NUMBER 13-08-114-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ REYNA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 319th District Court 

of Nueces County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

A jury found appellant, Samuel Rodriguez Reyna, guilty of murder. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (West 2003). After finding he had a previous felony 

conviction, the jury assessed punishment at ninety-nine years‘ imprisonment. In eleven 

issues, Reyna argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) 

various witnesses committed aggravated perjury; (3) the testimony of several witnesses 
2

was inadmissible; (4) the State‘s improper investigation denied him due process and a fair 

trial; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial application for writ 

of habeas corpus and his motion to suppress his video-taped statement. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2006, Kimberly Powell, Samuel Reyna, and Ricardo Reyes were 

drinking beer in a vacant lot on Corpus Christi‘s Leopard Street. Paul Licoscos and his 

girlfriend, Debra Oscar, were also drinking beer in the lot. Powell testified that because 

Oscar was intoxicated, Reyna told Licoscos, ― ̳You need to take care of her[.]‘‖ At that 

point, Reyna and Licoscos started fighting, and after Powell broke it up, the two shook 

hands. Afterwards, Powell left to buy more beer. Upon returning, she saw Reyna and 

Licoscos staring at each other. She walked away from them, and when she turned 

around, she ―saw Sammy [Reyna] start stabbing him [Licoscos] in the back.‖ Unable to 

pull Reyna away from Licoscos, Powell ran behind a nearby Shell station and waited for 

Reyna to leave the area. After he left, she checked on Licoscos and then called 9-1-1. 

Powell testified that because she was afraid of Reyna, she told the police that the 

suspect was a ―black man.‖ Later, the police showed her a photo line-up, and she 

identified Reyna as the person who stabbed Licoscos.

On cross-examination, Powell testified that ―[t]here was no lighting‖ at the crime 

scene and that she had been drinking the night of the murder. She stated that when she 

called 9-1-1, she identified the suspect as ―[a] black man with a blue shirt and brown 

 ̳buckles.‘‖ When asked about the weapon, which the killer used to stab Licoscos, she 

testified that even though she could not identify the weapon, she ―could . . . see the 
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weapon.‖

Michelle Robertson arrived at the vacant lot shortly before the stabbing. At some 

point, she saw Reyna with a knife. When the prosecutor asked her, ―[D]id the defendant 

[Reyna] say anything to you after you saw the knife about what he was going to do to Paul 

[Licoscos]?‖, she replied, ―He said he was gonna kill the motherf—.‖ Then, she saw 

Reyna stab Licoscos about six or seven times with the knife. 

Officer Macedonio Rodriguez, the first officer to arrive at the scene, found 

Licoscos‘s body in the vacant lot. He testified that Powell, who did not appear to be 

intoxicated, described the suspect as ―a black male, 38 to 40 years of age, about five foot 

eight; . . . wearing shorts, a jersey, Addida [sic] shoes; and that . . . he used a pair of 

scissors in the assault.‖ 

Officer Crispin Mendez arrived at the scene shortly after Officer Rodriguez. He 

testified that Powell, who was afraid to talk to him, said that a ―black male went after the 

victim with some scissors and began to stab him.‖ She also told him the suspect chased 

her and that she ran across the street because she was afraid of him.

Detective R.L. Garcia, who investigated the murder, testified that Powell gave 

―varying statements about the identity‖ of the suspect. When he spoke to her again, she 

said the suspect‘s name was ―Samuel Rodriguez‖ and that she initially lied about the 

suspect‘s identity because she ―was a street person that was scared of the suspect.‖ 

When Detective Garcia showed her the photo line-up, she identified suspect number five, 

who is ―Samuel Rodriguez Reyna.‖
4

Detective T.K. Revis testified that after the murder, Powell gave him a statement in 

which she lied about the suspect‘s age, clothing, and race. Later, however, she told him 

she had lied about the suspect‘s description because ―she was scared of retaliation from 

Mr. Reyna.‖ She gave Detective Revis another statement in which she identified Samuel 

Reyna as the murderer. Detective Revis also testified that Powell identified Reyna from 

a photo line-up. He had no information that either Debra Oscar or Ricardo Reyes were 

involved in the murder.

In the morning following the murder, Officer Kevin Felt was on patrol and saw 

Reyna standing on a sidewalk near Omaha Street. Officer Felt pulled up next to him and 

asked him his name. Reyna identified himself, walked up to Officer Felt‘s squad car, and 

said, ― ̳I‘m Samuel Reyna. I hear you‘re looking for me.‘‖ He asked Reyna if he had any 

weapons and then tried to pat him down. At that point, Reyna reached into his right front 

pocket, and Officer Felt ―grabbed [Reyna‘s] hand, and removed with his hand a knife‖ 

from Reyna‘s pocket. Officer Felt described the knife as a ―[b]lack folding knife, probably 

around three inches long.‖ He put Reyna in the back seat of his squad car and notified 

Detective Garcia, who came to the scene and identified himself to Reyna. Detective 

Garcia testified that Reyna asked him, ― ̳Do you want to talk to me about the fight or the 

stabbing?‘‖ Reyna agreed to go to the police station and talk to him about the incident.

