Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1508-CR-1263 | June 16, 2016 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Eric P. Babbs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Byron Etter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Cause No.

49A02-1508-CR-1263

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable J. Jeffrey Edens, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1301-FA-4106

Barnes, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Byron Etter challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. We 

affirm.
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Issue

[2] The restated issue is whether the special judge properly denied Etter’s motion to 

dismiss because the trial court did not “goad” Etter into moving for a mistrial.

Facts

[3] On January 24, 2013, the State charged Etter with Class A felony child 

molesting, Class B felony rape, Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, 

and Class D felony child solicitation. On July 21, 2014, Etter’s jury trial began. 

The State’s first witness was L.B., the alleged victim. Etter requested a mistrial 

twice during L.B.’s testimony. The first time, Etter objected to the foundation, 

or lack thereof, the State attempted to lay in order to admit certain photographs; 

he moved for a mistrial when the State described in front of the witness (but 

outside the presence of the jury) the substance of the foundational testimony it 

sought from her. The trial court denied Etter’s motion.

[4] Shortly thereafter, Etter attempted to cross-examine L.B. regarding what he 

described as inconsistencies between her answers to foundation questions the 

State asked outside the presence of the jury and her answers to the same line of 

questioning when her testimony resumed. The trial court disagreed that the 

statements were inconsistent and, after calling the parties to the bench, 

explained why it believed that to be the case. Defense counsel then asked, “Are 

you advocating for the State?” Tr. p. 90. The trial court responded, “No, 

absolutely not . . . I am offended by what you just said to me, absolutely not . . . 

I’m not advocating for anybody here, only justice . . . Only that the truth come 
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out.” Id. at 91. The bench conference continued, and defense counsel again 

explained his interpretation of L.B.’s testimony. Toward the end of the 

discussion, the trial court said to defense counsel, “Just have it your way.” Id.

at 92. 

[5] The bench conference concluded, and this exchange took place:

THE COURT: It’s Burger King today.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m going to object to 

that comment. And at this time, I’m going to move for a mistrial 

because I believe --

THE COURT: I’m going to grant it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

THE COURT: I’m granting the mistrial.

Id. The jury exited the courtroom, and the trial court said:

We’re done. Thank you. I’m going to reset this for trial [a]nd 

I’m going to put it on my commissioner’s calendar and you can 

have the rest of your cases in my court in front of the 

commissioner, [defense counsel]. Your attitude towards this 

Court has always been disrespectful and it was no less today. It’s 

nothing less than I expected, actually. I don’t know why I would 

have expected anything different. We can try this Thursday. I’ll 

put it on her calendar and we can do the trial then.

Id. at 93.
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[6] Three days later, the trial judge recused herself, and this case was transferred to 

Marion County Superior Court Judge Grant Hawkins. Arguing double 

jeopardy barred his retrial, Etter filed a motion to dismiss. Attached to that 

motion were affidavits from two deputy public defenders who were present in 

the courtroom during Etter’s trial. The affidavits set out what those attorneys 

heard and observed with regard to the “Burger King” comment and the bench 

conference that immediately preceded the comment. The State responded to 

Etter’s motion. Judge Hawkins then recused himself, and our supreme court 

appointed a special judge. The parties declined the opportunity to make any 

further arguments with regard to Etter’s motion to dismiss. In January 2015, 

the special judge made findings of fact and conclusions thereon and denied 

Etter’s motion. In August 2015, the special judge granted Etter’s motion to 

certify the January 2015 order for interlocutory appeal. We agreed to entertain 

Etter’s interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B). 

Analysis

[7] Etter contends that, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution,

1 double 

jeopardy bars his retrial. The Fifth Amendment to the United States 

 

1 Etter argues that we should afford him broader double jeopardy protection under our state constitution than 

that provided by the federal constitution. He contends that courts in other states, including Oregon and 

Arizona, have done so and urges us to follow suit. However, Etter cites to no Indiana precedent to support 

his request. We note that Indiana courts have not undertaken a separate analysis under our state constitution 

when addressing the double jeopardy issue Etter presents here. See Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 575-

76 (Ind. 19967); Green v. State, 875 N.E.2d 473, 476-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Thus, we do not 

separately address Etter’s claim under the Indiana Constitution.
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Constitution “protects a criminal defendant from repeated prosecutions for the 

same offense.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2087 

(1982). The Double Jeopardy Clause further grants a defendant the right “to 

have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Id. at 671-72, 102 S. Ct. at 

2087. In general, when a defendant elects to terminate the proceedings against 

him or her, double jeopardy does not bar retrial. See id. at 672-73, 102 S. Ct. at 

2088. However, there is a narrow exception to this rule: “The Double 

Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions 

intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to the 

substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions.” Id. at 674, 102 S. Ct. at 

2088 (citation omitted). “[I]f a defendant moves for or consents to a mistrial, 

the defendant forfeits the right to raise a double jeopardy claim in subsequent 

proceedings unless the motion for mistrial was necessitated by governmental 

conduct ‘intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial.’” 

Willoughby, 660 N.E.2d at 576 (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 102 S. Ct. at 

2089). 

[8] We need not determine whether the trial court’s intemperate remarks fall within 

the ambit of “governmental conduct.” Id. The parties do not dispute that they 

do. We therefore address Etter’s argument assuming, without deciding, that is 

the case.

[9] The parties disagree regarding the standard of review we should apply. Etter 

contends that the standard of review on a claim of double jeopardy is de novo 

and that the standard of review regarding motions to dismiss is abuse of 
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discretion. He candidly acknowledges, however, our supreme court has stated 

that an appellate court examining a governmental actor’s intent in these 

circumstances should consider the trial court’s determination to be “very 

persuasive.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16 (quoting Butler v. State, 724 N.E.2d 600, 604 

(Ind. 2000)). That is the argument the State adopts. Relying in part on Butler,

2

the State contends that where, as here, the trial court makes findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we should review its ruling under a clearly erroneous 

standard.

[10] Etter argues his case is distinguishable from Butler. He contends, in sum, that 

because the special judge was not present during Etter’s aborted trial, he “had 

no more opportunity to assess the actor’s intent than does an appellate court.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 16. Instead, the special judge’s review of the record, on 

which he based the findings of fact, “[was] like an appellate court’s review: [he]

ha[d] only the record to consider in making its determination of intent.” Id. 

We agree.

 

2 We note that the State relies on two other cases—Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014), and Candler v. 

State, 837 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)—in support of its argument regarding the standard of review. 

Neither of those cases examines the double jeopardy issue Etter raises here, however. In Robinson, our 

supreme court discussed whether and to what extent reviewing the video of a traffic stop constituted 

reweighing evidence when that video conflicted with a police officer’s live testimony about the traffic stop. 

The trial court concluded the officer’s testimony should be afforded more weight than the video. Our 

supreme court concluded that even though it was able to view the same video evidence the trial court did, it 

could not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court by reweighing the evidence. Robinson differs 

from this case in that the trial judge in that case heard live testimony, which, obviously, was not before the 

reviewing court. The State cites to Candler for the general proposition that we review factual findings under a 

clearly erroneous standard. Because Robinson and Candler do not speak to the standard of review we should 

apply in addressing this particular double jeopardy question, and because Robinson is distinguishable, they do 

not persuade us to apply a more deferential standard of review.
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[11] In Butler, our supreme court stated, “Although a trial court’s determination of 

prosecutorial intent is not conclusive for purposes of state appellate review, we 

do regard its determination as ‘very persuasive.’ It is a factual determination 

that we review under a clearly erroneous standard.” Butler, 724 N.E.2d at 602-

04 (citation omitted). But Butler is distinguishable from this case. In Butler, the 

same trial judge who presided over the trial and granted Butler’s motion for a 

mistrial found that the circumstances necessitating the mistrial were not created 

by the State. In that case, the trial court was able to observe the participants in 

the trial and use those first-hand observations to determine whether the

governmental actor intended to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial. 

Here, however, the special judge was not present during Etter’s aborted trial 

and, like us, had only the record to review.

[12] We afford a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon deference 

because “the trial court views the evidence firsthand and we review a cold 

documentary record.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 

2005). Our supreme court has stated, “when ‘the trial court rules on a paper 

record without conducting an evidentiary hearing,’ as happened here, we are ‘in 

as good a position as the trial court . . . to determine the force and effect of the 

evidence.’ Under those circumstances, our review is de novo.” In re Adoption of 

C.B.M. 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013) (quoting GKN v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 

397, 401 (Ind. 2001)) (ellipses and emphasis in original). Because the special 

judge in this case did not view Etter’s trial firsthand, its findings and 

conclusions regarding the trial court’s intent are based on the same paper and 
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audio records now before this court. Thus, we are in as good a position as the 

special judge was to determine whether the trial court intended to goad Etter 

into requesting a mistrial. Our task, then, is to assess whether the subjective 

intent of the trial court was to goad Etter into moving for a mistrial. See Farris v. 

State, 753 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. 2001) (“The subjective intent of the 

[governmental actor] is the dispositive issue”) and Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 667, 

102 S. Ct. at 2088. 

[13] The special judge issued expansive, detailed findings of fact. Although we do 

not defer to those findings, we do view some of them as a helpful starting point 

for our review.3 The special judge recounted the parties’ disagreements 

regarding aspects of L.B.’s testimony and found that, while granting one of 

defense counsel’s motions, the trial court responded, “Oh, good Lord.” App. p. 

180. The special judge quotes several excerpts from the conversation held 

outside the presence of the jury that immediately preceded the “Burger King” 

comment. The special judge found that defense counsel and the trial court 

engaged in an exchange after defense counsel asked, “Are you advocating for 

the State?” and that the trial court stated it was offended. Id. at 182. Shortly 

after that, the following exchange took place: 

 

3 The trial court denied Etter’s first request for a mistrial. Had it been attempting to goad Etter into making 

that first request, it stands to reason that it would have granted his motion. Because it did not, we conclude 

the trial court was not trying to goad Etter into requesting a mistrial at that time, and we confine our review 

to the conversations and comments that took place after the trial court denied Etter’s first motion for a 

mistrial.
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[Defense Counsel]: That’s what the testimony was. We can go 

back and listen to it, Judge.

