SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5429-16T1

SCOTT RICKABAUGH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALAURA P. JONES and 

DOROTHY JONES, 

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________

Argued September 26, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0950-14.

Mark J. Molz argued the cause for appellant.

Francis X. Ryan argued the cause for respondents 

(Green, Lundgren & Ryan, PC, attorneys; Francis X. 

Ryan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 11, 2019
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This is an automobile negligence action. A jury unanimously determined 

that Plaintiff, Scott Rickabaugh, who was subject to the limitation on lawsuit 

threshold, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), had not "sustained a [permanent] injury 

proximately caused by the . . . motor vehicle accident." Plaintiff appeals from 

an order that denied the motion for a new trial. He contends the trial court erred 

by permitting a medical expert to read inadmissible hearsay statements from his 

report under the guise of refreshing his recollection. He also contends the trial 

court compounded the error by making a prejudicial remark when his attorney 

argued the point while making his objection at trial. Last, plaintiff contends he 

proved he sustained a permanent injury. Finding no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court and no merit in plaintiff's challenge to the verdict, we affirm.

This action arose when an automobile that defendant Dorothy Jones

owned and defendant Alaura P. Jones was driving "rear-ended" an automobile

plaintiff was driving. During trial, the parties presented conflicting expert 

medical testimony as to whether plaintiff had sustained a permanent injury in 

the accident. The court dismissed the complaint against Dorothy Jones at the 

close of all the evidence. Following the jury's verdict of no cause for action, 

plaintiff moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff 

appealed. 
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Plaintiff's primary contention on appeal concerns his objection to part of 

the trial testimony of the defense medical expert, Roy B. Friedenthal, an 

orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Friedenthal opined plaintiff suffered no permanent 

injury as a result of the vehicular accident. 

Dr. Friedenthal prepared an initial report after examining plaintiff. He 

prepared several subsequent reports as the result of receiving and reviewing 

additional records and information thereafter. Early in his trial testimony, Dr. 

Friedenthal said he would need to refer to his initial report to refresh his 

recollection while testifying. Plaintiff's counsel objected: 

Q. [Defense Counsel]: And, Doctor, with this 

exam being more than a year ago, [plaintiff's counsel] 

brought up on voir dire that you've wrote reports for my 

office? 

A. I did.

Q. And would you need to use those reports 

and reference those reports to refresh your recollection 

when you're giving testimony here?

A. I will. I have the copies in front of me, I have the 

record I reviewed, and I will refer to this nine-page 

report to refresh my recollection.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Judge, I’m going to object. 

Judge, he needs to testify from personal knowledge. 

That’s a requirement of Rule 602. 
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[Court]: Okay. The witnesses are allowed to refresh 

their recollection based on information. So if you want 

personal knowledge of all the records for this 

individual, I have not seen a plaintiff's doctor - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Judge, I'm going to object to 

the colloquy. 

[Court]: - - nor the defendant's doctor - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: I object to the colloquy. 

[Court]: - - not refer to records. And I am speaking

. . .

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: I understand, Judge, in front of 

the jury.

[Court]: So I am going to allow him to refresh his 

recollection and testify as to this evaluation.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: May I respond?

[Court]: Yes.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Judge, Rule 803(c)(5) requires 

him to admit that he has no personal knowledge before 

he can refresh his recollection with the report. 

[Court]: I have not seen any - - he has the personal 

knowledge that's recorded.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Judge, counsel just said in 

front the jury that he can't remember and he's going to 

refer to his report. That was the issue that - - that has 

already risen.
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[Defense Counsel]: And, Your Honor, I would 

suggest that it's already been ruled upon.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: It actually was not ruled upon, 

Judge. I've prepared a motion, but I haven't filed it yet.

[Court]: I don't have that motion.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Correct.

[Court]: I will allow the doctor to testify. It's 

reasonable. 

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: He's going to read from his 

report, Judge?

[Court]: I don't - - he hasn't read from his report. 

He's referring to it. I think even your police officer had 

to refer to his report. 

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Not my police officer, Judge, 

it's somebody that we subpoenaed.

