NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-4482-16T4

 A-4504-16T4

JOANN MONDSINI,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

LOCAL FINANCE BOARD,

Respondent-Respondent.

____________________________

ROCKAWAY VALLEY REGIONAL 

SEWERAGE AUTHORITY,

Intervenor-Appellant.

_____________________________

Argued December 17, 2018 – Decided March 5, 2019

Before Judges Messano, Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Community Affairs, Local Finance Board, Complaint 

#13-038.

Richard A. Gantner argued the cause for appellant 

(Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, LLC, attorneys; 

Richard A. Gantner, on the briefs).

Stephen E. Trimboli argued the cause for intervenorappellant (Trimboli & Prusinowski, LLC, attorneys; 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

March 5, 2019

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-4482-16T4 2

Stephen E. Trimboli, of counsel and on the briefs; 

Lauren W. Kavanagh, on the briefs).

Dominic L. Giova, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Melanie R. Walter, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

JoAnn Mondsini became the Executive Director of the Rockaway Valley 

Regional Sewerage Authority (the Authority) in September 2012. Within 

weeks, Mondsini faced a natural disaster of epic proportions, Super Storm 

Sandy, which struck New Jersey on October 29, causing catastrophic damage 

to homes, businesses and the State's infrastructure. The Authority lost 

electrical power during the storm and maintained operations by using diesel 

generators. If the generators failed, millions of gallons of untreated sewage 

would discharge into the Rockaway River. The situation grew critical as the 

Authority anticipated it would run out of diesel fuel by November 2. 

Certain Authority employees were essential to keep the generators 

operating. Because of a statewide gasoline shortage, these employees were 

unable to fuel their personal vehicles to drive to and from work. Mondsini 

authorized several employees to fuel their personal vehicles from an Authority 

gasoline pump. She contacted the Regional Operations Intelligence Center, a 
A-4482-16T4 3

statewide emergency management consortium, and advised of the critical 

situation the Authority faced.

Bruce MacNeal was a member of the Authority's Board of 

Commissioners and served as board secretary. As such, he was an employee 

of the Authority and was authorized to sign the Authority's checks. On 

November 2, MacNeal, who often came to the Authority to sign checks and 

otherwise keep abreast of its activities, arrived and offered his assistance to 

Mondsini. She had MacNeal sign two checks in anticipation of a diesel oil 

delivery later that day. She also asked if he could "commandeer a gas station"

in Boonton, where MacNeal lived, to supply gas to the Authority's essential 

personnel, and obtain food from restaurants that might be open to feed 

Authority personnel on site. 

While discussing the gasoline shortage, MacNeal said he needed to find 

gasoline himself. Mondsini authorized MacNeal to fuel his personal vehicle 

from the Authority's pump. Unbeknownst to Mondsini, MacNeal fueled two

personal vehicles with the Authority's gasoline. Mondsini advised the Board

of her actions regarding the crisis at its next meeting on Thursday, November 

8. 

An unknown informant complained to law enforcement authorities about 

Authority employees using agency gasoline for personal use during the storm. 
A-4482-16T4 4

The report was referred to the Local Finance Board (LFB). After 

investigation, the LFB found Mondsini violated N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(c) 

(subsection (c)), a provision of the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), 

N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, which provides: "No local government officer 

or employee shall use or attempt to use his official position to secure 

unwarranted privileges or advantages for himself or others." The LFB

assessed a $100 fine against Mondsini, which it simultaneously waived. 1 

Mondsini appealed, and the matter was transferred to the Office of 

Administrative Law as a contested case. The Authority intervened in support 

of Mondsini. After denying the LFB's motion for summary decision, the 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and rendered an initial 

decision. 

Among other things, the ALJ found Mondsini to be a credible witness 

and concluded she had not violated the LGEL.2 He reasoned that a violation of 

subsection (c) "requires a showing of intent." The ALJ also rejected the LFB's 

contention that Mondsini secured an "unwarranted" privilege for MacNeal 

because he was not an "essential employee" and obtained gasoline that was 

unavailable to the public. Finding Mondsini's "sole intent was to keep the 

 

1 The LFB also filed a violation against MacNeal and fined him $200.

 

2 Our summary of the facts is based on the ALJ's findings of fact.
A-4482-16T4 5

plant up and running" during the crisis, the ALJ concluded she "acted 

prudently. To permit the LFB to use hindsight to say this was a violation of 

the [LGEL] would have local government officials afraid to perform their 

jobs."

