## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE

AUBURN RANCHERIA, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. GAVIN C. NEWSOM, as Governor

, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

S238544

Third Appellate District
C075126

Sacramento County Superior Co urt
34

- 2013

- 80001412CUWMGDS

August 31 , 2020

Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kruger, and Fybel * concurred.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

Chief Justice Cantil

- Sakauye filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Liu concurred.1 U NITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE
AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM

S238544

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

This is a case about how California law applies to the delicate juncture of executive power , federalism, and tribal sovereignty

. Under the federa l Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA ; 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. )

, the U nited S tates Secretary
of the Interior (Interior Secretary) may permit casino

- style gaming on certain land taken into federal trust for an Indian
tribe , so long as the G overnor of the st ate where the land is
located concurs

. But nowhere in the California Constitution is the Governor granted explicit authority to concur in this cooperative

- federalism scheme. We must decide whether the
Governor nonetheless has the authority to concur in t he Interior Secretary’s determination to allow gaming on tribal
trust land in California. 1

W hat we hold is that California law empowers the
Governor to concur

. As amended in 2000, t he California
Constitution permits casino

- style gaming under certain
cond itions on “Indian” and “tribal” lands

— terms that

1 The action was brought against Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. , who c oncu rred in the Interior Secretary’s determination. Because Governor Gavin C. Newsom has since assumed office, we have substituted him as the defendant and respondent. ( Code of Civ. Proc., § 368.5 .)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

2 encompass land where the Governor’s concurrence is required
before casino

- style gaming may occur. Our decision is supported by the Governor’s historical practice of concurring under a variety of federal s tatutes
, the legislatively enacted expectation that the Governor represent the state’s interests in negotiations or proceedings involving the federal government

, and the absence of any explicit constitutional or statutory limits on the Governor’s power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination under IGRA

. These markers of the legal terrain help us map a zone of twilight between the powers of the Governor and the Legislature . B ut they also convey why legislative change s can , by bringing any impl icit gubernatorial power to “its lowest ebb” in this domain, restrict or eliminate the Governor’s

concurrence power. ( Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) ( Youngstown ).)
Because the Legislature has imposed no such restriction, however, we conclude the Governor acted lawfully when he
concurred in the Interior Secretary’s determination

. The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion

, so we affirm.

I.
The California Constitution specifically mentions casino

style gaming , “federally recognized Indian tribes,” and lands
that are “ Indian” and “tribal” “in accordance with federal law.” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) As these provisions

— like
IGRA

— were enacted against the backdrop of longstanding
tribal efforts to establish casino

- style gaming operations on land under their control, we begin with a survey of the relevant history

.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

3 A.
Long before this country ’s founding

, Indian tribes already
existed as “self

- governing sovereign political communities, ”
each with their own distinct lands

. ( United States v. Wheeler (1978) 435 U.S. 313, 322

– 323. ) T ribes haven’t “possessed [] the
f ull attributes of sovereignty” since the federal Constitution was signed, but they remain a “separate people, with the power of reg ulating their internal and social relations.” ( United States v. Kagama (1886) 118 U.S. 375, 381

– 382. ) Yet that

power is bounded, too : U nder the Indian c ommerce c lause of the United States Constitution, Congress possesses the

“ plenary power to legislate in the field of I ndian affairs ” and to limit the powers that tribes otherwise possess. ( Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989) 490 U.S. 163, 192.) So the sovereignty of Indian tribes “is of a unique and limited
character [:] It exists [] at the suffe rance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance ” if and when Congress acts. ( Wheeler

, supra , 435 U.S. at p. 323.)
These implicit contradictions have catalyzed conflicting expectations and struggles for power, with tribal gaming as a recurring f

lashpoint

. G aming is a significant enterprise for
Indian tribes

— it “cannot be understood as . . . wholly separate from the Tribes’ core governmental functions.” ( Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (2014) 572 U.S. 782, 810 ( conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) Gambling operations serve as a means for tribes “to assert their sovereign status and achieve economic independence.” (Mason, Indian Gaming: Tribal Sovereignty and American Politics (2000) p. 4 .) It is partly symbolic: “Gaming [] represents a sta nd for political independence as tribes assert their sovereign right toUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

4 determine for themselves what they can control on tribal lands.” ( Ibid. ) But gaming also serves a practical function:
B ecause of the limits placed on tribal governments’ ability to impose taxes, gaming “may be the only means by which a tribe can raise revenues.” (Struve

, Tribal Immunity and Tribal
Courts (2004) 36 Ariz.St

. L. J. 137, 169.) In that sense, gaming operations are often essential to tribes’ economic self

sufficiency

. Yet from the start, federal and state government s sought

t o curtail gaming on Indian land

. (See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

, Hearing b efore House Com. on Interior and
Insular Affairs on H.R. No. 964 and H.R. No. 2507 , 100th Cong. , 1st Sess., at p. 158 (1 987) , written testimony of Sen.
Reid [ u nless Indian gaming is regulated, “ the hope for controlling organized crime in this country will be lost forever” ].) To prev ent the perverse consequences some legislators believed woul d arise from such activities , Co ngress enacted legislation such as the Johnson Act of 1951 (15 U.S.C. § 1175(a) ) , which outlawed the manufacture, possession, or use of gambling devices, and the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 ( 18 U.S.C. § 1955 ), which made it a federal offense to

eng age in any for

- profit gambling business that was prohibited
under state law.

Because of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs,

s tates initially lacked the authority to regulate tribal gaming. But in 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which

e mpowered six states

— including California

— to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian land. ( 18 U.S .C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321

– 1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 .) When California sought to enforce its state gambling law

— which permitted,UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

5 subject to criminal penalties, gaming only when operated by certain charitable organizations with restrictions on prizes

— against two Indian tribes, the tribes challenged the state’s power to do so. The Supreme Court soon offered a partial answer to the question: To what extent did states have jurisdiction to enforce their own laws against tribes? Ruling in the tribes’ favor, the Court distinguished between laws that were “prohibitory” and those that were “regulatory”: Although Congress had allowed states to enforce proh ibitions on gambling against Indian tribes, it hadn’t bestowed states with

“ civil regulatory power over Indian reservations .” ( California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 210, 208.) Because California ’s gambling law was regulatory in

nature

— “California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular”

— the Court concluded that the state lacked the power to restrict tribal gaming. ( Id. at p. 211.) Following Cabazon , states couldn’t restrict or otherwis e regulate Indian gaming operations unless they prohibited all gaming.

B.
Congress responded to Cabazon ’s new strictures on state regulation of Indian gaming by enacting IGRA . (25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq

. ) Following centuries of conflict over gaming
betwee n tribes, states, and the federal government, Congress’s
purpose was to “balance the need for sound enforcement of gaming laws and regulations, with the strong Federal interest in preserving the sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian land

. ” ( S en

. Rep

. No . 100

- 446 , 2d Sess., p. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. C ode
C ong. & A dmin. N ews, p. 30 75 .) To that end, IGRA dividedUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

6 gaming into three categories: class I, class II, and class III. Class I gaming, those played for “prizes of minimal value,” would be regulated exclusively by Indian tribes. ( 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). ) Class II gaming, which includes higher

- stakes games such as bingo

, was also under the control of Indian
tribes

, unless a state prohibited such g aming for any purpose. ( 25 U.S.C. § § 2703(7)(A)(i)

, 2710 .)

This dispute concerns class III gaming. A ll forms of gaming that aren’t covered by class I or class II gaming come within the ambit of class III

— including casino

- style games such as slot machin es, roulette, and blackjack. (25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).) Because class III gaming can be “a source of substantial revenue for the Indian tribes and a significant rival for traditional private sector gaming facilities,” its regulation
“has been the most contro versial part of [] IGRA and the subject of considerable litigation between various Indian tribes and the states.” ( Flynt v. California Gambling Control
Commission (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1134.) Before a tribe can conduct class III gaming, it must sa tisfy several requirements under IGRA

— such as forming a tribal

- state compact, in which the tribe and the state agree on issues surrounding tribal gaming operations

. 2

2 Class III gaming must also satisfy other requireme nts under IGRA: It must be authorized by an ordinance or resolution adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe and the Chairman of the Nat ional Indian Gaming Commission and located in a s tate that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, orga nization, or entity . These requirements are not at issue in this case.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

7 IGRA also imposes additional requirements for Indian tribes wishing to conduct class III gaming on certain types of
land. The federal government has, throughout our nation’s history, adopted policies that have removed Indian tribes from
their native reservations and radically reduced their land
bases . In an effort to rectify these past wron gs and to reconstitute these land bases

, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). ( 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. ;

see Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 ed.) § 4.04 (3)(a) .) T he IRA allows the Interior Secretary to acquire
and ta ke land into trust f or an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 5108 .) C lass III gaming on land taken into trust after October 17, 1988

— the date Congress enacted IGRA

— may occur only under certain conditions set forth in the federal

statute. The condition at is sue here requires that the Interior Secretary, “ after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, . . . determine[] that a gaming establishment on [those] acquired lands would be in
the best interest of the Indian tribe an d its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.” (25
U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) “[ T ] he Governor of the S tate in which the gaming ” will occur must also “concur[] in the [Interior] Secretary’s determination .” ( Ibid. )

C.
In 2002, the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians (the Enterprise Tribe) made a request culminating in the gubernatorial concurrence at the heart of this case

. The tribe sought for the Interior Secretary to acquire land in Yuba County in trust on the tribe’s beh alf so the Enterprise Tribe
could build a casi no featuring class III gaming. B efore takingUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

8 the land into trust, the Interior Secretary determined that the proposed venue was in t he best interest of the tribe and wasn’t
detrimental to the surrounding commu nity. In accordance
with IGRA ’s requirements , the Interior Secretary notified the
G overnor in 2011 and sought his concur rence in the
determination.
Nearly a decade after the Enterprise Tribe’s initial
request , i n 2012, t he Governor concurred

. He explaine d that conducting class III gaming on that land would “directly benefit” a “large tribal population” of “more than 800 native Californians who face serious economic hardship.” (Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., letter to Interior Secretary Kenneth L.
Salazar , Aug. 30, 2012.) The casino would “create jobs and generate revenue for Yuba County,” which had “a 16% unemployment rate” at the time. ( Ibid .) On the same day he sent his concurrence letter, the Governor executed a tribal

state gaming compact between t he state and the Enterprise
Tribe. A few months later, the Interior Secretary took the land into trust for the Enterprise Tribe.

United Auburn Indian Community owns and operates the Thunder Valley Casino Resort

, located about 20 miles from the proposed site of the Enterprise Tribe’s casino. 3 Believing

3 T he Enterprise Tribe’s casino resort , the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Sacramento at Fir e Mountain, has since opened. (See McGough, Ready to ‘Rock’: Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Sac rame nto u nveils o pening d ate , Sac. Bee (Sept. 6, 2019) <https://www.sacbee.com/article234801132.html> [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020 ]; all Internet citations in this opinion areUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

9 that the Governor’s concurrence was unlawful under state law

, United Auburn filed a petition for a writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief

. The Governor demurred to the complaint, arguing that the California Constitution and state statutes empowered him to concur i n the Interior Secretary’s determination, and that his concurrence didn’t violate the separation of powers

. T he superior court sustained the
de murrer and entered judgment in the Gove rnor’s favor.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. I t rejected each of United
Auburn’s contentions: that the Governor lacked the power to concur under California law, that the Governor’s concurrence was a legislative act that violated the separation of powers,
and that the Governor exceeded his authority by entering into compact negotiations for land that hadn’t yet been taken into trust by the Interior Secretary. ( United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 36, 54.) S hortly after that decision, a different appellate court held that the Governor lacked the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination . ( Stand U p for California ! v. State of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686,
70 5. ) We granted review to resolve the split

. I I.

