2013 IL 114811



### IN TH E
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF IL LI NOI S

(Doc ket No. 114811)
DANI EL HOOKE R et al.
, Appellees, v. THE RETI REMENT BO ARD OF THE FI REMEN’S ANNUI TY AND BEN EFI T FUN D

OF CHI CAGO, Appe llant.

Opinion filed Dece mber 19, 2013.

J USTI CE BU RKE delivere d the j u d gment of the court, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Gar

man and J ustices Fr eeman, Thomas, and Kar meier c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.
J ustice Theis dissented, with opinion, joined by J ustice Kilbride.

OP INION

¶ 1 Section 6-140(a ) of the I llinois Pension Code (40 I L CS 5/ 6-140

(West 2008)) define s the terms of the annuity available to a widow of

a firema n whose d ea t h was the result of a perf ormanc e of an act of duty

. The primary issue prese nted in this case is wh et h er a form of fi re man’s compensa tion known as “duty availability pay ” must be included in the calc ulation of that annuity
, even if the firema n never

rec eived such compensation while working as a firef ighte r. The appellate court conclude d that it must. 2012 I L App (1st) 111625. For the re asons that follow, we reve rse.

¶ 2 Ba ckg round ¶ 3 Plaintiffs Elaine Hooker an d J u n e M u rp h y we re m arried to

Chicag o firefi gh ters. Elaine’s husband, Michae l Hooker
, joined theChicag o fire depar tment in 1967. He suffe red a d u t y -r elated injury and was awa

rded a duty disability b en ef i t in 1989. Michae l died in 2000. J u n e’ s husband, J ames Murphy
, joined the Chicag o fire depart m en t in 1966. He also suffe red a duty -re lated injury and was

awa rded a duty disability benef it in 1985. J ames died in 1998. ¶ 4 Followi n g t h e d ea t h s o f t h eir husbands, plaintiffs wer e both

g rant ed an ordinary widow’s pension by the defe ndant, the Retirement Boa

rd of the F iremen’ s Annuity and Retireme nt B enef

it Fund of Chicag o (B oard)
, pursuant to section 6-141.1 of the Pension Code (40 I L CS 5/6-141. 1 (W est 2008)). I n Fe bruar y of 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint for administrative revie w of that decision in the circ uit court of Cook County

. ¶ 5 I n their complaint, plaintiffs alleg ed that they wer e entitled, under

secti on 6-140(a ) of the Pension Code (40 I L CS 5/6-140(a) (West 2008)), to the annui t y wh ich is awa rded to the widow of a firema n who died in the line of duty

. Rely ing on Bertucc i v. Retireme nt Board of the Firemen’

s Annuity & Bene

fit Fund
, 351 I ll

. App. 3d 368 (2004), the circ uit court en t ere d an agr eed order that plaintiffs wer e entitled to the section 6-140(a ) annuity beca use their husbands’ duty

rela ted injuries wer e per m an en t and had preve nted them from ever returning to active duty

. The cause wa s then rema nded to the B oard for a calc ulation of benef its due to plaintiffs. The Boa rd awa rded plaintiffs section 6-140(a ) benef its retroa ctive t o the date of the Bertucc i decision. ¶ 6 I n September of 2006, the circ uit court g rante d plaintiffs leave to

file a three -count, first amende d complaint. Count I of the complaint
soug ht administrative revie w of the Boa rd’s decision on rema

nd and alleg ed that plaintiffs wer e entitled to benef its retroa ctive to the date of their husbands’ deaths, rathe r than t h e date of the Bertucc i decision. Count I I soug ht cer tification o f t he class of all widows simil arly situated. ¶ 7 Count I I I raised a differ ent matter. I n this count, plaintiffs alleg ed

that the ca lculation of their widow’s annuity under section 6-140(a ) had to include a ty

pe of firema

n’s compensa tion known as duty availability pay

. Plaintiffs acknow ledg ed that duty availability pay

was not in exis tence at the time their husbands wer e fireme n and that neither husband had rec eived such compensa tion while employ ed by the Chicag o fire depar

tment. Neve rtheless, plaintiffs maintained that the Boa rd was require d to i nclude duty availability pay in the calc ulation of the annuiti es which they rec eived under section 6-

