1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### BOYL E v . UNITE D STATE S CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECON D CIRCUIT No. 07–1 30 9. Ar g u ed Janu a r y14, 2009 —Dec ided Ju ne 8, 2009 The evidence at peti tioner Boyle’s trial f o r violating the Racketeer In

fluenced a n d Corrupt Orga niza tions Act (RICO) provisi o n forbidding “an yper s on. . . assoc i ate dw i than y enterprise engaged in, or the ac

tiv i ties of whi c h affec t , inter s tate orfor e ig n c o mmer c e , to c o nduc t or participate, di rectly o rindirectly, in the conduct of such enterp rise’s affair s thr o ugh a patter nof r a c k eteeringac tiv i ty ,” 18 U. S. C. §1962(c), was sufficient to prove, a m ong o t her t h ings , t h a tB o yle a n d other s c o mmitted a ser i es of bank th efts in sev e r a l Stat es; that the pa rt icipa n ts included acor egroup , along with others recruited from time to t i me; and thatthe c o r eg r oup was looselyandi n for m allyor ganized, lacking a leader, hierarchy, or any long-term master plan. Relying largely on Unit ed S t atesv. Tu rk et te , 452 U. S. 576, 58 3, th e Dis t rictCourtins t ruct ed t h e j u ry t h a tt oes t ab lis h a RICO a s s o cia

tion-in-fac t“enter pr ise,” the Gov e rnment must prove (1) an ongoing orga niza t i on wit hafra m ework, form a lor inform a l , for ca rr ying out its objec t iv es, an d (2) th at a ssoc i a t ion memb ers functioned a s acon tinuing unit to a c hieveaco mmon purpos e. T h e court a l s otold the j u ry t h a ta na s s o cia t ion-in-fa ct ’s exis t e nce is oft e n m o re rea d ily pr ov ed bywh at itdoes th an byab str a c t an aly s is of i t s st r u c t ur e, an d denied Boyle’s req u es tfor an ins t ruct ion req u iring t h e Gover n m e nt to pr ov e that the enter p r i se had “a n a s cer t a i nable s t ructura lhiera r chy dis t inctfromt h e cha r ge d predic ate ac ts.” Boyle was convicted, a n d t h e S e con dCircuita ffirm ed. Held: 1

. An a s s o ciat ion-in-fa ctent e rpris e und er RICO m u s thave a “str uc tur e ,” but the per t inent jur y instruction need notbe framed in the precise language Boyle proposes, i.e., a s having “ a n a s cert a i nable s t ruct ure b e yo nd t h a tinhere ntin t h e pa t t e rn of ra cket ee ring a c t ivit y2 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Sy llabu s inwh ichit eng a g e s.” Pp. 4–12. (a) Inligh tof RICO’ s br oa d st ate m en t t h at anen ter p r i se “in

c l u d es an y . . . g r ou p of in div i du als assoc i ated infac talth ou ghn o t a leg a l en tity ,” §196 1(4), an d th e r e qu ir emen t th at RI CO be “li b er ally c o n s tr u e d to effec t u a te its r e medial pu r p o s es,” n o te follo win g§1961, Turk ett ee x plained that “enterprise” re ac hes “a g r ou p of per s on s asso ciated togethe rfor a common purpose of engaging in a course of con

du c t ,” 452 U. S., at 583, an d “is pr ov ed byev idenc eof anon g o ingor g a n i zation , for m al orin for m al, an d by evidence that the various a s s o cia t es function a s acontinuing unit.” Ibid

. Pp. 4–5. (b) The questi on presented by t h is ca s eis whet her a na s s o cia

t i on-in-fa ctent e rpris em u s t have “ a n a s cert a i nab l e s t ruct ure b e yond that inher e nt in the patter nof r a cketeering activity in which it en

g a g e s . ” P e t

. f o rC e r t

. i

. T h i s q u e s t i on can be broken into three parts. Fir s t, the enter p r i se must hav e a “str uc tur e ” that, underRICO’ s ter m s, has at l e ast thr ee feat ur es: a purpos e, relationships among the associ ates, an d longevity sufficient toperm itt h e as s o cia t es t o purs ue the enterprise’s purpose. See Turk ette, 452 U. S., at 5 83. Th e in

str u c t ions need not ac tuallyuse the ter m“str uc tur e ,” howev e r , so long as the re levant point’s subst a nce is adequately exp r essed. Sec

ond, because a jury must fin dthe ex istenc e of elements of a crime be

y o n da r e asonable dou b t, r e qu ir in ga ju ry to fin dth e ex isten c e of a s t ruct ure t h a tis ascertaina b lewould be redundant and potentially misle a ding

. Thir d, the phr a se “bey ond tha tinher e nt in th e patter nof ra cket eering a c t ivit y” is corr ect l y in ter p r e t e d to mean that the enter

prise’s existen c e is a separate elem ent tha tmustbe pr o v ed, not that s u ch exis t e ncem a y never b einferre d fromthe evidence showing that the associates engaged in a patternof rack eteering activi ty. See ibid. Pp. 6–8. (c ) Boy l e’ s ar gu men tth atanen ter p r i se mu st h av e str u c t u r al fea

tur e s addi tion al to those tha tc a n be fair lyinfer r e d fr om RICO’ s lan

gua g e—e. g . , ahiera rchi c a ls t ruct u r e or cha i n of com m a n d ; fixed roles for a s s o ciat es ; a n d a nent e r p ris e name, r e g u larmeet ings, dues, es

tabl ished rule s and regulati ons, di sciplina r y proced ures, or induction or initiation ceremonies—has no bas is i nth e st atu t e ’ s tex t

