A History of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility (1971–2003)

Renee M. Rottner

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY, NO. 47

INVISIBLE

MAKING THE 
MAKING THE 

INVISIBLE

VISIBLE

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of Communications

NASA History Division

Washington, DC 20546

NASA SP-2017-4547

A History of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility (1971–2003)

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY, NO. 47

Renee M. Rottner
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rottner, Renee M., 1967–

Title: Making the invisible visible: a history of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility (1971–2003)/ by 

Renee M. Rottner.

Other titles: History of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility (1971–2003)

Description: | Series: Monographs in aerospace history; #47 | Series: NASA SP; 2017-4547 | Includes 

bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2012013847

Subjects: LCSH: Spitzer Space Telescope (Spacecraft) | Infrared astronomy. | Orbiting astronomical 

observatories. | Space telescopes.

Classification: LCC QB470 .R68 2012 | DDC 522/.2919—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2012013847

ON THE COVER

Front: Giant star Zeta Ophiuchi and its effects on the surrounding dust clouds 

Back (top left to bottom right): Orion, the Whirlpool Galaxy, galaxy NGC 1292, RCW 49 nebula, the 

center of the Milky Way Galaxy, “yellow balls” in the W33 Star forming region, Helix Nebula, spiral 

galaxy NGC 2841

This publication is available as a free download at http://www.nasa.gov/ebooks.

9 781626 830363

ISBN 9781626830363

90000 >
iii

Contents

v Acknowledgments

vii List of Figures and Tables

xi Introduction

1 CHAPTER 1

Ancient Views

13 CHAPTER 2

Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Ground

29 CHAPTER 3

Making the Case for SIRTF

41 CHAPTER 4

SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telescope

61 CHAPTER 5

Selling It

83 CHAPTER 6

Out of Step

101 CHAPTER 7

From Orphan to Poster Child

117 CHAPTER 8

Constructing SIRTF

137 CHAPTER 9

Making the Invisible Visible

153 APPENDIX A

Contributors to SIRTF

159 Bibliography

173 The NASA History Series

183 Index

v

Acknowledgments 

Over a thousand people helped make the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) 

a reality. Dozens more helped make this monograph a reality. But one person stands out—neither this monograph nor SIRTF would have been 

possible without the unflagging support of Mike 

Werner (Jet Propulsion Laboratory)—I dedicate 

this monograph to him.

I would like to express my gratitude to 

the people who gave of their time to be interviewed for this history: Fred Witteborn (Ames) 

imagined SIRTF before the technology existed, 

while Giovanni Fazio (Harvard-Smithsonian 

Astrophysical Observatory), Jim Houck 

(Cornell), and George Rieke (Arizona) made that 

technology real.

Bob Gehrz (Minnesota), Lawrence “Larry” 

Manning (Ames), and Charlie Pellerin and Harley 

Thronson (NASA Headquarters) went above and 

beyond, being incredibly generous with their 

time and contacts. Martin Harwit (Cornell) and 

Dan Weedman (Penn State) provided extremely 

useful historical perspective.

Although many more people helped make 

SIRTF possible, I’d like to thank a few who 

agreed to be interviewed. From Ames: Michael 

Bicay, Craig McCreight, Ramsey Melugin, and 

Lou Young. From JPL: Dave Gallagher, Bill 

Irace, Johnny Kwok, Charles Lawrence, Larry 

Simmons, and Bob Wilson. From Headquarters: 

Nancy Boggess, Lawrence “Larry” Caroff, and 

Frank Martin. From outside of NASA: Eric 

Becklin (University of California, Los Angeles), 

Tim Kelly (Ball Aerospace), Marcia Rieke 

(Arizona), and Tom Soifer (Caltech).

Monographs are not just written by those 

listed as the author. I am grateful to the staff of 

the Ames archives, especially Glenn Bugos and 

April Gage, and the staff of the Headquarters 

Historical Reference Collection, especially Colin 

Fries and Jane Odom, all of whom helped me 

find—and make sense of—the mountains of 

materials available on a major telescope project.

Many thanks to the people who helped me 

to reduce that mountain of material into a readable manuscript: Sara Lippincott (Pasadena), 

editor and fact-checker extraordinaire; Julia Kim 

(New York University) for archive assistance; and 

the anonymous peer reviewers who commented 

on early drafts. At the NASA History Division, 

thanks to Chief Historian Bill Barry, former 

Chief Historian Steve Dick, and Steve Garber for 

shepherding this project through to completion.

To guide my efforts in crafting a history, 

I thank David DeVorkin (National Air and 

Space Museum), Patrick McCray (University 

of California [UC], Santa Barbara), and Robert 

Smith (University of Alberta) for writing other 

books that were not only valuable secondary 

source materials, but excellent models. And I 

thank my colleague, Kenji Klein (UC Irvine/

California State University, Long Beach), who 

showed me the possibilities of history as a tool 

for social science research.

Thanks are also due to a number of talented 

professionals who helped bring this project from 

manuscript to finished publication. Editors 

Emily Dressler and Yvette Smith did excellent 

work preparing the manuscript for publication. In the Communications Support Service 

Center (CSSC), Mary Tonkinson, Lisa Jirousek, 

Chinenye Okparanta, and J. Andrew Cooke carefully copyedited the text; Michele Ostovar did an 

expert job laying out the beautiful design and 
vi Making the Invisible Visible

creating the e-book version; Kristin Harley thoroughly indexed our work; and printing specialist 

Tun Hla made sure the traditional hard copies 

were printed to exacting standards. Supervisors 

Barbara Bullock and Maxine Aldred helped by 

overseeing all of this CSSC production work.

Last but certainly not least, I thank my academic colleagues, especially Christine Beckman 

(UC-Irvine/University of Maryland) for guiding 

this project as a dissertation and monograph, as 

well as Barbara Lawrence (UCLA) for introducing me to the SIRTF project team and Cristina 

Gibson (UC-Irvine/University of Western 

Australia) for introducing me to Barbara. Thank 

you so much for all your mentorship.
vii

List of Figures and Tables 

Figure 1.1. In Johannes Hevelius’s Firmamentum 

Sobiescianum sive Uranographia (Gdansk, 

1690), the figure of Orion is drawn as if looking from the heavens toward Earth. Thus, the 

stars appear as mirror images of ground-based 

observations.For more details, see Nick Kanas, 

Star Maps: History, Artistry, and Cartography, 

2nd ed. (New York: Springer, 2009).

Figure 1.2. The Constellation of Orion (Akira 

Fujii, Space Telescope Science Institute for 

NASA, Photo ID STScI-2006-01).

Figure 1.3. “Messier Object 42,” illustration of 

Orion Nebula published in an addition to 

the first version of the Messier Catalog in 

the Mémoires de l’Académie Royale for 1771 

(Paris, 1774), pp. 460–461. The image has 

been rotated; the original orientation can be 

viewed online at http://messier.seds.org/xtra/

history/m-m31_42.html (accessed 30 August 

2016); see also http://messier.seds.org/m/m042.

html and http://messier.seds.org/.

Figure 1.4. “M42: The Orion Nebula (widefield),” 

2004 (A. Block and R. Steinberg, National 

Optical Astronomy Observatory, Photo ID 

NOAO-m42steinberg).

Figure 1.5. “The Infrared Hunter,” 2006 (Tom 

Megeath, University of Toledo for NASA/

JPL-Caltech/Spitzer Science Center, Photo 

ID ssc2006-16c).

Figure 1.6. The Hertzsprung-Russell diagram, 

reproduced here from “Life Cycles of Stars” 

(EG-1997(09)-004-GSFC), available at 

http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/educators/lifecycles/

Imagine2.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).

Figure 1.7. Yerkes Observatory staff, May 1946. 

This photograph is reproduced by permission 

from the University of Chicago.

Figure 1.8. The spectroscopy experiment and 

rocket (The Jesse Greenstein Papers, Caltech 

Archives, Photo ID JLG50.9-1).

Figure 1.9. Jesse L. Greenstein in front of the 

Palomar Observatory, 1965 (Leigh Wiener, 

Caltech Archives, Photo ID 10.12-13).

Figure 2.1. Dr. Nancy Grace Roman, NASA’s first 

Chief of Astronomy, with a model of the 

Orbiting Solar Observatory, c. 1963 (NASA 

63-OSO-1).

Figure 2.2. Experiments on the OSO-1 mission, 

reproduced from J. Lindsay et al., Orbiting 

Solar Observatory Satellite OSO I: The Project 

Summary (Washington, DC: NASA SP-57, 

1965), p. 2, Fig. 1.2.

Figure 2.3. Comparison of wavelengths in the 

electromagnetic spectrum, reproduced here 

from http://science.hq.nasa.gov/kids/imagers/ems/

ems_length_final.gif (accessed 30 August 2016).

Table 2.1. Coolants used in infrared astronomy 

were compiled by the author. The values for 

each chemical are from P. J. Linstrom and W. 

Mallard (2014). NIST Chemistry WebBook, 

NIST Standard Reference Database Number 

69 (National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Gaithersburg MD, 2014). 

Available online at http://webbook.nist.gov/

chemistry/ (accessed 30 August 2016). 

Figure 2.4. The telemetry van constructed by 

Giovanni Fazio and Henry Helmken of the 

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 

and used during the 1960s at the National 

Scientific Balloon Facility in Palestine, TX, 

to record data from their high-altitude, 

balloon-borne gamma-ray telescope. Fazio 

presented this photograph from his personal 

files at the 37th Committee on Space Research 
viii Making the Invisible Visible

Scientific Assembly in Montreal, Canada, 

in a lecture titled “Flying High-Altitude 

Balloon-Borne Telescopes 50 Years Ago,” 

delivered on Tuesday, 15 July 2008, in session 

PSB1 (Scientific Ballooning: Recent Developments in Technology and Instrumentation: 

Reminiscences).

Table 2.2. Reproduced from U.S. Space Science 

Board, Space Research: Directions for the 

Future. Report of a Study by the Space Science 

Board, Woods Hole, MA, NRC Pub. 1403 

(Washington, DC: National Academy of 

Sciences, 1966), pp. 346–347.

Figure 3.1. Lead-sulfide (PbS) infrared detectors, 

c. 1946, constructed by Robert Cashman 

(National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian 

Institution, no. A19940241000).

Figure 3.2. Caltech’s 12-foot-high, 62-inch infrared telescope, c. 1965 (National Air and 

Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, no. 

A19820363000). This instrument is now part 

of the permanent collection of the National 

Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC.

Figure 3.3. Frank Low’s 2-foot-high infrared 

telescope aboard the NASA Ames Learjet, 

c. 1972 (National Air and Space Museum, 

Smithsonian Institution, no. A19830086000). 

This instrument is now part of the permanent collection of the National Air and Space 

Museum in Washington, DC.

Figure 4.1. Design for SIRTF as a Shuttle-attached 

payload, by Fred Witteborn, Lou Young, 

Larry Caroff, and Eric Becklin at the NASA 

Ames Research Center, c. 1971, reproduced 

from “A Short and Personal History of the 

Spitzer Space Telescope,” by Michael Werner, 

ASP Conference Series 357 (2006): 7–22; preprint available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/

astro-ph/pdf/0503/0503624v1.pdf (accessed 

30 August 2016). The full caption in Werner’s 

article reads: “Preliminary concept for a far 

infrared ‘liquid helium cooled telescope 

for sortie mode shuttle,’ 1971. The original 

drawing notes that helium gas vents, a removable vacuum cover, and a ‘finder scope with 

TV’ are not shown.”

Figure 4.2. Specification of possible SIRTF design 

and instrument suite, c. 1973, reproduced 

from the Final Report of the Space Shuttle 

Payload Planning Working Groups, Volume 1: 

Astronomy (Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard 

Space Flight Center, 1973), p. 8.

Figure 4.3. Design for SIRTF as a Shuttle-attached 

payload, c. 1980, reproduced from Fred C. 

Witteborn, Michael W. Werner, and Lou S. 

Young, “Astrophysics Near-Term Program. 

Project Concept Summary: Shuttle Infrared 

Telescope Facility” (Washington, DC: NASA, 

1980), Publication NTRS 19830074573, 

p. 6. This Shuttle configuration is largely the 

same as one presented on page 670 of Fred 

C. Witteborn and Lou S. Young, “Spacelab 

Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF),” Journal 

of Spacecraft and Rockets 13, no. 11 (November 

1976): 667–674. This article is based on an 

earlier conference publication, “A Cooled 

Infrared Telescope for the Space Shuttle: The 

Spacelab Infrared Telescope Facility,” published in January 1976 as AIAA paper #76-

174; also see presentation by Lou Young to 

NASA on the Statement of Work, Phase A for 

SIRTF. NASA Ames History Office, NASA 

Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 

PP05.04, Larry A. Manning Papers 1967–

1988, Box 2, Folder 3.

Figure 4.4. SIRTF is the 1.5-meter telescope on 

the right in the top drawing and on the left in 

the bottom one. SIRTF was imagined to be 

one of several infrared missions that would fly 

in combination on the Space Shuttle. Images 

from Final Report of the Payload Planning 

Working Groups, vol. 1: Astronomy (May 

1973), p. 29.

Table 4.1. SIRTF as a 1-meter telescope to be 

flown on the Space Shuttle in 1981. The 

Space Science Board gave SIRTF the highest 
List of Figures and Tables ix

priority—as a Shuttle payload. SIRTF is 

represented at the top of the first column in 

this table as a liquid-hydrogen (LH2)-cooled 

1-meter telescope to be flown on the Shuttle 

in 1981. Table is from Space Science Board 

(Richard M. Goody, Chair), Scientific Uses of 

the Space Shuttle (Washington, DC: National 

Academy of Sciences, 1974), p. 99.

Table 4.2. Members of the Focal-plane Instruments 

and Requirements Science Team (FIRST), 

listed in “Appendices to FIRST Interim 

Report on SIRTF,” Ames Research Center, 

April 14, 1978. This committee defined the 

initial scientific and technological scope of 

SIRTF, which formed the basis of NASA’s 

1983 SIRTF Announcement of Opportunity.

Table 4.3. Timeline of key scientific and technical feasibility reports on SIRTF as a Shuttleattached payload as of 1980. Source: author.

Figure 5.1. Participants in the first meeting of the 

Scientific Working Group, held at NASA Ames 

Research Center, 12–14 September 1984. The 

names of SWG members are set in bold type. 

Front row (left to right): Giovanni Fazio, George 

Rieke, Nancy Boggess, Jim Houck, Frank Low, 

Terry Herter; back row: George Newton, Dan 

Gezari, Ned Wright, Mike Jura, Mike Werner, 

Fred Witteborn. A copy of this photograph 

is archived with the NASA History Division’s 

Historical Reference Collection (HRC). NASA 

Image A84-0569-35.

Figure 5.2. Mobius strip from the SIRTF Coloring 

Book (1982), archived with the NASA HRC.

Figure 5.3. Organizational chart of the NASA 

Office of Space Science and Applications from 

the September 1987 SIRTF SWG Meeting 

Minutes, archived with the NASA HRC.

Figure 5.4. Timeline of the federal budget process 

as summarized in http://www.rules.house.gov/

Archives/RS20152.pdf. The most recent version of document RS20152 is available from 

the Congressional Research Service.

Figure 6.1. Data on projects are compiled from a) 

the Augustine report, 1990 (available online 

at http://history.nasa.gov/augustine/image9.jpg

(accessed 30 August 2016); also b) memo 

from Charles J. Pellerin, 18 May 1989, on 

“Process for Center Review/Selection”; and c) 

HQ Proposal Ames Review, 1989, p. 85.

Figure 6.2. Chart based on data from the NASA 

Historical Data Book, vols. I (1959–1968, p. 

115), IV (1969–1978, p. 8), VI (1979–1988, 

p. 522), and VII (1989–1990, p. T-406). 

Inflation-rate factors are taken from the NASA 

New Start Index; the most recent version is 

available at http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/

files/files/2014_NASA_New_Start_Inflation_

Indexuse_in_FY15_final_for_distribution.xlsx

(accessed 9 November 2016).

Figure 6.3. Image is from SIRTF Briefing for 

OSSA, 22 March 1990, p. 22; copy archived 

with the NASA HRC.

Table 6.1. From Center Competition Report, 

1989; copy archived with the NASA HRC. 

Scores for Marshall were not ranked by the 

review committee and are omitted.

Table 6.2. “Full Mission Life Cycle,” Figure 7.1 

in Dave Doody, Basics of Space Flight, JPL 

D-20120, CL-03-0371; available at http://

solarsystem.nasa.gov/basics/bsf7-1.php (accessed 

30 August 2016).

Figure 6.4. SIRTF Briefing for OSSA, 22 March 

1990, p. 22; archived with the NASA HRC.

Table 7.1. “Chronological Changes to SIRTF,” 

compiled by Johnny Kwok, Figure 2 in 

Robert K. Wilson and Charles P. Scott, 

“The Road to Launch and Operations of the 

Spitzer Space Telescope,” paper presented at 

the SpaceOps Conference, Rome, Italy, 16 

June 2006; available at http://trs-new.jpl.nasa.

gov/dspace/handle/2014/41102 (accessed 30 

August 2016). 

Figure 7.1. Graphics compiled by author from 

SIRTF project documents: the Titan and Atlas 

models are from “SIRTF Pre-project Review,” 
x Making the Invisible Visible

OSSA, 15 May 1992, Jim Evans (JPL); the 

Delta model is from the 2003 SIRTF launch 

press kit. A similar compilation appears in 

Wilson and Scott, “The Road to Launch,” 

2006. 

Figure 8.1. Photo by Russ Underwood (Lockheed 

Martin Space Systems) of SIRTF during final 

integration and test at Lockheed Martin, 

Sunnyvale, CA, available at http://legacy.spitzer.

caltech.edu/Media/gallery/sirtf_04_2002.jpg

(accessed 30 August 2016).

Figure 8.2. Exterior components of SIRTF, line 

drawing reproduced from M. D. Bicay and 

M. W. Werner, “SIRTF: Linking the Great 

Observatories with the Origins Program,” in 

Origins, ed. Charles E. Woodward, J. Michael 

Shull, and Harley A. Thronson, Jr., ASP 

Conference Series, Vol. 48 (San Francisco: 

Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 1998), 

pp. 290–297, available online at http://adsabs.

harvard.edu/full/1998ASPC..148..290B 

(accessed 30 August 2016).

Figure 8.3. Cryo-telescope assembly (CTA). Image 

reproduced from “SIRTF Facility Status 

Report,” presentation by Tom Roellig to the 

SIRTF SWG Meeting, 16–17 October 1997, 

Pasadena, CA.

Figure 8.4. Photo of Ball Aerospace technicians working on the telescope’s beryllium mirror, available at http://www.spitzer.

caltech.edu/images/2433-SIRTFmirror2-

Spitzer-Space-Telescope (accessed 30 August 

2016).

Figure 8.5. Photo of SIRTF instruments installed in 

the cryostat, Figure 12 in David B. Gallagher, 

William R. Irace, and Michael W. Werner, 

“Development of the Space Infrared Telescope 

Facility (SIRTF),” in SPIE Proceedings 4850 

(IR Space Telescopes and Instruments), ed. John 

C. Mather (Bellingham, WA: SPIE, 2003), pp. 

17–29, available at http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/

data/SPITZER/docs/files/spitzer/spie_4850_17.

pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). 

Figure 8.6. a) Photo of the Infrared Array Camera 

(IRAC) cryogenic assembly (CA) at Goddard 

Space Flight Center, available at https://www.

cfa.harvard.edu/irac/00-480c.jpg. For more 

detail, see Plate 1 in G. Fazio et al., “The 

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC) for the Spitzer 

Space Telescope,” The Astrophysical Journal 

Supplement Series 154, no. 1 (2004): 10–17, 

available at http://iopscience.iop.org/0067-

0049/154/1/10/pdf/0067-0049_154_1_10.

pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). b) Photo of 

the Infrared Spectrograph (IRS) after integration with the Multiple Instrument Chamber, 

available at http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/data/

SPITZER/docs/files/spitzer/spie_4850_122.pdf

(accessed 30 August 2016). For more detail, 

see Figure 1a in Amanda K. Mainzer et al., 

“Pre-Launch Performance Testing of the 

Pointing Calibration and Reference Sensor 

for SIRTF,” in SPIE Proceedings 4850 (IR 

Space Telescopes and Instruments), ed. John C. 

Mather (Bellingham, WA: SPIE, 2003), pp. 

122–129. c) Photo of the Multiband Imaging 

Photometer for SIRTF (MIPS). Photo credit: 

Ball Aerospace (by permission).

Figure 8.7. Functional (not reporting) paths 

are shown. Reproduced from Spitzer Space 

Telescope Handbook, 2010, Figure 2.1; 

Version 2.1 of this document, published in 

March 2013, is available at http://irsa.ipac.

caltech.edu/data/SPITZER/docs/spitzermission/

missionoverview/spitzertelescopehandbook/ 

(accessed 30 August 2016). 

Figure 8.8. The Spitzer Space Telescope cryogenic telescope assembly (CTA) being prepared for vibration testing, reproduced here 

from http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/images/

2430-SIRTFtank-Spitzer-Cryogenic-TelescopeAssembly (accessed 30 August 2016).

Figure 8.9. Photo of launch at Cape Canaveral. 

SIRTF is packed inside the white portion of 

the Delta rocket’s nose cone. Photo credit: 

NASA Kennedy Space Center.
xi

Introduction

Monday, 25 August 2003, Cape Canaveral 

just past 1:30 in the morning: It’s a typical Florida late-summer night—crushingly hot, 

with humidity so high it might as well be raining. But the starry sky is mostly clear. One cloud 

squats nearby, threatening to stop the countdown. Yet the small crowd of astrophysicists and 

engineers isn’t looking up. Their gaze is fixed 

on the launch site a few miles away, where, in 

a few moments, a rocket will ignite and either 

carry their telescope into space or blast it into a 

million pieces.

Some of them have waited almost three 

decades for this moment. As they labored to build 

the telescope, their children grew up and started 

families, their students graduated and became 

tenured professors. Now the Space Infrared 

Telescope Facility (SIRTF), their collective progeny, is about to leave the nest, too. Perched atop 

a 130-foot Delta II rocket with over 500,000 

pounds of fuel in its belly, SIRTF waits—and so 

do its builders.

When the rocket ignites, there is no sound, 

only a massive fireball that lights up the sky and 

is reflected in the pond that separates observers 

from the launch site. A ripple moves across the 

water’s surface as a wave of heat from the launch 

rushes towards them. Silently, rising out of the 

smoke, SIRTF moves away from Earth. Just then 

the roar of the rocket’s engines reaches their ears 

and the shockwave rumbles through their chests, 

mingling with shouts of joy and relief.1

For some members of the astronomy community, this was the start of the story they were 

looking forward to: the operational phase. While 

the launch was a climactic moment for those who 

had worked so long and hard to make SIRTF a 

reality, it meant that operation of the telescope 

would now be turned over to other engineers and 

to the scientists who would share viewing time 

and access to the data that SIRTF’s instruments 

would collect. The following December, this transition would also be marked by a name change: 

from SIRTF to the Spitzer Space Telescope, 

acknowledging the vision and tireless advocacy of 

the late astrophysicist Lyman Spitzer, Jr., who, in 

1946—noting that “such a scientific tool, if practically feasible, could revolutionize astronomical 

techniques and open up completely new vistas of 

astronomical research”—first proposed putting a 

telescope in space.2

A technological marvel, the telescope weighed 

nearly a ton, measured approximately 4.5 meters 

in length and 2.1 meters in diameter, and carried 

three state-of-the-art instruments: the Infrared 

Array Camera (IRAC), the Infrared Spectrograph 

(IRS), and the Multiband Imaging Photometer 

for Spitzer (MIPS). It was the most sensitive 

infrared telescope ever built. SIRTF would relay 

data that could not possibly be collected from the 

ground because Earth’s atmosphere absorbs most 

of the infrared radiation emitted by astronomical 

objects. A space-based infrared telescope would 

be able to see things no human had ever seen. It 

1. NASA Kennedy Space Center Press Release 76-03, 25 August 2003, available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/

news/releases/2003/release-20030825.html (accessed 30 August 2016).

2. John M. Logsdon, ed., with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport, 

Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, vol. 5, chap. 3, p. 547, doc. 

III-1 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 2001).
xii Making the Invisible Visible

would pierce the ubiquitous dust of interstellar 

space, sending back data on phenomena ranging 

from planets far beyond the solar system to brown 

dwarfs too faint to be observed from Earth. It 

would look back in time to when the universe 

was only 800 million years old.3

 It bore sophisticated sensors developed by researchers from the 

military, government, academia, and industry, 

who had refined the technology for more than 30 

years to achieve the kind of sensitivity that would 

make the invisible visible. And the technology 

was the easy part.

__

SIRTF was not yet in development when, in 

July 1969, a more famous launch took place at 

the same site. After Apollo 11’s successful Moon 

landing, NASA searched for a new purpose, while 

an economic recession waited around the corner. 

In the early 1970s, there was a small group of 

advocates for an infrared space telescope; however, the field of infrared astronomy was only a 

few years old, and no one had ever built a spacebased observatory of the required complexity. 

Considering the technical, political, scientific, 

and economic uncertainties, it was not obvious 

that a project like SIRTF could—or should—be 

dared by NASA. 

How did SIRTF manage to overcome these 

uncertainties? The project developed in parallel 

with the field of infrared astrophysics and was 

thus unencumbered by legacy or legitimacy.

This monograph makes visible the invisible forces that influenced the design of SIRTF’s 

innovative technology. The lessons learned by the 

project team over the course of building SIRTF, 

now better known as the Spitzer Space Telescope, 

are about managing innovation over time and 

in the face of uncertainty. These are universal 

lessons, applicable to any project whose stakeholders control the necessary resources. SIRTF’s 

stakeholders focused on a variety of issues: technical, scientific, political, and economic, as well 

as organizational needs and goals. What made 

SIRTF’s evolution particularly difficult was that 

the stakeholders changed over time—in their 

composition, goals, and influence.

As a machine, Spitzer is an elegant compromise between what was scientifically desirable 

and what was technically feasible. As a social construction, it was shaped by political, economic, 

and institutional realities that entailed both possibility and constraint.4

 Moreover, before there 

could be an operational telescope, stakeholders 

had to be “sold” on the project—won over by 

scientists who had not been trained in persuasion, sales, product design, or customer service. 

They undoubtedly did not know that their telescope would take 30 years to build. It would have 

been impossible to foresee how issues at NASA 

3. The Great Observatories Origins Deep Survey (GOODS) provided the first views of the early universe. See M. Giavalisco et 

al., “The Great Observatories Origins Deep Survey: Initial Results from Optical and Near-Infrared Imaging,” Astrophysical 

Journal 600, no. 2 (2004): L93–L98. Data from Hubble, released in December 2003, looked back to a universe 400–800 

million years old. Data from Spitzer when the universe was 800 million years old were available by June 2004. For details, 

see H. Yan et al., “High-Redshift Extremely Red Objects in the Hubble Space Telescope Ultra Deep Field Revealed by the 

GOODS Infrared Array Camera Observations,” Astrophysical Journal 616 (2004): 63–70. 

4. The assertion that social and political forces affect large-scale innovation projects is not new. Interested readers are 

directed to Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological 

Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). In the NASA 

context, see Robert W. Smith, with contributions by Paul A. Hanle, Robert Kargon, and Joseph N. Tatarewicz, The 

Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics, with a new afterword (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1993); Brian Woods, “A Political History of NASA’s Space Shuttle: The Development Years, 1972–1982,” 

Sociological Review 57, no. 1 (2009): 25–46; Stephen J. Garber, “Birds of a Feather? How Politics and Culture Affected 

the Designs of the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Buran” (master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 

University, 2002).
Introduction xiii

Headquarters, in Congress, within the economy, 

and across international politics might affect its 

design. Eventually, as the project members developed strategies for managing uncertainty and 

acquiring legitimacy, they came to understand 

and even anticipate these challenges.

Innovation does not come from individuals; 

it comes from social interactions among individuals, borrowing ideas and adapting them to a 

particular setting or project.5

 This is hardly to say 

that people do not matter. A dedicated core group 

worked continuously on SIRTF; without them, 

the project would likely have faltered. There were 

also individuals who played interim but pivotal 

roles. Yet the histories of such remarkable human 

accomplishments often overlook the forces that 

informed those achievements. The Spitzer Space 

Telescope was shaped as much by the institutional 

landscape, the aftereffects of World War II, the 

Cold War space race, and advances in other scientific fields. Crises also played a role—economic 

recessions, loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, 

and mission failures that cost NASA much of the 

public’s (and the politicians’) faith. These forces 

and events determined, in large part, scientists’ 

access to the ideas and technologies used in their 

innovations. This monograph traces those invisible threads as they became the warp and weft of 

Spitzer. It also examines how the team became 

more adept at that weaving and offers lessons for 

managers and developers of long-term projects 

focused on innovative technologies and produced 

in the face of uncertainty.

In a project of great complexity and duration, 

there are many aspects one could emphasize, and 

this study pretends to be neither comprehensive 

nor definitive. Its purpose is twofold: It serves as a 

chronology of a major NASA mission that has led 

to fundamental changes in our scientific understanding of the universe, and it highlights how 

the development of such a project is impacted by 

regional and national politics, economic conditions, scientific agendas, and technical requirements. I emphasize the strategies by which the 

team gained, lost, and regained the resources and 

legitimacy needed to sustain the project. To help 

the reader understand those actions, the narrative 

reaches back in time to when infrared astronomy 

and NASA were just beginning, with the aim of 

presenting the Spitzer Space Telescope in its historical context.

In preparing the chronology, I conducted 

oral history interviews with 29 people, including scientists, engineers, and administrators 

who participated in the project. I also made use 

of interviews and publications prepared by historians of science and NASA researchers. I collected meeting minutes of the Scientific Working 

Group (SWG) that established SIRTF’s scientific 

objectives and preliminary design, as well as the 

SWG’s quarterly reports to NASA Headquarters, 

feasibility studies, technical reports, and scientific papers relating to the development both 

of Spitzer and of infrared astronomy. This collection of source materials has been deposited 

in the Historical Reference Collection (HRC) 

archives of the History Division at NASA 

Headquarters in Washington, DC, for use in 

future scholarly research. 

The structure for this monograph is as follows: Chapter 1 outlines the early interest in and 

obstacles to studying astronomical objects in the 

5. Academic research refutes the myth of the individual inventor toiling away in solitude; it is the exception, not the rule. 

All steps of innovation, from conceptualization to diffusion, have been shown to be subject to social processes. Some 

representative works on this topic include T. Allen, Managing the Flow of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); 

A. Hargadon and R. Sutton, “Technology Brokering and Innovation in a Product Development Firm,” Administrative 

Science Quarterly 42, no. 7 (1997): 16–49; and Pino G. Audia and Christopher I. Rider, “A Garage and an Idea: What 

More Does an Entrepreneur Need?,” California Management Review 48, no. 1 (2005): 6–28.
xiv Making the Invisible Visible

infrared regions. Chapter 2 introduces many of 

the core participants and institutions that would 

develop SIRTF. Chapter 3 describes early research 

efforts along with the challenges and lack of legitimacy that plagued infrared astronomy. Chapter 

4 focuses on the technical feasibility studies that 

provided initial justification for SIRTF, leading 

to NASA’s Announcement of Opportunity, an 

invitation to the scientific community to develop 

instruments for the proposed facility. Chapter 5 

focuses on how SIRTF, as a NASA project, was 

managed, including the selection of the Science 

Working Group and the acquisition of project 

resources. Chapter 6 focuses on the alignment 

(and misalignment) of SIRTF with the nation’s 

political goals and those of the scientific community. Chapter 7 addresses the actions taken 

to reduce costs and attain economic feasibility 

so as to achieve “New Start” status (i.e., designation as a fully funded project in the NASA 

budget approved by Congress) in fiscal year (FY) 

1998. Chapter 8 details some of the challenges 

in actually building a one-of-a-kind telescope 

facility while working across diverse institutions. 

Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, discusses 

strategies by which the project was managed 

despite ever-changing political, economic, technical, and scientific objectives.
1

CHAPTER 1

Ancient Views

For a world otherwise divided by geography, 

language, and culture, the stars provide a 

common point of reference. From almost every 

place on Earth—even where the Milky Way has 

been washed out by the city lights of New York, 

Buenos Aires, Tokyo, Los Angeles, or Paris—one 

can look up and see the constellation Orion (Fig. 

1.1). The stars Rigel and Betelgeuse, which mark 

Orion’s foot and shoulder, are among the brightest in the sky and yet are 640 and 700–900 lightyears, respectively, from Earth. Between them 

lies a trio of stars that compose Orion’s Belt. 

Dangling below the belt are more stars that form 

Orion’s Sword.

Before the advent of infrared astronomy 

in the 1960s, astronomers thought they knew 

everything about Orion. This constellation was 

well known to ancient civilizations: Romans 

called it the Hunter, and Egyptians the Shepherd. 

The earliest records of Orion are from Babylon 

(present-day Iraq), c. 1350–1170 BCE, where 

the constellation was called Papsukkal, which in 

Akkadian means “messenger of the gods.”1

FIGURE 1.1. Orion from Johannes Hevelius, 

Firmamentum Sobiescianum sive 

Uranographia (Gdansk, 1690).

1. John H. Rogers, “Origins of the ancient constellations: 

I. The Mesopotamian Traditions,” Journal of the 

British Astronomical Association 108, no. 1 (1998): 

9–28; available at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/

full/1998JBAA..108....9R.
2 Making the Invisible Visible

More than 3,000 years of observation have not 

dimmed our fascination with Orion. It requires 

only a bit of imagination to see the Hunter’s 

outline and a dark sky to see his Sword (Fig. 

1.2). Away from city lights, the Sword appears 

to comprise three stars. Upon closer inspection, 

each of these “stars” turns out to be a cluster of 

stars.2

 But to the naked eye, the middle “star” in 

Orion’s Sword appears noticeably hazy because it 

comprises thousands of stars wrapped in a blanket of dust.3

 Thus, when Charles Messier aimed 

his telescope at Orion’s Sword as it hung above 

Paris on 4 March 1769,4

 he would not have been 

surprised to find a nebulous cloud filled with 

multiple points of light. However, he wasn’t particularly interested in glowing star formations: 

Charles Messier was a comet hunter.

In the 18th century, tracking comets was 

the way to make one’s reputation in astronomy. 

Messier sought to eliminate the spurious accounts 

of comets that were causing contemporary astronomers much confusion and embarrassment. Too 

many “comets” were turning out to be nebulae, 

which, like the hazy star in Orion’s Sword, glowed 

and had fuzzy shapes. Mapping the nebulae was 

thus a way to separate the stellar background from 

the comets. Using equipment not much more 

powerful than modern binoculars, Messier documented more than 100 such objects, including the 

one now viewable in his telescope, which he duly 

named the Orion Nebula (Fig. 1.3). He published 

the first of his careful accounts and illustrations in 

1771. It turned out to be so useful to astronomers 

that the items he cataloged have become known 

as Messier Objects. Rather than building a reputation for discovering comets, Messier found lasting fame for classifying the astronomical objects 

that were a nuisance to him. Today we refer to 

the Orion Nebula as Messier 42, or simply M42, 

a designation that derives from its place as the 

42nd entry in Messier’s Catalog of Nebulae and 

Star Clusters.

FIGURE 1.2. The Constellation of Orion (Space 

Telescope Science Institute).

2. Starting at the tip of the sword and moving upward, these three clusters are NGC 1980 (which includes the iota Ori 

cluster), M42 (which includes the M43 nebula and the Trapezium cluster), and NGC1977 (which includes two major stars: 

42 Ori and 45 Ori). Going a little further up towards the belt, we might also include a fourth “star,” which is the more 

diffuse NGC 1981. For details, see Philip M. Bagnall, The Star Atlas Companion: What You Need to Know About the 

Constellations (New York, NY: Springer, 2012), esp. pp. 330–332; see also Fred Schaaf, The 50 Best Sights in Astronomy 

and How to See Them: Observing Eclipses, Bright Comets, Meteor Showers, and Other Celestial Wonders (Hoboken, 

NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 150.

3. “NASA’s Hubble Reveals Thousands of Orion Nebula Stars,” NASA press release (#06–007), 11 January 2006, http://

www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/jan/HQ_06007_HST_AAS.html (accessed 30 August 2016).

4. Hartmut Frommert, Christine Kronberg, Guy McArthur, and Mark Elowitz, SEDS Messier Catalog, SEDS, University of 

Arizona Chapter, Tucson, Arizona, 1994–2016, http://messier.seds.org/ (accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 1 • Ancient V

More than two centuries later, we are still 

looking at M42 through telescopes. Images from 

the ground taken in 2006 reveal its clouds of dust 

and thousands of stars in great detail (Fig. 1.4, 

p. 4). Messier’s drawing was remarkably accurate 

and shows the Trapezium, the cluster of stars 

at the center that is the engine of this energetic 

nebula. What scientists now understand from 

optical and infrared observations is that M42 is a 

stellar nursery (Fig. 1.5, p. 4), where new stars are 

forming and churning the dust with their stellar 

winds and gravitation.

Bringing Dust into Focus

Despite the monumental improvements in optical telescopes since Messier’s time, dust is still 

a nuisance for optical astronomers. Starlight, 

which is simply radiation that reaches Earth’s 

surface, is obscured by dust particles. As light 

passes through space, it encounters particles from 

the solid and gaseous remains of ancient stars. 

The light’s path is blocked or bent, depending on 

the size and shape of the particles. Unfortunately 

for optical astronomers, dust is everywhere, and 

it is unevenly distributed.

Very few astronomers considered dust a subject worthy of study before infrared technology 

came on the scene in the 1960s. Until then, 

astronomers did as they had always done: They 

measured the visible wavelengths, in which stars 

appear as white, blue, yellow, orange, and red, 

depending on how hot they are. For example, 

the two brightest stars in Orion are not the same 

color, even to the naked eye: Rigel is a hot blue 

supergiant (B class), while Betelgeuse is a comparatively cooler red supergiant (M class). Such color 

differences help scientists to identify the size and 

FIGURE 1.3. Charles Messier’s drawing of the Orion Nebula M42 (1771), rotated.
4 Making the Invisible Visible

temperatures of stellar objects and allow classification of stars as illustrated in the HertzsprungRussell diagram (see Fig. 1.6).

Color is a useful way to classify a star, but 

dust can distort colors. For example, our Sun 

is a yellow star (G class)—not too hot and not 

too cold—but when dust is present or sunlight is 

passing low through the atmosphere at dusk and 

dawn, the Sun changes from yellow to red. This 

makes for wonderful photographs but dubious 

science if results depend on when and where you 

observe a star.

Dust was an astronomical topic that attracted 

a select few: “I was interested in dust,” Jesse 

Greenstein said in a 1977 interview.5

 Interstellar 

dust will redden any light that passes through 

FIGURE 1.4. M42 in the visible spectrum (National 

Optical Astronomy Observatory).

FIGURE 1.5. M42 in the infrared spectrum (Spitzer 

Science Center).

5. Jesse L. Greenstein, interview by Spencer R. Weart, Session I, Pasadena, CA, 7 April 1977, Niels Bohr Library & 

Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, transcript available at https://www.aip.org/history-programs/

niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/4643-1 (accessed 30 August 2016); see also Jesse L. Greenstein, “Studies of Interstellar 

Absorption” (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1937). 
Chapter 1 • Ancient V

it, and Greenstein’s doctoral thesis on interstellar absorption, completed at Harvard in 1937, 

was one of the first studies to calculate the ratio 

of light absorption to reddening for the B-class 

stars. These stars are among the hottest, whitest 

objects in our galaxy and include Rigel in Orion. 

Like virtually all other astronomers at that time, 

Greenstein was an optical astronomer; however, 

he gravitated toward unusual research topics and 

was successful despite, or perhaps because of, that 

predilection. After receiving his doctorate, he was 

awarded a National Research Council Fellowship 

that enabled him to continue his work at the 

Yerkes Observatory.

The View from Yerkes

The Yerkes Observatory was an exciting place 

to be during Greenstein’s tenure there. With its 

40-inch refracting telescope, completed in 1895 

and still the largest refracting telescope in the 

world, Yerkes had no trouble attracting top talent 

(Fig. 1.7, p. 6). Seventy-six miles north of the 

University of Chicago, which owned it, Yerkes 

sat in the woods of Wisconsin near Lake Geneva, 

where the nights were often dark, clear, and cold.

At Yerkes, Greenstein pursued research on 

comets, but unlike Charles Messier, his interest in comets was incidental to his research on 

interstellar dust. With access to powerful instruments, Greenstein was able to obtain the first 

high-resolution spectra of comets: “[W]hen a 

bright comet came along, here I was with what 

was then the best spectrograph in the world. 

There’s no reason not to see what the comet 

spectrum is like on a much bigger scale, just 

to satisfy curiosity.”6

 Greenstein’s abundant 

curiosity led him to undertake research, with 

Gerard Kuiper, using a highly novel method—

rocket-based instrumentation.

O B A F G K M

25,000 10,000 6,000 3,000

+15

+10

+5

0

–5

–10

10–4

10–2

1

102

104

Absolute Magnitude

Luminosity

Spectral Class

Temperature (K)

Supergiants

Giants

Main Sequence

White Dwarfs

FIGURE 1.6. The Hertzsprung-Russell diagram relates stellar classification to absolute magnitude, luminosity, 

and surface temperature (“Life Cycles of Stars”).

6. Greenstein interview (Weart, Session III), 26 July 1977.
6 Making the Invisible Visible

Kuiper had been at Yerkes since 1936, steadily 

making major discoveries about, among other 

things, the atmospheres of planets and the moons 

that orbit them in the outer solar system. In the 

summer of 1945, as a member of the Alsos mission investigating the level of nuclear energy 

and nuclear-weapons development in Germany, 

Kuiper visited a German radar-countermeasures 

laboratory.8

 He ended up bringing back new ideas 

for astronomy research after seeing the infrared detectors developed by German engineers 

for military weaponry. “In fact, [Kuiper] liberated a captured German night-vision infrared device, which he and I experimented with,” 

said Greenstein. “He also liberated what was 

called a lead-sulfide [PbS] photoconductor cell. 

With that, he observed the atmospheres of the 

planets in the near-infrared and was the first to 

discover that the satellite Titan had an atmosphere. That was done with a formerly classified 

military device.”9 

FIGURE 1.7. Yerkes Observatory staff, May 1946. Seated in the center row are Jesse L. Greenstein (with 

moustache) and Gerard P. Kuiper (to right of Greenstein), and in the front row is Nancy G. Roman 

(third from left).7

7. Thanks to Virginia Trimble, who identified some of the people shown here in “Obituary: Jesse Leonard Greenstein (1909–

2002),” Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific 115, no. 809 (2003): 890–896.

8. Hilmar W. Duerbeck, “German Astronomy in the Third Reich,” in Organizations and Strategies in Astronomy, vol. 7, ed. 

André Heck (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006), pp. 383–413; also see Jesse L. Greenstein, interview by Rachel 

Prud’homme, Pasadena, CA, 25 February–23 March 1982, Oral History Project, California Institute of Technology Archives, 

transcript available at http://oralhistories.library.caltech.edu/51/01/OH_Greenstein_J.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).

9. Greenstein interview (Prud’homme), 25 February–23 March 1982. According to Dale Cruikshank, although Kuiper 

was indeed familiar with German technology, the detectors he used were U.S.-made. “The American detectors were 

declassified in September 1946, and Kuiper soon collaborated with the detector’s developer, Robert J. Cashman, on 

construction of an infrared spectrometer for the study of stellar spectra in the wavelength region of 1–3 micrometers”; see 

Dale P. Cruikshank, “Gerard Peter Kuiper,” in Biographical Memoirs, vol. 62 (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 

1993), pp. 258–295, esp. p. 266.
Chapter 1 • Ancient V

Kuiper and his colleagues began to apply these 

German-made infrared detectors to novel types 

of astronomical research.10 Similarly, astronomers in New Mexico were finding new uses for 

the German V-2 rocket. More than 100 German 

rocket scientists and 300 railway boxcars loaded 

with V-2 parts were brought to White Sands 

Proving Ground to continue rocket development under U.S. Army supervision.11 American 

scientists were encouraged to supply instruments 

that could be used for experiments—and ballast—

in rocket nose cones during testing. One of the first 

to answer the call was James Van Allen of Johns 

Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab (APL). 

Established in 1942 to support the war effort, 

APL produced some of the first pictures of Earth 

from space in 1946, 12 years before the launch 

of Sputnik.12 In a 1982 interview, Greenstein 

FIGURE 1.8. Spectroscopy experiment and rocket (The Jesse Greenstein Papers).

10. Gerard P. Kuiper et al., “An Infrared Stellar Spectrometer,” Astrophysical Journal 106, no. 2 (1947): 243–250. 

11. Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

12. The earliest photo was taken 65 miles above Earth on 24 October 1946, as reported in Tony Reichhardt, “The 

First Photo From Space,” Air & Space Magazine, Smithsonian Institution (1 November 2006), available at http://

www.airspacemag.com/space/the-first-photo-from-space-13721411/ (accessed 30 August 2016). On 7 March 

1947, a Naval Research team led by John Mengel mounted a camera to a V-2 that flew 100 miles above Earth. 

For more details, see White Sands Missile Range chronology at http://www.wsmr.army.mil/PAO/WSHist/Pages/

ChronologyCowboystoV2stotheSpaceShuttletolasers.aspx (accessed 30 August 2016).
8 Making the Invisible Visible

recalled the solar spectroscopy experiment (Fig. 

1.8, p. 7) that he had conducted with physicists 

at APL in April 1947: “I had a spaceflight with 

a rocket on a captured V-2. It failed. The man 

who sponsored this project and gave me $7,000 

and a V-2 was James Van Allen.”13 Greenstein 

described this experiment in more detail during a 

1977 interview:

I designed and built a two-quartz prism 

ultraviolet spectrograph.... We had to build 

the instrument and the control mechanism. 

I carried the spectrograph, which was about 

a meter long, in a wooden box by train to 

White Sands; saw it mounted; and worked 

with the Germans, who didn’t know how 

the V-2 behaved at high altitude—I actually met [Wernher] von Braun, with whom 

I kept up a kind of contact over many years. 

It was an adventure. But it was a failure. [We 

didn’t understand] just what an experiment 

in flight does to an instrument.... [U]sing it 

in a zero-gravity flight environment bound 

up the spectrography drive. It tried to turn 

on and tried to turn off, but it never could 

move. I think it must have stripped the 

gears. It was really pathetic. But you know, 

it would have been fun had it worked.14

Although the experiment was a failure, it 

exemplified a new type of science. “I think I lived 

at a break between when science was an amateur’s 

pursuit and when it was a profession,” Greenstein 

said. “By 1930 or 1934 onward, it became a profession.”15 This new breed of scientists embraced 

the latest technology. Greenstein added that the 

work done at Yerkes by Kuiper in the infrared 

“was perhaps one of the first examples of the 

increased technological trend in astronomy that 

began right after the war.”16 The rocket work 

on the V-2s and other rockets by Van Allen 

and Greenstein foreshadowed the move toward 

space and the application of military research to 

astronomy. As Van Allen observed, “the immense 

opportunity for finally being able to make scientific observations through and above the atmosphere of the Earth drove us to heroic measures 

and into a new style of research, very different 

from the laboratory type in which many of us 

had been trained.”17

The ability to use sounding rockets and 

high-altitude balloons, which had previously 

been developed by the military for reconnaissance, now made it possible for scientists to 

study high-altitude physics—solar wind, ultraviolet radiation, cosmic rays—and their effects 

on weather, communications, and spaceflight. 

During the 1950s, balloons could reach altitudes 

of up to 20 miles above Earth, while sounding 

rockets typically reached 70 miles above Earth, 

flying 10 times higher than commercial aircraft. 

It was not long before rockets were developed 

that could reach 125 miles. In the 1950s, Van 

Allen developed and flew a balloon-launched 

rocket, or rockoon: A balloon would hoist the 

instruments 10 miles up, and then a second-stage 

rocket would launch them higher, to roughly 60 

miles in altitude.

It was also a time of increased government 

funding for science. A field of new agencies and 

advisory councils sprouted up. Jesse Greenstein 

became involved with the National Science 

Foundation (NSF) at its inception in 1950. James 

Van Allen was enlisted in 1958 as a founding 

13. Greenstein interview (Prud’homme), 25 February–23 March 1982.

14. Greenstein interview (Weart, Session II), 21 July 1977.

15. Greenstein interview (Weart, Session I), 7 April 1977.

16. Greenstein interview (Weart, Session II), 21 July 1977.

17. James A. Van Allen, Origins of Magnetospheric Physics (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2004), p. 19. 
Chapter 1 • Ancient V

member of the National Academy of Sciences’ 

Space Science Board (SSB), which guided the 

establishment of NASA.

After the war, many scientists moved around 

as military projects ended and academic research 

accelerated. In 1951, Van Allen returned to the 

University of Iowa, where he had earned his 

doctorate in 1939, to lead the physics department. Kuiper remained at Yerkes and became its 

director in 1947, while Greenstein left in 1948 

to join the faculty at the California Institute of 

Technology (Caltech) and build its astronomy 

department—a plum assignment for someone 

just 11 years out of graduate school.

As part of his new duties at Caltech, Greenstein 

was put in charge of the astronomy program, which 

had prime access to the Hale 200-inch telescope 

on Mount Palomar (Fig. 1.9). Known simply as 

the “200-inch,” it was the largest telescope ever 

constructed from the time it began operations 

in 1949 until 1993, when the 10-meter Keck I, 

on Mauna Kea, became fully operational.18 As 

a scholar at a prestigious university, and with 

access to the most powerful telescope in the 

world, Greenstein was highly visible and much 

sought after. This visibility led to his election to 

the National Academy of Sciences in 1957 and 

his participation on many influential committees, panels, and boards. He served as a member 

of the 1947 Grants Committee for the Office of 

Naval Research (ONR); chairman (1952) and 

consultant (1953–1955) to the NSF’s Astronomy 

Advisory Committee; member of the Scientific 

Advisory Board, U.S. Air Force (1956–1960); 

consultant to the RAND Corporation (1957–

1961); member of the Astronomy Panel, NASA 

Steering Committee (1961–1964); and member 

of the Ramsey Committee (1966), which led to 

the development of the Hubble Space Telescope.19

Just as science was now a profession, so the role of 

the scientist increasingly entailed a large commitment to public service.

Another notable person who departed Yerkes 

and headed for the public sector after the war 

was Nancy Roman. After completing her doctorate in 1949 at the University of Chicago, Roman 

had stayed on as a research associate and then as 

an assistant professor, conducting research on 

galactic structure and stellar motion at Yerkes. As 

a woman pursuing a doctorate in astronomy, she 

had often encountered discouragement from her 

parents, college deans, professors, and colleagues. 

She noted that at the time it was nearly impossible 

for a woman to get tenure in an astronomy department.20 So in 1955, she took a job with the Naval 

FIGURE 1.9. Greenstein in front of the Palomar 

Observatory, c. 1965 (Leigh Wiener).

18. Although the Soviets built a 6-meter telescope in 1975, design flaws prevented it from exceeding the resolution of the 

smaller Palomar 200-inch telescope. In 1993, the Keck Observatories in Mauna Kea, Hawai’i, surpassed all previous 

telescopes with a segmented 10-meter mirror. For an excellent history of Palomar, see Ronald Florence, The Perfect 

Machine: Building the Palomar Telescope (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995).

19. Greenstein interview (Weart, Session II), 21 July 1977.

20. Nancy Grace Roman, interview by Rebecca Wright, Chevy Chase, MD, 15 September 2000, file 3636, NASA History 

Program Office, NASA, Washington, DC. A 66-page transcript of this interview is available in digital form at http://www.

jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_histories/NASA_HQ/Herstory/RomanNG/RomanNG_9-15-00.htm (accessed 30 August 2016); 

subsequent citations will include page numbers that refer to this transcript.
10 Making the Invisible Visible

Research Laboratory (NRL), where work was 

under way in a new area—radio astronomy—

that held great promise and opportunity.

Roman had been at NRL for less than a 

year when, in 1956, she received an invitation 

on short notice to attend the dedication of an 

observatory in Armenia as a guest of the Soviet 

Academy of Sciences. She had been selected to 

replace someone who had declined. The director 

of the new observatory had been impressed by 

one of her papers, a 1947 two-page research note 

on so-called high-velocity stars.21 That paper had 

been outside of Roman’s normal area of interest, 

and she had all but forgotten it. Surprised by the 

invitation, yet determined to attend, she recalls:

I was working for the Navy, still in the middle 

of the Cold War. I had secret clearance, and 

I wanted to go to the Soviet Union. It turns 

out I was the first civilian [working for the 

military] to go to the Soviet Union after 

the beginning of the Cold War. So, as you 

can imagine[,]...this was a bit of a hurdle, 

and it turned out that the only way I could 

possibly get the paperwork through was to 

essentially walk it through myself.... I might 

add that the paperwork had to go all the way 

to the secretary of the Navy to get approval 

for my going, so it was a major undertaking, 

and...by the time I was finished, people 

knew me at the Naval Research Lab.... 

So I went down to the Soviet Embassy [to 

get a visa] and sat in the hall for about 45 

minutes. Then they took my passport, and 

they said, “We’ll call you when it’s ready.” 

[Later] I went down to get it, and this time it 

was quite a different reception. I was ushered 

into the office of the scientific attaché, given 

tea, a cup of tea, and just generally greeted 

like a great VIP. You know, I was, what, all 

of thirty-one? It turned out, among other 

things, that the science attaché had been a 

translator for the man who was going to be 

the director of this observatory...and had a 

lot of respect for him, and the fact that he 

had invited me to this dedication really put 

me on a high peg with him.22

Roman’s tenacity was rewarded. She obtained 

the visa, as well as approval from the Secretary 

of the Navy, and, having cleared the bureaucratic 

hurdles, was present at the dedication ceremony 

of the Byurakan Observatory on 19 September 

1956, where she crossed paths once more with 

Jesse Greenstein, who had also been invited.23 Her 

ability to overcome the naysayers would serve her 

well as she charted new ground at NASA.

A New Agency

NASA began operations on 1 October 1958, 

almost one year to the day after the launch of 

Sputnik by the Soviet Union. The new agency 

was a combination of other programs, such as the 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

(NACA), the Army Ballistic Missile Agency 

(ABMA), and parts of NRL. Although Roman 

was not a member of the NRL group that transferred to NASA, she was well known there, both 

for her travels and for her technical expertise. 

“A few months after NASA was formed, I was 

asked if I knew anyone who would like to set up 

a program in space astronomy,” she remembers. 

“[T]he challenge of starting with a clean slate 

to formulate a program that would influence 

21. Nancy G. Roman, “A Note on Beta-Cephei,” Astrophysical Journal 106, no. 2 (1947): 311–312. 

22. Roman interview (Wright), 15 September 2000, pp. 11–12.

23. Byurakan Astrophysical Observatory Web site, http://www.bao.am/history.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 1 • Ancient Vi

astronomy for decades to come was too great 

to resist.”24 Roman expressed her interest in the 

position, and in February 1959 she joined NASA 

as head of this new program.

“The first year I was at NASA,” Roman said, 

“I was only responsible for optical and ultraviolet 

astronomy. Frankly, there wasn’t much else.”25 The 

astronomy effort at NASA was small. Gerhardt 

Schilling, who was initially in charge, had left 

NASA by the end of 1959. Roman became the 

chief of astronomy in the Office of Space Science, 

a position she would hold under various titles until 

she retired from NASA in 1979. As the research 

program grew, it would be carved up into separate 

offices for x-ray, optical, ultraviolet, and infrared 

astronomy.26 But during her first year, Roman 

managed all of the astronomy-related programs 

and grants.

Being at NASA posed some challenges. “I had 

never used the prefix ‘Dr.’ with my name, but 

when I started with NASA, I had to,” Roman 

recalled. “Otherwise, I could not get past the secretaries.”27 In the early 1960s, women were rare 

in scientific fields and rarer still in positions of 

authority. In many ways, Roman represents the 

transformations occurring at the time, and she 

was herself a transformative force in astrophysics 

research. The way in which astronomy was done 

had changed radically since the war. During her 

undergraduate astronomy studies at Swarthmore, 

Roman recalled meeting with Professor Peter van 

de Kamp to discuss how she might get started on 

research: “He was using plates that were taken by 

his predecessors 50 years earlier, and in turn he 

felt that he was obligated to replace those with 

plates that his successors would use 50 years in the 

future.”28 It was no longer necessary for astronomers to solely rely on what they could find in the 

archives. There were now alternatives to groundbased telescopes, and observations could be made 

beyond the visible spectrum. Her exposure to 

radio astronomy at NRL and rocket-based experimentation at Yerkes had conditioned Roman to 

welcome new approaches and technology and to 

be comfortable with change.

24. Nancy G. Roman, unattributed interview, NASA Solar System Exploration Web site, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/people/

romann (accessed 30 August 2016); see also Roman interview (Wright), 15 September 2000, p. 15.

25. Roman interview (Wright), 15 September 2000, p. 17.

26. Nancy Grace Roman, “Exploring the Universe: Space-Based Astronomy and Astrophysics,” in Exploring the Unknown: 

Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V: Exploring the Cosmos, ed. John M. 

Logsdon, with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport (Washington, DC: 

NASA SP-2001-4407), pp. 501–545, esp. p. 504.

27. Nancy Grace Roman, Women@NASA Web Chat, 4 November 1997, http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/women/archive/nr.html

(accessed 31 May 2010; .pdf is available in monograph archive in the NASA HRC).

28. Nancy G. Roman, interview by David H. DeVorkin, Washington, DC, 19 August 1980, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, 

American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD; transcript available at https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohrlibrary/oral-histories/4846 (accessed 30 August 2016).

13

CHAPTER 2

Getting Infrared Astronomy 

Off the Ground

FIGURE 2.1. Dr. Nancy Grace Roman, NASA’s 

first Chief of Astronomy, with a model 

of the Orbiting Solar Observatory, 

c. 1963 (NASA).

1. Richard Tousey, “Solar Research from Rockets,” Science 134, no. 3477 (18 August 1961): 441–448; Martin Schwarzchild 

and Barbara Schwarzchild, “Balloon Astronomy,” Scientific American 200, no. 5 (May 1959): 52–59.

At the time of NASA’s founding, astronomers 

were using balloons, sounding rockets, and 

airplanes to carry their instruments to altitudes 

between 8.5 and 70 miles above the surface of 

Earth. All of these airborne methods allow instruments to overcome atmospheric obstructions, 

such as dust and water vapor, at many (but not 

all) wavelengths, including parts of the infrared 

spectrum. The only way to eliminate the interference caused by the atmosphere, especially in the 

infrared, is to get above it. Instruments on balloon 

and rocket flights were further constrained by an 

inability to view a celestial object long enough or 

accurately enough to make a satisfactory observation (i.e., one that produced interpretable data).1

Placing an instrument on board a satellite in lowEarth orbit (typically 200–800 miles in altitude) 

would allow for better observation of sources that 

often appear faint.

To get into low-Earth orbit, astronomers 

would need NASA’s help—specifically, the help 

of Nancy Roman, who in 1959 had assumed 

charge of NASA’s observational astronomy 

program (Fig. 2.1). Although astronomers still 

observed mostly at optical wavelengths, they were 

increasingly interested in the high-energy spectra 

(ultraviolet, x-ray, and gamma ray), which could 

be viewed only from space. NASA’s observational 

astronomy program included three satellite-based 
14 Making the Invisible Visible

observatory programs: the Orbiting Geophysical 

Observatory (OGO) focused on Earth, the 

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) focused on 

the Sun, and the Orbiting Astronomical 

Observatory (OAO) focused on high-energy 

celestial phenomena. In a briefing on the OAO 

held at NASA Headquarters on 1 December 

1959, Roman noted that “you cannot exploit the 

advantages of getting above the atmosphere 

unless you are able to get up there reasonably 

large-sized telescopes, and unless you are able to 

keep these telescopes pointing at one region of 

the sky for long periods of time to a high degree 

of accuracy”; she went on to explain that the 

OAO project would be a prototype for a “stabilized platform system, into which various types of 

optical instrumentation could be inserted.”2

Major advances in astronomy made by the 200-

inch Palomar telescope alone, since its first light 

in 1949—such as Walter Baade’s 1951 discovery 

of colliding galaxies and Maarten Schmidt’s identification of the first quasi-stellar radio source, or 

quasar, in 1963—revealed a turbulent and particle-filled universe. Balloons, rockets, and the very 

first satellites were also showing results, especially 

in the high-energy spectra.3

 Every discovery only 

yielded more questions.

In the years following World War II, some 

startling discoveries were made in the field of 

astrophysics. From 1952 through 1955, the 

Office of Naval Research and the Atomic Energy 

Commission jointly sponsored James Van Allen’s 

investigation of the northern polar aurora’s electromagnetic signature by means of rockets.4

 This 

research resulted in the detection of anomalous 

radiation surrounding Earth, now known as the 

Van Allen Belts and understood to be rings of 

highly charged particles held in place by Earth’s 

magnetic field. The discovery of a blanket of 

trapped radiation around Earth confounded 

expectations. It was particularly disconcerting for 

NASA’s piloted spaceflight program, as little was 

known about the trapped radiation except that 

it might be lethal to humans and might damage 

sensitive instruments. Hoping to avoid unwelcome surprises, NASA was interested in sponsoring research on such issues.5

Discoveries by experimental high-energy particle physicists also were opening new views. The 

production of gamma rays in the laboratory led 

Philip Morrison of Cornell University to predict in 1958 that gamma rays would be found in 

space.6

 Up to that point, no one had ever looked; 

gamma rays were first observed in the lab, not in 

2. Nancy G. Roman, “Transcript of Orbiting Astronomical Observatories Project Briefing, NASA, 1 December 

1959,” NASA TM-X-50191. The full text of this transcript is available online at http://archive.org/stream/nasa_

techdoc_19630040885/19630040885_djvu.txt (accessed 30 August 2016).

3. For a history of early high-altitude astronomy, see Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space 

Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 1980), esp. ch. 4, n. 7.

4. The first hint of the radiation belts came from data obtained by rockets before 1958, but it was the Explorer 1 mission 

(1958) that provided definitive evidence of the phenomenon; see Leslie H. Meredith et al., “Direct Detection of Soft 

Radiation Above 50 Kilometers in the Auroral Zone,” Physical Review 97, no. 1 (1955): 201–205; James A. Van Allen, 

“Direct Detection of Auroral Radiation with Rocket Equipment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 

the United States of America 43, no. 1 (1957): 57–62; and James A. Van Allen et al., “Observations of High Intensity 

Radiation by Satellites 1958 Alpha and Gamma,” Jet Propulsion 28, no. 9 (1958): 588–592.

5. At an OSO project briefing, Dr. James E. Kupperian from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center noted, “At the moment 

we are getting new surprises from the Van Allen belt as the data [from other experiments] come in” (Orbiting Astronomical 

Observatories Project Briefing, p. 99). Some of the other experiments that were under way in 1959 are listed in James 

A. Van Allen, “The Geomagnetically Trapped Corpuscular Radiation,” Journal of Geophysical Research, vol. 64, no. 11 

(1959): 1683–1689.

6. Philip Morrison, “On Gamma-Ray Astronomy,” Il Nuovo Cimento 7, no. 6 (1958): 858–865.
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

nature. However, as scientists would soon learn, 

gamma radiation is present in space but blocked 

by Earth’s atmosphere.

