### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 23, 200 4 S es sio n
RENA MAE BLAI R v. ROLL IN C. BROW NSON, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Ham blen Coun ty No. 2003-187 K ind all T. L aws on, Jud ge

No. E2004-00817-COA- R3-CV - F ILED FEBRUARY 22, 2005

This action for spe cif

i c p er formance wa s filed following a for eclosure sale of r eal pr operty . The fore closure w as prompted by a prior pur chase r’s de fault. Rena Ma e B lair (“the plaintiff”) , the holder
o f t h e f i r s td e e d o f tru s t i n d e f

au l t , a c t i n g t h r o u g h h e r d a u g h t e r a n d s u b s t i t u t e tru s t e e , L i n d a C ar a w a y, advertised and conduc ted the for eclosure sale wi t h t h e as s i s tance of an attorney . At the sale, the property was sold to Rolli n C. Brow nson and his wife, Ma ry Ann B rownson (“ the def

endants” ) for $77,642.05. There was no writing at the time of the sale me morializi ng its terms, but Mr. Brow nson did pr ovide Ms. Ca

raw ay with an earnest money chec k. Subsequent to the sale, t h e a t t o rney c on du c tin g the sa le dr a ft e d a dee d whi c h pur po rt s to set fo rth the te rm s of the sa le . T he de fe nd a nts
re fu se d to g o thr ou g h with the sa le wh e n th e y le arn e d th a t th e pr op e rt y

wa s r e pu te d to be wo rth o nly $50,000. I n response to the plaintiff’s complaint for specific perf ormanc e, the defe ndants raise d the statute o f frauds as an a ffirmative defe nse, conte nding that there w as no written memor andum ref lecting the terms of the parties’ oral ag ree ment. Following a benc h trial, the court below g rante d the plaint if

f’ s r e qu e st f

or sp e c if ic pe rf orma nc e . T he de fe nd a nts app e a l. We a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J ., joined.
Kelley Hinsley , Morristown, Tenne ssee, for t he appellants, Rolli n C. Br ownson and wife , Mary Ann Br ownson.

L ori L . J essee , Morristown, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Re na Mae Bla ir.

OP IN ION-2- I. The prope rty

is located in Morristown a nd consists o f a l o t i m p roved with a house. The plaintiff first sold the property to L eig h Fa rmer, who secur ed her note to the plaintiff by a first de ed of trust. Unbeknow nst to the plaintiff, Fa rmer subse quently

secur ed a loa n fo r t h e purpose of remode l i n g t he house. In so doing, she executed a se cond dee d of trust to Household Fina ncial Center, I nc. Household filed its second de ed of trust for rec ordation on Jul y

23, 1999. After

doing extensive work on the property , Fa rmer left town in 2002, defaulting on both of her oblig ations. She left owing the plaintiff $74,000, whe reupon the plaintiff place d a “F or Sale” sign in the front y ard of the house.

I n J uly or Aug ust, 2002, the defe ndants s aw the sign on the pr operty and conta cted Linda Caraw ay , the plaintiff’s daug hter, a bo u t p u rchasing it for

their daug hter. Since the plaintiff was
e l d e r l y a n d h a d b e e n i l l , s h e p e r m i t t e d h e r d a u g h t e r t o a c ta s h e r

a g e n tw i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e p r o p e r t y. Th e plaint if

f w a s u na wa

re of the ou tst a nd ing d ebt to Ho us e ho ld w he n th e de fe nd a nts fi rs t approa ched he r daug hter. How ever , upon learning of the sec ond d ee d o f t rust, the plaintiff determined that a for eclosure sale would be nece ssary to clear the title. On Au gu s t 8 , 2002, the defe ndants g ave Ms. Car away a $500 “e arne st d ep o s i t ” and aske d her to sig n a handw ritten memorandum stating that the def endants wanted to purcha se t he subj ect property “if there is a cle ar title and the price wi t h l egal f ees a fter f orec losure does not e x cee d $75,500.” The memorandum further provides that if the price e x cee ds that amount, the plaintiff would g rant the de fendants the first rig ht of ref

usal. Ms. Caraw ay signe d the m emorandum as t he plainti ff’ s ag ent; on Aug ust 12, 2002, she wa s desig nated a s substit ute trustee unde r the fir st deed of tr ust. Following the parties’ Aug ust 8, 2002, a g ree ment, the defe ndants wer e g rante d acc ess to the house. The pla intiff and Ms. Cara way hired attorney

