NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER C1

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA Engineering & Safety Center ANNUAL REPORT
NESC strives to set the example for engineering and technical excellence in NASA.


NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

From the Administr

Opposite Page: The Space Shuttle Program returns to flight on 

July 26, 2005 with STS-114

Through its dedicated team of technical 

experts and its commitment to safety, 

NASA‘s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 

has set an example of engineering excellence 

within the Agency. By leveraging the technical 

expertise resident at our Centers, and by 

encouraging diverse perspectives, NESC has 

demonstrated its ability to provide independent 

technical assessment of issues for NASA’s highrisk endeavors. In particular, NESC played a 

pivotal role in the Space Shuttle’s return to flight, 

as well as provided significant contributions to 

numerous other critical NASA projects.

– Michael Griffin, Administrator, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

From the Administrator .................................3

Table of Contents ........................................5

Senior Leadership Messages ........................7

NESC in 2005 ......................................... 11

Technical Accomplishments ........................ 17

Spotlight on Return to Flight

Major Technical Assessments Completed

Status of NESC Work In Progress

NESC Academy.........................................43

NESC Honor Awards..................................45

NESC Leadership Team .................................51

Rotation

Biographies

Alumni

Table of 

Opposite Page: Laboratory Technicians (clockwise from left) Richard 

Czernec, Robert Butler and Bruce Frankenfield, prepare an International 

Space Station AN fitting for Leak Testing at the Structural Dynamics 

Laboratory, Glenn Research Center

Cover Page: Dr. Rebecca MacKay, Senior Materials Scientist of the 

Materials and Structures Division at Glenn Research Center, examines 

an Orbiter Reaction Control System Thruster for cracks in the Electron 

Optics Laboratory
 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

SENIOR Leade

Bryan D

NASA Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer

NESC’s second year was even more dramatic and noteworthy than its first. As 

the Agency went through the many boards and certification reviews in the returnto-flight effort, NESC provided key input to enable Shuttle program managers to 

better understand technical concerns and questions that had to be answered in 

the path to return to flight. I personally asked NESC to help me understand several 

safety questions I had before I was able to concur in our readiness to launch 

STS-114. I also asked NESC for special assessments of other flight activities for 

robotic spacecraft and independent assessments of risk management models. 

The successful mission of STS-114 and the successful year that NASA had in 

its space and aeronautic research activities were certainly in no small part due 

to the hard work and dedication of the members of NESC. NESC has truly 

met its charter to provide engineering and safety excellence to support NASA’s 

missions.

Christo

NASA Chief Engineer

In the second year of NESC’s operations, discipline experts from within and 

outside of the Agency were brought to bear on many significant engineering 

challenges. NESC’s network of over 500 experts became operational and 

fully respected for its in-depth analysis and recommendations for engineering 

improvements. The safety risks of the Shuttle flight 114 were better understood 

through the efforts of these highly experienced engineers and scientists. At 

the same time, the NESC Academy was launched with the charter to transfer 

expert knowledge to younger engineers both within and outside of the Agency. 

This establishes another standard of engineering excellence for NESC and will 

contribute to Agency Engineering Excellence for the future.

Opposite Page: Full view of International Space Station from Discovery 

(STS-114) after undocking; background area shows part of the Caspian 

NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Ralph R. Roe

DIRECTOR, NASA Engineering and Safety Center

In October of this year, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) initiated its 

100th technical assessment. This significant milestone has demonstrated NESC’s 

continuing ability to make a valuable contribution to the Agency. During our first two 

years of operation, NESC has built a strong technical team and solid processes that 

allow the organization to effectively provide the Agency with a critical resource. By 

drawing upon the technical expertise at the Centers and bringing them together with 

program personnel, NESC has been able to provide program managers with more 

robust solutions and the data needed to make more informed decisions. 

The prime focus of NESC’s activities during this year has been on the Space Shuttle’s 

return to flight. NESC was engaged in many areas during the preparations for STS114, including human factor considerations for External Tank foam application, peer review of the debris transport math models, 

and a review of the flight rationale used by the Shuttle program. In addition, NESC also performed technical assessments for all of 

NASA’s Mission Directorates and provided expert support for external organizations, such as the U.S. Navy. We have highlighted a 

number of these activities in this Annual Report.

One accomplishment this year that I am very proud of is the creation of the NESC Academy. Our discipline experts represent literally 

hundreds of years of experience. The purpose of the NESC Academy is to pass along this wealth of information and insight to our 

younger engineers. By the end of the year, we will have successfully completed three pilot courses in Space Life Support Systems, 

Space Propulsion Systems, and Power & Avionics. Additional courses in other discipline areas will be offered throughout the coming 

year. 

When NESC was created more than two years ago, it was chartered with the ambitious task to fill a technical void within the Agency. 

I can proudly say that the men and women of NESC have stepped up to meet this challenge and have demonstrated the true 

meaning of engineering excellence. We have begun to transition our staff back to leadership positions at the Centers. They bring 

back a broader perspective that will benefit their new organizations. In addition, the new technical talent within NESC ensures that 

we maintain a fresh and unbiased perspective.

During our third year of operation, NESC will begin to shift its focus to providing technical expertise and independent assessments for 

Exploration Systems. We will continue to share our knowledge across the Agency and work with senior leadership to implement the 

broadly applicable lessons learned discovered during the course of our activities. As NESC expands into new areas, we will remain 

committed to the premise on which we were founded – engineering excellence. 

Opposite Page: Discovery (STS-114) photographed from the International 

Space Station during rendezvous and docking operation

SENIOR Leade

Senior Leadership Messages
10 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 11

Our mission is to perform value-added independent testing, analysis, and assessments 

of NASA’s high-risk projects to ensure safety and mission success. We engage 

proactively to help NASA avoid future problems.

DOE Labs

Industry 1%

DoD 10%

1%

University

4% NASA

84%

2005 NESC SPRT Composition

NESC IN 200

NESC is an independently funded NASA program with a 

dedicated team of technical experts that provides objective 

engineering and safety assessments of critical, high-risk 

projects. Its strength is rooted in the diverse perspectives and 

broad knowledge base that it draws upon to add value to NESC 

products, affording customers a responsive, alternate path for 

assessing and preventing technical problems while protecting 

vital human and national resources. 

NESC’s charter is founded on one essential principle – 

engineering excellence. Balanced with an independent and 

objective reporting structure, NESC represents a truly unique, 

valuable technical resource.

Engineering Excellence

NESC’s organizational model is founded on a knowledge base 

of technical expertise derived from within all NASA Centers and 

among a group of partner organizations external to the Agency. 

For each technical assessment that is conducted, NESC 

accesses a ready group of engineering experts – called Super 

Problem Resolution Teams (SPRTs) – from 15 discipline areas. 

These teams, which are led by NESC Discipline Experts, work 

together to ensure that the highest standard of engineering 

excellence is achieved. In 2005, NESC’s SPRTs consisted of 

NASA representatives, industry consultants, academia, and 

experts from other government agencies. 

By drawing from the minds of leading engineers across the 

country, NESC consistently optimizes its processes, deepens 

its knowledge base, strengthens its technical capabilities, 

and broadens its perspectives, thereby further executing its 

commitment to engineering excellence.

Independence & Objectivity

NESC performs technical assessments and provides 

recommendations based on independent testing and analysis, 

not subjective opinion. Independently funded through the Office 

of the Chief Engineer, NESC offers NASA Centers, programs, 

and other organizations an alternate reporting path through 

which objective assessments are conducted and alternative 

viewpoints are encouraged. A rigorous peer review process 

furthers NESC’s commitment to achieving the highest possible 

safety standards. 

A Unique Resource 

NESC is a strong, Agency-wide technical resource that 

offers a forum for reporting technical issues and contributing 

alternative viewpoints for high-risk NASA programs. A multidisciplined team of engineers serves as a distinctively unbiased 

assessment resource to NASA. 

Opposite Page: “Baggie Type” Helium Leak Test of AN Fittings performed 

by Brian Hurd, Structural Dynamics Laboratory Technician, Glenn 

Research Center

2005 NESC Super Problem Resolution 

Teams Composition
12 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC’s technical evaluation and consultation products are 

delivered in the form of written reports that include solutiondriven, preventative, and corrective recommendations. 

With each assessment, lessons learned are communicated 

to Agency leadership through bi-annual briefings, and to 

engineers through the Agency Lesson Learned system, which 

better informs the technical community and, therefore, NESC’s 

engineers, customers, and stakeholders. 

NESC’s range of services includes testing, analysis, and data 

review in the following 15 engineering disciplines:

n Flight Sciences

n Fluids/Life Support/Thermal

n Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC)

n Human Factors

n Human Space Flight Operations

n Materials

n Mechanical Analysis

n Mechanical Systems

n Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE)

n Power & Avionics

n Propulsion 

n Robotic Missions

n Software

n Structures

n Systems Engineering

NESC proactively engages through technical disciplineadvancing activities, and is currently leading NASA’s efforts 

for independent data mining and trend analysis to identify 

potential concerns before they become major problems – both 

within and across NASA programs. NESC has established 

a Data Mining and Trending Working Group that includes 

representatives from all NASA Centers, as well as external 

experts. This Group will ensure that results are maximized, and 

that NESC comprehensively learns from previous efforts.

“We really value the expertise that NESC brings to 

independent reviews of technical issues. Its insight 

has helped managers to understand risks and make 

informed decisions on several different topics.”

— Ellen Ochoa, Deputy Director, Flight Crew Operations, Johnson 

Space Center

ARC

DFRC

WSTF

JSC SSC

IV&V

MSFC

KSC

WFF HQ

GRC GSFC

LaRC JPL

The Aerospace Corporation

The Boeing Company

Federal Aviation Administration 

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories

Lockheed Martin

National Institute of Aerospace

National Transportation Safety Board

Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis 

Center

Sandia National Laboratories

School of Aviation Safety

Southwest Research Institute

Swales Aerospace

Wedeven Associates, Inc.

Select 2005 NESC Partnerships/

Collaborations

NASA Centers and Facilities Participating in NESC Activities 

NESC in 2005
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

Looki

In 2006, NESC’s strategy will be driven by growth – in technical 

excellence, in the value its services provide to ensuring safety in 

critical missions, and in the increasingly broad reach of its impact. 

As a multi-disciplined One NASA organization, NESC strives to 

achieve the following organizational goals: 

n To prevent future technical problems through proactive 

testing and assessment

n To develop new tools and techniques for improved data 

mining and trending across NASA programs.

n To increase its customer base to include a broader range of 

NASA programs, other government agencies, and external 

organizations.

n To continually enhance its knowledge base by attracting 

the best and brightest engineering minds.

n To constantly develop new processes and expand services 

to provide the best value to its customers.

NESC is a technically robust organization with great potential. 

Its strategy in 2006 is to further apply its technical expertise 

to areas of NASA that are of high-risk and importance. Some 

key technical areas that will be focused on in 2006 include 

the Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and 

Exploration Systems.

n The Space Shuttle represents NASA’s highest area of 

risk because of its human element. NESC is committed 

to focusing its technical expertise to proactively ensure 

continued successful Space Shuttle launches in the future. 

Upcoming efforts for the program include night flights and 

replacing the maturing Shuttle fleet. 

n The ISS is an important program for NASA. NESC’s testing, 

evaluation, and assessment of the risks, resources, and 

interactions with the ISS will be of increased focus, as it 

continues to protect NASA’s – and the country’s – vital 

human and national resources, both on and beyond Earth.

n Exploration Systems is a growing area of concentration for 

NESC. The current Space Shuttle will retire by 2010. NESC will 

be engaged in the Constellation Program, which will develop 

the ability to travel to and explore the moon and Mars. NESC’s 

work in proactive trending tools will also positively impact 

NASA’s exploration efforts.

2005 ACCOMPLISHMENT

NESC concluded its second year of full operations in 2005. Efforts this year resulted in many accomplishments, both from an 

organizational perspective and through increased technical expertise. Some 2005 organizational achievements included:

n Initiating NESC’s 100th Technical Assessment in October. 

n Providing value-added recommendations to ensure the 

Space Shuttle Discovery’s successful return to flight in July. 

NESC was integrally involved in the testing and objective 

assessment of engineering challenges critical to the Space 

Shuttle’s launch. 

n Completing projects for four of NASA’s Mission Directorates 

– Space Operations, Exploration, Science, and Aeronautics 

Research. This represents the depth of NESC’s engineering 

expertise and the reach of its value-added assessments.

n Launching NESC’s Academy in September. The collective 

breadth and depth of NESC’s knowledge base is transferred 

to NASA’s engineers through the NESC Academy. To date, 

the Academy courses have attracted participation requests 

exceeding class capacity. A solid starting point has been 

provided for the 2006 class roster. 

n Transitioning technical leaders back to their Centers.

n Hiring the next round of technical leaders.

n Completing a broad range of major technical accomplishments, 

which are included in the Technical Accomplishments section 

of this report.

