[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Bey v. Rasawehr , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3301.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -3301
B EY ET AL ., A PPELLEES , v . R ASAWEHR , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Bey v. Rasawehr , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3301.]
First Amendment—Prior restraints—R .C. 2903.214—Civil-stalking protection order enjoining future Internet postings about a person imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech in violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Cons titution—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed in part. (No. 2019-0295—Submitted February 11, 2020—Decided June 16, 202 0.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mercer County, Nos. 10-18-02 and 10-18-03, 2019-Ohio-57.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal we are asked to determine whether a civilstalking protection order enjo ining future postings about a pet itioner imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech in violati on of the FirstS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude that it does. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Third Distr ict Court of A ppeals.
I. BACKGROUND {¶ 2} In November 2015, appellee Joni Bey’s husband died. Approximately seven months later, appellant, Jeffrey Rasawehr, Bey’s brother, ostensibly began writing and pos ting public comments on craigsl ist.org and the Lima News website that accused Bey of having contributed to her husband’s death and that further accused local public officials of having faile d to investigate the circumstances of his death. In September 2017, after a several- month period of relative quiet, a new barrage o f similar public accusations com menced. A billboard located near Bey’s home contained a large portrait-style pictur e of Rasawehr with the message, “Jeff Rasawehr says, ‘LEARN ABOUT COUNTY CORRUPTIO N & COVER-UPS AT...’ CountyCoverUp.c om.” (Capitalization sic.) Th e website
contained a series of Internet postings apparently authored by Rasawehr, including postings dated September 13, Oct ober 1, November 2, and Novembe r 3, 2017, in which Rasawehr reiterated his accusations against Bey and vario us local public
officials. {¶ 3} Rasawehr’s father died in January 2008. And in June 2016, Rasawehr’s mother, appellee Rebe cca Rasawehr, began receiving t reatment similar to that of Bey. The June 2016 a nd subsequent 2017 Internet pos tings, ostensibly authored by Rasawehr, likewise accused Rebecca of having contri buted to her husband’s death and again accuse d local public officials of hav ing failed to investigate that death. {¶ 4} On November 16, 2017, pursuant to R.C. 2903.214, Joni Bey and Rebecca Rasawehr (collectively, “appellees”) each filed a petit ion for a civilstalking protection order (“CSPO”) against Rasawehr. Their pet itions, to which various postings allegedly authore d by Rasawehr were attached, were heard by the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas on December 4, 2017. Appel lees eachJanuary Term, 2020

3 testified to the facts set forth in their petitions and the men tal distress caused by Rasawehr’s postings. Rasawehr invoked his Fifth Amendment righ t and declined to answer questions put to h im by appellees’ counsel. {¶ 5} On January 18, 2018, the trial c ourt granted appellees’ petitio ns and issued CSPOs that prohibited Ra sawehr from having any contact w ith them, directly or indirectly, coming w ithin 500 feet of them, or ente ring certain protected locations. In paragraph nine of the respective CSPOs (“paragra ph nine”), the trial court added the following provi sion tailored specifically to th is case:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: RESPONDENT SHALL REFRAIN from posting about Petitioners on any social media service, web site, discussion board, or similar outle t or service and shall remove all such postings from CountyCoverUp.com that relate to Petitioners

. Respondent shall refrain from posting about the deaths of Petitioners’ husbands in any manner that expresses, implies, or suggests that the Petitioners are culpable in those deaths.

(Capitalization sic.) This orde r will remain in effect until J anuary 15, 2023. {¶ 6} Rasawehr appealed and the Third District Court of Appeals affir med the trial court’s judgment in both cases. The court of appeals first found that the evidence in the record supported the trial court’s determinatio n that appellees had
satisfied their burden to estab lish that the CSPOs against Rasa wehr were warranted. 2019-Ohio-57, ¶ 24-34. The court of appeals rejected Rasawehr’ s constitutional challenges to paragraph nine. Id. at ¶ 35-48. One member of the court dissented but only as to the portion of paragraph nine prohibiting Rasawe hr from posting about appellees on any social-med ia service, website, discussio n board, or similar outlet or service, finding that provision to be ambiguous and t hus unenforceable.
Id. at ¶ 50-54 (Zimmerman, P.J., dissen ting in part and concurring in part).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 7} We accepted jurisdiction over Rasawehr’s second proposition of law:
“Prior restraints on the exer cise of free speech are unconstitu tional and presumptively invalid.” See 155 Ohio St.3d 1455, 2019-Ohio-1759, 122 N.E.3d
216.
II. ANALYSIS {¶ 8} This case requires us to consider whether paragraph nine of the CSPOs issued by the trial court constitutes a prior restraint o n protected speech in
violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitut ion. 1 To resolve this issue, we will begin by reviewing the law that governs the issuance of CSPOs
in Ohio. We will then consider t he First Amendment principles governing regulations of speech that Rasawehr alleges have been violated. Finally, we will apply those principles to paragr aph nine of the CSPOs issued in this case.
A. Ohio CSPOs {¶ 9} R.C. 2903.211 prohibits menacing by stalking. R.C. 2903.211(A) provides:

