FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DEC 19, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-11568

________________________

Agency No. 13434-03

ROLAND WOMACK, 

MARIE WOMACK, 

Petitioners-Appellants, 

versus 

COMMISSIONER OF IRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

______________________

No. 07-11569

_______________________

Agency No. 19829-03

ANASTASIOS SPIRIDAKOS,

MARIA SPIRIDAKOS,

Petitioners-Appellants,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF IRS,

Respondent-Appellee.
Honorable Beverly B. Martin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of *

Georgia, sitting by designation. 

2

________________________

Appeals from Decisions of the

United States Tax Court

_________________________

(December 19, 2007)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and MARTIN,*

District Judge.

MARTIN, District Judge:

This is an appeal by Florida State Lottery winners from the United States

Tax Court’s decision that proceeds from the sale of the rights to future installment

payments from lottery winnings (“Lottery Rights”) are taxable as ordinary income,

rather than at the lower tax rate applied to the sale of a long term capital asset. The

Tax Court specifically held that Lottery Rights are not capital assets as defined in

26 U.S.C. § 1221 (“Section 1221"), under the judicially established substitute for

ordinary income doctrine. We affirm.

I. Background

Roland Womack won a portion of an $8,000,000 Florida State Lottery

(“Florida Lotto”) prize on January 20, 1996. At the time, the prize was payable

only in twenty annual installments of $150,000. Mr. Womack received four such
As required by Florida state law, Fla. Stat. § 24.1153(1), Mr. Womack and Ms. Spiridakos 1

each obtained Circuit Court approval to assign their respective rights to receive future lottery

winnings.

3

annual installments from 1996 to 1999, and he reported those payments as ordinary

income on the federal tax returns he filed jointly with his wife, Marie Womack.

In 1999, Florida amended its law to permit lottery winners to assign Lottery

Rights. Fla. Stat. § 24.1153. Mr. Womack subsequently sold the right to receive

the remaining sixteen payments to Singer Asset Finance Company (“Singer”) in

exchange for a sum of $1,328,000. The total face value of the remaining payments

was $2,400,000. The Womacks reported the amount received from Singer on their

2000 joint federal income tax return as proceeds from the sale of a long term

capital asset.

Maria Spiridakos is also a Florida Lotto winner. She won a $6,240,000

prize on January 6, 1990, payable in 20 annual installments of $312,000. She

received ten annual payments and, from 1990 to 1999, she and her husband,

Anastasios Spiridakos, reported those payments as ordinary income on their jointly

filed federal income tax returns. Ms. Spiridakos sold the right to receive her

remaining payments to Singer for $2,125,000, which the Spiridakoses reported on

their 2000 joint federal income tax return as proceeds from the sale of a long term

capital asset.1
Including the Womacks and the Spiridakoses, 59 Florida Lotto winners have agreed to be 2

bound by the decision in this case. Womack v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2006-240, 2006 WL 3208890, at

*1 & n.1 (Nov. 7, 2006).

4

The IRS issued notices of deficiency to the Womacks and the Spiridakoses

(collectively, “Taxpayers”) for failure to pay tax on the lump sum payment as

ordinary income. Taxpayers each filed a petition with the Tax Court seeking a

redetermination. The Tax Court consolidated the petitions and denied both on

November 7, 2006. Taxpayers now appeal.2

II. Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482, which

specifies that we review Tax Court decisions “in the same manner and to the same

extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 26

U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review the Tax Court’s interpretations of the Internal

Revenue Code de novo. L.V. Castle Inv. Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 465 F.3d 1243,

1245 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. Discussion

The question before us is whether Lottery Rights are “capital assets” as

defined by Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1221. Income

representing proceeds from the sale or exchange of a capital asset that a taxpayer

holds for over a year is considered a “capital gain,” 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3), and is
As the Tax Court noted, for the year 2000, the maximum tax rate for the payment Taxpayers 3

received was 39.6% if ordinary income, and 20% if a capital gain. Womack v. Comm’r, T.C.M.

2006-240, 2006 WL 3208890, at *4 n.4 (Nov. 7, 2006).

