Reply to Attn of 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Headquarters 

Washington, DC 20546-0001 

EA 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

August 6, 2012 

Associate Administrator (Acting) 

Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics 

Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer (GEMS) Independent 

Assessment 

Please find enclosed the final report of the Independent Assessment of the Science 

Mission Directorate's Non-Confirmation of the Gravity and Extreme Magnetism 

Small Explorer (GEMS) project. On May 10, 2012, the Science Mission Directorate 

held a Program Management Council (DPMC) at which they conducted the 

Confirmation Review for the GEMS project. The decision of the DPMC was to nonconfirm GEMS for continuation into the detailed design phase, thus effectively 

terminating the project. The rationale for this decision was documented in the 

signed decision memorandum from the May 10th DPMC. In a letter sent to NASA 

Administrator Bolden dated June 19, 2012, Senator Barbara Mikulski requested that 

the Agency conduct an independent assessment of this non-confirmation decision. 

The scope of the assessment included a review of the process and procedures 

leading to the non-confirmation decision, an examination of the costs to continue 

the project vs. termination costs, and assessment of the impact of cancellation on the 

cost of launch services for future NASA missions. After an in-depth review of 

relevant materials and interviews with parties involved with the decision, the 

Assessment Panel determined that the decision was compliant with formal Agency 

and Mission Directorate policies, requirements and guidance. While the review 

revealed some anomalies in the process, the Panel did not consider these to be 

material to the non-confirmation decision. The Assessment Panel's key finding was 

that the process upon which the non-confirmation decision was made was 

appropriate. 

This submittal of the Assessment Panel's final report includes a copy of the letter 

from Senator Mikulski in which she requests that the Agency perform the 

independent assessment, Administrator Bolden's reply letter to Senator Mikulski's 

request, the Panel's approved charter, and the final report, which is in presentation 

format. 
It was an honor for the members of the Panel to be asked to provide this service to 

the Agency. In taking on this responsibility, we were assisted by NASA civil servant 

and contractor staff representing the Office of the Chief Engineer, the Science 

Mission Directorate, the SMEX Program and GEMS Project Offices, the Goddard 

Space Flight Center, and Orbital Sciences Corporation. To a person, everyone with 

whom we interacted was a consummate professional. It was truly humbling to have 

encountered so many dedicated and capable individuals; the experience gives one 

great hope for the future of the Agency. 

Along with all of the Panel members, I stand ready to answer any questions or 

concerns that you may have about this report, or to provide any additional 

information that you may require. 

Respectfully, 

Thomas B. Irvine 

Deputy Associate Administrator 

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 

Cc wi Enclosures: 

David Radzanowski 

Mary D. Kerwin 

Janet Petro 

John Grunsfeld 

Chuck Gay 

Paul Hertz 

Nick Chrissotimos 

Greg Frazier 

Sandra Smalley 

Nancy Hammell 

Frank Peri 

DeeDee Healey 

Gale Allen 

Ron Larson 

Helen Grant 

Jim Norman 

Anne Sweet 

Amanda Mitskevich 

Mike Ryschkewitsch 

Chris Scalese 

Rick Obenschain 
GEMS 

Final Independent Assessment
Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small 

Explorer Non-Confirmation Analysis

Tom Irvine, Assessment Chair

July 24, 2012

1
Summary Findings and Recommendation

• The Assessment Panel was asked to review the process and procedures 

leading to the non-confirmation decision

• We were also asked to look into non-confirm related effects 1) for 

continuation vs. termination costs, and 2) on launch services for future 

NASA missions

• Summary assessment: the process followed by SMD/Decision Authority 

was sound, although discrepancies were found

– One discrepancy involved the SMD Handbook guidance for reconciliation of cost 

estimates prior to KDP-C; there was confusion involving cost caps, schedule delays, and 

misunderstandings regarding formal and informal decisions/direction

– Other discrepancies were not material to the non-confirm decision and should be taken 

as lessons-learned

• Recommendation: the Panel has determined that the process upon which 

the non-confirmation decision was made was appropriate

2
Outline

• Assessment Team Charter Purpose/Scope

• Assessment Panel and Supporting Organizations

• Approach

• Background on Policy and Process

• Timeline Describing Contributing Factors

• Summary of Changes to the Plan

• Assessment of the Non-Confirmation Decision

• Additional Observations

• Closeout Cost Comparison

• Launch Services Impact

• Summary

3
Assessment Team Charter Purpose/Scope

• Assess the GEMS non-confirmation decision by addressing1:

– The justification and process for non-confirming

– The cost to finish GEMS vs. cost to terminate and store any residual 

hardware or prototypes

– The impact of cancellation on future NASA launch costs

• Determine the validity of the process used to make the GEMS nonconfirmation decision in terms of consistency with applicable 

guiding/controlling documents

• Recommendation as to whether or not the process upon which the nonconfirmation decision was made was appropriate

(1) Letter from Senator Barbara Mikulski to Administrator Bolden dated June 19, 2012, in 

response to notification of the GEMS non-confirmation prior to NASA submission of the 

FY 2012 Operating Plan Change to the Congress on June 20, in which the nonconfirmation was defined

4
Assessment Team Charter Purpose/Scope (continued)

• What’s the big picture? (that we did not lose sight of amid process detail)

– Science objectives are compelling; project aligns with Astrophysics decadal priorities

– Programmatic objectives beyond successful project execution—such as astrophysics flight rate 

(especially for small sat launch) and portfolio balance—are also considerations

• What we are chartered to do:

– Review the process leading to the KDP-C decision

– Review and assess existing data for consistency and compliance to applicable government 

requirements for non-confirming the project

– Address the question: “were the data that would have been required to make the nonconfirmation decision available to the decision makers at the time of the DPMC KDP-C”

• What we are not chartered to do:

– Reproduce the technical/cost/schedule/risk analysis already performed by SMD, the 

Astrophysics Division, SMEX Program, GEMS Project, or GEMS Independent Assessment Panels, 

including the SRB and the Aerospace Corporation

• Assessment Timeline

– First panel meeting July 10th

– Brief NASA AA July 24th

5
Assessment Panel and Supporting Organizations

• Panel Members

– Chair: Tom Irvine

– OoE: Helen Grant

– OCE: Sandra Smalley

– HEOMD: Nancy Hammell

– LaRC: Frank Peri

– OSMA: DeeDee Healey

– OCS: Gale Allen

• Supporting Organizations

– IPAO/CAD: Ron Larson/James Johnson

– Launch Services Program: Jim Norman, Anne Sweet, Amanda Mitskevich

– Administrative Support: Precittia Taylor, Alicia Wesley, Maria Werries

6
Approach: How Did the Panel do Its Job?

Data Gathering

• Relevant documentation covering the timeframe from Announcement of 

Opportunity (AO), Concept Study Report (CSR), through early 2011 Replan, 

January 2012 Continuation Review, PDR, Goddard Center Management 

Council (CMC), and KDP-C

• The following organizations provided written documentation:

– SMD Astrophysics Division (Division Chief and Program Executive)

