F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P laintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

C A M E R O N R E E D , Defendant-Appellant

. No. 12-10420

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01394- PMP-VCF -1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Philip M. Pro, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J une 13, 2013—San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 22, 2013

B efore: Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain and Milan D. Smith, J r., Circuit J udg es, and Michael M. Anello, District J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e Anello

* T h e Ho n o rab le Mich ael M. A n ello

, U n i ted States District J u d g e f o r th e So u th ern District o f

Calif o rn ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction by conditional g uilty plea
to violating Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.110(3) ( g ), which prohibits driving with over 2 ng /ml of marijuana in the blood,

a s s i milated into federal law under the A ssimilative Crim e s Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1 3, in a case in wh i c h the defendant was arrested after driving erratically on a federal road in the L ake Mead National Recreation Area.

The panel held t h a t assimilation of Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law was prope r because althoug h the defendant’s conduct is p unishable u n d er the f ederal DUI
reg ulation (36 C.F .R. § 4.23(a)(1)), 36 C.F .R. § 4.2 manifests the National Park S e rv ice’s clear intent to assimilate traffic laws such as Nevada’s per se drug g e d driving law, there is a
g ap in federal law with respect to punishing o p er ators o f vehicles who ex ceed a p er s e d ru g limit reg ardless o f impairment, and assimilating the Ne v a da law would not conflict with federal policy or ef f e c t ively rewrite a federal offense definition.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 3

COUNSEL

Alina Maria Shell, Ass i s t a n t F e deral Public Defender, L a s Veg as, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Adam McMeen F lake (arg ued), Assistant United States Attorney
, and Nadia J anjua Ahmed, Special A ssistant United States Attorney , L as Veg as, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

ANEL L O, District J udg e :

Appellant Cameron Reed was arrested after d riving erratically on a federal road loc a t ed in the L ake Mead National Recreation Area in Nevada. Reed’s b lood contained 3.7 nanog rams per milliliter (ng /ml) of mar i j u a na. Reed pleaded g uilty to violating Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.110(3)(g ), which p rohibits driving with over 2 n g /ml of marijuana in the blood, a ssimilated into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA” or “ t h e A ct”), 18 U.S.C. § 13. Reed
asserts that his conviction was i m proper b ecause an applicable federal reg ulation puni s hes h is conduct, thereby precluding assimilation of Nevada law.

W e h ave jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291. B ecause assimilation of Nevada law was proper, we affirm.

B A C K G R O U N D

On March 27, 2010, a National Park Serv i c e ( “NPS”)
rang e r at the L ake Mead National Recreation Area observed a vehicle traveling at a hig h rate of speed. The rang er pacedU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 4

t he vehicle at 40 miles per hour in a posted 15 miles-per

hour-z one, a

nd watched as it turned into the ex it of a one-way loop, passing two “Do Not E n ter ” s i gn s. After initiating a traffic stop, the rang e r identified the driver as Reed. A strong odor of b urnt marijuana emanated from the vehicle, an d t he
rang e r saw a n open container of “Mike’s Hard L emonade” resting in the center console. Reed’s speech was slurred a nd he admitted to smoking o ne marijuana joint and taking a sip of alcohol while driving

. The rang er administered f our field sobriety tests; Reed failed three. Re e d w a s arrested. Subsequently

, the rang e r

searched Reed’s vehicle and found

a cig arette box containing a su b s t ance he suspected to be marijuana. L ater blood tests revealed 3.7 ng /ml o f Ä 9-Tetra h y drocannabinol (marijuana) and 15 ng /ml THC carbox y lic acid (marijuana metabolite) in Reed’s sy stem.

Reed was orig inally charg ed w ith four federal Class B misdemeanor offenses, including opera ting a motor vehicle under the influence of d r ug s or alcohol in v i o lation o f 36 C.F .R. § 4.23(a)(1) (Count One), unsafe operation in violation of 36 C.F

. R. § 4.22(b)(1) (Count Two), possession of a contro l l e d s ubstance in violation o f 36 C.F .R. § 2.35(b)(2) (Count Three), and open container in violation of 36 C.F .R. § 4.14(b) (Count F our). L ater, via an amended complaint, Reed was further c harg ed with operating a vehicle with an amount of marijuana in his blood in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 4 84C.110(3)(g ) (Count F ive), and o p erating a vehicle with an amount of marijuana metabolite in h is blood in violation of Nev. Rev. Sta t. § 484C.110(3)(h)(1) (Count Six ). The g overnment used t he ACA to assimilate the Nevada laws into federal law.

Reed moved to dismiss the state law claims, arg uing that they were not properly a s s i m i lated u nder the ACA. After aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 5

mag istrate judg e denied the motion, Reed entered conditional
g uilty p leas to Count Two ( unsafe operation) and Count F ive (driving with a proscribed amount of marijuana in his blood). The remaining claims w e r e dismissed. Reed reserved his rig ht to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss Count F ive, but w aived h i s rig ht to appeal any other a spect of his conviction. On appeal, the d istrict court affirmed, concluding that assimilation of the Nevada law was proper.