In its final agency decision, the LFB accepted the ALJ's findings of fact, 

with only one modification, i.e., the ALJ's assessment that the testimony of the 

LFB's investigator was less than credible. The LFB, however, rejected the 

ALJ's legal conclusions, asserting subsection (c) does not "require[] a showing 

of intent." In addition, the LFB rejected the ALJ's suggestion that the LGEL 

includes a "crisis exception." The LFB reinstated the violation and penalty, 

but once again waived its enforcement. 

We consolidated the appeals filed by Mondsini (A-4482-16), and the 

Authority, which intervened before the LFB (A-4504-16), to issue a single 

opinion. Mondsini argues subsection (c) requires proof of "specific intent" to 

violate its provisions, and she never acted to "secure unwarranted privileges or 

advantages" for MacNeal. The Authority reiterates these arguments and 

further contends that the LFB erred by concluding MacNeal was not an 

essential employee of the Authority, duly authorized under the Sewerage 

Authorities Law, N.J.S.A. 40:14A-1 to -45, to perform certain functions. It 
A-4482-16T4 6

also argues the LFB lacked jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 

40:14A-35. 

I.

We begin by noting "[j]udicial review of agency determinations is 

limited." Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 

150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys.,

206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial 

decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re 

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 

39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). "A reviewing court 'must be mindful of, and 

deferential to, the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular 

field.'" Allstars Auto Grp., 234 N.J. at 158 (quoting Circus Liquors, Inc. v. 

Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009)). 

Nevertheless, "because 'questions of law are the province of the judicial 

branch,' we are 'in no way bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or 

its determination of a strictly legal issue,' particularly when 'that interpretation 

is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives[.]'" Russo, 206 N.J. at 27 

(citations omitted). Similarly, "if the agency interpretation of a statute is 

plainly at odds with the plain meaning of the statute, the agency interpretation 
A-4482-16T4 7

will be set aside." Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 193 N.J. 558, 568 

(2008). 

Because these appeals present a question of statutory interpretation, "we 

strive to effectuate the Legislature's intent." Finkelman v. Nat'l Football 

League, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op at 11) (citing Cashin v. Bello, 223 

N.J. 328, 335 (2015); DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "[T]he 

best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 

492 (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)). "If the plain 

language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretative 

process is over." Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)

(quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 

189, 195 (2007)). "We construe the statutory language 'in context with related 

provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Finkelman, ___ 

N.J. ___ (slip op. at 11) (quoting Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 

515 (2018)).

II.

Before turning to the specific language of the LGEL, we recognize its 

"objective is to make ethical standards in state and local government 'clear, 

consistent, uniform in their application, and enforceable on a statewide basis.'" 

Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 552 (2015) (quoting 
A-4482-16T4 8

Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 531 (1993)). "Noting that '[w]henever the 

public perceives a conflict between the private interests and the public duties 

of a government officer or employee,' the public's confidence in the integrity 

of government is 'imperiled,' the Legislature recognized the need for standards 

by which it may be determined 'whether public duties are being faithfully 

performed.'" Id. at 553 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 40A:9-

22.2(c)-(d)); see also Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 536 (Clifford, J., concurring in 

part, dissenting in part) (noting the Legislature enacted the LGEL "to codify a 

set of guidelines designed to limit actions by local officials that might create 

doubt in the minds of citizens concerning the motivations of those officials"). 

The LGEL "demands that an officeholder discharge duties with undivided 

loyalty." Macdougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 401 (1996). Nevertheless, 

"[t]here cannot be a conflict of interest where there do not exist, realistically, 

contradictory desires tugging the official in opposite directions.'" 

Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 524 (alteration in original) (quoting LaRue v. Twp. 

of East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 448 (App. Div. 1961)).

