J-A05044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN OLIEMULLER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2479 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at CP-15-CR-0002916-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2023

Steven Oliemuller (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him of third degree murder.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the following facts:

On June 18, 201[8], at approximately 8:18 a.m., 

Pennsylvania State Police [PSP] responded to a 9-1-1 call at 7245 

McFettridge Lane, Lower Milford Township, Lehigh County, for the 

report of a possible drug overdose. Upon arrival, Troopers 

observed an unconscious female, later identified as Alexus Quay

[the Victim], on the floor of a first-floor bedroom. ... 

[Appellant] informed police about his romantic relationship 

with the [Victim]. He admitted he was the only one at the 

residence with her and last saw [the Victim] the night before 

sitting on the deck of the[ir] residence. Trooper [Steven] Furlong 

testified that first-responders were concerned that the case was 

not a drug overdose because of the significant injuries found on 

[the Victim’s] body. Police observed significant physical injuries 

to [the Victim’s] head, stomach, back, arms, and legs. The 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). 
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injuries included open wounds and what appeared to responders 

as “drag marks.” Straw and other debris were observed on her 

body and her hair was wet.

Troopers inspected the residence and discovered red stains 

on a second-floor bedroom mattress and pillow. A framing 

hammer was observed on the floor at the foot of the bed. The 

door to the bedroom was damaged and numerous articles of 

clothing were strewn across the side yard of the residence. Water 

was discovered on the kitchen, living room, and hallway floors 

leading to the bedroom where [the Victim’s] body was found. A 

prescription pill bottle and screwdriver were located on the deck

where [Appellant] indicated he last saw [the Victim]. [Appellant] 

exhibited injuries to his hands, forearms, and face[,] which 

appeared to responders as scratches and a fat lip.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/20, at 2-3. 

 The Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder by criminal 

information filed August 1, 2019. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed notice 

of intent to present prior bad acts evidence at trial. Appellant filed a response 

seeking to preclude the evidence. The trial court entered an order granting

the Commonwealth’s request on November 10, 2020. 

Trial commenced June 8, 2021, and concluded with the jury’s guilty 

verdict on June 17, 2021. Forensic pathologist Rameen Starling-Roney had 

testified that the Victim’s manner of death was homicide, and the cause of 

death was blunt-force trauma to various parts of the body. N.T., 6/9/21, at 

201. Dr. Starling-Roney noted the presence of prescription medication and 

methamphetamine (meth) in the Victim’s body, but ruled out drug overdose 

as the cause of death. Id. at 201-05. He also opined that the blunt force 

trauma could not have been caused accidentally. Id. at 204-05. 
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Multiple witnesses testified about Appellant’s meth use and the 

behavioral changes it caused. See, e.g., N.T., 6/9/21, at 108-09, 127-33; 

N.T., 6/10/21, at 42-83; N.T., 6/15/21, at 40-148; N.T., 6/16/21, at 123-59. 

The witnesses testified that Appellant became paranoid and violent when using

meth. See id. The witnesses also testified that Appellant used meth on the 

weekend of the Victim’s murder; this testimony was confirmed by drug test

results. See N.T., 6/14/01, at 204-05 (Appellant’s urine tested positive for 

meth).

Specifically, Appellant’s cousin, Chuck Gischel (Gischel), testified he and 

Appellant regularly used meth. N.T., 6/15/21, at 274-75. Gischel testified 

that he observed Appellant use meth in the late evening of Saturday, June 16, 

2018, and/or the early morning of Sunday June 17, 2018. Id. at 278-79. He 

also saw Appellant ingest meth later in the morning of June 17, 2018. Id. at 

284.

Appellant’s sister’s former boyfriend, Charles Price (Price), testified that 

he and Appellant used meth (and other drugs). N.T., 6/10/21, at 50-51. Price 

relayed that on the Saturday before the Victim’s death, the Victim and 

Appellant attended a birthday party for Price’s daughter. Id. at 48, 50-51. 

