Report

by the 

International Space Station (ISS)

Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE)

Task Force

to the

NASA Advisory Council

November 1, 2001

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ii

Report

by the

International Space Station (ISS)

Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE)

Task Force

to the

NASA Advisory Council

November 1, 2001
iii

PREFACE

A primary mission of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is 

“To advance human exploration, use, and development of space.” 

We have developed this report upon this premise. The International Space Station (ISS) 

objectives require the establishment of a long-term human presence in space. A clear 

articulation of the mission of ISS within the broader context of the human exploration of 

space would greatly benefit the setting of research priorities for the station.

Although the configuration of the Space Station has been modified, the fundamental 

purposes remain scientific research and international cooperation. Specific objectives are:

• To provide the means to sustain humans during extended space flight. This will 

require a primary research focus on discovering any adverse effects of long-term 

human presence in space.

• Perform “world class” scientific research that requires low gravity and is enhanced by 

astronaut interaction.

• Enhance international cooperation and U.S. leadership through international 

development and operations of ISS.

A critical element required for the overall ISS Program is a commitment to a long-term 

plan for transporting astronauts to and from the ISS. 

We offer this report in response to the Terms of Reference (Appendix A) jointly 

established by NASA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We believe the 

recommendations contained in this report will enhance the probability that a credible ISS 

core complete program can be established. We also believe a responsible plan is offered 

to move beyond core complete to a fully capable ISS if justified by NASA performance.

The International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force (IMCE) 

commends the many dedicated NASA, international partners, support teams, and 

contractor personnel who contributed to this report. While these individuals provided 

constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the content of the final report 

rests entirely with the IMCE. Further, the findings and recommendations in this report are 

those of the IMCE.
iv

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION MANAGEMENT AND COST 

EVALUATION TASK FORCE MEMBERS

A. Thomas Young, Chairman, North Potomac, MD

RADM. Thomas Betterton, USN (Retired), Vice Chairman, Warrenton, VA

SCIENCE GROUP MEMBERS

Michael DeBakey, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston TX

Robert Richardson, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

Richard Roberts, New England Biolabs, Beverly, MA

Rae Silver, Columbia University, New York, NY

ENGINEERING GROUP MEMBERS 

Andreas Acrivos, City College of the City University of New York, NY

Kent Black, Pottsboro, TS

Pete Bracken, Gaithersburg, MD

Gregory Canavan, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM

Sidney Gutierrez, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

Bradford Parkinson, Stanford University, Stanford, CA

Peter Wilhelm, Naval Center for Space Technology, Washington, DC

Brig. Gen. Simon Worden, Headquarters, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, CO

BUSINESS, FINANCE GROUP MEMBERS

Anthony DeMarco, PRICE Systems, L.L.C., Mount Laurel, NJ

William Friend, Chairman, University of California President’s Council on the 

National Laboratories, Washington, DC

Susan Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Institute, Washington, DC

Robert Grady, The Carlyle Group, San Francisco, CA
v

ADM. Paul Reason, USN (Retired), Metro Machine Corporation, Norfolk, VA

Roger Tetrault, Punta Gorda, FL

SUPPORT STAFF

In addition to the International Space Station Management and Cost Eva luation Task 

Force staff, the following NASA personnel assisted the committee, helped obtain the 

required materials, and coordinated briefings:

Daniel Hedin, Executive Secretary, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC

Steven Schmidt, Executive Assistant, Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA

Nantel Suzuki, Executive Assistant, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC

Yvonne Kellogg, Technical Editor, Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface iii

IMCE Task Force Members iv

1.0 Executive Summary 1

2.0 Specific Findings 3

3.0 Specific Recommendations 8

4.0 IMCE Task Force Organization and Process 11

5.0 IMCE Task Force Report 12

6.0 Appendices 35

A. Terms of Reference 35

B. President’s Budget Blueprint 37

C. Biographical Sketches of Committee Members 41

D. Cost Analysis Support Team (CAST) Report 47

E. Financial Management Team (FMT) Interim Report 78

F. Nomenclature 84
1

1.0 Executive Summary

The International Space Station (ISS) Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force 

(IMCE) was chartered to conduct an independent external review and assessment of the 

ISS cost, budget, and management. In addition, the Task Force was asked to provide 

recommendations that could provide maximum benefit to the U.S. taxpayers and the 

International Partners within the President’s budget request. 

The Task Force has made the following principal findings:

v The ISS Program’s technical achievements to date, as represented by onorbit capability, are extraordinary. 

v The existing ISS Program Plan for executing the FY 02-06 budget is not 

credible. 

v The existing deficiencies in management structure, institutional culture, cost 

estimating, and program control must be acknowledged and corrected for 

the Program to move forward in a credible fashion.

v Additional budget flexibility, from within the Office of Space Flight (OSF) 

must be provided for a credible core complete program.

v The research support program is proceeding assuming the budget that was 

in place before the FY02 budget runout reduction of $1B. 

v There are opportunities to maximize research on the core station program 

with modest cost impact.

v The U.S. Core Complete configuration (three-person crew) as an end-state

will not achieve the unique research potential of the ISS.

v The cost estimates for the U.S.-funded enhancement options (e.g., permanent 

7-person crew) are not sufficiently developed to assess credibility.

