United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

No. 22-40559

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Amber Ford; Regan Kimbrough; Donald Newsome, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Anderson County, Texas; Taket Holdings, L.L.C.; Adam 

Corley; Timothy Green; Greg Taylor; Robin Jones; 

Jonathan Strong; Jessica Carpenter; Alicia Wilson; 

Matthew Wickersham; Travis Wesson; Dakota Hughes; 

Todd Choate, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:19-CV-384

______________________________

Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Our prior panel opinion, Ford v. Anderson County, 90 F.4th 736 (5th 

Cir. 2024), is WITHDRAWN. The following panel opinion is 

SUBSTITUTED:

On June 15, 2018, pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome died in 

Anderson County Jail due to complications from Addison’s disease. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 22, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Newsome’s family members filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Anderson County, Sheriff Greg Taylor, Dr. Adam Corley, Nurse Timothy 

Green, and several jailers. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated 

Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee by failing to 

treat her chronic illness, resulting in a preventable death. The district court 

granted summary judgment for all Defendants and dismissed Plaintiffs’

lawsuit with prejudice. After reviewing the record, we find that Plaintiffs 

have established genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether several 

Defendants violated Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. We 

accordingly REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones, 

Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes, but we 

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants 

Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C. We AFFIRM 

IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Adam Corley

as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against him, but we REVERSE the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to 

Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM IN PART the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants Anderson County and 

Greg Taylor, but we VACATE the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ 

motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND with 

instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include 

additional supervisory and municipal liability claims. Finally, we AFFIRM

the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. 

I.

A.

This case involves the death of pretrial detainee Rhonda Newsome 

while in the custody of Anderson County Jail. Newsome had a history of 

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several chronic conditions, including Addison’s disease, an uncommon 

illness that occurs when the adrenal glands do not produce enough of certain 

hormones. If left untreated, Addison’s disease can accelerate into an 

“Addisonian crisis,” which requires immediate medical intervention. Early 

indicators of an Addisonian crisis may include severe weakness, pain in the 

lower back or legs, abdominal pain, vomiting, and low blood pressure.

Addison’s disease requires lifelong treatment, which is primarily 

accomplished through administering steroid medications. When Addison’s 

disease patients are unmedicated for even brief periods of time, they can be 

at a high risk of experiencing an Addisonian crisis.

During Newsome’s detainment, Anderson County contracted with 

Dr. Adam Corley, a private physician who provided medical care for 

detainees. Dr. Corley held the title of medical director of the jail. The County 

also employed Timothy Green, a registered nurse who worked at the jail parttime. 

Anderson County Jail’s health services plan states that medical care is 

to be provided to detainees twenty-four hours a day, and detainees are to be 

medically screened upon admission. Detainees with chronic illnesses are to 

undergo a medical assessment, and the jail physician is tasked with instituting 

a treatment regimen.

B.

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Rhonda 

Newsome, age fifty, was arrested on March 9, 2018, following a domestic 

disturbance in which she allegedly chased her adult daughter with a pair of 

scissors. Newsome was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon. After being treated at Palestine Regional Medical Center for back 

issues, Newsome was taken to Anderson County Jail on March 10, 2018, for 

pretrial detention. 

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According to her jail intake form, Newsome suffered from several 

medical conditions, including Addison’s disease, fibromyalgia, seizures, joint 

or disc disease, spinal stenosis, and osteoarthritis. The form also indicates

that Newsome was taking ten prescription medications at the time. 

On March 11, Nurse Green examined Newsome. According to 

Green’s deposition testimony, Green and Newsome discussed her medical 

history and medications, and Green instituted a verbal treatment plan to 

“continue the medications that [Newsome] was on.” Green stated that this 

verbal treatment plan involved asking the jail staff to monitor Newsome and 

notifying Dr. Corley of any changes in her condition. 

During the months of March, April, and May, Newsome had periodic 

medical issues. On April 4, Newsome accidentally took an extra dose of blood 

pressure medication. Nurse Green treated her with a liter of saline solution, 

placed her on medical observation with repeated blood pressure readings, 

and reexamined her the next day. Green noted in Newsome’s medical 

activity log on April 5 that he would “attempt to obtain medical records.” 

On April 16 and April 18, Newsome complained of acid reflux, and 

jailers provided her with over-the-counter medication. On April 20, Nurse 

Green personally examined Newsome again and noted low blood pressure 

and bilateral leg swelling. Newsome was placed on medical observation, in 

which jailers logged her actions every fifteen minutes. Nurse Green further 

indicated that he would draw blood and report lab results to Dr. Corley, but 

it is disputed whether this blood draw occurred. 

On May 11, about two months into Newsome’s detention, Dr. Corley 

personally examined Newsome for the first and only time at the jail. Dr. 

Corley’s notes indicate that Newsome was in “no distress” during the 

examination, and that her “chief complaint” was gas. Dr. Corley 

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acknowledged that Newsome suffered from Addison’s disease, and he made 

a note to follow up on medical records requests. 

Plaintiffs allege that Newsome was never prescribed or systematically 

provided with steroids—the primary treatment for Addison’s disease—

during her ninety-seven-day detention. They also allege that Newsome did 

not have her blood drawn for monitoring until June 15, the day of her death. 

On the evening of June 14, Newsome began vomiting and 

experiencing pain in her stomach and right flank area. After she complained 

to jail staff, Nurse Green visited the jail around midnight to personally 

examine her.1 Green claims that he consulted with Dr. Corley by phone, and 

that per Dr. Corley’s instructions he administered one liter of saline and fifty

milligrams of Phenergan for nausea treatment. Green testified that Newsome 

complained of “some mild nausea and some vomiting,” but that she had 

stable vital signs and appeared alert and oriented. Green also claims that he 

asked Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, but Newsome declined. 

After Green purportedly treated Newsome late on June 14, Newsome 

was placed on medical observation and jail staff were instructed to move her 

into a holding cell where she could be observed through the night. Video 

footage indicates that jail staff checked on Newsome thirty-one times during 

the seventeen-hour period between midnight on June 14 and her death in the 

afternoon of June 15. 

_____________________

1 Plaintiffs claim that there is a factual dispute regarding whether Nurse Green 

made this midnight visit to Newsome. We express no view on whether Plaintiffs have 

presented sufficient evidence to support a justifiable inference that Nurse Green fabricated 

this visit. Even if we accepted as true Green’s claim that he treated Newsome that night, 

we would still hold that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment due to

the events that transpired on June 15.

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Plaintiffs have presented affidavit evidence from other detainees in 

nearby cells on the night of June 14 through June 15 indicating that during 

this seventeen-hour period, Newsome was in grave distress from a severe 

Addisonian crisis. Detainee Edward Jimenez, who was in a cell adjacent to 

Newsome’s cell, testified that Newsome repeatedly cried and screamed 

during the night, repeating phrases such as “help-help,” “I’m hurting bad,” 

“please help,” “Lord help me,” “take me to the hospital,” and “I need a 

doctor.” Jimenez reports being unable to sleep due to the noise. He also 

claims that nearby jailers appeared to be ignoring Newsome’s cries and pleas 

for help. 

Detainee Ashley Lyons, who was in a cell adjacent to Newsome’s cell

on June 15, testified that she repeatedly heard Newsome groaning and saying 

that she needed to go to the hospital. Lyons reports that Newsome’s cries for 

help were loud enough to wake her up on several occasions. 

Detainee Charles Patrick Sweet, who was near Newsome’s holding 

cell, testified that during the middle of the night he heard “a female voice 

coming from the processing area repeatedly crying out loudly that she needed 

[a] doctor and that she needed to go to the hospital.” 

Around 1:30 a.m. on June 15, A’rhonda Kelli Schuckers, an inmate 

and trustee at Anderson County Jail, assisted in removing Newsome from her 

cell for a shower. Newsome was unable to walk on her own; she had to be 

supported on both sides by a trustee and a jailer. While cleaning Newsome’s 

cell during the shower, Schuckers noticed that Newsome had vomited a black 

substance into a cup. After Newsome returned to her cell, Jailer-Defendant 

Robin Jones took Newsome’s blood pressure and yelled out that it was 

80/40. 

At approximately 7:40 a.m. on June 15, Nurse Green examined 

Newsome. Newsome’s medical activity log indicates that she was nauseated, 

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“had thrown up brown colored fluid but was still able to tolerate water,” and 

was complaining of “right flank area pain.” Green drew a blood sample and 

gave Newsome Phenergan and Tylenol #4. Green claims that he asked 

Newsome if she wanted to go to the hospital, and that she declined. Green’s 

notes indicate that upon receiving the results of Newsome’s blood work, Dr. 

