UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) JOSEPH A. STALLARD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) )
v. ) Civil Action No. 20

- 2703 (RBW) ) GOLDMAN SACHS G R OUP, INC., et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Joseph A. Stallard, brings this civil action against the defendants, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (the “Goldman defe ndants”), and V o odoo SAS (“Voodoo”) , alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18, 1114(1), 1117, 1125(a); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)

– (b) , 506(a) ; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1952(a), 1956, 1962, 2320(a), as well as common law claims of trademark infringement, unfair compe tition, fraud, n egligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. See generally Complaint ( “ Compl. ” ) , ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court are (1) Voodoo’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for improper service of proce s s, see Voodoo S AS’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Improper Service of Process Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (“ Voodoo’s Mot.”), ECF No. 14 ; and (2) the plaintiff’s motion for alternative service, see Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Voo d oo SAS’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Improper Service of Process Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) or in the Alternative, Plaintiff’s Motion for Alternative Service Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF2 No. 16. 1 U p o n careful consi deration of the parties’ submissions, 2 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny Voodoo’s motion , and grant in part and deny in part the plaintiff’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND The plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 18 , 2019. See Com pl. ¶ 1. In hi s Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Voodoo , a French company, see id. ¶ 8 , (1) “distributed a video game” called “Knock Balls[,]” which “infring[ed] the copyrights of [the plaintiff’s] Knocky Balls video game[,]” id. ¶ 2; (2) gave [Knocky Balls] a fake negative r eview[,]” id. ; and ( 3) “reported [Knocky Balls] to Google[,]” who “removed [Knocky Balls] from Google Play and put [the plaintiff’s] developer account in jeopardy [,] ” id. The plaintiff further alleges that the
Gold man defenda nts “ funded Voodoo with at least $200 mil l ion [,] ” which “ caused Voodoo to dominate the mobile video game market in a way that violates [ ] antitrust laws.” Id

. ¶ 4

. On January 20, 2021, Voodoo filed its motion to dismiss for improper service o f process

. See Voodoo ’s Mot. at 5

. Voodoo al leges that the pl a intiff “made no effort to serve Voodoo with
his [C] omplaint through any of the procedures set forth in Fed [ eral ] R [ ule of ] Civ [ il ]
P [ rocedure] 4(h) for serving process on a foreign corporation ” and “[i]n stead [ ] p urports to have
effected service on Voodo o by identifying an attorney representing Voodoo in wholly unrelated litigation [before] the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Ninth Circuit [ ( “ Ninth Ci rcuit ” )] , then making repeated eff orts to del iver the [C] omplai nt to her by mail and in person at her home

1 The Goldman defendants have al so filed a motion t o dis m is s , see Motion to Dismis s by Goldman Sachs & C o. LLC, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., ECF No . 13, which the Court will resolve separate ly.

2 In addition to the filings a lready identified, th e Court consider ed the following submissions in rendering its decis i on : ( 1 ) Voodoo SAS’s Repl y Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for I mproper Service of Pr oce ss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ

. P. 12(b)(5) ( “ Voodoo’s Repl y”), ECF No. 20

.3 and workpl ace [,] ” despite being repea tedly “informe d [that] she was not an authorized agent for service of process on Voodoo[.]” Id. at 1.
A. The Plaintiff’s Attempted Service The parti es predomin antly agree on the facts regarding the plaintiff’s attempted service

on Voodoo. On October 1, 2020, the plaint if f mailed a package, containing a Notice of Lawsuit, a request to waive service, and a copy of the plaintiff’s Complaint, via United States Post al
Service Prior ity Mail , to Jaime A. Santos at the District of Colu mbia office of Goodwin Procter LLP (“Goodwi n” )

. 3 See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 ; Voodoo ’ s Mot., Exhibit ( “ Ex. ” ) 1 at 1 ( reflecting a
United States Postal Service envelope dated October 1 , 2020, add ressed to “ J a ime A. Santos, Goodwin Procter LLP, 1900 N Stree t N W, Washi ngton, DC 20036 ” ) . In response, Santos sent

an e - ma il to t he plaintiff on October 16, 2020, stating that , although she had “received [the pl aintiff’s] correspondence[,]” “ t he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require corporations to be served by delivering a copy of the summons and compl aint to an officer, a man ag ing or general agent, or another agent authorized by appointment or by law to rece ive service of process” and
she was “not an officer, managing agent, or general agent of Voodoo [ ], and [had] not been authorized by appointment o r by law to receive servi ce of process for Voodoo[.] ” Voodoo ’ s Mot., Ex. 2 (E

- mail from Jaime A. Santos to Joseph Stallard (Oct. 16, 2020 1: 03 p.m.) ( “ Santos Oct. 16, 2020 1:03 p.m. E

- mail ” )) at 1 ; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 4

– 5 ( d escribing the e

- ma il)

. On
that same day, the plaint iff repl ied t o S antos’ s email , stating that he “disagree[d]” because Santos

3 The Court notes th at “ [ t ] he plaintiff disputes the date [ that Ja im e] S a n tos [ , the attorney for Voodoo wh om the plaint iff attempted to serv e,] received the [the re quest for] wai ve r [of service,]” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, and as serts t hat “the defendant did not me ntion the plaintiff ’s other email to Santos on October 17 [, 202 0 ,] ” Id. at 6 ( citi ng Pl. ’s Opp’n, Ex. 2 ( E

- mail from Josep h Stallard to Jaime A . Santos (Oct . 17, 2020 1:47 p.m. ) (“ Pl. ’ s Oct. 1 7 , 2020 1:47 p. m. E

mail ”) at 1 )