Giovanni Fazio was among the first to look 

for gamma rays in space. After receiving his 

Ph.D. in high-energy particle physics at the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fazio 

joined the faculty of the University of Rochester 

in 1959. There he worked with Professors Everett 

Hafner, Mort Kaplon, and Joseph Duthie, as 

well as Joseph Klarmann and Gerald Share, to 

construct gamma-ray detectors for particle accelerators, such as the Cosmotron at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory and the Bevatron at the 

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. Fazio came across 

the 1958 paper by Morrison and a 1959 paper 

by a Rochester colleague, Malcolm Savedoff, who 

also asserted that gamma rays could be found in 

space.7

 “Gamma-ray astronomy was a completely 

unknown topic at that time,” Fazio notes. “Since 

we were building gamma-ray detectors for the 

accelerators, we said, ‘Wow, we can detect this 

very easily, so let’s get started!’”8

 Fazio would have 

the same reaction when infrared detectors came 

along a decade later.

Embarking on a search for cosmic gamma 

rays, the elementary-particle physics group at 

the University of Rochester built a Čerenkov 

counter to look for high-energy phenomena similar to those found in particle accelerators and 

nuclear reactors. With financial support from 

the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and 

NASA, the first instrument was ready for flight 

in 1959. Testing took place at the Sioux Falls, 

South Dakota, airport, with the help of Raven 

Industries, a local start-up that manufactured 

high-altitude research balloons.9

 However, the 

experimenters were unable to obtain results due 

to a balloon failure.10 

Undeterred, Fazio continued to refine the 

protocol for balloon experiments, a research platform he would use for 30 years (1959–1989) 

to study a variety of wavelengths. As for the 

gamma-ray detector that Fazio and Hafner had 

designed,11 another one was built, and Nancy 

Roman saw that it was placed on board NASA’s 

first observatory in space.12

On 7 March 1962, NASA’s first Orbiting 

Solar Observatory (OSO-1) was launched from 

Cape Canaveral. OSO-1 carried 12 instruments; 

Figure 2.2 (p. 16) illustrates the placement of several of them in the observatory wheel housing, 

including Fazio and Hafner’s gamma-ray detector.13 “It was a very crude detector,” Fazio notes:

7. Malcolm P. Savedoff, “The Crab and Cygnus A as Gamma Ray Sources,” Il Nuovo Cimento 13, no. 1 (1959): 12–18.

8. Giovanni G. Fazio, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 26 May 2009. Unless otherwise noted, all interviews were 

conducted by the author, Renee Rottner.

9. For more on Raven Industries, see http://ravenind.com/about/our-history/ (accessed 30 August 2016).

10. Giovanni G. Fazio, “Flying High-Altitude Balloon-Borne Telescopes 50 Years Ago,” presentation to the 37th Committee on 

Space Research (COSPAR) Scientific Assembly, held 13–20 July 2008, Montreal, Canada.

11. Giovanni G. Fazio and Everett M. Hafner, “Directional High Energy Gamma-Ray Counter,” Review of Scientific Instruments

32, no. 6 (1961): 697–702. 

12. Technically, the first gamma-ray experiment on board a satellite was launched 3 November 1957, on the U.S.S.R.’s 

Sputnik 2; however, the results were not released to the international community. In the U.S., the first gamma-ray 

experiment was Explorer 11, launched on 27 April 1961; for more details, see http://heasarc.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/

heasarc/missions/explorer11.html (accessed 30 August 2016). Neither Sputnik 2 nor Explorer 11 was a telescope, let 

alone an observatory, as they could not be pointed at a source but had to rely on whatever observations could be made 

while tumbling in orbit. That Explorer 11 did detect 22 gamma rays of cosmic origin was remarkable and is generally 

considered the beginning of gamma-ray astronomy.

13. Giovanni G. Fazio and Everett M. Hafner, “OSO-1 High-Energy Gamma-Ray Experiment,” Journal of Geophysical 

Research 72, no. 9 (1967): 2452–2455; also see Nancy G. Roman, Orbiting Solar Observatory Satellite OSO I: The 

Project Summary (Washington, DC: NASA SP-57, 1965).
16 Making the Invisible Visible

I had built it in the laboratory at the 

University of Rochester—two years from 

concept to launch. We built it ourselves. The 

final checkout on the rocket was, I took a 

voltmeter up to the top of the rocket and 

checked the voltages—that was the final 

checkout, you know. It worked, but it didn’t 

detect any gamma rays from the Sun. The 

camera wasn’t sensitive enough. The problem is that there are so few of them. As you 

go higher and higher in frequency and 

shorter and shorter in wavelength and more 

energetic in the spectrum, the flux gets 

weaker and weaker.14

NASA’s program of orbiting observatories was 

very successful, even if the phenomena under 

study occasionally eluded the investigators. A 

total of eight OSO missions were launched 

between 1962 and 1975. The Orbiting 

Geophysical Observatory program placed six satellites in orbit from 1964 to 1969, and the 

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory program 

launched four satellites between 1966 and 1972, 

of which two succeeded. In total, NASA’s three 

orbiting observatory programs carried aloft more 

than 200 experiments to examine the cosmos 

across most of the electromagnetic spectrum, 

from radio waves to gamma rays. The only wavelength left unstudied was the infrared (Fig. 2.3).15

Bringing the Infrared into View

The omission of the infrared spectrum from 

experiments on the orbiting observatories is glaring. Nearly all of the experiments on the orbiting 

FIGURE 2.2. Experiments on the OSO-1 mission (Orbiting Solar Observatory Satellite 

OSO I: The Project Summary).

14. Fazio interview, 26 May 2009.

15. The sole exception was OSO-3, on which Carr B. Neel, Jr., from NASA Ames Research Center, had three instruments 

designed to measure the long-wave radiation signature of Earth and the testing of materials for use in long-wave sensors. 

See, for example, Carr B. Neel, Jr., et al., “Studies Related to Satellite Thermal Control: Measurements of Earth-Reflected 

Sunlight and Stability of Thermal-Control Coatings,” Solar Physics 6, no. 2 (1963): 235–240.
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

observatories were dedicated to the shorter wavelengths: ultraviolet, x-ray, and gamma-ray. At 

the other end of the spectrum, the longer wavelengths—radio and microwaves—had been a 

focus of much military research and were used 

extensively in communications but were not of 

interest to most astronomers. Scientists originally 

thought that radio and microwaves were found 

only on Earth, and only in laboratories. This view 

changed when, in the 1930s, researchers working on radio communications and equipment 

observed cosmic radio waves,16 and in 1965 two 

physicists working on telecommunications for 

Bell Telephone Laboratories identified the cosmic 

microwave background, remnant radiation from 

the birth of the universe 13.7 billion years ago.17

Radio and microwave astronomy would follow 

these discoveries, with the creation of many new, 

large ground-based telescope facilities, such as 

the first National Radio Astronomy Observatory 

(NRAO), at Green Bank, West Virginia, in 1956. 

Research on infrared, however, lagged behind.

Why was infrared left out of NASA’s early 

space experiments? In 1962 a panel of renowned 

U.S. astronomers and physicists advised NASA 

that “infrared observations from satellites of 

celestial objects should be given a low priority.”18 The committee was convened by the Space 

Science Board (SSB) of the National Academy of 

Sciences, the most prestigious scientific society in 

the United States. The reasoning of the SSB panel 

was that infrared should continue to be explored 

by more primitive means, such as balloons and 

rockets, before being given coveted space on 

satellites. Ultraviolet and x-ray researchers had 

proven that they could obtain useful results at 

FIGURE 2.3. Comparison of wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum (NASA).

16. See Karl G. Jansky, “Radio Waves from Outside the Solar System,” Nature 132, no. 3323 (1933): 66; and Grote Reber, 

“Cosmic Static,” Astrophysical Journal 100, no. 3 (1944): 279–287.

17. See Arno A. Penzias and Robert W. Wilson, “A Measurement of Excess Antenna Temperature at 4080 Mc/s,” 

Astrophysical Journal 142, no. 1 (1965): 419–421; and Robert H. Dicke et al., “Cosmic Black-Body Radiation,” 

Astrophysical Journal 142, no. 1 (1965): 414–419. At wavelengths longer than the far-infrared, the cosmic microwave 

background (CMB) glows at 3.5 K and was first detected by Penzias and Wilson in 1965 (for which they received the 

1978 Nobel Prize in physics) and first precisely measured in 1992 by NASA’s Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) 

mission (for which George Smoot and John Mather received the 2006 Nobel Prize in physics). The CMB offers strong 

evidence of the big-bang theory of the universe, overturning the steady-state models that ruled astrophysics until the 

1960s. For more information, two highly readable accounts are Simon Singh’s Big Bang: The Origin of the Universe (New 

York: Harper Perennial, 2005) and John C. Mather and John Boslough’s The Very First Light: The True Inside Story of the 

Scientific Journey Back to the Dawn of the Universe, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 

18. A Review of Space Research: The Report of the Summer Study Conducted Under the Auspices of the Space Science 

Board of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council Publication 1079 (Washington, DC: National 

Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1962), p. 2-25 (hereafter cited as SSB Study Group, Summer Study).
18 Making the Invisible Visible

higher altitudes and were therefore to be given 

priority on satellites.

The experts also seemed to think that there 

was not much to learn from the infrared, particularly in observations of the Sun. The SSB panel 

reported that “[infrared] observation may not tell 

us much that is not already deducible from observations in the visible.... [M]uch of the infrared 

emission from the Sun can be observed from the 

ground.”19 Such logic assumed that we understood the infrared regime—even though almost 

nothing was known about the infrared in 1962. 

The SSB reported to NASA that “there is no 

broad background of experience on which to base 

conclusions as to the improvements [in infrared 

astronomy] to be gained from space observations.”20 In essence, their rather circular argument 

was that until researchers exhaust all other observational opportunities—however inadequate and 

obscured by the atmosphere those may be—the 

panel was against studying the infrared on the 

grounds that so little was known about it.

The technology to detect infrared radiation 

was just coming into existence. Lead-sulfide 

(PbS) detectors, used to sense exhaust heat from 

enemy jets, had been installed on Sidewinder 

missiles by 1958. Developed at the Navy’s 

China Lake facility in the Mojave Desert, the 

Sidewinder was named after an indigenous rattlesnake that hunts by sensing the body heat of 

its prey. It wasn’t until the early 1960s, however, 

that sensors developed by the military to detect 

infrared heat—a traceable and therefore important feature of incoming missiles, enemy aircraft, 

and nighttime troop movements—were not only 

declassified for civilian use but were also becoming sensitive enough to merit their inclusion on 

space missions.

A key technical breakthrough came from military and industrial research on semiconductors. 

Infrared detectors are typically designed around 

semiconductor crystals, such as silicon, germanium, gallium, indium, or lead, because these 

elements are differentially sensitive to infrared 

wavelengths. When a semiconductor is exposed 

to infrared radiation, it absorbs the photons and 

becomes capable of conducting a current. It is 

called a semiconductor precisely because it conducts a current only under some conditions. By 

tracking these changes in the conductance of the 

semiconductor, it is possible to measure the presence of infrared light of particular wavelengths.21

By adding other elements as the semiconductor 

crystals form (a process known as doping), one 

can fine-tune the detectors to respond only in the 

presence of a specific wavelength—like a thermometer that registers when the temperature is 

at 0°C exactly and not a degree above or below 

freezing. The research at China Lake and at the 

Naval Research Laboratory led to new photoconductors made of indium antimonide (InSb), 

sensitive to the 1- to 5-micron range, and gallium-doped germanium (GaGe), sensitive to 

40–120 microns.22 A mercury-doped germanium 

(GeHg) detector that even now remains classified was incorporated in 1962 into an infrared 

instrument by planetary scientist Bruce Murray 

and engineer James Westphal at Caltech, in collaboration with Dowell Martz at China Lake. 

As a feasibility study, Murray’s team cooled the 

19. SSB Study Group, Summer Study, p. 2-7.

20. SSB Study Group, Summer Study, p. 2-24.

21. For a review of Spitzer’s infrared technology and how it evolved, see Paul L. Richards and Craig R. McCreight, “Infrared 

Detectors for Astrophysics,” Physics Today 58, no. 2 (2005): 41–47; and Frank J. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern 

Infrared Astronomy,” Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics 45 (2007): 43–75.

22. W. J. Moore and H. Shenker, “A High-Detectivity Gallium-Doped Germanium Detector for the 40–120μ Region,” Infrared 

Physics 5, no. 3 (September 1965): 99–106; also see Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval 

Weapons Systems, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006).
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

detector in liquid hydrogen and observed the 

unilluminated Moon and Betelgeuse in Orion at 

8–14 microns, which was most of the infrared 

spectrum that could be seen from the ground.23

The results were so surprising that Murray’s team 

was immediately offered the use of the 200-inch 

Palomar telescope—itself a surprising outcome, 

for they were not astronomers and viewing time 

on the 200-inch was in high demand. With some 

additional modifications to the detector, they 

obtained the first infrared map of Venus.24

Another major technical issue was the emissions from the detectors themselves, a problem 

known as background-limited infrared performance, or BLIP.25 The more heat a detector emitted, the more it recorded signals originating from 

itself rather than from the source of interest. Such 

unwanted signals, or noise, made it hard to distinguish a faint or faraway celestial source from 

some part of the detector an inch away. One way 

to reduce the heat from a detector was to cool the 

instrument. By placing it in a dewar (a thermos 

of a supercooled liquid, such as helium, hydrogen, nitrogen, or neon), scientists could ensure 

that any infrared signals they picked up were not 

coming from the detector. Observing objects in 

the far-infrared, such as protostars or debris disks, 

would require that the detectors be cooled to near 

absolute zero (see Table 2.1). 

By 1968, scientists had identified a range of 

materials sensitive to infrared across nearly all 

of its wavelengths. These new materials would 

allow them to develop detectors that could measure infrared “heat” from relatively cold celestial 

TABLE 2.1. Coolants used in infrared astronomy.

Coolants Used in Infrared Astronomy Boiling Point

Celsius Fahrenheit Kelvin

Carbon dioxide (“dry ice”) –79°C –109°F 195 K

Krypton –153°C –244°F 120 K

Oxygen –183°C –297°F 90 K 

Nitrogen –196°C –321°F 77 K

Neon –246°C –411°F 27 K

Hydrogen –253°C –423°F 20 K

Helium –269°C –452°F 4 K

Additional reference points

Temperature of space –270°C –455°F 3 K

Theoretical limit (“absolute zero”) –273°C –460°F 0 K

Coolants used in infrared astronomy were compiled by the author. The values for each chemical are from P. J. 

Linstrom and W. Mallard (2014). NIST Chemistry WebBook, NIST Standard Reference Database Number 69 

(National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg MD, 2014). Available online at http://webbook.nist.

gov/chemistry/ (accessed 30 August 2016).

23. James A. Westphal et al., “An 8–14 Micron Infrared Astronomical Photometer,” Applied Optics 2, no. 7 (1963): 749–753.

24. Bruce C. Murray et al., “Venus, a Map of Its Brightness Temperature,” Science 140, no. 3565 (1963a): 391–392. See also 

the interview with James Westphal, Pasadena, CA, by David DeVorkin, 9 August 1982, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, 

American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/

24985-1 (accessed 30 August 2016) and Westphal interview, 9 August 1982.

25. For a technical discussion of background limited infrared performance (BLIP), see Stephan D. Price, “Infrared Sky 

Surveys,” Space Science Review 142, nos. 1–4 (2009): 233–321.
20 Making the Invisible Visible

sources emitting from 1,000 kelvins (K) down to 

3 K, just above absolute zero. To appreciate how 

cold that is, consider that at the freezing point of 

water (273 K), ice cubes are downright steamy in 

the infrared.26

The rapid pace of semiconductor development during the 1960s led the Space Science 

Board (SSB) to reverse its 1962 recommendation 

only three years later. In its 1965 report, the SSB 

noted that infrared studies should be considered 

for future orbiting observatories and science 

programs.27

While much had changed in the available 

technology, the lack of people trained in both 

infrared techniques and astronomy remained 

an issue. It was not until 1961 that the astrophysicist Harold L. Johnson, working at the 

McDonald Observatory of the University of 

Texas, made the first repeatable, verifiable 

observations of cosmic sources in the infrared.28

Johnson is thus, according to some, the first 

modern infrared astronomer.29 An early adopter 

of the new semiconductor materials, Johnson 

used a lead-sulfide detector to study the near-infrared (typically 1–3 micron[s]), and by 1961 he 

was using an indium-antimonide detector built 

by Texas Instruments.30 During World War II, he 

had worked with radar-interference techniques; 

now he applied the knowledge he had gained 

of photoelectronics to astronomical photometry instruments, earning a doctorate in optical astronomy at the University of California, 

Berkeley in 1948.31

Setting the Stage for SIRTF

The early 1960s was a period of dismal support 

for infrared astronomy, at least among the astronomers on the influential SSB. Yet it was during 

this time that others were laying the scientific 

foundations for SIRTF. Fundamental infrared technology and expertise were aggregating: 

supercooled low-temperature bolometers at the 

University of Arizona, infrared spectroscopy at 

Cornell University, and infrared detectors at the 

Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics.32

The seeds of these programs were sown in the 

early 1960s, when the physicists who would 

develop the technology were converting to 

infrared astronomy. Two decades later, in 1983, 

NASA would hold a competition for scientific instruments to be designed for SIRTF. The 

instruments and Principal Investigators (PIs) for 

SIRTF would come from these places.

26. For reference, 1,000 K = 1,340°F, 3 K = –454°F, and 273 K = 32°F.

27. Space Research: Directions for the Future. Report of a Study by the Space Science Board, Woods Hole, MA

(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Publication 1043, 1966), p. 153, hereafter 

cited as SSB Study Group, Space Research: Directions for the Future.

28. Harold L. Johnson, “Infrared Stellar Photometry,” Astrophysical Journal 135, no. 1 (1962): 69–77.

29. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy.” 

30. Johnson, “Infrared Stellar Photometry”; and Harold L. Johnson and Frank J. Low, “Stellar Photometry at 10 μ,” 

Astrophysical Journal 139 (1964): 1130–1134. Other work was also under way at Caltech, where, in the summer of 1962, 

researchers looked at Betelgeuse, Jupiter, Saturn, and the Moon: Bruce C. Murray and Robert L. Wildey, “Stellar and 

Planetary Observations at 10 Microns,” Astrophysical Journal 137 (1963): 692–693. At UC Berkeley, R. L. Wax wrote his 

dissertation on infrared astronomy, publishing it as “Balloon Observations of Infrared and X-ray Intensities in the Auroral 

Zone,” Journal of Atmospheric and Terrestrial Physics 28, no. 4 (1965): 397–407.

31. Gérard H. De Vaucouleurs, “Harold Lester Johnson,” Biographical Memoirs, vol. 67 (Washington, DC: National 

Academies Press, 1995), pp. 243–261. 

32. Although the focus is on the groups that led SIRTF’s development, there were a handful of other universities and research 

labs, such as Caltech and the University of Minnesota, that also had active infrared research programs; for more on this, 

see Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy.” 
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 

In 1960, Gerard Kuiper left Yerkes Observatory 

and moved to the University of Arizona, in 

Tucson, where he established the Lunar and 

Planetary Laboratory (LPL). This was a bold 

move, as so-called serious astrophysicists at the 

time focused on stars, not moons and planets.33

Scientists had shied away from this area since 

the time of Percival Lowell, who published Mars

(1895), Mars and Its Canals (1906), and Mars 

As the Abode of Life (1908), triggering a slew of 

sensational stories in the media on Martian civilizations and other science fictions. Embarrassed 

by the unscientific treatment of this research, few 

astronomers openly worked on planetary or lunar 

science. Kuiper’s lab was a welcoming refuge for 

those working on these topics.34

NASA was glad to sponsor Kuiper’s work. By 

1961, the Agency’s top priority was the human 

space program, propelled by President Kennedy’s 

goal to land an American on the Moon by the 

end of the decade.35 NASA was eager for any 

research that could help with this task and 

provided Kuiper with funds for lunar studies 

and telescopes.

Kuiper began to build up the new department at Arizona. Over the next four years he 

hired both Harold Johnson and Frank Low. 

Kuiper had worked with Johnson at Yerkes 

(and briefly at the University of Texas) and 

was impressed by Johnson’s work with detectors. In Kuiper’s lunar lab, Johnson “was free to 

pursue his main line of interest—namely, the 

infrared photometry and interference spectroscopy of stars,” a former colleague noted. “He 

used to joke that he was the ‘stellar division’ of 

the Lunar and Planetary Laboratory.”36 Frank 

Low was a low-temperature-physicist-turnedinfrared-astronomer and would provide the 

essential know-how for cooling infrared detectors to a few degrees above absolute zero. Low 

recalls his conversion while working with semiconductor materials:

[I]n my first professional job at Texas 

Instruments (TI) Central Research Lab in 

Dallas, I became interested in developing 

a modern version of a cryogenically cooled 

bolometer perfectly suited for exploring 

the spectral range from 1 μm to 1.2 mm. 

In early 1961 I published an article that 

described a novel way to measure [infrared] 

radiation by using basic bolometer principles. My paper explains in full detail how 

the new germanium device functions [Low, 

1961]. When the article finally appeared in 

print I was greatly surprised by its positive 

reception among astronomers.... After the 

article appeared, several eager astronomers 

visited me in Dallas. Among the visitors 

[was] a young graduate student, Carl Sagan. 

He was eager to have me build a bolometer system so NASA could fly an [infrared] spectrometer on a balloon to look for 

organic molecules in a search for life on 

Mars. The system needed both the detector 

33. Joseph N. Tatarewicz, Space Technology and Planetary Astronomy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990).

34. Cruikshank, “Gerard Peter Kuiper,” p. 273. 

35. Kennedy announced the goal of putting a person on the Moon on 25 May 1961. However, two months earlier, the SSB 

recommended that science be the prime motivation for NASA’s activities; they did not think that the focus should be 

on human spaceflight; see letter from Lloyd Berkner, chairman of SSB, to James Webb, NASA Administrator, “Policy 

Positions on (1) Man’s Role in the National Space Program and (2) Support of Basic Research for Space Science,” 27 

March 1961, Space Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, http://www.nap.edu/

catalog/12427/policy-positions-on-1-mans-role-in-the-national-space-program-and-2-support-of-basic-research-forspace-science-march-27 (accessed 30 August 2016).

36. De Vaucouleurs, “Harold Lester Johnson,” p. 251.
22 Making the Invisible Visible

and a liquid helium dewar to hold it just a 

few degrees above absolute zero.37

With nascent technologies and low-temperature 

techniques used by only a few infrared physicists, 

many established astronomers considered infrared a 

dead end, while the physicists had no training in 

astronomy. Those who did pursue infrared astronomy often had to cross professional boundaries and 

endure skepticism from their colleagues. In a history of infrared astronomy, astrophysicist Martin 

Harwit writes:

The difficulties of making observations with 

liquid-helium-cooled devices at that time 

are hard to grasp today. Observatories were 

not equipped with liquid helium, helium 

transfer lines, vacuum pumps for pumping 

the helium down to lower temperatures, 

or most of the necessary electronic instruments. An observer had to arrive bringing all 

this equipment along. The night assistants 

in charge of the telescopes, who had never 

seen anything like this and didn’t like what 

they saw, had to be mollified, if not by the 

observer then by the site director.38

In July 1963, before Low came to the Lunar 

and Planetary Laboratory, he had worked with 

Johnson on an infrared project at McDonald 

Observatory, aided by Arnold Davidson, a radio 

astronomer from the National Radio Astronomy 

Observatory in Green Bank, West Virginia. 

The skepticism of the astronomy establishment 

regarding infrared astronomy was on display 

during that experiment. Davidson and Low were 

using an instrument they had built from indium-antimonide detectors developed by the U.S. 

Department of Defense (DOD) and cooled to 

super-low temperatures in the technique recently 

developed by Low. Johnson had arranged to test 

their equipment at the observatory. Low recalls 

an encounter there as they waited for the skies 

to clear: 

[T]he dome at McDonald Observatory 

could be reached only by foot on rather 

narrow and steep steps. One day, as Arnold 

and I were leaving the dome, we crossed 

paths with a distinguished looking optical 

astronomer who was surprised to find two 

young persons there. He wanted to know 

who we were and why we were there. We 

identified ourselves and told him we were 

working with Harold Johnson in the infrared. His response was that he could not 

understand why we were spending our time 

waiting for clear weather when we were not 

going to get any results in the infrared.39

Johnson, Davidson, and Low succeeded 

beyond even their own expectations. The results 

they achieved were foundational to the nascent 

field of infrared astronomy. Davidson and Low 

had covered the spectral range from 8 to 14 

microns, and their data supported Johnson’s 

typology of infrared-source temperatures (a sort 

of Hertzsprung-Russell diagram using heat rather 

37. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy,” pp. 44–45. The paper Low refers to in this passage is Frank J. 

Low, “Low-Temperature Germanium Bolometer,” Journal of the Optical Society of America 51, no. 11 (1961): 1300–1304. 

At the time of this visit to Low, Sagan was not a student but a postdoc on a Miller Fellowship (1960–1962) at Berkeley. 

Sagan had received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1960 under the supervision of Gerard Kuiper. The 

detector was for the Stratoscope II spectrometer project at Berkeley, details of which can be found in R. E. Danielson et 

al., “Mars Observations from Stratoscope II,” Astronomical Journal 69, no. 5 (1964): 344–352.

38. Martin Harwit, “The Early Days of Infrared Space Astronomy,” in The Century of Space Science, vol. 1, ed. Johan A. M. 

Bleeker, Johannes Geiss, and Martin C. E. Huber (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 301–330, esp. p. 305. 

39. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy,” p. 46.
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

than light), a framework by which the distances 

of objects are still measured.40

The new cooled instrument also made technological leaps. “The linearity, repeatability, and 

sensitivity were all much higher than one would 

expect for an all-new instrument,” Low noted.41

It often takes several hours of continuous observation to get a high-resolution image of a celestial source in the visible wavelengths. In contrast, 

Davidson and Low measured infrared light from 

Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Titan, and 24 stars—in a 

single night.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY 

Two thousand miles away from Tucson, a similar transformation was taking place at Cornell 

University, where another physicist was converting to infrared astronomy. Martin Harwit 

had earned a doctoral degree in physics from 

MIT in 1960 but had done graduate work at 

the University of Michigan in atmospheric 

research and postdoctoral research at Cambridge 

University with the famous astrophysicist Fred 

Hoyle.42 With this exposure to physics, astronomy, and atmospheric research methods, Harwit 

arrived at Cornell in 1962. He joined the Center 

for Radio Physics and Space Research, under 

the leadership of Thomas Gold, with the goal of 

working in the infrared using telescopes mounted 

on sounding rockets. This was an audacious goal 

in the early 1960s, given the state of rocketry and 

sensors—and exactly the sort of unconventional 

research that Gold relished.

To supplement his knowledge, Harwit contacted Herbert Friedman at the Naval Research 

Laboratory and was invited to spend a year there, 

supported by a National Science Foundation 

fellowship. Working with Henry Kondracki, 

Harwit set up a lab to perform rocket-borne 

infrared astronomy. He recalls that after returning to Cornell from his tutorial year at NRL: 

I got a phone call from Nancy Roman, who 

was the head of Astrophysics at NASA at 

the time. She asked whether I would want 

to set up a program of infrared astronomy 

at Cornell—which was sort of astonishing, 

in a way. I told the head of my department, 

Tommy Gold, and he spent half an hour 

trying to figure out why they should have 

asked me to do that when he was having 

trouble getting money from NASA. But he 

was continually criticizing NASA, and they 

were a little bit vindictive in those days.... 

I got a dowry of $250,000 to set up a lab. 

[Roman] asked me what would it cost, 

and because we had set up this lab at NRL 

I knew what I needed. So I said $250,000 

and $100,000 a year after that. So that’s 

what they gave us and that allowed us to fly 

rockets maybe every six months if we could 

recover a rocket payload, and once a year if 

we had to start from scratch—which unfortunately happened a lot because rockets in 

those days were very unreliable.... It was 

a really heartbreaking operation.... [T]he 

rocket would be spinning the whole time 

and you couldn’t get anything [because the 

equipment couldn’t deploy], or the parachute would break off. It was just one thing 

after another.43

40. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy,” passim; for the published typology, see Harold L. Johnson, 

“Astronomical Measurements in the Infrared,” Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics 4 (1966): 193–206.

41. Low et al., “The Beginning of Modern Infrared Astronomy,” p. 47.

42. Martin O. Harwit, interview by David DeVorkin, Washington, DC, 20 June 1983, session I, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, 

American Institute of Physics (AIP), College Park, MD, https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/

oral-histories/28169-1 (accessed 30 August 2016).

43. Martin O. Harwit, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 26 May 2009.
24 Making the Invisible Visible

The failure rate of rocket-borne experiments was 

high, whether due to the 

rockets themselves or the 

cold temperatures in the 

upper atmosphere, which 

often froze the instruments 

before any data could be 

collected. Given these hazards, it was risky to trade 

the relative comforts of a 

cold and isolated groundbased observatory for the 

erratic problems of airborne 

instruments.

Although NASA was 

supportive of high-atmosphere research using 

rockets, the astronomy community in the 1960s was 

slow to embrace the new 

technology. For nearly four centuries, the paradigm for astronomy was to use a ground-based 

telescope, with the largest mirror one could construct, set inside an observatory on the highest 

possible hilltop. The observatory would serve 

multiple experimenters, ideally providing them 

with operational and data support. Observations 

could be sustained or repeated over long periods. In contrast, rocket-mounted experiments 

captured only a few minutes of data—and 

only a single cross-sectional slice, as the vehicle 

ascended through the upper atmosphere. When 

the rocket reached apogee, it slowed and fell back 

to Earth, arriving (it was hoped) in one piece 

with the data on board or already telemetered 

to receivers on Earth. Those “receivers” were not 

the same sophisticated and automated tracking 

systems employed today; often they were simply 

graduate students chasing the signal using homemade equipment, as shown in Figure 2.4.

In the infrared, these limits on the data were 

offset by the rare opportunity to get above the 

atmosphere and view parts of the infrared spectrum unobservable from Earth. Even one minute 

of data collected on a rocket was more than could 

be collected from the ground by any observatory. 

Thus, while the risks of failure were high, so were 

the scientific rewards. 

The costs associated with rocket-borne experiments were modest compared with the rest of 

NASA’s budget for space science, which averaged 

$500 million annually throughout the 1960s 

(about 11.5 percent of NASA’s total annual 

budget).44 The total funds available, across all of 

the government agencies that supported rocket-based science, amounted to $50 million, half 

FIGURE 2.4. The challenges of capturing data: gamma-ray telemetry in the

1960s (Giovanni Fazio, personal files).

44. Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Norman Augustine, chair), Report of the Advisory

Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Washington, DC: NASA, 1990), hereafter cited as “Augustine

report,” Figure 7.
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

of which was provided by NASA. A typical experiment would cost $50,000 to $200,000 (in 1966 

U.S. dollars), including launch, equipment recovery, and data reduction, as shown in Table 2.2.

Harwit had the funds to conduct rocket-borne 

astronomy; now he needed a team to help solve 

the many technical problems. He hired Henry 

Kondracki, the mechanical engineer with whom 

he had worked during his year at NRL.45 In 1967, 

James R. Houck joined the Cornell group, first 

as a postdoctoral fellow and later as a professor. 

Houck had been a doctoral student in solid-state 

physics at Cornell, working in the building just 

next door to Harwit. As yet another physicist who 

converted to infrared astronomy, Houck would 

become the PI for SIRTF’s infrared spectrograph 

in 1984. One of Harwit’s graduate students, 

Michael Werner (Ph.D., 1968), would become 

SIRTF’s project scientist and, by most accounts, 

the force that held it together for three decades. 

Judith Pipher (Ph.D., 1971) and B. Thomas 

Soifer (Ph.D., 1972) also began working with the 

infrared group at Cornell and would each play a 

role in SIRTF.

Meanwhile, Harwit pursued the infrared in 

other ways. It was only a small shift to consider 

putting the equipment on aircraft, especially 

after NASA cut off the funding for rockets in the 

early 1970s due to decreases in Agency funding. 

NASA was willing to fund this new work and 

was already funding Frank Low, who had pioneered airborne infrared astronomy by installing 

an infrared telescope on a Learjet. Although the 

cooled instruments could not fly as high, they 

could take measurements over a longer period of 

time, and the Learjet, unlike a rocket, was a reusable platform, making it cost-effective for gathering data. One of the first observational targets 

was an astronomy favorite—the Orion Nebula. 

Harwit recalls the early work: 

Houck developed a compact, fully liquid-helium-cooled, grating spectrometer 

for the mid-infrared range that was sufficiently small to be mounted on the 30-cm 

(12-inch) telescope on the NASA Learjet. 

With this he obtained spectra of Jupiter and 

the Orion Nebula...across the 16–40 μm 

range.... Using a slightly modified copy of 

this design on the Learjet, Dennis B. Ward 

and [Harwit] obtained a first spectrum of 

the Orion Nebula from ~75 to 100 μm....

Infrared astronomy was coming into its 

own as an analytical tool but there was still 

a great deal that was totally unknown: No 

unbiased survey of the sky had been made at 

long infrared wavelengths, so that observers 

TABLE 2.2. Typical costs of rocket-borne experiments (in 1966 U.S. dollars).

Rocket Costs (in 1966 dollars) Pointing System

Aerobee meteorological rocket $10,000 per experiment

(e.g., photographing vapor trails in atmosphere)

None

Aerobee meteorological rocket $20,000–40,000 per experiment

(e.g., ionospheric measures)

None

Aerobee meteorological rocket $150,000 per experiment 

(e.g., galactic x-ray mapping)

None

Aerobee-Hi $200,000 per experiment Biaxial

Aerobee-350 $500,000 per experiment Multidirectional

45. Harwit, “The Early Days of Infrared Space Astronomy,” p. 309.
26 Making the Invisible Visible

continued to primarily work with sources 

familiar from visible or radio observations. 

We had no idea of what else might be found 

if the methods were at hand. The infrared 

background radiation also remained a complete mystery.46

HARVARD-SMITHSONIAN CENTER FOR 

ASTROPHYSICS 

Giovanni Fazio, the elementary-particle physicist 

who became a gamma-ray astronomer, would 

also soon convert to infrared experiments. In 

1962, after putting a gamma-ray detector on 

NASA’s OSO-1 satellite, he left the University 

of Rochester and joined the Smithsonian 

Astronomical Observatory (SAO) in Cambridge, 

Massachusetts.47

To help with his balloon-based astronomy 

program at SAO, Fazio hired George Rieke, a 

graduate student of the Harvard experimental 

physicist Jabez Curry Street. There had been a 

long historical association between Harvard’s 

Department of Astronomy and the Smithsonian 

Astrophysical Observatory, where many Harvard 

faculty had joint appointments. Thus, in 1973, 

the two institutions formed a single organization and named it the Harvard-Smithsonian 

Center for Astrophysics (CfA), with which Fazio 

became affiliated.

Rieke worked with Fazio to improve the gamma-ray detectors. Gamma rays, as noted, are 

rather rare events, and no matter how good the 

equipment, it is often difficult to detect them in 

sufficient quantities on which to draw scientifically valid conclusions. Fortunately for Rieke, 

the experiments were successful enough to form 

the basis of his 1969 dissertation on detecting 

gamma rays in space.48 After graduating from 

Harvard, he was hired by Gerard Kuiper and 

joined the astronomy faculty of the University of 

Arizona, where he would eventually be selected as 

PI for SIRTF’s Multiband Imaging Photometer 

(MIPS).49 Fazio would be selected as PI for the 

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC).

By 1970, Fazio had become dissatisfied with 

using balloons to search for gamma rays and 

turned instead to search for infrared sources. In 

a 2009 interview, he recalled that “the number of 

photons being detected divided by the number of 

hours that I was spending working on it, was so 

small that I quit...I had had it.”50 Although the 

search for gamma rays from balloons and rockets 

was declared a bust,51 Fazio considers the time 

well invested for what was to come:

I find that people say, “You wasted all that 

time.” I really didn’t waste time. I mean, I 

learned a lot of things. I learned ballooning. 

Without the balloon, I wouldn’t have gotten 

into infrared. Everything I’ve ever done, even 

though it’s remote, in some ways helped in 

the future. I’ve never found anything that 

didn’t help me in the future.52

46. Harwit, “The Early Days of Infrared Space Astronomy,” pp. 315–316. “Infrared background radiation” is a reference to the 

cosmic microwave background.

47. Fazio interview, 26 May 2009.

48. George H. Rieke, “A Search for Cosmic Sources of 10 Exp 11 TO 10 Exp 14 EV Gamma-Rays” (doctoral dissertation, 

Harvard University, 1969).

49. George H. Rieke, interview by author, Pasadena, CA, 9 June 2009.

50. Fazio interview, 26 May 2009.

51. R. K. Sood, “Detection of High Energy Gamma-rays from the Galactic Disk at Balloon Altitudes,” Nature 222, no. 5194 

(17 May 1969): 650–652.

52. Fazio interview, 26 May 2009.
Chapter 2 • Getting Infrared Astronomy Off the Gro

To help make the switch from gamma rays 

to infrared, Fazio was joined by his doctoral student, Edward L. (Ned) Wright (Ph.D., 1976) 

and by Tom Soifer, who did postdoctoral research 

in 1973 after finishing his doctorate at Cornell. 

Also doing graduate work at the CfA was Michael 

A. Jura (Ph.D., 1971). Wright and Jura, as faculty 

at UCLA, would later join SIRTF as interdisciplinary scientists. Soifer would go on to direct 

the Spitzer Science Center, which is where the 

science operations team processes the raw data 

from the observatory, and manages requests for 

viewing time and access to archived datasets.

Ready for an Infrared Revolution

Even when infrared experiments were successful, the 

evidence they provided remained doubtful. Because 

the methods were so unconventional and prone to 

failure, it was hard to differentiate significant results 

from spurious ones. In many cases, results could not 

be verified by ground-based telescopes, nor did the 

results fit prevailing theory. One way to interpret 

this is that the airborne infrared astronomers had 

found entirely new phenomena—so, naturally, the 

data from the new instruments and theory did not 

match. A simpler interpretation is that the data from 

the balloon and rocket experiments were wrong.

In 1967, three separate papers appeared in the 

astronomical journals that made traditional astronomers take notice of the new infrared astronomy. 

Kris Davidson and Martin Harwit provided a theoretical paper that suggested infrared emissions from 

young massive stars, born inside dusty clouds and 

still in their formative stages, should be observable 

at infrared wavelengths long before their cocoon of 

dust clears and the stars become visible at optical 

wavelengths.53 Using the biggest ground-based telescope—the 200-inch Palomar—and fitting it with 

an infrared detector, Caltech’s Gerry Neugebauer 

and his graduate student Eric Becklin took observations of the near-infrared wavelengths from 1.5 to 

13.5 microns.54 It was a technical accomplishment, 

and also a scientific one. Scientists were astonished 

at their finding of a very strong infrared source 

within the Orion Nebula—Orion still had secrets 

despite centuries of astronomical observations. The 

source, thought to be a protostar buried in a cloud 

of gas and dust, was not visible in the optical wavelengths and thus had not been detected before. To 

verify this finding, Frank Low and his graduate student Doug Kleinmann at the University of Arizona, 

using a different telescope and detector, took a look 

at a longer infrared wavelength of 20 microns. Not 

only did Low and Kleinmann confirm the BecklinNeugebauer object, they also found another previously undetected source in the Orion Nebula, even 

cooler than the first and subsequently named the 

Kleinmann-Low nebula.55

With verification through repeated experiments 

and theory to support the findings, traditional 

astronomers began to see that the infrared might 

be a valuable wavelength to study all on its own. 

Together with the technology suitable for studying infrared and people with the expertise to adapt 

it to astronomy, the pieces for building SIRTF 

were falling into place. George Rieke would later 

observe that

SIRTF was built when infrared astronomy was still in the pioneering stage. The 

people who had to figure out how to build 

53. Kris Davidson and Martin Harwit, “Infrared and Radio Appearance of Cocoon Stars,” Astrophysical Journal 148 (1967): 

443–448.

54. Eric E. Becklin and Gerry Neugebauer, “Observations of an Infrared Star in the Orion Nebula,” Astrophysical Journal 147 

(1967): 799–802. This was a follow-up study to Neugebauer’s infrared sky survey at 2 μm using the Mt. Wilson 60-inch 

telescope: Gerry Neugebauer et al., “Observations of Extremely Cool Stars,” Astrophysical Journal 142 (July 1965): 399–401.

55. Douglas E. Kleinmann and Frank J. Low, “Discovery of an Infrared Nebula in Orion,” Astrophysical Journal 149 (July 

1967): Letters, L1–L4. 
28 Making the Invisible Visible

the first decent infrared astronomy instruments were the ones who were involved in 

building SIRTF. Usually it’s a much longer 

time between when a field is invented and 

when you get to build a really ambitious 

space project. And so you end up getting 

specialists in the science and specialists in 

the technology. The technology specialists 

eventually become engineers instead of scientists. So there is a sort of middle-aging of 

fields before they get into the space game, 

in general, and that didn’t happen with the 

infrared—we got in early.56

56. Rieke interview, 9 June 2009.
29

CHAPTER 3

Making the Case for SIRTF

The year 1967 marked a turning point in the 

study of infrared astronomy. Astronomers 

had been pointing telescopes at the Orion Nebula 

for hundreds of years and were now stunned to 

find two entirely new nebulae embedded there, 

which became known as the Kleinmann-Low and 

Becklin-Neugebauer objects. Looking through 

the infrared window had opened new horizons, 

making it clear that an infrared universe existed 

and that our knowledge of it was rudimentary 

at best. Earlier rocket-borne experiments had 

indicated that there were many new things to 

observe in the infrared, but such results were so 

unexpected that astronomers mostly dismissed 

them as instrument error.1

 Skepticism was compounded by the fact that much of the research was 

not done within the astronomy community, but 

by outsiders: physicists in concert with the military. It was not until ground-based observations 

confirmed these phenomena—using traditional 

telescopes modified with infrared detectors—

and physicists replicated the rocket-based results 

at several university observatories that infrared 

astronomy began to be taken seriously. These 

data forced traditional astronomers to reevaluate 

what they knew about galaxies, stars, and planets 

and to speculate about unknown objects that 

might be observable only in the infrared.

Telescope Surveys and 

Telescope Facilities

The first step in understanding the infrared universe was to conduct a sky survey. Sky surveys are 

comparable to the mapping expeditions of Lewis 

and Clark, where the goal was to determine the 

lay of the land. Once a rough sketch was made, 

other teams could return to make more detailed 

observations. For the sky in the optical wavelengths, many surveys already existed, including Messier’s catalog of 1771. The infrared was 

terra incognita.

For astronomers, it made little sense to build 

an elaborate infrared telescope that could be 

pointed at celestial targets until they understood 

what sources existed in the infrared wavelengths 

and were worth observing. A great deal could 

nevertheless be accomplished with a fairly simple 

telescope. First, all that was needed was a map 

of the infrared region. To construct it, infrared 

instruments were being strapped to ground-based 

telescopes, balloons, rockets, aircraft, and—the 

1. Harwit interview, 26 May 2009; and James R. Houck, interview by author, Ithaca, NY, 25 May 2009.
30 Making the Invisible Visible

newest launch vehicle under development—the 

Space Shuttle.

Giovanni Fazio, the Harvard physicist who had 

previously built a gamma-ray detector for NASA’s 

OSO satellite, now was designing an infrared 

telescope (IRT) to fly on the Shuttle, which was 

still under development; the IRT would serve as 

a test bed for space-based infrared sensor technology. The IRT would also provide useful data on 

the operating conditions aboard the Shuttle and 

what effect these might have on infrared observations.2

 But the IRT would not be launched until 

the 1980s, so it was not a substitute for other, 

more immediate infrared survey efforts; nor was 

it a substitute for an instrument like SIRTF. 

While the letters IRT stand for infrared telescope

in both cases, the last letter in SIRTF stands for 

facility. As a facility, SIRTF would be more than a 

telescope; it would have features to which astronomers were accustomed, such as a pointable telescope and multiple filters and instruments for 

running different experiments. Modern groundbased observatories often have several telescopes 

of various sizes and with sensitivity to different 

wavelengths. Similarly, SIRTF would carry a variety of instruments, giving astronomers flexibility 

in designing experiments. And like its groundbased counterparts, SIRTF would be capable of 

zooming in with great precision on particular 

targets and holding them in view for extended 

periods. By contrast, a sky survey could (and 

arguably should) be conducted using a comparatively simple, single-purpose telescope.

Leveraging Military Research

While astronomers stood to gain the most from a 

sky survey, few were interested in doing what was 

essentially engineering work. In contrast, military 

researchers and university physicists were willing 

to develop the technology for an infrared sky 

survey. The Air Force had determined by the late 

1950s that an infrared sky survey was needed, 

but not for the purpose of astronomical research; 

tacticians wanted to be able to distinguish the 

heat of stellar radiation from the heat of incoming missiles. However, the technology required 

for detecting infrared radiation—whether from 

earthly or celestial sources—did not yet exist. 

Over the next several decades, as noted in chapter 

2, the military invested tens of millions of dollars 

in research to develop the necessary instruments 

equipped with infrared detectors (Fig. 3.1).3

 By 

the early 1960s, these military investments were 

beginning to pay off. The Air Force, through 

its Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL), 

funded the work of physicist Freeman F. Hall, 

who conducted a sky survey in 1962 at the ITT 

Federal Laboratory in Sylmar, California, using 

lead-sulfide (PbS) detectors that operated primarily in the 1- to 3-micron range, just a little 

longer than optical wavelengths.4

 However, 

viewing from the ground involved cooling the 

instruments down so that ambient heat would 

not saturate the sensors, rendering them unable 

to detect celestial infrared sources. As a coolant, 

Hall used frozen carbon dioxide (dry ice). The 

experiment was a limited success—fewer than 50 

sources were identified—although Hall’s work 

2. Fazio interview, 26 May 2009; see also Giovanni G. Fazio, “Planned NASA Space Infrared Astronomy Experiments,” 

Advances in Space Research 2, no. 4 (1982): 97–106.

3. Sky survey work in the 1960s was classified; results from this research were first made public in the 1970s and published 

by Stephan D. Price and Russell G. Walker, The AFGL Four-Color Infrared Sky Survey: Catalog of Observations at 4.2, 

11.0, 19.8, and 27.4 μ, Publication AFGL-TR-76-0208 (Hanscom AFB, MA: Air Force Geophysics Laboratory [AFGL], 

Air Force Systems Command, USAF, 1976). For an excellent review of the history of infrared sky surveys, including the 

pioneering work done by Air Force engineers, see Price, “Infrared Sky Surveys,” 2009.

4. Price, “Infrared Sky Surveys,” p. 241.
Chapter 3 • Making the Case for SI

did demonstrate the feasibility of a cryogenically 

cooled infrared telescope.

The results of Hall’s infrared sky survey 

remained classified, but infrared technology was 

slowly becoming more available, and a few adventurous scientists were trying it out. Around the 

same time, a sky survey was being contemplated 

by physicist Robert Leighton at Caltech.5

 He submitted a funding proposal to NASA in 1962 for 

the construction of a 62-inch telescope on which 

to install infrared detectors. Gerry Neugebauer, 

hired that year as an assistant professor, and several Caltech undergraduate and graduate students 

helped Leighton to build the telescope. Like 

Freeman Hall, they used PbS detectors but cooled 

them with liquid nitrogen, which, at –210°C, 

was much colder than dry ice. They also used a 

telescope with a bigger aperture and new filters 

developed by Optical Coating Laboratory, in 

Santa Rosa, California.6

 Figure 3.2 (p. 32) shows 

the completed 12-foot-high telescope. The survey 

was conducted from January 1965 through the 

spring of 1968. In his description of an early test, 

Neugebauer captures the interaction between 

engineering ingenuity and happy accident that 

marked the beginnings of infrared research:

The construction was done here on campus 

and we erected the telescope ourselves. I 

remember the first night that we ran with 

detectors on the telescope.... [I]t was 

just right outside Bridge [Norman Bridge 

Laboratory of Physics, on the Caltech 

campus], in a little alleyway, in which 

you could only look vertical, essentially. It 

turned out it was the first night I had gotten 

the detectors working, and just by luck, we 

looked up. We didn’t know anything about 

the sky, of course. We looked up and there 

was a star that looked sort of red, so we 

pointed toward it. It turns out that it was 

Beta Pegasus, which is, in fact, one of the 

three or four brightest stars in the sky at two 

microns. We just picked that one by sheer 

accident, because it happened to be overhead in a very narrow range in this alleyway. 

And everything just worked perfectly.7

Because Neugebauer and Leighton were 

physicists, they had no idea what astronomical results to expect. “I went to the astronomers 

and asked how many stars will we see? They said 

75,” Neugebauer remembers. “That was the biggest number I got.”8

 Neugebauer and Leighton 

weren’t the only ones to be surprised when their 

FIGURE 3.1. Lead-sulfide (PbS) detectors (c. 1946) 

(NASM).

5. Robert B. Leighton, interview by David DeVorkin, Pasadena, CA, 29 July 1977; also Gerry Neugebauer, interview by David 

DeVorkin, Pasadena, CA, 12 August 1982. Both interviews are from the Space Astronomy Oral History Project, National 

Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution.

6. For a brief discussion of filters, see Westphal interview, 9 August 1982. Relevant publications of results include Gerry 

Neugebauer and Robert D. Leighton, Two Micron Sky Survey: A Preliminary Catalog (Washington, DC: NASA SP-3047, 

1969); and Bruce Murray et al., “Infrared Photometric Mapping of Venus Through the 8–14 Micron Atmospheric Window,” 

Journal of Geophysical Research 68 (1963b): 4813–4818. 

7. Neugebauer interview, 12 August 1982.

8. Neugebauer interview, 12 August 1982.
32 Making the Invisible Visible

FIGURE 3.2. The 62-inch ground-based infrared telescope used for the Caltech Two-Micron Sky Survey (NASM).
Chapter 3 • Making the Case for SI

Two-Micron Sky Survey, which they published in 

1969, gathered light from 20,000 stars.

The Case for Space-Based 

Observations

In a panel convened by the National Academy 

of Sciences’ Space Science Board in 1965,9

 the 

discussions included infrared but not as a standalone field of science; rather, it was a topic split 

between the well-established optical and radio 

groups. Each group was proposing a space-based 

telescope that would cover some portion (but 

not all) of the infrared spectrum. Infrared was 

such a young field that the physicist Frank Low, 

who had been involved in astronomy for a mere 

five years, was the token infrared astronomer on 

both the Working Group on Optical Astronomy 

(chaired by Lyman Spitzer, the first champion of 

space-based astronomy) and the Working Group 

on Radio and Radar Astronomy. As the field of 

infrared solidified, so would Low’s influence. But 

at that moment, infrared was not a separate field 

of astronomy, and the role it would play in space 

science was unclear. Murray and Westphal, Hall, 

and Leighton and Neugebauer had demonstrated 

that infrared had promise from the ground. 

Space-based observations had yet to be proved.

Gerry Neugebauer, however, had had some 

experience with space-based observations while 

working on the Mariner 2 program, when he had 

mapped planetary surfaces in the infrared from 

space-borne instruments. Mariner, managed 

at JPL, comprised a series of 10 space probes 

sent to measure the surface and atmosphere of 

Mars, Venus, and Mercury. Mariner 2, launched 

in August 1962, was sent to Venus. Among the 

instruments on the probe was one by Neugebauer 

to measure radiation at 8–12 microns in the 

mid-infrared. Although Neugebauer’s instrument worked, he was piggy-backing on another 

experiment—literally: His infrared instrument 

was mounted on a microwave dish designed 

for another experiment. But the dish got stuck. 

“[We] were just sitting on top of it, and we 

couldn’t point independently,” Neugebauer told 

an interviewer in 1982. “So the microwave lost 

sync, and instead of making a whole map of 

Venus as it was supposed to, it made a funny 

three-angle cut across Venus. So all we got were 

three swaths across Venus...[whereas] Bruce 

Murray had been able to make a total map of 

Venus.”10 Like Murray, Neugebauer was an outsider to the astronomy community—he was a 

physicist and he studied planets; and, like NASA, 

he was intrigued with the possibilities of research 

using infrared detectors.

Neugebauer’s instrument had gotten within 

22,000 miles of Venus. Technically, it was a 

major accomplishment; scientifically, it was not. 

The Mariner team was chagrinned that Bruce 

Murray, working with Caltech graduate student 

Robert Wildey and engineer James Westphal, 

had already done an infrared map of Venus from 

the ground (see chapter 2). While tens of millions of miles from Venus, Murray had been able 

to obtain results more useful than those obtained 

by Neugebauer and the army of engineers and 

scientists who built and flew the Mariner probe. 

The results from the infrared experiment on 

board Mariner 2 exemplified the excitement 

and disappointment of space-borne astronomy. 

With attention being focused on infrared observations, some scientists were slowly warming to 

this new area of astronomy. At the same time, 

others were lining up against it. While Mariner 2 

demonstrated that infrared observations could be 

made in space, it was less successful in showing 

9. SSB Study Group, Space Research: Directions for the Future: The Report of a Study by the Space Science Board, 

Woods Hole, MA (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Publication 1403, 1966).

10. Neugebauer interview, 12 August 1982.
34 Making the Invisible Visible

had begun tirelessly advocating for a future that 

included telescopes in space, and who was working 

on NASA’s Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 

(OAO) program, recalled in a 1977 interview:

For years and years, ever since the war, I’ve 

been talking about space astronomy to anybody who would be interested enough to 

listen to me. Jesse Greenstein was a good 

friend of mine from this period, and he 

sent up a payload in a V-2 rocket. The only 

trouble was that the rocket exploded about 

a hundred feet or so above the launch tower, 

so all that work was wasted. It sort of soured 

him on space astronomy for a while! But 

when I told him I was getting involved in 

the OAO program, he shook his head, and 

said, “Well, Lyman, you’re young. You’ll live 

to see it fail.”11

Lyman Spitzer lived for almost 83 years 

(1914–1997) and is the person for whom the 

telescope that is the subject of this monograph 

is named. Spitzer lived long enough not only 

to see the four OAOs launched but also to see 

his dream become reality with the launch of the 

Hubble Space Telescope in 1990. That telescope, 

the first true observatory in space, might have 

been named Spitzer instead of Hubble but for 

NASA’s policy of not naming projects after living 

people. Spitzer would be posthumously honored 

in 2003, when SIRTF was renamed the Spitzer 

Space Telescope—after it was determined that 

the instruments were working. 

NASA Loses Luster

Just as 1967 brought much attention to infrared 

astronomy, another event was bringing attention 

that such efforts were worth it. Many scientists 

felt that space-based observations were a waste 

of money—money that could be better spent 

on ground-based observations. Although there 

were now more funding sources for astronomy 

(through NASA, DOD, and NSF), the cost of 

instrumentation had also increased, and with 

it, competition among scientists. Moreover, the 

instruments were custom-tailored to particular wavelengths. Thus, arguments over funding 

were closely intertwined with issues of scientific merit. One day in 1963, not long after the 

Mariner 2 mission, Neugebauer happened to be 

at NASA Headquarters when a letter arrived that 

openly criticized the space program. Addressed 

to Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM), the letter 

had been written by one of the senator’s New 

Mexico constituents, Bradford A. Smith. What 

got everyone’s attention was that Dr. Smith was 

a prominent astronomer and Senator Anderson 

chaired the Senate Committee on Aeronautical 

and Space Sciences, meaning that he had oversight of both space policy and NASA’s budget. 

Witnessing the arrival of this letter, Neugebauer 

had the impression that Smith wanted to build 

up the ground-based program. Certainly, Smith’s 

home state of New Mexico provided excellent 

sites for viewing the sky. But this was more than 

a pork-barrel ploy. 

Even before Smith wrote his letter, Caltech’s 

Jesse Greenstein had been openly critical of space 

science programs. Greenstein, who had been disappointed by his experiments on rockets (and 

who, from his position at Caltech, enjoyed prime 

access to the coveted and very much ground-based 

200-inch Hale telescope), was an influential advisor to NASA and would chair the decadal committee that laid out the future of U.S. astronomy 

for the 1970s. Lyman Spitzer, who back in 1946 

11. Lyman Spitzer, interview by David H. DeVorkin, Pasadena, CA, 8 April 1977, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, American 

Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/4901-1

(accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 3 • Making the Case for SI

to NASA—unwelcome attention. While scientists were criticizing NASA’s budget priorities, 

the Agency found itself under intense scrutiny 

by both Congress and the media after a fire 

during a launch simulation claimed the lives of 

three Apollo astronauts. As NASA’s Associate 

Administrator at the time, Homer Newell, recalls:

Under the best of circumstances the Apollo 

204 fire on 27 January 1967 would have 

been difficult to live down. But coming 

at a time when the country was becoming 

more concerned about a variety of problems 

other than whether the United States was or 

was not ahead of the Soviets in space, the 

impact of the accident upon the [A]gency 

was immeasurably increased. A great deal 

of [NASA] Administrator Webb’s time was 

taken up in recouping for NASA the respect 

it had been building up in the Mercury, 

Gemini, and other programs, and in regaining the confidence of the Congress. That in 

Apollo the United States was on trial, as it 

were, before the whole world had much to 

do with the program’s continuing to receive 

support. But in the aftermath of the congressional hearings and internal NASA reviews, 

Webb began to sense a slackening of support 

for the space program.12

According to Newell, this lack of support did 

not deter Thomas O. Paine, who became NASA 

Administrator in March 1969, shortly after the 

congressional hearings on the Apollo fire ended 

and Webb retired. By 1969, with funding for 

Apollo winding down, NASA was looking for 

new ways to contribute to national policy. After 

the Moon landing, some felt that an equally 

grand project was needed. Reflecting those opinions and hopes (and not the economic realities), 

Paine advocated several big projects: a lunar base, 

a space station, and a reusable space transportation system—the Space Shuttle.13

To get political support for development of 

the Shuttle, planners wanted to show that there 

was widespread support and demand for regular 

crewed spaceflights. By including onboard experiments (something that was not central to the 

Apollo Moon missions), they hoped to make support for a Shuttle more compelling to both scientists and Congress. Likewise, a space station was 

meant to appeal to scientists and compete with 

the Soviets, who were moving forward with the 

first orbiting space platform, Salyut (launched 

in 1971).14

To guide NASA and Congress, the scientific 

community was called upon to develop a list of 

priorities for policy-makers.15 Under the sponsorship of the National Academy of Sciences, which 

12. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4211, 2004), 

pp. 284–285, available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4211/cover.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).

13. Ibid.

14. For a discussion of the scientific community’s concerns with science being subservient to engineering and piloted 

mission goals of NASA throughout the 1960s, please see Tatarewicz, pp. 103, 136–137; and Walter A. McDougall, ...

the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), esp. 

pp. 389–402. To garner support for the Space Shuttle, panels of scientists were tasked with finding payloads that would 

warrant reusable and long-term space platforms; see, for example, Proceedings of the Space Shuttle Sortie Workshop, 

Greenbelt, MD, Volume 1: Policy and System Characteristics and Volume II: Working Group Reports (Greenbelt, MD: 

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 1972); and Final Report of the Space Shuttle Payload Planning Working Groups, 

Volume 1: Astronomy, Publication NTRS 1974007405 (Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 1973); while 

Fred Witteborn, who conceived SIRTF, served on the panel that issued the report Scientific Uses of the Space Shuttle

(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1974).

15. Astronomy Survey Committee (Jesse Greenstein, chair), Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s, Volume 1: Report 

of the Astronomy Survey Committee and Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s, Volume 2: Reports of the Panels 

(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1972), hereafter cited as “Greenstein report.” 
36 Making the Invisible Visible

had been advising Congress and presidents on 

policy since Abraham Lincoln was in office, scientists from many fields gathered between July 

1969 and October 1971 to identify the most 

promising research directions and determine the 

best use of funding for ground-based, airborne, 

and space-based experiments. Jesse Greenstein 

chaired the Astronomy Survey Committee, 

which brought together scientists studying all 

regions of the electromagnetic spectrum and 

asked them to prioritize research programs 

within their respective domains. The infrared 

panel included John Gaustad (UC-Berkeley) as 

chair, Eric Becklin (Caltech), Fred Gillett (UCSan Diego), James Houck (Cornell), Harold 

Larson (Arizona), Robert Leighton (Caltech), 

Frank Low (Arizona), Douglas McNutt 

(NRL), Russell Walker (AFCRL), and Neville 

Woolf (Minnesota).

The infrared panel recommended a sky survey 

to obtain an overall picture, to be followed by a 

cooled infrared space telescope of great sensitivity. The cost estimate for the proposed infrared 

telescope was $100 million, which was 20 times 

more expensive than anything else the infrared 

panel recommended. The panel submitted its 

recommendations to Greenstein’s committee, 

which was charged with synthesizing the various 

panel reports. The committee’s goal was to provide NASA and other policy-makers with a consensus on scientific research priorities that had 

been weighed against economic considerations. 

The resulting decadal survey for the 1970s, also 

known as the Greenstein report, ultimately recommended that highest priority be given to solar, 

optical, and x-ray programs—areas that had 

already produced important findings and could 

be counted on to deliver solid research results, 

even within a limited national budget. Regarding 

the cooled infrared space telescope, Greenstein’s 

report was dismissive: “This instrument will be 

needed in time, but technological problems are 

severe, cost is high, and much can be done from 

a stratospheric platform first [i.e., from balloons, 

rockets, and aircraft].”16

As the 1960s drew to a close, the economic, 

political, technical, and scientific forces that had 

given rise to infrared astronomy were pulling it in 

different directions. As a scientific field, infrared 

astronomy did not have a central research question or a way to unite all the stakeholders in a 

common pursuit. Universities were vying for leadership in this new scientific field, but most of the 

required technology did not yet exist. Aerospace 

companies were competing for contracts to 

develop that technology. Although NASA was 

encouraging astronomers to propose experiments 

as a way to increase the scientific support and 

content for the Shuttle Program—and thus its 

political appeal to Congress—scientists remained 

doubtful about NASA’s commitment to spacebased science. Furthermore, it seemed clear that 

national priorities would now focus on cutting 

domestic spending and ending the Vietnam War, 

as Nixon had indicated in his 1968 election campaign. And with the White House turning its 

lights off at night due to the 1970s energy crisis, 

the economic mood on funding lavish space programs had grown dark. 

Infrared Up in the Air

It was in this chilly political climate that Fred 

C. Witteborn conceived of building a cryogenically cooled infrared space telescope. Witteborn 

was the chief of the new Astrophysics Branch at 

NASA’s Ames Research Center. Ames had been 

founded in 1939 by the U.S. government to conduct aeronautical research, as a backup facility for 

the Langley Research Center, in Virginia, in case 

16. Greenstein report, vol. 2, p. 93.
Chapter 3 • Making the Case for SI

of a wartime attack on the East Coast. Ames is at 

the southern end of San Francisco Bay and lies 

off California Highway 101, halfway along the 

16-mile stretch between Stanford University to 

the north and Silicon Valley to the south. Both 

geographically and intellectually, Ames is situated between the worlds of scientific research and 

technology development. Witteborn had to enlist 

both these realms to produce his cryogenically 

cooled infrared space telescope.

Witteborn had come to Ames for a summer 

job in 1957 while working on his doctorate 

in physics at Stanford. His graduate advisor, 

William Fairbank, was a low-temperature physicist who had started a research program to test 

part of Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity.17 Key to this research was finding a way to 

slow matter down by cryogenically cooling the 

particles. “P. W. Selzer, W. M. Fairbank, and C. 

W. F. Everitt were the inventors of a vent valve 

that enabled the storage of superfluid helium in 

space,” Witteborn recently recalled. “This solved 

the trouble with cryogens: When you have zero 

gravity, what’s to keep them in the bottom of the 

tank? But if it’s superfluid with a proper temperature gradient across the porous plug vent, you’re 

able to contain superfluid.”18 Witteborn learned 

about these techniques while working on his dissertation, which he completed in May 1965.