While at the police station, Detectives Garcia and Revis interviewed Reyna. The 

interview was recorded1and played to the jury during the guilt-innocence phase. The 

videotape showed that Reyna told the detectives he had nothing to say about what 

 

1 During the guilt-innocence phase, the prosecutor introduced the videotape of Reyna‘s interview 

into evidence as State‘s exhibit 103.
5

happened between him and Licoscos. Afterwards, they stopped the interrogation and 

arrested Reyna pursuant to an arrest warrant.

Cynthia Morales, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety 

crime lab, tested a blood sample removed from the blade of the knife that Officer Felt took 

from Reyna‘s pocket. Morales testified the DNA profile from this blood sample was 

consistent with Licoscos‘s DNA profile. She said the DNA profile found on Reyna‘s belt 

was consistent with Licoscos‘s DNA profile. On Reyna‘s shoes, she found a mixture of 

blood consistent with the DNA profiles of Reyna and Licoscos. She said that on one of 

Reyna‘s socks, ―the DNA profile was consistent with a mixture from Samuel Reyna and 

Paul Licoscos.‖

Dr. Rey Fernandez, the pathologist who performed Licoscos‘s autopsy, testified

that Licoscos had four stab wounds on the front chest area and four stab wounds ―at the 

back.‖ He stated, ―These would be the type that I would expect from a sharp-edged 

weapon like a knife.‖ He said the fatal-type wounds punctured Licoscos‘s lungs and 

liver. He testified that the cause of death was ―multiple stab wounds.‖

The defense did not call any witnesses to testify at the guilt-innocence phase. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Sufficiency

In issue one, Reyna contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support 

his conviction. The court of criminal appeals has held that there is no meaningful 

distinction between the legal sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency standard. 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (overruling 
6

Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)); id. at 926 (Cochran, J., 

concurring). Thus, the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard is the ―only standard that 

a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 

support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.‖ Id. at 895; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Therefore, we will review Reyna‘s sufficiency challenge by applying the standard of 

review set out in Jackson. See Pomier v. State, 326 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (applying a single standard of review required 

by Brooks).

1. Standard of Review

―When reviewing a case for legal sufficiency, we view all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Winfrey v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 875, 878–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979)). Accordingly, ―we  ̳determine whether the necessary inferences are 

reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.‘‖ Id. at 879 (quoting Clayton v. State, 

235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 

16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). ―It has been said quite appropriately, that  ̳[t]he appellate 

scales are supposed to be weighted in favor of upholding a trial court‘s judgment of 

conviction, and this weighting includes, for example, the highly deferential standard of 

review for legal-sufficiency claims.‘‖ Id. (quoting Haynes v. State, 273 S.W.3d 183, 195 
7

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Keller J., dissenting) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). ―We 

must therefore determine whether the evidence presented to the jury, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant‖ 

committed the crime for which the jury found him guilty. See id. ―It is the obligation and 

responsibility of appellate courts  ̳to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports 

a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.‘‖ Id. at 882 

(quoting Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In addition, 

― ̳[i]f the evidence at trial raises only a suspicion of guilt, even a strong one, then that 

evidence is insufficient [to convict].‘‖ Id. (quoting Urbano v. State, 837 S.W.2d 114, 116 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), superseded in part on other grounds, Herrin v. State, 125 

S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

2. Applicable Law and Analysis

A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the 

death of another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). In this case, the medical 

evidence showed Licoscos died from multiple stab wounds. These wounds were the 

type produced by a sharp-edged weapon like a knife. Both Powell and Robertson saw 

Reyna stab Licoscos several times, and Robertson saw that Reyna used a knife to stab 

him. In the morning following Licoscos‘s murder, a knife was taken from Reyna‘s pocket. 

Its blade tested positive for blood, and the DNA profile from this blood was consistent with 

Licoscos‘s DNA profile.

Even though Powell initially lied to the 9-1-1 operator and to the police about the 

suspect‘s identity, an appellate court must be ―deferential to the jury‘s determination of 
8

witness credibility. . . .‖ Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

―What weight to give contradictory testimonial evidence is within the sole province of the 

jury, because it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.‖ Id. at 408–09. The 

jury could have reasonably chosen to disbelieve Powell‘s statements to the police that the 

suspect was a black man who used scissors to stab the victim and to believe her

testimony at trial that she had seen Reyna stab Licoscos. See id. In addition, the 

evidence showed that Reyna left the crime scene after stabbing Licoscos. ―Evidence of 

flight is admissible as a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.‖ 

Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Thus, the jury could 

reasonably have considered Reyna‘s flight as incriminating circumstantial evidence.

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury‘s finding that Reyna intentionally or 

knowingly caused the death of Paul Licoscos. Accordingly, we overrule the first issue.

