TOt 

FROM: 

Stuart Eizenstat Barry Blechman 

Al Stern Dick Steadman 

David Rubenstein FC/--Y 

. 

Nick MacNeil 

SUBJECT: NASA Recommendations 

2. 

3* 

CARTER - MONDALE c J 

TRANSITION PLANNING GROUP 

NASA's priorities are on the development end of R & D, 

not the basic research end. NASA directs our R & D 

resources toward centralized big technology, maintaining the defense R & D orientation of the aerospace 

industry. 

The Shuttle has become the end, rather than the means, 

because NASA space policy has been shaped by the Office 

of (Manned) Space Flight. The Offices of Space Science, 

Applications, and Aerongutics Technology get the funds 

that are left over. 

Alternative directions for space technology may be 

neglected because 

(a) the Administrator's power to hire and fire 

top management inhibits effective dissent 

(b) important NASA managers are from Defense and 

the aerospace industry 

(c) NASA's budget is supported and approved by a 

space constituency. 

.eance 

_-.- - 

See Section 1, Budget History; Figures 1 and 2, 

Organization Chart and R & D Allocations: Annex B, 

Space Centers. 
CONTENTS 

1. Budget History 

2. Current Programs 

a. Dominant Mission 

b. Overhead 

tc. Shuttle Description 

d. Program Projections 

3. Funding Justif ications Unconvincing 

a. NASA Mission Unclear 

. 

b. . Budgeting Process 

C. Unconvincing Arguments 

d. Expert vs. Popular Opinion 

4. Recommendations 

a. Outline National Goals 

b. Outline Correspondi,ng Space Programs 

c. Label Programs Accurately 

. de Downgrade Economic Objectives 

e. Curb Budget Expansion 

f. Vice Presidential Science/R&D Advisory Committee 

g* More Program Office Autonomy 

h. Reorient NASA Leadership 

. 1. Postpone Appointments and New Starts 

59 Options 

a. Appoint "Jury" 

b. Keep Shuttle Experimental 

c. Give NASA Other Technological Challenges 

Annex A - Shuttle Justifications 

Annex B - Work Impact at Installations 

Annex C - Military Space Programs 

Annex D - NASA's R & D Direction 

Annex E - Personnel Practices 

Annex F - Knowledaeab3.e Sources 
1. Budget History 

Perhaps the agency's growth, retraction, and 

resiliency can best be seen in its level of employment 

since 1962. 

MANPOWER 

500,000 

H 

Ia 

IO 

u 

u 

u 

R 

II 

‘M 

R __ -_-- 

uil 

R 

TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 

._ --- 

In real year dollars NASA funding is 70% what it was 

in its peak year, and increa2ing. 

NASA APPROPRIATIONS 

in year by year dollars 

The shaded area above represents about $70 billion. 

The U.S. Interstate Highway System has' cost about $60 billion. 

7t 73 74 7S- 76 77 -;ie 

3.3 3.Y 3.0 3.r 2.r 3,6 4. f 
Viewing the past in 1977 dollars, as NASA does, 

current funding is l/3 what it was in 1965. The following graph compares NASA trends with military R & D, and 

civilian non-NASA R & D. 

Note that this graph understates NASA's budget 

(because it puts $400 million for aeronautics 

and space applications in Civilian R.& D) and does not 

indicate military space programs (only about a third of 

which are funded from military R ,& D). See 'Annex C, 

Military Space Programs. 

. 

Conduct of Research and Development - Obligations 

( : smlllonr 

P-l 

SBilllw 

I 

.i 

%I ,* I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ’ ’ ’ 1 ’ 0 

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 ‘77 / 

. ,<d 

Fid Ymn Ertimalt 

2. Current Programs 

a. The "Dominant Mission" Concept 

The reason for the sharp decrease in the agency's 

budget was that NASA had essentially completed the mission 

for which the budget had been increased. But the dominant 

mission concept has been carried over to the Shuttle. 

The organization chart (Figure 1) puts Space Flight 

on a par, on the one hand with Science, Applications, and 

OAST, and on the other hand with the management of the * 

agency? facilities and its overhead. (It is not clear, in 

fact, that Space Centers do not bypass the Associate 

Administrator for Center Operations and go directly to Space. 

Flight, Space Science, and so on.) Figure 2 shows the relative 

power of the R & D offices. It can be assumed that the 

executive ability of officials will be commensurate with the 

size of the budgets they administer, 
NATliBNAl AIRONAUTICS AND SPACI ADMINISTRATION 

ADMINISTRATOR 

DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR 

Owl M 

r-l ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR 

wm w 

r-l 

ASSOCIATC 

ADMINISTRATOR 

can., ZLW.. 

o- 
______ 24 .__.- __.-- - . 

z 

‘la): 

_._ -.- 

I 

FY 1977 - R.& D ; 

'minus T & DA 

(billions of dollars) 1. 

I be 

-ExpeTdable launch vehicles . 

L 

.Shuttle 

IO 

R 

_--. 5 

.-- 

.-- 

--- 

.<t .3 

.t 

.I 

. - 

/.I 

.,s 

.L( 

83 

.z 

.I 

- - 

R 

Fy 1977 - "Overhead"' 

(billions of dollars) 

R & D program proportionsr 

I ota 

11 

II __-. -- .- _ _ 

I 

_-__--_.-__. 'FIGURE 2 i 
b. Overhead 

In Figure 1, Tracking and Data Acquisition appears 

as R & D, although it is essentially overhead. 

Funds for Construction of Facilities and Research 

and Program Management are distributed among NASA's 12 major 

facilities, the largest of which are listed-in Annex B. . 

Overhead raises at least three issues: 

--the possibility that high costs of R & D l 

overshadow the spending of smaller amounts 

(see marked sections of Construction of 

Facilities breakdown) 

--the extent to which overhead justifies 

program, particularly when overhead is 

parceled out in widespread bases 

--the extent to which overhead resources 

match program priorities. 

To illustrate: the following table shows 42% of 1977 

R & PM goes to Space Flight. But Space Flight accounts for 

60% of NASA's R & D budget. Should overhead components be 

roughly proportional to the size of the programs they are 

meant to support? If so, then non-Shuttle R & D programs 

account for a disproportionate share of overhead costs. 

But if, over the years: on an a 

Shuttle overhead accounts for about z 

ency-wide basis, 

0% of R & PM, then 

the Shuttle costs a great deal more than the R & D budget alone 

would indicate -- unless the Shuttle overhead not shown in 

NASA R & PM is contractor overhead, paid from the NASA 

R & D budget. 

CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 

AND RESEARCH AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 

FY 77 Estimate 

(millions of dollars) 

Program Activities 

Space Flight 

Science 

Applications 

Space Research 

Aero Research 

Support 

C of F 'R & PM 

39.8 348.1 

8.7 114.2 

-s-m 87.1 

.7 75.3 

,28.3 146.2 

45.8 43.1 

124.0 814.0 

Function R & PM 

Personnel 612.4 

Travel & Transp. 19.7 

Rent 61.7 

Supplies 13.9 

Equipment 2.5 

Other 103.9 

814.0 

---- ----- - -. - -- -~-.. .._.--- 
CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 

FISCAL YEAR 1977 

Item 

1. Modlflcatlon for high enthalpy entry facility, Ames Research 

Center ____________________------------------------------- 

2. JlodlEcation of Eight simulator for advanced aircraft, Ames 

Research Center---- ------___----_______------------------ 

3. Construction of supply support facility, Ames Research Center-- 

4. Construction of addition to flight control facility, Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center-----------------------------i5. Construction of addition to lunar sample curatorial facility, 

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center------------------------ 

6. Constructlon of airlock to spin test facility, John F. Kennedy 

Space Center--------------------------------------------- 

7. Modifications for utility control system, John F. Kennedy 

Space Center- ______--____________------------------------- 

S. Construction of addition for aeroelastic model laboratory, 

Langley Research Center _____: ____________________________ 

9. Construction of data reduction center annex, Langley Research 

Center ________________________________________----------- 

10. Construction of refuse-flred steam generating faclllty, Langley 

Research Center------------------------------------------ 

11. XModlEcation of refrigeration system, electric propulsion laboratory, Lewis Research Center---- ________________________ 

12. Rehabilitation of combustion air drying system, engine research 

building, Lewis Research Center ___________________________ 

13. Large aeronautical facility: construotion of natlonal transonlc 

facility, Langley Research Center---- _____________________ 

14. Space Shuttle facilities at various locations as follows: 

(a) Construction of Orbiter processing facility, John F. 

Kennedy Space Center ____________________ -___-__ 

(b) Modifications to launch complex 39, John F. Kennedy 

Space Center------------------------------------- 

(c) McdiEcation for solid rocket booster processing facilities, John F. Kennedy Space Center ___________-_- 

(d) Construction of Shuttle/Carrl& aircraft mating facility, John F. Kennedy Space Center ____________---__ 

(e) Modiflcations for crew training facilities, Lyndon B. 

Johnson Space Center ____________________________ 

’ (f) Rehabilitation and modlflcation of Shuttle facilities, 

at various locations------------------------------ 

(g) Modidcation of manufactnring and final assembly 

facilities for external tanks, Michoud Assembly 

Facility ______-_________________________________- 

15. Space Shuttle payload facilities at various locations as follows : 

(a) ModiEcations to operations and checkou,t building for 

Spacelab, John F. Kennedy Space Center ____-_____ 

(b) Modkications and addition for Shuttle payload develop 

ment, Goddard Space Flight Center _____________-- 

16. Rehabilitation and modiflcatlon of facilities at various locations, 

not in excess of $500,000 per project _______________________ 

17. Minor construotion of new facilities and additions to existing 

Amount 

$1, 220, ooo 

1, 730, 000 

1, 540, 900 

760,ooo 

2,800,0@3 

3,750,ooo 

19, 866, ooo 

9,700,ooo 

_1,930,ooo I 

1,700,000 

780,ooo 

1,7Eo,O90 

star? the 

moon rocks 

39.5 millior 

Shuttle 

4.3 millior 

Shuttle 

35.5 millio: 

facilities at various locations, not in excess of $250,000 per 

project _-_---______-_-_-_______________________---------- 6, 125,000 Miscellaneous 

13. Facility planning and design not otherwlse provided for------ 12,655,OOO 

Total _-_____________-________________________------- 323,670,OOO 

Figure 3 

. 

. 
c. The Shuttle, or "Space Transportation System" 

The components of the Shuttle program are 

between 2 and 5 orbiters'or Shuttles, two booster motors 

and an external tank to launch the Shuttle, the Spacelab, 

the Space Tug, and the Interim Upper Stage (IUS). 

The Air Force will build the IUS to boost payloads into outer geosynchronous orbit until NASA 

completes the Space Tug for this purpose. 

The Shuttle will lift 65,000 lbs into 150-mile 

East-West orbit, or 32,000 lbs into loo-mile North-South 

orbit. Though the Shuttle is reusable, each flight l 

would cost about $13 million in 1976 dollars, In 

addition to lifting and retrieving payloads, and servicing 

them in-orbit, the Shuttle can be used in "sortie mode"; 

. l.e., it can be an orbiting platform itself, staying up 

one week, or up to one month with necessary modifications. 

Note that the Shuttle cannot service or retrieve 

satellites from more than one orbit on the same launch. 

Note too that the satellite must be maneuvered by remote 

control to permit the Shuttle to take it out of orbit. 

EXPENDABLEDROPTANK 

SPACE SHUTTLE 

ORBITER 

I 

I - CARGO BAY 

SOLID ROCKET 

BOOSTERS 

Yai-v 

SPACE SHUTTLE 

MAIN ENGINES Y’ 

I FT. 

TITAN MAIN 

SPACE SHUTTLE TITAN 3 C 

.- 
d. Program Projections 

Remember that the spending shown in FY 1978 Runout 

(Figure 4) and New Starts (Figure 5) does not 

really taper off. New layers are added each 

coming year. 

Total proposed spending on major programs is shown 

in the linear projections that follow. But first . 

a breakdown of the formal R & D categories. 

There are four program areas: Flight, Science, 

Applications, and OAST. OAST is the Office of 

Aeronautics and Space Technology; the "A" represents 

the "A" of NASA (and its predecessor NACA). Since 

the orientation of R & D in OAST is not as clear, 

as controversial, or as costly as R & D on the space 

side, it will not be discussed here. Thus we are 

left with Flight, Science, and Applications. 
6 

National Aeronautfcs and Space Administration 

FY 1978'BUXET ESTIXATES 

(3 u-t !~!lAl:o::sJ 

BUDGET AVTWOFLTY FY 1976 'I'. P. FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 

Research 6 DeveloDment 

Space Shuttle 1,206.O 321.0 ‘1,288.l 1,302.7 

Space Flight Operations 

1,11%4 

188.7 48.4 202.2 297.6 360.4 

Expendable Launch Vehicles 165.9 37.1 151.4 138.5 95.4 

Su.btotal~&IGHT l-,560.6 406.5 1,641.7 1,738.a 1,571.2 

Physics and Astronomy 159.3 43.5 166.3 234.1 

Lunar & Planetary E-1 

270.2 

254.2 67.5 191.9 170.3 216.2 

Life Sciences 20.6 5.4 22.1 36.4 51.1 

Subtotal SCIENCE, 434.1 116.4 300.3 440. a 537.5 

Space'APPLICATIfwG ,+ ,178.2 47.7 19j.2 224.8 222.8 c... -. ,__. - 

FY 1978 PROCRA!! Rl'YOL'T 

FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 

680.8 343.9 135.9 

508.7 594.0 592.1 

'45.2 25.6 29.9 

1,234.7 '163.5 748.E 

266.9 264.0 235.7 

225.9 152.1 94.4 

56.5 63.9 6’ .,.%I 

551.3 :79.9 389.0 

226.4 163.0 135.5 

Multi-Mission Xodular S/C 

Space Research & Tech. 