– Standing Review Board and Integrated Independent Review Team

– GEMS Project

– Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

– Orbital Sciences Corporation

• Much of our emphasis was from 2011 Replan forward to KDP-C

7
Approach: How did the Panel do Its Job?

Clarifying Discussions

• Purpose: Discuss and clarify any confusion, questions or concerns Panel had with 

submitted documentation

• Asked many of same questions of multiple organizations to assess consistency in 

understanding of process and procedural policy, requirements, guidance, and 

communications

• Assessment Panel held question and answer sessions with:

– Standing Review Board - Linda Pacini (for Mike Gazarik)

– Orbital Sciences Corporation - Mike Miller, Joe Bushman, Kate Kronmiller (Assessment Panel 

supported by OGC and HQ OP during this meeting)

– SMEX Program - Nick Chrissotimos, Christine Hinkle, Mike Delmont, Herb Middleman

– SMD/Astrophysics - Chuck Gay, Paul Hertz, Geoff Yoder, Lia LaPiana

– GEMS Project Office - Greg Frazier, Jean Swank, Jean Grady, Matt Ritsko, Keith Jahoda, Tom 

Johnson

• Panel Chair met individually with:

– SMD - John Grunsfeld, Chuck Gay

– Agency Chief Engineer - Mike Ryschkewitsch

– SMD Chief Engineer - Ken Ledbetter

– GSFC Director - Chris Scolese (telephone conversation)

8
Background on Policy and Process

9
Environment

• Federal government departments and agencies are operating in a time of heightened fiscal 

responsibility and accountability

• Accordingly, NASA has updated policy and guidance to focus on:

– Formulation and Implementation with robust cost estimating, including independent cost estimates

– Well defined baselines, designs, and risk postures at key decision points

– Formal requirements and guidance with emphasis on formal (decision) documentation

• NASA has enhanced process and implementation

– Ensuring independent assessment continues and that criteria are understood

– Enhancing periodic performance review process

– Providing support to projects when cost, schedule and/or technical performance in question 

• NASA shifting its operational paradigm to balance technical accomplishments with 

establishment/execution of adequate cost, schedule and technical baselines along with 

addressing poor performance to avoid collateral impact to other missions

10

GEMS is a Category 3 project (less than $250M) in Phase B, and was 

requesting transition from Formulation to Implementation (Phase C) where the 

official Agency baseline is established and external commitments are made
Policy and Process Applicable to GEMS

• NPR 7120.5, NASA Spaceflight Program and Project Management requirements establishes 

spaceflight project lifecycle, governance and decision making process, and requirements

– Governing Body is the SMD Directorate Program Management Council (DPMC)

– Decision Authority (DA) is the SMD Associate Administrator

• The DA is decision maker at Key Decision Points and Termination/Cancellation Reviews

• The NASA Associate Administrator adjudicates dissenting opinions

– Termination/Continuation reviews may be requested for circumstances such as:

• Anticipated inability of the program or project to meet its commitments

• Unanticipated change in Agency strategic planning

• Unanticipated change in the NASA budget

– A requirement relevant to our process discrepancy finding: “Required ICAs/ICEs will be reconciled 

internally within the SRB and with the program/project prior to the PMC review” (NPR 7120.5D Paragraph 

2.5.2.2); the ICE requirement was subsequently eliminated in NID 7120-97 which was applicable at KDP-C. 

11

GEMS was under 7120.5D at award, but also determined it is compliant with 

the most current revision, NASA Interim Directive (NID) 7120-97, against 

which the Project was assessed at KDP-C 
Policy and Process Applicable to GEMS

SMD Policy and Guidance 

• GEMS competitively selected as part of an SMD Explorer Program Small Explorers and Missions of Opportunity 

(SMEX) AO, which:

– Establishes cost cap

– Establishes cancellation criteria including if at any time, cost, schedule, or scientific performance commitments appear to be 

in peril

• SMD Policy Document (SPD) 19 - Meeting the Cost and Schedule Cap for PI Led Missions

– At KDP-B, PI commits to mission cost commitment at or below the AO-specified cost cap

– Project budget and schedule are baselined at KDP-C; a joint cost and schedule estimate is developed by the project and 

assessed by the SRB prior to KDP-C (additional independent cost and schedule estimates may be conducted) 

– At KDP-C, the Management Baseline is the PI-managed cost as proposed in the proposal or CSR, as adjusted by SMD at, as 

minimum, the 50% confidence level established by the joint cost and schedule estimates (50% JCL)

– One of the decisions associated with KDP-C approval is identification of sufficient cost reserves that can supplement the 

Management Baseline budget and satisfy the Agency JCL requirements; SMD generally sets the Commitment Baseline 

budget at or near the 70% joint confidence level

– The Agency considers provision of additional funds to the project beyond the Commitment Baseline (established at KDP-C) 

to constitute a breach of the Agency’s cost commitment

• SMD Handbook (provides guidance and describes SMD practice)

– A “no confirmation” decision by the SMD AA at the confirmation review can direct the project back for further Formulation 

or it can terminate any further effort; changes in budget or strategic plan criteria used to assess the project, or changes 

within the program or project that violate the original approval criteria, could necessitate reformulation and reevaluation for 

re-baselining or cancellation

– Special-purpose independent reviews (e.g. Cancellation Review) are conducted when directed by the Agency or Directorate 

PMC; elements such as the anticipated inability of a project to meet its commitments, an unanticipated change in Agency 

strategic planning, or an unanticipated change in the NASA budget may initiate such reviews

– In preparation for KDP-C, ensure completion of detailed project cost estimate and independent cost estimate, and that 

estimates are reconciled to achieve a thorough understanding of expected costs, cost assumptions and risks

12
Timeline Describing Contributing Factors

13
GEMS Timeline
Summary of Changes to the Plan

Date PI-managed 

Cost

Expected 

KDP-C

Expected 

LRD

Conditions

Initial Selection June 

2009

$119M Sept 

2011

April 

2014

Project asked for early 

start of polarimeter

Replan #1 April 

2011

$121M Oct 2011 July 2014 SMD directed $12M in 

descopes and $2M in 

approved 

new/restored scope 

(E/PO, PS, student)

Replan #2 

(Continuation 

Review)

Jan 

2012

$135M May 

2012

Nov 2014

KDP-C May 

2012

>= $150M May 

2012

April 

2015

SMD assessment at 

50% Cost confidence

15
Assessment of the 

Non-Confirmation Decision

16
Assessment of the 

Non-Confirmation Decision

• Policies and procedures followed: 

– Project conducted reviews and completed required products

– Independent Estimates and Joint Confidence Level analyses were conducted

– Decision process included Project presentation of their baseline, recommendations from 

the Program, Center, and SMD Astrophysics Division

– Decision was made by the Decision Authority after considering all information

– If some instances, policies and procedures were not followed explicitly, however, their 

intent was met (e.g. termination criteria called out in memo from Astrophysics Division 

rather than in the PLRA per the SMD Handbook; PLRA was to be baselined at KDP-C)

• Policies and procedures not followed:

– Three weeks post PDR, project delivered updated integrated master schedule to SRB for 

inclusion in the ICE, leaving only one week to review project data and hold schedule

