Filed 8/18/23 In re D.L. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.L., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B321015

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MJ24058)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.L., a Minor,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Brian C. Yep, Judge. Affirmed.

Lynette Gladd Moore; Laini Millar Melnick, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
2

Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Appellant D.L., who was born in 2001, appeals from orders 

sustaining a juvenile wardship petition and the court’s 

disposition order. Appellant admits that he and Deonta Johnson 

also known as “Fatboy” “planned to rob a neighborhood 

convenience store called ‘the [D]airy.’ ” Appellant also admits 

that Johnson would “rush in with a gun belonging to appellant 

and demand the money.” It is undisputed that Johnson shot the 

Dairy’s employee, John Ruh, three times and Ruh died of 

multiple gunshot wounds. 

Appellant does not challenge on appeal that he was a major 

participant in the robbery. He, however, challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support that he participated in the 

robbery with reckless indifference to human life. We conclude 

substantial evidence shows appellant acted with reckless 

indifference to human life and affirm the order sustaining the 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and the 

dispositional order.

BACKGROUND

As a preliminary matter, we note that in his appellate 

briefing, appellant concedes he “provided the gun and induced 

Ruh to open the cash register” and expressly assumes there was 

sufficient evidence to support he was a major participant in the 

robbery. We agree with appellant’s assumption that he was a 

major participant in the underlying felony. As is evident from 

our factual summary below, appellant participated in every 
3

phase of the robbery. He planned the robbery, induced Ruh to 

open the cash register, supplied the lethal weapon used in the 

robbery, and was present during the robbery. As his confederate 

used lethal force, appellant watched and smiled. Appellant’s 

participation in the robbery “was sufficiently significant to be 

considered ‘major.’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 611

(Clark).) 

Our factual summary is accordingly focused on appellant’s 

only appellate challenge, that is, to the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding reckless indifference to human life. 

1. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition

As later sustained, the second amended petition in count 

one alleged appellant committed Ruh’s murder. The murder 

occurred while appellant and Johnson were attempting to commit 

a robbery. A principal was armed with a firearm. 

In count two, the People alleged, and the court sustained,

one count of attempted second degree robbery and that a 

principal was armed with a firearm.1 

2. Evidence at trial

The parties stipulated in the 2022 trial that Ruh died of 

multiple gunshot wounds. Appellant did not call any witnesses. 

a. M.H.’s testimony

M.H. dated appellant and M.H.’s daughter referred to 

appellant as dad. Appellant told M.H. that Fatboy proposed 

robbing the Dairy. According to M.H., Fatboy was a member of 

1 Additional allegations, including three counts of 

dissuading a witness, M.H., by force or threat, were dismissed. 
4

the 30 Crip Harlem gang. M.H. testified that appellant belonged 

to a different gang.

Appellant told M.H. that he and Fatboy planned a robbery.

They knew that Ruh worked alone. Appellant said he gave the 

gun to Fatboy “right before” entering the Dairy. Appellant told 

M.H. that Fatboy was supposed to scare Ruh with the gun.

Appellant also told M.H. the robbery did not “go as 

planned” because Fatboy shot the cashier and that “was not 

supposed to happen.” Appellant said, “Fatboy had shot him 

[Ruh] just for no reason.” Appellant reiterated to M.H.: “They 

was just supposed to rob him and that was it.” Appellant told 

M.H., “Fatboy had told the man to put his hands up” and 

appellant was near the door “telling him [Fatboy] to come on, and 

that’s when Fatboy had shot the man.”

After the shooting, appellant and Fatboy went to 

appellant’s house where Fatboy had been staying. Appellant told 

M.H. the gun was “dirty” because Fatboy shot the cashier.

Neither appellant nor Fatboy obtained any money from the 

robbery.

