IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2022 WY 117

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2022

 September 26, 2022

DELORES M. STATZER,

Appellant 

(Plaintiff), 

v. 

LONNIE D. STATZER, 

Appellee 

(Defendant).

S-22-0016 

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County 

The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Joshua J. Merseal, Merseal Law, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. 

Representing Appellee:

Alexander K. Davison and Patrick D. Kent, Patton & Davison LLC, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Kent. 

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Delores M. Statzer filed suit against her son, Lonnie D. Statzer, seeking title to a 

parcel of property in Laramie County he acquired when he exchanged it for a parcel of 

property in Carbon County—a parcel his parents deeded to him years prior. Delores

alleged claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title. Both parties moved

for summary judgment. Delores now appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Lonnie on all three claims. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] We restate the issue:

Is Lonnie entitled to summary judgment on Delores’ 

claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and 

quiet title?

FACTS

[¶3] This case involves a dispute over family property. Through two quitclaim deeds—

one in 2015 and one in 20161

—Delores and Duwayne Statzer conveyed a parcel of land in 

Carbon County (the Carbon County property) to their son, Lonnie Statzer. Both deeds 

identified Delores and Duwayne as “Grantor” and Lonnie as “Grantee,” and the 2016 deed 

stated “neither the Grantor nor any other person . . . shall or will hereafter claim or demand 

any right or title to the subject property or any part thereof[.]” The 2015 deed was for $0;

the 2016 deed specified that Lonnie paid $10 in consideration.

[¶4] Delores and Duwayne continued utilizing and controlling the Carbon County 

property in certain ways over the next few years. They leased the property to a power 

company, accepted payments on the lease, and at one point signed an option contract for 

sale of the property. They also paid the property taxes. Duwayne passed away in January 

2019.

[¶5] In Spring 2019, Lonnie traded the Carbon County property for a parcel of property 

in Laramie County (the Laramie County property), accepting the Laramie County property

via a special warranty deed. Following this transaction, the relationship between Lonnie 

and Delores deteriorated. This deterioration is evidenced by a seven page letter Lonnie 

wrote to Delores in June 2019, in which he discussed his understanding of both property 

transactions, his belief Duwayne wanted him to acquire the Laramie County property,

1 The 2016 deed included the N1/2SW1/4 portion of the property, which had been omitted from the 2015 

deed.
2

Delores’ “lies [and] rumors” about him and favoritism toward her other son, and Delores’

repeated demands for title to the Laramie County property.

[¶6] In August 2019, Delores sent Lonnie a letter, through her attorney, demanding he 

“return [] legal ownership” of the Laramie County property. When Lonnie refused, Delores

filed suit against him.

[¶7] Delores’ complaint sought legal title to the Laramie County property, asserting

claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title. In an accompanying 

affidavit, she stated:

• she and Duwayne acquired certain property during their 

marriage;

2

• “in an uncounseled attempt at estate planning,” they 

transferred a property to each of their children;

• the understanding on transferring these properties was that 

the children would receive “title only and [she and 

Duwayne] would retain possession and control of the 

properties”;

• “in accordance with this plan,” she and Duwayne 

transferred the Carbon County property to Lonnie;

• after Duwayne died, Lonnie traded the Carbon County 

property for property in Laramie County;

• she and Duwayne “paid all the property taxes and fees 

associated with the Carbon County property”;

• Lonnie knew the Carbon County property “was not his to 

control”;

• Lonnie admitted “he did not believe the property was his 

and that it belonged to [her]” in his June 2019 letter; and

• Lonnie was “preventing [her] from controlling, accessing, 

owning or possessing the Laramie County property.”

2 Charles E. Terry conveyed the Carbon County property to Delores and Duwayne in November 2002.
3

Lonnie responded, generally denying her claims, and asserting several affirmative 

defenses.