Witteborn continued to work at Ames while 

pursuing his doctoral degree. During this time, his 

boss at Ames, Michel Bader, started the airborne 

astronomy program by modifying commercial 

aircraft. Even though Ames did not have any 

astronomers on staff, it was renowned for its aerospace development capabilities. It has its own airport, Moffett Field, and the world’s largest wind 

tunnel—so large it can accommodate a Boeing 

727. Airborne astronomy was a perfect way to 

leverage Ames’s engineering strengths in order to 

move the Center beyond aeronautics design and 

toward astrophysics research (while further validating its identity as a part of NASA). Airborne 

astronomy was economically attractive—cheaper 

than using rockets, applicable at all wavelengths, 

more flexible than a mountaintop location, and 

updatable as technology improved. In 1964, Bader 

had secured a Convair 990 airplane on which to 

conduct scientific experiments in “sortie mode,” 

a single flight to achieve a narrowly defined mission, in which the necessary equipment is carried 

aloft, measurements are made, and then brought 

back to Earth. Although NASA owned the plane, 

it was made available to scientists from around the 

world. Among the first to design airborne experiments were Gerald Kuiper, Dale Cruikshank, and 

Frank Low from the University of Arizona and 

Gerry Neugebauer from Caltech.19

The infrared telescope that Frank Low configured for the Convair 990 made it possible to take 

observations at 40,000 feet while neutralizing 

much of the interference from the atmosphere; 

observations were limited, however, by the size of 

the aircraft’s 12-inch windows and 1-inch-thick 

17. Incidentally, this research program evolved into the NASA-Stanford Gravity Probe-B project; for an early discussion, see 

C. W. Francis Everitt, William M. Fairbank, and Leonard I. Schiff, “Theoretical Background and Present Status of the 

Stanford Relativity-Gyroscope Experiment” in The Significance of Space Research for Fundamental Physics: Proceedings 

of the Colloquium of the European Space Research Organization, held 4 September 1969 at Interlaken, Switzerland 

(ESRO SP, No. 52): p. 33–43 (proceedings available at http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_

Public/03/024/3024818.pdf).

18. Fred C. Witteborn, interview by author, Mountain View, CA, 2 September 2008.

19. Research publications that resulted from work on the Convair 990 aircraft included G. Münch et al., “Infrared Coronal 

Lines. II. Observation of [Si x] λ1.43 μ and [Mg VIII] λ3.03 μ,” Astrophysical Journal 149 (1967): 681–686; also see 

Gillespie, Carl, ed., Gerard P. Kuiper Airborne Observatory and Learjet Observatory Plus Astronomy-Related Publications 

from the NASA Convair 990 Aircraft (Moffett Field, CA: Ames Research Center, 1991).
38 Making the Invisible Visible

glass.20 Low was soon developing a telescope to 

work with an open port—basically a hole in the 

side of the plane—initially under sponsorship by 

AFCRL and later by NASA.21 The instrument 

(shown in Fig. 3.3) was installed on a Learjet, and 

NASA gave Ames responsibility for conducting 

the flights. 

“One of the things that we were supposed to 

do when the Astrophysics Branch was first born 

was to fly on the Learjet with a small airborne 

telescope,” Witteborn reports; “Headquarters had 

twisted [Low’s] arm to make it available to the 

rest of the IR [infrared] community. We had the 

misfortune of being made the host center for his 

telescope to fly on a NASA airplane. This created 

some friction.”22 Low had a strong personality, 

and by all accounts he was a forceful if gruff advocate for infrared research. Along with demanding 

personalities, researchers on the Learjet had to 

cope with a physically demanding environment. 

Astronomers and experimental astrophysicists are 

used to cold, dark observing conditions, but the 

Learjet was in a different league. Even though the 

cabin was partially pressurized and heated, the air 

remained so cold and thin that everyone on board 

wore oxygen masks and warm clothes.23 They flew 

sorties at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning and always 

needed scientists who were willing to give up their 

sleep to run the equipment. “I lost the need to have 

regular hours after that project,” Witteborn said. 

“I never worried again about when I got up. But 

[Lawrence J.] Caroff was in the [Ames] theoretical 

branch. So for him to volunteer was something of 

a sacrifice, but he was a very good telescope operator.” Although Caroff was one of the only theoreticians who flew, the Learjet program benefited 

many experimentalists besides Low. According to 

Witteborn, “we built our own instruments and 

flew on the Learjet and did some early infrared 

research, spectroscopic research. There had been 

some research done on the [Convair] 990, but this 

was the first open-port spectroscopy done from 

the Learjet with our instruments.”24

The airborne astronomy program at Ames 

grew throughout the 1960s, and by 1971 it was 

reorganized to bring together all of the infrared 

science projects. As there was already a NASA 

“Infrared Branch” at Goddard Space Flight 

Center (and fierce competition between the two 

Centers), Ames called their new infrared division 

the Astrophysics Branch. Bader asked Witteborn 

to lead the new branch and to find a way to continue hosting astronomical missions. “When 

Mike Bader heard that they wanted science instruments for the sortie mode on the Space Shuttle, 

he said, ‘Gee, you guys ought to put a telescope 

on there.’ He had an entirely different idea than 

I of what it should be,” Witteborn remembers. “I 

realized right away that for infrared we needed a 

cryogenic telescope.”25

20. Wendy Whiting Dolci, “Milestones in Airborne Astronomy: From the 1920’s to the Present,” AIAA, 1997 World Aviation 

Congress, October 13–16, 1997, Anaheim, CA. This article is available in print as NASA ARC 975609 and in digital format 

at https://www.sofia.usra.edu/sites/default/files/97-Whiting_AeroHistory.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).

21. Price, “Infrared Sky Surveys,” pp. 248–249.

22. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

23. NASA Ames Research Center, “Lear-Jet Airborne Observatory Investigators Handbook” (Moffett Field, CA: NASA TM108623, 1974).

24. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

25. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008. In regard to the Space Shuttle, sorties were discussed at least as early as 

September 1971; see Judy A. Rumerman, ed., NASA Historical Data Books, Volume V: NASA Launch Systems, Space 

Transportation, Human Spaceflight, and Space Science, 1979–1988 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012, 1999), p. 462. The 

chapter on space science is available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4012/vol5/vol_v_ch_4.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 3 • Making the Case for SI

FIGURE 3.3. Telescope with cryogenically cooled infrared instruments (c. 1972), developed by Frank Low and 

flown aboard the NASA Ames Learjet (NASM).

41

CHAPTER 4

SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared 

Telescope

To sketch out what such a telescope might 

look like, Witteborn assembled a team at 

Ames that included Lou Young, a seasoned engineering manager from the Apollo program; Larry 

Caroff, the airborne-telescope-operating theoretician; and Eric Becklin, co-discoverer of the 

Becklin-Neugebauer object and an active participant in the Ames airborne astronomy program 

after earning his doctorate from Caltech. Their 

resulting design (Fig. 4.1) was originally conceived as a cooled telescope with a 1-meter 

mirror. The technical instruments envisioned as 

early as 1973 (Fig. 4.2, p. 42) hint at the photometric and spectroscopic instruments that were 

actually flown 30 years later.

FIGURE 4.1. Design for SIRTF as a Shuttle-attached payload, by Fred Witteborn and 

colleagues at Ames (c. 1971).
42 Making the Invisible Visible

Witteborn represented Ames at a conference 

on sortie-mode astronomy held at Goddard 

Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, 

Maryland, from 31 July to 4 August 1972. This 

conference, co-chaired by Larry Caroff, was the 

first step in sortie-mode planning for the Space 

Shuttle. “Bill [William F.] Hoffmann was there 

and he gave a paper on his balloon-borne, infrared telescope,” Witteborn said. “He and I got 

together and discussed the importance of having 

a cold telescope on the [S]huttle.”1

 The “cooled 

infrared telescope,” as it was then called, would 

become SIRTF and would eventually be renamed 

the Spitzer Space Telescope.

While the acronym SIRTF remained constant 

until December 2003 (when the telescope’s name 

was changed to Spitzer, four months after launch), 

the meaning of the acronym did change. Initially, 

SIRTF stood for Shuttle Infrared Telescope 

Facility because SIRTF was originally intended 

to be flown as an attached payload to the Space 

Shuttle. Choosing the Shuttle as the launch vehicle for SIRTF solved some problems but created 

others. If rockets were capable of sending humans 

to the Moon, why commit to launching SIRTF 

FIGURE 4.2. Specification of possible SIRTF design and instrument suite (c. 1973) (NASA Goddard

Space Flight Center).

The 1.5-m infrared telescope (Figure 2) is envisioned as a Cassegrain with an

f/2 primary possessing at least a 0.5° field of view, a modulating secondary

mirror, cooled baffles, a movable sun shield and a removable thin plastic

window for protection from contaminants during early phases of a mission. The

telescope would be mounted on gimbals (possibly on a swing table) on a Sortie

pallet and would constitute approximately 1/2 of a Sortie payload. Manned

access to the focal plane would not be necessary. A rotatable tertiary mirror

in the instrument bay would be commanded to direct the light beam into any of

several different instruments. Instruments could be interchanged from mission

to mission to accommodate the needs of different investigators. A complement

of instruments and detectors might include:

• A broad-band infrared filter photometer using a liquid helium-cooled detector.

• An infrared photoconductor detector array (LHe-cooled doped germanium) for

flux measurements with spatial resolution.

• A Fourier spectrometer (LHe-cooled) for medium resolution (0.1 cm–1) infrared

spectroscopy.

• An infrared polarimeter (both linear and circular)

• A grating spectrometer with multichannel detectors for intermediate band

infrared spectrophotometry.

Rotatable disks between the tertiary and secondary mirrors would contain an

assortment of filters and an optional beam chopper.

1. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008. See also Proceedings of the Space Shuttle Sortie Workshop, July 31–August

4, 1972, Volume 1: Policy and System Characteristics and Volume 2: Working Group Reports (Greenbelt, MD: NASA

Goddard Space Flight Center, 1972).
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

on a system that had not yet flown? As Witteborn 

recalls, “We were told by NASA Headquarters in 

no uncertain terms that if you are going to get 

NASA’s money to fly scientific payload missions 

in space, you had better plan on doing it on the 

[S]huttle...[which] was going to be so much

cheaper. They were going to fly payloads for $100

per pound.”2

 Rocket-borne payloads cost $1,000

per pound. Moreover, NASA was discontinuing

manufacture of expendable rockets and therefore

had a limited stockpile with many demands on

it—from launching telecommunications satellites to carrying military payloads.3

The 1972 conference on sortie-mode astronomy at Goddard brought together members 

of NASA from Headquarters, Marshall Space 

Flight Center (MSFC), Ames Research Center 

(ARC), and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

(JPL). Working groups were assigned to different subfields of astronomy, including solar, 

x-ray, optical, and high-energy physics. The

Working Group on Infrared Astronomy was

co-chaired by Caroff and Maurice Dubin, from

Headquarters. Participants included, besides

Witteborn, William Hoffmann (University of

Arizona), Theodore P. Stecher (GSFC), Reinhard

Beer (JPL), and Thomas Wdowiak (MSFC). Also

representing Headquarters was Nancy Boggess.

Boggess was a senior staff scientist at 

Headquarters; she joined NASA after receiving 

her doctorate in astrophysics from the University 

of Michigan in 1967. Her boss was Nancy Roman, 

who was also present at this meeting and busy 

chairing the Optical Astronomy Working Group, 

which was discussing the Hubble Space Telescope 

project. As the scope of NASA’s involvement in 

astronomy grew, it became necessary for Roman 

to delegate the management of various subfields; 

Roman put Boggess in charge of the new infrared 

program. As Boggess later recalled:

At that point, infrared was just coming into 

view at NASA. Nancy Roman supported 

several infrared researchers at Caltech and at 

the University of Minnesota, so she had her 

hands full and asked me to work on that.... 

Since nobody at Headquarters knew much 

about infrared, she gave me the opportunity 

to go around to the various universities that 

we were supporting and learn a lot of infrared astronomy from the researchers. I’ll be 

indebted to her for it, because it helped me 

manage the program much better having 

that background.... It really gave me a good 

fundamental understanding of what the 

problems were in the infrared and how to 

overcome them and what the science goals 

could be in the infrared.4 

Following the workshop at Goddard, discussions about SIRTF continued. Roman chaired 

a subcommittee within the Payload Planning 

Working Group, an ad hoc committee of 

researchers from NASA Centers and scientists 

from the United States and abroad to oversee 

the scientific uses of the Space Shuttle.5

 Other 

subgroups met to focus on possible Shuttle payloads for solar, high-energy, and atmospheric science; whatever wasn’t covered by those categories 

was put under the aegis of Roman’s group, the 

Astronomy Science Working Group, which met 

from November 1972 to April 1973 and included 

2. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

3. President Reagan reinstated the expendable launch vehicle program after the loss of Challenger; see Marcia S. Smith,

Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports, Congressional Research

Service, Library of Congress (IB93062 CRS Issue Brief for Congress), updated 3 February 2003.

4. Nancy Boggess, interview by author, Boulder, CO, 19 March 2009.

5. Final Report of the Space Shuttle Payload Planning Working Groups, vol. 1. cf. n. 6.
44 Making the Invisible Visible

scientists from several NASA Centers (Goddard, 

Ames, Johnson, Marshall, and Headquarters), 

from the NRL, and from many of the major 

ground-based observatories, including Yerkes, 

Palomar, Lowell, Washburn, Lick, Steward, and 

McDonald in the United States and observatories 

in Marseille and Paris. 

The initial idea for SIRTF was a cryogenically 

cooled infrared telescope mounted to a reusable 

instrument pallet. Observation would begin 

when the Shuttle achieved its low-Earth orbit and 

opened its cargo-bay doors to the sky (Fig. 4.3).6

The telescope would be cooled to below 20 

K and have a mirror of 1.0–1.5 meters, its size 

being restricted to what could fit in the Shuttle’s 

bay (15 feet in diameter and 60 feet long). Since 

the initial 1971 design, the telescope had nearly 

tripled in length and was now over 24 feet long.

It was expected that scientists would use 

SIRTF to conduct sky surveys as well as to 

gather data on galactic composition, early conditions of the universe, and dust clouds. To meet 

these science objectives, the original design of 

SIRTF relied on two types of measurements: 

FIGURE 4.3. SIRTF as a Shuttle-attached payload (c. 1980) (NASA).

6. This Shuttle configuration is largely the same as one presented in Fred C. Witteborn and Lou S. Young, “Spacelab

Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF),” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 13, no. 11 (November 1976): 667–674, esp.

p. 670. Witteborn and Young’s article is based on an earlier conference paper, “A Cooled Infrared Telescope for the Space

Shuttle: The Spacelab Infrared Telescope Facility,” that was published in January 1976 as AIAA paper # 76-174; see also

the presentation by Lou Young to NASA on the Statement of Work, Phase A, for SIRTF (Item PP05.04, Larry A. Manning

Papers 1967–1988, Box 2, Folder 3, housed in the NASA Ames History Office, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett

Field, CA).
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

photometric and spectroscopic. Photometry shows 

an object’s energy output 

and temperature, whereas 

spectroscopy shows its 

chemical composition.

The Astronomy Science 

Working Group expressed 

concerns about contamination from the Shuttle environment. Dust, moisture, 

and fumes could all cause 

light to scatter before it 

could be read by the instruments—or, worse, these 

substances could stick to 

the telescope’s mirror and 

obscure the data entirely. 

Except for an occasional 

cleaning of the mirrors 

by a Shuttle astronaut, 

the telescope required no 

maintenance. To prevent 

contamination, the working group proposed that 

SIRTF be a free-flying 

satellite. Instead of being 

operated on board the 

Shuttle, SIRTF would be 

launched by the Shuttle 

and placed in orbit using a space tug called an 

orbital maneuvering vehicle. SIRTF would then 

be periodically visited and serviced by Shuttle 

crews to maintain the instruments and replace 

the cryogen. However, this was a bit premature, as neither the Shuttle nor the space tug 

existed yet.

In its final report, Roman’s Astronomy 

Science Working Group recommended that 

various Shuttle payloads include three infrared 

telescopes, as well as the Hubble Space Telescope 

(primarily for optical wavelengths), which was 

already a few years into planning. The first project in the infrared would be a small cooled telescope, which eventually developed into SIRTF.7

The second infrared project was to be a pair of 

large, uncooled telescopes, the first of which 

would have a mirror 4 meters in diameter and the 

second a mirror 8 meters in diameter, both operating at around 200 K, for gathering far-infrared 

FIGURE 4.4. Proposed Shuttle payloads with multiple infrared telescopes

(Final Report of the Payload Planning Working Groups, vol. 1: 

Astronomy).

7. Final Report of the Payload Planning Working Groups, vol. 1: Astronomy (Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight

Center, 1973).
46 Making the Invisible Visible

the stratosphere only, while x-ray, optical, and 

gamma-ray research should be done in space.11

The inconsistency was surprising, in that the SSB 

was an NAS subcommittee. The divergence from 

Greenstein’s decadal survey was due to the political positioning of the Space Shuttle Program. 

While the cooled infrared telescope was not a 

priority within the wider scientific community, it 

was a priority for those trying to generate support 

for the Shuttle by identifying possible scientific 

payloads to carry.

SIRTF was to be followed by other telescopes—some that were smaller or designed for 

a specific experiment, such as a sky survey, and 

culminating in a multipurpose telescope facility 

with a 10-meter mirror, to be assembled in space 

via the Shuttle. Table 4.1 shows the proposed 

schedule of Shuttle-borne infrared experiments, 

as envisioned by the SSB panel.

While these recommendations were intended 

to increase support for the Space Shuttle, particularly among the scientific community, they were 

somewhat disconnected from those promoted by 

John E. Naugle, NASA’s Associate Administrator 

for Space Science and Applications. In Naugle’s 

testimony to the U.S. Senate on the use of the 

Space Shuttle and in the popular press, the Space 

Shuttle had been sold mainly on the basis of its 

ability to economically gather data that addressed 

problems on Earth, such as tracking weather and 

crops.12 Infrared remote sensing (which focuses 

on Earth) was an important part of this solution, 

whereas infrared astronomy (which focuses on 

deep space) was not. Moreover, the U.S. government was then dealing with the 1973 OPEC 

observations at more than 100 microns.8 The 

working group speculated that, in time, the 

small cooled infrared telescope would be flown 

with one of these larger uncooled telescopes (see 

Fig. 4.4, p. 45). 

The next step in the development of SIRTF 

was to broaden discussions to include scientists 

involved in setting national policy. In July 1973, 

the NAS’s Space Science Board (SSB) met in 

Woods Hole, Massachusetts, to discuss the scientific uses of the Space Shuttle. At this meeting, 91 

scientists, including 13 from outside the United 

States, convened to consider how the Space 

Shuttle might be used for research in atmospheric, 

planetary, and life sciences; high-energy physics; 

and optical and infrared astronomy. The infrared 

astronomy panel was chaired by Bill Hoffmann 

(University of Arizona) and included Rudolf 

Hanel (GSFC), David Rank (Lick Observatory), 

and Fred Witteborn (ARC), all of whom had 

participated in Roman’s Astronomy Science 

Working Group. Joining them on the panel were 

Richard Jennings (University College London), 

Gerry Neugebauer (Caltech), and Stephan Price 

(AFCRL).9

The top recommendation by the SSB’s infrared panel was for a 1.0- to 1.5-meter cryogenically cooled telescope, to be launched in 1981 

in sortie mode.10 This proposal was consistent 

with the earlier recommendations of Roman’s 

Astronomy Science Working Group; however, 

it contradicted the 1972 Greenstein report, the 

National Academy of Sciences’ decadal survey for 

the 1970s, which had recommended that infrared research be conducted on the ground and in 

8. An incarnation of the 4-meter telescope that was proposed in 1973 became part of the Herschel mission, a joint program

of the European Space Agency and NASA that launched 14 May 2009.

9. National Research Council, Scientific Uses of the Space Shuttle (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1974).

10. National Research Council, Scientific Uses of the Space Shuttle, p. 99.

11. Greenstein report, vol. 1 (1972), pp. 11, 85, and 91.

12. Space Shuttle Payloads: Hearing Before the U. S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 30–31

October 1973, Washington, DC; John E. Naugle, “Research with the Space Shuttle,” Physics Today 26, no. 11 (1973):

30–37.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

oil embargo and the resulting economic crisis. 

Although NASA had won congressional approval 

to move ahead with the Shuttle, infrared astronomy’s budget within NASA was expected to be 

small—infrared research was to be allocated $2 

million a year, or 2.6 percent of the Office of 

Space Science and Applications (OSSA) astronomy budget, throughout the 1970s. In 1972, 

the National Academy of Sciences recommended 

doubling the funds for infrared to $4 million a 

year; none of that money was earmarked for an 

infrared space telescope.13

Assessing the Shuttle Environment 

SIRTF had no priority in NASA’s overall science 

budget; however, funds for science could be had 

from the Shuttle program. That it was politically 

and economically desirable to put an infrared 

telescope on the Space Shuttle was a weak argument; weaker still was the notion that the Shuttle 

would provide observing conditions that could 

satisfy scientific and technical needs.

The major technical problem with having 

an infrared telescope on the Shuttle was contamination. One source would be the debris and 

Year

’79 ’80 ’81 ’82 ’83 ’84 ’85 ’86 ’87 ’88 ’89 ’90 ’91

Sortie

LH2

-cooled, 1 m 1⁄2 2 × 1⁄2 2 × 1⁄2 2 × 1⁄2 2 × 1⁄2 1⁄2 1⁄2

Ambienttemperature, 1 ma 1⁄4 2 × 1⁄4 1⁄4 2 × 1⁄4 2 × 1⁄4 2 × 1⁄4 2 × 1⁄4

Ambienttemperature, 3 mb 1 1 1 1 1 1

Interferometer 

10-m baseline 1⁄2 1⁄2

LH2

-cooled 2.5 mb 1 2 2 2 2

Interferometer, 

1.5-km baselineb 1⁄2 1⁄2 1⁄2 1⁄2

Ambienttemperature, 10 mc 1 1 1⁄4 1⁄4

Small Free-Flyers and Rocket Payloads

IR survey

Submillimeter 

background

Millimeter 

background

lR monitors/

Explorers

a Operation of first flights will be during test phase of Shuttle.

b Whether these instruments are sortie mode or free-flyers should be decided on basis of early sortie results.

c To be assembled in space durlng sortie mission and then set free.

TABLE 4.1. SIRTF as a 1-meter telescope to be flown on the Space Shuttle in 1981.

13. Greenstein report (1972), vol. 1, p. 11; and vol. 2, p. 380.
48 Making the Invisible Visible

outgassing of materials from the Shuttle. Another 

source would be the astronauts, who would create 

vapor clouds by simply exhaling and vibrations 

by moving about. For a highly sensitive telescope, 

the moisture and jitter on the Shuttle might be 

worse than anything encountered on the ground. 

“As the science teams began to look at it, they saw 

that contamination was an unknown,” Witteborn 

said.14 They estimated that infrared sensors would 

pick up particles as small as 2 microns up to 10 

kilometers away. To put the problem in perspective, the period at the end of this sentence measures about 400 microns. Everyone was right to 

be worried; conclusive evidence that the Shuttle 

environment gave off too much heat and vapor for 

infrared observations would come in 1985 from 

Giovanni Fazio’s IRT, which took measurements 

on board an orbiting Shuttle. 

Even if the Shuttle were contaminant-free, 

a major scientific concern remained as to the 

amount of viewing time available on a Shuttleborne telescope. With astronauts on board, the 

Shuttle could stay in orbit for only a few weeks. 

The scientists wanted a month or more of observing time. As Witteborn recalls: 

[NASA told us to] count on a week or two 

[in orbit, with] 60 [opportunities to launch] 

a year. Then, if your instrument didn’t work 

out quite the way you wanted, you would 

have a chance to fix it between missions. 

Well, it sounded very similar to what Ames 

was doing with the 990 [the Convair aircraft that replaced the Learjet]. You build 

an instrument, you fly it, you come down 

again, and you change it. Also, on the 

Kuiper Airborne Observatory [the C-141 

aircraft that began operations in 1974]—

again, you fly your instrument for eight to 

10 hours, and then you have a chance to put 

new cryogen in it, fix it up, and send it up 

again. So the idea was appealing.15

Nevertheless, Witteborn and the rest of the 

panelists at the 1973 meeting at Woods Hole 

made it clear in their report that they preferred 

a longer mission. Despite the imperative to use 

the Shuttle, they had expressed a preference for 

a free flyer as early as 1972. “We really much 

preferred to have our own missions as a separate 

satellite,” Witteborn said.16 If disconnected from 

the Shuttle, SIRTF could then be left in orbit, 

lengthening the observational periods and reducing the possibility of contamination. But in 1972 

no one knew for certain what the real effects of 

a Shuttle environment were, as the Shuttle itself 

was still in the early stages of design.17

To understand the anticipated operational 

environment of the Shuttle, NASA provided 

money to conduct engineering studies and 

brought together a group of experts to oversee 

the process. “Study money was made available,” 

Witteborn said. “It was a whole $25,000.”18 The 

slim budgets of the 1970s intensified the competition among astronomers over funding and project priority. Witteborn continues: 

A certain person in the astronomical community was intensely outraged over this—

“All that money was being squandered at 

Ames for this project.” So it was reexamined 

and NASA Headquarters decided we could 

14. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008; see also Witteborn and Young, “SIRTF” (1976).

15. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

16. Ibid.

17. For preference of scientists to have the telescope remain in orbit, see Proceedings of the Space Shuttle Sortie Workshop,

vol. II, p. 15-2.

18. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

do a study of the contamination environment of the Space Shuttle and its effect on 

infrared astronomical observations. Martin 

Marietta won this contract, which in hindsight appeared to be a traditional buy-in. A 

big company like that couldn’t do much for 

$25,000, but they did an impressive job. 

They reported on how you measure the 

contamination looking at the materials and 

how they outgas. They obviously had done 

a study before on this and gave us the same 

stuff again, but applied to the Shuttle. It was 

to their advantage to do it, too. And we asked 

for more. We asked for a literature search on 

infrared techniques for space astronomy.19

The Martin Marietta report was the first technical study of what would develop into SIRTF.

Developing a Design for SIRTF

Not long after the contamination study of the 

Shuttle environment, NASA put out a call for 

proposals to develop a design for this new cooled 

infrared Shuttle telescope. Martin Marietta was 

interested in responding to the call and hired 

several astrophysicists to review its proposal. 

One of those consultants was Robert D. Gehrz, 

who had recently obtained a doctorate in physics 

(1971) from the University of Minnesota. His 

dissertation was on astrophysics and involved 

the construction of infrared detectors used on 

ground-based telescopes. Shortly after joining the 

faculty at the University of Wyoming in the fall 

of 1972, Gehrz reported,

I was approached by Martin Marietta 

Aerospace to consult with them on a proposal 

they were writing to do the initial design studies for SIRTF. At the same time, they hired 

Jim Houck and George Rieke as consultants. 

I think they hired George a little ahead of the 

other two of us, and George recommended 

that they put us on board. So we essentially 

got in, the three of us, on the ground floor 

by consulting with that company.... We 

evaluated this proposal and told the Martin 

Marietta guys that we didn’t think it was up 

to snuff. We thought that they had some 

flaws in it that were going to cause it to get 

rejected. In fact, they told us they didn’t really 

have time to correct those, and they submitted it as it was, and it did get rejected. But 

then NASA hired a panel of consultants to 

monitor the progress of the winners. George 

and Jim and I were all hired to do that.20

The winner of the contract competition to 

design an infrared payload was Hughes Aerospace. 

The design study was prepared in collaboration 

with Ames and overseen by the Shuttle Infrared 

Telescope Science Accommodations Group 

(SIRTSAG), a review panel of experts formed in 

1974 by NASA Headquarters and Ames, which 

included several people who had participated in 

earlier panels: David Rank (chair), Eric Becklin, 

Fred Gillett, D. A. “Al” Harper, Jr. (of Yerkes 

Observatory), Bill Hoffmann, Frank Low, and 

Russ Walker (who had left AFCRL and joined 

Ames in 1976).21 These scientists had experience 

across all the infrared techniques that had been 

tried before—rockets, balloons, aircraft, and the 

19. According to Witteborn (in a 2 September 2008 interview), the contamination study for which Martin Marietta received

$25,000 is L. E. Bareiss, R. O. Rantanen, and E. B. Ress, Payload/Orbiter Contamination Control Requirement Study

Final Report, MRC 74-93 (Denver, CO: Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp., 1974).

20. Robert D. Gehrz, interview by author, Long Beach, CA, 5 January 2009.

21. Witteborn and Young, “SIRTF” (1976).
50 Making the Invisible Visible

ground. They helped set the scientific objectives of SIRTF and lent their expertise on how 

it might be built. The final Hughes report—“A 

Large Cooled Infrared Telescope Facility for 

Spacelab” by Steve McCarthy, Lou Young, and 

Fred Witteborn—was the first paper to use the 

acronym “SIRTF.”22 In this original incarnation, 

SIRTF was designed to be placed on Spacelab 

aboard the Shuttle. Spacelab was a European 

project that would provide the Shuttle with a 

reusable platform for experiments and, perhaps 

more important, a way for the international 

community to share the use and costs of the 

Shuttle.23 Each Spacelab-equipped Shuttle mission would host a pallet of scientific instruments 

assembled on the ground and swapped out 

between missions. Spacelab would use common 

modules and support systems, thereby increasing 

its flexibility while reducing costs of the Shuttle 

as a laboratory. The Hughes study resulted in a 

design for a cryogenic telescope to be mounted 

on Spacelab, as well as technical analyses of the 

thermal and material properties of SIRTF. This 

study was a key data point in arguments that 

a Shuttle-borne cryogenically cooled infrared 

telescope was technologically feasible. But more 

work was needed to address issues of contamination and viewing time that could compromise its 

scientific utility. 

“After the [Hughes] study, there were more 

meetings of the infrared astronomers and they 

became actively involved on a larger scale,” 

Witteborn said.24

A key group in this process was the Design 

Optimization Study Team (DOST), a review 

panel of experts chaired by Nancy Boggess from 

NASA Headquarters that included Gehrz, Rieke, 

and Houck.

This advisory group was expanded into the 

Focal-plane Instruments and Requirements 

Science Team (FIRST). Table 4.2 lists the 35 

members of FIRST at the time their final report 

was submitted in 1979.25 The FIRST group was 

responsible for developing the language for the 

Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for SIRTF. 

The AO is a public document that represents 

NASA’s official commitment to a project and 

solicits proposals from the scientific and engineering communities to develop that project. 

“That team concocted the baseline scientific 

mission and a complement of instruments that 

it thought were required to accomplish that mission,” recalled Bob Gehrz, who was a member of 

FIRST. Gehrz continued:

Then it split itself up into subteams that went 

away and designed the various instruments 

and wrote conceptual descriptions of them 

and even defined them to the point where 

we had optical drawings, tables of filters that 

would be required, and tables of detectors 

we wanted to see in them, and sensitivities 

calculated and everything. That all went into 

the AO.... They were conceptual designs...

meant to be representative of what NASA 

was thinking it needed for the Shuttle.26

22. Steve G. McCarthy, Lou S. Young, and Fred C. Witteborn, “A Large Cooled Infrared Telescope Facility for Spacelab,”

paper presented at the 21st annual meeting of the American Astronautical Society (abstract no. AAS 75–284), held in

Denver, CO, 26–28 August 1975; also see Witteborn and Young, “SIRTF” (1976).

23. For more on the history of Spacelab and the Space Shuttle, see Science in Orbit: The Shuttle & Spacelab Experience,

1981–1986 (Huntsville, AL: NASA NP-119, 1988), available at http://history.nasa.gov/NP-119/contents.htm (accessed

30 August 2016); and Roger D. Launius and Aaron K. Gillette, Toward a History of the Space Shuttle: An Annotated

Bibliography, 2 vols., NASA Monographs in Aerospace History (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1992), available at

https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/708235main_Shuttle_Bibliography_1-ebook.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).

24. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

25. “Appendices to FIRST Interim Report on SIRTF,” Ames Research Center, 14 April 1978.

26. Gehrz interview, 5 January 2009.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

Participants in the Focal Plane Instruments and Requirements Science Team (FIRST)

and the SIRTF Science Working Group

Name Organization

Eric E. Becklin University of Hawaii

Nancy W. Boggess NASA-Headquarters

Paul E. Boynton University of Washington

Richard W. Capps University of Hawaii

K. l. Roland Chan NASA-ARC

Dale l. Compton NASA-ARC

Edwin F. Erickson NASA-ARC

Neal J. Evans University of Texas at Austin

Giovanni G. Fazio Harvard College Observatory and Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory

Robert O. Gehrz University of Wyoming

Fred C. Gillett Kitt Peak National Observatory

Doyal A. Harper, Jr. Yerkes Observatory, University of Chicago

Paul M. Harvey University of Arizona

William F. Hoffmann Steward Observatory, University of Arizona

James R. Houck Cornell University

Roger F. Knacke State University of New York at Stony Brook

Virgil C. Kunde NASA-GSFC

Harold P. Larson University of Arizona

Frank J . Low University of Arizona

John C. Mather NASA-GSFC

K. Michael Merrill University of Minnesota

Alan F. M. Moorwood ESA

Gerry Neugebauer California Institute of Technology

Judith L. Pipher University of Rochester

David M. Rank University of California at Santa Cruz

Paul L. Richards University of California, Berkeley

George H. Rieke University of Arizona

Stephen T. Ridgway Kitt Peak National Observatory

Baruch T. Soifer California Institute of Technology

Wayne A. Stein University of Minnesota

Rodger I. Thompson University of Arizona

NASA-ARC

NASA-ARC

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Mi

NASA-ARC

TABLE 4.2. Members of FIRST, the committee that developed the initial scientific and technological scope of SIRTF.

To summarize the events of the 1970s, SIRTF 

had been formed out of a process that brought 

together scientists and engineers from universities, government, and industry. Science objectives 

were developed and prioritized by various panels 

convened by NASA and the National Academy 

of Sciences. Industry experts established the feasibility of a cryogenically cooled telescope and 

produced cost estimates for SIRTF. By the end 

of the decade, infrared scientists from a range of 

institutions were in agreement that SIRTF would 

be worth building. 

The next step was to convince Congress to 

allocate the funds for such a major undertaking. 

To make the case for SIRTF—as a Shuttle-based 

telescope—administrators at NASA Headquarters 

marshaled the evidence from all existing studies 

on SIRTF’s science definition and engineering 

design. Data supporting this approach were by 

this time considerable (see Table. 4.3).27

27. Several of these items are referenced in a presentation on SIRTF’s status given by Lou Young, on 24 July 1981 (NASAARC, SPS-14, archived in the NASA HRC).
52 Making the Invisible Visible

TABLE 4.3. Timeline of key scientific and technical feasibility reports on SIRTF as a Shuttle-attached payload 

as of 1980.

Date Activity/Report Emphasis

July 1969–

Oct. 1971

Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s: Astronomy Survey Committee, (Greenstein 

Report), pub. April 1972. National Academy of Sciences

Policy

July 27–

Aug. 15, 1970

Friedman report (1971)—at request of NASA Priorities for Space Research: 1971–1980, 

Report of a Study on Space Science and Earth Observations Priorities, Space Science 

Board, National Research Council—recommended that infrared orbiting telescope 

(70 cm) be studied

Policy

May 1971 Very early system design study: Fred Witteborn, Lou Young. Larry Caroff, Eric Becklin Engineering

Aug. 1972 Johnson, Rodney O., and Meredith, Leslie. eds. Proceedings of the Space Shuttle 

Sortie Workshop. Greenbelt, MD: Goddard Space Flight Center, 1974. 2 Vols. (held at 

Goddard Space Flight Center on 31 July–4 August 1972).

Engineering

Nov. 1972–

April 1973

Astronomy Working Group (primarily for Shuttle-borne instruments), chaired by 

N. Roman, NASA

Science

May 1973 Final Reports of the Space Shuttle Payload Planning Working Groups, Vol. I–V, NASA 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, May 1973.

Engineering

July 1973 National Academy of Sciences. Scientific Uses of the Space Shuttle. Washington, DC: 

National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, 1974. (held at Woods Hole 

in July 1973)

Science

Oct. 1973 Space Shuttle Payloads: Hearing Before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space 

Sciences. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 

Sciences, 30–31 October 1973. 

Policy

Nov. 1973 Naugle, John E. “Research with the Space Shuttle.” Physics Today. 26 (November 

1973): 30–37. 

Science

1974 NASA RFP for facility design study. Martin Marietta hired Gehtz et al to review their 

proposal draft.

Engineering

1974 $25,000 to Martin Marietta—Bareiss, Rantanen, and Ress, “Payload/Orbiter 

Contamination Control Requirement Study Final Report” [4]—that was done and 

finished in 1974. 

Engineering

July 1974 Explorer AO, received 13 infrared proposals (Harwit History of IR, p. 40) Science

Feb. 1974–

Jun. 1976 

SIRTF Science Accommodations Group Science

1975 SSB/NAS: IR panel, chaired by G. Neugebauer, of the Space Science Board that met 

at Snowmass, Colorado, in 1975 (published in Report on Space Science 1975, see 

below).

Science

Aug. 26–28, 

1975

McCarthy, S. G.; Young, L. S.; Witteborn, F. C. (1975) A large cooled infrared telescope 

facility for Spacelab, Meeting on Space Shuttle Missions of the 80s, Denver, Colorado, 

Aug. 26–28, 1975, AAS 39 p. ( Feasibility and design study by Hughes Aircraft & 

Grumman Aircraft)

Engineering

1976 “Report on Space Science 1975,” National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 

1976.

Policy

1976–1977 Shuttle accommodations and mission system engineering study by Rockwell Intl. Engineering

Jan. 1976 Witteborn, F. C.; Young, L. S. November 1976 Spacelab infrared telescope facility 

(SIRTF). J. Spacecr. Rockets, Vol. 13, No. 11 p. 667–674—originally presented at 

Aerospace Sciences Meeting, 14th, January 26–28, 1976, Washington, DC.

Science

(continued)
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

Date Activity/Report Emphasis

Aug. 1976 “Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), Final Report of Preliminary Design Study,” 

Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, California, August 1976. Contract NAS2-8494.

Engineering

1977 “Final Report, Vol. 1, Study to Analyze Integration of Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility 

(SIRTF),” Rockwell International Corp., Downey, California, 1977.

Engineering

Jan. 1977–

Jan. 1979

Focal Plane Instruments & Requirements Science Team Science

1978 Spacelab Multiuser Instrument Review Science

July 1978–

Dec. 1978

Design Optimization Study Team Science

April 1978 “Appendices to FIRST Interim Report on SIRTF,” Ames Research Center, 14 April 1978. Science

1978–1979 Telescope design optimization study by Perkin-Elmer, Beech Aircraft & SAI Engineering

Jan. 1979–

Nov. 1979

SIRTF Science Working Group Science

1979 CSAA, Space Science Board, NAS Science

Aug. 1979 SIRTF System Design Summary Document, Final Report of Design Optimization Study, 

Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk, Connecticut, August, 1979.

Engineering

Sept.1979 “SIRTF Design Optimization Study: Final Technical Report,” Perkin-Elmer Corp., 

Norwalk, Connecticut, 30 September 1979. Contract NAS2-10066.

Engineering

Nov. 1979 Final Report of the Focal Plane Instruments and Requirements Science Team and the 

SIRTF Science Working Group, NASA Ames Research Center, November, 1979.

Science

Attached to the Shuttle

To persuade Congress to authorize funding for 

SIRTF, scientists had to demonstrate that the 

project would meet a strong need. But first, the 

scientists themselves had to be convinced that 

SIRTF was worth doing, meaning that it was 

the best use of the nation’s shrinking research 

funds. Scientists and Congress wanted to 

know: Should we spend our money on SIRTF?

The decadal survey published in 1972 (the 

Greenstein report) had shown how effective a 

consensus document could be for the field of 

astronomy. Although there was much internal debate, through the Greenstein report 

the scientists showed a largely united front 

that made it clear which projects NASA and 

Congress should fund. On the basis of the 

National Academy of Sciences’ recommendations, scientists saw funding flow in the 1970s 

toward major missions, such as the Large Space 

Telescope (Hubble) and the Compton Gamma 

Ray Observatory (CGRO), and toward moderate (under $200 million) Explorer missions, 

such as the Infrared Astronomical Satellite 

(IRAS), an international collaboration to conduct an infrared sky survey. However, the 1970s 

was an economically difficult decade for both 

NASA and the country, and not every project 

the scientists recommended was funded. While 

several ground-based observatories were built 

(for optical, radio, and infrared wavelengths), 

the budget for airborne experiments shrank. 

With limited funding for rockets, balloons, 

and aircraft, infrared astronomy was still operating mostly from the ground, through a layer 

of atmospheric dust and water vapor. The only 

politically viable way to get off the ground was 

to be on the Space Shuttle, even if it, too, had 

a layer of dust and water vapor.
54 Making the Invisible Visible

In this environment, the 1980s started with 

both a new decadal survey by the National 

Academy of Sciences and a commitment by Ames 

to form an official SIRTF study team tasked with 

producing a preliminary design based on the 

work of the FIRST group.28 But just as things 

were starting to come together, the project began 

moving in two directions. The NAS decadal 

survey committee took the position that SIRTF 

should be a Shuttle-attached telescope—as all 

of the studies in the prior decade had assumed 

it would be. However, the scientists who had 

done those studies were increasingly advocating 

for SIRTF to be a free flyer: the Shuttle might 

be used to put SIRTF in orbit, but in their view 

SIRTF should be left in space when the Shuttle 

returned to Earth. As a stand-alone satellite, 

SIRTF would be more scientifically useful but far 

more costly. Only one of these two options could 

be supported. Resolution of this scientific and 

economic tension would come while NASA was 

preparing the Announcement of Opportunity.

The Announcement of Opportunity 

for SIRTF

Ames created the official SIRTF study group in 

January 1980, with Fred Witteborn as the study’s 

lead scientist and Lou Young as its manager. 

Among the group’s goals were “to force the release 

of the Announcement of Opportunity, and...to 

make sure that funding continued for more studies,” Witteborn said, adding:

I think the driving force behind this [AO] 

was the infrared astronomers, the infrared 

community. It was organized by Ames at 

that time, but also [NASA] Headquarters. 

Nancy Boggess and Nancy Roman were 

the Headquarters persons involved.... This 

group really was mainly focused on defining 

the scientific requirements better and giving 

the rationale for why you needed the infrared telescope. They did a lot of calculations, 

and there was some real science behind it. 

They were trying to show why you needed 

[an infrared telescope] in addition to the 

Hubble telescope. Congress’s point of view 

was, you’ve got a bunch of telescopes already, 

what more do you want? 

We had a series of meetings and the whole 

thrust of all of these meetings and studies was 

to get the Announcement of Opportunity 

out. By 1980, infrared astronomers were 

quite sure that they wanted this telescope. 

The next step was to get NASA to get committed to funding. The way you do that is 

you get NASA to release an Announcement 

of Opportunity. Before NASA would do 

that, they wanted to be very sure of what it 

was going to cost and what the science was 

going to be like. They had to compare it with 

other projects. By then, there were all sorts 

of scientists vying for funding, particularly 

astronomers—UV astronomy, gamma-ray 

astronomy, x-ray astronomy, solar astronomy—all these people wanted major projects, minor projects. And from their points 

of view, they each had a better reason for 

doing their projects than the others. So the 

period from 1980 to 1984 was really spent 

in refining the requirements and explaining the possibilities as to what the science 

accomplishments could be, what the science objectives were, as well as the mission 

requirements.29

28. Director’s memo AO-15, 31 January 1980, NASA Ames History Office, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 

PP05.04, Larry A. Manning Papers 1967–1988, Box 2, Folder 3.

29. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

Meanwhile, the National Academy of Sciences 

convened the Astronomy Survey Committee, 

under the chairmanship of Harvard astronomer George Field, for another decadal survey to 

establish the science priorities for the 1980s.30 As 

a member of the decadal survey committee, Bob 

Gehrz was told to assume that SIRTF was safe 

to move forward as a Shuttle-based project and 

would not need prioritization. Although Gehrz 

knew that within the SIRTF working groups 

they were moving away from this configuration, he could not take this factor into account. 

Gehrz explains:

It was initially planned that this [Shuttleborne] telescope was going to launch for the 

first time in about 1979 and that the price tag 

would be between $100 million and $120 

million. It would be a 120-centimeter telescope. When it came time to do the decadal 

astronomy survey chaired by George Field 

for the decade of the ’80s, NASA told that 

committee that SIRTF should be considered 

a project that was safe from prioritization.... 

So it didn’t actually get a prioritization with 

all the projects in that decadal survey that 

were to compete against one another; it 

was one of the baseline projects that NASA 

already had in hand. At that same time, 

some of the people on the SIRTF project—led by Frank Low, as I recall—began 

to agitate for it being put into Earth orbit 

[as a free flyer], because it was recognized 

that the Shuttle environment was much too 

dirty to really fly a cryogenic telescope. It 

was also recognized at that point that bringing a telescope like that down through the 

atmosphere was going to contaminate it so 

badly that it would essentially have to be 

rebuilt from scratch every time you reflew it. 

It would have to be completely disassembled 

and cleaned, it would be so badly contaminated. So they began to agitate for it being a 

telescope that was launched from the Shuttle 

bay but then remained in Earth orbit, where 

it could be refurbished periodically by the 

Shuttle. Then the price began to go up a 

lot, and it also changed the baseline concept 

to the point where NASA said, “This is no 

longer the done deal that was presented to 

the Field committee. This has to be reprioritized.” So it threw the project into a whole 

new regime.... 

I was on the Field committee, and I caught 

a lot of flak about this, because some of the 

people on the project claimed I hadn’t advocated it strongly enough to get it into the 

review process. But we had been told we 

couldn’t put it in there. Frank Martin was 

the guy at NASA who pretty much steadfastly held that line. So it wasn’t prioritized 

in the Field committee as a Shuttle-attached 

mission, and it certainly wasn’t in there as a 

free flyer. So that meant it was a project that 

was now off the charts. It was a brand new 

project, which had to be reprioritized by the 

next decadal survey [for the 1990s].31

The project NASA was willing to fund was 

a Shuttle-based SIRTF. The project the scientists 

wanted was a free flyer. Both sides were guilty of 

wishful thinking. The net result, however, was 

that the Field report did not explicitly prioritize 

30. This survey, which would become known as the Field report, was published under the title Astronomy and Astrophysics 

for the 1980’s, Volume 1: Report of the Astronomy Survey Committee and Volume 2: Reports of the Panels (Washington, 

DC: National Academies Press, 1982–1983). Volumes 1 and 2 are available online at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.

php?record_id=549 and http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=550, respectively.

31. Gehrz interview, 5 January 2009.
56 Making the Invisible Visible

SIRTF in the decadal survey and so offered no 

political cover for the project when SIRTF later 

changed scope.

A Spectrum of Projects

Frank Martin, who had told Gehrz that SIRTF 

was a done deal, ultimately decided the priority of NASA’s astronomical missions. He had 

been playing that role since the 1970s, when 

he was put in charge of advanced programs in 

the Astrophysics Division and had overseen the 

selection of some smaller-scale infrared projects 

that included the Cosmic Background Explorer 

(COBE) and the Infrared Astronomical Satellite 

(IRAS). COBE would test the Big Bang theory 

by measuring the cosmic microwave background. 

IRAS was developed and operated by astronomers from the United States, the Netherlands, 

and the United Kingdom to conduct an infrared sky survey. Less complex than SIRTF, COBE 

(launched in 1989) and IRAS (launched in 1983) 

had small budget profiles and were being built as 

free flyers. Martin was committed to seeing both 

of these projects through.32

Around 1979, Martin was promoted to 

Director of the Astrophysics Division. Like everyone appointed to that position, he received a never-ending stream of visitors who argued that their 

pet projects should receive priority. Scientists typically felt that more money should be spent for 

research in their favorite wavelength—optical, 

x-ray, gamma ray, ultraviolet, radio, and increasingly, infrared. It had not taken long for NASA to 

adopt a portfolio of projects to support across the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Funding and personnel were limited, however, as both the Carter and 

Reagan administrations cut space science budgets. Martin was forced to cancel projects in order 

to keep the budget in line, terminating missions 

already in orbit (Copernicus and Einstein) in 

favor of those being jointly developed with the 

European Space Agency (International Solar 

Polar Mission and a Halley’s Comet flyby). This 

only increased the number of scientists who lined 

up at his door to either request new projects or 

reinstate canceled ones.

In addition to balancing the needs of the 

scientific community, Martin was finding it 

increasingly difficult to explain to Congress why 

NASA needed all these projects. It was hard to 

sell politicians on these projects one at a time, 

especially when the projects were neither distinct 

enough from one another nor similar enough to 

speak of them as a package. It was a hodgepodge 

of projects—all possessing scientific merit and 

passionate advocates—and Martin had to find a 

way to ensure that the right projects got the right 

resources at the right time.

IRAS and COBE were high on Martin’s 

to-do list, and the National Academy of Sciences 

agreed that these projects should receive priority. However, Martin’s peers in the Defense 

Department were unconvinced that this was 

money well spent. Nancy Boggess remembers the 

day she represented NASA at a meeting at the 

Pentagon, before IRAS launched: 

I gave a presentation on what IRAS was to 

do. I gave a big long spiel, and at the end of 

it this admiral stood up and said, “Do you 

mean to tell me you put a bucket of superfluid helium up there with a telescope in it 

and expect to see anything but white light?” 

I said yes. The entire table guffawed; they 

agreed with him. That didn’t make NASA 

feel very comfortable—that all these big military men were thinking we wouldn’t have a 

prayer of a chance of seeing anything with 

IRAS. How wrong they were! 33

32. Frank Martin, telephone interview by author, 27 March 2009.

33. Boggess interview, 19 March 2009.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

Launched in January 1983, IRAS produced 

an extremely successful sky survey, a project that 

the Air Force had unsatisfactorily pursued for 

two decades. But until the results were in, this 

skepticism did not make Boggess’s or Martin’s 

jobs any easier.

Something that did help Martin was an article by Martin Harwit.34 Published in 1975 (and 

expanded into a book in 1981), Harwit’s thesis 

argued that technology was the driving force in 

astronomy. “Somebody walked down the hall 

and handed it to me,” Frank Martin remembers: 

I read it and I knew exactly what to do once I 

read that article. I told Harwit he wrote this 

for two people and probably only one—it 

was me—it was the Director of Astrophysics 

at NASA. Because many of these things that 

he talked about couldn’t be done from the 

ground. He made it very clear about the 

criteria for determining what kinds of mission should be pursued. Every part of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. It’s a very clear 

discussion.35

Ironically, Harwit had written the book after 

NASA cut the funding for his sounding-rocket 

program, which increased his free time.36 Frank 

Martin describes how Harwit’s ideas shaped his 

thinking:

I had a mindset that these things were all 

expensive. Whether they were the small 

Explorer missions, or Hubble Space 

Telescope, or something that was supposedly 

going to fly on the Shuttle, like SIRTF—

these things were really expensive. Yet the 

science of these missions was necessary.... 

But what I thought, as a representative of 

the taxpayers’ money, was that there had to 

be a strong discovery element in all these 

missions, given the fact that we really hadn’t 

looked at the universe across the whole 

electromagnetic spectrum. Harwit’s article 

really spoke to me—that’s what we should 

be doing. So whether we were looking 

at...attached payloads in the Shuttle, which 

SIRTF was in the early phases, or at Hubble 

Space Telescope, the gamma-ray observatory, the Chandra X-ray Telescope, all those 

things were concepts in the mid-70s that 

we funded and defined when I was doing 

advanced programs. All those things were 

pieces of this huge puzzle that...Harwit 

talked about in his book.37

Four telescopes representing the essential 

wavelengths and providing orders-of-magnitude 

greater resolution than any other instrument 

before them were already under way at NASA. 

Harwit had provided a compelling story for 

cosmic discovery. “We were able to package all 

this stuff together,” Frank Martin recalls, “in 

such a way that folks in Washington, DC, and at 

NASA could understand that a telescope wasn’t 

a telescope wasn’t a telescope—what we were 

doing was something that could only be done 

by NASA, and could only be done by the federal 

government, which was to open up this huge discovery space for science and the country.”38

34. Martin Harwit, “The Number of Class A Phenomena Characterizing the Universe,” Royal Astronomical Society Quarterly 

Journal 16 (December 1975): 378–409. See also Martin Harwit, Cosmic Discovery: The Search, Scope and Heritage of 

Astronomy (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1981).

35. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

36. Harwit interview, 26 May 2009.

37. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

38. Ibid.
58 Making the Invisible Visible

As for SIRTF, the infrared was going to be 

represented first by IRAS and COBE. “I think 

people were looking for payloads to fly on the 

Shuttle, and in my mind we were busy focusing 

on getting IRAS flown,” Martin says:

That was one of my passions, that and 

COBE—during this period as Director of 

Astrophysics—getting that thing built.... 

Between spending Explorer money on IRAS 

and getting the COBE mission going, I 

knew that I wasn’t going to get the money 

to do SIRTF for some time, and all I really 

felt was important to SIRTF was that we 

kept it going and kept it alive. Whether 

it actually flew on the Shuttle wasn’t that 

important to me at that point. What was 

important was that I had a source of funds 

that allowed us to continue to work on the 

technology and continue the planning.... 

The nice thing about the Shuttle-attached 

payloads was that it gave me another source 

of funds to do that. The agency [NASA] 

was willing to put money into those kinds 

of things. So during the late ’70s and very 

early ’80s, I was content to let the science 

team and Ames continue to work on SIRTF 

as an attached payload, and let’s worry about 

what we’re really going to do when we get 

to the point where we’re really talking about 

moving out with it.39

It all came together at the start of 1983. 

Congress had recently granted funding approval 

for COBE, and IRAS launched on 25 January. 

Shortly thereafter, with his goals accomplished, 

Frank Martin left NASA Headquarters. Charles 

Pellerin, who had been Martin’s deputy, took 

over the role of Director of Astrophysics. Support 

at Headquarters for Shuttle-based projects was 

extremely high. However, Pellerin felt that it 

was a poor use of funds to attach SIRTF to the 

Shuttle, where it could gather only a few days of 

data at a time. Nancy Boggess and the small community of infrared scientists agreed. Nevertheless, 

Boggess persuaded Pellerin that they should proceed with what was sellable to NASA administrators at that moment and change SIRTF to a free 

flyer later. On 13 May 1983, Pellerin authorized 

the Announcement of Opportunity for SIRTF as 

a Shuttle-attached facility.40

The AO called for proposals from the scientific and engineering communities to design and 

build instruments for the first-ever space-based 

infrared telescope facility. The AO stated: 

SIRTF is envisaged as an attached Shuttle 

mission with an evolving scientific payload. 

Several flights are anticipated with a probable transition into a more extended mode 

of operation, possibly in association with a 

future space platform or space station. The 

SIRTF will be a 1-meter class, cryogenically 

cooled, multi-user facility consisting of a 

telescope and associated focal plane instruments. It will be launched on the Space 

Shuttle and will remain attached to the 

Shuttle as a Spacelab payload during astronomical observations, after which it will be 

returned to Earth for refurbishment prior 

to re-flight.41

It had taken 12 years to get to this point—

the AO reflected the alignment of political, 

economic, technical, and scientific arguments. 

It was a fragile conjunction. For a moment in 

May 1983, Fred Witteborn could be glad that 

NASA had released an AO for SIRTF, a public 

39. Ibid. 

40. Charles J. Pellerin, interview by author, Boulder, CO, 19 March 2009. 

41. NASA Announcement of Opportunity OSSA-1-83: Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), 13 May 1983.
Chapter 4 • SIRTF as a Shuttle-Based Infrared Telesc

declaration that it was supporting this project. 

SIRTF had even won over the decadal survey 

committee, which had withheld support in the 

1970s and now granted SIRTF full support (as a 

Shuttle-attached payload) in the 1980s.

The decadal survey for the 1980s, NASA’s 

budget for infrared science, and the AO for SIRTF 

were obsolete by July. As early results from IRAS 

came in, it became clear that an infrared telescope 

had to be a free flyer to fully realize the potential 

scientific benefit. Frank Low, in particular, took 

to this argument and lobbied NASA to change 

the AO. By 22 November, the last drop of cryogen was used by IRAS, and its mission was completed. Low’s mission was also achieved. The AO 

had been amended, and the proposals arriving 

at NASA by the 5 December deadline included 

instrument designs for SIRTF as a Shuttle-based 

telescope with options as a free flyer.

61

CHAPTER 5

Selling It 

The Announcement of Opportunity provided the SIRTF project with the legitimacy 

and visibility to recruit industrial and academic 

partners to design and build it. Attracting those 

partners is one thing; managing a growing project 

is another. As a NASA project, SIRTF acquired 

resources through a key management process 

colloquially called “selling it,” which involved 

simultaneously achieving priority in the scientific 

community, at NASA Headquarters, and in the 

national budget.

To manage large projects, NASA uses a 

system that is both hierarchical and decentralized. Hierarchically, Headquarters exercises oversight at the program and project levels and selects 

a program scientist from Headquarters’ staff to 

oversee one or more projects. At the next level 

down, a project scientist and project manager 

are selected from the staff at one of the NASA 

Centers. The project scientist is responsible for 

working with the Headquarters program scientist to develop the core scientific objectives of the 

mission (the “Level 1 Requirements”), while the 

project manager ensures that those core objectives are met and that costs and schedules stay in 

line during design and construction.

Recognizing that hierarchical controls are 

insufficient in projects of great complexity, 

Headquarters turns to experts—from industry, 

academia, and other NASA Centers—to compose the project teams. NASA retains oversight 

through its program and project leaders. Nancy 

Boggess, SIRTF’s program scientist (a role she 

also held on other infrared projects, including 

IRAS, IRS, and COBE), explains the job thusly: 

“I represented NASA, and I was to get an agreement from the scientific community—that they 

would stand by this project as it evolved and 

come up with good ideas to reduce the cost and 

do things that would make it work well.”1

 The 

SIRTF project team members were selected on 

the merits of their instrument and science proposals, which were prepared as formal responses 

to the Announcement of Opportunity released 

by NASA Headquarters in May of 1983.

Selecting the Team

The AO for SIRTF focused on the science that 

such a telescope might achieve and called for two 

types of proposals. The first was for “focal-plane 

investigations.” The focal plane is the area of the 

1. Nancy Boggess, telephone interview by author, 2 March 2009.
62 Making the Invisible Visible

telescope where infrared flux is collected and 

recorded by instruments tuned to detect photons 

or spectra. The second was for investigators to 

oversee the project, either as “facility scientists,” 

responsible for ensuring that the overall design of 

the telescope facility would address the project’s 

core scientific questions, or as “interdisciplinary 

scientists,” theoreticians or generalists who would 

maximize the applicability of SIRTF’s data to 

users across the astrophysical disciplines.2

Instrument proposals were submitted by 

several teams. Eric Becklin led a team from the 

University of Hawai‘i to build a near-infrared 

camera, with Honeywell as the prime contractor for the instrument and Rockwell building 

the detectors. Bob Gehrz, in collaboration with 

Larry Caroff and Ball Aerospace, also proposed 

a near-infrared camera. Fred Witteborn participated in a proposal for a spectrometer to measure 

the chemical composition of stellar targets.3

Despite the active role each of these scientists had played in early design studies, neither 

Becklin, Caroff, Gehrz, nor Witteborn had their 

proposals selected for funding. Gehrz recalls,

We went to NASA for our debriefing. We 

were told by Nancy Boggess and her colleague Charlie Pellerin. They told us that we 

were the No. 1 science team and that we had 

simply been deselected because we had no 

experience building space hardware, which 

I found to be amusing when it became my 

turn to actually be facility scientist for this 

telescope. I really did think I knew how to 

do that kind of stuff.... The point is, I had 

never done it. NASA’s argument was that I 

shouldn’t be allowed to do it, therefore. Only 

people who had done it should be allowed to 

join the club.4

The list of infrared scientists was short in 

1984, and the list of those with space-hardware 

experience was even shorter. 

The winning proposals had space experience 

or were in the process of getting it. Giovanni 

Fazio, of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for 

Astrophysics, was named Principal Investigator 

(PI) for SIRTF’s Infrared Array Camera (IRAC). 

Fazio was concurrently the PI for the first 

Shuttle-based infrared instrument (IRT), which 

would launch on the Spacelab-2 pallet in July 

1985. Jim Houck, of Cornell, was named PI 

for SIRTF’s infrared spectrograph (IRS). Houck 

was a member of the science team for IRAS, 

the international sky-survey project that had 

launched in January 1983. And George Rieke, 

of the University of Arizona, was named PI 

for SIRTF’s far-infrared camera, or Multiband 

Imaging Photometer (MIPS). Rieke didn’t have 

space experience, but he submitted what may 

have been the only proposal for a far-infrared 

camera, and he worked closely at the University 

of Arizona with Frank Low, who was part of the 

IRAS science team.5 

In addition to the instrument selection, NASA 

named Frank Low as SIRTF’s facility scientist, 

2. NASA Announcement of Opportunity OSSA-1-83: Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), 13 May 1983.

3. NASA does not publicly disclose the names of all those who submit proposals, only of those whose proposals are 

selected. Thus, this is a partial list, as it includes only the names of those who indicated that they responded to the AO. 

The list is based on the following sources: Eric Becklin, interview by author, Long Beach, CA, 5 January 2009; Robert D. 

Gehrz, telephone interview by author, 20 January 2009; and Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

4. Gehrz telephone interview, 20 January 2009.

5. NASA Ames Press Release 84-32. An additional reference is “A Short and Personal History of the Spitzer Space 

Telescope,” by Michael Werner, 1995, ASP Conference Series, preprint available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/astro-ph/

pdf/0503/0503624v1.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). The U.S. IRAS science team consisted of G. Neugebauer, 
Chapter 5 • Selling

and Mike Jura and Ned Wright, who had both 

received their doctorates from Harvard and were 

now professors at UCLA, as multidisciplinary 

scientists. Jura and Wright, between them, represented a wide swath of astrophysical interests, as 

Jura’s work focused on processes within the solar 

system, and Wright’s focused beyond it. Ames 

was designated the host Center; from Ames, 

Michael Werner was selected as project scientist, 

Fred Witteborn as deputy project scientist, and 

Lou Young as project manager.

Managing Influence

It may seem surprising that Fred Witteborn was 

not made SIRTF’s project scientist—after all, he 

had led the project up to that point, and people 

liked him. But there were two factors that diminished his influence: He was a member of the 

infrared community, and he worked at Ames. 

Both were battlefields.

The infrared community was more contentious than other astronomy fields. Perhaps this was 

because infrared astronomy was so new that little 

agreement existed on what was the right thing to 

do or the right way to do it. Without a paradigm, 

scientists may not readily agree on a direction. 

When seeking the consensus needed to move forward, forceful personalities were often more persuasive than facts. As Witteborn recounts: 

I was at a meeting at Snowmass [in Aspen, 

Colorado], and we were trying to develop 

priorities. One of the Headquarters people 

who was from the Solar Astronomy Group 

was also having solar astronomy people 

meet at Snowmass at the same time. The 

Solar Astronomy manager came over to our 

meeting, which was being led by Nancy 

Roman and Nancy Boggess. He came over 

to our meeting and listened in. Listened to 

us fighting. He finally said, “Let me tell you 

how our group works. They get the funding every year.” If you look at the history of 

NASA [in solar astronomy], there is OSO-1, 

OSO-2,... [OSO-3 and up through the 

Explorer series]—when I started looking at 

the numbers, they were up to OSO-35.... 

I mean, they had lots and lots of projects. 

They ordered them, and they got together, 

and they had friendly meetings. He said, 

“Contrast that with this group. You’re fighting each other tooth and nail. Each one of 

you is saying that more should be done at 

your institution and not at the other institution.” I may be giving the false impression that they were fighting with us. The 

[infrared scientists] were fighting with each 

other.... One of the Headquarters directors 

in the early days would go around to each of 

the places where Headquarters’ astronomy 

money was being spent. She would talk to 

the people there about their needs for the 

next year and so forth. Headquarters’ science managers would travel from university to university, from Center to Center. 