-2-140(a) . Count I I Ialso soug ht cer tification of the c lass of all widows who were re ceiving section 6-140(a) annuities but had not had duty availability

pay included in the dete rmination of their be nefits. ¶ 8 T h e ci rc u i t co u rt s t ay ed proce eding s on plaintiffs’ am en d ed

complaint. There afte r, in Dec ember of 2007, the court vaca ted the Boa rd’s decision from the orig inal order on rema nd, and direc ted the Boa rd to pay plaintiffs benef

its retroa ctive to the date of the death of

eac h plaintiff’ s spouse. The Boa rd appea led that decision and the appellate court aff

irmed. S ee Ho o ker v. Retireme nt Board of the Firemen’ s Annuity & Bene

fit Fund
, 391 I ll. App. 3d 129 (2009). The Boa rd subsequently awa

rded benef

its to p l aintiffs retroa ctive to the deaths of their husbands, as well as prejudg ment and postjudgment interest. ¶ 9 Procee dings then we n t forwa rd on plaintiffs’ amende d complaint. Be cause plaintiffs had been paid benef its retroa ctive to t h e date of their husbands’ deaths, as well as interest, the circ uit court conclude d that count I of plaintiffs’ complaint had been fully resolved and was moot. The court ther efor e dismissed count I

. ¶ 10 Wit h respe ct to count I I
, the court noted that plaintiffs, the named

repr esenta tives of the putative class, no longe r had a valid cause o f action. C iting to W

heatley v

. Board of Education of Townshi p High School District 205
, 99 I ll. 2d 481 (1984), the court deter mined that, for thi s re ason, dismiss al was require d. See id. at 486 (whe re the claims of the named repr esenta tives “have been resolved, they are not proper parties who would fairly and adequately protec t the interest of the class they

purport to re prese nt”). ¶ 11 On count I I I
, t h e p ar t i es fi l ed cr o s s -m o t i o n s fo r sum mary

judgme nt. Following argument , the court denied plaintiffs’ motion,
g rante d the Boa

rd’s mot i o n, and declined to cer tify the class. Plaintiffs then appea led the g rant of the Boa rd’s motion for summary judgme nt. The appe llate cour t reve rsed. 2012 I LApp (1st) 111625. ¶ 12 The appellate court conclude d that under the lang uag e of section

6-111(i) of the Pension Code (40 I L CS 5/6-111(i) (West 2008)), the Boa rd was require d to include duty availability pay in the calc ulation of an ann uity awa

rded pursuant to section 6-140(a ), even if duty availability pay was not rec eived by the firema n. The appellate court also conclude d that class cer tification was appropr iate. The appellate
court there fore reve rsed the judgme nt of the circ uit co u rt and

rema nded the cause to the circ uit court for calcu l at ion of the

-3-appropr iate award o f annuit ies. We g rante d the Board’ s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. C t. R. 315 (eff. F eb. 26, 2010).

¶ 13 Analy sis ¶ 14 The Board’s Appeal ¶ 15 S u m m ar y j u d gm en t m ay be g rante d whe n “t h e p l ea d i n gs ,

deposi t i o ns, and admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if
any , show that there is no gen u i ne issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” 735 I L CS 5/2-10 0 5(c) (West 2010). The interpre tation of a statute, such as the Pension Code, is a mat t er of law and thus prese nts a matter that is appropr ia

te f o r summary judgme nt. Village of Chatham, Illinois v. County of Sangamon, Illinois
, 216 I ll. 2d 402, 433 (2005). I ssues of statutory interpre tation and summary judgme nt rulings a

re reviewed de novo

. First American Bank Corp. v. Henry
, 239 I ll. 2d 511, 515 (2011). ¶ 16 Secti o n 6 -1 4 0 o f t h e P en s i o n C ode define s the terms of the