NESC is proud of its successes during 2005, and is committed 

to further growth and increased achievements during 2006. 

NESC in 2005

“NESC provides a valuable engineering resource that is available to all programs. The International Space 

Station Program has made extensive use of NESC on a variety of topics. These NESC inputs were invaluable in 

allowing the program to make key engineering decisions.”

— Bill Gerstenmaier, Former Manager, International Space Station Program
14 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

“We are about more than getting the Shuttle flying. 

We also work to ensure safety in the future. Therefore, 

NESC is an invaluable resource to NASA.”

— Ken Cameron, NESC Deputy Director for Safety

NESC provides its customers an immeasurable advantage by 

bringing together multi-disciplined teams of experts to solve 

complex problems. As a result, NESC is able to recommend 

improved, safer technical solutions, stronger checks and 

balances, and better inform decision makers through objective 

assessments. Customer reports about the value that NESC 

adds to their efforts to solve technical challenges has led to a 

steady interest in NESC in 2005.

The majority of NESC’s projects this year have been technical 

assessments in space operations – more specifically, 

assessments in support of NASA’s return-to-flight activities. 

Notably, however, NESC has completed projects across the 

NASA Directorates.

On October 6, 2005, NESC celebrated the acceptance of its 

100th request since receiving its charter in 2003.

In its second year of operations, NESC experienced 

a continued increase in requests for its services. By 

October 31, 2005, NESC had accepted 44 requests.

NESC is operating with a projected budget through 2010. 

Funding for NESC’s activities - which were managed at Langley 

Research Center - reached $65.5 million in FY 2005. 

NESC in 2005

2005 Calendar Year 

44 Total as of October 31, 2005

Since 2003 Charter

106 Total as of October 31, 2005

Accepted Requests by Mission Directorate

2005 Mer
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

NESC Total Funding by Center – FY 2005

ARC

9%

KSC

4%

MSFC

14%

SSC

1%

GRC

11%

DFRC

2%

JSC

7%

LaRC

47%

GSFC

4%

JPL

1%

NESC Total Funding by Center - FY 2005

NESC in 2005

2005 Calendar Year 

44 Total as of October 31, 2005

Since 2003 Charter

106 Total as of October 31, 2005

Source of Accepted Requests

Earth Grey: 0C, 10M, 20Y, 55K

Earth Brown: 0C, 60M, 100Y, 70K

External to Agency

12%

Anonymous

2%

Program

Analysis &

Evaluation

2%

Safety and 

Mission

Assurance

at Centers

2%

Program

Management

23%

Oce of Safety

and Mission

Assurance

7%

Center

Management

2%

Engineering

& Scientic

Organizations

34% NESC

16%

Sources of Accepted Requests for

the 2005 Calendar Year
16 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

Technical Acc

Spotlight on Return to Flight 

Our contributions to the return-to-flight effort were essential to the success of Discovery’s 

launch in July. By providing an alternate place for NASA to turn for help with high-risk 

technical problems related to the Space Shuttle, we were able to positively impact the 

safety of the Shuttle’s mission. 

Given the vital human and national resources at risk when man 

enters space, NESC placed its focus in 2005 on helping the 

Space Shuttle return to flight. NESC’s engineers were more 

than up to the task, given the breadth and depth of their 

experience, expertise, perspectives, and – most importantly 

– their dedication and determination. 

Involvement in return-to-flight activities enabled NESC to 

demonstrate its value to NASA during the execution of a 

series of high-risk, historical activities. NESC’s return-toflight technical assessments were comprised of some of the 

following areas:

n Human Factors

n Feedline Bellows Ice Elimination

n Nondestructive Evaluation 

n Foam Dissection Data

n Reaction Control System Thruster Cracks

n Debris Transport Math Models

n Wing Leading Edge Attachment Hardware Integrity

n Rudder Speed Brake Actuator

n Cure-in-Place Ablative Applicator Tile Repair

n BUMPER Micro Meteoroid/Orbital Debris 

n T-0 Umbilical Interface

n Body Flap Actuator

n Recurring Anomalies

“During return to flight, NESC proved invaluable to 

the Shuttle Program. It performed independent tests 

and analysis and brought outstanding results back to 

the Program to be used in the decision making process. 

Safety through engineering excellence is exactly what 

NESC has provided.” 

— Bill Parsons, Former Space Shuttle Program Manager

Right Page: Launch of Discovery (STS-114)

Opposite Page: James E. Fesmire (Kennedy Space Center Cryogenic 

Laboratory Lead - rear left) and Ray E. Patrick (Director of Research and 

Development, Sealed Air Corporation) make final adjustments of the 

nanogel sacrificial retainer system on a liquid oxygen (LOX) feedline bellows 

test article prior to environmental testing
18
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

Technical Acc

Return to Flight

Problem: A Columbia Accident Investigation Board member 

raised questions concerning the structural integrity of the wing 

leading edge (WLE) spar and reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) 

attach hardware.

NESC Contribution: NESC conducted forensic metallurgical 

analysis of the debris from Columbia for anomalous failure 

mechanisms or indications of environmentally assisted aging. 

The team also conducted tests and metallurgical analyses of 

RCC attach hardware components removed from Discovery 

with a history of 30 flights, and reviewed inspection records for 

any indication of environmentally assisted aging. Flight thermal 

data and existing project thermal models were reviewed, the 

models were enhanced, and thermal analysis was performed 

to assess time and temperature exposure of spar and attach 

hardware. Time and temperature-dependent aging tests were 

conducted where insufficient engineering data was available 

to assess the performance degradation from service related 

thermal exposure. Existing project structural models were 

reviewed and enhanced. A case study was conducted to 

evaluate the capability of the WLE spar and RCC attach 

hardware to withstand a foam impact. Fracture and durability 

analysis was performed on WLE spar and RCC attach hardware 

components.

The team concluded from testing and analysis of the Columbia 

debris and of attach hardware components removed from 

Discovery that there is no indication of environmentally assisted 

aging of any components. The team further concluded based 

on testing, analysis, and review of the inspections performed 

on the Orbiters that there are no return-to-flight concerns 

with the existing spar and attach hardware. As a result of the 

assessment, the team identified secondary issues which were 

conveyed to the project as recommendations.

Lesson Learned: When commercially-available materials are 

used at or near their design limits, including the environments 

to which they may be exposed, it is critically important that 

all aspects of the materials’ properties and how they can be 

affected by different environments are clearly communicated 

between the various disciplines involved in the design. In 

addition, this information must be clearly documented so that 

the engineers and technicians who implement, maintain, and 

ensure the quality of the vehicle have a clear understanding of 

the required material properties and environmental effects on 

those properties.

Right Page: Reinforced carbon-carbon panel attached to the wing spar 

of Space Shuttle Discovery

Wing Spar

Insulation

Spar Fitting 

Spanner Beam

RCC Panel

Orbiter reinforced carbon-carbon wing leading edge attach hardware integrity

Opposite Page: The Space Shuttle Discovery, (STS-114), docked to the

 Destiny laboratory of the International Space Station
20 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Micro Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Model 

Called BUMPER II

Problem: Micro meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) are 

a serious hazard for manned spacecraft. Micro meteoroids 

are naturally occurring particles that are created from the 

breakup of asteroids and comets while orbital debris is humangenerated by spacecraft. Because these particles are traveling 

at many kilometers per second, even very small particles can 

cause loss of spacecraft critical systems or crew, in the case 

of manned spacecraft. NASA uses the BUMPER II code to 

calculate the risk of MMOD impact causing critical damage for 

each Space Shuttle mission, and the risk of MMOD penetration 

for the International Space Station (ISS), extravehicular activity 

suits, and other spacecraft. Space Shuttle mission operations 

have often been directly affected by risk predictions based on 

BUMPER II. NESC was requested to perform an independent 

validation and verifi cation – that is, a line-by-line review of 

the BUMPER II software code, modeling assumptions, and 

potential error sources. 

NESC Contribution: NESC examined the MMOD risk 

assessment process used for the Space Shuttle and ISS 

programs, the key general assumptions used in these 

assessments, the models built into BUMPER II, and the 

correctness of the BUMPER II code. Overall, the independent 

technical inspection provided 102 observations and 

recommendations regarding BUMPER II software improvement, 

ranging from general structure (e.g., combining the two codes 

into a single software core package) to the defi nition of 

units and constants. Many of the observed problems could 

produce errors in the output of BUMPER II. The assessment 

found that the code provides a point estimate of MMOD risk 

with no assessment of its associated uncertainty. Further, 

the uncertainties associated with underlying BUMPER II input 

models are largely unknown. 

BUMPER II is the best tool currently available for vital Space 

Shuttle and ISS MMOD risk assessments. NASA recognizes 

the importance of providing uncertainty bounds, and work is 

underway to develop the tools and methodology needed to 

include uncertainty bounds with BUMPER II results. Reporting 

risk predictions with uncertainty bounds enables those 

performing the program’s probabilistic risk assessments to 

fold the results into the assessment. Implementation of the 

recommendations will provide NASA missions with the MMOD 

tools needed for the Moon and Mars missions.

Perforation

Impact damage occurred near 

predicted high-risk area

Velocity

Space

Shuttle impact risk from orbital debris > 3mm diameter

BUMPER perforation risk plot with impact locations noted

Technical Accomplishments

Crater

High-risk

Low Risk

High

Risk

Low

Risk
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 21

Shuttle Kevlar Composite Overwrapped 

Pressure Vessels Safety for Flight Concern

External Tank Liquid Oxygen Feedline 

Bellows Ice Prevention Design

Gaseous nitrogen Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels installed in the 

Orbiter environmental control and life support system

Problem: NESC was tasked to evaluate the fl ight rationale for 

the Kevlar/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 

(COPVs) used in Space Shuttle systems.

NESC Contribution: As part of the evaluation, NESC 

examined the Space Shuttle Program’s (SSP) Fleet Leader 

COPV, which had been pressurized under test conditions for 26 

years. Also examined were fl ight hardware design certifi cation 

and qualifi cation test results, fl eet leader test results, and stress 

rupture test results.

NESC determined that there is signifi cantly less stress rupture 

life margin remaining in the SSP COPVs than was previously 

assumed. NESC assisted the Orbiter Project Offi ce by: 1) 

accurately assessing the risk of COPV stress rupture failure, 2) 

developing fl ight rationale for return to fl ight, and, 3) outlining 

plans for future tests to complete COPV hardware certifi cation 

for the future life of the SSP. 

Lesson Learned: Increased use of composite structures 

in spacecraft requires comprehensive test programs to better 

understand potential failure modes, such as stress rupture. 

Future spacefl ight programs should ensure that provisions 

for adequate long-term testing are included in the project 

requirements.

Kennedy Space Center Engineers Charlie Stevenson, left, Wesley Johnson, center, and 

James Fesmire, right, install shrink wrap on a liquid oxygen bellows test article prior to 

cryogenic testing

Problem: Potentially damaging ice can grow on components 

of the Space Shuttle’s External Tank (ET) once it is fi lled with 

cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. In particular, the liquid oxygen 

(LOX) feedline bellows and LOX feedline support brackets are 

susceptible to the formation of ice because only a limited 

amount of thermal protection can be applied while still allowing 

for the required motion of the bellows and brackets.

NESC Contribution: NESC is developing designs that 

mitigate the risk to the Orbiter from ice debris shed by the 

ET during ascent. Through the use of a shrink wrap fi lm fi lled 

with nanogel insulating beads, the formation of ice on the LOX 

feedline bellows was prevented under worst-case temperature 

and humidity environments during preliminary testing.

This design allows the bellows to move normally and the 

insulating system to separate from the bellows early in fl ight. 

Additionally, special coatings for the feedline brackets are 

being developed to infl uence the formation and adhesion of 

ice. Initial laboratory tests have shown that coatings can alter 

the ice adhesion strength and structural integrity. Ice liberation 

tests that rely on launch acoustic and vibration loads will be 

used to evaluate the effectiveness of candidate coatings.

Technical Accomplishments
22 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: The Space Shuttle Program requested that NESC 

perform a peer review of the Orbiter damage assessment math 

model tools.

NESC Contribution: A pre-fl ight and on-orbit assessment 

strategy involving a combination of new and existing math 

model tools was developed to determine the impact and 

damage tolerance of the Orbiter TPS (acreage tiles and 

reinforced carbon-carbon on the nose cap and wing 

leading edges) due to impacts from expected debris. 

NESC peer reviewed an engineering data package for each 

math model tool. The peer review included an assessment 

of the end-to-end, integrated analysis strategy to address the 

compatibility of data exchange between the models, and the 

propagation of uncertainties from the initial defi nition of the 

impact event to the fi nal estimate of the resulting damage.

