NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 12a0209n.06 No. 10-5767 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY OLDHAM, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. UNITED STAT ES POSTAL S ERVICE, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEAL F ROM THE UNITED STA T ES DISTRICT COURT F OR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESS EE

Before: K

ENNEDY, G IBBO NS, and KETHLEDGE, Circ uit Jud ges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Anthony Oldham, a f

ormer e mploy ee of

the United States Postal Service (“U SPS ”), filed suit under the Fa ir L abor Standards Act of 1938 (“F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , to r ecove r unpaid overtime compensa tion. After a bench tr ial, the district c ourt ruled in f avor of the USPS, findi ng that Oldham did not work the overtime hours for which he soug ht rec overy . I n addition, the district court found that beca use Oldham self-r eporte d his time and was paid for any claimed overtime, his failure to repor t additional overtime hours all ege d l y worke d barr ed rec overy . Oldham appea ls. For the following rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the district court. I

. This case arises from overtime work which Oldham alleg edly perf ormed in 2003, 2004, and 2005 without compensa tion. Oldham was employ ed by the USPS as a non-exempt employ ee from 1Oldham v. United States Postal Serv ice

No. 10-5767 May 1994 th ro u gh M ay 2005. I n November of 1999, Oldham beca me a full-time window cler k—classified as an Ex ecutive and Administrative Schedule ( “ E A S” ) 5 p o s it ion—at the Madison, Tenne ssee, Post Offic e. Oldham subsequently beg an taking o n temporar y supervisory positions, known as 204Bs, at various post office s around Tenne ssee. I n J anuar y of 2003, Oldham went to L ebanon, Tenne ssee, on a 204B assig nment at a new annex post office that the USPS was opening due to the high volume of mail rec eived by the main post office in L ebanon. Oldham claimed that 1 he put in g rea ter than twe lve hour day s from J anuar y 2003 throug h the summer of 2003, g ener ally working from 4:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. After the summer of 2003, Oldham testified that he beg an coming in a littl e later, starting his workda y at approximately 5:00 or 5:30 a .m., and leaving work a t 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. I n Marc h 2004, Oldham beca me an officia l L ebanon employ ee throug h an in v o luntary

re as s ignme nt. Thus, his home office was no longe r Madison, and at this point another US P S employ ee, Pam Hig don, g ener ally enter ed his tim e, al t h oug h occa sionally other USP S employ ees would enter his time. Although Oldham should have been clocking in and out of work, he was told not to do so by

Trac y Mofield, the L ebanon postmaster , and Ke lly J ordan, the station manag er. Oldham testified that he g ener ally worke d six day s a wee k, twelve hours a day from October 2003 throug h J uly 2004, and afte r his rea ssignment to L ebanon beca me officia l, he continued to work from approximately 5:00 or 5:30 a.m. to 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. Severa l cowor kers place d Oldham’s

arr ival time at t he annex at 7: 00 a.m. or later, with others reporting a 6:30 a.m. arrival, and others

The district court’s d ec i s i o n was premised on its finding that Oldham was a non-exempt 1 employ ee—e ven when perf orming supervisory tasks as a 204B—ma king FL SA applicable , and the parties do not conte st this findi ng on appea l. -2-Oldham v. United States Postal Serv ice

No. 10-5767 sug g esting that a 6:00 a.m. arriv al wa s Ol dham’s “normal time.” I n addition, Oldham’s L ebanon supervisor, Kelly J ordan testified that he told his supervisory -leve l em p loy ees to show up approximately thirty minutes befor e the city postal car riers would clock in, w hich would sug g est a 6:30 a.m. or 7:00 a.m. arr ival time, and that he told Oldham that it was an eig ht hour job. Employ ees at the L ebanon A nnex also reca lled that Oldham took long lunc h brea ks and often le ft ear lier than his own testimony would sug g est. For instance, J ordan testified that he and Oldham often took twohour long lunch brea

ks. Fur ther, By rum O’Guin testified that Oldham was occa sionally absent from the annex at 3:30 p.m. when O’Guin would return from his route, and J are d Kenna mer rec alled that he overla pped with Oldham while taking over his position in L ebanon and that t h e two men both worke d from 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. during that period. I n addition, other employ ees te stified that when Oldham stay ed later than his officia l duties at the annex require d, it was often in order to work

on persona l matters such as his resume or the newsletter for his Masonic lodge , or to make- up time beca use he ha d taken a

