RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2022

TO BE PUBLISHED

1

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2020-SC-0520-I

2020-SC-0544-I

DAVID M. WARD; AND KENTUCKY

ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 

LAWYERS, INC.

APPELLANTS/

CROSS-APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

NO. 20-CI-00471

V.

SENATOR WHITNEY WESTERFIELD, IN HIS 

PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; 

MARSY’S LAW FOR KENTUCKY, LLC; AND 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL CAMERON

APPELLEES/

CROSS-APPELLANTS

AND 

SECRETARY OF STATE, EX REL. MICHAEL G. 

ADAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THE 

KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, 

EX REL. MICHAEL G. ADAMS, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF ELECTION 

OFFICIAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH; AND 

A.B. CHANDLER III, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN

APPELLEES/

CROSS-APPELLEES
2

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON

VACATING AND REMANDING

The parties appeal a ruling of the Franklin Circuit Court concerning the 

second attempt to include Marsy’s Law, an amendment related to crime 

victims’ rights, in the Kentucky Constitution. We accepted transfer from the 

Court of Appeals because this case raises important questions regarding a 

challenge to a constitutional ballot initiative. After careful review of the record, 

we conclude that Appellants’ claims must be dismissed for lack of standing. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2018, the General Assembly proposed, and Kentucky voters ratified, 

the constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law. After a legal challenge, 

this Court invalidated the 2018 amendment because the entire text of the 

proposed amendment was not placed on the ballot.1

In 2020, the General Assembly again proposed the Marsy’s Law 

constitutional amendment. Appellants2 sued the Secretary of State, the State 

Board of Elections, and the Chairperson of the State Board of Elections before 

the general election. The Complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief 

either prohibiting Marsy’s Law from appearing on the ballot or, in the 

alternative, preventing tabulation of votes on ratification of the amendment. 

1 Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2019) (hereinafter “Ward I”). 

2 The Appellants in this action are David M. Ward, a resident and taxpayer in

this Commonwealth, and the Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 

(“KACDL”), a nonprofit corporation advocating on behalf of attorneys engaged in the 

defense of criminal prosecutions in the Court of Justice (collectively “Appellants”).
3

Appellants also brought facial challenges to the legality of substantive 

provisions of Marsy’s Law.

The Kentucky Attorney General, Marsy’s Law for Kentucky, LLC, and 

Senator Whitney Westerfield intervened as co-defendants. The Plaintiffs and 

Intervening Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

In October 2020, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 

the Intervening Defendants. The trial court ruled in favor of the Intervening

Defendants on Plaintiffs’ procedural claims. Still, the trial court concluded that 

Appellants’ facial challenges to Marsy’s Law were not ripe because the 

amendment had not yet been ratified by Kentucky voters. The trial court 

withheld ruling on Appellants’ facial challenges and held those claims in 

abeyance. 

The parties filed cross-appeals. The Court of Appeals recommended 

transfer of those appeals to this Court. This Court accepted transfer and 

denied Appellants’ motion for emergency relief. In their response briefs to this 

Court, Appellees challenged the justiciability of Appellants’ claims. While this 

appeal was pending, Kentucky voters ratified the Marsy’s Law constitutional 

amendment. We now address the parties’ arguments on appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the trial court’s issuance of summary judgment de novo and 

any factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and
4

not clearly erroneous.”3 Whether Appellants have standing is a jurisdictional

question of law that is reviewed de novo.4

III. ANALYSIS

Section 112 of the Kentucky Constitution gives circuit courts original 

jurisdiction in all justiciable causes not vested in another court.5 This Court 

has held, and reaffirmed, that “the existence of a plaintiff's standing is a 

constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the courts of this 

Commonwealth.”6 We have adopted the federal standard for standing 

espoused in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.

7

To have constitutional standing, a “plaintiff must have suffered an injury 

in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”8 

The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of 

standing.9

3 Adams v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017). 

4 Commonwealth v. B.H., 548 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. 2018) (“Jurisdiction is a 

question of law, and our review is de novo.”).

5 “The Circuit Court shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not 

vested in some other court. It shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be 

provided by law.” Ky. Const. § 112(5).

6 Commonwealth Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Dep’t for Medicaid Servs. v. 

Sexton ex rel. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Ky. 2018); see 

also Beshear v. Ridgeway, ___S.W.3d___, 2021-SC-0225-I, 2022 WL 575442 at *1, 3 

(Ky. Feb. 24, 2022); Overstreet v. Mayberry, 603 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Ky. 2020); 

Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Ky. 2020). 

