THE ' .· a .

..··---.·--..--.------ ----------------

APOLLO SPACECRAFT 

A CHRONOLOGY 

VOLUME II 

November 8, 1962-September 30, 1964 

by 

Mary Louise Morse and Jean Kernahan Bays 

THE NASA HISTORICAL SERIES 

Scientific and Technical Information Office 1973 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Washington, D.C. 
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price $3.20 Stock Number 3300-;0455 (Paper Cover) 

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 69- 60008 


the story where the first left off, in November 1962. The first volume dealt 

with the birth of the Apollo Program and traced its early development. The 

second concerns its teenage period, up to September 30, 1964. 

By late 1962 the broad conceptual design of the Apollo spacecraft and the 

Apollo lunar landing mission was complete. The Administrator formally 

advised the President of the United States on December 10 that NASA had 

selected lunar orbit rendezvous over direct ascent and earth orbit rendezvous 

as the mode for landing on the moon. All major spacecraft contractors had 

been selected; detailed system design and early developmental testing were 

under way. 

On October 20, 1962, soon after Wally Schirra's six-orbit mission in 

Sigma 7, the first formal overall status review of the Apollo spacecraft and 

flight mission effort was given to Administrator James E. Webb. The writer 

of this foreword, who was then the Assistant Director for Apollo Spacecraft 

Development, recalls George Low, then Director of Manned Spacecraft and 

Flight Missions under D. Brainerd Holmes, discussing the planning schedule 

for completion of the Mercury Project in 1963, initiation of Gemini flights 

in 1964, and the start of Apollo earth orbital flights in 1965. Major design 

features of the spacecraft and subsystems were discussed and so were facilities, 

training, flight mission plans, and resources. At the conclusion of the review, 

Mr. Webb, Dr. Dryden, and Dr. Seamans commented favorably on the overview provided and on the accomplishments and hard planning that had been 

completed. The chronology of events during the subsequent two years, as 

summarized herein, provides an interesting comparison with the plans as 

discussed that day; we came very close to what was planned for 1963 and 

1964. 

During 1963 , formal contract negotiations with the previously selected 

major spacecraft contractors were completed. In addition most of the contractors for major facilities and support activities on the ground were 

selected. ~he latter group included Radio Corporation of America to furnish the spacecraft vacuum test chamber at Houston, Bell Aerosystems for 

the lunar landing training vehicle, Philco Corporation as prime contractor 

for the Mission Control Center, Link Division of General Precision, Inc., for 

the lunar mission simulators, and International Business Machines for the 

Real Time Computer Complex at Houston's Mission Control Center. 

Also in 1963 the Office of Manned Space Flight was reorganized under its 

new leader, George E. Mueller, to strengthen its systems engineering and 

integration role in overall management of the Apollo-Saturn Program. In 

111 
thousands of subsystems and components involved. The go

try team for carrying out the Apollo spacecraft and fligh

tasks was essentially complete by late 1963. Concurrently, 

were proceeding for the Saturn launch vehicles at the Mars

Center and for launch site preparation at the Kennedy Sp

was named by President Johnson on November 28, 1963. 

Meanwhile, a series of basic program decisions were mad

the spacecraft and lunar landing mission design teams to pr

design. Among these decisions were the following: 

• Nominal earth landing would be on the water. Th

from the original plan which provided for earth landing in 

or the southwestern United States. The change was made 

advantage of the softer impact conditions afforded by w

though the operational flexibility afforded by ocean land

tional favorable factor. 

• CSM to LM transposition and docking would be b

mode. This meant that, after injection into translunar tra

would detach the CSM from its launch position and would 

craft 180° and manually maneuver it into a docked positi

• The crew would operate the LM from standing po

• The spacecraft g11idance computer would use micro

• The Lunar Module would have a four-legged, de

gear. This was a change from the original Grumman con

had five legs. 

• The Lunar Module would be capable of support

operation of two men on the lunar surface for up to 24 hou

in flight. 

At the same time, rapid progress was made on the dev

spacecraft, on the Saturn launch vehicles, and on the fac

them. Typical events in 1963 included: 

• The service propulsion prototype engine successfully 

firings. 

• The first of a number of parachute malfunctions 

development drop tests. 

• The impact test facility for development and ve

Command Module landing system at the North American 

California, was completed. 

• Flight of Saturn SA- 4 verified the capability of the 

to operate satisfactorily after a simulated in-flight failure o

lV 
y gp

mission on May 15-16, 1963, the unmanned Lunar Orbiter Project was 

approved, and scientific guidelines for the Apollo mission were promulgated. 

A new group of 14 astronauts, including Buzz Aldrin and Mike Collins, who 

were destined to join Neil Armstrong in the first lunar landing mission, 

was selected in October 1963. 

Dr. Mueller, in the fall of 1963, introduced something that was to have 

a mighty effect on "landing before this decade is out." It was called "all-up 

testing." Under the "all-up" concept, launch vehicle and spacecraft development flights were combined, with all elements active and as close to lunar 

configuration as possible, beginning with the very first flight. This plan 

replaced the more conventional approach of making initial launch vehicle 

tests with dummy upper stages and dummy spacecraft. 

Because the Saturn I flight program was of an interim non-lunar configuration, it was curtailed and four manned earth orbital flights with the 

Saturn I launch vehicle were canceled. The Saturn IB development for 

manned flight was accelerated and all Saturn IB flights, beginning with 

SA-201, would carry operational spacecraft. Similarly, the Saturn V development flights, beginning with 501, would be in "all-up" configuration and 

vehicle 501 would be used to obtain reentry data on the Apollo spacecraft. 

The first manned flight on both the Saturn IB and V would follow two 

successful unmanned flights, so that the first manned flights could be as 

early as vehicles 203 and 503 for the IB and V, respectively. This would 

exploit early successful flight operation of the new launch vehicles by reducing the total number of flights required to qualify the lunar flight configuration for manned operations. The first manned flight on a Saturn V 

did of course take place on vehicle 503 in December 1968-the successful 

A polio 8 mission. 

Another Mueller innovation was the Apollo Executives Group, which 

first met in the fall of 1963. It brought together senior officials of the major 

Apollo-Saturn contractors, such as the Presidents of North American, Boeing, and Grumman, with senior NASA Manned Space Flight executives 

(Mueller, von Braun, Gilruth, and Debus). These periodic meetings proved 

to be an excellent mechanism for opening lines of communication at the 

top, for assuring timely top management attention to the most ·important 

problems as they arose, and for assuring a coordinated t~am effort on the 

many faceted Apollo-Saturn activities. A similar group of Gemini Executives was also set up; there was considerable cross-communication between 

v 
In early 1964, the Block II CSM lunar-orbit-rendezvo

guidelines were forwarded by NASA to North American, 

mockup was formally reviewed in September of that ye

configuration had been configured before the LOR mode 

consequence, it did not have the docking and crew-transfer 

among other changes, were incorporated in the Block II. 

The first Gemini mission, a successful unmanned test fli

on April 8. Ranger VII provided the first close-up picture

July. Project FIRE provided flight data at Apollo reentry s

I flights SA- 5, SA-6, and SA-7 were successfully comple

SA- 7, the seventh straight Saturn I success, provided a fu

tion of the Apollo Launch Escape System jettison. The un

Saturn launch successes presented a far different picture 

when a 50% launch success record was considered except

In summary, the two years covered by this volume of th

the essential completion of the putting together of the Ap

industry team, substantial maturing of the design, veri

essential design features by test, streamlining of the flight 

adoption of the all-up concept, and the acquisition of fir

Iunar surface from the Ranger Program. 

As this volume comes to a close, there were still four y

the first manned Apollo mission, and nearly five years 

landing. Many difficulties lay ahead, but the course had 

giant strides had been taken along that course. 

Deputy Director

Former Direct

Apoll

Vl 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vlll 

THE KEY EvENTS . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 


PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 


PART I: 	 DEFINING CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS; NOVEMBER 8, 1962, 


THROUGH AUGUST 28, 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 


PART II: 	 DEVELOPING HARDWARE DISTINCTIONS; AUGUST 30, 1963, 


THROUGH APRIL 2S-30, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 


PART III: 	 DEVELOPING SOFTWARE GROUND RULES; APRIL 29, 1964, 


THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 


APPENDIXES 

I. Glossary of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 


2. Spacecraft Weight by Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 


3. Major Spacecraft Component Manufacturers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 


4. Flight Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 


5. Apollo Program Flight Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 


6. Hardware Manufacture and Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 


7. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 


8. Organizational Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 


INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 


Vll 
All photographs and illustrations are U.S. Governmerlt ones except as credited. Persons in the photographs are identified in the captions. 

PART I 


SA-3 on the pad •••••• 0. 0 0 ••••• • ••••• •• 0 0. 0 0 •••••

Little Joe II contract signed ..... ..... .. . .. ... , . . . 

Transposition and docking maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Vertical Assembly Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CM boilerplate 3 delivered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Simulation of I/ 6 g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Space Environmental Facility (artist's concept) . . . . . . . 

Cutaway concept of Environmental Chamber . . . . . . . . 

Command module with strakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Merritt Island ground-breaking ceremony . . . . . . . . . . . 

Crawler-transporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Drop test at NAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Michaud Assembly Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MSC centrifuge (artist's concept) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Little Joe II assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hardware recovery possibilities (cartoon) . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Astronauts in mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Martin Company "bug" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Philco contract signing ...... . ............. . ...... 

SA-4 poised for liftoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Command module fabrication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Launch escape motor ... . ... . .... . ...... . ... . ... . ..

Combustion experiments .......... . . . ...... . ..... _ 

Hypervelocity Ballistic Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LEM model shown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. Little Joe II progress checked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lunar personnel propulsion proposal 

Vlll 
Arnold Engineering Development Center facility . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 


Frictionless platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 


BP-6 arrival at WSMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 


Docking probe and drogue assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 


LEM ascent engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 


Equal-period orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 


Little Joe II qualification test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 


PART II 


Lunar Orbiter model 83 


BP-12 Design Engineering Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 


NASA Administrator examining model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 


Guidance and navigation system mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92-93 


Lunar Landing Research Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 


"Retriever" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 


Optimum LEM descent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 


Prototype space suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 


Reaction control thrusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 


BP-6 pad abort test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 


Wind tunnel testing . .... . . .... .. .... . ................ _. . . 109 


Transonic Wind Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 


Launch escape motor firing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 


Flight director attitude indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 


Launch escape vehicle configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 


Apollo spacecraft simulator (Honeywell) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 


Thermal Vacuum Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 


Service module mockup ..... .. ... . .. . . ." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 


Heating experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 


Mission Control Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 


LEM test mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 


Evolving spacecraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 


BP-13 hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 


Lunar landing research vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 


lX 
PART III 


Communications links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

BP-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Zero-g mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Controls and panel displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LEM metal mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SA-6 space vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Apollo flotation collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Docking concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Simplified mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Gas storage system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

J-2 engine assembly line ............ . ............. ~.

BP-15 stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lunar TV camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Crawler track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ranger VII photos ....... .·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Water-cooled garment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Electroluminescent lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Thermal overgarments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

BP-15 transported to pad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Honeycomb installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Suit test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CM uprighting system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Weightless familiarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Astronaut mobility test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Flight directors ....... .... .................·. . . . . . . . 

Flight kit assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LEM foot pad ....................................

BP-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Service module propulsion test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Block II mockup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

X 
1962 

During December: Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) prepared the preliminary lunar landing 

mission design. 

1963 

January 2: Radio Corporation of America awarded contract for two large vacuum chambers 

at MSC for space environmental testing. 

January 28: Philco Corporation selected as prime contractor for the Mission Control Center 

(MCC) at MSC. 

February 18: Signed definitive contract with General Dynamics/Convair for Little Joe II test 

vehicles. 

March 11: NASA and Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation formalized a definitive 

contract for development of the luna.r excursion module (LEM) . 

July 12: International Business Machines awarded definitive contract for the realtime computer complex at MSC's MCC. 

August 14: Signed definitive contract worth $938.4 million with North American Aviation, 

Inc. (NAA), for command and service modules (CSM) on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. 

August 30: NASA approved the Lunar Orbiter program. 

November 7: Apollo Pad Abort Mission 1, using command module (CM) boilerplate (BP) 

6, conducted at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). 

November 22: Preliminary ground rules selected for the Spacecraft Development Test Program and lunar landing sites. 

1964 

January 21: NAA presented a block change concept for the Block II CSM design for lunar 

missions. 

March 9: MSC assigned funds and responsibility for developing scientific instruments for 

lunar exploration. 

April 28-30: NAA held basic mockup inspection and review for the Block II CSM. 

May 4: Program mission objectives and ground rules specified by the Apollo Mission Planning 

Task Force. 

May 13: First flight test of Little Joe II using CM BP-12 at WSMR. 

July 28: Ranger VII televised pictures of lunar surface up to impact. 

September 14: Ground rules firmly defined for LEM guidance and control system. 

September 18: Apollo Mission A-102, using BP-15 for the CSM and SA-7 for the launch 

vehicle, confirmed compatibility of the Saturn Block II and CSM as well as the launch 

escape vehicle system. 

September 30: NAA conducted formal inspection and review of the Block II CSM mockup. 

Xl 

what surely will be :t'ecorded as one of the epochal achievements of mankind. 

For any insight into the significance of this "giant leap," it is essential to 

reckon with the technology and to appreciate the hard work-and the sacrifices-that made Apollo 11 possible. 

This, the second volume of The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, tells a 

part of this story. It follows- the precedents and format of the first in the 

series (NASA SP--4009). The third volume, now nearly completed, will 

chronicle developments within Project Apollo through detailed hardware 

design and early ground and flight testing. A fourth will cover the development phase, recovery from the Apollo 204 fire, the first lunar landing flight, 

and the lunar exploration phase of the program. 

By this series of documented resource books, the authors have hoped to 

provide a tool for further historical studies of Project Apollo and for attempts to understand scientific and technological change during the decade 

of the Sixties. Our immediate aim has been to serve not only the needs of 

scholarship and management, but also the "average American" who might 

wish to probe behind the headlines of space news. 

Largely because our research has relied most heavily on records held at 

NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, Texas, the title of 

this series indicates its bias toward spacecraft development. Many NASA 

chronologies and historical monographs-some completed and some in 

progress-analyze, describe, and interpret various other aspects of American 

aeronautical and astronautical progress. In manned space flight, for example, 

This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (NASA SP-4101) has been 

written and a history of Project Gemini is nearing completion. Perhaps 

someday the full complexity of the interrelated technological and scientific 

activities of Project Apollo may be synthesized more meaningfully. But for 

now we have presented a skeletal outline of events that affected conceptual 

design and early engineering work on both hardware and software for the 

Apollo spacecraft. 

Part I, "Defining Contractual Relations," deals mostly with establishing 

government-industry working arrangements and preliminary hardware design once the prime contractors were selected. Part II, "Developing Hardware Distinctions," characterizes the period of late 1963 and early 1964 as 

a time of technological transition. And Part III, "Developing Software 

Ground Rules," tells schematically how, during much of 1964, preliminary 

mission planning and ground tests led toward the freezing of hardware design and the movement toward flight testing. 

xiii 
has been edited downward in size several times, but we 

readers to point out its worst sins of omission and com

ments for the most part were originally in the English 

verted to metric. 

The authors of this volume worked with MSC historian

wood and Ivan D. Ertel by virtue of a NASA contract (

the University of Houston's Department of History. Pr

Tinsley and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., provided academic sup

historians Eugene M. Emme, Frank W. Anderson, Jr.

Putnam encouraged the processes of research and revisio

tion. Archivists in Washington, notably Lee D. Saegesse

Centers, and in Houston, particularly Billie D. Rowe

mensely helpful. Courtney G. Brooks and Sally D. Gat

comment edition, and Corinne L. Morris prepared the 

Ertel illustrated the text, while Anderson and Carrie E. 

herded the work through the publication_ process. To the

informants, readers, librarians, and historians the auth

this series are indebted. 

December 1, 1971 

XlV 
PART I 


Defining Contractual Relations 

November 8, 1962, through August 28, 1963 
The Key Events 

1962 

November 16: Saturn-Apollo 3 ( SA-3) launch marks first full-weight 

rocket. 

December 4: Contract for Vertical Assembly Building at Cape Canavera

of four New York architectural engineering firms. 

During December: Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) prepared the prelim

mission design. 

1963 

January 2: Contract let to Radio Corporation of America for two large 

MSC for space environmental testing; 

January 18: Contract let to Bell Aerosystems Company for two lunar 

hicles by Flight Research Center. 

January 28: Philco Corporation selected as prime contractor for the Mi

(MCC) at MSC. 

February 8: Definitive contract let to Raytheon Company for command 

board digital computer. 

February 13: MSC reorganized Apollo Spacecraft Project Office. 

February 18: Definitive contract let to General Dynamics/Convair for 

vehicle. 

February 20: NASA reorganized the Office of Manned Space Flight. 

March 11: Definitive contract formalized between NASA and Grumman 

Corporation for the Lunar Excursion Module. 

March 13: First long-duration static test of Saturn SA-5 first stage. 

March 28: Saturn SA-4 launched in successful test of engine-out capabili

April10: Contract let to Link Division, General Precision, Inc., for luna

May 3: First of series of qualification drop tests for the earth landing 

El Centro, Calif. 

May 15-16: Last flight of Mercury: Cooper in Faith 7. 

June 14-19: Vosfok V and VI tandem flights. 

During ]une: Most CM subsystem designs frozen. 

july 12: Definitive contract let to International Business Machines for th

complex at MSC's MCC. · 

August 5: First static firing test of SatUrn S-IV stage for SA-5 conducted 

Company in Sacramento, Calif. 

August 14: Definitive contract with North American Aviation, Inc., for c

modules signed on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis for $938.4 million. 

August 28: First Little Joe II launched at White Sands Missile Range, N

2 

Defining Contractual Relations 

November 8, 1962, through August 28; 1963 

"Not one or two men will make the landing on the moon, but, figuratively, 

the entire Nation." That is how NASA's Deputy Administrator, Hugh L. 

Dryden, described America's commitment to Apollo during a speech in 

Washington, D.C. "What we are buying in our national space program," 

Dryden said, "is the knowledge, the experience, the skills, the industrial 

facilities, and the experimental hardware that will make the United States 

first in every field of space exploration. .. . The investment in space progress 

is big and will grow, but the potential returns on the investment are even 

larger. And because it concerns us all, scientific progress is everyone's responsibility. Every citizen should understand what the space program really 

is about and what it can do." 

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 12, 1963), pp. 235- 36. 

The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and the Raytheon Company came to 

terms on the definitive contract for the Apollo spacecraft guidance computer. 

(See February 8, 1963.) 

Manned Space Flight [MSF] Management Council Meeting, November 27, 1962, Agenda 

Item 2, p. 3. 

North American Aviation, Inc., selected the Aerospace Electrical Division 

of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to build the power conversion units 

for the command module (CM) electrical system. The units would convert 

direct current from the fuel cells to alternating current. 

Aviation Daily, November 13, 1962, p. 71. 

The Aerojet-General Corporation reported completion of successful firings 

of the prototype service propulsion engine. The restartable engine, with 

an ablative thrust chamber, reached thrusts up to 21 500 pounds. [Normal 

thrust rating for the service propulsion engine is 20 500.) 

Aviation Daily, November 15, 1962, p. 89; Aviation Week and Space T echnology, 77 

(November 19, 1962), p. 40. 

3 

1962 

November 

8 

9 

13 

15 
1962 

November 

16 

The Saturn-Apollo 3 vehicle on its launch pedestal rea<;ly for 

This photo was taken three days before liftoff and presen

view of the Pad 34 area and the proximity of the Atlantic O

Saturn-Apollo 3 (Saturn C-1, later called Saturn I) was laun

Atlantic Missile Range. Upper stages of the launch vehicle w

23 000 gallons of water to simulate the weight of live stage

altitude of 167 kilometers (104 miles), four minutes 53 second

the rocket was detonated by explosives upon command fro

water was released into the ionosphere, forming a massive 

particles several miles, in diameter. By this experiment, know

Highwater," scientists had hoped to obtain data on atmospher

poor telemetry made the results questionable. The flight 

straight success for the Saturn C-1 and the first with max

board. 

MSFC Historical Office, History of the George C. Marshall Space /!light 

july 1 Through December 31, 1962 (MHM--6), Vol. I, p. 193; MSFC, 

Flight Evaluation," MPR-SAT-63-1 , January 8, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 8, 151; 

ton Post, November 1.7, 1962; The New York Times, November 17, 1962. 

4 
NASA Technical Note, TN D-2506 (1965), p. 5. 

About 100 Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation and MSC representatives began seven weeks of negotiations on the lunar excursion module 

(LEM) contract. After agreeing on the scope of work and on operating and 

coordination procedures, the two sides reached fiscal accord. Negotiations 

were completed on January 3, 1963. Eleven days later, NASA authorized 

Grumman to proceed with LEM development. (See March 11, 1963.) 

MSC, "Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 2 for Period Ending December 31, 

1962," p. 21; "Project Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3 for Period Ending March 

31, 1963," p. I; NASA Contract No. NAS 9-1100, "Project Apollo Lunar Excursion 

Module Development Program," J anuary 14, 1963; Clyde B. Bothmer, memorandum for 

distribution, "Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Management Council held on 

Tuesday, January 29, 196~ , at the Launch Operations Center, Cocoa Beach, Florida," 

with enclosure: subject as above, p. 3. 

North American defined requirements for the command and service modules 

(CSM) stabilization and controi system. 

North American Aviation, Iric. [hereafter cited as NAA], "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62- 300-8, November 30, 1962, p. 52. 

NASA invited ten industrial firms to submit bids by December 7 for a 

contract to build a control center at MSC and to integrate ground operational support systems for Apollo and the rendezvous phases of Gemini. On 

January 28, 1963, NASA announced that the contract had been awarded 

to the Philco Corporation, a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. 

NASA News Release 63-14, "Philco to Develop Manned Flight Control Center at Houston," January 28, 1963; Aviation Daily, November 20, 1962, p. Ill. 

A Goddard Space Flight Center report summarizing recommendations for 

ground instrumentation support for the near-earth phases of the Apollo 

missions was forwarded to the Apollo Task Group of the NASA Headquarters Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA). This report 

presented a preliminary conception of the Apollo network. 

The tracking network would consist of stations equipped with 9-meter (30­

foot) antennas for near-earth tracking and communications and of stations 

having 26-meter (85-foot) antennas for use at lunar distances. A unified 

S-hand system, capable of receiving and transmitting voice, U;:lemetry, and 

television on a single radio-frequency band, was the basis of the network 

operation. 

5 

19 

19 

20 

23 
26 

27 

27 

p); 

, (); 

(to be selected). Three new tracking ships and special e

existing network stations for earth-orbit checkout of th

also be needed. 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Tracking and Data Systems Dir

Instrumentation Support Plan for the Near-Earth Phases of Apollo 

23, 1962; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Applications and T

mittee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, H

1st Sess. (1963), pp. 2795-2801. 

At a news conference in Cleveland, Ohio, during the I

Fair there, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dry

flight practice at orbital maneuvering was essential for 

believed that landings would follow reconnaissance of t

lunar and near-lunar-surface flights. 

The Plain Dealer, Cleveland, November 27, 1962. 

NASA awarded a $2.56 million contract to Ling-Temco-

to develop the velocity package for Project Fire, to simu

lunar mission. An Atlas D booster would lift an in

(looking like a miniature Apollo CM) to an altitude 

(400 000 feet). The velocity package would then fire the 

a minus 15 degree trajectory at a velocity of II 300 met

second. On December 17, Republic Aviation Corpor

the reentry vehicle, reported that design was 95 percen

fabrication had already begun. 

Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1962; LTV, Chance Vought Corp

Div., "Fire Velocity Package," (undated), pp. 1-1, 11-4; Aviation W

nology, 77 (December 17, 1962), pp. 53, 55, 57. 

MSC officials met with representatives of Jet Propulsio

and the NASA · Office of Tracking and Data Acquisit

discussed locating the third Deep Space Instrumentatio

Europe instead of at a previously selected South African 

of this chronology [NASA SP-4009], September 13, 196

gated several European sites and noted the communic

MSC stated that a coverage gap of up to two hours was 

prohibitive. JPL and OTDA agreed to place the Euro

the coverage gap would be minimal or nonexistent. Ho

of a communications loss at a particular location would n

6 

oxygen and pressurization and would control temperature, humidity, and 

air contaminants. The suit would protect the astronaut against solar radiation and extreme temperatures. The helmet faceplate would shield him 

against solar glare and would be defrosted for good visibility at very low 

temperatures. An emergency oxygen supply was also part of the assembly. 

Four days earlier, MSC had added specifications for an extravehicular suit 

communications and telemetry (EVSCT) system to the space suit contract 

with Hamilton Standard Division of United Aircraft Corporation. The 

EVSCT system included equipment for three major operations: 

(1) Full two-way voice communication between two astronauts on the 

lunar surface, using the transceivers in the LEM and CM as relay stations 

(2) Redundant one-way voice communication capability between any 

number of suited astronauts 

(3) Telemetry of physiological and suit environmental data to the LEM 

or CM for relay to earth via the S-hand link. 

[The EVSCT contract was awarded to International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) Corporation's Kellogg Division. (See March 26, 1963.)] 

Memorandum, Ralph S. Sawyer, MSC, to Crew Systems Div., Attn: James V. Correale, 

"Extravehicular Suit ..Communications and Telemetry System Specifications," November 

23, 1962; MSC News Release, "Project Apollo Space Suits," November 26, 1962; The 

Evening Star, Washington, November 28, !962; _The Houston Post, November 27, 1962. 

Representatives of Hamilton Standard and International Latex 'Corporation 

(ILC) met to discuss mating the portable life support system to the ILC 

space suit configuration. As a result of mockup demonstrations and other 

studies, over-the-shoulder straps similar to those in the mockup were substituted for the rigid "horns." 

Hamilton Standard, "Monthly Progress Repert through November 30, 1962, for Apollo 

Space Suit Assembly," PR-2-ll-62, Item 7.2. 

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth reported to the Manned Space Flight 

(MSF) Management Council that formal negotiations between NASA and 

North American on the Apollo spacecraft development contract would begin 

in January 1963. He further informed the council that the design release 

for all Apollo systems, with the exception of the space suit, was scheduled 

for mid-1963; the suit was scheduled for January 1964. 

MSF Management Council Meeting, November 27, 1962, Agenda Item 2, pp. 2-3 [and 

supplemental page]. 

7 

27 

27 
1962 

November 

During 

the 

Month 

A $6 million contract for the Little Joe II launch vehicle 

DynamicsjConvair of San Diego, Calif., November 28, 196

president of General Dynamics/Convair, signed the con

were, left to right, J. Harris, contracts manager for Little J

C. D. Sword, Apollo procurement chief; and J. B. Hurt, 

Joe project manager. Convair had previously been awarded 

to design and manufacture the Little Joe II test vehicle. (S

entry, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume 1). 

AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors Corporation ass

CM inertial reference integrating gyro (IRIG) for final tests 

Three IRlGs in the CM navigation and guidance system p

ence from which velocity and attitude changes could be 

of the unit was scheduled for February 1963. (See February 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 2," p. 13. 

North American completed a study of CSM-LEM transposit

During a lunar mission, after the spacecraft was fired i

toward the moon, the CSM would separate from the adap

taining the LEM. It would then turn around, dock with the 

the second vehicle free from the adapter. The contracto

methods of completing this maneuver: free fly-around, teth

and mechanical repositioning. Of the three, the company re

free fly-around, based on NASA's criteria of minimum weig

8 
Three phases of activity in the line drawing indicate the techniques of the free 

fly-around method of the docking exercise between the CSM and the LEM. 

-Line drawing by NAA. 

design, maximum docking reliability, minimum time of operation, and 

maximum visibility. 

Also investigated was crew transfer from the CM to the LEM, to determine 

the requirements for crew performance and, from this, to define human 

engineering needs. North American concluded that a separate LEM airlock 

was not needed but that the CSM oxygen supply system's capacity should 

be increased to effect LEM pressurization. 

On November 29, North American presented the results of docking simulations, which showed that the free flight docking mode was feasible and that 

the 45-kilogram (100-pound) service module (SM) reaction control system 

engines were adequate for the terminal phase of docking. The simulations 

also showed that overall performance of the maneuver was improved by 

providing the astronaut with an attitude display and some form of alignment aid, such as probe. 

MSC, "Abstract of Proceedings, Flight Technology Systems Meeting No. 12, November 

27, 1962," November 30, 1962; "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-8, pp. 

11-14: 

9 

November 

1962 
went on, the drogue parachutes produced unfavorable 

parachute deployment. (See January 18, 1963.) 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report,'' SID 62- 300-8, p. 77. 

During Extensive material and thermal property tests indica

the honeycomb matrix bonded to the steel substructure 

Month proach for a new heatshield design for the CM. (See Fe

Ibid., pp. 143- 144. 

During Collins Radio Company selected Motorola~ Inc., Milit

the 

Month sion, to develop and produce the spacecraft S-band tra

ponder would aid in tracking the spacecraft in deep spa

used to transmit and receive telemetry signals and to c

ground stations and the spacecraft by FM voice and 

formal contract with Motorola was awarded in mid-Fe

Also, Collins awarded a contract to the Leach Corpora

ment of command and service module (CSM) data stor

tape recorders must have a five-hour capacity for colle

data, draw less than 20 watts of power, and be desig

changes. 

Ibid., p. 89; NAA, "Apollo Facts," RB0070163, (undated), pp. 43

During MSC awarded a $222 000 contract to the Air Force S

the wind tunnel tests of the Apollo spacecraft at its Arn

Month velopment Center, Tullahoma, Tenn. 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 77 (November 12, 1962), p

North American made a number of changes in the lay

During • Putting the lithium hydroxide canisters in the l

the 

and food stowage compartments in the aft equipment 

Month 

• Regrouping equipment in the left-hand forwar

make pressure suit disconnects easier to reach and to 

vanced packaging.concept for the cabin heat exchange

• Moving the'waste management control panel an

tanks to the right-hand equipment bay 

• Revisiqg the aft compartment control layout to 

impact attenuation system and to add tie rods for retai

10 
The MSC Apollo Spacecraft Project Office (ASPO) outlined the photographic equipment needed for Apollo missions. This included two motion 

picture cameras (16- and 70-mm) and a 35-mm still camera. It was essential 

that the camera, including film loading, be operable by an astronaut wearing 

pressurized gloves. On February 25, 1963, NASA informed North American 

that the cameras would be government furnished equipment. 

Memorandum, Charles W . Frick, MSC, to Office of Asst. Dir. for Information and Control Systems, Attn: Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Div., "Cameras for Apollo 

Spacecraft," December 3, 1962; letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information 

Systems Div., "Contract Change Authorization No. Twenty-Six," February 25, 1963. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, acting for NASA, awarded a $3.332 

million contract to four New York architectural engineering firms to design 

At left is an artist's concept 

of the Vertical Assembly 

Building at Merritt Island; 

below, the construction in 

progress as of July 31, 1964. 

December 

3 
4 

5 

5 

Inc., to construct the V AB. 

01·/ando Sentinel, December 5, 1962; MSC, Space News Roundup, J an

Th e Keunedy Space Cente1· StO?)' (KSC, 1969), pp. 19-20. 

The first test of the Apollo main parachute system, condu

Air Facility, El Centro, Calif., foreshadowed lengthy t

landing apparatus for the spacecraft. One parachute faile

another disreefed prematurely, and the third disreefed 

after some delay. No data reduction was possible because 

North American was investigating. 

MSF Management Council Minutes, December 18, 1962, p. 2; NAA

Progress Report," SID 62-300-9, J anuary 15, 1963, p. 20. 

At a meeting held at Massachusetts Institute of Technolo

mentation Laboratory, representatives of MIT, MSC, H

Division, and International Latex Corporation examine

an astronaut's use of optical navigation equipment while 

suit with helmet visor down. MSC was studying helmet d

allow the astronaut to place his face directly against the 

might avoid an increase in the weight of the eyepiece. I

Hamilton Standard recommended adding corrective devi

system rather than adding corrective devices to the helmet 

helmet. In the same month, ASPO set 52.32 millimeters (

distance of the astronaut's eye away from the helmet. MIT 

a lightweight adapter for the navigation instruments to pro

of up to 76.2 millimeters (3 inches). 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 2," p. 9; Hamilton Standard 

Space Suit Navigation System Optical Interface Meeting," HSER 25

1962, pp. 1- 2. 

T he General Electric Policy Review Board, established b

agement Council, held its first meeting. On February 9, th

Company (GE) had been selected by NASA to provide in

(including booster-spacecraft interface), ensure reliability 

vehicle, and develop and operate a checkout system. T

Board was organized to oversee the entire GE Apollo ef

Memorandum, James E. Sloan, NASA, to Wernher von Braun, Kurt H. 

R. Gilruth, "General Electric Policy Review Board," December 6, 19

Electric Policy Review Board Charter," December 4, 1962; memoran

ruth and Wa lter C. Williams, "Charter of Policy Review Board fo

Manned Lunar Landing Program Effort," January 8, 1963 (charter 

12 
NASA Administrator James E. Webb, in a letter to the President, explained 

the rationale behind the Agency's selection of lunar orbit rendezvous (rather 

than either direct ascent or earth orbit rendezvous) as the mode for landing 

Apollo astronauts on the moon. (See Volume I, July 11, 1962.) Arguments 

for and against any of the three modes could have been interminable: "We 

are dealing with a matter that cannot be conclusively proved before the 

fact," Webb said. "The decision on the mode ... had to be made at this 

time in order to maintain our schedules, which aim at a landing attempt in 

late 1967." 

John M. Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation of the Lun·ar Landing Decision," (HHN81), August 1969, pp. 85, 87. 

NASA authorized North American's Columbus, Ohio, Division to proceed 

with a LEM docking study. 

TWX, J. F. Leonard, NAA, to NASA, [Attn:] D. B. Cherry, December 14, 1962. 

The first static firing of the Apollo tower jettison motor, under development by Thiokol Chemical Corporation, was successfully performed. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-9, p. 14; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report 

No.2," p. 6. 

Northrop Corporation's Ventura Division, prime contractor for the development of sea-markers to indicate the location of the spacecraft after a 

water landing, suggested three possible approaches: 

(1) A shotgun shell type that would dispense colored smoke 

(2) A floating, controlled-rate dispenser (described as an improvement 

on the current water-soluble binder method) 

(3) A floating panel with relatively permanent fluorescent qualities. 

Northrop Ventura recommended the first method, because it would produce 

the strongest color and size contrast and would have the longest life for its 

weight. 

Memorandum, W. E. Oller, Northrop Ventura, to MSC, Attn: P. Armitage, "NAS 9-482, 

Status of Remainder of Program," December 12, 1962. 

MSC officials, both in Houston and at the Preflight Operations Division at 

Cape Canaveral, agreed on a vacuum chamber at the Florida location to test 

13 


10 

11 

11 

12 

13 
18 

19 

pp

began redesigning the couch to make it lighter and simpler 

investigation was continuing on crew restraint systems in li

changes. An analysis of acceleration forces imposed on crew 

reentry at various couch back and CM angles of attack was 

tion. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 2," pp. 9, 10; NASA-Resident 

Project Office (RASPOf NAA), "Consolidated Activity Report . . . , D

January 5, 1963," p. 3. 

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth reported to the MSF Man

that tests by Republic Aviation Corporation, the U.S. Air 

Aerospace Medicine (SAM) at Brooks Air Force Base, Te

Navy Air Crew Equipment Laboratory (ACEL) at Philad

established that, physiologically, a spacecraft atmosphere o

3.5 newtons per square centimeter (five pounds per squa

[psia ]) was acceptable. During the separate experiments, 

had been exposed to pure oxygen environments for perio

weeks without showing adverse effects. Two fires had occur

tember 10 at SAM and the other on November 17 at ACE

both cases was faulty test equipment. On July 11, NASA ha

American to design the CM for 3.5 newtons per square ce

pure-oxygen atmosphere. 

MSF Management Council Minutes, December 18, 1962, p. 3; "Apo11o 

Report No.2," p . II; "Abstract of Proceedings, Crew Systems Meeting N

18, 1962," December 20, 1962. 

NASA announced that Ranger VI (see Volume I, August 

be used for intensive reliability tests. Resultant improve

incorporated into subsequent spacecraft (numbers VII- I

launchings of those vehicles by "several months." The revi

based on recommendations by a Board of Inquiry headed b

Kelley (USN), Director of Electronics and Control in the 

Advanced Research and Technology. (See Volume 1, Octob

Kelley board, appointed by NASA Space Sciences Director H

after the Ranger V flight, consisted of officials from NAS

five NASA Centers, and Bellcomm, Inc. The board conclud

reliability could be achieved through spacecraft design 

modifications and by more rigorous testing and checkout. 

1964.) . 

14 
Exhaust Impingement on the Lunar Surface During the Terminal Phases of Lunar 

Landing," December 20, 1962. 

North American delivered CM boilerplate (BP) 3, to Northrop Ventura, 21 

for installation of an earth-landing system. BP-3 was scheduled to undergo 

parachute tests at El Centro, Calif., during early 1963. 

RASPOJNAA, "Consolidated Activity Report ... , December I, 1962-January 5, 1963," 

p. 7. 

The Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company submitted to North Amer­ 26 

ican cost proposal and design specifications on the Apollo stabilization and 

Many changes were made in 

space suits before the Apollo 

suit was finally developed in 

flight configuration. Joe 

Kosmo, Crew Systems Division, is shown on December 

20, 1962, modeling a suit 

with constant volume joints 

constructed of restrained 

bellows. 
1962 

December 

28 

CM boilerplate (BP) 3 was being off-loaded at the Nor

Ventura Division plant at Newbury Park, C

control system, based upon the new Statement of Work 

cember 17. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 2," p. 16. 

North American selected Radiation, Inc., to develop t

modulation (PCM) telemetry system. The PCM telem

spacecraft data into digital signals for transmission to gr

$4.3 million contract was officially announced on Februa

16 
North American's Rocketdyne Division completed the first test firings of 28 

the CM reaction control engines. 

Ralph B. Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program (NAA, Space and Informa· 

tion Systems Div., January 20, 1966), p. 8; "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62­

300-9, p. 13. 

Langley Research Center conducted studies to determine what problems might 

be encountered by an astronaut wearing a space suit and walking on the 

lunar surface where the lunar force of gravity is only one sixth of that on 

earth. In this laboratory device, a system of slings supported most of the 

weight of the man and allowed him to walk and jump under conditions 

simulating lunar gravity. Here a scientist was being prepared for tests in the 

facility. 
LARGE SPACE 


ENVIRONMENT 


S I MULAT1 ON CHAMBER 


of sim

1963 

January 

8 

permitting observation of the effects of solar heating enc

mission. At the end of July, MSC awarded RCA ano

$3 341 750) for these solar simulators. 

MSC Release 63-1, "Contract Awarded to RCA Services Compan

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, 

July 21-August 17, 1963," p. 3. 

After studying the present radar coverage provided by 

representative Apollo trajectories, North American reco

ing C-hand radars be modified to increase ranging limit

bility for tracking to 920 kilometers (500 nautical mile

for near-earth trajectories, was wholly inadequate for la

Tracking capability should be extended to 59 000 kilom

cal miles), North American said; and to improve trac

mitter power and receiver sensitivity should be increas

Memorandum, C. H. Feltz, NAA, to MSC, Attn: J. T. Markley, "

150, Research and Development for Project Apollo Spacecraft, C

liminary Report," January 8, 1963. 

20 
Apollo program.] Bellcomms studies, either in progress or planned, included 

computer support, environmental hazards, mission safety and reliability, 

communications and tracking, trajectory analyses, and lunar surface vehicles. 

Memorandum, Paul E. Purser, MSC, to Distribution, "Operations of OMSF Office of 

Systems and Bellcomm," January 14, 1963. 

MSC and OMSF agreed that an unmanned Apollo spacecraft must be flown 

on the Saturn C-1 before a manned flight. SA-10 was scheduled to be the 

unmanned flight and SA-111, the first manned mission. 

Memorandum, John H . Disher, NASA, to MSC, Attn: Paul E. Purser, "Review of Apollo 

Quarterly Status Report No. 2," January 23, 1963. 

The MSC Flight Operations Division's Mission Analysis Branch analyzed 

three operational procedures for the first phase of descent from lunar orbit: 

(1) The first was a LEM-only maneuver. The LEM would transfer to 

an orbit different from that of the CSM but with the same period and having 

a pericynthion of 15 240 meters (50 000 feet). After one orbit and reconnaissance of the landing site, the LEM would begin descent maneuvers. 

(2) The second method required the entire spacecraft (CSM/LEM) to 

transfer from the initial circular orbit to an elliptical orbit with a pericynthion of 15 240 meters (50 000 feet). 

(3) The third technique involved the LEM's changing from the origi" 

nal 147-kilometer (SO-nautical-mile) circular orbit to an elliptic orbit having 

a pericynthion of 15 240 meters (50 000 feet). The CSM, in turn, would 

transfer to an elliptic orbit with a pericynthion of 65 kilometers (30 nautical 

miles). This would enable the CSM to keep the LEM under observation 

until the LEM began its descent to the lunar surface. 

Comparisons of velocity changes and fuel requirements for the three methods 

showed that the second technique would use much more fuel than the 

others and, therefore, was not recommended for further consideration. 

[Apocynthion and pericynthion are the high and low points, respectively, of 

an object in orbit around the moon (as, for example, a spacecraft sent from 

earth). Apolune and perilune also refer to these orbital parameters, but 

these latter two words apply specifically to an object launched from the 

moon itself.] 

Memorandum, Stephen Huzar, MSC, to Chief, FOD, "Compa riso•· of Fuel Requirements for Three Near-Moon Orbital T\'!chniques Associated With the Planning of the 

Lunar Landing Mission," J anuary 16, 1963. 

21 

10 

16 
17 

17 

18 

on estimates of heating on the CM blunt face, which abs

reentry, but afterbody heating rates were not as clea

American was studying Project Mercury flight data and 

tunnel tests to arrive at revised estimates. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3," p. 33; "Apollo Monthly Pr

62-300-10, p. 7. 

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., of MSC's Flight Operations D

vised ASPO that the digital up-data link being develop

program appeared acceptable for Apollo as well. In 

representatives of FOD and ASPO had agreed that an in

link (a means by which the ground could feed current 

spacecraft's computer during a mission) was essential f

flights. Kraft proposed that the Gemini-type link be used 

and on June 13 MSC ordered North American to includ

CM. 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Ap

January 17, 1963; letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Sp.ace and 

Div., "Contract Change Authorization No. Fifty-Four," June 13, 19

President John F. Kennedy sent his budget request fo

to Congress. The President recommended a NASA appr

billion, $3.193 billion of which was for manned space 

ceived a dramatic increase-$1.207 billion compared wi

previous year. NASA Administrator James E. Webb no

ized the budget, about half a billion dollars less than ea

one of "austerity." While it would not appreciably speed 

ing timetable, he said, NASA could achieve the goal of 

the moon within the decade. 

The Houston Post, January 18, 1963. 

Two aerodynamic strakes were added to the CM to el

of a hypersonic apex-forward trim point on reentry. [Du

launch escape system (LES) abort, the crew would underg

if the CM were to trim apex forward. During a low-a

was the potential problem of the apex cover not clea

November 1962.)] The strakes, located in the yaw plan

span of one foot and resulted in significant weight pen

the strakes had to be increased later because of change

moved the center of gravity forward and because of the 

22 

A command module with strakes is shown inside the clean room at NAA just 

after de-mating from the service module following combined systems checkout. The strakes may be observed at either side of the command module, 

just above the aft heatshield line. -NAA photo. 

material needed to combat the increased heating of the strakes during reentry. Removal of the strakes would cause a major redesign to permit the 

apex cover to be jettisoned in the low angle-of-attack (apex forward) region. 

In the summer of 1963, however, MSC and North American representatives 

agreed that the strakes should be removed and an apex-mounted flap be 

added. The flap could be jettisoned with the LES tower during normal 

missions and retained with the CM during a LES abort. 

North American then suggested a "tower flap dual mode" approach. This 

concept incorporated fixed surfaces at the upper end of the LES tower 

which would be exposed to the air stream after jettison of the expended 

rocket casing. For aborts below 9140 meters (30 000 feet), the jettison motor 

would pull away the expended motor casing, the LES tower, and apex cover. 

The contractor carried out extensive wind tunnel tests of this configuration 

and reported to MSC during October that a 0.5941-square-meter (920-squareinch) planer flap located in the upper bay of the LES, coupled with a more 

favorable CM center of gravity, would be required to solve the reentry 

problem. 

23 

January 

1963 
18 

23 

24 

Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-30G-9, p. 6; ibid., SID 

SID 62-30G-Il, April I, 1963, p. 7; ibid., SID 62-30G-12, p. 8; 

August 1, 1963, p . 5; ibid., SID 62-30G-16, September 1, 1963, p. 8

October 1, 1963, p . 5; ibid., SID 62-300-18, November 1, 1963, p. 3

December 1, 1963, p . 5; ibid., SID 62- 300- 20, January 1, 1964, p. 5

February!, 1964, p. 3; ibid., SID 62-300- 23, April I, 1964, p. 3; "

Report, September 19-25, 1963," p. 3; "ASPO Weekly Activity R

0ctober 2, 1963," p . 2; "ASPO Status Report For Period Endin

"ASPO Status Report For Period October 16-November 12, 1963"; 

:For Period December 18-January 14, 1964"; "ASPO Status Rep

December 4, 1963"; "ASPO Status Report For Week Ending Decem

Status Report For Week Ending January 7, 1964"; "Monthly AS

Period January 16-February 12, 1964"; "Apollo Quarterly Status 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4 for Period Ending June 30

Quarterly Status Report No. 5 for Period Ending September 30, 

Quarterly Status Report No. 6 for Period Ending December 31 

"Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned S

July 6, 1963," p. 4; "Minutes of NASA-NAA Technical Managem

25, 1964"; Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p. 

NASA's Flight Research Center (FRC) announced the 

lion contract to Bell Aerosystems Company of Bell Ae

for the design and construction of two manned lunar 

hicles. The vehicles would be abie to take off and la

power, reach an altitude of about 1220 meters (4000 

horizontally. A fan turbojet engine would supply a co

of five-sixths the weight of the vehicle to simulate the 

the lunar surface. Tests would be conducted at FRC. 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963 (NASA SP-4004), p. 17; Daily 

Va., January 1.~, 1963; Wall Street journal, J anuary 22, 1963; Av

24, 1963, p. 161. 

The Hamilton Standard space suit contract was amend

ing space suit communications and telemetry equipm

27, 1962.) 

Hamilton Standard, " Monthly Progress Report for the Period of 

1963, for Apollo Space Suit Assembly," PR-4- 1-63, p . l. 

The first evaluation of crew mobility in the Internation

(ILC) pressure suit was conducted at North American 

problems. Three test subjects performed simulated flig

mockup. CM spatial restrictions on mobility were show

ing suit sizes, crew couch dimensions, and restraint 

adjustment, and release were appraised. Numerous i

24 

specialize in Project Gemini; John H. Glenn, Jr., would concentrate on 

Project Apollo; M. Scott Carpenter would cover lunar excursion training; 

and Walter M. Schirra, Jr., would be responsible for Gemini and Apollo 

operations and training. As Coordinator for Astronaut Activities, Donald K. 

Slayton would maintain overall supervision of astronaut duties. 

Specialty areas for the second generation were: trainers and simulators, Neil 

A. Armstrong; boosters, Frank Borman; cockpit layout and systems integration, Charles Conrad, Jr.; recovery system, James A. Lovell, Jr.; guidance 

and navigation, James A. McDivitt; electrical, sequential, and mission planning, Elliot M. See, Jr.; communications, instrumentation, and range integration, Thomas P. Stafford; flight control systems, Edward H. White II; 

and environmental control systems, personal equipment, and survival equipment, John W. Young. 

MSC Fact Sheet No. 113, "Specialized Assignments for MSC Astronauts and Flight Crew 

Personnel," January 26, 1963; The Washington Post, January 27, 1963. 

NASA announced the selection of the Philco Corporation as prime contractor for the Mission Control Center (MCC) at MSC. To be operational in 

mid-1964, MCC would link the spacecraft with ground controllers at MSC 

through the worldwide tracking network. 

NASA News Release 63-14, "Philco to Develop Manned Flight Mission Control Center 

at Houston ," January 28, 1963; Wall Street journal, January 29, 1963. 

Following a technical conference on the LEM electrical power system (EPS), 

Grumman began a study to define the EPS configuration. Included was an 

analysis of EPS requirements and of weight and reliability for fuel cells 

and batteries. Total energy required for the LEM mission, including the 

translunar phase, was estimated at 61.3 kilowatt-hours. Upon completion 

of this and a similar study by MSC, Grumman decided upon a three-cell 

arrangement with an auxiliary battery. Capacity would be determined when 

the EPS load analysis was completed. (See March 7.) 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3," pp. 27-28. 

Grumman and NASA announced the selection of four companies as major 

LEM subcontractors: 

(1) Rocketdyne for the descent engine (see February 13) 

(2) Bell Aerosystems Company for the ascent engine (see February 25) 

25 

28 

28 

30 
1963 

January 

During 

the 

Month 

February 

tions, MSC; G. Merritt 

Preston, Director of PreFlight Operations Division, 

MSC; Kurt H. Debus, 

Director, Launch Operations Center; D. Brainerd 

Holmes, Director, NASA 

Office of Manned Space 

Flight; Wernher von Braun, 

Director, Marshall Space 

Flight Center; Col. H. R. 

Parfitt, District Engineer, 

U.S. Army; and Col. E. 


Richardson, U.S. Air Force. 


(3) The Marquardt Corporation for the reaction c

March 11) 

(4) Hamilton Standard for the environmental control sy

MSC News Release 63- 14, January 30, 1963; Aviation Daily, J anua

Wall Street journal, January 31, 1963. 

MSC awarded a contract to Chance Vought Corporati

guidance system techniques for the LEM in an abort dur

NASA News Release 63-41, "January Contracts," March 4, 1963. 

NASA authorized North American to extend until Jun

shield development program. This gave the company tim

recommend one of the three ablative materials still under 

materials were subjected to tests of thermal performa

mechanical properties, and structural compatibility with 

shield substructure. North American sought also to det

facturing feasibility of placing the materials in a Fib

matrix bonded to a steel substructure. (See November 19

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Syst

Change Authorization No. Thirteen, Revision 2," March 11, 1963. 

26 
AlthougJ; the Apollo earth landing system was designed to withstand the 

shock of coming down on varying terrains, some experience was necessary 

to verify this capabiiity. Because of the complexity of the Apollo mission 

and because the earth landing system did not provide a means of avoiding 

obstacles, landing accuracy was even more significant for Apollo than for 

Gemini. With so many variables involved, Williams recommended that 

specific landing locations for future missions not be immediately designated. 

(See March 5 and February 25, 1964.) 

Memorandum, Walter C. Williams, MSC, to NASA Headquarters, Attn: OMSF, "Designation of Landing Sites for Projects Gemini and Apollo," February I, 1963. 

Aerojet-General Corporation, Sacramento, Calif., began full-scale firings of 

a service propulsion engine with a redesigned injector baffle. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

January 27- February 23, 1963," p. 56. 