Corley might order a CT scan and send Newsome to the hospital for further 

evaluation. Following this visit, Green took Newsome’s blood sample to 

Palestine Regional Medical Center for testing.

The parties dispute whether Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s 

blood test results that morning, or later that afternoon when Newsome was 

found unresponsive. The test results indicate that Newsome’s blood urea 

nitrogen level was critically high, and her potassium level was critically low. 

The blood work report’s notation indicates that lab technician Wesley Wood 

called Nurse Green at approximately 10:40 a.m. on June 15 and reported a 

“critical value,” which indicates a medical emergency that requires 

immediate attention. The report further indicates that Nurse Green “read 

back” the critical value to confirm understanding. However, Wood could not 

recall in his deposition—taken over two years later—what values he read to 

Green. Green, on the other hand, has repeatedly testified that he does not 

recall being informed of any critical values on the morning of June 15. He 

states that had he received the critical values that morning, he would have 

immediately called Dr. Corley. 

Plaintiffs highlight that shortly after this call discussing lab results, 

Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate. Throughout the day on June 

15, Choate undertook efforts to call the district attorney’s office and obtain a 

personal recognizance bond (“PR bond”) for Newsome. Choate explained

in his deposition that he requests PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe 

someone is going to go to the hospital.” He also acknowledged that this 

practice exists because of staffing issues; when a detainee is admitted to the 

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hospital under a PR bond, the jail does not need staff to sit at the hospital 

with the detainee. This plan to secure a PR bond for Newsome had been 

discussed with Sheriff Greg Taylor, the undisputed policymaker at Anderson 

County Jail during Newsome’s detainment. Furthermore, in an affidavit, 

former jailer Jacob P. Mobley testified that Nurse Green confided to him that 

Sheriff Taylor had limited Green’s ability to send people to the hospital due 

to cost concerns. The request for a PR bond was canceled when Newsome 

was finally taken to the hospital in the afternoon. 

At approximately 4:20 p.m. on June 15, Jailer-Defendants Jessica 

Carpenter, Matthew Wickersham, and Dakota Hughes assisted Newsome to 

the toilet. On the way to the toilet, Newsome grabbed the wall, fell, and 

vomited, and Carpenter retrieved a wheelchair for her. Wickersham told 

Newsome to let the jailers know when she was finished using the toilet, and 

he left the cell door open a crack. At around 5:00 p.m., Jailer-Defendant 

Wickersham checked on Newsome and found her unresponsive. As multiple 

Jailer Defendants began to locate emergency equipment, Wickersham called 

Nurse Green, who instructed him to notify emergency medical services

(“EMS”). Green testified that he learned about Newsome’s critical blood 

work results around the same time that Newsome was found unresponsive. 

After Wickersham called Nurse Green, Carpenter wheeled Newsome 

into the processing area. Newsome was laid onto a mat, and JailerDefendants Alicia Wilson, Hughes, and Carpenter left to retrieve a 

defibrillator. Two Anderson County deputies took turns providing chest 

compressions to Newsome until EMS arrived. 

Newsome was pronounced dead at the hospital at 5:37 p.m. 

Newsome’s autopsy indicates that she died of “[c]omplications of Addison’s 

disease, hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, obesity, and 

pulmonary emphysema.”

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C.

Plaintiffs-Appellants in this action are Amber Ford (Newsome’s 

daughter), Regan Kimbrough (Newsome’s son), and Donald Newsome 

(Newsome’s father). Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in federal court on 

August 21, 2019. Defendants-Appellees are Anderson County, Texas; Greg 

Taylor, the Sheriff of Anderson County during the relevant period; jailers 

Robin Jones, Jonathan Strong, Jessica Carpenter, Alicia Wilson, Matthew 

Wickersham, Travis Wesson, Dakota Hughes, and Todd Choate 

(collectively, the “Jailer Defendants”); Nurse Timothy Green; Dr. Adam 

Corley; and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C., a medical services company formed

by Dr. Corley and Nurse Green. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, and they claim that Defendants violated Newsome’s Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights as a pretrial detainee. 

Plaintiffs sought leave to file a third amended complaint on January 

13, 2021. They intended to add as a defendant Lieutenant Tia Pierson, 

another jailer who is alleged to have been aware of Newsome’s critical 

condition. The proposed third amended complaint would also include 

allegations about a policy of delaying medical treatment to seek detainees’ 

release on PR bonds. 

On May 5, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for all 

Defendants except for Anderson County, finding that these individual 

Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court first 

addressed the claims against Sheriff Taylor, who was not personally involved 

in Newsome’s treatment, but who was alleged to have: (1) failed to train or 

supervise his staff; (2) implemented a policy prohibiting jail staff below the 

rank of sergeant from contacting EMS without permission from superiors; 

and (3) implemented a policy requiring staff to secure PR bonds when 

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detainees needed hospitalization.

2 The district court found that Plaintiffs’ 

evidence was insufficient to show that Sheriff Taylor acted with the requisite 

level of deliberate indifference to establish a constitutional violation. 

Turning to the Jailer Defendants, the district court found that each 

jailer lacked subjective knowledge of Newsome’s dire medical situation, and 

that their responses to Newsome’s medical issues were reasonable. The 

district court then addressed the Defendants responsible for Newsome’s 

medical treatment. The district court found that, at best, Plaintiffs had shown 

that additional or different treatment may have prevented Newsome’s death, 

but that they had not shown that Dr. Corley exhibited “deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.”3 The district court 

similarly found that Nurse Green’s actions, even if negligent, did not rise to 

the level of deliberate indifference required to find a constitutional violation. 

The district court also granted summary judgment for TAKET Holdings, 

L.L.C., because the company was not contracted with Anderson County at 

the time of Newsome’s detainment and death.4

On July 29, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for 

Anderson County, the last remaining Defendant in the case. The district 

court first found, as a threshold matter, that the municipality could not be 

_____________________

2 The policy regarding PR bonds was not properly raised before the district court 

because it was not alleged in the operative second amended complaint. See Jackson v.

Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court nevertheless determined 

that even if the claim had been properly raised, Plaintiffs’ evidence did not show that this 

policy contributed to Newsome’s death or was implemented with deliberate indifference. 

3 As a threshold issue, the district court concluded that Dr. Corley was entitled to 

assert qualified immunity. Plaintiffs do not contest this determination on appeal.

4 On appeal, Plaintiffs do not contest the grant of summary judgment for TAKET 

Holdings, L.L.C. We accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment for this Defendant.

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held liable when there was no finding of an underlying constitutional violation

committed by an individual defendant, citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 

U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Then, addressing the two alleged policies of prohibiting 

jailers from calling EMS without approval and delaying hospitalization to 

request PR bonds, the district court found that there was insufficient

evidence that these policies existed or contributed to Newsome’s death. The 

district court issued a final judgment in favor of Defendants on July 29, 2022. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was 

denied as moot when the district court granted summary judgment for all 

individual Defendants. In its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider 

the granting of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the district 

court clarified that there was insufficient evidence of the alleged PR bond 

policy, and that granting Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended 

complaint would have been futile. 

II.

A.

We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

each individual Defendant. This court reviews grants of summary judgment 

de novo. Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., 41 F.4th 493, 502 (5th Cir. 2022). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is “no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact 

is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). The court views all evidence and draws all justifiable 

inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Moore, 41 F.4th at 502.

“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment 

burden of proof.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). To 

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overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish: 

“(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that 

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours 

of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Although this does not mean that “a case directly 

on point” is required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. The salient 

question is whether the state of the law gives the official “fair warning” that

his or her conduct is unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 

(2002).

“The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are found in the 

procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Est. of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 

2015). For claims related to the medical treatment of a pretrial detainee, this 

court will find a constitutional violation where an officer: (1) subjectively 

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee; and (2) responded 

to that risk with “deliberate indifference.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206–

07 (5th Cir. 2021).5

_____________________

5 The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical 

needs, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a pretrial 

detainee’s medical needs. Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019). Because there 

is “no significant distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates concerning 

basic human needs such as medical care,” Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 

2001), case law related to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care can clearly 

establish a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care for the 

purposes of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 951–52 (5th Cir. 

2022) (finding that a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care was 

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We have described deliberate indifference as “an extremely high 

standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th 

Cir. 2001). A detainee can establish a jail official’s deliberate indifference by 

showing that the official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, 

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that 

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” See 

Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). Deliberate indifference 

can also be shown where a jail official knows that a detainee faces “a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847

(1994). On the other hand, “[u]nsuccessful medical treatment, acts of 

negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate 

indifference.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).

