Filed 12/9/13 P. v Proctor CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES SYLVESTER PROCTOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B245973

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA390864)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Patricia Schnegg, Judge. Affirmed. 

James Sylvester Proctor, in pro. per., and David Blake Chatfield, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________
2

James Sylvester Proctor was shot during a confrontation with police in which he 

threatened three officers with a meat cleaver. Proctor was arrested and charged in an 

information with three counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. 

Code, § 245, subd. (c))1and one count of exhibiting a deadly weapon to resist arrest 

(§ 417.8) with special allegations he had suffered one prior serious or violent felony 

conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and the three strikes law 

(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served 13 prior separate prison 

terms for felonies (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Represented by counsel, Proctor pleaded not 

guilty and denied the special allegations.

The trial court granted Proctor’s motion for discovery of police personnel records 

(Evid. Code, § 1045; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531), reviewed the 

records at an in camera hearing and found discoverable information, which was provided 

to Proctor. 

On the day trial was to begin, Proctor waived his rights to a jury trial and entered a 

plea of no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and 

admitted he had suffered a prior strike conviction. The plea was part of a negotiated 

agreement that Proctor would be sentenced to an aggregate state prison sentence of four 

years and the remaining counts and special allegations would be dismissed. At the time 

he entered his plea, Proctor was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and 

consequences of the plea, which he stated he understood. Defense counsel joined in the 

waivers of Proctor’s constitutional rights. The trial court expressly found Proctor’s

waivers and plea were voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

The trial court sentenced Proctor to a four-year state prison term, consisting of the 

two-year lower term doubled under the three strikes law in accordance with the plea 

agreement. The court awarded Proctor presentence custody credit of 692 days 

(346 actual days and 346 days of conduct credit). The court ordered Proctor to pay a $40 

court security fee, a $30 criminal conviction assessment and a $240 restitution fine. The 

 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
3

court imposed and suspended a parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45. The 

remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed.

Proctor filed a notice of appeal in which he checked the preprinted boxes 

indicating his appeal was “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the 

plea” and “the denial of a motion to suppress evidence” and “challenged the validity of 

the plea or admission.”2 The trial court denied Proctor’s request for a certificate of 

probable cause, in which he asserted he had been denied his speedy trial rights, convicted 

by “false evidence,” and provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 

After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues 

were raised. On August 26, 2013 we advised Proctor he had 30 days within which to 

personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. On September 3, 

2013 we received a handwritten letter in which Proctor asserted the police never read him 

his “Miranda rights” following his arrest and, from what we can determine, Proctor also 

claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 

A criminal defendant who appeals following a plea of no contest or guilty without 

a certificate of probable cause can only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence or raise grounds arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect the plea’s 

validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1).) To the extent Proctor is challenging the 

 

2 Proctor’s notice of appeal was filed on December 28, 2012, which was 66 days 

after entry of the judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308 (a) [notice of appeal 

must be filed within 60 days after rendition of judgment or making of order being 

appealed].) Nonetheless, because Proctor was a state prison inmate acting in propria 

persona, the “prison-delivery rule” applies. In this case, the last day in which Proctor 

could properly file his notice of appeal was Monday, December 24, 2012 (the 60th day 

actually fell on Saturday, December 22, 2012, extending the filing deadline to Monday, 

December 24, 2012). Proctor signed the notice of appeal and request for a certificate of 

probable cause on December 23, 2012, gave the documents to prison officials, who 

mailed them on or about December 24, 2012, according to the postmark on the envelope 

addressed to the Superior Court. Consequently, under the prison-delivery rule (In re 

Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 130; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(5)), the notice of 

appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause are deemed to have been filed on 

December 24, 2012; they are, therefore, timely. 
4

validity of his plea and his sentence imposed as part of his plea, his appeal is inoperative. 

Furthermore, he did not file a motion to suppress evidence. With respect to other 

potential sentencing or post-plea issues that do not in substance challenge the validity of 

the plea itself, we have examined the record and are satisfied Proctor’s attorney has fully 

complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issue exists. (Smith v. 

Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly

(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) 

The judgment is affirmed. 

PERLUSS, P. J. 

We concur:

ZELON, J.

SEGAL, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.