B. Alleged Perjured Testimony

In issues two through five, Reyna contends Kimberly Powell, Michelle Robertson, 

Detective Revis, and Detective Garcia committed aggravated perjury while testifying 

during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure governs preservation of error, and states, in part:

(a) In General.–As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate 

review, the record must show that:

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, 

objection, or motion that:

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party 

sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make 
9

the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific 

grounds were apparent from the context;

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

This rule encompasses the concept of ―party responsibility.‖ Reyna v. State, 168 

S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In other words, ―[t]he complaining party bears 

the responsibility of clearly conveying to the trial judge the particular complaint, including 

the precise and proper application of the law as well as the underlying rationale.‖ Id. at 

177. ―To avoid forfeiting a complaint on appeal, the party must  ̳let the trial judge know 

what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge 

to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about 

it.‘‖ Pena v State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. 

State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). This method gives the trial court 

and the opposing party a chance to correct the error. Id. ―Whether a party‘s particular 

complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal comports with the 

complaint made at trial. In making this determination, we consider the context in which 

the complaint was made and the parties‘ shared understanding at that time.‖ Id. 

(footnote omitted).

During the time that these four witnesses testified, defense counsel made no 

objections that any part of their testimony constituted either perjury or aggravated perjury. 

Consequently, the complaints are not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1. In addition, there is no evidence in the record to show that these four witnesses 

were lying. Issues two through five are overruled.
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C. Admission of Testimony Under Rule 609(a)

In issues six and eight, Reyna contends that the testimony of Michelle Robertson 

and Kimberly Powell was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 609(a). Rule 

609(a) allows a person to impeach a witness‘s credibility with evidence of the witness‘s 

conviction for a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude. See TEX. R. EVID. 609(a). 

Robertson testified she was presently on felony probation for possession of a controlled 

substance and tampering with evidence. She had three prior felony convictions in 

Louisiana that included ―two drug charges and one damaging government property.‖ On 

cross-examination, she stated she had been ―charged with prohibited substance in a 

correctional facility‖ and that she had also been ―charged‖ with two counts of prostitution.

Nothing in the record indicates defense counsel was prevented from impeaching 

Robertson‘s credibility with either her prior felony convictions or any other charges that 

were brought against her. In addition, nothing in the record indicates defense counsel 

was prevented from impeaching Powell‘s credibility with any prior conviction that she may 

have had. Thus, there was no violation of rule 609(a). Issues six and eight are 

overruled.

D. Admission of Testimony Under Rule 613(b)

In issue seven, Reyna contends Michelle Robertson‘s testimony was inadmissible 

under Texas Rule of Evidence 613(b). ―Rule of Evidence 613(b), which creates an 

exception to Rule 608(b),[2] provides that a witness may be impeached by using extrinsic 

evidence to show bias or interest.‖ Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 40 (Tex. Crim. 

 

2

―Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that a witness‘s credibility may not be impeached with specific 

instances of the witness‘s conduct other than a criminal conviction as provided in rule 609(a).‖ Billodeau v. 

State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 39–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 608(b)).
11

App. 2009). Specifically, this rule provides:

In impeaching a witness by proof of circumstances or statements showing 

bias or interest on the part of such witness, and before further 

cross-examination concerning, or extrinsic evidence of, such bias or 

interest may be allowed, the circumstances supporting such claim or the 

details of such statement, including the contents and where, when and to 

whom made, must be made known to the witness, and the witness must be 

given an opportunity to explain or to deny such circumstances or statement. 

If written, the writing need not be shown to the witness at that time, but on 

request the same shall be shown to opposing counsel. If the witness 

unequivocally admits such bias or interest, extrinsic evidence of same shall 

not be admitted. A party shall be permitted to present evidence rebutting 

any evidence impeaching one of said party‘s witnesses on grounds of bias 

or interest.

TEX. R. EVID. 613(b).

Nothing in this record shows that defense counsel was prevented from impeaching 

Robertson by use of extrinsic evidence to show her bias or interest. Defense counsel 

was allowed to cross-examine her concerning whether she entered into a plea agreement 

with the State in exchange for her testimony against Reyna. We hold there was no 

violation of rule 613(b). Issue seven is overruled.

E. Improper Investigation

In issue nine, Reyna contends that the State‘s ―improper investigation‖ denied him 

due process and a fair trial. He calls our attention to articles 2.01 and 2.03(b) of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 2.01 states, in relevant part: ―It shall be the 

primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, . . . not to convict, but to see that justice is done. 

They shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence 

of the accused.‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (West 2005). Article 2.03(b) 

states, in relevant part: ―It is the duty of the trial court, the attorney representing the 
12

accused, the attorney representing the state and all peace officers to so conduct 

themselves as to insure a fair trial for both the state and the defendant, not impair the 

presumption of innocence, . . . .‖ Id. § 2.03(b). Reyna argues the State failed to call 

Debra Oscar and Ricardo Reyes to testify at an examining trial and at the guilt-innocence 

phase of his trial.

