UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT

LORI MARTINEZ, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

No. 14-2124 

(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00538-JCH-GBW) 

(D.N.M.) 

DARREN HOOKER, ROOSEVELT 

COUNTY SHERIFF, individually; 

JAVIER SANCHEZ, individually; 

and CHARLIE SMART, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Lori Martinez was arrested on the evening of June 12, 2012, under a bench 

warrant issued by the City of Portales municipal court judge. The warrant 

 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, 

for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without 

oral argument. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 4, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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authorized the arrest of “Lori Teel” for failing to appear in court for fines relating 

to overdue library books. The warrant, issued on May 17, 2011, stated Teel’s date 

of birth as December 3, 1981, and her address as 2200 S. Ave. I Portales, NM 

88130. We accept the following summary of facts from the United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico’s Memorandum Opinion and Order: 

On June 12, 2012, Jimmy Teel was a suspect in a criminal 

investigation conducted by the Defendants in this case, all of whom 

are members of the Roosevelt County Sheriff’s Department. They 

apprehended and arrested Mr. Teel outside the apartments where he 

lived. During the arrest, Martinez approached the scene and asked 

why her husband was being arrested. She identified herself as “Lori 

Martinez,” said that she was married to Mr. Teel, and gave her date 

of birth as December 3, 1981. Defendant Javier Sanchez called his 

dispatcher with this information, and they informed him that while 

there were no warrants for a “Lori Martinez,” there was an 

outstanding bench warrant for “Lori Teel” with the same date of 

birth as Martinez. The dispatcher also informed Sanchez that the 

address on the bench warrant was 2200 S. Ave. I, Portales, NM 

88130. Sanchez asked Martinez if she had ever lived at that address. 

Martinez said that she had previously lived at the Baptist Children’s 

Home, but could not remember the address. The dispatcher informed 

Sanchez that the address at issue matched with the Baptist Children’s 

Home. Next, Sanchez asked Martinez if she ever went by the name 

“Lori Teel,” which she denied. However, Martinez did confirm that 

she had been married to Jimmy Teel for two years. There is a fact 

dispute as to whether or not Martinez admitted checking out 

materials from the city library—Sanchez asserts that she admitted 

that she did, and Martinez contends that she did not. There is also a 

fact dispute as to whether or not Mr. Teel told the Defendants that 

his wife went by the name “Lori Teel.” Due to “manpower issues,” 

Sanchez asked a City of Portales police officer, Raul Rosa, to 

execute the warrant and arrest Martinez. However, after speaking 

with Martinez, Officer Rosa concluded that he lacked sufficient 

evidence to confirm that Martinez was the “Lori Teel” identified in 

the warrant. As a result, he declined to arrest Martinez. After 

checking with his supervisors, Sanchez arrested Martinez based upon 

the outstanding bench warrant for Lori Teel. 

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Appellant’s App. vol. I at 8–9. After spending a night in jail, Martinez posted 

the cash bail bond. For reasons unknown, the City Attorney dismissed the charges 

a few days later. 

 On August 9, 2012, Martinez filed a lawsuit in the Ninth Judicial District 

Court against the City of Portales and the City Manager. Martinez v. City of 

Portales, et al., Civ. No. 12-933 WJ/GBW (“Martinez I”). She alleged 

negligence, violation of due process and equal protection, failure to train, and 

municipal liability for an unconstitutional custom or policy. The defendants 

removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New 

Mexico. 

 The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The 

court held that the bench warrant was facially valid and that the deputies from the 

Sheriff’s Department (the defendants in this case) had probable cause to arrest 

Martinez. Martinez filed her notice to appeal the court’s grant of summary 

judgment with this court, but the parties settled the case before the appeal was 

resolved. 

