STATEMENT OF 

REAR ADMIRAL PAUL E. SULLIVAN, U.S. NAVY 

DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SHIP DESIGN, INTEGRATION AND 

ENGINEERING 

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE SCIENCE COMMITTEE 

ON THE 

SUBSAFE PROGRAM 

29 OCTOBER 2003 

Good Morning Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Hall and members of the 

committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee about the Submarine 

Safety Program, which the Navy calls SUBSAFE, and how it operates. 

My name is RADM Paul Sullivan, USN. I serve as the Naval Sea System Command’s 

Deputy Commander for Ship Design, Integration and Engineering, which is the authority 

for the technical requirements of the SUBSAFE Program. 

To establish perspective, I will provide a brief history of the SUBSAFE Program and its 

development. I will then give you a description of how the program operates and the 

organizational relationships that support it. I am also prepared to discuss our 

NASA/Navy benchmarking activities that have occurred over the past year. 

SUBSAFE PROGRAM HISTORY 

On April 10, 1963, while engaged in a deep test dive, approximately 200 miles off the 

northeastern coast of the United States, the USS THRESHER (SSN-593) was lost at sea 

with all persons aboard – 112 naval personnel and 17 civilians. Launched in 1960 and 

the first ship of her class, the THRESHER was the leading edge of US submarine 

technology, combining nuclear power with a modern hull design. She was fast, quiet and 

deep diving. The loss of THRESHER and her crew was a devastating event for the 

submarine community, the Navy and the nation. 
The Navy immediately restricted all submarines in depth until an understanding of the 

circumstances surrounding the loss of the THRESHER could be gained. 

A Judge Advocate General (JAG) Court of Inquiry was conducted, a THRESHER Design 

Appraisal Board was established, and the Navy testified before the Joint Committee on 

Atomic Energy of the 88th Congress. 

The JAG Court of Inquiry Report contained 166 Findings of Fact, 55 Opinions, and 19 

Recommendations. The recommendations were technically evaluated and incorporated 

into the Navy’s SUBSAFE, design and operational requirements. 

The THRESHER Design Appraisal Board reviewed the THRESHER’s design and 

provided a number of recommendations for improvements. 

Navy testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy occurred on June 26, 27, 

July 23, 1963 and July 1, 1964 and is a part of the Congressional Record. 

While the exact cause of the THRESHER loss is not known, from the facts gathered 

during the investigations, we do know that there were deficient specifications, deficient 

shipbuilding practices, deficient maintenance practices, and deficient operational 

procedures. Here’s what we think happened: 

• THRESHER had about 3000 silver-brazed piping joints exposed to full 

submergence pressure. During her last shipyard maintenance period 145 of these 

joints were inspected on a not-to-delay vessel basis using a new technique called 

Ultrasonic Testing. Fourteen percent of the joints tested showed sub-standard 

joint integrity. Extrapolating these test results to the entire population of 3000 

silver-brazed joints indicates that possibly more than 400 joints on THRESHER 

could have been sub-standard. One or more of these joints is believed to have 

failed, resulting in flooding in the engine room. 

• The crew was unable to access vital equipment to stop the flooding. 

• Saltwater spray on electrical components caused short circuits, reactor shutdown, 

and loss of propulsion power. 

• The main ballast tank blow system failed to operate properly at test depth. We

believe that various restrictions in the air system coupled with excessive moisture 

in the system led to ice formation in the blow system piping. The resulting 

blockage caused an inadequate blow rate. Consequently, the submarine was 

unable to overcome the increasing weight of water rushing into the engine room. 

The loss of THRESHER was the genesis of the SUBSAFE Program. In June 1963, not 

quite two months after THRESHER sank, the SUBSAFE Program was created. The 

SUBSAFE Certification Criterion was issued by BUSHIPS letter Ser 525-0462 of 20 

December 1963, formally implementing the Program.

2
The Submarine Safety Certification Criterion provided the basic foundation and structure 

of the program that is still in place today. The program established: 

• Submarine design requirements 

• Initial SUBSAFE certification requirements with a supporting process, and 

• Certification continuity requirements with a supporting process. 

Over the next 11 years the submarine safety criterion underwent 37 changes. In 1974, 

these requirements and changes were codified in the Submarine Safety Requirements 

Manual (NAVSEA 0924-062-0010). This manual continues to be the set of formal base 

requirements for our program today. Over the years, it has been successfully applied to 

many classes of nuclear submarines and has been implemented for the construction of our 

newest VIRGINIA Class submarine. 

