Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 196 / Thursday, October 9, 2014 / Notices 61061 

and other related elements of logistics 

and program support. 

(iv) Military Department: Army (WAS) 

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: 

FMS case UAK-$991M-30Nov90 

FMS case JBV-$2.7B-16Dec92 

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, 

Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology 

Contained in the Defense Article or 

Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: 

See Annex Attached 

(viii) Date Report Delivered to 

Congress: 30 Sep 14 

POLICY JUSTIFICATION 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)— 

Patriot Air Defense System with PAC-3 

Enhancement 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 

requested a possible sale of 202 Patriot 

Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 Missiles 

with containers, and 1 Guidance 

Enhanced Missile (GEM) Flight Test 

Target/Patriot as a Target. Also included 

are 2 PAC-3 Telemetry Kits, 6 Fire 

Solution Computers, 36 Launcher 

Station Modification Kits, 2 Missile 

Round Trainers, 2 PAC-3 Slings, 6 

Patriot Automated Logistics Systems 

Kits, 6 Shorting Plugs, spare and repair 

parts, lot validation and range support, 

ground support equipment, repair and 

return, publications and technical 

documentation, personnel training and 

training equipment, Quality Assurance 

Team, U.S. Government and contractor 

technical and logistics support services, 

and other related elements of logistics 

and program support. The estimated 

cost is $1.750 billion. 

The program will contribute to the 

foreign policy and national security of 

the United States by helping to improve 

the security of a partner which has been, 

and continues to be, an important force 

for political stability and economic 

progress in the Middle East. 

The proposed sale will help replenish 

Saudi’s current Patriot missiles which 

are becoming obsolete and difficult to 

sustain due to age and the limited 

availability of repair parts. The purchase 

of PAC-3 missiles will support current 

and future defense missions and 

promote stability within the region. 

Saudi Arabia, which already has Patriot 

missiles in its inventory, will have no 

difficulty absorbing these additional 

missiles into its armed forces. 

The proposed sale will not alter the 

basic military balance in the region. 

The principal contractors will be 

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire 

Control in Dallas, Texas; and Raytheon 

Corporation in Tewksbury, 

Massachusetts. Although offsets are 

requested, they are unknown at this 

time and will be determined during 

negotiations between the KSA and 

contractor. 

Implementation of this proposed 

program will require one U.S. contractor 

to travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

for a period of three years for equipment 

fielding and system checkout. 

There will be no adverse impact on 

U.S. defense readiness as a result of this 

proposed sale. 

Transmittal No. 14–43 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of 

Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the 

Arms Export Control Act 

Annex 

Item No. vii 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 

1. The Patriot Air Defense System 

contains classified Confidential 

hardware components and critical/

sensitive technology. The Patriot 

Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile 

Four-Pack is classified Confidential and 

the improved PAC-3 launcher hardware 

is Unclassified. The missiles requested 

represent significant technological 

advances for the existing Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia Patriot system capabilities. 

With the incorporation of the PAC-3 

missile, the Patriot System will continue 

to hold a significant technology lead 

over other surface-to-air missile systems 

in the world. 

2. The PAC-3 sensitive/critical 

technology is primarily in the area of 

design and production know-how and 

primarily inherent in the design, 

development and/or manufacturing data 

related to certain components. The list 

of components is classified 

Confidential. 

3. Information on system performance 

capabilities, effectiveness, survivability, 

PAC-3 Missile seeker capabilities, select 

software/software documentation and 

test data are classified up to and 

including Secret. 

4. Loss of this hardware, software, 

documentation and/or data could 

permit development of information 

which may lead to a significant threat to 

future U.S. military operations. If a 

technology adversary were to obtain 

knowledge of the specific hardware and 

software elements, the information 

could be used to develop 

countermeasures that might reduce 

weapon system effectiveness or be used 

in the development of a system with 

similar capabilities. 

5. If a technologically advanced 

adversary were to obtain knowledge of 

the specific hardware and software 

elements, the information could be used 

to develop countermeasures that might 

reduce weapon system effectiveness or 

be used in the development of a system 

with similar advance capabilities. 

6. A determination has been made 

that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can 

provide substantially the same degree of 

protection for this technology as the 

U.S. Government. This proposed sale is 

necessary in furtherance of the U.S. 

foreign policy and national security 

objectives outlined in the Policy 

Justification. 

7. All defense articles and services 

listed in this transmittal have been 

authorized for release and export to the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

[FR Doc. 2014–24136 Filed 10–8–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal Nos. 14–42] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency, Department of Defense. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601– 

3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to 

the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittals 14–42 

with attached transmittal, policy 

justification, and Sensitivity of 

Technology. 

Dated: October 3, 2014. 