Reed timely a p pealed to this Court. He a sserts that his conviction was improper bec a u s e a federal reg ulation punishes his conduct, thereby precluding assimilation of the Nevada law. 1

A P P L I C A B L E L A W

I. The Assim ilative Crim e s Act – 18 U.S.C. § 13(a)

The ACA promotes the e ven-handed application of state law to local conduct that federal law does not punish and, but for the situs being a federal enclave, would q ualify as a local offense. United States v. W aites
, 198 F .3d 1 123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Act provides:

W h oever within or upon any [ federal enclave] is g uilty of any act o r omission w hich, althoug h not m a d e punishable b y any a ct o f Co n gress, would be punishable if committed

1 Reed also co n tests th e co n stitu tio n ality of Nev ad a’ s p er se m arij u an a

m etab o lite law

, Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 4 8 4 .1 10 (3 )(h ). W e d o n o t reach th is
arg u m en t, h o w ev er, becau se th e issu e is m o o t

. Co u n t Six

, w h ich

co n tain ed th is ch ar g e, w as d ism issed as p art o f R eed ’ s co n d itio n al p lea. Mo reo v er, Reed w aiv ed h is rig h t to ap p eal an y asp ect o f th is ch arg e.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 6

or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State

. . . in which such place is sit u a t e d

, . . . shall be g u ilt y o f a like o ffense and subject to like punishment.

18 U.S.C. § 1 3 ( a )

. The A CA’s basic purpose is “one o f borrowing state law to fill g aps in the federal c r i m i n al law that applies on f

e d e r a l e nclaves.” Lewis v. United States
, 523 U .S. 155, 160 (1998). I n so doin g , t he Act “establishes uniformity in a state’s prohibitory laws where such conduct is not made penal b y federal s tatutes.” U nited States v

. Marcyes
, 557 F .2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1 977). B ut the ACA is not inten d e d t o make federal e n c laves subject to the entirety of the criminal law of the state in which the enclave is located. I nstead, it makes a pplicable o n l y those state criminal laws that make punishable acts or omissions that have not been made punishable “by any enactment o f Cong r ess.” 18 U.S.C. § 13(a).

I n Lewis v. United States
, 523 U .S. 1 5 5 ( 1 998), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for analy z ing whether a p a r ticular state c riminal law is properly incorporated into f

ederal l a w u n der the Act. F irst, a court must inquire whether t he “defendant’s ‘act or omission

. . . [ is] made punishable by any e nactment of Cong ress.’” Lewis
, 523 U .S. at 164 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13(a)). “I f the answer to this q uestion is ‘no,’ that will normally end the matter. The ACA presumably would assimilate the statute.” Id. B ut if the act or omission in question is punishable by some federal enactment, a court must ask a second question: “Does applic ab l e f

ederal law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant’s to the ex clusion o f the particular state statute at issue? ” Id. at 166.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 7

II. Title 36 of

the Code of

F ederal Regulations

Title 3 6 o f the C o d e o f F ederal Reg ulations “provide[ s] for the proper use, manag ement, g o vernment, and protection of persons, property , a

n d natural and cultural resources within

areas under the jurisd i c tion of the N ational Park Service.” 36 C.F .R. § 1 .1(a). Part 4 of T itle 36 (“Part 4 ” ) r e gu l a tes vehicles a n d t r affic safety within park a reas. See 36 C.F .R. §§ 4.1–4.31. B ecause the L ake Mead N ational Recreation Area is federally owned land operated by the NPS, all drivers within the park, Reed included, are subject to t h e traffic
reg ulations set forth in Part 4.

“[ T] he foundation of [ Part 4’s] v ehicle and traffic safety
reg ulations [i s ] t

h e n o n c o n flicting provisions of the respective State vehicle codes, which are adopted in § 4.2.” V e h i cl e s and Traffic Safety

, 52 F ed. Reg

. 106 70-01, 10670 (Apr. 2, 1987). Section 4.2 provides:

(a) Unless specifi c a lly addressed b y reg ulations in this chapter, traffic and the use of vehicles within a p a

r k area are g overned b y S t a t e l a w. State law that is now or may late r be in e ffect is adopted and made a part of the
reg ulations in this part.

(b) Violating a provision o f S tate law is prohibited.

36 C.F

. R. § 4.2. I n its final r ule commentary , the NPS

ex p ounded on § 4.2 by

stating :

[ Section 4.2]
, which applies reg ardless of the ty pe o f jurisdiction e x e rcised b y the NPS,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 8

adopts State v ehicle codes as the basis for the
reg ulation and control of traffic in park areas. The NPS is adopting

, as if they were a part o f the reg ulations in Part 4, all the applicable a nd nonconflicting v ehicle and traffic laws of the State a nd local political subdivision(s) within whose ex terior boundari e s a park area or a portion thereof is located.

Vehicles and T raffic Safety

, 5 2 Fed. Reg

. 10670-01, 10678 (Apr. 2, 1987).

3 6 C.F .R. § 4 .23 addresses driving while under t h e influence of alcohol or drug s. Specifically

, § 4.23(a)(1) (the “federa l DUI reg ulation”) prohibits “[ o] perating or being in actual phy sical control of a motor vehicle” when the o perator is “[ u] nder the influence of alcohol, o r a drug

, or drug s, o r any combination thereof, to a deg ree that renders the o perator incapable o f safe operation.” 36 C.F .R. § 4.23(a)(1). Section 4.23(a)(2) (the “per se drunk d riving reg u lation”) prohibits operating a motor vehicle when “[ t] h e alcohol concentration in the operator’s blood or breath is 0

. 0 8 g rams or more o f alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 0.08 g rams or more o f alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” 36 C.F .R. § 4.23(a)(2).

Of p ar t i c ular sig nificance to our discussion here, while the f ederal DUI reg ulation prohibits operating a vehicle while under the i n f

l u ence of a lcohol or drug s to a deg ree that renders the operator incapable of safe operation, the subsequent per se drunk d riving reg ulation codifies only a per

se alcohol provision, and d o e s n ot include a corresponding
per se drug p r o v i sion. I n its initial and final rule
announcements of § 4.23(a), the NPS clarified that these twoU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 9

reg ulations were separate and distinct o ffenses, rather than alternative methods of establishing impairment:

Parag raph (a) of this reg ulation addresses two i n d ividual offenses. The first is a stand a r d prohibition ag ainst operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug s

. . . . The second offense involves operating a vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the operator’s b l ood is 0.10 g rams or more o f alcohol per 100 milliliters o f blood or 0.10
g rams or m o r e of alcohol per 210 liters o f breath.

Vehicles and Traffic Safety (F inal Rule), 52 F ed. Reg

. 10670- 01, 10680 (Apr. 2, 1987); V e h i cl e s and Traffic Safety (Proposed Rule), 51 F e d

. Reg

. 21 840-01, 21843 (J une 16, 1986).

III. Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C.110

Similar to the federal reg ulations, Nevada law includes an “under the influence” of dr u gs or alcohol law in a ddition to

a per se drunk driving provi s i o n

. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.110(1)–(2). Proceeding one step further, Nevada law promulg a tes a per se drug g e d d riving provision, which provides in relevant part that:

I t is unlawful for any

person to drive o r be in actual phy sica l c o ntrol of a vehicle on a hig hway or o n premises to which the public has a ccess with an amount of a prohibit e d

s u b stance in his o r her blood or urine that i sU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 10

equal to o r gr e at e r t han:

. . . [ 2 nanog rams o f marijuana per milliliter of blood.]

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.110(3)(g ) (“Nevada’s per se drug g ed d r i v ing law”). B ecause there is no federal equivalent t o Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law, the g overnment utiliz ed the ACA to assimilate the Nevada statute into federal law in the am e n d e d complaint filed ag ainst Reed. Reed’s appeal questions whether assimilati o n o f Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law was proper.

D I S C U S S I O N

W e review de novo whether the ACA assimilates a state law crime. See United States v

. Souza , 392 F .3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004).

I. Lewis - Step One

Lewis instructs us to first question w h e t her Reed’s conduct is made punishable b y “any enactment of Cong ress.” Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 164. A n “ enactment of Cong re ss,” for
purpose s of the ACA, e ncompasses federal reg ulations a s well as statutes. See United States v. W aites
, 198 F

. 3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). The parties ag ree that the federal DUI
reg ulation, 36 C.F .R. § 4

. 2 3(a)(1), is the lone federal
enactment w hich c ould punis h Reed’s behavior of driving while impa i r e d

. As mentioned, this reg ulation prohibits “[ o] perating o r b e ing in actual phy sical control o f a motor vehicle” when the o perator is “[ u ] nder the influence o f alcohol, or a drug

, or drug s, or any combination thereof, to a deg ree that renders the operator incapable of safe operation.” 36 C.F .R. § 4.23(a)(1).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 11

W h en c onsidering Lewis ’s first prong , the district court compared Reed’s conduct to the federal DUI reg ulation, a nd determined that the reg ulation punished his conduct. Specifically , the district court found:

Reed drove 40 miles per hour i n a 15 miles
per hou r z one, entered the ex it of a one-way loop, and passed two “Do Not Enter” sig ns. Reed h ad slurred speech a nd failed three F ield Sobriety Tests. Reed admitted taking a sip o f alc ohol and smoking marijuana before driving

. W hen [the park rang er] se a r c h ed Reed’s vehicle, he f

ound an open container o f “Mike[ ’] s Hard L emonade” and 1.33 g rams o f marijuana. Reed’s blood contained 3.7 ng /ml of marijuana. Th e [ federal DUI reg ulation] punishes this conduct. I ndeed, Count One of the Amended Complaint charg ed Reed with violating the [ federal DUI reg ulation] for this
very conduct.

United S tates v

. Reed

, 8 78 F

. Supp. 2 d 1 199, 1205 (D. Nev. 2012).

W e ag ree with the district c ourt and conclude that Reed’s conduct is punishable under the federal DUI reg ulation. Reed operated a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner w hile under the influence of d

r ug s. This conduct is directly punishable b y § 4.23(a)(1). 2 W e thus proceed to the second prong of Lewis

.

2 T h e g o v ern m en t arg u es th at th e p r e c i s e c o n d u ct in q u estio n is no t p u n ish ab le b y th e f

ed eral DUI reg u l atio n , th ereb y co n clu d in g th e AC A

an aly sis at L ewis ’ s f

i rst p ro n g

. S

ee Lewis
, 5 2 3 U.S. at 16 4

. T h e g o v ern m en t reach es th is resu lt b y n o tin g th at th e elem en ts o f N ev ad a’ s perU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 12

II. Lewis - Step Tw o

Once we conclude that a federal enactment p u n i shes the defendant’s conduct, we are instructed to consider whe t her the applicable federal law “preclude[ s] application of the state law in question.” Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 164. I n this reg ard, “[ t] he primary

question . . . is one of leg islative intent: Does applicable feder a l l a w indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant’s to the ex clusion of the particular state

s tatute at issue? ” Id. at 1 66. Properly framed, we inq u i re : Does the NPS indicate an inten t to punish Reed’s behavior with the federal DUI reg u lation to the exclusion o f Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law?

There is no “auto m a t i c g eneral answer to this second
qu es t i o n .” Id. at 165. H owever, a state statute will not be assimilated if, for ex ample, ( 1) its application would conflict with federal policy ; (2) it would effectively rewrite an offense definition that Cong ress carefully c on sidered; or (3) the federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field

se d ru g g ed d riv in g law d if f er f ro m t h e elem en ts o f t h e fe d eral D UI
reg u latio n

. W h ile th is o b serv atio n is co rrect, it is n o t d isp o s itiv e o f th e issu e

. On th e co n trary , th e elem en ts o f th e su b j ect law s are larg ely irrelev an t at Lewis ’ s f

irst p ro n g

. Wh en f

aced w ith a si m i l ar arg u m en t, Lewis u n eq ui v o cally clarif

ied th at th e “ p recise acts” test– “ w h i ch co m es clo se to a ‘ p r e c i s e elem en ts’ test”– w o u ld “ p ro du ce an A CA th at is t o o b ro ad [,]” “ assim ilat[in g ] s t ate law ev en w h ere th ere i s n o g ap to f

ill.” Id

. at 1 6 3

– 6 4.

Fu rth erm o re, u n der th e g o v ern m en t’ s ap p ro ach

, th e q u estio n of

w h eth er “ th e d

efen d a nt’s a ct o r o missio n ” is “ m ad e p u n ish ab le b y an y

en actm en t o f C o n g ress” co u ld b e an sw ered w ith o u t an y co n sid eratio n of th e d ef en dan t’ s acts o r o m issio n s

. T h is cu rio u s ap p ro ach is n o t san ctio n ed b y Lewis
, w

h ich clearly d irects th at th e f ocu s b e o n th e “ d ef

en d an t’ s acts

o r o m issio n s.” Id

. at 1 6 8 (q u o tin g 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 3 (a)).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 13

as to e x clude use of the particular sta te statute. Id. at 164 (citations omitted).

“I t seems fairly obvious that the A ct will n ot apply where b o t h state and federal statutes seek to punish approx imat el y the same w rong ful behavior–where, for ex ample, differences
among e lements of the crimes reflect jurisdictional, or other technical, c onsi d erations, or where differences amount only
to those of name, d efinitional lang u ag e , or punishment.” Id.

a t 165. Conversely

, “a substantial difference in the k i n d o f

wr o n gf u l b ehavior covered (on the o ne hand by the state statute, on the other, by federal enactmen t s ) will ordinarily indicate a g ap for a state statute to fill–un l e s s Cong ress t hroug h the comprehensiveness o f its reg ulation, or throu gh lang uag e revealing a conflicting p o l i c y , indicates to the contrary in a particular case.” Id

. a t 1 65–66 (citations omitted). “The ultimate issue is whether there i s a g ap in federal law that may be filled by [Nevad a ’ s per se drug g ed driving law] .” Souza
, 392 F

. 3d at 1054 (citing L ewis
, 523 U.S. at 160). W e answer “y es,” for several reasons.

F irst, the NPS’s intent with respect to g ap filling is clearly manifested in § 4.2, which automatically invites assimilation of all nonconflict i n g s t ate traffic laws. Second, the subject laws do not seek to punish approx imately the same wrong f ul behavior. W hile there is some o verlap b etween the conduct proscribed by the s u b

j ect laws, the g eneraliz ed federal DUI
reg ulation d oes not p unish the s pecific conduct of driving with a certain level of drug s in o ne’s b l o o d

. T h ird, assimilating Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law would not conflict w ith fed e r al policy or effectively rewrite an offense definition that the NPS carefully considered, nor d oes Part 4 of Title 36 o f the Code o f Fe d e r al Reg ulations reveal anU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 14

intent to occupy so much of a field a s to preclude assimilation of the per se drug g ed driving law.

A. Section 4.2 Ma n i fests the NP S’s C lear Intent t o Assim ilate State Traf

f ic Law s Such As Nevada’s P er Se Drugged Driving Law

.