The SUBSAFE Program has been very successful. Between 1915 and 1963, sixteen 

submarines were lost due to non-combat causes, an average of one every three years. 

Since the inception of the SUBSAFE Program in 1963, only one submarine has been lost. 

USS SCORPION (SSN 589) was lost in May 1968 with 99 officers and men aboard. She 

was not a SUBSAFE certified submarine and the evidence indicates that she was lost for 

reasons that would not have been mitigated by the SUBSAFE Program. We have never 

lost a SUBSAFE certified submarine. 

However, SUBSAFE has not been without problems. We must constantly remind 

ourselves that it only takes a moment to fail. In 1984 NAVSEA directed that a thorough 

evaluation be conducted of the entire SUBSAFE Program to ensure that the mandatory 

discipline and attention to detail had been maintained. In September 1985 the Submarine 

Safety and Quality Assurance Office was established as an independent organization

within the NAVSEA Undersea Warfare Directorate (NAVSEA 07) in a move to 

strengthen the review of and compliance with SUBSAFE requirements. Audits 

conducted by the Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Office pointed out 

discrepancies within the SUBSAFE boundaries. Additionally, a number of incidents and 

breakdowns occurred in SUBSAFE components that raised concerns with the quality of 

SUBSAFE work. In response to these trends, the Chief Engineer of the Navy chartered a 

senior review group with experience in submarine research, design, fabrication, 

construction, testing and maintenance to assess the SUBSAFE program’s 

implementation. In conjunction with functional audits performed by the Submarine 

Safety and Quality Assurance Office, the senior review group conducted an in depth 

review of the SUBSAFE Program at submarine facilities. The loss of the 

CHALLENGER in January 1986 added impetus to this effort. The results showed clearly 

that there was an unacceptable level of complacency fostered by past success; standards 

were beginning to be seen as goals vice hard requirements; and there was a generally lax 

attitude toward aspects of submarine configuration. 

3
The lessons learned from those reviews include: 

• Disciplined compliance with standards and requirements is mandatory. 

• An engineering review system must be capable of highlighting and thoroughly 

resolving technical problems and issues. 

• Well-structured and managed safety and quality programs are required to ensure 

all elements of system safety, quality and readiness are adequate to support 

operation. 

• Safety and quality organizations must have sufficient authority and organizational 

freedom without external pressure. 

The Navy continues to evaluate its SUBSAFE Program to adapt to the ever-changing 

construction and maintenance environments as well as new and evolving technologies 

being used in our submarines. Since its creation in 1974 the SUBSAFE Manual has 

undergone several changes. For example, the SUBSAFE boundary has been redefined 

based on improvements in submarine recovery capability and establishment of a 

disciplined material identification and control process. An example of changing 

technology is the utilization of fly-by-wire ship control technology on SEAWOLF and 

VIRGINIA class submarines. Paramount in this adaptation process is the premise that 

the requirements, which keep the SUBSAFE Program successful, will not be 

compromised. It is a daily and difficult task; but our program and the personnel who 

function within it are committed to it. 

PURPOSE AND FOCUS 

The purpose of the SUBSAFE Program is to provide maximum reasonable assurance of 

watertight integrity and recovery capability. It is important to recognize that the 

SUBSAFE Program does not spread or dilute its focus beyond this purpose. Mission 

assurance is not a concern of the SUBSAFE Program, it is simply a side benefit of the 

program. Other safety programs and organizations regulate such things as fire safety, 

weapons systems safety, and nuclear reactor systems safety. 

Maximum reasonable assurance is achieved by certifying that each submarine meets 

submarine safety requirements upon delivery to the Navy and by maintaining that 

certification throughout the life of the submarine. 

We apply SUBSAFE requirements to what we call the SUBSAFE Certification Boundary 

– those structures, systems, and components critical to the watertight integrity and 

recovery capability of the submarine. The SUBSAFE boundary is defined in the 

SUBSAFE Manual and depicted diagrammatically in what we call SUBSAFE 

Certification Boundary Books. 

SUBSAFE CULTURE 

4
Safety is central to the culture of our entire Navy submarine community, including 

designers, builders, maintainers, and operators. The SUBSAFE Program infuses the 

submarine Navy with safety requirements uniformity, clarity, focus, and accountability. 