. However , b ecause the Court concludes that Santo s is not authori zed to receiv e service on behalf of Voodoo, see infra Se ction III.A , and the plaintiff has not attempted any other form of serv ice o n Voodoo, neith er the date on whi ch Santos allegedly rec eived the request for wai ver of ser vice nor an e - mai l from the plaintiff to San t os affects th e Court’s determination that servic e has no t been prope rly effected on Voodoo.4 was “the lead counsel” in Voodoo SAS v. Say Games , LLC , a case before the Ninth Circuit.
Voo doo ’ s Mo t., Ex. 3 ( E

- ma il from J os eph A. Stallard to Jaim e Santos (Oct. 16, 2020 3:06 p .m.) ( “ P l. ’ s Oct . 16, 2020 3:06 p.m. E

- mail ” )) at 1 ; s e e a l s o Pl.’s O pp’n at 5 (describing the e

- mail)

. Accordingly , the plain tiff argued, Santos was “ appearing as the agent for Voodoo, while Voodoo
is in the country[,]” and because Santos “ ha [ d ] been ser ved, so ha[d] Vood oo.” Vo odoo ’ s Mot. , Ex. 3 (Pl. ’ s Oct. 16, 2020 3:06 p.m. E

- mail) at 1 ; see also id. , Ex. 3 (Pl

. ’ s Oct. 16, 2 020 3:06 p.m.
E

- mail) at 1 (a rguing that service was proper under D.C. Code § 13

- 334)

. Replying by email th at same day, Santos r eiterated that she was “ not an agen[t] a ut hor ize d by appointment or by law to receive service of process for Voodoo ” and could not “ offer [the plaintiff] legal advice for how
to effect service of process on a foreign corporati on.” Id. , Ex. 4 (E

- mail from Jaime Santos to Joseph Stallard (Oct. 16 , 202 0 9 :50 p.m.) ( “ Santos Oct. 16 , 2020 9:50 p.m. E

- mail ” )) at 1 ; see
also Pl. ’ s O pp ’ n at 5 (describing the e

- mail).
On November 3, 2020, a process s erver appea red at Santos’ s home wi th a copy of the Complaint and summons , see Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; Voodoo’s Mot. a t 3 , wh ich lists the “[d]efendant’s name and address” as “ Voodoo SAS [ ,] c/o Jaim e A. Santos [,] Goodwin Procter

LLP [,] 1 900 N Street, NW [,] Washi ngton, DC 2 0036 [ , ] ” Summons in a C ivil Action ( “ Summons ” ) at 1 , ECF No. 4

. On November 10, 2020, the plaintiff e ma ile d S antos, apologizing fo r contact ing S antos a t her hom e , and r equesting t hat she either “ arrange for [her]self or [her] [ ] office to acce pt the summ ons in [th e District of Columbia]” or “agree to
return the W aiver o f Service.” Voodoo ’ s Mot. , Ex. 5 ( E

- m ail from Joseph Stallard to Jaime Santos (Nov. 10, 2020 10:41 a

. m.) ( “ Pl. ’ s Nov. 10, 2020 10:41 a .m. E

- mail ” )) at 1 ; see also Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 5 (describ in g the e

- mail). On November 12 , 2020, the plaintiff emailed three c ounsel who represent Vo odoo in this case

— Al icia Rubi o - Sprin g , Keith Levenberg, and Ira J. Levy

—5 s tati ng, inter alia , t hat “ [t] his [wa]s [his] attempt to meet and confer ” prior to filing a motion “ for an inju nction to order the arrangement of service on [Santos] in [the District of Columbia] for Voodoo[ .] ” Voodoo ’ s Mot. , Ex. 6 (E

- mail from Joseph Stallard to Al icia Rubi o - Sprin g , Keith Levenberg, and Ira J. Levy (Nov. 12, 2020 11:01 a.m.) ( “ Pl. ’ s Nov. 12, 2020 11:01 a.m

. E

- mail ” )) at 1; see also Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 5 (describing the e

- mail). The plaintiff also requested that
the attor ne ys “ arrange to open [Good win ’ s District of Colu mbia] office so t hat t he summons can
be served there [,] ” “ agree t o return th e [w]aiv er of [s]ervice to [the plaintiff] b y e[

- ]mail [,] ” or

“ explain why, even if [Voodoo thought] serv ice [wa]s improper, [the a ttorneys thought] it[ was] appropriate for [ Goodw in ] to evade se rv ice b y r efusing to return the [w]aiver of [s]erv ice,
refusi ng to co operate wi th the process serv ers, and now refusing to cooperate with [him]. ”
Voodoo ’ s Mot., Ex

. 6 ( Pl. ’ s Nov. 12, 2020 11: 01 a.m. E

- mail) at 1.
On N ovember 13, 2020, Rubi o - Spring responded to the pl ai ntiff , s ta ting that , “[w]ith

respec t to [the p laintiff ’s] attempts to leave a summons at Goodwin’s [ ] office, [he was ] free to leave any materials there [, h ] o wever , as [ ] Sa ntos originally explained on October 16, [2020,
she ] has not been authorized to acce pt se rvice of process on behalf of Voodoo [ ] (no r has
Goodw in Procter LLP or any other partner or employee of Goodwin Procter LLP) and [Goodwin] cannot offer [the plaintif f] legal advice for how to ef fect service of proces s on a foreign corporation .” Voo doo ’ s Mot. , Ex. 7 (E

- mail from A l icia Rubio

- Sprin g to Joseph Stallard (Nov. 13, 2020 1:0 2 p.m.) ( “ Rubi o - Spring Nov. 13, 2020 1:02 p.m. E