We note that defense counsel did not object to the State‘s failure to call either 

Oscar or Reyes as witnesses. Thus, the complaint is not preserved for appellate review. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that Oscar and Reyes 

were present in the vacant lot before, during, and after Licoscos‘s murder. Even though 

the appellate record does not indicate why the State did not call them to testify, Kimberly 

Powell testified Reyes was ―passed out drunk‖ and was not involved in the fight between 

Reyna and Licoscos. Officer Rodriguez, while at the crime scene, contacted Oscar and 

Reyes. He stated that Oscar ―was passed out[,]‖ and Reyes ―was very, very intoxicated‖ 

and ―had no clue what was going on.‖

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the prosecution may have determined that 

because of their intoxication, Oscar and Reyes were incapable of testifying about the 

events surrounding Licoscos‘s murder. Consequently, neither would have any 

information establishing Reyna‘s innocence. The State‘s failure to call them as 

witnesses could not have constituted suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses 

by the State. In addition, there is no evidence to show that the State secreted these 

witnesses or suppressed any facts. We hold there is no violation of articles 2.01 or 

2.03(b). Issue nine is overruled.
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F. Denial of Pretrial Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus

In issue ten, Reyna contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

amended application for writ of habeas corpus. 

1. Background

On August 28, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on Reyna‘s pro se, pretrial 

amended application for writ of habeas corpus. During the hearing, Reyna told the trial 

court that he was ―claiming three grounds‖ for relief. First, he complained he did not 

receive an examining trial. Second, he complained he was not served with a certified 

copy of the indictment.3 And, third, he complained that on March 29, 2007, he filed a pro 

se, pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, ―and the State failed to exercise its due 

diligence and issue a process writ of habeas corpus, setting an immediate speedy 

hearing on the merits and rule on the writ. . . .‖ After hearing Reyna‘s complaints, the trial 

court denied relief.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a writ of habeas corpus for an 

abuse of discretion. Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); 

Jaime v. State, 81 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. ref‘d). To prevail on 

a writ of habeas corpus, the proponent must prove the allegations by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Ex parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, 

no pet.); see Ex parte Thomas, 906 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

 

3

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 25.01, 25.02 (West 2009) (requiring that the accused in 

every felony case be served with a certified copy of the indictment).
14

An accused ―may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus only in very limited 

circumstances.‖ Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Ex 

parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The accused may: (1) 

―challenge the State‘s power to restrain him at all;‖ (2) ―challenge the manner of his 

pretrial restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions attached to bail;‖ and (3) ―raise certain 

issues which, if meritorious, would bar prosecution or conviction.‖ Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 

801. A pretrial writ of habeas corpus may also be used ―to challenge the jurisdiction of 

the court if the face of the indictment shows that any prosecution is barred by the statute 

of limitations.‖ Id. at 802. ―[A] pretrial writ application is not appropriate when resolution 

of the question presented, even if resolved in favor of the applicant, would not result in 

immediate release.‖ Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619.

3. Analysis

With respect to Reyna‘s complaint that he was not served with a certified copy of 

the indictment, we note that on December 7, 2006, the trial court held an arraignment 

during which the presiding judge asked Reyna, ―Have you received a copy of the 

indictment that was filed against you?‖ To this, Reyna said, ―Yes, Your Honor. On 

November the 30th.‖ The judge read the indictment to Reyna and then asked him if he 

understood ―what the State is accusing you of?‖ Reyna replied in the affirmative and 

pleaded ―[n]ot guilty[.]‖ Reyna did not inform the trial court that the copy of the indictment 

was not certified. Furthermore, he does not show that the purported failure to serve him 

with a certified copy of the indictment ―would have resulted in his immediate release.‖ 

See id.
15

Concerning his failure to receive an examining trial, the code of criminal procedure 

provides, in relevant part: ―The accused in any felony case shall have the right to an 

examining trial before indictment. . . .‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 16.01 (West 

2005) (emphasis added). At the time the trial court heard Reyna‘s amended application 

for writ of habeas corpus, he had already been indicted and, therefore, no longer had ―a 

right‖ to an examining trial. See id.

With regard to Reyna‘s original application for writ of habeas corpus, the record 

does not show why he did not receive an ―immediate speedy hearing‖ or a ruling on the 

merits. However, even if all three grounds for relief (i.e., those grounds for relief that he 

raised at the hearing on his amended application for writ of habeas corpus) were resolved 

in his favor, he does not show how any of these grounds for relief would have either 

resulted in his immediate release or would have barred the prosecution against him. 

See Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 801; Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619. We therefore hold the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. Issue ten is overruled.

G. Motion to Suppress

In issue eleven, Reyna contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion to suppress.