Appellant told M.H. not to tell anyone about the attempted 

robbery and shooting, and also told M.H., “ ‘I got to get out of 

here.’ ” After the shooting, M.H. saw appellant carry the gun to 

the “places we go” such as clubs. Appellant described the gun as 

“ ‘dirty’ ” and said, “ ‘[I]t’s got a body on it.’ ” 

b. Security footage

Detective Steven Blagg described the video footage of the 

robbery.2 “Mr. Ruh just accepted something from somebody 

2 This video footage is not in the appellate record.
5

[appellant] on the other side of the counter. When he opened the 

register another figure appeared [Johnson] . . . causing Mr. Ruh 

to slam the door shut of the cash register. What appears to be 

gunshots go off. And the person who was on the customer side of 

the counter [appellant], . . . then starts to walk towards the door 

while smiling.”

Another video showed appellant asking Ruh, “ ‘Can I get a 

Newport [cigarette]?’ ” Appellant hands something to Ruh 

causing Ruh to open the cash register. After Ruh opens the cash 

register, Johnson says, “ ‘Empty the register.’ ” Ruh slammed the 

cash register shut. Ruh said, “ ‘What are you gonna rob me with 

a pellet gun?’ ” Ruh opened the cash register because appellant 

paid for the Newport cigarette. Appellant did not object to the 

latter statement.

Detective Blagg further testified that videos of the incident 

showed Johnson firing the gun. He said that three shots can be 

heard on the video. According to Blagg, “[T]here was a lull 

between the first and second gunshot.” According to Blagg, each 

time Johnson fired, appellant’s body twitched; Detective Blagg 

explained that twitching is a typical response to a gunshot in 

close proximity. Blagg further described that as the shots were 

being fired, appellant was “[v]ery slowly moving” towards the 

door. Appellant “continued to observe what was going on behind 

the counter.” After the shooting, Johnson continued to try to 

break open the cash register and appellant left the Dairy. 

From the video it appeared to Blagg that appellant was 

about 15 yards ahead of Johnson as both traveled in the same 

direction away from the Dairy.
6

c. Other evidence

Detective Scott Lawler testified that he interviewed 

appellant. Appellant said he lived with Fatboy but when Fatboy 

stole from appellant’s sister, appellant’s mother told Fatboy to 

leave the home. 

When Lawler interviewed appellant, appellant said he 

went alone to the Dairy to get a cigarette. Appellant said that he 

“frequently” went to the Dairy. 

Appellant stated that “[w]hile inside getting the cigarette 

somebody came in with a gun. He [appellant] ran, or attempted 

to run out but that individual was blocking the door. He finally 

made it outside and heard . . . two to three gunshots as he was 

running away.” 

After Detective Lawler informed appellant that video 

surveillance depicted appellant and Johson approaching the 

Dairy, appellant then changed his story stating: “[O]n the 

morning of the incident Deonta [Johnson] approached him . . . . 

[Johnson] stated ‘Let’s go get a cigarette.’ That’s when both of 

them left [appellant’s] house to go get a cigarette. Appellant said 

that Johnson robbed the store. Appellant said that Johnson shot 

Ruh. Appellant “saw” Johnson shoot Ruh with a black and 

chrome semi-automatic firearm. Appellant said he did not call 

the police. Appellant told Lawler he knew Ruh. 

3. Court findings and sentence

The trial court found the following facts: Deonta Johnson 

and appellant arrived at the Dairy around the same time. 

Appellant entered the Dairy and asked Ruh to buy a cigarette. 

“[T]his is part of a plan. . . . so that the victim will open the cash 

drawer. And as soon as the victim opened the cash drawer 
7

Deonta Johnson rushed in from the side, gun drawn, and asked 

the victim for money. The victim shuts the cash drawer and 

refuses to give the money to Deonta Johnson. There’s a brief 

verbal exchange. And then Deonta Johnson shoots the victim 

three times.” 

The court continued: Appellant does not call “emergency 

medical services, does not try to assist the victim, he does not call 

911 for the sheriff’s [sic] to come.” Johnson unsuccessfully tries 

to open the cash drawer and then Johnson and appellant run 

“across the same open field, in the direction of the minor’s house.” 

