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*********************************************** 
RAUL DIAZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 39651)

DiPentima, C. J., and Elgo and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of

home invasion, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that

his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court, after

a trial, rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the

petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. On

appeal, he claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge, to which

he had pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S.

25), on the ground that the charge was duplicative of a charge of burglary

in the first degree in the substitute information. Held that the habeas

court properly denied the habeas petition; as a matter of law, the petitioner waived his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge when he pleaded

guilty to the home invasion charge pursuant to the Alford doctrine and

his plea was accepted by the trial court, and he made no claim that his

plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, nor did he

allege a jurisdictional defect.

Argued September 13—officially released October 30, 2018

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Tolland and tried to the court, Oliver, J.; judgment

denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the

granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Deren Manasevit, for the appellant (petitioner).

Melissa Patterson, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Matthew Gedansky, state’s

attorney, and David Carlucci, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The petitioner, Raul Diaz, appeals from the

judgment of the habeas court denying his amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court erroneously

denied his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion

to dismiss a home invasion charge, to which he pleaded

guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine.1 We affirm the

judgment of the habeas court.

The following factual and procedural background is

relevant to our resolution of the petitioner’s appeal.2

On October 27, 2011, the petitioner entered the Ellington home of the seventy-seven year old victim when he

was not there. While the petitioner was still in the home,

the victim returned. The petitioner asked the victim to

step aside so that he could flee the home, but the victim

refused. The petitioner struck the victim with a jewelry

box, resulting in a laceration on his head and a broken

nose and cheekbone. After taking the victim’s wallet

and car keys, the petitioner fled in the victim’s car, but

was later apprehended.

The petitioner was charged in a substitute information with two counts of home invasion in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-100aa,3

two counts of burglary

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a101 (a) (1) and (2), one count of larceny in the third

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124, one

count of larceny in the fourth degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-125, one count of assault in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a60b, and one count of robbery in the first degree involving a dangerous instrument in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3). On April 26, 2013, after the

petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the state,

he pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to one count

of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a100aa (a) (2). After a thorough canvass, the court

accepted the plea, rendered a judgment of conviction

and sentenced the petitioner in accordance with the

plea agreement to twenty-five years imprisonment. The

petitioner did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this habeas

action. On February 25, 2016, the petitioner filed an

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging,

among other claims, that his trial counsel had rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge on the ground that it

was duplicative of the first degree burglary charge. After

a trial, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish
that his trial counsel deficiently performed by not filing

a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge. The

habeas court found that although the petitioner’s trial

counsel agreed with the state’s assessment that the

petitioner violated the home invasion statute, he nonetheless argued, although unsuccessfully, to the court

and the prosecutor that the home invasion charge

should be dropped, and in any event that the petitioner

should be allowed to plead to the first degree burglary

charge instead of the home invasion charge. Moreover,

the habeas court agreed with his trial counsel’s testimony stating that there was no good faith basis on

which to bring a motion to dismiss the home invasion

charge in the trial court. The habeas court further concluded that, even if the petitioner’s trial counsel had

deficiently performed, which he had not, the petitioner

was not prejudiced. The habeas court granted certification to appeal its denial, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The petitioner’s sole claim on appeal is that the

habeas court erroneously denied his petition for a writ

of habeas corpus because it concluded that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion

charge did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the petitioner

waived his right to raise this claim when he pleaded

guilty under the Alford doctrine.

We first set forth the applicable legal principles that

guide our analysis. ‘‘A plea of guilty, voluntarily and

knowingly made, waives all nonjurisdictional defects

and defenses in the proceedings preliminary thereto.’’

Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 22, 355 A.2d 49

(1974). ‘‘In general, the only allowable challenges after

a plea are those relating either to the voluntary and

intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise of the trial

court’s jurisdiction.’’ State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 80,

751 A.2d 298 (2000). ‘‘[A] guilty plea represents a break

in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty

of the offense with which he is charged, he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to

the entry of the guilty plea.’’ Tollett v. Henderson, 411

U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973).

Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is . . . not necessary for the trial court

to canvass the defendant to determine that [he] understands that [his] plea of guilty or nolo contendere operates as a waiver of any challenge to pretrial

proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Johnson, supra, 42.

In Savage v. Commissioner of Correction, 122 Conn.

App. 800, 802, 998 A.2d 1247 (2010), this court dismissed

an appeal in which the petitioner, after pleading guilty

pursuant to the Alford doctrine, claimed that his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing

to file a motion for a speedy trial and a motion to

dismiss. Id. The court concluded that the petitioner

waived his right to raise the claim when he pleaded

guilty under Alford. Id.; see also Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 796–99, 189

A.3d 135 (petitioner waived claims unrelated to guilty

plea, including ineffective assistance of counsel), cert.

denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186 A.3d 707 (2018); State v.

Hanson, 117 Conn. App. 436, 456–57, 979 A.2d 576

(2009) (declining to review nonjurisdictional claims

made after voluntary and intelligent plea), cert. denied,

295 Conn. 907, 989 A.2d 604, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986,

131 S. Ct. 425, 178 L. Ed. 2d 331 (2010); McKnight v.

Commissioner of Correction, 35 Conn. App. 762, 765

n.6, 646 A.2d 305 (guilty plea would have waived ineffective assistance claim stemming from probable cause

hearing), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 936, 650 A.2d 173

(1994). Additionally, in State v. Christensen, 157 Conn.

App. 290, 291, 115 A.3d 1138 (2015), a direct appeal

from the defendant’s conviction, this court determined

that the defendant waived his claims that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress and his conditional plea of nolo contendere when he subsequently

entered into a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.

We view Savage as factually and legally analogous

to the present case. The petitioner in this case pleaded

guilty to home invasion under Alford and makes no

claim that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, nor has he alleged a jurisdictional

defect. As our case law makes clear, an Alford plea

effectively waives a petitioner’s right to claim a constitutional defect unrelated to the plea. Savage v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 122 Conn. App. 800. As a

result, the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to file a

motion to dismiss the home invasion charge was waived

when he entered his Alford plea that was accepted by

the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does

not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is

so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805, 807 n.1, 772

A.2d 690 (2001).

2 The facts are as recited by the prosecution during the petitioner’s

canvass.

3 The second of the home invasion charges was added by the state immediately prior to the trial. All references herein to the home invasion charge

are to the first home invasion charge.