The facts in Wyzykowski predated enactment of the LGEL, but the 

Court there directed that "[f]uture decisions should be consistent with the 

principles of [the LGEL]." Id. at 530. Still, Wyzykowski's analytical 

paradigm continues to influence our decisions. See, e.g., Grabowsky, 221 N.J. 
A-4482-16T4 9

at 552-55; Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 375 (2007) 

(noting "common law conflict-of-interest doctrine" as explained in 

Wyzykowski and other cases are "supplemented by the [LGEL]").

"In furtherance of [the LGEL's] purposes, the Legislature adopted a 

statutory code of ethics, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 . . . ." Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 

Local Fin. Bd. v. Cook, 282 N.J. Super. 207, 209 (App. Div. 1995). This code 

of ethics prohibits local government officers and employees from engaging in 

seven specific forms of conduct. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(a) and -22.5 (c) to 

(h). The Legislature granted the LFB "jurisdiction to govern and guide the 

conduct of local government officers or employees regarding violations of the 

provisions of th[e] [LGEL] who are not otherwise regulated by a county or 

municipal code of ethics . . . ." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4; see also N.J.S.A. 40A:9-

22.7 (enumerating the powers given to the LFB to implement the LGEL). 

In this case, we must construe subsection (c), which, recall, prohibits a 

local government officer or employee from "us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use his 

official position to secure unwarranted privileges or advantages for himself or 

others." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(c). Mondsini and the Authority both contend 

that the statute requires a showing that the use or attempted use of one's public 

position be for the specific purpose of securing an "unwarranted" privilege or 

advantage for the officer or some other person. 
A-4482-16T4 10

The LFB asserts to the contrary that no specific intent is required, but 

rather only that the officer's actions create the potential for the public's

perception of impropriety. The LFB argues that since it is undisputed 

Mondsini permitted MacNeal to use the Authority's gasoline, her intention in 

doing so was irrelevant. Moreover, since the gasoline was unavailable to the 

public at large, Mondsini bestowed an "unwarranted privilege" on MacNeal. 

Undoubtedly, the Legislature's recognition of the importance of public 

perception finds voice in the operative language of certain subsections of the 

LGEL's code of ethics. As the ALJ noted, for example, subsection (d) 

prohibits an official from acting "in his official capacity in any matter where 

he . . . or a business organization in which he has an interest, has a direct or 

indirect financial or personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to 

impair his objectivity or independence of judgment[.]" N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) 

(emphasis added); cf. Kane Props., LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 

221-22 (2013) (defining general ethical standard for assessing municipal 

attorney's conduct as engendering an "objectively reasonable" doubt about the 

integrity of the proceedings). Likewise, in subsection (e), the Legislature 

prohibited local government officials and employees from "undertak[ing] any 

employment or service, whether compensated or not, which might reasonably 
A-4482-16T4 11

be expected to prejudice his independence of judgment in the exercise of his 

official duties[.]" N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(e) (emphasis added). 

Much of the case law spawned by the LGEL deals with application of 

these subsections, or similar common law principles enunciated prior to 

passage of the LGEL, to specific facts, where the critical issue was whether the 

public officer or employee was in an actual conflict of interest or there was an 

appearance of impropriety. As we have noted, "[d]etermination of whether a 

conflict of interest exists must be done on a case-by-case, fact-sensitive basis." 

Shapiro v. Mertz, 368 N.J. Super. 46, 53 (App. Div. 2004) (citing 

Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523).

In Wyzykowski, the Court considered whether local planning board 

members, appointed by the mayor, could consider a development application 

he submitted in his private capacity, "or conversely," whether the mayor could 

appear before the board. 132 N.J. at 511. In considering the necessity of 

disqualification, "[t]he question will always be whether the circumstances 

could reasonably be interpreted to show that they had the likely capacity to 

tempt the official to depart from his sworn public duty." Id. at 523 (emphasis 

added) (quoting Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 

(1958)). It is not necessary to demonstrate actual proof of dishonesty because 

only the potential for conflict is necessary. Id. at 524. Decisions construing 
A-4482-16T4 12

N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) adopt this expansive view, holding an appearance of 

impropriety, not an actual conflict of interest, creates a disqualifying situation. 

For example, in Randolph v. City of Brigantine Planning Bd., 405 N.J. 

Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2009), we considered the application of subsection 

(d) of the LGEL's code of ethics, where the board chairwoman lived with a 

principal of the board's retained engineering firm. We phrased the issue as

whether "the circumstances could reasonably be 

interpreted to show" that [the chairwoman's] 

relationship with [the principal of the engineering 

firm] "had the likely capacity" to tempt her to depart 

from her sworn public duty, thus eroding confidence 

by the public that she would make her own 

independent judgment as to [the developer's] 

application before the [b]oard. 

[Id. at 229 (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523).]

We held, "the public could perceive that [the chairwoman's] personal 

involvement with [the principal of the engineering firm] could reasonably be 

expected to impair her objectivity and independence of judgment." Id. at 231.

Similarly, in Shapiro, we considered whether a municipal 

councilwoman's vote to appoint her husband to the planning board violated 

subsection (d) of the LGEL's code of ethics. 368 N.J. Super. at 49. In 

affirming the trial court's decision to set aside the appointment, "[w]e 

focus[ed] . . . not on any actual or potential personal or other interest which 
A-4482-16T4 13

[the councilwoman] might possibly have. We focus[ed] on the public's 

perception of an undesirable conflict." Id. at 55.

The Legislature, however, chose markedly different language to 

proscribe other types of conduct that violate the LGEL's code of ethics. We 

presume the Legislature was aware of and intended these differences. See In 

re Referendum on City of Trenton Ordinance 09-02, 201 N.J. 349, 366 (2010). 

We may assume the Legislature's use of different language signifies its intent 

to deal dissimilarly with other types of official conduct. See, e.g., State v. 

Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 20 (1987) ("[A] comparative analysis of the language of 

a contemporaneous statute may, because of contrasting language applicable to 

similar subject matter, be indicative of an intent or purpose on the part of the 

Legislature to provide different treatment . . . .") (quoting Malone v. Fender, 

80 N.J. 129, 136 (1979)). 

By their plain language, other subsections of the code of ethics require 

that the public official, or in one instance, a member of the public, act with a 

specific purpose. Subsection (f), for example, prohibits the public official or 

employee from soliciting or accepting things of value "based upon an 

understanding that [it] . . . was given or offered for the purpose of

influencing . . . the discharge of his official duties." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(f) 

(emphasis added). Subsection (g) prohibits the official's use of insider 
A-4482-16T4 14

information "for the purpose of securing financial gain . . . ." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-

22.5(g) (emphasis added). 

Although the LGEL has engendered many decisions in the courts and at 

the agency level, only two of our published decisions have addressed

subsection (c).3 In Jock v. Shire Realty, Inc., 295 N.J. Super. 67, 68 (App. 

Div. 1996), we considered "whether [Amato,] a member of a Zoning Board of 

Adjustment[, could] testify as an expert witness in support of an application 

for certain 'hardship' variances on behalf of a corporation of which he was the 

controlling stockholder." We noted the seeming conflict between N.J.S.A. 

40A:9-22.5(h), prohibiting public officers from appearing in pending matters 

before agencies of "the local government in which he serves," and N.J.S.A. 

40A:9-22.5(k), permitting officials to represent themselves in proceedings 

concerning their own interests. Id. at 73. We concluded that subsection (k) 

did not "provide a general exemption to [subsection](h)," ibid., and that 

"Amato's appearance as an expert witness, seeking to convince his fellow 

 

3 Unpublished opinions from our court have conflicting interpretations as to 

whether subsection (c) requires proof of a specific intent to secure an 

unwarranted benefit or privilege. Similarly, our review of decisions filed by 

ALJs in various agency proceedings reflect a lack of uniformity regarding the 

issue. Our research was unable to ascertain whether the LFB adopted and 

affirmed the ALJ's initial decision in some of these cases, although it appears 

in final agency decisions we have been able to review, that, consistent with its 

argument in this appeal, the LFB has held subsection (c) does not require proof 

that the local official or employee acted with a specific intent. 
A-4482-16T4 15

Board members to allow him to develop this property in violation of the 

zoning ordinance requirements, created at least the potential for conflict." Id.

at 74.

