PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19

- 3820

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JAMELL BIRT,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Mid dle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1

- 02

- cr

- 286

- 001

District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane

_______________

Argued

April 14, 2020

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN , and SHWARTZ, Circuit

Judges.

( O pinion Filed : July 20 , 2020 )

_______________2 Heidi R . Freese

Fre derick W. Ulrich [ARGUED]

Office of Federal Public Defender

100 Chestnut Street

– Ste. 306

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellant

William A. Behe [ARGUED]

Dav id J. Freed

Office of United States Attorney

Mi ddle Distric t of Pennsylvania

228 Walnut Street

P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appel lee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge

.

W e a r e a s k e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r a s t a t u t e w h o s e t e x t i s

u n c h a n g e d b y a l a t e r a c t o f C o n g r e s s c a n n e v e r t heless b e s a i d

t o h a v e b e e n “ m o d i f

i e d ” b y t h a t e n a c t m e n t

. A l t h o u g h t h e

q u e s t i o n m i g h t s e e m s i m p l e

, g e t t i n g t o a n a n s w e r i s n o t

, a n d

t h e a n a l y s i s m a y h a v e s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f

o r m a n y

f e d e r a l p r i s o n e r s

.

J a m e l l B i r t c o n t e n d s t h a t h e i s o n e s u c h p r i s o n e r

. H e

appeals the Di strict Court’s denial of his request f o r a l o w e r

s e n t e n c e pur su ant to the First Step Act ( t h e “ A c t ” )

. A s h e3 s e e s i t

, his c o n viction f

o r p o s s e s s i o n w i t h i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e

c r a c k

, i n v i o l a t i o n o f 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d (b)(1)(C),

qualifies as a “covered offense” u n d e r the Act and s o he is

entitled to resentencing. W e d i s a g r e e

. “ C o v e r e d o f f e n s e s

, ”

a s t he F i r s t S t e p A c t d e f

i n e s t h a t t e r m

, a r e o f

f e n s e s p r o s c r i b e d

b y c r i m i n a l s t a t

u t e s t h a t h a v e h a d t h e i r p e n a l t y p r o v i s i o n s

m o d i f i e d b y a n o t h e r s t a t

u t e

, specifically t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g

A c t

. B u t t h e p e n a l t i e s f o r B i r t ’ s s t a t

u t e o f c o n v i c t i o n h a v e

n o t b e e n m o d i f

i e d

, a n d

, w i t h o u t s u c h a m o d i f i c a t i o n

, t h e F i r s t

S t e p A c t h a s n o a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o B i r t ’ s c a s e

. W e w i l l t h e r e f o r e

a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

.

I. BACKGROUND

In 20 01, Birt was arrested f o l l o w i n g a routine traffic

stop i n P e n n s y l v a n i a

. H e c o n s e n t e d t o a search o f h i s c a r

, and

a s t a t e t r o o p e r found 186 .5 grams of crack cocaine in the

trun k

.

B i r t originally faced state charges and was released on

b ail. But after v i o l a t i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s r e l e a s e , he was

char ged i n f

e d e r a l c o u r t

. U l t i m a t e l y , the U nited Stat es

Attorney for the Middle Dist rict of Pennsylvania filed a

superseding information charging h im with one c ou n t of

possession with intent to dis tribute an unspecified amount of

crack cocaine in violation of 21 U .S.C. § 841(a)( 1 )

. Birt

eve nt ually ple d guilty t o t h a t c h a r g e

, a n d h i s p l e a a g r e e m e n t

s t a t e d t h a t “ [ t ] h e m a x i m u m p e n a l t y f o r [ h i s ] o f

f e n s e i s

i m p r i s o n m e n t f

o r a p e r i o d o f 2 0 y e a r s [ a n d ] a f i n e o f $ 1

m i l l i o n d o l l a r s

, ” a s w e l l a s a p e r i o d o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e a n d

various c o s t s a n d c o l l a t e r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s

. ( A p p

. a t 1 8

. )

T hose p e n a l t i e s a r e s e t f o r t h i n 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

. T h e p r o b a t i o n o f

f i c e t h e n i s s u e d a P r e s e n t e n c e R e p o r t n o t i n g4 t h a t

, a s s t a t e d i n t h a t s t a t u t o r y s ub s e c t i o n

, B i r t ’ s m a x i m u m

s e n t e n c e w a s 2 0 y e a r s

. I n d u e c o u r s e

, t he District Co urt

i m p o s e d t h e m a x i m u m s e n t e n c e

, w h i c h w e a f f i r m e d on

appeal. 1

Y ears later, Birt filed a motion to r educe his sentence

pursuant to Amendment 750 to the United S tate s Sente ncing

Guid e lines

, a n “ amendment[] wh i ch lowered the base offens e

levels applicable to crack cocaine off en ses.” Unite d States v.