(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender wil l cause physical harm to the other person or a family or househol d member of the other person or cause mental distress to the othe r person or a family or household m ember of the other person. * * * (2) No person, through the use of any form of written communication or any electronic method of remotely transferring information, including, but not limited to, any computer, compu ter network, computer program, computer system, or

1. Rasawehr’s appeal does not claim protection under Article I , Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution (“Freedom of speech; of the press; of libels”), so we do not co nsider whether Ohio’s constitution is violated by paragraph nine.January Term, 2020

5 telecommunication device shall post a message or use any intentionally written or verbal graphic gesture with purpose to do either of the following: (a) Violate division (A )(1) of this section; (b) Urge or incite another to commit a violation of division (A)(1) of this section.

{¶ 10} “ ‘Pattern of conduct’ means two o r more actions or incidents c losely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior convicti on based on any of those actions or incidents.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). {¶ 11} “Mental distress” means “[a]ny mental illness or condition that involves some temporary subs tantial incapacity,” R.C. 2903.211( D)(2)(a), or that “would normally require psychiatr ic treatment, psychological tr eatment, or other mental health services,” R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)(b). {¶ 12} “ ‘Post a message’ means tran sferring, sending, posting, publis hing, disseminating, or otherwise communicating, or attempting to tra nsfer, send, post, publish, disseminate, or otherwis e communicate, any message or information, whether truthful or untruthful, about an individual, and whethe r done under one’s own name, under the name of anot her, or while impersonating ano ther.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(7). {¶ 13} R.C. 2903.214 provides a civil remedy for stalking victims. R. C. 2903.214(C) states:

A person may seek relief under this section for the person, or any parent or adult household member may seek relief under t his section on behalf of any other family or household member, by f iling a petition with the court. The petition shall contain or state all of the following:S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 (1) An allegation that the respondent is eighteen years of age or older and engaged in a violation of section 2903.211 of the Revised Code against the person to be protected by the protecti on order or committed a sexually oriented offense against the pers on to be protected by the protection or der, including a description o f the
nature and extent of the violation;
* * * (3) A request for relie f under this section.

{¶ 14} R.C. 2903.214(E)(1)(a) states:

After an ex parte or full hearing, the court may issue any protection order, with or wit hout bond, that contains terms des igned to ensure the safety and protection of the person to be protect ed by the protection order, including, but not limited to, a requirem ent that the respondent refrain from entering the residence, school, bus iness, or place of employment of the p etitioner or family or household
member.

{¶ 15} A person who violates a CSPO is subject to criminal prosecution for a violation of R.C. 2919.27 and may be punished for contempt of court. R.C. 2903.214(K). {¶ 16} A CSPO issued pursuant to R.C. 2903.214 is a “ ‘special statuto ry remedy that is designed to prevent violence * * *.’ ” J.P. v. T.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010897, 2017-Ohio-233, ¶ 28, quoting Oliver v. Johnson , 4th Dist. Jackson No. 06CA16, 2007-Ohio-5880, ¶ 1. “The goal of R.C. 290 3.214 is to allow the police and the courts to act before a victim is harmed by a stalker.” (Emphasis sic.) Irwin v. Murray, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1113, 2006-Ohio-1633, ¶ 15.January Term, 2020

