If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re CATRELL JAVON SHELTON, Minor.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Petitioner-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

May 18, 2023

v No. 363578

Ingham Circuit Court

CATRELL JAVON SHELTON, Family Division

LC No. 22-000404-DL

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent is charged with open murder for the shooting death of Mathews. Because 

respondent was a minor when the offense occurred, petitioner initially filed a delinquency petition 

in the trial court. Later, petitioner filed a motion asking the court to waive jurisdiction and allow 

respondent to be tried as an adult. Petitioner also asked for a charge of carrying a concealed 

weapon to be added. Following the first phase of the waiver hearing, the court determined that 

there was probable cause that respondent committed the offenses of open murder and carrying a 

concealed weapon. And, after the second phase of the waiver hearing, the court found that the 

interests of respondent and the public would be best served by waiver. Consequently, the court 

waived jurisdiction over respondent and transferred the matter to the criminal division of the circuit 

court. Respondent appeals that decision as of right. Because there are no errors warranting 

reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

Mathews was shot dead on May 6, 2022. The shooting was witnessed by BP, a 13-yearold who was a friend of Mathews. At the first phase of the waiver hearing, BP testified that before 

the shooting he got a ride from Mathews. He was in the front seat with Mathews; respondent and 

two other individuals were in the backseat. BP recounted that respondent put a gun to Mathews’s 
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head and warned him that he “better not reach for your blick.”1 Gunfire then erupted from the 

backseat. BP stated that two different guns were fired. He put his head down, so he did not see 

who was firing. However, before the shooting started, he saw respondent with a “FN” gun in his 

hand, and after the shooting, he witnessed respondent’s co-respondent put a .45-caliber gun into 

his pants. BP stated that he fell out of the car, saw Mathews lying on the ground, and ran away 

from the scene.

II. WAIVER HEARING

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by waiving jurisdiction. This Court reviews a 

decision on a motion to waive jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. People v Fultz, 453 Mich 

937, 937; 554 NW2d 725 (1996). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an 

outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 320; 

817 NW2d 33 (2012). We review for clear error the court’s findings of fact. MCR 2.613(C); 

MCR 3.902(A). A trial court’s “finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to support the 

finding.” In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich App 323, 329; 890 NW2d 387 (2016) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

“Generally, the family division of the circuit court (family court) has exclusive jurisdiction 

over juveniles under [eighteen] years of age who commit criminal offenses.” People v Conat, 238 

Mich App 134, 139; 605 NW2d 49 (1999), citing MCL 712A.2(a)(1).2 But the jurisdiction may 

be waived either automatically if the offense is a “specified juvenile violation” under MCL 

600.6063or by a traditional waiver under MCL 712A.4. Under a traditional waiver, a court may 

waive its jurisdiction to the circuit court upon a motion by the prosecuting attorney. MCL 

712A.4(1). Traditional-waiver hearings consist of two phases. MCR 3.950(D). During the first 

phase, the court must “determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has 

 

1 A blick is a term used to refer to a gun.

2 At the time Conat was decided, MCL 712A.2(a)(1), as amended by 1998 PA 478, provided for 

family division jurisdiction of “a juvenile under 17 years of age” who committed a criminal 

offense. However, effective October 1, 2021, MCL 712A.2(a)(1) was amended to increase this 

age ceiling to 18 years of age. 2019 PA 113. See also MCL 712A.1(1)(i), which was amended, 

effective April 4, 2021, to provide, “Beginning October 1, 2021, ‘juvenile’ means a person who is 

less than 18 years of age who is the subject of a delinquency petition.” 2020 PA 389.

3 MCL 750.316 (murder) is included as a “specified juvenile violation.” MCL 600.606(2)(a). 

However, petitioner chose to initiate proceedings in the family division of the circuit court and to 

request a traditional waiver. On appeal, petitioner contends that because an automatic waiver was 

available, there can be no error in the trial court’s waiver decision. However, the availability of 

an alternative means of achieving a waiver of the court’s jurisdiction, does not mean that the 

court’s analysis under a traditional waiver framework is incapable of being considered.
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been committed that if committed by an adult would be a felony” and that the respondent 

“committed the offense.” MCR 3.950(D)(1). See also MCL 712A.4(3). During the second phase, 

the court must “determine whether the interests of the juvenile and the public would best be served 

by granting the [waiver] motion.” MCR 3.950(D)(2). See also MCL 712A.4(4).