Sa vani , 733 F.3d 56, 58 (3d C ir. 2013). The D i s t r i c t C ourt

granted that motion in early 2012, and red uced Birt’s

sentence t o 2 10 m onths. We also af fir med that ord er.

A n o t h e r f

e w years p a s s e d a n d Birt fil ed another

mo tion fo r resentencing, thi s time based on the Fir st Step Ac t.

The government originally conced ed that Birt was entitled to

relief but s ubs equently wi th d rew tha t concession and a rgu ed

that no r esentencing was i n o r d e r

. The Di st rict Court a g r e e d

, d e c i d i n g t hat Birt was not con vi cted of a “covere d offense”

within the meaning of the Act and

, thus

, that h e was not

entitled to re lief.

1 In a prior opinion

, we summa rized Birt ’ s s e nt encing

, noting that he “was a career offender with a criminal h istory

category of VI and an adjusted t ot a l offe nse level of 34,

y ielding an adv isory guidel ines range of 262 to 327 mo nt hs.

T he Distr ict Court imposed the statutory maximum o f 240

months.” United States v. Birt , 479 F. App ’ x 445, 446 (3d

Cir. 2012)

.5 T h i s t i m e l y a p p e a l f

o l l o w e d

.

II. DIS CU SSION 2

T h e i s s u e b e f

o r e u s i s o n e o f s t a t

u t o r y i n t e r

p r e t a t i o n

. A s n o t e d e a r l i e r

, Birt was convicted a n d s e n t e n c e d under 21

U.S

. C. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d (b)(1)(C) for possession wi th intent to

distribu te an unspecified q uan tity of crack co caine. We m u st

deter mi ne w h e t h e r t h o s e t w o s ub s e c t i o n s

, a c t i n g i n c o n c e r t

,

q u a l i f y a s a “cover ed offense” within the meaning of the F i r s t

S t e p A c t

. 3

A. T h e A p p l i c a b l e S t a t u t e s

T o a n s w e r t h a t q u e s t i o n w e n e e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e

i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h r e e s t a t

u t e s : the Fa ir Sentencin g Act, Pub. L.

2 The D istrict C ourt had jurisdiction pu r su a nt to 18

U .S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582( c)(1)

. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U .S.C. § 1291. “ Our

rev iew over a district court’s decision to grant or deny a

motion for sentence reduction is typically for abuse of

discretion. H o w ev e r, ... w e exercis e plenary review [ when]

we are pre sented with legal questions[ .]” Uni ted Stat es v

. Thompson, 825 F.3d 19 8 , 20 3 (3d Cir . 2016) (citations and

internal quotation mar ks omitted). T hat is what we f ace no w.

3 In determining whether a convicti on constitutes a

“covered offense,” we focus on the statute of conviction, not

the specific actions of the offender. United States v. Harris

, No. 19

- 2517, 2020 WL 3563995

, -- F.3d

-- (3d Cir. 2020)

.6 No. 111

- 2 20 ; the retroactivity provision of the F i r s t S t e p A c t ;

and the p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s A c t u n d e r

w h i c h B i r t w a s c o n v i c t e d

, n a m e l y 21 U.S .C. § 841 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d

( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

.

The Fair Sent enc i ng Act was passed t o reduce the

d ispariti es in sentenci ng between crack coca ine and powder

cocaine o f

fense s

. Pub. L. N o

. 111

– 220, § 2, 1 24 Stat. 2 372,

2 372 (2010). It reduced the crack/powder ratio f r o m 1 0 0 : 1 to

approximately 18:1. Unit ed States v. Dix o n , 6 48 F .3d 195,

19 7 (3d Cir. 2011 )

. The a m o u n t s o f crack cocain e n e e d e d t o

t r i g g e r s t a t

u t o r y m i n i m u m s e n t e n c e s w e r e a l s o c h a n g e d

, b y

a m e n d i n g 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). Prior to

the Fair Sentenci ng Act, section 841(b)( 1)(A) (iii) impose d a

m inimum s e nte nce of 10 years a nd a m ax imum sen tence of

life for an o ffense in volv ing 50 grams or more of crack.

Section 841(b ) (1)(B) (i ii) imposed a mini mum sentence of 5

yea rs and a m aximum sentence of 40 years for an offense

involvin g 5 g rams or more of c rack. T h e F air Se ntencing Ac t

modi fi ed the l anguage of t hose prov isions to repl ace “ 50 ”

with “ 280 ” a nd “ 5 ” with “ 28. ” Pub. L. No. 111

- 220, § 2

, 1 24

Stat. 2 372 (2010)

. B y c o n t r a s t

, t he penalty p r o v i s i o n for

offense s involving an uns pecif ied q u a n t i t y of dr

ugs

, 21

U.S. C. § 8 41(b) (1)(C), was u n c h a n g e d

.

