Constellation Acceleration Study 

Report 

December 18, 2008
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................. 1 

1.0 Introduction............................................................................................................ 5 

2.0 Option 1 - Summary .......................................................................................... 10 

2.1 Option 1 - Orion Overview......................................................................................... 11 

2.2 Option 1 - Ares Overview........................................................................................... 12 

2.2.1 Option 1 - First Stage (FS) Element: ........................................................... 12 

2.2.2 Option 1 - Upper Stage (US) Element:........................................................ 13 

2.2.3 Option 1 - Upper Stage Engine (USE) Element: ......................................... 15 

2.3 Option 1 - EVA Overview .......................................................................................... 17 

2.4 Option 1 - Ground Operations Overview.................................................................... 17 

2.5 Option 1 - Mission Operations Overview................................................................... 18 

3.0 Option 2 - Summary .......................................................................................... 19 

3.1 Option 2 - Orion Overview......................................................................................... 20 

3.2 Option 2 - Ares Overview........................................................................................... 21 

3.2.1 Option 2 - First Stage (FS) Element: ........................................................... 21 

3.2.2 Option 2 - Upper Stage (US) Element:........................................................ 22 

3.2.3 Option 2 - Upper Stage Engine (USE) Element: ......................................... 23 

3.3 Option 2 - EVA Overview .......................................................................................... 25 

3.4 Option 2 - Ground Operations Overview.................................................................... 25 

3.5 Option 2 - Mission Operations Overview................................................................... 27 

4.0 Option 3 - Summary .......................................................................................... 28 

4.1 Option 3 - Orion Overview......................................................................................... 28 

4.2 Option 3 -Ares Overview............................................................................................ 28 

4.2.1 Option 3 - First Stage Element: ................................................................... 29 

4.2.2 Option 3 - Upper Stage Element:................................................................. 29 

4.2.3 Option 3 - Upper Stage Engine Element: .................................................... 29 

4.3 Option 3 - EVA Overview .......................................................................................... 29 

4.4 Option 3 - Ground Operations Overview.................................................................... 30 

4.5 Option 3 - Mission Operations Overview................................................................... 30 

5.0 Conclusions........................................................................................................... 31 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Executive Summary 

In 2004, the White House formulated a Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). The VSE 

called for retiring the Space Shuttle in September 2010, developing and flying the Orion 

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to the International Space Station (ISS) and return to 

the Moon before 2020, and building upon the Orion lunar architecture to explore Mars in 

the future. Currently the gap between Space Shuttle retirement and Orion initial 

operational capability (IOC) in March 2015 is potentially five years. 

The purpose of the Constellation Program Acceleration (CxAccel) Study is to identify 

potential program content and budget options to accelerate Constellation schedules to 

minimize the gap in US human spaceflight post-shuttle retirement and to decrease 

reliance on international assets for crew rescue from ISS. The Terms of Reference for the 

study were provided by the Constellation Program Manager. The CxAccel Study was 

comprised of representatives from the Constellation Program (CxP) office and each of the 

projects. To ensure diversity of thought, and to challenge assumptions, the team also 

included senior systems engineers and managers external to the CxP and the Agency. 

For the purposes of this study an authority to proceed (ATP) date of April 1, 2009 was 

established. In addition, it has been assumed that the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) will 

not be extended and that the current manifest will be flown out through STS-133. 

Another ground rule for this study was that any suggested deferment of lunar vehicle 

capability would be incorporated into a future block upgrade. However, currently no 

lunar capabilities have been deferred as a result of this study. At the acceleration decision 

point, the Program can decide to implement design simplifications identified in this study 

that provide the best opportunity for acceleration. These suggested simplifications can be 

implemented independent of acceleration to realize a cost savings of up to $500M. This 

study did not address the cost for re-establishing any potential deferred lunar capabilities. 

Although the external IOC commitment date is March 2015, all cost and schedules 

impacts for this study were based from the CxP Manager Recommend (PMR) 08, 

Revision 1 (PMR08 Rev 1) baseline of September 2014. An overall, qualitative risk 

assessment (high, medium, low) of achieving the options was performed. In addition, an 

overall technical risk assessment (safety and mission success) was performed for each 

option relative to the current baseline.

This study considered three acceleration options: 

• Option #1 Increase confidence in PMR08 Rev 1 (Sept 2014) 

• Option #2 Accelerate PMR08 Rev 1 by 12 months (Sept 2013) 

• Option #3 Accelerate PMR08 Rev 1 by 18 months (March 2013) 

The current contracts were reviewed and no contractual impediments to implementing 

these options were identified. Several contractual strategies were evaluated but none 

resulted in significant schedule acceleration. However, several shuttle transition dates 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

will need to be either maintained or accelerated (based on the option) in order to enable 

acceleration, including, A2 test stand, Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) High Bay 3, 

Launch Pad 39B, Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) floor space, and Orion docking 

system hardware. 

In developing these options, the current technical, cost, and schedule status for each of 

the projects was reviewed. The program has developed a robust technical design for the 

Lunar mission. Due to an insufficient funding profile and the lack of adequate Program 

reserves in 2009 and 2010, in conjunction with the effect of two consecutive Continuing 

Resolutions, the CxP has had to defer development of facilities, equipment, engineering 

development units, tooling, ground testing and wind tunnel testing. The flight test 

program had to be minimized to a success oriented program with no room for test 

failures. These changes effectively represent the deferral of a significant portion of the 

development phase of the program and result in a significant increase in risk to achieving 

the schedule. Today’s integrated program critical path is artificially driven by the 

insufficient funding profile in 2009/2010 and technical content deferral - not by optimal 

hardware design, build and test constraints and deliveries. Normally the integrated critical 

path would be key to defining the best approach to acceleration; however, because the 

program critical path had not been re-established in response to changes resulting from 

the PMR08 Rev 1, each project focused on accelerating the fundamental phases of 

design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E). Furthermore, the program’s lack of 

reserves has driven numerous items in the current technical baseline to not be fully 

funded, including some design changes that are being carried as threats. These changes 

are documented in two categories: current baseline shortfall and technical baseline 

changes. The current baseline shortfall includes undefinitized changes in the Orion 

contract, affects on reusability due to the design change from land landing to water 

landing, additional Upper Stage Engine testing and program challenges to the projects. 

The technical baseline changes include recent design changes that are currently unfunded 

including phased array communication system, high voltage power system, thrust 

oscillation mitigations, First Stage nozzle extension, and implementation of the 

International System of units (SI). The result is a $1.9B shortfall between the available 

funding and the technical baseline. These costs must be addressed irrespective of 

acceleration and therefore will be shown separately from the costs for acceleration. 

Due to these factors, achieving the current baseline schedule, PMR08 Rev 1, with a 

September 2014 IOC is high programmatic risk and considered not achievable with the 

corresponding current technical content, cost, and schedule. Option 1 increases the 

confidence in meeting the current PMR08 Rev 1 baseline by increasing funding early 

enough in 2009 and 2010 to ensure a more robust vehicle development and test phase. 

This includes restoring adequate program reserves, restoring deferred design and 

development work, early procurement of long lead time items, and acceleration of 

assembly, integration and test. Option 1 also accelerates the flight test program and adds 

an additional Ascent Abort test of opportunity. This ensures a more robust flight test 

program that buys down abort and integrated vehicle risks earlier and has the capacity to 

have a failed flight test, recover and minimize schedule delay. Orion accelerates assembly 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

by incorporation of a segmented design. Ares includes two additional development Upper 

Stage Engines for accelerated testing; restores manufacturing capability at Marshall 

Space Flight Center (MSFC) for parallel manufacturing of the development Upper 

Stages; and incorporates manufacturing improvements on the First Stage. Ground 

Operations accelerates development of the mobile launcher and utilizes a high-fidelity 

Orion mock-up as a pathfinder to reduce processing time. In addition Orion has identified 

potential hardware and software simplifications that can be implemented at the 

acceleration decision point, based on their potential for acceleration at that time. Option 

1 (September 2014) is achievable at a decreased programmatic risk posture from the 

baseline (high to medium) because of increased early funding and reserves, the more 

robust test program, and acceleration of ground and flight tests. The cost to implement 

Option 1 is $1.8B to 2015 ($1.7B in 2009 and 2010). 

Option 2 accelerates IOC by 12 months to September 2013 by utilizing all steps in 

Option 1 (less the addition of two Ares development engines), eliminating Ares I-Y flight 

test, accelerating manufacturing for Orion, compressing First Stage test schedules, 

deferring upper stage engine testing for lunar requirements, accelerating ground 

operations development and processing, and performing qualification testing 

incrementally in parallel with the flight test program. Eliminating the Ares I-Y flight test 

reduces the integrated vehicle test opportunities, but has the benefit of removing a unique 

hardware and software configuration. Option 2 (September 2013) is achievable at a 

similar high programmatic risk posture as the baseline, but with adequate funds to 

execute, and requires an aggressive schedule with no margin available for test failures, 

flight or ground. Technical risk is increased relative to the baseline primarily because of 

the deletion of the Ares I-Y flight test. The cost to implement Option 2 is $2.6B to 2015 

($2.3B in 2009 and 2010). 

