National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Headquarters 

Washington, DC 20546-0001 

Reply to Attn of: Science Mission Directorate 

JUN 2 6 2018 

Summary of NASA responses to Webb Independent Review Board Recommendations 

Following the agency's review of the mission's remaining tasks and recent integration and test 

challenges, NASA has established March 30,2021, as the new launch date for the James Webb Space 

Telescope (Webb), the next great astronomy observatory. This date is consistent with the findings of an 

Independent Review Board (JRB), set up on April2018, and chaired by retired Aerospace Executive and 

Member ofthe Academy ofEngineering, Tom Young. As a result ofthe delay, Webb's totallifecycle 

cost to support the March 202llaunch date is estimated at $9.66 b.illion. The development cost estimate 

to support the new launch date is $8.8B (up from the $8B development cost estimate established in 

2011). Along with the IRB's broad-view assessment, NASA also considered data from the project's 

Standing Review Board (SRB). Both review panels had concluded that a 2020 launch date would have 

been feasible before the recent acoustics test anomaly. 

By setting this new launch data, NASA also agrees with a central finding of the IRB that the development 

of this telescope should move forward because of the exceptional potential and science insight the James 

Webb Space Telescope promises. The value of Webb was confirmed by NASA Administrator Jim 

Bridenstine: "Webb is a top priority mission that has great national importance for the agency and it will 

move forward. Webb wi11leave a legacy of exceptional science and cutting-edge technical innovations 

in the years ahead and will inspire future generations of astronomers, explorers, scientists, artists, and 

engineers." 

In response to my charge, the IRB identified a variety of factors influencing mission success, leading to 

findings and recommendations to NASA over a wide range of technical, organizational, and other factors. 

NASA fully accepts the intent of all the IRB's recommendations (italicized), has already started 

implementing most of them, and NASA's response (bold) to each is provided below. The full IRB report 

is also available. The newly established launch date, cost commitment, and our responses to the IRB 

report were approved by the Agency Program Management Council. 

I want to thank the IRB members for their critical analysis of the project as a whole. They have provided 

us with valuable independent insights that will help ensure the success of this crucial mission. In fact, 

some of the recommendations are aligned with actions already taken by the project team prior to 

receiving this report. 

Webb's world-class science, from detecting light from the first stars and galaxies in the distant universe 

to probing the atmospheres in nearby exoplanets for possible signs of habitability, will underpin many 

other astrophysics projects that will use its high-caliber capabilities to enhance their science return. I 

::I:~o t~e successful completion of this importruJt mission. 

Associate Administrator, 

Science Mission Directorate 

Attached: NASA's Response t IRB recommendations 
NASA's Responses and Actions Already taken in response to the recommendations of the 

Independent Review Board. 

Commissioning Risks: 

1) NASA should designate a Commission Manager. Agree. The project will identify a 

Commission Manager who has extensive systems engineering experience with 

JWST. 

2) NASA should implement sunshield hardware and simulation elements to aid in 

sunshield anomaly identification and resolution. Agree. Will adjudicate as part of 

the review and implementation of the "top ten" mission enhancement effort. At 

the request of the IRB, the "top ten" mission enhancements were identified by 

NASA, Space Telescope Science Institute (STScl) and Northrop Grumman Aerospace 

Systems (NGAS) as activities beyond the current work scope that would enhance 

mission success if implemented. 

Human Mistakes During Integration and Test: 

1) Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS) should establish corrective actions in 

processes, training, personnel certification, individual accountability and a robust 

testing, analysis and inspection process. Agree. NGAS stood down operations and 

performed an independent set of reviews and rewrites of all propulsion procedures 

including feedback from the performers. Also, applied Integration & Test (I&T) 

procedure expertise to manufacturing operations. To further enhance robustness 

in I& T, NGAS will be incorporating cross program independent reviews of the table 

top and pre-task briefing processes. 

• Will ensure that, in addition to formal training and certification to processes, 

that critical operations also require individual performers to have expertise and 

prior successful execution of the tasks. 

• A process is in place to recognize and reward performers who say 

'Stop'. Additionally, brought in outside program leadership to meet with the 

performing organizations to hear feedback and incorporate into actions. 

• Recently, instituted an accountability process with checklist insuring 

independence of quality inspectors. Reinforced the importance of 

independence to insure first time success. 

Embedded Problems: 

1) Goddard and NGAS conduct an audit including forensic engineering, hardware 

pedigree assessment, drawing checks, etc., to identify potential embedded problems. 

Agree. Activities initiated: solicited support from GSFC Engineering Directorate and 

NGAS engineering organization for an independent set of eyes. This activity will 

include a comprehensive review of designs, processes, and tests to uncover 

embedded problems. 
• Prioritize completion to support upcoming testing. NASA is auditing NGAS's 

verification processes of soft structure installation. Soft structure is more 

complex, and involves more organizational hand-offs than hard structure items. 

• NASA is auditing launch vehicle interfaces based on Falcon 9 Zuma incident. 

Residual Risks: 

1} GSFC should conduct an audit of the JWST project residual risk, reviewing the 

objective evidence of (a) the completed Test As You Fly (TAYF) and Single Point 

Failures (SPFs) mitigation plans, and (b) failure corrective action effectiveness to 

determine the "as built" residual risk. Agree. Project actively pursuing. Every year or 

after key test we review the complete risk list for accepted, watch, mitigated, and 

open risks for currency and relevance. Mission System Engineer (MSE) reports 

project status every month to the GSFC Engineering Directorate including any 

changes to TAYF and SPF waiver accuracy I risk level based on results of test, 

inspection or verification activities. The MSE is the project Independent Technical 

Authority and is a key member of this process. 

2) The Project should reconcile the "as built' residual risk with the expected "as 

designed" residual risk. Agree. The project continuously reviews the "as-built" 

hardware compared to the "as-designed" assumption via the weekly Architecture 

Working Group (AWG). The status of "as-built'' Single Point Failure verification is a 

monthly AWG topic. 

Mission Success Dependence on Launch Vehicle: 

1) The Launch Services Program (LSP) shall be accountable for JWST launch success at 

the same level of responsibility they have for U.S. launches, or NASA should contract 

with Aerospace Corporation for similar accountability. Agree with the intent of this 

recommendation. NASA is working with ESA to establish a "Mission Success" plan. 

It is important that any additional assessment be focused, concise, and bring value 

to the mission. A well-meaning assessment, if applied in the wrong areas, could be 

counterproductive and prove to be a distraction to the entire team. LSP's extensive 

experience can increase the likelihood of mission success in certain key areas while 

ESA maintains accountability for the launch service. ESA and CNES (government, 

not industry) are the design and qualification authorities for the highly reliable 

Ariane 5 and they have an appropriate set of checks and balances with Arianespace 

(industry). 

