NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KRISTEN STEGER-GRAHAM, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

PAUL GRAHAM, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0035 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2020-000901

The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

State 48 Law Firm, Scottsdale

By Robert Hendricks, Stephen Vincent, Ankita Gupta

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix

By Eileen Dennis GilBride

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

Lawrence & Jecmen PLLC, Scottsdale

By Andrea Christine Lawrence

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 8-29-2023
STEGER-GRAHAM v. GRAHAM

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Kristen Steger-Graham (“Wife”) appeals the superior court’s 

order modifying the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage (“Decree”) 

to correct a clerical mistake in the equalization payment to her former 

husband, Paul Graham (“Husband”). Wife also appeals the order 

precluding her testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Finally, she appeals 

the order denying her motion to reconsider, to alter or amend, and for relief

from the Decree. We affirm the court’s orders and award Husband his 

attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 During the parties’ divorce proceedings, they hired mediator

David Horowitz to assist them in resolving their case. They met with 

Horowitz several times and ultimately reached a full settlement. They 

memorialized their settlement in four separate agreements under Arizona 

Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69. The first two agreements 

addressed child-related issues and are not part of this appeal. The third

agreement resolved their real-property issues and required Wife to pay 

Husband an equalization payment of $278,000. The fourth agreement 

resolved their remaining financial issues and increased the “total”

equalization payment to $360,000. Concerning this total equalization

amount, the parties “agree[d] and underst[ood] that this figure includes the 

$278,000 [Wife] owes [Husband] for the division of the real property.”

¶3 Almost immediately after entering into these Rule 69

agreements, the parties began contacting Horowitz about 

“enforcement/contempt issues,” each alleging the other had violated the 

agreements’ terms. They stipulated that Horowitz would arbitrate these 

claims and that, afterwards, he would submit to the court a proposed decree 

reflecting their mediated agreements and his arbitration rulings.

¶4 The arbitration took place in early December 2021. A month 

later, Horowitz discussed the draft decree with counsel during a telephone 
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3

call. He confirmed the total equalization payment would be $360,000, 

which included the equalization of $278,000 “for the houses.” He also 

confirmed he would adjust the total equalization figure based on his 

arbitration rulings. Before the call ended, he offered counsel the 

opportunity to review the final draft decree, but both attorneys waived the 

right to do so. In January 2022, Horowitz lodged and the court signed the 

proposed decree.

¶5 In February 2022, Husband filed a motion for relief from the 

Decree. He alleged the Decree contained a clerical error because it ordered 

Wife to pay him a total equalization payment of $260,000, which was 

$100,000 less than the amount reflected in their Rule 69 agreements. Wife 

responded that the figure in the Decree was not a clerical mistake at all, but 

that even if it was a mistake, it was a non-fixable “judgmental” mistake.

¶6 The attorneys asked Horowitz to review the $100,000 

discrepancy. After doing so, Horowitz filed a notice of errata, stating he 

had made a clerical error with respect to the equalization payment. He also 

explained he intended to give Wife a credit of $18,000 based on his 

arbitration rulings but “erroneously deducted the $18,000 . . . from the 

$278,000 equalization payment for the houses instead of deducting the 

$18,000 payment from the full amount of the equalization payment of 

$360,000.” He continued, “[t]he correct amount of the equalization 

payment from [Wife] to [Husband] should be $342,000” instead of the 

$260,000 as stated in the Decree.

¶7 In November 2022, the superior court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the sole issue of the equalization payment referenced in the

notice of errata. Horowitz appeared voluntarily and testified to the nature 

of his mistake consistent with his statements in the notice of errata. 

Horowitz testified that he thought he did the math correctly, but upon 

investigating the matter to his “horror and humiliation” he realized his

error. He also testified that his task was not to reconsider the agreed-upon 

equalization payments, but rather to offset from the total equalization 

payment any adjustments he considered appropriate due to “either or both 

of the parties’ bad behaviors.” In addition to Horowitz’ testimony, the 

court considered the Rule 69 agreements and the audio and video 

recordings of both the arbitration hearing and the arbitrator’s subsequent 

telephone call with counsel.

