Filed 8/12/21 Villas at Corte Bella v. WestPark Corte Bella Community Assn. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE VILLAS AT CORTE BELLA,

 Cross-complainant and Appellant,

v.

WESTPARK CORTE BELLA 

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,

 Cross-defendant and Respondent.

 G059577

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-01000679)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Nancy E. Zeltzer, Judge. Affirmed.

Irwin Leroy Schroeder for Cross-complainant and Appellant.

Callahan & Blaine, Edward Susolik and Saleem K. Erakat for 

Cross-defendant and Respondent.

* * *
2

INTRODUCTION

The Villas at Corte Bella (the Villas) appeals from an order granting the 

motion of Westpark Corte Bella Community Association (Westpark) to recall a writ of 

execution and quash a notice of levy. The writ of execution had been issued to enforce a 

judgment entered to confirm an arbitration award. The arbitration award had required 

Westpark, by July 3, 2014, to open an account to cover Westpark and the Villas’ shared 

expenses, and to fund that account with $100,000 to cover the Villas’ balance. The trial 

court found that Westpark had satisfied the judgment in June 2014 by creating that

account and funding it with $100,000.

We conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted the meaning and scope 

of the judgment. A trial court has authority to recall and/or quash a writ of execution that 

was improvidently issued, and a writ of execution is improvidently issued if the judgment 

has been paid. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Westpark had 

satisfied the judgment. We therefore affirm the order.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE APPELLANT’S OPENING 

BRIEF AND APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Before reciting the facts, we must first determine which parts, if any, of the 

Villas’ briefs should be considered. Both the appellant’s opening brief and the 

appellant’s reply brief fail miserably to comply with rule 8.204(a) of the California Rules 

of Court (references to rules are to the California Rules of Court). 

Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires that any “reference to a matter in the record”

must be supported by “a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the 

matter appears.” Based on rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), Westpark requests that we strike the 

appellant’s opening brief because it does not adequately cite to the record. 

The appellant’s opening brief does not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)

because, while the brief has some record references, large parts of the brief, including 
3

half of the statement of facts, have none. We have the discretion to disregard passages of 

a brief that do not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National 

Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 195; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 967, 990.) Rather than strike the entire appellant’s opening brief, we shall 

exercise our discretion to disregard those parts of the brief that do not comply with rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C).

The appellant’s opening brief fails to comply with rule 8.204(a) in two 

other respects. First, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) requires an appellant’s opening brief to “[s]tate 

that the judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is 

appealable.” The Villas’ opening brief has a section entitled “Statement of 

Appealability” but it has no citation to authority and does not explain why the order 

granting the motion to recall the writ of execution and quash the notice of levy is 

appealable.1 The statement of appealability claims “[t]he exceeding of 

authority/jurisdiction rendered her decision appealable” but that is not a ground for 

appealability identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a), or 

elsewhere.

Second, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each brief to “[s]tate each point under 

a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by 

argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” The appellant’s opening brief does 

not comply with this rule. The argument section of the appellant’s opening brief has two 

subsections: One subsection has the heading “The Standard of Review, Elements of the 

Action” and the other has the heading “The Error of the Court.” Neither heading

1

 An order made to enforce a judgment or to deny enforcement of a judgment is 

appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) as an order 

made after an appealable judgment. (In re Marriage of Green (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 

1312, 1319 [order quashing writ of execution is appealable]; Jones v. World Life 

Research Institute (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 836, 839 (Jones) [order denying motion to 

vacate and quash levy of execution is appealable].) 
4

summarizes the point or points being made in the subsection. In addition, the subsection 

with the heading “The Error of the Court” has no citation to authority except for a general 

citation to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We 

shall exercise our discretion not to consider that subsection. (See Winslett v. 1811 27th 

Avenue LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248, fn. 6; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 

Cal.App.5th 172, 179; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.)

The entire appellant’s reply brief is in violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) and 

(C) because the brief has only a handful of record references and is completely lacking in 

citation to authority. The arguments made in the appellant’s reply brief are therefore 

forfeited, and we shall not consider them. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 

Cal.App.5th 404, 418-419; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 

836, 852; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp., supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1114.) We shall not 

consider factual assertions made in the appellant’s reply brief that are not supported by a 

citation to the record. (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 195.)

