IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 25, 2021 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. VALRIE HART

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Polk County

No. 17-CR-138 Sandra Donaghy, Judge

No. E2020-01144-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Valrie Hart, pleaded guilty in the Polk County Criminal Court to four 

counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, a Class 

A felony, conspiracy to commit robbery or theft, a Class D felony, theft of property valued 

at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued 

at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently 

amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 

39-13-401 (2018) (robbery), 39-12-103 (2018) (conspiracy), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft). 

After the appropriate merger, the trial court imposed life imprisonment for two counts of 

felony murder, twenty-five years for each count of especially aggravated robbery, and three 

years for conspiracy to commit robbery or theft. The trial court ordered partial consecutive 

service, for an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences, plus twenty-five years. 

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying sentence 

enhancement factors related to treating the victims with exceptional cruelty and to abusing 

a private trust. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA 

MCGEE OGLE and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Steven B. Ward, Madisonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Valrie Hart.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant Attorney 

General; Renee W. Turner, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stephen D. Crump, District 

Attorney General; and Shari Tayloe, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, 

State of Tennessee.

01/28/2022
-2-

OPINION

The plea agreement, the guilty plea hearing transcript, and the presentence report

are not contained in the appellate record. The Defendant has the burden of preparing a fair, 

accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues 

raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). This 

includes the obligation to have a transcript of the evidence or proceedings prepared, 

including the presentence report. See T.R.A.P. 24(b). Despite these deficiencies, we 

conclude that the record is nonetheless adequate for appellate review. See State v. Caudle, 

388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012) (“[W]hen a record does not include a transcript of the 

hearing on the guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-bycase basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review[.]”). 

The record reflects that the Defendant’s convictions relate to a February 28, 2017 

incident, during which the Defendant fatally shot Jeremy Walker and Larry Jeffries inside 

the home the victims shared. The Defendant and her son, codefendant Ahren Presley, were

indicted, and on January 24, 2020, the Defendant pleaded guilty as charged in the

indictment. Although the State’s recitation of the factual basis for the Defendant’s guilty 

pleas is not contained in the record, the first degree murder report completed pursuant to 

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 summarized the facts of case as follows:

Valrie Hart and Ahren Presley are co-defendants in this double homicide 

case. Ms. Hart is the mother of Mr. Presley. Although indicted jointly, these 

cases were severed for trial. Mr. Presley took his case to a jury trial.[

1

] Ms. 

Hart waived her rights, entered pleas of guilty to all charges and was 

sentenced by the Court.

Mr. Presley and a friend went to the home of the victims, Larry Jeffries and 

Jeremy Walker. Mr. Jeffries owned the home and had full-time employment. 

Mr. Walker is described as a young, mentally challenged man. He received 

SSI as a source of income. After the visit, Mr. Presley informed his mother 

of the “things” he saw and the two discussed committing a robbery. This 

discussion was confirmed by the friend, who left the restaurant where this 

conversation occurred. 

 

1 Codefendant Ahren Presley was convicted as charged after a jury trial. The trial court imposed an effective 

sentence of two consecutive life sentences, plus twenty years. Codefendant Presley has appealed his 

convictions and sentence, and his case is pending disposition before the Tennessee Court of Criminal 

Appeals. State v. Ahren Presley, No. E2020-01249-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2020) (notice 

of appeal). We take judicial notice of these proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 201. 
-3-

Days later, the bodies of Larry Jeffries and Jeremy Walker were discovered 

in their home. The autopsy report showed that Mr. Jeffries had been shot one 

time in the back of the head, a close-range shot. Mr. Walker had been shot 

in the back and also in the back of his head. The crime scene had been 

manipulated in that their dogs had been confined, windows covered, and 

floors cleaned. Televisions, the security camera system, credit and bank

cards, and Mr. Jeffries’ vehicle had been stolen. Forensics showed that bullet 

fragments from the victims had the same characteristics as the revolver 

recovered. 

Law enforcement tracked use of the bank cards to the defendants and their 

associates and collected physical descriptions, video, and other information. 

A credit card had been used to rent a hotel room . . . where both defendants 

were detained . . . and their belongings and vehicles were searched. Ms. Hart 

had used the credit card to buy musical equipment. The stolen vehicle was 

later found and traced back to this defendant.

