### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 14, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. HA RR Y JA MIESO N

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 00-01887, 00-01888, 00- 01889 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Jud ge

No. W2003-02666-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 23, 2004

The a ppellant, Har

ry J amieson, wa s convicted by a S helby County jury of one count of a g g ravated robbery and two counts of a g g ravated assault. F ollowing a hearing, the t ri al co urt sentenc ed the appellant to an e ffe ctive senten ce o f n i n e y ear s in the Tennesse e De partment of Corr ection. The appellant now a

ppeals, c halleng ing the sufficie ncy of t he evidence and t he sente nce imposed by the tr ia l c ou rt . In li g ht o f the Un ite d Stat e s Supr e me Cou rt ’s de c isi on in B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , _

_ U .S.

__, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), we modify the appe llant’s sentenc e for ag g ravated robbe ry

to eig ht y ear s and the se ntence s for a g g ravated assault to three y ear s eac h, for a n eff ective se ntence of eig ht y ear s inc arc e ratio n. We o the rw ise a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt ar e Affi rm ed as M odi fie d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., joined.

Robert Wils on J ones, Shelby County Public De fende r; W. Mar k Ward, Assistant Public De fende r (on appe al); and Robert J . Ross, I I , Memphis, Tenne ssee (at trial), for the appe llant, Harry J amieson.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and B etsy

L

. Carnesa le, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On Octobe r 18, 1999, the e ighte en-y ear -old appe llant and T y rell Arnold a g ree d to rob the F a zoli ’s Re staur a nt l oc a te d a t 64 66 Pop lar Av e nu e in Me mph is. Prior to the ro bb e ry , th e app e lla nt, his girlf riend, a nd Arnold we nt to the a partment of se ventee n-y ear -old Kevin Gonzalez, a friend who liv e d a c ro ss the str e e t f

ro m th e re staur a nt. Go nza le z pr ov ide d th e app e lla nt andArno ld w ith a du ff leI n h i s br i ef , t h e appe l l an t n ot es t h at t h e appe l l an t a n d Ar n ol d “ we r e al s o c h ar g ed i n i n di ct men t s #00- 01890 1
and #0 0

- 0 1 8 9 1 wi t h aggravat ed ass aul t s up o n t wo other pe o p l e who were present duri ng t he al l eged rob b ery , but at t he

e n d o f t h e [S ]ta te ’s p ro o f, the trial [c o u rt] d ire c te d ve rd ic ts o f ac q u itt a l o n b o th in d ic tm e n ts.”

O n t he prev i ous appeal , t hi s cour t conc l uded t hat t he t r i al cour t comm i t t ed r eve r s i bl e e r r or by f ai l i ng t o i ns t r uct 2
the ju ry o n fac ili ta tio n o f ag g ra v a te d ro b b e ry a n d a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt.
-2- bag and a B B g un. Arnold had a “movie prop pistol” that re sembled a nine -millim eter h an d gu n. Gonzalez and the appe llant’s g irlfriend a g ree d to wait at the apartment during the robbe ry , leaving the doors unlocked in or der for the a ppellant and Arnold to enter the a partment onc e the r obbery was complete.

L ater that evening , the appe llant and Arnold e ntere d the re staurant shortly befor e the restaur ant closed. U pon entering the re staurant, the two me n order ed a pizza and sat in a booth nea r the front of

the re staurant. The rea fter, the re staurant mana g er, Stepha nie Parks, wa lked throug h the dining r oom to lock the door in the fr ont foy er. The two men eng ag ed her in small talk, asking if she was the manag er and when the restaur ant closed. Parks answe red their questions and informed them that their food would be delivere d to their table. Parks the n returne d to t h e m anag er’ s office , and sh e a ndthe oth e r e mpl oy e e s p re pa re d to c los e the re staur a nt.

Whil e the employ ees pr epar ed for closing , Arnold wa lked to the kitchen with the pr op g un
a ndor de re d th e e mpl oy e e s to g e t on the fl oo r. He the n o rd e re d Pa rks to st and a ndop e n th e c a sh
re gi s t er s an d t h e s af

e. T h e m o n ey fr o m t h e ca s h re gi s t er s an d s af e w as p l ac ed i n t o t h e d u ff l e b ag. Du ri ng the ro bb e ry , th e app e lla nt r e ma ine d o n the cus tom e r s ide of the c ou nte r n e ar the re g ist e rs

. He did not spea

k or display

a we apon. When the robbe ry was c omplete, the two men ran f rom the

r e s t a u r a n ta n d r e t u r n e d t o G o n z a l e z ’ s ap ar t m e n t , w h e r e t h e y s p l i tt h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e r o b b e r y. There afte r, the a

ppell an t , h i s gi rlfrie nd, Arnold, and G onzalez went to a local pool hall. The appellant subseque ntly

purcha sed a pa ir of boots and a pair of te n n i s shoes with his share of the
s t o l e n m o n e y.