The Navy’s safety culture is embedded in the military, Civil Service, and contractor 

community through: 

• Clear, concise, non-negotiable requirements, 

• Multiple, structured audits that hold personnel at all levels accountable for safety, 

and 

• Annual training with strong, emotional lessons learned from past failures. 

Together, these processes serve as powerful motivators that maintain the Navy’s safety 

culture at all levels. In the submarine Navy, many individuals understand safety on a 

first-hand and personal basis. The Navy has had over one hundred thousand individuals 

that have been to sea in submarines. In fact, many of the submarine designers and senior 

managers at both the contractors and NAVSEA routinely are onboard each submarine 

during its sea trials. In addition, the submarine Navy conducts annual training, revisiting 

major mishaps and lessons learned, including THRESHER and CHALLENGER. 

NAVSEA uses the THRESHER loss as the basis for annual mandatory training. During 

training, personnel watch a video on the THRESHER, listen to a two- minute long 

audiotape of a submarine’s hull collapsing, and are reminded that people were dying as 

this occurred. These vivid reminders, posters, and other observances throughout the 

submarine community help maintain the safety focus, and it continually renews our 

safety culture. The Navy has a traditional military discipline and culture. The NAVSEA 

organization that deals with submarine technology also is oriented to compliance with

institutional policy requirements. In the submarine Navy there is a uniformity of training, 

qualification requirements, education, etc., which reflects a single mission or product 

line, i.e., building and operating nuclear powered submarines. 

SUBSAFE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 

SUBSAFE certification is a process, not just a final step. It is a disciplined process that 

brings structure to our new construction and maintenance programs and leads to formal

authorization for unrestricted operations. SUBSAFE certification is applied in four areas: 

• Design, 

• Material, 

• Fabrication, and 

• Testing. 

5
Certification in these areas applies both to new construction and to maintenance 

throughout the life of the submarine. 

The heart of the SUBSAFE Program and its certification processes is a combination of 

Work Discipline, Material Control, and Documentation: 

• Work discipline demands knowledge of the requirements and compliance with 

those requirements, for everyone who performs any kind of work associated with 

submarines. Individuals have a responsibility to know if SUBSAFE impacts their 

work. 

• Material Control is everything involved in ensuring that correct material is 

installed correctly, beginning with contracts that purchase material, all the way 

through receipt inspection, storage, handling, and finally installation in the 

submarine. 

• Documentation important to SUBSAFE certification falls into two categories:

o Selected Record Drawings and Data: Specific design products are 

created when the submarine is designed. These products consist of 

documents such as system diagrams, SUBSAFE Mapping 

Drawings, Ship Systems Manuals, SUBSAFE certification 

Boundary Books, etc. They must be maintained current 

throughout the life of the submarine to enable us to maintain 

SUBSAFE certification. 

o Objective Quality Evidence (OQE): Specific work records are 

created when work is performed and consist of documents such as 

weld forms, Non–Destructive Testing forms, mechanical assembly 

records, hydrostatic and operational test forms, technical work 

documents in which data is recorded, waivers and deviations, etc. 

These records document the work performed and the worker’s 

signature certifying it was done per the requirements. It is 

important to understand that SUBSAFE certification is based on 

objective quality evidence. Without objective quality evidence 

there is no basis for certification, no matter who did the work or 

how well it was done. Objective quality evidence provides proof 

that deliberate steps were taken to comply with requirements. 

The basic outline of the SUBSAFE certification process is as follows: 

• SUBSAFE requirements are invoked in the design and construction contracts for 

new submarines, in the work package for submarines undergoing depot 

maintenance periods, and in the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual for operating 

submarines. 

6
• Material procurement and fabrication, overhaul and repair, installation and testing 

generate objective quality evidence for these efforts. This objective quality 

evidence is formally and independently reviewed and approved to assure 

compliance with SUBSAFE requirements. The objective quality evidence is then 

retained for the life of the submarine. 

• Formal statements of compliance are provided by the organizations performing 

the work and by the government supervising authority responsible for the 

oversight of these organizations. All organizations performing SUBSAFE work 

must be evaluated, qualified and authorized in accordance with NAVSEA 

requirements to perform this work. A Naval Supervising Authority, assigned to 

each contractor organization, is responsible to monitor and evaluate contractor 

performance. 