The Task Force has the following primary recommendations:

ÿ Actions required to develop and implement a credible U.S. core complete 

program within the President’s FY02 Budget Blueprint (Appendix B):

• Major changes must be made in how the ISS program is managed

• Additional cost reductions are required within the baseline program

• Additional funds must be identified and applied from the Human 

Space Flight budget
2

• A clearly defined program with a credible end - state, agreed to by all 

stakeholders, must be developed and implemented

ÿ Actions required to maximize research within the President’s FY02 Budget 

Blueprint:

• Scientific research priorities must be established and an executable 

program, consistent with those priorities, must be developed and 

implemented

• Additional crew time must be allocated to support the highest priority 

research 

• Science leadership must be established at the highest level within the 

ISS Program Office
3

2.0 Specific Findings

In performing an independent external review and assessment of cost, budget, and 

management of the ISS, the IMCE Task Force (Appendix C) has made the following 

specific findings:

The ISS Program, while taking a conservative approach and making safety paramount, 

has achieved excellent progress in integration of diverse international technologies.

Assembly of the ISS began in November 1998 with the launch of the Russian Zarya 

module. To date there have been 21 missions, including assembly and 

logistics/utilization. All have been successful, with no major anomalies. Having 

completed the ISS phase that has enabled early research, a three-person permanent crew 

has been established and the keystone elements of three of the five international partners 

have been successfully deployed. The assembly, integration, and operation of the 

complex systems have been conducted with extraordinary success, proving the 

competency of the design and the technical team. The ISS has been assembled, outfitted 

with tons of equipment and supplies for the health and safety of future crews, and initial 

research is underway. Twenty kilowatts of renewable electric power is being produced, 

more than ever generated in space. The elements that will comprise the 300 foot ISS truss 

structure are being readied for launch in 2002 and early 2003. The risk in design and 

development of the vehicle has been largely retired. 

NASA has not accomplished a rigorous ISS cost estimate. The program lacks the 

necessary skills and tools to perform the level of financial management needed for 

successful completion within budget.

NASA cannot rationalize the cost estimating variances in the FY02 budget formulation 

process by merely suggesting that it is largely due to the complexity of the program. The 

underestimation of remaining development and operations costs, along with the 

continued escalation of cost estimates even into the IMCE review period, is a clear 

indication of inadequate methodology, tools, and controls. There is no common guideline 

for the generation of estimates across the program. There are multiple budgeting 

techniques and multiple reporting techniques. NASA ISS support and ISS contractors 

estimate and report in a myriad of methods. Financial forecasting and strategic planning 

suffer from insufficient “forward” analysis and planning due to division of financial 

authority and responsibility, lack of experienced financial personnel and modern tools, 

diverse and often incompatible accounting systems, and uneven and non-standard cost 

reporting capabilities. 

The cost to achieve comparable expectations at assembly complete has grown from an 

estimate of $17.4B to over $30B. Much of this cost growth is a consequence of 

underestimating cost and a schedule erosion of 4+ years. 

Much of the cost growth is attributable to clearly delineable areas such as: inadequate 

initial requirements definition, added content, late element delivery, development 

problems leading to cost variance, inadequate understanding of international integration 
4

requirements, and increased institutional charges on the program. In addition, imposition 

of annual budget caps forced the program to an inefficient spend profile and reinforced 

the management’s focus on meeting annual budgets rather than on total cost 

management.

A cost of $8.3B (FY02-06) is not credible for the core complete baseline without radical 

reform.

The Task Force unanimously concluded that the current program plan is not credible. 

Task Force concerns included management and program control deficiencies as well as 

overly optimistic cost avoidance initiatives. Additionally, the Task Force thought the 

remaining development and integration risk, including research facilities, is 

underestimated and the level of unencumbered program reserves is inadequate.

The NASA/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) agreement for the FY02 budget 

(FY02-06) was $8.3B, including a NASA management challenge (shortfall) of $484M 

and unencumbered reserves of $750M. During the review, new cost increases totaling 

$366M were identified. Additional, but uncosted, concerns were identified in the area of 

contractor rates, International Partner cost implications stemming from scaling back the 

baseline to the U.S. core configuration, the risk of research development activities, and 

inadequate Preplanned Product Improvement funding. Offsets in the amount of $440M 

from within the program were identified. The major portion of these offsets came from 

projected program staff reductions in operations and sustaining engineering. 

Approximately $1B of potential additional savings from within OSF were later identified 

by NASA. These estimates result from both a shuttle flight rate revision and the on-going 

Strategic Resources Review (SRR)/institutional savings effort. Part of the projected

savings come from reducing civil service staffing across OSF. Successful completion of 

the core complete program is dependent on increased funding flexibility and savings 

within the program and other OSF activities, as well as management reform and a 

credible program roadmap. The latter two issues are discussed elsewhere in this report.

The Task Force expressed concern with respect to the required budget flexibility , 

including validity of the original $8.3B cost estimate and the probability of achieving all 

the projected savings. There was consensus however, that given the other steps 

recommended in this report, there is a reasonable chance of successfully executing the 

core program.

The management focus is on technical excellence and crew safety with emphasis on 

near- term schedules, rather than total program costs.

