alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

      We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-38528, 333-41718, 333-53206 and 333-53202)
and the related Prospectuses pertaining to the registration of $196,250,000
of 4 3/4% convertible subordinated notes due March 7, 2007 and 3,074,091
shares of common stock issuable upon conversion of the notes, the
registration of an aggregate amount of $220,000,000 of common stock and the
registration of an aggregate amount of $300,000,000 of debt and equity
securities, and in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-19389,
333-44717, 333-43560, 333-49026 and 333-54526) pertaining to the 1992 Stock
Option Plan, the 1994 Equity Incentive Plan, the Non-Employee Directors'
Stock Option Plan, the Nonstatutory Stock Options, the 2000 Nonstatutory
Incentive Plan, the 2000 Equity Incentive Plan and the Employee Stock
Purchase Plan of CV Therapeutics, Inc., of our report dated February 20,
2001, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of CV
Therapeutics, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended December 31, 2000.

                                          /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Palo Alto, California
March 29, 2001
#### George Huston and J. S. Taylor *v.*J. B. Drury.

Attorney and Client — Excessive Eee in Divorce Proceedings.

Though the evidence may show the services of attorneys for the wife, in divorce proceedings, to be worth $300, in the absence of evidence as to the ability of the husband to make such a payment in that the estate is not ample, the court will not reverse the court below for an allowance of only $150.

APPEAL EROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT.

*634September 17, 1868.

James, *Huston*& Taylor, *for appellant.*

Hughes¡, *for appellee.*

Opinion op the Oourt by

Judge Peters :

Upon a joint proceeding of appellants, not being partners, by motion against appelle to recover three hundred dollars for services rendered his wife as her attorneys in defending a suit brought by him against her for divorce; the court below adjudged he should pay them one hundred and fifty dollars, half the amount claimed by them,' and to correct that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Whilst appellants have shown by the evidence what the services rendered Mrs. Drury in defending the suit were reasonably worth three hundred dollars, or one hundred and fifty dollars each, still an allowance of three hundred dollars to them against appellee could not be made without a departure from the principle settled by this court in the case of *Burgess vs.*Burgess, *1st Duvall 287,*for which we see no -sufficient reason, especially as the evidence does not show that appellee’s estate is ample.

Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jerry L. Black, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc., 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC 

Civil Action No. CV-17-03448-PHX-DGC 

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

To: Freese & Goss PLLC - Birmingham, AL 

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff) 

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. 

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. 

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. 

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/26/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent. 

Date: November 6, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr. 

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party 

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons 

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599) 

Printed Name 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363 

Address 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

E-mail Address 

(404) 322-6155 

Telephone number 

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8717 Filed 11/08/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8717 Filed 11/08/17 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WORKFORCE COVENTRY INDUSTRIES CORP FOR THE SIX
MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          16,032
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,699,914
<ALLOWANCES>                                   148,300
<INVENTORY>                                  1,942,066
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,576,419
<PP&E>                                       3,483,630
<DEPRECIATION>                                 489,650
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,545,592
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,521,970
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        221
<COMMON>                                         2,952
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,767,603
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,545,592
<SALES>                                      7,766,881
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,766,881
<CGS>                                        6,004,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,004,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,776,657
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             131,913
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,102,425)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,102,425)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,102,425)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.76)
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 13

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the Annual Report on December 31, 2004 for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Paulo Guilherme Aguiar Cunha, the Chief Executive Officer, and Fabio Schvartsman, the Chief Financial Officer of Ultrapar Participações S.A., each certifies that, to the best of their respective knowledge:

|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                              
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Ultrapar Participações S.A.
|  

|São Paulo, June
        24,
          2005
|------------------------------------------
|                                          
|                                          
|                                          
|By:                                       
|                                          
|Name:                                     
|Title:                                    
|                                          
|                                          
|By:                                       
|                                          
|Name:                                     
|Title:
#### M. Oanpelt *v.*Blount Hodge.