7 R.C. 2903.214 “does not create a tort remedy” to compensate the victim for damages. J.P. at ¶ 28, citing Oliver at ¶ 1

. Instead, it provides expeditious remedies that “are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other availab le civil or criminal remedies,” R.C. 2903.214(G)(1); see also J.P. at ¶ 28. {¶ 17} In this case, the trial cour t found upon a preponderance of the evidence that Rasawehr had engaged in a pattern of conduct that was the proximate cause of the fear and mental distress experienced by appellees. The court further found that Rasawehr authored the Internet postings depicted in appellees’ hearing exhibits “with the knowledge, if not the intent, that his posti ng of the information would cause each of the [appellees] fear and mental distress.” Appellees’ mental distress “included losing slee p, unwanted communication and, in response to questions by others who have viewed the information on the vari ous websites, their resulting reluctance to be seen in public due to embarrassment, worry, anxiety, and humiliation as evidenced by petitioner Bey seeking and receivin g psychological counseling and petitioner Rebecca Rasawehr taking anxiety medic ation.” Further,
the court concluded that the anx iety of each appellee had “rise n to the extent that each fear[ed] physical harm may be inflicted upon them” by Rasa wehr. Concluding that Rasawehr had violated R.C. 2903.211(A), the trial court is sued CSPOs pursuant to R.C. 2903.214. {¶ 18} Rasawehr does not contest the tria l court’s decision to issue C SPOs. He instead contests only the relief ordered in paragraph nine o f the CSPOs, arguing specifically that the trial court’s order that he refrain from posting about appellees on any social-media service, website, discussion board, or simi lar outlet or service and that he refrain from posting about the deaths of appellees’ husbands in any manner that expresse d, implied, or suggested that appellees wer e culpable in those deaths is a prior restraint on free speech that violates the Fi rst Amendment to the
United States Constitution.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 B. The First Amendment and Prior Restraints {¶ 19} The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freed om of speech.” “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment’s Free Sp eech Clause applicable against t he States * * *.” Manhattan Community Access Corp. v.
Halleck , ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1921, 1928, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019). {¶ 20} “ ‘[A]s a general matter, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its m essage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” ’ ” Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1521 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002), quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. , 463 U.S. 60, 65, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d. 469 (1983), quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). {¶ 21} The right to free speech secured by the First Amendment is not absolute, however, and the government may regulate it in a mann er that is
consistent with the Constitution. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). {¶ 22} A regulation of speech that is content-based is presumptively unconstitutional and is subject to strict scrutiny, which requi res that it be the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest. See Reed v. Gilbert, ___U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226-2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014); United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). {¶ 23} Content-neutral regulations limiting the time, place, and manne r of speech are constitutional as long as they promote “important go vernmental interestsJanuary Term, 2020

9 unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and do[] not burd en substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm., 520 U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997), syllabus. See also McCullen at 486; United States v. O’Brien , 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). {¶ 24} Like statutes that regulate sp eech, court-ordered injunctions t hat regulate speech are also subject to First Amendment scrutiny. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. , 512 U.S. 753, 757, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). {¶ 25} Rasawehr argues that paragraph ni ne imposes a “prior restraint” on his First Amendment right to free speech. “The term ‘prior res traint’ is used ‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.’ ” (Emphasis added in Alexander .) Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993), quoting Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech , Section 4.03, at 4-14 (1984). See also State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 20, quoting 2 Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech , Section 15.1, at 15-4 (2009) (prior restraint refers to “ ‘judi cial orders or administrative rules that operate to forbid expression before i t takes place’ ”). “Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., c ourt orders that actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.”
Alexander at 550. {¶ 26} A prior restraint is not unconstitutional per se but bears “ ‘a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ ” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), quotin g Bantam Books, Inc

. v. Sullivan , 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d (1963). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2dS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 822 (1971). For example, in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 415-417, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)
, an Illinois court enjoined a “racially integrated community organization” that was critical of a local real-estate broker’s business practices “ ‘from passing out pamphlets, leaf lets or literature of any kind, and from picketing, anywhere in the City of Westchest er, Illinois.’ ” The United States Supreme Court or dered that the injunction be vaca ted, noting:

It is elementary, of course, that in a case of this kind the co urts do
not concern themselves with the truth or validity of the public ation.
Under Near v. Minnesota , 283 U.S. 697 (1931) [51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357], the injunction, so far as it imposes prior restrai nt on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights. Here, as in that case, the injunction operates, not to redress allege d private wrongs, but to suppres s, on the basis of previous publicati ons, distribution of literature “of any kind” in a city of 18,000.

Id. at 418-419. The court noted that even if the petitioners’ pea ceful distribution of literature was intended to have a coercive impact on the respon dent’s business practices, that “d[id] not remove them from the reach of the Fi rst Amendment.” Id.
at 419. The court declared:

No prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an in dividual in being free from public criticism of his business practices i n pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court. Designating the conduct as an i nvasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of th e natureJanuary Term, 2020

11 revealed by this record. * * * [R]espondent is not attempting t o stop the flow of information into his own household, but to the publ ic. Accordingly, the injunction issued by the Illinois court must b e vacated.

