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James R. Condo (#005867)

Amanda C. Sheridan (#027360)

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

One Arizona Center

400 E. Van Buren, Suite 1900

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2204

Telephone: (602) 382-6000

jcondo@swlaw.com

asheridan@swlaw.com

Richard B. North, Jr. (admitted pro hac vice)

Georgia Bar No. 545599

Matthew B. Lerner (admitted pro hac vice)

Georgia Bar No. 446986

NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP

Atlantic Station

201 17th Street, NW, Suite 1700

Atlanta, GA 30363

Telephone: (404) 322-6000

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com 

matthew.lerner@nelsonmullins.com

Attorneys for Defendants

C. R. Bard, Inc. and 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability 

Litigation,

No. 2:15-MD-02641-DGC

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO 

EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 

RECOVERY® FILTER 

COMPLICATIONS AND OTHER 

COMPLICATIONS THAT ARE NOT 

SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO 

THE INCIDENT AT ISSUE

(Assigned to the Honorable David G. 

Campbell)

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Bard moves in limine to exclude evidence of other incidents and complications 

involving other Bard IVC filters, including the Recovery® Filter, and to require Plaintiffs 

to prove, outside of the presence of the jury, that another incident or complication is 

substantially similar to the alleged incident at issue in this case.1In support of this Motion, 

Bard respectfully shows the Court as follows:

INTRODUCTION 

The product at issue in this case is the Bard G2® Filter. Plaintiff alleges that the G2 

Filter implanted in her in June 2007 tilted, caudally migrated, perforated her IVC, 

fractured, and that fractured portions of the device embolized to other parts of her body, 

allegedly causing her injuries. Given those factual allegations, Plaintiff’s legal claims turn 

on whether the G2 Filter implanted in her was defectively or negligently designed, and 

whether Bard provided adequate warnings to her implanting physician.

Ignoring the proper scope of the issues in this case, Plaintiff has made clear that she 

intends to inflame the jury by turning this G2 Filter case into a referendum on an entirely

different product: Bard’s Recovery Filter. As “fuel” for that effort, Plaintiff intends to 

introduce extensive testimony and evidence about reports of the Recovery Filter fracturing

and a small number of reports of the Recovery Filter allegedly migrating to a patient’s 

heart, resulting in patient death. In an effort to “stoke the flame” of prejudice, Plaintiff 

intends to offer extensive testimony and evidence about Bard’s efforts to investigate, 

analyze, and respond to these reports of Recovery Filter fracture and migration. Plaintiff 

intends to do all of this, despite that this case does not involve the Recovery Filter, and 

does not involve a migration of the G2 Filter (much less a Recovery Filter) to her heart.

While the Court previously ruled that “Plaintiff has shown ‘substantial similarity’ 

between the Recovery and G2 Filters” as one basis for denying summary judgment on the 

punitive damages claim, Doc. 8874 at 21, respectfully, this issue was not significantly 

briefed outside of the limited summary judgment context on Plaintiff’s punitive damages 

claim. Indeed, Plaintiff made no mention of the standard whatsoever in her Response. See 

 

1 Counsel for Defendants conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs and this motion is opposed.

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Doc. 8163. Moreover, Bard’s Reply mentioned the point only in a cursory fashion, and 

did not address the vast majority of authorities on the issue. See Doc. 8574. Bard 

respectfully submits that this question warrants more detailed briefing, as it presents the 

fundamental issue in this case. Specifically, the Court should determine whether the jury 

will be asked to analyze the questions truly at issue (alleged defects in the G2 Filter and 

any causal link with Plaintiff’s alleged injury), or whether Plaintiff will be permitted to 

broaden this trial – beyond the legal issues at play – into a broad-ranging referendum on a 

different device: the Recovery Filter. Plaintiff should not be permitted to do so here.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In June 2007, Plaintiff received Bard’s second generation retrievable IVC filter, 

called the G2 Filter. Plaintiff’s G2 Filter allegedly tilted, caudally migrated, perforated, 

fractured, and a fractured strut embolized to Plaintiff’s heart. Plaintiff allegedly 

experienced a “caudal” migration, movement of her filter approximately 3cm down 

towards her feet, not a “cephalad” or “cranial” migration, involving movement of the 

filter up towards her heart or lungs, which can be fatal.