Aeronautical. Res. b Tech. 

subtota+.G-i 250.3 63.1 272.1 360.6 416.8 ' 424,s 374.8 3C8.7 

Tracking L Data Acquis 240.8 63.4 255.0 284.3 312.8 384.7 376.0 

ethnology Utilization 7.5 2.0 

nergy Technology Appl 

8.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 

5.9 1.5 6.0 8.5 10.5 5.0 '5.0 

Subtotal RSD 

I 

2,677.4 700.6 2,761.4 3,092.a 3141.6 2,857.6 2,37:.7 

*. Construction of Facilities I 82 .l 10.7 118.1 195.6 200.0 161.0 125.0 110.0 

V 

i); Research 6, Program Management 792.3 220.8 813.0 818.5 ala.5 818.5 918.5 818.5 

9 TOTAL HASA 3,551.E 932.1 3r692.5 4,106.g 4160.1 3,837.r 3,319.2 2899.3 

Additional Requirement 

Procurement of Fourth and 

Fifth Shuttle Orbiter 46.5 14.1. 4 213.3 278.4 291.2 

GRAKD TOTAL 3,551.8 932.1 3,692.S 4,153.4 2301.5 4,050.d 3190 5 

___-- 

3,596-a __-~-L 

- --.-.~ 
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. 
(1) Flight - 

I 

1971 

Budget 

Estimate 

000's 

1975 

Actual 

OOO'b 

I Space Shuttle 1,288,100 ................... 797,500 

Space Flight Operations ......... 248,800 

Expendable Launch Vehicles ...... 139,500 

Total ......................... 1.235.800 

.___-. ~-- 

- 

I 

205,200 

. '151,400 

1.644.700 

r 

SPACE SHmLE ROT&E AND PRODUCTION PUNNING AN0 PROGRAM INTEGRATIC' 

ADVANCED PROGRAMS 

-OEVELOPMENT.TEST, ANO MISSION OF 

,'OPERATlONS CAPABILITY DEVELOPMEN77 79 a0 81 a2 

FISCAL YEAR t-J*ii 

____- - - 

R next three pages) 

1977 

1975 Budget 

Actual Estimate 

6643 ocds 

136,315 165,800 

261,200 191,100 

(2) Science (Projections 

Programs 

Physics and astronomy ........... 

Lunar and planetary exploration. 

Life sciences ................... 

Total ......................... 

19,800 22,125 

417,315 379,025 
250 

----- 'ELESCOPE OPERATIONS 

IO TCI rofmne t3if-w n-v 

-’ 

FlGiJRE ;6, ASTROPHYSICS PROGRAM FUNDING 

FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS 

In I cmxurc rt+biLI I I 

* SPACE TELESCOPE 

Id 

TOTAL ONGOING PROGRAM 

SHUllLE PAYLOADS 

\EXPLORERS 

SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND 

TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ACTIWIES 

I I I I I 

77 78 79 80 81 82 ' 

FISCAL YEAR NASA HQ 077-114(l) 

1 O-l -76 
- - - - p‘.I w. m ,..m - II - Iu __ - -, - - -. 

200 

150 

100 

50 

--- - 

FIGURE ‘7. SOLAR TERRESTRIAL PROGRAM FUNDING. 

(/w-x?~~l+rsrcS) 

-OUT-OF-THE ECLIPTIC 

I '/ATMOSPHERIC, MAGNETOSPHERIC, 

AND PLASMAS-IN-SPACE 

SPACELAB-PAYLOADS LABORATORY 

TOTAL ONGOING PROGRAM 

,SOLAR SPACELABLOCK ll 

SHUTTLE UV OPTICAL TELESCOPE/ 

l-METER SOLAR OBSERVATORY 

SOLAR MAXIMUM MISSION REFLIGHT 

- UPPER ATMOSPHERE RESEARCH 

SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ACTlVlTlES 

77 79 80 

FISCAL YEAR 

81 82 

. 

NASA HQ 077-l 27( 1) 

1 O-1 -76 
FlGUFiE 8. LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROGRAM FUNDING~ 

MARS SURFACE 

MARS FOLLOW-ON 

PLANNING AND 

-. 

HALLEY RENDEZVOUS 

JUPITER ORBITER-PROBE 

T~TALONGOING PROGRAM 

(31 PIONEER VENUS 

SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ACTIVITIES (2) MARINER JUPITER-SATURN 

I I I I J (1) VIKING EXTENDED 

17 78 79 80 81 82 l 

FISCAL YEAR NASA HQ 077-l 25(l) 

10-t -76 
---. 

(3) Applications (Projection next page) 

The following table omits Technology Utilization 

and Energy Technology, which belong conceptually 

in Applications. 

Earth resources detection and 

monitoring. . . ..*........................ 

Earth dynamic's monitoring and forecasting. 

Ocean condition monitoring and forecasting 

Environmental quality monitoring.......... 

Weather and climate observation and 

forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Materials processing in space............. 

Space communications................F..... 

Information management.................... 

Applications explorer missions............ 

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

- ----. --.- _ .._.- 

1975 

Actual 

000'S 

58,687 67,300 

9,600 4,600 

15,600 30,600 

26,400 26,100 

42,073 36,300 

4,600 9,200 

12,000 10,600 

3,200 3,200 

2,588 10,300 

174.748 198.200 

1977 

Budget 

Estimate 

000'S 

. 

NASA plans to spendmore than three times 

. as much on experimental communications satellites. 

Operational satellites are paid for by the users. 

SPACE COMMUNICATIONS 

60 - 

COMMUNICATIONS Si 

- IAN0 MOBILE 

SERVICE SATELLITE 

GROUND BASECI AUGMENTATIONS PAYLOADS 

SEARCH AND RESCUE SATELLITE 

ONGOING PROGRAM 

I I I I I 

78. 79 a0 ai a2 

FISCAL YEAR 
__.--_ _-...- --. 
@JOr 

_. 

. - 

(4) Shuttle-dependent Applications 

The following projections show NASA's 

determination to find uses for space and 

the Shuttle. The overall agency outlook, 

on the following page, tends to further 

blur the distinction between NASA-chosen 

objectives and NASA-chosen means of. 

achieving them. 1 

SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION 

\ \ 

LARGE SPACE STRUCTURES ' 

ORBITAL OPERATIONS CAPABlllTY 

I I I I I I 

77 78 79 00 81 82 03 84 85 

200 -. 

.-. 

si: t 

4 

- MATERIALS PROCESSING ACE PROCESSING LABOAATOi 

cti 

g2 60 

t . 

SPACELAB 

Em 

DEVEKlPMEM 

SPACE CONSTRUCTION BASE 

ONGOING PROGRAM 

SPACELAB R&O FAClLIlY 

EARTH b SPACE 

ENERGY SOURCES 

FIEM REIMBURSABLE 

SATELLlTE POWER SYSTEMS (JOINT ERDA-NASA FUNOINGI 

TECHNOLOGY IOENTIFICATION AN0 VERIFICATION 

. 
2 5,000 

25 

ig . 

FIGURE :10. ESTIMATED BUDGET AUTHihlTY REQUIRED 

/(//w/l 5- y&M pPosE~T~on/ 

c 

i&l 4,000 

2 

z 

ZI 

L 3,000 I 0 

77 78 , 

- AERONAUTICS 

-SCIENCE 

e APPLICATIONS 

ENERGY 

-SPACE INOUSTRlALlZATlON 

--TRANSPORTATION 

e SHUTTLE ROT&E AND PRODUCTION 

- SPACE TECHNOLOGY 

-TRACKING AN0 DATA ACQUISFION 

- w CONSTRUCTION OF FAClLlTlES 

t -SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 

- RESEARCH AN0 PROGRAM 

MANAGEMENT 

79 80 

FISCAL YEAR 

81 82 

. 

NASA HQ 076-l 1x1) 

1 O-l -76 
3. Funding Justifications Unconvincing 

a. NASA Mission Unclear 

Much apprehension and uneasiness about the NASA 

budget would disappear if the civilian space program, like 

its military counterpart, had clear-objectives related 

to national goals. 

DOD, with 38% of the space budget, would deny that' 

its space efforts constitute a program; Defense programs 

are not ends but rather the means of accomplishing certain 

military missions, the purpose of which is to defend the 

nation and its allies from attack. Space programs have 

to compete with other means of accomplishing the same 

mission. 

The entire 

considered R & D. 

Foundation, 

NASA budget, on the other hand, is 

According to the National Science 

R& D is not an end in itself 

but is a means whereby national 

goals can be achieved more 

effectively and efficiently.... I 

What are these goals?. NASA has more difficulty.than most 

-agencies..in desc_ri~~in~ational_noals in such.. a way that its 

programs relate to them. The law establishing NASA is no 

.help in this regard. The National Aeronautics and Space Act 

of 1958 declares that the 'general welfare and security of 

the United States require "adequate provision" for 

aeronautical and space activities. But then it states 

that NASA must contribute to one or more of eight objectives, 

several of which go far beyond the usual understanding of 

welfare and security. Are we called as a nation to something 

greater than our welfare and security? There is no guide in law 

as to what "provision" is "adequate" for NASA's programs. 

b. The Budgeting Process 

Budgeting decisions are made in a framework provided 

by space scientists and engineers. This term is short-hand 

for those employed by NASA, by the aerospace industry, and by 

the universities. They decide what NASA's mission in space 

is (see Figure ll),they tell us the value of space activities, 

and they.largely determine the share of available funds each 

program receives (see Figure 2). 

The club seems to achieve a consensus in-house;by 

rallying around those programs with enough political appeal 
. EXPLORATION 

- NEW FUNDAMENT.AL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EARTH, SOLAR SYSTEM 

AND UNIVERSE . 

- SEARCH FOR LIFE 

0 APPLICATIONS 

- BENEFITS IN AGRICULTURE,WEATHER FORECASTING; 

COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER FIELDS - 

- DIRECT COOPERATION WITH DOD, NOAA, EPA, DOI, DOA 

- NEW INDUSTRIES 

0 MAN LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE I0 SPACE TRANSPORTATION 

- MAKING SPACE MORE ACCESSIBLE TO BOTH DOMESTIC (CIVIL AND 

MILITARY) AND FOREIGN USERS 

3 ch l ENERGY 

F 

m 

- TERRESTRIAL APPLICATIONS FOR ERDA, USE OF SPACE 

. 

= . RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORTING THE ABOVE 
to have a spill-over or logjam-breaking effect for the most 

members. Thus seldom will scientists or engineers openly 

criticize programs that they consider ill-advised. Budget 

requests are made to OMB and the public with as little 

open dissent and as much gravity and consensus as possible. 

This behavior is the result of a shared outlook. It is 

aggravated by the ease with which most professional groups 

accept the "responsible" consensus. 

It is true that independent budget evaluations are 

attempted by OMB, the Appropriations and Budget Committees, 

and the GAO. But as long as there is a general consensus 

within the club, and as long as evaluations are based on 

NASA-commissioned studies, these economy-oriented critiques 

will not be effectual. Indeed, not all these authorities 

are economy-oriented. As staffers become familiar with 

space activities they become interested in them. If pressures 

build to stimulate the economy, what better place than in 

one's favorite R & D program? 

c. UnconvincinP Arguments 

Most agencies have a wide range of arguments to back 

up budget requests but they usually use these arguments 

informally. At budget hearings an agency will try to keep 

it simple. Informal arguments might lose some of their 

appeal to individual interests if they were listed together, 

and exposed to criticism. ~ 

Critics of a particular program would do a service if 

they took issue not only with the program's formal justification but with all the other claims that are made in support 

. of it. However, the critic runs the risk of strengthening 

his case logically and weakening it here and there politically. 

Inaccurate claims can usually be asserted more quickly than 

they can be refuted. 

Unconvincing arguments tend to weaken the aura of 

scientific invincibility and suggest a bureaucratic tendency 

to keep trying a multitude of arguments to weaken people's 

resistance, or to provide that particular argument which 

one group can accept. This list is by no means complete. 

(1) The "Critical Threshold" Argument 

NASA will maintain that funding must be kept at 

a certain level to preserve the necessary scientific 

and engineering base in people and facilities. 
m 

There is no one threshold, but a series of 

thresholds depending on the level and the purpose of 

.R & D. The concept itself is suspect: if a base could 

be created when needed, it can be re-created. The costs of starting it up must be balanced against the costs of 

an entrenchment process that diverts the government's 

attention and funds from new problems, or new approaches 

to old problems. 

(2) NASA's Stimulative Effect on the Economy 

. 

It is claimed that NASA expenditures are highly 

labor intensive, have a high multiplier effect, are not 

inflationary, and return the investment many times over 

due to the advanced technology involved. 