1. Standard of Review

In reviewing the trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated 

standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 

(citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Appellate courts 
16

―should afford almost total deference to a trial court‘s determination of the historical facts 

that the record supports especially when the trial court‘s fact findings are based on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor.‖ Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997). We ―afford the same amount of deference to trial courts‘ rulings on 

 ̳application of law to fact questions,‘ also known as  ̳mixed questions of law and fact,‘ if 

the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor.‖ Id. ―We conduct a de novo review of evidence when the resolution of 

mixed questions of law and fact do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.‖ 

St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). We review the trial 

court‘s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). ―We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s 

conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement.‖ Id. We will sustain the trial court‘s ruling if the ruling ―is reasonably 

supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.‖ Id. 

(citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). The ―deferential 

standard of review in Guzman also applies to a trial court‘s determination of historical 

facts when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence 

at a suppression hearing.‖ Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007).

When a trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine ―whether the evidence 

(viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s ruling) supports these fact findings.‖ 

State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then review ―the trial 
17

court‘s legal ruling de novo unless the trial court‘s supported-by-the-record explicit fact 

findings are also dispositive of the legal ruling.‖ Id. 

2. The Suppression Hearing

During the suppression hearing, Reyna sought to suppress all statements that he 

made to the police on the grounds he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

waive his rights under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Reyna did 

not testify at the suppression hearing, and the defense did not call any witnesses to testify 

on his behalf.

a. Reyna’s Video-taped Statement

In the afternoon following Licoscos‘s murder, Reyna gave a video-taped statement 

to Detectives Garcia and Revis. A videotape of the statement was played for the trial 

court during the suppression hearing. It showed that before the detectives began 

interrogating Reyna, Detective Revis gave him a preprinted form that contained the 

warnings4required by article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Detective 

Revis read the warnings to Reyna, and after reading each warning, he asked Reyna if he 

understood that particular warning. Reyna answered in the affirmative each time 

Detective Revis asked him if he understood the particular waning, and Reyna wrote his 

initials next to each of these warnings. After Detective Revis finished reading the 

 

4

The warnings contained on the preprinted form are as follows: (1) ―You have the right to remain 

silent and not make any statement at all;‖ (2) ―Any statement you make may be used as evidence against 

you in court;‖ (3) ―You have the right to have a lawyer present to advise you prior to and during any 

questioning;‖ (4) ―If you are unable to employ a lawyer, you have the right to have a lawyer appointed to 

advise you prior to and during any questioning;― and (5) ―You have the right to terminate the interview at any 

time.‖ 
18

warnings to Reyna, he asked Reyna two separate questions:5 ―Do you understand 

these rights?‖ and ―Do you understand that you are being video recorded?‖ In response 

to each question, Reyna stated that he understood, and he wrote his initials next to each 

question. Afterwards, the detectives began interrogating him about the murder. The 

videotape showed that Reyna did not ask for a lawyer and that he did not ask to terminate 

the interview.

b. Detective Garcia’s Testimony

In the morning following Licoscos‘s murder, Officer Felts notified Detective Garcia 

that he had placed Reyna in the back seat of his patrol car. Detective Garcia went to that 

location and asked Reyna if he wanted to talk to him at the police station. Reyna agreed 

to go to the police station. Reyna was taken to the station, where he gave his 

video-taped statement. Detective Garcia testified that before they began the 

interrogation, Detective Revis gave Reyna the preprinted form6and read the warnings to 

him. Detective Garcia stated that Reyna understood his rights and that Reyna wrote his 

initials next to each right, indicating he understood them. At the bottom of the preprinted 

form above the signature line appeared the following paragraph: ―I HAVE KNOWINGLY, 

INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED THE RIGHTS LISTED ABOVE AND I 

HAVE NOT BEEN COERCED, PROMISED ANYTHING, OR THREATENED BY 

ANYONE TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT.‖ The videotape showed that neither detective 

read that statement to Reyna prior to beginning the interrogation. Furthermore, 

 

5

These two questions appear on the preprinted form immediately below the five warnings.

6 During the suppression hearing, the trial court admitted the preprinted form into evidence as 

State‘s exhibit 1.
19

Detective Garcia testified the aforementioned statement was never read to Reyna, and 

Reyna‘s initials do not appear next to it.

Detective Garcia stated Reyna did not ask for a lawyer and that he did not ask to 

terminate the interview. In addition, Detective Garcia testified he neither intimidated nor 

threatened Reyna. When the prosecutor asked Detective Garcia, ―He [Reyna] did give a 

statement on that video that he thoroughly understood his Miranda warnings, correct?‖, 

he said, ―That‘s correct.‖ Next, the prosecutor asked him, ―And that he [Reyna] waived 

them[?]‖, he said, ―Yes, sir.‖

Detective Revis testified he read the warnings on the preprinted form to Reyna, 

who placed his initials at the left of each warning. He testified Reyna gave no ―indication

that he was being forced to comply‖ or that ―this was involuntary.‖ Reyna never told 

Detective Revis that ―he was being threatened[.]‖ He testified he was in the process of 

obtaining Reyna‘s arrest warrant ―at or around the time‖ Reyna ―made contact with Officer 

Felt‖ and ―being taken to the [police] station . . . .‖ Detective Revis testified Reyna gave 

no ―indication that the statement he was making was in any way involuntary[.]‖

After hearing the testimony and arguments from both sides, the trial court denied 

the motion to suppress. We set out in full the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions 

of law as follows:

The Court makes the following findings of fact:

1. The Defendant voluntarily accompanied Detective R.L. Garcia to the 

police department.