In addition, the appellant’s reply brief makes the argument that the trial 

court violated the principle of judicial estoppel. That argument was not made in the 

appellant’s opening brief and is forfeited for that reason. (Estate of Bonzi (2013) 216 

Cal.App.4th 1085, 1106, fn. 6 [“we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in 

a reply brief”]; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 

401, 427-428 [arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief are 

forfeited].)

The subsection of the appellant’s opening brief with the heading “The 

Standard of Review, Elements of the Action” does not so much as mention a standard of 

review. Nowhere in either of its appellate briefs does the Villas address the standard of 

review, which is abuse of discretion (Potts v. Superior Court (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 692, 

694). Although a statement of the standard of review is not a technical requirement of an 
5

appellate brief, “[f]ailure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a 

lack of merit.” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 

Cal.App.4th 456, 465 (Sonic).) “‘Arguments should be tailored according to the 

applicable standard of appellate review.’” (Ibid.) By failing to acknowledge the standard 

of review, tailor its arguments to that standard, and properly cite to the record, the Villas 

has failed to make “coherent legal argument” sufficient to meet its burden of proving 

error. (Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 555.) 

Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s opening brief and the appellant’s 

reply brief, we could affirm, without considering the merits, on the ground the Villas has

conceded its appeal lacks merit (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465) or on the 

ground the Villas has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating reversible error

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609). Nonetheless, we shall consider the 

merits—but in doing so we shall not consider any parts of the appellant’s opening brief 

and the appellant’s reply brief that do not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), the subsection 

of the appellant’s opening brief with the heading “The Error of the Court,” and the 

arguments made in the appellant’s reply brief. 

FACTS

I. 

The Arbitration Award

The Villas and Westpark are both homeowners associations. A dispute 

between them arose out of a shared facilities easement agreement whereby the Villas 

would contribute toward its share of expenses for shared common areas and facilities. 

The dispute was submitted to arbitration. The Villas and Westpark stipulated to an 

arbitration award, and, in June 2014, an award of arbitration signed by retired Judge 

James L. Smith was entered. 
6

Relevant to this appeal are the following provisions of the arbitration 

award:

(1) “On or before July 3, 2014 [Westpark] will create a dedicated Shared 

Reserve Account funded by both [Westpark] and The Villas.”

(2) “The Villas[’

] balance for the Shared Reserve account as of 12/31/13 

will be $100,000 to be funded by [Westpark].”

(3) “[Westpark] shall have the ability to borrow from its portion of the 

Shared Reserve Account.”

Westpark maintained its normal reserve account with Merrill Lynch (the 

normal reserve account). In June 2014, Westpark opened another account with Merrill 

Lynch (the shared reserve account) to serve as the shared reserve account required by the 

arbitration award. Westpark transferred $104,950 in cash from the normal reserve 

account to the shared reserve account to satisfy the arbitration award’s requirement that

Westpark fund the Villas’ $100,000 balance in that account. Westpark also funded the 

shared reserve account with $497,791.86 in securities. 

In September 2014, the Villas requested (1) confirmation that Westpark had 

opened the reserve account required by the arbitration and (2) copies of statements from 

that account for July and August 2014. Westpark provided copies of the July and August 

2014 statements for the shared reserve account to the Villas. The Villas acknowledged it 

had received the documents requested from Westpark. 

II. 

Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award 

and the Judgment

In June 2018, the Villas filed a petition to confirm and enter judgment 

according to the arbitration award (the petition). Westpark moved to dismiss the petition 

on the ground of insufficient and untimely service of process. 
7

The trial court denied Westpark’s motion to dismiss, granted the petition, 

confirmed the award, and ordered entry of judgment. The court signed a single document 

called “Order Confirming Arbitration Award and Judgment” that contained both the 

order granting the Villas’ petition to confirm the arbitration award and the judgment. The 

order portion stated the arbitration award is “confirmed in all aspects and that a Judgment 

be entered in conformity therewith.”

The judgment portion provided that the Villas “recover the sum of 

$100,000, together with interest at the rate of 10% per year from July 3, 2014.” The 

judgment further provided: “IT IS ADJUDICATED that the declaratory relief specified 

in paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of the stipulated award will remain in perpetuity. . . . [¶] 2. On 

or before July 3, 2014, [Westpark] will create a dedicated Shared Reserve Account 

funded by both [Westpark] and The Villas.” 