Aside from the fact that these are the findings 

of studies commissioned by NASA (see. following section on 

vested experts), the point is not how stimulative NASA 

spending is in absolute terms, but how stimulative it is 

compared to equivalent spending by some other agency in 

some other sector, 

policies. 

or by different fiscal and monetary 

(3) The Level Budget "Commitment" of January 1972 

NASA often refer,s to OMB assurances that it 

would have a funding floor in constant dollars to build the 

shuttle. 

by OMB. 

Actually the "commitment" was made by NASA, not 

'The political process does not permit long-term 

comitments to controversial programs, yet claims of a 

"commitment" are still heard. 

(4) The "Cutting Edge" of Technology 

In simplest form this argument holds that 

what makes America preeminent is advanced technology, and 

that we depend on it for our.defense and foreign exchange 

earnings. The "cutting edge" is never far from nuclear 

energy and the aerospace industry, and in these areas 

the high quality of research brings the highest return 

on our R & D dollars. 

This argument confuses the value of R & D 

with subjective judgments on the value of different types 

of R & D. The issue should not be whether aircraft sales 

are a major earner of foreign exchange, but whether some . 

other industry would have produced greater social and 

economic benefits if an equivalent amount had been invested 

in it. As to quality of research, talent follows money. 

Our military and space efforts might'well benefit from cheaper, 

more numerous and more expendable units. See Annex D. 
(5) Individual Science Programs Vital. 

This tactic is to evaluate individual science 

programs in isolation from basic research policy. The 

stress is on the worthy objective and not on whether the 

program is cost effective, or whether data are related 

to results from recent or concurrent programs, or whether 

technology offers the possibility-of leap-frogging to a . 

more advanced stage. 

The Space Telescope is a case in point. If l 

observations are vastly improved outside the earth's 

atmosphere, why have observatories been built or upgraded 

recently in Chile, Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and 

Arizona? Is there duplication from military space programs? 

(6)' National Security, or A Race with the Russians 

The space club is not averse to taking a page 

out of DOD's book. When pressed, NASA will disclaim 

competition, but say the Russians are ahead. 

DR. FLETCHER. We don't regard 

ourselves as being in a race 

with the Soviet Union. We do 

feel that we cannot fall too far 

behind in technology. 

Some proponents will say that NASA programs 

have profound security implications. These claims 

suggest that DOD does not recognize certain defense 

needs, or that NASA should pay for a certain part of 

national defense. 

(7) International Prestige 

Akin to national defense is the notion that to 

keep our political and cultural values in high esteem, 

here and abroad, we must periodically give a display of 

technological virtuosity. Perhaps a winning team in 

sports or technology helps Americans feel less threatened 

by foreign developments beyond our control. We transfer 

vigor and Number 1 status in a particular field, to the 

nation as a whole. Selling international prestige on this 

basis panders to people's insecurities. 

(8) The Call of Adventure 

Adventure covers a variety of appeals to our 

emotions and imaginations. 

--Vicarious space travel: 

e.g. the Shuttle will have hygienic 

facilities for both men and women 

.I_ 

-” __ ., ,_^_, --_-..- -^ __,____ _ _____ “_f---l._--.--l “L -. 

-__ __-.--._--..~ ~--- 
1- 

c . 

b 

and that "average" people --'non-astronauts -- 

will be placed in orbit, to obtain the 

"liberating perspectives" of space. 

--Creativity,: 

e.g. the space program fills the same human 

need as cathedral-building in the Middle Ages. 

--An Alternative to War: 

e.g. World War I might have been avoided if 

European nations could have vented their 

aggressiveness on space operations rather 

than armaments. 

--A New Start for Mankind: . 

e.g. artists' conceptions of space colonies, 

space factories. 

--America's Destiny: 

e.g. The UnitedStates is the only country 

on this planet that can answer the riddle 

of man. 

--Spectator Sports 

e.g. Astronauts -- technological sports figures -- 

may do more to heighten this sense of adventure 

than to justify the added expense of manned over 

un-manned space missions. Perhaps they can be 

likened to a strong football team, that provides 

the gate receipts to support other athletic 

programs. 

As with the intern%tional prestige appeal, there is 

a touqh.of "Madison Avenue" to this -- space is more than 

R&D-- 

ment, 

it is patriotism, "gee-whiz" technology, entertaincreativity, our national destiny. But the very success of these appeals to our emotions and imaginations shows that 

welfare and security are not the total of human aspiration. 

We enter a decision-making area full of risk for public 

policy which imposes certain responsibilities on government 

officials. Programs funded emotionally often lead to waste, 

empty psychological gratifications, and inflation. Ancient and recent history offer examples of peoples who have asserted 

their values and spirit in unprecedented, uneconomic programs 

that drained them, sometimes fatally, of their vitality and 

resources. The display of power was as important as the end 

it was put to. See Annex, Shuttle Justifications, Zg. 

But non-economic or "irrational" motivations do 

exist, and they carry the po'tential for great creativity 

as well as great waste. Adventurous social programs and 

R & D programs have given us new knowledge, new powers and 

perhaps a new identity. Thus it is essential to argue over 

what kind of adventure we are getting into, and the costs. 

This is'almost impossible when budget requests are made 

entirely on economic ,grounds, and the appeal to non-economic 

motivations is under the table. (See Recommendations.) 
-.---- - . ...*-- --. .-. “. ____j_L _ -__ - .,_ ..--. 

(9) Fait Accompli Statement 

"The debate over manned vs. unmanned space 

flight was settled by the decision to build the Shuttle." 

This ploy can be used for most programs. It was a favorite 

for continuing the Vietnam war. 

d. Expert vs. Popular Opinion 

Related to the consensus‘-of scientists and engineers 

with regard to budget requests is the absence of an outside 

vantage point that the layman could turn to for a professional 

but fresh perspective. The problem goes beyond the natural 

similarity of viewpoint of persons in the same field. As 

then Senator Mondale asked on May 9, 1972: 

How can Congress and the public 

approve massive spending on new 

technology programs without the 

benefit of independent evaluations 

of such programs? 

NASA's contractors are not likely to offer opinions which 

have not been checked with NASA. At times estimates suggest 

a form of blackmail: 

NASA said that if the expendable 

alternate were selected, a further 

analysis might increase the 

development cost of the new 

expendable(l.~unch vehiclef) by 

about l-billion dollars. ' 

I . 

On the one hand there must be a taxpayer counterweight to vested expert opinion. On the other hand there 

must be disinterested expert opinion to dampen public 

enthusiasm for space programs based on psychic gratifications rather than economic or .scientific returns. 

Those who find entertainment or the solution to war in 

space may,ultimately push space expenditures higher than 

space scientists and engineers. The object of both counterweights is to use national resources wisely. 

1. Note that there is no comparison of total development 

costs of expendable and re-usable launch systems. 
4. Recommendations 

a. Outline National goals -- for example -- 

(1) The President's Economic Goals: 

-- 43% unemployment by 1981 

-- inflation under x9; 

-- a balanced budget, amounting to 

21% of GNP 

-- a relatively favorable balance 

of trade 

(2) Defense Against Military Threat 

(3) Pollution at Acceptable Levels 

(4) International Collaboration, Project 

Humanitarian Values 

(5) Scientific Discovery 

(6) A Program to Expjess National Values 

and Energy (?) 

b. Outline Corresponding Space Programs -- -- for example 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

Defense Satellites 

Scientific Probes, Experiments 

Economic Application Satellites (crop and weather 

forecasting, resource management) 

Pollution Detection Devices 

Public Service,Satellites (education, 

search and rescue) 

Solar Energy Platform 

Reimbursable Projects (communications 

satellites, space manufacturing) 
C. 

d. 

e. 

(3) International Cooperative Ventures 

(To train foreign scientists, share 

information, share the expense, use and 

seek superior talent.) 

To make these ventures effective the U.S. 

should avoid paternalism, or the notion 

that our resources give us a Manifest 

Destiny in space. 

(9) Experimental Civilian R gG D 

Develop technology that applies to the way 

people live now, in this country and abroad. 

See Annex D, IdASA's R SC D Direction. 

Accurate Labelling 

Avoid the scientific mystique. Justify programs 

in terms of all other activity being carried out 

to achieve the same broad objective. Set forth 

all the arguments used to support the program, 

strong or weak, point by point. lf the program 

is based partly on non-economic considerations, 

such as curiosity or adventure, make that part 

of the apDea1 explicit, so that the rest of us 

can recognize the trade-offs and judge for ourselves whether the adventure will strengthen or 

weaken us in the long run. 

Downgrade Economic Objectives 

Economic stimulation should take a back seat when 

R & D programs are funded, because these programs 

invest in personnel and facilities that are far 

more specialized and influential, and multiply 

more rapidly, than the constituencies of nonR & D programs. Multiplying the supply of 

program administrators multiplies the demand for more 

of the same. This skews the economy more than 

it stimulates it. See Annex D, NASA's R et D 

Direction, Constituencies. 

Curb Eudcret Sxnansion 

Through Executive Order establish an obstacle 

course of hearings, studies and consultations 

for budget increases over, say, 57:. Once a 

benchmark budget has been set, vary the size of 

the slices, not the pie (see Figure 2). Nhen 

priorities change, resources must be shifted, 

not added on. Scientists and engineers should 

be encouraged to blunt their spears on each 

other rather than the Administration. 
f. ljse a Science R&D Jury to Recommend R ,3 D Priorities 

to the President 

Appoint a Science/R&D Council, headed by the Vice 

President, made up of distinguished laymen, to 

recommend allocation of R & D funding as to function 

and agency. (See Figure 12,) 

This Council would not resemble the President's new 

Committee on Science and Technology. It would 

present the President with a proposed R G D budget. 

Its members would represent labor, business, 

education, consumers, the press and other sectors 

without being weighted 2 to 1 in favor of engineers, 

scientists and bureaucrats. The members would serve 

full-time, for a year, without staff. 

The Council would hear expert testimony from 

scientists, engineers, and those most knowledgeable 

about R 8 D. Its recommended budget would include 

military as well as civilian R & D. In the space 

field, for example, the members would have security 

clearances adequate to allow them to try to fund 

military and space programs from the same "pie," 

minimizing duplication and maximizing multiple 

missions. 

Discussion: 

In seeking impartialtty for decision-makers it would 

seem logical to assign laymen to determine the overall size of the Science/R&D budget, and scientists 

and engineers to decide how the R & D pie will be 

divided. But more impartiality can be achieved by 

reversing the roles. 

-l”l_ll(i -. __ /,^ - __..I__,*“,__.- .,..- . . ..” .,._,. II_ ,._.- ‘--_l.--l . . ..I --- 

At the level of deciding between the nation's R & D 

and other non-defense 

7 

oods and services (assuming 

this model is accepted , laymen are not disinterested, 

and may be too shortsighted to see the value of R 3~ D, 

whereas the parochialism of scientific and engineering opinion would be less at the overall R & D level 

than at the level of funding individual R & D programs. 

kt the program level, experts seek national commitments to their ovm programs, thus tending to jack up 

overall R & D on political considerations. Zxpert 

opinion at the overall R 8c D level, however, might 

dampen this effect. A compromise would be to set 

R & D within a narrow percentage range of PeGera 

spending (not GEP). 
: - 

m I - 

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._.. _ll^“..- _.,..... ._.- -I 

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II 

R SC D priorities are as political as they are scientific. 

A full debate is necessary. I'lithout it we will be less 

likely to achieve mid-range budgetary stability and 

more importantly the lead-time necessary for contractors 

and scientists to prepare themselves for new problems 

and priorities. 

et. Enforce OMB Circular A-109; Decentralize 

Depending on how one defines a need, circular A-10 

could have prevented the Shuttle controversy. The circulastates: 

“When analysis of an agency's mission 

shows that a need for a new major 

system exists, such a need should not 

be defined in equipment terms, but 

should be defined in terms of the mission, 

purpose, capability, agency components 

involved, schedule and cost objectives, 

and operating constraints." 

The present arrangement allows Space Flight 

to turn to Space Science and Space Applications and say 

"Here is your equipment, the Shuttle. Make use of it." MC 

Space Flight will then find a new project. When it can no 

longer carry the expense of the Spacelab, or Space Industr: 

alization, it will tur: these half-started programs over tc 

Science or Applications, the offices which should have 

controlled R & D from the beginning. 

To take mission-orientation further, overhead could 

be funded out of the end-result offices (Science, Applicationand OAST). The NASA Comptroller would be split in three, 

and those three offices would draw up budget requests for 

C of F and R & PM. Facilities would bill those 3 offices for 

services rendered. (OMB and the GAO would have to ensure 

that billings represent the full cost of government facilitie. 

and personnel.) In effect all work would be contracted out, 

to either private or government contractors, whichever program 

management preferred. 

Some of the advantages of decentralized budgeting 

are the following: 

-- it would weaken the agency's hierarchy,'its 

1nstltutlona-l values, its growth as a buresucrao;. 

-- it would force economies on laboratories 

and facilities of marginal usefulness. 

-- it would increase the practical applications 

of independent (unstructured) R & D. 
-- it would make programs available to 

facilities, and facilities available 

to programs, across the board. 

Facilities and laboratories affected 

would be subject to a wider range of 

ideas and work opportunities. 