Option 3 accelerates IOC by 18 months. In order to accomplish this, over 50% of the 

Orion hardware would need to be procured prior to the Preliminary Design Review, 

increasing the likelihood that incorrect or unnecessary parts are purchased. In addition, 

the required hardware deliveries for the launch vehicle are not achievable. As such, 

Option 3 was deemed to be too high a risk to implement successfully. While Option 3 

content will be described for evaluation, it was not costed for this study. 

To further enable these options, there are a few key decisions that need to be made prior 

to the April 1, 2009 assumed ATP date. The decisions include initiating design for Upper 

Stage manufacturing at MSFC, notifying contractors to prepare for staffing ramp up, and 

program pre-planning efforts for acceleration before the turn on date. 

This CxAccel Study has concluded that with adequate funding, the risk of achieving 

Option 1 is reduced from the baseline (high risk to medium risk). Option 2 is achievable 

at a similar high programmatic risk posture as the baseline - with adequate funds to 

execute but requires an aggressive schedule with no margin available for test failures, 

flight or ground. Option 2 represents the limit to which funding can accelerate IOC. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

It is recognized that additional funding for acceleration may not be available. Because the 

current baseline is high risk, and if additional funding is not available, the Program 

should implement the no-cost or cost avoidance ideas identified in this study as soon as 

possible to ensure the external IOC commitment date of March 2015 is still achievable. 

This includes assembly, integration and test improvements; software reductions; 

incremental qualification; and design simplifications of Orion. 

The CxAccel Study results are based on a single point in time and the baseline may 

change between report’s release and approval to accelerate. Upon authority to proceed, 

the Program will need to determine the best use of funding to buy down the most risk. In 

addition, there are programmatic decisions that can be made from a program lifecycle 

perspective that may result in an increased risk to realizing acceleration but they are 

deemed to be necessary from a broader program perspective. The opportunity for 

acceleration is a limited window. Because of the need to initiate long lead item 

procurements, any delay in an acceleration decision beyond mid-2009 would preclude 

any significant acceleration.
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

1.0 Introduction 

The purpose of the Constellation Program Acceleration (CxAccel) Study is to identify 

potential program content and budget options to accelerate Constellation schedules to 

minimize the gap in US human spaceflight post-shuttle retirement and to decrease 

reliance on international assets for crew rescue from ISS. The Terms of Reference for the 

study were provided by the Constellation Program Manager. 

The CxAccel Study was performed by a team whose core included each of the deputy 

project managers within the Constellation Program (CxP) as well as a group of senior 

engineers from across the Agency and outside the agency with Apollo, Space Shuttle, 

International Space Station, and Robotic spaceflight experience to ensure the broadest 

possible perspective on this issue. The team was organized by projects with a crosscutting team providing integration across five sub-teams. The Program Planning and 

Control (PP&C) team provided analysis integration of all study costs. The CxAccel Study 

structure is shown in Figure 1. 

Figure 1 - CxAccel Study Team Structure 

To provide the study with a common baseline, each of the five Constellation Projects 

provided a current status of their project including cost, technical and schedule data. This 

status highlighted the fact that the program has developed a robust technical design for 

the Lunar mission. However, due to an insufficient funding profile and the lack of 

adequate Program reserves in 2009 and 2010, in conjunction with the effect of two 

consecutive Continuing Resolutions, the CxP has had to defer development of facilities, 

equipment, engineering development units, tooling, ground testing and wind tunnel 

testing. The flight test program had to be minimized to an aggressive success oriented 

program with no room for test failures. These changes effectively represent the deferral 

of a large portion of the development phase of the program and result in a significant 

increase in risk to achieving the schedule. Furthermore, the program’s lack of reserves 

CxAccel Study Team

Orion

Sub-Team

EVA

Sub-Team

Mission Ops

Sub-Team

Ares

Sub-Team

Ground Ops

Sub-Team

PP&C

Sub-Team

Cross-Cutting

Sub-Team

Membership: Level II SE&I, CE, 

S&MA, OTI, contracts, legal

CxAccel Study Team

Orion

Sub-Team

EVA

Sub-Team

Mission Ops

Sub-Team

Ares

Sub-Team

Ground Ops

Sub-Team

PP&C

Sub-Team

Cross-Cutting

Sub-Team

Membership: Level II SE&I, CE, 

S&MA, OTI, contracts, legal
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

has driven numerous items in the current technical baseline to not be fully funded, 

including some design changes that are being carried as threats. These changes are 

documented in two categories: current baseline shortfall and technical baseline changes. 

The current baseline shortfall includes undefinitized changes in the Orion contract, 

affects on reusability due to the design change from land landing to water landing, 

additional Upper Stage Engine testing and program challenges to the projects. The 

technical baseline changes include recent design changes that are currently unfunded 

including phased array communication system, high voltage power system, thrust 

oscillation mitigations, First Stage nozzle extension, and implementation of the 

International System of units (SI). The result is a $1.9B shortfall between the available 

funding and the technical baseline. These costs must be addressed irrespective of 

acceleration and therefore will be shown separately from the costs for acceleration. 

Due to these factors, achieving the current baseline schedule, PMR08 Rev 1, with a 

September 2014 IOC, is high risk and considered not achievable with the corresponding 

current technical content, cost, and schedule. 

With this data as a reference, the diverse team then brainstormed ideas on how to 

accelerate the program. This resulted in over 160 different ideas for acceleration. After 

evaluating the brainstorming ideas some very fundamental strategies were developed that 

could be applied consistently across the projects. Today’s integrated program critical path 

is artificially driven by the insufficient funding profile in 2009/2010 and technical content 

deferral - not by optimal hardware design, build and test constraints and deliveries. 

Normally, the integrated critical path would be key to defining the best approach to 

acceleration; however, because the program critical path had not been re-established in 

response to changes resulting from the PMR08 Rev 1, each project focused on 

accelerating the fundamental phases of design, development, test and evaluation 

(DDT&E). Figure 2 shows a notional schedule for DDT&E of spaceflight hardware. 

Figure 2 - Notional Development Schedule 

Human Launch

Design and Development

Vehicle Qual

Assembly & Integration 

Long Lead Procurement

- 5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0

Acceleration Turn-On

9/2008 9/2010 9/2011 9/2012 9/2013 9/2009

Flight Test Program

Software

Human Launch

Design and Development

Vehicle Qual

Assembly & Integration 

Long Lead Procurement

- 5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0

Acceleration Turn-On

9/2008 9/2010 9/2011 9/2012 9/2013 9/2009

Flight Test Program

Software
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Each project identified opportunities for acceleration in each step of DDT&E. Then these 

opportunities for acceleration were evaluated for implementation into three basic 

schedule options. This general schedule provided the team the areas of focus for 

acceleration. The cost and schedule impacts for the three study options were based from 

the internal PMR08 Rev 1 IOC baseline of September 2014. These dates represent a 6 

month acceleration from the external IOC date of March 2015. 

• Option #1 Increase confidence in PMR08 Rev 1 (Sept 2014) 

• Option #2 Accelerate PMR08 Rev 1 by 12 months (Sept 2013) 

• Option #3 Accelerate PMR08 Rev 1 by 18 months (March 2013) 

For the purposes of this study an authority to proceed (ATP) date of April 1, 2009 was 

established. In addition, it has been assumed that the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) will 

not be extended and that the current manifest will be flown out through STS-133. 

Another ground rule for this study was that any suggested deferment of lunar capability 

would be incorporated into a future block upgrade. However, currently no lunar 

capabilities have been deferred as a result of this study. At the acceleration decision 

point, the Program can decide to implement design simplifications identified in this study 

that provide the best opportunity for acceleration. These suggested simplifications can be 

implemented independent of acceleration to realize a cost savings of up to $500M. This 

study did not address the cost for re-establishing any potential deferred lunar capabilities. 

An overall, qualitative risk assessment (high, medium, low) of achieving the options was 

performed. In addition, an overall technical risk assessment (safety and mission success) 

was performed for each option relative to the current baseline. 