In February 2020, an abstract of judgment reflecting a judgment of 

$100,000 was issued. The Villas filed a memorandum of costs after judgment for 

postjudgment costs and interest in the total amount of $56,242.40. A writ of execution in 

the amount of $156,282.40 was issued in February 2020, and a writ of execution in the 

amount of $158,658.92 was issued in March 2020. Also in March 2020, the writ of 

execution was levied on Westpark’s bank, savings, and investment accounts at Bank of 

America and Merrill Lynch, and a notice of levy was filed. 

III. 

Motion to Recall the Writ of Execution

and Quash the Notice of Levy

On March 30, 2020, Westpark filed a request for an “Emergency Civil 

Temporary Injunction to Recall Erroneous Writ of Execution and Quash Notice of Levy.” 

The basis for the request was that Westpark had complied with the arbitration award and 

the judgment did not require Westpark to pay money directly to the Villas. 
8

In April 2020, the trial court issued both a temporary restraining order 

staying further enforcement of the judgment and an order to show cause re: preliminary 

injunction (the OSC). Due to court closure precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, as 

well as a continuance, the hearing on the OSC2was not conducted until June 22, 2020. A 

minute order entered on that date states, at the outset: “The Court discloses on the record 

that Counsel Edward Susolik of Callahan & Blaine, APLC, and the Court have had prior 

social contact in connection with attendance at various bench and bar organizations, 

primarily the Banyard Inn of Court. The Court can remain fair. No objection by 

counsel.” 

The minute order states: “Westpark contends that it has complied with the 

Arbitrator’s Award and has submitted the statements from July and August 2014 from a 

Merrill Lynch account (No. 265-02163) titled ‘Westpark Corte Bella Community 

Association Shared Maintenanc[e].’ . . . The Statement shows a transaction on 7/1 

described as BBIF Treasury Fund purchase of $104,950 and another deposit of $100,000 

described as Preferred Deposit (Bus) on 7/12. . . . Although the account is labeled as 

‘Shared Maintenance’ there is no indication of when it was created and whether it is a 

Shared Reserve Account funded by Westpark and Plaintiff as contemplated by the 

Arbitrator’s Award. The Court is inclined to continue the hearing to allow Westpark to 

submit further evidence showing that the Merrill Lynch account (No. 265-02163) titled 

‘Westpark Corte Bella Community Association Shared Maintenanc[e]’ was created in 

compliance with paragraph 2 of the Arbitrator’s Award; and that the two deposits for 

$104,950 and $100,000 were made in compliance with paragraph 3 of the Arbitrator’s 

Award.” The court set a supplemental briefing schedule. 

2

 At some point, Westpark’s request for a temporary injunction was deemed also to be a 

motion to recall the writ of execution and to quash the notice of levy. The minute order 

entered on June 22, 2020 refers both to the OSC and a motion by Westpark to recall the 

writ of execution and to quash the notice of levy. 
9

As part of its supplemental briefing, Westpark submitted a declaration from

Katie Vos, the accounting manager of Optimum Professional Property Management 

(OPPM), Westpark’s then current property management company, and the opening 

statement for the Shared Reserve Account. This evidence showed the shared reserve

account had been funded with a transfer of $104,950 from Westpark’s normal reserve 

account and $497,791.86 in securities transferred from Westpark. 

The Villas objected to the Vos declaration on the grounds that OPPM was 

not Westpark’s property manager until October 2015, Vos did not prepare the financials

for Westpark until November 2015, and all of her testimony was hearsay. The Villas 

argued the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the OSC and was permitted to consider 

only evidence from after August 2019 as to any payments made by Westpark. 

In response to the Villas’ opposition, Westpark submitted a supplemental 

declaration from Vos in which she testified she had requested the opening statement for 

the shared reserve account directly from Merrill Lynch, as well as the statement for the 

corresponding dates for the general reserve account. 

At the hearing on July 27, 2020, the court announced it had tentatively 

decided to deny the OSC and motion to quash based on the court’s concern that Vos’s 

declarations were not based on personal knowledge. The court stated it was inclined to 

continue the motion in order for Westpark to submit a revised declaration “as I think we 

need to know what has happened here.” Counsel for the Villas requested the opportunity 

to depose Vos. The court denied the request and informed counsel he could argue the 

Vos declaration was insufficient. After hearing argument from counsel, the court 

changed its tentative ruling and decided to continue the matter to permit Westpark to 

submit an amended declaration from Vos or new declarations to address whether the 

arbitration award had been satisfied. The Villas was permitted to submit further 

opposition. 
10

Westpark submitted a declaration from Rio Ramos, who in 2014 was 

employed as a junior accountant at Keystone Pacific Property Management (Keystone),

the management company for Westpark from December 2005 through October 2015. In 

his declaration, Ramos testified that in the spring of 2014 he was told that Westpark and 

the Villas had stipulated to an arbitration award that required Westpark to open a 

dedicated shared reserve account for the reserves related to the Shared Facilities 