Although not necessary to our decision, we also noted that Amato's 

appearance violated subsection (c). We reasoned, "[b]ecause an application 

for a variance necessarily seeks permission to violate the dictates of the zoning 

ordinance, 'a reasonably informed citizen could see [Amato] as seeking a favor 

or special treatment.'" Id. at 73 (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 531).

To the extent this dicta suggests the mere public perception that an

official used his office to secure an unwarranted privilege or advantage is 

sufficient proof he or she violated subsection (c), we disapprove it. Amato's 

intent to secure a particular "privilege or advantage," i.e., the variance, was 

never at issue; indeed, his corporation filed the application and he then 

appeared at the hearing to testify as an expert in its favor. Our colleagues' 

statement was more relevant to whether the public would perceive Amato 

"used" his public office to obtain the variance.

The only other reported case addressing subsection (c) is In re Zisa, 385 

N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2006). There, the City of Hackensack purchased a 

piece of property intending to create a parking lot to alleviate the scarcity of 
A-4482-16T4 16

parking in its central business district. Id. at 191. Zisa, as mayor and member 

of the municipal council, voted affirmatively to issue bonds to finance the 

purchase of the property and subsequently voted to authorize its purchase. 

Ibid. Within two months, Zisa, as managing member of a limited liability 

corporation, purchased nearby property with the intention to lease it to the 

county school district. Id. at 191-92.

Knowing the school district required more parking than was available at 

the property he was about to purchase, Zisa had his private attorney negotiate 

the lease of additional parking spaces at the proposed municipal parking lot. 

Id. at 192. Once he secured the city's agreement, Zisa finalized his purchase of 

the property. Ibid. In the interim, Hackensack proceeded to solicit bids for the 

paving of the proposed municipal parking lot. Id. at 193. Ultimately, after 

soliciting the advice of the municipal attorney, Zisa voted, along with the other 

council members, to award the contract to a sole bidder, and thereafter voted 

repeatedly to authorize progress payments to the contractor. Ibid.

The LFB concluded that Zisa's actions regarding the paving contract 

violated subsection (c), "because the expenditure of public funds . . . 'secured 

the advantage of improving the parking for [Zisa's] tenant.'" Id. at 195.4 In 

 

4 The LFB also cited Zisa for violating subsection (d) of the code of ethics. 

We also reversed on that ground, but we need not address our rationale. 
A-4482-16T4 17

reversing, we noted there was nothing in the record demonstrating Zisa's 

tenant, i.e., the school district, required paved parking spaces, so there was no 

advantage to Zisa in having the lot paved. Ibid. We did not address whether 

subsection (c) required proof of specific intent.

Although the Legislature did not use the words "for the purpose of" in 

subsection (c) as it did in subsections (f) and (g), it nevertheless prohibited the 

use or attempted use of public office to achieve a particular end, i.e., "to secure 

unwarranted privileges or advantages . . . ." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(c). As such, 

the mere public perception of impropriety does not violate subsection (c); a 

violation requires proof that the public official intended to use his or her office 

for a specific purpose. Our conclusion is strengthened by the Legislature's 

decision to proscribe an official's attempted, albeit unsuccessful, use of his or 

her office to secure unwarranted privileges or advantages. By definition, to 

attempt something is "[t]o try to do, make, or achieve" it, whether successful 

or not. Webster's II New College Dictionary 74 (3rd ed. 2005). 

As a result, based on subsection (c)'s plain and unambiguous language, 

we conclude that a public official or employee only violates this provision of 

the LGEL if she uses or attempts to use her official position with the intent to 

secure unwarranted advantages or privileges for herself or another. In this 

case, the ALJ found as a fact that Mondsini lacked such a purpose, and that her 
A-4482-16T4 18

only purpose in allowing MacNeal to use the Authority's gasoline was to keep 

the Authority operating during the crisis. The LFB accepted these factual 

findings. We therefore reverse the Agency's decision. 