1. FIRST PHASE

Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that there was 

probable cause to believe that the alleged offenses were committed by him. In the first phase, the

court must make two determinations on the record: (1) whether “there is probable cause to believe 

that an offense has been committed that if committed by an adult would be a felony,” and (2) 

whether “there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile who is 14 years of age or older 

committed the offense.” MCR 3.950(D)(1); see also MCL 712A.4(3). “Probable cause requires 

a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to 

conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 

50, 57; 780 NW2d 280 (2010) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). The prosecuting 

attorney has the burden to present legally admissible evidence demonstrating each element of the 

offense and to establish probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense. MCR 

3.950(D)(1)(b).

Here, the court’s finding of probable cause was based upon its finding that BP’s testimony 

was credible. On appeal, respondent argues that the credibility finding was clearly erroneous. In 

support, he directs this Court to inconsistencies, contradictions, and “outright falsehoods” among 

BP’s prior statements to law enforcement and his testimony at the waiver hearing. He asserts that 

BP was a wholly unreliable witness and that his testimony should have been disregarded because 

it lacked credibility.

In analyzing BP’s credibility, the court found:

The Court listened to the testimony. The biggest argument that has been 

made is the credibility of the 13-year-old witness that links these two young men 

to the scene in the car when the shooting occurred. The Court finds that his 

testimony about them being in the car with weapons to be credible. There are a lot 

of questions about credibility on details but as was noted, when you look at the jury 

instruction for credibility, which is a guide, this Court is not in the position of 

employing jury instructions other than to give a guide for the legal framework 

within which I must base my opinion.

The age of the witness, [BP], is 13. While he is a pretty sophisticated 13-

year-old with knowledge of guns, with knowledge of the streets, with knowledge 

of the language of the streets, what is not in dispute is he’s 13. What is also not in 

dispute is just based upon the conduct of the people in the gallery during his 

testimony, the kind of stress, fear and anguish that young man must experience 

every day, having been present where a murder occurred for a dear friend, could 

really contribute to him being all over the place. He admitted he didn’t want to be 

a rat, a snitch. When you’re living in the streets where that young man is living, 

that’s real and the stories change depending upon how fearful you are for your life. 
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That young man didn’t want to be here today. That young man was only here 

because we had officers get him. That’s real. The Court considers that when 

considering the credibility of his testimony.

The court also found:

I believe what [BP] said about that based upon his reaction. His statements 

were corroborated by the sloppy use of social media that both [co-respondent] and 

[respondent] engaged in. It was corroborated because they had the guns. While 

sitting listening to the testimony, I had an opportunity, which being in court allows, 

to look at [co-respondent] and [respondent] as the evidence was being presented. 

Their reaction also corroborates that they had possession of guns when they were 

on social media, which makes it fair and reasonable to assume that the testimony 

of [BP] that they had guns on their person on that day is believable. Their behavior 

on social media, as well as their response when they watched the video corroborate 

that.

We conclude that, notwithstanding that respondent has directed this Court to weaknesses 

in BP’s testimony, the trial court did not err by finding BP credible. The court’s decision, which 

was based upon its observations of BP, respondent and co-respondent, and the conduct of 

individuals in the gallery, was not improper. Indeed, this Court must defer to the trial court's 

“superior position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testified before it.” People v White, 

331 Mich App 144, 150; 951 NW2d 106 (2020). See also MCR 2.613(C) (stating that “regard 

shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

who appeared before it.”).

BP’s testimony supported the trial court’s finding that respondent had a gun and pointed it 

at Mathews’s head, that respondent’s co-respondent had a gun, that the third individual in the 

backseat did not have a weapon, that respondent and his co-respondent were in the backseat of the 

vehicle, and that shots were fired from the back of the vehicle directly after respondent put a gun 

to Mathews’s head. Further, Mathews was pronounced dead at the scene. Forensic evidence also 

demonstrated that shell casings were found inside the vehicle from the same type of guns 

respondent and his co-respondent were seen holding. As a result, the evidence supports the court’s 

finding that respondent had a gun and that both respondent and his co-respondent fired their 

weapons from the backseat of the vehicle toward Mathews in the front seat, and Mathews died 

after being shot. In addition, respondent was charged with “open murder,” and therefore the degree 

does not have to be specified. See Johnson, 427 Mich at 108. Thus, on this record, there is enough 

to “conscientiously entertain” a reasonable belief that respondent either fired the shots that resulted 

in Mathews’s death, or acted in concert with his co-respondent to cause Mathews’s death and is 

guilty of felony murder or guilty on an aiding and abetting theory, based on the evidence presented. 

