SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5625-17T1

GERONIMO Q. MINESES, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EDGAR G. CARRERA-LOPEZ, 

DONERITE TRUCKING, LLC, 

and FRANKLIN AGUILAR,

Defendants-Respondents. 

______________________________

VILMA MINESES, by her subrogee

STATE FARM INDEMNITY 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. 

PLAZA INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

______________________________

Argued telephonically June 11, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

July 5, 2019
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On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-4381-16.

Ernest Blair argued the cause for appellant (Karim 

Arzadi, attorney; Ernest Blair, on the briefs).

Terrence John Bolan argued the cause for respondents 

(Bolan Jahnsen, attorneys; Terrence John Bolan, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Geronimo Q. Mineses, Jr. appeals from a June 22, 2018 final 

judgment after a no cause jury verdict, finding plaintiff failed to prove defendant 

Edgar G. Carrera-Lopez1 was negligent. In addition, plaintiff appeals from a 

July 20, 2018 order denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm both orders.

The jury had to determine whether defendant was liable for an automobile 

accident occurring on October 19, 2015. On the liability issue, the jury heard 

testimony from plaintiff, defendant, and a police officer who responded to the 

accident, Officer Christopher Cavallo. 

Plaintiff testified at trial he was stopped at an intersection in the center 

lane of a three-lane highway. Defendant's truck was directly behind his car. 

When the light turned green, plaintiff stated he began to move forward when he 

 

1

 Plaintiff named two additional defendants in his complaint. However, counsel 

and the trial court referred only to defendant Edgar G. Carrera-Lopez throughout

the trial. 
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was struck from behind by defendant. The impact caused his car to turn in front 

of the truck and he was pushed thirty feet. According to plaintiff, he did not 

change lanes prior to being struck by the truck. At the scene of the accident, 

plaintiff provided a statement to the responding police officer. 

Defense counsel cross-examined plaintiff regarding his version of the 

accident. Defense counsel also read to the jury the portion of plaintiff's 

deposition explaining the accident. During his deposition, plaintiff testified 

defendant's truck hit his car near the left rear tire. At trial, plaintiff stated

defendant's truck struck the rear of his car.

Officer Cavallo testified he was dispatched to the accident scene. The 

officer was unable to recall specific details regarding this particular incident, 

but described his usual procedure when responding to a motor vehicle accident. 

Officer Cavallo explained that he typically takes statements from the individuals 

involved in an accident. In this case, he created a written report after the 

accident and referred to the report during his trial testimony. According to 

Officer Cavallo, plaintiff said defendant's truck hit his car from behind, causing 

the car to turn in front of the truck and dragging the car thirty feet. 

Officer Cavallo testified he also spoke with defendant. Defendant 

allegedly told the officer that he did not realize plaintiff's car was in front of him
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and his truck hit plaintiff's car from behind. On cross-examination, Officer 

Cavallo admitted the parties' statements in his written report were not verbatim. 

He also testified that the damage to plaintiff's car was located in the "rear driver's 

side quarter panel or back fender." 

The jury also heard testimony from defendant. According to defendant, 

prior to the accident, he was stopped at a red light in the center lane. Defendant 

stated plaintiff's car was to the right of his truck. When the light turned green, 

defendant explained "the next thing [he] knew [plaintiff] was in front of 

[defendant's truck]." He further testified, "I don't know [why Officer Cavallo 

wrote the truck hit plaintiff's car from behind] . . . , because I told him one thing 

and what's on the report is something else." 

After completion of the testimony, the judge conducted a charge 

conference. Plaintiff requested the judge instruct the jury on N.J.S.A. 39:4-89, 

which requires drivers to follow at a reasonable distance. Defendant asked the 

judge to include a charge based on N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), which requires drivers 

to perform safe lane changes. 

Plaintiff's counsel objected to inclusion of the unsafe lane change charge, 

arguing there was insufficient evidence to support such a jury instruction. The 
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judge overruled plaintiff's objection, finding there was sufficient evidence to 

infer plaintiff failed to change lanes safely. 

In the final charge, the judge explained that the jury "should consider the[]

instructions as a whole, and . . . not pick out any particular instruction and place 

undue emphasis upon it." The judge also stated the jury's decision should be 

"based solely on the evidence presented and [the judge's] instructions on the 

law." In addition, the jury was instructed "to decide which witness[es] to believe 

and which witnesses not to believe." Specifically, the judge told the jury to 

assess the credibility of the witnesses by examining the witnesses' interest in the 

outcome of the case, the accuracy of the witnesses' testimony, and any 

explanation given by the witnesses to explain any inconsistencies in the 

testimony.

With regard to the specific evidence, the judge explained the case involved

a car accident and plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent. The judge told 

the jury that defendant denied he was negligent and claimed in turn that plaintiff 

was negligent. The judge instructed the jury that it would decide the issue of

negligence. 

The judge further told the jury that a party making an allegation must 

prove the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge stated,
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[i]n this action, the plaintiff has the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all of 

the facts necessary to prove . . . that the defendant was 

negligent and that said negligence was a proximate 

cause of the accident. 

However, the trial judge omitted a similar instruction regarding the 

defendant's burden of proof. The judge told the jury both parties "assert that the 

other party was guilty of negligence in the operation of their automobile," that 

each party asserted the other violated a specific motor vehicle statute, and the 

jury could find the violation of a statute constituted negligence.

After the judge charged the jury, plaintiff's counsel requested a sidebar 

conference. Plaintiff argued the judge failed to instruct the jury on defendant's

burden of proof. During the sidebar colloquy, the judge ruled that the jury was 

told defendant had the same burden of proof as plaintiff.2 The judge believed 

he had instructed the jury properly and denied the request to add to the charge. 

The jury then deliberated and unanimously found plaintiff failed to prove 

defendant was negligent. As a result, the jury did not consider the remaining

questions on the verdict sheet, including the question regarding plaintiff's 

negligence.

 

2

 In his merits brief, defendant concedes the judge omitted the portion of the 

model jury charge related to defendant's burden of proof. 
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Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the evidence demonstrated 

defendant was negligent in the operation of his truck. Plaintiff also claimed 

"[t]here's nothing . . . offered by the defendant to account for an improper lane 

change." Plaintiff asserted the jury overlooked uncontroverted evidence and 

"[a] terrible wrong was committed by th[e] jury." 

In a July 20, 2018 order, the judge denied the new trial motion. He found

the testimony and evidence presented at trial allowed the jury to infer plaintiff 

caused the accident. The judge therefore did not "find that . . . there was a 

miscarriage of justice." 

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in denying his motion for a new 

trial. In addition, plaintiff contends it was an error for the judge to charge the 

jury regarding an unsafe lane change, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Further, plaintiff 

claims the judge erred in failing to charge the jury as to defendant's burden of 

proof. Because defendant requested the jury be instructed regarding plaintiff's 

violation of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b), plaintiff asserts the judge should have 

instructed that defendant had the burden of establishing the facts necessary to 

prove the unsafe lane change allegation against plaintiff.

A new trial motion is governed by Rule 4:49-1. In accordance with the

rule, "[t]he trial judge shall grant the motion [for a new trial] if, having given 
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due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the 

witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of 

justice under the law." R. 4:49-1(a). A trial court's ruling on a "motion for a 

new trial will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that there was a 

miscarriage of justice under the law." Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 

312 N.J. Super. 20, 36 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 

422, 432 (1994)). Jury verdicts are "entitled to considerable deference and 

'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and 

factually supported and articulated determination, after canvassing the record 

and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would 

constitute a manifest denial of justice.'" Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., 

Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 

588, 597-98 (1977)).

Jury trials are the bedrock of our system of civil justice, and the jury's 

fact-finding function deserves a high degree of respect and judicial deference. 

See Caldwell, 136 N.J. at 432. In assessing the strength of the proofs, a jury 

verdict is "impregnable unless so distorted and wrong, in the objective and 

articulated view of a judge, as to manifest with utmost certainty a plain 
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miscarriage of justice." Doe v. Arts, 360 N.J. Super. 492, 502-03 (App. Div. 

2003) (quoting Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979)). 

Applying these principles, we are satisfied there was ample evidence for

the jury to reasonably find plaintiff failed to establish defendant was negligent 

in the operation of his truck. The damage described by the parties and shown

on the photographs was on the driver's side rear panel, not the rear bumper as 

later claimed by plaintiff. In addition, it was the jury's province to assess the 

credibility of the parties' inconsistent versions of the accident. 

We next consider plaintiff's argument that the judge's instructions to the 

jury were erroneous. "It is axiomatic that clear and correct jury charges are 

essential to a fair trial, and the failure to provide them may constitute plain 

error." Das v. Thani, 171 N.J. 518, 527 (2002) (citing State v. Robinson, 165 

N.J. 32, 40 (2001)). Reversible error "will not be found where the charge, 

considered as a whole, adequately conveys the law and is unlikely to confuse or 

mislead the jury, even though part of the charge, standing alone, might be 

incorrect." Fischer v. Canario, 143 N.J. 235, 254 (1996) (citing Latta v. 

Caulfield, 79 N.J. 128, 135 (1979)). 

Here, the judge instructed the jury that a party asserting an allegation had 

the burden of proving the allegation. The judge should have also instructed the 
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jury specifically as to defendant's burden of proof regarding his allegations as 

the judge did with regard to plaintiff's burden of proof. But the error is harmless. 

The first question on the verdict sheet asked whether plaintiff proved defendant 

was negligent. Having unanimously answered "no" to that question, the jury did 

not deliberate on the remaining questions, including whether plaintiff was 

negligent. The jury never had to decide whether defendant met his burden of 

proving plaintiff's negligence because plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of 

proof regarding defendant's negligence.

In reviewing the record, the jury charge as a whole adequately conveyed 

the law regarding negligence. Because the jury never reached the issue of 

plaintiff's negligence, the judge's failure to explicitly state defendant had the 

burden of proving plaintiff's negligence did not confuse or mislead the jury. 

Moreover, defense counsel never argued the issue of plaintiff's negligence 

during summation. Consequently, we are satisfied that the jury was not 

confused and properly applied the law as instructed by the judge. 

We are satisfied there was sufficient credible evidence to support the 

jury's verdict and, therefore, we discern no basis for disturbing the judge's denial 

of plaintiffs motion for a new trial. 

Affirmed.