. A s Turk ett esaid, an associa t ion

- in-fact ente rpris eis s i mply acontinuing unit that functions with a c o mmon pu rpose. The breadth of RICO’s “enterpris e” concept is high lightedbycompar in gth e statu t e with ot her federa l la ws having much m o re s t ringentreq u ire m ent s for t a r geting or ga nized crimina l groups : E.g., § 195 5(b) define s an “illegal g a mblin gbu si n e ss” as on e t h at “in v olves five or more persons who conduct, fina n c e, ma na ge, s u pervis e, dire ct, or o w n all or part of such bu sin e ss.” Pp. 8–10. (d) Rejection of Boyle’s argument does not lead to a merger of the3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s §1962(c) crimeand other fed e ral offenses. For e x ample, proof that a defen d an t v i olated §1 95 5 do es n o t neces s a rily es tablis h tha the con

spired to p a rti c ipate in aga mbling ent e rpris e ’s a ffa irs throu gh apa t

ter nof r a c k eteer ingac tiv i ty

. Rath er, that would require the prosecu

tion to prove either that the defe ndant c o m m ittedapa tte r nof §195 5 violations or a pattern of state-l a w gambling crimes. See §1961(1)

. Pp. 10–1 1. (e) Beca us e RICO’s la ngua ge is clea r, the Court need not rea c h Boyle’s statutory purpose, legislativ e history, o rrule-of

- lenity argu

men t s. Pp. 11–12.

2. The instructions below were co rre ct and adequate. By explicitly telling jurors they co uld not convic t on the RICO charges unless they found tha tthe Gover n ment ha d provedthe existence of an enterprise, t h e ins t ruct ions m a de clea r t h a t th is w a s a separ a te element from the pattern of racketeering a c tivity. The j u rors a l s o were a d eq ua t e ly told that the e n ter p r i se needed the s t r u c t ur al at tr ibu t es th at may b e inferred from the statutory language. Finally, the instr u ction that a n enterprise’s existence “is of tentimes mor e r e adilypr ov enbywh at i t does, r a th ert h anbyabs tr a c t an aly s i s of its structure” properly con

veyed T u rk ett e ’s point that proof of a patt ern of racketeering activity m a y b e s u fficientin a pa rt icula rca s et o perm it a ninference of t h e enterprise’s existence. P. 12. 283 Fed. Appx . 825, affir m ed

.

ALITO , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d S CALI A , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , T HOMAS , an d G IN SB U R G , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., filed a dissentin g opinion, in which B REYER , J., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 07–1 30 9 

### EDMU ND BOYL E, PE TITIONE R v. UNITE D STAT ES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e8, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. We are a s ked in this case to decide whether an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq ., must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the patternof rac k eteering ac tivit yin which i t engages.” Pet. for Cer t . i. We hold that su ch an enterpri se must have a “stru cture ” but that a ninstructio nframed in this precise language is not neces s ary. The District Co urt properly in structed th e jury in t h is case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I A The evidence at petitioner’s trial was sufficient to prove the following: Petitioner and ot hers partic i pated in a series of ba nkthefts in Ne w York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin during the 1990’s. The participants in these crimes included a core group, along wi th oth e rs who were recruited fr om time to time. Although the participant s sometimes attempted bank-vaul t burglaries and ban k robberies, the group u s ually targ eted cash-laden night

-2 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### deposit boxes, which are often found in ba nks in retail areas. Each thef t was t y pical l y car r ied out bya g r o u p of par

ticipants who met bef o rehand to plan the crime, gather tools (such as crowbars , fishing gaffs, and walkie-talkies), and assign the roles that each participant would play (such as lookout and driver). Th e participa nts generally split the proceeds from the thefts. The group was loosely and informally organized. It does not appear to have ha d a leader or hierarchy; nor does it appear that the partici

pants ever formulated any long-term master plan or agreement. From 1991 to 1994, th e core grou p was responsible for more than 30 night-deposit-box th efts. By 19 94, petitioner had joined the group, and over the next five years, he participate d in numerous attempted night-deposit-bo x thefts and at least two attempted bank-vault burglaries. In 2003, petitioner was indicted for participa tion in the conduct of t h e affairs of an enterp rise through a patternof racketeerin g activity, i nviolation of 18 U. S. C. §1962(c); conspiracy to commit that offense, in violation of §1962( d); conspiracy to commit bank burgl ary, in violation of §3 71; and nine counts of bank burglary and attempted ban k burglary, inviolation of §2113(a). B In instructi ng the jur yon the meaning of a RICO “en

terprise,” t h e District Court relied largelyon language in UnitedS t atesv. Turke t te , 452 U. S. 576 (1981). The court told the jur o rs that, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, th e Governm e nt had to prove tha t : “(1) There [was] an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carr ying out its objec

tives; and (2) the vari ous members and associates of the association function[ed] as acontinuing unit to achieve a common purpose.” App. 112. Over petitioner’s objectio n ,3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### the court also told the jury that it c o uld “find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structu r a l hierarchy, f o rm[ed] solely for the purpose of c a rrying out a pattern of racketeerin g acts” and that “[ c] ommon sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily provenby what it does, rather than by ab stract anal ysis of its structu re.” Id. , at 111– 112. 1 