Then, of course, budget restrictions got such 

that Headquarters people had to save their 

travel and they couldn’t travel anymore. But 

anyway, she came here [to Ames] after she 

went to the University of Arizona. She said, 

“Well I fund six groups there in astronomy 

and infrared astronomy. So I asked them to 

all meet with me together. But they’re not 

talking to each other, so we had to meet 

Chairman, H. H. Aumann, C. A. Beichman, T. J. Chester, T. N. Gautier, F. C. Gillett, M. G. Hauser, G. Helou, J. R. Houck, 

C. J. Lonsdale, F. J. Low, B. T. Soifer, R. G. Walker, and E. T. Young. This list appears in the acknowledgments section of 

the Explanatory Supplement to the IRAS Sky Survey Atlas, by Sherry L. Wheelock et al. (Pasadena, CA: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, 1994), available at http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/IRASdocs/exp.sup/ch13/A.html (accessed 30 August 2016).
64 Making the Invisible Visible

Without strong ties to or clear support from 

Headquarters, Ames directors were either disinclined or unable to build the teams and capabilities for complex projects. “The Pioneer program 

[a series of spacecraft designed to explore the 

planets, which Ames managed and which ran 

from 1958 until 2003, when Pioneer 10 sent 

back its last data] was done with very little enthusiasm from the outside, even [from] the Ames 

directors,” Witteborn recalls.8

 Administrators at 

Ames shied away from large projects.

As a result, Ames lacked not only prestige 

but also resources. Throughout the 1960s, when 

the rest of NASA was expanding rapidly to support the Apollo Moon missions, Ames did not 

share in this growth. Ames focused on aeronautical research, and its role in Apollo was mostly 

confined to working on reentry-vehicle dynamics and nose-cone design. Then, as the Apollo 

program was nearing its goals, NASA started to 

scale back on the research effort. The first hiring 

freezes were in 1965. “It comes back to haunt you 

as time goes on,” Witteborn says. He continues:

When the Astrophysics Branch was set 

up here [in 1971], why didn’t we hire any 

astronomers? It wasn’t because we didn’t 

like astronomers. It was a hiring freeze. It 

was very difficult. One of the most useful 

people I had was another physicist who, like 

myself, was very good at [designing] instruments. And of course, he was supposed to 

be designing instruments for airborne studies. His name was Ed Erickson. He was a 

separately.” So you could see how tight the 

competition was.6

In such a contentious environment, prestige 

determined the degree to which one’s voice was 

heard. Those with the most prestige came from 

universities; those with the least came from government. And within NASA, the Centers that 

managed space missions (Goddard, Marshall, 

Johnson, and JPL) had more institutional clout 

than Centers that focused on aeronautics (Ames 

and Langley). 

This pecking order was especially true in the 

1980s, when Ames found itself at the bottom and 

competing with the other Centers for resources 

and respect. Although it is one of the oldest 

NASA Centers, Ames is one of the most vulnerable to political and economic forces. At its 

inception during World War II, Ames had been 

intended to serve as a backup facility for Langley 

Research Center, in Hampton, Virginia, in case 

the East Coast was attacked. After the war, Ames 

was often viewed by Headquarters as an outpost 

that could be closed down. “From the Eastern 

point of view, Ames was always a place that was 

a redundant system that they set up because of 

the international situation,” Witteborn says. “As 

Ames continued to grow, it was more and more 

competitive with the East Coast, or at least began 

taking away their resources. So it was obviously 

a target for closure.” Ames’s relative redundancy was compounded by its isolationism. The 

early history of Ames depicts an organization 

that avoided interactions with Headquarters.7

6. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008. Witteborn referred to Explorer 35 as “OSO-35,” but in fact solar astronomers had 

two programs—the Orbiting Solar Observatories program, which went up to OSO-9, and the Explorer program, which 

went up to Explorer 59. Simpler to build than an OSO, the Explorers were comparatively inexpensive and were used to 

conduct a range of experiments that were largely dominated by solar science. For more details, see http://history.nasa.

gov/explorer.html and http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/missions (accessed 30 August 2016). 

7. This characterization of Ames is supported in interviews conducted by the author and is detailed in chapter 2 of Glenn 

E. Bugos, Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years at the NASA Ames Research Center, SP-4314 (Washington, DC: NASA, 

2000), available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4314/sp4314.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).

8. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.
Chapter 5 • Selling

postdoc, and when his postdoc ended, [as 

branch chief] I wanted to hire him. I was 

told there were no positions. I said, “Come 

on now, this is really important.” They 

said, “Well, we know we need to hire some 

people at Ames. What Ames managers had 

done was to issue hiring warrants to branch 

chiefs, and if you get one, then you can use it 

any way you want. If you want another one, 

they are going to ask you how the first one 

went.” So it was really tough to hire Ed. I 

immediately announced my intentions that 

I wanted to hire him. Then I left for a meeting at Headquarters for a few days of planning for infrared astronomy related to the 

LST [Large Space Telescope, which became 

the Hubble] project. When I came back 

three days later, they said, “A funny thing 

happened while you were gone. We lost your 

hiring warrant. We hired somebody else.”

Eventually, after several more warrants and 

an intervention by Hans Mark, the Director of 

Ames at that time, Witteborn was able to hire 

Erickson.9

Acquiring resources for a major new program 

like SIRTF in an environment of scarcity is a 

process fraught with internal competition and 

political maneuvering. Solar astronomy was less 

contentious because they had history on their 

side—the Sun was a well-established target for 

observations, most obviously in the traditional, 

visible wavelengths. Infrared was a new field and 

lacked legitimacy.

Witteborn mastered this game at least partially, as by 1980 there were 14 infrared astrophysicists working at Ames.10 But this was of 

little import to the infrared community. What 

mattered was who those astrophysicists were. 

According to Witteborn, “The way the university 

science works in infrared astronomy and in 

cryogenics as well [is] if you have some of their 

doctoral students here, why, then you are recognized.” He continues:

The astronomical infrared community did 

not see us as major players. In my branch, 

my first question when I was asked to be 

branch chief, which was in 1971, was, How 

many astronomers can I hire? Mike Bader 

and Hans Mark said, “What? You got two in 

the branch.” But these weren’t major astronomers, they were grad students really.... [I]t 

was a long time before we actually were able 

to hire an astronomer outright. However, we 

did have the Theoretical Branch..., which

had a number of astronomers. Larry Caroff 

was one of them. And they had Jim [James 

B.] Pollock, who suggested projects to study 

from the Learjet. In fact, he and I and our 

collaborators here found sulfuric acid in the 

Venus atmosphere. Now, three groups simultaneously discovered that—two working 

from the ground and one from the air—but 

we had the most complete spectrum, because 

we could get above the water vapor in Earth’s 

atmosphere. And that led to early discoveries.

But anyway, we were not looked upon by 

the infrared community as good astronomers. They wouldn’t tell us that; they told 

Headquarters that. And Headquarters said, 

“You guys aren’t producing any papers.” But 

that wasn’t entirely true. At one meeting, the 

session chairman commented on our paper 

on far-infrared interferometer spectra of the 

Orion Nebula and said, “Well, the shape is 

not particularly exciting, but this is the first 

far-infrared spectrum of a nebula that was 

ever taken. It’s interesting from that point of 

9. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

10. SIRTF System Summary Review, Ames Research Center, 24 July 1981, slide 13.
66 Making the Invisible Visible

community saw SIRTF as the major infrared 

mission. This was the message delivered in the 

National Academy of Sciences’ decadal survey for 

the 1980s, known as the Field report and authored 

by eminent (and university-based) astronomers 

and astrophysicists.13 Naturally, it would matter 

to them who would be selected as the SIRTF 

project scientist, for this person would represent 

the scientific concerns of the community and 

ensure that the data obtained by SIRTF would 

be of high quality. “In the early ’80s,” Witteborn 

reports, “I heard indirectly that the astronomical 

community told Headquarters—who then talked 

to upper management [at Ames]—that they’d 

really like the job that I was doing to be done by 

‘somebody from the infrared community.’ So the 

job opening was created and they invited people 

from everywhere.... [M]y bosses offered it to 

me, I think, as a formality. I told them that the 

[infrared] community would be more comfortable with Mike Werner, and he became SIRTF 

project scientist.”14

Mike Werner had joined Ames in 1979, but 

since earning his doctorate under Martin Harwit 

at Cornell, he had worked in some of the most 

prestigious astronomy circles. The route he 

took to get there included some familiar paths. 

Originally starting out as a physics major, Werner 

switched to astronomy while an undergraduate 

at Haverford College, where Nancy Boggess had 

taken master’s-level courses in astronomy a few 

years earlier.15 To gain more experience in astronomy before entering graduate school, Werner 

spent a year at the Naval Research Laboratory. 

view. It’s a continuum.” I won’t tell you how 

hard it was—how hard we had to work before 

we produced that big blob [spectral graph], 

but there it was. So then you hear[d], “Well, 

you guys aren’t using the big telescopes.” 

We had already developed the instruments, 

so we applied for [observing] time. We got 

time on big telescopes. So the next thing was 

“Well, those aren’t big enough telescopes.” 

So we got time on bigger telescopes. We 

got time on the IRTF [InfraRed Telescope 

Facility at the University of Hawai‘i], which 

was the big infrared telescope at that time.11

Yet it was never enough. The infrared community, dominated by university scientists, measured success by the criteria used in universities, 

all but guaranteeing that Ames scientists would 

fall short. It did not matter that Witteborn had a 

doctorate from Stanford. He had spent his entire 

career at Ames, and his research was constrained 

by its institutional realities—working on missions that aligned with NASA’s goals and that 

were within the budgets that Congress authorized. And he was further constrained by the low 

status of Ames within NASA, the historical result 

of Center management that positioned Ames for 

aeronautics and not NASA’s high-profile plans 

for space-based projects.12

Selecting a Leader for SIRTF

Despite Ames being a relatively weak platform 

from which to sell a new project, the scientific 

11. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

12. The situation that Ames faced in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is somewhat changed today. Ames has remained small by 

comparison with other NASA Centers (which tend to be better positioned for managing large-scale programs); however, 

Ames has emerged as a valuable research center and contributor to innovation in Silicon Valley and the aerospace industry.

13. Field report, passim.

14. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008.

15. John C. Mather and John Boslough, The Very First Light: The True Inside Story of the Scientific Journey Back to the 

Dawn of the Universe, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 90.
Chapter 5 • Selling

There he met Harwit, who was at the NRL on 

a fellowship and encouraged Werner to apply to 

the Cornell doctoral program. Harwit became 

Werner’s thesis advisor, and after graduating 

from Cornell in 1968, Werner spent a year in 

Cambridge, England, at Fred Hoyle’s Institute 

for Theoretical Astronomy. Hoyle, a well-known 

theorist, had hosted Harwit as a postdoc in the 

early 1960s.

Returning to the United States, Werner 

accepted a postdoc appointment at Berkeley 

(1969–1972) in the lab of Charles Townes, who 

had received the 1964 Nobel Prize in physics for 

his work on masers and was now developing their 

application to questions in infrared astronomy.16

Townes describes one of the early projects he and 

Werner worked on, showing how necessary it was 

to build one’s own equipment and how skepticism had to be applied to the results:

We were fortunate to begin almost immediately with what seemed like an interesting 

and relatively simple measurement, even 

though a new spectrometer needed to be put 

together for it. Martin Harwit and his associates at Cornell had just published observations from high-altitude rocket observations 

indicating a remarkably intense isotropic flux 

in the 0.4–1.3-mm wavelength range.... The 

flux was about 25 times more than expected 

from a 2.7-K blackbody field. It appeared 

strong enough and at wavelengths where 

the atmosphere was transparent enough that 

we should be able to observe the radiation 

from a high-altitude location on Earth. 

Mike Werner, a newly arrived postdoc at 

UC Berkeley, and John Mather, a graduate 

student interested in our research, were willing to try to measure this exciting but very 

puzzling radiation. Could it even be some 

intense spectral line? I asked Paul Richards, a 

fellow professor experienced with bolometers 

and far IR, for help to speed up the work, 

and fortunately he was also interested. These 

three put together both a tunable and a fixed 

Fabry-Perot interferometer with nickel mesh 

reflectors, an indium-antimonide bolometer detector, a chopper, and a focuser of 

8-cm aperture.... The system was set up at 

a 12,500-foot altitude on White Mountain 

in eastern California, and spectra were taken 

in the 0.7–1.7-mm wavelength range with a 

resolving power of about 100. The radiation 

apparently detected by rocket flights didn’t 

seem to be there! Rocket measurements are 

of course difficult, and this was not the only 

time that rocket measurements were to give 

misleading results in measuring the isotropic 

background radiation.17

Werner’s two stints as a postdoc, at Cambridge 

and Berkeley, gave him an opportunity to work 

with prominent researchers in both theoretical and experimental astrophysics. While still at 

Berkeley, he began conducting experiments on 

the Learjet at Ames (and later, on Ames’s Kuiper 

Airborne Observatory). This airborne work 

continued when he joined the Caltech faculty 

16. Michael W. Werner, interview by Sara Lippincott, Pasadena, CA, 25 July 2008, Oral History Project, California Institute of 

Technology Archives; a 41-page transcript of this interview is available online at http://oralhistories.library.caltech.edu/163/

(accessed 30 August 2016).

17. Charles H. Townes, “A Physicist Courts Astronomy,” prefatory chapter in the Annual Review of Astronomy and 

Astrophysics 35 (1997): xiii–xliv. Townes continues: “The work clearly interested Paul Richards, who then moved into 

rocket measurements of the background radiation. John Mather became Paul’s student, and eventually was to lead a 

spectacularly successful experiment, with the COBE satellite, to measure the background radiation and apparently really 

get it right” (p. xxxiv). Mather did indeed get it right—he won the Nobel Prize in physics in 2006 for his work on COBE, for 

which he served as the project scientist. 
68 Making the Invisible Visible

in 1972.18 As part of the infrared group with 

Gerry Neugebauer and Eric Becklin, Werner continued to develop instrumentation and pursue 

research that included observations of Orion in 

the mid-infrared.19

SIRTF, of course, was just getting started. 

Becklin, with the encouragement of Neugebauer, 

had gotten involved in SIRTF, which is how 

Werner had learned of the project. “[Becklin] 

was on one of the very early study teams,” Werner 

recalls. “I remember him talking about that at 

one of our sack lunches up in 469 Lauritsen 

[at Caltech], which we had every week. But in 

January 1977, because of the success of my work 

on the Kuiper Airborne Observatory, I was asked 

[by David Rank, at UC Santa Cruz, whom 

Werner knew from Berkeley] whether I wanted 

to head a sub-team of one of these study groups 

that was helping to define SIRTF. So I said, sure, 

I’d like to do that.”20

The timing was fortuitous. Werner received 

an unfavorable tenure decision from Caltech, so 

he joined Ames in 1979 at the invitation of Fred 

Witteborn. Thus, when the time came to select 

a project scientist from among the NASA ranks, 

Werner had both the requisite knowledge about 

the project and academic experience at premier 

institutions. He also knew how to build instruments, a skill born of necessity from working 

in infrared astronomy. Finally, Werner had an 

almost egoless quality that would serve him well 

in the often-contentious infrared community—

he made people feel connected to the project 

without putting himself at the center. “One of 

the huge successes was getting Mike Werner to 

be project scientist,” Gehrz remembers. “Mike 

really facilitated this project by letting everybody 

do the things they did best and encouraging their 

participation. He was very even-handed and 

diplomatic....”21 Werner pulled in people with 

diverse interests and motivations, whether they 

were on the Science Working Group or contractors developing the technology for SIRTF. He 

kept them involved (and focused) by emphasizing that their contributions would one day help 

to answer important scientific questions about 

the origins of the universe. SIRTF was needed to 

get the data, and obtaining it was Werner’s prime 

motive for leading the project. Looking back on 

what has made Werner effective for nearly 30 

years as project scientist, George Rieke observes: 

It’s very simple. He was totally honorable. 

That means that whatever Mike told you, 

you knew he was telling you the truth. And 

that was really important.... [T]he fact that 

SIRTF was spread over many different institutions [required an] honest broker, to convince people that what was being done, even 

though it was very unpleasant for them, was 

being done for the good of the project, and 

in the long run it would be OK. It had to be 

somebody you had a huge amount of trust 

in, and Mike did that.22

Getting to Work

As project scientist, Werner presided over the 

meetings of the Science Working Group (SWG), 

18. Werner interview (Lippincott), 25 July 2008.

19. D. Brandshaft, R. A. McLaren, and M. W. Werner, “Spectroscopy of the Orion Nebula from 80 to 135 microns,” 

Astrophysical Journal 199, no. 2 (1975): L115–L117. M. W. Werner, I. Gatley, E. E. Becklin, D. A. Harper, R. F. 

Loewenstein, C. M. Telesco, and H. A. Thronson. “One arc-minute resolution maps of the Orion Nebula at 20, 50, and 

100 microns,” Astrophysical Journal 204, no 3 (1976): 420–423.

20. Werner interview (Lippincott), 25 July 2008.

21. Gehrz interview, 20 January 2009.

22. Rieke interview, 9 June 2009.
Chapter 5 • Selling

the main body responsible for specifying the 

design of SIRTF. With the selection process 

for the Announcement of Opportunity complete, Werner chaired the kickoff meeting of the 

SWG, which was held at Ames from 12 to 14 

September 1984. Members of the SWG included 

Werner, Witteborn, and Nancy Boggess, as 

well as the instrument PIs—Giovanni Fazio, 

Jim Houck, and George Rieke. The SWG also 

included Frank Low, Mike Jura, and Ned Wright, 

each of whom had broad responsibilities (see Fig. 

5.1). Attendees regularly included managers from 

Headquarters, SIRTF project office staff, and 

external engineering contractors.23

By the September 1984 meeting, NASA had 

already decided that SIRTF was going to be a free 

flyer and that the SWG would abandon the sortie 

option. The previous design had assumed that 

SIRTF would be mounted on a Spacelab pallet 

in the Shuttle’s cargo bay and stay in space for 

a week or two. Instead, the Shuttle would now 

hoist SIRTF into space and leave it there. This 

change to a free flyer meant that the engineering 

studies had to be redone, a new design developed, 

and an appropriate orbit selected. 

It would not be the last time that the SWG 

would select a new orbit. This time, however, 

the options were limited to a so-called low-Earth 

orbit, 900 kilometers up. This orbit would put 

SIRTF within reach of the Shuttle for servicing. 

With a free flyer, the SWG no longer needed to 

worry about the heat, dust, and water vapor in 

the Shuttle affecting SIRTF. However, the lowEarth orbit was still fraught with obstacles to 

observations—namely, Earth, the Moon, and the 

Sun. Other concerns included cosmic rays and 

FIGURE 5.1. Participants in the first meeting of the Scientific Working Group, held at 

Ames Research Center in September 1984. 

23. SIRTF Science Working Group (SWG) Meeting Minutes, 12–14 September 1984.
70 Making the Invisible Visible

the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), which is a 

particularly low and intense region of radiation 

where the inner Van Allen radiation belt dips 

toward Earth. Even a brief glimpse of one of these 

warm objects can momentarily blind SIRTF’s 

infrared detectors and quickly deplete the cryogen that keeps them cold.

To select an orbit that avoided most of these 

problems, the SWG worked with the SIRTF 

Study Office at Ames to compare an equatorial 

orbit (at a 28.5° angle to the Equator) with a 

polar orbit (at a 99° angle).24 Regarding science 

objectives, a polar orbit would provide more 

observation time at longer wavelengths (~200 

microns), whereas the equatorial orbit would 

allow for observations to be made simultaneously from SIRTF and the ground. Regarding 

technical performance, neither angle would 

entirely avoid the SAA. The equatorial orbit 

would avoid the SAA on many rotations, but 

when it passed through the Anomaly, the radiation would be intense enough that SIRTF would 

need to be shut down to protect the detectors 

(a strategy used with Hubble). In contrast, the 

polar orbit would take SIRTF through a less 

dense part of the SAA. However, it would do 

so on almost every rotation; so radiation would 

accrue over time, causing SIRTF’s sensors to 

slowly degrade.

The equatorial orbit was unanimously adopted 

by the SWG in March 1985, although this “best” 

option allowed for only a paltry 24 minutes of 

observing time during each 90-minute orbit.25 In 

between, SIRTF would need to dodge the heat 

of the Sun, the Moon, and Earth. During each 

orbit, SIRTF would need to be repositioned with 

enough time to settle before it could lock onto a 

new target. This would involve rolling, slewing, 

pointing, and nodding—motions that would be 

time-consuming and nontrivial for a telescope 

moving above Earth at 27,000 miles per hour.

Assuming these technical challenges could be 

overcome, the SWG was planning for SIRTF to 

have a two-year mission lifespan and to be capable of detecting infrared wavelengths from 1.8 to 

700 microns, which is nearly the entire infrared 

spectrum. It was becoming clear that the limiting 

design factor would be the detectors, particularly 

for Fazio’s and Rieke’s instruments (IRAC and 

MIPS, respectively). So Fazio and Rieke agreed 

to jointly develop the detectors and try two 

approaches: repurposing existing military detectors that had been designed for the near-infrared 

and conducting basic research to develop detectors for the far-infrared. 

Leading the detector development was Dr. 

Craig McCreight, a member of Fazio’s instrument team. McCreight explains: 

What we were trying to do was to operate 

detectors at a much lower temperature than 

had been done before. These cryogenic detectors have to be quite cool to work at all, but 

we were going to take it even colder, because 

the cryogen tank was basically designed for 

around 2 K near the lambda point of liquid 

helium. And the key question was, Could 

these very sensitive detectors be pushed to 

lower temperature to fit the mission needs? 

The other technical thing we were trying to 

do, which was new, was to have [the detectors] stare for a very long period of time: to 

look at the sky, integrate the signal for quite 

a long period—as opposed to the military, 

which was operating really quickly, looking 

for fast-moving objects and things that we 

24. The early members of the SIRTF Study Office included Walt Brooks (telescope facility manager), Silvia Cox, Ann Dinger, J. 

Givens, Bob Jackson, Larry Manning (systems engineering manager), Joe Mansfield, Ramsey Melugin, Jim Murphy (chief/

project manager), Ken Nishioka, Rubin Ramos (science instruments manager), Gary Thorley (deputy project manager), 

and Chris Wiltsee.

25. For details on orbits, see http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/OrbitsCatalog/printall.php (accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 5 • Selling

often weren’t able to talk very freely about. 

So it was a different application. We wanted 

to slow [the detectors] down and cool them 

down and see if they could approach what 

we needed.26

In addition to his role on Fazio’s team, 

McCreight managed Ames’s advanced detector 

program and had helped to develop the detectors 

for IRAS, which used 62 discrete detectors that 

operated between 12 and 100 microns. Although 

these were not integrated arrays (the chip with 

62 detectors was about the size of a coffee cup), 

they nevertheless provided a matrix with which 

“you could image the sky,” McCreight said, “as 

opposed to having to move your ‘little’ single, 

discrete point detector and raster it around. And 

the fact that you could stare at an area of the sky 

and not move the telescope greatly simplified the 

pointing requirements of the telescope. There are 

probably a range of systems or requirements on 

the telescope that got eased or relaxed or canceled 

because of the power of the staring array. It was 

pretty important.”27

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

To develop the detectors and other components 

of SIRTF, the project would need much more 

funding. By the time the SWG was formed, 

approximately $15 million had been spent on 

SIRTF, or a little more than $1 million a year 

since Fred Witteborn had started working on the 

project in 1971. SIRTF needed a “New Start,” a 

formal request to Congress for the funds needed 

for NASA to build and launch a major project. This process requires project approval from 

NASA Headquarters and budget approval from 

Congress. When the SWG first met, in September 

1984, they projected that SIRTF would obtain a 

New Start in FY 1987. By December, that prediction had changed to FY 1989, because another 

project had jumped ahead in line. Although no 

one knew it at the time, SIRTF would not get a 

New Start until FY 1998. From the inception of 

the project, schedule after schedule showed the 

New Start as always at least three years out, with 

launch three years after that.28 This perpetually 

revised schedule was humorously represented as 

a Mobius strip by project manager Lou Young 

(Fig. 5.2).

FIGURE 5.2. A humorous take on the SIRTF project 

schedule, with the New Start always 

in the future (SIRTF Coloring Book).

26. Craig McCreight, interview by author, Mountain View, CA, 2 September 2008.

27. McCreight interview, 2 September 2008.

28. For example, as of October 1979, the New Start was expected in FY 1982, with launch in FY 1996, per the Phase A 

Statement of Work (SOW); see Larry Manning, “Space Infrared Telescope Facility. Statement of Work Specification, Phase 

A,” AFS1070.8A, presentation dated 4 October 1979 and housed in the NASA Ames History Office Archives Reference 

Collection, FC5: D4, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. By contrast, in February 1989 it was expected that a New 

Start would occur in FY 1992, with launch in FY98; see Proceedings of the Third Infrared-Detector Technology Workshop, 

comp. Craig R. McCreight, ARC-12851 (Moffett Field, CA: NASA, 1989); NTRS 19900011997.
72 Making the Invisible Visible

However, Pellerin did not particularly care if 

AXAF or SIRTF went first. What he was determined to accomplish was to put a suite of telescopes into space that could, for the first time 

in history, observe objects simultaneously across 

the entire spectrum. Although Martin, his predecessor, had laid the foundation, it was Pellerin 

who would bundle together the four major telescope programs that spanned the spectrum and 

were in various stages of development: Hubble, 

AXAF, SIRTF, and the Compton Gamma-Ray 

Observatory (CGRO). Although separate scientific communities championed each project, 

referring to the telescopes collectively as “the 

Great Observatories” made it much easier to sell 

all of them.31

Joining the Great Observatories

The majority of NASA’s budget in the 1980s 

was being spent on Hubble, the Space Shuttle, 

and planning for a crewed space station; and cost 

overruns under Martin and Pellerin were further 

reducing the money that was left for other projects. All such projects were one of a kind and state 

of the art, so it was not surprising that cost estimates were inaccurate. IRAS came in $60 million 

over its initial budget. By the time Pellerin took 

over the division, Hubble had overrun its budget 

by $400 million, and millions more would be 

needed to complete it. (After Hubble launched 

on 24 April 1990, even more funding would be 

required to fix the spherical aberration of its primary mirror.) The project members of AXAF and 

SIRTF were continually badgering Pellerin for a 

New Start, but resources could support only one. 

No matter which project he picked, he would 

have a fight on his hands. As Pellerin recalls:

The process by which projects at NASA 

obtain a New Start is revealed in the stories of 

how SIRTF became a member of NASA’s Great 

Observatories and how another project, the 

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), 

gained a New Start before SIRTF did.

The ordering of NASA missions is anything 

but straightforward. Qualifying as a New Start 

depends on whether the technology is feasible, 

the budgets are reasonable, and the mission fits 

with both the nation’s policy objectives and other 

missions already committed to by NASA. All of 

these criteria are like stakes driven into quicksand, 

because anything and everything can change—

officeholders leave, technology becomes obsolete, and economic conditions shift. Given the 

complexity of prioritizing missions in a changing 

environment, advocates must be absolutely committed to a project and skilled at “selling it.”

For astronomy missions, the person who 

sat at the intersection of competing political, 

economic, and scientific priorities was NASA’s 

Director of Astrophysics.29 This person, like 

other divisional directors in NASA’s Office of 

Space Science and Applications (OSSA), was 

not a political appointee and might stay in the 

role long enough to seize (or create) the opportunity for a New Start.30 When Frank Martin was 

in this role, he single-mindedly pursued IRAS, 

which launched under his directorship. However, 

Martin also made sure to keep missions across 

the electromagnetic spectrum on life support 

with small pockets of money from general development and discretionary funds, and he also 

ensured that COBE (launched in 1989) received 

a New Start.

Charlie Pellerin, who replaced Martin in 

1983, also had a single-minded focus. Under 

Pellerin’s tenure, AXAF received a New Start. 

29. NASA’s Astrophysics Division is now known as the Solar and Terrestrial Astrophysics Division.

30. NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) is now known as the Science Mission Directorate.

31. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
Chapter 5 • Selling

I might not be able to sustain it even as 

Director of Astrophysics. They would go 

over my head. They would go to the decadal 

survey [committee], they would go to my 

bosses on the Hill. They would fight me 

everywhere.... What I’ve got to do is come 

up with a story that gets everyone to support 

the whole program. I’ve got to get them to 

believe in me. Some tale that’s going to get 

everybody behind everything.... I need help 

for Hubble. It’s overrunning all the time. 

It’s not going to get canceled, but if I don’t 

have political support, it’s just going to be 

more difficult. The gamma-ray observatory 

is very fragile, because it’s a very small community of people. The number of people 

doing gamma-ray astronomy is minuscule, 

and it’s vulnerable [to cancellation] at any 

moment.... And then I’ve got SIRTF and 

AXAF as the two movable chips. So what I 

had to do was get people to believe in me 

when I told them that we were going to 

do all four [Great Observatories].... That 

was the only way I could succeed politically with this program.... I said, “What’s 

the physics story here?”... About that time, 

a guy named Dave Gilman, who worked 

for me, either told me about or gave me a 

copy of Martin Harwit’s book called Cosmic 

Discovery. Frank [Martin] had heavily relied 

on that book, too. I didn’t know that until 

later....

I was trying to get data of a sort that never 

existed before. We never had the measurements of an object across all the things that 

were going on in it.... So I looked in Martin’s 

book.... [T]his is the ammunition for 

making the discovery argument [through] 

the advancement of capabilities. And I can 

show, for each of these missions—I’m not 

talking about astronomy, I’m talking about 

the advancement in measurement capability, 

the historical trend curve and the discoveries that have come out of each one. The 

fact that all together they can bring physics 

that we have never seen before. That was the 

sales pitch...to everybody. Now, my biggest 

problem was not the science community in 

getting it going forward; my biggest problem were the bureaucrats in Washington 

who controlled the money: the staffers on 

the Hill, the people in OMB [Office of 

Management and Budget]. I talked to them 

early on and I recognized that when I told 

them I was the Director of Astrophysics, 

their eyes glazed over, because what they 

believed was that they couldn’t understand 

it. None of them had technical degrees. 

They all remembered flunking high-school 

physics or something. So what they’re saying 

to themselves is “Whatever he’s going to say 

is beyond my capacity to understand.” So 

I’m pondering this, and I’m asking myself, 

“What’s the least intimidating medium I 

can use to communicate this, because I’ve 

got to get this message across. How about a 

comic book?”32

Pellerin asked his deputy, George Newton, 

to invite some of the top astrophysicists to come 

to Washington on 3 January 1985 and draw cartoons that could be used to communicate the 

benefits of this four-telescope program. Among 

those who accepted the invitation were key scientists for the Hubble, AXAF, SIRTF, and CGRO, 

as well as members of past decadal surveys. It was 

a prestigious group. “I started to think about this 

meeting, and I began getting nervous,” Pellerin 

said. “When I was a practicing scientist, these guys 

were God. I knew I was smarter than they were 

about what we were doing here, but I wanted to 

32. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
74 Making the Invisible Visible

make sure I could show them that.... To do that, 

I’d have to have someone else run the meeting. So 

I thought, Martin Harwit wrote this book—why 

don’t I get Martin Harwit to run this meeting? 

I’d never met him, so I called Dave Gilman [and 

Dave said], ‘He’s a great guy.’”33 Encouraged by 

Gilman’s recommendation, Pellerin then called 

Harwit, who was rather surprised by the request 

but readily agreed to chair the meeting.34

At the meeting, Pellerin and Harwit explained 

to the other scientists the context of the day’s 

meeting. They drew on the list of cosmological 

questions that Harwit laid out in his book—How 

are stars born? How do quasars work? “We took 

flip-chart paper and we put a question on top,” 

Pellerin recalls. “And then I got the top astrophysicists in America on their hands and knees 

down there, using these crayons.”35

Harwit took the drawings and, with around 

$25,000 from Pellerin, turned them into a publishable booklet. He was assisted in this task to 

make the science understandable by Valerie Neal 

of the Essex Corporation, who had a doctorate in 

the humanities, and by illustrator Brien O’Brien. 

Pellerin had 15,000 copies printed and distributed them widely. “They came in on a forklift,” 

Pellerin remembers, “and we took them on the 

Hill. We took them to schools. We did everything except drop them out of airplanes....We 

[went] to everybody that matters and they [got] 

to hear the story: a new physics in our lifetime—

American leadership through these observatories.... In a year, the Great Observatories was a 

household word.”36

Prioritizing the Missions

Having conditioned Congress and the OMB 

to welcome the Great Observatories concept, 

Pellerin’s next step was to get NASA to authorize 

a New Start for either AXAF or SIRTF. It did 

not matter to Pellerin which one was funded—

both were part of the Great Observatories. “I 

asked myself, what’s the optimum sequence to 

get them all done as quickly as possible?” Pellerin 

said. “AXAF had contracted studies, SIRTF 

didn’t.... We had Marshall spending a lot of 

money [on AXAF]. The design was very mature. 

I had the decadal survey supporting me. I had all 

these things. AXAF was just further along [than 

SIRTF]. I wasn’t interested in which one went 

first, I was interested in how fast I could do all 

of them.”37

People close to SIRTF might disagree that 

their project was not as mature as AXAF. The 

Field report had indeed given AXAF top priority 

for new missions. However, it also explicitly characterized SIRTF as an ongoing mission, along 

33. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009. Participants in the comic book development meeting included Robert A. Brown, 

from Marshall; Carl Fichtel and George Pieper from Goddard; George Field, Josh Grindlay, Robert Noyes, Irwin Shapiro, 

and Harvey Tananbaum, all from the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; Riccardo Giacconi from the Space 

Telescope Science Institute; Bill Hoffmann and George Rieke, from the University of Arizona; Ken Kellermann from the 

National Radio Astronomy Observatory; Jeremiah Ostriker from Princeton; Edwin Salpeter from Cornell; and Rainer 

Weiss from MIT. For this list and a detailed discussion of the Great Observatories based on Harwit’s papers in the Cornell 

archives, see Martin Harwit, “Conceiving and Marketing NASA’s Great Observatories,” Experimental Astronomy 26, nos. 

1–3 (2009): 163–177.

34. Martin O. Harwit interview, Cambridge, MA, 26 May 2009.

35. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009. 

36. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009; see also Harwit, “Conceiving and Marketing NASA’s Great Observatories.” Two different 

versions of the comic book were produced, both titled “The Great Observatories for Space Astrophysics.” The first 

(NASA-CR-176754/NASA NTRS Doc 19860015241) was printed in 1985; the second version (NASA-NP-128 / NTRS 

Doc 19920001848) was printed in 1991.

37. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009. 
Chapter 5 • Selling

with Hubble and CGRO.38 The key difference 

between the projects was that SIRTF did not 

yet have a New Start, while Hubble (FY 1978) 

and CGRO (FY 1980) did.39 This put SIRTF on 

less-certain ground. Moreover, the Field report 

had assumed that SIRTF would be a Shuttleattached payload. Now SIRTF, like AXAF, was 

being planned as a Shuttle-launched free flyer. 

AXAF had been on this development path since 

the beginning, whereas SIRTF had switched to 

being a free flyer in 1984. Pellerin estimated that 

it might take two years for SIRTF to catch up 

with AXAF.40 Although the technologies required 

for SIRTF had already been largely demonstrated 

by IRAS, SIRTF was in the middle of a major 

redesign. AXAF was not. Others have characterized this episode as a competition between AXAF 

and SIRTF,41 but the reality is less dramatic. One 

telescope had to go first. Pellerin simply picked 

the one that was most sellable at that moment.

Selling SIRTF internally at NASA was still a 

challenge. Pellerin’s Astrophysics Division was just 

one group within the Office of Space Science and 

Applications (see Fig. 5.3), and each such group 

FIGURE 5.3. Organizational chart of NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications (September 1987 SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes).

38. Field report, vol. 1, pp. 13–14.

39. Gamma-Ray Observatory Science Working Team, “The Gamma-Ray Observatory Science Plan, September 1981,” 

in Logsdon et al., eds., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, 

Volume 5: Exploring the Cosmos, pp. 692–697, available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4407/vol5/chapter-3/III-32%20

%28292%29.pdf.

40. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

41. This is a theme in the history of AXAF presented by Wallace Tucker and Karen Tucker in Revealing the Universe: The 

Making of the Chandra X-ray Observatory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
76 Making the Invisible Visible

had a set of projects it wanted to move forward. 

“There was a lot of in-fighting about which New 

Start was going to happen and when,” Pellerin 

said.42 It fell to Burton I. (Burt) Edelson, NASA’s 

Associate Administrator for Space Science and 

Applications (1982–1986), to make a recommendation. Edelson managed by consensus, 

or at least aspired to, despite the conflicting 

demands and budgetary constraints that caused 

fierce competition among the NASA Centers and 

divisions.43

To select the New Starts for the near future, 

Edelson brought his staff and other interested 

parties together at the Belmont Conference 

Center in Elkridge, Maryland, for a weekend 

planning retreat. “It was a very unfair setting for 

me,” Pellerin recalls, “because Burt had invited 

people who were opposed to my program, like 

the director of the Jet Propulsion Lab, Lew 

Allen. [He’s] a great man, but if he was going to 

be there, the Director of Marshall should have 

been there, too, and he wasn’t invited; so it was a 

stacked deck. These people were going to vote on 

something they knew nothing about. There was 

no opportunity to educate anybody.”44 Even with 

the help of a professional facilitator, by the last 

day the attendees had still not addressed the New 

Starts. As Pellerin recalls it,

I went to the facilitator and said, “We came 

here to do this [New Start selection]. When 

are we going to do it?”.... So they put up 

these viewgraphs, and they had these projects 

in some order. There were like twelve candidates for New Starts [and] AXAF was low on 

the list.... We’d have a sequence of the top 

four and then the rest would go away. I had 

two or three up there. I had AXAF. SIRTF 

wasn’t on the chart then, I don’t think.... So 

the facilitator said, “Let’s take a straw vote 

to see how we all feel about this.” I’m sitting there and I’m thinking, if we vote, it’s 

over. Burt is not going to have a straw vote 

and then continue to discuss this. So we go 

around the table one at a time, and everyone 

was being very politic: three votes for this, 

four votes for this. There were twelve candidates, and we each had twenty-four votes [to 

distribute among the projects].... Before we 

started voting, I asked the facilitator, “What 

are the rules on voting?” He said, “It’s just 

a straw vote, so you can vote any way you 

want.” He goes around the table, and I’m 

the next to the last person, and I’m looking 

at this, and AXAF is going no place. So I 

said, “Twenty-four votes for AXAF.” Burt 

jumps up and screams at me, “You can’t do 

that!” I said to the facilitator, “I asked you 

about the rules, and you said the rules say I 

can.” He looks at Burt and says, “He’s right, 

that’s what I told him the rules were.” Burt 

was steaming mad, because he thought he’d 

managed to get rid of AXAF. And the person 

after me did it political again: two for this, 

one for that, four, two. So as a result, AXAF 

came in second out of the twelve. That’s 

the only year in NASA I didn’t get a bonus, 

because Burt was so mad about that....

I got my project. Right after the top planetary mission.... That’s how it was decided. 

And exactly what I knew would happen is 

that Burt would collect up all the charts 

and we’d leave. I knew we’d never have a 

42. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

43. Edelson’s preference for consensus is remarked on both by Pellerin (19 March 2009 interview) and by Harwit (“Conceiving 

and Marketing NASA’s Great Observatories,” p. 170). Edelson, who died in 2002, was a longtime public servant, having 

served in the Navy (1943–1967), at NASA (1982–1986), and, after his retirement, at George Washington University’s 

Institute for Applied Space Research; see http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/biedelson.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).

44. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
Chapter 5 • Selling

conversation after the straw vote, because 

I knew Burt. Burt was uncomfortable with 

any conflict; he couldn’t stand it. This was 

the biggest conflict: Whose billion-dollar 

thing comes next? And to Lew Allen’s great 

credit, he got up in the middle of it and said, 

“You know, it’s a really clear choice here. 

If you want to support JPL institutionally, 

you’re going to vote for my mission. If you 

want the best science, you’re going to vote 

for Charlie’s.” I never quit respecting that bit 

of integrity from him.45

This episode illustrates how opportunities 

to “sell” a project do not always appear in a predictable way and how politics and personal idiosyncrasies can shape the outcomes. However, 

this is not to say that such decisions are made 

irrationally. Every project being considered for 

a New Start was thoughtfully vetted by dozens 

of smart, creative, skilled scientists and policy 

makers. Every project had a solid rationale for 

being funded. Unfortunately, there were more 

good ideas than money to develop them.

The Federal Budget 

With Burt Edelson committed to supporting 

AXAF as a New Start, Pellerin was one step closer 

to realizing the Great Observatories concept. The 

next hurdle was getting Congress and President 

Reagan to sign a budget that authorized spending 

on AXAF, the next of the Great Observatories.

Every spring, the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) starts working with federal 

agencies to develop a budget that the President 

will present to Congress. The OMB provides 

financial guidance as to how much funding 

each agency might expect and tries to align the 

budget with the President’s goals while balancing the demands of health, defense, and national 

priorities.46 The President’s budget, traditionally presented on the first Monday in February, 

offers recommendations as to how discretionary 

monies should be spent to meet policy goals in 

the upcoming fiscal year (beginning 1 October). 

Discretionary funding makes up nearly a third of 

the national budget and affects nearly everything 

with an acronym: FDA, EPA, DOD, HUD, 

NIH, and many others, including NASA.

Congress then takes these recommendations 

and marks up the budget after hearing from the 

directors of the various agencies, who are brought 

before Congress to defend their budgets and project priorities. Both houses of Congress modify 

the budget and come to an agreement on overall fiscal policy that is (ideally, but not always) in 

line with the President’s recommendations. This 

policy document is not legally binding but serves 

as the basis for legislation in which funds are 

actually granted to various agencies and projects.

Every year, the budget process is repeated and 

often begins before the current budget is finalized (see Fig. 5.4, p. 78). This federal budgeting 

process makes it difficult for NASA to secure 

funding, as all long-term projects require annual 

approval, and budget requests must be submitted 

nearly two years in advance, regardless of changing national priorities and development costs.

45. In the account of AXAF’s history given by Tucker and Tucker, the authors reference a meeting of NASA’s Space and Earth 

Science Advisory Committee (SESAC) in which two programs being managed by JPL were ranked higher than AXAF: the 

ocean Topography Experiment (TOPEX), an Earth ocean mapper) and the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF), one 

of the two flagship missions of the Mariner Mark II program (Revealing the Universe, p. 94). CRAF was canceled in 1992, 

while Cassini was launched in 1997.

46. For a more detailed description of the federal budget process, see “Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,” Report 

no. 98-721, 3 December 2012, by Bill Heniff, Jr., Megan Lynch, and Jessica Tollestrup (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, 2012).
78 Making the Invisible Visible

Appropriations are as much a financial process as a political one. Thus, it is not surprising 

that Congress, the President, and the OMB can 

and often do decide the fate of individual projects, particularly if those projects are expensive 

or politically visible. For example, Cold War concerns led President Kennedy to push the Apollo 

program and President Reagan to push the Star 

Wars defense system despite the objections of scientists and engineers who thought the respective 

technologies were not yet possible.

NASA’s New Starts must therefore have broad 

political and fiscal appeal. But it is a challenge 

to align the interests of presidents, congressional 

representatives, OMB staff, and agency directors 

and keep them aligned throughout an 18-month 

budget cycle. That is a lot of time for something 

to go wrong.

Appealing to Power

Charlie Pellerin was pleased that the NASA 

budget submitted to the OMB in mid-1987 

included at least one of the Great Observatories, 

AXAF. However, the two preceding years had 

been hard. NASA had been consumed by the 

congressional investigation of the Challenger

explosion in January 1986, in which the Shuttle’s 

seven crewmembers had been killed. At the time, 

NASA was without a permanent Administrator. 

The Executive Budget Process Timetable

Date Activities

Calendar Year Prior to the Year in Which Fiscal Year Begins

Spring OMB issues planning guidance to executive agencies for the budget beginning 

October 1 of the following year.

Spring and Summer Agencies begin development of budget requests.

September Agencies submit initial budget requests to OMB.

October–November President based on recommendations by the OMB director makes decisions on 

agency requests. OMB informs agencies of decisions, commonly referred to as 

OMB “passback.”

December Agencies may appeal these decisions to the OMB director and in some cases 

directly to the President.

Calendar Year in Which Fiscal Year Begins

By first Monday in February President submits budget to Congress.

February–September Congressional phase. Agencies interact with Congress, justifying and explaining 

President’s budget.

By July 15 President submits mid-session review to Congress.

August 21 (or within 10 days 

after approval of a spending bill)

OMB apportions available funds to agencies by time period, program, project, or 

activity.

October 1 Fiscal year begins.

Calendar Years in Which Fiscal Year Begins and Ends

October–September Agencies make allotments, obligate funds, conduct activities, and request 

supplemental appropriations, if necessary. President may propose supplemental 

appropriations and impoundments (i.e., deferrals and rescissions) to Congress.

September 30 Fiscal year ends.

Source: Office of Management and Budget. Circular No. A-11 (Washington: July 2007). Section 10.5.

FIGURE 5.4. Timeline of the federal budget process.
Chapter 5 • Selling

The outgoing Administrator, James M. Beggs, 

had been on leave since December 1985; and his 

successor, James C. Fletcher, would not be confirmed until the following May. Changes were 

also happening in the Office of Space Science 

and Applications: Burt Edelson had retired, 

and Lennard A. Fisk had become the Associate 

Administrator for OSSA in May 1987.47 About 

the only thing that was unchanged was the cost 

overruns on Hubble. Thus, when the budget 

was submitted, Pellerin had two new bosses and 

regard for NASA was at an all-time low.

Although Pellerin’s division was not directly 

involved in the Shuttle investigations, no telescope was going to fly on a Shuttle for the time 

being. If anything was going into space, then the 

first in line was Hubble, which was now in a holding pattern and burning tens of millions of dollars 

as it kept teams together waiting for their chance 

at launch. AXAF was next, but it wasn’t going 

anywhere until Hubble was back on track. And 

SIRTF would have to find a new ride, because 

the supercooled helium cryogen it relied on was 

highly pressurized—and highly explosive—a risk 

that was now seen as too great to take on a Shuttle.

Although Fisk saw to it that AXAF made it 

into NASA’s FY 1988 budget, it was dropped in 

January 1988, just days before President Reagan 

was to give his State of the Union address.48

Pellerin had to act fast and relied on a process 

called reclama to try to reverse that decision. 

“‘Reclama’ means that you go to the [NASA] 

administrator and he agrees to go back and appeal 

this,” Pellerin explains. “The way the appeal 

works is that if it’s a big thing like this, you go 

and you make a presentation to the President in 

person, and you try to overrule his OMB director. So the OMB director is going to negotiate 

with you to avoid this, but he’s not going to negotiate much, because he’s the President’s man.”49

Pellerin first needed to get the support of 

the new NASA Administrator, Jim Fletcher. 

Fortunately for Pellerin, he had a very good relationship with Fletcher, who had previously served 

in this role (1971–1977) under Presidents Nixon 

and Ford. After Fletcher left office in 1977, he 

joined University Corporation for Atmospheric 

Research (UCAR), a consortium that managed 

NASA’s balloon program, which is where he met 

Pellerin. “Most people, after Fletcher left [NASA], 

treated him like a nobody,” Pellerin recollects.

I always thought that since he had been the 

administrator, I was going to give him the 

respect an administrator gets, even though 

he’s not the administrator anymore. I just 

thought it was the decent thing to do, to 

treat him the same way. So I had meetings 

with him and met with his board, and I was 

deferential to him.... So now he’s back [at 

NASA] and I’ve got this relationship with 

him that I built during the years he was 

gone.... So when AXAF got taken out of the 

OMB budget, I went to meet him in person, 

with Fisk, and I said, “Jim, you’ve got to put 

this back in.” He said, “No, Charlie, I’d like 

to help you, but they’ve cut manpower costs, 

they’ve cut the Shuttle main-engine testing, 

they’ve cut the facilities. NASA’s got more 

important things than your science project.” 

I said, “Let me explain what this is, Jim. This 

is the Great Observatories program.”50

47. See Lennard A. Fisk, interview by Rebecca Wright, Ann Arbor, MI, 8 September 2010, at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/

oral_histories/NASA_HQ/Administrators/FiskLA/FiskLA_9-8-10.htm (accessed 30 August 2016).

48. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009; for a more complete account of AXAF’s history, see Tucker and Tucker, Revealing the 

Universe.

49. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

50. Ibid.
80 Making the Invisible Visible

Fletcher authorized Pellerin to make a case to 

take before the OMB and, ultimately, President 

Reagan. With only a few days before Reagan 

would unveil his budget, there was no time for a 

letter-writing campaign, a blue-ribbon panel, or 

any of the other strategies that AXAF’s advocates 

had become adept at for mustering support.

What would persuade Reagan? The Challenger 

explosion had happened on his watch, two years 

earlier. Since that time, the Soviets had put into 

orbit the Mir space station and the Kvant-1, a 

module for x-ray and optical astrophysics, which 

had launched and successfully docked with Mir 

the previous spring. The only thing they had not 

done was fly their own piloted space-transport 

system, but they were preparing to, and their 

vehicle looked nearly identical to the U.S. Space 

Shuttle. Even so, it wasn’t all competition with 

the Soviets: Pellerin was involved in building a 

cooperative program with the Soviet Union in 

space (paralleling efforts in the Manned Space 

Directorate, which managed a 1995 mission in 

which the Shuttle docked with Mir). Pellerin had 

become good friends with his Soviet counterpart, 

Rashid Alievich Sunyaev, who had given him a 

picture of Mir with Kvant-1 attached to it.51

It occurred to Pellerin that he might be able 

to use this image of Mir to persuade the OMB 

director and President Reagan that AXAF needed 

to be funded. Working with Trish Pengra of 

BDM Corporation, a professional services firm 

that provided regular support to the Astrophysics 

Division, Pellerin developed a compelling (and 

mostly truthful) story. It was about the Russians: 

“We put a picture of an American flag you 

could see through with AXAF and a Soviet flag 

you could see through with Mir,” Pellerin said. 

“And of course, I didn’t label that little chunk on 

the end as the x-ray part. They wouldn’t know, 

right? And I put, ‘To whom will the future in 

space astronomy belong?’ as the title. Now, if 

there were things more important than AXAF 

to Mr. Jim Fletcher, is this ever going to get out 

of NASA this way? No. There’s no way.” Pellerin 

understood that since this image could be seen 

by the President, everyone who ranked between 

Pellerin and the President would want to review 

the presentation. That would take too long, and 

someone was sure to come along who wouldn’t 

like it. “I had to make a choice,” Pellerin said: 

I decided that I would see what I could 

get away with and I called Fisk’s administrative assistant and said, “I’ve got some 

charts for OMB, does anybody want to see 

them?” The assistant said no. Then I called 

Fletcher’s office. I got some administrative 

person, and I said, “I’ve got some charts for 

OMB.”... They had no idea what charts 

I was talking about. I made it sound real 

casual. They must have thought just some 

routine stuff.... Trish found out that the 

President doesn’t hurt his eyes. He only 

looks at [2- by 4-foot] foam boards. So Trish 

finds out who [makes those] and has four or 

five slabs made up, and the last one is this 

slab. So we got the foam boards. I wrapped 

them up in a brown wrapper. I put a NASA 

sticker on there with no cover letter, and I 

just put “Director, OMB,” with no return 

address. We hired a courier to take it to the 

OMB director’s office, [and he] drops this 

package from NASA off. The next day I get 

a call from Fisk and he says, “Fletcher just 

called me and said that the damndest thing 

happened. AXAF is back in the budget. Do 

you know anything about it?” “No sir....” I 

mean, let’s be honest, I pushed higher priority things to the Agency aside for this. If 

I got caught doing this, I might be fired.... 

Nobody figured it out. [Years later] I had a 

guy in a workshop at Huntsville who worked 

51. Ibid.
Chapter 5 • Selling

at OMB at the time. He said this package 

came in and it created this enormous stir. 

He said no one had ever seen anything like 

this before. The OMB director looked at it 

and said, “Tell me again, why did we take 

this out?” It turns out that some lower-level 

guy had just thrown AXAF out for the hell 

of it; there was no clear rationale as to why 

they’d done it. The OMB director said, “I’m 

going to go to the President with this chart? 

Put that thing back in.” And that was the 

end of it.52

The story of how AXAF moved ahead of 

SIRTF is not about which project was better. 

They were both important to Pellerin and the 

scientific community. AXAF did not launch first 

because its advocates were more persuasive but 

because there was not enough money to fund 

both and one had to be first. SIRTF had made 

a design change to a free flyer that was substantively different from what the Field committee 

had endorsed. New engineering work for SIRTF 

to be a free flyer was needed, whereas AXAF had 

always been on that track.

This a story about how careful scientific and 

technical work, coupled with seemingly random 

processes at the economic and political levels, 

created opportunities for projects to get on or get 

off track.53 Seizing such opportunities required 

initiative, such as Pellerin displayed, but also 

support for such actions. Len Fisk noted, “It 

was my management practice to give my division directors a lot of license, particularly when 

they were as ingenious as Charlie. They might 

have been surprised to know how much I actually knew of their actions, and found ways to 

encourage them.”54

It is a story that describes many accounts of 

large-scale projects—not just AXAF and SIRTF. 

Its conclusion depends on whether project managers and budget-level administrators establish 

favorable circumstances for achieving their goals. 

Seemingly unrelated events or circumstances 

can sometimes propel this narrative: a book that 

influenced NASA policy-makers written only 

because Martin Harwit had spare time for writing after NASA cut his funding; a comic book 

that bundled together a set of independently conceived projects, making all of them easier to sell 

to Congress; the Shuttle disaster that ended once 

and for all any speculation that SIRTF (and its 

volatile pressurized-helium cryogen) would be an 

attached payload; and competition in space that 

spoke to the “Star Wars” president. All of these 

factors existed outside the project teams, where 

decisions were essentially divorced from technical 

and scientific considerations. Politics, economics, 

and personalities all can drive the prioritization 

of projects. When a mission like SIRTF gets off 

the ground, it is because many hands have been 

there to lift it, some pushing, some pulling, and 

some obstinately holding the tethers until it can 

no longer be kept down.

52. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009. Pellerin’s account was confirmed by Lennard Fisk and Trish Pengra (e-mail exchanges 

with the author, 10–12 October 2011). 

53. Political scientists and policy scholars have developed ideas around policy windows and venues, as an insightful reviewer 

noted. For more detail, the interested reader is directed to John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 

2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995); Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American 

Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The 

Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

54. Lennard Fisk, e-mail exchange with the author, 12 October 2011.

83

CHAPTER 6

Out of Step

The SIRTF team was disappointed to see 

AXAF move ahead of them to the front of 

the line. They were more than a little surprised, 

too. Members of both the SWG and the SIRTF 

project office at Ames had assumed not only that 

SIRTF would be the next major New Start but 

that they had put into place the supports necessary to justify this position—scientifically, politically, technologically, and economically.

Realigning Support for SIRTF

In the three-plus years since its first meeting, the 

SIRTF SWG had reached out to the scientific 

community to garner support. The most influential group of scientists was still the optical 

astronomers, for whom an infrared telescope 

had limited appeal. However, astronomers of 

all stripes were increasingly studying planets, 

which are relatively cold and dark objects and 

thus well suited to examination in the infrared. 

By the 1980s, planetary astronomy had shed the 

image associated a century earlier with Percival 

Lowell’s description of Martian canals and the 

ensuing popular speculations about life on 

Mars. Over the preceding two decades, optical 

astronomy and planetary astronomy had gradually converged, in large part due to NASA’s planetary missions, such as Mariner (which revealed 

the “canals” to be an optical illusion), Pioneer, 

and Voyager.

Planetary astronomers had become a powerful group, and their support for SIRTF was 

highly desired. To represent the interests of these 

scientists, Dale Cruikshank, of NASA Ames, was 

added to the SWG. Cruikshank’s doctoral advisor at the University of Arizona had been Gerard 

Kuiper (see chapter 2), who advocated both infrared and planetary research before either was fashionable. As a member of the SWG, Cruikshank’s 

role was to incorporate ideas on how SIRTF 

could best be used for planetary research.1

The SWG also designated one of its members, 

Mike Jura, as the political point man. Jura, who 

was one of the SWG’s interdisciplinary scientists, initially focused on providing information 

about SIRTF to the advisory boards that shaped 

national science priorities and policy, such as 

NASA’s Space and Earth Sciences Advisory 

Committee (SESAC).2

1. Cruikshank became advisor to the Science Working Group in August 1986 and was formally made an SWG member in 

October 1988 (SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 12–14 August 1986 and 17–19 October 1988).

2. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 15–17 December 1986.
84 Making the Invisible Visible

Other outreach efforts by the SWG (with 

help from the Ames project office) included a 

brochure on SIRTF for lay audiences and a newsletter to keep the scientific community informed 

of their progress. They also edited a special issue 

of the academic journal Astrophysical Letters and 

Communications that detailed the scientific capabilities of SIRTF as a free flyer.3

What the SWG failed to appreciate was the 

short shelf life of decadal surveys; nor did it 

anticipate that shifting SIRTF from a Shuttleborne facility to a free flyer would make the 

relevant part of the Field report obsolete, and 

with it support for SIRTF. Although the move 

to a free flyer improved the observational quality of the telescope, it also made SIRTF seem 

like a brand-new project and therefore in need 

of reprioritizing in the next decadal survey.4

The move to a higher orbit also introduced new 

technological considerations and tradeoffs that 

would require evaluation before a design could 

be specified. 

In addition to this erosion of scientific and 

technical support, economic and political support was dwindling. Outside advisory groups had 

expressed growing concern with NASA’s overall 

ability to reach its many goals. One particularly 

influential review was conducted for the White 

House by the Advisory Committee on the Future 

of the U.S. Space Program, chaired by Norman 

Augustine, who was then CEO of Martin 

Marietta. In its 17 December 1990 report, the 

so-called Augustine Committee recognized the 

progress of the Great Observatories program and 

other NASA initiatives (see Fig. 6.1) yet raised 

serious issues: 

With so spectacular a set of achievements as 

a foundation, and with a substantial number 

of space projects underway, the U.S. space 

research enterprise should be healthy and 

flourishing. Yet discussions with researchers 

within NASA and in the university community reveal that there is significant discontent and unease about what the future may 

hold for U.S. space research. The reasons for 

these concerns have been documented in 

some detail in the 1986 report entitled “The 

Crisis in Space and Earth Science” issued by 

the NASA Advisory Council. They include 

such factors as (a) the widening of research 

horizons in response to past accomplishments so that there are now more opportunities than can be accommodated by the 

available resources; (b) the space technology 

required to support new advances is often 

more costly and sophisticated than in the 

past; (c) the growing complexity of interactions between NASA and its larger and more 

diverse research community; and (d) program stretch-outs, delays and cancellations 

that waste creative researchers’ time, squander resources, and decrease flight opportunities. We believe that many of these reasons 

continue to exist.5

The problems identified by the Augustine 

Committee were largely due to a lack of 

resources—a problem for which there was no 

simple solution, as NASA’s budget was being 

squeezed from two sides. On one side were several large and technically complex programs, 

such as the Shuttle and the International Space 

Station, that ate up the majority of the budget. 

Problems with the Shuttle required additional 

3. See “Spacelab 2 Mission,” a special issue of Astrophysical Letters and Communications 27, no. 3 (1988).

4. Robert D. Gehrz, interview, Long Beach, CA, 5 January 2009.

5. Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Norman Augustine, chair), Report of the Advisory Committee 

on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Washington, DC: NASA, 1990), hereafter cited as the “Augustine report”.
Chapter 6 • Out of S

funding in the late 1980s and created overruns 

in the budgets of projects that depended on 

it. By October 1989, Hubble’s development 

costs stood at $1.6 billion, and millions more 

were being spent while Hubble waited for a 

ride to space.6

 A year later, with accumulated 

operations, servicing, and storage costs added 

in, the total costs had risen to $2.19 billion.7

Although demands on the budget were rising, 

available funding was not. NASA’s budget was 

being squeezed on the other side by Congress, 

which kept appropriations nearly flat (adjusting for inflation) at $9 billion throughout the 

1980s (see Fig. 6.2, p. 86). Even after launch, 

Hubble’s relentless drain on the budget continued, as it was revealed that the telescope’s 

FIGURE 6.1. Major NASA projects from 1959 to 1990.

6. The Shuttle fleet was grounded in 1986 due to the Challenger accident. When flights resumed, a backlog of military

and commercial payloads was given priority over Hubble. See Robert W. Smith, with contributions by Paul A. Hanle,

Robert Kargon, and Joseph N. Tatarewicz, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Smith notes that Hubble’s development costs by October 1986 were

$1.6 billion in real dollars (p. 371). For budget details, see NASA Historical Data Book, vol. V, chap. 4, table 4.5, and vol.

VII, chap. 4, table 4.6; available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4012/vol5/vol_v_ch_4.pdf and http://history.nasa.gov/

SP-4012v7ch4.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).

7. See D. Radzanowski, NASA Under Scrutiny: The Shuttle and Hubble, Congressional Research Service Report CRS1990-SPR-0030, 13 September 1990, p. 8; values reported in real dollars.
86 Making the Invisible Visible

money for AXAF’s mirror to be built. This was 

a test: If the AXAF team could demonstrate the 

critical technology by 1991, then further funding would be likely; if not, Congress would kill 

the project.9

The Great Observatories concept had successfully linked four distinct projects, in the hope that 

it would make them all easier to sell; indeed, all 

but SIRTF had been approved by 1989. But this 

approval also linked them with the “Hubble syndrome”—the potential for programs to consume 

resources in excess of those originally planned.10

Hubble, with an initial price tag of $490 million, 

had ended up costing nearly $2.6 billion. The 

mirror was out of focus and would necessitate a 

Shuttle mission to repair it.8

Despite the widespread appeal of the Great 

Observatories concept, Congress had little 

appetite for more billion-dollar telescope projects until they could see the returns from their 

investment in Hubble. Even though AXAF had 

received a New Start for FY 1988 and the OMB 

had restored AXAF to the President’s budget, 

Congress was reluctant to appropriate the funds 

to build it, perhaps in part because the company 

that had built Hubble’s ill-fated mirror was also 

under contract to build AXAF’s. To limit their 

exposure, Congress authorized only enough 

0

5

1959196419691974197919841989

10

15

20

25

30

NASA’s Budget Authority in 1990 Dollars (in Billions)

FIGURE 6.2. NASA’s budget authority (billions, in 1990 dollars).

8. Throughout the 1990s, Hubble’s budget exceeded $150 million per year in real dollars for ongoing operations and three 

servicing missions (NASA’s Office of the Inspector General, Final Report on HST Cost Saving Initiatives, Report IG-99-

013, 19 March 1999, p. 6; available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/hqlibrary/documents/o43731805.pdf (accessed 30 

August 2016).

9. Wallace Tucker and Karen Tucker, Revealing the Universe: The Making of the Chandra X-ray Observatory (Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

10. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 5 March 1990.
Chapter 6 • Out of S

presumption was that if one Great Observatory 

had technical issues, cost overruns, or management problems, then the others were likely to as 

well. AXAF was estimated to cost $1.2 billion; 

SIRTF between $1.2 and $1.7 billion.11 Until 

Hubble was fixed and AXAF passed its technical 

test, Headquarters could not go before Congress 

and credibly argue that SIRTF should be supported. As the last of the Great Observatories, 

SIRTF could not move forward until AXAF did.