(Citation omitted.) Id. at 419-420. {¶ 27} The fact that expression may now occur in “cyberspace—the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union , 521 U.S. 844, 868, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), and social media in particular,” Packingham v. North Carolina, ___ U.S.___, 137 S.Ct 1730, 1735, 198 L.Ed.2d 273 (2017), does not mean tha t governmental regulation of that speech is beyond the reach of First Amendment analysis and scrutiny. See Packingham at 1735-1737 (invalidating a North Carolina statute that prohibite d registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social-networking websites) ; see also Toledo
Blade Co. , 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 25, quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm ., 558 U.S. 310, 326, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (notwithstanding the emergence of “revolutio nary changes in the delivery of information to the public” through the Internet and other forms of mass communication, “ ‘[c]ourts, too, are bound by the First Am endment * * * [and] [w]e [must] decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutio nal lines based on the particular media or technology used’ ”). {¶ 28} Therefore, we must decide whether paragraph nine of the CSPOs enjoining Rasawehr from posting about appellees imposed an unco nstitutional prior restraint on his First Amendment right to free speech. In doin g so, we confront the practical conundrum such proceedings can present:

Compared to subsequent punishment for crimes of violence, civil harassment orders are easy to obtain and easy to enforce. Thes e areS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 their chief virtues. Compared t o subsequent punishment for spe ech, prior restraints are also easy to obtain and easy to enforce. These
are their chief vices.

Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 Hastings L.J. 781, 824 (2013).
III. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO PARAGRAPH NINE {¶ 29} Rasawehr contends that by enjoi ning him from future posting of messages about appellees, the CS POs include an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression covered by the First Amendment. We therefore consid er these prohibitions in light of First Amendment jurisprudence. 2
A. Content-based vs. content-neutr al restrictions {¶ 30} Because these injunctive orders regulate speech, we must first determine whether these regula tions are content-based or conten t-neutral. See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (“we think it unexceptional to perform the fir st part of a multipart constitu tional analysis first”). {¶ 31} “Government regulation of speech is content based if a law appl ies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. at 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236. A law is content based “if it require[s] ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘e xamine the content of

2. Rasawehr does not articulate any argument contesting the pr ovision of paragraph nine that ordered him to remove prior postings from CountyCoverUp.com that related to appellees. Compare Coleman v. Razete, 2019-Ohio-2106, 137 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.) (order “[r]eq uiring [respondent] to remove all existing references to [petitioner] from internet or social-networking sites that [respondent] operate[ed] or control[led] was narrowly tail ored to redress the specific pattern of conduct that [respondent] had engaged in to knowingly cause [pe titioner] mental distress” and to prevent further mental distress to petitioner, while also “safe guard[ing] free speech concerns”). Because Rasawehr does not contest that provision here and the o rdered removal of prior postings would not in any case amount to a prior restraint, we do not co nsider that provision further in this

case.January Term, 2020

13 the message that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has occurred.”
McCullen at 479, quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. League of Women Voters of California., 468 U.S. 364, 383, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984).
A law is also content-based if it is “concerned with undesirabl e effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isten ers’ reactions to speech.’ ” McCullen at 481, quoting Boos v. Barry , 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). {¶ 32} Paragraph nine of the CSPOs orde red Rasawehr to (1) refrain fro m posting about appellees on any socia l-media service, website, d iscussion board, or similar outlet or service and (2) refrain specifically from pos ting about the deaths of appellees’ husbands in any ma nner that expressed, implied, o r suggested that appellees were culpable in those deaths. Putting aside for the moment the extraordinary scope of these inj unctions, we can only conclude that they are intended to regulate the subject matter, the content of speech, or both. {¶ 33} A regulation of speech that is “about” appellees is necessarily a regulation of the subject matter of that speech. The first sen tence of paragraph nine fully regulates and in this case puts limits on any expression that relates to that particular subject, i.e., appellees. And the regulation of spe ech in the second sentence of paragraph nine about the deaths of appellees’ husba nds that says anything about possible culpability regulates not only the subj ect matter but also the message. It is inescapable that a regulation of speech “ab out” a specific person (or likely any other specific subject of discussion) is a regul ation of the content of that speech and must therefore be analyzed as a content-based r egulation. {¶ 34} For their part, appellees do not seriously dispute that the reg ulation of speech concerning their alleged culpability in the deaths of their husbands is a content-based regulation. Appell ees do, however, dispute that the prohibition from posting about them in general is content-based and instead cont end that this is a content-neutral regulation. They rely on Commonwealth v. Lambert , 2016 PAS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 Super 200, 147 A.3d 1221 (Pa.Super.Ct.2015), in which the Super ior Court of Pennsylvania, the state’s inter mediate appellate court, reviewe d a comparable protective order and ruled that the prohibition was “not concer ned with the content of Appellant’s speech but with, instead, the target of his speech, namely, Plaintiff, whom the court has already deemed the victim of his abusive con duct.” (Emphasis sic.) Id . at 1229. {¶ 35} But the “target” of such speech necessarily concerns the subjec t matter of the speech. It “cannot be justified without referenc e to the content of the prohibited communication.” People v. Relerford , 2017 IL 121094, 422 Ill.Dec. 774, 104 N.E.3d 341, 350 (2017). It requires an examination of its content, i.e, the person(s) being discussed, to det ermine whether a violation has occurred and is
concerned with undesirable effect s that arise from “ ‘the direc t impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech,” McCullen , 573 U.S. at 481, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502, quoting Boos , 485 U.S. at 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333. We therefore cannot accept appellees’ attempt to characterize the order banning all posted speech a bout them as merely a content- neutral regulation. {¶ 36} Nor can the prohibitions in paragraph nine be considered merely incidental to a regulation of conduct. See O’Brien , 391 U.S. at 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (act of burning Selective Service registra tion certificate could be prosecuted for violation of law prohibiting destruction of r egistration certificates
even if conduct was intended to express an idea or belief)

