Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 63547 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

46 CFR Parts 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 

15 

[Docket No. USCG–2014–0016] 

Policy Implementing the Standards of 

Training, Certification, and 

Watchkeeping 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard announces 

the availability of five Navigation and 

Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVICs), 

which are the third set of a series of 

NVICs to implement the Final Rule that 

aligned Coast Guard regulations with 

amendments to the International 

Convention on Standards of Training, 

Certification and Watchkeeping for 

Seafarers and made changes to national 

endorsements. These NVICs will 

provide guidance to mariners 

concerning new regulations governing 

merchant mariner certificates and 

endorsements to Merchant Mariner 

Credentials (MMC). 

DATES: These NVICs are effective on 

October 24, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions about this notice, 

call or email Luke B. Harden, Mariner 

Credentialing Program Policy Division 

(CG–CVC–4), U.S. Coast Guard; 

telephone 202–372–2357, or 

MMCPolicy@uscg.mil. If you have 

questions on viewing material in the 

docket, call Cheryl Collins, Program 

Manager, Docket Operations, telephone 

202–366–9826. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Viewing Documents 

The five NVICs listed below are 

available and can be viewed by going to 

http://www.uscg.mil/nmc and clicking 

on ‘‘STCW Rule Information,’’ then 

click on ‘‘STCW Rule NVICs.’’ 

Discussion 

On December 24, 2014, the Coast 

Guard published a Final Rule in the 

Federal Register (78 FR 77796) 

amending Title 46, Code of Federal 

Regulations, to implement the 

International Convention on Standards 

of Training, Certification and 

Watchkeeping for Seafarers, as amended 

1978 (STCW Convention), including the 

2010 amendments to the STCW 

Convention, and the Seafarers’ Training, 

Certification and Watchkeeping Code. 

The final rule also made changes to 

reorganize, clarify, and update 

regulations for credentialing merchant 

mariners. In the future, the Coast Guard 

will issue additional NVICs to provide 

further guidance on the implementation 

of the new regulations regarding 

endorsements to Merchant Mariner 

Credentials (MMCs). The five NVICs 

listed below represent the third phase of 

this effort: 

1. Guidelines for Qualification for 

High-Speed Craft Type-Rating 

Endorsements (NVIC 20–14). This NVIC 

describes policy for merchant mariners 

to qualify for and renew endorsements 

for service on vessels designed and 

operated in accordance with the 

International Code of Safety for HighSpeed Craft, 2000. 

2. Guidelines on Qualification for 

Endorsements for Vessel Security 

Officers, Vessel Personnel with 

Designated Security Duties, and 

Security Awareness (NVIC 21–14). This 

NVIC describes policy for merchant 

mariners to qualify for and renew STCW 

endorsements for Vessel Security 

Officers, Vessel Personnel with 

Designated Security Duties, and for 

Security Awareness. 

3. Guidelines on Qualification for 

STCW Endorsements for Officers and 

Ratings on Oil, Chemical, and Liquefied 

Gas Tank Vessels (NVIC 22–14). This 

NVIC describes policy for merchant 

mariners to qualify for and renew STCW 

endorsements for service on tank 

vessels. 

4. Guidelines on Qualification for 

STCW Endorsements as ElectroTechnical Officer on Vessels Powered 

by Main Propulsion Machinery of 750 

kW/1,000 HP or More (NVIC 23–14). 

This NVIC describes policy for 

merchant mariners to qualify for and 

renew endorsements as ElectroTechnical Officer on vessels powered by 

main propulsion machinery of 750 kW/ 

1,000 HP or more. 

5. Guidelines on Qualification for 

STCW Endorsements as ElectroTechnical Rating on Vessels Powered by 

Main Propulsion Machinery of 750 kW/ 

1,000 HP or More(NVIC 24–14). This 

NVIC describes policy for merchant 

mariners to qualify for and renew 

endorsements as Electro-Technical 

Rating on vessels powered by main 

propulsion machinery of 750 kW/1,000 

HP or more. 

Authority 

This notice is issued under the 

authority of 5 U.S.C. 552(a). 

Dated: October 10, 2014. 

J.C. Burton, 

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Director, 

Inspection & Compliance. 

[FR Doc. 2014–24869 Filed 10–23–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–04–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 76 

[MB Docket No. 12–3; FCC 14–141] 

Sports Blackout Rules 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the 

Commission eliminates the sports 

blackout rules for cable operators, 

satellite carriers, and open video 

systems. Elimination of the sports 

blackout rules will remove unnecessary 

and outdated regulations and remove 

regulatory reinforcement (and the 

Commission’s implicit endorsement) of 

the NFL’s private blackout policy, 

which deprives consumers of the ability 

to view on television the teams that they 

have subsidized through publiclyfunded stadiums and other tax benefits. 

Elimination of the sports blackout rules 

may not end all sports blackouts. To the 

extent that the NFL (or any other sports 

league) chooses to continue its private 

blackout policy, it will no longer 

entitled to the protections of the sports 

blackout rules. Instead, it must rely on 

the same avenues available to any other 

entity that wishes to protect its 

distribution rights in the private 

marketplace. 

DATES: Effective November 24, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

additional information, contact Kathy 

Berthot, Kathy.Berthot@fcc.gov, of the 

Media Bureau, Policy Division, (202) 

418–7454. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Report 

and Order, FCC 14–141, adopted and 

released on September 30, 2014. The 

full text is available for public 

inspection and copying during regular 

business hours in the FCC Reference 

Center, Federal Communications 

Commission, 445 12th Street SW., CY– 

A257, Washington, DC 20554. This 

document will also be available via 

ECFS (http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/). 

Documents will be available 

electronically in ASCII, Word 97, and/ 

or Adobe Acrobat. The complete text 

may be purchased from the 

Commission’s copy contractor, 445 12th 


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63548 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

Street SW., Room CY–B402, 

Washington, DC 20554. To request this 

document in accessible formats 

(computer diskettes, large print, audio 

recording, and Braille), send an email to 

fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Commission’s 

Consumer and Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202) 

418–0432 (TTY). 

This document contains no new or 

modified information collection 

requirements. 

Summary of the Report and Order 

I. Introduction 

1. In this Report and Order, we 

eliminate our sports blackout rules, 

which prohibit cable operators, satellite 

carriers, and open video systems from 

retransmitting, within a protected local 

blackout zone, the signal of a distant 

broadcast station carrying a sporting 

event if the event is not available live on 

a local television broadcast station. The 

sports blackout rules have reinforced 

the sports leagues’ private blackout 

policies since 1975, with the objective 

of helping to ensure that sports telecasts 

are available to the public. The sports 

industry has evolved dramatically over 

the last 40 years, however. The sports 

blackout rules have little relevance 

today for sports other than professional 

football. With respect to professional 

football, television revenues have 

replaced gate receipts as the primary 

source of revenue for NFL teams. For 

this reason, among others, we conclude 

that the sports blackout rules are no 

longer needed to ensure that sports 

programming is widely available to 

television viewers. 

2. Eliminating the sports blackout 

rules will also remove unnecessary and 

outdated regulations. Additionally, 

eliminating the rules will remove 

regulatory reinforcement (and the FCC’s 

implicit endorsement) of the NFL’s 

private blackout policy, which prevents 

consumers—many of whom cannot 

attend games because they are elderly or 

disabled or are fans who have been 

priced out of attending games due to 

increased costs for tickets, parking, and 

concessions, yet have subsidized NFL 

teams with their tax dollars through 

publicly-financed stadiums and other 

tax benefits—from watching their teams’ 

games on local television. For these 

reasons, we find that eliminating our 

sports blackout rules will serve the 

public interest. We acknowledge that 

elimination of our sports blackout rules 

may not end local blackouts of sports 

events because the NFL and other sports 

leagues may choose to continue their 

private blackout policies. Nevertheless, 

to the extent that the NFL or any other 

sports league decides to continue its 

blackout policies, it will no longer be 

entitled to additional protections under 

our sports blackout rules, but instead 

must rely on the same processes 

available to any other entities that wish 

to protect their distribution rights in the 

private marketplace. 

II. Background 

3. In the Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NPRM), the Commission 

provided extensive background on the 

history of the sports blackout rules, 

which we incorporate by reference and 

do not repeat here. The sports blackout 

rules bar cable operators, satellite 

carriers, and open video systems from 

retransmitting, within a 35-mile zone of 

protection, a distant broadcast station 

carrying a sports event that is not 

available live on a television broadcast 

station licensed to the community in 

which the event is taking place. The 

Commission first adopted a sports 

blackout rule for cable operators in 

1975, when game ticket sales were the 

primary source of revenue for sports 

leagues. This rule was intended to 

ensure that the potential loss of gate 

receipts resulting from cable system 

importation of distant stations did not 

lead sports clubs to refuse to sell their 

rights to sports events to distant 

stations, which would reduce the 

overall availability of sports 

programming to television viewers. The 

Commission’s objective in adopting the 

cable sports blackout rule was not to 

ensure the profitability of organized 

sports, but rather to ensure the overall 

availability of sports telecasts to the 

general public. Indeed, in 1975, had 

sports teams refused to allow sports 

events to be televised on distant 

broadcast stations, their games likely 

would not have been televised at all or 

perhaps only carried on cable systems to 

which few Americans subscribed. At the 

direction of Congress, the Commission 

later applied the cable sports blackout 

rule to open video systems and then to 

satellite carriers to provide parity 

between cable and newer video 

distributors. 

4. Sports leagues’ blackout policies 

determine which games are blacked out 

on local television stations. These 

policies are implemented primarily 

through contracts negotiated between 

the leagues or individual teams that 

hold the distribution rights to the games 

and the entities to which they grant 

those rights, including television 

networks, local television broadcast 

stations, Regional Sports Networks 

(RSNs), and multichannel video 

programming distributors (MVPDs). The 

Commission’s rules supplement these 

contractual relationships by barring 

MVPDs from retransmitting, within the 

local blackout zone, games that the 

sports leagues or individual teams 

require local television stations to black 

out. 

5. In November 2011, the Sports Fan 

Coalition, Inc., National Consumers 

League, Public Knowledge, League of 

Fans, and Media Access Project filed a 

joint Petition for Rulemaking arguing 

that the Commission should no longer 

facilitate the sports leagues’ ‘‘anticonsumer’’ blackout policies and urging 

the Commission to eliminate the sports 

blackout rules. On January 12, 2012, the 

Media Bureau issued a Public Notice 

seeking comment on the Petition. The 

record compiled in response to the 

Public Notice suggested that, given the 

dramatic changes in the sports industry 

in the 40 years since the sports blackout 

rules were originally adopted, the sports 

blackout rules may no longer be 

necessary to ensure that sports 

programming is widely available to 

television viewers and, in fact, may be 

reinforcing a private policy that 

promotes just the opposite (i.e., more 

restrictive access for consumers to 

televised games with little, if any, 

countervailing public interest benefit). 

On December 18, 2013, the Commission 

released an NPRM proposing to 

eliminate the sports blackout rules. The 

NPRM sought comment on whether the 

sports blackout rules have become 

outdated due to marketplace changes 

since their adoption and whether 

modification or elimination of those 

rules is appropriate. It tentatively 

concluded that the Commission has the 

authority to repeal the cable sports 

blackout rule and sought comment on 

whether the Commission also has the 

authority to repeal the sports blackout 

rules for satellite and OVS. In addition, 

the NPRM requested comment on 

whether the economic rationale 

underlying the sports blackout rules 

remains valid. Finally, the NPRM sought 

comment on the potential benefits and 

harms of eliminating the rules on 

interested parties, including sports 

leagues, broadcasters, and consumers. 

III. Discussion 

6. For the reasons set forth below, we 

eliminate the sports blackout rules. 

First, we conclude that the Commission 

has the authority to eliminate the sports 

blackout rules for cable operators, 

satellite carriers, and open video 

systems. Second, we review the changes 

in the sports industry since the cable 

sports blackout rule was first adopted 

nearly 40 years ago and conclude that, 

in light of these substantial changes, the 

sports blackout rules are no longer 


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needed to ensure that sports 

programming is widely available to 

television viewers. We further conclude 

that elimination of the sports blackout 

rules will serve the public interest by 

removing unnecessary regulation and 

removing regulatory reinforcement of 

the NFL’s blackout policy, which 

prevents many consumers who have 

subsidized the NFL through publiclyfunded stadiums and other tax benefits 

from watching locally blacked out 

games. To the extent that the NFL (or 

any other sports league) chooses to 

continue its blackout policies through 

private contractual arrangements, it will 

no longer be entitled to additional 

protections under our sports blackout 

rules, but instead must rely on the same 

processes available to any other entities 

that wish to protect their distribution 

rights in the private marketplace. 

Finally, we conclude that repeal of the 

sports blackout rules will not adversely 

impact broadcasters, consumers, or local 

businesses. 

A. Authority To Eliminate Sports 

Blackout Rules 

7. We conclude that the Commission 

has the authority to eliminate the sports 

blackout rules for cable operators, 

satellite carriers, and open video 

systems. While there is no statutory 

provision mandating that the 

Commission adopt a sports blackout 

rule for cable, the Commission premised 

its adoption of the cable sports blackout 

rule in large part on the policy 

established by Congress in the Sports 

Broadcasting Act of 1961, which 

exempts from the antitrust laws joint 

agreements among individual teams 

engaged in professional football, 

baseball, basketball, or hockey that 

permit the leagues to pool the 

individual teams’ television rights and 

sell those rights as a package and 

expressly permits these four 

professional sports leagues to black out 

television broadcasts of home games 

within the home territory of a member 

team. Subsequent legislation directed 

the Commission to apply the cable 

sports blackout rule to open video 

services and satellite television 

operators. Thus, Section 653(b)(1)(D) of 

the Act, as added by the 1996 Act, 

directed the Commission to extend to 

open video systems ‘‘the Commission’s 

regulations concerning sports 

exclusivity (47 CFR 76.67).’’ Similarly, 

Section 339(b) of the Act, as added by 

SHVIA in 1999, directed the 

Commission to ‘‘apply . . . sports 

blackout protection (47 CFR 76.67) to 

the retransmission of the signals of 

nationally distributed superstations by 

satellite carriers’’ and, ‘‘to the extent 

technically feasible and not 

economically prohibitive, apply sports 

blackout protection (47 CFR 76.67) to 

the retransmission of the signals of 

network stations by satellite carriers.’’ 

8. We find that elimination of the 

cable sports blackout rule is authorized 

under the Commission’s general 

rulemaking power, which grants the 

Commission the authority to revisit its 

rules and modify or repeal them if it 

finds that such action is warranted. As 

discussed above, Congress never 

required the Commission to adopt a 

sports blackout rule for cable. Further, 

when it directed the Commission to 

apply the sports blackout protection in 

47 CFR 76.67 to DBS and OVS, Congress 

left intact the Commission’s general 

rulemaking authority with respect to the 

cable sports blackout rule, including the 

authority to modify or repeal this rule 

should it find that such action is 

appropriate. We also note that no 

commenter disputes our authority to 

eliminate the cable sports blackout rule. 

9. Additionally, we conclude that we 

have the authority to eliminate the 

sports blackout rules for DBS and OVS. 

We find unpersuasive assertions in the 

record that the Commission may not 

eliminate the sports blackout rules for 

DBS and OVS absent congressional 

repeal of Sections 339(b) and 

653(b)(1)(D) of the Act. The NFL argues 

that, since these statutory provisions 

provide that the Commission ‘‘shall’’ 

apply the cable sports blackout rule to 

DBS and OVS, the Commission has no 

discretion to eliminate the sports 

blackout rules for DBS and OVS. We 

disagree. In enacting Sections 339(b) 

and 653(b)(1)(D), Congress did not enact 

sports blackout protection for DBS or 

OVS but rather directed the Commission 

to apply to DBS and OVS the same 

sports blackout protection that the 

Commission applied to cable. Thus, the 

use of ‘‘shall’’ in Sections 339(b) and 

653(b)(1)(D) merely instructed the 

Commission to apply to DBS and OVS 

the same sports blackout protection that 

is applicable to cable. The Commission 

discharged its statutory obligation 

through adoption of sports blackout 

rules for OVS in 1996 (47 CFR 

76.1506(m)) and for DBS in 2000 (47 

CFR 76.127). Nowhere did Congress 

require the Commission to maintain 

these rules in perpetuity, and Congress 

was aware that the Commission has 

general rulemaking power to revisit its 

rules and modify or repeal them if it 

finds that such action is appropriate. 

Sections 339(b) and 653(b)(1)(D) do not 

limit the Commission’s authority to 

repeal or modify its cable sports 

blackout rule at some future time, nor is 

there any indication in the legislative 

history that Congress intended to 

withdraw this authority. Accordingly, 

we conclude that, by expressly tying 

these statutory provisions to the cable 

sports blackout rule, Congress 

demonstrated its intent that the 

Commission accord the same regulatory 

treatment to DBS and OVS as it does to 

cable with respect to sports blackouts, 

including modification or repeal of the 

sports blackout rules for these services 

if it determines that modification or 

repeal of the cable sports blackout rule 

is warranted. 

10. The legislative history of the 

Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act 

of 1999 supports this conclusion. The 

legislative history makes clear that 

Congress sought to place satellite 

carriers on an equal footing with cable 

operators with respect to the availability 

of broadcast programming. Specifically, 

the legislative history indicates that the 

sports blackout rules for satellite 

carriers ‘‘should be as similar as 

possible to that applicable to cable 

services.’’ Congress’s clear intent to 

create regulatory parity between cable 

and satellite, and its preservation of 

Commission authority to modify or 

repeal the cable sports blackout rule, 

thus further support our interpretation 

that Congress intended that the 

Commission would retain its authority 

to repeal the sports blackout rules for 

OVS and DBS if necessary to maintain 

regulatory parity with cable in the 

future. 

11. We reject the Baseball 

Commissioner’s assertion that the 

Satellite Home Viewer Extension and 

Reauthorization Act of 2004 (SHVERA) 

evidences Congress’s intent that the 

Commission do no more than provide to 

Congress ‘‘recommendations’’ as to 

whether the sports blackout rules for 

DBS and OVS should be altered, and 

that any changes based on those 

recommendations were to be made by 

Congress. SHVERA directed the 

Commission to complete an inquiry and 

submit a report to Congress ‘‘regarding 

the impact on competition in the 

multichannel video programming 

distribution market of the current 

retransmission consent, network nonduplication, syndicated exclusivity, and 

sports blackout rules, including the 

impact of those rules on the ability of 

rural cable operators to compete with 

direct broadcast satellite (‘DBS’) 

industry in the provision of digital 

broadcast television signals to 

consumers.’’ SHVERA further directed 

the Commission to ‘‘include such 

recommendations for changes in any 

statutory provisions relating to such 

rules as the Commission deems 

appropriate.’’ Contrary to the Baseball 


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Commissioner’s suggestion, we do not 

believe this latter directive can 

reasonably be interpreted to reflect an 

intent on the part of Congress to limit 

the Commission only to making 

recommendations about the sports 

blackout rules for DBS and OVS. As 

noted above, the purpose of the 

SHVERA inquiry and report was to 

evaluate the impact of the specified 

rules on competition in the MVPD 

market, including their impact on the 

ability of rural cable operators to 

compete with DBS in the provision of 

digital broadcast television signals. If 

Congress had intended to suspend or 

limit the Commission’s general 

rulemaking powers under the 

Communications Act with respect to the 

sports blackout rules for DBS and OVS, 

Congress would have done so rather 

than direct that ‘‘such report shall 

include such recommendations for 

changes in any statutory provisions 

relating to such rules as the Commission 

deems appropriate.’’ There is nothing in 

the SHVERA directive that indicates 

that Congress’s objective was to 

preclude the Commission from making 

any modifications to the sports blackout 

and other listed rules. Indeed, given the 

inclusion of retransmission consent in 

the relevant SHVERA provision, the 

Baseball Commissioner’s argument, if 

accepted, would lead to the conclusion 

that Congress barred the Commission 

revising any of its rules pertaining to 

retransmission consent. We reject this 

position, which has no basis in the text 

of the statute. Rather, we think the more 

reasonable interpretation is that 

Congress simply intended that the 

Commission provide recommendations 

for any legislative changes that it 

deemed necessary or appropriate to 

address the impact of the specified rules 

on competition among MVPDs. 

B. Sports Blackout Rules No Longer 

Needed To Ensure That Sports Telecasts 

Are Widely Available to the Public 

12. Our policy inquiry begins with an 

evaluation of whether the sports 

blackout rules are still needed to 

achieve the objective of ensuring the 

wide availability of sporting events on 

television in light of the dramatic 

changes that have occurred in the sports 

industry over the last 40 years. As an 

initial matter, we find that the sports 

blackout rules have little relevance 

today for sports other than professional 

football. We therefore focus our analysis 

on whether the sports blackout rules 

remain necessary to preserve the overall 

availability to television viewers of NFL 

games. We conclude that sports 

blackout rules are no longer needed to 

serve that purpose. We find that, during 

the past 40 years, television revenues 

have replaced gate receipts as the 

principal source of revenue for NFL 

teams and there has been a substantial 

decline in the number of NFL games 

blacked out due to failure to sell out. We 

further find that the loss to consumers 

of their ability to view the game on 

television when an NFL game is blacked 

out exceeds any gain in gate receipts 

and other revenue that may accrue to 

the NFL as a result of a blackout. In 

addition, the record demonstrates that 

changes in the industry make it unlikely 

that the NFL would move its games to 

pay TV as a result of the elimination of 

the sports blackout rules, 

notwithstanding the NFL’s claims to the 

contrary. Given that the goal of the rules 

was not to protect the profitability of 

sports leagues but rather to ensure that 

sports programming is widely available 

to television viewers, we believe that all 

of these factors weigh in favor of 

eliminating the sports blackout rules. 

i. Primary Relevance to Professional 

Football 

13. The record confirms that the 

sports blackout rules are no longer 

relevant for sports other than 

professional football. As explained in 

the NPRM, in professional sports 

leagues other than the NFL, individual 

teams, rather than the league, hold and 

sell the distribution rights for all or most 

of their games, both home and away 

games, in their home markets. Thus, 

each individual team is in control of 

deciding how many of its home games 

are telecast live in its home market, and 

individual teams have generally chosen 

to telecast all or most of their home 

games in the team’s local market. 

Moreover, most individual teams 

distribute the majority of their televised 

games today through RSNs rather than 

over-the-air television stations. The 

NPRM accordingly sought comment on 

whether the sports blackout rules are 

still relevant for these other professional 

sports leagues. The NPRM also 

requested specific data on the extent to 

which games of other professional 

sports leagues, as well as other 

professional, collegiate, and high school 

sports events, are blacked out locally 

pursuant to the Commission’s sports 

blackout rules and the reasons for any 

such blackouts (i.e., whether they are 

blacked out due to failure to sell out or 

for some other reason). No commenter 

asserts, or provides supporting data 

showing, that sports events other than 

NFL games are blacked out locally today 

pursuant to the Commission’s sports 

blackout rules. In the absence of any 

such assertions or data, we conclude 

that the sports blackout rules are no 

longer relevant for sports other than 

professional football. Accordingly, we 

focus our analysis herein on whether 

the sports blackout rules are still needed 

to ensure the overall availability to 

television viewers of NFL games. 

ii. NFL Gate Receipts and Other 

Revenues 

14. The substantial shift in 

importance of gate receipts vis-a`-vis 

television and other revenues for NFL 

clubs over the past 40 years supports 

our conclusion that the sports blackout 

rules are no longer needed to meet their 

underlying policy objective of ensuring 

that sports programming is widely 

available to the viewing public. When 

the Commission adopted the cable 

sports blackout rule in 1975, it found 

that ‘‘gate receipts were the primary 

source of revenue for sports clubs.’’ The 

Commission acknowledged that ‘‘teams 

have a reasonable interest in protecting 

their home gate receipts from the 

potentially harmful financial effects of 

invading telecasts of their games from 

distant television stations’’ and found 

that ‘‘a local team’s need to protect its 

gate receipts might require that it 

prohibit the telecasting of its games on 

[distant] television stations which might 

be carried on local cable systems.’’ Gate 

receipts, however, are no longer the 

primary source of revenue for the NFL. 

According to the NFL, gate receipts 

account for approximately 25 percent of 

NFL team revenue today. Other 

estimates suggest that gate receipts 

account for closer to 20 percent of NFL 

revenue. In either event, gate receipts 

are now dwarfed by television revenues, 

which have grown exponentially over 

the past four decades. In 1975, annual 

television revenues for the NFL were 

estimated at $55 million (which in 

today’s dollars would be approximately 

$242 million). In 2011, the NFL entered 

into long-term contracts totaling an 

estimated $27.6 billion with CBS, Fox, 

and NBC to air NFL games from 2014 to 

2022. The NFL also has an eight-year, 

$15 billion deal with ESPN for the rights 

to Monday Night Football, which 

extends from 2014 to 2021. 