B.

We begin with Defendant Adam Corley. It is undisputed that Dr. 

Corley’s first and only significant personal interaction with Newsome was on 

May 11, when he addressed her complaints of gas. During this interaction, 

Dr. Corley was aware that Newsome had Addison’s disease, and he may have 

reviewed her medical activity log to find that Newsome had experienced low 

blood pressure and leg swelling on April 20. Based on this interaction, 

whether Dr. Corley committed a constitutional violation hinges on: (1) 

whether Dr. Corley’s knowledge that Newsome had Addison’s disease 

constituted subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm; and 

(2) whether Dr. Corley’s failure to provide any follow-up treatment or 

_____________________

clearly established by Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), an Eighth Amendment 

case); Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Eighth Amendment cases, 

including Easter, to find that a pretrial detainee’s right to medical care was clearly 

established). 

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monitoring until the date of Newsome’s death constituted deliberate 

indifference. We find that both questions can be answered in the affirmative.

Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding 

whether Dr. Corley had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 

harm to Newsome. It is undisputed that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that 

Newsome had Addison’s disease, and it is undisputed that Dr. Corley had 

basic knowledge about Addison’s disease. A reasonable jury could therefore 

find that Dr. Corley subjectively knew that Newsome suffered from a chronic 

illness that could become life-threatening if left untreated. This should 

suffice to establish Dr. Corley’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of 

serious harm.6

Plaintiffs have also presented a genuine dispute of material fact 

regarding whether Dr. Corley’s failure to treat or monitor Newsome’s 

Addison’s disease constituted deliberate indifference. Had Dr. Corley simply 

mistreated Newsome’s Addison’s disease or made negligent treatment 

decisions, that would not constitute deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463 

F.3d at 346. But Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Dr. Corley did not 

monitor or treat Newsome’s Addison’s disease whatsoever.

7 Accordingly, 

_____________________

6 We note that a patient does not need to be experiencing an acute medical crisis 

requiring emergency intervention to be facing a substantial risk of serious harm—suffering 

from a known chronic issue that requires ongoing or long-term treatment may also suffice. 

See, e.g., Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a sufficient 

risk of harm for a deliberate indifference claim where jail medical staff were on notice that 

an inmate had ulcers that required diligent day-to-day treatment); Delaughter v. Woodall, 

909 F.3d 130, 138–41 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate in need of a hip replacement 

and reconstructive surgery stated a deliberate indifference claim that should have survived 

a summary judgment challenge); Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2016)

(affirming that a prisoner with a “serious medical need for physical therapy” stated a valid 

deliberate indifference claim).

7 While Dr. Corley did treat Newsome’s immediate symptom of gas with anti-gas 

medication, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that he did not treat Newsome for 

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Plaintiffs have presented a factual dispute regarding whether Dr. Corley 

responded to Newsome’s potentially life-threatening illness with deliberate 

indifference by failing to provide any treatment.

Dr. Corley counters Plaintiffs’ allegation of deliberate indifference by 

referencing the well-established principle that questions regarding proper 

diagnosis and treatment are “classic example[s] of . . . matter[s] for medical 

judgment,” and not bases for finding a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1976). But treating Addison’s disease is not

particularly complex—as Plaintiffs point out, typical treatment involves 

administering common steroids such as hydrocortisone. A reasonable jury

could conclude that failing to provide steroid medications to an Addison’s 

disease patient is not a legitimate exercise of “medical judgment.” See 

Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 (reversing summary judgment for a defendant 

where it was “not clear” that the cancellation of the plaintiff’s surgery and a 

medical center’s refusal to accept the plaintiff as a patient were “medicaljudgment decisions”).

In summary, Plaintiffs have presented facts indicating that Dr. Corley: 

(1) subjectively knew that Newsome had Addison’s disease—a potentially 

fatal but eminently treatable condition; and (2) did nothing to treat this 

_____________________

Addison’s disease. Responding to a serious medical issue with such a cursory level of care 

may still constitute deliberate indifference. See Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 206, 210 

(5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a nearly two-hour delay in calling an ambulance could 

constitute deliberate indifference, even though a defendant had administered first aid); 

Ledesma v. Swartz, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that treating 

complaints of a broken jaw with only over-the-counter pain medication and a liquid diet 

could constitute deliberate indifference); see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (“When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory as 

to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.”).

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chronic illness. A jury considering these facts could find that Dr. Corley 

violated Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Dr. Corley has invoked qualified immunity. Under our case law, 

Plaintiffs must show that Newsome’s rights “were clearly established at the 

time of the violation.” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021). In 

Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d at 465, we held that the law is clearly established 

that a prisoner’s rights are violated if “a prison official ‘refuse[s] to treat him, 

ignore[s] his complaints, intentionally treat[s] him incorrectly, or engage[s]

in any similar conduct that . . . clearly evince[s] a wanton disregard for any 

serious medical needs.’” (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). And in Sims v. 

Griffin, 35 F.4th at 951, we reiterated that Easter illustrates circumstances 

where a detainee “can show [that] his clearly established rights . . . were 

violated.” In Easter, the plaintiff prisoner had chronic heart problems and 

visited the prison infirmary complaining of severe chest pain. Easter, 467 

F.3d at 461. The prison nurse, who knew of the prisoner’s heart problems, 

denied the prisoner’s request for medicine after learning that the prison 

pharmacy was closed. Id. at 461, 463–64. We held that the nurse was not 

entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because her

actions may have violated the prisoner’s clearly established constitutional 

rights. Id. at 465. 

Like the nurse in Easter, Dr. Corley knew that an inmate had a serious 

medical condition but failed to treat her for that condition. We recognize that 

the prisoner in Easter was denied treatment during an acute period, while Dr. 

Corley denied Newsome ongoing, day-to-day treatment for her known 

chronic condition—Addison’s disease. But our case law clearly establishes 

that refusal to treat in both types of circumstances is a violation of an inmate’s

constitutional rights. In Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d at 260, a 

paraplegic inmate developed decubitus ulcers (bed sores) while 

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incarcerated.8 The inmate’s doctor provided mandatory medical orders to 

the jail’s medical staff. Id. The medical staff knew that the inmate had a 

serious ailment but “did not provide the prescribed treatments, seek 

alternative placement for [the inmate], or monitor the progression of his 

wounds.” Id. at 261. We determined that the medical staff’s refusal to 

provide the inmate with ongoing treatment, “despite their actual knowledge 

of the seriousness of [the inmate’s] condition,” could constitute deliberate 

indifference. Id. at 263.9

_____________________

8 While Plaintiffs themselves do not cite to Lawson, in a qualified immunity inquiry

“we needn’t limit our analysis to the cases cited by Plaintiffs.” See Joseph ex rel. Est. of 

Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 338 (5th Cir. 2020); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 

(1994) (“A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should . . . use its 

‘full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.’” (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 

U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984))).

9 Several of our unpublished opinions are also worth highlighting. This court’s 

unpublished opinions cannot clearly establish the law for the purposes of qualified 

immunity, but they nevertheless may “aptly illustrate[] the established right.” Cooper v. 

Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). Of particular relevance is this court’s decision 

in Dauzat v. Carter, 670 F. App’x at 298, where we affirmed that a prisoner stated a valid 

deliberate indifference claim in alleging that a doctor ignored his “serious medical need for 

physical therapy” by only providing a wellness program conducted by inmates. We further 

held that the prisoner’s constitutional rights were clearly established by Easter and Lawson. 

Here, we similarly hold that Newsome’s right to not be denied, by deliberate indifference, 

treatment for her chronic condition was clearly established by Easter and Lawson.

Furthermore, in several other unpublished opinions, we have recognized that an 

official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs when he or she 

delays treatment or provides only cursory care. See, e.g., Loosier v. Unknown Med. Dr., 435 

F. App’x 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference 

claim where a doctor knew that the prisoner had injured his neck but “chose not to provide 

him any treatment or medication for his injury”); Ledesma, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (finding 

that an inmate stated a deliberate indifference claim where a doctor treated complaints of a 

broken jaw with nothing more than Motrin and a liquid diet); Vasquez v. Dretke, 226 F. 

App’x 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference claim 

where dentists knew that the prisoner needed dentures but refused to provide care). 

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We also note that several of our sister circuits have found that failing 

to provide treatment for a chronic illness may constitute deliberate 

indifference. In Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2001), 

the Seventh Circuit held that a jury could find that two jail officials were

deliberately indifferent for failing to provide a diabetic detainee with a 

morning insulin shot. In Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 

1999), the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for a 

deputy sheriff who was accused of denying diabetes medication to an inmate. 