The a ppellant and Arnold were subsequently char g ed by indictment w ith a g g ravated robbe ry and ag g ravated assault. F ollowing a jury trial, the appe llant was convic ted of o ne count of ag g ravated robbe ry

and two counts of agg ravated assault. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant 1 to concur rent terms of nine y ear s for the a g g ravated robbe ry and four y ear s for e ach a g gravated assault, for a n eff

ective s en t en ce o f n ine y ear s incarc eration. On appea l, this court reve rsed the appellant’ s convictions and re manded f or a ne w trial. State v. Har ry J amieson, No. W2001-02449- 2 CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1075 (J ackson, D ec. 13, 2002)

.
On re trial, Parks testified that Gonzalez had pre viouslyworke d at F a zo li ’ s b u t w a s terminated two wee ks prior to the robbe ry . She had never seen t he appellant or Arnold. Parks testified that as she spoke with the appellant a nd Arnold at their ta ble on the nig ht of the robbe ry , she thoug ht it was unusual that Arnold wa s wea ring “two sets of c lothes” and both men w ere drinking from cups “wr apped up w ith paper towe ls.”-3-

Parks testified that af

ter speaking with the m en, she went to the m anag er’ s office “to g et an elec tronic counte r” to c ount the money in the cash r eg i s t er s

. When she walke d out of the off ice, Arnold wa s standing in the k i t ch en wi t h a gun. Arnold pointed the wea pon at the employ ees a nd
or de re d th e m “ to g e t on the f* ** ing fl oo r. ” Park s te sti fi e d th a t Rebecc a Jac ks on wa s a

ble to

“ sn [ea k] ou t th e ba c k do or .” Arno ld the n tol d Park s to sta nd a ndre mov e the mon e y fr om the c a sh reg isters. When Parks s tood, she observed t he appellant standing on the “gue st side” of the c ounter
near the ca sh reg isters. Acc ording to Parks, the appe llant did not appear to be surprised by Arnold’s actions. He “wa s just watching what was g oing on up front[,]

. . . looking over his shoulder to see if any one wa s coming throug h those doors.”
Parks testified that althoug h the appe llant and Arnold did not speak to e ach othe r, there was non-ver bal communication, such a s nodding, betwee n the two men throug hout the robbery . Parks testified, “It was obvious that [t he appe llant] was involved.” Parks was una ble to determine if the appellant ha d a g un; howeve r, Arnold’s g un appea red to be a nine-millimeter ha ndg un. She testified that Arnold pointed the g un at her as she e mptied the cash r eg isters and plac ed the money into the d u ff l e b ag. P ar k s t es t i fi ed t h at af t er s h e em p t i ed t h e f

i rs tca s h re gi s t er , t h e r es t au ra n tt el ep h o n e r an g. Park s to ld A rn oldthat sh e sh ou ld a ns we r the te le ph on e be c a us e if it we re he r bo ss c a lli ng , he wo uld become suspicious w hen no one answe red. Arnold motioned f or Parks to answe r the tele phone, but the app e lla nt s ho ok

his he a d “ no .” Af

te r s pe akin g wi th the app e lla nt, Arno ld o rd e re d Pa rk s n ot t o answe r the tele phone.
Shortlythere afte r, a buzzer sounded a lerting the employ ees that a vehic le had a rrived at the dr ive -thr u la ne

. Park s told Arno ld to g o to the oth e r s ide of the c ou nte r o r the drive r w ou ld b e able to see him. When the vehicle approa ched the window, Parks informe d the driver that the re staurant had close d early

beca use the ove n was broke n. After the vehicle left, Arnold a sked Parks whe re the
sa fe wa s lo c a ted. As Park s le d A rn oldto the ma na g e r’ s o ff ic e , s he dia le d 9 -1 -1 on a c or dle ss telephone in he r pocke t. I n the offic e, Parks r emoved the money from the sa fe a nd place d it in the duffle ba g . Parks testified that as she remove d the m oney , Arnold used one of his hands to point the
we a po n at he r

a n d t h e o t h e r

h a n d t o ru m m a g e t h r o u g h t h e p u r s e o f a n e m p l o y e e , A s h l e y

H o d g e s. Parks told Arnold not to ste al from “a fiftee n y ear old c hild.” Arnold responde d that he thought the p u r s e w a s “ a

b a n k b a g

. ” A f

te r Pa rk s e mp ti e d th e s a f

e , A r n o ldg r ab b e d th e b a g , a n d h e a n d the appe l l ant ra n from the r estaurant. I mmediately there afte r, Parks re ported the r obbery to the 9-1-1 operator. Police offic ers a rrived w ithin seconds. Acc ording to Parks, approxi m at el y $ 1,800 was stolen from the re staurant.