Taking the Axe to AXAF

All of these billion-dollar telescopes had been 

conceived in more optimistic times. Now they 

were Charlie Pellerin’s responsibility. As NASA’s 

Director of Astrophysics, Pellerin reported to 

Lennard Fisk, the Associate Administrator in 

charge of OSSA.12 Pellerin recalls, “Fisk called 

me into his office one day, and he showed me 

this chart. And he showed straight-line, 7-percent growth for space science. He said, ‘This is 

the best we can hope for.’... The problem I had 

was that AXAF and Cassini [a Saturn mission] 

were peaking their funding.... They were peaking at the same time, and they were sticking up 

above that curve. Fisk said, ‘What are we going 

to do about this?’ I said, ‘Thank you for sharing’ 

and I went back to my office.” Fisk was not going 

to cut other programs to stay within budget; 

the cuts had to come from AXAF or Cassini.13

Pellerin was reluctant to take on Cassini—it had 

the support of the planetary community, which 

was concentrated at Caltech and JPL (where most 

of NASA’s planetary missions were managed) and 

the Planetary Society (which had been founded 

by prominent scientists Carl Sagan of Cornell 

and Bruce Murray of Caltech). “I thought about 

it, and rightly or wrongly I decided that Cassini 

was much more powerful than me,” Pellerin 

says. “At this time, AXAF was in Huntsville, at 

Marshall. The astrophysics program was all over 

NASA, in pieces. Marshall had AXAF, it had the 

Shuttle main engines, it had the Shuttle external 

tank. It had a space station coming up.”14 AXAF 

was just one of many projects competing for 

the attention of Marshall and the astrophysics 

community. Cassini, on the other hand, had the 

concentrated attention of JPL, Caltech, and the 

Planetary Society, each influential in its own right 

in the scientific community and in Congress. In 

short, Cassini had “[a]ll these political tools,” 

Pellerin said, “that I didn’t have [for AXAF].” The 

only tool he had was a fist to pound on tables at 

Marshall and demand that the project team find 

ways to reduce AXAF’s $3 billion cost. “One day 

I got $200 million out of it,” Pellerin remembers, “but it was still growing.... Here was the 

dilemma. The more it grew, the more it slipped, 

the more it slipped, the more it cost.... If [cost] 

becomes the issue, we’re going to lose, and someone is going to cancel AXAF, and then the Great 

Observatories are gone, and SIRTF loses its physics rationale, and all that. So I had to find a way 

[to prove the project’s value].”15

AXAF, Hubble, and SIRTF were all originally 

designed for a low-Earth orbit. While that orbit 

is relatively easy and inexpensive to reach, the 

usable observing time, or “efficiency,” is poor, 

because the Moon, the Sun, or Earth is often 

11. Presentation to Lennard Fisk, 28 June 1989.

12. Fisk was Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Science and Applications at NASA May 1987–June 1993; see 

Fisk interview, 8 September 2010.

13. Cassini did cut its costs by reducing the pointing capabilities of the planetary orbiter and eliminating CRAF, the comet 

mission. Details on the mission can be found in J. P. Lebreton and D. L. Matson, “The Huygens Probe: Science, Payload 

and Mission Overview,” Space Science Reviews 104, nos. 1–4 (2002): 59–100.

14. Pellerin, interview, 19 March 2009. 

15. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
88 Making the Invisible Visible

ultimately proved unworkable. Another scheme 

was to share costs with an international partner, 

as had been done in the highly successful IRAS 

project, the Dutch-U.S.-British infrared survey 

telescope launched in 1983. SIRTF SWG members met with infrared scientists around the world 

to explore ways they might collaborate. This was 

done at the urging of Headquarters, which was 

being pressured by Congress to leverage international participation and resources in lean economic times. Dutifully, the SWG had gone on 

what they called the “ISO death march,” a fourday, four-country visit by several SWG members in spring 1988 to explore how the United 

States might participate in the Infrared Space 

Observatory (ISO), a European Space Agency 

project.17 The SWG also met with a team of 

Japanese scientists, who had ideas for an instrument (and resources) they might add to SIRTF.18

In the end, these initiatives did not pan out. 

A more promising (and proven) tactic for 

reducing costs was to assign the best management 

team to the project. The SWG was responsible 

for figuring out what SIRTF needed to become 

a useful scientific instrument. But every brain 

also needs a body. The body of SIRTF comprised 

dozens of systems—including cryogenic, electrical, flight navigation, and data acquisition—that 

had to be engineered and then assembled into 

one spacecraft (see Fig. 6.3). This process was 

the responsibility of the project manager and 

the Ames project office. Later, additional teams 

would manage the launch, operate the spacecraft, 

and process the telescope data. There were thousands of parts and hundreds of people. It is safe 

in the way. Pellerin realized that if he could get 

AXAF into a high-Earth orbit, then he would get 

a threefold improvement in efficiency. Even if he 

eliminated the Shuttle servicing and some of the 

more complex engineering components, which 

would diminish the facility’s lifetime and overall 

capabilities, the improvement in efficiency would 

make up the difference. By lopping off major 

portions of AXAF, costs would come down; yet 

it could still deliver on the goals in the original 

project proposal. “I’m back to where I started,” 

Pellerin said. “I’ve got the same science.” Pellerin 

latched onto the idea of splitting AXAF into two 

missions, a proposal that the development team 

vehemently resisted.16 The idea won out, however, and eventually a substantially lighter and 

cheaper AXAF mission, renamed Chandra X-ray 

Observatory, launched in 1999. 

Resizing SIRTF

Meanwhile, SIRTF was experiencing mission 

creep. To secure the support of the planetary 

community, Cruikshank was recommending the 

addition of another instrument—a high-resolution spectrometer, which could be used to map 

the chemical composition of planets and other 

solar system objects. Frank Low was pushing for 

a high-resolution sky survey that would provide a 

more detailed sky map than IRAS had provided. 

Yet SIRTF, too, would have to be scaled back.

As with AXAF, Headquarters put pressure 

on the SIRTF team to find ways to shrink costs. 

One idea was to use a common spacecraft design 

for AXAF and SIRTF, although this proposal 

16. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009; see also Tucker and Tucker, Revealing the Universe. AXAF was split into two missions 

in mid-1992, AXAF-I (imaging) and AXAF-S (spectroscopy). AXAF-S was canceled in 1993.

17. A handful of U.S. scientists were involved in ISO, including Martin Harwit, who was funded by NASA (SIRTF SWG Meeting 

Minutes, 11–13 May 1988).

18. The Japanese scientists were looking for a home for their instrument after the IRTS project was canceled in Japan; see 

Satio Hayakawa and Mamoru Saito, “Astronomy in Japan,” Astrophysics and Space Science 99, nos. 1–2 (1984): 393–

402. Eventually, the IRTS project was reinstated by the Japanese government, and a version of this instrument was flown, 

with participation by SIRTF/Ames scientist Tom Roellig.
Chapter 6 • Out of S

to assume that there will be problems in a complex project with untested technology and that 

some of these problems will be impossible to plan 

for. Therefore, it is vital that the project manager have broad experience and that the people 

around him have deep and diverse expertise to 

handle any problems. 

Ames had never managed a $2 billion project. 

Marshall, JPL, and Goddard had. Ames employed 

1,000 people. Marshall, JPL, and Goddard were 

all many times that size. Ames’s only major space 

project was Pioneer, a series of planetary missions 

the last of which had launched in 1978. Did 

Ames currently have the necessary skills and staff 

to manage a project the scale of SIRTF? This was 

the question that several people at Headquarters 

were asking in the spring of 1989.

Losing Faith in Ames

SIRTF was the responsibility of the Space Science 

Division at Ames. Unfortunately for SIRTF, 

space science was not one of Ames’s core elements. At Ames, it was aeronautics research and 

Shuttle-related programs, not space science, that 

received priority, as these were seen to be more in 

line with Ames’s overall mission. Ames’s management of Pioneer is a case in point. The Pioneer 

missions had generated broad popular interest, 

especially Pioneer 10, with its gold-anodized 

aluminum plaque depicting a man and woman, 

intended to show any extraterrestrial intelligence 

it encountered who the creatures were that had 

built this probe. However, despite public and scientific interest and substantial financial support 

FIGURE 6.3. Integration flow for SIRTF systems (SIRTF Briefing for OSSA, 22 March 1990).
90 Making the Invisible Visible

from NASA, Ames’s leadership provided only 

lukewarm support for Pioneer.19

The Ames Space Science Division had developed a strategic plan in 1985 to address this 

failing. Specifically, its leadership sought to 

“increase...[the division’s] visibility and credibility both internally and externally” in order to 

acquire the funding and manpower to support 

their desired projects and to “develop a mindset” within Ames and Headquarters to “change 

the Division’s status at Ames from one of ‘benign 

neglect’ or ‘toleration’ to being an important 

Center component.”20 By 1989, the division 

had not yet succeeded in changing the perceptions of Ames’s management. The Director of 

Ames, William Ballhaus, provided Headquarters 

with a list of his Center priorities for 1989. “I 

think SIRTF was number 14 on the list,” recalls 

Larry Caroff, who left Ames in 1988 to head the 

Infrared, Submillimeter, and Radio Astrophysics 

Branch at Headquarters. “Charlie [Pellerin] hit 

the ceiling about that and said ‘Ames doesn’t 

really want this, they don’t care about it, I don’t 

think they can handle it.’”21 Larry Manning, who 

had worked on SIRTF and with Caroff at Ames 

before joining him at Headquarters, elaborates: 

The two Center directors that were 

involved—Ballhaus up until [February] 

1988 and then [Dale] Compton—clearly 

saw Ames as a research center, and neither 

of them were project people. Dale’s only 

project experience had been on IRAS, which 

had not been, from his viewpoint, a positive 

experience. I think he clearly wanted some 

indication from Charlie that Ames is going 

to get this, and Charlie wanted indication 

from Ames that Ames is going to be linked 

with the people that were needed to do it. 

They sort of butted heads.22 

Pellerin was not worried about the ability of 

the SWG and the Ames project office to develop a 

good design. SIRTF’s detector-development program was among the most advanced in the world 

for long-infrared wavelengths, and the scientists 

there had conducted dozens of mission options 

studies. Designing SIRTF was not what Pellerin 

was worried about—it was flying SIRTF. Pellerin 

was concerned that Ames did not have the staff to 

rapidly and adequately troubleshoot problems or 

the processes for averting problems with the contractors who were building SIRTF. It wasn’t clear 

that Ames had enough people to do the job, and 

even if the Center did, it was undermined by the 

fact that the managers at Ames would not aggressively commit to SIRTF. According to Pellerin: 

Flight projects are a whole different deal. 

Flight projects are just antithetical to 

research. Researchers...are going to do 

the best of everything, and they’re not 

going to use processes.... Flight projects 

have very rigorous processes for testing, 

19. Witteborn interview, 2 September 2008. 

20. Space Science Division Strategic Plans, 1980s, AFS1070.8A, Archives Reference Collection, FC5:D4, p. 5, NASA Ames 

History Office, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA.

21. Larry A. Manning and Lawrence J. Caroff, interview, Mountain View, CA, 3 September 2008.

22. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008. According to http://www.nasa.gov/offices/nac/members/Ballhaus-bio.

html, Ballhaus served as Director of Ames (1984–1989) and also served as Acting Associate Administrator for Aeronautics 

and Space Technology at NASA Headquarters (1988–1989). At Ames, he was a research scientist (1971–1978), the 

Director of Astronautics (1980–1984), and chief of the Applied Computational Aerodynamics Branch (1979). Ballhaus 

worked for Lockheed Martin from 1989 to 2000, when he became the president of Aerospace Corporation in September 

of that year and then CEO in May 2001. A list of Center Directors that includes dates of their service is available at http://

www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/director.html (accessed 30 August 2016).
Chapter 6 • Out of S

for what they call validation and verification.... “Verification” means you meet the 

requirements and “validation” means that 

it’s going to operate as intended and give 

the results.... It’s not unusual for a space 

system to spend 18 months in test before 

it launches. Thermovac chambers that simulate space and all that stuff. So the project centers know how to do this and have 

the mindset to do it. Ames doesn’t. They 

have none of the infrastructure for it. At 

Goddard or Marshall, they’ve got at least 

1,000, maybe up to 2,000, engineers who 

are in what’s called the functional organization.... And they’re grouped by disciplines. 

And they’re all experts in cryogenics or 

system engineering or mechanical systems. 

I think mechanical systems at Goddard has 

800 people in that division. So when I had a 

contract that got in trouble—the same with 

JPL—those people go fix it. They go out to 

the contractor plant, and they bring in technical expertise for overseeing what the contractor is doing and then tell the contractor 

how to do it.... When Ames is in trouble, I 

have nobody to go to. I have no engineering staff. I have no one who’s worked on a 

project since Pioneer, which last launched in 

1978. I’ve got nobody there. So why do I 

want to expose myself to that risk?23

Pellerin wanted to transfer SIRTF to 

another Center. He had just finished the last 

of his battles with contractors over the construction of Hubble. (Hubble would launch in 

a year, and new battles would ensue over the 

imperfect mirror.) There had been problems 

with Lockheed, the contractor responsible for 

Hubble’s system integration and test. This was 

due to incompatibilities between Lockheed and 

Goddard in their organizational cultures and 

testing processes.24 An army of engineers from 

Goddard went to Sunnyvale and stayed until 

the issues were resolved. It was quite likely that 

SIRTF would end up at Lockheed, too, if for 

no other reason than that Ames was right next 

door to the Lockheed facility. “I was scared to 

death that Ames might end up doing SIRTF 

with Sunnyvale with nobody to watch,” Pellerin 

said. “How am I ever going to get the oversight 

I need and the management I need?”25 Although 

the contract for Hubble was huge by NASA’s 

standards, it was small by Lockheed’s. Goddard 

found it hard to get the best people and the 

attention of management at Lockheed.26 The 

majority of Lockheed’s revenue came from classified work. Pellerin was worried that Ames, 

given its size, would have even less influence 

over the contractor.27

23. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009. Compare Pellerin’s remark about JPL in this passage with the following entry in one of 

the Caroff notebooks: “JPL: center positioned as planetary, but also long wavelength astrophysics; would be enthusiastic 

to work with Ames on IR; lots of personnel (5300) and can ‘store’ about 1000 people by doing DoD work when a NASA 

project is not available.” Note that this is a unique and flexible advantage for a Center working on projects that drag out 

at NASA (entry dated 9 November 1988, “IR/SubMM/Radio Branch, Book II, July 29, 1988, to November 3, 1989,” 

Lawrence J. Caroff Notebooks, PP08.18, Box 1, Folder 3, NASA Ames History Office, ARC, Moffett Field, CA).

24. Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 365.

25. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

26. Lockheed certainly has talented people—this is the firm that, in response to Sputnik, developed the first U.S. spy 

satellite at Sunnyvale, while the Burbank facility is where the U-2 and A-12/SR-71 Blackbird originated and gave us 

the term skunk works to designate a place of innovation; available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/pressreleases/2010/august/FirstSuccessfulCoronaRemo.html (accessed 30 August 2016).

27. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
92 Making the Invisible Visible

A Noncompetitive Competition

On 5 April 1989, a letter went out to the 

Directors of all of NASA’s Centers announcing 

that a “non-competitive competition” would be 

held to determine which Center would be given 

management of SIRTF. The letter was from 

Pellerin’s boss, Lennard Fisk, who indicated that 

Ames was the default choice, but there were caveats. Fisk wrote:

I have decided that Ames, in consideration 

of its extensive and excellent study activities 

in support of SIRTF, will be given first consideration in this selection. For this reason, 

the Management Plans submitted by other 

centers (which are generally more experienced in this class of mission) will be used 

first as aids in evaluating the reasonableness 

of the Ames plan. If, after such evaluation, 

it is decided that the Ames plan is sound, 

realistic, and consistent with agency polices 

and plans, Ames will be selected as the management center. If, on the other hand, it is 

decided that Ames should not be selected, 

we shall proceed, on the basis of the material in hand, to select one of the other centers. It is planned that this final decision will 

be made by June 1, 1989, two weeks after 

receipt of your submissions.28

The decision, in part, had already been made. 

In Pellerin’s mind, Goddard and JPL were the 

obvious choices. Both had been expressing their 

interest in the project since November 1988.29

Goddard had developed the Einstein Observatory, 

the first X-ray space telescope launched in 1978, 

and was currently overseeing Hubble (in coordination with Marshall Space Flight Center, where 

AXAF was located). In addition, Goddard was 

already building IRAC, SIRTF’s short-wavelength infrared camera, for Giovanni Fazio, the 

instrument’s principal investigator. The other 

leading candidate was JPL, which wanted to 

be the home for infrared astrophysics (together 

with Caltech, which manages JPL for NASA). 

“JPL really wanted it badly,” Pellerin said. “They 

romanced me hard.”30 Pellerin wanted to go 

ahead and transfer SIRTF to JPL. 

People at Ames were upset by this decision—

they had nurtured SIRTF for 18 years—and did 

not want to see it taken away just when it looked 

as if it would become a reality. Pellerin told the 

SIRTF team at Ames, “You don’t have the depth 

of expertise I want when [the contractors] get in 

trouble.... It’s not you guys. I don’t have any difficulty with you.... This center doesn’t have the 

depth to do it.”31 The Ames team thought they 

could handle it and demanded a competition. 

Though Pellerin was doubtful that Ames could 

win, he agreed to it and Fisk oversaw the process.

Four Centers bid for SIRTF—Ames, JPL, 

Goddard, and Marshall—and submitted a project management plan. Each expected to handle 

the project at their own Center, but Marshall’s 

plan proposed teaming with Ames to manage the 

SIRTF Science Center, which would handle science program selection, scheduling, data acquisition, and processing after launch. In the little 

time that everyone had to put together plans, 

28. Lennard Fisk to NASA Center Directors, dated 5 April 1989, in Science Working Group minutes and presentations of 

10–12 July 1989, pp. 88–90.

29. Lawrence J. Caroff Notebooks, entries dated 9 November and 22 November 1988, PP08.18, Box 1, Folder 3, “IR/

SubMM/Radio Branch, Book II July 29, 1988 to November 3, 1989,” NASA Ames History Office, NASA Ames Research 

Center, Moffett Field, CA.

30. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

31. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.
Chapter 6 • Out of S

Marshall had not coordinated this with Ames, so 

it was difficult to evaluate this teaming arrangement. Pellerin would have resisted it anyway. 

“Anytime someone says, ‘I’m going to set up an 

organization to get the best people from everywhere,’ you run away,” he said. “I’m going to set 

up an organization with clean interfaces, and 

they’re going to find the people.... Inter-Center 

interfaces are disastrous.... Nobody wants to be 

subordinate.... With a Center and a contractor, 

it’s no problem. The Center is in charge, the contractor is the second-tier party.... But when it’s 

even/even, and neither one wants to be bossed by 

the other, nobody’s in charge.”32 Pellerin insisted 

that one Center get SIRTF, all of it.

At the end of June, representatives of the four 

Centers were invited to present their plans to Fisk 

and Robert Rosen, the Associate Administrator 

for NASA’s Office of Aeronautics and Space 

Technology. The criteria were, in equal measure, 

the Center’s commitment to SIRTF, its scientific/

technical understanding and past performance 

in building infrared instruments, the qualifications of the project team at that Center, and the 

adequacy of its management plan. “Adequacy” 

included considerations of the Center’s past performance in managing billion-dollar projects, 

and a projected cost and development schedule 

in line with other Centers’. In addition, the plan 

needed to specify which portions of the program 

were to be outsourced to contractors and how 

their performance would be monitored, what 

the interfaces would be between organizations, 

how the systems would be integrated, and where 

the expertise and personnel would come from to 

troubleshoot or manage crises that might arise.33

Watching this process unfold, Larry Caroff was 

dismayed that his former colleagues at Ames 

might lose the project to which they had dedicated so much of their careers. Caroff was joined 

in his concern by Fred Gillett, who was wrapping 

up two years at Headquarters as a Visiting Senior 

Scientist for the Infrared and Radio Astrophysics 

Branch (a branch he helped establish). Both 

Caroff and Gillett understood the concerns of 

their current colleagues at Headquarters and 

so sought to provide insight into this process. 

Although projects had occasionally been transferred from one Center to another, there had 

never been a competition like this. The rules 

had to be invented. Gillett wrote to the Ames 

team that 

I and others are trying to make sure that this 

process is as fair as possible, but you should 

recognize at the start that there is going to 

be a tremendous variation in the parameters that describe the definition and development phases.... That means that there 

will be a tremendous latitude for interpreting the reality of proposed resource plans. 

Therefore, Ames’s proposal is going to have 

to do more than just be consistent with 

what is adjudged as appropriate...because 

“appropriate” is in large part going to be in 

the eye of the beholder. The way to win this 

non-competitive competition is to make the 

proposal so compelling that it would seem 

foolish not to support it.34

The Ames proposal had to make Pellerin 

look smart in recommending them, and it had 

to dispel the notion that Ames management was 

ambivalent about the SIRTF program. 

Ames management made their strong support very clear. Nevertheless, serious reservations 

32. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

33. Fisk, 5 April 1989, letter.

34. E-mail from Fred Gillett to D. Compton, J. Sharp, and P. Dyal, “SIRTF Management Decision” (message # LJIJ-2807-

7450), dated 14 April 1989.
94 Making the Invisible Visible

TABLE 6.1. Criteria of Center competition with scores ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high).

Criteria Ames Goddard JPL

Center Commitment

• Priority of SIRTF and Center commitment

• SIRTF project access to top levels of management

• First-rate team/program phaseout to accommodate SIRTF

4 3 4

Scientific/Technical Expertise

• Demonstrated scientific/technical understanding of SIRTF program

• Scientific/technical approach planned for SIRTF

• Scientific/technical Center experience and past performance

5 5 4

Management Plan

• Management Center experience and past performance

• Program schedule and resource requirements

• SIRTF project organization and management approach

• Assignment of responsibilities (in house or contract)

• Methods of project monitoring and control (in house or contract)

• Technical problem solving and crisis management

• The role of other Centers

• Management, scientific, and reporting interfaces between project/program

• Cost and availability of proposed facilities

1 5 5

Project Team

• SIRTF definition phase project team (phase B)

• SIRTF development phase project team (phase C/D)

• Additional personnel proposed for SIRTF project team

3 4 4

slanted against it, the process provided a rare and 

valuable opportunity for Headquarters to bring 

the expertise of four of its major project Centers 

to bear on SIRTF and take stock of the program. 

By comparing the different cost estimates and 

project management approaches, executives in 

Fisk’s and Pellerin’s OSSA could triangulate the 

likely costs and possible problems of SIRTF.

Seismic Shift 

At the end of September 1989, Headquarters 

began the formal transfer of SIRTF from Ames 

to JPL.35 The project experienced a physical dislocation of 300 miles, roughly paralleling the 

San Andreas fault line, from Mountain View 

to Pasadena, California. After the rumbling 

stopped, the project found itself relatively intact. 

remained about whether Ames had the necessary 

resources to solve technical problems and effectively handle crises. Marshall’s project plan did 

not provide a sufficiently detailed account of how 

a teaming arrangement with Ames would work, 

and the reviewers found it difficult to score their 

plan. JPL and Goddard had similar strengths, but 

ultimately JPL demonstrated greater interest in 

managing SIRTF. An average score for all criteria 

is presented in Table 6.1. 

It is likely that the competition was over 

before it began. Ames lost and JPL was given 

responsibility for taking SIRTF through to 

the next stage. In some ways, it was not unlike 

Pellerin’s experience with the straw vote on New 

Starts. The cards had already been dealt, and all 

that was left was to play the hand. Regardless 

of whether the competition was fair to Ames or 

35. Lawrence J. Caroff Notebooks, entry dated 9/26/89, PP08.18, Box 1, Folder 3, “IR/SubMM/Radio Branch, Book II July 

29, 1988 to November 3, 1989,” NASA Ames History Office, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA.
Chapter 6 • Out of S

Prior to the competition, JPL had begun working with Ames to help define a data communications plan under various orbit scenarios. As a 

result, JPL scientists were already familiar with 

SIRTF’s design when the laboratory was awarded 

the management contract. While Ames personnel would rather have retained the management 

of SIRTF, they wanted SIRTF to succeed and 

helped to make the transfer as smooth as possible.

JPL wanted Mike Werner to remain as project 

scientist. Werner wanted to, as well; for two years 

he commuted to JPL from Northern California, 

where his son was finishing high school. The 

only other person to transfer from Ames to JPL 

was Peter Eisenhardt, who was a co-investigator on the IRAC instrument. Werner had hired 

him after Eisenhardt completed his Ph.D. at the 

University of Arizona in 1984.

The bulk of the knowledge about SIRTF 

resided in the Science Working Group.36 This 

was both unusual and fortunate, as it really 

didn’t matter to the SWG which Center was 

responsible for the project. The SWG’s scientists 

were at the cutting edge of the infrared detector 

technology upon which SIRTF’s instruments 

relied. The flight Centers—JPL, Goddard, and 

Marshall—each had relevant skills for designing 

and operating the spacecraft on which the SWG’s 

instruments would be installed.

Another reason that the move to JPL was not 

more disruptive is that SIRTF’s design was not 

that mature. Despite the fact that SIRTF had 

been under development for almost two decades, 

it was still in Phase A. Since 1971, all of the work 

on SIRTF had been to develop a concept and 

conduct preliminary analyses. SIRTF was just on 

the cusp of moving into Phase B, which is NASA 

nomenclature for the engineering-design portion 

of the project. After successfully completing Phase 

B, NASA might then authorize a New Start and 

enter Phase C/D to build and launch the facility (see Table 6.2 for details). Up to this point, 

the SIRTF SWG and project office members had 

mostly worked on feasibility studies, tradeoff 

analyses, and detector development. These activities were useful for developing technical knowledge but did little to move the project forward. 

Indeed, there was a sense that some were simply 

“bring me a rock” exercises, designed to keep 

the team together and busy while Headquarters 

TABLE 6.2. Full mission life cycle.

Pre-Phase A Conceptual study

Phase A Preliminary analysis

Phase B Definition • System requirements review

• System design review

• Non-advocate review

Phase C/D Design and development • Preliminary design review

• Critical design review

• Test readiness review

• Flight readiness review

Phase E Operations phase 

MO&DA (Mission Ops & Data Analysis)

• Primary mission

• Extended mission

36. Michael W. Werner, interview by author, Pasadena, CA, 15 December 2008; and Caroff and Manning interview, 3 

September 2008. 
96 Making the Invisible Visible

worked to obtain the necessary financial and 

political support for a New Start.37

One of the first tasks after the project arrived 

at JPL was to prepare the request for proposals 

(RFP) for Phase B. The RFP was a solicitation 

for contractors to turn the Phase A conceptual 

design into an engineering design. This activity 

had started at Ames and was continued at JPL as 

a way to show that the project hadn’t lost momentum as a result of the move. The RFP was issued 

with the permission of NASA Headquarters on 

1 June 1990.

As the excitement over SIRTF wore off a little, 

JPL managers realized that they first needed to 

have their own internal review before bringing in 

outside contractors. JPL had assigned a seasoned 

project manager to SIRTF, Dick Spehalski, who 

had previously managed several billion-dollar 

missions. In October 1989, Spehalski convened 

an internal review of SIRTF’s engineering and 

systems integration issues, drawing JPL representatives from all the major engineering areas (see 

organization chart in Fig. 6.4).38 This joint review 

provided an opportunity to consider SIRTF in 

a more reflective way than had been possible 

during the brief management competition.

As Spehalski was bringing together the JPL 

team to assess SIRTF, the Agency’s overall priorities and performance were being reviewed 

at the behest of Vice President Dan Quayle by 

a 12-member committee chaired by Norman 

Augustine. In December 1990, they presented 

their findings in the Report of the Advisory 

Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program.

As noted earlier, the Augustine commission gave 

NASA a mixed rating, affirming space science as 

one of NASA’s core elements but criticizing the 

Agency for its lack of a coherent national space 

FIGURE 6.4. Organization chart of SIRTF (c. 1990) (SIRTF Briefing for OSSA, 22 March 1990).

37. McCreight interview, 2 September 2008.

38. Dick Spehalski, SIRTF JPL Internal Review, October 1989.

SPACE INFRARED TELESCOPE FACILITY (SIRTF)

PROJECT ORGANIZATION

Technical Divisions

31 32 33 34 35 36

P. Mason

J. Plamondon

37 38

Tracking and 

Data Systems

J. Wilcher

Launch Vehicle System 

Manager LaRC

J. Wikete

Project & System 

Engineering Manager

W. McLaughlin

Contracts and 

Procurement

I. Petrac

Flight System 

Manager

A. Cherniack

Financial 

Management

Systems Earth and Space 

Sciences

Telecommunications 

Science and 

Engineering

Electronics and 

Control

Mechanical Systems 

Engineering and 

Research

Information 

Systems

Institutional 

Computing and 

Mission Operations

Observational 

Systems

R & QA

Safety

Project Manager

R. Spehalski

Project Scientist

M. Werner

Science and Mission 

Operations Manager

R. Miller

Mission Design 

Manager

J. Kwok

Flight Operations 

Center Manager

Vacant

Science Support 

Center Manager

R. Miller, Acting

Mission Operations 

Support Manager

M. Alazard

Payload 

Manager

F. Wright

Telescope 

Manager

F. Barath, Acting

Spacecraft 

Manager

W. McLaughlin, Acting

System Engineering 

Manager

N. Yarnell

Flight System Inte gration 

and Test Manager

H. Doupe
Chapter 6 • Out of S

policy. The committee was of the opinion that 

“NASA is oversubscribed in terms of the projects 

it is pursuing, given its financial and personnel 

resources and the time allotted to pursue them.”39

In this climate, which was also chilled by the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf, Congress asked 

NASA to defer Phase B activities for SIRTF. Once 

again, SIRTF had to hit the brakes. 

Attention to Advocacy

To successfully sell a billion-dollar project, 

one needs both political support and financial 

resources. At the end of 1990, SIRTF didn’t have 

enough of either one. The SWG knew that it had 

to reduce SIRTF’s costs (a fact that Pellerin would 

regularly remind them of). Certainly, SIRTF’s 

costs had to align with the available funding, but 

how much was available depended on the mood 

in Congress and at Headquarters. So, with one 

eye on the budget, the SWG began to focus on 

managing the mood of stakeholders through 

deliberate advocacy.

The SWG had learned the hard way about 

not having explicit support in the Field report. 

With a new decade, there would be a new survey. 

The 1990s decadal survey was chaired by John 

Bahcall, as enthusiastic a supporter of spacebased telescopes as was his older colleague Lyman 

Spitzer. The SWG took an aggressive stance to 

ensure that the Bahcall report gave SIRTF sufficient support; the goal was not merely for SIRTF 

to be a priority, but for it to be the top priority. 

The SWG was aided by having Fred Gillett 

and Jim Houck, two major supporters of SIRTF, 

as chair and vice-chair, respectively, of the Infrared 

Astronomy Panel of the 1990s survey committee. 

Gillett, as noted above, had helped to establish the 

Infrared branch at Headquarters and was a good 

friend of Frank Low, one of the SIRTF facility 

scientists. Low and Gillett had both worked on 

IRAS, where Low was responsible for the cryogenic technology and Gillett for the detectors. 

Gillett and Low were both brilliant but opposite 

in temperament. Low relied on his intuition, preferring that things be done his way, and (to the 

irritation of others) he was usually right. He was 

argumentative but deeply committed—playing 

the role of the “loyal opposition.”40 In contrast, 

Gillett was meticulous, polished, and very skilled 

at building consensus. Choosing Gillett as chair 

was a decision with which even Low couldn’t disagree. Jim Houck was also a favorable choice for 

the infrared panel. Houck was a member of the 

SWG and PI for the spectroscopy instrument on 

SIRTF. Houck had even been a member of the 

1970s decadal survey (Greenstein report). Back 

then, there were only a handful of infrared scientists. Although more established scientists ultimately set the agenda for the 1970s, the idea of 

a SIRTF-like project was not new. Houck had 

introduced it then but would now be in a better 

position to address objections.

Gillett and Houck succeeded in their mission.41 Not only was SIRTF named as the top 

priority in the Bahcall report, but the 1990s were 

named the “Decade of the Infrared.”42 There had 

never been a clearer statement of scientific support for SIRTF. Now the SWG just needed to 

secure funding for the project. 

While Congress was advising NASA to defer 

the Phase B activities for SIRTF, the SWG was 

39. Augustine report, 1990, page 19.

40. Michael Werner, “Frank Low’s Contributions to the History of Infrared Astronomy,” presentation at the 214th Meeting of 

the American Astronomical Society, 7–11 June 2009, Pasadena, CA.

41. Another advocate was Charles Beichman, who had an indirect position of influence on the decadal review. Beichman, an 

infrared astronomer at Caltech/JPL and a key participant in SIRTF’s IRAC instrument, moved to Princeton for a year to 

help John Bahcall manage the decadal review process.

42. Bahcall report, p. 75.
98 Making the Invisible Visible

getting advice on how to lobby Congress. JPL’s 

director for Earth and Space Science, Charles 

Elachi, and the SIRTF program manager at 

Headquarters, Art Fuchs, recommended to the 

SWG that it appoint someone to be the chief 

advocate for SIRTF.43 Such a strategy had worked 

for AXAF; Harvey Tananbaum, of the HarvardSmithsonian Center for Astrophysics, was a tireless 

and relentless advocate for AXAF and was free to 

promote the project because he was not a federal 

employee. It should be noted that, as government 

employees, NASA personnel are not permitted to 

lobby or directly persuade elected officials to support a particular program (Pellerin’s own AXAF 

maneuvers notwithstanding). NASA’s priorities 

are dictated by the White House and Congress, 

and government employees are meant to carry 

out those directives. However, not all members of 

the SIRTF SWG were employees of NASA or the 

government. The three Principal Investigators 

were all employed by universities: Jim Houck 

(Cornell), George Rieke (University of Arizona), 

and Giovanni Fazio (Harvard-Smithsonian 

Center for Astrophysics). As such, they were not 

prohibited from lobbying—nor, for that matter, 

are JPL employees, who are directly managed by 

Caltech, not NASA.44 However, the three PIs 

were all busy serving on professional committees, 

teaching courses at their home institutions, and 

developing their instruments for SIRTF.

Therefore, starting with its April 1991 meeting, the SWG was joined by a new member, 

Marcia Rieke.45 Like her husband George, 

Marcia Rieke was an accomplished astronomer, instrument builder, and faculty member 

at the University of Arizona. Both had earned 

their doctorates in Boston in the 1970s, George 

at Harvard, Marcia at MIT. They later met at 

the University of Arizona and eventually married. While George was busy developing detectors for SIRTF, Marcia was doing the same for 

Hubble. Marcia’s detectors, among the first 

128- by 128-pixel arrays in infrared astronomy, 

were incorporated in the Near Infrared Camera 

and Multi-Object Spectrometer (NICMOS) and 

installed on Hubble during a servicing mission 

in 1997. Hubble, primarily an optical telescope, 

could now see in the dark (at least in the near-infrared spectrum), thanks in part to Marcia.

Rieke was enthusiastic about her new role as 

SIRTF’s chief advocate. At the earliest opportunity, she visited DC. Her timing could not have 

had been worse. The American Astronomical 

Society was holding its 177th meeting in 

Philadelphia from 13 to 17 January 1991. “I took 

the train down to Washington, DC,” Rieke said. 

“I was going to talk with the folks at Headquarters 

about what approach we’d use in doing advocacy and presenting the SIRTF project to people 

on Capitol Hill so they’d understand it, and so 

on. Well, it was kind of a dead-on-arrival meeting, because I walked in the door and they said, 

‘There’s a letter from Senator Mikulski [saying] 

that these projects are all canceled.’”46 To top it 

off, that week, a U.S.-led coalition began the 

bombing attack on Iraq known as Desert Storm. 

43. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 11–13 December 1990.

44. JPL is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and is managed by Caltech under contract with NASA. 

Furthermore, Caltech is a private research university. Because of this arrangement, unique among the NASA Centers, 

employees of JPL/Caltech can lobby government officials on behalf of themselves or their organizations.

45. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 9–11 April 1991.

46. Barbara Mikulski, Democratic senator from Maryland who at the time of this writing is nearing retirement, was a member 

of the Appropriations Committee from 1987 to 2015. She is a strong advocate for NASA: Goddard is in her state, and 

Hubble alone has brought hundreds of jobs to her state. While the quotation reflects Mikulski’s influence, she would not 

have had unilateral power to cancel a mission. Instead, cancellations result from legislative or report language of the 

Appropriations Committee. 
Chapter 6 • Out of S

Rieke had become SIRTF’s advocate just as 

NASA Headquarters was told to cancel SIRTF. 

People avoided mentioning SIRTF in the halls 

of Headquarters.47 Associate Administrator Len 

Fisk scraped together discretionary funding and 

funneled it to the “Infrared Astronomy Mission” 

that everyone formerly with SIRTF was now 

working on.48

Project Manager Merry-Go-Round

The “Infrared Astronomy Mission” was sustained 

by scraps from Headquarters’ and JPL’s discretionary funding. The detectors were the crown 

jewels of the telescope, and spending time and 

money on their development was important 

and useful work. But without a real project to 

hold the team together, JPL began to take seasoned managers from SIRTF and reassign them. 

For better or worse, JPL had plenty of work 

for experienced managers to do. The high-gain 

antenna on the Galileo probe failed to deploy in 

April 1991. Spehalski, who had been managing 

the Galileo project one way or another since the 

mid-1970s, was put back on to help troubleshoot 

Galileo, leaving SIRTF after only one year as its 

project manager.49

SIRTF was no longer a major project but 

simply a detector-development initiative. So JPL 

assigned James A. Evans to be the project manager of this “sort-of SIRTF”; his formal title was 

manager of the Astrophysics and Fundamental 

Physics Preprojects program. Evans’s two decades 

of experience managing the development of tanks 

for the Army did not make him a particularly 

good fit for SIRTF or for infrared detector development in general, but he remained with sort-of 

SIRTF until October 1993, when he became 

assistant laboratory director of JPL’s Office of 

Technology and Applications.50

Moving managers around was a disruptive 

but increasingly necessary practice. Media and 

congressional scrutiny were now a regular part 

of operations, especially when something went 

wrong with a project for which taxpayers were 

expected to pay a billion dollars or more. The best 

project managers were in high demand to quickly 

correct technical issues and avoid public-relations 

disasters. Two months earlier, in August 1993, 

mission operations engineers had lost contact 

with Mars Observer just as it was nearing the 

planet.51 The public had all but forgotten about 

the probe during the year it took to reach Mars. 

Presumably, it exploded because of a fuel leak 

while attempting to achieve orbit. Before the 

explosion of Challenger and the Hubble mirror 

debacle, such a loss might have received little 

attention. Now it was front-page news. 

There was no project more important to 

NASA in the autumn of 1993 than the repair of 

Hubble’s mirror. Hubble had launched in 1990 

with a mirror whose outer edge was too flat by 

4 microns (roughly equal to one-twelfth the 

thickness of a human hair). NASA did not catch 

the problem before launch; the polishing process 

was a classified military secret, and NASA had 

relied on the contractor’s test reports. The result 

of this spherical aberration was a telescope that 

47. Marcia J. Rieke, interview by author, Long Beach, CA, 6 January 2009; also Werner interview, 15 December 2008.

48. The designation “Infrared Astronomy Mission” is used instead of “SIRTF” on the project Gantt charts (see, e.g., SIRTF 

SWG Meeting Minutes, 11–13 December 1992).

49. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 16–18 March 1992.

50. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 16–18 March 1992.

51. Mars Observer Mission Failure Investigation Board Report (T. P. Coffey, chairman), National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, 31 December 1993; available at http://spacese.spacegrant.org/Failure%20Reports/Mars_

Observer_12_93_MIB.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).
100 Making the Invisible Visible

could not focus properly. NASA called on experts 

at several Centers and on contractors to develop 

the solution, the Wide Field/Planetary Camera 

Number 2 (WFPC2), which functioned much 

like a pair of prescription glasses for correcting 

astigmatism. The servicing mission occurred in 

December 1993, during which Shuttle astronauts 

fitted Hubble with the new instrument, resulting in some of the most spectacular and sublime 

images of space anyone had ever seen.

The person responsible for the WFPC2 program at JPL was Larry Simmons, and a lot was 

riding on him. He had to coordinate the efforts of 

dozens of organizations and hundreds of people, 

who had 18 months to build WFPC2 and train 

the Shuttle astronauts to install it on Hubble, 

350 miles above Earth—all under intense scrutiny from the press, the public, and Congress. 

Simmons explained to NASA Administrator 

Daniel S. Goldin how what they were doing 

was “going to save the Hubble.” In response, 

Simmons remembers, Goldin, “nose to nose 

almost, looking me in the face, putting his glasses 

up on his forehead, [said,] ‘What you’re doing is 

going to save NASA.’ I mean, he was adamant. 

So we had a lot of oversight.”52 Simmons would 

become SIRTF’s next project manager.53

52. Larry Simmons, interview by author, Pasadena, CA, 18 February 2009. 

53. In a personal communication dated 8 November 2010, Michael Werner commented:

WF/PC-2 was under development at JPL when the spherical aberration problem was discovered. The camera was 

redesigned during the fabrication process to correct the images.... When Simmons came to work on Spitzer after 

the success of WF/PC-2, he brought with him several other excellent engineers—notably Steve Macenka and Jim 

Fanson (and eventually Dave Gallagher)—who had contributed to the success of WF/PC-2 and were really, really 

capable. I learned from this that one of the attributes of a good Project Manager is that he attracts good people to 

work with him, who may follow him from project to project.
101

CHAPTER 7

From Orphan to Poster Child

When Larry Simmons came on board in 

November 1993, the SIRTF SWG was 

doing what it could to make the pendulum swing 

back its way. Nearly three years had passed since 

Marcia Rieke’s first visit to NASA Headquarters 

in January 1991; on subsequent visits, she found 

the Agency’s administrators to be somewhat 

more receptive. The Gulf War was now over, and 

Congress was more willing to hear about new 

space-related initiatives, but on the Hill, NASA 

was perceived as inefficient, slow, and bloated. 

NASA—the innovative darling of the 1960s—

had become, in the worst sense of the word, a 

bureaucracy.

To address this perception, the White House 

had appointed a new NASA administrator, Dan 

Goldin, to cut costs and reduce risks across the 

entire Agency. Goldin replaced Richard Truly, 

an admiral and former astronaut, who had been 

brought in to start the cost-cutting process by 

first taming the problems with the Space Shuttle 

and Hubble programs. Goldin took the reins on 

1 April 1992. He had had 25 years of experience 

in the defense industry, most recently as the vice 

president and general manager of the TRW Space 

and Technology Group. He brought to NASA 

such management concepts as Total Quality 

Management and a greater reliance on outsourcing. During his tenure (1992–2001), he cut staffing levels, directed more funding toward science 

missions, and instituted a new policy on projects. 

In the Goldin era, projects could no longer be 

so large that they consumed the majority of the 

Agency’s budget or caused a public outcry when 

they failed. Instead of a few large projects, there 

would be many small ones, resulting in more 

opportunities to experiment with new technologies and in shorter development cycles. 

Faster, Better, Cheaper

Goldin’s project philosophy came to be known 

as “faster, better, cheaper.”1

 SIRTF was certainly 

better. But it wasn’t faster or cheaper. Even before 

Goldin’s arrival, Charlie Pellerin and the SWG 

had been searching for ways to reduce the cost. 

1. Goldin’s approach is probably best viewed as beneficial in the short term but problematic in the long term. A number of 

scientists have criticized the “faster, better, cheaper” approach. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (6 vols. 

[Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2003], available at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/html/start.html) argued 

that this policy was too aggressive and had undermined safety and quality at NASA, citing it as a cause of the second 

Shuttle disaster. For an in-depth discussion of Goldin’s policies, including their benefits, see Howard E. McCurdy, Faster, 

Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
102 Making the Invisible Visible

Pellerin wanted nothing more than to complete 

the Great Observatories. Thus SIRTF needed to 

be ready with a plan when Congress was once 

more receptive.

SIRTF would probably never be faster. 

Although the project had changed, the acronym 

had been the same for two decades. Fisk suggested 

giving it a new name as a way to reinvigorate the 

project. Unfortunately, doing so would wipe out 

all the advocacy and name recognition that had 

been achieved. The name remained.

SIRTF could perhaps be cheaper. A month 

before Goldin came on board, the SWG had 

unveiled a slimmer SIRTF.2

 As with any cargo, 

its weight largely determines how much it will 

cost. The larger the telescope, the more complex 

and costly it is to build and the more powerful 

and costly the rocket needed for launch. At the 

cheaper end, IRAS cost $400 million and was put 

into a 900-kilometer orbit with a Delta rocket. 

By contrast, Hubble—which cost $2 billion, 

weighed 24,500 pounds (11,113 kilograms), 

and spanned 43.5 feet (13.3 meters)3

—was so 

large that only the Shuttle could accommodate 

it. By 1989, when the SIRTF project arrived at 

JPL, launching on the Shuttle was no longer 

the favored option, so SIRTF was configured to 

launch with a Titan rocket, the standard choice 

for large payloads. But Titan rockets are also 

expensive. By 1992, SIRTF had gone on a diet 

and was small enough that it could now fit on 

an Atlas rocket, which brought down costs. But 

the price for SIRTF was still a hefty $1.2 billion. 

Even in its current configuration, it would never 

satisfy Goldin’s criteria.

Going in Circles (Around the Sun)

Although shrinking SIRTF to fit on an Atlas 

rocket didn’t entirely solve the budget problems, 

reducing the weight revived the possibility of 

launching SIRTF into an even higher orbit. The 

SWG had considered nearly a dozen orbit configurations by this point.4

 The perfect orbit was one 

that allowed for maximum unobstructed viewing 

and could be reached with a (cheap) launch vehicle. SIRTF was at that point designed to orbit 

Earth, with all the concomitant interference from 

the planet itself, plus its Sun and Moon. Earth 

orbit was easy to reach with most launch vehicles 

and provided plenty of opportunities to download data from the telescope as it passed over 

ground stations. From an observational perspective, however, it was inefficient.

Johnny Kwok had a radical idea. He had 

heard the scientists’ argument that the farther 

the telescope could get from Earth, the better 

it would be for astronomical observations. This 

started Kwok thinking about a “trailing-Earth 

orbit,” in which the telescope trails Earth around 

the Sun. This type of orbit had never been 

tried before. Kwok’s insight was that, like two 

cars racing around a track, the telescope would 

follow behind Earth as they were both pulled 

along by the Sun’s gravity. Although they would 

have the same orbit, the telescope would be a 

little slower than Earth. After six or seven years, 

the distance between them due to drift would 

likely be too great for communications; after 60 

to 70 years, the gap would close as Earth lapped 

the telescope. Kwok, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on orbital mechanics and has worked at 

JPL on numerous missions, said:

2. Project-plan briefing presented by James Evans, SIRTF (JPL) Project Manager, to George Newton, NASA (Headquarters) 

Program Manager, June 1993.

3. Telescope specifications and total cost come from http://hubblesite.org/the_telescope/hubble_essentials/quick_facts.php

(accessed 30 August 2016).

4. Rieke, interview, 9 June 2009.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

It gave me an idea about how do I leave 

Earth. Well, from a simple, dynamical perspective, to leave Earth is very simple. You 

just give it enough energy, and with a simple 

equation that you can figure out, you just 

escape. But the problem with escaping is 

that, Well, which way do I escape to? That’s 

something you had to model. Do I shoot 

the telescope in the Sun’s direction, up or 

down?... In 1991, I was a supervisor in the 

mission-design section. I didn’t have time 

to play around with modeling these things. 

One day, a summer student from Colorado 

came in, came to my office. His name was 

Cesar Ocampo—he’s now a professor at the 

University of Texas, my old school.... He 

was a summer student in a different group 

and basically told his supervisor he didn’t 

like the assignment he was given. The supervisor said, “Well, go talk to Johnny. He’s 

always thinking about stuff that he may not 

have time to do himself.” So Cesar came, 

and I talked to him. As an undergraduate 

he’d studied basically the same stuff that I’d 

studied, so it was very easy to talk to him 

and explain things to him. What came to 

my mind about SIRTF was this high-Earth 

orbit. The project was happy with the way 

it was, but I knew that a simple calculation 

says that high-Earth orbit was not a very 

good orbit to be in from an energy perspective. But if I let SIRTF escape, I can 

actually use a smaller rocket; I mean, that 

calculation is very simple. But the thing I 

didn’t have time to figure out was, Which 

way do I send it [into solar orbit]?... [I]f the 

Sun [has] enough gravitational attraction, 

SIRTF may come back and hit the Earth.... 

[I told Cesar to model it], shoot it in different directions and sample all these variables, 

and then tell me what energy and direction 

you want to give to this spacecraft so it will 

escape [Earth], but escape at the minimum 

rate—because I didn’t want it to leave Earth 

too fast, because then I couldn’t talk to it. 

My data rate would go down if it got too far 

away from Earth. So the goal was to find the 

minimum rate at which it would leave Earth 

but without coming back and hitting Earth. 

Cesar knew exactly what I wanted, so over 

the summer he developed a model [and] 

produced a very nice report. In it, there was 

a plot that showed exactly what it took to do 

this, with the minimum distance. Then he 

left after the summer. I put that report away, 

because no one had asked for it. But I knew 

the answer.5

About a year later, Mike Werner was holding another SWG meeting and was looking for 

new ideas for SIRTF. James Evans, the current 

project manager, dropped by Kwok’s office and 

asked him if he might have anything to contribute. Kwok said, “Yes, sure. I think you can change 

the orbit.” When the agenda came out, Kwok’s 

name was not on it. He figured the SWG was 

too busy or didn’t want to hear about yet another 

orbit from a lower-level supervisor. It turned out 

that Kwok had been left off the agenda inadvertently. The SWG was interested, but the schedule was now full. “I ended up doing it during 

lunchtime,” Kwok said. “I told them my...concept—sending a telescope away from Earth and 

just drifting in space.” His presentation was met 

with silence. Frank Low was the first to speak, 

and Kwok braced himself. “Frank Low is another 

one of these brilliant astronomers, but he’s very 

critical...he didn’t have much respect for engineers.... What happened was that...Frank Low 

jumped up and said, ‘That was the best idea I’ve 

heard all day.’ So everybody starting rallying 

behind the [heliocentric, Earth-trailing] concept, 

5. Johnny Kwok, interview with author (Session I), Pasadena, CA, 26 February 2009.
104 Making the Invisible Visible

They wanted the big thing. It took months and 

months, and they finally came around.”9

By the time the SWG came around and 

accepted that NASA would never give them 

a billion dollars, it was November 1993, and 

many of SIRTF’s supporters had left the stage. 

Bill Clinton was president, the leadership in the 

House and Senate had shifted to the Democrats, 

and there were 19 new members on the House 

Appropriations Committee.10 These changes 

meant that a new set of actors were called upon 

to support SIRTF and the Great Observatories.

Despite the changeover from the Bush to the 

Clinton administration, Dan Goldin had been 

asked to stay on as NASA Administrator. Goldin 

took this as an endorsement of his policies, and 

“faster, better, cheaper” became the Agency’s 

mantra. Goldin’s style and policies did not mesh 

well with the Old Guard. Charlie Pellerin left in 

the summer of 1992, a few months after Goldin 

arrived. Len Fisk left a year later. By November 

1993, NASA Headquarters looked quite different 

to Marcia Rieke and the rest of the SIRTF team. 

Fisk had been replaced by Wesley T. Huntress, a 

scientist from Caltech and JPL. Pellerin’s position 

remained unfilled for nearly a year, until Daniel 

Weedman, a professor at Penn State and a collaborator of Jim Houck’s, became the new Director of 

Astrophysics. Larry Caroff was one of the few infrared-science supporters who stayed at Headquarters 

after Goldin came to NASA. Weedman and Caroff 

shared the difficult task of making infrared science 

a priority in the NASA budget.

SIRTF was out of step with the direction in 

which Goldin was taking NASA. Pellerin had 

and then we went off and in the next few months 

we just redesigned the system so that it would 

come down in mass and in cost.”6

Kwok’s idea for a heliocentric, Earth-trailing 

orbit was very efficient and maximized the available observing time. SIRTF needed only to be 

made light enough to launch on an Atlas rocket. 

Even if some capabilities had to be cut to achieve 

the weight reductions, the improvement in efficiency might make up the difference. It gave the 

SWG some breathing room, despite the budgetary constraints.

The overall cost of the mission remained a 

problem. “Still we were stuck,” Pellerin said.7

 A 

recurring question was whether SIRTF could be 

broken up into a few smaller missions (as had 

been done with AXAF), thereby making the 

whole easier to fund. The SWG duly conducted 

a “meiosis study” to see how SIRTF could be split 

up, but the cost savings were not compelling and 

the idea was dropped.8

However, the investment made over the preceding years in developing infrared detectors 

meant that they were now far more powerful than 

they had been when SIRTF was first conceived. 

Could the mission be reduced without losing 

any science? “It’s the same argument as AXAF,” 

Pellerin said. “Detector technology is a hundred 

times better [compared to 1983, when the SIRTF 

Announcement of Opportunity came out]. So I 

can make something one-hundredth the size and 

get you what we [originally contracted]. I don’t 

want to have to do that. Just cut the cost by a 

factor of 3 or 4, and I’ll be happy.... [The SWG] 

all pissed and moaned, just like the AXAF guys. 

6. Kwok interview (Session II), 25 March 2009.

7. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

8. Rich Miller, “Meiosis Study for SIRTF,” reproduced in the SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 1–2 December 1992, Appendix O.

9. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

10. Memorandum to Space Science Working Group on House Reorganization, dated 18 November 1992, included in the 

SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 1–2 December 1992.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

been right: Shrinking SIRTF by 30 percent to 

fit on an Atlas rocket was not enough. Chipping 

away at the edges would not make SIRTF sellable. Headquarters had radically changed. SIRTF 

would have to do the same.

At times it seemed that the SWG was the only 

group still thinking about SIRTF since the project had moved to JPL. Pellerin was no longer at 

Headquarters, which reduced the drive to complete the Great Observatories. Headquarters had 

its hands full with fixing Hubble, while JPL was 

focused on problems with the Galileo and Mars 

Observer missions. While JPL was putting out 

fires, rumors erupted that Goddard might be 

angling for SIRTF.11 It was certainly a plausible 

story; now that their work with Hubble was drawing to a close, Goddard engineers were likely scouting for new projects. Goddard was already helping 

Giovanni Fazio develop IRAC, one of SIRTF’s 

three scientific instruments, so why not the build 

the spacecraft and manage the mission, too?

The SOFIA and Edison Threats

Whether or not Center management of SIRTF 

was actually in dispute, fights over funding were 

very real. Groups were competing for a slice of a 

shrinking pie. Should money ever become available for a New Start, two projects were lining up 

to eat SIRTF’s lunch: SOFIA and Edison.

SOFIA, the Stratospheric Observatory for 

Infrared Astronomy, was an airborne infrared 

telescope being developed at Ames, and Edison 

was a space-based infrared telescope being developed by Scottish and American researchers. Both 

projects were being pitched as cost-effective, 

next-generation infrared instruments. Although 

the scientific community supported SIRTF, it 

was anxious to get a new infrared instrument up 

and running to follow up on the findings of the 

COBE and IRAS missions of the 1980s. No one 

knew if or when SIRTF would fly. SOFIA and 

Edison provided a way to hedge one’s bets.

The advocates for SOFIA were in many cases 

the same people who advocated for SIRTF, who 

naturally used many of the same arguments. In fact, 

Marcia Rieke was asked by Larry Caroff to set up 

a joint SIRTF/SOFIA advocacy program.12 While 

sharing such activities was efficient, it also blurred 

the distinct differences between the two projects, 

making it unclear to OSSA director Len Fisk why 

both projects were needed. This resulted in the 

SIRTF and SOFIA teams arguing over which project was better, more important, and further along 

in development. Despite some overlap, they differed in one critical way: SIRTF had greater sensitivity for seeing fainter objects, whereas SOFIA 

had higher resolution for seeing brighter objects. 

Like a wide-angle versus a close-up camera lens, 

SIRTF and SOFIA were tools equally valuable to 

astronomers for their research.

Weedman and Caroff had to referee these 

arguments, and whichever project they supported, the other project would argue against. 

“These are the kind of tightropes, the kind of 

juggling, that has to be done at Headquarters, 

which makes the Headquarters job so challenging on the one hand and so invigorating on the 

other,” Weedman later recalled. “You’re juggling 

all of these competitions. The Centers are competing with each other. The different segments of 

the community are competing with each other. 

So you have to find a path that accommodates 

all these competitions and gets it done in the 

end. That’s why the management challenge is 

so complicated.”13 There weren’t enough funds 

11. “IR/SubMM/Radio Branch, Book IV, March 15, 1990, to September 11, 1990,” Lawrence J. Caroff notebooks, PP08.18, 

Box 1, Folder 5, NASA Ames History Office, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. 

12. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

13. Daniel W. Weedman, interview by author, Washington, DC, 27 May 2009.
106 Making the Invisible Visible

return to Ames in 1997, both projects had been 

scaled back in ways that made them complementary rather than competitive missions, and able 

to fit together within the NASA budget. “Dan 

[Weedman] was instrumental in getting SIRTF 

sold,” Caroff recalled. “He took over the division 

at the critical time for a year or two, and he got 

SIRTF and SOFIA sold—[a] master strategist.”18

The other project that was making life difficult for SIRTF was Edison, a large infrared 

space telescope concept initially conceived 

by Tim Hawarden, of the Royal Observatory 

at Edinburgh, Scotland.19 It was potentially 

a “faster, better, cheaper” mission because it 

needed no cryogen, instead using the cold temperatures in space to passively cool the infrared 

instruments. This was a radical departure from 

all other infrared space missions—IRAS, COBE, 

Fazio’s IRT on the Shuttle, and the upcoming 

European Space Agency’s ISO project—which 

had immersed the entire telescope, mirrors and 

all, in a cryogen bath called a dewar. Analogous 

to a thermos, the dewar was a proven technology, which SIRTF was also planning to use. In 

contrast, Edison eliminated the cryogen entirely. 

This dewar-free approach had never been tried, 

but if it worked, it would reduce the weight, 

complexity, and cost of the mission.

Advocates for Edison were already involved 

with NASA through the SOFIA project, including astrophysicist Harley Thronson of the 

University of Wyoming and Daniel Lester of 

the University of Texas at Austin. After funding Hawarden’s initial work the European Space 

to support both SIRTF and SOFIA in their current configurations. Complicating matters, the 

Bahcall report was so ambiguously worded that 

both project teams believed their own project had 

received highest priority—SIRTF as the highest 

priority New Start for large projects and SOFIA 

for moderate-sized projects.14 Unfortunately, each 

project was estimated to cost a billion dollars, and 

NASA couldn’t support both. The Bahcall report 

failed to provide NASA with a clear priority or 

political cover for canceling one over the other. 

To resolve the conflict, the science teams pushed 

to have the Bahcall committee review the two 

programs again and render a definitive opinion. 

Both project teams probably thought they would 

win. However, Caroff thought both would lose, 

as weakening support for one project would inevitably weaken support for the other.15 The chairman of the National Research Council’s Space 

Studies Board, physicist Louis Lanzerotti, reluctantly agreed to do a limited review.16 The result 

was an even more carefully worded report asserting that both SIRTF and SOFIA were needed.

With the backing of Lanzerotti’s report, 

Weedman and Caroff sought to eliminate the 

either/or perception regarding SIRTF and 

SOFIA.17 Weedman worked on the policy makers, 

while Caroff focused on the project teams. Caroff 

pushed to lower the cost of both programs by 

reducing their capabilities, particularly where 

they overlapped. Thus the differences between 

the programs would be clearer, and the savings 

might make it possible to afford both as smaller 

programs. By the time Caroff left Headquarters to 

14. Bahcall report, pp. 75–80.

15. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

16. Letter from Louis J. Lanzerotti, chair of Space Studies Board, to Wesley T. Huntress, Associate Administrator for Space 

Science, NASA, dated 21 April 1994.

17. Weedman interview, 27 May 2009; also Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

18. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

19. Hawarden’s original project was called “Passively-cooled Orbiting Infrared Observatory Telescope” (POIROT); see H. A. 

Thronson et al., “The Edison Infrared Space Observatory,” Space Science Reviews 74, nos. 1–2 (1995): 139–144.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

Agency decided not to pursue it further, possibly because ISO was consuming its resources 

and attention. Thronson, who had worked with 

Hawarden while on a sabbatical at Edinburgh, 

wanted to pursue the Edison concept when he 

returned to the United States and thought that 

NASA might be willing to develop it.20 The idea 

of passive cooling was promising, but it needed 

much more engineering analysis to see whether 

it was feasible. Such an analysis seemed harmless 

and prudent, so Caroff provided Thronson with 

a little money out of his discretionary funds at 

Headquarters to get some studies under way.21

On the shoestring budget NASA provided, 

Thronson was able to hire two people (working 

during their free time) to calculate the thermal 

profile and optical sensitivity for a parabolic, 

passively cooled telescope design: Ramona 

Cummings, at Marshall, who worked on the 

engine bells for the Space Shuttle; and one of 

Thronson’s engineering graduate students (“a 

computer whiz”) at Wyoming, whose master’s 

thesis was designing an improved snowplow. 

They weren’t experts in space telescopes, but they 

knew how to model parabolas. Interestingly, both 

engineers were surprised to find that the temperature inside a parabolic curve would drop to 

somewhere between 10 K and –40 K. Thronson 

was not surprised: Tim Hawarden, “with his HP 

calculator, came up with this number a couple of 

years ago,” he remembers.22

These early results were promising, so the 

Edison team ran with it. Thronson and his colleagues tried to generate awareness of the concept 

through journal publications and presentations 

at academic conferences. “Present your stuff in 

public, let folks throw rocks at it,” Thronson 

says. “You hope that enough folks will read 

it and they’ll say, ‘Yes, you know, I think these 

guys are right.’ The SIRTF people did basically 

the same thing in the early ’80s, about a decade 

earlier.”23 The advocacy for Edison did not go 

over well with people working on SIRTF or at 

Headquarters. Caroff recalled: 

[Edison] rose up and people gave it a lot of 

attention, and they were advocating it to 

Congress and at the Agency and saying that 

it could do the job of SIRTF plus a lot more, 

a lot cheaper, and would last longer....

There was an enormous row. I mean, the 

SIRTF people were completely—Oh, they 

were so up in arms and angry it wasn’t even 

funny.... Here are the people at NASA 

asking Congress to spend a billion dollars 

on this infrared mission [SIRTF]. Here is 

[Edison], a bunch of other people coming 

along saying, “Pfft, this whole thing can 

be done for a couple hundred million. We 

can put this thing together and carve it out 

of balsa wood and launch it with a rubber 

band.” They have not studied the thing in 

anywhere near the depth that SIRTF had 

been studied. They hadn’t done the engineering studies. They were just doing sort 

of back-of-the-envelope, order-of-magnitude calculations...But the idea that they 

would trump this thing, when SIRTF was 

in a delicate part of its life trying to get 

sold—basically what they are saying, or you 

could interpret what they were saying, was 

‘SIRTF’s old hat, we’ve gone beyond that, 

why would you want to put money into that 

when you can do this?’ Here is a bunch of 

people on SIRTF who have invested [almost 

20] years, and a center that’s invested an 

20. Harley A. Thronson, interview by author, Long Beach, CA, 4 January 2009.

21. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

22. Thronson interview, 4 January 2009.

23. Thronson interview, 4 January 2009.
108 Making the Invisible Visible

awful lot of its future in this mission. And a 

lot of people who think this Edison mission 

is just viewgraphs right now. There is no 

engineering to back it up. They did [calculations], but there really wasn’t an in-depth 

engineering study of it to back it up. So they 

were just coming in with these concepts 

and ideas and challenging SIRTF. Do this 

debate in the scientific community behind 

closed doors and stuff like that, fine. Do 

it out in the open with Congress involved, 

you know, and people getting wind of the 

fact that NASA’s ‘probably doing something 

really stupid. Why, here are these boys from 

the Royal Observatory of Edinburgh and a 

few others, University of Wyoming, they can 

really teach them a thing or two about how 

to do missions.’ That was the problem.”24

Administrators at Headquarters and the 

SWG scientists were worried that Edison 

could derail SIRTF, and some (but not all) of 

JPL’s engineers wanted nothing to do with an 

untested approach.25 The resistance to Edison 

was overwhelming. “Frank Low probably chewed 

somebody’s tail,” Caroff said when describing 

the pressure exercised by SIRTF’s advocates. 