Her bert B acon to c onduct the foreclosure sale, which wa s d u ly a d v e r ti s e d a n d s c h e d u le d f o r Se p te mb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 2

. O n Se p te mb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 2, Mr. Ba con appe are d at t he courthouse steps and re ad the notice of for eclosure as it appea red in the
ne ws pa pe r. Th a t no tic e pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt part , that th e pr op e rt y wo uldbe so ld “ to the hig he st bid de r, ” a ndthat “ [i]f the hig he st bid de r is un able to pe rf orm wi th the te rm s o f the sa le , th e ri g ht i s re se rv e d to pr oc e e d to the ne xt hi ghest bi dd e r a ble to c omp ly

or to r e -a dv e rt ise .” Th e de fe nd a nts
wer e the only

individuals to appear at the fore closure sal e. They first bid $75,500. They wer e advised, howe ver, that the purcha se price would have to be $77,642.05 in order to clear the title and
c ov e r the e xpe ns e of

c on du c tin g the sa le . A ft e r s te pp ing ou tsi de to d isc us s th e pric e , th e de fe nd a nts returne d and bid the hig her amount. Mr. Ba con dec lare d the prope rty sold to the d ef

en d an t s and informed them that he would prepa re the nece ssary

paper s. The de fendants indicated that they wer e in the proce ss of obtaining financ ing and would need a couple of weeks t o do so. Mr. Ba con g ave the def e n d a n ts u n ti l th e e n d o f th e mo n th to s e c u r e th e b a lan c e d u e o n th e b id

. T h e c lo s in g was tentatively

set for Septe mber 30, 2002.

On Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 02 , th e de fe nd a nts te nd e re d a c he c k for $7 ,2 00 to Ms. Cara way . Thi s amount repr esents ten pe rce nt of the price less the $500 alre ady paid as earne st money . On the che ck made pay able to Ms. Cara way , Mr. Brownson wrote the foll owing in the memo section of the c heck:T he defendan t s rai s ed t wo addi t i onal af f i r mat i ve defens es : ( 1) e s t op pel , becau s e t he pl ai nt i f f al l ege dl y en t er ed 1
i n t o n eg ot i at i on s wi t h t h i r d pa r t i es a f t er t h e for ec l os u r e s al e t o r en t t h e pr oper t y , t h er eby e v i den ci n g a n i n t en t t o di s av ow t he fo recl o sur e and t he exi st ence o f a co nt ract, and (2) f ai l ure of co nsi d erat i o n due t o t he d i spari t y be t ween t he val ue
o f t he d i sput ed p rop ert y and t he b i d p ri ce. H o wever, t he real i ss ue o n ap p eal i s t he ap p l i cab i l i t y of t he d efense of t he st atute o f

f rau d s.
-3- “ De po sit fo r 5 05 L ou ise –c on tin g e nt o n g e tti ng fi na nc ia l [sic ].” Up on ha nd ing the c he c k to Ms. Cara way , M r. B ro wn so n a sk e d w he the r the c he c k w a s “ ok a y .” Ms. Ca ra way state d th a t it

wa s, althoug h she later

testified that she ne ver notice d the additional notation on the che ck. The re w ere no additional writing s at the time of the sa le.

F oll ow ing the sa le , M r. B a c on pr e pa re d a su bs titute trus te e ’s de e d tha t con ve y e d the pr op e rt y in fee s i m p l e t o the def

endants. Ms. Cara way

signe d the dee d, althoug h it was not notarized or dated.

Th e de fe nd a nts la te r d e te rm ine d the y wo uldne e d mo re tim e be fo re the y c ou ld c los e be c aus e they had bee n unable to g et the house a ppraised. Mr . Br o wn s o n offe red to g ive Ms. Caraw ay an additional $15,000 beca

use of the de lay . Howeve r, Ms. Cara way did not insist upon t he additional payment. Mr. B rownson indicate d that the def endants would be able to close in about a we ek.

The house a

ppraisal c ame in at $50,000. The de fendants were informed that it would take betwee n $25,000 and $35,000 to put the house in a livable c ondition. They wer e also a dvised that they could sec ure the nece ssary additional financ ing if

they would use their pri m ar y re s i d ence as collater al. The de fendants subsequently offe red Ms. Car away

$55,000 for the home. Ms. Caraw ay re sp on de d th a t she e xpe c te d the a mou nt bid a t the fo re c los ur e sa le . Sh e a lso inf orme d th e de fe nd a nts that the plaintiff could a ssist wit h financ ing by car ry ing a note until they

completed r enovations.

