1

Filed 10/29/13 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

KERN, INYO & MONO COUNTIES 

PLUMBING, PIPEFITTER & 

REFRIGERATION/AIR CONDITIONING 

MECHANIC JOINT APPRENTICESHIP 

AND TRAINING COMMITTEE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP 

COUNCIL, 

 Defendant and Respondent; 

PLUMBING, HEATING AND COOLING 

CONTRACTORS OF THE GREATER 

SACRAMENTO AREA PLUMBERS 

UNILATERAL APPRENTICESHIP 

COMMITTEE, 

 Real Party in Interest and Appellant. 

 A136680 

 (City and County of San Francisco 

 Super. Ct. No. CPF-11-510995) 

 Appellant and real party in interest Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors of 

the Greater Sacramento Area Plumbers Unilateral Apprenticeship Committee (the 

Applicant Committee) provides a plumbing apprenticeship training program in 46 

northern California counties. In 2007, the Applicant Committee sought and received 

approval from the Division of Apprenticeship Standards (DAS) to expand its 

apprenticeship program into Kern County. Respondent Kern, Inyo & Mono Counties 

Plumbing, Pipefitters & Refrigeration/Air Conditioning Mechanic Joint 

Apprenticeship and Training Committee (the Existing Committee), which already 

conducts a plumbing apprenticeship training program in Kern County, opposed the 
2

expansion and appealed the approval to the California Apprenticeship Council (Council). 

After the Council denied the appeal, the Existing Committee initiated the present writ 

proceedings, successfully obtaining a writ of mandate in the trial court overturning the 

Council’s decision. 

 On appeal, the Applicant Committee argues that the trial court erred in interpreting 

Labor Code1

 section 3075, subdivision (b)(3), which authorizes approval of a new 

apprenticeship program if “[e]xisting apprenticeship programs approved under this 

chapter that serve the same trade and geographic area have been identified by the 

California Apprenticeship Council as deficient in meeting their obligations under this 

chapter.” We agree with the Applicant Committee that the trial court incorrectly 

concluded that an existing program must have been identified as deficient during an audit 

conducted pursuant to section 3073.1 before section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) authorizes 

approval of a new apprenticeship program. Although no interpretation of section 3075 

can be perfectly squared with all of its terms, we conclude that under the construction 

most consistent with the language and apparent purpose of section 3075, subdivision 

(b)(3), the Council has authority to identify deficiencies in an existing committee’s 

program during the process of reviewing an application for approval of a new 

apprenticeship and training program. Because substantial evidence supports the Council’s 

finding that the Existing Committee’s program was deficient based on its substandard 

graduation rates, its decision denying the Existing Committee’s appeal from approval of 

the new program should not have been overturned. Accordingly, we shall reverse the 

order granting the writ of mandate. 

Background

A. Legal Background 

 California regulates programs for the training of apprentices in the construction 

trades under the Shelley–Maloney Apprenticeship Labor Standards Act of 1939 (Act). 

(§ 3070 et seq.; Southern California Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. 

 

1

 All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise noted. 
3

California Apprenticeship Council (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1535 (Southern 

California Cement Masons JAC).)2

 “Oversight of apprenticeship programs is vested in 

the Division of Apprenticeship Standards (DAS), one of five divisions within the 

Department of Industrial Relations (Department). [Citation.] The Council is a public 

body consisting largely of DAS officials and industry and trade union representatives 

appointed by the Governor. The Council's purpose is to ‘aid[ ] the Director [of Industrial 

Relations] in formulating policies for the effective administration’ of the laws governing 

apprenticeship, including through the formulation of regulations establishing standards 

for apprentice working conditions and assuring equal opportunities in apprenticeship 

programs. [Citations.] [¶] The Act encourages construction industry trade unions and 

employers to create programs to train and regulate the employment of apprentices. 

[Citations.] Such an apprenticeship program can apply for official approval by the DAS. 

[Citation.] Although DAS approval is not required for the operation of a program, ‘strong 

financial incentives’ and other advantages are available to approved programs.” 

(Southern California Cement Masons JAC, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1535-1536, fns. 

omitted.) 

 Since 1984, section 3075 has provided: “An apprenticeship program . . . may be 

approved by the chief [of the DAS] in any trade in the state or in a city or trade area, 

whenever the apprentice training needs justify the establishment . . . .” (Stats. 1984, 

ch. 330, § 3; as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 903, § 7.) Although, as recently observed by 

Division One of this court, the Act gives approved programs some protection from 

competition by other apprenticeship programs (Southern California Cement Masons JAC, 

supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1536-1537), this protection is not as broad as it once was, 

nor is it as broad as the Existing Committee suggests. Under the Council’s former 

 

2

 For an explanation of the interrelationship between federal law, specifically the 

National Apprenticeship Act, commonly known as the Fitzgerald Act (29 U.S.C. § 50), 

and California law governing apprenticeship training, see Southern Cal. Ch. of 

Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 

432-434.) 
4

regulations, the DAS was prohibited from approving a new program that would adversely 

affect an existing program.3

 In Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. 

California Apprenticeship Council, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 450-453, our Supreme Court 

held that this regulation was not saved from federal preemption and therefore “the state 

may not demand that an apprenticeship program satisfy this state requirement in order to 

obtain Fitzgerald Act approval.” (Id. at p. 453.) This provision therefore was removed 

from the regulations in 1995 (Register 95, No. 36 (Sept. 6, 1995)) and in 1999 a new 

subdivision was added to section 3075 to define the circumstances under which 

apprentice training needs may be deemed to justify the approval of a new apprenticeship 

program. (Stats. 1999, ch. 903, § 7.) Rather than avoiding adverse effects to existing 

programs, the focus is placed on the need for an additional program. 

 Under what is now subdivision (b) of section 3075, “the apprentice training needs 

in the building and construction trades shall be deemed to justify the approval of a new 

apprenticeship program only if” one or more of three conditions is satisfied. The three 

alternatives are: “(1) There is no existing apprenticeship program approved under this 

chapter serving the same craft or trade and geographic area. [¶] (2) Existing 

apprenticeship programs approved under this chapter that serve the same craft or trade 

and geographic area do not have the capacity, or neglect or refuse, to dispatch sufficient 

apprentices to qualified employers at a public works site who are willing to abide by the 

applicable apprenticeship standards. [¶] (3) Existing apprenticeship programs approved 

under this chapter that serve the same trade and geographic area have been identified by 

the California Apprenticeship Council as deficient in meeting their obligations under this 

chapter.” (Ibid.) 

 

3

 Title 8, section 212.2, subdivision (a) of the California Code of Regulations formerly 

provided: “The Chief DAS [Chief of the Division] shall consult with the sponsor, or 

sponsors, of the existing program or programs in the area when the apprenticeship 

standards submitted for approval would result in establishing a program where a similar 

program is already established and functioning or when it would affect an existing 

program or programs. Approval shall be denied when it is found that existing prevailing 

conditions (including the training standards) in the area and industry would in any way be 

lowered or adversely affected. . . .” (Register 86, No. 36 (Aug. 29. 1986).) 
5

 To obtain approval for a new apprenticeship program, a sponsoring committee 

must submit written program standards to the Chief of the DAS for approval. (Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 8, § 212.2, subd. (a).) As part of the administrative review of the proposed 

program, the Chief is required serve a copy of the application on each existing program in 

the apprenticeable occupation in the same geographic area and these programs may 

submit comments on the application. (Id., subd. (g).) In addition, the Chief may consult 

with the sponsors of any existing programs that could be affected by approval of the new 

program. (Ibid.) A decision by the Chief to approve or deny an application to establish a 

new apprenticeship program may be appealed to the Council by the applicant or any 

union or existing program that submitted comments to the proposed program. (Id., 

subd. (k).) Appeals are initially referred to a three-member panel of the Council which 

provides a recommendation to the full Council. (Id., subd. (l).) Thereafter, the Council 

may affirm, reverse or modify the decision of the Chief or the recommendation of the 

panel. (Id., subd. (m).) The decision of the Council is final (id., subd. (m)), subject only 

to judicial review by writ of mandate. 

 In the same legislation that added subdivision (b) to section 3075, section 3073.1 

was added to the Act, calling for random audits of existing apprenticeship programs. 

(Stats. 1999, ch. 903, § 5.) Under this provision, an apprenticeship program is subject to 

random audit performed by the DAS to, among other things, “ensure that the program 

audited is complying with its standards” and “determine whether apprentices are 

graduating from the program on schedule or dropping out.” (§ 3073.1, subd. (a).) If 

deficiencies are recognized in the audit, the DAS must prepare an audit report 

recommending remedial action to correct the deficiencies and a proposed timeline for 

doing so. (§ 3073.1, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.3, subd. (h).) The proposed 

audit report must be submitted to the program for comment and the DAS may reopen the 

audit in response to any comments. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.3, subd. (f).) A final 

audit report, taking into account any comments by the program, must be submitted to the 

Council and made public. (§ 3073.1, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.3, subd. (f).) 

At each regular meeting of the Council, “[t]he Chief DAS shall report . . . the status of 
6

each audit, including whether or not the deficiencies identified in the audit report have 

been corrected.” (Cal. Code Regs., § 212.3, subd. (h).) The failure to correct deficiencies 

within a reasonable period of time shall be grounds for withdrawing state approval of a 

program. (§ 3073.1, subd. (b).)4

B. Procedural History

 In 2007 the Applicant Committee sought and, on June 21, 2007, received approval 

from the Chief to expand its apprenticeship program into Kern County. The Existing 

Committee timely appealed the approval to the Council. On December 15, 2010, 

following an extended and complicated procedural history in which two writs of mandate 

were granted, the Council issued the decision denying the appeal that is now before us.5

In this decision, the Council finds that in the years 2002 through 2007, the graduation rate 

 

4

 Although the initial audit is random, the DAS may “conduct[] more frequent or random 

audits of apprenticeship programs where deficiencies have been identified” and “shall 

give priority in conducting audits to programs that have been identified as having 

deficiencies.” (§ 3073.1, subds. (b), (c).) 

5

 Initially, both the Chief and the Council approved the Applicant Committee’s program 

for expansion into Kern County based on subdivision (b)(2) of section 3075. The Existing 

Committee obtained a writ of mandate from the superior court overturning that approval 

on the ground that the Council had improperly interpreted subdivision (b)(2). On 

remand, the Council referred the matter to a three-member panel, which conducted an 

evidentiary hearing, concluded that there was no evidence to support a finding of need 

under subdivision (b)(2), and recommended that the Council grant the appeal. The 

Council voted to reject the recommendation and requested the Attorney General’s office 

to prepare an order for adoption by the Council denying the appeal. The proposed order 

included findings of fact demonstrating a training need under both subdivisions (b)(2) 

and (b)(3). The Existing Committee objected to the inclusion of the finding under 

subdivision (b)(3), arguing that the Council had not reviewed the transcript of the 

evidentiary hearing and was in no position to make such a finding. After considerable 

discussion, the Council voted not to adopt the proposed order, approved a contrary 

motion to adopt the panel’s recommendation, and an order was entered granting the 

appeal. The Applicant Committee challenged this order and obtained a writ of mandate 

directing the Council to set aside that decision on the ground that the Council had no 

authority to reconsider its prior decision denying the appeal. On remand, the Council 

adopted the proposed order initially presented by the Attorney General’s office, including 

the factual finding under section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) that is at issue in the present 

appeal. 
7

for apprentices in the Existing Committee’s program was less than 30 percent, which is 

below the 55 percent graduation rate required by the plumbing industry’s minimum 

training standards. The Council concluded that this “low graduation rate is deficient and 

therefore justifies a finding of a need for the [Applicant Committee’s] expansion,” citing 

section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). 

 The Existing Committee filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate 

seeking to set aside the denial of its appeal. On July 24, 2012, the superior court granted 

the petition.The court ruled, among other things, that the Council “misinterpreted Section 

3075(b)(3) by finding [the Existing Committee] ‘deficient’ and such finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” The court explained, “The language of [Section 

3075, subdivision (b)(3)] indicates that the [Council’s] assertion that the graduation rates 

is a ‘deficiency’ is mistaken. The Section provides that the program(s) must ‘have been 

identified’ as deficient by the [Council]. The [Council] must have identified a program as 

deficient in meeting its obligations ‘under this chapter,’ i.e. Sections 3070 through 

3099.5. [¶] Labor Code Section 3073.1 sets forth the manner in which apprenticeship 

programs are identified as ‘deficient.’ This is through an audit process. . . . [¶] Read 

together, Subsections 3073.1(c) and 3075(b)(3) make clear that the phrase ‘identified . . . 

as deficient’ in 3075(b)(3) is a term of art relating to a deficiency identified in an audit 

per 3073.1(c). Because there is no evidence that [the Existing Committee’s program] had 

been identified as ‘deficient’ by the [Council] per Section 3073.1 at the time of the 

[d]ecision, the [Council’s] . . . finding cannot stand.” 

 The Applicant Committee timely filed a notice of appeal. 

Discussion

A. Standard of Review 

 When reviewing a decision issued by an administrative agency, the appellate 

court’s “task . . . is the same as that of the trial court: that is, to review the agency’s 

actions to determine whether the agency complied with procedures required by law.” (Al 

Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v. Board of Harbor Commissioners (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 729, 

738.) “The appellate court reviews the administrative record independently; the trial 
8

court’s conclusions are not binding on it.” (Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375-1376.) 

B. Administrative Mandamus Versus Traditional Mandamus 

 The parties devote considerable briefing to the question of whether review of the 

Council’s decision is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, traditional 

mandamus, or section 1094.5, administrative mandamus. The complexity of this question 

was recently addressed in Southern California Cement Masons JAC, supra, 213 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1541-1542: “Because the Council’s decision falls between the statutory 

cracks of writ review, the choice between Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 

1094.5 is not straightforward. It is generally recognized that traditional mandamus under 

section 1085 applies to ‘quasi-legislative’ decisions, defined as those involving ‘ “the 

formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases,” ’ while administrative mandamus 

under section 1094.5 applies to ‘quasi-judicial’ decisions, which involve ‘ “ ‘the actual 

application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The decision to 

approve an apprenticeship program, based as it is on the application of [Labor Code] 

section 3075 and the DAS regulations to the particular circumstances of the relevant 

programs, is far more adjudicatory than legislative in nature, placing it in the natural 

domain of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Yet because the Chief and the 

Council are not required to hold a hearing before approving or denying approval of an 

apprenticeship program (see § 3075, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.2, subds. (h), 

(l)), their decisions do not fall within the literal language of that section, which applies 

only to decisions rendered ‘as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is 

required to be given[ and] evidence is required to be taken’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, 

subd. (a)). As a result, it is not readily apparent which statute should apply.” 

 Having set forth the issue, the court concluded that it need not “resolve this 

dilemma because the standard of review applicable to the particular issues raised . . . is 

not dependent on the type of writ review.” (Southern California Cement Masons JAC, 

supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541.) The court explained, “Each of the Existing 

Committees’ three arguments contends the Chief and Council erred in interpreting 
9

section 3075. When reviewing an administrative agency’s interpretation of a governing 

statute, including the type of informal interpretation embodied in the decision under 

review, we must ‘independently judge the text of the statute, taking into account and 

respecting the agency’s interpretation of its meaning.’ ” (Ibid., citing Yamaha Corp. of 

America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.) The court recognized that 

“[b]ecause the Council’s decision was the product of an agency with special expertise, 

operating in a complex area of commerce, the Council’s interpretation deserves 

significant deference” although “the ‘ “ ‘ultimate responsibility for the construction of the 

statute’ ” ’ is ours.” (Southern California Cement Masons JAC, supra, at p. 1542.) 

 As in Southern California Cement Masons JAC, the dispositive issue on this 

appeal involves only the interpretation of section 3075, in this case the meaning of 

subdivision (b)(3). Thus, regardless of whether these proceedings are governed by section 

1085 or 1094.5, we must “ ‘independently judge the text of the statute, taking into 

account and respecting the agency’s interpretation of its meaning.’ ” (213 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1541.) 

C. Section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) does not require that the existing 

 apprenticeship program be identified as deficient during a DAS audit before 

 approval of a new apprenticeship program. 

 The parties agree that under section 3075, subdivision (b)(3), an application for 

approval of a new apprenticeship program cannot be approved unless existing programs 

serving the same trade and geographic area “have been identified by the . . . Council as 

deficient in meeting their obligations under this chapter.” (§ 3075, subd.(b)(3)). The 

Existing Committee contends that the Council may identify an existing program as 

deficient only if the Chief DAS has first made such a determination in an audit conducted 

pursuant to section 3073.1. The Applicant Committee contends that the Council may 

identify a deficiency in the first instance during the administrative proceeding in which 

the need for a new program is considered. 