¶8 Two weeks later, the superior court issued an under 

advisement ruling, finding the parties had stipulated in their mediated 

agreements to the total equalization figure of $360,000. The court further
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4

found the parties had agreed to be bound by the Decree issued by the 

arbitrator, and it was not inequitable or unjust to correct the Decree as 

requested in the notice of errata. The court concluded “Horowitz provided 

sufficient evidence to establish that Paragraph 14 of the [Decree] includes 

an imputation error resulting in an incorrect final equalization amount.” 

The court amended the Decree’s total equalization figure to $342,000. Three 

months later, the court sua sponte amended the Decree a second time to 

extend the deadline for Wife’s equalization payment.

¶9 Wife timely appeals the superior court’s post-decree orders. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

section 12-2101(A)(1) and (2), except as explained below.

DISCUSSION

¶10 We review de novo the superior court’s decision to apply Rule 

85(a) to the facts presented. See In re $11,660.00 U.S. Currency, 251 Ariz. 106, 

108, ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (applying de novo standard to Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Civil Rule”) 60(a), the civil counterpart to Rule 85(a)). We 

apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the court’s ultimate 

decision on whether to grant relief under Rule 85(a). See Clark v. Kreamer, 

243 Ariz. 272, 275, ¶ 10 (App. 2017).

I. The Decree

A. Equalization Payment Provision

¶11 Under Rule 85(a), “[a] court must correct a clerical mistake or 

a mistake arising from oversight or omission if one is found in a judgment.” 

This rule allows the court to make a correction “on motion or on its own” 

and contains no deadline. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 85(a). When a clerical 

error is raised, “the family court should examine the record to determine 

whether the judgment accurately recorded the court’s intent” and, if it does 

not, “the judgment should be corrected.” Vincent v. Shanovich, 243 Ariz. 

269, 271, ¶ 8 (2017).

¶12 The provisions of the Decree addressing the equalization 

payment are squarely at odds with each other. In Paragraph 14, the Decree 

orders Wife to pay Husband a total equalization of $260,000, and purports 

to include and account for the $278,000 she owed him for the division of 

theirreal property. Wife offers no reasonable explanation for how the lesser 

equalization of $260,000 somehow includes the larger equalization of 

$278,000. Her argument is further belied by Paragraph 10.a., which 

addresses only the parties’ real property. This paragraph orders Wife to 
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5

pay Husband an equalization payment of $278,000 “for the houses.” It also 

provides that if she fails to pay him this equalization payment, “the 

$278,000 shall become a judgment, accruing interest at the judicial rate and 

any residences necessary shall be immediately listed for sale and sold to 

satisfy the removal of [Husband] from any mortgage(s) and the payment of 

$278,000.”

¶13 As written, the ambiguity in the Decree cannot be 

harmonized in a way that is logical without concluding that it contains a 

clerical mistake. This conclusion is also consistent with our prior decisions 

in cases involving divorce decrees that contained provisions that directly 

contradicted each other. See, e.g., Rozzell v. Rozzell, 1 CA-CV 08-0470, 2009 

WL 350912, at *1, *2, ¶¶ 2, 11 (App. Feb. 12, 2009) (mem. decision) (decree 

contained a clerical error because it ordered husband to pay $2,000 in 

spousal maintenance, whereas the child support worksheet credited the 

husband with a $3,000 spousal maintenance obligation); see also Buchholz v. 

Odom, 1 CA-CV 10-0316, 2011 WL 1867301, at *1, ¶ 6 (App. May 10, 2011) 

(mem. decision) (decree contained a clerical error because it awarded a 

property to “husband or wife”).

B. Clerical Mistake

¶14 Wife argues that the mistake in the total equalization payment

is not a clerical mistake, but a non-fixable “judgmental” mistake. Although 

Rule 85 mandates that the court must correct clerical mistakes or those 

arising from oversight or omission, the rule does not apply to “judgmental”

errors. Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 271, ¶ 8. “A judgmental error occurs when the 

court’s decision is accurately set forth but is legally incorrect.” Id. Put 

differently, Rule 85(a) does not permit the court to change “a judgment . . . 

which was entered as the court intended.” Ace Auto. Prod., Inc. v. Van 

Duyne, 156 Ariz. 140, 142-43 (App. 1987).