Under IGRA , the Interior Secretary may allow class III gaming on land the federal government takes into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted if she determines that gaming would be in the best interest of the tribe and would not

archived by year, docket number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>.)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

10 be detrimental to the surrounding community . But it is only
with the concurrence of the Governor from the state where gaming would occur that IGRA allows the Interior Secretary’s
decision to take effect . (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) What IGRA does not resolve is whether the Governor has a legal basis to

concur ; gubernatorial power arises from state constitutional and statutory authority. Although the Governor’s “concurrence (or lack thereof) is given effect under federal law, [] the authority to act is provided by state law.” ( Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. U .S. (9th Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 688, 697.) So we must determine whether California law empowers
the Governor to concur. 4

A.
The power of the Governor is rooted in our state Constitution and further structured by statutes that must themselves conform to constitutional constraints. (See generally Cal. Const., art. V ; Professional Engineers in California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989, 1041.) A brief history of gambling in California helps inform the scope of the Governor’s power in the sphere of tribal gaming.

4 That IGRA requires the Governor’s concurrence before class III gaming can occur on certain trust lands arguably demonstrates a legislatively enacted expectation that state governors generally possess the concurrence power. It’s unlikely that lawmaker s wo uld require governors to exercise a
concurrence power they believed they lacked. Regardless of what federal lawmakers believed, however

, it is in California law that the Governor must find authority.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

11 The California Constitution, as enacted in 1849, prohibited lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IV, § 27.) And when the P enal C ode was enacted in 1872, it prohibited several activities that fall within the ambit of gambling, including slot machines, roulette, and

— whatever it means

— ho key

- pokey. 5 (Pen. Code, § § 330

, 330a

. ) Over time, however, our supreme charter has been amended
several times to loosen those prohibition s

. In 1933, for example, an amendment to the Constitution authorize d the Legislature to allow horse races and horse race wagering. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (b) .) In 1976, the Co nstitution was
amended again to authorize the Legislature to permit bingo gaming for charitable purposes

. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (c) .) And a 1984 constitutional amendment “authorized the establishment of a California State Lottery.” (Cal. Co nst., art. IV, § 19, subd. (d)

. ) These exceptions did not, how e ver, encompass the casino

- style gaming at issue in this case. Indeed, “[i]n 1984, the people of California amended our Constitution to state a fundamental public policy against the

5 Just about the only thing that’s clear about th e te rm

“ hokey

- pokey” is that it wasn’t a reference to the tr aditional children’s dance song. Former Attorney General of California Frederick Howser acknowledged that hokey

- pokey “cannot be defined by consulting any standard reference work,” and even “[e]x haus tive research” had failed to yield any mention of the illicit game. ( “Stud

- Horse Poker” and “ Hokey

- Pokey” Are Illegal Card Games , Healdsburg Tribune (Mar. 28, 1947) p. 7.) It appears to have been a variation on poker. ( See Singsen, Where Will the Bu ck S top on California Penal Code Section 330: Solving the Stud

- Horse Poker Conundrum (1988) 11 Hastings Comm./Ent. L.J. 95, 138

– 139.)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

12 legalizati on in California of casino gambling

. ” ( Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Intern at . Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 5 89 ; see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e ) .) What the Constitution was amended to convey is that “[t]he Legislature has no p ower to authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and
New Jer sey.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)

That prohibition lasted until 2000. That year, California voters enacted Proposition 1A, which amended t he Constitution to give the Governor authority “to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature,
for the operation of slot machines and [other class III gaming] by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in
Califor nia in accordance with federal law. ” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) N otwithstanding the Constitution’s general
restriction on casino

- style gaming, Proposition 1A allowed that

t ype of gaming “ to be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to [triba l

- state] compacts

. ” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f)

. )

T he parties agree that Proposition 1A provides the starting point for our analysis

. They also agree that Proposition 1A doesn’t expressly grant the Governor the power

to concur

— it only authorizes him “to negotiate and conclude
compacts . . . for the operation of slot machines and [other class III gaming] .” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) Where they
differ in their views is whether the ballot initiative’s language,

context , and history, taken together, prohibit the Governor from concurring, and whether the Governor’s concurrence violates the separation of powers.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

13 B

. The Governor’s initial argument is a sweeping one: He
contends that , although Proposition 1A doesn’t expres sly grant the Governor the power to concur, it nevertheless “ presupposes that the Governor possesses [that] power.” Because Proposition 1A allows casino

- style gaming “in accordance with federal law,” and because federal law

— IGRA

— is designed on the pre mise that state governors may concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow gaming on that land, the Governor argues that the California Constitution implicitly
bestows on him the power to offer the requisite concurrence
under IGRA

. U nder the Governor’s proposed interpretation of Proposition 1A, the California Constitution allows gaming to the full extent that federal law permits it

— and no other provision of state law restricts such gaming

. But this precise argument , we conclude, lacks suppo rt in the language of Proposition 1A

. G ubernatorial powers aren’t limited to explicitly enumerated grants of authority. But given the preexisting, constitutionally enshrined policy against casino

style gaming in California, the Governor fails to demonstr ate that the most reasonable reading of Proposition 1A’s phrase “in
accordance with federal law” is one automatically allow ing him
to exercise any conceivable power that IGRA contemplates

governors may exercise over gaming

. Nor does anything in
IGRA’s tex t, structure, or history suggest Congress sought to use federal authority

— assuming it was enough to preempt
state law in this manner

— to unilaterally grant governors the power to concur. So Proposition 1A’s mere reference to federal law does not, by it self, bestow the Governor with the

concurrence power.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

14 That Proposition 1A , by itself, falls short of granting the Governor the power to concur does not resolve the question before us. Even in the absence of an express grant of authority, each branch of government possesses certain inherent and implied powers. (See Spear v. Reeves (1906) 148 Cal. 501, 504.) We’ve often discussed such powers in the context of the judiciary

— courts possess an inherent power “to admit and to discipline attorneys” ( In re A ttorney Discipline System (1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 592) and “ ‘ to punish [parties] for contempt’ ” (

Burns v. Superior Court of City and County of San
Francisco (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 4). T he Legislature can wield
certain implied and inherent powers as well, suc h as the power to investigate ( Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla (2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 499 ) and the “power to create any agency it wishes unless the power is denied it by the Constitution” ( County of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources
Conservation et c. Com. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 361, 375
, fn. 4 ( dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) )

. Some of the powers that inhere to the
executive arise by implication, too . It’s “well settled,” for example, that an executive officer “ may exercise

. . . powers as

are necessary for the due and efficient administration of powers expressly granted by statute” or “may fairly be implied from the statute granting the powers.” ( Dickey v. Raisin
Proration Zone (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 810

, italics omitted .) The Governor’s implied powers include the authority to add a reasonable condition to a prisoner’s pardon or commutation. ( Ex parte Kelly (1908) 155 Cal. 39, 41.)

United Auburn contends that even if inherent and implied powers are within the ambit of the Governor’s authority, the power to concur in the Interior Secretary’sUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

15 determination isn’t among them . Its argument is rooted in article IV, section 19, subdivision (e) of the California
Constitution

— which, as United Auburn characterizes it,

“ states a broad and far

- reaching prohibition o n [casino

- style] gaming.” According to United Auburn , the Governor may not concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class
III gaming on Indian land taken into trust because California
law prohibits class III gaming.
That argument, however , overlooks the pivotal role Proposition 1A plays in the story of how California has regulated gaming . That ballot initiative amended the
California Constitution to allow casino

- style gaming “by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands ” and “ on tribal lands ” in California, “in accordance with federal law.” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f)

, italics added

. ) United
Auburn first urges us to construe this language as referring only to land for which the Governor’s concurrence isn’t required to conduct class III gaming. So according to United Auburn, the voters enacting Proposition 1A would have understood they were allowing for casino

- style gaming on
Indian reservation s , as well as on land taken into trust before
IGRA was enacted and certain l and taken into trust after
IGRA was enacted

— on which casino

- style gaming may take place without the Governor’s concurrence

— but not on land
taken into trust after IGRA’s effective date if the Governor’s concurrence is required for class III gaming on su ch land

. T hat assertion clashes with the meaning of Indian land
under federal law. IGRA defines “ Indian land s” to include “any
lands title to which is [] held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual.” (25 U.S.C.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

16 § 2703(4)(B).) W hen the federal government takes land into trust for an Indian tribe, therefore, that land necessarily
becomes Indian land. This definition of Indian land

— which encompasses reservation land and tribal trust land, regardless
of whether the Governor’s concurrence is required for gaming
on the land

— is supported by federal Indian law more generally. (See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505, 511 [“[No] precedent of this Court has
ever drawn the distinction between tri bal trust land and
reservations ” ]; Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 ed.) § 3.04( 2)(c ) (ii) [“The Supreme Court has [] held that tribal trust land is the equivalent of a reservation and thus Indian country” ]; Rest

. , Law of American Indians (T e nt. D raft No. 2, Mar. 13, 2018) § 15 , subd. (a) [definin g “Indian lands” to
include “ lands held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe or individual members of an Indian tribe”] .) When construing initiatives such as Proposition 1A, we presume

e lectors “to [have been] aware of existing laws and judicial
construction [s] thereof ” when they voted. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11.) Nowhere did Proposition 1A offer its own definition of “Indian lands” or “tribal lands. ” And Propos ition 1A’s Voter Information Guide explained to voters that federal law regulated gaming on Indian land (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) analysis of Prop. 1A by Legis. Analyst , p. 4)

— indeed, the text of the ballot proposition said i t was allowing class III gaming “on
Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law ” ( id.

, text of Prop. 1A, p. 90)

. None of this bolsters the case for assuming that the terms “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” inUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

17 Proposition 1A have a narrow, be spoke content different from
their ordinary meaning under federal law.

United Auburn then seeks to buttress its argument by offering a somewhat different definition of “tribal l ands” and “Indian lands”: land recognized as Indian land when IGRA

was enact ed , but not after

. This proposed interpretation of the

terms pivots not on whether casino

- style gaming would require the Governor’s concurrence, but instead on whether the Indian land was acquired after IGRA was enacted

— irrespective of
whether that land has become “Indian” or “tribal” land “under
federal law” in the decades since IGRA’s effective date

. T hat definition is also implausible . T he language of Proposition 1A offers no indication that voters enshrined in the Constitution the technical, insid e

- baseball distinction between gaming on federally designated Indian land before IGRA’s effective date (what United Auburn proposes to be true “Indian” or “tribal” lands), and after

. IGRA , for its part, allows class III gaming on certain land taken into t rust for an Indian
tribe after the statute’s effective date without the Governor’s

concurrence , so long as the Governor executes a tribal

- state compact

. ( See 25 U.S.C. § 27 19(b)(1)(B)(i)

– (iii) [casino

- style gaming on “lands [] taken into trust as part of[ :] [¶] (i) a settlement of a land claim”; “(ii) the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by the [Interior] Secretary under the Federal acknowledgment process”; or “(iii) the restoration
of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Fede ral recognition ” does not require the Governor’s assent].) U nder United Auburn’s argument, however, Proposition 1A prohibits class III gaming from taking place even on these lands.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

18 We are not persuaded

. United Auburn’s contention lacks support in the la nguage of Proposition 1A , which explicitly empowers the Governor to negotiate and conclude compacts for class III gaming on “ Indian land s . . . in accordance with federal law” and “permit[s]” class III gaming “on tribal lands subject to those compacts

. ” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) Because Proposition 1A allows class III gaming on “Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law,” it makes little sense to interpre t a rticle IV , section 19 as prohibiting
such gaming on certain trust la nds

— considered Indian lands
under federal law

— for which IGRA does not even require the Governor’s concurrence before class III gaming may occur. ( Ibid. ) United Auburn’s interpretation would also cut against the cooperative

- federalism scheme created b y IGRA to permit class III gaming on Indian land. We decline to create su ch a
conflict between state and federal law where none exists. 6 (See California ARCO Distrib utors , Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 349, 359 [ “State and federa l laws should be accommodated and harmonized where possible ”]; Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit (1960) 362 U.S. 440, 446 [“[The Supreme] Court’s decisions [] enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists”].)