### Petitioner requested an instruct ion that the Govern

ment was required to prove that the enterprise “had an ongoing organization, a core mem b ership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an a s certainable structura l

——————

1 The relevant portion of the i n structions was as follow s : “The term ‘ent erpris e’ a s us ed in these instructions may also include a g r ou p of people as soc i ated infac t , even th ough this association is no t recognized as a legal entity. Indeed, a nenterprise need not have a na me. Thus , a nenterpris e need not b ea form[a l] b u s i nes s entity s u ch as ac o r p or ation , bu t may be mer e lyan in for m al as so c i ationof in di

viduals. A group or association of peop le can be an ‘enterprise’ if, among other requirements, these indiv i duals ‘ a s s oc iate’ tog e therfora purpose of e n gaging in a course of conduct. Common sense sug gests that the existence of an asso cia t io n-in-fact is oftentimes more r e adilypr ov en bywh at it does, r a th erth a nbyabstr ac t an aly s is of it s s t ruct ure.

“Moreover, yo u may find an enterpri se where an association of indi

vidua l s , witho u t st ruct ural hiera rchy , forms so lely for the purpose of ca rryin g outapat t e rn of ra cket eering a c t s . S u ch a na s s o ciat ion of persons may be establishedby evid ence showing an ongoing organiza

tion, formal or informal, and . . . by evidence that the pe ople mak i ng up the associatio n functioned a s a conti nuing unit. There f ore, in order to establi s h the existence of s u ch anenterpr i se, the g o ver n ment must prove that: (1) There is anongoing organization withsome sort of framework, fo rmal or informal, for carrying outits objectives; and ( 2 ) th e v a r i ou s m e mber s an d a ssoc i ate s of the associationfunction as a continuin gu n it to a c hieve a common purpo s e.

“Reg ar din g‘ o rg an ization , ’ it is notne ce ssa ry thatth e e n t erpri se have any particula r or form al str u cture , but it must have sufficient organiza

tion that its m e mber s func tioned an d operated in a coordinated manner in order t oca rry outt h e a lleged common purpose or purposes of the en ter p r i se.” App. 111– 11 3 (emph a si s adde d).4 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### hierarchy d i stinct from the charge d predicate acts.” Id. , at 95. The District Cou rt refused to give that instruction. Petitioner was convicted on 11 of the 12 cou n ts agains t him, including the RICO counts, and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. In a sum m ary order, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated th e sentence on a g r ound not rel e vant to t h e issues bef o re us. 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2007). The Court o f Appeals di d not speci f ically address the RICO jury in

structions, stating only that the arguments not discussed in the order were “wi t hout merit.” Id. , at 826. Petitioner was then resentenced, and we granted certiorari, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Ap

peals concerning the meaning of a RICO enterprise. II A RICO make s it “unlawful for any p e rson empl oyed by or associa t ed with any en ter p ris eengaged in, or the activities of which aff e ct, interst a te or foreign commer ce, to condu ct or participa te, directly or indire ctly, in the co nduct of su ch enterprise’s affairs th rough a p a ttern of racketeerin g activity or collectionof unlawful debt.” 18 U. S. C. §1962(c) (emphasis added). The statute does no t specifically define the outer boundaries of the “enterprise” concept but sta t es that the term “inclu des any in dividual, p a rtnership, corporatio n, association, or other le gal entity, and any un ion or grou p of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en

tity.” §1961(4). 2 

### This enumeration of includedenterprises

——————

2 This provision does not purp ort to se t out an exhaustive definition of the ter m“ente r pr ise.” Comp ar e §§196 1(1)– ( 2) (defin in gwh at th e ter m s “r ac keteer ingac tiv i ty” and “St a te” me an) with§§19 61( 3)–(4) (def in in g what the terms “person” and “enterprise” include). Accordin gly, t h i s pr ov ision does not for e c l ose the possib ili tythat the ter mmigh t inc l ude, in addition to the specifically e numerated entities, others that fal l5 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### is obviouslybroad, encompassing “ any. . . group of indi

viduals associated in fact.” Ibid . (emphasis added). The term “any” ensures that the definition has a wide reach, see, e.g. , Al iv. FederalBureau of Prisons , 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at4–5), and the very concept of an association in fact is expansive. In addition, the RIC O statute pro vides that its term s are to be “liberally con

strued to effectuate its remedial purposes.” §904(a), 8 4 Stat. 947, note following 18 U. S. C. §1961; s ee als o , e.g. , National O r ganiza tionfor Women, Inc. v. Scheidler , 51 0 U. S. 249, 2 57 (1994) (“RICO b r oadly defines ‘enterprise’ ”); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. I m rex Co. , 4 73 U. S. 47 9, 497 (198 5) ( “ R I C O i s t o b e r e a db r o a d l y” ) ; R u ssello v. Unit e dSt at es , 464 U. S. 1 6 , 21 (1983) (noting “the pattern of the RIC O statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth”). In light of these statutory featu r es, we explained in Turke t t eth at “an enterprise includes any union or grou p of individuals associated in fact” and that RIC O reaches “a group of persons assoc i ated together for a common pur

pose of engaging in a course of con d uct.” 452 U. S., at 580, 583. Such an enterpri se, we said, “is proved b yevidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi

dence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Id ., at 583. Notwithstanding these precedents, the dissent asserts that the d e finition of a RICO e n terprise is limited to “business-li k e entities. ” See post , at 1–5 (opinion of S TEVE NS 

### , J. ). We see no basis to impose such an extratex

tual requirement. 3

—————— within the or dinar ymeaningof the ter m “e nter pr ise.” Se e H. J. Inc. v. Northw est ern Bell Telepho n e Co. , 492 U. S. 22 9, 23 8 (1 989) (ex p l a in i n g that the ter m “pat ter n” also r e tain s its ordina ry mea n ingnotwiths ta nd

in gth e statu t or ydefin i tioni n§1961(5)).