2. The Defendant was told that he was free to leave.

3. The Defendant never requested to leave.
20

4. Detective TK Revis informed the defendant he had a right to remain silent 

and not make any statement, that any statement made could be used as 

evidence against him in court, that he had the right to hire a lawyer and have 

a lawyer present prior and during any questioning, that he could have an 

appointed lawyer if he could not afford one, and that he could terminate the 

interview at any time.

5. The defendant acknowledged his rights by placing his initials on the 

rights sheet.

6. The defendant acknowledged on the sheet that he understood his rights 

and knew he was being video recorded.

7. The Defendant did not ask for a lawyer.

8. The Defendant was not threatened or intimidated.

The Court makes the following conclusions of law:

1. The Defendant was not under arrest at the time his statement was given. 

2. The Defendant was informed of his rights under Miranda and Texas Code 

of Criminal Procedure, article 38.22.

3. The Defendant‘s statement was voluntarily given.

3. Applicable Law and Analysis

a. Whether Detectives Garcia and Revis Engaged in Overreaching

A confession is involuntary under the Due Process Clause ―only if there was 

official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was 

unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its 

maker.‖ Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Statements 

that courts have found involuntary under the Due Process Clause involve the crucial 

element of police overreaching and involve fact scenarios in which the suspect was 

subjected to threats, physical abuse, or extended periods of interrogation without rest or 
21

nourishment. See Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 170–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 

(collecting cases). Absent coercive police activity, a statement is not involuntary within 

the meaning of the Due Process Clause even if it was not the product of a meaningful 

choice by its maker. Id. at 170 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986)).

Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is likewise aimed at 

protecting a suspect from police overreaching. Id. at 172. Specifically, article 38.22, 

section 6 provides that only voluntary statements may be admitted in evidence. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 6 (West 2005). This statute works in tandem 

with article 38.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that an 

accused's statement may be used in evidence against him ―if it appears that the same 

was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion.‖ Id. § 38.21. Claims 

of involuntariness under these statutes can be, but need not be, predicated on police 

overreaching of the sort required under due-process analysis. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d 

at 172. Under articles 38.21 and section 6 of article 38.22, we may consider, in addition 

to any allegedly coercive police conduct, factors such as the suspect's youth, intoxication, 

mental retardation, or other disability that would not raise a federal due-process claim. 

Id. at 172–73.

― ̳Voluntariness' under both constitutional and state law doctrines is to be 

measured according to the totality of the circumstances.‖ Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 

417, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

trial court's finding, we find nothing in this record that could reasonably be considered 

police overreaching of the sort that would render a statement involuntary in either the due 
22

process or the statutory sense. Therefore, we hold that Reyna's video-taped statement 

was not the product of police overreaching. See Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170, 

172–73.

b. Whether Reyna Knowingly, Intelligently, and Voluntarily Waived His 

Rights

Article 38.22 ―prohibits the use of oral statements made as a result of custodial 

interrogation unless, inter alia, an electronic recording is made of the statement, Miranda

warnings are given, and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any 

rights set out in the warnings.‖ Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 583 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §

3(a)(1)–(2) (West 2005).7 An inquiry into the waiver of Miranda rights has two distinct 

dimensions. Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing 

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987)). First, the waiver must be ― ̳voluntary in 

the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, 

coercion, or deception.‘‖ Id. (quoting Spring, 479 U.S. at 573). Second, the suspect 

must have made the waiver ― ̳with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‘‖ Id. (quoting Spring,

479 U.S. at 573). The ―Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and 

 

7

Article 38.22 § 2(a) requires that an accused receive the following warnings: (1) ―he has the right 

to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against 

him at his trial;‖ (2) ―any statements he makes may be used against him in court;‖ (3) ―he has the right to 

have a lawyer present to advise him before and during the questioning;‖ (4) ―if he is unable to employ a 

lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning;‖ and 

(5) ―he has the right to terminate the interview at any time[.]‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a) 

(West 2005). Article 38.22 § 3 ―categorically provides,  ̳No oral or sign language statement of an accused 

made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding 

unless‘ the five statutory conditions are met.‖ Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)). Article 38.22 § 3(a)(2) requires that an oral 

statement resulting from custodial interrogation must contain a warning informing the accused of his or her 

rights, and that there be a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. 
23

understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.‖ 

Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. It is enough that a ―suspect knows that he may choose not to 

talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking 

at any time.‖ Id.

