NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

Relevant Technical 

Requirements

Mishaps During Entry, 

Descent, and Landing

OCHMO-TB-039

Rev B

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care

[V1 3012] Terrestrial Launch/Landing Medical 

Support 

[V1 5009] Physiological Exposure Mission Training

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D

[V2 3006] Human-Centered Task Analysis

[V2 3102] Human Error Analysis

[V2 6011] Post Landing Relative Humidity (RH)

[V2 6025] Contamination Monitoring and Alerting

[V2 6048] Toxic Hazard Level Four

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration 

Limits

[V2 6065] Rotational Velocity

[V2 6066] Sustained Rotational Acceleration Due to 

Cross-Coupled Rotation

[V2 6067] Transient Rotational Acceleration

[V2 6069] Acceleration Injury Prevention

[V2 6081] Alarm Maximum Sound Level Limit

[V2 6107] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat Atmospheric 

Ventilation

[V2 7043] Medical Capability

[V2 7055] Priority of Stowage Accessibility

[V2 8023] Unlatching Hatches

[V2 8033] Restraints for Crew Tasks

[V2 9053] Protective Equipment

[V2 9055] Equipment Automation of Rescue Aids

[V2 10165] Automation and Robotics Override and 

Shut-Down Capabilities

[V2 10002] Design-Induced Error

[V2 10084] Communication Capability

[V2 11001] Suited Donning and Doffing

[V2 11024] Ability to Work in Suits

[V2 11032] LEA Suited Decompression Sickness 

Prevention Capability

[V2 11100] Pressure Suits for Protection from Cabin 

Depressurization 

Executive Summary

Re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, descent, and 

subsequent landing are a few of the stages in 

spaceflight that are life-threatening due to the 

myriad of processes and vehicle reliabilities that 

must occur in order for the crew to land safely and 

unharmed. The crew and vehicle are subjected to 

the vacuum of space, extreme heat, high speeds, 

g-forces, and vibrations. Historically, astronauts 

have sustained minor injuries, but loss of life has 

occurred, as well as near-misses. It is imperative 

that these lessons learned be considered in vehicle 

design and protecting the crew within. 

Soyuz 1: Vladimir Komarov
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

Soyuz 11 – June 30, 1971

During separation of the orbital and service modules from the descent module, the pyrotechnic system did 

not operate as intended. All of the pyrotechnics fired simultaneously rather than the designed sequential 

firing mode, which was believed to be due to the excessive vibration loads on the vehicle. This caused a 

pressure equalization seal to open in the descent module at a higher-than-designed altitude, resulting in 

the rapid depressurization of the crew module. The rapid depress led to loss of consciousness of the crew 

despite attempts by one of the crew to block the leakage of air from the vehicle. The spacecraft otherwise 

made a nominal automatic touchdown with no known anomalies at the time of the recovery team. The 

lives of Georgi Dobrovolski, Vladislav Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev were lost due to the vacuum experienced.

Soyuz TMA-11 (15S) – April 19, 2008

During entry, the Soyuz instrumentation and propulsion module (IPM) failed to properly separate from the 

descent module (DM). This resulted in a ballistic entry, higher g-loads during descent, and the spacecraft 

landing more than 400 km short of the intended target. The abnormal entry attitude (hatch-forward) during 

early descent caused excessive heating on the hatch and back shell of the descent module. The recovery 

team's arrival at the landing site was delayed by approximately 45 minutes due to the off-target landing. Yi 

So-yeon was later hospitalized because of injuries sustained during entry and landing. The South Korean 

Science Ministry stated that the astronaut had a minor injury to her neck muscles and had bruised her 

spinal column.

Contributing factor: 

• A Russian investigation into the cause of the DM/IPM separation system failure concluded that one of 

the five pyrotechnically actuated locks, which attach the Soyuz instrumentation and propulsion module 

to the descent module, failed to release at the proper time.