– Though discussion of estimate variances took place, reconciliation of the ICE was not 

performed prior to CM; however, no formal objections were raised with decision to 

proceed with KDP-C 

– All positions were made known to Astrophysics Division

17
Assessment of the 

Non-Confirmation Decision (continued)

• What occurs at KDP-C

– At its heart, the KDP-C or Confirmation Review is the Decision Authority making a 

judgment as to whether there is a reasonable case that the project can be completed for 

the budget NASA has available and in the schedule allotted

– Decision Authority assesses the risk of cost overrun and schedule slip using data 

presented by the Project, Program, Center, HQ staff, and independent review bodies, as 

well as information gleaned on project performance from normal HQ oversight in phases 

leading up to KDP-C

– For GEMS project, Decision Authority is SMD AA with advice from SMD DPMC members

• A word (or two) on cost caps

– Much debate regarding the value of the cost cap leading into KDP-C

– Project believes that the cost cap was raised from $121M to $135M, based on 

communication from SMD in the weeks after the January 2012 Continuation Review, the 

Draft PLRA, and budget data in N2

– SMD believes that the $135M was a value for the Project to use in planning as they 

prepared for KDP-C

– In the context of the KDP-C, whether the cost cap was $121M or $135M is less 

important than the risk that the project budget and schedule will grow beyond what 

NASA is willing to fund

18
• What transpired leading up to, and at, KDP-C (Confirmation Review)

– SMD conducted a Continuation Review 3 months prior to KDP-C at which it was determined that the science 

is still compelling, that the amount of additional funds required for reserves didn’t warrant cancellation and 

that the amount of additional funds needed to restore healthy cost reserves was not substantially large 

enough to warrant termination prior to Confirmation Review

– Project believes they made a case at Confirmation Review that they could achieve the 11/2014 launch date 

with a budget of $135M at 50% Confidence Level and $156M at 70% Confidence Level

– Independent cost and schedule estimates from Aerospace and SRB indicate a 50% Confidence Level budget 

in the range of $150 to $157M and a 70% Confidence Level of approximately $167 to $169M

– Cost estimate prepared by GSFC RAO office was $129M at 50% Confidence Level and $165M at 70% 

Confidence Level

– Goddard CMC, held prior to KDP-C, agreed with decision not to reconcile project JCL and the ICEs, based on 

their understanding that the 50% CL cost presented at KDP-C would be compared against an approved 

$135M cost cap, and that other factors (existence of 4 estimates, credits for other support/risk reduction) 

would be taken into account 

• This concurrence was inconsistent with the Continuation Review Decision Memo—a key 

misunderstanding

19

Continuation Review Decision Memo states: “additional [cost] 

increases identified at Confirmation Review will be considered 

cumulative when considering whether to confirm”

Assessment of the 

Non-Confirmation Decision (continued)
Assessment of the 

Non-Confirmation Decision (continued)

• What was decided (and officially documented)

– Decision Authority determined that cost estimates developed by Aerospace and SRB 

most appropriately reflected the potential future cost and schedule picture

– This was determined based not only on information presented in the DPMC, but also on 

past project performance

– GEMS science had already been descoped during replan conducted during Phase B; 

there were no practical descope options available to offset future cost and schedule 

growth

20
Additional Observations

21
Additional Observations

• Non-Confirmation Decision Documentation

– The Decision Agreement coming out of the May 10, 2012 DPMC KDP-C Review 

presented a rationale for non-confirmation that, as noted by SMD in retrospect, could 

have been more clearly worded

– Inconsistent with previous DPMC decision documentation, the Explorers Program 

Manager and GSFC Director were not given the opportunity to sign the KDP-C Review 

Decision Agreement

• While SMD noted their reasoning was to reflect their ownership of the decision, the panel felt 

that all parties would have been better served by including the Program and Center in the 

decision documentation process

• Program Level Requirements Agreement (PLRA)

– In late 2011, the project began circulating a draft PLRA—including reference to the $135 

million cost cap—through the appropriate signature cycle in preparation for KDP-C

– By mid-April, 2012 all signatures had been acquired except that of the SMD Associate 

Administrator, who signs when the project is confirmed at KDP-C

– While the document was still in draft form pending confirmation, it was not marked as 

such, and was widely distributed and subsequently assumed as the new project 

baseline, when in fact it was not

22
Closeout Cost Comparison 

23
Closeout Cost Comparison 

• Potential Termination Liability is the maximum cost that will be incurred if the government 

terminates. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) also refers to such costs as “termination 

costs.” Allowable contract termination costs are specified in the FAR and include:

– Employee severance pay

– Rental costs for unexpired leases and penalties for early termination of leases 

– Subcontractor claims

• The total costs associated with terminating GEMS will be calculated at the time of 

termination

– NASA will propose a final operating plan adjustment reflecting these costs

• Preliminary termination costs provided by the GEMS project are:

– $13.0M estimated (June 5 KDP-C Follow-up package)

– Minimal storage fees 

• Estimated low to high range of costs to complete GEMS

– $135M (current project estimate) less $43.5M (costs incurred through May 2012) = $91.5M (cost to 

complete) + launch vehicle costs*

– $169M (independent cost estimate at 70% CL) less $43.5M (costs incurred through May 2012) = 

$125.5M + launch vehicle costs*

* Launch Vehicle costs estimated at not-to-exceed $55M 

24
Launch Services Impact

25
Launch Services Impact

Tasking:

• Assess potential impacts of cancelling GEMS on future launch vehicle costs for 

projected NASA missions

• Use the 2012 AMPM as guide for projected future NASA missions that would use a 

launch vehicle of the capability necessary to launch GEMS

• Provide any additional launch vehicle projected needs not covered in the 2012 

AMPM that are relevant to non-confirmation of GEMS

• Provide any documented launch vehicle provider on and off ramp projections that 

could be impacted by non-confirmation of GEMS

26
Launch Services Impact

• Current NASA missions on contract or planning to require launch vehicle of the same capability 

necessary to launch GEMS:

– IRIS launching in 2013 

– EV-2 launching in 2016/17

• Potential future NASA missions that might* use a launch vehicle of the capability necessary to 

launch GEMS:

– Helio EX-1 in 2018

– Helio SMEX in 2021

– Astro SMEX in 2021

• There are no documented launch vehicle provider on/off ramp projections that could be impacted 

by a non-confirmation of GEMS

• However, a launch vehicle provider’s viability in an already fragile small payload/small launch 

vehicle market could cause a rapid change to their business case

• Cancellation of a certified launch vehicle product line could drive additional costs or risk, by either 

using a launch vehicle with more performance than required, or one not yet certified

• Another concern with cancellation of a launch vehicle product line would be potential workforce 

dilution and the impact to launch services in process, such as IRIS

* projects not far enough along in solicitation of mission concepts to understand their launch service requirements

27
Assessment Summary

28
Summary: What We Did

• We conducted a review (July 10th-July 24th) of the process leading to the KDP-C 

non-confirmation decision

• We reviewed and assessed existing data for consistency and compliance to 

applicable government requirements for non-confirming the project

• We addressed the question: “were the data that would have been required to 

make the non-confirmation decision available to the decision makers at the time 

of the DPMC KDP-C”