NASA announced a simplified terminology for the Saturn booster series: 

Saturn C-1 became "Saturn I," Saturn C-lB becatne "Saturn IB," and 

Saturn C-5 became "Saturn V." 

MSC Fact Sheet No. 136, "NASA Simplifies Names of Saturn Launch Vehicles," February 

7, 1963. 

MSC issued a definitive contract for $15 029 420 to the Raytheon Company, 

Space and Information Systems Division, to design and develop the CM 

onboard digital computer. The contract was in support of the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, which was developing the Apollo guidance and 

navigation systems. Announcement of the contract was made on February 

II. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

January 27- February 23, 1963," p. 29; MSC News Release 63- 18, February II, 1963; 

Missiles and Rockets, 12 (February 18, 1963), p. 42. 

The first inertial reference integrating gyro produced by AC Spark Plug 

was accepted by NASA and delivered to the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory. (See November 1962.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

J anuary 27- February 23, 1963," p. 57. 

27 

6 

7 

8 

11 
A completed crawler-transporter at Merritt Island

1963 	 NASA selected the Marion Power Shovel Company to design 

crawler-transport, a device to haul the Apollo space vehi

February 

complete with spacecraft and associated launch equipment) fr

12 	 Assembly Building to the Merritt Island, Fla., launch pad

about 5.6 kilometers (3.5 miles). The crawler would be 39

feet) long, 35 meters (115 feet) wide, and 6. meters (20 feet) h

weight 2.5 million kilograms (5.5 million pounds). NASA p

two crawlers at a cost of $4 to $5 million each. Formal neg

on February 20 and the contract was signed on March 29. 

Saturn Illustrated Chronology (MHR-3, August 10, 1964), p. 73; NASA 

63-27, "Marion to Build NASA Crawler," February 12, 1963. 

13 	 In a reorganization of ASPO, MSC announced the appoi

deputy managers. Robert 0. Piland, deputy for the LEM, 

Decker, deputy for the CSM, would supervise cost, schedule

sign, and production. J. Thomas Markley was named Spec

the Apollo Manager, Charles W. Frick. Also appointed to 

positions were Caldwell C. Johnson, Manager, Spacecraft 

CSM; Owen E. Maynard, Acting Manager, Spacecraft System

and David W. Gilbert, Manager, Spacecraft Systems Office, 

Navigation. 

MSC News Release 63-27, February 13, 1963. 

13 	 Grumman began discussions with Rocketdyne on the dev

throttleable LEM descent engine. Engine specifications (h

10: l thrust 	variation) had been laid down by MSC. (See M

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manne

January 27-February 23, 1963," p. 57; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report N

28 
y

vair for the Little Joe II test vehicle. (See May II, 1962, Vol. 1.) A number 

of changes defined by contract change proposals were incorporated irito the 

final document: 

• Four instead of five vehicles to be manufactured and delivered 

• Launching from White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), N.M., instead 

of Cape Canaveral 

• Additional support equipment, better definition of vehicle design, 

and responsibility for launch support. 

Little joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-2, 

l-4; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space 

Flight, January 27-February 23, 1963," p. 28. 

A boilerplate spacecraft is 

dropped in the impact test 

facility at NAA's Downey, 

Calif., plant. The tower was 

43.6 meters (143 feet) high, 

the pendulum pivot was 

38.1 meters (125 feet), and 

maximum impact velocity 

was 12.2 meters (40 feet) per 

second vertical and 15.2 

meters (50 feet) per second 

horizontal. - NAA photo. 
19 

20 

20 

21 

py gp,, p ; 

1963, p. 312. 

North American shipped CM boilerplate 19 to Northro

as "a parachute test vehicle. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, M

January 27- February 23, 1963," p. 55. 

At a meeting of the MSC-MSFC Flight Mechanics Pa

that Marshall would investigate "engine-out" capability 

performance should one of its engines fail) for use in 

alternative missions. Not all Saturn I, IB, and V miss

engine-out capability. Also, the panel decided that the la

would be jettisoned ten seconds after S-IV ignition on 

vehicles. (See March 28.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, M

January 27-February 23, 1963," p. 58. 

In a reorganization of OMSF, Director D. Brainerd 

Joseph F. Shea as Deputy Director for Systems and G

Deputy Director for Programs. All major OMSF directora

reported directly to Holmes. In the new organizational 

of Systems Studies William A. Lee, Director of Systems 

A. Gautraud, and Director of Integration and Checko

would report to Shea. Director of Launch Vehicles Mil

rector of Space Medicine Charles H. Roadman, and the 

craft and Flight Missions (then vacant) would report to 

Lilly, Director of Administration, would provide adm

in both major areas. 

NASA News Release 63- 32, "Holmes Names Two Deputies," Febr

Washington Post, February 21, 1963. 

MSC issued a Request for Proposals (due by March 1

altimeter system. Greater accuracy than that provided 

would be needed during the descent to the lunar surfac

last moments before touchdown. Preliminary MSC stu

the general feasibility of an altimeter system using a s

tronics package. After final selection and visual observat

site, radioactive material would be released at an altitude 

(100 feet) and allowed to fall to the surface. The detecto

conjunction with electronic circuitry to compute the sp

30 

adaptability of Surveyor and other unmanned probes for use with manned 

miSSIOnS. 

MSC, "Consolidated Monthly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned 


Space Flight, February 24-March 23, 1963," p. 44. 


Grumman began initial talks with the Bell Aerosystems Company on de­ 25 

velopment of the LEM ascent engine. Complete specifications were expected 

by March 2. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 


January 27-February 23, 1963," p. 28. 


MSC ordered North American to provide batteries, wholly independent of 25 

the main electrical system in the CM, to fire all pyrotechnics aboard the 

spacecraft. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 


Change Authorization No. Twenty-Eight," February 25, 1963. 


NASA announced the signing of a formal contract with The Boeing Com­ 25 

pany for the S-IC (first stage) of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the largest 

Aerial view of the Michoud Operations Plant, New Orleans, La. 
26 

26 

27 

27 

advance testing would be done at MSFC and the Mississ

facility. 

NASA News Release 6~37, "NASA Contracts with Boeing for Satu

ary 25, 1963; Aviation Daily, February 27, 1963, p. 361. 

Two aerospace technologists at MSC, James A. Ferrando 

berry, Jr., analyzed orbital constraints on the CSM im

capability of the LEM during the descent and hover ph

sion. Their study concerned the feasibility of rendezvo

gency demand an immediate return to the CSM. 

Ferrando and Lineberry found that, once abort factors a

exist "very few" orbits that are acceptable from which t

They reported that the most advantageous orbit for 

a 14 7 -kilometer (80-nautical-mile) circular one. 

Memorandum, James A. Ferrando and Edgar C. Lineberry, Jr., to 

tions Div., "The Influence of LEM Abort Capability Upon the Sele

Module Lunar Orbit," February 26, 1963. 

NASA selected Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Inc., to design M

tion facility, including a centrifuge capable of spinni

and its crew at gravity forces equal to those experienced 

Space Business Daily, February 26, 1963, p. 243; Aviation Daily, Feb

Aviation Daily reported an announcement by Frank 

LEM Project Manager at Grumman, that a Request 

be issued in about two weeks for the development of 

propulsion system. Because the descent stage presented 

LEM's "biggest development problem," Canning sa

program was essential. 

Aviation Daily, February 27, 1963, p . 362. 

The Apollo Mission Planning Panel held its organi

MSC. The panel's function was to develop the lunar lan

coordinate trajectory analyses for all Saturn missions

tingency plans for all manned Apollo missions. 

Membership on the panel included representatives 

NASA Headquarters, North American, Grumman, an

NASA Centers being called on when necessary. By 

32 

An artist's concept of the MSC flight acceleration facility. 

accurate mission plan possible, the panel would ensure that the spacecraft 1963 


could satisfy Apollo's anticipated mission objectives. Most of the panel's February 


influence on spacecraft design would relate to the LEM, which was at an 


earlier stage of development than the CSM. The panel was not given respon­


sibility for preparing operational plans to be used on actual Apollo missions, 


however. 


MSC, "Minutes of Meeting on Apollo Mission Planning Panel Organization Meeting, 


February 27, 1963," March 7, 1963. 


Elgin National Watch Company received a subcontract from North Ameri­ 27 


can for the design and development of central timing equipment for the 


Apollo spacecraft. [This equipment provided time-correlation of all space­


craft time-sensitive events. Originally, Greenwich Mean Time was to be used 


to record all events, but this was later changed. (See August 30-September 5, 


1963.)] 


Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1963; Wall Street journal, February 28, 1963. 

Grumman began fabrication of a one-tenth scale model of the LEM for Durlng 

stage separation tests. In launching from the lunar surface, the LEM's the 

Month 

ascent engine fires just after pyrotechnic severance of all connections between the two stages, a maneuver aptly called "fire in the hole." 

Also, Grumman advised that, from the standpoint of landing stability, a 

five-legged LEM was unsatisfactory. Under investigation were a number 

33 
Department to proceed with the PACE program. (See M

Month 

[PACE (prelaunch automatic checkout equipment) wo

spacecraft checkout. It would be computer-directed and op

control.] 

GE, "Support Program Monthly Progress Report, February 1963," 

[NOTE: Use of the acronym "PACE" was sui:Jsequently dropped at t

company claiming prior rights to the name.] 

March 	 Grumman began initial discussions with Hamilton Stan

velopment of the LEM environmental control system. 4 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Man

January 27-February 23, 1963," p. 57; "Consolidated Monthly Activit

Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, February 24-March 23, 19

The first photos released by General Dynamics/Convair in Sa

the assembly of the Little Joe II launch vehicle included 

the thrust bulkhead. This was the lowest section of the v

secure the seven solid-fuel rockets in the inner chambers. T

was used in the qualification test flight in August 1963. 

-Genera
Many modes of recovering the spacecraft or launch vehicle stages were considered 

at various times in the early years of the Apollo program. All these considerations prompted the accompanying cartoon, produced by an unidentified artist, incorporating the use of rotors, parasail, glidesail, and solid 

parachutes to return a happy first stage back to earth while two feathered 

friends hitched a ride and wondered how it worked. 

As a parallel to the existing Northrop Ventura contract, and upon authori­ 1963 

zation by NASA, North American awarded a contract for a solid parachute March 

program to the Pioneer Parachute Company. [A solid parachute is one with 

4

solid (unbroken) gores; the sole opening in the canopy is a vent at the top. 

Ringsail parachutes (used on the Northrop Ventura recovery system) have 

slotted gores. In effect, each panel formed on the gores becomes a "sail."] 

(See June 28.) 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3," p. 18; letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space 


and Information Systems Div., "Contract Change Authorization No. Twenty-Seven," 


February 25, 1963. 


MSC "acquired" under a loan agreement an amphibious landing craft from 4 

the Army. Equipment to retrieve Apollo boilerplate spacecraft and other 

objects used in air drops and flotation tests was installed. The vessel, later 

named the Retriever, arrived at its Seabrook, Tex., docking facility late m 

June. 

MSC News Release 63-38, "MSC Acquires Test Vehicle," March 4, 1963; MSC, Space 


News Roundup, June 26, 1963, p. I. 


35 
5 

5 

6 

was sged. (See 

ay 6.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Monthly Activity Report for the Office of the D

Space Flight, February 24-March 23, 1963," p. 30; "Consolidated Activity 

Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, September 22-0ctober 19, 

NASA announced an American agreement with Australia, s

ary 26, that permitted the space agency to build and oper

tracking stations "down under." A key link in the Jet Pro

tory's network of Deep Space Instrumentation Facilities 

structed in Tidbinbilla Valley, 18 kilometers (11 miles) so

berra. Equipment at this site included a 26-meter (85-foot

antenna and electronic equipment for transmitting, receivi

.ing radio signals from spacecraft. Tracking stations would 

Carnarvon and Darwin. 

NASA News Release 63-47, "NASA to Establish Deep Space Track

Australia," March 5, 1963; Aviation Daily, March 8, 1963, p. 52. 

The Mission Analysis Branch (MAB) of MSC's Flight Ope

cited the principal disadvantages of the land recovery m

missions. (See February 1.) Of primary concern was the possi

in an unplanned area and the concomitant dangers invo

recovery, the main disadvantages were the establishment of 

areas in the southern hemisphere and the apex-down flo

MAB believed no insurmountable obstacles existed for e

(See February 25, 1964.) 

Memorandum, John Bryant, MSC, to Chief, FOD, "Operational Cons

Selection of Primary Land or Sea Return Areas for Apollo," March 5

North American completed construction of Apollo boilerp

sisting of launch escape tower and CSM. It was delivered to 

18, where dynamic testing on the vehicle began two days la

BP-9 was ·sent to MSFC for compatibility tests with the 

vehicle. 

MSC, "Consolidated Monthly Activity Report for the Office of the D

Space Flight, February 24-March 23, 1963," p. 50; Oakley, Historical 

Apollo Program, p. 8; Birmingham Post-Herald, April 5, 1963; The H

April 9, 1963; The Binningham News, April 9, 1963. 

The first Block I Apollo pulsed integrating pendulum 

produced by the Sperry Gyroscope Company, was delive

Instrumentation Laboratory. [Three accelerometers were p

36 


6 
of fluid tanks, and two batteries for peak power loads. For industrial competition to develop the power sources, Grumman suggested Pratt and 

Whitney Aircraft and GE for the fuel cells, and Eagle-Picher, Electrical 

Storage Battery, Yardney, Gulton, and Delco-Remy for the batteries. 

"Activity Report, RASPOfGAEC, 3/3/63-3/9/63" (undated), pp. l-2. 

North American moved CM boilerplate (BP) 6 from the manufacturing 8 

facilities to the Apollo Test Preparation Interim Area at Downey, Calif. 

During a visit to NAA during March 1963, Astronauts.M. Scott Carpenter, John 

H. Glenn, Jr., and Walter M. Schirra, Jr., took time out to "try the spacecraft 


on for size." The spacecraft mockup was one of the items inspected as they 


~oured the NAA spacecraft facilities at Downey, Calif. 

10 

11 

11 

11 

13 

Grumman presented its first monthly progress report on 

accordance with NASA's list of high-priority items, princi

work was concentrated on spacecraft and subsystem confi

mission plans and test program investigations, common u

surveys, and preparation for implementing subcontractor ef

"Monthly Progress Report No. 1," LPR-10-1, p. 4. 

Grumman completed its first "fire-in-the-hole" model tes

1963.) Even though preliminary data agreed with predic

nonetheless planned to have a support contractor, the M

verify the findings. 

"Activity Report, RASPOfGAEC, 3f 10f6?r-3fi6f63" (undated), p. 2. 

NASA announced signing of the contract with Grumman 

of the LEM. (See November 19, 1962.) Company officials 

document on January 21 and, following legal reviews, NAS

had formally approved the agreement on March 7. Und

contract (NA.S 9-1100) ($362.5 million for costs and $25.4 

Grumman was authorized to design, fabricate, and deliver 

and 11 flight vehicles. The contractor would also provide 

for Apollo flights. MSC outlined a developmental approa

into the contract as "Exhibit B, Technical Approach," t

"framework within which the initial design and operationa

LEM were developed. 

NASA-MSC, "Lunar Excursion Module, Project Apollo, Exhibit B, Tec

Contract NAS 9- 1100," December 20, 1962, p . 1; MSF Management C

January 29, 1963, Agenda Item 3, "MSC Status Report," pp. 

Management Council Minutes, January 29, 1963, p. 3; MSC, "Conso

Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, Fe

23, 1963," p. 29; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3," p. 1; NAS

63-51, "Contract Signed to Develop Lunar Excursion Module," March 

Grumman began early contract talks with the Marquardt 

development of the LEM reaction control system. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director

Flight, January 27- February 23, 1963," p. 57; "Consolidated Monthly Ac

the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, February 24--March 2

The first stage of the Saturn SA-5 launch vehicle was stati

for 144.44 seconds in the first long-duration test for a Bl

cluster of eight H-1 engines produced 680 thousand kilogr

38 

throttled descent engine to be developed concurrently with Rocketdynes 

helium injection descent engine. (See February 27.) Corporations represented were Space Technology Laboratories; United Technology Center, 

a division of United Aircraft Corporation; Reaction Motors Division, 

Thiokol Chemical Corporation; and Aerojet-General Corporation. Technical and cost proposals were due at Grumman on April 8. 

"Activity Report, RASPOfGAEC, 3fl0f63-3fl6f63" (undated), p. I. 

Homer E. Newell, Director of NASA's Office of Space Sciences, summarized 

results of studies by Langley Research Center and Space Technology 

Laboratories on an unmanned lunar orbiter spacecraft. These studies had 

been prompted by questions of the reliability and photographic capabilities 

of such spacecraft. Both studies indicated that, on a five-shot program, the 

A model of a two-man lunar 

landing "bug" developed by 

Martin Company of Baltimore simulated the critical 

rendezvous and docking 

portions of a manned mission to the moon. The twoman "bug" featured a round 

docking ring into which a 

simulated nose cone of an 

Apollo spacecraft could be 

inserted as part of a rendez. 

vous and docking maneuver. 

The "bug" could move up 

to about 25 degrees about 

three axes of motion-roll, 

pitch, and yaw. The nose 

cone of the simulated 

Apollo spacecraft approaching a docking maneuver. 

-Martin Company photo. 

14 
THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

1963 probability was .93 for one and .81 for two successful missions; they also

Mareh confirmed that the spacecraft would be capable of photographing a landed

Surveyor to assist in Apollo site verification.

Memorandum, Newell, NASA, to Dir., OMSF, “Questions on the unmanned lunar orbiter,” March 14, 1963, with four enclosures; Bruce K. Byers, “Lunar Orbiter; a Preliminary

History’’ (HHN-71), August 1969, pp. 21-22.

20 John A. Hombeck, president of Bellcomm, testified before the House

Committee on Science and Astronautics’ Subcommittee on Manned Space 

Flight concerning the nature and scope of Bellcomm’s support for NASA’s 

Apollo program. In answer to the question as to how Bellcomm would 

decide “which area would be the most feasible’’ for a lunar landing, Hornbeck replied, “. . . the safety of the landing—that will be the paramount 

thing.” He said that his company was studying a number of likely areas, 

but would “not recommend a specific site at the moment.” Further, “ Preliminary studies . . . suggest that the characteristics of a ‘good’ site for early 

exploration might be (1) on a lunar sea, (2) 10 miles [16 kilometers] from a 

continent, and (3) 10 miles [16 kilometers] from a postmarial crater.” This 

type of site, Hornbeck said, would permit the most scientific activity

Oscar T. Simpson, General Manager of Philco Corporation’s Western Develop­ ment Laboratories, signed the definitive contract for Philco’s activities in equipping the Mission Control Center. Looking on was James Stroup, a contracting officer for MSC.
practicable, and would enable NASA’s planners to design future missions 1963

for even greater scientific returns. March

U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight of the Committee on

Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, Hearings on H.R. 5466 (Superseded

by H.R. 7500), [No. 3] Part 2(a), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), p. 378.

MSC awarded the Philco Corporation a definitive contract (worth almost 21

$33.8 million) to provide flight information and flight control display equipment (with the exception of the realtime computer complex) for the Mission 

Control Center at MSC. NASA Headquarters approved the contract at the 

end of the month.

MSC, “Consolidated Monthly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned

Space Flight, February 24-March 23, 1963,” p. 29; “Apollo Quarterly Status Report No.

3,” p. 49; Space Business Daily, April 4, 1963, p. 432.

General Dynamics/Convair completed structural assembly of the first 25

launcher for the Little Joe II test program. During the next few weeks, 

electrical equipment installation, vehicle mating, and checkout were completed. The launcher was then disassembled and delivered to WSMR on 

April 25, 1963.

Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-4

and 1-6.

North American analyzed lighting conditions in the CM and found that 25-31

glossy or light-colored garments and pressure suits produced unsatisfactory 

reflections on glass surfaces. A series of tests were planned to define the 

allowable limits of reflection on windows and display panel faces to preclude interference with crew performance.

“Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program, Weekly Activity Report (Period 25 March

1963 through 31 March 1963),” p. 5.

Hamilton Standard Division awarded a contract to ITT/Kellogg for the 26

design and manufacture of a prototype extravehicular suit telemetry and 

communications system to be used with the portable life support system.

(See November 27, 1962.)

Memorandum, Michael B. Luse, MSC, to Crew Systems Division, Attn; M. I. Radnofsky,

“Extra-Vehicular Suit Telemetry and Communication System,” March 11, 1964.

PART i: DEFINING CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

MSC announced the beginning of CM environmental control system tests 

at the AiResearch Manufacturing Company simulating prelaunch, ascent, 

orbital, and reentry pressure effects. Earlier in the month, analysis had indicated that the CM interior temperature could be maintained between 

294 K (70° F) and 300 K (80° F) during all flight operations, although prelaunch temperatures might rise to a maximum of 302 K (84° F).

“Apollo Monthly Progress Report,” SID 62-300-11, p. 12; MSC News' Release 63-rBl,

March 26, 1963.

41
THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

1963 A meeting was held at North American to define CM-space suit interface

March problem areas. (See January 24.) Demonstrations of pressurized Inter26-28 national Latex suits revealed poor crew mobility and task performance inside

the CM, caused in part by the crew’s unavoidably interfering with one 

another.

Other items received considerable attention: A six-foot umbilical hose 

would be adequate for the astronaut in the CM. The location of spacecraft 

water, oxygen, and electrical fittings was judged satisfactory, as were the 

new couch assist handholds. The astronaut’s ability to operate the environmental control system (ECS) oxygen flow control valve while couched and 

pressurized was questionable. Therefore, it was decided that the ECS valve 

would remain open and that the astronaut would use the suit control 

valve to regulate the flow. It was also found that the hand controller must 

be moved about nine inches forward.

Memorandum, J. F. Saunders, Jr., RASPO/NAA, to L. McMillion, MSC, “Data Transmittal,’’ April 5, 1963, with enclosures: Agenda and Minutes of Meeting, “Command

Module—Space Suit Interface Meeting No. 4, NAA, Downey—26, 27, 28 March 1963.’’

27 The Apollo Mission Planning Panel (see February 27) set forth two firm 

requirements for the lunar landing mission. First, both LEM crewmen 

must be able to function on the lunar surface simultaneously. MSC contractors were directed to embody this requirement in the design and development of the Apollo spacecraft systems. Second, the panel established 

duration limits for lunar operations. These limits, based upon the 48-hour 

LEM operation requirement, were 24 hours on the lunar surface and 24 

hours in flight on one extreme, and 45 surface hours and 3 flight hours on 

the other. Grumman was directed to design the LEM to perform throughout 

this range of mission profiles.

MSC, “Abstract of Meeting on Apollo Mission Planning Meeting No. 1, March 27, 1963,’’

March 29, 1963; memorandum, Robert V. Battey, MSC, to Action Committee, “Errata to

Abstract of Mission Planning Panel Meeting No. I,” April 1, 1963.

28 NASA launched Saturn SA-4 from Cape Canaveral. The S-I Saturn stage 

reached an altitude of 129 kilometers (80 statute miles) and a peak velocity 

of 5906 kilometers (3660 miles) per hour. This was the last of four successful 

tests for the first stage of the Saturn I vehicle. After 100 seconds of flight, 

No. 5 of the booster’s eight engines was cut off by a preset timer. That 

engine’s propellants were rerouted to the remaining seven, which continued 

to burn. This experiment confirmed the “engine-out” capability that MSFC 

engineers had designed into the Saturn I. (See February 20.)

Saturn Illustrated Chronology, pp. 76-77; History of Marshall . . . January 1-June 10,

1963, Vol. I, pp. 16-18.

42
The Saturn SA-4 stood on Pad 34, Cape Canaveral, shortly before liftoff. 

North American selected two subcontractors to build tankage for the SM: 

Allison Division of General Motors Corporation to fabricate the fuel and March 

oxidizer tanks; and Airite Products, Inc., those for helium storage. During 

the 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300--ll, p. 3. Month 

RCA completed a study on ablative versus regenerative cooling for the During 

thrust chamber of the LEM ascent engine. Because of low cooling margins the 

Month 

available with regenerative cooling, Grumman selected the ablative 

43 

1963 
Month 

design specifications for the LEM communications syst

sions led to a simpler design for the S-hand receiver and t

the S-hand transmitter (required because of North A

approach). 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 2," LPR-10-2, p . 15. 

During MSC sent MIT and Grumman radar configuration requ

the LEM. The descent equipment would be a three-beam d

Month 

a two-position antenna. Operating independently of the 

and navigation system, it would determine altitude, rat

horizontal velocity from 7000 meters (20 000 feet) above 

The LEM rendezvous radar, a gimbaled antenna with a 

of movement, and the rendezvous transponder mounted 

would provide tracking data, thus aiding the LEM to inte

CM. The SM would be equipped with an identical rend

transponder. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3," p . 23. 

During MSC reported that preliminary plans for Apollo scientifi

the had been prepared with the cooperation of NASA Head

Quarter 

pulsion Laboratory, and the Goddard Space Flight Cen

periments would not be selected until about Decemb

scientists time to prepare proposals. Prime consideration 

to experiments that promised the maximum return for 

and complexity, and to those that were man-oriented and 

spacecraft restraints. Among those already suggested we

(active and passive), and instruments to measure the surfac

magnetic field, radiation spectrum, soil density, and gravit

planned to procure most of this equipment through t

munity and through other NASA and government organi

Ibid., p. 30. 

During To provide a more physiologically acceptable load factor o

the reentry and abort, MSC was considering revised angles f

Quarter 

in the CM. To reduce the couch's complexity, North A

44 

to be stowed in the CM. Smaller equipment and consumables would be 

distributed between modules according to mission phase requirements. 

Ibid., p. 22. 

Grumman began "Lunar Hover and Landing Simulation IliA," a series 

of tests simulating a LEM landing. Crew station configuration and instrument panel layout were representative of the actual vehicle. 

Through this simulation, Grumman sought primarily to evaluate the 

astronauts' ability to perform the landing maneuver manually, using semiautomatic as well as degraded attitude control modes. Other items evaluated 

included the flight control system parameters, the attitude and thrust controller configurations, the pressure suit's constraint during landing maneuvers, the handling qualities and operation of LEM test article 9 as a freeflight vehicle, and manual abort initiation during the terminal landing 

maneuver. 

GAEC, "Final Report: Lunar Landing Simulation IliA," LED-77o-4, April 1, 1964, p. 1. 

The Soviet Union announced the successful launch of the Lunik IV probe 

toward the moon. The 1412-kilogram (3135-pound) spacecraft's mission was 

not immediately disclosed, but Western observers speculated that an instrumented soft landing was planned. On April 6, at 4:26a.m. Moscow time, 

Lunik IV passed within 8499 kilometers (5281 miles) of the moon. The 

Soviet news agency, Tass, reported that data had been received from the 

spacecraft throughout its flight and that radio communication would continue for a few more days. 

The Washington Post, April 3 and 5, 1963; The New York Times, April 3, 1963; The 

Sunday Star, Washington, April 7, 1963. 

Charles W. Frick resigned as ASPO Manager and Robert 0. Piland was 

named Acting ASPO Manager. 

MSC Announcement 178, "New Assignment of Personnel," April 3, 1963. 

At a North American design review, NASA representatives expressed a 

preference for a fixed CM crew couch. This would have the advantages of 

45 


April 

2 

3 

3 
A number of "boilerplate" 

command modules were 

fabricated as test vehicles 

early in the Apollo program. Above, inspecting the 

assembly of one on April 1, 

1963, were George Lemke, 

left, NASA resident Apollo 

project manager, and John 

Paup, vice president of 

NAA's Space and Information Systems Division and 

Apollo project manager. At 

right, an Apollo command 

module heatshield skin is 

pre-fitted with metal honeycomb at NAA's Downey 

plant, as J. W. Fleetwood, 

right, manager of Apollo 

manufacturing, and general 

foreman B. E. Dean discuss 

the project. -NAA photos. 
g g p

adjust their normal body position for proper viewing. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-12, p. 11; ibid., SID 62-300-13, June 1, 

1963, pp. 1, 7-8. 

North American awarded a $9.5 million letter contract to the Link Division 

of General Precision, Inc., for the development and installation of two 

spacecraft simulators, one at MSC and the other at the Launch Operations 

Center. Except for weightlessness, the trainers would simulate the entire 

lunar mission, incl.uding sound and lighting effects. (See December 8, 1962.) 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," p. 40; "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 

62-300-12, p. 2; Aviation Daily, May 1, 1963, p. 1. 

Wesley E. Messing, MSC WSMR Operations Manager, notified NASA, 

North American, and General DynamicsjConvair (GD /C) that Phase I of 

the range's launch complex was completed. GD/C and North American 

could now install equipment for the launch of boilerplate 6 and the Little 

Joe II vehicle. 

TWX, Messing to MSC (Attn: W. C. Williams and R. 0. Piland), NASA Hqs (Attn: G. 

M. Low), GDfC (Attn: J. B. Hurt), and NAA, S&ID (Attn: J. L. Pearce), April 10, 1963. 

North American chose Simmonds Precision Products, Inc., to design and 

build an electronic measurement and display system to gauge the service 

propulsion system propellants. Both a primary and a backup system were 

required by the contract, which was expected to cost about $2 million. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62- 300-13, p. 2; Space Business Daily, June 26, 

1963, p. 824. 

On the basis of wind tunnel tests and analytical studies, North American 

recommended a cl.ange in the planned test of the launch escape system 

(LES) using boilerplate 22. In an LES abort, the contractor reported, 18 300 

meters (60 000 feet) was the maximum altitude at which high dynamic 

pressure had to be considered. Therefore North American proposed an 

abort simulation at that altitude, where maximum dynamic pressures were 

reached, at a speed of Mach 2. 5. 

The abort test would demonstrate two possibly critical areas: 

(1) Any destablizing effect of large LES motor plumes on the CM 

47 

10 

10 

16-May 15 

16-May 15 
17 

y 

North American simplified the CM water management sy

it from the freon system. A 4.5-kilogram ( l 0-pound) freon 

in the left-hand equipment bay. Waste water formed dur

boost, previously ejected overboard, could now be used 

coolant. The storage capacity of the potable water tank 

29 to 16 kilograms (64 to 36 pounds) and the tank was m

equipment bay to protect it from potential damage duri

and other minor changes caused a reduction in CM weig

in the reliability of the CM's water management system. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," p. 7; "Apollo Monthly Pro

62-300- 13, p. 13. 

At a mechanical systems meeting at MSC, customer and c

a preliminary configuration freeze for the LEM. After 

cussion," Grumman agreed to begin designing systems an

on this configuration, bearing in mind that certain un

docking system scanning telescope location and function

A Lockheed Propulsion Company technician tightened bolts 

escape motor in preparation for its delivery to NAA. 
Combustion experiments for Project Apollo produced striking results at Honeywell's Aeronautical Division in Minneapolis. Over 115 different materials 

which might be used in or on the Honeywell-developed Apollo stabilization 

and control system were tested to determine ease of ignition, duration and 

effect of burning, and toxicity of burn-products in a typical space capsule 

atmosphere. Test specimens of materials ranging from wire insulation, tapes 

and tying cords to foams, casting resins, and plastics were suspended in a 

bell jar containing a 100-percent oxygen atmosphere. An electrically heated 

coil generated temperatures from 1073 K to ll73 K (800 to 900 degrees C). 

Here, technician Bill Williams closely observed the explosive effect of overheating an epoxy adhesive sample. -Minneapolis-Honeywell photo. 
30 

25-26 

During 

the 

Month 

At ASPO's request, Wayne E. Koons of the Flight Ope

visited North American to discuss several features of spacec

recovery procedures. Koon's objective, in short, was to recom

when ASPO and the contractor disagreed on specific point

alternate courses when the two organizations agreed. A que

about a recovery hoisting loop. Neither group wanted one, 

added weight and caused design changes. In another area, 

wanted to do an elaborate study of the flotation characteri

Koons recommended to ASPO that a full-scale model of th

in an open-sea environment. 

There were a number of other cases wherein North Ame

agreed on procedures which simply required formal stat

would be done. Examples of these were: 

• Spacecraft reaction control fuel would be dumped 

(in both normal and abort operations) 

• The "peripheral equipment bay" would be flooded w

after landing 

• Location aids would be dye markers and recovery an

Memorandum, W. E. Koons, MSC, to Chief, Flight Operations Div., "R

NAA, S&ID, Downey, Calif., 25-26 April 1963," May 7, 1963. 

The Apollo Spacecraft Mission Trajectory Sub-Panel discuss

orbit requirements for the lunar mission. The maximum n

was fixed by the S-IVB's 4.5-hour duration limit. Norm

injection (TLI) would be made during the second orbit. Th

North American to investigate the trajectory that would r

tion from the third, or contingency, orbit. The contrac

reckon also with the effects of a contingency TLI upon the 

free return trajectory and fixed lunar landing sites. 

Minutes of Second Meeting of the Apollo Spacecraft Mission Traje

April 30, 1963. 

NASA issued a technical note reporting that scientists at 

Center Hypervelocity Ballistic Range, Moffett Field, Calif., 

experiments simulating the impact of micrometeoroids on t

The experimenters examined the threat of surface debris, 

ejecta, that would be thrown from resultant craters. Dat

secondary particles capable of penetrating an astronaut's 

50 

The Hypervelocity Ballistic Missile Range at Ames Research Center launched 

projectiles at speeds up to 27 360 kilometers (17 000 miles) per hour to 

simulate micrometeoroids in outer space. 

equaled the number of primary micrometeoroids. Thus the danger of 1963 

micrometeoroid impact to astronauts on the moon may be almost double April 

what was previously thought. 

Donald E. Gault, Eugene M. Shoemaker, and Henry J. Moore, Spray Ejected From the 


Lunar Surface by Meteoroid Impact, NASA TN D-1767, April 1963, p. I; Aviation 


Week and Space Technology, 78 Oanuary 14, 1964), pp. 54-55, 57, 59. 


NASA and General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) negotiated a second Little During 

Joe II launch vehicle contract. (See February 18.) For an additional $337 456, the 

Month GD jC expanded its program to include the launch of a qualificatiort test 

vehicle before the scheduled Apollo tests. This called for an accelerated 

production schedule for the four launch vehicles and their pair of launchers. 

An additional telemetry system and an instrumentation transmitter system 

were incorporated in the qualification test vehicle, which was equipped 

with a simulated payload. At the same time, NASA established earlier 

launch dates for the first two Apollo Little Joe II missions. 

Little foe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Report, Vol. I, p. 4-3. 

51 
THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

1963

A p ril

D uring

the

M onth

During

the

M onth

Grumman reported to MSC the results of studies on common usage of 

communications. Television cameras for the two spacecraft would be identical (see May 2); the LEM transponder would be as similar as possible to 

that in the CSM.

“Monthly Progress Report No. 3,” LPR-10-6, p. 21.

Grumman recommended that the LEM reaction control system (RCS) be 

equipped with dual interconnected tanks, separately pressurized and employing positive expulsion bladders. The design would provide for an 

emergency supply of propellants from the main ascent propulsion tanks. 

The RCS oxidizer to fuel ratio would be changed from 2. 0:1 to 1.6:1. MSC 

approved both of these changes.

Ibid., p. 20; “Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 3,” p. 20.

Examining a one-eighth scale model of the LEM are, left to right, Congressman George P. Miller, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics; Joseph M. Gavin, Grumman vice president; and Robert S. Mullaney, Grumman Apollo Program Manager. —Grumman photo.
Grumman reported that it had advised North American’s Rocketdyne Division to go ahead with the lunar excursion module descent engine development program. Negotiations were complete and the contract was being prepared for MSC’s review and approval. The go-ahead was formally issued on 

May 2. (See January 30, February 13, and November 21.)

MSC, “Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight,

April 28-May 18, 1963,” p. 32; “Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4,” p. 21; GAEC,

“Monthly Progress Report No. 4,” LPR-10-7, June 10, 1963, p. 2.

NASA, North American, Grumman, and RCA representatives determined 

the alterations needed to make the CM television camera compatible with 

that in the LEM: an additional oscillator to provide synchronization, conversion of operating voltage from 115 AC to 28 DC, and reduction of the 

lines per frame from 400 to 320.

NAA, “Apollo Monthly Progress Report,” SID 62-300-14, July 1, 1963, p. 9.

PART x: DEFINING CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

At El Centro, Calif., Northrop Ventura conducted the first of a series of 

qualification tests for the Apollo earth landing system (ELS). The test 

article, CM boilerplate 3, was dropped from a specially modified Air Force 

C-133. The test was entirely successful. The ELS’s three main parachutes 

reduced the spacecraft’s rate of descent to about 9.1 meters (30 feet) per 

second at impact, within acceptable limits.

MSC News Release 63-85, May 3, 1963; “Apollo Monthly Progress Report,” SID 62-300-

13, p. 10.

NASA authorized North American to procure carbon dioxide sensors as 

part of the environmental control system instrumentation on early spacecraft flights. (See March 5.)

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., “Contract

Change Authorization No. Forty-Three,” May 6, 1963.

Astronauts M. Scott Carpenter, Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Neil A. Armstrong, 

James A. McDivitt, Elliot M. See, Jr., Edward H. White II, Charles Conrad, 

Jr., and John W. Young participated in a study in LTV’s Manned Space 

Flight Simulator at Dallas, Tex. Under an MSC contract, LTV was studying 

the astronauts’ ability to control the LEM manually and to rendezvous 

with the CM if the primary guidance system failed during descent. (See 

September and October 10, 1963, and April 24, 1964.)

MSC News Release 63-81, May 6, 1963.

MSC announced a reorganization of ASPO:

Acting Manager: Robert O. Piland 

Deputy Manager, Spacecraft: Robert O. Piland 

Assistant Deputy Manager for CSM: Caldwell C. Johnson 

Deputy Manager for System Integration: Alfred D. Mardel 

Deputy Manager LEM: James L. Decker

1963

M ay

1

2

3

6

6

53
THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

1963

M a y

A NASA team inspected progress on Little Joe II in San Diego, Calif., May 6, 1963. Left to right, Walter C. Williams, MSC Deputy Director; Acting Apollo Project Manager Robert O. Piland; Convair Little Joe II Program Manager J. B. Hurt; and James C. Elms, MSC Deputy Director.

Manager, Spacecraft Systems Office: David W. Gilbert 

Manager, Project Integration Office: J. Thomas Markley

MSC Announcement No. 193, “Reorganization of the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office,”

May 7, 1963.

54

(
responsibilities between operations and development within MSC. Walter C. 

Williams, Deputy Director for Mission Requirements and Flight Operations, would develop mission plans and rules, crew training, ground support 

and mission control complexes, and would manage all MSC flight operations. At the same time, he would serve as Director of Flight Operations in 

the NASA Headquarters OMSF with complete mission authority during 

flight tests of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. James C. Elms, Deputy 

Director for Development and Programs, would manage all MSC manned 

space flight projects and would plan, organize, and direct MSC administrative and technical support. 

MSC News Release 63-88, May 10, 1963. 

NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., directed that a 10 

Communications and Tracking Steering Panel and a Working Group be 

organized. They would develop specifications, performance requirements, 

and implementation plans for the Manned Space Flight Network in support 

of the Apollo flight missions. 

Memorandum, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA, to Director, Office of Manned Space Flight, 


et a!., "Functional organization to develop specifications, performance requirements and 


implementation plans for the Manned Space Flight Network," May 10, 1963. 


Grumman Early selected Space Technology Laboratories (STL) to develop and 

in fabricate a mechanically throttled descent engine for the LEM, paralleling the 

Rocketdyne's effort. (See February 27 and March 14.) Following NASA Month 

and MSC concurrence, Grumman began negotiations with STL on June 1. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 


April 28-May 18, 1963," p . 32; "Monthly Progress Report No. 4," LPR-10--7, p. 44; 


"Activity Report, Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, May 16--June 13, 1963," p. 8. 


Grumman submitted to NASA a Quality Control Program Plan for the 14 


LEM, detailing efforts in management, documentation, training, procure­


ment, and fabrication. 


GAEC, "Report No. 1, Grumman Monthly Quality Status Report for Lunar Excursion 


Module," LPR-50--1, February 14, 1964. 


Grumman, reporting on the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle's (LLRV) IS 

application to the LEM development program, stated the LLRV could be 

used profitably to test LEM hardware. Also included was a development 

55 
20 

22 

2o-22 

161.3 by 267 kilometer (100.2 by 165.9 statute mile) 

Cooper manually fired the retrorockets and the sp

atmosphere, landing safely in the Pacific Ocean 34 h

49 seconds after liftoff. Astronaut Cooper was report

Cooper's one-day flight turned out to be the final 

June 12.) 

James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology (NASA SP-

In support of NASA's manned space flight programs, A

awarded a $1 50 000 contract to Westinghouse Elect

one-year study of potential physiological damage in s

radiation. 

NASA News Release 63-107, "NASA Awards Contract for Stud

May 20, 1963. 

At a meeting on mechanical systems at MSC, Grumm

report on the LEM landing gear design and LEM 

February and April 17.) On May 9, NASA had dire

consider a more favorable lunar surface than that des

Statement of Work. Accordingly, Grumman recomm

LEMJS- IVB clearance of 152.4 centimeters (40 inch

radius of 457 centimeters (180 inches). Beyond this r

scheme was considered more suitable but would requ

The landing gear envelope study was extended for o

a stowed height of the LEM above the S-IVB for ada

3 and October 2.) 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 4," LPR- 10-7, p. 13. 

Grumman representatives met with the ASPO Ele

(ESP). From ESP, the contractor learned that the comm

handle voice only. Transmission of physiological and 

the LEM to the CM was no longer required. VHF 

and S-band transmission to ground stations was still 

Grumman was asked to study the feasibility of a bac

for communications with crewmen on the lunar su

VHF transmitter fail. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Directo

May 19-June 15, 1963," pp. 54-55; "Monthly Progress Report N

56 
A one-man rocket propulsion device, light enough and small enough to be stored 

in a spacecraft, was designed to give a lunar explorer more range in examining the moon in addition to permitting him to make quick, close examinations. The model was a result of a study made for MSC by Hamilton 

Standard. -Hamilton Standard photo. 

NASA Headquarters, MSC, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC, North 

American, and Grumman agreed that the LEM and CSM would incorporate 

phase-coherent S-band transponders. [The S-band system provides a variety 

of communications services. Being phase-coherent meant that it could also 

57 

1963 

May 

23 
23 

23-24 

24 

10-7, p. 21; MSC, Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the D

Space Flight, May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 62; interview, telephone, Alf

MSC, March 5, 1970. 

MIT suggested a major redesign of the Apollo guidance co

the CM and LEM computers as similar as possible. NAS

redesign and the Raytheon Company, subcontractor for the 

work. 

Raytheon Company, Space and Information Systems Div., "Quarterly 

No. 4," FR- 3-87, April 1-June 30, 1963. 

Meeting in Bethpage, N. Y., officials from MSC, Grum

Standard, International Latex, and North American exam

suit interface problems. This session resulted in several sign

• Suit evaluation would include a vehicle mockup in 

zero and one-sixth g trajectories 

• The suit assembly emergency oxygen supply would 

backup pressurization and oxygen supply during crew tr

CM to the LEM 

• The four-hour operating requirement for the port

system (PLSS) should not be considered for normal operat

• Pending final design of a waste management system, 

retain provisions for stowage of human wastes 

• The thermal garment would not normally be worn 

• The PLSS battery would be charged before earth laun

• Prototype Apollo space suits were to be delivered 

soon as possible for evaluation and vehicle design. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Man

May 19-June 15, 1963," pp. 59-60. 

North American demonstrated problems with side-arm co

and armrest design inside the CM. Major difficulties were 

subject tried to manipulate controls while wearing a pressu

American had scheduled further study of these design prob

"Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program, Weekly Activity Report (Per

through 2 June 1963)," p. 5. 

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth reported to the MSF Man

that the lunar landing mission duration profiles, on which 

would base the £eliability design objectives for mission 

safety and which assumed a 14-day mission, had been 

58 


28 
g g 

ca~ in Columbus, Ohio, and at LTV would be used throughout 1963. Two 

part-task LEM simulators would be operational at Grumman early in 1964, 

with a complete mission simulator available in 1965. MSC had approved 

the contractor's procurement of two visual display systems for use in the 

simulators. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

May 19-June 15, 1963," pp. 62, 63; GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-10­

16, August 10, 1963, p. 5. 

The Operational Evaluation and Test Branch of MSC's Flight Operations 

Division considered three methods of providing a recovery hoisting loop 

on the CM: loop separate from the spacecraft and attached after landing, 

use of the existing parachute bridle, and loop installed as part of the CM 

equipment similar to Mercury and Gemini. Studies showed that the third 

method was preferable. (See April 25-26.) 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Command module recovery hoisting loop," May 29, 1963. 

Rocketdyne reported to Grumman on the LEM descent stage engine 

development program. Revised measurements for the engine were: diameter, 

137 centimeters (54 inches); length, 221 centimeters (87 inches) (30.5 centimeters [twelve inches] more than the original constraint that Grumman 

had imposed on Rocketdyne). 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 61; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," p. 21. 

In its first estimates of reliability for the LEM, Grumman reported a .90 

probability for mission success and .994 for crew safety. (The probabilities 

required by NASA were .984 and .9995, respectively.) 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 4," LPR-10-7, p. 26. 

After a detailed comparison of titanium and aluminum propellant tanks for 

the LEM descent stage, Grumman selected the lighter titanium. 

Ibid., p. 7. 

Grumman studied the possibility of using the portable life support system 

lithium hydroxide cartridges in the LEM environmental control system, and 

29 

30 

During 

the 

Month 

During 

the 

Month 

During 

the 

Month 

59 

1963 

determined that such common usage was feasible. This 

May verified by tests at Hamilton Standard. 

Ibid., p. 12. 

During Grumman completed the LEM M- 1 mockup and bega

the ment in the vehicle. Also, the contractor began revising 

Month to permit comparisons of visibility. (See September 16- 

Ibid., p. 8. 

During NASA and General DynamicsjConvair negotiated a m

the Little Joe II launch vehicle contract. (See February 1

Month 

two additional launch vehicles which would incorporat

trol subsystem (as opposed to the early fixed-fin version)

MSC announced that the contract amendment was be

Headquarters' approval followed a week later. 

Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Re

MSC News Release 63-223, November I, 1963; MSC, "Consolidated 

the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, October 2(}--Novem

60 
North American announced that it had selected ITTs Industrial Products 

Division to provide battery chargers for the CSM, designed for an operational 

lifetime of 40 000 hours. 

Space Business Daily, June 4, 1963, p. 712. 

The $889.3 million definitive Apollo contract with North American was 

delivered to NASA Headquarters for review and approval. The target date 

for approval was extended to June 30. (See August 14.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 33. 

NASA announced that it would select 10 to 15 new astronauts to begin 

training in October. Civilian applications were due July I; those from military personnel, prescreened by their services; were due July 15. New selection criteria reduced the maximum age to 35 years and eliminated the 

requirement for test pilot certifications. 

NASA News Release 63-122, "NASA to Select New Astronauts," June 5, 1963. 

The Operational _Evaluation and Test Branch of MSC's Flight Operations 

Division made the following recommendations on Apollo postlanding water 

survival equipment: 

• Development should continue on a three-man life raft for the Apollo 

mission. 

• A 12-hour-duration dye marker packet should be passively deployed 

on impact. An additional 18 hours of dye marker should be stored in the 

survival kit. 

• Two radio beacons of the type being developed for Gemini should 

be included in the survival kit. 

• Water egress safety features in the Mercury and Gemini space suits 

should be included in the Apollo space suit. 

• All Apollo equipment which might be involved in water egress, 

survival, and recovery situations should be configured for water laridings. 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo postlanding water 

survival equipment," June 6, 1963. 

North American completed a backup testing program (authorized by MSC 

on November 20, 1962) on a number of ablative materials for the CM heatshield. Only one of the materials (Avcoat 5026- 39) performed satisfactorily 

at low temperatures. During a meeting on June 18 at MSC, company 

61 


3 

4 

5 

6 

10 
10 

10 

Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4, p. 15; MSC, Consolidated A

the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, June 16-July 20, 19

"Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space F

1963," p. 8. 

NASA issued a $1 946 450 definitive contract to Aerojet-G

tion for Algol solid-propellant motors for GD jC's Little Jo

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Man

May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 33. 

CZhristopher C. Kraft, Jr., of the MSC Flight Operations 

that an up-data link (UDL) (see January 17) be include

In general, the UDL would function when a great deal o

transmitted during a time-critical phase. It would also p

of the ground operational support system as a relay stati

mission of data between the CM and LEM. In case of pow

the LEM, the UDL could start the computer faster and m

a manual voice link, and it could be us.ed to resume synch

computer timing system. 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Up-D

Lunar Excursion Module," June 10, 1963. 

A sketch prepared by John Gurley demonstrates the space

entering the earth's atmosphere. 

1~- -- Skip range ----

Ballistic Initial 

entry trajectory 

Skip-out 

-- [__________3f!l"!!!l__~e~~---- flight path angle ------------------------------ s~~~

\ Altitude Skip-out entry 

Range 
spacecraft follows a ballistic trajectory until it reencounters the atmosphere. 

During this skip portion of reentry, there is no control of the vehicle's 

flight trajectory. The length of this skip is, therefore, determined by the 

angle and speed at the start of this ballistic trajectory. The distance of the 

skip in turn determines the spacecraft's landing area. Variations in both 

speed and angle at the start of the skip thus are directly related to landing 

accuracy, but the effect of these variations is felt much more in shallow 

than in steep trajectories. In light of these factors, MAB recommended that, 

for Apollo flights, the skip phase of reentry be made at the steepest practicable angle consistent with n1aximum allowable acceleration forces. 

Memorandum, John R. Gurley, MSC, to Chief, Flight Operations Div., "A Study of Skip 

Range Sensitivities and Allowable Errors in Exit Conditions Applicable to the Apollo 

Missions," June 12, 1963. 

NASA Administrator James E. Webb, testifying before the Senate space 

committee, said that NASA did not plan any further Mercury flights. 

Project Mercury, America's first manned space flight program, thus was 

ended. 

Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: 

A History of Project Mercury (NASA SP-4201, 1966), p . 503. 

D. Brainerd ·Holmes announced his resignation as NASA's Deputy Associate 

Administrator and Director of Manned Space Flight, effective sometime 

in the fall. He had joined NASA in 1961 and was returning to industry. 

NASA News Release 63-133, "Holmes Returns to Industry as Mercury Concludes," June 

12, 1963. 

NASA Headquarters approved a definitive contract for $35 844 550 with 

AC Spark Plug for the manufacture and testing of navigation and guidance 

equipment for the CM. This superseded a letter contract of May 30, 1962. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 33; NASA News Release 63-136, "Contract Signed with AC 

Spark Plug for Apollo Guidance System," June 14, 1963; AC Spark Plug, "Apollo Guid· 

ance and Navigation System Participating Contractor Quarterly Technical Progress Report," January 1963, p. 2-1. 

MSC conducted the final inspection of the Little Joe II launch complex at 

WSMR. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

May 19-June 15, 1963," p. 31. 