What w e find more persuasive is the most reasonable inference from Proposition 1A’s text and context : The terms

6 United Auburn itself appears to abandon this proposed reading of “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” in its reply brief

, re verting to its previous argument that “the voters [who enacted Proposition 1A] meant to facilitate gaming that required no concurrence.”UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

19 “Indian ” and “tribal ” lands

— which appear in close proximity to the phrase “in accordance with federal law”

— are best
understood

, as they are under f ederal law

, to include Indian
reservation land and all land the federal government has acquired in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes

. (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 1A, p. 90.) In the absence of any specialize d definition of the terms within Proposition 1A, the most reasonable understanding of voters’ purpose in enacting Proposition 1A is that they sought to permit casino

- style gaming on all Indian
land in accordance with federal law

— notwithstanding the
Calif or nia Constitution’s general restriction on casino

- style gaming. (Compare Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e) with Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)

That Indian land encompass es reservation land as well

as land taken into trust for Indian tribes b ea rs on another of United Auburn’s arguments. It points our attention to the fact
that Proposition 1A empowers the Governor only “ to negotiate
and conclude compacts ” for gaming on Indian land

— not to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination. ( Ca l. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) Because compacting and concurring

are distinct actions, United Auburn contends , the Governor’s authority to compact doesn’t imply his power to concur.
We agree that the power to negotiate compacts with
Indian tribes d oes not, by itself, imply the power to concur.
But neither does Proposition 1A’s failure to expressly mention the power to concur imply any sort of limitation on the
Governor’s inherent powers

— including his power to concur

. The ballot initiative amen de d the Constitution to bestow the Governor with the power “to negotiate and conclude compacts

.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

20 . . for the operation of [casino

- style gaming] . . . on Indian lands in California.” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) Because
casino

- style gaming can n o t occur on some Indian land s

— certain land taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA
was enacted

— without the Governor’s concurrence, the power to negotiate compacts for class III gaming on those lands is consistent with the Governor exercising h is inherent power to concur to allow class III gaming to occur on those lands.
Suppose voters had limited the Gove rnor’s compacting power to land on which casino

- style gaming could occur
without his concurrence . One might then reasonably expect
that the P roposition would have limited the Governor’s power to negotiate co mpacts only where the land in question was

“ reservation land ,” land designated as “ Indian land ” before
IGRA was enacted , or “Indian land not requiring a

concurrence

. ” Yet n othing close to t his limitation appears in the language of Proposition 1A. (Cf. City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard (1959) 52 Cal.2d 385, 395 [ a statute’s om ission
of a term used elsewhere “ ‘ is significant to show ’ ” a different intended purpose].) What P roposition 1 A ’s language conveys
instead is that the Governor’s power to negotiate and conclude compacts for class III gaming extends to all land that counts as “Indian” or “tribal” under federal law, with no intricate pre

- or post

- IGRA , concurrence or no concurrenc e proviso . That the Governor has the power to negotiate and conclude compacts for class III gaming on “Indian” and “ tribal” land thus
demonstrates that article IV, section 19, subdivision (e)’s general ban on casino

- style gaming doesn’t apply to gaming on
l and taken into trust after IGRA was enacted for which theUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

21 Governor’s concurrence is required. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e) .)

Unable to ground its argument in the four corners of the ballot proposition , United Auburn seeks firmer footing in Proposition 1A’s ballot materials. It explains that Proposition 1A’s proponents advocated for passage of the ballot proposition “so we can keep the gaming we have on our reservations.” (Voter Information Guide , Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) argument in f

avor of Prop. 1A

, p . 6.) United Auburn also
contends that the primary motivation for Proposition 1A appears to have been to ratify 57 compacts that California had negotiated before 2000

— compacts for land on which gaming
could occur without the Governo r’ s concurrence . ( Id

. , analysis of Prop. 1A by Legis. Analyst, pp. 4

– 5.) And it calls our attention to a back

- and

- forth exchange between supporter s and opponents of the initiative included in the ballot materials , in which proponents of Proposition 1A wr ot e: “ ‘ Proposition 1A and federal law strictly lim it Indian gaming to tribal land. The [opponents’] claim that casinos could be built anywhere [if Proposition 1A is enacted] is totally false .’ ” ( Id

. , rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7.)

It’s tr ue that ballot materials sometimes illuminate how we interpret voter initiatives. (See People v. Valencia (2017) 3
Cal.5th 347 , 364.) But these materials don’t support the weight United Auburn hoists onto them , and they don’t override our understanding o f Proposition 1A’s language: that class III gaming may occur on Indian land . (See California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934 ( California Cannabis Coalition ) [“ we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s bal lo t ma terials” only if “theUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

22 provision[’s] intended purpose [] remains opaque” after analysis of its text].) The Governor’s interpretation, too, fits
with the maxim of Proposition 1A’s proponents: That the proposed ballot initiative “ ‘ strictly limit [s] I nd ian gaming to tribal land, ’ ” and that “ ‘ the claim [ s ] that casinos could be built anywhere is totally false. ’ ” (Voter Information Guide, Primary
Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A

, p. 7 .) Class III gaming, after all, may occur o nly on reservation land or land the federal government has converted to Indian land by taking it into trust for an Indian tribe. We acknowledge that t he language inclu ded in these materials arguably support s the conclusion that the predominant
rationale b ehind Proposition 1A was to allow Indian tribes to

c onduct class III gaming on land for which the Governor’s concurrence wasn’t required

— including on land for which California had negotiated 57 compacts before 2000. What the materials do not suggest, ho wever, is that the most defensible account of Proposition 1A’s purpose was to allow casino

- style gaming only on lands associated with those compacts

. In response to this line of argument, the dissent invokes a private website, www.ye son1A.net, that Pro po sition 1A ’s proponents cited in their rebuttal to arguments against the ballot proposition

. Because that website “equated ‘Indian lands’ and ‘tribal lands’ with ‘reservation lands,’ and indicated
that tribal casinos would be limited to these lands ,” the d issent contends, voters would have construed Proposition 1A to authorize casinos only on Indian reservations. ( D is. opn., post , at p. 22, fn. 4 .) N ot even United Auburn advances such a
narrow construction of Proposition 1A

— as we’ve explained

, both de fi nitions of “Indian” and “tribal” lands offered by UnitedUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

23 Auburn encompass some kinds of Indian trust land in addition

to Indian reservations

. Taking account of a private website
that showed up as a link i n one of the ballot statements

—

e ven if there’s no particular evidence that many voters examined its contents

— could conceivably make sense in light
of how we consider appropriate extrinsic sources when the initiatives we interpret are unclear

. (See California Cannabis
Coalition

, supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 934 .) What makes less sense is to give outsized importance to its peculiar interpretation
when there’s no particular logic or argument persuasively supporting its theory , and it goes beyond what the ballot materials themselves imply. In any event, we par se the
website differently. The website’s homepage explained that “Prop 1A . . . simply allows federally

- recognized California tribes to continue to have gaming on federally

- designated tribal land, as provided by federal law ”

— and the very next

sente nce identified IGRA as the relevant federal law. ( Yes on 1A, Proposition 1A

. . . The California Indian Self

- Reliance
Amendment on the March 2000 State Ballot (Mar. 6, 2000)

< http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2000_999_028/ > [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020]

. ) T he dissent cites a different portion of the website, but the point it conveys is the same : It stated that “federal law strictly limits tribal gaming to Indian lands only” before explaining that Congress enacted “[t]he Indian Gaming Regulatory Act . . . in 1 988.” (Yes on 1A, Proposition 1A: Answers to Common Questions (Mar. 6, 2000)

< http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2000_999_028/ > [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020] .)

Elsewhere the dissent suggest s that Proposition 1A may have used “Indian lands” as a term of art

— one referring toUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

24 “ reservation lands and after

- acquired trust lands for which no concurrence is required

. ” (Dis. opn., post , at p. 19.) Like United Auburn, however, the dissent fails to persuasively explain why the “Indian lands” term of art would h appe n to encompass only those trust lands on which gaming may occur without the Governor’s concurrence, but not other trust lands which require the Governor’s concurrence for class III gaming. That federal law draws a line to distinguish “Indian lands”
fr om o ther lands is not in dispute. What that line fails to do is draw any distinction between lands where gaming may occur with or without a governor’s concurrence. Instead, as we’ve explained, federal law defines all these lands as Indian land. (See Coh en’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 ed.) § 3.04(2)(c)(ii) .) So w hereas the dissent questions the transparency of Proposition 1A’s ballot materials (dis. opn.,
post , at p. 26 ) , we read those materials to reit erate a consistent

message a s it’s relevan t to this case : Proposition 1A would allow class III gaming on all Indian land, as defined by IGRA.

Nor have we any reason to conclude that our interpretation would “put[] gambling casinos right in everyone’s backyard

, ” as opponents of Proposition 1A wa rned

. (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) argument against Prop. 1A

, p. 7 .) A micus curia e North Fork
Rancheria observes that the Interior Secretary has requested gubernatorial concurrences only 16 times nationwide in the 31

years since IGR A was enacted, and state governors have concurred in only 10 of those determinations

. So i n the subset
of instances where the Interior Secretary agrees that land held in trust for a tribe may be used for gaming, the requiredUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

25 gubernatorial concurrence furt her narrows where gaming may

occur. 7

W e find no reason to conclude from these ballot
materials , from Proposition 1A’s language, or from any other

7 The dissent claims that our opinion allows “a single state official , the Governor ,” to exercise the “consequenti al p ower” of allowing class III gaming on land taken into trust after IGRA was enacted

. (Dis. opn., post , at p. 17

– 18.) What this bold assertion seems to miss is that nothing in our opinion anoints the Governor Emperor of tribal gaming. The dissent’s re adin g of our conclusi on overlooks several pieces of an intricate jigsaw puzzle that must fall into place before class III gaming can

occur on land taken into trust after IGRA’s effective date : An Indian tribe must duly authorize casino

- style gaming

. (25 U.S. C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) .) A state must permit that type of gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity

. ( Id.

, § 2710(d)(1)(B ) .) T he gaming must abide by the terms of a tribal

- state compact

. ( Id.

, § 2710(d)(1)(C ) .) For land that doesn’ t sa tisfy other conditions in IGRA, t he Interior Secretary must determine that gaming would be in the best interest of the tribe and wouldn’t be detrimental to the surrounding community

. ( Id.

