FINAL REPORT OF THE OSAM-1 INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD 

29 FEBRUARY 2024 

Background 

The OSAM-1 project is a Technology Demonstration Mission within the Space Technology Mission 

Directorate (STMD), which is managed by Technology Development Missions Program Office at 

the Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC). The project was initiated in 2015 as RESTORE-L 

(Robotic Servicing Demonstration Mission). 

Building on a history of demonstrations to lead to a capability to upgrade and maintain assets 

in space, NASA's OSAM-1 project seeks to rendezvous with, refuel, and relocate a United 

States Government-owned satellite, Landsat 7, to demonstrate the feasibility of on-orbit refueling, 

satellite relocation, and life extension. The project also intends to demonstrate 

assembly of a communications antenna using a robotic arm. The project has incurred 

substantial cost increases and schedule delays since its inception. 

In late 2023, the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) requested an 

independent Continuation Review to assess project programmatic and technical performance as 

well as return on investment (ROI) to NASA of technology gains from the OSAM-1 

mission, to include benchmarking of the current government and commercial satellite 

servicing market environment. The independent review board (IRB) was directed to offer its own 

assessment of project cost and schedule ‘to go.’ The IRB’s Terms of Reference (TOR) are 

appended (Appendix A). 

Executive Summary 

During the period November 2023 – February 2024, the IRB conducted a series of interviews with 

both OSAM-1 project personnel and defense and commercial industry representatives (e.g., Space 

Force, US Space Command, Maxar, Northrop Grumman, OrbitFab, Astroscale). The board 

subsequently performed both a data review and cost/schedule analysis and has produced a set of 

observations, findings, and consensus recommendations. 

The board’s evaluation of the project’s cost-to-go is in-family (albeit higher) than both the project’s 

own forecast and the assessment of the project’s Standing Review Board (SRB). The IRB conducted 

an analysis – based on existing project cost assessment tools – and concluded that OSAM-1’s 

estimate at complete is $2,380M. Note that OSAM-1 had spent approximately $1,400M by 

November 2023 – suggesting a cost-to-go of $980M. 

Paired with the cost-to-go evaluation, the IRB found that the ‘most likely’ (70% confidence) Launch 

Readiness Date will occur later than both the project and SRB currently forecast: March 2028. The 

IRB included additional risks and risk factors to arrive at this finding. 

1 
The IRB also assessed the status of various project elements and/or systems, including the OSAM1 spacecraft, its two-arm Servicing Payload (SP), SPIDER (Space Infrastructure Dexterous Robot, a 

secondary payload intended to demonstrate on-orbit RF antenna assembly), its rendezvous and 

proximity operations (RPO) sensors and algorithms, mission operations, integration and test, 

systems engineering, mission assurance, project management, and launch. The IRB assesses that 

there is substantial remaining technical, cost, and schedule risk in the project – particularly in 

the project’s efforts to complete its Kodiak LiDAR, SP build, spacecraft flight software, and 

translation of test procedures owing to the project’s decision to use its own ground system 

environment rather than that of its prime contractor.1

 NASA’s decision to delay acquisition of a 

launch vehicle for OSAM-1 is an additional source of schedule risk which must be addressed as 

soon as possible should the project go forward. 

The IRB interviewed numerous civil, defense, and private sector stakeholders to assess the ‘return 

on investment’ or downstream applicability of OSAM-1 to future missions and architectures. The 

board’s consensus evaluation is that the U.S. space industry, particularly from a national security 

space perspective, has evolved beyond OSAM-1’s primary objective of legacy space vehicle 

refueling – stakeholders generally expect future national security spacecraft to be refueled via 

prepared interfaces. 

The value to future NASA, civil and commercial spacecraft being refueled by legacy fill and drain 

valves was unclear. The IRB does believe that dexterous robotic servicing will be an important 

national capability in the future, and that successful completion of the OSAM-1 mission would 

enable NASA to lay claim to demonstrating some of its key aspects. However, the community’s 

widely held understanding is that the OSAM-1 mission is overly focused on delivering propellant to 

an aged LandSat-7 spacecraft. This mission goal is not perceived to be of value, particularly 

when paired with the high cost-to-go and pace at which the program is executing. 

Based on the board’s findings, as well as its subsequent deliberations, the IRB recommends the 

OSAM-1 project be discontinued. This effort, originally forecast to cost no more than $750M and 

launch by 2020, is seven to eight years behind schedule and $1,500M over budget – and it is 

demonstrating satellite servicing capabilities with few strong links to future civil, defense, or 

commercial plans. 

Project Execution Overview 

The IRB interviewed project personnel and affiliated individuals over the course of its investigation, 

assembling a number of observations, findings, and recommendations regarding OSAM-1 project 

execution. Findings and recommendations were assembled through consensus during board 

deliberations. Those identified for special emphasis are discussed below. 

Principal Observations 

1

 ASIST/FEDS (Advanced Spacecraft Integration and System Test (ASIST)/Front End Data System (FEDS)), Goddard 

Space Flight Center’s common telemetry and command system intended for use throughout all phases of a project’s 

lifecycle, from inception through on-orbit operations. See https://sed.gsfc.nasa.gov/etd/583/tech/asist. 
1. Launch. The project’s previous launch vehicle procurement was allowed to expire. A new one

will have to be initiated, but had not been approved as of the IRB’s report publication and is

unlikely to happen until after a successful KDP-D. The project reported that the minimum time

(i.e., granting authority to proceed to launch readiness data or LRD) to obtain a booster is 18

months, although after further inquiry, the board believes that a 24-month schedule appears

more likely.2

 The decision to re-start a launch vehicle acquisition resides at the Associate

Administrator level. Multiple interviewees commented that the price of the launch vehicle would 

be adversely affected by specific requirements levied by NASA.

2. Risk Identification, Evaluation, Burndown. Project leadership has bucketed numerous

technical, schedule, and cost risks in the “1 x 5” (very low likelihood of realization, loss of

mission if realized) category, making prioritization for mitigation difficult. The project’s Standing

Review Board made note of this issue during the November 2023 System Integration Review.

3. Programming and Budgeting. Projected cost of OSAM-1 has risen from $1,780M in 2020

(launch-ready by September 2025) to $2,280M (+$500M) in November 2023 (launch-ready

by July 2027). Project personnel indicate they retain zero margin to these latest estimates.

4. General Program Management. OSAM-1 organic (GSFC) head count in November was at or

near 600 full time equivalent personnel (80% contract support and 20% civil servant). Program

leadership notes it is rapidly working to reduce this figure substantially – it incurs a burn rate of

$13-14M/month (annual burn of $156-168M).

Multiple interviewees remarked on the perceived mismatch between mission assurance class

designation and technology demonstration objectives, Goddard’s alleged “Class B” culture, and

the resulting team confusion and dissonance this has generated.

5. Integration and Test (I&T). The IRB was impressed by project personnel’s comprehensive

planning in support of OSAM-1 I&T. The board repeatedly heard that translating MAXAR test

procedures into Goddard’s ground environment will be the most significant driver to schedule.

I&T will be conducted at numerous physical locations on a number of testbeds (e.g, AutoCapture 

Testbed, FlatSat Testbed, LiDAR vacuum testing at a Marshall Space Flight Center facility).

6. Mission Operations. The availability of Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) to support

OSAM-1’s checkout and on-orbit operations is a potential problem. The vehicle’s forecast

launch (now April 2026) a potential problem – only TDRS #8, #10, #11, #12, and #13 remain

and their operational state in the timeframe of interest is uncertain. The program is undertaking

mitigation via ACCESS,3

 since OSAM-1 requires near-continuous Ka-band access to execute

successfully. Operations are conducted in multiple, collaborating ops centers.

2

 OSAM-1 was designed for compatibility with both SpaceX Falcon 9 and United Launch Alliance Vulcan launch vehicles. 

3 https://esc.gsfc.nasa.gov/projects/ACCESS 
7. Spacecraft. To obtain a spacecraft, project personnel allocated $131M to Maxar Space of Palo

Alto, California, on a firm fixed price effort – now substantially overrun. OSAM-1’s satellite bus

is a modified SSL 1300 GEO bus intended for specialized servicing operations in Low Earth Orbit

(LEO). The SSL 1300 bus is a design with substantial flight heritage, its first instantiations having

flown in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The SSL 1300 was selected by the project partially

because of this heritage; it was hoped that cost savings could be reaped by opting for a

commercial bus. Multiple interviewees highlighted the 1300 design as optimized for use in

geosynchronous earth orbit, not low earth orbit (where the OSAM-1 mission will be conducted);

this has led to hardware and software design modifications which has impacted cost and

schedule.