63 

12 

12 

14 

14 
1963 

June 

14-15 

14-19 

Above is an artist's concept 

of the instructor-operator 

station to control the Apollo 

mission simulator and to 

monitor crew performance 

via dosed-circuit TV monitors. At right, Lloyd L. 

Kelly, President of Link 

Group, General Precision, 

Inc., inspects a I/ lOth-scale 

model of the simulator for 

the command module and 

visual system. This engineering model was used in 

checking clearances, service 

access, and overall configur~ 

ation requirements. 

-Link photos. 

At its plant in Binghampton, N. Y., Link Division of G

Inc., held a mockup review of the Apollo mission simulat

modifications in the instructor's console were suggested. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," p. 40. 

The Soviet Union launched Vostok V, piloted by Lt. Col. 

sky. Two days later Lt. VCJlentina V. Tereshkova, the f

followed in Vostok VI. Purposes of the dual mission w

medical-biological effects of prolonged space flight upon 

perfect spacecraft systems. On its first orbit, Vostok VI ca

three miles of Vostok V, apparently the closest distance ach

flight, and established radio contact. Both cosmonauts 

June 19. The space spectacular featured television cove

that was viewed in the West as well as in Russia. 

64 
flights simulated the LEMs attitude, velocity, range, and dive angle in the 

final approach trajectory. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," p . 18; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for 

the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, June 16-July 20, 1963," p . 27. 

MSC reported that crew systems engineers at the Center were assessing 

feasibility of having the LEM crew stand rather than sit_ MSC requested 

Grumman also to look into having the crew fly the vehicle from a standing 

position. The concept was formally proposed at the August 27 crew systems 

meeting and was approved at the NASA-Grumman review of the LEM M-1 

mockup on September 16-18. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

June 16-July 20, 1963," p . 77; "Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-10-16, p. 12; 

MSC, "Apollo Spacecraft Project Office Activity Report, June 14--July 18, 1963," p . [15]. 

North American signed (and NASA approved) a definitive contract with 

Allison Division of General Motors for the service propulsion system propellant tanks. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

June 23-29, 1963," p. 6. 

MSC met with those contractors partiCipating in the development of the 

LEM guidance and navigation system. (See October 18.) Statements of Work 

for the LEM design concept were agreed upon. (Technical directives covering most of the work had been received earlier by the contractors.) 

MSC, "Activity Report, Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, For Period June 21-27, 1963," 

P· 2. 

North American awarded a contract, valued at $2.8 million, to Avien, Inc., 

to develop the steerable S-band antenna for the CSM. (See June 11-18, 

1964.) 

Ibid.; Space Business Daily, July 18, 1963, p. 95. 

North American officially froze the design of the CM's stabilization and 

control system. 

"Abstract of Proceedings, Command Module Stabilization and Control Systems Meeting 

No. 16," June 27, 1963, p. I; MSC, "Activity Report, Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, 

For Period June 21-27, 1963," p. 2. 

65 

1~July 20 

20 

21-27 

21-27 

22 
Relationship of SCS to other Apollo subsyste

Left, lunar module, 1962; right, lunar module, 

MSC Direct0r Robert R. Gilruth reported to the MSF M

that the LEM landing gear design freeze was now sched

Grumman had originally proposed a LEM configuration 

but LEM changes had made this concept impractical. 

1963 

June 

25 

66 

reliable than the five-legged configuration. (See October 2.) 

"Lunar Excursion Module Design Status" (undated), prepared for Gilruth's presentation 

at the June 25, 1963, meeting of the MSF Management Council, held at the Manned 

Spacecraft Center. 

The first full-scale firing of the SM engine was conducted at the Arnold 26 

Engineering Development Center. At the start of the shutdown sequence, 

Arnold Engineering Development Center altitude rocket test facility. 


-AEDC photo. 

26 	 MSC anno~uiced that it had contracted with the Martin C

velop a frictionless platform to simulate the reactions of an 

astronaut in five degrees of freedom-pitch, yaw, roll, for

and side-to-side. MSC Crew Systems Division would use th

test and evaluate space suits, stabilization devices, tethering 

MSC News Release 63-108, June 26, 1963. 

28 	 A cluster of two Pioneer tri-conical solid parachutes was tes

chutes failed. Because of this unsatisfactory performance, th

parachute program was officially canceled on July 15. (See M

This Martin Company proto­


type showed the general 


configuration of the extra­


vehicular activity simulator 


developed for MSC. Sched­


uled for delivery later in 


1963 MSC's version would 


allow the subject to be fully 


clothed in a pressurized 


space suit with a portable 


environmental control sys­


tem. 

system areas: systems engineering support, communications, radar, inflight 


testing, and ground support. RCA would also fabricate electronic com­


ponents of the LEM stabilization and control system. [Engineers and scien­


tists from RCA had been working at Grumman on specific projects since 


February.] 


NASA News Release 63-143, "RCA Subcontractor to Grumman for LEM," June 28, 1963; 


"Monthly Progress Report No. 1," LPR-10-1, p. 2. 


The CSM data storage equipment was modified to incorporate a fast-dump 28 

capability. Data could thus be recorded at a low speed for later playback 

at high speed to ground stations. 

Letter, H . P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 


Change Authorization No. Fifty-Nine," June 28, 1963. 


North American reported that mission success predictions continued to be During 

less than the apportioned values. For example, the environmental control the 

Month 

subsystem had a predicted mission reliability of .9805, compared to a .997675 

apportionment. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," pp. 32, 33. 

Planning During and final details of LTV abort simulation negotiations with 

Grumman were completed. The abort experiments, to be conducted at the 

Month 

LTV's aerospace simulation facility in Dallas, Tex., were scheduled to begin 

in October. (See April24, 1964.) 

GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 5," LPR-10-11, July 10, 1963, p. 19. 

MSC reported that two portable life support systems would be stowed in During 

the LEM and one in the CM. Resupplying water, oxygen, and lithium the 

Month 

hydroxide could be done in a matter of minutes; however, battery recharging took considerably longer, and detailed design of a charger was continuing. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," pp. 24, 25. 

Grumman completed the LEM circuit design for suit and cabin pressure During 

control systems. Also the contractor formulated a detailed plan for the the 

Month 

evaluation of red and white cockpit lighting; equipment for the test had 

already been received. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 5," LPR-10-11, pp. 13, 20. 

69 
BP-6 had arrived and was being off-loaded at 

1963 	 North American shipped Apollo CM boilerplate 6 and 

equipment to WSMR. (See November 7.) July 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 4," pp. 35, 36; MSC, "Consolid

1-2 

for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, June 16-July 2

3 	 Space Technology Laboratories received Grumman's g

the parallel descent engine for the LEM. (See February 

early May.) At the same time, Grumman ordered Bell 

pany to proceed with the LEM ascent engine. The contr

at $18 742 820 and $11 205 415, respectively. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, M

June 16-July 20, 1963," p. 37; "Monthly Progress Report No. 6,

9-10 	 North American held a review of the CM main disp

would be compatible with the fixed couch and new p

contractor's drawings and comments by the astronauts 

by MSC. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, M

June 16-July 20, 1963," p. 71. 

10 	 As proposed by Joseph F. Shea, Deputy Director (Syst

six weeks earlier, the MSF Management Council est

70 
clear the proposed action with the Director of OMSF. 

When the Panel Review Board assumed its duties, the Space Vehicle Review Board was abolished. (See Volume I, October 3, 1961.) 

Memorandum, D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA, to Distr., "Panel Review Board," July 10, 

1963; MSF Management Council Minutes, May 28, 1963, pp. 3-4. 

The Marquardt Corporation began testing the prototype engine for the SM 

reaction control system. Preliminary data showed a specific impulse slightly 

less than 300 seconds. 

NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program, Weekly Activity Report (Period 8 July 

1963 through 14 July 1963)," p . 2. 

North American reported that it had tried several types of restraint systems 

for the sleeping area in the equipment bay area of the CM. A "net" arrangement worked fairly well and was adaptable to the constant wear garment 

worn by the crew. However, North American believed that a simpler restraint system was needed, and was pursuing several other concepts. 

Ibid., p. 4. 

Aero Spacelines' "Pregnant Guppy," a modified Boeing Stratocruiser, won 

airworthiness certification by the Federal Aviation Agency. The aircraft 

would be used to transport major Apollo spacecraft and launch vehicle 

components. 

Saturn Illustrated Chronology, p. 82; Orlando Sentinel, July 12, 1963. 

MSC signed a definitive contract, valued at $36.2 million, with International Business Machines (IBM) for the realtime computer complex in 

the MSC Mission Control Center. IBM was responsible for the design of 

the computer center, mission and mathematical analyses, programming 

equipment engineering, computer and program testing, maintenance and 

operation, and documentation. The complex, consisting of four IBM 7094 

computers with their associated equipment, would monitor and analyze data 

from Gemini and Apollo missions. 

NASA News Release 63- 151, "Contract Signed with IBM. for Computer Equipment," 

July 12, 1963; Space Business Daily, July 15, 1963, p. 74. 

MSC had received 271 applicatiQns for the astronaut program. (See June 5.) 

Seventy-one were military pilots (one from the Army, 34 from the Navy, 

7l 

10 

10 

10 

12 

15 
16 

Dynamics/Convair plant to WSMR, where the test laun

for August. (See August 28.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Ma

June 16-July 20, 1963," p. 35; Little joe 11 Test Launch Vehicle, NAS

Final Report, Vol. I, p. l-6; TWX, NASA Resident Office, WSMR, 

Report for MSG-WSMR Office for June 16 through July 20," July 23

MSC directed North American to concentrate on the exte

cept for CSM docking with the LEM. The original impac

had been modified: 

(I) The primary mode. employed an extendable 

establish initial contact and docking at a separation dis

prevent dangerous impact as a result of pilot error. 

(2) The backup mode consisted of free-flying the two 

Mean relative impact velocities established during free-fly

lation studies would be used as the design impact velocitie

North American and Grumman began a hardware testing 

tion program in late September to evaluate the feasibilit

of extendable probe/ tether systems. The two companies w

the stiffness required of the docking structure for comp

stabilization and control system. (See November 19-20.) 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62- 300-16, pp. 3, 9; MSC, "W

port for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, July 28-Aug

"Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-10-16, p. 3. 

Apollo command module 

probe and drogue assembly. Comrnand module 

-NAA drawing. 
y 

ppg pyp

control motor. (See December 28, 1962.) 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-16, p . 18. 

MSC authorized North American to fit the launch escape system with a 

redundant tower separation ·device. This equipment incorporated an explosive bolt and shaped charge cutter. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. Sixty-Two," July 18, 1963. 

Grumman selectc;:d Pratt and Whitney to develop fuel cells for the LEM. 

Current LEM design called for three cells, supplemented by a battery for 

power during peak consumption beyond what the cells could deliver. 

Grumman and Pratt and Whitney completed contract negotiations on 

August 27, and MSC issued a letter go-ahead on September 5. Including fees 

and royalties, the contract was worth $9.411 million. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

July 21-27, 1963," p. 8; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 5-ll , 1963," p. 

5; GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 7," LPR-10-22, September 10, 1963, p. 2. 

North American, Grumman, and Hamilton Standard, meeting at MSC with 

Crew Systems Division engineers, agreed that the portable life support 

system (PLSS) would have three attaching points for stowage in the spacecraft. In addition, it was agreed that the PLSS should not be used for 

shoulder restraint in the LEM. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-10-16, p. 12; MSC, "Apollo Spacecraft Project 

Office Activity Report, June 14-July 18, 1963," p . [8]. 

Grumman directed the Marquardt Corporation to begin development of 

the LEM reaction control system thrusters. Negotiations had begun on 

March II on the definitive subcontract, a cost-plus-incentive-fee type with 

a total estimated cost of $IO 871 I86. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

July 21-August 17, 1963," p. 36; "Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-10-16, p. 50; 

GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 8," LPR-10-24, October 10, 1963, p. 49. 

NASA launched a Scout rocket with a nose cone of experimental heatshield 

18 

18 

18 

19 

20 

material from Wallops Island, Va. The rocket was intentionally destroyed 

when it deviated from its course a few seconds after liftoff. The nose cone 

73 

Technology Laboratories, was named NASA Deputy As

tor for Manned Space Flight to succeed D. Brainerd 

September l. 

NASA News Release 63- 162, "NASA Names New Head for Manne

ceeds Holmes," July 23, 1963. 

23 	 Grumman authorized Hamilton Sta:r.dard to begin d

environmental control system (ECS) for the LEM. The 

fee contract was valued at $8 371 465. The parts of the E

by Hamilton Standard were specified by Grumman. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 6," LPR-lQ-16, p. 50; MSC, "Consolid

for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, July 21-Augu

A full-scale mockup showed the final configuration of the 

engine developed by Bell Aerosystems Company. The en

and nozzle extension were made of an ablative material. 
the space suit hoses in the LEM. This arrangement, called the "buddy 

concept," would permit one portable life support system to support two 

crewmen and thus would eliminate the need for a special suit-to-suit hose. 

(See August 26, 1964.) 

Ibid., p. 6. 

MIT and Grumman representatives discussed installing the inertial measure- 3o-31 

ment unit and the optical telescope in the LEM. Of several possible locations, the top centerline of the cabin seemed most promising. Grumman 

agreed to provide a preliminary structural arrangement of the guidance 

A briefing aid depicted the equal-period orbit method of LEM descent to the 

lunar surface from lunar orbit. 

LEM injection 

6sun 

Earth~ 
2 

5 

9-10 

methods of descent from lunar parking orbit: (l) desc

(the minimum energy Hohmann transfer), (2) the com

spacecraft, and (3) the synchronous equal period m

contractor felt that weight factors should be of primar

favored the Hohmann transfer and North American t

which represented the extremes of energy requiremen

reliability, fuel consumption, and operational flexibil

synchronous method as the prime mission mode bu

tinued investigation of the other two techniques. 

Memorandum, John E. Gerstle, Jr., and Joe D. Parne, MSC, to C

Div., "LEM Descent Profile," August 20, 1963. 

North American asked MSC if Grumman was design

a thrusting capability with the CSM attached and, if n

to require the additional effort by Grumman to pr

North American had been proceeding on the assump

service propulsion system (SPS) fail during translu

would make any course corrections needed to ensure a 

[The Guidance and Control Panel, at a meeting on No

stated that a LEM would be included on all Saturn V f

a backup propulsion in case of SPS failure.] On Augus

Acting ASPO Manager, responded by asking North Am

the operational and systems aspects of this backup 

decision was made. 

TWX, H. G. Osbon, NAA, to MSC, Attn: Robert 0. Piland, 

Piland to NAA, Attn: E. E. Sack, "LEM Propulsion System as Ba

System," August 6, 1963. 

In what was to have been an acceptance test, the Doug

static fired the first Saturn S-IV flight stage at Sacram

cation of fire in the engine area forced technicians to 

after little more than one minute's firing. A week lat

was repeated, this time without incident, when the 

over seven minutes. [The stage became part of the SA- 

first compkte Saturn I to fly. See January 29, 1964.] 

History of Marshall ... january 1-]une 30, 1963, Vol. I, p. 16; 

August 6, 1963; The Houston Post, August 13, 1963. 

The Panel Review Board (see July 10) held its first m

Operations Center (LOC). The board established an 

76 

·by almost two years North American's selection as prime contractor. The 

$938.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee agreement was the most valuable single 

research and development contract in American history. The contract called 

for the initial production (i.e., through May 15, 1965) of 11 mockups, 15 

boilerplate vehicles, and 11 production articles. (See September 1, 1964.) 

Space News Roundup, August 21, 1963; Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, pp. 11, 24-25; Space Business Daily, August 19, 1963, p. 255. 

ITT's Kellogg Division delivered to Hamilton Standard the first operational 

prototype space suit communications system. (See November 27, 1962.) 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 79 (August 19, 1963), p . 29; Space Business Daily, 

August 20, 1963, p. 263. 

At a meeting on the LEM electrical power system, Grumman presented its 

latest load analysis, which placed the LEM's mission energy requirements 

at 76.53 kilowatt-hours. . (See January 28.) The control energy level for the 

complete LEM mission had been set at 54 kilowatt-hours and the target 

energy level at 47.12 kilowatt-hours. Grumman and MSC were jointly 

establishing ground rules for an electrical power reduction program. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, August 15-21, 1963," p. 4. 

MSC Crew Systems Division conducted mobility tests of the Apollo prototype space suit inside a mockup of the CM. Technicians also tested the 

suit on a treadmill. The subjects' carbon dioxide buildup did not exceed 

two percent; their metabolic rates were about 897 000 joules (850 BTU) 

per hour at vent pressure, 1 688 000 joules at 2.4 newtons per square centimeter (1600 BTU at 3.5 psi), and 2 320 000 joules at 3.5 newtons per square 

centimeter (2200 BTU at 5.0 psi). 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

August 18-September 21, 1963," p. 40. · 

MSC completed a comparison of 17-volt and 2lt-:\rolt batteries for the portable 

life support system. The study showed that a 28-volt battery would provide 

comparable energy levels without incr ease in size and weight and would 

be compatible with the spacecraft electrical system. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

August 18-24, 1963," p. 6. 

77 

Mid-month 

15 

15-September 21 

Week of 


August 18 

Week of 


August 22-29 


26 

the moon-"by far the most restrictive of the lot"). Nex

number of operational constraints, ones "reasonably rep

expected for a typical flight," but by no means an "exhau

• A minimum daily launch window of three hours 

• A 26-degree maximum azimuth variation 

• An earth landing within 40 degrees of the equato

• A minimum of three successive daily launch wind

• A daylight launch with at least three hours of dayli

• Transposition and docking in sunlight 

• Use of but one of the two daily windows avail

injection. 

Bryant advised that, taken just by themselves, these vario

mission and operational, had a "restrictive effect" an

flexibility was thereby "dramatically curtailed." Moreov

a number of possible constraints which have not been 

could still further affect the size of the ultimate launch 

list was "increasing almost daily"): requirements for tra

for lighting during rendezvous and reentry; and restr

solar activity, launch environment, and-no small ma

ditions at the launch site. 

"The consequences," Bryant concluded, "of imposing 

number of these flight restrictions is obvious-the even

all operational flexibility. The only solution is .. . [a] m

tion of every constraint which tends to reduce the nu

launch opportunities," looking toward eliminating "as 

Memorandum, John Bryant, MSC, to Chief, Flight Operations Div

missions with imposed operational contraints," September 5, 1963

An Ad Hoc Rendezvous Working Group was formed at 

possibility of substituting a unified S-band system for the 

radar on the LEM and CSM. 

"ASPO Weekly Activity Report, August 22-29, 1963," p . 7; MSC, "We

for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, September 1- 7

MSC received proposals for the visual displays for th

Because of the changed shape of that vehicle's window

man had to return those proposals to the original bidde

78 

organization of NASA Headquarters (see October 9), a Deputy Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight would become responsible for all 

manned space flight activities within NASA. 

MSF Management Council Meeting, August 27, 1963, Agenda Item 10, "Responsibility of 


the Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight For Technical Matters," 


p.l. 

At left is the scene at White Sands as NASA and contractor engineers and technicians worked through the night to assure that everything was in readiness 

for the launch of the Little Joe II qualification test vehicle. At right is the 

scene the next morning just after all seven motors of the vehicle ignited 

simultaneously, providing a thrust of about 141 000 kilograms (310 000 

pounds). 
28 	 The Little Joe II qualification test vehicle was launche

objectives were to prove the Little Joe's capability as a

test vehicle and to determine base pressures and heat

· These aims were achieved. The lone failure was a 

destruct system. 

Little joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Rep

1-13, 1-17. 

80 

PART II 


Developing Hardware Distinctions 

August 30, 1963, through April 28-30, 1964 
The Key. Events 

1963 

August 30: Lunar Orbiter program officially approved. 

September 16-18: Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation 

review of first lunar excursion module (LEM) ascent stage 

October 8: Joseph F. Shea named manager of Apollo Spacecr

Spacecraft Center (MSC) . 

October 18: Third "class" of astronauts introduced. 

October 24: George ;E. Mueller, the new NASA Associate Adm

Flight, held first meeting of NASA-Industry Apollo Exec

November 1: Major reorganization of NASA Headquarters a

Flight (OMSF) took effect; Mueller directed the revis

schedules. 

November 7: Apollo Pad Abort Mission .1, using command mo

conducted at White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex. 

November 22: Preliminary ground rules for the Spacecraft De

gross lunar landing sites selected. 

December 31: Samuel C. Phillips (Brig. Gen., USAF) annou

Director for Apollo Program. 

1964 

January 3: Apollo prime contractors issued joint report on spac

January 19: George M. Low assigned to MSC as Deputy Direc

January 21: North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA), present

Block II command and service module ( CSM), designed f

January 29: Saturn-Apollo 5 flight marked first mission of Bl

stages. 

March 9: MSC assigned funds and responsibility for develop

lunar exploration. 

March 23: OMSF outlined Saturn-Apollo mission plans. 

March 24-26: GAEC held first complete LEM mockup TM- 1 in

April 8: First Gemini mission pe.~;formed. 

April 14: Project Fire tested heat transfer concepts for Apollo 

miles) per hour lunar return velocity. 

April 21: Basic rules for Apollo space suit operation establish

April 28-30: NAA held basic mockup inspection and review fo

82 

Developing Hardware Distinctions 

August 30, 1963, through April 28-30, 1964 

NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., approved the Lunar 

Orbiter program. Objectives of the program were reconnaissance of the 

moon's topography, investigation of its environment, and collection of selenodetic information. (See May 12, 1964.) 

The document called for five flight and three test articles. The Lunar 

Orbiter spacecraft would be capable of photographing the moon from a 

distance of 22 miles above the surface. Overall cost of the program was 

estimated at between $150 and $200 million. 

NASA Office of Space Sciences (OSS) Review, "Lunar Orbit!!!' Program Status Report," 

September 4, 1963; Space Business Daily, September 3, 1963, p. 327; NASA Project 

Approval Document, "Research and Development Project: Lunar Orbiter," Cost No. 

A scale model of the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. 

1963 

August 

30 
limits represented variations that might arise as studies pr

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, August 30-September 4, 1963," 

During Grumman built a full-scale cardboard model of the LEM to 

the problems of cockpit geometry, specifically the arrangement o

Month 

This mockup was reviewed by MSC astronauts and the layo

was revised according to some of their suggestions. 

Also Grumman reported that a preliminary analysis show

control system plume heating of the LEM "landing gear w

problem. [This difficulty had been greatly alleviated by t

five to four landing legs on the vehicle. (See April 17 and M

"Monthly Progress Report No. 7," LPR-10-22, pp. 7, 25. 

During At a meeting at MSC, Grumman representatives submitt

the posal for LEM test articles L T A-8 and L T A-9, and sug

Month 

program for the two vehicles: L T A- 8 should be used for 

grated systems testing in the altituqe propulsion test facilitie

Missile Range ; L T A- 9 should be used for manned atmo

operation tests. The contractor also recommended an ear

stration program to verify the helicopter tether operation 

promised greatly increased mission test capability over 

facilities. The tether method (helicopter or fixed-base) shoul

after the verification. L T A-8 should be considered as a cons

and L T A-9 as a constraint to the lunar landing mission. 

Ibid., pp. 45, 46. 

September MSC reported that design of the control and displays panel 

1-7 	 about 90 percent complete. North American was expecte

design by September 20. Qualification testing of the pan

around December 1. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned S

tember 1- 7, 1963," p. 3. 

4 	 Director Robert R . Gilruth established the MSC Manned Sp

Board to set up engineering, design, and procedural stand

spacecraft and associated systems. The board was compose

Faget, Chairman; James A. Chamberlin; Kenneth S. Klein

Bailey, Jr.; G. Barry Graves; Jacob C. Moser; and No

84 
landings under various test conditions. Among these were release of the 

main parachutes at impact, deployment of the postlanding antennas, 

actuation of the mechanical location aids, and activation of the recovery 

radio equipment. 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Recommendation for a 

water landing operational qualification test series using AFRM 005," September 4, 1963. 

MSC began a study to define the stability limits of a 457-centimeter (180­

inch) radius LEM gear configuration. The study, in two phases, sought to 

examine factors affecting stability (such as lunar slope, touchdown velocity 

and direction, and the effects of soil mechanics) in direct support of the onesixth model and full-scale drop test programs and to complete definition 

of landing capabilities of the LEM. (See October 2.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 5-11, 1963," pp. 7-8. 

MSC announced a $7.658 million definitive contract with Kollsman Instrument Corporation for the CM guidance and navigation optical equipment, 

including a scanning telescope, sextant, map and data viewer, and related 

ground support equipment. MSC had awarded Kollsman a letter contract 

on May 28, 1962, and had completed negotiations for the definitive contract 

on March 29, 1963. "The newly signed contract calls for delivery of all 

hardware to AC Spark Plug by August 1, 1964." 

MSC News Release 63-147, September 6, 1963; MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the 

Office of the Director,· Manned Space Flight, May 27-June 3, 1962," p . 12; Kollsman 

Instrument Corporation, "Apollo Program Quarterly Progress Report No. 3," March 31, 

1963, p. 2; ibid., "Apollo Program Quarterly Progress Report No. 6," December 31, 1963, 

pp. 10-1 1. 

MSC Flight Operations Division (FOD) established a 72-hour lifetime for 

Apollo recovery aids. This limitation was derived from considerations of 

possible landing footprints, staging bases, and aircraft range and flying time 

to the landing areas. Primary location aids were the spacecraft equipment 

(VHF AM transceiver, VHF recovery beacon, and HF transceiver) and 

the VHF survival radio. Because of battery limitations, current planning 

called for only a 24-hour usage of the VHF recovery beacon. If electronic 

aids were needed beyond this time, the VHF survival radio would be used. 

If the spacecraft were damaged or lost, the VHF survival radio would 

be the only electronic location aid available. MSC had recently selected 

85 


5-11 

6 

6 
6 

9 

12 

16 

16 

At El Centro, Calif., CM boilerplate (BP) 3, a parach

destroyed during tests simulating the new BP- 6 co

strakes or apex cover). Drogue parachute descent, d

mortar fire appeared normal. However, one pilot pa

contact with the vehicle and its main parachute did 

of harness damage, the remaining two main parachutes 

Investigation of the BP- 3 failure resulting in rigging 

on BP- 6 and BP-19. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-17, p . 11; ibid., SID 

MSC ordered North American to make provisions in 

charging the 28-volt portable life support system bat

craft battery charger. 

On the following day, the Center informed North A

new mechanical clock timer system would be provi

indicating elapsed time from liftoff and predicting tim

various events during the mission. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Sy

Change Authorization No. Eighty-Two," September 9, 1963; ib

Authorization No. Eighty-Four," September 10, 1963. 

NASA announced that, in the future, unmanned lun

(e.g., Rangers and Surveyors) will be assembled in "clea

with germ-killing substances to reduce the number of 

surfaces. These sterilization procedures, less stringent t

were intended to prevent contamination of the luna

same time, avoid damag.e to sensitive electronic compo

tion was suspected as one of the reasons for the failure 

The Washington Post, September 13, 1963. 

A tone warning signal was added to the CM instrum

system malfunctioned, this warning would be heard thr

caution and warning subsystem and the astronauts' ear

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information S

Change Authorization No. Eighty-Nine," September 16, 1963. 

The launch escape system was modified so that, und

ditions, the crew could jettison the tower. On unman

86 

A design engineering inspection (DEI) and Apollo program design review were 

held at NAA's El Segundo, Calif., facilities September 10- 12, 1963. About 

70 NASA personnel members participated in the DEI of boilerplate 12 before 

it was shipped to WSMR to test the launch escape system. The following 

two days approximately 100 NASA officials including personnel from most 

NASA Centers and Headquarters attended the program design review. Topics 

included structural design, the propulsion, power, and electrical systems, 

guidance and navigation, simulation and trainers, ground support equipment, and a program hardware summary. 

tower jettison was initiated by a signal from the instrument unit of the 

S- IV (second) stage. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. Ninety-One," September 16, 1963. 

NASA representatives held a formal review of Grumman's LEM M-1 mockup, a full-scale representation of the LEM's crew compartment. MSC decided that (l) the window shape (triangular) and visibility were satisfactory; 

(2) a standing position for the crew was approved, although, in general, it 

was believed that restraints restricted crew mobility; (3) the controllers were 

positioned too low and lacked suitable arm support for fine control; and 

(4) crew station arrangement was generally acceptable, although specific 

details required further study. (See June 16-July 20 and August 27.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Status Report, September 19- 25, 1963." 

87 

1963 

September 

16-18 
18 

19 

-19-25 

19-25 

19-0ctober 16 

September 22-0ctober 19, 1963," p. 31. 

The AiResearch Manufacturing Company announced th

awarded a $20 million definitive contract for the CM enviro

[AiResearch had been developing the system under a lette

1961. See Volume I, December 21, 1961.] 

The Houston Post, September 19, 1963. 

MSC made several changes in the CM's landing requir

attenuation would be passive, except for that afforded by th

and the suspension system. The spacecraft would be susp

landing parachutesin a pitch attitude that imposed minimu

on the crew. A crushable structure to absorb landing shock 

the aft equipment bay area. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems 

Change Authorization No. Ninety-Three," September 19, 1963. 

The space suit umbilical disconnects were being redesigned 

concept" and for interchangeability between the CM and 

September 29, 1964.) MSC was reviewing methods for a cre

to the LEM following space suit failure on the lunar surfac

August 3.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 19-25, 1963,'; p. 4. 

North American incorporated an automatic radiator contro

environmental control system to eliminate the need for 

during lunar orbit. 

Recent load analysis at North American placed the power re

day mission at 577 kilowatt-hours, a decrease of about 80 

from earlier estimates. 

Ibid., pp. 2, 3. 

Grumman directed Bell Aerosystems Company to establi

nozzle extension as the primary design for the LEM's asce

T he radiation-cooled nozzle design, a weight-saving altern

approved by NASA. (See March; also January and May 4- 11

MSC, "ASPO Monthly Activity Report, September 19- 0ctober 16, 1963

88 
p

tries-indeed, of all the world-cannot work together in the conquest of 

space, sending some day in this decade to the moon, not the representatives 

of a single nation, but the representatives of all humanity." 

During a news conference in Houston that same day, several NASA officials 

commented on the President's address. Associate Administrator Robert C. 

Seamans, Jr., stated that Kenne_dy's proposals came as no great surprise. 

He said that many " large areas" for cooperation exist, such as exchanges of 

scientific information and in space tracking, but emphasized that no cosmonauts would be flying in Apollo spacecraft. Deputy Associate Administrator 

George E. Mueller shared Seamans' views, comparing future U.S.-U.S.S.R. 

cooperation in space to joint explorations in Antarctica. Scientists from both 

nations work together, but "they get there in different ships." Just three 

days earlier, MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth had told the National Rocket 

Club that a joint American-Russian space flight-especially one to the 

moon-would present ·almost insuperable technological difficulties. "I 

tremble at the thought of the integration problems ... ," he said. Gilruth 

cautioned his audience that he was speaking "not as an international 

politician," but as an engineer. The task of mating American and Russian 

spacecraft and launch vehicles would make such international cooperation 

"hard to do in a practical sort of way." And at the September 20 MSC news 

conference he added that such problems "are very difficult even when they 

[hardware components] are built by American contractors." 

Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101), p . 

288; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963, pp. 343, 347; The Houston Chronicle, September 19, 20, 21, 1963. 

North American checked out the test fixture that was slated for the astronaut centrifuge training program, resolving interfaces between test fixture, 

centrifuge, and the test conductor's console, and familiarizing astronauts 

with controls and displays inside the spacecraft. 

On October 1, North American delivered the test fixture to the U.S. Navy 

Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory, where the first phase of the 

manned centrifuge program was scheduled to begin that month. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-18, pp. 4-5; MSC, "ASPO Weekly 

Activity Report, October 3-9, 1963," p. 3. · 

89 

22-29 
1963 

September 

24 

25-26 

NASA Administrator James E. Webb examined a doc

Apollo spacecraft model during a visit to Houston 

MSC advised North American that the television c

being modified so that ground personnel could 

and flight operations. Television images would be 

earth via the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility. 

Letter, H . P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information 

Change Authorization No. Ninety-Five," September 24, 1963. 

MSC representatives reviewed Grumman's program 

the LEM, to be conducted with the test model 2 (T

the vehicle's configuration had changed so extensive

90 
two fuel cells, still supplemented by an auxiliary battery system, with continued study on tankage design. On December 10, ASPO authorized the 

contractor to proceed with this configuration. 

Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, 

Electrical Power Subsystem Configuration Recommendation," December 10, 1963; MSC, 

"ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-0ctober 2, 1963," p. II. 

OMSF, MSC, and Bellcomm representatives, meeting in Washington, D.C., 

discussed Apollo mission plans: OMSF introduced a requirement that the 

first manned flight in the Saturn IB program include a LEM. ASPO had 

planned this flight·as a CSM maximum duration mission only. 

• Bellcomm was asked to develop an Apollo mission assignment program without a Saturn I. 

• MSFC had been asking OMSF concurrence in including a restart 

capability in the S-IVB (second) stage during the Saturn IB program. 

ASPO would agree to this, but only if the H-1 engine were uprated from 

85 275 to 90 718 kilograms (188 000 to 200 000 pounds) of thrust, resulting 

in a 907-kilogram (2000-pound) payload gain. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-0ctober 2, 1963." 

MSC representatives visited Grumman for a preliminary evaluation of the 

Apollo space suit integration into the LEM. A suit failure ended the exercise prematurely. Nonetheless, leg and foot mobility was good, but the 

upper torso and shoulder needed improvement. 

On October 11, MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) tested the suit's mobility 

with the portable life support system (PLSS). CSD researchers found that 

the PLSS did not restrict the wearer's movement because the suit supported 

the weight of the PLSS. Shifts in the center of gravity appeared insignificant. 

The PLSS controls, because of their location, were difficult to operate, 

which demanded further investigation. 

Ibid.; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space 

Flight, September 22- 0ctober 19, 1963," p. 48. 

North American recommended that the portable life support system in the 

CM be deleted. Current planning placed two units in the LEM and one in 

the CM. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-0ctober 2, 1963," p. 3. 

91 

26-27 

26-0ctober 2 

26 
MSC News Release 63171, October 16, 1963. 

30 	 Qualification testing began on fuel tanks for the service 

(SPS). The first article tested developed a small crack below 

which was being investigated, but pressurization caused 

the tank. During mid-October, several tanks underwent p

on November 1, the first SPS helium tank was burst-tested

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending October 16, 1963"; "A

for Period October 16-November 12, 1963"; "ASPO Status Report 

October 23, 1963." 

During The interrelationships between all major LEM test vehi

the test constraints and documentation requirements, were 

Month logic study, prepared by Grumman and forwarded to M

feasibility of alterations in the LEM test program as neede

"Monthly Progress Report No. 8," LPR-10-24, p. 45. 

A stack of logic and rope memory modules for the Apollo onb

checked by Ralph R. Ragan, left, operations manager of S

tion Systems Division of Raytheon's Sudbury (Mass.) Lab

Hall, Director of Apollo Computer Division at MIT

Laboratory. 
measurement unit in 

the system. Below left, 

director of the Laboratory Dr. C. Stark Draper 

posed beside a mockup 

of the guidance and 

navigation system. Below right, the mockup 

was checked by Milton 

B. Trageser, director of 

the Apollo program at 

the ~ Laboratory, and 

David W. Gilbert, right, 

head of the Guidance 

and Control Division, 

Apollo Project Office, 

MSC. 
provided ample clearance for the spacecraft, both top a

between the service propulsion engine bell and the instrum

S-IVB). (See June 3 and December 5.) 

At this same 	meeting, Grumman presented a comparison 

laterally folded landing gears (both of 457-centimeter [1

The radial-fold configuration, MSC reported, promised a w

22.2 kilograms (49 pounds). MSC approved the concept, w

meter (345-inch) adapter. Further, an adapter of that leng

modate a larger, lateral fold gear (508 centimeters [200 inche

During the next several weeks, Grumman stl!died a variety 

ments (sizes, means of deployment, stability, and even a "

At a subsequent LEM Mechanical Systems Meeting, on 

Grumman presented data (design, performance, and wei

other four-legged gear arrangements-a 457-centimeter (

fold "tripod" gear (i.e., attached to the vehicle by three st

centimeter (160-inch) and 457-centimeter (180-inch) cantil

it turned out, the 406.4-centimeter (160-inch) cantilevered 

meeting requirements demanded in the work statement, in 

was more stable than the larger tripod gear. In addition to 

ably lighter, the cantilevered design offered several added a

• A reduced stowed height for the LEM from 336.5 to 3

(132.5 to 123.5 inches) 

• A shorter landing stroke (50.8 instead of 101.6 centime

of 40 inches) 

• Better protection from irregularities (protuberances

• An alleviation of the gear heating problem (caused 

engine's exhaust plume) 

• Simpler locking mechanisms 

• A better capability to handle vanous load patterns 

pads. 

Because of these significant (and persuasive) factors, MSC 

man's change to the 406.4-centimeter (160-inch) cantilever

as the design for the LEM's landing gear. By mid-Novembe

to OMSF that Grumman was pursuing the 406.4-centim

cantilevered gear. Although analyses would not be com

weeks, the design was "shown . . . to be the lightest g

date.... Tentative estimates indicate a gear stowed heig

94 

Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, September 8- 14, 1963," pp. 

lQ-11; "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, 

November 17-23, 1963," pp. 9-10; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of 

the Director, Manned Space Flight, October 2Q-November 16, 1963," p. 36; "Apollo 

Quarterly Status Report No. 6," p. 27; "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending October 

16, 1963"; "ASPO Weekly Status Report, November 12-19, 1963"; "Monthly Progress Report No. 7," LPR-10-22, p. 10; "Monthly Progress Report No. 8," LPR-10-24, p. 11; 

GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. IO," LPR-lQ-26, December 10, 1963, p. 10; GAEC, 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 11," LPR-lQ-27, January 10, 1964, p. 11. 

NASA announced the appointment of Joseph F. Shea as ASPO Manager 

effective October 22. He had been Deputy Director (Systems) in OMSF. 

George M. Low, OMSF Deputy Director (Programs), would direct the 

Systems office as well as his own. Robert 0. Piland, Acting Manager of 

ASPO since April 3, resumed his former duties as Deputy Manager. 

NASA News Release 63-226, "Shea to Head Apollo Spacecraft Development at Manned 

Spacecraft Center," October 8, 1963; MSC News Release 63-163, October 8, 1963; MSC 

Announcement No. 263, "Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office," October 22, 1963. 

Verne C. Fryklund, Jr., of NASA's Office of Space Sciences (OSS), in a 

memorandum to MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth, recommended some 

general guidelines for Apollo scientific investigations of the moon (which 

OSS already was us.ing). "These guidelines," Fryklund told Gilruth, "... 

should be followed in the preparation of your plans," and thus were "intended to place some specific constraints on studies. . . . The primary 

scientific objective of the Apollo project," Fryklund said, was, of course, 

the "acquisition of comprehensive data about the moon." With this as a 

starting point, he went on, " ... it follows that the structure of the moon's 

surface, gross body properties and large-scale measurements of physical and 

chemical characteristics, and observation of whatever phenomena may occur 

at the actual surface will be the prime scientific objectives." Basically, OSS's 

guidelines spelled out what types of activity were and were not part of 

Apollo's immediate goals. These activities were presumed to be mostly 

reconnaissance, "to acquire knowledge of as large an area as possible, and 

by as simple a means as possible, in the limited time available." The three 

principal scientific activities "listed in order of decreasing importance" 

were: (1) "comprehensive observation of lunar phenomena," (2) "collection 

of representative samples," and (3) "emplacement of monitoring equipment." 

8 

8 

95 

8 

9 

10 

14 

At MSC, the Spacecraft Technology Division reported to 

of a study on tethered docking of the LEM and CSM. 

people found that a cable did not reduce the impact veloc

that a pilot could achieve during free flyaround, nor was f

reduced. In fact, when direct control of the spacecraft wa

tether proved a hindrance and actually increased the 

required. 

MSC, "Flight Crew Operations Division, Activity Report, Septembe

1963," pp. 2-3. 

NASA Administrator James E. Webb announced a major 

NASA Headquarters, effective November 1, to consolidate 

major programs and direction of research and developme

realign Headquarters management of agency-wide suppo

October 28, NASA Headquarters announced a simila

within OMSF, also to take effect on November 1, to s

Headquarters' control of the agency's manned space flig

effect, these administrative adjustments "recombined pr

tutional management by placing the field centers under t

program directors instead of under general management (

Administrator)." 

NASA News Release 63- 225, "NASA Announces Reorganization," Octob

News Release 63-241, "NASA Realigns Office of Manned Space Fli

1963; Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, pp. 289-9

LTV announced the results of tests performed by astronau

Space Flight Mission Simulator in Dallas, Tex. (See May 

17, 1963, and April 24, 1964.) These indicated that, sho

guidance and navigation system fail, LEM pilots could 

the CM by using a circular slide rule to process LEM rad

Tulsa Daily World, October ll, 1963; The Houston Post, October ll, 

Langley Research Center's Lunar Landing Research Fac

completion. A gantry structure 121.9 meters (400 feet) lon

(250 feet) high would suspend a model of the LEM. It w

sixths of the model's weight, simulating lunar gravity, 

enable astronauts to practice lunar landings. (See Volume 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 79 (October 14, 1963), pp. 83

News Roundup, November 27, 1963, p. 8. 

96 
Above is a model of the proto· 

type rocket-powered vehicle 

to be used in thelunar landing test facility at NASA's 

Langley Research Center. 

At the right is an engineering sketch of the way the 

facility would look when 

completed and in use. 
16-17 

16-23 

16-November 15 

, 

coordinating work at MSC and MSFC. The sub-pan

each Center: MSFC would define the dispersions co

vehicle performance reserves, prepare a set of typical 

errors for the Saturn V launch vehicle, and give MSC 

guidance computation for injection into an earth parki

identify the constraints required for free-return traj

MSFC with details of the MIT guidance method. Fur

would exchange data each month showing current 

spacecraft performance capability. (For operational 

other than performance capability would be based on 

would not reflect the current weight status.) 

Memorandum, Secretaries, Guidance and Performance Sub-Pane

Distr., "Minutes of First Guidance and Performance Sub-Panel 

1963. 

. MSC discussed commonality of displays_ and controls w

spacecraft contractors. A review of panel components 

man might use the same vendors as North Americ

switches, potentiometers, and indicators. 

MSC, "ASPO Activity Report, October 16-22, 1963," pp. 1-2. 

An MSC Spacecraft Technology Division Working 

Apollo mission requirements and suggested a numb

spacecraft weight: eliminate the free-return trajector

return times; use the Hohmann descent technique, r

period orbit method, yet size the tanks for the equal pe

the CSMjLEM dual rendezvous capability; reduce th

time for the LEM (the period of time during which th

in orbit before rendezvousing with the CSM); reduce th

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending October 23, 196

Because of an electrical equipment failure on Me

American began a CM humidity study. T he compan

compartment major spacecraft systems which were no

tion in the presence of corrosive moisture. (The en

system did not guarantee complete humidity contro

examined in minute detail all electrical/electronic 

98 

Above, the MSC "Navy" was 

arriving at its Seabrook 

docking facility and, at 

right, Skipper Frank Gammon of Flight Operations 

Division took command. 

The modified Army LCU 

(landing craft, utility), 

painted "NASA blue and 

white," was named Retriever to indicate its function 

in recovering spacecraft in 

drop and flotation tests in 

Galveston and Trinity Bays 

and in the Gulf of Mexico. 

The 115-foot Retriever 

could recover heavy spacecraft and could spend five 

days in the open sea. It had 

a permanent crew of three. 
~ \ 

Comparison 

Impulsive 00 5731 

Theoretical 0.3 6023 9° 

·Theoretical optimum lunar model descent with thrust-to

value in lunar orbit) at 0.3, height at perilune of the tr

meters (50 000 feet), and using the Hohmann transfer 

gram showed the velocity change (aVc, in feet per se

flight-path angle (y) close to those for an impulsive 

instantaneous change, without time value, taken as 

unachievable ideal for comparison). 

1963 	 American was considering design changes that would pro

from moisture. October 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-19, p. 25. 

18 	 NASA and GDJC negotiated amendments totaling $354 

contract. This sum covered study activity and several rela

that came out of a Design Engineering Inspection on M

support equipment was authorized, as was fabricatio

breadboard autopilot system for use at MSC. The ·d

deleted and the instrumentation was limited to a con

vehicle to be used for Mission A- 002 (BP- 23). 

Little ]oe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final Rep

18 	 NASA Headquarters announced the selection of five or

tract negotiations totaling $60 million for the developm

100 
equipment for the r•r\1 coo well. See Vol. I, August 9, 1961, and May 8, 1962.) 

MSC News ele , v3- 17:,, October 18, 1963. 

NASA announced the selection of 14 astronauts for Projects Gemini and 

Apollo, bringing to 30 the total number of Am...:rican spacemen. They were 

Maj. Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Capt. William A. Anders, Capt. Charles A. 

Bassett II, Capt. Michael Collins, Capt. Donn F. Eisele, Capt. Theodore C. 

Freeman, and Capt. David R. Scott of the Air Force; Lt. Cdr. Richard F. 

Gordon, Jr., Lt. Alan L. Bean, Lt. Eugene A. Cernan, and Lt. Roger B. 

Chaffee of the Navy; Capt. Clifton C. Williams, Jr., of the Marine Corps; 

R. Walter Cunningham, research scientist for the Rand Corporation; and 

Russell L. Schweickart, research scientist for MIT. 

MSC News Release 63-180, October 18, 1963; Space News Roundup, October 30, 1963. 

MSC reported that preliminary testing had begun on the first prototype 

extravehicular suit telemetry and communications system and on the portable life support system of which it was an integral part. The hardware had 

recently been received from the prime contractor, Hamilton Standard. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space 

Flight, October 20-November 16, 1963," p. 67. 

The second prototype space suit was received by MSC's Crew Systems Division. (See August 15-September 21.) Preliminary tests showed little improvement in mobility over the first suit. On October 24-25, a space suit 

mobility demonstration was held at North American. The results showed 

that the suit had less shoulder mobility than the earlier version, but more 

lower limb mobility. (See September 26-27.) Astronaut John W. Young, 

wearing the pressurized suit and a mockup portable life support system 

(PLSS), attempted an egress through the CM hatch but encountered considerable difficulty. At the same time, tests of the suit-couch-restraint system 

interfaces and control display layout were begun at the Navy's Aviation 

Medical Acceleration Laboratory centrifuge in Johnsville, Pa. Major problems were restriction of downward vision by the helmet, extension of the 

suit elbow/arm beyond the couc},l, and awkward reach patterns to the lower 

part of the control panel. On October 30-November 1, lunar task studies 

with the suit were carried out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in a KC101 

18 

20-November 16 

21 
Apollo prototype space suit with reflective coverall and life-sup

back pack. 

1963 	 135 aircraft at simulated lunar gravity. Mobility tests were 

suit pressurized and a PLSS attached. October 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 6," p. 25; MSC, "Weekly Activity 

Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, October 27-November 2, 196

"ASPO Status Report for Week Ending November 6, 1963;" "ASPO Sta

Period Ending October 23, 1963;" "ASPO Status Report for Period Octo

ber 12, 1963." 

22 	 George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for 

Flight, appointed Walter C. Williams Deputy Associate Ad

Manned Space Flight in OMSF. Williams would direct oper

MSFC, and LOC for all manned space flight missions. 

MSC News Release 63-179, October 22, 1963. 

23 	 MSC Flight Operations Division defined systems and outline

for the lunar landing mission. System definitions were: (1) 

efficient or economic; (2) a! ternate, either redundant (id

independent of the primary) or backup (not identical but 

the same function); (3) critical (failure would jeopardize 

(4) repairable (for which tools and spares were carried and w

102 
operational ground rules for the Lunar Landing Mission, October 23, 1963, with en

closure. 

MSC Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division awarded a $50 000 

contract to the Hughes Aircraft Company for a study of backup high gain 

directable antennas for the LEM lunar surface equipment. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending October 30, 1963." 

Because OMSF had requested OSSA to provide lunar surface microrelief and 

bearing strength data to support LEM landing site selection and to permit 

LEM landing-gear c:Iesign validation, the Ad Hoc Working Group on FollowOn Surveyor Instrumentation met at NASA Headquarters. Attending were 

Chairman Verne C. Fryklund, Clark Goodman, Martin Swetnick, and 

Paul Brockman of the NASA Office of Space Sciences and Applications; 

Harry Hess and George Derbyshire of the National Academy of Sciences; 

Dennis James of Bellcomm (for OMSF); and Milton Beilock of the Jet 

P.ropulsion Laboratory (JPL). The group proposed "a fresh look at the 

problem of instrumenting payloads of Surveyor spacecraft that may follow 

the currently approved developmental and operational flights, so that these 

spacecraft will be able to determine that a particular lunar site is suitable 

for an Apollo landing." The study was assigned to JPL. 

Summary Minutes, "Ad Hoc Working Group on Follow-On Surveyor Instrumentation, 

October 24, 1963," October 28, 1963, pp. 1-2. 

The NASA- Industry Apollo Executives Group, composed of top managers 

in OMSF and executives of the major Apollo contractors, met for the first 

time. The group met with George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, for status briefings and problem discussions. 

In this manner, NASA sought to make executives personally aware of major 

problems in the program. 

Tenth Semiannual Report to Congress of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, july 1-December 31, 1963 (1964), p. 43. 

MSC directed Grumman to schedule manned environmental control system 

(ECS) development tests, using a welded-shell cabin boilerplate and air lock. 

At about the same time, the company was also requested to quote cost and 

delivery schedule for a second boilerplate vessel, complete with prototype 

ECS. Although this vessel would be used by the MSC Crew Systems Division 

for in-house investigation and evaluation of ECS development problems, its 

103 


23-30 

24 

24 

25 
29 

30 

After a program review at an MSF Management Counci

E. Mueller, head of OMSF, suggested several testing pro

schedules, "dead-end" testing, that is, "tests involving com

that [would] not fly operationally without major modifi

minimized. Henceforth, Mueller said, NASA would conce

testing. [In "all-up" testing, the complete spacecraft an

configuration would be used on each flight. Previously, 

called for a gradual buildup of subsystems, systems stage

successive flight tests.] To simplify both t~ting and 

Canaveral, complete systems should be delivered. An ins

force with senior representatives from each Center, one 

and Walter C. Williams of OMSF should be set up imm

task force, to study storable fuels and small motors, would 

from Lewis Research Center, MSC, MSFC, as well as re

outside the government. 

Memorandum, Clyde Bothmer, MSF Management Council, for Dist

ment Council Meeting, October 29, 1963,. in Washington, D.C.," Oct

NASA canceled four manned earth orbital flights with th

vehicle. Six of a series of 10 unmanned Saturn I develo

still scheduled. Development of the Saturn IB for ma

be accelerated and "all-up" testing would be started. (

This action followed Bellcomm's recommendation of a n

in the Apollo spacecraft flight test program. The program 

ferred from Saturn I to Saturn IB launch vehicles; the 

should end with flight SA- 10. All Saturn IB flights, begin

should carry operational spacecraft, including equipment 

ing of the spacecraft systems in earth orbit. 

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Georg

recommended the changeover from the Saturn I to the S

Administrator James E. Webb on October 26. Webb's 

two days later. 