-- it would require ways of making the Civil 

Service more responsive to public needs. 

h. Reorient JJASA Leadership 

Section 203 (b) (2) of the 195,5 Aeronautics and 

Space Act allows the RASri Administrator to hire up to 

425 executives, and set their salaries to the top Civil 

Service grades. This high number of excepted positions 

tends to unify top management. Unity is more beneficial 

to the implementation of policy than to the formation of it. 

This system naturally lends itself to the notion of 

a network, and a perception that when RIFs come the Civil 

Service takes a disproportionate share. The system may 

also be related to MM's poor Equal Employment Opportunity 

(ZZO) record, discussed in Annex E. 

Disturbing also is the number of former military 

personnel and former NASA contractors within the excepted 

positions. They cannot help but affect relations between 

fiASA, Defense, and industry, and the kinds of work that 

DJASA undertakes. Likewise a survey should be made of 

where ISASH scientists have done their work. There may be 

a certain parochialism among the prestige institutions. 

This too may affect the kinds of work JiHSk does, who does 

it,, and where. 

If the thrust of this memorandum is followed, a new 

Administrator will have to come from outside the space 

club. he or she will have to be willing and able to use 

his authority to remove TdASA veterans from excepted 

positions, and replace them with younger professionals. 

The purpose of these changes would be: 

-- to make i\rASA's personnel system 

more responsive to need, not less. 

-- implement the spirit of EEO. 

-- offset the steady increase in the 

average age of NASA employees. 

-- encourage disciplined dissent. 

i. Postpone the Appointment of a Science Adviser (OSTP) 

and a NASA Administrator Until These Issues Have 

Been Discussed 

Do not approve new starts at NASA until the budget 

decision-making has been studied. Do not be rushed. If an 

attempt is made to challenge the experts who choose our 

options, appoint science and R & D officials who will 

support the new approach and make it work. 
The three options listed probably bear little relation 

to OK6 options, which reflect expert opinion. ti;y options 

suggest that we explore new directions for R & D, that 

we not commit ourselves to Shuttle operations, regardless 

of "cost-effectiveness," and that we give laymen a share 

in setting ii & D priorities. To sum up, the options are 

based on keeping control of the agency.1. 

The options also reflect a bias toward Space Applications. Admittedly there are no options as to how 

Applications could use additional resources, but current 

TiASA emphasis suggests that money (and talent) thrown 

at this area could bring significant results. 

J 

1. OIhE may not see this as a problem. In discussing 

I'IASA's FY 1978 budget request, an OIMB report states: 

"Substantial flexibility exists for reducing future year 

funding based on long-range policy and budget decisions in 

future budgets" --as if a program's constituency did not 

grow and gain a wider hearin,?, as if our investment does not 

bind us tighter to a program, with each passing year. 
Option 1 - Appoint "jury" to recommend all R & D program 

priorities. 

Budget effect - Unlikely to change level of space 

funding, but might favor Applications 

over Flight and Science. 

Discussion 

OMB states that R & D funding, 

is not a separately programed or 

budgeted activity of the Federal 

Government. Its funding must 

therefore be considered primarily 

in light of the potential 

contributions of science and 

technology to meeting agency or 

national goals and not as an end 

in itself. 

Realizing that "therefore" belongs to the first 

sentence, not the second, the crucial point is that 

agency or national goals are slurred together. There 

is often a time-lag betw*een agency goals and new 

perceptions of how national goals can be achieved. 

Since R & D needs more lead-time it is important that 

agency R & D decisions be subject to modification by 

a group with a totally national perspective. 

1. 

2. 

Advantages Disadvantages 

Less overlap between 

military and civilian 

space programs. 

1. " Jury" unqualified to 

grasp issues involved. 

Build broader consensus 2. " Jury" will become the 

for longer-range planning, captive of a particular 

more lead-time for R & 0 faction. 

contractors. 

3. A form of Executive 

oversight over Defense 

R & D. 

4. l4ore attention to national 

goals than agency goals. 
Option 2 - Build only three Shuttles. Use Shuttle 

for R & D and as required by individual 

missions. 

Budget effect - Gradual reduction instead of sharp 

increase in Shuttle expenditure. 

FY 1978 is build-up year. 

Discussion 

Using the Shuttle as an R & D program for launch 

and payload reusability, while improving expendable 

systems, will provide greater flexibility. Some 

resources can be shifted to Space Applications. 

Publicize DOD distrust, and Mondale, Proxmire and 

GAO objections. OMB notes "widely divergent views." 

Advantages Disadvantages 

1. Change the big-program 1. Political repercussions 

legacy of NASA; redirect R & D from 

from areas surrounding 

affected facilities 

"producers" to "consumers." (see Figure 

2. Take advantage of new -J 2. Wide currency of 

broom; use press and public "cost-effectiveness" 

concern over inflation and argument. 

bureaucracy. 

3. Decision to put "Carter 

imprint" on Applications, 

give shuttle contractors 

an advantage in seeking 

Applications contracts. 

4. Catch up in expendable 

vehicle technology, 

building Fords instead 

of Cadillacs. 

5. More Science and 

Applications value per 

dollar spent, less drama. 

-_.._ ._-. . . . . --... .-__- l..*-- -, .l..__-_-l_ -.-_ ----- 
Option 3 - Expand the NASA charter to provide limited 

funding for specified technological 

breakthroughs. 

Budaet Effect - None. 

Discussion 

NASA coordinates with other agencies, industry and 

academia. It has capabilities in energy research, 

materials development, and across the spectrum of advanced 

technology. It put a man on the moon. It thinks more 

about the future than other agencies. 

Why not challenge NASA to find technological 

breakthroughs to problems here on earth? NASA would 

serve as a gadfly, to weaken monopolization of R & D 

fields by other agencies. Congress and NASA would draw 

up a list of problems most susceptible to new technology, 

and NASA would in effect bid for a contract. New 

automobiles, insulation, and housing modules come to 

mind. See Annex D, NASA's R B D Direction, section 3. 

Advantages d Disadvantages 

1. Encourage new 

interdisciplinary 

approaches to old 

problems. 

1. Maintain unneeded personnel 

and facilities on hare-brained 

schemes. 
- 

II I - 

I - 

I 

ANNEX A 

Shuttle Justifications 

Lack of clear objectives for the agency is reflected in 

the confusing justifications for the Shuttle. 

1. Formal Justification Is Irrelevant 

a. Cost Effective -- the Shuttle is cheaper than 

expendable launch vehicles. 

NASA states that the Shuttle is cheaper than the 

alternative -- expendable launch vehicles -- based 

on a certain frequency of missions (58% higher 

than preceding lo-year average), a certain overall 

payload weight (an annual payload six times what 

it was in 1969), a certain savings from lower-cost 

payload design and reusability, and a steadily 

increasing budget for NASA in current dollars. 

In 1972 President Nixon said that the Shuttle would 

"routinize" transportation into near space and 

"take the astronomical costs out of astronautics." 

This argument does not justify a growing national 

effort in space; it assumes and even requires it. 

Readers who wish to be side-tracked by this 

flypaper device will find it discussed in the 

last paragraph. 

b. A new capability to use space. 

When pressed on cost-effectiveness assumptions by 

Senator Proxmire, in February 1976, the NASA 

Administrator replied: "We went ahead with the Space 

Shuttle.. .because it offers...a new, more effective 

and efficient way of expanding the uses of space." 

Yet no one can clearly identify what these uses 

are or whether the Shuttle investment is the most 

efficient way of expanding them. 
c. ,Jorld technological leadership. 

In what? Emphasis on Shuttle allows foreign 

advantage in expendable launch vehicle technology. 

Why must the "cutting edge" of technology be in 

military-related programs with high development 

costs' See Annex D on NASA R S: D Direction. 

SHUTTLE FUNDING BY CHARACTER OF WORK 

(millions of dollars) 

77 78 

$ % $ 

Basic & Applied 

Research 145 7 156 

. 

Proof of Concept 18 1 60 

Full Scale 

Development 1809 92 1928 

Total 1972 ~ 2144 

% 

7 

3 

90 

79 

$ 

156 

47 

1835 

2038 

% 

8 

2 

90 

Source: OMB 

2. Informal Justifications Are Questionable 

a. IViilitary Security. 

DGD's responsibility. 

b. Employment. 

On a national level, comparable employment could be 

generated by other programs, in NASA (science and 

Applications) or out of NASA (ERDA, private industry). 

IVith regard to specific facilities and contractors, 

the point is valid. 

C. Delays raise cost. 

Kay also slow waste. 
__ __.. __- ._

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 li-- 

I 

I 

II 

I 

d. European Space Agency is investing $jOO million 

in Spacelab. 

NASA is investing 4300 million in Spacelab. 

e. Shuttle essential to Space Applications and Space 

Science. 

Although these are presented as the "uses of space" 

which the Shuttle will expand, they have actually 

been neglected by TlASA's diversion of funds to the 

Shuttle program. 

f. The need to put non-astronauts in space. 

At what cost? For practical results or public 

relations? 

65. Adventure and economic growth (See 3.c.(a)) 

Let us recognize that the Shuttle offers a form of 

adventure and a vision of the future, and debate it 

as such. There are different kinds of intellectual, 

emotional, and ohysical adventure, and there are 

alternative visions of the future. Large scale 

sophisticated technology should have no monopoly on 

our imaginations. 

Let us keep separate the sales pitches that involve 

international prestige, displays of power, Buck Rogers 

entertainment. These play up to our insecurities 

and offer satisfactions and diversions that are artificial. 

;rjhere there are Ili;adison !Lvenue techniques there is the 

possibility that the Shuttle vision of the future is 

the favorite of big business. Eusinessmen may see 

space manufacturing as a way of maintaining our present 

types of growth, technology and consumption. Space 

scientists may see it as a peaceful offshoot of weapons 

technology, creating different kinds of growth and 

different social attitudes. 

In this vision of the future, in which we are investing billions, space will provide new sources of energy, 

new materials, new growth, new cures for disease. 

People will be distracted from population pressures, 

economic ineoualities, and nuclear contamination. 

(Problems that d on't lend themselves to technological 

solutions are "cultural factors" which are ignored, or 

thought to be transformed by the future.) 

It is possible that technology will change our lives, 

but is it this Shuttle type of technology? 
3. Factual Justifications 

a. Shuttle operations could possibly lead to unforeseen 

genuinely economical space activities that would not 

be apparent from using only an R & D shuttle. 

b. Space operations in the 90's may require a commitment 

to manned space flight and the physical retrieval of 

a high percentage of satellite payloads. 

4. Reconstructing the Shuttle Decision 

By hindsight it would seem that NASA should have studied 

the missions for space launches before and not after 

the development of the $30 to $50 billion Shuttle. 

At the time the decision was made, however, the following 

conditions prevailed: 

-- 

-- NASA is oriented toward expensive "hardware." 

-- 

the Apollo program was ending, forcing 

traumatic reductions. 

NASA could probably get more funds from 

Congress for the Shuttle than it could 

for Science or Applications. 

Shuttle research sp=ills over to aeronautics. 

Space Flight was called Manned Space Flight. 

The thrust of that office is to enable human 

beings to work in space, which causes NASA 

to de-emphasize missions that can be 

accomplished at less cost without human 

beings. 

5. The "Cost-Effectiveness" Argument 

a. Cost estimates were obtained from NASA-contracted 

studies (See Section 3d.) 

b. NASA studies underestimate Shuttle costs and 

over-estimate those of its alternatives. 

According to the GAO, 

(1) NASA has yet to provide an estimate of all 

Shuttle costs. 

(2) NASA's management-to-cost techniques are a way 

of holding down more realistic field center 

PstimltP-. -L L_ L-- _ 

--- 

._, - _._-- --. l___--l__ __I. -- ,-.l--l-l---- 
(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

B,ajor Shuttle costs have gone up 50; from 1972 

to 1976, and further real and inflationary 

increases can be expected from budget-caused 

delays, environmental impact studies, and unforeseen design problems. 

Crucial to "cost-effectiveness" are the "savings" 

made possible by the Shuttle's ability to retrieve 

space payloads, repair them in space, and utilize 

lower-cost payload desia -- yet these cost 

benefits are dubious. A separate Shuttle flight 

is reauired for each orbit retrieval. Technology 

advandes so rapidly it may be cheaper to build 

new units than repair old. Designing for heavier 

and larger payloads means reversing the industry 

trend toward greater sophistication. 

The 58% higher launch rate may be unrealistic; 

none of the Shuttle's potential users (e.g. Commerce, 

DOD) has committed itself to a minimum number of 

missions. 

Eudget constraints add to program risk because 

NASA's "cost-effectiveness" model puts pressure 

on engineers to compress testing schedules rather 

than on !‘;A% to postpone revenue-generating operations. 

C. DOD is to be a major user of the Shuttle, but several 

Air Force studies have su ggested the Shuttle may cost 

more than expendable vehicles. The Air Force has not 

released its studies on the feasibility of recovery 

and re-use of Defense satellites, most of which are in 

geosynchronous or higher-than-Shuttle orbits. 

d. "Cost-effectiveness" is clever: 

(1) It diverts attention from "what's it for?" 

(2) It conveys frugality by asserting that substantial 

savings will result if the nation embarks on a 

$40 billion program. 