Additionally, the NFL’s four-year deal 

with DIRECTV for NFL Sunday Ticket, 

which runs through 2014, is reportedly 

worth an estimated $4.1 billion. Further, 

the NFL recently entered into a one-year 

contract with CBS to air eight Thursday 

Night Football games, which is 

estimated to be worth $275 million or 

$34.4 million per game. The NFL is 

expected to collect an estimated $6 

billion per year in total television 

revenues beginning in 2014. Other 

significant sources of revenue for the 

NFL include sponsorships, which 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 63551 

totaled an estimated $1.07 billion in 

2013, merchandising and licensing, 

which are estimated at around $1 billion 

per year, and in-stadium revenues such 

as concessions and parking. Total NFL 

revenues reportedly topped $10 billion 

for the first time during the 2013 season. 

The NFL is the most lucrative sports 

league in the world, with each of its 32 

teams worth on average $1.17 billion. 

15. We find that the replacement of 

television revenues for gate receipts as 

the main source of revenue for NFL 

clubs creates a powerful economic 

incentive for the industry to make 

games widely available to television 

viewers even in the absence of the 

blackout rules. This change in the NFL’s 

economic structure thus supports our 

conclusion that the sports blackout rules 

are no longer necessary to promote 

attendance at games in order to ensure 

that sports programming is widely 

available to television viewers. We are 

not persuaded by NAB’s argument that 

the Commission should not consider 

gate receipts or the economic condition 

of the sports leagues as part of our 

analysis of whether to eliminate the 

sports blackout rules. According to 

NAB, it is misguided to base possible 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

on changing economic conditions. 

Rather, it maintains that, if the NFL 

believes that it is economically desirable 

to maintain a policy of blackouts in 

local markets when games do not sell 

out, the Commission should not 

substitute its judgment for that of the 

NFL. However, as we stated in the 

NPRM, ‘‘[t]he objective of the sports 

blackout rules is not to ensure the 

profitability or financial viability of 

sports leagues, but rather to ensure that 

sports programming is widely available 

to television viewers. Thus, we are 

interested in gate receipts and other 

revenues only to the extent that such 

revenues are relevant to this objective.’’ 

We conclude that it is relevant to our 

analysis of the continued need for the 

sports blackout rules that television 

revenues have supplanted gate receipts 

as NFL clubs’ principal source of 

revenue and that total revenues for the 

NFL have skyrocketed since 1975. 

iii. Reduction in NFL Blackouts 

16. We also conclude that the 

substantial decline in the number of 

NFL games blacked out locally over the 

past 40 years supports a finding that the 

sports blackout rules are no longer 

needed to ensure that sports 

programming is widely available to 

television viewers. The record shows 

that the NFL’s rise in popularity since 

1975 has made it easier for teams to sell 

out games than it was at the time the 

sports blackout rules were first adopted. 

In 1975, the year the Commission 

adopted the cable sports blackout rule, 

59 percent of regular season NFL games 

were blacked out locally due to failure 

to sell out. As the NFL notes, ‘‘NFL 

football over the past few decades has 

become the most popular, most watched 

professional sport in America.’’ The 

Sports Economists explain that 

televising NFL games has substantially 

increased the fan base for professional 

football, which in turn has allowed 

teams to sell more tickets. Indeed, the 

immense popularity of NFL football has 

ensured that the vast majority of NFL 

teams sell out all of their games every 

season. Thus, the number of regular 

season NFL games blacked out has 

declined substantially since 1975. 

Between 1975 and 2013, the percentage 

of regular season NFL games blacked 

out dropped by more than 58 percent. 

During the 2013 NFL season, only two 

(0.78 percent) of 256 regular season NFL 

games were blacked out. Total 

attendance at NFL games in 1975 was 

approximately 10.2 million. In 2013, 

total NFL attendance rose for the third 

straight year to approximately 17.3 

million. In addition, blackouts of NFL 

games have been limited in recent years 

to a few markets. 

17. The NFL asserts that one reason 

for the ‘‘success’’ of its blackout policy 

is that ‘‘the League has adjusted its 

policy in recent years to give teams 

more flexibility as they seek to strike the 

right balance between promoting the instadium experience and engaging fans 

over television.’’ There is little 

evidence, however, that the NFL’s 

relaxation of its blackout policy in 2012 

has had a significant impact on the 

number of NFL games blacked out 

during the past two NFL seasons. 

Moreover, the NFL fails to explain why 

it believes that its relaxed policy favors 

retention of the sports blackout rules. 

Under the revised blackout policy, NFL 

teams have the option of deciding at the 

beginning of each season to reduce the 

percentage of tickets that must be sold 

at least 72 hours prior to the game in 

order to avoid a blackout to anywhere 

between 85 and 100 percent and 

adhering to that alternative blackout 

threshold throughout the season. Few 

NFL teams have taken advantage of this 

policy because, if the team’s ticket sales 

exceed the benchmark threshold set by 

the team at the beginning of the season, 

the team must share a higher percentage 

of the revenue from those ticket sales 

than usual with the visiting team. The 

total number of NFL games blacked out 

dropped by only one game between 

2011 and 2012, the first year the revised 

blackout policy was in effect. One of the 

teams that elected to lower its 

benchmark threshold to 85 percent, the 

Tampa Bay Buccaneers, actually saw an 

increase in the number of games blacked 

out from 2011 to 2012; the team took 

other measures in 2013 to avoid 

blackouts altogether. In contrast, three 

teams that experienced blackouts in 

both 2011 and 2012—the Cincinnati 

Bengals, Buffalo Bills, and San Diego 

Chargers—all reduced their number of 

blackouts in 2013, despite electing not 

to lower their benchmark thresholds. 

Thus, we do not believe that the NFL’s 

recent relaxation of its blackout policy 

favors retention of the Commission’s 

sports blackout rules. 

18. We further note that individual 

NFL clubs have used a variety of other 

measures in recent years to avoid 

blackouts, which suggest that they value 

television revenues more than selling 

out stadiums. Such measures have 

included removing seats or covering 

seats with tarps to reduce stadium 

capacity; reducing ticket prices; and 

buying tickets themselves at a 

discounted price. In addition, local 

television network affiliates that would 

otherwise be airing these games and 

other local businesses that would 

benefit from the games being televised 

have purchased outstanding tickets to 

help avert blackouts. The fact that many 

NFL clubs, as well as local network 

affiliates and other local businesses, 

choose to take such measures to avoid 

blackouts, even when it entails an 

economic cost, reflects the industry 

trend toward maximizing television 

revenues above other considerations, 

including selling out stadiums. 

19. We conclude that the substantial 

decrease in the number of NFL games 

blacked out locally since 1975 

demonstrates that the sports blackout 

rules are no longer necessary to ensure 

the wide availability of sports telecasts 

to the general public and thus weighs in 

favor of eliminating the sports blackout 

rules. At the time that the sports 

blackout rules were first adopted, nearly 

60 percent of NFL games were blacked 

out locally due to failure to sell out. 

Since that time, the popularity of NFL 

football has soared, making it far easier 

for most teams to sell out all of their 

games and making blackouts of NFL 

games increasingly rare. Additionally, 

the measures taken by NFL teams in 

recent years to prevent blackouts 

indicate that these teams are more 

concerned with television revenues than 

with selling out every seat in the 

stadium. NAB argues that the fact that 

the 2013 NFL season featured the fewest 

local blackouts since the league’s 

inception ‘‘demonstrates that the 


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existing blackout policies . . . are 

working well and should not be upset.’’ 

We find this argument unpersuasive. 

NAB offers no support for its suggestion 

that the 2013 season featured the fewest 

local blackouts as a result of the NFL’s 

blackout policies, much less the 

Commission’s rules. Moreover, even the 

NFL acknowledges that there are a 

number of factors apart from its 

blackout policies—such as stadium 

capacity, weather, and team 

performance—that determine whether a 

team sells out a particular home game. 

Thus, we cannot conclude that the very 

low number of blackouts during the 

2013 season is attributable to the NFL’s 

blackout policies or that it establishes 

that the sports blackout rules should be 

retained. Rather, if anything, the very 

low number of blackouts in 2013 seems 

to suggest that stadium revenues that 

once were preserved by blackouts are 

less significant than the television 

revenues the NFL enjoys by preventing 

blackouts. 

iv. Impact of Blackouts on NFL 

Attendance and Gate Receipts 

20. As reviewed above, the 

Commission adopted the sports 

blackout rules to promote the 

availability of sports programming to 

television viewers, not to boost sports 

leagues’ financial bottom line. 

Nevertheless, based on the record before 

us, we conclude that the loss to 

consumers of their ability to view an 

NFL game that has been blacked out 

locally exceeds any gains in gate 

receipts and other in-stadium revenues 

that may accrue to the NFL as a result 

of blacking out the game. In the NPRM, 

we sought comment on the conclusion 

of the Sports Economists that, based on 

their review of several econometric 

studies of attendance at NFL games as 

well as other team sports in the U.S. and 

Europe, there is no evidence that local 

blackouts of NFL games significantly 

affect either ticket sales or no-shows at 

those games. The NFL disputes this 

conclusion, arguing that recent 

empirical research demonstrates that the 

sports blackout rules play a vital role in 

ensuring that professional sports games 

reach near-capacity attendance and that 

blackouts are associated with ‘‘a 

statistically significant increase in 

attendance and decrease in ‘no-shows.’ ’’ 

Specifically, the NFL’s economist 

expert, Dr. Singer, asserts that a 2000 

study by Putsis and Sen demonstrates 

that the NFL’s blackout policy has a 

positive effect on attendance at NFL 

games. The Putsis and Sen study 

examined the impact of blackouts on 

attendance at NFL games using data on 

economic, demographic, team, and 

game specific variables for the eight 

NFL teams that experienced blackouts 

of at least one home game during the 

1996–1997 NFL season. The study 

found that, for these eight teams, 

blackouts were associated with an 

average maximum increase in overall 

tickets sold per game of 11,310, an 

average maximum decrease in no-shows 

per game of 4,959, and an average 

maximum per game increase in 

revenues of $414,336 per team. 

21. We acknowledge that the Putsis 

and Sen study indicates that blackouts 

have a positive impact on gate receipts 

and other in-stadium revenues. As the 

Sports Economists observe, however, 

Dr. Singer focuses only on the statistical 

significance of this study and fails to 

consider its economic significance. In 

this regard, Putsis and Sen also find 

that, when viewed in the broader 

context of the societal and economic 

loss due to the game not being broadcast 

in the local area, the gain to the NFL in 

on-site stadium revenue due to a 

blackout (e.g., through additional ticket 

and concession sales) is small in 

comparison to the loss to consumers of 

their ability to view NFL games that 

have been blacked out locally. 

Specifically, Putsis and Sen state that 

‘‘even if one estimates the maximum 

potential impact on NFL game day 

revenue—the welfare loss resulting from 

the blackouts likely exceeds the loss in 

NFL revenue. Thus, the imposition of a 

blackout creates a market failure. . . .’’ 

In other words, as the Sports 

Economists put it, the added money 

spent by the few fans ‘‘driven’’ to the 

stadium by a blackout is a gain to the 

NFL but is not economically significant 

when compared to the loss of viewer 

value. The Sports Economists therefore 

conclude that this study does not 

provide evidence of an economically 

significant relationship between 

attendance and blackouts. We agree. 

Particularly when considered in relation 

to the NFL’s $6 billion annual television 

revenues, we cannot conclude based on 

this study that blackouts have an 

economically significant impact on 

attendance at NFL games or gate 

receipts from those games. Additionally, 

we cannot conclude based on this study 

that the positive impact of the sports 

blackout rule on gate receipts and 

attendance exceeds the loss of television 

revenues or the societal loss to 

consumers of their ability to view 

locally blacked out NFL games. In any 

event, the goal of the sports blackout 

rules is not to protect the profitability of 

sports leagues but rather to ensure that 

sports programming is widely available 

to television viewers. 

v. Migration of NFL Games to Pay TV 

22. We conclude that elimination of 

the sports blackout rules is unlikely to 

reduce the availability of NFL games to 

free, over-the-air television viewers by 

leading the NFL to migrate its games to 

pay TV. As noted above, the NFL’s 

existing contracts with the broadcast 

networks extend through 2022 so 

migration of NFL games will not even be 

an issue until 2023. Dr. Singer asserts 

that, by spurring attendance at games, 

the sports blackout rules facilitate the 

NFL’s ‘‘free TV’’ model. In the absence 

of the sports blackout rules, he 

continues, the NFL would likely be 

forced to migrate to a ‘‘pay TV’’ model 

in order to preserve its private blackout 

policy (and thus its ability to control the 

distribution of its programming). Dr. 