The program approved an early delivery of the bus to Goddard prior to completion of their

Reference Performance Test (RPT) – the vehicle is therefore “shipped” but not officially

“delivered” (i.e., performance validated). Due to the overrun it has sustained, Maxar is triaging

additional work effort requested by Goddard; at the time of this writing, project personnel were

negotiating an IDIQ (Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity) contract with options for task orders

to prioritize specific efforts for completion.

Goddard is lacking key test scripts for upcoming vehicle tests – scripts which must be translated 

from Maxar’s ITAC to Goddard’s ASIST/FEDS environment. The project made the decision to fly

with ASIST/FEDS in 2018). Flight software, which will arrive in multiple ‘drops,’ has yet to be

delivered – the first ‘drop’ is expected no earlier than March 2024.

8. SPIDER.

4

 SPIDER, a secondary payload and late add to the mission, is a $146M effort to place

MAXAR’s Dragonfly Tipping Point RF antenna on-orbit assembly experiment on the OSAM-1 bus. 

SPIDER’s robotic arms are slated to arrive extremely late in the integration and test flow (i.e.,

post-thermal vacuum testing, or TVAC). In multiple interviews, program personnel expressed

ambivalence about SPIDER’s value to NASA.

9. Kodiak LiDAR. Goddard’s Kodiak LiDAR was a late add to the OSAM-1 mission5

 – an in-house

build incorporated in response to stated need for multiple rendezvous and proximity operations

sensor phenomenologies, and, according to several team members, to mitigate the “lost in

space” issue encountered during DARPA’s 2007 Orbital Express mission.6

 Team strength at the

time of the board’s interview cycle was approximately 50 personnel. Approximately 11 months

behind schedule as of November 2023; intended to deliver a primary and backup LiDAR (for

range determination and pose estimation) by June/July 2024. Commercial LiDAR from Jena

4

 Space Infrastructure Dexterous Robot, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-funds-demonstration-ofassembly-and-manufacturing-in-space/ 5

 KODIAK replaced a Ball Aerospace flash LiDAR, which was cancelled. 

6

 On May 12, 2007, the Orbital Express mission experienced an anomaly which resulted in a large, unplanned separation 

(up to and perhaps slightly greater than 6 km) between the servicing satellite ASTRO and client satellite NextSat. The 

servicer’s relative navigation filter became corrupted and the mission operations team was forced to rely on Haystack 

Observatory observations to determine the relative location(s) of the two vehicles. Subsequently, DARPA 

recommended ultra-wide-field-of-view sensor capabilities (i.e., 4-pi steradian capable radar) as a means to mitigate 

this problem on future servicing missions. 
Optronik in process for award by 1 March 2024, but delivery will require 17+ months (July 2025 

or later). This late delivery poses problems for integration (most of the spacecraft and its 

subsystems will have undergone essentially all functional and environmental testing efforts by 

the time the Jena LiDAR arrives).7

10. Servicing Payload (SP). The SP is a Goddard’s in-house effort, comprised of robotic arms,

sensors, rendezvous and proximity operations algorithms, and end effectors (i.e., tools)

designed to expose Landsat 7 propellant fill and drain valves, refuel the spacecraft, and install

additional hardware to facilitate/demonstrate ease of future refueling. Six of 16 subsystems had

been delivered for integration as of November 2023. The project’s ternary critical path ran

through its SP robotic arm assembly (RAA).

Principal Findings 

Cost and Schedule ‘To Go.’ The IRB expects the project to face additional challenges as it 

proceeds into Integration and Test, which are likely to add to the current cost estimate of $2.25B8

and launch ready date (LRD) of July 2027. The IRB added four discrete risks, a “risk factor” for 

thermal vacuum testing, adjusted time-dependent cost uncertainties to align with current program 

Earned Value Management (EVM) performance, and has concluded that the program as constituted 

will likely not be ready for launch until March 2028 – at a total cost of $2.38B. This finding is in 

family with program and Standing Review Board estimates. Additional information regarding the 

IRB’s cost and schedule analysis can be found in Appendix B. 

2. Workforce. OSAM-1 is operating at very high spending rates driven by a large in-house ‘standing

army’ of contract and civil servant staff and – if it were to be required to complete inside its 2020

target cost – would have to lower that spend rate to ~$8M/month through February 2026.9

 This

would necessitate an immediate reduction to 400 heads (assuming a February 2026 LRD). This

would have to fall even further, to 225 heads, if a delay through 2028 is unavoidable.

3. Launch. The program has set aside substantial monies (slightly more than $100M) to cover the

cost of a NASA-procured launch vehicle – funds which could be used to re-establish program

margin were the program to be continued. This would require the sole-source commercial-style

acquisition of a Falcon 9 booster, which should be obtainable for substantially less than $100M.

While other options exist (e.g., contribution of a ‘free’ launch vehicle from the Space Force via such

venues as DOD’s Space Experiments Review Board (SERB) or Space Prototyping Review Board

(SPRB)), these will likely cause NASA to lose control of its project schedule – with implications for

incurring downstream ‘standing army’ costs.

7

 The project has attempted to obtain an existing LiDAR from other programs contracting with Jena, to no avail. Highlevel headquarters advocacy does not appear to have been explicitly solicited. 

8

 Cumulative program spend was approximately $1,400M (November 2023).

9

 With 36 months remaining, mean monthly spend will have to be maintained below $8.5M/month to deliver inside the 

2020 forecast of $1.78B (this assumes a $50M set-aside for launch vehicle procurement and $20M for Maxar IDIQ 

tasks). If the program is permitted to stretch to March 2028, mean monthly spend will have to maintained at a 

significantly lower level (~$4.5M/month) to achieve its 2020 target cost. 
4. Prime contractor performance. While the prime contractor, Maxar, has suffered substantial

delays and has incurred a significant overrun on its spacecraft contract, the IRB was unable to draw

a clear cause-and-effect relationship between that delay and overrun and the roughly $1.5-billion

increase in the OSAM-1 estimate-at-complete (and seven- to eight-year delay) since inception. If 

NASA decides to move forward with the project, the proposed IDIQ contract should be augmented

as necessary to permit the prime to complete its work.

5. Kodiak. In the event of continuation, the program’s Kodiak LiDAR effort should be deemed nonessential and sidelined if it is unable to meet its schedule objectives. All RPO operations envisioned

by the project should be capable of being conducted by a combination of visible and infrared

cameras (with the possible need for a range-finding capability, which does not demand full LiDAR

functionality).

6. SPIDER. While considered a secondary experiment by the Goddard team, the IRB concluded

that SPIDER’s assembly demonstration is at least as useful as (if not more useful than) an

unprepared servicing test. As such, the board did not find that a descope of SPIDER would be

warranted in the event of program continuation. However, SPIDER remains a significant cost driver

and programmatic ‘guardrails’ need to be put in place to ensure it does not cause additional delays

and cost growth.

Recommendations 

In light of the IRB’s findings – both regarding project execution and return on investment (detailed in 

the next section) – the board is unable to recommend project continuation. Both cost- and 

schedule-to-go are substantial and the risk for further schedule decay and cost increases remains 

high. The board nevertheless recognizes that NASA may opt to continue the project despite these 

concerns; as a result, the IRB decided to offer ‘continuation’ recommendations (i.e., proposed 

conditions for proceeding). The board recognizes that some of the conditions may be perceived as 

onerous – but nevertheless believes that imposition of these conditions is essential to successful 

project completion.10

1. The IRB recommends the OSAM-1 mission not continue.

2. The board recommends neither revisions nor rescoping of the OSAM-1 mission. Redefining

the mission to enhance its relevance with respect to future civil, defense, and commercial

applications will be difficult if not impossible to achieve inside current budget and schedule

constraints.

3. The board recommends NASA proceed with the project only if the following conditions can

be met:

10 The IRB notes that these continuation recommendations are based primarily on an assessment of the project’s 

execution status, go-forward plans, and cost-/schedule-to-go. ROI considerations will also impact NASA’s decision to 

continue or discontinue OSAM-1. 
(a) OSAM-1 project leadership conduct a two-week stand-down to immediately downsize

organic Goddard operations to no more than 200 personnel (FTEs);11

(b) Accept the spacecraft bus “as is” and proceed with integration and test; approve

waivers as necessary to allow this to happen;

(c) Remove the Kodiak LiDAR from the critical path. Stand up a tiger team (Goddard and

independent experts) to modify OSAM-1’s existing rendezvous and proximity operations

(RPO) algorithms to support machine vision-only “lunge” and docking;

(d) Remove the SPIDER payload from the critical path. Set no-later-than (NLT) target dates

for delivery, installation, and test campaign completion. If the dates are not met, fly the

SPIDER demonstration as a mass simulator (i.e., no functionality). Preparations to allow

safe flight and operations with a “dummy” SPIDER must be performed.