As leg islative intent is “primary ” to resolution of Lewis ’s second step, we beg in there. See Lewis
, 5 23 U.S. at 166. Part 4 of Title 3 6 o f the Code o f F ederal Reg ulations presents a unique statutory framework with respect to g ap filling

. Under § 4.2, the federal traffic r e g ulations ex plicitly incorporate all
state v e h icle a

nd traffic laws, “ [u] nless specifically addressed” b y t h e federal reg ulations. 36 C.F .R. § 4.2. A s t h e leg islative history states, “[ t] he N PS intends tha t t h e foundation of its vehicle and traffic safety reg ulations be the nonconflicting provisions of the res p e c tive State vehicle codes, which are adopted in § 4.2.” 52 F ed. Reg . 10670-01, 10670 (Apr. 2, 1987) (emphasis added). According ly

, “[ t] he NPS is adopting

, a s if they were a part of the r e gu l a t ions in Part 4, all the applicable and nonconfli c t i n g vehicle a nd traffic laws of the State

. . . within whose ex terior boundaries a park area . . . is located.” Id. at 10678. 3

The NPS’s intent could not be clearer: all nonconflicting
state traffic laws apply o n federal enclaves. I n lieu o f

3 A rev iew o f caselaw d em on strates th at § 4 .2 is g en erally a stan d alo n e

v eh icle t h ro u g h w h ich th e Un ited States assim ilates state traf f ic law s in to f ed eral law

. In th ese cases, th e A CA is g en erally n o t ev en in v o k ed

. S ee, e.g

. , Un ited S ta tes v. Bib b in s , 6 3 7 F.3 d 1 0 8 7, 1 0 8 8 (9 th Cir. 20 1 1) (in co rp o ratin g Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 4 8 2

. 2 7 5
, o b stru ctin g a licen se p late, d irectly u n d er § 4 .2 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Bo h n , 6 22 F.3 d 1 1 2 9
, 11 33 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) (in co rp o ratin g a W ash i n g to n law p ro h i b itin g d riv in g a m o to rcy cle

w ith o u t w earin g a h elm et u n d er § 4 .2 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 15

promulg a ting doz ens, if not h u ndreds, o f traffic laws, the NPS

was satisfie d to issue but a handful, leaving nonconflicting
state law to fill the g aps. W e thus p roceed to c o n s ider whether Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law is “specifically addressed” by

—such that it “conflicts” with—Part 4’s
reg ulations.

As detailed above, Part 4 does not codify a per se drug g ed driving reg ulation, nor does it otherwise “spec i fically address” such a provision. Consequently

, a plain reading of Part 4 demands a finding that Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law does not conflict with Part 4’s reg ulations.

Reed arg ues that the absence of a per se drug g e d driving
reg ulat i o n indicates the N PS’s deliberate intent to preclude federal prosecutions of operators who drive with per se levels of drug s in their sy stem. Reed p r esumes this intent b y invoking the principle of statutory c o n struction—known a s the Russello presumption—that where “Cong ress i n c ludes particular lang

uag e in o ne section of a statute but o mits it in another section of the same Act, it is g enerally presumed that Cong r ess acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or ex clusion.” Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). I n this case, while Part 4’s federal DUI

r eg ulation addresses drug s, the accompany ing per s e reg ulation does not.

W e find the Russello p resumption unpersuasive in this
contex t. F irst, because the NPS’s intent is clear, we need not attempt to infer it via the Russello p resumption. As d iscussed previously

, the NPS clearly understands that there are g aps in its reg u l ations and clearly incorporates all state vehicle a nd
tr a f f ic laws to fill those g aps. Apply ing the Russello presumption would eviscerate the basic structure of Part 4.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 16

Second, there is strong evidence to support a finding that the NPS did n o t even consider adopting a per se drug g ed driving offense, thereby rebutting the Russello presumption. 4 I ndeed, Part 4’s leg islative history makes no mention o f a proposed, y et rejected, p er se drug g e d driving reg ula t i o n. This omission is unsur

p r i s ing considering that not a sing le
state had enacted a per se d rug g ed driving law when Part 4 was adopted in 1987.

To ready our historical lens, we ask the following : W hat

was the NPS’s intent in adopting an “under the influence” o f alcohol o r d r ug s r eg u lation, and a per se drunk driving
reg ulation, but not a per se drug g ed driving reg ulation? The historical prog ression o f “under the influen c e ” a nd per se drunk driving laws v ersus per se d rug g ed driving laws provides a log ical ex planation.

By 1966, nearly all states prohibited motorists f r om driving a motor v ehicle while under the influence of drug s o r alcohol. 5 Similarly

, per se drunk driving laws have b e e n on the books since the 1960s. “I n the late 1 960 s a n d e arly 1970s, States beg an adopting per se laws t h at defined the

4 T h e Su prem e Co u rt h as h eld th at th e exp ressio un iu s est exclu si o

a lteriu s statu to ry p rin cip le d o es n o t ap p ly “ u n less it is f air to su pp o se th at Co n g ress co n sid ered th e u n n am ed p o ssib ility

an d m ean t

to say n o to it.” Ma r x v

. Gen

. Reven u e Co rp

. , 13 3 S. Ct. 1 1 6 6
, 1 1 7 5 (2 0 1 3 ) (q u o tatio n s

an d citatio n s o m i tted ). T h e exp r essio u n iu s can on creates a p resu m p tio n t h at “ w h en a statu te d esig n ates certain p erso n s, th in g s , o r m an n ers o r

o p eratio n , all o m iss i o n s s h o u ld b e u n d ersto o d as ex clu sio n s.” Un ited S ta tes v. Fu ller

, 5 3 1 F.3 d 1 0 2 0, 1 0 2 7 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 8 )

. T h is can o n is d irectly related to th e Ru ssello p rin cip le, an d co u rts at tim es u se th em in terch an g eab ly

. S

ee id

.