Park s te sti fi e d th a t du ri ng the ro bb e ry , th e e mpl oy e e s r e ma ine d o n th e fl oo r. Ac c or din g to Parks, “Anthony York was incre dibly calm; he didn’t say a word, make any noise at all. Amanda [Murray ] and Ashley

[Hodge s] were ju s t h y sterica l, I mean, ve ry

hy sterica l . . . [ and] [ c]ry ing.” Park s st a te d th a t a lth ou g h sh e a tte mpt e d to re ma in c a lm, sh e wa s f ri g hte ne d a ndwo rrie d s he wo uld
never ag ain see her daug hters.
Anthony York testified at trial that he was working at Fa zoli ’s on October 18, 1999, when two men walke d into the restaur ant. York recog nized the appellant, a forme r hig h school classmate

.-4-

York testified tha t as he a nd the other e mploy ees pr epar ed for closing , “[t] he other

g entleman .

. . c a me ba c k w ith the g un , to ld u s to g e t do wn , a ndthe n h e g ot [Pa rk s] u p and to ok her to the c a sh reg isters, took her ba ck to the saf e to g et all the money and they left. The [appe llant] . . . stay ed up fr on t.” Yo rk

state d th a t he fe ared A rno ld who wa lke d a ro un d p oin tin g his g un a t th e e mpl oy e e s. Although Y ork wa s n ot as afr aid of the a ppellant whom he did not observe with a wea pon, York b e l i e v e d t h a tt h e ap p e l l a n tw i l l i n g l y p ar t i c i p a t e di n t h e r o b b e r y.

York testified tha t after

the men lef

t, he and the ot her employ ees got up from the f loor. He related that by

the time he wa l k ed t o t h e front of the restaur ant, the police ha d arrived. York informed the police that he had rec og nized the appellant. Day s later, the police returne d to Fazoli’s to obtain a statement fr om York and to a sk York to view a photogr aphic lineup. Yor k provided a statement and ide ntified the appe llant in the lineup. York c ircled the appellant’ s photogr aph and
wr ote un de rn e a th the ph oto g ra ph , “I ha d a c la ss at G e rm a nto wn Hi g h Sc ho ol w ith thi s p e rs on . T his is the person that did not have the g un Monday night.”

Ke vin Go nza le z te sti fi e d th a t on Oc tob e r 18, 19 99 , he pa rt ic ipate d in the ro bb e ry

of F a zoli ’s

. He r elated that he had been employ ed at the restaur ant sever al months prior to the robbery , but had been te rminated. On the day of the robbe ry , Arnold telephone d Gonzalez and said that he a nd the
app e lla nt p la nn e d to ro b F a zoli ’s . A rn olda sk e d G on zal e z to “ wa it with th e do or s o pe n. ” Sho rt ly afte r their tele phone conve rsation, Ar n o l d , t he appe llant, and the appe llant’s g irlfriend a rrived at Gonzalez’s a

partment. Arnold and the appellant informed Gonzalez of their plan, stating that afte r the ro bb e ry

“ [t]he y we re g oin g to c ome ba c k a ndc ha ng e c lothe s a nd the y we re jus t g oin g to w a it a littl e bit and leave.” A ccor ding to Gonzalez, Arnold ha d the “movie pr op pistol” when he a rrived at Gonzalez ’s apartment. Gonzalez ex plained that whe n he and A rnold wer e y oung , a friend had g iven them the pistol. Gonzalez t estified that Arnold and the appe llant asked him f or we apons. He g ave the appellant a BB g un and provided a duff le bag in which to place the money taken f rom the
re s t au ra n t

. P ri o r t o l ea v i n g t h e a p ar t m en t , Ar n o l d an d t h e a p p el l an tp l ac ed t h e gu n s i n t h e b ag.

Go nza le z te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r the ro bb e ry , A rn olda ndthe app e lla nt r e turne d to his apa rt me nt. Th e re a ft e r, Go nza le z, A rn old , th e app e lla nt, a ndhis g ir lf ri e nd wen t into Go nza le z’s be dr oo m to count the money , which totaled approximately $1,000. Arnold and the appellant divided the mone y and g ave G onzalez between $50 a nd $60. Arnold and the appe llant then chang ed clothes, a nd the g roup we nt to “play [] pool.” Acc ording to Gonzalez, the appellant never appea red to be afr aid of Arnold.
Approxim ately

five da y s later, police office rs questioned Gonzalez about his invol vement in the robber

y

. Gonzalez testified t hat initiallyhe wa s uncooper ative, but the next day he provide d the of fi c e rs wi th a