The d e f e n d a n ts d e c id e d th e y n o lo n g e r w a n te d th e p r o p e r ty

. I n ma k in g th is d ecision, the defe ndants wer e prompted by the fac t that the property was worth less than the bid amount. They
wer e also u n wi l l i n g to mortga g e their ow n home. The pla intiff made se vera l reque sts that the de fe nd a nts satis fy

the ba la nc e ow ing on the ir bid , b ut s he re c e ive d no re sp on se

. F oll ow ing the sa le and throug h roug hly

November

or De cembe r, the de fendants worked on the h o u s e and placed elec tricity service in their names. In J anuary 2003, howeve r, they

terminated this servic e. The plaintiff br oug ht this action for specific performanc e on April 11, 2003. I n their answe r f i l e d A u g u s t2 0 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e d e f e n d a n t s r a i s e d th e s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s a s a n a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. In 1 pa rt ic ula r, the de fe nd a nts a ve rr e d th a t no writi ng or me mor a nd um wa s e ve r e xec ute d b y the pa rt ie s, and since the t ransa ction was for the sale of land, the ag ree ment was une nforc eable . A benc h trial was he ld on J anuary

28, 2004. At its conclusion, the trial court re ndere d its decision from the benc h and orally awa

rded judgment to t he plaintiff. B y written judg ment enter ed Mar ch 3, 2004, the tria l court g rante d the plaintiff’s complaint for specific perf ormanc e and order ed the plaintiff to de liverO n Apri l 26, 200 3, dur i ng t he pendenc y of t hes e pr oceedi ng s , i t was di s cover ed t ha t the proper t y ha d been 2

v a n d a lize d a n d su b sta n tial d a m a g e w a s d o n e to the h o m e

. In its o p inio n re n d e re d fro m the b e n c h , the trial c o u rt h e ld tha t t h e b u ye r b o re th e r isk o f lo ss d u rin g th e re le v a n t p e rio d o f t im e . T h e d e fen d a n ts d o no t ad d re ss th is ru ling in the ir b rie f an d , co n se q u e n tly, w e w ill no t ad d re ss it o n a p p e a l.

T he p l ai nt i f

f f urt her r ai ses eq ui t ab l e est o p p el as an al t ernat e m echanis m b y w hi ch t he co nt ract c an b e b rought 3

o u t o f t h e sta tute o f fra u d s. S h e a rg u e s tha t fa ilure to e n fo rc e this c o n tra c t wo u ld re su lt in h a rd sh ip o r o p p re ssio n

. See Bal i l es v . Ci t i es Se r v. Co. , 5 7 8 S .W .2 d 6 2 1 , 6 2 4 (T e n n . 1 9 7 9 ). S inc e w e a ff irm the tr ia l c o u rt’s j u d g m e n t o n th e b a sis

o f t h a t co u rt’s ra tio n a le , w e d e c line to a d d re ss t h e a p p lica b ili ty o f the d o c trine o f eq u itab le e sto p p e l t o the fac ts o f t h is

cas e.

-4- the pr op e rty

in e xch a ng e fo r the ba la nc e of the a g re e d p ur c ha se p ri ce, whi c h a mou nte d to $6 9, 94 2. 05

. I t is fr om this or de r that th e de fe nd a nts app e a l.

2

II.

The de fendants contend that the trial c ourt err ed when it found t hat t he dee d signe d only by Ms. Caraway

suffice d to satisfy

the statute of f

rauds. I n particula

r, t he defenda nts arg ue that the de ed did not accur ately

rec ite the terms of the parties’ oral a g ree ment arising out of the for eclosure sale. The de fendants further c ontend that the notation on the che ck indicating that the sale w as conting ent upon the def

endants obtaining financ ing c onstitut ed a c ounteroff er, w hich, when not a cce pted, was withdrawn by

the new of

fer of $55,000.