• Audits are conducted to examine material, inspect installations and review 

objective quality evidence for compliance with SUBSAFE requirements. 

• For new construction submarines and submarines in major depot maintenance 

periods, the assigned NAVSEA Program Manager uses a formal checklist to 

collect specific documentation and information required for NAVSEA

Headquarters certification. When all documentation has been collected, reviewed 

and approved by the Technical Authority and the SUBSAFE Office, the Program

Manager formally presents the package to the Certifying Official for review and 

certification for sea trials. For new construction submarines, the formal 

presentation of the certification package is made to the Program Executive Officer 

for Submarines, and for in-service submarines completing a major depot 

maintenance period the certification package is formally presented to the Deputy 

Commander for Undersea Warfare. Approval by the Certifying Official includes 

verification of full concurrence, as well as discussion and resolution of dissenting 

opinions or concerns. After successful sea trials, a second review is performed 

prior to authorizing unrestricted operations for the submarine. 

SUBSAFE CERTIFICATION MAINTENANCE

Once a submarine is certified for unrestricted operation, there are two elements, in 

addition to audits, that we use to maintain the submarine in a certified condition. They 

are the Re-Entry Control Process and the Unrestricted Operation/Maintenance 

Requirement Card (URO/MRC) Program. 

Re-entry Control is used to control work within the SUBSAFE Certification Boundary. It 

is the backbone of certification maintenance and continuity. It provides an identifiable, 

accountable and auditable record of work performed within the SUBSAFE boundary. 

The purpose is to provide positive assurance that all SUBSAFE systems and components 

are restored to a fully certified condition. Re-entry control procedures help us maintain 

work discipline by identifying the work to be performed and the standards to be met. Reentry control establishes personal accountability because the personnel authorizing, 

7
performing and certifying the work and testing must sign their names on the re-entry 

control documentation. It is the process we use to collect the OQE that supports 

certification.

The Unrestricted Operation/Maintenance Requirement Card (URO/MRC) Program

facilitates planned periodic inspections and tests of critical equipment, systems, and 

structure to ensure that they have not degraded to an unacceptable level due to use, age, 

or environment. The URO/MRC Program provides the technical basis for authorizing 

continued unrestricted operations of Navy submarines. The responsibility to complete 

URO/MRC inspections is divided among multiple organizations. Some inspections can 

only be completed by a shipyard during a maintenance period. Other inspections are the 

responsibility of an Intermediate Maintenance Activity or Ships Force. NAVSEA

manages the program by tracking performance to ensure that periodicity requirements are 

not violated, inspections are not missed, and results meet invoked technical requirements. 

AUDITS 

A key element of certification and certification maintenance is the audit program. The 

audit program was established in 1963. During testimony before Congress Admiral 

Curtze stated: “To ensure the adequacy of the application of the quality assurance 

programs in shipyards a system of audits has been established....” This system of audits 

is still in place today. There are two primary types of audits: Certification Audits and 

Functional Audits. 

In a SUBSAFE CERTIFICATION Audit we look at the Objective Quality Evidence 

associated with an individual submarine to ensure that the material condition of that 

submarine is satisfactory for sea trials and unrestricted operations. These audits are 

performed at the completion of new construction and at the end of major depot 

maintenance periods. They cover a planned sample of specific aspects of all SUBSAFE 

work performed, including inspection of a sample of installed equipment. The results 

and resolution of deficiencies identified during such audits become one element of final 

NAVSEA approval for sea trials and subsequent unrestricted operations. 

In a SUBSAFE FUNCTIONAL Audit we periodically review the policies, procedures, 

and practices used by each organization, including contractors, that performs SUBSAFE 

work, to ensure that those policies, procedures and practices comply with SUBSAFE 

requirements, are healthy, and are capable of producing certifiable hardware or design 

products. This audit also includes surveillance of actual work in progress. Organizations 

audited include public and private shipyards, engineering offices, the Fleet, and 

NAVSEA headquarters. 

In addition to the audits performed by NAVSEA, our shipyards, field organizations and 

the Fleet are required to conduct internal (or self) audits of their policies, procedures, and 

practices and of the work they perform.