• We reviewed and documented the Project-generated cost to finish GEMS vs. cost 

to terminate and store any residual hardware or prototypes (this is an incomplete 

answer based on June 2012 data)

• The Launch Services Program assessed and defined the impact of cancellation on 

future NASA launch costs

29
Summary: Findings

Our Assessment of the Justification and Process for Non-Confirming

• The process followed by SMD/Decision Authority was sound, although there were 

discrepancies

• The data required to make an informed decision by the Decision Authority was available at 

KDP-C 

• Independent cost estimates were not reconciled with the project cost estimate as required 

by 7120.5D

• Our assessment is that this discrepancy does not invalidate the non-confirm decision, 

because the Continuation Review decision memo clearly states that additional project cost 

increases from the $121M Cost Cap would be considered cumulative when considering 

whether to confirm

• It was within Agency and mission directorate established processes that the Decision 

Authority made his decision, using projected cost and schedule growth based on projected 

risks from past project performance and other project historical data 

• Other discrepancies were not material to the non-confirm decision and should be taken as 

lessons-learned

30

Our assessment is that the process upon which the non-confirmation decision was 

made was appropriate
Appendix A: 

Policy and Process Details

31
7120.5D (Valid at Selection)

Termination:

• Section 2.4.5.C - Disapproval for continuation to the next KDP. In such cases, follow-up actions may include a request for 

more information and/or a delta independent review; a request for a Termination Review for the program or the project 

(Phases B, C, D, and E only); direction to continue in the current phase; or re-direction of the program/project.

• 2.5.5 If the Decision Authority is considering the termination of a program or a project in Phases B, C, D, or E, then a special 

termination KDP may be initiated. Circumstances such as the anticipated inability of the program or project to meet its 

commitments, an unanticipated change in Agency strategic planning, or an unanticipated change in the NASA budget may be 

instrumental in triggering a termination KDP. For Category 2 and 3 projects, the Decision Authority notifies the NASA 

Associate Administrator at least 45 days (Category 2 projects) or 21 days (Category 3 projects) in advance of a termination 

KDP; for programs and Category 1 projects, the MDAA provides recommendations to the Decision Authority on the need for 

a termination KDP. The Decision Authority commissions an independent assessment, and following its completion, the 

governing PMC holds a Termination Review. For operating missions, terminations are handled in accordance with NPD 

8010.3, Notification of Intent to Decommission or Terminate Operating Space Missions and Terminate Missions.

• 2.5.6 At the Termination Review, the program and the project teams present status, including any material requested by the 

Decision Authority. A Center assessment is presented as the Technical Authority (see Section 3.4) at the program or project 

level, or an OCE assessment is presented as the Technical Authority for tightly coupled programs with multiple Centers 

implementing the projects. Appropriate support organizations are represented (e.g., procurement, external affairs, 

legislative affairs, and public affairs), as needed. The decision and basis of decision are fully documented and reviewed with 

the NASA Associate Administrator prior to final implementation.

• Definition: Termination Review. A review initiated by the Decision Authority for the purpose of securing a recommendation 

as to whether to continue or terminate a program or project. Failing to stay within the parameters or levels specified in 

controlling documents will result in consideration of a termination review.

32
7120.5D (Valid at Selection)

Program Plan Template:

c. Program Requirements on Projects. -For each project, provide a top-level description, including the mission's science or 

exploration objectives. Document the project's category, governing PMC, and risk classification. Describe the project's 

mission, performance, and safety requirements. For science missions, include both baseline science requirements and 

threshold science requirements. (See Appendix A for definitions.) Identify the mission success criteria for each project based 

on the baseline science requirements. State each requirement in objective, quantifiable, and verifiable terms. Identify the 

project's principal schedule milestones, including PDR, CDR, launch, mission operational-critical milestones, and the planned 

decommissioning date. State the development and/or total life-cycle cost constraints on the project. Set forth any budget 

constraints by fiscal year. State the specific conditions under which a project Termination Review would be triggered. 

Describe any additional requirements on the project (e.g., international partners). If the mission characteristics indicate a

greater emphasis is necessary on maintaining either technical, cost, or schedule, then identify which is most important (e.g., 

state if the mission is cost capped, or if schedule is paramount as for a planetary mission, or if it is critical to accomplish all of 

the technical objectives as for a technology demonstration mission).

• 3.1.b of the Program Plan Template – Control Plans - Describe the program's performance measures in objective, 

quantifiable, and measurable terms and document how the measures are traced from the program high-level requirements. 

Establish goal and threshold values for the performance metrics to be achieved at each KDP, as appropriate; In addition, 

document the minimum mission success criteria associated with the high-level program requirements that, if not met, 

trigger consideration of a Termination Review.

• 3.7 Review Plans: Explain the reporting requirements for program reviews. Provide the technical, scientific, schedule, cost, 

and other criteria that will be utilized in the consideration of a Termination Review.

• Project Plan Template Section 3.1 - b. Describe the project's performance measures in objective, quantifiable, and 

measurable terms and document how the measures are traced from the program requirements on the project. In addition, 

document the minimum mission success criteria associated with the program requirements on the project that, if not met, 

trigger consideration of a Termination Review.

Project Plan Template: Section 3.8 Review Plan -Explain the reporting requirements for project reviews. Provide the technical, 

scientific, schedule, cost, and other criteria that will be utilized in the consideration of a Termination Review.

33
7120.5D (Valid at Selection)

Independent Reviews:

• 2.5.2 At the completion of the internal technical and programmatic reviews described in paragraph 2.5.1, an independent 

life-cycle review is conducted by a Standing Review Board (SRB).11 The independent life-cycle review is conducted under 

documented Agency and Center review processes. Programs and projects are required to document in their Program and 

Project Plans their approach to conducting program/project internal reviews and how they will support the independent lifecycle reviews. Consistent with these processes and plans, the Terms of Reference (ToR) for each independent life-cycle 

review are jointly developed and approved/concurred by the respective individuals in Table 2-3.

• 2.5.2.1 The independent life-cycle review is convened by the same individuals (see Table 2-3) who develop the ToR to 

objectively assess the program/project's progress against the Program/Project Plan; its readiness to proceed to the next 

phase; compliance with NPR 7120.5 requirements; and for projects, the adequacy and credibility of the Integrated Baseline 

(at PDR and later). For the program and project reviews leading to program and project approval- P/SRR (PPAR) and P/SDR 

(PAR) for programs, and SRR/SDR/MDR (PNAR) and PDR (NAR) for Projects - a more integrated technical and programmatic 

review and evaluation is conducted, using the following criteria:

a. Alignment with and c Adequacy of technical approach, as defined by NPR 7123.1 entrance and success criteria.

c. Adequacy of schedule.

d. Adequacy of estimated costs (total and by fiscal year), including Independent Cost Analyses (ICAs) and Independent Cost 

Estimates (ICEs), against approved budget resources.

e. Adequacy/availability of resources other than budget.

f. Adequacy of risk management approach and risk identification/mitigation.

g. Adequacy of management approachontributing to Agency needs, goals, and objectives, and the adequacy of requirements 

flow-down

2.5.2.2 The SRB's role13 is advisory to the program/project and the convening authorities and does not have authority over 

anyprogram/project content. Its review provides expert assessment of the technical and programmatic approach, risk 

posture, andprogress against the program/project baseline. When appropriate, it may offer recommendations to improve 

performance and/orreduce risk. Its outputs are briefed to the program/project under review prior to being reported to the 

next higher level ofmanagement. Required ICAs/ICEs will be reconciled internally within the SRB and with the 

program/project prior to the PMCreview.