annuities rec eived by p la in tif fs. That provision states, in rele vant part: “The annuity for the widow of a firema n whose death results fr o m the perf

ormanc e of an act or acts of duty shall b e an amount equal to 50% of the curr ent annual salary attache d to the classified position to which the firema n was cer tifi ed at the t i m e o f his death and 75% there of afte r Dec ember 31, 1972.” 40 I L CS 5/ 6-140(a ) (West 2008). Under section 6-140(a ), the annuity is ca l culated based on “the

curr ent annual salary attache d to the classified position t o which the firema n was cer tified at the time of his death.” Id

. This means that the
amount of the ann u i t y does not depend on the dece ased firema n’s
actua l salary at any time during his car eer

. The amount of the annuity is instead “fle x ible, chang ing to ref lect s al ary chang es in the fire depar tment.” Kozak v. Retireme nt Board of Firemen ’s A nnuity & Bene fit Fund
, 95 I ll. 2d 211, 215 (1983). Thus, for example, if the fire depar tment incre ases the curr ent pay for fireme n at the position which the decedent had attained at the time of his death, the a nnuity under section 6-140 will incr ease , even though the dece dent himself never

rec eived the inc rea sed pay

. ¶ 17 P l ai n t i ff

s al l eg e that, in addition to basing the annuity u n d er section 6 -1 40(a) on the s alar y attache d to “the classified posi tion to which the firema

n was cer tified at the time of his death,” the annuity

-4-must also be calc ulated using a ty pe of compensa tion known as “duty availability pay .” Acc ording to the parties, duty availability pay was

cre ated in the ear ly 19 9 0s pursuant to a collective- barg aining
ag ree ment betwee n the firef ighte rs’ union and the City of Chicag o. I t is curr ently paid on a q u ar t erly basis and is g ener ally intended to compensa te firef

ighte rs for being available for duty

. For a number of
y ear s afte r it was cre ated, duty availability pay was not included in the calc ulation of benef

its under the Pension Code and, specific ally
, was not included in the Code’s de finition of “salar y .” ¶ 18 I n 2004, the Pensi o n C o d e’ s trea tment of duty availability pay chang ed when section 6-111 of the Code was amende d to provide as follows: “[ T ]he salary of a firema n *** shall include any du t y availability pay rec eived by the firema n *** and ref

ere nces in this Article to the salary attache d to or appropr i at ed fo r the
perma nent assig ned position or classified car eer service rank,
g rade
, or posi tion of t he fireman shall be deemed t o i n cl u de that duty availability

pay .” 40 I L CS 5/ 6-111(i) ( West 2008). Rely ing on this provision, plaintiffs maintain that duty availability
pay must be included within the meaning of the wor d “s al ary ” in section 6-140(a ). Plaintiffs emphasize the word “dee m” in section 6- 111(i) and argue that “the statutory words ‘d eeme d to include’ specific ally reje ct” the idea that duty availability pay must be rec eived by the firema

n in order to be included in the calc ulation of the annuity under section 6-140(a ). Thus, acc ording to pl ai n tiffs, even though their husbands did n o t rec eive duty availability pay , and section 6- 111(i) was not amende d until afte r their deaths, duty availability pay must still be included in the ca l cu l ati on of their annuities. We disag ree

. ¶ 19 Plaintiffs fail to rea d secti o n 6 -1 1 1 (i ) in its entirety

. Section 6-

111(i) states that ref

ere nces to the salary attache d to the position of a firema n “shall be dee med to include that duty availability pay .” The word “ that” re fer s back to the previous lang uag e of se ction 6-111(i) which states that “sala

ry ” includes duty availability pay that has been “re ceive d by the firema

n.” Thus, section 6-111(i) simply states that ref ere nces e lsewher e in the Pension Code to the word “sala ry ” shall be trea ted as including duty availability pay rec eived by the firema n. ¶ 20 The appellate court held that section 6-11 1 (i ) “c l ar i fi es ” t hat

