory 

Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 

illustrates the political, economic, 

managerial, international, and cultural 

contexts in which the events of flight 

have unfolded, and it will undoubtedly 

serve as an excellent resource for a wide 

audience to become acquainted with 

NASA’s heritage. 

Production work continues on three 

additional publications that are scheduled to be published this year, including The Aeronautics and Space Report 

of the President: Fiscal Years 2021 and 

2022 Activities, A Wartime Necessity: 

The National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics (NACA) and Other National 

Aeronautical Research Organizations’ 

Efforts at Innovation during World 

War II, edited by Alex M Spencer, and

NASA’s Discovery Program: The First 

Twenty Years of Competitive Planetary 

Exploration by Susan M. Niebur with 

David W. Brown (editor).

Armstrong Flight Research 

Center (AFRC)

Edwards Air Force Base, California

» By Christian Gelzer, Historian

Christian Gelzer has been working diligently to transfer AFRC history Web 

pages to the Agency’s new website, due 

to be released this spring. Additionally, 

to help reduce the Center’s holdings 

and spare anyone from having to move 

the Center history office’s nearly 100 

boxes of publications in the future, 

he spent a day distributing NASA 

CONGRATULATIONS TO 

NASA HISTORIAN, 

JENNIFER ROSS-NAZZAL!

The NASA History Office’s own Dr. Jennifer Ross-Nazzal 

has received the 2023 Liz Carpenter Award for her book, 

Making Space for Women: Stories from Trailblazing Women of NASA’s 

Johnson Space Center! This award, given annually by the Texas State 

Historical Association, goes to the best scholarly book covering the history 

of women and Texas.

Making Space for Women features the stories of 21 

women who worked at Johnson Space Center as 

astronauts, scientists, engineers, secretaries, trainers, 

managers, and more. Their narratives discuss the 

changes they experienced in their careers as the 

workforce became more diverse. Ross-Nazzal has 

served as the Historian at NASA’s Johnson Space 

Center since 2002, researching and writing on a 

variety of subjects including women’s history.

29
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

publications to Center employees and 

to anyone else who was interested. 

Following a request from an engineer, 

Gelzer is preparing a series of talks to 

NASA Center engineers about X-planes, 

the AFRC’s role with them, and what 

the projects accomplished. With the 

continued retirement of engineers with 

experience with the X-planes in the 

1970s and 1980s, a significant proportion of the current engineering workforce at Armstrong have been with the 

Agency for less than five years and are 

eager to learn more about these experimental aircraft. 

News from NASA’s Centers (continued)

ERIK CONWAY NAMED 

2022 AAAS FELLOW

I

n an announcement in January 2023, 

NASA-JPL Historian Erik Conway was one 

of only four individuals with NASA affiliations 

named as 2022 fellows by the American Association 

for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), receiving this 

prestigious nod in the Section on History and Philosophy of Science. Conway 

has served as the historian at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory since 2004, 

focusing on science and technology. The author of histories of atmospheric 

science, supersonic transportation, aviation infrastructure, Mars exploration, 

and climate change denial, he most recently co-authored the book A History 

of Near-Earth Objects Research, published in 2022. Congratulations Erik on 

being recognized with this distinction!

Learning from NASA’s Launch Failures (continued)

occasions in which attendees contacted their teams during 

class intermissions to ensure that some technical aspect was 

checked. In one instance, the Ares-I team incorporated a 

pump test into their pre-launch procedures after learning 

that a failed boost pump caused the loss of the first TitanCentaur mission in 1974.

After 16 years and 127 classes conducted on four continents, 

Ross and Nieberding will be retiring from their secondary 

career after a May 2023 class at Kennedy Space Center. 

The Mission Success First course, however, will carry on, 

with additional cases and fresh insight provided by Ann 

and Randy Over. The former has 36 years of microgravity 

and spaceflight systems experience at NASA Glenn, and 

the latter was chief engineer at the Ohio Department of 

Transportation. They will present their first class in June 

2023 in the Netherlands. 

Larry Ross, Ann Over, Joe Nieberding, and Randy Over (left to 

right) pose for a photo at a June 2022 class for the European Space 

Agency held in Noordwijk, Netherlands.