Figure 3 depicts the manifest developed for this study. The details of the three options 

and manifest changes are described in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this 

report. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Figure 3 – CxAccel Study Manifest 

In order to enable acceleration, the CxAccel study reviewed contracts, procurement 

mechanisms and facilities. The current contracts were reviewed and no contractual 

impediments to implementing these options were identified. The following contractual 

and budgetary strategies were evaluated: 

• A change to no-year funding is not recommended due to additional reporting and 

oversight outweighing the benefits 

• The change in account reporting going below the CxP level would hinder 

acceleration and it is recommended that the Agency continue to push-back on this 

change 

• The Agency should seek indemnification authority in the FY10 budget request 

• While relief from external reporting requirements is not practical at this time, 

Headquarters is attempting to minimize the direct impact to the Constellation 

Program 

• The CxP should work with Headquarters Facilities Engineering and Real Property 

Division and Headquarters Comptroller to better utilize existing CoF flexibility 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

• As acceleration options are placed under contract, existing contract incentives 

should be revisited to determine if adjustments would be appropriate to properly 

motivate the new contract objectives (including any enhanced emphasis on 

schedule) 

• If acceleration is pursued, the CxP should identify any critical items (i.e. helium, 

titanium) that may benefit from a DX priority rating. If so, pursue adding Cx to 

the DoD list of approved programs. [Note that Ares and Orion are currently DO 

rated and are prioritized over unrated contracts.] 

To further enable the acceleration options the team recommends that the Systems 

Engineering and Technical Integration (Program Integration) function be strengthened to 

ensure the proper coordination, communication and technical leadership. In addition, 

there are a number of key decisions that need to be made prior to the April 1, 2009 

assumed authority to proceed date. The decisions include Upper Stage parallel 

manufacturing, contractor preparations for staffing ramp up, and pre-planning efforts 

before the turn on date. Several shuttle transition dates will need to be accelerated in 

order to enable acceleration, including the docking system hardware delivery, A2 test 

stand, Vehicle Assembly Building, Launch Pad 39B, Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) 

floor space, and Orion docking system hardware. 

For each of the options, the hardware dependencies and delivery dates were assessed and 

all conflicts resolved or mitigation steps identified. The remainder of this CxAccel Study 

report will describe the details of the three options. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

2.0 Option 1 - Summary 

The intent of option 1 is to increase confidence in meeting PMR08 Rev 1 (September 

2014) IOC. This represents a 6 month acceleration from the external IOC commitment 

date of March 2015. The general approach is to increase funding in 2009 and 2010 to 

ensure a more robust vehicle development and test phase. This includes restoring 

adequate program reserves, restoring deferred design and development work, early 

procurement of long lead time items, and acceleration of assembly, integration and test. 

Option 1 also accelerates the flight test program and adds an additional Ascent Abort test 

of opportunity. This ensures a more robust flight test program that buys down abort and 

integrated vehicle risks earlier and has the capacity to have a failed flight test, recover 

and maintain schedule. 

For the Orion Project, the vehicle would incorporate a segmented crew module to 

facilitate spacecraft subsystem integration and a high-fidelity production pathfinder to 

verify and identify issues with planned processing. There are options identified within 

Orion for decreasing vehicle complexity for the ISS missions by deferring specific lunar 

technical capabilities for a block upgrade that can be implemented at acceleration turn on 

if additional schedule margin is desired. These options are provided as a means for 

deferring development costs and would reduce schedule risk by reducing qualification 

testing and vehicle integration and tests of lunar capabilities. 

For the Ares Project, emphasis is primarily on accelerating and increasing production 

rates and increasing ground and flight testing, specifically, an upper stage engine would 

be added to Ares I-Y. For the Upper Stage (US), the production line at MSFC would be 

restored for manufacturing the qualification and test units. Production would be 

increased to two shifts on both production lines. Authority and funding for completing 

the design of the MSFC production line would need to occur prior to April 1, 2009. For 

Upper Stage Engine (USE), two additional development engines would be added to the 

test matrix and the availability of test stand A-2 at Stennis Space Center would be 

accelerated to July 2009, with initial operation in July 2010, enabling approximately 10% 

more testing than currently planned. For First Stage a new nondestructive examination 

approach would be implemented on the propellant casting to reduce overall production 

duration. Additionally, parallel processing of the propellant liner insulation would be 

pursued. In order to provide additional performance margin for ascent, the 9.3 expansion 

ratio nozzle, now planned for lunar missions, would be introduced on DM-4. 

For the Extravehicular Project hardware, Option 1 is executable within the current 

baseline with schedule margin and represents the lowest lifecycle cost and quickest path 

to lunar solutions. 

Ground Operations accelerates development of the mobile launcher and utilizes a highfidelity Orion mock-up as a pathfinder to reduce processing time. Additionally command 

and control system software, and instrumentation and design of cable plants at Launch 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Pad 39B would be accelerated. Furthermore, key SSP assets must be turned over in time 

to support critical path development work. Specifically, the Vehicle Assembly Building, 

High Bay 3 no later than January 2010, Launch Pad 39B no later than July 2009, and 

moving Hubble Space Telescope Launch on need to Pad 39A. 

Mission Operations is coupled to Orion and Ares vehicle design and flight software and 

is not an impediment to acceleration. Flight software across all of the projects is being 

scrubbed and reduced, and is incrementally developed and released according to critical 

functions. By adding an USE to the Ares I-Y flight, the flight software for Ares I-Y is no 

longer unique from Orion 1, and efforts can be dedicated to accelerating Orion 1 software 

release. Option 1 does not require any deviations to the technical baseline beyond the 

early introduction of the 9.3 FS nozzle and the addition of an USE on Ares I-Y. 

Compared to the PMR08 Rev 1 baseline, the overall Option 1 delta costs are listed below: 

Option 1 ($M) FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 Total

Current Baseline Shortfall 172 135 18 165 140 364 160 1154

Technical Baseline Changes 183 263 160 96 71 21 10 804

Acceleration 355 1384 365 3 5 (71) (200) 1842

Total 710 1782 543 265 217 314 (30) 3801

Option 1 (September 2014) is achievable at a decreased programmatic risk posture from 

the baseline (high to medium) because of increased funding and reserves, the more robust 

test program, and acceleration of ground and flight tests. 

2.1 Option 1 - Orion Overview

Orion Option 1 provides a higher confidence schedule to a September 2014 Constellation 

IOC date. This higher confidence schedule is achieved by restoring critical work that 

was deferred during the PMR08 Rev 1 budget process due to FY 09 and FY10 funding 

limitations. This work includes the tests necessary to define and characterize Orion 

environments, developmental testing of critical Orion systems and the procurement of 

engineering development units and long lead components. Orion abort system 

development confidence is improved by advancing the abort flight test schedule to retire 

development risk early. An additional flight test was also added to increase development 

confidence and to mitigate the potential impact of a loss of objectives in early testing. 

Two improvements to the Orion manufacturing process will be incorporated in order to 

resolve the current schedule disconnect between Orion and the Ground Operations 

Project. The first improvement will be to implement a segmented crew module 

manufacturing approach. This approach, which is being developed during the current 

Orion design analysis cycle (DAC), will reduce Orion production and integration time by 

3 to 4 months. Second, a high-fidelity Orion production pathfinder article will be 

developed to verify and identify issues with the Orion assembly and Ground Operations 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

integration processes. This pathfinder allows the Ground Operations Project to accept 

early Orion flight articles 1 to 2 months later than currently planned. 

No specific deviations from the baseline lunar plan are included in this option. However, 

a list of potential Orion design simplifications was developed. Currently, the Orion 

design must meet all Space Station and Lunar Sortie mission requirements prior to PDR. 

Not all of these capabilities are required for a Space Station mission. Upon a decision to 

accelerate, the Orion design can be simplified by deferring capabilities not required for a 

Station flight to provide additional schedule confidence or to reduce Project cost. The 

cost savings for implementing these simplifications could potentially be as high as 

$500M. All deferred capabilities would be restored in future block upgrades. The design 

simplification list was developed from a long list of proposals which were evaluated from 

a simplification standpoint and for their potential to streamline design, development, test 

and evaluation. In addition, a review of Orion software requirements to determine which 

can be reduced or deferred to provide software development schedule margin was 

initiated. The results of this study will be available for use by an April 1, 2009 

Acceleration decision date. 

The April 1, 2009 authorization to proceed (ATP) date, the reduced ISS Flight Operations 

Scenario, and the Option 1 flight manifest were the driving assumptions for the Orion 

Acceleration analyses. 

The primary risk of Option 1 is potential technical or schedule issues with segmented 

crew module manufacturing. This new approach is being studied extensively in DAC-3. 

2.2 Option 1 - Ares Overview

2.2.1 Option 1 - First Stage (FS) Element: 

The FS Element’s current plan to meet the PMR08 Rev 1 Schedule provides a fully 

qualified stage in time for Ares I-Y. The FS Element has identified some 

opportunities to increase the confidence of meeting that schedule. FS will test four 

Development Motors (DMs) to complete the design and resolve major design 

decisions such as Propellant/Liner/Insulation (PLI) processing, ply lifting in the 

nozzle, and insulation design both in the aft dome and on the case walls. 

Opportunities to test the 9.3 area ratio nozzle and the reaction mass actuators to 

suppress thrust oscillation are also included in the DM plan. All major structures, 

avionics, separation and pyrotechnics, and control systems will be completely verified 

prior to the Design Certification Review (DCR). Testing of the three Qualification 

Motors (QMs) and FS DCR will be completed prior to the Orion 2 (crewed) flight. 