The Sixth Circuit and Fourth Circuit have held that jail officials could be held 

liable for overseeing medical systems that denied treatment to inmates with 

chronic conditions. See Young ex rel. Est. of Young v. Martin, 51 F. App’x 509, 

515 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a jail director was not entitled to qualified 

immunity for implementing a policy that provided minimal care to inmates 

with chronic illnesses); Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 360–61 (4th Cir. 

2019) (finding that a chief physician could be held liable for implementing 

policies that denied treatment to inmates with the hepatitis C virus).

Considering the foregoing authorities, we find that Dr. Corley’s 

alleged failure to provide any treatment to a detainee with a chronic illness 

that can become life-threatening if left untreated may have violated 

Newsome’s clearly established constitutional rights. A jury may ultimately 

find that the absence in the record of Newsome affirmatively requesting 

Addison’s disease medication weighs against Plaintiffs’ case, or they may 

find that Newsome’s medication list—which contained a long list of 

medications but not steroid medications—ultimately did not provide Dr. 

Corley with clear enough notice that Newsome was not being treated for 

Addison’s disease. However, construing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a 

jury could also reasonably conclude that a patient with untreated Addison’s 

disease presents a serious, obvious risk that is in line with our prior cases 

finding deliberate indifference for failing to provide medical care. We find 

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that these factual issues regarding Dr. Corley’s notice of the risk facing 

Newsome and his actions following his encounter with Newsome preclude 

summary judgment.

We briefly note that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint appears to 

plead a supervisory claim against Dr. Corley. However, as Dr. Corley 

correctly points out, Plaintiffs have abandoned their supervisory claim 

against him by failing to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Ogle, 

415 F.3d 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2005). We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to 

Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory 

deliberate indifference claim. 

C.

We next address Defendant Timothy Green. In opposing Nurse 

Green’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs centered on Nurse 

Green’s conduct on June 14 and June 15, the dates on which Newsome 

exhibited symptoms of an acute Addisonian crisis. We find that Plaintiffs 

have presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that 

Nurse Green’s actions on June 15, the day of Newsome’s death, constituted 

a violation of Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

To establish that Nurse Green subjectively knew of a substantial risk 

of serious harm to Newsome, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating 

that the results of Newsome’s blood work put Nurse Green on notice that 

Newsome needed emergency care. In his deposition, lab technician Wesley

Wood acknowledged that a lab report of Newsome’s blood work indicates

that: (1) Newsome’s blood work revealed “critical values”; (2) Wood called 

Nurse Green on the morning of June 15 to notify him of these results; and (3) 

Nurse Green “understood those results and read them back.” We find that 

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the call that occurred between Wood and Nurse Green around 10:40 a.m. on 

June 15 establishes a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Nurse 

Green’s subjective knowledge that Newsome was at risk of an Addisonian 

crisis.

Additionally, Plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating that Nurse 

Green’s response to this information was deliberately indifferent, not merely 

negligent or inadequate. Immediately after getting off the phone with Wood, 

Nurse Green called Jail Captain Todd Choate, who worked on June 15 to 

release Newsome via a PR bond. Rather than attempt to provide any medical 

assistance to Newsome, Nurse Green purportedly delayed care for over six 

hours, up until Newsome’s death.

Viewing this evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable jury could 

determine that on the morning of June 15, Nurse Green: (1) knew that 

Newsome had vomited “brown colored fluid” and was in a serious enough 

condition to warrant blood work and potential hospitalization; (2) received 

lab results indicating that Newsome was in a critical condition and needed 

emergency care; and (3) delayed the provision of care for over six hours.

10

_____________________

10 The affidavit of former jailer Jacob Mobley suggests that Nurse Green 

deliberately delayed sending Newsome to the hospital due to restrictions placed upon him 

by Sheriff Taylor. If it is the case that Nurse Green delayed sending Newsome to the 

hospital because of the PR bond policy, the fact that Green acted pursuant to municipal 

policy may aid in Green’s defense. See Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 626 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(“Although an officer’s compliance with prison policy by no means immunizes his actions 

from liability under § 1983, it militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.”); Cope, 

3 F.4th at 208 (holding that a jailer did not act with deliberate indifference by failing to 

immediately enter a cell where a detainee had strangled himself, since the jailer was 

following the jail’s policy that jailers not enter a cell until backup arrives). We note, 

however, that asserting an “I was following orders” defense may not be viable if those 

orders are “facially outrageous,” which, considering the purported cost-saving rationale 

for the PR bond policy and the significant delay in addressing Newsome’s medical 

emergency, may be the case here. See Cope, 3 F.4th at 208 (quoting Jacobs v. W. Feliciana 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 2000)) (noting that “jailers who follow policies 

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These factual conclusions could support a finding that Nurse Green violated 

Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee by

responding to a substantial risk of serious harm to Newsome with deliberate 

indifference. 

Turning to the second prong of our qualified immunity inquiry, we 

find that Newsome’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were clearly established 

at the time of Nurse Green’s alleged constitutional violation. There is ample 

case law in this circuit indicating that denying or unreasonably delaying 

medical treatment to someone in need of immediate medical assistance 

constitutes deliberate indifference. We again reference Easter, where we 

found that a nurse’s refusal to provide any treatment to a prisoner in need of 

medication could constitute a clearly established violation of the prisoner’s 

constitutional rights. Easter, 467 F.3d at 464–65.

Additionally, in Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d at 210, this court held that 

the plaintiffs had stated a deliberate indifference claim sufficient to survive a 

motion for summary judgment when there was a one-hour and forty-twominute delay in calling an ambulance for a heat stroke victim who was 

unconscious and vomiting. Even though a defendant at the court-ordered 

boot camp had administered first aid, id. at 206, the extensive delay in calling

an ambulance rose to the level of deliberate indifference, id. at 210.

Here, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

Nurse Green learned of Newsome’s critical blood work results and failed to 

act on this information for over six hours until Newsome’s death. A jury

_____________________

aimed at protecting the jailer should not be considered deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s 

medical need” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, details regarding the nature of the PR

bond policy—i.e., a top-down policy promulgated by Sheriff Taylor that employees were 

bound to follow versus a widespread practice that was more akin to a custom—may impact 

how a jury views Nurse Green’s reasonableness in following the policy in this instance. 

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could conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act in light of this critical 

information was a total refusal of care to a patient known to be suffering from 

chronic, serious medical issues, as in Easter. Alternatively, a jury could 

conclude that Nurse Green’s failure to act for over six hours when presented 

with indications of a medical emergency constituted deliberate indifference 

like the delay alleged in Austin. 

We conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact over when 

Nurse Green knew of the critical values, and thus whether he acted with

deliberate indifference. We further conclude that under Easter and Austin, 

Nurse Green was on notice that deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious 

medical needs is a Fourteenth Amendment violation. We accordingly 

REVERSEthe district court’s grant of summary judgment for Nurse Green. 

D.

We next address the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham, 

Jessica Carpenter, Dakota Hughes, Todd Choate, Alicia Wilson, and Travis 

Wesson.

1. Jailer-Defendants Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones

Jailer-Defendant Jonathan Strong was working during the night of 

June 14 through June 15, and he used a wheelchair to place Newsome into a 

holding cell near midnight for medical observation. Jailer-Defendant Robin 

Jones was also working during the night of June 14 through June 15, and she

took Newsome’s blood pressure around 2:00 a.m. Furthermore, video 

evidence indicates that Strong and Jones were in close proximity to—and 

entered—Newsome’s cell throughout the evening. Plaintiffs have presented

evidence that during that evening, Newsome: (1) repeatedly cried out that 

she needed to go to the hospital; (2) vomited a black or brown substance in 

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her cell; (3) had a blood pressure reading of 80/40, which was measured by 

Jailer-Defendant Jones; and (4) was unable to ambulate without assistance. 

In granting summary judgment in favor of the Jailer Defendants, the 

district court primarily relied on two unpublished cases that it considered 

substantially similar to the present case: Trevino v. Hinz, 751 F. App’x 551 

(5th Cir. 2018), and Rombach v. Culpepper, No. 20-30554, 2021 WL 2944809 

(5th Cir. July 13, 2021). In Trevino, an arrestee died after she surreptitiously 

ingested methamphetamine during a traffic stop. Trevino, 751 F. App’x at 

552. While the arrestee was sitting on the curb waiting for an officer to 

complete paperwork, the arrestee started vomiting, shaking, and dry heaving. 

