J-S60031-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.Y., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.D., MOTHER No. 848 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered April 14, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Orphans’

Court, at No(s): A-8099

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2014

L.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered on April 

14, 2014, in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court 

Division, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, D.J.Y. 

(“Child”), born in May of 2005, pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Child is autistic and has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 

Trial Ct. Op., 6/12/14, at 6. In 2007, Luzerne County Children and Youth 

Services (“CYS”) removed Child from the care of Mother and Father and 

placed Child in the custody of Child’s maternal great aunt (“Great Aunt”) and 

great uncle (“Great Uncle”) (together, “Petitioners”), in whose care Child has 

remained up to the filing of the subject termination petition. Id. at 2. On 

June 16, 2008, the trial court entered an order, giving primary physical 

 

1 The trial court, by separate decree dated and entered on April 14, 2014, 

also involuntarily terminated G.Y.’s (“Father’s”) parental rights to Child. 

Father did not participate in any of the lower court proceedings, has not 

appealed the decree terminating his parental rights to Child, and is not a 

party to this appeal.
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custody of Child to Petitioners, allowing Mother visitation with Child, and 

requiring Mother to complete a parenting class, a drug and alcohol 

evaluation, and a mental health evaluation. Id. at 7, 14. Pursuant to the 

order, Mother was also required to provide to the trial court written 

documentation verifying that she had completed all of the requirements. Id.

at 7.

On August 23, 2013, Petitioners filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to Child, alleging the 

elements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b) as grounds for termination. 

Id. at 1. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on April 9, 2014. Id. 

At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Petitioners and Mother. 

S.D. (“Maternal Grandmother”), R.P. (“Maternal Great Grandmother”), and 

Mother’s 15-year-old son, Child’s brother, O.Y., also testified at the hearing.

Great Aunt testified that, over the course of the six months prior to 

filing the termination petition (February 23, 2013 to August 23, 2013), 

Mother did not have any contact with Child, nor had she fulfilled any 

parental duties on Child’s behalf:

Q. From February 23rd, 2013 up to the date of August 23rd, 

2013, has [Mother] had any contact with [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Has she made any phone calls to [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Has she sent any cards or letters to [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Has she sent any gifts to [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Has she come by the house and asked to speak to [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Has she had any indirect contact with [Child] through 

Facebook or social media?

A. No.
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Q. During that period of time, have you prevented her from 

contacting [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Does [Mother] provide any type of financial support for 

[Child]?

A. No.

Q. Does she pay child support?

A. No.

Q. Is she court ordered to pay child support?

A. No.

Q. Does she drop off clothing for [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Does she drop off food for [Child]?

A. No.

Q. Does she give you any support outside of the court for 

[Child]?

A. No.

Q. . . . has she taken [Child] to any doctor’s appointments?

A. No.

Q. Dentist appointments?

A. No.

Q. Mental health appointments?

A. No.

Q. Has she done any parental duties whatsoever on behalf of 

[Child] during that six-month period?

A. No.

Notes of Testimony, 4/9/14, at 18-20. Great Aunt further testified that 

Mother could have contacted Child during the six months prior to the filing of 

the termination petition since Mother was aware of Petitioners’ telephone 

number, having previously called Great Aunt on that exact telephone 

number, as well as Petitioners’ address, having previously visited Petitioners’ 

residence. Id. at 11-12. Great Uncle corroborated Great Aunt’s testimony 

and testified that he, too, had done nothing to prevent Mother from 

contacting or seeing Child during the six months prior to filing the 

termination petition. Id. at 49-50. Further, Petitioners testified that it is 
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their intention to adopt Child should the trial court grant the termination 

petition. Id. at 46-48.

