Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 7, 2018 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00021-CR CRAIG AARON MILLER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80261-2015



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis , Stoddart, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Francis Craig Aaron Miller appeals his conviction for aggravated assaul t with a deadly weapon. After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to two years confinement suspended for five years and a $2,500 fine. In his first issue, appellan t asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support the convic tion. The State joins appell ant in his second issue that the judgment should be modified to correct the name of the presidin g judge. We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm t he judgment as modified. On October 20, 2014, Chandler Roach, the complainant, was drivi ng on FM 1378 when he noticed a pickup truck, driven by appellant, driving erraticall y behind him. Appellant unsuccessfully attempted to pass Roach twice on the right-hand side, but was prevented by other cars on the road. On the third attempt, appellant’s truck clip ped the rear, right side of Roach’s–2– truck. Appellant then accelerated through a red light. Roach stopped at the red light and lost sight of the appellant until he approached the next light where he fo und appellant standing in the middle of the road with his arms outstretched. In an effort to avoid appellant and get away from the situation, Roach turned at the intersection. Appellant got bac k in his truck, caught up to Roach, and made a quick maneuver towards the side of Roach’s truck. R oach braked and appellant’s truck clipped the right front side of R oach’s truck causing appellant to lose control, hit the center median, and flip. Roach drove to the ne xt light, called the police, an d returned to the scene of the accident. Two other drivers on the road w itnessed the events and testifie d at trial. Timothy Dart told the jury appellant came up fast behind him and tailgated him. Appellant “almost pushed the car that was next to us behind me out of the way,” r equiring the ot her driver to hit the brakes quickly. As appellant passed Dart, a pass enger in appellant’s truck made obscene gestures while hanging out the window. Appellant changed lanes causing another vehicl e to slam on their brakes to avoid a collision. Dart saw appellant clip the back bumper of Roach’ s truck. Kevin Grimes witnessed the second collision between appellant’s truck and Roach’s. Grimes said he heard revving engines and thought Roach and appe llant were racing. He saw appellant’s truck pass Roach’s and then immediately turn left t o cut Roach’s truck off. As appellant’s truck pulled in front of Roach, it hit the median a nd flipped into oncoming traffic. Appellant admitted at trial he was intoxicated at the time of t he accident and was in a rush to get back to work. He thought Roach slowed down on purpose d uring their initial interaction, causing him to clip the back of Roach’s bumper. Appellant drov e ahead of Roach and pulled over to examine the damage to his truck. He then stood in the roadw ay in front of Roach’s oncoming vehicle with his arms outstretc hed in a “why-did-you-do-that ki nd of gesture.” When Roach turned at the intersection, appellant s aid he “wasn’t in the right sta te of mind to let him just take off.” Appellant told the jury that just before the crash, he was driv ing next to Roach and made another–3– gesture. “Roach came into my lane and clipped the bed of my tr uck” and “that’s what sent me in front of him.” Appellant admitted to driving recklessly and to being mad but denied that he was trying to threaten Roach. After hearing the ev idence, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant contends the evidence was legally ins ufficient to support the verdict. Specifically, he contends the evidence is insufficient to estab lish he intentionally or knowingly threatened the complainant. When reviewing a challenge to th e legal sufficiency of the evid ence supporting a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element s of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State , 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We do not resol ve conflicts of fact, weigh e vidence, or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant as long as the cumulative force of all the incrim inating circumstances is enough to warrant conviction. See Kennemur v. State , 280 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can be sufficient alone to establish an accused’s guilt. Id

. The indictment alleged appellan t intentionally and knowingly th reatened Roach with imminent bodily injury while usi ng or exhibiting a motor vehicl e as a deadly weapon. A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature or result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the resul t. T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 6.03(a) (West 2017). A person acts knowin gly as to the nature or circu mstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circu mstances exist and he acts knowingly–4– as to the result of his conduct wh en he is aware that his condu ct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id . § 6.03(b). A defendant’s intent or knowledge is a question of fact to b e determined from a totality of the circumstances including the defendant’s acts, words, and conduct. See
Dobbins v. State , 228 S.W.3d 761–2, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, p et. dism’d). Here, Roach and two other witnes ses testified appellant was dri ving erratically and made contact with Roach’s truck on two occasions. After clipping Ro ach’s truck the first time, appellant ran a red light and then got out of his truck, blocking Roach’s path as he approached. Appellant admitted he was angry when Roach turned onto another street ins tead of stopping. Appellant then chased after Roach and maneuvered his truck in front of Roach’s with such force that he hit the median and lost control of his vehicle. The jury could reasona bly infer from this conduct that appellant’s actions were knowing or intentional. See Nguyen v. State , 506 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to suppor t conviction for aggravated assault with vehicle where int ent could be inferred from prior aggressive driving). Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient because Ro ach gave conflicting testimony about how he perceived appellant’s conduct. He sugge sts the evidence must show Roach was fearful appellant would injure him for there to be su fficient evidence of an intentional or knowing threat. He contends a complainant must actually perceive the threat to prove the element of “threatens” in an assault case. The court of crimin al appeals has considered this question in an aggravated assault by threat case and determined the evidence is sufficient if it supports an inference that the victim did in fact perceive the threat. Olivas v. State , 203 S.W.3d 341, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). During trial, Roach told the ju ry he would describe appellant’s actions as threatening, but he “wouldn’t take a threat to it.” Roach told the jury he did not stop when appellant got out of his car because he didn’t want to fight with appellant and was tryi ng to distance himself from the–5– situation. Roach described the events as scary and said he bel ieved appellant int ended his actions to be threatening. This evidence shows Roach perceived appella nt’s actions as a threat. Even if Roach’s testimony that he did not feel personally threatened co uld be seen as contradicting his testimony about appellant’s threat ening behavior, the jury weig hed the evidence and interpreted Roach’s testimony to mean that he perceived a threat. See Boston v. State, 410 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (evidence sufficient to support a convic tion for aggravated robbery by threat where a rational jury could have inferred that the victi m was threatened, that the victim perceived the threat, an d that the victim wa s placed in fear as a result of the p erceived threat); see also Strange v. State , 446 S.W.3d 567, 574–75 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.). After reviewing the record, we conclude the State introduced sufficie nt evidence to support the conviction. We overrule appellan t’s first point of error. In appellant’s second issue, the State joins appellant in his r equest to modify the name of the judge. The record shows Judge Keith Dean presided over the proceedings. The judgment, however, identifies Judge John Roach, Jr. We modify the trial court’s judgment to show the presiding judge is Keith Dean a nd affirm the judgment as modifi ed. See T EX

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. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Te x. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).

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. P. 47.2(b) 170021F.U05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE–6– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
CRAIG AARON MILLER, Appellant

No. 05-17-00021-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80261-2015. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis. Justices Stoddart and Whitehill participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of t his date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The name of the presiding judge is MODIFIED to read “Hon. Keith Dean.”
As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered February 7, 2018.