Aaron Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

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61062 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 196 / Thursday, October 9, 2014 / Notices 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 

Transmittal No. 14–42 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of 

Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the 

Arms Export Control Act, as amended 

(i) Prospective Purchaser: United Arab 

Emirates (UAE) 

(ii) Total Estimated Value: 

Major Defense Equipment * $400 million 

Other .................................... $500 million 

Total .................................. $900 million 

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms 

Export Control Act. 

(iii) Description and Quantity or 

Quantities of Articles or Services under 

Consideration for Purchase: 

12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

Systems (HIMARS) Launchers 

100 M57 Army Tactical Missile System 

(ATACMS) T2K (Block IA Unitary), 

Rockets 

65 M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket (GMLRS) Unitary Pods 

Also included are 12 High Mobility 

Artillery Rocket System Resupply 

Vehicles M1084A1P2; 2 Wreckers, 5 

Ton, M1089A1P2, with Long Term 

Armor Strategy (LTAS) Cab and B-Kit 

Armor; 90 Low Cost Reduced-Range 

Practice Rocket (RRPR) pods; support 

equipment; communications equipment; 

spare and repair parts; test sets; 

batteries; laptop computers; 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 196 / Thursday, October 9, 2014 / Notices 61063 

publications and technical data; facility 

design; personnel training and 

equipment; systems integration support; 

a Quality Assurance Team and a 

Technical Assistance Fielding Team 

support; United States Government and 

contractor engineering and logistics 

personnel services; and other related 

elements of logistics support. 

(iv) Military Department: Army (ZVE 

and ZVD) 

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: FMS 

Case ZUD—$595M—1 August 2007 

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, 

Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology 

Contained in the Defense Article or 

Defense Services proposed to be sold: 

See attached annex 

(viii) Date Report Delivered to 

Congress: 29 September 2014 

POLICY JUSTIFICATION 

UAE—High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

Systems (HIMARS) Launchers 

The Government of the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible 

sale of 

12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

Systems (HIMARS) Launchers 

100 M57 Army Tactical Missile System 

(ATACMS) T2K (Block IA Unitary) 

Rockets 

65 M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket (GMLRS) Unitary Pods 

Also included are 12 High Mobility 

Artillery Rocket System Resupply 

Vehicles M1084A1P2; 2 Wreckers, 5 

Ton, M1089A1P2, with Long Term 

Armor Strategy (LTAS) Cab and B-Kit 

Armor; 90 Low Cost Reduced-Range 

Practice Rocket (RRPR) pods; support 

equipment; communications equipment; 

spare and repair parts; test sets; 

batteries; laptop computers; 

publications and technical data; 

personnel training and equipment; 

systems integration support; a Quality 

Assurance Team and a Technical 

Assistance Fielding Team support; 

United States Government and 

contractor engineering and logistics 

personnel services; and other related 

elements of logistics support. The 

estimated cost is $900 million. 

This proposed sale will contribute to 

the foreign policy and national security 

of the U.S. by helping to improve the 

security of a friendly country that has 

been and continues to be an important 

force for political stability and economic 

progress in the Middle East. 

The HIMARS will improve the UAE’s 

capability to meet current and future 

threats and provide greater security for 

its critical infrastructure. This proposed 

sale will also enhance the UAE’s 

interoperability with the U.S. and its 

allies, making it a more valuable partner 

in an increasingly important area of the 

world. The UAE will have no difficulty 

absorbing this equipment into its armed 

forces. 

The proposed sale of this equipment 

and support will not alter the basic 

military balance in the region. 

The principal contractor will be 

Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire 

Control in Dallas, Texas. There are no 

known offset agreements proposed in 

connection with this potential sale. 

Implementation of this proposed sale 

will require the assignment of up to ten 

U.S. government or contractor 

representatives to travel to the UAE for 

a period of up to one year for equipment 

de-processing/fielding, system checkout 

and training. 

There will be no adverse impact on 

U.S. defense readiness as a result of this 

proposed sale. 

Transmittal No. 14–42 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of 

Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the 

Arms Export Control Act, as amended 

Annex 

Item No. vii 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 

1. High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

System (HIMARS) with the Universal 

Fire Control System (UFCS). HIMARS is 

a C–130 transportable, wheeled version 

of the Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(MLRS) launcher. Integrated on a 5-ton 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 

(FMTV) truck chassis, it carries one 

launch pod containing six MLRS rockets 

or one ATACMS missile and is capable 

of firing all MLRS Family of Munitions 

(MFOM) rockets and missiles, to 

include Guided MLRS, ATACMS 

Unitary, and future variants. HIMARS 

operates with the same MLRS 

command, control, and 

communications, as well as the same 

size crew, as the M270A1 launcher. The 

HIMARS launcher has a Global 

Positioning System (GPS) Precise 

Positioning System (PPS), but can 

operate without it. The launcher has a 

maximum speed of 55 mph and a 

minimum cruising range of 300 miles. 