The definition, in full, states: 4

For purposes of this subtitle, the term ‘capital asset’ means property held by the taxpayer (whether

or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include--

(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be

included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held

by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;

(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance

for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business;

(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or

similar property, held by--

(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,

(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom

such property was prepared or produced, or

(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for purposes

of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by reference to the basis of such

property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B);

(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for

services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1);

(5) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional Record)

which is received from the United States Government or any agency thereof, other than by purchase

at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held by--

(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or

(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined, for

purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by reference to the basis

of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A);

(6) any commodities derivative financial instrument held by a commodities derivatives

dealer, unless--

(A) it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such instrument has no

connection to the activities of such dealer as a dealer, and

(B) such instrument is clearly identified in such dealer's records as being described

in subparagraph (A) before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered into

(or such other time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe);

(7) any hedging transaction which is clearly identified as such before the close of the day on

5

taxed at a favorable rate. Other income, or “ordinary income,” is taxed at a higher 3

rate. Section 1221 defines a capital asset as any property the taxpayer holds, but

excludes certain items from the definition. Taxpayers held their Lottery Rights for 4
which it was acquired, originated, or entered into (or such other time as the Secretary may by

regulations prescribe); or

(8) supplies of a type regularly used or consumed by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of

a trade or business of the taxpayer.

26 U.S.C. § 1221(a).

6

more than one year before selling them, so Taxpayers may report the lump sum

payment they received in consideration as a capital gain if Lottery Rights are

considered a capital asset. 

The Tax Court and the four U.S. Circuit Courts to consider the question have

concluded that Lottery Rights are not a capital asset within the definition set forth

in Section 1221. E.g., Prebola v. Comm’r, 482 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2007); Watkins

v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006); Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399 (3d

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007); United States v. Maginnis, 356

F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 1 (2002). These decisions

are based on the so-called substitute for ordinary income doctrine, which provides

that when a party receives a lump sum payment as “essentially a substitute for what

would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income” that lump sum

payment is taxable as ordinary income as well. Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356

U.S. 260, 265, 78 S. Ct. 691, 694, 2 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1958). We agree that the

substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies to Lottery Rights, and therefore that

proceeds from the sale of Lottery Rights are taxable as ordinary income.
7

A. The Substitute for Ordinary Income Doctrine

The statutory definition of capital asset “has . . . never been read as broadly

as the statutory language might seem to permit, because such a reading would

encompass some things Congress did not intend to be taxed as capital gains.” 

Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1181. Congress intended ordinary income to be the default

tax rate, with capital gains treatment an exception applicable only in appropriate

cases. In fact, “the term ‘capital asset’ is to be construed narrowly in accordance

with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations

typically involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a

substantial period of time.” Comm’r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130,

134, 80 S. Ct. 1497, 1500, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1617 (1960). This interpretation prevents

taxpayers from circumventing ordinary income tax rates by selling rights to future

ordinary income payments in exchange for a lump sum. See Lake, 356 U.S. at

265, 78 S. Ct. at 694. 

The doctrine is attributed to four seminal Supreme Court cases: Hort v.

Commissioner, Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor

Transport, Inc., and United States v. Midland-Ross Corp. The taxpayer in Hort,

313 U.S. 28, 29, 61 S. Ct. 757, 757, 85 L. Ed. 1168 (1941), a building owner,

received a lump sum in exchange for cancelling a lease on the property. The sum

was taxable as ordinary income because it was “essentially a substitute” for the
8

rental payments, themselves obviously ordinary income. Id. at 31, 61 S. Ct. at 758. 

In Lake, 356 U.S. at 261-62, 78 S. Ct. at 692-93, the taxpayer, a corporation,

assigned a portion of oil and sulphur payment rights to its president in

consideration for the cancellation of a debt the corporation owed to the president. 

The Supreme Court considered the profit to be in essence a substitution for the oil

and sulphur payments that the corporation would have otherwise received in the

future, and held it taxable as ordinary income for that reason. Id. at 265, 78 S. Ct.

at 694. 

The Gillette taxpayer owned a motor vehicle facility during World War II,

which the government assumed control of and for which it paid just compensation. 

