2021 UT 22

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN C. MCQUARRIE,

Appellant,

v.

JANETTE COLLEDGE MCQUARRIE nka JANETTE KENDALL,

Appellee.

No. 20190902-SC

Heard March 5, 2021

Filed June 17, 2021

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake

Honorable Robert P. Faust

No. 084904419

Attorneys:

Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull, James A. McIntyre, Richard R. 

Golden, Salt Lake City, for appellant

David L. Arrington, Douglas B. Thayer, Melinda H. Birrell, Lehi, 

for appellee

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE 

AND JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶1 As a general rule, a stipulated divorce decree is 

interpreted in accordance with the law of contract interpretation—

with the goal of discerning the intentions of the parties, as 

reflected in the ordinary meaning of the terms of the decree as a 

whole. But that general rule is subject to a specific statutory 

exception. If a divorce decree calls for payment of alimony, the 

payment is presumed to terminate upon remarriage of the 

receiving spouse, and the presumption is rebutted only if the 
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Opinion of the Court

2

divorce decree “specifically provides otherwise.” UTAH CODE § 30-

3-5(9) (2015).

¶2 As the district court and the court of appeals in this case 

noted, the divorce decree at issue included provisions that, taken 

as a whole, could be interpreted to suggest that the parties 

contemplated that alimony would continue upon remarriage. But 

that is insufficient. Under the above-quoted statute as interpreted 

in our case law, the presumption that alimony terminates upon 

remarriage is rebutted only by a “specific[]” alimony provision 

that expressly “provides otherwise.” There was no such specific, 

express provision in the decree at issue here. And we reverse the 

decision of the court of appeals on that basis.

I

¶3 Melvin McQuarrie and Janette Colledge McQuarrie (now 

known as Janette Kendall) married in 1980 and divorced in 2008. 

The district court entered a divorce decree detailing the terms of 

their mediated stipulation for divorce.

¶4 Under paragraphs 9 and 10 of the stipulated decree, 

Melvin1 was required to pay alimony to Janette in two phases. 

First, during the period in which Melvin was required to pay 

child support, he was required to make a $2,000 monthly alimony 

payment (subject to cost-of-living increases) “until the first of any 

of the following occurrences: a. [Melvin’s] death; or b. [Janette’s] 

death.” Second, after the child support obligation ended, Melvin 

was required to make an increased alimony payment to Janette 

“until the first of any of the following occurrences: c. [Melvin’s] 

death; d. The expiration of 372 months from the signing of the 

decree of divorce; or e. [Janette’s] death.”

¶5 The alimony provisions of the decree do not explicitly 

address the effect of Janette’s remarriage. But other provisions of 

the decree do refer to the possibility of her remarriage, either 

expressly or by implication.

¶6 In paragraph 11, the decree requires Melvin to pay $1 

million to an annuity underwriter of Janette’s choice, with Janette 

“irrevocably designated as the beneficiary of the annuity during 

her lifetime with the power to designate any blood relative as the 

______________________________________________________________________________

1 We use first names to avoid any confusion. No disrespect is 

intended by the informality.
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Opinion of the Court

3

beneficiary of any death benefit provided by the annuity.” The 

power to designate a beneficiary of a death benefit is expressly 

limited, however. “[I]n the event [Janette] remarries, she may not 

designate her spouse or his children as beneficiaries, even if she 

were to adopt them.” The expressed “intention of the parties” was 

“that the annuity is solely for the benefit of [Janette] and no one 

else.” It was “anticipated that the annuity [would] provide a 

stream of income to [Janette] for her lifetime sufficient to 

supplement what [Melvin] pays as alimony.”