[¶8] After completing discovery, Lonnie moved for summary judgment on all three of 

Delores’ claims, and Delores moved for summary judgment on her unjust enrichment and 

constructive trust claims. In support of his motion, Lonnie submitted a Rule 56.1 statement 

of facts, deeds for the Carbon County and Laramie County properties, and Delores’ 

responses to his first set of interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for 

production. In support of her motion, Delores submitted a Rule 56.1 statement of facts,

deeds and other documents related to the Carbon County property, deeds and related 

documents for the Laramie County property, Lonnie’s June 2019 letter, Lonnie’s admission 

that he wrote the letter, her affidavit, her August 2019 letter to Lonnie, and Lonnie’s 

responses to her requests for production. Following a hearing, the district court awarded 

summary judgment to Lonnie on all three claims. Delores appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] W.R.C.P. 56(a) states “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.”

[¶10] We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Spence v. Sloan, 

2022 WY 96, ¶ 22, 515 P.3d 572, 579 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Miller v. Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. 

Dist. #1, 2021 WY 134, ¶ 13, 500 P.3d 242, 246 (Wyo. 2021)).

We . . . afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. 

Thornock v. PacifiCorp, 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 

(Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses 

the same legal standard as the district court. Id. The record is 

assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion . . . , and we give a party opposing

summary judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that 

may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one 

that would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 

essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by 

the parties. Id.

Id. (quoting Miller, ¶ 13, 500 P.3d at 246).

[¶11] As to the burdens on the parties: 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case and showing there is no genuine 
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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Once that burden is met, the 

opposing party is obligated to respond with materials beyond 

the pleadings to show a genuine issue of material fact. When 

the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of 

persuasion, it establishes a prima facie case for summary

judgment by showing a lack of evidence on an essential 

element of the opposing party’s claim. 

Id. ¶ 23, 515 P.3d at 579 (quoting Miller, ¶ 14, 500 P.3d at 246). 

DISCUSSION 

[¶12] Delores contends the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Lonnie

because, at the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact on all three of her claims. 

At best, she contends, the district court should have granted her summary judgment on her 

unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims. On our de novo review, we agree with the 

district court that Lonnie is entitled to summary judgment on all three claims. 

Unjust Enrichment 

[¶13] “Unjust enrichment (or quantum meruit) is an equitable remedy which implies a 

contract so that one party may recover damages from another.” Electrical Wholesale 

Supply Co., Inc. v. Fraser, 2015 WY 105, ¶ 27, 356 P.3d 254, 261 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting 

Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc., 847 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wyo. 1993)). The plaintiff 

must prove:

(1) Valuable services were rendered, or materials furnished, 

(2) to the party to be charged, 

(3) which services or materials were accepted, used and 

enjoyed by the party, and, 

(4) under such circumstances which reasonably notified the 

party to be charged that the plaintiff, in rendering such services 

or furnishing such materials, expected to be paid by the party 

to be charged. Without such payment, the party would be 

unjustly enriched. 

Id. (quoting Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1004). 
5

[¶14] The fourth element of an unjust enrichment claim includes two separate 

requirements. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 2004 WY 140, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d 852, 856 (Wyo. 2004); see 

also Nuhome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d 940, 948 (Wyo. 2003); 

Elec. Wholesale Supply, ¶ 34, 356 P.3d at 263. First, the plaintiff must prove “the 

circumstances were such that the [defendant] was reasonably notified that the [plaintiff]

expected to be paid[.]” Jacoby, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d at 856 (quoting Nuhome, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 

948). An “express demand for payment” is not required. Redland v. Redland, 2012 WY 

148, ¶ 146, 288 P.3d 1173, 1205 (Wyo. 2012). Second, the plaintiff must prove the 

defendant would be unjustly enriched if the plaintiff is not paid. Jacoby, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d at 

856 (quoting Nuhome, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 948). 

[¶15] In his summary judgment memorandum, Lonnie argued there was no evidence the 

Carbon County property was conveyed to him under circumstances reasonably notifying 

him that Delores expected to be paid for the Carbon County property. We conclude Lonnie 

met his prima facie burden by showing a lack of evidence on this requirement. Delores 

therefore had to come forward with evidence supporting the reasonable notification 

requirement. She did not.

