1

Filed 1/17/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MUSTAFA EDAIS et al.,

 Petitioners,

 v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN 

MATEO COUNTY,

 Respondent;

ROBERT FOUCRAULT, as Coroner,

etc., et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

 A164947

MUSTAFA EDAIS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ROBERT FOUCRAULT, as Coroner,

etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A165208

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 21CIV04737)

Thirty-two-year-old Munir Edais died of suicide by hanging at 2:41 a.m. 

on January 21, 2020, according to an autopsy report prepared by the San 

Mateo County Coroner’s Office (Coroner’s Office). The decedent’s parents, 

petitioners Mustafa and Majeda Edais (together, petitioners), distrust this 

conclusion. To investigate the possibility of foul play, they hired Judy 

Melinek, M.D., a certified forensic pathologist, to undertake a forensic 

autopsy review. The primary question before the court today is the extent to 

which Coroner’s Office records that Dr. Melinek needs to conduct this review 
2

must be released to her under the California Public Records Act (CPRA or 

Act). (See Gov. Code, §§ 7920.000 et seq.; all unspecified statutory references 

are to this code.)

1 We conclude the records in question are public records and 

may not, for the most part, be withheld. 

BACKGROUND

Evidence submitted to the superior court establishes the following 

facts. Munir Edais was a Los Gatos police officer, on his way to work the 

night shift at 6 p.m. on January 19, 2020. The day before, he had confronted 

Eman Edais, his wife of six months, with his suspicion that she was being 

unfaithful, and he told her he intended to seek a divorce. As he drove to work 

on January 19, Munir2 discussed this intention on a call with his sister, with 

whom he was close, but then he uncharacteristically failed to respond to the

multiple voice and text messages she left over the next 36 hours. 

In the early morning hours of January 21, 2020, Eman called 911 to 

report Munir had hanged himself in their apartment. When Eman placed 

her 911 call, a third person may have been present in the apartment. 

According to a forensic audio analyst hired by petitioners, the sound of a 

whispered voice can be detected in the background on an enhanced audiotape 

of the 911 call. The Daly City Police Department responded to the call, and 

soon summoned personnel from the Coroner’s Office to the Edais’s home. The

1 Former Government Code sections 6250 et seq., enacted in 1981, was 

repealed effective January 1, 2023 and replaced by a new Government Code 

sections 7920.000 et seq. addressing the same subject matters. (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 614.) (See The People’s Business A Guide to the California Public Records 

Act (2022) Appendix 2, pp. 83–88 <https://www.calcities.org/resource/thepeople's-business-a-guide-to-the-california-public-records-act> (as of Jan. 13, 

2023).) 

2 We use first names only to avoid confusion and intend no disrespect.
3

Coroner’s Office examined and photographed the scene, interviewed Eman, 

and took custody of Munir’s body. Neither the police department nor the 

Coroner’s Office, in the reports they prepared, identify a third person as 

having been present. 

On March 22, 2020, after conducting an autopsy, the Coroner’s Office

published a report classifying Munir’s death a suicide. 

A forensic autopsy review is common where bereaved family members 

have unanswered questions about an official autopsy report. According to Dr. 

Melinek, who has conducted many such studies, a forensic autopsy review

requires examination of scene photographs, autopsy photographs, various 

reports (e.g., the autopsy report and death scene investigation report), all

notes and recordings taken by the coroner’s investigator who examined the 

scene and by the forensic pathologist who examined the body, and recuts of 

microscopic slides of any tissues retained. Petitioners sought the required

records informally and then, on April 22, 2021, served a formal CPRA request 

on Robert Foucrault, in his capacity as San Mateo County Coroner.

Petitioners’ CPRA request sought “all DOCUMENTS received or 

generated by, or currently in the possession of, the [Coroner’s] Office in 

connection with the death of Munir Edais.” The request defined 

“DOCUMENTS” broadly, to include photographs, video recordings, “and all 

other electronically stored information.” For physical evidence that could not 

be reproduced, petitioners requested an appointment for Dr. Melinek or her 

designee to inspect the evidence. And petitioners offered, in making their 

CPRA request, to have all the requested materials sent directly to Dr. 