Mr. Presley made admissions to others, but gave no statement to the police. 

He told a friend that Valrie shot one of the men with a gun in the head, that 

the bodies were not removed, but that the scene was cleaned.

In an interview with law enforcement, Valrie Hart initially admitted that she 

went to the home of the victims with Mr. Presley in possession of a borrowed 

.38 caliber revolver. The plan was to rob the victims. She stated that she 

heard two shots and entered the home. She and her son loaded stolen items 

into her car and into Mr. Jeffries’ car. At her sentencing hearing, Ms. Hart 

admitted that she discussed with her son a plan to rob the victims. She stole 

a gun and they went to the house where they were invited into the home. She 

testified that she shot both victims in the back of the head, took items from 

their pockets, and stole their televisions and Larry Jeffries’ car. She stated 

that she sold the car for drugs. 

The Rule 12 report, which reflects the trial judge’s signature, states that the victims 

had been ages fifty-two and twenty-seven and had not been “tortured” during the offenses. 

The report reflects that the Defendant had been the “primary assailant” because she had 

been the shooter and that she had been under the influence of methamphetamine at the time 

of the offenses. 

At the sentencing hearing, the presentence report was received as an exhibit. 

Although the report is not contained in the appellate record, defense counsel informed the 

trial court that counsel and the Defendant had reviewed the report, that the defense did not 

dispute the “factual statements, the statistical information regarding [the Defendant], her 
-4-

background, [and] her criminal history.” However, the defense disputed the factual basis 

to support the application of enhancement factor (14) as requested by the State. See T.C.A. 

§ 40-35-114(14) (2019) (“The defendant abused a position of . . . private trust . . . that 

significantly facilitated the commission of the offense[.]”). 

Rebecca Woodard, Mr. Walker’s mother, testified that the victim’s killing had 

deeply affected her family. She said that the victim had been intellectually disabled and 

kind-hearted. She said that the victim’s father was hospitalized two weeks after the 

shooting because of “a nervous breakdown.” She said that she, too, struggled with the 

victim’s death because the victim had been “the special one of the family.” She said that 

the victim had not been able to work and that he had received disability benefits, which 

were about $700 per month. She requested the maximum sentence to prevent the 

Defendant from hurting anyone in the future. 

The prosecutor read a written statement prepared by Mr. Jeffries’s sister. In the 

statement, she stated that her brother’s kindness was “what ended his life.” She said that 

the victim allowed two strangers to enter his home for the night so they “could get warm.” 

She said that her nephew discovered the victims and that he was “devasted” by what he 

saw at the home. She said that her family’s life had been “turned upside down,” that she 

had nightmares about the shooting, and that she had been in constant fear. She said that 

her mother was “beyond devasted.” 

The Defendant testified that she was addicted to methamphetamine at the time of 

the offenses, that she had been in confinement for two years and eight months, and that 

during this time, she had stopped using drugs and “had gotten right with God again.” She 

apologized for the pain she had caused the victims’ families and said, “I take full 

responsibility for my actions no matter how heinous it was. I can never make it right.” 

On cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that she did not express remorse for 

her conduct during her presentence interview and that she had a criminal history. She said 

that after the present offenses occurred, she was convicted of possession of 

methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia in Bradley County. She agreed 

she and codefendant Presley were together at the time of the drug-related offenses. 

The Defendant testified that she and codefendant Presley discussed and planned the 

robbery in this case. She agreed that the victims were kind to her and that the victims 

invited her and her son inside. She admitted shooting the victims and said she shot Mr. 

Jeffries in the back of the head after Mr. Jeffries entered the home. She said that she shot 

Mr. Walker in the back of the head after she and codefendant Presley entered the home. 

She admitted stealing from the victims and said she sold the victims’ belongings to another 

person in order to purchase methamphetamine. When asked why she traveled to Texas 

after the killings, she said that she did not know she was under police investigation and that 
-5-

she wanted to return to her childhood home. The Defendant stated that before the killings, 

she fired a gun inside the home she shared with her then-boyfriend because she wanted to 

scare him. 