Memoranda: Mueller to Robert F. Freitag, "Replacement of Schedu

on Saturn I," October 18, 1963; Mueller to Webb, "Reorientation of 

tober 26, 1963, with handwritten notation signed by Webb, undat

mended Changes in the Use of Space Vehicles in the Apollo T est 

Memorandum, MD(S) 3100.180 (Octo~r 29, 1963), pp. 1-4; NASA N

"NASA Announces Changes in Saturn Missions," October 30, 1963. 

104 
The first production F-1 engine was flown from Rocketdynes Canoga Park, 31 

Calif., facility, where it was manufactured, to MSFC aboard Aero Spacelines' "Pregnant Guppy." 

David S. Akens, A. Ruth Jarrell, and Leo L. Jones, History of the George C. Marshall 


Space Flight Center From july I Through December 31, 1963 (MHM-8, July 1964), Vol. 


I, p. 129. 


NASA tentatively approved Project Luster, a program designed to capture During 

lunar dust deflected from the moon by meteorites and spun into orbit the 

Month around the earth. An Aerobee 150 sounding rocket containing scientific 

equipment built by Electro-Optical Systems, Inc., was scheduled for launch 

in late 1964. 

Missiles and Rockets, 13 (October 14, 1963), p. 9. 

NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller November 

notified the Directors of MSC, MSFC, and LOC that he intended to plan 

A drawing of the 445-newton-thrust (100-lb-thrust) reaction control rocket, left, 

shows the major components of the vital rocket engine used to maintain 

attitude and perform maneuvers in space. At right is a photo of a production 

model. The engine could be commanded to fire for periods of time ranging 

from milliseconds to long continuous operations. 

-Marquardt drawing and photo. 
3 

On November 18, Mueller further rlefined the flight 

Early Saturn IB flights might not be able to include t

effort must be made to phase the LEM into the picture 

Launch vehicle payload capability must be reached as qu

Subsystems for the early flights should be the same as 

lunar missions. To conserve funds, the first Saturn V ve

to obtain reentry data early in the Saturn test program. 

By December 31 the official schedule showed: 

Final Saturn I flight (SA-10): June 1965 

First Saturn IB flight (SA-20 1): first quarter, 1966 

First manned Saturn IB flight: either SA-203, third 

or SA-207, third quarter of 1967 

First Saturn V flight (SA-50 1): first quarter, 1967 

First manned Saturn V flight: either SA-503, third 

or SA-507, second quarter of 1968. 

TWX, Mueller to Dir., MSC, MSFC, and LOC, "Revised Manned Sp

November I, I963; memor;mdum, Mueller to Dir., MSC, MSFC, 

Space Flight Schedule," November IS, I963; "Apollo Quarterly S

fig. 9, 10, II. 

MSC Flight Operations Division outlined the advantag

CSM's capability to use the HF transceiver during ea

transceiver would allow the CSM to communicate wit

station at any time during earth orbit, even when the sp

sight (LOS) contact with only one or two ground stati

It would give the astronauts an additional communic

important, this HF capability could alert the network 

in the spacecraft and give the Flight Director more time 

while the spacecraft was out of LOS communication with 

Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Ap

tions during earth orbit," November I, I963. 

MSC Crew Systems Division, conducting flammability t

wear garment material in a 3.5 newtons per square cen

percent oxygen atmosphere, reported that no fires ha

thus far. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Mann

vember 3- 9, I963," p. 7. 

106 
Donald K. Slayton, Assistant Director for Flight Crew Operations 

Wesley L. Hjornevik, Assistant Director for Administration 

Joseph F. Shea, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 

Charles W. Mathews, Manager, Gemini Program Office and 

G. Merritt Preston, Manager, MSC Florida Operations. 

MSC News Release 63-277, November 5, 1963; The Houston Post, November 6, 1963. 

MSC accepted the final items of a $237 000 vibration test system from the 

LTV Electronics Division to be used in testing spacecraft parts. 

On this same day, MSC awarded a $183 152 contract to Wyle Laboratories 

to construct a high-intensity acoustic facility, also for testing spacecraft parts. 

The facility would ·generate noise that might be encountered in space flight. 

MSC News Release 63-224, November 5, 1963; MSC News Release 63- 225, November 5, 

1963. 

North American presented to MSC the results of a three-month study on 

radiation instrumentation. Three general areas were covered: radio-frequency (RF) warning systems, directional instrumentation, and external 

environment instrumentation. The company concluded that, with the use of 

an RF system, astronauts would receive about two hours' notice of any 

impending solar proton event and could take appropriate action. Proper 

orientation of the spacecraft could reduce doses by 17 percent, but this 

could be accomplished only by using a directional detection instrument. 

There was a 70 percent chance that dosages would exceed safe limits unless 

such an instrument was used. Conseqqently North American recommended 

prompt development. 

Despite the contractor's findings, MSC concluded that there was no need for 

an RF warning system aboard the spacecraft, believing that radiation warning could be handled more effectively by ground systems. But MSC did 

concur in the recommendation for a combined proton direction and external 

environment detection system and authorized North American to proceed 

with its design and development. · 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period October 16-November 12, 1963"; memorandum, 

David M. Hammock and Lee N. McMillion, MSC, to E. E. Sack, NAA, "Contract NAS 

9-150, Radiation Instrumentation for Apollo," November 27, 1963; "Apollo Monthly 

Progress Report," SID 62- 300-20, pp. 12- 13. 

107 

5 

7 
Key sequences of the first pad abort test of the Apollo prog

just after the escape tower ignition. At center, top, 

ployed and, below, the pilot chutes pulling the mai

the three main chutes fully open as they lowered boi

1963 	 Apollo Pad Abort Mission I (PA-1), the first off-the-

November launch escape system (LES), was conducted at WSM

boilerplate 6 and an LES for this test. 

7 

All sequencing was normal. The tower-jettison motor 

into a proper ballistic trajectory. The drogue parach

grammed, followed by the pilot parachute and main 

lasted 165.1 seconds. The postflight investigation di

nificant problem: exhaust impingement that resulted 

the CM. 

"Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Apollo Pad .Abort 1," N

1- 1, 1-2. 3-1. • 

8 	 Grumman issued a go-ahead to RCA to develop the 

ations on the $23.461 million cost-plus-fixed-fee con

on December 10. Areas yet to be negotiated betwee

were LEM communications, inflight test, ground sup

stabilization and control systems. (See June 28.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director

October 20c-November 16, 1963," p. 57; Wall Street journal, De

8 	 MSFC directed R,ocketdyne to develop an uprated H

m the first stage of the Saturn IB. In August, Rock

108 
factorily. The cargo parachute used for recovery, however, failed to fully 

inflate, and the vehicle was damaged at impact. This failure was unrelated 

to the test objectives. 

Msc; "ASPO Status Report for Period October 16-November 12, 1963." 

A joint North American-MSC meeting reviewed the tower flap versus 12 

canard concept for the earth landing system (ELS). (See January 18.) During 

a low-altitude abort, MSC thought, the ELS could be deployed apex forward 

with a very high probability of mission success by using the tower flap 

configuration. The parachute system proposed for this mode would be 

very reliable, even though this was not the most desirable position for 

deploying parachutes. Dynamic stability of the tower flap configuration 

during high-altitude aborts required further wind tunnel testing at Ames 

Research- Center. Two basic unknowns in the canard system were deployment reliability, and the probability of the crew's being able to establish 

One of the functions of Ames Research Center was supporting research for 

NASA's manned space flight projects. In the photo, the launch escape system 

of the Apollo command module was readied for aerodynamic testing in the 

Ames Unitary Wind Tunnel. 
12 

12 

12-15 

12-19 

13-14 

of both configurations, with an in-depth analysis of t

case the stability problem on the tower flap could n

end of the year. (See February 7 and 25, 1964.) 

Memorandum, David M. Hammock, MSC, to Asst. Dir. for Eng

ment, "Analysis of the abort and earth landing systems if implem

versus a canard mode," November 18, 1963. 

The Boeing Company and NASA signed a $27.4 m

agreement to the contract for development, fabrication

(first) stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle. 

Aviation W eek and Space Technology, 79 (November 25, 1963

History of Marshall ... july 1-December 31, 1963, Vol. I, p. 

NASA awarded a $19.2 million contract to Blount B

and M. M. Sundt Construction Company for the co

part of the Saturn V Launch Complex 39 at LOC. 

Akens et a[., History of Marshall .. . july 1- December 31, 1963, 

North American representatives reviewe·d Farrand Op

contract with Link for visual displays in the Apoll

MSC officials attended the technical portion of the me

at Link. Farrand and Link had established window 

optical axis orientations. Designs were to be review

and currency of window locations and crew eye positio

MSC, "'ASPO Status Report for Week Ending November 19, 196

ASPO reviewed Grumman's evaluation of series and pa

systems for the LEM ascent stage. Because of the co

in minimizing propellant residuals in a parallel syst

peared preferable, despite an increase in LEM struc

study of the vehicle showed the feasibility of a tw

which would be lighter and have about the same prop

four-tank series-feed arrangement. (See December 17.) 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 10," LPR- 10-26, p. 16; MSC, "A

Week Ending November 19, 1963"; "Apollo Quarterly Status Rep

After careful study, Grumman proposed to MSC 1

reducing the weight of the LEM. These involved elim

110 

ASPO revised the normal and emergency impact limits (20 and 40 g, 

respectively) to be used as human tolerance criteria for spacecraft design. 

[These limits superseded those established in the August 14, 1963, North 

American contract and subsequent correspondence.] 

Memorandum, David M. Hammock, MSC, to NAA, Attn: E. E. Sack, "Contract 9-150, 

Impact Acceleration Limits," November 14, 1963. 

NASA and contractor studies showed that, in the event of an engine hardover failure during maximum q, a manual abort was impractical for the 

Saturn I and IB, and must be carried out by automatic devices. Studies were 

continuing to determine whether, in a similar situation, a manual abort 

was possible from a Saturn V. 

Memorandum, Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to ASPO, Attn: Calvin H. Perrine, "Apollo abort 

.mode in event of maximum 'q' engine hard-over malfunction," November 15, 1963. 

All production drawings for the CM environmental control system were 

released. · AiResearch Manufacturing Company reported the most critical 

pacing items were the suit heat exchanger, cyclic accumulator selector valve, 

and the potable and waste water tanks. 

The Garrett Corporation, AiResearch Manufacturing Division, "Monthly Progress Report, Environmental Control System, NAA/S&ID, Project Apollo, 16 November 1963-15 

December 1963," SS-1013-R(l9) January 2, 1964, p. 4. 

North American conducted an eight-day trial of the prototype Apollo diet. 

· Three test subjects, who continued their normal activities rather than being 

confined, were given performance and oxygen consumption tests and lean 

body mass and body compartment water evaluations. The results showed 

insignificant changes in weight and physiology. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300--20, p. 6. 

As a result of an MSC Crew Systems Division-Hamilton Standard meeting 

on the space suit, MSC directed the company to develop a micrometeoroid 

protective garment to be worn over.the suit. (See August 13-20, 1964.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, November 17-December 21. 1963," p. 54. 

111 

14 

15 

1~December 15 

1~December 15 

17-December 21 
21 

22 

which must be incorporated into the spacecraft specific

There would be two ways for the astronauts to get fro

the other. The primary mode involved docking and 

transfer tunnel. An emergency method entailed crew 

through free space. The CSM would take an active par

ing, but both spacecraft must be able to take the prim

orbit docking maneuver. A single crewman must be a

docking maneuver and crew transfer. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending December 4, 1963"; 

for Week Ending December 17, 1963"; "Apollo Monthly Progress 

20, pp. 7, 8, 18; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 6," pp. 3-4

MSC approved Grumman's $19 383 822 cost-plus-fixed-

Rocketdyne for the LEM descent engine development p

30, February 13, and May 1.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the As

Manned Space Flight, November 17-December 21, 1963," p. 42. 

MSC's Space Environment Division (SED) recommend

naissance verification) 10 lunar landing areas for the Ap

( 1) 36°55' E. 1 °45' N. 

( 2) 31° E. oo N. 

( 3) 28°22' E. 1 °10' N. 

( 4) 24° 10' E. 0°10' N. 

( 5) 12°50' E. 0°20' N. 

( 6) 1 °28' w. 0°30' s. 

( 7) 13° 15' w. 2°45' N. 

( 8) 28° 15' w. 2°45' N. 

( 9) 31 °30' w. 1 °05' s. 

(10) 41 °30' w. 1° 10' s. 

SED chose these sites on the basis of regional slopes, 

strength, landmarks, isolated features, and the size, sh

the various areas. The list included several sites that th

nated earlier in the year. 

NASA Project Apollo Working Paper No. llOO, "Environmenta

the Choice of Lunar Operational Dates and the Choice of Luna

vember 22, 1963), pp. 30-33. 

11 2 
() g gy q

firing time was increased from 250 to 500 seconds. 

Akens et al., History of Marshall . . . july 1-December 31, 1963, Vol. I, p. 242; Missiles 

and Rockets, 13 (December 9, 1963), p . 10; interview, telephone, Erika Fry, Rocketdyne, 

February 24, 1969. 

ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea asked NASA Headquarters to revise velocity 

budgets for the Apollo spacecraft. (Studies had indicated that those budgets 

could be reduced without degrading performance.) He proposed that the lO 

percent safety margin applied to the original budget be eliminated in favor 

of specific allowan~es for each identifiable uncertainty and contingency; but, 

to provide for maneuvers which might be desired on later Apollo missions, 

the LEM's propellant tanks should be oversized. (See December 1963.) 

The ASPO Manager's proposal resulted from experience that had arisen 

because of unfortunate terminology used to designate the extra fuel. Originally the fuel budget for various phases of the mission had been analyzed and 

a I 0 percent allowance had been made to cover-at that time, unspecifiedcontingencies, dispersions, and uncertainties. Mistakenly this fuel addition 

became known as a "10% reserve"! John P. Mayer and his men in the 

Mission Planning and Analysis Division worried because engineers at North 

American, Grumman, and NASA had "been freely 'eating' off the so-called 

'reserve'" before studies had been completed to define what some of the 

contingencies might be and to apportion some fuel for that specific situation. 

Mayer wanted the item labeled a "10% uncertainty." 

Shea recommended also that the capacity of the LEM descent tanks be 

sufficient to achieve an equiperiod orbit, should this become desirable. However, the spacecraft should carry only enough propellant for a Hohmann 

transfer. This was believed adequate, because the as.cent engine was available for abort maneuvers if the descent engine failed and because a lowaltitude pass over the landing site was no longer considered necessary. By 

restricting lunar landing sites to the area between ±5° latitude and by 

limiting the lunar stay time to less than 48 hours, a one-half-degree, rather 

than two-degree, plane change was sufficient. 

In the meantime, Shea reported, his office was investigating how much 

weight could be saved by these propellant reductions. 

Memorandum, Shea to NASA Headquarters, Attn: Mgr., Apollo Program Office, "Revised Apollo Spacecraft t..V Budget," November 27, 1963; memorandum, Christopher C. 

113 

27 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), "... to honor his memo

of the works he started ... ,"Johnson said. On the follow

an executive order making this change official. With t

Florida Governor Farris Bryant, he also changed the name 

to Cape Kennedy. 

Angela C. Gresser, "Historical Aspects Concerning the Redesigna

Cape Canaveral," KHN-1, April 1964, p . 15; The New York Times, 

The Houston Chronicle, November 30, 1963. 

28-December 4 MSC reviewed a North American proposal for adding 

control system to the SM to maintain satisfactory tempe

pulsion and reaction control engines. The company's sc

water-glycol heat transport loops with appropriate nu

radiators. During December, MSC directed North Ame

liminary design of a system for earth orbit only. Appr

intended for lunar missions was deferred pending a com

of requirements. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending December 4, 1963"

Status Report No. 6," p. 15. 

29 	 After a meeting with Grumman officials on November 

the contractor to begin a Grumman-directed Apollo mi

ment study. (See January 16, 1964.) 

TWX, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, 

During MSC directed Grumman to halt work on LEM test 

the determination of its status as a tethered flight vehicle. 

Month As a result, the proposed flight demonstration of the te

an S- 64A Skycrane helicopter, was canceled. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 10," LPR-10-26, p. 37. 

During Ames Research Center performed simulated meteoroid 

the Avco Corporation heatshie1d structure. Four targets of 

Month 

a stainless steel backup structure were tested. The abl

honeycomb matrix, was 4.369 millimeters (0.172 inch) t

and 17.424 millimeters (0.686 inch) thick in the other 

was tested at 116.48 K (-250 degrees F) and at room 

no apparent difference in damage. 

114 
MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending December 4, 1963." 

Verne C. Fryklund of NASA's Manned Space Sciences Division advised 

Bellcomm of the procedure for determining Apollo landing sites on the 

moon. The Manned Space Sciences chief outlined an elimination for the 

site selection process. For the first step, extant selenographic material would 

be used to pick targets of interest for Lunar Orbiter spa'cecraft photography. 

After study of the Lunar Orbiter photography, a narrower choice of targets 

then became the object of Surveyor spacecraft lunar missions, with final 

choice of potential landing sites to be made after the Surveyor program. 

(See December 20.) 

The selection criteria at all stages were determined by lunar surface requirements prepared by OMSF. Fryklund emphasized that a landing at the 

least hazardous spot, rather than in the area with the most scientific 

interest, was the chief aim of the site selection process. 

Memorandum, Verne C. Fryklund, NASA Manned Space Sciences Division, to B. T. 

Howard, Bellcomm, "Your memorandum of October 31, 1963 about Apollo Landing 

Sites," November 4, 1963. 

Grumman selected AiResearch Manufacturing Company to supply cryogenic storage tanks for the LEM electrical power system. Final negotiations 

on the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract were held in June 1964. 

On this same date, Grumman concluded negotiations with Allison Division 

of General Motors Corporation for design and fabrication of the LEM 

descent engine propellant storage tanks (at a cost of $5 479 560). 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 6," pp. 30, 32; MSC, "Project Apollo Quarterly 

Status Report No. 8 for Period Ending June 30, 1964," p. 38; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, November 17-December 21, 1963," p. 42. 

A design review of the CSM part-task trainer was held at North American. 

Briefings included general design criteria and requirements, physical configuration, simulation models, and scheduling.. The trainer was expected to 

be operational in December 1964. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-20, pp. 20-21; MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending December 10, 1963." 

115 

During 

the 

Month 

December 

2 

3-5 
THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

1963 Primarily to save weight, the length of the adapter was shortened to 853

member centimeters (336 inches), as recommended by Grumman. (See October 2.)

5 Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, “Contract NAS 9-1100,

Line Items 1 and 6, Implementation of Actions Recommended in Apollo Program Systems Meetings,” December 5, 1963; TWX, David M. Hammock and Maynard, MSC, to

GAEC, Attn: Mullaney, and NAA, Attn: E. E. Sack, December 5, 1963.

9 ASPO requested that Grumman make a layout for transmittal to MSFC

showing space required in the S—IVB instrument unit for 406.4- and 457- 

centimeter (160- and 180-inch) cantilevered gears and for 508-centimeter 

(200-inch)-radius lateral fold gears. (See October 2.)

Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, “Contract NAS 9-1100,

Implementation of Actions in MSC-MSFC Mechanical Integration Panel,” December 9,

1963.

10-17 As a result of wind tunnel tests, Langley Research Center researchers found

the LEM/Little Joe II configuration to be aerodynamically unstable. To 

achieve stability, larger booster fins were needed. However, bigger fins 

caused more drag, shortening the length of the flight. MSC was investigating

To define the aerodynamic forces and moments on the Apollo launch escape system during the most critical period of flight, NASA scientists investigated a 0.085 scale Apollo launch escape vehicle model. Mounted in Langley Research Center’s 16-Foot Transonic Wind Tunnel, the model was studied at transonic speeds to determine aerodynamic characteristics during separa­ tion from the service module. The decomposition products of hydrogen peroxide were used to simulate the rocket exhaust. The experiments were designed to help ensure that the command module and crew could be safely recovered if a launch vehicle should malfunction.

I
minutes during this phase of the mission. 

MSC, "ASPO S~a~us Repor~ for Week Ending December 17, 1963." 

NASA Headquarters approved a $48 064 658 supplement to the Douglas 

Aircraft Company, Inc., contract for 10 additional S-IVB stages, four for the 

Saturn IB and six for the Saturn V missions. 

Akens et al., History of Marshall . .. july 1- December 31, 1963, Vol. I, p. 69. 

NASA canceled five Ranger flights (numbers 10 through 14) designed to 

take high-resolution photographs of the lunar surface before impact. [Five 

Rangers had thus far been launched.] OSS Associate Administrator Homer 

E. Newell stated that NASA would depend on the remaining four Rangers, 

the Lunar Orbiters, and the Surveyors for information about the lunar 

surface. Cancellation of the flights promised to save $90 million. 

NASA News Release 63-276, "NASA Cancels Five Follow-On Rangers," December 13, 

1963. 

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Experiments submitted its final 

recommendations on what should be Apollo's principal scientific objectives: 

(I) Examination of the physical and geological properties of the moon 

in the area surrounding the spacecraft 

(2) Geological mapping 

(3) Investigations of the moon's interior 

(4) Studies of the lunar atmosphere 

(5) Radio astronomy from the surface. 

This group, which had as its chairman Charles P. Sonett of NASA's Ames 

Research Center and thus was known as the Sonett Committee, had been 

formed wholly within NASA for just this purpose. Much of the Sonett Committee's report already was contained in the Office of Space Sciences' guidelines transmitted earlier to MSC (see October 8); their reception was not 

what one could call enthusiastic. 

"Final Repor~ of ~he Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Experimen~s and Training on 

~he Scien~ific pec~s of ~he Apollo Program," December 15, 1963, p. 4; ~~ , Willis B. 

os~ , ~o socia~e Adminis~rator for Manned Space Flight, "Apollo Scientific Guidelines," December 19, 1963. 

117 

11 

13 

15 
16 

16 

16 

16-January 15 

the next five days. This experiment demonstrated that 

100 percent oxygen environment under these conditio

ill effects. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director, 

October 20--November 16, 1963," p. 63; The Houston Chronicl

Missiles and Rockets, 13 (November II, 1963), p. 31 ; The Even

December 17, 1963. 

To ensure MSC's use of its manpower resources to th

sible, the Engineering and Development Directorate (E

system manager to each of the major subsystems in 

EDD provided such support as was needed for him to 

ment effectively. These subsystem managers were resp

the development of systems within the cost and schedu

program. Primary duties were management of contracto

MSC, "Apollo Subsystem Management Plan,'' December 16, 1963

General Dynamics Corporation announced the receipt 

about $4 million) from the Philco Corporation for fab

puter display equipment for the Integrated Mission Con

Wall Street journal, December 16, 1963. 

ASPO concurred in Grumman's recommendation to d

gimbal actuation system in the LEM's descent engine. A 

figuration would normally require mission abort in cas

Consequently, in making this change, Grumman must 

abort and the associated staging operation would no

survival and mission reliability. 

Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R . S. Mullan

IIOO, Item 2, Descent Engine Gimbal Drive Actuator," Decembe

Phase I of the Apollo manned centrifuge program w

U.S. Navy Aerospace Medical Acceleration Laborator

The tests pointed up interface problems between couch

For example, pressurizing the suit increased the dif

lower . part of the instrument panel. The test fixture w

the couch, framework, and empty instrument panel w

national Latex Corporation to serve as a mockup for f

liS 
MSC directed North American to redesign the CM environmental control 

system compressor to provide .283 cubic meters (10 cubic feet) of air per 

minute to each space suit at 1.8 newtons per square centimeter (3.5 psi), 16.78 

kilograms (37 pounds) per hour total. 

Ibid., p. 10. 

Grumman proposed a two-tank ascent stage configuration for the LEM. 

(See November 12-19.) On January 17, 1964, ASPO formally concurred 

and authorized Grumman to go ahead with the design. The change was 

expected to reduce spacecraft weight by about 45 kilograms (100 pounds) 

and would make for a simpler, more reliable ascent propulsion system. 

ASPO also concurred in the selection of titanium for the two propellant 

tanks. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 11," LPR-10-27, p. I; letter, William F. Rector III, MSC, 

to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM Program Review," January 

17, 1964. 

MSC directed North American to assign bioinstrumentation channels to 

the CM for early manned flights for monitoring the crew's pulse rate, blood 

pressure, respiration, and temperature. These readings could be obtained 

simultaneously on any one crew member and by switching from man to 

man for monitoring the entire crew. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period December IS-January 14, 1964." 

The System Engineering Division (SED) examined the feasibility of performing an unmanned earth orbital mission without the guidance and 

navigation system. SED concluded that the stabilization and control system 

could be used as an attitude reference for one to two orbits and would have 

accuracies at retrofire suitable for recovery. The number of orbits depended 

upon the number of maneuvers performed by the vehicle, since the gyros 

tended to drift. 

Ibid. 

Pratt and Whitney Aircraft delivered the first three prototype-A fuel 

cells to North American. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-21, p. 11. 

119 

17 

18-January 14 

18-January 14 

19 
20--January 18 

21 

23 

(

g) gg , 

photographs of the moon and transmit them by telem

The spacecraft would also detect radiation and micr

and supply tracking data on the gravitational field of t

tion derived from the project (managed by Langley Rese

aid in the selection of lunar landing sites. (See Novemb

1964.) 

NASA News Release 63-280, "NASA to Negotiate with Boeing 

December 20, 1963. 

MSC awarded the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers c

$4 211 377 (to be subcontracted toW. S. Bellows Constr

and Peter Kiewit and Sons, Inc.) for the construction o

and Training Facility and for additions to several exist

Center. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Asso

Manned Space Flight, December 22, 1963-January 18, 1964," p. 38

64-46, March 5, 1964; The Houston Post, January 9, 1964. 

MSC defined the LEM terminal rendezvous maneuvers

mission would begin at a range of 9.3 kilometers (five n

the CSM and terminate at a range of 152.4 meters (500 f

vous initiation, closing velocity should be reduced to 6

per second by use of the ascent engine. The reaction co

be used exclusively thereafter. 

Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "C

Definition of LEM Terminal Rendezvous Model," December 21 , 1

Motorola, Inc., received a follow-on contract from t

Laboratory for the manufacture and integration of at 

receiving subsystems for NASA's Deep Space Network 

Flight Network ground stations. Within the unified S-h

by NASA, receiving equipment of the two networks 

except for a slight difference in operating frequency. Th

munications between ground stations and spacecraft to 

quency. It also allowed more efficient power transfer be

antennas and the spacecraft and would greatly reduce 

countered with UHF frequencies. 

NASA News Release 63 284, "Motorola to MakeS-Band Radio Rece

NASA Ground Stations," December 23, 1963. 

120 
Phillips as Deputy Director of the NASA Headquarters Apollo Program 

Office. General Phillips assumed management of the manned lunar landing 

program, working under George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator of 

Manned Space Flight and Director of the Apollo Program Office. 

NASA News Release 63-287, "NASA Appoints General Phillips to Assist" in Apollo­


Program Management," December 31, 1963. 


MSC decided to supply television cameras for the LEM as government­ During 

furnished items. Grumman was ordered to cease its effort on this component. the 

Month 

Resizing of the LEM propulsion tanks was completed by Grumman. The 

cylindrical section of the descent tank was extended 34.04 millimeters (1.34 

inches), for a total of 36.27 centimeters (14.28 inches) between the spherical 

end bells. The ascent tanks (two-tank series) were 1240.54 centimeters (48.84 

inches) in diameter. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. II," LPR-10-27, pp. 18, 30. 

RCA, contractor to Grumman for the LEM rendezvous and landing radars, During 

chose Ryan Aeronautical Company as vendor for the landing radar. The the 

Month contract was signed March 16, 1964. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 6," p. 34. 

North American, Grumman, and MIT Instrumentation Laboratory sum­ 1964 

marized results of a six-week study, conducted at ASPO's request, on require­ January 

ments for a Spacecraft Development Program. Purpose of the study was to 

define joint contractor recommendations for an overall development test 3 

plan within resource constraints set down by NASA. ASPO required that 

the plan define individual ground test and mission objectives, mission 

descriptions, hardware requirements (including ground support equipment), 

test milestones, and individual subsystem test histories. 

Intermediate objectives for the Apollo program were outlined: the qualificadon of a manned CSM capable of earth reentry at parabolic velocities 

after an extended space mission; qualification of a mannoo LEM both 

physically and functionally compatible with the CSM; and demonstration of 

121 
3 

7 

pp

suggested: 

(1) Landing of an unmanned spacecraft. If this f

would be little or no gain, since there was not yet a 

for instrumenting the unmanned vehicle for necessary 

landing were successful, it would prove only that th

of landing at that particular location. 

(2) Designing the LEM for a reasonably smooth 

avoid placing too stringent a requirement on the la

commodate all lunar surface unknowns. A block c

design could then be planned for about mid-1966. By 

lunar data from Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbi

available. The group agreed the second solution was mo

The contractors recommended: (1) ASPO concur wit

as a planning basis for implementation; (2) ASPO issue 

Plan to all three contractors (preferably within 30 t

contractor analyze the effect of the plan upon spacecraf

ment contracts; and (4) ASPO and the contractors con

of the plan once it was formalized. 

In addition, the test plan should be coordinated wit

mission study, as well as development testing and sys

the complete Apollo program. 

The complete findings of this joint study were contai

report issued by North American and submitted to M

1964. [This document became known informally as th

Present Report."] 

"Apollo Spacecraft Development Test Plan," SID 64-66-1, Vol. I, 

MSC forwarded a $1.4 m:illion contract to Control D

two computer systems and peripheral equipment whic

to GE as part of the preflight acceptance checkout equ

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the A

Manned Space Flight, December 22, 1963-January 18, 1964," p. 

ASPO directed Grumman to implement a number of 

space suit oxygen umbilical hoses discussed at a joi

American meeting and forwarded to ASPO on Decemb

a design that would permit use of CM hose sets in 

122 

a contractor for the connectors.) · 

MSC "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending December 10, 1963"; TWX, William F. 

Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Space Suit Oxygen Umbilical Hoses," 

January 7, 1964. 

MSC directed Grumman to integrate LEM translation and descent engine 

thrust controllers. The integrated controller would be lighter and easier 

to install; also it would permit simultaneous reaction control system translation and descent engine control. Grumman had predicted that such a capability might be required for touchdown. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending January 7, 1963." 

The Flight Data Systems Branch of the Engineering and Development 

Directorate provided ASPO's Lunar Mission Planning Branch with information about the LEM extravehicular suit telemetry and communications 

system. No line of sight (LOS) communications were possible, and there 

would be no ground wave propagation and no atmospheric reflection. The 

link between astronaut and LEM would be limited to LOS of the two antennas, and surface activities by an extravehicular astronaut must be planned 

according!y. 

Memorandum, Ragan Edmiston, MSC, to Richard H. Kohrs, "Lunar transmission range 

for AstrofLEM communications link," January 10, 1964. 

Three U. S. Air Force test pilots began a five-week training period at the 

Martin Company leading to their participation in a simulated seven-day 

lunar landing mission. This was part of Martin's year-long study of crew 

performance during simulated Apollo missions (under a $771 000 contract 

from NASA). 

The Houston Post, January 13, 1964; The Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1964. 

Based on the LEM mockup review of September 16-18, 1963, MSC established criteria for redundancy of controls and displays in the LEM crew 

station. Within the framework of apportioned reliability requirements for 

mission success and crew safety, these guidelines applied: (1) the LEM must 

be provisioned so that hover to touchdown could be flown manually by the 

crew; (2) no single failure in the controls and displays should cause an 

abort; and (3) the unknowns associated with lighting conditions or dust 

caused by rocket exhaust impingement on the lunar surface might require 

123 


8 

10 

11 

14 
14 

15 

15 

1964. 

At an MSC-North American meeting, spacecraft c

lems were reviewed. Testing had indicated that cons

essential to ensure equipment operation in a high-h

Also antenna designs had created several problem area

antenna's causing the CM to roll during reentry. The 

consumed in counteracting this roll exceeded reentry 

because the CM could float upside down, the recove

pointed at the ocean floor. In fact, many at this mee

the overall communications concept was satisfactory 

tailed ground receiver characteristics." The situation 

the primary problems in the area of communication

the lack of functional requirements specifications." 

"Minutes of NASA- NAA Technical Management Meeting, Janu

MSC and Bellcomm agreed upon a plan for testing 

under reentry conditions. Following Project Fire and 

IB would be used to launch standard "all-up" space

orbit; the SM engine would boost the spacecraft's ve

(29 000 feet) per second. Two flights were scheduled, 

performance and the other a long-range flight to ach

load and assess the interaction of the ablator, its b

other related structural members. This degree of h

would permit "demonstration" rather than "devel

Saturn V. 

Memorandum, Robert 0. Piland, MSC, to Joseph F. Shea, "A

January 16, 1964. 

The first fuel cell module delivered by Pratt and 

North American was started and put on load. The mod

and all test objectives were accomplished. Total op

hours six minutes, with one hour at each of four loa

amperes. The fuel cell was shut down without incide

1500 cubic centimeters (1.6 quarts) of water were col

"Apollo Monthly Pro~ess Report," SID 62-300-21, p . 11. 

124 
get their comments on the feasibility of the manual reorientation maneuver 

required by the canard abort system concept. (See November 12, 1963.) 

The astronauts affirmed that they could accomplish the maneuver and that 

manual control during high-altitude aborts was · an acceptable part of a 

launch escape system design. They pointed out the need to eliminate 

any possibility of sooting of the windows during normal and abort flight. 

Although the current design did not preclude such sooting, a contemplated 

boost protective cover might satisfy this requirement. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending January 23, 1964." 

ASPO asked the Flight Crew Operations Directorate to study whatever 

was necessary to ensure that the LEM crew could reorient their spacecraft 

manually in an abort 36 600 meters (120 000 feet) above the moon. 

Ibid. 

MSC's Center Medical Office was reevaluating recommendations for LEM 

bioinstrumentation. The original request was for three high-frequency channels (two electrocardiogram and one respiration) that could be switched to 

monitor all crew members. Grumman wanted to provide one channel for 

each astronaut with no switching. 

Ibid. 

ASPO and the Astronaut Office agreed to provide the crew with food that 

could be eaten in a liquid or semi-liquid form during emergency pressurized 

operation. This would permit considerable reduction in the diameter of 

the emergency feeding port in the helmet visor. 

Ibid. 

Representatives of Grumman, MSC's Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Division, ASPO, and Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 

(RASPO) at Bethpage met at Grumman to plan the LEM's electrical power 

system. The current configuration was composed of three fuel cell generators 

with a maximum power output of 900 watts each, spiking stabilizing batteries, one primary general-purpos, · AC inverter, and a conventional bus 

125 


15-23 

15-23 

15-23 

16 
16 

16-February 12 

1~ebruary 15 

errors in energy requirements 

• Fuel cells and cryogenic fuels needed testing in 

environment 

• Grumman depended upon its subcontractors to d

testing procedures 

• Optimum power supply modes and motors for 

control system were still to be selected 

• "Essential loads" needed standardizing to allow th

ing structure 

• Proper charging rates and equipment for the po

system extravehicular suit batteries needed to be selected

Memorandum, Donald G. Wiseman, MSC, to Deputy Asst. Dir. for E

velopment, "Meetings attended by Instrumentation and Electronics S

sonnel at the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation," Janua

Grumman presented to MSC the first monthly progress re

Mission Planning Study. (See November 29, 1963.) Th

designated the Apollo Mission Planning Task Force (AM

ground rules and constraints to serve as a base line arou

flexibilities and contingency analyses could be built. M

cussion at the meeting were the reference mission, study 

assignments, and future plans. The following week, M

tions Directorate provided a reference trajectory for t

Major constraints were daylight launch, translunar inj

second earth parking orbit, free-return trajectory, dayligh

lunar equator, 24-hour lunar surface staytime, and a 

earth. (See May 4.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Week Ending January 23, 1964"; "A

for Period December 18-January 14, 1964." 

The first full-throttle firing of Space Technology Labo

scent engine (being developed as a parallel effort to the R

was carried out. The test lasted 214 seconds, with cham

66.2 to 6.9 newtons per square centimeter (96 to 10 psi). E

was about five percent below the required level. 

MSC, "Monthly ASPO Status Report for Period January 16-Februa

Two astronauts took part in tests conducted by North Am

equipment stowage locations in CM mockup 2. Worki

126 , 

NAA, Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 6230022, March 1, 1964, p . 6. 

AiResearch Manufacturing Company reported that it had completed design 

effort on all components of the CM environmental control system. (See 

January 23-29.) 

The Garrett Corporation, AiResearch Manufacturing Division, "Monthly Progress Re· 

port, Environmental Control System, NAAfS&ID, Project Apollo, 16 January 1964-15 

February 1964," S5-1013-R(21), February 29, 1964. 

Grumman was studying problems of transmitting data if the LEM missed 

rendezvous with the CSM after lunar launch. This meant that the LEM had 

to orbit the moon and a data transmission blackout would occur while the 

LEM was on the far side of the moon. There were two possible solutions, an 

onboard data recorder or dual transmission to the CSM and the earth. This 

redundancy had not previously been planned upon, however. 

Memorandum, Donald G. Wiseman, MSC, to Deputy Asst. Dir. for Engineering and 

Development, "Meetings attended by Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Division 

personnel at the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation," January 24, 1964. 

A design review of the CM reaction control system (RCS) was held. Included 

was a discussion of possible exposure of the crew to hazardous fumes from 

propellants if the RCS ruptured at earth impact. For the time being, the 

RCS design would not be changed, but no manned flights would be conducted until the matter had been satisfactorily resolved. A detailed study 

would be made on whether to eliminate, reduce, or accept this crew safety 

hazard. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-22, p. 22. 

NASA assigned George M. Low to the position of Deputy Director of MSC. 

He would replace James C. Elms, who had resigned on January 17 to return 

to private industry. Although Low continued as Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters until May 1, he 

assumed his new duties at MSC the first part of February. 

MSC News Release 64-13, J anuary 17, 1964; NASA News Release 64-13, " NASA Names 

Low Deputy Director of Manned Spacecraft Center," January 19, 1964. 

North American gave a presentation at MSC on the block h~m e concept 

with emphasis on Block II CSM changes. These were defined as modifications necessary for compatibility with the LEM, structural changes to reduce 

127 


1Hebruary 15 

17 

17 

19 

21 
22 

Representatives of MSC, North American, Collins Radio 

Motorola, Inc., met in Scottsdale, Ariz., to discuss a propo

The test firing of a launch escape motor for the Apollo spacecraf

system made a spectacular flame pattern during static fir

Propulsion Company's Potrero facility near Beaumont, Ca

canted outboard, split the flame of the solid-fuel rocket 

equal tails. 
Period January 30-February 5, 1964;" "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300­

22, p. 10. 

NASA and North American discussed visibility requirements on the CM 

and came to the following conclusions: the contractor would provide four 

portholes in the protective shroud so the astronauts could see through both 

side and forward viewing windows, and ensure that all windows were clean 

after launch escape tower separation. North American proposed the addition 

to Block II CM of a collimated optical device for orientation and alignment 

during docking. MSC .Flight Crew Operations Directorate recommended 

that mirrors be added to increase external and internal field of vision. 

MSC, "Minutes, Project Apollo Window and Vision Requirements Meeting, January 

23, 1964," January 24, 1964; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the 

Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, January 19-February 15, 1964," pp. 29­

30; MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period January 23-29, 1964." 

MSC issued a $9.2 million contract amendment to North American for the 

construction and modification of buildings at Downey, Calif., and for 

research and development work on the CM. 

MSC News Release 64-17, January 23, 1964. 

The AiResearch Manufacturing Company began qualification testing of the 

first group of components of the CM environmental control system. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period January 30-February 5, 1964"; "Monthly Progress 

Report, Environmental Control System," S5-'-1013-R(21), p. 2. 

The second phase of docking simulation studies ended at North AmericanColumbus (Ohio). Tests included 170 runs simulating transposition and 

lunar orbital docking with stable and unstable targets, and two extendible 

probe concepts: cable and rigid boom. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-22, p . 2. 

A design review of crew systems checkout for the CM waste management 

~ystem was held at North American. As a result, MSC established specific 

requirements for leakage flow measurement and for checkout at North 

American and Cape Kennedy. The current capability of the checkout unit 

restricted it to measuring only gross leakage of segments of the system. 

129 


23 

23 

23-29 

24 

24 
27 

27 

28 

pany to manufacture high-pressure insulated tanks. T

available about May 15, would be used in a study of 

supercritical helium pressurization system for the LEM

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate A

Space Flight, January 26-February 1, 1964," p. ll. 

ASPO asked Grumman to study whether attitude co

vehicles was practicable using the LEM's stabilization 

(RCS). Grumman also was to evaluate the RCS fuel 

five-minute alignment period to permit two star sigh

directed the contractor to determine RCS fuel requir

alignment of the LEM's inertial measurement unit d

This second alignment was needed for the required la

a Hohmann descent. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "

Request for Study of LEM Capability to Stabil.ize the Command 

in Lunar Orbit," January 27, 1964. 

Studies on the LEM's capability to serve as the active ve

docking showed the forward docking tunnel to be th

complishing this. ASPO requested Grumman to inves

of this docking approach and the effect it might have 

configuration. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "

Effects of Docking Requirements on the LEM Configuration," Ja

The United States and Spain agreed to the constructio

$1.5 million space tracking and data acquisition station 

(30 miles) west of Madrid, Spain. Spanish firms would c

and other support structures, and Spanish technicians 

operating the station. Linked with the NASA Deep Sp

Facility, the station included a 26-meter (85-foot)-dia

tenna and equipment for transmitting, receiving, recor

and communications with the spacecraft. Later, unifie

was added to join the facility with the Manned Space 

support the Apollo program. 

NASA News Release 64-22. "Spain Becomes Site of Major U.S. Sp

January 28, 1964; U.S. Congress, Eleventh Semiannual Report to 

No. 63, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 26, 1965), p. 146. 

130 
performed as expected. The Block II SA-5 was also the first flight test of 

the Saturn I guidance system. 

MSFC, Results of the Fifth Saturn I Launch Vehicle T est Flight, SA-5 (MPR- SATFE-64-17, September 22, 1964), pp. 1-5, 8, 82, 85; Missiles and Rockets, 14 (February 3, 

1964), pp. 17- 18. 

NASA announced the award of a $1.356 million contract to the Blaw-Knox 

Company for design and construction of three parabolic antennas, each 26 

meters (85 feet) in diameter, for the Manned Space Flight Network stations 

at Goldstone, Calif.; Canberra, Australia; and near Madrid, Spain. 

Missiles and Rockets, 14 (February 10, 1964), p. 42; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964 

(NASA SP-4005, 1965), p. 33. 

NASA launched Ranger VI from Cape Kennedy. (See December 19, 1962.) 

The probe, which sought to obtain television pictures of the lunar surface, 

landed in the moon's Sea of Tranquility on February 2. Despite being 

the subject of an intensive quality and reliability testing program, Ranger VI 

was a failure- no pictures were obtained. The cause was believed to exist 

in the power system for the spacecraft's television cameras. 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, pp. 34-35, 41; Henry L. Richter, Jr., (ed.), Space 

Measurements Survey: Instruments and Spacecraft, October 1957-March 1965 (NASA 

SP-3028), p. 468. 

MSC and North American representatives discussed preliminary analysis of 

the probabilities of mission success if the spacecraft were hit by meteoroids. 

The contractor believed that pressurized tankage in the SM must be penetrated before a failure was assumed. To MSC, this view appeared overly 

optimistic. MSC held that, as the failure criterion, no debris should result 

from meteoroid impact of the SM outer structure. (This change in criteria 

would cost several hundred pounds in meteoroid protection weight in the 

SM and LEM.] North American thought that penetration of one half the 

depth of the heatshield on the conical surface of the CM was a failure. 

Here, MSC thought the contractor too conservative; full penetration could 

probably be allowed. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period January 30-February 5, 1964." 

Grumman began initial talks with Bell Aerosystems Company looking 

toward concentrating on the .all-ablative concept for the LEM's ascent 

engine, thus abandoning the hope of using the lighter, radiatively cooled 

131 


29 

30 

30-February 5 

During 

the 

Month 
February 

3 

4 

At an Apollo Program Review held at MSC, Maxime 

that Crew Systems Division had learned that the metab

walking in an unpressurized suit was twice that of a man 

When the suit was pressurized to 1.8 newtons per squ

psi), the rate was about four times as much. To count

cooled undergarment developed by the British Ministry 

Aircraft Establishment was being tested at Hamilton 

"space-age long johns" had a network of small tubes th

circulated and absorbed body heat. Advantages of the sys

heat transfer, low circulating noise levels, and relatively 

required. An MSC study on integration of the suit with 

~ental control system showed a possible weight savin

(20 pounds). 

NASA, "Apollo, Program Review Document, February 1, 1964," p. 

ASPO Status Report for Period January 16-February 12, 1964"; Sp

February 3, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period February 13

Week and Space Technology, 80 (February 17, 1964), p. 29; MSC, "

for Period Ending February 27- March 4, 1964"; TWX, W·. F. R

GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, March 2, 1964. 

Fourteen new astronauts, chosen in October 1963, rep

training for the Gemini and Apollo programs. (See Octo

MSC News Release 64-24, February 3, 1964. 

MSC and MSFC officials discussed development flight te

shield qualification. Engineers from the Houston grou

mission profiles and the number of missions needed t

ponent. MSFC needed this information to judge its laun

ment test requirements against those of MSC to qualify 

the middle of the month, Richard D. Nelson of the Mi

Analysis Division (MPAD) had summarized the profile

the Saturn V that satisfied MSC's needs. Nelson comp

trajectories that could provide reentry speeds of aro

(36 000 feet) per second, simulating lunar return. As an ex

l" would use two of the booster's stages to fire into a 

path, and then use a third stage to accelerate to the desire

Flight profiles for Saturn IB missions for heatshield qua

proved to be a little more difficult because "nobody wo

the requirements or constraints, or test objectives." In o

requirements for booster development test objectives an

132 

velocities" (8500 to 8800 meters per second) (28 000 to 29 000 feet per second). Skopinski also enumerated specific test objectives covering the whole 

spacecraft-launch vehicle development test program. These were first distributed on March 27, and adjustments were made several times later in the year. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period January 30-February 5, 1964"; memorandum, 

Carl R. Huss, MSC, to BE4fHistorical Office, "Comments on Voltime II of The Apollo 

Spacecraft: A Chronolol!:Y," March 30, 1970; memorandum, Richard D. Nelson, MSC, 

to Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Division, "Mission profiles for Saturn V superorbital heat shield qualification test," February 13, 1964; memorandum, Ted H. Skopinski, MSC, to Distr., "Summary of broad term test objectives and constraints for Saturn 

IB development missions 201 and 202," March 27, 1964; memorandum, E. D. Murrah 

and R. E. McAdams, MSC, to Distr., "Possible change in trajectory profile for Apollo 

mission SA-201," September 29, 1964; memorandum, McAdams, to Distr., "Revised preliminary trajectory profile for Apollo Mission SA-201," October 19, 1964; memorandum, 

McAdams, to Distr., "Preliminary Reference Trajectory for Apollo Mission SA-201," 

October 26, 1964. 

Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company reported it had developed an 

all-attitude display unit'for the CM to monitor the guidance and navigation 

system and provide backup through the stabilization and control system. 

The Flight Director Attitude Indicator (or "eight-ball") would give enough 

information for all spacecraft attitude maneuvers during the entire mission 

to be executed manually, if necessary. 

Honeywell News Release, "All-Attitude Display Produced By Honeywell For Apollo 

Spacecraft," February 6, 1964; Space Business Daily, February 24, 1964, p. 290. 

Grumman received MSC's response to the "Project Christmas Present Report" (see January 3), and accordingly reevaluated its testing concept for 

the LEM. On February 19, the contractor proposed to ASPO Manager 

.Joseph F. Shea a flight program schedule, which was tentatively approved. 

ASPO's forthcoming proposal was identical to Grumman's proposaL It 

called for 11 LEMs (which were now renumbered consecutively) and two 

flight test articles. All LEMs were to have full mission capability, but 

numbers one through three had to be capable of either manned or unmanned flight. 

GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 13,'~ LPR-10-29, March 10, 1964, p. 35; "Monthly 

Progress Report No. 14," LPR-10-30, p. 36. 

Engineers from ASPO and Engineering and Development Directorate (EDD) 

discussed the current status of the tower flap versus the canard launch escape 

vehicle (LEV) configurations. (See November 12, 1963.) Their aim was to 

133 


6 

7 

7 
February 

Space globe built by Honeywell would help guide Project A

their 800 000-kilometer (500 000-mile) flight to the moo

on the globe and pointers on the instrument face (left) 

at a glance which way their spacecraft faced and how f

any direction. The new device, produced with watc

Honeywell's Aeronautical Division in Minneapolis, was 

tor attitude indicator. In the photo, engineer Bill 

adjustments to a unit ready for shipment to North Am

-Minneapol

select one of the two LEV configurations for Block I spa

ary 25.) ASPO and EDD concluded that the canard w

superior; that arguments against the canard, based on se

cal complexity, qr schedule effect, were not sufficient to 

dynamic advantage; and that this configuration shou

134 

1964 
Launch escape motor 

Structural skirt 

Boost protective cover 

Block I spacecraft. However, further analysis was needed to choose the 1964 

design for the Block II LEV. February 

Memorandum, Calvin H . Perrine, Jr., MSC, to Distribution, "Minutes of meeting on 


tower flap and canards, February 7, 1964," February 12, 1964. 


During a meeting at MSC, North American and MSC Crew Systems Division 7 

agreed that there should be a central authority with total cognizance over 

Gemini and Apollo food and survival equipment, and that all this equipment should be government furnished. 

MSC, "Monthly ASPO Status Report for Period January 16--February 12, 1964." 

MSC directed Grumman t9 stop all work on the LEM j Little Joe II program. 10 

This action followed the ASPO Manager's decision against a testing program 

for the LEM comparable to that for the CSM. (See December 10-17, 1963.) 

Ibid.; memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Distr., "Cancellation of LEM/ LJ II Pro· 


gram," February 10, 1964. 


ASPO directed Grumman to provide an abort guidance system (AGS) in 11 

the LEM using an inertial reference system attached to the structure of the 

vehicle. Should the spacecraft's navigation and guidance system fail, the 

crew could use the AGS to effect an abort. Such a device eliminated the 

135 
12 

13 

13-19 

13-20 

14 

NASA gave credit to two MSC engineers, George C. Fr

Richard, for designing a harness system for the LEM t

to fly the vehicle from a standing position. Eliminati

the LEM's weight and gave the crew better visibility a

of controls and intruments. (See September 16-18, 19

MSC News Release 64-27, February 12, 1964. 

MSC issued Requests for Proposals to more than 50 fir

and recommendations on how the lunar surface 

Studies should show how lunar surveys could be perfo

on the lunar surface might be located for future lunar n

use of equipment planned for the LEM and CM was 

scientific apparatus aboard the LEM would be selenod

study would not include actual fabrication of hardw

estimates of cost and development times. 