Transport and Spacecraft/Launch Integration: 

1} NASA should define security requirements and plan for JWST transport to launch site. 

Agree. The project engaged United States Air Force (USAF} Transportation 

Command in 2015 to perform a risk assessment of the transport "'1 year before the 

launch readiness date. NASA is working with ESA on the details of security 

arrangements based on the threat analyses and identifying ways NASA can assist 

ESA in protecting the spacecraft and conducting launch site operations for JWST. 
2) NASA should develop contingency operations and sparing plan for spacecraft/launch 

site operations. Agree. Contingency operations and equipment sparing plans are 

being developed for the launch site. 

3) NASA should develop "pathfinder" JWST simulator and contamination protection 

systems for integration "dry runs." Agree. Pathfinder plans for launch site 

operations are underway and will be performed prior to Observatory shipment. 

4) NASA should assess shipping vessel contamination environment and develop 

contingency plans for off-nominal shipping operation. Agree. The JWST shipping 

container is very robust, so particle monitoring of the exterior to the container 

should not be necessary. Erring on the side of caution, the Project will place a 

witness plate in the hold area of the ship for information. 

Mission Operations: 

1) It is critically important that GSFC JWST Project Office maintain responsibility and 

provide adequate support to ensure Space Telescope Science Institute (STScl) mission 

operations readiness. Agree. The project maintains the responsibility for mission 

operations. 

2) The Project should review all simulators/testbeds and required usage against prelaunch tests and rehearsals, post-launch deployment anomaly resolution, fault 

isolation and correction. Agree. An assessment of the readiness of the simulators 

and testbeds and their usages is being adjudicated as part of the "top ten" mission 

enhancement activity described above. 

3) The GSFC JWST Project Office should develop a staffing plan that meets the needs of 

1& T and operational readiness. Agree. The project has a staffing plan to support all 

the activities leading up to launch and has been coordinating with the I& T team to 

ensure the proper support. 

4) The Project should develop and approve a transition plan that defines the level of 

mission operations responsibility for STScl as a function of time with independent 

gate reviews at transition points. Agree. The project is developing a transition plan 

that describes the changes in responsibility once commissioning is complete. 

JWST Reporting: 

1) NASA should implement JWST reporting structure as represented by accompanying 

diagram in the IRB report. 

2) NASA should revise NASA policy directive consistent with recommendation. Agree 

with the intent of these two recommendations. The Program and Project 

understand the fundamental concern of the IRB and are developing a plan to better 

communicate the organizational roles and responsibilities at the Program and 

Project level. 

Management Communications: 

1) The GSFC and NGAS Project Offices should be established as consistent and factual 

source of all JWST mission status. Agree. Program Office and Project will collaborate 

in communicating mission status. 
2) Communications of status and details appropriate for stakeholders needs to be 

presented clearly and frequently. Agree. The Program Office Communications Plan 

will target the release Webb features at the conclusion of major milestones or as 

often as there is substantive material. 

3) NASA HQ should be responsible for developing a "communication plan" (messaging 

strategy) for JWST. Agree. The completed Webb Communications Plan is in review, 

and will be signed soon. 

4) Communicating complexity, risk and science return for JWST is critically important. 

Agree. Program Office Communications Team reviewing the Webb Communications 

Plan with the entire Webb team. 

5) Same criticality and assessment charts used for all JWST reporting. Agree. 

Assessment charts will accurately communicate JWST status and risk in a consistent 

manner. Where there might be differences in risk posture, there may be legitimate 

differences (such as when HQ is holding UFE to mitigate a risk at the project level) 

in how the risk is being communicated. In those cases, the differences will be 

transparently identified at all levels within NGAS, the Project and the Program. 

Mission Success: 

1) Management unambiguously emphasize the priority of mission success to "working 

level" personnel. Agree. Mission success is the highest priority. As an example, 

during the OTIS vibration anomaly the project focused on mission success. The 

investigation took the required time to thoroughly resolve the issue. 

2) Employees must feel empowered to stop or slow down if the pace or procedures can 

jeopardize mission success. Agree. NGAS (and GSFC) will continue to emphasize the 

importance of stopping or calling attention to a concern. NGAS also provides 

special recognition and rewards for individuals who do so. 

3) NASA assess "top ten" mission success enhancements (see the three charts associated 

with the recommendation in the report) and implement where appropriate. Agree. 

The ••top ten" mission enhancement list described above is being implemented by 

the project and program office. 

Responsible Design Engineer (ROE) Role: 

1) ROEs be involved and responsible for their element through the successful 

commissioning of the observatory. Agree. This is GSFC standard approach to 

responsible engineers and NGAS is adopting this and bringing back any key ROEs 

who have left for other assignments at NGAS. 

I& T Staff Adequacy: 

1) The project should augmentation I& T staff; this critically important to execute the I& T 

program. Agree. NGAS has already started augmenting the 1& T staff. 
Employee Morale: 

1) Augment I& T staff to achieve more realistic work schedules. Agree. The project and 

NGAS have already adjusted I&Twork activities to a sustainable schedule 

considering the new launch date. 

2} Implement strategies for improving team morale, such as periodic science lectures for 

NGAS personnel and families. Agree. The project will bring world-class scientists to 

facilities where key hardware has been built and tested, including to NGAS. 

Engagement of Science Community: 

1) Assure consistent, sustained and meaningful engagement of the Science Working 

Group (SWG). Agree. Reinstitute weekly teleconferences (started June 18), and 

three face-to-face meetings per year. 

2) Appoint an executive committee of NASA-selected members of the SWG to act as 

conduits to broader community on mission challenges. Agree. Plan with the full SWG 

at their next meeting (July) how to most effectively harness their time and talents 

to act as conduits to the broader community on mission challenges. 
James Webb Space Telescope

Independent Review Board

Report

May 31, 2018
2
This is an important chart to give a macro view of JWST. The statement of incredible capability and 

awesome scientific potential was initially thought to be “over the top.” After discussion, the Webb 

Independent Review Board (IRB) clearly believes that “awesome” is a correct assessment of the JWST 

scientific potential. To achieve this potential requires an observatory with significant complexity and risk. It 

is easy to defend that JWST has the highest complexity and risk of any civil space robotic system. Clearly, 

it is in the top few. The complexity and risk must be considered in all decisions that affect JWST mission 

success.

The observation that there are no small JWST integration and test problems was not initially recognized by 

the Webb IRB, and this also may be true of others involved with JWST. It is a most important observation 

that will be apparent in subsequent Findings and Recommendations. It is caused by the complexity and 

highly integrated nature of the observatory. Specifically, it implies, as an example, that a very small human 

error or test anomaly can impact the schedule by months and the cost by tens of millions of dollars.

Each member of the Webb IRB believes that cost and schedule are important elements of a space project 

and must be responsibly managed. Throughout much of the life of a space project, cost, schedule, 

technical performance, risk and requirements can be responsibly managed without compromising mission 

success. All projects reach a point in their development where this trade can no longer be made without 

adversely impacting mission success. JWST has reached this point and must now be completed within the 

principle that mission success is the top priority and is more important than cost and schedule.

3
There are two primary elements of the JWST observatory. The first is the combined Optical Telescope 

Element and Integrated Science Module, or OTIS. The second is the Spacecraft Element (SCE), which is 

the combined Spacecraft Bus, Trim Flap, and Multilayer Sunshield.

4
JWST is among the most complicated scientific experiment ever attempted. It is important to recognize that 

the challenges associated with this complex observatory are being undertaken in order to achieve 

transformative scientific discoveries, from the earliest state of the universe, to the birth of galaxies, stars & 

planetary systems, as well as the characterization of habitable environments in the solar neighborhood.

Captions for images that illustrate Webb’s diverse science objectives, from left to right:

• A schematic that illustrates how Webb will be able to see back in time to when the first bright objects 

(stars and galaxies) were forming in the early universe.

• New General Catalogue (NGC) 3344 is a glorious spiral galaxy around half the size of the Milky Way, 

one of many galaxy types whose origins will be studied.

• The Pillars of Creation in the Eagle Nebula captured in infrared light by Hubble. The light from young 

stars being formed pierce the clouds of dust and gas in the infrared. 

• An artist's conception of Pulsar (PSR) B1257+12's system of planets, which does not involve a main 

sequence star like our own, but rather, a pulsar.

5
Extensive testing of OTIS and the JWST instrument suite provides high confidence that the mission will 

achieve all of the highly ambitious science goals.

In particular, end-to-end testing indicates that there are no performance problems.

6
7
The Webb IRB Charter is taken from the Terms of Reference established by NASA. It requires that the 

Webb IRB evaluate all factors influencing JWST mission success from the beginning of the review in April 

2018 through completion of the observatory’s commissioning, at launch plus six months.

8
The Webb IRB conducted the independent review consistent with the principal that the resulting 

Observations, Concerns, Findings and Recommendations had relevancy to maximizing JWST’s probability 

of success.

The Webb IRB wants to emphasize that the independent review was a mission success review, not a 

failure review.

9
Brief biographies for each board member are provided in the Appendix. The contributions of Dan Woods, 

Review Manager, and John Karcz, Executive Secretary, were extraordinary. This review would not have 

been possible without the support of these two exceptional individuals.

The support of NASA, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS) and the Space Telescope Science 

Institute (STScI)was critical to accomplishing the independent review. JWST implementation was at 

maximum intensity during the time the review was being conducted. The incredible people at these 

organizations went the “extra mile” to ensure that the Webb IRB was adequately informed and that all 

questions and requests for additional information were answered. The Webb IRB is indebted to all who 

supported our effort so well.

10
A very deliberate and focused methodology was used by the Webb IRB in the conduct of the review. There 

were numerous structured reviews characterized by organized presentations and considerable discussion. 

Informal discussions were important to ensure that Webb IRB members had a good understanding of 

topics pertinent to mission success. Personal, not-for-attribution interviews were held with several selected 

individuals. These individual interviews were invaluable to understanding the perspectives of key JWST 

participants. The interviews were with individuals representing various JWST levels of responsibility.

During the course of the review, it became clear that the set of mission success enhancements that could 

be identified by ten board members within two months would be limited. NASA Headquarters (HQ), 

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), NGAS and STScI were requested to develop sets of “Top Ten Items 

to Increase Probability of Mission Success” if cost and schedule were not constraints. The Webb IRB 

subsequently decided that the NASA HQ list not be included in this report since NASA HQ is the recipient 

and implementation authority for the Webb IRB report.

Most-probable cost and schedule estimates are critically important to the mission success of a major space 

project and were part of the scope of the review.

Deliberations, discussion, debate and arguments within the Webb IRB were extremely important to 

developing credible Findings and Recommendations. The purpose of the many hours of deliberation was to 

achieve understanding, not compromise or consensus.

11
It was clearly recognized that JWST is in a critical phase in its development and any impact by an 

independent review board must be timely. This resulted in a two-month review schedule. While the 

schedule was demanding, the Webb IRB believes it was adequate to accomplish the established charter.

12
A report on JWST mission success would not be complete without acknowledging the exceptional 

accomplishments that have been realized.

The skills and experience of the key personnel assigned to work on JWST are commensurate with the 

importance and complexity of the mission. The project offices at each institution are led by individuals who 

have demonstrated leadership skills honed by experience with other missions. Each institution matrixes 

personnel to support the project, in areas such as mechanical and electrical engineering, integration and 

test and quality assurance. In their interactions with the Webb IRB, the team members demonstrated 

unwavering commitment to the mission and a depth of understanding of the technical requirements and 

challenges of JWST.

The collective team has achieved significant milestones in the program. There were important precursor 

technology developments that led to implementation and integration of some very complex components. 

While those listed are the top highlights of the JWST program, there are many more achievements that 

collectively contributed to readiness for integration and test.

13
This report contains numerous recommendations all directed toward contributing to the maximization of 

JWST mission success. The Webb IRB strongly recommends that all the recommendations be 

implemented.

14
The Webb IRB developed a set of technical, management and cost/schedule Observations and Concerns. 

The criterion for inclusion was relevance of an item to JWST mission success. This set of Observations 

and Concerns provided the foundation for Webb IRB Findings & Recommendations. Each item will be 

individually discussed on subsequent charts.

15
16
17
JWST has a large number of “firsts” that require special attention to ensure that the absence of experience 

does not have a negative impact upon the probability of mission success. It is important to recognize a 

particular activity is a “first” so it can receive appropriate attention.

18
19
Commissioning is the set of activities undertaken after launch to prepare for nominal science operations. It 

includes the solar array and antenna deployments, sunshield deployment, OTIS deployments, thermal 

cool-down, telescope focusing and science instrument checkout and operational preparation. The sum of 

these activities takes about six months. 

Commissioning risks are dominated by the fact that verification by test as you fly cannot be accomplished 

at the system level. This requires that significant mitigation actions must be undertaken to ensure the 

residual risk of this phase is brought to acceptable levels.

Many of these activities are mission critical, but the highest risk, highest criticality event is sunshield 

deployment, driven by the complexity of the deployment and the large number of deployment mission 

critical single point failures.

Sunshield deployment takes place in the first month of commissioning. It has the positive characteristic that 

it is NOT time critical. The vehicle is stable for long durations both before the sunshield deployment, and 

between individual activities during the deployment.

The JWST project has concentrated significant efforts and resources on the commissioning phase, with a 

heavy emphasis on the deployments.

20
21

Both the JWST Commissioning Phase and Mars landers’ Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) are 

characterized by (1) being mission critical, (2) being the highest risk operational point in the mission, 

(3) having a significant number of single point failures, almost all of which are mission single point failures 

as well, (4) being impossible to test as you fly, and therefore having a significant number of test as you fly 

exceptions and resulting mitigations, and (5) being highly integrated activities.

Because of these characteristics, the Mars lander missions have placed EDL under the leadership of a 

single “world class” systems engineer. This individual reports to the Project Manager and has total 

responsibility for EDL throughout the system design and throughout the life cycle – design, design 

verification and validation, EDL testing during system integration and test, operational planning, operational 

testing and rehearsals, and operational execution.

As with all critical flight sequences, contingency planning is an important part of commissioning 

preparation. That planning must include a comprehensive survey of the possible flight contingencies, how 

they will be unambiguously recognized utilizing the flight telemetry, what are the possible operational 

recovery responses, and how will the contingencies, their recognition and recovery be replicated on the 

ground prior to response execution on the flight vehicle.
22

The Webb IRB recommends that JWST responsibility for commissioning mirror the Mars lander’s approach 

to EDL, and that a Commissioning Manager be appointed with total end-to-end responsibility for 

commissioning success. This individual needs to be a “world class” system engineer with experience and 

technical knowledge of the JWST design and have the necessary leadership credentials. This position 

needs to report to the project manager.

The JWST project needs to ensure that the required capabilities are in place to replicate contingencies, 

their recognition and recovery on the ground prior to response execution on the flight vehicle. In particular, 

because of the complexity and critical nature of the sunshield deployment, the ground hardware and 

simulation elements for the sunshield should be reviewed by the project to determine whether they are 

adequate for high confidence flight contingency recognition, recovery and response. Any identified 

deficiencies in the ground suite of capabilities needs to be rectified and tested for adequacy prior to launch.
23

Space is a “one strike and you’re out business.” Hundreds of people can perform thousands of tasks 

correctly, but ultimately a mission failure can result from one person making one mistake that goes 

undetected. Or, if the mistake is caught in an advanced stage of a system’s development, the result can be 

large cost and schedule increases. Human-induced errors can result from a flawed process, touch labor 

not properly interpreting the process or not properly following it, technicians not being trained and certified 

to execute a process, and functional organizations like Quality Assurance not properly verifying that a 

process has been implemented correctly.

There have been several JWST Project problems due to human-induced errors that had substantial cost 

and schedule impact. In one case, an improper solvent was used to clean propulsion system valves that 

had been stored. The error was a failure to check with the valve vendor to ensure the solvent to be used 

was recommended and would not damage the valves. The valves had to be removed from the spacecraft, 

repaired or replaced, and reinstalled.

Another human-induced error was improper test wiring that caused excess voltage to be applied to 

transducers. The error resulted from an improper interpretation of a process step. The error should have 

been detected by the inspector, who did not inspect, but relied on the technician’s word that he had done 

the wiring correctly. Another seemingly small mistake that had a large impact was discovered after the SCE 

Acoustic Test. To address a risk that fasteners for sunshield membrane covers might snag the membrane, 

the fastening lock nuts were tightened only to be flush with their bolts. Unfortunately, this compromised the 

locking mechanism, and after the test, loose hardware was found in the lower area of the spacecraft.

Despite best efforts, humans will, on occasion, make mistakes. Those mistakes must be detected and 

corrected by an effective safety net. The safety net consists of:

• Processes that produce predictable, repeatable results, that are not subject to interpretation, and that 

represent the collective learning experience of the organization, including from preventive/corrective 

action from past failures and anomalies.

• Individuals who are properly trained in the processes, follow them in a disciplined way, and authorized 

to call a halt if something in the process doesn’t seem right. 

• Accountable individuals in functions, like Quality Assurance, who ensure that procedures have been 

properly followed prior to sign-off. 

• Verification and Validation testing to ensure system requirements are met. 

• Independent analysis or inspection to supplement testing when necessary.
The Webb IRB recommends that NGAS review processes/procedures to be sure they are current, accurate 

and implementable. The Webb IRB has noted two examples of human induced errors resulting from 

incomplete procedures (e.g., requiring that the solvent selected for cleaning valves be recommended by 

the vendor) or processes that could be misinterpreted (e.g., the improper wiring that caused excess voltage 

to be applied to transducers). Both examples resulted in substantial schedule and cost increases.

The Webb IRB recommends that individuals at the working level be trained to understand that, on JWST, 

seemingly small errors produce large consequences.

The Webb IRB recommends that individuals scheduled to perform tasks on the observatory be properly 

trained, capable, and certified to perform those tasks and properly supervised. Those not properly certified 

must not be allowed to perform tasks that could result in damage to the system. This is an especially 

critical discipline to maintain, particularly on second or third shift activities and when schedule pressure 

exists (which will likely always be the case on JWST Integration & Test (I&T) and when supervision may be 

thin.

The Webb IRB has noted lapses in individual accountability that have substantially increased schedule and 

cost and, potentially, increased risk. The Webb IRB recommends that discipline be continually instilled in 

the workforce such that people feel accountable and own what NGAS is relying on them to do. A signature 

sign-off must mean something. With this ownership mindset, people must believe they are empowered to 

call a halt to the execution of a process if it doesn’t look right or they don’t completely understand what they 

are being called upon to do.

The Webb IRB recommends that NGAS management maintain a failure-proof safety net to ensure mission 

success. This safety net encompasses testing, independent analysis, and inspection to ensure that the 

system design meets all of its requirements and any workmanship errors are detected and corrected.

24
Embedded problems, that is problems that are in the as-built observatory that have not been detected 

through analysis, inspection or test activities, pose a significant mission success risk to JWST (if 

undiscovered before launch) or a significant cost and schedule risk (if discovered during the “to-go” work 

between now and launch).

The propulsion valve issue mentioned before and most recently the sunshield fasteners that came loose 

during acoustic testing of the Spacecraft Element are two examples of problems that were discovered later 

in the development phase than they should have been, with subsequent large impacts on cost and 

schedule for the remedial actions required. These experiences raise the possibility of other such issues 

remaining in the design at this stage.

To attack this, the Webb IRB recommends GSFC and NGAS conduct an audit to identify potential 

embedded problems still remaining in the observatory.

25
All space missions have residual risks. They come primarily from (1) inability to Test As You Fly (TAYF) the

vehicle because of the fundamental lack of facilities, or the inability to match the actual environment the

vehicle will be in; (2) the existence of Single Point Failures (SPFs); (3) test anomalies with uncertain

effectiveness in the corrective actions; or (4) unverified failures–anomalies where the root cause of the

failure cannot be determined.

Maintaining insight into residual risks is more difficult with a large, complex mission such as JWST. These

missions are usually expensive, highly visible to the public and political leadership, and very important to

the agency. This difficulty is exacerbated by the long duration of the development, where personnel

turnover and the cadence of issues/problems being worked makes it more difficult to maintain visibility.

The JWST project through both GSFC and NGAS have a mature and integrated process for processing

and handling "as designed" residual risks, particularly in the design process and the test phase, and have

mature processes for monitoring these risks over time in order to determine, at the end of the development,

the “as built” residual risks arising from these same items.

26
27

Although the GSFC processes are mature, because of the JWST project’s duration, complexity, cost and

visibility, GSFC should undertake an audit of the JWST project residual risk, reviewing the objective

evidence of (1) the completed TAYF and SPFs mitigation plans, and (2) failure corrective action

effectiveness to determine the “as built” residual risk. Once done, they should then reconcile the “as built’

residual risk with the expected “as designed” residual risks such that the residual risk posture clearly

identifies 1) TAYF and SPF mitigation actions that were not successfully completed or completed with

liens, 2) test failures that occurred where the corrective action is incomplete or uncertain, 3) unverified

failure occurrences, and 4) unexpected vehicle behavior during test that is accepted “use as is.”
28

The Ariane program is run by the European Space Agency (ESA) in partnership with the French Space 

Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales (CNES). The program provides access to Space with the Ariane 

launchers from the European spaceport in Kourou, French Guiana. Arianespace, a commercial subsidiary 

of CNES, handles the production, operations and marketing for the Ariane launch vehicles.

NASA has manifested instrument payloads on ESA-developed and Ariane-launched spacecraft over the 

years. However, the only NASA developed spacecraft where NASA played a major role was the Earth 

Science Topex/Poseidon mission, a NASA/ESA collaboration successfully launched in 1992 on an 

Ariane 4. One of the communication satellites on board the January 25, 2018 launch included a NASA 

instrument called Global-Scale Observations of the Limb and Disk (GOLD) as a hosted payload. The 

launch resulted in an anomaly being investigated by ESA.

For NASA launches, the Launch Services Program (LSP) approves mission unique requirements, 

implementation, and launch, and has insight into almost all aspects of the launch vehicle and provider on 

NASA’s behalf. For these launches, LSP a) conducts mission analysis and planning to meet spacecraft 

customer requirements, b) has ownership of mission requirements on the vehicle, c) provides approval of 

spacecraft integration, d) has insight into the launch vehicle resulting in NASA independent 

recommendations and launch readiness verification, e) independently evaluates fleet technical standards 

for adequacy and compliance to contract, f) applies consistent mission success processes across all 

families of launch systems, and g) has go/no-go authority for Flight Readiness Certification and during the 

launch countdown. Significant results of the LSP certification and technical oversight efforts are reported to 

the Flight Planning Board (as required) and in the Launch Readiness Review Process. These functions (or 

their equivalent) are fulfilled for JWST by ESA/CNES Arianespace, with limited visibility by LSP. 

The Webb IRB is concerned with the limited visibility into Ariane processes and the analysis of data and 

information encompassed by the LSP responsibilities for NASA missions. The LSP processes are designed 

to catch the kinds of issues that led to the recent Ariane anomaly and that escaped their mission assurance 

processes. Another Webb IRB concern is that the transition from Ariane 5 to Ariane 6 is scheduled to take 

place during the timeframe of the JWST planned launch dates. The viability of inventory and competition 

for resources could be a risk to JWST.
The documented role for LSP in JWST is “Advisory.” In practice, LSP seems to have access and visibility 

into the processes, procedures, the resolution of technical issues and anomalies, and has been allowed to 

participate in some independent review discussions. NASA-ESA agreements for JWST define the meetings 

that NASA can participate in, and specifically where NASA is a formal board member with NASA 

authority during polls at the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and Launch Readiness Review (LRR) (or their 

equivalents). The “Advisory” role, however, does not allow the depth of understanding, insight, 

and independent checks and balances to ensure the highest practicable probability of launch success 

through focused approvals and widespread technical insight, formal multi-discipline engineering 

evaluations and recommendations, and authority during formal polls leading to certification for launch—the 

role and mission of LSP for NASA missions.

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The shipment of the JWST observatory and related assets are the responsibility of NASA, who will benefit 

from Arianespace’s extensive experience in the support and/or shipment of assets from various parts of the 

world either by sea or air. Arianespace’s experience includes rocket subsystems, ground spacecraft 

systems, support equipment, fuel, etc. The record of success in accomplishing these aspects of the 

missions is noteworthy, as is the customer orientation of the personnel entrusted with interfacing with the 

customers. Planning for the JWST mission is far along, with well-established relationships (NASA, ESA, 

NGAS, Arianespace, CNES) between the parties. Interactions also occur regularly, including site visits and 

Technical Interface Meetings (TIMs) at Arianespace, CNES, and the European spaceport.

The route for the shipment of the observatory from the Port of Los Angeles in Long Beach, CA through the 

Panama Canal and to the Port of Pariacabo in Kourou, French Guiana is well planned and will be executed 

via a NASA contract with the Compagnie Maritime Nantaise, the company that operates the ships. 

Shipment of the integrated observatory by air was not possible, although some ground support (e.g. fuel 

service carts and fuel) will be shipped by air. The Webb IRB found that the efforts to understand and plan 

the route and risks were excellent. The Project conducted early characterization of the structural loads 

environments by instrumenting a loaded vessel with multiple accelerometers and correlating the loads 

environment with sea states throughout the voyage. 

The area of greatest discussion and concern was the security of the route, the organizations that the 

Project plans to use to conduct the assessments [e.g. Department of Defense (DoD) and/or Department of 

Transportation (DoT)] and whether another party within NASA should conduct an independent assessment. 

In addition, the decision authority within NASA for approval of the route, the approach, and the level of 

public exposure of the asset was not clear.

The launch site processing activities were found to be well planned, although questions remain as to the 

adequacy of schedule margins and the planning for contingency operations in a facility more accustomed 

to the processing of commercial payloads. 

Of a lesser concern was that the Project did not characterize the contamination environment, primarily 

because of the self-protection provided by the observatory shipping container.

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JWST is an extremely high value asset. NASA should consider conducting an independent assessment of 

the shipping route and the level of security required, and whether the activity is announced as part of the 

Education and Public Outreach initiatives for JWST. The plan and approach should be approved by the 

Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Associate Administrator (AA) and the NASA AA.

The European Space Port facilities and personnel have been demonstrated through numerous successful 

launch operations and launches. Although they are experienced with the processing and launch of 

scientific observatories, the predominance of their experience is with commercial assets. The JWST 

observatory is a large observatory with stringent handling and contamination control requirements. It would 

be prudent for NASA to rehearse the complete end-to-end flow and operations, including contingencies in 

the event that the observatory should have to go back in the flow and/or be accessed for anomaly 

resolution or repairs that can be accomplished at the launch site. The effectiveness of repairs will require 

detailed knowledge of inventory hardware, some of which should be included as part of the shipment of 

equipment. 

The JWST Project has done an excellent job at characterizing conservatively the structural mechanical 

signature of the shipping vessel at sea. The Project has also taken great care in the design and procedures 

related for the safe shipment of the observatory in its shipping container during all phases. It would be of 

benefit to also characterize the shipping vessel environment for contamination and contamination sources 

to properly prepare for and respond to anomalous conditions encountered during the process.

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While STScI is experienced in operations for science campaigns (e.g., for the Hubble Space Telescope) 

this is the first time they are responsible for fielding a Flight Operations Team (FOT) which will ultimately be 

responsible for daily operations of a spacecraft. This requires that they develop the unique skills required of 

operations personnel for JWST, practiced during operational readiness exercises, rehearsals, and other 

opportunities. It also requires that they create a culture that supports the daily cadence of spacecraft 

operations.

The ability to simulate observatory functions is essential to understanding interactions among components, 

anomaly investigation, and training of operations personnel. While the JWST project has various simulators 

and testbeds that help with observatory testing and training, there is no testbed that encompasses the total 

observatory flight system. This is particularly true of components relating to the sunshield. Additionally, the 

simulators that represent the flight components/subsystems are not always high fidelity. The lack of fidelity 

inhibits understanding and can prevent the team from stressing the system and simulating possible 

anomalies that could occur.

The I&T, launch operations, operational readiness exercises and mission rehearsals often rely on the same 

set of engineers or engineering skills. As these can happen in parallel, there is pressure on individuals as 

well as on the institution to provide the appropriate expertise.
STScI is developing a cadre of trained professionals to operate JWST. It is incumbent on GSFC, which has 

overall mission operations responsibility and a long history of mission operations, to ensure that STScI is 

prepared for its role in all phases of the mission. During commissioning, the ops team will consist of GSFC 

engineers and scientists, NGAS, Ball Aerospace Technology Corporation, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

(JPL) and instrument engineers, and the STScI FOT. After commissioning, while the FOT will play the 

prominent role, there will undoubtedly be need for them to call on other expertise to confirm their analyses 

of observatory performance or when anomalies arise. 

The partners in the project have all identified the desire for improved simulation capability. Improvements 

should be implemented wherever possible.

The GSFC Project Office, in conjunction with NGAS, should review activities required pre-launch, for both 

the number of people required to accomplish them, and the relative timing of the activities. Where conflicts 

occur, the timing should be adjusted and/or personnel should be added to support the activities effectively.

Some planning on transitioning post-commissioning operations responsibility to STScI has already 

occurred, and it will continue. The Webb IRB recommends that the transition be documented in a formal 

plan that is independently reviewed. At minimum, the plan would cover governance, roles, responsibilities 

and criteria for transition. It is possible that there will be more than one transition gate—or point of handing 

over responsibility to the FOT—that will occur. The readiness at each gate should also be independently 

reviewed.

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The Webb IRB found the current management concept and reporting structure to be complex, confusing, 

and inefficient. As examples, some described the Goddard Center Director as responsible for JWST 

mission success, and others indicated the position was only responsible for providing staffing and facilities. 

Some cited the JWST Program Director as reporting to the NASA AA and others said the position reports 

to the SMD AA. In summary, the Webb IRB found that considerable time and effort was being spent trying 

to understand the JWST management and reporting.
Instead of trying to understand prior history, the Webb IRB chose to define the management and reporting 

believed to be necessary to maximize the probability of success. Specifically, the JWST program in total is 

the responsibility of the SMD AA, who reports to the NASA Administrator/Deputy Administrator/AA. The 

JWST Program Director supports the SMD AA in implementing the JWST Program. The Goddard Center 

Director is responsible for all aspects of the JWST Project, reporting to the SMD AA. Responsible for 

Project implementation is the JWST Project Manager, reporting to the Goddard Center Director. To further 

clarify the Webb IRB recommendation, it is anticipated that a considerable fraction of the SMD AA’s time 

(approximately 25 percent) and the Goddard Center Director’s time (approximately 50 percent) will be 

devoted to JWST. This is thought to be consistent with the JWST complexity, risk and national importance.

The Webb IRB recognizes that for institutional management, the SMD AA and Goddard Center Director 

report to the NASA Administrator.

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Communication with key stakeholders, including the science community, Congress and NASA leadership, 

has been variable, and at times, inconsistent. For example, members of the Science Working Group and 

other key stakeholders communicated that they were caught completely by surprise by the recent 

announcement of significant launch delays. Moreover, the Webb IRB found that there were differing 

perceptions of project status (i.e. progress or lack thereof against plans and other commitments, issues, 

risks, and corrective actions) in various parts of GSFC, HQ and NGAS.

Project reports at the GSFC monthly reviews and reports at the SMD Flight Monthly Reviews were found to 

be consistent in presenting technical and programmatic status and risks, albeit with some minor changes in 

the explanations or rationale. The bigger discrepancies were found in the summaries provided at SMD 

Quarterly Reviews and above, where the summaries could be interpreted as de-emphasizing the severity 

of the technical and programmatic status, issues, and risks. The Webb IRB also found the “scoring” of 

concerns to be confusing or inconsistent. For example, a “Yellow” used in some cases was considered a 

“Minor Issue,” where the NASA review practice is for yellow to indicate “Status is Cautionary,” signaling that 

there are known findings which may compromise project success, while communicating that mitigation 

approaches have been identified and clearly communicated to address those findings. In these cases, the 

project manager is vested with the full authority and/or resources required to implement the mitigations. A 

“Red” score is considered to represent that the “Status is Unsatisfactory,” where there are known issues 

which will likely preclude project success, but either mitigation approaches have not been identified or the 

project manager is not vested with the authority and/or resources required to implement the mitigations. 

GSFC and/or NASA HQ may have potential solutions or resources to deal with “Cautionary” or 

“Unsatisfactory” conditions, but the descriptions up and down the reporting chain should be accurate and 

consistent.

JWST is the most complex space system that NASA SMD has ever built. The mission risks inherent in the 

complexity of JWST cannot be underestimated and should be communicated clearly within NASA and to 

other stakeholders. Small problems can represent significant delays and cost for JWST; understanding the 

complexities of the observatory system helps provide the proper context and perspective.

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Moving forward, it is essential that the GSFC and NGAS Project Offices establish a coherent, agreed-upon 

and factual narrative on status and communicate it regularly across to all relevant stakeholders. JWST 

reporting should be based on a common set of assessment criteria and charts. NASA HQ, using the 

Project Office input, should be responsible for JWST’s status reporting to the NASA AA and other 

stakeholders and for an effective communication plan.

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The Webb IRB guiding principal, as stated earlier, is to “maximize the probability of mission success.” This

principal was adopted by the Webb IRB because of the Nation’s substantial investment in JWST to date,

the observatory system’s complexity, its resultant risk, and the anticipated unprecedented science return

once the system is successfully deployed and made operational.

The visibility of JWST and considerable public interest concerning the project's cost and schedule make it

critically important for people at all levels working on JWST to understand that mission success is the most

important objective. In particular, people at the working level, as they make decisions and work on the

system, must not assume increased mission risk by prioritizing schedule and cost objectives above mission

success. Any action that could increase mission success risk must therefore be raised to a management

level that has the resources to mitigate that risk. This approach will ensure that risk choices made at the

working level do not become a “relief valve” for schedule and cost challenges such that the Project

Manager loses control of the risk baseline.

From the discussions the Webb IRB has had with NASA HQ, GSFC and NGAS leadership, the Webb IRB

believes that leadership in all organizations understand the project's risk posture and have placed the

proper level of importance on mission success through careful risk analysis and the associated

implementation of risk mitigations. Proactive leadership at all levels is especially important in identifying

items that will enhance the probability of JWST mission success. Recognizing this, the Webb IRB invited

GSFC, NGAS, and STScI to each generate a list of items that could, if implemented, decrease risk and

increase the probability of mission success if not constrained by cost and schedule. All three organizations

identified impressive lists of top ten mission success items that are currently being assessed for

implementation.
It is imperative that management continue to emphasize the priority of mission success over cost, schedule 

or other factors when communicating with working level personnel. Employees must understand the 

importance of their actions and personally own each activity performed. As part of this process they should 

also know that they are empowered to call a halt when they feel there is a risk being taken that could 

jeopardize mission success.

One critical outcome from the Webb IRB efforts to date has been the identification of the mission success 

enhancements listed on the next three charts. The Webb IRB recommends that NASA assess these 

enhancements and implement them where appropriate.

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The role of the cognizant engineer is a key element in the safety net designed to enhance mission success. 

A properly trained and experienced engineer is assigned for each component or piece of software in a 

system, and that person should be responsible for ensuring the integrity of that item through design, 

fabrication, test, and operation. At NGAS, cognizant engineers are called “Responsible Design Engineers” 

(RDEs).

Items are often handed off from one process to another through the design, fabrication, and test phase of a 

development program. The Webb IRB recommends that the RDE “own” the item and ensure that none of 

these steps endanger the item or adversely affect its performance. The RDE must be available to respond 

to any issues associated with the item. This includes disposition of any non-conformances, test issues, 

anomaly resolution, and root cause and corrective action efforts. Prior to any test, an RDE should review 

the test procedures and ensure those conducting the test are properly certified to do so.

RDEs must be carefully selected, trained, and chartered in a way that clearly defines their responsibilities. 

In the past at NGAS, RDE responsibility ended with the completion of design and test. It is critical that RDE 

responsibility for maintaining the integrity of an item continue through successful integration and test and 

the commissioning of the observatory.

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From discussions with the GSFC project, GSFC Quality Assurance personnel, and various people from 

NGAS, the Webb IRB concluded that the bench strength and staffing for the long-term duration of the I&T 

function are inadequate. The project needs to ensure that the right personnel and appropriate level of effort 

are maintained throughout SCE and Observatory I&T.

NGAS has taken steps to improve its JWST I&T work schedule to lessen the impact on its personnel, 

including allowing some shifts to be staffed by “volunteers.” NGAS also recently put in place additional 

floor-level management with the appropriate expertise and authority to make real-time decisions, a move 

that helped to streamline the overall I&T flow. Even so, it appeared that there were insufficient personnel 

with the necessary expertise to fully staff the second shift. The third shift was even leaner, and focused on 

“special” activities that need to be worked. The Webb IRB recommends that NGAS re-look at staff 

allocations and add staff where appropriate to make their I&T flow more robust, efficient and flexible.

The Webb IRB also recommends that RDEs maintain consistent involvement with their element through all 

phases of the project (see previous chart).

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Recent I&T activities have required an extended period of second shifts combined with overtime. The 

pressure has taken a toll that is reflected in both morale and overall team performance. NGAS recognized 

the impact of prolonged work stress on team morale and took some steps to rationalize the work load 

through operational changes on the floor in combination with adding personnel. GSFC is also providing 

supplemental personnel. Although the added GSFC staff does not directly change the amount of work to 

be done, the added insight has helped to improve procedural documentation and has helped to reduce 

associated implementation errors.

Sustained work stress and reduced team morale are tightly coupled just as improved team morale and 

improved team performance are tightly coupled. Thus, the schedule delays up to now plus the potential for 

other schedule delays means that a proactive series of stress mitigations will be essential if any level of 

sustained improvement in team performance is to be realized. The stress affects everyone but has the 

greatest impact on the many members of the team who are young with young families. It is not realistic to 

expect a 40-hour week during the I&T phase of the mission, but it is reasonable for management to 

implement a strategy, including adding additional I&T staff, that gives team members days or even 

weekends off, while also having some days of normal length.

Team morale-building outside of the work environment is also recommended. Science lectures by John 

Mather, Marcia Rieke and other JWST scientists can be helpful in connecting the team's work to what will 

be an exciting ground-breaking mission. Inviting the families to these events and other open-house 

activities that include food are additional ways for the team to feel engaged.
The GSFC Project Science Team provided the Webb IRB with a comprehensive list of engagement 

activities of the JWST Project with the science community. The number of activities and level of serious 

and substantial engagement has varied over the long mission development period. Of late, the level of 

interaction of the JWST Project with the Science Working Group (SWG) has been inadequate. Most 

importantly, the responsiveness of the GSFC scientific leadership to concerns raised by the SWG has been 

inadequate, and has led to a lack of trust between GSFC scientific leadership and the broader community. 

It is important to remember that the SWG holds important and unique knowledge that is an asset to the 

mission. In addition the science community is geographically diverse and plays a critical role in advocacy 

for the mission. It is essential for project scientific leadership at GSFC to recognize that they must include 

the SWG and other stakeholders in a substantive way in decision making, and reverse the appearance in 

the community that the GSFC scientists are marginalizing the SWG and other stakeholders in substantive 

decisions involving the scientific direction and execution of the project.

There is everything to be gained by regular and meaningful interactions with the SWG and by serious 

consideration of any ideas that emerge which could improve the chances of mission success and efficiency 

of science operations. The Project should also appoint a small Executive Committee of the SWG to receive 

detailed information on the conduct of the Project. The Executive Committee could serve a useful role in 

communicating with the scientific community when mission challenges or opportunities arise, and if wellchosen, could act as advocates for policy makers and other key stakeholders.

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JWST has been challenged by a variety of schedule issues in recent years. Several complications involved 

the sunshield. The first sunshield-deployment exercise took longer than expected, and post-test analysis 

showed that the duration would not get better. Additionally, tears during testing required repair, and snags 

required implementation of preventive measures. The propulsion system experienced both the transducer 

problem and the valve-leak issue. Ultimately, it was determined that the voltage and improper solvent 

issues were due to poorly-written work procedures. The recovery from the pressure-transducer issue was 

inefficient because early welds were defective and had to be replaced with brazed joints.

In addition to the anomalies and issues leading to critical path changes, NGAS experienced slower than 

planned execution rates in fourth quarter of FY17 that resulted in further erosion of schedule margin. The 

project did not have a comprehensive understanding of the risks/issues they were facing and how the 

risks/issues could ultimately affect the project schedule. As recently as February 2018, the schedule was in 

a state of flux. NGAS schedule performance continued to be poor at roughly 50% efficiency. NGAS SCE 

I&T performance improved to 90% efficiency in March 2018 with the completion of both the shock and 

acoustic tests. However, the full extent of the acoustics test anomaly that resulted in fasteners coming 

loose during the test is still under investigation for schedule impact.

The Webb IRB’s primary concern is that the project will forego assurance of mission success to regain 

schedule. The Webb IRB wants to make certain that this does not happen. Now that risks have been 

realized and corrective actions identified, NASA needs to ensure that the project has the resources 

(budget, manpower) available to implement those corrections moving forward.

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The Webb IRB determined that the project has robust scheduling processes. The schedule is mechanically 

sound, passing a standard health check with minimal “errors.” It is also developed to the right level of detail 

for Observatory I&T with a daily cadence of activities, and includes activities replanned to reflect more 

realistic durations. The Webb IRB also analyzed changes in the Project’s internal schedule that moved the 

Launch Readiness Date (LRD) from October 2018 to January 2020 (prior to the Acoustics Test Anomaly). 

The changes were easily traceable between the two most current versions of the integrated master 

schedule and reflected the messaging the project provided about duration changes in activities and the 

addition of mitigations due to recent schedule risks. The Webb IRB observed that 70% of scheduled work 

is based on calendars with 6-day or 7-day workweeks and 20% of remaining milestones and activities start 

or finish on a weekend or holiday. There was also no margin to the Observatory Ship Date. Concerns 

related to these observations include reduced flexibility for surge time (and contingency for performance 

issues), employee burnout, and availability of key personnel for all shifts.

The project monitors near-term milestones on a weekly basis. The Webb IRB analyzed overall project and 

NGAS-specific performance looking at earned value data, including the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) 

and Cost Performance Index (CPI), as well as the Current Execution Index (CEI) data, which calculates the 

ratio of tasks actually accomplished versus the tasks scheduled to be accomplished. Positive schedule 

performance was observed prior to initiation of spacecraft/sunshield integration and test. The negative 

schedule performance over the past year due to technical issues and mistakes improved in March, but the 

project was still experiencing issues. For the nine months from July 2017 to March 2018, the project 

showed an average Current Execution Index (CEI) at ~ 50%. Although the project experienced a recent 

increase in efficiency (i.e., March 2018 CEI = 90%), the potential for additional technical challenges with 

significant schedule (and cost) impact remains.
The Schedule Risk Analysis (SRA) results represent 5 different cases as follows:

• Run 1 illustrates the SRA with only Webb IRB-assessed duration uncertainty factors applied.

• Run 2 illustrates the SRA with Webb IRB-assessed duration uncertainty and project-assessed risks, 

issues, and threats applied. 

• Run 3 illustrates the SRA with Webb IRB-assessed duration uncertainty and Webb IRB-assessed risks, 

issues, and threats applied. The associated 70% confidence level date is August 1, 2020.

• Run 4 illustrates the SRA with Webb IRB-assessed duration uncertainty and project-assessed risks, 

issues, and threats applied. It also includes the Acoustics Test Anomaly.

• Run 5 illustrates the SRA with Webb IRB-assessed duration uncertainty and Webb IRB-assessed risks, 

issues, and threats applied. It also includes the Acoustics Test Anomaly. The associated 70% 

confidence level date is March 7, 2021, and the 80% level is March 23, 2021.

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Based on its analysis, the Webb IRB has identified a recommended launch date. There are a number of 

potential risks that cannot be effectively modeled that are not included in the analysis.

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The cost impact was calculated as a function of the Webb IRB’s assessment of the potential schedule 

impact to the project. Given that recent anomalies, human errors, and potential threats and risks are 

impacting work during I&T, the cost of moving the launch date to accommodate necessary rework and risk 

mitigations was calculated using the project’s average burn-rate ($34.7M) over the past seven months 

(FY18). The expected impact of moving the launch date from October 2018 to March 2021 (29 months) is 

approximately $1 billion.

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This report contains numerous recommendations all directed toward contributing to the maximization of 

JWST mission success. The Webb IRB strongly recommends that all the recommendations be 

implemented.

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