Caroff himself co-opted the Edison team, redirecting their energies into SOFIA. “I really 

co-opted Harley [Thronson], because when I left 

Headquarters, I asked him if he’d take my place. 

And he did.” 26

“I had been working on various advisory 

committees and so on for NASA,” Thronson 

said. “Larry [Caroff], like Mike Werner and the 

other folks, had really sweated to get SIRTF and 

SOFIA [funded].... Larry had been in that role 

for ten years, and I think he was really ready to go. 

The infrared astronomy community owes Larry a 

lot.... [He] invited me out to dinner, and we had 

a long talk about where NASA astrophysics was 

going. When I woke up the following morning, 

I discovered that I had tentatively accepted a job 

at Headquarters.” Thronson arrived in early 1996 

and was put in charge of SIRTF. “The job of the 

program scientist at Headquarters is to represent 

the project—its scientific goals—to Headquarters 

and represent Headquarters’ goals for the project 

to the mission,” Thronson said. “I saw to it—as 

did other folks—that SIRTF had as easy a time as 

one could have.”27

SIRTF was not only alive but thriving in 

1996 when Thronson took over. To reach that 

point, it had been radically redesigned. By 

1993, when Edison and SOFIA were biting at 

the heels of the SIRTF team, it took a step back 

and came up with a mission concept that was 

unassailable.

24. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008. The passively cooled approach of Edison is being adopted by the 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). This claim is supported by John Mather’s Nobel bio, which mentions the 

link between JWST and Edison (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2006/mather-autobio.

html); the presence of Matt Mountain on JWST’s SWG and as a coauthor of a 1990 proposal on Edison (https://jwst.

nasa.gov/meet-mountain.html); and an article by Edison proposal coauthor John K. Davies in The Space Review, 

2006 (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/688/1), and in the same journal, 1992 (http://www.springerlink.com/

content/w63246064028331x). Another project, SAFIR (Single Aperture Far-Infrared Observatory), is borrowing some of 

Edison’s far-infrared technology concepts, according to the joint Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008. For 

more details, see Dan Lester et al., “Large Infrared Telescopes in the Exploration Era: SAFIR” in UV/Optical/IR Space 

Telescopes: Innovative Technologies and Concepts III, SPIE Proceedings 6687, ed. Harold A. MacEwan and James B. 

Breckinridge (Bellingham, WA: SPIE, 2007). Note that SAFIR, which Caroff pronounced as “sapphire,” is not the same as 

SAFIRE (Submillimeter And Far Infrared Experiment), an instrument on SOFIA.

25. Dr. Donald Rapp, who for many years was chief engineer of missions, tried to find a way for JPL to be involved (personal 

communication with author, 19 November 2007 and reports).

26. Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008.

27. Thronson interview, 4 January 2009.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

A Retreat

In the hope that the SWG might develop some 

new ideas for SIRTF, Jim Houck suggested that 

they schedule a planning retreat. They chose 

a weekend in November 1993 to convene in 

Broomfield, Colorado, near the headquarters of 

Ball Aerospace. Ball had been a longtime partner on SIRTF on various engineering studies 

and most recently had built some of the corrective instrumentation for Hubble. The meeting in Broomfield brought together the SWG 

and the instrument team members. The primary goal of the meeting was to come up with 

a SIRTF that would sell.28 The feeling was that 

if they didn’t come up with something new, that 

could be it for SIRTF. The program might be 

permanently canceled.

The project design stood at $1.3 billion, 

which was an improvement over earlier designs. 

While SIRTF was still heavy enough to require 

an Atlas rocket, it was no longer so heavy that an 

expensive Titan would be needed. The telescope’s 

three instruments—the near-infrared camera, the 

far-infrared camera, and the spectroscope—had a 

range of capabilities that appealed to a broad set 

of scientists. The Atlas-SIRTF concept had been 

well received in a presentation given earlier that 

summer by then-project manager Jim Evans to 

his boss, George Newton, who oversaw SIRTF 

and other programs at Headquarters.

Since then, the rules and project manager had 

changed. Larry Simmons, officially SIRTF’s new 

project manager, was back at JPL wrapping up 

his responsibilities for the Hubble repair mission. 

After headline-making losses, NASA wanted 

more wins and smaller bets. “Goldin decreed that 

he wanted to fill the sky, blacken the sky with 

satellites,” Simmons recalls:

You can’t do that if every one of them costs 

several billion dollars. So he said, “We’re not 

going to launch any missions that cost more 

than a half a billion dollars.” So Jim Evans’ 

billion-dollar SIRTF was sort of dead on 

arrival; so Jim went on to another project. 

And I had just finished building the camera 

that fixed the Hubble.... I had a certain reputation at NASA for getting tough things 

done. I think that contributed, frankly, to 

why I was asked to take over SIRTF. The 

guideline I was given was that we could do 

anything we wanted, but the project had to 

cost less than a half a billion dollars. That 

was a starting point. And that had to include 

everything—launch services and all of that.29

For 20 years, SIRTF’s advocates had done their 

best to accommodate the demands of Agency 

administrators, whether by accepting new Center 

management, flying on a Shuttle, or conducting 

“bring me a rock” studies. This request to cut the 

budget by half after the project had already been 

de-scoped left many of the scientists wondering if 

SIRTF would still be worth doing at such a price. 

To the three instrument PIs, it just might be OK, 

as long as it wasn’t their instrument that got cut.

Balancing tradeoffs is part of the management job. Simmons transitioned to SIRTF after 

leading the Hubble repair mission. As a new 

member of the team, says Simmons, “one of the 

things I had to do was find out what it was [the 

scientists] wanted”:

What they wanted was to get really interesting infrared pictures of the sky, ultimately. 

So how were they going to do that? Well, 

it turned out they didn’t all have the same 

vision. Some of them were interested in the 

28. The description of the Broomfield meeting in this chapter is based on Rieke interview, 9 June 2009; Werner interview, 15 

December 2008; Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009; and Gehrz interview, 5 January 2009.

29. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.
110 Making the Invisible Visible

far infrared, some of them were interested 

in the near infrared. Some were interested in 

spectroscopy, and others were interested in 

imaging. So there were all kinds of interests. 

It was interesting being the new guy. Some of 

them would take me aside, one-on-one, and 

say, “You don’t have to worry about that guy 

over there, he doesn’t have very much influence on things anyway.” So I’d listen to him, 

and then the other guy would come along 

and say, “What he’s trying to do isn’t really 

going to work, and it’s just going to sink 

this ship, so don’t pay too much attention 

to him.” So I realized soon that I couldn’t 

just go to one guy and say, “What should we 

do?” I really had to understand the team.30

Simmons, like Mike Werner, had a very 

open management style. He was willing to share 

financial information—how much was going to 

whom, and for what purpose—with all members 

of the team, whether they were from NASA, the 

academic community, or private industry. This 

openness helped the team to understand the 

financial impact of their actions on the project 

as a whole.

At Broomfield, Mike Werner tried to get the 

SWG to focus on the bigger picture, too. Rather 

than getting caught up in squabbles about who 

was going to lose what functionality on their 

instrument, he sought to build consensus around 

the science that SIRTF needed to accomplish. 

The PIs had invested years in engineering their 

instruments, but they were scientists above all. 

Werner counted on them to recognize that their 

instruments were being built in service to the scientific objectives.

And what were those objectives? The Bahcall 

report, which indicated that SIRTF was the most 

important (large) mission, also laid out the core 

scientific questions in infrared astronomy. It was 

hard to argue with a document that presumably 

represented the consensus of the infrared community, of which the SWG were all members. Werner 

and his deputy project scientist and right-hand 

man, Tom Soifer, tried to identify science topics 

that matched those of the Bahcall report. Mike 

Jura, George Rieke, and Bob Gehrz also helped 

to refine the list. Thus, with relatively little argument, the PIs—Rieke, Giovanni Fazio, and Jim 

Houck—and the rest of the SWG achieved consensus on the questions that the suite of instruments needed to address. The four science goals 

for SIRTF were to observe 1) protoplanetary and 

planetary debris disks (essentially dust clouds 

that are in the process of coalescing into planets), 

2) brown dwarfs and super planets (intermediate 

structures between solid-core planets and fusioning-core stars), 3) ultraluminous galaxies and 

active galactic nuclei (in which star formation 

and black holes might be observed), and 4) the 

early universe (deep surveys to capture emissions 

from the distant edges of the universe).31

These four scientific programs formed the 

yardstick against which tradeoffs could be measured. A feature could not be cut out if it impaired 

(or added if it failed to enhance) SIRTF’s ability to gather data needed to address the four 

areas. This simplified the mission, in both cost 

and complexity.

After deciding on what sort of data SIRTF 

absolutely must be able to gather, the SWG 

turned to the question of how to bring down 

costs. The main ways to accomplish this are to 

either reduce the launch weight or increase the 

30. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.

31. Michael Werner, “A Short and Personal History of the Spitzer Space Telescope,” 1995, ASP Conference Series, preprint 

available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/astro-ph/pdf/0503/0503624v1.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016); and SIRTF SWG 

Meeting Minutes, 16–17 December 1993.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

viewing efficiency. SIRTF was heavy because it 

needed to carry sufficient cryogen (a few thousand liters) to ensure the instruments would be 

sensitive enough for infrared observations and to 

give them a lifespan long enough to make those 

observations. SIRTF’s efficiency depended on 

how long it had a clear view of space, without 

radiation from Earth, the Moon, or the Sun.

As noted, for the Atlas-launched mission 

SIRTF was now 30 percent lighter than it had 

been for the Shuttle-launch mode, allowing a 

launch into high-Earth orbit. It had been redesigned for operation 100,000 kilometers above 

Earth, for which the orbital mechanics were 

well understood. Johnny Kwok’s innovative proposal—to place SIRTF in an Earth-trailing solar 

orbit—was untried, but it had great promise as a 

way to increase the telescope’s viewing efficiency. 

The SWG decided that the risks were worth it if 

they could maximize observation time.

With clear science goals, and an orbit that 

optimized efficiency, the remaining challenge 

was to bring down the weight. One night, Frank 

Low hit upon the idea of doing a warm launch. 

Typically, infrared telescopes are put into a dewar 

of cryogen and cooled to a few kelvins while 

still on the ground. When the telescope reaches 

orbit, it’s ready to go. Low suggested putting 

only the infrared instruments—not the mirrors 

and other optical components—into the dewar 

and letting the other components cool in space. 

It might take a few weeks for the telescope to 

radiatively cool in orbit, but this change meant a 

substantial reduction in the quantity of cryogen 

that would need to be carried aboard the Atlas 

and a corresponding weight savings at launch. 

Alternatively, the same amount of cryogen could 

be made to last longer, increasing SIRTF’s operational lifespan.

The warm-launch concept was a breakthrough. It reduced both the weight and the cost 

of SIRTF without compromising its capabilities. 

The Ball engineers, who had built dewars for all 

of the previous infrared missions, agreed that 

putting only the instrument chamber, rather than 

the whole telescope, into a cryogen dewar just 

might work. They were willing to give it a try.

As with any great idea, there are arguments 

about who deserves credit for the warm-launch 

concept. Frank Low indisputably brought forward the idea that the SWG adopted in 1993. 

However, the notion of passively cooling a 

telescope in space had been advanced by Tim 

Hawarden in 1989. The Edison team had developed the concept further but may have gone 

too far by suggesting that no cryogen at all was 

needed for an infrared telescope. Even with radiative cooling, SIRTF would have to be cooled 

to operate at the far-infrared wavelengths. And 

another group, led by Goddard’s Harvey Moseley, 

recommended a similar passive-cooling approach 

in their proposal during the SIRTF center competition in 1989.32 The historical record cannot 

resolve the debate, and it seems quite likely that 

Hawarden, Moseley, and Low independently 

developed their ideas.33 However, they did so in 

an environment that they shared, and it seems 

that any credit should probably be shared as well.

With a warm launch, SIRTF would be light 

enough to launch on a Delta rocket. The Delta 

32. In interviews, Larry Manning, Larry Caroff, and Giovanni Fazio reported that S. Harvey Moseley had a similar idea 

(Manning and Caroff interview, 3 September 2008; Fazio interview, 26 May 2009).

33. Sadly, both Hawarden and Low passed away in 2009. However, their ideas for radiative cooling (and those of Moseley, 

who oversaw the construction of SIRTF’s IRAC instrument) live on in the design for the James Webb Space Telescope, 

the follow-on mission to SIRTF and Hubble that is being planned for launch after 2017. Their accomplishments were 

recognized by their peers: Hawarden posthumously received the NASA Exceptional Technology Achievement Medal 

(2010). Low received the NASA Exceptional Public Service Medal (2008) and the American Astronomical Society’s Joseph 

Weber Award for Astronomical Instrumentation (2003). Moseley received the Weber award (2007).
112 Making the Invisible Visible

TABLE 7.1. Chronological changes to SIRTF (compiled by Johnny Kwok).

Period 1972–1984 1984–1988 1988–1992 1992–1994 1994–1996 1997

Orbit 300 km 900 km 70,000–

100,000 km

Solar Solar Solar

Launch Vehicle STS STS, OMV Titan IV Atlas II-AS Delta II-7920 Delta 

II-7920H

Tracking System TDRSS TDRSS DSN 26M DSN 34M DSN 34M DSN 34M

Mass (kg) 4500 5560 5500 2460 750 865

Lifetime 30 days/

launch 

(serviceable)

2 years/

launch 

(serviceable)

5 years 3 years 2.5 years 5 years

Primary Mirror (cm) 100 95 95 85 85 85

Helium (liter) 350 6600 4000 920 250 350

Wavelength 2–2000 1.8–700 1.8–700 2.5–200 3.6–160 3.6–160

Detectors n/a ~10,000 ~50,000 ~140,000 ~350,000 ~350,000

Cost Godzillion $ Godzillion $ ~$2B $860M <$500M $450M*

The mass increase from 1996 to 1997 was due to the launch vehicle being upgraded to a Delta 7920-H, which provided additional launch 

capability that was used to increase the cryogen and, in turn, SIRTF’s operational lifetime (SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 16–17 December 

1996, archived with NASA Headquarters History Program Office). Conducting cost estimates prior to 1988 was difficult because SIRTF’s 

performance specifications had not yet been established. As a result, estimates were unreliable until the late 1980s, when the SWG (formed in 

1984) developed a set of specifications for SIRTF that met scientific needs. Budget exercises prior to that time, such as those recorded in the 

Phase A Statement of Work, reveal multiple approaches for estimating costs, including taking IRAS as a template and applying a 3x factor for 

increased complexity, resulting in a cost estimate for SIRTF of ~$130 million (1980, real dollars). Note that this did not include launch costs or 

integration costs with the Shuttle, and in regard to costs, IRAS could provide little guidance, as it was launched by rocket (Statement of Work 

Specification, Phase A, Space Infrared Telescope Facility, AFS1070.8A, Archives Reference Collection, FC5:D4, NASA Ames History Office, 

NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA).

* The total cost of SIRTF was $708 million (in 2001 dollars), plus $68 million for launch services. If SIRTF had launched in Dec. 2001 as planned, 

the telescope cost would have been $515 million. Launch delays contributed to the increased cost, but also enabled further development and 

readiness testing that has led SIRTF to far exceed its planned usefulness. As of this publication, data collection is expected to last until mid2018. Details are from personal communication with Mike Werner, Feb. 24, 2017.

more sensitive, its orbit was more efficient, and 

its design made better use of the cryogen, the 

cosmetic resemblance between SIRTF and IRAS 

was strong (Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1). Although the 

trailing-Earth orbit and warm-launch schemes 

were untested, the cost profile and similarity to 

a successful mission balanced the perceived risks 

and, as the director of JPL put it, made SIRTF 

“exactly the kind of innovative mission” that 

NASA wanted.35

was smaller and therefore cheaper to launch 

than an Atlas rocket; but because the Delta’s 

payload area was limited, SIRTF’s mirror could 

not exceed 3 feet in diameter. If SIRTF could 

be made to fit, the cost savings would make the 

mission affordable. SIRTF had gone from a $1.2 

billion, 5,700-kilogram Titan-launched concept 

to a $400 million, 750-kilogram Delta-launched 

concept.34 It was now looking more like the 

IRAS telescope, which had also launched on a 

Delta rocket. Although SIRTF’s detectors were 

34. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 9–10 May 1995.

35. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 9–10 May 1995.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

Poster Child

The Broomfield meeting was a huge success, as 

it pulled together the three key elements—clear 

scientific goals, an innovative orbit, and a warm 

launch—that made SIRTF not just sellable but 

also a poster child for “faster, better, cheaper.” Yes, 

faster. A month after the Broomfield meeting, 

Mike Werner presented the new SIRTF concept 

to Dr. Richard Obermann, science advisor to the 

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics.36

By April 1994, the concept had been sufficiently 

developed to win over JPL management.37

SIRTF, for the first time in its history, 

appeared in the national budget. Congress appropriated $10 million in the FY96 budget specifically for SIRTF. This was short of the $15 million 

Headquarters had requested, but, as Weedman 

said, “The amount of money was irrelevant, 

because what NASA wanted was Congress’s blessing of SIRTF, which any allocation achieved.”38

Headquarters added another $5 million from discretionary funds to make up the shortfall. SIRTF 

was now in Phase B, where the feasibility analyses 

of Phase A (1984–1995) were converted into an 

integrated systems design that included detailed 

engineering specifications, budgets for all aspects 

of the project, and an operations plan for when 

the telescope was in orbit. The transition from 

Phase A to Phase B is perhaps analogous to the 

condensation of gas into a liquid—with pressure, 

things become more tangible, more visible, but 

still fluid. The transition from Phase B to Phase C 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6 m

Atlas

(c. 1993)

Titan

(c. 1990)

Delta

(c. 2003)

FIGURE 7.1. The evolution of SIRTF as a free-flyer: Comparison of models launched by Titan, Atlas, and 

Delta rockets.

36. Michael Werner, SIRTF Reconfiguration, presentation to Dr. Richard M. Obermann, science advisor, House Subcommittee 

on Space and Aeronautics, 10 December 1993.

37. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 5–6 May 1994.

38. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 12–13 September 1995.
114 Making the Invisible Visible

is analogous to liquid becoming a solid: As pressure increases, things become aligned and freeze 

into a stable configuration. Phase D involves the 

preparations for launch, while Phase E includes 

all mission operations in space.

On 19 November 1996, with funding and 

paperwork in place, JPL announced that it had 

signed a Programmatic Commitment Agreement 

with Headquarters, formally authorizing the 

design of SIRTF to begin.39 Lockheed and Ball 

were brought on as subcontractors to help with 

the design in Phase B (with additional support 

from Hughes), and it was expected that they 

would be retained to build SIRTF whenever 

construction began in Phase C or Phase D. No 

one was sure whether that day would come, and 

the task at hand was to design SIRTF to fulfill 

its scientific promise and show that it could be 

done for under $500 million. That was no small 

challenge, as $500 million was nearly the amount 

spent on the mission to correct Hubble’s mirror. 

Simmons, who had led that repair effort, was now 

the SIRTF project manager. He had to manage 

with a lean budget and without sacrificing the 

very things that made SIRTF sellable—clear 

scientific goals, an innovative orbit, and a warm 

launch, the latter two of which were untried. As 

Simmons remembers it:

There were those who said that idea [the 

warm launch] was crazy and couldn’t be 

done, and there were others who said it 

could be done. I was smart enough to not 

take sides but to listen to the two sides argue 

it out. As a matter of fact, there were people 

on the project—key people on the project—who as late as launch [August 2003] 

still said we could have done it the other way 

[a cold launch, with the whole telescope in 

a dewar]. There were those who just never 

let go of the fact that we could have done 

it the other way. I don’t believe that. The 

reason I don’t believe that is that we would 

never have been given the funding to start 

if we had tried to do it the other way.... 

Politically, it could not [have been done the 

other way]. The thing that really got SIRTF 

going was the fact that we showed that we 

could do things in a different way. We could 

satisfy NASA’s goals of having industry have 

a significant role. We could convince people 

that this approach would work, that it was 

credible. So they kind of dipped their toe 

in the water and let us go forward with this 

approach. Another very important part of 

SIRTF, I should say, was the contribution 

by the celestial mechanics people to not 

go into Earth orbit. All the missions previously of this nature had gone into Earth 

orbit—including Hubble, including IRAS. 

The mission designer, a guy named Johnny 

Kwok, is the guy who said, “We could use 

a smaller rocket to put a bigger payload 

into an orbit going around the Sun instead 

of going around the Earth.” It takes about 

a microsecond to figure out that there are 

some real advantages to that. One of them 

is that you don’t have to go through the 

heat-and-cold cycle once a day. The thermal 

environment is absolutely constant, because 

you’re a constant distance from the Sun. 

The trick was to come up with an orbit—a 

solar orbit, it’s called—that didn’t separate 

[SIRTF] from the Earth too fast. If it went 

too fast away from the Earth, then communications would be a problem, because the 

1/R2

 problem—the farther away you get, 

the more power you need to transmit signal. 

We wanted to send fairly high data rates, so 

we wanted communications. The celestial 

mechanics guys, the orbit guys, figured out 

how we could come up with a way to get the 

39. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 16–17 December 1996.
Chapter 7 • From Orphan to Poster Chi

40. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.

maximum amount of material into space, 

into the solar Earth-trailing orbit, that 

allowed for a telescope that would be very 

stable, could make lots of observations, and 

could operate 24/7—which was something 

I think other people really envied when they 

saw what we could do. So these pieces kept 

coming together, and we kept building on 

this concept. Pretty soon, people started 

hearing about it, and saying, “Oh, come tell 

us about it.” It became interesting to both 

the science community and the management community at NASA Headquarters to 

hear what we were going to do with this.40

117

CHAPTER 8

Constructing SIRTF

SIRTF’s Phase B design stage lasted only two 

years. Compared with the difficulties in Phase 

A in becoming (and remaining) one of NASA’s 

priorities—from releasing the Announcement 

of Opportunity in 1983 to getting congressional approval for funding in 1996—Phase B was 

relatively easy. The team moved quickly through 

this phase, in which the SWG weighed scientific and technical tradeoffs, consolidating the 

knowledge gained from earlier studies and tests. 

Project scientist Mike Werner described the 

Phase B period: 

Once we got the authority to go ahead, 

then things started happening a lot quicker. 

There’d been an in-house design activity led 

by a guy named Jim Fanson,...a very, very 

talented engineer, [who] really brought the 

warm-launch concept to life. Then we went 

out and selected contractors, not to build 

a mission to a set of specifications but to 

help us implement...the warm-launch concept.... [People from] the instrument teams 

[and] our facility scientists, Frank Low and 

George Rieke and Tom Roellig, particularly 

Tom, spent a lot of time at JPL interacting 

with the contractors, making sure they knew 

what their jobs were, defining interfaces, 

roles and responsibilities—who builds this 

part, who builds that part, and so forth. 

After that, we quickly got into a regular 

cadence of quarterly reviews, monthly management meetings, frequent teleconferences, 

interactions with the contractors.1

During this period, Werner made sure that 

the team stopped once in a while to celebrate 

milestones and breakthroughs.

SIRTF did not remain long in Phase B 

because the feasibility of the design was readily 

established. The detectors, which were critical 

to the success of the design, had benefited from 

more than two decades of development by the 

SIRTF team.2

 The cryogenic system had been 

largely demonstrated by the performance of 

IRAS, whose launch in 1983 unleashed a flood 

of scientific results into the academic journals. 

Prototypes of other challenging components, 

1. Werner interview, 15 December 2008.

2. In addition to the SWG members, many people were ultimately involved in the effort to characterize the various 

semiconductor materials and develop the detectors. A few major contributors should be acknowledged: Craig McCreight 

(Ames), Harvey Moseley (Goddard), and Judith Pipher (University of Rochester). See Appendix A for a full list of participants.
118 Making the Invisible Visible

such as a demonstration mirror successfully 

milled from beryllium, also helped to establish the 

design’s feasibility. Sometimes prototypes helped 

in unintended ways. On a visit to Washington, 

Jim Houck, PI of the infrared spectrograph, 

brought along a spare instrument housing to 

show his colleagues at NASA Headquarters. He 

happened to still have the housing with him 

when he later met with a congressional representative who was unenthusiastic about funding 

another telescope after Hubble. The spare was 

the result of a machining error, but the size and 

weight were approximately correct—about that 

of an empty shoebox. “I pulled out the model,” 

Houck remembers, “and he looked at it, and he 

said, ‘That’s what it looks like?’ And I said, ‘Yeah.’ 

He said, ‘I’ll try to get you a little money.’”3

 The 

prototypes were useful to show that SIRTF was 

doable—scientifically and technically, of course, 

but also economically and politically. At SIRTF’s 

conception in 1971, it had been impossible to 

build infrared detector arrays and large beryllium 

mirrors, let alone cool them to a few kelvins in 

space. By the late 1990s it was no longer impossible, just exceedingly difficult.

SIRTF’s Design

The flight-ready design was driven largely by 

economic and scientific needs. NASA, with 

Congress’s support, had budgeted $400 million 

to build SIRTF and $300 million to operate it 

after launch.4 In return for their public investment, the nation’s taxpayers would acquire an 

instrument capable of addressing major scientific 

questions about the emergence and evolution of 

stars and planets.5

 Specifically, SIRTF was being 

designed for research centered on the four key 

topics mentioned in chapter 7: a) protoplanetary and planetary debris disks, b) brown dwarfs 

and super planets, c) ultraluminous galaxies and 

active galactic nuclei, and d) the early universe.6

As noted, these four goals were aligned with scientific priorities listed in the decadal survey for 

the 1990s (the Bahcall report) and fully exploited 

the unique capabilities of a highly sensitive, 

space-borne infrared telescope.

To achieve its key scientific goals, SIRTF 

relied on three instruments that covered the infrared spectrum from 3.6 to 160.0 microns. Two 

of these—the Infrared Array Camera (IRAC) 

and the Multiband Imaging Photometer for 

SIRTF (MIPS)—were cameras that could detect 

sources emitting in the infrared, while the third, 

the Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), was a spectroscope, which could detect the sources’ chemical 

composition. These were the same three instruments that had been selected following the 1983 

Announcement of Opportunity; however, their 

realized operating range had narrowed since then. 

The wavelength coverage was 3.6–160 microns 

for imaging, 5.3–40 microns for spectroscopy, 

and 55–95 microns for spectrophotometry.7

The far-infrared band was eliminated and the 

3. Houck interview, 25 May 2009.

4. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 9–10 May 1995, including presentation by project manager Larry Simmons.

5. For more detailed reviews of the design and operation of SIRTF, see Schuyler Van Dyk, Michael Werner, and Nancy 

Silbermann, Spitzer Space Telescope Handbook, Version 2.1, available at http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/data/SPITZER/

docs/spitzermission/missionoverview/spitzertelescopehandbook/ (accessed 30 August 2016); R. D. Gehrz et al., “The 

NASA Spitzer Space Telescope,” Review of Scientific Instruments 78, no. 011302 (2007): 1–38.

6. M. D. Bicay and M. W. Werner, “SIRTF: Linking the Great Observatories with the Origins Program,” in Origins, ASP 

Conference Series, vol. 148, ed. Charles E. Woodward, J. Michael Shull, and Harley A. Thronson, Jr. (San Francisco: 

Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 1998), pp. 290–297.

7. Spectrophotometry, as the name suggests, uses a blend of spectra and photometric data to obtain spectral energy 

distributions (SED), which can be used to classify stars. Data are from Spitzer Space Telescope Handbook.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

spectroscopic capabilities 

reduced, but the remaining 

infrared wavelengths held 

great promise for scientific 

discovery.

The entire telescope 

facility was about the size of 

a car. When the 95-gallon 

liquid helium tank was 

empty, SIRTF weighed 1,877 

pounds. It stood just over 

13 feet (see Figs. 8.1, 8.2, and 

8.3).8 The top third contained 

the telescope itself. This 

portion, which was mostly 

hollow, was where the photons 

of infrared radiation would 

be collected and directed 

onto the 33.5-inch (85-centimeter) beryllium mirror (see 

Fig. 8.4, p. 121). The mirror 

sat directly above the Multiple 

Instrument Chamber (MIC) 

(see Fig. 8.5, p. 121), which 

spanned the facility’s middle 

third. Here the three scientific 

instruments would record the 

brightness and intensity of the 

infrared flux collected by the 

mirror. To bring the instruments to the necessary operating temperature of 5.5 K, 

they would sit in a dewar of 

liquid helium. The bottom 

third of the facility was the 

spacecraft bus, which contained the electronics 

and the mechanisms to point the telescope and 

send data back to Earth.

One side of the facility would be covered by 

a solar panel, which would simultaneously draw 

FIGURE 8.1. SIRTF during final integration and testing at Lockheed Martin, 

Sunnyvale, California (Russ Underwood, Lockheed Martin 

Space Systems).

8. Spitzer Fact Sheet, JPL Project Office, Doc. #PM 12-12-03, http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/file/97-Fact-Sheet (accessed 

30 August 2016).

operating power from the Sun and shield the 

infrared detectors from its light. The three scientific instruments sat atop 350 liters of liquid 

helium. For a photo and description of the IRAC, 

IRS, and MIPS instruments, see Figure 8.6.
120 Making the Invisible Visible

Telescope

Cryo-Telescope Assembly (CTA)

Outer Shell

Star Tracker Aperture Shield

Star Trackers and IRUs

Low Gain Antennae High Gain Antenna

Spacecraft Bus

Spacecraft Shield

Solar Panel Shield

Solar Panel

FIGURE 8.2. Exterior components of SIRTF.

Telescope

Outer Shell

Aperture Door

Multiple Instrument Chamber (MIC)

 • IRAC Cold Assembly

 • IRS Cold Assembly

 • MIPS Cold Assembly

 • PCRS Cold Assembly

Cryostat Vacuum Shell

CTA Support Truss

Spacecraft Shield

Star Tracker (2)

IRU (Gyro) (2)

Cold Gas Nozzles

Solar Panel

Solar Panel Shield

Helium Tank

High Gain Antenna

Spacecraft Bus

 • IRAC Electronics

 • IRS/MIPS Electronics

FIGURE 8.3. Interior components of SIRTF.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

FIGURE 8.4. The beryllium mirror and telescope assembly at Ball Aerospace.

FIGURE 8.5. The three science instruments installed in Spitzer’s cryogenic 

Multiple Instrument Chamber (MIC) at Ball Aerospace.
122 Making the Invisible Visible

a) Infrared Array Camera (IRAC)

The Infrared Array Camera (IRAC) cryogenic 

assembly with top cover removed at NASA 

Goddard, Greenbelt, Maryland.

The IRAC provides large-field imaging in four bands between 3 

and 9 microns. The IRAC bands were selected to characterize 

the starlight from distant galaxies, allowing estimation of their 

redshifts, and to identify nearby substellar objects (brown dwarfs) 

by measuring their cool spectral energy distributions.

The near-infrared to mid-infrared imaging by IRAC provides 

evidence for many of the science themes that have fueled interest 

in the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), for which IRAC and 

SIRTF were important scientific and technical precursors.

IRAC was built at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). 

Giovanni Fazio (Harvard SAO) is the Principal Investigator. Harvey 

Moseley (GSFC) is the Instrument Scientist. 

b) Infrared Spectrograph (IRS)

The Infrared Spectrograph (IRS) after integration 

with the Multiple Instrument Chamber at Ball 

Aerospace, Boulder, Colorado.

The IRS provides low-resolution spectroscopy (4 to 40 microns) 

that probes the composition of debris systems and the nature 

of interstellar dust in highly red-shifted galaxies. It also provides 

moderate-resolution spectra to study the emission lines from 

infrared-bright galaxies to determine their sources of energy.

The European Space Agency’s Infrared Space Observatory (ISO) 

has shown that the 5- to 37-micron spectral region is rich in 

both emission lines and broad molecular features. The increased 

sensitivity of IRS resulting from its high-performance arrays allows 

these molecular features to be probed to far fainter levels than 

with ISO.

The IRS was built at Ball Aerospace. James Houck (Cornell) is the 

Principal Investigator.

c) Multiband Imaging Photometer for SIRTF (MIPS)

A Ball Aerospace technician holding the Multiband 

Imaging Photometer for SIRTF (MIPS) prior to 

integration (Ball Aerospace).

The MIPS supports large field mapping and high-resolution 

imaging from the mid-infrared to the submillimeter wavebands. 

Its concept is centered on the study of the far-infrared emissions 

of distant galaxies due to ultraviolet and visible energy absorbed 

and reradiated at longer wavelengths by their interstellar dust 

and on the analysis of the systems of debris around nearby stars 

associated with possible planetary systems.

The MIPS gives a much deeper look at the far-infrared sky than was 

possible with either ISO or its predecessor, IRAS, which surveyed 

the entire sky in 1983. The archive of MIPS data will constitute a 

fundamental scientific resource for many years. 

MIPS was built at Ball Aerospace. George Rieke (University of 

Arizona) is the Principal Investigator. 

FIGURE 8.6. The IRAC, IRS, and MIPS instruments.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

A New Start

After two years in Phase B, the SIRTF project 

office at JPL—working closely with the SWG, 

instrument PIs, and contractors—had resolved 

many of the technical issues and was preparing 

to specify how the system would be integrated 

and launched and the data retrieved. The final 

hurdle before building a launch-ready version 

of SIRTF was to pass the internal Preliminary 

Design Review (PDR) and the Non-Advocate 

Review (NAR).

To save time, project manager Simmons was 

able to schedule the reviews back to back. So, 

over three days in September 1997, panels of peer 

reviewers heard from the SWG and the project 

office on how they planned to build and operate 

SIRTF. During the first two days presentations 

focused on the PDR. Those on the final day outlined SIRTF’s implementation plan to the NAR 

board, whose members were not stakeholders in 

the project. Overall, the project received strong 

support from these review boards, both of which 

recommended to NASA management that SIRTF 

advance to Phase C/D.9

 There was agreement at 

all levels that SIRTF’s scientific goals continued to generate excitement. And costs, reduced 

by 75 percent from the original 1989 estimate, 

made the project affordable within NASA’s tight 

budget. As a result, SIRTF was granted New Start 

status in FY98.10

Construction could finally begin. As the sole 

New Start that year and the de facto flagship mission for NASA, SIRTF was now on a fast track 

for launch in 2001. A contemporary article by 

Michael Bicay and Michael Werner explains how 

the project was organized:

While JPL remains responsible for project 

management, systems/mission engineering, science management, and flight operations, the other partners have all been 

identified in the past year and have been 

actively working together during SIRTF’s 

design phase. Lockheed Martin (Sunnyvale, 

CA) is the partner responsible for the 

spacecraft and for the system integration 

and testing. Ball Aerospace (Boulder, CO) 

assumes responsibility for the cryogenic telescope assembly and will build the IRS and 

MIPS instruments. NASA’s Goddard Space 

Flight Center (Greenbelt, MD) will build 

the IRAC instrument. Finally, the Infrared 

Processing and Analysis Center (Pasadena, 

CA) has been designated as the SIRTF 

Science Center (SSC), and will be responsible for all elements of science operations.11

Figure 8.7 (p. 124) illustrates the management configuration. Tom Soifer, who had been 

Werner’s deputy, became the director of the 

Science Center, and Charles Lawrence replaced 

Soifer as the deputy project scientist. As of March 

1998, 283 people were working on SIRTF.12

(This figure represents just a small fraction of the 

total number of people who worked on SIRTF, 

all of whom are listed in Appendix A.)

SIRTF’s Build

The team that had designed SIRTF in Phase B 

was going to build it in Phase C. This is more 

unusual than it might appear. Normally, NASA 

competitively selects several vendors to propose 

9. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 29 April–1 May 1997 and 16–17 October 1997.

10. On 25 March 1998, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin authorized the start of work on the Space Infrared Telescope 

Facility, per JPL Press Release #98-028, available at http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/releases/98/sirtfgo.html (accessed 30 

August 2016).

11. Bicay and Werner, “SIRTF: Linking the Great Observatories with the Origins Program,” p. 295.

12. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 21–23 April 1998.
124 Making the Invisible Visible

designs in Phase B, then reopens the competition 

to select the best vendor to implement the design 

in Phase C. Instead, the SIRTF project team had 

engaged a limited set of contractors during the 

design phase, with the open intention of retaining them to build the telescope facility.

This apparent lack of competition actually 

helped to reduce overall costs. Larry Simmons 

made the budget allocation process transparent 

so that all participants—whether they were from 

universities, private industry, or NASA—had 

the same information. Because they were part 

of the design process, contractors could provide more accurate estimates of how much time 

and money it would take to build SIRTF; and 

because they were part of the budget process, it 

was a little easier to hold them to their financial 

commitments if the project encountered problems later. This was important, because NASA 

Administrator Goldin, under pressure from 

Congress, was taking a hard line on overruns and 

regaining control over costs at NASA. The success 

of SIRTF depended on a collective effort by the 

academic, government, and commercial partners, 

and Simmons ensured that their common interests were kept in view. To buffer against overruns 

and to ensure teamwork, Simmons had incorporated some innovative financial incentives into 

everyone’s contracts. As he reported to the SWG 

in April 1998, “These incentives are contingent 

in part upon completion of Phase C/D by the 

entire team with the $450 million cost cap, and 

upon SIRTF meeting Level 1 requirements 2.5 

years after launch, and not solely upon individual 

team member performance.”13

It would be unrealistic to think that from here 

on in, the sailing would be smooth. Although the 

review boards had strongly recommended that 

SIRTF move into Phase C, ongoing reviews, 

similar to the earlier NAR and PDR panels, had 

identified a few potential problems.14 The top 

two were schedule and software. This turned 

JPL

Project Manager

Project Scientist

Engineering Oversight

Mission Design

Interface to NASA

Financial Management

Lockheed Martin

System Engineering 

Integration & Test

MIPS Instrument

PI: G. Rieke

(Univ. of Arizona)

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

IRS Instrument

PI: J. Houck

(Cornell Univ.)

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

IRAC Instrument

PI: G. Fazio

(Harvard–SAO)

Contractor:

NASA Goddard

Ball Aerospace

Cryogenic Telescope 

Assembly

Design & Implementation

JPL

Mission Operating

Design & Implementation

SIRTF Source Center

(Caltech)

Science Operations

Design & Implementation

Lockheed Martin

Spacecraft Design

and Implementation

FIGURE 8.7. SIRTF project organization during development (1996–2003).

13. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 21–23 April 1998.

14. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 11–12 November 1998. 
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

out to be an astute assessment. As the construction of SIRTF got under way, these two issues 

were the main source of unanticipated costs 

and frustration.

The schedule was aggressive in part because 

if SIRTF launched in 2001, all four Great 

Observatories—each of which had a limited 

lifespan—could be operating at the same time, 

realizing Charlie Pellerin’s vision. Another upside 

to an aggressive schedule was that it encouraged 

everyone to work efficiently. The downside was 

that if something went wrong, there was minimal 

time available for troubleshooting problems and 

testing solutions.

The Hardest Problems

While the software and schedule would provide 

the team with some difficult moments, neither 

was the toughest problem, according to Charles 

Lawrence, SIRTF’s new deputy project scientist, 

who has remarked that the greatest challenge in 

an innovative project is “figuring out what to 

worry about, and when to stop worrying about 

it.”15 In SIRTF’s case this principle was illustrated 

by two problems that lacked a clear resolution: 

the overpressurization of the dewar and the 

delamination of one of the spectrographic filters.

In an innovative project, there will almost 

always be problems that are hard to resolve. First, 

it is difficult to make decisions when dealing with 

inherently novel situations. SIRTF was a one-ofa-kind, state-of-the-art telescope facility; what 

little precedent there was—in sensors, orbits, and 

cryogenics—might not be relevant. Second, the 

system was so complex that fixing one problem 

risked causing new ones. Better the devil you 

know than the one you don’t. Third, the data 

used to arrive at a decision are often themselves 

novel and ambiguous. (Recall how the infrared 

data that Jim Houck and Martin Harwit obtained 

in the 1960s using rockets was erroneously dismissed as instrument error by other experts.) And 

fourth, it’s often difficult to tell whether or not 

a solution really addresses the problem, because 

tests can’t always be devised to reveal the impact 

on all of the affected elements. “We live in a world 

of room temperature,” says Tim Kelly, cryogenic 

expert at Ball Aerospace. “Our engineering has 

been developed over 4,000 years at room temperature. Our intuition is at room temperature. 

When we move off of that, either up or down, 

we’re in unknown territory and intuition doesn’t 

work.”16 The only truly sufficient test is to see 

how the telescope facility operates in space, but 

by then it’s no longer a test.

Under Pressure

At the end of December 2000, SIRTF almost 

blew up at Ball Aerospace—literally. Just about 

everyone who has ever worked with dewars—

including most members of the SWG—has 

blown one up at one time or another.17 Ball 

had assembled the flight-ready instruments and 

was testing their performance under cryogenic 

conditions by placing them inside the dewar in 

which the instruments were to fly, along with 

several hundred liters of supercooled helium 

under high pressure. At that stage, it’s potentially 

a bomb,18 and a small misstep can result in a very 

large problem.

Ball was responsible for almost everything 

related to the science mission, while Lockheed 

15. Charles Lawrence, in conversation with the author, at Jet Propulsion Lab, Pasadena, CA, 29 April 2005.

16. Timothy J. Kelly, interview with author, Boulder, CO, 20 March 2009.

17. Houck interview, 25 May 2009.

18. The helium is not explosive, per se. Rather, it is the tendency for liquid helium to rapidly expand as it warms and turns to 

gas, and this rapid expansion will cause the container (in this case the dewar) to burst.
126 Making the Invisible Visible

developed the spacecraft and the flight software. 

Ball had built two of the three science instruments (NASA Goddard built the third), and the 

cryogenic dewar, and it had recently completed 

the assembly of the MIC in which the three scientific instruments were integrated. The MIC 

was then put into the dewar, which was filled 

with liquid helium, and Ball ran tests to see how 

well the instruments operated together at a few 

kelvins. The tests had gone very well. Ball had 

overseen the systems integration of dewars for 

other missions such as IRAS. As a leader in cryogenic technology, Ball had met its schedule commitments. NASA’s contract with Ball included 

performance incentives in the form of bonus fees 

for meeting certain deadlines. Ball’s portion of 

the project was four months ahead of schedule at 

the time of the incident.

Over the holidays, one of Ball’s technicians 

was monitoring the live cryostat. Sensors made 

it possible for him to do so from his home computer, but on occasion he would come to the Ball 

offices to top off the slowly evaporating helium in 

order to keep the instruments at the correct temperature. This was a tricky task. Liquid helium 

is so cold that it will turn any gas or liquid it 

touches into a solid, including the air around it. 

As it happened, an ice plug formed in one of the 

helium vent lines. Dr. Bill Burmester was walking 

by, just checking on things at the lab. When he 

saw the problem that confronted the technician, 

Burmester told him to call Tim Kelly.19

Kelly had been with Ball since the 1970s. 

He had worked on IRAS and knew as much as 

anyone about cryogenic systems. He had risen to 

become a senior project leader and was known 

for putting out fires. (In his case, this description 

was more than a figure of speech—Kelly was also 

a volunteer fire fighter in Colorado.) When he 

heard about the problem with SIRTF’s cryostat, 

he acted immediately: “I organized the communication that had to go out...and made sure 

things were safe, as best I could,” Kelly remembers. “I called the president of the company [Don 

Vanlandingham], called NASA [Bill Irace, deputy 

project manager; and Dave Gallagher, who had 

succeeded Larry Simmons as project manager], 

told them what’s going on..., made sure that 

[our guy] had somebody over there ASAP to 

help him—Quality and Mission Assurance.... I 

got the program manager who was running the 

program at the time involved.” Kelly defused 

the emergency and turned it over to the team to 

resolve the ice plug. He continues: 

Now we’re into January [2001], about a 

week or ten days later.... A [different] technician apparently notices the temperature is 

rising in the cryostat. He tries to tell people 

in the meeting, the engineers and the program managers—this is Ball people, now.... 

They’re sitting around trying to figure out 

what’s going on. They’ve got an ice plug 

and they’ve got to get rid of it.... They just 

ignored him, because they said, “If the temperature’s going up, the pressure would be 

going up.” Well, guess what, the pressure 

was going up.20

The sensors weren’t providing accurate pressure readouts because of the ice plug. By the time 

the evidence was unambiguous, the pressure was 

so high that people were no longer just worrying 

about possible instrument damage but whether 

the cryostat would explode. According to Kelly, 

people were “not managing the information”; a 

series of small missteps had occurred and now 

they had a bomb on their hands, with all of 

SIRTF’s instruments inside. Kelly describes what 

happened next:

19. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

20. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

So I was called to come back, and the very 

first job I was given was to work with the 

team and put that presentation together so 

that I could spend an hour and a half in front 

of Ed [Edward J.] Weiler [then Associate 

Administrator for NASA’s Space Science 

Enterprise] at Headquarters and explain 

how this went wrong.... We were drinking 

coffee at NASA Headquarters in the morning, before the meeting, and the Lockheed 

guy said, “Weiler is going to kill you.” 

Because he’s known to be a very non-linear 

guy.... I’m in this meeting, it’s packed. It’s 

a rather small room, but it’s packed. Weiler 

is sitting there in his chair, and I’m giving 

the presentation. I’m [a few minutes] into 

it, and [Weiler’s] lieutenant says, “Tim, it 

sounds to me like whatever you could have 

done wrong, you did do wrong. Is that what 

you’re telling me?” I said, “Yes, that’s pretty 

much it.” Well, it’s actually a very disarming 

technique. Now, I didn’t mean it as a technique, I really didn’t. But honesty always is 

disarming in those kind of venues. At that 

point, I was allowed to march through the 

rest of the presentation, because I wasn’t 

defending myself, so no one was attacking 

me. They were asking questions. So we had a 

good meeting. We laid out what went wrong 

and how we were going to recover. At the 

end of the meeting, Weiler slumped in his 

chair. He just slumped. He said, “It sounds 

like you know what you did wrong and you 

know how to fix it. Get the hell out of here.” 

I think we all ran. And that was it. We went 

back and we fixed the cryostat lickety-split, 

and it’s still working.21

The problem was finally clear—Ball and 

the SWG had reconstructed the event and now 

knew exactly how much overpressurization had 

occurred, when it started, and how long it lasted. 

But short of replacing all of the components, the 

solution could only be a partial one. The SIRTF 

team would have to rely on tests to determine 

whether any damage had been done—such as 

leaks or weakened connectors—that could jeopardize the scientific mission (see Fig. 8.8, p. 128). 

SWG member Bob Gehrz, working closely with 

Ball, led a tiger team to test the integrity of the 

dewar in every way possible.22

Coming Apart

“We used up all of our schedule margin in convincing ourselves that the cryostat was OK, and 

at the same time there was another problem 

lurking in the weeds,” Mike Werner remembers. 

“There was a problem with one of the filters in 

the infrared spectrograph, which had shown signs 

of deteriorating.”

The delamination of the spectrograph filter 

created a situation in which the problem was 

clear but the solution was not. Like a tiny sheet 

of plywood, the filter was made of many layers of 

exotic materials. The first layer was deposited on 

a crystalline silicate substrate, and the others were 

deposited one upon the next in a high vacuum 

environment. The resulting filter was intended 

to block much of the spectrum, allowing only a 

relatively narrow range of infrared wavelengths 

to reach the spectrograph module. Houck had 

found evidence that the filter had begun to 

delaminate, which means that some of the layers 

had separated. Houck’s team had delivered a pair 

21. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

22. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009; also see John P. Schwenker et al., “SIRTF-CTA optical performance test,” SPIE Proceedings 4850 (IR Space Telescopes and Instruments), ed. John C. Mather, (Bellingham, WA: SPIE, 2003), pp. 304–317.
128 Making the Invisible Visible

FIGURE 8.8. The instrument cryostat (with a mass model telescope on top), being prepared for shake testing.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

of these filters to Ball and kept a spare set.23 When 

technicians placed the detector arrays into the 

IRS, one of the chips—slightly thicker than the 

rest—came under greater pressure as the mount 

was tightened. As a result of this tension, the 

chip flexed just enough to weaken some of the 

glued bonds, causing the layers to delaminate at 

one end. In plywood, this would result in splinters. In a silicon detector, it interrupts the signal. 

The filter is a multi-coated optical surface—layer 

upon layer—and the coatings had separated from 

the substrate, leaving only gold pads holding it 

in place.24 The chief concern was that the filter 

would further delaminate during launch or in 

space—due to mechanical shock, vibration, and/

or thermal cycles—and in the worst case, little 

particles would break off and float around in the 

telescope, distorting the data.

The straightforward solution would seem to be 

to replace the filter. What made the delamination 

issue so challenging is that it was not discovered 

until after the detector array had been installed into 

the MIC. The MIC was by this time sealed and 

sitting in a dewar of liquid helium. Disassembling 

the MIC now to fix an existing problem would 

probably cause new problems. For example, when 

the three instruments were installed in the MIC 

the electrical connections which brought the signal 

from the instruments to the outside were made by 

hooking together very delicate cables consisting of 

very fine wires soldered to a miniature connector. 

The cables were kept as fine as possible in order to 

reduce the heat that they carried from the warm 

exterior to the cold interior of SIRTF; as a result 

they were very delicate. During disassembly or 

reassembly of the MIC, a wire could detach from 

the connector, leading to a loss of signal or even a 

short circuit. In fact, according to Houck, as the 

MIC had cooled, “some of the connectors in the 

MIPS instrument [had] failed. There was no question—it hadn’t happened when the telescope was 

warm. The outside of the telescope was warm, but 

when the outside of the telescope got cold, that’s 

when there was this problem.”25 Given the difficulties of assembling the MIC, getting all three 

instruments working together was a huge accomplishment, even if one of Houck’s spectrographic 

filters was partially defective. Opening the MIC 

now was not without risk and could cause both 

the schedule and the budget to slip by at least a 

half year.

“Houck...was rightly very concerned that 

the filter might delaminate,” Werner said, “and 

his instrument wouldn’t work well, and we would 

disappoint our user community, and he would get 

a bad name, basically, which is a very reasonable 

thing for him to [have been] concerned about. 

At first he said, ‘I’ll take care of this myself,’ but 

it was going on at the same time as this problem with the cryostat, so it didn’t get as much 

visibility. But after we were done convincing ourselves that the cryostat was OK, then we had this 

potentially delaminating instrument component 

to worry about.”26 Although the delamination 

was a potentially serious problem, its loss might 

affect only one of four modules of the spectrograph; the other three would be unaffected if the 

fragments did not spread throughout the MIC.

Opening the cryostat had high risks, but it 

was not without precedent. The IRAS cryostat 

had been opened in order to fix several shorts. 

Although this caused a schedule delay, it also 

23. Ball Aerospace’s Optical Coating Laboratory and Boeing manufactured the chips for the IRS instrument’s infrared 

detector array. For more detail, see J. R. Houck et al., “IRS: the Spectrograph on SIRTF; Its Fabrication and Testing,” 

SPIE Proceedings 4131 (Infrared Spaceborne Remote Sensing VIII), ed. M. Strojnik and B. F. Andresen (Bellingham, WA: 

SPIE, 2000), pp. 70–77.

24. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 15–16 August 2001.

25. Houck interview, 25 May 2009. 

26. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008.
130 Making the Invisible Visible

provided an opportunity to correct a few other 

minor problems. IRAS later performed extremely 

well in space and must be counted a success even 

though it cost twice as much as budgeted and 

took two years longer than planned.27

The team was searching for any kind of data or 

tests that might help them characterize the extent 

of the delamination problem, in the hopes of 

arriving at the right solution. Of the four vendors 

for this type of filter, three had gotten out of the 

business during the past decade. “We were still 

waffling around,” Werner said. “We went into 

a shake test which was to simulate the launch, 

and the filters survived the shake test [in which 

SIRTF was placed in a simulator that replicated 

the mechanical forces at launch]. So it was still 

suspect, but it was no worse after the shake test 

than it was before the shake test.”28 Presentations 

were made to Headquarters by Houck and Dave 

Gallagher, but ultimately a decision needed to be 

made. It would have to be made by Gallagher, 

who had taken over as project manager in 1999, 

when Simmons was asked to set up and lead a 

new Astronomy and Physics Directorate at JPL.29

Simmons still had some involvement in SIRTF, 

but Gallagher, who had been Simmons’s deputy, 

now had top responsibility.

To share opinions and insights, members of 

the SWG and the project office met over dinner 

at a restaurant near Caltech. Houck was strongly 

in favor of opening up the cryostat and replacing 

the filter. So was Irace, who had been involved 

in the opening of IRAS during the integration 

and test phase before launch.30 To characterize 

the effects of bits of the filter coming loose in the 

telescope, Werner noted that chips of paint had 

affected the NICMOS instrument on Hubble. 

This problem had been analyzed and documented 

by the Hubble scientists; however, Irace, who is a 

tenacious troubleshooter and accomplished systems engineer, felt that those findings were not 

good enough to use as reliable engineering data. 

In a rare display of anger, Werner was upset with 

Irace for dismissing one of the few data points 

they had.31 Ironically, Irace rejected data that supported his case to open the dewar, while Werner 

fought to include data that undermined his case 

to leave the dewar sealed.

At an SWG meeting after the shake test, there 

were several who disagreed with Houck and Irace 

and felt the risks of opening up the dewar were 

too high. “I thought as chairman of the Science 

Working Group, I should speak up first to say 

what I thought,” Werner recalls. “This was 

very difficult for me, because I had known Jim 

[Houck] for 35 years at least, at that point.... 

Tom Soifer had been his first graduate student, 

Tom Roellig had been his student.... I was at 

[graduate school] with Jim back before either 

of us had a Ph.D.”32 Soifer, Werner, Frank Low, 

and Marcia Rieke all voted against opening the 

cryostat. George Rieke was also against opening it, even though doing so would have given 

him an opportunity to fix the dead wiring on his 

27. Martin, telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

28. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009.

29. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 19–21 October 1999. Larry L. Simmons was officially promoted to head a new Astronomy 

and Physics Directorate in May 2001, per JPL press release of 2 May 2001 (online at http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/

releases/2001/2001reorg.html (accessed 30 August 2016).

30. IRAS Explanatory Supplement XIII, Contributors to IRAS, available at http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/IRASdocs/exp.sup/

ch13/A.html (accessed 30 August 2016).

31. G. H. Rieke, The Last of the Great Observatories: Spitzer and the Era of Faster, Better, Cheaper at NASA (Tucson: The 

University of Arizona Press, 2006); also Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008.

32. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

instrument.33 “I’m not sure if I made a recommendation formally to [Gallagher],” Werner said, 

“but if I did, I would have said, ‘This is what 

the Science Working Group assessment was, but 

in my position as project scientist, I think you 

shouldn’t change it.’ They are advisory to me, I’m 

advisory to him.”34

Gallagher took their advice into consideration. Even if they fixed the filter, there was a possibility that new problems would be introduced. 

No matter what he decided, he would have some 

unhappy scientists. “I tried to do it in the most 

collegial way,” Gallagher said, “...but ultimately 

I decided that we shouldn’t open everything up. 

It was a huge schedule hit to open everything up, 

probably six to nine months.”35 The outcome of 

his decision wouldn’t be known until SIRTF was 

in orbit.36 Fortunately, the filter would survive 

launch and that module of the IRS operated satisfactorily throughout the cryogenic mission with 

no obvious further delamination of the filter.

The delamination problem was one of the 

most stressful events for the team during the 

entire project. Houck would have preferred a different outcome and wasn’t happy with the process 

at times, but he abided by Gallagher’s decision.37

As George Rieke recalls:

We really discussed these things in a very open 

way, rather than [making] a unilateral decision, or feeling that there were political games 

being played, or anything like that. I think 

what made it work smoothly was just the tone 

that Mike [Werner] and Dave [Gallagher]—

and, obviously, others, but Mike and Dave in 

particular—set at that stage. [At the dinner] 

we sat around, and we discussed this—just 

“Here’s a problem, what are we going to do 

about it?” There was no matter of rank, there 

were no raised voices, just everybody puzzling 

over what the best solution was. In the end, 

we took a vote. Jim Houck lost the vote, and 

he then sort of ridiculed us gently. He drew 

little symbols and passed them around, and 

people who had said things he thought weren’t 

very courageous got a waffle symbol.... Just a 

little drawing of a waffle. But that was it. It 

illustrates a mode of problem-solving that’s 

very hard to achieve but very effective. What’s 

really effective about it is that when you solve 

the problem, you haven’t created wounds that 

make the next problem even harder to solve.38

The Software Challenge

While the problems with the dewar and the 

delamination were surprising, other problems 

were less so. As the Phase B review board had 

noted, the software was likely to be a source of 

trouble. Although SIRTF’s software would be 

partly based on prior missions, some fundamentally new activities would require mostly custom 

software. First, SIRTF had three instruments that 

operated together and made systems integration more demanding, whereas instruments on 

33. According to Werner, “The MIPS team lost part of its 160-micron array to a wiring failure before launch and half of its 

70-micron array after launch, probably to the same cause” (personal communication with author, 8 November 2010). 

Despite the wiring problem, Rieke’s instrument still demonstrated excellent data-acquisition capabilities.

34. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009.

35. David B. Gallagher, interview with author, Pasadena, CA, 3 March 2009.

36. In a later exchange Werner added, “Fortunately, [the filter] survived launch and stood us in good stead throughout the 

flight. Whatever degradation there was has been dealt with in the data processing and analysis procedures” (personal 

communication with author, 8 November 2010).

37. Houck interview, 25 May 2009.

38. Rieke interview, 9 June 2009.
132 Making the Invisible Visible

previous cryogenic missions had operated independently. Second, the pointing control system 

(PCS) that aimed the telescope toward observational targets needed to operate with far more 

precision than its counterparts had on prior missions. Third, SIRTF needed to be more adaptable 

in detecting and recovering from faults while in 

orbit. Ordinarily, when a spacecraft encounters a 

problem, it shuts down and goes into safe mode, 

powering down and awaiting instructions from 

ground crews. It can take a week to restore science operations from this safe state. SIRTF, whose 

operation was already limited by its cryogen 

stores, couldn’t afford to take a week to recover 

each time it ran into a problem. Instead, software 

was needed for a new “standby” mode, in which 

SIRTF operated autonomously when dealing 

with a problem, shutting down a limited portion 

of the facility, thereby enabling ground crews to 

restart operations within a day or two. Fourth, 

SIRTF needed software to handle the unprecedented rates of data collection; it was the first 

mission to make use of the new 2.2-Mbps download capability of the Deep Space Network. Fifth, 

even existing spacecraft flight software needed to 

be redesigned to account for SIRTF’s novel Earthtrailing orbital dynamics. All of these innovations 

made developing the software far more complex 

than it had been for prior missions.39

Responsibility for developing the flight 

software and the spacecraft went to Lockheed 

Martin Space Systems Company (LMSSC). In 

1995, Lockheed and Martin-Marietta merged. 

This brought together the space systems group 

in Sunnyvale (formerly Lockheed) and the 

flight-operations group in Denver (formerly 

Martin-Marietta). When the Phase B proposals 

were submitted in 1996, the merger provided 

a compelling reason to have the combined 

resources and experiences of Lockheed Martin 

brought to bear on the development of SIRTF. 

While Sunnyvale would have overall responsibility, it was believed that some of the flight software previously built by the Denver team could 

be repurposed and integrated into the software 

being developed in Sunnyvale. One person 

who thought so was Frank Martin, who had 

preceded Charlie Pellerin as NASA’s Director 

of Astrophysics and laid the foundation for 

the Great Observatories. Martin was an executive with Lockheed Martin at the time of the 

proposal. After they had won the contract and 

software development had begun, he recalls, “we 

stopped and looked at it carefully, [and] it really 

didn’t make as much sense. This is one of those 

cases where it’s a better marketing story than it 

is an implementation story. The Lockheed team, 

after I left [Lockheed Martin], struggled quite a 

bit in getting the software straightened out.”40

The software requirements were more complex than those in anyone’s prior experience, 

and the challenges of the corporate merger were 

underappreciated at the time. “I think [Lockheed 

Martin] erroneously assumed that there was a lot 

of stuff they [could] reuse,” Mike Werner said. 

“They didn’t realize the complexity of [SIRTF’s] 

fault protection, which relies on autonomy, 

because [SIRTF] is not in constant contact with 

the Earth, so if something goes wrong, it has to 

be able to sense it and correct it, and that’s called 

autonomy.” For every software component—

whether new or repurposed—there had to be a 

fault-protection complement. “I think the complexity of that totally caught them off guard,” 

Werner said.41 Even JPL’s Johnny Kwok, who proposed SIRTF’s solar Earth-trailing orbit and has 

39. Patricia Lock, “SIRTF—Inheritance, Adaptation, and Advancement,” in Proceedings of AIAA SpaceOps Conference 2000, 

(June 2000), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2014/14468 (accessed 30 August 2016).

40. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

41. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

developed software for several successful NASA 

missions, expressed frustration that he couldn’t 

do more: “I could contribute [to] the communication system, the pointing-control system, 

and some of the functionality on the spacecraft,” 

Kwok said, “[but] I don’t know what to do with 

the flight software. It’s like spaghetti, and I don’t 

know how to get it unraveled.”42

Lockheed Martin tried to solve the problem 

by adding programmers. The software continued 

to fall behind schedule. Bill Irace, who was overseeing the systems engineering for SIRTF, was 

spending two or three days a week at Lockheed’s 

Sunnyvale facility; however, he, too, was unable 

to tame the problem. “[We didn’t realize quickly 

enough] that Lockheed Martin didn’t know how 

to write the software,” Irace remembers.43 The 

“faster, better, cheaper” policies of Dan Goldin 

had strongly encouraged the repurposing of software as a way to save money in development 

and testing. But in practice, those savings are 

very difficult to achieve unless the team comes 

with the software, because there is always some 

implicit knowledge that resides in the staff and 

is not captured in the code or documentation.44

Knitting together a team was hindered by the 

recent merger of Lockheed Martin. “They were 

totally different [organizational] cultures,” said 

Gallagher. “That created a lot of problems in getting a team together.”45

Compounding the issue was a software labor 

shortage—it was the late 1990s and programmers were shunning established firms in favor 

of Internet ventures. “I remember they had job 

fairs right outside the Lockheed Martin gates in 

Sunnyvale. It was very hard to keep people on the 

team,” Gallagher said.46 As a result, the software 

team at Sunnyvale was fairly new. Kwok says, 

“I remember they were sending people to some 

of the basic real-time software control classes. 

I said, ‘Wait a second! You’re building my telescope and you just go take a class on how to write 

real-time control software?’”47 Sunnyvale had 

project oversight but was relying on the team in 

Denver to produce some of the electronic parts 

and share their considerable flight-software experience. “But they had not learned how to work 

together,” Kwok said.48 It probably did not help 

that the Sunnyvale and Denver operations had 

both wanted to bid on SIRTF. Lockheed Martin 

management had picked Sunnyvale to lead and 

expected Denver to simply help them.49 But 

in practice this turned out to be problematic, 

as Denver focused on its own contracts, many 

of which were for NASA’s high-profile Mars 

missions. Lockheed Martin changed project 

42. Kwok interview, 25 March 2009.

43. William R. Irace, interview with author, Pasadena, CA, 18 February 2009.

44. Robert K. Wilson and Charles P. Scott, “The Road to Launch and Operations of the Spitzer Space Telescope,” 

paper presented at the SpaceOps Conference, Rome, Italy, 16 June 2006; available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.

jsp?R=20080022114 (accessed 30 August 2016); also see James L. Fanson, Giovanni G. Fazio, James R. Houck, Tim 

Kelly, George H. Rieke, Domenick J. Tenerelli, and Milt Whitten, “Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF),” Proceedings 

of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE), Space Telescopes and Instruments V, no. 3356 (August 

28, 1998), pp. 478–491.