34
7120.5D (Valid at Selection)

Independent Reviews:

• 2.5.2.1 The independent life-cycle review is convened by the same individuals (see Table 2-3) who develop the ToR to 

objectively assess the program/project's progress against the Program/Project Plan; its readiness to proceed to the next 

phase; compliance with NPR 7120.5 requirements; and for projects, the adequacy and credibility of the Integrated Baseline 

(at PDR and later). For the program and project reviews leading to program and project approval- P/SRR (PPAR) and P/SDR 

(PAR) for programs, and SRR/SDR/MDR (PNAR) and PDR (NAR) for Projects - a more integrated technical and programmatic 

review and evaluation is conducted, using the following criteria:12

a. Alignment with and contributing to Agency needs, goals, and objectives, and the adequacy of requirements flow-down 

NPR 7120.5D -- Chapter2 Verify Current version before use at: http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/ Page 18 of 97NPR 7120.5D --

Chapter2 Verify Current version befor use at:http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/Page 18 of 97from those.

b. Adequacy of technical approach, as defined by NPR 7123.1 entrance and success criteria.

c. Adequacy of schedule.

d. Adequacy of estimated costs (total and by fiscal year), including Independent Cost Analyses (ICAs) and Independent

Cost Estimates (ICEs), against approved budget resources.

e. Adequacy/availability of resources other than budget.

f. Adequacy of risk management approach and risk identification/mitigation.

g. Adequacy of management approach.

35
7120.5D (Valid at Selection)

AO:

• 2.3.2.2 Some Mission Directorates have chosen to establish several new space flight programs that use a one or two-step Announcement of 

Opportunity (AO) process to initiate projects. In a one-step AO process, projects are competed and selected for implementation in a single step. 

In two-step competitions, several projects may be selected in Step 1 and given time to mature their concepts in a funded Phase A before the Step 

2 down-selection to one or more projects for further formulation. Program resources are invested (following Step 1 selections) to bring these 

projects to a state in which their science content, cost, schedule, technical performance, project implementation strategies, safety and mission 

assurance strategies, and management approach can be better judged. 9 These projects are often referred to as competed or "AO-driven.“ 

• Footnote 9 From the point of view of the selected AO-driven project, the proposing teams are clearly doing formal project formulation (e.g., 

putting together a detailed WBS, schedules, cost estimates, and implementation plan) during the funded Phase A concept study and the 

preparation of the Step 2 proposal. From the point of view of the program, no specific project has been chosen, a FAD is not written, the cost is 

unknown, and the project-level requirements are not yet identified, yet formulation has begun. The first KDP is the down selection process, and 

following selection, the process becomes conventional.

Requirements During Phase B (see section 4.5)

• ...(5) Develop, document, and maintain a project Integrated Baseline for all work performed by the project noting the following:

(i) The project's Integrated Baseline is consistent with the NASA standard space flight project WBS (see Appendix G) and has an associated WBS 

dictionary.

(ii) The project's Integrated Baseline includes the integrated master schedule, baseline life-cycle cost estimate, workforce estimates, and the 

PDR-technical baseline, all consistent with the program requirements levied on the project.

(iii) The baseline life-cycle cost estimate is based on the PDR-technical baseline and integrated master schedule and is expected to include a 

review of the entire scope of work with a series of in-depth assessments of selected critical work elements of the WBS prior to and following the 

project's PDR/NAR preceding KDP C. (Note: The CADRe is updated to reflect changes.)

(iv) The baseline life-cycle cost estimate uses the latest available full-cost accounting initiative guidance and practices.

(v) The baseline life-cycle cost estimate includes reserves, along with the level of confidence estimate provided by the reserves based on a costrisk analysis.

(vi) The baseline life-cycle cost estimate is time-phased by Government Fiscal Year (GFY) to WBS Level 2.

(6) Reconcile (i.e., explain any significant differences) the project's baseline life-cycle cost estimate with the PDR/NAR Independent Cost 

Estimate.

36
Nov 23, 2010 Scolese Letter

• At KDP-C

1. Tightly coupled programs and projects must develop and provide the 

following:

a. A program or project-generated cost-and/or resource-loaded devleopment 

schedule and a probability calculation of meeting both the cost and 

development schedule targets, also called a Joint Cost and Schedule 

Confidence Level (JCL);

37
SPD 19 June 18, 2010

Meeting the 70% JCL Requirement in PI-led Missions

Executive Summary:

(a) In the proposal at KDP-A (selection for one step selections) and in the Concept Study Report (CSR) at KDP-B (downselection for two step 

selections), the PI commits to a mission cost commitment which is at or below the AO-specified cost cap. (Section 1(c))

(b) The budget and schedule for the project will be baselined at KDP-C. The PI’s cost commitment is still valid and does not go away at KDP-C 

even though the Commitment Baseline (at 70% joint confidence level) may be higher than the PI’s cost commitment. (Section 3(b),

Section 3(f))

(c) SMD considers provision of UFE funds to the project beyond the Management Baseline to

constitute an overrun of the PI’s cost commitment. (Section 3(g))

Background:

1. Background

(a) NASA requirements state that programs and projects must have sufficient cost and schedule reserves at Key Decision Point C (KDP-C) to 

ensure success. NM 7120-81 (NPR 7120.5D NID), Section 2.1.8.2, defines the project Management Baseline, Unallocated Future 

Expenses (UFE), and the project Commitment Baseline (which is the Management Baseline plus any Unallocated Future Expenses). 

NM 7120-81 requires programs to have a Commitment Baseline set at a 70% joint confidence level, and it requires projects to have a 

Commitment Baseline consistent with the program’s joint confidence level.

(b) SMD’s competitively-selected, PI-led missions are generally projects in uncoupled programs (e.g. Explorer, Discovery, New Frontiers, 

etc.). For an uncoupled program to maintain a Commitment Baseline at the 70% joint confidence level, each of the projects must also 

maintain a joint confidence level at or near 70%.

(c) SMD Announcements of Opportunity (AOs) set a cost cap for competitively-selected, PI-led mission proposals. The cost cap is restated, if 

necessary, in the Guidelines for Phase A Concept Study Reports. In the proposal at KDP-A (selection for one step selections) and in the 

Concept Study Report (CSR) at KDP-B (downselection for two step selections), the PI commits to a mission cost commitment which is 

at or below the AO-specified cost cap.

38
SPD 19 June 18, 2010

Meeting the 70% JCL Requirement in PI-led Missions

Background:

1. Background

(d) After consultation with the PI, the cost commitment may be adjusted by SMD during development to accommodate changes.

(e) It is generally the case that the project design maturity is insufficient to determine the 70% joint confidence level for cost and schedule at either KDP-A 

or KDP-B. The agreed-to PI-led mission cost commitment, which includes appropriate cost and schedule reserves for the planned mission, may or 

may not be at a 70% joint confidence level.

Policy:

(a) The project (as referenced in NM 1720-81) is the PI-led mission. The program (as referenced in NM 1720-81) is the loosely coupled, multi-mission 

program, which includes PI-led missions, other projects, and a future mission budget.

(b) The budget and schedule for the project will be baselined at KDP-C. A joint cost and schedule estimate will be developed by the project, and assessed 

by the Standing Review Board, prior to KDP-C. Additional independent cost and schedule estimates may be conducted.

(c) At KDP-C, the Management Baseline will be the PI-led mission cost commitment as proposed in the proposal or CSR and as adjusted by SMD. The 

Management Baseline is the project budget that is provided to the PI-led project and the implementing Center. The PI and the implementing Center 

commit to SMD to execute the project within the approved Management Baseline, so the Management Baseline budget approved at KDP-C 

becomes the PI-led mission cost commitment.

(d) One of the decisions associated with KDP-C approval is identification of sufficient cost reserves (UFE) that, if needed, can supplement the Management 

Baseline budget and satisfy the Agency JCL requirements. As discussed in Section 1, SMD generally sets the Commitment Baseline budget to be at or 

near the 70% joint confidence limit. SMD and the Agency commit to

Congress to execute the project within the approved Commitment Budget.

(e) The identified UFE that constitute the difference between the mission cost cap and the 70% confidence limit will be held by SMD at Headquarters in 

the project’s budget line. UFE will not be provided to the project, nor will they be used to increase the PI-led mission cost commitment beyond the 

project’s Management Baseline budget, without approval by the SMD Directorate

Program Management Council.

(f) The PI’s cost commitment is still valid and does not go away at KDP-C even though the Commitment Baseline (at 70% joint confidence level) may be 

higher than the PI’s cost commitment.

(g) SMD considers provision of UFE funds to the project beyond the Management Baseline to constitute an overrun of the PI’s cost commitment.

(h) The Agency considers provision of additional funds to the project beyond the Commitment Baseline to constitute a breach of the Agency’s cost 

commitment. 

39
SMD Handbook

5.5.1: ...With this input, the SMD PMC assesses the mission’s prospect of being able to meet the science objectives on schedule and within budget and 

documents the results, actions and recommendations to the SMD AA in the Decision Memorandum. The SMD AA decides whether to authorize project 

transition to Implementation, if Category 2 or 3, or to allow the project to proceed to the Agency PMC for final approval, if Category 1. With the SMD 

AA’s “confirm” decision to proceed, the SMD AA signs the PLRA if there are no outstanding items in the PLRA and if the PLRA has not already been 

approved. The DPMC members sign the Decision Memorandum (before the meeting adjourns, if possible)

...A “no confirmation” decision by the SMD AA at the CR or a non-approval from the APMC can direct the project back to the Center for further 

Formulation, or it can terminate any further effort. This decision is documented in the Decision Memorandum or in a letter drafted by the PE for SMD 

AA signature. Changes in budget or in strategic plan criteria used to assess the project, or changes within the program or project that violate the original 

approval criteria, could necessitate reformulation and reevaluation for re-baselining or cancellation. The project returns to Formulation, addressing 

whatever deficiencies are identified as the rationale for not proceeding to Implementation. If cancellation is the chosen option, the PE should ensure 

that all appropriate stakeholders are notified and that the appropriate lessons learned are captured in an archive such as the on-line Lessons-Learned 

Information System.

5.4.3.2 NASA HQ Policy Decisions/Actions during Phase B

A project performs many activities during Phase B leading to a mission preliminary design. These activities are covered by Center processes, and include those 

required by NPR 7120.5. This handbook is HQ-oriented and describes HQ personnel responsibilities during Phase B. The PE, working in close 

coordination with the PS and the Program Manager, should verify that the following key decisions are made and actions completed:

• Ensure completion of a detailed project cost estimate and an independent cost estimate and that those estimates are reconciled to achieve a thorough 

understanding of expected costs, cost assumptions and risks.

• Decide what mission cancellation criteria are to be placed into the Program Plan.

• Determine, in consultation with the Program and Project Managers, what technology can be used for the project, based on critical need, risk, TRL, and 

mission criticality. Determine whether the technology is mission enabling or mission enhancing.

5.4.3.3 Preparation for Approval (NAR/KDP-C)

The PE works with the Program Office and the project to organize and conduct the Confirmation Process for KDP-C, which is the SMD process for Approval of 

science projects to transition from Formulation to Implementation. The PE verifies that the necessary tasks and proper documentation has been 

accomplished during Phase B. In addition, the PA&E office requires an update to the CADRe document for Category-1 and -2 projects at KDP-C. From 

project reviews, project documentation, and consultation with the Program Manager, the PE assesses whether or not the project has completed the 

Formulation objectives to the point of readiness to begin detailed design and that development within the anticipated cost and schedule continues to 

be viable. If, through this analysis, and after consultation with the cognizant DD, PS, and Program Manager, the PE determines the project is not ready, 

he/she will recommend the project continue further formulation. With a decision that the project is ready to transition, the PE initiates and coordinates 

the approval activity. Approval for Implementation is discussed in Section 5.5, “Approval Subprocess (Phase B to C Transition).”

40
AO

5.4.2 PI Mission Cost

For a SMEX, the PI Mission Cost is limited to $105 million in FY 2008 dollars, including funding for all phases and all elements(e.g., Phase A 

through Phase F, any GFE except standard launch services, implementation of the E/PO program, mission operations and data analysis, 

safety reliability and quality assurance activities, and reserves). The proposer may distribute the funds among these elements as best suits 

the investigation.

4.2 General Program Constraints and Guidelines

...

In accordance with NASA's policy of assigning program management responsibility to its Centers, NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has 

been assigned program management responsibility for the Explorer Program. In this role, which is separate from its role as a possible 

partner in the investigation, GSFC is responsible for NASA's fiduciary responsibility to ensure that Explorer missions are achieved in 

compliance with the cost, schedule, performance, reliability, and safety requirements committed to by the PI. 

...

Once an investigation has been selected for flight, failure to maintain reasonable progress on an

agreed upon schedule, or failure to operate within the cost and other constraints outlined below,

or failure to be able to meet the mission’s technical objectives may be cause for its termination

by NASA. Every aspect of a selected investigation must reflect a commitment to mission success

while keeping total costs as low as possible. Consequently, investigations should be designed

and planned to emphasize mission success within cost and schedule constraints by incorporating

sufficient margins, reserves, and resiliency. Only those investigations whose proposed cost,

schedule, and launch vehicle requirements do not exceed the constraints and guidelines identified

in this AO will be considered as candidates for selection for flight.