The manufacturing, evaluation, and test schedule for this plan assumes standard 

manufacturing processes and shift schedules at ATK. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

To increase confidence in meeting this schedule, the FS Element looked at five major 

areas of schedule risk: (1) thrust oscillation mitigation design; (2) PLI processing; (3) 

motor inspection techniques; (4) accelerating the development of the 9.3 area ratio 

nozzle; and (5) nozzle manufacturing. The increase to Design, Development, Test, 

and Evaluation (DDT&E) cost will be offset by lowering the cost of anomaly 

resolutions in the production phase of the program. 

Based on the results of the Flight Support Motor No. 15 investigation, the FS 

manufacturing processes are being modified to ensure minimal voids and a secure 

bond between the insulation and the propellant. In order to provide additional risk 

reduction and increase schedule confidence, the FS Element wants to evaluate three 

major PLI acceleration process changes in parallel. These changes that require 

characterization are: (1) a mechanized case strip-lining insulation process; (2) using 

vacuum during insulation processing to remove entrapped gas; and (3) a pressurized 

curing process for the propellant after casting. These process changes have a medium 

Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and could provide significant schedule savings 

based upon their success. 

The FS Element wants to aggressively develop a new, faster digital Non-Destructive 

Evaluation (NDE) approach for evaluating insulated motors with cured propellant to 

provide additional risk reduction and increased schedule confidence. Two digital 

NDE options being pursued for evaluation have a medium TRL. 

The FS Element needs to accelerate the development of the larger area ratio nozzle 

(the 9.3 nozzle) to allow implementation on DM-4 and on the qualification series of 

motor tests. This saves the cost of a later re-qualification as well as avoids the 

complication and schedule impacts of developing two vehicle designs and two 

designs of the mobile launch platform at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). 

One of the major objectives of the development test program is to eliminate ply lifting 

in the nozzle exit cone. Improved manufacturing methods need to be developed to 

reduce the variability of these new designs. A near-term programmatic decision is 

requested to permit First Stage to select proposed schedule confidence options for 

implementation. 

2.2.2 Option 1 - Upper Stage (US) Element: 

The US Element considered Option 1 with the following assumptions being made: (1) 

ATP is April 1, 2009; (2) no shuttle extension beyond CY 2010; (3) five days/two 

shifts in production at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) and manufacturing at 

the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); and (4) the addition of a J-2X engine on 

Ares I-Y. 

The US Element would augment MAF production with a manufacturing line at 

MSFC to allow for parallel fabrication of test article and qualification/flight units. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

This would include shifting manufacturing of the Ground Vibration Test Article 

(GVTA), Integrated Stage Test Article (ISTA), and Ares I-Y Test Article to MSFC. 

As part of this option, the US Element would add back the MSFC Building 4707 

Vertical Assembly and MSFC Building 4708 Integration areas that were eliminated in 

the recent PMR08 REV 1 re-planning activity, which reduced budget in FY09 and 

FY10. Also, the US Element would accelerate the MSFC Building 4755 Liquid 

Oxygen Tank/Thrust Cone test area that was delayed in the recent re-planning 

activity. This approach takes advantage of tooling already in place at MSFC. After 

IOC, these facilities and tooling will be utilized by Ares V for their development 

activities. It should be noted that production of US qualification/flight units would 

remain at MAF and the integrity of the US qualification program will be maintained. 

In order to accommodate an accelerated schedule, two shifts would be implemented 

on MAF and MSFC lines. 

Another vital part of the US approach is to implement parallel testing in the Software 

Integration Test Facility (SITF). Shifting from serial to parallel software qualification 

testing could potentially save 4 months. However, risk is associated with this 

approach, as there would be a lack of capacity to support regression testing and 

problem solving. A third SITF line could be created to mitigate this risk. 

Additionally, efficiencies must be gained by supplementing the NASA Design Team 

(NDT) with experienced Instrument Unit Avionics Contractor (IUAC) (Boeing) 

personnel. This augmentation could potentially save 2 months in schedule. 

Another critical element pertaining to the acceleration of software development is the 

elimination of a unique software package for Ares I-Y. The addition of an engine to 

Ares I-Y makes the software package consistent with the Orion 1 and Orion 2 

software and saves an additional 6 months. 

Finally, procurement of all hardware components would need to be re-phased to 

support the accelerated schedule. 

The main schedule risk with respect to US acceleration is that facilities will not be 

available in a timely fashion. In PMR08 Rev 1, the US Element is already assuming 

an aggressive facility build schedule at MAF. The new High Bay 103 is the “long 

pole in the tent.” This effort will have to be further accelerated and MSFC 

Construction of Facility (CoF) activities have to be re-initiated. 

It must be noted that the ability to activate a manufacturing line at MSFC in a timely 

manner to support the acceleration options would be severely impacted if the facility 

design for MSFC Buildings 4707 and 4708 is not completed by April 1, 2009. If the 

US Element waits until April to re-start the design effort, 5 months will be added for 

the completion of schedule design, and it is doubtful that construction for Building 

4707 can be accelerated enough to recover the added schedule burden. Immediate 

CoF authority and $650k is required to complete the design effort prior to April 1, 

2009. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

CoF projects require congressional authorization via the Agency’s Operating Plan and 

are at risk until a FY 2009 authorization is approved. Possible mitigation steps for this 

risk are: immediate re-start of the design effort for MSFC manufacturing capability 

which was halted in the latest budget reduction exercise, utilizing on-hand CoF 

authority beginning now (December 2008); pre-approval of a possible CoF update for 

FY09 in the early April timeframe, or a waiver of CoF regulations for FY09 and 

FY10; and the availability of additional budget authority in FY09 and FY10 to 

augment present CoF and local authority budgets to provide incentives for rapid 

design, deployment, and delivery. 

In addition to acceleration capability, the implementation of a manufacturing line at 

MSFC would build robustness into the CxP schedule without additional technical 

risk. 

No negative impacts are foreseen in regard to lunar capability. 

2.2.3 Option 1 - Upper Stage Engine (USE) Element: 

The J-2X development effort recently completed a successful Critical Design Review 

(CDR). Thus, the USE Element’s current plan to meet the current PMR08 Rev 1 

schedule by accelerating or further ensuring engine availability for the first human 

flight of the CxP must be focused on the engine development, qualification, and 

certification effort that follows the initial completion of the design rather than redefinition or re-design activities. 

Due to the programmatic and technical challenges for accomplishing the current 

schedule, there are two significant constraints that specifically affect J-2X 

development. First, no plausible path exists for accelerating the Powerpack Assembly 

(PPA-2). Second, no viable option exists for accelerating the construction of Test 

Stand A-3. 

The current schedule utilizes a development engine on the first Ares I uncrewed flight 

test and the first production engine on the second Ares I uncrewed flight. The first 

crewed flight is scheduled to use the second production engine. For Option 1, this 

approach is maintained. 

The fidelity of the USE Element’s assessment of Option 1 is based on top-down 

parametric assessments with regards to test-turnaround capabilities, engine testing 

costs, and engine-build and delivery schedules. Detailed planning, should it become 

necessary, would follow at a later date. 

The basic strategies for accelerating J-2X development were derived from the 

preliminary list of acceleration ideas generated by the CxP Acceleration study. The 

first overriding strategy is to get as much hardware into testing as quickly as possible. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

This approach assumes a risk that some hardware may be fabricated without 

incorporating lessons learned from development testing. The accelerated availability 

of Test Stand A-2 is necessary to accomplish this strategy. 

To acquire Test Stand A-2 sooner, the handover of the stand from the Space Shuttle 

Main Engine (SSME) Project is approximately 3 months earlier and the work on 

converting the stand for the J-2X starts immediately after handover. The end result 

assumes that Test Stand A-2 is ready for J-2X testing in July 2010, which is 1 year 

earlier than currently planned. 

There is a possibility that some verification activities relating to performance and 

design requirements beyond the IOC may be deferred to reduce time-consuming testfail-fix scenarios. The functional requirements dedicated to the lunar mission and the 

Ares V vehicle are prime candidates. Furthermore, while the engine is designed for 

certain performance requirements, an allowance for lower levels of initial 

performance may be necessary if setbacks occur during development testing. 

The final overarching strategy is the full funding of identified cost threats against 

PMR08 Rev 1 and the removal of imposed challenges and work deferments to fit 

under related current funding profiles. 

The USE Element may accomplish the Option 1 objectives by incorporating the 

following: 

• Test Stand A-2 availability for J-2X testing is accelerated. 

• Several of the early development engines are fabricated, assembled, and 

delivered earlier (approximately 5-7 months) than the current PMR08 Rev 1 

schedule. 

• Two new engines are added to the development schedule to enhance the 

robustness of earlier hardware testing. 

• Approximately 10 percent more engine testing is added due to Test Stand A-2 

and two new engines being made available. 