Singer states that the NFL would seek to 

preserve its private blackout policy 

because this policy is profitmaximizing. Migration of NFL games to 

pay TV, he maintains, would leave 

consumers who rely solely on over-theair television unable to view NFL games 

(i.e., it would reduce the overall 

availability of sports telecasts to the 

public). 

23. To support his assertions, Dr. 

Singer states that the NFL’s calculus for 

switching from its ‘‘free TV’’ model to 

pay TV in the absence of the sports 

blackout rules is as follows: the NFL 

would switch to pay TV if the value to 

the NFL of distributing its games via pay 

TV (i.e., the revenues that the NFL 

would earn from distributing its games 

via pay TV) plus the increase in gate 

revenue from its blackout policy 

exceeds the value to the NFL of 

distributing its games via over-the-air 

television in the absence of the sports 

blackout rules (i.e., the revenues that the 

NFL would earn from distributing its 

games via over-the-air television in the 

absence of the sports blackout rules). 

According to Dr. Singer, the value to the 

NFL of distributing its games via overthe-air television would decrease in the 

absence of the sports blackout rules 

because the lack of exclusivity for local 

broadcasters that would result from 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

would reduce the value of the NFL 

telecasts to advertisers, which in turn 

would reduce the value that the 

networks would pay for rights to NFL 

games. Dr. Singer also indicates that the 

NFL’s calculus ‘‘assume[s] that no 

amount of contracting . . . can restore 

the full value of exclusivity.’’ 

24. Even if we were to assume that 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

will result in the reduction in exclusive 

distribution rights for some local 

broadcasters and that no amount of 


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contracting could restore the full value 

of exclusivity, it does not follow that it 

would be more profitable for the NFL to 

migrate its games to pay TV. It is 

necessary to consider the magnitude of 

the reduction in exclusivity and the 

impact of that reduction on the rights 

payment that the NFL would receive 

from broadcasters in the absence of the 

sports blackout rules. We believe that, if 

there were any reduction, the magnitude 

would be small because only a small 

number of games are blacked out locally 

today due to failure to sell out. 

Moreover, both Putsis and Sen and the 

Sports Economists agree that the 

increase in gate revenue to the NFL from 

its blackout policy is small. Under the 

NFL’s calculus, the NFL would not be 

expected to migrate its games to pay TV 

unless the NFL could earn almost as 

much from distributing its games via 

pay TV as it could from distributing its 

games via over-the-air television in the 

absence of the sports blackout rules. 

Because the record does not show that 

eliminating the sports blackout rules 

would have a significant impact on the 

NFL’s over-the-air revenues, and for the 

reasons provided below, we think that 

this is highly unlikely. 

25. While the NFL currently 

distributes a limited number of games 

via pay TV, the fact that it distributes 

the majority of its games via broadcast 

television stations (which may be 

viewed by consumers on free, over-theair television or on basic MVPD service) 

indicates that it is more profitable for it 

to do so. Indeed, we note that NFL 

games are consistently the highest rated 

programs on broadcast television. 

According to a recent NFL press release, 

average viewership of NFL games on 

broadcast television has increased 31 

percent from 15.5 million in 2003 to 

20.3 million in 2013. NFL games 

accounted for 34 of the 35 most-watched 

television shows among all 

programming during the 2013 NFL 

regular season and 22 of these games 

were watched by at least 25 million 

viewers. In addition, NFL games attract 

the young male demographic highly 

coveted by advertisers, and most 

consumers watch NFL games live, 

which is important to advertisers at a 

time when many viewers record 

programs and then skip the commercials 

when they watch them. The high 

viewership of NFL games on broadcast 

television stations (whether viewed by 

consumers over-the-air or via MVPD 

service) enables television networks and 

their local affiliates to command the 

highest possible advertising rates for 

spots during NFL games. In contrast, 

ESPN and NFL Network, the two pay 

TV networks that currently hold rights 

to distribute some NFL games, do not 

attract nearly the same level of 

viewership as the television networks. 

In 2013, ESPN’s Monday Night Football 

averaged 13.7 million viewers and NFL 

Network’s Thursday Night Football 

averaged 8.1 million viewers. ESPN and 

NFL Network therefore are unable to 

charge as much as broadcast networks 

for advertising spots aired during NFL 

games. Specifically, estimates for a 30- 

second spot aired during an NFL game 

on ESPN in 2013 range from $325,000 

to $410,000, while estimates for a 30- 

second spot aired during an NFL game 

on broadcast television in 2013 range 

from $593,000 to $628,000. The 

substantial difference in viewership of 

NFL games on broadcast television 

stations and pay TV networks—and the 

corresponding difference in the 

advertising rates that broadcast 

television and pay TV networks charge 

for spots during NFL games—reflects, 

among other things, the fact that a 

significant number of consumers rely 

exclusively on broadcast television 

received over the air or subscribe only 

to basic MVPD service. According to the 

NFL, approximately 22.4 million 

households (almost 20 percent of all 

U.S. households with a television) 

relied solely on over-the-air 

broadcasting in 2013. The Commission 

recently found that, as of July 2012, 

approximately 11.1 million U.S. 

households with a television, which 

represented 9.7 percent of all television 

households at that time, relied 

exclusively on over-the-air television. In 

addition, a recent Media Bureau survey 

indicates that, as of January 1, 2013, 14 

percent of cable subscribers took basic 

service only. Thus, in order for the NFL 

to earn almost as much from 

distributing its games via pay TV as it 

could from distributing its games via 

broadcast television stations, a 

significant percentage of the over-the-air 

television households would have to 

switch to pay TV and the households 

that subscribe only to basic cable service 

would have to upgrade to a higher tier 

of pay TV. While Dr. Singer suggests 

that if the NFL migrated all of its games 

to pay TV, some over-the-air television 

households would subscribe to pay TV 

in order to receive the games, he does 

not provide any estimate or evidence of 

the number of over-the-air television 

households that would switch to pay 

TV. There is also no evidence in the 

record as to the number of basic service 

tier only subscribers that could be 

expected to upgrade to a higher service 

tier if the NFL migrated its games to pay 

TV. Given the immense popularity of 

NFL football on broadcast television and 

the significant number of over-the-air 

television households and households 

that subscribe only to basic MVPD 

service, we think that it is highly 

unlikely that it would be more 

profitable for the NFL to distribute its 

games via pay TV than via broadcast 

television in the absence of the sports 

blackout rules. Furthermore, we note 

that the broadcast networks also value 

NFL programming highly because it 

provides them a platform to promote 

their prime-time lineups and boosts 

their ratings for prime-time and other 

network programming, which may 

allow broadcasters to demand higher 

retransmission consent fees from 

MVPDs. Thus, the broadcast networks 

will have a strong incentive to take 

measures to ensure that the NFL does 

not migrate its games to pay TV after 

their current contracts expire in 2022. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the NFL 

is unlikely to migrate a substantial 

number of its games to pay TV as a 

result of elimination of the sports 

blackout rules. Ultimately, we believe 

that the market, rather than the 

elimination of our sports blackout rules, 

will determine whether NFL football 

stays on broadcast television or moves 

to pay TV. 

vi. Erosion of Economic Basis for Sports 

Blackout Rules 

26. As previously discussed, the 

sports blackout rules were premised on 

the concern that the potential loss of 

gate receipts resulting from cable, OVS 

and satellite system importation of 

distant stations would lead the NFL and 

other sports leagues to refuse to sell 

their rights to sports events to distant 

stations, thereby substantially reducing 

the overall availability of sports 

programming to television viewers. We 

conclude that this concern is no longer 

valid in today’s marketplace. As 

discussed above, blackouts are no longer 

relevant for sports other than 

professional football. With respect to 

NFL football, television revenues have 

become the dominant share of NFL 

revenues with a corresponding decrease 

in gate receipts as a proportion of 

overall revenues. Moreover, the number 

of sell-outs and total attendance at NFL 

games has increased substantially since 

1975, reflecting an increase in the 

popularity of NFL games. These trends 

undermine the notion that the NFL 

would find it profitable to significantly 

restrict television broadcasts of its 

games to protect gate receipts and instadium revenues. Additionally, the 

record shows that the loss to consumers 

of their ability to view a game on local 

television when an NFL game is blacked 


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63554 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

out exceeds any gain to the NFL in gate 

receipts and other in-stadium revenue 

as a result of a blackout and that the 

NFL is unlikely to migrate its games to 

pay TV as a result of elimination of the 

sports blackout rules because it would 

not be profitable for it to do so. 

Accordingly, based on all of these 

factors, we conclude that the economic 

considerations underlying the sports 

blackout rules are no longer valid and, 

therefore, the sports blackout rules are 

no longer needed to ensure that NFL 

games are widely available to the 

viewing public. 

vii. Elimination of the Sports Blackout 

Rules 

27. As explained in detail above, the 

sports blackout rules are no longer 

necessary to ensure the overall 

availability of NFL games to television 

viewers. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the sports blackout rules are outdated 

and should be eliminated. We recognize 

that eliminating our sports blackout 

rules is unlikely to end all sports 

blackouts. The NFL has stated that it 

most likely will continue its underlying 

blackout policy. Thus, consumers may 

still be unable to view locally blacked 

out NFL games despite repeal of our 

rules. Nevertheless, we conclude that it 

will serve the public interest to 

eliminate regulations that are no longer 

needed to serve their original purpose of 

ensuring that sports telecasts are widely 

available to the viewing public. If 

regulations are no longer serving a 

public interest purpose, they should be 

eliminated. 

28. We also find that the public 

interest will be served by removing 

regulatory reinforcement of the NFL’s 

blackout policy. With annual revenues 

totaling around $10 billion, the NFL is 

the most lucrative sports league in the 

world. In addition, most NFL teams are 

heavily subsidized by consumers 

through publicly funded stadiums and 

other tax benefits. Yet consumers— 

including elderly and disabled sports 

fans who are physically unable to attend 

games in person and sports fans who 

cannot afford to attend games due to 

high ticket prices or the economy—are 

sometimes unable to watch their 

favorite teams on television simply 

because a game is not completely sold 

out. We acknowledge that repeal of our 

sports blackout rules may not provide 

an immediate, direct benefit to these 

consumers. We find, however, that 

rather than fulfilling their intended goal 

of ensuring the widespread availability 

of sports programming to the viewing 

public, our sports blackout rules may be 

having the opposite effect by reinforcing 

and implicitly endorsing a private 

policy that deprives many consumers of 

the ability to watch on television the 

teams that they have subsidized through 

their tax dollars. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the public interest will be 

served by eliminating regulatory 

reinforcement and endorsement of the 

NFL’s blackout policy. 

C. Impact of Eliminating Sports 

Blackout Rules on NFL’s Ability To 

Control Distribution of Its Games 

29. The NFL claims that the sports 

blackout rules provide protections that 

cannot be achieved through other 

regulatory means or by private contract 

and thus without the rules, there would 

likely be a decrease in the amount of 

professional sports on broadcast 

television, thereby decreasing the 

availability of sports programming to 

the public. Specifically, the NFL and 

NAB raise a number of arguments as to 

why, as a result of the compulsory 

copyright licenses and contractual 

limitations, the NFL will be unable to 

control the distribution of its games or 

obtain blackout protection in the private 

marketplace—measures they claim are 

necessary to ‘‘[help] keep sports 

programming on free, over-the-air 

broadcast television, available to all 

viewers.’’ Below, we address these 

arguments and explain that the 

protections that will remain available to 

the NFL after repeal of the sports 

blackout rules will be adequate to 

ensure that broadcast television remains 

an attractive medium for distributing 

sports content. Accordingly, if the NFL 

(or any other sports league) chooses to 

continue its blackout policy, it must do 

so by relying on the same processes 

available to any other entity that wishes 

to protect its distribution rights in the 

marketplace. 

i. NFL’s Blackout Policy 

30. Elimination of the sports blackout 

rules will not, by itself, preclude 

blackouts of future NFL games because 

the NFL’s blackout policy, rather than 

the Commission’s rules, determines 

whether games are blacked out on local 

television stations. The NFL’s blackout 

policy is given effect through 

contractual arrangements between the 

NFL and the entities to which it grants 

distribution rights, including television 

networks and their affiliates, national 

sports networks such as ESPN and the 

NFL Network, and MVPDs. The 

Commission’s sports blackout rules 

have merely reinforced these 

contractual arrangements by barring 

MVPDs from retransmitting, within the 

specified local blackout zone, games 

that the NFL has required local 

television stations to black out. Thus, 

repeal of the sports blackout rules will 

not remove the NFL’s private blackout 

policy or likely end blackouts on local 

television stations. The NFL indicates 

that it likely will continue to enforce its 

blackout policy in the absence of the 

sports blackout rules. As we explain 

below, to the extent that the NFL 

chooses to continue its blackout policy, 

we find it to be in the public interest to 

require it to rely on the same avenues 

available to other market participants in 

order to protect its distribution rights 

rather than provide additional 

protections under sports blackout rules 

which no longer serve their original 

purpose of ensuring that sports telecasts 

are widely available to the viewing 

public. 

ii. Compulsory Copyright Licenses 

31. The compulsory copyright 

licenses granted under the Copyright 

Act permit cable systems and, to a more 

limited extent, satellite carriers to 

retransmit the signals of distant 

broadcast stations without obtaining the 

consent of owners of content carried on 

the stations, including the sports 

leagues whose games are carried on 

those stations, when the carriage of such 

stations is permitted under FCC rules. 