¶15 Wife asserts the error in the Decree is judgmental because the 

Decree was entered “as the court intended.” She asserts “the Arbitrator’s 

intent is of only fleeting relevance here,” and “[i]t is the trial judge’s intent 

that matters here.” She relies on Ace Automotive Products, Inc., where we 

affirmed the superior court’s finding that there was no clerical error in the 

judgment because even if the figure in the judgment was incorrect, the court

had intended to enter the judgment as written. Id. at 143; see also Minjares 

v. State, 223 Ariz. 54, 60, ¶¶ 24-26 (App. 2009).

¶16 Wife’s argument, however, takes an unrealistically narrow 

approach to the question of intent. It was the arbitrator who drafted the 
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proposed decree and presented it to the court. The court acted reasonably 

by assuming that this decree accurately reflected the arbitrator’s intent, 

based on the parties’ prior agreements and the arbitrator’s assessment of 

any adjustments he determined were appropriate regarding the 

enforcement dispute. But the arbitrator’s testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing was that he mistakenly deducted $18,000 from the $278,000 housing 

equalization payment instead of making that deduction from the global 

equalization payment that the parties had agreed to, which was $360,000. 

The arbitrator’s testimony reflects the mistake was clerical. See Vincent, 243 

Ariz. at 271, ¶ 8.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

¶17 Wife claims that the superior court erred by going on a “fact 

finding operation” because the court was not permitted to seek out new 

facts to correct a clerical mistake. A Rule 85(a) motion, however, triggers 

the superior court’s fact-finding function, requiring it to determine whether 

there was a clerical mistake. Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 271, ¶ 8 (superior court 

should examine the record to determine if the decree reflects the court’s 

intent); Crye v. Edwards, 178 Ariz. 327, 329 (App. 1993) (The superior court 

“must generally engage in factfinding to determine whether to grant relief 

under [Civil] Rule 60(a).”). Although courts are not required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on a Rule 85(a) motion, they often do so when there is 

insufficient evidence in the record to resolve the matter. See, e.g., Buchholz, 

1 CA-CV 10-0316, at *1, ¶ 5; DeForest v. DeForest, 143 Ariz. 627, 631-32 (App. 

1985); Rae v. Brunswick Tire Corp., 45 Ariz. 135, 139 (1935). The superior 

court did not err in holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 

the figures it approved in the Decree were based on a clerical mistake.

¶18 Wife next asserts that the superior court erred by considering 

testimony and evidence outside of what was in the record at the time the 

court entered the Decree. But when considering clerical mistakes, Arizona 

courts consider extrinsic evidence, including the testimony of judicial 

officers. See, e.g., Rozzell, 1 CA CV 08-0470, at *1, ¶ 4 (affirming lower court’s 

order to amend a decree “based on a clear recollection of [the] case, as well 

as the court’s review of its draft decree”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also DeForest, 143 Ariz. at 631-32 (“[T]he testimony [and notes] 

of the trial judge who presided at the [prior] hearing . . . [are] probative 

evidence of the fact of rendition and the terms of the judgment . . . .”); State 

v. Johnson, 113 Ariz. 506, 508-09 (1976) (affirming the lower court’s entry of 

judgment nunc pro tunc based on a different judge’s minute entry 

statement that he had intended to dismiss the criminal matter “without 

prejudice”); Rae, 45 Ariz. at 139 (The lower court was justified in relying on
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the court clerk’s testimony to correct a minute entry order to show the 

matter was “dismissed without prejudice.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 394 (1939) (affirming the lower 

court’s reliance on a judge’s testimony for the purpose of determining 

whether a juror was competent). “An arbitrator is empowered to hear and 

decide disputes by the mutual assent of parties who voluntarily agree to 

arbitrate a defined universe of disputes.” The Spaulding LLC v. Miller, 250 

Ariz. 383, 384, ¶ 2 (App. 2020). A judge of the Arizona superior court, on 

the other hand, is an officer elected by the citizenry or appointed by the 

governor who enjoys original jurisdiction over divorce matters. Ariz. 

Const. art. 6, §§ 12, 14(9). It follows, then, that if a judge may, in limited 

circumstances, be called to give testimony regarding the terms of her 

judgment, an arbitrator may be similarly called to testify.

¶19 Wife further argues that, even if extrinsic evidence were

permissible, the superior court erred by taking testimony from Horowitz to

determine that there was a clerical error. Citing In re Marriage of Zale, 193 

Ariz. 246 (1999), she asserts a judgment should never “be overthrown or 

limited by the oral testimony of a judge or juror of what he had in mind at 

the time of the decision.” Id. at 249, ¶ 11 (quoting Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 

U.S. 276, 307 (1904)). But the limitation in Zale—which held that the parol 

evidence rule does not apply to a judgment—does not apply when the 

superior court utilizes a rule of procedure authorizing it to fix a mistake in 

a judgment. See Zale, 193 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 7. Indeed, Zale excludes from its 

holding cases “to correct clerical and other mistakes in a judgment” under 

Civil Rule 60. See Zale, 193 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 11 n.1 (“Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60 is 

available to correct clerical and other mistakes in a judgment, as well as to 

provide other relief.”). The cases Zale relies on for its holding, Hyden v. Law 

Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 848 P.2d 1086 (N.M. Ct. App.

1993), and People v. Tippett, 733 P.2d 1183 (Colo. 1987), also do not involve 

clerical errors. See 193 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 14.

¶20 We recognize that there are good policy reasons for 

prohibiting arbitrators or judges from testifying. See, e.g., Phillips v. Clancy, 

152 Ariz. 415, 421 (App. 1986) (“Public policy considerations militate 

against the trial judge testifying as an expert witness in litigation involving 

parties who previously appeared before him.”) (citation omitted); see also 

State v. Miller, 128 Ariz. 112, 118 (App. 1980) (reasoning that the court 

should weigh seriously whether to allow testimony of a judge). But those 

policy considerations do not apply in this case because the arbitrator 

brought his clerical mistake to the superior court’s attention by filing the

notice of errata and appeared voluntarily to testify regarding his mistake.

Moreover, the court relied on Horowitz’ testimony to determine whether 
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he made a clerical mistake, not to interpret or impeach the Decree. See 6 

C.J.S. Arbitration § 240 (May 2023 Update) (“The testimony of arbitrators is 

generally admissible to prove any matter in connection with the arbitration 

that can be proved by other parol evidence . . . [but arbitrators] may not 

testify for the purpose of impeaching or interpreting their award.”).

¶21 We conclude that the superior court did not err by amending 

the Decree to correct the arbitrator’s clerical mistake. Because we affirm the 

court’s order under Rule 85(a), we do not address the parties’ arguments 

regarding Rule 85(b).

II. Due Process

¶22 Wife claims the superior court denied her due process 

because it did not allow her to testify at the evidentiary hearing on the

notice of errata. Due process, however, does not require the court to allow

a party to present irrelevant evidence. See State v. Paxson, 203 Ariz. 38, 41,

¶ 13 (App. 2002); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a)(2). We will affirm the court’s 

rulings on the exclusion of evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion. 

Belliard v. Becker, 216 Ariz. 356, 358, ¶ 13 (App. 2007).

¶23 At the evidentiary hearing, Wife began to testify about her 

compliance with provisions of the Decree that were unrelated to the notice 

of errata. Husband objected to her testimony on the ground that it was 

irrelevant, and the court sustained the objection. The court explained to 

counsel that it had set the hearing solely on the issue of the notice of errata

and that it was not the proper time to litigate enforcement claims. The court 

further explained to Wife that her claims were not waived, and that she 

would have the opportunity to bring those claims before the court in the 

future if she decided to do so. Wife’s attorney responded,

So if the Court doesn’t need any further information to review 

those two equitable claims [regarding unjust enrichment and 

unclean hands], I certainly won’t waste the Court’s time.

Because Wife conceded that her testimony was unnecessary, she has 

waived appellate review of the court’s order excluding her testimony. See 

State v. Totress, 107 Ariz. 18, 20 (1971) (“It is a fundamental rule of appellate 

procedure in Arizona that the trial court must be given an opportunity to 

correct the errors at trial, and where no such claim of error was made-at the 

trial court level-the claim is waived.”).
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III. Wife’s Post-Decree Motion

¶24 Wife argues that the superior court abused its discretion by 

denying her motion to reconsider, to alter or amend, and for relief from the 

Decree. Her motion requested the court modify the Decree’s child support, 

property-distribution, and equalization-payment orders.