3 The dissent c l aims that the “busin es s-like” limit ation “i s confirmed by the text of §1962(c) and our decision i n Revesv. Ern s t& Yo ung , 507 U. S. 170 (1 99 3).” Post , a t3. Sec t ion19 62 (c ), h o wev e r , state s on lyth a t6 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### B As noted, the specific question on which we gran ted certiorari i s whetheran association-in-fact enterpris e must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inher

ent in the pattern of racketeeri n g activit yin which it engages.” Pet. for Ce rt. i. We will break this question into three parts. First, mu st an association-in-fact enterprise have a “str ucture”? S e cond, must the struct ure be “ascer

tainable”? Third, must the “structure” go “beyond that inherent in the patter nof racket eering activ i ty” in whic h its members engage? “Structu re.” We agree with petiti oner that a nassocia

tion-in-fact enterprise must have a struc t ure. In the sen s e relevant here, the term “stru ctu r e ” means “ [ t]he way i n which par t s are arrang ed or put to gether to fo rm a whole” and “[t]he i n terrelation or arran g ement of par t s in a com

plex entity. ” Ameri c a nHerita ge Dictionary 1718 (4th e d

. 2000); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1 410 (1967) (defining structure to m e an, among other things, “the pattern of relationships, as of status or friendship, existing among the members o f a group or society”). From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise must have at least thr ee structur a l features: a purpose, rel a tionships among those associate d with the e n terprise, and longevity sufficient to perm it

—————— one may not “conduct or participate, direct ly or indi rect ly, in t h e conductof [a n] ent e rpris e ’sa ffa irs t h rough apa t t e rn of ra cket eerin g ac tiv i ty

. ” Wh atev erbu sin e ss-like c h ar a c ter i stic s th e dissen th a s i n mind, we do not see them in§1962(c). Furthermore, Rev e s v. Ern s t & Young , 507 U. S. 17 0 (1 99 3), is in appo site bec a u s e th a tc a se tu r n ed on ourinter p r e tation of the p a r t ic ipat ion re quirement of §1962, not th e definition of “enterprise.” See id. , at 184–1 85. Inan y c a se, it wou l d be an inter p r e tiv estr e tc h to d e duc e from the requiremen t that an enter

pr ise must b e“dir ec ted” t oimpose the muc hbr oad e r , amor phous r e quir ement that it be “bus i n ess-like.”7 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### these associates to purs ue the enterprise’s pur p ose. As we succinctlyp u t it in Tu rkette , ana ssociation-in-fact enter

prise is “a group of persons associated together for a com

mon purpose of enga ging in a course of conduct.” 45 2 U. S., at 58 3. That an “enterprise” must have a purpose is apparent from meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i.e. , a “ven

ture,” “und ertaking,” or “p roject. ” Webster’s Third Ne w International Dictionary 757 (1976). The concept of “asso

ciat[ion]” requires both interpersonal relationships and a common interest. See id. , at 132 (defining “as s ociation” as “an organiz a tion of persons having a common interest”) ; Black’s La w Dictionary 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1 968) (definin g “association” as a “collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object”)

. Section 1962(c) reinforces this conclusion and als o show s that an “enterprise” must have some longevity, since the off e nse proscribed by that provision demands proof that the enterprise had “affairs” of sufficient dura tion to permit a nassociate to “ p artici

pate” in those affairs through “a pattern of racketeerin g activity. ” Although an association-in-fact enterprise must have these structural features, it d oes not follow that a district court mustuse the term “st r uctu re” in its j u ry instru c tions. A trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an inst ruction so long as the substance of the relevant point is adequately expressed. “Asc ertaina ble.” Wh e n e v e raj u r yi s t o l dt h a ti tm u s t find the existence of an elem ent beyond a reasonab le doubt, that element must be “ascertainable” or else t h e jury could not find that it was proved. Therefore, telli ng the members of the j u ry that th ey had to ascertain t h e existence of an “ascertainable structure” wo uld have been redundant and potentially mislea ding. “Beyond th at inhe ren t in the pa tte rn of r a cketeerin g activi ty.” This phrase may be interpreted in least two8 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### different ways, and its correctn ess depends on the particu

lar sense in which the phrase is used. If t h e phrase is interpretedto mean that the existence of an enterprise is a separate element th at must be proved, it is of course correct. As we explained in Turke tte , the existence of an enterprise is an element distinct f r om the pat t ern of rac k

eteering activity and “proof of o n e does not necessarily establish th e other.” 4

### 452 U. S., at 5 8 3

. On the other hand, if the phrase is usedto mean that the existence of an ent e rprise maynever be i n ferred fro m the evidence showing that persons associat ed with the enterprise engaged in a patternof racketeerin g activity, i t is incorrect. We recog n ized in Tu rkettethat the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise “may in particula r cases coalesce.” Ibid