¶7 A footnote to the annuity provision states that Janette is 

“ordered to be responsible for her utilities, maintenance, taxes and 

insurance on the marital home” (which was awarded to Janette) 

after she “is eligible to receive the annuity.” It also provides for a 

meeting, to be held every three years, to allow the parties “to 

review their respective standard of living” and to make any 

necessary “upward” adjustment of “alimony beyond the”

Consumer Price Index. “The standard of living [was] ordered to 

be equal.” And the meeting was aimed at facilitating an exchange 

of information of relevance to the assessment and equalization of 

the parties’ standard of living. Each party was required “to 

update any new documentation to the mediation binder, 

including new property holdings/assets, increased earnings, 

bonuses, and/or royalties, and business to debt ratio.” Melvin and 

Janette were to meet “without spouses or attorneys,” but “if 

necessary,” they could “agree upon a mediator” to be present.

¶8 The decree also makes reference to remarriage in a few 

provisions addressing division of property. It states that Melvin is 

required to “pay the first deed of trust” on the marital home and 

to pay for “utilities, lawn care, snow removal, upkeep, 

maintenance, [and] a housekeeper” for the home, while providing 

that Melvin is relieved of the latter responsibilities (but not the 

payment of the first deed of trust) if Janette remarries. It also 

requires Melvin to purchase or lease a car for Janette every five 

years, but provides that that obligation ceases if Janette remarries. 

And it orders Melvin and Janette to “enter into a prenuptial 

agreement prior to any remarriage,” while prohibiting them from 

divesting assets to future spouses and restraining them from 

disclosing the terms of the decree to such spouses.

¶9 Janette remarried in 2014. Later that year, she filed a 

petition to modify the divorce decree, asserting that Melvin had 

defrauded her in failing to disclose certain assets and 

misrepresenting the value of the marital home. She also filed a 
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4

motion seeking to have Melvin held in contempt for failing to 

make certain payments required under the decree.

¶10 Melvin filed a counter-petition to modify the decree. In 

the counter-petition, Melvin asserted that Janette’s remarriage 

constituted a “substantial and material change in the parties’ 

circumstances” justifying a termination of the alimony obligation. 

Citing Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) (2015), Melvin contended that 

the alimony obligation terminated as a matter of law upon 

Janette’s remarriage because the decree did not “specifically 

provide” that alimony would continue after her remarriage.

¶11 The district court denied both parties’ motions. In 

denying Melvin’s motion, the court considered “all the language

in” the decree and concluded that the alimony provisions “were 

not something that would be terminated or eliminated based 

upon the remarriage” of Janette. And it held that the decree 

“language specifically provides that the alimony/child support 

payments would continue beyond remarriage and were 

structured to provide the appropriate division of the marital 

assets” to Janette.

¶12 Melvin challenged that decision on appeal, again citing 

Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) (2015) and again asserting that his 

alimony obligation terminated because the divorce decree did not 

“specifically provide” that the alimony payment was to continue 

after Janette’s remarriage. The court of appeals affirmed. See 

McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2019 UT App 147, 450 P.3d 1133. It 

acknowledged that “[a]limony is presumed to terminate upon the 

remarriage of the receiving spouse” and noted that this 

presumption “is now codified in” Utah Code section 30-3-5(9)

(2015). Id. ¶ 28 (citation omitted). But it did not elaborate on the 

requirement of a decree provision that “specifically provides” that 

alimony payments are to continue after remarriage. Like the 

district court, it turned instead to the terms of the decree “as a 

whole.” Id. ¶ 31. And it stated that its role was to “ascertain the 

intentions of the parties” to the decree with regard to the payment 

of alimony. Id. ¶ 29 (citation omitted). Citing not just the alimony 

provisions but the terms of other provisions of the divorce decree, 

the court of appeals concluded that the decree “specifically 

provides that alimony would survive Janette’s remarriage.” Id.

¶ 31.

¶13 The court noted that the decree provided that Melvin’s 

obligation to provide a car allowance and to pay certain 

household expenses would terminate upon Janette’s remarriage. 
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Opinion of the Court

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Id. It also credited the footnote calling for a meeting between the 

parties to review their standard of living and make any necessary 

adjustment to alimony payments—noting that that provision 

prohibited the attendance of the parties’ “spouses,” which the 

court viewed as an acknowledgement of the possibility that both 

Melvin and Janette might have remarried at a time when they 

would be meeting to discuss an adjustment to alimony payments.