- mail ” ) ) at 1; see also Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 5 ( stating that “ Rubio

- Spr ing e[

- ]mailed the pla intiff to allow the service ” of Santos “ at
Go odwin ’ s [ Di strict of Columbia ] office ” )

. Accordingly, Rubio

- Spring stated, “ any package that [the plaintiff] le[ft] at [Goodwin’s office] does not constitute proper ser vice .” Voodoo ’ s Mot ., E x. 7 (Rubio

- Spring Nov. 13, 2020 1: 02 p.m. E

- mail ) at 1.6 On November 19 , 2020, th e plaintiff filed what he all eged to be proof of service

. See
Proof of Service of Summons and C omplaint on Voodoo SAS (“Proof of Serv ice”) at 1, ECF
No. 8

. In his purp orted P roof of S ervice, the pl aintiff states that Rubio

- Spring “ author iz ed the

sum mo ns and co mpla int to be delivered to [ ] Santos at her place of business

. . . by leaving it with Huylinh Ho a t Goodwin [’s District of Columbia of fice].” Id. ¶ 2. He furth er represents that

“ service of process was completed by Hannah Britton , a proce ss se rver unre late d to the case ,” id. ¶ 3, and attache s an affidavit from Britton reflecting service on Ho “as [an a]uthorized [a]gent of Voodoo[,]” i d. , Ex. 1 ( Affidavit of Pro cess Server ) at 1 ; se e also Vo odoo ’ s Mot. at 4 (stating that

“ on Novem be r 18, 2 020 , [the p]la inti ff directed a process server, Hannah Britton, to deliver a copy of the summons and Complaint to [ ] Ho , a Goodwin employee, at Goodw in ’ s [District of Columbia] office ” ). According to a de claration filed by Ho, a “ Court Procedur es a nd Do cke ti ng Clerk ” at
Goodwin’s District of Columbia office , Voodoo ’ s Mot., Ex. 8 (Declaration of HuyL inh Ho ( “ Ho
Decl

. ” )) ¶ 1, Ho “met Hannah Britton, w ho identified herself as a p rocess server, in the lobby of
Goodwin’s office ” and “received a pack ag e conta ini ng the summ ons and complaint in the above

captioned case fr om [ ] Bri tton.” Id. , Ex. 8 (Ho Decl.) ¶ 3. Ho further states that , “[ u]pon receiving the package from [ ] Britto n ,” H o “ s tated t hat [she was] a Co urt Procedures and Docketing Clerk ” and “ remin ded [ ] Bri tton that [she] was only receiving the package ” and “ not accepting this pac kage for service.” Id. , Ex. 8 (Ho Decl.) ¶ 4. Ho also state d th at she is “ not an [a]utho rized [ a] gent of Voodoo [ ] an d [i s] not authorized to accept service of any doc uments on
b ehalf of V oodoo [.]” Id. , Ex. 8 (Ho Decl.) ¶ 5.7 II. STANDARD O F REVIEW
S e rvic e of process in federal court is gov erned by Feder al Rule of Civil P r ocedure 4 , which se ts forth th e vario us methods o f serv ice depending on the type of defendant being s erved

. See Fed. R. C iv . P. 4. Service of corporations, partnerships, and association s is controlled by Rule 4(h), which states that , [u]nless federal law provides otherwise or the d ef endant ’ s waiver has b een filed, a domestic or foreign corporation, or a partnershi p or other unincorpo rated association that is subject to suit under a commo n name, must be served: (1) in a judicial district of the United States: (A) in the mann er prescrib ed by Rul e 4(e)(1) fo r serv ing an individual; or (B) by delivering a cop y of the su mmons and of the com plaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or a ny other agent authorized by appoint ment or by law to rec eive service of process and

— if the agent i s one a uthorized by s tatu te and the statute so requires

— by also mailing a copy of each to th e defendan t; or (2) at a place not w ithin any judicial district of the United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual , e x cept per so nal del ivery under f( 2)(C )(i)

. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). Fo r defendants l ocated “ not within an y judicial district of the United States[,] ” F e d

. R

. C i v
. P

. 4 ( h ) ( 2 ) , Rule 4(h) (2) incorporates by reference Rule 4(f), which governs servic e of individu als in a f o reign c ountry , see id

. U nder Rule 4(f), [u]nless f e deral law provide s otherwise , an individual

— othe r than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whos e waiver has been filed

— may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United S ta tes: (1) by any i nt erna tional agreed means of service that is reasona bly calcula ted to give notice, s uch as those authorized by the Hague Co nvention on the S e rvice Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents ; (2) if there is no internatio nally agr ee d means , or if an i nt erna tional agreement allows but does not specif y o ther means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give not ice:8 (A) as prescrib ed by the foreign country ’ s law for service in that country in an action in its courts o f general j urisdic tion; (B) a s the foreign authority directs in response to a let ter rogator y or letter of reque s t; or (C) unless prohibited by the foreign country ’ s law, by: (i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personall y; or (i i) using any f orm of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individ ual and that require s a si gned receipt; or (3) by other means not prohibi ted by international agreement, as the court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
U nder Rule 12(b)(5) , 4 a part y may seek d is miss al of a complaint on the basis of

“ insufficien t service o f process [ , ] ” Fed. R . C iv. P. 12(b)(5) , which includes b ringing a c hallenge

to “ the mode of delivery or the lack of delivery of [a] sum mons and complaint[,] ” 5B Ch arles A.
Wr ight & Arthur R. Mi ll er, Fed eral Practice & Procedure § 1353 (3d ed. 20 04). When service is contested, th e plaintiff “ bears the burden of demonstrati ng the vali dity of [his, her, or] its proposed method of service. ” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of Petro le um Expo rting Countr ie s , 1 07 F. Supp. 3d 134, 136 (D.D.C. 2015); see als o Light v. Wolf , 8 16 F.2d 7 46 , 7 51 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “ Thus, the plaintiff must dem onstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicab le provision of law. ” Am