Attachment — Grounds for — Bill of Sale — Fraudulent Intent to Prefer Creditors

M. Oanpelt, having agreed to mortgage certain property to Hodge, his creditor, as collateral security, shortly thereafter by bill of sale, transferred all his property to one Kuglar, but possession not actually having been delivered. This was done in seeming contemplation of the removal from the State of said Oanpelt before the expiration of his lease from Hodge. Held to be sufficient to sustain an attachment by the creditor, Hodge.

APPEAL FROM! LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT.

April 26, 1868.

Husbands, *Bush*& Bush, Lmdsey, *for appellant.*

Bennett, *for appellee.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Robertson :

As the decision of this case depends on a multitude of facts respecting which the testimony is apparently conflicting, a detail and analysis of the evidence are deemed useless in this opinion.

We shall therefore content ourselves with the following judicial conclusions:

1. The bill of sale to Kuglar was intended to protect the property ostensibly transferred by it from the appellee’s demand.

2. That bill of sale being made after the agreement to mortgage the sale property to the appellee as collateral security, and the possession moreover being inconsistently retained by Oanpelt, must be deemed fraudulent as against the appellee.

3. The evidence authorized the deduction that the Oanpelts secretly contemplated a removal from the State before the expiration of the lease, and were selling property and trying to borrow money preparatory to that removal and for evading the payment of the debt to the appellee and, without payment, thus avoiding all liability on the lease.

Wherefore this court adjudges, as the circuit court did, that the attachment was sustained by the proof. And consequently the judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kathleen Casci,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03565-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Curtis Law Group

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/11/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 18, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8290 Filed 10/20/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8290 Filed 10/20/17 Page 2 of 2
#### William T. Dudley *v.*John W. Jeffries et al. William T. Dudley *v.*W. K. Wall's Heirs et al.

Decretal Sale — Resale—Vested Rights.

Where real estate has been regularly and fairly sold at a fair price, the first bidder, having no vested rights before confirmation, cannot complain at a second sale, at which another bids more than he is willing to give.

APPEAL PROM PLBMING CIRCUIT COURT.

October 16, 1868.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Kobertson:

Whatever we may think of the propriety of a chancellor’s opening bidding when, under his decree, real estate has been regularly and fairly sold at a fair price, the first bidder, having no vested right before confirmation, has no just cause of complaint when, at *460the second sale, another person bid much more than he was willing to give.

*Wadsworth, for appellant.*

*Stanton*& Throop, *for appellees.*

And, under such circumstances, this court cannot reverse the order opening the bidding, but must adjudge that the last sale was properly confirmable.

Wherefore, the judgments are approved.
National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center

Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812

October 23, 2023 

Reply to Attn of: LS01 (AMM) 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: Pamela A. Bourque 

SUBJECT: Approval for NASA Employees to Attend the Blue Origin-KBR 

Reception Following the Von Braun Memorial Dinner 

In accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(2) and (3), I make the following determination: 

Several NASA employees have been invited to attend the Blue Origin-KBR Reception 

(Reception) following the Von Braun Memorial Dinner. The Reception will be held on 

October 25, 2023, from 9:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. at Baker & Able at the 106 Jefferson Hotel in 

Huntsville. 

This event will be a widely attended gathering of aerospace industry members, federal 

government representatives, local elected officials, academia, and other guests from the 

community. The cost for refreshments is estimated at $40 per person. Approximately 100 

people are expected to attend. This event is sponsored by Blue Origin and KBR, both of 

which are NASA contractors. I find that the event meets the requirements of a “widely 

attended gathering” as defined in 5 CFR § 2635.204(g)(2). 

I have determined that free attendance of NASA employees is in the interest of the agency 

because it will further agency programs and operations. Their attendance at the event will 

help to raise NASA’s profile with state and federal governmental leaders, contribute to 

community relations, and will support NASA’s statutory mandate to disseminate information 

about its programs. 

Given the purpose of the event, NASA’s interest in it, the broad attendance anticipated, and 

the reasonable market value of the event, I have determined that the value to the agency in 

having these employees attend this event outweighs any concern that free attendance may or 

may appear to improperly influence them in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, 

these NASA employees may accept free attendance to the Reception. They may also accept 

invitations for an accompanying spouse or guest. 