. C The crux of petitioner’s argument is that a RICO enter

prise must have structural features in addition to those that we thi n k can be fairly inferred from the language of the statute. Although petitioner concedes that an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise may be an “ ‘informal’ ” group a n d that “not ‘much’ ” s t r u cture is needed, Reply Brief f o r Petitioner 24, he contends that s u ch an enterprise must have at lea s t some additional structural attributes, such as a stru ctural “hie rarch y,” “r ole differentiation,” a “unique modus operan di ,” a “chain of command,” “profes

sionalism and sophistication of organization,” “diversit y

——————

4 It is ea syto e n v i sionsitu at i o n s in which proof that ind ividuals en

g a g e d in a patter nof r a c k eteer ingac tiv i tywould not est abli s h th e existence of a nenterprise. For exam ple, suppose that several individu

als, independ ently and without coor dina tion, engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as RICO pred icates—for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of these patterns woul d not be enough to show th at the individ u als were members of an ente rpris e .9 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### and complexity of cri mes,” “membership d u es, rules and regulations,” “uncha rge dor ad diti onal crimes aside from predicate a cts,” an “int ernal discipline mechanism,” “reg u lar meetings regardingenterprise affairs,” an “enterprise ‘name,’ ” an d “inductio nor initiation ceremonies and ritu

als.” Id. , at 31–35; see also Brief for Petitioner 26–28, 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 8, 1 7

. We see no basis in the language of RICO for the struc

tural requirements that petitioner asks us t o recognize. As we said in Turkette , an associat ion-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose. Such a group need not have a hierarchical stru c ture or a “c hain of command”; deci sions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods—by major

ity vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not h a ve fixed roles; differe nt members may perform different roles at diff erent times

. Thegroup need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, establish e d rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induc

tion or initi a tion ceremonies. Wh i l e the group must func

tion as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, noth ing in RIC O exempts an enterprise whose asso ciates engage in spurts of activity p unctuated b yperiods of quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage i nextortionthroughold-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute’s rea c h. The breadth of the“enterprise” concept i nRICO is highlighted by comparing the statute with other federal statutes that target organized criminal grou ps. For exa m ple, 18 U. S. C. §1955(b), which wa s enacted together with RICO as pa rt of the Organized Cri m e Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922, defines a n“illegal gambling business” as one that “involves five or more persons who con d uct, finance,10 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such busi

ness.” A “continuing criminal en terprise,” as defined in 21 U. S. C. §848(c), must involve more than five persons who act in concert and musthave an “organizer,” supervisor, o r other manager. Congress included no suchrequirement s in RICO. III A Contrar yt o petitioner’s claims, rejection of his argu

ment regar d ing these structu ral characterist ics does not lead to a merger of the crime proscribed by 18 U. S. C. §1962(c) (participating in the af fairs of anenterprise through a p a ttern of ra cketeering activity) an d any of th e following of fenses: op erating a ga mbling business, §1955 ; conspiring t o commit one or more crimes thatare listed a s RICO predicate offenses, §371; or conspiring to violate th e RICO statu t e, §1962(d). Proof that adefendant violated §1955 does not necessar

ily establish that the d e fendant conspired to p a rticipate i n the affairs of a gambling enterpri se through a pattern of racketeerin g activi ty. In order to prove the latter offense, the prosecution must prove either that the defenda n t committed a pattern of §1955 violations or a pattern o f state-law gambling crimes. See §1961(1). No such proof is needed to establish a simple violation of §1955. Likewise, proof that a defendant conspired to commit a RICO predicate offense—for example, arson—does not necessarily establish that the defendant participatedin the affairs of an arson enterprise through a pattern of arson crimes. Under §371, a conspiracy is an inchoate crime that may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of thea greement and the commission of a single over t act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United Statesv. Feola , 420 U. S. 6 71, 694 (1975). Section 1962(c) demands much more: th e creation of an “enter

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. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt 

### prise”—a group with a common purpose and course o f conduct—a n d the actual commission of a pattern of predi

cate offenses. 5 

### Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation of §§1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even if pet i tioner’s co nception of an ass o ciation-in-fact enterprise were accept ed. B Because the statutory language is clear, there is no ne ed to reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statu

tory purpose, legislativ e history, o rthe rule o f lenity. In prior cases, we have rejected si mila r arguments in favor of the clear but expansive text of the statute. See Nation al Orga nizatio nfor Wome n , 510 U. S., at 262 (“The fact that RICO has b een appliedin situations not expressly antici

pated by Congress does not d e m o nstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (quoting Sedima , 473 U. S., at 499, brackets an d internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Turke t t e , 4 52 U. S., a t589–591. “We have repeatedly refused to adopt narro wing constr uctions of RICO in orde r to make it conform to a prec onceived notion of what Con

gress intended to pros cribe.” Br i d gev. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. , 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 20); see also , e.g. , National Orga nizatio nfor Wome n , supra , a t 252 (rejecting the argument that “RICO requires proof that either the rack eteering enterprise or the predicate acts of rac k eteering were motivated by an eco n omic pur

pose”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwes te rn Bell Te leph one Co. , 49 2 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (declining to read “an organized

——————

5 The dissent states that “[o]nly if proo f of the ent e rprise ele

ment . . . requi r es evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an iden titydist in c tfr om §371 offen s es.” Post , at 7 (opinion of S TEVENS , J.). This is incorrect: Even if t h e sa me evide n ce may prove two sep a rate elements, this does not mean that the two elements collap s e into one.12 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S Opinion of theCourt 