state me nt, inf

or min g the of

fi c e rs of e a c h o f the ir ro le s in the ro bb e ry

. He a lso tol d the offic ers that he had thrown the g uns into a dumpster behind hi s apartment. The off icer s located the wea pons, collecting them as evidenc e. Additionally , Gonzalez ga ve the of fice rs the money

that
rema ined from his shar e of the robber y p r o c e e d s

. G onzalez was subsequently adjudicate d delinquent i n t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r tf

o r c o m m i t t i n g f

a c i l i t a t i o n o f

a g g r a v a t e dr o b b e r y.-5-

Rebec ca Jackson testified at trial that as she wa s leaving work o n October 18, 1999, she hear d someone say , “[G]et on the f’ing floor.” Jackson t es t i fi ed that she hid underneath a sink. Whil e underneath the sink, Jackson hear d “people whimpering and car ry ing on.” When Arnold and Parks went to the c ash re g isters at the fr ont counter, Jackson was able to sneak out the back door

. On c e ou tsi de , Jac ks on ob se rv e d a ve hic le app ro a c hin g the drive -thr u la ne

. Hi din g in n e arb y

bu sh e s, she told the driver

that the re staurant wa s being robbed a nd asked him to ca ll police. The drive r called the police on his c ellular tele phone, told J ackson to re main hidden, and then pr ocee ded to the drive-thr u window. Shortly

there afte r, Jackson g ot into her veh i cl e and drove to the front of the restaur ant. The pe rpetrators had alr eady fled.

J ackson te stified that she wa s unable to see if the perpetrator s had weapons. Howeve r, she overhe ard “ one of th e l i ttle gir ls” say , “[P] lease don’t shoot me, please don’t shoot me.” Jackson
re la te d, “ At that poin t in tim e my lif e c ou ld ha ve be e n tak e n, bu t now that I loo k ba c k on it . . . my co-w orker s, their lives wer e more in dang er . . . tha n mine was.”

I n its case- in-chief

, the State called Ty

rell Arnold as a witness, but he ref used to te stify . The tr ia l c ou rt the n pe rm itt e d th e Sta te to i ntr od uc e Arno ld’ s te sti mon y fr om the fi rs t tria l. A t th e fi rs t tri al, Arnold testified tha t one af ternoon he and the a

ppellant ag ree d to commit a robbery . They chose F azoli’s Restaurant bec ause it wa s located ne ar G onzalez’s apartment c omplex . Acc ording to Arn old , th e app e lla nt w a s in iti a lly he sit a nt, bu t “ a ft e r h e tho ug ht a bo ut i t f or a lit tle bit he sa id okay , let’s do i t.” There afte r, Arnold and the appellant dr ove to Gonzalez’s apartment where they chang ed clothes and waited until thirty minutes before the re staurant c losed. Gonzalez provided the ap p el l an twi t h a B B gu n wh i ch wa s p l ac ed i n t o a d u ff l e b ag.

When the appellant and Arnold arrived at the restaurant, no customers we re pr esent, a nd the employ ees w ere in the “b ac k k i t chen” prepa ring to close. Arnold told the appe llant to watch the doors while he w ent into the kitchen. I n the kitchen, Arnold pointed the prop g un at the employ ees and orde red the m to ge t on the floor. He then told the restaurant manag er to open the ca sh reg isters
a ndthe sa fe . T he app e lla nt h e ld the bag c on ta ini ng the B B g un un til Arno ld a sk e d f or the ba g in which to put the money . After placing the money

into the duffle ba g , Arnold and the appellant r an fr om the re staur a nt t o G on zal e z’s apa rt me nt. On c e ins ide the apa rt me nt, the y

div ide d a pp ro xima te ly $1 ,400 take n f

ro m th e re staur a nt. Arno ld t e sti fi e d th a t th e app e lla nt’ s r ole in the ro bb e ry wa s to watch the doors and notify Arnold if any one ente re d t h e restaur ant. Acc ording to Arnold, the appellant a g ree d to “play

that role.” On cross-examination, Arnold conce ded that during the robbe ry he neve r saw the appellant holding a g un.

I n October

19 9 9 , L i eu t enant J oseph Scott was a se rg eant with the Me mphis P olice Depa rtment’s Robbery

Division. After the instant offe nses were c ommitt ed, Lieutenant Scott went to the home of the appellant’s pa rents to re cover

property the appe llant claimed to have purcha sed with his share of the robbery proce eds. When L ieutenant Scott ar rived at the house, the a

ppellant’s pa re nts con sen ted to a

se arc h o f the app e lla nt’ s b e dr oo m. In th e be dr oo m, Lie ute na nt S c ott discovere d a pair of new tennis shoes and a box which had contained a pair of boots. Lie u t en ant Sc ott dis c ov e re d $ 25 3 in a

pil low c a se in the app e llant’ s clo se t. L ie ute na nt S c ott te sti fi e d th a t he a lso-6-

went to Gonzalez’s apar tment and spoke with Gonzalez and his mother. Gonzalez informed L ie ute na nt S c ott

that th e g un s u sed in the ro bb e ry we re in a

du mps te r b e hin d th e apa rt me nts

. G o n z a l e z a l s o g a v e L i e u t e n a n tS c o t tt h e d u f f l e b a g u s e d i n t h e r o b b e r y.