5 S ee T in a W esco t t Ca fa r o , S lip pin g Th ro u gh Th e C

ra cks: W h y Ca n ’t W e S to p Dru g g ed Drivin g ? , 3 2 W . New

En g . L . Rev . 3 3, 4 1 (2 01 0 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 17

offense in terms of the B AC level.” 6 I n the 1980s alone, “[ a] bout 1200 anti-drunk driving laws were passed a s a result of political pressure . . . .” 7

However, in 1987, the y ear Part 4 was adopted, no State h a d a per se drug g ed d riving law. 8 “Drug per se laws, analog ous to illeg al p er se laws for alcohol, a r e a relatively

new p henomenon in the U nited States. Ariz ona was the first State to adopt a drug per se law, in 1990 . . . .” 9

W i t h t h i s h istorical backdrop, it b ecomes clear why the N P S would adopt an “under the influence” of alcohol o r drug s r eg ulation, a n d a per se drunk driving reg ulation, but
not a pe r se drug g ed driving reg u lation. “Under the influence” statute s were commonplace and the n ational conversation reg arding per se drunk drivin g l a w s w as loud, but the d iscussion involving per se drug g ed driving laws was not y et ripe. 1 0 F or t h e s e reasons, w e are satisfied that the

6 U.S. Dep ’ t o f T ran sp ., Dru g Per S e L a w s : A R eview o f Th eir Use in S ta tes 4 (2 0 1 0 ) [h erein af ter Dru g P e r S

e La ws ], a va ila b le a t

w w w .n h tsa.g o v /staticf

iles/n ti/im p aired

_ d riv in g /p d f

/8 1 1 3 1 7 .p d f

.

7 J o h n Ho f

f m an , Imp lied Co n s en t W

ith A Twist: Ad

d i n g Blo o d

to New Jersey’s Imp lied Co n sen t La w a n d Crimin a l izin g Refu sa l W h ere Drin kin g

a n d Drivin g Resu lts in Dea t h o r S erio us In j u ry , 3 5 Ru tg ers L .J

. 3 4 5
, 3 4 5

n .1 (2 0 03 ) (citin g A lan Cav aio la & Ch arles W u th

, Ass e ss m e n t a n d Trea tmen t o

f th e DW I Offen d er 2 4 (2 0 02 )).

8 S ee Dru g Per S e La ws , s u

p ra n o te 6 , at 6 an d T ab le 1

.

9 Id

. at 6

.

10 In ad ditio n , th e task o f en u m eratin g a p er s e d ru g g ed d riv in g reg u latio n ab sen t g u id an ce f ro m an y ex istin g state law w o u ld be d if f icu lt,
to say th e least. It is f

airly sim p le to p ro m

u lg ate an “ u n d er th e in f

lu en ce”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 18

R u ssello presumption is not applicable here. W hat remain s is the NPS’s codified intent for all n onconflicting state traffic laws, whether c urrently in effect or later placed into effect, to apply on federal enclaves.

B. The Subject Law s Do Not P unish A p p r o xim ately the Sam e Wrongf

ul Behavior Becaus e t h e F ederal Regulations Do N o t P unish the Specif ic Conduct of Driving w ith a Certain Level of Drugs in One’s Blood

.

W e nex t consider whether the subject laws seek to punish
approx imately the same wrong ful behavior. Lewis a dvises that this can occur where “differences among elements of the

c r i m e s r e f

l e c t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

, o r o t h e r t e c h n i c a l

, considerations, or where differences amount only to those o f
name, definitional lang uag e, o r p u nishment.” Lewis
,

reg u latio n

. A do p tin g a p er se reg u latio n is an o th er m atter en tirely

. Ev en

a b r i e f gl a n ce at Nev ad a’ s p er se d ru g g ed d riv in g law (Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 4 8 4C.1 1 0 (3 )) d em o n s trates th e h ig h ly tech n ical n atu re o f th is en d eav o r. Nev ad a’ s statu te lists o u t 1 1 p ro h ib i t e d s u b stan ces an d sp ecif

ies th e

u n iq u e th resh old l ev el f

or each i n term s of n an o g ram s p er m illiliter in bo th

u rin e an d b lo o d. Research in g th ese s u b stan ces an d decip h erin g th e th resh o ld lev el f

or each u n do u

bted ly req u ired m

u ch ef f o rt. In l ig h t o f th is ard u o u s task

, it stan d s to reaso n t h at t h e NP S w o u ld p ass o n b ein g th e f irst

en tity to f o rm u late su ch a reg u latio n

. In stead

, as w o u ld ap p ear to b e its in t en t, th e NP S w as satisf ied to allo w an

y l ater- ad o p ted state law s to f i l l th is g ap

. See 3 6 C.F.R

. § 4.2

. T h e Su p rem e C o u rt h as reco g n ized th at Co n g ress en acted t

h e A CA to res p o n d t o f ed eral co u rts’ in ab i lity to d eclare crim e s

— a s s tate co u rts co u ld —acco rd in g to th e “ g en eral

co m m o n

- law .” Un ited S ta tes v. Press Pu b l’g Co

. , 2 1 9 U.S. 1
, 1 2 (1 9 1 1 );

see W illia m s v. U

n i ted Sta tes , 3 27 U.S. 7 1 1
, 7 2 0 n .1 9 (1 9 4 6 ); Lewis
, 5 2 3 U.S. at 1 6 0

. T h o u g h t o d ay ’ s d ecisio n resp o n d s t o N e v ad a’ s leg i slativ e, rath er th a n j u d icial d eclaratio n , it is co n sisten t w ith th e id ea th at Co n g ress en acted th e A CA to p erm it “ lo cal statu tes to f ill in g ap s in th e Fed eral Crim in al Co d e w h ere n o actio n o f Co n g ress h as b een t ak en to d ef in e th e m i ssin g o f

f en ses.” W

illia m s , 3 2 7 U.S. at 7 1 9

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 19

523 U.S. at 165 (citing United States v. Adams

, 502 F

. Supp. 21 (S. D

. F la. 1980)). A r eview of Adams assists in
cry stalliz ing this rule.

I n A dams

, the defendant was apprehended for carry ing a concealed revolver into a federal courthous e

. He was charg ed, pursuant to the ACA, under a F lorida statute making it a felony to carry a concealed f irearm. H e challeng ed his indictment under t he ACA because a federal reg ulation specifically made it a misdemeanor to carry a concealed
weapon o nto federal propert y

. The district c ourt f ound that “[ t] he act prohibited under both the F lorida statute and the federal reg ulation is the carry i n g o f a concealed weapon. There c an be n o doubt that this is the ‘precise act’ which both laws prohibit.” Adams

, 502 F

. Supp. at 24. I t was “immaterial” that a violati o n of the federal reg ulation constituted a misdemeanor while a violation of the F lorida
statute was a f

elony

. Id. at 25. B e cause the federal reg ulation covered the “specific act” involved, the c ourt refused to assimilate the F lorida statute. Id.

Here, Reed argu e s that Nevada’s p er se drug g ed driving law and the federal DUI regu l at i o n a r e not distinct o ffenses but rather two d ifferent modes of proving the same crime. He posits that the Nevada law simply makes it e as i e r for the prosecution to prove its case.

W e disag r ee. W hile there is undoubtedly some overlap in the ty pe o f b e h avior punished by the subject laws, the differences are not trivial and relate to the specific conduct proscribed, unlike i n A d a ms

. The federal DUI reg ulation punishes d

riving unsafely because of impairment

. Nevada’s
per se drug g ed driving law punishes driving after ing esting a specific amount of drug s, regardless of impairment

. ThisU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 20

distinction makes all the dif f e rence. The federal DUI
reg ulation, s t a

n ding alone, cannot punish drivers w ho manag e to drive safely even a fter consuming an ex cessive a mount o f marijuana. Conversely

, Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law,

s t anding alone, cannot punish drivers who drive unsaf el y

even if impaired, so long as they have consumed only trace amounts of marijuana. Onl y t o g ether do these laws punish both those who drive unsafely because of impairment a nd those who drive “safely

” even while daring to test the limits of their c o g nitive and kinesthetic abilities. A c cording ly

, since these laws g overn, a nd thereby seek to reg u late, different behaviors, it cannot be said tha t p e r se laws ex ist simply to make prosecuting impaired drivers an easier endeavor.

This Court’s ruling in Unit e d States v. Souza
, 392 F .3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2004), is instructive. T here, the defendant forcefully entered and removed two bag s f r o m a vehicle parked in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park and was charg ed under the ACA, assimilating Haw. Rev. Stat

. § 708-836.5, which punishes unauthoriz ed e ntry into a motor vehicle with the intent to c o m mit a crime a g ainst a person. Souza
, 392 F .3 d a t 1 0 5 2. The Court f ound that several federal breaking -and-entering statutes “squarely ” covered the defendant’s conduct. Id. a t 1053. Nonetheless, we determined t h a t “a g ap remains, b ecause there is no applicable federal p r o v ision that punishes specifically the unauthoriz ed entry into a motor vehicle

. . . . ” I d

. at 1054. “Mere g eneral p rohibitions a g ainst tampering

, vandalism, trespassing

, and theft do not rise to the level of manifesting a federal policy a gainst assimilating a statute that punishes the specific c onduct of unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle

. ” I d

. (emphasis added). B ecause a g ap ex isted, and be c a u s e “[ t] here [ was] no indication of a n overriding federal p olicyU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 21

with which the [ Hawaii] statue interfere[ d ]
, ” the Hawaii statute was properly

assimilated. S

ee id. at 1054–55.

Similarly here, Nevada’s per se d r u gg ed driving law properly fills a g ap in federa l law by punishing the specific conduct of d

riving with a certain level of drug s in the blood. F urther, the mere presence of the federal DUI reg ulation does
not manifest a f

e d eral policy ag a inst assimilating Nevada’s
per se drug g ed driving law, p articularly in lig ht of the NPS’s clear intent to a ssimilate all nonconflicting laws as well a s the inclusion of the per se drunk driving reg ulation.