The a m e n d m e n t s t o s ub s e c t i o n s ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) a n d

( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) o f § 8 4 1 we re n o t a t f i r s t retroactive

. C o n s e q u e n t l y

, those w ho were sentenced before the F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

went into effect h a d d ramat ically h i g h e r sent ences t h a n those

who were s e n t e n c e d l a t e r f o r t h e s a m e c r i m e s

. Congress

s o u g h t t o r e c t i f

y that d i s p a r i t y w h e n i t p a s s e d t h e F i r s t S t e p

A c t

. Sec tion 4 04 of t h a t s t a t u t e allow s a d i strict c ourt, w h e n

c o n s i d e r i n g a d e f

e n s e m o t i o n a i m e d a t a s e n t e n c e for a7 “ covered offense

, ” to “ impose a re d uc ed sente nce as if

se ctions 2 and 3 of the Fa ir Sentencing Act o f 2010 were in

effect at the time the covere d offense was committed. ” First

Step Act, Pub. L. N o

. 115

- 391, § 404( b ), 132 Stat. 5194 , 5 222

( 2 0 1 8 )

. T h e t e r m “cover ed offense” is de fined as “ a violation

o f a Fede ral criminal statu te, t he statutory penalties f or whic h

were modified by section 2 or 3 of t he Fair Sentencing Act of

2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010

. ” First Step

Act, P ub. L. N o

. 115

- 391, § 4 04(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222

. The F i r s t S t e p Act thus made it pos sible for s o m e p r i s o n e r s to

s e ek reduced sentences

, even if they had been s entenced prior

to t h e effective d a t e of the Fair Sentencing Act.

B. T h e M e a n i n g o f “ C o v e r e d O f f e n s e ”

The text o f 21 U

. S .C. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d 841(b)(1)(C)

–

t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s c o m p r i s i n g B i r t ’ s c r i m e o f c o n v i c t i o n

– wa s

, a s j u s t n o t e d

, u n t o u c h e d by the Fair Sentencing A ct.

T h a t t e x t r e m a i n s t h e s a m e t o t h e l a s t l e t t e r

. O n its face

, then

, it i s n o t a p p a r e n t h o w a c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r t h o s e s u b s e c t i o n s

c o u l d qualif

y as “a v iolati on of a Federal cr iminal s tatute, th e

st atutory penalties for which we re modifie d by section 2 or 3

of the Fair Sentencing Act of 201 0[.]” First Step Act, Pub. L.

115

- 391, § 404(a), 132 St at. 5194, 5222 ( 2 0 1 8 )

. S i n c e

“ m o d i f y ” a n d “ c h a n g e ” a r e c l o s e s y n o n y m s

, s o meth ing that is

co mpl etely un c hanged ha s not, in ordinary parlance , be en

“modified.” S

e e C h a n g e

, Merriam

- Webster.com T h e s a u r u s

, https://www.merriam

- webster.com/thesaur us/c hange

,

a ccessed 2 3 J u n . 20 20 ( l i s t i n g “ m o d i f y ” a s a s y n o n y m f

o r

“ c h a n g e ” )

.

B ir t a t t a c k s that textual f a c t i n t w o w a y s

. F i r s t

, h e

a r g u e s t h a t h i s s t a t

u t e o f c o n v i c t i o n i s § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 )

, n o t t h e8 c o m b i n a t i o n o f s u b s e c t i o n s ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

. V i e w e d i n

t h a t l i g h t

, h e s a y s

, h i s s t a t u t e o f c o n v i c t i o n w a s m o d i f i e d b y

t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

, s i n c e s o m e o f t h e p e n a l t y p r o v i s i o n s

a s s o c i a t e d w i t h § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) w e r e m o d i f i e d

, e v e n i f s ub s e c t i o n

( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) w a s n o t

. S e c o n d

, h e a r g u e s t h a t

, a s s u m i n g h i s

c o n v i c t i o n i s h e l d t o b e o n e u n d e r a c o m b i n a t i o n o f

s u b s e c t i o n s ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d (b)(1)(C)

, the way in whi c h ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

i s a f f e c t e d b y c h a n g e s t o t he other penalty p rovisions in § 841

means that t h o s e c h a n g e s necessarily s e r v e d t o m o d i f

y

(b )(1)(C) as well. We d i s a g r e e o n b o t h p o i n t s

.

1. T h e r e l e v a n t s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n i s t h e

c o m b i n a t i o n o f § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d

§ 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

.

B i r t ’ s s t a t

u t e o f c o n v i c t i o n i s a t i g h t c o m b i n a t i o n o f

s u b s e c t i o n s ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d (b)(1)(C) o f § 8 4 1

, n o t § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) i n

i s o l a t i o n o r § 8 4 1 a s a w h o l e

. T h a t c o n c l u s i o n b e c o m e s

a p p a r e n t w h e n w e c o n s i d e r t h e s t r u c t u r e o f § 8 4 1 i n

c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h r e l e v a n t S u p r e m e C o u r t p r e c e d e n t

.