At trial , t h e ap p el l ant testified that he me t Arnold afte r moving to Memphis when he wa s thirteen y ear s old. I nitially , the appe llant believed that Arnold was “lar g er than life,” a nd he wa nted to emulat e Ar n o l d. Howeve r, months prior to the robbe ry , the appe llant learne d that Arnold had committed severa l robberie s in Arkansa s in order to sustain his drug addiction.

The a ppellant testified that in Octobe r 1999, he w as living w ith Arnold. On the day of the robbery , he and A rnold visited Gonzalez at hi s apartment. The appellant testified t hat upon arriving at the apa rtment, Gonzalez informed him of Arnold’s plan to commit a robbery . Gonzalez ex plained that Arno ld ne e de d mon e y to hir e a n a tto rn e y to re pr e se nt him in pe nd ing crim in al c a se s. Eventually , the appe llant ag ree d to participate in the robbery . The a ppellant testified that Arnold had chosen to rob F azoli’s Restaurant bec ause it wa s located a cross the s t re et from Gonzalez’s
apa rt me nt.

Ex pressing conce rn about the r obbery , the appe llant sugg ested that they g o “look ar ound” the re staur a nt. Arno ld a g re e d, a nd he a nd the app e lla nt wa lke d a c ro ss the str e e t, t akin g the du ff le bag

. When the y arrived at the re staurant, the a ppellant informed A rnold that he re cog nized two of the empl o y ee s wo rk i n g that evening . After placing an orde r and sitting at a table, Arnold said, “[L ]e t’ s ju s t d o it r ig h t n o w

. ” T h e ap p e ll a n t to ld A r n o ld h e w a s “ n u ts ” a n d s to o d to leave . The appellant te stified that as he turne d his back, he hear d Arnold tell the employ ees to “ g et on the g round.”

The a ppellant testified that whe n he re alized A rnold was robbing the restaur ant, he “ froze.” He wa s unable to spea

k and nodded at Arnold in an attempt t o tell him “no.” The a ppellant claimed that in hin ds ig ht, he wi sh e d h e ha d ta c kle d A rn old . A ft e r A rn oldha d ta ke n th e mon e y , h e ra n p a st the app e lla nt, sla

pp e d th e app e lla nt’ s ar m, andsa id, “ [R]un. ” Th e app e lla nt andArno ld r a n to Gonzalez’s a

partment, whe re, a ccor ding to the a ppellant, Arnold a nd Gonzalez counted the money while he and his g irlfriend sat in the l iving room. The a ppellant testified that Arnold placed a portion of the money into a pil lowcase and shoved the pillowcase at him, say ing, “ [Y] ou keep y our f***ing mouth shut or y ou’ll be sorry .” The rea fter, the appellant, his g irlfriend, A rnold, and Gonzalez went to p la y po ol.

The a pp el l an t claimed that he never solicited Arnold to commit the robbery , nor did he provide a ido r

p r o mo te th e r o b b e r y

. T h e ap p e ll a n t t e s ti f ie d th a t at th e ti me o f

th e r o b b e r y

h e w as frig htened of

Arnold. The appellant denied being “a lookout” during the robbery . He f urther de nied holding the duf

fle ba g or g oing be hind the counter . The a ppellant claimed that he spent a portion of the robbery proce eds because at the t ime of t he offenses he was eighte en y ear s old and “stupid.” He a lso noted that he coope rate d fully with the pol ice and informed them of Gonz alez’s involvement in the c ri me s. On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, the app e lla nt de nie d tha t Gon zal e z g a ve him a B B g un to u se i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f

t h e r o b b e r y.-7-

Ba sed upon the for eg oing te stimony , t h e j u ry convicted the appellant of one count of ag gra v ated robbery

and two counts of a g g ravated assault. F ollowing a hearing, the trial court
se nte n c e d t h e ap p e l l a n t t o c o n c u rr e n t s e n t e n c e s o f n i n e y e ar s f o r t h e a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y a nd six y ear s for e ach a g g ravated assault, for an ef fec ti v e sentenc e of niney ear s incarc eration. The trial court a lso imposed a five hundred dol lar fine for each offense

. The appellant now brings this appea l
c ha lle ng ing the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e a ndthe se nte nc e imp os e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

.
II. Ana lys is

A. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e When an appel lant challeng es the suff iciency of the c onvicting e vidence , the standar d for revie w is “whe ther, a fter vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most fa v o ra b l e t o the prosec ution, any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U.S

. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct . 2 78 1, 27 89 (1 97 9) ; T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (e ). On app e a l, the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll
rea sonable or le g itimate infere nces which may be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cre dibilit y of witnesses and the we ight a nd value to be af forde d the evidence, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the j u ryas t ri er o f fa ct

. S t at e v

. Bl an d , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 1 , 6 5 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ). T h i s co u rt wi l l n o tre we i gh
or re eva l u at e t he evide nce. I d. Be cause a jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence with which a defe ndant is initi ally cloake d at trial and r eplac es it on appea l with one of g uilt, a
c on vic te d d e fe nd a nt h a s the bu rd e n of de mon str a tin g to thi s cou rt that the e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

On app e a l, the app ellan t c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e a t tria l w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his convictions of ag g ravated robbery and agg ravated assault. Specifica lly , the appe llant asserts that the
e vid e nc e wa s in su ff

ic ie nt t o supp ort a

fi nd ing that he wa s c ri min a lly re sp on sib le fo r the of

fe ns e s. The a ppellant ar g ues that at most the evidenc e supports a f inding that he was g uiltyof fa cilitation. The State maintains that the e vidence was suff icient for a

jury to conclude bey ond a rea sonable doubt that th e app e lla nt c omm itt e d th e ins ta nt o ff e ns e s. Ag g ra va te d r ob be ry

is d e fi ne d in pe rt ine nt p art a s r ob bery “ [a]c c omp lis he d w ith a de a dly
we apo n o r b y

dis play of a ny art ic le us e d or

fa sh ion e d to le a d th e vic tim to r e a so na

bly be lie ve it t o be a de adly

wea pon.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( a)( 1) (2003). Robbery is “the intentional or knowing theft of pr operty from the pe rson of a nother by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea r.” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -4 01 (a ) (2 00 3)

. A pe rs on c omm its a g g ra vate d a ssa ult wh o in te nti on a lly or knowing ly , by

use o r d isplay

of a de adly

wea pon, cause s another to r easona bly fea r imminent bo dil y inj ury . T e nn . Co de An n. §§ 39 -1 3- 10 1( a)(2 ), 39 -1 3- 10 2( a )( 1) (B ) ( 20 03 ). A p e rs on is criminally

responsible for the actions of another when “ [a] cting with intent to promote or assist the
c omm iss ion of

the of fe ns e , o r t o b e ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or re su lts of the of fe ns e , the pe rs on so lic its , direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11- 402(2) ( 2003).T he Stat e f ai l ed t o ad d res s t hese spe ci f i c argum ent s regarding t he suf f i ci ency o f

t he evi d ence supp o rt i ng t he 3

c o n v ic tio n s fo r th e a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lts o f H o d g e s a n d M u rr a y.
-8- Take n in the light most favor able to the State, the evidence adduced at trial reve aled that on October 18, 1999, the appe llant and Arnold a g ree d to rob Fa zoli ’s Restaura nt l o ca t ed near Gonzalez’s apartment. When they enter ed the restaur ant, the employ ees w ere in the “bac k kitchen” prepa ring to close. Arnold wa lked into the kitchen, pointed a “ prop pistol” at t h e employ ees, a nd order ed them to the floor w hile the appe llant stood near the front counter , acting as “lookout.” W hen Parks re moved the money from the r eg ister, the appe llant handed a duffle ba g to Arnold, who order ed P arks to plac e the money into the bag . After

Parks had e mptied the reg isters and saf e, Arnold and the appellant r an fro m t h e re staurant to Gonzalez’s apa rtment wher e they

divided the money . The a

ppellant subsequently

purcha sed a pa ir of tennis shoes a nd a pair o f b o o t s with a portion of his sha

re of the proce eds. Moreove r, $253 was discovere d in a pillowcas e i n the
app e lla nt’ s c los e t.
Contrary to the appellant’ s testimonythat he wa s frig htened of Arnold, Parks a nd York testified that the appe llant appea red to willing ly

participa te in the robbe ry . Additionally , Arnold and Gonzalez testified that the appellant he lped plan the robbe ry , ag ree ing to a ct as “ lookout” and asking Gonzalez for a we apon. Mo re o v er , t h e appe llant benef itted in the proce eds of the r obbery . The appellant c laims that the evidenc e supported only convictions of fa cilitation. W e disag ree . The trial court instructe d the jury

on fac ilitation of eac h of these offe nses, but the jury convicted the appellant as cha rg ed in the indictments. We conclude that the ev i d en ce was suffic ient to support the
app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio ns of a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

a nda g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

.
Ne x t , t h e ap pellant asserts that, even if the e vidence was suff icient “to esta

blish criminal responsibilityfor the c riminal offe nses,” the e vidence was insuffic i en t t o fi n d that he committed
a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult s u po n A sh le y