### crime limitation into RICO’s pat t ern concep t”); Sedim a , supra , at 4 81 (rejecting the vi ew that RICO provides a private right of action “only against defendants who ha d been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurre d a ‘rac kete ering injury ’ ”). IV The instruc t ions the DistrictCo urt jud g e g a ve to the jury in thi s case were correct a n d adequate. These in

structions explicitly t o ld the jurors that they could not convict on the RICO charges unless they found that the Government had proved the existence of an enterprise. See App. 11 1. The inst ructions ma de clear tha tthis was a separate element from the pattern of racketeer ing activit y . Ibid. The instructions also a d equately told the jury that th e enterprise needed to have the st ructural a t tributes th at may be inferred from the statuto r y langua ge. As noted, the trial ju dge told th e jury thatthe Gover n ment was required to prove that there was “an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, form al or informal, for carry

ing out its objectives” and that “the various members a n d associates of the association function[ed] as a continuin g unit to achieve a common purpose.” Id. , at 112. Finally, the trial jud g e did not erri ninstructin gthe ju r y that “the existence of an associat ion-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by whatit does, rather than by ab

stract anal ysis of its structu re.” Id ., at 111–112. This instruction properly conveyed the point we made in Turke t t e th at proof of a pattern of racketeering activit y may be sufficient in a particula r case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. We therefo r e affirm the judgment of theCourt of Appeals. It is so orde red._________________

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. S. ____ (2009) S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 07–1 30 9 

### EDMU ND BOYL E, PE TITIONE R v. UNITE D STAT ES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [Ju n e8, 2009] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , wit hwhom J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### joins, dissenting. In my view, Congress intended th e term “ent erprise” as it is used in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or

ganizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. , to refer only to business-lik e en tities that have an existence apart from the predicate acts committed by their employees o r associates. The trial judge in th is case committed t w o significant errors relating to the meaning of that term. First, he instructed th e jury tha t“an association of indi

viduals, without structural hi erarchy, form[ e d] solely for the purpose of car r yingout a pa tte rn of rac k et eering acts” can constitute an enterprise. App. 112. An d he allowed the juryto f i nd that element satisfied by evide n ce showin g a group of c r iminals with no existence beyond its intermit

tent commission of racketeering acts and related offenses. Because the Court’s d e cision affir m ing petitioner’s convic

tion is inconsistent with the statutory meaning of the ter m enterprise and serves to exp and RICO liability far beyond the bounds Congress intended, I respectfully dissent. I RICO make s it “unlawful for any p e rson empl oyed by or associated with an y en terprise eng a ged in, or t h e activities of which aff e ct, interst a te or foreign commer ce, to condu ct2 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### or participa te, directly or indire ctly, in the co nduct of su ch enterprise’s affairs th rough a p a ttern of racketeerin g activity. ” §1962(c). The statute defines “ e nterprise” to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, ass o cia

tion, or oth e r legal ent i ty, and any union or group of indi

viduals associated in fact althou gh not a legal entity.” §1961(4). It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions construing the term that Congress used “enterprise” in these provisions in thesense of “abusiness o r ganization,” Webster’s Third New I n ternational Dictionary 757 (1976), rather than“a ‘venture ,’ ‘under taking,’ or ‘project,’ ” an te , at 6 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Diction

ary, a t757 ). Firs t, t h e terms “i ndividual, partnership , corporation, association, or otherlegal entity” describ e entities with formal legal struc t u r es most co mmonly es

tablished for business purposes. §1961(4). Incontext, th e subsequent reference to any “union or group of individuals associated in fact altho u gh not a l e galenti ty ” reflects an intended commonality between the legal a n d nonlegal entities included in the provision. Ibid. (emphasis added). “The juxta p osition of t h e two phrases suggests that ‘ass o ciated in f a ct’ just m e ans struct ured witho u t the aid of legally defined structural forms such as the business corporation.” Limeston e Developm ent Corp. v. Lemont , 520 F. 3d 797, 804–805 (CA7 2008). 1

——————

1 To b es u re , w ehave rea dRICO’s ent e rpri s et e rmb r oa dly t oincl ude entities withex c l usiv ely nonec o nomic motiv e s orwhollyunlawful purposes. See National Orga nization for Women, Inc

. v. Schei d ler , 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (NOW ); United Statesv. T u rk et te , 452 U. S. 576 , 580 –5 81 (19 8 1 )

. Bu t th ose holdin g s ar e co nsistent with the conclusion th at anen ter p r i se is a bu s i n e ss-lik e enti ty. Indeed, the examples of qu alify i n gas soc i ation s c i t e d in Turke t te—including loan-sharking, property-fencing, drug-trafficking, and counterfeiting ope r ations— s a t i s f y t h a tcrit e rion, a s ea ch des crib e s a norga niza tion with continuin g operations dir e cted toward providing go ods orserv ic es to its c u sto m e r s. See id. , at58 9–5 90 (c itin g 84 St at. 9 23; 116 Con g . Re c . 592 ( 1 9 70))

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### That an enterprise must have busi n ess-like characteris

tics is confi r med by th e text of §1962(c) and our decision in Revesv. Erns t& Y o ung , 507 U. S. 170 (1993). Section 1962(c) creates liabilit y for “cond uct[ing] or participat[i n g]