The UFCS provides the command and 

control interface, man-machine 

interface, weapon interface, launcher 

interface and embedded training. The 

UFCS enables the launcher to 

interoperate with compatible national 

fire direction systems to navigate to 

specific fire and reload points, compute 

the technical firing solution, and orient 

the Launcher Module (LM) on the target 

to deliver the weapon accurately and 

effectively. The UFCS is capable of 

firing all MFOM rockets and missiles. It 

includes Built-in-Test and capability to 

store critical mission parameters, as 

well as system configuration and 

maintenance information. The UFCS 

also provided position navigation and 

processing necessary to direct and 

maintain control of the launcher system 

to allow for accurate firing and loading 

of weapons. The HIMARS end item 

hardware is Unclassified. 

2. M57 ATACMS Block 1A Unitary 

Rockets. The purpose of the M57 

Missile is to provide Corps and Joint 

Task Force Commanders the capability 

to attack high-payoff, time sensitive 

targets when and where collateral 

damage, unexploded ordnance, or 

piloted aircraft risk may be of concern. 

Regardless of weather conditions, the 

M57 Missile can be employed against a 

variety of infrastructure, tactical, and, 

operational targets. The M57 ATACMS 

Block 1A (Unitary) rocket is a 

conventional, semi-ballistic missile 

which utilizes a 500-lb HE unitary 

warhead in place of the standard antipersonnel, anti-material (APAM) 

submunitions. The Block IA 

configuration has increased range and 

accuracy as compared to the Block I 

(70–300km for Block 1A vs. 25–165km 

for Block I) and maintains lethality due 

to a Global Positioning System (GPS) 

PPS aided guidance system. The M57 

ATACMS Block 1A (Unitary) is the Full 

Material Release variant of ATACMS 

Unitary (formerly the M48 Quick 

Reaction Unitary), and has been 

upgraded to TACMS 2K (T2K) 

specifications (T2K includes redesigned 

components to compensate for 

obsolescence issues and brings down 

per-unit costs). 

Components of the M57 ATACMS 

Block IA Unitary missile are considered 

highly resistant to reverse engineering, 

and the impact of loss or diversion of 

the end item hardware would have 

minimum adverse impact. However, 

technical data for production of the Ring 

Laser Gyroscope (RLG), or for 

production, procession, fabrication, and 

loading of the solid propellant rocket 

motor are potentially applicable to 

development and production of 

accurate, long-range missile delivery 

systems. In addition, the RLG and 

accelerometers would have applicability 

to aircraft, space, and submarine 

programs. Lithium battery technology 

has applicability in a number of areas 

such as smart munitions 

communication, etc. 

The data table and mission critical 

data generator special applications 

software is classified Confidential. The 

Security Classification Guide’s (SCG’s) 

classification of performance data and 

information ranges from Unclassified to 

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61064 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 196 / Thursday, October 9, 2014 / Notices 

Secret. System accuracy, lethality, and 

effectiveness data are classified Secret. 

System response time and most 

trajectory data are classified 

Confidential. Range, reliability, and 

maintainability data are Unclassified. 

Countermeasures and countercountermeasures are classified Secret. 

3. M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary. 

GMLRS Unitary uses a Unitary High 

Explosive (HE) Warhead along with GPS 

PPS-aided IMU based guidance and 

control for ground-to-ground precision 

point targeting. GPS PPS is not required 

for GMLRS to meet its effectiveness 

threshold. Additionally, GMLRS 

Unitary uses an Electronic Safe and Arm 

Fuze (ESAF) along with a nose mounted 

proximity sensor to give enhanced 

effectiveness to the GMLRS Unitary 

rocket by providing tri-mode warhead 

functionality with point detonate, point 

detonate with programmable delay, or 

Height of Burst proximity function. 

