[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3416.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O

. 2020-O HIO -3416

T HE S TATE EX REL

. M AGSIG v. T HE C ITY OF T OLEDO

. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3416.] Civil law—R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vests exclusive jurisdiction over noncriminal traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts—A city does not have jurisdiction to conduct its own quasi-judicial proceedings to adjudicate a person’s liability for violating a municipal traffic ordinance— Writ granted. (No. 2019-1526—Submitted Marc h 3, 2020—Decided June 24, 2020.)

I N P ROHIBITION

.

________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Susan Magsig, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent, the city of Toledo, from con ducting an administrative hearing to adjudicate her liability for violatin g a municipal trafficS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 ordinance. On November 15, 2019, we granted an alternative wri t. 157 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2019-Ohio-4696, 134 N.E.3d 1199. We now grant a writ of prohibition. I. Background {¶ 2} Toledo has a civil-enforcement system for red-light and speedin gcamera violations. Toledo Muni cipal Code (“TMC”) 313.12(a)(1). Under that system, the owner (or, in some cases, the operator) of a vehicl e is liable for a penalty of $120 for operating a vehicle in excess of the designated spe ed limit. TMC 313.12(c)(2) and (d)(2). The offense is “deemed a noncriminal violation for which a civil penalty” is imposed, a nd the penalty does not include t he imposition of points toward a license suspension. TMC 313.12(d)(2). {¶ 3} Toledo cites such violations by sending the vehicle owner a cit ation called a “Notice of Liability. ” TMC 313.12(a)(3). The owner h as 21 days from the date on the notice in which to file an appeal with a hearing of ficer. TMC 313.12(d)(4). Appeals are conducted through an administrative process established by the municipal police department. Id . “The failure to give notice of appeal or pay the civil penalty within [the 21-day] time period shall con stitute a waiver of the right to contest the citation,” id ., will be “considered an admission” of liability, id ., and will result in the impos ition of an additi onal $25 penalty, TMC 313.12(d)(5). {¶ 4} On August 19, 2019, Toledo’s automated system generated a notic e of liability for a speeding offense allegedly committed by Mags ig. 1 The notice informed Magsig that she had until October 11 to respond. Mags ig requested a hearing before the city’s administrative-hearing officer, which the city scheduled

for November 19. {¶ 5} On November 4, however, Magsig co mmenced the present action for a writ of prohibition to prevent To ledo from conducting the adm inistrative hearing on the grounds that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by 2019 Am.S ub.H.B. No. 62

1. The parties have stipulated t o the authenticity of the exhib its attached to the complaint.January Term, 2020

3 (“H.B. 62”) (effective July 3, 2019), vests exclusive jurisdict ion in the municipal courts to adjudicate every alle ged noncriminal traffic-law viol ation. On November 15, we denied Toledo’s motion to d ismiss and granted an alterna tive writ, ordering the parties to present evidence and file briefs in accordance w ith S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05. 157 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2019-Ohio-4696, 134 N.E.3d 1199. The part ies have submitted stipulations of fact and filed briefs. Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost has submitted an amicus brief urging that this court grant Mags ig a writ of prohibition. II. Legal analysis {¶ 6} Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue : the exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power, the lack of aut hority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordina ry course of law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese , 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, if the absen ce of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a petitioner need not establish the third prong, the lack of an a dequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008- Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. “When a court patently and un ambiguously lacks jurisdiction to consider a matter, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent assumption of jurisdiction rega rdless of whether the lower cour t has ruled on the question of its jurisdiction.” Dept. of Adm. Servs., Office of Collective Bargaining v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 54 Ohio St.3d 48, 562 N.E.2d 125 (1990), syllabus. {¶ 7} Toledo does not dispute that its hearing officer will be exerci sing quasi-judicial authority. Quasi- judicial power refers to “the power to hear and

determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Oh io Bur. of Motor Vehicles , 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). Magsig contends th at the hearing officer patently and unambiguous ly lacks jurisdiction. We agre e and conclude that Toledo’s patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction to carry o ut its red-light andS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 speeding-camera civil-enforcement system is clear on the face o f R.C. 1901.20(A)(1). {¶ 8} R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by H.B. 62, provides that a municipal court “has jurisdicti on over the violation of any ord inance of any municipal corporation within its territory, including exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action concerning a v iolation of a state traffic la w or a municipal traffic ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) The express language of the st atute confers exclusive jurisdiction on the municipal courts to adjudicate ci vil actions for a municipal traffic-law violation. Toledo’s ordinance allowing a n administrativehearing officer to adjudicate noncriminal traffic-law violation s contravenes the statute’s plain language. {¶ 9} In opposing the writ, Toledo make s three arguments, which we

address below.