Id. ¶ 33. And it cited other provisions of the decree referring to the 

possibility of Janette’s remarriage—including the prohibition on 

naming a future spouse as beneficiary of the annuity and the 

requirement that Melvin continue to pay the mortgage on 

Janette’s home even if she were to remarry. Id. ¶ 35.

¶14 As to the alimony provisions themselves, the court of 

appeals noted that they identified Janette’s death, but not her 

remarriage, as an event that would terminate the alimony 

payment. In the court of appeals’ view, these provisions would be 

“meaningless” if they were interpreted to allow for termination of 

alimony upon Janette’s remarriage. Id. ¶ 32.

¶15 On these grounds, the court of appeals concluded that 

“the parties considered Janette’s potential remarriage and 

specifically agreed on how that event would affect their respective 

rights and obligations” under the decree. Id. ¶ 35. It held that “the 

only ‘reasonable’ interpretation” of the decree “as a whole is that 

alimony terminates only as expressly provided”—upon Janette’s 

death, Melvin’s death, or 372 months from the date of execution of 

the decree. Id. The cited “provisions,” in the court’s view, 

“strengthen an inference that the parties intentionally omitted 

remarriage” from the list of events that would terminate Melvin’s 

alimony obligation. Id. ¶ 31. And on that basis, the court of 

appeals held that the decree as a whole “specifically provides” 

that alimony was to continue despite Janette’s remarriage. Id. ¶ 36.

¶16 Melvin filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we 

granted. We review the court of appeals’ decision de novo, 

according no deference to its decision. State v. Lujan, 2020 UT 5, 

¶ 18, 459 P.3d 992.

¶17 We consider first Melvin’s challenge to the court of 

appeals’ determination that the divorce decree “specifically 

provides” for payment of alimony after remarriage. We then take 

up a further request made by Melvin—that we enter an order 

disgorging the alimony payments he has made in the period after 

Janette’s remarriage. We reverse the court of appeals, decline to 
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Opinion of the Court

6

enter an order of disgorgement, and remand to the district court 

for any further proceedings that that court may deem appropriate.

II

¶18 As a general rule, a stipulated divorce decree is 

interpreted as if it were a contract between the parties. Parties to a 

divorce are bound by the terms of their stipulated agreement. See 

Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 378 P.3d 1232; see also

Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984) (parties bound 

by terms of stipulated agreement in property boundary dispute). 

And the court’s goal in interpreting such a document is to credit 

the agreed-upon terms of the stipulation under “established rules 

of contract interpretation.” Thayer, 2016 UT App 146 ¶ 17 (citation 

omitted). In so doing, a court should consider each provision of a 

decree “in relation to all others, with a view toward giving effect 

to all and ignoring none.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶19 We see a basis for the court of appeals’ decision under this 

standard of interpretation. Several of the terms of the divorce 

decree make reference to the possibility of Janette’s remarriage. 

And the alimony provisions themselves list conditions other than 

remarriage (death of one of the parties or expiration of a 372-

month period) as grounds for termination of Melvin’s alimony 

obligation. With this in mind, we can see why the court of appeals 

found a basis for an “inference that the parties intentionally 

omitted remarriage” from the list of events that would terminate 

Melvin’s alimony obligation. By stating that alimony would 

terminate upon Melvin’s or Janette’s death or after a period of 372 

months, it is entirely possible that the parties to the decree were 

contemplating that there were no other events (such as Janette’s 

remarriage) that would cut off the alimony payment.

¶20 This inference, moreover, may be strengthened by other 

provisions of the decree. A key provision, as the court of appeals 

noted, is the footnote calling for a meeting—without “spouses”—

to review the parties’ standard of living and make any necessary

alimony adjustments. That provision implicitly seems to 

contemplate the possibility of an alimony adjustment made after 

Janette remarried, since it prohibits the attendance of “spouses” 

(plural).

¶21 For these reasons, we likely would be affirming the court 

of appeals if we agreed that the effect of remarriage on the 

alimony payment were a matter of discerning the parties’ likely 

intentions as reflected in the terms of the divorce decree 
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Opinion of the Court

7

interpreted as a whole. But that is not the standard. By statute, a 

party’s obligation to make alimony payments is distinct from 

other terms and conditions of a divorce decree. If a decree sets 

forth an obligation to pay alimony, the payment obligation is 

legally presumed to terminate upon remarriage of the receiving 

spouse. See UTAH CODE § 30-3-5(9) (2015). And the presumption is 

rebutted not by a showing of the parties’ contrary intentions as 

evidenced by the terms of the divorce decree as a whole, but by a 

specific proviso to the contrary in a provision addressed to the 

payment of alimony. See id.

¶22 This follows from the governing text of the controlling 

statute. “Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 

otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 

former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or 

death of that former spouse.” Id. The statute prescribes the 

presumptive effect of the terms of an “order of the court that a 

party pay alimony to a former spouse.” Such terms are to be 

interpreted to “automatically terminate[] upon the remarriage or 

death” of the former spouse. This presumption is rebuttable. But 

the rebuttal must be in the manner set forth by statute: The 

“decree of divorce” must “specifically provide[] otherwise.”

¶23 A divorce decree “specifically provides otherwise” only if 

there is a provision that speaks directly to the alimony payment in 

terms that explicitly prescribe a payment obligation that persists 

despite remarriage. This is clear from the language and structure 

of the statute. A divorce decree “specifically” overrides the 

statutory presumption only where it speaks specifically to the 

alimony payment obligation. And it “provides otherwise” only in 

a provision of the decree that contradicts the presumption—in 

stating otherwise (contrary to the statutory presumption) that 

alimony will continue despite remarriage.

¶24 This interpretive standard is reinforced in Utah case law. 

In Lord v. Shaw, we considered a divorce decree stating that 

“alimony [was] to run for a period of three years,” entered under 

a statute essentially identical to the provision at issue here. 682 

P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1984)), (citing UTAH CODE § 30-3-5(2) (Supp. 

1983)), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. Sound Lab, 694 P.2d 

1043 (Utah 1984). After remarriage, the receiving spouse asserted 

a right to continued alimony during the agreed-upon three-year 

period. She contended that the parties understood that alimony 

was to continue “for three years regardless of her marital status.” 

Id. And she asserted that the three-year period was aimed at 
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Opinion of the Court

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“assist[ing] her with her education, which would take three 

years.” Id.

¶25 In Lord we nowhere refuted the receiving spouse’s 

assertions about the parties’ intentions under the divorce decree, 

or denied the inference that could be drawn from the decree’s 

proviso that alimony would continue “for a period of three 

years.” But we noted that the duty to pay alimony is presumed to 

terminate upon remarriage unless the divorce decree “specifically 

provides otherwise.” Id. (citing UTAH CODE § 30-3-5(2) (Supp. 

1983)). And we held that the decree did not “provide for an 

exception to the general rule that alimony terminates upon 

remarriage” because it did not include a specific proviso calling 

for payment of alimony after the receiving spouse’s remarriage. 

Id.

¶26 The divorce decree at issue in this case is admittedly more 

detailed than the one presented in Lord. And in some ways, the 

decree at issue here may provide an even stronger basis for an 

inference that the parties may have contemplated the possibility 

of alimony payments continuing after remarriage of the receiving 

spouse. But the controlling statute does not provide for rebuttal of 

the underlying presumption by inference. It requires a specific 

proviso that alimony continues after remarriage. And the absence 

of such proviso is as controlling here as it was in Lord.

¶27 In so holding, we are not requiring the inclusion of 

talismanic phrases or magic words. We are simply following the 

dictates of the statute as interpreted in the case law. And we are 

accordingly holding that the presumption that alimony terminates 

upon remarriage is not rebutted by inference but only by a 

specific proviso that such payments will continue after the 

receiving party remarries.