, § 2719(b)(1)(A) .) And the Legislature remains free to restric t th e Governor’s concurrence power if it so chooses. (See ante , pp. 3 5

– 3 7 .) What our opinion does conclude is that the Governor may concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming

— if (and only if) all the other necessary cond itio ns for class III gaming are satisfie d in this cooperative

- federalism scheme

. Nowhere does the dissent persuasively justify its assumptions that article IV, section 19 of the California Constitution imposes a

“ flat prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey

- styl e casinos” despite Proposition 1A’s explicit amendment of the state Constitution in 2000 to permit some class III gaming, or that a gubernatorial concurrence under IGRA is prohibited unless it’s expressly authorized. (Dis. opn., post , at p p. 25

– 26 .)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

26 provision of the California Constitution that the Governor is barred from concurring in the Interior Sec reta ry’s
determination to allow class III gaming on land taken into
trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted. What we
find instead is that article IV, section 19, subdivision (f)

— added to the California Constitution by Proposition 1A

— allows cl ass III gaming to occur “subject to [Governor

negotiated] compacts” on all “Indian” or “tribal” lands. Included among these lands are those that require the
Governor to concur before class III gaming is permitted

. To somehow find among these words a cate gori cal rule against gubernatorial concurrence s is to place on the constitutional provision’s delicate frame a weight it cannot bear.

C

. United Auburn also argues that separation of powers

concerns cut against recognition of a concurrence power here

. E ven if the California Constitution

— as amended by Proposition 1A

— doesn’t prohibit the Governor from concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination, United
Auburn posits

, the Governor lacks that power because concurring is a legislative function, n ot a n executive one. To find otherwise, claims United Auburn, infringe s on the Legislature’s prerogatives. That the language enshrined in the
Constitution by Proposition 1A appears in a rticle IV of the
Constitution

— a section that contains other legisla tive powers

— underscores for United Auburn that concurrence is a legislative function

. Although we endeavor to read constitutional provisions
in context , the placement of a provision isn’t dispositive to our analysis

. Consider t he constitutional provis ion authorizingUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

27 this court to recommend (or decline to recommend ) that an application for executive pardon or clemency be granted to a defendant who has been “twice convicted of a felony.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (a).) That power

— primarily jud icia l
in nature

— doesn’t become an executive one simply because it appears in article V of the Constitution, which contains
executive functions. So we decline to characterize the Governor’s concurrence as a legislative act simply because Proposition 1A a dded a provision to article IV of the California
Constitution

. Nor can we assume

, as United Auburn’s argument

presumes, that we can in every instance neatly disaggregate executive, legislative, and judicial power. Treating these
domains as entirely separa te a nd independent spheres

contrasts with the more nuanced treatment of these powers

— and their frequent overlap

— under our state constitutional system . (See Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 52 [“ California decisions long have rec ognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ‘ “ does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in m any respects mutually dependent” ’ ”].) Indeed, our Constitution’s history “strongly supports a flexible, nonformalis t

un derstanding of separation of powers in which the functions of the offices are fluid.” (Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers (2004) 51 UCLA
L. Rev. 1079, 1106 ; cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial
Protecti on B ureau (2020) 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2226 ( dis. opn. of Kagan, J.) [ “[T] he separation of powers is, by design, neither rigid nor complete ”].) Rather than attempt to characterize the Governor’s concurrence power as a wholly legislative orUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

28 executive one, we con stru e the power as containing features that cut across both categories.

That fact isn’t fatal to the Governor’s exercise of the concurrence power, for nothing in our separation of powers jurisprudence demands “ ‘a hermetic sealing off of the three
branc hes of Government from one another.’ ” ( Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329, 338.) We’ve instead recognized “that the three branches of government are interdependent,” and so government officials frequently perform

— and are permit ted to perform

— actions that “may ‘significantly affect those of another branch.’ ” ( Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 298 .) What the doctrine prohibits is “ one branch of government [] exercising the compl ete power constitutionally
vested in another ” ( Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117 ) , or exercising power in a way “ ‘ “ that undermine[s] the authority and independence of one or another coordinate [b]ranch ” ’ ” ( Carmel Valley

, supra , 25 Cal .4th at p. 297). S o the question before us is whether concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination unduly limits the role and function of the legislative branch

. We begin our analysis

, once again

, with Proposition 1A. Although the constitutional ame ndment doesn’t expressly authorize the Governor to concur, it does allow casino

- style gaming to occur on Indian land in accordance with federal law. Proposition 1A was significant because it amended the Constitution to signal a policy of greater openn ess toward
casino

- style gaming

— which California had previously prohibited . (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).) When he

concurs in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow classUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

29 III gaming on land taken into trust for an Indian tribe,
th eref ore, the Governor acts consistently with the state’s policy toward gaming on Indian land , as established by voters. He is not, as United Auburn would have us believe, engaging in “gubernatorial legislation.”
That the Governor has historically been t aske d with concurring

— or declining to concur

— under a variety of
federal statutes also supports our conclusion that the concurrence power is an executive one . (See In re Battelle (1929) 207 Cal. 227 , 242.) Since 1958, f ederal law has required gubernat oria l consent before the s ecretary of a military department may order Army or Air National reservists to active duty. (10 U.S.C. § 12301(b).) T he Migratory Bird
Conservation Act , enacted in 1961, requires the Governor’s approval before land can be acquir ed f rom the migratory bird
conservation fund. (16 U.S.C. § 715k

- 5

. ) Since 1970, the Clean
Air Act has required the consent of the Governor before the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

may grant waivers to allow the construction o f ce rtain new source polluters

. (42 U.S.C. § 7411 (j )(1)(A).) The National Estuary Program, established in 1987, requires gubernatorial concurrence before the EPA Administrator may approve a conservation and management plan for an estuary. ( 33 U.S.C. § 1 330 ( f)(1).) And the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program , enacted in 1996, prohibits parents from receiving benefits if they are not employed or participating in community service unless the “chief executive officer of the State opts out.” (42 U.S .C. § 602(a)(l)(B)(iv).)
The concurrence power isn’t a hollow one

— the Governor has exercised it throughout our state’s history. (E.g. CaliforniaUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

30 Society of Anesthesiologists v. Brown (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 390, 395 [“Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger .

. . exercised his discretion under federal law [42 C.F.R. § 482.52(c)(1) (2020) ] [ to opt ] California out of the federal physician supervision Medicare reimbursement requirement”]; Fort Ord Reuse Authority, Media Release: Major Event in Completion of Early
Tra nsfer of Former Fort Ord Property (Aug. 12, 2008)

< https://dtsc.ca.gov/wp

- content/uploads/sites/31/2019/04/ FORA_MediaRelease.pdf> [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020] [Governor Schwarzenegger’s concurrence in the transfer of 3,337 acres of land for economic reuse “pr ovi de[d] approval to begin a $100 million privatized munitions and explosives cleanup program” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
C ompensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) , 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. ]; U.S. G en. A ccounting O ff.

, Rep

. to the Ranki ng Minority Member, Com

. on Commerce, H.R. , Hazardous Waste: Information on Potential Superfund Sites (Nov. 1998), at pp. 350

– 352 [ Governor of California declined to approve placement of three sites on the National Priorities List for
hazardous waste clean up under CERCLA ]; Governor Pete Wilson, letter to Administrator Carol Browner, Nov. 17, 1993 [concurring in the EPA Administrator’s conservation and management plan for an estuary under the National Estuary Program ]; Governor Edmund G. Brown

, Jr., letter t o D octor Robert M. White 8 [approving a proposed management program

8 Governor Brown’s letter is available at: <https://books.google.com/books?id=By75Tpr47w4C&lpg=PA15 &dq=Combined%20CCMP%20%26%20Final%20EIS&pg=PA7#

v=o nepage&q&f=false> [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020]

.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

31 under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. ]. ) And although the Legislature has expressly
authorized the Governor to concur under some of these schemes (see , e. g., Fish & G. Code, § 10680), it has remained silent regarding the Governor’s concurrence power under most of them. Historical practice thus demonstrates that the Governor has the authority to concur in cooperative

- federalism
schemes such as IGRA without exp ress legislative authorization, so long as the Governor’s concurrence is
consistent with state law.
United Auburn seeks to distinguish the Governor’ s concurrence here by asserting that it “has massive land

- use and tax

- base consequences.” The Governor’s co ncurrence

causes the land taken into trust for an Indian tribe to no longer “be subject to California’s civil, criminal, and tax jurisdiction.” According to United Auburn, the pivotal role a concurrence plays in the Interior Secretary’s determination

— an d how that determination triggers these significant results

— makes it unlawful for the Governor to exercise that power.

United Auburn’s acute concern about the consequences of a gubernatorial decision is misplaced. United Auburn is
correct that ta kin g land into trust for an Indian tribe causes that land to no longer be subject to state or local taxes. ( 25 U.S.C. § 510 8. ) But because it is the Interior Secretary

— not the Governor

— who retains exclusive authority over whether
to take land into tr ust (25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (2020)), it is not the
Governor’s concurrence that carries with it that effect. In any
event, closer scrutiny demonstrates that the effect of the
Governor’s concurrence under IGRA isn’t materially distinct
from that under other coop era tive

- federalism schemesUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

32 requiring his concurrence

. Consider the federal law requiring the United States Secretary of Energy to consult with and
obtain the consent of the Governor of a state where land will be acquired for the purpose of disposing radio act ive waste. (42 U.S.C. § 7916.) Or the requirement that the Interior Secretary
obtain a governor’s concurrence before acquiring land in national parks for the establishment of an airport. ( 54 U.S.C. § 101501(c)(2) .) These examples illustrate how gube rna torial
decisions routinely trigger enormous consequences for local
communities. For these reasons, the consequences of the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s
determination don’t affect the scope of his power , so long as his

concurrence is consistent with state law.
The concurrence power is also consistent with the Governor’s historic role as the state’s representative

— a role
he has held since before the California Constitution was
enacted. At the 1849 constitutional convention , deleg ate s agreed that “it is a well [

- ] established principle ” that the Governor ought to communicate directly with, and represent the state to

, the federal executive branch

. (Browne, Report of
the Debates in the Convention of California on the Formation
of the Sta te Constitution in September and October, 1849 (1850) p. 277 .) The Legislature later codified the Governor’s
station as “ the sole official organ of communication between the government of this State and the government of . . . the
United States” when i t e nacted Government Code section
12012. This provision , which readily demonstrates a legislatively enacted expectation that the Governor serve as the state’s representative to the federal government

, bolsters the argument that the Go vernor is capable of pla ying a role inUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

33 federal schemes that depend on the state government to convey

an official position on behalf of the state of California. (Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) 453 U.S. 654, 677 [“ statutes [are] highly relevant in the looser sense of indicat ing ” the scope of executive power, even in the absence of express constitutional authority].)
Indeed, finding the Governor unable to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination under IGRA would be in
tension with his legislatively enacted authorit y und er Government Code section 12012. At oral argument, United Auburn conceded that the Governor’s executive power

encompasses consulting informally with federal officials who seek his perspective on decisions that may affect the state.
United Aub urn neve rth eless seeks to distinguish that correspondence from IGRA’s requirement that the Interior Secretary consult with and obtain the Governor’s concurrence before class III gaming may occur on land taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA’s effective d ate

. Yet the Governor’s
concurrence under IGRA is akin to analogous communication s with the federal government in which he serves as the state’s representative

— particularly when the federal officer with whom he communicates makes the discretionary decis ion to assign significant weight to the Governor’s views. That Congress required the Interior Secretary to garner the concurrence of state governors, rather than leaving that decision to the Interior Secretary’s discretion, doesn’t by itself strip the Gov ern or of power to serve as “the sole official organ
of communication” between the state and the federal government. (Gov. Code, § 12012.)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

34 T he resulting constitutional and statutory picture in this

case reveals not only nuances about how California ha s c hosen
to conduct relations between the state and the federal government , but also the subtle shades depicting the precise limits of the respective powers of the Governor and the Legislature here

. Recall that the California Constitution and
other state law once prohibited casino

- style gaming . (See Cal.
C onst., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e) ; Pen. Code, § § 330

