Filed 3/21/22 Monroy v. Alaska Airlines CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DORA MONROY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B310495

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV01220)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.

Raymond Ghermezian for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Worthe Hanson & Worthe, Todd C. Worthe and MacKenzie C. 

Foellmer for Defendant and Respondent.

________________________
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This is a slip and fall case in which the trial court granted a defense 

motion for summary judgment. Appellant Dora Monroy was descending 

an exterior staircase from an Alaska Airlines, Inc. plane, using the 

handrail for support. When her hand came in contact with a clear 

slippery substance, her hand slid and she fell. The issue is whether 

Monroy presented evidence establishing a triable issue about Alaska’s 

knowledge of the slippery spot on the handrail (or, put differently, 

whether its inspection was legally sufficient). The trial court found that, 

under the circumstances of this case, the inspection was reasonable. We 

agree and affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 14, 2018, Monroy was on an Alaska flight from Seattle 

to Burbank. When the plane landed, she exited through its rear door, 

stepping first onto a platform, then onto the stairs, her left hand on the 

rail as she descended. Her hand encountered something slippery on the 

rail (it was clear and not visible); her hand slid, and she fell down the 

remaining stairs.

In January 2019, Monroy sued Alaska; the cities of Burbank, 

Glendale, Los Angeles and Pasadena;the County of Los Angeles; and the 

Burbank-Glendale-PasadenaAirport Authority, alleging causes of action 

for damages on theories of maintaining a dangerous condition (Gov. 

Code, § 835), vicarious liability, negligence and premises liability (the 

only causes of action against Alaska are those for negligence and 

premises liability). Alaska answered, then moved for summary 

judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) on the ground that there is no 

evidence that Alaska had (or should have had) notice of the slippery 

handrail.

Alaska has one set of stairs used to deplane passengers from the 

back of planes landing at the Burbank airport. On the day Monroy fell, 

an Alaska employee, Kimberly Crawford, waited on the ground while the 
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stairs were positioned for the arriving plane. Crawford then walked up 

the stairs, looking for any “issues” (periodically using the handrails),

then opened the aircraft door and informed the flight attendant that the 

passengers could deplane. Crawford’s inspection was primarily visual, 

to ensure the stairs were free of any debris — but she used the handrails 

and did not feel or otherwise find any problems. Before Monroy fell, 

Crawford stood at the bottom of the stairs, watching 12 to 15 passengers 

deplane (none of whom said anything to Crawford about a slippery 

railing).

Monroy opposed Alaska’s summary judgment motion, contending 

the inspection was unreasonable because Crawford did not use a 

checklist and because no one wiped the handrails before the passengers 

deplaned. There is no showing that a checklist was required or that, had 

one been used, the result would have been different. Monroy presented 

her own declaration, and one from her expert (Eris Barillas) who opined 

that, had the handrail been “foreign-substance free,” Monroy would not 

have fallen. There was at most a five-minute gap of time between 

Crawford’s inspection and Monroy’s fall.

In November 2020, the trial court granted Alaska’s motion for 

summary judgment. After observing that the elements are the same for 

premises liability and negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages) 

(Castellon v. U.S. Bankcorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998), the trial 

court noted the issue here — that for both causes of action, if a danger 

exists, the property owner is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to 

make the condition reasonably safe or, if that isn’t possible, to give notice 

of the danger. (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 

446.) A plaintiff alleging injuries arising from a dangerous condition (or 

opposing a defense motion for summary judgment) must prove the 

defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. 

(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.)
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Based on the evidence discussed above, the trial court found that 

Alaska did not know (and should not have known) about the slippery 

patch on the handrail — in short, that Alaska did not have actual or 

constructive notice of the slippery substance — and that Monroy failed 

to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact about the 

reasonableness of Alaska’s inspection. For this reason, Alaska’s motion 

for summary judgment was properly granted.

Monroy appeals from the judgment thereafter entered.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Standards of review.

In the trial court, the initial burden is on the moving party to show 

there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, 

Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant meets its burden 

if it shows that a cause of action has no merit because one or more 

elements of that cause of action cannot be established; at that point, the 

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact. 

(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 

463, 467.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal 

questions for the court. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 

Cal.App.4th 32, 36; Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116

Cal.App.4th 497, 503.)

On appeal, our review is de novo, meaning we apply the same test 

the trial court used (Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 

83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054; Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 

925), liberally construing the evidence and resolving all evidentiary 

doubts in Monroy’s favor. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 

36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 

75 Cal.App.4th 832, 854.)
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B. There is no triable issue of fact about

whether Alaska exercised reasonable care.

Monroy contends there is a triable issue of material fact about 

whether Alaska exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its 

property. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 840.) 

We disagree.

Uncontroverted evidence establishes that Crawford examined the 

stairway, including the handrails, for debris and other hazards (Monroy 

does not explain how Crawford or Alaska could possibly have discovered 

an invisible slippery patch on one handrail). Although Monroy claims 

Crawford should have used a checklist, Monroy does not explain how 

that would have helped (and common sense tells us that, by carrying a 

checklist at least one of Crawford’s hands would have been encumbered, 

making it difficult for her to use the handrail herself). Moreover, as

Crawford watched from a spot at the bottom of the stairs, 12 to 15 people 

safely descended the staircase before Monroy, suggesting the slippery 

spot was far from obvious.

We reject Monroy’s assertion that she did not have to show actual 

knowledge because the evidence suggests the dangerous condition was 

present for a sufficient period of time to charge Alaska with constructive 

knowledge. She fails to point to any evidence showing how long it had 

been there, and she ignores the fact that Alaska did inspect the stairway 

before it was used. And as already noted, at least a dozen people safely 

descended the stairs without incident before Monroy fell. No reasonable 

jury could determine on these facts that Alaska could or should have 

done more than it did. Where, as here, the evidence does not support a 

reasonable inference that the hazard existed long enough to be 

discovered in the exercise of reasonable care, the issue of notice may be 

resolved as a matter of law. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th 

at p. 1207.)
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C. Monroy’s expert’s testimony was considered.

Monroy contends the trial court failed to consider her expert’s 

testimony. The expert’s view was legally irrelevant since a layman 

would understand the issue — whether Alaska knew or should have 

known about the invisible substance on the handrail. Monroy offers no 

authorities or argument to suggest that the answer to this question 

required expert testimony.

The trial court expressly rejected the expert’s effort to shift the 

blame for the fall to the steepness of the stairs, a theory that was not 

pleaded in Monroy’s complaint. (Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life 

& Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74-75.) Monroy’s complaint 

raised only one issue, and that was her claim that there was an invisible 

slippery substance on the handrail. Her complaint said nothing about 

the steepness of the stairs. Monroy could have but did not seek leave to 

amend. (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 

1654, 1663 [summary judgment cannot be defeated by a claim not raised 

by the complaint].)

The trial court correctly concluded that Monroy’s opposition to 

Alaska’s motion for summary judgment did not raise a triable issue of 

material fact. No reasonable juror could or would find that a 

“reasonable” inspection in this case required the inspector to touch every 

portion of the staircase, including the handrails, or that Alaska should 

have wiped down both handrails before each use.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Alaska Airlines shall recover its costs 

of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

VOGEL, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.