• Cost threats identified against PMR08 Rev 1 are funded and imposed funding 

challenges in FY09 and FY10 are removed. 

• One development engine supports one uncrewed test flight, the first 

production engine supports a second uncrewed flight, and then the second 

production engine supports the first crewed flight. 

• IOC performance and design requirements are retained at current values 

unless or until an issue arises. 

The net result of the J-2X acceleration strategy is a production engine that incurs 

reduced risk for supporting the currently PMR08 Rev 1 scheduled first human flight 

with a substantial increase in necessary workforce funding in FY09 and FY10. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

2.3 Option 1 - EVA Overview

The EVA System baseline schedule and architecture is considered to be executable with 

minimal risk. Therefore, Option 1 is the same as the current EVA Systems Project 

baseline. The initial capability system is designed to support all Orion operations, 

including lunar transportation, while incorporating as much commonality as possible to 

support Lunar Surface EVA. As such, the suit used on ISS missions supports the 

required ascent, entry, 1-g crew survival and survival in a depressurized cabin. 

Additionally, though enabling hardware may not be manifested on ISS missions, the 

system is capable of supporting microgravity EVA and long-term (144 hour) survival in a 

depressurized cabin. This option assumes that the Orion vehicle maintains the capability 

to support an Orion-based EVA and that the decision to do an EVA will simply be a 

manifesting decision and will not be designed out. This option maintains the current 

program schedule for launch in September 2014 and has no funding delta from the 

PMR08 Rev 1 budget baseline. Option 1 has no decrease in capability in Configuration 1, 

does not sacrifice lunar commonality, and does not require a block upgrade for the lunar 

mission.

2.4 Option 1 - Ground Operations Overview

Ground Operations (GO) Option 1 provides opportunities to increase schedule confidence 

by mitigating known risks. Because the current baseline was previously delayed by 

PMR08 Rev 1 budget, Option 1 provides modest funding to allow earlier starts in 

construction and fabrication projects, minimizing the number of major projects on the 

GO critical path. New funding is also included to address known technical risks and 

ground systems modifications related to acceleration of the 9.3 Nozzle Extension for 

Ares I. Processing schedules were compressed based on incorporating an Orion Project 

provided pathfinder to mitigate first flight processing issues, and the need for on-time 

turnover of shuttle assets was reiterated. 

Four specific factors addressed baseline planning for Option 1. 

1. Accelerate ground systems development through accelerated funding from FY11 

to FY09 and FY10, removing key projects from critical path. With early funding, 

critical path assessment of both ground systems development and processing 

operations determined that only VAB and Mobile Launcher (ML) remained on 

critical path. 

2. Address technical risks through new funding. Additional funding was included to 

mitigate priority risks for incorporating SI units and sound suppression system 

capability. New funding was also included to modify ground systems in support 

of the early implementation of Ares I 9.3 First Stage nozzle extension. 

Modifications include retractable vehicle support post development, a new 

Rotation Processing and Surge Facility (RPSF) and supporting GSE. 

3. Maintain current Shuttle facilities transition planning. Existing negotiated 

turnover of critical assets from the SSP would be maintained as defined in the Cx 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Ground Operations baseline (VAB high bay no later than January 2010 and 

Launch Pad 39B no later than July 2009). 

4. Minimal compression of baseline processing schedules. Incorporation of Orion 

Project provided high-fidelity pathfinder serves as a key mitigation for first flight 

issues. Baseline processing schedules are reduced as a result of exercising the 

ground systems, procedures and processes with flight-like systems. 

As a result, Option 1 would enhance schedule confidence, but does not impact baselined 

architecture plans or require additional scope. 

With accelerated funding -- for ML; Launch Pad 39B construction; Command, Control, 

& Communications (CCC) software development; and additional funding for highly 

likely cost threats. The cost analysis for Option 1 is determined to be high fidelity. 

Content was derived from the PMR08 Rev 1 baseline. Option 1 adjustments were based 

on project manager-lead assessments, including estimates from in-house design and 

Architects & Engineering (A&E) analysis support. 

 

Through accelerated and new funding, on-time shuttle transitions, and incorporation of 

the Orion high-fidelity pathfinder, Option 1 would increase confidence in the baseline 

schedule to IOC. 

2.5 Option 1 - Mission Operations Overview

Mission Operations was evaluated for Option 1, but because the Mission Operations 

critical path is dependent on the final configuration of the Ares and Orion vehicle design 

and flight software, acceleration opportunities and impediments for Option 1 within 

Mission Operations were not specifically identified. Mission Operations opportunities 

may be reevaluated once the Orion and Ares Flight Software Scrubs are complete. Any 

design simplifications implemented by the Orion Project will also need to be evaluated 

for effects on the Mission Operations critical path. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

3.0 Option 2 - Summary 

Option 2 accelerates the Program initial operational capability (IOC) date one year from 

September 2014 to September 2013. This represents an 18 month acceleration from the 

external IOC commitment date of March 2015. In addition to the steps taken in Option 1 

(less the addition of two Ares development engines), Option 2 eliminates Ares I-Y flight 

test (reference Figure 3 - CxAccel Study Manifest), accelerates manufacturing for Orion, 

compresses First Stage test schedules, defers Upper Stage Engine testing for lunar 

requirements, accelerates ground operations development and processing, and performs 

qualification testing incrementally in parallel with the flight test program. Eliminating the 

Ares I-Y flight test reduces the integrated vehicle test opportunities, but has the benefit of 

removing a unique hardware and software configuration. Option 2 does maintain the 

additional Ascent Abort test of opportunity that was added in Option 1. It should be 

noted that Option 2 includes one additional operational flight in 2015. 

For the Orion spacecraft, Design Analysis Cycle (DAC)-3 will be nearly complete at the 

acceleration authority to proceed (ATP) date of April 1, 2009. As such, the vehicle design 

will proceed through Preliminary Design Review in August 2009. The focus for 

acceleration will be on long lead procurements and performing qualification testing in 

parallel with assembly and integration. Qualification will be aligned with the Orion 1 test 

flight. The Orion 1 spacecraft will be fully capable for the ISS mission but some 

hardware and software capabilities may be deferred to a future upgrade. 

The Ares First Stage static test schedule will be compressed by 10 months. Compressing 

the development and qualification motor schedule is challenging and requires some 

different linkages between static tests to make configuration decisions for each motor, but 

all major test objectives will still be achieved. All First Stage subsystems will address 

long-lead time needs for drawings and procurements. The Upper Stage Element would 

again augment Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) production with a second production 

line at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to allow for parallel fabrication of test 

article and qualification/flight test units. This line would only remain in operation 

through IOC and will then be transitioned to the Ares V vehicle. The basic strategy for 

accelerating J-2X development is to get as much hardware into testing as quickly as 

possible. This approach assumes a risk that some hardware may be fabricated without 

incorporating lessons learned from development testing. The additional development 

engines identified in Option 1 would not be included in Option 2. The availability of Test 

Stand A-2 by July 2009 is required to accomplish this strategy. 

Option 2 requires a more aggressive approach to accelerating the Ground Operations 

baseline. Although Ares I-Y is removed, due to the single string architecture and launch 

spacing, the complete operational capability is still required for the first Ares I launch of 

mission Orion-1. To achieve this acceleration, the ground systems development will need 

to be accelerated by six months, the aggressive turnover of some shuttle assets will be 

required (VAB high bay, Launch Pad 39B, etc.), and the processing schedule will be 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

compressed. Processing improvements will be achieved through the proposed Orion and 

other potential pathfinders that would validate Ground Operations prior to Orion 1 

processing. Finally, the Multi-Element Integration Testing (MEIT) will be moved from 

Orion 1 to Orion 2. 

For the EVA system, the initial capability technical baseline will be de-scoped to only 

include ISS requirements for the ISS Design Reference Mission; extensibility to meet 

lunar transportation requirements will be maintained as a goal to minimize cost. 

However, commonality between the ISS and lunar suits is decreased compared with the 

baseline, increasing life cycle costs. 

Compared to the PMR08 Rev 1 baseline, the overall Option 2 delta costs are listed below: 

Option 2 ($M) FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 Total

Current Baseline Shortfall 172 135 18 165 140 364 160 1154

Technical Baseline Changes 156 231 151 75 46 14 9 683

Acceleration 479 1849 815 126 40 (286) (465) 2556

Total 806 2216 983 366 226 92 (295) 4393

Option 2 (September 2013) is achievable at a similar high programmatic risk posture as 

the baseline, but with adequate funds to execute, and requires an aggressive schedule 

with no margin available for test failures, flight or ground. Technical risk is increased 

relative to the baseline primarily because of the deletion of the Ares I-Y flight test. 

3.1 Option 2 - Orion Overview

For Option 2, acceleration is enabled by advancing the first full up Ares I flight by 6 

months and replacing Ares I-Y by the Orion 1 orbital mission. Required Orion related 

abort test objectives planned for Ares I-Y will be accomplished on one of the existing 

abort test booster flights in the Option 1 Orion flight test program. 