, 330a .) But in 2000, voters amended the Constitution to allow that type of gambling under certain conditions . ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) I n so doing, they bestowed certain powers on the
Governor

— the power to “negotiate and conclude compacts” for class III gaming “on Indian lands in California in
accordance with federal law”

— and other powers on the Legislature

— the authority to ratify (o r decline to ratify) those compacts. ( Ibid

. )
What the newly amended Constitution didn’t address, at least not expressly, was whether the Governor has the power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming on certain l and taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted, or the division of authority
between the executive and legislative branch over that task

. Yet in the years since Proposition 1A was enacted, our Legislature has not

— in contrast to the lawm aki ng bodies of
other states (s ee, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat., § 5

- 601(a)

, (c) [authorizing the Arizona Governor to negotiate and execute compacts but expressly prohibiting the Governor from concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination ] )

—UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

35 exercised it s a uthority to enact legislation limiting the Governor’s power to concur. 9

In the absence of an express grant or denial of authority,
we conclude that the Governor’s concurrence falls within a “zone of twilight in which he and [the Legislature] may have

co ncu rrent authority” and where legislative “inertia, indifference or quiescence” invites the exercise of executive

power. ( Youngstown

, supra , 343 U.S. at p. 637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) .) By opening the door for class III gaming on “Indian” and “tribal ” l ands

— some of which require a gubernatorial concurrence before class III gaming may occur

— Proposition 1A put an end to California’s “ flat prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey

- style casinos ” ( dis. opn., post , at p. 25), thereby opening the door for th e G overnor to concur in the

9 Indeed, the Legislature has declined to restrict the Gove rnor’s power to concur under IGRA despite being given the opportunity to do so. Assembly Bill No. 1377 (2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.) , introduced in February 2017, would’ve required the Governor to seek the Legislature’s approval before concurring in the Inte rior Secretary’s determination to allow casino

- style gaming on land taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted. The bill failed to pass before the end of the 2017

– 2018 regular session and died on January 31, 2018 under article IV, section 10
, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution

. (Assem. Bill No. 1377 (2017

– 2018 Reg. Sess.) .) Although “[w]e have often said that mere legislative inaction is a ‘ weak re ed’ upon which to rest any conclusion about the Legislature's intent ” ( Prachasa isor adej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 217, 243), the Assembly’s consideration and rejection of Assembly Bill No. 1377 arguably demonstrates some measure of acquiesce by the Legislature in the Governor’s concurrence power.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

36 Interior Secretary’s determination allowing gaming on those
lands. ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) The Governor’s

concurrence in that determination is consistent with his historic practice of concurring in a variety o f c ooperative

federalism schemes

, and his role as the state’s representative
under Government Code section 12012. So we find it
consistent with Proposition 1A and our separation of powers jurisprudence to conclude that, despite the absence of specific leg isl ative authorization, California law empowers the
Governor to concur.
That power, however, isn’ t an indefeasible one. Although our analysis of Proposition 1A and other state law supports the finding that the Governor has the power to concur, it also
de mon strates that the legislative branch is capable of enacting legislation that would reduce the Governor’s concurrence

power to “its lowest ebb.” ( Youngstown

, supra , 343 U.S. at p. 637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) .) The Legislature may, for example, requi re the Governor to obtain legislative authorization before concurring in the Interior Secretary’s
determination

— just as Proposition 1A requires the Legislature to ratify compacts that the Governor negotiates and concludes before they become effective. ( See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) Because neither the California Constitution nor other state law speaks directly to the Governor’s concurrence power under IGRA, California law is not inconsistent with this conclusion: That the Legislature

may res trict or eliminate the Governor’s implicit power to

concur. In the absence of state l aw creating such a limitation

, however, we may not enact one on the Legislature’s behalf. We
conclude that current California law permits the Governor’sUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

37 concurrence i n t he Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming on Indian land taken into trust for an Indi an tribe after IGRA was enacted

. 10

III.

United Auburn argues that even if the Governor generally has the power to concur, he lacks that power in thi s particular case

. It s argument relies on the Governor’s order of operations. According to United Auburn, the California
Constitution limits any gubernatorial power to negotiate and conclude compacts for class III gaming , and to concur in the
Interior Se cretary’s determination permitting gaming , to land designated as “ Indian land ” at the time of the compact negotiations. Because the land at issue in this case hadn’t yet been taken into trust for the Enterprise Tribe when the
Governor negotiated and co ncl uded the compact to allow gaming

, United Auburn contends that the Governor’s compact
and concurrence were invalid.
The language of our constitutional charter belies this argument

. By amending the Constitution to add article IV,

10 Because we conc lude that the Legislature may restrict the Governor’s power to concur, we reject the argument of amicus curiae Picayune Rancheria: that Congress has violated the anticommandeering doctrine by prohibiting other branches of government from constraining the Governor’s power to concur. Our conclusion that California law, rather than federal law, empowers the Governor to concur also dispels United Auburn’s suggestion that IGRA “almost certainly run[s] afoul of the [Tenth] Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ” by bestowing the Governor with the concurrence power.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

38 section 19, subdivision ( f ) , Proposition 1A empower ed the
Governor to negotiate and conclude compacts “ for the operation . . . and for the conduct of [class III gaming] by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California.” Those requirements were satisfied here

— w hen the Enterprise Tribe engaged in class III gaming, it did so on land the federal government had , by that point, designated as Indian land by holding it in trust for the Enterprise Tribe.

N othing in the Constitution restrict s the Governor’ s power to neg otiate and conclude compacts to parcels designated “Indian land” at the time the negotiation happens.
That there’s no such constraint makes sense in light of historical practice: The 57 compacts negotiated and executed by California , which Proposition 1A ratified, allowed class III gaming to occur on land that hadn’t yet been taken into trust
and didn’t otherwise constitute Indian land at the time of negotiation. Indeed, the land ultimately taken into trust for United Auburn wasn’t yet Indian land whe n C alifornia and the tribe negotiated and concluded the compact for class III gaming on the tribe’s land

. (See City of Roseville v. Norton (D.D. C. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 130, 135

– 136.) We decline to read into the Constitution a requirement that not only app ear s nowhere in its text but would also invalidate the gaming operations of Indian tribes across the state

— including those
of United Auburn

. IV

. For decades, California imposed on itself a categorical prohibition on casino

- style gaming that surely restr ict ed not only legislative authority, but gubernatorial power. Yet as the wheel of time spun, voters placed their bets on a ConstitutionUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

39 that regulated

— rather than prohibited

— casino

- style (class III) gaming and empowered the Governor to negotiate and

con clude compacts for casino

- style gaming on Indian land in California. In doing so, voters enacted Proposition 1A and changed the situation materially. They amended state law to
allow class III gaming on all “Indian” and “tribal” lands “ in
accordance wi th federal law. ” ( Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f). ) The Governor’s historical practice of concurring in a range of other cooperative

- federalism schemes, and his longstanding and legislatively enacted role as the state’s representa tive to
the federa l g overnment, demonstrate that he may concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination without violating the Legislature’s prerogatives.
The Legislature nonetheless plays a robust role in responding to the use, and defining the scope, of executive

power. Nea rly seven decades have passed since Justice Jackson emphasized that constitutions of separated powers “enjoin [] upon its branches separateness but interdepe ndence ”

— “autonomy but reciprocity.” ( Youngstown

, supra , 343 U.S. at p. 635 (conc. opn. of Jack son , J.) .) And while the materials before us are not quite as “enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was calle d upon to interpret for Pharaoh ” ( id. at p. 634), they nonetheless require nuanced interpretation for

us to discern how California’s Constitution allows ex ecutive and legislative prerogatives to coexist in the continuing story of
its calibrated approach to tribal gaming. Although lawmakers haven’t done so yet, they remain free to restrict or eliminate the Governor’s authority to concur. That the Legisla tur e has
enacted no such law means the power to concur remains in theUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Opinion of the Court by Cu éllar

, J.

40 Governor’s hands. As for the power that remains in our hands,

we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

CUÉLLAR, J.

We Concur: CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. KRUGER, J. FYBEL, J. *

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.1 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE
AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM

S238544

Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Cantil

- Sakauye

I respectfully dissent. “In the case of a voters’ initiative

statute

. . . we may not properly interpret the measure in a way tha t the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.” ( Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114.) This same principle applies when we interpret a legislative constitutional amendment approved by the voters.

The ou tcome here turns on the interpretation of Proposition 1A, a ballot measure through which the electorate
amended the state Constitution in 2000 to carve out a limited exception to the prevailing state policy against “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).) The majority holds that as amended by Proposition 1A to allow for gaming compacts between the state and individual Indian tribes, the state
Constitution allows the G overnor to concur wit h a federal determination that it would be appropriate to situate a gambling facility on certain off

- reservation lands that may be placed into trust for a tribe by the federal government. This concurrence represents the only authoriza tion by a California state official that is absolutely required under federal law for sophisticated gaming, including slot machines and banked card games, to take place on these lands. Whether the Governor possesses the power to concur is therefore an iss ue of greatUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

2 significa nce to the Indian tribes of this state that engage or want to engage in casino operations, not to mention anyone else interested in where gambling can occur within state
boundaries.
I would hold that the Governor lacks such a power. The voters who appr oved Proposition 1A endorsed gaming compacts, and only compacts. The measure is not properly read as authorizing concurrences as well. An average voter would not have understood such a consequential power as implied or otherwise envi sioned by Proposition 1A’s authorization of gaming compacts, for reasons including the fact that the power to concur is not invariably or even normally necessary to effectuate the compacting power. That Proposition 1A did not entail a power to concur beco mes even

more apparen t when its provisions are read in legal and historical context and in the light cast by the relevant ballot materials. These resources clarify why voters might have authorized tribal gaming at locations that do not require a

concurren ce but not at those s ites where a concurrence is a prerequisite; and they confirm that Proposition 1A is best construed as striking such a balance.
For these reasons, as elaborated below, it is my view that the court’s decision today recognizing a power to concur gives
the v oters who approved Proposition 1A quite a bit more

— or depending on one’s perspective, less

— than they bargained for. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

3 I. B ACKGROUND My unders tanding of what the s tate Constitution, as amended by Proposition 1A, does and does not allow derives from a review of federal and state law applicable to tribal gaming and how this body of law developed over time.
A summary of these principles and events follows.

Our stat e has long forbidden, limited, or regulated different forms of gambling. (See Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 591

– 594 ( Hotel Employees ).) Well along in this history, in 1984 the electorate approved P roposition 37, which authorized a state lottery (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (d)) as an exception to the general prohibition on lotteries and lottery tickets that appears at article IV, section 19, subdivision (a) of the state Co nstitution. Proposit ion 37 also added subdivision (e) to article IV, section 19 of the state charter (article IV, section 19(e)). This provision announces, “The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos of the type currently oper ating in Nevada and N ew Jersey.” This bar on casino gaming “was designed

. . . to elevate statutory prohibitions on a set of gambling activities to a constitutional level.” ( Hotel Employees , at pp. 605

– 606.)
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Four yea rs later, after the d ecision of the United States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 upended state constraints on tribal gaming, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or IGRA. (Pub.L. No. 100

- 49 7 (Oct. 17, 1988)
102 Stat. 2467, as amended & codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.) This law provides a frameworkUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

4 through which Indian tribes can develop gaming operations in a manner that allows for the assertion of legitimate state interests that may be implicated by such activity. (See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 688, 693 ( Confederated Tribes ).)