. . . in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeeringactivity.” In Reves, we examined that provis ion’s mean ing and held that, “[i]n order to ‘participa te, directly orindire ctly, in the conduct of suc h enterprise’s affairs,’ one must hav e some part in directin g those affairs.” Id. , at 179 (quoting §1962(c)). It is not enough for a defendant to “carryon” or “participate in” an enterprise’s affairs th rough a p a ttern of racketeerin g activity; ins t ead, evidence that he operated, managed, or directed th ose affairs is required. See id. , at 177–179. This requirement confirms that the enterprise element demands evidence of a certain q uantum of business-like organization— i.e. , a system of processes, dea l ings, or oth e r affairs that can be “directed.” Our cases also make clear that an enterprise “is an entity separate and apart from t h e pattern of activity i n which it engages.” Unit e dSt at esv. Tu rke t te , 452 U. S. 576, 583 (1 981). As with the req u irement that an enter

prise have business-like characteristics, that an enterprise must have a separate existence is confirmed by §1962(c) and Reves

. If an entity’s existenc e consisted solely of it s members’ performance of a patte rn of rack e t eering acts, the “enterprise’s affairs” would be synonymous with the “pattern of racketeerin g activi ty.” Section 1962(c) would then prohibit an individual from conducting o rparti cipat

ing in “the conduct of [a pattern of racketeering activity] through a pattern of rac k eteering ac tivity”—a readi n g

—————— Simi larly, the enterprise at i ssue in NOW was a nationwide network of an tiabor t iong r ou ps th at h a d a le ader sh ip c o u n s el an d r e g u larc o n f er ences and who s e members u n dertook anex tensiv e patte r nof ex tor t ion, arson, and other racketeering activi ty fo r the purposeof “shut[ting] downabor t ionc lin ic s.” 510 U. S., at 253.4 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### that is unbearably redundant, pa rticularly i na case like this one in which a single pattern of activity is alleged. The only way to a v oid thatresult is to require that a n “enterprise’s affairs” be something other tha nthe patte rn of racketeer ing activit yundertakenby its members. 2 

### Recognizing an enterprise’s business-like nature and its distinctness from the pattern of predicate acts, however, does not an swer the q u estion of what proof each elem e n t requires. In cases involving a legal entity, t h e matter of proving the enterprise element is straightfor w ard, as th e entity’s legal existence will always be something apart from the pattern of activity perfor med by the defendant or his associa t es. Cf. Cedric Kush ner Promotions, Ltd. v. King , 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001). But in the case of an association-in-fact enterprise, the Governme nt must ad

duce other evidence of the en tity’s “separ ate” existe nce and “ongoing organization.” Tu rkette , 452 U. S., at 583. There may be cases in whicha jury can in fer that exis

tence and continuity from the evidence used to establish the pattern of rac k eteering acti vity. Ibid. But that will be

——————

2 Th e oth e rsu bsec tion s of 18 U. S. C. §1962 fu r t h e rdemon s tr ate th e bu sin e ss-l i ke n a tu r eof th e en ter p r i se elemen t an d its n e c e ssar ydis

tinc tness fr om the pa tter nof r a c k eteering activity. Subsection (a) prohibits anyone who receives income deri ved from a p a ttern of racket

eering a c t ivit yfrom“ u s [ ing] or inve s t [ing], direct ly o rindirect ly, a n y part of such income .

. . in acquisit ion of any interest in, or the estab

lishment or op eration of, any enterpri se.” And subsecti on (b) prohibits a n yone from“ a cq uir[ing] or m a int a in[ing]” a n y int e res t in or cont rol of an enter p r i se thr o ugh a patter nof r a c k et eer ingac tiv i ty. We noted in NOW that the ter menter p r i se “play s a dif f erent role in the structure” of those subse c tions than it does in subsection (c) because the enter

pr ise inth ose su bsec tion s i s th e v i c t im. 510 U. S., at 258–25 9. We did not, howev e r, sug g e st that the te r mhas a su b s tan t ial l ydiffer e n t meaning in ea ch subsecti on. To t h eco nt r a ry, o u rob s e rva t ion t h a tt h e enter p r i se in subsec tion (c ) is “th e vehicle through whic h the unla w fu l patter nof r a cketeer ingac tiv i tyis c o mmitted,” id. , at 259, indicate s th at, a s insu bsec tion s ( a) an d (b), the e n ter p r i se mus thav ean ex i s tenc e apar t fr om the patter nof r a c k eteer ingac tiv i ty

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. S. ____ (2009) S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### true only when the pat t ern of activity is so complex that it could not be performed in the absence of structu res or processes f o r plannin gor concealing the illegal conduct beyond those inherentin performing the predicate acts. More often, proof of anenterprise’s separate e x istence wil l require different evidence from th at used to establish the pattern of predicate acts. Precisely what proof is required in each case is a more difficult question, larg ely due to the abundant variety of RICO predi c ates and enterpri ses. Because covered enter

prises are necessarily busines s-like in natu r e, however, proof of an association-in-fact enterprise’s separate exis

tence will generally require evidence of rules, routines, or processes through whi c h the entit ymaintains its continu

ing operations and seeks to conceal its i lleg a l acts. As petitioner s u ggests, this requirement will usually be sati s fied by evidence that the association has an “ a scertainable structu re beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeer

ing activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. Exam

ples of such structure includ e an organizational hierarchy, a “framewo rk for ma king decisions,” an “in t ernal disci