The court found, “[T]here was clearly a plan . . . [a]nd the 

gun had to be part of the plan, otherwise the robbery would not 

be successful.” As soon as Ruh opened the cash drawer, “Johnson 

rushed in from the side of the victim with the gun drawn. So 

clearly, the gun was part of the plan that was hatched to rob the 

Dairy.” 

The court further found, “The undisputed evidence is that 

the minor chose the Dairy for the robbery. The minor had been 

there many times before and he knew the victim. Clearly, the 

victim must also have known or known of the minor. With this in 

mind, how could the robbery have been successful unless the 

victim was shot and killed? In other words, how could Deonta 

Johnson and the minor have gotten away with the robbery if, in 

fact, the victim knew who they were or at least knew who the 

minor was.” 

The court found that appellant was a major participant in 

the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. 

The court then sustained the petition. 
8

After a contested disposition hearing, the court sentenced 

defendant to a secure youth treatment facility for a period of 

25 years to life. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Appellant’s sole challenge is to the sufficiency of evidence 

that he acted with reckless indifference to human life and that he 

had intent to kill.3 “[W]e determine whether substantial 

evidence—‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value’—supports the juvenile court’s findings. [Citation.] We 

view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution 

and presume in support of the [findings] the existence of every 

fact the [court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’

[Citation.] We ‘accept [all] logical inferences that the [court] 

might have drawn from the . . . evidence’ [citation], but reject 

inferences ‘ “based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, 

speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work” ’

[citation].” (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.) 

3 Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting that he was a major participant in the 

robbery and we conclude that there was substantial evidence 

supporting he acted with reckless indifference to human life 

sufficient to support the murder conviction, we need not consider 

whether he also harbored the intent to kill Ruh. 
9

B. Standard for Reckless Indifference to Human Life

Senate Bill No. 1437 amended Penal Code4 section 189 to 

provide that a defendant who was not the actual killer or did not 

have an intent to kill is not liable for felony murder unless he 

“was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) 

of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; 

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703.) Section 190.2, 

subdivision (d) provides: “[E]very person, not the actual killer, 

who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major 

participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, 

requests, or assists in the commission of a felony [including 

robbery] . . . which results in the death of some person or persons, 

and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree . . . shall be 

punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life 

without the possibility of parole . . . .” (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) The 

newly narrowed scope of felony murder is based on “preexisting 

law governing felony-murder special-circumstance findings . . . to 

determine whether the defendant may be sentenced to death or 

life without possibility of parole.” (Strong, at p. 703.) 

Section 190.2 codified the rule announced in Tison v. 

Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison). (People v. Clark, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p.616.) Both Tison and a prior United States 

Supreme Court case, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 

(Enmund), permit imposition of the death penalty for a felony 

murder when a defendant’s involvement is substantial and 

demonstrates a reckless indifference to the risk of death. The 

two cases “help define the constitutional limits for punishing 

4 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
10

accomplices to felony murder.” (In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 

38, 46.) “At one end of this Enmund-Tison continuum is ‘ “the 

minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither 

intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental 

state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] At the other end are the ‘actual 

killers and those who attempted or intended to kill. [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.] ‘Somewhere between them . . . lies the constitutional 

minimum’ showing required for the imposition of death or life 

without the possibility of parole.” (Ibid.) That constitutional 

minimum is the standard now incorporated into the definition of 

felony murder. (§ 189.)

Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. 782 involved a robbery and 

murder of an elderly couple. (Id. at p. 784.) Enmund drove two 

confederates to the scene and waited to help them escape. (Id. at 

pp. 786, 788.) He was not present for the murder or robbery. (Id.

at p. 788.) The Supreme Court held that imposition of the death 

penalty was inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments when Enmund did not kill the victims, was not 

present when they were killed, and did not intend they be killed 

or anticipate that lethal force would or might be used. (Ibid.) 

The facts of Tison demonstrated a more culpable mental 

state than that harbored by the defendant in Enmund. In Tison, 

in an effort to help Gary Tison escape prison, the Tison family,

including sons Raymond and Ricky, “assembled a large arsenal of 

weapons.” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 139.) Family members 

entered the prison carrying an ice chest filled with guns. (Ibid.) 

They armed Gary Tison and his cellmate and left the prison. 

(Ibid.) Gary Tison and his cellmate “brutally murder[ed]” four 

“captives” who had stopped to try to aid the Tison family with a 

flat tire. (Id. at p. 141.) “Neither [Raymond nor Ricky] made an 
11

effort to help the victims, though both later stated they were 

surprised by the shooting.” (Ibid.) Raymond and Ricky were 

convicted of felony murder for all four murders. (Ibid.)

The United States Supreme Court upheld the death 

sentence, finding Raymond and Ricky showed reckless 

indifference to human life. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 152.) 

The high court reasoned that Raymond Tison was prepared to kill 

in furtherance of the prison break, flagged down the victims to 

assist with the flat tire, robbed the victims and guarded them at 

gunpoint while the group considered their fate. Raymond “stood 

by and watched the killing, making no effort to assist the victims 

before, during, or after the shooting. (Id. at p. 151.) “Instead, he 

chose to assist the killers in their continuing criminal 

endeavors . . . .” (Ibid.) Similarly, Ricky Tison brought guns into 

the prison to arm the prisoners, participated in the kidnapping 

and robbery, and watched the killing without aiding the victims. 

(Id. at p. 152.) 

Our high court applied Enmund and Tison in People v. 

Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks). Defendant Matthews 

“acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which Leon 

Banks and others participated.” (Id. at p. 794.) “In the course of 

escaping, Banks shot one of the robbery victims.” (Ibid.) 

Matthews and two of his confederates were gang members, but 

Banks was not a gang member. (Id. at pp. 795–796, 810.) 

Although the gang’s primary activities included shootings, 

attempted murders and murders, “[n]o evidence was presented 

that Matthews” or his fellow gang members “had killed before, or 

that Matthews knew any of the three had killed before.” (Id. at 

p. 796.)
12

Our Supreme Court reversed the felony murder special 

circumstance, finding Matthews no more culpable than the 

getaway driver in Enmund. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) 

Our Supreme Court emphasized that “a defendant’s personal 

involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an 

ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as 

Earl Enmund.” (Id. at p. 802.) “Matthews, like Enmund and 

unlike the Tisons, did not see the shooting happen, did not have 

reason to know it was going to happen, and could not do anything 

to stop the shooting or render assistance.” (Id. at p. 807.) 

Although Matthews knew he was participating in an armed 

robbery, “nothing at trial supported the conclusion beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Matthews knew his own actions would 

involve a grave risk of death. There was no evidence Matthews 

intended to kill or, unlike the Tisons, knowingly conspired with 

accomplices known to have killed before. Instead, as in Enmund, 

Banks’s killing of [the victim] was apparently a spontaneous 

response to armed resistance from the victim.” (Ibid.) 

Subsequent to Enmund and Tison, courts have refined the 

meaning of reckless indifference to human life. “ ‘[T]he culpable 

mental state of “reckless indifference to life” is one in which the 

defendant “knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to 

carry a grave risk of death” [citation] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re 

Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App..5th 1002, 1021.) 

The following nonexclusive factors are relevant to whether 

defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life: (1) the 

defendant’s knowledge of weapons and use of a weapon even if 

the defendant did not kill the victim; (2) the defendant’s presence 

at the scene of the crime and failure to aid the victim; (3) the 

duration of the felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s 
13

likelihood of killing; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize 

risk of violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

pp. 618–623.) No single factor is “ ‘necessary’ ” or “ ‘necessarily 

sufficient.’ ” (In re Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019.)

Our high court explained in Clark that the mental state 

comprising reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to 

kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even 

if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the 

outcome of his [or her] actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

pp. 616–617.) The required intent has “both subjective and 

objective elements. The subjective element is the defendant’s 

conscious disregard of risks known to him or her. But 

recklessness is not determined merely by reference to a 

defendant’s subjective feeling that he or she is engaging in risky 

activities. Rather, recklessness is also determined by . . . what ‘a 

law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 617.) 

In In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), our high 

court held that a petitioner who planned an unarmed assault and 

was not present when a confederate shot the victim did not act 

with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at pp. 671, 672, 

678–679.) Scoggins further held that “ ‘[a]wareness of no more 

than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] 

is insufficient’ ” to establish reckless indifference to human life; 

“ ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the 

statutory requirement. [Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a 

participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate 

lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless 

indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 677.) 
14

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion That 

Appellant Acted with Reckless Indifference to 

Human Life

Applying Clark’s factors (which Scoggins reaffirmed) here, 

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

order. (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) In so 

concluding, we consider the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) 

1. Defendant’s knowledge of weapons and use of a 

weapon

Appellant did not personally use a weapon. Appellant 

knew a weapon would be used in the robbery and in fact, 

provided the weapon to his confederate. Appellant acknowledges 

that he “provided the murder weapon . . . .” M.H. testified that 

appellant told her he gave Fatboy the gun so that Fatboy could 

scare Ruh. 

2. Defendant’s presence and failure to aid

Appellant was present at the scene of the crime and did not 

aid the victim. Appellant told law enforcement that he did not 

call the police. 

3. Duration of the felony

Our record does not disclose the duration of the felony, but 

it appears to have occurred over a short time period. Appellant 

requested a cigarette; Johnson ordered Ruh to empty the cash 

register; Ruh refused; Johnson shot Ruh three times, Johnson 

tried to open the cash register; and both appellant and Johnson 

left the Dairy, traveling in the same direction. 
15

Notwithstanding the short duration, the felony lasted long

enough for appellant to have had an opportunity to intervene. 

There was a “lull” between the first and second shooting. 

Appellant did not try to stop Johnson from shooting again. 

Instead he merely observed with a smile on his face. (See In re 

McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1012, 1014 [even if felony 

was brief, petitioner had opportunity to “say or do something”].) 

4. Likelihood of killing

There was no evidence of appellant’s knowledge of 

Johnson’s likelihood of killing. Although Johnson was a gang 

member, there was no evidence that Johnson previously killed or 

attempted to kill anyone. We agree with appellant insofar as he 

argues that there was no evidence he and Johnson agreed to kill 

Ruh to avoid being identified by Ruh. However, no evidence 

supports appellant’s alternate theory that Johnson’s decision to 

shoot arose quickly was based on “ ‘[Ruh’s] unexpected 

resistance’ ” to opening the cash register. The evidence was that 

Ruh opened the cash register but then closed it, not that he 

resisted opening it. More important, the record does not show 

that Johnson’s decision to shoot was based on “ ‘unexpected 

resistance’ ” because no witness supports that scenario. 

5. Appellant’s efforts to minimize risk of violence

Appellant knew that Johnson would use the gun to scare 

Ruh. There was no evidence that appellant took any steps to 

decrease the risk of violence created by such a threat. To the 

contrary—he provided the loaded firearm to Ruh. This case 

is not like Clark, where the defendant planned a robbery at a 

store when it was closed and planned that the robbery 
16

involve only one unloaded gun. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

pp. 621–622.) 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant 

was not “ ‘ “the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the 

scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any 

culpable mental state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Loza, 

supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.) Except for the absence of any 

evidence concerning Johnson’s proclivity to kill, all of the Clark 

factors support the trial court’s finding that appellant acted with 

reckless indifference to human life. Further, even if appellant 

did not know of a likelihood Johnson would shoot Ruh before the 

shooting, he was aware of the risk of death once the shooting 

started and did nothing to assist Ruh during the lull between the 

first and second shot. Substantial evidence thus supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that appellant harbored reckless 

indifference to human life. 