41
7120 NID – 97 (Valid at KDP-C)

From the Definitions:

Decommissioning. The process of ending an operating mission and the attendant project as a result of a planned end of the mission or project 

termination. Decommissioning includes final delivery of any remaining project deliverables, disposal of the spacecraft and all its various 

supporting systems, closeout of contracts and financial obligations, and archiving of project/mission operational and scientific data and 

artifacts. Decommissioning does not mean that scientific data analysis ceases, only that the project will no longer provide the resources for 

continued research and analysis.

Termination Review. A review initiated by the Decision Authority for the purpose of securing a recommendation as to whether to continue or 

terminate a program or project. Failing to stay within the parameters or levels specified in controlling documents will result in consideration 

of a termination review.

From the Program Plan Template:

Program Requirements on Projects. For each project, provide a top-level description, requirements. For science missions, include both baseline 

science requirements and threshold science requirements. (See Appendix A for definitions.) Identify the mission success criteria for each 

project based on the threshold science requirements. State each requirement in objective, Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design 

Review (CDR), launch, mission operationalcritical milestones, and the planned decommissioning date. State the development and/or total 

life cycle cost constraints on the project. Set forth any budget constraints by fiscal year. State the specific conditions under which a project 

Termination Review would be triggered. Describe any additional requirements on the project (e.g., international partners). If the mission 

characteristics indicate a greater emphasis is necessary on maintaining technical, cost, or schedule, then identify which is most important 

(e.g., state if the mission is cost capped; or if schedule is paramount, as for a planetary mission; or if it is critical to accomplish all of the 

technical objectives, as for a technology demonstration mission).

42
7120 NID – 97 (Valid at KDP-C)

Program plan Template Section 3.1 Program Control Plans

(...my computer is doing weird things with cut and past)....and document how the measures are traced from the program high-level 

requirements. Establish baseline and threshold values for the performance metrics to be achieved at each Key Decision Point (KDP), as 

appropriate. In addition, document the mission success criteria associated with the program-level requirements that, if not met, trigger 

consideration of a Termination Review. Review Plan from the template Identify any deviations from these documents that the program is 

planning. Provide the technical, scientific, schedule, cost, and other criteria that will be utilized in the consideration of a Termination 

Review.

From the Project Plan Template

Project Plan section 3.1 Control Plans

Describe the projects performance measures in objective, quantifiable, and measurable terms and document how the measures are traced from 

the program requirements on the project. In addition, document the minimum mission success criteria associated with the program 

requirements on the project, that if not met, trigger consideration of a termination review.

Project Plan Template Section 3.10 Review Plan

Identify any deviations from these documents that the project is planning. Provide the technical, scientific, schedule, cost, and other criteria that 

will be utilized in the consideration of a Termination Review.

2.4.2 All programs and projects develop cost estimates and planned schedules for the work to be performed in the current and following life cycle phases 

(see Appendix C tables). As part of developing these estimates, the program or project shall document the basis of estimate.

NOTE: The requirement for ICE’s and reconciliation of ICE’s was intentionally removed from NID-97. Independent Cost Assessments of the project’s estimate 

/JCL are required.

43
GEMS 

Charter
Office of Evaluation 

Charter for the Assessment Panel 

Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer (GEMS) 

NOD-Confirmation Analysis 

Ja etro 

Director (Acting) 

Office of Evaluation 

NASA Headquarters 

Concurred by: 

10=-~ Robert Ligbtfoot ~ 

NASA Associate Administrator 

NASA Headquarters 

a wski 

Chief of Staff ASA Administrator 

NASA Headquarters 

~£~-' Assessment Cbair 

Thomas Irvine 

July 9, 2012 

Deputy Associate Administrator, Aeronautics Research 

NASA Headquarters 
Contents 

Office of Evaluation 

GEMS Non-Confirm Assessment 

2 

Background .................................................................................................................................................. .3 

Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... .3 

Scope of Work ............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Approach ....................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Resources Required (personnel, contractors, funds, material) ...................................................................... 5 

Panel Members .......................................................................................................................................... 5 

Supporting Members ... ....... ................ .. ...... .................... ....... ....... ............. .... .. ........... 5 

Other Factors to consider .............................................................................................................................. 5 

Final Report ................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Report Out ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Timeline of Activities .. ............. .... ........ ... ............................... ........ ......... ......... ........ .... 6 
Background 

Office of Evaluation 

GEMS Non-Confirm Assessment 

3 

The Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer (GEMS) was awarded as part of the 

Announcement of Opportunity for Small Explorers (SMEX) issued September 28, 2007 with two 

launch windows. Each proposer was to propose a Launch Readiness Date for the 1 st and 2nd 

launch slots 

• 1st launch No Earlier Than (NET) than Dec 2012 

• 2nd launch NET April 2014 and No Later Than (NLT) Sept 30, 2015 

GEMS was selected as the 2nd SMEX starting on November 2010 with a proposed Launch 

Readiness Date of April 3, 2014. The project was notified that they were in the 2nd launch slot 

during Step 2, after submitting the Concept Study Report (CSR) Proposal. The Science Mission 

Directorate (SMD) non-confirmed GEMS during the Directorate Program Management Council 

(DPMC) GEMS confirmation review (KDP-C) held in May 2012. Senator Mikulski requested a 

review of the GEMS non-confirmation decision in a letter dated June 19, 2012 to the NASA 

Administrator. 

Purpose 

The purpose of this review is to provide an assessment of the GEMS non-confirmation decision 

addressing items referenced in the June 19, 2012 letter to the NASA Administrator from Senator 

Mikulski. The assessment shall evaluate the justification and the process for the nonconfirmation decision .. The assessment will result in fmdings as to the validity of the process 

used to make the GEMS non-confirmation decision in terms of that processes consistency with 

applicable guiding/controlling documents. Based on those findings, a recommendation will be 

made as to whether or not the process upon which the non-confirmation decision was made was 

appropriate. 

Scope of Work 

The assessment shall be focused in the following three areas: 

1. The justification and process for cancelling GEMS 

2. The cost to fmish GEMS versus cost to terminate GEMS and store any incomplete or 

prototype hardware 

3. The impact of cancellation on future NASA launch costs 

This assessment is not intended to reproduce the technicallcostlschedule/risk analysis already 

performed by the Mission Directorate, Astrophysics Division, Explorers Program Office at 

GSFC, GEMS project, or independent assessment panels i.e. SRB and Aerospace Corp. Rather, 

it is to review and assess the existing data for consistency and compliance to applicable 

Government requirements for non-confirming the project. In essence, this assessment will 

attempt to answer the question, "were the data that would have been required to make the nonconfirination decision available to the decision makers at the time of the Science Mission 

Directorate's Program Management Council." The assessment will consider the cost to finish 

GEMS versus the cost to terminate the project and to subsequently store incomplete hardware, 

prototypes, and other related equipment. This will include reviewing the impacts and plans for 
Office of Evaluation 

GEMS Non-Confirm Assessment 

storage and/or reuse of residual hardware, to the extent that such hardware exists, as a result of 

non-confirmation; 

Approach 

The assessment panel will review SMD's non-confmnationjustification and supporting 

documentation to determine the level of consistency between the stated non-confirmation 

rational and supporting detail. The assessment panel will also review the process for nonconfirming an Explorer SMEX program taking into account the Announcement of Opportunity 

for Small Explorers (SMEX) issued September 28, 2007, SMD processes, and Government 

requirements. 