2

More than four years before Plaintiff received the G2 Filter, FDA cleared Bard’s 

first-generation retrievable IVC filter, called the Recovery Filter. The Recovery Filter was 

commercially marketed from the beginning of 2003 until the fall of 2005. During that 

time, Bard monitored the performance of the Recovery Filter, analyzed the adverse events 

that were reported by doctors and others to the company, and reported the events to FDA. 

These adverse events included reports of Recovery Filter fracture and migration, including 

reports of migration of the entire Recovery Filter to a patient’s heart, resulting in death.

As part of its post-market surveillance of the Recovery Filter, Bard formed internal 

teams (Product Assessment Teams) to study and analyze the adverse events reported 

 

2 Caudal migration is entirely different than cephalad migration and is often asymptomatic 

and clinically insignificant. See Christos Athanasoulis, et al., Inferior Vena Caval Filters: 

Review of a 26-year Single-Center Clinical Experience, Radiology 2000; 126:54-66, 63-

64 (“We do not consider caudal migrations to be major complications. Caudal migrations 

are clinically relevant only when the devices move to an iliac vein.”); Cf. Charles Owens, 

et al., Intracardiac Migration of Inferior Vena Cava Filters, Chest 2009; 136:877-887 

(discussing cephalad migrations to the heart, some of which resulted in death).

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about the Recovery Filter. Bard properly documented its work, analyses, and 

investigations of the Recovery Filter through reports, Remedial Action Plans, and Health 

Hazard Evaluations. Bard also communicated with FDA and physicians about the 

Recovery Filter. Those efforts, complaints, investigations, and communications were 

undertaken long before the G2 Filter was on the market. As such, evidence of Recovery 

Filter complications has absolutely no relevance to the issues in this case.

In late 2005, Bard introduced the G2 Filter to the market. Based on clinical 

experience with the Recovery Filter, Bard made several significant changes to the G2 

Filter: the filter hook wire diameter was increased, the filter leg span was increased, the 

filter arm length was increased, the filter arm tips were curved, the curvature radius of the 

filter arms at the sleeve were increased, and the spline was modified to accommodate the 

other dimensional changes. FDA cleared the G2 Filter for permanent use in August 2005, 

and as a retrievable device in January 2008. In September 2005, Bard ceased selling the 

Recovery Filter after it introduced the G2 Filter, more than a year and a half before the G2 

Filter was ever implanted in Plaintiff.

As Plaintiff conceded in other briefing submitted in this case, one of Bard’s goals 

in developing the G2 Filter was to reduce the number of incidents of filter fracture and 

migration that Bard had observed with the Recovery Filter. See Doc. 7950 at ¶ 63. Indeed, 

Bard made the dimensional changes above to the design of the Recovery when developing 

the G2 Filter aimed specifically at improving fracture and migration resistance. See id. at ¶ 

313. As a result, whether the Recovery Filter fractures or migrates at a percentage that is 

relatively higher than other devices (which is one of the arguments Plaintiff intends to 

make), or whether Bard warned physicians of the relative risks of the Recovery Filter 

(which, again, is one of the arguments Plaintiff intends to make), has absolutely no 

bearing on whether a later generation filter that Plaintiff actually received -- the G2 Filter, 

which was intended to and in fact did address concerns about filter fracture and migration3

-- was somehow defective and caused Plaintiff’s injuries. 

 

3 Plaintiff’s own expert cites failure rate data that demonstrates the G2 Filter experienced 

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ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

A. Evidence of Other Incidents Is Admissible Only if Plaintiff Carries Her 

Burden of Proving That the Evidence is Substantially Similar to Her Case

It is fundamental that all evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 

402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining 

the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Evidence of other incidents or other complications is 

relevant and admissible only if such other incidents or other complications are 

“substantially similar” to the case at hand. Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 

F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991).

4 The reasons courts exclude dissimilar evidence is 

because of the recognized potential for “substantial prejudice” created by such evidence, 

Tran v. Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005), and the likelihood that 

the “jury could easily be confused or misled into imposing liability on the mere basis of 

what could have happened rather than what did happen.” See Bauerlein v. Equity 

Residential Properties Mgmt. Corp., No. CIV 04-1904 PHXSMM, 2007 WL 1546101, at 

*1 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2007) (granting motion in limine excluding evidence of other deaths 

involving defendant’s mini-blinds products that occurred under different circumstances).

Plaintiff has the burden of proving substantial similarity “outside the presence of 

the jury.” Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 1991). To carry 

 

a lower incidence of fracture and migration over the predicate Recovery Filter. See Expert 

Report of Rebecca Betensky (Doc. 7289 at Ex. A; Redacted copy at Doc. 8118-1), at 8-9.

4

“Admission of other similar accidents or occurrences is governed by the federal 

substantial similarity doctrine and not state law.” Reid v. BMW of N. Am., 464 F. Supp. 2d 

1267, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 890 (Ga. Ct. App.

2006); see, e.g., W. Recreational Vehicles, Inc. v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 23 F.3d 1547, 

1555 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining “general rule in federal courts” within the Ninth Circuit); 

Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding FRE, not 

Georgia law, govern the admissibility of similar transaction evidence in products liability 

action in diversity case); accord In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prod. 

Liab. Litig., No. 3:07-CV-00101, 2010 WL 1962943, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 14, 2010) 

(applying FRE instead of Georgia law). This Court applies the law of the Ninth Circuit on 

issues of federal law. See Doc. 8872 at 7. Regardless, both bodies of law require exclusion 

here of any incidents or complications for which Plaintiff fails to demonstrate substantial 

similarity. St John v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 8:10ML02151 JVS FMOX, 2013 WL 

5775081, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (“The Ninth Circuit has much the same 

standard” as that under Georgia law). 

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this burden, Plaintiff must establish concrete and detailed facts to prove substantial 

similarity of each proffered incident. Cursory factual accounts and/or superficial 

similarities are not enough to prove substantial similarity. See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech 

Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]oo few established facts about 

the [prior] accident” to make comparison) (emphasis original); Ponder v. Warren Tool 

Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1560 (10th Cir. 1987) (mere “superficial factual similarity between 

the two accidents” insufficient). “The district court must be apprised of the specific facts 

of previous accidents in order to make a reasoned determination as to whether the prior 

accidents are ‘substantially similar.’ Absent such a foundation, it is impossible [to do so].”

Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1995).5 Because “this requires a detailed 

consideration of each [incident],” one MDL court in this circuit recently limited the 

plaintiffs to presentation of only ten other incidents at trial and ordered plaintiffs to submit 

detailed briefing demonstrating substantial similarity through excerpts from relevant 

expert reports, depositions, and other data sources. St John, 2013 WL 5775081, at *5. 

Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have routinely excluded 

evidence of other incidents or complications where such evidence is not substantially 

similar to the case being tried because it involves different models of products, Daniel v. 

Coleman Co. Inc., 599 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming exclusion of evidence 

of accidents caused by defendant’s other models of heaters due to their dissimilarities in 

size, intended use, and warning language), different alleged injuries and complications, 

see Ramirez v. E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 8:09-CV-321-T-33TBM, 2010 WL 

3467655, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2010) (excluding evidence of other claims of injury 

where, inter alia, the evidence involved different complications and different injuries), 

different parts of the same model of product, see Hamatie v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., No. 

6:06-CV-817-ORL-18, 2007 WL 7626033, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2007) (excluding 

evidence of prior accidents involving the same model of ladder at issue, where the prior 

 

5 Nor can Plaintiff “improperly shift the burden to the Court” to review cursory evidence 

to find “any support for Plaintiff’s claim of substantial similarity.” Steede v. Gen. Motors, 

LLC, No. 11-2351-STA-DKV, 2013 WL 142484, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 2013).

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claims did not involve alleged “separation of the base and fly sections” of the ladder),

individuals with different medical courses, see id., and different conditions giving rise to 

the accident. See Jaramillo v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F. App’x 76, 78–79 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(reversing and remanding for new trial where comparative accident statistics were not 

“based on accidents that occurred under circumstances similar to [plaintiff’s] accident”). 

Thus, in light of the authorities stated above, Plaintiff should be permitted to 

attempt to introduce evidence of other incidents or complications only after she satisfies 

her burden of proving -- outside of the presence of the jury -- that such other incidents or 

complications are substantially similar to her alleged complications with her G2 Filter. 

B. Recovery Filter Complications Involving Cephalad Migration Are Not 

Substantially Similar to Plaintiff’s Alleged Complications Involving a G2

Filter Caudal Migration and Fractured Strut Embolization

Plaintiff has already injected in this case evidence of irrelevant, dissimilar incidents 

involving Recovery Filter complications, in particular Recovery Filter cephalad 

migrations of the entire filter to patients’ hearts, and Bard’s analyses and investigations 

into such incidents. See Doc. 8163 at 4. These complications are not substantially similar 

to Plaintiff’s alleged G2 Filter caudal migration and embolization of a fractured strut (not

the entire filter) to her heart. The following table 6illustrates some of the main 

dissimilarities between these incidents: 

Recovery® Filter 

Cephalad Migration 

of Entire Filter to 

Heart

Plaintiff’s Alleged G2® Filter Caudal 

Migration and Embolization of 

Fractured Strut to Heart

Different models 

of products

Recovery® Filter G2® Filter 

Different alleged 

complications

Cephalad Migration Caudal Migration/Embolization of 

fractured strut

Different alleged 

injuries 

Emergency open heart 

surgery and/or patient 

death 

Non-emergent percutaneous procedure to 

remove filter/Non-emergent, “minimally 

invasive,” surgical procedure to remove 

fractured strut from heart

Different alleged Alleged inadequate Shape and geometry of the G2 Filter 

 

6 This Table is for illustrative purposes. Bard does not intend to represent that all reports 

of Recovery Filter migrations to a patient’s heart follow these precise parameters. 

Regardless, Plaintiff has the burden to prove substantial similarity of these incidents to her 

case. See Cooper, 945 F.2d at 1105. It is not Bard’s burden to prove dissimilarity.

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defects radial strength and/or 

anchoring hooks

makes it unstable

Different 

physiological 

forces potentially 

causing the

complication

Filter dislodgment and 

migration potentially 

due to large clot 

burdens overloading 

the filter 

Fracture allegedly caused by stresses on 

device following tilt, caudal migration,

and/or perforation allegedly caused by 

normal physiological forces

As illustrated above, incidents of Recovery Filter cephalad migration of the entire 

filter to a patient’s heart are not substantially similar to Plaintiff’s G2 Filter caudal 

migration and strut embolization. The G2 Filter was specifically designed to address and 

improve upon the clinical experience with the Recovery Filter, including cephalad 

migration resistance. So, by their very nature, the circumstances surrounding adverse 

events involving a different filter and different filter complications cannot be substantially 

similar to Plaintiff’s alleged complications. Thus, evidence of these dissimilar 

complications is simply not relevant because it does not tend to prove or disprove the 

disputed facts of consequence in this action, i.e., whether the G2 Filter implanted in 

Plaintiff was defective and whether any alleged defect caused her alleged injuries. 

For these reasons, the Court should exclude as irrelevant evidence of Recovery 

Filter complications, including, in particular, evidence concerning Recovery Filter 

migrations to patients’ hearts.

C. Evidence Of Recovery Filter Complications Is Inadmissible Under Rule 403

Plaintiff seeks to introduce at trial evidence of Recovery Filter cephalad migrations 

to patients’ hearts resulting in patient death. Here, Plaintiff survived her fracture and strut 

embolization, so this evidence concerning complications resulting in patient death is not 

substantially similar to Plaintiff’s alleged complication. Such irrelevant and inflammatory 

evidence is precisely the type of evidence that can lead to “substantial prejudice” to Bard 

and that can “confuse or mislead the jury.” Tran, 420 F.3d at 1316; Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The probative value of any evidence in this case about complications reported 

through adverse events and investigation and analysis of the Recovery Filter is slight, if 

any, given the difference of the filter models in question, the timing of their development, 

and the date of the implant of the filter at issue. Any probative value of such evidence, 

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especially those resulting in death, is also greatly outweighed by the unfair prejudice, 

misleading of the jury, confusion of the issues, and consumption of time that the 

admission of such evidence would cause. Put simply, this evidence is inadmissible under 

Rule 403. See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir. 

1985) (Admitting evidence of the allegedly similar incidents may have “an undue 

tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis”); Bauerlein, 2007 WL 1546101, at 

*1 (excluding evidence of other incidents involving death under FRE 403).

If Plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence concerning the reported adverse events 

with the Recovery Filter and Bard’s analysis and investigation of those incidents, Bard 

will necessarily have to introduce (1) its own evidence of the reasons that caused Bard to 

design the Recovery Filter the way it did, (2) evidence of the information and technology 

available when the Recovery Filter was designed, (3) evidence of the information and 

technology available when the G2 Filter was designed, (4) why and how Bard addressed 

the adverse events reported about the Recovery Filter, and (5) the extensive analysis, 

investigation, and reports it performed regarding the investigations it undertook regarding 

the Recovery Filter. This would inevitably result in a trial-within-a-trial on the 

development of the Recovery Filter and its performance in the marketplace (all of which 

took place years before a different filter was implanted in Plaintiff).

This trial-within-a-trial would waste significant judicial resources and prevent the 

parties from trying the issues presented by this particular case. It is for these reasons that 

courts routinely guard against presentation of evidence on collateral and irrelevant 

matters. See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 2007) (“No judge 

wants to see one trial turn into several, especially when the one trial presents complex 

issues with which the jury may already be struggling.”). Ultimately, admission of the 

evidence regarding other incidents and complications involving the Recovery Filter will 

bury the Court and jury under an avalanche of collateral questions and competing 

arguments involving filters and circumstances not at issue in this case, thus resulting in 

unavoidable confusion, as well as adding substantially to the length of the trial.

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D. Evidence Of Recovery Filter Complications Is Not Relevant to Prove “Notice”

Plaintiff will likely respond to this Motion by arguing that evidence regarding 

Recovery Filter complications is somehow relevant to prove “notice.” This argument is 

erroneous. First, Plaintiff intends to use Recovery Filter migration evidence (and other 

evidence of dissimilar incidents involving Bard’s IVC filters) to prove her design defect 

allegations, and much more, not just to prove Bard was on “notice.” Second, Bard’s 

“notice” of the potential for a G2 Filter to move, perforate, migrate, or fracture is not 

contested by Bard in this case. In fact, Bard’s notice of these potential complications is 

precisely the reason that Bard warned about all of these complications in the G2 Filter 

Instructions for Use (“IFU”). See G2 Filter IFU (Doc. 7457-1). Thus, where, as here, a 

defendant does not contest notice of the potential for a complication or injury to occur 

from use of its product, evidence of prior accidents has little, if any, probative value on 

the issue of notice. See Thomas v. Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-cv730-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 4188308, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2010). 