. Univ. v. Dist rict of Colu mbia , No. 1 :19

- CV

- 3512 (TJK

- G MH) , 2 020 WL 4754619, at *3

4 The plaintiff argues that “ Fede ral R ule of Civ il Pr ocedure 12(b)(4) a llows [a] defendant to raise a defense for

‘ insufficient proces s ’ ” and , there fore, because “ [t ]he defend ant did not raise that defen se, [ ] it is u ndisputed th a t the process service delivered sufficient process to [ ] Ho at [Goodwin ’ s Dis trict of Columbia] office. ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 10. However, as Voodoo correctly not es, see Voodoo ’ s Reply at 3, because it c hallenges the method of delivery of the
s um mons, rather than the sub stance of the summons, the pertinent standard is Rul e 12(b)(5 ), rather than Rule 12(b)(4). S ee Jouanny v. Embass y of Fr. in the U.S. , 220 F. Supp. 3 d 34, 36 n.1 (D.D.C. 2016 ) (noting that “ ‘ Rule 12(b)(5) [ ] is the proper vehicl e for challenging the mode of delivery or the lack of deliv ery o f the summons a nd compla int [,] ” r ather than Rule 12(b)(4 ) (quoting 5B C harles A . Wright & A r thur A. Miller, Fe deral P r actice & Procedure § 1353 (3d ed. 2004 )) ).9 (D.D.C. July 13, 2020) (in ternal citations and quotation marks omitted). “ If [the] plaintiff does

not meet [ his, ] he r [ , or i ts ] bur den, the Cour t ma y dismiss the complaint without prejudice for
insu fficient se rvice of process. ” H ash em v. Shabi , No. 17

- 1645 (ABJ), 2018 WL 3382913, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5))

. “ A court may, however, in its s ou nd
disc retion, also di re c t that service be effected within a pa rticular pe riod of tim e. ” Mohammad
Hilm i N assif & Partners v. Republic of I ra q , No. 17

- CV

- 219 3 (KBJ), 2 020 WL 1444918, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2020) (internal citations and quotation ma rks om it ted).
Because the pl ai n tiff is proceed ing pro se , the Court appreciates that “ [p]ro se litigan ts [,] ” such as the pl ain tiff , “ are allowed more latitude than litigants repr esented by counsel to correct
defe cts in service of process and pleadings. ” Moore v. Agency fo r In t ’ l Dev

. , 994 F.2d 874, 8 76 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (underline added) . Although “ [t]he assi stan ce provided by di strict

courts

. . . does not constitute a license f or a plaintiff filing pro se t o ignore the Federal Rules of
Civil P r ocedure, ” id. ( internal citat io ns and qu otation marks om itted), the Court may
nevertheless decline to dis miss a pro se plaintiff ’ s cas e f or insufficient service of process in favor
of allo wing the plaintiff another opportunity to comply with the rules. See Lindse y v. United
States , 4 48 F. Sup p. 2d 37, 46

– 48 (D .D.C. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock , 54 9 U.S. 199, 211

– 14 (2 007) ( concluding that the pro se plaintiff’s method of service did not comply with the Federal Rules , but “nevertheless conclud [ing] that the complai nt shoul d not be
dismissed because of this defect ”).
III. ANALYSIS
Voodoo moves t o dismiss t he plaintiff ’ s Com pla int for improper service be cause (1) the plaintiff “ never served an ‘ agent authorized by appoint ment or by law to receive serv ice of process[,] ” as re quired b y Rule 4(h)(1)(b) , see Voo doo ’ s M ot . at 5; and (2) the plaintiff “ never10 attem pted service by in ter nationally agreed means of service[,] ” as required b y Rules 4(h)(2)
and 4(f)(1), id. at 8. Vood oo argues that “ th e appropriat e remedy is dismissal ” b ecause t he

“ [p]laintiff w as given months to effect service and still faile d to use (o r, for that matter , e ven attempt) an authorized method [of service

. ] ” I d. In response, the plaintiff argues that his service
of Santos complied w ith Rule 4(h)(1)(b) , s ee Pl. ’ s O pp ’ n at 11 , but , in the alternati ve, ask s t he
Court to either retr oactively “ order the service on [Santos] under [Rule] 4(f)(3)[,] ” id. at 19, or to prospectively authorize service “ by registered mail under [Rule] 4(f)(2)(c) (ii) [,] ” id. at 22. F or
the f o l lowin g reasons , t he Court concludes that th e plaintiff ’ s atte mpts to serve Vo odoo through
Santo s d o not constitute proper service within the meaning of Rule 4(h), but that the plaintiff
should be granted an extension of time in order to effect service o n V oodoo in accordance with Rule 4(f).
A. Whether Santos I s an A uthorized Agen t of Voodoo In light of the p a rt ies ’ agreement t hat the plaintiff only attempt ed to serve Voodoo by delivering a copy of the summ ons and Complaint to S antos, see id. at 4

– 7 ( describ in g the plainti ff ’ s attempts at serv ice ); Voodoo ’ s Mot. at 1