In addition to the actions taken in Option 1, assembly of the Orion qualification vehicle 

and system qualification testing will be advanced 6 months to support this option. 

Procurements for this assembly must begin immediately upon the authorization to 

accelerate and docking systems hardware transfer from the SSP must occur as currently 

planned. The system PDR will be conducted as planned as approximately 28% of the 

vehicle must be in procurement by the PDR for this option. Orion spacecraft qualification 

itself will be aligned with the Orion 1 flight. As in Option 1, the Orion design will be 

evaluated and any vehicle simplifications necessary to enable the accelerated schedule 

will be incorporated (deferred capabilities will be restored in subsequent Orion block 

upgrades). Software acceleration will be achieved by moving capabilities required for 

Orion 1 and Orion 2 into earlier releases. This will be enabled by the deletion of the Ares 

I-Y unique load and software simplification. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

A review of the primary Orion critical path as depicted below was conducted to verify the 

viability of this plan. Component procurement, vehicle manufacturing and vehicle 

qualification were reviewed. The results were reviewed with an independent team of 

experienced aerospace managers and compared with similar activities on other similar 

aerospace development projects. This activity was done at the vehicle level. Component 

level developmental testing and qualification was not assessed in detail for either prime 

or GFE equipment and some risk may exist in individual component qualification plans. 

Flight article delivery for Orion 1 and 2 to Ground Operations was also advanced. A 2nd

structural test capability at MAF and a 2nd integration station in the Operations and 

Checkout (O&C) building will be provided to enhance the ability to manufacture, 

integrate and test two vehicles in parallel to meet these schedules. 

3.2 Option 2 - Ares Overview

3.2.1 Option 2 - First Stage (FS) Element: 

The FS Element assessed Option 2 (accelerating the ISS launch schedule by 12 

months) as executable with a medium degree of risk based on an engineering and risk 

analysis. Basically, FS compressed the static test schedule by 10 months. The QM-1 

Motor Fabrication Review is moved from April 2011 to July 2010. Compressing the 

DM/QM schedule is challenging and requires some different linkages between static 

tests to make configuration decisions for each motor, but major test objectives will 

still be met. For example, the design of the QM and flight motor nozzles will be 

influenced by the DM-4 post-test evaluation results because the decision on the 

nozzle can be postponed until after the DM-4 tests are complete. The Ares I-Y flight 

stage is deleted from the manifest. The 9.3 area ratio nozzle is deleted from the FS 

Element Option 2 configuration. 

Motor qualification will be complete and evaluated prior to the Orion 1 (uncrewed) 

and 2 (crewed) flights. The manufacturing, evaluation, and test schedule for this plan 

assumes standard manufacturing processes and shift schedules at ATK. 

ATP IOC

Vehicle Qual

Assembly & Integration 

Component Procurement

- 5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0

9/2008 9/2010 9/2011 9/2012 9/2013 9/2009

DAC3 PDR

ATP IOC

Vehicle Qual

Assembly & Integration 

Component Procurement

- 5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0

9/2008 9/2010 9/2011 9/2012 9/2013 9/2009

DAC3 PDR
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

All FS subsystems will address long-lead time needs for drawings and procurements. 

Full-scale acoustics loads validation, separation shock testing, and full-scale 

Structural Test Article (STA) testing, plus model validation and certification analyses, 

must be completed prior to the FS DCR and the Orion 2 (crewed) flight. Long-lead 

procurements and test schedules will be adjusted to ensure this requirement is met. 

Options will be considered to resolve cooling designs for the avionics within the 

forward skirt to support this acceleration. The structures subsystem will assess 

conducting forward skirt thermal environments validation using a full-scale test 

article. This would support launching the Orion 1 vehicle without an Environmental 

Control System (ECS) for cooling the forward skirt. Options to minimize program 

risk are either baselining an ECS now or alternatively (not preferred) implementing a 

Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) and appropriate sensors to operate avionics boxes up 

to thermal limits. 

The FS Element is evaluating hardware and booster processing options for a 

programmatic decision as described in Option 1 (thrust oscillation mitigation design, 

PLI processing, motor inspection techniques, and improving nozzle manufacturing) to 

increase confidence in meeting the motor processing schedule. 

3.2.2 Option 2 - Upper Stage (US) Element: 

The US Element would augment MAF production with a manufacturing line at 

MSFC to allow for parallel fabrication of test article and qualification/flight units. 

This would include shifting manufacturing of the Ground Vibration Test Article 

(GVTA) and Integrated Stage Test Article (ISTA) to MSFC. As part of this option, 

the US Element would add back the MSFC Building 4707 Vertical Assembly and 

MSFC Building 4708 Integration areas that were eliminated in the recent PMR08 Rev 

1 re-planning activity, and reduced the budget in FY09 and FY10. Also, the US 

Element would accelerate the MSFC Building 4755 Liquid Oxygen Tank/Thrust 

Cone test area that was delayed in the recent re-planning activity. This approach takes 

advantage of tooling already in place at MSFC. After IOC, these facilities and tooling 

will be utilized by Ares V for their development activities. It should be noted that 

production of US qualification/flight units would remain at MAF and the integrity of 

the US qualification program will be maintained. In order to accommodate an 

accelerated schedule, two shifts would be implemented on MAF and MSFC lines. 

Another vital part of the US approach is to implement parallel testing in the Software 

Integration Test Facility (SITF). Shifting from serial to parallel software qualification 

testing could potentially save 4 months. However, risk is associated with this 

approach, as there would be a lack of capacity to support regression testing and 

problem solving. A third SITF line could be created to mitigate this risk. 

Additionally, efficiencies must be gained by supplementing the NASA Design Team 

(NDT) with approximately 10 experienced Instrument Unit Avionics Contractor 

(IUAC) (Boeing) personnel. This augmentation could potentially save 2 months in 

schedule. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Another critical element pertaining to the acceleration of software development is the 

elimination of a unique software package for Ares I-Y. The deletion of Ares I-Y 

saves an additional 6 months in schedule. 

Finally, procurement of all hardware components would need to be re-phased to 

support the accelerated schedule. 

The main schedule risk with respect to US acceleration is that facilities will not be 

available in a timely fashion. In PMR08 Rev 1, the US Element is already assuming 

an aggressive facility build schedule at MAF. The new High Bay 103 is the “long 

pole in the tent.” This effort will have to be further accelerated and MSFC CoF 

activities have to be re-initiated. 

It must be noted that the ability to activate a manufacturing line at MSFC in a timely 

manner to support the acceleration options would be severely impacted if the facility 

design for MSFC Buildings 4707 and 4708 is not completed by April 1, 2009. Restarting the MSFC manufacturing line requires early finalization of requirements for 

facility interfaces. If the US Element waits until April to re-start the design effort, 5 

months will be added for the completion of schedule design, and it is doubtful that 

construction for Building 4707 can be accelerated enough to recover the added 

schedule burden. Immediate Construction of Facility (CoF) authority and $650k is 

required to complete the design effort prior to April 1, 2009. 

Construction of Facilities (CoF) projects require congressional authorization via the 

Agency’s Operating Plan and are at risk until a fiscal year 2009 authorization is 

approved. Possible mitigation steps for this risk are: immediate re-start of the design 

effort for MSFC manufacturing capability which was halted in the latest budget 

reduction exercise, utilizing on-hand CoF authority beginning now (December 2008); 

pre-approval of a possible CoF update for FY09 in the early April timeframe, or a 

waiver of CoF regulations for FY09 and FY10; and the availability of additional 

budget authority in FY09 and FY10 to augment present CoF and local authority 

budgets to provide incentives for rapid design, deployment, and delivery. 

In addition to acceleration capability, the implementation of a manufacturing line at 

MSFC would build robustness into the CxP schedule without additional technical 

risk. 

No negative impacts are foreseen in regard to lunar capability. 

3.2.3 Option 2 - Upper Stage Engine (USE) Element: 

The J-2X development effort recently completed a successful CDR. Thus, the USE 

Element’s current plan to accomplish the first crewed flight 1 year earlier than the 

PMR08 Rev 1 schedule by accelerating or further ensuring engine availability for the 

first human flight of the CxP must be focused on the engine development, 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

qualification, and certification effort that follows the initial completion of the design 

rather than re-definition or re-design activities. 

Due to the programmatic and technical challenges for accomplishing the current 

schedule, there are two significant constraints that specifically affect J-2X 

development. First, no plausible path exists for accelerating the PPA-2. Second, no 

viable option exits for accelerating Test Stand A-3 construction. 

The current schedule utilizes a development engine on the first Ares I uncrewed flight 

test and the first production engine on the second Ares I uncrewed flight. The first 

crewed flight is scheduled to use the second production engine. For acceleration 

consideration, any uncrewed flight must use a development engine and the first 

crewed flight must use the first production engine. 