E. “Substantial Equivalence” Is Not the Same as “Substantial Similarity”

Although the Recovery Filter and the G2 Filter are “substantially equivalent” under 

the applicable FDA regulations, complications involving the Recovery Filter are not per 

se “substantially similar” to the G2 Filter. As noted above, a showing of “substantial 

similarity” under Ninth Circuit precedent requires a plaintiff to prove that “all of the 

incidents occurred under substantially similar circumstances.” Arnold v. Sam’s Club, 662 

F. App’x 506, 506 (9th Cir. 2016). To resolve substantial similarity questions, courts often 

look at whether the models of products are the same, whether the alleged injuries are the 

same, whether the alleged complications are the same, whether the conditions giving rise 

to the incident were the same, as well as other factors. See supra Section A. 

In contrast, two products can be “substantially equivalent,” a distinct regulatory 

term-of-art, if they have the same intended use and different technological characteristics, 

so long as the newer product does not raise new questions of safety and effectiveness, and 

data demonstrates that the newer product has comparable safety and effectiveness as the 

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older device. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A). In fact, two devices can be “substantially 

equivalent” even if they have different technological characteristics, materials, and look 

very different. See, e.g., “Substantially equivalent” devices attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

Here, the G2 Filter has important design changes compared to the Recovery Filter.

Specifically, the G2 Filter has a 25% greater leg span and 24% thicker hooks, changes 

which were implemented specifically to reduce the potential for cephalad migration. 

Additionally, the G2 Filter arms are 50% longer, the arms have curved ends, and arms 

emerge from the filter “sleeve” with a radiused curve, as opposed to a more acute angle. 

These changes were specifically implemented to make the G2 Filter more fatigue 

resistant. See Ex. A (illustration of changes). While these changes are only geometrical, 

they had a significant effect on the performance of the device. See Lewy v. Remington 

Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that even minor dimensional 

changes to a product, including a “change in the tolerances as small as the width of a

human hair,” can have a large impact on product performance, making the two products 

not substantially similar for purposes of deciding admissibility of prior accidents); see 

also id. (holding that trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of accidents 

involving prior model gun, where subsequent model gun was designed specifically to 

address problems associated with the prior model); see also Colp, 630 S.E.2d at 888

(applying Georgia law, affirming exclusion of other incidents involving prior model 

minivans, where plaintiff’s subsequent model was designed specifically to address 

problems observed in prior model and such changes created “an appreciable difference in 

performance”). Indeed, Bard’s clinical experience proves that the G2 Filter has improved 

fracture and migration rates compared to the Recovery Filter. See Doc. 7289 at Ex. A.

For these reasons, the mere fact that FDA found the Recovery and G2 Filters 

“substantially equivalent” does not per se mean that complications involving the 

Recovery Filter are “substantially similar” to complications involving the G2 Filter.

CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, Bard respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9862 Filed 01/26/18 Page 11 of 13
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Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

L.L.P.

201 17t h Street NW, Suite 1700

Atlanta, GA 30363

(404) 322-6000

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2018.

s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Richard B. North, Jr.

Georgia Bar No. 545599

Matthew B. Lerner

Georgia Bar No. 446986

NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP

Atlantic Station

201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700

Atlanta, GA 30363

PH: (404) 322-6000

FX: (404) 322-6050

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

matthew.lerner@nelsonmullins.com

James R. Condo (#005867)

Amanda Sheridan (#027360)

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

One Arizona Center

400 E. Van Buren

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2204

PH: (602) 382-6000

jcondo@swlaw.com

asheridan@swlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

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Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

L.L.P.

201 17t h Street NW, Suite 1700

Atlanta, GA 30363

(404) 322-6000

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of January, 2018, the foregoing was 

electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will 

automatically send email notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.

s/Richard B. North, Jr.

Richard B. North, Jr.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 9862 Filed 01/26/18 Page 13 of 13