Appellant’s contrary argument does not view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. For example, 

appellant states that “[t]he crime happened quickly and 

[appellant] had no opportunity to restrain Johnson or aid the 

victim.” 

Appellant’s similar statement that he had “no realistic 

opportunity to intervene before Johnson opened fire” is not 

supported by citation to the record. Appellant’s statements 

ignore the evidence that he was near Johnson and the victim 

during the shooting. He chose not to attempt to restrain or even 

dissuade Johnson from shooting. Instead, he smiled as Johnson 

shot Ruh. According to Detective Blagg’s description of the video 

footage, appellant “just stands there observing the interaction 

between Deonta Johnson and Mr. Ruh.” Appellant’s statement 
17

that he “left immediately when Johnson started shooting” also is 

incorrect. The evidence showed that appellant did not leave until 

after Johnson fired all three shots. 

Appellant’s reliance on People v. Ramirez (2021) 

71 Cal.App.5th 970 is misplaced. In Ramirez, Division Seven of 

this court concluded that a petitioner seeking resentencing of a 

murder conviction did not act with reckless indifference to human 

life. (Id. at p. 975.) The court explained: “Ramirez did not 

provide the murder weapon, instruct his confederate to shoot, or 

know of his confederate’s propensity toward violence, and the 

shooting occurred quickly without Ramirez having a meaningful 

opportunity to intervene.” (Ibid.) In Ramirez, the 15-year-old 

petitioner “did not want a gun to be used and did not want to be 

involved” in a planned carjacking. (Id. at p. 979.) When his 

confederate started shooting during the carjacking, Ramirez “ 

‘took off.’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally, Ramirez presented evidence that 

he “did not want to hurt anyone.” (Id. at p. 981.) The shooter 

was on the driver side and Ramirez was on the passenger side of 

a vehicle during the shooting and Ramirez was not close enough 

to restrain the shooter. (Id. at p. 989.) The rapid pace of the 

crime also afforded Ramirez “no opportunity” to intervene. (Ibid.) 

Ramirez did not know the victim was wounded by the gunfire. 

(Ibid.) The court further found that there was evidence “Ramirez 

was influenced by peer pressure” and his age (15 years) 

“diminishes any inference he acted with reckless disregard for 

human life . . . .” (Id. at p. 990.) “The evidence is not sufficient to 

prove 15-year-old Ramirez was ‘subjectively aware that his 

actions created a graver risk of death’ than any other armed 

carjacking.” (Id. at pp. 990–991.) 
18

The difference between Ramirez and the appeal before us is 

patent. Appellant supplied Johnson with a loaded firearm. In 

contrast to Ramirez, who did not want involvement of a gun, 

appellant wanted Johnson to use a gun to scare Ruh. Whereas 

Ramirez was on the other side of a vehicle, making it impossible 

for him to intervene during the shooting, appellant was near 

Johnson and Ruh, and did nothing to intervene. Instead, he 

smiled as Johnson killed Ruh. Appellant presented no evidence 

that he did not want to shoot anyone or that he was influenced to 

participate in the robbery by peer pressure. 

In his reply brief, appellant relies heavily on People v. Keel

(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546 (Keel), which is also distinguishable.

In Keel, 15-year-old Keel and an 18-year-old confederate robbed a 

victim and one of them shot and killed the victim when the victim 

resisted the robbery and tried to flee. (Id. at p. 550.) Both Keel 

and his confederate were armed. (Id. at p. 552.) Both were 

identified as the shooter by eyewitnesses, but the casings 

recovered at the scene matched Keel’s confederate’s gun. (Id. at 

p. 553.) Keel testified that he was “ ‘shocked and ‘surprised’ ” 

when his confederate pulled out a gun. (Id. at p. 554.) Keel 

further testified that he was “ ‘shocked,’ ” “ ‘scared,’ ” and 

“ ‘surprised’ ” when his confederate fired the gun. (Ibid.) Keel 

testified that his gun was not loaded and that he did not know his 

confederate’s gun was loaded. (Id. at pp. 553–554.) 

The appellate court concluded that Keel did not act with 

reckless indifference to human life because Keel did not provide 

his confederate with the firearm or instruct the confederate to 

use the firearm. (Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 559.) No 

evidence contradicted Keel’s testimony that Keel did not know his 

confederate’s gun was loaded. (Ibid.) Additionally, there was no 
19

evidence that Keel’s gun was loaded. (Ibid.) The appellate court 

indicated that the decision to rob “ ‘was made quickly’ ” and the 

“decision to shoot was apparently made even more quickly in 

response to [the victim’s] unexpected resistance and efforts to 

flee.” (Id. at p. 560.) Keel therefore had no “meaningful 

opportunity to restrain [his confederate]” or intervene to stop 

him. (Ibid.) Instead, the shooting was an “ ‘impulsive’ response 

to the victim’s unexpected resistance, as opposed to the 

culmination of a prolonged interaction that increased the 

opportunity for violence.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 561.) Keel 

offered testimony that his confederate did not have a “reputation

as a menace or a killer.” (Ibid.) 

The court also relied on Keel’s “ ‘youth at the time’ ” finding 

it “ ‘greatly diminishes any inference he acted with reckless 

disregard for human life’ during the armed robbery.” (Keel, 

supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562.) To that point, the court 

explained: “[T]here was evidence suggesting Keel’s youth may 

have rendered him especially vulnerable to outside pressures. 

Keel associated with the East Side Crips street gang when he 

was just six or seven years old. He received a moniker . . . at the 

tender age of six from a gang member that, in Keel’s words, he 

considered to be a ‘father figure.’ According to Keel, there was an 

expectation among gang members that younger gang associates 

would ‘instantly go do’ their bidding. Given this expectation, it is 

reasonable to infer Keel would have felt pressure to ‘hit the block’ 

and go along with the robbery instigated by . . . a fellow gang 

associate who was three years Keel’s senior.” (Ibid.) 

In contrast to Keel, the crime here was not “unplanned.” 

Appellant and Johnson planned the robbery and selected the 

Dairy because Ruh worked alone. In contrast to Keel, there was 
20

no evidence appellant knew the gun was unloaded. To the 

contrary, he supplied the loaded weapon to his confederate. 

There was no evidence that appellant felt peer pressure to 

participate in the robbery or that appellant was especially 

vulnerable to peer pressure. No evidence in this case requires 

the conclusion that the shooting was an “impulsive response” in 

contrast to Keel. 

Finally, both Ramirez and Keel considered the age of the 

defendant when evaluating whether he acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. In contrast to this case, in both 

Ramirez and Keel the defendants presented evidence showing the 

relevance of their youth to assessing their mental state. Here, no 

witness presented evidence that appellant’s age (16) prevented 

him from harboring reckless indifference to human life. In his 

reply brief, appellant cites general principles indicating that 

juveniles are less mature than adults. The only support for 

applying this proposition to appellant is the unvarnished 

statement that “[t]here can be no reasonable doubt that at age 16 

[appellant] was neurologically immature and because of that 

immaturity, like other adolescents of his age, he was prone to 

take more risks and make poorer choices than an adult with a 

f[u]lly developed prefrontal cortex.” 

Appellant’s argument that he was “neurologically 

immature” has no evidentiary support in the record other than 

appellate counsel’s mere argument. Although appellant’s age is a 

“relevant factor” (In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454), it 

is not dispositive (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470). 

Appellant cites no case supporting the proposition that a 16-yearold never can harbor reckless indifference to human life. The 

totality of circumstances supports the court’s finding that 
21

appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life when he 

planned a robbery, supplied the loaded firearm used in the 

robbery, smiled rather than intervened when his confederate shot 

the victim three times, and left the scene without any effort to 

assist the victim. 

DISPOSITION

The court’s order sustaining the petition and the court’s 

disposition order are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.