Human Space Flight programs have historically been focused on protecting crew safety; 

this is particularly true during the crucial launch phase when issues must be acted upon in 

an instant. A large percentage of employees working on the ISS program have gained 

their skills and experiences on the Shuttle and earlier manned programs. There are many 

indications this experience base and culture have been transferred to the ISS program. As 

an example, a substantial sustaining engineering function has been established separate 

from the operations structure.
5

The Task Force believes this approach is not necessary and it is possible to “dual-use” 

engineer-operators to reduce overall cost. Since the ISS is a crewed vehicle, many of the 

anomalies can be stabilized by the crew and addressed with technical expertise on the 

ground that is “on-call” and not “on-tap.” While this may reduce ISS availability 

somewhat, it could substantially reduce required manpower. As the Shuttle-Mir Program 

has proven, a space station has much different attributes that would allow for lower 

staffing levels. While the currently planned ISS staffing levels will enable continued high 

levels of response, the Task Force considers them to be unnecessary. 

The Program is being managed as an “ institution” rather than as a program with 

specific purpose, focused goals and objectives, and defined milestones.

The institutional needs of the Centers are driving the Program, rather than the Program 

requirements being served by the Centers. The impact of institutional management is 

clearly indicated in the overall staffing levels of the program. The institution, not the 

program, controls the majority of these resources and timely destaffing is significantly 

hindered. At this phase of the ISS program, deleting more hardware saves very little 

money since the bulk of the expenditures are in the “people” category.

The financial focus is on fiscal year budget management rather than on total Program 

cost management.

At the time the Space Station was redesigned in 1994, annual budget caps of $2.1B were 

levied on the program as a means to control costs. In general, such caps establishing level 

annual funding on a major program are counterproductive to controlling total program 

cost. Total cost and schedule became variables as NASA’s focus became one of 

executing the program within the annual budgets. Additional funding was requested and 

provided for the Russian Program Assurance and Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) efforts. To 

stay within the annual budget caps, basic program content slipped and the total program 

cost grew. The final ISS cost estimate at completion has not been a management criterion 

within NASA.

Lack of a defined program baseline has created confusion and inefficiencies.

The President’s FY02 Budget Blueprint and the subsequent NASA/OMB agreement 

relative to the “U.S. Core” program allow for NASA to maintain critical skills necessary 

to build additional content. At the start of the IMCE review, it appeared the ISS Program 

was still assuming the “Program Manager’s” Recommended Program ($8.3B + $2.5B) 

was the baseline and that the core complete program was an option. The research support 

element of the ISS is still being implemented according to the original program and has 

been unable to take action in FY01 to terminate certain research activities. The scientific 

community is confused and considers the reduction to a three-person crew, from the 

seven-person crew baseline, to have a significant adverse impact on science. The 

International Partners believe the U.S. cannot unilaterally change the previously existing 

baseline assembly sequence.

 
6

Current research support funding represents a 40-percent reduction in buying power 

from that originally planned.

When the Space Station Program was redesigned in 1993, the research support budget of 

$3.8B through assembly complete was programmed for research facilities and for 

recurring utilization. Between 1993 and 2001, the ISS Program experienced major delays, 

which resulted in slippage of the program schedule. As deviations in the program 

schedule occurred, the research support budget was realigned to keep synchronicity with 

the program. Consequently, the funding was taken out of the near-term years and was 

reinstated in the out years. During this process, the design, development, and fabrication 

of the research facilities were being delayed and experienced a cost inefficiency. This 

inefficiency in combination with 4.5 years of inflation and $0.4B funding for Mir has 

reduced the buying power of research funds by 40 percent. The total budget of $3.8B has 

not changed appreciably, but has been spread over a 13-year period for less capability. 

Discounting for the above factors (40 percent), the buying power of the current budget 

($1.6B budget through FY02 – FY06) is approximately $2.3B.

The Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) is not well coordinated with 

the Office of Space Flight (OSF) or the program office for policy and strategic 

planning. The scientific community representation is not at an effective level in the 

program office structure.

The transfer of research support budget responsibility to OBPR underscores the need for 

increased and continuing coordination with OSF. Some progress had been made through 

the inclusion of OBPR in the OSF management council. The recommendation for a 

realignment of the program office reporting chain, addressed later in the report, would 

alleviate this issue. Additionally, the recommendation to establish a Deputy for Science 

in the program office reverts to an earlier structure and will provide appropriate visibility 

for the science community.

A centrifuge is mandatory to accomplish meaningful biological research. Availability 

as late as FY08 is unacceptable.

The centrifuge facility is essential for performing the most promising ISS “world class” 

biological research. It is critical for fundamental space biology and for the foundation of 

biomedical research because it provides the control needed for the interpretation of 

experimental results. This Task Force (and other science groups) has said that this type of 

research cannot be done without a centrifuge and adequate crew time. The centrifuge is 

now being constructed by the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) 

as part of a barter agreement. Because of budget and technical issues the centrifuge 

delivery has been delayed until Calendar Year (CY) 08. 

There are opportunities to maximize scientific research on the core station with modest 

cost impact.

The crew time available with a permanent crew of three persons can be effectively 

doubled by extending sortie mission crew time aboard the ISS. This can be accomplished 
7

by overlapping planned Soyuz exchange periods so that the visiting crew is aboard ISS 

for a period of 30 days every 5 months. Using existing Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) 

capability could allow for Shuttle docked time of up to 14 days. The increased research 

benefit derives primarily from offloading ISS maintenance tasks to the visiting Shuttle 

crew. However, there will be significant microgravity constraints due to the Shuttle being 

docked to the station, as well as crew transfer and maintenance operations.

Cost estimates for the U.S.- funded enhancement options need further development to 

assess credibility.

The proposed enhancement options consist of various combinations of habitation, life 

support, and crew return capability. There is inadequate current costing information 

associated with the non-U.S. components (Enterprise, ASI Hab, and additional Soyuz). 

The CRV cost estimate of $1.3B is plausible, with several development and acquisition 

assumptions that have yet to be verified. Project interruptions will have cost impact on all 

of the elements under consideration. 
8

3.0 Specific Recommendations

Establish the ISS Program Office separate from, but residing at JSC, reporting to a 

new Associate Administrator (AA) for the ISS.

The new Associate Administrator’s office would combine the ISS-related functions of 

OSF and OBPR and have program oversight responsibility. It is imperative this new 

office ensures continuity of program checks and balances in quality and technical 

oversight. ISS offices at other supporting Centers would report to the ISS Program 

Manager, who would own all ISS personnel. 

Consolidate prime and non-prime contracts into a minimum number of resulting 

contracts all reporting to the program office.

Currently, there are over 30 contracts supporting the ISS Program. Consolidate these 

contracts to achieve a minimum number of resulting contracts, with clearly defined cost 

performance reporting requirements.

Develop a life cycle technical baseline and manage the ISS Program to total cost and 

schedule as well as fiscal year budgets.

A life cycle technical baseline must be developed that can be used as the basis for a 

formal cost estimate. Use the Department of Defense cost assessment approach as a 

model and develop a full ISS cost estimate. Develop an Integrated Program Management 

Plan delineating the work to be accomplished; the work breakdown structure; the roles 

and responsibilities of performing organizations; required resources; schedules; and the 

management techniques, tools, and reports to be used in implementing the Program. 

Establish a state-of-the-art management information system. Establish a state-of-the-art 

planning and control system, including independent cost estimating capability. Finally, 

the financial and project control function needs to be strengthened significantly in the ISS 

Program office and NASA Headquarters (AA level).

Consider revising the ISS crew rotation period to 6 months and reducing the Space 

Shuttle flight rate accordingly. The result would be a delay in U.S. Core complete 

assembly sequence by up to 2 months. Target cost savings: $668M,

and

Continue to examine Strategic Resources Review (SRR) and Institutional cost 

reductions. Target cost savings: $350M-$450 M.

These recommendations represent one approach to provide a portion of the required 

budget flexibility. NASA should continue to refine these estimates and examine other 

options.

The first two actions would incorporate a 6-month crew rotation cycle starting in FY03. 

This would result in U.S. core complete moving 2 months to April 2004, and reduce
9

Space Shuttle annual flight rate required to support ISS to four a year. The resulting cost 

savings (FY02-06) from this change in assembly sequence and Space Shuttle flight rate 

reduction would provide an estimated $188M in ISS savings and $480M in Shuttle 

savings.

NASA must also move forward to implement cost savings identified in the Fall 2001 

Strategic Resources Review and other institutional savings. This includes items such as 

facility and lab closures, and civil service staffing reductions needed to realize the 

$350M-$450M cost savings target.

Develop a credible program road map starting with core complete and leading to an 

end state that achieves expanded research potential. Include gate decisions based on 

demonstrated ability to execute the program 

and

Identify funding to maintain critical activities for potential enhancement options.

The existing U.S. core complete program should not be established as an “end-state” 

condition. It presents significant research and Interna tional Partner implications that 

could be avoided by implementing a performance-gate approach that would allow 

increasing research capability based on realized performance to plan. Metrics for 

evaluating performance should be developed in conjunction with the Administration 

(OMB). The opportunity to realize the high research potential that many dedicated 

employees have worked years to achieve will maintain motivation in achieving the cost 

savings necessary to accomplish the core. 

The initial performance gate would be to implement changes required to establish 

credible/executable ($8.3B + additions from Human Space Flight) Program by June of 

2002. During this period, the IMCE recommends providing (within existing budgets) the 

minimum funding necessary to keep enhancements viable to return to the fully capable 

program with minimum cost impact.

The end state should be defined in terms of the science priorities recommended below.

Establish research priorities. The Task Force is unanimous in that the highest 

research priority should be solving problems associated with long-duration human 

space flight, including the engineering required for human support mechanisms,

and

Provide the Centrifuge Accommodation Module (CAM) and centrifuge as mandatory 

to accomplish top priority biological research. Availability as late as FY08 is 

unacceptable, 

and 
10

Establish a research plan consistent with the priorities, including a prudent level of 

reserves, and compliant with the approved budget.

These are fundamental steps toward maximizing the research benefits of the ISS. The 

phased implementation of capability envisioned in the “end state” plan must incorporate 

science priorities, research facilities, and utilization as primary considerations. The Task 

Force also noted the significance of research in physical and microgravity sciences, and 

urged they be strongly considered when establishing priorities. 

Provide additional crew time for scientific research through the use of extended 

duration shuttle and overlap of Soyuz missions.

The high-priority fundamental biological research necessary to demonstrate feasibility of 

future human exploration requires significant ISS crew interaction. Extended Soyuz 

sortie missions can be implemented in the near future and coupled with Shuttle EDO 

missions can measurably increase crew time to conduct this research.