Id. The arrestee claimed to be having a seizure, but the officers on the scene 

thought that she was faking her symptoms to avoid jail. Id. at 552–53. Once it 

became clear to the officers that the distress was genuine, they called an 

ambulance. Id. at 553. This court found that the officers did not act with 

deliberate indifference when initially failing to take the arrestee’s symptoms 

seriously, since they were not unreasonable in initially believing that the 

arrestee’s “ambiguous” symptoms did not require immediate medical 

attention. Id. at 556.

In Rombach, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the decedent 

detainee told a group of jailers that he needed to go to the hospital because he 

was vomiting and going through drug withdrawal. Rombach, 2021 WL 

2944809, at *5. One guard allegedly told the detainee that he would have to 

suffer through his symptoms, while another guard provided the detainee with 

castor oil for his constipation. Id. A few days later, the detainee passed away 

due to a perforated duodenal ulcer (stomach ulcer). Id. at *1. This court 

found that the jailers were not deliberately indifferent because, among other 

things: the detainee had written in his medical information sheet that he did 

not regularly take drugs; the detainee later told the officers that “he was fine” 

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when they followed up with him about his withdrawal symptoms; and no jail 

personnel were aware of the detainee’s undiscovered ulcer issue. Id. at *6.

This case is materially distinguishable from Trevino and Rombach. 

Perhaps most significantly, Newsome was on medical observation at the jail. 

Unlike the officers in Trevino, the Jailer Defendants had no reason to believe 

that Newsome’s pleas for help or symptoms were not genuine; because she 

was placed on medical observation, the jailers were on notice that Newsome 

might be at risk of experiencing a medical emergency. Furthermore, Trevino

involved a delay in care where the officers had reason to believe that there 

was not an emergency health situation; once they realized that there was a 

genuine emergency, they sought help. Here, there were many reasons to 

think that there was an emergency health situation—Newsome’s pleas for 

help, that she was on medical observation, and her alarming symptoms. 

Despite these indicators, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones did not seek 

emergency medical assistance.

Furthermore, viewing the evidence in their favor, Plaintiffs’ case is 

distinguishable from that of the plaintiffs in Rombach. In Rombach, the 

decedent told his jailers that he was experiencing withdrawal from heroin, 

and the warden had testified that a nearby hospital “routinely explained to 

the jail facility . . . that there is no real treatment of withdrawal symptoms and 

it is sufficient for the jail to observe the inmate in withdrawal and provide 

plenty of hydration, aspirin, and malox-type [sic] products to assist the 

inmate.” Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809, at *1. Here, Newsome’s pleas for 

help, vomiting of a black or brown substance, inability to ambulate without 

assistance, and medical observation status present distinguishable facts

indicating that hospitalization was necessary. 

Plaintiffs argue that Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, presents a more 

comparable fact pattern. In Sims, a pretrial detainee who may have ingested 

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a bag full of drugs cried out for medical attention over the course of several 

hours, and he vomited a “dark black liquid” that he smeared all over the floor 

and his face. Id. at 948. The jailers consciously decided to not call EMS, and 

one guard made disparaging comments about the detainee’s condition. Id. 

After hours of vomiting black liquid and crying out with no response from 

jailers, the detainee died. Id. This court determined that the guards’ refusal 

of care was comparable to the nurse’s refusal of care in Easter v. Powell, 467 

F.3d at 465, which was cited as the case law that clearly established the 

detainee’s constitutional rights. Sims, 35 F.4th at 951–52. 

Plaintiffs are correct that there are some significant similarities

between Sims and the present case. Like the detainee in Sims, Newsome died 

a slow, seemingly preventable death. She vomited a dark substance, and 

evidence indicates that she cried out for help and begged to go to the hospital.

Granted, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of the Jailer Defendants

directly admitting that they were subjectively aware of Newsome’s cries or 

her dark-colored vomit. However, summary judgment evidence indicates 

that Newsome cried out for several hours in an area that Strong and Jones 

patrolled throughout the evening. Summary judgment evidence further 

indicates that the Jailer Defendants entered Newsome’s cell in several 

instances. Accordingly, at this summary judgment stage, we find that 

Plaintiffs have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones heard Newsome’s cries and saw the darkcolored vomit. If a jury concludes that Strong and Jones heard these repeated 

cries for help and did nothing to assist Newsome, they could reasonably find 

that this conduct constituted deliberate indifference because they “refused 

to treat [her], ignored [her] complaints,” and evinced “a wanton disregard 

for [her] serious medical needs.” Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (quoting Domino, 

239 F.3d at 756). 

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We also find that Newsome’s constitutional rights were clearly 

established by Easter.

11 Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, like the nurse 

in Easter, Jailer-Defendants Strong and Jones ignored an inmate’s complaints 

and refused to provide any medical assistance. See id. at 461. Furthermore, 

because Newsome was on medical observation, a reasonable jury could infer 

that Strong and Jones knew that Newsome faced a substantial risk of serious 

harm if they were unresponsive to her medical needs. 

While Plaintiffs have failed to provide a direct admission from JailerDefendants Strong and Jones that they heard Newsome’s cries for help, we 

agree with Plaintiffs that they have raised legitimate “fact issues as to each 

jailer’s knowledge of [Newsome’s] emergency condition in the . . . hours 

prior to her death.” Because of these disputed fact issues, we REVERSE

the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants 

Jonathan Strong and Robin Jones.

2. Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and 

Dakota Hughes

Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and 

Dakota Hughes all assisted Newsome to the toilet in her cell on June 15. 

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that during this trip to the toilet, 

_____________________

11 Our conclusion is bolstered by a line of prior cases in which we found that officials 

may have exhibited deliberate indifference by ignoring or providing only a cursory response 

to medical complaints. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Grayson, 557 F. App’x 341, 342, 346–47 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (finding deliberate indifference where a nurse responded to complaints of 

nausea, vomiting, and severe abdominal pain with nausea medicine and an enema); Galvan 

v. Calhoun County, 719 F. App’x 372, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that an inmate stated 

a deliberate indifference claim where prison officials responded to his complaints of 

excruciating stomach pain by providing Pepto-Bismol and a home remedy); Harris v. 

Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159–60 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate 

indifference claim where prison officials ignored his repeated complaints of excruciating 

pain after his jaw broke); Ledesma, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1.

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Newsome was unable to walk, collapsed, and vomited upon collapsing. For 

instance, Hughes relayed in an incident report that after Newsome fell, 

Hughes “rolled her on her side and [Newsome] was puking.”12 Despite these 

signs of a medical emergency, Wickersham, Carpenter, and Hughes did not 

seek medical assistance or closely monitor Newsome. Instead, they left her 

alone on the toilet for about thirty minutes, where Newsome experienced her 

final moments of consciousness.

While Wickersham, Carpenter, and Hughes lacked the benefit of 

hindsight when they assisted Newsome to the toilet, the fact that Newsome 

would be found unresponsive thirty minutes later raises factual issues 

regarding what kind of condition Newsome was in at the time. Based on the 

evidence that Plaintiffs have presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Newsome’s collapse and vomiting episode indicated that she faced a 

substantial risk of serious harm, and that Jailer-Defendants Wickersham, 

Carpenter, and Hughes’s failure to monitor Newsome or provide immediate 

medical assistance constituted deliberate indifference. 

We find that Newsome’s rights were clearly established, especially 

considering the parallels between the present case and Austin v. Johnson, in 

which boot-camp personnel potentially exhibited deliberate indifference in 

their delay to call an ambulance after the plaintiff collapsed and vomited. 

Austin, 328 F.3d at 210.13 Because fact issues exist regarding Newsome’s 

_____________________

12 Hughes’s recollection that Newsome fell, was rolled to her side, and vomited is 

conspicuously not corroborated by the other two Jailer Defendants. Carpenter, for 

instance, testified that Newsome “lost her footing,” but never fell. The lack of consistency 

across the Jailer Defendants’ testimony raises credibility issues that are best addressed by 

a jury.

13 In addition to Austin, several of our prior cases support our conclusion that a jail 

official exhibits deliberate indifference by failing to provide care when an inmate faces a 

serious medical emergency. See, e.g., Loosier, 435 F. App’x at 306; Perez v. Anderson, 350 F. 

App’x 959, 962–63 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that a prisoner stated a deliberate indifference 

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medical condition during her collapse, and because the Jailer Defendants 

responded to Newsome’s potentially serious condition by failing to seek 

immediate medical assistance, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for Jailer-Defendants Matthew Wickersham, Jessica 

Carpenter, and Dakota Hughes.

3. Jail Captain Todd Choate

Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause a jury could conclude [Captain]

Choate improperly denied and delayed emergency medical care for 

Newsome for non-medical reasons, fact issues exist as to whether Choate was 

deliberately indifferent to Newsome’s serious medical needs.” Their 

argument has merit. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Nurse Green 

contacted Captain Choate shortly after receiving Newsome’s blood work 

results. It is also undisputed that Captain Choate attempted to secure 

Newsome’s release via a PR bond on June 15. When asked in his deposition

what the purpose of his call to the district attorney on June 15 was, Choate 

replied that “[a]nytime that we believe someone is going to go to the hospital, 

we will call the DA’s office, [to] see if they will entertain a PR bond.” Choate 

also suggested that Anderson County Jail seeks these PR bond releases due 

to staffing concerns—a non-medical reason.14

Defendants offer an alternative explanation for Captain Choate’s 

actions. Relying on Choate’s affidavit, they claim that Choate believed that 

_____________________

claim by alleging that jail officials failed to provide him with pain relief or x-rays until several 

months after an attack by other prisoners); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 

1961) (holding that a pretrial detainee with dislocated and fractured vertebrae stated a valid 

claim for relief where officials provided him with no medical attention). 

14 As we noted in our discussion of Nurse Green’s liability, if it is found that 

Captain Choate delayed care pursuant to official policy, that may factor into an analysis of 

whether he exhibited deliberate indifference. See supra note 10.

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Newsome may have been suffering from a stomach bug, and that Choate 

seeks releases on PR bonds for detainees who “ha[ve] a history of medical 

issues and [are] not feeling well.”

As Plaintiffs point out, Captain Choate’s “stomach bug” explanation 

is contradicted by his deposition testimony, which indicates that Choate 

knew that Newsome needed hospitalization. This inference is strengthened 

by the fact that Choate spoke with Nurse Green directly after Green learned 

of Newsome’s blood work results. A jury could therefore conclude that

Choate indeed knew that Newsome needed to go to the hospital and that she 

had a “history of medical issues,” and thus that he had subjective knowledge 

that she faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Furthermore, a jury could 

find that delaying the provision of emergency medical care for a detainee in 

need of hospitalization to secure her release on a PR bond was a “refus[al] to 

treat” Newsome or a “wanton disregard for [her] serious medical needs” 

that would constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 

(quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238). While a jury may ultimately credit the 

explanation contained in Captain Choate’s affidavit, we find that Plaintiffs 

have presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Choate 

subjectively knew of Newsome’s critical condition and responded with 

deliberate indifference.

Furthermore, as discussed in our analysis of Nurse Green’s potential 

liability, it is clearly established that delaying care for a detainee in need of 

emergency medical intervention may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment 

violation. A jury could conclude that Captain Choate’s failure to order 

emergency medical care for a detainee in need of hospitalization constituted 

a refusal of care, see Easter, 467 F.3d at 465, or that he exhibited deliberate 

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indifference by delaying emergency medical care for over six hours, see 

Austin, 328 F.3d at 210.

15

Because Plaintiffs have submitted evidence establishing genuine 

disputes of material fact regarding Choate’s liability, we REVERSE the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment for Jail Captain Todd Choate. 

4. Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson

Plaintiffs allege that Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson denied 

Newsome’s request to see a doctor for “severe stomach pain” on June 12, 

three days before Newsome’s death. Even accepting this allegation as true, 

we find that Plaintiffs have presented insufficient evidence for a jury to 

conclude that Wilson’s singular denial of a request to see a doctor amounted 

to deliberate indifference. “[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred 

merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial 

risk of serious harm.” Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th 

Cir. 2001). To prevail under a deliberate indifference theory, a plaintiff must 

show that the defendant official “was aware of facts from which an inference 

of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn,” and that “the official 

actually drew that inference.” Id. at 458–59.

_____________________

15Additionally, as we noted in Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 138 n.7, “We have previously 

suggested that a non-medical reason for delay in treatment constitutes deliberate 

indifference, and several of our sister circuits have held so explicitly.” See Thibodeaux v. 

Thomas, 548 F. App’x 174, 175 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a claimant stated a colorable 

Eighth Amendment claim where prison officials allegedly delayed a surgery by sending him 

to the wrong facility and failing to file appropriate paperwork); Reed v. Cameron, 380 F. 

App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations raise an inference that prison 

officials were deliberately indifferent to his suffering and delayed medical care for nonmedical reasons.”); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“When prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s obvious and serious need for medical 

treatment and delay medical treatment of that condition for non-medical reasons, their 

conduct in causing the delay creates the constitutional infirmity.”).

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Plaintiffs have alleged that Jailer-Defendant Wilson denied 

Newsome’s request to see a doctor, but they have not supported this 

allegation with sufficient evidentiary detail to allow a jury to conclude that 

Wilson was subjectively aware that Newsome faced a substantial risk of 

serious harm at that moment. A singular denial of a request to see a doctor—

absent more details that would unambiguously indicate a medical crisis—

does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Rombach, 2021 WL 2944809, 

at *5. Because Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to establish that JailerDefendant Wilson exhibited deliberate indifference, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment for Alicia Wilson. 

5. Jailer-Defendant Travis Wesson

On appeal, Plaintiffs’ only allegation against Jailer-Defendant Travis 

Wesson is that he failed to adequately aid the other jailers after Newsome was 

found unresponsive. Wesson was asked to assist in an emergency situation 

that he seemingly had no knowledge of, and his alleged failure to 

meaningfully contribute while other jailers offered assistance does not 

constitute deliberate indifference. Moreover, because Newsome was already 

unresponsive when Wesson arrived, there is insufficient evidence to 

conclude that Wesson’s actions “result[ed] in substantial harm.” See 

Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). We accordingly 

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Travis 

Wesson. 

III.

In arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment 

for Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, Plaintiffs primarily 

reference the alleged policy of attempting to secure PR bonds when detainees 

require hospitalization. However, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding this PR

bond policy are not contained in the operative second amended complaint. 

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Instead, these allegations were raised for the first time in response to 

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and thus they were not 

properly raised before the district court. See Jackson, 3 F.4th at 188 (“[A] 

claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in 

response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the 

court.” (quoting Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113

(5th Cir. 2005))). Plaintiffs attempted to add allegations related to the PR

bond policy by filing a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, but 

the district court denied this motion as moot, and alternatively denied it as 

futile. Because the alleged PR bond policy is central to Plaintiffs’ claims 

against Defendants Greg Taylor and Anderson County, we address the 

district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended 

complaint before turning to the grants of summary judgment for these 

Defendants.

A district court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to amend 

pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 

332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003). When a denial of a motion for leave to 

amend a complaint is based on the futility of the amendment, the court 

applies “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 

12(b)(6).” Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 

229 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 

(5th Cir. 2000)). The question therefore is whether in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs the amended complaint states any valid claim for relief. 

See Stripling, 234 F.3d at 873.

Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint makes two substantive 

additions to their pleadings: (1) it adds Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a Jailer 

Defendant; and (2) it adds allegations of the purported PR bond policy. 

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We first address Plaintiffs’ attempt to add Lieutenant Pierson as a 

defendant, which faces a statute of limitations issue. In Texas, the statute of 

limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is two years. Shelby v. City of El Paso, 

577 F. App’x 327, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2014). Newsome died on June 15, 2018, 

so a § 1983 claim related to this incident became untimely in June 2020. 

Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on 

January 13, 2021. 

When a plaintiff adds a defendant after the limitations period has run, 

Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the plaintiff to 

relate the claims filed against the new defendant back to the date of the 

original filing. Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2019). 

But Rule 15(c) is intended to correct a mistake concerning the identity of a

defendant; it does not permit adding a new defendant when the plaintiff did 

not originally know of that defendant’s identity. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs 

sought to add Lieutenant Pierson as a new defendant based on facts that they 

learned during discovery. This is not a case of “a mistake concerning the 

proper party’s identity,” and thus the claim against Pierson is time-barred. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).

Even if Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson was not time-barred, we

would still find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that adding Pierson as a defendant would be futile. The only

non-conclusory information related to Pierson in Plaintiffs’ proposed third 

amended complaint is a brief allegation that on June 15, Pierson exchanged 

text messages with Nurse Green. Even accepting these facts as true, these 

allegations do not “properly set[] forth a claim of a deprivation of rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States caused by persons acting under color of state law.” Ariyan, 29 F.4th 

at 229 (quoting S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Ct. of State of La., 

252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ claim against Pierson would not 

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survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and thus the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs leave to amend to add Pierson as a 

defendant.

Turning to Plaintiffs’ proposed claims of municipal liability against 

Anderson County and supervisory liability against Sheriff Taylor, we find 

that the district court abused its discretion in determining that pleading these 

claims would be futile. 

We begin with Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against Anderson 

County. To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff 

must show: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker 

can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a 

constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” 

Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). Generally, a 

plaintiff must show that the policy was implemented with “deliberate 

indifference” to the “known or obvious consequences” that a constitutional 

violation would result.16 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

_____________________

16 On appeal, Plaintiffs claim that they have pleaded facts that raise a “conditionsof-confinement” theory of liability. Under this theory of liability, a plaintiff challenges the 

“general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.” Sanchez v. 

Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 

633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff challenging a condition of confinement is “relieved 

from the burden of demonstrating a municipal entity’s or individual jail official’s actual 

intent to punish.” Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Because 

Plaintiffs never raised a conditions-of-confinement theory of liability below, we cannot say 

that the district court erred in failing to consider it. We leave the door open for Plaintiffs to 

raise this theory of liability on remand, and for the district court to address the viability of 

this theory in the first instance. See Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1991)

(“As a court for review of errors, we are not to decide facts or make legal conclusions in 

the first instance. Our task is to review the actions of a trial court for claimed errors.”).

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397, 407 (1997)). Proving deliberate indifference in a municipal liability 

action generally requires showing that a policy caused a pattern of 

constitutional violations, and proving deliberate indifference based on a 

single incident requires showing that the injury suffered was a “highly 

predictable” consequence of the policy. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 

536, 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint properly pleads a 

municipal liability claim against Anderson County for its alleged policy of 

requesting PR bonds for detainees requiring hospitalization. The district 

court abused its discretion in deciding that Plaintiffs’ evidence of the PR

bond policy was so inadequate that it would be futile for Plaintiffs to amend 

their complaint. Jail Captain Choate admitted that Anderson County Jail 

seeks PR bonds “[a]nytime that [jail staff] believe someone is going to go to 

the hospital.” Furthermore, Choate admitted that this practice was carried 

out due to jail staffing concerns, and Nurse Green allegedly admitted that his 

ability to send detainees to the hospital was curtailed by Sheriff Taylor. 

Sheriff Taylor also admitted to participating in the process of coordinating a 

PR bond for Newsome. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence that this 

policy existed, that Sheriff Taylor seemingly knew of the policy, and that the 

delay caused by the policy contributed to Newsome’s death, Plaintiffs’ 

attempt to state a municipal liability claim against Anderson County should 

not have been considered futile. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint states 

that the PR bond policy applied “anytime an inmate/detainee was

experiencing a serious medical need,” including “emergency situations such 

as Rhonda Newsome’s.” Plaintiffs have not pleaded a pattern of prior 

constitutional violations, as is typically required to establish that a municipal 

policy was implemented with deliberate indifference. However, given our 

prior cases indicating that a delay in medical care to a critically ill detainee 

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can constitute deliberate indifference, see, e.g., Austin, 328 F.3d at 210, we 

find that a constitutional violation would be a “highly predictable” 

consequence of a policy that purposefully delays emergency care to detainees 

requiring hospitalization.

We note that at this stage in the litigation, we decline to determine 

whether Plaintiffs’ evidence of the alleged PR bond policy is sufficient to 

overcome a motion for summary judgment. For Plaintiffs to establish that 

this policy was implemented with deliberate indifference and prevail on their 

municipal liability claim based on a single incident, they will have to show 

that the PR bond policy indeed was a blanket practice that applied even to 

emergency situations. Alternatively, they could establish deliberate

indifference by showing a pattern of prior constitutional violations. At this 

juncture, however, Plaintiffs simply need to plead allegations that are 

sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ariyan, 29 F.4th at 

229. They have done so. Because Plaintiffs have presented evidence 

indicating that their allegations related to the PR bond policy are not the 

products of pure speculation, we find that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to properly plead these 

allegations against Anderson County. 

A similar analysis applies to Plaintiffs’ proposed supervisory liability 

claim against Sheriff Taylor. See Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d 

539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting “the close relationship between the elements 

of municipal liability and an individual supervisor’s liability”). Liability 

under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not cognizable in actions brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President 

Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a plaintiff must show 

either [that] the supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional 

violation or that there is a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the 

supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.” Brown v. Taylor, 911 

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F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689

(5th Cir. 2003)). Liability may be found where “supervisory officials 

implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.’” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting 

Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

Furthermore, “[i]n order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional 

violations committed by subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that 

the supervisor act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to 

violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.”

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t 

of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)).

Based on the evidence of the alleged PR bond policy outlined above, 

Plaintiffs can plead a colorable supervisory liability claim against Sheriff 

Taylor, who is the undisputed policymaker in this case. Plaintiffs’ proposed 

third amended complaint contains allegations that Sheriff Taylor 

implemented the policy of delaying care for detainees with serious medical 

needs, and that he was personally involved in Newsome’s delay of care on 

the date of her death. While we decline at this stage to address whether 

Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence for their supervisory liability 

claim to survive a summary judgment challenge, we find that Plaintiffs, at the 

very least, have shown that amending their pleadings would not be futile. 

Furthermore, we find that Plaintiffs’ allegations against Sheriff Taylor 

are sufficient to overcome his defense of qualified immunity at the motion to 

dismiss stage. Newsome had a clearly established right to not be denied, by 

deliberate indifference, attention to her serious medical needs under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Austin, 328 F.3d at 210; Easter, 467 F.3d at 

464–65. Additionally, “[t]his court has interpreted ‘clearly established law’

on the subject of policy promulgation to require ‘an intentional choice’”

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where it is “obvious that the likely consequences . . . will be a deprivation of 

civil rights.” Brown, 623 F.3d at 257 (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 

F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because our prior case law makes clear to a 

reasonable officer that a delay in medical care may constitute a Fourteenth 

Amendment violation, and because an unconstitutional delay in care is a 

highly predictable consequence of Sheriff Taylor’s alleged policy of delaying 

medical care for critically ill detainees, we find that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are 

sufficient to overcome Taylor’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to 

dismiss stage. 

* * *

In summary, we find that the district court abused its discretion in 

determining that granting Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint 

would be futile. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that 

Anderson County Jail seeks PR bonds for detainees who may need 

hospitalization. Whether Plaintiffs’ municipal and supervisory liability 

claims related to this alleged PR bond policy would survive a summary 

judgment challenge is a question we decline to answer at this time; we simply 

hold that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss. On the other hand, we find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that adding Lieutenant Tia Pierson as a defendant 

would be futile. We accordingly VACATE the district court’s denial of 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and 

REMAND with instructions to permit the addition of municipal and 

supervisory claims related to the alleged PR bond policy. 

IV.

Having addressed Plaintiffs’ unpled claims relating to the alleged PR

bond policy, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Sheriff Taylor in his supervisory capacity. In their second amended 

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complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Taylor failed to adequately train jail 

staff and implemented a policy prohibiting lower-ranking jail staff from 

contacting EMS. On appeal, the only claim that Plaintiffs specifically raise 

against Sheriff Taylor in his individual capacity is their allegation that Taylor 

implemented the PR bond policy. We find that Plaintiffs’ fleeting reference 

to other “associated policies” is insufficient to preserve their failure-to-train 

claim and permission-to-contact-EMS policy claim against Sheriff Taylor. 

Because Plaintiffs did not “address the district court’s analysis and explain 

how it erred” by granting summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor on these 

issues, we consider these claims abandoned on appeal due to inadequate 

briefing. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)).

Thus, while Plaintiffs should be permitted to properly plead their PR

bond policy claim against Sheriff Taylor, the supervisory claims against 

Sheriff Taylor that were pleaded in their second amended complaint have 

been abandoned on appeal. We accordingly AFFIRM IN PART the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment for Sheriff Taylor for the supervisory 

claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint. 

V.

We reach a similar conclusion in addressing the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment for Anderson County in its municipal capacity. To 

hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a 

deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law is inflicted 

pursuant to “official policy,” which may include “duly promulgated policy 

statements, ordinances or regulations,” or “a persistent, widespread practice 

of [municipal] officials or employees, which . . . is so common and wellsettled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” 

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Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)).

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that, in addition to the PR bond policy, 

Anderson County had other “policies restricting hospitalization and thereby 

delaying critical care,” including the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, as 

well as a policy of delaying immediate medical care by calling medical staff to 

ask for instructions. While we agree with Plaintiffs that they should be 

permitted to properly plead their PR bond policy claim against Anderson 

County, we find unavailing Plaintiffs’ other policy-based claims. 