n extra-long lunch. I n J uly 2004, Oldham rec eived a 204B assig nment to work in the Antioch Post Offi ce . During his time in Antioch, Oldham repor ted his time using a time car d. Oldham has made no claims for overtime worke d during his 204B assig nment in Antioch, which ended in J anuar y 2005, beca use he acknow ledg es that he was compensa ted for any overtime worke d during that time period. On Dec ember 25, 2004, Oldham was promoted to postmaster for the Arring ton, Tenne ssee post of fice , and he officia lly beg an repor ting to the Arring ton office on approximately J anuar y 24, 2005. Oldham alleg es that a manag er of post office opera tions (“MPOO” ), Ramona Mitchell, asked him to stay on in order to assist his Antioch supervisor by g etting the new repla ceme nts up to speed,

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No. 10-5767 completing an additional task of tracking the s tree t observa tions of post al carrier s that wer e being conducte d in her twenty -t wo office s, and car ry ing out additional street observa tions in Antioch. Mitchell’s testimony

differ s from Oldham’s. Mitche ll testified that the specia l projec t of trac king the s tree t observa tions should have been a fiftee n to thirty minute task involving making a si mple Ex cel sprea dsheet and that she “neve r knew of Mr. Oldham g oing out to any office on my behalf .” Oldham t estified that beca use he had not completed the stre et observations in Antioch by J anuar y 24, he worke d in both Antioch and Arring ton for the first few wee ks following h i s start as Arring ton’s postmaster. Due to this workload, Oldham claims that he was working from 4:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 7:00 p.m

. As a postmaster, Oldham was able to self-r eport his time and submitt ed his hours to the time

an d attendanc e office direc tly

. Howeve r, Oldham testified that when he spoke with the time and at t en d an ce office , he was told that they would only acc ept his repor t of the hours worke d i n Arring ton and that the office for which he was p erforming additional work (Antioch) would be responsible for submitt ing his additional h o u rs . Ol d h am alleg es that he informed a supervisor in Antioch about the hours he was logg ing on the street observa tions, but these additional hours wer e

n ot included in his pay . When he noticed the discrepa ncy and informed the time and attendanc e office , he was told that it was the responsibility of t h e i n d ividual office s to submit adjustments to

corr ect the e rror . Oldham admits that when the a djustments were not made , he did not follow-up to corr ect his time beca

use he was “so busy at that time” that he was “hoping [t ime and attendanc e] would take c are of it.”

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No. 10-5767 At a dinner g ather ing held on Marc h 31, 2005, Oldham alleg es that Mona Mitchell approa ched him and reque sted that he perf orm additional work cer

tify ing the Fr anklin Post Offic e. After the g ather ing, Oldham claims to have worke d in three post office s until May 2005: F ranklin, Antioch, and Arring ton. Whi le sprea ding his time ac ross all three office s, Oldham alleg es t hat he beg an his wo rk day at 4:00 a.m. in the Fr anklin office , would leave for Arring ton at 11:00 a.m.,

overse e new employ ee training there , and then head out to Antioch t o conduct street obs erva tions in the afte rnoon. Although Oldham aff irmatively responde d to questions premised on the fac t that he worke d in three post office s from approx i m at el y Fe b ruar y to May 2005, Oldham’s specific testimony was that he finished the Antioch work on April 1, 2005 and that he commence d working in Fr anklin afte r t he dinner g ather ing, which was stipul ated to have occur red on Marc h 31, 2005. Thus, the testimony

sug g ests that he wor

ked at most one da

y in all three loc ations. On April 22, 2005, USPS inspectors interview e d O ld h a m r e g a r d in g a ll e g ations of improperly issuing money order s. Oldham was then place d on paid administrative leave and resig ned from the USPS in J uly 2005. Oldham’s FL SA claim seeks compensa tion for overtime work alleg edly car ried out during two periods: first, from October 4, 2003 throug h ear ly J uly 2004, when he was a 204B hourly employ ee working in L ebanon; and second, betwee n J anuar y 24, 2005 and April 22, 2005, 2 when he was a

n hourly employ ee a

nd postmaster of Ar

ring ton. Oldham filed a complaint on October 4, 2006, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tenne ssee, alleg ing that the USPS willfully , knowing ly , or rec klessly violated the Although Oldham actua lly claimed that he wor ked throug h May

2005 in his complaint, at 2 trial he clar ified and admitted that he was remove d from his position and place d on administrative leave on April 22, 2005. -5-Oldham v. United States Postal Serv ice