The NFL and NAB argue that, in the 

absence of the sports blackout rules, the 

compulsory copyright licenses will 

enable MVPDs to circumvent the private 

contractual agreements between the 

NFL and broadcasters and retransmit 

distant stations carrying locally blacked 

out games. This ‘‘loss of control’’ over 

program distribution, according to 

commenters, ‘‘would threaten the 

continued distribution of major sporting 

events on free, over-the-air television’’ 

thereby leading sports leagues to move 

the programming to ‘‘pay platforms 

where the compulsory license would 

not undermine their ability to control 

distribution.’’ We do not agree with the 

NFL and NAB that the Copyright Act, 

left unchecked by sports blackout rules, 

will make broadcast television less 

competitive in obtaining rights to 

popular sports programming and 

accelerate its migration to pay TV. With 

respect to satellite carriers, we expect 

that the limited nature of the 

compulsory license granted to satellite 

carriers by the Copyright Act may 

largely preclude them from 

retransmitting the signals of distant 

network stations carrying locally 

blacked out NFL games. Satellite 

carriers may retransmit the signals of 

distant network stations to subscribers 

only if local network stations are 

unavailable to the subscribers as part of 

a local-into-local satellite package and 

the subscribers are ‘‘unserved’’ by the 


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local network stations over the air. 

Satellite carriers currently offer localinto-local service to more than 99 

percent of U.S. television households, 

including all markets that are home to 

NFL teams. Thus, with certain 

exceptions, it appears that satellite 

carriers may be precluded by statute 

from retransmitting distant network 

stations carrying locally blacked out 

NFL games. And although cable 

operators may in certain circumstances 

use the compulsory copyright license to 

retransmit the signals of distant 

broadcast stations without obtaining the 

consent of the content owners, 

including the sports leagues whose 

games are carried on those stations, we 

believe, as explained below, that the 

NFL can adequately protect its 

distribution rights through private 

contractual arrangements with broadcast 

networks and MVPDs. 

iii. Retransmission Consent and 

Contractual Arrangements With 

Broadcasters 

32. The NFL asserts that private 

contractual arrangements with broadcast 

networks will not adequately protect its 

program distribution rights and, 

therefore, eliminating the sports 

blackout rules will result in the 

migration of sports programming from 

broadcast television to pay TV, thereby 

decreasing public access to games. We 

disagree. As explained above, we 

believe that it would not be in the NFL’s 

economic interest to remove their games 

from broadcast television. And in any 

event, as explained below, the 

retransmission consent requirement and 

its contractual arrangements with 

broadcasters will provide the NFL with 

adequate protection to control the 

distribution of its programming 

following elimination of the sports 

blackout rules. When the cable sports 

blackout rule was first adopted nearly 

40 years ago, the Communications Act 

prohibited a broadcast station from 

rebroadcasting another station’s signal 

without the latter’s permission, but did 

not prohibit cable retransmission of 

broadcast stations without permission. 

In the 1992 Cable Act, however, 

Congress extended this restriction on 

unauthorized retransmission of 

broadcast stations to cable operators. 

The restriction on unauthorized 

retransmission of broadcast stations was 

later extended to all MVPDs. Thus, with 

limited exceptions, MVPDs today may 

not carry a broadcaster’s signal without 

the permission of the broadcaster. 

Accordingly, the retransmission consent 

requirement helps to ensure that 

broadcast television remains an 

attractive medium for distributing sports 

content. 

33. The NFL argues that without 

sports blackout rules, private contracts 

with broadcasters will not adequately 

protect its distribution rights. According 

to the NFL, it is unable to prevent 

contractually network affiliates from 

allowing their signals to be imported 

into a market where an NFL game has 

been blacked out because it lacks direct 

privity of contract with the affiliates; its 

contracts with the broadcast networks 

do not contain provisions requiring the 

networks to ensure that their affiliates 

prohibit MVPDs from retransmitting 

blacked out NFL games into a local 

market; and the networks have no 

incentive to reopen these contracts to 

add such a provision. A review of 

network affiliation agreements on file 

with the Commission, however, 

indicates that many existing network 

affiliation agreements already include 

provisions prohibiting the affiliate from 

allowing its signal to be retransmitted 

by an MVPD in a distant market. It 

appears, therefore, that such provisions 

are likely standard clauses routinely 

included in network affiliation 

agreements. Given that many, if not all, 

existing network affiliation agreements 

effectively provide the NFL with 

blackout protection, we find that the 

NFL’s assertion that the networks would 

be required to amend their affiliation 

agreements with each of their nearly 200 

local network affiliates to adequately 

protect its distribution rights (e.g., 

include blackout protection) is at least 

greatly overstated. 

34. To the extent that any existing 

network affiliation agreements do not 

already include such provisions, the 

record suggests that the NFL has the 

ability to adequately protect its rights 

(e.g., obtain blackout protection) 

through negotiations with broadcast 

networks in the private marketplace. 

Contrary to the NFL’s assertion, the 

record shows that the networks would 

have a very strong incentive to reopen 

their contracts with the NFL and 

affiliates to include blackout protection 

for the NFL—namely, to increase the 

chances that each network will be able 

to continue airing NFL games after 2022, 

when their existing contracts with the 

NFL expire. For example, were CBS to 

reopen its contracts but NBC fail to take 

this step, presumably CBS would enjoy 

an advantage over NBC in the next 

competition for NFL television rights. 

As discussed above, NFL games are 

consistently the most highly-rated 

programs on broadcast television, which 

translates into the highest possible 

advertising revenues for the networks. 

The popularity of the NFL games and 

the steep ad rates that these games 

command appear to provide the 

networks ample motivation to reopen 

their contracts with the NFL to include 

blackout protection, where such 

protection is needed. In addition, NFL 

programming is highly valuable to the 

broadcast networks because it provides 

them a platform to promote their primetime lineups and boosts their ratings for 

prime-time and other network 

programming. Further, while the NFL 

contends that an affiliate would have no 

incentive to open its existing affiliation 

agreement for early renegotiation to 

accept such a provision, the record 

shows that the affiliates will likewise be 

highly motivated to keep the NFL games 

on their network. In any event, 

regardless of the NFL’s ability to obtain 

blackout protection without the rules, 

we conclude that there is no public 

interest justification for retaining the 

rules because we find that there is little 

risk that sports telecasts on broadcast 

television will be significantly curtailed 

without them. 

iv. Contractual Arrangements With 

MVPDs 

35. The NFL similarly asserts that it 

cannot adequately protect its program 

distribution rights through its private 

contractual agreements with MVPDs 

and, therefore, repeal of the sports 

blackout rules may force it to move its 

games from broadcast television to pay 

TV, resulting in reduced public access 

to NFL games. But so long as the NFL 

is able to protect its program 

distribution rights through agreements 

with broadcasters, it need not do so 

through agreements with MVPDs. In any 

event, contrary to the NFL’s arguments, 

we observe that the NFL also has the 

ability to obtain blackout protection 

through private contractual 

arrangements with MVPDs. The NFL 

indicates that it has contracts with nine 

major operators of cable, satellite, and 

telecommunications services and a 

national cooperative that represents 

many smaller MVPDs that distribute the 

NFL Network and NFL RedZone, but 

asserts that these contracts contain no 

provisions that prohibit the MVPDs 

from importing a distant signal of a nonNFL Network game into a market where 

that game has been blacked out on the 

local broadcast station. The NFL claims 

that without such protection, it cannot 

accomplish the goals of the sports 

blackout rules through these contracts. 

The NFL argues that it took many years 

of difficult negotiations with the MVPDs 

to achieve widespread carriage of the 

NFL Network and NFL RedZone and 

that it sees no incentives for the MVPDs 

to reopen these contracts—which 


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typically run for seven to nine years— 

and accept an unrelated, collateral 

provision that limits their ability to 

import a distant signal of a local nonNFL Network game that has been 

blacked out. Based on the record 

gathered in this proceeding, we believe 

the NFL’s claimed difficulty is 

overstated. We recognize that contract 

negotiations can be difficult. 

Nevertheless, the record shows that the 

NFL is sufficiently positioned to 

incentivize the MVPDs to reopen their 

contracts and include blackout 

provisions to protect the NFL’s 

distribution rights of its games shown 

on broadcast television if necessary. The 

NFL Network is one of the fastest 

growing cable networks, and is highly 

valued by MVPDs. Accordingly, we 

expect that MVPDs will be motivated to 

reopen their contracts and discuss 

inclusion of a blackout provision, if the 

NFL offers adequate incentives. Even if 

the MVPDs are unwilling to do so, 

however, as discussed above, we find 

that there is little risk that the NFL will 

move its games from broadcast 

television to pay TV. 

36. We note, moreover, that the NFL 

offers no explanation as to why MVPDs 

currently comply with the NFL’s policy 

of blacking out games that are not sold 

out throughout the NFL clubs’ home 

territories, which generally extend well 

beyond the 35-mile zone of protection 

afforded by the Commission’s sports 

blackout rules. The NFL has more 

broadly defined a club’s ‘‘home 

territory’’ to include the surrounding 

territory 75 miles in every direction 

from the exterior corporate limits of the 

city in which the club is located. In 

addition, the NFL has defined one or 

more ‘‘secondary markets’’ for most 

teams, which include any network 

affiliate station(s) whose signal can be 

seen within 75 miles of the game site. 

Under the NFL’s blackout policy, if a 

game is not sold out within 72 hours 

prior to kickoff, the game is blacked out 

on network affiliates in both the team’s 

home market and any secondary 

markets. And notwithstanding the fact 

that the Commission’s sports blackout 

rules only provide a 35-mile zone of 

protection, MVPDs apparently comply 

with the NFL’s policy of blacking out 

games in both the home and secondary 

markets. Such blackouts clearly go well 

beyond the scope of what is required 

under the Commission’s sports blackout 

rules and indicate that the NFL has the 

ability to obtain even greater blackout 

protection from MVPDs in the private 

marketplace than that afforded under 

the Commission’s sports blackout rules. 

In any event, regardless of the NFL’s 

ability to obtain blackout protection 

without the rules, we conclude that 

there is no public interest justification 

for retaining the rules because we find 

that there is little risk that sports 

telecasts will not be widely available on 

television without them. 

v. Compulsory License and 

Retransmission Consent Fees 

37. The NFL and NAB argue that the 

current copyright royalty system would 

not discourage all cable systems from 

retransmitting distant signals of locally 

blacked out games. We expect, however, 

that even if cable operators are able to 

obtain consent to retransmit a distant 

signal of a locally blacked out game, 

compulsory license fees, along with 

retransmission consent fees, may make 

it unprofitable for them to do so in 

many cases. The copyright royalty 

system is highly complex and the cost 

of importing distant signals varies 

widely by cable system, depending on 

the size of the cable system and the 

number of distant signals carried. As 

NCTA and SFC point out, cable systems 

that retransmit a distant signal for a 

single day, or even a single sports event, 

must pay royalties for the signal as if it 

had been carried for the entire sixmonth compulsory license accounting 

period. Thus, in some cases, 

compulsory license fees alone may 

make it prohibitively expensive for 

cable systems to retransmit a distant 

signal carrying a locally blacked out 

sports event. 

38. Additionally, we note that 

retransmission consent fees have risen 

sharply in recent years, and the trend is 

expected to continue. The rising costs 

for sports rights have been a significant 

factor in broadcasters’ demands for 

larger retransmission consent fees. NFL 

games are among the most popular and 

costly programming on television. 