Space Business Daily, February 13, 1964, p. 238; ibid., March 2, 

Boilerplate (BP) 13 spacecraft was flown from North 

Calif., to MSC's Florida Operations facility at Cape 

vehicle was inspected and checked out. On April 2

launch escape system were moved to the pad and m

vehicle, SA-6. After exhaustive testing, a Flight Readi

19 established that BP-13 was ready for launch. (See M

MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-101 (BP-13)," MS

1964), pp. 6-1 through 6-4. 

The Block II CSM configuration (see January 21) was 

of changes: mandatory changes necessary to meet the 

(1) Functional requirements of the lunar mission 

(2) Manufacturing or fabrication changes (iden

proved fabrication techniques) 

(3) Technically desirable and weight reduction c

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period F<;bruary 13--20, 1964." 

MSC ordered North American to design the SM's re

with the capability for emergency retrograde from eart

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and' Information S

Change Authorization No. One-Hundred, Forty-Seven," February 

136 
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-23, p. 5. 

The potable water system was changed to meter both hot and cold water 

in one-ounce increments to provide accurate measurements for food rehydration. The previous water valve was a full-flow tap. 

Ibid., p. 10. 

MSC gave its formal consent to two of Grumman's subcontracts for engines 

for the LEM: 

(1) With Bell Aerosystems for the ascent engine ($11 205 416 incentivefee contract) 

(2) With Space Technology Laboratories for a descent engine to parallel that being developed by Rocketdyne ($18 742 820 fixed-fee contract). 

(See May 1963.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, February 16-March 21, 1964," p. 45. 

MSC completed and forwarded to NASA Headquarters a plan for changing 

the relationship of the navigation and guidance contractors. AC Spark Plug 

would become the principal contractor, with the Raytheon Company and 

Kollsman Instrument Corporation as subcontractors. MIT would still have 

primary responsibility for system design and analysis. (See June 20.) 

Ibid. 

MSC announced that, during a 14-day lunar mission, fuel cells in the Apollo 

CSM would produce about 16 liters (60 gallons) of potable water while 

furnishing power to operate the electronic equipment. 

MSC News Release 64-32, February 17, 1964. 

General DynamicsjConvair delivered to White Sands Missile Range 

(WSMR) the second Little Joe II launch vehicle, the first Little Joe II 

scheduled to fly with a production Apollo spacecraft. (See May 13.) 

MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-{)01 (BP-12)," ' MSC-R-A-64-1, May 28, 

1964, p . 2- 1. 

Motorola, Inc., submitted a proposal to NASA for the Apollo Unified SBand Test Program, a series of tests on the unified S-band transponder and 

137 


16--March 15 

16--March 21 

16--March 21 

17 

17 

17 
20-26 

20-26 

20-26 

20-26 

20-26 

22 

at the International Latex Corporation. [Reviewers iden

but they were minor and the suit was accepted.] 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period February 20-26, 1964." 

Trajectory analyses by North American indicated that, 

configuration, it was highly probable that crew accelerat

exceeded during high-altitude abort. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-March 

North American submitted to ASPO a proposal for dyn

docking subsystem, which called for a full-scale air-sup

The contractor estimated the program cost at $2.7 m

vehicle design, construction, and operation. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period February 20-26, 1964." 

ASPO decided upon transfer through free space as the 

the crew's getting from the LEM back to the CM if the t

not be pressurized. North American had not designed 

vehicular activity nor for passage through the docking 

surized suit. Thus there was no way for the LEM crew 

CM unless docking was successfully accomplished. ASP

transfer in a pressurized suit both through the docking 

space to be a double redundancy that could not be affo

Ibid. 

North American conducted three tests (4, 20, and 88 h

fuel cell. The third ended prematurely because of a sudd

(Specification life on the modules was 100 hours.) 

During this same week, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft test

cell for 400 hours without shutdown and reported no le

Ibid. 

Grumman completed negotiations with Bell Aerosystem

LEM's reaction control system propellant tanks. 

Ibid. 

George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for M

summarized recent studies of the dangers of meteoroid

138 

of their rarity. Radiation in the Van Allen belts was not dangerous because 

the spacecraft would fly through the belts at high speeds. 

NASA News Release 64-43, "Radiation, Technical Problems Won't Bar Moon Landing 

in This Decade, Mueller Says," February 22, 1964. 

RCA presented results of a weight and power tradeoff study on the LEM's 

radar systems, which were over Grumman's specification in varying amounts 

from 100 to 300 percent. RCA proposed that the accuracy requirements be 

relaxed to cope with this problem. MSC requested Grumman, on the basis 

of this report, to estimate a slippage in the schedule and the effects of 

additional weight and power. (See February 27-March 4.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-March 4, 1964." 

At a NASA-North American Technical Management Meeting at Downey, 

Calif., North American recommended that Apollo earth landings be primarily on water. On the basis of analytical studies and impact tests, the 

contractor had determined that "land impact problems are so severe that 

they require abandoning this mode as a primary landing mode." In these 

landings, North American had advised, it was highly probable that the 

spacecraft's impact limits would be surpassed. In fact, even in water landings 

"there may be impact damage which would result in leakage of the capsule." (See March 29-April 4.) ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea, at this meeting, "stated that MSC concurs that land impact problems have not been 

solved, and that planning to utilize water impact is satisfactory." (See 

December 1962; February 1 and March 5, 1963.) 

Three days later, Shea reported to the MSC Senior Staff that Apollo landings would be primarily on water. The only exceptions, he said, would be 

pad aborts and emergency landings. With this question of "wet" versus 

"dry" landing modes settled, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Assistant Director 

for Flight Operations, brought up the unpleasant problem of the CM's 

having two stable attitudes while afloat-and especially the apex-down one. 

This upside-down attitude, Kraft emphasized, submerged the vehicle's 

recovery antennas and posed a very real possibility of flooding in rough seas. 

Shea countered that these problems could be "put to bed" by using. some 

type of inflatable device to upright the spacecraft. (See April 15 and August 

16-September 15.) 

"Minutes of NASA-NAA Technical Management Meeting, February 25, 1964," February 

26, 1964, p. 3; MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, February 28, 1964," p. 4. 

139 

24 

25 
1964 

February 

25 

25 

Apollo spacecraft simulator built by Honeywell for testing 

tion and control system (SCS) was described as the larg

device of its kind. Cold-gas reaction jets maneuvered 

form at the company's Aeronautical Division, Minne

characteristics of the Apollo command module in fl

moon. A single stainless steel bearing (center) resting o

of gas supported some eight metric tons (nine U.S

virtually isolating the platform from friction and vib

nard Aske inspected one of the jets (upper right) 

McKinley adjusted part of the bearing mechanism. B

were developed for North American Aviation under 

- Minneap

Grumman and RCA signed a contract on the LEM 

system. (See June 28, 1963.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 12-18, 1964"; 

Quarterly Status Report No. 7 for Period Ending March 31, 196

At a NASA- North American technical management m

versus canard configuration for the launch escape vehic

Manager Joseph F. Shea decided that canards should 

Block I vehicles, with continued study on eliminating 

II vehicles. (See January 18 and November 12, 1963, an

140 
MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) received an improved version of the 

Apollo space suit (the A-3H-024 Phase B). In the course of the following 

week, CSD engineers examined the suit for weight, leakage, donning, and 

mobility. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-March 4, 1964." 

Boilerplate (BP) 19 was drop tested at El Centro, Calif., simulating flight 

conditions and recovery of BP-12. (See May 13.) A second BP-19 drop, on 

April 8, removed all constraints on the BP-12 configuration and earth landing system. Another aim, to obtain information on vehicle dynamics, was 

not accomplished because of the early firing of a backup drogue parachute. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 7," p. 5; "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 

62-300-23, p. 19; NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-24, May I, 1964, 

p. 28; MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 9-16, 19'64." 

MSC and AC Spark Plug negotiated amendments to AC's contract for a 

research and development program for inertial reference integrating gyroscopes. The amendments covered cost overruns, an additional 30 pieces of 

hardware, and conversion of the contract to an incentive-fee type (target 

price, $3.465 million; ceiling price, $3.65 million). 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned 

Space Flight, February 16-March 21, 1964," p. 45; MSC, "ASPO Status Report for 

Period Ending February 27-March 4, 1964." 

Representatives from MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) visited Hamilton 

Standard to discuss space suit development. The prototype suit (024) was 

demonstrated and its features compared with the Gemini suit. Deficiencies 

in the Apollo helmet were noted and suggestions were made on how to 

improve the design. [At this time, CSD began looking into the possibility 

of using Gemini suits during Apollo earth orbital flights, and during the 

next several weeks began testing Gemini suits in Apollo environments. (See 

April 28-30.)] 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-March 4, 1964;" MSC, 

"ASPO Management Report for Period April 2-9, 1964." 

A joint Grumman, RCA, Ryan Aeronautical Company, ASPO, and Flight 

Crew Support Division (FCSD) meeting was held at Bethpage to review 

capability of the LEM landing radar to meet FCSD's requirements for ascent 

and for orbit circularization. A preliminary (unfunded) Ryan study (re141 


27 

27-29 

27-March 4 

27-March 4 

27 
1964 

February 

To learn more about the meteoroid penetration hazard to 

of Langley Research Center launched satellites to gather 

penetration data. In the photo a micrometeoroid satell

an environmental test in Langley's 8- x 15-foot Therm

in which the widely varying temperatures to be experi

simulated. Installed around the fourth stage of a Scout 

satellite contained highly sensitive detectors to record p

velocity space particles and to study the effects of the sp

spacecraft systems and components, such as solar cells a

quested by ASPO earlier in the month) indicated som

accuracy requirements could be met. RCA advised that i

to make these measurements with the rendezvous rad

large weight penalty, about 38 to 56 kilograms (84 to 1

be incurred if the landing radar were moved from the de

stage to become part of the abort guidance system. Add

the ascent stage would have to be justified either by impro

ance or added crew safety. MSC authorized RCA and 

problem at greater length. In the meantime, ASPO 

analyze weights, radar accuracies, and abort guidance 

bility. (See March 16 and May 22.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-Marc

Status Report for Period March 19-26, 1964." 

142 
thought that specifications might be reached by increasing the chamber 

pressure to 82.7 newtons per square centimeter (120 psia) and the exhaust 

velocity efficiency to 97.3 percent, and by using a hard, rather than a soft, 

throat. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending February 27-March 4, 1964." 

At North American, a mockup of the crew transfer tunnel was reviewed 

informally. The mockup was configured to the North American-proposed 

Block II design (in which the tunnel was larger in diameter and shorter 

in length than on the existing spacecraft). MSC asked the contractor to place 

An Apollo service module 

mockup showing the portion that contained the 

main rocket engine and 

propellant supply to be 

used for maneuvers to and 

from the moon. Produced 

by Aerojet-General Corporation under contract to 

N AA, the engine could provide more than 89 000 newtons (20 000 pounds) of 

thrust to keep Apollo on 

course and to perform other 

missions. Standing by the 

multiple-start engine's flaring skirt were N AA and 

Aerojet rocket engineers. 

March 

2-9 
9 

. 10 

10 

12 

MSC received an additional $1.035 million in Fiscal Y

cover development of equipment and operational techn

exploration of the moon: 

• Power supplies for long-life equipment to be inst

surface during Apollo missions 

• Telemetry and Deep Space Instrumentation Facilit

this equipment 

• Tools and materials needed for examining, packag

ing lunar samples 

• Cameras and film suitable for use on the moon 

astronaut 

• Methods of obtaining and returning lunar sample

nating or changing them 

• Techniques and instrumentation for geological ma

environment 

• Processes for obtaining water, hydrogen, and oxyge

material on the moon. 

Additionally, MSC would evaluate current techniques in 

determine subsurface structural conditions. 

Memorandum, Homer E. Newell, NASA, to Dir., MSC, throug

Manned Space Flight, "'Funding for Development of Scientific Inst

Lunar Missions," March 9, 1964 . 

Grumman completed negotiations with Yardney Electric 

auxiliaq• battery for the LEM. A contract would be a

requirements were determined by Grumman and MSC. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending March 5-ll, 1964." 

Grumman and North American began working out ways 

of ground support equipment (GSE). Through informal 

phone discussions, the two prime contractors agreed to a 

for the GSE's use, maintenance, and training procedures. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 14," LPR-1(}-30, p. 32. 

Goddard Space Flight Center awarded a $1.963 millio

Commonwealth of Australia's Department of Supply to c

a data acquisition facility, including an antenna 26 m

diameter, at Canberra, Australia. The station would b

NASA Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network t

144 

North American was directed by NASA to study feasibility of using the 

LEM propulsion system as backup to the SM propulsion system. The most 

important item in the contractor's analysis was strength of the docking 

structure and its ability to withstand LEM main-engine and reaction control 

system thrusting. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. 161," March 12, 1964. 

NASA completed formal negotiations with Aerojet-General Corporation for 

12 Algol 1-D solid rocket motors, to be used in the Little Joe II vehicles. 

The contract was a fixed-price-plus-incentive-fee type with a target price of 

about $1.4 million. A maximum price of 20 percent more than the target 

cost was allowed. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, February 16-March 21, 1964," -p . 46. 

Grumman completed negotiations with Kearfott Products Division, General Precision, Inc., for the LEM rate gyro assembly, and a contract was 

awarded later in the month. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 12-iS, 1964;" "Apollo Quarterly Status 

Report No. 7," p. 23. 

Primarily as a weight-saving measure, the gas storage pressure in the LEM's 

descent stage helium tank was reduced from 3103 to 2413 newtons per 

square centimeter (4500 to 3500 psia). This allowed the thickness of the tank 

wall to be reduced. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 12-18, 1964;" MSC, "Consolidated Activity 

Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, February 

16-March 21, 1964," p. 24. 

ASPO notified Grumman that certain items were no longer to be considered 

in the weight saving program: guidance and navigation components, drinking water tankage, scientific equipment, pyrotechnic batteries, among others. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-llOO, 

weight reduction items," March 13, 1964. _ 

Ryan Aeronautical Company signed a contract with RCA for the LEM 

lunar landing radar. Ryan was instructed to design for altitudes of 21 300 

145 


12 

12 

12-18 

12-18 

13 

16 
16-April 15 

components had been submitted to North American

The Garrett Corporation, AiResearch Manufacturing Division

port, Environmental Control System, NAAJS&ID, Project Ap

April 1964," S8-1013-R(23), April 30, 1964, p. 7. 

North American held a design review of the CM h

Use of titanium in place of stainless steel was being 

weight reduction study for the Block II spacecraft. A

weight saving of several hundred pounds might be a

factors would be considered: the brittleness of stain

cold temperatures, the higher cost of titanium, and 

fusion bonding of titanium honeycomb. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-24, p. 14. 

Intense heat like that ex peri-. 

enced by spacecraft during 

atmosphere entry was generated in the laboratory by 

scientists of Langley Research Center. Tests in the 

Structures Laboratory 2500­

kilowatt, subsonic electricar~ heater evaluated materials for heat shielding of 

reentry vehicles. In the 5800 

K (10 000°F) air stream 

produced by the arc heater, 

an ablation material shaped 

like an Apollo spacecraft 

was placed for the experiment. The stream of gas 

impinging oii the model 

issued from the nozzle at 

more than eight tenths kilometer per second (one half 

mile per second). 
September 30, 1963.) Thus far, the company had been surveying and 

rating measurements to be made on the lunar surface. Areas covered included soil mechanics, mapping, geophysics, magnetism, electricity, and 

radiation. Equipment for gathering information, such as hand tools, sample 

return containers, dosimeters, particle spectrometers, data recording systems, 

seismometers, gravity meters, cameras, pentrometers, and inass spectrometers 

had been considered. The next phase of the study involved integrating and 

defining the measurements and instruments according to implementation 

problems, mission needs, lunar environment limitations, and relative importance to a particular mission. Texas Instruments would recommend a 

sequence for performing the experiments. 

Memorandum, H. R. Largent, MSC, to Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Div. 


Files, "Lunar surface experiments study (NAS 9-2115)," March 17, 1964. 


NASA instructed North American to fix the CM crew couches along all 19 

axes during normal and emergency acceleration, except at impact. During 

nonacceleration mission phases, the couches would be adjustable for crew 

comfort. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 


Change Authorization No. 167," March 19, 1964. 


Grumman reported to MSC the current load status and projected load 19-20 

growth for the LEM's electrical power system, requesting a mission profile 

of 121 kilowatt-hours total energy. (See January 28 and August 15, 1963.) 

The company also presented its latest recommendation for the LEM power 

generation subsystem configuration: two 900-watt fuel cells, a descent stage 

peaking battery, an ascent stage survival battery, and four cryogenic storage 

tanks. To compensate for voltage drop~ in the power distribution subsystem, 

·Grumman recommended that two cells be added to the current fuel cell 

stack; however, on March 23 ASPO directed the contractor to continue 

development of the 900-watt, three-fuel-cell assembly and a five-tank cryogenic storage system. MSC's position derived from the belief that the load 

growth would make the two-cell arrangement inadequate. Also the threecell configuration, through greater redundancy, afforded greater safety and 

chances of mission success: the mission could continue in spite of a failure 

in one of the cells; should two cells fail, the mission could be aborted on 

147 

19-26 

19-26 

20 

20 

23 

After the decision to use canards instead of tower fla

North American returned to the concept of a hard b

The tower jettison motor would remove the cover a

(See July 24.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 19-26, 1964." 

MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) evaluated a CM 

centimeters (23 inches). CSD found that the couch ham

movement in an unpressurized suit and totally restr

was pressurized. 

Ibid. 

NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications beg

groups of ~dentists to assist the agency in defining 

scientific objectives of Project Apollo. (See October 

1963.) In a number of letters to prominent American sc

ministrator for Space Science and Applications Hom

them to propose suitable experiments in such fields a

geochemistry, biology, and atmospheric science. This 

proposals, Newell explained, is "for the purpose of a

Apollo science program is well balanced, as complete as 

potential investigators have been given an opportuni

ments." The proposals would then be reviewed by subc

Space Sciences Steering Committee. 

Letter, Homer E. Newell, NASA, to Dr. S. P. Clark, Yale Univ

Twenty-eight nearly identical letters were sent to other membe

academic community. 

Tests at North American demonstrated the possibil

tools to break the CM hatch windows for postlandi

spacecraft. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-24, p. 8. 

Members of the Gemini Flights Experiments Review 

cedures for incorporating Apollo-type experiments i

gram, experiments that directly supported the three

These experiments encompassed crew observations

photometry. 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 19-26, 1964." 

148 
Mission Control Center (Building 30) at MSC was physically completed, if not yet 

operationally ready, March 21, 1964. 

OMSF outlined launch vehicle development, spacecraft development, and 1964 

crew performance demonstration missions, using the Saturn IB and March 

Saturn V: 

23 

(1) Launch vehicle and unmanned CSM (at least two flights planned) 

(2) CSM long-duration 

(3) CSM and LEM (two flights planned) 

(4) Launch vehicle and heatshield (at least two flights) 

(5) Lunar mission simulation 

(6) Lunar exploration. 

Missions (1) through (3) would use the Saturn IB and (4) through (6) the 

Saturn V. Additional launch vehicles and spacecraft would be provided for 

contingency or repeated flights. If necessary, repeat flights could provide 

additional crew training. 

NASA OMSF, "Apollo Flight Mission Assignments," Program Directive M-DE 8000.005B, 


March 23, 1964. 


To verify a narrower hatch configuration proposed for Block II spacecraft, 24 

North American evaluated the capability of an astronaut wearing a pressurized space suit and a portable life support system to pass through the 

main hatch of the CM for extravehicular activities. Subjects were able to 

enter and leave the mockup without undue difficulty despite the presence 

of gravity. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-24, pp. 6-7. 

The first formal inspection and review of the LEM test mockup TM-1 was 

held at Grumman. TM-1 allowed early assessment of crew mobility, ingress, 

149 

24-26 
g, y, 

The LEM TM-1 mockup was displayed at the Grumm

N.Y., during its first inspection. Engineer Bill Pete

climbing the ladder to the entry platform. 
mission, the spacecraft lifetime was extended from 60 days to one year; and 

(2) to expand the area of photographic coverage, the film capacity was 

increased. 

Lee R. Scherer, NASA, "Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report," March 26, 1964. 

The General Electric (GE) Company submitted its cost quotations to NASA, 

starting the final phase of a program to provide Acceptance Checkout 

Equipment (ACE-formerly PACE [see February 1963]) ground stations 

for Apollo spacecraft. The overall "ACE" plan slated three ground stations 

for North American, two for Grumman, four for Cape Kennedy, and one 

for MSC. GE's contract called for spacecraft systems integration and checkout and for maintenance of the ACE stations. Much of the ACE equipment 

was government furnished and had been procured by NASA from several 

sources: Control Data Corporation-computer; Radiation, Inc.-" decommutators and pulse code modulation simulators." By May, GE had set up 

and commenced operating an experimental ACE station at Cape Kennedy. 

(See August 23-September 19.) 

MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period March 26-April 2, 1964;" "Apollo Quarterly 

Status Report No. 7," p. 61 ; "Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 8," pp. 59-60; MSC, 

"Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned 

Space Flight, February 16-March 21, 1964," pp. 9, 78; "Consolidated Activity Report 

for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, April 19-May 16, 

1964," p. 46; MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, May 17-23, 1964," p. 3; NASA News Release 63-286, "NASA to 

Extend Contract with Control Data Corporation," December 26, 1963; MSC News Re· 

lease 64-108, June 8, 1964. 

Because of the pure oxygen atmosphere specified for the spacecraft, North 

American reviewed its requirements for component testing. Recent evaluation of the CM circuit breakers had indicated a high probability that they 

would cause a fire. The company's reliability office recommended more 

flammability testing, not only on circuit breakers but on the control and 

display components as well. The reliability people recommended also that 

procurement specifications be amended to include such testing. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 2-9, 1964." 

Impact tests indicated that, because of oscillations and consequent high 

angles of attack, the CM might not withstand water impact and could sink. 

151 


26-Aprill 

29-April4 

25 
1964 

March 

30 

Three generations of U.S. spacecraft and the ever-growi

propel astronauts into the unknown : Flying solo, orb

rode a craft 3 meters long and 1.8 meters in diamete

diameter), hurled aloft by an Atlas launch vehicle. G

were to circle the earth in a capsule with 50 percent 

Mercury's. A 27-meter (90-foot) Titan II would boost 

kilometers (185 miles) high. Apollo astronauts would 

command module twice the size of the Gemini caps

men aboard would descend to the moon's surface i

module (LEM), an 11-metric-ton (l2Y2-U.S.-ton) craft. 

Apollo vehicle, the service module, contained the v

Powerful, 110-meter (362-foot) Saturn V would launch 

orbit. (Artist's concept) -National Geo

North American planned a series of water impact tests 

to study the problem. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate A

Space Flight, March 29-April 4, 1964," p. 5; MSC, "ASPO Sta

March 26--April 2, 1964." 

MSFC awarded Rocketdyne a definitive contract (valu

for the production of 76 F- 1 engines for the first st

launch vehicle and for delivery of ground support equ

152 
MSC negotiated a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, valued at $1.65 million, April 

with Hamilton Standard for 27 prototype Apollo space suits and 12 pairs 

of gloves. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 


Manned Space Flight, March 22-April 18, 1964," p. 56. 


Space Technology Laboratories (STL) began using its new San Juan Capi­ 2-9 


strano, Calif., test facility to static fire the firm's LEM descent engine. 


Hereafter, the bulk of STL's development firings were made at this site. 


MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 2-9, 1964"; MSC, "Weekly Activity 


Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 7-13, 


1964," p. 2. 


The MSC Operations Planning Division (OPD) reviewed recent revisions 2-9 

by OMSF to Apollo's communications requirements: 

The first Apollo boilerplate to fly during the program was BP-13, shown here in 

Hangar AF at Cape Kennedy before being taken to the launch complex to 

be mated with the Saturn SA-6 launch vehicle. The Apollo escape rocket 

and tower are in the foreground. 
6-13 

7 

7-8 

lunar surface (to be compatible with the design of th

system) 

• Elimination of the requirement for direct tra

from an extravehicular astronaut; instead, such tran

layed via the LEM. 

Thus were resolved, OPD reported, a number of 

incompatibilities between OMSF's requirements and 

two spacecraft). Two other items that OMSF made 

were already compatible with the design of the spac

(l) A radar in the CSM capable of tracking t

LEM had a compatible transponder) 

(2) Three-way communications between an astr

fellow crewman inside the LEM, and with ~ission c

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 2- 9, 1964." 

Grumman issued a letter contract to AiResearch M

to start design of cryogenic tank assemblies for the 

search received the formal contract on June 23. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 9-16, 1964"

ment Report, June 18-25, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management R

Bell Aerosystems Company completed the first of two 

vehicles, to be delivered to the NASA Flight Resea

(See January 18, 1963.) 

MSC News Release 64-68, April 7, 1964. 

At the April 7-8 NASA- North American Technical 

(the first of th~se meetings to be held at MSC's new 

Lake Site 1"), ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea summ

activities concerning the Block II spacecraft. He spel

ASPO was investigating-which included virtually 

tween escape tower and service engine bell. Shea o

"customer and contractor" to work out the defin

aiming at a target date of mid-May 1965. These proce

giving North American descriptions of its Block II w

reduction, and a set of ground rules for the Block I

And to ensure that both sides cooperated as closely a

Shea named Owen E. Maynard, Chief of MSC'

154 

The lunar landing research vehicle. 

-Bell Aerosystems photo. 

Division, and his counterpart at Downey, Norman]. Ryker, Jr., to "honcho" 1964 

the effort. April 

"Minutes of NASA-NAA Technical Management Meeting, April 7- 8, 1964," pp. 3-5. 

The first Gemini mission, Gemini-Titan I, was launched from Complex 19 8 

at Cape Kennedy at 11:00 a.m., e.s.t. This was an unmanned flight, using 

the first production Gemini spacecraft and a modified Titan II Gemini 

launch vehicle (GLV). The mission's primary purpose was to verify the 

structural integrity of the GLV and spacecraft, as well as to demonstrate 

the GLV's ability to place the spacecraft into a prescribed earth orbit. Mission plans did not include separation of the spacecraft from the second 

stage of the vehicle, and both were inserted into orbit as a unit six minutes 

after launch. The planned mission encompassed only the first three orbits 

and ended about four hours and 50 minutes after liftoff. No recovery was 

planned. The flight qualified the GLV and the structure of the spacecraft. 

James M. Grimwood and Barton C. Hacker, with Peter J. Vorzimmer, Project Gemini 


Technology and Operations: A Chronology (NASA SP-4002, 1969), p. 139. 


ASPO gave Grumman specific instructions on insulating wiring in the LEM: 13 


Teflon-insulated wiring was mandatory in a pure oxygen atmosphere. If 


the standard-thickness Teflon insulation was too heavy, a thin-wall Teflon­


insulated wiring with abrasion-resistant coating should be considered. 


Teflon-insulated wiring should also be used outside the pressurized cabin, 


155 
April 

The first Gemini-Titan I space vehicle lifted off Pad 

April 8, 1964. 

wherever that wiring was exposed. Any approved spacec

be used within subsystem modules which were herm

inert gas atmosphere or potted within the case. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "

Spacecraft Electrical Wiring Insulation," April 13, 1964. 

156 

1964 
The 56-metric-ton, 11.6-meter-diameter (62-U.S.-ton, 38-foot-diameter) stainless 

steel door for Chamber A of MSC's Space Environmental Simulation Laboratory was swung into place early in April 1964 to finish enclosing the large 

test facility. Chamber A was tubular, 35.7 meters high, 19.8 meters in diameter (ll7 feet high, 65 feet in diameter), and extended 7.3 meters (24 feet) 

into the ground. It was designed to simulate lunar trips with realism and 

detail close to those of actual flight. 

Firings at the Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) and at 1964 

Aerojet-General Corporation's Sacramento test site completed Phase I 

April

development tests of the SM propulsion engine. The last simulated altitude 

test at AEDC was a sustained burn of 635 seconds, which demonstrated the 14 

engine's capability for long-duration firing. Preliminary data indicated that 

performance was about three percent below specification, but analysis was 

in progress to see if it could be improved. 

NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-25, June I, 1964, p. II; MSC, 


"ASPO Management Report for Period April 23-30, 1964' '; "ASPO Management Report 


for Period April 30-May 7, 1964." 


An Atlas D launch vehicle lifted a Project Fire spacecraft (see November 14 

27, 1962) from Cape Kennedy in the first test of the heat that would be 

encountered by a spacecraft reentering the atmosphere at Iunar-return 

velocity. During the spacecraft's fall toward earth, a solid-fuel Antares II 

157 
1964 

April 

15 

orientedr 

I 

4 

/ tlas . 

//~eparat1on 

I~ 

Sustainer burnout 

• Heat s~ield separation 

• Start Uncaget1meV/Pr guidance 

• 

1 

I Boo•t• '"~' 

Atlas launch l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 

RI Booster jettison. 

Atlas burnout 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 

VIP separation 3 + 4 + 5 Boost phase 

V/P ignition 4 + 5 t Atlas guidan_ce == =:. . 

V/P burnout 4 + 5 -- ... ~;;;;:~....: . 

Reentry package and adapter 

A typical Project Fire reentry or orbital mission. The wei

rocket behind the payload fired for 30 seconds, increas

to 40 501 kilometers (25 166 miles) per hour. Instrum

radioed temperature data to the ground. The space

an estimated temperature of 11 400 K (20 000 degrees 

after launch, the spacecraft impacted into the Atlantic 

sponsored by Langley Research Center, provided ree

ments needed to evaluate heatshield materials and 

communications blackout during reentry. 

NASA News Release 64-69, "NASA Schedules Project Fire L

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, p. 135. 

Dale D. Myers, North American's Space and Informa

vice president, succeeded John W. Paup as the contrac

for the CM. 

Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p. 10. 

158 
, gpp, 

Grumman completed an environmental control system water management 

configuration study and concluded that a revised design would significantly 

improve the probability of mission success and crew safety. This design 

would combine water tanks for the water management functions into one 

easily accessible package. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964." 

MSC Crew Systems Division representatives attended a demonstration at 

Grumman of Apollo Phase Band Gemini space suits using the LEM TM-1 

mockup and a mockup portable life support system. Tests demonstrated 

ingressjegress capability through the forward and top hatches, operation of 

controls and displays, and methods of getting out on the lunar surface and 

returning to the spacecraft. Generally, the Apollo suit proved sufficiently 

mobile for all these tasks, though there was no great difference between its 

performance and that of the Gemini suit during these trials. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for the Period April 16-23, 1964"; GAEC, "Monthly 

Progress Report No. 15," LPR-10--31, May 10, 1964, p. 9. 

NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) and the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS) were planning a scientist-astronaut program. 

NAS people had met in Houston with MSC officials in February to help 

draft a formal plan to develop a "scientist astronaut program for NASA." 

This plan also placed the responsibility on NAS to define what scientific 

qualifications a person would need; MSC agreed to define "other qualifications." 

OSSA Associate Administrator Homer E. Newell asked Harry H. Hess, 

Chairman of the Space Science Board, NAS, and his group to pursue this 

plan and be ready with a qualification list (both NAS and NASA requirements) by August for advertisement. Newell said the screening-for-selection 

process could be scheduled for February 1965. (See August 19.) 

Letter, Newell, NASA, to Harry H. Hess, Chairman, Space Science Board, National 

Academy of Science, April 16, 1964. 

Joseph F. Shea, ASPO Manager, m a letter to North American's Apollo 

Program Manager, summarized MSC's review of the weight status of the 

159 


15 

15-16 

16 

16 
Redesign of the CM would cause a number of change

although ASPO believed that the 73.7-centimeter (29-inc

could be retained and tunnel access might be improved 

for seating the hatches were removed. Other changes 

docking and transfer requirement would be considere

did not affect the structure below the deck. 

Changes below the deck would be kept to a minimum 

and the outer structure. Anything which might invalida

of the Block I lunar reentry tests to the Block II des

changed. 

ASPO wanted to evaluate a preliminary design of the CM 

access to the LEM would be by extravehicular transfer. 

proach was not currently considered operationally acc

from such a design should be studied. 

ASPO agreed that the CM thermal protection would be 

tion of a boost protective cover for both Block I and Bloc

should be simple to design and operate, and a boost c

coating the CM with a thermally efficient surface. This

attitude programming, should permit North American to 

ablator bond line temperature from 394 K (250 degrees 

(150 degrees F). ASPO also asked the contractor to c

bond line temperature on the blunt face from 590 

to 700 K (800 degrees F). These changes would redu

significant!y. 

To eliminate the humidity problem in the Block I sub

lieved that electronic repackaging would be required. Suc

take advantage of ASPO's decision to eliminate onboard 

acceptable means of achieving mission reliability. A more 

arrangement should be considered in conjunction with 

repackaging. Elimination of onboard maintenance wou

ments on the inflight test system; perhaps that system c

from the spacecraft. 

The biggest uncertainty in weight requirements was me

The design approach to this problem should be incor

design of the SM to reduce both the tank size and structu

6 statement of Robert 0. Piland) consistent with a 16 80

160 
time constants, the reaction control system (RCS) might have to be modified. 

It might also be desirable to change the RCS fuel to monomethylhydrazine. 

Because of the large amount of spacecraft wiring, North American was asked 

to study using smaller sizes and reduced insulation thicknesses. 

Another consideration was reducing the lunar mission time from 14 days 

to the reference mission length of about 10 days. But the current tank 

sizes should be maintained and the spacecraft should be capable of 14­

day earth orbital missions with three men. The velocity reserve in the RCS 

might be decreased if the attitude requirements for guidance and navigation were eased. Here, also, the current tank sizes should not be changed. 

Other major changes (such as redesign of the fuel cell, incorporation of new 

heatshield material, cryogenic helium pressures, and adapter staging) could 

be considered in the redesign; they would, however, be approved only if 

the foregoing changes did not provide sufficient weight margin. 

ASPO would require a complete preliminary design and impact assessment 

of the Block II spacecraft before its incorporation into the program would 

be authorized. 

Letter, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to John W. Paup, NAA, April 16, 1964. 

North American conducted a preliminary study on removal of one of three 

fuel cells from the Block II CSM. The contractor predicted a total weight 

saving of about 168 kilograms (370 pounds), with potential indirect reductions in the cryogenic systems, but this change would require a significant 

increase in reliability. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 23-30, 1964." 

MSC, North American, and Grumman reviewed development problems in 

the LEM and SM reaction control thrust chambers. They agreed that a 

reassessment of the chambers' operational and thermal parameters was 

necessary. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 16-23, 1964." 

North American completed the first of a series of simulations to evaluate the 

astronauts' ability to perform attitude change maneuvers under varying 

rates and angles. Subjects were tested in a shirtsleeve environment and in 

vented and pressurized International Latex Corporation state-of-the-art 

161 

16-22 

16-May 15 

16-23 
20 

21 

21 

ability to land the spacecraft from a standing position. (See S

1963.) All tests were run with the subject in an unpressu

"hands off" standing position with no restraint system or ar

"Monthly Progress Report No. 15," LPR-1(}-31, p. 10. 

NASA selected IBM, Federal Systems Division, to develop 

instrument units (IU) for the Saturn IB and Saturn V launc

had been chosen by NASA in October 1963 to design an

data adapters and digital guidance computers and to integrat

the IUs.] Under this new contract, expected to be worth ov

IBM would supply the structure and the environmental 

NASA would furnish the telemetry system and the stab

(ST-124M) of the guidance system. MSFC would manage th

NASA News Release 64-89, "NASA Selects IBM as Lead Contractor f

Instrument Unit," April 20, 1964. 

ASPO directed Hamilton Standard to provide urine storag

space suit for prelaunch and launch. The contractor wa

the suitability of a Mercury-Gemini type urinal for storage 

disposal. 

TWX, W. F. Rector Ill, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: Waste Management Pr

April 21, 1964. 

Officials from ASPO, Flight Crew Operations Directorate

Division, and Hamilton Standard established the basic g

Apollo space suit operation: 

(1) At least one crewman would wear his space suit at 

(2) All three crewmen would wears their suits conti

launch through translunar injection, lunar operations, and 

(3) The three crewmen could remain suited at all 

they could remove the suits during translunar and transeart

(4) The crew would be able to return from any poin

in pressurized suits 

(5) Two men in the CM would be able to don their 

minutes. 

Operations Planning Division reported that these rules req

fications to the suit and only minor changes to the enviro

system. 

162 
either the primary or backup guidance mode. North American had drawn 

up the requirements early in 1962, with the intent of providing a heatshield that would not be a constraint on reentry. However, it was now 

deemed extremely unlikely that an entry, employing either the primary 

or backup guidance mode, would ever experience the heat loads that the 

contractor had designed for earlier. The ablator weight savings, using the 

MIT trajectories, could amount to several hundred pounds. 

Memorandum, C. H. Perrine, MSC, to Mgr., ASPO, "Modification of the heat shield 


design philosophy," April 23, 1964. 


Grumman redesigned the LEM environmental control system to incor- 23-30 

porate a replaceable lithium hydroxide cartridge with a portable life support 

system cartridge in parallel for emergency backup. The LEM cartridge 

would be replaced once during a two-day mission. 

Also MSC advised Grumman that estimates of the metabolic rates for 

astronauts on the lunar surface had been increased. The major effect of 

this change was an increase in the requirements for oxygen and water for 

the portable life support system. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 23-30, 1964." 

Rocketdyne conducted the first firing of the prototype thrust chamber 23-30 

assembly for its LEM descent engine. 

Ibid. 

Representatives from a number of elements within MSC (including systems 24 

and structural engineers, advanced systems and rendezvous experts, and 

two astronauts, Edward H. White II and Elliot M. See, Jr.) discussed the 

idea of deleting the LEM's front docking capability (an idea spawned by 

the recent TM-1 mockup review [see March 24-26]). Rather than nose-tonose docking, the LEM crew might be able to perform the rendezvous and 

docking maneuver, docking at the spacecraft's upper (transfer) hatch, by 

using a window above the LEM commander's head to enable him to see his 

target. A good many factors pointed to the merit of this approach: 

• A rectangular window 18 by 38 centimeters (seven by 15 inches) above 

the commander's head could readiry be incorporated into the LEM's structure, with only minimal design changes. The weight penalty would be 

between 4.5 and 6.8 kilograms (10 and 15 pounds) (excluding possible effects 

163 
(y ), y pp

needed. 

• The top-only docking arrangement would simplify t

tion per se. The crew would no longer have to transfer 

the top to the front hatch prior to rejoining the CM. (

pressurizing the spacecraft to perform this task thus was 

additional "fringe benefit," the front hatch could possibl

to make it easier for the crewmen to get out of and bac

while on the moon. 

• The overhead window would enable the LEM c

the moon during powered descent and ascent portions o

thus would afford the crew a visual attitude and attitude r

There existed, naturally, some offsetting factors: the pilot

his target (thought to be of" no major consequence"); and 

quickly to scan his instrument panel (which was not ess

maneuver called for the pilot to fly his vehicle, for a con

in a rather strained physical position (i.e., with his head 

But because of the many inherent advantages, the group 

active docking at the upper hatch was acceptable as a ba

docking. (CM-active docking still would be the normal pr

that vehicle could "perform the docking maneuver more 

reliably than can the LEM ... Deletion of the front dock

(the] LEM will not alter this relationship, therefore the 

required to dock only when the CSM or the crew m

incapacitated. If the CSM is incapacitated returning to it 

importance.") They recommended that Grumman be dir

with this concept for the LEM. (See May 7-14 and May 22

Letter, Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., to Assistant Chief, Systems Engineering 

tion of TM-1 mockup review chit no. A9-4;• April 28, 1964, with enc

list. 

To train astronauts in various mtsston procedures, LTV 

simulations of manual abort and, within a week, would b

simulated final maneuver phases of a rendezvous. (See May 

and October 10, 1963; also see June 1963.) 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 15," LPR-10-31, p. 1. 

The NASA Manned Space Science Division was planning a 

ments program for manned and unmanned earth orb

164 


24 

24 
the period from September 16, 1963, through March 31, 1965, and the total 

cost-plus-fixed-fee was $720 624. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, April 19--May 16, 1964," p. 46. 

At Downey, Calif., MSC and North American officials conducted a mockup 

review on the Block I CSM. Major items reviewed were: 

• Cabin interior (complete except for hatches, display panel lighting, 

survival equipment, umbilical connections, and zero-g restraints) 

• CM exterior (complete except for hatches and boost protective cover) 

• Earth landing system 

• Launch escape system 

• SM. 

One hundred and eleven request for change forms were submitted to the 

mockup review board, composed of Robert 0. Piland (Chairman), Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Donald K. Slayton, Caldwell C. Johnson, Owen E. 

Maynard, and Clinton L. Taylor of MSC; and H. G. Osbon and Charles 

H. Feltz of North American. 

For the first time, three representative Apollo space suits were used in the 

CM couches. Pressurized suit demonstrations, with three suited astronauts 

lying side by side in the couches, showed that the prototype suit shoulders 

and elbows overlapped and prevented effective operation of the CM displays 

and controls. Previous tests, using only one suited subject, had indicated that 

suit mobility was adequate. Gemini suits, tested under the same conditions, 

proved much more usable. (See February 27-March 4.) Moreover, using 

Gemini suits for Apollo earth orbital missions promised a substantial 

financial saving. As a result of further tests conducted in May, the decision 

was made to use the Gemini suits for these missions. The existing Apollo 

space suit contract effort was redirected to concentrate on later Apollo 

flights. A redesign of the Apollo suit shoulders and elbows also was begun. 

MSC, "Command and Service Modules, Project Apollo Board Report for NASA Inspec· 

tion and Review of Block I Mock-Up, April 23-30, 1964," pp. 1-2; MSC, "ASPO Manage· 

ment Report for Period April 3Q-May 7 •. 1964"; MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the 

Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 3-9, 1964," p. 5; "Apollo 

Quarterly Status Report No. 8," pp. 47-48; interview, telephone, Matthew I. Radnofsky, 

Houston, March 24, 1970. 

165 


28-30 

PART Ill 

Developing Software Ground Rules 

April 29, 1964, through September 30, 1964 
1964 

The Key Events 

May 4: Apollo Mission Planning Task Force specified the program

ground rules. 

May 13: First flight test of Little Joe II using a command module (

at White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex. 

May 28: Apollo Saturn Mission A-101, using CM BP-13 atop SA-

launched at Cape Kennedy, Fla., to prove spacecraft/launch v

June 11: NASA directed North American Aviation, rnc. (NAA), t

changes to both Block I and Block II spacecraft systems. 

July 28: Ranger VII mission finally succeeded in televising pictur

impact. 

August 18: Scout launch tested Apollo-type ablator materials at lun

September 14: Ground rules for lunar excursion module guid

firmly defined. 

September 18: Apollo Mission A-102, using BP-15 for the comm

(CSM) and SA-7 for the launch vehicle, confirmed Saturn Bl

bility as well as the launch escape vehicle system. 

September 30: NAA conducted formal inspection and review of Bl

168 

Developing Software Ground Rules 

April 29, 1964, through September 30, 1964 

ASPO defined weight and volume allocations for scientific equipment. Exact 

location of this equipment could not be specified, but each module had to 

have the following capacities: 

• CM and LEM ascent stage: 36 kilograms (80 pounds); 0.06 cubic 

meter (2 cubic feet) 

• LEM descent stage: 95 kilograms (210 pounds); 0.27 cubic meter 

(9 cubic feet), minimum; 0.45 cubic meter (15 cubic feet), design objective. 

Any additional space gained by jettisoning expendable equipment could 

also be used for storage. (See June 8.) 

Requirements for thermal protection for the scientific equipment were not 

yet defined, nor was the packaging concept. Electrical outlets on the LEM, 

furnishing power to the equipment, would of course have to be within 

the reach of an astronaut while he was standing on the moon's surface 

outside the spacecraft. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-llOO, 

Scientific Equipment," April 29, 1964. 

MSC established new LEM abort guidance ground rules, which defined the 

operaticn and reliability requirements of the stabilization and control 

system's abort guidance section. Grumman was to continue st udies on the 

abort pitch programmer and on the capability of the LEM to perform 

rendezvous. 

Letter, W. F. Rector Ill, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9- llOO, 


Abort Guidance Section of the Stabilization and Control Subsystem," April 29, 1964. 


MSC authorized major revisions in the CM communications system to 

provide better voice and data relay between the CM, the LEM, and 

ground stations. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. 201," April 30, 1964. 

169 

1964 

April 

29 

29 

30 
f7 

VHF

S-ba

Communications links between CM, LEM, and earth 

1964 	 Following a series of 15 acceptance firings at Rocketdyn

test facility (conducted during March and April), the fir

April 

duction J-2 	engine was delivered to Douglas Aircraft C

30 	 The engine then began "battleship" testing (i.e., fitted 

stage of the vehicle built especially for static testing) at D

test site. 

Akens, et al., History of Marshall . . . january I through june 30, 

148, 224. 

During Grumman awarded Bell Aerosystems Company the contr

the ascent stage reaction control system propellant tanks. T

Month worth about $3.5 million. 

Missiles and Rockets, 14 (April 27, 1964), p. 23. 

During Grumman recommended using a self-stabilized trim gim

the descent stage of the LEM, which would save about 34 kilog

Month 

of reaction control system propellant. 

"Monthly Progress Report No. 15," LPR-10-31, p. 24. 

May MSC Structures and Mechanics Division began vibrat

1 boilerplate (BP) 22 to determine resonant frequencies, m

170 
gpp

not imposing any requirement for the crew to get out of the CM quickly 

should some problem arise with the launch vehicle while on the pad. Given 

such an occurrence with the crewmen perched almost 122 meters (400 feet) 

high-and atop a fueled Saturn V-it was believed more rational to make 

a standard abort (using the launch escape system) or to hold the countdown 

until the vehicle could be made. safe. 

MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 1, 1964," p. 3. 

MSC Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division personnel visited 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory to review the Surveyor landing radar test program and to investigate the use of either a reflector or a transponder on 

the Surveyor to help in the selection of landing sites for the LEM. At that 

time, the possibility did not appear promising because reflector usage 

seemed impractical and because power requirements were far above what 

was available. Additional study on the matter was planned. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 23-30, 1964"; "ASPO Management 

Report for Period April 3o-May 7, 1964." 

Grumman completed negotiations with RCA for the attitude and translation 

control assembly (A TCA) for the LEM. The ATCA imposed thrust demands 

on the vehicle's stabilization and control system based upon information 

from the guidance equipment. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, April 19- May 16, 1964," p. 45. 

The Apollo Mission Planning Task Force presented its Phase I progress 

report to ASPO. (See November 29, 1963, and January 16, 1964.) ASPO, 

in assigning this task, had defined its principal objectives: the determination of mission-related, functional requirements for spacecraft subsystems; 

the examination of current subsystem capabilities to meet these requirements; the evaluation of the capability of the spacecraft to fly missions which 

met the program objectives; the determination of flexibilities available within established control weights; and the provision of mission plans which 

would be the basis for other analyses and reporting. 

The task force further refined program objectives: (1) to land two astronauts 

and scientific equipment on the near-earth-side of the moon and return 

them safely to earth; and (2) to perform experiments within the restrictions 

171 


4 
4-11 

5 

6 

spacecat ope

atos ad seveocotgeces wee 

trajectory ground rules were considered more operatio

nature, the group included 16 as necessary to define the 

bilities of the spacecraft design. A reference trajectory, 

assumed a launch date of May 8, 1968, and a 41 000-kilog

spacecraft injected into a 66.4-hour translunar-coastjfre

GAEC, "Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, Phase I Progress R

Vols. I, II, Ill, May 4, 1964. 

MSC ordered Grumman to halt all work on a radiativel

the LEM's ascent engine. (See January; also see Septem

196S.) The Center took this action largely to avoid sch

cause the work was drawing vah.iable people away from 

effort, an ablative nozzle). Also involved in the cancellatio

as high risk and cost; the lack of previous experience with 

minor saving in weight at best. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 7-14, 1964." 

MSC Operations Planning Division (OPD) reviewed p

the LEM if the fuel cell assembly (FCA) failed. OPD con

man's requirements were too stringent (i.e., turning off 

needed for 1 unar landing should one FCA fail and tur

not needed for crew safety following an abort should tw

planned to review all subsystems to determine their d

FCA-dictated abort. 

MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 3Q-May 7, 1964

NASA selected RCA for negotiation of a contract for C

ment to be used on tracking ships by NASA and the Dep

under the U.S. Navy Instrumentation Ships Project O

missions. 

NASA News Release 64-107, "NASA Selects RCA Radar for Tracking 

ASPO notified Grumman that a number of componen

common-use items, because they were used in conjunctio

furnished equipment that was interchangeable between 

oxygen and water disconnects on the portable life suppor

disconnects for the suit umbilicals. ASPO added suit um

dioxide sensors to the common-use list. 

172 

7 
7-14 

At MSC's request, Grumman studied the use of the LEM stabilization and 

control system in aligning that vehicle's inertial measurement unit before 

spacecraft separation. The company found that the maneuver would consume 5.33 kilograms (11.74 pounds) of fuel from the vehicle's stabilization 

and control system (SCS), compared with 2.83 kilograms (6.24 pounds) for 

the same alignment with a free LEM. Grumman advised that the best 

procedure would be to use the CSM to position the LEM telescope field 

of view. The LEM could then begin the necessary drift for sighting, using 

less than 0.23 kilogram (0.5 pound) of SCS fuel. 

Also, Grumman studied the feasibility of an overhead window at the command pilot's station in the LEM. The contractor was pursuing the question 

of the optimum window size and location and the type of reticle required. 

(See April 24 and May 22.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 7-14, 1964." 

North American completed the environmental requirements for the CM 

television camera. The camera must be able to function under conditions 

of 100 percent humidity, including unhooking and reconnecting the cable. 

Also, because of the humidity requirement and the "outgassing" properties 

of commercial lenses (that is, the gases which they could possibly give off 

inside the spacecraft's cabin), North American decided that a special zoom 

lens would have to be developed, which would cost around $110 000. 

Ibid. 

NASA and The Boeing Company signed a contract for five Lunar Orbiter 

spacecraft. Under the incentive provisions, Boeing could receive up to $5.3 

million more than the basic $80 million cost if all Lunar Orbiter missions 

were successful. (See December 20, 1963.) 

NASA News Release 64-109, "NASA Signs Contract with Boeing for Lunar Orbiter," 

May 8,1964. 

ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea told the Center's Senior Staff that it was 

imperative to decide whether to use the gas-cooled space suit or the liquidcooled undergarment. (See February 1.) Studies had shown that the current 

gas-cooled suit would not meet the heat load requirements and improvement 

would be difficult. Shea felt that parallel developments should not be carried 

out. A more conservative approach might be to adopt the liquid-cooled 

173 


7-14 

8 

8 
11-18 

12 

In line with selection of the liquid-cooled undergarment, H

was directed to stop work on the gas-cooled and begin w

cooled portable life support system (PLSS). On June 3

officially notified that the PLSS was being redesigned to 

transport loop for removal of heat from inside the space 

be done by the liquid-cooled garment and incorporation o

through which a coolant would be circulated. Current 

would be used to the greatest practical extent. It was expe

undergarments would first be used in manned flight about 

MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 8, 1964," p. 4; "Minut

Meeting, May 22, 1964," p. 4; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Re

1964"; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney

9-IIOO, Portable life support system changes," June 3, 1964. 