SUBSAFE ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 

8
The SUBSAFE Program maintains a formal organizational structure with clear 

delineation of responsibilities in the SUBSAFE Requirements Manual. Ultimately, the 

purpose of the SUBSAFE Organization is to support the Fleet. We strongly believe that 

our sailors must be able to go to sea with full confidence in the safety of their submarine. 

Only then will they be able to focus fully on their task of operating the submarine and

carrying out assigned operations successfully. 

There are three key elements in our Headquarters organization: Technical Authority, 

Program Management and Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance. Each of these 

elements is organizationally independent and has specifically defined roles in the 

SUBSAFE Program. 

NAVSEA Technical Authority provides technical direction and assistance to Program 

Managers and the Fleet. In our terms, Technical Authority is the authority, responsibility 

and accountability to establish, monitor and approve technical products and policy in 

conformance to higher tier policy and requirements. Technical authorities are warranted 

(formally given authority) within NAVSEA and our field organizations. Technical 

warrant holders are subject matter experts. Within the defined technical area warranted, 

they are responsible for establishing technical standards, entrusted and empowered to 

make authoritative decisions, and held accountable for the technical decisions made. 

Where technical products are not in conformance with technical policy, standards and 

requirements, warrant holders are responsible to identify associated risks and approve 

non-conformances (waivers or deviations) in a manner that ensures risks are acceptable. 

NAVSEA is accustomed to evaluating risk; however, non-conformances are treated as an 

exception vice the norm. Full discussion of technical issues is required before making 

decisions. Discussions and decisions are coordinated with the Program Management and 

Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Offices. However, NAVSEA 05, Ship Design, 

Integration and Engineering, is the final authority for the technical requirements of the

SUBSAFE Program. 

• Within the Undersea Warfare Directorate (NAVSEA 07) the Director, Submarine 

Hull, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Management Division (NAVSEA 

07T) is the warranted technical authority and provides system engineering and 

support for submarine technical SUBSAFE issues. 

Submarine Program Managers manage all aspects of assigned submarine programs in 

construction, maintenance and modernization, including oversight of cost, schedule, 

performance and direction of life cycle management. They are responsible and 

accountable to ensure compliance with the requirements of the SUBSAFE Program and 

with technical policy and standards established by the technical authority. 

The Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Office (NAVSEA 07Q) manages the 

SUBSAFE program and audits organizations performing SUBSAFE work to ensure 

compliance with SUBSAFE requirements. NAVSEA 07Q is the primary point of contact 

9
within NAVSEA Headquarters in all matters relating to SUBSAFE Program policy and 

requirements. 

In addition, several groups and committees have been formally constituted to provide

oversight of and guidance to the SUBSAFE Program and to provide a forum to evaluate 

and make changes to the program: 

• The SUBSAFE Oversight Committee (SSOC) provides independent command 

level oversight to ensure objectives of the SUBSAFE Program are met. Members 

are of Flag rank and represent NAVSEA Directorates (SEA 09, PEO-SUB, SEA 

05, SEA 04, SEA 07) and the Navy Inventory Control Point. 

• The SUBSAFE Steering Task Group (SSSTG) was established based on results of 

the THRESHER investigation to ensure adequate provision of safety features in 

current and future submarine construction, conversion, and major depot 

availability programs. The SSSTG defines the scope of the SUBSAFE Program, 

reviews program progress and approves or disapproves proposed policy changes. 

Members include Admirals, Senior Executive Service members and other senior 

civilian managers with direct SUBSAFE and technical responsibilities, as well as 

the Submarine Program Managers. 

• The SUBSAFE Working Group (SSWG) consists of SUBSAFE Program

Directors from Headquarters, shipyards, field organizations, and the Fleet. The 

Working Group meets formally twice a year to provide a forum to discuss and 

evaluate SUBSAFE Program progress, implementation and proposals for 

improvement. SUBSAFE Program Directors are the focal point for SUBSAFE 

matters and are responsible and accountable for implementation and proper 

execution of the SUBSAFE Program within their respective organizations. They 

maintain close liaison with NAVSEA 07Q to present or obtain information 

relative to SUBSAFE issues. 