10/12/2023

Rev B 2

Soyuz 11: (L-R) 

Georgi Dobrovolski, 

Viktor Patsayev and 

Vladislav Volkov

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care, [V1 5009] Physiological Exposure Mission Training

[V2 9055] Equipment Automation of Rescue Aids, [V2 11032] LEA Suited Decompression Sickness Prevention 

Capability, [V2 11100] Pressure Suits for Protection from Cabin Depressurization 

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3012] Terrestrial Launch/Landing Medical Support, [V1 5009] Physiological Exposure Mission Training 

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, [V2 6069] Acceleration Injury Prevention, [V2 8033] Crew 

Restraint Provision

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D

Contributing factors:

• Absence of an open-valve warning system

• Absence of an emergency valve-choking system 

• No structural shock testing performed for a worst-case 

scenario

• Crew were not wearing pressurized suits for re-entry

See OCHMO-TB-38 Decompression & LEA Suit Mishaps
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

3

STS-107 – February 1, 2003

Damage to the Thermal Protection System from a debris strike on ascent resulted in the loss of crew and vehicle on 

entry.

At 81.7 seconds Mission Elapsed Time a piece of foam insulation from the External Tank (ET) left bipod ramp 

separated from the ET and struck the orbiter left wing leading edge in the vicinity of the lower half of reinforced 

carbon-carbon (RCC) panel #8, causing a breach in the RCC. During re-entry this breach allowed super-heated air to 

penetrate through the leading-edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, 

resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the 

wing, and break-up of the orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the design of the orbiter, 

there was no possibility for the crew to survive. 

Contributing factors:

• Depressurization of the crew module, which started at or shortly after orbiter breakup. Existing crew equipment 

protects for this type of lethal event, but inadequate time existed to configure the equipment for the environment 

encountered. The crew would have only had about 40 seconds to don gloves and helmets.

• The combination of the lack of upper body restraint and a helmet that, by design, does not internally conform to 

the head while exposed to cyclical motion resulted in lethal mechanical injuries for some of the unconscious or 

deceased crew members. If the harnesses had been locked or the crew had been conscious and able to brace, the 

injuries likely would not have been lethal.

• Separation from the crew module and the seats with associated forces, material interactions, and thermal 

consequences. This event is the least understood due to limitations in current knowledge of mechanisms at this 

Mach number and altitude. Although the seat restraints played a significant role in the lethal-level mechanical 

injuries, there is currently no full range of equipment to protect for this event. This event was not survivable by 

any means currently known to the investigative team. 

• Exposure to near vacuum, aerodynamic accelerations, and cold temperatures. Current crew survival equipment is 

not certified to protect the crew above 100,000 feet, although it may potentially be capable of protecting the 

crew.

See OCHMO-TB-38 Decompression & LEA Suit Mishaps

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care, [V1 5009] Physiological 

Exposure Mission Training 

[V2 3006] Human-Centered Task Analysis, [V2 3102] Human Error 

Analysis, [V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, 

[V2 6065] Rotational Velocity, [V2 6066] Sustained Rotational 

Acceleration Due to Cross-Coupled Rotation, [V2 6067] Transient 

Rotational Acceleration, [V2 6069] Acceleration Injury Prevention, 

[V2 8033] Crew Restraint Provision, [V2 11024] Ability to Work in 

Suits, [V2 11032] LEA Suited Decompression Sickness Prevention 

Capability, [V2 11100] Pressure Suits for Protection from Cabin 

Depressurization 

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 

2, Rev D 

STS-107: Rear (L-R) David Brown, Laurel Clark, Michael 

Anderson, Ilan Ramon; Front (L-R) Rick Husband, Kalpana

Chawla, William McCool

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

4

Apollo ASTP – July 24, 1975

As the spacecraft descended, the commander, who was reading the checklist, failed to tell the command 

module pilot to move the Earth Landing System auto/manual switch to auto. The crew saw that the 

spacecraft was well below the deployment altitude and proceeded to manually deploy the chutes. Drogue 

chutes were deployed manually at 18,550 feet instead of 23,500 feet as the automatic system would have 

done. At 10,000 feet the commander realized that Earth Lander System (ELS) was not in AUTO and quickly 

switched ELS Logic and AUTO, deploying the main parachutes at 7,150 feet and disabling the Reaction 

Control System (RCS) instead of 10,500 feet. The RCS was not disabled manually (RCS command switch 

turned to “off”) at this time. It was disabled manually at 16,000 feet instead of when the checklist indicated 

at 24,000 feet, which was due to the alarm noise levels leading to the inability to communicate properly to 

initiate the command. The cabin pressure relief valve opened automatically at 24,500 feet. 