After a 444-second firing, Rocketdyne's first LEM descent 

thrust chamber developed a hot gas leak at the injector fla

under way by the contractor to determine the cause of the l

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associa

Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 24; MSC, "ASPO We

Report, May 14-21, 1964." 

Verne C. Fryklund, Jr., Chief of the Lunar and Planetary B

Office of Space Science and Applications, reported that th

program was being coordinated with Apollo's requirement

This agreement was reached through a series of meetings 

William B. Taylor, of OMSF's Advanced Manned Mission

torate; and LeeR. Scherer, Lunar Orbiter Program Mana

forth general requirements for maps for the Apollo progra

Lunar Orbiter data were intended for Apollo's use, Fry

requirements must be borne in mind when Lunar Orbiter's 

analyzed and distributed. MSC was interested primarily 

area of the moon (10 degrees above and below the equator

rather stringent demands for accuracy around selected l

requirements were dictated by Apollo's need for selen

graphic information, essential for lunar navigation and l

tion and for scientific activities by the astronauts on the l

though each mission might ultimately require special 

advised, major requirements could be met by a common 

and photomosaics. 

Memorandum, Fryklund, NASA, to Distr., "The Lunar Orbiter Progr

mapping requirements of Project Apollo," May 12, 1964. 

174 
PART III: DEVELOPING SOFTWARE GROUND RULES

Apollo’s first flight test using the Little Joe II launch vehicle, Mission A-001, 

using CSM boilerplate (BP) 12, was launched from WSMR. The test was 

conducted to determine aerodynamic characteristics of the launch escape 

system (LES) and its capability to pull the spacecraft away from the launch 

vehicle during an abort at transonic speeds and high dynamic pressure. 

Thrust termination subjected the spacecraft to an environment more severe 

than expected, above the qualification test level of many of the CM’s 

components.

Except for a parachute failure, spacecraft and LES functioned flawlessly. 

All but one test objective was met: because of excessive spacecraft oscillation at the time the main parachutes were deployed, one riser was dragged 

across the spacecraft structure and severed. The shroud lines of the nowfreed parachute burned a gore in one of the two remaining parachutes. 

Although the damaged gore failed, these two main parachutes deployed 

normally. BP-12 landed 828 meters (22 400) feet downrange about five 

minutes and 50 seconds after liftoff. At impact, its rate of descent was 

7.9 meters (26 feet) per second, 0.06 meters (two feet) per second faster than 

planned but still within human tolerances.

“Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-001 (BP-12),” pp. 1-1, 2-1, 3-1, 6-1.

MSC decided to provide equipment in the LEM for recording the astronauts’ voices, and was studying ways to achieve a capability for time correlation with a minimum increase in power and weight.

MSC, “ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964.”

The first test of a fully ablative thrust chamber for the LEM descent engine was held at Space Technology Laboratories. The chamber, with a wall 

thickness of 22.4 millimeters (0.88 inch), was fired for 488 seconds. Although 

some charring occurred, there was no streaking or gouging. Data showed 

good performance at low thrust.

MSC, “ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964”; MSC, “Weekly Activity 

Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 24-30, 

1964.”

General Electric (GE) issued a report on postlanding tilt angles for the LEM 

(the result of a study ordered by ASPO). The Apollo Systems Specification, 

put out by OMSF, called for the LEM’s ability to lift off from the moon 

from an angle of 30 degrees; MSC’s LEM Technical Approach stated that 

“the Lunar Touchdown System [i.e., the landing gear] will be required to 

land the LEM in a near vertical position satisfactory for lunar launch and 

normal egress.” GE’s study was an attempt to reconcile this difference. There 

was some concern that, for a variety of reasons, a 30-degree tilt might be 

undesirable: the spacecraft could tip over; once stage separation occurred, 

the vehicle’s ascent portion could shift slightly; and the crew’s visibility 

and mobility—including their ability to get in and out of the craft—might

1964

May

13

14-21

18-25

21

175
CIM orientationb :J 

Drogue disconnect-pilot deploy---~ 

Main parachute deployment 

CIM & main chutes dep

Little Joe II launch 

c

The planned sequence of 

events for the BP-12 suborbital flight is shown 

above. At right is the liftoff. 
General Electric Company, Apollo Support Department, Study of the Postlanding Tilt 

Angle of the LEM," TIR 545-S64-0!Hl06, May 21 , 1964, passim, but especially pp. 

1--4, 32-34; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; interview, 

telephone, Richard H. Kohrs, Houston, March 9, 1970. 

NASA completed negotiations with General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) for 

two additional Little Joe II test vehicles and associated ground equipment. 

(See February 18, 1963.) The amendment (worth $1 352 050) increased the 

contract's total estimated cost and fee to $12 478 205, and brought to eight 

the total number of Little Joes (excluding the qualification vehicle) that 

NASA bought from GD j C. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 42; Little joe II Test Launch Vehicle, 

NASA Project Apollo: Final R eport, Vol. I, pp. 1-7, 4--4. 

North American completed zero-g egress tests, using the proposed small 

configuration CM side entry hatch with a crewman wearing a pressurized 

Gemini space suit and an operational portable life support system. Weightless tests were also conducted on the crew couch zero-g restraint harness. 

The subjects had considerable difficulty attaching the harness; additional 

development and testing were necessary. 

NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62- 300-26, July 1, 1964, p. 7; MSC, 

"ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4, 1964." 

ASPO directed Grumman to provide an overhead window in the LEM 

to permit the pilot to dock at the upper docking hatch. The forward access 

hatch was retained for lunar surface ingress and egress and on-the-pad 

access capabilities. The contractor would remove the forward docking interface and tunnel. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21- 28, 1964"; MSC, "Minutes of Senior 

Staff Meeting, May 22, 1964," p. 4. 

MSC received results of RCA and Ryan Aeronautical Company studies on 

modifying either the LEM landing or rendezvous radar to achieve the high 

accuracies needed to circularize the LEM's lunar orbit. The contractors 

concluded that, as currently designed, radar performance would be marginal. 

Attempts to obtain this degree of accuracy could cause schedules to slip, 

because of the lack of knowledge of lunar reflectivity. As a means of reducing 

177 


21 

21-2a 

22 

22 
1964 

May 

22 

Command module zero-g mockup. 

the effects of surface vanauons, RCA and Ryan reco

the spectrum of the radar. (See February 27-March 4 an

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; 

Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, M

May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 58. 

MSC informed Grumman of two major revisions to th

crew transfer between the two spacecraft: 

(1) Definite tasks were replaced with a general r

" pressurized crew" should be able to prepare the do

translunar operations. 

(2) The requirement for a crewman to pressurize 

with the aid of a second crewman, move through the tr

out damage to the suit was changed: the crew ml!St 

through the tunnel in a pressurized suit as a degraded 

178 
Apollo system check was performed at Honeywell's Minneapolis Aeronautical 

Division on manual controls and panel displays of the spacecraft's stabilization and control system. Engineer Bruce Lockhart held one set of manual 

control sticks for translation maneuvers (left hand) and rotation maneuvers 

(right hand). The instruments were (clockwise from upper left) the flight 

director attitude indicator, attitude setfgimbal position indicator, SCS control panel, and velocity change indicator. - Minneapolis-Honeywell photo. 

179 

26 

26 

26 

27 

28 

At Hamilton Standard, MSC representatives reviewed 

space suit (A3H-024). Tests showed that a suited astro

on the thermal coverall while wearing a portable life s

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28--June 4, 1964.

ASPO notified Grumman that the carbon dioxide sens

item. Since failure of this component could cause loss 

be designed to meet crew safety reliability. NASA's 

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, manufacturer of the sensor

to include testing required for crew safety items. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "

carbon dioxide (C02) sensor requirement," May 26, 1964. 

ASPO directed North American to provide a station in 

astronauts could put on and remove the portable life su

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964." 

Meetings at Grumman (on May 21-22) had disclosed tha

changed from an all-welded LEM cabin to one that w

Although this change had not been coordinated wit

nonetheless agreed to it, provided the structural integ

fabricated could be demonstrated under all load, tempe

conditions. MSC recommended that representatives fr

MSFC to review welding and sealant techniques de

launch vehicles. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28--June 4, 1964.

Apollo Mission A-101, the first flight of an Apollo spac

launch vehicle, was launched from Cape Kennedy. T

flight was to demonstrate the compatibility of the spacec

vehicle for earth orbital flights. A-101 also was the fir

conducted at Cape Kennedy, and consisted of CSM 

and the Saturn SA-6 vehicle. 

Launch azimuth was 105 degrees. S-I's first stage numb

down prematurely at T + 116.9 seconds, delaying S-1 c

which occurred at T + 148.8 seconds (2.7 seconds late

stage ignited at T + 150.9 seconds, and the LES was jet

later and was propelled safely from the flight path. S-

180 

coverage and availability were, in general, quite good. Electromagnetic 

Engineering test pilot Charles Smythe wore a Gemini pressure suit as he stood on 

the ladder of the all metal mockup of the LEM. This mockup was the final 

design version (including rivets) established as a basis for tooling and fabrication. 
1964 

May 

An unusual view of the SA-ti space vehicle was taken from 

at Pad 34 during a radio frequency interference test 

interference was minor and did not degrade or inv

instrumentation and communications systems per

battery performances exceeded expectations. LES sep

tectable disturbance of the flight vehicle. The seque

bolts, and tower jettison all functioned properly. Ae

namic, acoustic, and vibration data contained no s

stresses on the LES were considerably less than those i

loads on other spacecraft structures all were within d

BP-13 and the spent S-IV stage circled the earth 54 ti

the atmosphere east of Canton Island in the Pacific 

spacecraft recovery was planned. 

182 
MSC, Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 42. 

MSC instructed North American to continue the Apollo food studies 

(being done under subcontract by the Stanford Research Center) on diet 

selection, nutritional value, packaging design and materials, and rehyd-ration. 

North American was asked to furnish a final report documenting the project 

and to provide MSC Crew Systems Division with one set (i.e., food supply 

for three crewmen for a two-week Apollo mission) for evaluation of both the 

food itself and of packaging concepts. The contractor also was asked to 

report its findings 'on studies of snacks for the crewmen. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. 174, Revision 1," May 28, 1964. 

MSC reported that Grumman was studying how much restraint the LEM 

crew needed during lunar landing, and was conducting manned drop tests 

to help define requirements. The program was divided into two phases, one 

on vertical and the other on off-axis landing. In the first part, already completed, the subject had needed no restraints. The second phase, however, 

was much more severe, and it was believed that restraint would probably 

be essentiaL 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4, 1964"; "Quarterly Status 

Report No. 8," p. 35. 

At the CSM mockup review at North American on April 28-30, MSC 

officials were concerned about the complexity of the couch/restraint system. 

Because of the decision that primary landing would be on water (see 

February 28), the system was reviewed. Based upon load analyses, supplemented by manned tests at Holloman Air Force Base, a simpler system 

(principally a combination' lap belt and shoulder harness) was found 

acceptable. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964"; "Quarterly Status Report 

No. 8," pp. 12- 13. 

MSC notified Grumman that primary LEM ingress and egress was through 

the forward hatch. To aid the LEM crew in getting down to the lunar surface and in climbing back into their vehicle, the Center said, a narrow 

platform must be provided from the hatch to the landing gear knuckle 

183 


28-June 4 

During 

the 

Month 

June 

28 

1-5 
MSC, Spc.ce News Roundup, June 24, 1964, p . 3. 

2 	 NASA signed a production contract worth $1.82 millio

scope for accelerometers for the CSM's navigation and g

Volume I, May 8, 1962.) [Sperry Gyroscope had been 

first half of 1962 to develop these devices, and a dev

had been signed on June I of that year.] 

NASA Contract NAS 9-2847, June 2, 1964. 

Technical Services Division supported the tests of the flotat

AFB with scuba divers and other personnel. Also pres

representatives of the Overhaul and Repair Departm

Station, Pensacola, Fla., who fabricated_the test collar 

development. 
ASPO therefore directed Grumman to take no further action on an EDS 


for the LEM; to analyze possible failures continuously to ensure that safety 


requirements were met; and to advise ASPO if, at any time, those analyses 


indicated increased criticality which might warrant reconsideration of an 


EDS. 


Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, 


Lunar Excursion Module Recommendation Concerning LEM Emergency Detection," 


June 3, 1964. 


After studying several configurations for the probe and drogue docking 4 

concept, North American recommended one particular design: three radial 

attenuators attached to three pitch arms, a probe head, a sliding center probe, 

a stored gas retracting mechanism, and three probe-to-tunnel mounting 

Docking concept for the probe and drogue. 
8 

8 

9 

determine how much that energy added to the radia

on the vehicle, and what effect it would have on t

material on the CM. North American's first estimate

about 20 percent for lunar return velocities (a figure 

experts at MSC called "very conservative"), which wo

kilogram (10-pound) increase in ablator weight. Be

sions were insignificant at orbital speeds, MSC's Str

Division recommended that their effect be consider

of the Block II CM's heatshield. 

Ibid. 

ASPO redefined the allowances for scientific equipm

stage. Major changes were the increase of storage sp

cubic meter (two to three cubic feet) and of weight fr

(80 to 100 pounds). (See April 29.) 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R . S. Mullaney

Scientific Equipment," June 8, 1964. 

A test of the landing impact and stability test prog

North American's drop facility. CM boilerplate 2 

centerline perpendicular to the water at a vertical sp

feet) per second. For the first time, a self-contained in

was installed in the dummy in the center couch. Th

were not instrumented. Onboard cameras documente

and responses during impact. No motion of the du

restraint harnesses was observed, indicating that supp

excellent. The simulated heatshield ruptured, as expe

NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300--27, Aug

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 4-11 , 1964"; int

W. Briggs, RASPOfNAA, January 12, 1970. 

In response to a Grumman request, ASPO provided 

crew provision requirem~nts. Caloric requirements, 

ing, and reconstitution of food supplies were spelled o

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney

LEM crew provisions," June 9, 1964. 

MSC announced the letting of a $67 261 contract t

a study of LEM navigation using lunar landmarks for 

186 


9 
ecacotacts vaued at $.85 oto povde tepeatue ad 

pressure transducer instrumentation for the CM. 

Space Business Daily, June 9, 1964, p. 212. 

Intending to rely on redundant and backup systems to ensure the spacecraft's reliability, MSC ordered North American to discontinue all effort on 

the infiight test and maintenance concept for the CM, including spare parts. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. 213," June 9, 1964. 

MSC clarified design criteria for the launch escape vehicle (LEV). During 

initial portions of the first-stage flight, when range safety considerations 

precluded thrust termination (estimated to be 40 seconds), the LEV must 

Spacesuits and computers were 

used in combination with 

a simplified mockup of 

NASA's Apollo moonship 

(background) at the Aeronautical Division of Honeywell in Minneapolis, where 

the stabilization and control 

system for the three-man 

spacecraft was developed. In 

the photo engineer Bill 

Summers (left) made final 

adjustments on one of a 

number of computers which 

would feed simulated flight 

information to engineer-test 

pilot Jim O'Neil (right) 

when he was inside the 

command module mockup. 

- Minneapolis-Honeywell 

photo. 

9 

9 
11 

Early 

June 

11-ta 

after the Kepler crater in the Oceanus Procellarum

MSC. It would be used for geological training of astr

their mobility in space suits. The 100-meter (328-fo

be covered mainly with slag. Plans for several crate

feet) in diameter and 4.6 meters (15 feet) deep were 

a large crater 19.5 meters (64 feet) in diameter an

deep and a smaller crater 12.2 meters (40 feet) in 

(10 feet) deep. There would be a major ridge, 102.4 

and 3.7 meters (12 fe et) high, and about 75 small cra

(4 feet) in diameter. [The mock lunar surface was co

MSC, Space News Roundup, June 10, 1964, p . 7; MSC News 

21 , 1964. 

NASA notified Grumman, MIT, and North Amer

furnish the CSM rendezvous radar to be used with 

on the LEM. A purchase order for the additional un

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 8," p. 46. 

MSC directed North American to make a number o

II CSM configuration, some of which were mandator

well. This action followed reviews of the contractor's 

cal Report at Houston and at NASA Headquarter

Director Samuel C. Phillips and OMSF chief Geor

May. (See April 16.) 

Basically, these changes (including a number to the 

were imposed by the requirements of a lunar miss

the CM per se: provisions for docking (including v

of the transfer tunnel; capability for extravehicula

portable life support systems and scientific equip

protection had to be added to the SM. (See Septemb

Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Addressees, "CSM 

mitted to NAA for implementation," June 19, 1964, with 

Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., 

II changes," June 11, 1964, with enclosures. 

North American canceled its contract with Avien, In

high-gain antenna system. (See June 21..!.27, 1963.) 

August 15, North American awarded 90-day study c

188 

(begun May 12) on a $4.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a Mission 

Trajectory Control Program, a continuing project begun in September 1963 

to analyze Gemini missions. STL would develop computer programs for 

flight control trajectories, orbital maneuvers, and analyses of guidance 

systems, range safety, and mission error. NASA Headquarters approved the 

contract on August 18 and announced the contract award on August 20. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, July 19- August 22, 1964," p. 42; "Consolidated Activity Report 

for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 

1964," p. 43; NASA News Release 64-206, "STL to Compute Gemini, Apollo Missions 

Simulations," August 20, 1964. 

MSC approved Grumman's subcontract (valued at $9 411 144) with Pratt 

and Whitney Aircraft for the LEM fuel cell assembly. 

' 

On this same day, the Center awarded a letter contract with a total estimated cost and fee of $3.315 million to AC Spark Plug for the LEM guidance 

and navigation and coupling display unit. (See October 18, 1963.) 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 37. 

Space Business Daily reported that MSC was developing a packaging system 

for bringing back uncontaminated lunar specimens for study. First, the 

Center would explore methods for collecting, storing, and shipping geological, chemical, and biological specimens in their original conditions to 

earth laboratories. MSC then would award a contract for production of the 

system. 

Space Business Daily, June 15, 1964, p. 239. 

ASPO notified Grumman that the use of reclaimed high explosives was 

undesirable, since this might reduce the reliability and quality of pyrotechnic systems. To trace any lot of reclaimed material to its point of 

origin was virtually impossible, nor could adulterants such as TNT, which 

might have been added for original military use, be easily removed. MSC 

therefore directed North American to use only virgin, newly manufactured 

high explosives in Apollo pyrotechnic devices and systems. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9- llOO, 

High explosives in the Apollo Spacecraft," June 1~, 1964. 

189 

12 

15 

16 
17 

18-25 

18-25 

18-25 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information S

Change Authorization No. 216," June 16, 1964, with enclosure: 

II, Definition Discussions," June 4, 1964. 

NASA selected Collins Radio Company for an estima

price-plus-incentive-fee contract to fabricate, install, in

fied S-hand tracking, data acquisition, and communic

Manned Space Flight Network stations. Chosen from 

Collins would provide NASA with nine systems, eac

foot)-diameter parabolic antenna. Six of these woul

facilities being prepared for Gemini flights and thre

at new Apollo stations. About 30 partial systems wou

into existing ground stations for tracking Apollo fligh

NASA News Release 64-116, "NASA Negotiating Apollo C

Contracts," May 14, 1964; NASA News Release 64-146, "NASA S

Provide Apollo Tracking Systems," June 17, 1964. 

At MSC, tests were completed on the modified spac

prototype helmet. Tests in the CM mockup indicated 

gave better visibility than previous helmets. The range 

by the neck joint, however, was not considered adequa

helmet were shipped back to Hamilton Standard for a

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 11-18, 1964"; "

ment Report, June 18-25, 1964." 

Beech Aircraft Corporation completed qualification te

pressure vessel for the CSM electrical power system 

four vessels exceeded burst pressure specification requir

oxygen tanks also were burst tested, with satisfactory 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the A

Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p . 19; MSC, "ASP

Report, June 18-25, 1964." 

MSC and Honeywell studied feasibility of the astronau

control of the spacecraft during SM propulsion engin

earth orbit. Investigators found that, although the tas

difficult as the maneuver progressed from attitude 

manual control nonetheless was entirely feasible. 

studied six possible methods of providing electroni

stabilization and control system (SCS) to perform just 

190 

trical power and drinking 

water. The system was in 

the Apollo 13 service module. At upper left was one 

of two oxygen tanks. At 

lower right was a cylindrical housing jacket, rounded 

on each end, that enclosed 

two cryogenic hydrogen 

tanks. 

-Beech Aircraft photo. 

the end recommended manual rate command. Based upon this recommendation and the earlier study, on August 19 MSC decided to incorporate this 

manual rate control capability in Block I SCS systems. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 18-25, 1964"; MSC, "Consolidated 

Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, 

July 19-August 22, 1964," pp. 20, 47; NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 

62-300--29, October I, 1964, p. ll; interview, telephone, Kenneth J. Cox, Houston, 

March 10, 1970. 

Qualification testing on the launch escape motor began with a successful 

static firing by the Lockheed Propulsion Company. Twenty motors were 

tested during July and August; all performed satisfactorily. (See August 30.) 

Lockheed Propulsion Company, "Apollo Launch Escape and Pitch Control Motors, 

Monthly Progress Report No. 28," LPC No. 588-P-28, September 30, 1964, p. 5; "Apollo 

Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300--27, p . 15. 

NASA announced a realignment of CSM guidance and navigation system 

contractors, effective July 25. (See February 16- March 21.) Two of the 

prime contractors, Kollsman Instrument Corporation (supplier of the scanning telescope, sextant, and map and data viewer) and Raytheon Company 

(manufacturer of the onboard computer), became subcontractors to AC 

Spark Plug, prime · contractor for the inertial measuring unit and for 

191 


1964 

June 

19 

20 
21-July 18 _ 

24 

24 

24 

25 

Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space 

1964," p. 3. 

Two amendments to the LEM contract were forwarded 

signature. One, for $1.257 million, was for additional flig

port at MSC; the other, for $4.252 million, was for a data 

to be installed in the Apollo Propulsion System Devel

WSMR. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Asso

Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p . 37; MSC News R

tember 11, 1964. 

NASA Headquarters approved the definitive contract w

the production of 55 J-2 engines (used in the S-IVB stag

and Saturn V launch vehicles). Negotiations had taken p

to May 15. Initial value of the contract was $89.5 million

Akens et al., History of Marshall ... january 1 through june 30, 1

226; David S. Akens, Leo L. Jones, and A. Ruth Jarrell, History 

Marshall Space Flight Center from july 1 through December 31, 1

dated), Vol. I, p. 132. 

The Army Map Service reported the completion for NAS

plete topographic map of the visible face of the moon. 

The San Diego Union, June 25, 1964. 

North American conducted the first hot fire tests of the S

system, with steady and pulsed firings. Only one engi

only problem encountered was with the oxidizer shutoff 

have to be completely redesi~ed. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 25-July 2, 1964." 

Grumman engineers, meeting with ASPO officials in Ho

contractor's philosophy about onboard checkout of the LE

required to do the job. Scheduled at times when the a

heavily pressed with other activities, company engineers 

be three major checkouts of the LEM to come: (1) after lu

(2) immediately after lunar landing, and (3) just before 

course, the astronauts would monitor the various syste

with the LEM to manage and operate its subsystems. The 

192 

The hydrogen-fueled J-2 rocket engines for the upper stages of the Saturn IB 

and Saturn V launch vehicles were completed on the assembly line at the 

Canoga Park, Calif., plant of Rocketdyne Division of NAA. T he J-2 developed a thrust of 1000 kilonewtons (225 000 pounds) at altitude. It operated in a cluster of five engines in the S-II stage and singly in the S-IVB 

stage of the Apollo launch vehicle. - Rocketdyne photo. 

visualize any need for "centralized onboard checkout equipment"-caution 

and warning lights, controls and displays, help from the ground network, 

among others, should satisfy the needs. Grumman ask,ed MSC for authority 

193 

June 

1964 
25 

25-July 1 

26 

26 

27, 1964. 

LTV was awarded a $1 125 040 contract for a dynamic 

simulator to study task assignments in simulated space fl

was capable of yaw, pitch, and roll movements and dup

and noise incurred during liftoff, powered flight, and re

plays simulated views of starfields, earth or moon horizons, 

vehicles, and landscapes. 

MSC News Release 64-122, July I, 1964; MSC, "Consolidated Activi

Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 21-Ju

Zero g tests of the CMfLEM crew transfer tunnel were p

135 aircraft at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, verifyi

during crew-transfer zero-g simulations conducted at No

February and March. The task of controlling equipmen

·For example, the docking probe was temporarily lost during 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 2-9, 1964." 

MSC awarded a letter contract (with a total cost and fee es

million) to Kollsman Instrument Corporation for optica

the LEM guidance and navigation system. (See October 

ations for a definitive contract began July 10. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associa

Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 37. 

ASPO, Bellcomm, Inc., and MSC's Mission Planning and 

completed a study on reentry range requirements. Becaus

tion limit of 10 g's, the minimum reentry range was 2200 

nautical miles [n.m.]). A range flexibility of about 1600 

n .m.) was essential to allow for weather conditions. An 

kilometers (1000 n.m.) was required by the emergency re

system. Therefore, the heatshield must be designed to w

heating over a 5920-kilometer (3200-n.m.) range. 

During mid-July, ASPO learned from the Landing and R

that the minimum acceptable CM maneuverability during 

kilometers (1000 n.m.) for water landings. "This requirem

storm size, weather predictability, and reliability of sto

direction of movement." Landing errors associated with r

194 

MSC authorized Grumman to procure a "voice only" tape recorder with 

time correlation for use in the LEM data storage electronic assembly. The 

unit would be voice operated and have a capacity of 10 hours recording time. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned 

Space Flight, June 28-July 4, 1964," p. 3. 

After acceptance testing, AiResearch Manufacturing Company delivered the 

first production CM environmental control system to North American. 

The Garrett Corporation, AiResearch Manufacturing Division, "Monthly Progress Report, Environmental Control System, NAA/S&ID-, Project Apollo, 16 June 1964-15 July 

1964," S5-l013-R(26), July 31, 1964, pp. I, 15. 

MSC directed North American to make whatever changes were necessary 

in the Block I design to make the spacecraft compatible with the Gemini 

space suit. (See May 7.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 25-July 2, 1964." 

MSC's Operations Planning Division requested OMSF to revise its spacecraft specifications to (I) delete the requirement for data storage in the 

LEM (this function would be performed by the CSM data recording equipment via an RF link); and (2) drop the requirement for one portable life 

support system (PLSS) for each crewman (a third PLSS would only allow 

the CM pilot to enter the LEM without benefit of a hard dock, and studies 

had shown that this situation probably would never arise). 

Early in July, MSC requested OMSF to change two other requirements from 

tentative to firm: (1) LEM tilt angle at lunar liftoff should not exceed 30 

degrees (MSC had accepted this value and Grumman had been asked to 

design systems to conform [see May 21]); (2) the service propulsion system 

should include a propellant control so that unused propellants (resulting 

from mixture ratio shift) would not exceed 0.5 percent of the initial propellant supply. (Studies showed that the North American design already 

met this requirement.) 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 8," p. 63; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management 

Report, July 2-9, 1964." 

ASPO spelled out operational procedures for the space suit emergency 

oxygen supply (EOS) units. [The primary function of the EOS was as a 

195 


28-July 4 

30 

30 

During 

the 

Month 

July 
2-9 

8 

Putting on or taking off the units unassisted would not b

American and Grumman were directed to provide suitabl

each spacecraft. 

TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Attn: E. E. Sack, July 1, 1964; TWX

MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, July 14, 1964; memorandum, W

MSC, to Chief, Crew Systems Div., "Apollo Emergency Oxygen 

(EOSS)," July 24, 1964. 

MSC's Operations Planning Division (OPD) examined a 1

mission (a manned Apollo Lunar Orbiter-type of photo

OPD found that the 578-kilowatt-hour capability of the 

power system was adequate, provided there were no cryog

Ifsuch failures occurred, the maximum mission duration w

(four days in lunar orbit). 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 2-9, 1964;" interview, 

H. Kohrs, Houston, March 11, 1970. 

Donald K. Slayton, MSC Assistant Director for Flight 

announced specific assignments for the astronauts. Alan B

named Chief of the Astronaut Office, Slayton's former jo

now divided into three branches, Apollo, Gemini, and 

Training: L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., was head of the Ap

James A. McDivitt, Charles Conrad, Jr., Frank Borman

White II assisting him; in the Gemini branch, headed by 

were Walter M. Schirra, Jr., John W. Young, and Thom

Operations and Training branch was headed by Neil A. A

by Elliot M. See, Jr., and James A. Lovell, Jr. (M. Sco

rently on duty with the U.S. Navy's Project Sealab, was n

MSC assignment.) 

The 14 newest astronauts were given individual assign

Operations and Training branch: Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., 

(including trajectory analysis and flight plans); William A

mental control systems and radiation and thermal prote

Bassett II, training and simulators; Alan L. Bean, recover

A. Cernan, spacecraft propulsion and the Agena; Roger 

munications and the Deep Space Network; Michael Coll

and extravehicular experiments; R. Walter Cunningha

sequential systems and monitoring of unmanned flight exp

programs which might relate to MSC programs; Donn 

196 

Going over the Apollo Boilerplate 15 command and service module stacking 

check-off sheet in Hangar AF, Cape Kennedy, Fla., were, left to right, Allen 

Cave, MSC mechanical systems engineer; Thomas Black, MSC operations 

engineer; and Orval M. Bradford, Jr., NAA operations engineer. The checkoff was made before mating the package to the Saturn SA- 7. 

and translation control systems; Theodore C. Freeman, boosters; Richard F. 1964 

Gordon, Jr., cockpit integration; Russell L. Schweickart, future manned July 

programs and inflight experiments in Gemini and Apollo; David R . Scott, 

guidance and navigation; and Clifton C. Williams, Jr., range operations and 

crew safety. 

MSC News Release 64-125, July 9, 1964; MSC, Space News Roundup, July 8, 1964, 


pp. l, 3. 


Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips called a meeting at NASA 8 

Headquarters to discuss disposing of the S-IVB stage and its instrument 

197 
the spacecraft. 

"Minutes of Meeting to Review Disposition of the 8-IVBfiU and Relate

quirements During the Post Injection Phase of Lunar Missions," July 15

8-9 	 MSC representatives attended the second Block I CSM mo

North American. (See April 28-30.) Although the crew area 

improved, further changes in the suit umbilicals and the res

and significant ones-still were required. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 9-16, 1964." 

9 	 ASPO directed Grumman to delete 200 watts, currently ap

LEM's power allotment charts, for lighting during televisio

of lunar earthshine scenes. The LEM television camera, whic

The lunar television camera. 
The crawler track at Marion, Ohio, in mid-July 1964 before its shipment to 

Merritt Island. The Marion Power Shovel Company had the contract to 

build the crawler-transport. 

by the government, would be able to televise all lunar scenes during 1964 

sunshine or earthshine periods. July 

TWX, W. F. Rector Ill, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, July 9, 1964. 

A NASA-North American Technical Management meeting set the CM 16 

control weight (based ori an assumed 41 000-kilogram [90 000-pound]-payload capability of the Saturn V) at 5000 kilograms (11 000 pounds). MSC 

then asked and North American agreed to design, test, and qualify the open 

ring-sail main parachutes for a CM weighing 5200 kilograms (ll 500 

pounds). 

"Minutes of NASA- NAA Technical Management Meeting, July 14, 1964"; MSC, "ASPO 


Weekly Management Report, July 30-August 6, 1964." 


Once the decision was made to use Gemini space suits during Apollo earth­ 16 

orbital flights, NASA took the next step. The space agency gave to the David 

Clark Company, manufacturer of the Gemini suit, a program for modifying 

and testing that suit for use in the Apollo program, and designated it the 

"Aponi" suit. Formal contract awards were scheduled for late in the year. 

Memorandum, H. F. Battaglia, MSC, to Chief, MSC Crew Systems Div., "Trip report 


for visit to David Clark Company, Worcester, Massachusetts concerning Aponi Space 


Suit Program," July 16, 1964. 


Representatives of North American, RCA, and MSC's Instrumentation and 16-17 

Electronic Systems Division held a meeting on the status of the CSM television subsystem. A design review covering all electrical, mechanical, and 

199 
20-21 

21 

21 

21 

Ohio, facility to study propellant consumption, eng

stabilization and control system characteristics and perfo

results showed that sighting aids mounted on the LEM 

satisfactory docking. Furthermore, during transposit

IVB's roll rate must be no greater than 0.1 degree. No

prepare a full-scale, three-dimensional study to evaluate 

ing and would design sighting aids (to be tested at Lang

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate A

Space Flight, July 19- 25, 1964," p. 4; "Apollo Monthly Progress R

p. 8. 

At Grumman, representatives from MSC's Structures 

Systems Engineering Divisions reviewed the design cr

landing gear. The group agreed to study landing stabili

conditions. This investigation, and results of MSC G

Division's landing simulations, would permit a realis

406.4-centimeter (160-inch) cantilever gear. (See Octob

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 23-30, 1964." 

MSC approved a configuration that Hamilton Standar

for the power supply for the liquid-cooled portable 

This configuration embodied an 11-cell secondary b

conversion devices for each electrical load. The total 

quired was 108.8 watt-hours. 

TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, 

Grumman held a portable life support system (PLSS) 

test mockup 1 for the MS,C Crew Systems Division. Subj

the PLSS on and take it off, unassisted, with the s

unpressurized. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 23- 30, 1964." 

MSC approved Grumman's subcontract with Allison 

Motors Corporation for the LEM descent engine tan

the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract was $5.48 million. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the As

Manned Space Flight, July 19-August 22, 1964," p. 41. 

NASA announced that its Office of Space Science and 

viting scientists to participate in a scientific experiment 

200 


21 
NASA News Release 64-177, "NASA Invites World Sciem:sts to Propose Space Experi· 

ments," July 21, 1964. 

As currently conceived, the LEM's waste management system was designed 

for direct transfer from the space suit assembly and immediate dumping. 

If a storage system for the urine were not designed into the LEM, ASPO 

reported, the spacecraft could be lightened by more than 23 kilograms 

(50 pounds). 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 23-30, 1964." 

At its Reno, Nev., facility, Rocketdyne conducted the first checkout firing 

(five seconds) of their LEM descent engine at a simulated altitude of 39 600 

meters (130 000 feet). A heavyweight, 20.3-millimeter (.080-inch) thick nozzle 

extension skirt was used. During the following week, firings of the engine 

included one of 110 seconds. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 23-30, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 30-August 6, 1964." 

Dalmo Victor Company was selected to supply the LEM S-band steerable 

antenna system to RCA, subcontractor for the LEM communication system. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 23-30, 1964." 

After comparing capabilities of the space suit assembly with and without 

the emergency oxygen supply (EOS), the MSC Apollo Portable Life Support Systems Office reco~mended that the EOS system be retained for 

crew safety considerations. (See July 1.) 

Memorandum, William C. Kinkaide, MSC, to Crew Systems Division, "Apollo Emergency 

Oxygen Supply Subsystem (EOSS)," July 24, 1964. 

MSC authorized North American to provide a boost protective cover that 

would completely enclose the conical portion of the CM during launch. 

As an integral part of the launch escape system (LES), the cover would be 

jettisoned after atmospheric exit or during an atmospheric abort. Also the 

cover would satisfy the requirement for clean windows on the CM after LES 

separation and would protect the CM's thermal coating and docking mechanism from the launch environment. (See January 15-23 and March 19- 26.) 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., "Contract 

Change Authorization No. 235," July 24, 1964. 

201 

23-30 

23-30 

23-30 

24 

24 
28 

28 

30 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "C

Apollo spacecraft thermal design mission," July 27, 1964. 

MSC awarded a $335 791 contract to Lockheed-Calif

transient heat transfer and thermodynamic analyses 

pulsion system (SPS). Phase I, an analytical study, an

a one-third-scale model of the SPS, were scheduled for c

ary and May. Tests would be run in the Hughes Aircraf

chamber in a thermal vacuum and under simulated sola

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 13-20, 1964." 

Ranger VII was launched from Cape Kennedy. The 3

pound) spacecraft, carrying six television cameras to ta

of the moon, was boosted into an earth-parking orbit 

launch vehicle. The Agena engines then refired to place 

translunar trajectory. On July 31, Ranger VII crashlan

10.7°S, 20.7°W, in the Sea of Clouds. The spacecraft sent 

beginning at an altitude of about 800 kilometers (500 m

impact. 

During the next several weeks, MSC's Space Environme

Grumman, and Bellcomm studied these photographs 

October 30, ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea informed 

Deputy Director of the OMSF Apollo Program, that t

had eliminated most of the major uncertainties abou

that could be resolved by photographic techniques. 

The New York Times, July 29, 1964; memorandum, John M. Egg

"Preliminary analysis of Ranger 7 photographs," August 13, 1964; 

to NASA Headquarters, Attn: Phillips, "Apollo Mapping and Sur

30, 1964. 

MSC awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract estimated 

Astronautics Division of LTV for Apollo space suit eva

development and qualification testing of Gemini space su

space environment simulator. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Ass

Manned Space Flight, July 19-August 22, 1964," p. 64; memorandu

MSC, to Chief, .Systems Test Branch, "Technical Monitorship of 

vironment Simulator Contract," August 26, 1964. 

202 
Two of the pictures relayed back to the earth by Ranger VII July 31, 1964. The 

photo at left was taken from an altitude of 124,9 kilometers (77.6 miles) and 

the photo at right from an altitude of 78.1 kilometers (48.5 miles). 

NASA approved Grumman's proposal to use the spacecraft's VHF radios as 1964 

an "intercom" between the docked LEM and the CM. Early planning had July 

involved the use of a hardlinejumbilical arrangement. 

TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, July 30, 1964. 

Technicians 30-August 6 in MSC's Operations Planning Division (OPD) studied oxygen 

storage capacities in the two spacecraft to determine whether those supplies 

exceeded by 50 percent the levels of consumption anticipated during a 

normal mission (as required by OMSF specifications). On the basis of current design consumption, they found that mission requirements were 

exceeded by only 45 and 25 percent for the CSM and LEM, respectively. 

OPD therefore recommended that OMSF's specifications be revised, because 

oxygen for the fuel cells as well as for breathing was contained in the same 

tanks. Rather than the 50 percent reserve, OPD said, Headquarters should 

instead require the oxygen supplies in both spacecraft to be the maximum 

amount that would be used for environmental control and for generating 

power during a lunar mission. And, to allow for safe aborts, some alternate 

or redundant oxygen storage would be provided in each spacecraft. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 30-August 6, 1964." 

203 


30 
and Hygiene Section, who was present at the meeti

Systems Division of the scientists' concern and relayed 

tions on ways of preventing or controlling such con

bacteria filters). 

Memorandum, Elliott S. Harris, MSC, to Chief, Crew Systems D

tamination," July 31, 1964. 

During At Hamilton Standard and at MSC, testing continued 

the the Hamilton Standard liquid-cooled garment as well a

Month 

developed by the Crew Systems Division. (See Febru

While sweating was not yet completely eliminated, th

confirmed the efficacy of using liquid- rather than gas-co

MSC, Space News Roundup, June 24, 1964, p. 7; MSC News Re

1964; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the As

Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 53; memorandu

man and Francis J. DeVos, MSC, to Apollo Portable Life Support 

Report-Contract NAS 9-723," July 8, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Weekly 

July 2-9, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 1~23 , 

August At its new Magic Mountain, Calif., facility, the Mar

3 began development firings on the LEM reaction contr

successively more advanced components, the testing pr

ally build toward a complete prototype. Early in Sep

pulsion and Power Division (PPD) rep-orted that Marqu

testing temporarily because of problems with monitorin

the Division grumbled, could have been checked ou

started). Two weeks later, PPD reported that contami

chamber had forced Marquardt to halt these developm

Finally, by mid-October, problems with manufactur

checking of th~ thrust chambers at the company's m

portended a twenty-week slippage in delivery of the ch

Mountain site. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 30--August 6, 1

Management Report, August 27-September 3, 1964"; "ASPO Wee

port, September 10--17, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report

4 	 ASPO tentatively approved Grumman's recommenda

luminescent lighting for controls and display panels ins

(with backup floodlighting). "Definitive acceptance," 

pendent upon resolution of actual production hardwar

204 
An experimental water-cooled garment, designed to cool space-suit-dad astronauts 

by water-filled tubes, was delivered to MSC's Crew Systems Division for 

evaluation. The garments were expected to allow astronauts to work harder 

and perform more tasks than originally expected. 

action followed a July 16 presentation of the electroluminescent concept by 

Grumman and a review by MSC representatives (among whom were two 

astronauts, Richard F. Gordon, Jr., and Charles Conrad, Jr.). [Electroluminescence involved the use of a crystalline phosphor to give off light. 

Advantages of the concept, which was wholly new to manned spacecraft, 

205 

August 

1964 
LEM forward display panel showing electrolumin

1964 	 were that it used less power and gave off less heat t

candescent bulbs; and, even more significant in the ey

August 

was much more even and had an "afterglow" of less t

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, 

Lighting Mockup Review," with enclosure: "Abstract of Proceedi

tion Meeting, GAEC, Bethpage, L. I., New York, Subject: LEM 

view," July 17, 1964. 

4 	 At a meeting at MSC on July 23, MIT outlined a

requirements, as well as landing site selection procedu

This included the recticular patterns on the LEM wi

where the vehicle was coming down and which enab

touchdown corrections. There was a good deal of c

time during the final letdown phase, dust might ob

vision and make the radar data unreliable. To overco

Grumman to use inertially derived data to monitor 

or as a basis for switching to manual control of the d

206 
said, the service propulsion tanks in the Block II SM were being shortened. 

But he emphasized that the length of the spacecraft per se "will not be 

reduced," and would thus remain the same as the Block I vehicle. 

Memorandum, Piland, MSC, to Addressees, "Block II Service Module Length," August 


6, 1964. 


To investigate problems that might be encountered during the LEM's 6-13 

"blast off" from the moon, Grumman conducted "fire in the hole" tests 

using a l j 10th-scale model of the spacecraft. (See February and March 11, 

1963.) These tests showed that the initial shock of the ascent engine's 

Astronauts Frank Borman, left, and Elliot M. See, Jr., demonstrated prototype 

thermal overgarments designed to protect men on the moon from the direct 

rays of the sun unscreened by the thick protection of atmosphere available 

on the earth. On their backs were mockups of units which would provide 

life support and communications equipment while astronauts were on the 

surface of the moon. 
The fully stacked Apollo Boilerplate 15 command modul

adapter section being transported to Pad 37 for mating 

1964 	 ignition could increase the pressure in the engine noz

square centimeter (3 psi), and that this pressure coul

August 

of the nozzle to the other by as much as 0.53 newtons p

(0.75 psi). This pressure differential would change t

cause an overturning moment on the vehicle. Grumma

testing before actual full-scale firings began at WSM

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 6-13, 1964." 

7 	 At North American, engineers from MSC's Crew Sy

reviewed the revised CM couch restraint system. (

considered the restraint harness unacceptable for use 

suit. Also the harness attachment gave inadequate rest

208 
defining the LEMs guidance equipment (anticipated early in November), 

Grumman should pursue the analog concept (i.e., visual display instruments). (MSC was in the midst of "tradeoff" studies on digital versus analog 

indicators.) ASPO thus sought to ensure that the manufacturerer did not 

delay procurement of the devices. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R . S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-llOO, 

LEM Attitude Indicator and Gimbal Angle , Sequence Transformation Assembly 

(GASTA) ," August 7, 1964. 

At its Potrero, Calif., test facility, Lockheed Propulsion Company began 

qualification testing on the pitch control motors for the launch escape 

system. Early in September, when the program ended, about two dozen 

motors had been successfully fired for full duration. Test and reliability 

results showed that the motors met procurement specifications and had 

an average specific impulse three percent higher than required. 

Lockheed Propulsion Company, "Qualification Test Report, Apollo Pitch Control 

Motor," 588-M-50, December 8, 1964, pp. 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-11. 

The modified ring-sail parachutes for the CM's earth landing system demonstrated their potential when Northrop Ventura conducted its first clustered 

drop using that type of chute. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned 

Space Flight, August 9-15, 1964," p. 2. 

During late July and early August, MSC and its two spacecraft contractors 

worked out the dimensions of sample containers and other scientific equipment that would be stowed aboard the spacecraft during lunar missions: 

48 by 20 by 29 centimeters (19 by 8 by 11.5 inches). MSC asked Grumman 

for cost and weight estimates for the containers. 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, 

Results of Meeting on Scientific Equipment Stowage Space," August ll, 1964, with 

enclosure: "Results of Meeting on Scientific Equipment Stowage Space, July 23, 1964." 

In designing batteries for the LEM electrical power system, ASPO ordered 

Grumman to assume that, if a fuel cell failed, the mission would be aborted. 

TWX, W. F. Rector Ill, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, August 12, 1964. 

The U. S. Navy's Air Crew Equipment Laboratory agreed to conduct a 

series of tests on the water-cooled undergarment. Part I would determine 

209 


7 

9-15 

11 

12 

13-20 
1964 

August 

13-20 

13-September 3 

An Avco employee prefitted honeycomb to clamps on edge 

command module. The containers held clips that sec

the substructure. The aft compartment faced forwa

module into the earth's atmosphere and therefore bor

-Av

the garment's suitability for the postlanding phase of 

would investigate the CM range of temperature tha

wearing the garment, with and without a space suit. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 13-20, 1964." 

To save money on the Hamilton Standard contract 

MSC's Crew Systems Division (CSD) would take over 

ment of the meteoroid protective garment. Since the

knowledge about the need for meteoroid protection, 

concentrated contractor effort was "unwarranted" at th

ber 17-December 21, 1963.) 

Ibid. 

MSC Crew Systems Division engineers evaluated the 

ferring water from the CM to the LEM in lunar orb

hardware modifications would be needed-either lower 

210 

crew performance, at Bend, Ore., 

August 24-28, 1964--Hester used a 

modified "Jacob's Staff," designed 

to help him keep his balance. 

in the LEM during transfer or a pump added to the water management 

system in the CM. Six weeks later, Grumman submitted a report confirming 

that continuous use of CM water from transposition to separation was more 

desirable than transferring water to the LEM. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 13-20, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 27-September 3, 1964"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, 

October 1-8, 1964." 

At Baylor University's College of Medicine, investigators presented some 

results of a joint MSC-Baylor study of human tolerance to low frequency 

noise (up to 12 cycles per second [cps]). (The study was undertaken because, 

as launch vehicles for manned spacecraft become larger-i.e., Saturn V and 

Apollo-they produce higher noise levels, but lower noise frequencies. The 

possibility of harmful effects upon the crew had to be known.] Audiometry 

indicated some temporary physiological effect: after three minutes of exposure at levels of about 140 decibels (db), about half of the twenty test 

subjects suffered some temporary impairment of their hearing. No serious 

vestibular effects were encountered during noise levels below 12 cps with 

a maximum of 144 db; hear.t and respiration rates of the subjects indicated 

211 


1964 

August 

14 
16-September 15 

9100 meters (30 000 feet), simultaneous separation of th

and the launch escape system (with boost protective cover 

would damage the parachutes or escape hatch. One meth

this hazard was to jettison the apex cover 0.4 second af

tower jettison motor and firing of the separation bolts. A

were means of sequencing the firing of the jettison mot

bolts, and the heatshield thrusters. 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-30o-29, p. 3; MSC, "Co

Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space 

September 19, 1964," p. 63. 

North American recommended an uprighting system for 

of three 0.566-cubic-meter (20-cubic-foot) airbags and a

with an electric pump. Using the bags and flooding th

would maintain a single-point flotation attitude for both 

II CMs. MSC Structures and Mechanics Division tests of 

indicated that all three bags were needed· to upright the C

can contended that any two bags would usually be suffici

bag providing a redundant capability. The contractor wou

-Y -

Center of gravity Center of g

Command module uprighting Stable n 

system. -NAA drawing. lapexdown) Forward hatch 
reentry tests to evaluate the thermal performance of various ablative materials. The material (Avcoat 5026-39, which was being considered for use 

in the CM's heatshield-see June 10, 1963) was fabricated and bonded in 

much the same manner as on the actual heatshield. The multi-staged rocket's 

trajectory propelled the payload into a reentry path that simulated heating 

loads and shear forces of lunar returns. Though not coming through completely unscathed, the material nonetheless survived. 

Data on heating, telemetered from the vehicle, established design limits for 

the ablative material and, thus, were applied to the design of the CM's 

thermal protection. 

James L. Raper (ed.), Results of a Flight Test of the Apollo Heat-Shield Material at 

28,000 Feet Per Second, NASA TM X-ll82, February 1966, pp. I, 5, ll-12, 23; MSC, 

"ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 3-10, 1964"; NASA News Release 64-­

202, "Re-entry Heating Experiment to be Flown by Scout," August II, 1964. 

Thiokol Chemical Corporation began qualification testing on the tower 

jettison motor. The third motor to be fired in the series, on September 9, 

experienced a failure of the spot welding on the interstage structure. The 

motor, now freed, broke apart in the test bay. Analysis of the failure and 

repairs to the test stand followed, but Thiokol reported that testing could 

not be resumed until about mid-November-"at the earliest." This foreshadowed a probable delay of about two months in the qualification program. 

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, Elkton Div., "Apollo Tower Jettison Program, Monthly 

Progress Report No. 26," A-226, October 14, 1964, pp. ii, 2-12, 32-34; "Apollo Monthly 

Progress Report," SID 62-300-29, p. 16. 

Homer E. Newell, head of NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications, 

informed MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth that, as NASA had requested 

(see April 16), the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences 

had defined the academic requirements for scientist-astronauts for the Apollo 

program. These requirements demanded graduate studies to the doctorate 

level, or equivalent. 

Letter, Newell, NASA, to Gilruth, MSC, August 19, 1964. 

MSC's Crew Systems Division (CSD) appraised crew tolerance to SM abort 

accelerations for Block I spacecraft. Normal mission limits of +·15 g, with 

total base durations of 50 seconds, were judged tolerable. Under these con213 


18 

19 

2o-27 
Much of the weightless training obtained by the astron

Force C- 135 aircraft following parabolic curves. H

nician braced himself at the side of the cabin as As

sett II was suspended and Astronaut Theodore C. Fr

1964 	 ditions, CSD estimated that dizziness or visual distur

lessthan 10 percent of the cases. CSD set emergency 

August 

base durations not exceeding 40 seconds. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 20-27, 1964

21 	 ASPO gave Grumman formal approval to proceed 

a mission programmer for the LEM. The concept, wh

presented in June, involved using the guidance c

sequencing element, with the tape reader as a backup 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney

LEM Mission Programer," August 21, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Week

August 20-27, 1964." 

23-29 	 A redesigned thrust chamber (called the " phase C"

engine was tested in the altitude chamber at Arnold 

ment Center. [The "phase C" chamber differed from 

a compression-molded ablative throat section was us

380, and five seconds produced only negligible throa

214 
trajectory. Analog computer analysis indicated the BMAG's feasibility, 

provided the spacecraft did not maintain a constant roll rate during reentry. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the 

Manned Space Flight, August 23--September 19, 1964," p. 49. 