45. Gallagher interview, 3 March 2009.

46. Gallagher interview, 3 March 2009.

47. Kwok interview, 25 March 2009.

48. Kwok interview, 25 March 2009.

49. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.
134 Making the Invisible Visible

managers several times, but this had little effect 

on SIRTF’s software-development rate.

Eventually, the SIRTF project team enlisted 

the help of Headquarters. In a progress report 

to the SWG, Irace mentioned that “the status 

of SIRTF flight software is a major concern 

at Headquarters, with Administrator Goldin 

inquiring about this topic. Weiler [Associate 

Administrator for Space Science Enterprise] has 

discussed this issue with the CEO of Lockheed 

Martin.”50 Headquarters had already delayed 

SIRTF’s launch, for reasons that had as much to 

do with the software problems as with a shortage 

of launch vehicles. By May 2002, the software 

was back on track and launch was scheduled for 

2003.51 Lockheed Martin had appointed John 

Straetker as its SIRTF program manager and 

Nick Vadlamudi as the observatory system-engineering manager, and by all accounts they turned 

things around. Straetker “saw the observatory 

from completing the test and integration at 

Lockheed through to launch at the Cape. It made 

a tremendous difference,” Werner said. “The 

spacecraft has worked very, very well. What that 

may mean is that the lower-level engineers who 

were working on the project were doing well, but 

someplace in the middle there was a big disconnect.”52 Simmons concurred: “[T]o the credit of 

the people working on the job day by day, they 

sort of fought their own management to make 

it successful.”53 In the end, the software worked 

very well, but its cost went from $15 million to 

$70 million and used up more than half of the 

budget reserve that Larry Simmons had set aside.

If the software was complicated for Lockheed 

Martin to build, it would also be difficult to 

operate in space. Mission operations had been 

planned on a shoestring, before the software 

issues were fully understood. The reserve fund 

might have helped, but the software problems 

had drawn it down. There was separate funding 

for SIRTF’s Science Center operations, where 

the data would be received and processed. The 

SSC was part of the Infrared Processing Analysis 

Center, which received funding directly from 

Headquarters to handle several major infrared 

datasets. SIRTF’s mission operations were the 

responsibility of JPL, but the money was insufficient to properly staff and train a crew on novel 

software. “For this and a variety of other reasons, 

we didn’t really have a very robust operations 

plan..., the nuts and bolts of commanding a 

spacecraft,” Werner said. “We actually failed the 

Critical Design Review for the mission-operations system. At that point, Dave Gallagher went 

around JPL and said, ‘We need the very best 

mission-operations guy you’ve got. Who is that?’ 

They said, ‘It’s Bob [Robert K.] Wilson.’ Bob 

came in and brought in some really good people 

and straightened things out pretty quickly.”54

Wilson was made the SIRTF mission operations 

system manager, and Johnny Kwok became the 

mission system engineer. Keyur Patel, an expert 

on autonomous software, was made the flight-engineering office manager, and Fernando Tolivar 

joined the team as flight system engineer. Wilson 

had 18 months to get everything in order.55 And 

he did it. “The big decision that [Wilson] made 

that was really positive was to enlist Lockheed 

Martin, in Denver, in the spacecraft operations,” 

Werner said. “Lockheed, Sunnyvale, which is 

where Spitzer had been built, sort of had the 

50. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 15–16 August 2001.

51. SIRTF SWG Meeting Minutes, 10–11 May 2002.

52. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009. 

53. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.

54. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009.

55. Wilson and Scott, “The Road to Launch,” 2006.
Chapter 8 • Constructing SIR

right of first refusal, but 

they really didn’t want 

to do it.... Whereas at 

[Denver,] there are groups 

of people whose job it is 

to operate spacecraft. They 

operate a lot of [JPL’s] 

Mars spacecraft and were 

familiar with the spacecraft 

avionics and electronics.... 

They were a very logical 

choice to do the operations. [The Denver team] 

has done very well by us.”56

Launch

The Space Infrared 

Telescope Facility launched 

from Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station in Florida 

on Monday, 25 August 

2003, at 1:35 a.m. Eastern 

Daylight Time (see Fig. 

8.9). SIRTF entered its 

solar Earth-trailing orbit 

and opened its lens to 

the sky, receiving first 

light on 1 September.57 It 

began collecting data on 

1 December.58 The main 

mission lasted twice as 

long as expected. The cryogen finally ran out on 15 

FIGURE 8.9. Image of the August 2003 launch at Cape Canaveral Air Force

Station, Florida, of the Delta rocket that carried Spitzer into 

trailing-Earth orbit (NASA Kennedy Space Center).

56. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009.

57. SIRTF Science Center Press Release #146 (9 March 2003), available at http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/news/146-

ssc2003-03-Space-Infrared-Telescope-Facility-Mission-Status (accessed 30 August 2016).

58. The date of September 1 is drawn from the caption of an image transmitted during Spitzer’s first power-up sequence,

or “aliveness test,” in space. Two versions of this image (with and without annotation) can be viewed online at http://

photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/catalog/PIA04724 (accessed 30 August 2016). For more details, see John W. Miles et al.,

“Execution of the Spitzer In-Orbit Checkout and Science Verification Plan,” a paper presented at the SPIE Astronomical

Telescopes and Instrumentation Conference, Glasgow, Scotland, 21 June 2004.
136 Making the Invisible Visible

May 2009.59 SIRTF, renamed the Spitzer Space 

Telescope in honor of Lyman Spitzer, the pioneering promoter of space-borne astronomy, 

will continue to send back data with the two 

short-wavelength detectors on IRAC that can 

operate at warmer temperatures (34.5 K).60 By 

2016, Spitzer had drifted more than 100 million miles from Earth.61 Eventually, however, 

data collection will end as the telescope’s signals 

become too faint for two-way communication on 

the current data network. Around the year 2068, 

Spitzer will once again be within signaling reach 

when its orbit comes full circle. What remains are 

the data Spitzer has gathered, which have already 

led to discoveries of exoplanets and observations 

of the farthest reaches of space.62 In the data still 

to come, there are bound to be surprises. The harvest from SIRTF will sustain future generations 

of infrared astronomers and those who want to 

understand the origins of our universe.

59. SIRTF Science Center Press Release #436 (15 May 2009), available at http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/news/

436-ssc2009-12-NASA-s-Spitzer-Begins-Warm-Mission (accessed 30 August 2016).

60. Spitzer Fact Sheet.

61. SIRTF is drifting away from Earth at a rate of 0.1 Astronomical Units (AU) per year. In 10 years, it will have drifted over 

90 million miles (per Spitzer Fact Sheet). Its current location can be found at http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/mission/

where_is_spitzer (accessed 30 August 2016).

62. For more on the key scientific findings made possible by the Spitzer telescope, please visit http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/

data/SPITZER/docs/spitzermission/missionoverview/papers/ and http://irsa.ipac.caltech.edu/data/SPITZER/docs/

spitzermission/observingprograms/legacy/ (accessed 30 August 2016). For a summary of initial findings, please see 

Michael Werner, “Spitzer: The First 30 Months,” Astronomy & Geophysics 47, no. 6 (2006): 6.11–6.16; and Michael 

Werner et al., “First Fruits of the Spitzer Space Telescope: Galactic and Solar System Studies,” Annual Review of 

Astronomy and Astrophysics 44 (September 2006): 269–321.
137

CHAPTER 9

Making the Invisible Visible

Spitzer’s success is due in part to its many technological innovations, such as its sensors, its 

Earth-trailing orbit, and its use of radiative cooling. But it is also due to managerial innovations 

that can help shape collaboration and sustain a 

project. Three behaviors fostered the project’s 

success. Based on themes that participants repeatedly mentioned, the three factors were nurturing 

relationships, challenging boundaries, and establishing interfaces. While these set the management of the Spitzer project apart from others, 

they are still general enough to be applicable to 

other projects.

Management Lessons

How NASA manages projects has already been 

the subject of several books, including one by 

Charlie Pellerin.1

 The technology that makes 

Spitzer unique is truly remarkable, and all of the 

SWG members have written detailed descriptions of the instruments and the facility. Over 

seven thousand articles have been published on 

the scientific results from Spitzer. There are even 

two personal histories of the project, by Mike 

Werner (2006) and George Rieke (2006). What 

all of these narratives skim over, however, are the 

managerial skills that enabled it to endure for 

decades, to transform itself from orbit to orbit, 

and ultimately to secure the commitment of 

shifting constituencies. Management was not 

the primary focus for most of the people working on what was then known as SIRTF. Because 

bad management tends to stand out, while good 

management fades into the background, the 

nearly invisible ways in which this project was 

managed are worth a closer look.

In more than 35 interviews, most of them 

conducted in 2008 and 2009, participants 

repeatedly mentioned the management contributions of two people: Mike Werner and Larry 

Simmons. Werner has been the project scientist 

since 1983. Whereas other members of the SWG 

worked on other missions in addition to SIRTF, 

this project was Werner’s full-time job. “I have 

to give Mike...particular credit for keeping the 

project alive,” Simmons says.2 In turn, Werner 

credits Simmons with keeping the team aligned 

and making SIRTF happen. Simmons was a relative newcomer, joining as project manager at the 

1. Charles J. Pellerin, How NASA Builds Teams: Mission Critical Soft Skills for Scientists, Engineers, and Project Teams

(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009). 

2. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009. 
138 Making the Invisible Visible

end of 1993, but he possessed deep institutional 

knowledge about how to get things done at JPL.

“The project scientist and the project manager are partners in assuring the scientific success 

of a mission,” notes Werner.3

 Nevertheless, both 

Werner and Simmons would quickly avow that 

much of the credit for SIRTF’s success belongs 

to other people. This collaborative spirit is partly 

what made them so effective. Others also played 

key roles: Fred Witteborn and Nancy Boggess got 

SIRTF started; Martin Harwit gave it a storyline; 

Charlie Pellerin, Dan Weedman, and Larry Caroff 

worked the politics and budgets at Headquarters; 

Frank Low and Johnny Kwok came up with technical breakthroughs; and Marcia Rieke and Bob 

Gehrz worked to get Congress and the scientific 

community lined up behind SIRTF. Dozens 

more who are not mentioned by name supplied 

valuable assistance, but those identified here 

stand out because their actions were striking or 

tied to specific, visible events. While their contributions were necessary, they were not sufficient. 

It was Werner and Simmons who provided the 

cement that held everything together.

Although Werner and Simmons had different 

roles, they had the same goal: to get SIRTF into 

orbit. No manager can force people to get along, 

but he or she can establish structures and norms 

that shape team behaviors, such as courtesy and 

collaboration. SIRTF’s managers successfully 

changed the relational aspects of teaming by 

holding retreats and team-building workshops, 

rotating meetings to different locations, colocating teams, and establishing contracts that 

rewarded team outcomes.

Simmons and Werner pioneered these efforts, 

but they were emulated by other senior leaders 

for SIRTF, such as Dave Gallagher and Bill Irace 

at JPL, Tim Kelly at Ball Aerospace, and John 

Straetker at Lockheed Martin. Because direct testimony can best illustrate how these managerial 

techniques were applied in the case of SIRTF, the 

following sections contain interview excerpts that 

address each technique in turn.

A. NURTURE RELATIONSHIPS

One mechanism used to organize the project 

activity was to forge interpersonal relationships. 

Strong relationships can help to hold a project 

like SIRTF together, especially during crises or 

long delays. But most relationships do not exist 

before the project. They are established as people 

are brought together to work on it, and those 

relationships need to be developed, regularly 

maintained, and occasionally repaired. As the 

top two people officially responsible for managing SIRTF, Werner and Simmons (and later 

Gallagher) felt that nurturing interpersonal relationships was one of their most important contributions—even though they sometimes had to 

defend this activity to their team members and 

upper management.

1. Spend time in their world. Managers actively 

developed their own connections across the organization. They thus knew in advance where particular knowledge and information resided, and 

they were well positioned to detect the first signs 

of emergent problems.

Dave Gallagher, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“I learned this a long time ago. When I was back 

at Headquarters, I would just sort of walk through 

the building. I made a lot of friends and got to 

know a lot of people. It sounds lame, but I would 

start on the top floor, and I would basically walk 

the floor and get to know people and introduce 

myself to people I didn’t know and try to establish some relationships.... It wasn’t manipulative 

in nature, like ‘I need to get to know these people 

because I’m going to want something from them.’ 

3. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009. 
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

I actually enjoyed it. I like to understand organizational dynamics and how things really work 

and how decisions get made and what motivates 

people. The best way to understand that is [by] 

spending time talking to people, so that’s what 

I did.”4

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“A very important part of this kind of a job is 

to be proactive. I would spend a fair amount of 

my time talking to the other managers just to 

make sure I understood what was happening. 

At one point we had a concern about how we 

were going to get the telescope focused. Bill Irace 

and I purposely identified a couple of people we 

thought would be good to head up that activity—a couple from the science team and one 

engineering guy who set up this tiger team that 

worked on focusing the telescope. I participated 

in those discussions and made sure that we had 

a well-defined, agreed-upon focus criterion that 

was argued out in advance, so that we wouldn’t 

get into a big argument about it in the heat of 

battle. I would take on special topics that were 

cross-organizational and that otherwise might 

have fallen through the cracks.”5

Dave Gallagher, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“I’m very focused on trying to spend a lot of 

time with people, trying to...understand their 

world. That requires time and travel. This team’s 

key players...had all been together so long, 

you know, that I was definitely a little bit of 

an outsider [in 1999]. There was an element of 

earning their trust, spending time with them, 

understanding how we’d gotten here. That was 

one thing. Keeping our relationship with NASA 

Headquarters healthy was extremely time-consuming. Lia LaPiana [SIRTF program executive 

at Headquarters] and I spent a lot of time on 

the phone and either her coming out here [to 

JPL] or us going back there [to Headquarters] 

sort of monthly. I borrowed—and maybe modified a little bit, but mostly just borrowed—this 

concept from Larry [Simmons] of a monthly 

management team face-to-face meeting. I think 

that’s very important. We rotated the venue.... 

We’d go to [the University of] Arizona, we’d go 

to Cornell, we’d go to Lockheed, Ball. It really 

helps to meet with people on their turf. Again, 

that’s time-consuming. We ultimately had to go 

get more money from NASA Headquarters. That 

process was challenging.”6

2. Enforce respectfulness. Many SIRTF participants had joined the team as the result of winning a competition, including the PIs, the NASA 

Centers, and the contractors. Simmons had to 

find a way to convert the dynamics of competition into those of collaboration. He established 

a rule that team members would not complain 

about one another. SIRTF was being developed with limited resources; there were plenty 

of challenges to address but not enough money 

to address them all. Every member of the team 

needed to do his or her part, but in order to meet 

their own obligations, they often had to rely 

on others.

Bill Irace, SIRTF Deputy Project Manager (JPL)

“I think if you had to point to one thing that 

caused SIRTF to be successful, it was that it was 

a culture that was established at the beginning, 

which is, you do not fight with each other. You 

do not badmouth someone else. You do not 

say, ‘He doesn’t know what he’s doing.’ Larry 

[Simmons] never let that happen anywhere in his 

presence, including in the [project] office itself. 

4. Gallagher interview, 3 March 2009.

5. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008. 

6. Gallagher interview, 3 March 2009.
140 Making the Invisible Visible

would always physically meet somewhere; and we 

would meet in different places, in different people’s plants. We’d go to Colorado, or Sunnyvale, or 

the launch site, or wherever, but we would always 

meet. That created a human connection among all 

these people, which was built not just formally but 

at dinners, parties on occasion.”9

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“We saw each other every month. I attribute a 

lot of the project’s success to those face-to-face 

meetings. My meetings were four hours long. 

We’d meet from 8:00 [a.m.] to 12:00 [p.m.], or 

something like that.... Everybody would come in 

the day before...and they would get together for 

dinner, and then they would meet for breakfast 

and we would have the meeting. It’s too late to 

go to the airport to catch the flight home, so they 

would spend the afternoon talking to each other 

about stuff, and then they would go home the 

next day. So there was a lot of opportunity for 

face time.... It facilitated people interacting with 

each other, and that was really, I think, the key to 

SIRTF.... Mike [Werner] was excellent at having 

regular Science Working Group meetings.”10

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“One of the things that [rotating the venue] did 

is it made everybody feel like they were involved 

in everything.”11

4. Create a place for interaction. Despite the efforts 

to build connections among SIRTF’s team members, the fact remained that they were all members 

of different organizations, spread over three time 

zones. Simmons cajoled JPL management into 

giving him physical space so that the project had 

People would grouse, and he’d say, ‘Do not say 

that. They’re a part of the team; we need to work 

with them. They’re the ones who are going to get 

the job done. So do not ever do that.’ That culture was established from the beginning.”7

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“I’ve often told my teams over the years, you 

never call a company, you call a person at the 

company. If the company answers the phone, 

hang up, because it’s a machine. So you come to 

realize that even though you’re not in the business 

of dealing with people in a buy/sell relationship 

so much, the thing that makes the project work or 

not work are the people. So then you have to sit 

back and say, well, who are the important people 

and what are the roles of the various people and 

how do I deal with them.”8

3. Create opportunities for interaction. In a project as complex as SIRTF, meetings are a fact of 

life. While the ostensible goal of a meeting is to 

gather or disseminate information, Werner and 

Simmons consciously used meetings as a way to 

foster human connections. Face-to-face meetings 

were regularly held at different team members’ 

locations. This gave the whole team (not just the 

leaders) a chance to learn about one another’s 

worlds. It also distributed the burden of traveling 

to meetings. Many interviewees identified these 

monthly meetings as essential to SIRTF’s success. 

Bill Irace, SIRTF Deputy Project Manager (JPL)

“Larry would require the key managers from all the 

areas, maybe ten people, to meet face-to-face every 

month, whether they wanted to or not—whether 

they thought it was a good idea or not. They 

7. Irace interview, 18 February 2009.

8. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.

9. Irace interview, 18 February 2009.

10. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.

11. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008. 
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

a home base for team members, regardless of their 

organizational affiliations. Simmons was thus able 

to dissolve organizational boundaries and make 

people feel that they were part of one organization, the SIRTF project. Sharing an office also 

created additional opportunities for interaction.

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“Facilities are always a problem at JPL; there’s 

never enough space. So I lobbied for some space. 

It turned out that an old building was being 

refurbished, and the top floor of the building was 

about to be completely renovated. It was about 

the right amount of square footage for our project.... So I got to help define the final layout of 

that floor because we were going to be [its] first 

users. I could put my entire team up there. I got 

people from the line organization to co-locate 

with us. I’m a big believer in co-location. I don’t 

care who your boss is, if you’re working on my 

project, I’d like you to be kind of close by. So we 

got enough space so that we could co-locate many 

of the key people. In co-locating them, we were 

kind of isolated [from the rest of JPL] because 

this building is sort of off in the corner. That 

had its good parts and its bad parts, from some 

people’s point of view. We were no longer right 

in the middle of the swirling JPL. But we were 

co-located, so if you wanted to ask the structures 

guy a question, he was right over there. Many 

of the team members were right next to each 

other. They’d go to lunch together.... Some of 

them would stay and talk after work about what 

we should do about the thermostat, or something like that.... It helped congeal the team. We 

were able to create office space for some of our 

contractors.... They were only there part of the 

time [and desks would sometimes be empty]. So 

I had to kind of stand there with a straight face 

sometimes and people would say to me, ‘Well, 

do you really need that space?’ I would say ‘Oh, 

yeah, it’s absolutely essential we have that space.’ 

So we got it, and that helped, too, because when 

the scientists came in, there was a place for them 

[to] sit and work. When the contractors would 

come, there was a place for them to work, and 

they could leave notes to each other. We actually 

established that as a precedent.... Those are the 

kind of things we could do because there really 

weren’t solid rules at the time. You could kind 

of create these rules—that we needed places for 

these people. Colocating them, having them not 

think of themselves as working for the company 

as much as working for SIRTF—all that contributed to the glue that made them a team. It became 

a very strong team.... When you have enough 

skill, diversity, and quality of team members that 

almost anything you can come up with is within 

their capabilities, you have a strong team.”12

5. Establish the desired norms. Shared space and 

frequent interactions are often not enough to 

bring a team together when its members belong 

to different organizations. Even in the case of the 

merger between Lockheed and Martin Marietta, 

corporations that shared a top management team 

and stock price, the two were more separate than 

integrated when it came to SIRTF. With little 

or no organizational leverage, Simmons had to 

find a way to bring together team members—

from various universities, government labs, and 

contractors—who were not just from different 

organizations but from institutions with radically different incentives and rewards. Werner 

helped people to see how their work on SIRTF 

contributed to a scientific quest. Simmons held 

a team-building retreat, which was a highly 

unusual thing to ask of scientists and engineers, 

whose training had not focused on skills necessary for collaboration, such as networking and 

interpersonal communication. 

12. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.
142 Making the Invisible Visible

you’re wearing. You’re part of a team. When 

people work on projects, they tend to identify 

more strongly with the project than they do with 

their home organization.”15

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“I never let them talk about the company they 

worked for; they always had to talk about the 

fact that they worked on SIRTF and what their 

job was on SIRTF. They were responsible for the 

cryogenics, they were responsible for the telescope; whatever their job was on SIRTF, that’s 

who they were. They weren’t the guy from Ball, 

they weren’t the guy from Lockheed, they weren’t 

the guy from [JPL’s] Division 32. They were the 

SIRTF guy responsible for data processing, or the 

SIRTF guy responsible for mission analysis, or 

whatever their job was. It didn’t take too long, 

frankly, because I would hound them about that. 

It didn’t take too long before they quit introducing themselves to each other as ‘I’m from Ball.’ 

They’d call each other [and say]: ‘I’m responsible for the cryogenics, and I need this from 

you.’... There was one case where [a person from 

Lockheed] needed some tungsten to do something with. ‘I need a block of tungsten, but I can’t 

get it for three weeks.’ [A person from Ball said] 

‘I’ve got some here. I’ll send you some.’ They FedEx’ed it back and forth.... They didn’t have contracts with each other, so they were able to share 

information, share actual materials, because it all 

contributed to getting the project done—without having to go through a central focus, which 

some projects tend to do. Some project managers tend to want to know everything that’s going 

on all the time and have everything approved. I 

didn’t do that.”16

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“Once we had Ball and Lockheed as part of the 

team, the very first thing I did is, I had a threeday retreat up in Oxnard [California], at a place 

called the Mandalay Bay, and invited each of the 

companies to send—I don’t remember how many 

people, three or four people. The PIs came and 

the facility scientists came, and the JPL people 

came, and we just got to know each other. They 

thought I was a screwball because I said, ‘We’re 

not going to get anything out of this meeting 

except to find out who each other are. I want to 

know who’s got kids,’ and so forth.... I put a lot 

of effort into forcing the team to function as a 

team.... I had two people from JPL who were in 

our training organization who actually facilitated 

[the retreat]. They came up with some of the 

stupid stuff we did. A guy who’s a tenured professor at a university, you say to him, ‘I want you 

to make this thing out of toilet paper tubes and 

plastic bottles and stuff.’ But they were all having 

a good time.... You just got to know each other. 

You got a sense for what their personal issues were 

as well as their professional issues.... I’m experimenting here... [They] got to know each other 

well enough that...people actually got to where 

they were working on SIRTF, instead of working 

for their company.”13

Frank Martin, Director of Astrophysics 

(NASA Headquarters):14

 “When people are all part of one organization—

one NASA Center, or one company—they tend 

to behave differently when they get in a tough 

situation; if they’re partners with somebody, then 

who’s responsible?... Once you get into the mission, people don’t pay attention to what badge 

13. Simmons interview (Session I), 18 February 2009.

14. Frank Martin was NASA’s Director of Astrophysics from 1979 to 1983, the period during which some of SIRTF’s initial 

studies were commissioned. Later, Martin was a senior executive at Lockheed Martin (1990–2001) when the Phase C 

contracts for building SIRTF were signed.

15. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009. 

16. Simmons interview (Sessions I and II), 18 February and 9 March 2009.
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

B. CHALLENGE BOUNDARIES

The second mechanism used to organize the project activity was a redefinition of the boundaries 

people took for granted. Challenging boundaries is necessary to make people see beyond them. 

Job titles, a building block of the organizational 

chart, are intended to clarify who owns what part 

of the project. Titles can, however, impede creative problem solving and lead to an “it’s-not-myjob” mentality. In addition, job titles and boxes 

on an organizational chart do not reflect the 

other identities people have within their profession, company, or division. Simmons and Werner 

removed the traditional antagonisms—between 

scientists and engineers, government employees 

and contractors, research and operations—and 

helped people to instead identify with the project. Team members were made to feel that they 

were contributing to something larger—and to 

understand how their piece completed the puzzle.

1. Do not hoard information. On an innovative project like SIRTF, where the design cannot be well 

defined or the challenges fully understood at the 

start, people will quickly add buffers by padding 

the schedule, the budget, and their contracts. 

This is a normal response to sparse or ambiguous information. Scientists, by training, tend to 

seek out more information. The adoption of the 

Earth-trailing solar orbit suggested by Kwok, a 

lower-level engineering manager, demonstrates 

how flows of information can benefit the project. 

In contrast, many of the participants were accustomed to working on classified contracts, or in 

highly political environments, where there can be 

real benefits to damming the flow of information. 

Simmons and others overcame this tendency by 

sharing essential information with the entire 

management team, not just those whose paycheck was signed by JPL. With shared information, the team was better able to reach consensus 

and, when there were disagreements, to work out 

compromises or alternative solutions.

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“One of the things Simmons did which was very 

effective was he kept open books, so everybody 

always knew how much money everybody else 

was getting. We had a management team that 

met every month; that was the internal management team of the project. And one of the things 

that was always on the agenda was potential allocations of our project reserve. So even though he, 

and later Dave Gallagher, reserved the prerogative to make the final decision, everybody could 

feel that they’d been consulted and had a say in 

how these reserve funds were allocated.”17

Charles Lawrence, SIRTF Deputy Project Scientist (JPL)

“Everybody [on the management team] knew 

how much money there was available. Everybody 

knew where it was going.... If somebody was 

having a problem and they needed more money, 

they made the request. ‘Here’s why we need this, 

here’s how much it’s going to cost, here’s what 

we’re going to do.’ So everybody had insight, 

everybody had knowledge. And along with that 

comes a confidence that you’re not missing something, that nobody’s trying to pull a fast one on 

you. That’s a departure from the way a lot of 

things are managed. A lot of managers see knowledge as power and withholding knowledge as one 

of the main ways of controlling things. I happen 

to think that’s not very productive. If power is 

what you’re interested in, maybe it’s OK. If 

making things work is what you’re interested in, 

it’s not very productive.... Now, another aspect 

was that the contracts as they were written were 

cost-plus-incentive contracts, as one of the things 

allowed by federal procurement regulations. The 

incentive fee had a component that depended on 

the overall success of the mission. That means that 

17. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008. 
144 Making the Invisible Visible

Lockheed’s fee depended on Ball’s performance; 

Ball’s and Lockheed’s performance depended on 

the instruments working; and so on. The advantage of that is that you’ve removed the incentive 

for people to solve their own problems at the 

expense of somebody else—or to not help solving somebody else’s problem in the optimum way 

just because it’s going to cost you a little bit more 

money. All right, so it’s going to cost you a little 

bit more money. You say, ‘Sure, we’re glad to do 

it. It’s going to cost us a little bit more money. 

Overall it’s the best solution. Money flows from 

one place to another, whatever.’ So the incentive 

is you work together, you [get] the best overall 

product. You don’t maximize your little piece 

of it.”18

2. Focus on talent, not titles. There is a tendency 

among scientists and engineers to focus on their 

specialty—that is, the science or the engineering. 

Although there was plenty of hierarchy and specialized expertise in the SIRTF project, the roles 

were surprisingly fluid. Scientists on SIRTF did 

not simply design their experiment and then 

hand it to the engineers to build, as many interviewees noted is typically done on space projects. 

In the SIRTF project, the scientists (perhaps 

because they were also instrument builders) often 

acted like engineers when faced with challenges: 

redesigning rather than giving up. The engineers 

also acted like scientists, never forgetting that the 

goal of the mission was not to build something 

on schedule and within budget but to bring back 

infrared data. 

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“For the system-design team, I had a system 

architect. His name was Jim Fanson. I had Jim 

run the system-design team meetings. When you 

have design teams, they work at different levels 

and you don’t only have one: You have one for 

the electronics and one for the telescope and so 

forth. Jim Fanson ran the Über system-design 

team. What they did is, they created much of the 

documentation that flowed down to the other 

organizations [i.e., the various subgroups that 

made up the SIRTF team] to tell them what they 

had to do. ‘This is what the telescope has to do.’ 

‘This is the interface between the telescope and 

the spacecraft,’ and so forth and so on. So I had 

these key guys, and they all had titles—because 

everybody likes to have a title. I had a meeting 

with my team once a week. At one of my oncea-week meetings, the team said, ‘Well, we need 

role statements.’ I said, ‘Well, our job is to get 

SIRTF built.’ They said, ‘Yeah, but I’m responsible for the spacecraft, I need a role statement.’ I 

said, ‘Well, you’re on the design team. Work with 

the other guys, get the spacecraft built.’ ‘Well, 

we need role statements.’ I said, ‘OK, write me 

role statements.’ They said, ‘When do you want 

them?’ So I said, ‘Well, make it two weeks,” or 

something like that—I don’t remember what I 

said. So they all wrote me role statements. So I 

sat down and I...talked to them about their role 

statements, and after I got them from them, I put 

them in a drawer and never got them out again. 

They never brought it up again. They were OK 

with it, but they had to write down what their 

role was, and they wanted to talk about it. So we 

did that. Now, at the time, the JPL nominal situation was, you’d write a role statement, they’d 

sign it, I’d sign it, we’d put it in a book, and then 

somehow it would become part of the history 

of the project. ‘These were the roles of the key 

people,’ and so forth. Then when you went to 

give them raises and stuff, you’d drag out the role 

statements and say, ‘This guy is responsible for 

this and this, and therefore he should get a big 

raise,’ or whatever. But I didn’t do that. I just said, 

‘OK, you want a role statement, write a role statement.’ They wrote it, and I put them away. They 

18. Charles R. Lawrence, interview by author, Pasadena, CA, 19 January 2009.
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

were happy with that, because they had wanted 

to write them, and they got to write them, and 

we were done with it.”19

Charles Lawrence, SIRTF Deputy Project Scientist (JPL)

“The Science Working Group [was] involved 

at a very detailed level in what might have been 

thought of as engineering parts of the project. 

There’s a lot of knowledge on the SWG, a lot 

of experience, and certainly a deep understanding of what the science goals were and what 

the effect of various possibilities on the science 

[might be]. There was also, to go along with it, a 

lot of experience in doing things for constrained 

budgets and a recognition of the importance 

of schedules and budgets. So you had a highly 

experienced and capable science team with a lot 

to offer in working out solutions to technical 

problems. And they did. So when teams were set 

up to address particular aspects of the mission, 

you’d put together a team that had people from 

every part of the project involved with it. And 

you’d get them all together, and they’d work on 

it together. It didn’t matter whose problem it was 

in particular.”20

3. Cultivate ownership. Although the SIRTF team 

made organizational boundaries somewhat permeable by fostering norms of openness and 

inclusion, everyone was aware that final authority rests in one person, the project manager. As 

NASA’s representative overseeing the project, 

the project manager decided how resources 

would be allocated, what risks were not acceptable, and whether to launch. Simmons (and later 

Gallagher) never abdicated their responsibility, 

but they did not rely on their power to manage 

the project. They relied on other people.

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“I expected my team to do the job. I didn’t expect 

them to say, ‘This is my part of the job, and I 

don’t care about anybody else.’ I expected them 

to work together and, as a team, get the job 

done. So I had a mission manager and I had a 

telescope manager. I had a spacecraft manager. 

I had a system engineer and all of these various 

skills. I had them get together and have designteam meetings—which I didn’t go to, by the way, 

because I wanted to let them know it was up to 

them to come up with the design. I would support what they were doing.”21

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“A car can be built with interchangeable people 

as well as interchangeable parts. But SIRTF 

couldn’t be, and the very first prototype car 

probably couldn’t be, either. Now, there was, of 

course, during the project, a well-defined organization, [with] well-defined reporting routes 

from that organization back to Caltech and to 

Headquarters. But one of the things I learned 

from Larry Simmons was that ‘It’s the people, 

stupid.’ NASA doesn’t build anything. JPL 

doesn’t build anything. People within NASA and 

JPL build things. And the way it works—with 

JPL, at least—is that a tremendous amount of 

authority and responsibility is vested in the project manager. The project manager is clearly the 

single most important person in the organization, 

and everybody else is sort of a subcontractor.... It 

was an interesting realization that the instrument 

teams had both the deliverable role, in which case 

they reported to the project management, and the 

science role, in which case they reported to me or 

discussed it with me. [What] made it a success 

was that we didn’t, in general, interfere with the 

subcontractors unless they were screwing up. We 

19. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.

20. Lawrence interview, 19 January 2009. 

21. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.
146 Making the Invisible Visible

didn’t have this arrogant feeling that often comes 

in a place like JPL—that regardless of who they 

are or what they’re doing, we know how to do it 

better, and we’re going to go tell them how to do 

it.... A big part of the success of SIRTF was in 

getting a great team in and empowering the team 

and allowing the team members to manage their 

own part of the job [while] keeping enough of an 

eye on them so that if things started to go awry, 

we could help put them back on the rails before 

they got too far off.”22 

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“One of the things about a NASA project is, in the 

space program, the person who really is supposed 

to be in charge is the project scientist, because 

he’s the guy who’s presumably come up with a 

proposal to do something, or he’s been brought 

in to lead a team of scientists to do something, 

and what they’re trying to do has to get implemented in a way that they can be successful. So, 

as a manager who also tends to think of myself 

as a bit of a scientist, my job isn’t to tell people 

what to do so much as find out what needs to be 

done and see that that gets done.... I’m not out 

to become the boss as much as I’m out to find 

the right people and lead a team that will accomplish what we want to do. Early on in a project 

like SIRTF, it’s not real clear what we want to do. 

So part of the job of managing this is to get the 

people who do know to share with the rest of the 

team, as it exists at that time, what we want to do, 

and see if we can craft something that everybody 

will be happy with.”23

4. Design the project around the people. During 

the three decades SIRTF was in development, it was managed by many different 

people—administrators at Headquarters, collaborators at the NASA Centers, and contractors at 

Ball and Lockheed Martin. In a project of this 

duration and size, staff turnover was inevitable. 

The project adapted—intentionally or not—

to the talent that was working on it. Werner, 

Simmons, and Gallagher were keenly aware that 

it was up to them to ensure the best use of the 

project’s human resources.

Dave Gallagher, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“You do yourself a huge favor by not trying to 

fix everything yourself, especially on big projects 

with 300 or 400 people. You try and get the right 

people in the right place. If the only skill you had 

was that you could pick people well and put the 

right person in the right job, that’s probably all 

you’d need.”24

Tim Kelly, Project Manager (Ball Aerospace)

“One of the things Larry [Simmons] told us 

right at the get-go was that Lockheed didn’t win 

a bus architecture and we didn’t win a telescope 

architecture. We won the right to participate in 

the design and architecture of the SIRTF observatory. Therefore we were going to go through, 

basically, a six-month system-engineering tranche 

collectively, to figure out how we [would proceed]. This was a very hard pill for everyone to 

swallow, because, ‘Hey, you picked us because we 

proposed to make this thing fifteen feet tall and 

paint it green, and now you’re saying you don’t 

want it fifteen feet tall and maybe it could be red? 

We don’t understand.’ So that was one of the first 

problems Larry had to deal with—trying to get 

people in a new mindset of ‘How we are going to 

go forward?’ and ‘Take those proposals you guys 

labored over and throw them away, and let’s get 

22. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008. 

23. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.

24. Gallagher interview, 3 March 2009.
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

a clean piece of paper and see what’s the best way 

to do this.’”25

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“We made the best use of the talents and abilities 

of the people we had who were, on the science 

side, uniformly all very highly motivated by the 

realization of how great the scientific return of 

Spitzer would be.”26

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“George Rieke [PI for MIPS] was making these 

detectors that were going to be good at the long 

wavelengths, and he was building them in the 

basement at the University of Arizona.... The 

way scientific investigation is done is, you find 

something that allows you to do something that 

somebody else hasn’t done.... Sometimes it’s the 

telescope; usually it’s the detector. So NASA and 

everybody expects that the detectors are always 

going to be your biggest problem, because it’s 

something no one’s done before. With the SIRTF 

team, they had detectors, and so I was evaluating where we were.... I talked to George, and he 

showed me his lab, and he’s got these guys who 

have been building these detectors for five, six, or 

seven years, and [he] said, ‘It’s going to be really 

tough getting this work transitioned to industry.’ 

I said, ‘Why are we transitioning it to industry?’ 

He said, ‘Well, we’re not going to be allowed 

to build flight hardware here at the University 

of Arizona.’ I said, ‘Why not?’ He said, ‘NASA 

won’t let us.’ I said, ‘I’m NASA, and I’ll let you.’ 

He didn’t believe me. He didn’t think we were 

going to be able to do that. I said, ‘Why should 

we spend money having someone learn what you 

can already do?’... When you stop and think 

about it, it was stupid to think about trying to 

take something that someone had developed and 

teach someone else how to do it, while the guys 

who knew how to do it sat and watched them.... 

When somebody wanted to do something and it 

didn’t make any sense, we’d say, ‘It doesn’t make 

any sense.’ When someone wanted to do something that made sense, we’d say, ‘OK, let’s do it.’ 

We didn’t need permission for a lot of things. I 

think that’s where people tend to get stuck in 

the mud sometimes—they’re always looking for 

someone to give them approval to do something. 

Frankly, that’s the job of a project manager—to 

say, ‘This is the right thing to do; let’s do it.’”27

C. ESTABLISH CLEAR INTERFACES

The third mechanism is establishing clear interfaces, the place where one thing comes into 

contact with another. Interfaces occur between 

organizations, between levels of management, 

and between the various engineering specialties 

within SIRTF. Establishing clear interfaces makes 

it easier for managers to direct information to 

where it needs to flow. This is the idea behind the 

organizational chart. But creating clear interfaces 

is difficult to do. Like dredging a channel—you 

need to remain vigilant so that the mud doesn’t 

build up as you are sending valuable cargo up- or 

downstream; you don’t want something critical to 

get stuck on a sandbar. Likewise, the lines in an 

organizational chart might appear solid, but if in 

practice they are crossed or broken, then essential 

information gets bogged down. Many interviewees noted that when the lines of authority and 

communication overlapped or became ambiguous, it caused problems for the project.

1. Minimize the interfaces. It is perhaps not surprising that the word interface came up so 

often, as the interviewees were all engineers 

25. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

26. Werner interview (Session II), 19 January 2009. 

27. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.
148 Making the Invisible Visible

and scientists. Good designers know that limiting the interfaces between elements in an 

engineered system is a sure way to reduce costs 

and risks while enhancing reliability. For just 

this reason, SIRTF had very few moving parts. 

SIRTF’s managers understood the need to minimize the number of human interfaces—not 

informal, social relationships but those points 

where people are passing responsibility and 

information back and forth.

Johnny Kwok, SIRTF Mission Manager (JPL)

“There were some technical interfaces, but 

the majority of the problems arose from just 

people—not having the right people, not having 

people work together.”28

Tim Kelly, Project Manager (Ball Aerospace)

“What’s a bad interface? Let’s talk about organizations. They don’t know how to interact, so you 

have every level, every person, kind of all coming 

together and tying themselves in knots with constant phone calls, confusion, bickering, questions 

about memos, countless meetings to sort out 

problems and misunderstandings. What we tried 

to do on SIRTF, what Larry tried to do, was have 

crisp, clean, and clear communications between 

organizations on technical and programmatic 

issues. Bill Irace would use the word broadband

[to describe how] a lot of information comes 

across, but only in a controlled, clear way.”29

Frank Martin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“[For example,] the Hubble Space Telescope 

was a very complicated mission in many ways. 

It wasn’t because the telescope was necessarily 

hard to do—which it was. It was because there 

were multiple Centers [and contractors] involved 

[e.g., Marshall, Goddard, JPL, Lockheed, PerkinElmer]. There were a lot of really good people 

drawn to the project, but what happened was, for 

a variety of reasons, NASA created some rather 

complicated interfaces for these people to work 

in.... I didn’t know any better.... I said, ‘Creating 

interfaces is not a bad thing, it’s a good thing.’... 

Only later did I learn, after my second big cost 

overrun [on IRAS], that these interfaces contribute to your problems.”30

Charlie Pellerin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“The things we didn’t understand when we were 

young and naïve was that every interface costs 

a ton of money, and inter-Center interfaces are 

the worst.”31

Frank Martin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“One of the things I’ve learned in looking back 

at all these missions...is you’ve got to keep minimizing the interfaces. You’ve got to be able to 

do systems engineering on projects. You’ve got 

to be able to keep these things where people 

can manage them, because these things are hard 

enough to do just to build them.”32

2. Manage the interfaces. After the administrators 

reduce the interfaces, those that remain need to 

be managed. Someone has to ensure that the parts 

fit together, information is transferred, problems 

are addressed, and resources are directed toward 

project needs. These interfaces are dynamic—

teams shuffle, issues arise, and priorities shift—

yet the connections across the interfaces must 

28. Kwok interview (Session II), 25 March 2009.

29. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

30. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

31. Pellerin interview, 19 March 2009.

32. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

be maintained. The comments from Martin 

and Kelly reflect how interfaces, good and bad, 

affect those responsible for oversight and those 

being overseen. 

Frank Martin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“If you listen to people talk about Center-toCenter relationships, they always talk about partnering; so no one wants to be in charge, even 

though you have to have that. So when you’ve 

got two Centers doing things, there’s that interface. And then when you’ve got contractors providing things—as with Hubble, where you’ve 

got a spacecraft coming in and somebody else 

provides the telescope, and so forth—somebody 

has to manage that interface. Somebody has to 

manage what’s going on. Whereas if you just have 

a project...where all the [associate] contractors 

reported through the prime, [you could hold] 

somebody responsible and accountable for managing all that stuff. You weren’t doing it yourself, 

and you were using your talents, your system 

engineers, and your managers to provide insight 

and oversight of what was happening, as opposed 

to actually having to do it [yourself] and no one 

else looking over your shoulder. Every time we 

had a good success and pretty much stayed on 

cost and schedule, we had prime contractors and 

one NASA Center.... When we got in trouble 

was when we let ourselves drift into this business 

and its mindset—that we’ll just get the best and 

the brightest, and we’ll pick from this Center and 

that Center, and we’ll create these management 

things, and good people will do good things. It 

doesn’t work that way.”33

Tim Kelly, Project Manager (Ball Aerospace)

“I was a part of the management team and my 

focus, my job, unlike the other people on my 

team, was to ensure that I created a good interface to everybody else. That my opposite numbers at Lockheed, at the different universities, at 

JPL had what they needed and that we as a team 

looked unassailable. I didn’t want to let other 

people down. We had a great environment where 

we never really poked at each other in public, 

because when any one part was hurt, the rest of 

us looked like idiots, too. We tried to work that 

way. And I tried to make sure communication 

was good. I would spend a lot of time with Bill 

trying to get into his head.”34

Frank Martin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“The difficulty with these things is that when 

it gets Center-to-Center, or when it gets company-to-company,...your loyalties are outside. 

People tend to go native, and when trouble happens, it’s ‘us against them’ as opposed to ‘we’re all 

in this together.’”35

Tim Kelly, Project Manager (Ball Aerospace)

“Usually you learn things around problems. And 

that’s where teams are formed, not around good 

times. The formative things are the pressures 

that are put on a team. There were issues with 

the flat cables that brought signals out from the 

detectors, across the CTA [cryogenic telescope 

assembly], and down into the bus. They had 

very, very small connectors. They were very fragile. The electronic guys wanted them very big. 

The thermal guys wanted them very small. There 

were some issues as to whether they were going 

to work or not. Everybody started to get wound 

up. You see that all the time on any problem in 

any organization on anything. As soon as there’s 

a problem, everybody starts winding themselves 

up, and pretty soon you’ve got chaos. Larry was 

very good at keeping people calm and cool. He 

33. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.

34. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

35. Martin telephone interview, 27 March 2009.
150 Making the Invisible Visible

said, ‘OK, let’s get on top of this, let’s get on it 

in a controlled way. Who’s responsible for the 

cable?’ ‘Well, Ball’s responsible for it.’ ‘OK, let 

Ball take the lead in solving the problem.’ And 

then he would get Tom Roellig, who’s a good 

physicist, has a good head on his shoulders, who 

can contribute—an important thing on Larry’s 

part, not just observing, contributing—[Roellig] 

can represent the science on this and make sure 

that this is going to go well.... ‘Roellig, can you 

help them?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Ball, can you accept Roellig to 

come into your meetings and treat him like one 

of your people?’ ‘Yes, we can do it.’ So that’s a 

good example of a clean interface.”36

3. Tailor the context. Organizational structures, 

such as hierarchy and role statements, are created 

to make it easier to manage complex projects. 

However, these structures can take on a life of their 

own, whereby assumptions and virtual boundaries become real. This is problematic in everything 

but the most routine tasks. Even in SIRTF, where 

the scientists and engineers exercised a great deal 

of autonomy, Simmons and other managers took 

care that the structures did not unnecessarily constrain their behaviors. To foster innovation, structures must serve the people, not the other way 

around. Simmons sought to tailor (or eliminate) 

activities that were not useful.

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“To make too many boxes and try and stack them 

next to each other doesn’t work nearly as well as 

getting everybody in one box and hav[ing] them 

work together. That’s what structure can do, if 

you’re not careful. You’ll end up having everybody in their own little box. Think about each 

of us standing in a cardboard box. If we are all in 

one box, we can move around, we can help each 

other. If you fall down, I can pick you up. But if 

we’re all in separate boxes and the line between 

your box and mine is well-defined, then I can’t 

help you very much.”37

Mike Werner, SIRTF Project Scientist (JPL)

“When I first came to JPL, I thought, ‘Well, everything we’re doing’—like a preliminary design 

review or a requirements review—‘is something 

that’s been done hundreds of times at JPL. There 

must be a template we can follow.’ But that isn’t 

true. Every project, rightly or wrongly, tends to 

tailor the processes to its own needs.”38

Larry Simmons, SIRTF Project Manager (JPL)

“Much of the structure was perception rather 

than real. [Headquarters] used to require monthly 

reports from all the projects. People would put in 

enormous amounts of time writing these twenty-, 

thirty-, forty-page monthly reports. I said to the 

guys at Headquarters, ‘Do you ever read those?’ 

No. I said, ‘So if I quit sending them, it won’t 

be a problem.’ They said no [laughter]. So we 

didn’t do those. It didn’t really cause anybody a 

problem, because it was a perceived requirement. 

Because we were strapped for cash, I would push 

back on everybody: Why do you want that? Are 

you really going to use it? And the things they 

really needed and really wanted to use, of course, 

I gave them. But there were many, many things 

that just were required [on paper but that didn’t 

benefit the project].”39

4. Recognize the importance of trust. In complex 

projects, at least at NASA, there are many levels 

of oversight. There are dozens of review boards 

and layers of management that vet the design, 

36. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

37. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009.

38. Werner interview (Session I), 15 December 2008. 

39. Simmons interview (Session II), 9 March 2009. 
Chapter 9 • Making the Invisible Visib

the science objectives, the operations. And they 

can (and do) catch errors and anticipate where 

problems will emerge. However, as Jim Houck 

puts it, “Every single day, you’re closing another 

lock that you cannot reopen.”40 Making progress 

requires having courage that you have done what 

you can and trusting in those who are doing the 

rest. There’s no other choice when you are listening to the countdown, while your life’s work sits 

strapped onto a rocket.

Tim Kelly, Project Manager (Ball Aerospace)

“Interfaces depend upon trust. You have to trust 

your teammates. I have to trust Lockheed. I have 

to trust JPL. Often as not, it’s not the organization 

you trust as much as the individuals. When something goes terribly wrong, your first inclination is 

to be critical. Again, that’s where Larry [Simmons] 

tried to keep people focused: ‘This is not about 

emotions, let’s get back to the problem. We know 

that whatever organization is involved wants this 

to work as much as you do. So let’s just back off of 

that and get to solv[ing] the problem.’”41

Johnny Kwok, SIRTF Mission Manager (JPL)

“People didn’t challenge me [on the solar Earthtrailing orbit]. For whatever reason, no one 

actually asked me, ‘Could you double check, 

triple check, that this will actually work?’ It was 

radical, but I think the team felt that that was 

the only solution available at the time. But I was 

always worried: Had I made any mistakes? No, 

I didn’t make any mistakes.... A few months 

before launch, I was taking a couple of days’ 

vacation.... Larry Simmons called me on my cell 

phone and he said, ‘Johnny, I just remembered, I 

never asked you. Have you checked your work?’ 

[Laughter.]”42

Charlie Pellerin, Director of Astrophysics (NASA Headquarters)

“The performance ultimately is not driven by 

the science, because you can overcome the science. It’s not driven by the technology; with 

proper planning and work, you can develop the 

technology. It’s driven by the performance of the 

team, and it’s driven by the context they’re living 

in. I would claim that teams that have atmospheres of high mutual respect and expressed 

appreciation, carefully addressed shared interests, 

no difficulties across organizational interfaces, 

etc.—those teams are going to function at 100 

percent of what’s possible for groups of people to 

do together.”43

40. Houck interview, 25 May 2009.

41. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

42. Kwok interview (Session II), 25 March 2009.

43. Kelly interview, 20 March 2009.

153

APPENDIX A

Contributors to SIRTF

Enormous and sustained efforts on the part of 

hundreds of people and dozens of organizations were needed to imagine, build, and operate 

SIRTF. The names of all who participated in this 

endeavor are given here, organized according to 

institutional affiliation and role in project management or instrument and system construction.1

Management

SIRTF Science Working Group: M. Werner, JPL, 

Project Scientist; C. Lawrence, JPL, Deputy 

Project Scientist; T. Roellig, NASA Ames, 

Facility Scientist; G. Fazio, SAO, IRAC Principal 

Investigator; J. Houck, Cornell, Principal 

Investigator; G. Rieke, U. Arizona, MIPS 

Principal Investigator; D. Cruikshank, NASA 

Ames; R. Gehrz, U. Minnesota; M. Jura, UCLA; 

F. Low, U. Arizona; M. Rieke, U. Arizona; E. 

Wright, UCLA.

NASA Headquarters (program management): 

N. Boggess, L. Caroff, J. Frogel, F. Gillett, J. 

Hayes, W. Huntress, A. Kinney, L. LaPiana, K. 

Ledbetter, C. Pellerin, C. Scolise, H. Thronson, 

D. Weedman, E. Weiler.

NASA Ames Research Center (project management 

through 1989): W. Brooks, P. Davis, A. Dinger, L. 

Manning, R. Melugin, J. Murphy, R. Ramos, C. 

Wiltsee, F. Witteborn, L. Young.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of 

Technology (project and science management, mission operations): D. Achhnani, A. Agrawal, T. 

Alfery, K. Anderson, J. Arnett, B. Arroyo, D. 

Avila, W. Barboza, M. Bareh, S. Barry, D. Bayard, 

C. Beichman, M. Beltran, R. Bennett, P. Beyer, 

K. Bilby, D. Bliss, G. Bonfiglio, M. Bothwell, 

J. Bottenfield, D. Boussalis, C. Boyles, M. Brown, 

P. Brugarolas, R. Bunker, C. Cagle, C. Carrion, J. 

Casani, E. Cherniack, E. Clark, D. Cole, J. Craft, 

J. Cruz, S. Dekany, M. Deutsch, J. Dooley, R. 

Dumas, M. Ebersole, P. Eisenhardt, C. Elachi, 

W. Ellery, D. Elliott, K. Erickson, J. Evans, 

J. Fanson, T. Feehan, R. Fragoso, L. Francis, 

D. Gallagher, M. Gallagher, G. Ganapathi, 

M. Garcia, N. Gautier, T. Gavin, S. Giacoma, 

J. Gilbert, L. Gilliam, C. Glazer, P. Gluck, V. 

Gorjian, G. Greanias, C. Guernsey, A. Guerrero, 

M. Hashemi, G. Havens, C. Hidalgo, E. Higa, 

G. Hill, J. Hodder, H. Hotz, W. Hu, J. Hunt, 

Jr., D. Hurley, J. Ibanez, W. Irace, K. Jin, M. 

1. This list is adapted from the Spitzer Handbook, 2010.
154 Making the Invisible Visible

Johansen, M. Jones, B. Kahr, J. Kahr, B. Kang, P. 

Kaskiewicz, J. Keene, D. Kern, T. Kia, M. Kline, 

B. Korechoff, P. Kwan, J. Kwok, H. Kwong-Fu, 

M. Larson, M. Leeds, R. Lineaweaver, S. Linick, 

P. Lock, W. Lombard, S. Long, T. Luchik, J. 

Lumsden, M. Lysek, G. Macala, S. Macenka, 

N. Mainland, E. Martinez, M. McAuley, J. 

Mehta, P. Menon, R. Miller, C. Miyamoto, W. 

Moore, F. Morales, R. Morris, A. Nakata, B. 

Naron, A. Nash, D. Nichols, M. Osmolovsky, 

K. Owen-Mankovich, K. Patel, S. Peer, J. Platt, 

N. Portugues, D. Potts, S. Ramsey, S. Rangel, R. 

Reid, J. Reimer, E. Rice, D. Rockey, E. Romana, 

C. Rondeau, A. Sanders, M. Sarrel, V. Scarffe, T. 

Scharton, H. Schember, C. Scott, P. K. Sharma, 

T. Shaw, D. Shebel, J. Short, L. Simmons, C. 

Simon, B. Smith, R. Smith, P. Sorci, T. Specht, R. 

Spehalski, G. Squibb, S. Stanboli, K. Stapelfeldt, 

D. Stern, K. Stowers, J. Stultz, M. Tankenson, 

N. Thomas, R. Thomas, F. Tolivar, R. Torres, R. 

Tung, N. Vandermey, P. Varghese, M. Vogt, V. 

Voskanian, B. Waggoner, L. Wainio, T. Weise, 

J. Weiss, K. Weld, R. Wilson, M. Winters, S. 

Wissler, G. Yankura, K. Yetter.

Spitzer Science Center, California Institute of 

Technology (science operations): W. Amaya, 

L. Amy, P. Appleton, D. Ardila, L. Armus, 

J. Aronsson, D. Avila, M. Barba, S. Barba, 

J. Bauer, R. Beck, C. Bennett, J. Bennett, B. 

Bhattacharya, M. Bicay, C. Bluehawk, C. Boyles, 

H. Brandenburg, I. Bregman, C. Brinkworth, 

T. Brooke, J. Bruher, M. Burgdorf, S. Carey, 

M. Castillo, R. Chary, J. Chavez, W. Clavin, J. 

Colbert, S. Comeau, M. Crane, D. Daou, A. 

Dean, V. Desai, M. Dobard, S. Dodd, R. Ebert, 

R. Estrada, D. Fadda, S. Fajardo-Acosta, F. Fang, 

J. Fowler, D. Frayer, L. Garcia, C. Gelino, W. 

Glaccum, T. Goldina, W. Green, T. Greene, C. 

Grillmair, E. Ha, E. Hacopians, T. Handley, B. 

Hartley, I. Heinrichsen, G. Helou, S. Hemple, 

D. Henderson, L. Hermans, T. Hesselroth, 

A. Hoac, D. Hoard, R. Hoban, J. Howell, 

H. Hu, H. Hurt, H. Huynh, M. Im, J. Ingalls, 

E. Jackson, J. Jacobson, T. Jarrett, G. JohnsonMcGee, J. Keller, A. Kelly, E. Kennedy, I. Khan, 

D. Kirkpatrick, S. Kolhatkar, J. Krick, M. Lacy, 

R. Laher, S. Laine, J. Lampley, W. Latter, T. Lau, 

W. Lee, M. Legassie, D. Levine, J. Li, P. J. Llamas, 

T. Lo, W. Lockhart, L. Ly, P. Lowrance, N. Lu, 

J. Ma, W. Mahoney, D. Makovoz, V. Mannings, 

F. Marleau, T. Marston, F. Masci, H. McCallon, 

B. McCollum, D. McElroy, M. McElveney, 

N. McElveney, V. Meadows, Y. Mei, S. Milanian, 

D. Mittman, A. Molloy, P. Morris, M. Moshir, 

R. Narron, B. Nelson, R. Newman, A. NoriegaCrespo, J. Ochotorena, P. Ogle, J. O’Linger, D. 

Padgett, R. Paladini, P. Patterson, A. Pearl, M. 

Pesenson, S. Potts, T. Pyle, W. Reach, L. Rebull, 

J. Rector, J. Rho, T. Roby, E. Ryan, R. Scholey, E. 

Scire, S. Shenoy, K. Sheth, A. Shields, D. Shupe, 

N. Silbermann, T. Soifer, I. Song, G. Squires, 

J. Stauffer, J. Stuesser, S. Stolovy, L. StorrieLombardi, J. Surace, H. Teplitz, M. Thaller, G. 

Turek, S. Tyler, S. Van Dyk, L. Vu, S. Wachter, C. 

Waterson, W. Wheaton, S. Wheelock, J. White, 

A. Wiercigroch, G. Wilson, X. Wu, L. Yan, F. Yu.

Construction

Ball Aerospace (Cryogenic Telescope Assembly):

R. Abbott, D. Adams, S. Adams, J. Austin, 

B. Bailey, H. Bareiss, J. Barnwell, T. Beck, B. 

Benedict, M. Bilkey, W. Blalock, M. Breth, R. 

Brown, D. Brunner, D. Burg, W. Burmester, S. 

Burns, M. Cannon, W. Cash, T. Castetter, M. 

Cawley, W. Cebula, D. Chaney, G. J. Chodil, 

C. Cliff, S. Conley, A. Cooper, J. Cornwell, Sr., 

L. Cortelyou, J. Craner, K. Craven, D. Curtis, 

F. Davis, J. Davis, C. Dayton, M. Denaro, 

A. DiFronzo, T. Dilworth, N. Dobbins, C. 

Downey, A. Dreher, R. Drewlow, B. Dubrovin, 

J. Duncan, D. Durbin, S. Engles, P. Finley, J. 

Fleming, S. Forrest, R. Fredo, K. Gause, M. Gee, 

S. Ghesquiere, R. Gifford, J. Good, M. Hanna, 

D. Happs, F. Hausle, G. Helling, D. Herhager, 
Appendix A • Contributors to SI

B. Heurich, E. Hicks, M. Hindman, R. Hopkins, 

H. Hoshiko, Jr., J. Houlton, J. Hueser, J. Hurt, 

W. Hyatt, K. Jackson, D. Johnson, G. Johnson, 

P. Johnson, T. Kelly, B. Kelsic, S. Kemper, R. 

Killmon, R. Knewtson, T. Konetski, B. Kramer, 

R. Kramer, L. Krauze, T. Laing, R. LaPointe, J. 

Lee, D. Lemon, P. Lien, R. Lytle, L. Madayev, 

M. Mann, R. Manning, J. Manriquez, M. 

Martella, G. Martinez, T. McClure, C. Meier, 

B. Messervy, K. Modafferi, S. Murray, J. Necas, 

Jr., M. Neitenbach, P. Neuroth, S. Nieczkoski, 

G. Niswender, E. Norman-Gravseth, R. Oonk, 

L. Oystol, J. Pace, K. Parrish, A. Pearl, Jr., R. 

Pederson, S. Phanekham, C. Priday, B. Queen, 

P. Quigley, S. Rearden, M. Reavis, M. Rice, 

M. Richardson, P. Robinson, C. Rowland, K. 

Russell, W. Schade, R. Schildgen, C. Schroeder, 

G. Schultz, R. Schweickart, J. Schweinsberg, 

J. Schwenker, S. Scott, W. Seelig, L. Seide, K. 

Shelley, T. Shelton, J. Shykula, J. Sietz, J. Simbai, 

L. Smeins, K. Sniff, B. Snyder, B. Spath, D. 

Sterling, N. Stoffer, B. Stone, M. Taylor, R. 

Taylor, D. Tennant, R. Tio, P. True II, A. Urbach, 

S. Vallejo, K. Van Leuven, L. Vernon, S. Volz, V. 

VonRuden, D. Waldeck, J. Wassmer, B. Welch, 

A. Wells, J. Wells, T. Westegard, C. Williamson, 

E. Worner, Jr., T. Yarnell, J. Yochum, A. Youmans, 

J. Zynsky.

Lockheed Martin (spacecraft, systems engineering, 

spacecraft operations): B. Adams, J. Akbarzadeh, 

K. Aline, T. Alt, G. Andersen, J. Arends, F. 

Arioli, A. Auyeung, D. Bell, R. Bell, F. Bennett, 

J. Bennett, M. Berning, H. Betts, M. Billian, S. 

Broadhead, B. Bocz, G. Bollendonk, N. Bossio, 

P. Boyle, T. Bridges, C. Brink, R. Brookner, J. 

Brunton, D. Bucher, M. Burrack, R. Caffrey, 

S. Carmer, P. Carney, T. Carpenter, R. Castro, 

J. Cattrysse, J. Cernac, G. Cesarone, K. Chan, 

C. Chang, M. Chuang, D. Chenette, A. Chopra, 

Z. Chou, W. Christensen, K. Chu, W. Clark, J. 

Clayton, S. Cleland, W. Clements, C. Colborn, 

A. Cooprider, B. Corwin, B. Costanzo, D. 

Cortes, M. Cox, M. Cox, J. Coyne, S. Curtin, G. 

Dankiewicz, C. Darr, J. Dates, J. Day, S. DeBrock, 

T. Decker, R. Defoe, J. Delavan, G. Delezynski, 

J. Delk, B. Dempsey, R. Dodder, T. Dougherty, 

H. Drosdat, G. Du, B. Dudginski, M. Dunn, 

R. Dunn, M. Dunnam, D. Durant, D. Eckart, 

B. Edwards, M. Effertz, L. Ellis, P. Emig, N. 

Etling, M. Etz, N. Fernando, C. Figge, R. Finch, 

S. Finnell, A. Fisher, M. Fisher, P. Fleming, D. 

Ford, K. Foster, J. Frakes, P. Frankel, D. Fulton, 

P. Galli, D. Garcia, M. Gardner, B. Garner, 

S. Gaskin, S. Gasner, M. Geil, E. Georgieva, T. 

Gibson, B. Goddard, M. Gonzalez, D. Goold, 

D. Graves, S. Gray, I. Grimm, J. Grinwis, M. 

Gronet, R. Grubic, S. Guyer, M. Haggard, J. 

Harrison, G. Hauser, C. Hayashi, P. Headley, 

W. Hegarty, S. Heires, J. Herrerias, D. Hirsch, 

K. Hooper, J. Horwath, S. Housten, D. Howell, 

L. Huff, G. Idemoto, B. Jackson, K. Janeiro, K. 

Johnson, M. Johnson, R. Kaiser, P. Kallemeyn, 

G. Kang, R. Kasuda, M. Kawasaki, B. Keeney, 

J. Kenworthy, C. King, A. Klavins, K. Klein, C. 

Klien, P. Klier, C. Koch, L. Koch, D. Koide, R. 