(e) Create urgency by establishing a “date certain” for OSAM-1 launch readiness – the IRB

recommends NLT 1 February 2026. The board recommends NASA obtain necessary

approvals to initiate launch contracting tasks immediately. The focus would be on obtaining

a launcher commercially, demanding no special accommodations to NASA safety

requirements.

Return on investment (ROI) Overview 

The satellite industry, particularly from a national security space perspective, has moved past the 

prime OSAM-1 objective of legacy space vehicle refueling, preparing future national security 

spacecraft to be refueled via prepared interfaces. The value to future NASA, civil and commercial 

spacecraft being refueled by legacy fill and drain valves is also not clear. It is clear that the capability 

of advanced dexterous robotic servicing is widely believed to be understood to be an important 

national capability in the future, and one that OSAM-1 could demonstrate. However, the widely held 

understanding is that the OSAM-1 mission is focused on delivering fuel to an aged LandSat-7 

spacecraft, and that this particular mission objective is not perceived to be of value, particularly in 

light of the project’s high cost and delayed pacing. 

Review of OSAM-1 Level 1 Requirements 

As presented at the OSAM-1 SIR at NASA GSFC in November 2023, the Level 1 Requirements for 

OSAM-1 are: 

1. Rendezvous – rendezvous with a spacecraft not designed for servicing in low Earth orbit to

within 40 meters

2. Inspection - inspect a spacecraft not designed for servicing in low Earth orbit by detecting

1 cm features from a distance of at least 80 meters

3. Autonomously Capture - autonomously capture a spacecraft not designed for servicing in

Low Earth Orbit (LEO)

4. Telerobotic Servicing - perform tele-operated robotic servicing tasks on a captured

spacecraft in low Earth orbit allowing refueling of that spacecraft

5. Refueling - transfer at least 40 kilograms of hydrazine monopropellant to a captured

spacecraft in low Earth orbit to enhance mission lifetime or assist in disposal

11 The IRB consensus is that this number is more than adequate, based on its members’ experiences with analogous 

projects conducted elsewhere. 
6. Relocation - relocate a captured spacecraft by altering its orbit a minimum velocity change

(delta-V) of 1 meter/second

7. Release and Departure - safely release and depart from a captured spacecraft in low Earth

orbit without adversely affecting the client’s ability to return to an operational state

8. Technology Infusion - demonstrate technologies that can be used directly by Orion

9. On-Orbit Assembly –demonstrate on-orbit assembly of a 3m antenna with a surface error

of less than 0.03 cm RMS

10. On-Orbit Manufacturing –demonstrate on-orbit manufacturing of a 10m structural beam

with stiffness greater than 1.25 N/m

Of these requirements, most have either already been demonstrated or will have been 

demonstrated by the time OSAM-1 launches. 

Arguably, both Rendezvous (#1) and Inspection (#2) requirements were successful met by 

DARPA’s Orbital Express mission in 2007 and will have been executed in GEO pending successful 

launch and execution of the DARPA/Northrop Grumman Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous 

Satellites (RSGS)/Mission Robotic Vehicle (MRV) mission, slated to launch in 2025.12 Note that 

RSGS and MRV are actually the same mission, referred to by two different commonly used names. 

Requirements for Autonomously Capture (#3), Relocation (#6), and Release/Departure (#7) will 

have also been completed by RSGS, planned to launch at least a year ahead of OSAM-1, albeit in 

GEO instead of in LEO. 

Telerobotic Servicing (#4) is a fully unique OSAM-1 requirement, and a successful OSAM-1 would 

be anticipated to be the first mission to execute this capability of refueling an unprepared client 

spacecraft. 

Refueling (#5), as written, was partially demonstrated by DARPA’s Orbital Express. Fuel transfer 

to an unprepared client makes it unique, but directly associated with Requirement #4 above. 

On-Orbit Assembly (#9) is unique to OSAM-1 and would demonstrate a new national capability. 

The IRB observed that this capability is being treated as a lower priority Level 1 requirement by NASA 

Goddard and is at some programmatic risk for deletion. 

Of the two primary areas of OSAM-1 unique requirements, the IRB has not been able to validate that 

there is any interest in legacy space vehicle refueling in the U.S. space community but has seen 

some interest in on-orbit assembly. On-orbit assembly of a 3-meter reflector is clearly of 

commercial interest to Maxar and is expected that it would be of ongoing interest to civil space 

exploration missions, such as for lunar or planetary exploration where both mass and volume 

savings could be enabled by assembling antenna’s larger than could be stowed or with better 

surface properties than could be unfurled. 

12 https://spacenews.com/darpas-robot-could-start-servicing-satellites-in-2025/
NASA Robotic Refueling Mission (RRM) Activities 

NASA demonstrated tools, technologies, and techniques to robotically refuel and repair satellites in 

space on-board the International Space Station circa 2012-2015. The activity utilized the station’s 

twin-armed Dextre robot arm. Dextre picked up RRM tools and practiced tasks on RRM’s 

components and boards. Activities include cutting and peeling back protective thermal blankets, 

unscrewing caps, accessing valves, and transferring fluid. 

Applicability of OSAM-1 developed technologies to NASA Missions 

The Office of Science and Technology Policy released a National strategy for In-space Servicing, 

Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM)13 in April 2022. The six goals stated in the report are: (1) 

advancing ISAM research and development; (2) prioritizing the expansion of scalable infrastructure; 

(3) accelerating the emerging ISAM commercial industry; (4) promoting international collaboration

and cooperation to achieve ISAM goals; (5) prioritizing environmental sustainability as we move

forward with ISAM capabilities; and (6) inspiring a diverse future workforce as a potential outcome

of ISAM innovation.

The report states further, “The USG recognizes the commercial sector’s capability, capacity, 

competency, and capitalization for rapid innovation. The sector seeks to expand and accelerate the 

development and delivery of ISAM capabilities and services in this growing market. The United 

States considers the development of a strong ISAM commercial base important to U.S. goals in 

space as described in the U.S. Space Priorities Framework.” 

Analysis of the NASA on-orbit assembly, servicing and manufacturing roadmaps as presented to the 

National Academies Committee on NASA Mission Critical Workforce, Infrastructure on December 

1, 2023, and Technology and presentations made by NASA STMD at the NASA SpaceTech Event on 

August 17, 2023 suggest that there is broad applicability in refueling, servicing and assembly 

capabilities but there does not appear to be a focused capability roadmap timeline of when activities 

should be demonstrated to be infused into NASA missions and the broader servicing industry. The 

IRB did not find dependency by those we interviewed in NOAA, Space Force, SPACECOM, NASA’s 

Science Mission Directorate, and NASA’s Exploration Mission Directorate. We did not find specific 

needs and technology gaps identified with proposed plans to reduce risk and fill the identified gaps. 

Typically for unknown capabilities that are needed a decade in the future, technology investments 

would be in the NASA Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 1-6 stage with a focus on developing 

needed technology in the laboratory and or ground. High-investment on-orbit demonstrations are 

reserved for those technologies ready to be infused into missions and operations. TDM activities 

should have an infusion plan for NASA missions and/or the industrial base. 

NASA may want to consider a roadmap construct along the following construct: 

• Focus on development and infusion of prepared interfaces into upcoming missions and

spacecraft;

13 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/04-2022-ISAM-National-Strategy-Final.pdf
• Develop and infuse into industry widely applicable and affordable Rendezvous and Proximity

Operations (RPO) capabilities (sensors and algorithms);

• Demonstrate on-orbit fuel transfer and on-orbit fuel storage capabilities and infuse into industry; 

• Develop robust and affordable dexterous robotic operations through ground test facilities and

potentially on-board the ISS;

• Demonstrate on-orbit dexterous robotic operations using low-cost platforms such as small

spacecraft (ESPA-class or smaller);

• Capitalize on capabilities demonstrated by the RSGS mission; and

• Through the OSAM-1 consortium, develop standard robotic assembly and repair interfaces and

procedures

• Leverage existing and upcoming missions to demonstrate technology and capabilities in

a focused and planned approach leading to a 4th generation epoch where assembly and

manufacturing operations become routine.