Under articles 38.21 and 38.22 and their predecessors, fact scenarios that have 

raised a state-law claim of involuntariness include the following: (1) the suspect was ill 

and on medication and that fact may have rendered his confession involuntary; (2) the 

suspect was mentally retarded and may not have knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 

waived his rights; (3) the suspect lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights; (4) 

the suspect was intoxicated, and ―did not know what he was signing‖; (5) the suspect was 

confronted by the brother-in-law of his murder victim and beaten; and (6) ―the suspect 

was returned to the store he broke into  ̳for questioning by several‘‖ armed persons. 

Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172–73. As the sole judge of the credibility of the evidence 

and witnesses, the trial court had the discretion to believe the testimony of Detectives 

Garcia and Revis that Reyna understood his rights. The testimony and the videotape 

established that: (1) before Reyna made his statement, Detective Revis gave him the 

article 38.22 warnings on a pre-printed form; (2) Detective Revis read the warnings to 

him; and (3) Reyna indicated to Detectives Garcia and Revis that he understood his 

rights.

The videotape also showed Reyna: (1) was coherent; (2) understood what 

Detective Revis was saying to him; (3) was thinking clearly; (4) was calm and cooperative, 

not sleepy or confused; (5) never asked to speak with an attorney; and (6) never asked to 
24

terminate the interview. Moreover, the evidence does not show that Reyna could not 

understand his rights because he was ill or on medication, mentally disabled, lacked the 

mental capacity to understand his rights, intoxicated, or under the influence of drugs. 

Thus, nothing in the videotape showed that Reyna did not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waive his rights. The videotape presents indisputable visual evidence 

supporting the testimony of Detectives Garcia and Revis.

Accordingly, Reyna‘s contention that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waive his rights is not supported by the evidence. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in concluding that Reyna‘s video-taped statement was voluntarily 

given.

c. Did Reyna Implicitly or Expressly Waive His Rights?

It is undisputed that Reyna failed to expressly waive his rights. The waiver of 

rights discussed in article 38.22 § 3(a)(2)8―may be inferred from the actions and words of 

the person interrogated.‖ Barfield v. State, 784 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), 

overruled on other grounds, Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

―A waiver may be found in an express written or oral statement or, in at least some cases, 

may be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.‖ Mays v. State, 

726 S.W.2d 937, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). As the court of criminal appeals stated in 

Barfield, ―[w]e do not . . . interpret the oral confession statute to require an express verbal 

statement from an accused that he waives his rights prior to giving the statement.‖ 

Barfield, 784 S.W.2d at 40–41. ―In reaching the voluntariness of a confession,‖ we look 

 

8

Article 38.22, section 3(a)(2) states, ―prior to the statement but during the recording the accused 

is given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning[.]‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a)(2).
25

―at the totality of circumstances.‖ Id. at 41; see also Berry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 463, 465 

(Tex. Crim. App. (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). Examining the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding Reyna‘s video-taped statement, we note that before he made this statement, 

Detective Revis read him the warnings from the preprinted form and that Reyna told him 

and Detective Garcia he understood each warning. After Detective Revis read him the 

warnings, Reyna began to answer the detectives‘ questions. He did not ask to terminate 

the interview, did not ask for an attorney, and did not ask to leave. Thus, we conclude 

that Reyna implicitly waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily as required 

by article 38.22. See Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that defendant validly waived 

his rights when he understood his rights and proceeded to answer questions); Hargrove 

v. State, 162 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd) (finding 

accused validly waived rights despite lack of explicit waiver); State v. Oliver, 29 S.W.3d 

190, 193 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref'd) (finding that, despite lack of explicit 

waiver, accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made a statement after reading 

his rights, indicating he understood them, and proceeding without hesitation to discuss 

circumstances surrounding the murder). Such an implicit waiver is valid under article 

38.22 and under the United States and Texas Constitutions. Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 

583–84. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding he validly waived his 

legal rights prior to giving his video-taped statement. Therefore, we hold the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. Issue eleven is overruled.
26

III. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

In his supplemental brief, Reyna contends the police did not have probable cause 

to arrest him. We disagree.

Detectives Garcia and Revis arrested Reyna pursuant to an arrest warrant. 

When reviewing a magistrate‘s decision to issue an arrest warrant, we apply a highly 

deferential standard in keeping with the constitutional preference for a warrant. 

Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 59–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 

143 S.W.3d 808, 810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Consequently, a reviewing court 

should not invalidate a warrant by interpreting the affidavit or complaint in a hyper 

technical manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 

59. Instead, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the 

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to support 

the issuance of the warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 

362–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

An arrest warrant must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to support 

an independent judgment that probable cause existed for the warrant. McFarland v. 