The trial court found that at the guilty plea hearing, the Defendant admitted shooting

the victims. The court credited the victim impact statements from the victims’ family 

members and the Defendant’s testimony. The court found that the Defendant was 

“competent and grounded.” The court found, based upon the Defendant’s testimony, that 

she and her son planned the robbery, that she procured the revolver from Crystal Dillard,

2

that the victims were kind to the Defendant, and that she shot the victims in the back of the 

head. The court stated that although it did not know how long it took the victims to 

succumb to their injuries, the Defendant took the victims’ belongings and stole Mr. 

Jeffries’s car and that the Defendant bought methamphetamine with the proceeds of the 

stolen items. The court found that the Defendant fled to Texas after the killings and that 

the Defendant admitted firing a gun inside a home she shared with a previous boyfriend in 

an effort to scare him. 

The trial court reviewed the presentence report, which the court said reflected the 

Defendant had two drug-related convictions that occurred sixteen days after the offenses

in the present case. The Defendant left high school after the tenth grade and later obtained 

her GED. The Defendant reported good mental health despite a bipolar diagnosis, having

obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression, and having attempted suicide six years 

earlier. The Defendant reported using methamphetamine for thirteen years, during which 

she attended substance abuse treatment at “Pine Ridge” but continued to use drugs. The 

Defendant reported having a “stable home,” although she reported her mother used 

marijuana and “slept around.” The Defendant stated that her mother’s conduct “messed 

her up.” The Defendant had been married twice and had three children, which included 

codefendant Presley, and her employment history was “sporadic” because of her drug use. 

She received an honorable discharge from the Army after failing to pass a physical fitness 

test. 

The trial court stated that the Strong-R assessment reflected the Defendant had a 

“high risk to reoffend for drugs.” The court stated that the Defendant’s Strong-R 

assessment was “high” based, in part, upon the lack of a stable home and lack of 

employment history. 

 

2 Other evidence shows that the Defendant and codefendant Presley traded some of the items stolen from 

the victims in exchange for drugs from Crystal Dillard, who was indicted along with the Defendant and 

codefendant Presley. Other evidence likewise shows that codefendant Dillard sold drugs to the Defendant 

and codefendant Presley. However, codefendant Dillard received the benefit of an immunity agreement in 

exchange for her testimony at codefendant Presley’s trial. 
-6-

The trial court determined that although confinement was required for the first 

degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions, confinement was 

likewise warranted for the remaining convictions on the grounds that it was necessary to 

avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses and that it would deter others who might 

commit similar offenses. See T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(B) (2019). The court found that the 

offenses involved the loss of life of two victims inside their home, that the victims invited 

the Defendant inside, that the Defendant entered with the intent to rob the victims, and that 

she shot the victims in the back of the head. 

The trial court declined to apply any mitigating factors. See id. § 40-35-113 (2019). 

The court found that the Defendant did not express remorse for killing the victims during 

her presentence interview. The court acknowledged that the Defendant’s “remedial actions 

in the jail [were] exemplary” but determined her post-arrest conduct did not warrant 

mitigation weight. 

The trial court applied eight enhancement factors. The court applied factor (1) 

because the Defendant had been convicted of drug-related offenses in Bradley County 

since the offenses in the present case and had fired a handgun inside the home she shared 

with a former boyfriend, who she intended to scare. See id. § 40-35-114(1) (2018) (“The 

defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition 

to those necessary to establish the appropriate range[.]”). The court applied factor (2) 

because the Defendant admitted she was the leader in the commission of these offenses, 

which involved her son. See id. § 40-35-114(2) (“The defendant was the leader in the 

commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors[.]”). The court applied 

factor (3) because the offenses involved two victims. See id. § 40-35-114(3) (“The offense 

involved more than one (1) victim[.]”). The court found that because one victim was shot 

in the back and in the back of the head, the evidence showed that one victim tried to flee. 

The court found that the Defendant committed execution-style murders after the victims

opened their home to her and her son. The court likewise determined that the employee at 

the music store, at which the Defendant used the victims’ financial information to purchase 

items, “was so skeptical” that the Defendant was purchasing the items with a stolen debit 

card that the employee noted the license plate number of the car driven by the Defendant. 