Along these same lines, the NPS’s adoption of the p er se drunk d riving reg ulation further belies Reed’s arg ument that the f ederal DUI reg ulation covers the same wrong ful conduct. As discussed previously

, the NPS ex p ressly c l a rified, when promulg a ting § 4.23(a), that it considered the DUI reg ulation and the per se drunk d

riving reg ulation to be “two individual

o f f e n s e s , ” n o t a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g i mpairment. See 52 F ed. Reg

. 10670-01, 10680 (Apr. 2, 1987). This sug g ests that the NPS would find more t h a n “mere jurisdictional, technical, o r definitional differences between the statutes.” Souza
, 392 F .3d at 1053. L ikewise, it follows that t h e NPS would deem N evada’s per se drug g ed driving law separate and distinct f ro m the federal DUI
reg ulation.

These differences “in the kind of wron g ful behavior covered (on the one hand by the state statute, on the other, b y federal enactments) will o rd i n a rily indicate a g ap f or a state statute to fill–unless [ the NPS]

. . . indicates to the contrary in

a particular case.” Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 165–66 (cit a t i o n s

o m itted). A s set forth previously

, while the NPS ha s n o t i n d icated any intent to preclude prosecution o f d rivers w h oU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 22

violate a state’s per se drug g e d driving law, it h a s specifically codified its intent to incorporate a ll nonconflicting state traffic laws into Part 4 of Tit l e 3 6 of the Code of F ederal Reg ulations. Thus, by a ll accounts, assimilation of Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law is proper.

F inally

, Reed arg ues that the subject laws seek to punish
approx imately the same wrong ful conduct because they seek
to curtai l the same social h arm, i.e., the public safety

concerns raised by impaired drivers. This arg um e n t i s not persuasive. Neither Lewis
, nor any known ACA a uthority

, requires a court to compare the social h arms addressed when

c o nsidering whether the subject laws punish the s a m e conduct. 1 1 Such a r equirement would severely limit the ACA because many laws, whether directly or indirectly

, attempt to

11 T he w o rd “ h arm ” ap p ears o n ly o n ce in Lewis ou tsid e of d i rect q u o tatio n s o f state an d f

ed eral m u rd er s tatu tes. T h e so le ref eren ce co m es

w ith in th e Co u rt’ s d iscu ssi o n o f t h e p ro p er in terp retatio n o f th e A CA ’ s

“ an y en actm en t” lan g u ag e. T h e Co u rt n o tes,

a literal in terp retatio n o f th e w o rd s “ an y en a c tm en t”

w o u l d leav e f

ed er a l crim in al en clav e law su b j ect to g ap s o f th e v ery k in d th e A ct w as desig n ed to f ill. T h e A ct w o u l d be u n ab le to assim i late ev en a h ig h ly
sp ecif ic state law

aim ed d irectly

at a serio u s, n arro w ly d ef in ed ev il, if th e lan g u ag e o f a n y f ed eral statu te, h o w ev er b ro ad an d h ow ev er clearly aim ed at a d if f eren t k in d o f h a rm , w ere to co v er th e d ef en d an t’ s act. W ere th ere on ly a state, an d n o f ed eral, law a g ain st m

u rd er, f o r ex am p le, a fe d e r al p ro h ib itio n o f assau l t co u ld
p rev en t th e state statu te f ro m f illin g th e o b v io u s

resu ltin g g ap

.

L e w i s , 5 23 U.S. at 1 6 1 (italics in o rig in al; u n d erlin e ad ded ). Clea r l y , Lewis ’ s co n sid eratio n

o f “ h arm ” can n o t b e stretch ed to su bsu m e th e lin e

o f reaso n in g o f

f ered b y Reed h ere.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 23

curtail the same social harm. F or ex ample, speed limits and distracted d

r iving laws seek to ad dress the harm of vehicle collisions. B ut it cannot reasonably be said that the presence of o n e in the federal reg u lations would p revent assimilation of the other. I

n sum, the social harm soug ht to be addressed play s no substantial role i n d e termining whether two laws
g overn separate behavior. I n no helpful way does t h e h a r m addressed indicate the conduct proscribed.

III. The Rem ainin g Lewis C onsiderations F avor Assim ilation

As mentioned, Lewis provides that a state statute will not be assimilated if, for ex ample, (1) application of the state statute would c onflict w ith federal p o l i cy ; (2) application o f the statute would effectively rewrite an offense definition that Cong r ess carefully considered; or (3) the f e d e ral statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as to ex clude use of the p articular state statute. Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 164. Much of the preceding analy sis directly touches on these ex a mples, but it bears specific mention that (1 ) R e e d cites no federal policy with which Nevada’s p er se drug g ed driving law could conflict; (2) it is unconte s t e d t hat assimilating Nevada’s per

se drug g ed d r i v i n g law would n ot effectively rewrite an offense definition that the NPS c arefully considered; a nd (3) the NPS has not indicated a n intent to o ccupy the entire field of driving with a certain level of drug s in the blood

. To the contrary , as set forth a

bove, the NPS intentionally left g aps in Part 4 to be filled by

nonconflicting state law.

I n sum, b ecause there is no indication of an ov e r r i d i ng federal policy with which Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law interferes, see Souza , 392 F

. 3d at 1054–55, and because there i s a ga p in federal law w ith respect to punishingU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R E E D 24

operators of vehicles w h o ex ceed a per se drug limit
reg ardless of impairment, see id. (citing Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 160), we ag ree with the district court that t here is a g ap in federal law which may be properly f illed by Nevada’s per se drug g ed driving law.

AF F IRMED.