The issue be fore us is whether the deed, w h i ch wa s d raf ted af ter the f orec losure sale and signe d only

by Ms. Caraway , suffice s to satis fy t h e s t atut e of f rauds. As w e find that the de ed contained the terms of the or al ag ree ment enter ed into at the for eclosure sal e, we af fi rm the trial
c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that th e c on tr a c t is e nf or c e able a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nts

. 3

III

. When an appea l is pursued from a bench trial, our re view of the trial’s court findings of fac t is de novo upon the re cord. Te nn. R. App. P. 1 3 (d ). We acc ord these f indings a presumption of
corr ection unless the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst them. Id. As to the trial court’ s conclusions of law, how ever , there is no suc h presumption of cor rec tness. Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997) . The issue be fore us conce rns w h et h er t h e s tatute of fr auds pre cludes
e nf or c e me nt o f the or a l a g re e me nt e nte re d int o a t the fo re c los ur e sa le

. Whe the r a me mor a nd um i s sufficie nt to satisfy the statute of frauds is a question of law. See Ma sse y v . Ha rd c as tle , 753 S.W .2d 127, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

The sta t u t e o f f

ra u d s , co d i fi ed i n T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 2 9 -2 -1 0 1 (a ) ( 2 0 0 0 ), p ro v i d es , i n rele vant pa rt , th a t no a c tio n s ha ll b e br ou g ht,-5- (4) [u]pon any

contra ct for the sal e o f l an ds, tenements, or hereditaments, or the making of any leasethere of for

a long er te rm than one ( 1) y ear

. . . unless the promise or a g ree ment, upon which such a ction shall be b ro u gh t , o r s o m e m em o ra n d u mo r n o t e t h er eo f, s h al l b e i n wr i t i n g, and sig ned by

the party to be charg ed therewith, or som e other person l a w f u l l y au t h o r i z e d b y s u c h p ar t y.
The a g ree ment befor e us is one for the sale of

land. Ther ef

o re , i t must satis fy

the pre scription of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 2-101(a )(4) to be enf orce able.

I n Tenne ssee, the refe renc e to a memorandum “sig ned by the party to be cha rg ed” ha s been construed, in the r eal e state conte x t, to mean “the owner of the rea lty rathe r than the party attempted to be char g ed or held liable in an action based on the memora ndum.” Bradley v. Pe n Tax Corp. , No. 89-416-II , 1990 WL

33404, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Marc h 28, 1990)(c itations omi tted). Appar ently , Tenne ssee is in a small minority of state s t hat place this int erpr etation on the statute. See Ashley v . Preston , 3 9 S.W. 2d 27 9, 28 0 (T e nn

. 19 31 ). Te nn e sse e c ou rt s h a ve int e rp re te d it thi s way beca use the statute “ was a dopted and e nacte d in Tennesse e for the protec tion of the people, w ho owned the title to re al estate .” Irwin v. Dawson , 273 S.W .2d 6, 7 (Tenn. 1954)

.
I n the instant case , the dee d draf ted by the plaintiff’s attorney

was sig ned by

Ms. Caraway in h e r c apa c ity

a s th e a g e nt o f the pa

rty to b e c ha rg e d. Th e de fe nd a nts c on c e de that th e ho ldi ng in Bradley is the law. Howeve r, they arg ue that the r ationale use d to justi fy Tenne ssee’ s interpre tation of thi s lang ua g e do e s n ot a

pp ly to the fa c ts o f this c a se

. I t ha s b e e n s a id that th e ru le is d e sig ne d to “prote ct the owne rs of land from being drawn int o hasty or i nconsiderate agr eeme nts” and to guar d “ag ainst misunderstanding as to the nature and extent of such ag ree ments.” Whit by v. Whitby , 36 Tenn. 473, 478 (Tenn. 1857). Since t he rule serve s to protec t the owner when sued by the purc haser , so the arg ume nt g oe s, it h a s b e e n u se d i nfr equ ent ly in the c on te xt of a n o wn e r s e e kin g sp e c if ic perf ormanc e ag ainst a purc haser

. Whil e we have a cknowledg ed the paucity of ca ses wher ein a n o wn er seeks to enfor ce a contra ct ag ainst a purcha ser, we have nonetheless aff irmed the af

oresa id principle of law . We have state d th a t
[i ]t

m a y b e ar g u e d w i t h c o n s i d e r ab l e l o g i c t h a ti ti s g r os sly inconsistent to require the signature of the seller to validate a sale of
rea l estate but to enfor ce the same a g ree ment ag ainst the buy er w ho sig n e d n o w r itte n me mo r a n d u m. N o a u th o r it y h a s b e e n f

o u nd wh e r e ina b u y e r w a s f o r c e d to s p e c if

ic a ll y p e r f o r m o r p a y d a ma g es without his si g nature . All a uthorities e x amined involved an ef fort by the buy er to f

orce the seller to spe cifica lly perf orm. Neve rtheless, the L eg islature has de clared the policy of the State in words w hich the-6- Sup re me Cou rt

ha s h e ld t o me a n th a t on ly the sell er’s si g natur e is
nece ssary for a valid contra ct t o sell land. Any chang e in the law or its int e rp re ta tio n must

c ome fr om the L e g isl a tur e or the Sup re me Court.
Massey , 7 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t1 3 7

. In l i g h to f o u r p r e c e d e n t , w e f

i n d t h a tt h e d e e d h a s b e e n s i g n e d b y a lawfully authorized ag ent of the party to be char g ed and there fore satisfies this element of the statute.