Easement Agreement and that Westpark was to fund the Villas’ $100,000 initial balance 

of the shared reserve account. Ramos testified that Westpark maintained its normal 

reserve account with Merrill Lynch and that Westpark opened the shared reserve account 

at Merrill Lynch in June 2014 to comply with the arbitration award. Ramos identified the 

documents he reviewed to prepare his declaration and attached the opening statement for 

the shared reserve account.

Ramos testified in his declaration: “Westpark transferred $104,950 in cash 

from the normal reserve account, along with $497,791.86 in securities into the shared 

maintenance account. Of the cash transfer, $100,000 was to fund the Villas’ portion of 

the shared maintenance account as required by the Arbitration Award, with the remaining 

balanc[e] of cash and securities funding Westpark’s portion of the shared maintenance

account.”

In its supplemental opposition, the Villas challenged Ramos’s declaration 

as “window dressing.” However, the Villas did not present evidence to counter Ramos’s 

declaration that in June 2014, Westpark had transferred $100,000 to the shared reserve

account in compliance with the arbitration award. 

IV. 

Order Granting Motion to Recall the Writ of Execution 

and Quash the Notice of Levy

By minute order entered on August 24, 2020, the trial court granted 

Westpark’s motion to recall the writ of execution and quash the notice of levy. The court 
11

considered the arbitration award and found that it required Westpark to open a shared 

reserve account and to fund the account with $100,000. The court also considered the 

judgment and found it “is not inconsistent with” the arbitration award and states the 

arbitration award “‘is confirmed in all aspects and that a Judgment be entered in 

conformity therewith.’” The court concluded, “[t]he Judgment read in accordance the 

Award of the Arbitrator requires the creation of a dedicated Shared Reserve Account to 

be funded by Westpark with $100,000 and not a direct payment of $100,000.”

The trial court found that the Ramos declaration established that Westpark 

had satisfied the judgment by complying with the terms of arbitration award: “R[amos]

attests that of the cash transfer, $100,000 was to fund the Villas’ portion of the Shared 

Maintenance Account as required by the Arbitration Award, with the remaining balance 

of cash and securities funding Westpark’s portion of the shared maintenance account. . . 

Westpark has therefore sufficiently shown that in compliance with the Arbitration Award, 

it created a Shared Reserve Account and funded the account with $100,000.”

DISCUSSION

I. 

Standard of Review

An order recalling or quashing a writ of execution is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard. (Potts v. Superior Court, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at p. 694.) 

In applying the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court measures the evidence 

presented to the trial court against the range of options permitted by the established legal 

criteria. (Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1089.) 

The scope of the trial court’s discretion is limited by the governing law, and an action 

that “‘“transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law”’” constitutes an 

abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) 
12

The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial 

evidence standard while the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. (County 

of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230.) “It is up to the trial court 

to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in it, and assess the credibility of witnesses. 

[Citation.] The reviewing court resolves any evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the 

trial court’s ruling [citation], and, if more than one reasonable inference can be deduced 

from the facts, the reviewing court must accept the inference supporting the trial court’s 

decision [citation].” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. 

(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789 (Cornerstone).)

II. 

The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Meaning

and Scope of the Judgment

The Villas argues the judgment required Westpark to pay the Villas 

$100,000 plus interest and the court’s order granting the motion to recall the writ of 

execution and quash the notice of levy constituted an improper modification of the 

judgment that was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. As the judgment was final, the Villas 

argues it could be modified only by means of a new trial or appeal. 

The trial court did not modify the judgment or act beyond its jurisdiction. 

Nor did the trial court disregard the principle of finality of judgments. In ruling on 

Westpark’s motion to recall the writ of execution, the trial court was called upon to 

interpret the meaning of the judgment and determine its scope. The trial court correctly 

interpreted the judgment in a way that made it conform to the arbitration award. 