Create a Deputy Program Manager for Science position in ISS Program Office. Assign 

a science community representative with dual responsibility to the Program and OBPR.

The Task Force noted that ISS research objective considerations are not generally given 

full representation in programmatic decision forums. The creation of a Deputy Program 

Manager for Science will provide increased and coordinated representation of the 

scientific communities interest at a high programmatic level.
11

4.0 IMCE Organization and Process

In July 2001, the NASA Administrator established the IMCE Task Force consisting of 

experts in the fields of science, engineering, finance, and business to assess the budget, 

management, and research utilization challenges on the ISS Program and to provide 

advice to NASA and the administration in this regard. The team was chaired by Mr. A. 

Thomas Young, with Rear Admiral Tom Betterton serving as deputy chairman. The Task 

Force’s primary objectives were to assess cost estimates for the core U.S. program and 

potential U.S.-funded enhancements. The Task Force was also asked to identify 

opportunities for maximizing capability to meet priority research program needs within 

the planned ISS budget and International Partner contributions. 

Because of the international nature of the ISS partnership, the Task Force also extended 

an invitation to NASA’s international partners, (the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the 

European Space Agency (ESA), Russian Space Agency (RSA), and the National Space 

Development Agency of Japan (NASDA)) to have representation as observers.

The official kick-off meeting of the IMCE Task Force was held at the NASA 

Headquarters, Washington DC on August 21-22, 2001 and since then, the members of the 

Task Force have meet on a regular basis. The IMCE Task Force was granted access to all 

aspects of the ISS program. The Task Force also conducted fact finding trips to meet with 

the ISS Program management, the organizational support personnel, and the prime 

contractor. The fact finding concentrated on the trends of past, current, and projections of 

estimated performance of the ISS Program.

The IMCE Task Force was provided independent assessment support from two teams. 

The Cost Analysis Support Team (CAST) was directed at cost analysis; the Financial 

Management Team (FMT) concentrated on performance management systems in the ISS 

Program. While supporting the IMCE Task Force, these subteams conducted their own 

independent assessments and provided reports to the Task Force for consideration. The 

CAST provided a final report (Appendix D). Their findings and recommendations have 

been incorporated into the body of the IMCE report. The FMT provided only preliminary 

assessments (Appendix E). Its final findings will be submitted directly to NASA for 

consideration at a later date. 

The Task Force collected information through briefings (program status and special 

topics), interviews, conversations, other governmental review committees, and from 

reviewing applicable documentation. These inputs were interpreted and the findings and 

recommendations formed were then reviewed by the entire Task Force. The main 

observations and recommendations are presented in the balance of this summary. 
12

5.0 IMCE Task Force Report

IMCE Task Force Report
13

1

International Space Station

Management and Cost Evaluation

Task Force

Report

November 1, 2001

2

l Charter

l Definitions

l Membership

l Methodology

l Schedule of Activities

l General Observations

l Cost Credibility

l Requirements to Achieve Credibility

l Maximize Research

l Enhancements

l Summary

Outline
14

3

l Assess the credibility of the International Space Station (ISS) cost estimate for

the approved ISS program, including risks and mitigation strategies.

l Assess program assumptions and requirements and identify options for smaller

growth and/or budget savings and efficiencies.

l Identify opportunities for maximizing research within the planned ISS budget.

l Assess cost estimates for potential U.S.-funded enhancements to the core

station and recommend refinements as necessary to achieve high confidence

estimates.

l Review ISS Program and financial management, tools, and identified reforms,

and make recommendations for improvements.

l Provide report to NASA Advisory Council by November 1, 2001.

Charter

4

Habitation

Module

Cupola

Crew Return

Vehicle

Node 3

ISS Cost Estimate

$8.3B FY’02 – FY’06

Elements on Orbit

U.S. “Core” Elements to be added

U.S. Elements not included in “Core”

International Elements to be added

Soyuz

Port Photovoltaic

Arrays

Airlock

Canadarm2

Docking

Compartment

Pressurized

Mating Adapter 2

Unity

(Node 1)

U.S. Lab

Destiny

Z1 Truss Segment

Zarya (Dawn)

Control Module

Zvezda (Star)

Service Module

Pressurized

Mating Adapter 3

P6 Truss

Segment

Docking and

Stowage Module

European Lab

Columbus

Pressurized Mating Adapter 1

Kibo (Hope) JEM Experiment

Logistics Module - Exposed Section

Kibo (Hope) JEM

 Exposed Facility

Kibo (Hope) JEM

Pressurized Module

Kibo (Hope) JEM Remote Manipulator System

Kibo (Hope) JEM Experiment

Logistics Module--Pressurized Section

Research

Module Universal Docking

Module

Research

Module

Science Power

Platform

Definitions

S6 Truss

Segment

S0 Truss Segment

Mobile

Servicing

System

Mobile

Transporter

P3 Truss

Segment

P4 Truss

Segment

Solar Alpha

Rotary Joint

P1 Truss

Segment

Thermal

Radiators

S1 Truss

Segment

Node 2

P5 Truss

Segment

S3 Truss

Segment

Solar Alpha

Rotary Joint

S4 Truss

Segment

Starboard

Photovoltaic

Arrays

S5 Truss

Segment

Centrifuge Accommodation Module
15

5

Thomas Young, Chair

RADM. Thomas Betterton, Vice Chair

Andreas Acrivos

Kent Black

Peter Bracken

Gregory Canavan

Michael DeBakey

Anthony DeMarco

Susan Eisenhower Z

William Friend

Membership

Robert Grady

Sidney Gutierrez

Bradford Parkinson

ADM. Paul Reason

Robert Richardson

Richard Roberts

Rae Silver

Roger Tetrault

Peter Wilhelm

Brig. Gen. Simon Worden

6

Cost Assessment Support Team:

Steve Miller

George Flach

John Tomick

Jim Bui

Rey Carpio

Financial Management Team:

Patrick Ciganer

Morgan Kinghorn

Al Tucker

Owen Barwell

Staff Support:

Daniel Hedin, Executive Secretary

Steven Schmidt, Executive Assistant

Nantel Suzuki, Executive Assistant

Yvonne Kellogg, Technical Editor

IMCE Support

Jeff Drezner

Kurt Held

Liam Sarsfield

Bob Shishko

Mike Peters

George Gould

Laura Kopp

Joe Jockel
16

7

Methodology

l Structured Reviews

l Independent Reports

Š Cost Analysis Support Team

Š Financial Management Team

l Executive Sessions

l Scientific Research Session

l Team Discussions

8

Schedule of Activities

Date Location Activity

Aug. 20, 21 NASA Headquarters Kickoff, review plan, fact finding

Sept. 11, 12 Johnson Space Center Fact finding (Subgroup of total Task Force)

Sept. 25, 26, 27 Johnson Space Center Fact finding, interviews

Oct. 9,10 NASA Headquarters Fact finding, interviews, scientific research 

review, International Partner presentations

Oct . 22, 23, 24 NASA Headquarters Fact finding, interviews, findings and 

recommendations

Oct. 30, 31 NASA Headquarters Report preparation

Nov. 1 NASA Headquarters Draft Report to NASA Administrator

Nov. 1 IMCE Report Delivered to the NASA 

Advisory Council (NAC)

Nov. 6 NASA Headquarters NAC meeting to review IMCE Report
17

9

General Observations

l Outstanding technical accomplishments

Š Operational system in orbit

Š Fully functioning 3-person crew

Š Integration of diverse international technologies

Š Progress, Shuttle, and Soyuz support as required

Š Additional elements progressing toward launch

l Significant schedule delay

Š FY94 Program

Assembly complete 6/02

Š FY02 Program (before revisions)

Assembly complete 11/06

l Significant cost increase

l Significant reduction in expected science return

10

Cost History

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

($ in billions)

FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02

$17.4

$21.1

$23.7

$24.6

$23.3

$30.1 

(includes cost

through FY06 )

FY02

$17.4 $17.4 $17.4

$26.1 

(includes cost

through FY06 )

(U.S.core

complete

in FY04)

NASA/OMB agreement

Assembly Complete Core Complete
18

11

Cost Credibility

Charter

Assess the credibility of the ISS cost estimate

for the approved ISS Program including risks

and mitigation strategies.

Finding

Judgment of the ISS Management and Cost

Evaluation Task Force (IMCE) is that a cost of

$8.3B (FY 02-06) is not credible for the core

complete baseline without radical reform.

12

Cost Credibility, cont.

Rationale

l ISS program management approach

l General observations on ISS management

l IMCE cost review results

l Cost Analysis Support Team results
19

12

Cost Credibility, cont.

Rationale

l ISS program management approach

l General observations on ISS management

l IMCE cost review results

l Cost Analysis Support Team results

13

Current ISS Program Management Approach

l Focus on technical excellence and crew safety

l Considerable attention on near-term schedules

l Manage expenditures to ensure FY budget is not exceeded

l Total cost is not a management metric that is used

l Work that cannot be accomplished within FY budget moves to a

future FY with little recognition of contribution to total cost growth

(schedule becomes a reserve)

l Inadequate management information system and tools being used

for program control

l No rigorous cost estimate exists

Š Recent Nbottoms upÓ budget estimate helpful but not sufficient

l Science program is not integrated in the ISS management
20

14

General Observations on ISS Management

l Priority on Fiscal Year management

l Institutional management approach as

opposed to project management

approach

l Different program baselines being used

by various elements of the program

15

Total Civ Serv ISS Civil Serv ISS Contractors

Mission Ops Directorate 454 265 1557

Engineering 814 403 783

Space & Life Sciences 184 31 241

EVA Project 27 19 188

Kennedy Space Center 1835 322 643

Marshall Space Flt Ctr 2692 144 159

ISS Program Office 238 238 3426

Other JSC Organizations 1287 122 790

Glenn Research Center 28

Goddard Space Flt Ctr 15

TOTAL 7531 1544 7828

FY02

Program 

Direct 

Reporting 

ISS Staffing and Reporting
21

16

IMCE Cost Review Results

l NASA estimate (FY02-06) required

for core complete at start of review

l Probable increases identified

during review

l Additional concerns

Š Contractor rates

Š International Partner costs

Š Research

Š No common baseline

l Offsets

Š Content changes and rates

Š Operations and sustaining

engineering

Shortfall/

Budget Offsets Reserve

$8.3B ($484M) $750M

($366M)

 (?)

$110M

$330M

______________________________________

$8.3B ($410M+?) $750M

Note: P3I assumed to be separately funded

17

Cost Analysis Support Team Results

l ISS Program Office does not have a

robust process to develop cost

estimates independent of contractor

proposals

l ISS business practices must change to

meet OMB budget
22

18

Requirements to Achieve Credibility

Charter

l Assess program assumptions and requirements and identify options

to smaller growth and/or budget savings and efficiencies

l Review ISS Program and financial management, tools, and identified

reforms, and make recommendations for improvements.

Findings

Judgment of the IMCE is that the core complete baseline could be

accomplished if:

Š Major changes are made in how the ISS Program is managed

Š Additional cost reductions are achieved in ISS core complete program

Š Additional funds are applied to ISS from non-ISS parts of the Human

Space Flight budget

Š A clearly defined program baseline with a credible Nend stateÓ is

established

19

Required Management Changes

l Maintain mission success as Number 1 Priority

l Manage ISS as a program, not an institution

Š All ISS manpower included in program office

Š ISS program manager controls staffing requirements

Š Streamline management reporting and control

Š Program management approach applies to all involved

NASA Centers

Š Maintain Nchecks and balancesÓ to ensure mission success
23

20

Streamline Management Reporting and Control

NASA

Administrator

Assoc. Adm.

Biological and Physical Research 

ISS Program Office

KSC ISS 

Project Office

MSFC ISS 

Project Office

Option 1

Assoc. Adm.

 Space Flight

Johnson Space

Center

21

ISS Management

NASA

Administrator

Assoc. Adm.

 ISS

ISS Program Office

KSC ISS 

Project Office

MSFC ISS 

Project Office

Option 2 (Recommended)

Johnson Space

Center

? Significantly

strengthen program

control and financial

analysis at program

office and NASA

Headquarters
24

22

Required Management Changes

l Consolidate prime and non-prime contracts into minimum number

of resulting contracts all reporting to the program office

l Manage to total program cost and schedule as well as FY budgets

Š Develop a technical baseline that can be costed

Š Develop a NASA total cost estimate

Š Use DoD approach

Š Establish management accountability

l Establish a state-of-the-art management information system

Š Existing program control system is highly inadequate

Š No credible plan

Š Ineffective actual vs. plan system

l Strengthen financial and project control function at ISS Program

office and NASA Headquarters Associate Administrator

23

Contract Consolidation

Current

Boeing - Prime Contract

26 Non-Prime Contracts

Consolidate to the

minimum number of

resulting contracts
25

24

Additional Funding Sources

l Incorporate 6-month ISS crew rotation in FY03

l Resulting change in assembly sequence delays U.S.

core complete two months to April 2004 and

International Partner elements up to one year

l Reduced Space Shuttle flight rate required to support

ISS

FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06

Current budgeted flight rate 7 5 6 6 6

Revised 7 4 5 4 4

Flights reduced 0 1 1 2 2

25

Additional Funding Sources, cont.

l Cost savings (FY02-06) from change in Space

Shuttle flight rate reduction

ISS $188M

Shuttle $480M

l Potential savings (FY02-06) from Strategic

Resources Review (SRR)/Institutional reductions

Å $350M - $450M

$668M
26

26

IMCE Cost Review Results

Budget Shortfall/Offsets Reserve

$8.3B ($484M) $750M

($366M)

 (?)

$110M

$330M

______________________________________

$8.3B ($410M+?) $750M

Å$1.0B

______________________________________

$8.3B $600M-? $750M

l NASA estimate (FY02-06) required for

core complete at start of review

l Probable increases identified during

review

l Additional concerns

Š Contractor rates

Š International Partner costs

Š Research

Š No common baseline

l Offsets

Š Content changes and rates

Š Operations and sustaining

engineering

l Additional resources

Š Assembly sequence and Shuttle

flight rate change

Š SRR/Institutional reductions

27

Program Baseline

l Lack of a NdefinedÓ program baseline causing confusion

and inefficiencies

Š ISS Program was (start of IMCE review) assuming NProgram

ManagerÕsÓ Recommended Program ($8.3B + $2.5B) was

baseline and core complete was an option.

Š Research hardware element of ISS being implemented as

original program.

Š Office of Biological and Physical Research and science

community are uncertain.

l 3-person vs. 7-person crew

l Centrifuge module ranges from top-priority to cancellation

l Many assuming 3-person plan is temporary
27

28

Program Baseline, cont.

l Lack of a NdefinedÓ program baseline causing confusion

and inefficiencies (concluded)

Š International Partners believe they have been told original

program is the baseline and they have NTreaty levelÓ

commitments.

Š Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) team assuming funding to continue

at a reduced level

Š Etc.

29

Program Baseline, cont.

l Options

Š Core complete as Nend stateÓ

l 3-person permanent crew for life of ISS

l Adverse science implications

l Adverse International Partner implications

Š Original program as Nend stateÓ

l Provides unique research potential of ISS

l Requires additional NASA funding

l Inconsistent with OMB and Congressional ISS credibility issues with NASA

Š Core complete with NASA performance gates leading to

Nend stateÓ

l End state defined by science priorities to achieve expanded research

potential

l NASA performance becomes critical to future of ISS

l Opportunity provided to achieve unique research potential of ISS
28

31

Maximize Research

Charter

Identify opportunities for maximizing research within

the planned ISS budget.

Findings

Research management requires significant changes

to maximize return within a given budget.

30

l Establish

credible/executable

program ($8.3B +

additions from Human

Space Flight)

l Establish science

priorities

l Provide minimum

funding necessary to

keep enhancements

viable to return to full

research potential

(within existing

budgets)

ISS NEnd StateÓ

11/01 - 6/02

Implement

Revised

Program

Acceptable

Program

Performance

?

Core Complete

NEnd StateÓ

Yes

No

Reassess

Resource

Needs

Expanded

research

potential

Fall CY 2003

NEnd StateÓ
29

32

Maximize Research, cont.

Current Status

l Research (facilities, utilization, operations, and Mir) budget

FY 2002 $4.0B

FY 1994 $3.8B

Buying power reduced 40%

l Science program is not effectively integrated in the ISS

management

l Research implementation is proceeding assuming original

program

Š No defined science priorities

Š Critical hardware very late

Š Insufficient research reserve

Š 3-person crew has adverse impact on science that can be performed

33

ISS Research Budget History

Excluding Mir Support Funding

($M)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06

FY94 Budget

Total $3.8B

Assembly complete

11/06

Assembly complete

6/02

FY02 Budget

Total $4.0B

Mir - $0.4B

 $3.6B
30

34

Maximize Research, cont.

Recommendations

l Establish science priorities

Š Give highest priority to research directed at solving problems

associated with long-duration human space flight including

engineering required to support humans in long-duration

space flight.

Š The centrifuge is mandatory to accomplish top priority

fundamental biology research. Availability as late as O08 is

unacceptable.

Š Research in the physical sciences of utmost importance can

be accomplished on the ISS.

35

l Establish a plan allocating available financial

resources consistent with science priorities,

including a prudent reserve

l Augment 3-person crew

Š Extended duration shuttle (requires adding shuttle

flights if 4 per year flight rate option implemented)

Š Overlap Soyuz missions

l Strengthen science management within the

ISS Program

Maximize Research, cont.
31

36

Maximize Research, cont.

l Extended duration shuttle

Š Docked time of at least 14 days is feasible

l Overlap Soyuz missions

Š 30 days of 6-person crew every 5 months

Š Cost impact TBD

6 month

Lifetime 6 month

Lifetime

Soyuz

docked

 with ISS Soyuz

Replacement

1-month

Overlap

6 month

Soyuz Lifetime

Replacement

1-month

Overlap

1-month

Overlap

37

Science Management

• ISS Deputy Program

 Manager for Science

Š Equal to other deputies

Š Jointly report to

 Program Manager

 and AA OBPR

Š Highly respected

 member of science

 community with

 management skills

ISS Program Manager

Deputy for Science

Deputy for Technical

Deputy for Operations

? Science Steering 

 Group (SSG) Chaired 

 by Deputy Program

 Manager for Science

Š Members from

 ISS-related science 

 disciplines

Š Meets frequently

 (at least monthly)

? Science Teams

Š Chaired by member

 of SSG

Š Members from the 

 science community

ISS Program
32

38

Enhancements

Charter

Assess cost estimates for potential U.S.-funded enhancements to the core

station and recommend refinements as necessary to achieve high confidence

estimates

Enhancement options to sustain 6 or 7 person crew

A- Node 3, US ECLS, 2nd Soyuz

 B- Enterprise (RS ECLS, 2nd Soyuz)

 C- Node 3, US ECLS, ASI Hab, CRV

Findings

Cost estimates for U.S.-funded enhancement options are not sufficiently

developed to assess credibility

l CRV estimate of $1.3B is plausible with following assumptions:

Š Assumes FY02 start (program interruption could have significant cost impact)

Š Existing component and subsystem contracts remain valid

Š 3-year on orbit lifetime is not a significant problem

Š Prime contractor accepts X-38 contributions

39

 A - Node 3, US ECLS, 2nd Soyuz

Node 3

US ECLS

Oxygen Generation (O2 gen.)

Carbon Dioxide Removal (ARS)

Toilet (WHC)

Water/Urine Processors

Lab Soyuz

Galley

Node 2

Crew Quarters

FY 02-06

Å $0.5B
33

40

B - Enterprise (RS ECLS, 2nd Soyuz)

Enterprise

Russian ECLS

Oxygen Generation (Electron)

Carbon Dioxide Removal ( Vozdukh )

Toilet

Lab Soyuz

Galley

Node 2

Crew Quarters

FY 02-06

Å $0.5B

41

C - Node 3, US ECLS, ASI Hab, CRV

Node 3

US ECLS

Oxygen Generation (O2 gen.)

Carbon Dioxide Removal (ARS)

Toilet (WHC), Water/Urine Processors

ASI Hab

Crew Quarters

Galley

CRV

FY 02-06

Å $1.1 B

Assumes

? Italians fund

ASI Hab

?ESA funds

$0.5B for CRV
34

42

Summary

l ISS core complete program is not credible for cost of $8.3B

(FY02-06).

l ISS core complete program could be credible with major

changes including significant staff reductions.

Caution: NASA Human Space Flight Nway of doing businessÓ will

be difficult to change to the degree required.

l Research management requires significant changes to

maximize return within a given budget.

l A program baseline that includes expanded research potential

as the Nend stateÓ maintains the unique research potential

of ISS.

Requires: NASA to demonstrate credibility as a prerequisite to

proceeding beyond the core complete program.
For Appendices to this report, go to:

ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/2001/imce_appdx.pdf