The damage assessment tools were found to be acceptable for 

supporting return to fl ight. However, technical limitations in the 

use of each damage assessment modeling tool were identifi ed. 

NESC and the NASA Independent Technical Authority have 

jointly funded additional NASA efforts to validate these models 

and better quantify uncertainty in the solution.

Lesson Learned:

A comprehensive test program using design of experiments 

logic is required to adequately verify and validate complex 

math model tools.

Ground Support Equipment T-0 Umbilical to the Space Shuttle Program’s Flight 

Element Assessment

Problem: The Ground Support Equipment T-0 umbilical 

connections provide a command path from the Space Shuttle 

Orbiter to the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and holddown post 

pyrotechnic bolts so bolt separation can be initiated at T-0. 

NESC provided alternate viewpoints of several T-0 connection 

failures and concluded that a level of uncertainty remained 

despite the corrective actions implemented. The concern was 

that the root cause of the failures was never fully determined, 

which questioned the adequacy of the corrective actions and 

level of risk remaining for future Shuttle fl ights.

NESC Contribution: NESC assessed the T-0 umbilical 

ground processing changes, the testing and modeling 

performed by the Space Shuttle Program’s (SSP) Tiger Team, 

as well as the safety margin expressed. NESC modeling work 

combined and augmented existing models to create a single 

integrated model suitable for supporting structural dynamic 

analysis, confi rming the Tiger Team’s results and demonstrating 

that the analyses were insensitive to underlying assumptions. 

The safety margin analysis performed by NESC indicated 

a very low likelihood of simultaneous failure of redundant

circuits. Connector examination and testing performed 

by NESC confi rmed that the corrosion failure mechanism 

proposed by the Program was credible.

An NESC recommendation to instrument the T-0 interface 

during launch to anchor the models was accepted by the SSP, 

and a directive to that effect was issued. The work performed 

by NESC led to a better understanding of the engineering data 

and reaffi rmed the risk assessment for safety and mission 

success.

(continued on next page)

Peer Review of the Math Model Tools to be Used to Assess Damage to Tile and Reinforced 

Carbon-Carbon Due to Debris Impact Assessment

Technical Accomplishments

NESC reviewed models for predicting damage to reinforced 

carbon-carbon and tile caused by foam and ice being shed 

from the external tank during ascent
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 2

Nondestructive Evaluation for External 

Tank Thermal Protection System 

Closeout Verifi cation

Problem: Nondestructive inspection technologies were 

not available for subsurface inspection of the sprayed-on 

foam insulation (SOFI) used on the Space Shuttle’s external 

tank (ET). Efforts to develop new inspection technologies 

were having limited success. The development of inspection 

technologies was hindered by the lack of controlled inspection 

requirements and resulted in ever-changing instrument and 

software development efforts that led to probability of detection 

(POD) studies that were of limited value. 

NESC Contribution: NESC developed a plan to stabilize the 

nondestructive evaluation (NDE) procedures and processes 

before initiating a POD study. Inspection criteria of the spatial 

distribution of fl aw indications, nearest neighbor, size, location, 

type (shape), and orientation, including obtaining adequate 

representative POD test articles, are to be controlled and fi xed 

before the POD study begins. 

Lesson Learned: The development of NDE technologies to 

meet ever-changing uncontrolled inspection criteria results 

in producing inspection technologies that may have limited 

impact. Initiating POD studies are not recommended until both 

the NDE technologies and inspection criteria are fi xed. 

“The Terahertz Imaging System (inspection technology) 

has been sufficiently developed and listed as a new 

nondestructive evaluation technology. The System 

greatly increases the resolution of the technology as 

shown.” 

– Edward Generazio, Former NESC Discipline Expert

Terahertz imaging of spray-on foam insulation 

August 2003 capability–(Upper Photo) 

Improved capability in May 2005–(Lower Photo)

Illustration of T-0 interface

Technical Accomplishments

Lesson Learned: Programs with elements that share 

physical interfaces, and therefore risks, should ensure 

that responsibility for integrated hazards is clearly defi ned, 

integrated hazard reports are developed, and periodic system 

reviews of these hazard are reported.

Lesson Learned: The development of NDE technologies 

to meet ever-changing uncontrolled inspection criteria results 

in producing inspection technologies that may have limited 

impact. It is not recommended to initiate POD studies until both 

the NDE technologies and inspection criteria are fi xed. 
24 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: During a routine inspection of a Space Shuttle 

Orbiter Reaction Control System thruster, crack indications 

were detected in 9 of the 16 injector fl ange bolt counter bores. 

Further disassembly, in preparation for the failure analysis, also 

revealed cracking in the injector fl ange relief radius. Additionally, 

during removal and replacement of a thrust chamber for a 

follow-on thruster, it was found that the injector was incorrectly 

cleaned by immersion in Oakite Rustripper, an aggressive 

sodium hydroxide solution.

NESC Contribution: Two NESC teams were chartered 

to disposition the thruster cracking and sodium hydroxide 

exposure. A materials team was chartered to consult with 

the Orbiter materials team to determine the root cause of the 

injector cracking, determine the likelihood of crack propagation 

while in service, and disposition the thrusters that were exposed 

to sodium hydroxide. The second team was a nondestructive 

evaluation (NDE) team that consulted with the Orbiter NDE team 

to develop NDE techniques to examine thrusters to determine 

fi t-for-service.

Extensive material testing, evaluation, and stress and fracture 

analysis established the root cause of the cracking and 

determined that the thrusters with crack indications have 

suffi cient safety margins to fl y for the remainder of the Space 

Shuttle Program. Although sodium hydroxide exposure can 

lead to compromised material properties, testing indicated 

that routine exposures occurring during nominal thruster 

processing do not create a structural concern. Although 

signifi cant progress was made developing NDE techniques for 

measuring cracks in thruster injectors, the material, stress, and 

fracture analyses results eliminated the need for NDE for fl ight 

rationale.

Typical counter bore cracks visible under UV light with dye penetrant

Orbiter Thruster Mounting Flange Bolt Hole Cracking 

“During the material analysis and testing, material 

test techniques were innovatively tailored to match 

the available material and configurations that 

established the injector material properties for the 

flight thruster. Specifically, fracture toughness and 

fatigue crack growth rates were established for these 

injector configurations, so that the properties could be 

qualitatively compared to nominal injector material 

properties and could be used in the safety margin 

evaluations.” 

– Mike Kirsch, NESC Back-Up Principal Engineer

Orbiter Reaction Control Thruster undergoing examination for cracks by 

the Near Field Emissions Electron Microscope in the Electron Optics 

Laboratory, Glenn Research Center

Technical Accomplishments
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 2

Cure-in-Place Ablative Applicator

Problem: NESC was requested to evaluate the technology 

readiness level of the Cure-in-Place Ablative Applicator 

utilizing STA-54, and to determine if the proposed system is 

suffi ciently mature to perform an extravehicular activity (EVA) 

demonstration during the fl ight of STS-121. 

NESC Contribution: NESC determined the STA-54 material 

formulation, processing, storage, and cure practices generate 

potential for gas bubble formation during the dispensing and 

cure cycles. If left uncharacterized or controlled, it could impact 

the performance of an on-orbit tile repair.

NESC concluded STA-54 is suffi ciently characterized to meet 

the identifi ed materials science evaluation objectives for the 

planned STS-121 EVA. The completed ground-based material 

and process sensitivity studies provide confi dence that 

dispensed STA-54 can vacuum cure and provide acceptable 

thermal performance data with a range of gas bubble volume 

fraction. However, the planned STS-121 STA-54 application 

is considered a precursor to future on-orbit demonstrations 

that will evaluate the combined effects of microgravity, space 

vacuum, material/tool performance, and operations techniques. 

Additional material and process sensitivity studies are required 

to complete characterization of STA-54 as an effective onorbit tile repair technique. NESC continues to provide technical 

oversight of STA-54 development in the areas of gas bubble 

formation prediction, STA-54/tile thermal expansion mismatch 

evaluation, and material uncured material compatibility/toxicity 

concerns.

Lesson Learned: Operational assumptions and boundary 

conditions set in the development phase have long-term 

implications that should be periodically revisited at interim 

design reviews to ensure the continued viability of the proposed 

design solution.

Technical Accomplishments

Onboard a KC-135 aircraft, astronaut Robert L. Curbeam

rehearses extravehicular activity tasks for repairing

damaged Shuttle tiles

Repairing of damaged Shuttle tiles: testing the application of STA-54 Cure-in-Place 

Ablative Applicator to simulated damage of the Orbiter’s thermal protection tiles
2 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Gaseous Hydrogen Vent Arm Behavior Prediction Model Review

Problem: The gaseous hydrogen (GH2) vent arm is a launch 

pad structure designed to support the Ground Umbilical Carrier 

Panel (GUCP) and seven-inch hydrogen vent line fl exhose 

during Shuttle processing. At T-0, the GUCP separates from 

the Shuttle external tank by means of a pyrotechnic device, and 

the arm drops away from the vehicle and into a restraint. During 

the STS-108 launch, the arm failed to engage the restraining 

device and impacted the pad structure with resultant damage 

to both the arm and the pad. Debris was also liberated during 

the incident, which could have caused signifi cant damage to 

the Shuttle fl ight vehicle had it made contact. The GH2 vent 

arm restraining device was modifi ed and wind constraints 

established in the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) to minimize 

the possibility of wind loads defl ecting the arm and causing 

another mishap. Recent review of the math model created to 

validate this change resulted in a reduction of the LCC allowable 

vent arm wind limit from 34 knots to 24 knots. 

Hydrogen vent arm in the launch configuration

NESC Contribution: The Kennedy Space Center Independent 

Technical Authority and Ground Operations Chief Engineer’s 

offi ce requested an NESC review of the math model to ensure 

it is not providing overly conservative or restrictive results. 

NESC reviewed and validated a computer simulation used to 

predict GH2 vent arm behavior under wind loading.

Several concerns surfaced during the review. The winds 

are measured at the 60 foot level, not at the 250 foot level 

where the arm is located. The model did not account for 

wear and free-play in the arm joint mechanism, nor was the 

model fully validated. It was recommended to upgrade the 

wind measurement equipment at the launch pads to better 

characterize the wind speed and direction at the vent arm and 

additional testing be performed to validate the model. NESC 

concurred with the recommendation to lower the LCC for future 

Shuttle missions.
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 2

Problem: The Space Shuttle Reaction Jet Driver (RJD) 

avionics boxes control the thrusters that are used to maneuver 

the vehicle. A failed-on primary thruster for as little as two 

seconds during mated operations with the International Space 

Station could be catastrophic. The zero-fault tolerant RJD 

circuit design violates Space Shuttle Program requirements for 

a two-fault tolerance of critical systems. In addition, potential 

age degradation of RJD transistors and wiring were unknown. 

NESC Contribution: NESC conducted extensive reviews, 

analyses, tests, and inspections to determine the RJD 

inadvertent fi ring risk. The testing of fl own RJD transistors 

revealed no age concerns, and a modifi ed box-level health 

check was instituted.

Lesson Learned: When extending components beyond 

their original design life, adequate screens for aging and/or 

degradation should be performed.

Peer Review of the Flight Rationale for

Expected Debris Assessment

Problem: Work recently completed by the Orbiter and 

External Tank (ET) engineering teams indicated that the Space 

Shuttle System could not be fully certifi ed for fl ight through 

expected foam or ice debris liberated from the ET. Therefore, 

the fl ight rationale must be based on an accepted risk strategy. 

The Space Shuttle Program requested that NESC perform a 

peer review of the fl ight rationale strategy and the supporting 

engineering data.

NESC Contribution: NESC assessed the fl ight rationale logic 

for expected debris and identifi ed the limitations and gaps in 

the supporting engineering data. The assessment included the 

standard deterministic methods to compute C/E, the Orbiter 

impact capability margin, where C is the impact capability of 

the Orbiter’s reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) and tile, and E is 

the foam and ice debris environment; and the Monte Carlobased probabilistic estimate of the likelihood of critical impact 

of foam and ice debris damage to the Orbiter.

The probability of critical damage to the Orbiter nose cap 

and wing leading edge RCC was found to be suffi ciently low 

enough to classify the risk as remote or improbable, depending 

on the debris source. Additionally, the higher risk of critical 

damage to Orbiter tiles from sources of foam debris and from 

ice debris (feedline brackets, mid and aft feedline bellows, and 

umbilicals) are categorized as infrequent. However, the ice 

controls specifi ed in the Launch Commit Criteria are deemed 

adequate to render the risks acceptable. As new data becomes 

available from STS-114, the probabilistic risk assessment will 

need to be updated.

(continued on next page)

Orbiter primary thrusters (three primary thrusters are visible closest to the 

nose cap on Endeavour)

Reaction Jet Driver electronics box

Space Shuttle Reaction Jet Driver

Technical Accomplishments

“NESC flight rationale recommendations were 

recognized by the Space Shuttle Program as valueadded, and were implemented into the final results.” 

– John Stadler, NESC Systems Engineering Office
28 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Lesson Learned: Comparing the operational environment 

with the certifi cation requirements of a spacecraft, and 

resolving any discrepancies, must be a continuous process 

throughout the life of the spacecraft. 

Areas examined during NESC peer review of flight rationale

Problem: The Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake 

(R/SB) system provides steering and braking for the Orbiter 

during descent and landing. An investigation was initiated 

after an inspection of the Discovery actuators was performed 

revealing damage to the gears that appeared to be propagated 

by a corrosion pitting mechanism. 

NESC Contribution: NESC was requested by the Space 

Shuttle Program management to help determine what 

consequences could result from operating with the damaged 

hardware and to determine the cause of this damage. To 

investigate the causes of this damage and to determine the 

potential consequences, NESC formulated a detailed plan to 

examine the background and root causes of the damage. This 

knowledge, along with testing and analysis, was then applied 

to quantify the effects of this damage on system performance 

and margins of safety. This was accomplished through 

fundamental experiments, bench tests, analysis, and system 

level testing. The analysis revealed questionable assumptions 

regarding actuator-to-structure interface boundary conditions 

and the internal load distributions on planet gears and on 

individual gear teeth, resulting in a further reduction in the 

strength margin. 

NESC’s testing concluded that the micro pitting was actually 

fretting damage on the gears caused by high cycle, small dither 

motions at light loads mainly accumulated during powered 

Orbiter hydraulic systems ground checkout. In addition, testing 

demonstrated that the fretting cracks do not propagate when 

exposed to high-cycle loading at high loads, and that the gears’ 

strength was essentially unchanged by the presence of the 

fretting damage. The system level test confi rmed that the gears 

with fl eet representative fretting damage and representative 

Orbiter interface stiffness can endure 1.25 times the design 

limit loads without failure or loss of effi ciency. Considering 

these conclusions, NESC recommended the Orbiter Discovery 

was safe for return to fl ight.

Lesson Learned: When conducting a subsystem qualifi cation 

Space Shuttle Orbiter Rudder/Speed Brake 

Margins of Safety Assessment

Debris Source

Debris Transport

Orbiter Thermal

Protection System Damage

(continued on next page)
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 2

Rudder/Speed Brake Actuator installed in an Orbiter tail section

Rudder/Speed Brake cut-away view

Orbiter Repair Maneuver

Technical Accomplishments

Lesson Learned: When conducting a subsystem qualifi cation 

test on fl ight hardware, it is imperative that the induced 

environment conditions, and interface boundary conditions 

of fl ight and ground operations are accounted for and well 

understood. 

Problem: The Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) is a complex 

and hazardous human/robotic contingency operation developed 

to support the repair of entry-critical Thermal Protection 

System (TPS) tiles and reinforced carbon-carbon damage at 

locations that cannot be reached with the Orbiter docked to the 

International Space Station (ISS) by either the Shuttle’s or the 

Space Station’s robotic arms. The ORM is intended to undock 

and position the Orbiter such that nearly 100 percent of the TPS 

tile is within reach of an extravehicular activity (EVA) astronaut 

positioned on the Space Station’s robotic arm. The ORM is 

a contigency operation involving close proximity movements 

of SSP and ISS structure with limited back-out opportunities 

and reduced crew visibility. There is also a high potential for 

adverse control-structure interactions possibly resulting in large 

or unstable relative motion between the Orbiter and the EVA 

astronaut at the repair worksite. 

NESC Contribution: NASA conducted an independent peer 

review of the ORM. The primary review objective was to assess 

the status, depth, and completeness of the pre-return-to-fl ight 

ORM dynamic modeling, simulation, and analysis work, as well 

as to assess the overall operational readiness of the ORM. 

NESC found that while a signifi cant amount of analysis had 

already been performed, some critical open work remained 

for the ORM Working Group and a number of these tasks 

would need to be completed prior to safely invoking the ORM 

as a viable on-orbit contingency. NESC provided additional 

recommendations that needed to be addressed prior to the 

fi rst use of the ORM. In particular, NESC provided specifi c 

recommendations primarily focused on re-validating the 

stability robustness and rate damping performance of the 

ISS attitude control system used during the ORM. NESC also 

recommended that an independent validation of the ORM 

integrated, multi-body end-to-end dynamic software simulation 

be completed prior to fi rst use of the ORM.

Lesson Learned: An early-on analytical checkpoint in the 

assessment of control system stability is the demonstration 

Output Ring Gear

(Rotors)

Fixed Ring Gears

(Stators)

Planet Gear

Sun Gear

Jack Shaft

Left Input Shaft

(Inboard) 

Right Input Shaft

(Outboard)

Fixed Ring Gears

(Stators)

Planet Gear

(continued on next page)
0 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Illustration of Orbiter Thermal Protection System repair extravehicular activity; the Orbiter maintains position with its arm 

while the astronaut is on the end of the International Space Station arm

Lesson Learned: An early-on analytical checkpoint in the 

assessment of control system stability is the demonstration 

of a high-degree of correlation and agreement between 

linear and non-linear dynamic modeling results. A clear and 

straightforward technical rationale, based upon an in-depth 

physical understanding of the system’s dynamics, is required to 

reconcile signifi cant deviations between linear and non-linear 

modeling results.

“NESC team members were able to engage in a very 

detailed and productive technical dialogue from 

two very distinct sets of viewpoints and engineering 

experiences - that of Robotic Spacecraft control system 

designers and that of Human Space Flight control system 

designers. The diversity of both technical experiences 

and design guidelines helped NESC to draw out and 

focus on the critical issue, such as the very low phase 

margins in the International Space Station controller. 

Very spirited discussions about the degree to which the 

results obtained from the linear and the non-linear 

dynamic models should agree transpired. This led to 

the ORM team going back and doing a detailed reexamination and comparison between their models. 

This had a positive result of providing data that 

added a significant level of confidence that there will 

be adequate ISS controller stability during the ORM 

maneuvers should they need to be performed.” 

– Neil Dennehy, NESC Discipline Expert for GNC
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

Problem: The recurring anomalies review was a proactive 

activity to surface hidden risk in advance of a critical failure by 

applying fresh engineering talent and new insight to recurrent 

problems. An additional goal was to “connect the dots” in a 

manner that events had not been previously related before they 

manifested themselves as failures. 

NESC Contribution: Six discipline-centered technical 

sub-teams were formed including mechanisms, structures, 

electrical, fl uids, propulsion, and software. The teams began 

their work with a review of recurrent problems surfaced by the 

program data mining activities. Information was also drawn 

from the programs’ various problem reporting databases, 

briefi ngs, technical summaries, etc. The Space Shuttle 

Program (SSP) assessment was completed in January 2005, 

while the International Space Station analysis is complete and 

in the process of being compiled.

NESC’s SSP assessment surfaced 26 technical issues for 

further action and 12 non-technical issues resulting in 63 

recommendations. Two identifi ed areas of concern – solid 

rocket motor nozzle ply lifting and solid rocket booster 

holddown post stud hang-up – are the subjects of the NESC 

parallel assessments. Six of the technical issues required SSP 

Problem: The Cassini/Huygens mission is a joint effort 

between NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) to 

explore Saturn and its satellites. NASA experts voiced concerns 

to NESC about portions of the Huygens probe entry, descent, 

and landing (EDL), based on experience and lessons learned. 

NESC Contribution: NESC was actively involved in the 

EDL analysis focusing on the parachute deployment trigger 

performance and the resultant effects on the operation of 

the parachute system. NESC also evaluated ESA’s prediction 

of the aerodynamic and radiative heating environment to be 

encountered by the probe at Titan and the corresponding 

Thermal Protection System response. NESC’s assessment of 

the Huygens probe EDL on Titan included a data review and 

independent analyses. 

action prior to the STS-114 to return to fl ight.

Lesson Learned: Future problem reporting databases should 

be designed to facilitate proactive trending and analysis, while 

minimizing inconsistencies in record identifi ers and maximizing 

comparisons across programs and projects.

The recurring anomalies review highlighted areas for additional 

program disposition, such as the solid rocket booster holddown 

post stud hang-up issue illustrated above

Cassini/Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, 

and Landing

Technical Accomplishments

tEChNiCAl ACCompliShmENtS

Major Technical Assessments Completed

Space Shuttle Program and International Space Station Recurring Anomalies Review

Cassini Spacecraft with Huygens Probe visible on the left 

(continued on next page) behind the gold foil covered heat shield
2 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: The Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared 

Astronomy (SOFIA) modifi cation to a NASA Boeing 747SP 

airplane includes a large open cavity in the aft fuselage 

section that is larger than any previously fl own open cavity. 

Despite numerous wind tunnel tests and extensive analysis, 

there remain uncertainties regarding the acoustic environment 

within the cavity, especially in the off nominal failed door 

open descent fl ight regime, where some degree of acoustic 

resonance is expected to occur.

NESC Contribution: NESC was requested to determine if the 

approach taken by the SOFIA Project in the analysis, structural 

design, and proposed approach to fl ight test were sound and 

conservative.

The SOFIA project appropriately accounted for and designed 

an aperture treatment for fl ow control to mitigate or suppress 

telescope cavity resonances. There are uncertainties whether an 

uncontrolled cavity resonance will occur if the cavity door failed 

to close during descent to landing from cruise altitude. These 

uncertainties are mitigated through a thorough, incremental 

building-block approach to opening the door during the fl ight 

test phase of the program. Flight test planning indicates a 

cautious approach to hazardous testing and to areas where 

uncertainties exist. The cavity acoustic fatigue analysis and 

damage tolerance analysis was started, but not completed, 

during the time period of this assessment. The validity of some 

The Stratospheric Observatory for 

Infrared Astronomy

Workers lower the infrared telescope into the cavity of the NASA Boeing 747SP 

(photo courtesy of L3)

“The Technical Assessment requestor stated a concern 

over the potential for structural damage caused 

by an acoustical resonance occurring at or near 

a structural mode. A worst-case scenario is that 

cavity Rossiter mode frequencies could align with 

the frequencies of the cavity acoustic resonances 

frequencies and cavity structure vibration mode 

frequencies. If such a possibility were to occur, one 

is confronted with a ‘triple resonance’, which would 

imply the potential for a catastrophic condition.

The team performed an analysis which disclosed that 

there is only a single set of frequencies at which cavity 

resonances occur. Contrary to the initial expectation, 

these frequencies are neither the structure’s natural 

frequencies, nor the purely acoustic resonant 

frequencies of the cavity. The worst-case scenario 

places a Rossiter mode frequency at a coupled cavitystructural resonance, which is not a ‘triple resonance’ 

effect.” 

– Mike Kehoe, Former NESC Chief Engineer 

The assessment results were shared with the Cassini program 

and with the ESA. Concurrent reviews, led by the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory and ESA, relied on NESC’s EDL assessment 

results to formulate a recommendation to not change any 

mission parameter. The recommendation was accepted and 

the Huygens probe was released nominally on December 24, 

2004. A successful EDL was executed on January 14, 2005.

Lesson Learned: State-of-the-art tools and methods 

currently available to NASA, particularly in aeroheating, were 

only marginally suffi cient to conduct this assessment in the 

time allotted. Future interplanetary EDL analyses should be 

identifi ed and initiated early enough to allow adequate time to 

complete the required analysis.

of this assessment. The validity of some aspects of the 

proposed approach could not be substantiated and require 

verifi cation prior to cavity open door fl ight. 
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: The International Space Station (ISS) Program 

requested NESC support in assessing the approach and 

corrective actions proposed to address the observed chemical 

changes to the Internal Active Thermal Control System (IATCS) 

coolant chemistry, the potential for component life reduction, 

and requirements updates for crew protection. 

The water-based IATCS collects heat from sources within the 

pressurized elements that are transferred to the External Active 

Thermal Control Systems via externally mounted ammonia-towater Interface Heat Exchangers. The U.S. Laboratory IATCS 

on-orbit coolant chemistry has experienced deviation outside 

specifi cation limits due to a combination of a high partial 

pressure of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the gas permeable Tefl on 

hoses used in the IATCS. Diffusion of CO2 through the fl exible 

hoses lowered the coolant pH and resulted in increased microbe 

population, hardware corrosion, and precipitate formation. 

Concerns were raised that continued elevated microbial levels 

and precipitation in the IATCS fl uid could lead to fouling-related 

issues, galvanic and/or microbial corrosion, and reductions in 

cold plate/HX effi ciencies. 

NESC Contribution: NESC recommended seven 

antimicrobials for additional evaluations and characterization 

against the reference antimicrobial of glutaralde hyde. Additional 

collateral recommendations were provided on synergistic 

components of the IATCS coolant chemistry that included: 

borate/carbonate buffer additions, returned U.S. Laboratory 

hardware examination, and Nickel Removal Assembly and 

Phosphorous Removal Assembly characterization and 

implementation.

Lesson Learned: Closed-loop water-based cooling systems 

should not use gas permeable tubing and servicing units should 

be governed by the same confi guration and coolant controls 

as fl ight systems to minimize the introduction of uncontrolled 

contaminants, microorganisms, and nutrients that could allow 

unanticipated changes to coolant stability.

International Space Station Internal Active Thermal Control 

System Cooling Water Chemistry

Technical Accomplishments

U.S. Laboratory module of the International Space Station
4 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: NESC provided sequential assessments concerning 

the nickel hydrogen (NiH2) battery charge capacity prediction 

methodology and the current and anticipated state of the 

spacecraft subsystem health to support a robotic servicing 

mission (SM). 

NESC Contribution: In the initial consultation, the proposed 

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) NiH2 battery capacity prediction 

tool was viewed as conservative with the Hollandsworth/

Armantrout model as having the greatest likelihood of accurately 

estimating the HST battery capacity over time. The second 

assessment involved the request to analyze the spacecraft 

subsystems and the parameters that describe the HST health 

to determine the timeliness of a robotic SM and whether a 

robotic SM is likely to provide the capability to extend the 

useful scientifi c life of HST by fi ve years. 

NESC concluded that there was a high likelihood of having a 

viable vehicle available for a robotic SM. Following successful 

equipment and instrument replacement during an optimized 

SM, the potential for at least fi ve additional years of science 

discovery is very good. Overall, NESC observed the HST 

Program to be a resourceful team with extensive corporate 

knowledge that has repeatedly demonstrated the ability 

to react to, and plan for, adverse conditions. A number of 

innovation applications of HST systems to non-traditional roles 

are considered in fault planning. The HST team has operations 

rooted in established procedures and a layered approach to 

anomaly recognition and disposition.

Lesson Learned: The proper selection, preservation, and 

development of an operations and sustaining engineering 

workforce is critical in the identifi cation of emerging performance 

trends and the generation of innovative corrective actions.

Hubble Space Telescope

Hubble Space Telescope Nickel Hydrogren Battery Charge Capacity Prediction 

Review and System Health Assessment

Nickel hydrogen battery ground test unit undergoing long term capacity 

testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: NESC was requested to determine associated 

risks and potential acceptance rationale of not performing 

post proof nondestructive evaluation (NDE) on fi ve European 

manufactured International Space Station modules.

NESC Contribution: These modules were considered 

pressure loaded structures and not pressure vessels, thus 

allowing the use of leak-before-burst (LBB) criteria as a 

substitute for post proof NDE. The reliance on LBB criteria 

reduces the potential for detection of unacceptable weld fl aws 

that could extend to a critical crack size and module rupture 

without adequate operational controls. In addition, the original 

structural analysis did not incorporate local stress magnifi cations 

from allowable weld peaking and mismatch features.

NESC recommended performing limited post proof inspections 

and specialized analyses to assess both the weld-as-designed 

and nonconformance conditions. This approach was 

augmented with empirical testing and statistical examination of 

inspection data from applicable welded structures.

Lesson Learned: While the use of LBB criteria as a design 

characteristic is acceptable, complex welded structures should 

be assessed using safe-life analysis techniques that utilize post 

proof NDE results, and incorporate weld drawing/specifi cation 

dimensional discontinuities.

Lynn Hoffland prepares a test coupon for residual stress assessment

Multi-purpose logistics module in the Space Station 

Processing Facility at Kennedy Space Center

International Space Station Module Post Proof Nondestructive Evaluation

Technical Accomplishments

Chris McGougan, Marshall Space Flight Center, performs a weld peaking 

and mismatch measurement of a simulated International Space Station 

Aluminum Variable Polarity Plasma Arc weld
 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: The International Space Station (ISS) developed a 

small over board leak in a window purge metal bellows fl ex 

hose. Conditions that contributed to the diffi cultly in determining 

the leak rate and locating the leak site were: the leak rate was 

well below the ISS leak rate procedural plan for leak isolation; 

the leak rate was within pressure sensors accuracies; direct 

nitrogen (N2) measurement was less than every two weeks 

(to extend sensor life); the leak event occurred during a time 

period with oxygen (O2) pressure variations; and there was not 

an accurate ground console calculation for daily leak rate. 

NESC Contribution: NESC recommended to the ISS 

Program Leak Team to improve the accuracy of atmospheric 

leak detection and leak measurement capabilities by creating 

a ground console automatic N2 mass daily trending model. 

NESC recommended maintaining a continuous N2 pressure 

reading with the mass spectrometer and resetting the trend 

curve after each ISS platform attitude change, and after the 

addition of N2. 

NESC identifi ed the need for fl exible seals in irregular surfaces 

of the module, and also the need for an infrared camera to 

aid in identifying the location of potential leaks and thermal 

problems. NESC further observed that attitude changes affect 

internal air temperature gradients for less than six hours after 

the change. ISS N2 and O2 storage tanks need temperature 

sensors and thermal attitude trending to provide early leak 

detection. Each tank should have a remote control isolation 

valve. 

Cosmonaut and International Space Station - Expedition One crew member 

Yuri Gidzenko examines the ISS laboratory window and flex hose 

(visible at top of window)

Improved Methods for Air Leak Detection on the International Space Station

ISS Window Flex Hose
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: The liquid hydrogen (LH2) Engine Cut-off (ECO) 

Sensors are thermal mass loss devices located at the bottom of 

the External Tank (ET). They are used to detect low propellant 

levels. The device is intended to protect the Space Shuttle 

Main Engine turbo-pumps from operating without fuel (dry). 

Testing of the sensors at cryogenic conditions during STS-114 

launch countdown resulted in intermittent operation, with a 

failure mode that forces the ECO sensor electronics to falsely 

report the presence of fuel (wet) when there is none (dry).

NESC Contribution: NESC assisted with troubleshooting 

the ECO sensor problem and participated in the electronics 

analysis, ET thermal modeling, and sensor electronics thermal 

analysis.

A more detailed understanding of the ECO sensor and 

associated electronics was obtained, contributing to confi dence 

to proceed with the launch of STS-114, even though the root 

cause of the failure was not identifi ed.

An additional theory regarding the intermittent nature of the 

ECO sensor failure has been posited, focusing on the sensor 

terminals and the thermal conditioning environment seen prior 

to fl ight. This theory is currently being investigated further by 

NESC.

Support STS-114 Gap Filler Anomalies

Tiger Team Investigation

Problem: An on-orbit video inspection performed during the 

STS-114 mission of Orbiter Discovery revealed that several 

Thermal Protection System gap fi llers were protruding between 

tiles on Discovery’s underbelly, requiring an extravehicular 

activity by the crew to remove them. The Orbiter Project Offi ce 

created the Gap Filler Anomalies Tiger Team and requested 

that NESC work with this team in fi nding solutions to the gap 

fi ller bonding problem.

NESC Contribution: NESC worked closely with the Tiger 

Team’s investigation to understand the current gap fi ller bonding 

techniques that led to Discovery’s STS-114 protrusions, and 

development of improved gap fi ller bonding techniques and 

fl eet-wide gap fi ller integrity checks. NESC performed an 

independent statistical review of a Design of Experiments (DOE) 

brought forward from within the Tiger Team to substantiate the 

new gap fi ller bonding process.

The NESC DOE investigated the infl uence between bond 

strength, gap fi ller layers, technicians, and quality control 

personnel. To determine if the pull loads applied to gap fi llers 

during installation and verifi cation tests are being transferred to 

the bond line, NESC developed a fi nite element analysis model 

to provide the Tiger Team confi dence in its assumptions. While 

the new bonding and verifi cation technique will increase the 

gap fi ller-to-Orbiter bond, the integrity of previously installed 

gap fi llers throughout the fl eet will be ensured by a robust 

verifi cation technique. 

(Lower Left) Gap filler undergoing the newly developed bonding process; 

tape is used to provide the necessary force to ensure gap filler 

bondline contact 

(Lower Right) STS-114 Astronaut Steve Robinson holds the gap filler 

removed from Discovery’s Thermal Protection System

tEChNiCAl ACCompliShmENtS

Status of NESC Work In Progress

Engine Cut-Off Sensor 

Anomaly Consultation

Engine Cut-Off Point Sensor Electronics Box stimulates ECO 

Sensors and conditions signals received from them for processing by 

thE Orbiter and ground computers

Technical Accomplishments
8 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

AN-Type Fittings in the International Space Station Node 2 Ammonia System

Problem: A concern was presented to NESC due to the Air 

Force-Navy (AN) fi ttings used in ground support systems 

at Kennedy Space Center having a history of leaking. The 

International Space Station (ISS) Node 2 element also utilizes 

AN fi ttings to connect its ammonia system piping together. 

The ISS ammonia system accepts the heat from critical ISS 

systems and rejects the heat by circulating ammonia through 

radiators which radiate the heat to space. A potential personnel 

hazard can occur should this system leak during ground 

processing. Depending on the type and severity of leakage 

on-orbit, the ammonia system could require more than the 

planned execution for replenishment or disablement of critical 

ISS systems.

NESC Contribution: NESC reviewed the assembly and 

testing documentation and a chronology of the documentation 

revealed a number of discrepancies and irregularities. Based 

on the issues raised by the documentation review, NESC 

recommended to the ISS Program that a Node 2 ammonia 

system pressure decay test be conducted to determine the 

system’s integrity. This test was conducted with satisfactory 

results. It was also discovered that the ammonia system AN 

fi ttings were qualifi ed by similarity with a much smaller AN 

fi tting that was used in a different system and environment.

An exact chronological order of assembly and testing events 

was established based on interviews with personnel who 

participated in the Node 2 assembly and test. NESC developed 

and conducted a “mimic” test at Glenn Research Center, 

which tested a fl ight-like hardware confi guration through all 

the pressurizations, depressurizations, and vibrations that 

the actual Node 2 hardware would encounter from initial 

assembly through on-orbit operations. Qualifi cation launch 

vibrations were substituted for actual launch vibrations due to 

the aforementioned issues with qualifi cation by similarity. All of 

these mimic tests had satisfactory results.

Preliminary NESC fi ndings indicate that the current conditions of 

the AN fi ttings in the Node 2 ammonia system are acceptable 

to support ground and fl ight operations.

AN fitting being prepared for helium leak test
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER Technical Accomplishments 

Problem: NESC received an anonymous request to examine 

and assess the Space Station to Shuttle Power Transfer 

System (SSPTS). The SSPTS is being designed to take 120 

Volt Direct Current (VDC) International Space Station (ISS) 

power and send it to the Space Shuttle where it is connected 

to the Shuttle’s 28VDC main power bus after being converted 

to 28VDC via the Shuttle’s Power Transfer Unit (PTU). The 

requestor was concerned that there might be little to no 

supporting data that demonstrates the control of two potential 

hazards. The hazards could result in an overvoltage condition 

on the Space Shuttle main power bus, thus leading to a 

disabled Shuttle on-orbit. The concerns include whether an 

internal short circuit in the PTU that results in 120VDC at the 

Space Shuttle power buses will present a hazard to the Space 

Shuttle, and whether the Station design assures that it will not 

transmit more than 120VDC to the Shuttle due to a Station 

failure. 

NESC Contribution: NESC initially reviewed prior analyses 

performed by the Shuttle Program, noting that these analyses 

found that three failures must occur to

Space Station to Shuttle Power Transfer System

cause an overvoltage on the Shuttle’s 28VDC main power 

bus. They concluded that the design meets the dual fault 

tolerant requirement per the safety requirements for avionics 

on catastrophic hazards. NESC then performed an extensive 

independent system analysis to assess whether an internal 

short circuit in the PTU or Station transmission of more than 

120VDC could result in a credible overvoltage hazard to the 

Space Shuttle.

The team further analyzed various two-fault possibilities to 

verify that the latest architecture of the SSPTS tolerates two 

faults successfully and prevents the two hazards mentioned 

above. 

Preliminary NESC fi ndings indicate that the current conditions 

concluded that the referenced hazards have been adequately 

addressed by the present design implementation, which 

incorporates two-fault protection. The concerns raised by the 

anonymous requestor were adequately addressed.

The Space Station to Shuttle Power Transfer System will extend the amount of time an Orbiter 

can remain docked to the International Space Center by four to five days
40 Technical Accomplishments NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Problem: NESC provided signifi cant support to a number 

of planetary missions, including Cassini/Huygens, Deep 

Impact, Genesis, Stardust, and the Mars Reconnaissance 

Orbiter (MRO). Specifi cally on the MRO mission that launched 

successfully to Mars on August 12, 2005, there were a 

number of issues that NESC provided in-depth independent 

technical analysis and review. The independent perspective 

provided by NESC was critical to satisfying management that 

the mission was ready for fl ight at an acceptable level of risk. 

NESC Contribution: The areas where NESC was engaged 

were: 1) ring laser gyro laser intensity monitor degradation, 

2) battery charge electronics potential single point failure that 

could overvoltage the bus and leave the batteries off-line for 

charging, and 3) solar thermal vacuum 

Risk Assessment for the Battery Charge Electronics Single Point Failure Issue on the Mars 

Reconnaissance Orbiter, Stardust Entry, and Review of a Test Anomaly Resulting in 

Contamination of Elements of Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Spacecraft

Artist rendition of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter in orbit

test contamination. The ring laser issue was resolved by 

establishing conservative screening requirements, which the 

project implemented.

After thorough analysis of the battery charge electronics failure 

mode, it was shown to not represent a single point failure 

for overvoltage. However, because the risk of the batteries 

being off-line for charging could not be fully mitigated by 

ground intervention (batteries could discharge before the next 

ground communication cycle), a change in the fault protection 

software was implemented to assure that the batteries would 

be placed on-line without the need for ground intervention. 

The work on the thermal vacuum test contamination involved 

a review of the project’s assessment and corrective action, 

which was found to be thorough and accurate. 
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 41

Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post 

Stud Hang-Up

Doug Harrington (seated) and Scott Hacker from the Energy Systems 

Test Branch of the Energy Systems Division at the Johnson Space Center 

perform tests to characterize the explosive devices that split the holddown 

post nut at launch, freeing the Space Shuttle from

 the launch pad during liftoff

Problem: The Space Shuttle is held in place on the launch pad 

by eight large stud/nut assemblies. Four of these assemblies 

are connected to each of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) 

and held to the launch pad’s holddown posts (HDP). At the 

instant of the Shuttle’s launch, the nuts are pyrotechnically 

separated which allows the studs themselves to move into 

the HDP, away from the soon to be moving Shuttle. Over the 

course of the program, some of these studs have not dropped 

out of the way fast enough and have been pinched by the 

SRBs as the Shuttle moves up and laterally. Concerns have 

been raised as to the amount of lateral loads induced by these 

hang-ups into the Shuttle components. The purpose of NESC’s 

Stud Hang-up Assessment is to determine the root causes of 

these hang-ups, and to propose recommendations to prevent 

future hang-ups.

NESC Contribution: To date, NESC has conducted a 

number of separate tests with spare fl ight hardware that have 

attempted to isolate and determine the various contributions 

of the numerous variables inherent in the design of this 

system. For example, each nut has two pyrotechnic devices 

for redundancy purposes. In a number of live fi rings, NESC 

has noted that if the pyros do not explode at the same time, 

also known as pyro skew, the time taken for the stud to get 

out of the way increases drastically. NESC has also determined 

that the causes for this skew rest almost exclusively with the 

electronic components feeding the fi ring signal to the pyros. 

Additionally, because this large pyrotechnic event happens 

entirely within an enclosure meant to contain debris, remnants 

of the nut can cause a signifi cant decrease in stud exit time 

due to re-contact with the stud. NESC also developed highfi delity simulation models and is using actual test data to refi ne 

the model. 

While testing is still in progress, it is presently clear that there 

are multiple factors that affect whether a stud hangs up. NESC 

is currently working on how to mitigate these factors. The 

benefi t of preventing future stud hang ups will resolve any 

concerns about exceeding any unanticipated loads on the 

Shuttle assembly at launch.
42

“ The NESC Academy has proven very effective in 

transferring the experience of NASA’s senior technical 

experts to the engineering community, both inside and 

outside the agency.”

— Rick Gilbrech, Former Deputy Director, NESC
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 4

NESC Acad

Through the Academy, NESC is able to communicate the 

wealth of knowledge that NASA’s senior engineers have gained 

throughout their careers by providing an outlet for them to 

share their expertise with the next generation of engineers. 

The subject matter addressed through the NESC Academy 

spans across NESC’s 15 engineering discipline areas. The 

courses, which provide an exceptional learning opportunity 

and require several months of preparation, last 2 or 3 days and 

are conducted at major colleges and universities across the 

country. Courses focus on developing technical expertise in 

problem resolution, and include classroom activities consisting 

of instruction, course related facility tours, and group problemsolving exercises. The Academy’s first class, titled Space 

Life Support Systems: Learning from the Past and Looking to 

the Future, was taught in September by Hank Rotter at The 

University of Houston Clear Lake in Houston, Texas. Two more 

courses were conducted at the end of 2005 addressing Space 

Propulsion Systems and Power & Avionics. Academy courses 

are open Agency-wide and to outside contractors. To date, 

expressed interest in 2005 courses outweighed classroom 

capacity. As a by-product of the NESC Academy, NESC plans 

to reach out to college students in an effort to foster continued 

interest in NASA, and in the field of engineering. 

The NESC Academy has uncovered a real desire within NASA 

to listen to and learn from NESC’s senior engineers. As NASA 

prepares for future great journeys, the tradition of passing on 

Lessons Learned will become increasingly important.

The NESC Academy was successfully launched in 2005 to further execute our 

commitment to engineering excellence, and to support the spirit of One NASA.

Opposite Page: Hank Rotter (above left) and George Hopson (below left) were instructors for the first two NESC Academy courses

Attendance of the Space Propulsion Systems Class was over twice what was anticipated
44 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 4

Opposite Page: Dr. Michael P. Nemeth, Senior Engineering Scientist at 

Langley Research Center, is working on a special-purpose combined-loads 

testing machine; this machine is used to study load introduction effects. 

Dr. Nemeth was awarded the NESC Engineering Excellence Award for his 

work in the area of structural mechanics as a member of the External Tank 

Independent Technical Assessment Team

NESC Honor Aw

These honorary awards formally identify individuals and groups 

who have made outstanding contributions to NESC’s mission 

and who demonstrate the following characteristics:

n Engineering and technical excellence

n Fostering an open environment

There are four NESC Honor Award categories.

NESC Director’s Award honors individuals who take 

personal accountability and ownership in initiating clear and 

open communication on diverse and controversial issues. 

A key component of this award is based on the process of 

challenging engineering truths.

NESC Engineering Excellence Award honors individual 

accomplishments of NESC job-related tasks of such magnitude 

and merit as to deserve special recognition.

NESC Leadership Award honors individuals who have had a 

pronounced effect upon the technical activities of NESC.

NESC Group Achievement Award honors a team of 

employees comprised of government and non-government 

personnel. The award is in recognition of outstanding 

accomplishment through the coordination of individual efforts 

that have contributed substantially to the success of NESC’s 

mission.

NESC honor awards are part of our incentive and recognition program. They are given 

each year to NASA Center employees, industry representatives, and other stakeholders 

for their efforts and achievements in the areas of engineering, leadership, teamwork, 

and communication.

On February 8, 2005, Langley Center Director, Roy E. Bridges, Jr. (left) 

and NESC Director, Ralph R. Roe, Jr. (right) presented Richard W. Powell 

(center) the NESC Director’s Award for outstanding direction and technical 

leadership of the Cassini/Huygens Independent Technical Assessment Team
46 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER

NESC Honor Aw

Dr. Paul M. Munafo, Former NESC Deputy Director (far right), and his wife, Ginger (far left), view his NESC Engineering 

Excellence Award during an NESC Honor Award Ceremony in 2004

NESC dir

Dewey B. Channell

(Marshall Space Flight Center) Posthumous

Honored for providing an alternate opinion, thus ensuring 

the T-0 interface was subjected to a rigorous technical 

engineering assessment.

Philip M. Deans

(Johnson Space Center)

Honored for providing an alternate opinion, thus ensuring the 

T-0 interface was subjected to a rigorous technical engineering 

assessment.

Pat B. McLaughlan

(Johnson Space Center)

Honored for submitting an alternate opinion regarding the 

safety and flight readiness of the Composite Overwrapped 

Pressure Vessels for the Space Shuttle. 

Richard W. Powell 

(Langley Research Center) 

Honored for providing outstanding direction and technical 

leadership to the Cassini/Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, and 

Landing Independent Technical Assessment Team.

Robert J. Wingate

(Marshall Space Flight Center) 

Honored for providing professional integrity and perseverance 

for challenging the prevailing certification approach to the 

External Tank’s manually sprayed “fly-as-is” foam.

NESC Honor Awards

NESC is proud to recognize the following 2005 Honor Award recipients. 
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 4

NESC n

AWAR

James E. Fesmire

(Kennedy Space Center)

Honored for engineering excellence leading to the successful 

development of the Space Shuttle External Tank Liquid Oxygen 

Feedline Sacrificial Retainer System.

Lorie Grimes-Ledesma

(Jet Propulsion Laboratory)

Honored for engineering excellence on the NESC Composite 

Overwrapped Pressure Vessels Assessment Team.

Dr. Michael P. Nemeth

(Langley Research Center)

Honored for outstanding technical contributions in the area 

of structural mechanics as a member of the External Tank 

Independent Technical Assessment Team.

NESC Honor Awards presented on June 7, 2005. Front row from left: Dr. Michael Nemeth (LaRC), Robert Wingate (MSFC), Pat McLaughlan (JSC), Kay 

Channell accepting for Dewey Channell (MSFC), Lorie Grimes-Ledesma (JPL), and Philip Deans, (JSC) Back row from left: Hank Rotter (JSC) accepting for 

Dr. Eugene Ungar (JSC), Ralph Roe, Jr. (NESC Director/presenter), Dr. Stuart Phoenix (Cornell University), Andreas Dibbern (KSC) accepting for James 

Fesmire (KSC), and Jerry Ross (NESC Chief Astronaut/presenter)

Tim Wilson, NESC Chief Engineer from Kennedy Space Center, accepts 

the NESC Group Achievement Award on behalf of the NESC Recurring 

Anomalies Review Team

NESC Honor Awards

Dr. Eugene K. Ungar

(Johnson Space Center)

Honored for outstanding technical contributions in the area of 

fluids/thermodynamic analysis as a member of the External 

Tank Assessment and NESC Flight Rationale for Expected 

Debris Peer Review Team.

Dr. Stuart L. Phoenix

(Cornell University)

Honored for engineering excellence on the NESC Composite 

Overwrapped Pressure Vessels Assessment Team.
48 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Flowliner Independent Technical Assessment Te

Honored for exemplary contributions conducting unique 

engineering analyses and tests to independently assess the 

flowliner cracking problem.

Flowliner Inspection Te

Honored for exemplary contributions developing an edge 

replication method to inspect slots for surface defects and 

fatigue cracks.

Cassini/Huygens Probe, Entry, Descent, and Land

Independent Technical Assessment T

Honored for exemplary contributions in the modeling of the 

Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, and Landing on Titan.

Composite Pressure Vessel Safety for Flight Concern

Independent Technical Assessment T

Honored for providing engineering excellence in resolving 

difficult technical questions related to a potentially catastrophic 

failure mode of Kevlar Composite Overwrapped Pressure 

Vessels.

NESC Group Achievement Award presented by Dr. Julian M. Earls, Director of 

Glenn Research Center, on August 30, 2005 to members of NESC’s Recurring 

Anomalies Review Team and NESC’s Reaction Jet Drivers Independent Technical 

Assessment Team

On February 8, 2005, Langley Research Center Director, Roy Bridges, Jr., and NESC 

Director, Ralph Roe, Jr., presented the NESC Group Achievement Award to the 

Cassini/Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, and Landing Independent Technical 

Assessment Team

NESC Honor Awards

NESC GROUP ACHIEVEMENT AWA
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 4

Management and Technical Suppor

Office Staff Awar

Honored for creating the business, administrative, and financial 

infrastructure for NESC.

Liquid Oxygen Feedline Bellows Ice Preven

Tea

Honored for developing alternative solutions for the prevention 

of ice on the External Tank Liquid Oxygen Feedline Bellows.

Recurring Anomalies Review T

Honored for the team’s efforts to independently review the Space 

Shuttle and International Space Station Programs’ recurring 

anomalies to proactively identify technical vulnerabilities.

Reaction Jet Drivers Independent Techni

Assessment Tea

Honored for outstanding contributions to the independent 

technical assessment of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction 

Jet Driver inadvertent thruster firing hazard.

Most of the Flowliner ITA Team members are pictured above. Dr. Charles E. Harris, Principal Engineer leading the team effort,

presented the awards on November 14, 2004

The first NESC Group Achievement Awards were presented at Langley 

Research Center to the Flowliner Inspection Team; team members pictured 

above are Scott A. Willard, William T. Howard, and John A. Newman

NESC Honor Awards
5
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 5

NESC leadershi

Rotation

To meet this objective, the NESC organizational model provides 

for a formal leadership rotation.

A key component to the continued success of this organizational 

model is that leadership assignments are limited to approximately 

2 years, allowing members to broaden their experiences and 

perspectives before returning to key leadership roles at NASA 

Centers. The NESC knowledge base also greatly benefits from 

the expertise and fresh perspectives that members bring to 

NESC during their rotations.

Members have entered the leadership team from positions 

across NASA and external to the Agency. During their rotations, 

members are afforded many opportunities that they might not 

otherwise gain exposure to during their careers. Some of the 

rewards alumni cite from participation on NESC’s leadership 

team include:

n Opportunities to interact with some of the best technical 

experts in NASA

n Involvement in an increased number of projects and NASA 

programs

n Increased advancement opportunities following 

completion of their NESC assignment

Since 2003, 46 percent of the NESC leadership team 

completed their rotations and have moved into other leadership 

positions within NASA. These individuals have made significant 

contributions to NESC, and their rotation experiences will 

Engineering excellence is the foundation of our charter. A fundamental

objective for an organization driven by excellence is to promote exceptional leadership. 

Opposite Page: In the Kennedy Space Center Payload Hazardous Servicing 

Facility, the Mars Reconnaisance Orbiter is ready to be encapsulated before 

moving to the launch pad

Right Page: Rick Gilbrech accepting his new position as Deputy Director, 

Langley Research Center

positively support their future career endeavors.

“Strong, focused leadership is paramount in 

maintaining the core principles of NESC.” 

— Steve Gentz, NESC Principal Engineer

“I am pleased to have Rick as my partner to lead 

Langley Research Center into the next hundred years 

of flight.” 

— Lesa B. Roe, Director, NASA Langley Research Center
52 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER

During the NESC Conference held at Redondo Beach, California. Neil Dennehy, NESC Discipline Expert for Guidance, Navigation, and Control, Mike Hagopian, NESC Chief 

Engineer at Goddard Space Flight Center, and Tim Wilson, NESC Chief Engineer from Kennedy Space Center exchange information regarding NESC activities

“My experience at NESC was very positive, and enabled me 

to interact with NASA’s best expertise across not only my 

specific discipline, but the broad range of expertise represented 

within NESC. This has helped broaden my background 

and understanding of the various NASA programs, the 

engineering technical base, and the Agency’s culture from 

Center to Center. It has been a privilege to be associated 

with such an outstanding group of people who are so focused 

on improving safety and mission success.”

– Steve Labbe, Acting NESC Discipline Expert for Flight Sciences, Johnson 

Space Flight Center

NESC Leadership Team

Members of the NESC Leadership Team resident at Johnson Space Center (left to right): 

Steve Labbe, Hank Rotter and Julie Kramer White participate remotely via video 

conference in an NESC meeting
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC leadershi

Biographies

NASA HQ SENIOR S&MA

INTEGRATION MANAGER

Wayne R. Frazier

NASA HQ OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

ENGINEER REPRESENTATIVE

Keith L. Hudkins

PRINCIPAL

ENGINEERS OFFICE

Clinton H. Cragg

Steven J. Gentz

Charles E. Harris

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Ralph R. Roe, Jr.

Director

Richard J. Gilbrech

Deputy Director

Kenneth D. Cameron

Deputy Director For Safety

Jerry L. Ross (JSC)

Chief Astronaut

David S. Leckrone (GSFC)

Chief Scientist

NESC CHIEF ENGINEERS (NCE)

Stephen F. Cash

Derrick J. Cheston

Dennis B. Dillman

Michael G. Gilbert

Michael Hagopian

David A. Hamilton

Michael W. Kehoe

Dean A. Kontinos

Brian K. Muirhead

Shamim A. Rahman

Timmy R. Wilson

MSFC

GRC

HQ

LaRC

GSFC

JSC

DFRC

ARC

JPL

SSC

KSC

NESC DISCIPLINE EXPERTS (NDE)

Cornelius J. Dennehy (GSFC)

Edward R. Generazio (LaRC)

George D. Hopson (MSFC)

Robert A. Kichak (GSFC)

Julie A. Kramer White (JSC)

Steven G. Labbe ((JSC)

John P. McManamen (JSC)

Cynthia H. Null (ARC)

Robert S. Piascik (LaRC)

Ivatury S. Raju (LaRC)

Henry A. Rotter (JSC)

Steven S. Scott (GSFC)

GNC

NDE

PROPULSION

POWER & AVIONICS

MECHANICAL ANALYSIS

FLIGHT SCIENCES

MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

HUMAN FACTORS

MATERIALS

STRUCTURES

FLUIDS/LIFE SUPPORT/THERMAL

SOFTWARE

SYSTEMS

ENGINEERING OFFICE

Dawn M. Schaible

Manager

MANAGEMENT AND

TECHNICAL SUPPORT OFFICE

Marc S. Hollander

Manager

NESC Leadership Team
4 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

biogrAphiES

Dr. Richard J. Gilbrech

NESC Deputy Director

OFFICE OF ThE DIRECTOR

Ralph R. Roe, Jr

NESC Director

Dr. Richard J. Gilbrech was NESC’s 

Deputy Director at Langley Research 

Center (LaRC). Dr. Gilbrech joined 

NESC at its beginning as a Principal 

Engineer from Stennis Space Center, 

where he served as Manager of 

the Program Integration Offi ce 

responsible for NASA’s rocket 

propulsion test facilities. Dr. Gilbrech 

has 14 years of combined experience 

in NASA propulsion, propulsion testing, 

and the Space Shuttle Program.

In October 2005, Dr. Gilbrech was 

selected as Langley Research Center’s 

Deputy Director.

Mr. Ralph R. Roe, Jr. serves as 

NESC’s Director at Langley Research 

Center (LaRC). Mr. Roe has over 22 

years of experience in human space 

fl ight program management, technical 

management, and test engineering. 

Mr. Roe previously held several key 

positions in the Space Shuttle Program, 

including Vehicle Engineering Manager, 

Launch Director, and Kennedy Space 

Center Engineering Director.

NESC Leadership Team
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Kenneth d. Cameron

NESC Deputy Director for Safety

Jerry l. ross, Colonel

NESC Chief Astronaut

dr. david S. leckrone

NESC Chief Scientist

Mr. Kenneth D. Cameron is an Astronaut 

and NESC’s Deputy Director for Safety 

at Langley Research Center (LaRC). 

Mr. Cameron was formerly an NESC 

Principal Engineer serving at LaRC. Mr. 

Cameron joined NESC after 7 years in 

private industry and a career in the U.S. 

Marine Corps. Mr. Cameron has over 

25 years of experience in aeronautics 

and astronautics as a Naval Aviator, Test 

Pilot, and Astronaut, and is the veteran 

of three Space Shuttle missions: Pilot 

of STS-37 and Commander of STS-56 

and STS-74.

Mr. Jerry L. Ross is NESC’s Chief 

Astronaut and is resident at Johnson 

Space Center (JSC). In addition to 

Mr. Ross’ NESC assignment, he will 

continue in his current position as Chief 

of the Vehicle Integration Test Offi ce 

at JSC. With over 35 years of fl ight, 

technical, and managerial experience 

with the U.S. Air Force and Shuttle 

Program, Mr. Ross is the veteran of 

seven Shuttle fl ights, including nine 

extravehicular activities, and was a 

Flight Test Engineer prior to joining 

NASA in 1979.

Dr. David S. Leckrone is NESC’s 

Chief Scientist and is resident 

at Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC). Prior to joining NESC, 

Dr. Leckrone served as the Senior 

Scientist for Large Aperture 

Telescopes at GSFC, and currently 

is the Senior Project Scientist for the 

Hubble Space Telescope Program. 

Dr. Leckrone has over 35 years of 

experience in NASA astrophysics 

programs.

NESC Leadership Team
 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NASA hEADQUARTERS LIAISON

wayne r. Frazier 

NASA Headquarters Senior SMA 

Integration Manager

Keith l. hudkins 

NASA Headquarters Offi ce of the 

Chief Engineer Representative

Mr. Keith L. Hudkins is the representative 

from the NASA Headquarters Offi ce of 

the Chief Engineer to NESC. Mr. Hudkins 

is resident in the Offi ce of the Chief 

Engineer at NASA Headquarters, where 

he serves as the NASA Deputy Chief 

Engineer. Mr. Hudkins has over 35 years 

of experience in systems engineering 

and engineering management, served 

as the Chief Engineer for the Shuttle 

Program, and was the Shuttle Orbiter 

Program Director.

Mr. Wayne R. Frazier currently serves 

as Senior Safety and Mission Assurance 

Manager in the Offi ce of Safety and 

Mission Assurance (OSMA), where he 

is assigned as the Liaison Offi cer to 

NESC, the Offi ce of the Chief Engineer, 

the Software Independent Verifi cation 

and Validation Facility in West Virginia, 

and other remote activities of OSMA. He 

was formerly Manager of System Safety 

in the OSMA at NASA Headquarters 

and has over 30 years of experience 

in System Safety, Propulsion and 

Explosive Safety, Mishap Investigation, 

Range Safety, Pressure Systems, Crane 

Safety, and Orbital Debris Mitigation.

NESC Leadership Team

biogrAphiES
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Clinton h. Cragg

NESC Principal Engineer

NESC PRINCIPAL ENGINEERS

dr. Charles E. harris

NESC Principal Engineer

Steven J. gentz

NESC Principal Engineer 

Mr. Clinton H. Cragg is a Principal 

Engineer with NESC at Langley 

Research Center (LaRC). 

Mr. Cragg came to NESC after 

retiring from the U.S. Navy. 

Mr. Cragg served as the 

Commanding Offi cer of the U.S.S. 

Ohio and later as the Chief of 

Current Operations, U.S. European 

Command. Mr. Cragg has over 27 

years of experience in supervision, 

command, and ship-borne nuclear 

safety.

Mr. Steven J. Gentz is a Principal 

Engineer with NESC at Langley 

Research Center (LaRC). 

Mr. Gentz joined NESC from the 

Marshall Space Flight Center with 

over 22 years of experience involving 

numerous NASA, Department 

of Defense, and industry failure 

analyses and incident investigations, 

including Challenger, Columbia, 

Tethered Satellite System, and the 

TWA 800 Accident Investigations.

Dr. Charles E. Harris was a Principal 

Engineer with NESC at Langley 

Research Center (LaRC). Prior to 

joining NESC, Dr. Harris was the 

Director of the National Institute of 

Aerospace Management Offi ce at 

LaRC and has 18 years in senior 

positions in NASA materials and 

structures organizations. Prior to 

joining NASA in 1987, Dr. Harris 

was a professor of Aerospace 

Engineering at Texas A&M University 

(1984-87) and a professor of 

Engineering Mechanics at Virginia 

Tech (1980-84). 

In October 2005, Dr. Harris was 

selected to be the Director of the 

Exploration and Flight Projects 

Directorate–a newly formed offi ce 

at LaRC.

NESC Leadership Team
8 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

MANAGEMENT AND TEChNICAL 

SUPPORT OFFICE

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OFFICE

dawn m. Schaible

Manager, Systems Engineering 

Offi ce

Mr. Marc S. Hollander is Manager 

of the Management and Technical 

Support Offi ce at Langley 

Research Center (LaRC). Prior to 

joining NESC in February 2005, 

Mr. Hollander was the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary and Chief Financial Offi cer 

for the Science and Technology 

Directorate, Department of Homeland 

Security. Mr. Hollander started his 

federal career in 1987 with the 

Department of Energy (DOE) where 

he held several key management 

positions. In 2000, Mr. Hollander was 

appointed as the fi rst Chief Information 

Offi cer for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration, a separately organized 

agency within DOE.

Ms. Dawn M. Schaible is Manager 

of NESC’s Systems Engineering 

Offi ce at Langley Research Center 

(LaRC). Prior to joining NESC, 

Ms. Schaible was the Technical Assistant 

to the Director for the International 

Space Station/Payload Processing 

Directorate at Kennedy Space Center. 

Ms. Schaible has over 18 years of 

experience in systems engineering, 

integration, and ground processing for 

the Space Shuttle and International 

Space Station Programs.

marc S. hollander

Manager, Management and

Technical Support Offi ce

NESC Leadership Team

biogrAphiES
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC ChIEF ENGINEERS OFFICE

Stephen F. Cash

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Stephen F. Cash is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC). Mr. Cash came to 

NESC from MSFC, where he was 

the Deputy Project Manager for 

the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor. 

Mr. Cash has over 20 years of 

experience in the design, development, 

test, and manufacture of large solid 

rocket motors.

dennis b. dillman

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Dennis B. Dillman is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at NASA Headquarters. 

Mr. Dillman came to NESC from the 

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC), where he chaired design 

reviews for major projects, including 

the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing 

Missions, the James Webb Space 

Telescope, and several Earth Observing 

System satellites. Prior to his time at 

GSFC, Mr. Dillman worked at the NASA 

Johnson Space Center managing 

Shuttle Orbiter sustaining engineering 

efforts and training Shuttle fl ight crews.

NESC Leadership Team

derrick J. Cheston

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Derrick J. Cheston is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Glenn Research Center 

(GRC). Mr. Cheston joined NESC from 

his prior position at GRC as Chief of the 

Thermal/Fluids Systems Branch. Mr. 

Cheston has 21 years of experience 

in aerospace engineering and 

management, including mechanical 

design and testing and thermal/fl uids 

analysis.
0 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC ChIEF ENGINEERS OFFICE (continued)

dr. michael g. gilbert

NESC Chief Engineer 

Dr. Michael G. Gilbert is NESC’s 

Chief Engineer at Langley Research 

Center (LaRC). Before joining NESC, 

he was Head of the LaRC Systems 

Management Offi ce. Dr. Gilbert 

has over 28 years of engineering, 

research, and management

experience with aircraft, missile, 

spacecraft, Space Shuttle, and 

International Space Station Programs.

david A. hamilton

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. David A. Hamilton is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Johnson Space Center 

(JSC). Mr. Hamilton came to NESC 

from JSC, where he served as Chief 

of the Shuttle/Station Engineering 

Offi ce and also as the Chairman of 

the Shuttle Chief Engineers Council. 

Mr. Hamilton has over 38 years of 

combined experience in NASA manned 

space fl ight programs, including Apollo, 

Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, ISS, Shuttle, and 

Mir.

NESC Leadership Team

michael hagopian

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Michael Hagopian is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Goddard Space Flight Center 

(GSFC). Mr. Hagopian came to NESC 

from his position as Associate Chief 

of the Mechanical Systems Division at 

GSFC. Mr. Hagopian has over 21 years 

of experience in the development of 

space and Earth science satellites.

biogrAphiES
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 1

brian K. muirhead

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Brian K. Muirhead is NESC’s 

Chief Engineer, as well as the Center 

Chief Engineer at the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory (JPL). Prior to his position 

with NESC, Mr. Muirhead was Chief 

Engineer for the Mars Science 

Laboratory. Mr. Muirhead has over 28 

years of combined experience managing 

space science missions and experience 

in spacecraft and instrument systems 

design, development, integration, test, 

and operations, including the Galileo, 

SIR-C, Mars Pathfi nder, and Deep 

Impact missions.

michael w. Kehoe

NESC Chief Engineer

Mr. Michael W. Kehoe was NESC’s 

Chief Engineer at Dryden Flight 

Research Center (DFRC). Prior to 

joining NESC, Mr. Kehoe served at 

DFRC as the Center Chief Engineer and 

System Management Offi ce Director. 

Mr. Kehoe has over 31 years of 

experience in aeronautical engineering, 

primarily in experimental fl ight test.

In October 2005, Mr. Kehoe was 

selected to be Dryden’s liaison in the 

Crew Exploration Vehicle Flight Test 

Offi ce at Johnson Space Center.

dr. dean A. Kontinos

NESC Chief Engineer 

Dr. Dean A. Kontinos is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Ames Research Center 

(ARC). Before joining NESC, he was 

Chief of the Reacting Flow Environments 

Branch at ARC, performing and 

managing research and development 

in aerothermodynamics, arc-jet testing, 

and planetary entry design tools. He has 

15 years of experience in computational 

modeling of hypersonic fl owfi elds and 

the thermal response of hypervelocity 

vehicles.

NESC Leadership Team
2 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC ChIEF ENGINEERS OFFICE

dr. Shamim A. rahman

NESC Chief Engineer 

Dr. Shamim A. Rahman is NESC’s 

Chief Engineer at Stennis Space Center 

(SSC). Dr. Rahman came to NESC 

from SSC, where he served as the 

Chief Engineer for the Propulsion Test 

Operations Division. Dr. Rahman has 18 

years of experience in the engineering 

of space launch vehicles and test 

systems, primarily in fl uid, thermal, and 

propulsion systems.

NESC Leadership Team

biogrAphiES

timmy r. wilson

NESC Chief Engineer 

Mr. Timmy R. Wilson is NESC’s Chief 

Engineer at Kennedy Space Center 

(KSC). Prior to joining NESC, Mr. Wilson 

served as Deputy Chief Engineer for 

Shuttle Processing at KSC. Mr. Wilson 

has over 24 years of engineering and 

management experience supporting 

the Space Shuttle Program.
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC DISCIPLINE ExPERTS OFFICE

george d. hopson

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. George D. Hopson is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Propulsion and 

is resident at Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC). Mr. Hopson came to 

NESC from the Space Shuttle Main 

Engine Project Offi ce, where he served 

as Director. Mr. Hopson has over 43 

years of combined experience in Space 

Shuttle main engine, space propulsion, 

space systems dynamics, and project 

management.

Cornelius J. dennehy

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Cornelius J. Dennehy is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Guidance 

Navigation and Control (GNC) systems 

and is resident at Goddard Space 

Fight Center (GSFC). Mr. Dennehy 

came to NESC from the Mission 

Engineering and Systems Analysis 

Division at GSFC, where he served 

as the Division’s Assistant Chief for 

Technology. Mr. Dennehy has over 25 

years of experience in the architecture, 

design, development, integration, and 

operation of GNC systems, and space 

platforms for communications, defense, 

remote sensing, and scientifi c mission 

applications.

NESC Leadership Team

dr. Edward r. generazio

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Edward R. Generazio was NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Nondestructive 

Evaluation (NDE) and was a resident at 

Langley Research Center (LaRC). Dr. 

Generazio joined NESC after serving as 

the Branch Head of LaRC’s NDE Sciences 

Branch. He was also responsible for 

executing the NASA Offi ce of Safety 

and Mission Assurance Agency-wide 

NDE Program. Dr. Generazio has over 

22 years of experience in NDE.

In October 2005, Dr. Generazio was 

selected as a Senior Research Engineer 

in the Research and Technology 

Directorate at LaRC.
4 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

Steven g. labbe

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Steven G. Labbe is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Flight Sciences 

and is resident at Johnson Space 

Center (JSC). Prior to joining NESC, 

Mr. Labbe served as Chief of the 

Applied Aeroscience and Computational 

Fluid Dynamics Branch at JSC. Mr. 

Labbe has over 21 years of experience 

in aerodynamics research applied to 

programs that include Space Shuttle 

and X-38.

robert A. Kichak

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Robert A. Kichak is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Power and 

Avionics and is resident at Goddard 

Space Flight Center (GSFC). 

Mr. Kichak came to NESC from the 

Electrical Engineering Division at GSFC, 

where he served as the Division’s Chief 

Engineer. Mr. Kichak has over 36 years 

of experience in spacecraft power, 

electrical, and avionics systems.

NESC DISCIPLINE ExPERTS OFFICE (continued)

NESC Leadership Team

biogrAphiES

Julie A. Kramer white

NESC Discipline Expert

Ms. Julie A. Kramer White was NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Mechanical 

Analysis and is resident at Johnson 

Space Center (JSC). Prior to joining 

NESC, Ms. Kramer White served as the 

Chief Engineer for Orbiter Maintenance 

Down Period in the Orbiter Engineering 

Offi ce at JSC. Ms. Kramer White has 

over 14 years of combined experience 

in Shuttle and International Space 

Station structures and mechanics.

In October 2005, Ms. Kramer White 

was selected as a back-up Principal 

Engineer in the NESC.
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

dr. robert S. piascik

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Robert S. Piascik is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Materials and is 

resident at Langley Research Center 

(LaRC). Dr. Piascik joined NESC from 

the LaRC Mechanics of Materials 

Branch and the Metals and Thermal 

Structures Branch, where he served as 

a Senior Materials Scientist. Dr. Piascik 

has over 21 years of experience in the 

commercial nuclear power industry and 

over 14 years of experience in basic 

and applied materials research for 

several NASA programs.

John p. mcmanamen

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. John P. McManamen is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Mechanical 

Systems and is resident at Johnson 

Space Center (JSC). Prior to joining 

NESC, Mr. McManamen served in a 

dual role capacity as the Engineering 

Directorate’s Chief Engineer of the 

International Space Station and as 

Deputy Chief of the Shuttle/Station 

Engineering Offi ce. Mr. McManamen 

has over 18 years of experience in 

mechanical systems of the Shuttle 

Orbiter and International Space Station.

NESC Leadership Team

dr. Cynthia h. Null

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Cynthia H. Null is NESC’s Discipline 

Expert for Human Factors and is resident 

at Ames Research Center (ARC). Before 

joining NESC, Dr. Null was a scientist in 

the Human Factors Division and Deputy 

Program Manager of the Space Human 

Factors Engineering Project. Dr. Null 

has 19 years of experience lecturing on 

Human Factors, and another 14 years 

of experience in Human Factors applied 

to NASA programs.
 NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC DISCIPLINE ExPERTS OFFICE

Steven S. Scott

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Steven S. Scott was NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Software and 

was a resident at Goddard Space 

Flight Center (GSFC). Prior to joining 

NESC, Mr. Scott served as the Chief 

Engineer in the Applied Engineering 

and Technology Directorate at GSFC. 

Mr. Scott has over 15 years of experience 

in satellite software engineering.

In October 2005, Mr. Scott was 

selected as GSFC’s Chief Engineer.

dr. ivatury S. raju

NESC Discipline Expert

Dr. Ivatury S. Raju is NESC’s Discipline 

Expert for Structures and is resident 

at Langley Research Center (LaRC). 

Dr. Raju was the Senior Technologist 

in the LaRC Structures and Materials 

Competency prior to joining NESC. Dr. 

Raju has over 30 years of experience in 

structures, structural mechanics, and 

structural integrity.

NESC Leadership Team

biogrAphiES

henry A. rotter

NESC Discipline Expert

Mr. Henry (Hank) A. Rotter is NESC’s 

Discipline Expert for Fluids, Life Support, 

and Thermal Systems, and is resident 

at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Mr. 

Rotter joined NESC from the JSC Crew 

and Thermal Systems Division and the 

Space Launch Initiative Program, where 

he was Engineering Manager and the 

Orbital Space Plane Team Leader for 

life support and active thermal control 

teams. Mr. Rotter has over 38 years of 

life support and active thermal control 

systems experience during the Apollo, 

Shuttle, and Orbital Space Plane 

Programs.
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

NESC ALUMNI

Frank h. bauer

NESC Discipline Expert for Guidance Navigation and 

Control (2003-2004)

Currently participating in the Senior Executive Service Career 

Development Program at NASA Headquarters

J. larry Crawford

NESC Deputy Director for Safety (2003-2004)

Left NESC to become Director of Safety and Mission Assurance 

at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and has since retired

dr. michael S. Freeman

NESC Chief Engineer at Ames Research Center (ARC) 

(2003-2004) 

Retired

t. randy galloway

NESC Chief Engineer at Stennis Space Center (SSC) 

(2003-2004)

Currently the Deputy Director of SSC’s Propulsion Test 

Directorate

dr. Steven A. hawley

NESC Chief Astronaut (2003-2004)

Currently the Director of Astromaterials Research and 

Exploration Science at Johnson Space Center (JSC)

danny d. Johnston

NESC Chief Engineer at Marshall Space Flight Center 

(MSFC) (2003-2004)

Currently serving on a detailed assignment at MSFC in the 

NASA Chief Engineer’s Offi ce

matthew r. landano

NESC Chief Engineer at NASA’s Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory (JPL) (2003-2004)

Returned to his assignment at JPL as the Director of Offi ce of 

Safety and Mission Success

dr. paul m. munafo

NESC Deputy Director (2003-2004)

Currently the Assistant Director for Safety and Engineering and 

Systems Technical Warrant Holder for Space Shuttle Propulsion 

at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)

Stan C. Newberry

Manager of NESC’s Management and Technical Support 

Offi ce (2003-2004)

Left NESC to become the Deputy Center Director at Ames 

Research Center (ARC)

John E. tinsley

NASA Headquarters Senior Safety and Mission 

Assurance Manager for NESC (2003-2004)

Currently the Director of the Mission Support Division 

at NASA Headquarters

NESC Team Members (left to right) Jerry Ross, Ed Generazio, Charlie Harris (in rear), Mike Kehoe, Bob Kichak, and Peggy Chun 

Leadership Team
6

Additional information about NESC and its activities can be found at

www.nesc.nasa.gov

For general questions and requests for NESC technical reviews

Email: nesc@nasa.gov

For anonymous requests write:

NESC

NASA Langley Research Center

Mail Stop 118

Hampton, VA 23681

For Media Inquiries:

Email Keith Henry

H.K.Henry@nasa.gov

Future Opportunities Within NESC

Positions available within NESC can be found through the NASAJobs website at www. nasajobs.nasa.gov

www.nasa.gov

NP-2005-11-71-LARC