Associate Administrator, 

MSGcompleted negotiations with General Electric Corporation (GE) Apollo 

Support Department for 10 ground stations for spacecraft checkout. (See 

March 25.) The figure finally agreed upon, $62 244 657 with a $4.1 million 

fee, was over $20 million less than GE's March quotation. 

23-September 19 

Ibid., p. 41. 

MSC's Technical Services Division (TSD) built a prototype lightweight 

Apollo couch and test fixture and delivered them to the Crew Systems 

Division. TSD had designed this couch assembly, as a single unit, to 

replace previously planned individual couches in the CM, which would 

save 15.9 kilograms (35 pounds). During subsequent qualification testing, 

however, the couch did not stand up structurally, and was abandoned. But 

the concept itself was later useful to North American in the design of their 

couch arrangement. 

23-September 19 

Ibid., p. 35; interview, telephone, Ralph Drexel, Houston, March 12, 1970. 

At North American, the service propulsion engine was gimbaled during 

hot firing tests, the first time that the engine had been gimbaled under 

these conditions. Gimbal operation was satisfactory. 

24-28 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 3-10, 1964;" "Apollo Monthly 

Progress Report," SID 62-300-29, pp. 14-15. 

MSC's Crew Systems Division (CSD) conducted mobility tests on lunar-like 

surfaces near Bend, Oreg. Three types of terrain were used: loose basaltic 

rubble, low-density pumice with crusty surface and low bearing load, and 

loose sand. Several CSD engineers and Astronaut Walter Cunningham wore 

pressurized Apollo prototype space suits and simulated portable life support systems. Climbing steep slopes covered by loose material proved difficult unless aided by ropes. Not surprisingly, how fast they could walk 

depended upon the terrain. Simple geophysical tasks at the level of the 

astronaut's feet were easily accomplished, but those requiring good visibility 

24-29 

215 
Astronaut R. Walter Cunningham climbed a slope near Pa

kilometers (50 miles) from Bend, Ore., while wearing a 

1964 and dexterity were almost impossible and were better 

August 	 working level of between one and four feet above the 

problems with the space suit were fogging of the visor, 

tion, and stiffness in the hips and ankles of the suits. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, August 27-Septembe

Weekly Management Report, September 3-10, 1964"; MSC, "Consolid

for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight

ber 19, 1964," p. 65; memorandum, Willis B. Foster, NASA, to A

Space Flight, "Apollo Field Simulations," September 8, 1964; MSC, 

up, September 2, 1964, p. I. 

25 	 At a Contractor Coordination Meeting on June 9- 10, 

made that there existed a single-point failure that would 

216 

(1) The radar transponder in the CSM must be turned on before the 

LEM's ascent from the moon and must be pointed toward the LEM during 

ascent and rendezvous. 

(2) The CSM's attitude had to be stabilized during this phase of the 

miSSIOn. 

The two prime contractors, Rector said, should decide on some means of 

controlling remotely the CSM's transponder and its stabilization and control system. The contractors should, however, use the simplest and most 

reliable arrangement. To initiate these two functions, the CSM would 

receive commands from the ground. Finally, Rector informed Grumman 

of a new ground rule on CSM communications: continuous communications, both telemetry and voice, must be maintained whenever the spacecraft was in view of the earth. 

Letter, Rector, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, Operations 

Groundrule for Disabled CSM Astronaut," August 25, 1964. 

Apollo operational radiation protection was divided into two categories: 

personal dosimeters (attached to the space suit) and a portable, hand-held, 

radiation survey meter. Grumman was directed to provide a readily accessible stowage location aboard the LEM for the meter, which would weigh 

about 0.5 kilogram (one pound) and measure approximately 51 x 51 x 191 

millimeters (2 x 2 x 7.5 inches). 

Letter, W. F. Rector Ill, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, 

Space Allocation for LEM Radiation Instrumentation," August 25, 1964. 

MSC's Crew Systems Division (CSD) concluded that, in terms of weight and 

complexity, the "buddy system" concept for supporting two crewmen on a 

single portable life support system (see July 28- August 3, 1963) was undesirablre. An additional emergency oxygen system seemed more practical. 

The suit assembly already provided at least five minutes of emergency life 

support; this extra system would afford another five, at a cost of only 1.4 

kilograms (three pounds). Consequently CSD redefined the rescue requirement to mean simply "the capability for the crewman remaining in the 

spacecraft to egress . .. and attend or retrieve the crewman in distress." 

Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Asst. Chief, Systems Engineering Div., 

"Portable Life Support System emergency operation," August 26, 1964. 

217 

25 

25 
30-September 5 

31 

31 

During 

the 

Month 

MSC decided to use total mission elapsed time, instead 

time, as the time reference for mission operations. (Se

North American and Grumman were directed to provi

for this display. 

MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate A

Space Flight," August 30-September 5, 1964," p. 3. 

Robert E. Smylie, of MSC's Crew Systems Division 

as a consequence of MSC's canceling the requireme

tenance, there were no longer any provisions for too

inside the spacecraft. Smylie reported that CSD was 

carrying tools and small equipment needed on the 

would be stowed along with the scientific equipment i

stage. 

Memorandum, Smylie, MSC, to Systems Engineering Div., Att

"Extravehicular equipment belt," August 31, 1964. 

Studies of future Gemini and Apollo missions show

flight directors would be needed. MSC Director 

named Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., John D. Hodge, E

Glynn S. Lunney to these positions. The flight directo

flight operations from launch to recovery. Their resp

clude making operational decisions on spacecraft perf

ing flight plans, and ensuring the safety of the astronau

MSC Announcement 64-120, "Designation of Flight Directors," 

News Release 64-150, September 4, 1964. 

During zero g tests at Wright-Patterson Air Force B

pressurized Gemini space suits got into the Apollo 

tached the restraint harness. They entered through a 

73.6 centimeters (29 inches) in diameter. One subje

with a portable life support system (PLSS) strapped on 

with the PLSS carried in his hands. One subject also w

nel with an 24.7-meter (81-foot) umbilical hose attach

tests demonstrated the feasibility of moving the couch 

position without readjusting the restraint harness; a

the need for impwving the lap belt. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 3-10, 196

218 
Flight Directors, clockwise from upper left, Glynn S. Lunney, John D. Hodge, 

Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., and Eugene F. Kranz around the Flight Director's 

console in Mission Control at MSC. 

MSC Crew Systems Division reported that the present water capacity of the 

LEM (181 kilograms; 400 pounds) was sufficient for either a 35-hour lunar 

stay with a nine-hour orbital contingency or for a 44-hour lunar stay with no 

reserve. No excessive weight growths were needed to accomplish this mission 

flexibility. 

Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to A5st. Chief, Systems Engineering Div., 

"LEM ECS Water Provisioning," September 1, 1964; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report 

for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, August 23-September 19, 1964," p. 19. 

NASA and North American signed an amendment to the prime contractor's 

Apollo contract, extending that agreement to February 15, 1966. The 

amendment called for production of five additional CSM's (flight articles), 

three more boilerplate spacecraft, another full-scale mockup, and nine 

adapters which house the LEM. (See August 14, 1963.) The $496 million 

amendment increased the estimated value of North American's contract 

September 

219 


1964 
2-9 

The alternate mode of escape tower jettison called 

escape 'motors. Analyzing the structural integrity 

soned, MSC Structures and Mechanics Division ca

hold together for 3.5 seconds at least. By that time, 

(2000 feet) away from the flight path of the spacecr

This second method for shedding the tower would 

coming AS-102 mission. (See September 18.) 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 3-10, 

A flight kit assembly which would store the equivalent 

of documents for astronauts was being developed 

formation Systems Division in September 1964. The 

with hinged cover to serve as a lapboard writing s

centimeter (4- by 5-inch) projection screen in the 

of the cover. Its film was coded and indexed so t

select any page from I to 12 000 and receive it on 

seconds or less. A space-suited engineer held an earl

assembly for the photo during a test at NAA. 
March 10 and had been implemented by technical directives from MIT 

to Kollsman. The definitive contract covered work until December 31. 

After that date, Kollsman would become a subcontractor to AC Spark Plug. 

Ibid., p. 40; Kollsman Instrument Corporation, "LEM [Optics] Program Quarterly 

Technical Progress Report No. 1," September 30, 1964, pp. Kv, K1-1, K2-l. 

To evaluate lunar surface light, Astronauts Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Elliot M. 

See, Jr., and David R. Scott (accompanied by engineer pilots) began simulated landing approaches over lava fiats in southern Idaho. They wore dark 

glasses that had been modified to permit rapid change to progressively darker 

(or lighter) filters. Diving in T-33 aircraft from 4600 meters (15 000 feet), 

they leveled off at 900 meters (3000 feet). See, who had also participated in 

helicopter exercises earlier in California, believed that the reflected earthshine would be insufficient to allow a LEM pilot to avoid deep surface cracks 

or large boulders. He also thought that earthshine would limit the crew's 

visibility to only a short distance. Aldrin, however, felt that this was a pessimistic view. He suggested that the LEM might be equipped with landing 

lights or flares. 

The Houston Post, September 3, 1964; Jim Maloney, The Houston Post, September 12, 

1964; interview, telephone, Dean F. Grimm, MSC, January 27, 1970. 

Grumman and the Link Division signed a definitive cost-plus-incentive-fee 

contract (valued at $7 083 022) for two LEM simulators. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 3- 10, 1964;" "ASPO Weekly 

Management Report, September 10-17, 1964." 

North American gave Miineapolis-Honeywell an official go-ahead to begin 

design work on the Block II CSM stabilization and control system. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management R,eport, September 3- 10, 1964." 

Representatives of Geonautics, Inc., reported on the status of their study 

of selenodetic experiments for early lunar surface missions. (See June 9.) 

Results to date indicated that lunar survey measurements could rely heavily 

on photographic data acquired on the lunar surface. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

.Manned Space Flight, August 23-September 19, 1964," p. 65. 

The resident Apollo office at Grumman reported that Pratt and Whitney 

had achieved reliable 100-hour operation of the LEM fuel cell through the 

221 


3 

3-10 

3-10 

4 

8-11 
9 

9 

11 

14 

14 

Robert E. Smylie, of MSC's Crew Systems Division, a

formance Section of the Center's Space Medicine Bran

bility of men in space suits to roll over in 1/6 g. In a 

a mockup portable life support system (PLSS), a subje

had been unable to turn over. Two different PLSS co

kinds of thermal garments would be tested with the 

emergency oxygen system mockup would be attached to 

Memorandum, Smylie, MSC, to Chief, Space Medicine Branch, "T

roll-over capability in If6 g," September 9, 1964. 

NASA directed North American to add the electronic

to enable the crew to gimbal the service propulsion 

rotational hand controller. 

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Sy

Change Authorization No. 250," September 9, 1964. 

MSC issued a definitive contract to AC Spark Plug for 

navigation equipment. (See October 18, 1963, and Jun

and fee of the contract was $2.316 million. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate A

Space Flight, August 23-September 19, 1964," p. 40. 

MSC issued three amendments (worth $6 134 ll3) t

contract. These amendments provided funds for data ac

that MSC formerly was to have furnished; for static te

and for additional systems engineering studies by Grum

Ibid. 

ASPO issued ground rules for Grumman and MIT to u

LEM guidance and control system. MSC's concerns rel

lunar landing aborts and recognition of guidance and 

failures. An example of rules during an abort stated th

be able to provide information for the astronauts to 

gain orbital flight on the first effort after initiating a

attempt failed, procedures had to specify how the crew 

to achieve orbit and then rendezvous and dock with t

matter concerned investigations to assure that failures 

222 

A new design of the LEM landing gear foot pad (Aladdin's lamp) was checked 

by shopmen before the honeycomb core, left, was placed inside for bonding. 

-Grumman photo. 

control system could be detected and to define what responses the crew 1964 

must make to those failures. September 

Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-llOO, 


Ground Rules for LEM Guidance and Navigation Operation and Monitoring," Septem­


ber 14, 1964. 


North American completed modifications to CM boilerplate (BP) 6, which 14 


had been used in Apollo mission PA-l (see November 7, 1963). The space­


craft, now designated BP-6A, was then delivered to Northrop Ventura for 


use as a parachute test vehicle. 


"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62- 300- 29, p. I. 

The first attitude-controlled Little Joe II (see May 1963) was shipped to 14 

WSMR. This vehicle would be used for Mission A- 002, scheduled for 

December 1964. 

Little joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo, Final R eport, p. l-6. 

William A. Lee of ASPO outlined minimum communications requirements 15 

for "near-lunar" operations. Those of a general nature included two-way 

voice communication between spacecraft and ground at any time when 

a line-of-sight existed with the tracking network. Also there should be 

223 
16 

17 

17-24 

18 

data, television, voice simultaneously at least 50 percent 

hour on and half-hour off) and, on occasions, as much as tw

• Lunar Orbit: (a) continuous voice except when 

and out of sight with the ground network; (b) continuous 

LEM and the spacecraft at all times when the LEM was 

or ascending. 

• Transearth: the same as translunar. 

Memorandum, Lee, MSC, to Addressees, "CSM Lunar Mission Commu

ments," September 15, 1964. 

The Air Force released Launch Complex 16 of its Easte

NASA for use as a service propulsion system test facilit

stand. 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 9," p. 47. 

The first production CM environmental control system 

boilerplate 14, and pressurization tests on the water-g

begun. Contamination checks, servicing, and checkout we

the end of the month. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 10-17, 1964

Management Report, September 24-0ctober I, 1964"; "Apollo Quar

No. 9," p. 47. 

MSC's Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Divisio

ASPO that it would probably recommend a second stee

gain antenna on the CSM. IESD based this assertion upo

requirements for communications, the need for reliabilit

imposed by the spacecraft's attitude. The division was 

Electronics Company the job of analyzing the problems 

tracking with the high gain antennas on both spacecra

the dual-antenna concept for the CS.M a part of that study

Lockheed's study were: an RF (radio frequency) tracking 

it with the current infrared concept; and an inertial re

acquisition. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September .17-24, 1964

Apollo Mission A-102, the second flight of•an Apollo 

Saturn I (SA-7) launch vehicle, was launched from Co

224 

jettison (i.e., using the launch escape and pitch control motors). 

The launch azimuth was again 105 degrees. The S-1 stage shut down at 

T + 147.4 seconds, only 0.7 second later than planned. The S-1 and S- IV 

stages separated at T + 148.2 seconds, and the S-IV stage ignited 1.7 seconds 

after that. The launch escape tower was jettisoned at T + 160.2 seconds. 

S-IV cutoff took place at T + 621.1 seconds, burning 1.3 seconds longer 

than anticipated. The spacecraft and S-IV were inserted into orbit at 631.1 

seconds (2.0 seconds late), at a velocity of 7810.05 meters (25 623.54 feet) per 

second. The spacecraft weight at insertion was 7815.9 kilograms (17 231 

pounds). Orbital parameters were 212.66 and 226.50 kilometers (114.85 and 

122.37 nautical miles), and the period 88.64 minutes. 

All spacecraft test objectives were met. Satisfactory engineering data verified the launch and exit design criteria. The launch escape and pitch control motors moved the launch escape system safely out of the path of the 

spacecraft. The Manned Space Flight Network obtained telemetry data into 

the fifth orbit, at which time the transponders stopped working, but several 

stations continued to track the vehicle until it reentered over the Indian 

Ocean on its 59th journey around the earth. As with BP-1 3, no recovery 

of the spacecraft was planned. 

MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A- 102 (BP- 15)," MSC-R-A-64-3 (October 

10, 1964), pp. 1- 1, 2-1, 3-4, 3- 5, 3-6, 5-l, 6-1, 7- 15. 

ASPO asked Grumman to investigate automatic switching mechanisms for 

LEM VHF and S-hand omnidirectional antennas. If such devices were used 

in manned flights, the crew would need to pay only minimum attention to 

antenna selection; on unmanned flights, it would improve communication 

operations and range. 

TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, September 18, 1964. 

"Fire-in-the-hole" tests of the LEM's ascent engine (see February 1963) 

were completed at Arnold Engineering Development Center after 18 successful runs. Visual inspection showed no damage to the thrust chamber. 

Grumman confidently reported to MSC that these tests indicated that "the 

ascent engine can handle the shock" of ignition with its exhaust nozzle 

enclosed by the descent stage of the vehicle. 

MSC, ''Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned 


Space Flight, September 20-26, 1964," p. 3; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, 


225 

18 

20-26 
preparations on P

1964 

September 

20-30 

September 17-24, 1964;" GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 20," LP

10, 1964, p. 20. 

Joseph F. Shea directed that the LEM's television camer

inghouse (see September 3) also be used in the Block II CM

contractor for the Block I's camera.) Engineers from Nor

MSC met with Westinghouse representatives to work out 

(such as mounting, since Westinghouse's camera was l

versatile-than was RCA's). 

"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 9," p. 2; MSC, "Consolidated Ac

the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, Septe

17, 1964," p. 52; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, October 

view, telephone, Milton G. Kingsley, Houston, March 13, 1970. 

226 
, p ; , p, , J, , 9, 9

NASA approved Grumman's subcontract with RCA for the LEM attitude 

and translation control assembly. (See May l.) The cost-plus-incentive-fee 

subcontract was valued at $9 038 875. 

MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, 

Manned Space Flight, September 2Q-October 17, 1964," p. 39. 

North American, MIT, and NASA jointly conducted a series of tests at 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The tests, in which four astronauts participated, evaluated suit mobility, manipulation of controls, and adjustment of couch and restraints. 

NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-30G-30, November I, 1964, pp. 7- 8. 

The first SM propulsion engine firing in the F-2 text fixture at WSMR 

was unsuccessful. Although analysis was incomplete, improper functioning 

of the engine's main propellant valve might have delayed full combustion 

until eight seconds after fire signal. In a second test on October I, the 

engine was fired for 10 seconds. The engine performed satisfactorily this 

time, even though oxidizer inlet pressure was below normal. 

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 17- 24, 1964"; "Apollo Monthly 

Progress Report," SID 62- 30G-30, pp. 16, 32. 

North American and MSC officials negotiated the specifications for the 

overall Block I CSM system, including special needs for some spacecraft to 

provide for specific mission objectives. The documents subsequently were 

incorporated into the North American contract. (See Volume I, July 28 and 

November 7, 1962; April28-30, 1964.) 

"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-30G-30, p . 27. 

NASA approved a $14 185 848 contract with North American for spare parts 

(for Apollo spacecraft and ground support equipment) to expedite repairing 

of the CSM at WSMR and Cape Kennedy. Spares would include complete 

electronic packages, hydraulic and mechanical components, reaction control engines, and equipment needed to service the spacecraft. 

MSC News Release 64-159, September 25, 1964. 

MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth approved a Structures and Mechanics 

Division proposal for three-dimensional dynamic testing of the Apollo 

227 


21 

21-24 

22 

24-27 

25 

25 
1964 

September 

28 

A service module propulsion test at WSTF. 

docking system in a thermal-vacuum environment. Tests w

late 1965 in the Center's Space Environment Simulation La

MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, September 24--0ctober 

Quarterly Status Report No. 9," p. 8. 

MSC's Crew Systems Division (CSD) advised against 

capacity of the portable life support system. CSD contended 

design was capable of performing a variety of lunar missi

mum design metabolic load of 1600 BTUs per hour) and th

30 minutes of contingency time was sufficient. 

Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Systems Engineering Div

operation of the Portable Life Support System," September 28, 1964. 

228 
two cabins unpressurized. Both CM and LEM umbilicals had to be long 

enough to enable the astronauts to reach the LEM's ECS controls. 

TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, September 29, 1964; 


TWX, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Hamilton Standard, Attn: R; Breeding, October 8, 


1964. 


NASA conducted a formal inspection and review of the Block II CSM 30 

mockup. [The design resulted from a number of meetings earlier in the year 

(see April 16 and June II), a three-month program definition study, and 

additional investigations requested by NASA.] 

North American presented mockups of the CM interior, upper deck, lower 

equipment bay, and the SM with two bays exposed. Actual hardware was 

Block II command module's lower equipment bay. 
required for Block II were defined only as to maxim

mockup, showing actual hardware configuration, of 

interior and exterior would be available in February an

Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Sy

Change Authorization No. 254," October 1, 1964; MSC, "Command 

Project Apollo, Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review 

September 2~0ctober 1, 1964," pp. 1-4. 

230 

APPENDIXES 


GAEC 

GE 

HF 

IBM 

ITT 

KSC 

LEM 

LES 

LEV 

LOC 

LTV 

MCC 

MIT 

MSC 

MSF 

MSFC 

NAA 

NASA 

OMSF 

OSSA 

RASPO 

RCA 

RF 

SM 

STL 

VHF 

WSMR 

WSTF 

gg p

Grumman Aircraft Engineermg Corporation 

General Electric Company 

High frequency 

International Business Machines Corporation 

International Telephone and Telegraph Company 

Kennedy Space Center 

Lunar excursion module 

Launch escape system 

Launch escape vehicle 

Launch Operations Center 

Ling-T emco-Vought 

Mission Control Center 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Manned Spacecraft Center 

Manned Space Flight 

Marshall Space Flight Center 

North American Aviation, Inc. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Office of Manned Space Flight 

Office of Space Sciences and Applications 

Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 

Radio Corporation of America 

Radio frequency 

Service module 

Space Technology Laboratories, Inc. 

Very high frequency 

White Sands Missile Range 

White Sands Test Facility 

233 


December 1962 March 1963 

Item Control Target Current Control Target Current 

Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight 

(kgs, lbs) (kgs, lbs) (kgs, lbs) (kgs, lbs) (kgs, lbs) (kgs, lbs) 

Command 4309 3856 4246 4309 3856 4067 

Module (9500) (8500) (9350) (9500) (8500) (8990) 

Service 5214 4990 4629 4763 4309 4336 

Module (11 500) (11 000) (10 205) (10 500) (9500) (9780) 

SM Useful 18 370 15 531 15 744 17 921 16 381 16 860 

Propellant (40 500) (34 240) (34 710) (39 730) (36 115) (37 170) 

S-IVB 1361 1361 1479 1542 1361 1411 

Adapter (3000) (3000) (3260) (3400) (3000) (311 0) 

Lunar Exc. 11 567 11 113 9752 11 961 11 113 11 113 

Module (25 500) (24 500) (21 500) (26 370) (24 500) (24 500) 

Total 40 823 35 471 35 745 40 823 37 247 38 124 

Spacecraft (90 000) (78 200) (79 025) (90 000) (82 115) (84 050) 

Injected 

235 

Command 

Module 

4309 

(9500) 

Service 

Module 

4763 

(10 500) 

SM Useful 

Propellant 

17 921 

(39 730) 

S-IVB 

Adapter 

1542 

(3400) 

L~nar Exc. 

Module 

11 961 

(26 370) 

Total 

Spacecraft 

Injected 

40 823 

(90 000) 

Item 

Command 

Module 

4309 

(9500) 

Service 

Module 

4763 

(10 500) 

SM Useful 

Propellant 

22 524 

(39 900) 

S-IVB 

Adapter 

1542 

(3400) 

Lunar Exc. 

Module 

12 Ill 

(26 700) 

Total 

Spacecraft 

Injected 

40 823 

(90 000) 

3856 4059 

(8500) (9170) 

4309 4264 

(9500) (9620) 

ll 381 17 060 

(36 115) (37 610) 

1361 1411 

(3000) (311 0) 

ll 113 ll 521 

(24 500) (25 400) 

37 247 38 471 

(82 115) (85 410) 

December 1963 

3856 4332 

(8500) (9770) 

4309 4408 

(9500) (9960) 

16 488 18 727 

(36 350) (41 285) 

1361 1542 

(3000) (3400) 

ll 340 13 819 

(25 000) (30 465) 

37 353 42 037 

(82 350) (94 880) 

\ 

4309 

(9500) 

4763 

(10 500) 

17 988 

(39 900) 

1542 


(3400) 


12 Ill 

(26 700) 

40 823 

(90 000) 

4309 

(9500) 

4763 

(10 500) 

16 828 

(37 100) 

1542 

(3400) 

13 281 

(29 500) 

40 823 

(90 000) 

I 

(

(

(

(

(

(

Ma

(

(

(

(

(

(

236 

•

Module (9500) (8500) (10 030) (11 000) (10 090) 

Service 4763 4082 4590 4627 4559 •

Module (10 500) (9000) (10 120) (10 200) (10 050) 

SM Useful 16 828 14 662 16 617 17 468 16 894 •

Propellant (37 100) (32 325) (36 635) (38 510) (37 244) 

-

S- IVB 1542 1406 1576 1724 • 1678 

Adapter (3400) (3100) (3475) (3800) (3700) 

Lunar Exc. 13 281 II 567 12 748 13 281 13 250 •

Module (29 500) (25 500) (28 105) (29 500) (29 431 ) 

Total 40 823 35 573 40 082 42 638 40 057 •

Spacecraft (90 000) (78 425) (88 365) (94 000) (90 515) 

Injected 

• No longer reported. 

237 


APPENDIX 3—MAJOR SPACECRAFT

COMPONENT MANUFACTURERS

NAA/Rocketdyne 

nd Space Tech Lab

LM descent stage propulsion

RCA AC Spark Plug 

Communications, instrumentation, VHF 

transponder power amp, VHF transmitter, 

omni-directional, erectable antenna, TV, 

personnel (extra vehicular)

Inertial measuring unit, power servo 

assy, ground support, system assembly, 

test, inertial reference integrating gyro

Honeywell Company Collins Radio Link Beech Aircraft Bell Aerosystems

Stabilization, control Telecommunications Spacecraft mission 

simulators

Supercritical gas 

storaqe

RCS positive 

expulsion fuel tanks

Allison and Airit e Radiation lnc. Simmonds Precision RCA Westinghouse

Products Telemetry data Electric

processing tor Apollo 

S-II stage

Products TV cameras, main

communications

antenna

Fuel components Propellant mixture 

controls Static inverter

Elgin National Watch RCA MIT Raytheon Kollsman Instrument

Sequencer Radar, engineering 

services

Associate primeguidance, navigation Computer Optics

289

Lockheed

Pitch motor

iNortronics

Q ball 

Thiokol 

Tower jettison motor

Launch escape system

Lockheed 

Launch escape motor

NAA

Command module

N o r t h r o p 

Recovery system

Airesearch

Environmental control

A V C O

Heat shield

Aeronca 

Honeycomb panels

Marquardt

S/M RCS

Pratt and Whitney 

Fuel cell Service module

NAA

I U/Apollo adapters

Aerojet General

S/M engine

Marquardt

LMRCS

Grumman 

LM

Hamilton Standard 

Environmental control

Bell Aerospace

LM accent stage propulsion

APPENDIX 4-FLI

[November 8, 1962, thro

Date Name General Miss

1962 

Nov 16 Saturn (SA-3) Launch vehicle dev

test ("Project Hig

Dec 16 Explorer XVI (S-55b) Scientific micromete

satellite 

1963 

Mar 28 Saturn (SA-4) Launch vehicle dev

N) 

test ("engine out" 

*"" 

test) 

Apr 2 Lunik I V Lunar probe-repor

tempt to soft-land 

ment package 

Apr 2 Explorer X VII Measure atmospher

composition, pres

temperature at al

249 to 933 kilom

to 580 miles) 

May 15 Fatth 7 (MA-9)· Project Mercury ma

day mission-four

manned orbital fl

• The launches described in this table include only those related to the ex­


ploration of the moon: unmanned lunar probes, unmanned tests of spacecraft 


designed for later manned missions, and manned spacecraft flights. The table 


is not intended as a comprehensive summary of all American and Soviet space 


flights. 

Date Name General Missio

June 14 Vostok V Manned orbital space 

first launch of seco

dem flight 

June 16 Vostok VI Manned orbital space 

second launch ofsec

dem flight 

July 20 - Experimental heatshi

entry (29 934 kilome

hour) (18 600 mph) 

Aug 28 - Prove capability of Li

II as an Apollo sp

test vehicle 

Nl 

,.j:o. 

Nl Nov 7 Pad Abort-1 Qualification test of 

launch escape system 

feet a safe pad abort

craft BP-6) 

Nov 26 Explorer XVIII To measure interp

magnetic fields, sola

and cosmic radiat

tween earth and mo

Nov 27 Centaur II In-space ignition of C

liquid-hydrogen eng

(second attempt, firs

success) 

Dec 19 Explorer XIX To measure atmosphe

sity fluctuations of 

I high latitudes 
1964 

Jan 29 I Saturn (SA-5) I Test structure and 

ance of 2-stage Satur

second stage 

Jan 30 I Ranger VI I Television photograph

moon at close range 

Apr 8 I Gemini-Titan 1 1 Unmanned flight test 

tural integrity of 

spacecraft and comp

with launch vehicle 

Apr 14 I Project Fire 1 Test of Apollo samp

shield material at l

entry speeds 

May 13 I Apollo Mission A-001 1 Test capability of lau

cape system to prop

craft from launch 

N) 

""'" (.,)!) 

during abort at t

speed (Spacecraft B

May 28 Apollo Mission First flight of an Apo

A-101 (SA-6) figured spacecraft 

Saturn launch vehi

Jul 28 I Ranger VII 

(Spacecraft BP-13) 

I Television photograph

moon at close range 

Aug 18 I - 1 Experimental heatsh

Aug 25 I Explorer XX 

entry test 

I Map irregularities in 

of earth's atmosph

tain electron densi

temperatures near 

Sep 18 I Apollo Mission I Demonstrate spacecraf

A-102 (SA-7) vehicle compatibilit

(Spacecraft BP-15) 

g p(v) 

(2) 	 Demonstrate the capability of the escape system to propel a command module to 

a safe distance from a launch vehicle during a pad abort. (Achieved) 

(3) 	Demonstrate launch-escape timing sequence. (Achieved) 

(4) 	 Demonstrate proper operation of the launch-escape tower release device. 

(Achieved) 

(5) 	 Demonstrate proper operation of the tower-jettison and pitch-control motors. 

(Achieved) 

(6) 	 Demonstrate earth-landing timing sequence and proper operation of the parachute subsystem of the earth-landing system. (Achieved) 


Second Order Objectives: 


(1) 	Determine dynamics of command module during jettisoning of escape tower. 

(Achieved) 

(2) 	 Demonstrate operation of research and development instrumentation and communications equipment to be used on subsequent flights. (Achieved) 

(3) 	Demonstrate compatibility of prototype handling ground support equipment. 

(Achieved) 

(4) 	Determine initial separation trajectory of the launch escape tower. (Achieved) 

(5) 	Determine escape-tower vibration during pad abort, (Achieved) 

Apollo Mission A-001 (May 13, 1964) 

First Order Objectives: 

(1) 	Demonstrate the structural iQ.tegrity of the escape tower. (Achieved) 

(2) 	Demonstrate the capability of the escape subsystem to propel the command mod- · 

ule to a predetermined distance from launch vehicle. (Achieved) 

(3) Determine aerodynamic stability characteristics of the escape configuration for 

this abort condition. (Achieved) 

(4) 	Demonstrate proper operation of the command module to service module separation subsystem. (Achieved) 

(5) 	Demonstrate satisfactory recovery timing sequence in the earth-landing subsystem. 

(Achieved) 

• Apollo spacecraft development flights only 

245 

control subsystem motor. The riser broke after main par

and the command module descended safely on the two rem

chutes.) 

Apollo Mission A-101 (May 28, 1964) 

First Order Objectives: 

(1) 	 Demonstrate physical compatibility of the spacecraft with th

der preflight and flight conditions. (Achieved) 

(2) 	 Obtain data to verify design criteria for the launch environ

(3) 	 Demonstrate the p;imary mode of the launch escape towe

escape tower jettison motor. (Achieved) 


Second Order Objectives: 


(1) 	 Demonstrate the structural integrity of the launch escap

flight-loading conditions. (Achieved) 

(2) 	 Demonstrate the compatibility of the BP-13 communicatio

tion subsystem with the launch vehicle system. (Achieved) 

(3) 	 Demonstrate the adequacy of ground support handling eq

dures. (Achieved) 

Apollo Mission A-102 (September 18, 1964) 

First Order Objectives: 

None-since Apollo Mission A-101 was successful and the launc

ments for the spacecraft were measured satisfactorily. 

Second Order Objectives: 

(1) 	 Determine the launch and exit environmental parameters 

teria. (Achieved) 

(2) 	 Demonstrate the alternate mode of spacecraft launch escape 

lizing the launch-escape motor and pitch-control motor. (Ac

246 

Date 

BP-1 CM ll-14-62 Land and water impact tests MSC 

BP-2 CM 12-ll-62 Land and water impact tests MSC 

BP-3 CM 4-15-63 Parachute recovery 

BP-6 CM 7-01-63 Pad abort 

LES 7-01-63 Pad abort 

BP-9 CM 3-ll-63 Dynamic test 

SM 3-ll-63 

LES 3-ll-63 

Adapter 3-ll-63 

BP-12 CM 2-16-64 Transonic abort 

SM 2-25-64 Transonic abort 

LES 2-22-64 Transonic abort 

BP-13 CM 2-17-64 Booster and launch enviSM 2-15-64 ronment compatibility 

LES 2- 15­ 64 

Adapter 2-14-64 

BP-15 CM 6-14-64 Booster and launch env1­

SM 6-05-64 ronment compatibility 

LES 6-14-64 

Adapter 6-05-64 

BP- 16 CM 8- 17-64 Booster, flight compatibility 

LES 8-17-64 

Adapter 8-17-64 

BP-19 CM 2- 19- 63 Parachute recovery 

BP- 23 CM 9- 17-64 High-Q abort 

SM 9- 14-64 High-Q abort 

LES 9-19-64 High-Q abort 

BP- 25 CM 10-02-62 Water recovery and han- MSC 

dling e~uipment tests 

247 

BP-27 	 CM 9-25-64 


SM 9-28-64 


LES 9-25-64 


Section B-Mockups, Trainers, Simulators 

M-2 	 CM 9-29-62 

M-3 	 CM 9-10-62 

M-4 	 SM 11-14-62 


(partial) 


Adapter 11-14-62 


(partial) 


M-5 	 CM 10-12-62 

M-7 	 SM 11-04-62 

M-9 	 CM 1-04-63 


SM 1-04-63 


LES 1-04-63 


Adapter 1-04-63 


M-Il 	 CM 1-04-63 

SM 1-04-63 

LES 1-04-63 

Adapter 1-04-63 

M-12 	 CM 10-12-62 

(partial) 

M-22 	 CM 3-18-64 

M-23 	 CM 12-01-64 

(partial) 

SM 12-01-64 

(partial) 

LES 12-01-64 

(partial) 

Dynamic tests 

Dynamic tests 

Dynamic tests 

Interior arrangement 

Interior arrangement 

Interface studies 

Exterior arrangement 

Design studies 

Handling and trans porta- 

tion studies 

Handling and trans porta- 

tion studies 

Crew support studies 

Interior and exterior 

arrangement 

Umbilical tests 

Excerpted from material compiled by North American Rockwell's Space Division Public Relatio

248 

g 

1964 

(Original budget request including Fiscal Year 1963 

supplemental) 

NASA: 

Apollo: 

$3 926 000 000 

2 243 900 000 

Command and service modules

Lunar excursion module: 

Guidance and navigation: 

Integration, reliability, 

and checkout: 

: $545 874 000 

135 000 000 

91 499 000 

60 699 000 

(Fiscal _budget appropriation with Fiscal Year 1963 

NASA: 

Apollo: 

$3 974 979 000 

2 272 952 000 

Spacecraft support: 

Saturn I: 

Saturn IB: 

Saturn V: 

43 503 000 

187 077 000 

146 817 000 

763 382 000 

supplemental) Engine development: 

Apollo mission support: 

166 000 000 

133 101 000 

1965 

(Original budget request including Fiscal Year 1964 

supplemental) 

NASA: 

Apollo: 

$4 523 000 000 

2 818 500 000 

Command and service modules

Lunar excursion module: 

Guidance and navigation: 

Integration, reliability, 

and checkout: 

: $577 834 000 

242 600 000 

81 038 000 

24 763 000 

Spacecraft support: 

Saturn I : 

83 663 000 

. 40 265 000 

(Fiscal budget a~ 

propriation with 

Fiscal Year 1964 

supplemental) 

NASA: 

Apollo: 

$4 270 695 000 

2 614 619 000 

Saturn IB: 

Saturn V: 

Engine development: 

Apollo mission support: 

262 690 000 

964 924 000 

166 300 000 

170 542 000 

Compiled by F. P. Hopson, Program Control and Contra.cts Directorate 

249 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A

[April2

PRES IDEm OF 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE COUNCIL 

Washington, D. C. 

.. I ______________,

1'0 

U1 

0 

AMES RESEARCH 

CENTER 

Moffett Field, Calif. 

r I 

JET PROPULSION LANGLEY 

LABORATORY RESEARCH CENTER 

(Contractor Operated) Hampton, Va. Pasadena, Calif. 

I 

HEAD

NATIONA

AND SPACE 

Wash

Fll GHT RESEARCH 

CENTER · 

Edwards, Calif. 

I 

LAUNCH 

OPERATIONS CENTER 

Cocoa Beach, Florida 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AN

[Novembe

I 

LEGISLATIVE INTERNATIONAL 


AFFAIR$ PROGRAMS 


Assistant Assistant 

Administrator Administrator 

I 

INDUSTRY AFFAIRS 

Deputy 

Associate 

Nl Administrator 

(,J"t-

WESTERN NORTH 

OPERATIONS EASTERN 

OFFICE OFFICE 

Santa Monica, Calif. Cambridge, Mass. 

MANNED 

SPACE FllGHT 

Associate Administrator 

I 

GEORGE C. MARSHALL MANNED 

SPACE FLIGHT CENTER SPACECRAFT CENTER 

Director Director 

Huntsville, Ala. Houston, Tex. 

LAUNCH 


OPERATIONS CENTER 


Director 


Cocoa Beach, Fla. 


I 

GENERAL 

COUNSEL 

I 

PROGRAMMING 

Deputy 


Associate 


Administrator 


Admin

Deputy A

Assistant Dep

Executive 

Officer 

Asso

Admin

De

SPACE 

AND APP

Associate A

I 

GODDARD 


SPACE Fll GHT CENTER 


Director 


Greenbelt, Md. 


I 

PACIFIC LAUNCH 


OPERATIONS OFFICE 


Director 


Lompoc, Calif. 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AN

[Aprill9

I 

OFFICE OF 

LEGISLATIVE 

AFFAIRS 

I 

OFFICE OF 

INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS 

OFFICE OF 

INDUSTRY 

AFFAIRS 

-

I 

OFFICE OF 

GENERAL 

COUNSEL 

INVENTIONS & 

CONTR IBUTI ONS 

BOARD 

I 

OFFICE OF 

MANAGEMENT 

DEVELOPMENT 

I 

OFFICE OF 

PROGRAMMING 

Administr

Deputy Admin 

Assistant Deputy A

Executive 

I 

Officer 

Associa

Administr

Deput

(,Jl 

1'\0 

I 

WESTERN 

OPERATIONS 

OFFICE 

Monica, cam. 

OFFICE OF 

MANNED 

SPACE FLIGHT 

J I 

GEORGE C. MARSHALL MANNED 

SPACE FLIGHT CENTER SPACECRAFT CENTER 

Huntsville, Ala. Houston, Tex. 

OFFICE 

SPACE SC

AND APPLIC

I 

GODDARD 

SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 

Greenbelt, Md. 

I 

JOHN F. KENNEDY 

SPACE CENTER 

Cocoa Beach, Fla. 

PACIFIC LAUNCH 

OPERATl ONS OFFICE 

lompoc, Calif. 
OFFICE OF MANNE

[March 

I 

Executive Assistant 

Clyde Bothmer }- OfFI

Di

I 

I 

Executive Assistant 

Joseph R. Quinn 

Joseph 

}­ Deputy 

OM

(Syst

Nl 

(,Jl 

(.>0 

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 

John A. Gautraud 

Director 

Executive Assistant 

(Vacanti 

SYSTEMS STUDIES 

William A. Lee 

Director 

Executive Assistant 

IVacantl 

INTEGRATION& CHECKOUT 

James 1. Sloan 

Director 

Executive Assistant 

1­ John R. Schalbley 

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 

MARSHALL MANNED 

SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 1-1­ SPACECRAFT CENTER 

Arthur Rudolph Richard J. Hayes 

Assistant Director Assistant Director 

1­

HUMAN FACTORS 

STUDIES 

Assistant Director 

IVacantl 

INTEGRATION 

PhilipS. Seivaggi 

Assistant Director 

DESIGN & 

PERFORMANCE 

Eldon W. Hall 

Assistant Director 

FLIGHT SYSTEMS 

Michael 1. Yarymovych 

Assistant Director 

PROGRAM PLANNING 

Douglas R. LDrd 

Assistant Director 

CHECKOUT 

Jack F. Underwood 

Assistant Director 

COMMUNI CATl ONS 

& TRACKING 

James H. Turnock, Jr. 

Assistant Director 

DES IGN PRACTICES 

& RELIABILITY 

James E. O'Neill 

Assistant Director 

-

ENGI NEERING STUDIES 

William B. Taylor 

Assistant Director 

L.. 

RELIABILITY 

ASSESSMENT 

Richard H. Myers 

Assistant Director 

EXPLORATION STUDIES 

Assistant Director 

IVacantl 
OFFICE OF MANNED 

Uuly 18, 1

N) 

(.jt 

*"" 

,----.,------r---­ OFFICE OF MANNED SPAC 

D. Brainerd Holm

Director of Man ned Spa

BeiiQ)II1m Inc. 

I John A. Hornbeck President 

ADVANCED STUDIES SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 

Wil liam A. lee John A. Ga utraud 

Director !Acting) Director 

Executive Assistant 

!Vacanti 

lUNAR STUDIES I HINTEGRATION I 

Thomas C. Evans Philips. Selvaggl 

Assistant Director Assistant Director 

ENGINEERING STUDIES I H CHECKOUT I

William B. Taylor Jack F. Underwood 

Assistant Director Assistant Director 

PROGRAM REliABi liTY OBJECTIVES 

James E. O'Neill Douglas R. lord Assistant Director Assistant Director 

Joseph F. Shea Geo

Deputy Director Dep

OMSF 

!Systems) !P

r, '""00· 

RESOURCES MANAGEMENT , SERV ICES 

William E. lilly IWilliam M. Shea 

Director L 

___ _

Program Assistan Manageme ts nt I 

Secrest L Berry 

Allee J. Hathcock 

-

PlANS AND 

I 

H 

RESOURCES 

Wil liam P. Risso 

Assistant Director 

H 

FACILITIES I 

Rodolfo A. Dlaz 

Assistant Director 

PROGRAM 

MANAGEMENT 

OPERATIO NS 

MANNED SATEUITE 

STUDIES 

HMichael I.Yarymovych 

Assistant Director 

PLAI£TARY MISSIONI 

STUDIES 

Assistant Director 

!Vacanti 

YVEHICLE PROPERTIES 

Eldon W. Hall 

Assistant Director 
OFFICE OF MAN

Uanu

EXPERIMENTS BOARD I 

MANI£D SPACE FliGHfl 

I 

..... ------..---- 

___ MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT MANNED SPA

I DIVISION I I CENTIR DMLOPMENT I l PROGRAM CONTROL MANAGEMENT 

I SSA 1I RobertF. Freitag LJ Assistant I Clyde B. 

I Willis B. Foster I I Director I 1 JJ<t v. Cromer I Direct.- Direc

1 Direct.- I WllllimF._.e I[___ ..J AlbertP.llttle 

L 

______j ExecutlveAsslstant ExecutlveA

PROGRAM OPERATIONS PlANS AND ANALYSIS 

ADMINI STRATIVE SERVICES 

William E. lilly Norman Rafel 

tActlngl Director lAding) Director 

Wllllilm T. Ashley Chief 

FACiliTIES TECHNICAL RESOURCES 

MANAGEMENT 

RElATIONS PROGRAMMING REQUIREMENTS 

AM> CONSTRUCTION Harper E. Van Ness M. J. Barkdull Kahao 

Director 

RodolfoA. Olilz Director 

Direct.­

GEMINI PROGRAM 

George M. Low 

tActlng) Director 

Wltlllm C. Schneider 

Deputy 

GEMINI GEMINI SYSTEMS 

PROGRAM CONTROL ENG llf'ER ING 

Richard C. Henry EIOOn W. Hill 

lActlngl Director Director 

GEMINI FliGHT 

GEMINI TEST OPERATIONS 

LeRoy E. Day John A. Edwards 

<Acting) Director IActlngl Direct.- 

GEMINI RELIABiliTY 

AND QUAliTY 

WBIIim C. Schneider 

tActlngl Director 
OFFICE OF MANNED 

Uu1y 1, 1

GEMINI PROGRAM 	 APOLLO PROGRAM 

George M. Low George 

E. Mueller SPECIAL 

IActlngl Director 	 IActlngi Director SPACE 

William C, Schneider Samuel C. Phillips STU

Deputy Director Deputy Director William 

tVacanU John R. Schalbley Dir

Executive Assistant Executive Assistant 

APOLLO SYSTEMS 

GEMINI PROGRAM GEMINI SYSTEMS APOLLO PROGRAM 	 ENGINEERING 

·CONTROL ENG INEER ING CONTROL 	 

IBEL1COMMI 

-	 

IVacanU Eldon W. Hall Samuel c. Phillips 	 

T. H. Thompson 

Director Director IActlngl Director 	 

Director 

SYSTEM SYSTEM 

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 

CON'IGURATION CON'IGURATION 

MANAGEMENT 	 

IBEL1COMMI IBEL1COMMl

Anthony L llccardl tvacanu 	 John w. Colopy Charles T. Newrnin 

Chief Chief 

Chief Chief J, P. Downs B. Kaskey 

Depl Head Depl Head 

PROGRAM SYSTEM PROGRAM 	 

MISSION ANALYSIS PROCUREMENT IDENTIFICATION 

PLANNING 	 PLANNING 

IBEUCOMMl 	 

Vearl N, Nuff Jerald Kubat f- Daniel A. linn 	 

IVacanU 	 

I Chief 	 Chief Chief C. C. Wllihile 

Chief 	 

I 	 Depl. HllOd 

I APOUO TEST APOUOFLIGHT 	 

RESOURCES 	 

OPERATIONS 	 

John H. Disher 

Joseph Ferrwmdez Director 	 John K. Holcomb 	 

I Chief 	 

Director 	 

I 	 

PROCUREMENT 	 MISSION MISSION 

TEST PLANNING CHECKOUT REQUIREMENTS OPERATIONS 

L Sidney A. tariskl MeiYyn Savage Jack F. Underwood Chief Chief John K. Holcomb Irving Susson 

Chief !Acting! Chief !Acting) thief 

SPACECRAFT AND 

GEMINI TEST 
 GEMINI FLIGilT PROPULSION TEST 

OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE 

LAUNCH VEHICLE TES MISSION SUPPORT 

leRoy E. Day leo X. Abernethy
 PERFORMANCE 	 

John A. Edwards Charles H. King 	 

Director George C, White, Jr. 	 !Acting Chiefl 

Director Chief 	 

Chief 	 

APOLLO 	 

MISSION PLANNING RELIABILITY AND 	 

QUALITY 	 

(Vacant) 

Chief George A. Lemke 

Director 

MISSION RUIABILITY QUALITY 

OPERATIONS ENGINEERING ASSURANCE 	 

Philip H. Bolger John Mirsh, Jr. Timothy J. O'Keefe 

Chief !Acting! Chief Chief 

CONTRACTOR GEMINI RELIABILITY 

AND QUALITY 

SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

William c. Schnekler 	 

Hervey Hill 

Chief IActlngl Director 	 
r---.-.---::r----; 1 

PUBliC AfFAIRS 

L£GALAOVISOR CfFIC£R 

.limes£. Rilly Allred P. Allbrendo 

Assoclitl Adm

Dep

lo

Assist

lo

Dtp

forMin

A'ANII:D SPACt: 

fliGHT EXPERIMENTS 


BOARD 


BertA.. Dtnickt 

1 """""s"'"''Y 1 

1 1 1 1 1 

MAtHD SPACt: FliGHT 
 MANNED SPACE 

FIELD CENTER OEVELOPWNT FliGHT PROGRAM 

Roblrt.F. Frtltlg COHIROl 

l i:iiiiiitiWI 

-i Assistant 1 WilliamE. lilly 

Stlnlty 

··-

M. Smoltnsky Dirldor 

Albert P. little 

Wlllllm Deputy F. Director Moore f.xecutlveAsslstJnt 

Executive Assistant 


FACILITIES 


OPERATIONS 

PROGRAMMING 

AND CONSTRUCTION 

Berl'llrd I. Johnson 

RodolfoA. Dill 

Director lA.dlng)Dirtc:tor 

VEHICL£ AP«< FINo\NCIAl SPACECRAF

PROPULSION 

FACI LITIES 

MANAGEMENf lAUNCH FAC 

John A. Gr

Htrry Mitchel 

Chief 

Chief 

FAC ILITIES FACILHI

CONTR

ENG IN£ER ING AND 

CONSTRUCTION 

GeraldP. G

Chief 

C.11dD. Chief Heattr TheodorCeS.Toppen hief 

-

GEMINI APOllO 

RESOURCES CONTR RESOURCES CONTROL 


.loMph Fwnandez Charles T. Newman 

Chief Chief 

TECHNICAL 

PlANS AMl 

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 

REQUIREMENTS 

IO"man Rilfel 

William E. Ully Director 

lAding) Director 

TESTAND TECHNICAL PROGRAM PROGRAM 

OPERATIONS SUPPORT PlANS COORDINA

Gus A. D'Onofrio Gus A. D'Pnofrio Nofl!llnRafel BernardO. 