Melinek, who agreed to return or destroy them at the conclusion of her 

assignment. 
4

In response to this CPRA request, the Coroner’s Office produced, for 

the second time, copies of several reports it had previously provided—the

summary Report of Investigation (Coroner’s Report), a Pathology Report, and 

a Forensic Laboratory Report (Toxicology Report). But it declined to provide 

photographs of the scene or the autopsy and declined to provide the full

Summary and Investigation Notes Report (Investigation Report) prepared by 

the coroner’s investigator, explaining that the decedent’s widow had not 

consented to such disclosure. 

Petitioners then sought a writ of mandate to compel production, as well 

as declaratory and injunctive relief. (See Gov. Code § 7923.000; Code Civ. 

Proc., §§ 525, 1060, 1085 et seq.) On September 3, 2021, they filed in the 

superior court a verified petition and complaint (Petition) against the 

Coroner and the County (together, respondents).3 The Petition sought all of 

the documents requested in the CPRA request, plus attorney’s fees. 

Respondents answered, and delivered for the trial court’s in camera review 

copies of the autopsy photographs and the Investigation Report. The matter 

came on for hearing on March 25, 2022.

The Superior Court denied the requested writ “in its entirety” and 

ordered judgment to enter against petitioners. In an April 4, 2022 order, the 

court first found that the only documents petitioners sought were the

Coroner’s death-scene and autopsy photographs and an unredacted copy of 

the Investigation Report. The court determined respondents were “justified 

in refusing to make [these documents] public under the Public Records Act 

because they are not Public Records and/or . . . would be exempt from the 

3 Although the Coroner and the County are real-parties-in-interest in 

the writ proceeding before us, they are respondents in the appeal and were 

respondents in the trial court proceeding.
5

Public Records Act under Government Code Sections 6254(c), 6254(k), and 

6276.34 [current sections 7927.700, 7927.705, and 7930.180, respectively].” 

And, the order continued, respondents “established that, under Government 

Code Section 6255 [current section 7922.000], the public interest served by 

not disclosing the record[s] clearly outweighs the public interest served by 

disclosure of the record[s].” As it made no order to release documents under 

the CPRA, the court declined to award petitioners attorney’s fees or costs.

At the same time and in the same order in which it denied relief under 

the CPRA, the superior court on its “own motion” required respondents to 

produce to petitioners the requested photographs and Investigation Report. 

The court cited Code of Civil Procedure section 129, subdivision (a), which 

authorizes a court—on good cause and after notice to the district attorney—to 

order the release of a coroner’s photos of the deceased. The April 4, 2022 

order finds that respondents had agreed to provide petitioners the 

Investigation Report and the photographs under this code section even before 

the petition was filed, and that petitioners had subsequently notified the 

District Attorney’s office they were seeking these documents. In ordering the

photographs and Investigation Report turned over to petitioners, the court 

also ordered the parties to negotiate a protective order to prevent their 

further release. 

On April 14, 2022, petitioners filed in this court a petition for 

extraordinary writ. (See Gov. Code, § 7923.500.) Petitioners ask us to direct 

the superior court to vacate its April 4 order and replace it with a new order 

that would direct the Coroner’s Office immediately to release “all of the 

public records that it generated or received in connection with its 

investigation into” Munir’s death. Petitioners contend that the trial court

failed to comprehend the entire scope of documents they were seeking, that 
6

respondents failed to establish any applicable exemption to disclosure under 

the CPRA, and that the order to release documents misapplied Civil 

Procedure section 129, incorrectly depriving petitioners of their right to 

attorney’s fees under the CPRA. (See Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 419, 427 (Filarsky) [“award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 

[section 7923.115] is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails”].) On May 27, 2022, 

we issued an order to show cause why the relief petitioners seek should not 

be granted. 