Gillette, 364 U.S. at 131-32, 80 S. Ct. at 1499. Though the taking involved

“property” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, that fact “[did]

not answer the entirely different question whether [the compensation] comes

within the capital-gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id. at 133, 80

S. Ct. at 1500. Indeed, the Supreme Court held the compensation paid to taxpayer

taxable as ordinary income. Id. at 136, 80 S. Ct. at 1501. Finally, in MidlandRoss, 381 U.S. 54, 55-56, 85 S. Ct. 1308, 1309, 14 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1965), the

taxpayer bought noninterest-bearing promissory notes subject to an original issue

discount, and then sold them for more than the issue price but still less than face

value. The Supreme Court held that the gains attributable to the original issue
We note that Taxpayers’ initial brief is strikingly similar to that of the appellants in 5

Maginnis. Opening Br. of Maginnis et al., Defs.-Appellants, United States v. Maginnis, No. 02-

35664, Feb. 1. 2003. Thus, the Maginnis court confronted, and rejected, largely the same arguments

that Taxpayers raise here. 

9

discount were taxable as ordinary income, noting the similarity to stated interest. 

Id. at 57-58, 85 S. Ct. at 1310. The overall effect of these cases has been to narrow

what a mechanical application of Section 1221 would otherwise cause to be treated

as a capital asset. 

With that background, four Circuits have reviewed the precise legal question

we face here under materially identical circumstances. Each Circuit has 5

concluded that Lottery Rights are substitutes for ordinary income, but came to this

conclusion in different ways. The Ninth Circuit used a case-by-case analysis, but

focused on two factors in particular: that the taxpayer “(1) did not make any

underlying investment of capital in return for the receipt of his lottery right, and

(2) the sale of his right did not reflect an accretion in value over cost to any

underlying asset [he] held.” Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183. Though the Maginnis

court noted that these factors would not be dispositive in all cases, the Third

Circuit in Lattera, 437 F.3d at 404-09, found the factors problematic, and instead

formulated its own approach, which it termed the “family resemblance” test. 

Within the confines of this test, the Third Circuit analyzed the nature of the sale

and the character of the asset, specifically, whether the payment was for the future
10

right to earn income or for the future right to earned income. Id. at 409. The

Second and Tenth Circuits did not explicitly adopt the Maginnis reasoning or the

Lattera test, but held that “whatever the [substitute for ordinary income] doctrine’s

outer limits, this case falls squarely within them.” Prebola, 482 F.3d at 612; see

Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1273 (“[W]e need not formulate any specific test regarding

the appropriate limits of the doctrine's application.”); Wolman v. Comm’r, 180

Fed. Appx. 830, 831 (10th Cir. 2006) (“For the same reasons stated in Watkins, we

reject the Wolmans’ argument and hold that the lump sum payments were taxable

as ordinary income.”).

We agree with our sister circuits that Lottery Rights are a clear case of a

substitute for ordinary income. A lottery winner who has not sold the right to his

winnings to a third party must report the winnings as ordinary income whether the

state pays him in a lump sum or in installments. See 26 U.S.C. § 165(d)

(describing tax treatment for losses from wagering transactions); Comm’r v.

Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 32 & n.11, 107 S. Ct. 980, 986 & n.11, 94 L. Ed. 2d 25

(1987) (describing the lottery as a form of public gambling subject to 26 U.S.C.

§ 165(d)’s provision regarding wagering losses). Thus, when a lottery winner sells

the right to his winnings, he replaces future ordinary income. In defining “capital

asset,” Congress did not intend for taxpayers to circumvent ordinary income tax

treatment by packaging ordinary income payments and selling them to a third
As they are stated in Maginnis, these factors are obviously imperfect. For example, relying 6

on the taxpayer’s underlying investment ignores legitimate capital assets obtained through gifts or

inheritances, and consideration of accretion in value excludes capital assets that typically depreciate,

such as cars. See Lattera, 437 F.3d at 405. The Maginnis court properly observed that the factors

would not be dispositive in every case. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183. A court would have no

occasion to evaluate these factors where the asset sold is something other than a claim to ordinary

income, such as a car. The factors do, however, serve to emphasize the essence of a capital

transaction: “that the sale or exchange of an asset results in a return of a capital investment coupled

with realized gain or loss.” Holt v. Comm’r, 303 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Gillette,

364 U.S. at 134, 80 S. Ct. at 1500 (“This Court has long held that the term ‘capital asset’ is to be

construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains treatment

only in situations typically involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a

11

party. See Lake, 356 U.S. at 265, 78 S. Ct. at 694 (illustrating courts’ need to

protect against “artful devices”).