 Apparently dissatisfied with the settlement in her first case, Martinez filed a 

new complaint in the Ninth Judicial District Court (“Martinez II”). She based her 

claims on the same factual allegations that she pleaded in Martinez I, although 

she sued different defendants: Darren Hooker, Javier Sanchez, and Charlie Smart, 

all of whom are employees of the Sheriff’s Department (“Defendants”). In 

Martinez II, Martinez asserts three claims: (1) an unconstitutional policy or 

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custom of the municipality that resulted in an unreasonable seizure of her person 

and arrest without probable cause; (2) a § 1983 claim against Defendants in their 

official capacities for unreasonable seizure and arrest without probable cause; and 

(3) false arrest and false imprisonment. After Defendants removed the case to 

federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants. It held that (1) Martinez was barred by issue preclusion from 

litigating this case because the court in Martinez I had found there was probable 

cause for Martinez’s arrest and the bench warrant was facially valid, and (2) her 

claims against Defendants in their official capacities failed because their actions 

as individual state actors did not constitute a constitutional violation or custom by 

the governmental agency. Martinez timely appealed. 

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Cooperman 

v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is 

appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). We apply this standard by viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Foster v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187, 

1192 (10th Cir. 2002). 

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B. Issue Preclusion

The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents a party from “relitigating an issue 

once it has suffered an adverse determination on the issue, even if the issue arises 

when the party is pursuing or defending against a different claim.” Park Lake 

Res. Ltd. Liab. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agr., 378 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004); see 

also Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006). Issue preclusion 

bars reconsideration of an issue that has been previously decided in an earlier 

action when the following elements are met: 

(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in 

the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally 

adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is 

invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior 

adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. 

Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab., 378 F.3d at 1136; Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 

1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000). The district court held that all four elements were 

satisfied, barring Martinez’s claims involving probable cause and the validity of 

the bench warrant. We agree that Martinez is barred by issue preclusion from 

raising her claims. 

 Martinez sets forth two arguments. First, she contends that the issues are 

distinct because Martinez I involved the City’s underlying policies that existed 

before her arrest of seeking to use the municipal court as a collection agency, 

while Martinez II involves her actual arrest. Second, she argues that she did not 

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have a full and fair opportunity to litigate her issues in Martinez I because it was 

settled before this court decided the appeal. 

 As a preliminary argument, the Defendants contend that Martinez did not 

challenge in the district court the first element of issue preclusion, whether the 

issues are identical, and so she should not be able to assert it for the first time on 

appeal. “When an issue has not been properly raised below, ‘to preserve the 

integrity of the appellate structure, we should not be considered a ‘second-shot’ 

forum . . . where secondary, back-up theories may be mounted for the first time.’” 

Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 

1997)); Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 128 F.3d 1380, 1386 (10th Cir. 1997) 

(“We will consider matters not raised or argued in the trial court only in the most 

unusual circumstances which may include . . . instances where public interest is 

implicated . . . or where manifest injustice would result.”) (internal quotations 

omitted) (citations omitted). Because Martinez did not challenge the first element 

of issue preclusion in the district court, we will not entertain it here.1

 Thus, on 

appeal, we consider only the fourth element. As explained below, we hold that 

Martinez had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her issues in Martinez I and so 

is barred from raising these issues on appeal. 

 1

 The district court in Martinez I found that the Defendants had a facially valid bench 

warrant for Lori Teel’s arrest, and that they had reason to believe that Martinez was Lori 

Teel. Those are the same issues in Martinez II. 

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Martinez argues that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues 

in Martinez I. The doctrine of issue preclusion bars attack on a judgment only when the 

issue in question has been fully and fairly litigated in the prior proceeding. Bell v. Dillard 

Dep’t Stores, Inc., 85 F.3d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Murdock v. 

Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 689 (10th Cir. 1992). 

She claims that because her case settled on appeal, before the court decided the merits, 

she did not fully and fairly litigate the issue in that proceeding. She alleges that her “lack 

of opportunity to appeal [the] issue establishes that there has not been a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate it.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. 

She submits Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1991), in support of her 

argument. But the case offers her no help. In Dixon, this court held that the district court 

correctly denied the motion for summary judgment based on issue preclusion and 

qualified immunity, in part because the appellees did not have a full and fair opportunity 

to litigate the issue of probable cause in the prior proceeding. Id. at 1459. In that first 

case, the appellees did not have an opportunity to appeal the court’s ruling on their 

motion to suppress because an interlocutory appeal at that time, before final judgment, 

would have been improper. Id. After they were acquitted, an appeal would have been 

moot.2 Id. 