Moreover, unlike a situation where a 

station cannot reach an agreement on 

retransmission consent with a cable 

system for in-market carriage—resulting 

in a loss of the station’s local audience 

and a corresponding loss in local 

advertising revenues—a distant station 

does not risk losing any local 

advertising revenues if it cannot reach 

an agreement with a cable system for 

out-of-market carriage; thus, a distant 

station would be in a very good 

bargaining position vis-a`-vis the cable 

system to demand high retransmission 

consent fees. Accordingly, we expect 

that retransmission consent fees charged 

by distant stations for retransmission of 

locally blacked out NFL games would be 

substantial and, along with the 

compulsory license fees, may make it 

cost prohibitive for cable systems to 

carry such distant stations in at least 

many situations. In any event, 

regardless of the NFL’s ability to obtain 

blackout protection without the rules, 

we conclude that there is no public 

interest justification for retaining the 

rules because we find that there is little 

risk that sports telecasts will not be 

widely available on television without 

them. 

D. Local Impact of Eliminating Sports 

Blackout Rules 

39. We now examine the impact of 

eliminating the sports blackout rules on 

other interested parties. We conclude 

that eliminating the sports blackout 

rules will not adversely impact 

broadcasters, consumers, or local 

businesses. 

i. Impact on Localism 

40. We conclude that the elimination 

of the sports blackout rules is unlikely 

to adversely impact localism in 

broadcasting. NAB asserts that 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

will result in decreased advertising 

revenues for local stations in markets 

prone to NFL blackouts, such as San 

Diego, Jacksonville, Buffalo, and 

Cincinnati, which in turn will diminish 

those stations’ ability to provide quality 

programming, including sports 

programming. As explained in detail 

above, however, the record 

demonstrates that the sports blackout 

rules are no longer needed to ensure 

that sports programming is widely 

available to the viewing public. In 

addition, elimination of the sports 

blackout rules is unlikely to accelerate 

the migration of NFL games from overthe-air to pay TV in the near future or 

in the longer term. We also note that the 

record demonstrates that the NFL will 

be able to achieve exclusivity following 

the repeal of the sports blackout rules, 

if it chooses to do so, thus maintaining 

the attractiveness of NFL games to 

advertisers. Further, we note that it may 

benefit localism if the NFL ended its 

blackout policy because local stations in 

markets prone to blackouts may carry 

more games and earn more advertising 

revenues. Therefore, we conclude that 

retention of the sports blackout rules is 

not necessary to preserve or promote 

localism. 

ii. Impact on Consumers 

41. We acknowledge that repeal of the 

sports blackout rules may not provide 

consumers relief from local blackouts of 

NFL games because the NFL may choose 

to continue its private blackout policy. 

The NFL has indicated that it will likely 

still require non-sold-out games to be 

blacked out locally, and consumers will 


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be unable to watch those games on 

either broadcast television or pay TV. 

We also conclude, however, that 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

is unlikely to harm consumers. As we 

discuss at length above, the record 

indicates that elimination of the sports 

blackout rules is unlikely to accelerate 

the migration of NFL games from free, 

over-the-air television to pay TV. Since 

the NFL is in the first year of nine-year 

contracts with the CBS, Fox, and NBC 

television networks to air NFL games on 

broadcast television, there will be no 

additional migration of NFL games to 

pay TV through at least 2022. 

42. Additionally, we find 

unconvincing the arguments that 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

will harm consumers by causing NFL 

teams to raise ticket prices. The NFL’s 

economist expert, Dr. Singer, asserts 

that the sports blackout rules provide its 

teams with an economic incentive to 

price tickets below the levels that would 

exist if teams were maximizing gate 

receipts only. Dr. Singer states that even 

if a team could increase its total gate 

receipts by raising ticket prices, the 

team likely would keep prices low in an 

effort to fill seats and avoid a blackout 

because blackouts result in loss of 

advertising revenues. Thus, he avers 

that elimination of the sports blackout 

rules likely would lead to higher ticket 

prices because sports teams would no 

longer have an incentive to keep 

attendance above a certain level; 

instead, their ticket pricing strategy 

would focus on maximizing gate receipt 

revenue. As the Sports Economists 

observe, however, there is no empirical 

support for this argument and ‘‘there is 

no logical connection between the 

[NFL’s blackout] policy and pricing.’’ In 

addition, Dr. Singer concedes that 

‘‘[e]conomists have offered additional 

hypotheses to explain why NFL teams 

refrain from raising ticket prices, 

including public pressure, the need to 

establish long-term relationships with 

fans, and the desire to maximize instadium revenues, such as concessions 

and parking. . . . It is plausible that 

some or all of these considerations also 

play a role in tempering ticket 

prices. . . .’’ Dr. Singer makes no 

attempt to quantify the marginal impact 

of the sports blackout rules on ticket 

prices given these other factors. 

Moreover, as the Sports Economists 

point out, an NFL team can take other 

measures to avoid blackouts, such as 

reducing the prices of unsold seats and 

removing seats or covering them with 

tarps to reduce a stadium’s seating 

capacity. Furthermore, to the extent the 

NFL chooses to continue its blackout 

policy through other existing 

regulations and through private 

contractual agreements, teams will 

retain their incentive to limit increases 

in ticket prices. 

43. Dr. Singer also asserts that the 

sports blackout rules benefit national 

television viewers because ‘‘[s]old-out 

stadiums populated by boisterous, 

visible fans make telecasts of NFL games 

more appealing to the marginal, national 

fan, thereby improving fans’ viewing 

experiences, and increasing the value of 

NFL programming’’ to national 

audiences and therefore to advertisers. 

As the Sports Economists observe, 

however, the difference between a fully 

sold-out stadium and a nearly full 

stadium subject to a local blackout due 

to failure to sell out is likely not very 

significant in terms of appeal to national 

audiences and advertisers, and it is not 

technologically difficult for broadcasters 

to avoid showing empty portions of 

non-sold-out stadiums. Further, we note 

that the NFL’s blackout policy allows 

teams to cover seats with tarps in order 

to reduce stadium capacity and thereby 

avoid blackouts, and to reduce the 

percentage of tickets that must be sold 

in order to avoid a blackout to as low 

as 85 percent (thereby leaving up to 15 

percent of non-premium seats empty). 

In addition, the NFL does not count 

non-sold-out premium seats for 

purposes of its blackout policy. We find 

it difficult to reconcile these features of 

the NFL’s blackout policy—which allow 

teams to leave significant numbers of 

seats empty without facing a blackout— 

with its argument that the sports 

blackout rules are needed to make 

telecasts of NFL games more appealing 

to audiences and advertisers. 

iii. Impact on Local Businesses and 

Economies 

44. Several commenters express 

concern that elimination of the sports 

blackout rules will adversely impact 

local businesses and economic activity 

in and surrounding NFL stadiums by 

removing incentives to fill the stadiums. 

These commenters assert that NFL 

stadiums and related infrastructure 

investment have helped to create jobs, 

support businesses, and generate tax 

revenue and are important sources of 

employment, growth, and development 

for local communities. We disagree that 

eliminating the sports blackout rules 

will remove incentives for NFL clubs to 

sell out stadiums. In-stadium revenues 

(e.g., concessions, parking) are a 

significant source of revenue for NFL 

clubs and will provide them an 

economic incentive to fill their 

stadiums. Additionally, if the NFL 

chooses to continue its blackout policy, 

it will be able to control the distribution 

of its games through other existing 

regulations or through contractual 

arrangements in the private 

marketplace. Accordingly, repeal of the 

sports blackout rules will not create a 

disincentive for NFL teams to fill their 

stadiums or have a negative impact on 

local economies. 

Other Issues 

45. We reject the Baseball 

Commissioner’s assertion that the sports 

blackout rules remain necessary to 

protect the ability of MLB clubs to 

license to RSNs the exclusive right to 

televise home games. The Baseball 

Commissioner states that the sports 

blackout rules prevent MVPDs from 

exploiting the compulsory copyright 

license by importing distant broadcasts 

of games that MLB clubs have licensed 

to RSNs such as MASN and YES 

Network to televise on an exclusive 

basis. According to the Baseball 

Commissioner, the ability to protect 

these exclusive rights under the sports 

blackout rules incentivizes RSNs, as 

exclusive licensees, to televise the 

games in their local markets and 

incentivizes MLB clubs to license the 

distribution of games on distant 

broadcast stations (i.e., in the away 

team’s local market), thereby 

maintaining the overall availability of 

sports programming to television 

viewers. We note, however, that the 

sports blackout rules were not intended 

to protect the exclusive distribution 

rights granted by individual sports 

teams to RSNs, nor were they intended 

to prevent dual telecasts of the same 

game in the same local market. Rather, 

they were intended to promote the wide 

availability of sports events on 

television, and the Baseball 

Commissioner did not submit into the 

record any economic evidence or 

analysis that it would be profitable for 

baseball teams to curtail the availability 

of games on television if the blackout 

rules are repealed. Accordingly, we see 

no need to retain the sports blackout 

rules to protect RSN exclusivity. 

Additionally, the Baseball 

Commissioner’s proposal that we 

‘‘strengthen’’ the sports blackout rules 

by prohibiting MVPDs from importing a 

distant station carrying a game that is 

being carried live on a local broadcast 

station is beyond the scope of this 

proceeding and we decline to consider 

it. 


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IV. Procedural Matters 

A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Act 

Analysis 

46. As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), the Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated into 

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) in this proceeding. The Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission) sought written public 

comment on the proposals in the NPRM, 

including comment on the IRFA. The 

Commission received no comments on 

the IRFA. This Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to 

the RFA. 

Need for, and Objectives of, the Report 

and Order 

47. The Commission’s sports blackout 

rules prohibit cable operators, satellite 

carriers, and open video systems (OVS) 

from retransmitting, within a protected 

local blackout zone, the signal of a 

distant broadcast station carrying a live 

sporting event if the event is not 

available live on a local television 

broadcast station. The Commission first 

adopted a sports blackout rule for cable 

operators in 1975, when game ticket 

sales were the primary source of 

revenue for sports leagues. This rule 

was intended to ensure that the 

potential loss of gate receipts resulting 

from cable system importation of distant 

stations did not lead sports clubs to 

refuse to sell their rights to sports events 

to distant stations, which would reduce 

the overall availability of sports 

programming to television viewers. At 

the direction of Congress, the 

Commission later applied the cable 

sports blackout rule to open video 

systems and then to satellite carriers to 

provide parity between cable and newer 

video distributors. 

48. Sports leagues’ blackout policies, 

rather than the Commission’s rules, 

determine which sports events are 

blacked out on local television stations. 

These policies are given effect through 

contractual arrangements negotiated 

between the leagues or individual teams 

that hold the rights to the games and the 

entities to which they grant distribution 

rights, including television networks, 

local television broadcast stations, 

Regional Sports Networks (RSNs), and 

multichannel video programming 

distributors (MVPDs). The 

Commission’s rules merely supplement 

these contractual relationships by 

barring MVPDs from retransmitting, 

within the local blackout zone, games 

that the sports leagues or individual 

teams require local television stations to 

black out. 

49. In 2012, the Media Bureau issued 

a Public Notice to request comment on 

a Petition for Rulemaking seeking 

elimination of the sports blackout rules. 

The record amassed in response to the 

Public Notice suggested that, given the 

substantial changes in the sports 

industry in the 40 years since the sports 

blackout rules were originally adopted, 

the sports blackout rules may no longer 

be necessary to ensure the overall 

availability of sports programming to 

the general public. The Commission 

subsequently released an NPRM seeking 

comment whether the sports blackout 

rules have become outdated due to 

marketplace changes since their 

adoption and whether modification or 

elimination of those rules is 

appropriate. 

50. Based on the record before us, we 

conclude that the sports blackout rules 

are no longer necessary to ensure that 

sports programming is widely available 

to the public. The sports industry has 

evolved dramatically in the four 

decades since the cable sports blackout 

rule was adopted. The record confirms 

that the sports blackout rules are no 

longer relevant for sports other than 

professional football. With respect to 

NFL football, television revenues have 

become the dominant share of NFL 

revenues with a corresponding decrease 

in gate receipts. Moreover, the number 

of sell-outs and total attendance at NFL 

games has increased substantially since 

1975, reflecting an increase in the 

quality and popularity of NFL games. 

These trends undermine the notion that 

the NFL would find it profitable to 

significantly restrict television 

broadcasts of its games to protect gate 

receipts and in-stadium revenues. 

Additionally, the loss to consumers of 

their ability to view the game on 

television when an NFL game is blacked 

out exceeds any gain in gate receipts 

and other revenue that may accrue to 

the NFL as a result of a blackout, and 

the record indicates that the NFL is 

unlikely to migrate its games to pay TV 

following elimination of sports blackout 

rules because it would not be profitable 

for it to do so. Accordingly, based on all 

of these factors, we conclude that the 

economic considerations underlying the 

sports blackout rules are no longer valid 

and the sports blackout rules therefore 

are no longer needed to ensure that NFL 

games are widely available to television 

viewers. 