(3) It justifies follow-on programs, like a permanent 

space station, to allow us to get our full money's 

worth. In FY 78 NASA requested $15 million for 

"Space Industrialization," the wedge for a new 

dominant mission. 
Annex 2 

Work Impact at Installations 

Pie other program accounts for the same percentage of R & D 

work as the Shuttle does at Johnson, Kennedy and iviarshall. Eut 

Shuttle cut-backs would affect Johnson, Kennedy and Marshall as 

the percentages indicate, over time, only to the extent that 

there were no programs to replace the Shuttle. NASA tells us 

that Shuttle R & D resources will be shifted to Science and 

Applications after the Shuttle becomes operational. If the 

Shuttle were cut back, that process could start now. 

.-- 

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Annex C 

Kilitary Space Programs 

Size and Objectives 

Only part of DOD's space-related programs are included in 

military R & D, but the two are shown together, with 

NASA's incurred obligations, for comparison. The military 

space "overhead" may be understated. 

Spending 38$ of U.S. space money, DOD programs should be 

scrutinized as closely as iGASA's. The scrutiny is more 

difficult, however, due to overclassification, institutional reticence (see paragraph on Shuttle), and scatteration. 

The third factor, more reassuring, is the impression that 

space activities are split up among distinct military 

missions. It makes empire-building harder to detect 

because SAMSO turns the programs over to the commands 

that use them. The Defense Support Program is run by 

NORAD, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program by 

SAC, and the three communications programs, DSCSII, 

AFSATCOH, and FLTSATCOIV!, are run by DCA, the Air Force 

and the Navy. SAMSO is the air Force unit that develops 

and launches Defense satellites. 

In theory, space programs are approved by hard-nosed 

commanders who only want the job done most effectively. 

In practice a relaxed budget may permit redundancy, or 

placing satellites in operation before they are perfected 

for peacetime or reliable in wartime. 

Overclassification 

There should be a presumption that any information that 

can be correctly assumed by the Soviet government should 

be available to the American people. A few highly sensitive activities should not make all others classified as 

well. Cost should be broken down in greater detail. 

The need for various systems must also be explained. 

Defense communications, for example, already seem 

adequate: only disinterested officers, forced to make 

choices, can give us an accurate judgment. '.. 

._._-_ .I..__ 1-- 

-. ;.. .,- ._ -- 

-.. _-- 
PROGRAM 

Mission Oriented 

Navi ation 

piLmLIc*psl 

Communications 

J!! x1 MS;-& 

Geodesy 

Warning ,bJP 

Weather D/rlLP 

Veh. Development 

Space Ground Support* 

Supporting R&D** 

General Support III 

($ in millions) 

DOD SPACE AND SPACE RELATED PROGRAMS 

FY 1975 FY 1976 Fy 197T FY 1977 

47.6 104.5 

361.5 362.5 

7.7 9.4 

136.5 92.7 

29.1 42.3 

36.8 57.2 

91.9 115.3 

137.1 139.9 

1044.2 1061.3 

TOTAL / \ 1892.4 1985.1 448.3 

(396~) (W 

^- . 

22.7 

57.5 

0.1 

15.3 

7.2 

18.9 

21.3 

42.6 

262.7 

102.7 

658.6 

6.6 

86.4 

57.9 

109.1 

123.0 

183.6 

1008.4 

Notes: * Includes range support, instrumentation, ground based 

satellite detection, tracking and control. 

** Includes research, exploratory and advanced developments. 

*** Includes support organizations as well as general operational 

support. 

Table P-5. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY RESEARCH AND 

DEVELOPMENT (obligations in millions of dollars) 

___. -._-- 

1975 1976 TQ 1977 

.CIY.I estimate cstimlte eslimale 

--- -- 

Conduct of R. & D.: 

Research. development. test. and evaluation: 

Military sciences.. _ _ ____ .__.. .____._____._._._ 405 442 115 513 

Aircraft and related cquipmcnt .______. ___ . .__. 1.648 I.941 443 2.260 

Missiles uv.i related equipment ____ __.__ __ _._____ 2. 160 2,277 562 2. so4 

Xfilitary astronautics and related equipment. _. _. _ 527 582 139 593 

Ships. small craft and related equipment. _ _ _ ____ 63) 608 165 736 

Ordnance. combat vehiclc¶and related equipment... 471 556 171 751 

Other cquipmcnt... __ ________ ___....._________ 1.8-H 2.096 538 2,361 

f’rogramwidc manaScment and support _________._ 869 93s 263 1.037 

Other appropriations... __. __ _ ._ ._ _ ._ __________ 429 412 II4 443 

___ __ ---- --- 

Totalconduct of R.& D., ohligaLms. _ _ ______._ 8,987 9,879 2.510 II, 198 

.:.. _ : X- z-7. -_. _ __ _ :-- 

Total conduct of research, included above. _ __ _ _ 1.6lil 1,756 519 2,035 

Total conduct of development, included above. _. 1,326 8, I23 1,991 9.163 

R. h D. faclllttcs. obtlyatiom _._._. _. _.... ..__ lb+ 176 36 356 

--- - -- -- 

T 01 t 1 ” bl’ qa I’ IO”, .___._ _ ______. _ __....._._ .._ 9,151 10,055 2, S46 11,554 
3* The Shuttle 

As to how necessary the Shuttle is to improve DOD space 

capabilities, DOD has made no final judgment. Air Force 

briefers tick off the Shuttle's selling points: twice 

the payload weight, three times the volume, in-orbit 

servicing and testing, retrieval, the ending of DOD-IGASA 

duplication. 

But they do not refute the counter-arguments: 

--Retrieval, for refurbishment of payloads or fail 

analysis, is only practical from low orbit. Nos 

DOD satellites go to geosynchronous orbit, which 

Shuttle cannot reach. 

ure 

t 

the 

--Eigh equipment reliability and rapid technological 

advances reduce the importance of in-orbit servicing, 

and man-in-space. Long lead-time investments run 

greater risk of obsolescence. 

--iihat would be the advantages and disadvantages of 

having men in space in time of war? 

--If cost estimates for adapting DOD payloads to the 

Shuttle are now $700 million, and if DOD must build 

the IUS, how cost effective is the Shuttle from DOD's 

point of view? # 

Several hypotheses suggest themselves to explain why this 

subject is so difficult to discuss: 

--tight security (see paragraph 2). 

--decision-makers have not grasped all the technical 

aspects, and the technical people are too specialized 

to decide. 

--political pressure to accept the Shuttle. 

--unwillingness to discuss the issue with non-DOD 

personnel. 

--ties with NASA. 

Insights into DOD's "commitment" to the Shuttle will not 

be available through official channels to any questioner 

who does not have some power of the purse at Defense. 
4 . Ban on Suace Vieaponry 

STATEMENT OF HERBERT REIS. LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. MISSION 

TO THE UPTITED NATIONS July 2 3 , 19 75 

The follr o~lter spcce tre:lLiv:: nrc the Outer Space Tretlty,ncgotiiLtc~l 

in 1066; the Astronnut Assistnncc nntl Relrlrn Agreement, ncgotinted 

in 1067; the T,i:lbiliLy Convention, the ncgotin.tion of which n7l.S COmplt~tetl in 19’71 ; nncl the Rcgi::tr:\tion Convention, completed in 107-k. 

‘I’hc first of tllese corlvonlions. tlic Otltcr Space Dent-, 

. . _. mnndntes tluxt outer spnce nnrl 

celestial bodies are f&ly n.rnil:ll,le for esplorntion nrld use bv el-cry 

state nnd cannot, bo sul,jrcLe~l to ~II~_V clniul of nnLion>ll s;ovcr&gnty nr 

cschlsiw llse. It pro\-iclc!: thst the! obligntions of n state under intern,ztionnl hlV to nl*oitl using nrmctl force nnd to resolve its internntional 

difEJWllCeS pe3CdUlly apply eqrinlly to conduct in space. 

‘I’he trcntylnys clown the rule t,hnt, no stntc may orbit nuclear vxnpod 

or install them on n cclestinl botlv. It calls for the ~ncourngement of 

scientific inwstigntion 2nd estni;lishrs internntion31 cooperntion in 

SpWC nntl space-relatetl progrnms ns n funclwnentsl objective of the 

commllnit~ of nntions, howewr dispn.rn.tc, rnny be thir Earth-bnsecl 

policic>s. Ittleclnrrs thnt s;pnrc wtivitics sllo~lld 1)~ condllctptj u-it11 fi 

view to benefiting nil mankind. -- 

-- 

--_ _ 

The Outer Space Treaty specifically bans nuclear weaporls 

and "other weapons of mass destruction." What initiatives 

have been taken by the U.S. to negotiate a treaty that 

would ban all weapons from space? 

USAF briefers refer to space as the fourth medium of 

war, after land, sea, and air. tiilitary space activities account for 38% of the U.S. space budget. Does 

all this money go to survgillance and communications 

devices? 

Lasers and “killer satellites” are mentioned in trade 

publications and Congressional hearings. Once these 

weapons are used, how would the conflict escalate? 

dhat would be the effects on the global environment? 

If opposing satellites today can be likened to the 

early encounters between aviators in World Nar I, 

where are we going? Surely nations that forego 

chemical and biological warfare can forego weapons 

in space. Even "knock-out" uses of these weapons 

could not prevent nuclear retaliation. 

The thrust of the Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. 

proDosed, is that space activities should be conducted 

for the benefit of all mankind. B complete report 

must be made on exactly the type and extent of U.S. 

and Soviet efforts to put destructive devices in orbit. 
Annex II 

NASA's R FL D Direction 

- 

“1 

1. Development vs. Basic Research 

Different fields require different proportions of basic 

and applied research and development. Since development is costlier than basic research, one R & D program with 

high development costs may starve many basic research 

programs. how are the trade-offs made? Obviously a 

program should not be ruled out because it entails 

development costs; yet the economic, employment and high 

political benefits are such that the R ?L D rationale for 

the program should be given rigorous objective scrutiny. 

2. Constituencies 

i3y natural inclination and by training, specialists tend 

to believe their specialty can be a major if not a determining factor in the progress of mankind. It would not 

occur to them that money for their specialty brings them 

status and power. They believe in their specialty (most 

of them) for the benefits it brings to others. 

Uhen cries in the wilderpess are eventually heard and 

supported by government R & D, 

constituency. what emerges is a political 

If a small group shakes the tree successfully a larger group gathers, organizes, and shakes harder. 

Mew cries in the wilderness are drowned out. 

Once a new elite gains tenure it can shape the thinking 

and outlook of a younger people for a generation. Rapid social and technological change may leave the experts' 

formative experiences far behind, 

access to leadership positions, but they not only control 

in those positions. they reproduce themselves 

A scientist in a field that affects 

our future can reproduce himself, in PhD's, every year, 

for decades after he has done his "best" work. Section 102 (a)(4) of the new National Science Act reflects the 

expert belief that R SC D depends on greater numbers of 

scientists and engineers. But it is not the number, it 

is the kind and their orientation. 

39 Other Directions 

Alternatives to big technology and economic centralization 

need not lead to stagnation, an orgy of consumption, or a return to the Kiddie Ages, It is alleged that today the 

United States operates with the oldest stock of metalworking machinery of any industrial country, and that 80;; 
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR R 6 D 

BY AGENCY AND CHARACTER OF WORK - FY 1977 

millions of dollars 

Research 

Basic Applied 

Devel(>pnent 

HEW 670 DOD 1719 DOD 9214 

NSF 630 BEW 1392 NASA 2687 ' 

DOD 291 NASA 603 J ERDA 2530 

ERDA 289 ERDA 459 YEW 474 

NASA 255 / Commerce 14s DOT 295 

Ag 185 

Source: NSF 

FEDERAL OBLIGATI,ONS FOR RESEARCH 

BY AGENCY AND FIELD OF SCIENCE - FY 1977 

millions of dollars 

Basic Applied 

Physical Engineering Physical Engineering 

Sciences Sciences 

ERDA 235 DOD ERDA NSF 175 NSF DOD 

192 DOD 1155 

161 NASA 412 ,' 

NASA 160~ ERDA 43 Ag 36 NRC 114 

DOD 65 NASA 41 .d' EPA 28 ERDA 73 

Commerce 19 

NASA 18~ 

Source: NSF 
DiASA PROGRAN CATEGORIES EY TYPE OF R & D 

(millions of dollars) 

Basic & Proof of Full Scale Total 

Applied Concept Development 

I I Science (e.g.Viking) 4.3 1.2 16.3 21.8 

Applications (e.g.Landsat) 8.4 6.6 6.2 21.2 

Capability (e.g.Shuttle) 3.7 1.6 

Development 

46.9 52.2 

Total iz-3 --m m 95.2 

Source: OMB 

4 
of our Federal R & D is related to weaponry. ;/hy is R & D 

not targeted at new forms of transportation, insulation, 

clothing, 

markets, 

or at products designed specifically for foreign 

to improve our balance of payments? Why can't 

we lead the world in l&w cost products, like Jeeps that 

cost $1,000, or expendable rocket launchers that cost 207; 

of current rockets? On the other hand we could increase 

technical sophistication on a smaller scale. Mindful 

perhaps of the New York blackout of 1965, the new director 

of JPL advocates a decentralization of the American 

economy, based on small scale sophisticated technology, 

local energy sources, and nation-wide communications. 

Defense R SC D is not readily transferable to civilian use. 

Typically it produces units that are few in quantity, 

high in price.' Defense and space R & D are concentrated 

in developmental R & D, focusged on the end product, 

rather than basic research, which has more zenera purpose 

applications. . . . Defense and space R & D draws away scientists 

and funds from civilian R 3~ D. 

