alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Betty Holland, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al., 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC 

Civil Action No. CV-17-03440-PHX-DGC 

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record 

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for: 

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. 

Date: November 6, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr. 

Attorney's signature 

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599) 

Printed name and bar number 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363 

Address 

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

E-mail Address 

(404) 322-6000 

Telephone number

(404 322-6050 

FAX number 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8612 Filed 11/06/17 Page 1 of 1
#### WILLIAM A. FASOLO v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF DIVISION OF PENSIONS OF NEW JERSEY TREASURY.

July 2, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maria E. Alarcon,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03615-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Marc J Bern & Partners LLP

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/13/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 18, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8312 Filed 10/20/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8312 Filed 10/20/17 Page 2 of 2
# In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

══════════ ══ No. WR

- 84,565

- 01

══════════ ══

EX PARTE KERRY MAX COOK , App licant

═══════════════════════════════════════ On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Cause No. 1

- 77

- 179

- A in the 114 th District Court Smith County

═══════════════════════════════════════
Y EAR Y , J., filed a dissenting opinion

. I agree with Presiding Judge Keller that Applicant has failed to
demonstrate that he is actually innocent , and that he has also not shown that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the standard announced by this Court’s opinion in Ex parte Elizondo , 947 S.W .2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). But I also conclude that Applicant is not entitled to a new trial. I would simply deny relief.COOK

– 2

“ Only the use of material false evidence amounts to a due

- process violation. ” Ex p arte Weinstein , 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). False evidence is “material” only if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that it affected the judgment of the jury. Ex parte Chaney , 563 S.W.3d 239, 263

– 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

. The applicant also has
the burd en to show the materiality of the false evidence by a preponderance of the evidence

. Id

. The Court is convinced that, not only was materially false evidence used against Applicant to induce his plea in this case, but also that he has shown himself now to be actually innocent of the unimaginable crime for which he was convicted by a jury twice and upon his own plea once . Wow! I hope they are right since their judgment wins the day in this Court. I agree with both Applicant and the Court that there is now new evidence showing that some of the evidence relied upon by the State to induce Applicant’ s latest plea of nolo contendere has
turned out to be false. I simply cannot conclude however , like the Court does, that the false evidence was material. I n all humility, I may be wrong about my assessment of the evidence in this case, but I remain
convinc ed today that, even being put on notice of the false evidence pointed to by Applicant, on balance, a rational jury would still have found Applicant guilty. I respectfully dissent.

FILED : June 19, 2024 PUBLISH
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE>  7
       
<S>                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                     JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       MAR-31-1998
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    11,927
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                        0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                          0
<EQUITIES>                                 984
<MORTGAGE>                               3,811
<REAL-ESTATE>                            9,892
<TOTAL-INVEST>                          28,443
<CASH>                                   5,914
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                       3,901
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                   1,906
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          66,949
<POLICY-LOSSES>                         35,627
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                      6,063
<POLICY-OTHER>                               0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                        0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                          1,025
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                    55
<OTHER-SE>                              12,679
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            66,949
<PREMIUMS>                               2,737
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                        561
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                         315
<OTHER-INCOME>                             550
<BENEFITS>                               1,593
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                 29
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                     3,142
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (492)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (492)
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                              (492)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             (.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                0
<RESERVE-OPEN>                          30,050
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                      1,653
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                          (60)
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                         164
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                         4,472
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                         27,007
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                     60
        


</TABLE>
#### Jonathan Ellis v. Robert Riggin.

Contract for Sale of Land — Reeission—Damages for Breach — Rent.

Upon reeission of a contract for sale of land, damages resulting to the rendee by reason of the failure of the vendor to carry out an agreed reeission between the parties, will be allowed the vendee, it appearing that he vacated the premises at vendor’s demand some .three months prior to the settlement of the vendor, for which time the vendee would be entitled to his rental of t-o premises.

APPEAL EROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT ÓOURT.

October 17, 1868.