There are important differences between Lottery Rights and the typical

capital asset. The sale of a capital asset captures the increased value of the

underlying asset. Perhaps the most common example occurs when a taxpayer

purchases shares of stock, owns the shares for longer than a year, and then sells

them at a higher price. The taxpayer makes an underlying investment in a capital

asset when he purchases the stock. When he sells the shares at a higher price, the

gain represents an increase in the value of the original investment. As the Ninth

Circuit noted in Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183, Lottery Rights lack these

characteristics emblematic of capital assets -- Lottery Rights involve no underlying

investment of capital. Furthermore, any “gain” from their sale reflects no change

in the value of the asset. It is simply the amount Taxpayers would have received

eventually, discounted to present value. 

6
substantial period of time . . . .”). We also note that the tax treatment of gifts, inheritances, and sales

of automobiles is well established and neither relevant to nor affected by the issues in this case. 

12

Furthermore, when a lottery winner sells Lottery Rights, he transfers a right

to income that is already earned, not a right to earn income in the future. See

Lattera, 437 F.3d at 407-09. The Fifth Circuit long ago drew this distinction in

United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963), when it held

that proceeds from the grant of an exclusive license to use an oil well surveying

patent warranted capital gains treatment. Recognizing the “vast difference between

the present sale of the future right to earn income and the present sale of the future

right to earned income,” id. at 59, the Dresser court noted that an exclusive patent

license is property that can produce unknown income in the future, as opposed to

property that represents income payments already certain in amount, but to be paid

in the future. 

A capital asset has the potential to earn income in the future based on the

owner’s actions in using it. Lottery winners, by contrast, are “entitled to the

income merely by virtue of owning the property.” Note, Thomas G. Sinclair,

Limiting the Substitute-for-Ordinary-Income Doctrine: An Analysis Through Its

Most Recent Application Involving the Sale of Future Lottery Rights, 56 S.C. L.

Rev. 387, 406 (2004); see Lattera, 437 F.3d at 409-10; Dresser, 324 F.2d at 59. 

Income need not be accrued for tax purposes to be “earned” in this sense. Cf.
 Ark. Best, 485 U.S. at 216-18, 108 S. Ct. at 974-75, addressed the question of whether the 7

taxpayer’s motive in acquiring an asset, either a business motive or an investment motive,

determines whether it is a capital asset or an ordinary asset. The substitute for ordinary income

doctrine was not relevant to the decision. 

13

Thomas v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. Ohio 1999), aff’d, 213 F.3d 927

(6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a lottery winner must report income from winnings

during the period the payment was received). Thus, income from a lottery

payment is earned income despite the fact that it does not accrue until the

scheduled annual payment date. Proceeds from the sale of Lottery Rights are a

clear substitute for ordinary income and are taxable as ordinary income. 

1. Effect of Arkansas Best

We briefly address Taxpayers’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision

in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm’r, 485 U.S. 212, 108 S. Ct. 971, 99 L. Ed. 2d 183

(1988), significantly limited the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. Like

other courts that have confronted it, we reject this contention. Maginnis, 356 F.3d

at 1185; Lattera, 437 F.3d at 403-04; Davis, 119 T.C. at 6; Gladden v. Comm’r,

112 T.C. 209, 221 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 262 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001);

FNMA v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 541, 573 & n.30 (1993). 

The Arkansas Best Court discussed the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine in a footnote. The footnote reads, in full: 7

Petitioner mistakenly relies on cases in which this Court, in narrowly

applying the general definition of “capital asset,” has “construed
14

‘capital asset’ to exclude property representing income items or

accretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly

attributable to income,” even though these items are property in the

broad sense of the word. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381

U.S. 54, 57, 85 S. Ct. 1308, 1310, 14 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1965). See, e.g.,

Comm’r v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 80 S. Ct. 1497, 4 L. Ed.

2d 1617 (1960) (“capital asset” does not include compensation

awarded taxpayer that represented fair rental value of its facilities);

Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 78 S. Ct. 691, 2 L. Ed. 2d

243 [sic] (1958) (“capital asset” does not include proceeds from sale

of oil payment rights); Hort v. Comm’r, 313 U.S. 28, 61 S. Ct. 757, 85

L. Ed. 1168 (1941) (“capital asset” does not include payment to lessor

for cancellation of unexpired portion of a lease). This line of cases,

based on the premise that § 1221 “property” does not include claims

or rights to ordinary income, has no application in the present context.

Petitioner sold capital stock, not a claim to ordinary income.

Ark. Best, 485 U.S. at 217 n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 975 n.5 (emphasis added and citation

formatting modified). This footnote affirmed that the substitute for ordinary

income doctrine applies to “property” that represents a claim to ordinary income. 

Taxpayers urge a different interpretation. They focus on the Court’s use of

the word “narrowly” and insist that the factual scenarios corresponding to the four

Supreme Court cases cited in the footnote, Hort, Lake, Gillette, and Midland-Ross,

are the only surviving remnants of the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. 

They argue that because the footnote “directly clashes with the body of the opinion

. . . the only logical reading of the use of the term ‘narrowly’ in footnote 5 is that

only in those particular ‘narrow’ factual situations that existed in the cited cases is

the [d]octrine applicable.” (Br. for the Appellants 42.) 
15

Taxpayers’ reading is not the natural one. In the footnote, the word

“narrowly” modifies the phrase that immediately follows, “applying the general

definition of ‘capital asset.’” The footnote unambiguously explains that in the

cited cases, the Court applied the statutory definition of capital asset narrowly. It

in no way implies that the Court applied the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine narrowly, nor hints that the Court would confine the doctrine to the facts

of the cases it cites. To the contrary, the Court cites general language that indicates

that it would apply the doctrine in any situation involving “‘income items or

accretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly attributable to

income.’” Ark. Best, 485 U.S. at 217 n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 975 n.5 (quoting MidlandRoss, 381 U.S. at 57, 85 S. Ct. at 1310). We have no trouble reconciling this

footnote with the body of the Arkansas Best opinion for the reasons stated in the

footnote itself: the taxpayer in that case “sold capital stock, not a claim to ordinary

income.” Id. We reject Taxpayers’ attempt to limit the substitute for ordinary

income doctrine in an unreasonable manner not suggested by the relevant case law. 

This is not to say that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies

upon the sale of every asset that produces ordinary income. Taken to its logical

extreme, the substitute for ordinary income doctrine would obliterate capital gains

treatment altogether because a capital asset’s present value is often based on its

future ability to produce revenue in the form of ordinary income. Maginnis, 356
16

F.3d at 1182. We acknowledge that the doctrine has its outer limits, but we do not

define them here. We merely recognize that Arkansas Best did not circumscribe

the substitute for the ordinary income doctrine. See, e.g., Maginnis, 356 F.3d at

1185; Lattera, 437 F.3d at 403-04.

B. “Property” Under Section 1221

As Taxpayers note, Arkansas Best makes clear that if a given asset is not

listed within Section 1221’s exclusions, it is a capital asset unless it is not

considered “property.” Ark. Best, 485 U.S. at 217-18, 108 S. Ct. at 975. The

pertinent Treasury Department regulation also provides that “[t]he term capital

assets includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by section 1221.” 

26 C.F.R. § 1.1221-1(a). The parties do not dispute that Lottery Rights are not

within the statutory exclusions. Therefore, in deciding that the substitute for

ordinary income doctrine applies, we necessarily find that Lottery Rights do not

constitute “property” as that term is used in Section 1221. 4 Mertens Law of

Federal Income Taxation § 22:4 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Mertens] (“In situations

where the court determines that the intangible right is a substitute for ordinary

income, the court concludes (either implicitly or explicitly) that the asset sold does

not constitute property for purposes of Section 1221.”). 

Taxpayers also note that Lottery Rights are property in the ordinary sense of

the term and for purposes of other state and federal laws. We recognize that
 Taxpayers argue that Gillette’s statement about “property” should be confined to the narrow 8

context of that case. Courts applying the substitute for ordinary income doctrine have relied on this

statement as a general proposition. E.g., Midland-Ross, 381 U.S. at 56-57, 85 S. Ct. at 1310;

Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1271-72. 