Section 841 is f

r a m e d a s a general pr ohibit ion on

certain kinds o f conduct

, followed by a l ist of penalties

corresponding to the particular ma nner in w hich the

p rohibition i s violated. S u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 1 ) , titl ed “[u]nlawful

acts

, ” prohibi t s t he “manufacture, dis tr ibut[ion]

, or

di sp ens[ i n g ], o r posse ss[ion] with intent to manufacture,

distribute, or dis pense

, a controlled sub stance[.]” 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)( 1). T h a t p r o v i s i o n w a s n o t c h a n g e d b y t h e F a i r

S e n t e n c i n g A c t

. S e c t i o n 841(b)

, title d “[p ]enalties [

, ] ” lays

out

, i n t u r n

, the c onsequences for viol ating § 841(a). Id

. § 8 41( b). Those conseq uences vary based on the type of

control led substance a t issue and the q uantity of the9 controlled substance. The subsec tions deal ing with crack

coca i ne a re (b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii), a nd (b)(1)(C). 4 A s

p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d

, s ubsect ion ( b ) ( 1 ) (A)( iii) imposes a

mandatory minimum of 10 years’ impris onment and a

maxim um of life for an offense involving 280 grams or more

of crack

. A g a i n

, i t h a d b e e n 50 gram s , prior to t he pass a g e of

the Fair Se ntenci ng Ac t . Subsection ( b ) ( 1 ) (B)(iii) imposes a

mandatory minimum of 5 years a n d a maximum of 40 years

for an offens e inv olv i ng 28 grams o r more of crack

, a n d

, b e f o r e t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

, t h a t t r i g g e r h a d b e e n 5 grams

. Last ly, subsection ( b ) ( 1 ) (C ) imposes a s t atut ory maximu m of

20 years

, a n d n o m a n d a t o r y m i n i m u m

, for an offense

involving an u nspecified a mount of cr ack

, a s i t d i d b e f o r e t h e

F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

.

B i r t a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s statutory s t r u c t u r e m e a n s tha t “all

defend ants convicted u nder Se ct ion[] 841(a )(1) ... are eligible

for a red uced sentence.” ( Opening Br. at 16

- 17). H e a r g u e s

t h a t b e c a u s e § 841(a) lays out the proscribed conduct a nd

then § 841(b) lays out the penalti es f o r t h a t c o n d

u c t

, t h e

n e c e s s a r y c o n c l u s i o n i s t hat the off ense of c onv ic tion is §

8 41(a). And because the Fair Sentencing Act un doubtedly

modified the penal ties sec ti on ( that is to say, i t m o d i f i e d p a r t s

o f § 841(b) )

, a v iolatio n of § 8 41(a) counts as “ a violation of

a Federal cri m ina l st atute, the statu tor y penaltie s f or which

were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sente ncing Act of

4 Un like subsectio ns (b)( 1)(A)(iii) and (b)(1)(B)(ii i) of

§ 8 4 1, whic h are both directed e xpress l y to offenses i n volving

cocaine base , subsection (b)(1)(C) deals with con trolled

substance offenses more generally, including those involving

cocaine base.10 2010 [.]” First Step Act, Pu b. L. N o

. 115

- 391, § 40 4(a), 13 2

Stat. 5194, 5222

. B i r t t h u s b e l i e v e s h e c o m m i t t e d a “ c o v e r e d

o f f e n s e ” w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t a n d i s

e n t i t l e d t o r e s e n t e n c i n g

.

T h a t r e a s o n i n g i s n o t i m p l a u s i b l e

. I n d e e d

, i t i s

p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h t h a t i t w a s a d o p t e d b y o n e o f o u r s i s t e r

c i r c u i t s

. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e F i r s t

C i r c u i t co nclude d t h a t t h e “ relevant statut e

... vi ol ated is

eit her § 841 as a who l e, or § 841(a), which describes all the

conduct necessary to v iolate § 841. Section 841(b)(1), in

turn, sets forth how the penaltie s for that conduc t vary based

on drug q ua ntity. ” Unit ed States v. Smi t h , 954 F.3d 446, 44 9

( 1s t Cir. 2020 )

. O u r c o n c l u s i o n

, h o w e v e r

, i s d i f f e r e n t

, b e c a u s e o f t h e S u

p r e m e C o u r t ’ s r

u l i n g i n A l l e

y n e v

. U n i t e d

S t a t e s

, 5 7 0 U

. S

. 9 9 ( 2 0 1 3 )

.