30
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Other Aerospace History News

Applications Open for 2023 Fellowships in Aerospace History

The Fellowships in Aerospace History 

are offered annually by NASA to 

support significant scholarly research 

projects in aerospace history. These 

fellowships grant the opportunity to 

engage in significant and sustained 

advanced research in all aspects of the 

history of aerospace from the earliest 

human interest in flight to the present, 

including cultural and intellectual history; economic history; history of law 

and public policy; and the history of 

science, engineering, and management. 

NASA provides funds to the History 

of Science Society (HSS) to allow us 

to award a fellowship. Representatives 

from the A merican Historica l 

Association (AHA), HSS, and Society 

for the History of Technology (SHOT) 

comprise the review committee. Three 

fellowships will be offered for the 

2022–23 term; applications will be 

entered into consideration for all three 

fellowships:

• AHA Fellowship in Aerospace 

History

• AHA Fellowship in the History of 

Space Technology

• HSS Fellowship in Aerospace 

History 

Eligibility

Applicants must possess a PhD in history or in a closely related field or be 

enrolled as a student (having completed 

all coursework) in a doctoral degree 

granting program. Preference will be 

given to scholars at early stages in their 

careers. Stipends may be awarded 

only to US citizens or permanent 

residents.

Fellowship Term

The fellowship term is for a period of 

at least six months, but not more than 

nine months, and should commence 

no later than January of the fellowship 

term. The fellow will be expected to 

devote the term largely to the proposed research project. Residency is 

not required, but office space may be 

provided by the Kluge Center at the 

Library of Congress upon request for 

a minimum of three months. Fellows 

are encouraged to take advantage of 

resources at the National Archives, the 

National Academies of Science, the 

Library of Congress, the Smithsonian 

Air and Space Museum, NASA 

Headquarters, and other collections in 

the Washington, DC, area.

Other Requirements

The fellow will be expected to write a 

report and present a public lecture on 

the fellowship experience. If the fellow 

is in residency in Washington, DC, a 

presentation at NASA Headquarters is 

encouraged. The fellow shall provide to 

the NASA History Office a copy of any 

publications that might emerge from 

the research undertaken during the 

fellowship year.

Stipend

The stipend is US$21,890 for a six- to 

nine-month fellowship, which includes 

travel expenses. The fellowship income 

is classified as stipendiary—there are 

no provisions for paying fringe benefits 

or withholding taxes—and will be disbursed in equal payments over the term 

of the fellowship. Funds may not be 

used to support tuition or fees. A fellow 

may not hold other major fellowships 

or grants during the fellowship term, 

except sabbatical and supplemental 

grants from their own institutions, and 

small grants from other sources for 

specific research expenses. Sources of 

anticipated support must be listed in 

the application form.

To Apply

Log into your MY AHA account and 

click “Available Application Forms” in 

the AHA Awards, Grants, and Jobs 

section. If you don’t have an account, 

create one. The applicant must submit 

a completed application, CV, a specific 

and detailed research proposal that 

will be the basis of the fellow’s research 

during the term and can also include 

additional writing samples. Two to four 

letters of recommendation that address 

your historical competence; your ability 

to apply historical concepts and methods to aerospace science, technology, 

management, or policy; and your ability to communicate both orally and in 

writing are also required. Completed 

applications are due April 1.

Please contact awards@historians.org

with any questions.

31
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Space Archives and Special 

Collection Database

» By Scott Sacknoff, Chair, 

SPACE 3.0 Foundation

The SPACE 3.0 Foundation has sponsored a graduate student to build a 

database of space-related archives and 

special collections to assist current 

and future researchers in discovering 

sources of materials and how they can 

access them. This spreadsheet will 

be made available for free via a link 

from the SpaceCommerce.org and 

SpaceHistory101.com websites.

An initial passthrough has been completed, and we are now seeking input 

to identify collections and other categories of useful information. The current list of archives identified can be 

reviewed in the linked PDF. If there are 

others you think should be included, 

please either send an email to info@

spacecommerce.org or fill out and send 

us the linked Excel data entry form.

Fields Currently Being Collected

• Organization

• Collection Name

• Materials Held

• Description of Collection Holdings

• Collection Amount/Size

• Access Restrictions

• Address / Country / Contact Phone 

Number / Contact Email Address

• Link to Collection Website

If you have any questions or other input, 

please contact Scott Sacknoff. 