Regarding the permission-to-contact-EMS policy, the only evidence 

that Plaintiffs have provided of such a policy existing is a single statement 

from Jailer-Defendant Alicia Wilson, who testified that she lacked the 

independent authority to call 911 because she “wasn’t a sergeant, just a 

regular jailer.” The district court did not err in determining that this 

statement was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy, especially 

considering consistent testimony from other Defendants that no such policy 

existed. Moreover, even if we were convinced that such a policy existed, 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that this policy was a “moving force” 

behind the violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Piotrowski, 237 

F.3d at 578. While Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the Jailer 

Defendants may have ignored Newsome’s cries for help or failed to provide 

emergency medical assistance, they have not presented enough evidence that 

a Jailer Defendant sought to assist Newsome but was delayed in doing so by 

a policy preventing him or her from contacting EMS to create a genuine 

dispute of material fact.

Plaintiffs’ claim that Anderson County had a policy of seeking 

instructions from medical staff before administering emergency aid fares no 

better. For starters, Jailer-Defendant Matthew Wickersham did not exhibit 

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deliberate indifference by deciding to call Nurse Green for instructions after 

finding Newsome unresponsive in her cell, and we do not hold municipalities 

liable under § 1983 absent an underlying violation of the Constitution or 

federal law. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799; Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 

458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because [Plaintiff] has alleged no constitutional 

injury attributable to the [o]fficers, [Plaintiff] has failed to state a claim that a 

[c]ity policy was the moving force behind a violation of his constitutional 

rights.”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to determine that Wickersham’s decision to call Nurse Green 

for instructions reflected “official policy” or “a persistent, widespread 

practice” of Anderson County.

The only alleged municipal policy that Plaintiffs sufficiently pressed

on appeal is the PR bond policy. The municipal policies alleged in Plaintiffs’

second amended complaint, on the other hand, are either unsupported by 

Plaintiffs’ evidence or abandoned on appeal for inadequate briefing. See 

Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327. Therefore, while we will permit Plaintiffs to plead 

their PR bond policy claim against Anderson County, we AFFIRM IN 

PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Anderson County 

for the municipal claims pleaded in the operative second amended complaint.

VI.

In addition to contesting the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment for Defendants on appeal, Plaintiffs also raise on appeal the issue 

of Defendants’ alleged spoliation of electronic data. Specifically, Plaintiffs 

highlight that a series of text messages between Nurse Green, Captain 

Choate, and Lieutenant Pierson sent on June 15 are unavailable. Plaintiffs

moved for discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), 

which the district court addressed and denied in its order granting summary 

judgment for the individual Defendants.

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A trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions for spoliation of 

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 

707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015). This court permits an adverse inference or sanctions 

against the spoliator only upon a showing of “bad faith” or “bad conduct.” 

Id. (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 

2005)). A party seeking an adverse inference—i.e., a presumption that “the 

lost information was unfavorable to the [spoliating] party”—must establish 

that “the [spoliating] party acted with the intent to deprive another party of 

the information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).

Because the Texas Rangers conducted an investigation following 

Newsome’s death, it may be reasonable to conclude that Defendants had a 

duty to preserve electronically stored information. It also seems likely that 

the text messages at issue contained information related to Newsome. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are unable to effectively rebut Defendants’ 

explanation that they purchased new phones and, as a result, lost access to 

these text messages. While it may be true that Defendants intended to 

“frustrate future discovery by destroying incriminating evidence,” we find 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Plaintiffs 

have failed to present evidence of bad faith sufficient to warrant spoliation 

sanctions. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for 

sanctions.

VII.

We conclude by addressing Defendants’ evidentiary objections that 

are preserved on appeal. “Properly preserved evidentiary objections are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 

716 (5th Cir. 2011).

Defendant Timothy Green objects to Plaintiffs’ citations to recorded 

interviews conducted by a Texas Ranger, as well as a transcript of those

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interviews. We need not rely on these interviews, however, because the 

record contains deposition excerpts from the Ranger’s interviewees that 

corroborate the pertinent information contained in the Ranger’s interviews. 

Because our conclusions would be the same regardless of the admissibility of 

these interviews, we need not address the merits of Defendant Green’s

evidentiary objections. See United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 

1976) (declining to decide whether the district court erred in admitting 

testimony, noting that “inasmuch as the testimony was merely cumulative 

and in light of the record taken as a whole, any error was harmless”); Weaver 

v. U.S. Coast Guard, 53 F.3d 1282, 1995 WL 295978, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995)

(declining to determine whether certain statements were hearsay where 

admission of these statements would have no bearing on the case’s ultimate 

disposition); East v. Walgreen Co., 860 F. App’x 367, 369 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021)

(declining to address a hearsay issue where the admission of a contested 

statement would not affect the outcome of summary judgment).

Defendant Green also objects to a chart created by Plaintiffs’ counsel 

that purports to reflect Green’s telephone calls. We need not rely on this 

chart, however, because Plaintiffs have provided the underlying phone 

records. We leave it to the district court to determine in the first instance 

whether Plaintiffs’ evidentiary aids are appropriate. We also need not rely on

an order issued by the Texas Board of Nursing suspending Defendant 

Green’s nursing license, which Green objects to on hearsay and 

authentication grounds, since the facts contained in this order are cumulative 

of information contained elsewhere in the record.17

_____________________

17 We also note that we do not deem the Texas Board of Nursing’s conclusions of 

law that Defendant Green violated state regulations relevant to our analysis of Green’s

alleged violation of Newsome’s constitutional rights. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 194 (“Officials 

sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their 

conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”); Gagne v. City of Galveston, 

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Defendant Green and Defendant Adam Corley both preserve their 

objections to Plaintiffs’ use of sworn expert reports, but we find these 

objections unpersuasive. Defendant Green argues that the expert reports 

were outside the scope of the district court’s discovery order, which limited 

discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. But the district court’s 

discovery order made no mention of prohibiting expert disclosure, and 

Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity 

because they help explain the substantial risk that Addison’s disease patients 

face when their condition is left untreated. The district court’s several cites 

to the expert reports in its order granting summary judgment for the 

individual Defendants bolsters Plaintiffs’ argument that their inclusion of 

expert reports did not violate the district court’s discovery order.

Defendants Green and Corley also object to the expert reports as 

containing hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Defendants’ broad hearsay 

objections are arguably too “loosely formulated and imprecise” to be 

considered preserved on appeal, since Defendants did not point the district 

court to the portions of the extensive expert reports that they find 

objectionable. See United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 2015)

(quoting United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878, 885 (5th Cir. 1998)). 

Furthermore, evidence may be considered on summary judgment provided 

“[its] contents can be presented in admissible form at trial,” Patel v. Tex. Tech 

Univ., 941 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2019), and Plaintiffs have properly 

submitted sworn declarations from their experts pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) indicating that Plaintiffs intend to rely on their 

experts’ testimony at trial. Defendants have made no effort to specify which 

_____________________

805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]llegations about the breach of a statute or regulation 

are simply irrelevant to the question of an official’s eligibility for qualified immunity in a 

suit over the deprivation of a constitutional right.”).

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portions of the experts’ reports fall outside the scope of permissible expert 

testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Finally, in a one-sentence footnote, Anderson County and the Jailer 

Defendants attempt to reassert their objections to Plaintiffs’ affidavit 

evidence. The district court overruled these objections in its order granting 

summary judgment for the individual Defendants, finding that personal 

knowledge could be inferred from each affidavit itself. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. 

Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Defendants undertook 

no effort to address the district court’s analysis and explain how it abused its 

discretion in overruling Defendants’ evidentiary objections, we consider 

these objections forfeited on appeal. See Hallam, 42 F.4th at 327.

VIII.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for Defendants Timothy Green, Todd Choate, Jonathan 

Strong, Robin Jones, Matthew Wickersham, Jessica Carpenter, and Dakota 

Hughes. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Defendants Alicia Wilson, Travis Wesson, and TAKET Holdings, L.L.C. 

We AFFIRM IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

for Defendant Adam Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ supervisory claim against 

him, but we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Dr. Corley as related to Plaintiffs’ nonsupervisory claim. We also AFFIRM 

IN PART the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants 

Anderson County and Greg Taylor for the claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ second 

amended complaint, and we VACATE the district court’s denial of 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and REMAND

with instructions to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to include 

additional supervisory and municipal liability claims based on the alleged

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policy of delaying treatment to obtain PR bonds. Finally, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.

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