¶25 The superior court entered the Decree in January 2022. Wife 

filed her motion in February 2022. The court denied Wife’s motion by 

minute entry order in March 2022. In its order, the court also denied “any 

affirmative relief sought before the date of this order that is not expressly 

granted above,” and it certified the orders as final under Rule 78(c). Under 

ARCAP 9(a), a party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the 

court enters the judgment they seek to appeal. Wife, however, did not file 

her notice of appeal until December 12, 2022, nine months after the court’s 

final order denying her motion. Because Wife’s notice of appeal is 

untimely, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of her February 2022 

motion. See James v. State, 215 Ariz. 182, 185, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (failure to file 

a notice within thirty days deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction).

¶26 Even if we had jurisdiction, we see no merit to this argument.

We review the court’s denial of post-decree motions under Rules 35.1, 83(a), 

and 85(b) for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 

238, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (denial of motions for reconsideration); Clark, 243 

Ariz. at 275, ¶ 10 (denial of Rule 85 motions); Stock v. Stock, 250 Ariz. 352, 

354, ¶ 5 (App. 2020) (denial of motions to alter or amend). We will affirm 

the court’s ruling for any reason supported by the record. Pettit v. Pettit, 

218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 (App. 2008).

¶27 Wife contends the superior court erred by refusing to even 

consider her motion. She asserts that the court was wrong when it wrote 

that it had “accepted the parties’ agreements as written and submitted in 

the [Decree] and will not consider modifications or amendments to the 

Decree now, as the Court did not issue the orders therein.” We disagree. 

The parties had already entered into Rule 69 agreements resolving all the 

issues in their divorce case. The court had merged their agreements into 

the Decree. Once the court adopted these agreements, it lost its ability to 

modify or reject them. See Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 472, ¶ 9

(App. 2018) (“Although courts can, in the first instance, reject a Rule 69 

agreement, neither the statute nor the rule vest courts with discretion to 

modify an agreement the court has adopted.”).
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¶28 Wife nevertheless argues that the superior court did in fact

have the authority to “clarify” or “modify” the Decree under Rules 67.2, 

85(a), and 91. She makes the same argument based on A.R.S. §§ 25-327 and 

-411. But she did not raise these arguments in her motion, nor did she file 

a petition for post-decree modification of child support or legal decisionmaking under A.R.S. §§ 25-327 or -411. And although she did cite Rule 

83(a)(1)(G) in her motion with regards to modifying the child support 

orders, she did not allege any uncontested facts in her motion that would 

have supported amending the Decree under this rule. See Ariz. R. Fam. 

Law. P. 83(a)(1)(G) (permitting the court to alter or amend a judgment if 

there are “mistakenly overlooked or misapplied uncontested facts, 

including mathematical errors, which were necessary to the ruling”).

¶29 Based on this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying her motion.

IV. Wife’s Remaining Claims

¶30 Wife’s opening brief also raises several cursory arguments, 

which do not require reversal. She contends, for instance, that the superior 

court erred by not granting her motion to strike Husband’s second motion 

forrelief under Rule 85(a). Wife also asserts that the court erred by referring

to the Decree as a “consent decree” in its November 2022 under advisement 

ruling. She further asserts it was error for the court to find the parties had 

agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s rulings and had waived their right 

to review the terms of the Decree. Wife fails to develop these arguments in 

her opening brief or show why they would justify reversal. Accordingly, 

we conclude she has waived these issues, and we do not address them on 

their merits. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); see also Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 

Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007) (an appellant’s failure to develop and 

support an argument waives the issue on appeal).
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CONCLUSION

¶31 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

orders amending the Decree to correct the arbitrator’s clerical mistake;

precluding Wife’s irrelevant testimony at the evidentiary hearing; and 

denying her motion to reconsider, to alter or amend, and for relief from the 

Decree. Husband requests his attorneys’ fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 25-

324(A). We have considered the relative financial resources of the parties 

and the reasonableness of the positions they asserted on appeal. See id. In 

the exercise of our discretion, we award Husband his reasonable attorneys’ 

fees and costs on appeal, upon compliance with ARCAP 21.