Applicability of OSAM-1 developed technologies to National Security Space Missions 

Discussions with key personnel in the national security space arena has made it clear that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) space components are very interested in ‘Dynamic Space Operations 

(DSO)’14 as a relatively new term-of-art for the ability of the DOD to be able to execute missions 

without restrictions imposed by limited commodities such as fuel. Allowing satellites to execute 

sustained maneuver and/or to be highly maneuverable has an opportunity to allow military 

advantage in space via competitive endurance but is not consistent with present day space 

architectures that do not include refueling or other types of replenishment available to them. The 

limitations imposed by fuel limitations (and other consumables) constrain space operations in a way 

that is undesirable to national security leadership. The solution space to achieve Dynamic Space 

Operations is still open, with refueling space systems a primary option, as is developing new space 

systems that are designed to be replaced at a rapid cadence, so that exhausting the capability of a 

space vehicle is not mission limiting, as it’s replacement will be available to be quickly on station. 

In response to this capability need, the IRB identified two investment activities by the Space Force 

Space Systems Command (SSC), the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the Space Enterprise 

Consortium, and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) that total approximately $75M. The first is Tetra5, an effort that seeks to demonstrate on-orbit refueling of small satellites in geostationary orbit. 

Orion Space Systems is the Tetra-5 prime contractor and passed a critical design review in January 

14 https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3370546/usspacecom-outlinesrequirements-for-sustained-maneuver-dynamic-space-operations/ 
2024.15 The second activity is a $25.5M contract to Astroscale U.S. for co-development of an onorbit refueling vehicle.16 The IRB also noted a call from a White House official, Diane Howard, 

National Space Council head of commercial space policy calling on further and significant 

investment in space mobility by the DOD and Space Force and other executive branch agencies in 

January 2024.17 

The DOD Air Force Space Mobility and Logistics (SML) presentation by Maj Gen Stephen Purdy SQ 

Military Deputy on October 12, 2023 presents a space architecture that primarily depends on 

industry capabilities.18 The IRB consistently found DoD officials expressing the opinion that industry 

offerings – rather than organically developed capability – would be sourced to meet DOD space 

servicing needs. 

While the call for Dynamic Space Operations is at first look a beneficiary of OSAM-1 developed 

technologies, the timeline of OSAM-1 having deployed, demonstrated and be able to field an 

operational legacy refueling capability is not. The DOD interests are looking to jump past legacy 

space vehicle refueling and have space systems able to be refueling/replenished via much simpler 

built-in cooperative refueling interfaces on future systems that will be fielded ahead of the OSAM-1 

team being able to deliver or perform technology transfer of their legacy refueling capability. The 

DOD is already funding and preparing initial on-orbit demonstrations of cooperative refueling 

interfaces. The value of legacy refueling to the DOD is presently assessed as minimal and 

decreasing. 

The IRB was unable to identify any DOD stakeholder interested in the OSAM-1 antenna assembly 

mission capability, and the board surmises that this is likely because antenna assembly does not 

directly benefit Dynamic Space Operations and is viewed as being a capability that will take longer 

before it’s in widespread use than the deployment of cooperative space vehicle refueling. DOD 

personnel interviewed stated that antenna assembly was much more likely applicable to civil 

exploration missions (such as on the lunar surface) than to national security space missions. 

While refueling is not the only on-orbit servicing that is of interest to the DOD, it was also clear 

amongst the national security personnel interviewed that the DOD’s interest on OSAM/ISAM 

technologies is much more in geostationary orbit (GEO) than in low-earth orbit (LEO). Other 

servicing capabilities that would be of interest to the DOD are already planned to be deployed by the 

RSGS/MRV mission and other commercial capabilities that are moving to demonstration presently. 

DOD personnel interviewed did express concerns about the implications to the broader U.S. space 

industrial base if OSAM-1 were it to not continue. The development of new national capabilities 

15 https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2024/01/03/orion-space-completes-cdr-for-tetra-5-onorbit-demonstration-mission/ 16 https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-and-astroscale-to-co-invest-in-a-refueling-satellite/ 17 https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/white-house-official-urges-more-real-pentagon-investment-in-spacemobility/ 18 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ) Space Mobility & 

Logistics (SML) in National Security Maj Gen Stephen Purdy SQ Military Deputy 12 Oct 23
related to OSM/ISAM is viewed to be fragile and is also viewed that it will not achieve the promises 

of a robust multi-orbit satellite servicing capability without both sustained government indicators to 

use commercially available services and investment in the maturation of those technologies. 

In light of the expected cost and schedule to achieve on-orbit operations based on the current 

program plan, the board found that these same interviewees were consistent in their view that the 

high cost, relatively short operational life, the mission orbit in LEO and OSAM-1’s own inability to be 

refueled did not make their industrial impact concerns override consideration of program 

termination or substantial redirection. 

Industry Servicing Summary 

The IRB interviews and study of industry participants found Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 

(RPO) capabilities exist within industry with a focus on geosynchronous orbit (GEO). Participants 

suggested that up to 20 companies exist that provide turnkey RPO capabilities on offer to service 

providers. In addition, the IRB found that unprepared servicing concepts rely on the attachment of 

a servicing module or spacecraft to provide the needed propulsion to extend the lifetime of the client. 

This appears to be a more cost-effective approach in contract to refueling the client spacecraft. The 

IRB findings are shown in Table 1. 

Table 1. Industry Servicing Summary 

Northrup Grumman Space Logistics Mission Extension Vehicle 

Two ongoing commercial missions MEV-1 in 2020 and MEV-2 in 2021 

Serviced geostationary orbit satellites 

Utilizes a docking system allowing the MEV to extend the service of the client 

satellite 

Roadmap Overview 

• 1st epoch: Unprepared refueling MEV concept & MRV and extension

pod concept

• 2nd epoch: Prepared interfaces for servicing (e.g., power, refueling)

• 3rd epoch: Persistent robotic capabilities in geosynchronous orbit

(prepared interfaces)

• 4th epoch: In-orbit assembly & manufacturing

Lockheed Martin 

Lockheed Martin In-space Upgrade Satellite System (Linuss) demonstrated close 

proximity and other technologies in geostationary orbit April 2023 

Lockheed Martin has long-term plans to develop servicing vehicles for the 

commercial and government markets. “Our future vehicles will be able to dock 

with either a cooperative or uncooperative satellite and do any required upgrades or 

servicing.” SpaceNews Sandra Erwin April 17, 2023 

DARPA Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) 
Scheduled to launch in 2025 with a 10-year lifetime, two arms on a NG spacecraft 

will support NG Space Logistics system installing mission extension pods onto 

client spacecraft 

• Utilizes attachment to the client spacecraft engine aperture (TBC)

Astroscale 

End-of-Life Services demonstration (ELSA-d) successfully completed controlled 

close-approach rendezvous operations May 2022 

Space Systems Command funding for Astroscale Prototype Servicer-Refueling 

underway with delivery in 2026 

Blue Origin 

Developing a ‘Blue Ring’ transfer vehicle that could also serve as a fuel depot and 

possibly possess robotic arms 

Prepared Refueling 

The United States Space Force (USSF) has 

funded at least two concepts for prepared 

fluid transfer interfaces. The Rapid 

Attachable Fluid Transfer Interface (RAFTI) 

concept is provided by OrbitFab and the 

Passive Refueling Module is provided by 

Northrop Grumman. Development of both 

interfaces are funded in the Tetra-5 program 

run by the Space Enterprise Consortium.19 

OSAM-1 In-space Robotic Assembly 

As show in Figure 3, OSAM-1 plans to 

demonstrate the assembly of a 3m reflector. 

The IRB did find general interest in the SPIDER 

demonstration of in-space assembly 

capabilities. In particular, Maxar provided a description of the benefits of demonstrated assembly 

on-orbit20. They suggested the demonstrated assembly would lead to lower cost and risk solutions 

for both the Commercial Low earth orbit Destinations (CLD) and Artemis missions, reduce risk for 

hi-strength/hi-torque actuators, scalable 1-g and 0-g arms, and direct benefit to Maxar’s support for 

NASA’s Lightbender program. Lightbender is a low-TRL NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts 

(NIAC) funded effort by the Space Technology Mission Directorate21. The IRB did note that the 

benefit of the capability is likely further in the future with further risk reduction to be performed 

before the capability is infused into a mission. 