The next evening, Appellant called his sister, Haleigh Oliemuller (Haleigh), and 

Price overhead Appellant state that he would “drag [Price] with a chain.” Id. 

at 52. Appellant threatened that if Price did not go to Appellant’s home, 

Appellant would come to Price. Id. at 53. Price described Appellant’s voice 
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as “irate, a little frantic” and “stressed and angry.” Id. Price explained that 

Appellant acted this way when he used meth. Id. at 74. After speaking with 

Appellant, Price took his family, sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 that

Sunday night, to a hotel because he “wasn’t taking any chances.” Id. at 56. 

Price testified that Appellant “definitely sounded upset” and Price was afraid 

of Appellant. Id. at 56-57. Price and his family spent two nights at a hotel in 

Landsdale. Id. at 58-59. They then spent another two nights at a hotel in 

Colmar, even though they had learned about the Victim’s death, because Price 

“wasn’t taking any chances.” Id. at 58-59, 79. Price stated that he wanted 

to “make sure [his] family was safe.” Id. at 80. 

Price further testified that Appellant had hit him with a closed fist while 

using meth, and Price was “afraid” of Appellant “at times.” Id. at 60, 63-64. 

After hitting Price, Appellant “shot a couple rounds into the wall [of Appellant’s 

home]” with a .22 firearm. Id. at 65. On another occasion, when Appellant 

was using meth and Price refused to lend him a car, Appellant slapped Price

across the face. Id. at 67-68. Price described Appellant as “very paranoid ... 

agitated[, and] thought everybody was out to get him.” Id. at 75.

Appellant’s sister, Haleigh, testified reluctantly; consequently, the

Commonwealth introduced her grand jury testimony. N.T., 6/15/21, at 40-

148. Haleigh stated that the Victim would stay at her house when Appellant 

and Gischel were using drugs. Id. at 56-60. Haleigh admitted she, Appellant 

and Gischel used meth the weekend of the Victim’s death. Id. at 61, 98-101. 
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She agreed that Appellant’s behavior changed when he used meth and he 

would experience hallucinations. Id. at 65-70. Through her grand jury 

testimony, Haleigh corroborated Price’s testimony about getting “weird” 

phone calls from Appellant on the night of June 17, 2018. Haleigh’s grand 

jury testimony further confirmed that after warning Appellant’s former 

paramour, Ashley Swartley (Swartley), about Appellant’s behavior, she, Price,

and their children quickly left their residence and stayed at two out-of-county 

hotels for four nights. Id. at 123-42. 

Swartley testified that she had been involved with Appellant for over 15 

years and they shared two children. N.T., 6/16/21, at 123-25. She averred 

that Appellant’s meth use was a factor in the end of their relationship. Id. at 

126. Swartley did not want the couple’s children around Appellant when he 

was using drugs, so she would take the children and stay away from Appellant 

for days at a time. Id. Swartley stated that when she started leaving with 

the children, Appellant “would be very upset, aggressive, wanting us to come 

home. If I wouldn’t bring the kids home[, he] threatened to kill me and kill 

my family.” Id. at 127. She described that when Appellant used meth:

He believed there were people outside on the property at times. 

He believed that there were drones flying over the property and 

watching us. 

At one point[, Appellant said] there was a box of puppies 

dropped off on our porch ... and I went out and there was not a 

box of puppies on the porch.
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Id. at 128. Swartley testified that Appellant could become violent when using 

meth, and described him grabbing her, shoving her against a wall, and 

pushing her to the ground. Id. at 129. Swartley recalled an incident where 

Appellant took her phone, disabled her car, and prevented her from leaving 

the home because he believed people were watching. Id. at 129-30. Swartley 

recounted incidents which occurred within two months of the Victim’s death, 

when the Victim contacted Swartley and asked her to pick up the children 

because the Victim was concerned about Appellant’s drug use and some of his 

associates. Id. at 141-46. Lastly, Swartley testified that Haleigh called her 

on the night of June 17, 2018 to ask if she and Price could stay with her 

because Appellant was threatening to kill Haleigh and Price. Id. at 155. 

Michelle Halbsgut (Halbsgut), the Victim’s instructor at the Pennsylvania 

Institute for Massage Therapy, testified to the change in the Victim’s behavior, 

from being a model student in January 2018, to missing classes in March 2018. 

N.T., 6/15/21, at 305-06, 309-10. Halbsgut explained that part of massage

training involves students practicing on one another, and in March 2018, 

Appellant was often unable to be massaged because her body was covered 

with bruises. Id. at 308, 316-21.