A. This court’s decision in Walker v. Toledo {¶ 10} First, Toledo argues that this court has already ruled in Walker v.

Toledo , 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, that R.C. 1901.20 contains no language barring Toledo from implementing its own c ivil administrative-enforcement syst em under its home-rule authority . But our holding

in Walker was made in the context of a di fferent statutory scheme and is no longer applicable. {¶ 11} The version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) that was in effect at the tim e of

our Walker decision did not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving traffic-camera citations. Id. at ¶ 1-3. The previous version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) stated: “The muni cipal court has jurisdictio n of the violation of any ordinance of any municipal co rporation within its territory * * *.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 98, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7357. We held that “any” did not mean the same thing as “exclusive,” and that the statute could therefore not be read as conferring exclusive jurisdiction over civil traffic-law vi olations on municipalJanuary Term, 2020

5 courts. Id. at ¶ 25. But as amended by H.B. 62 in 2019, R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) now states that municipal courts have “ exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action concerning a violation of a sta te traffic law or a municipal tr affic ordinance.” (Emphasis added). The curre nt version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) cl early and unambiguously reserves for munici pal courts exclusive authority to adjudicate every civil traffic-law violation. And that statutory grant of jurisdiction “cannot be impaired or restricted by any municipal charter or ordinance pr ovision.” Cupps v.

Toledo , 170 Ohio St. 144, 151, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959). B. Preemption under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) {¶ 12} Alternatively, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) does not preempt its administrative scheme . Rather, Toledo contends tha t R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) divests jurisdiction only from other courts , not from administrative bodies. In other words, despite the language in the amended st atute, Toledo suggests that the jurisdiction of the municipal courts is not t ruly exclusive. According to Toledo, the language that the General Assembly add ed “can be read to mean ‘jurisdiction to the exc lusion of any other court’ ” bu t not to the exclusion of a municipal admin istrative body. {¶ 13} Toledo’s argument runs counter to the plain language of the sta tute, which vests the municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction , without limitations. Toledo’s preferred construction of the statute requires us to a dd words to the text, which we are not permitted to do. In re Adoption of P.L.H. , 151 Ohio St.3d 554, 2017-Ohio-5824, 91 N.E.3d 698, ¶ 27. {¶ 14} We reject Toledo’s argument that H.B. 62 preserved the jurisdic tion

of local administrative-hearin g officers for noncriminal traffi c-law violations. C. Constitutionality of certain provisions enacted in H.B. 62 {¶ 15} Finally, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A) is unenforceable because other provisions enacted in H.B. 62 are unconstitutiona l. Toledo points to R.C. 4511.096(C) and (D), which re quire a municipality to file specific documentsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 in municipal court in photo-enfo rcement cases. And Toledo cont ends that these— and other similar statutes that purport to set rules for a muni cipal court’s operation—violate the separation- of-powers doctrine and Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the M odern Courts Amendment of 1968. {¶ 16} But even assuming these provi sions are unconstitu tional (a ques tion we emphatically do not decide), Toledo does not claim that the exclusivejurisdiction clause of R.C. 1901.20(A) itself violates the Cons titution. To the contrary, the authority of the G eneral Assembly to set the juri sdiction of the municipal courts is undisputed. {¶ 17} Toledo’s constitutional challenge to unrelated amendments that

H.B. 62 made to other statutes f ails to account for the authori ty of courts to sever unconstitutional portions of a sta tute without affecting other portions of the statute or related provisions. See State v. Romage , 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 15; Geiger v. Geiger , 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927);

see also R.C. 1.50. {¶ 18} To determine whether severance is appropriate, we consider (1) whether the constitutional and unconstitutional parts are c apable of standing alone, (2) whether the unconstitutional part is so connected wi th the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislature if we strike it, and (3) whether we mu st insert words in order to eff ectuate the remaining constitutional portion. Romage at ¶ 15; see also Geiger at 466. {¶ 19} The disputed provisions are eas ily severable (if necessary). T he statutory provision making the municipal court’s jurisdiction e xclusive may still be enforced even if (hypothetically) the specific requirements for conducting those hearings would eventually be declared to be unconstitutional. For this reason, Toledo’s constitutional challenge to portions of H.B. 62 is of no consequence to this case.January Term, 2020

7 III. Conclusion {¶ 20} R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vest s exclusive jurisdiction over noncriminal traffic-law adjudicati ons in the municipal courts. Toledo therefore has no jurisdiction to conduct its own quasi-judicial proceedings. We therefore grant a writ of prohibition. Writ granted.

O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and

S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, and Ronald J. Mayle, for relato r. Dale R. Emch, Toledo Law Director , Jeffrey B. Charles, Chief of Litigation, and John T. Madigan, Senior Attorney, for respondent. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicit or, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solic itor, and Halli Brownfield Watso n, Assistant Attorney General, urging granting of the writ of prohibition fo r amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

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