State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by 

Mosely v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The sufficiency of an 

affidavit for an arrest warrant is limited to the four corners of the affidavit, viewing the 

affidavit in a common sense and realistic manner, and recognizing the magistrate‘s 

discretion to draw reasonable inferences. See Moss v. State, 75 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref‘d); see also Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61; Davis v. 
27

State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Probable cause requires the affiant to demonstrate that there is a probability that 

the accused committed an offense, not that the evidence proves the suspect‘s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Moss, 75 S.W.3d at 140. Two of the circumstances 

considered when the affiant relies on an informant‘s representations include the 

informant‘s reliability or veracity and the basis of the informant‘s knowledge. See Gates, 

462 U.S. at 233; State v. Ozuna, 88 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. 

ref‘d); Martin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref‘d). The 

validity of the affidavit does not require proof of both, and a deficiency in one may be 

offset by a strong showing of the other. Martin, 67 S.W.3d at 344.

Moreover, as long as the affidavit sets forth the affiant‘s belief that the informant 

was credible or that his or her information was reliable, the affidavit need not disclose the 

affiant‘s personal observations. Ozuna, 88 S.W.3d at 310. The trial court considers 

several factors in determining the informant‘s credibility: (1) whether the informant 

presented first-hand observations; (2) the degree of detail provided by the informant; (3) 

whether reasonable corroboration of the informant‘s statement existed; and (4) whether 

the informant testified at the probable-cause hearing. Id. at 311.

In this case, the affiant, Officer T.K. Revis, stated in his affidavit, in relevant part, 

that he had probable cause to believe that Reyna committed the offense of murder based 

upon:

1.) Offense report 06-043709, dated 07-25-06, written by Sgt. M. Rodriguez 

#1074, CCPD. Report indicates that at 1:42 a.m. he responded to the 

1600 block of Leopard for a stabbing. He was flagged down by Kimberly 

Powell in front of 1608 Leopard Street, Corpus Christi, Nueces County, 
28

Texas. Powell advised that the stabbing victim was laying in the vacant lot 

next to the building and directed him there. Sgt. Rodriguez found the

victim, later identified as Paul Licoscos had been stabbed several times and 

did not appear to be breathing. EMS arrived and found that the victim had 

no pulse. Powell advised that she was with Licoscos, Debra Oscar, 

Ricardo Reyes and a black male. That they were all drinking beer there in 

the vacant lot. Before midnight Paul and the black male got into a fist fight 

over the black male accusing Paul of not taking care of his girlfriend [Debra 

Oscar]. They shook hands and everything was fine. At about 1:20 a.m. 

she [Powell] was returning from the Shell station and she saw the black 

male stab Paul several times with a pair of scissors. She fled the area 

because the black male was chasing her. Paul Licoscos was transported 

to the Nueces County Morgue by the Medical Examiner transport.

2.) Statement‘s [sic] from Kimberly Powell in which she identifies Samuel 

Reyna, dob 04-21-54 from a 6 photo lineup of men as the man she saw stab 

Paul with the scissors in the back several times and the man she tried to pull 

off of Paul when he was stabbing him.

3.) Statement from Debra Oscar in which she indicates that before midnight 

she was with Paul and a guy she knew as Sam. That they were all 3 

drinking beer up under 286 across from the Shell station. That is the last 

thing that she remembers. She identified Samuel Reyna dob 04-21-54 

from a 6 photo color photo lineup of men as the man she knew as Sam.

4.) Report from Medical Examiner Dr. Fernandez which will indicate that 

Paul Licoscos died as a result of penetrating stab wounds to the torso.

Officer Revis signed this affidavit before a magistrate on July 25, 2006.

After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the magistrate 

had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to support the 

issuance of Reyna‘s arrest warrant. We note that even though Officer Revis does not 

specifically mention anything about Powell‘s reliability or veracity, he does state the basis 

of her knowledge; i.e., he stated she was present at the scene and saw Licoscos get 

stabbed by Reyna. She identified Reyna from a photo lineup as the person she saw stab 

Licoscos several times. In addition, Oscar‘s statement showed that prior to Licoscos‘s 
29

murder, she was with him and a man who she knew as ―Sam.‖ She identified ―Sam‖ from 

a photo lineup as Samuel Reyna.

Moreover, Officer Revis noted that Officer Rodriguez had been ―flagged down‖ by 

Powell, who directed him to the location of Licoscos‘s body. Officer Rodriguez saw that 

Licoscos had been stabbed and did not appear to be breathing. In Davis v. State, the 

court of criminal appeals stated that ―[o]bservations reported to the affiant by other 

officers engaged in the investigation can constitute a reliable basis for issuing a warrant.‖ 

202 S.W.3d 149, 156 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 

U.S. 102, 108–09 (1965)).

Viewing the affidavit in a common sense and realistic manner, and recognizing the 

magistrate‘s discretion to draw reasonable inferences, we conclude the affidavit provided 

the magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that 

probable cause existed to support the issuance of the warrant. The supplemental issue 

is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.

ROSE VELA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 

4th day of August, 2011.