Ho dg e s or Am a nd a Mu rr a y , the vic tim s na me d in the ind ic tme nts

. Specifica lly , the appe llant arg ues that no evide nce w as pre sented that Hodg es or Murray fea red imminent bodil y

injury or that they

wer e unaw arethat Arnold’s g u n wa s n o t re al . The a ppellant
no te s th a t ne ith e r As hle y Ho dg e s nor Am a nd a Mu rr a y te sti fi e d at tri a l. Th e app e lla nt c on te nd s th a t, even if circ umstantial evidence exis ted to support the cha rg es, “it ca nnot be said that the evidenc e is such to justi fy

a rational trier of f

act in finding g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” 3

“A victim’s fe ar of

imminent bodil y

injury may be p roven with circumstantial evidenc e.” State v. J essie James Austin, No. W 2001-00120-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 66, at **14-15 (Jackson, Jan. 25, 2002). I n Austin, a ca s e wi t h simil ar f acts, the de fenda nt was convicted of

two counts of agg ravated assault for pointi ng a gun at two y oung brothers. I d. at *2. Only one of the brothers te stified at trial. I d. at *14. On appe al, the def endant c ontended that beca use only one victim testified at t ri al , the def endant c ould not be convicted of the ag g ravated
a s s a u l t o f b o t h v i c t i m s

. Id

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, h e ar g u e d t h a t“ b e c a u s e [ t h e o t h e r v i c t i m ] d i d n o tt e s t i f

y, nothing shows that [he] fear ed imminent bodilyhar m o r t h at he wa s even a war e that a g un was pointed at him.” I d. Howeve r, this court obser ved that such f ear may be proven with circumstantial
e vid e nc e , n oti ng that “ ‘[t ]he e le me nt o f “ fe ar” is s a tis fi e d if the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the inc ide nt, wi thi n-9-

rea son and common experienc e, ar e of suc h a natur e as to c ause a person to re asonably

fea r imm ine nt b od ily

inj ury .’” I d. a t *1 5 ( qu oti ng Sta te v. Gr e g ory Whit fi e ld, No . 0 2C0 1- 97 06 -C R00226, 1998 Tenn. C ri m

. App. L EXI S 529 (J ackson, Ma y 8, 1998)). B ased upon the fac ts and circ umstances, this court c oncluded i n Au s t in that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to show that the defe ndant’s ac tions caused both victims to reasona bly fea r imminent bodilyinjury . I d. at *16.

I n the instant case , the evid e n c e e s ta b li s h e d that Arnold conf

ronted the e mploy ees, displaying what appe are d to be a nine- milli meter ha ndg un and orde ri n g t h em t o the floor. At tria l, Parks specific ally

named Hodg es and Murra y when asked at whom Arnold pointed the g un. She further related that Hodg es and Murra y wer e “hy sterica l” and “ crying” as they lay fac e down on the f

loor du ri ng the ro bb e ry . Jac ks on te sti fi e d th a t a s sh e hidunder ne a th the sin k, sh e he ard“ pe op le whimpering and ca

rrying on.” She also hea

rd “one of the littl e g irls” say , “[P] lease don’t shoot me, please don’t shoot me.” J ackson related, “At t hat poi nt in time mylife could ha ve bee n taken, but now that I look back on it . . . my

co-w orker s, their l ives wer e more in dang er .

. . than m ine was.” As in A us tin , w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e in the ins ta nt c a se wa s su ff ic ie nt fo r a ratio na l ju ro r t o i n f e r t h a tH o d g e s a n d M u rr a y r e a s o n ab l y f e ar e d i m m i n e n tb o d i l y i n

j u r y.

B. Sente ncing

Prior to our revie w on appea l, the appellant filed a motion reque sting this court to consider the impact on his sentenc e of the United S tates S upreme Court’s decision in Bla kely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), which w as re lease d afte r the a ppellant submitted his brief in the ins ta nt c a se

. We g ra nte d the app e lla nt’ s re qu e st a ndg rante d th e Sta te the op po rtun ity to r e sp on d to the appe llant’s arg uments on the issue.