The interpretation of a judgment is a question of law for the court. (Mendly 

v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205.) “[T]he ‘same rules apply 

in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning 

of any other writing.’” (Estate of Careaga (1964) 61 Cal.2d 471, 475.) If the language 

of the judgment is uncertain, judicial intent is determined by the totality of the 
13

circumstances. (In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1429-

1430.) “Thus, we construe the judgment as a whole to give effect to its obvious intention 

[citation], and in the process we can resort to the entire record supporting the judgment 

[citation].” (In re Marriage of Farner (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1370, 1376.) We construe 

any ambiguity in the judgment in a manner making it “‘lawful, operative, definite, 

reasonable and capable of being carried into effect,’” and we avoid an interpretation that 

would make the judgment “‘extraordinary, harsh, unjust, inequitable or which would 

result in absurdity.’” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 

989.)

We, as the trial court, must resolve conflicting interpretations of the 

judgment. The Villas asserts the judgment required Westpark to pay it $100,000 and 

relies on the provision in the judgment providing for the Villas to “recover the sum of 

$100,000, together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per year from July 3, 2014.” 

Westpark asserts the judgment required only that it open the shared reserve account and 

fund it with $100,000 to cover the Villas’ balance. Westpark relies on the provisions in 

the judgment providing that “the declaratory relief specified in paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of 

the stipulated award will remain in perpetuity” and that “[o]n or before July 3, 2014, 

[Westpark] will create a dedicated Shared Reserve Account funded by both [Westpark] 

and The Villas.” 

The most plausible interpretation of the judgment, construed as a whole, 

and with resort to the entire record, is that it required Westpark to open the shared reserve 

account and fund it with $100,000 on behalf of the Villas. The judgment did not require 

Westpark to pay $100,000 directly to the Villas. The order granting the Villas’ petition 

to confirm the arbitration award and the judgment were issued together in a single 

document. The order confirmed the arbitration award “in all aspects” and directed entry 

of a judgment “in conformity therewith.” The plain meaning of this language is that the 
14

judgment to be entered had to conform to the arbitration award and therefore could not 

add to or vary its terms. 

The judgment, in conformity with the arbitration award, specifically states 

that “[o]n or before July 3, 2014, [Westpark] will create a dedicated Shared Reserve 

Account funded by both [Westpark] and The Villas.” The proviso in the judgment that 

the Villas recover $100,000 plus interest from Westpark must refer to the proviso in the 

arbitration award that “The Villas[’

] balance for the Shared Reserve account as of 

12/31/13 will be $100,000 to be funded by [Westpark].” The judgment had to conform to 

the arbitration award, and the arbitration award did not require Westpark to pay $100,000 

directly to the Villas. The interpretation of the judgment posited by the Villas—that 

Westbrook is required to pay it $100,000—would make the judgment not in conformity 

with the arbitration award. 

In addition, the interpretation posited by the Villas would render the 

judgment in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. A judgment that awards greater relief 

than stipulated to by the parties is excess of the court’s jurisdiction and therefore void. 

(Jones, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 840.) The Villas and Westpark stipulated to an 

arbitration award by which Westpark would open the shared reserve account and fund the 

Villas’ balance in it of $100,000. Interpreting the judgment as requiring Westpark to pay 

$100,000 directly to the Villas would award the Villas relief greater than that to which 

the parties stipulated in the arbitration award. 

III. 

The Trial Court Had Authority to Recall the Writ of 

Execution and Quash the Notice of Levy

The Villas argues that Westpark did not have the right to attack the 

judgment because Westpark did not oppose the motion to confirm the arbitration award 

on the merits and did not appeal from the judgment. Westpark is not attacking the 

judgment or challenging its finality. Westpark claims the levy was improper because 
15

Westpark had satisfied the terms of the judgment by opening the shared reserve account 

in 2014 and funding it with $100,000. 

The trial court had authority to determine whether the writ of execution and 

levy were improper. “Certainly a trial court has the power, and it is the trial court’s duty, 

to vacate or recall a writ of execution which has been improvidently issued.” (Jones, 

supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 840, citing Evans v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 186.) 

“A writ of execution may be recalled and quashed where the issuance was improperly or 

inadvertently made.” (Meyer v. Meyer (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 48, 49.) “The court’s 

inherent equitable power over its process gives it authority, on motion, to recall and/or 

quash a writ of execution improperly or inadvertently issued; or to vacate an execution 

levy.” (Ahart, Cal. Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments and Debts (The Rutter Group 

2020) ¶ 6:612, p. 6D-96.)

