FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNIE WALKER, aka PJ’s Auto 

Body,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 07-15357

v. D.C. No.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE  CV-06-01703-MCE

COMPANY; GEICO CASUALTY

COMPANY; and GEICO INDEMNITY

CO.,

Defendant-Appellees. 

JOHNNIE WALKER, aka PJ’s Auto 

Body, No. 07-15424

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  CV-06-01618-

MCE/DAD USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE

COMPANY, OPINION

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 11, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed March 10, 2009

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, William C. Canby, Jr. and

Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

3111
Opinion by Judge Schroeder

3112 WALKER v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COUNSEL

Douglas L. Johnson, Beverly Hills, California, for the

plaintiff-appellant. 

Richard A. Derevan, Costa Mesa, California, for the

defendants-appellees GEICO Insurance Co, et al. 

James R. McGuire, San Francisco, California, for defendantappellee USAA Casualty Insurance, Co. 

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 

The plaintiff-appellant Johnnie Walker does business as

PJ’s Auto Body (“Walker”). He filed these putative class

actions against two major insurance companies doing business in California: USAA Casualty Insurance Company

(“USAA”) and GEICO General Insurance Company, et al.

Walker claimed violations of various California statutes in

connection with volume discount agreements the insurers had

WALKER v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 3113
with other automotive body repair shops (“direct repair providers”). Walker similarly challenged the inclusion of negotiated prices in price surveys that insurance companies are

permitted to conduct pursuant to California law. See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 10, § 2698.91. The district court dismissed the

actions for failure to state a claim on which relief could be

granted, and we affirm. 

All issues arise under California law. The district court’s

decision in Walker’s suit against USAA is published at

Walker v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (E.D.

Cal. 2007). 

[1] Walker first contends on appeal that the district court

erred in ruling that he lacked standing under California’s

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200, et seq. As amended pursuant to the 2004 voter

approval of Proposition 64, the UCL in § 17204 now requires

a plaintiff to establish that it has “suffered injury in fact and

has lost money or property.” See Californians for Disability

Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC, 138 P.3d 207, 209-10 (Cal. 2006).

Walker’s position is that, although he cannot establish the requisite “lost money or property” for purposes of monetary

relief under the UCL, he is nevertheless entitled to an injunction effectively requiring these insurers in the future to pay

higher rates for their insureds’ auto body repairs. His argument is supported neither by the language of the amended

statute nor its purpose. See Buckland v. Threshold Enters.

Ltd., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 543, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)

(“Because remedies for individuals under the UCL are

restricted to injunctive relief and restitution, the import of the

requirement is to limit standing to individuals who suffer

losses of money or property that are eligible for restitution.”).

The history and purpose of the law are outlined more fully in

the district court’s opinion, with which we agree. See Walker,

474 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 

[2] Next, Walker maintains that the district judge erred in

dismissing his cause of action for “unjust enrichment,” and

3114 WALKER v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
that the district court should have analyzed his complaint as

one attempting to plead a cause of action for restitution. See

McBride v. Boughton, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 121-22 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2004). Because the defendants have no money or property that belongs to Walker, he has no stronger claim for the

equitable remedy of restitution than he has for unfair competition under California law. See Buckland, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

557-58. 

[3] Finally, Walker contends he has adequately alleged a

violation of California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 16720. He essentially claims that the defendants conspired with direct repair providers for the purpose of restraining trade by agreeing to provide the providers more business

in exchange for negotiated rates. He further alleges the agreements wrongfully enabled the insurers to include these negotiated rates in surveys in order to set lower prices for auto body

repairs than the prices Walker would like to charge. As the

district court correctly pointed out, however, the discounts

negotiated between the insurance companies and the direct

repair providers reflect the proper functioning of the market

to bring about lower prices to consumers. “[Walker’s] desire

to charge more than the market will bear does not transform

[defendants’] lawful formation of service contracts into a forbidden conspiracy to destroy competition.” Walker, 474 F.

Supp. 2d at 1175. 

AFFIRMED. 

WALKER v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 3115