B u i l d i n g o n t h e p r i n c i p l e l a i d o u t i n A p p r e n d i v

. N

e w

J e r s e y

, 5 3 0 U

. S

. 4 6 6 ( 2 0 0 0 )

, A l l e y n e h e l d t h a t “ [ a ] ny fact

t hat, by law, increases the pe nalty for a c rime is an ‘ eleme nt ’

that must be su bmitted to the j ury and found beyond a

reasonable doubt. ” 5 70 U.S. a t 103

. S o

, u n d e r A l l e y n e

, a n y

f a c t t h a t l e g a l l y r e q u i r e s a n i n c r e a s e d p e n a l t y i s a n e l e m e n t o f

t h e s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e i t s e l f

. A n d i f i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e

d i f f e r e n t f a c t s f o r t h e r e t o b e d i f

f e r e n t p e n a l t i e s

, t h e n t h e r e a r e

d i f f e r e n t c r i m e s

, n o t m e r e l y t h e s a m e c r i m e w i t h d i f f e r e n t

p e n a l t i e s

.

Sec t i o n 8 4 1 ( a ) doesn’t con tain any r e f e r e n c e t o

penalt i e s

. T h o s e a r e s e t f o r t h i n § 8 4 1 ( b )

, a n d t h e f a c t s

n e c e s s a r y t o i m p o s e t h e m m u s t b e p r o v e d t o a j u r y b e y o n d a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

. T h u s

, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e s ub s e c t i o n o f

8 4 1 ( b ) i m p l i c a t e d b y a d e f e n d a n t ’ s c h a r g i n g d oc u m e n t

,11 d i f f e r e n t f a c t s m u s t b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y i n o r d e r f o r t h e

g o v e r n m e n t t o m e e t i t s b u r d e n o f p r o o f

, a s r e q u i r e d b y

A l l e y n e

. I f

, f o r e x a m p l e

, t h e i n d i c t m e n t o r i n f o r m a t i o n

c h a r g i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t s p e c i f

i e s t h e a m o u n t o f c r a c k t h a t i s

i n v o l v e d i n t h e o f

f e n s e

, t h e n r e f

e r e n c e m u s t b e m a d e t o t h e

s u b s e c t i o n s o f § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p e rt i n e n t d r u g

q u a n t i t y t h r e s h o l d s a n d w h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t p r o v e t o

c o m e w i t h i n t h o s e t h r e s h o l d s

. I t f o l l o w s t h a t “ 21 U.S. C.

§ 841 (b)(1)(A), § 841(b)(1)(B), and § 841 (b)(1)(C ) are each

dist i nct crim es

. ” United States v. Will iams , 402 F. Sup p. 3d

442, 449 n

. 7 (N.D. Ill. 2 019) ( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) ; c f

. United

States v. Shaw , 957 F .3d 734, 739

- 4 0 (7th Cir. 20 20) ( h o l d i n g

t h a t d e f e n d a n t s c o u l d s e e k r e l i e f u n d e r t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e c o n v i c t e d u n d e r § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) a n d

8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) a n d “ the penalty for each of those cri mes was

modified by the Fa ir S entencing Act ” ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. W e

a r e t h e r e f o r e l e f t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t B i r t ’ s c r i m e o f c o n v i c t i o n i s

d e f i n e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

.

T h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s n o t a l t e r e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t B i r t ’ s

chargin g document list s o n l y t h e violation of § 841(a) (1) as

h i s crime

. T hat is c o n c e p t u a l l y incom plete for purposes o f

both pros ecutio n resp ons ibilities and the First Step A c t

. As

j u s t d i s c u s s e d , § 841(a) d o e s n o t c o n t a i n t h e d r u g t h r e s h o l d s

t h a t a r e i n t e g r a l t o d e f

i n i n g w h a t a r e

, a f

t e r A l l e y n e

, d i s t i n c t

c r i m e s

. I t i s t h u s

, i n o u r v i e w

, n o t t r u e t h a t “ § 8 41(a )

... desc ribes all the conduct necessa ry to v iolate § 841 [

, ] ” a s t h e

F i r s t C i r c u i t h a s a s s e r t e d

. Smi th , 954 F.3d a t 449

. D e p e n d i n g

o n t h e c h a r g e

, a n addit ional part of the statute must be

a ccounted for and proof offere d for there to be conviction of a

crim e. Because the c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t i n t

h i s c a s e did no t

specify a n amount of crack cocaine, the only s ubsection th at

can fill that role is § 841(b)(1 )(C)

. T h u s

, although t h e12 s u p e r s e d i n g i n f

o r m a t i o n d i d n o t e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r e n c e

§ 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

, t h e n e c e s s a r y i n f e r e n c e i s t h a t B i r t w a s

p r o s e c u t e d f

o r a c r i m e d e f

i n e d i n p a r t b y t

h a t s ub s e c t i o n

. T h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s b o l s t e r e d b y t h e P S R ’ s e x p l i c i t r e l i a n c e o n

( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) t o e s t a b l i s h t h e m a x i m u m s e n t e n c e t o w h i c h B i r t

w a s e x p o s e d

. 5

The First Circuit r e

j e c t e d t h a t k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g

. I t

d i sm iss e d Alley n e as b e i n g m erely con cern e d w i t h cri minal

procedure

, an d i t s a i d that ther e was “ no reason to bel ieve that

Congress wo uld have thought the holding in Alleyne ” had any

bearing on the question s r a i s e d b y t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

. Smith

, 954 F .3 d at 450. But Alley ne is no n a r r o w p roced u r a l r u l i n g

. It is a landma rk c onstitutional dec is ion that redef in ed what

constitut es an eleme nt of a crime and thu s what con stitutes

the crime itself. There is no reason no t to be lieve that

C ongres s knew suc h a sign ificant ruling wo uld affect the

inte rpre t ation of legislation addr essi ng penalties for dr ug

dealing

. See Miles v. Ape x Marine Corp. , 498 U.S. 19, 32

(1990) ( “ W e as sume that Congress is aware of existing law

when it passes l egislation

. ”). T h e p o i n t o f t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

w a s t o a m e l i o r a t e c e r t a i n p e n a l t i e s

, i n c l u d i n g m a n d a t o r y

m i n i m u m s

, a t t a c h e d t o d r u g d e a l i n g

. S

e e First Step Ac t, Pu b.

L. 115

- 391, § 40 1

, 132 Stat. 5194

, 52 2 0 ( s t a t i n g

, i n a r e l a t e d

s e c t i o n

, t h a t p a r t o f t h e e f f e c t o f t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t i s t o

5 Birt was , of course, convicted long b efore the

decision in All e

y ne was handed down , so prosecutors had no

reason a t the ti me to co nsid er the necessity of listing the

perti nent penalty subsection of § 841 to complete the

description of the crime.13 “ r e d u c e a n d r e s t r i c t e n h a n c e d s e n t e n c i n g f o r p r i o r d r

u g

f e l o n i e s ” )

.

M o r e o v e r

, t h e rea ding t h a t B i r t a n d o u r s i s t e r c i r c u i t

g i v e the F i r s t S t e p A c t w o u l d h a v e s e r i o u s a n d u n i n t e n d e d

c o n s e q u e n c e s

. E very defendant convi cted under § 841 ( a )

c o u l d s e e k resente ncing regardless of w h e t h e r the subsec t ion

under w hich he was co nvicted was c h a n g e d i n a n y w a y

. In

f act, a de fendan t convicte d of a crime entir ely unrelated to

c rack cocaine would be enti tled t o resentencing. Section

8 41( b) provi d es p enaltie s asso ciated with other controlled

substa nces besid e s c o c a i n e b a s e

. So

, if we trea t § 841(a) as

th e crime of conv ictio n, defendants co nvicted of , say, heroin

offense s, w ould be entitled to resentencing beca use the

penaltie s in § 841 (b) hav e bee n mo dified. That o u t c o m e

would be o d d , to say the l east

. The Fa ir Sentencing Ac t was

m e a n t to “ restore fairn ess to Federal coca ine sentencing.”

Pub. L. 111

– 22 0 , § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 23 72 (2010). Allowing

defendants convicte d of crimes u n r e l a t e d t o c o c a i n e to b e

resentenc e d doe s not further th e sta ted pur pose

. I t i s d i f

f i c u l t

t o b e l i e v e t h a t i s w h a t C o n g r e s s h a d i n m i n d

. 6

6 The First Circu it ackn owl edge d t his poin t , o b serving

t hat a “ diff

icul t que stion would be whether a vi olat ion

of § 841(a)( 1) invol ving onl y a controlled s ubstance other

t han crack cocaine (h eroin, for e xample) would al so be

consid ered a ‘ covered off ense. ’ ” Smith , 954 F.3d at 450 n. 5

. Th e c ourt decli ne d to reach the is su e , t h ough

, because it was

not square ly p res e nted. Id

. Yet the clear im plication of

S mith ’ s holding is that non

- crack offense s would indeed

quali fy as covered of

fenses und er t he First Step Act

.14 2. S ub s e c t i o n 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) w a s n o t

m o d i f i e d

.

T h e o n l y q u e s t i o n t h a t r e m a i n s i s w h e t h e r

§ 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) w a s m o d i f i e d b y t h e F a i r S entenc ing A c t a n d

t h u s

, i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 )

, q u a l i f i e s a s a “ c o v e r e d

o f f e n s e ” u n d e r t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

. 7 T h e a n s w e r i s i t w a s n o t

m o d i f i e d a n d s o d o e s n o t q u a l i f y

.