The fidelity of the USE Element’s assessment of Option 2 is based on top-down 

parametric assessments with regards to test-turnaround capabilities, engine testing 

costs, and engine-build and delivery schedules. Detailed planning, should it become 

necessary, would follow at a later date. 

The basic strategies for accelerating J-2X development were derived from the 

preliminary list of acceleration ideas generated by the CxP Acceleration study. The 

first overriding strategy is to get as much hardware into testing as quickly as possible. 

This approach assumes a risk that some hardware may be fabricated without 

incorporating lessons learned from development testing. The accelerated availability 

of Test Stand A-2 is necessary to accomplish this strategy. 

To acquire Test Stand A-2 sooner, the handover of the stand from the SSME project 

is approximately 3 months earlier and the work on converting the stand for the J-2X 

starts immediately after handover. The end result assumes that Test Stand A-2 is 

ready for J-2X testing in July 2010, which is 1 year earlier than currently planned. 

There is a possibility that some verification activities relating to performance and 

design requirements beyond the IOC may be deferred to reduce time-consuming testfail-fix scenarios. The functional requirements dedicated to the lunar mission and the 

Ares V vehicle are prime candidates. Furthermore, while the engine is designed for 

certain performance requirements, an allowance for lower levels of initial 

performance may be necessary if setbacks occur during development testing. 

The final overarching strategy is the full funding of identified cost threats against 

PMR08 Rev 1 and the removal of imposed challenges and work deferments to fit 

under related current funding profiles. 

The J-2X may accomplish the Option 2 objectives by incorporating the following: 

• Test Stand A-2 availability for J-2X testing is accelerated. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

• All of the early development engines are fabricated, assembled, and delivered 

earlier (approximately 5-9 months) than the current PMR08 Rev 1 schedule. 

The two certification engines are delivered approximately 8-9 months early, and 

the production engine is delivered approximately 5 months earlier. 

• Engine testing is reduced by approximately 10 percent since some verification 

activities are deferred. 

• Cost threats identified against PMR08 Rev 1 are funded and imposed funding 

challenges in FY09 and FY10 are removed. 

• One development engine supports one uncrewed test flight and the first 

production engine supports the first crewed flight. 

• IOC performance and design requirements are retained at current values unless 

or until an issue arises. 

The net result of the J-2X acceleration strategy is a production engine supporting the 

first human flight approximately 1 year earlier than the PMR08 Rev 1 schedule with a 

substantial increase in necessary workforce funding in FY09 and FY10. 

3.3 Option 2 - EVA Overview

In order to attain 12-month acceleration, the initial capability technical baseline will be 

de-scoped to address only ISS requirements for the ISS DRM; extensibility to meet lunar 

transportation requirements will be maintained as a goal to minimize redesign as much as 

possible. Hardware unique to microgravity EVA (e.g. long EVA umbilical, suit thermal 

and micrometeoroid protection garment, etc) and long-term unpressurized survival (e.g. 

long-term waste management) will not be developed or built to support the ISS mission. 

This option will require a second development cycle to upgrade the Launch, Entry, and 

Abort (LEA) configuration from ISS-only to be lunar transportation capable. The EVA 

Systems Project will continue to strive for maximum commonality between all suit 

configurations, but this commonality will be sacrificed as needed to meet the schedule. 

Option 2 has a decreased capability for Configuration 1 for the ISS mission, sacrifices 

lunar commonality as needed, and requires a block upgrade for the lunar mission. 

3.4 Option 2 - Ground Operations Overview

Option 2 requires a more aggressive approach to accelerating the baseline. Although 

Ares I-Y is removed, due to the single string architecture and launch spacing, the 

complete operational capability is still required for the first launch of Orion 1. Early 

funding limits, an even greater dependence on shuttle infrastructure transition, and 

remaining flight design ambiguities limit opportunities to accelerate ground development 

and operations schedules. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

To accomplish Option 2, more aggressive funding was included to further accelerate 

construction and fabrication projects and decouple the integrated ground systems 

operational readiness dates (ORD), enabling an eight-month acceleration to ground 

systems development. But with the more aggressive schedule, additional ground projects 

enter the GO critical path, re-introducing schedule risk. New development funding was 

also included in Option 2 to address known technical risks. 

In Option 2, four elements are required: 

1. Accelerated ground systems development including earlier design in FY 2009 and 

start of fabrication and installation in FY 2010. Accomplishing this requires early 

development of ML, VAB, CCC, Pad 39B, and Multi-Purpose Processing Facility 

(MPPF) projects, as well as increasing capabilities for umbilical testing at the 

Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF). With Option 2, the critical path would 

include Ares I-X and the MPPF, as well as the VAB and ML projects described in 

Option 1. 

2. Address technical risks through new funding. Additional funding was again 

included to mitigate priority risks for incorporating SI units and post liftoff sound 

suppression system capability. In Option 2, the early implementation of the Ares 

I First Stage 9.3 nozzle extension has not been incorporated. 

3. Early turnover of Shuttle assets. Critical turnovers, including VAB High Bay and 

Pad 39B, are required by July 2009. This accelerates the current VAB milestone 

by approximately six months and requires execution of HST LON activities from 

Pad 39A. 

4. Compressed processing schedules. Additional schedule compression is enabled 

by the incorporation of Orion Project provided high-fidelity pathfinder as a key 

mitigation for first flight issues. This approach is sensitive to flight hardware and 

software configurations and delivery schedules, as the ground system validation 

and verification, pathfinder mitigation flow, ORD, and turnover to operations are 

tightly coupled to predicted nominal launch site processing flows. High-fidelity 

pathfinders are instrumental in reducing risk to first flight processing schedules. 

However, risk remains in the spacecraft servicing and integration schedule. After 

adjusting MEIT from Orion 1 to Orion 2, a six-week disconnect exists between 

Orion 1 delivery and Ground Operations need dates. Further adjustments to the 

Ground Operations shifting during spacecraft offline processing would mitigate 

approximately one month. The remainder of the schedule mitigation would be 

addressed as forward work. 

 

Although a schedule benefit would be realized, the deletion of Ares I-Y is a significant 

challenge to supporting Option 2. Ares I-Y would have provided a dry-run simulation of 

many ground processes, loading propellants, J-2X support and other services. 

Implementing Orion 1 as the first flight would require functionality of all ground systems 

and operations, without prior validation. Acquiring structural and test articles for First 

Stage and Upper Stage hardware would mitigate first flight issues and technical risks in 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

safety and reliability associated with eliminating the Ares I-Y integrated vehicle flow. 

Mitigations would include retiring integrated vehicle risks early in the processing 

environment, as well as verification of flight validated and loads models with ground 

systems. 

The cost analysis for Option 2 is determined to be lower in fidelity from Option 1 based 

on the assumptions regarding vehicle requirement stability. The schedule risk for Option 

2 is determined to be moderate-to-high risk based on the elimination of Ares I-Y as a 

pathfinder to Orion 1, as well as removal of schedule contingencies in the offline 

spacecraft processing flows. However, through aggressive acceleration and new funding, 

earlier shuttle asset transitions, and incorporation of the Orion and potential Ares highfidelity pathfinders, Option 2 strategies would enable approximate 12 month acceleration 

to IOC. 

3.5 Option 2 - Mission Operations Overview

Mission Operations Option 2 is similar to Option 1 because the Mission Operations 

critical path dependencies on Ares and Orion have not changed. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

4.0 Option 3 - Summary 

Option 3 intended to accelerate the CxP IOC date by 18 months from September, 2014 to 

March 2013. This would have represented a 24 month acceleration from the external IOC 

commitment date of March 2015. In order to achieve this acceleration the Orion Project 

would have to immediately initiate long lead procurement orders, prior to the acceleration 

authority to proceed date of April 1, 2009. Further, over 50% of the vehicle components 

would have been in the procurement process prior to the Orion System level PDR, 

increasing the likelihood that incorrect or unnecessary parts are purchased. The Ares 

development, qualification, and manufacturing timeline would require an unrealistic 

compression of hardware qualification and manufacturing schedules. The EVA Project 

would need to develop and certify an ISS transition suit comprised mainly of heritage 

hardware. This heritage suit would provide basic launch/entry/abort and crew survival 

protection and short term unpressurized survival capability, but would not be upgradeable 

for lunar capability. 

These factors would result in an unacceptable risk to implementation and Option 3 was 

determined to not be viable. It will be described in the study for evaluation but the costs 

were not analyzed. 