The law provides that a c ontrac t signe d only by the vendor

may b e en fo rce d if it can be demonstrated that the purcha ser orally assented to the ag ree ment. Bradley , 1990 WL 33404, at *4. Th e re fo re , w e mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the de e d c on sti tut e s a writt e n me mor a nd um s uf fi cie nt t o satis fy the statut e of

fr aud s. Th e de fe nd a nts c on te ndthat si nc e the de e d d id n ot c on ta in the te rm s of the or a l c on tr a c t a nd

the y ne ve r a c c e pte d th e deed, it i s u ne nf or c e able . T he re fo re , w e mus t determine (1) the sc ope of the oral ag ree ment betwee n the parties, and (2) whether the undeliver ed deed c ontains the terms of that oral a g ree ment. See Black v. Black , 202 S.W .2d 659, 661-63 (Te nn. 1947).

I V.

The de fendants do not really dispute that there w as a n o ral a g ree ment to purcha se the plaint if f’ s p ro pe rty

a t th e fo re c los ur e sa le . M r. B a c on a ndMs. Cara way ind ic a te d to the de fe nd a nts that they woul d n ee d a bid of $77,642.05. The de fendants subsequently bid this amount and Mr. B a c on de c lare d th e pr op e rty so ld t o the de fe nd a nts

. Mr . Ba c on su bs e qu e ntl y state d th a t he wo uld prepa re the documents deeding the property to them, and ag ree d to give the def endants until the end of the month to pay

the re maining ba lance

. The closing was tentatively set for Septe mber 30, 2002.

The prec ise terms of that a g ree ment, howeve r, ar e in dispute. The de fendants contend that the notation made by

Mr. B rownson in the memo section of his earnest money chec k, in which he wrote the sale wa s “conting ent on g etting f inancial [sic],” was a term of the ora l ag ree ment. We find that it was not. Following the sale, the parties discussed the time fra me for pay ing the balanc e due and for executing the deed. At trial, Mr. Br ownson testified that he informed Ms. Ca raw ay and Mr. Ba con that he w as “w orking on financ ing and expected to have something c ompleted by the end of the mon th. ” He a lso te sti fi e d th a t w he n h e ma de the no ta tio n on the c he c k a ndha nd e d it to M s. Caraw ay , he aske d, “I s this okay ? ” Howe ver, t here is nothing in the re cord indicating that he direc ted her attention to the notation or attempted to disc uss it with he r. I n rende ring its judgment fr om the be nc h, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:
that notation on the chec k – First of all, it isn’t very clea r as to what exactly it means. So that’ s a problem there

. The e videncethat I ’ve hear d, I would find that that was not discussed an d agr ee d b y the parties. So ther e wa s no discussion and ag ree ment about that, or, at le a st, no a g re e me nt, a ndve ry lit tle , if a ny , d isc us sio n at a ll.-7-

We find that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that this so-called
c on tin g e nc y

wa s n ot a

te rm of the or a l c on tr a c t. T he de fe nd a nts arg ue th at th e brevi ty of the ir
c on ve rs a tio n a

bo ut f inanc ing me re ly

su g g e sts that th e y

ha d n ot f ina lize d the a g re e me nt t o p ur c ha se the prope rty . We disag ree . Mr. B rownson testified at trial that he wa s wo rk i ng on obtaining financ ing and there fore neede d a couple of we eks to secur e the ba lance due on the purcha se. The fa c t th at f inanc ing ma y ha ve be e n me nti on e d in thi s c on te xt d oe s no t su g g e st i t w a s a te rm of the sa le when ther e is no evidenc e that any discussion took place with respect to this “conting ency .” The defe ndants furthe r charg e that Ms. Caraw ay must have noticed the notation on the chec k when she stated it was “okay .” Ms. Cara way testified, howeve r, that she did not notice the notation.