Although subsect i o n (C ) nowhere mentions a d rug

quan t ity tri gger, Birt argues t hat “Congress n ecess ar ily

modified the weigh t rang e in Section 841(b)(1 ) (C )” by virtue

of t he modifi cation s m a d e to t he other two r e l e v a n t

subsections o f 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 )

. 8 ( Opening Br. at 14.) He f in ds

support for his position in the st atutory text that s a y s

s u b p a r a g r a p h (C) w i l l a p p l y “except as provided in

s ubparagraphs (A ) [ a n d ] ( B )

... . ” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C ).

In his view, tha t means t hat sub p a r a g r a p h (C) in corporated by

7 I t is undisputed that § 841(a)(1) w as not modified in

any wa y by the F air Sentencing Act.

8 T he same provision in (C) a lso ment ions

su bparag raph ( D )

. As alrea dy discussed, subp aragraph ( A) of

§ 841(b)(1) co nt ains in fur ther su bpar ag raph (iii) the

triggering amount of crack for a 10

- year m inimum mandatory

sentence

, an d, sim il arl y, subparagraph (B) c o ntains in furth er

subpa ragraph (iii) t he tri ggering amount for a five

- yea r

m inimu m mandatory sentence . Subparagraph (D) est a blishes

ma xi mum sentences for certain marijuana crimes and is not

rel evant here.15 reference the pena l t y t r i g g e r s in (A) and (B), and thus that all

th r ee were modifie d even though only (A) and (B) were

actually cha nged

. S o B i r t frames the issue a s f o l l o w s :

§ 841(b)(1)(C) app li es in two circumstanc es

– first, when the

s p e c i f i e d amount of crack is below the amou nt that wou ld

trig ge r the mandatory m inimum in 841(b)(1) (B)(iii); or

second, when the a moun t of crack cocaine is unspecifie d.

View e d in that light, § 84 1(b)( 1)(C) w as modified by the Fair

Sentencin g Act becaus e the first circumstance a r i s e s b a s e d o n

t h e m o d i f i e d t r i g g e r i n ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ( i i i )

, i

. e

. , t h e i n c r e a s e f r o m 5

gram s to 28 grams. 9

That arg ument t o o h a s s o m e s u r f a c e a p p e a l

. T h e

p r o b l e m r e m a i n s

, how ever

, t h a t B i r t c a n n o t p o i n t t o a n y

c i r c u m s t a n c e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e o n e c o n v i c t e d u n d e r ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

w o u l d h a v e f

a c e d d i f f e r e n t p e n a l t i e s b e f

o r e a n d a f

t e r t h e

p a s s a g e o f t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

. A s w a s s a i d r e c e n t l y b y a

w e l l

- r e s p e c t e d j u d g e o n t h e c o u r t w h e r e B i r t w a s c o n v i c t e d

, while t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t ’ s increase in the amount of

crack r equired to tri gger a mandatory minimu m penalty under

§ 8 41(a)(1)(B) “did, in turn, incr ease the maximum amount of

[crack] subject to penalty under

... § 841 ( b)(1)(C),

... that did

9 The Fourt h Circui t re cently adopted this line of

reasoning , c oncludin g that “ by incr easing the drug weights t o

which the penalt ies in Subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and

(B)(iii) applied, Congress also increased the crack cocaine

w eights to w hich Subsection 841(b)(1) ( C) applie d and

thereby modified the statu tory penal ty ” for that subsection

. Uni ted States v. Woods on , 2020 WL 344392 5 at *3 ( 4th Cir.

2020). As discussed herein , we respectfully disagree

.16 not affect anyone orig inally sentenced under

... § 841(b)(1 )(C). Put simply, any d efendant

... sentenced

under

... § 841(b)( 1)(C) prio r to the enactment of the Fair

Sentencin g Act would prese ntly be subject to the exact same

statutory penalt y of up to 20 yea rs

. ” Uni ted States v.

Robe rson , No. 99CR80

- 1, 20 19 WL 669991 2, at *3 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 9, 2019) ( M u n l e y

, J

. )

, a p p e a l d o c k e t e d

, N o

. 1 9

- 3 9 7 2

( 3 d C i r

. D e c

. 2 6

, 2 0 1 9 )

. I n s h o r t

, t h e t e x t a n d e f f e c t o f

§ 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) a r e t h e s a m e n o w a s b e f o r e

. 10 T r y a s h e

10 Th at is true both for t hose who were charged w ith

crimes invol v ing an unsp ecified amount of crack and those, if

an y, charg e d with a specified amount below the tri gger found

in subsection 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) . As to the former, “ [ b ] oth

be fore and after the pa ssage of the Fair Sentencing Act of

2 010, a crim inal def endant co nvicted of

violating § 841(b)(1)( C) with r espec t to any u n speci f ied

quantity of a Schedule I or I I co ntrolled substance would be

subject under the provision to a statutor y range of 0 to 20

ye ars of impris onment. ” United States v . Hunter , N o.