No. 10-5767 FL SA by failing to pay his wag es due for hours worke d in excess of forty hours per wee k. Following a three-da y bench trial, the di strict court ruled in favor of t he USP S. The dist rict court conclude d by a “pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e . . . that [Oldham] did not work the overtime hours for which he seeks rec overy ,” and found that “[Oldham] enter ed his ow n time for the una uthorized overtime and the evidenc e establishes that [Oldham] was actua l l y perf orming persona l activities or did not perf orm postal work or w as not authorized to incur this overtime wor k.” Oldham then filed a motion to alter o r am en d t h e district court’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, pursuant to Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e 52(b) and 59. Oldham first arg ued that the district court should alter or amend its prior fac tual finding s and leg al conclusions beca use the timekeeping and pay roll rec ords of the USPS inacc urate ly repr esente d th e n u m ber of hours Oldham worke d and how much he should have be en compe nsated for that time. Second, Oldham

as s er ted t hat t he dis trict court errone ously relied upon W ood v. Mid-America Manageme nt Cor p . , 192 F. App’ x 378 (6th Cir. 2006), to support its conclusion. The district court denied Oldham’s motion. The distric t co urt reje cted Oldham’s first contention that the USPS rec ords “‘do not acc urate ly ref lect the amount of hours’ that [Ol d ham] worke d or how much [Oldham] should have been paid” beca use it found that in “2003 and 2004 afte r the end of his schedule d eig ht hour shift at the L ebanon Annex, [Oldham] was n o t doing compensa ble work for the [US PS] ,” and bey ond Oldham’s own testimony reg arding his twelve hour day s at the anne x there was no “ corr oborative w itness who testified [Oldham] was a t the L ebanon

annex any ear lier than 6:00 a.m.” R. 93, at 1. The district court also noted that afte r Oldham beg an working as the postmaster in Ar ring ton, there was no corr oborative proof for his alleg ed work for

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No. 10-5767 the Antioch post office and that Oldham’s testimony reg arding the street observa tions car ried out for Mitchell was contra dicted by Mitchell’s testimony

. The district court rea ffirme d its decision not to

acc ept as cre dible Oldham’s “self-re ported hours that wer e not recorde d in the [ USPS ]’s rec ords” beca use Oldham had either self-r eporte d his time to the USPS via a timekeepe r or by p er s o n al l y enter ing his own time, was paid for his repor ted overtime hours, and was appropr iately not paid for the time he failed to repor t. The district court explai n ed t hat “[a]n employ ee must advise the employ er of overtime work and failure to do so prec ludes an FL SA [action] .” Id. at 2 (citing Harvill v. W estward Commc’ns, L LC , 433 F.3d 428, 441 ( 5th Cir. 2005)). The district c ourt also re jected Oldh am ’s ch al l enge to its relianc e on W ood , finding that the case , which held that “an employ er cannot suffe r or permit an employ ee to perf orm service s about which the employ er knows nothing,”

was a pplicable. R. 93, at 2–3 (quoting W ood , 192 F. App’ x at 380). I I

. On appea l from a bench trial, we review the district court’s factua l finding s for clear err o r and its co n cl u s i ons of law de novo . Moorer v. Baptist Mem ’l Health Care Sys. , 398 F.3d 469, 478–79 (6th Cir. 2005); see Fe d. R. C i v . P

. 52(a) (6). A finding of fac t is clea rly err oneous when “‘a lthough there is evidenc e to support it, the revie wing court on the entire evidenc e is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 571 F.3d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mabry , 518 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The burden is on th e ap p ell ant to prove such a mistake, and this burden is not met mere ly by demonstrating a conflict in the testimony , nor by seeking to rede termine the cre dibilit y of witnesses. Moreove r, the appellate court must revie w the fac ts in the light most favor able to the appellee .”

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No. 10-5767 Harrison v. Monume ntal Life Ins. Co. , 333 F.3d 717, 722 (6th Cir. 2003) (interna l citations omitted). A district court’s de termination of witness cr edibility is entitled to gre at def

ere nce on a

ppeal. See Anderson v. City of Bessem er City , 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); Isabel v. City of Mem phis , 404 F.3d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 2005). I I I

. A. Congr ess enac ted the FL S A in order to “compe nsate those who labor[] in excess of the statutory maxi mum number of hours for the wea r and tear of extra work

. . . .” Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron , 334 U.S. 4 4 6 , 4 6 0 (1948). The FL SA require s employ ers to pay their non-exempt employ ees “time-a

nd-a- half for work perf

ormed in excess of forty hours per wee k.” Acs v. Detroit Edison Co. , 444 F.3d 763, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quota tion omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)