4 

The assessment panel will document the estimated costs to complete GEMS using the 

independent review team results (SRB) and compare the difference between continuation costs 

versus estimated termination liability costs. Termiuation liability costs include cost for 

terminating contracts and storing residUa! hardware as a result of non-confmning GEMS. The 

assessment panel will also review plans for reuse of the GEMS hardware to the maximum extent 

practical. 

The assessment panel will work with the NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) to assess 

potential impacts of cancelling GEMS on future launch vehicle needs and costs for projected 

NASA missions, especially in the small payloads class. The LSP and the assessment panel will 

use the 2012 Agency Mission Planning Model (AMPM) as a guide for projected future NASA 

missions that would use a launch vehicle of the capability necessary to launch GEMS. LSP will 

be tasked to provide any additional launch vehicle projected needs not covered in the 2012 

AMPM that are relevant due to the non-confirmation of GEMS. LSP will also be tasked to 

provide any documented launch vehicle provider on and off ramp projections that could be 

impacted by a non-confirmation of GEMS. 

The mechanics of conducting the evaluation will be conducted as follows: 

• Collect and organize all applicable existing program/project data; may be done with the 

assistance of the IPAO/CAD 

• The assessment panel will review and evaluate the existing program/project data 

• The Assessment panel will hold face-to-face meetings with the Science Mission 

Directorate, the Explorer Program, the GEMS project, and the SRB, as necessary. These 

meetings are for the purpose of ensuring that all pertinent existing data is available to the 

review team and for getting answers to clarifying questions. [NOTE: only existing 

GEMS data should be used for the GEMS specific portion of the review since this is a 

process-centered assessment.] 
Office of Evaluation 

GEMS Non-Confirm Assessment 

5 

• The assessment panel team develops a summary package to include as a minimum a 

presentation of their fmdings, recommendations and open questions with a corresponding 

white paper, if necessary, for explanatory/clarification purposes 

• Hold a face-to-face debriefmg meeting with SMD, the Explorer Program, and the GEMS 

project and its SRB. Attendance wiIl be limited to those organizations that provided data 

to the assessment pane\. The assessment panel wiIl caucus afterwards to discuss and to 

amend their findings and recommendations, if necessary, based on these debriefs 

• The assessment panel presents their findings and recommendations to the Associate 

Administrator and to the Chief of Staff 

Resources Required (personnel, contractors, funds, material) 

Panel Members: 

OoE: 

Chair: 

·OCE: 

Helen Grant (assessment oversight) 

Thomas Irvine 

Sandra Smalley 

HEOMD Budget Office: Nancy HammeIl 

LaRC: Frank Peri 

OSMA: Deirdre Healey 

OCS: Gale AIlen 

Supporting members: 

IP AO/CAD: Rick Greathouse (initial data coIlection and independent process assessment 

monitoring) 

LSP: Jim Nelson, Anne Sweet, Amanda Mitskevich (for assessment of the impact of 

canceIlation on future NASA launch costs) 

No contractor personnel are required to support the panel; no funds or materials wiIl be 

required 

Other Factors to consider 

GEMS launch vehicle procurement was active at the time of the SMD non-confirmation 

decision. This procurement activity is on hold, but not canceIled. Accordingly, all launch 

vehicle related discussions and documentation pertaining specifically to a potential GEMS 

launch vehicle wiIl be treated as procurement sensitive. 

Final Report 

PPT presentation with supporting white paper for clarification purposes, if needed 
Report Out 

Office of Evaluation 

GEMS Non-Confirm Assessment 

Panel reports to the NASA AA and the Agency Chief of Staff 

Timeline of activities 

1. Panel notification and commitment 

2. Data gathering lanalysis 

3. Kick-offmeeting - Assessment panel 

4. SMD, Explorer, GEMS face-to-face mtgs 

5. Brief out to SMD/GEMS/SRB 

6. Report out to AAlCoS 

7/05/12 

7/9112 to 7/13/12 

7/1012012 

7/18/12 -7120112 

7/23/12 

7/24/12 or 7/25/12 

6 
NASA Administrator Bolden 

Letter
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Office of the Administrator 

Washington, DC 20546-0001 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski 

Chairwoman 

June 28, 2012 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 

Science, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairwoman: 

.. 

N~ 

In response to your letter of June 19,2012, regarding NASA's decision to not 

confirm the Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer (GEMS) mission to 

proceed to development, I am writing to inform you that NASA will undertake an 

independent assessment of the decision regarding GEMS. This independent assessment 

will be targeted for completion no later than July 27 and will report to Associate 

Administrator Robert Lightfoot. The independent assessment will evaluate the items 

outlined in your letter. 

I expect the formal charter for the assessment to be finalized in the near future, 

and the chair and team that will support the assessment to be designated in the near 

future as well. I will ensure that this information is provided to you as soon as possible. 

I look forward to working with you on this matter. 

Sincerely, 

Charles F. Bolden, Jr. 

Administrator 
Chairwoman Mikulski

Letter
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII, CHAIRMAN 

THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI, VICE CHAIRMAN 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT 

TOM HARKIN, IOWA 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND 

HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN 

PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS 

TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA 

JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY 

BEN NELSON, NEBRASKA 

MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS 

JON TESTER, MONTANA 

SHERROD BROWN, OHIO 

MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE 

SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE 

LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA 

MARK KIRK, ILLINOIS 

DANIEL COATS,INDIANA 

ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI 

JERRY MORAN, KANSAS 

JOHN HOEVEN, NORTH DAKOTA 

RON JOHNSON, WISCONSIN 

CHARLES J. HOUY, STAFF DIRECTOR 

BRUCE EVANS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR 

The Honorable Charles F. Bolden, Jr. 

Administrator 

cmnitrd ~tatrs ~rnatr COMMITIEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025 

http://appropriations,senate.gov 

June 19,2012 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

300 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20546 

Dear Administrator Bolden: 

I understand that NASA intends to cancel the Gravity and Extreme Magnetism Small 

Explorer (GEMS). Such a cancellation is subject to the notification requirements of section 505 

of Public Law 112-55. This letter is to request an independent analysis of NASA's proposal to 

cancel GEMS. I request you submit this analysis, which should be conducted independent of the 

Science Mission Directorate, along with any request under section 505 to cancel GEMS. 

The analysis, at a minimum, should evaluate: (1) the justification and process for 

cancelling GEMS; (2) the cost to finish GEMS versus cost to terminate and store any incomplete 

hardware or prototypes; and (3) the impact of cancellation on future NASA launch costs. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt response to this request. If you have any 

questions about this request, pl,ease contact Jean Toal Eisen of my staff at (202) 228-3449. 

Barbara A. Mikulski 

Chairwoman 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 

Science and Related Agencies 

,