7 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560–61 (1992)).

8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

9 Id. at 561.
5

A. Appellants have not established constitutional standing as citizens 

and voters.

Appellants have not met their burden of establishing that the alleged

injuries harmed them in a concrete and particularized manner. Instead, 

Appellants’ claims constitute nonjusticiable generalized grievances because the 

harms they assert are shared in equal measure by all citizens of the 

Commonwealth. 

One of the major principles underlying the standing doctrine is the 

prohibition against “generalized grievances.”10 “[W]hen the asserted harm is a 

‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large 

class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of 

jurisdiction.”11 

Kentucky courts recognize the prohibition against generalized grievances. 

In Sexton, we explained that the prohibition against generalized grievances was 

one of “two major federal prudential standing principles.”12 Even before Sexton

both this Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized the prohibition 

against generalized grievances as part of our standing jurisprudence.13 And 

10 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 193.

11 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. 

Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998); Young v. Lundergan, No. 2015-CA-431-MR, 2016 WL 

1068978, at *4 (Ky. App. Mar. 18, 2016).

12 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 193.

13 See Lawson v. Attorney Gen., 415 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Ky. 2013) (explaining that 

standing can refer to various judicially-related limitations on the exercise of 

jurisdiction, such as barring adjudication of generalized grievances); Young, 2016 WL 

1068978, at *4 (holding that the injury alleged by a voter was a generalized grievance 

because it was common to other citizens); see also Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of 

Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 Ky. J. Equine, Agric. & Nat. Resources L.
6

after Sexton, our Court has reiterated that to have standing a plaintiff must 

have personally suffered some actual or threatened injury.14 

Moreover, persuasive federal authority is helpful in defining the 

parameters of the prohibition against generalized grievances. “To have 

standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects him [or her] in a 

‘personal and individual way.’”15 The litigant “must possess a ‘direct stake in 

the outcome’ of the case.”16 A litigant raising a generally available grievance 

about government, no matter how sincere, and claiming only harm to his and 

every other citizen’s interest in the proper application of the laws, does not 

state a justiciable case or controversy.17

Appellants contend that they have standing as citizens and voters. But 

Appellants’ Complaint does not assert standing based on status as a voter. 

The Complaint says that “Plaintiff David M. Ward is a resident of this 

Commonwealth who pays taxes to the Commonwealth.” Furthermore, the 

349, 369-70 (2016) (explaining that, before Sexton, standing in Kentucky appeared “to 

be a self-imposed restraint based on a prohibition against generalized grievances”).

14 Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 252.

15 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560). 

16 Id. (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)).

17 Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 

(2007) (per curiam ) (“Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized grievances has a 

lengthy pedigree.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (“[A]n asserted right to 

have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to 

confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 

(1923) (“The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that he 

has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not 

merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”).
7

Complaint does not allege that members of KACDL are voters. The Complaint 

is devoid of any mention of Appellants being harmed as voters.

Even accepting that Appellants are voters and citizens, Appellants do not 

allege a concrete and particularized injury. Appellants do not contend that 

they misunderstood the contents of the Marsy’s Law ballot question. Nor have 

Appellants argued that they are personally impacted by the substantive 

provisions in Marsy’s Law. Instead, Appellants advance hypothetical harms on 

behalf of unspecified injured voters and citizens. As such, Appellants have not 

established that they are impacted by Marsy’s Law in a “personal and 

individualized way.”

18

Appellants contend that “[a]ny adult citizen of Kentucky has standing to 

challenge the sufficiency of a proposed Constitutional amendment because 

every citizen will be affected by it after ratification.” But Appellants’ 

statement—that every adult citizen in Kentucky has standing to challenge the 

sufficiency of the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment—essentially concedes 

that their alleged injuries constitute nonjusticiable generalized grievances. 

Appellants admit that any Kentuckian could assert injuries identical to those 

contained in their Complaint. As such, Appellants are not directly affected by 

Marsy’s Law. 

Appellants invite this Court to create a special standing doctrine for 

voters alleging injury in the context of a constitutional ballot initiative. It is 

18 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 560).
8

true that Kentucky voters play a unique role in ratifying constitutional ballot 

initiatives. Yet, Appellants have cited no authority supporting their contention 

that voters challenging the procedural and substantive legality of constitutional 

ballot initiatives should be exempted from the requirement of alleging an injury 

in fact. The Kentucky Constitution limits the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts to 

justiciable causes. So we must decline Appellants’ invitation because the 

allegation of a concrete and particularized injury is a constitutional 

prerequisite to prosecution of any action in the courts of this Commonwealth.

Additionally, our holding in Ward I has no impact on our analysis of 

constitutional standing here. In Ward I, we considered whether this Court had 

authority to address the parties’ claims on the merits based on separation of 

powers.19 This Court did not, however, directly analyze whether Ward or 

KACDL had constitutional standing under Sexton and its progeny. While 

constitutional standing was raised before the circuit court in Ward I, the issue 

of constitutional standing was abandoned on appeal.20 As such, we assumed, 

without deciding, that KACDL had standing based on the same standing 

arguments advanced by Appellants in Ward I.

21 Since we did not render a 

ruling on constitutional standing in Ward I, the issue of constitutional standing

related to these Appellants presents an issue of first impression for our Court. 

19 Ward I, 599 S.W.3d at 744–46.

20 Id. at 746 n.16.

21 Id.
9

We recognize that at least one case from this Court, Fletcher v. Wilson,

22

suggests that voters may have pre-election standing to challenge ballot 

access.23 Fletcher held that two duly qualified Democratic Party electors had 

standing to challenge primary election ballot access of four Democratic 

candidates for local office.24 But the holding in Fletcher has no direct impact 

on the question of constitutional standing in this case. 

First, the subject matter and scope of the alleged injury in Fletcher is 

distinct from this case. Fletcher dealt with whether voters had pre-election 

standing to challenge primary ballot access of candidates for local office. 

Essentially, Fletcher and its progeny stand for the proposition that questions of 

“eligibility for a candidate for nomination or election should . . . be determined 

before the voting takes place.”25 Alternatively, this case deals with procedural 

and facial challenges to a constitutional ballot initiative that can be brought by 

any citizen in the Commonwealth. Fletcher neither held that voters enjoy 

special constitutional standing in the context of election challenges nor 

evaluated standing in the context of a voter challenge to a constitutional ballot 

initiative. Instead, Fletcher’s analysis was limited to the narrow question of 

22 495 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1973).

23 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 118.176 allows for challenges to a 

candidate’s bona fide qualifications prior to an election. We do not consider statutory 

standing to challenge ballot access or question a candidate’s qualifications in this 

decision. 

24 Fletcher, 495 S.W.2d at 794–75.

25 Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
10

whether the voters and citizens in that case had standing pre-election to 

challenge candidate ballot access. 

Second, Fletcher was decided in 1973, decades before we clarified our 

standing jurisprudence in Sexton. In Sexton, we made clear that constitutional 

standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bring a justiciable cause of action. 

As a result, all litigants, including voters, must allege a concrete and 

particularized injury-in-fact to invoke the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts. 

Concluding that Appellants have standing to challenge the Marsy’s Law ballot 

initiative based on Fletcher would constitute a sweeping expansion of the 

holding in Fletcher and would be squarely inconsistent with Sexton and the 

series of recent cases from this Court that have followed its rule. 

Similarly, the holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Chandler v. 

Winchester26 has no impact on the question presented here. Chandler

examined whether the Attorney General could challenge a constitutional ballot 

initiative concerning the budgets of local governments under Kentucky Revised 

Statute (KRS) 120.280. The Court of Appeals concluded that the fifteen-day 

post-election limitation period for contesting a constitutional ballot initiative in 

KRS 120.280(1) applied and that the Attorney General’s challenge to the 

election two years later was time-barred.27 That case is irrelevant here because 

26 973 S.W.3d 78 (Ky. App. 1998).

27 Id. at 82.
11

there is no evidence or allegation that Appellants challenged the Marsy’s Law 

amendment under KRS 120.280.28 

Furthermore, the fact that Appellants sought declaratory relief has no 

bearing on constitutional standing in this matter. It is true that “[t]he 

[Declaratory Judgment] Act allows courts to determine a litigant's rights before 

harm occurs.”29 Even so, litigants may not establish constitutional standing by 

simply seeking declaratory relief. Instead, “[a]n actual, justiciable controversy 

is a condition precedent to an action under our Declaratory Judgment Act.”30 

As such, Appellants must have constitutional standing to bring an action, 

regardless of the type of relief sought.

Lastly, the concept of irreparable harm is irrelevant to the question of 

constitutional standing. Appellants cite persuasive federal authority for the 

proposition that deprivation of constitutional rights causes irreparable harm. 

The authorities cited by Appellants stand for the proposition “that when 

reviewing a motion for a preliminary injunction, if it is found that a 

28 We do not consider the existence of statutory standing under KRS 120.280 

because we are unaware of any statutory contest to the Marsy’s Law constitutional 

ballot initiative under KRS 120.280(1). 

29 Commonwealth v. Ky. Ret. Sys., 396 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Ky. 2013). 

30 Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 68 (Ky. 2021) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). Cameron supports the proposition that constitutional standing is 

an essential element of a justiciable cause of action, even in declaratory judgment 

actions. See id. at 68. Additionally, in Cameron, we considered the narrow question of 

when the Governor may sue to challenge an infringement of his asserted 

constitutional authority. The questions presented by this case—whether these 

Appellants have constitutional and taxpayer standing to bring procedural and facial 

challenges to a constitutional ballot initiative—are markedly different than the issues 

presented in Cameron. 
12

constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a finding of irreparable 

injury is mandated.”31 So, if a constitutional right is being threatened or 

impaired, it will satisfy the first factor of the four-factor federal 

preliminary-injunction standard. But this case is not before the Court on

review of a preliminary injunction. The relevant question on appeal is whether 

Appellants have suffered a sufficiently personal and direct injury to confer 

constitutional standing—not whether Appellants demonstrated that they would 

suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. 

That is not to say that no citizens or voters have standing to bring similar 

claims. At oral argument, Appellees conceded that a voter alleging that that he

or she misunderstood a constitutional ballot question would likely have 

standing to challenge a constitutional ballot proposal. That same voter may 

have the ability to bring a pre-election challenge once the ballot question is 

finalized or published. Additionally, a criminal defendant, crime victim, or 

other participant in the criminal-justice process may have standing to 

challenge the substantive provisions of Marsy’s Law. Finally, certain 

government officials, such as the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and

members of the Board of Elections may have standing to challenge procedural 

defects surrounding enactment of a constitutional ballot initiative. We need 

not resolve such advisory questions here. Our analysis in this case is limited 

to whether these Appellants have standing as citizens and voters on this record. 

31 Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see 

also 11A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2020).
13

Ultimately, Appellants lack standing as citizens and voters because they have 

not demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury that is not shared with 

all Kentucky citizens and voters.

B. Appellants have not demonstrated that they have taxpayer standing.

Appellants also contend that they have standing as taxpayers. It is true 

that Kentucky courts recognize taxpayer standing in certain circumstances as 

a matter of equity.

32 Most cases involving taxpayer standing involve litigants 

suing governmental entities or their agents to challenge the propriety of city, 

county, or state expenditure of public funds.33 

Of course, since government revenue is generated by taxes, all 

government action necessarily involves some tangential relationship to taxes 

and the expenditure of public funds. But that fact alone cannot confer 

taxpayer standing. Our concept of constitutional standing would be 

eviscerated if litigants could challenge any government action based on an 

attenuated relationship between the harm alleged as a result of the government 

action and the general expenditure of public funds to support government 

functions. Rather, justiciability in the context of a taxpayer’s action requires 

that the taxpayer represents an interest that is direct, pecuniary, and 

substantial.34 

32 See Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 194 n.33; see also Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263.

33 See Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263. 

34 Cooper v. Kentuckian Citizen, 258 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ky. 1953); see also 

Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–35 (1952); 

Rosenbalm v. Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, 838 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Ky. App. 1992).
14

Here, Appellants do not have an interest that is sufficiently direct, 

pecuniary, and substantial to invoke taxpayer standing. In their procedural 

claims, Appellants argue that the Legislature failed to follow Kentucky law 

concerning the enactment and referral of the Marsy’s Law ballot initiative to 

Kentucky voters; therefore, Appellants contend that no election should have 

been held and any resulting expenditure of public funds to place the initiative 

on the ballot was improper. But Appellants’ procedural claims are too 

attenuated from the expenditure of public funds for the invocation of taxpayer 

standing. Appellants have no direct, pecuniary, or substantial interest in the 

expenditure of public funds on the alleged illegal election that is not shared in 

equal part with every taxpayer in this Commonwealth.

Additionally, Appellants do not actually challenge the propriety of any 

expenditure of public funds in any of their facial challenges. For instance, 

Appellants note that Marsy’s Law grants victims the right to representation by 

counsel but contend that Marsy’s Law is unclear if counsel must be appointed 

for indigent victims and, if so, how appointed counsel will be compensated. 

Appellants acknowledge that it is unclear if counsel must be appointed for 

indigent victims in criminal matters under Marsy’s Law. Thus, by Appellants’ 

own admission, it is unclear if any expenditure of public funds is required in 

order to implement this provision of Marsy’s Law. 

Furthermore, Appellants acknowledge that no such expenditure of public 

funds has been made. Appellants do not challenge government funding of 

counsel for indigent victims. Instead, they complain that the General Assembly 
15

failed to make an appropriation to support appointment of counsel to indigent 

victims. As a result, this facial claim does not challenge the propriety of the 

expenditure of public funds.

Appellants cite Stiglitz v. Schardien35 and its progeny for the proposition 

that taxpayers have standing to challenge a legislative act that infringes upon 

the rights of a citizen, taxpayer, and voter. Stiglitz, a 1931 case, held that 

citizens, taxpayers, and voters had standing to challenge acts that 

reapportioned state legislative districts because the acts infringed on citizens’ 

right to equal representation.36 But the Stiglitz court did not discuss citizen, 

voter, and taxpayer standing as distinct concepts. Stiglitz did not hold that 

taxpayers have blanket standing to challenge any legislative act regardless of 

the existence of a pecuniary interest in the challenged expenditure of public 

funds. Instead, Stiglitz’s holding on standing in the context of a challenge to 

redistricting legislation relies heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs were citizens 

and voters, not that those plaintiffs were taxpayers.37 As such, Stiglitz provides 

little support for Appellants’ arguments that they have taxpayer standing in 

this case.38 

35 40 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1931).

36 Id. at 317–18.

37 See Beauchamp v. Silk, 120 S.W.2d 765, 766–67 (Ky. 1938) (“That (Stiglitz) 

case, perhaps involved more of a political than a pecuniary right of the plaintiff 

therein[.]”).

38 Beauchamp cites Stiglitz for the proposition that citizens, taxpayers, and 

voters have standing to bring a lawsuit to prevent enforcement of a void legislative act. 

See Beauchamp, 120 S.W.2d at 766–67. But Beauchamp is unpersuasive for the same 

reasons as Stiglitz. Neither case engages in any reasoned analysis about 

constitutional and taxpayer standing as distinct doctrines. And neither case 
16

Appellants also cite State Text-Book Commission v. Weathers39 in support 

of their contention that they have taxpayer standing. In Weathers, a private 

citizen sought a writ of mandamus alleging that the state text-book commission 

violated numerous provisions of the statute defining the commission’s duties.40 

The Court concluded that Weathers had standing to bring the mandamus 

action as a private citizen seeking to enforce a public duty owed to the public.41 

In so holding, the Court noted that the petition did not allege that Weathers 

was a taxpayer.42 Instead, the petition “allege[d] his citizenship in the state, 

and that he [was] a patron of its common schools, the first showing him to be a 

member of the state, and the last showing him to have a direct interest in the 

maintenance of its common schools, saying nothing of his being a contributor 

to the expense of such maintenance.”

43 Weathers did not hold that taxpayers 

have blanket standing to challenge a legislative act without showing some 

special of pecuniary interest in the alleged improper expenditure of public 

funds. As a result, Weathers is unavailing here.

Of course, constitutional and taxpayer standing are not dissonant 

concepts. Under Kentucky law, taxpayer standing may be properly invoked in 

considered taxpayer standing in the context of a challenge to a constitutional ballot 

initiative. As such, neither Stiglitz nor Beauchamp is dispositive on the issue of 

taxpayer standing. 

39 213 S.W. 207 (Ky. 1919). 

40 Id. at 208.

41 Id. at 209.

42 Id.

43 Id.
17

circumstances in which a litigant challenges the propriety of expenditure of 

public funds.44 Still, it bears repeating that litigants seeking to invoke taxpayer 

standing must demonstrate that they represent an interest that is direct, 

pecuniary, and substantial.45 A direct, pecuniary, and substantial interest on 

the part of these Appellants is lacking here. 

In sum, Appellants have neither cited nor are we aware of any authority 

granting taxpayer standing in similar circumstances to those presented here. 

As such, Appellants do not have standing as taxpayers to bring their asserted 

claims.46

C. Our holding on standing here has no impact on our prior decision in 

Ward I. 

Our conclusion that Appellants lack standing in this action has no 

impact on the precedential effect of our decision in Ward I. It is true that Ward 

I involved similar claims and included similarly situated parties as those in this 

action. Even so, the issues of constitutional and taxpayer standing were 

neither challenged nor discussed in Ward I. The existence of unaddressed 

jurisdictional defects in a previous action has no precedential effect.47 At 

bottom, Ward I and the present case involve two closely related, yet distinct 

44 See Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 194 n.33; see also Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263.

45 See Cooper v. Kentuckian Citizen, 258 S.W.2d at 696.

46 Appellants have not asserted associational or representative standing on the 

part of Appellant KACDL. As a result, we do not consider associational or 

representative standing here.

47 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[S]tanding was neither 

challenged nor discussed in that case, and we have repeatedly held that the existence 

of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”).
18

constitutional ballot initiatives. In Ward I, this Court reached a final, nonappealable judgment, which remains good law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Appellants lack 

constitutional standing to bring their claims because Appellants failed to allege 

a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact on this record. Appellants have 

also failed to demonstrate that they have taxpayer standing. As a result, 

Appellants’ claims constitute nonjusticiable generalized grievances. The 

judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded 

with instruction to dismiss the action in its entirety without prejudice.

All sitting. Conley, Hughes, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., concur. 

VanMeter, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion.

VANMETER, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: In Sexton, we 

established the mandatory constitutional requirement that 

justiciability/standing is properly considered at every level of the judicial 

process. 566 S.W.3d at 196-97. We decided Ward I nine months later.48

Notwithstanding the Sexton mandate, we glossed over and ignored 

jurisdictional standing in Ward I and proceeded to decide the merits.49 

48 Sexton was initially rendered in September 2018; Ward I was initially 

rendered in June 2019. Petitions for rehearing were filed and denied in each case, but 

Sexton was finally decided four months before the initial rendition date for Ward I.

49 Ward I contains the statement language that “we find the constitutional 

challenges to the proposed amendment in this case to be justiciable.” 599 S.W.3d at 

745. But that holding was to address Sen. Westerfield’s argument that the proposal 

and adoption of a constitutional amendment was a non-justiciable political question. 
19

Admittedly, we noted that the challenges to standing had been dropped, 599 

S.W.3d at 746 n. 16, but this implicit affirmation of standing comported with 

longstanding recognition of voter standing to challenge ballot access. See 

Fletcher v Wilson, 495 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1973) (discussing case law back to 

1913); see also Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966) (addressing 

pre-election challenge to proposed revision to the Kentucky constitution). The 

standing issue in this case, voter standing to challenge ballot access of 

constitutional amendment, is functionally no different than the standing issue 

directly addressed in Fletcher, i.e., voter standing to challenge a candidate’s 

ballot access. I would recognize the appellants’ standing in this case, 

independently of any statutory challenge under KRS 120.250. 

That noted, I concur in the majority’s result which tacitly upholds the 

amendment as approved by the voters of the Commonwealth, since, as 

practical matter, no one will have properly challenged its enactment. My 

review of the briefs and the record is that the appellants’ challenge fails on the 

merits.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE DAVID M. WARD:

J. David Niehaus

Virginia H. Snell

Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF 

CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, INC.:

Michael R. Mazzoli

Cox & Mazzoli, PLLC
20

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT MARSY’S LAW FOR 

KENTUCKY, LLC:

John C. Roach

W. Keith Ransdell

Ransdell, Roach & Royse, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT SENATOR WHITNEY 

WESTERFIELD:

David Fleenor

General Counsel

Office of the Senate President

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF 

KENTUCKY EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL CAMERON:

Matthew F. Kuhn

Brett R. Nolan

Office of the Solicitor General

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLEE MICHAEL G. ADAMS, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE:

R. Kent Westberry

Bridget M. Bush

Landrum & Shouse LLP

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLEE A.B. CHANDLER, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS:

Taylor A. Brown

General Counsel

State Board of Elections