For the sake of completeness, we address whether Mondsini secured an 

"unwarranted privilege or advantage" for MacNeal by authorizing his use of 

the Authority's gasoline. Based on its interpretation of our decision in Zisa, 

the LFB concluded she did. The LFB emphasized that MacNeal obtained 

something unavailable to the public. It concluded that permitting him to fuel a 

personal vehicle was an unauthorized exercise of Mondsini's powers, because 

MacNeal was not an essential employee, and Mondsini could have provided a 

"fleet vehicle" for MacNeal to use as he sought gasoline from nearby vendors.

Pursuant to rules of statutory construction, we accord words "their 

generally accepted meaning." N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. "Unwarranted" is defined as 

"[h]aving no justification." Webster's II New College Dictionary 1240 (3rd ed. 

2005). The legislative history of the LGEL provides no further guidance on 

what is an "unwarranted privilege or advantage," nor does our review of 

decisions under the ethics laws of some of our sister states that use identical 

language. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §74 (Consol. 2019); Mass. Ann. Laws

ch. 268A, §23 (2018). In Zisa, we defined "unwarranted" consistently with its 

plain meaning, as a privilege or advantage "that is unjustified or unauthorized, 
A-4482-16T4 19

one that would permit the municipal official to obtain something otherwise not 

available to the public at large." 385 N.J. Super. at 196 (emphasis added). 

Here, of course, although not designated before the storm as an essential 

employee, and, as the ALJ concluded, Mondsini did not ask MacNeal to come 

to the Authority, MacNeal was nevertheless one of its employees. We do not 

think, however, that being an employee in and of itself is dispositive of 

whether the privilege or advantage is "unwarranted."

However, once MacNeal was there, Mondsini exercised her executive 

authority and told MacNeal he could use the Authority's gasoline, hoping he 

could secure more gasoline and food for essential workers. There is no 

authority cited by the LFB that prohibited Mondsini from exercising her 

powers this way. 

This is not to say that simply authorizing some particular use of agency 

personnel or resources immunizes a local official or employee from violating 

subsection (c). If, for example, the privilege or advantage was secured through 

the unauthorized exercise of an official's duties, or the exercise of those duties 

in an unauthorized manner, the official could be subject to penalties under 

subsection (c). See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a) (by way of analogy, defining the 

criminal offense of official misconduct). 
A-4482-16T4 20

However, there was no evidence that Mondsini exceeded her authority 

under the Sewerage Authorities Law, or the Authority's governing documents. 

Nor do we accept the LFB's reasoning that Mondsini acted in an unauthorized 

manner because other options existed, e.g., providing a "fleet vehicle" to 

MacNeal. We refuse to engage in such "Monday morning quarterbacking." 

Even when applying broader principles of disqualification based upon the 

appearance of competing public and private interests, the Court made clear: 

"The [LGEL] must be applied with caution, as '[l]ocal governments would be 

seriously handicapped if every possible interest, no matter how remote and 

speculative, would serve as a disqualification of an official.'" Grabowsky, 221 

N.J. at 554 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 

523).

Lastly, the LFB rejected any consideration of the undisputed fact that 

Mondsini faced an emergency of significant magnitude involving a threat to 

the public safety of untold thousands and criticized the ALJ's conclusion 

because it created an "emergency exception" to the LGEL. This contention 

overlooks a longstanding and essential premise of our jurisprudence that 

predates enactment of the LGEL, namely that in the area of ethical concerns, 

evaluation of any public official's actions "must be carefully evaluated based 
A-4482-16T4 21

on the circumstances of the specific case." Ibid. (citing Van Itallie, 28 N.J. at

268).

We reverse in A-4482-16.

III.

We have already addressed most of the issues raised by the Authority's 

appeal. To the extent the Authority argues its employees and officers were not 

subject to the jurisdiction of the LFB regarding enforcement of the LGEL, the 

argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

We otherwise dismiss A-4504-16 as moot.