As pr e vio us ly

no te d, the e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing wi th respe ct to the “c ontinge ncy ” ar g ument.

V. The g ener al rule f

or whe ther a

memorandum suff

ices to satisfy

the statute of f

rauds r equire s that

the me mor a nd um .

. . c on ta in the e sse nti al ter ms o f the c on tr a c t,

expressed with such ce rtainty that they may be under stood from the
me mor a nd um i tse lf

or so me oth e r wri ti ng to w hic h it re fe rs or wi th which it is connec ted, without resorting to parol evide nce. A memorand um disclosing mer ely that a contr act ha d been ma de, without showing what the contra ct is, is not sufficient to satisfy the
re qu ir e me nt o f the Sta tut e of F ra ud s th a t th e re be a me mor a nd um i n writi ng of the c on tr a c t.

La mber t v . Ho me Fe d. Sav . & L oa n Ass ’n

. , 481 S.W .2d 770, 773 (Tenn. 1972) (citations omitted). I n the instant c ase, the fac t that the deed w as not delivere d does not mean that it cannot satisfy the writing require ment of the statute of frauds. Our c ourts have c onsistentlyheld that an unde livered deed w ill constit ute a suff icient memora ndum of the contra ct of sa l e “i f the de ed conta ins substa n t i al l ythe terms of a prior par ol contrac t.” Black , 202 S.W .2d at 662 (c itation omit ted). There fore , the primary

issue befor e us is whether the dee d contains t he terms of t he ora l ag ree ment assented to by

the def endants.

The de fendants arg ue that the de ed fa i l s t o satisfy the statute of f

rauds be cause it does not contain all the terms of the ora l contrac t. I n support of this arg ument, the def endants re fer

us to a litany of ca ses invol v i n g undelivere d deeds that addre ss the require ments of a memor andum used to memorialize an oral c ontrac t. The d ef en d an ts proffe r these c ases to ar g ue that the f acts of the instant case f

ail to meet these r equire ments. I n one such c ited case , Black v. Black , th e Sup re me Court held that a dee d signe d by the owner

but never delivere d to the purcha ser suff iced to satisfy the statute of f

rauds be cause the dee d fully described t he property , included the usual covena nts of
war ranty , conta i n ed n ea rly

a ver batim statement of the c ontrac t as testified to by the parties, and-8-

contained the words “ha ve bar g ained,” there by connoting a prior tr ansac tion. Id. at 663. I n this case, howeve r, the de fendants arg ue that the deed did not contain all of the te rms: it failed to indicate that it was being made pur suant to a prior or al ag ree ment, and it f ailed to inc lude an essential term of the contra ct, that is, that the ag ree ment was c ontinge nt upon the defe ndants securing f inancing

. The de ed, which w as dra fted by Mr. B acon and signe d by Ms. Caraway , rea ds, in releva nt pa rt , a s f oll ow s:

WHERE AS , de fa

ult wa s ma de in the pay me nt o f the sa id indebtedness a n d t he lawf ul owners a nd holders of the promissory
no te evide nc ing sa me ha vin g dir e c te d me a s Su bs titute Tr us te e to adver tise a n d s e ll s a id r e a l e s tate in a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e te r ms and provisions of said Dee d of Trust and I did sell at 1 0 :00 a.m. at the f r o n td o o r o f

th e C o u r t h o u s e i n M o rr i s t o w n , H a m b l e n C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, a nd as adve rtised in the Citi zen Tribune , a we e kly publication i n Hamblen County , Tenne ssee, the said property for cash, and in bar of the equity of re demption, waived in the a bove ref ere nced de ed of trust, when, ROLL I N C. BROWNSON and wife , MARY ANN B ROWNS ON, a mong othe rs, bec ame the bidde r there fore and bid the sum of $77,642.05, which being the hig hest and be st b id, sa me wa s st

ru c k o ff a ndso ld t o th e sa id R OL L I N C

. BROWNSON and wif

e, MARY ANN B ROWNS ON, as te nants by the entire ty , their heirs and assig ns, the here inafter described re al estate . . .