– 4 (same), the Court first considers wh ethe r
Santos was authorized to receive service o n behalf of Voodoo under Rul e 4 (h). For the following re asons, the Court concl ud es that the plai nt iff has no t met his burde n to demonstrate
that Santos was an “ agent authorized by app ointment or by law to re cei ve service of process ” within the meaning of R ule 4(h)(1)( B). Rule 4(h) governs s ervice o n “a corporation , partnership, or as sociation

. ”
Fed

. R. Civ. P. 4 (h) ( c apitali zation omitted). Under Rule 4(h)(1)(B), service may be effe cted “by
de livering a co py of the summons and of the complaint to

. . . any [ ] agent authorized by11 appointme nt or by law to receiv e service of process [. ] ” Fed. R. Civ. P . 4 (h)(1)( B)

. 5 “ [A]ny agent who accepts service must be shown to have been authorize d to bind h is [or her] princip al by the acceptance of process [ , ] ” Schwarz v. Th omas , 222 F.2d 3 05, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1955) , either explicit ly or “ implied in fact[,] ” United States v. Z ie gler Bolt & Parts Co. , 111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Ci r. 1997). The plain t if f a rgues th at Santos ’ s representation of Voodoo in unrelated litigation be fore
the Nin th Circuit amounts to either explicit or imp licit authorization b y Vood oo of Santos as its

agen t for the purpose of accepting service

. See Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 11 ( arguing tha t , “ [e]ven if the
author ization was not explicit, it can also be implied from the relationsh ip ” ). However , a s
Vo odoo correctly argue s , see Voodoo ’ s Re p ly at 4 (arguing that “this C ou rt, and numerous
oth ers, have held that an attorney ’s representa ti on of a clie nt d oes not ma ke th e attorney an agent for receiving service of process ” ); see also id. at 4 n.1 (l isting cases) ; Voodoo ’s Mot

. at 5

– 8 ( discussi ng cases) , evidence that Santos h a s represented Voo doo in other matters does not, on its

own, demons trate that she is “ aut horized by appo int ment or by law to receive service of process[,] ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B)

. See, e. g. , Raja v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Cor p. , No. 16

- cv - 0 511 (KBJ), 2018 W L 818393, at *3 ( “ [S]erving an attorney of record who is not a designated agent
of the d efendan t for t h e p urpose of service does not satisfy the service of process requirement. ” );
Jo hnson

- Richardson v. Univ. of Phoeni x , 2020 WL 7318004, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec

. 11, 2020) ( noting that “ [m]ultiple decisions in this district have recognized that counsel of record i s not an authorized agent simply by virtue of representing the defendant in the lawsuit ” ); Ziegler Bolt &

5 There is no dispute that (1) t he plaintiff did not attempt service on Voodoo outside of the Uni ted States, see Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 11 ( represe nting that the plaintif f “ did not serve [Voodoo] outside of the U ni ted S tates u nder [Rule] 4 (h)(2) ” ); a nd (2) that Santos is no t “ an officer , a man ag ing [ agent , ] or [a] general agent ” of Voodoo, Fed. R. Civ . P. 4 (h)(1)(B). Se e general l y Voodoo ’ s Mem.; Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n; V oodoo ’ s Reply

. Accordingly, the Court f ocuses solely on the provision in Rule 4(h) (1)(B) that permits service on “ age nt[s] a uthorized by ap pointment or by law to receive service of process[,] ” Fed . R. C iv. P. 4(h)(1) (B).12 Parts Co. , 111 F .3d at 88 1 ( “ The mere relation s h ip between a defendant and h is[, her, or it s] attorney do es not, in itse lf, convey authority to accept se rvice. ” ). Rather, the pl aintiff bears t he burden to provide “ evidence indi cating that [Voodoo]
authorized [Santos] , i m plicitl y or explicitly , to r e ce ive service. ” Wilson v. Prud ential Fin. , 332 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D .C. 2004) ; accord Dalal v. Go l dman Sachs & Co. , Civil Action
No. 06

- 1061 (EGS), 2007 WL 1334972, at *3 (D.D.C. May 7, 2007) (con clu ding that Dalal ’ s

“ servi ce [ ] was still inad equate be ca use it was made upon [Goldman Sach s & Co. ’ s] counsel ”
and the re was “ no i ndication tha t [Goldm an S a ch s & Co. ’ s ] counsel was an agent authorized to receive process on [Goldman Sachs & Co. ’ s ] behalf ” ); Brodie v. Worthington , C ivil Action
No. 09

- 18 28 (HHK), 2 01 1 WL 4402783, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 20 11) ( concluding tha t “ B rodie

mu st offer evid ence tha t [ o n e of the de fendant s in that case] authorized his attorney to receive process on his behalf ” becaus e “ [e]vidence that [ t h a t d e f e n d a n t ’ s] attorney r epresents h im in th[at] matter d[id] not suffice, especially when the at torney has e xplicitly dis claimed any

a

ut hority to receive service on [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s ] behalf ” ). “ [T ] he re must be a factual basis for
be lieving that an appointmen t to receive process had been ma de [.] ” Pollard v. District of
Columbia , 285 F .R.D. 125, 128 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation mar k s omitted)

. However, outside of San tos ’ s alleged representation of Voodoo , the plaint iff adduces no
evidence demonstrat ing that Santos “ exercised [any] a ut hori ty beyond the attorney

- client relationship ” that would explicitly or impliedly confer “ the pow e r to accept service [,] ” Ziegler
Bolt & Parts Co. , 111 F.3d at 881. S ee genera ll y Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n
. Ind eed , the evi dence be fore t he Court demonstrates unambigu ou sly that Santos did not have such authorization. 6 Se e Vo odoo ’ s