4.1 Option 3 - Orion Overview

Option 3 accelerates the CxP IOC date by 18 months to March 2013. A detailed analysis 

of the Orion critical path demonstrated that in order to achieve this acceleration, the 

Project would have had to ramp up long lead procurement orders in the fall of 2008 to 

support production of the qualification vehicle. Further, over 54% of the vehicle 

components would have been in the procurement process prior to the Orion System level 

PDR, thus increasing the likelihood that incorrect or unnecessary parts would be 

purchased. This was judged to be a non-achievable plan. Several alternatives were 

investigated to mitigate this early procurement challenge. The most promising alternative 

was to move the Orion 1 launch to within 3 months of the Orion 2 launch, regaining 3 

months on the front end of the schedule. This proposal was not incorporated in this study 

as it did not provide enough time in between the flights for necessary data analysis. 

4.2 Option 3 -Ares Overview

The assessment by the CxAccel Ares subteam of the adjustments and modifications to the 

Ares development, qualification, and manufacturing timeline resulted in identification of 

unrealistic compression of hardware qualification and manufacturing schedules. Key 

program milestones (i.e., IOC/Orion 2) could no longer be supported. Specific areas of 

concern include: 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

4.2.1 Option 3 - First Stage Element: 

The Static Test schedule could not be safely compressed further than in Option 2. 

First Stage hardware certification cannot be completed to support a first crewed flight 

in March 2013. 

4.2.2 Option 3 - Upper Stage Element: 

The Upper Stage Element cannot accelerate DCR prior to April 2013 due to the need 

to complete qualification and Integrated Stage Test Article (ISTA) testing and 

analysis prior to DCR. Upper Stage hardware certification is not complete until July 

2013 and cannot be completed to support a first crewed flight in March 2013. 

4.2.3 Option 3 - Upper Stage Engine Element: 

The Upper Stage Engine Element would require that Test Stand A-2 be made 

available for J-2X no later than July 2009. Additionally, in order to accomplish the 

two-part certification test series in the time required, the current RS-68 Test Stand B1B being used by the DoD would need to be available for handover to the CxP no 

later than April 2009 to enable J-2X testing by October 2011. All engine deliveries, 

including development, certification, and production engines would be significantly 

accelerated. 

The sequence of events to accomplish Option 3 would be extraordinarily successoriented, and exhibits high and unacceptable technical and programmatic risk. 

4.3 Option 3 - EVA Overview

In order to attain the 18 month acceleration, the EVA Project will develop and certify an 

ISS transition suit comprised mainly of heritage hardware, modified to be compatible 

with Orion interfaces and to meet Constellation requirements. This heritage suit will 

provide basic launch/entry/abort and crew survival protection and short term 

unpressurized survival capability. It is not upgradeable for lunar capability. This suit will 

not support microgravity EVA and could not be upgraded to do so. A separate suit will 

need to be developed for the lunar mission; the lunar suit system, with both Configuration 

1 and Configuration 2 suits, will have to be developed concurrently as part of the lunar 

capability development cycle. Therefore, there will be no commonality between the 

heritage-based ISS suit and Configuration 1 of the lunar suit system. Option 3 was not 

considered feasible by the CxP; therefore, costs were not analyzed for this option. Option 

3 has a substantially decreased capability for ISS missions, completely sacrifices 

commonality between the ISS and lunar phase, and requires an entirely new suit for the 

lunar mission. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

4.4 Option 3 - Ground Operations Overview

Option 3 requires an even more aggressive approach to accelerating the baseline. 

Although Ares I-Y is removed, due to the single string architecture and launch spacing, 

the complete operational capability is still required for the first launch of Orion-1; 

accelerated 6 months earlier than Option 2. Early funding limits, an even greater 

dependence on shuttle infrastructure transition, and remaining flight design ambiguities 

limit opportunities to accelerate ground development and operations schedules. 

To accomplish Option 3, more aggressive funding and development acceleration would 

be required. Standalone ground system projects, with additional funding, could likely be 

accelerated. However, dependencies on flight system products preclude significant GSE 

development and final Operational Readiness of the Ground Systems. 

4.5 Option 3 - Mission Operations Overview

This option is not supportable due to vehicle design hardware and software products 

being unsupportable. 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

5.0 Conclusions 

The CxAccel Study found that the current baseline, PMR08 Rev 1, is clearly at high 

programmatic risk and not achievable on the current content, cost, or schedule due to an 

insufficient funding profile and the lack of adequate Program reserves in 2009 and 2010, 

in conjunction with the effect of two Continuing Resolutions. The CxP has had to defer 

development of facilities, equipment, engineering development units, tooling, ground 

testing and wind tunnel testing. The flight test program had to be minimized to an 

aggressive success oriented program with no room for test failures. These changes 

effectively resulted in the deferral of a large portion of the development phase of the 

program. 

Option 1 (September 2014) is achievable at a decreased programmatic risk posture from 

the baseline (high to medium) because of increased funding and reserves, the more robust 

test program, and acceleration of ground and flight tests. 

Option 2 (September 2013) is achievable at a similar high risk posture as the baseline, 

but with adequate funds to execute, and requires an aggressive schedule with no margin 

available for test failures. Technical risk is increased relative to the baseline primarily 

because of the deletion of the Ares I-Y flight test. 

Option 3 (March 2013) was found to not be achievable because it requires initiating long 

lead procurement of over 50% of Orion components prior to PDR and Upper Stage and 

Upper Stage Engine cannot deliver hardware in time to support Orion 1. As a result, 

Option 3 was not costed in this study. 

Table 1 provides a delta cost by option from PMR08 Rev 1. In order to quantify the total 

current funding requirements associated with each option, the option costs distinguish 

acceleration costs from current baseline shortfalls to PMR08, Rev 1 and technical 

baseline changes instituted since PMR08 Rev 1. Additionally, Program Reserve was 

added at 20% for DDT&E and 10% for production 

 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Table 1 – Delta Costs by Option from PMR08, Rev 1 

Reserves 545 451 549 541

Option 1 ($M) Option 2 ($M)

2491

446

307

1194

38

0

0

52

468

636

FY 09-10

Technical Baseline Changes 804 388 683

Current Baseline Shortfall 1154 307 1154

Total 3801 3023 4393

Subtotal Acceleration 1391 1778 2015

PI 100 38 100

EVA 0 (3) (20)

Missions Ops 0 167 220

Ground Ops 41 245 293

Ares 1 787 505 791

Orion (w/o design simp.) 463 826 631

Project FY 09 - 15 FY 09-10 FY09 - 15

Reserves 545 451 549 541

Option 1 ($M) Option 2 ($M)

2491

446

307

1194

38

0

0

52

468

636

FY 09-10

Technical Baseline Changes 804 388 683

Current Baseline Shortfall 1154 307 1154

Total 3801 3023 4393

Subtotal Acceleration 1391 1778 2015

PI 100 38 100

EVA 0 (3) (20)

Missions Ops 0 167 220

Ground Ops 41 245 293

Ares 1 787 505 791

Orion (w/o design simp.) 463 826 631

Project FY 09 - 15 FY 09-10 FY09 - 15

Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the phasing of the baseline and Options 1 and 2. 

The graph illustrates how budget reductions in FY09 and FY10 shift technical content to 

later years, and thus defer mitigation of risks too late in the Program. Both Options 1 and 

2 provide a funding profile similar to a classical development program and allow for risk 

mitigation early in the Program. 

0

1,500

3,000

4,500

6,000

FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15

$ in M

PMR08 R1

Cost Requirement

Option 2

Cost Requirement

Option 1

Figure 4 – CxAccel Study Phasing Plan 
Constellation Acceleration Study Report 12/18/08 

 

Figure 5 is a notional illustration of IOC versus acceleration cost, versus programmatic 

risk. For example, study Option 1 has the same IOC as the PMR08 Rev 1; however, 

PMR08 Rev 1 lacks adequate funding and is higher risk as illustrated on the shift on the 

risk contour line. Option 2 accelerates IOC by 12 months but because of the compressed 

schedule is at a similar high risk posture as PMR08 Rev 1. It should be noted that there is 

a continuum of possible IOC dates, between Option 2 and 1 with reduced risk as you 

move from left to right. Option 3 has the highest risk of all of the options, and was not 

consider achievable. 

low

medium

high

low

medium

high

Figure 5 – IOC versus Costs versus Risk 

It is recognized that additional funding may not be available and therefore to achieve the 

external commitment of March 2015, the CxP should implement all no-cost and cost 

avoidance strategies as soon as possible including: design simplifications, software 

scrubs, assembly integration and test improvements, incremental qualification of 

hardware, and flight test optimization. Additionally the CxP should review scope and 

content for additional acceleration ideas, adjustment, and phasing. 

The CxAccel Study results are based on a single point in time and the baseline may 

change between this report’s release and approval to accelerate. Upon authority to 

proceed, the CxP will need to determine the best use of funding to buy down the most 

risk. In addition, there are programmatic decisions that can be made from a program 

lifecycle perspective that may result in an increased risk to realizing acceleration but they 

are deemed to be necessary from a broader program perspective. The opportunity for 

acceleration is a limited window. Because of the need to initiate long lead item 

procurements, any delay in an acceleration decision beyond mid-2009 would preclude 

any significant acceleration.