We find that the dee d ref ere nces the prior ag ree ment by rec iting what occur re d at t h e foreclosure sale, the pla ce at which the ora l ag ree ment was e ntere d into. T h i s is not, as the defe ndants arg ue, a ca se whe re the writing fails to ref ere nce the prior ora l ag ree ment. See E s li ck v. Friedm an , 235 S.W .2d 808, 813 (Tenn. 1 9 5 1 ) (whe re the purported w ritten memorandum wa s unambig uous and made no r efe renc e to the alleg ed prior or al contra ct, it failed to satisfy the statute of f

rauds) . The
ne e d f or so me re fe re nc e to a prior or a l a g re e me nt ste ms fr om a c on c e rnthat pa

rt ie s w ou ld o the rw ise draf t instruments following neg otiations when the parties had y et to a g ree on the terms of the sale. See Black , 2 0 2 S. W. 2 d a t 6 6 2

. Co n s e q u e n tl y , a me mo r a n d u m th a t s a ti s f ie s th e s tatu te o f

fra uds must set forth the a g ree d-upon terms of the contra ct soug ht to be enfor ced. See id. The Black court cited the lang u age of “ha ve g rante d, barg ained, sold and c onvey ed,” a s being indicative of a prior sale. Id. at 663. Although the deed befor e us does not conta in this precise lang uag e, we find that t h e l an gu age em p l o y ed t o re ci t e t h e p ro ce ed i n gs at t h e f o re cl o s u re s al e –i n p ar t i cu l ar , t h e l an gu age stating that the pro p er t y “w as struck of f and sold to the said ROLL I N C. BROWNSON and wife , MARY ANN B ROWNS ON” – suf fice s to demo n s t ra t e that this deed wa s cre ated pur suant to the oral a g ree ment enter ed into at the for eclosure sale.

Th e de fe nd a nts a lso c on te nd that the de e d fa ils to re fl e c t the te rm s of the a g re e me nt b e c aus e it does n o t c o n tain a r e f e r e n c e to th e “ c o n ti n g e n c y

. ” A s p r e v io u s ly d is c u s s e d , h o w e v e r, the-9-

c on tin g e nc y

wa s n ot a te rm of the or a l con tr a c t tha t wa s ag re e d upo n by the pa rt ie s. Exc lud ing thi s alleged term, the re maining te rms contained in the deed c oincide with Mr. B rownson’s testimony as to his understanding of the ora l ag ree ment. Mr. B rownson’s testimony at trial evidenc es his belief that the purc hase w as conting ent on financ ing, and the s ale was conditional beca use t he buy er ha d
a n o pti on to re -a dv e rt ise or g o to the ne xt bid de r i n th e e ve nt that th e de fe nd a nts c ou ld n ot p e rf orm. Ho we ve r, he a lso state d th a t w he n h e le ft the fo re c los ur e sa le , h e un de rs too d th a t he ha d ju st purcha sed the subjec t property . The de fendants acc epted the terms of the a g ree ment enter ed into at the fo re c los ur e sa le , a ndthe ir su bs e qu e nt d e c isi onno t to fo llo w thr ou g h o n th e pu rc ha se wa s b e c aus e they decide d they

wer e paying mor e than the pr operty was worth. As the trial court noted,

Mr . B ro wn so n h a s te sti fi e d, I thi nk ve ry ho ne stl y , a ndve ry

fr a nk ly . . . the g ist of t h e problem came when it wa s discovere d that the property wouldn’t appraise, or didn’t appraise, or may not appra ise, or be w o r thw h a t i t w a s f ir s t th o u g h t t o b e

. . . H e s a idh e –I d o n ’t
reme mber e x actly

how, but he re alized that, quote, his bid was too high.

In l i g h to f t h e f o r e g o i n g , w e f

i n d t h a tt h e m a t e r i a l t e r m s c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y, t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a tt h e s a l e , a n d t h e a m o u n to w e d w e r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e d e e d , a n d t h e d e f e n d a n ts
or a lly a sse nte d to tho se te rm s. Th os e fa c ts t ake thi s c a se ou t of the ba r o f the statut e of

fr a ud s.

V I.

The defenda nts also arg ue that the notation on the check c onstitut ed a c ounteroff er that was
never acc epted by

the plaintiff. In support of this arg ument, the def endants c ite Wes t

fal l v. Brentw ood Serv. Group, Inc. , N o. E2 00 0- 01 08 6- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 0 WL 17 21 65 9, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. E. S., fi le d Nov e mbe r 17, 20 00 ), wh e re a n emp loy e e mod if ie d his co ntr a c t pri or

to s ig nin g it, and the c ourt held that t he amended provision was not enfor cea ble. Simil arly , the def

endants a rg ue that th e no ta tio n n e xt to the sig natur e on Mr . B ro wn so n’ s c he c k c on sti tut e s a c ou nte ro ff