ref ere nces to the word “salary ” m ust include duty availability pay

even if such pay was n ev er re ce ived by the firema n but the court

-5-provided no e x planation as to why the phra se “tha t duty

availability
pay ” should ref

er to any thing other than “duty availability p ay

r e c e iv e d b y th e firema

n.” I ndeed, the appellate court eff ectively added lang uag e to the statute by rea ding section 6-111(i) as stating that the word “ salary” shall include duty availability pay , “eve n if it was not

re ce i v ed by the firema

n.” This is inappropria te. See, e.g ., People v. W oodard
, 175 I ll. 2d 435, 443 (1997) (“the court is not fre e to depar t from the plain languag e and meaning of the statute by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, o r co nditions that the leg islature did not express”). ¶ 21 Fur

ther, we note th a

t the appellate court’s interpre tation of sec tion 6-111(i) can lead to anomalous results. Duty availability pay is a form of compensa tion but it is not salary

. Unlike salary
, which will alway s exis t s o l ong as there are firef ighte rs, it is possible that duty availability pay may not be included in a particula r collectivebarg aining ag ree ment. Should that be the case , and if we rea d section 6-111(i) as stating that t h e word “sala ry ” must include duty availability pay even when it has not been rec eived by the firema n, it would lead t o an anomalous situation wher e individuals such as plaintiffs would have duty availability pay included in the calc ulation of their annuities under section 6-140(a ) even though their husbands did not rec eive duty availability pay and n o cu rrent firef ighte r is

rec eiving it. W e do not think the leg islature intended suc h a re sult. ¶ 22 P l ai n t i ff

s al s o re l y o n C o l l ins v. Retireme nt Board o f t h e Policeme n’s Annuity & Bene fit Fund—City of Chicago
, 334 I ll. App. 3d 909 (2002). In that case , the appellate court held t hat a statutory provision which incre ased the amount of salary on which a police office r’s pension is ba sed by including a duty availability allowanc e applied to a police office r who had retire d while on duty disability and, there fore
, that the office r could take advanta g e of the provision by retroa ctively contributing the appropr iate employ ee contribut ion
to the pension fund. Be cause Colli ns interpre ted provisions of the Pension Code other than those at issue here , the ca se is inapposite. ¶ 23 Pursuant to the plain lang uag e o f s ec t i o n 6 -1 1 1 (i ), only duty availability pay rec eived by the firema n is included in the salary calc ulation under sectio n 6 -1 40(a)

. I n this case , there is no dispute that p l ai ntiffs’ husbands did not rec eive duty availability pay

. Acc ording ly
, the appellate court err ed in concluding that summary judgme nt should be g rante d plain tif fs. We reve rse the judgme nt of the appellate court with respe ct t o count I I I of pl aintiffs’ complaint and

-6-aff irm the judgme nt of the circ uit court g ranting summary judgme nt to the Boa

rd. ¶ 24 The appellate court also conclude d that cl as s ce rt i fi ca tion was

proper with respe ct to count I I I of plaintiffs’ complaint. 2012 I L App (1st) 111625, ¶¶ 22-33

. Howeve r, because we have determined that
p l aint iffs do not have a valid cause of action under count I I I
, it

nece ssarily follows that class cer tification is inappropria te. See, e.g. , Schlessinger v. Olsen
, 86 I ll. 2d 314, 318 (1981) (“no class action can proce ed unless a cause of action is stated”)

. We there fore reve rse that portion of the appellate court’s judgme nt which deter mined that class

cer tification of count I I Iwas a ppropriate

.