Chit! IActlngl Chief !Acting) Chief Chief 

GROUND SCHEDU

OPERATIONAL COST A.No\LYSI S ANALYS 

Frilnlr. T. Rosenberg 

SUPP<RT fr«<R. Ste

Wlllilm£. Miller Chief Chief 

Chief 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

[April 29, 1963]

roO r 00

T H E A PO L L O SPACECRAFT: A CHRONOLOGY

NASA REGIONAL 

AUDIT OFFICE

LEGAL

OFFICE

PUBLIC

AFFAIRS

OFFICE

DIRECTOR

Deputy Director

Deputy Director for Mission 

for Programs Requirements 

& Development & night 

Operations

ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES 

OFFICE

RELIABILITY & FLIGHT

SAFETY OFFICE

PROGRAM ANALYSIS 

& EVALUATION OFFICE

GEMINI

PROJECT OFFICE

APOLLO SPACECRAFT 

PROJECT OFFICE

MERCURY 

PROJECT OFFICE

CENTER MEDICAL 

OPERATIONS OFFICE

Assistant Director 

for Engineering 

& Development

Assistant Director 

for Administration

SPACECRAFT

TECHNOLOGY

DIVISION

CREW SYSTEMS 

DIVISION

SYSTEMS 

EVALUATION 

& DEVELOPMENT 

_ DIVISION____

SPACE

ENVIRONMENT

DIVISION

PROCUREMENT 

& CONTRACTS 

DIVISION

MANAGEMENT

ANALYSIS

DIVISION

FINANCIAL

MANAGEMENT

DIVISION

COMPUTATION & 

DATA REDUCTION 

DIVISION

Assistant Director 

for Information 

& Control Systems

INSTRUMENTATION 

& ELECTRONICS 

SYSTEMS DIVISION

•Assistant Director 

for Information & 

Control Systems

GROUND SYSTEMS 

PROJECT OFFICE

FLIGHT

OPERATIONS

DIVISION

FLIGHT CREW 

OPERATIONS 

DIVISION

SECURITY

DIVISION

PERSONNEL

DIVISION

MANAGER OF 

CENTER SERVICES

LOGISTICS

DIVISION

TECHNICAL

SERVICES

DIVISION

TECHNICAL

INFORMATION

DIVISION

PHOTOGRAPHIC

SERVICES

DIVISION

FACILITIES

DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICES

DIVISION

MSC Manager 

O f WSMR 

Operations

MSC Manager 

Of AMR 

Operations

PREFLIGHT

OPERATIONS

DIVISION

•The Assistant Director for Info. & Control Systems 

reports to the Deputy Director for MR & FO for 

IMCC and GOSS Implementation matters and 

reports to the Deputy Director for P&D for all 

other matters.
MANNED SPACE

(Novembe

Direc

Deputy D

Special A

r--------­

NASA REGIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELIABILITY & QUALITY 

AUDIHJFFICE OFFICE ASSURANCE OFFICE 

1 l 

GEMINI 

PROGRAM 

OFFICE 

I I 

Assistant Director Assistant Director 

tor tor 

Flight Operations Administration 

I I l 

FLIGHT MANAGEMENT 

CONTROL ANALYSIS 

Nl H DIVISION DIVISION 

(.;11 I H 

c.o 

RECOVERY PROGRAM ANALYSIS PROCUREMENT 

OPERATIONS & RESOURCES & CONTRACTS 

H DIVISION MANAGEMENT DIVISION DIVISION 

I }H 

y MI SS ION 

PERSONNEL SECURITY ANALYSIS 

DI VI SION DIVIS ION DIVISION 

I H 

OFFICE OF OFFICE OF 

TECHNICAL& ENGINEERING ADMINISTRATIVE 

SERVICES SERVICES 

FACILITIES DIVISION 

TECHNICAL I NFORMATl ON D IV. 

ENGINEERING DIVISION 

LOGISTICS DIVISION 

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVI SI ON 

OFFICE SERVICES DIVISION 

PHOTOGRAPHIC DIVISION 

MSC Manager 

1 

WSMR 

Operations I

MSC Ma

Florid

Opera

l 

PREFL

OPERAT

DIVIS

I 
MANNED SPACECR

[August 13, 

Director 

Deputy Directo

Special Assistan

I 

Chief of Center 

Medical Programs 

,....--------­ 

NASA REGIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELIABILITY & QUALITY 

AUDIT OFFICE OFFICE ASSURANCE OFFICE 

I I 

GEMINI 

PROGRAM 

OFFICE 

I I 

I 

N) Assistant Director Assistant Director 

O'l for for 

0 Flight Operations Administration 

I 1 l 

FLIGHT MANAGEMENT 

SUPPORT ANALYSIS 

H DIVISION DIVISION 

I 1 

MISSION PLANNING RESOURCES PROCUREMENT 

& ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT & CONTRACTS 

1 DIVISION DIVISION t1 DIVISION 

I I 

FLIGHT PERSONNEL 

SECURITY CONTROL 

DIVISION DIVISION 1 DIVISION t1 

I I 

OFFICE OF OFFICE OF 

LAND ING & RECOVERY TECHNICAL & ENGINEERING r- ADMINISTRATIVE 

DIVISION 1 SERVICES SERVICES 

I I 

FACILITIES DIVISION 

TECHNICAL INFORMATION DIV. 

ENGINEERING DIVISION 

LOGISTICS DIVISION 


TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION 
 

I 

OFFICE SERVICES DIVISION 


PHOTOGRAPHIC DIVISION 


MSC WSMR 

OPERATIONS 

I I I 
APOLLO -SPACECRAFT 

Deputy Manager, 

Lunar Excursion Module-'­

J. L. Decker 

Nl 

O'l

-

LEM ADMINl STRATI ON RASPO-BETHPAGE 

OFFICE 

Res. Mgr. --J. W. Small Manager--C. E. McCollough 

lEM ENGINEER ING 

lEM SYSTEMS OFFICE TEST OFFICE 


Manager--0. E. Maynard 
 Act. Mgr. --J. L Decker Assl Mgr. --w. F. Rector 

(May I, 

APOllO SPACECRA

OFFICE 

Acting Manager--R

Special Asslstant-

PROJECT INTEGRATION 


OFFICE 


Manager--J. T. Markley 


Asst. Mg(. --A. L Granfield 


SPACECRAFT SYSTE

GUIDANCE AND C

Manager--D. W

Asst. Mgr. --P. 

G&C ADMINISTRATION 

OFFICE 

Manager--J. Cl)urch 

G&C ENGINEE

OFFICE 

Manager--D. W
Ueputy Manager, Nl Lunar Excursion Module--

Ol James L Declcer Nl 

lEM 

ADMINI STRATION RASPO-BETHPAGE 

OFFICE Resident Manager-­

Manager-- John W. Small 

C. E. McCollough 

APOLLO SPACECRAFT P

[August 26, 1

APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROJE

Acting Manager--Robert 0

Special Asst. Mgr. --Thomas 

PROJECT INTEGRATION 


OfFI CE 


Manager--J. Thomas Markley 1-­

Asst. Mgr. --A. L Grandfield 

I 

SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS OfFICE 

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 

Manager--David W. Gilbert 

Asst. Mgr. --Paul E. Ebersole 

G&C 


ADMINISTRATI ON RASPO--BOSTON 


OfFI CE 
 Resident Manager-­

Manager-- W. J. Rhine 


James C. Church 


lEM ENGINEERING 

G&C 

OfFICE 

LEM SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 

TEST OfFICE Manager-- OFFICE 

0. E. Maynard Acti ng Manager-- Manager-- 

T 

. J. Adams Assistant Manager-- David W. Gilbert 

William F. Rector 
PROGRAM CONTROl DIVISION 

OPERATIONS PlANNING J. T. Markley--Chlef DIVISION 

J. G. McClintock--Asst. Chief W. A. Lee--Chief 

G. J. Stoops--Assl Chief 

LUNAR MISSION IN=ORMATION CONTROl 

PLANNING BRANCH OFFICE 

R. V. Battey·.Chlel c. c. 

TEST PROGRAM PLANS AND PROGRAM 

PLANNING BRANCH BRANCH 

T. F. Baker--Chief J. C. Church-<hlef 

C&SM PROJECT OFFICER ADVANCED PLANNING &CONTRACT ENGINEERING 

BRANCH BRANCH 

(VacanU C. L Ta lor--Chief 

lEM PROJECT CfFIC£R & 

CONTRACT ENGINEERING 

BRANCH 

W. F. Rector--thief 

N&G PROJECT OfFICER & 


CONTRACT ENGit£ERING 


BRANCH 


R. W • . Young--thief 

ACE SIC &Ull PROJECT 

OFFICER & CONTRACT 

ENGINEERING BRANCH 

M. E. Dell--thief 

APOLLO SPACECRA

[August 

APOUO SPACECRAFT PR

OFFICE 

J. F. Shu--Manag

R. 0. M

RASPO ·DOWNEY 

R. H. Rldnour-·Res. Wq. 

ENGINEERI NG BRANCH 

D. 0. Few--chief 

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING liST DIV

DIVISION 

W. M. Blan

o. E. Maynard--Assl Chief 

E. M. Flelds--

D 

ESIGN CONTROL BRANCH 

0. E. Maynard--Acting Chief 

SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 

BRANCH 

E. B. Hamblett--Chief 

CREW INTEGRATION 

BRANCH 

J. P. Ldtus--thief 

DESIGN INTEGRATION 

BRANCH 

0. 0. Ohlsson--Chief 

FliGHT ITCHNOlOGY 

BRANCH 

c. H. Perrine--Chief 
1 

BUSINESS 


MANAGEMENT 


OFFICE 


F. D. Brandon 

Nl 

O'l 

.... 

I 

MECHANICAL & PROPULSION SYSTEMS 

DIVISION 

A. M. Busch--!Actlngl Chief 

W. 	R. Meyer--Deputy for Mechanical and 

Propulsion Systems 

H MECHANICAL BRANCH 

H PROPULSION BRANCH 

y MAlfUNCTION ANALYSIS BRANCH 

MSC FLORIDA OP

[December 5, 

MSC Manager, Florida Op

G. Merritt Presto

: 

RESIDENT GEMINI 

PROGRAM 

OFFICE 

-

Ueputy Manager, Florida O

D. 0. Black 

Assl Manager I 

for Gemini 

w. Kapryan J. J. Williams 

INSPECTION & QUALITY 

CONTROL OFFICE 

F. M. Crlchton 	 

Chief Engineer-

W. R. Durrett 

Deputy Chief Engin

A. M. Busch 

I 

ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS 

DIVISION 

W. 	 

R. Durrett--(Actlngl Chief 

M.A. 	Wedding--Deputy for 

Telecom mun!cations 

w. 	T. Rlsler--Deputy for Electrical, 

Guidance & Navigation 

H

ELECTRICAL BRANCH H 
 

HGUIDANCE & NAVIGATION BRANCH H

H 	 y 

INSTRUMENTATION BRANCH 

y RADIO FREQUENCY BRANCH 
I 

BUSINESS 


MANAGEMENT 


OFFICE 


F. D. Brandon 

I 

Assistant Manager 

for Gemini-­

J. J. Williams 

I 

GEM INl CONTRACTOR 

Nl SUPPORT Ol 

<.J< 

I 

MECHANI CAL& PROPULSION SYSTEMS 

DIVISION 

A. M. Busch--Chief 

W. R. Meyer--Deputy for Mechanical and 

Propulsion Systems 

-{ MECHANICAL BRANCH 

rl PROPULSION BRANCH 

1MALFUNCTIONS ANALYSIS BRANCH 

MSC FLORIDA 

Uuly 2

Manager, MSC Flo

G. Merritt 

Deputy Manager, Fl

D. 0. B

OPERATIONS SUPPORT, 

PlANSAND PROGRAMS 

OFFICE 

B. P. Brown 

Assistant Manager f

W. R. D

IActlngl Deputy Asst. 

A. M. 

ELECTRICAL & EUCTRONI CS SYSTEMS 


DIVISION 
 

J. E. Dowling--IActingl Chief 	 

M. A. Wedding--Deputy for 

Telecommunications 

W. 	T. Risler--Deputy for Electrical, 


Guidance & Navigation 


EUCTR ICAL BRANCH 

rl 

INSTRUMENTATION BRANCH 

1GUIDANCE & NAVIGATION BRANCH 

RADIO FREQUENCY BRANCH

•To be filled by WaHer E. Parsons upon return from special assignment in Apollo SIC Program O
I 

FLIGHT TEST 

OFFICE 

1':1 

O'l O'l 

TEST 

- OPERAJIONS 

BRANCH 

-

PROPULSION 

BRANCH 

ELECTRICAL 

1­ SYSTEMS 

BRANCH 

MECHANICAL 

I- SYSTEMS 

BRANCH 

I 

PROGRAM 


CONTROL 


OFFICE 


MSC WSMR OPE

rseptember 16, 

MSC WSMR 

OPERATIONS 

T 

PUBLIC 

AFFAIRS 

OFFICE 

I 

PROPULSION 

ENGINEERING 

OFFICE 

TEST · 

- ENGINEERING 

BRANCH 

PROPULSION 

- SYSTEMS 

BRANCH 

ENERGY & 

1- CONTROL SYSTEMS 

BRANCH 

MECHANICAL 

I- SYSTEMS 

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INSTRUMENTATION DATA 

.... SYSTEMS ..... SYSTEMS 

BRANCH BRANCH 

-­
LITTLE JOE II AND APOLLO P

Uune 1

OPERA

DIRE

W. C. W

N) 

0'1 

.....:) 

I 

FLIGHT PREF

OPERATIONS OPERA

G. s. Lunney W. G

W. G. Frye IAssistantl 

A 


Ablation. See Heatshield. 


Abort acceleration, service module, 213-214 


Abort, lunar landing, 26, 32, 113, 135-136, 169, 172, 209, 


222-223 

simulation, 69 

Abort, Saturn launch, Ill, 125, 138, 171, 187-188, 212 

Accelerometer. See Navigation and guidance. · 

Acceptance checkout equipment. See Prelaunch acceptance 

checkout equipment. 

AC Spark Plug Division. See General Motors Corporation. Adapter, spacecraft-S'aturn V, 61 

Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Experiments, 117 

Ad Hoc Working Group on Follow-On Surveyor Instru­ mentation, 103 

Aerobee 150 sounding rocket, 105 

Aerojet-General Corporation, 3, 27, 39, 62, 145, 157 

Aero Spacelines, Inc., 71, 105 

AiResearch Manufacturing Company, 41, 88, Ill, 115, 127, 

129, 130, 146, 154, 195 

Air Force Systems Command. See United States Air Force. Airite Products, Inc., 43 

Akens, David S., 105 

Aldrin, Edwin E., Jr., 101, 196, 221 

Alexander, Charles C., 63 

"All-up" testing concept, launch vehicle-spacecraft, 104, 

105-106, 124 

American Car and Foundry Industries, Inc., 19 

Ames Research Center, 22, 56, 109, 114-115, 117 

Hypervelocity Ballistic Range, 50--51 

Anders, William A., 101, 196 

Anderson, Frank W., Jr., xiv 

Antennas, 5-6, 22, 103, 124, 131, 225 

Apocynthion, 21 

Apollo and Gemini mission simulation programs, 189 

Apollo Docking Interface Panel, 112 

Apollo Executives Group, NASA-Industry, 103 

Apollo Mission A-001, 175 

Apollo Mission A-002, 100, 223 

Apollo Mission A-101 , 180--183, 225 

Apollo Mission As-102, 220, 224-225 

Apollo Mission As-201, 104, 106 

heatshield qualification, 132-133 

Apollo Mission As-202, 133 

heatshield qualification, 132-133 

Apollo Mission As-203, 106 

Apollo Mission As-207, 106 

Apollo Mission As-501, 106 

Apollo Mission As-503, 106 

Apollo Mission As-507, 106 

Apollo Mission Pad Abort I (PA-l), 108, 223 

Apollo mission plan development study, 114 

See also Apollo Mission Planning Task Force. 

Apollo Mission Planning Panel, 32- 33, 42 

Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, 126 

Phase I progress report, 171-172 

Apollo Propulsion System Development Facility, 192 

Apollo Spacecraft Mission Trajectory Sub-Panel, 50 

Apollo Spacecraft Project Office. See Manned Spacecraft 

Center. 

Apolune, 

Armitage, Peter J., 13 

Armstrong, Neil A., 25, 53, 196 

Arnold Engineering Development Center. See United States 

Air Force. Ascent engine. See Lunar excursion module. 

ASPO. See Manned Spacecraft Center, Apollo Spacecraft 

Project Office. 

Astronauts 

assignments, 25, 196 

names. See under each: 

Aldrin, Edwin E., Jr. 

Anders, William A. 

Armstrong, Neil A. 

Bassett, Charles A., II 

Bean, Alan L. 

Borman, Frank 

Carpenter, M. Scott 

Cernan, Eugene A. 

Chaffee, Roger B. 

Collins, Michael 

Conrad, Charles, Jr. 

Cooper, L. Gordon, Jr. 

Cunningham, R. Walter 

Eisele, Donn F. 

Freeman, Theodore C. 

Glenn, John H., Jr. 

Gordon, Richard F., Jr. 

Grissom, Virgil I. 

Lovell, J ames A., Jr. 

McDivitt, James A. 

Schirra, Walter M., Jr. Schweickart, Russell L. 

Scott, David R. 

See, Elliot M., Jr. 

Shepard, Alan B., Jr. 

Slayton, Donald K. 

Stafford, Thomas P. 

White, Edward H., II 

Williams, Clifton C., Jr. 

Young, John W. scientist-astronaut, 159, 213 


selection, 61, 71-72, 101 


third group report to work, 132 


Atmosphere, Spacecraft, 14, 118, 151 

Australia, 36, 144 

Avco Corporation, 61- 62, ll4 

Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory. See United 

States Navy. 

Avien, Inc., 65, 188 

8 

Bailey, F. John, Jr., 84 

Bassett, Charle~ A., II, 101, 196 

Battaglia, Hal'o[d G., 199 

batteries, 25, 37, 77, 91, 126, 144, 147, 209 

chargers, 61 , 86 

command module, 61 , 147 

lunar excursion module, 25, 37, 91 , 126, 144, 209· 

portable life support system, 77, 86 

See also Electrical system, spacecraft. 

269 

Bertram, Emil P., 77 


Bioinstrumentation, 119, 125 


Bissett-Berman Corporation, 183 


Blaw-Knox Company, 131 


Blount Brothers Corporation, 110 


Boeing Company, The, 31, 110, 120, 151, 173 


Boilerplate spacecraft, 15, 29, 30, 36, 37, 70, 86, 108, 136, 


141, 153, l70---l7l, 175, 180, 184, 186, 223, 224, 225 


BP-2, 186 


BP-3, 15, 29, 86 


BP-6, 37, 70, 86, 108, 223 


BP-6A, 223 


BP-9, 36 


BP42, 141, 153, 175 


BP-13, 136, 180, 225 


BP-14, 224 


BP-15, 225 


BP-19, 30, 86, 141 


BP-22, 170---171 


BP-25, 184 


Borman, Frank, 25, 196 


Bothmer, Clyde B., 5, 104 


Brandon, George W., 31 


British Ministry of Aviation, 132 


Royal Aircraft Establishment, 132 


Brockman, Paul R., 103 


Brooks, Courtney G., xiv 


Bryant, Farris, 114 


Bryant, John, 36,78 


Buckley, Edmond C., 6 


"Buddy concept." See Suit, space. 


Budget, NASA, 22 


Byers, Bruce K., 40, 84 


Bykovsky, Valery F., 64 


c 

Cameras, II 


Canards, aerodynamic, 22-24, 109 


abort system concept, 125 


versus tower flap configuration, 109-110, 133-135, 


138, 140, 148 


See also Launch escape system. 


Canberra; Australia, 6, 131, 144 


Canning, Frank, 32 


Cape Canaveral, 114 


Cape Kennedy, 114 


Carbee, Robert M., 151 


Carbon dioxide measuring system, 36 


sensors, 53, 180 


Carpenter, M. Scott, 25, 53, 196 


C-hand radar, 19, 20, 172 


Centrifuge, 32, 89, 121 


Phase I training, 118 


Cernan, Eugene A., 101 , 196 


Chaffee, Roger B., 101, 196 


Chamberlin, James A., 84 


Chance Vought Corporation, 26 


Clark, S. P., 148 


CM. See Command module, Apollo. 


Cohen, Aaron, 195 


Collins, Michael, 101, 196 


Collins Radio Company, 10, 19, 44, 128, 190 


mockup review, 229230 

boilerplate. See Boilerplate, s

common use components, 19, 

common use ground support 

communications, 124, 169 


computer. See Computer, spa

contract, 61, 77 


control and display panel, 84 

control weight, 199 


couch. See Couch, spacecraft 

crew transfer tunnel mockup

development test program, 1

docking. See Docking, spacec

earth landing system. See L

earth; Landing, spacecraft 

teristics, spacecraft; Parac

spacecraft. 

electrical system. See Electric

environmental control syste

control system. 

first flight, 180---181 

flight schedule, 149 


fuel cell. See Fuel cell. 

hatch, 171, 177 


hatch configuration, Block II

heatshield. See Heatshield. 

infli~ht maintenance concept

landmg characteristics. See 

command module. 

land versus water landing. Se

craft; Landing, spacecraft, 

layout, 10---11, 18 


main display console, 70 


meteoroid hits, 131 


missions. See Apollo Mission 

navigation and guidance. Se

ance. oxygen storage capacity, 203 


parachutes. See Parachute sy

portholes and windows, 129 


postlanding ventilation, 148 


radar, 78, 153, 188 


reaction control engines. Se

gines. 

reliability, 69 


scientific equipment weight 

169 


separate operation requireme

sleeping restraint, 71 


stabilization and control sy

and control system. 

stowage locations, 126--127 

suit interface. See Suit, space

temperature and pressure t

tion, 187 


thermal control system, 114 


upside down floating chara

212-213 


vibration tests, 170---171 

visibi!ity requirements•• I29 

warmng system, 86 


waste management system, 1

water management system, 4

weight reduction. See Weigh

270 

Corps of Engineers. See United States Army. 


Correale, James V., 7 


Couch, spacecraft crew, 14, 44-45, 45-47, 88, liS, 147, 148, 


183, 208, 215 


restraint system, 208, 215 


Cox, Kenneth J ., 191 


Crawler transport, 28 


Crew safety, 18, 216-217 


Crew Systems Division. See Manned Spacecraft Center. 


Crew transfer between spacecraft, 8, ll2, 137, 138, 143, 160, 


178-180, 188, 218, 229 


emergency method, ll2, 138, 160, 188 


ground rule revisions, 178-180 


. zero-g test, 194 


Cunningham, R. Walter, 101, 196, 215 


Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 22 


D 

Dalmo Victor Company, 201 


Data storage equipment, 69 


David Clark Company, 199 


Debus, Kurt H ., 12 


Decker, James L., 28, 53 


Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, 6-7, 36, 90, 120, 130, 
 144-145 . 


Delco-Remy, 37 


Denicke, Bert A., 77 


Derbyshire, George, 103 


Descent engine. See Lunar excursion module. 


DeVos, Francis J., 204 


Disher, John H., 21 


Docking, spacecraft, 8, 13, 72, 96, ll2, 129, 130, 138, 163­

164, 185, 188, 194, 200, 227- 228 


Douglas Aircraft Company, 76, ll7, 170 


Drexel, Ralph E., 215 


Drop test, spacecraft, 29 


Dryden, Hugh L., 3, 6 


Duret, Eugene L., 103 


Dust, moon, 15, 105 


E 

.Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 37, 147 


Earthshine, 221 


EDD. See Manned Spacecraft Center, Engineering and 


Development Directorate. 


Edmiston, Ragan C., 123 


Eggleston, John M., 202 


Eickmeier, Alfred B., 58 


Eisele, Donn F., 101, 196 


Electrical Storage Battery Company, 37 


Electrical Systems Panel, 56 


Electrical system, spacecraft 


command module, 31, 88, 98, 190 


lunar excursion module, 25, 69, 77, 91 , ll5, 125, 


147-148, 172, 198-199, 209 


lunar survey mission, 14-day, 196 


See also Fuel cell; Batteries. 


Electro-Optical Systems, Inc., 105 


Micro Systems, 187 


earth-orbital, 164-165 


incorporation of Apollo-type in Gemini flights, 148 


scientific equipment weight and volume allocation, 


169, 171-172, 186, 200-201 


Explorer XVI, 139 


Extravehicular activity, 149 


equipment belt, 218 


F 

F-1 engine, 105, 152 


Faget, Maxime A., 84, 107, Ill, 132, 150 


Faith 7 (Mercury-Atlas 9), 56, 98 


Farrand Optical Company, 79, llO 


Feltz, Charles H., 20, 165 


Ferrando, James A., 32 


"Fire in the hole" tests, lunar excursion module, 33, 38, 


207, 225 


Flammability tests, 106 


Flight acceleration facility, 32 


Flight Research Center (FRC), 24 


Flight schedule, Apollo-Saturn, 21, 104, 105, 149 


Flight Technology Systems Panel, Lunar Excursion Module, 55 


Flotation collar, 184 


Food, space, Ill, 125, 135, 183, 186 


Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Inc., 32 


Ford Motor Company, 5 


Philco Corporation, 5, 25, 41, liS, 165 


Foss, Ted H., 188 


Foster, Willis B., 165, 216 


Franklin, George C., 136 


Freedman, Gilbert M., 204 


Freeman, Theodore C., 101, 197 


Free return trajectory, 50, 98, 171-172 


Freitag, Robert F., 104 · 


French, Burrell 0., 212 


Frick, Charles W., ll, 28, 45 


Fry, Erika, ll3 


Fryklund, Verne C., Jr., 95-96, 103, ll5, 174 


:Fuel cell, 3, 25, 37, 73, 91 


command module, ll9, 124, 137, 138, 160, 161 


lunar excursion module, 125- 126, 138, 147- 148, 154, 


172, 189, 209, 221-222 


G 

GAEC. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation. 


Garrett Corporation, The. See AiResearch Manufacturing 


Company. 


Gates, Sally D., xiv 


Gault, Donald E., 51 


Gautrand, John A., 30 


Gemini Flights Experiments Review Panel, 148 


Gemini-Titan I, 155 


General Dynamics Corporation, liS 


General DynamicsjConvair, 18, 29, 41, 47, 51, 60, 72, 100, 


137, 177 


General Electric, 12, 34, 37, 122, 175- 177, 215 


Policy Review Board, 12 


271 

Gilruth, Robert R., 7, 12, 14, 55, 58, 66, 84, 89, 107, 213, 


218,227 


Glenn, John H., Jr., 25 


Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 5, 44, 144 


Goldstone, California, 6, 131 


Goodman, Clark, 103 


Gordon, Richard F., Jr., 101, 197, 205 


Graves, Claude A., I 95 


Graves, G. Barry, 84 


Gresser, Angela C., 114 


Grimm, Dean F., 221 


Grimwood, James M., xiv, 56, 63, 155 


Grissom, Virgil I., 25, 196 


Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation (GAEC), 


passim 

contract, 5, 38, 222 


flight support engineering, 192 


lunar excursion module. See Lunar excursion 


module. 


Guidance and Control Panel, 76 


Guidance and navigation. See navigation and guidance. 


Guidance and Performance Sub-Panel, 98 


Culton Industries, Inc., 37 


Gurley, John R., 63 


H 

H-1 engine, 91, 108-109 


Hacker, Barton C., 155 


Hamilton Standard Division. See United Aircraft Corporation. 


Hammock, David M., 107, 110, Ill, 116 


Handcontroller, spacecraft, 58 


Harris, Elliott S., 204 


Heatshield, 10, 26, 61-62, 84, 124, 163, 186 


design, 10, 84, 146 


development program, 26 


material, 10, 61~2. 73-74, 75, 146, 213 


meteoroid impact study, 114-115 


termination of backup, 61~2 

test plan, 124, 132-133 


Hess, Harry H., 103, 159 


Hjornevik, Wesley L., 107 


Hodge, John D., 218 . 
 Holmes, D. Brainerd, 30, 63, 71, 74 


Hornbeck, John A., 40 


Howard, B. T., 115 


Hughes Aircraft Company, 103, 188-189, 202 


Hunt, Gerald L., 55 


Hurt, J. B., 47 


Huss, Carl R., 133, 195 


Huzar, Stephen, 21 


IBM. See International Business Machines. 


ILC. See International Latex Corporation. 


Impact test facility, 29 


Inertial measuring unit, 75 


Inertial reference integrating gyro (IRIG), 8, 27, 141 


Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division. See 


Manned Spacecraft Center. 


J 

J-2, engine, 113, 170, 192 


James, Dennis, 103 


Jarrell, A. Ruth, 105 


Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 6, 

Johnson, Caldwell C., 28, 53, 165 


Johnson, Lyndon B., 114 


Johnston, RichardS., 5, 217, 219, 22

Jones, Enoch M., 136 


Jones, Leo L., 105 


K 

Karegeannes, Carrie E., xiv 


Kelley, Albert J., 14 


Kelley Board, 14 


Kelly, Tom J., 151 


Kennedy, John F., 22, 89, 114 


Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 114 


Kincaide, William C., 196, 201 


Kingsley, Milton G., 226 


Kleinknecht, Kenneth S., 84 


Kohrs, Richard H., 123, 177 


Kollsman Instruments Corporation, 

221 


Koons, Wayne E., 50 


Kraft, Christopher C., Jr., 19, 22, .62

114, 139, 165, 218 


Kranz, Eugene F., 218 


KSC. See Kennedy Space Center. 


Kuettner, Joachim P., 77 


L 

Landing characteristics, command m

151-152, 186 


Lambert, C. Harold, Jr., 227 


Landing gear. See Lunar excursion 

Landing, spacecraft, earth, 18-19, 27

water versus land, 18-19, 27, 

Landing system, Apollo, earth, 53, 1

Langley Research Center (LRC), 22, 

Largent, H. R., 147 


Launch escape system, 13, 17, 18, 22

87, 109-110, 125, 138, 140-141, 

201, 209, 212, 213, 218, 220 


Apollo Mission Pad Abort I 

Block I design, 140-141 


Block II design, 140-141 


canards versus tower flap, 

140-141, 148 


design criteria clarification, 1

Launch Operations Center (LOC), 4

redesignated, 114 


See also Kennedy Space Cent

Launch Complex 39, Saturn V, 110 

Leach Corporation, 10 


Lee, William A., 30, 332 


LEM. See Lunar. excursion module. 

272 

Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. (LTV), 6, 69, 88, 96, 107, 164, 


194, 202 


Astronautics Division, 202 


Electronics Division, 107 


Little Joe II, 18, 41, 47, 51, 60, 62, 63, 100, 137, 145, 153, 


177, 223 


Algol motors, 62, 45 


attitude control system, 60, 223 


contract, 29, 51, 60, 100, 177 


Design Engineering Inspection, 100 


instability with lunar excursion module, 116, 135 


launch, 175 


launch complex inspection, 63 


launch site decision, 29 


qualification test vehicle, 72, 80 


LOC. See Launch Operation~ Center. 


Lockheed-California Company, 202 


Lockheed Propulsion Company, 17, 50, 73, 191, 209 


Lockheed Electronics Company, 224 


Loftus, Joseph P., Jr., 164 


Logsdon, John M., 13 


Lovell, James A., Jr., 25, 196 


Low, George M., 30, 47, 95, 127 


LTV. See Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. 


Lunar excursion module (LEM), Apollo 


abort capability design, 32, 123-124, 125, 135-136 


abort guidance system, 135-136 


abort, lunar landing, See Abort, lunar landing. 


abort simulation, 69 


adapter, 116 


adapter installation, 61, 94 


all-welded to partially riveted construction, 180 


ascent engine, 25- 26, 31, 33-34, 43-44, 70, 88, 110, 


119, 121, 131-132, 137, 143, 172, 207- 208, 214-215, 


225 


attitude translation and control assembly, 171, 227 


batteries. See Batteries. 


bioinstrumentation, 125 


cockpit layout, 84, 87, 204-205 


common use ground support equipment, 144 


communications system, 44, 69, 108, 140, 153, 169, 201 


computer. See Computer. 


contract, 5, 38, 222 


controllers, translation and descent engine thrust, 


123 


data storage, 195 


decision for crew to stand, 65, 80, 87, 136, 162, 183 


deletion of front docking, 163-164 


descent engine, 25-26, 28, 32, 39, 53, 55, 59, 70, 112, 


115, 118, 121, 126, 137, 153, 163, 174, 175, 200, 201, 


227 


development test program, 113, 121-122 


docking. See docking, spacecraft. 


dual-control requirement, 123-124 


electrical system. See Electrical system. 


electroluminescent lighting, 204-205 


emergency detection system, 185 


environmental control system. See Environmental 


control system. 


first progress report, 38 


landing, 15, 21, 30-31, 85, 103, 123-124, 175-177, 206 


landing gear, 33-34, 48, 56, 66, 67, 84, 85, 94-95, 103, 


116, 125, 175-177, 200 


landing simulation test, 45 


lunar landing aids, 206 


lunar landing mission. See Lunar landing mission, 

7-day; 10-day; and 14-day. 

lunar Iandin~ mission design. See Lunar landing 

mission destgn. 

Lunar Landing Research Facility. See Lunar Landing Research Facility. 

lunar landing research vehicle. See Lunar landing 

research vehicle. 

lunar surface water requirements, 219 


M- 1 mock-up, 60, 65, 87 


meteoroid hits, 131 


missed rendezvous with CSM after launch, 127 


mission programmer, 214 


mock-up review, 123-124 


navigation and guidance. See Navigation and guidance. 

onboard checkout concept, 192- 193 


operation requirements, 42, 202, 216-217 


overhead window, 163-164, 173, 177 


oxygen storage capacity, 203 


postlanding tilt angle, 175-176, 195 


preliminary configuration freeze, 48-49 


Project Christmas Present Report, 121-122, 133 


quality control program, 55 


radar, 44, 69, 78, 108, 121, 139, 141-142, 145-146, 


177-178, 188, 201, 206-207 


reaction control engines. See Reaction control engines. 

reliability, 59 


scientific equipment weight and volume allocation, 

169, 171-172, 186, 200-201 


service module failure backup, 76, 145 


spacecraft and test articles. See LEM spacecraft and 

test articles. stabilization and control. See Stabilization and control. 

suit and cabin pressure control, 69 


suit interface. See Suit, space. 

television cameras, 121 


terminal rendezvous maneuvers, 120 


thermal test, 90-91 


upper docking hatch, 163-164, 177 


use of command module components, 19, 52, 53, 58, 


98, 172-173 


visibility, 60, 65, 73, 80, 87, 163-164, 206 


weight reduction study, 110-111 


wiring insulation, 155- 156 


Lunar landing mission 


7-day, 123 


10-day, 159- 160 


14-day, 58- 59, 88, 137, 159-160 


Lunar landing mission design, 18, 21, 30-31, 32-33, 42, 76, 


78, 98, 123-124, 126, 171-172 


abort criteria, 32, 123-124 


Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, 126 


fuel budget, 113 


273 

p, 

Lunar specimen handling, 189 

Lunar surface 

contamination, 204 

equipment, 103, 136, 144 

exploration, 44, 89, 92, 95-96 

proposals, 136, 144, 147, 148 

microrelief, 103 

model training area, 188 

Lunar Surface Experiments Panel, 31, 147 

Lunar surface model training area, 188 

Lunar survey mission, 14-day, 196 

Lunik IV, 45 

Lunney, Glynn S., 219 

M 

McAdams, R. E., 133 

McDivitt, James A., 25, 53, 196 

McMillion, Lee N., 42, 86, 107, 218 

Madrid, Spain, 130, 131 

Maloney, Jim, 221 

Maloney, Philip R., 77 

Manager, Apollo subsystem, 118 

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), passim 

Apollo Spacecraft Project Office (ASPO), passim 

reorganization, 28, 53 

Center Medical Office, 125 

Crew Systems Division, 77, 91, 103, 106, Ill, 132, 135, 

141, 148, 159, 162, 183, 200, 204, 210, 213, 215, 217, 

219, 228, 229 

Engineering and Development Directorate (EDD), 

liS, 123, 133, 163 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate, 125, 129, 141, 

162 

Flight Operations Division, 18-19, 21, 22, 36, 59, 61, 

63, 78, 85, 102 

Landing and Recovery Division, 184 

Preflight Operations Division, 13-14 

reorganization, 55, 107 

Manned Spacecraft Criteria Board, 84 

Manned Space Flight Management Council, 7, 12, 14, 58­

59, 66-67, 70-71, 79, 104 

Maps, moon, 174, 192 

Mardel, Alfred D., 14, 53 

Marion Power Shovel Company, 28 

Markley, J. Thomas, 20, 28, 54 

Marquardt Corporation, The, 26, 38, 71, 73, 105, 204 

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), 4, 30, 61, 71, 98, 

104, 105, 132 

Martin Company, The, 38, 68, 123 

lunar landing study, 123 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 12, 27, 36, 

44, 101, 121, 137, 163, 188, 190, 192, 206, 221, 227 

Mathews, Charles W., 107 

Mayer, John P., ll3 

Maynard, Owen E., 28, 91, 114, ll6, liS, 120, 150, 154, 165, 1~1% . 

Mercury. See Project Mercury. 

Messing, Wesley E., 47 

Michel, Edward L., 5 

Michoud Operations Plant, 32 

jy 

Mississippi Test Operations, 32 

MIT. See Massachusetts Institute 

Moore, Henry J., 51 

Morris, Corinne L., xiv 

Morrison-Knudson Company, 12 

Moser, Jacob C., 84 

Motorola, Inc., 10, 120, 128, 137 

MSC. See Manned Spacecraft Cen

MSFC. See Marshall Space Flight 

Mueller, George E., 74, 89, 102, 10

Mullaney, R. S., 91, ll4, ll6, liS

132, 136, 145, 156, 159, 169, 174

199, 200, 202, 203, 206, 207' 20

Murrah, E. D., 133 

Myers, Dale D., 158 

N 

NAA. See North American Aviati

NASA Headquarters 

Manned Space Science Divi

Office of Advanced Res

(OART), 14 

Office of Manned Space F

115, 149 

Apollo Program Office, 

reorganization, 30 

Office of Space Sciences (O

174, 200-201, 213 

Office of Space Sciences a

Soo Office of Space Scienc

Office of Tracking and Data 

Space Sciences Steering Com

reorganization, 79, 96 

National Academy of Sciences, 139

Committee on Lunar Explo

National Rocket Club, 89 

Navigation and guidance 

accelerometer, 36, 184 

Bissett-Berman contract, 18

body-mounted attitude gyr

command module, 3, 8, 27, 

computer, See Computer, s

contractor relationship, 137

equipment testing, 63 

flight director attitude ind

159, 209 

inertial measuring unit, 75

lunar excursion module, 6

171, 173, 186, 189, 194, 22

optical devices, 12, 75, 85, 2

radar. See Command m

module. 

reentry trajectories, 163 

unmanned earth-orbital m

Nelson, Richard D., 132 

Newell, Homer E., 14, 39, 117, 144

noise, low-frequency, 211-212 

noise tests, spacecraft parts, I 07 

North American Aviation, Inc. (N

Apollo spacecraft contract, 

modification and construct

274 

Optical devices. See navigation and guidance. 

Osbon, H. G., 76, 165 

Oxygen environmental tests, 5, 14, 106, 118, 151, 155 

fire, 5, 14, 151 · 

p 

PACE. See Prelaunch acceptance checkout equipment. 

Panel Review Board, 70-71, 76--77 

Parachute system, 12, 15, 35, 53, 68, 85 86 88 108 141 

175, 199, 209 • • • • • 

Paul Hardeman, Inc., 12 

Paup, John W., 158, 161 

Payne, Joe D., 76 

Pearce, J. L., 47 

Pericynthion, 21 

Perilune, 21 

Perini Corporation, 12 

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 36, 180 

Perrine, Calvin H., 111, 135, 163 

Peter Kiewit and Sons, Inc., 120 

Philco Corporation. See Ford Motor Company. 

Phillips, Samuel C., 121, 188, 197, 202 

Piland, Robert 0., 28, 45, 47, 53, 76, 95, 124, 165, 174 207 

Pioneer Parachute Company, 35, 68--69 ' 

PLSS. See Portable life support system. 

Portable life support system, 7, 45, 59-60, 69, 73, 77, 86, 

91, 101-102, 163, 172-173, 174, 177, 180, 195 200 215­

216, 228 • • 

Prat~ and Whitney Aircraft, 37, 7S, 119, 124, 138, 189, 221 

Preflight Operations Division. See Manned Spacecraft 

Center. 

"Pregnant Guppy," 71, 105 

Prelaunch acceptance checkout equipment, 34, 122, 151, 215 

Preston, G. Merritt, 107 

Project Apollo, passim · 

Project Christmas Present Report, 121-122 133 

Project Fire, 6, 124, 157-158 ' 

Project High Water, 4 

Project Luster, 105 

Project Mercury, 22, 56, 63 

Propellant budget, 113 

Propellant measuring system, 47 

Pulse code modulation. See Telemetry. 

Purser, Paul E., 21 

Putnam, William D., xiv 

Pyrotechnics, 31, 189 

reclaimed explosives, 189 

Q 

Qualification test vehicle. See Little Joe II. 

R 

Radar. See Command module; Lunar excursion module. 

Radiation altimeter $ystem. .30 

Radiation, cosmic. !56~ 120, U8-l39, 217 

Radiation instrumentatiDn, W7, 217 

warning system, 107 

Radiation, Inc., 16, 151 

lunar excursion module, 25, 52, 73, 138, 161, 170, 204 

service module, 71, 105, 136, 160, 161, 192 

Recovery aids, spacecraft, 13, 22, 36, 50, 59, 61, 85 

flotation collar, 184 

Recovery rules and procedures, 50 

Rector, William F., III, 119, 123, 124, 130, 132, 145, 150, 

156, 159, 162, 169, 174, 180, 185, 186, 194, 196, 199, 200, 

202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 214, 217, 223, 225, 229 

Reentry, 22, 44--45, 63, 124, 163, 194-195 

automatic modes, 119 

loads, 44--45, 194-195 

range, 194-195 

"skip" phenomenon, 63 

test plan, 124 

trajectories, 163 

ultraviolet emissions, 186 

Reentry heating, 22, 73-74, 84, 157-158, 186, 194-195, 213 

Scout tests, 73-74, 213 

See also Project Fire. 

Reliability, spacecraft, 18, 59, 69 

Rendezvous study, 88, 96, 120 

Rendezvous Working Group, Ad Hoc, 78 

Repair concept, spacecraft, 102- 103 

Retriever, 35 

Richard, Louie G., 136 

Richter, Henry L., Jr., 131 

Roadman, Charles H., 30 

Rocketdyne. See North American Aviation, Inc. 

Rosen, Milton W., 30 

RoSholt, Robert L., 89 

Rowell, Billie D., xiv 

Russia. See Soviet Union. 

Russian-American space cooperation, 89 

Ryan Aeronautical Company, 121, 141, 145, 177 

Ryker, Norman J ., Jr., 155 

s 

s--64A Skycrane helicopter, 114 

Sack, E. E., 76, 107, 111, 116, 188 

Saegesser, Lee D., xiv 

Saturn 

"engine out" capability, 30, 42 

hard-over engine failure, Ill 

manufacture, 31-32 

simplification of names, 27 

tower jettison, 86--87 

Saturn I, 104, 224-225 

hard-over engine failure, 111 

Saturn IB, 91, 104, 105-106, 108-109, 117, 124, 132-133, 

162, 192 

flight schedule, 149 

hard-over engine failure, 111 

Saturn V, 12, 98, 105- 106, 110, 117, 124, 132-133, 152- 153, 

162, 171, 192 

flight schedule, 149 

hard-over engine failure, 111 

Saturn SA-3, 4 

Project High Water, 4 

Saturn SA-4, 42 

Saturn SA- 5, 38-39, 77, 131 

275 

Saturn 8-IV stage, 76, 86-87, 91, 117, 192, 197-198 

disposal during lunar mission, 197-198 

Saunders, J. F., Jr., 42 

Sawyer, Ralph S., 7 

S-hand radar, 5, 10, 44, 56, 57, 65, 78, 120, 128-129, 137­

138, 144-145, 188, 190, 201, 224 

Scherer, LeeR., 151, 174 

Schirra, Walter M., Jr., 25, 53, 196 

Schweickart, Russell L., 101 , 197, 221 

Scott, David R., 101, 197 

Scout rocket, 73-74, 124 

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 55, 83, 89 

Sea of Tranquillity, 131 

See, Elliot M., Jr., 25, 53, 163, 196, 221 

Service module, Apollo 

, addition of micrometeoroid protection, 188 

contract, 61, 77 

engine, 67-68,76, 98, 157, 215, 222, 223-224,227 

failure procedure, 76, 145 

heat transfer and thermodynamic analysis, 202 

propulsion tanks, 207 

reaction control engines. See Reaction control en· 

gines. 

Sextant. See Navigation and guidance, optical devices . . 

Shea, Joseph F., 21 , 30, 70, 95, 107, 113, 124, 133, 135, 136, 

139, 140, 154, 159, 171 , 173, 202, 226 

Shepard, Alan B., Jr., 25, 196 

Shoemaker, Eugene M., 51 

Simmonds Precision Products, Inc., 47 

Simulators, training, 13, 47, 59, 64, 110, 221 

CSM part-task trainer, 115 

dynamic crew procedures, 194 

extravehicular, 68 

lunar excursion module, 221 

mockup review, 64 

visual displays, 78-79, llO 

Sites, Apollo lunar landing, 39-40, 103, ll2, ll3, 115, 171, 

174, 186-187 

"Skip" phenomenon. See Reentry. 

Skopinski, Ted H ., 133 

Slayton, Donald K., 25, 107, 150, 165, 196 

Sloan, James E., 30 

Smith, George B., Jr., 5 

Smith, Norman F., 84 

Smylie, Robert E., 202, 218, 222 

Sonett, Charles P., 117 

Sonett Committee, ll7 

Soviet Union, 45, 64, 89 

Space Business Daily, 189 

Space Technology Laboratories (STL), 39, 55, 70, 126, 137, 153, 175, 189 . 

ipace Vehicle Review Board, 7o-71 

)pain, 130 

)perry Gyroscope Company, 36, 101, 184 

Sperry Phoenix, 86 

;tabilization and control system 

command and service modules, 5, 15-16, 65, 19Q-191 

Block II, 221 

lunar excursion module, 69, 130, 170, 171, 173 

lunar orbit requirement, 130 · 

·tafford, Thomas P., 25, 196 

tanford Research Center, 183 

emergency oxygen supply 

flight·wear ground rules, 

gas-cooled versus liquid-c

174, 204 

improved version , 141 

lunar excursion module 

123, 132 

lunar surface, 7, 88 

micrometeoroid protectiv

mobility, 77 , 101-102, 126

mobility test at Bend, Or

PLSS interface, 91, 180 

Project Gemini suit, 141, 

202, 218 

second prototype, 101-102 

waste management, 162 

water-cooled undergarme

210 

Sundt Construction Company, 1

Surveyor, 31 , 40, 86, 103, 115, 11

Survival equipment, postlanding

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., xiv, 63 

Swetnick, Martin J., 103 

Sword, C. D., 69 

T 

Tanks, gas storage, 43, 59, 65, 

200 

Tape recorders, 175, 195 

Taylor, Clinton L., 165, 196 

Taylor, William B., 174 

Telemetry, 5-6, 10 

pulse code modulation, 1

up-data link, 22, 62 

Telescope. See Navigation and g

Television, 5-6, 10, 52, 53, 90, 

221, 226 

Tereshkova, Valentina V., 64 

Texas Instruments, Inc., 92, 147 

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, 

Reaction Motors Division

Thompson, Floyd L., 84 

Timing equipment, 33, 86, 141, 

Tinsley, James A., xiv 

TLI. See Translunar injection. 

"Tower flap." See Canards. 

Tracking network, 5-6, 6-7, 19

106, 120, 128-129, 130, 131, 

190, 223-224 

Translunar injection, 50, 98 

Transposition and docking. See 

Truszynski, Gerald M., 7 

Tunnel, crew transfer. See Cre

craft. 

u 

Up-data link. See Computer, sp

United Aircraft Corporation, 7 

Hamilton Standard Divis

276 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 101, 218, 227 

United States Army, ll, 35 

Corps of Engineers, ll, 120 

Map Service, 192 

United States House of Representatives, Committee on 

Science and Astronautics, 40 

United States Navy, 5, 12 

Aircrew Equipment Laboratory, 5, 10, 209 

Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory, 89, 101, 

ll8 

Instrumentation Ships Projects Office, 172 

Naval Air Facility, El Centro, 12, 15 · U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union. 

v 

VAB. See Vertical Assembly Building. 


Vacuum chamber, test facility, 13-14, 19-20 


Vertical Assembly Building (VAB), ll-12 


Vibration test, spacecraft part, I 07 


von Braun, Wernher, 12 


White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), 29, 41, 47, 63, 70, 72, 

80, 137' 184, 192, 227 

Williams, Clifton C., Jr., 101, 197 

Williams, Walter C., 12, 27, 47, 55, 102, 104 

Wiseman, Donald G., 126, 127 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. See United States Air 

Force. 

Wyle Laboratories, 107 

WSMR. See White Sands Missile Range. 

X 

X-band radar, 78 

y 

Yardney Electric Corporation, 37, 144 

Young, John W., 25, 53, 101, 196 

Yschek, H. P., 11, 22, 26, 31, 35, 73, 86, 88, 90, 136, 145, 

147, 169, 183, 187, 188, 190, 201, 222, 230 

277 


THE AUTHORS 

Mary Louise Morse has been a Research Associate with the Department of 

History of the University of Houston since the fall of 1966, currently serving 

as an assistant to the institution's Director of Research. Born in Beverly, 

Massachusetts, she received her B.S. in Education from Salem State College, 

Salem, Massachusetts (1947), and her M.A. in History from Columbia University (1950). She was a senior editor with the MIT Press, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts, before moving to Houston. 

Jean Kernahan Bays was a Research Associate with the Department of 

History of the University of Houston from August 1967 to June 1969. Born 

in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, she received a B.A. in History from Denison 

University (1965) and an M.A. in History from the University of Houston 

(1967), where she served as a teaching fellow. She has also worked as a 

Research Librarian for the Houston, Texas, Public Library. She is married 

and lives in Houston. . · 
HISTORIES 

• Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101, 1966, G

• Loyd 	S. Swenson, James M. Grimwood, and. Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A H

NASA SP-4201, 1966, GPO, $5.50. 

• Constance MeL. Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard-A History, NASA SP-4202, 1970; 

sonian Institution Press, 1971, $12.50. 

• Alfred Rosenthal, 	Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center, NA

$2.50. 

• 	Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research: A History of the Ames Research Center, 1

1970, GPO, $4.75. 

HISTORICAL STUDIES 

• Eugene M. Emme (ed.), History of Rocket Technology, Detroit: Wayne State University, 

• Mae Mills Link, Space Medicine in Project Mercury, NASA SP-4003, 1965, NTIS, $6.00.

• Historical Sketch of NASA, NASA EP-29, 1965 and 1966, NTIS, $6.00. 

• 	Katherine M. Dickson (Library of Congress), History of Aeronautics and Astronautics: A 

NASA HHR-29, NTIS, $6.00. 

• Eugene M. Emme (ed.), Statements by the Presidents of the United States on Internation

Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Sen. Doc. 92-40, 1971, GPO, $

• William R. Corliss, NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary, NASA SP

• Helen T. Wells with Susan Whiteley, Origins of NASA Names, NASA SP-4402 (1973). 

• Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Dat

SP-4012 (1973). 
• --, 1965, NASA SP-4006, 1966, NTIS, $6.00. 


• --, 1966, NASA SP-4007, 1967, NTIS, $6.00. 


• --, 1967, NASA SP-4008, 1968, GPO, $2.25. 


• --, 1968, NASA SP-4010, 1969, GPO, $2.00. 


• --, 1969, NASA SP-4014, 1970, GPO, $2.25. 


• --, 1970, NASA SP-4015, 1972, GPO: domestic mail, $3.10; bookstore, $2.75. 


• --, 1971, NASA SP-4016 (1973). 


• James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, NASA SP-4001, 1963, NTIS, $6.00. 

• 	James M. Grimwood and Barton C. Hacker, with Peter J. Vorzimmer, Project Gemini Technology and Operations: 

A Chronology, NASA SP-4002, 1969, GPO, $2.75. 

• 	Ivan D. Ertel and Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Vol. I, Through November 7, 

1962, NASA SP-4009, 1969, GPO, $2.50. 

• R. Cargill Hall, Project Ranger: A Chronology, JPL( HR-2. 1971, NTIS, $6.00. 

• GPO: Titles may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

20402. 

•• NTIS: Titles may be ordered from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. 22151. 

-tf U . S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE' 1973 0 - 469-200