Call for Papers for Discovery@30, New Frontiers@20: 

A Symposium on the History of NASA’s Discovery and 

New Frontiers Programs

» By Brian Odom, NASA Chief Historian

Dates: 18–19 January 2024

Location: Washington, DC

Congress approved NASA’s Discovery 

Program in 1993, initiating a new era 

of lower-cost, competed missions to 

explore the solar system. Like NASA’s 

older Explorer program of astronomy 

and astrophysics missions, these missions were to be developed and led by 

principal investigators. In 2002, based 

on the model of Discovery but recognizing a need for medium-class science 

missions to tackle questions identified 

in the decadal survey, NASA initiated 

the New Frontiers Program. Over the 

past 30 years, missions from these two 

programs have transformed our understanding of our solar system and have 

accomplished historic firsts. They have 

also redefined the role of science and 

scientists in the development of planetary science missions, even as this willingness to experiment with innovative 

management approaches created a tension with an often risk-averse NASA.

The NASA History Office and the 

Smithsonian’s National Air and Space 

Museum invite proposals for papers 

to be presented at a two-day symposium to be held 18–19 January 2024 in 

Washington, DC. We welcome diverse 

voices and perspectives to examine 

the history of the Discovery and New 

Frontiers Programs, their successes and 

failures, and their impact on knowledge 

and the practice of planetary science. 

The symposium will be a combination 

of panel discussions, keynote talks, and 

group discussion. The intention is to 

publish an anthology of selected papers.

Visit the Call for Papers web page to 

see a list of potential topics for papers.

Submission Procedure

If you wish to present a paper, please 

send the title, an abstract of no more 

than 400 words, and a short biography 

or curriculum vitae, including affiliation, by 1 May 2023 to Dr. Brian 

C. Odom, NASA’s Chief Historian. 

Questions about the symposium are 

also welcome. 

In NASA InSight’s second full selfie on Mars, made up of 14 images taken in the spring 

of 2019, a thin coating of dust covers the spacecraft. InSight, a mission of the Discovery 

Program, recently concluded in December 2022. Photo credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech.

Other Aerospace History News (continued)

32
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Apollo 

Astronaut 

Walter 

Cunningham 

Dies at 90

» Reprinted from NASA Press Release 

23-001 on 3 January 2023

F

ORMER ASTRONAUT Walter 

Cunningham, who flew into 

space on Apollo 7, the first flight 

with crew in NASA’s Apollo Program, 

died early Tuesday morning [3 January] 

in Houston. He was 90 years old.

“Walt Cunningham was a fighter pilot, 

physicist, and an entrepreneur—but, 

above all, he was an explorer. On Apollo 

7, the first launch of a crewed Apollo 

mission, Walt and his crewmates made 

history, paving the way for the Artemis 

Generation we see today,” said NASA 

Administrator Bill Nelson. “NASA will 

always remember his contributions to 

our nation’s space program and sends 

our condolences to the Cunningham 

family.”

Cunningham was born 16 March 

1932, in Creston, Iowa. He graduated 

from Venice High School, in Venice, 

California, before going on to receive a 

Bachelor of Arts with honors in physics 

in 1960 and a Master of Arts with distinction in physics in 1961 from the 

University of California at Los Angeles. 

He then completed a doctorate in 

physics with exception of thesis at the 

Advanced Management Program in the 

Harvard Graduate School of Business 

in 1974.

The Cunningham family offered the 

following statement: “We would like to 

express our immense pride in the life 

that he lived, and our deep gratitude 

for the man that he was—a patriot, 

an explorer, pilot, astronaut, husband, 

brother, and father. The world has lost 

another true hero, and we will miss 

him dearly.”

He joined the Navy in 1951 and served 

on active duty with the U.S. Marine 

NASA astronaut Walter 

Cunningham, Apollo 7 lunar 

module pilot, was photographed during the mission. 

(Photo credit: NASA)

“Walt Cunningham was a fighter pilot, physicist, and an 

entrepreneur—but, above all, he was an explorer. On 

Apollo 7, the first launch of a crewed Apollo mission, 

Walt and his crewmates made history, paving the way 

for the Artemis Generation we see today.”

—Administrator Bill Nelson

33
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Corps, retiring with the rank of colonel. 

He flew 54 missions as a night fighter 

pilot in Korea. He worked as a scientist 

for the Rand Corporation for three 

years. While with Rand, he worked on 

classified defense studies and problems 

related to the Earth’s magnetosphere. 

Cunningham had accumulated more 

than 4,500 hours of flying time in 40 

different aircraft, including more than 

3,400 in jet aircraft.

Cunningham was selected as an astronaut in 1963 as part of NASA’s third 

astronaut class.

“On behalf of NASA’s Johnson Space 

Center, we are beholden to Walt’s service to our nation and dedication to the 

advancement of human space exploration,” said Vanessa Wyche, Center 

director. “Walt’s accomplished legacy 

will continue to serve as an inspiration 

to us all.”

Prior to his assignment to the Apollo 7 

crew, Cunningham was on the prime 

crew for Apollo 2 until it was canceled, 

and he was the backup lunar module 

pilot for Apollo 1. 

Cunningham was designated the lunar 

module pilot for the 11-day flight 

of Apollo 7, which launched on 11 

October 1968, and was the first human 

flight test of the Apollo spacecraft. 

With Walter M. Schirra, Jr. and Donn 

F. Eisele, he tested maneuvers necessary 

for docking and lunar orbit rendezvous 

using the second stage of their Saturn 

IB rocket. The crew successfully completed eight tests, igniting the service 

module engine, measuring the accuracy of performance of all spacecraft 

systems, and providing the first live 

television transmission of onboard crew 

activities. The 263-hour, 4.5-millionmile flight splashed down 22 October 

1968 in the Atlantic Ocean.

Cunningham’s last assignment at 

NASA Johnson was chief of the Skylab 

branch of the Flight Crew Directorate. 

In this capacity, he was responsible for 

the operational inputs for five major 

pieces of manned space hardware, two 

different launch vehicles and 56 major 

experiments that comprised the Skylab 

Program.

Cunningham retired from NASA in 

1971 and would go on to lead multiple 

technical and financial organizations. 

He served in senior leadership roles 

with Century Development Corp., 

Hydrotech Development Company, 

and 3D International. Cunningham 

also was a longtime investor and entrepreneur, organizing small businesses 

and private investment firms. He also 

was a frequent keynote speaker and 

radio talk show host.

His numerous awards include the 

NASA Exceptional Service Medal and 

NASA Distinguished Service Medal. 

For his service he was inducted into the 

Astronaut Hall of Fame, International 

Space Hall of Fame, Iowa Aviation 

Hall of Fame, San Diego Air and Space 

Museum Hall of Fame, and Houston 

Hall of Fame. Cunningham and the 

Apollo 7 crew also earned an Emmy 

in the form of the National Academy 

of Television Arts and Sciences Special 

Trustee Award. 

Apollo Astronaut Walter Cunningham Dies at 90 (continued)

A memorial wreath was placed in the Heroes and Legends exhibit at the Kennedy Space 

Center Visitor Complex in Florida following the 9 January 2023 ceremony honoring the 

memory of Walter Cunningham. (Photo credit: NASA/Cory Huston)

34
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Remembering 

Douglas Mudgway, 

Engineer and Author

» Adapted from Douglas Mudgway’s obituary

DOUGLAS JAMES MUDGWAY,

born in Auckland, New Zealand, 

passed away on 20 December 

2022, at the age of 99. Mudgway 

graduated from the University of New 

Zealand in 1945 with a degree in physics and mathematics, and after working for the New Zealand Department 

of Scientific and Industrial Research, 

moved to Australia to work as a scientist on radar for the guided missile 

test range at Woomera, dividing his 

time between there and in England at 

the Royal Aircraft Establishment. In 

1962 he was hired by NASA to work 

as a development engineer at the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory 

( JPL) in Pasadena, 

California, and moved 

with his wife and three children to the 

United States.

At JPL, Mudgway was the Deep 

Space Tracking and Data Acquisition 

Manager of the Surveyor Moon landing spacecraft (1966), the Viking Mars 

landers (1976), and for the Galileo 

mission to Jupiter from its inception in 

1978 until his retirement in 1991. He 

was awarded the NASA Exceptional 

Service Medal for his work on Viking 

in 1978, and received a second award, 

the Exceptional Achievement Medal 

for his contribution to the Galileo mission in 1991. 

