UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

BRANDON MATTHEW McCAIN, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

TRACY McCOLLUM, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 14-6176 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-00528-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

 

Before TYMKOVICH, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Brandon Matthew McCain, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, 

seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. We deny Mr. McCain’s 

request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. We deny his application to proceed on 

appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. 

I. Background 

 In 2010, Mr. McCain was convicted by an Oklahoma state-court jury of 

robbery with a dangerous weapon. The evidence presented at trial showed that two 

 

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 2, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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men wearing black clothes and face masks entered Spivey’s convenience store in Elk 

City, Oklahoma. One of the men approached the store clerk with a gun in his hand 

and told him to get down on the ground. Thinking it was a prank, the store clerk did 

not immediately comply, and the man with the gun struck him in the face. The store 

clerk then obeyed the man’s second command to get down on the ground. The same 

man said something like, “James, get the cash or money.” Trial Tr. at 302. After 

taking money from the register, the men left the store. The incident lasted about 

30 seconds. 

 At approximately the same time as the robbery at Spivey’s, the Elk City Police 

Department received a telephone call reporting an accident in another part of town. 

The police later determined that no such accident had occurred, and they concluded 

the call was intended to divert officers from the part of town where the robbery was 

being committed at Spivey’s. 

The Elk City police did not immediately have any suspects in the Spivey’s 

robbery. Their investigation of a burglary at a different Elk City business, L&R Tire, 

led to the arrest of Brian Houser and Paul Wyble. While they were being booked for 

that offense, one of the police officers recognized Mr. Houser’s voice as sounding 

like the person who had called in the fake accident report at the time of the Spivey’s 

robbery. 

Mr. Houser agreed to speak to the Elk City police about various unsolved 

crimes. He admitted his participation in the L&R Tire burglary and in using a stolen 

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credit card at Wal-Mart. Mr. Houser also admitted being the getaway driver in the 

Spivey’s robbery and making the fake accident report, but he denied direct 

participation in that crime. He eventually identified Mr. Wyble and Mr. McCain as 

the two men who entered Spivey’s and robbed the store. Mr. Houser testified at 

Mr. McCain’s trial. 

 Mr. McCain was tried on a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. His 

first trial ended in a mistrial, but he was found guilty in a second trial and sentenced 

to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) 

affirmed Mr. McCain’s conviction on direct appeal. The OCCA also affirmed the 

state trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. 

 Mr. McCain filed an application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Applying the deferential review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 2254(d)(1)-(2), the district court held that the 

OCCA’s rulings on Mr. McCain’s claims did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. The court therefore denied habeas relief. 

II. Standards of Review 

In order to obtain a COA, Mr. McCain must make “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In deciding whether to 

issue a COA, we limit our examination to “a threshold inquiry into the underlying 

merit of [the applicant’s] claims.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). 

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Our standard of review depends on whether the district court decided a claim on the 

merits or dismissed it on procedural grounds. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484-85 (2000). In this case, where the district court denied Mr. McCain’s 

constitutional claims on the merits, to obtain a COA he “must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong.” Id. at 484. Because Mr. McCain proceeds pro se, we 

liberally construe his application for a COA. See Hall v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266 

(10th Cir. 2002). 

III. Discussion 

Mr. McCain raises three constitutional claims in his application for a COA: 

(1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 

robbery with a dangerous weapon; (2) he was denied a fair trial by the introduction of 

evidence of other crimes; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a 

limiting instruction on the use of evidence of other crimes.1

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Mr. McCain contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him of robbery 

with a dangerous weapon. The OCCA rejected this claim on the merits in his direct 

 

1

 Mr. McCain includes four issues in his application for a COA, but we construe 

his first and fourth issues as raising the same claim of error. In addition, he states 

that he is not seeking a COA on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel, yet he asks this court to review that claim. We cannot do so because “[a] 

COA is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction in a habeas action.” Frost v. Pryor, 

749 F.3d 1212, 1222 (10th Cir. 2014). 

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appeal. The district court held that the OCCA reasonably applied the standard in 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), under which evidence is sufficient to 

support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 319. After reviewing the elements of the 

offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon under Oklahoma law, the district court 

noted that the evidence included Mr. Houser’s testimony, physical evidence linking 

Mr. McCain to the crime, and Mr. McCain’s own incriminating statements made 

during phone calls from jail. Although Mr. McCain’s testimony contradicted 

Mr. Houser’s, the court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found that 

Mr. McCain was one of the two men who robbed Spivey’s. The district court held 

that the OCCA’s ruling on this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, federal law; nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Mr. McCain argues that, because Oklahoma law requires corroboration of an 

accomplice’s testimony, his conviction cannot be based on Mr. Houser’s 

uncorroborated testimony. He maintains that, without Mr. Houser’s self-serving 

testimony, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, even 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 

But as the district court held, Mr. McCain’s reliance on a state-law 

corroboration requirement is misplaced because such laws “do not implicate 

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constitutional concerns that can be addressed on habeas review.” Scrivner v. Tansy, 

68 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation mark omitted). Rather, 

“[t]he Constitution does not prohibit convictions based primarily on accomplice 

testimony.” Id. “A jury may convict based on the uncorroborated testimony of [an 

accomplice] so long as the testimony is not incredible on its face and is otherwise 

capable of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and brackets omitted). Although Mr. McCain points to other evidence 

contradicting Mr. Houser’s testimony, he does not show that the testimony was 

incredible on its face. And while he attacks the persuasive value of the physical 

evidence linking him to the crime, he ignores his own incriminating statements made 

during phone calls from jail, which the district court also cited. 