6 T h e plainti ff claims in his oppos ition that bo th Voodoo and Santos were “ careful to [ not] definit ively state t hat Santos was not authorized to receiv e service of pro cess
. ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 12

. H owever , this argument ignores th e (continued . . .)13 Reply, Ex. 1 (De claration of Jaime A. Santos, Es q. ( “ Santos Decl. ” )) ¶ 2 ( “ I am n ot an officer, managing agent, or gene ral agent of Voodoo, and Vo o doo has not a uthorized me to accept or
waiv e service of process on it s behalf. ” ) ; see also Vood oo ’ s Mot. , Ex. 2 ( Santos Oct. 16, 2020
1: 03 p .m. E

- mail ) at 1 (stating that San tos is “ not an officer, managing agent, or general agent of
Voodoo [ ] , and I have not been aut horized by appointment or by l aw to receive servi ce of

proc ess for Voodoo ” ); id. , Ex. 4 ( Santos O ct. 16 , 2020 9:50 p.m. E

- mail ) at 1 (stating that Santos
is “ not an agen [t] authorized by app oin t ment or by law to receive service of process fo r
Voodoo ” ); id. , Ex. 7 ( Ru bi o - Spring Nov. 13, 2 020 1:0 2 p. m. E

- mail ) at 1 (stating that “ Attorn ey
Santos has not been authorized to ac cep t se rvic e of process on behalf of Voodoo [ ] (nor has
Goodwin

. . . or a ny oth er partner or employee o f Goodwin

. . . ) ” )

. 7 In respons e, t he plaintiff arg ues that V oo doo “ s igned a power of attorney to Santos, and the statutory p ower of attor n ey [under District of C olumbia l aw ,] auth oriz es [Santos] to receive service of process. ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 12 ; see also id. at 11

– 12 ( citing D.C. C ode § 21

- 2112(6)).

H owever , a s V oo doo correctly argu es, th e “ [p]laintiff appears to have conflated an attorney

- at

l aw rep r esenting a client i n c ourt , i.e. , the pra ctice o f law, with a non

- lawyer attorney

- in

- fact ” exercising authority o n someone ’ s beha lf unde r a po wer of attorney. Voodo o ’ s Rep ly at 8

(. . . continue d )
m u ltiple , unequi v o cal stateme nts to the contrary that were made to the plaint iff via e

- mail by both Santos and Ru bio

- Spring , s ee inf ra , at 1 2

– 1 3 , a nd later set forth in the Santos de claration , see Santos Decl. ¶ 2.

7 T he pl ai ntiff argues that “ [c]ourts hav e said that [ ] a declaration with a bare d enial of the a pplicability o f [R] ule 4 to the person se rviced is not enough ” to demo nstrat e that service of process was ins ufficient

. Pl

. ’ s Opp ’ n at 13 (citing Yueh

- Lan Wan g ex re l. We n - Youn g Wong v. New Mighty U.S. Tr

. , 322 F. R.D. 11, 31 (D. D.C. 20 17))

. H ow ever, “ [t]he party o n whose behalf service is made has [met its] b urden of establishing its validity w hen ch allenged

. ” Lig ht , 81 6 F .2d at 751

. In light of ( 1) the clear case la w holding th at an a ttorney

- c lient relationship is not enough to author ize an attorney to receive ser vice on behalf o f the client, see Brodie , 2 01 1 WL 44 02783, at * 1 ( “ E vide nce that [that defendant ’ s] a ttorney represents him in th[at] ma tter d [ id] not suf fi ce, especially when the at to rney has explicitly discla imed any authority to receive service on [the defendant ’ s] beh alf

. ” ) ; and ( 2) the plainti ff ’ s fail ure to provide a ny su pport for his allegations th at Voodoo authorized Santos to rece ive se r vice on its b ehalf, see generall y Pl. ’ s O pp ’ n, the Court concludes that the plaintiff ha s not met his burden to d emonstrate that service was v alid.14 (emphasis in original) ; see a lso D.C. Code § 21

- 2112 (setting forth t he pow e rs that som eone can grant an att orney - in

- fact by sign ing a power of attorney , including, inter alia , “ [w]ai v[ing] t he
issuance an d se r vi ce of process upon the pri nci p al [ and] accept [ing] serv ice of process ” ) ; cf. In re Cherry , No. 12

- 00803, 2013 WL 135229 4 , at *2 ( B a nkr
. D.D .C. Apr. 3, 2013) ( concludi ng
that § 21

- 2112 does “ not exten d to permit [an individual] to act as a lawyer for ” anoth er
ind ividual ). Without any e vi dence t o s u pport the plaintiff ’ s alle gation that Santos holds
Voodoo ’ s power of attorney, see g ener al ly Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n, his a rgument does not compel the
conclusion tha t Santos is an agent of Vo odoo authori zed to re ceive s ervice on Voo doo ’ s behalf

. See Zieg le r Bolt & Parts Co. , 1 11 F.3d at 881 ( noting that “ [ a] part y [ ] cannot fa bri cate [ ] implied authority [t o accept s ervice of proce ss as a n agent] from who le cloth to cure a deficient service, but must present facts and circu mstan ces showing the proper re la tionshi p between the defendant and its alleged agen t ” ).
A ccordingly, contrary to the plaintiff ’ s argument, see Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 11, the return from the process ser ver who delivered the copy of the summons and the Complaint to Ho a t
Goodwi n ’ s District of Co lu mbia office , see id. , Ex . 8 (Affidavit of Process Server) at 1, i s n ot

“ prima facie evidence of valid service[ ,] ” id. at 1 1 , becau se it was not served upo n someone

au tho rized to accept service on Voodoo ’ s behalf

. Furthermor e, the plaintiff ’ s arguments t hat
Voodo o consented to the Cou rt ’ s jurisdiction through Santos fail because Santos is no t Voodo o ’ s agent