pline mechanism,” “regular meetings,” or a practice of “reinvest[ing] proceeds to promote and expand the enter

prise.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 31–34. Inother case s, the enterpr i se’s existence might be established through evidence that it provides goods or services to third parties, as such an undertaki ng will require organizational ele

ments mor e comprehensive than those neces s ary to per

form a pattern of predicate acts. Thus, the evidence needed to establish an enterprise will vary from case to case, but in every ca se the Gov e rnment must carr y i t s burden of proving that an allegedenterprise has an exis

tence separate from t h e pattern of racketee ring ac tivit y undertakenby its constituents.6 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### II In some respects, my r e ading of the statute is not very different from that adopted by th e Court. We agree that “an association-in-fact enterprise must have atleast three structu ral features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associat es to pursue the ent e rprise’s pur

pose.” Ante , at6. B u t the Court stops short of gi vin g content to that requirement. It states only that RICO “demands proof that the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of suffi

cient durat i on to permit an associate to ‘p articipate’ i n those affair s through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity, ’ ” before concluding that “[a] trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an inst ruction” an d need not use the ter m “structu r e .” Ante , at 7. While I agree the word struc t ure is not talismanic, I would hold that the instructions must convey the requirement that the alleged enterprise have an existence apart from th e alleged pattern of predicate acts. The Court’s decision, by contrast, will al low juries to inf e r the exis tence of a n enterprise in every case involving a pattern of rack eteer

ing activit yundertakenby two or more associates. By permitti ng the Government to prove both elements with the sa me evidence, the Cour t renders t h e enterprise requiremen tessentially meaningless in as sociation-in-fa ct cases. It also threatens to make that category of §1962(c) offenses in distinguishable from conspiracies to commit predicate acts, see §37 1 , as theo n ly remaini n g difference is §1962(c)’s pattern requirement

. The Court resists this criticism, a r guing tha t §1962(c) “demands much more” than the in choate offense defin e d in §371. Ante , at 10. It states that the latter “ m ay be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the com

mission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspir

acy,” where a s the former requires the creation of “a group with acom m on purpo s e and cou r se of cond uct—andt h e7 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses. ” Ibid. Give n that it is also unlawful to conspi re to violate §1962(c), see §1962(d), this comment provide s no assur ance that RICO and §3 71 offenses remain distinct. Only i f proof of the enterprise element

—the “group with a com mon purpose and cours e of conduc t”—require s evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pat

tern of predicate acts will RICO off e nses retai nan identit y distinct fro m §371 offenses. This case illustrates these concerns. The trial judge instructed t h e jury tha tan enterp rise need have only th e degree of organization necessary “for carrying out its objectives” and that it could “find an enterprise where an associationof individuals, without stru ctur a l hierarch y, forms solely for the purpose of c a rrying outa pattern of racketeerin g acts.” App. 112. 3 

### These instructions were plainly deficient, as they di d not require the Government to prove tha tthe alleged enterpris e had an ex istence apart from the pattern of predicate acts. Instead, they permit

ted the Government’s proof of t h e enterprise’s structu r e and continuing nature—requirements onwhich a l l agree—to consist only of evid ence that petiti oner and his associates performed a pattern of r a cketeeringactivity. Petitioner’s requested instruction would have require d the jury to find that the alleged enterprise “had an ongo

ing organization, a cor e members h ip that functioned as a continuing unit, and a nascertainable structural hierarchy distinct f r om the cha r ged predi c ate acts.” Id. , at 95. Th at instruction does not pr ecisely trac kmyunde r standing o f the statute; although evidence of “structural hierarchy” can evidence an enterprise, it is not necessary to establish that element. Nevertheless, the proposed instructio n would have better dire cted the ju ry to consider whethe r

——————

3 For the full te xt of the relev a nt portion of the instructio ns, see ante , at 3, n

. 1.8 BOYLE v. UN ITED STATE S S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

### the alleged enterprise posse ssed the separ a te existence necessary to expose petitioner to l i ability under §1962(c), and the trial judge should have considered an instructio n along those lines. The trial ju dge also er red in findi n g the Gov e rnment’s evidence in this case suffici ent to support petitioner’s RICO convi ctions. Petitioner was alleged to have partic i

pated and conspired t o participat e in the conduct of a n enterprise’s affairs th rough a p a ttern of racketeerin g activitycon s isting of one act of b ank robber yandthre e acts of inte rstate t r an sportation of stolen funds. Id. , a t 15–19. The “primary goals” of the alleged enterpris e “included generating money for its members and associ

ates through the commission of criminal activity, inclu d

ing bank robberies, ba nk burglari e s and interstate tran s portation of stolen mo ney.” Id. , at 14. An d its modu s operandi was to congre gate periodi c ally when an associate had a leadon a n i ght-deposit box that the group could breakinto. Whoever a m ong the a ssociates w a s availabl e would bring screwdriv e rs, crowb a r s, and wal k ie-talkies to the location. Some acted as lookouts, wh ile others re trieved the money. When the ende avor was successful, the participant s would split the proceeds. Thus, the group’s purpose and activiti es, and petitioner’s participatio n therein, were limited to sporadic acts of taking mone y from bank deposit boxes. There is no evidence in RICO’s text or history that Congress intended it to reach such ad hoc associations of thieves. III Because the instructions and evidence in this case did not satisfy the requirement that an alleged enterprise have an existence separate and ap art from th e pattern of activity in which it engages, I respectfully di ssent.