Kriegbaum, J. Kuchera, J. Ladewig, D. Lance, M. 

Lang, K. Lauffer, A. Lee, E. Lee, J. Lee, R. Lee, 

D. Leister, K. Loar, A. Lott, C. Love, N. Iyengar, 

P. Ma, A. Magallanes, A. Mainzer, T. Maloney, 

S. Mar, B. Marquardt, M. Martin, G. Mason, R. 

Maxwell, R. May, G. McAllister, S. McElheny, 

M. McGee, J. McGowan, D. McKinney, A. 

McMechen, E. Merlo, C. Mifsud, J. Miles, S. 

Miller, A. Minter, C. Miran, S. Mittal, R. Mock, 

R. Mock, J. Montgomery, J. Moore, H. Mora, M. 

Moradia, L. Morales, R. Morales, G. Morison, 

J. Mota, F. Moules, S. Mumaw, L. Naes, A. 

Nalbandian, J. Nelson, L. Nenoff, J. Neuman, D. 

Nguyen, K. Nguyen, T. Nguyen, D. Niebur, D. 

Nishimura, M. Ochs, T. Oliver, J. Oo, J. Ortiz, 

G. Pace, L. Padgett, N. Page, G. Painter, H. 

Pandya, L. Pappas, N. Pemberton, R. Peterson, 

H. Phan, L. Phan, J. Pine, R. Poling, R. Potash, 

D. Radtke, W. Ramos, T. Ransom, M. Ratajczyk, 

D. Read, S. Ready, M. Rich, R. Richey, H. Rizvi, 
156 Making the Invisible Visible

J. Geiger, D. Gezari, D. Glenar, J. Golden, P. 

Gorog, S. Graham, C. Hakun, P. Haney, T. 

Hegerty, M. Jhabvala, F. Jones-Selden, R. Jungo, 

G. Karpati, R. Katz, R. Kichak, R. Koehler, R. 

Kolecki, D. Krebs, A. Kutyrev, J. Lander, M. 

Lander, N. Lee, J. Lohr, P. Losch, J. MacLoed, 

R. Maichle, S. Mann, N. Martin, P. Maymon, D. 

McComas, J. McDonnell, D. McHugh, J. Mills, 

C. Moiser, S. Moseley, T. Nguyen, T. Powers, K. 

Rehm, G. Reinhardt, J. Rivera, F. D. Robinson, 

C. Romano, M. Ryschkewitsch, S. Schwinger, 

K. Shakoorzadeh, P. Shu, N. Shukla, S. Smith, 

R. Stavely, W. Tallant, V. Torres, C. Trout, C. 

Trujillo, D. Vavra, G. Voellmer, V. Weyers, R. 

Whitley, J. Wolfgang, L. Workman, D. Yoder. 

Raytheon Vision Systems (detector arrays): C. 

Anderson, J. Asbrock, V. Bowman, G. Chapman, 

E. Corrales, G. Domingo, A. Estrada, B. Fletcher, 

A. Hoffman, L. Lum, N. Lum, S. Morales, O. 

Moreno, H. Mosel-Riedo, J. Rosbeck, K. Schartz, 

M. Smith, S. Solomon, K. Sparkman, P. Villa, S. 

Woolaway. 

University of Arizona: W. Hoffman, T. Tysenn, 

P. Woida. 

University of Rochester (InSb detector array testing): 

C. Bacon, R. Benson, H. Chen, J. Comparetta, 

N. Cowen, M. Drennan, W. Forrest, J. Garnett, 

B. Goss, S. Libonate, R. Madson, B. Marazus, K. 

McFadden, C. McMurtry, D. Myers, Z. Ninkov, 

R. Overbeck, J. Pipher, R. Sarkis, J. Schoenwald, 

B. White, J. Wu.

Infrared Spectrograph (IRS)

Cornell University (project management and science): D. Barry, S. V. W. Beckwith, J. BernhardSalas, C. Blacken, B. Brandl, V. Charmandaris, 

M. Colonno, S. Corbin, P. Devine, D. Devost, 

J. Diller, K. Duclos, E. Furlan, G. Gull, P. Hall, 

L. Hao, C. Henderson, T. Herter, J. Higdon, 

C. Rollin, C. Rudy, M. Rugebregt, R. Russek, B. 

Sable, C. Sandwick, M. Santos, N. Schieler, J. 

Schirle, G. Schlueter, M. Schmitzer, E. Sedivy, R. 

Seeders, S. Selover, R. Shaw, F. Sheetz, D. Shelton, 

R. Sherman, T. Sherrill, O. Short, R. Sison, B. 

Smith, F. Smith, S. Smith, B. Sotak, S. Spath, J. 

St. Pierre, K. Starnes, K. Stowers, J. Straetker, T. 

Stretch, S. Sulak, W. Sun, D. Swanson, C. Tatro, 

M. Tebo, D. Telford, A. Tessaro, J. Tietz, D. 

Tenerelli, J. Tolomeo, S. Toro-Allen, J. Tousseau, 

R. Traber, M. Tran, P. Travis, K. Uselman, 

S. Utke, N. Vadlamudi, R. VanBezooijen, J. 

Vantuno, R. Vasquez, G. Vergho, C. Voth, B. 

Vu, P. Wagner, M. White, M. Whitten, J. Wood, 

C. Worthley, D. Wright, C. Yanari, L. Yeaman, 

D. Zempel, S. Zeppa.

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC)

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (project management and science): L. Allen, C. Arabadjis, M. 

Ashby, P. Barmby, V. Bawdekar, J. Boczenowski, 

D. Boyd, J. Campbell-Cameron, J. Chappell, 

M. Cohen, K. Daigle, L. Deutsch, L. Frazier, 

T. Gauron, J. Gomes, J. Hora, M. Horan, J. 

Huang, J. Huchra, E. Johnston, M. Kanouse, S. 

Kleiner, D. Koch, M. Marengo, S. Megeath, G. 

Melnick, W. Martell, P. Okun, M.Pahre, B. Patten, 

J. Polizotti, J. Rosenberg, H. Smith, J. Spitzak, R. 

Taylor, E. Tollestrup, J. Wamback, Z. Wang, S. 

Willner; NASA/ARC (Si:As detector array testing): J. Estrada, R. Johnston, C. McCreight, M. 

McKelvey, R. McMurray, R. McHugh, N. Moss, 

W. Oglivie, N. Scott, S. Zins. 

NASA/GSFC (instrument development): T. 

Ackerson, M. Alexander, C. Allen, R. Arendt, 

M. Armbruster, S. Babu, W. Barber, R. Barney, 

L. Bashar, C. Bearer, C. Bernabe, W. Blanco, R. 

Boyle, K. Brenneman, G. Brown, M. Brown, G. 

Cammarata, S. Casey, P. Chen, M. Cushman, P. 

Davila, M. Davis, M. Dipirro, C. Doria-Warner, 

W. Eichhorn, D. Evans, D. Fixsen, J. Florez, 
Appendix A • Contributors to SI

S. Higdon, P. Howell, L. McCall, A. Parks, 

B. Pirger, A. Rakowski, S. Reinehart, A. Reza, 

E. E. Salpeter, J. Schoenwald, G. Sloan, J. Smith, 

H. Spoon, K. Uchida, D. Weedman, J. Wilson. 

University of Rochester: D. M. Watson, W. F. 

Forrest. 

California Institute of Technology: K. Matthews. 

Ball Aerospace (instrument development): D. 

Alderman, D. Anthony, M. Bangert, J. Barnwell, 

A. Bartels, S. Becker, W. Belcher, J. Bergstrom, 

D. Bickel, M. Bolton, S. Burcar, D. Burg, 

S. Burns, S. Burns, D. Burr, P. Burrowes, W. 

Cebula, C. Conger, J. Crispin, M. Dean, M. 

D’Ordine, S. Downey, R. Drewlow, L. Duchow, 

D. Eva, C. Evans, M. Foster, S. Fujita, D. 

Gallagher, A. Gaspers, P. Gentry, S. Giddens, J. 

Graw, M. Hanna, A. Haralson, M. Henderson, 

D. Herhager, J. Hill, S. Horacek, M. Huisjen, 

S. Hunter, J. Jacob, R. Karre, L. Larsen, P. Lien, 

R. Manning, J. Marriott, D. McConnell, M. 

McIntosh, R. McIntosh, G. Mead, B. Michelson, 

B. Miller, J. Moorehead, M. Morris, J. Murphy, 

M. Nelson, J. Pacha, I. Patrick, A. Pearl, B. Pett, S. 

Randall, C. Rowland, R. Sandoval, D. Sealman, 

K. Shelley, J. Simbai, L. Smeins, C. Stewart, G. 

Taudien, D. Tennant, J. Troeltzsch, B. Unruh, J. 

van Cleve, C. Varner, J. Winghart, J. Workman; 

Rockwell (detector arrays): B. Beardwood, J. 

Huffman, D. Reynolds, D. Seib, M. Stapelbroek, 

S. Stetson. 

OCLI (filters): S. Corda, B. Dungan, D. Favot, S. 

Highland, M. Inong, V. Jauregui, C. Kennemore, 

B. Langley, S. Mansour, R. Mapes, M. Mazzuchi, 

C. Piazzo.

Multiband Imaging Photometer for 

Spitzer (MIPS)

University of Arizona (project management, array 

construction, and science): A. Alonso-Herrero, M. 

Alwardi, I. Barg, M. Blaylock, M. Bradley, M. 

Buglewicz, J. Cadien, A. Churchill, H. Dang, 

L. Davidson, J. T. Davis, H. Dole, E. Egami, C. 

Engelbracht, K. A. Ennico, J. Facio, J. Flores, 

K. D. Gordon, L. Hammond, D. Hines, J. Hinz, 

R. Hodge, T. Horne, P. Hubbard, D. M. Kelly, 

D. Knight, K. A. Kormos, E. LeFloc’h, F. J. Low, 

M. McCormick, T. J. McMahon, T. Milner, K. 

Misselt, J. Morrison, K. Morse, J. Muzerolle, 

G. X. Neugebauer, L. Norvelle, C. Papovich, 

P. Perez-Gonzalez, M. J. Rieke, G. Rivlis, P. 

Rogers, R. Schnurr, M. Scutero, C. Siqueiros, P. 

Smith, J. A. Stansberry, P. Strittmatter, K. Su, C. 

Thompson, P. van Buren, S. Warner, K. White, 

D. A. Wilson, G. S. Winters, E. Young. 

University of California, Berkeley/LBNL (science and 

detector material): E. Arens, J. W. Beeman, E. E. 

Haller, P. L. Richards. 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (science): C. Beichman, 

K. Stapelfeldt. 

National Optical Astronomy Observatories (science): 

J. Mould. 

Center for Astrophysics (science): C. Lada; Ball 

Aerospace (instrument development): D. Bean, 

M. Belton, T. Bunting, W. Burmester, S. Castro, 

C. Conger, L. Derouin, C. Downey, B. Frank, 

H. Garner, P. Gentry, T. Glenn, M. Hegge, G. B. 

Heim, M. L. Henderson, F. Lawson, K. MacFeely, 

B. McGilvray, R. Manning, D. Michika, C. D. 

Miller, D. Morgan, M. Neitenbach, R. Novaria, 

R. Ordonez, R. J. Pearson, Bruce Pett, K. Rogers, 

J. P. Schwenker, K. Shelley, S. Siewert, D. W. 

Strecker, S. Tennant, J. Troeltzsch, B. Unruh, 
158 Making the Invisible Visible

R. M. Warden, J. Wedlake, N. Werholz, J. 

Winghart, R. Woodruff, C. Yanoski. 

Raytheon (readout development): J. Asbrock, A. 

Hoffmann, N. Lum. 

Ames Research Center (readout development): C. 

McCreight. 

QM Industries (far-infrared filters): P. A. R. Ade. 

Blackforest Engineering (engineering support): S. 

Gaalema. 

Battel Engineering (engineering support): S. Battel. 

SRON (scan mirror development): T. Degraauw. 
159

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Caroff, Larry, interview, 3 September 2008—see 

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MA, 26 May 2009 [ch2].

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Pasadena, CA, 26 July 1977 [Session III], Niels 

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23 March 1982, Oral History Project, California 

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Washington, DC, 20 June 1983 [Session II], 

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Harwit, Martin O., interview by author, Cambridge, 

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Houck, James R., interview by author, Ithaca, NY, 

25 May 2009 [ch3n1].

Irace, William R., interview by author, Pasadena, CA, 

18 February 2009 [ch8n42].

Kelly. Timothy J., interview by author, Boulder, CO, 

20 March 2009 [ch8n17].

Kwok, Johnny, interview by author (Session I), 

Pasadena, CA, 26 February 2009 [ch7n5].

Kwok, Johnny, interview (Session II), 25 March 

2009 [ch7n6].

Lawrence, Charles R., interview by author, Pasadena, 

CA, 19 January 2009 [ch9n18].

Leighton, Robert B., interview by David H. 

DeVorkin, Pasadena, CA, 29 July 1977 [Session 

I], Niels Bohr Library & Archives, American 

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[ch3n5].

Manning, Larry A., and Larry J. Caroff, joint 

interview by author, Mountain View, CA, 

3 September 2008 [ch6n22].

Martin, Frank, telephone interview, 27 March 2009 

[ch4n30 and ch4nn].

McCreight, Craig, interview by author, Mountain 

View, CA, 2 September 2008 [ch5n26].

Neugebauer, Gerry, interview by David H. 

DeVorkin, Pasadena, CA, 12 August 1982, 

Oral History Program, National Air and Space 

Museum, Washington DC [ch3n5].

Pellerin, Charles J., interview by author, Boulder, 

CO, 19 March 2009 [ch4n38].

Rieke, George H., interview by author, Pasadena, 

CA, 9 June 2009 [ch2n51].

Rieke, Marcia J., interview by author, Long Beach, 

CA, 6 January 2009 [ch6n48].

Roman, Nancy Grace, interview by Rebecca Wright, 

Chevy Chase, MD, 15 September 2000, file 

3636, NASA History Program Office, NASA, 

Washington, DC; also online at http://www.jsc.

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Washington, DC, 19 August 1980, Niels 

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Simmons, Larry, interview by author (Session I), 

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Simmons, Larry, interview (Session II), 9 March 

2009 [ch8n48].

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Thronson, Harley A., interview by author, Long 

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183

Index

A

absolute zero, 19–22

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF). See also

Chandra X-ray Observatory

advocacy for, 98

budgets for, 78–81, 87

defunded, 80–81

Great Observatories program, 72–81, 92

“New Start,” 72–76, 86

orbit of, 87–88

priority of, 47, 73–74, 83, 87, 98

renamed Chandra X-ray Observatory, 88

scaled back, 88, 104

Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space 

Program, 84, 96

aeronautics versus astronomy, 63–68, 89–90

airborne astronomy, 14n3, 25, 29, 36–38, 41

Allen, Lew, 76–77

Alsos mission, 6

American Astronomical Society, 98

Ames Research Center (ARC), 36–38, 41–43, 106

aeronautics versus astronomy, 64–66, 89–90

collaboration with NASA, 49

data communication plan, 95

flight testing at, 90–91

influence of, 64–66, 91, 94

infrared astronomy panel, 46

infrared observations, 67

isolationism of, 64

project management, 88–89, 93–94

projects at, 64–66

relationship with JPL, 95

relationship with NASA, 63–66

SIRTF Phase B RFP, 96

SIRTF project management bid, 92–94

SIRTF Space Science Division, 89–90

SIRTF Study Office, 54, 70, 83–84, 93

SOFIA development, 105

Anderson, Clinton, 34

Announcement of Opportunity

defined, 50, 54

of Explorer, 52

of SIRTF, xiv, 50, 58–59, 61, 69, 104, 117–118

Apollo 1 fire (AS-204), 35

Apollo program, xii, 35, 41, 64, 78

Applied Physics Lab (APL) at Johns Hopkins, 7

archives, xiii, 11, 74n33

Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 10

astronomers

attitudes toward infrared research, 17–22, 24, 29, 31–33

interpretation of infrared research, 27

astronomy. See also infrared astronomy; optical astronomy 

versus aeronautics, 63–68, 89–90

airborne, 14n3, 25, 29, 36–38, 41

balloon-borne observations, 13–15, 26, 36. See also

rockoon

balloon-borne observations (Hoffman’s paper), 42

birth of stars, 27, 74, 118

budgets for, 23–25, 36–37

collaboration in, xi, 130–131, 137–151

consensus in, 53

“Decade of the Infrared,” 97

first infrared astronomer, 20

German contributions to, 6–8

high-energy, 13–14, 43

influence of, 83

infrared, skepticism toward, 29, 33

infrared technique studies, 49

microwave, 17, 26n46, 33, 56

military contributions to, 6, 8, 17–18, 29–30

optical, influence of, 83

optical working groups, 43

optimal observational conditions, 24

physicists’ contribution to, 14, 20–23, 25, 29–30, 37

planetary, 83, 110, 118, 136

radio, 10, 17, 22, 33

radio, funding for, 53, 56

rivalries in, 64–66

rocket-borne experiment costs, 25

rocket-borne observations, 5, 8, 11, 13–14, 29, 36

rocket-borne observation failures, 34

solar, 36, 43, 54

sortie-mode, 37–38, 41–43, 46–47, 69

space-borne observations, 33–35, 136

spectroscopy, 6–8

and technology, 57

ultraviolet, 8, 11, 13, 17–18, 54, 56

x-ray, 11, 36, 43, 54

Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s (report), 52

Astronomy Survey Committee, 36, 52, 55

Astronomy Working Group (Optical), 43–45, 52

Astrophysical Letters and Communications, 84

Atlas rocket, 111–112, 113

for SIRTF launch, 102, 104–105, 109

Atomic Energy Commission, 14

Augustine, Norman, 84, 96

Augustine Committee report, 24n44, 84, 96–98
184 Making the Invisible Visible

B

Baade, Walter, 14

Bader, Michel, 37–38, 65

Bahcall, John, 97

Bahcall report, 97, 106, 110, 118

Ball Aerospace, 62, 111, 138–150

cryogenic technology, 125–127

Hubble Space Telescope, 109

SIRTF Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), 125–127, 129–131

SIRTF meetings, 139

SIRTF Phase B subcontractor, 114, 123

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Ballhaus, William, 90

balloon-borne observations, 8, 13–14, 29, 36. See also

rockoon

abandoned, 26

and gamma rays, 15

Mars research, 21

paper on, 42

balloons, altitudes of, 8, 13

BDM Corporation, 80

Becklin, Eric

Astronomy Survey Committee infrared panel, 36

Becklin-Neugebauer object, 27, 29, 41

FIRST, 51

infrared observations, 27

infrared astronomy panel, 68

SIRTSAG, 49

SIRTF early design, 41

SIRTF near-infrared camera, 62

Very early system design study (SIRTF), 52

Becklin-Neugebauer object, 27, 29, 41

Beggs, James M., 79

Bell Telephone Laboratories, 17

Beta Pegasus, 31

Betelgeuse, 1, 3, 19, 20n30

Bevatron, 15

Bicay, Michael, 123

Big Bang, 17, 56, 68, 110, 136

Boggess, Nancy

COBE program scientist, 61

FIRST, 51

Haverford College, 66

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 56–57

NASA senior staff scientist, 43

Science Working Group, 69

SIRTF Announcement of Opportunity, 54

SIRTF program scientist, 61–63, 138

bolometers, 20–23, 67

Boynton, Paul E., 51

Brookhaven National Laboratory, 15

Broomfield meeting, 109–113

brown dwarfs, xii, 110, 118, 122

budgets

federal, 77–78

federal (timetable), 78

fiscal policy (U.S.), 77–78

Hubble budget, 72–73, 86n8, 102

Hubble budget shortfalls, 79, 86

infrared astronomy, 47

NASA budget authority, 86

NASA budget cuts, 57, 101

NASA budget shortfalls, 77, 84

SIRTF budget, 54–55, 118, 139

Burmester, William, 126

Bush, George Herbert Walker, 104

Byurakan Observatory, 10

C

California Institute of Technology (Caltech), 130, 145

Bruce Murray at, 87

Cassini program, 87

Eric Becklin at, 36, 41, 68

Gerry Neugebauer at, 27, 37, 46

infrared astronomy panel, 46

infrared research at, 20n 30, 20n 32, 43

James Westphal at, 18, 33

Jesse Greenstein at, 9, 34

management of JPL, 92, 98

Michael Werner at, 67–68

Optical Astronomy Working Group, 43

planetary astronomy, 87

relationship with JPL, 92, 98

Robert Leighton at, 31, 36

Robert Wildey at, 33

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Two-Micron Sky Survey telescope, 31, 32

Wesley Huntress at, 104

Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL), 30, 36, 38, 

46, 49. See also military contributions to science; U.S. 

Navy

Cape Canaveral, 15, 135

Capps, Richard W., 51

Caroff, Lawrence J.

Ames theoretician, 38, 41, 65

Infrared, Submillimeter, and Radio Astrophysics Branch 

(NASA), 90, 104

return to Ames, 106

SIRTF near-infrared camera, 62

SIRTF program scientist, 108

SIRTF project management bids, 93

SIRTF/SOFIA advocacy program, 105–106, 138

SIRTF/SOFIA competition, 106

SIRTF sortie-mode design, 41–43

Very early system design study (SIRTF), 52

Carter, Jimmy (James Earl), 56

Cassini program, 77n45, 87

Catalog of Nebulae and Star Clusters, 2, 29

Center for Radio Physics and Space Research, 23

Cerenkov counter, 15

Challenger (Space Shuttle), xiii, 43n3, 78–81, 85n6, 99

Chan, K.I. Roland, 51

Chandra X-ray Observatory, 57, 88. See also Advanced 

X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
Index 185

China Lake facility (U.S. Navy), 18

Clinton, Bill, 104

Cold War, xiii, 10, 78

Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF), 77n45, 87n13

comets, 2, 5, 56

Committee on Space Astronomy and Astrophysics (CSAA), 

53

Compton, Dale I., 51, 90

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO), 53, 57. 

See also gamma ray detectors

Great Observatories program, 72–81

priority of, 73, 75

Congress (U.S.)

fiscal policy, xiii–xiv, 66, 77–78, 81n53

Great Observatories program, 74, 77

House Appropriations Committee, 104

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, 113

infrared telescopes (IRT), 56

NASA appropriations, xiv, 53, 85–87, 101–102, 113, 118

NASA oversight, xiii, 35, 88, 98n46, 100, 107–108, 124

“New Start,” 71

party control of, 104

SIRTF funding, 51, 53–54, 58

Space Shuttle, 36, 47

contamination, 45, 47–50, 55

Copernicus mission, 56

Cornell University, 20, 36, 139

Carl Sagan at, 87

infrared spectroscopy at 20, 23–26

IRAS team listing, 62n5

James Houck at, 25–26, 36, 51, 62, 98, 122

Martin Harwit at, 23–26, 66

Michael Werner at, 66–67

Philip Morrison at, 14

SIRTF meetings, 139

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Thomas Soifer at, 27

Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE), 17n17, 56–58, 61, 

67n17

cryogenically cooled, 106

“New Start,” 72

successes of, 105

cosmic background radiation (CMB), 17, 26n46, 56, 67

infrared, 26

Cosmic Discovery: The Search, Scope, and Heritage of 

Astronomy, 57, 73–74, 81

cosmic rays, 8, 69

Cosmotron, 15

“Crisis in Space and Earth Science, the” report, 84

Cruikshank, Dale, 6n9, 37, 83, 88

cryogenic telescope assembly (CTA), 149

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

cryogenically cooled infrared telescope (IRT) 

contamination of, 55

design for, 49

feasibility study, 46

Hughes report, 50

problems with, 125–127

SIRTF designed as, 41–42, 44–45, 58

weight of, 111

CSAA (Committee on Space Astronomy and Astrophysics), 

53. See also Space Science Board (SSB)

Cummings, Ramona, 107

D

Davidson, Arnold, 22–23

Davidson, Kris, 27

decadal surveys

Bahcall report, 97, 106, 110, 118

Field report, 55–59, 66, 73, 75, 84, 97

Greenstein report, 36, 46, 53–59, 73, 97

Deep Space Network, 132

Delta rocket, 112, 113

for SIRTF launch, xi, 102, 111–112, 135

Department of Defense (DOD), 22, 34, 56, 77

Desert Storm, 97–99, 101

Design Optimization Study Team (DOST), 50

dewar, 111, 114, 119

defined, 106

pressurization, 125n18, 125–127

and SIRTF MIC, 129–131

Dubin, Maurice, 43

dust

atmospheric, 53

contaminant, 45, 69

interstellar, 3–5, 13, 44

Duthie, Joseph, 15

E

Earth-trailing orbit, 102, 111–115, 137, 143, 151

Edelson, Burton I., 76–77, 79

Edison program, 105–108

passive cooled IRTs, 106, 111

projected cost of, 107

SIRTF/Edison competition, 107–108

Einstein, Albert, 37

Einstein program, 56

Einstein Observatory, 92

Eisenhardt, Peter, 95

Elachi, Charles, 98

electromagnetic spectrum, 16, 36, 56–57, 72

wavelengths, 17

energy crisis, 36, 46–47

Erickson, Edwin F., 51, 64–65

Essex Corporation, 74

European Space Agency, 46n8, 56, 88, 106, 122

Evans, James A., 99, 103, 109

Evans, Neal J., 51

Everitt, C.W.F., 37

Explorer program, 14n4, 53, 57–58, 63–64

Announcement of Opportunity, 52

observation of gamma rays, 15n12
186 Making the Invisible Visible

F

Fairbank, William M., 37

Fanson, James, 100n53, 117, 144

“faster, cheaper, better,” 101, 104, 113, 133. See also

Goldin, Daniel

Fazio, Giovanni

balloon-borne observations, 15–16, 26–27

FIRST, 51

gamma ray research, 15–16

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 71

infrared telescopes (IRT), 30, 48, 106

Science Working Group PI, 69, 70, 98

SIRTF Infrared Array Camera (IRAC), 26, 62, 92, 105, 

122

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

federal budget, 77–78

timetable, 78

Field, George, 55, 74n33

Field report, 55–59, 66, 73, 75, 84, 97

First Gulf War, 97–99, 101

first infrared astronomer, 20

first orbiting observatory, 15–16, 16

fiscal policy (U.S.), 77–78

Fisk, Lennard A.

departure from NASA, 104

Infrared Astronomy Mission, 99

Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), 75, 

79–80, 87

SIRTF project management bids, 92–93

SIRTF renamed, 102

Fletcher, James C., 79–80

flight testing, 90–91

Focal-plane Instruments and Requirements Science Team 

(FIRST), 50–51, 53, 54

final report, 53

focal-plane investigations, 61–62

Ford, Gerald, 79

Friedman, Herbert, 23

Friedman report, 52

Fuchs, Art, 98

G

galaxies, 14, 29, 110, 118, 122

Galileo program, 99, 105

Gallagher, David B., 100n53, 143 

personality of, 131, 138–139, 145–146

quoted, 138–139, 146

SIRTF project manager, 126, 130–131, 133–134, 143

gamma ray detectors, 15–16, 24, 26–27, 30, 46. See also

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO)

gamma rays (cosmic), 13–17, 26, 54–56

detected by OSO-1, 26

Gaustad, John E., 36

Gehrz, Robert D.

advocacy for SIRTF, 138

Bahcall report, 110

Design Optimization Study Team (DOST), 50

FIRST, 50, 51

NASA RFP for facility design study, 52

Shuttle-based SIRTF, 55–56

SIRTF dewar, 127

SIRTF initial design studies, 49

SIRTF near-infrared camera, 62

Gemini program, 35

German contributions to astronomy, 6–8

Gillett, Fred C., 36, 49

FIRST, 51

Infrared and Radio Astrophysics Branch (NASA), 93

Infrared Astronomy Panel, 97

IRAS team listing, 62n5

personality of, 97

Gilman, Dave, 73–74

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 38, 42–43, 95

flight testing, 91

Hubble Space Telescope, 148–149

influence of, 64

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC), 122, 123

infrared astronomy panel, 46

and Optical Astronomy Working Group, 44

passive cooled IRTs, 111

project management, 89

SIRTF construction, 126

SIRTF project management bid, 92–94, 105

Gold, Thomas, 23

Goldin, Daniel. See also “faster, cheaper, better”NASA 

Administrator, 100–102, 104, 109, 134

SIRTF construction, 123–124, 133–134

gravity, 8, 37, 102

Great Observatories program, 72–81, 84, 123n11, 132

appeal of, 86

congressional support of, 104

Harwit promotional booklet, 74, 81

NASA support for, 105

project interdependence of, 87, 125

publicity for, 74, 81, 107

Greenstein, Jesse L., 6, 9

Astronomy Survey Committee chair, 36

Caltech astronomy department, 9–10

interstellar dust, 4–5

rocket-borne observations, 5–8, 34

solar spectroscopy experiment, 8

Greenstein report, 35–36, 46, 53–59, 73, 97. 

H

Hafner, Everett, 15–16

Hale Observatory at Mount Palomar, 9, 14, 19, 27, 34

Hall, Freeman F., 30–31, 33

Halley’s Comet, 56

Hanel, Rudolf, 46

Harper, Doyal A., 49, 51

Harvard-Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO), 

26, 122

SIRTF project organization chart, 124
Index 187

Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (CfA), 20, 

26–28, 62, 98

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Harvey, Paul M., 51

Harwit, Martin, 52

book, 57, 73–74, 81, 138

Cornell, 23, 66–67

history of infrared astronomy, 22

ISO, 88n17

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 23, 67

rocket-borne experiments, 25, 125

theoretical paper, 27

Haverford College, 66

Hawarden, Tim, 106–107, 111

heat detectors, 18, 30

Herschel mission, 46n8

Hertzsprung-Russell diagram, 3–4, 5, 22–23

Hoffmann, William F., 42–43, 46, 49, 51, 74n33

Honeywell, 62

Houck, James R.

Broomfield meeting, 109–110

Cornell, 25, 36, 62, 98

Design Optimization Study Team (DOST), 50

FIRST, 51

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 62

Infrared Astronomy Panel, 97

NASA Director of Astrophysics, 104

personality of, 131

rocket-borne experiments, 125

Science Working Group PI, 69, 69, 97–98, 109–110, 118

SIRTF contract competition, 49

SIRTF Infrared Spectrograph (IRS) PI, 25, 62, 97–98 

110, 118, 122

SIRTF IRS filter delamination, 127, 129–131

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

House Appropriations Committee, 104

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, 113

Hoyle, Fred, 23, 67

Hubble Space Telescope, 53, 65, 148–149

budget for, 72–73, 86n8, 102

budget shortfalls, 79, 86

construction of, 91

development of, 9

effects of radiation on, 70

expense of, 57, 118

Great Observatories program, 72–81, 92

“Hubble Syndrome,” 86

infrared detectors for, 98

launch of, 34

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer 

(NICMOS), 130

and Optical Astronomy Working Group, 43

orbit of, 87–88, 114

as Shuttle payload, 45

priority of, 53–54, 75, 85n6, 98n46, 99

problems with, 99–101, 130

repairs to, 72, 100, 109, 114

Hughes Aerospace, 49, 53

Hughes report, 50, 52. See also “Large Cooled Infrared 

Telescope Facility for Spacelab”

Huntress, Welsey T., 104

I

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC), xi, 26, 62, 70, 92, 122

Cold Assembly, 120

defined, 118

SIRTF integration flow, 89

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

successes of, 136

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 61–62, 97

budgets for, 72

cost, actual, 130, 148

cryogenically cooled, 106

cryostat, 129–130

defined, 53

dewar integration, 126, 130

as free flying satellite, 56

launch, 117

mission completion, 59

orbit of, 114

priority of, 58, 72

program scientist (Boggess), 61

projected cost of, 102

results from, 59

successes of, 88, 105

team listing, 62n5

infrared astronomy, 1, 11, 19–21, 33, 136. See also astronomy; optical astronomy

age of, xii

at Ames Research Center, 65

budgets for, 23–25, 36

community, 38

coolants, 19

“Decade of the Infrared,” 97

defined, 46

funding for, 53

history of, 22, 29

innovations, xii–xiii, 117–118, 125

map of Venus, 33

masers, 67

observations, accuracy of, 27

photography, 4

photometry, 20–21, 45

and planetary astronomy, 83

physicists’ contribution to, 20–23

preparatory research, 95–96

research neglected, 16–18

rewards of, 24, 27–28

as separate field of research, 25–29, 33

and SIRTF, 50, 54

skepticism toward, 21–22, 29, 31–33, 36, 65

and Space Shuttle, 46

Infrared Astronomy Panel 

Science Working Group (SWG), 35–36 
188 Making the Invisible Visible

Space Science Board (SSB), 46

infrared cosmic background radiation, 26

infrared detectors, 31

cryogenically cooled, 30–31, 31

devices (night vision), 6

early, 20

effects of radiation on, 70

innovations, 95, 104, 117–118

invented, 15

lead-sulfide (PbS), 6, 18, 20, 30–31, 31

limits of, 24, 33–34, 70–71

Mars research, 21

military, 70–71

military applications of, 18

on SIRTF, 99

problems with, 19, 30, 129

and semiconductors, 18–20

successes of, 22–23, 29–33

Infrared Processing and Analysis Center, 123–134

infrared radiation, xi, 17–18, 21, 30, 119

infrared remote sensing, 46

infrared sky surveys, 25–26, 29–33, 36

by SIRTF, 43–44

deep space, 110

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 56–57

international collaboration on, 53, 56

Infrared Space Observatory (ISO), 88, 106–107, 122

Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), xi, 61, 120

Ball Aerospace, 123

described, 118–119

filter delamination, 125, 127, 129–131

Principal Investigator (Houck), 62

program scientist (Boggess), 61

SIRTF integration flow, 89

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Infrared Telescope Facility (IRTF), 66

infrared telescopes (IRTs), 23, 29–30, 32, 45

contamination of, 45, 47–49

cryogenically cooled, 31, 36–38, 39, 41–42

design optimization study, 53

Edison program, 105

focal plane, 61–62

funding for, 56

multiple missions, 54

passive cooled, 106–107, 111

planetary astronomy, 83

sensitivity of, 48

Shuttle-based, 46–48, 106

space-borne, xii, 118

Spacelab-2 payload, 62

Institute for Theoretical Astronomy, 67

International Solar Polar Mission, 56

International Space Station (ISS), 84

Irace, William R., 126, 138–139

quoted, 139–140, 148

SIRTF cryostat, 130–131

SIRTF software, 133–134

ITT Federal Laboratory, 30

J

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 108n24, 111n33, 

122

Jennings, Richard, 46

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 43, 76–77, 138, 151

Astronomy and Physics Directorate, 130

data communication plan, 95

discretionary funding, 99

Earth and Space Science, 98

Edison program, 108

employees, 98

facilities, 141

flight testing, 91

Hubble Space Telescope, 148

influence of, 64

internal review, 96

Mars missions, 135

Office of Technology and Applications, 99

partnered with Ames, 95

personnel reassignment, 99

planetary astronomy, 87

project management, 89

relationship with Caltech, 92, 98

SIRTF mission operations, 134

SIRTF objectives, 112

SIRTF Phase B, 123, 132

SIRTF Programmatic Commitment Agreement, 114

SIRTF project management, 123, 140–142, 144

SIRTF project management bid, 92–94

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

SIRTF redesigned, 113–114

transfer of SIRTF, 94–97, 102, 105

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL), 7

Johnson, Harold L., 20–23

Johnson, Rodney O., 52

Johnson Space Center (JSC), 44, 64

Jupiter, 20n30, 23, 25

Jura, Michael, 27, 63

Science Working Group, 69, 69, 83, 110

K

Kaplon, Mort, 15

Keck I telescope at Mauna Kea, 9

Kelly, Tim, 125–127, 138, 146–151

Kennedy, John F., 21, 78

Klarmann, Joseph, 15

Kleinmann, Douglas, 27 

Kleinmann-Low nebula, 27, 29

Knacke, Roger F., 51

Kondracki, Henry, 23, 25

Kuiper, Gerard P., 6, 22n37, 26, 83

airborne experiments, 37

infrared research, 5–9, 37

Lunar and Planetary Laboratory (LPL), 21

Kuiper Airborne Observatory, 48, 67–68

Kunde, Virgil C., 51

Kupperian, James E., 14n5

Kvant-1, 80
Index 189

Kwok, Johnny (John), 112, 138

personality of, 151

quoted, 148, 151

SIRTF chronological changes timetable, 112

SIRTF mission operations system manager, 134

SIRTF organization chart, 96

SIRTF software, 132–133

Trailing-Earth orbit, 102–104, 114, 132, 143

L

Langley Research Center, 36, 64

Lanzerotti, Louis, 106

LaPiana, Lia, 139

“Large Cooled Infrared Telescope Facility for Spacelab, a,” 

50. See also Hughes report

Large Space Telescope (LST). See Hubble Space Telescope

Larson, Harold P., 36, 51

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 15

Lawrence, Charles, 123, 125, 143–145

lead-sulfide (PbS) detectors, 18, 20, 30–31, 31

Leighton, Robert, 31, 33, 36

Lester, Daniel, 106

Lick Observatory, 44, 46

Lincoln, Abraham, 36

Lockheed Martin, 142, 144, 146, 148–149, 151

Hubble Space Telescope, 148

merger with Martin Marietta, 132, 141

organizational culture, 91, 133–134

SIRTF meetings, 139

SIRTF Phase B subcontractor, 114, 123, 125–127

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

SIRTF software, 132–134, 138,

Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (LMSSC), 132, 

134–135

Low, Frank, 39, 111n33

advocacy for SIRTF, 108

airborne infrared experiments, 25

Astronomy Survey Committee, 36–38

bolometer measurements, 21 

FIRST, 51

influence of, 33

infrared observations 21–23, 33

IRAS team listing, 62n5

Lunar and Planetary Laboratory, 21–22

NASA contract competition review panel, 49

Orion observations, 27, 29

personality of, 38, 97

Science Working Group, 69, 103

SIRTF as free flying satellite, 55, 59

SIRTF cryostat, 130–131

SIRTF facility scientist, 62, 88, 97, 117, 138

warm-launch concept, 111–112

Lowell Observatory, 44

Lowell, Percival, 21, 83

Lunar and Planetary Laboratory (LPL), 21–22

lunar science, 19–21, 35

M

M42 (Orion Nebula), 2–3, 2–4

Macenka, Steve, 100n53

Manning, Larry A., 90

Mariner program, 33–34, 77n45, 83

Mark, Hans, 65

Mars

canals, 21, 83

infrared observations of, 23

life on, 21, 83

Lowell’s books, 21

mapped by Mariner program, 33

Mars Observer, 99, 105

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), 43–44, 76

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), 74, 87, 

92

flight testing, 91

Hubble Space Telescope, 92, 148

influence of, 64

and Optical Astronomy Working Group, 44

project management, 89, 91

SIRTF project management bid, 92–95

Space Shuttle engine bells, 107

Space Shuttle main engines, 87

Martin, Frank

Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), 72

NASA Director of Astrophysics, 55–58, 72, 132–134, 

148

project management, 55–58, 72

quoted, 57–58, 142, 148–149

use of Martin Harwit’s book, 57, 73

Martin Marietta Aerospace

merger with Lockheed Martin, 132, 141

NASA RFP for facility design study, 52

“Payload/Orbiter Contamination Control Requirement 

Study,” 49, 52

SIRTF initial design, 49

Martz, Dowell, 18–19

masers, 67

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 15, 51

Mather, John C., 17n17 51, 67, 108n24

McCarthy, Steve G., 50, 52

McCreight, Craig, 70–71

McDonald Observatory, 20, 22, 44

McNutt, Douglas, 36

Mercury (planet), 33

Mercury program, 35

Meredith, Leslie, 52

Merrill, K. Michael, 51

Messier, Charles, 2–3, 5, 29

microwave astronomy, 17, 26n46, 33, 56

microwave radiation, 17

Mikulski, Barbara, 98

military contributions to science, xii, 8, 17–18, 29–30. See 

also Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL); U.S. 

Navy

Mir space station, 80
190 Making the Invisible Visible

Moffett Field, 37

Moon, infrared observations of, 19–20

Moon landings, xii, 35, 42, 64

Moorwood, Alan F.M., 51

Morrison, Philip, 14–15

Moseley, Harvey, 111, 122

Multiband Imaging Photometer for Spitzer (MIPS), xi, 26, 

62, 70, 120–122, 123, 147

defined, 118

failures of, 129, 131n33

SIRTF integration flow, 89

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

wiring failure, 131n33

Multiple Instrument Chamber (MIC), 119, 120–121, 

126, 129

Murray, Bruce, 18–19, 33, 87

N

National Academy of Sciences, 35–36

Astronomy Survey Committee, 55

budgets for infrared astronomy, 47

feasibility study of cryogenically cooled IRT, 51

Field report, 54–55, 66

Greenstein report, 46, 52

mission priorities, 53, 56

recommendations for major projects, 53

“Report on Space Science,” 52

Scientific Uses of Space Shuttle (report), 52

SIRTF study team, 54

Space Science Board (SSB), 8–9, 17–18, 20, 33, 53

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 10

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), 9, 34. See also Office of Space Science and 

Applications (OSSA)

Advisory Council, 84

and airborne astronomy, 38

Ball Aerospace contract, 126

budget authority, 86

budget cuts at, 57, 101

budget shortfalls, 77, 84

congressional support of SIRTF, 113

construction bid process, 123–124

contract competition, 49

criticism of, 23, 34–35, 101

decadal surveys. See Greenstein report, Field report

departments of, 46, 72

Edison program, 106–107

feasibility study of cryogenically cooled IRT, 51

founding of, 10–11, 13–14

Great Observatories program, 57

hiring freeze at, 64–65

Historical Reference Collection (HRC), xiii

Hubble budgets, 72–73

infrared astronomy program budgets, 47–49, 58–59

infrared panel, 35–36

Infrared Processing and Analysis Center, 134

and infrared research, 17–18, 21, 24, 36, 38

Infrared, Submillimeter, and Radio Astrophysics Branch 

(NASA), 90

instrument design competition, 20

and Kuiper’s research, 21

Mars missions, 133, 135

mission cancellations, 98n46

mission life cycle (full), 95

mission priorities, 72–81, 83, 98, 104–106, 117

naming policy, 34

“non-competition competition,” 92

Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, 93

Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), 11, 

46–47, 72, 75, 79–81

and Optical Astronomy Working Group, 44

orbiting observatory program, 15–16

passive cooled IRTs, 107

perception of, xviii, 100, 108–109

program manager, 98

project list, 85

project management, xii–xiii, 61–62, 95, 101, 109, 137, 

145–146

project scientist, role of, 146

Quality and Mission Assurance, 126

relationship with Ames Research Center, 49, 63–66

relationship with Caltech/JPL 92, 98

report timeline, 52

RFP for facility design study, 52

Shuttle engineering studies, 48–49

Shuttle Infrared Telescope Science Accommodation 

Group (SIRTSAG), 49

Shuttle program budgets, 42–43, 72

SIRTF Announcement of Opportunity, xiv, 50, 54

SIRTF budget, 54–55, 118, 139

SIRTF construction, 124

SIRTF infrared spectrograph (IRS), 126

SIRTF internal reviews, 123

SIRTF “New Start,” xiv, 71–72, 74

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

SIRTF trailing-Earth orbit, 115

Solar Astronomy Group, 63

sounding rocket program, 57

Space and Earth Sciences Advisory Committee (SESAC), 

77n45, 83

space policy, 96–97, 101

Space Science and Applications, 46, 76

space science budgets, 24–25

Space Science Enterprise, 127

Steering Committee, 9

National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), 17, 22

National Research Council, 5, 52, 106

National Science Foundation (NSF), 8, 23, 34

National Space Council, 106

Naugle, John E., 46, 52

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 9–11, 18, 23, 36, 44, 

66–67

Neal, Valerie, 74
Index 191

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer 

(NICMOS), 98, 130

nebulae, discovery of, 2, 27, 29, 41

Neel, Carr B., Jr., 16n15

Neugebauer, Gerry, 34, 37, 46

Becklin-Neugebauer object, 27, 29, 41

FIRST, 51–52

infrared astronomy panel, 46, 68

IRAS team listing, 62n5

Mariner 2, 33

quoted, 31

“New Start,” 86, 94, 105

for AXAF, 72–76, 86

competition for, 72–78, 105

for CGRO, 75

defined, 71

for Hubble, 75

for SIRTF, xiv, 71–76, 83, 95–96, 123

for SOFIA, 105

Newell, Homer, 35

Newton, George, 73, 109

Nixon, Richard, 36, 79

O

Obermann, Richard, 113

O’Brien, Brien, 74

observations

conditions of, 22, 24, 38

evaluations of, 48–49

funding for, 53

innovations, 71

in orbit, 13–14, 70

obstructions to, 13, 53, 69–70, 87–88, 102, 106–107

tracking celestial objects, 13

viewing window, 48

observatory programs, 13

observatories. See individual names.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 73–74, 77–81, 

86

Office of Naval Research (ONR), 9, 14

Office of Scientific Research (U.S. Air Force), 15

Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), 46–47, 

75, 79–81

Frank Martin at, 72

funding for, 94

Len Fisk at, 79, 94, 105

Nancy Roman at (OSS), 11

optical astronomy, 11, 13, 20, 33. See also astronomy; 

infrared astronomy

funding for, 53, 56

influence of, 83

and Kvant-1, 80

and Space Shuttle, 46

Optical Astronomy Working Group, 43–45, 52

Optical Coating Laboratory, 31, 129n23

orbital mechanics, 102–105, 111, 114. See also orbits

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) program, 14, 

16, 34

Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO) program, 14, 

16

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) program, 14–15, 30, 

64n6

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) model, 13

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO-1), 15–16, 16, 26, 63

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO-3), 16n15, 63

orbits. See also orbital mechanics

polar versus equatorial, 70

SIRTF performance in, 131–132, 136

trailing-Earth, 102, 111–115, 137, 143, 151

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 

(OPEC), 46–47

Orion (constellation), 1–2, 2, 5

infrared observations of, 19, 68

mythology of, 1

Orion Nebula, 2–3, 2–4

aircraft-borne observations of, 25

infrared spectrum of, 65–66

protostar in, 27

telescope observations of, 29

Ocampo, Cesar, 103

P

Paine, Thomas O., 35

particle accelerators, 15

passive cooled IRTs, 106–107, 111

Patel, Keyur, 134

Pellerin, Charles, 62, 138

book, 137

departure from NASA, 104

Great Observatories program, 72–75, 77–81, 98, 125

NASA Director of Astrophysics, 58, 72–76, 87, 90, 132

preference for SIRTF at JPL, 92–93

quoted, 148, 151

SIRTF “New Start”, 75–76

SIRTF projected cost, 101–105

Pengra, Trish, 80

Penzias, Arno A., 17n17, 

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 53, 148

photoconductors, 6, 42

physicists’ contribution to astronomy, 14, 20–23, 25, 

29–30, 37

Pioneer program, 10, 64, 83, 89–91

Pipher, Judith L., 25, 51, 117n2

planetary astronomy, 20–21, 83, 85, 110, 118, 136

Planetary Society, the, 87

Pollock, James B., 65

Price, Stephan D., 30n3, 46

Principal Investigators (PIs), 20, 110, 139, 124

Shuttle-based IRT, 62

SIRTF IRAC, 26, 62, 122

SIRTF IRS, 25, 62, 122

SIRTF MIPS, 26, 62, 122, 147

SIRTF Phase B, 123
192 Making the Invisible Visible

SIRTF redesign, 109

SIRTF spectroscopy, 97–98

public service, 9

Q

quasars, 14, 74

Quayle, Dan, 96

R

radiation, effects of, 14

radio astronomy, 10, 17, 22, 33

funding for, 53, 56

radio waves (interstellar), 14, 16–17

Ramsey Committee, 9

RAND Corporation, 9

Rank, David M., 46, 49, 51, 68

Raven Industries, 15

Reagan, Ronald, 43n3, 56, 77–79, 86

Soviet space program, 80–81

reclama, 79

Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. 

Space Program. See Augustine Report

Richards, Paul L., 51, 67–68

Ridgway, Stephen T., 51

Rieke, George H., 26–28, 49

book, 137

Design Optimization Study Team (DOST), 50

FIRST, 51

on Michael Werner, 68

Multiband Imaging Photometer (MIPS), 122, 147

personality of, 147

quoted, 27–28

Science Working Group PI, 69, 70, 98, 110

SIRTF cryostat, 130–131

SIRTF facility scientist, 117

SIRTF Multiband Imaging Photometer (MIPS), 62

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

Rieke, Marcia

SIRTF chief advocate, 98–99, 101, 104, 138

SIRTF cryostat, 130

SIRTF/SOFIA advocacy program, 105

Rigel, 1, 3, 5

rocket-borne observations, 5, 8, 11, 13–14, 29

costs of experiments, 25

early, 29

failures of, 23–24, 34

scientists’ preference for, 36

rockets, altitudes of, 8

rockoon, 8. See also astronomy, balloon-borne observations

Rockwell International, 52–53, 62 

Roellig, Tom, 88n18, 117, 130, 150

Roman, Nancy, 6, 13, 52, 63

and Hubble Space Telescope, 43

NASA Director of Astrophysics, 9–11, 13–15, 23

Optical Astronomy Working Group chair, 43, 45–46, 

52, 63

paper by, 10

Payload Planning Working Group chair, 43

personality of, 9–11

quoted, 10–11, 14

SIRTF Announcement of Opportunity, 54

Rosen, Robert, 93

Royal Observatory at Edinburgh, 106–108

S

Sagan, Carl, 21, 22n37, 87

Salyut, 35

satellites, 16, 109

early, 14

gamma-ray experiment, 15n12

infrared payloads, 13, 17–18

orbiting observatories, 13–16, 26, 30

SIRTF as, 45, 48, 54–55, 59, 75, 84, 113

Titan (moon), 6

Saturn, 20n30, 23, 87

Savedoff, Malcolm, 15

Schilling, Gerhardt, 11

Schmidt, Maarten, 14

science

collaboration in, xi, 130–131, 137–151

communication in, 147–151

competition, lack of, 124, 143

competition in, 56, 63–66, 87, 93–94, 105–110

goals for SIRTF, 110

government funding of, 8, 34, 53

innovations in, 114–115, 125

integrity in, 67–68, 76–77

interdisciplinary, 22, 33, 62–63

military contributions to, xii, 8, 17–18, 29–30

national policy, 46

objectives, 54, 57, 110

parallel discovery, xii, 111

partnerships in, 84, 138–151

and politics, 53, 77, 138

priorities for space program, 35–36

as profession, 8–9, 11, 28

as public service, 9

rivalries in, 8–49, 62–66, 76–77, 109–111

skepticism toward infrared, 21–22, 29, 31–33, 36, 65

Science Mission Directorate. See Office of Space Science 

and Applications (OSSA)

Science Working Group (SWG), xiii–xiv, 51, 53, 68–70, 

69, 83–84, 140

advocacy for SIRTF, 98, 109

dewar research, 125

international collaboration, 88

priorities of, 89–90, 110

SIRTF cryostat, 130–131

SIRTF Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), 130–131

SIRTF orbit, 102–105

SIRTF Phase B, 117, 123–124, 127

SIRTF projected cost, 101–105

SIRTF promotional brochure, 84

SIRTF software, 134
Index 193

SIRTF transfer to JPL, 95

“tiger team,” 127

warm-launch concept, 111

working style of, 145

writings, 137

Scientific Advisory Board (U.S. Air Force), 9

Scientific Working Group. See Science Working Group 

(SWG)

Selzer, P.W., 37

semiconductors, 18–20

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 

34, 52

sexism, 9–11

Share, Gerald, 15

Shuttle Infrared Telescope Science Accommodations Group 

(SIRTSAG), 49

Sidewinder missiles, 18

Simmons, Larry

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 130

personality of, 109–110, 137–143, 145–146, 149–151

quoted, 140–141, 144–147, 150–151

SIRTF infrared spectrograph (IRS), 126

SIRTF project manager, 100–101, 114, 123–124, 

149–150

SIRTF software, 134

SIRTF (Space Infrared Telescope Facility). See Space 

Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF); Spitzer Space 

Telescope

sky surveys, 

classified, 30n3

infrared, 25–26, 29–33, 36, 43–44, 53

Smith, Bradford A., 34

Smoot, George, 17n17

social change, 11

SOFIA/SIRTF competition, 105–106, 108

Soifer, Baruch Thomas., 25, 27, 51, 110, 123, 130

IRAS team listing, 62n5

solar astronomy, 36, 43, 54, 65

solar spectroscopy, 7–8

sounding rockets, 8

altitudes of, 13

and infrared telescopes, 23

South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), 70

Soviet Academy of Sciences, 10

Soviet Union, 10, 35

space program, 7, 10, 80–81

Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), 70, 119–120. 

See also Spitzer Space Telescope

acronym change, 42

acronym first use, 30, 50, 52

actual costs, 125

Ames oversight of, 91

Announcement of Opportunity, xiv, 50, 58–59, 61, 69, 

104, 117–118

budgets for, 47, 54, 71, 87, 97–100, 124

canceled, 98–99

coloring book, 71

competition with SOFIA, 105–106, 108

construction of, 27–28, 117–131, 119–122, 124–125

cost, actual, 134

Critical Design Review, 134

cryogenic telescope assembly, 123

cryostat, 89, 126–131

delayed, 58, 95, 97, 134

design (launch-ready), 123

Design Optimization Study Team (DOST), 53

design (preliminary) 41–42, 41, 44–45, 53, 118n5

design summary document, 53

dewar, 89, 106, 129–131

dewar pressurization, 125–127

dimensions, xi, 111, 119

Edison/SIRTF competition, 107–108

effects of radiation on, 70

as facility (opposed to telescope), 30

fate of, 136

fault protection, 132

feasibility study of, 51

in federal budget, 113

filter delamination, 125

flight-ready design (Phase B), 118

foundations for, 20–28, 29

as free flying satellite, 45, 48, 54–55, 59, 75, 84, 113

Great Observatories program, 72–81, 84

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC), 26, 62, 70, 92, 

118–119, 121–122

Infrared Array Camera (IRAC), successes of, 136

infrared detectors, 70–71, 117

Infrared Processing and Analysis Center, 123

Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), 61–62, 121–122, 123, 

125–127, 129–131

instruments, 41–42, 118–119, 123, 131–132

integration flow system, 89

internal reviews, 123

IRAS program, 112

JPL Programmatic Commitment Agreement, 114

launch, xi, 134–135

management bidding outcome, 94

Management Center, 105

mirror, 112, 118–119, 121

mission operations, 134

Multiband Imaging Photometer (MIPS), xi, 26, 62, 

118–119, 120–122, 123

Multiple Instrument Chamber (MIC), 119, 121, 126, 

129–131

and national policy, 46

“New Start,” xiv, 71–76, 95–96, 105–106, 123

Non-Advocate Review (NAR), 123

“non-competition competition,” 92

objectives, 54, 118, 123

observation window, 70, 104

orbit, performance in, 131–132, 136

orbit, trailing-Earth, 102, 111–112, 114–115, 136n61, 

137

orbit of, 69–70, 84, 87–88, 102–105
194 Making the Invisible Visible

Phase B, 95–96, 113–114, 123–127, 129–135

Phase C, 95, 113–114, 123–124

Phase D, 95, 114, 124

Phase E, 95, 114, 117

planetary astronomy, 83

pointing control system (PCS), 132

Preliminary Design Review (PDR), 123

priority of, 66, 73–74, 83, 87, 90, 97

project management bids, 92–94, 132

project organization chart, 96, 124

project schedule, 71–81, 71

projected cost of, 101–112

prototypes, 118

publications on, 73–74, 81, 84, 137

redesigned, 108–112

renamed Spitzer Space Telescope, xi, 34, 42, 136

report timeline, 52

rocket launch options, 102–104

safe mode, 132

scaled back, 88, 98–100, 104–105, 109–114, 112, 

118–119, 123

Science Accommodations Group, 52

Science Center, 92, 123, 134

science goals of, 110

Science Working Group, 53

as Shuttle-based facility, 41, 44, 47–51

Shuttle-based facility integration report, 53

SIRTF/SOFIA review, 106

software, 124–126, 131–135

specifications, 42

spectroscopy, 131–132

Spitzer Science Center, 27

study team, 54

successes of, 135–136, 147

SWG planning retreat, 109

system integration flow, 89

testing of, 130–131

“tiger team,” 127

timeline, 47, 71

transfer to JPL, 94–97, 102, 105

Über system-design team, 144

warm-launch concept, 111–114, 117

space program (U.S.), 14, 21, 33

budgets for, 77–78

criticism of, 34–36, 56, 79, 84–86

flight testing, 91

future of, 96–97

hardware, 62

infrared telescopes (IRT), 45

and policy makers, 35–36

priorities of, 53

Space Science Board (SSB), 8–9, 33, 52–53. See also 

Committee on Space Astronomy and Astrophysics 

(CSAA)

infrared recommendations, 17–20, 46

priorities of, 21n35

Space Shuttle (U.S.), 21, 35–36

budgets for, 47

Challenger, xiii, 43n3, 78–81, 85n6, 99

Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 101n1

contamination by, 47–50, 55

dimensions, 44

engine bells, 107

engineering studies, 48–49

observations (shuttle-based), 30

Payload Planning Working Groups (final report), 52

payloads, 29–30, 42–46, 58, 85n6, 111

Payloads: Committee on Aeronautical and Space 

Sciences (hearing), 52

politics of, 46–47

priority of, 89

problems with, 84–86, 101

scientific uses of, 43

servicing AXAF, 88

servicing Hubble, 100

Shuttle accommodations/mission system engineering 

study, 52

Shuttle Infrared Telescope Science Accommodation 

Group (SIRTSAG), 49

as SIRTF mount, 44–45, 50, 53, 55, 57–58

SIRTF sortie mission, 38, 42

Space Shuttle Sortie Workshop (proceedings), 52

space-borne observations, 33–36, 35, 136

Spacelab, 2, 50, 53, 58, 62, 69

spectra, 4–5, 11, 13–14

infrared, 19, 62

spectroscopy, 6–8, 38, 110

defined, 45

stars, 21

Spehalski, Richard, 96, 96, 99

Spitzer, Lyman, Jr., 33–34, 97, 136

quoted, xi

Spitzer Science Center, 27

Spitzer Space Telescope, xi–xiii, 34, 42, 134, 136–137. See 

also Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF)

Sputnik program, 7, 10, 15n12, 91n26

Stanford University, 37, 66

starlight, 3–5, 10, 23, 122

protostars, 19, 27

Stecher, Theodore P., 43

Stein, Wayne A., 51

Steward Observatory, 44, 51

Straetker, John, 134, 138

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 78, 81

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy 

(SOFIA), 105–106, 108

Street, J.C. (Jabez Curry), 26

Sunyaev, Rashid Alievich, 80

T

Tananbaum, Harvey, 74n33, 98

theoretical limit, 19–22

Thompson, Rodger I., 51

Thronson, Harley, 106–108
Index 195

Titan, infrared observations of, 23

Titan (moon), 6

Titan rocket, 102, 109, 112, 113

Tolivar, Fernando, 134

Topography Experiment (TOPEX), 77n45

Total Quality Management, 101

Townes, Charles, 67

trailing-Earth orbit, 102, 111–115, 137, 143, 151

Trapezium constellation, 2n2, 3

Truly, Richard, 101

TRW Space and Technology Group, 101

200-inch Palomar telescope (Hale), 9, 14, 19, 27, 34

Two-Micron Sky Survey, 31, 33

Two-Micron Sky Survey telescope, 31, 32

U

ultraviolet astronomy, 8, 11, 13, 17–18, 54

funding for, 56

universe

age of, xii, 17, 110, 118

origin of, 68, 136

size of, 110

University College London, 46

University of Arizona, 63 

bolometers, 20

Dale Cruikshank at 83

Peter Eisenhardt at, 95

FIRST, 51

infrared astronomy panel, 46

William Hoffmann at, 43, 46

Douglas Kleinmann at, 27

Gerard Kuiper at, 21, 26, 83

Frank Low at, 21–23, 27, 37, 46

Lunar and Planetary laboratory (LPL), 21

George Rieke at, 26, 46, 98, 122, 147

SIRTF meetings, 139

SIRTF project organization chart, 124

University of California–Berkeley, 36, 67

University of California–San Diego, 36

University of California–Santa Cruz, 68

University of Chicago, 5, 9, 22n37, 51

University of Hawai’i, 51, 62, 66

University of Iowa, 9 

University of Minnesota, 20n30, 36, 43, 49, 51

University of Rochester, 15–16, 26, 51

University of Texas, 20–21, 103

University of Texas at Austin, 51, 106–107

University of Wyoming, 49, 51, 106–108

U.S. Air Force, 9, 15, 30, 135

Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL), 30, 36, 38, 

46, 49 

infrared surveys, 30n3, 57

U.S. Army, 7, 10

U.S. Navy, 18, 23, 36. See also Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL); military contributions to science.

China Lake facility, 18

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 9–11, 18, 23, 36, 

44, 66–67

V

V-2 rocket, 7–8, 34

Van Allen, James, 7–9, 14

Van Allen radiation belts, 14, 70

van de Kamp, Peter, 11

Vanlandingham, Don, 126

Venus, 19, 33, 65

von Braun, Wernher, 8

Voyager program, 83

W

Walker, Russell G., 30n3, 36, 49, 62n5

warm-launch concept, 111–114, 117

Washburn Observatory 44

Wdowiak, Thomas, 43

Webb, James, 21n35, 35

Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 108n24, 111n33, 122

Weedman, Daniel, 104–106, 113, 138

Weiler, Edward J., 127, 134

Werner, Michael, 25, 146

advocacy for SIRTF, 108

article by, 62n5, 123

book, 137

FIRST, 51

influence of, 68

masers, 67

personality of, 110, 117, 130–131, 137–141, 143

quoted, 139, 145–146, 147, 150

Science Working Group, 68–71, 103

SIRTF cryostat, 130–131

SIRTF fault protection, 132

SIRTF Infrared Spectrograph (IRS), 127, 129–131

SIRTF Phase B, 117

SIRTF project scientist, 63, 66–71, 95, 96

SIRTF redesigned, 113

SIRTF software, 134–135

Westphal, James, 18–19, 33

White Sands Missile Range (Proving Ground), 7–8

Wide Field/Planetary Camera Number 2 (WFPC2), 100

Wildey, Robert, 33

Wilson, Robert K., 17n17, 134–135

Witteborn, Fred C., 51–52, 68–71

Ames astrophysics chief, 36–38, 41–42, 46

FIRST, 51

Greenstein report, 58–59

Hughes report, 50, 52

influence of, 63–66

infrared astronomy panel, 46

infrared telescopes (IRT) observation window, 48

quoted, 37–38, 42–43, 48–49, 54

Science Working Group, 69

SIRTF Announcement of Opportunity, 58–59

SIRTF conceived by, 36, 50, 138

SIRTF deputy project scientist, 63–66

SIRTF spectrometer proposal, 62

SIRTF study team, 54
196 Making the Invisible Visible

Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) first presentation, 52

Very early system design study (SIRTF), 52

Working Group on Infrared Astronomy, 43

Working Group on Infrared Astronomy, 43

Working Group on Optical Astronomy, 33

Working Group on Radio and Radar Astronomy, 33

Wright, Edward L., 27, 51, 63, 69

X

x-ray astronomy, 11, 36, 43, 54

Einstein Observatory, 92

funding for, 56

Kvant-1, 80

x-rays, 13, 17–18

Y

Yerkes Observatory, 5–6, 8–9, 11, 44, 49

Young, Lou, 41

FIRST, 51

Hughes report, 50, 52

Mobius strip SIRTF schedule, 71

SIRTF project manager, 63

SIRTF study team, 54

Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) first presentation, 51n27, 52

Very early system design study (SIRTF), 52

Z

zero gravity, 8, 37
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