Plunkett, 485 Mich at 57. The trial court, therefore, did not clearly err by finding that there was 

probable cause to believe that respondent committed the offenses of open murder and carrying a 

concealed weapon.
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2. SECOND PHASE

If the trial court finds the requisite probable cause at the first-phase hearing, a “secondphase hearing shall be held to determine whether the interests of the juvenile and the public would 

best be served by granting the motion.” MCR 3.950(2); see also MCL 712A.4(4). In making this 

determination, the trial court is required to consider the following six factors:

(i) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, 

including, but not limited to, the existence of any aggravating factors recognized 

by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and 

the effect on any victim;

(ii) the culpability of the juvenile in committing the alleged offense, 

including, but not limited to, the level of the juvenile’s participation in planning 

and carrying out the offense and the existence of any aggravating or mitigating 

factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines;

(iii) the juvenile’s prior record of delinquency including, but not limited to, 

any record of detention, any police record, any school record, or any other evidence 

indicating prior delinquent behavior;

(iv) the juvenile’s programming history, including, but not limited to, the 

juvenile’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;

(v) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile 

justice system;

(vi) the dispositional options available for the juvenile. [MCR 

3.950(D)(2)(d); see also MCL 712A.4(4).]

The trial court must give “greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the juvenile’s 

prior record of delinquency than to the other criteria.” MCL 712A.4(4). There also must be 

evidence in the record regarding the suitability of programs and facilities available in the juvenile 

and adult correctional systems, and the trial court must refer to this evidence. People v Dunbar, 

423 Mich 380, 388; 377 NW2d 262 (1985). Here, the trial court considered the six factors stated 

in MCR 3.950(D)(2)(d) and MCL 712A.4(4), and, as required by MCL 712A.4(4), it gave greater 

weight to the seriousness of the offense and respondent’s prior delinquency record. We consider 

the analysis of each factor in turn.

First, respondent was accused of murder, which is an undeniably extremely serious offense. 

See People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 256; 987 NW2d 161) (“There can be no dispute that any form 

of murder is one of the most severe and heinous crimes that a person can commit in any 

jurisdiction[.]”). In finding that factor one favored a waiver of jurisdiction, the trial court properly 

noted the seriousness of the offense. The court also found that the use of firearms—which were 

displayed on social media—was an aggravating factor. We discern no error in the court’s 

determination that factor one favors waiver of jurisdiction.
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Second, the testimony and evidence presented demonstrate respondent was culpable. And, 

although respondent disagrees with the trial court’s credibility assessment of BP, we will defer to 

that determination, which was based on the trial court’s observation of the witness while he was 

testifying. See MCR 2.613(C). This factor, therefore, favors waiver.

Third, respondent’s prior record of delinquency also favors waiver. Although respondent 

was only found responsible for one curfew violation and pleaded guilty to one charge of 

“disorderly person, jostling,” respondent’s record demonstrated that he was also involved in many 

encounters with the police for larceny, shoplifting, attempted robbery, vehicle theft, traffic 

infractions, possession of a firearm, and disorderly conduct. In addition, respondent had an 

extensive delinquency record regarding his behavior in school, which included multiple 

suspensions for behavioral issues and ultimately expulsion. Given the nature of all of these 

offenses and respondent’s behavioral issues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding that this factor weighed in favor of waiving jurisdiction.

Next, as to factor four, the record demonstrates that respondent did not participate in 

programming, and therefore, the trial court’s decision that this factor weighed in favor of waiver 

was not an abuse of discretion. Respondent participated in counseling in 2017, and at the time of 

this offense, he was participating in probationary services in March 2022, including cognitive 

behavioral therapy, group intervention courses, mental health services, and mental health 

counseling, but failed to comply with the terms of his probation.

Regarding factors five and six, the record demonstrated that a secure juvenile facility was 

the only option available to respondent in the juvenile system because of the seriousness of the 

offense committed. Other placement options, such as the Youth Center in which respondent had 

initially been placed, were inadequate because of the seriousness of the offense and respondent’s 

lack of benefit from the services he was already receiving there. Although there was not specific 

evidence of what respondent’s needs were, there was sufficient evidence of the suitability of 

programs and facilities in the juvenile and adult systems that the trial court considered. Dunbar, 

423 Mich at 388. As a result, the adult system, rather than the juvenile system, would better suit 

respondent’s needs based on the seriousness of the offense. Further, because respondent could 

only be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile system until he was 21 years old, and he was 17 years 

old at the time of the second-phase hearing, respondent would age out of the juvenile system after 

only four years. As a result, the juvenile system was inadequate to punish respondent for this 

offense, for which respondent could be sentenced to life imprisonment for in the adult system. 

Therefore, this weighs in favor of waiver of jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the interests 

of respondent and the public would be best served by a waiver.

Affirmed.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Michael J. Kelly