3:05C R54 (J B A) , 2019 WL 1220311, at *2 (D. Conn

. Mar. 15 , 201 9)

. As to the la tter, it is a practical certain ty tha t

those de fendants would face no negative consequences. If th e

amount char ged was less than 5 grams, then the Fair

Sentencing Act cha nged nothing b e c a u s e § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) w a s

a l w a y s t h e o n l y a p p l i c a b l e sub s e c t i o n

. If th e amount w as

more than 5 grams, t h ose de fendant s wo uld at least in theory

have been subjected already to the earlier mandato r y

minimum sentences ( i.e.

, those in eff e ct before the enactment

o f the Fair Sentencing Act) found in (b)(1) (A)(iii ) o r

(b)(1) (B)(iii) a n d so have an arg ument for el igib ility fo r r elief

under the First S tep A ct.17 m i g h t

, B i r t c a n n o t c h a n g e t h a t

, a n d

, a ccordingly, conviction s

u n d e r t h a t s u b s e c t i o n a r e n o t “ c o v e r e d o f f e n s e s

, ” a s d e f

i n e d

b y t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

.

T he Supreme Court has g i v e n s o m e t h i n g o f a n

i n d i r e c t e n d o r s e m e n t o f this view. I n ex pla ining t h e e f f e c t o f

t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t

, t h e C o u r t has o b s e r v e d

, a s w e h a v e

h e r e

, t hat i t “ incr eased the drug amounts triggeri ng mandatory

minim ums for crack traf ficking offenses from 5 grams to 28

grams in re sp ect to t h e 5

– year min imum and from 5 0 grams

to 280 grams in respect to the 10

– year minimum [. ] ” Dorsey v.

United States , 56 7 U.S. 26 0, 269 (2 012)

. T h e C o u r t t h e n

c i t e d § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( i i i ) a n d 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ( i i i ) b u t m a d e n o

r e f e r e n c e t o § 841(b)(1)(C)

. T hat charact e rization o f t h e

e f f e c t s o f t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t c a n b e s e e n a s r e c o g n i z i n g

that § 841(b)(1)(C), which imposes no man dat ory minimum,

was not m o d i f

i e d

.

I t i s u n s u r

p r i s i n g

, t h e n

, t h a t m a n y courts around the

count ry have concluded that § 841(b)(1)( C) was not

“modified” by the F a ir Sen ten cing A c t

, within the meaning of

the F i r s t S t e p A c t

. 11 W e l i k e w i s e h o l d t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r

11 See, e.g., United States v. Foley , 798 F. App'x. 534,

536 (11th Cir. 2020) (unp ublished) (holding that “ [ s] ections

2 a nd 3 of the Fair Sente ncing Act modi fi ed 21 U.S.C.

§§ 8 41( b)(1)( A)(iii ), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 844(a), 960(b)(1)(C),

and 960(b)(2)(C)

—

but, import antly her e, n ot

§ 841(b)(1)(C ) ” ); United States v. Brown , 785 F. App’x 189,

190 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Because the Fair

Sentenci ng Act did not m odify the statutory penalties for18 § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) i s n o t a “ c o v e r e d o f f e n s e ”

w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t

. B i r t i s t h e r e f o r e

i n e l i g i b l e f

o r t h e r e l i e f h e s e e k s

.

III. CONCLUSI ON

F or the foregoing reasons, we will aff i rm t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ’ s d e n i a l o f B i r t ’ s m o t i o n f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g

.

[ § 841(b)(1)(C)] , [the defe ndant’s] offense is not a covered

offense and the district court correctly denied [the] motion to

reduce his sentence pursuant to § 404 of the F irst Step Act.”);

United States v. Duggan , 771 F. A pp’x 261, 261 (4th Cir.

2019) (per curiam) (“The offense for which Duggan was

convicted and sentenced

— possession with intent to distribute

a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1) ( C)

—

was not modified by section 2 or 3 of the

2010 F SA. The d istrict court thus lacked jurisdiction to

reduce Du ggan’s sentence under the 2018 [First Step Act].”

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B))); United States v.

Wiseman , 932 F .3d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 20 1 9) (“Because

Wiseman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1 )(C),

not § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the First Step Act [] . . . would not

impact him, even if he had been sentenced after the First Step

Act’s effective date.”) ; United Stat es v. Martinez , 777 F.

Ap p ’ x 946, 947 (10th Cir. 2019) (“ The Fair Sen tencing Act

had no effect on § 841(b )(1)(C) and, thus, [th e] cri me of

con viction is not a ‘ c overed offense ’ under the Act. ”);

Rober son , 2019 W L 669991 2 at *3 (finding that

§ 841(b)(1)(C) is n ot a “cov ered offense ” under the F i r s t S t e p

A c t ); United States v. Washin gton , No. 1:07

- CR

- 04 01, 2019

WL 4273862 , at *2 (M .D. Pa . Sept . 1 0, 2019) (same).