A writ of execution is improvidently granted and may be recalled if the 

judgment has been paid. (Ahart, Cal. Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments and Debts, 

supra, ¶ 6:613, p. 6D-96, citing Meyer v. Meyer, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d at p. 49.) The 

appellate court defers to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence on the issue 

whether the judgment has been paid. (Meyer v. Meyer, supra, p. 49.)

Relying on Del Riccio v. Superior Court (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 29 (Del 

Riccio), the Villas argues the trial court lost jurisdiction to recall the writ of execution and 

quash the levy once the levy had been served on Westpark’s bank. In Del Riccio, the 

levy had been served on the judgment debtor’s bank and the bank had made its return and 

paid to the sheriff the amount the judgment debtor had on deposit. (Id. at p. 30.) In that 

situation, the appellate court held, the trial court did not have authority to order return of 

the bank proceeds to the judgment debtor: “When the writ has been regularly issued and 

executed, money collected, while in the hands of the officer, is property of the judgment 

creditors and not the debtor. Nothing can be done with it other than to turn it over to the 

creditor.” (Id. at p. 31.)
16

Del Riccio stands for the proposition that “‘[t]he court would not have had 

authority to order the [judgment creditors] to pay the money into court after they had 

received it.’” (Adir Internat., LLC v. Superior Court (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 996, 1002.) 

In the present case, the levy was served on Bank of America, but there is no evidence a

return was made to the sheriff. Westpark’s bank accounts had been frozen. The trial 

court’s order did not compel the Villas or the sheriff to pay into court or return to 

Westpark proceeds collected from the levy because no proceeds had been collected. 

IV. 

Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding 

that Westpark Had Satisfied the Judgment

Based on the Ramos declaration, the trial court found that Westpark had 

satisfied the judgment by creating the shared reserve account in June 2014 and funding it 

with $100,000. This factual finding is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. 

(SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 

461-462.) The Ramos declaration and the documents attached to that declaration 

constitute substantial evidence supporting those findings.3 The trial court, expressly or 

impliedly, found Ramos to be credible, and “[w]e accept the trial court’s determination of 

the credibility of witnesses presenting testimony by declaration.” (Cornerstone, supra, 

56 Cal.App.5th at p. 805.)

4

3

The Villas argues it was denied due process because the trial court did not permit the 

Villas to cross examine and/or depose witnesses. This argument does not come under its 

own heading, the Villas provides no record citations for the argument, and the Villas cites

no authority other than a general, unspecific citation to the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The argument is forfeited. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); see Holden v. City of San Diego, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 418-419.)

4

In People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527-528, the California Supreme Court 

carved out a narrow exception to this principle when an appellate court reviews a 

decision on a petition to vacate a conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7. In that 
17

V. 

We Reject the Villas’ Claim of Judicial Bias

Before reaching the disposition, we feel compelled to address the Villas’

accusation that Judge Zeltzer, who granted the motion to recall the writ of execution and 

quash the notice of levy, was biased. At page 20 of the appellant’s opening brief, the 

Villas makes this charge: “The VILLAS request the court read [3CT, 613, lines 5-16] to 

see how flagrant Mr. Susolik and Judge Zeltzer[’

]s relationship exists, the VILLAS were 

denied all discovery and Mr. Susolik received whatever he wanted. The bias is 

undeniable.” (Italics added.)

Impugning the integrity of the trial judge is a serious matter (see Martinez 

v. O’Hara (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 853, 858), and “had better be supported by concrete 

evidence” (Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 793). The Villas and its counsel 

have provided none. We have read the passage cited and found not even a hint of bias 

there, or elsewhere in the record. Not getting what you want does not mean the judge is 

biased against you. At the initial hearing, when Westpark sought a temporary restraining 

order, Judge Zeltzer disclosed on the record that she had had social contact with attorney

Susolik “in connection with attendance at various bench and bar organizations, primarily 

the Banyard Inn of Court.” This is hardly a “flagrant” relationship—it is merely a type of 

social contact that commonly arises between members of the judiciary and members of 

the bar who participate in bench-and-bar organizations such as the American Inns of 

Court. Moreover, the Villas did not object to Judge Zeltzer handling the matter.

Judge Zeltzer stated she could remain fair. Nothing in the record causes us 

to doubt Judge Zeltzer’s sincerity in making that representation or her success in adhering 

to it.

situation, and that one only, the appellate court may independently assess the credibility 

of a petitioner presenting testimony by declaration. (People v. Vivar, supra, at 

pp. 527-528.) 
18

DISPOSITION

The order granting Westpark’s motion to recall writ of execution and quash 

notice of levy is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.