In her testimony, Mother admitted that she had not performed 

parental duties such as taking Child to the doctor, dentist, or optometrist 

since Child was two years old, and that, since 2008, besides running into 

Child on occasion at a family affair, she had only seen Child on one 

occasion—his eighth birthday in May 2013. Id. at 97, 108-109. Mother also 

confirmed that, in the six months prior to the filing of the termination 

petition, she did not telephone Petitioners to speak with Child, nor did she 

send any cards, letters, gifts, or money to Petitioners for Child. Id. at 97-

98, 109.

On cross-examination, Mother testified to her issues with substance 

abuse, indicating that, on January 18, 2013, she had pleaded guilty to 

possession of a controlled substance and, from February 2013 to the 

beginning of March 2013, was incarcerated for retail theft and possession of 

a controlled substance. Id. at 99-100. In addition, on March 11, 2013, 

Mother pleaded guilty to public drunkenness and similar conduct. Id. at 99. 

Mother further testified that, upon her release from incarceration in March 

2013, she admitted herself to Valley Forge Medical Center, a rehab facility, 

and that she had remained sober since being successfully discharged from 

the facility in April 2013. Id. at 79, 113. Nevertheless, despite being able 

to provide the trial court with a certificate evidencing her successful 

completion of a rehabilitative programs, Mother failed to supply written 

documentation verifying her completion of a drug and alcohol evaluation and 
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a mental health evaluation, as required by the trial court’s June 16, 2008 

order. Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

On April 14, 2014, the trial court entered corresponding decrees, 

terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father, respectively, pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). On May 14, 2014, Mother 

simultaneously filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Mother raises a single question for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in finding that [Petitioners] met 

[their] burden to prove the elements of termination with respect 

to [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b)][] through clear and 

convincing evidence?

Mother’s Brief at 3.

We review appeals from the involuntary termination of parental rights 

according to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re:]

R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275], 36 A.3d [567, 572 (2011) (plurality 

opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might have 

reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett 

v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [613 Pa. 371], 34 A.3d 1, 51 

(2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 

(2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
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As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis: 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 
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parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

With respect to section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six 

months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform

parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Further,

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 602, 708 

A.2d 88, 92 (1998)).

This Court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development 

of the child.” In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted). We have explained:

A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court 

has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which 

requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.
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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

Id.

Further, we have stated that a parent is required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

In her brief on appeal, Mother essentially argues that Petitioners 

presented insufficient evidence to sustain their burden under section 

2511(a)(1) and (b), and, thus, that the trial court abused its discretion in 

terminating her parental rights to Child. Specifically, Mother contends that 

the trial court erred in finding that Mother’s conduct during the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition established her refusal or failure 

to perform parental duties on Child’s behalf or evidenced Mother’s settled 

purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child. In support, Mother 

emphasizes her testimony that she maintained regular contact with Child up 

to her incarceration from February 2013 to the beginning of March 2013, 
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during which she claims that she was unable to telephone Petitioners to 

speak to Child and had no funds to buy stamps to send cards or letters to 

Child. Mother’s Brief at 8 (citing N.T., 4/9/14, at 96). In addition, Mother 

avers that, after being successfully discharged from rehabilitation in April 

2013, she made several attempts to contact Child, all of which were 

unsuccessful because Petitioners, recognizing Mother’s telephone number on 

their caller identification, refused to answer her phone calls. Id. at 9 (citing 

N.T., 4/9/14, at 79-81). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its analysis under 

section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

With grounds for termination under [section 2511(a)(1)], 

the first line of inquiry. . . is the parent’s explanation for his or 

her conduct. . . . Mother testified that [during her incarceration 

from February 2013 to the beginning of March 2013] she did not 

request visits with [Child] because she believed [that] prison is 

an inappropriate place to visit for a child. However, Mother did 

not make any attempts to call[] [or] send letters or cards to 

[Child] while she was incarcerated. When Mother was 

questioned several times as to the reason for [her] not calling 

[Child] from prison, Mother seemed to avoid answering the 

questions by answering that the counselors did not care. 

