[Cite as State v. Lenard, 2017-Ohio-8570.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104986

STATE OF OHIO

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

RICHARD MARCUS LENARD 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

APPLICATION DENIED 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-15-597800-A 

Application for Reopening 

Motion No. 509715 

RELEASE DATE: November 15, 2017 
FOR APPELLANT

Richard Marcus Lenard, pro se 

Inmate No. 700503 

Mansfield Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 788 

Mansfield, Ohio 44901 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Katherine Mullin 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} Richard Marcus Lenard has filed a timely application for reopening pursuant to 

App.R. 26(B). Lenard is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in State v. 

Lenard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104986, 2017-Ohio-4074, that affirmed his conviction and 

sentence for the offenses of theft and tampering with records. We decline to reopen Lenard’s 

original appeal. 

{¶2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Lenard is 

required to establish that the performance of his appellate counsel was deficient and the 

deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), cert. denied, 

497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). 

{¶3} In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that a court’s scrutiny of an 

attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court further stated that it is all too tempting 

for a defendant to second-guess his attorney after conviction and that it would be too easy for a 

court to conclude that a specific act or omission was deficient, especially when examining the 

matter in hindsight. Thus, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 

considered sound trial strategy. Strickland. 

{¶4} Herein, Lenard has raised one proposed assignment of error in support of his 

application for reopening. Lenard’s sole proposed assignment of error is that: 

The trial court erred by imposing court costs in the entry without imposing them 

in open court. 
{¶5} Lenard, through his proposed assignment of error, argues that the trial court did not 

impose costs during the sentencing hearing and thus was prohibited from including court costs 

within the sentencing journal entry. Contrary to the appellant’s argument, the trial court did 

address the issue of costs during sentencing hearing and did impose costs. 

And on count 2, tampering with records, misdemeanor of the first degree, 6 

months. Count 1 and 2 will run concurrent to one another. I am going to waive 

a fine, order that you do pay court costs. You may perform Court Community 

Work Service in lieu of costs which you can do in prison. And you are 

remanded. 

Tr. 587 - 588. 

{¶6} The appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced through his sole 

assignment of error, because the trial court did impose costs at the sentencing hearing. 

Appellate counsel was not required to raise a frivolous argument on appeal. State v. Buford, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75288, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2623 (May 31, 2000). See also State v. 

Anderson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103490, 2015-Ohio-420; State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 101368, 2015-Ohio-420. 

{¶7} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied. 

 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR