www.nasa.gov Office of Security and Program Protectio

Counterintelligence Program

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Informational Newsletter on Counterintelligence and 

Counterterrorism Issues Affecting NASA 

All Eyes on 

April–June 2008 

A Counterintelligence Perspective on NASA 

Technology Protection 

This article presents the unclassified details of an 

actual counterintelligence investigation that I conducted while 

employed with another Federal agency. The case is representative of some of the methods foreign intelligence services use 

in order to exploit Government employees with access to information or technology they are seeking. 

This case begins at an auditorium where I presented 

an espionage awareness briefing to an audience of 200 scientists and engineers. The purpose of the briefing was to educate 

the audience on how to recognize possible indicators that a 

foreign intelligence service was trying to exploit them for the 

purpose of illegally collecting information or technologies. The 

group was polite and even posed some interesting questions for 

clarification. But I left the auditorium with the general impression that they were mostly skeptical and did not necessarily 

accept the fact that foreign intelligence officers were active in 

the United States or that they could ever personally be targeted 

by one. After all, the Cold War was over, and the general 

impression was that all of the United States’ enemies had since 

rejected spying against us. Right? 

One week after my presentation, I received a telephone call from one of the engineers who had attended the 

briefing. He said that something had occurred over the weekend that seemed unusual, and that even though he thought it 

was probably nothing, one of his colleagues thought he ought 

to talk to me anyway. I went to his office right away. He was 

right to call me, because the events he related were hardly 

“nothing.” 

Over the weekend, the engineer received an unexpected telephone call from an unknown gentleman who happened to be in town and was eager to arrange a meeting. The 

caller explained that he was interested in the engineer’s work, 

and that he had a business proposal for him. The engineer 

agreed to let him come to his home but realized shortly after he 

hung up that he had not given him his address. Surprisingly, the 

foreign businessman arrived at his home within a few minutes. 

He told our engineer that he represented a consulting group in a 

foreign country. He and his colleagues had read the engineer’s 

papers and heard his presentations at various events throughout 

the world, and as a result, they were convinced that his work 

and talents would be a great contribution to their consulting 

firm. He asked the engineer to consider the proposal and said 

that he would contact him again. He left his business card with 

the engineer. 

Using the information provided on the business card, 

we were able to confirm with our partners in the intelligence 

community that the “businessman” was actually a known foreign intelligence officer working under the cover of a businessman. We knew who he really was, but we did not yet know 

his true intentions. Our engineer was skeptical about what we 

had discovered but nevertheless agreed to work with us and 

continue to meet with the “businessman” to help us determine 

what he was really after. During the course of subsequent 

meetings and communications over the next few months, the 

foreign businessman asked our engineer to get copies of 

articles or papers that he said he was not able to get. Over the 

course of time, his requests became more suspicious in nature, 

asking for information and publications that, even though not 

classified, the engineer did not feel comfortable providing. 

Finally, after the foreign businessman believed that he had . . . 

(continued on page 3) 

Counterintelligence Quote of the Month 

“The betrayal of trust carries a heavy taboo.” 

—Aldrich Ames, Soviet spy in the CIA 

Office of Security and Program Protection 

Interim Assistant Administrator 

Jack Forsythe 

Counterintelligence Program Staff 

Director Operations 

A publication of the Office of Security and 

Program Protection 

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All Eyes on NASA page 2 

Counterintelligence News 

Wi-Fi Security 

Some Advice from the FBI 

You’re at the airport waiting for your flight. With time 

to kill, you’re thinking of connecting your laptop to the airport’s Wi-Fi to check your office e-mail . . . do some personal 

banking . . . or shop for a gift for your spouse. But first, consider this: odds are there’s a hacker nearby, with his own 

laptop, attempting to “eavesdrop” on your computer to obtain 

personal data that will provide access to your money or even to 

your company’s sensitive information. 

Here’s something else to consider: there are 68,000 

Wi-Fi “hot spots” in the U.S. (see the graphic below for the 

top Wi-Fi countries)—at airports, coffee shops, hotels, bookstores, schools, and other locations where hundreds or thousands of people pass through every day. While many of these 

hot spots have secure networks, some do not, according to 

Supervisory Special Agent of our Cyber 

Division. And connecting to an unsecure network can leave 

you vulnerable to attacks from hackers. 

How do hackers grab your personal data out of 

thin air? Agent Peterson said one of the most common types 

of attack is this: a bogus but legitimate-looking Wi-Fi network 

with a strong signal is strategically set up in a known hot spot 

. . . and the hacker waits for nearby laptops to connect to it. At 

that point, your computer—including all your sensitive information, such as user ID, passwords, and credit card numbers— 

basically belongs to the hacker. The intruder can mine your 

computer for valuable data, direct you to phony Web pages that 

look like ones you frequent, and record your every keystroke. 