During a 30-second period of high thruster activity after drogue parachute deployment, a mixture of air and 

propellant combustion products followed by a mixture of air and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer (N2O4) vapors 

were sucked into the cabin. One of the positive roll thrusters is located only two feet away from the steam 

vent that pulls in outside air when the cabin relief valve is open. This exposed the crew to a high level of 

N2O4 since emergency oxygen masks were not available until landing. The pilot passed out, but the 

commander quickly put the oxygen mask on him and he was revived. The exposure resulted in a two-week 

hospital stay for the crew after landing.

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 5009] Physiological Exposure Mission Training

[V2 3006] Human-Centered Task Analysis, [V2 3102] Human Error Analysis, [V2 6081] Alarm Maximum Sound 

Level Limit, [V2 6025] Contamination Monitoring and Alerting, [V2 6048] Toxic Hazard Level Four, [V2 7055] 

Priority of Stowage Accessibility, [V2 9053] Protective Equipment, [V2 9055] Equipment Automation of Rescue 

Aids, [V2 10002] Design-Induced Error, [V2 10165] Automation and Robotics Override and Shut-Down 

Capabilities

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

Contributing factors:

• Failure to follow a time-critical 

procedure in a tightly coupled system

• The noise from an alarm caused 

communication difficulties between the 

crew and it could not be confirmed if the 

switch was thrown

• Nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) flooded the 

cabin when the cabin pressure relief 

opened, which was due to the closure of 

the propellant isolation valves from crew 

not activating the ELS at the correct 

altitude – cabin pressure relief valve was 

located two feet from the positive RCS 

roll thrusters Rescue team with ASTP Apollo command module during recovery

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

5

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, [V2 10165] Automation and Robotics Override 

and Shut-Down Capabilities

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

Mercury MR-4 – July 21, 1961

After landing , the spacecraft hatch pyrotechnic charges 

prematurely fired. The crewmember was able to escape from the 

emergency situation, but because of waves flooding the capsule, 

the capsule sunk and the crew member was nearly drowned. The 

crewmember was rescued after three to four minutes in the water.

Contributing factors:

• Hatch opened prematurely without command, which led to the 

flooding of the cabin prior to the arrival of rescue crew

• Water ingress through open valve in suit and neck dam

Additional Recommendations

• LEA suit should be able to withstand water ingress in the 

event of a cabin egress during a water landing.

Soyuz 1 – April 24, 1967

On the maiden flight of the Russian Soyuz spacecraft, the 

cosmonaut encountered an anomaly with the parachute system. 

During the descent, the drag chutes successfully deployed, but the 

main chutes failed to deploy properly. Detecting increasing speeds, 

the computer deployed a backup parachute. Because the drag chute 

was still attached and failed to release, the backup chute became 

tangled with the drag chute, preventing the deployment of the 

backup chute and resulting in a high-speed impact with the ground. 

Vladimir Komarov died on impact.