1. The compact requirement for class III gaming
IGRA recognizes three different tiers, or “classes” of gaming that may occur on Indian lands if the necessary prerequisites are satisfied. “ ‘ “Class I” consists of social games for minimal prizes and traditional Indian games; “Class II” includes Bingo an d similar games of chance such as pull ta bs and lotto; “Class III” includes all games not included in Classes
I or II.’ ” ( Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1994) 64 F.3d 1250, 1255

– 1256 ( Rumsey Indian
Rancheria ).)
Class I gamin g on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).) Class II gaming on these lands is generally permitted if “located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity (a nd such gaming is not otherwise specifica lly prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law),” and “the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or resolution which is approved by the” tribe’s chairperson. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (B).)

Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and banked card games, is by far the most lucrative of the three gaming categories and “is subject to a greater degree of federal

state regulation than either class I or class II gaming.” ( In re Indian Gaming Rela ted Cases (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1094,UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

5 1097.) Section 11 of IGRA provides that “Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are” duly authorized by a tribe, “located in a State that permits such gaming for any pur pose by any person, organization, or
enti ty,” and “conducted in conformance with a Tribal

- State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A), (B), (C).) “IGRA’s compact requirement grants States the right to negotia te with tribes located within
their borde rs regarding aspects of class III tribal gaming that might affect legitimate State interests.” ( In re Indian Gaming
Related Cases , 331 F.3d at p. 1097.) Through this mechanism, “[t]he compacting process gives to s tates civil regulatory authority that the y otherwise would lack under Cabazon , while granting to tribes the ability to offer legal class III gaming.” ( Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3d 712, 716.)
A compact betwee n a tribe and a state may contain the

par ties’ agreement on matters such as the kinds of class III gaming that will occur, how this gaming will be regulated, and various other matters relevant to these operations. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).) Compacts al so require federal approval to
become eff

ective. ( Id ., § 2710(d)(3)(B).) A state that allows class III gaming must negotiate in good faith with a tribe that requests a gaming compact. ( Id ., § 2710(d)(3)(A).) 1 If a tribe

1 There is a split of authority regarding whether a state must engage in good faith negotiations concerning class III gaming if it allows any kind of class III game, or if a st ate must so negotiate only if it allows the specific class III game(s) that a tribe wants to pursu e. (Compare Rumsey Indian Rancheria

,UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

6 believes the state has failed to satisfy this responsibility, IGRA provi des for a cause of action in federal court, enforceable against a state that has waived its immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. (25 U.S .C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 76 .) Through such an action, a tribe can obtain court intervention and mediation to help secure a compact. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i)

– (vi).) If these efforts fail to yie ld an agreement, IGRA directs the federal Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter re ferred to as the Secretary) to impose “procedures” upon a state specifying how class III gaming by the tribe is to occur. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii).)

2. The concurr ence requirement for gaming on certain after

- acquired lands

IGRA authorizes tribal gaming on “Indian lands,” defined as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and [¶] (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by
the United S tates for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)

– (B); see also id. , § 5108 [authorizing the Secretary to acquire land in trust for a tribe]; 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11 (2020) [articulating criteria to be considered by the Secretary in determining whether to place land into

supra , 64 F.3d at p. 1258 with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn. (2d Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 1024, 1030.)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

7 trust for a tribe].) 2 But the statute generally prohibits class II and class III gaming on lands acquired by the federal government in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988, the statute’s date of enactment. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).) This proscription responds to conce rns raised in Congress “about the possibility that tribal governments might acquire land in or near metropolitan areas on which they might open bingo or even casino facilities.” (Boylan, Reflections on IGRA 20 Years After Enactment (2010) 42
Ariz.St. L.J. 1, 9

– 10.)
The statute provides for several exceptions that moderate the general rule prohibiting class II and class III gaming on “after

- acquired” trust lands. Among them, the prohibition does

2 A fed eral regulation promulgated in 2008 (Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed . Reg. 29354 (May 20, 2008)) defines “reservation” as “(1) Land set aside by the United States by final ratified treaty, agreement, Executive Order, Proclamat ion, Secretarial Order or Federal statute for the tribe, notwithstanding the issuance of any paten t; [¶] (2) Land of Indian colonies and rancherias (including rancherias restored by judicial action) set aside by the United States for the permanent settleme nt of the Indians as its homeland; [¶] (3) Land acquired by the United States to reorganize adult Indians pursuant to statute; or [¶] (4) Land acquired by a tribe through a grant from a sovereign, including pueblo lands, which is subject to a Federal restr iction against alienation.” (25 C.F.R. § 292.2 (2020) .) Prior to the promulgation of this regula tion, the meaning of “reservation,” as used in the relevant provisions of IGRA, was less certain. (Compare Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton (10th Cir

. 2001) 240 F.3d 1250, 1267 with Exposing Truth about Casinos v. Kempthorne (D.C. Cir. 2007) 492 F .3d 460, 465.)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

8 not apply to trust lands that are “located within or contig uous to the boundaries of the reservation of the Indian tribe on October 17, 1988” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)(1)), or when “lands are taken into trust as part of

— [¶] (i) a settlement of a land claim, [¶] (ii) the initial reservation of an Indian tribe
acknowle dged by the Secretary under the Federal acknowledgment process, or [¶] (iii) the re storation of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition” ( id

., § 2719(b)(1)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 292.3

– 292.12 (2020)). These exceptions have bee n described as either “so obvious that they might be seen as merely technical corre ctions to the general definition of ‘Indian lands’ ” or “relatively noncontroversial from a conceptual standpoint because they too have history behind them.” (Jensen, India n Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands (2008) 47 Washburn L.J. 675, 687 (hereinafter Jens en).) “[A]ll require, at least indirectly, demonstrating a strong link between the tribe and the land at
issue

. . . .” ( Id ., at p. 688.) Furthermore, “because these

prov isions deal with circumstances that are exceptional, they are less likely to be of general public interest” than the exception that depends on the existence and exercise of the power to concur. ( Ibid .)
This additional exception involving the power to conc ur appears at section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, which provides that tribal gaming may oc cur on land taken into trust by the federal government for a tribe after IGRA’s date of enactment if “the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, dete rmines that a gaming establishment on [the] newly acquired lands would be in the best interest ofUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

9 the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be
detrimental to the surro unding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activit y is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) A positive two

- part determination by the Secretary does not absolutely require a showing that the property involved is close to a tribe’s existing reservation
la nds, or that the tribe has a historical connection to the site, although these are among the facts considered by the Secretary in determining whether a gaming establishment
would be in the best interest of the tribe and its members and
whether it would or would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.16, 292.17, 292.21(a) (2020); see also id. , § 151.11(b) (2020) [identifying the
location of off

- res ervation land proposed to be taken into trust for a tribe, relative to a tribe’s re servation, as a factor to be considered by the Secretary in deciding whether to take the land into trust].)
Section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, with its requirements of a

two

- part determination by the Secretary and a concurrence by the appropriate governor, “is S ection 20’s only truly discretionary exception.” (All, John McCain and the Indian Gaming “Backlash”: The Unfortunate Irony of S. 2078 (2006) 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 302 (hereinafter All).) Because the sequence described by section 20(b)(1)(A) “cou ld apply to any tribe, it is by definition a broader exception than any of the mandatory exceptions” IGRA provides to the law’s general prohibition of gaming on after

- acquir ed lands. (All, at p. 303.) As one scholar has explained, this is the exception f or “newly acquired lands most likely to have broad application

— andUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

10 most likely therefore to generate public discussion and, for some, dismay.” (Jensen, supra , 47 Washburn L.J. at p. 688.)
Although IGRA is the source of the concurrence procedure, wheth er an individual state governor has the power to concur is a matter of state law. ( Confederated Tribes

, supra , 110 F.3d at p. 697.) And in contrast with IGRA’s provision o f a cause of action when a state does not engage in good faith compact negotiations , nothing within the statute allows a tribe to seek judicial review of a Governor’s refusal to issue a concurrence. Thus, the concurrence requirement “essentially provides veto power to the Governor of the State in which the land [proposed as a site for g aming operations] is located.” (Sheppard, Taking Indian Land into Trust (1999) 44 S.D. L.Rev. 681, 687.)
B. Proposition 5
The enactment of IGRA did not quell the debates in this state over tribal gaming. “Despite IGRA’s negotiation and compact framewo rk, several unresolved conflicts

. . . developed between the State of California and Indian tribes surrounding class III gaming and, especially, gaming devices in casinos.” ( Hotel Employees

, supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 596.)
Proposition 5, an initiative mea sure appearing on the November 1998 ballot, was designed to better define the parameters for tribal gaming within the state. This measure included a model gaming compact th at, if requested by a tribe, was to be promptly approved by the Governor as a minis terial matter. (Gov. Code, § 98002, subd. (a).) The model compact authorized class III card games and certain slot machines, so long as the payouts drew from a “players’ p ool” funded byUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
Cantil

- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

11 player wagers. ( Id ., § 98004.) Another provision within Propositio n 5 authorized the Governor to negotiate gaming compacts with terms different from those contained in the model compact and to reach agreement with tribes on such compacts. (Gov. Code, § 98002, subd. (b).) Nothing within Proposition 5 expressly conferred a power to concur upon the
Governor.
Proposition 5 passed, but that victory was short

- lived.
We determined in Hotel Employees that the proposition’s model compact author ized gaming that the state Constitution precluded as representative of “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).) On that basis, we concluded that the vast majority of the initiative, incl uding its model compact, was invalid and unenforceable. ( Hotel Employees

, supra , 2 1 Cal.4th at p. 615.) We held that only the initiative’s waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims brought in federal

court

— part of section 98005 of the Government Code

— was severable from the invalid portions of Proposition 5 and survived. ( Hot el Employees , at pp. 614

– 615.)
C. Proposition 1A

Within weeks of our decision in Hotel Employees

, overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and the Assembly voted to pla ce Proposition 1A before the electorate at the March 2000 primary election. Throug h Proposition 1A, voters were asked to decide whether to add a new subdivision (f) to article IV, section 19 of the state Constitution (article IV, section 19(f)), providing in part that notwithstanding constitutional constraints on gaming, “the Governor i s authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject toUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

12 ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and bank ing and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian
tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law.” (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 1A, p. 90 (Voter Information Guide).)

Coincident with Proposition 1A’s placement on the ballot,
then

- Governor Gray Davis negotiated gami ng compacts with 57 tribes. ( In re Indian Gaming Related Cases

, supra , 331 F.3d at pp. 1105

– 1106.) None of these compacts required a concurrence. The Legislature promptly ratified the compacts (Stats. 1999, ch. 874, § 1, pp. 6257

– 6260), which authorized forms of class III gaming (e.g., banked card games) that were not permitted under the model compact found within Proposition 5.
Because of the constitutional prohibition on gaming, however, these negotiated compacts would become effective only if Propos ition 1A passed. Which it did: Proposition 1A was approved by voters at the March 2000 primary election.
D. Factual and Procedural Background
The Enterprise Rancheria o f Maidu Indians (the Enterprise Tribe) was federally recognized as a sovereign
Indi an tribe in 1915. In June 2002, the Enterprise Tribe asked the federal government to take approximately 40 acres of off

reservation land into trust for the tribe. This par cel is in Yuba County, near the community of Olivehurst. It is situated approximat ely 36 miles by car from where the Enterprise Tribe maintains its core governmental functions. The Enterprise Tribe subsequently confirmed that the purpose of the proposedUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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- Sakauye, C. J

. , dissenting

13 trust acquisition was to host a class III gaming facility. The tribe supported its application for a casino with documentation
of the economic benefits that would accrue to the tribe and the surrounding community if the casino project went forward.