Trooper Edward Prentice testified that upon seeing the Victim’s body, he 

questioned Appellant, who did not give direct answers, and had a “shaky” 

voice and “visibly shaking” hands. N.T., 6/9/21, at 109. Trooper Prentice 

stated that Appellant agreed to go to the police barracks, where he was seated 
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in an area with windows 6 - 9 feet from the ground. Id. at 131. Appellant 

repeatedly said that he saw someone outside, even though it was impossible. 

Id. Appellant also maintained there was someone in an air vent and he heard 

“tapping” noises in the hallway. Id. Later, Appellant threw a book at Trooper 

Prentice. Id. at 132. Trooper Prentice opined that Appellant was coming 

down from a meth high. Id. at 145. Trooper John McGranahan also 

encountered Appellant that day, and described him as “very combative.” N.T., 

6/10/21, at 113. 

April Cooper, a psychiatric evaluator at Lehigh Valley Hospital, evaluated 

Appellant the evening of June 18, 2018. N.T., 6/15/21, at 25-26. She 

described Appellant as having a “blunted affect.” Id. at 28. She relayed that 

Appellant admitted to using meth that day. Id. at 29-30. Appellant told Ms. 

Cooper the police brought him to the hospital because he was hallucinating,

but he believed the police “were messing with him and berating him. ... [The 

police] were hiding behind [] a curtain in a window, and [Appellant] ... threw 

something at the window.” Id. at 31. Ms. Cooper concluded Appellant did

not have a psychiatric disorder, and his hallucinations were the result of drug 

use. Id. at 32.

The Commonwealth also elicited testimony from two jailhouse 

informants, Jason Swiderski (Swiderski) and Daniel Santiago (Santiago). Both 

men had extensive criminal records, and received favorable consideration in 
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pending cases in return for their testimony. N.T., 6/14/21, at 92-95; N.T.,

6/15/21, at 212-14.

Swiderski testified that Appellant told him he and the Victim were using 

meth; Appellant was giving the Victim drugs to calm her down; and “he beat 

her up, slapped her around[.]” N.T., 6/14/21, at 106. Swiderski claimed 

Appellant admitted “he beat the living shit out of her and he gave her a hot 

shot, mother of all shots ....” Id. at 108. Appellant then “found out after 

seeing her on the ground that she was dead.” Id. Appellant disputed these 

claims, and his counsel cross-examined Swiderski extensively, implying that 

Swiderski would say anything to get a favorable deal from the Commonwealth. 

See id. at 118-86.

Santiago testified Appellant told him and Santiago’s friend, “Huey,” that 

Appellant “had an argument with his girlfriend because he slipped something

into her drink ... he pushed her[,] and her head hit something[,] and she was 

on the floor.” N.T., 6/15/21, at 226. Appellant related that he ”blacked out 

and started hitting” the Victim, and “could not recall what he hit her with.” 

Id. Defense counsel cross-examined Santiago, and suggested Santiago would 

lie to get favorable treatment. Id. at 230-64.

On June 17, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder. 

On September 9, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 — 40 years 

in prison. Appellant successfully sought permission to appeal nunc pro tunc. 

Appellant appealed and on March 8, 2022, this Court remanded the case for
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Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement as ordered by the trial court. 

Appellant and the trial court have since complied with Rule 1925.

Appellant raises three issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err in admitting prior bad acts testimony

about [Appellant’s] prior domestic abuse and prior drug use 

from [Swartley]?

2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] request for a 

mistrial when two PSP Troopers testified to his pre-arrest 

silence, his request for an attorney and invocation of his 5th

and 14th Amendment rights under the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution as such evidence was used against [Appellant] 

as evidence of guilt?

3. Did the trial court err in not giving the jury an instruction on 

involuntary manslaughter?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court wrongly admitted 

“character testimony” from Swartley. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant 

maintains

all of her testimony except that small portion about her 

observations of [the Victim] on June 16th and 17th of 2018 should 

have been inadmissible as some of it was irrelevant but all of its 

probative value was outweighed by the prejudice, especially 

considering the sequencing of the witnesses called, Swartley was 

the last called by the Commonwealth right after the lead 

investigator from the PSP. Admissible [sic] of this testimony was 

error, and the Commonwealth cannot show beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the verdict would be the same even if such testimony 

was not admitted.