The trial court applied enhancement factor (5) after determining that the Defendant 

“treated, or allowed a victim to be treated, with exceptional cruelty.” See id. § 40-35-

114(5). The court found that based upon the Defendant’s testimony, she shot the victims 

in the back of the head at close range. The court found that the autopsy reports reflect that 

the gunshot wounds were “almost contact wounds” and that the medical examiner’s 

testimony at codefendant Presley’s trial showed the offenses were “exceptionally cruel and 

heinous.” The court applied factor (10) because the Defendant’s stealing property for drugs 

showed she had “absolutely no hesitation” in committing a crime when the risk to human 

life was high. See id. § 40-35-114(10). The court found that “they” only went to the 
-7-

victims’ home to frighten them “into giving over their stuff” but that the risk to life was 

high. The court likewise applied factor (12) based upon the “proof in the record” that Mr. 

Walker “was the victim or person other than the intended victim.” See id. § 40-35-114(12) 

(“During the commission of the felony, the defendant intentionally inflicted serious bodily 

injury upon another person, or the actions of the defendant resulted in the death of, or 

serious bodily injury to, a victim or a person other than the intended victims[.]”). 

The trial court applied enhancement factor (14) after determining that the Defendant 

had violated a private trust with the victims. See id. § 40-35-114(14). The court 

acknowledged that this factor applied, generally, when a defendant has a parental or 

caretaking relationship with a victim. The court stated, though,

but when you open your house to somebody who doesn’t have anywhere to 

stay and you let them live there, that’s creating a private trust. You’re letting 

them come into your -- to your home where we all have a greatest expectation 

of privacy. And Mr. Presley used that . . . to see what stuff that they have. 

He goes and tells his mother about it and then the plan is contrived to go back 

to the home. So because of the victim’s relationship with Mr. Presley, Ms. 

Hart gets access into the property and she now is in a position where she can 

murder. So even though she didn’t even meet them before that day, she relied 

on the relationship that her son had developed with these men and that’s an 

abuse of that private trust. 

Last, the trial court applied enhancement factor (24) because the offenses involved 

a theft and because the manner in which the offense was committed resulted in the victims’ 

suffering significant damage to their property. See id. § 40-35-114(24). The court applied 

this factor based upon evidence presented during codefendant Presley’s trial, which 

showed that the Defendant and codefendant Presley took televisions, cut wires,3searched 

the victims’ pockets, and took a car while the victims lay dying inside their home. 

The trial court reviewed the statistical information published by the Administrative 

Office of the Courts in connection with data obtained from July 1, 2011, through June 30, 

2019. The court stated that the data showed that 99% of defendants who had been 

convicted of a Class A felony were sentenced to incarceration, with a median sentence 

length of 240 months. The court stated that the data showed that Range I, standard 

offenders convicted of a Class D felony received a median sentence length between twentyfive to twenty-six months.

 

3 Other evidence shows that the victims’ home had a security system and that the wires to the cameras inside 

the home had been cut. 
-8-

The trial court determined that the Defendant could maintain her sobriety and focus 

her life “on good things” when in confinement and that, as a result, the Defendant had a 

potential for rehabilitation.

The trial court merged the two felony murder convictions in connection with Mr. 

Jeffries and imposed a life sentence. The court merged the two felony murder convictions 

in connection with Mr. Walker and imposed a life sentence. The court merged the 

respective theft convictions with the corresponding especially aggravated robbery 

convictions for each victim. The court imposed a three-year sentence for conspiracy to 

commit robbery or theft and twenty-five years for each especially aggravated robbery 

conviction. 

The trial court imposed partial consecutive service after determining that the 

Defendant was a dangerous offender. The court found that the Defendant had admitted to 

firing a gun in order to scare a former boyfriend and to shooting two unsuspecting victims 

from behind. The court found that the Defendant’s behavior indicated little or no regard 

for human life, based upon the evidence that the Defendant entered the victims’ home with 

a loaded gun, shot the victims, and watched them bleed to death while she and her son 

robbed the victims. The court found, as well, that the Defendant attempted to prevent 

discovery of the victims’ bodies. The court determined that the circumstances surrounding

the offenses were aggravated and that the killings were violent, which the court described 

as “near-contact” wounds. The court found that the scene was “very terrible, gross,” and 

that the offenses were “highly aggravated, especially when one considers what they sought 

to gain from this was taking what little these men had and then they turn around and trade 

it for drugs.” The court likewise found that confinement for an extended period of time 

was necessary to protect society from the Defendant’s unwillingness to lead a productive 

life and from her criminal activity in furtherance of her “anti-societal” lifestyle. The court 

noted that the Defendant’s reported employment at restaurants and as a forklift operator 

had not been confirmed and that the evidence showed the thirty-nine-year-old Defendant 

had been a drug addict for seventeen years and had murdered two people. The court found 

that the length of the sentences reasonably related to the severity of the conviction offenses.