. On the contrary, the regulation of expressive activit y is the obvious purpose of par agraph nine of the
CSPOs here. {¶ 37} We therefore conclude that the prohibition of certain future sp eech by paragraph nine is a content-based regulation. B. Exception for s peech integral to criminal conduct {¶ 38} Having determined that speech was being regulated on the basis of its content does not necessarily mean, however, that it cannot be regulated. TheJanuary Term, 2020

15 First Amendment does “ ‘permit[] restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377, 382-383, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Those categories include: “advoc acy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawle ss action; obscenity; defamatio n; speech integral to criminal conduct; so-called ‘fighting words,’; child pornograph y; fraud; true threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat t he government has the power to prevent * * *.” (Citations omitted.) United States v. Alvarez , 567 U.S. 709, 717, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opi nion). {¶ 39} In this case, the court of appeals suggested—but did not actual ly
decide—that Rasawehr’s restraine d speech could have been “ ‘int egral to criminal conduct,’ ” 2019-Ohio-57, at ¶ 40, quoting Alvarez at 721, and thus within a class of “unprotected speech,” id . at ¶ 39. Appellees more directly contend that Rasawehr’s speech is “categorically unprotected” because it is “speech integral to
criminal conduct.” 3 For support, appellees cite Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co. , 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). In Giboney, unionized ice peddlers picketed against Empire Storage and Ice Company after it refused to agree not to sell ice to nonunion peddler s, a practice that would hav e violated Missouri’s antitrade-restraint law. When Empire sued to enjoin the picket ing, the union answered by asserting a constitutional right to picket for the purpose of forcing Empire to discontinue its sal e of ice to nonunion peddlers. {¶ 40} Upholding the trial court’s pick eting injunction against the un ion, the United States Supreme Court ruled that all of the union’s a ctivities “constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violati on of Missouri’s
valid law.” Id . at 498. The court expressly re jected the suggestion “that th e constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunit y to speech or

3. Appellees do not contend that Rasawehr’s restrained speech could be subject to regulation on the other possibly applicable categories such as defamation or true threats.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a v alid criminal statute.”
Id . According to the court, “the injunction did no more than enj oin an offense against Missouri law, a felony.” Id. Because the “sole, unlawful immediate objective” of the expressive ac tivity was to “induce Empire to violate Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful dema nds,” prohibiting that expressiv e activity did not violate rights protected b y the First Amendment. Id . at 502. The court explained:

[It] has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduc t illegal merely because the co nduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of la nguage, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpre tation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspir acies deemed injurious to society.

(Citations omitted.) Id

. {¶ 41} According to appellees, Rasawehr’s postings are integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stal king in violation of R.C. 2 903.211(A). But there has been no judicial determination here that future posti ngs Rasawehr might make will be integral to the commission of the crime and thus u nprotected by the First Amendment. “The special vice of a prior restraint is tha t communication will be suppressed, either directly o r by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations , 413 U.S. 376, 390, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). Speech may not be catego rically suppressed by means of a prior restraint absent a judicial determination t hat the speech would be unprotected by the First Amendment. See Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U.S. 51,January Term, 2020

17 58, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965) (“because only a judici al determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to fr eedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint”). {¶ 42} Our decision in O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc ., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), is instructive. In t hat case, the plaintiff, a landlord, alleged that the def endant, a tenant-organization, had compiled and published a list of landlords about whom defendant had received the most complaints. The plaintiff alleged that the list contained fals e and defamatory information about him. The plain tiff’s complaint requested var ious forms of injunctive relief that would enjoin the defendant from dissemin ating allegedly defamatory information in the f uture. The trial court dismisse d the complaint because the plaintiff “had not ‘met the heavy burden of justify ing prior restraint.’ ”
Id . at 244. The court of appeals re versed, determining that if t he trial court found the defendant’s statements to be defamatory, “then the question whether defendant should be enjoined from future repetition of the same statement s could properly be
before the court.” Id . at 245. {¶ 43} We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in O’Brien , stating:

Once speech has judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for r estraint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper. The judicial determination that specific speech is defamatory must be made prior to any restraint. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, 149 [87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094]. In an analogous area, dealing with obscene materials, the United States Supreme Court, in Southeastern Promotions v.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 Conrad [420 U.S. 546, 558-559, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)], said: “* * * The presumption against prior restraints is heavier— and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits o n expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distincti on is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to pu nish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to
throttle them and all others bef orehand. It is always difficul t to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line betwe en legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn tha t the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. See Speiser v.
Randall , 357 U.S. 513 (1958) [78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460].” Speaking of allowable remedies available, that same court,
in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957), 354 U.S. 436, 437, [77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469,] said: “* * * ‘limited injunctive remedy,’ under closely defined procedural safeguards, against t he sale and distribution of wri tten and printed matter found after due trial to be obscene [may be allowed] * * *.” (Em phasis added.)

Id . at 245-246. {¶ 44} Because the plaintiff’s complaint in O’Brien sought to prospectively enjoin further publication of allegedly defamatory information, we held that such relief could be awarded if the pl aintiff’s allegations—“that fi les of a false and defamatory nature are being used to coerce the public into refu sing to rent from
him”—could be s ubstantiated. Id . at 246. Thus, O’Brien confirms that before a court may enjoin the future pub lication of allegedly defamatory statements basedJanuary Term, 2020

19 on their content, there must fi rst be a judicial determination that the subject statements were in fact defamatory. Id

. {¶ 45} In the case before us, however, there has been no such judicial determination that future postings by Rasawehr will be an integ ral means to criminal conduct and thus unprotecte d by the First Amendment. {¶ 46} Even if the trial court here determined solely for purposes of civil protection that Rasawehr violat ed R.C. 2903.211(A), there has b een no valid judicial determination that any future expression Rasawehr might make to others through posted messages would necessarily be integral to the cr iminal conduct of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A). Even if past speech that
an offender made to a person that the offender knew would cause that person to
believe that the offe nder would cause physical harm to that per son or would cause mental distress to that person could be considered speech that was integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking, we do not believe tha t this principle may be applied categorically to future speech—that is by its nature uncertain and
unknowable—directed to others

. {¶ 47} Because of the uncertainty inherent in evaluating future speech that has yet to be expressed, the record here cannot justify a conte nt-based prior restraint on speech when there has been no valid judicial determination t hat such speech will be integral to criminal conduct, d efamatory, or otherwise subje ct to lawful regulation based on its content. {¶ 48} When it comes to speech, the application of a criminal law shou ld generally occur after the contested speech takes place, not bef ore it is even uttered. As observed by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-181, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968),S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 Ordinarily, the State’s constitutionally permissible interests are adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom t o speak has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact and consequences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are materially different from t hose of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgement.

{¶ 49} For their part, appellees rely on federal-court decisions that have upheld the constitutionality of the federal stalking statute, 1 8 U.S.C. 2261A. 4 See United States v. Gonzalez , 905 F.3d 165 (3d Cir.2018); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir.2014); United States v. Sayer , 748 F.3d. 425 (1st Cir.2014); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2012). But those decisions are inapposite here inasmuch as they involved prosecutions and conv ictions under that
federal statute for past speech that was integral to the course of criminal conduct. By contrast, there has been no criminal prosecution and convict ion of Rasawehr for having engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 290 3.211 or any other offenses relating to his state ments about appellees. More impo rtantly, none of those cases involved prior restraints on future speech like those imp osed here by paragraph nine.

4. 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2) prohibits whoever
with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place u nder surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, u ses the mail, any interactive computer service or electronic communication servic e or electronic communication system of interstate commerce, or any other facil ity of interstate or foreign commerce, to engage in a course of conduct that— (A) places that person in reasonable fear of the death of or se rious bodily injury to a person * * * or (B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person * * *.January Term, 2020

21 {¶ 50} Because there was no valid judicial determination that any futu re Internet postings that Rasawehr might make about appellees woul d necessarily be integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking in vio lation of R.C. 2903.211(A), or that such postings would be defamatory or other wise proscribable, that future expression would not be excluded categorically from First Amendment protection. The trial court’s CSPOs thus represent prior restr aints that are unconstitutional unless they can survive strict scrutiny. See Toledo Blade Co. , 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 21. C. Application of strict scrutiny {¶ 51} A content-based regulation of p rotected speech c annot be sustai ned unless it is the least restrictive means to achieve a compellin g state interest. See
Reed , __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 2231, 192 L.Ed.2d 236; McCullen , 573 U.S. at 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502; Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865; Sable Communications of California, Inc. , 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93. Assuming, wit hout deciding, that there is a compelling state interest in protecting civil-stalki ng victims from fear of imminent physical harm or mental distress, the means chosen her e are not the least restrictive. The scope of paragr aph nine, which prohibits Rasa wehr from posting anything about appellees is remarkable. It has no defined limits. Any thing that Rasawehr might ever post about appellees, no matter how innocuo us, would conceivably subject him to proceedings for contempt of court if not criminal prosecution under R.C. 2919.27 for violating the CSPO. By any measure, this regulation of speech is demonstrably overbroad. {¶ 52} In Flood v. Wilk , 430 Ill.Dec. 96, 2019 IL App (1st) 172792, 125 N.E.3d 1114, 1116-1117 (2019), the past or of a church obtained a “stalking no contact order” that, among other things, prevented the responde nt from “communicating, publishing or communicating, in any form any wr iting naming orS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 regarding [the pastor], his family or any employee, staff or me mber” of the pastor’s church congregation. V acating that part of the order, the appe llate court stated:

Since the trial court’s order in the instant case targeted resp ondent’s speech based on its subject matter—the church or its members—it
would be considered a content-base d restriction and presumptive ly prohibited. An injunction that prohibits respondent from writi ng anything at all about his pastor or any other member of his church congregation—whether flattering or unflattering, fact or opinio n, innocuous or significant, and regardless of the medium of communication—certainly would not be that rare case that surviv es strict scrutiny. It is all but impossible to imagine a factual record that would justify this blanket restriction on respondent’s spe ech. Paragraph (b)(5) of the order is substantially and obviously overbroad, and it violates responde nt’s first-amendment right t o free speech.

(Emphasis sic.) Id . at 1126. {¶ 53} Not unlike the order in Flood that prohibited the respondent from writing anything about the pastor or any employee or member of the church, the orders issued here prohibited Ras awehr from writing anything ab out appellees “on any social media service, website, discussion board, or similar outlet or service.” Nothing in the record before us justifies such an utterly sweep ing restriction on First Amendment expression. Nor does it justify the attempt to limit its censorship to postings about the deaths of appellees’ husbands or appellee s’ alleged culpability
in their husbands’ deaths. {¶ 54} Appellees maintain that paragra ph nine was narrowly tailored to limit the exercise of free speech to only the degree necessary to achieve theJanuary Term, 2020

23 compelling state interest of protecting them from “stalking and harassment” and
that no less restrictive alternative would be as effective. Bu t we fail to see how an order that prohibits Rasawehr from posting anything about appellees either protects
them from certain mental distre ss or prohibits only distress-ca using speech. To the contrary, it prohibits everythin g. And while the restraint on postings about appellees concerning their alleged culpability in the deaths of their husbands bears at least some factual relation to the allegations contained in their petitions, it suffers from the same fatal flaw by suppressing all expression about th at topic regardless
of whether it causes mental dis tress cognizable under R.C. 2903 .211(D)(2)(a) and (b). Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals made the se First Amendment
sensitive determinations in this case. {¶ 55} We by no means discount any mental distress and embarrassment that appellees experienced, nor d o we doubt that future stateme nts may cause additional mental anguish. But speech does not lose its protec ted character simply because it may be upsetting and cause distress or embarrassment