¶ 25 Cross-Appeal ¶ 26 P l ai n tiff Elaine Hooker died in September 2010. In the cir cu i t

court, Elaine’s son, Daniel Hooker
, was substitut ed as specia l
repr esenta tive and the case continued. Subsequently
, while plaintiffs’

case was befor e the appellate court, Daniel asked the appellate court to consider a new issue, specific ally
, whether a collective- barg aining
ag ree ment betwee n t h e C i t y of Chicag o and the firef ighte rs’ union which acc orded retroa ctive benef its to firef ighte rs applied to the final determination of Elaine’s benef its, even though the collectivebarg aining ag ree ment was not ratified until afte r h er d eath. The appellate court declined to re ac h t h i s issue beca use it had not been raised in the c ircuit court. 2012 I L App (1st) 111625, ¶¶

35-36. ¶ 27 I n a cr oss-appe al, Danie l asks this court to reve rse the judg ment

of the appellate court and addre ss the merits of the issue. At the same time, howev er , Daniel has informed this court that, following the appellate court’s de cision, a sepa rate lawsuit was filed in the circuit
court which alleg ed that the new collective- barg aining ag ree ment applied to Elaine; that the circ uit c ourt ruled ag ainst Elaine’s e state; and that the matter

is now pendingin the appellate court. Be cause a separ ate lawsui t h as been filed and the matter is curr ently being litigated, we decline to rea ch the merits of the applicability of the new collective- barg aining ag ree ment. We there fore aff irm that portion of the appe llate cour

t judgment whic h declined to r eac h this iss ue. ¶ 28 Finally
, both plaintiffs and the Boa rd have filed motions to strike portions of their opponents’ br iefs. B oth motions are denied.

-7-¶ 29 Conclusion

¶ 30 For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the appellate court is

reve rsed in part and aff

irmed in part. The j u d gm ent of the circ uit court is af firmed.

¶ 31 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed in par t and af firmed in par

t. ¶ 32 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.

¶ 33 J USTI CE THEI S, dissenting: ¶ 34 I respe ctfully dissent from the majority opinion beca use I believe the opinion depar

ts from the plain language of the Pension Code. Ba sed upon t he plain lang uag e of the C ode, the Boa rd was require d
to include duty availability pay as part of the “cur rent annual salary” in calculating a

widow’s duty -re lated annuity

. ¶ 35 I t is undisput ed t h at s i n ce 1 9 9 2
, t h e co l l ec t i v e- b ar gaining

ag ree ment betwee n the City of Chicag o and the Chicag o Fire fig hters Un ion, L ocal 2, has included compensa tion known as “d u t y availabili ty pay ” for all fireme n, except cer tain employ ees assig ned
to platoon duty

. The pay

ment amounts are the same for all employ ees

cover ed by the labor contra ct and have incre ased with ever y contra ct
y ear

. For example, in 2004, under the then-e x isting collectivebarg aining agr eeme nt, a firema n rec eived $680 per quarte r in duty availability pay reg ardle ss of rank and g rade

. I n 2012, t h at amount

was incre ased to $805 per quarte r for all ranks and g rade s. I t is further undisputed that betwee n 1994 and 2004, duty availability pay was not included i n t h e calc ulation of a firema n’s salary under the Pension Code. Howeve r, in 2004, the Pension Code was amende d to inc lude duty availability pay in calculating a fireman’s salary

. 40 I L CS 5/6- 111(i) (West 2004). ¶ 36 The Boa

rd maintains that the widows’ duty -re lated annuity does
not include du t y availability pay beca use their husbands did not

rec eive this compensa tion prior to their deaths. The widows disag ree , arguing that under the unambig uous lang uag e of sections 6-1 4 0 (a ) and 6-111(i) of the P en s i on Code, their annuity is not based upon their husbands’ salary but, rathe r, is based on the curr ent salary for the positions their husbands attained as fire fig hters, and that the curr ent salary fo r those positions includes duty availability pay

. There fore
, they argue the Boa

rd miscalculate d their annuities by failing to include the duty

availability

pay in that calculation.