Yet new technological directions require not just a neutral 

government role in R & D, but active government support. 

Companies have practical difficulties in obtaining market 

rewards for "blue sky" R & D. Eesides, scientific knowledge is a public good. 

require flexibility, 

If effective weapons systems 

of technology, 

obtained by developing a large "menu" 

and buying information on alternative 

systems, why shouldn't the same principle apply to civilian 

technology? I 
RUTHERFORD ASSOCIATES, INC. 

Wcemlxr let 1976 

M E I'! 0 Ii A I\' D U I-'1 ---------- 

TOI Nicholas MarVeil 

Carter Mondale Transjtion Planning Group 

P.O. ROX 2600 

Washington, l3.C. 2001.3 

FROM8 W.A. Rutherford 

SIJRJECTr Aide Memo1.r: MA..% Transition Overview Paper 

1. As I indicated earlier the following information, 

observations and views are based on material gathered . I 

in the course of interviews with various persons inside 

and outside of NASA before and durlnq the transition 

period as well as direct personal experience and exposure while working as a consultant to the Agency 

over the past two years. 

1.1 Thi.s material is submitted for your information (and 

may or may not be included i.n or apl'ended to your 

final transition report on NASA) and for the lest 

possible utilization as you see fit. 
m 

Page -2- 

2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE + RACKGROUND 

There are three major considerations in this arear 

2-l First, as an organ of government NASA is 

2.4 

singularly free of centralized Federal 

government control. The Senate and House Committees 

with legislative oversight responsibilities, along 

with OKB are the only real "controling" forces 

or influences on the Agency, and its proven 

effectiveness in "lobbying" members of Congress 

have measurably lessened the impact of the former. 

In fact many Centers and Center Directors (including 

a numbe.r Of outst3anding Scientists - Werner Van Br;lur, 

is an Alumnus Of the Marshall Space Flight Centerand several former Astronauts) have their own 

contacts, supporters, friends and lobbyists in 

the Corlgress, in various Government Agents as well 

as professional and public followers making them pokeforces to deal with and reinforcing their independent: 

from central and external controls. 

.-..-- -_--- - 
3. SOME PROBLEM AREAS 

3.1 General 

This situation has a great deal to do with the 

array of problems confronting the Agency. The ingroup, esoteric atmosphere mentioned earlier has seen 

the creation of an "old boy-network" among the staff; 

a number of questionable procurement procedures 

including early construction and a.cquisitions outside 

normal Federal channels and constraints; favoritism 

in grants and awards to universities, companies and 

individuals; notoriously unequal personnel practices; 

costly programs and operations and a. serious absence 

I 

of direction and planning in the overall management 

of the Agency. 

4.3 Jn fact NASA has a notoriously had EEO standing. 

with some 16,000 personnel they presently have 

only a 7.4 percent minority participation in the 

work force - up from only 5.4 percent follr years ago. 

Of the first 20 Federal Ag??ICieS NASA is 20th or 

last. The Agency is bes et by a growing number of 

discrimination complaints and is being taken to 

court in a medley of class action sllits. 
4.5 The fact is that the Agency's Planned rate of 

Increased minority involvement is only Q/lOths 

of 1 pprrent annually. At this rate they do not 

even expect to reach EEO parity with other Federal 

Agencies until 1985. Many question wheather with 

management's current lethargic programs parity wili 

be achieved even then. 

4.6 The Agency uses the classic excuse that the scienti 

and technical nature of their work make it difficulto recruit qualified minorities. However the fact 

of the matter is that only 48% of NASA'S work force 

is scientific or technical. Yet the *minority figur= 

is still far below parity in the other 52% of the 

work force. 

4.8 Similarly, minoiities and women are totally 

absent from many key areas of Agency management 

or are only represented in token nllmbers. 

4.9 YASA nrocurement, L tjniversity grants, education 

office publications and public affairs offices 

all have only limited and token programs involving 

minority communities - if at all. 

5. ~EORGANI%ATION/CONSOI,T~ATIO~ 

5.1 A clear case can he made for the reorganization 

and consolidation of those Government Agencies 

involved in Space and Space related activities. 

The Agencies that have major programs in these 

areas in addition to NASA are notably the Department 

of Defense, ERDA, NSF. 
5.2 NASA OffiCi?ls express interest in and atpproval 

Of the concept Of a National Science and Technolo,- 

Agency but make a clear cut distinction \ 

between Space Research and applications Of 

research in specific areas. The hiatus Is 

between the developers and the users9 as they 

see it, and would influence their role as the 

"umbre11a" Agency. 

6. SOME RECOMMENDATIO!'TS 

6.1 That a major management study of the. Agency 

be conducted especially regarding the planning, 

program development and decision making processes. 

6.2 That the decentralized semi-autonomous Center's 4 

system be eliminated, an? a centralized line of 

operational and program authority be established. 

6.3 Develop new Equal Employment policies, programs 

and staff. 

6.4 Install a management by objective system for progrz 

development. 

6.5 Better coordinate research and share facilities, 

information and equipment with other Federal 

AqencieS doing related work such 8s the Air Force, 

DOD, ERDA, YOOA, etc. 

6.6 Improve commlJn i t-y relations and public affairs 

programs to involve and better inform the public 
i 

In . - 

ia -

ml 

In order to shed some,additional light on the subject of top level management 

talent (TLMI'), which the Agency has a "problem" in acquiring (See Fact Sheet #6), 

the following curves are provided for your perusal: 

36000 

;30000 

5 N 

28000 

26000 , 

r 

I 140 

2200 

11 

Calendar Year I 67 I 68 

1 

t AS, 70 1 71 1 93 - 

Top Level I?gmt Emplovees 1111 121 

i 73+++ - 

119 17n llh I 77 ; I,?7 ' 

HQ Permanent Employees 1 2116 2080 

&3'Fv i 

-2022 1994 75 I 3 115 lo:.-'.1 NASA UStc60 '- ..~------------.-- 

g;~~;~Top Level Mgmt Rmp&yees: 

L-e 34641 133929 32548 1 :05:6! $3:2 i 26FFfi7 -.4---L-- 

Anyone with "Administrator" in Title;lst level dir, 

: TLME-NASA HQ Telephone Directories; 

Records 1967-69; 

GMR Reports:1970-74 Personnel 

Total NASA- Jan 75 Historical Pocket Statistics 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

ADMl,PjlSTRATOR A 

, ,, ., ,,.” 

bs DEPUTY 

I 

I I 

I I I 

ir- I 1 
EXPLORING THE ~NK.?JOW 559 

in orbit and beaming it down to earth, the President indicated th 

end to happen much more quickly than we now expect and that w 

talk about them now. He was also interested in the nuclear waste 

sident liked the fact that ordinary people would b 

only requirement for a flight would be that there 

eiterated his concern for preserving theskills of t 

dent said that even though 

, we should realize that it wi 

that the shuttle will prove 

ceiving our affirmative 

reply, requested that fact that the shut 7 billion toy,” that it is 

indeed useful, and that tt 1s a investment in that t operations costs by a factor 

of 10. But he indicated that e stment, we would have to do it 

anyway, because space flight is h g in space now and will continue 

to fly in space, and we’d best be p 

2. International Cooperation. t said that he is most interested in making the space program a truly internati am and that he had previously expressed 

that interest. He wanted us to stress i al cooperation and participation for all 

nations. He said that he was disappoi we had been unable to fly foreign astronauts on Apollo, but understood inability to do so. He understood that 

foreign astronauts of all nati nd appeared to be particularly 

interested in Eastern Europe program. However, in connection with international coo tion, he is not only int ted in flying foreign astronauts, 

but also in other type ngful participation, bo periments and even in space 

hardware developme 

n. The president was interested 1 int activities with the 

USSR in connection also described to him 

policy level discussions with the USSR. 

t asked John Ehrlichman to mention both the internati 

e USSR docking possibilities to Henry Kissinger. 

cc: A/Dr. Fletcher 

Document III-33 

Document title: Nick MacNeil, 

Eizenstat, Al Stern, David Rube 

ommendations,” January 31,1977. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection,-, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Unlike Presidents-elect Kennedy and Nixon, Jimmy Carter did not appoint a blue 

ribbon group on space during his post-election transition. Instead, the NASA transition 

paper was prepared by one individual who took a generally skeptical view of NASA and 

most of its programs. Unlike earlier space transition reports, this document was completed 

after President Carter entered the White House. 
560 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICY AND PUVS 

[no pagination] Summary 

1. NASA’s priorities are on the development end of R & D, not the basic research 

end. NASA directs our R & D resources toward centralized big technology, maintaining 

the defense R & D orientation of the aerospace industry. 

2. The Shuttle has become the end, rather than the means, because NASA space 

policy has been shaped by the Office of (Manned) Space Flight. The Offices of Space 

Science, Applications, and Aeronautics Technology get the funds that are left over. 

3. Alternative directions for space technology may be neglected because 

(a) the Administrator’s power to hire and fire top management inhibits effective 

dissent 

(b) important NASA managers are from Defense and the aerospace industry 

(c) NASA’s budget is supported and approved by a space constituency.... 

1. Budget History 

Perhaps the agency’s growth, retraction, and resiliency can best be seen in its level of 

employment since 1962. 

Manpower 

500,000 1 

e Total Employment 

1 I I I I t I I I I I a I I I I I I 

JUW June June Jcm June Jim Jure June June Junn Jurm Jim Jwa June jlne Jm June Sql 

lsm 1961 1982 1963 1964 1965 1966 867 1w 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 

Total Em~ment 46.766 74.577 137.6% 246,304 379.064 409.900 393,924 306.926 267.671 216,345 167.603 149,603 144.968 134,055 125.054 127.733 131,016 121.016 

EdETm, 36,500 57.503 115,5W 216,4CO 347,lCC 376.700 3W.ooO,273,200 235.400 166.600 136.560 120,130 117.540 106,tW 100.200 103.400 106.700 97,200 

I ,I , I I I I , I 1 

In real year dollars NASA funding is 70% [of what] it was in its peak year, and increasing.. . . 

3. Funding Justifications Unconvincing 

a. NASA Mission Unclear 

Much apprehension and uneasiness about the NASA budget would disappear if the 

civilian apace program, like its military counterpart, had clear objectives related to national goals. 

DOD, with 38% of the space budget, would deny that its space efforts constitute a 

program; Defense programs are not ends but rather the means of accomplishing certain 

military missions, the purpose of which is to defend the nation and its allies from attack. 

Space programs have to compete with other means of accomplishing the same mission. 

The entire NASA budget, on the other hand, is considered R 8c D. &cording to the 

National Science Foundation, “R & D is not an end in itself but is a means whereby national goals can be achieved more effectively and efficiently.. . .‘I 

What are these goals? NASA has more difficulty than most agencies in describing 
I 

EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 561 

NASA Appropriations 

In Year-by-Year Dollars 

o’l ’ 

I I I I I I t I 1 I I I I 1 I I I t 

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 63 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 70 

37 .4a 96 1.8 3.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.6 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 4.1 

Conduct of Research and DevelopmenLObligations 

$Billions 

P-l 

$Billions 

12 

10 

8 

6 

. 

--- Defense 

- Civilian 

-m-m- Space 

-12 

-10 

-8 

-6 

-4 

-2 

-0 

1953 1955 

Fiscal Years 

1975 ‘77 

Estimate 
2.5 

2 

p 

.Z 

i2 .5 

.4 

.3 

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS 

1.2 

FY 1977-R&D 

minus T&DA 

- Expendable launch vehicles 

- Shuttle 

Flight Science Applies OAST 

.81 

FY 1977-“Overhead” 

R&D program proportions: 

59% of 1.19 = .70 

15% of 1.19 = .18 

T&DA Const of 

Facilities 
. . . 

cuwuez 

Space Flight 

Science 

Applications 

Space Research 

Aero Research 

Support 45.8 

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 

Construction of Facilities 

and Research and Program Management 

FY 77 Estimate 

(Millions of Dollars) 

C 

39.8 

8.7 

- 

.7 

28.9 

43.1 

124.0 

R&PM 

348 1 

114.2 

87.1 

75.3 

146.2 

814.0 

Function 

Personnel 

Travel & Transp. 

Rent 

Supplies 

Equipment 

Other 

563 / II 

R8cPM 

612.4 

19.7 

61.7 

13.9 

2.5 

103.9 

814.0 

national goals in such a way that its programs relate to them. The law establishing NASA is 

no help in this regard. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 declares that the 

general welfare and security of the United States require “adequate provision” for aeronautical and space activities. But then it states that NASA must contribute to one or more 

of eight objectives, several of which go far beyond the usual understanding of welfare and 

security. Are we called as a nation to something greater than our welfare and security? 

There is no guide in law as to what provision is “adequate” for NASA’s programs. 

b. The Budgeting Process 

Budgeting decisions are made in a framework provided by space scientists and engineers. This term is short-hand for those employed by NASA, by the aerospace industry, 

and by the universities. They decide what NASA’s mission in space is . . . , they tell us the 

value of space activities, and they largely determ.ine the share of available funds each program receives . . . 