[The Court]: Well, go right ahead, [defense counsel].

[Defense Counsel]: I mean -- no, I’m just saying --

[The Court]: Do whatever you want to do. This is your trial.

[The Court]: Go ahead.

[Defense Counsel]: I’m just (inaudible) go ahead and finish 

(inaudible). That’s fine.

[The Court]: Go right ahead.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay.

[The Court]: Just have it your way.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay.

Tr. p. 92. The bench conference concluded, and the trial court then said, “It’s 

Burger King today.” Id.

[14] The special judge found that Etter and the State disagreed regarding how loudly 

the trial court made the “Burger King” comment and that “[t]he State argues 

that it was not loud enough for the courtroom to hear . . . . However the 

comment was made loud enough for two deputy public defenders sitting in the 
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back of the courtroom, to have heard it.” App. p. 183. The special judge 

further found:

55) After the jury was released [the trial court] address[ed] 

[defense counsel]:

We’re done. Thank you. I’m going to reset this for trial [a]nd 

I’m going to put it on my commissioner’s calendar and you can 

have the rest of your cases in my court in front of the 

commissioner, [defense counsel]. Your attitude towards this 

Court has always been disrespectful and it was no less today. It’s 

nothing less than I expected, actually. I don’t know why I would 

have expected anything different. We can try this Thursday. I’ll 

put it on her calendar and we can do the trial then.

Id. at 183.

[15] The special judge found “Clearly [the trial court] became frustrated over the 

events that transpired during the trial” and cited the admonishment the trial 

court gave defense counsel after the jury was excused. Id. at 185. In particular, 

the special judge noted, “At one point [the trial court] stated, ‘Your attitude 

toward this Court has always been disrespectful and it was no less today.’” Id. 

The special judge concluded that statement was “not without merit” and that 

defense counsel’s question regarding the trial court’s impartiality “could be 

perceived as being disrespectful in nature.” Id. at 186. The special judge 

acknowledged “a buildup on [sic] tension between [the trial court] and [defense 

counsel] . . . [which] reached a breaking point when [the trial court] stated ‘It’s 

Burger King today.’” Id. (no citation in original). 
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[16] Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the abovereferenced findings are accurate. In addition to the special judge’s findings, our 

review of the record reveals that the trial court made several frustrated, 

intemperate remarks directed at defense counsel during the bench conference

immediately preceding the “Burger King” comment; the exchanges between the 

trial court and defense counsel were tense. Our review of the audio recording 

reveals that the volume of the trial court’s voice increased during the bench 

conference when she denied advocating for the State and expressed her 

frustration with defense counsel’s suggestion otherwise. But the record contains 

no evidence the jury heard any of the comments immediately preceding the 

“Burger King” comment. That is true even though two attorneys present in the 

courtroom heard snippets of the bench conference and described the trial court’s 

expression and tone as “angry or upset” and “very impatient.” App. p. 159.

[17] We next turn to the “Burger King” comment, the comment that seems to have 

precipitated Etter’s request for a mistrial. Based on our review of the audio 

recording of the trial, we observe that the volume of that comment was not as 

loud as statements the trial court made to the courtroom in general, but not as 

quiet, generally, as those it made during bench conferences. We further observe 

that the record contains no evidence the jurors heard the comment, despite the 

fact that two attorneys present in the courtroom did. We do not believe it is 

reasonable to infer that the jurors were paying attention to the non-testimony 

statement to the same degree the attorneys were, particularly one made 

immediately following a bench conference, which is designed to be a private 
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conversation between the trial court and the parties. Therefore, we do not 

believe it is reasonable to infer that the jurors heard the comment simply 

because the attorneys who were observing the trial did. 

[18] The meaning of the “Burger King” comment is not self-evident. It was flippant

and may have trivialized the importance of a Class B felony jury trial. But it is 

not clear from our review of the transcript or audio recording precisely what the 

trial court intended to convey when she made the comment. Etter explains in 

his motion to dismiss that the “Burger King” comment is “not unlike the 

comments cited by the Judicial Qualification Commission as in the case against 

[another trial judge]: ‘This isn’t McDonald[’]s, you can’t get what you want 

when you want it.’” App. p. 155 (no citation in original). We are unfamiliar 

with that context and presume the jury was as well. Without that context, we 

do not assign the same offensive meaning to it that defense counsel 

understandably did. More to the point, however, there is nothing in the record 

that establishes, or from which we can infer, that the trial court had that context 

in mind when she made the comment or otherwise intended it to prompt 

defense counsel to seek a mistrial.

[19] Our review of the record, including the audio recording of the trial, reveals that, 

although the trial court was frustrated with defense counsel and made 

inappropriate comments, there is no evidence she intended to goad Etter into 

requesting a mistrial. Although we do not condone the trial court’s comments,

we cannot say they were so damaging to Etter as to necessitate a mistrial.
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Conclusion

[20] The special judge properly denied Etter’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.