Then[,] when asked specifically as to whether she attempted to 

call [Child] from prison, Mother responded that she requested a 

“male” to make a phone call on three (3) different occasions in 

February of 2013 and that the “male” would not call [anymore] 

and that no one cared. Mother also did not write to [Child] from 

prison claiming that she did not have money for stamps. It is 

also interesting to note that subsequent to being released from 

prison, Mother was in Valley Forge Medical Rehabilitation Center 

from March 2013 until April 2013. During her stay, Mother also 

did not call or write to [Child], claiming that she had no funds to 

do so. However, when Mother left the Rehabilitation Center in 

April of 2013, Mother still did not call or write to [Child] between 

April 2013 and August 2013. During that time, Mother was 

neither incarcerated nor in a [r]ehabilitation [c]enter.
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Mother gave inconsistent testimony regarding calling 

[Child] between February 2013 and August 2013. Mother 

testified that in April of 2013, she was calling [Petitioners’] 

residence, but [Petitioners] would not answer the telephone. 

Then[,] Mother testified that she did not telephone [Petitioners]

to speak to [Child] between February 23, 2013 and August 23, 

2013.

The [trial court] finds that Mother did not attempt to call or 

write to [Child] while she was incarcerated. The [trial court] 

does not find Mother credible in testifying that she asked a male 

to call or that she had no funds to write a letter. Even after 

Mother was released from prison and the rehabilitation center, 

Mother still did not call or write to [Child] for the remaining four 

(4) months prior to the filing of the [termination petition].

[Based on the foregoing, the trial court finds that Mother] 

did not utilize [the] resources [available to her in prison] to 

maintain a place of importance in [Child’s] life. Thus, the [trial 

court] finds [that] Mother has refused or failed to perform any 

parental duties between February 23, 2013 and August 23, 2013 

and did not offer a reasonable explanation for not performing her 

parental duties.

The second line of inquiry is the post-abandonment contact 

between parent and child. There is credible testimony given by 

[Great Aunt] that Mother did not have any contact with [Child] 

six (6) months prior to filing the [termination petition] (between 

February [23,] 2013 and August 23, 2013)[.] [Child] has been 

living with [Great Aunt] since 2007. Mother testified that the 

only time she saw [Child] was when the families got together. 

Mother testified that she saw [Child] on one or two occasions in 

December of 2013 when [Child] and [Great Aunt] were visiting 

[Maternal Great Grandmother’s] home. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-11 (internal citations omitted).

After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s 

findings are supported by clear and convincing, competent evidence, and 

that it reasonably concluded that Mother, by her conduct during the sixmonth period preceding the filing of the termination petition, demonstrated 

a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child and/or her 
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refusal or failure to perform parental duties on Child’s behalf, in accordance 

with section 2511(a)(1). Further, to the extent that Mother is asking this 

Court to revisit the trial court’s determinations regarding the credibility of 

the testifying witnesses, we find that the trial court’s findings are supported 

by competent evidence of record and, accordingly, discern no abuse of 

discretion or error of law on the trial court’s part. See In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 506 (stating that “[t]he trial court, not the appellate 

court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the 

witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence.”) (internal citations omitted).

We now turn our attention to section 2511(b) and look to see if the 

trial court properly found that termination was in the best interest of Child. 

With respect to section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 

884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
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In its analysis of section 2511(b), the trial court explained:

The third line of inquiry. . . requires the [trial court] to 

review the evidence in support of termination under [section 

2511(b)]. . . . The [trial court] finds that [Child’s] physical 

needs are met by [Petitioners]. [Great Aunt] testified that [] she 

and [Great Uncle] take [Child] regularly to the pediatrician and 

that [Child’s] immunizations are up to date. [Great Aunt] 

testified that [Petitioners] own their home and [Child] has his 

own room. [Great Aunt] stated she prepares [Child’s] meals and 

also insures that [Child] has sufficient clothing to wear.