Based upon these determinations, the trial court ordered consecutive service of the 

life sentences for felony murder and twenty-five years for one count of especially 

aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences, plus 

twenty-five years. This appeal followed.

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors 

related to treating the victims with exceptional cruelty and to the Defendant’s abusing a 

private trust in order to accomplish the robbery. She asserts that the record does not support 

the application of these factors. She does not challenge the application of the remaining 
-9-

enhancement factors. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

applying these factors. 

As a preliminary matter, the Defendant states in her appellate brief that she 

challenges the trial court’s application of two enhancement factors and the court’s 

imposition of consecutive service. However, the arguments contained in the brief and at 

oral argument were limited to the court’s application of the enhancement factors. As a 

result, our review is limited to the trial court’s application of enhancement factors (5) and 

(14). See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by argument, 

citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived[.]”).

This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence within the appropriate 

sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of 

reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must 

consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, 

the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature 

and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement 

factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to 

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any statement that the defendant 

made on his own behalf, and the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. State v. Ashby, 

823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (citing T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103, -210; State v. Moss, 727 

S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); 

see T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102 (2018), 41-1-126 (2018) (validated risk and needs assessments).

Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range 

sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our 

Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706-07. “[A] trial court’s misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial 

court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. at 706. “So long as 

there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as 

provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld 

on appeal. Id.

The record reflects that the trial court considered the evidence at the guilty plea and 

sentencing hearings, the presentence report, the principles of sentencing, the enhancement 

factors and mitigation evidence, the nature of the offenses, the statistical information

provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Defendant’s presentence 

statement and sentencing hearing testimony, and the Defendant’s potential for 

rehabilitation. The Defendant received within-range sentences for the conviction offenses. 

As a result, the court’s determinations are afforded a presumption of reasonableness. 
-10-

A. The Defendant Treated the Victims with Exceptional Cruelty

“[P]roper application of enhancement factor (5) requires a finding of cruelty under 

the statute ‘over and above’ what is required to sustain a conviction for an offense.” State 

v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Embry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 456 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). The evidence must support a finding that “the infliction of pain 

or suffering [is] for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom, and not merely 

pain or suffering inflicted as a means of accomplishing the crime charged.” State v. Kelly 

Haynes, No. W1999-01485-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298744, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 

14, 2000). Whether a defendant treats a victim with exceptional cruelty is “a matter of 

degree.” State v. Terrance Maurice Moore, No. 02C01-9306-CC-00126, 1994 WL 

245481, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 1994).

The record reflects that the trial court took judicial notice of the evidence presented 

at codefendant Presley’s trial because the court’s findings and determinations at the 

Defendant’s sentencing hearing, at least in part, were based upon evidence presented at 

codefendant Presley’s trial and were not presented as evidence at the Defendant’s 

sentencing hearing. See Tenn. R. Evid. 201. The court applied enhancement factor (5) 

based, in part, upon the Defendant’s admission at the sentencing hearing that she shot both 

victims in the back of the head. Mr. Walker was also shot in the back. 

The trial court likewise relied upon the autopsy reports and the medical examiner’s 

testimony at codefendant Presley’s trial to determine that the killings were exceptionally 

cruel and heinous. However, our review of the autopsy reports and the transcript of the 

medical examiner’s testimony at codefendant Presley’s trial do not support a finding of 

cruelty “over and above” that which was necessary to accomplish the offenses. See Arnett, 

49 S.W.3d at 258; Embry, 915 S.W.2d at 456. Although the victims were shot “executionstyle” at close range from behind, the evidence does not reflect that the Defendant inflicted 

pain or suffering upon the victims for its own sake or for gratification, nor does the 

evidence reflect that the victims were subjected to mental or physical abuse before being 

shot. Rather, the evidence reflects that the pain and suffering inflicted upon the victims 

were a means of accomplishing the robbery and theft. The Rule 12 report completed in 

connection with the Defendant’s first degree murder convictions reflects that the victims 

had not been tortured. 