Separately, petitioners have appealed the same April 4, 2022 order. In 

their appeal, petitioners contend they had a right to attorney’s fees since the 

superior court ordered partial disclosure of the documents their CPRA 

request had sought, and that the superior court erred in ignoring their

request to compel discovery from the Coroner’s Office on the scope of the 

relevant documents it retained. Because the appeal challenges the same 

order as the writ and is now also ripe for decision, we consolidate the writ 

and appeal for purposes of this opinion.4

DISCUSSION

“Openness in government is essential to the functioning of a 

democracy.” (International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers,

Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 328

(International Federation).) To that end, the California Constitution 

declares, “The people have the right of access to information concerning the 

conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore, . . . the writings of public 

officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.” (Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 3, subd. (b)(1).) A public agency seeking to withhold a record from 

4 This consolidation is on the court’s own motion, as we previously 

denied petitioners’ request to consolidate before the appeal was fully briefed.
7

disclosure bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the CPRA’s 

disclosure directive applies. (International Federation, at p. 329.) And in 

determining whether the CPRA applies, or whether an exemption has been 

established, the California Constitution instructs that a statutory provision 

“shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people’s right of access, and 

narrowly construed if it limits the right of access.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, 

subd. (b)(2); City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 617.)

Even as the Constitution and the CPRA mandate broad disclosure, the 

Legislature has also “been ‘mindful of the right of individuals to privacy.’ 

(§ [7921.000].) Set forth in the Act are numerous exceptions to the 

requirement of public disclosure, many of which are designed to protect 

individual privacy. (See[, e.g., §§ 7925.005, 7927.700, 7927.705].) In 

addition, a catchall exception applies if ‘on the facts of the particular case the 

public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the 

public interest served by disclosure of the record.’ (§ [7922.000].) Unless one 

of the exceptions stated in the Act applies, the public is entitled to access to 

‘any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s 

business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency.’ 

(§ [7920.530]; § [7922.525].)” (International Federation, supra, at p. 329,

footnote omitted.) 

Where, as here, the trial court has refused to order records disclosed 

under the CPRA, the court’s order is reviewable by petition for issuance of an 

extraordinary writ. (§ 7923.500; Dixon v. Superior Court (2009) 170 

Cal.App.4th 1271, 1275 (Dixon).) “ ‘Factual findings made by the trial court 

will be upheld if based on substantial evidence. But the interpretation of the 

[CPRA], and its application to undisputed facts, present questions of law that 

are subject to [independent] appellate review.’ ” (Ibid.) “And when it comes 
8

to balancing various interests under the CPRA, while we accept the trial 

court’s express and implied factual determinations if supported by the record, 

‘we undertake the weighing process anew.’ ” (Los Angeles Unified School

Dist. v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 222, 237 (L.A. Unified).)

I.

Petitioners first assign error to the trial court’s conclusion that their 

CPRA request was narrowed in discussions among the parties, until it 

encompassed only the death-scene and autopsy photographs and the 

Investigation Report. Petitioners contend, persuasively, that the language of 

their CPRA request was much broader, seeking “all” documents relating to 

Munir’s death that were received by, generated by, or in the possession of the 

Coroner’s Office. Without disputing that point, respondents attempt to

support the trial court’s conclusion by pointing to language in Mustafa 

Edais’s Claim Against the County of San Mateo (Claim), which he served 

before filing the Petition. The Claim states, “To complete her assignment, 

Dr. Melinek must examine the records of the Coroner’s Office’s investigation,” 

in particular “the unredacted notes and reports prepared by the Coroner’s 

Office’s staff” and “all post-mortem photographs taken of both the Decedent 

and the scene of his death.” 

Respondents focus on the portion of the Claim’s language mentioning 

particular documents, while ignoring the broader statement that Dr. Melinek 

requires “the records of the Coroner’s Office’s investigation” into Munir’s 

death. We see no basis for concluding that by calling out specific documents 

of particular relevance, petitioners have abandoned the broader aspects of 

their Claim or their CPRA request. Respondents’ argument also assumes, 

without evidence to support the assumption, that the Investigation Report 

and the reports previously produced to petitioners are the sum total of the 
9

“notes and reports” the Coroner’s Office has regarding Munir’s death. 

Finally, respondents ignore that the Claim attaches a copy of the full CPRA 

request, asserts without qualification that “the Coroner’s objections to [the] 

request are meritless,” and nowhere purports to narrow the scope of the 

attached request. Under these circumstances, we conclude the Claim cannot 

reasonably be interpreted as having narrowed the CPRA request. We find, 

accordingly, no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion 

that petitioners narrowed their claim to the specified documents that 

respondents had given the trial court to review.

II.

Petitioners next assign error to the trial court’s order to release the 

photographs and Investigation Report under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 129, subdivision (a) (section 129(a)). Petitioners correctly point out 

that section 129(a) applies on its face only to photographs and video

recordings “of the body, or any portion of the body, of a deceased person, 

taken by or for the coroner at the scene of death or in the course of a post 

mortem examination or autopsy.” Where it applies, section 129(a) prohibits 

copying or disseminating these sensitive images, except in specified 

circumstances including after a judicial finding of good cause. Respondents 

offer no counter to the argument that, because it concerns only photographs 

and videos of the decedent’s body, section 129(a) provides no legal basis for 

compelling production of the Investigation Report. And indeed, we see no 

basis under section 129(a) for the trial court’s order compelling production of 

that document. We will, however, conclude below that the Investigation 

Report must be disclosed under the CPRA, which not only provides a legal 

underpinning for the action the trial court has already taken but also has 
10

consequences for appellant’s right to recover attorney fees, as we see in 

part IV. 

Petitioners contend that even as to the photographs section 129(a) does 

not support the court’s order. Subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 129 (section 129(b)) expressly states, “This section shall not apply to 

the making or dissemination of [autopsy photographs] for use in the field of 

forensic pathology.” Petitioners assert that because Dr. Melinek is a certified 

forensic pathologist who intends to use the photographs for work in forensic 

pathology, the language of section 129(b) means that section 129(a) does not 

apply to any of the records petitioners seek. Respondents contest this point

but, as we explain below, we see no need to resolve this aspect of the parties’

dispute. 

III.

In petitioners’ third assignment of error, they contend the trial court 

misapplied the CPRA in concluding the records requested were not public 

records and/or fell within one of the statutory exemptions. 

A.

We begin with the question whether the records petitioners seek are 

“public records” for purposes of the CPRA. Petitioners assert that they are, 

citing Dixon, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 1271. We agree. Dixon held “coroner 

and autopsy reports that constitute investigations of a suspected homicide 

death—in which the prospect of criminal law enforcement proceedings is 

concrete and definite—are public records that are exempt from disclosure 

under Government Code section [7923.600].” (Id. at pp. 1273–1274; italics 

added.) Section 7923.600’s exemption to disclosure is for investigatory files 

compiled for law enforcement purposes, and it is not at issue here; the 

important point for our purpose is the antecedent conclusion that “coroner 
11

and autopsy reports . . . are public records.” (Dixon, at pp. 1273–1274.) 

Given the CPRA’s broad definition of “public records,” Dixon called this an 

“unremarkable proposition” that “no one could dispute.” (Id. at p. 1278; 

§ 7920.530.) “The CPRA defines ‘ “[p]ublic records” ’ as including ‘any writing 

containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business 

prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of 

physical form or characteristics,’ ” the Dixon court explained. (Dixon, at 

p. 1278; § 7920.530.) As in our case, the serious question in Dixon was “not 

whether coroner/autopsy investigatory reports are public records, but 

whether, in certain circumstances, they are exempt from public disclosure 

under a particular CPRA exemption provision.” (Dixon, at p. 1278.)

Respondents protest that the photographs are not public records

because Code of Civil Procedure section 129, not the CPRA, governs their 

release. We think the issue of whether section 129(a) prevents respondents 

from releasing the photographs goes to whether the photographs fall within 

an exemption to the CPRA, a question to which we next turn. We see nothing 

in section 129(a) that prevents the conclusion, at the outset, that all of the 

documents in petitioners’ CPRA request are public records.

B.

Three sections of the CPRA work together to exclude from disclosure

certain postmortem and autopsy photographs. Section 7927.705 excludes

“records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to

federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence 

Code relating to privilege.” (Italics added.) Section 7930.005 fleshes out the 

meaning of “pursuant to . . . state law.” It provides, “[r]ecords or information 

not required to be disclosed pursuant to [Section 7927.705] may include, but 

shall not be limited to, records or information identified in statutes listed in 
12

Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7930.100).” A long list of statutes 

ensues. The list includes, at section 7930.180: “Postmortem or autopsy 

photos, Section 129, Code of Civil Procedure.” 

These statutory provisions together exempt from disclosure under the 

CPRA postmortem or autopsy photographs whose disclosure Code of Civil 

Procedure section 129(a) prohibits. Section 129(a) bars the Coroner’s Office 

from disclosing its photographs depicting “the body, or any portion of the 

body, of a deceased person,” unless a judge finds good cause or another 

exception to section 129(a) applies. To the extent section 129(a) conflicts with 

CPRA-mandated disclosure, the provisions of section 129(a) control. We 

know this because the first words of section 129(a) are “[n]otwithstanding 

any other law, . . . ” and because a canon of statutory construction instructs 

that, where statutes conflict, “ ‘ “more specific provisions take precedence 

over more general ones.” ’ ” (Grassi v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th

283, 305.) Section 129(a) is more specific, in that it applies only to a coroner’s 

photographs and videos of a decedent’s body, whereas the CPRA governs 

public documents generally. 

The parties disagree as to whether the requested photographs fall 

within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 129(a)’s prohibition on 

disclosure, given section 129(b)’s language authorizing the “making or 

dissemination” of copies of a coroner’s photographs “for use in the field of 

forensic pathology.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 129(b).) We need not resolve this 

dispute. The trial court ordered the photographs produced to petitioners

under a protective order, respondents do not challenge that ruling and have 

already turned over the photographs,5 and petitioners do not argue that the 

5 Petitioners contend there must be additional photographs responsive 

to their CPRA request beyond those reviewed by the trial court and released 
13

protective order hampers their use of the photographs. Petitioners thus have

already obtained the relief they sought regarding these particular documents, 

albeit on a different legal theory from the one they invoked. And, since we 

separately decide with regard to the Investigation Report that petitioners’ 

CPRA request has merit, petitioners’ request for attorney’s fees seems not to 

hinge on the precise legal theory supporting the trial court’s disclosure order. 

At some future point, if some other person were to seek access to these

photographs, the difference in legal theories could become significant. 

Records released to one requestor under the CPRA generally must be made 

available to other members of the public. (See City of San Jose v. Superior

Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018.) Records released pursuant to 

section 129(a) are likely not subject to the same requirement. But what 

matters here is that petitioners received the photographs and respondents 

are not seeking their return, so there is nothing further to decide as to these 

documents. (See McLeod v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 

1156, 1170, fn. 11 [we “ ‘review the trial court’s order, not its reasoning,’ ” and 

affirm if correct on any theory supported by record].)

C.

As to the Investigation Report, we consider the other specific exemption 

on which the trial court relied. Section 7927.700 exempts from disclosure 

“personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute 

an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” In determining whether an 

invasion of personal privacy is “unwarranted,” the court balances the public 

interest in disclosure against the individual’s interest in privacy. 

(International Federation, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 329–330; L.A. Unified, 

under the protective order. If there are, then the trial court on remand can 

address in the first instance whether those, too, should be disclosed.
14

supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 240–241.) We undertake this balancing with 

respect to the Investigation Report specifically, but in so doing illustrate how, 

on remand, the trial court is to balance the competing public and private 

interests in disclosure when deciding whether to order the disclosure of other

documents responsive to the CPRA request that have not yet been produced

to it for inspection.

The public interest in release of these Coroner’s Office documents is 

significant. “[T]he fact that a member of the public is interested in a matter 

does not, by itself, make it a matter of public interest.” (L.A. Unified, supra, 

228 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.) A matter is of public interest where “disclosure 

‘would contribute significantly to public understanding of government 

activities’ and serve the legislative purpose of ‘ “ ‘shed[ding] light on an 

agency’s performance of its statutory duties.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 241.) Here, 

release of the Investigation Report will assist interested members of the 

public in assessing whether the Coroner’s Office investigated Munir’s death 

thoroughly and competently, as the document contains work product on

which the Coroner’s Office based the Coroner’s Report it released to the 

public. 

L.A. Unified instructs that the weight of the public interest “ ‘ “is 

proportionate to the gravity of the governmental tasks sought to be 

illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will serve to 

illuminate.” ’ ” (L.A. Unified, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 242.) Here, the 

gravity of the governmental task looms large, as the requested documents 

will support (or fail to) the government’s determination that Munir was not a 

homicide victim, but a suicide. The public interest in correctly distinguishing 

suicide from homicide is patent. It justifies even compromising the 

confidentiality of a patient’s medical records. For example, a separate 
15

provision of the civil code requires a health care provider to disclose medical

information upon the request of a coroner investigating a death that “may 

involve . . . suicide[]” or is otherwise suspicious. (Civ. Code, § 56.10, 

subd. (b)(8).)6 The requested information is also of a nature that should

illuminate directly the quality of the Coroner’s Office’s work on this case. 

Petitioners’ forensic pathologist has opined that the requested records are 

essential for her forensic review. 

As against this weighty public interest in disclosure, the individual 

privacy interests are more elusive. Petitioners assert that Munir, because he 

is dead, no longer has privacy interests to protect. Respondents counter that 

the privacy of a decedent’s family must also weigh in the balance. In the 

abstract, respondents may be right. “Family members have a personal stake 

in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public 

exploitation that” intrudes upon their grief. (National Archives and Records 

Admin. v. Favish (2004) 541 U.S. 157, 168 (Favish).) For this reason, the 

common law has long recognized “a family’s control over the body and death 

images of the deceased.” (Ibid.) 

6 The Coroner’s Office contends that Munir’s medical information 

produced to it under this provision is exempt from disclosure under section 

7927.705, which incorporates by reference other protections from disclosure

in state law. Under Civil Code section 56.10, subdivision (b)(8), a “coroner 

shall not disclose the information contained in the medical record obtained 

pursuant to this paragraph to a third party without a court order . . . .” Here, 

the court has already ordered the unredacted Investigation Report to be 

produced to petitioners under a protective order, but the trial court should 

carefully consider this provision if other requested documents include 

additional information that the Coroner’s Office obtained from Munir’s health 

care providers, or if other persons request that the Coroner’s Office disclose to 

them records containing Munir’s medical information.
16

But respondents’ argument ignores important facts. First, members of 

Munir’s own family (his parents, supported by his sister) are the ones seeking

these documents. It cannot be the role of the Coroner’s Office to protect these 

family members from themselves. In assessing the weight of the family 

members’ privacy interest, we consider it significant that three members of 

Munir’s family believe their privacy interest pales in comparison to their 

interest in having these documents disclosed. (Cf. Wessler v. United States 

Dept. of Justice (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 381 F.Supp.3d 253, 259 (Wessler) [family 

members of deceased detainees “ ‘expressed gratitude’ ” for public disclosure 

of medical neglect in prisons].) To the extent the Coroner’s Office is seeking 

to protect the privacy of Munir’s widow, it is on somewhat firmer ground. 

Because Eman declined to provide the Coroner’s Office with written 

authorization for the release of the requested documents we can infer that 

she opposes petitioners’ request, but we have no affirmative statement from 

her on the subject. As the surviving spouse, she has certain rights with 

regards to Munir’s remains and estate. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 27520 [right 

to request coroner to perform an autopsy]; Health & Saf. Code, § 7100 [right 

to make funeral arrangements and dispose of remains]; Prob. Code, § 6401 

[right of intestate succession].) But so, too, do a decedent’s parents have such

rights, either behind or alongside the rights of a surviving spouse. (See, e.g., 

Gov. Code, § 27520 [parent may request, if no surviving spouse]; Health & 

Saf. Code, § 7100 [parent’s priority below surviving spouse]; Prob. Code, 

§ 6401 [parents and their issue to split decedent’s separate property with 

surviving spouse].) Here, where the surviving spouse has made no 

affirmative request for privacy, where there is no evidence that disclosure 

will lead to public spectacle, and where other close family members uniformly 

favor disclosure and distrust the motives of the surviving spouse in failing to 
17

agree, we assess the private interest in nondisclosure as somewhat

attenuated. 

A second important fact in assessing the weight of the individual 

privacy interest is that the documents we discuss here are not photographs 

and videos of the deceased, but technical documents such as coroner’s notes 

and observations recorded in words and numbers. State law recognizes the 

extreme sensitivity of death-scene and autopsy photographs of the deceased,

often protecting these images from disclosure (Code Civ. Proc., § 129(a)), but 

we know of no comparable statute protecting the other documents petitioners 

seek.7 This is not to say that surviving family members retain no privacy 

interest in a document such as the Investigation Report, but any such 

interest is somewhat diminished, as compared to graphic and unsettling

images of the deceased. (Cf. Wessler, supra, 381 F.Supp.3d at pp. 259–260

[decedents’ family members have a moderate privacy interest in medical and 

autopsy records, “even if the records do not depict graphic death scene images 

as in Favish”].) 

In Favish, the United States Supreme Court refused to order the 

release of death-scene photographs from a federal investigation into Vincent 

Foster’s suicide, construing the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as 

recognizing a personal privacy right of surviving family members with 

respect to these images. (Favish, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 160–161, 170.) 

Despite some factual similarities, Favish is of limited utility here. The 

California Supreme Court has warned that the FOIA provision “at issue in 

Favish is not comparable to” section 7927.700, and Favish’s “expansive view 

7 As previously noted, state law also protects as particularly sensitive 

the decedent’s medical information disclosed to the Coroner’s Office, which 

should be separately considered. (See ante, at p. 15, fn. 6 [discussing Civ. 

Code, § 56.10, subd. (b)(8)].)
18

of the concept of personal privacy” may not carry over when interpreting the 

CPRA. (International Federation, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 336–337, fn. 8.) In 

particular, the California Supreme Court warned against shifting to the 

person requesting public documents the burden of establishing a sufficient 

reason for disclosure. (Ibid.) 

The California Supreme Court in International Federation illustrates

the proper application of section 7927.700. The question before the Court 

there was whether the CPRA requires a city to disclose the names and 

salaries of all its employees earning at least $100,000 per year. 

(International Federation, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 327.) The city and unions 

representing public employees argued against disclosure, asserting the 

employees’ right to financial privacy. (Id. at pp. 327–328.) The California 

Supreme Court rejected that argument. Although it recognized that 

individuals generally have a privacy interest in their own financial 

information, the Court observed that compensation of public employees has

long been a matter of public record. (Id. at pp. 330–331.) This custom and 

practice means public employees cannot reasonably expect their salary 

information to remain confidential, and their privacy interest “is, accordingly, 

entitled to diminished weight in the balancing test we apply under section 

[7927.700].” (Id. at p. 331.) The Court then discussed the benefits of public 

disclosure, which enables citizens to review whether their money is being 

properly spent, before concluding: “The [c]ity and the [u]nions failed to 

present any evidence establishing that the [c]ity’s consistent past practice of 

disclosing its employees’ salaries created any safety or privacy problems for 

those employees that would outweigh the public interest in disclosure.” (Id. 

at p. 337.)
19

The privacy interest here is similarly diminished and is outweighed by 

the public interest in disclosure. Dr. Melnick’s unrebutted testimony was 

that “[i]t is common practice for coroners and medical examiners to permit 

release of records to outside forensic consultants to perform a secondary 

review of the medical evidence.” The Coroner’s Office has presented no

evidence establishing that this common practice creates privacy problems for 

family members of the deceased, in this case or more broadly. Following 

International Federation, we accordingly conclude that the public interest in 

disclosing the Investigation Report—which will facilitate a forensic review 

that directly bears on how well the Coroner’s Office has performed its 

duties—outweighs any individual privacy interest. Section 7927.700 does not 

exempt this document from disclosure.

D.

Finally, respondents contend that the catchall exception of section 

7922.000 protects from disclosure the documents petitioners request. Like 

section 7927.700, section 7922.000 requires us to balance the public interest 

served by disclosure against other interests. With the catchall exception, we 

ask whether the public interest served by disclosure is clearly outweighed by 

a public interest in not disclosing the records. (§ 7922.000.)

For the most part, respondents’ discussion of a public interest in

nondisclosure reiterates the private interests we analyzed with respect to

section 7927.700. The only truly public interest they add into the mix is a 

concern that public disclosure of the requested records will chill cooperation 

from members of the public in future coroner’s investigations. A coroner’s 

ability to gain cooperation from the public is undoubtedly a significant public 

interest, but petitioners point out that the law gives coroners sweeping 

powers to control death scenes and the disposition of human remains while
20

completing their investigations, and that anyone who interferes with a 

coroner’s investigation is chargeable with a misdemeanor. (Gov. Code,

§§ 27491.2, 27491.3, subds. (a) & (c); Health & Saf. Code, § 7102). Petitioners 

also point out that the declarations of a Deputy Coroner and Supervising 

Deputy Coroner, which respondents submitted in opposing writ relief, are 

silent as to any such chilling effect. On this record, respondents have 

established no public interest served by withholding the requested documents 

that is any more substantial than the private interests we have already found 

insufficient under section 7927.700 with regard to the Investigation Report.

We have already found the public interest in disclosure to be significant 

since the Investigation Report is essential to a forensic review of the 

Coroner’s Office’s determination of the cause of Munir’s death. We 

accordingly conclude that any public interest served by refusing to disclose it 

does not clearly outweigh this public interest in disclosure. (See L.A. Unified, 

228 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.) 

IV.

In their appeal, petitioners urge two ancillary points. They contend 

that the trial court’s April 4, 2022 order erroneously identified respondents as

the prevailing party and prevented petitioners from recovering attorney’s fees 

or costs “pursuant to Government Code section [7923.115] or any other 

provision of law.” They also contend that the trial court erred in ignoring 

their request to compel limited discovery from the Coroner’s Office as to what 

responsive records exist and on what basis they are being withheld. 

We will remand for the trial court to consider these issues anew in light 

of our conclusions above. We have determined the trial court erred in 

limiting petitioners’ CPRA request to solely the Investigation Report and the 

postmortem and autopsy photographs. On remand, the trial court should
21

address petitioners’ motion to compel discovery from the Coroner’s Office in 

light of this conclusion. We have also determined that the trial court erred in 

refusing to order disclosure under the CPRA of, at least, the Investigation 

Report. This conclusion means that petitioners are entitled to reasonable 

attorney’s fees and court costs. Section 7923.115 makes such an award

“mandatory if the plaintiff prevails” in CPRA litigation. (Filarsky, supra, 28 

Cal.4th at p. 427.) We accordingly vacate that portion of the April 4 order 

which denies petitioners’ request for fees and costs.

DISPOSITION

The judgment on the Petition is reversed, and the April 4, 2022 order is 

vacated to the extent it (1) finds that petitioners limited their CPRA request 

to certain photographs and the Investigation Report; (2) finds that the 

records sought are not public records and/or are exempt from disclosure 

under the CPRA; (3) denies the Petition in its entirety; and (4) orders 

petitioners to bear their own attorney’s fees and costs. The matter is 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a), petitioners are 

awarded their costs on appeal.

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.

PETROU, J.
22

Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Robert D. Foiles

Counsel: Mackenzie & Albritton, Mark L. Mosley for Plaintiff and 

Appellant

John D. Nibbelin, County Counsel, Brian E. Kulich, Chief 

Deputy for Defendant and Respondent 

Edais et al. v. Superior Court/Edais et al. v. Foucrault et al. (A164947/A165208)