51. We recognize that eliminating our 

sports blackout rules is unlikely to end 

all sports blackouts. The NFL has stated 

that it most likely will continue its 

underlying blackout policy. Thus, 

consumers may still be unable to view 

locally blacked out NFL games despite 

repeal of our rules. Nevertheless, we 

conclude that it will serve the public 

interest to eliminate regulations that are 

no longer needed to serve their original 

purpose of ensuring that sports telecasts 

are widely available to the viewing 

public. We also find that the public 

interest will be served by removing 

regulatory reinforcement (and the 

Commission’s implicit endorsement) of 

the NFL’s blackout policy. Although the 

NFL is the most lucrative sports league 

in the world with annual revenues 

totaling around $10 billion and most 

NFL teams are heavily subsidized by 

consumers through publicly funded 

stadiums and other tax benefits, 

consumers are sometimes unable to 

watch their favorite teams on television 

simply because a game is not 

completely sold out. While repeal of our 

sports blackout rules may not provide 

an immediate, direct benefit to these 

consumers, rather than fulfilling their 

intended goal of ensuring the 

widespread availability of sports 

programming to the general public, our 

sports blackout rules may be having the 

opposite effect by reinforcing a private 

policy that deprives many consumers of 

the ability to watch on television the 

teams that they have subsidized through 

their tax dollars. 

52. To the extent that the NFL or any 

other sports league decides to continue 

their blackout policies following 

elimination of the sports blackout rules, 

it will no longer be entitled to 

additional protections under our sports 

blackout rules, but instead must rely on 

the same processes available to any 

other entities that wish to protect their 

distribution rights in the private 

marketplace. While the NFL argues that 

the sports blackout rules provide 

protections that cannot be achieved 

through other regulatory means or by 

private contract, we find that the NFL 

will be able to protect its distribution 

rights following elimination of the 

sports blackout rules through other 

existing regulations and through private 

contractual arrangements. First, the 

limited nature of the satellite 

compulsory license will largely 

preclude satellite carriers from 

retransmitting distant stations carrying 

locally blacked out NFL games. In 

addition, the retransmission consent 

requirement and the NFL’s contractual 

arrangements with broadcasters will 

provide the NFL with the means to 

control the distribution of its 

programming. Specifically, we note that 

many existing network affiliation 

agreements already include provisions 

prohibiting the affiliate from allowing 

its signal to be retransmitted by an 


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MVPD in a distant market and some 

network affiliation agreements also 

include provisions giving the NFL broad 

discretion to limit or condition an 

affiliate’s distribution rights to NFL 

games. To the extent that any network 

affiliation agreements do not include 

such provisions, the record indicates 

that the NFL can obtain blackout 

protection through negotiations with the 

broadcast networks in the private 

marketplace. The NFL also has the 

ability to obtain blackout protection 

through private contractual negotiations 

with MVPDs. Moreover, we note that 

MVPDs currently comply with the 

NFL’s policy of blacking out games that 

are not sold out throughout the NFL 

clubs’ ‘‘home territories,’’ which 

generally extend well beyond the 35- 

mile zone of protection afforded by the 

Commission’s sports blackout rules. 

This indicates that the NFL has the 

ability to obtain greater protection than 

that provided by the Commission’s 

sports blackout rules in the private 

marketplace, should it choose to do so. 

We further observe that retransmission 

consent fees and compulsory copyright 

license fees may, to some extent, make 

it unprofitable for cable operators to 

take advantage of the compulsory 

copyright licenses to retransmit distant 

stations carrying locally blacked out 

NFL games. 

53. Finally, we conclude that 

elimination of the sports blackout rules 

will not adversely affect broadcasters, 

consumers, or local businesses. 

Localism is unlikely to be adversely 

affected by repeal of the sports blackout 

rules. In addition, elimination of the 

sports blackout rules will not harm 

consumers by forcing the NFL to 

migrate its games to pay TV or by 

causing the NFL to raise its ticket prices. 

Moreover, eliminating the sports 

blackout rules will not harm local 

businesses and local economies in areas 

surrounding NFL stadiums by removing 

incentives to fill the stadiums. 

Summary of Significant Issues Raised in 

Response to the IRFA 

54. No comments were filed in 

response to the IRFA. Additionally, 

pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act 

of 2010, the Commission is required to 

respond to any comments filed by the 

Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration, and to provide 

a detailed statement of any change made 

to the proposed rules as a result of those 

comments. The Chief Counsel did not 

file any comments in response to the 

proposed rules in this proceeding. 

Description and Estimate of the Number 

of Small Entities to Which the Rules 

Will Apply 

55. The RFA directs the Commission 

to provide a description of and, where 

feasible, an estimate of the number of 

small entities that will be affected by the 

rules adopted in the Order. The RFA 

generally defines the term ‘‘small 

entity’’ as having the same meaning as 

the terms ‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small 

organization,’’ and ‘‘small governmental 

jurisdiction.’’ In addition, the term 

‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning 

as the term ‘‘small business concern’’ 

under the Small Business Act. A ‘‘small 

business concern’’ is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated; (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation; 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. Below are 

descriptions of the small entities that 

are directly affected by the rules 

adopted in the Order, including, where 

feasible, an estimate of the number of 

such small entities. 

56. Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers. The 2007 North American 

Industry Classification System 

(‘‘NAICS’’) defines ‘‘Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers’’ as 

follows: ‘‘This industry comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

operating and/or providing access to 

transmission facilities and infrastructure 

that they own and/or lease for the 

transmission of voice, data, text, sound, 

and video using wired 

telecommunications networks. 

Transmission facilities may be based on 

a single technology or a combination of 

technologies. Establishments in this 

industry use the wired 

telecommunications network facilities 

that they operate to provide a variety of 

services, such as wired telephony 

services, including VoIP services; wired 

(cable) audio and video programming 

distribution; and wired broadband 

Internet services. By exception, 

establishments providing satellite 

television distribution services using 

facilities and infrastructure that they 

operate are included in this industry.’’ 

The SBA has developed a small 

business size standard for wireline firms 

within the broad economic census 

category, ‘‘Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers.’’ Under this category, the SBA 

deems a wireline business to be small if 

it has 1,500 or fewer employees. Census 

data for 2007 shows that there were 

31,996 establishments that operated that 

year. Of this total, 30,178 establishments 

had fewer than 100 employees, and 

1,818 establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, we estimate that the majority 

of businesses can be considered small 

entities. 

57. Cable Television Distribution 

Services. Since 2007, these services 

have been defined within the broad 

economic census category of Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers, which 

was developed for small wireline 

businesses. This category is defined as 

follows: ‘‘This industry comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

operating and/or providing access to 

transmission facilities and infrastructure 

that they own and/or lease for the 

transmission of voice, data, text, sound, 

and video using wired 

telecommunications networks. 

Transmission facilities may be based on 

a single technology or a combination of 

technologies. Establishments in this 

industry use the wired 

telecommunications network facilities 

that they operate to provide a variety of 

services, such as wired telephony 

services, including VoIP services; wired 

(cable) audio and video programming 

distribution; and wired broadband 

Internet services.’’ The SBA has 

developed a small business size 

standard for this category, which is: All 

such businesses having 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Census data for 2007 shows 

that there were 31,996 establishments 

that operated that year. Of this total, 

30,178 establishments had fewer than 

100 employees, and 1,818 

establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, we estimate that the majority 

of such businesses can be considered 

small entities. 

58. Cable Companies and Systems. 

The Commission has also developed its 

own small business size standards, for 

the purpose of cable rate regulation. 

Under the Commission’s rules, a ‘‘small 

cable company’’ is one serving 400,000 

or fewer subscribers nationwide. 

Industry data shows that there were 

1,100 cable companies at the end of 

December 2012. Of this total, all but ten 

cable operators nationwide are small 

under this size standard. In addition, 

under the Commission’s rate regulation 

rules, a ‘‘small system’’ is a cable system 

serving 15,000 or fewer subscribers. 

Current Commission records show 4,945 

cable systems nationwide. Of this total, 

4,380 cable systems have less than 

20,000 subscribers, and 565 systems 

have 20,000 or more subscribers, based 

on the same records. Thus, under this 

standard, we estimate that most cable 

systems are small entities. 

59. Cable System Operators (Telecom 

Act Standard). The Communications 

Act of 1934, as amended, also contains 

a size standard for small cable system 

operators, which is ‘‘a cable operator 


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that, directly or through an affiliate, 

serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 

percent of all subscribers in the United 

States and is not affiliated with any 

entity or entities whose gross annual 

revenues in the aggregate exceed 

$250,000,000.’’ There are approximately 

56.4 million incumbent cable video 

subscribers in the United States today. 

Accordingly, an operator serving fewer 

than 564,000 subscribers shall be 

deemed a small operator if its annual 

revenues, when combined with the total 

annual revenues of all its affiliates, do 

not exceed $250 million in the 

aggregate. Based on available data, we 

find that all but ten incumbent cable 

operators are small entities under this 

size standard. We note that the 

Commission neither requests nor 

collects information on whether cable 

system operators are affiliated with 

entities whose gross annual revenues 

exceed $250 million. Although it seems 

certain that some of these cable system 

operators are affiliated with entities 

whose gross annual revenues exceed 

$250,000,000, we are unable at this time 

to estimate with greater precision the 

number of cable system operators that 

would qualify as small cable operators 

under the definition in the 

Communications Act. 

60. Television Broadcasting. This 

Economic Census category ‘‘comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

broadcasting images together with 

sound. These establishments operate 

television broadcasting studios and 

facilities for the programming and 

transmission of programs to the public.’’ 

The SBA has created the following 

small business size standard for such 

businesses: Those having $35.5 million 

or less in annual receipts. The 2007 U.S. 

Census indicates that 2,076 television 

stations operated in that year. Of that 

number, 1,515 had annual receipts of 

$10,000,000 dollars or less, and 561 had 

annual receipts of more than 

$10,000,000. Since the Census has no 

additional classifications on the basis of 

which to identify the number of stations 

whose receipts exceeded $35.5 million 

in that year, the Commission concludes 

that the majority of television stations 

were small under the applicable SBA 

size standard. 

61. Apart from the U.S. Census, the 

Commission has estimated the number 

of licensed commercial television 

stations to be 1,387. In addition, 

according to Commission staff review of 

the BIA Advisory Services, LLC’s Media 

Access Pro Television Database on 

March 28, 2012, about 950 of an 

estimated 1,300 commercial television 

stations (or approximately 73 percent) 

had revenues of $14 million or less. We 

therefore estimate that the majority of 

commercial television broadcasters are 

small entities. 

62. We note, however, that in 

assessing whether a business concern 

qualifies as small under the above 

definition, business (control) affiliations 

must be included. Our estimate, 

therefore, likely overstates the number 

of small entities that might be affected 

by our action because the revenue figure 

on which it is based does not include or 

aggregate revenues from affiliated 

companies. In addition, an element of 

the definition of ‘‘small business’’ is that 

the entity not be dominant in its field 

of operation. We are unable at this time 

to define or quantify the criteria that 

would establish whether a specific 

television station is dominant in its field 

of operation. Accordingly, the estimate 

of small businesses to which rules may 

apply does not exclude any television 

station from the definition of a small 

business on this basis and is therefore 

possibly over-inclusive to that extent. 

63. In addition, the Commission has 

estimated the number of licensed 

noncommercial educational television 

stations to be 395. These stations are 

non-profit, and therefore considered to 

be small entities. 

64. Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) 

Service. DBS service is a nationally 

distributed subscription service that 

delivers video and audio programming 

via satellite to a small parabolic ‘‘dish’’ 

antenna at the subscriber’s location. 

DBS, by exception, is now included in 

the SBA’s broad economic census 

category, Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers, which was developed for small 

wireline businesses. Under this 

category, the SBA deems a wireline 

business to be small if it has 1,500 or 

fewer employees. Census data for 2007 

shows that there were 31,996 

establishments that operated that year. 

Of this total, 30,178 establishments had 

fewer than 100 employees, and 1,818 

establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, the majority of such 

businesses can be considered small 

entities. However, the data we have 

available as a basis for estimating the 

number of such small entities were 

gathered under a superseded SBA small 

business size standard formerly titled 

‘‘Cable and Other Program 

Distribution.’’ The definition of Cable 

and Other Program Distribution 

provided that a small entity is one with 

$12.5 million or less in annual receipts. 

Currently, only two entities provide 

DBS service, which requires a great 

investment of capital for operation: 

DIRECTV and DISH Network. Each 

currently offer subscription services. 