In S eptember 2011, the Secretary issued a favorable two

part determination pursuant to section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA. The Secretary concluded that gaming on the parcel would be in the best interest of the Enterprise Tribe and would not be
detrimental to the sur rounding community or to neighboring tribes. The Secretary also found that the Ent erprise Tribe had a “significant historical connection” to the site.
The Secretary requested that then

- Governor Jerry Brown
concur in this determination. The Governor iss ued his concurrence in August 2012. In 2013, the Secretary took the
land into trus t for the tribe for the purpose of gaming.
On behalf of the state, the Governor negotiated a compact for class III gaming with the Enterprise Tribe. The proposed compact was submitted to the Legislature for approval. The Legislature failed to ratify th e agreement, however, and it died by its own terms in 2014. The Enterprise Tribe invoked IGRA’s judicial failsafe, arguing that the Legislature’s inaction amounted to a fai lure by the state to proceed in good faith. The federal district court rejected th e state’s assertion of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as inconsistent with the waiver appearing at section 98005 of the Government Code. ( Estom Yumeka Maid u Tribe v. California (E.D.Cal. 2016) 163 F.Supp.3d 769, 776

– 777.) The court concl uded that the state had not met its burden of showing it had negotiated in good faith. ( Id ., at p. 786.) It ordered the parties to conclude a compact within 60UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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14 days. ( Id ., at pp. 786

– 787; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).)

Neither this order nor subsequent mediation led to a compact. In August 2016, the Secretary issued secretarial procedures for the conduct of class III gaming on the parcel. The Enterprise Tribe’s casino property

— the Hard Rock Hotel
& Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain

— has since opened at
the Olivehurst site.
Plaintiff United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn Rancheria oper ates the Thunder Valley Casino Resort in Lincoln, California. This casino is located within 25 miles of
the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Sacramento at F ire Mountain. United Auburn asserts that the new casino will siphon business away from its facility, with negative economic consequences for the tribe. In this lawsuit, United Auburn contends that as a matter of state law, the Governor lacks the power to concur in the Secretary’s two

- part determination. The superior court rejected United Auburn’s argument, a s did the Court of Appeal. ( United Auburn Indian Community of
Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 36, 42.)
E. Other Litigation

While thi s case was pending before us, we granted review in another matter that also presents the question whether the Governor has the power to concur. In Stand Up for California!
v. State of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686 ( Stand Up! ), the
Fifth Dis trict Cou rt of Appeal concluded that the Governor lacked such authority, at least given the specific facts as alleged in that case.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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15 In Stand Up! , the Governor issued a concurrence in
connection with an off

- reservation casino proposed by the
North Fork Ra ncheria o f Mono Indians and negotiated a compact for gaming operations by the tribe. The off

reservation land where the casino would be situated was then taken into trust by the federal government. Unlike here, the Legislature ratified the compact that t he Govern or had negotiated. But the compact was made subject to a voter referendum (Proposition 48) at the November 2014 election, at which time it was rejected by the voters. (See Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691

– 694 [recounting these events]. )

All thr ee justices on the Stand Up! panel concluded that under the circumstances, the Governor lacked the authority to concur with the Secretary’s two

- part determination. Justice Smith, emphasizing that voters had rejected the gaming compact the Governo r had neg otiated, determined that “it would be perverse to find the Governor has an implied authority based on an express power [to compact] that the state has finally decided not to exercise, after protracted consideration by the Governor, the Legislature , and the voters.” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 700.)
Concurring and dissenting in Stand Up! , Justice Detjen
focused on the fact that a concurrence had been issued and a compact had been negotiated before the federal government acquired the la nd in tru st for the tribe. She explained, “Because the land was not held in trust at the time the Governor negotiated the announced compact, the Governor was not negotiating a compact for gaming on Indian lands and, thus, exceeded any authority granted by Proposit ion 1A.” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 715 (conc. & dis. opn. ofUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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16 Detjen, J.).) Because the concurrence related to what Justice Detjen regarded as an improper exercise of the compacting power, it too was invalid. ( Id ., at pp. 710, 718

– 7 19 (conc. & dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).)
Also concurring and dissenting, Justice Franson took the position that regardless of whether a gaming compact has or has not been approved, the state Constitution, as amended by Proposition 1A, does not grant the Gove rnor the power to concur. Regarding Proposition 1A, he explained, “[E]xpanding Indian gaming to off

- reservation locations was and is a controversial issue of public policy with a wide range of consequences for Californians. It is implausible that the

ave rage vote r would have understood the controversy was being resolved by an undisclosed, implied grant of the authority to concur.” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 723 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).) 3

II. D ISCUSSION

“ ‘In construing constitu tional an d statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration .’ ” ( Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 505.) We construe the language of a measure approved by the electorat e as it would

3 Justice Franson’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Stand Up! used “the phrase ‘off

- reservation casinos’ to mean casinos located on ‘af ter

- acquired trust land’ for which the Secretary of the Interior’s

. . . two

- part determination an d the Governor’s concurrence is required before casino

- type gambling may proceed at that location.” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 722, fn. 1 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.) .)UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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17 be understood by an average voter. ( People v. Adelmann (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1071, 1080 [“ ‘[t]he particularized meaning of words in complex, legislatively enacted statutes has little bearing on the interpretation of words in an initiati ve, which we construe according to their ordinary meanings as understood by ‘the average voter’ ”]; see also Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 902; Wallace v. Zinman (1927) 200 Cal. 585, 592.) This general rule whereby we construe words a s carryin g their normal, everyday meanings is subject to an exception when it appears that voters would have understood a term as having a special or technical meaning in its specific context. ( Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 13 18; Kaise r v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538.) We also presume that the average voter is aware of existing law, but this presumption is “not conclusive.” ( Santos v. Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 410.)

A. Article IV, Section 19(f) Does Not Confer a
P ower To C oncur As added by Proposition 1A, article IV, section 19(f) carves out a limited exception to the general prohibitions on lotteries and casino gaming that appear elsewhere in the same section of the state Constitution. Article IV, section 19(f)

p rovides, in full, “Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the

con duct of l ottery games and banking and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accordingly, slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage cardUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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18 games are hereby per mitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to those compacts.”
As Justice Franson determined in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Stand Up! , an average voter would not have understood this language as giving the Governor the power t o concur. Article IV, section 19(f) speaks only of compacts to be ratified by the Legislature, not gubernatorial concurrences. This cannot be regarded as an inadvertent oversight. By giving or withholding a concurrence, a governor exercises veto power o ver the a pplication of section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, the broadest and perhaps most controversial of the exceptions to the general prohibition against gaming on after

acquired tribal lands. (All, supra , 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at p. 304; Jensen, supra , 47 Washburn L.J. at p. 688.) Given how federal courts have construed Government Code section 98005, recognizing a power to concur means that a determination by a single state official, the Governor, imposes upon the state an obligation to negotiate in good faith for class III gaming on property associated with a positive two

- part determination by the Secretary. In fact, the Governor’s concurrence is the only authorization by the state that is absolutely necessary for a casino offering this kind of gaming to open at such a site. The
facts of this case demonstrate as much

— the Hard Rock Hotel
& Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain has become operational without the Legislature ever having ratified a compact, with secretarial procedures for the conduct of gamin g having been imposed upon the state instead. Nothing within article IV, section 19(f) reasonably conveys that it gives the Governor such a consequential power. (Cf. In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 782 [“We are not persuaded theUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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19 Legislature woul d have si lently, or at best obscurely, decided so important and controversial a public policy matter and created a significant departure from the existing law”].)
Nor is the existence of a power to concur somehow implied by Proposition 1A’s authorization o f gaming compacts. The Governor’s involvement with a compact is “of a qualitatively different nature from his concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s discretionary ‘best

- interests’ waiver of § 2719’s general gaming prohibition.” ( Keweenaw Bay Indian
Comm unity v. U.S. (6th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d 469, 477.) Under IGRA, compacts and concurrences are distinct acts with different consequences. (See Keweenaw Bay , at p. 475 [“the existence of a valid, approved compact does not eliminate other statutory requiremen ts, in th is case, conformity with § 2719”].) Class II gaming can occur on off

- reservation lands pursuant to a concurrence, without the need for a gaming compact. And compacts can be completed and ratified even if the Governor lacks the power to concur, p rovided t hat they authorize only class III gaming operations on trust lands acquired on or before October 17, 1988, or on after

- acquired trust lands for which no concurrence is required. These are in fact the most common kinds of gaming compacts; as previ ously men tioned, not one of the compacts directly before the voters at the March 2000 primary election required a concurrence to become
effective.
In short, a voter in the March 2000 primary election would not have understood Proposition 1A’s authorizati on of

gam ing compacts as subsuming an implied power to concur. By authorizing compacts but not concurrences, Proposition 1A struck a balance. The measure permitted a relatively broadUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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20 array of class III tribal gaming (at least compared to what was previou sly allow ed) on reservation lands and after

- acquired trust lands for which no concurrence is required, but it did not open the door to the most open

- ended and potentially controversial category of class III casino developments, those requiring the exercise of the c oncurrence power. B. The Ballot Materials for Proposition 1A Do Not Support a Power To Concur The ballot materials associated with Proposition 1A provide additional indications that the voters who approved
that measure did not intend to confer the power to concur. Where, as here, a constitutional amendment has been approved by the voters, “the ballot summary and arguments and analysis presented to the electorate in connection with a particular measure may be helpful in determining the probable

mean ing of un certain language.” ( Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245

– 246.) Nothing within the voter pamphlet for the March 2000 primary election explained to voters that Proposition 1A would give t he Govern or the power to concur. To the contrary, through such silence and the affirmative representations of the measure’s proponents, these materials suggested that Proposition 1A would not pave the way for class
III casinos on after

- acquired trust land s through section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA.
Beginning with the Legislative Analyst’s analysis of the measure, this description never raised the possibility that Proposition 1A could lead to off

- reservation gaming that requires a concurrence. The analysis addre ssed Prop osition 5,

our Hotel Employees decision, and the gaming compacts withUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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21 57 tribes that would become effective if Proposition 1A passed and the federal government gave its approval. (Voter Information Guide, supra , analysis of Prop. 1A by Legis.
Ana lyst, pp. 4

– 5.) The analysis also explained that Proposition 1A “amends the State Constitution to permit Indian tribes to conduct and operate slot machines, lottery games, and banked and percentage card games on Indian land. These gambling
activities cou ld only o ccur if (1) the Governor and an Indian tribe reach agreement on a compact, (2) the Legislature approves the compact, and (3) the federal government approves the compact.” (Voter Information Guide, analysis of Prop. 1A by Legis. Analyst, p. 5.) B y failing to include a concurrence among the prerequisites for class III gaming, this analysis conveyed that the measure authorized only gaming operations for which no concurrence is required.
The arguments by proponents of Proposition 1A that appeared wi thin the spring 2000 ballot pamphlet carried a similar message. The argument in favor of Proposition 1A advised that voter approval was necessary to preserve tribal gaming where it was currently being conducted: “We are asking you to vote YES on Proposit ion 1A so we can keep the gaming we have on our reservations.” (Voter Information Guide, supra , argument in favor of Prop. 1A, p. 6.) This argument also explained, “Prop 1A has been put on the March
ballot to

. . . establish clearly that Indian gaming on tribal
l ands is legal in California.” ( Ibid .) In response to opponents’ arguments that “[c]asinos won’t be limited to remote locations” (Voter Information Guide, argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7) and “Indian tribes are already buying up prime property for
casinos in our towns and cities” ( ibid .), proponents quoted aUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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22 former field investigator for the Nat ional Indian Gaming Commission as saying, “ ‘Proposition 1A and federal law strictly limit Indian gaming to tribal land. The claim that casinos could be built anyw here is totally false’ ” (Voter Information Guide, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7), and repeated an economist’s assertion that ‘‘ ‘[t]he majority
of Indian Tribes are located on remote reservations and the fact is their markets will only suppo rt a limited number of
machines’ ” ( ibid .).
At oral argument, counsel for the Governor chara cterized at least the first of these responses as “clever” and technically correct. But when reviewing a ballot argument for insight into voter intent, the questio n is not whether a party to the debate earns points for artful wordplay. What matters inste ad is how an argument contributed, if at all, to a voter’s understanding of the measure to which it pertains. Here, an average voter
would have understood these re sponses as addressing the opponents’ assertion that if Proposition 1A passed, casinos
could crop up in towns and cities across the state. The responses imparted to an average voter that this claim was false, and that the casinos authorized by Proposition 1A would be situated on “ ‘remote reservations’ ” (Voter Information Guide, supra , rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7), or at least where tribes were “ ‘located’ ” ( ibid .). By implication, these responses corroborated what an average voter alread y would have gleaned from the proposition’s text: that the measure did not confer the power to concur. For as has been explained, if the Governor does have this power, it can open the door to gaming facilities situated on any land within the
state that th e federal government has found suitable forUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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23 gaming and agrees to take into trust for a tribe

— decisions that do not strictly demand that the property be close to an existing reservation or that the tribe have a historical relationship to the proposed trus t land. 4

4 Similarly , on www.yeson1A.net, a website that Proposition 1A’s pr oponents directed voters toward in the ballot materials (Voter Information Guide, supra , rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7), the most pertinent explanation of the measure’s effect on where tribal gaming could take place equated “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” with “reservation lands,” and indicated that tribal casinos would be limi ted to these lands. The website included the following exchange: “Q. How would the number of casinos be limited under the compact and would the passage of Prop 1A al low Indian tribes to build casinos outside of tribal lands? [¶] A. There are several cl ear limitations: First, existing federal law strictly limits tribal gaming to Indian lands only. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) passed by Congress in 1988, mandates that Indian casinos can only be located on tribal reservation lands. [¶] Secon d, under the recent tribal

state compact signed by the Governor, a California tribe is specifically prohibited from operating more than two casinos on their reservatio n. [¶] Third, the economic reality will continue to limit the number of Indian casinos in our state. In most areas where Indian gaming is economically viable, the local tribes already have a casino. Most non

- gaming tribes are located too far from popul ation centers, in remote areas where an Indian casino simply would not be practical. In Nevada, casinos are legal everywhere but you can drive for miles through that state without seeing a casino in non

- urban areas because the market to support them does not exist.” (Yes on 1A, Proposition 1A: Answers to Common Questions (Mar. 6, 2000) <http ://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2000_999_028/> [as of Aug. 2 8 , 2020 ], italics added; this citation is archived by year, docket number, and case name at <http://ww w.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>.) Regardless of whetherUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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24 All in all, I agree with Justice Franson’s conclusion in Stand Up! that Propositio n 1A cannot properly be construed as giving the Governor the power to concur. As he recapped, after an exhaustive analysis of the issue, “First, the text of Propos ition 1A plainly omits the power to concur in the Secretary’s two

- part determination. Secon d, an implied grant of that power is not necessary under the principles of California law that govern necessary implications. Third, the wording of Proposition 1A and the materials in the ballot pamphlet did not inform the average voter that approving
Pro position 1A would grant the Governor the power to concur or, more generally, would grant the Governor the authority to either veto or approve a proposed off

- reserva tion casino. Fourth, expanding Indian gaming to off

- reservation locations
was and is a cont roversial question of public policy with a wide range of consequences, and it is implausible that the average voter would have understood that Proposition 1A grante d the Governor an implied authority to concur and thereby allowed
off

- reservation casinos. The controversy should not be resolved by implication when the voters were not informed that such an

Proposition 1A actually limited casin os to reservation lands, as opposed to reservation lands and a limited array of off

reservation lands where no concurrence would be required for the institution of cas ino operations, this description of where casinos could appear if Proposition 1A passed i s more consistent with an interpretation of the measure as not encompassing a power to concur than it is with the majority’s construction of the constitutional amendme nt as authorizing the more open

- ended siting of casinos in the state.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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25 implication existed.” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at p.
7 67 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).)
C. The Arguments for Recognizing a Power To Concur Are Unpersuasive The most weighty argument in favor of the majority’s interpretation of Proposition 1A derives from the use of the term “Indian lands” within article I V, section 19(f)’s authorization of compacts for gaming “by federally recognized
Indian trib es on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law.” As previously observed, IGRA provides a framework for tribal gaming on “Indian lands,” which the statute defines as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and [¶] (B) a ny lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual sub ject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over
which an Indian tribe e xercises governmental power.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)

– (B).) This definition leads to an argument in favor of recognizing a power to concur that proceeds as
follow s: Proposition 1A authorizes compacts for gaming on “Indian lands”; IGRA supplies a broad de finition of “Indian lands”; an average voter would have understood Proposition 1A as authorizing compacts for casinos located on any such lands; therefore, article IV, section 19(f) incorporates an implied power to concur, because a concurrence is necessar y for class III gaming operations on certain after

- acquired Indian lands.
I find this argument unpersuasive. First, it is unclear at best that an average voter w ould have understood “Indian lands,” as that term is used in article IV, section 19(f), as

c arrying the technical meaning assigned to it by section 4 ofUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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26 IGRA. Article IV, section 19(f) uses “Indian lands” interchangeably with another term, “tribal lands,” that appears nowhere in the federal statute. A voter could have regarded this use of diffe rent phrasing as communicating that Proposition 1A did not embrace the definition IGRA attaches to one, and only one, of these terms. Second, even assuming that

vo ters did understand “Indian lands” within Proposition 1A as invoking IGRA’s definition of th is term, article IV, section 19(f) does not say that gaming may occur on any or all of these lands. Instead, this provision allows the Governor to “negotiate and c onclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature” through which certain specifie d forms of gaming may occur on Indian lands, and repeats that this gaming may occur “on tribal lands subject to those compacts.” Without any reference to a power t o concur, an average voter would have understood article IV, section 19(f) as envisioning cl ass III gaming only on those “Indian lands” or “tribal lands” on which a compact, and a compact alone, provides sufficient state
authorization for the institution o f gaming operations.
The majority also claims that the Governor possesses the “inherent pow er to concur to allow class III gaming .” (Maj.

opn., ante , at p. 20.) But this bold assertion is exactly that

— mere assertion. The majority nowhere explains why the Governor possesses such inherent authority in a sphere controlled by the state Constitu tion’s flat prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey

- style casinos and its specification of a limited exception for tribal gaming. These provisions of article IV,

sect ion 19 establish that the Governor has no such inherent power. That which is not authorized by article IV, section 19(f) remains forbidden by article IV, section 19(e). And as I haveUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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27 explained, neither the text nor the context of article IV, section 19(f ) supports an interpretation of this provision as authorizing
the Governor to concur. In li ght of article IV, section 19(e)’s broad prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey

- style casinos, this conclusion resolves the question before us. The electorate that

a pproved Proposition 1A was not required to go further and explicitly deny the Governor the p ower to concur in order to prevent its exercise. (See maj. opn., ante , at pp. 19

– 20, 35

– 37.)
To draw from Justice Franson’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Stand Up! one final time, “The initiative process functions best when voters are (1) informe d that the initiative addresses a controversial issue with a wide range of impacts for Californians and (2) told how the initiative resolves
that controversial issu e. When voters are so informed, courts can ‘give effect to the voters’ formally expressed i ntent, without speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects on which they were not asked to vote.’ ( Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. ( 2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 930

. . . .)” ( Stand Up!

, supra , 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 722

– 723 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).) Today’s decision does not advance the goal of transparency. Proposition 1A’s text and ballot materials emphasized legislative approv al for gaming compacts, they did not disclose the existence of the power to concur, and they did not portray the proposition as opening the
door to off

- reservation gaming to the extent that concurrences can. Under the circumstances, it is a mistake to con clude that the voters who approved the measure intended to give the Governor the power to co ncur.UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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28 III. C ONCLUSION Legislative constitutional amendments, like initiatives, provide concrete examples of direct democracy in action.
Courts must review the e lectorate’s handiwork carefully. If we give voters more or less than what they approved, our interpretations can sow cynicism and distrust of the process.
To accurately capture the intent behind a measure approved by the electorate, we must appreciate h ow average voters genuinely would have understood what was p ut before them. Realistically, the average voter at the March 2000 election would not have understood article IV, section 19(f) as going beyond its plain language regarding compacts and also givi ng the Governor the power to concur. Such a voter would

not have locked into article IV, section 19(f)’s reference to “Indian lands,” consulted IGRA, and concluded that even though the constitutional amendment did not mention a power to concur, it necessa rily contemplated casinos that could exist only through the exercise of such a power. And such a voter would not have understood Proposition 1A, with its focus on legislatively ratified compacts, as nevertheless allowing a
casino to be built on off

- reserv ation land such as that involved
here even without a compact , so long as the Governor concurred and other prerequisites were met.
Voters clearly have the power to authorize tribal gaming
on off

- reservation trust lands to a greater extent than they did
with Proposition 1A. But by all indications, they chose a path that steps out of the shadow of the general state policy against Nevada and New Jersey

- style casinos only so far as to allow class III gaming on those lands where no gubernatorial
concurrence is r equired. Where the majority sees twilight, IUNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RAN CHERIA v. NEWSOM
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29 see a series o f decisions by the electorate

— first prohibiting certain kinds of casino operations, then relaxing this restriction to a limited degree

— to which we must defer. Because I believe that today’s d ecision gives voters something different from what they barg ained for, I respectfully dissent.

CANTIL

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I Concur:
LIU, J.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion United Aub urn Indian Community of the Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom

__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 4 Cal.App.5th 36 Rehearing Granted

_ _________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S238544 Date Filed: August 31, 2020

_____ _____________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior County: Sacramento Judge: Eugene L. Balonon

__________________________________________________________________________________
Counsel:

Bingham McCutc hen, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

, Thomas F. Gede and Colin C. West for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Snell & Wilmer, Sean M. S herlock, Todd Lundell and Jenny Hua for Stand Up For California! as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Fredericks Peebles & Morgan and Michael A. Robinson for Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintif f and Appellant.

Law Office of Frank Lawrence, Frank R. Lawrence, Zehava Zevit; Forman & Associates, George Forman, Jay B. Shapiro and Margaret Rosenfeld for the Mooretown Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California and Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Community as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra , A ttorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Sara J. Drake , Assistant Attorney General, William P. Torngren and Timoth y M. Muscat , Deputy Attorneys General, Max Carter

- Oberstone, Deputy State Solicitor General

, and Janill L. Richards, Princ ipal State Deputy Solicitor General, for Defendant and Respondent.

Dentons US, Charles A. Bird, Matthew G. Adams; Maier Pfeffer Kim Geary & Cohen, Michael S. Pfeffer and John A. Maier for the Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria, Califor nia as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Maier Pfeffer Kim Geary & Cohen , John A. Maier; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Ha le and Dorr, Danielle Spinelli, Christopher E. Babbitt, Jonathan A. Bressler and Claire Chung for North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent

.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for public ation with opinion):

Thomas Gede Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP One Market Street, Spear Tower San Francisco, CA 94105 (41 5) 442

- 1000

Michael J. Mongan State Solicitor General 455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102

- 7004 (415) 510

- 3920