[¶16] Delores argued Lonnie was wrong on the facts and the law. On the facts, she 

asserted Lonnie’s June 2019 letter created a genuine issue of material fact because Lonnie

knew she and Duwayne wanted the Carbon County property back:

Dad said he didn’t want to sell the [Carbon County] property 

but he would trade for some deer or elk property with tags. No 

one in the family said a word while this process was going on 

over [three] proposed properties. As soon as they offered this 

new property and I told you [and] Dad all hell broke loose,

why? Because David wanted it [and] by God you were going 

to get it for him. You both kept saying you wanted you[r] name 

back on the [Carbon County] land.

She further asserted her August 2019 letter demanding Lonnie return the Laramie County 

property to her created a genuine issue of material fact.

[¶17] We conclude neither letter created a genuine issue of material fact whether the 

Carbon County property was conveyed to Lonnie under circumstances reasonably 

notifying him that Delores expected to be paid for the property. Lonnie’s letter supported

that Delores and Duwayne demanded the Carbon County property back sometime after

Lonnie began exploring the possibility of trading it for different property. Delores’ letter 

supported thatshe demanded Lonnie give her the Laramie County property in August 2019, 

years after the Carbon County property was conveyed to him. These after-the-fact

demands for the Carbon County and Laramie County properties have nothing to do with 
6 

whether Lonnie was reasonably notified Delores expected to be paid for the property when 

she and Duwayne conveyed the Carbon County property to him in 2015 and 2016. 

[¶18] On the law, Delores focused on the fourth element’s second requirement—unjust 

enrichment—to the exclusion of the first requirement—reasonable notification of an 

expectation of payment. In the district court, as on appeal, she emphasized our statements 

in Redland that “analysis of the fourth element of an unjust enrichment claim does not rest 

on an express demand for payment”; “[e]lement four is the heart of an unjust enrichment 

claim”; and “[t]he receipt of a benefit must be unjust” to the defendant. Redland, ¶ 146, 

288 P.3d at 1205–06 (quoting Jacoby, ¶ 13, 100 P.3d at 856). In emphasizing these 

statements, Delores seems to suggest the fourth element requires only proof of unjust 

enrichment. However, as explained above, the fourth element includes two separate 

requirements, Jacoby, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d at 856, both of which were met in Redland, ¶¶ 145–

49, 288 P.3d at 1205–07. 

[¶19] Lonnie made his prima facie case by showing there was no evidence that when title 

to the Carbon County property was conveyed to him, he was reasonably notified Delores 

expected payment for the property. And, as shown, Delores failed to come forward with 

evidence Lonnie was reasonably notified. Lonnie was therefore entitled to summary 

judgment on Delores’ unjust enrichment claim. 

Constructive Trust 

[¶20] “A constructive trust arises by construction of the court when equity so demands.” 

Baker v. Ayres & Baker Pole & Post, Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 26, 117 P.3d 1234, 1242 (Wyo. 

2005) (citing Rossel v. Miller, 2001 WY 60, ¶ 13, 26 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Wyo. 2001)). “It 

is an equitable remedy imposed to compel a person who unfairly holds a property interest 

to hold property in trust for the person for whom in equity and good conscience it should 

be held.” Id. (citing Rossel, ¶ 13, 26 P.3d at 1028). Stated differently, 

“A constructive trust is the formula through which the 

conscience of equity finds expression. When property has 

been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of legal 

title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, 

equity converts him into a trustee.” 

Id. (quoting Rossel, ¶ 19, 26 P.3d at 1029). 

[¶21] “To warrant imposition of a constructive trust,” the plaintiff must prove three 

elements: “a promise, either express or implied; a transfer made in reliance on that promise; 
7

and unjust enrichment.”3

 Id. (citing Rossel, ¶ 13, 26 P.3d at 1028). As to the third element, 

“unjust enrichment occurs when ‘a party receives something of value without payment, 

which was accepted and used so as to unjustly enrich the recipient of the goods or 

services.’” Baker v. Ayres & Baker Pole & Post, Inc., 2007 WY 185, ¶ 17, 170 P.3d 1247, 

1252 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 2, ¶ 26, 60 

P.3d 1277, 1288 (Wyo. 2003)). Each constructive trust claim is unique and should be 

decided on its “particular facts, circumstances, and conditions.” 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 182, 

Westlaw (Aug. 2022 update) (“No exhaustive catalog can be made of the types of wrongful 

retention of property which have moved courts to decree a constructive trust; wherever 

equity finds such a wrongful holding, it will give relief, whether the type of injustice be 

new or old.” (footnote omitted)).

[¶22] The Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160, Westlaw (May 2022 update) states 

that “[w]here property is held by one person upon a constructive trust for another, and the 

constructive trustee by the wrongful disposition of the property acquires other property, he 

holds the property so acquired upon a constructive trust[.]” See also Bogert’s The Law of 

Trusts and Trustees § 471, Westlaw (June 2022 update) (“If the property has been sold, the 

trust attaches to the proceeds held by the defendant, or to other property held by the 

defendant into which the original property or its proceeds can be traced.” (footnotes 

omitted)). Thus, Delores’ constructive trust claim would survive summary judgment if she

could show that when she and Duwayne conveyed the Carbon County property to Lonnie

there was an express or implied promise Lonnie would reconvey the Carbon County 

property back to them, and that she and Duwayne conveyed the property to Lonnie in 

reliance on such promise. Cf. Thomasi, 660 P.2d 806 (agreeing there was sufficient 

evidence to impose a constructive trust where Ms. Bainbrich conveyed real property to her 

friends for sham consideration in an effort to place the property beyond the reach of 

creditors and pursuant to an agreement they would reconvey the property to her when any 

risk of her losing the property had passed, the threat had long passed, and the friends never 

reconveyed the property); Fuller v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306 (Wyo. 1980) (concluding the facts 

supported imposition of a constructive trust where Ms. Fuller transferred title of 

unencumbered real property to her son pursuant to an agreement that he would borrow 

money to pay Ms. Fuller’s debts and then, after the loan was repaid, retransfer the property 

to her).

[¶23] In his summary judgment memorandum, Lonnie argued there was no evidence he 

made any promise to reconvey the Carbon County property to his parents. Consequently, 

Delores “could not have relied on any such promise when transferring the Carbon County 

3 Some states require the constructive trust plaintiff to establish the parties had a fiduciary or confidential 

relationship. See, e.g. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 176, Westlaw (Aug. 2022 update). Wyoming does not. Thomasi 

v. Koch, 660 P.2d 806, 809 (Wyo. 1983) (“We do not find a requirement in the jurisprudence of the State 

of Wyoming that a constructive trust can only be found if a fiduciary relationship or a close family 

relationship exists between the transferor and transferee at the time that the property is transferred.”).
8

property to [him].” We agree. By showing a lack of evidence on the first two elements for 

a constructive trust claim Lonnie satisfied his prima facie burden.

[¶24] Delores’ discovery responses, which Lonnie submitted in support of his motion, 

allude to an agreement to reconvey,4 but Delores has never relied on them to support her 

constructive trust claim on summary judgment. We “will not frame the issues for the 

litigants and will not consider issues not raised by them and not supported by cogent 

argument and authoritative citation.” Ross v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2022 

WY 11, ¶ 24, 503 P.3d 23, 31 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Woods v. State, 2017 WY 111, ¶ 18, 

401 P.3d 962, 969 (Wyo. 2017)); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider 

only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”); Bear Peak 

Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Res., LLC, 2017 WY 124, ¶ 35, 403 P.3d 1033, 1046 

(Wyo. 2017) (declining to consider an argument that there was a genuine issue of material 

fact where Bear Peak Resources, LLC chose not to make that argument to the district court

and instead made it for the first time on appeal).

[¶25] Delores instead plainly asserted in her affidavit that the agreement was Lonnie 

would receive title to the Carbon County property but she and Duwayne would retain 

possession and control of the property. She then argued Lonnie’s June 2019 letter, which 

she attached to her summary judgment motion and relied on to oppose Lonnie’s motion, 

created a genuine issue of material fact in that it was replete with the terms of the 

agreement. Referring to the letter, she specifically noted Lonnie’s acknowledgement that 

the Carbon County property was put in his name for safekeeping and that she and Duwayne 

asked him to put the property back in their names. She further asserted Lonnie 

“memorialized his agreement to put the Laramie County property in [her] name after the 

transfer.”