. See Snyder v. Phelps , 562 U.S. 443, 458, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (anti military and homophobic statements near fune ral for serviceman killed in action was protected despite jury’s finding that it was “outrageous” as an element of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Natl. Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
v. Claiborne Hardware Co. , 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character * * * sim ply because it may
embarrass others or coer ce them into action”). {¶ 56} Moreover, appellees are not without civil tort remedies to redr ess any cognizable injuries they claim to have suffered as a result of Rasawehr’s statements about them, including but not necessarily limited to actions for defamation. But the special sta tutory process to provide exped ited civil relief to stalking victims under R.C. 2903.214 serves primarily to protec t victims from imminent threats of physical harm and mental distress. It is n ot designed to be aS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 shortcut or substitute for conven tional civil remedies and thus is not the appropriate means to obtain the panoply of monetary damages and injunctive relief that may properly be awarded through such proceedings. In any case, the potential abuse of speech rights in the future cannot justify the blanket prohibit ion imposed here on Rasawehr’s speech before it has even been uttered. {¶ 57} Here, the court of appeals observed that “not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance,” 2019-Ohio-57, at ¶ 41, and that “[ i]t is speech on ‘ “matters of public concern” ’ that is ‘at the heart of the Fi rst Amendment’s protection,’ ” id ., quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U.S. 749, 758-759, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), quoti ng First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765, 776, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), citing Thornhill v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88, 101, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed 1093 (1940). Appellees similarly maintain, in defending the CSPOs under stri ct scrutiny, that the value of Rasawehr’s speech concerning private matters is “decid edly low” when balanced against the interest in upholding the CSPOs. They rel y on Snyder , in which the United States Supreme C ourt reviewed a jury verdict t hat held a church and its leaders liable for the emotional distress caused by the ir protest using antimilitary statements and homophobic slurs near an American s erviceman’s funeral. The court ruled that “[w]hether the First Amendment p rohibits holding [the church] liable for its speech in this case turns largely o n whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumst ances of the case.”
Id . at 451. Because the speech at issue in Snyder involved matters of public concern, to include “the political and moral conduct of the Uni ted States and its citizens” and “homosexuality in the military,” id . at 454, it was “entitled to ‘special protection’ ” and the court set aside the jury’s verdict again st the church, id . at 458-
459. {¶ 58} In their brief to this court, appellees claim that in contrast to Snyder ,January Term, 2020

25 Rasawehr’s speech (1) consists of a barrage of personal attacks blended with just enough public criticism to create an illusion of public debate; (2) is, by Rasawehr’s own admission, motivated b y a personal grudge against his family evidenced by the content of his writings; and (3) did not tak e place on a public street.

As appellees must concede, howev er, Rasawehr’s statements purpo rted to implicate local public officials in an alleged criminal conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court has said that “ ‘speech on public issues occupies the hig hest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.’ ” Snyder , 562 U.S. at 452, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, quoting Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Su ch speech is protected by the First Amendment even though the speaker or wri ter was motivated by hatred or ill-will. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 53, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (“while * * * a bad motive may be dee med controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we th ink the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about publ ic figures”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). {¶ 59} In any case, our role here is not to pass judgment on the truth , plausibility, or First Amendment value of Rasawehr’s allegation s. To the extent
his statements involve matters o f both private and public conce rn, we cannot discount the First Amendment prot ection afforded to that expres sion. We most assuredly have no license to recognize some new category of unp rotected speech based on its supposed value. Rejecting such a “free-floating t est for First Amendment coverage,” the United States Supreme Court declared i n Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435, that the First Am endment’s guarantee of free speech “does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” “O ur decisions * * *S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

26 cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to dec lare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.” Id. at 472. {¶ 60} Prior restraints on First Amendm ent expression are presumptivel y unconstitutional. Because paragraph nine of the CSPOs is conte nt based and does not survive strict scrutiny, we hereby vacate those portions of paragraph nine that enjoin Rasawehr from future pos tings about appellees or that ex press, imply, or suggest that appellees were cu lpable in the deaths of their hus bands.
IV. CONCLUSION {¶ 61} The CSPOs issued here undoubtedly sought to provide some measure of relief to appellees for the mental distress they exp erienced because of Rasawehr’s public acc usations. But the means chosen to provide that relief—with its virtually unlimited restraint on the content of future post ings about appellees— went far beyond anything that the factual record before us can sustain and the First Amendment can tolerate. We therefore reverse the judgment of t he Third District Court of Appeals to the extent that it upheld the trial court’s CSPOs enjoining future postings about appellees or postings that express, imply, or su ggest that appellees were culpable in the deaths of their husbands, and we vacate th ose provisions of paragraph nine that prohibited such future postings and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceed ings consistent with this opinio n. Judgment reversed in part
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Miltner Reed, L.L.C., Ryan K. Miltner, and Kristine H. Reed, fo r appellees. Sawan & Sawan, L.L.C., and De nnis E. Sawan, for appellant.January Term, 2020

27 Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Alexandria M. Ruden, Haley K. Martinelli, and Tonya D. Whitsett; and Micaela C. Deming, urging affirmance for amici curiae Legal Aid Society of C leveland and Ohio Domestic Violence Netwo rk. Scott & Cyan Banister First Am endment Clinic, UCLA School of L aw and Eugene Volokh; and Law Office of Karin L. Coble and Karin L. Co ble, urging reversal for amici curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1851 Center for Constitutional Law, and Professors Jonathan Entin, David F. For te, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen La zarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, M argaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, and Eugene Volokh. Fritz Byers, urging reversal f or amicus curiae Block Communica tions, Inc.

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