UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TOBIN DON LEMMONS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant 

v. 

WESLEY CLYMER, Pawnee County 

Drug Task Force Member; TODD 

FENTON, Pawnee County Drug Task 

Force Member; CLINT STOUT, Pawnee 

County Drug Task Force Member; KEITH 

HAMMONS, Pawnee County Drug Task 

Force Member; MIKE WATERS, Sheriff, 

Pawnee County; JT ADAMS, Pawnee 

County Commissioner previously named as 

JT; JERI SHAW, Pawnee County Jail 

Administrator, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-5135 

(D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00500-JED-PJC) 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 6, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Appellant Tobin Don Lemmons, who is incarcerated in state prison in 

Oklahoma, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The district court 

identified sixteen separate claims, including various claims of inadequate provision 

of medical care, unauthorized searches and seizures, destruction of property, 

excessive force, equal protection violations, inadequate protection from other 

inmates, inhumane conditions of confinement, and denial of access to the courts. The 

district court dismissed each of Mr. Lemmons’s claims, either for failure to state a 

claim or on summary judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 

affirm. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Between August 27, 2010, and August 23, 2011, Mr. Lemmons was in and out 

of the Pawnee County Jail in Pawnee, Oklahoma, five times.1

 During his final stay at 

the Pawnee County Jail, Mr. Lemmons filed his complaint in this matter. The 

complaint alleges Jail Administrator Jeri Shaw, the County Sheriff’s Office, the 

Court Clerk’s Office, and various police officers violated Mr. Lemmons’s civil rights 

during searches of his home, while arresting Mr. Lemmons, or during his 

 1

 Mr. Lemmons is now in custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 

serving concurrent sentences totaling fifteen years. 

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confinement at the jail. Most relevant to this appeal, Mr. Lemmons alleges (1) police 

officers stole or destroyed his property while conducting unlawful searches of his 

home, (2) jail administrators failed to provide adequate medical treatment relating to 

his seizure disorder, (3) jail officials stood by while other inmates assaulted him, and 

(4) the County Clerk’s office denied him access to the courts. As part of his 

complaint, Mr. Lemmons also moved the court to seize records and moved for 

appointment of counsel. The district court treated the motion to seize records as a 

motion for a preliminary injunction and ruled that Mr. Lemmons had not met his 

burden of demonstrating the need for injunctive relief. The district court also 

exercised its discretion in denying Mr. Lemmons’s motion for appointment of 

counsel. 

Before serving the complaint on the defendants, Mr. Lemmons submitted a 

motion to amend his complaint. The district court issued an order explaining that 

Mr. Lemmons’s motion was moot since none of the defendants had been served and 

he was therefore free to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A). 

But the district court further instructed that any amended complaint must be 

“complete in itself,” without reference to the original complaint. Ignoring these 

instructions, Mr. Lemmons filed a “Motion to Proceed with Supplemental 

Propositions” and a proposed “Amended Civil Rights Complaint Supplementation,” 

which merely added new claims to the original complaint, instead of superseding it. 

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The district court issued an order denying the motion2

 and ruling that the case would 

proceed on the claims set forth in the original complaint. 

Through three separate orders, the district court dismissed each of the claims 

in Mr. Lemmons’s complaint, either for failure to state a claim or on summary 

judgment. After each order issued, Mr. Lemmons filed a notice of appeal. In his 

appeal of the first order, Mr. Lemmons also appealed the district court’s denial of 

injunctive relief. This court dismissed the first appeal for lack of finality as to 

Mr. Lemmons’s § 1983 claims and as untimely in regard to Mr. Lemmons’s 

challenge to the denial of injunctive relief. We dismissed the second appeal for 

failure to prosecute. Before us now is Mr. Lemmons’s third appeal, in which he 

challenges the district court’s final order entering judgment in favor of defendants on 

Mr. Lemmons’s § 1983 claims. 

III. DISCUSSION

Construing Mr. Lemmons’s appellate brief liberally, as we are required to do 

in the context of a pro se litigant, Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 

2013), we understand Mr. Lemmons to challenge (1) the denial of his motion for 

injunctive relief, (2) the denial of his motion to amend/supplement his complaint, (3) 

the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel, and (4) several of the district 

court’s rulings on his § 1983 claims. We address each argument in turn. 

 2

 The district court granted a minor aspect of the amended complaint, which 

requested that the record be modified to reflect that the last name of defendant JT is 

Adams. But the district court denied the motion as to the substantive amendments. 

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A. Denial of Injunctive Relief 

Typically, this court reviews a district court’s denial of preliminary injunction 

for an abuse of discretion. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 727 (10th Cir. 2015). But 

Mr. Lemmons’s challenge to the district court’s preliminary injunction decision 

comes before us in a unique procedural posture. As explained above, when 

Mr. Lemmons filed his first notice of appeal in this matter, we interpreted it as 

appealing in part the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. In that order, we 

explained that because Mr. Lemmons failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty 

days of the entry of judgment denying injunctive relief, the appeal was untimely. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (granting the courts of 

appeals immediate jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders refusing 

injunctions). Under the law of the case doctrine, we dismiss this challenge for the 

same reasons we dismissed it in the earlier appeal. Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 

F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a case is appealed and remanded, the 

decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and ordinarily will be 

followed by both the trial court on remand and the appellate court in any subsequent 

appeal.”). 

B. Denial of Motion to Proceed with Supplemental Propositions 

We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of 

discretion. Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000, 1012 (10th Cir. 2014).

Mr. Lemmons argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion on 

the basis that the proposed amended complaint did not comply with the district 

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court’s order that it be “complete in itself.” He insists it was impossible to amend the 

entire complaint due to the inadequate jail law library; specifically, he claims he was 

deterred from making copies and pursuing the litigation of his amendments to the 

original complaint. We fail to see how any limitation on photocopying prevented 

Mr. Lemmon from complying with the district court’s order that any amended 

complaint be “complete in itself.” Moreover, we do not consider the district court’s 

requirement overly burdensome. To the contrary, the order merely reflects the 

purpose of an amended pleading, which is to “entirely replace the earlier pleading.” 

6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 

1504 at 254 (2010). We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his Motion to Proceed with Supplemental Propositions. 

Mr. Lemmons appears to argue in the alternative that the district court should 

have treated his motion as one to supplement the complaint, not a motion to amend. 

Specifically, he claims he should have been permitted to supplement his complaint by 

adding a claim of sexual battery that took place in February 2012, after the date he 

filed his original complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (explaining that courts may 

“permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, 

occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be 

supplemented”). But nowhere in his Motion to Proceed with Supplemental 

Propositions or in his proposed amended/supplemental complaint did Mr. Lemmons 

raise a sexual battery claim, and he has not directed us to any other document filed in 

the district court in which he attempted to raise such a claim. We cannot conclude 

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that the district court erred in denying Mr. Lemmons’s motion to supplement on the 

basis of a claim he did not present in that motion. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of Mr. Lemmons’s motion to amend and/or supplement. 

C. Denial of Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

We review a district court’s denial of a request for appointment of counsel in a 

civil case for an abuse of discretion. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th 

Cir. 1995). A district court may appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff if, under the 

totality of the circumstances, the denial of counsel would result in a fundamentally 

unfair proceeding, considering “the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the 

factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the 

complexities of the legal issues raised by the claims.” Id. In this case, the district 

court considered each of these factors and determined appointment of counsel was 

not warranted. Mr. Lemmons claims that because he was incarcerated throughout this 

litigation, his ability to investigate and contact witnesses was limited without 

appointed counsel. But the district court explicitly found Mr. Lemmons’s “ability to 

investigate the crucial facts” was not sufficiently inhibited to weigh in favor 

appointing counsel. Moreover, Mr. Lemmons’s filings in the district court and on 

appeal demonstrate his ability to conduct legal research and make relevant motions. 

