IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JOHN WATSON v. MIKE YOUNG, ET AL

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 98-7791; The Honorable R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

No. W1999-00683-COA-R3-CV - Decided July 10, 2000 

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by an inmate at the Northwest Correctional Complex.

The complaint sought damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an electrical shock

allegedly caused by the Defendant’s inactions. The Lake County Circuit Court dismissed the

complaint finding that the plaintiff’s claim sounded in negligence and the defendants, as state

employees, enjoyed absolute immunity from negligence claims.

Tenn.R.App.P. 3; Appeal as of right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FARMER, J., and LILLARD, J., joined.

John Watson, pro se, Tiptonville, Tennessee

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Pamela S.

Lorch, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees

OPINION

John Watson appeals from the decision of the Lake County Circuit Court, which dismissed his pro

se complaint. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

John Watson (“Appellant”) is a Tennessee Department of Correction inmate housed at the

Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCC”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Mike Young and Sonny

Wilkerson, the Defendants, were, at all times relevant, supervisors in the food service department

at NWCC. 

On May 8, 1998, the Appellant suffered burn injuries after allegedly coming into contact with

exposed electrical wiring while working in the kitchen. He filed suit against Young and Wilkerson,

claiming that they were aware of the risk of harm but failed to take any action to correct the

dangerous condition. After no answer was filed on behalf of the defendants, the Appellant filed a
1

 Subsequent to this order, both Defendants filed “memorandums” with the trial court in

which they addressed the complaint filed by the Appellant.

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request for entry of default. On October 22, 1998, the trial court entered an order giving the

Defendants thirty days in which to respond to the complaint.1 Thereafter, the Attorney General’s

Office, on behalf of the defendants, filed a motion for an extension of time in which to respond to

the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, and the defendants subsequently filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) and (6). 

On August 12, 1999, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case, finding that the

complaint asserted claims for negligence and the defendants, as state employees, had absolute

immunity from negligence claims pursuant to T.C.A. §9-8-307(h). The present appeal arises from

the order dismissing the complaint.

II. Law and Analysis

This appeal comes before the court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to rules 12.02(1) and (6)

of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In considering the appeal of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to

dismiss, this court is required to take the allegations of the complaint as true and to construe the

allegations liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664

S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1984). Such a motion admits the truth of all relevant and material

averments contained in the complaint but asserts that such facts do not constitute a cause of action.

Humphries v. West End Terrace, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Our review of

the complaint leads us to conclude that the motion to dismiss was properly granted.

The defendants, as state employees, enjoy immunity pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h), which

provides:

State officers and employees are absolutely immune from liability for

acts or omissions within the scope of the officer's or employee's office

or employment, except for willful, malicious, or criminal acts or

omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain. For

purposes of this chapter, "state officer" or "employee" has the

meaning set forth in § 8-42-101(3). 

The immunity provided by the quoted language serves as an absolute defense to all actions not

within the express exceptions. Therefore, the dispositive issue in this case centers on the nature of

the Appellant’s cause of action.

In his complaint, entitled “Tort Complaint,” the Appellant seeks redress for the “negligent

and proximate injury he received while being confined to his assigned work duty.” He further claims

that his injuries would not have occurred “had the defendants took reasonable care” and that their
2

 We believe the Appellant intended the word “cause” instead of “result.”

3

 In his appeal brief, the Appellant attempts to invoke T.C.A. § 9-8-307 (C), which confers

jurisdiction for “Negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real

property.” This issue has not been raised previously, therefore we shall not consider it in this appeal.

See Lovell v. Metropolitan Government, 696 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1985); Lawrence v. Stanford, 655

S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1983); Moran v. City of Knoxville, 600 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

 

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“negligence was the proximate result of injuries plaintiff suffered.”2

 Even his brief, filed for the

purposes of this appeal, speaks in terms of a negligence action. While it is sometimes difficult to

decipher a legal document written by a layperson, we are of the opinion that the Appellant’s

complaint clearly states a cause of action for negligence.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the Defendants were aware of some defect in the

electrical wiring, their failure to repair such a defect does not qualify as a willful, malicious, or

criminal act. At most, the Defendants were negligent in failing to remedy a known risk. The

Appellant’s complaint speaks in negligence terms, and the mere insertion of words such as “wanton”

or “deliberate indifference” does not change the character of the cause of action. Therefore, no

exception to the statutory immunity exists, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint.3

The Appellant also claims that the Defendants violated his rights under theEightAmendment

to the United States Constitution. We need not ponder long to conclude that the complaint fails to

state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Prison conditions are violative of the Eighth

Amendment only when they result in “serious deprivations of basic human needs.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981). The question under

the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a

prisoner to a sufficiently substantial "risk of serious damage to his future health." Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). As stated previously,

the allegations in the complaint, at most, make out a claim for negligence. Mere negligence does

not constitute deliberate indifference for the purposes of an Eighth amendment violation. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Moreover, we do not believe that the

alleged injuries suffered by the Appellant are the type of “serious damage” contemplated by the

applicable cases. As such, we believe the trial court was correct in dismissing that part of the

Appellant’s complaint alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 
4

 The Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in failing to address his motion for

default judgment. The question of whether the default judgment should have been granted lies

within the discretion of the trial court, and we find no reason to question the court’s decision. 

4

Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.4 Costs of the

appeal are taxed against the Appellant, John Watson, for which execution may issue if necessary.