The [trial court] finds that [Petitioners] also meet [Child’s] 

developmental needs. [Great Aunt] testified that since [Child] is 

autistic and has ADHD, [Child] takes medications. [Child] also 

has a [Therapeutic Staff Support] worker who works with [Child] 

twenty (20) hours per week. [Child] has a behavioral specialist 

who comes to [Child’s] residence two (2) hours every two (2) 

weeks and who also works with [Child] once per week at 

[Child’s] school. [Great Aunt] testified that she works with a 

mobile therapist who assists [Child] once per week for two (2) 

hours at the house.

The [trial court] also finds that [Petitioners] meet [Child’s] 

emotional needs. [Great Aunt] testified that [Child] calls her 

“Mommy” and [Great Uncle], “Daddy.” [Petitioners] adopted 

[Child’s] sister who resides with them. According to [Great 

Aunt], [Child] is very loving to his sister and views her and 

[Petitioners] as his family. Also, when [Child] is upset, [Great 

Aunt] provides him emotional support. [Great Aunt] testified 

that she understands [Child’s] needs. [Great Aunt] testified that 

she knows how to calm [Child] down when he is upset and when 

he has tantrums. [Great Aunt] testified that she and [Great 

Uncle] work with a mobile therapist who teaches them how to 

address [Child’s] emotional issues.

According to [Great Aunt], there is no emotional bond 

between [Child] and [Mother]. [Great Aunt] testified that [Child] 

does not remember [Mother], nor does [Child] ask for her. 

According to [Great Aunt], [Child] does not say he misses 

[Mother]. [Great Aunt] testified that [Child] knows [Mother] is 

part of the family because [Maternal Grandmother] and 

[Maternal Great Grandmother] remind [Child] about [Mother]. 
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[Great Aunt] testified that [Child] calls her “Mommy” and 

[Mother], “Mommy [L].” Mother admitted that although she 

does believe there is still a bond between herself and [Child], the 

bond is now stronger between [Great Aunt] and [Child].

[Great Aunt] testified that she would like to adopt [Child] 

should the [trial court] terminate parental rights. [Great Aunt] 

emphasized that she and [Great Uncle] already adopted [Child’s] 

sister. [Great Aunt] testified that she loves [Child] and if she 

were to adopt him, she knows she will be legally and financially 

responsible for him. . . . [Great Uncle] also testified that it is 

[Petitioners’] intention to adopt [Child], and further understands 

that he would be financially responsible for [Child]. . . .

The [trial court] finds that [] Mother is not able to meet 

[Child’s] best interests or needs. In stark contrast, [Petitioners] 

have amply demonstrated they continue to meet [Child’s] 

physical, developmental and emotional needs and that [Child] 

has thrived under their care. [Child] needs and deserves a 

permanent home. The only way to provide this to [Child] is to 

terminate the rights of [] Mother. Clearly[,] it is in [Child’s] best 

interest to do so.

Trial Ct. Op. at 11-17 (internal citations omitted).

Here, our review of the record indicates that there is competent 

evidence to support the trial court’s decision that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights best serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare. Although Mother has expressed a willingness to fulfill 

her parental duties regarding Child’s needs and welfare, her failure to put 

herself in a position to develop a parental bond with Child as well as her 

complete absence throughout the majority of Child’s life illustrate her 

inability to do so. Moreover, the trial court found that Child has bonded with 

Petitioners, who are pre-adoptive, have served as Child’s foster parents 

since he was three years old, and ably provide for Child’s special needs. In 

fact, as noted by the trial court, Mother, by her own admission, confirmed 

that Child has a stronger bond with Great Aunt than with her. As such, we 
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find that it was appropriate for the trial court to determine that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would not have a detrimental effect 

on Child and would be in Child’s best interest. In consideration of these 

circumstances and our careful review of the record, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in finding 

competent evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

Child under section 2511(b).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 

decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2014
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