Since retiring to Sonoma, 

California, Douglas Mudgway continued his involvement with the NASA 

Space Program as an independent 

consultant. He wrote extensively on 

his experiences with NASA’s solar 

system exploration and was the author 

of two books on the history of deep 

space technology, Uplink-Downlink: 

A History of the NASA Deep Space 

Network from 1957–1997, published 

as part of the NASA History Series in 

2002, and Big Dish: Building America’s 

Deep Space Connection to the Planets, 

published in 2005. He also authored 

a biography of deep space pioneer 

William H. Pickering, former JPL 

Director, that was published in 2007. 

In 2008, this book was selected by 

the American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics for Best History 

Manuscript dealing with the impact of 

space technology or science on society.

He is survived by his three adult children and their spouses, seven grandchildren and two great grandchildren. 

He will be remembered fondly by his 

many colleagues and friends. 

He wrote extensively 

on his experiences with 

NASA’s solar system 

exploration and was the 

author of two books on 

the history of deep space 

The 210' Dish Antenna at Goldstone, technology...

California, used to track Pioneer spacecraft, 

as seen in 1972. (Photo credit: NASA)

35
NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES Volume 40, Number 1 • Spring 2023

Upcoming Meetings

22–26 MARCH 2023

American Society for Environmental 

History Annual Meeting

Boston, Massachusetts

https://www.aseh.org/events 

28–30 MARCH 2023

International Astronautical 

Federation Spring Meetings 2023

Paris, France

https://www.iafastro.org/

events/iaf-spring-meetings/iafspring-meetings-2023.html

30 MARCH–2 APRIL 2023

Organization of American 

Historians Annual Meeting

Los Angeles, California

https://www.oah.org/

meetings-events/oah23

12–15 APRIL 2023

National Council on Public 

History Annual Meeting

Atlanta, Georgia

https://ncph.org/

conference/2023-annual-meeting/

19–21 APRIL 2023

2023 Forum on Philosophy, 

Engineering, and Technology

Delft, Netherlands

https://www.fpet2023.org/

1–2 JUNE 2023

Society for History in the Federal 

Government Annual Meeting

Washington, DC

https://shfg.wildapricot.

org/2023-annual-meeting-cfp

7–9 JUNE 2023

Policy History Conference

Columbus, Ohio

https://jph.asu.edu/2023-about

12–16 JUNE 2023

2023 AIAA Aviation and Aeronautics 

Forum and Exposition

San Diego, California (and online)

https://www.aiaa.org/aviation 

15–17 JUNE 2023

Society for Historians of 

American Foreign Relations 

(SHAFR) Annual Meeting

Arlington, Virginia

https://shafr.org/shafr2023

22–29 JULY 2023

ARCHIVES * RECORDS 2023 

(Joint Annual Meeting of the 

Council of State Archivists and the 

Society of American Archivists)

Washington, DC

https://www2.archivists.org/am2023

17–19 JULY 2023

5th Annual John Glenn 

Memorial Symposium

Cleveland, Ohio

https://astronautical.org/events/

john-glenn-memorial-symposium/

24-30 JULY 2023

Experimental Aircraft Association 

(EAA) AirVenture

Oshkosh, Wisconsin

https://www.eaa.org/airventure/

2–6 OCTOBER 2023

International Astronautical Congress

Baku, Azerbaijan

https://www.iafastro.org/

events/iac/iac-2023/ 

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TO DATE

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EXPLORE

New Titles 

in the NASA 

History Series

NACA to NASA to Now 

by Roger D. Launius

A History of Near-Earth 

Objects Research 

by Erik M. Conway, Donald 

K. Yeomans, and Meg 

Rosenburg

The Wind and Beyond,

Volume III: Other Paths, 

Other Flyways

James R. Hansen and 

Jeremy R. Kinney, eds.

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NASA HISTORY NEWS&NOTES

Newsletter Editor and Graphic Designer » Michele Ostovar

Copyeditor » Andrew Cooke

DOWNLOAD this and other recent 

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The Space Shuttle Columbia Memorial is seen after a wreath laying 

ceremony on 31 January 2014 at Arlington National Cemetery. 

Photo credit: (NASA/Bill Ingalls).