NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CAROLYN BARNES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2018-2096

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:17-cv-00534-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen 

Coster Williams.

______________________ 

Decided: January 9, 2019

______________________ 

CAROLYN BARNES, Leander, TX, pro se. 

 JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
2 BARNES v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. 

Plaintiff–Appellant Carolyn Barnes appeals the Court 

of Federal Claims’ (“Claims Court’s”) denial of her motion 

for relief under Rule 60 of the Rules of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims.1 Because we agree that the 

Claims Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On June 11, 2013, Ms. Barnes was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon while using or exhibiting a firearm. Barnes v. State, No. 03-13-00434, 2016 

WL 3917126, at *1 (Tex. App. July 13, 2016) (affirming 

conviction). Ms. Barnes filed a complaint on behalf of 

herself and her children in the Claims Court on April 13, 

2017, against numerous defendants, including but not 

limited to the United States, stemming from her purportedly wrongful conviction. The Claims Court aptly summarized Ms. Barnes’ complaint as follows:

Plaintiffs’ 179-page complaint is difficult to understand, but appears to stem from Ms. Barnes’ 

2013 aggravated assault conviction. Plaintiffs allege conspiracy on the part of a number of individuals to “frame” Ms. Barnes for a crime she did 

not commit. Plaintiffs further claim numerous violations of the Constitution, state and federal 

statutes, “international treaties, covenants, covenants, and conventions,” as well as breach of contract, criminal activity, and torts.

 

1 Ms. Barnes styled her filing as a motion for reconsideration but the Claims Court treated it as a Rule 60 

motion for relief from judgment. 
BARNES v. UNITED STATES 3

S.A. 207. All of Ms. Barnes’ allegations before the Claims 

Court amount to collateral attacks on her criminal conviction.

On November 29, 2017, the Claims Court dismissed

Ms. Barnes’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Claims Court entered judgment on November 

30, 2017. Ms. Barnes submitted a motion styled as a 

“motion to reconsider” on December 29, 2017. The Claims 

Court construed Ms. Barnes’ motion as a motion for relief 

from the judgment under Rule 60. On May 24, 2018, the 

Claims Court denied Ms. Barnes’ motion because she 

“ha[d] not articulated any grounds warranting reconsideration.” Ms. Barnes appealed to this court on June 21, 

2018. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

This court reviews a denial of a motion for relief from 

judgment for abuse of discretion. Progressive Indus., Inc. 

v. United States, 888 F.3d 1248, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction de novo. Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United 

States, 878 F.3d 1086, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 

Ms. Barnes purports to appeal from the Claims 

Court’s judgment dismissing her complaint. But Ms. 

Barnes’ appeal was docketed on June 21, 2018, well past 

the 60-day deadline to appeal from the Claims Court’s 

November 2017 judgment of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a)(1)(B). Though this deadline may be suspended by 

a motion under Rule 60, that is only so where the motion 

was filed with the Claims Court “within the time allowed,” which in this case is 28 days following entry of 

judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). 

Because Ms. Barnes filed her motion for relief with 

the Claims Court 29 days after the Claims Court’s judgment of dismissal was entered, her motion did not sus-
4 BARNES v. UNITED STATES

pend the deadline to appeal the Claims Court’s order of 

dismissal and was therefore untimely. Our jurisdiction is 

thus limited to a review of the Claims Court’s denial of 

Ms. Barnes’ motion for relief from judgment. See Browder 

v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 (1978) (“[A]n 

appeal from denial of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]

60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for 

review.”); Brown v. United States, 80 F. App’x 676, 677 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (construing plaintiff’s untimely motion for 

reconsideration as a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment and limiting this court’s review to the denial of Rule 

60 relief).2 Even if we were to consider Ms. Barnes’ 

appeal from both the Claims Court’s order of dismissal 

and denial of relief under Rule 60, the result would be the 

same.

Ms. Barnes’ claims are collateral attacks on her criminal conviction. It is well-established that the Claims 

Court “lacks jurisdiction to consider claims which amount 

to ‘collateral attacks’ on criminal convictions.” Mercer v. 

United States, 668 F. App’x 362, 363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

accord Beadles v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 242, 245 

(2014); Carter v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 898, 900 

(1981). The Claims Court thus correctly dismissed Ms. 

Barnes’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.

To the extent that Ms. Barnes argues that the limits 

on the jurisdiction of the Claims Court are unconstitu-

 

2 The standard of review for a denial of relief is the 

same for both a Rule 60 motion under the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Court of Federal 

claims. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 

994 F.2d 792, 794 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying the 

Rule 60 standard of review from Browder because “Rule 

60(b) of the Claims Court is a virtual duplicate of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)”).
BARNES v. UNITED STATES 5

tional, she provides no reasoned basis for why this would 

be the case. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Claims Court did not err in dismissing 

Ms. Barnes’ case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we 

affirm. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.