IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0566

Filed February 21, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER ALLEN BEALS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Paul R. Huscher, 

Judge.

Christopher Beals appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty 

to possession of a controlled substance, fentanyl, third offense, as an habitual 

offender. AFFIRMED.

Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro & Kozlowski, LLP, West Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2018).
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CARR, Senior Judge.

Christopher Beals appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty 

to possession of a controlled substance, fentanyl, third offense, as an habitual 

offender. He contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing a term 

of incarceration rather than suspending his sentence. Specifically, Beals argues 

the district court considered an impermissible factor in sentencing him.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Following a 2016 traffic stop, the State charged Beals with possession of a 

controlled substance, third offense, and driving while revoked. The parties entered 

into a plea agreement that encompassed several criminal cases pending against 

Beals; Beals agreed to plead guilty to the possession charge, and the State agreed 

to dismiss the driving-while-barred charge. In addition, the State agreed to 

recommend that the court suspend Beals’s sentence and place him on probation 

for a three-year period. During the plea colloquy, the district court informed Beals 

that the agreement was not binding on the court, which could impose any sentence 

up to the maximum, and asked Beals if he understood. After Beals answered 

affirmatively and asserted his desire to plead guilty, the district court accepted his 

plea.

Before sentencing, Beals, through counsel, filed a motion in arrest of 

judgment, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because at 

the time he entered it, he was “suffering from the effects of involuntary intoxication 

by an injection of horse tranquilizers.” Beals later withdrew the motion. Following 

a hearing, the court sentenced Beals to a fifteen-year prison term with a three-year 

mandatory minimum sentence.
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II. Scope and Standard of Review.

Our standard of review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. 

Letscher, 888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016). We will affirm a sentence that is 

within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Roby, 897 

N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017). We will find an abuse of discretion only if the court 

acted on clearly untenable grounds or to a clearly unreasonable extent. See State 

v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2016). Sentencing decisions enjoy a 

presumption of validity; Beals must make an affirmative showing that the 

sentencing court relied on improper factor to overcome the presumption. See id.

at 554; State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Iowa 2005) (“[T]he use of an 

impermissible sentencing factor is an abuse of discretion and requires 

resentencing.”).

III. Discussion.

In sentencing a defendant, the court must consider which sentence “will 

provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the 

protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.” 

Iowa Code § 901.5 (2016). The court must also consider and weigh other pertinent 

factors, “including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, 

character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.” State v. 

Formaro, 636 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). Before deferring or suspending 

sentence, “the court must additionally consider the defendant’s prior record of 

convictions or deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and 

any other relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options would satisfy 

the societal goals of sentencing.” Id.
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Beals alleges the sentencing court abused its discretion in failing to grant 

the probation term recommended by the prosecutor under the plea agreement, 

choosing instead to impose a prison term, because it considered an impermissible 

factor in sentencing him. Beals claims the court considered his filing of a motion 

in arrest of judgment when it determined his sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the court noted the presentence investigation 

report set forth a criminal history dating back twenty-two years, which included a 

number of probation revocations. The court told Beals, “There is nothing that I can 

see in your prior criminal history that would indicate any likelihood that you would 

be successful on probation.” The court then asked Beals about allegations that 

were made in his motion in arrest of judgment concerning his intoxication at the 

time he entered his guilty plea, which contradicted what Beals told the court at the 

guilty-plea hearing. The court concluded by stating:

I have reviewed the presentence investigation report. I have 

considered the circumstances of these offenses, [Beals]’s prior 

criminal history, his potential for successfully completing a probation, 

and the court finds that probation is not warranted in this case; 

that . . . it would unduly minimize the offenses and the circumstances 

of these offenses, and it would not adequately protect the public from 

further criminal offenses by this defendant.

The court imposed a fifteen-year term of incarceration with a three-year mandatory 

minimum sentence, as outlined in section 902.8.

Although the court inquired into the allegations made in Beals’s motion in 

arrest of judgment, nothing in the record indicates the court relied on the filing of

the motion or the information contained within it when it sentenced Beals. The 

court considered the proper factors in sentencing Beals—his lengthy criminal 

history, prior failures to successfully complete probation, and the likelihood he 
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would be successful if granted probation again. Weighing these factors against 

the need to punish Beals and protect society, the court declined to follow the plea 

recommendation and imposed a sentence of incarceration. Nothing in the record 

indicates that the court abused its discretion in sentencing Beals by relying on an 

improper factor. Because Beals has failed affirmatively to show the district court 

relied on an improper factor in sentencing him, we affirm the sentence imposed. 

AFFIRMED.