e r b e c aus e ins te a d o f a c c e pti ng the plaint if f’ s o ff e r t o p ur c ha se the pr op e rt y fo r $ 77 ,6 42 .0 5, the y

c ou nte re d w ith the provision that the sale be conting ent upon the def endants obtaining financ ing. An offe r or counter offe r can be withdra wn at any time prior to accepta nce. Mason v. Capitol Records, Inc. , No. 01A01-9807-CH- 00389, 1999 WL 976614, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. M.S., fil ed Oc tober 28, 1999). There fore , so the arg ument g oes, si nce the plaintiff never acce pted t his provision of t he contr act, a nd the defe ndants withdrew their initial off er when they proposed to pay $55,000 instead, the c ontrac t is not enforc eable

. The a cce ptance of an of

fer must be prec isely

in a ccor d with the terms of that off er. Ray v. Thom as , 2 32 S.W. 2d 32 , 35 (Te nn . 1 95 0) . “ I f an o ff e re e a sse nts to an o ff

e r, bu t on ly

wi th
c on dit ion s o r w ithva

ri e d te rm s, the re is no accep tan c e , b ut r a the r the e xpre ssi on c on sti tut e s a reje ction of t he original offer and i nitiation of a new offer .” We stf all , 2 0 0 0 WL 1 7 2 1 6 5 9 , a t * 5

. We fi nd , h ow e ve r, that th e de fe nd a nts ’ a rg ume nt f a ils in l ig ht o f o ur

dis po sit ionof thi s c a se

. Th e re is no evidenc e that the de fendants ex presse d this “c o u nteroff er” to the plaintiff. Ther e we re no-10-

conver sations about financ ing, and mere ly making a notation on a c heck w i thout discussing that notation with the other party does not suffice

. The fa ct of the matter is that the def endants off

ere d to purcha se t he property when they made their bid. That bid was ac cepte d by the plaintiff’s a g ent
a t th e auc tio n. Th is w a s th e c on tr a c t be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

V II.

Th e de fe nd a nts c on te ndthat sh ou ld w e fi ndthe y are lia ble on the or a l c on tr a c t f

or the sa le of prope rty , we should deny the p l ai n t i ff’ s reque st for spec ific per formanc e. As a n alternative
reme dy , the defe ndants arg ue that we should only awa rd to the plaintiff the diff

ere nce be tween the contra ct price – $77,6420.05 – and the f air mar ket value of

the prope rty

– $50,000 – which amount is $27,642.05.
Specific pe rformance is not a remedy available as of rig ht, but one within the discretion of the trial court. Shupt

rine v . Q uinn , 597 S.W .2d 728, 730 (Tenn. 1979) . The trial c ourt’s judg ment will not be disturbed on appea l a bsent an abuse of that discre tion. See id. at 731. “Where damag es are prac ticable, and would be a dequate , the Court, as a r ule, will not compel a spec ific per formanc e, but will leave the plaintiff to his reme dies at law, or will a war d damag es.” La ne v . As so c iat e d Ho us. De v e lop e rs , 7 67 S .W .2d 6 40 , 6 42 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8) (c itatio n o mit te d) . H ow e ve r, sp e c if ic perf ormanc e is appropriate in contra cts involving the sale of re al prope rty wher e, more often than not, an awa

rd of da mag es will not suffice to c ompensate the injured party

. Hil lar d v . Fr ank lin , 41 S.W .3d 106, 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). F or a c ourt to awa rd spec ifi c p er fo rm an ce , the contra ct must be “cle ar, c omplete and de finite in all its essential terms,” it must “show bey ond doubt that the minds of the parties a ctually met,” and it mus t be “free from any suspicion of fraud or unfa irness.” Id. (citations omitted).

As dis c us se d, we fi ndthat th e de e d c on ta ine d the te rm s of the or a l a g re e me nt a s a sse nte d to by the parties. There fore , we find that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion. According ly , we aff irm the trial court’s awa

rd of spe cific pe rformance to the plaintiff.

V III

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s g rant o f s pe c if ic pe rf orma nc e to the plaintif

f is affi rm e d. Th is c a se is
rema nded to the trial c ourt for e nforc ement of the trial court’ s judgme nt and for the collection of
c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll p ur su a nt t o a pp lic able la w. Cos ts on app eal are ta xedto the app e lla nts , Rolli n C. Brow nson and his wife, Ma ry Ann B rownson.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE