alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mary J. Cunningham *v.*George Collins and Wife.

Pleadings — Answer—Judgment for Costs.

The answer was not sufficient to escape a judgment for costs, but was an sion of a lot belonging to the plaintiffs,” is npt a "denial that che was in possession in fact, but only that her possession is unlawful, nor construed as a plain and simple denial of the title alleged m the petition. Nor does a denial “that she keeps plaintiff out of his rightful property” deny that she ,held the ground nor that it was the property of the co-plaintiff. The answer was not sufficient to escape a judgment for costs, but was an admission of title in the plaintiffs, and of her own possession.

APPEAL PROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

February 7, 1868

*Turner*& Trafton, *for appellant.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Kobertson :

The appellant’s answer, artfully evasive, denies neither the title of the appellees not her own actual possession of their ground. Denying that she *"unlawfully*holds possession of a lot belonging to the plaintiffs,” does not deny that she was in possession in fact but denies only that her posession is unlawful, nor, qualified as it is, can it be construed as a plain and simple denial of the alleged title. Nor does the denial “that she keeps *plff.*out of *his rightful*property” deny that she héld the ground nor that it was the property of his wife, who was co-plff. If she was not in possession she would have said so in simple and unambiguous terms, and thereby not only escaped costs but entitled herself to judgment for costs.

Properly scrutinized and tested her answer, therefore, admits both the title of the appelees and her own posession.

And consequently the judgment against her is right, and is therefore affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2214 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 547
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2214

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 3150 Great Northern Avenue in Missoula, Montana, as the ``Mike 
                        Mansfield Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 12, 2004

 Mr. Burns (for himself and Mr. Baucus) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
                                Affairs

                              June 7, 2004

               Reported by Ms. Collins, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 3150 Great Northern Avenue in Missoula, Montana, as the ``Mike 
                        Mansfield Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MIKE MANSFIELD POST OFFICE, MISSOULA, MONTANA.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 3150 Great Northern Avenue in Missoula, Montana, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Mike Mansfield Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Mike 
Mansfield Post Office''.

                                                       Calendar No. 547

108th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 2214

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 3150 Great Northern Avenue in Missoula, Montana, as the ``Mike 
                        Mansfield Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                              June 7, 2004

                       Reported without amendment
```
<PAGE>   1

                                  EXHIBIT 11.1

                    RESOURCE BANCSHARES MORTGAGE GROUP, INC.
            STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE,
                      BASIC AND DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

                   ($ in thousands, except per share amounts)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                        For the Quarter                   For the Six Months
                                                      Ended June 30, 1999                 Ended June 30, 1999
                                                      -------------------                 -------------------

<S>                                                   <C>                                 <C>
Net income                                                   $3,336                             $14,497

Net income per common share - basic (1)                      $ 0.16                             $  0.67

Net income per common share - diluted (2)                    $ 0.16                             $  0.66
</TABLE>

1)   The number of common shares outstanding used to compute net income per
share-basic was 20,958,060 and 21,587,836 for the quarter and six months ended
June 30, 1999, respectively.

2)   Diluted earnings per common share for the quarter and six months ended June
30, 1999, was calculated based on weighted average common shares outstanding of
21,138,487 and 21,800,285, respectively. Diluted earnings per common share
assumes the exercise of options covering 180,427 and 212,449 shares and computes
incremental shares using the treasury stock method for the quarter and six
months ended June 30, 1999, respectively
II 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2122 

To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prohibit 

the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the 

State of Hawaii. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 25, 2004 

Mr. AKAKA introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act 

to prohibit the comparative cost adjustment (CCA) program from operating in the State of Hawaii. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON OPERATION OF MEDICARE 

4 COMPARATIVE COST ADJUSTMENT (CCA) 

5 PROGRAM IN HAWAII. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1860C–1(b) of the Social 

7 Security Act, as added by section 241 of the Medicare Pre8 scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2 

•S 2122 IS 

1 2003 (Public Law 108–173), is amended by adding at the 

2 end the following: 

3 ‘‘(3) NO CCA AREAS WITHIN HAWAII.—A CCA 

4 area shall not include an MSA any portion of which 

5 is within the State of Hawaii.’’. 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 this section shall take effect as if included in the enact8 ment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 

9 and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–173). 

Æ
EXHIBIT 32.1
                                ------------

                 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that this
Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2004 fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in such report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

This 28th day of March, 2005.



                                       /s/ William B. Gossett
                                       ---------------------------------
                                       William B. Gossett
                                       President, Chief Executive Officer and
                                       Principal Financial and Accounting
                                       Officer
**EXHIBIT 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Harvey A. Wagner, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report of Quovadx, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-K for the yearended December 31, 2004;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;
 (b)  [Paragraph omitted in accordance with the SEC exemptive order contained in SECRelease No. 50754]
 (c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation;
 (d)  Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the Registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the Registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who havea significant role in the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: March 9, 2005         /s/ Harvey A. Wagner   Harvey A. Wagner   President and Chief Executive Officer
### M A N D A T E

THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE 408TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on February 11, 2015, the cause upon appeal to

revise or reverse your judgment between

R.J. Skye Foundation, LLC, et al, Appellant

V.

Wallace B. Jefferson, et al, Appellee

No. 04

- 15

- 00019

- CV and Tr. Ct. No. 2014

- CI

- 19776

was determined, and therein our said Court of Appeals made its order in these words:



## In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. Costs of this appeal are taxed

against Appellant Roman Gondorz.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of

Texas, with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on April 27, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853BILL OF COSTS



### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DISTRICT, AT SAN ANTONIO

No. 04

- 15

- 00019

- CV

R.J. Skye Foundation, LLC, et al

v.

Wallace B. Jefferson, et al

(NO. 2014

- CI

- 19776 IN 408TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

Balance of costs owing to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas: 0.00

**Court costs in**  **this cause shall**  **be paid as**  **per the**  **Judgment issued by**  **this Court.** 

I, KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and

payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of the COURT OF APPEALS for

the Fourth District of Texas, this April 27, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
#### Murphy & McCalister *v.*J. S. Hughes’ Admr. et al.

Bills and Notes — Assignment without Recourse.

A note, taken up by a volunteer, though assigned to him without recourse, is held to be discharged, as against the obligor, in a suit to enforce its collection.

Bills and Notes — Consideration.

Payment by appellants, of a note of another, against whom suit had been thréatened, where he had promised to renew with appellants, as sureties, held to be a binding consideration, in suit to recover from the payee.

APPEAL PROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT.

December 19, 1868.

Dunlap, *for appellant.*

*Hill*& *Alcorn, for appellee.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Robertson :

The testimony authorized these deductions: 1, that Hughes’ administrator and the administrator of Wallace were anxious to have the note now sued on paid or sued on without delay. Second, that John S. Hughes, as principal obligor, to avoid a suit, promised to pay the note by the substitution of his own note with the appellants as his sureties. Third, that the appellants, acquainted with that arrangement, and informed by Wallace’s administrator that unless the promised substitution should, *at once,*be made, suit would be brought on the note without any further delay, executed their own negotiable note, in the absence of J. S. Hughes, *for effectuating his arrangement and preventing the threatened suit and saving the credit of their partner.*Fourth, that the note was thus paid, and assigned (without recourse) to them, merely as evidence against J. ¡3. Hughes that they had paid it for him. And these authorized deductions show a binding consideration, and sustain the verdict to the effect that the noted sued on had been thus discharged.

And, therefore, there being no error in instructions, the judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Buis,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03563-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Curtis Law Group

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/11/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 18, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8282 Filed 10/20/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8282 Filed 10/20/17 Page 2 of 2
R-512 

OFl?ICE OF 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ACTSTIN. TEXAS 

PRICE DANIEL 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

June 4, 1947 

Honorable Tom Mart in, Chairmen, 

Came and Fisheries Committee, 

House of Representat lve s, 

Austin, Texas . Opinion No. v-237 

Re : Constitutionality 

of H. B. 309 amending Article 48Oa, 

Penal Code 1925. 

Deer Sir: 

You request the opinion of this department upon 

the constitutionality of House Bill Ho. 309 of the 50th 

Legislature, a copy of which Bill accompanies your request. 

The Title to th’e Bill Is es follows: 

“An Act amending Article 480e, Penal Code, 

1925, to make it the duty of the Came, Fish and 

Oyster Commission to enforce the provisions 

thereof; providing for remission of fines and 

penalt les collected thereunder end deposit thereof; repealing conflicting laws end declaring en 

emergency. 

There is no Article 48Ce Penal Code 1925. Article 480e of the Penal Code as codified in Vernon’s Texas 

Statutes is the Article to be amended. This is made clear 

in Section 1 of the body of the Act which ldentif ies the 

Article with House Bill 29, Second Called Session, 4lst 

Legislature, ch. 3, p. 4. 

The Title should be emended so es to emend Hmse 

Bill 29, Chapter 3, Second Celled Session hlst Legislature 

rather then ‘Article 480e Penal Code 1925.” 

Section 1 of the body of the Bill should be emended to correspond with the Title es to the statute being 

emended. 

‘ . 
fP ’ ,(-.\ 

._, 

Hoaoreble Tom Martin - phge 2 

With the changes above suggested, the Bill, if 

enacted Into law, would be valid es egalnst any constltutlonal objection. 

SUMMARY 

House Bill No. 309 of the 50th Lsgisleture is defective in that the Title purports 

to emend "Article 48Oe, Penal Code 1925," end 

there is no such Article in the Penal Code of 

1925. The Title should be re-written to emend 

House Bill 29, Chapter 3, Second Celled Session &lst Iegisleture, end Section 1 of the 

body of the Bill changed accordingly. With 

the changes suggested the Bill would be free 

from constitutional vice. 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEY (SNERAL OF TEXkS 

03:WB 

By &Jr 

Ocie Speer Ad%9 

Assistant
#### Hezekiah Park's Admr., *v.*Sally Park's Admr.

Decedents Estate — Disposition By Will.

Though the testator contemplated an equal division of his estate-among his two classes of devisees, yet, choosing as he did, the specific property to be distributed to each, the emancipation of the slaves alloted to one class did not entitle those devisees to any part of the'property devised to the others.

APPEAL EROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COUET.

December 11, 1867.

OPINION OE THE ÜOURT BY

JuDGE BoBERTSON.

Through tbe testator certainly contemplated an equal division of bis estate among bis two classes of devisees yet, choosing, as be did, tbe specific property to be distributed to each subject to all contingencies, tbe emancipation of tbe slaves allotted to one class did not entitle those devises to any portion of tbe land devised to tbe other class, any more than tbe death of tbe slaves after the termination of tbe estate of tbe deviso for life, would have entitled them to it. So far we concur with che circuit court.

We concur with that court also in tbe opinion that tbe personal property left at her death, by tbe legatee for life should be deemed her own absolutely, and which her administrator is entitled to bold for distribution among her legal distributees, or next of kin. Tbe fact that be assumed the ádministration without objection implies an admission that it was hers, and fortifies tbe presumption arising from lapse of time and the perishable character of tbe property, that none of it was tbe specific property bequeathed to her for life. *134And, there being no proof on this subject, we cannot assume that any of it was not her own acquisition by labor or purchase.

Harlan, *for Appellant.*

As to the essential matters of litigation we therefore approve the judgment of the circuit court.

Nor is there, in our opinion, any such substantial error in the judgment for costs as to require a reversal on that ground. While there may be some slight deviation from technical right in the distribution of costs, it seems to us that nevertheless the judgment, as rendered approximates sufficiently, for substantial justice, an equitable distribution, all things properly considered.

Wherefore' the judgment is affirmed, both on the original and cross-appeal.
#### W. G. Redman v. John B. Hart, Adr., et al.

Contracts — Covenants—Specific Execution.

An covenant by several obligors to pay certain debts out of any church funds that may come into their hands, will render them personally liable for a breach thereof, where such funds were proven to have been received by them.

APPEAL EROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 23, 1868.

*Jeff*Brown, *for appellant.*

Craddock, *for appellees.*

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Robertson:

Although the obligors were not at all worthy to be personally liable for the debt acknowledged by them for the church, yet their covenant to pay out of any church funds which might come to their hands, made them personally liable for a breach of it by non-payment out of such funds, if they came to their hands. The petition alleges that such funds; exceeding the amount of the note, did come to their hands and that, nevertheless, they failed to pay as promised. The co-obligor, Riedy, denied that charge, and a jury found against him, and we presume rightfully, as he acquiesced in the verdict and did not spread the evidence on the record.

The appellant, Redman, by failing to answer, admitted the allegations, and that admission is conclusively fortified by the verdict against his co-defendant.

The judgment against the appellant was therefore right, and we perecive no available error in the record. .

Wherefore the judgment against the appellant Redman is affirmed.