. S ee id. at 1 6

– 17 (arguing that , u nder D.C. Co de § 13

- 334, “ a plaintiff can serve [a

corp oration ’ s] agents[,] ” which “ s ubjects the corporat ion to ge neral personal jurisdi ct ion” ) ; see
also id. at 17

– 1 9 (arguing that j urisdiction over Voodo o is co nsistent with d ue process ). Therefore, without any evidence to demonstrate that Voodoo has either explicitly or implicitly autho rized Santos to receive service of process on its b eh alf, the Court concludes that15 Santos is not an a gent authorized by Voodoo to receive service of proce ss, and, a ccordingly , the plaintiff has not adequately served Voodoo under R u le 4( h) (1)(B)

. B. Th e Plai nt iff ’s Motion for Alt ernativ e Service
Havi ng conclu de d that th e plaintif f

’ s attempted service of Voodoo does not comply wit h
Ru le 4(h)(1)(B) ’ s requiremen t for servi ng a corpor ation via a n authorized agent, the Court turns to the plaintiff ’ s argume nts in th e alternative that t he Cour t should order service v ia Santos

r etrospecti vely or prospectively under Rule 4(f)(3), see id. at 21, or allow him to effect service according to Ru le 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), see id. at 22. In response, Voodoo argues that the Court shou ld deny the plainti ff ’ s motion and dismiss the plai nt iff ’ s cl a ims against it because (1) the “ [p]lai nt iff
did not a ttem pt to serve Voodoo outs ide of the United Stat es[,] ” has not “ attempt ed to comply
with the Ha gue Convention in any way[,] ” and “ furnishes no reason wh y he ca n [ n o] t comply with the Hague Con ve ntion[. ] ” Voodoo ’ s Reply at 12. The Court will address the p lai ntif f

’ s requests in turn.
1. The Plaintiff ’ s Request T hat the Court Authorize S e rvice on Voodoo Through Santos According to Rule 4(f)(3)
The plai ntiff fir st asks that th e Court “ order the ser vi ce on [Voo do o ’ s] att orney under [Rule] 4(f)(3)[.] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n a t 20 . For the following reasons , the Court declines to o rde r
service on Voodoo through Santos either r etrospectively or prospecti vely.
R

ule 4(f)( 3) grants a Court discre tion to authorize se rvice of a d efendant in a foreign
country by means not otherwise prov ided for in Rule 4(f )

. See Fed. R. Civ . P. 4(f)(3) ( “ Un less federal law provides otherwise, an in dividual

— other than a minor, an inco mpetent pers on, or a person whose waive r has been f il ed

— may b e se rved a t a pl ace not within any j udicial district of

t he U nited States

. . . b y other means not prohibited by i nte rnational agreement, as the court
orders. ” ). Under Rule 4(f)(3), “ courts have authorized a wide variety of alt ernative methods o f16 service [ ,] i ncluding

. . . d elivery to the defendant ’ s attorney[. ] ” Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int ’ l
Interlink , 284 F.3d 10 07, 1016 ( 9 th Cir. 2002) ; see , e.g. , Bazarian Int’l Fin. Assocs., LLC v.
Desar rollos Aeroh otelco, C.A. , 168 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14

– 17 (D .D.C. 20 16) (denying the
def endants’ motion to dismiss for insufficie nt s ervice of proces s and concluding that “permitting

se r vice of a foreign individual or corporation through retained United States c o unsel does not r un
afou l of [Rule 4(f)]’s a pplicati on to individu als and corporations, located in foreign countries,
where ser vice will be c om pleted ” ). Howe ver, “ [t] he decision w hether to allow alternative
methods of servi n g process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district

c ou rt

. ” Freed o m Watch , Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countri es , 766 F.3d 74, 8 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

. I n evalua ting pote ntial methods of service under Rule 4(f)(3), “ an earnest
effort should be made to de vi se a method of com mun ication that is consis te nt with due process and minimizes offense to foreign law

. ” I d

. at 82 (internal citations, quot ation marks, and

emp hasis omit ted). Here, u nlike in other cases where service on a foreign defendant ’ s Unit ed St ates co unsel
has been ordered under Rule 4(f)( 3) , the re is n o evidence that the plaintiff has made any att empt
at service in a manner tha t comp l ies with Rule 4 (f) prior to asking the Court to retroactively
auth orize his attempts to serve Voodoo

. Cf. Baza rian , 168 F. Supp. 3d at 1 4

– 17 (retroa ctively

a

ut horiz ing service on Un ited States coun sel under Rule 4(f)(3) after the plaintiff had “ attempted

t o comply with the Hague C onvention to serve the origina l complaint on [the defendant ] ” ) ; Kaplan v. Hezboll ah , 715 F. Supp. 2d 165 , 167 (D.D.C. 2010) (prosp ec ti vely ordering “ service by public ation[ ] ” on Hez bollah unde r Rule 4(f)(3) after plaintiff s had att emp te d to serve the alleged leader of He zbollah because service by publication “ would not appear to violat e an y international agreement regarding se rvice o f pr ocess and is reasonably calib rated to achieve17 notice to He zbollah ” ) ; Hashem , 2018 WL 3382913, at * 3

– 4 (a ll owing Has he m to serve Shabi

“ through [Shabi ’ s] counsel of record located in the United States ” af ter Hashem “ attempted to

serve
. . . Shabi by mai l un der Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) ” )

. In contrast to the cases where service by
means not p rovided in Rule 4(f) of defendants in for eign countries has been permitted , the onl y attempts at service made by the plain tiff ha ve b ee n h is attempts at serving Santos, whic h, under clear precedent from this circuit , see supra Sectio n III.A , do not comply with Rule 4. Moreover, the pl aintiff affirmat ively represents that he is able to comply with Rule 4 , s ee
Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 22 (st ating that he , “ vi a the Clerk[ of th e Court ], c an serve [Voodoo] b y regist ered mail under [ ] Rule .