-8-¶ 37 As expressed by the m ajority
, the ce ntral issue in this case turns

on the interpre tation of the Pension Code. The principles g uiding our revie w are familiar. Th e primary objective of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the leg islature’s intent. Chicago T eache rs Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City o f Chicago
, 2012 I L 112566, ¶ 15. The most reliab l e indicator of leg islative i ntent is the lang uag e of the statute, g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. Roselle Polic e P e n s io n B o a r d v. Village of

Roselle
, 232 I ll. 2d 546, 552 (2009). “[O]ne of the fundame ntal principles of statutory construction is to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole. [C itation.] Words and phrase s should not be co n s t ru ed in isolation, but inte rp re t ed in light of other rele vant portions of the
statute so that, if possible, no term is rende re d superf luous or meaning less.” Land v. Board of Educati o n of the City of Chicago
, 202 I ll. 2d 414, 422 (2002). ¶ 38 We must consider the rele vant s t at u t o ry provisions with these

g uiding principles in mind. Se cti on 6-140(a ) of the Pension Code provides in per

tinent part:
“The annuity for the widow of a firema n whose death results from the perf

ormanc e o f an act or acts of duty shall be an amount equal to 50% of the current annual salary attache d to the classified position t o which the firema n was cer tified at the time of his death an d 7 5 % there of afte r Dec ember 31, 1972.” (Emphasis added.) 40 I L CS 5/6-140(a) (West 2008). This court long ag o construed the words “cur re n t annual salary” to plainly mean that the annuity was based upon the current salary of a firema n and was flexibl e, incre asing with the chang es in their salarie s

as provided for under the applicable budg et appropr iations. Kozak v. Retireme nt Board of the Firemen’ s Annuity & Bene

fit Fund
, 95 I ll. 2d 211, 215 (1983). As noted by the m aj o rity
, this court expressly

re j ected the notion that the “cur rent” salary meant that the annui t y

was based upon the dece ased firema n’s salary at the time of his death. Id

. at 216. This court also stated that the Gene ral Assembly “wa s cog nizant of the incre ased expense o f the ty pe of open-e nded and fluctuating public pension bene fit it was adopting .” Id . at 218. ¶ 39 Thus, in Ko z a k
, w e r e c o g nized that widows might rec eive be nefits
g reater than their husbands’ salarie s at the time of their deat h s ( Kozak , 95 I ll. 2d at 220 (“the fac t that the leg islature tre ats widows of firef ighte rs killed in the line of dut y m o re generously than the bene fi ciaries of other pension statutes is neither absurd nor

-9-impossibl e to understand” )), and rec og nized that t h e amount of the annuity is not depende nt upon the dece ased firef ighte r’s salary but, rathe r, upon the “cu rr en t annual salary attache d to the classified position to w hich the firema n was cer tified at the time of his death.” 40 I L CS 5/6-140(a) (West 2008). This constructio n has been consistently upheld since 1983, and the leg islature is presumed to be

awa re of judicial decisions interpre ting this leg islation. Cripe v. Leiter
, 184 I ll. 2d 185, 197-98 (1998). Notably
, the Pension Code has been amende d sever al times since 1983 (see Pub. Act 92-50, § 5 (ef f. J uly 12, 2 0 0 1); Pub. Act 93-654, § 5 (ef f. J an. 16, 2004)), and the leg islature has not a ltered the lang uag e of this statute in response to this court’s holding. ¶ 40 To deter

mine whether the curr ent an n u al s al ar y o f a fi re man includes duty availability pay , we must consider the Pension Code’s definition of “sala

ry .” Under the statute, “sala ry ” i s d ef i ned as the “ac tual amount of the annual salary attache d to the perma nent car eer service rank held by the firema n.” 40 I L CS 5/6-111(d) (West 2008). I n 2004, the Gene ral Ass em b l y expanded on that definition as follows:
“the salary of a firema

n, as calculated

for any purpose under this Article
, shall include any duty availability pay rec eived by the firema

n (i) pursuant to a collective barg aining ag ree ment ***, and ref

ere nces in this Article to the salary attache d to or appropr iated for the perma nent assig ned position or classified

car eer service rank, g rade
, or position of the firema n shall be deeme d to include that duty availability p ay