Contributing factors: 

• Exhaust residue from the attitude control jets fouled the craft's 

ion orientation sensors, making control difficult

• Drag and main parachutes malfunctioned, entangling the backup 

parachute as it deployed

• Underlying issues included manufacturing oversight, external 

political pressures and inadequate preparation

Soyuz 1 shortly after impact

Virgil “Gus” Grissom during recovery 

following the capsule sinking

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V2 8023] Unlatching Hatches, [V2 11001] Suited Donning and 

Doffing

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

6

Soyuz 5 – January 18, 1969

Following retrofire, the explosive volts failed to fire and detach the capsule, causing the aircraft to be 

inverted and leaving the heat shield pointed in the wrong direction. As a result, the heat damage on Soyuz 

5 caused the parachute to partially deploy and the soft-landing rockets failed to fire, resulting in a harder 

than normal landing. Because of the force of the impact, Boris Volynov broke several teeth due to the 

force of being torn from his seat and thrown across the cabin. As a result of the re-entry, the vehicle 

landed off-course in the Ural mountain wilderness of near freezing temperatures. Volynov left the vehicle 

in an attempt to find shelter as he expected a delay in rescue. He was only found due to rescuers following 

footsteps in the snow and blood spots from when he spit in the snow.

Additional Recommendations

• Crew recovery operations should anticipate off-nominal landing in rough terrain or locations that 

could be inaccessible by vehicle or helicopter.

Soyuz 18-1 (18a) – April 5, 1975

During ascent, an excessive amount of vibration caused an electrical malfunction in the Soyuz booster to 

prematurely fire two of the four explosive latches holding the core of the first and second stage together. 

This severed the electrical connections necessary for firing the remaining two latches. When the core first 

stage burned out it could not be cast off as designed. Ignition of the second stage occurred nominally, but 

the booster was rapidly dragged off course by the weight of the depleted core first stage. When the course 

deviation reached 10-degrees, the automatic safety system activated, shutting down the booster and 

separating the Soyuz capsule from the launch vehicle. At the time of separation, the Soyuz was 180 km 

high and traveling at 5.5 km per second. The crew endured a 20+ g re-entry and landed in the Altai 

Mountains in southern Siberia. The capsule rolled down a snow-covered mountain side and was caught by 

the parachute in vegetation just short of a precipice. The cosmonauts were able to don their cold-weather 

clothing and clambered outside, waiting an hour in the sub-freezing cold next to the capsule. The crew was 

discovered by locals in the area, it wasn’t until the next day that the crew were able to be air-lifted out. 

One crewmember suffered internal injuries from the high-g re-entry and downhill fall and never flew 

again.

Additional Recommendations

• Crew recovery operations should anticipate off-nominal landing in higher altitudes or locations 

that could be inaccessible by vehicle or helicopter.

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, [V2 8033] Crew Restraint Provision, [V2 10084] 

Communication Capability

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, [V2 8033] Crew Restraint Provision

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

7

Soyuz 23 – October 16, 1976

During the attempted docking with Salyut 5, the vehicle suffered an 

automatic docking system malfunction during final approach. The 

cosmonauts were ordered to return to Earth. They had less than 2 days of 

battery power left and had already missed the landing opportunity for that 

day, so they powered down systems to conserve power. On October 16, 

1976 the Soyuz 23 descent module landed in Lake Tengiz, 2 kilometers from 

shore. The water created an electrical short which caused the reserve 

parachute to deploy. Parachute lines from the main and reserve parachute 

kept the capsule lying on its side in the water, preventing the hatch from 

opening and blocking the air vent. Transmission antennas became 

inoperable due to submersion in the water, and the inner walls of the 

capsule became covered in ice. 

The crew removed their pressure suits during this time to don their flight 

suits, however this took an hour and a half and required the use of a knife to 

cut themselves out. Attempts to recover the crew were not only thwarted by 

the icy waters of the lake, but also the bogs and marshes in the area. Due to 

the lack of light, the rescue had to be delayed further until daylight, leaving 

the crew in the capsule for 11 hours post-landing. The recovery team 

assumed the crew was dead due to the lack of communication, which was 

actually due to the crew losing consciousness from high levels of carbon 

dioxide in the cabin. They towed the capsule for 45-minutes back to the 

shore to await a special team to remove the bodies. After eleven hours in 

the capsule the crew finally opened the hatch from the inside.