“Another thing to remember,” said Agent “is 

that the connection between your laptop and the attacker’s 

laptop runs both ways: while he's taking info from you, you 

may be unknowingly downloading viruses, worms, and other 

malware from him.” 

Businesses that offer free or ad hoc Wi-Fi often don’t 

know their networks have been breached. Individual victims 

usually don’t realize they’ve been targeted until it’s too late. 

That’s why, according to Agent Peterson, there aren’t reliable 

stats on the number of these breaches, although the FBI does 

periodically receive reports on them. It’s also very tough to trace 

a hack that orig an open, unsecure network. 

Agent explained that the criminal aspect comes 

into play once data taken by the hacker is used to commit a 

crime. If the hacker, armed with your personal or corporate information or access codes, tries to break into a secured network— 

whether it’s a case of property or any other type of crime—then 

law enforcement gets involved. 

What can you do to protect yourself? Agent 

Peterson’s best advice is, don’t connect to an unknown Wi-Fi 

network. But if you have to, there are some precautions you can 

take to decrease the threat: 

•  Make sure your laptop security is up to date, with current versions of your operating system, Web browser

firewalls, and antivirus and anti-spyware software. 

•  Don’t conduct financial transactions or use application

like e-mail and instant messaging. 

•  Change the default setting on your laptop so you have t

manually select the Wi-Fi network to which you are 

connecting. 

•  Turn off your laptop’s Wi-Fi capabilities when you'r

not using them. 

For more basic information on computer security, see our How 

To Protect Your Computer. 

NASA OSPP PC/Laptop Security Tips 

Cuba To Step Up Spying on U.S. 

MIAMI (AFP)—Cuba’s vast international spy network, considered among the best in the world, will remain intact under the 

leadership of the new president, Raul Castro, intelligence experts 

say . . . . 

Read More 

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All Eyes on NASA page 3 

Main article, continued from page 1 

sufficiently cultivated a trusted friendship with our engineer, he 

asked him to obtain a copy of a specific document that was 

export controlled and was not approved for foreign release. The 

engineer was promised several thousand dollars in return. Interestingly enough, it was during this meeting that the engineer 

finally believed what I already knew to be true: A foreign 

intelligence officer had indeed tried to exploit him, but in this 

case we were in the background keeping everything secure. 

Based on the information in the requested document, we also 

knew what the intelligence officer was actually seeking and 

what he was willing to pay for it. This also gave the intelligence community a better understanding of what one of our 

potential military adversaries was working on and how far they 

had progressed. The document remained properly secured, and 

the intelligence officer’s efforts did not pay off. 

To fully appreciate how the events in this case are 

applicable to NASA employees, it is important to review some 

of the facts briefly. The engineer was initially identified and 

targeted by foreign intelligence through his papers and presentations on unclassified, “public domain” sources. The foreign 

intelligence service was able to look at the details of his papers 

and presentations and combine that information with their 

knowledge of where he worked to determine what else he 

might have access to. The fictitious business approach was 

simply a ruse to try to gain some trust and develop a professional relationship with the engineer. Continuing to ask the 

engineer for other articles and publications, which gradually 

and subtly became more sensitive in nature, was simply a way 

to test the engineer’s willingness to cooperate and to get him 

accustomed to providing the requested information. Once he 

thought everything about the relationship was firmly established, the intelligence officer requested an export controlled 

document in exchange for several thousand dollars. 

NASA employees should take several lessons from 

this case study, as there are many obvious similarities upon 

which to draw. Even though the Cold War is over, foreign 

countries have never stopped conducting espionage against the 

United States; such activity occurs today at an ever-increasing 

rate. Dual-purpose technologies are particularly targeted, and, 

by default, so are the engineers that work with them. It is also 

particularly important to understand that even unclassified 

work performed by employees without security clearances is 

potentially valuable to foreign intelligence. It is recognized that 

much of what NASA accomplishes involves significant and 

legitimate foreign collaboration, for which necessary processes 

and procedures are in place to gain the necessary approvals and 

support. However, it should also be recognized that there are 

times when people and events might not actually be what they 

seem to be on the surface. While we should not be paranoid or 

cynical in our business and professional relationships, we 

should nonetheless be able to recognize anomalies for what 

they are and get the appropriate assistance. One thoughtprovoking principle sums up how each of us should approach 

this possibility: “Never assume that the other guy would never 

do something we would never do.” Every NASA Center has a 

Counterintelligence Office with experienced special agents 

ready to assist in these matters, no matter how implausible 

something might seem. In the end, all suspicions or concerns 

reported to NASA Counterintelligence will be thoroughly and 

discreetly exam

 Article by SA LaRC Counterintelligence Office 

NASA Center CI Offices 

NASA Headquarters 

Ames Research Center 

Dryden Flight Research Center 

Glenn Research Center 

Goddard Space Flight Center 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Johnson Space Center 

Kennedy Space Center 

Langley Research Center 

Marshall Space Flight Center 

Stennis Space Center 

www.nasa.gov (b) (6), (b) (7)

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