J-S65031-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ANTHONY TYLER CAMPBELL, 

 Appellant No. 206 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County 

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-56-CR-0000746-2014 

CP-56-CR-0000747-2014 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 

 Appellant, Anthony Tyler Campbell, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his entry of a guilty plea to aggravated assault 

and flight to avoid apprehension.1 On appeal, he challenges the 

discretionary aspects and legality of his sentence. We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On October 19, 2015, Appellant entered a counseled, open guilty plea to the 

above-mentioned charges at Docket Nos. 746-2014 and 747-2014. The 

charges stem from an August 15, 2014 incident during which Appellant 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4) and 5126(a), respectively. 
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entered the victim’s apartment without permission, stabbed him in the head 

and face with a suspected knife or switchblade, and subsequently attempted 

to conceal himself from police. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/19/15, at 3-4; 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/15/14). In exchange for the plea, the 

Commonwealth withdrew several other charges then pending against 

Appellant. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, at 8). On January 19, 2016, after 

consideration of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the court imposed 

an aggregate, standard-range sentence of not less than three and one-half 

nor more than seven years’ incarceration. (See N.T. Sentencing, 1/19/16, 

at 7).2 This timely appeal followed.3

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its discretion in 

imposing a sentence of not less than three and a half (3 1⁄2) 

years and not more than seven (7) years[’] incarceration as said 

sentence is too severe and excessive based on the 

circumstances? 

II. Whether the sentence imposed by the [s]entencing [c]ourt 

violates the Eighth Amendment because [Appellant’s] repeat 

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2

 Appellant’s juvenile offenses were used in calculating his prior record score. 

See 204 Pa.Code § 303.6 (sentencing guideline directing the counting of 

prior juvenile adjudications in prior record score where certain criteria met); 

(see also Commonwealth’s Brief, at 3-4; Appellant’s Brief, at 17). 

3

 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on March 1, 2016. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed a Rule 1925(a) statement on March 2, 

2016, referring this Court to the sentencing order and transcript entered 

January 19, 2016, for the reasons for its sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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felon prior record status is based completely on juvenile 

offenses? 

III. Whether the sections of the sentencing guidelines which 

allow for a juvenile adjudication to be counted in the prior record 

score the same as an adult conviction as in the present case is 

[sic] unconstitutional? 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 3). 

 In his first issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence, arguing that it is excessive and severe in light of his young age 

and the fact that “a vast majority of [his] criminal record was juvenile 

offenses.” (Id. at 12; see id. at 11-13). This issue does not merit relief. 

It is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal the discretionary aspects of 

a sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 

1220 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we must engage 

in a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is 

timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence [, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. . . . 

[I]f the appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will 

then proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case. 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-30 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 

In the instant case, Appellant timely appealed, preserved his claim in 

the trial court, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. See id. 

With respect to the fourth requirement, “this Court has held that an 
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excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court 

failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). Therefore, we will 

review Appellant’s claim on the merits. 

 Our standard of review is as follows: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, 

the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion 

unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

 We are also mindful that, “where the sentencing judge had the benefit 

of a [PSI] report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 

161 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Here, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel emphasized 

Appellant’s young age and that his juvenile offenses contributed to his prior 

record score. (See N.T. Sentencing, at 4, 6). Before imposing its standardrange sentence, the trial court noted that it had considered all of the 
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information before it including the PSI report, the seriousness of the assault 

in that it involved a deadly weapon and caused serious bodily injury to the 

victim, and the fact that Appellant was on parole when he committed the 

instant offenses. (See id. at 7). Thus, the record reflects that the court 

was well aware of the facts of this case and mitigating factors. See

Ventura, supra at 1135. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Clarke, 

supra at 1287. Appellant’s first issue lacks merit. 

 We will address Appellant’s second and third issues challenging the 

legality of his sentence together because they essentially raise the same 

claim.4 Specifically, Appellant argues that his sentence is unconstitutional 

and violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

because his juvenile offenses were used to calculate his prior record score. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-20). Relying primarily on Roper v. Simmons, 

543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), and

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), Appellant maintains that 

juvenile adjudications must be treated differently than adult convictions 

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4

 Although Appellant failed to include this claim in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, (see Rule 1925(b) statement, 3/01/16, at unnumbered pages 1-

2), we will nevertheless address it because a “claim[] pertaining to the 

legality of sentence [is] non-waivable, . . . [and] is not even waived by a 

party’s failure to include it in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.” 

Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008), affirmed, 

17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). 
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when calculating a prior record score. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-16). 

The Commonwealth, however, contends that Appellant’s claim fails and is 

controlled by this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 

592 (Pa. Super. 2016). (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4). We agree with 

the Commonwealth.5 

In Bonner, a panel of this Court considered whether section 303.6 of 

the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines violates the proportionality 

principles of the Eighth Amendment. The Bonner Court held: 

Roper, Graham, and Miller all addressed the 

constitutionality of sentencing a defendant for offenses 

committed as a juvenile. In this case, [a]ppellant was an adult 

when he committed the instant offenses. Thus, Roper, 

Graham, and Miller are inapposite. Here, [a]ppellant is being 

held to account for conduct and choices he made as an adult 

with full knowledge of the nature and scope of his own criminal 

past, including juvenile adjudications. Thus, [a]ppellant’s 

contention that the sentencing guidelines fail to recognize the 

lack of maturity of a youthful offender holds little sway in the 

instant circumstances. Moreover, the sentencing guidelines 

attempt to ensure that a defendant knows the prior juvenile 

adjudications that will be used during subsequent adult 

sentencing proceedings by limiting such use to those committed 

after he turned 14 and that (typically) occurred within the past 

14 years. 204 Pa.Code §§ 303.6(a)(1), 303.6(c). They also 

include only the most serious adjudication of each disposition, 

effectively giving the defendant a volume discount for criminal 

conduct committed as a juvenile. 204 Pa.Code § 303.6(b). 

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5

 We note that because “the review of the constitutionality of a sentencing 

guideline raises a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Bonner, supra at 597 (citation 

omitted). 
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 * * * 

. . . [O]ur own independent evaluation indicates that use of a 

juvenile adjudication in calculating an adult defendant’s prior 

record score does not violate the proportionality principles of the 

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

1, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Instead, we hold that 

section 303.6 of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines fully 

complies with the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Roper, 

Graham, and Miller. 

Bonner, supra at 600–01, 603 (some case citations and footnote omitted). 

 Thus, prior precedent of this Court makes clear that use of Appellant’s 

juvenile offenses in calculating his prior record score was constitutionally 

sound. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s second and third issues do not merit 

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/22/2016