Control of the rocket in flight is 

accomplished by fins (canards) located 

in the nose section. GMLRS Unitary 

M31A1A1 end-item is comprised of a 

Launch Pod Container (LPC) and six 

GMLRS Unitary Rockets. The LPC can 

be loaded in the M270A1, M142 

HIMARS, or in the European M270 

launcher. The LPC provides a protective 

environment for the GMLRS Unitary 

during shipment and storage, and serves 

as an expendable launch rail when the 

GMLRS Unitary Rocket is fired. The 

height, width, length, and other features 

of the LPC are exactly the same as for 

the MLRS rocket LPC. The LPC is a 

controlled breathing type container 

equipped with desiccant for humidity 

control. The forward and aft LPC covers 

are designed to fracture as the rocket 

egresses from the container. The GMLRS 

rocket utilizes technologies in the 

guidance and control subsystem and the 

rocket motor that appear on the Military 

Critical Technologies List. The most 

serious consequences of unauthorized 

disclosure of information concerning 

the guidance and control subsystem are 

the accelerated development of 

countermeasures and manufacturing 

capability by other nations. Components 

of the GMLRS system are considered 

highly resistant to reverse engineering 

and the impact of loss or diversion of 

the end item hardware would have 

minimum adverse impact. However, 

technical data for production of the 

RLG, or for production, processing, 

fabrication, and loading of the solid 

propellant rocket motor are directly 

applicable to the development and 

production of accurate, long-range 

rocket and missile systems. In addition, 

the RLG and accelerometers would have 

applicability to aircraft, space and 

submarine programs. Lithium battery 

technology has applicability in a 

number of areas such as smart 

munitions, communications, etc. 

Production technology for the GMLRS 

motor exceeds limits established in the 

Missile Technology Control Regime. 

4. Missile Technology Control Regime 

(MTCR). The HIMARS and associated 

munitions are MTCR Category II 

controlled. The MTCR controlled items 

will be identified and reported as part 

of the MTCR process. 

5. If a technologically advanced 

adversary were to obtain knowledge of 

the specific hardware and software 

elements, the information could be used 

to develop countermeasures which 

might reduce weapon system 

effectiveness or be used in the 

development of a system with similar or 

advanced capabilities. 

6. A determination has been made 

that the recipient country can provide 

the same degree of protection for the 

sensitive technology being released as 

the U.S. Government. This sale is 

necessary in furtherance of the U.S. 

foreign policy and national security 

objectives outlined in the Policy 

Justification. 

7. All defense articles and services 

listed in this transmittal have been 

authorized for release and export to the 

United Arab Emirates. 

[FR Doc. 2014–24085 Filed 10–8–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Air Force 

Notice Is Given of the Names of 

Members of the Performance Review 

Board for the Department of the Air 

Force 

AGENCY: Department of the Air Force, 

DOD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Notice is given of the names 

of members of the Performance Review 

Board for the Department of the Air 

Force. 

DATES: Effective Date: November 3, 

2014. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant 

to 5 U.S.C. 4314(c) (1–5), the 

Department of the Air Force (AF) 

announces the appointment of members 

to the AF’s Senior Executive Service 

(SES) Performance Review Board (PRB). 

Appointments are made by the 

authorizing official. Each board member 

shall review and evaluate performance 

scores provided by the SES’ immediate 

supervisor. Performance standards must 

be applied consistently across the AF. 

The board will make final 

recommendations to the authorizing 

official relative to the performance of 

the executive. 

The members of the 2014 Performance 

Review Board for the U.S. Air Force are: 

1. Board President—Gen Selva, 

Commander, United States 

Transportation Command. 

2. Honorable Eric Fanning, Under 

Secretary of the Air Force. 

3. Gen Spencer, Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force. 

4. Lt Gen Litchfield, Commander, Air 

Force Sustainment Center. 

5. Lt Gen Greaves, Commander, Space 

& Missile Systems Center. 

6. Mr. Corsi, Assistant Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Manpower, Personnel and 

Services. 

7. Mr. McMillin, Auditor General of 

the Air Force. 

8. Ms. Thomas, Deputy Chief 

Management Officer of the Air Force. 

9. Ms. Salazar, Deputy Chief, 

Information Dominance and Deputy 

Chief Information Officer. 

10. Mr. Gill, Executive Director, Air 

Force Materiel Command. 

11. Mr. Sitterly, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

12. Mr. Lombardi, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Acquisition). 

13. Ms. Watern, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Cost and Economics. 

14. Ms. Rooney, Director, Intelligence 

Systems Support Office. 

15. Mr. Callicutt, Director, Capability 

and Resource Integration, United States 

Strategic Command. 

Additionally, all career status Air 

Force Tier 3 SES members not included 

in the above list are eligible to serve on 

the 2014 Performance Review Board and 

are hereby nominated for inclusion on 

an ad hoc basis in the event of 

absence(s). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Please direct any written comments or 

requests for information to Dr. Daramia 

Hinton, Deputy Director, Senior 

Executive Management, AF/DPS, 1040 

Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC, 

20330–1040 (PH: 703–695–7677; or via 

email at daramia.t.hinton.civ@

mail.mil.). 

Henry Williams, 

Acting Air Force Federal Register Liaison 

Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2014–24103 Filed 10–8–14; 8:45 am] 

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