[¶26] In his letter, Lonnie stated the following about ownership of the Carbon County 

property:

I never thought the property was mine. I told you the last time 

I was talking to you that it was yours until you and Dad passed 

away.

4 In her response to Lonnie’s first set of interrogatories, Delores asserted Lonnie’s June 2019 letter “shows 

that [Lonnie] knew the agreement was made with my husband, Duwayne Statzer, [] that my husband and I 

retained full power, possession, and control of the property and that the property was to be transferred back 

into our names at any time we requested.” In her response to Lonnie’s requests for admission, she asserted 

“[t]he Carbon County property listed on the Quitclaim Deed, dated May 16, 2016, was a verbal agreement 

between [Lonnie], my husband, and me that title would be transferred to [Lonnie] but the sole power, right, 

and authority to transfer the property would remain in control of my husband and me. [Lonnie] knew of 

this agreement as stated in his letter.”
9 

Yes it was put in our names early for safe keeping. Mine and 

David[’]s piece of land was valued about the same. The river 

prop[erty] was valued at 123,000, David[’]s nearly the same 

and Rene[’]s 250,000. 

[¶27] In addition, Lonnie said the following about his parents demanding the Carbon 

County property back: 

Dad said he didn’t want to sell the property but he would trade 

for some deer or elk property with tags. No one in the family 

said a word while this process was going on over [three] 

proposed properties. As soon as they offered this new property 

and I told you [and] Dad all hell broke loose, why? Because 

David wanted it [and] by God you were going to get it for him. 

You both kept saying you wanted you[r] name back on the

land. 

Finally, Lonnie said the following about putting the Laramie County property in Delores’ 

name: “I told you a few months ago when this started. Because you put the land solely in 

my name I would have to sign for it and then I would put it back in your name if the lies 

[and] rumors stopped about the lying [and] stealing the land.” 

[¶28] At most, these 2019 statements establish that Duwayne and Delores demanded

Lonnie return the Carbon County property to them only after they learned he was exploring 

the possibility of trading it for different property, and that in 2019 Lonnie contemplated he 

might put the Laramie County property in Delores’ name if certain conditions were met. 

Lonnie’s 2019 letter sheds no light on what promises, if any, he made to reconvey the 

Carbon County property at the time his parents conveyed it to him in 2015 and 2016. Nor 

does it show Delores conveyed the Carbon County property to Lonnie in reliance on any 

promise to reconvey. In fact, the 2016 deed, which both parties submitted with their 

summary judgment materials, expressly stated “neither the Grantor nor any other person . 

. . shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the subject property or any 

part thereof[.]” 

[¶29] Because Delores failed to come forward with evidence to support the first two 

elements of her constructive trust claim, Lonnie is entitled to summary judgment on that 

claim. 

Quiet Title 

[¶30] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 (LexisNexis 2021) identifies who may bring a quiet 

title action: 
10

An action may be brought by a person in possession of real 

property against any person who claims an estate or interest 

therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the 

adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may 

hold possession himself or by his tenant.

[¶31] To maintain a quiet title action “the plaintiff must have (1) possession, and (2) legal 

title or some interest in the property.” Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1995)

(quoting Hirsch v. McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1994)). If land is unoccupied, the 

person with title may bring a quiet title action, “either because the remedy exists 

independent of the statute, or because his title gives him constructive possession.” Bellis 

v. Kersey, 2010 WY 138, ¶ 17, 241 P.3d 818, 824 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Goodrich, 908 

P.2d at 418).

[¶32] For the reasons stated above, Delores has no equitable interest in the Laramie 

County property. Moreover, there is no dispute Delores does not have possession of the 

Laramie County property. Her affidavit states Lonnie is “preventing [her] from 

controlling, accessing, owning or possessing the Laramie County property.” Nor is there 

any dispute Lonnie has title to the Laramie County property. Consequently, regardless of 

whether the land is vacant, the right to bring a quiet title action belongs to Lonnie, not 

Delores. Because Delores lacks standing, Lonnie is entitled to summary judgment on her 

quiet title claim.

[¶33] Affirmed.