Id. 
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Our scope and standard of review concerning the admission of prior bad 

acts is well settled:

The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed 

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. In 

determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court 

must weigh the relevant and probative value of the evidence 

against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. Evidence is 

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case 

or tends to support a reasonable inference regarding a material 

fact. Although a court may find that evidence is relevant, the 

court may nevertheless conclude that such evidence is 

inadmissible on account of its prejudicial impact.

Evidence of prior bad acts committed by a defendant is not

admissible solely to show the defendant’s bad character or his 

propensity for committing bad acts. However, evidence of prior 

bad acts is admissible where there is a legitimate reason for the 

evidence, such as to establish: 1) motive; 2) intent; 3) absence 

of mistake or accident; 4) a common scheme or plan; and 5) 

identity. The evidence may also be admissible to impeach the 

credibility of a testifying defendant; to show that the defendant 

has used the prior bad acts to threaten the victim; and in 

situations where the bad acts were part of a chain or sequence of 

events that formed the history of the case and were part of its 

natural development.

Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

and emphasis omitted).

Appellant has waived his claim that the trial court erred in admitting

irrelevant — and unspecified — portions of Swartley’s testimony. In his 

response to the Commonwealth’s notice of intent to use prior bad acts 

evidence, Appellant did not challenge the relevance, but argued the evidence

was not proper Rule 404(b) evidence. Response to Commonwealth’s Petition 

to Admit Prior Bad Acts, 10/20/20, at 1-7. During Swartley’s testimony, 
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Appellant raised a single objection to a portion of her testimony on relevance 

grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. N.T., 6/16/21, at 156-

58. 

It is well-established that [a] party complaining, on appeal, of the 

admission of evidence in the court below will be confined to the 

specific objection there made. If counsel states the grounds 

for an objection, then all other unspecified grounds are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 863, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(emphasis added). Because Appellant either failed to object or objected on 

different grounds, he waived any challenge to Swartley’s testimony based on 

relevance.

Appellant also argues the trial court improperly admitted Swartley’s 

testimony about his drug use because it did not demonstrate “a true distinct 

pattern of crime” and was not “modus operandi.” Appellant’s Brief at 21; see 

generally id. at 21-27. However, the trial court did not permit the testimony

to show a signature or pattern crime, but to demonstrate Appellant’s

state of mind at the time of the Victim’s death, the lack of accident 

or absence of mistake, [Appellant’s] motive for the killing, as well 

as to show the natural progression of events leading up to [the 

Victim’s] death.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/20, at 12. With respect to Swartley’s testimony 

about domestic violence, the trial court did not admit it as “pattern” evidence,

but because it “demonstrate[d Appellant’s] intent to kill and the absence of 

accident or mistake at the time of the offense.” Id. at 13. Appellant does 
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not cite any law or argue that the trial court erred in admitting Swartley’s 

testimony for these reasons. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-27.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Swartley’s testimony was 

wrongly admitted, we would find any error harmless because Swartley’s 

testimony was cumulative. The harmless error doctrine “reflects the reality 

that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth 

v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014).

Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1) the 

error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de 

minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely 

cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially 

similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly 

admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so 

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

contributed to the verdict.

Id. at 671–72.

As discussed above, the record demonstrates Gischel, Price, and Haleigh 

testified about Appellant’s history of meth use, and in particular, his use of 

meth in the days preceding the Victim’s death. N.T., 6/10/21, at 50-51; N.T., 

6/15/21, at 61, 98-101, 274-75, 278-79, 284. Price and Haleigh testified that 

Appellant’s personality changed when he used meth, and he became paranoid, 

hallucinated, and acted violently. N.T., 6/10/21, at 52, 56-57, 60, 64-65, 67-

68, 74-75; N.T., 6/15/21, at 65-70, 123-42. Troopers Prentice and 

McGranahan, as well as the psychiatric evaluator, Cooper, had observed 

Appellant under the influence of meth shortly after the Victim’s death and 
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corroborated the testimony of Gischel, Price, and Haleigh. See N.T., 6/9/21, 

at 131-32; N.T., 6/10/21, at 113; N.T., 6/15/21, at 28-32.

In addition, Price and Haleigh testified that Appellant threatened them 

when he called the night before the Victim’s death, and as a result, they took 

their family to stay at a hotel out of the county. N.T., 6/10/21, at 53, 55-59, 

80; N.T., 6/15/21, 123-42. Haleigh testified that the Victim did not like to be 

around Appellant when he and Gischel were using drugs and would stay at 

Haleigh’s house. N.T., 6/15/21, at 56-60. Halbsgut testified about the Victim

having bruises on her body prior to her death. N.T., 6/15/21, at 316-21. 

Thus, Swartley’s testimony was cumulative of other witnesses’ testimony. 

Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671-

72. 

In his second issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for a mistrial after Troopers Prentice and McGranahan testified that 

while at the police station and served with search warrants for his clothes and 

person, Appellant requested counsel. N.T., 6/9/21, at 129; N.T., 6/10/21, at 

113.2 Appellant’s Brief at 27-30. Appellant argues the Commonwealth “used 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant waived his claims regarding other purportedly improper testimony

by Trooper Prentice and psychiatric evaluator Cooper concerning his silence. 

Appellant did not object to the testimony or raise it in his motion for a mistrial.

See N.T., 6/9/21, at 168-69; N.T., 6/15/21, at 31. Appellant sought a mistrial 

on the basis that Troopers Prentice and McGranahan improperly commented 

on his pre-arrest silence, not on the basis, advanced on appeal, that their 

testimony Appellant was not acting like a grief-stricken person constituted 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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these refences ... about [Appellant’s] pre- and post-arrest silence ... as 

evidence of guilt against him.” Appellant’s Brief at 29.

Initially, the record does not support Appellant’s contention that

Troopers Prentice and McGranahan commented on his post-arrest silence. The 

above incidents occurred at the police station prior to Appellant’s arrest. See 

N.T., 6/9/21, at 129-34; N.T., 6/15/21, at 31-33. Thus, there is no basis for 

Appellant’s claim regarding his post-arrest silence. To the extent Appellant 

avers violation of his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Appellant 

waived the issue because it is not developed in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 27-30. See also Commonwealth v. Wise, 171 A.3d 784, 791 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (issue waived where appellant provided an undeveloped argument and 

neglected to cite to controlling case law). Thus, we only address Appellant’s 

claim that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial where Troopers Prentice 

and McGranahan improperly commented on Appellant’s pre-arrest silence. 

____________________________________________

improper comments on his pre-arrest silence. N.T., 6/10/21, at 117-21; 

Appellant’s Brief at 29. “[O]ne must object to errors, improprieties or 

irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford 

the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly 

avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.” Keffer v. Bob 

Nolan’s Auto Service, Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 645 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also 

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008) (to 

preserve issue, party must make timely and specific objection to ensure the

trial court has opportunity to correct alleged error). Appellant cannot raise a 

new legal theory on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 

598-99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc).
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We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011). We have 

explained:

In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate the

negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial

elements are injected into the case or otherwise discovered at

trial. A trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident

upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its

unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by

preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. 

It is also settled that a mistrial is not necessary where

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any

potential prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 274 (Pa. Super. 2021) (emphasis

added, citations omitted), appeal denied, 267 A.3d 1213 (Pa. 2021). Trial 

courts “must consider all surrounding circumstances before finding that

curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme remedy of a mistrial is

required.” Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 266 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citation omitted). 

“The Fifth Amendment was enacted to protect against self-incrimination,

whether [the suspect is] in custody or not, charged with a crime, or merely

being questioned during the investigation of a crime.” Commonwealth v.

Molina, 33 A.3d 51, 63 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[T]he

government may not use ... silence as substantive evidence of guilt when a

defendant chooses not to testify. ... [That silence] may also not be used

against a defendant who remained silent during the investigation of a crime.”

Id. (citation omitted).
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The Fifth Amendment “does not impose a prima facie bar against any

mention of a defendant’s silence.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, the Fifth

Amendment protects against the prosecution’s exploitation of a defendant’s

right to remain silent. See id. “[A] mere reference to pre-arrest silence does

not constitute reversible error where the prosecution does not exploit the

defendant’s silence as a tacit admission of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Adams,

104 A.3d 511, 512-13 (Pa. 2014).

Here, the Commonwealth asked Trooper Prentice about Appellant’s

demeanor during questioning immediately after police discovered the Victim’s

body. N.T., 6/9/21, at 108-09. As to Appellant’s demeanor at the police

barracks, the Commonwealth asked:

Q. Would you describe for the jury anything you observed about

[Appellant’s] behavior and demeanor during that time?

A. For the search warrant to be executed on the clothing, he was

argumentative about all of that. He requested private counsel.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Can we approach, Judge?

* * *

[Defense Counsel]: I believe that my client’s indication [sic]

that his 5

th Amendment rights is not permissible in this evidence.

The Court: So what are you asking the court to do?

[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to ask for a very strong

curative instruction, Your Honor.

* * *

The Court: Okay. I’ll give an instruction. Okay.
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All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I’m going to

sustain that objection. You are to totally disregard that response. 

Okay?

Id. at 129-30 (emphasis added). Appellant did not object further or

otherwise seek relief.

The next day, the Commonwealth questioned Trooper McGranahan

about Appellant’s behavior when the trooper attempted to serve Appellant

with a body search warrant:

Q. Was [Appellant] cooperative?

A. No.

Q. What do you mean?

A. He was very combative. He wouldn’t let us take any

photographs of him. He kept arguing and fighting with us. He

kept repeating he wanted to talk to a lawyer.

N.T., 6/10/21, at 113.

Defense counsel objected, noting it was the second time a trooper

mentioned Appellant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and

requested a mistrial. Id. at 113-14. After hearing argument, the trial court

denied the motion, stating:

Okay. I’m satisfied that a detailed curative instruction or

cautionary instruction will suffice at this point, but I certainly

respect defense counsel’s position on this.

I would ask both of you just to instruct your witnesses

before they get on the stand, don’t mention anything of that

nature in the future. All right? Because the third time around,

you may not be so lucky. Okay.

***
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Just so the record is clear, I do not find that there’s a manifest

necessity for a mistrial.

N.T., 6/10/21, at 121-22; see also id. at 114-22. The trial court then

instructed the jury to disregard testimony about Appellant’s request for

counsel because,

that testimony under the Pennsylvania and the United States

Constitution, that any individual who is the subject of an

investigation has that right; however, that’s not something that

normally comes out in trial, and it should not come out in trial. So

I am directing you to totally disregard that testimony. It’s not to

be considered in your determination of whether [Appellant] is

guilty or not guilty in this case. All right? So that testimony is

stricken.

Id. at 123. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction or seek further

redress.

Our review reveals the troopers did not explicitly reference Appellant’s 

right to remain silent and the Commonwealth did not “exploit [Appellant’s]

silence as a tacit admission of guilt.” Adams, 104 A.3d at 513. The testimony 

from Troopers Prentice and McGranahan was “contextual and brief.” See id.

at 518. There was no further mention of Appellant’s pre-arrest silence or his

invocation of right to counsel. See Adams, 104 A.3d at 515. Finally, the trial

court gave a sufficient curative instruction. We presume a jury follows a

court’s instruction. See Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 

2004). We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

request for a mistrial. Thus, Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.
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In his final issue, Appellant argues he was entitled to a jury instruction 

on involuntary manslaughter. Appellant’s Brief at 30-31. Appellant contends 

the evidence indicated the Victim

may have been hit by her own car, or injured and moved through 

[Appellant’s house], or was moved by someone, multiple times. 

Furthermore, both jail-house witnesses presented [testimony]

against [Appellant;] Santiago and Swiderski mentioned some type 

of incident where [Appellant] admitted to drugging [the Victim] 

shorty before her death. The science shows [the Victim] died of 

blunt force injuries, but it’s ultimately speculation as to what 

specifically caused them. Apart, or perhaps in conjunction with 

the drugging, Appellant could have assaulted [the Victim] and his 

further negligence and recklessness led to her death.

Id.

Pertinently:

In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court 

committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which 

controlled the outcome of the case. We must view the charge as 

a whole; the trial court is free to use its own form of expression 

in creating the charge. A trial court has broad discretion in 

phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long 

as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the 

jury for its consideration. Moreover, it is well-settled that the trial 

court has wide discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial 

court is not required to give every charge that is requested 

by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge 

does not require reversal unless the appellant was 

prejudiced by that refusal. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 314 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted, emphasis added).

The Crimes Code provides:

A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct 

result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly 
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negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or 

grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). 

Furthermore:

Defendants are generally entitled to instructions that they have 

requested and that are supported by the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Markman, 591 Pa. 249, 916 A.2d 586, 607 

(2007); Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 570 Pa. 263, 809 A.2d 

256, 261 (2002) (“Where a defendant requests a jury instruction 

on a defense, the trial court may not refuse to instruct the jury 

regarding the defense if it is supported by evidence in the 

record.”); Commonwealth v. Browdie, 543 Pa. 337, 671 A.2d 

668, 673–74 (1996) (“[W]e hold that a trial court shall only 

instruct on an offense where the offense has been made an issue 

in the case and where the trial evidence reasonably would support 

such a verdict.”). We have explained that the reason for this rule 

is that “instructing the jury on legal principles that cannot 

rationally be applied to the facts presented at trial may confuse 

them and place obstacles in the path of a just verdict.” 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 583 Pa. 170, 876 A.2d 916, 925–26 

(2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179, 415 

A.2d 399, 400 (1980)). A criminal defendant must, therefore, 

“establish that the trial evidence would ‘reasonably support’ a 

verdict based on the desired charge and may not claim 

entitlement to an instruction that has no basis in the evidence 

presented during trial.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 

502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328, 1332–33 (1983)).

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 668 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis 

added). “An instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not required unless it 

has been made an issue in the case and the facts would support such a 

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 791 (Pa. 2009).

Involuntary manslaughter was never at issue in this case. There is no 

record support for Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth suggested the 

Victim was hit by a car. While Santiago and Swiderski testified Appellant told 
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them he gave the Victim drugs and she died while he was assaulting her, 

Appellant strongly implied that both men were lying. See N.T., 6/14/21, at 

106-08, 118-86; N.T., 6/15/21, at 226, 230-64. 

In his opening, defense counsel argued the Commonwealth, “zeroed in 

on [Appellant] at the expense of what actually happened.” N.T., 6/9/21, at 

19. Counsel asserted the “mess” in the house was not caused by a “great 

brawl,” but because Appellant “had millions of projects going on, also while 

on meth.” Id. at 21. Counsel argued:

You’ll say, man, those photos, man, they didn’t match up, why 

didn’t [the Commonwealth] investigate this. Think about that, be 

intellectually curious. Why didn’t the detectives do this, why didn’t 

the trooper do this, and think about it and say, man, I wish they 

did more, and you’re going to say, why didn’t they do more? Well, 

they are focusing on [Appellant] because [Appellant] can be an 

asshole and he was an asshole to them that night.

Id. at 22. Counsel also pronounced that Appellant, “didn’t murder her.” Id. 

at 23. 

Appellant’s defense was that he did not cause the Victim’s death, but

police focused only on him and thus conducted a tainted and shoddy 

investigation. See, e.g., N.T., 6/9/21, at 244-78 (defense counsel implying 

trooper did not properly investigate the case); N.T., 6/11/21, at 133-35 

(defense counsel referencing lack of serious injuries to Appellant despite 

Commonwealth’s claim that he beat the Victim to death); id. at 141 (defense 

counsel criticizing investigators for taking videos only inside the home); id. at 

146-47 (defense counsel criticizing investigators for not using drug dogs); id. 
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at 156 (defense counsel implying investigators tampered with evidence at 

crime scene); N.T., 6/14/21, at 85 (defense counsel criticizing serologist about 

delays in testing items for blood); N.T., 6/16/21, at 77-78 (defense counsel 

cross-examining lead investigator about failure to conduct a grid search of the 

property or use metal detectors). 

Appellant’s defense was incompatible with the crime of involuntary 

manslaughter. See Fletcher, 986 A.2d at 791; see also Commonwealth 

v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894, 917 (Pa. Super. 2004) (defendant not entitled to 

instruction on involuntary manslaughter where he denies committing any act 

causing the victim’s death). Therefore, Appellant’s final issue does not merit 

relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023