¶28 Janette warns of the possibility of a “trap” for the 

“unwary” if “technical” words are required to rebut the statutory 

presumption. And she asserts that there is “no discussion” in the 

legislative history indicating that the legislature “intended” to 

“require elevated precision in language or the placement of such 

language in a dedicated ‘proviso.’”

¶29 We accept some of the threshold premises of Janette’s

arguments. But we do not view them as undermining our 

holding. 

¶30 As to the first point, we again emphasize that the 

governing standard does not require any particular precision or 
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Opinion of the Court

9

use of technical language. It just requires a specific proviso that 

alimony payments are to continue despite remarriage. Perhaps 

some parties to a divorce will be unaware of the governing legal 

standard. But the statute states the governing standard. And the 

public is charged with knowledge of its terms and conditions—

ignorance of the law is no excuse. See In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 

UT 67, ¶ 19 n.3, 356 P.3d 1215.

¶31 On the second point, we concede that the requirement of 

a “dedicated ‘proviso’” is nowhere articulated in the legislative 

history. But “[l]egislative history is not law.” Graves v. N. E. Servs., 

Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 64, 345 P.3d 619. The law is set forth in the 

statutory text that was voted on by the legislature. See id. ¶¶ 64–65 

(stating that the law is the “statutory text” as “duly enacted” by 

the legislature). And we cannot foreclose an interpretation of the 

text on the ground that there is no evidence that it was considered 

openly on the legislative record. Such a decision would invert the 

premises of the legislative process, giving “primacy to legislative 

history, and only secondary significance to the duly enacted 

statute.” Id. ¶ 65 (explaining that this would “turn a core principle 

of statutory construction on its head”).

¶32 Janette’s objections ultimately are matters to be taken up, 

if at all, by the legislature. Perhaps that body could be persuaded 

that the effect of remarriage on an alimony clause should be a 

matter controlled purely by an inquiry into the likely intentions of 

the parties to the divorce decree. And if the legislature so 

concluded, it certainly could amend the operative statute, and 

thereby subject alimony provisions to a contract-based standard 

of interpretation.

¶33 But that is not our law as now written. And we see some 

wisdom in the law as it stands. The statutory presumption is a 

gap-filler. It sets a legal presumption based on an educated guess 

about the likely intentions of the parties to most divorce actions. 

And it facilitates the process of finalizing the divorce decree by 

setting a presumptive rule that remains in place unless expressly 

repudiated.2

______________________________________________________________________________

2 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of 

Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1100–02 (2017) (identifying 

these and other justifications for gap-filling canons of contract 

interpretation).
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¶34 The statutory presumption seems rooted in a fair guess 

about the likely intentions of the parties to most divorce decrees. 

And the standard, as stated in our law, provides a clear 

background rule that parties can negotiate around. If the parties 

wish to depart from the background presumption, they must do 

so explicitly in a proviso stating that alimony payments are to 

continue after remarriage. If they fail to “specifically” so 

“provide,” the statutory presumption is retained.

¶35 We reverse the court of appeals on this basis. The divorce 

decree in this case does not include a specific provision stating 

that alimony is to continue despite remarriage. The alimony 

provision identifies events other than remarriage that will trigger 

the termination of alimony. And that, combined with other 

references to remarriage in the decree, could be viewed to support 

an inference that the parties contemplated that alimony would 

continue despite the receiving spouse’s remarriage. But such an 

inference is insufficient under our law. And we conclude that 

Melvin’s alimony obligation terminated by operation of law 

because the decree did not “specifically provide[] otherwise.”

III

¶36 In addition to seeking reversal of the decision of the court 

of appeals, Melvin asks us to enter an order disgorging the 

alimony payments he has made to Janette after her remarriage. 

We decline to consider the disgorgement question in the absence 

of any analysis of the matter in the proceedings below. Instead, 

we reverse and remand the matter to the district court for any 

further proceedings the district court may deem appropriate.

¶37 In remanding, we are taking no position on the propriety 

or availability of any request for disgorgement or of the proper 

direction of any further proceedings on remand. We leave the 

matter to the sound discretion of the district court, with 

appropriate input from the parties.