17

Lottery Rights are property for most other purposes, but “property” under Section

1221 is a narrower concept. Gillette, 364 U.S. at 134-35, 80 S. Ct. at 1500-01;

Mertens, supra, § 22:4 (“The mere fact, however, that the asset in question

constitutes ‘property’ in the broad sense of the word does not mean that such asset

constitutes property for purposes of Section 1221 or that the property constitutes a

capital asset.”); Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital Gain Where

Rights to Future Income are Sold, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 737-38 (1956)

(“‘Property,’ as it is broadly used in other areas of the law, includes such items as

unpaid claims for personal services or for accrued rents. Unless Congress intended

that holders of such claims to ordinary income would be able by selling them to

transform ordinary income into capital gain, ‘property’ for the purposes of section

1221 is a more limited concept.”). As the Supreme Court has stated, “it is evident

that not everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and which is

outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset.” Gillette, 364 U.S. at

134, 80 S. Ct. at 1500. The Court again recognized in Arkansas Best that a literal 8

reading of the term “property” is not appropriate where such a reading would

include ordinary income and substitutes for ordinary income. See Ark. Best, 485
18

U.S. at 217 n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 975 n.5 (describing the assets falling within the

substitute for ordinary income doctrine as “property in the broad sense of the

word”); see also Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory

Analysis: Say What You Mean & Mean What You Say, 66 Miss. L.J. 37, 106

(1996) (“If the literal language of [Section 1221] were followed, taxpayers could

convert much of their ordinary income to capital gain merely by selling the right to

the income before the payment was actually made.”). 

This interpretation, which courts repeatedly adopt, gives effect to

congressional intent. In defining “capital asset,” Congress used the term

“property” to mean “not income” -- that is, “property” serves to distinguish assets

suitable for capital gains treatment from mere income. “Property” in the most

general sense means anything owned, which would also include income and any

rights or claims to it. Even if other statutes use “property” in this broad sense, to

exclude substitutes for income in determining what constitutes a capital asset is

consistent with the word “property.” No other interpretation of “property” would

harmonize with the statute’s purpose, as the very nature of the term “capital asset”

excludes what is in essence ordinary income. See Stanley S. Surrey, Definitional

Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 985, 987-88 (1956) (“Since

in one sense everything that the taxpayer holds is ‘property’ and hence will be a

capital asset, at this point it would seem to follow that all income could well be
19

‘capital gain’ . . . .”). Indeed, in applying the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine, the Gillette court declined to use the all-inclusive definition of property

the Supreme Court espoused in one of its earlier decisions, Crane v. Comm’r, 331

U.S. 1, 6, 67 S. Ct. 1047, 1051, 91 L. Ed. 1301 (1947) (interpreting “property” as

anything subject to ownership). Rather, the Gillette court confirmed that some

things that would normally be “property” are not capital assets, even if no statutory

exclusion covers them. Gillette, 364 U.S. at 134, 80 S. Ct. at 1500. Lottery

Rights, as we explained above, are substitutes for ordinary income. We now

address two of Taxpayers’ arguments related to specific types of property. 

1. Accounts Receivable

Taxpayers argue that Lottery Rights are property because they are “accounts

receivable.” Section 1221 excludes from the definition of capital asset certain

types of accounts receivable, specifically “accounts or notes receivable acquired in

the ordinary course of trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of

property described in paragraph (1).” 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(4). The exclusion of

business-related accounts receivable, according to Taxpayers, implies that all other

types of accounts receivable are property, because otherwise that exclusion would

be surplusage. 

Taxpayers’ primary support for their argument that Lottery Rights are

accounts receivable comes from the Uniform Commercial Code, which defines
20

“account” to include rights to payment “as winnings in a lottery or other game of

chance operated or sponsored by a State.” U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2). But the Internal

Revenue Code does not define “accounts receivable.” As the Fifth Circuit stated in

a case involving contractual rights in a mortgage servicing agency, “[t]he fact that

[those rights] constitute a species of ‘property’ under state law affords no

assistance in determining whether such rights are capital assets.” Bisbee-Baldwin

Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Miller v. Comm’r,

299 F.2d 706, 708 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that although ordinary property concepts

are relevant, non-tax definitions are “certainly not binding” on a court interpreting

Section 1221). 

In any event, the status of Lottery Rights as accounts receivable is a separate

question from whether Lottery Rights fall under the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine. As the Maginnis court stated: “Although some accounts receivable not

covered by 1221(a)(4)'s exception will be capital assets, under the substitute for

ordinary income doctrine, some will not be capital assets. Assuming without

deciding that Maginnis’ lottery right was an account receivable, that fact does not

affect our analysis.” Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1187 n.9. In other words, even if a

certain asset is classified as a non-business-related account receivable, the

application of the substitute for ordinary income doctrine is not necessarily
 This is consistent with Arkansas Best. There, the Court rejected a taxpayer’s reading of 9

Section 1221 that would have made surplusage of the statutory exceptions. Ark. Best, 485 U.S. at

218, 108 S. Ct. at 975. The Arkansas Best taxpayer argued that the exceptions in the statute were

“illustrative, rather than exhaustive,” and suggested that the Court was free to create additional

exceptions. Id. at 217, 108 S. Ct. at 975. The court rejected that argument, but distinguished cases

in which courts apply the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. Id. at 217 n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 975

n.5. The doctrine’s purpose is to narrow the statutory language in order to effect congressional

intent. By contrast, where no substitute for ordinary income is involved, Arkansas Best requires a

21

precluded, if the asset is otherwise a substitute for ordinary income under the

principles of the doctrine. 

We acknowledge the merits of Taxpayers’ statutory interpretation argument. 

But in order to effect congressional intent, courts applying the substitute for

ordinary income doctrine sometimes reach a different result than they would

applying bare interpretive canons without context. See In re Griffith, 206 F.3d

1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that canons of construction “‘are no more

than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation.’”)

(quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149,

117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)). The substitute for ordinary income doctrine prioritizes

substance over form to eliminate capital gains treatment in situations involving

claims for ordinary income. See Lake, 356 U.S. at 266, 78 S. Ct. at 695 (“The

substance of what was assigned was the right to receive future income.”). 

Congress did not intend to tax lottery winnings as capital gains. Thus, whether or

not Lottery Rights are “accounts receivable,” they are not capital assets under

Section 1221.9
broad reading of Section 1221 that would result in capital gains treatment unless one of the listed

exceptions applies. Arkansas Best supports an approach in which courts analyze the substitute for

ordinary income doctrine somewhat independently of the bare statutory text. See id. at 217 & n.5,

108 S. Ct. at 975 & n.5. 

 Taxpayers note that assets classified as debt instruments under § 1275 are traditionally 10

capital assets under § 1221, but do not cite any authority for this proposition. We did not locate any

cases in which an asset was held to be a capital asset under § 1221 because it was a debt instrument

under § 1275, and we agree with the Tax Court below that § 1275 is not determinative of capital

asset status under § 1221. Womack v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2006-240, 2006 WL 3208890, at *8

(Nov. 7, 2006). In any event, we accept the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1275 in Maginnis,

356 F.3d at 1187, which excludes Lottery Rights.

22

2. Debt Instruments

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Taxpayers' argument that Lottery Rights are

“debt instruments” under 26 U.S.C. § 1275. That section defines “debt instrument”

as “a bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness.” 26

U.S.C. § 1275(a)(1)(A). Taxpayers argue that Lottery Rights are property, and

therefore capital assets, because they are “evidence of indebtedness.” In 10

confronting the same argument, the Maginnis court cited Deputy v. du Pont, 308

U.S. 488, 498, 60 S. Ct. 363, 368, 84 L. Ed. 416 (1940), in which the Supreme

Court stated that “‘interest on indebtedness’ means compensation for the use or

forbearance of money.” Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1187. For example, an individual

borrowing money from a bank pays interest to the bank in exchange for having

access to the bank’s money up front. The Maginnis court stated that a lottery

winner “receive[s] his right to payments from the state . . . as a prize, not as any

compensation for the use or forbearance of money, and therefore the lottery right
23

d[oes] not constitute evidence of an indebtedness from [the state] to [the lottery

winner].” Id. We agree. That Lottery Rights are traded in the financial

marketplace is irrelevant to an asset’s characterization under Section 1275. In

determining whether Lottery Rights are evidence of indebtedness, we look to the

party allegedly indebted, here the state of Florida. Florida incurred no debt when it

undertook the obligation to make prize payments to lottery winners. The lottery

winners won a game of chance, for which they were awarded a certain amount of

money to be paid annually. They lent no money to Florida, and made no promise

to Florida to use money, or to refrain from using money. Lottery Rights are thus

not evidence of Florida’s indebtedness to Taxpayers, nor debt instruments under

Section 1275.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that proceeds from the sale of Lottery

Rights should be taxed as ordinary income under the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine. The Tax Court’s decision is AFFIRMED.