[Court]: Okay.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

[Court]: But even the police officer was allowed to 

refer to this report to refresh his recollection and testify, 

so I'm going to allow this doctor to do the same. 

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Thank you, Judge. I'll object 

if I feel the need. 

[Court]: All right.
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Defense counsel continued with the direct examination of Dr. 

Friedenthal. The following occurred:

Q [Defense Counsel]: And, Doctor, at the 

time of your evaluation of March 10, 2016, like you told 

us, did you take a history from this plaintiff.

A. I did. 

Q. And what was that history?

A. He told me that he sustained injuries in a motor 

vehicle accident of April 20, 2012. He told me that the 

vehicle he was driving - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Objection to reading from the 

report, Judge. He had his eyes down, he was clearly 

reading from his report. Judge, it's against the rules.

[Court]: It is not against the rules.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: [N.J.R.E.] 602 requires 

personal knowledge for a witness to be qualified to 

testify. It’s a very basic part of our jurisprudence. 

[Court]: Okay. A very basic part of our 

jurisprudence is expert witnesses may testify and rely 

on the information supplied by the witness and other -

- other reports. 

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: I agree.

[Court]: So that's what this individual is doing. 

Please - - I will allow him to refer to his report.
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[Plaintiff's Counsel]: That's not what's happening, 

Judge. He's reading from his report. It's clear as day. 

It violates Rule - - 

[Court]: It does not violate the rule. It does not 

violate the rule, counsel. Your objection is noted - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Rule 602, Judge - -

[Court]: - - and I'll allow this witness to continue to 

testify.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Thank you, Judge.

 

Later, when Dr. Friedenthal began to explain how he examined and 

evaluated plaintiff's complaints of back pain, the following exchange occurred:

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Judge, I'm going to object to 

the reading. The doctor has clearly got his head down 

and he's just reading his report into the record. It’s not 

permissible under our rules to do that.

[Court]: This is expert testimony, [counsel].

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: It is expert testimony.

[Court]: I know. The - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: It has to be based upon 

personal knowledge, according to the rules, [N.J.R.E.]

602. And I'm saying there’s no personal knowledge 

here. 

[Court]: no, expert testimony is based on 

information supplied by others, including your client. 

So he's - -
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[Plaintiff's Counsel]: But that - - that's - -

[Court]: - - providing the information and the 

evaluation based on his observation of your client. The 

- -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: But he still has to testify from 

personal knowledge, he can't just read a report. 

Otherwise, there wouldn't be any reason to have a trial, 

we would just submit reports. And clearly he has no 

personal knowledge.

[Court]: He has personal knowledge.

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: He doesn’t - -

[Court]: He examined him - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: - - because he has to read it.

[Court]: He's - -

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: He can’t remember. 

[Court]: Okay. Counsel, he is referring to his 

report. Your client supplied him with the information. 

He is providing the observations that he made. You can 

cross-examine him if there is anything other in his 

report, or I'm sure you have other ways of crossexamining him. He may refer to his report. I've already 

ruled, and your objection is noted. 

In his first and second points on appeal, plaintiff cites N.J.R.E. 612 — a 

rule he did not cite to the trial court — and argues the rule "precludes a party 

who refreshes the memory of a witness to introduce the material used to refresh 
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memory as substantive evidence on any issue." He also asserts the comments 

the trial court made when overruling his objection were prejudicial to his case. 

We begin with several fundamental principles concerning the conduct of 

trials. Trial courts are required to "exercise reasonable control over the mode 

and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence." N.J.R.E. 611(a). 

They are to do so "to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for 

the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) 

protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Ibid. For these 

reasons, among others, trial courts are "vested with broad discretion in 

evidentiary matters as well as matters affecting the conduct and proceedings in 

a trial." Barber v. Shop-Rite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 393 N.J. Super. 

292, 298 (App. Div. 2007) (citing State v E.B., 348 N.J. Super. 336, 344 (App. 

Div. 2002)).

Trial attorneys must make timely and correct objections to preserve issues 

for appellate review. "For the purpose of reserving questions for review or 

appeal . . ., a party, at the time the ruling . . . is made . . ., shall make known to 

the court specifically . . . the party's objection . . . and the grounds therefor." R.

1:7-2. An objection should be "clearly raised on the record at the time the trial 

court [can] explor[e] the issue with trial counsel." State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 
10 A-5429-16T1

231 (2015). Tepid, unspecific complaints are inadequate. See ibid. Once the 

court has ruled on an objection, "counsel must abide by [the court's] ruling, 

saving his objections for appeal." Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 102 

(App. Div. 1958), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 30 N.J. 485 (1959).

When a party objects on an incorrect ground or fails to specify the basis 

for an objection, we may review the issue for plain error. See State v. Nunez, 

436 N.J. Super. 70, 76 (App. Div. 2014); Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 310 N.J. 

Super. 507, 531-32 (App. Div. 1998). Appellate courts need not, however, 

consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. "It is a well-settled principle 

that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly 

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is 

available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the 

trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. 

Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 

58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).

Considering the trial record in light of these legal principles, we conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion when it overruled plaintiff's 

incorrect objections to Dr. Friedenthal's testimony. 
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Plaintiff first objected to Dr. Friedenthal's testimony on the ground he 

lacked personal knowledge, a prerequisite to a witness testifying at a trial. But 

the rule concerning personal knowledge, N.J.R.E. 602, begins with an exception 

for expert testimony: "Except as otherwise provided by Rule 703 (bases of 

opinion testimony by experts), a witness may not testify to a matter unless 

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 

personal knowledge of the matter. . . ." Dr. Friedenthal had been qualified as an 

expert, so N.J.R.E. 602's exception to the requirement of personal knowledge 

applied to the bases of his opinions. In addition, it was self-evident the doctor 

had personal knowledge of the examination he performed.

Plaintiff also objected to the doctor referring to his report because 

"[N.J.R.E.] 803(c)(5) requires him to admit that he has no personal knowledge 

before he can refresh his recollection with the report." This statement appears 

to confuse several concepts, including those of past recollection recorded and 

present recollection refreshed. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5), entitled "Recorded 

Recollection," sets forth the evidentiary elements a proponent must establish 

before reading all or part of the content of the recorded statement into evidence. 

The elements include insufficient present recollection of a matter of which the 

witness had knowledge. Ibid. The rule does not, as plaintiff argued at trial, 
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require the witness to "admit that he has no personal knowledge before he can 

refresh his recollection." 

In contrast, a witness may review a document to refresh his memory about 

a past event, but doing so does not make the document or its content admissible

in evidence. See State v. Rajnai, 132 N.J. Super. 530, 540-41 (App. Div. 1975). 

N.J.R.E. 612 — the rule plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal — governs 

the use an adverse party may make of a writing if a witness "uses [the] writing 

to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of testifying." 

The trial court properly sustained the erroneous objections plaintiff lodged 

to Dr. Friedenthal's testimony. We glean that plaintiff was actually attempting 

to prevent Dr. Friedenthal from reading the hearsay content of his report to the 

jury in the guise of refreshing his recollection. During its exchange with 

counsel, the trial court noted the doctor was not reading from his report, he was 

merely referring to it. The court exercised reasonable control over the mode of 

interrogating the witness. We discern no abuse of discretion in the manner in 

which it did so. N.J.R.E. 611(a). 

Plaintiff's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that his 

suggestion he was prejudiced by a comment the court made during an exchange 
13 A-5429-16T1

with his attorney over an objection is based on speculation and unsupported by 

the record. Besides, the attorney bears some responsibility for the extended 

exchange. Once a court has ruled on an objection, "counsel must abide by [the 

court's] ruling, saving his objections for appeal." Greenberg, 51 N.J. Super. at 

102. In this case, counsel did not adhere to this principle, but instead continued 

to press his erroneous objections. In any event, consideration of the entire trial 

record, including the court's instructions to the jury, leads to the conclusion the 

jury returned its verdict based on its assessment of the evidence, uninfluenced 

by the attorney's objections or the court's rulings on the objections.

Affirmed.