 Initially, we note that neither interpretation can be fully reconciled with all 

provisions of the Act. Under section 3073.1, audits are conducted by the DAS. Audit 
10

reports are “presented” to the Council, but there is no provision for the Council to ratify 

the results of the audit or to identify a program as deficient other than as specified in 

section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). (See § 3073.1; Cal. Code Regs. § 212.3.) Under section 

3075, subdivision (a), applications for approval of a new apprenticeship program are 

made to and considered by the Chief DAS. The application comes before the Council 

only on appeal from the Chief’s approval or denial of the application. (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 8, § 212.2.) Thus, the Chief DAS may approve an application under section 3075, 

subdivision (b)(3) only if the Council has identified a deficiency in existing programs, but 

the Council has no occasion to make such an identification until considering an appeal 

from the Chief’s acceptance or rejection of an application for a new program. Read 

literally, therefore, a new program can virtually never be approved under section 3075, 

subdivision (b)(3) because the Chief DAS cannot rely on that provision unless the 

Council has identified a deficiency, and the Council cannot identify a deficiency unless 

an appeal is before it from a decision of the Chief DAS.6

 This dilemma exists whether the 

Council may identify a deficiency in the first instance, as argued by the Applicant 

Committee, or only following a section 3073.1 audit, as suggested by the Existing 

Committee. Clearly, corrective legislation is called for.7

 

 

6

 In the present case, the issue came before the Council following the unusual procedural 

history summarized in footnote 5, ante.

7

 As initially proposed, section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) read “. . . identified by the chief 

or the [Council].” (Assem. Bill No. 921, as amended July 7, 1999.) For reasons unknown, 

but likely the result of a clerical error, Assembly Bill No. 921 was amended so that 

subdivision (b)(3) read in relevant part “identified by the chief of the [Council].” (Assem. 

Bill No. 921, as amended Aug. 17, 1999.) A subsequent amendment struck “the chief of” 

from the proposed legislation, since there is no chief of the Council, resulting in 

subdivision (b)(3) as enacted. (Assem. Bill No. 921, as amended Sept. 3, 1999.) The 

legislative history offers no explanation for the above amendments, suggesting that the 

removal of the Chief from subdivision (b)(3) was simply an inadvertent drafting error. 

For the reasons discussed below, we need not rewrite the statute to resolve the present 

appeal. We note, however, that the inclusion of the Chief in subdivision (b)(3), as initially 

proposed, would resolve the dilemma identified above, and that the conclusion we reach 

is consistent with a revision of the statute permitting an identification of a deficiency to 

be made either by the Chief DAS or the Council. 
11

 The Existing Committee argues that section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) must be 

interpreted within the context of “the statutory scheme of which [it] is a part” (Lopez v. 

Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1063), and that section 3073.1 “spells out how 

apprenticeship programs are indentified as ‘deficient.’ ” It points out that the requirement 

in section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) that an existing program “have been identified” as 

deficient is stated in the past tense. Therefore, it asserts, the provision must be understood 

to mean that the existing program has previously been identified as deficient in an audit 

conducted pursuant to section 3073.1. Moreover, section 3073.1, subdivision (b) requires 

the DAS to “recommend remedial action to correct deficiencies recognized in the audit 

report, and the failure to correct deficiencies within a reasonable period of time shall be 

grounds for withdrawing state approval of a program.”8

 Thus, the Existing Committee 

argues, “if an existing program has deficiencies that have been identified in an audit and 

that may render it at risk for withdrawal of state approval, this would create an 

apprenticeship training need in that trade and geographic area as described in [section 

3075, subdivision (b)(3)]. [¶] This is the only construction of [section 3075, subdivision 

(b)(3)] that integrates the provision with ‘the statutory scheme of which [it] is a part.” 

 Although not implausible, the Existing Committee’s interpretation cannot be 

squared with the plain language of section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). While, as the 

Existing Committee argues, that provision requires the deficiency in an existing program 

to “have been identified,” the deficiency must “have been identified by the California 

Apprenticeship Council”—language that the Existing Committee ignores. There is no 

other point in the processes created by the Act at which the Council identifies a 

deficiency in an existing program than during its review of the Chief’s decision to 

 

8

 This is how the section read when the matter was before the Council. Among other 

amendments made to the statute in 2011, section 3073.1, subdivision (b) was amended to 

provide that “the failure to follow division recommendations or to correct deficiencies 

within a reasonable period of time shall be grounds for withdrawing state approval of a 

program.” (Stats. 2011, ch. 696, § 1.) 
12

approve or deny a new program application. Under section 3073.1 and the related 

regulations, the identification of deficiencies during the audit process is made by the 

DAS, not by the Council. While the Council receives the audit report, there is no 

provision for the Council to approve or ratify the content of the report. The only point at 

which the Act requires the Council to identify a deficiency in an existing program is as a 

predicate to approval of a new program under section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). 

 The word “deficiency” (or “deficient”) is used throughout the Act in its ordinary 

sense, referring in some places to omissions or misstatements from program applications 

(§§ 3073.1, subd. (e); 3075.5) and in others to a failure to comply with program standards 

or to achieve program goals (§§ 3073.1, subds. (b), (c); 3075, subd. (b)(3)). There is no 

indication in the text or the history of the statute that the word is intended as a term of art 

meaning only a deficiency identified as such in a DAS audit. 

 To interpret the statute as suggested by the Existing Committee, the court would 

be required to read out of section 3075, subdivision (b)(3) the requirement that the 

deficiency be identified by the Council and replace it with another requirement, that the 

deficiency has been identified in a DAS audit. Sections 3075, subdivision (b) and 3073.1 

were enacted at the same time. (Stats. 1999, ch. 903, §§ 5, 7.) Had the Legislature wanted 

to so restrict the manner in which deficiencies must be identified for purposes of section 

3075, subdivision (b)(3), it would have been a simple matter to say so. Inserting into the 

statute the requirement that a deficiency in an existing program has been previously 

identified in a DAS audit before the Council may approve a new program because of that 

deficiency would be at odds with the most basic rules of statutory construction. (People v. 

Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587 [Courts will only engage in rewriting of a statute 

“ ‘when it has been obvious that a word or number had been erroneously used or 

omitted’ ” and “ ‘when compelled by necessity and supported by firm evidence of the 

drafters’ true intent.’ ”]; Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. (2004) 
13

121 Cal.App.4th 479, 486 [Courts “may not ‘insert qualifying provisions not included in 

the statute.’ ”].) 

Interpreting the statute as it has been written gives appropriate deference to the 

Council’s interpretation of its provisions. (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of 

Equalization, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1.) And this interpretation is not at odds with the broader 

statutory scheme. The audit process defined in section 3073.1 is designed to ensure that 

existing apprenticeship programs comply with applicable rules and standards and to 

recommend remedial measures to correct deficiencies, leading to potential withdrawal of 

state approval if those deficiencies are not corrected within a reasonable period of time. 

The approval process defined in section 3075 is not designed to correct deficiencies in 

existing programs, to discipline existing programs, or revoke their right to operate. 

Permitting the Council to identify an existing deficiency allows the Council to address a 

deficiency promptly, without awaiting an audit report, and to do so by authorizing the 

operation of a new program without revoking the authorization of an existing program. 

 In this case, the Chief’s decision includes the factual finding that the program 

sponsored by the Existing Committee had a five-year graduation rate of 23.8 percent. On 

appeal before the Council, the Existing Committee did not challenge this factual finding 

and the Council concluded that the substandard graduation rate was a deficiency within 

the meaning of section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). Because we conclude that section 3075, 

subdivision (b)(3) authorizes the Council to make such a finding without the deficiency 

having been previously identified in a DAS audit, and because the evidentiary support for 

the Council’s finding is not questioned, it follows that the Council did not err in 

approving the Applicant Committee’s program under section 3075, subdivision (b)(3). 

Hence, a writ of mandate should not have been granted compelling the Council to set 

aside its order denying the appeal from the approval of the Applicant Committee’s 

program. 
14

Disposition 

 The order granting writ of mandate is reversed. 

 _________________________ 

 Pollak, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

McGuiness, P. J. 

_________________________ 

Siggins, J. 
15

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court 

Trial Judge: Hon. Harold E. Kahn 

Counsel for Real Party in Interest 

 and Appellant: Carrie E. Bushman, 

 and 

 Grant R. Zehnder 

 of Cook Brown 

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent: Jeffrey L. Cutler 

 and 

 Elizabeth Rosenfeld 

 of Wohlner Kaplon Phillips Young 

 & Cutler 

Counsel for Defendant and Respondent: Karen Wing Yiu 

 Office of the Attorney General