This was an ordinary proceeding to enforce the collection of *216$300.00, which according to the answer was made as an. advancement upon the purchase of a house and lot from plaintiff in Paducah, Ky. No writings were entered into, but by verbal agreement defendant was to pay $100 down and $100 in one year after for same. He paid $300.00 and failed further to comply with agreement; both parties asks a rescission of the agreement to transfer property and defendant sets up a counter claim for $90.00 for three months rent of the house for which time the property was regarded as defendants by plaintiff, as defendant dispossesed his tenants for that length of time in order to comply with agreement.

Husbandsj *for appellant.*

Prom a judgment for $300, amount sued on, less credit of $90, amount of rent due defendant, this appeal is prosecuted.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Hardin:

The facts alleged in the defendant’s answer as .a counter claim, and fraud, were, we think, at least sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the injury sustained by the defendant by the plaintiff’s failure to comply with his agreement, which has caused the defendant'to remove his tenants from the house preparatory to giving possession to the plaintiff.

The facts of the ease thus presented were tried by the court, and the Judge seems to have estimated the damages sustained by the probable loss of rents, and set it off against $90 of the plaintiff’s demand. And in this we do not perceive any error for which this court should disturb the judgment.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
#### A. T. & J. Hardin *v.*Jas. M. Clarkson et al.

Judgment — Favorable to Defendants."

A judgment of court, more favorable to defendants than the record discloses, and from -which the complainants do not appeal,, will not be disturbed.

APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT GOURT.

May 30, 1868.

*Carlisle*& *O'Hara, for appellants.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

If it be conceded that tbe sale of tbe office of pest settler by Campbell to Hardin was illegal and void and tbe e&press contract unenforcib'le by reason thereof, tbe consequence would be tbe implied assumpsit in law of tbe Hardins to pay Campbell for bis bouses and goods, wbicb they got of bim tbeir reasonable cash value, wbicb we think tbe court properly fixed at $1,050, five hundred of wbicb was paid down, leaving unpaid $550.

’ This $550, Campbell’s creditors bad a right to attach, and tbe court having so determined, A. T. & J. Hardin prosecute this appeal.

Tbe court adjudged tbe $550 due in three future payments agreeable to tbe contract, when tbe law assumed it to be due at once on tbe reception of tbe bouses and goods, but this error could not be ungenerous to tbe Hardin’s, and tbe creditors do not complain.

Judgment affirmed.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Treasury

###### Internal Revenue Service

# AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Treasury.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

An open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Taxpayer Assistance Center Improvements Project Committee will be conducted. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel is soliciting public comments, ideas, and suggestions on improving customer service at the Internal Revenue Service.

# DATES:

The meeting will be held Thursday, November 13, 2014.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Donna Powers at 1-888-912-1227 or (954) 423-7977.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) that a meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Taxpayer Assistance Center Improvements Project Committee will be held Thursday, November 13, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Time. The public is invited to make oral comments or submit written statements for consideration. Due to limited conference lines, notification of intent to participate must be made with Donna Powers. For more information please contact Ms. Donna Powers at 1-888-912-1227 or (954) 423-7977, or write TAP Office, 1000 S. Pine Island Road, Plantation, FL 33324 or contact us at the Web site:                     *http://www.improveirs.org.*

The committee will be discussing various issues related to the Taxpayer Assistance Centers and public input is welcomed.

Dated: October 7, 2014.

Otis Simpson,

Acting Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.

[FR Doc. 2014-24412 Filed 10-14-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
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#### ALAN MARCUS v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF ALLENDALE.

May 16, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY AARON MOORE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

COCKS, LT

- Administration at MCADF; et

al.,

Defendants

- Appellees,

and

JIM M c CABE , DON BISCHOFF; et al.,

Defendants. No. 19

- 15569

D.C. No. 3:16

- cv

- 08244

- DLR

- JZB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020 * *

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Former Arizona state pretrial detainee Jeffrey Aaron Moore appeals pro se

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 15569

from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force, sexual assault,

and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S. C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca , 747 F.3d 1162,

1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Moore failed

to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigati on Reform

Act (“PLRA”) and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v.

Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (the PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which

means “using all steps the agency holds out, and doing so properly ” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ross v. Blake , 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860

(2016) (describing the limited circumstances under which administrative remedies

may be effectively unav ailable).

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE v. NOWELL

No. 433P01

Case below: 144 N.C. App. 636

Motion by Attorney General for temporary stay allowed 3 August 2001.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Petty, Chafin and Senior Judge Annunziata 

DEBORAH J. BAKER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0098-14-4 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 27, 2014 

WALMART ASSOCIATES, INC. AND NATIONAL UNION 

 FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, INC. 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (John J. O’Donnell, Jr., on brief), for appellant. 

 (Monica Taylor Monday; Peter G. Irot; Gentry Locke Rakes & 

Moore, LLP, on brief), for appellees. 

 Deborah J. Baker appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission finding 

that Baker’s Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy/Complex Regional Pain Syndrome was a 

consequence of a compensable consequence and therefore not compensable. We have reviewed 

the record and the commission’s opinion and find that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in its final opinion. See Baker v. WalMart 

Assoc. Inc., VWC File No. VA00000552521 (Dec. 18, 2013). We dispense with oral argument 

and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. See Code 

§ 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27. 

 Affirmed. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED
Exhibit 23

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The
Board of Directors and Stockholders
Consolidated Graphics, Inc.:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-62317) on Form S-4, and registration statement (Nos.
33-87192, 333-13737, 333-18435 and 333-66019) on Form S-8 of Consolidated Graphics, Inc. of our reports dated May 14,
2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Consolidated Graphics, Inc. as of March 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related consolidated statements of income, shareholders'
equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the two-year period ended March 31, 2004, and the related financial statement schedule, which reports appear in the March 31,
2004, annual report on Form 10-K of Consolidated Graphics, Inc.

Our
report refers to a change in the accounting for goodwill and to our audit of the transitional disclosures added to revise the 2002 consolidated financial statements, as more fully
described in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements. However, we were not engaged to audit, review, or apply any procedures to the 2002 consolidated financial statements other than
with respect to such disclosures.

/s/
KPMG LLP

Houston,
Texas
May 28, 2004

---



QuickLinks
#### CARTERET SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v. HARTZ MOUNTAIN PET FOODS, INC.

April 10, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23

                                 [LETTERHEAD]



              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


To: Heritage Oaks Bancorp

We consent to the incorporation of our report dated February 5, 1999, on the 
consolidated financial statements of Heritage Oaks Bancorp and Subsidiaries 
as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and for each of the three years in the 
period ended December 31, 1998, included in its Annual Report on Form 10-KSB 
for the year ended December 31, 1998.


/s/ VAVRINEK, TRINE, DAY & CO., LLP
---------------------------------
VAVRINEK, TRINE, DAY & CO., LLP
Certified Public Accountants
Rancho Cucamonga, California
March 25, 1999
Order filed February 28, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-12-00121-CV

____________

AGBOLADE O. ODUTAYO, Appellant

V.

JASPER EMERGENCY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P.A. and 

THE SCHUMACHER GROUP OF TEXAS, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 55th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-01829

O R D E R

This is an appeal from two orders granting summary judgment. The clerk’s record 

was filed February 22, 2012. The record contains the interlocutory summary judgment 

granted in favor of Jasper Emergency Medicine Associates, P.A., signed August 1, 2011. 

Our review has determined that the clerk's record does not contain the order granting the 

motion for summary judgment filed by The Schumacher Group of Texas, Inc., which was 

reportedly signed on January 5, 2012. 

The Harris County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk’s record on 

or before March 15, 2012, containing the order granting the motion for summary 
2

judgment filed by The Schumacher Group of Texas, Inc., signed on or about January 5, 

2012. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c). 

If the omitted item is not part of the case file, the district clerk is directed to file a

supplemental clerk’s record containing a certified statement that the omitted item is not a 

part of the case file.

PER CURIAM