Soyuz 23 during recovery (above) and 

shortly after recovery (below) from Lake 

Tengiz

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care

[V2 6004] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat Carbon Dioxide Levels, [V2 6011] Post 

Landing Relative Humidity, [V2 6107] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat 

Atmospheric Ventilation, [V2 9053] Protective Equipment, [V2 10084] 

Communication Capability, [V2 11001] Suited Donning and Doffing

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

Relevant Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care, [V1 3012] Terrestrial Launch/Landing Medical Support 

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits, [V2 8033] Crew Restraint Provision

From: NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C & NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D 

Soyuz TM-7 – April 27, 1989

A double-impact, “hard landing” resulted in an injury to a crew member's leg. The injury required medical treatment 

at the landing site. The hard landing was attributed to gusty winds at the landing site.

Additional Recommendations

• Manual parachute release capability

• Crew recovery operations should anticipate off-nominal landing in rough terrain or locations that could be 

inaccessible by vehicle or helicopter.

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

8

Vehicle design and operations must take into account the lessons learned from past incidents, either 

leading to the loss of crew or injury. As highlighted in previous examples, there were several events that 

happened during the most dynamic phases of the mission from a loss of oxygen and atmosphere to the 

ingress of toxic fumes due to an opening in the vehicle, and even an improper parachute deployment. In the 

most extreme event, the vehicle could break-up during entry leading to a loss of the crew. 

Many of these events may have been preventable either through risk mitigation or verification testing. The 

crew may need to have the ability to perform tasks manually when the automatic functions fail, or 

alternatively, a nominally manual function may need to be automatic in the event the crew fails to perform 

a critical task. However, it can be as simple as providing quick access to the tools or life-saving equipment to 

the crew in the vehicle. 

There are lessons that can be learned from minor events, as well as repeated ones. We cannot assume that 

an event that regularly happens is without fault or will not eventually lead to a failure, loss of vehicle, or 

even the loss of life. 

Hanger housing the Columbia recovery during the accident investigation.

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Back-Up

9 10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Rev A  Rev B

• Updated information to be consistent with NASA-STD-3001 

Volume 1 Rev C and Volume 2 Rev D.

Original  Rev A

• Updated information to be consistent with NASA-STD-3001 

Volume 1 Rev B and Volume 2 Rev C.

Major Changes Between Revisions

10 10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1 Revision C

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care All programs shall provide training, in-mission medical capabilities, 

and resources to diagnose and treat potential medical conditions based on epidemiological evidencebased PRA, individual crewmember needs, clinical practice guidelines, flight surgeon expertise, historical 

review, mission parameters, and vehicle-derived limitations. These analyses consider the needs and 

limitations of each specific vehicle and design reference mission (DRM) with particular attention to 

parameters such as mission duration, expected return time to Earth, mission route and destination, 

expected radiation profile, concept of operations, and more. In-mission capabilities (including hardware 

and software), resources (including consumables), and training to enable in-mission medical care, and 

behavioral care, are to include, but are not limited to: (see NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1 Rev C for full 

standard).

[V1 3012] Terrestrial Launch/Landing Medical Support All programs shall have medical capability at the 

site of terrestrial launch and landing to address nominal operations and launch/landing contingencies, 

including, but not limited to the following:

a. HSP technical requirements for the crew, the crew’s family, and supporting personnel for purpose of 

disease prevention.

b. Access to the full spectrum of medical capabilities, from routine medical and behavioral health care to 

advanced trauma life support (ATLS) capabilities, advanced cardiac life support (ACLS), or equivalent.

c. Incorporation of civilian and/or Department of Defense (DOD) facilities and Emergency Medical Services 

(EMS).

[V1 5009] Physiological Exposure Mission Training Physiological training shall be provided to assist 

crewmembers with pre-mission familiarization to in-flight exposures including but not limited to: carbon 

dioxide [CO2] exposure training, hypoxia training/instruction, centrifuge, and high-performance aircraft 

microgravity adaptation training in preparation for each mission.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D

[V2 3006] Human-Centered Task Analysis Each human spaceflight program or project shall perform a 

human-centered task analysis to support systems and operations design.