. ” (Emphasis added.) 40 I L CS 5/ 6-111(i) ( West 2008). Thu s , under the Pension Code, prior to 2004, duty availability pay was not included in the ca lculation of salar y for a ny purposes under the Pension Code. Howeve r, as of 2004, the leg islat u re h as deter mined that the salary of a firema n, as calc ulated for any purpose, including a widow’s annuity under section 6-140, includes that duty

av ai l ab ility pay rec eived by the firema n pursuant to a collectivebarg aining ag ree ment. 40 I L CS 5/ 6-111(i) ( West 2008). ¶ 41 I t is at this point that the majority abandons our rules of statutory

construction. Rather than harmonizing t h e two rele vant statutory provisions, the majority

assumes that we are consideringa widow’s husband’s salary

. I f we wer e cal culating the widows’ husbands’ salary then I would ag ree with the majority that duty availability pay

was not rec eived by them and, there fore
, would not be included in the

-10-calc ulation of their salary

. Neve rtheless, in the context of calc ulating

a section 6-140 widow’s duty -re lated annuity
, as explained, the salary is based on the curr ently employ ed firef ighte r who has attained the

same position as the widow’s husband. Acc ording ly
, the ref ere nce to “the salary of a fire man” in sec tion 6-111(i) is not a re fer ence to the widow’s husband’s salary but, rathe r, a curr ently employ ed firema n. ¶ 42 Reading the plain lang uag e of the Pension Code, and rea ding the

two statutory provisions in harmony as we must, for purposes of calc ulating the widow’s annuity under section 6-140, the curr ent annual salary of a firema

n includes that duty availability pay rec eived by the firema

n under the applicable collective- barg aining ag ree ment. Whether these partic u la

r w id o w s ’ husbands rec eived duty availability
pay is of no conseque nce. By failing to rea d sections 6-111(i) and 6- 140 as a whole, the majority er ro n eo u sly conclude s that the leg islature intended that the widows’ duty -re lated annuity calc ulation be based on whether their husbands rec eived the compensa tion as part of their sa lary

. ¶ 43 Additionally
, the majority ’s opinion inexpl icabl y o m i t s critica l

lang uag e in section 6-111(i) which expands the definition of salary “as calc ulated for any purpose,” under the Pension Code. (Emphasis added.) 40 I L CS 5/6-111(i) (West 2 0 08). As we have previously

re cog nized, the leg islature knows how to express a limit ing inte n t wher e it so desires. The failure to do so in this statute evince s that it did not have such intent with respe ct t o t h e widow’s annuity under section 6-140. We ca nnot rea d that lang uag e out of the statute. The majority ’s construction also re nders the meaning of “cur rent” in section 6-140 superf

luous, in direc t conflict with the principle that we aim to construe a statute such that n o t er m is rende red meaning less ( Land
, 202 I l l

. 2 d at 402), and is in direc t conflict with our longstanding decision in Kozak

. ¶ 44 M o re o v er , contra ry to the majority opinion, u n d er t h e p l ai n lang uag e of t h e statute there is no anomaly prese nted. I f the collective- barg aini ng ag ree ment no longe r provides for duty availability pay in the future, then based on the ex press languag e of section 6-111(i), duty availability pay will not be included in the calc ulation of the current annual salary of a firema n beca use it will
not have been rece ived by the firema n under the applicable collectivebarg aining ag ree ment. 40 I L CS 5/6-111(i) (West 2008). R ather
, the anomaly is cre ated b y the majority ’s construction as nothing in the
statute support s a m ultiti ere d sy stem for section 6-140 widows’

-11-annuit i es based on whether cer tain compensa

tion was rec eived by their husbands. ¶ 45 For all o f t h es e rea sons, I would hold that based upon the plain

lang uag e of the Pension Code, the Boa rd was require d to include duty availabilit y pay as part of the “cur rent annual salary” in calc ulating the widows’ duty

rela ted annuity

.

¶ 46 J USTI CE KI L BRI DE joins in this dissent.

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