1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–5639. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 18, 2018

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines re quire a sentencing judge to first

identify the recommended Guidelines sentencing range based on cer

tain offender and offense characte ristics. The judge might choose a penalty within that Guidelines rang e, or the judge may “depart” or “vary” from the Guidelin es and select a sentence outside the range.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 258–265. Either way, the judge must take into account certain statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), and must “state in open court the reasons for [imposing] the particular sentence,” §3553(c). But when it comes to how detailed that statement of reasons must be, “[t]he law leaves much . . . to the judge’s ow n professional judgment.” Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 356. The explanation need not be lengthy, es

pecially where “a matter is . . . conceptually simple . . . and the record makes clear that the sentencing ju dge considered the evidence and arguments.” Id ., at 359.

Here, petitioner pleaded guilt y to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The ju dge reviewed the Guidelines, deter

mined the range to be 135 to 168 months, and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the range. The Sent encing Commission later lowered the relevant range to 108 to 135 months, and petitioner sought a sen

tence reduction under §3582(c)(2). Petitioner asked the judge to re

duce his sentence to the bottom of the new range, but the judge re

duced petitioner’s sentence to 114 months instead. The order was entered on a form certifying that the judge had “considered” petition

er’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy stat ement. On appeal, petitioner ar

gued the sentencing judge did not ad equately explain why he rejected petitioner’s request for a 108-month sentence. The Court of Appeals2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

affirmed.

Held : Because the record as a whole demonstrates the judge had a rea

soned basis for his decision, the ju dge’s explanation for petitioner’s sentence reduction was adequate. Pp. 5–10.

(a) The Government argues petition er was not entitled to an expla

nation at all because the statute governing sentence-modification mo

tions does not expressly require a sentencing judge to state his rea

sons for imposing a particular sentence. See §3582(c)(2). It is unnecessary to go as far as the Government urges, however, because, even assuming the District Court had a duty to explain its reasons when modifying petitioner’s senten ce, what the court did here was sufficient. Pp. 5–6.

(b) Petitioner contends that a district court must explain its rea

soning in greater detail when the court imposes a “disproportionate” sentence reduction—that is, when the court reduces the prisoner’s sentence to a different point in the amended Guidelines range than the court previously selected in the original Guidelines range. That argument is unconvincing. As a technical matter, determining “pro

portionality” may prove difficult wh en the sentence is somewhere in the middle of the range. More impo rtantly, the choice among points on the Guidelines range often reflec ts the belief that the chosen sen

tence is the “right” sentence based on various factors, including those found in §3553(a). If the applicable Guidelines range is later re

duced, it is unsurprising that th e sentencing judge may choose a nonproportional point in the new range. Pp. 6–7.

(c) Even assuming that a judge re ducing a prisoner’s sentence must satisfy the same explanation requirement that applies at an original sentencing, the District Court’s ex planation was adequate. At the original sentencing, petitioner asked for a downward variance from the Guidelines range, which the ju dge denied. The judge observed that petitioner’s sentence was high because of the destructiveness of methamphetamine and the quantity involved. The record from the original sentencing was before the judge—the same judge who im

posed the original sentence—when he considered petitioner’s sen

tence-modification motion. By ente ring the form order, the judge cer

tified that he had “considered” pe titioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy
statement. Because the record as a whole suggests the judge origi

nally believed that 135 months was an appropriately high sentence in light of petitioner’s offense conduct, it is unsurprising that he consid

ered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate as well. That is not to say that a dispropor

tionate sentence reduction never may require a more detailed expla

nation. But given the simplicity of this case, the judg e’s awareness of3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Syllabus

the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the intuitive reason why he pick ed a sentence above the very bot

tom of the new range, his explanation fell within the scope of lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge. Pp. 7–10.

854 F. 3d 655, affirmed.

B REYER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS

, C. J., and T HOMAS , G INSBURG , and A LITO , JJ., joined. K ENNEDY , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which S OTOMAYOR and K AGAN , JJ., joined.
G ORSUCH , J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 17–5639

ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 18, 2018]

J USTICE B REYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original sentence from 135 months’ imprisonment to 114 months’. The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 months rather than a lower sentence. The Court of Ap

peals held that the judge’s explanation was adequate. And we agree with the Court of Appeals.

I
A
The Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to
consider certain listed characteristics of the offender and
the offense for which he was convicted. Those characteris

tics (and certain other factors) bring the judge to a Guide

lines table that sets forth a range of punishments, for2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

example, 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. A sentencing judge often will choose a specific penalty from a Guidelines range. But a judge also has the legal authority to impose a sentence outside the range either because he or she “departs” from the range (as is permitted by certain Guidelines rules) or because he or she chooses to “vary” from the Guidelines by not applying them at all. See
United States v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 258–265 (2005) (holding the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). The judge, however, must always take account of certain statu

tory factors. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) (requiring the judge
to consider the “seriousness of the offense” and the need to “afford adequate deterrence,” among other factors). And, of particular relevance here, the judge “shall state in open court the reasons for [the] imposition of the particular sentence.” §3553(c). If the sentence is outside the Guide

lines range (whether because of a “departure” or a “vari

ance”), the judge must state “the specific reason for the imposition of a . . . different” sentence. §3553(c)(2). If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, and the Guide

lines range exceeds 24 months , the judge must also state “the reason for imposing a se ntence at a particular point within the range.” §3553(c)(1).

B
We here consider one aspect of the judge’s obligation to provide reasons. In an earlier case, we set forth the law that governs the explanation requirement at sentencing.

In Rita v. United States , 551 U. S. 338 (2007), the offender sought a downward departure from the Guidelines. The record, we said, showed that the sentencing judge “lis

tened to each argument[,] . . . considered the supporting evidence[,] . . . was fully aware of defendant’s various physical ailments[,]” imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and, having considered the §3553(a) factors, said simply that the sentence was “ ‘appropriate.’ ”3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 358. We held that where “a matter is as conceptu

ally simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.” Id., at 359. We also discussed more generally the judge’s obligation to explain. We wrote that the statute calls

“for the judge to ‘state’ his ‘reasons.’ And that re

quirement reflects sound ju dicial practice. Judicial
decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those rea

sons helps provide the public with the assurance that
creates that trust.” Id., at 356.

But, we continued,

“we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as in

sisting upon a full opinion in every case. The appro

priateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circum

stances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes the word ‘granted’ or ‘denied’ on the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Ibid.

At bottom, the sentencing judge need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has consid

ered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Ibid. When a judge applies a sentence within the Guidelines range, he or she often does not need to provide a lengthy explanation. As we said in Rita, “[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of §3553(a) and other con

gressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical.” Id.,

at 357. We have followed this same reasoning in other sentenc

ing cases, including Gall v. United States , 552 U. S. 38 (2007), which we decided the same year as Rita . Cf. Kim

brough v. United States , 552 U. S. 85, 109 (2007) (suggest

ing a district judge’s decision to vary from the Guidelines range may be entitled to greater respect when the judge finds a particular case “‘outside the “heartland” ’ ” of the Guidelines). Indeed, the case before us differs from the
Guidelines cases that Rita describes in only one significant respect. It concerns a limited form of re sentencing.

C
The relevant lower court proceedings are not complicated. In 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to a federal crime, namely, possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, deter

mined that the applicable range was 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment and imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range: 135 months. Pursuant to its statutory author

ity, the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the relevant Guidelines range from 135 to 168 months to 108 to 135 months. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012– Nov. 2016) (USSG); see also 28 U. S. C. §994(o). Petitioner then sought and obtained a sentence modification. See 18

U. S. C. §3582(c)(2); USSG §1B1.10. He asked the judge to lower his sentence to the bottom of the new range, namely 108 months. But the judge instead lowered it to 114 months, not 108 months. The order was entered on a form issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The form certified the judge had “considered”5 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

petitioner’s motion and “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement. App. 106–107 (under seal). Petitioner appealed, claiming that the judge did not adequately explain why he rejected petitioner’s 108-month request. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument. 854

F. 3d 655 (CA10 2017). In its view, “absent any indication the court failed to consider the §3553(a) factors, a districtcourt . . . need not explain choosing a particular guidelines-range sentence.” Id. , at 659. Petitioner sought certiorari, and we granted his petition.

II
A
The Government, pointing out that this is a sentencemodification case, argues that this fact alone should se

cure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not insist that the judge provide a “reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” Compare §3553(c)(1) with §3582(c)(2). It adds that sentence modifications also differ procedurally from sentenci ng in that the offender is not entitled to be present in court at the time the reduced sentence is imposed. See Dillon v. United States , 560 U. S. 817, 828 (2010) (citing Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(b)(4)). As we have said before, “Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon

, supra, at
826. These procedural features, the Government asserts, mean that “the court has no duty” to provide an “on-the

record explanation” of its reasons. Brief for United States 12, 19.

We need not go so far. Even assuming (purely for ar

gument’s sake) district courts have equivalent duties when initially sentencing a defendant and when later modifying6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

the sentence, what the District Court did here was suffi

cient. At the original sentencing, the judge “must ade

quately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaning

ful appellate review.” 552 U. S., at 50; see also Rita , 551
U. S., at 356 (“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has consid

ered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal deci sionmaking authority”). Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, de

pends, as we have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. Id., at 356–357. In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the §3553(a) factors, among others. But in other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depend

ing, perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentenc

ing, see id., at 357). That may be the case even when there is little evidence in the record affirmatively showing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the §3553(a) factors. If the court of appeals considers an explanation inadequate in a particular case, it can send the case back
to the district court for a more complete explanation. Cf.
Molina-Martinez v. United States , 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 15) (“[A]ppellate courts retain broad discretion in determining whether a remand for resentencing is necessary”).

B
Petitioner argues that the judge should have explained more here because there is, or should be, some kind of presumption that the judge will choose a point within the new lower Guidelines range t hat is “proportional” to the point previously chosen in the older higher Guidelines range. We are not aware of any law or any convincing reason, however, suggesting that this is so.7 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

As a technical matter, dete rmining just what “propor

tionality” means in this context would often prove difficult
when the sentence is somewhere in the middle of the Guidelines range. The Sentencing Table calculates pun

ishments according to a logari thmic scale. Take petition

er’s original and amended Guidelines ranges, for example. The original range was 135 to 168 months, a difference of 33 months. The amended range, by comparison, is 108 to 135 months, a difference of 27 months. And viewed loga

rithmically, what may seem the middle of a new lower range is not necessarily proportionate to what may seem the middle of the old higher range. Nothing in the Guide

lines, or elsewhere, encour ages arguments about such matters among lawyers or judges who are not experts in
advanced mathematics. More importantly, the Guidelin es ranges reflect to some degree what many, perhaps most, judges believed in the pre-Guidelines era was a proper sentence based upon the
criminal behavior at issue and the characteristics of the offender. Thus, a judge’s choice among points on a range will often simply reflect the judge’s belief that the chosen sentence is the “right” sentence (or as close as possible to the “right” sentence) based on various factors, including those found in §3553(a). Insofar as that is so, it is unsur

prising that changing the applicable range may lead a judge to choose a nonproportional point on the new range. We see nothing that favors the one or the other. So, as is true of most Guidelines sentences, the judge need not provide a lengthy explanation if the “context and the record” make clear that the judge had “a reasoned basis” for reducing the defendant’s sentence. Rita

, supra, at 356, 359.

C
Turning to the facts of this case, we find that the Dis

trict Court’s explanation satisfies the standard we used in8 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Rita and Gall , assuming it applies to sentence modifica

tions. In Rita , as we earlier said, we upheld as lawful a sentencing judge’s explanation that stated simply that the Guidelines sentence imposed was “ ‘appropriate.’ ” 551
U. S., at 358. We noted that, in respect to the brevity or length of the reasons the judge gives for imposing a par

ticular Guidelines sentence, th e “law leaves much” to “the judge’s own professional judgment.” Id., at 356. We pointed out that the sentencing judge in that case had “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he ha[d] considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasonedbasis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Ibid. The same is true here. At petitioner’s original sentencing, he sought a variance from the Guidelines range (135 to 168 months) on the ground that his history and family circumstances war

ranted a lower sentence. The judge denied his request. In doing so, the judge noted that he had “consulted the sen

tencing factors of 18 U. S. C. 3553(a)(1).” He explained that the “reason the guideline sentence is high in this case, even the low end of 135 months, is because of the [drug] quantity.” He pointed out that petitioner had “dis

tributed 1.7 kilograms of actual methamphetamine,” a “significant quantity.” And he said that “one of the other reasons that the penalty is severe in this case is because of methamphetamine.” He elaborated this latter point by stating that he had “been doing this a long time, and from what [he] gather[ed] and what [he had] seen, metham

phetamine, it destroys individual lives, it destroys fami

lies, it can destroy communities.” App. 25. This record was before the judge when he considered petitioner’s request for a sent ence modification. He was the same judge who had sentenced petitioner originally. Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to 108 months, the bottom of the new range, stressing various educational courses he had taken in prison. The Govern

-9 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

ment pointed to his having also broken a moderately serious rule while in prison. The judge certified (on a form) that he had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the relevant Guidelines policy statements and the §3553(a) factors. Id ., at 106–107 (under seal). He then reduced the sentence to 114 months. The record as a whole strongly suggests that the judge originally believed that, given petitioner’s conduct, 135 months was an appropriately high sentence. So it is un

surprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appro

priate. As in Rita , there was not much else for the judge
to say. The dissent would have us ignore the record from the initial sentencing and consider only what the judge said when modifying petitioner’s sentence. See post, at 4-5 (opinion of K ENNEDY , J.). But, as we have made clear before, a sentence modification is “not a plenary resentenc

ing proceeding.” Dillon , 560 U. S., at 826. We therefore need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at peti

tioner’s initial sentencing. The dissent suggests the judge’s failure to grant petitioner a proportional reduction
“limits the relevance of the in itial sentencing proceeding.” Post, at 5. To the contrary, the record of the initial sen

tencing sheds light on why the court picked a point slightly above the bottom of the reduced Guidelines range when it modified petitioner’s senten ce. Our decision is not (as the dissent claims) based on mere “speculation.” Post, at

7. Rather, we simply find the record as a whole satisfies us that the judge “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal deci

sionmaking authority.” Rita

, supra , at 356. This is not to say that a disproportionate sentence re

duction never may require a more detailed explanation. It could be that, under different facts and a different record,
the district court’s use of a barebones form order in re

-10 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

sponse to a motion like petiti oner’s would be inadequate. As we said above, the courts of appeals are well suited to request a more detailed expl anation when necessary. See

supra, at 6. The dissent asserts that appellate courts would not need to remand for further explanation if dis

trict courts provided an additional “short statement or check[ed] additional boxes” on the form order. Post, at 8. That may be so, and nothing in this decision prevents judges from saying more when, in their professional judg

ment, saying more is appropriate. Providing a more de

tailed statement of reasons often serves “a salutary pur

pose” separate and apart from facilitating appellate
review. Rita , 551 U. S., at 357. But our task here is to
decide the case before us. And given the simplicity of this case, the judge’s awareness of the arguments, his consid

eration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the intui

tive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bot

tom of the new range, the judge’s explanation (minimal as it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge.
See Id. at 356. The Court of Appeals concluded the same. Its judgment
is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.

J USTICE G ORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 17–5639

ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 18, 2018]

J USTICE K ENNEDY , with whom J USTICE S OTOMAYOR and

J USTICE K AGAN join, dissenting.
When the District Court reduced petitioner Adaucto Chavez-Meza’s sentence, it entered its order on a terse “AO–247” form. An example of this form is attached as an Appendix, infra . On the form order, the District Court checked a box next to preprinted language stating that it
had “considered” Chavez-Meza’s motion for a reduced sentence and that it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG §1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” App. 106–107 (under seal). The District Court checked another box indicating that Chavez-Meza’s motion was granted, and the court stated that it was reducing his sentence to 114 months. Ibid.
But the District Court did not explain why it chose thatparticular sentence or why it had not sentenced ChavezMeza to the bottom of his Guidelines range, as it had done at his original sentencing. Under these circumstances, in my view the District Court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review, a conclusion that requires this respectful dissent. My disagreement with the majority is based on a serious problem—the difficulty for prisoners and appellate courts in ascertaining a district cour t’s reasons for imposing a2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting

sentence when the court fails to state those reasons on the record; yet, in the end, my disagreement turns on a small difference, for a remedy is simple and easily attained. Just a slight expansion of the AO–247 form would an

swer the concerns expressed in this dissent in most cases, and likely in the instant one. If the form were expanded to include just a few more categories covering the factors most often bearing on a trial court’s sentencing determina

tion, the objections petitioner raises likely would be met. The statute would be satisfied; district judges would have a helpful form that might well reduce the time for consid

eration of cases—and even if not would help ensure the full consideration which tends to result in uniformity and fairness; the Courts of Appeals, from the outset, would have far more assistance in determining whether appeals have merit; and this in turn would yield judicial efficien

cies that the sentencing system must have to be effective and that Courts of Appeals must have to ensure that the
relevant statute can be admi nistered and applied in an efficient, fair, and uniform way. The Court today, how

ever, gives its full approval to a conclusory order. Its result

ing holding is detrimental to the judicial system and to prisoners alike.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes a district court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when he “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc

ing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). Con

gress specified that district courts may reduce a defend

ant’s sentence only “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Ibid.

In United States v. Taylor , 487 U. S. 326, 336 (1988), this Court addressed a statutory scheme that, like §3582(c)(2), required district co urts to consider specific3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting

statutory factors when they exercised their discretion. The Court held that “[w]here , as here, Congress has de

clared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, what

ever its decision, clearly articu late their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review.” Id. , at 336–337. Here, the form order fails to provide sufficient infor

mation either to give adequate and efficient instruction to the trial court or to permit meaningful appellate review.
The form order discloses no basis for determining why the
District Court did not senten ce Chavez-Meza to the bot

tom of his new Guidelines range, as it had when it im

posed his original sentence. The Court points out that there is no presumption in favor of a proportional reduction when a judge reduces a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to §3582(c)(2). Ante , at 6–7. That is true, as far as it goes. The issue here, however, is not whether district courts must grant proportional reduc

tions; rather, the issue is what explanation should be required to permit meaningful review of a trial court’s resentencing order. The amount of necessary explanation might be different when a district court grants a proportional reduction—for example, when it sentences a defendant to the top or the bottom of his Guidelines range for both the initial and reduced sentence. In that circumstance, in most in

stances, an appellate court properly can infer that the dis

trict court’s reasons were the same as those it gave when it imposed the initial sentence. See Brief for National Asso

ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 6–11 (explaining that district courts typically grant pro

portional reductions and that the Sentencing Commission often assumes they will do so). Less explanation is neces

sary, not because proportional reductions are favored as a legal matter but because the initial sentencing proceeding4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting

provides a record from which an appellate court can make prompt and reliable inferences as to the reasons that
informed the trial court’s deci sion to resentence a defend

ant to the same relative point on his amended Guidelines range. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, furthermore,
one need not have an advanc ed degree in mathematics, much less a calculator, to draw this reasonable inference. District courts, as a matter of routine, regularly grant proportional reductions; and it seems unlikely that they conduct intricate logarithmic computations before doing

so. In contrast to a proportional reduction in a prisoner’s sentence, a nonproportional reduction suggests that the district court’s reasons for choosing a particular sentence might be different from those it gave when it imposed the
sentence in the first instance. Accordingly, a more specific explanation—but by no means an elaborate one—is neces

sary for an appellate court to determine why the district court chose a new point on the revised Guidelines range. The Court’s analogy to Rita v. United States , 551 U. S. 338, 356 (2007), fails as well. See ante , at 7–9. In Rita

, the District Court imposed the defendant’s sentence at a hearing. The record made clear that “the sentencing judge listened to each argument,” “considered the supporting evidence,” and then determin ed that a 33-month sentence was “appropriate.” 551 U. S., at 357–358. But here there was no hearing when the District Court reduced Chavez

Meza’s sentence in light of the amended Guidelines. The District Court’s reasoning must be surmised from its terse, largely uninformative order. At Chavez-Meza’s initial sentencing there was a hearing similar to the one in Rita

.But the fact that the District Court did not grant ChavezMeza a proportional reduction when it later reconsidered his sentence limits the relevance of the initial sentencing proceeding. The District Court may well have had a legitimate5 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting

reason for reducing Chavez-Meza’s sentence to 114 months instead of 108 months. And even a brief explana

tion stating that reason likely would have sufficed, for district courts need not write at length each time they rule upon a §3582(c)(2) motion. The Court is quite correct to point out that a trial judge “need only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’ ” Ante , at 3 (quoting Rita

, supra , at 356). It is likely that even a checkbox form would suffice in most cases, provided the form lists enough of the common rea

sons so that an appellate court, in most cases, can easily ascertain why the district co urt chose a particular sen

tence. Here, for example, th e District Court simply could
have added a sentence or two to the AO–247 form’s “Addi

tional Comments” box. Or, perhaps preferably, trial courts could use an expanded version of the AO–247 form that allows judges to indicate, even by checking a box, the reason or reasons for choosing a particular sentence. In this case, however, the District Court’s reasons re

main a mystery. The Court today speculates that the
District Court sentenced Chavez-Meza to 114 months because he distributed a large quantity of methampheta

mine. Ante, at 8. For its part, the Court of Appeals specu

lated that the reason might have been “an incident of misconduct while in prison.” See 854 F. 3d 655, 660 (CA10 2017). But there is no basis for these assumptions in the District Court’s order. The sort of guesswork the Court relies upon in today’s decision is insufficient to provide meaningful appellate review of a district court’s exercise of its discretion under §3582(c)(2). See Taylor , 487 U. S., at

342–343. According to the Court of Appeals, the relevant provi

sions of the Sentencing Reform Act must be read to allow a trial court not to give or state any reasons at all for a6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting

resentencing order. 854 F. 3d, at 658. This was error. The Court of Appeals reached its conclusion by comparing the provisions that relate to original sentencing— §3553(c)—with the provisions that pertain to the resen

tencing process—§3582(c)(2). It reasoned that, because the former has an express requirement to state reasons while the latter does not, the statutory structure elimi

nates any requirement for reasons upon resentencing. The Court of Appeals’ analysis, however, ignores the scope of the statutory text in §3553(c). That section pertains to a procedure that is a full- scale adversary proceeding, where the defendant and counsel are present. As part of that procedure, the statute states: “The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” §3553(c). The statute does not require a full-scale adversary proceeding when resentencing is being considered after a
Guidelines reduction. But it is incorrect to conclude that the absence of all those requirements forecloses the neces

sity to make a record that allows an appellate court to exercise meaningful review of the reasons for the resen

tencing order. This conclusion follows from this Court’s
decision in Taylor , holding that courts must “clearly artic

ulate” their reasoning “in order to permit meaningful appellate review,” even without any specific statutory command. 487 U. S., at 336–337. So the fact that Con

gress adopted a detailed explanatory requirement in another part of the statute does not displace Taylor ’s background rule that district courts must provide enough reasoning for appellate courts to review their decisions when they exercise discretion under a statute like §3582(c)(2). The Court quite correctly rejects the Government’s invitation to adopt the Court of Appeals’ interpretation.
See ante , at 5–6. The Court’s ensuing analysis, however, is, in my respectful view, still incorrect. On the one hand,7 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

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, J., dissenting

the Court holds that appellate courts may determine on a case-by-case basis whether a form order like the one here provides enough explanation. See ante , at 6, 9–10. Thus, any prisoner can appeal and argue that the order was insufficient in his case. On the other hand, the Court does not impose any serious require ment that a district court state its reasons on the front end—that is, before the appeal, when the district court rules on the §3582(c)(2) motion. Thus, in cases like this one, appeals will often be based on speculation that requires the prisoner, the Gov

ernment, and the Court of Appeals to hypothesize the potential reasons for the prisoner’s sentence when a re

duction is weighed and considered. This is an unwise allocation of judicial resources. Dis

trict courts, to state the obvious, are best positioned to explain their reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Under the majority’s opinion, however, appellate courts will often lack clarity as to a district court’s reasoning and will be forced to either speculate (as the Court does today) based on their own view of the record, or remand the case for further explanation, likely followed by another appeal.
What could have taken a sentence or two at the front end now can, and likely will, produce dozens of pages of briefs, bench memoranda, orders, and judicial opinions as the case makes its way first to the appellate court, then back down to the trial court and perhaps back to the appellate court again. A better, more efficient rule would require trial courts in cases like this one to provide their reasons in their initial decisions either by giving a short statement or checking
additional boxes. We must be conscious of the fact that
retroactive amendments to the Guidelines can result in thousands of resentencings. That is all the more reason the inefficiencies resulting fr om today’s decision ought to be avoided. And given the uncertainty that will ensue from today’s decision, district courts would be wise to say8 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

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, J., dissenting

more than the court said in this case, even in the absence of a holding requiring it to do so on the specific facts at
issue here. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.K ENNEDY

, J., dissenting 9 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Appendix to opinion of K ENNEDY

, J.

APPENDIXK ENNEDY

, J., dissenting 10 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES

Appendix to opinion of K ENNEDY

, J.