 2

 Martinez also submits Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d. 1995), to support her 

proposition. She runs into the same problem with Fletcher as she does with Dixon. In 

Fletcher, the party did not have the opportunity to appeal the court’s finding of fact 

because the court’s ruling was in its favor. Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1458. That stands in 

contrast to this case where Martinez had an opportunity to appeal the district court’s 

finding. 

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Martinez’s situation is quite different. In Martinez I, the district court issued a final 

judgment for which she had the absolute ability to appeal. She took advantage of that 

opportunity by filing her notice to appeal with this court. Before the Tenth Circuit could 

rule on the case, however, the parties voluntarily settled. As such, she had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate—opportunity being the operative word. 

In addition, the rationales for invoking issue preclusion are satisfied by applying it in 

this case. 

[Often, the] inquiry into whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate an issue . . . will focus on whether there were significant procedural 

limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to 

litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the 

nature or relationship of the parties. 

Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Here, nothing indicates that Martinez had different incentives to litigate her claims in 

Martinez I than she did in Martinez II. There were also no procedural limitations in 

Martinez I, as illustrated by her ability to fully brief the district court on the issues, which 

issued a final judgment against her, and her beginning the appeal process before settling. 

Her voluntary choice to drop the appeal does not entitle her to evade the fourth prong of 

issue preclusion. To allow such maneuvers would undermine the judicial system and the 

strong policies supporting issue preclusion. Perhaps in the future, under different 

circumstances, we might conclude that a settlement after a final judgment from the 

district court prevents a party from having a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue. 

But under this particular set of facts, the voluntary settlement did not prevent it. 

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“[T]here is no reason why a court should be bothered or a litigant harassed with 

duplicating lawsuits on the same docket; it is enough if one complete adjudication of the 

controversy be had.” Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296 F.3d 

982, 989 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sutcliffe Storage & Whse. Co. v. United States, 162 

F.2d 849, 851 (1st Cir. 1947)). Martinez had her chance to contest her arrest. Therefore, 

we will not address the merits of Martinez’s lawsuit because her claims are barred by the 

doctrine of issue preclusion.3

C. Official Capacity 

Martinez also argues that she is entitled to assert a claim against the 

Defendants in their official capacities because, she alleges, the Sheriff’s 

Department had an “unconstitutional or illegal custom and/or policy of arresting 

individuals without probable cause.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Specifically, she claims 

that the Sheriff’s Office had a policy or custom in place that allowed its “employees to 

act with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals including 

tolerating misconduct by its police officers, encouraging misconduct by failing to 

adequately supervise, discipline or train by among other things and using arrest for 

alleged over-due library books as a tool of fear, intimidation and retaliation.” Id. at 23 

[grammar in original]. The district court held that she could not succeed on this claim 

 3

 Martinez also argues that the identity of the causes of action is different and asks us 

to apply the transactional approach. However, this approach applies to claim preclusion, 

not issue preclusion, so we do not address this argument. See Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep’t of 

Emp’t Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating this court has 

adopted the transactional approach of Restatement (Second) of Judgments to determine 

“what constitutes a ‘cause of action’ for claim preclusion purposes”) (emphasis added). 

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because she failed to show that the Defendants, as employees of the Department, violated 

her constitutional rights. 

“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police 

officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of [the 

behavior] is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 

(1986) (emphasis in original). Here, the district court in Martinez I concluded that the 

bench warrant was facially valid and that the Defendants had probable cause to arrest 

Martinez. Absent a constitutional violation, her claim against the Defendants in their 

official capacity fails. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 239 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 

2001) (listing our sister circuits that have held that a city cannot be held liable absent a 

constitutional violation by an officer). Because Martinez is precluded from relitigating 

the issue of probable cause, we conclude that she establishes no constitutional violation. 

Therefore, we hold that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim as 

well. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 

Defendants. 

 ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Gregory A. Phillips 

 Circuit Judge 

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