The club seems to achieve a Consensus in-house, by rallying around those programs 

with enough political appeal to have a spill-over or logjam-breaking effect for the most 

members. Thus seldom will scientists or engineers openly criticize programs that they 

consider ill-advised. Budget requests are made to OMB and the public with as little open 

dissent and as much gravity and consensus as possible. This behavior is the result of a 

shared outlook. It is aggravated by the ease with which most professional groups accept 

the “responsible” consensus, 

It is true that independent budget evaluations are attempted by OMB, the Appropriations and Budget Committees, and the GAO. But as long as there is a general consensus within the club, and as long as evaluations are based on NASA-commissioned studies, 

these economy-oriented critiques will not be effectual. Indeed, not all these authorities 

are economy-oriented. As staffers become familiar with space activities they become interested in them. If pressures build to stimulate the economy, what better place than in one’s 

favorite R & D program? 

c. Unconvincing Arguments 

Most agencies have a wide range of arguments to back up budget requests but they 

usually use these arguments informally. At budget hearings an agency will try to keep it 

simple. Informal arguments might lose some of their appeal to individual interests if they 

were listed together, and exposed to criticism. 

Critics of a particular program would do a service if they took issue not only with the 

program’s formal justification but with all the other claims that are made in support of it. 

However, the critic runs the risk of strengthening his case logically and weakening it here 
564 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

FY 1978 Budget Estimates 

Space Shutlk 

Space Flight Operations 

Expendable Launch Vehicles 

Suborbital Flight 

Physics and Astronomy 

Lunar & Planetary Expl 

Lie Sciences 

Subtotal Science 

Space Applications 

Multi-Mission Modular S/C 

Space Research & Tech. 

Aeronautical Res. & Tech. 

Subtotal OAST 

Tracking & Data Acquisition 

Technology Utilization 

Energy Technology Applic. 

Subtotal R&D 

. 

on of Fa 

Total NASA 

Fy 

1,206.O 

188.7 

1,560.6 

159.3 

254.2 

434.1 

178.2 

Q 

74.9 

250.3 

240.8 

7.5 

53 

2,677.4 

82.1 

3551.8 

($Mil%ons) 

FY 1978 Program Runout 

T.P. FY1977 FY1978 FY1979 FYI980 FY1981 FYI982 

321.0 1,288.l 1,302.7 1,115.4 680.8 343.9 135.9 

48.4 202.2 297.6 360.4 508.7 594.0 592.1 

?!ulii.L41983~~m~ 

406.5 1,641.7 1,738.8 1,571.2 1,234.7 963.5 748.8 

43.5 166.3 234.1 270.2 266.9 264.0 235.7 

67.5 191.9 170.3 216.2 225.9 152.1 84.4 

L422J35A5lJIie5~m 

116.4 380.3 440.8 537.5 551.3 479.9 388.0 

47.7 198.2 224.8 242.8 266.4 163.0 135.5 

-o- -o- 25.0 40.0 21.0 2.5 -O19.3 82.0 115.0 114.7 112.9 -110.4 110.2 

242Li!mmsazl9LL6264411983 

63.1 272.1 360.6 416.8 424.5 374.8 308.7 

63.4 255.0 284.3 312.8 384.7 376.0 374.8 

2.0 8.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 

L5LQuuu5QL!I!LQ 

700.6 2,761.4 3,092.8 3,141.6 2,857.6 2,374.7 1,970.8 

10.7 118.1 19 5.6 200.0 161.0 125.0 110.0 

.i2!u~WW~8Ls3~ 

932.1 3,692.5 4,106.g 4,160.l 3,837.l $318.2 2,899.3 

Procurement of Fourth and Fifth Shuttle Orbiter 4fisum2284291.2 

- -- - - w 

Grand Total 3,551.8 932.1 3,692.5 4,153.4 4301.5 4,050.4 $596.6 3J90.5 
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 565 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

New Starts in FY 1978 BudPer 

(fMillions) 

Space Industrialization 

lu! 

15.0 

Space Telescope 36.0 79.4 92.0 95.7 66.8 65.1 435.0 

-and 

Jupiter Orbiter Probe 

Lunar Polar Orbiter 

Mars Follow-on 

Landsat D 

Aerorw4h 

Lift Cruise Fan Research Aircraft 

Landsat D 

Lunar Polar Orbiter 

Total New Starts 

FY1978 

20.7 

7.1 

20.0 

78.7 102.0 61.4 18.9 

43.9 37.4 13.9 2.7 

149 @u! ZLQ 3LQ 

14.0 60.0 72.0 34.0 

23 

62 

4.2 10.5 19.6 

IL2 

17.2 

4 

.4 

26 

11.0 

6.3 

63 

4.9 

1.6 

s.9 

ELQ 

15.0 

53 

5.5 

u.2 

281.7 

105.0 

20.0 

l&&w 

18.0 213.0 

&%5 

57.0 

57.0 

1977 

1975 Budget 

Actual Estimate 

(SThouundr) (SThousands) 

Space Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797,500 1,288,100 

Space Flight Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298,800 205,200 

Expendable Launch Vehicles ....................................................... 139.50Q 151.4OQ 

Total.. ......................................................................................... 1,235,800 1,644,700 
566 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICY AND PLANS 

SpaceShuHleRTDdEandProduction 

, Solar Electric Pfcwlslon Stape 

5 

0” 

m’ L I I I I I oew.lopmenI 

n 78 78 80 81 a2 

Fiscal Year 

and there politically. Inaccurate claims can usually be asserted more quickly than they can 

be refuted. 

Unconvincing arguments tend to weaken the aura of scientific invincibility and suggest a bureaucratic tendency to keep trying a multitude of arguments to weaken people’s 

resistance, or to provide that particular argument which one group can accept. This list is 

by no means complete. 

(1) The “Critical Threshold” Argument 

NASA will maintain that funding must be kept at a certain level to preserve the 

necessary scientific and engineering base in people and facilities. 

There is no one threshold, but a series of thresholds depending on the level and the 

purpose of R Jc D. The concept itself is suspect: if a base could be created when needed, it 

can be recreated. The costs of starting it up must be balanced against the costs of an entrenchment process that diverts the government’s attention and funds from new problems, or new approaches to old problems. 

(2) NASA’s Stimulative Effect on the Economy 

It is claimed that NASA expenditures are highly labor intensive, have a high multiplier effect, are not inflationary, and return the investment many times over due to the 

advanced technology involved. 

Aside from the fact that these are the findings of studies commissioned by NASA (see 

following section on vested experts), the point is not how stimulative NASA spending is in 

absolute terms, but how stimulative it is compared to equivalent spending by some other 

agency in some other sector, or by different fiscal and monetary policies. 

(3) The Level Budget “Commitment” of January 1972 

NASA often refers to OMB assurances that it would have a funding floor in constant 

dollars to build the shuttle. Actually the “commitment” was made by NASA, not by OMB. 

The political process does not permit long-term commitments to controversial programs, 

yet claims of a “commitment” are still heard. 

(4) The “Cutting Edge” of Technology 

In simplest form this argument holds that what makes America preeminent is advanced technology, and that we depend on it for our defense and foreign exchange earnings. The “cutting edge” is never far from nuclear energy and the aerospace industry, and 

in these areas the high quality of research brings the highest return on our R 8c D dollars. 

This argument confuses the value of R 8c D with subjective judgments on the value of 

different types of R & D. The issue should not be whether aircraft sales are a major earner 

of foreign exchange, but whether some other industry would have produced greater social 

and economic benefits if an equivalent amount had been invested in it. As to quality of 

_l_l.__~.-l_---. --___- -- 

^” ._ _.-.^. .-.. -_ . . . - ..I. ..I--.-- ----- 
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 567 

1 

research, talent follows money. 

Our military and space efforts might well benefit from cheaper, more numerous and 

f more expendable units. See Annex D, 

I (5) Individual Science Programs Vital 

j This tactic is to evaluate individual science programs in isolation from basic research 

policy. The stress is on the worthy objective and not on whether the program is cost effecI tive, or whether data are related to results from recent or concurrent programs, or whether 

technology offers the possibility of leapfrogging to a more advanced stage. 1 

! 

The Space Telescope is a case in point. If observations are vastly improved outside 

the earth’s atmosphere, why have observatories been built or upgraded recently in Chile, 

Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Arizona? Is there duplication from military space pro 

grams? 

(6) National Security, or A Race with the Russians 

The space club is not averse to taking a page out of DOD’s book. When pressed, 

NASA will disclaim competition, but say the Russians are ahead. 

DR FLETCHER We don’t regard ourselves as being in a race with tb Soviet Union. We 

do feel that we cannot fall too far behind in technobgy. 

I Some proponents will say that NASA programs have profound security implications. 

i These claims suggest that DOD does not recognize certain defense needs, or that NASA 

I 

should pay for a certain part of national defense. 

(7) International Prestige 

\ Akin to national defense is the notion that to keep our political and cultural values in 

high esteem, here and abroad, we must periodically give a display of technological virtuosity. Perhaps a winning team in sports or technology helps Americans feel less threatened 

by foreign developments beyond our control. We transfer vigor and Number 1 status in a 

particular field, to the nation as a whole. Selling international prestige on this basis panders to people’s insecurities. 

(8) The CalI of Adventure 

Adventure covers a variety of appeals to our emotions and imaginations. 

-Vicarious space travel: e.g. the Shuttle will have hygienic facilities for both men and 

women and that “average” people -non-astronauts-will be placed in orbit, to obtain the 

“liberating perspectives” of space 

- Creativity: e.g. the space program fills the same human need as cathedral-building 

in the Middle Ages. 

- An Alternative to War: e.g. World War I might have been avoided if European 

nations could have vented their aggressiveness on space operations rather than armaments. 

- A New Start for Mankind: e.g. artists’ conceptions of space colonies, space factories. 

-America’s Destiny: e.g. the United States is the only country on this planet that can 

answer the riddle of man. 

- Spectator Sport: e.g. Astronauts-technological sports figures-may do more to 

heighten this sense of adventure than to justify the added expense of manned over 

un-manned space missions. Perhaps they can be likened to a strong football team, that 

provides the gate receipts to support other athletic programs. 

As with the international prestige appeal, there is a touch of “Madison Avenue” to 

this-space is more than R 8c D-it is patriotism, “gee-whiz” technology, entertainment, 

creativity, our national destiny. But the very success of these appeals to our emotions and 

imaginations shows that welfare and security are not the total of human aspiration. We 

enter a decision-making area full of risk for public policy which imposes certain responsibilities on government officials. Programs funded emotionally often lead to waste, empty 

psychological gratifications, and inflation. Ancient and recent history offer examples of 

peoples who have asserted their values and spirit in unprecedented, uneconomic programs that drained them, sometimes fatally, of their vitality and resources. The display of 

power was as important as the end it was put to. See Annex, Shuttle Justifications, 2g. 

But non-economic or “irrational” motivations do exist, and they carry the potential 

for great creativity as well as great waste. Adventurous social programs and R & D programs 
568 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS 

have given us new knowledge, new powers and perhaps a new identity. Thus it is essential 

to argue over what kind of adventure we are getting into, and the costs. This is almost 

impossible when budget requests are made entirely on economic grounds, and the appeal 

to non-economic motivations is under the table. (See Recommendations.) 

(9) Fait Accompli Statement 

‘The debate over manned vs. unmanned space flight was settled by the decision to 

build the Shuttle.” This ploy can be used for most programs. It was a favorite for continuing the Vietnam war. 

d. Expert vs. Popular Opinion 

Related to the consensus of scientists and engineers with regard to budget requests is 

the absence of an outside vantage point that the layman could turn to for a professional 

but fresh perspective. The problem goes beyond the natural similarity of viewpoint of 

persons in the same field. As then Senator Mondale asked on May 9, 1972: 

How can Congress and the public approve massive spending on new technology programs without the benefit of independent evaluations of such programs? 

NASA’s contractors are not likely to offer opinions which have not been checked 

with NASA. At times estimates suggest a form of blackmail: 

NASA said that if the expendable alternate were selected, a further analysis might 

increase the development cost of the new expendable (launch vehicles) by about 1 billion 

dollars.’ 

On the one hand there must be a taxpayer counterweight to vested expert opinion. 

On the other hand there must be disinterested expert opinion to dampen public enthusiasm for space programs based on psychic gratifications rather than economic or scientific 

returns. Those who find entertainment or the solution to war in space may ultimately push 

space expenditures higher than space scientists and engineers. The object of both counterweights is to use national resources wisely. 

4. Recommendations 

a. Outliue National Goals-for example- 

(1) The President’s Economic Goals: 

- 4 l/z% unemployment by 1981 

- inflation under x% 

- a balanced budget, amoun ring to 21% of GNP 

- a relatively favorable balance of trade 

(2) Defense Against Military Threat 

(3) Pollution at Acceptable Levels 

(4) International Collaboration, Project Humanitarian Values 

(5) Scientific Discovery 

(6) A program to Express National Values and Energy (?) 

b. Outline Corresponding Space Programs-for exampleDefense Satellites 

Scientific Probes, Experiments 

Economic Application Satellites (crop and weather forecasting, resource 

management) 

Pollution Detection Devices 

Public Service Satellites (education, search and rescue) 

Solar Energy Platform 

Reimbursable Projects (communications satellites, space manufacturing) 

International Cooperative Ventures (To train foreign scientists, share 

information, share the expense, use and seek superior talent.) To make 

these ventures effective the US. should avoid paternalism, or the notion 

that our resources give us a Manifest Destiny in space. 

Note that there is no comparison of f&al development costs of expendable and reusable launch sys. 

terns. 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 569 

(9) Experimental Civilian R & D Develop technology that applies to the way people 

live now, in this country and abroad. 

See Annex D. NASA’s R & D Direction. 

c. Accurate Labelling 

Avoid the scientific mystique. Justify programs in terms of all other activity being 

carried out to achieve the same broad objective. Set forth all the arguments used to support the program, strong or weak, point by point, if the program is based partly on 

non-economic considerations, such as curiosity or adventure, make that part of the appeal 

explicit, so that the rest of us can recognize the trade-offs and judge for ourselves whether 

the adventure will strengthen or weaken us in the long run. 

d. Downgrade Economic Objectives 

Economic stimulation should take a back seat when R & D programs are funded, 

because these programs invest in personnel and facilities that are far more specialized and 

influential, and multiply more rapidly, than the constituencies of non-R & D programs. 

Multiplying the supply of program administrators multiplies the demand for more of the 

same. This skews the economy more than it stimulates it. See Annex D, NASA’s R & D 

Direction, Constituencies, 

e. Curb Budget Expansion 

Through Executive Order establish an obstacle course of hearings, studies and 

consultations for budget increases over, say, 5%. Once a benchmark budget has been set, 

vary the size of the slices, not the pie.. . . When priorities change, resources must be shifted, 

not added on. Scientists and engineers should be encouraged to blunt their spears on 

each other rather than the Administration. 

f. Use a Science/R&D Jury to Recommend R & D Priorities to the President 

Appoint a Science/R&D Council, headed by the Vice President, made up of distinguished laymen, to recommend allocation of R & D funding as to function and agency.. . . 

This Council would not resemble the President’s new Committee on Science and 

Technology. It would present the president with a proposed R & D budget. Its members 

would represent labor, business, education, consumers, the press and other sectors without being weighted 2 to 1 in favor of engineers, scientists and bureaucrats. The members 

would serve full-time, for a year, without staff. 

The Council would hear expert testimony from scientists, engineers, and those most 

knowledgeable about R & D. Its recommended budget would include military as well as 

civilian R & D in the space field, for example, the members would have security clearances 

adequate to allow them to try to fund military and space programs from the same “pie,” 

minimizing duplication and maximizing multiple missions. 

Discussion: 

In seeking impartiality for decision-makers it would seem logical to assign laymen to 

determine the over-all sire of the Science/R&D budget, and scientists and engineers to decide how the R & Dpie will be divided. But more impartiality can be achieved by reversing the 

roles. 

At the level of deciding between the nation’s R 8c D and other non-defense goods 

and services (assuming this model is accepted, laymen are not disinterested, and may be 

too shortsighted to see the value of R & D, whereas the parochialism of scientific and 

engineering opinion would be less at the overall R & D level than at the level of funding 

individual R & D programs. At the program level, experts seek national commitments to 

their own programs, thus tending to jack up overall R & D on political considerations. 

Expert opinion at the overall R 8c D level, however, might dampen this effect. A compromise would be to set R dc D within a narrow percentage range of general spending (not 

GNP). 

R & D priorities are as political as they are scientific. A full debate is necessary. Without it we will be less likely to achieve mid-range budgetary stability and more importantly 

the lead-time necessary for contractors and scientists to prepare themselves for new problems and priorities. 
570 THEEVOLUTIONOFU.S.SPACEPOLICYANDPWS 

Space Scienc*2% 

Space Applicatione-1% 

Other NASA-&% 

Agency and Mission 

Other HEW-2% 

T- 

‘A-1.3% 

Ag-2.2% - \ int-1.3% 

Shares of R&D 

Racornmond jury 

concept to weakon 

propownta ol 

Indlvldud R&D 

progrnmB, Rwldentlal 

backing to provldr 

Iwbulno for 

contraction and 

rxpanrlon. 

Dei,Non-Defr r 11 

75 77 79 

Federal Expenditures 

R&D 5.6% 

of totstncomnrnd 

ptannlng 

based on an 

opthnum 

wmntrgr. 

P 

404.5 

328.7 

Total Spending 

75 77 79 
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 571 

NASA 81 ERDA-5% - 

g. Enforce ONE Circular A-109; Decentralize 

Non-Def Purchases 

R&D 23% of non-Defanra. 

16% ol Dofon8a & non-Lhknr 

combined. Recommend 

RLD proponents 

b strongthonod 

In budgot 

decl&n-maklng. n 

Def & Non-Def 

Depending on how one defines a need, circular A-109 could have prevented the 

Shuttle controversy. The circular states: 

‘When analysis of an agency’s mission shows that a need for a new major system 

exists, such a need should not be defined in equipment terms, but should be defined in 

terms of the mission, purpose, capability, agency components involved, schedule and cost 

objectives, and operating constraints.” 

The present arrangement allows Space Flight to turn to Space Science and Space 

Applications and say “Here is your equipment, the Shuttle. Make use of it.” Manned Space 

Flightwill then find a new project. When it can no longer carry the expense of the Spacelab, 

or Space Industrialization, it will turn these half-started programs over to Science or Applications, the offices which should have controlled R & D from the beginning. 

To take mission-orientation further, overhead could be funded out of the end-result 

offices (Science, Applications, and OAST). The NASA Comptroller would be split in three, 

and those three offices would draw up budget requests for C of F and R 8c PM. Facilities 

would bill those 3 offices for services rendered. (OMB and the GAO would have to ensure 

that billings represent the full cost of government facilities and personnel.) In effect all 

work would be contracted out, to either private or government contractors, whichever 

program management preferred. 

Some of the advantages of decentralized budgeting are the following: 

- it would weaken the agency’s hierarchy, its institutional values, its growth as a bureaucracy. 

- it would force economies on laboratories and facilities of marginal usefulness. 

- it would increase the practical applications of independent (unstructured) R 8c D. 

- it would make programs available to facilities, and facilities available to programs, 

across the board. Facilities and laboratories affected would be subject to a wider range of 

ideas and work opportunities. 

- it would require ways of making the Civil Service more responsive to public needs. 

h. Reorient NASA Leadership 

Section 203 (b) (2) of the 1958 Aeronautics and Space Act allows the ASH Administrator to hire up to 425 executives, and set their salaries to the top Civil Service grades. 

This high number of excepted positions tends to unify top management. Unity is more 

beneficial to the implementation of policy than to the formation of it. 
572 THEEVOLUTIONOFU.S.SPACEPOLI~YANDPLANS 

This system naturally lends itself to the notion of a network, and a perception that 

when RIFs come the Civil Service takes a disproportionate share. The system may also be 

related to NASA’s poor Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) record, discussed in Annex E. 

Disturbing also is the number of former military personnel and former NASA contractors within the excepted positions. They cannot help but affect relations between 

NASA, Defense, and industry, and the kinds of work that NASA undertakes. Likewise a 

survey should be made of where NASA scientists have done their work. There may be a 

certain parochialism among the prestige institutions. This too may affect the kinds ofwork 

NASA does, who does it, and where. 

If the thrust of this memorandum is followed, a new Administrator will have to come 

from outside the space club. He or she will have to be willing and able to use his authority 

to remove NASA veterans from excepted positions, and replace them with younger professionals. The purpose of these changes would be: 

- to make NASA’s personnel system more responsive to need, not less. 

- implement the spirit of EEO. 

- offset the steady increase in the average age of NASA employees. 

- encourage disciplined dissent. 

i. Postpone the Appointment of a Science Adviser (OSTP) and a NASA Administrator Until These Issues Nave Been Discussed 

Do not approve new starts at NASA until the budget decision-making has been studied. Do not be rushed. If an attempt is made to challenge the experts who choose our 

options, appoint science and R & D officials who will support the new approach and make 

it work. 

5. options 

The three options listed probably bear little relation to OMB options, which reflect 

expert opinion. My options suggest that we explore new directions for R 8c D, that we not 

commit ourselves to Shuttle operations, regardless of “cost-effectiveness,” and that we give 

laymen a share in setting R & D priorities. To sum up, the options are based on keeping 

control of the agency.’ 

The options also reflect a bias toward Space Applications. Admittedly there are no 

options as to how Applications could use additional resources, but current XASA emphasis suggests that money (and talent) thrown at this area could bring significant results. 

Option 1 - Appoint “jury” to recommend all R 8c D program priorities. 

Budget effect - Unlikely to change level of space funding, but might favor Applications over Flight and Science. 

Discussion 

OMB states that R & D funding “is not a separately program[m]ed or budgeted activity of the Federal Government. Its funding must therefore be considered primarily in light 

of the potential contributions of science and technology to meeting agency or national 

goals and not as an end in itself.” 

Rea!izing that “therefore” belongs to the first sentence, not the second, the crucial 

point is that agency or national goals are slurred together. There is often a time-lag between agency goais and new perceptions of how national goals can be achieved. Since R & D 

needs more lead-time it is important that agency R & D decisions be subject to modification by a group with a totally national perspective. 
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 573 

Advantages 

1. Less overlap between 

military and civilian 

space programs. 

2. Build broader consensus 

for longer-range planning, 

more lead-time for 

contractors. 

3. A form of Executive 

oversight over Defense 

R & D. 

4. More attention to national 

goals than agency goals. 

Disadvantages 

1. “Jury” unqualified to 

grasp issues involved. 

2. “Jury” will become the 

captive of a particular 

R & D faction. 

Option 2 - Build only three Shuttles. Use Shuttle for R & D and as required by individual missions. 

Budget effect - Gradual reduction instead of sharp increase in Shuttle expenditure. 

FY 1978 is build-up year. 

Discussion 

Using the Shuttle as an R & D program for launch and payload reusability, while 

improving expendable systems, will provide greater flexibility. Some resources can be shifted 

to Space Applications. Publicize DOD distrust, and Mondale, Proxmire and GAO objections. OMB notes “widely divergent views.” 

Advantages 

1. Change the big-program 

legacy of NASA; redirect R & D from 

“producers” to “consumers.” 

2. Take advantage of new 

broom; use press and public 

concern over inflation and 

bureaucracy. 

3. Decision to put “Carter 

imprint” on Applications, 

give shuttle contractors 

an advantage in seeking 

Applications contracts. 

4. Catch up in expendable 

vehicle technology, 

building Fords instead 

of Cadillacs. 

5. More Science and 

Applications value per 

dollar spent, less drama. 

Disadvantages 

1. Political repercussions 

from areas surrounding 

affected facilities. 

2. Wide currency of 

“cost-effectiveness” 

argument. 

Option 3 - Expand the NASA charter to provide limited funding for specified technological breakthroughs. 

Budget Effect - None. 

Discussion 

NASA coordinates with other agencies, industry and academia. It has capabilities in 

energy research, materials development, and across the spectrum of advanced technology. 

It put a man on the moon. It thinks more about the future than other agencies. 

Why not challenge NASA to find technological breakthroughs to problems here on 

earth? NASA would serve as a gadfly, to weaken monopolization of R 8c D fields by other 
574 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS 

agencies. Congress and NASA would draw up a list of problems most susceptible to new 

technology, and NASAwould in effect bid for a contract. New automobiles, insulation, and 

housing modules come to mind. See Annex U, NASA’s R & D Direction, section 3. 

Advantages 

1. Encourage new 

interdisciplinary 

approaches to old 

problems. . . . 

Disadvantages 

1. Maintain unneeded 

personnel and facilities 

on harebrained schemes. 

Document III-34 

Document title: Presidential Directive/NSGS’I, “National Space Policy,” May 11,1978. 

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This directive resulted from a comprehensive review of U.S. space policy and programs undertaken during the early months of the Carter administration. It dealt primarily 

with the relationships among the civilian and national security portions of the national 

space program; its policy guidance with respect to the national security aspects of the 

effort was highly classified. The review was carried out under the auspices of the National 

Security Council, and it established a National Security Council Policy Review Committee 

chaired by the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Frank 

Press, as the mechanism for space policy formulation. 

[II Presidential Directive/NSC-3’7 

May 11,1978 

This directive establishes national policies which shall guide the conduct of United 

States activities in and related to the space programs and activities discussed below. The 

objectives of these policies are (1) to advance the interests of the United States through 

the exploration and use of space and (2) to cooperate with other nations in maintaining 

the freedom of space for all activities which enhance the security and welfare of mankind. 

1. The United States space program shall be conducted in accordance with the following basic principles. 

[2] a. [paragraph deleted during declassification review] 

b. The exploration and use of outer space in support of the national well-being and 

policies of the United States. 

c. Rejection of any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over celestial bodies, or 

any portion thereof, and rejection of any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire 

data from space. 

d. The space systems of any nation are national property and have the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with 

operational space systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sovereign rights. 

e. The United Stateswill pursue Activities in space in support of its right of self-defense. 

f. [paragraph deleted during declassification review] 

g. The United States will pursue space activities to increase scientific knowledge, 

develop useful civil applications of space technology, and maintain United States leadership in space. 
NASA SP-4407 

l3XPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 

Selected Documents in the History of the 

U.S. Civil *ace Program 

Volume 1: Organizing fin- E@lora tion 

John M. Logsdon, Editor 

with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, 

Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day 

The NASA History Series 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASA History Off ice 

Washington, D.C. 1995