The OCCA held there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. McCain’s 

conviction. Applying deferential review under AEDPA, the district court denied 

habeas relief. We deny a COA because Mr. McCain has now shown that the district 

court’s disposition of this claim is debatable by reasonable jurists. 

B. Introduction of Evidence of Other Crimes 

Mr. McCain contends the admission of evidence of other crimes committed by 

Mr. Houser and Mr. Wyble—specifically evidence regarding the burglary of L&R 

Tire and use of a stolen credit card at Walmart—denied him a fair trial because it was 

unduly prejudicial. The OCCA rejected this claim of error in his direct appeal, 

applying a plain error standard of review because he did not object to admission of 

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the evidence. It held there was evidence Mr. McCain was involved in the use of the 

stolen credit card, but the evidence did not implicate him in the L&R Tire burglary. 

The OCCA concluded Mr. McCain failed to show plain error because his own 

counsel referenced these two incidents in his opening statement and later questioned 

prosecution witnesses about Mr. McCain’s involvement in the two crimes. Thus, it 

concluded any error was invited error. 

The district court noted that a state court’s evidentiary ruling will not be 

disturbed on habeas review unless the defendant shows a denial of due process. 

See Scrivner, 68 F.3d at 1240 (“We will not disturb a state court’s admission of 

evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts unless the probative value of such evidence 

is so greatly outweighed by the prejudice flowing from its admission that the 

admission denies defendant due process of law.” (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted)). The court emphasized that Mr. McCain testified about his 

criminal history at his trial, admitting that he had stolen a credit card and used it at a 

local business. In addition, it reasoned that evidence regarding the L&R Tire 

burglary was relevant because it explained how the police linked Mr. Houser to the 

fake accident report during the Spivey’s robbery. The district court concluded the 

asserted evidentiary error did not violate Mr. McCain’s right to due process by 

rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. It therefore held that Mr. McCain failed to 

show the OCCA’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

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Mr. McCain asserts that the jury used the evidence regarding the L&R Tire 

burglary and the stolen credit card for the improper purpose of showing his 

propensity to commit similar crimes and establishing that he acted in conformity with 

these other offenses. He claims the evidence confused and misled the jury, and its 

probative value was substantially outweighed by is prejudicial effect on his right to a 

fair trial. But Mr. McCain does not address his failure to object to the evidence, his 

own counsel’s introduction of the evidence to the jury, his testimony admitting that 

he was guilty of using a stolen credit card, the lack of evidence implicating him in the 

L&R Tire burglary, or the district court’s rationale for concluding the evidence 

regarding that burglary was relevant. We deny a COA because Mr. McCain has not 

shown that reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s disposition of this 

claim. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Mr. McCain contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a 

limiting instruction on the jury’s use of the evidence regarding the L&R Tire 

burglary and the stolen credit card. The OCCA rejected this claim on the merits in 

Mr. McCain’s direct appeal. The district court held that the OCCA reasonably 

applied the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), under which a 

defendant must show (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” id. at 687. To establish prejudice, 

“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694. The district court agreed with the OCCA that Mr. McCain 

failed to show he had been prejudiced by the alleged error. It reasoned that, even if 

his counsel had requested a limiting instruction, there was sufficient evidence for the 

jury to convict him of robbery with a dangerous weapon. 

Mr. McCain again argues that the jury could have improperly used the 

evidence of the other crimes as substantive evidence of his guilt. He maintains that, 

in light of the substantial volume of evidence presented regarding these other crimes, 

as compared to the relative lack of evidence connecting him to the Spivey’s robbery, 

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted had the jury been 

given a limiting instruction. But contrary to Mr. McCain’s assertion, the evidence 

supporting his guilt—including Mr. Houser’s testimony—was not so scarce that there 

is a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the jury been so instructed. We 

deny a COA because Mr. McCain fails to show that the district court’s disposition of 

this claim is debatable by reasonable jurists.2

 

2

 We decline to address an additional claim that Mr. McCain attempts to raise in 

his application for a COA. He asserts that the district court denied him due process 

by ruling on his habeas application without referring it to a magistrate judge for a 

report and recommendation, to which he could have filed objections. But his 

self-described due process argument is not sufficiently developed to allow for 

meaningful appellate review. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 

(10th Cir. 1999) (stating court “will not craft a party’s arguments for him”); see also 

Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (reiterating “settled 

appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by 

(continued) 

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IV. Conclusion 

 We deny Mr. McCain’s application for a COA and dismiss the appeal. We 

deny his application to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees, and Mr. McCain 

is directed to immediately pay the full amount of the filing fee. 

 Entered for the Court 

 ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk 

 

some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

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