NASA employees whose duties may substantially affect Blue Origin or KBR are not covered 

in this determination and should seek a specific determination from this office pursuant to 5 

CFR § 2635.204(g)(3)(i) regarding their participation in this event. 
Note: Employees who have duties related to the ESSCA II procurement, where KBR is an 

interested party, are not covered by this memo and may not attend this event. 

Blue Origin and KBR are lobbying organizations and as such NASA employees who are in 

non-career positions for which Executive Order 13770 requires the signing of an ethics 

pledge may attend only if they make arrangements with the sponsor to reimburse the $40 cost 

of the ticket for themselves and their spouse or guest. 

Questions about this determination may be addressed to Annette Metcalf Coffel at 

256-544-0025. 

Pamela A. Bourque 

Acting Chief Counsel
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10

- 2108

___________

GLENN GATES; DONNA GATES, H/W,

ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

v.

ROHM AND HAAS COMPANY; MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC, ;

ROHM AND HAAS CHEMICALS LLC;

HUNTSMAN; HUNTSMAN POLYURETHANES;

MODINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY

Glenn Gates, Donna Gates,

Appellants

_____________________________

ORDER AMENDING OPINION

_____________________________

It appears that the address and firm info rmation listed for Louis C. Ricciardi, Esq.

on the precedential opinion filed in this case on August 25, 2011 is incorrect

. Accordingly, it is hereby O R D E R E D that the opinion is hereby amended to reflect the

correct information as follows:

LOUIS C. RICCIARDI, E SQUIRE (ARGUED)

Law Office of Louis C. Ricciardi, P.C.

1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 200

Philadelphia, PA, 19102

For the Court,

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

Date: September 6, 2011cc: Aaron J. Friewald, Esq.

Louis C. Ricciardi, Esq.

Nilam A. Sanghvi, Esq.

Samuel W. Silver, Esq.

Carl A. Solano, Esq.

Ralph G. Wellington, Esq.
EXHIBIT 10(K)(2)

                                AMENDMENT NO. 1
                                      TO
                               XEROX CORPORATION
                   DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN FOR DIRECTORS
                        1997 AMENDMENT AND RESTATEMENT

                                  WITNESSETH:
                                  ----------

WHEREAS, Xerox Corporation (the "Company") has adopted the Xerox Corporation
Deferred Compensation Plan For Directors, 1997 Amendment and Restatement (the
"Plan");

WHEREAS, the Company has determined to amend the Plan to allow Participants to
select beneficiary(s) in the event of their death either during service on the
Board of Directors or following retirement from the Board and to permit the
selection of any beneficiary(ies) selected by the Participant without
limitation; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18 of the Plan the Vice President responsible for
human resources of the Company is authorized to amend the Plan;

NOW, THEREFORE, subsections (d), (e) and (f) of Section 9 of the Plan be and
hereby are amended to read in their entirety as follows:

     "(d)  Upon termination of service on the Board of Directors, other than
termination resulting from death, prior to retirement, the total value of the
Participant's Accounts under the Plan shall be paid to the Participant as soon
as administratively possible after his or her date of termination.

     (e)  Upon the death of a Participant either before or after retirement the
total value of the Participant's Accounts under the Plan shall be paid in
accordance with an election made by such Participant in a lump sum or in
installments, as appropriate, from the Accounts established under Section 8 to
the beneficiary(ies) designated by the Participant.

     (f)  If a Participant dies either before or after retirement without
having made such an election, the total value of his or her Accounts under the
Plan shall be paid in a single payment to the Participant's estate as soon as
administratively possible after notice of his or her date of death has been
received by the Administrator."

This amendment is effective as of the date hereof.  In all other respects the
Plan shall remain unchanged.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be signed as of
the 1st day of January 1998.

                                          XEROX CORPORATION

                                          By:   /s/ Hector Motroni
                                              -----------------------
                                                   Vice President

Attest:

By:   Martin S. Wagner
      --------------------
      Assistant Secretary
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DANIEL SCARAFILE.

June 19, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE v. SMITH

No. 521A01

Case below: 146 N.C. App.-1

Petition by Attorney General for writ of supersedeas allowed 8 November 2001. Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 8 November 2001.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALBERT DOCKS.

July 2, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.