### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON JOHN WATSON v. MIKE YOUNG, ET AL An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County No. 98-7791; The Honorable R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge
No. W1999-00683-COA-R3-CV - Decided July 10, 2000

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by an inmate at the Northwest Correctional Complex. The complaint sought damages for perso nal injuries sustained as a result of an electrical shock allegedly caused by the Defendant’s inactions. The L ake County Circuit Court dismissed t h e complaint finding that the p

laintiff’s claim s

ounded in neglig

ence and the def

endants, as state employees,

enjoyed absolute immunity from negligen

ce claims. Tenn.R.App.P. 3; Appeal as of right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
H IGHERS , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which F ARMER , J., and L ILLARD , J., joined. John Watson, pro se, Tiptonville, Tennessee Paul G. Summers,

Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor

General; Pamela

S. Lorch, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees

OPINION John Watson appeals from the decision of the L

ake County Cir

cuit Court, which dismisse

d his pro se complaint. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. Facts and Procedural History John Watson (“Appellant”) is a Tennessee Department of Correction inmate housed at the Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCC”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Mike Young and Sonny Wilkerson, the Defendants, were, at all times relevant, super visors in the food service department at NWCC.
On May 8, 1998, the Appellant suffer ed burn injuries afte

r allegedly

coming into conta

ct with exposed electrical wiringwhile working in the kitchen. He filed suit against Young and Wilkerson, claiming that they

were aware of the risk of harm but failed to take any action to correct the dangerous condition. After no answer was filed on behalf of the defendants, the Appellant filed a1 Subsequent to this or der, both Defend

ants filed “memor

andums” wit

h the trial court in which they addre

ssed the complaint

filed by the Appel

lant. 2 request for entry of default. On October 22, 1998, the trial court entered an order giving the Defe nda nts thi rty d ays in which to respond to the complaint. 1 Thereafter, the Attorney General’s Office, on beha

lf of the defenda

nts, filed a motion f

or an extension of ti

me in which to respo

nd to the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, and the defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) and (6).
On August 12, 1999, th

e trial court entered an order dismissing the case, finding that the complaint asserted claims for negligence and the defendants, as state empl o yees, had a

bsolute immunity from negligence

claims pursuant to T.C.A. §9-8-307(h). The present appeal arises from the order dismissin

g the complaint.
II. Law and Analysis
This appeal comes before thecourt on a motion to dismiss pursuant to rules 12.02(1) and (6) of the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure. I

n considering th

e appeal of a Rule

12.02(6) motion to dismiss, this court is required to take the allegations of the complaint as true a nd to con strue the allegations liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Pemberton v. Ame rican Disti lled Spirits Co. , 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1984). Such a motion admits the truth of all relevant and material averments

contained in the complaint but asserts that such facts do not constitute a cause of action. Humphries v. West End Terrace, Inc. , 795 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Our review of the complaint leads us to conclude that the motion to dismiss was properly granted.
The defendants, as state employees, enjoy immunity pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h), which provides: Stateofficers and em ployees ar e absolutely

immune from liability for acts or omissions within

the scope of the officer's or employee' s office or emp loym ent, ex cept for willful, malicious, or criminal acts or omissions or for acts or omis sio ns don e for personal gain. For purposes of this chapter, "state officer" or "employ ee" has the meaning set forth in § 8-42-101(3).
The immunity provided by the quoted languag e ser ves as an absolute defense to all actions not within the express exceptions. Therefore, the dispositive issue in this case centers on the nature of the Appellant’s cause of action.
In his complaint, entitled “Tort Complaint,” the Appellant seeks redress for the “negligent and proximate injury

he received whi

le being confin

ed to his assigned

work duty.”

He further clai

ms that his injuries wo

uldnot have occurr

ed “had the defe

ndants took reaso

nable care” a

nd that their2 We believe the Appellant intended the word “cause” instead of “result.”

3 In his appeal brief

, the Appellant att

empts to invoke T.C.A. § 9-8-307 (C), which confers jurisdiction for “Negligently cre ated or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property.” This issue has not been raised previously, therefore we shall not consider it in this appeal. See Lovell v. Metropolitan Government , 696 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1985); Lawrence v. Stanford , 655 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1 983); Moran v. City of Kno xville , 600 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

3 “negligence

was the proximate result of injuries plaintiff suffered.” 2 Even his brief, filed for the purposes of th is appeal, speak s in terms of a neg

ligence action. While it is sometimes d ifficult to decipher a legal document written by a lay person, we are o f the opinion that the Appellant’s complaint clearly states a cause of action for neg ligence.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo , that the Defendants were aware of some defect in the electrical wiring, their fa ilure to repair su

ch a defect doe

s not qualify

as a will ful, mal icious, or criminal act. At most, the Defendants were negligent in failing to remedy a known risk. The Appellant’s complaint speaks in negligence terms, and the mere insertion of words such as “wanton” or “deliberate indifference”d oes not change the character of the cause of action. There fore, no exception to the sta

tutory immunit

y exists, and th

e trial court prop

erly dismisse

d the complaint. 3
T he Appellant also claims that the Defendants violated his rights under the Eight Amendmen t to the Unite

d States Co

nstitution . Weneed not ponder long to conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. P rison conditions ar e violative of the

Eighth Amen dmen tonly when they result in “serious deprivations of ba sic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981). The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficien tly s ubstantial "risk of ser ious damage to his futur e health." Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed. 2d 22 ( 199 3). As s tat ed p revi ous ly, the allegations in the complaint, at most, make out a claim for negligence. Mere neg ligence does notconstitute deliberate indifference for the purposes of an Eighth amendment violation. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Moreover, we do not believe that the alleged injuries s uffered by the Appellant are the type of “serious damage” contemplated by the applicable

cases. As such, we believe the trial cou rt was correct in dismissing that part of the Appellant’s complaint alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.4 The Appellant als o claims th at the trial court erred in failing to address his motion for default judgm en t. The question of whether the default judgment should have been granted lies within the discretion of the trial court, and we find no reason to question the court’s decision. 4 Conclusion For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 4 Costs of the app eal are t axe d aga ins t th e Ap pel lan t, J ohn Wat son , fo r wh ich exe cut ion may i ssu e if nece ssa ry.