19https://spacenews.com/space-force-seeks-to-clear-up-confusion-over-selection-of-northrop-grummans-refuelingtech/ 20 Email from Mr. Chuck Hulme, OSAM-1/SPIDER Program Manager, Maxar to Dr. Fred Kennedy, OSAM-1 IRB Chair, on 

January 12, 2024 (see Appendix D). 21 https://www.nasa.gov/general/light-bender/ 

Figure 1. Northrop Grumman Geosynchronous Auxiliary Support 

Tanker, or GAS-T (https://www.airandspaceforces.com/refuelingsatellites-space-force-choices/) 
OSAM-1 Technology License Overview 

The IRB found three technologies listed in the OSAM-1 

technology transfer database: Kodiak Scanning Lidar, a 

gripper tool, and the client berthing system.22

The IRB interviewed the licensees and found that the 

organizations have assessed the technology is not viable 

to their application or that they have matured the 

technology using internal investment and are not 

dependent on the OSAM-1 mission demonstration. 

In regard to the Kodiak Lidar system, the IRB did not find 

dependency on the system within NASA nor industry. The IRB notes that the use of the JenaOptronik’s RVS 3000 is fairly common and is used by Northup Grumman’s SpaceLogistics 

business23 and Astroscale.24 The IRB also 

noted competition to JennaOptronik’s 

system is present in industry, largely 

addressing a lower size-weight-and power 

(SWAP) system. 

Potential OSAM-1 Restructure

It is viewed by the IRB that the capability of 

developing dexterous robotic servicing will 

well serve national capabilities and be 

critical to a future state desired by a broad 

swath of the U.S. space community, where 

missions enabled by ISAM create strategic advantage giving the U.S. space capabilities well beyond 

what we have today, where space systems are routinely refueled, refreshed, assembled on-orbit 

and ultimately made more resilient. However, the high cost remaining and limited impact that 

OSAM-1 can contribute to the broader national space community should are considerations for 

NASA as it deliberates over project continuation. 

Recommendations 

In light of the IRB’s overall recommendation to discontinue the project, the board offers four ROIcentric recommendations for consideration. These are options to consider following a termination 

or restructuring, as NASA directs. 

22 Email from Ms. Trudy Kortes, NASA STMD Director of Technology Demonstrations to Dr. Michael Gazarik, IRB Deputy 

Chair, on November 17, 2023 

23 https://www.jena-optronik.de/products/rendezvous-sensors/rvs-3000-3d.html 24https://spaceref.com/space-commerce/astroscale-selects-lidar-from-jena-optronik-for-innovative-space-debrisremoval-mission-elsa-m/

Figure 3. Artist’s rendering of NASA’s OSAM-1 SPIDER 

Demonstration.

Figure 2. Orbit Fab’s RAFTI (Rapidly Attachable Fluid 

Transfer Interface).
Establishment of a University Consortium 

The IRB proposes NASA conduct a community workshop to identify how best to use the hardware 

and experience gained on the to-date OSAM-1 development. For example, similar to university 

consortia sponsored by NASA’s Space and Technology Mission Directorate (focused on specific 

technology areas), a consortium could be formed to both identify opportunities and provide a training 

pipeline for next-gen on-orbit servicing professionals. 

National On-orbit Testbed 

NASA should also consider deployment of a national on-orbit testbed, cost-shared by commercial 

and/or defense organizations – similar to Japan’s ETS-VII servicing demonstrator (1997-2002). The 

Japanese ETS-VII mission provides a model for what OSAM-1 could become if it is restructured to 

be a National Test Bed mission. ETS-VII was an experimental mission consisting of a LEO 

spacecraft with a 2-meter class robot arm and a separable smaller test vehicle, much like DARPA’s 

Orbital Express mission (2007). JAXA had a planned set of rendezvous, grapple and robotic 

experiments. After the planned set of experiments was completed, JAXA allowed both domestic 

and foreign proposers to propose extended operations. Winning proposals were given time on the 

space vehicle to carry out their proposal on-orbit. 

NASA could consider proposals from any U.S. organization (such as the members of the new 

COSMIC consortium) to propose additional operations, much in the same way the proposals are 

considered for Hubble Space Telescope observing time. Under this paradigm, providing both 

valuable on-orbit experience and lessons learned to the broader national space capabilities would 

be central to NASA’s mission. It is expected that all of national security space, civil space, 

commercial space, academia and primary/secondary education could and should be encouraged 

to propose to have on-orbit operations time. This could greatly accelerate the advancement of the 

industrial base in the U.S. as it did in Japan on ETS-VII. It is the opinion of the IRB that there would 

be many small companies that would benefit from the on-orbit expertise that such a testbed would 

provide. This concept was discussed within the national security space members that the IRB 

interviewed and found nearly unanimous strong support for what this would accomplish within both 

government and industry. And it could be expected this would be invaluable to STEM interests, with 

opportunities to perform limited robotic control potentially extremely engaging to primary school 

students, such as key STEM contest winners even at the elementary school level. 

Collaboration with DOD and Intelligence Communities 

The IRB suggests NASA engage the USSF and National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) to 

collaborate on topics of mutual interest, such as prepared refueling and cislunar access and identify 

joint opportunities that would leverage the existing OSAM-1 system and capabilities. This activity 

should also develop a specific roadmap with needs, technology and system capability gaps along a 

10-year timeline. Such a roadmap could be reviewed by the National Academy of Engineering.
Servicing, Refueling, and Assembly Roadmap 

Finally, the IRB suggests that NASA engage the commercial space industry to develop a joint 

roadmap to address its servicing, assembly, and manufacturing needs. There is an existing strong 

industrial base with developing capabilities for on-orbit refueling, servicing, and assembly 

operations. NASA STMD should consider identifying the highest-risk areas faced by the Nation’s 

industry base and develop focused investments on reducing risk in those areas and maturing the 

needed technology and capabilities that will serve the Nation. NASA STMD should also consider 

constructs such as consortiums and frequent workshops to strengthen awareness within NASA and 

alignment of the emerging in-space market and high-risk areas requiring government investment. 
APPENDIX A: OSAM-1 INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD TERMS OF REFERENCE 

1.0 Introduction 

On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing -1 (OSAM-1) is a Category 1, Class C Technology 

Demonstration Mission (TDM) within NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate. Building on a 

history of demonstrations to lead to a capability to upgrade and maintain assets in space, the OSAM-1 

project seeks to rendezvous with, refuel, and relocate a United States Government-owned satellite, 

Landsat 7,25 to demonstrate the feasibility of on-orbit refueling, satellite relocation, and life extension. 

The project also intends to demonstrate assembly of a communications antenna using a robotic arm. If 

successful, OSAM-1 capabilities will give satellite operators new ways to manage their fleets more 

efficiently and derive more value from their initial investment by enabling such in-space maintenance to 

extend the operational life of satellites, which also helps mitigate the growing problem of orbital debris. 

Successful completion of this mission would demonstrate several servicing technologies and 

capabilities that could then be available for future missions. NASA intends to transfer OSAM-1 

technologies to commercial entities to help jumpstart a new domestic spacecraft servicing industry. 

1.1 Purpose 

The Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) requests an independent Continuation Review to 

assess programmatic and technical performance as well as return on investment (ROI) to NASA of 

technology gains from the OSAM-1 mission, to include benchmarking of the current government and 

commercial satellite servicing market environment. The independent team should assess the cost-tocomplete. 

1.2 Background 

In 2016 NASA awarded the first contract in support of Robotic Servicing Demonstration Mission, called 

Restore-L,26 to demonstrate in-orbit robotic servicing and refueling to enable a satellite to function for 

years beyond its designed operational life. The project was assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC). In April 2020, with the addition of the Space Infrastructure Dexterous Robot (SPIDER) payload, 

NASA changed the mission’s name to OSAM-1 to reflect the expanded scope of the first autonomous 

robotic in-orbit satellite servicing, assembly, and manufacturing mission. 

In April 2017, Restore-L passed Key Decision Point (KDP)-B of the Formulation Phase with an estimated 

cost for the project between $626 million and $753 million with a targeted launch readiness date 

between June and December 2020. Over the subsequent 2 years, Restore-L experienced cost increases 

and schedule delays, as well as an evolution of overall scope to add on-orbit antenna assembly and 

beam manufacturing to the demonstration. Specifically, during formulation, the project had insufficient 

cost reserves to address risks and workforce shortages that led to delays in some of Restore-L’s 

subsystems, including the robotic arm system. By June 2018, the project’s preliminary cost estimate 

had grown to $1.04 billion. In March 2019, Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) officials 

directed the project to incorporate SPIDER, a payload developed under a NASA STMD Tipping Point firm 

25 https://www.usgs.gov/landsat-missions/landsat-7 

26 https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/restore-l-info_nnh15heomd001_r7.pdf
fixed price procurement to advance technologies needed for an in-space robotic manufacturing and 

assembly capability to increase the project’s value proposition.27 The project continued to experience 

challenges. 

In May 2020, the STMD Directorate Program Management Council (DPMC) evaluated the readiness of 

the project to proceed to Phase C of its life cycle development. Based on the Program Management 

Council review, the project was approved to enter Phase C with an Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) 

development estimate of $974.4 million and a launch readiness date of no later than September 2025; 

however, GSFC and STMD leadership approved the project to proceed with 15 percent cost reserves at 

baseline instead of the Goddard Procedural Requirements (GPR) recommended level of 25 percent, 

given a higher accepted risk posture for STMD technology demonstrations. With the approved KDP-C 

development estimate of $974.4 million, and the mission complexity and external visibility, the NASA 

Associate Administrator provided direction to categorize the project as a Category 1.28 As a technology 

demonstration mission with acceptable risk tolerance, the project remained Class C, with tailoring as 

appropriate to incorporate Class B approaches, while remaining mindful of increasing complexities and 

cost and schedule constraints.29

OSAM-1 was one of the first NASA projects to go through a KDP milestone during the COVID-19 

pandemic, with an approved KPD-C in May 2020. Because of this, Agency and project officials 

determined that COVID-19 impacts could not be fully incorporated into the project baseline at that time. 

Per the KDP-C decision memorandum, cost and schedule did not include impacts associated with the 

pandemic, stating that the project and GSFC will assess impacts in a “reasonable timeframe” and 

provide budget and schedule updates to the Technology Demonstration Missions (TDM) Program. 

Following the May 2020 KDP-C, the project experienced schedule delays and cost increases due to the 

government and contractor shutdowns, supply chain challenges, as well as non-COVID impacts 

characterized by project officials as technical, programmatic, and scope changes. In January 2022, the 

Associate Administrator for STMD issued an official breach notification to Congress because the Agency 

expected the OSAM-1 project to exceed its baseline development cost by more than 15 percent and its 

launch readiness date by more than 6 months. These cost and schedule overruns necessitated a project 

rebaseline and new Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC). In April 2022, the Agency rebaselined OSAM1 at a revised development estimate of $1.244B (an increase of approximately $270 million over the 

May 2020 development estimate) and extended the launch date from September 2025 to December 

2026 (15 months). 

Since the April 2022 rebaseline, the OSAM-1 project has continued to be challenged to meet cost and 

schedule commitments. At the Agency Baseline Performance Review (BPR) held on April 27, 2023, 

STMD informed the Associate Administrator that a recent Project assessment indicates low confidence 

in meeting the April 2022 rebaselined development estimate and launch readiness date. The project 

undertook assessment of possible descopes. At the August 23, 2023 DPMC, STMD leadership reviewed 

the OSAM-1 project cost and schedule information, including updated Joint Confidence Level data, along 

with independent cost and schedule analyses performed by the GSFC Requirements Assessment 

Office, Standing Review Board, and Aerospace Corporation. The results indicated the project was very 

likely to exceed the April 2022 rebaselined development estimate and launch readiness date. 

27 https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-funds-demonstration-of-assembly-and-manufacturing-in-space/ 

28 Program lifecycle cost in excess of $1B, human spaceflight, or “significant radioactive material.” 

29 https://explorers.larc.nasa.gov/2021APMIDEX/pdf_files/NPR_8705_4A.pdf 
Subsequently, the project status was briefed during the August 24, 2023 BPR, and the project presented 

the latest status to the Agency Program Management Council (APMC) on September 7, 2023. The APMC 

Chair directed the OSAM-1 project to (a) “hold” on procuring a launch vehicle, and (b) continue to work 

towards the January 2024 KDP-D, while continuing to assess performance. Additionally, STMD was 

directed to conduct an independent Continuation Review prior to KDP-D. 

1.3 Scope 

This Terms of Reference (ToR) covers the Independent Review Board pertaining to the purpose listed 

above. This review and team are separate and independent from the existing OSAM-1 Standing Review 

Board (SRB). 

This continuation review will evaluate two main topics: 

1. Assess project cost and schedule performance including the cost-to-go for completion of the project

with an independent, probabilistic cost and schedule analysis to ensure a realistic assessment of coststo-go. Has the OSAM-1 project shown enough improved performance in the last six months, and fully

estimate the challenges in the next integration activity, to provide confidence that the project can be

completed without further significant cost growth and schedule erosion or delay?

2. Assess return on investment to NASA compared to technology gains, given the current satellite

servicing market environment. Does the advancement of technologies in in-space servicing, assembly,

and manufacturing justify the cost to continue to fund OSAM-1? Are there any special considerations

such as workforce impact or on-the job training opportunities NASA should consider?

2.0 Study Objectives 

The Board will: 

x Assess project performance. Assess OSAM-1 cost-to-go for completion of the project and

performance against plan with respect to schedule, cost, and technical achievements over the

last 6 months. Evaluate the program’s plans for the next phase and confidence in schedule and

cost including an independent analysis if the board deems this necessary.

x Assess return on investment. Evaluate OSAM-1 technologies to be demonstrated as compared

to current state of the art for in space servicing, manufacturing, and assembly.

x Identify and raise other issues that might be crucial for mission success not yet recognized by

the project and identify specific corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of identified issues in

OSAM-1.

x Identify any additional programmatic solutions the board believes are required to bring the

project to a timely launch readiness.
x Identify any considerations and impacts to help NASA determine a decision to redirect, continue, 

or terminate the project.

3.0 Study Conduct 

3.1 Method 

This is a non-consensus board. The conclusions drawn will be majority opinion yet dissenting or outlying 

conclusions can be captured. 

Board members will perform a study that includes consideration of schedule, technical, and 

programmatic plans, activities, and risks. The board members will conduct open discussion and 

interviews with relevant personnel. Interviews with past and present OSAM-1 team members should be 

conducted as needed. Board members will be invited to participate in the OSAM-1 System Integration 

review (SIR), currently scheduled November 15-17, 2023. 

Board members will assess each of OSAM-1’s developing technologies against similar developments in 

in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing. Questions to be answered include: Where else is this 

technology being developed? When will it be demonstrated, and will it be demonstrated in space? What 

unique technologies does OSAM-1 offer, and how will they impact industry? The board members will 

conduct open discussion and interviews with relevant OSAM-1 personnel, industry, academia, and other 

government agencies as needed. 

Three briefings to NASA are expected. The first will be a snapshot briefing of the continuation review to 

the APMC Chair which will serve as an outbrief to OSAM-1 stakeholders, the second will be to a 

combined informational STMD DPMC/Agency PMC (TBR), and the third is the decisional Continuation 

Review APMC which is due prior to the KDP-D APMC. 

One final report to NASA is expected. This document will be delivered to STMD and APMC decision 

authority. 

Board membership is identified in Appendix 1 (below). 

OSAM-1 Technologies are identified in Appendix 2 (not included). 

Applicable documents and reference documents are identified in Appendix 3 (not included). 

Approval of IRB membership and individual biographies are identified in Appendix 4 (not included). 

3.2 Schedule 

Event Completion

TOR & Chair concurrence October 5, 2023 

Final Board nominations submitted for vetting and contracting October 10, 2023 

Kick-Off Week of October 23, 2023 

OSAM-1 SIR @ GSFC November 14-17, 2023 
Continuation Review / Snapshot Report Outbrief January 2024 

STMD DPMC: Continuation Review Report (Informational) January 2024 

OSAM-1 KDP-D @ GSFC CMC (TBD) January 2024 

Agency APMC: Continuation Review and KDP-D Outbriefs 

(decisional) 

February 2024 

Appendix 1- IRB membership

Fred Kennedy, Ph.D., Chair (Dark Fission Space Systems, Inc.) 

Michael Gazarik, Ph.D. Deputy Chair (University of Colorado) 

Bernard Kelm, Board Member, Naval Research Laboratory 

Timothy Cook, Board Member, Cutting Edge Communications (formerly Boeing Company) 

Stuart McClung, Board Member, NASA Johnson Space Center 

Brett Kennedy, Board Member, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

David McGowan, IRB Advisor, NASA Langley Research Center 

James Johnson, IRB Advisor, NASA Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

Ellen Stigberg, IRB Advisor, NASA Office of the Chief Program Management Officer 

Scott Darpel, IRB Advisor, NASA Glenn Research Center 

Joseph Carsten, IRB Advisor, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Michael Effinger, IRB Review Manager, Marshall Space Flight Center 

Tupper Hyde, IRB Observer, Goddard Space Flight Center 
APPENDIX B: JOINT CONFIDENCE LEVEL ANALYSIS/METHODOLOGY 

Appended are briefing materials prepared by the IRB (Mr. James Johnson) regarding its analytical 

efforts to establish a cost-to-go and schedule-to-go for OSAM-1. 

OSAM-1 IRB JCL

As of 17 Jan 2024

2

Removed at 

request of project

3
IRB Changes to Project JCL

• Add 4 “Red” Discrete Risks (6–9 month impacts)

• Kodiak Late Delivery, Spider Late Delivery, Rework due to Testing, and LV

Procurement Delays

• Include TI Cost range of $500K- $2M on Rework due to Testing

• $2M based on Project Risk data shown at SIR for 2 instances of damage ($2M/ ea)

• Add 1 Risk Factor to TVAC Activities durations

• Include Project Risks

• RPO Schedule, RE10, 4300, 4301, 4299, 4260

• Include Project LV Cost Risk

• Adjust all TD Cost Uncertainty for current EVM performance

• From +5% at Mean to +25%

4

IRB Compared to SRB

• SRB added 6 risks

• Range from 15d to 80d, this is more risks, but less than IRB riskimpacts

• SRB modified some Project Risks

• SRB also added the Project LV Cost Risk

• Same as IRB, utilized Project estimate of $17.5M

• SRB also modified TD Cost Uncertainty

• Both SRB and IRB are using EVM performance to adjust TD Cost Uncertainty for growth

• SRB used most recent CPI of .83, for +20% growth at mean

• IRB is using avg CPI of .80, for +25% growth at mean (Project was +5%)

• SRB concurred with Project that multiple risks are “included in Uncertainty”

• SRB & Project assume that Late SPIDER delivery is included in Uncertainty; IRB does not

• Duration Uncertainty distributions created by Project are conservative, but reflect the delays already incurred and

uncertainty in activity duration; IRB Risks are based on further delays (for example, IRB Risk Rework due to Testing)

• IRB understands that this is conservative/pessimistic; discussions, Interviews, and recent LiDAR CDR update

indicate further delays are possible

• Thus, IRB finds it acceptable to add Discrete Risks for Late Deliveries in addition to the Duration Uncertainty already

provided by the Project

• IRB did not adjust Duration Uncertainty provided by Project ; SRB did increase Duration Uncertainty in various areas such as

Robot, REU, and SVINT that appear low/optimistic. 5
Background

• IRB is performing an assessment of Project JCL from SIR (10/2023)

• HQ OCFO is supporting IRB as Consultant/Ex-Ȃ$$*, James Johnson

• IRB has identified adjustments and additions to Project JCL

• IRB has identified specific risks with likelihood and impact values, etc.

• IRB inputs based on discussions, Interviews, Project SIR, assessments, etc.

• IRB has met with SRB POCs for discussions on Project JCL

• IRB results are separate from the SRB

• IRB and SRB are both starting from same Project JCL model (JCL_354_October

2023)

• IRB JCL presentation includes results, drivers, and comparison(s)

6

7

Removed at 

request of project
Project JCL: General Comments

• It is the IRB understanding that the Project believes these Uncertainty

Distributions also include the Risks and Threats

• The Project has selected a variety of “High” Uncertainty Distributions that will increase the

schedule duration of many activities:

• Mechanical, KODIAK, ATDS, ROBOT, SPINT, + -ȅ, SPIDER, SPINT, etc. (see next slide)

• The SRB appears to concur that many risks, including late deliveries of key

components are included in the duration uncertainty

• The Project bases some Uncertainty Distributions on performance -to-date and

others on a rating menu/scorecard

8

• Mechanical, KODIAK, ATDS, ROBOT, SPINT, + -ȅ, SPIDER, SPINT, etc. (see next slide)

he SRB appears to concur that many risks, including late deliveries of key ding late

omponents are included in the duration uncertainty certainty

he Project bases some Uncertainty Distributions on performance ributions -to-date and

hers on a rating menu/scorecard

8

Late REU

Delivery

Late SPIDER

Delivery

Late SC

Delivery

9

Removed at 

request of project
Project Duration Uncertainty Inputs (Menu) Project Duration Uncertainty Inputs (Menu)

• Project selects Lognormal Distribution for Duration Uncertainty from Menu 10

13

Removed at 

request of project
IRB Risks

Impacting

CP

Impact Activities Impacted

Duration

Impact

TI Cost

IRB Risk Title Type Likelihood

TVAC Challenges Risk Factor 75% +50% Multiple

#154-#155, Kodiak: #1 Yes

Deliver to I&T

KODIAK LiDAR Discrete Risk 75% 9 Months

Late Delivery

#416-#417, SVINT Yes

Closeout, CPT, Stray

Light

$500K - 3 – 6 Months

$2M

Rework Due to Discrete Risk 35%

Testing

#386-#403, SPIDER: Yes

Build, Unpack, Inspect

SPIDER Late Discrete Risk 35% 6 Months

Delivery

#379-#380, SC Accept Yes

Test, Review

LV Procurement Discrete Risk 35% 6 Months

Delays

14

IRB Risks

15

IRB Risks

15 IRB Added Risks
LiDAR CDR Update – IRB Assessment

• Basis of Estimate for IRB Lidar Late Delivery Risk (75% Likelihood, 9

month impact):

• IRB observed and inquired about multiple activities from LiDAR CDR:

• (1) MEMS cards not complete, supposed to finish 12/19 &

12/20, 25 days late and counting to 10/31 SIR schedule;

• (2) Receiver backend card #1 12 days late and counting to 1/3

forecast (10/31 SIR schedule);

• (3) Receiver backend card #2 - no report, forecast is 1/25 but if

they haven't finished #1, then why would #2 be any better;

• (4) LRF Detector Card #1, forecast 12/8, so 38 days late to SIR

plan and counting;

• (5) LRF Detector Card #2 in test, forecast ready date 1/31 (?);

• (6) Imaging Detector Card #1 in queue behind LRF DC #2,

forecast 1/9, 6 days late and counting;

• (7) Imaging Detector Card #2 forecast ready 2/29 (what

confidence do we have in this date?);

• (8) FEIC #1 - anomaly in testing, waiting on new support

equipment (?) - forecast date not shown;

• (9) FEIC #2 forecast ready 1/12, so a few days late and

counting but see (8);

• (10) Clock cards are on hold for test, forecast ready dates 11/6

and 11/17, so both are ~ 60 days late and counting to the SIR

schedule (!);

• (11) Backplanes - appear complete. 16

Status Update indicates slip

IRB Risk Factor: TVAC Challenges

• Risk Factor is impacting: (red on CP)

• #429 – SVINT: TVAC Teardown

• #428 – SVINT: TVAC Cycles 2-4 w/SV CPT at Hot&Cold Plateaus + SPh

Special Test

• #427 – SVINT: TVAC in SES up to chamber break

• #426 – SVINT: TVAC Test Prep TCs Test Blankets etc

• #372 – PRSCT TVAC Prep

• #373 – PRSCT TVAC 2 Cycles Test Execution

• #327 – RRS2 Robot FLT2 TVAC Test

• #317 – RRS1 Robot TVAC Test

• #316 – RRS1 Enviro Testing Transfer and Config for TVAC

• #315 – RRS1 Enviro Testing Robot Config change for TVAC

17
18

Driver Comparison: Project vs IRB

19

• Driver Comparison of IRB

(top) vs Project (bottom)

• Numbers are days (duration)

added to the Activity Finish

Date at the Mean (blue), 75%-

tile (red) and 95%-tile

(yellow)

• Long bars indicate Activities

with extended delays to their

Finish Date

• Activities shown are ranked

in order of Criticality (impact

to the Critical Path)

• Discrete Risks added by IRB

are impacting Critical Path

New IRB

Risk

New IRB

Risks

New IRB

Risk

• Robot FLT SW

4.0 Increasing

Removed at 

request of project
Why FSW 4.0 is Increasing/Driving

• Project already had FSW as #4 critical in results

• Both FSW Release #4 and Release #2 are critical in Project results

• FSW 4.0 has 191d Activity Duration

• Final planned build

• FSW 4.0 Activity Finish Date changes by.....

• 97d / 123d / 189d at the Mean / 75% / 95%-tile

• Example: Finish end of May 2025....to....Finish in October 2025 (65% -tile)

• This is a large change in Finish Date

• Schedule Logic for FSW:

• Successors:

• HFCS R4 Rec/Integ Flight Baseline from Robot

• HFCS R4 System Development

• HFCS Complete R4

• Baseline Finish Date: Sept 2025

• SVINT Post-Enviro CPT

• FSW issue identified by Project during previousRebaseline

• Current EVM data indicates FSW continues to be a challenge (very low CPI, .53 avg)

20

21

Removed at 

request of project
22

23

Removed at 

request of project

Removed at 

request of project
24

25

Removed at 

request of project

Removed at 

request of project
BACKUP

Maxar Observations: FSW Challenges

• '$"#/*ȅ2- #'' )" .

at Maxar

• Project has reported missing

requirements and

verifications

• Project has repeatedly tried

to align FSW completion to

SC delivery

• IRB results illustrate how

FSW for OSAM-1 is

Increasing/Driving

• SRB added a Red 60%,80d

Risk for FSW V&V

27

Observations: FSW Challenges

- #'' )" .

reported missing

ts and

s

repeatedly tried p y

W completion to

lustrate how

M-1 is

riving

a Red 60%,80d

W V&V

27
Maxar Observations: RPT Delays

• Reference Performance

Test (RPT) growth has

been significant and

highlighted by Project

• Important Note at

bottom: RPT growth

shown does NOT include

testing with final FSW

28

Observations: RPT Delays

Performance

growth has

cant and

 by Project

Note at

T growth

s NOT include

h final FSW

28

Maxar Observations: + -ȅ '4.

• Project -  $1 + -ȅ2$/#

$)*(+' / '$"#/*ȅ2- 

• IG report also highlights this issue

and increased costs:

• ȆSpecificallyǺbetween January

ǓǑǓǓand May ǓǑǓǔNASA provided

laborǺsuch as assistance with flight

.*ƚ2- ).4./ (. )"$) -$)"

supportǺvalued at approximately

ʋǓmillion to help reduce impacts to

the mission scheduleǹȇ

• NASA partially concurred and,

ȆNASA will attempt to recoup costs

through discussions with Maxar on

potential equitable adjustmentsȇ

29

Observations: + -ȅ '4.

+ -ȅ2$/# +

#/*ȅ2- 

ghlights this issue

osts:

between January

ǓǑǓǔNASA provided

assistance with flight

.4./ (. )"$) -$)"

ed at approximately

help reduce impacts to

heduleǹȇ

y concurred and,

tempt to recoup costs

ssions with Maxar on

table adjustmentsȇ

29
Lognormal Distribution (Visual)

• CV = Std Dev / Mean, ../# * Ȃ$$ )/*!-$)  .-$ ./# “scatter”, higher CV equals a wider scatter, lower CV equals a tight scatter

• Graph shows how an identical Mean value can be impacted by changes to the Std Dev (changes to CV)(blue highest CV w/highest S td Dev)

• Project JCL inputs are using Lognormal distributions for Duration Uncertainty with CV’s ranging from .1 (low) to .5 (very hig h)

• These inputs at SIR indicate a high degree of uncertainty in the work to -go and produce a wide scatter result

Mean Std Dev

30

Credit: Wikipedia

Lognormal

has long

tail
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW ROSTER 

Table 2. IRB Interviewees 

Organization Participants Date Engagement 

Type 

Psionic LLC Steve Sandford November 22, 2023 Phone call 

Astroscale Ron Lopez November 29, 2023 Phone call 

Northrop Grumman Space 

Logistics 

Joe Anderson November 29, 2023, 

January 11, 2023 

Phone call 

and facility 

visit 

Lockheed Martin Space 

Systems 

Robert Chambers and 

Kate Watts 

December 6, 2023 Zoom call 

Orbit Fab Daniel Faber, Adam Harris 

and team 

December 14, 2023 Facility visit 

Maxar Robotics Chris Johnson, Justin 

Silver, Chuck Hulme, Artak 

Argelian, Dave Marlowe, 

Nick Wisnewski 

December 11, 2023 Facility visit 

Maxar Space David Pigeon, Rick 

Sanborn, Tony Harris, 

Chuck Hulme, Justin Silver 

December 12, 2023 Facility visit 

Defense Innovation Unit Maj. David Ryan, Cullen 

Greenfield, Rex 

Ridenoure, Dennis Poulos, 

Nick Jernigan, Omar 

Pimentel 

December 13, 2023 Facility visit 
Space Force Space 

Systems Command 

Maj. Frank Clark (USSF) 

and Joshua Davis 

(Aerospace) 

December 11, 2023 Facility visit 

(Aerospace 

Campus) 

Naval Research 

Laboratory 

Bill Vincent and Glen 

Henshaw 

January 11, 2024 Facility visit 

Johns Hopkins University 

Applied Physics 

Laboratory 

Glenn Creamer February 28, 2024 Phone call 

US SPACECOM Col. Ferguson 

USSPACECOM 

December 14, 2023 Facility visit 

USSF Space Test Range Maj. Westcott USSF December 14, 2023 Facility visit 

NASA Space Technology 

Mission Directorate 

Bo Naasz November 29, 2023 In-person 

NASA Space Technology 

Mission Directorate 

Jeffrey Sheehy December 4, 2023 Phone call 

NASA Goddard Space 

Flight Center (current and 

legacy members of OSAM1 Project Team) 

Betsy Park (Program 

Manager), Ross Henry, 

Mark Bailey, Russ Roder, 

Erik Andrews, Robert 

Dedaris, Jesse Leitner, 

Jason Emperador, Milton 

Davis, John Higinbotham, 

Brian Thomas, James 

Perry, et. al. 

Various Dates In-person and 

phone/video 

calls 

OSAM-1 Standing Review 

Board 

Frank Martin, Pete Pinetta, 

Billy Carson, Steve Battel, 

Chris Blake 

December 4, 2023 and 

December 6, 2023 

Phone calls 
APPENDIX D: EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE (MR. CHUCK HULME TO DR. FRED KENNEDY) 

SPIDER Robotic Arm 

The SPIDER mission intends to demonstrate free flyer capture, semi-autonomous robotic 

operation, and on-orbit assembly. In support of this mission, Maxar Space Robotics is developing 

the SPIDER assembly arm. These development efforts have enabled several key technologies and 

capabilities, thereby allowing us to propose lower cost/risk solutions in support of both CLD and 

Artemis missions now and in the future. Examples of these capabilities are: hi-strength/hi-torque 

actuators, scalable 1-g and 0-g arms, 0-g ground testing off-loader utilizing a multi-point off 

loader, analysis/simulation tools for dynamic robotic systems, compliance control, and visual 

control. 

Although the scope of the SPIDER mission is limited to assembly, we believe the technologies 

enable lower cost solutions to a wider range of markets. For example, on-orbit assembly allows 

for space and mass efficient satellite/spacecraft design that can be assembled or fueled on-orbit. 

This capability means larger instruments can be designed and launched, such as the successor to 

JWST. Additionally, it allows for mission expansion and upgrading via payload or sensor swapping 

and/or additions. These can lead to cost savings and shorter program durations for NASA 

missions/programs. 

We are already seeing the benefit, for both NASA and the commercial space industry. An example 

of a direct benefit to NASA from the SPIDER arm is NASA Langley’s Lightbender program we are 

currently supporting through an ACO. The aim of this program is to use robotics to assemble a 

modular mirror reflector that would redirect sunlight to the necessary areas around the moon. 

Robotically, it is almost an identical mission to SPIDER – grasp reflector segments and assemble 

the reflector. Therefore SPIDER program advances capabilities and TRL required for Lightbender 

as part of the Artemis program. Commercially, the development of the 0G arm and 0G off-loader 

(enabling ground testing of 0G arms) will allow us to offer lower risk and cost solutions to the 

primes vying to build the next Space Station as part of the CLD programs. 

Modular Antenna 

The SPIDER mission set the stage for both near term and long term satellite architecture changes 

that improve a satellite owner’s bottom line. In the near term, in-space antenna assembly gains 

operators a large increase in throughput and/or coverage, both of which bring increased revenue 

for a lower life cycle cost. This near term economic benefit will attract satellite owners to the value 

of in-space assembly and the reconfiguration opportunities it brings, and set the course towards 

the next generation of satellite architectures. Enabled by in-space assembly, the next generation 

of satellites will embody a vibrant, evolvable architecture that leverages in-situ fabrication, ondemand precision antenna assembly, shared platform resources, and payload technology refresh. 
Strategic technology refresh allows satellite owners to rapidly upgrade a small part of existing 

satellites to capitalize on emerging market needs, such as 5G mobile communications, and 

respond to market changes driven by technology advancements on the ground, such as over-thetop video. Technology refresh mitigates equipment obsolescence that erodes revenue potential 

as a satellite ages. 

Chuck Hulme 

OSAM-1 / SPIDER Program Manager 

Program Management Office