No. 86-522 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

JEAN PFAU, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-VSRICHLAND COUNTY, a political 

subdivision of the State of 

Montana, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Richland, 

The Honorable H. R. Obert, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gene R. Jarussi; Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey and 

Jarrussi, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: April 30, 1987 

Decided: July 91 1987 

~i led : 

'JUL 9 - 1987 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff Jean Pfau brought this action in the District 

Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County, to 

recover damages for injuries she sustained when she fell at 

the Richland County Fairgrounds. The jury found the defendant Richland County not negligent. Mrs. Pfau appealed from 

the judgment entered on the verdict and the District Court's 

denial of her motion for a new trial. We affirm. 

The issue is whether the District Court erred in failing 

to grant Mrs. Pfau a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury verdict. 

On August 4, 1982, Jean Pfau, her husband, and her 

children were at the Richland County Fairgrounds setting up a 

booth for the fair which was to start the next day. About 

8:00 or 9:00 p.m., Mrs. Pfau drove two of her children home. 

Around 10:30 or 11:OO p.m., she drove back to the fairgrounds 

to pick up her husband and third child. 

As Mrs. Pfau passed underneath the pedestrian archway at 

the south gate of the fairgrounds she tripped and fell. Mrs. 

Pfau sued Richland County on the basis that the sidewalk was 

unsafe. After a jury trial, the 12 person jury came back 

with a verdict that Richland County was not negligent. After 

her motion for a new trial was denied, Mrs. Pfau appealed. 

Did the District Court err in failing to grant Mrs. Pfau 

a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient 

to justify the jury verdict? 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, our 

standard is one of substantial evidence. As this Court 

recently stated in Clark v. Norris (Mont. 1987), 734 P.2d 

182, 185, 44 St. Rep. 444, 445: 
The standard of review is substantial 

evidence. If substantial evidence supports the 

case of the prevailing party the verdict will 

stand. The evidence will be viewed in a light most 

favorable to the party that prevailed at trial and, 

if the evidence conflicts, the credibility and 

weight given to the evidence is the province of the 

jury and not this Court. (Cite omitted.) 

This Court will especially not disturb a judgment on 

appeal where substantial evidence supports the judgment and 

the District Court has upheld the sufficiency of the evidence 

on a motion for a new trial. Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc. 

(1980), 199 Mont. 455, 461, 614 P.2d 502, 505. Simply put, 

the question before this Court is whether there is substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could return 

a defense verdict. 

After a careful review of the transcript, we conclude 

that there is substantial evidence in the record which supports the finding of the jury that Richland County was not 

negligent in the fall and injuries suffered by Mrs. Pfau. At 

trial, Mrs. Pfau' s attorney called Daniel Pfau, Jean Pfau' s 

husband, Doris Goebel, the secretary-manager for the Richland 

County Fair, and Jean Pfau herself. The attorney for 

Richland County cross-examined Doris Goebel and Jean Pfau and 

called George Urnback, the maintenance man for the Richland 

County Fairgrounds, as a witness. 

All four witnesses testified as to the condition of the 

sidewalk where Mrs. Pfau fell. Doris Goebel testified that 

the sidewalk looked like a typical sidewalk in a county 

fairground, that some of the sidewalk was older and some of 

it was newer. She further testified that parts of the sidewalk were cracked and somewhat uneven, but generally the 

sidewalk was in normal condition and did not represent a 

hazard. George Umback also testified that the sidewalk did 

not look hazardous to him, was well-lighted, and was 
essentially in the same shape as it had been for the previous 

12 years when he had worked at the fairgrounds. There is 

some contradiction in the testimony of the various witnesses 

with regard to the condition of the sidewalk. However, we 

are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the defendant. In addition, the credibility and weight to 

be given to the evidence is the province of the jury with 

which we will not interfere. Viewing the evidence in a light 

favorable to the defendant, we conclude there is substantial 

evidence to support the jury's determination that the defendant was not negligent. 

We affirm the District Court. 

We Concur: // 

Justices $,