[V2 3102] Human Error Analysis Each human spaceflight program or project shall perform a task-based 

human error analysis (HEA) to support systems and operations design.

[V2 6011] Post Landing Relative Humidity (RH) For nominal post landing operations, the system shall limit 

RH to the levels in Table 6.2-2—Average Relative Humidity Exposure Limits for Post Landing Operations.

[V2 6025] Contamination Monitoring and Alerting The system shall monitor and display atmospheric 

compound levels that result from contamination events, e.g., toxic release, systems leaks, or externally 

originated, before, during, and after an event and alert the crew locally and remotely in sufficient time for 

them to take appropriate action.

[V2 6048] Toxic Hazard Level Four The system shall prevent Toxic Hazard Level Four chemicals, as defined 

in JSC-26895, Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials, from 

entering the habitable volume of the spacecraft.

Referenced Technical Requirements

11

View the current versions of NASA-STD3001 Volume 1 & Volume 2 on the 

OCHMO Standards website

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D

[V2 6064] Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits The system shall limit the magnitude, direction, 

and duration of crew exposure to sustained (> 0.5 seconds) translational acceleration by staying below the 

limits in Figures 6.5-(2-7) and Tables 6.5-(1-6) for seated and standing postures.

[V2 6065] Rotational Velocity The system shall limit crew exposure to rotational velocities in yaw, pitch, 

and roll by staying below the limits specified in Figure 6.5-8—Rotational Velocity Limits and Table 6.5-7—

Rotational Velocity Limits.

[V2 6066] Sustained Rotational Acceleration Due to Cross-Coupled Rotation The system shall prevent the 

crew exposure to sustained (> 0.5 second) rotational accelerations caused by cross-coupled rotations 

greater than 2 rad/s2.

[V2 6067] Transient Rotational Acceleration The system shall limit transient (≤0.5 seconds) rotational 

accelerations in yaw, pitch, or roll as specified in Table 6.5-8—Head CG Rotational Acceleration Limits, to 

which the crew is exposed. The limits are appropriately scaled for each crewmember size from the 50th

percentile male limits of 2,200 rad/s2 for nominal and 3,800 rad/s2 for off-nominal cases.

[V2 6069] Acceleration Injury Prevention The system shall mitigate the risk of injury to crewmembers 

caused by accelerations during dynamic mission phases per Table 6.5-9—Acceptable Injury Risk Due to 

Dynamic Loads.

[V2 6081] Alarm Maximum Sound Level Limit The maximum alarm signal A-weighted sound level shall be 

less than 95 dBA at the operating position of the intended receiver.

[V2 6107] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat Atmospheric Ventilation The system shall maintain a ventilation rate 

within the internal atmosphere that is sufficient to provide circulation that prevents CO2 and thermal 

pockets from forming, except during suited operations, toxic cabin events, or when the crew is not 

inhabiting the vehicle.

[V2 7043] Medical Capability A medical system shall be provided to the crew to meet the medical 

requirements of NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1.

[V2 7055] Priority of Stowage Accessibility Stowage items shall be accessible in accordance with their 

use, with the easiest accessibility for mission-critical and most frequently used items.

[V2 8023] Unlatching Hatches Hatches shall require two distinct and sequential operations to unlatch.

[V2 8033] Restraints for Crew Tasks The system shall provide restraints for expected crew operations.

[V2 9053] Protective Equipment Protective equipment shall be provided to protect the crew from 

expected hazards.

[V2 9055] Equipment Automation of Rescue Aids Automation of protective equipment rescue aids shall 

be provided when the crew cannot perform assigned life-saving tasks.

[V2 10165] Automation and Robotics Override and Shut-Down Capabilities Automated or robotic 

systems shall provide the human operator the ability to safely override and shut down automated systems 

or subsystems.

[V2 10002] Design-Induced Error The system shall provide crew interfaces that do not exceed the 

maximum observed error rates listed in Table 5.1-1—Maximum Observed Design-Induced Error Rates.

[V2 10084] Communication Capability The system shall provide the capability to send and receive 

communication among crewmembers, spacecraft systems, and ground systems to support crew 

performance, behavioral health, and safety.

Referenced Technical Requirements

12

View the current versions of NASA-STD3001 Volume 1 & Volume 2 on the 

OCHMO Standards website

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Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D

[V2 11001] Suited Donning and Doffing The system shall accommodate efficient and effective donning 

and doffing of spacesuits for both nominal and contingency operations.

[V2 11024] Ability to Work in Suits Suits shall provide mobility, dexterity, and tactility to enable the 

crewmember to accomplish suited tasks within acceptable physical workload and fatigue limits while 

minimizing the risk of injury.

[V2 11032] LEA Suited Decompression Sickness Prevention Capability LEA spacesuits shall be capable of 

operating at sufficient pressure to protect against Type II decompression sickness in the event of a cabin 

depressurization.

[V2 11100] Pressure Suits for Protection from Cabin Depressurization The system shall provide the 

capability for crewmembers to wear pressure suits for sufficient duration during launch, entry, descent 

(to/from Earth, or other celestial body) and any operation deemed high risk for loss of crew life due to loss 

of cabin pressurization (such as in mission dockings, operations during periods of high incidence of 

micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) or complex vehicle maneuvers).

Referenced Technical Requirements

13

View the current versions of NASA-STD3001 Volume 1 & Volume 2 on the 

OCHMO Standards website

10/12/2023

Rev B
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-039

Mishaps During Entry, Descent, and 

Landing

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Reference List

14

1. “A Watery Yarn: The Unlucky Voyage of Soyuz 23 (Part 2).” Ben Evans. AmericaSpace. October 27th, 

2013. https://www.americaspace.com/

2. “Asynchronicity: The Near Loss of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project Crew.” NASA Safety Center. August 16, 

2016. https://sashare.sp.jsc.nasa.gov/Teams/NASA-STD-3001/TW/RefLib/Apollo/AsynchronicityThe%20Near%20Loss%20of%20the%20ASTP%20Crew.pdf

3. Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. NASA/SP-2008-565. National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/12/30/nasa.shuttle.pt1.pdf

4. “’Creeping and Unpleasant’: The Near-Space Experience of Soyuz 18A”. Ben Evans. AmericaSpace.com. 

September 29th, 2013. https://www.americaspace.com/2013/09/29/creeping-and-unpleasant-thenear-space-experience-of-soyuz-18a/

5. “Descent into the Void.” System Failure Case Studies. September 2010; Volume 4, Issue 9. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/descent-into-the-void.pdf

6. FLIGHT JOURNAL: The Aviation Adventure - Past, Present, and Future. June 2002 Volume 7, No.3. 

http://www.jamesoberg.com/062002flightjournalsoyuz5.html

7. Mercury Project Summary (NASA SP-45). NASA. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/1.-project-review.pdf

8. Mir Hardware Heritage. David S. F. Portree. Johnson Space Center, NASA. March 1995. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/mir-hardware-heritage.pdf

9. Results of the Second US Manned Suborbital Space Flight July 21, 1961. NASA. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/results-of-the-second-us-mannedsuborbital-flight.pdf

10. “Secret Space Escapes.” Science Channel. 2015.

11. Significant Incidents & Close Calls in Human Spaceflight. NASA. 2016. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/index.html

12. “Soyuz 1”. Encyclopedia Astronautica. March 30, 2015. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/soyuz-1.pdf

13. Space Facts. http://www.spacefacts.de/

14. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) on Soyuz Spacecraft as an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV). 

NASA. April 8, 1997. 

15. The Crew That Never Came Home: The Misfortunes of Soyuz 11.” Space Safety Magazine.

http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-disasters/soyuz-11/crew-home-misfortunes-soyuz-11/

16. “Tragic Tangle.” System Failure Case Studies. June 2010; Volume 4, Issue 6. 

https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/tragic-tangle.pdf

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