IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50475

Summary Calendar

EMILY JANE GALLIOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:13-CV-830

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Emily Jane Gallios, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment and dismissal of her diversity suit against Wells Fargo 

Bank National Association (Wells Fargo). The district court denied her IFP 

motion and certified that the appeal was legally frivolous. By moving for IFP 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 2, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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status, Gallios is challenging the district court’s certification. See Baugh v. 

Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Gallios does not challenge the district court’s determination that Wells 

Fargo was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on her suit to quiet title 

and her claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 

et seq.; the Texas Business and Commerce Code; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 

§ 2601, et seq.; and § 51.002 of the Texas Property Code. These issues are 

therefore abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 

813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Instead, Gallios contends that the district court violated her 

constitutional rights by denying her motion to discharge attorney Oscar Cantu

and proceed pro se. She also contends that the district court violated her due 

process rights by denying her motion to remand because, absent the claims 

raised in the unauthorized supplemental petition, the jurisdictional amount in 

controversy was not met. According to Gallios, had the district court allowed 

her to discharge Cantu, proceed pro se, and present her arguments regarding 

the unauthorized supplemental petition, her motion to remand would have 

been granted.

Gallios has not shown that she will raise a nonfrivolous issue for appeal 

with respect to these claims. Gallios’s contention that the district court forced 

her to retain Cantu is belied by the record. The day after Gallios filed her 

motion to discharge Cantu, the district court sought a response from Cantu 

and then permitted him to withdraw. Although the district court denied 

Gallios’s motion to proceed pro se and ordered her to obtain new counsel, 

Gallios was allowed to enter an appearance and proceed pro se for the duration 

of the case. Finally, Gallios did not file her motion to discharge Cantu, proceed 

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pro se, and voluntarily dismiss the case until December 26, 2013, more than 

four months after the filing of the supplemental petition and nearly two 

months after the district court’s denial of her motion to remand.

Although Gallios has shown that she is financially eligible to proceed 

IFP, she has not shown that “the appeal involves legal points arguable on their 

merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th 

Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, 

Gallios’s IFP motion is DENIED, and her appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. 

See id.; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

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