Based on this record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Mr. Lemmons’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

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D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

The remainder of Mr. Lemmons’s challenges go to the merits of his § 1983 

claims. Although Mr. Lemmons brought sixteen separate claims in the district court, 

he appeals the district court’s ruling on five3

 of his claims: (1) that law enforcement 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search and seizing 

and destroying his property; (2) that he was denied adequate medical treatment while 

in the Pawnee County Jail; (3) that he was denied proper protection against an assault 

by fellow inmates; (4) that he was denied access to the court due to the insufficient 

law library at the Pawnee County Jail and his lack of legal counsel; and (5) his claims 

against the Pawnee County Sheriff’s Office, Court Clerk’s Office, and other 

unknown defendants, whom the district court dismissed from the lawsuit. The district 

court disposed of each of these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

or on summary judgment. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of claims 

under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true the well-pled factual allegations and 

 3

 Mr. Lemmons’s appellate brief includes two additional arguments: a due 

process claim and a one-sentence argument that Pawnee officials allowed a convicted 

murderer and convicted sex offenders to “roam free,” thereby endangering public 

safety. Mr. Lemmons did not raise his due process concern in the district court, and 

the district court did not rule on it. He has therefore failed to preserve this claim, and 

we do not address it. See Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 940 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(explaining that, even in the context of a pro se litigant, we will only consider those 

arguments raised in the district court). As to Mr. Lemmons’s claim that convicted 

criminals were permitted to roam free, Mr. Lemmons fails to demonstrate that he 

suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of this alleged misconduct. Mr. Lemmons 

therefore lacks standing to bring this claim. See Petrella v. Brownback, 697 F.3d 

1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to have Article III standing, a plaintiff 

must allege a “concrete and particularized” injury (quoting Summers v. Earth Island 

Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).

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determining whether Mr. Lemmons has provided “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). We also 

review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment “and apply the same 

legal standards as the district court.” Ribeau v. Katt, 681 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 

2012). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). At summary judgment, we view 

the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Id.

1. Legality of Searches and Seizures and Alleged Destruction of Property 

Mr. Lemmons first argues the district court erred in dismissing his claims that 

police officers Fenton, Clymer, and Stout violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

unlawfully seizing and destroying documents Mr. Lemmons gathered as part of this 

litigation and conducting an impermissible warrantless search of his home and person 

on August 27, 2010. As to the destruction of documents, although Mr. Lemmons 

alleged several Fourth Amendment violations in the district court, he never pled a 

claim regarding the destruction of documents. In ruling on Mr. Lemmons’s various 

Fourth Amendment claims, the district court never addressed a claim based on the 

destruction of documents. Because the record contains no facts to support this 

allegation and the district court did not rule on this claim, we will not consider it on 

appeal. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) 

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(explaining that a theory raised for the first time on appeal is forfeited and we will 

not entertain a forfeited theory if the party fails to argue plain error). 

Mr. Lemmons also argues the district court erred in rejecting his claim that the 

August 27, 2010, search of his home and person violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. In dismissing this claim, the district court ruled Mr. Lemmons failed to 

present evidence controverting an August 28, 2010, Probable Cause Affidavit, which 

reported that Mr. Lemmons consented to the officers’ search. The district court also 

ruled that regardless of whether Mr. Lemmons consented to the search, his claim is 

precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that “to recover 

damages for . . . harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid,” a party raising a § 1983 claim “must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 

U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Mr. Lemmons has not explained why this holding of the 

district court was erroneous. Because we find the district court’s reasoning sound, we 

affirm the dismissal of Mr. Lemmons’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 

August 27, 2010, search. 

2. Provision of Medical Care 

Mr. Lemmons next challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim that 

Ms. Shaw failed to provide adequate medical treatment for Mr. Lemmons’s seizure 

disorder while he was in her custody at the Pawnee County Jail. Specifically, 

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Mr. Lemmons claims that when he was first booked at the jail, jail officials denied 

him his seizure medication and otherwise failed to properly provide for his medical 

needs. As the district court explained, to state a § 1983 claim for a violation of the 

Eight Amendment due to inadequate medical care, a prisoner must demonstrate a 

“deliberate indifference” to his serious medical needs. Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 

1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 

Mr. Lemmons has not met this burden. Instead, the record reflects that when 

Mr. Lemmons was booked into the Pawnee County Jail, he filled out a medical 

questionnaire, in which he answered “no” to whether he needed any immediate 

medical attention and “no” to whether he was currently taking any prescribed 

medications. Once jail officials became aware of Mr. Lemmons’s seizure disorder 

and his need for medication, the jail immediately provided Mr. Lemmons his daily 

doses of the necessary prescriptions. The record is replete with additional examples 

of medical care Mr. Lemmons received while in the Pawnee County Jail. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s determination that Mr. Lemmons failed to show a 