The medical examiner’s testimony at codefendant Presley’s trial is instructive. All 

three gunshot wounds showed the presence of soot and stippling, which indicated that the 

wounds were inflicted at close range. The head wounds were inflicted at an extremely 

close range, and the firearm could have touched the skin at the time it was fired. Although 

the gunshot wound to Mr. Walker’s back was not fatal immediately, the gunshot wounds 

to the victims’ heads would have caused immediate death. The evidence likewise does not 

reflect the victims suffered additional injuries associated with something other than the 
-11-

gunshot wounds. Furthermore, our review of the remaining witness testimony does not 

reflect evidence supporting the determination that the victims were treated with exceptional 

cruelty before their deaths. As a result, the trial court’s application of factor (5) is not 

supported by the evidence. However, the erroneous application of a single enhancement 

factor does not warrant relief because the record otherwise supports the within-range 

sentence imposed by the trial court, and the court applied six enhancement factors that have 

not been challenged by the Defendant. She is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

B. The Defendant Abused a Position of Private Trust to Accomplish the Offenses

Our supreme court has stated that in order for enhancement factor (14) to apply, 

courts must analyze “‘the nature of the relationship’ and whether that relationship 

‘promoted confidence, reliability, or faith.’” State v. Gutierrez, 5 S.W.3d 641, 646 (Tenn. 

1999) (quoting State v. Kissinger, 922 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tenn. 1996)). Such relationships 

“usually includes a degree of vulnerability,” and “[i]t is the exploitation of this 

vulnerability to achieve criminal purposes which is deemed more blameworthy and thus 

justifies application of the enhancement factor.” Gutierrez, 5 S.W.3d at 646. Therefore, a 

private trust requires evidence that the relationship between a defendant and a victim 

“caused the victim to be particularly vulnerable,” and a defendant must abuse this private 

trust in committing the offenses. Id. 

The record does not reflect that the Defendant and the victims had a preexisting 

relationship before the day of the offenses in the present case. However, the evidence at 

codefendant Presley’s trial reflects that that codefendant Presley and his friend, David 

Jaynes, were told to leave the Defendant’s home sometime before the offenses. Because 

they needed a place to stay, Mr. Walker, who was a friend of Mr. Jaynes, invited the men 

to stay at the home Mr. Walker and Mr. Jeffries shared. After having stayed overnight 

once inside the victims’ home, codefendant Presley told the Defendant about the victims’ 

personal property, and the two devised a plan to rob them. 

Likewise, at her sentencing hearing, the Defendant testified that she conspired with 

codefendant Presley to rob the victims, that the victims were kind to her, and that the 

victims invited her and her son inside the home where the killings occurred. The Defendant 

admitted shooting Mr. Walker after she and codefendant Presley entered the home and 

shooting Mr. Jeffries after he entered the home. 

We conclude that record supports the trial court’s application of this factor based 

upon the facts in the present case. Although the Defendant and the victims were not 

acquainted before the offenses, the victims had permitted codefendant Presley to stay at 

their home because he had nowhere to go. As a result of the victims’ generosity and trust 

in codefendant Presley, he and the Defendant devised a plan to rob the victims of their 

personal property. The Defendant and codefendant Presley were allowed inside the home 
-12-

at the time of the offenses because codefendant Presley held a trust with the victims, and 

that trust was extended to the Defendant because of the nature of her parental relationship 

with codefendant Presley. We acknowledge the evidence reflects that codefendant Presley 

had known the victims only for a short period of time and had stayed overnight at the 

victims’ home only once. This nonetheless created a relationship of trust, and the 

relationship was exploited by the Defendant and codefendant Presley in order to gain 

access to the victims’ home and belongings. In any event, even if application of this 

enhancement factor were erroneous, the record otherwise supports the within-range 

sentence imposed by the trial court, and the court applied six enhancement factors that have 

not been challenged by the Defendant. She is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgments 

of the trial court. 

 _____________________________________

 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE