alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE TRUSTS FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                             120
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   120
<PP&E>                                          87,276
<DEPRECIATION>                                  43,250
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  44,146
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      44,146
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    44,146
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,978
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   312
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,666
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Seymour Hopper *v.*John W. Holtzclau.

Bills and Jiotes — Assignment after Maturity.

A purchaser of a note, assigned, after maturity, takes it subject to all the equities that it would have been subject to in the hands of the payee.

Exceptions to Depositions — Appeal and Error.

Where depositions used in a former adjudication of a case before the Appellate Court and not then excepted to, are properly admitted, on the return of the cause, as evidence in the second trial, the question of its competency being settled by the former adjudication.

APPEAL PROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT.

Dcember 18, 1868.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Peters:

*666
      *Durham, Dunlap, for appellant.*

*Bell, Hill and Alcorn, for appellee.*

This is the third time this case has been to this court, and the two principal questions presented for consideration are, first, was the deposition of B. D. Lusk properly admitted as evidence for appellee.

After the reversal of the judgment upon the first'appéal, and on the next trial thereafter in the court below that deposition was offered by appellee, it was excepted to as being incompetent, by appellant, his exceptions were over-ruled, and the deposition read, no exceptions were taken to this ruling of the court, but the verdict and judgment on that trial were unfavorable to appellant, he then brought the case to this court, and it was again reversed, because the court below refused to permit him to introduce Alexander Lusk as a witness for him. No objection was made then in this court to. the admission of B. D. Lusk’s deposition, and that was not adjudged by this court as erroneous. As therefore that evidence was in and the same not then adjudged erroneous the court below properly admitted it on the last trial, the question of the competency having been thus settled by the former adjudication. This principle has often been recognized by this court.

*Second,*did the court err in the instructions given for appellee ? We think not. The note though negotiable was not assigned to appellant until after its maturity, and he then took it subject to all the equities that it would have been subject to in the hands of the payee.

Wherefore, the judgment must be *affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.1





Certifications Furnished Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002





I, Peter H. Woodward, Chief Executive Officer of Cartesian, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





1. The annual report on Form 10-K/A of the Company for the annual period ended December 31, 2016 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





BY:/s/ PETER H. WOODWARDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





Date: April 28, 2017





I, John C. Ferrara, Chief Financial Officer of Cartesian, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





1. The annual report on Form 10-K/A of the Company for the annual period ended December 31, 2016 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





BY:/s/ JOHN C. FERRARACHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





Date: April 28, 2017
Exhibit 21.1

eLOYALTY SUBSIDIARIES



|                                           |  |                              
|------------------------------------------ |  | -----------------------------
|Name of Company                            |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation
|                                           | 
|eLoyalty Europe Holding Corporation        |  | Delaware                     
|eLoyalty International Holding, Inc.       |  | Illinois                     
|eLoyalty (Netherlands) B.V.                |  | Netherlands                  
|eLoyalty (Canada) Corporation              |  | Canada                       
|eLoyalty (Deutschland) GmbH                |  | Germany                      
|eLoyalty (UK) Limited                      |  | England & Wales              
|eLoyalty Corporation (Australia) Pty. Ltd. |  | Australia                    
|eLoyalty International Limited             |  | Ireland
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          21,150
<SECURITIES>                                    47,604
<RECEIVABLES>                                  289,755
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    619,009
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,015,644
<PP&E>                                          54,767
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,562
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,066,105
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          860,321
<BONDS>                                          6,232
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           316
<OTHER-SE>                                     199,236
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   199,552
<SALES>                                         15,338
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,222
<CGS>                                           27,119
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   34,986
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,867
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,001
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              11,230
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (15,764)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (5,797)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (9,967)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (9,967)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.53)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.53)


</TABLE>
Name Address

Hardware / Specialty Stores
 

Telephone 

Ace Hardware 3902 NASA Rd 1 281-326-3300 

Allied Ace Hardware 5203 Fairmont, Pasadena 281-487-9288 

Computer Electronics, Etc. 110 E. Medical Center 

Blvd. 

281-286-5510 

Friendswood Hardware & 

Supply 

203 W Edgewood Ave 281-482-3487 

Home Depot 1514 E. Broadway 

(SR518) @ Dixie Farm Rd 

281-993-1111 

Home Depot 20251 Gulf Frwy. (@ 

NASA Rd. 1), Webster 

281-554-2420 

Home Depot 11820 Dickinson Rd. (I-45 

Southbound @ Bltwy. 8) 

281-464-2080 

K-Mart 1001 W Bay Area Blvd. 

(@ I-45 Northbound) 

281-338-1888 

Lowe’s 2741 E. Broadway 

(SR518) north of Dixie 

Farm Rd 

281-412-6300 

Matheson Tri-Gas Inc. 2200 Houston Ave 

Houston, TX 77007 

713-869-7351 

Praxair Industrial Gases 9200 Telephone Road 

Houston, TX 77075 

713-991-8700 

Pearland Lumber & Ace 

Hardware 

2027 N Main St. 281-485-1474 

Sears Hardware Store 2422-A Bay Area Blvd. (@ 

Space Center Blvd.) 

281-488-6786 

Sears Hardware Store 11293 Fuqua (@ I-45 

Southbound) 

713-910-0330 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. 300 Baybrook Mall 281-486-3174 

Space City Ace Hardware 3902 NASA Rd. 1 281-326-3300 

Target 1425 W Bay Area Blvd. 

(@ I-45, Baybrook Mall) 

281-338-1514 

Wal-Mart 20810 I-45 (Southbound @ 

NASA Rd. 1) 

281-338-1208
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andre Walton, Appellant.

[788 NYS2d 107]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berk-man, J, on motion for reassignment of counsel; Edward J. McLaughlin, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered January 10, 2003, convicting defendant of forgery in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 3V2 to 7 years, unanimously affirmed.

After sufficient inquiry, the court properly denied defendant’s request for new assigned counsel, since defendant failed to establish good cause for a substitution *(see People v Sides,*75 NY2d 822 [1990]). The record fails to support defendant’s current assertion that the court’s inquiry was inadequate; defen*420dant received ample opportunity to be heard both orally and in writing, and the court engaged him in an extended colloquy. Defendant’s unjustified hostility toward his counsel and his disagreements with counsel’s tactics did not require substitution *(see People v Sawyer,*57 NY2d 12, 19 [1982]; *People v Medina,*44 NY2d 199, 209 [1978]). Defendant’s challenge to the effectiveness of his trial representation involves matters outside the record and thus would require a CPL 440.10 motion *(People v Rivera,*71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; *People v Love,*57 NY2d 998 [1982]). To the extent the present record permits review, it establishes that counsel went on to provide effective assistance at trial *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]).

Defendant was not deprived of his right to conflict-free representation. When defendant filed meritless complaints to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee and in federal court against assigned counsel, any conflict was of defendant’s own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict *(see People v Linares,*2 NY3d 507, 512 [2004]; *People v Vasquez,*287 AD2d 334 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 709 [2002]; *People v Davis,*226 AD2d 125 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 1020 [1996]; *see also Mathis v Hood,*937 F2d 790, 796 [2d Cir 1991]). Counsel’s brief defense of his own performance, made in response to an inquiry from the court, did not create a prejudicial conflict. Counsel’s innocuous and generalized remark fell far short of providing damaging factual information *(compare People v Rozzell,*20 NY2d 712 [1967]), and the court’s familiarity with the proceedings permitted it to make an informed determination without having to rely on defense counsel’s statements *(see People v Vasquez,*287 AD2d 334 [2001], *supra).*

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining claims, including those contained in his pro se supplemental brief. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Williams, Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
#### S. D. Bartan et al. *v.*James Atchison.

■Constables — Official Duty and Responsibilities — Courts Inferior to Circuit Courts — Jurisdiction — Collection of Debts.

The law regulating the official duties and responsibilities of constable does not contemplate the collection of debts, as to which courts inferior to the Circuit Courts have no jurisdiction.

Same — Responsible as Agent and not as Officer.

Where a constable undertakes to collect debts over which the inferior courts have no jurisdiction he is responsible as agent and not as officer.

APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT.

June 22, 1867.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:

The petition states the name of the plaintiff as “ late a constable ■of Henry county,” and sets forth a list of notes and accounts, which as described,, appear to be the evidences of claims due to other persons than the plaintiff; and as the petition does not allege that the plaintiff was the legal or equitable owner, of the debts, or in fact that he delivered them to the appellant, Bartan, unless such averment is imported by the statement of the execution and delivery of the receipt, it may well be doubted whether the petition ■does not disclose a cause of action in the payers of the claims rather than in the plaintiff; but waiving this point, there is a still more serious, and we think, fatal objection to the judgment. Several of the claims embraced by the receipt of Bartan exceed the sums of which either justices or quarterly courts have jurisdiction. In our opinion the law regulating the official duties and Tesponsibilities of constables does not contemplate the collection of debts, as to which, courts inferior to the Circuit Courts have not jurisdiction, and which ordinarily require the services of a prac*587ticing attorney to prosecute them to judgment. As to each of the claims of this description, we think said Bartan was alone responsible; and, as an agent, not officially, nor was he liable for the damages or interest executing the ordinary legal interest demanded by the statutes against delinquent or defaulting officers.

Wherefore, as the amount of the judgment, as against all the defendants, is larger than was authorized by the facts disclosed in the petition, the same is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 333-121328, 333-19389, 333-44717, 333-98195, 333-100266, 333-68984, 333-64230, 333-60358, 333-54526, 333-49026, 333-43560, 333-109333, 333-128264, 333-136373, 333-145025 and 333-152630)pertaining to the 1992 Stock Option Plan, the 1994 Equity Incentive Plan, the Non-Employee Directors’ Stock Option Plan, the 2000 Nonstatutory Incentive Plan, the 2000 Equity Incentive Plan, the 2004 Employment Commencement Incentive Plan andthe Employee Stock Purchase Plan of CV Therapeutics, Inc., and the Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 333-38528, 333-53202, 333-59318, 333-109427, 333-109428, 333-118805, 333-126204, 333-133358 and 333-140106) and in the related Prospectuses ofour reports dated February 20, 2009, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of CV Therapeutics, Inc, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of CV Therapeutics, Inc., included in this Annual Report(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2008. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

Palo Alto, California 

February 25, 2009
#### ELAINE JACOVINI v. PHILLIP TURNER DISPLAYS, INC.

June 19, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
#### The Commonwealth *v.*John Gill.

Criminal Law — Tippling House — License Transferred.

Garriot having obtained a license to retail spirituous liquors in a certain house and not choosing to exercise the privilege himself gave it to the appellee, who was indicted for retailing under that license. Held that' the appellee had not violated the law against retailing spirituous liquor without a license.

APPEAL EROM TRIMBLE CIRCUIT COURT.

December 5, 1867.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Robertson .

E. M. Garriot having obtained a license to keep a tavern, which authorized him to retail spirituous liquors and not choosing to exercise that privilege himself, gave it to the appellee John Gill, who, for retailing under that license, was indicted for keeping a tippling house.

*137
      *Attorney*General, *for appellant.*

He pleaded tbe authority thus granted to him by Garriot under his license. And, on that issue, which the circuit court adjudged upon rendered judgment in his favor.

As the retailing was in a room covered by Garriot’s license, it seems to this court that the judgment is right. Although Garriot testified that he had no interest in the profits and charged nothing for the privilege granted to the' appellee, yet being, as he was, responsible on his bond for the conduct of the appellee as his gratuitous agent, the latter did not retail without lawful license and was therefore not fineable for the mere act of selling liquors by retail, nor was thereby guilty of keeping a tippling house. And this was substantially so adjudged by this court in the late unreported case of the Commonwealth vs. Neal.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.

(See Vol. 1, Ky. Opin., 79.)
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 4955

_____________________________
D ENNIS L ONG , Appellant,

v.

D EPT

. OF C ORRECTIONS , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. John C. Cooper , Judge

. May 8, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
D ISMISSED

. See Mobley v. McNeil , 989 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

W OLF , B ILBREY , and W INSOR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Dennis Long, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristen Lonergan, Assi stant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
#### Dickens and Another *v.*The State, on the Relation of Burger.

*Tuesday, May*27.

A constable’s bond, though not executed until after he had commenced the discharge of his duties, may be sued on for any breach of the condition committed subsequently to its execution.

APPEAL from .the *Hendricks*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

— This was an action of debt brought by the state, on the relation of *Burger,*against a constable and his surety on their bond. The constable had been specially appointed by a justice of the peace, and the bond was conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties. The breach assigned is, that the constable having an execution issued by a justice of the peace against the relator, levied the same on a certain horse and bridle belonging to the relator of the value of 92 dollars; that the property so levied on was exempt from execution; that the relator requested the constable to set apart said property as exempt from execution, but the request was refused. There was a plea in denial of the breach. The defendants also pleaded, that the bond sued on was not executed until after the levy on the property, and that the *359bond was therefore void. General demurrer to the last-mentioned plea, and the demurrer sustained. The issue on first plea was submitted to the Court. The plaintiff having closed her testimony, the defendants offered some irrelevant matters in evidence which were correctly excluded. The Court gave judgment for the plaintiff.

*J. Morrison,*for the appellants.

*C. C. Nave,*for the appellee.

The only question in the cause, except that respecting the evidence offered by the defendants, which we have already noticed, is whether or not the plea demurred to is valid.

We think it is not. It is said in support of the plea, that the bond was not executed in time to be legal. This objection is not tenable. A suit on the bond may be sustained for any breach of the condition committed subsequently to its execution. The breach complained of in this case is alleged to have occurred after the bond was executed, and the defendants, for any thing shown by the plea, are liable.

*Per Curiam.*

— The judgment is affirmed with 3 *per cent.*damages and costs.