SUBSAFE CERTIFICATION RELATIONSHIPS 

As described earlier in this testimony, each NAVSEA organization is assigned separate 

responsibility and authority for SUBSAFE Program requirements and compliance. Our 

technical authority managers are empowered and accountable to make disciplined 

technical decisions. They are formally given the authority, responsibility and 

accountability to establish, monitor and approve technical products and policy. The 

Submarine Program Managers are responsible for executing the SUBSAFE Program for 

assigned submarines in new construction and major depot availabilities. They have the 

authority, responsibility and accountability to ensure compliance with technical policy 

and standards established by cognizant technical authority. NAVSEA 07Q, Submarine 

Safety and Quality Assurance Office, is responsible and accountable for implementation 

and management of the SUBSAFE Program and for ensuring compliance with 

SUBSAFE Program requirements. 

10
The ultimate certification authority is the Program Executive Officer for Submarines 

(PEO SUB) for new construction and the Deputy Commander for Undersea Warfare 

(NAVSEA 07) for major depot availabilities. The Program manager, with the 

concurrence of and in the presence of the technical authority representative (NAVSEA

07T) and the SUBSAFE office (NAVSEA 07Q), presents the certification package with 

which he attests that the SUBSAFE material condition of the submarine is satisfactory for 

sea trials or for unrestricted operation. Each of the participants has the authority to stop 

the certification process until an identified issue is satisfactorily resolved.

NAVSEA PERSONNEL 

Our nuclear submarines are among the most complex weapon systems ever built. They 

require a highly competent and experienced technical workforce to accomplish their 

design, construction, maintenance and operation. In order for NAVSEA to continue to 

provide the best technical support to all aspects of our submarine programs, we are 

challenged to recruit and maintain a technically qualified workforce. In 1998, faced with 

downsizing and an aging workforce, NAVSEA initiated several actions to ensure we 

could meet current and future challenges. We refocused on our core competencies, 

defined new engineering categories and career paths, and obtained approval to infuse our 

engineering skill sets with young engineers to provide for a systematic transition of our 

workforce. We hired over 1000 engineers with a net gain of 300. This approach allowed 

our experienced engineers to train and mentor young engineers and help NAVSEA 

sustain our core competencies. Despite this limited success, mandated downsizing has 

continued to challenge us. I remain concerned about our ability, in the near future, to 

provide adequate technical support to, and quality overview of our submarine 

construction and maintenance programs. 

NASA/NAVY BENCHMARKING EXCHANGE (NNBE) 

The NASA/NAVY Benchmarking Exchange effort began activities in August 2002 and 

is ongoing. The NNBE was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share 

lessons learned in the Navy’s submarine and NASA’s human space flight programs. The 

focus is on safety and mission assurance policies, processes, accountability, and control 

measures. To date, nearly all of this effort has involved the Navy describing our 

organization, processes and practices to NASA. The NNBE Interim report was 

completed December 20, 2002. 

Phase-2 was initiated in January 2003 with 40 NAVSEA personnel spending a week at 

the Kennedy Space Center (January 13-17) being briefed on a wide array of topics related 

to the manufacturing, processing, and launch of the Space Shuttle with emphasis on 

safety, compliance verification, and safety certification processes. A follow-up trip to 

Kennedy Space Center and a trip to Johnson Space Center were scheduled for early 

February 2003. After loss of Columbia, the NAVSEA benchmarking of NASA activity 

was placed on hold until October when 18 NAVSEA software experts were hosted by

their NASA counterparts for a week of meetings at Kennedy Space Center and Johnson

Space Center. It should also be noted that Naval Reactors hosted 45 senior NASA 

11
managers for a “Challenger Launch Decision” training seminar at the Washington Naval 

Yard on May 15. 

Three Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) have been developed to formalize 

NASA/NAVSEA ongoing collaboration. The first, recently signed, establishes a sharing 

of data related to contractor and supplier quality and performance. The second MOA, in 

final preparation, establishes the basis for reciprocal participation in functional audits. 

The third MOA, also in final preparation, will establish reciprocal participation in 

engineering investigations and analyses. 

In conclusion, let me reiterate that since the inception of the SUBSAFE Program in 1963, 

the Navy has had a disciplined process that provides MAXIMUM reasonable assurance 

that our submarines are safe from flooding and can recover from a flooding incident. In 

1988, at a ceremony commemorating the 25th anniversary of the loss of THRESHER, the 

Navy’s ranking submarine officer, Admiral Bruce Demars, said: “The loss of 

THRESHER initiated fundamental changes in the way we do business, changes in design, 

construction, inspections, safety checks, tests and more. We have not forgotten the 

lesson learned. It’s a much safer submarine force today.” 

12