. . 4( f)(2)(C)(ii) ” ) , without providing any explanation as to why he has
failed to already do so , see generally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n. Accordingly, in light of the fact tha t the plaintif f re pr esents that he is a bl e to comply with Rule 4 , but has not yet attempted any m anner
of service aside f rom ser ving Santos , the Co urt dec lines to retroactively authorize service of
Voodoo via San tos

. 8

2. T he Plaintiff ’ s Request th at the Court Perm it Him to Serve Voodoo by Registe r ed Mail Under Rule 4(f)(2)( C )(ii ) Lastly, the Court turns to the plaintiff ’ s req uest that he be permitted to “ serve [Voodoo] by register ed mail under [ ] Rule .

. . 4(f)(2)( C)(ii). ” Id. at 22. As the pla intiff corre ctly argues, see id. , service of Voodoo b y reg istered m ail woul d be permissible under Rule 4(f)(2 )(C) ( ii). According to Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), “ if th ere is n o
interna tionally agreed means [of service ] , or i f an int ernational agreement allows[,] but does not specify[,] other means , ” “ unless pro hi bi ted by the for eign cou ntry ’ s law , ” a plaintiff may serve a

8 Becaus e the Court declin es to grant the plaintiff ’ s request unde r Ru le 4(f)(3) , it does not reach the plainti ff ’ s a rg um ents that the Court has the a uthority to re troactively permit service on Voodoo through Santos , see Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 21

– 22 (arg uing that because Voodoo “ already ha s actual notice of the case, then [the C ]our t[] can liberally construe the [R]ules to retro ac ti vely order

. . . service ” und er Rule 4(f)(3) ).18 fo reign defendant by “ using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the [defend ant] and th at requires a signed receipt[ .] ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (f)(2)(C)(ii). Article 10(a) of
the Ha gu e Convention o n th e S e rvice Abroad of Judicial and Extra judic ial Documents , to which
both France and th e United States are signatories , pe rmits service by ma il pu rsuant to
Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) , s ee Conve n tion Done a t the Hague A r t. 10, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U .S .T. 361 ( “ Ha gue C onve ntion ” ) (stating that, “ [p]rovided the State of des tination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with

. . . the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal

c hannels, di rectly to persons abroad ” ) ; Winter Splas h, Inc. v. Men on , __ U.S. __, 1 37 S . Ct. 1504, 15 13 (2017) (holding t hat “ the traditional tools of tr eaty interp retation unmistak ab ly
demonstrate that A r ticle 10(a) encom passes service by mail ” ) , and “ Fran ce has not objected to Article 10[ , ] ” Melia v. Les Gr ands Chais de Fr. , 135 F

. R.D. 28, 36 (D. R.I. 1991)

. Therefore , bec ause s ervice by mail is both “ allow[ed] ” by the Hague Convention , Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2),
and not “ pr ohibite d by the foreign country ’ s law[,] ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C), service on
Vood oo “ using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends . . . a nd tha t requires a s igned

rec eipt [,] ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), would comply with Rule 4.
Accor dingly, the Court concludes that i t w ill grant the plaint iff an extension of the
dead li ne by which he must effe ct ser vice on Vood oo in order for the plain tiff t o attempt service in compliance with Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii). Although Voodoo ’ s arguments regarding the pl aintiff ’ s unwillingness to attem pt comp liance with Rule 4 (f) prior to the issu an ce of this Memorandum Opini on and Ord er are compelling , see Voodoo ’ s Reply a t 14, the plaintiff ’ s pro se statu s and the
lack of evidence that Voodoo would fa ce any prejudic e from an extension of the serv ice deadline, s ee generall y id. ; Voo doo ’ s Mot ., cau se the Court to conclude that the pl aint iff should be granted a “ secon d bite[ a t] the apple[,] ” i d. at 14

. See Moore , 994 F. 2d at 876 (noting that19 “ [p ] ro se litiga nts are allowed more latitude than litiga nts repr esente d by counsel to c orrec t
defe c ts in se rv ice of proc ess and pleadings ” ). T he Court therefore den ies Voodoo ’ s motion to
dismiss , and gr ants the plainti ff ’ s motion for alternative service only to the extent he seeks an
extension of the service d eadline to effect serv ice on Vood oo in compliance wit h
Rule 4(f)(2)(C )(ii)

. However, the pla intiff is advised that, i n the event he f a ils to effect service in compliance with R ule 4 on or before the deadline ordered by the Court , Voodoo may renew its
moti on to dismis s under Rule 12(b)(5) , as the Co urt ’ s ext en sion “ does not, of c ou rse, ‘ constitute
a licen se for a plaintiff filing pro se to i gno re th e Federal Rules [,] ’ ” Lindsey , 448 F. Supp. 2 d

at 47.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the f oregoing reasons, th e Court conclude s that it must deny Voodoo ’ s motion to
dismiss , and g ra nt in part and deny in part the plaintiff ’ s motion for alternative service.
SO ORDERED this 6t h day of Jan uary , 2022

. 9

REGGIE B. WALTON United States Distr ict Ju dge

9 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order co nsistent with thi s Memora ndum Opinio n.