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

3. Protection Against Assault by Fellow Inmates 

Mr. Lemmons alleges that at one point during his time in the Pawnee County 

Jail, fellow inmates assaulted him due to rumors that he had AIDS, and Ms. Shaw 

and jail administrator Ryan Hammons stood by and watched the assault for a period 

of time before intervening. In rejecting this claim, the district court relied on a 

grievance Mr. Lemmons filed while in jail in which he reported being threatened by 

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other inmates, but further stated he was moved to isolation in response to these 

threats. Nowhere in the grievance did Mr. Lemmons discuss an assault or state that 

Ms. Shaw or Mr. Hammons failed to intervene to protect him. The district court also 

relied on record evidence of a jail policy requiring staff to file a jail incident report if 

they observe an inmate assault, as well as evidence showing no incident report exists 

of the alleged attack on Mr. Lemmons. Based on this evidence, we agree 

Mr. Lemmons failed to show he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), and 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 

4. Access to the Courts 

Mr. Lemmons claims he was denied access to the courts because defendants 

refused to provide him with a law library and he was denied legal counsel. Although 

inmates have a right of access to the courts, there is no “freestanding right to a law 

library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Thus, an 

inmate relying on an inadequate law library or legal representation to argue lack of 

access to the courts must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or 

legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id.

Mr. Lemmons has made no such showing. His conclusory arguments lack any 

evidentiary or legal support and are therefore insufficient to state a claim for relief. 

We thus affirm the district court on this claim. 

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5. Dismissal of Pawnee County Sheriff’s Office, Court Clerk’s Office, and 

Unknown Defendants 

Finally, Mr. Lemmons contends the district court erred in dismissing the 

Pawnee County Sheriff’s Office, Pawnee Court Clerk’s Office, and other unknown 

defendants on the basis that Mr. Lemmons failed to state a claim for relief against 

them. We disagree. The district court dismissed Sheriff Mike Waters and the County 

Sheriff’s Office because none of the allegations in Mr. Lemmons’s complaint suggest 

that the Sheriff or the Sheriff’s Office had any personal involvement in the incidents 

giving rise to Mr. Lemmons’s claims. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 

(10th Cir. 2011) (“Personal liability under § 1983 must be based on personal 

involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted)). On appeal, the only link Mr. Lemmons suggests exists between the County 

Sheriff’s Office and his alleged injuries is his claim that the Sheriff’s Office 

inadequately trained the officers who searched Mr. Lemmons’s home. In the context 

of § 1983 liability based on a defendant’s supervisory role, the plaintiff must show an 

“affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation,” by 

demonstrating (1) the supervisor’s personal involvement, (2) causation, and (3) a 

culpable state of mind. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 

760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the only alleged 

involvement of a supervisor is based on inadequate training, a defendant must show 

“essentially a complete failure to train, or training that is so reckless or grossly 

negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 

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905, 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Lemmons’s claim 

against the Pawnee County Sheriff’s office does not meet this standard. Instead, he 

provides only a conclusory argument that, had the Sheriff’s Office conducted better 

training, the officers would not have engaged in the alleged Fourth Amendment 

violations. Mr. Lemmons fails to demonstrate a complete failure to train or training 

that is objectively unreasonable. We thus conclude the district court correctly 

dismissed Mr. Lemmons’s claims against Sheriff Waters and the County Sheriff’s 

office. 

 As to the County Clerk’s Office and unknown defendants, the district court 

determined that the only claim against the office was Mr. Lemmons’s denial-ofaccess-to-the-courts claim, which the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Lemmons’s denial-of-accessto-the-courts claim, we also affirm the dismissal of the County Clerk’s Office and 

unknown defendants from this lawsuit. 

IV.CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Lemmons’s 

request for injunctive relief, his motion for appointment of counsel, his motion to 

supplement/amend his complaint, and each of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The 

District Court previously granted Mr. Lemmons’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and we remind him of his obligation to make partial payments until the 

district court and appellate filing fees are paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

We GRANT Mr. Lemmons’s request that we waive the fees associated with the two 

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appeals he filed before the district court had issued a final order in this case, 

appellate case numbers 12-5012 and 13-5136. 

 ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Carolyn B. McHugh 

 Circuit Judge 

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