. A FL SA pla intiff has the burden of proving “by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that he

o r she ‘per formed work for which he [or she] was not proper ly compensa ted.’” Mye rs v. Coppe r Cellar Corp. , 192 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. , 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946), supersede d by statute on other grounds , Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62). B. Oldham arg ues that the district court err ed by discounting cer tain testimony from non-par ty witnesses and evidenc e from cer tain exhibi ts. Specifica lly , Oldham arg ues that: (1) trial testimony clea rly established t h at h e commence d work at the L ebanon Annex befor e his schedule d “beg in time” and worked bey ond his schedule d “end time,” thus establishing that the pay roll and

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No. 10-5767 timekeeping rec ords from October 2003 throug h J une 28, 2004 are inacc urate beca use Oldham was perf orming compensab l e work outside of the eig ht hour workda y schedule ; and (2) USPS timekeeping and pay

roll rec ords betwee n J anuar y 26, 2005 and April 25, 2005, whe n h e wa s postmaster in Arring ton, are inacc urate beca use he perf

ormed work that he was not compensa ted for during that time. We addre ss the arg uments rela ting to the recover y of allege dly unpaid overtime during Oldham’s time as a 204B a t the L ebanon A nnex first. 1. L ebanon A nnex C laims Oldham n o t es t hat hi s USPS Employ ee Every thing Reports, which track hi s time worke d,

rec ord his w orkday as a 204B in L ebanon be tween O ctober 2003 and June 2004 as spanning eig ht hours with a one hour lunch brea k, commencing at either 6:00, 6:30, or 7:00 a.m. and ending at 3:00, 3:30, or 4:00 p.m., respe ctively

. Oldham arg ues that beca use trial testimony indicates that he worke d either before or after the rec orded tim es, t he dis trict court erre d in finding that he was not entitled to compensa

ble overtime. Howeve r, Oldham’s arg ument is based on the false premise that any time

one is at work outside of one’s schedule d or repor ted work hours, one is e ntitled to overtime, even if one does not actua lly work more than a standard eig ht hour shift. I n addition, Oldham’s arg ument 3 require s that a further infere nce be draw n from t h e evidenc e—that if he rema ined in the L ebanon Annex bey ond his schedule d end time, he was nece ssarily eng ag ed in overtime work. As neither of these infere nces need nece ssarily be made and testimony supported the conclusion that Oldham was

For example, if one was schedule d to work from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., but instead worke d 3 from 9:30 a .m. to 5:30 p.m., that would not entitle one to overtime pay as the hours worke d do not exceed the s t an d ar d eig ht hour shift. The rec ord demonstrates that this is not unhear d of at the USPS

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No. 10-5767 not eng ag ed in unpaid overtim e work while working in the L ebanon Annex betwee n October 4, 2003, and J une 28, 2004, the district court’s fac tual finding s on this point wer e not clea rly err oneous. As an initial matter, substantial testimony at trial contra dicted Oldham’s asser t i o n that he worke d approximately twelve hours a day , six day s a we ek in the L ebanon Annex. Although Oldham ref

err ed to sta

rting work as ea

rly as 4:00 a .m. w hile g etting the Annex up and running , he actua lly claims to have ty

pically worke d from 5:00 or 5: 30 a.m. until 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. during the period for which he is claiming unpaid overtime in L ebanon. There was no corr oborative testimony from any other L ebanon Annex employ ee that sug g ests that Oldham would reg ularly arr ive to start his workda

y at the Annex prior to 6:00 a.m. Given the other testimony at trial, the district court did not clea rly err in cre diting the testimony of multipl e non-par ty witnesses and the rec ords of the USPS instead of Oldham’s own uncor robora ted testimony

about his arr ival time at the Annex. Oldham asser

ts that testimony at trial demonstrated he worke d bey ond his set end time, and his super v i s o rs were aware of hi s work after his schedule d shift. Those facts, he submits, require

a finding that he was “‘suf fer ed or permitted’ to work bey o n d h i s s ch ed ule[d] end time” and there fore entitled to be paid for additional hours worke d. Oldham cites the testimony of Ke l ly J ordan, who was Oldham’s supervisor in L ebanon, in support of his arg ument that USPS supervisors

wer e aware of his overtime wor k at the end of

the day

. Oldham not es t hat J ordan testified that he knew that Oldham often stay ed bey ond his normal 3:30 p.m. or 4: 0 0 p.m. end time. Howeve r, Oldham fa ils to acknowledg e the f act that Jordan also testified that he and Oldham ge nera lly took two-hour long lunches and activity brea ks in the middle of the day , that Oldham sometimes stay ed late to make up fo r t he lengthy lunch hours, that Oldham t old him that he chose to stay late in the

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No. 10-5767 Annex beca

use his home life was unhappy , and that Oldham also stay ed late to work on his resume. I n addition, althoug h Oldham is corr ect that other trial testimony indicates that cowor kers can place him at the Ann ex af

t er 3 : 30 or 4:00 p.m., that fac t alone does not automatically entitle him to compensa tion for additional hours worke d. No witness actua lly s aw Ol d h am working on postal matters when he stay ed late. For example, Charles Robertson’s deposition testimony indicated that althoug h Robertson saw Oldh am stay ing late, he did not see what work Oldham was doing. Howeve r, Robertson did repor t observing Oldham working on his Masons’ lodge newsletter in the afte rnoon just befor e the two men left to g o home. Finally , USPS employ ees who repor ted Oldham’s time during his 204B assig nment in L ebanon testified that they enter ed Oldham’s time as he repor ted it to them. For example , P am Hig don, who was a supervisor at the main L ebanon post office ,

rec alled that she input Oldham’s time when he called in to repor t w orking more than an eig ht hour day

. Thus, beca

use signific ant trial testimony indicated that Oldham repor ted to w ork later than he cla imed, that he wa s not require d to stay later a nd often eng ag ed in per sonal ac tiviti es whe n he did so, and that he either repor ted his hours to others or enter ed his own time, including any claimed overtime, it was not clea r err or for the district court to find that Oldham did n o t establish by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that he w as owe d additional pay for the time wor

ked in L ebanon. 2. Arring ton Claims Oldham also cha lleng es t he factual findings t he district cour t made re g arding his overtime claims for the period of time that he was the Arring ton postmaster, ref lected in pay

roll rec ords from J anuar y 26, 2005 throug h April 25, 2005. Oldham contends that trial testimony and Plaintiff’s trial

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No. 10-5767 exhibi t 21, which contained a rec ord of the number of hours transfe rre d betwee n Arring ton and other post offices cover ing approximately the first four months of 2005, demonstrate that he worke d overtime hours be y ond the over time hours rec orded in the U SPS pay roll rec ords. At trial, Oldham testified that he worke d at the Antioch, Arring ton, and Fr anklin post office s from approximately Fe bruar y throug h May 2005. Oldham testified that he started his day in Fr anklin at 4: 00 a.m., worked there u n t i l 1 1 : 0 0 a.m., t hen headed to the Arrington Pos t Offic e and worke d there training L

ucas Br ewing ton, and then heade d to either Fr anklin or An t i o ch t o conduct street observa tions. Oldham is c orre ct that Roy Ray testified that he be lieved that Oldham worke d from 4:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. at the Fr anklin Post Offic e. Howeve r, Ray also noted that he could not rec all how long Oldham worke d at the Fr anklin Post Offic e and did not know whether Oldham worke d any

o vertime in Fr anklin. Oldham also corr ectly notes that Br ewing ton testified that he and Oldham

once worke d until 2:00 a.m. Howeve r, Br ewing ton a lso te stified that he and Oldham started work at 5:00 a .m. Monda

y throug h Fr iday during the three wee k training period, which is not consistent with a 4:00 a.m. start time for Oldham during that period. Contrary to Oldham’s claims, Br ewing ton testified that Oldham did not work at o t h er p ost office s during the training period and that afte r Oldham started working at other post office s, his Arring ton hours dropped off to th e p o i n t wh ere Br ewing ton saw him “ver y rar ely .” Other trial testimony and fac ts elicited at trial conflicte d with Oldham’s alleg ed work at three post o ff i ce s b et we en late J anuar y and May 2005. To beg in with, Oldham’s own testimony is internally inconsistent. Although Oldham testified t hat he worke d at three post office s during the months in quest i o n , he also testified that he only started g oing to Fr anklin at 4:00 a.m. afte r the

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No. 10-5767 dinner meeting , which was held on Marc h 31, 2005. Ramona Mitchell’s testimony confirme d that Oldham was not se nt to work in F ranklin until af ter the Marc h 31, 2005 meeting at the restaur ant. Oldham also testified that he finished up the work in Antioch “sometime around the first of April.” Thus, at most, Oldham would have worke d in F ranklin and the other two post of fice s for one day

. Fur ther, t ri al testimony failed to confirm Oldham’s claim that, afte r starting as the Arring ton postmaster, he simult aneously worke d in Antioch compl eting a projec t for Mitchell. Mitchell testified that althoug h she could not reme mber the exact projec t she asked Oldham to complete, she believed it was most likely a fifteen to thirty minute task, and she was unawa re tha t Oldham went to a ny office on her be half. Car ol Wood’s testimony also raised doubt r eg arding whether Oldham worke d in Antioch after J anuar y 2005. Wood, the Ant ioch pos tmaster, testi fied that Oldham di d not come back to the Antioch Post Offic e to work afte r he left to take his position in Arring ton, that she did not rec all his working on the 2005 rura l ma il c ount, a nd that she did not “re member seeing [Oldham] in Antioch afte r he went to Arring ton

. . . .” Wood also testified that Oldham would have compl eted street observa tions in Antioch by J anuar y 1, 2005. Finally , evidenc e prese nted at t ri al confirme d that Oldham submitt ed his hours worke d, including claims for overtime hours incurre d, betwee n Fe bruar

y and May 2005, and wa s paid for those hour s. Given the content of the trial testimony , it was not clea r err or for the district court to conclude that Oldham failed to establish that he was not compensa ted for alleg edly incurre d overtime betwee n Fe bruar y and May 2005. The district c ourt noted the contra dictory testimony

reg arding

Oldham’s work in Antioch afte r assuming his post as the Arring ton postmaster and the fac t that Oldham selfrepor ted his time and included ove rtime hours, for whic h he wa s compensate d. I n addition, give n -13-Oldham v. United States Postal Serv ice

No. 10-5767 the testimony and evidenc e prese nted at trial, the district court did not acc ept as cre dible Oldham’s self-r eporte d hours that wer e not ref lected in USPS rec ords. “‘ W h en fac tual finding s rest upon

cre dibilit y deter

minations, this Court aff

ords g rea t defe renc e to the finding s of the district court.’” Smoot v. United Transp. Union , 246 F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Schroye r v. Frankel , 197 F.3d 1170, 1173 (6th Cir. 1999)). Her e the trial judge ’s fac tual finding s wer e, in part, based on his decision t o cre dit the t estimony of non-party witnesses who told “‘c oher en t an d fac ially plausible stor[i es] that [were] not contra dicted by extrinsi c evidenc e . . . .’” Hogan v. United States , 407 F.3d 778, 782–83 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson , 470 U.S. at 575). Such finding s, “if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clea r err or.” Id. (interna l quota tion mar ks omitted). Given the conflicting testimony , the defe renc e owed to district court cre dibilit y deter minations, and the applicable clea

rly er roneous standard of revie w, we will not disturb the district court’s fac tual finding s. C. Old h am al s o arg ues that the district court err oneously relied on W ood v. Mid-Ame rica Managem ent Corp. , 192 F. App’x 378 (6th Cir. 2006) , and Harvill v. W estward Communic ations, LLC , 433 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2005), to find in favor of the USPS

. Oldham arg ues that his case is distinguishable f

rom the pre cede nt cited by the district court a

nd thus the district court incor rec tly

rea ched the leg al conclusion that his failure to repor t additional overtime hours bars his rec overy of unpaid overtime under the FL SA. Essentially , Oldham rea rg ues his challeng es to the fac tu a l f inding s of the district cour

t, discussed above , in this contex t.

-14-Oldham v. United States Postal Serv ice

No. 10-5767 I n W ood , we held that an employ er must pay an employ ee for overtime, even if the employ er did not specific ally ask the employ ee to perf orm that work—but “only if the employ er knows or has

rea son to believe that an employ ee is continuing to work and that work was suffe red or p er m i tted by the employ er . ” 1 9 2 F. App’x at 379 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Her e, as in W ood , Oldham repor

ted his own time, repor

ted some overtime, and the USPS lacke d any rea son to suspect that Oldham’s overtime repor ts w ere inacc urate

. See id. Although Oldham arg ues that the district court e rre d in finding tha t his USPS supervisors did not know or have rea son to know that he wa s perf orming compensa

ble work bey ond his schedule d hours, that arg ument essentially challeng es the district court’s factua l fi n d i n gs and fails to provide reasone d arg umentation indicating why W ood is inapplicable pre cede nt. Oldham likewise fails to succe ssfully distinguish Harvill or to establish why it was err or for the district court to cite it as persua sive prec edent, beca use his arg ument is premised on his challeng e to the district court’s fa ctual finding s—which we have a lrea dy found we re not c lear ly

err oneous. I V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t.

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