DIRECTV and DISH Network each 

report annual revenues that are in 

excess of the threshold for a small 

business. Because DBS service requires 

significant capital, we believe it is 

unlikely that a small entity as defined 

under the superseded SBA size standard 

would have the financial wherewithal to 

become a DBS service provider. 

65. Satellite Master Antenna 

Television (SMATV) Systems, also 

known as Private Cable Operators 

(PCOs). SMATV systems or PCOs are 

video distribution facilities that use 

closed transmission paths without using 

any public right-of-way. They acquire 

video programming and distribute it via 

terrestrial wiring in urban and suburban 

multiple dwelling units such as 

apartments and condominiums, and 

commercial multiple tenant units such 

as hotels and office buildings. SMATV 

systems or PCOs are now included in 

the SBA’s broad economic census 

category, Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers, which was developed for small 

wireline businesses. Under this 

category, the SBA deems a wireline 

business to be small if it has 1,500 or 

fewer employees. Census data for 2007 

show that there were 31,996 

establishments that operated that year. 

Of this total, 30,178 establishments had 

fewer than 100 employees, and 1,818 

establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, the majority of such 

businesses can be considered small 

entities. 

66. Home Satellite Dish (HSD) 

Service. HSD or the large dish segment 

of the satellite industry is the original 

satellite-to-home service offered to 

consumers, and involves the home 

reception of signals transmitted by 

satellites operating generally in the Cband frequency. Unlike DBS, which 

uses small dishes, HSD antennas are 

between four and eight feet in diameter 

and can receive a wide range of 

unscrambled (free) programming and 

scrambled programming purchased from 

program packagers that are licensed to 

facilitate subscribers’ receipt of video 

programming. Because HSD provides 

subscription services, HSD falls within 

the SBA-recognized definition of Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers. The SBA 

has developed a small business size 

standard for this category, which is: all 

such businesses having 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Census data for 2007 show 

that there were 31,996 establishments 

that operated that year. Of this total, 

30,178 establishments had fewer than 

100 employees, and 1,818 

establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, the majority of such 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 63561 

businesses can be considered small 

entities. 

67. Open Video Systems. The open 

video system (OVS) framework was 

established in 1996, and is one of four 

statutorily recognized options for the 

provision of video programming 

services by local exchange carriers. The 

OVS framework provides opportunities 

for the distribution of video 

programming other than through cable 

systems. Because OVS operators provide 

subscription services, OVS falls within 

the SBA small business size standard 

covering cable services, which is 

‘‘Wired Telecommunications Carriers.’’ 

The SBA has developed a small 

business size standard for this category, 

which is: All such businesses having 

1,500 or fewer employees. Census data 

for 2007 shows that there were 31,996 

establishments that operated that year. 

Of this total, 30,178 establishments had 

fewer than 100 employees, and 1,818 

establishments had 100 or more 

employees. Therefore, under this size 

standard, we estimate that the majority 

of these businesses can be considered 

small entities. In addition, we note that 

the Commission has certified some OVS 

operators, with some now providing 

service. Broadband service providers 

(BSPs) are currently the only significant 

holders of OVS certifications or local 

OVS franchises. The Commission does 

not have financial or employment 

information regarding the other entities 

authorized to provide OVS, some of 

which may not yet be operational. Thus, 

again, at least some of the OVS 

operators may qualify as small entities. 

68. Cable and Other Subscription 

Programming. The Census Bureau 

defines this category as follows: ‘‘This 

industry comprises establishments 

primarily engaged in operating studios 

and facilities for the broadcasting of 

programs on a subscription or fee basis. 

. . . These establishments produce 

programming in their own facilities or 

acquire programming from external 

sources. The programming material is 

usually delivered to a third party, such 

as cable systems or direct-to-home 

satellite systems, for transmission to 

viewers.’’ The SBA has developed a 

small business size standard for this 

category, which is: All such businesses 

having $35.5 million dollars or less in 

annual revenues. Census data for 2007 

show that there were 659 establishments 

that operated that year. Of that number, 

462 operated with annual revenues of 

$9,999,999 dollars or less. One hundred 

ninety-seven (197) operated with annual 

revenues of between $10 million and 

$100 million or more. Thus, under this 

size standard, the majority of such 

businesses can be considered small 

entities. 

i. Description of Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements for Small Entities 

69. The Report and Order eliminates 

the sports blackout rules for cable 

operators, satellite carriers, and open 

video systems. The Report and Order 

does not adopt any new reporting, 

recordkeeping, or compliance 

requirements for small entities. 

Steps Taken To Minimize Economic 

Impact on Small Entities and Significant 

Alternatives Considered 

70. The RFA requires an agency to 

describe any significant alternatives that 

it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance or reporting requirements 

under the rule for small entities; (3) the 

use of performance, rather than design, 

standards; and (4) an exemption from 

coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, 

for small entities. The IRFA invited 

comment on issues that had the 

potential to have a significant impact on 

some small entities. 

71. To the extent that the NFL or any 

other sports league decides to continue 

it blackout policy following elimination 

of the sports blackout rules, it can 

protect its distribution rights through 

other existing regulations and through 

private contractual arrangements. 

Because the NFL can protect its 

distribution rights through other 

existing regulations and through private 

contractual arrangements, repeal of the 

sports blackout rules will not adversely 

impact broadcasters or other affected 

entities as identified above, including 

small entities, by decreasing advertising 

revenues for local stations in markets 

prone to NFL blackouts or leading the 

NFL to migrate its games from broadcast 

television to pay TV. 

ii. Report to Congress 

72. The Commission will send a copy 

of the Order, including this FRFA, in a 

report to be sent to Congress pursuant 

to the Congressional Review Act. In 

addition, the Commission will send a 

copy of the Order, including this FRFA, 

to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

SBA. The Order and FRFA (or 

summaries thereof) will also be 

published in the Federal Register. 

B. Paperwork Reduction Act 

73. This document does not contain 

new or modified information collection 

requirements subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public 

Law 104–13. In addition, therefore, it 

does not contain any new or modified 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees, pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002. 

C. Additional Information 

74. For additional information on this 

proceeding, contact Kathy Berthot, 

Kathy.Berthot@fcc.gov, of the Media 

Bureau, Policy Division, (202) 418– 

2120. 

V. Ordering Clauses 

75. Accordingly, it is ordered that, 

pursuant to the authority found in 

Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 303(r), 339(b), and 

653(b) of the Communications Act of 

1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 

154(j), 303(r), 339(b), 573(b), this Report 

and Order is adopted, effective thirty 

(30) days after the date of publication in 

the Federal Register. 

76. It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

Information Center, shall send a copy of 

this Report and Order in MB Docket No. 

12–3, including the Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration. 

77. It is further ordered that the 

Commission shall send a copy of this 

Report and Order in MB Docket No. 12– 

3 in a report to be sent to Congress and 

the Government Accountability Office 

pursuant to the Congressional Review 

Act. 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 76 

Cable television. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene H. Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Final Rules 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission amends 47 part 76 as 

follows: 

PART 76—MULTICHANNEL VIDEO 

AND CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 76 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 153, 154, 

301, 302, 302a, 303, 303a, 307, 308, 309, 312, 

315, 317, 325, 339, 340, 341, 503, 521, 522, 

531, 532, 534, 535, 536, 537, 543, 544, 544a, 

545, 548, 549, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560, 561, 

571, 572 and 573. 


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63562 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 206 / Friday, October 24, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

■ 2. Amend § 76.110 by revising the first 

sentence to read as follows: 

§ 76.110 Substitutions. 

Whenever, pursuant to the 

requirements of the syndicated 

exclusivity rules, a community unit is 

required to delete a television program 

on a broadcast signal that is permitted 

to be carried under the Commission’s 

rules, such community unit may, 

consistent with these rules, substitute a 

program from any other television 

broadcast station. * * * 

§ 76.111 [Removed] 

■ 3. Remove § 76.111. 

■ 4. Amend § 76.120 by revising the 

heading and removing paragraph (e)(3) 

to read as follows: 

§ 76.120 Network non-duplication 

protection and syndicated exclusivity rules 

for satellite carriers: Definitions. 

* * * * * 

§§ 76.127 and 76.128 [Removed] 

■ 5. Remove §§ 76.127 and 76.128. 

■ 6. Amend § 76.130 by revising the first 

sentence to read as follows: 

§ 76.130 Substitutions. 

Whenever, pursuant to the 

requirements of the network program 

non-duplication or syndicated program 

exclusivity rules, a satellite carrier is 

required to delete a television program 

from retransmission to satellite 

subscribers within a zip code area, such 

satellite carrier may, consistent with 

this subpart, substitute a program from 

any other television broadcast station 

for which the satellite carrier has 

obtained the necessary legal rights and 

permissions, including but not limited 

to copyright and retransmission 

consent. * * * 

§ 76.1506 [Amended] 

■ 7. Amend § 76.1506 by removing 

paragraph (m) and redesignating 

paragraphs (n) and (o) as paragraphs (m) 

and (n). 

[FR Doc. 2014–24612 Filed 10–23–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

GENERAL SERVICES 

ADMINISTRATION 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

48 CFR Parts 2 and 4 

[FAC 2005–77; FAR Case 2012–023; 

Correction; Docket 2012–0023, Sequence 1] 

RIN 9000–AM60 

Federal Acquisition Regulation; 

Uniform Procurement Identification; 

Correction 

AGENCY: Department of Defense (DoD), 

General Services Administration (GSA), 

and National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA). 

ACTION: Final rule; Correction. 

SUMMARY: DoD, GSA, and NASA are 

issuing a correction to FAR Case 2012– 

023; Uniform Procurement 

Identification (Item III), which was 

published in the Federal Register at 79 

FR 61739, October 14, 2014. 

DATES: Effective: November 13, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Edward Loeb, Procurement Analyst, at 

202–501–0650, for clarification of 

content. For information pertaining to 

status or publication schedules, contact 

the Regulatory Secretariat at 202–501– 

4755. Please cite FAC 2005–77; FAR 

Case 2012–023; Correction. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Correction 

In rule FR Doc. 2014–24240 published 

in the Federal Register at 79 FR 61739, 

October 14, 2014, make the following 

correction: 

On page 61741, in the first column, 

second line, correct ‘‘4.601’’ to read 

‘‘4.1601’’. 

Authority: 40 U.S.C. 121(c); 10 U.S.C. 

chapter 137; and 51 U.S.C. 20113. 

Dated: October 21, 2014. 

William Clark, 

Acting Director, Office of Government-wide 

Acquisition Policy, Office of Acquisition 

Policy, Office of Government-wide Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25416 Filed 10–23–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6820–EP–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 300 

[Docket No. 130717632–4285–02] 

RIN 0648–XD504 

International Fisheries; Pacific Tuna 

Fisheries; 2014 Bigeye Tuna Longline 

Fishery Closure in the Eastern Pacific 

Ocean 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Temporary rule; fishery closure. 

SUMMARY: Because the 2014 catch limit 

of 500 metric tons is expected to be 

reached, NMFS is closing the U.S. 

pelagic longline fishery for bigeye tuna 

for vessels over 24 meters in overall 

length in the eastern Pacific Ocean 

(EPO) through December 31, 2014. This 

action is necessary to prevent the 

fishery from exceeding the applicable 

catch limit established by the InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission 

(IATTC) in Resolution C–13–01, which 

governs tuna conservation in the EPO 

from 2014–2016. 

DATES: Effective October 31, 2014, 

through December 31, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rachael Wadsworth, NMFS West Coast 

Region, 562–980–4036. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pelagic 

longline fishing in the EPO is managed, 

in part, under the Tuna Conventions Act 

of 1950 (Act), 16 U.S.C. 951–962. Under 

the Act, NMFS must publish regulations 

to carry out recommendations of the 

Inter-American Tropical Tuna 

Commission (IATTC) that have been 

approved by the Department of State 

(DOS). The United States is a member 

of the IATTC, which was established 

under the Convention for the 

Establishment of an Inter-American 

Tropical Tuna Commission signed in 

1949 (Convention) to provide an 

international agreement to ensure the 

effective international conservation and 

management of highly migratory species 

of fish in the IATTC Convention Area. 

The IATTC Convention Area includes 

the waters of the eastern Pacific Ocean 

(EPO) bounded by the coast of the 

Americas, the 50° N. and 50° S. 

parallels, and the 150° W. meridian. 

Regulations governing fishing by U.S. 

vessels in accordance with the Act 

appear at 50 CFR part 300, subpart C. 

Those regulations implement 

recommendations of the IATTC for the 


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