This court has r ec o gn i z ed that Blakely “ca lls int o question the continuing validity of our
curr ent sentenc ing sc heme.” State v. J ulius E. Sm ith, No. E2003-01059-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 644, at *10 (Knoxvil le, J uly 19, 2004); see a lso St ate v. Micha el Way ne Poe, No. E2003-00417-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 643, at *26 (Knoxvi lle, J uly 19, 2004). I n Blakely , __ U.S. __, 124 S. C t. at 2537 (citations omitted), the Supreme Court he ld that

the “statutory maxi mum” for Appr endi [v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8 (2 0 0 0 )] p u rp o s es i s t h e m a x i m u ms en t en ce a j u d ge may i mpose so le ly on the ba sis of t he fac ts re

fle c te d in the jur

y verdic t or a d

mi t t ed by the de

fendant . I n other wor ds, the rele vant “statut o ry m axim um” is not the max imum sentence a judge may impose after

finding additional fac ts, but t h e maximum he may i m pose without

a n y a d d i t i o n a l f

i n d i n g s

. W h e n a

j u d g e i n f

l i c ts punishment that the jury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow, t he jury has not found all the fa cts “whic h t h e law makes esse ntial to the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y.B e g i n n i n g J u l y 4, 20 02 , “ t h e 20 02 a me n dm e n t [ t o T e n n e s s e e Cod e An n ot a t e d s e c t i on 40

- 35

- 11 4] a dd ed 4

p re se n t [e n h a n c e m e n t fa c to r] (1 ) a n d re d e sig n a te d fo rm e r (1 ) th r o u g h (2 2 ) a s p re se n t (2 ) th ro u g h (2 3 ), re sp e c tive ly.” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 , A m e n d m e n ts (S u p p . 2 0 0 2 ).
-10- T h e a p p el l an twa s s en t en ce d as a R an ge I s t an d ar d o ff

en d er , fo r w h i ch t h e a p p l i ca b l e r an ge for a Class B fe l o n yis eig ht to twelve y ear s and for a Class C felony

is three to six y ear s. Tenn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 12 (a )( 2) -( 3) (2 00 3) . T he pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e fo r C la ss B a ndC f e lon ie s is the minimum wit hin the applicable rang e if there are no enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f t he trial court finds that such factors do exis t, the court must start at the pre sumptive sentence , enhanc e the se ntence within the rang e as appropriate for the enha nceme nt fac tors, and then reduc e the sentenc e within the rang e as appr opriate f or the mitigating f

actor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e)

.
I n the i nstant case , the trial court applied enha nceme nt fac tor (4), the offe nse involved more t h an o n e v i ct i m , an d en h an ce m en tfa ct o r ( 1 1 ), t h e d ef en d an th ad n o h es i t at i o n ab o u tco m m i t t i n g a crime w hen the risk to human life was hig h. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2003). The trial c ourt found no mitiga ting f

actor s to be applicable. B ased upon its finding s, the trial court sentence d the appellant to concu rrent sentence s of nine y ear s for the a g g ravated robbe ry and six y ear s for e ach ag g ravated assault. The trial court a lso imposed a five hundre d dollar fine f or ea ch convic tion.

I n its supplemental brief, the State conce des that enha nceme nt fac tor (4) w as applied in e rror

. We ag ree . I n sentenc ing the appellant afte r his f irst trial, the trial court applied enhanc ement fa ctor (3 ), no w fa c tor (4 ), up on fi nd ing that th e of fe ns e inv olv e d mo re than o ne vic tim

. On app e a l, this 4

cour t conclude d that this factor ma y not be applied to enhance a sentenc e “w hen, as he re, the defe ndant was c onvicted of committing ag g ravated robbery and ag g ravated assaults ag ainst specific , named victims.” State v. Har ry J amieson, No. W2001-02449-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 T enn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1075, at *31 (J ackson, D ec. 13, 2 0 0 2 ) (c i ting State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tenn. 2002)).

On the other

hand, enha nceme nt factor (11), the de fenda nt had no hesitation about committing a c rime when the risk to huma n life was high, may be applied when there is a risk to the life of someone other than the victim. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d at 707; see also J amieson, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1075, at **32-33. Prior to Blakely , the application of enhanc ement fa ctor (11) would have be en appr opriate in the instant ca se. Howe ver, be cause the fa cts u nderlying the application of e nhance ment fac tor (1 1 ) we re n o t ref lected in the jury

verdic t or admitted by

the appellant, B lakely

prec ludes its a

pplication. State v. Ambrec o Shaw, No. W2003-02822-CCA-R3- CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 826, at **26-27 (Jackson, Sept. 28, 2004).
Having determined that fac tors (4) a nd (11) should not have been a pplied to enhanc e the appellant’ s sentence s, we c onclude that the se ntence s sh o u l d be modified to the pre sumptive minimum sentenc es. Ac cording ly , t h e s en t ence for a g g ravated robbe ry is modified to eight y ear s
a ndthe se nte nc e s f

or a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult are mod if

ie d to thr e e y e ars e a c h, to b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y for a n eff ective se ntence of eig ht y ear s incarc eration.-11- III. Conclusi on

Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord, w e af

firm the appe llant’s convictions. Howeve r, we modify the appellant’s sentenc e for ag g ravated robbery to eig ht y ear s and each of the sentenc es for
a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult is m od if ie d to thr e e y e ars

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE