PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT

E. JEFFREY DONNER; JUDEE M. 

DONNER, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. No. 13-4057 

JACK NICKLAUS; JACK 

NICKLAUS GOLF CLUB, LLC, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00489-CW)

Justin T. Toth, Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah 

(Greggory J. Savage, Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, 

with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants E. Jeffrey Donner and 

Judee M. Donner. 

Alan Bradshaw, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, 

Utah (Brent V. Manning and Aaron C. Garrett, Manning Curtis Bradshaw & 

Bednar LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Patrick A. Shea, Patrick A. Shea, 

P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, and Jacque M. Ramos, J. Ramos Law Firm 

P.L.L.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief) for DefendantsAppellees Jack Nicklaus, and Jack Nicklaus Golf Club, LLC. 

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit 

Judges. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 19, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal grew out of a plan to build a luxurious golf course and 

development. The golf course would be designed by legendary golfer Jack 

Nicklaus, who would have a house in the development and serve as a 

member. Mr. Nicklaus joined the developer to solicit investors, lending his 

name in exchange for millions of dollars. 

Mr. Nicklaus’s participation allegedly led a married couple (Jeffrey 

and Judee Donner) to invest $1.5 million in the development. But, plans 

went awry: The developer’s parent company went bankrupt, and the 

developer was not able to build the golf course or development. The 

Donners settled with the developer’s parent company in its bankruptcy 

proceedings and sued Jack Nicklaus and Jack Nicklaus Golf Club, LLC for 

intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of 

the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 

(2006). The district court dismissed the action, holding in the alternative: 

 1. The complaint failed to state a valid claim for relief. 

 2. The defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the 

 Donners elected their remedies by entering into a settlement 

 agreement with other parties. 

On appeal, we must decide five issues: 

 1. Timeliness of Claims. The defendants argue that the tort 

 claims are untimely under state law. But, the defendants 

 waived this argument in district court by waiting to raise the 

 argument in their reply brief. Because the defendants have 

 waived the timeliness argument, we will not consider it. 

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2. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The district court 

 dismissed the claims under the Interstate Land Sales Full 

 Disclosure Act because the Donners’ purchase of a charter 

 membership did not concern a “lot.” We agree, concluding that 

 the alleged misrepresentations did not involve a specific, 

 identifiable tract. In the absence of a “lot” (as this term is used 

 in the statute), we affirm the dismissal of the statutory claims. 

3. Claims Involving Intentional Misrepresentation. The district 

court concluded that the Donners have not adequately alleged 

claims involving intentional misrepresentation. We conclude 

that the Donners have adequately alleged misrepresentation of 

Mr. Nicklaus’s membership status; thus, we reverse the 

dismissal of this claim. But, the Donners have not adequately 

alleged the remaining claims of intentional misrepresentation. 

Those claims were properly dismissed. 

4. Claims Involving Negligent Misrepresentation (Economic 

Loss Doctrine). The defendants argue that the negligent 

misrepresentation claims are barred by the economic loss 

doctrine. We agree. The charter membership agreement covers 

the subject matter of the dispute, and the Donners have not 

alleged the factual basis for a duty outside of that agreement. 

As a result, we uphold dismissal of the negligent 

misrepresentation claims. 

 5. Election of Remedies. In an alternative ruling, the district 

 court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the 

 ground that the Donners had elected their remedies through 

 their settlement agreement with the developer’s parent 

 company. We disagree with the district court because the 

 settlement agreement did not include the defendants and the 

 Donners neither affirmed nor repudiated a contract. Thus, we 

 reverse the summary judgment ruling. 

I. The Donners’ Investment 

 To address these issues, we must understand what the Donners 

allegedly read and relied on when they paid $1.5 million. 

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A. The Mount Holly Club 

In 2002, a group formed, calling itself “Mount Holly Club L.L.C.,” 

and set out to develop an exclusive private ski and golf resort in Utah. The 

club’s showcase would be a golf course designed by legendary golfer Jack 

Nicklaus. 

B. Jack Nicklaus’s Anticipated Role in the Development 

Beginning in 2006, the developer worked with Mr. Nicklaus to 

develop the golf course and market the club. 

As part of this effort, the developer entered into a contract with Mr. 

Nicklaus’s golf-course design company: The design company agreed to 

build the golf course, and the developer obtained the right to use the 

Nicklaus brand1

 and promote Mr. Nicklaus’s involvement. With this right, 

the developer issued Mr. Nicklaus an “honorary Founder Membership” in 

the club. 

Shortly thereafter, the developer expanded its relationship with Mr. 

Nicklaus by entering into a licensing agreement with another company of 

his, Nicklaus Golf. The licensing agreement allowed the developer to use 

the Nicklaus brand to advertise and promote membership in the golf club 

and the development. 

 

1

 The Nicklaus brand includes certain trademark rights in the name and 

phrase “Jack Nicklaus Golf ClubTM” and its Golden BearTM logo. Aplt. 

App. at 69. 

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C. Marketing Materials 

Following execution of the agreements, the developer joined Mr. 

Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf to market the new venture. These marketing 

efforts included a press release and a brochure. 

1. The Press Release 

The press release was issued by the developer and Nicklaus 

Golf. This document highlighted Mr. Nicklaus’s involvement and 

included a quotation by Mr. Nicklaus, reflecting his enthusiastic 

decision to become a “founding charter member”: “When I walked 

Mt. Holly Club, I was so captured by its potential [that] I thought 

through all 18 holes. In fact, I have been so impressed with the club 

and its management team that I became a founding charter member.” 

Aplt. App. at 88 (emphasis added). 

2. The Brochure 

After issuing the press release, the developer and the defendants 

created a full-color marketing brochure entitled: “Mt. Holly Club and Jack 

Nicklaus Invite You to Become a Charter Member.” Id. at 105-07. 

Immediately below this invitation was a quotation from Mr. Nicklaus: 

Mt. Holly Club enjoys the ideal alpine setting. I knew from my 

first visit there that we had been given a canvas on which to 

design a truly spectacular golf course. I am so impressed with 

the Mt. Holly Club and its management team that I became a 

founding charter member. I look forward to seeing you there. 

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Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Immediately following that statement, the 

brochure stated that “Charter Memberships can be acquired for [a] $1.5 

million entry fee.” Id. (emphasis in original omitted). 

D. The Charter Membership Agreement 

The Donners allegedly saw the press release and brochure and 

decided to buy a charter membership. For this charter membership, the 

Donners paid $1.5 million and signed a charter membership agreement. 

Under this agreement, the developer issued the Donners an estate lot 

certificate. The certificate could eventually be redeemed for an estate lot 

when it became available. 

E. The Filing of Bankruptcy and the Settlement Agreement 

The developer’s parent company filed bankruptcy. With the filing of 

bankruptcy, the Donners settled with the parent company, obtaining a lot 

near the ski area and the right to trade that property for a lot in the 

development once it is platted. And, if the golf club and ski area are 

eventually developed, the Donners would be entitled to memberships. 

F. The Donners’ Lawsuit 

The Donners sued Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf for intentional 

misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the 

Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 

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 The central claim is that Mr. Nicklaus induced purchase of a charter 

membership through material misrepresentations and omissions in the 

marketing materials. 

The district court concluded that 

● the Donners had failed to state plausible tort claims, 

● the Donners were not entitled to relief under the Interstate 

 Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, and 

● the Donners could not recover damages because they had 

 already elected other remedies through settlement. 

With these conclusions, the court alternatively dismissed the action under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment to the defendants 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. This appeal followed. 

II. Consideration of the Motion to Dismiss 

 We uphold the dismissal except on the claim involving intentional 

misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus’s membership status. 

A. Standard of Review 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough 

factual matter to state a plausible claim. Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 

Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). We engage in de novo review 

of the dismissal. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 

1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). 

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 B. Timeliness 

The defendants argue that the tort claims are untimely under Utah 

Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3) (2011), which provides that “[a]n action may be 

brought within three years . . . for relief on the ground of fraud or 

mistake.” This argument has been waived. 

In district court, the defendants raised the timeliness argument for 

the first time in a reply brief. That was too late because the District of 

Utah does not allow parties to assert new arguments in a reply brief. See 

Rios-Madrigal v. United States, Nos. 2:08-cv-257 CW, 2:05-cr-691, 2010 

WL 918087, at *3 (D. Utah Mar. 9, 2010) (“Because this argument was 

raised for the first time in Rios’ reply brief, the argument is waived.”); see 

also DUCiv R 7-1 (stating that reply memoranda “must be limited to 

rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum opposing the motion”). In 

light of the waiver, we will not consider the defendants’ argument on 

timeliness. 

C. Claims Under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 

The Donners also argue that the district court erroneously dismissed 

their claims under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1701 et seq. (2006). According to the Donners, they bought a lot based 

on Mr. Nicklaus’s fraudulent representations. We reject this argument: The 

statute addresses misrepresentations concerning the sale of a “lot,” and Mr. 

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Nicklaus’s alleged misrepresentations did not involve a “lot.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1703(a)(2) (2006). 

 The district court drew a similar conclusion,2

 and we engage in 

de novo review. United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035, 1040 (10th 

Cir. 2014). 

 We conduct this review based on the events described in the 

amended complaint. There, the Donners allege that when they bought a 

charter membership, they were promised an estate lot certificate rather 

than a specific parcel of land. The Donners could redeem the certificate for 

a specific parcel once the land was platted and available lots were 

designated. But, the certificate did not refer to a specific parcel. To the 

contrary, the certificate imposed three limitations on a purchase: 

 1. The Donners could redeem the certificate within a certain 

 time period; if the Donners chose not to “select and purchase” 

 an available lot within that period, the certificate would expire. 

 2. The Donners’ right to select an available lot for purchase was 

 subject to the prior right (if any) of other charter members. 

 

2

 The district court also concluded that 

● the Donners had not sufficiently alleged any 

 misrepresentations or omissions, and 

● the defendants had not qualified as “developers or agents” 

 under the statute. 

We need not address these conclusions because we conclude that the 

Donners’ purchase did not involve a “lot.” 

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 3. If the Donners chose to redeem the certificate and to buy an 

 available lot, the purchase would be “effected pursuant to a real 

 estate purchase contract containing customary terms and 

 conditions.” 

Aplt. App. at 231, 236-37. 

 Because the development was never completed, no lots were platted 

for the Donners to purchase. Thus, the Donners never had an opportunity to 

redeem their certificate. 

 The resulting issue is whether the Donners’ allegations fit the statute. 

The statute prohibits misrepresentation “with respect to the sale . . . or 

offer to sell . . . any lot” that does not fall within an exemption. Interstate 

Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2) (2006). The parties 

disagree about whether the alleged misrepresentations pertain to a “lot.” 

 The term is undefined in the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2006). 

Winter v. Hollingsworth Props., Inc., 777 F.2d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 

1985). In the absence of a statutory definition, the scope is ambiguous. 

One can reasonably interpret the statutory reference to a “lot” to mean a 

specifically defined parcel of land.3

 But, one could also reasonably 

 

3

 This interpretation of the term “lot” is consistent with the definition 

of local officials in the pertinent county (Beaver). Beaver County’s zoning 

ordinances defined the term “lot” as 

A parcel . . . of land . . . by metes and bounds and held or 

intended to be held in separate lease or ownership; or a unit of 

land shown as a lot or parcel on a recorded subdivision map; or 

a unit of land shown on a plat used in the lease or sale or offer 

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interpret the statute to refer to any piece of land, whether specifically 

defined or not. Thus, the Donners do not question the ambiguity of the 

statute. 

 Instead, the Donners rely on a regulation adopted by the agency 

administering the statute (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). This 

agency interpreted the term “lot” to mean “any portion, piece, division, 

unit, or undivided interest in land . . . if the interest include[d] the right to 

the exclusive use of a specific portion of the land.” 12 C.F.R. § 1010.1(b) 

(2007). The Donners do not question the validity of this regulatory 

definition. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 

842-44 (1984). Instead, they rely on this definition. 

 The resulting issue is whether the Donners were promised something 

that fit the agency’s definition of a “lot.” This definition contains a string 

of three prepositional phrases: 

 

of lease or sale of land resulting from the division of a larger 

tract into two (2) or more smaller units. 

Zoning Ordinances of Beaver County § 10.02.060(85) (Apr. 1993). The 

county’s subdivision ordinances provided a similar definition of “lot”: 

[A] parcel of real property with a separate and distance number 

or other designation shown on a plat or a parcel of real 

property delineated on an approved map of a record of survey, 

split or sub-parceling map as filed in the office of the County 

Recorder and intended as a unit for building development or 

transfer of ownership. 

Beaver County Subdivision Ordinance ch. 10(14) (1996). 

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● “to the exclusive use” 

● “of a specific portion” and 

● “of the land.” 

The first phrase (“to the exclusive use”) narrows the statute to cover 

representations about a unit of land available for the plaintiff’s exclusive 

use. The following two prepositional phrases serve to define that unit of 

land. 

 The phrase “of the land” is clear. This phrase refers either to the 

development as a whole or to some larger area. 

 The regulation defines “lot” based on a “specific portion” of the 

land. Thus, the term “lot” must refer to a specific portion of the 

development or some larger area. 

 With this regulatory definition of “lot,” the statute cannot be 

stretched to cover the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations. Those 

misrepresentations concerned what the Donners would eventually receive 

for their investment, but did not refer to a “specific portion” of land that 

would be subject to the Donners’ exclusive use. Thus, even if the Donners’ 

allegations were true, they would not fit the regulatory definition of the 

statutory term “lot.”4

 

4

 The record on appeal contains a proposed plat among the Donners’ 

settlement documents. This document does not affect our analysis. When 

the Donners invested $1.5 million, they acknowledged that they would 

receive only an estate lot certificate. Aplt. App. at 37. This certificate does 

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 We are guided not only by the regulatory definition, but also by the 

larger statutory context. See In re BDT Farms, Inc., 21 F.3d 1019, 1021 

(10th Cir. 1994) (examining “the larger statutory context” to interpret the 

statute). The statutory prohibition is phrased in the present tense, covering 

misrepresentations or omissions with respect to a “lot” already in 

existence, not one to be designated later. Thus, a misrepresentation or 

omission falls under the statute only if it involves exclusive use of a 

specific, identifiable portion of land. 

 The Donners’ claim does not involve a specific portion of land that 

was identifiable at the time of the alleged misrepresentations. In their 

opening brief, the Donners argue that they could select their “lot” “once 

the final resort [was] finalized.” Plaintiffs’ Opening Br. at 51-52. This 

argument is self-defeating: The promise could not involve a specific 

portion of the land if it could not have been selected until a future event 

took place (finalization of the plat). 

 The portion of land would presumably be identifiable later, when the 

plat was finalized. But, we know from other parts of the statute that it 

applies only when the portion of land is identifiable at the time of the 

misrepresentations. For example, the statute exempts subdivisions 

containing fewer than 25 “lots.” 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2006). Under the 

 

not constitute a legal title to a specific lot within the development. 

Therefore, no one could have identified the Donners’ eventual lot at the 

time of the alleged misrepresentations. 

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Donners’ interpretation, no one could determine whether the exemption 

applies until the development is eventually platted. If the plat ultimately 

contains fewer than 25 identifiable parcels (“lots”), Mr. Nicklaus’s 

representations could be exempt from the statute. If the plat ultimately 

contains 25 or more identifiable parcels, Mr. Nicklaus’s representations 

would not be exempt. One can apply the exemptions only by being able to 

count the lots in the subdivision at the time of the representation. See 

Bodansky v. Fifth on Park Condo, LLC, 635 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2011) 

(holding that a different exemption in the statute, one covering 100 or 

more “lots,” is based on the number of lots existing when the contract is 

signed); Nahigian v. Juno-Loudon, LLC, 677 F.3d 579, 587-89 (4th Cir. 

2012) (holding that the 100-lot exemption does not include future sales of 

lots); Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 756-57 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (holding that the 100-lot exemption is based on the number of 

lots existing when the contract is signed). 

 Against the backdrop of the regulatory definition and statutory 

context, the Donners argue that their claim fits the statute’s broad remedial 

purpose. But, “Congress did not . . . intend that [the Interstate Land Sales 

Full Disclosure Act] regulate all sales of real property.” Long v. Merrifield 

Town Ctr. L.P., 611 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, to determine 

which types of real property Congress intended to cover, we assume “that 

the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words 

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used.” Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). Applying the 

ordinary meaning of the words and the larger statutory context, we 

conclude that the alleged misrepresentations did not pertain to a “lot.” That 

is true even if Congress had broad remedial objectives. 

 We hold that the Donners have not stated a valid claim under the 

Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. Given this holding, we affirm 

the dismissal of the statutory claims. 

 D. Claims Involving Intentional Misrepresentation Under 

 State Law 

In the amended complaint, the Donners assert that Mr. Nicklaus and 

Nicklaus Golf made three false statements: 

1. Mr. Nicklaus is a “charter member” of Mount Holly and, as a 

 charter member, paid the $1.5 million purchase price for that 

 membership. 

2. Mount Holly was an existing facility that had development 

 approval and would continue to achieve certain development 

 benchmarks. 

3. The developer had the authority to convey legal title when the 

 Donners bought a charter membership. 

The Donners also allege a failure to disclose that one of the developer’s 

executives was a convicted felon. 

We conclude that the Donners have adequately alleged intentional 

misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus’s membership status. Thus, we reverse 

the dismissal of that claim. But, we affirm the dismissal of the remaining 

claims of intentional misrepresentation. 

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1. Elements of the Claims Involving Intentional 

 Misrepresentation 

A misrepresentation claim involves 

● a representation about a material fact 

● that was false 

● that the defendant knew was false or recklessly made without 

 enough knowledge 

● to induce another party to act 

● and the other party acted in reasonable reliance and 

 without knowing of the falsity 

● to that party’s injury. 

Utah v. Apotex Corp., 282 P.3d 66, 80 (Utah 2012). 

2. Mr. Nicklaus’s Membership Status 

The Donners allege that Mr. Nicklaus falsely represented that he was 

a charter member by stating: “I have been so impressed with the club and 

its management team that I became a founding charter member.” Aplt. App. 

at 25. This representation allegedly influenced the Donners, who claim 

they spent $1.5 million for a charter membership in part because they 

believed Mr. Nicklaus had also paid $1.5 million for the same type of 

membership. 

We conclude that the Donners have adequately alleged that 

Mr. Nicklaus misrepresented that he was a charter member. At this stage of 

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the proceedings, we look only to the amended complaint, and the Donners 

have adequately pleaded: 

● Mr. Nicklaus represented that he was a charter member of 

 Mount Holly. 

● By stating he was a “charter member,” Mr. Nicklaus implied 

that he had paid the $1.5 million purchase price for that 

membership. 

● Mr. Nicklaus’s representation was false because he was not a 

charter member and had not paid $1.5 million. 

● The Donners reasonably relied on the representation by 

purchasing a charter membership. 

a. Charter Membership 

The Donners have adequately pleaded that Mr. Nicklaus held himself 

out as a charter member. 

In the brochure attached to the amended complaint, Mr. Nicklaus 

states that he is a “charter member” immediately between (1) inviting the 

Donners to “become a charter member” and (2) explaining how the 

Donners can acquire a “charter membership.” Aplt. App. at 105-07.5

 

5

 Mr. Nicklaus also says in the press release that he is a charter 

member. Aplt. App. at 88. 

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In this context, the Donners have plausibly alleged that Mr. Nicklaus held 

himself out as a charter member. 

The defendants argue that Mr. Nicklaus’s statement constitutes an 

opinion, which cannot serve as the basis for a claim of intentional 

misrepresentation. This argument is based on the first half of the statement 

(that Mr. Nicklaus was impressed with the Mount Holly Club and its 

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management team). The defendants contend that Mr. Nicklaus’s 

“impression” involves an opinion rather than a fact. 

The defendants are correct about Mr. Nicklaus’s impressions. See 

Berkeley Bank for Coops. v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980). But 

Mr. Nicklaus stated more than his impressions; he stated that he was so 

impressed that he became a “charter member.” And Mr. Nicklaus’s 

declaration of a “charter membership” is a representation of present fact 

that goes beyond his opinion. 

b. $1.5 Million Purchase Price 

The Donners also allege that Mr. Nicklaus implied that he had paid 

the $1.5 million price for a charter membership. 

The marketing brochure states: 

1. A charter membership costs $1.5 million. 

2. Mr. Nicklaus was a charter member. 

Aplt. App. at 107. Thus, a fact-finder could reasonably infer that Mr. 

Nicklaus was implying that he had paid the $1.5 million purchase price for 

his charter membership. 

c. False Representation 

The Donners have also adequately pleaded that the representation 

was false because Mr. Nicklaus was not a charter member. 

The defendants argue that Mr. Nicklaus’s statement is true because 

he was an “honorary founding member” of Mount Holly. But, a fact-finder 

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could reasonably distinguish between Mr. Nicklaus’s honorary status as a 

“founding member” and a charter membership. The brochure describes a 

charter membership based on the $1.5 million purchase price. 

Mr. Nicklaus’s “founding membership” was “honorary,” meaning he paid 

nothing. Though “charter membership” and “founding membership” may 

ordinarily be synonymous, the price difference (free versus $1.5 million) 

could have struck the Donners as significant. 

The Donners allege in the amended complaint that they were induced 

to act by Mr. Nicklaus’s willingness to pay $1.5 million for his charter 

membership. It was the purchase price, rather than the title of the 

membership, that allegedly influenced the Donners. Thus, the Donners 

have adequately pleaded falsity of the representation regarding 

Mr. Nicklaus’s payment of the purchase price. 

d. Reasonable Reliance 

The Donners have also adequately alleged reasonable reliance on 

Mr. Nicklaus’s representation. 

To determine whether reliance is reasonable, courts consider the 

facts. Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 21 P.3d 219, 224-25 (Utah Ct. App. 

2000). The Donners allege that they reasonably relied on Mr. Nicklaus’s 

representation based on his use of the term “charter member” and his 

reputation for honesty and integrity. These allegations present a plausible 

basis for reasonable reliance. 

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The defendants contend that the reliance cannot be reasonable 

because: 

● the Donners were sophisticated purchasers and 

● the charter membership agreement would have clarified any 

 false representations. 

First, we reject the defendants’ argument involving the Donners’ 

sophistication. In Utah, plaintiffs may accept representations without 

investigation unless “‘facts should make it apparent . . . that [they are] 

being deceived.’” Robinson, 21 P.3d at 225 (quoting Conder v. A.L. 

Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 

The reasonableness of the reliance involves a fact question. In the 

amended complaint, the Donners did not include any facts that would have 

made their reliance unreasonable, regardless of their sophistication. In 

these circumstances, the Donners’ pleading of reasonable reliance is 

sufficient notwithstanding their alleged sophistication. 

Second, the defendants argue that 

● the charter membership agreement would have clarified any 

 false representations, and 

● a party “cannot reasonably continue to rely on [initially- 

 received false information] once true and corrected information 

 is furnished to him.” 

Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982). This 

argument is invalid. The agreement did not say, one way or the other, 

whether Mr. Nicklaus was a charter member. 

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The agreement did say that the Donners would not rely on 

representations by a “Company representative.” Aplt. App. at 232. But, 

this provision does not apply to the defendants. The membership agreement 

defines “Company” as “Mount Holly Club, LLC,” not Mr. Nicklaus or 

Nicklaus Golf. Id. at 231. 

We conclude that the Donners have adequately alleged reasonable 

reliance notwithstanding their sophistication or the terms of the charter 

membership agreement. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of the claim 

involving intentional misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus’s membership 

status. 

3. Remaining Claims of Intentional Misrepresentation 

But, the Donners have not adequately alleged any other basis for 

liability involving an intentional misrepresentation. 

a. Progress of the Mount Holly Development 

The Donners allege that the defendants falsely represented that the 

Mount Holly development had already been approved and would continue 

to achieve certain benchmarks. This allegation is not plausible given the 

express terms of the charter membership agreement and the associate 

program contract. 

The charter membership agreement states that 

● “at the present time[,] none of the Club facilities are 

completed” and 

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● “the substantial majority of the Resort has not yet been 

 developed.” 

Aplt. App. at 232. Thus, when the Donners signed the agreement, they 

should have realized that the facilities were not fully developed. 

The associate program contract states that 

● the defendants “make no representations concerning the . . . 

 completeness” or “date of completion” of the Club facilities 

 and 

● “no claim shall be made by any member . . . related to the 

 foregoing.” 

Id. at 253. Thus, when the Donners signed the associate program contract, 

they should have realized that the defendants were not representing 

completion of the facilities by any specific date. 

Given the express terms of these agreements, the Donners have not 

adequately pleaded reasonable reliance on statements concerning the 

development’s progress. 

b. Legal Title to the Property 

The Donners also complain that Mr. Nicklaus did not tell the truth 

when he said in the marketing materials that a buyer would receive an 

“estate lot.” The Donners regard this representation as false because “no 

title to an Estate Lot could [have been] conveyed at that time.” Id. at 39, 

¶ 102(d). 

Even viewing these allegations favorably to the Donners, we 

conclude a fact-finder could not infer reasonable reliance. The problem is 

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that the charter membership agreement and accompanying certificate make 

clear that a charter membership does not include conveyance of property. 

For example, the charter membership agreement states that the Donners 

would receive an “Estate Lot Certificate” that could be redeemed to buy 

“any available lot” “pursuant to a real estate purchase contract containing 

customary terms and conditions.” Id. at 236. With this written explanation, 

no reader could have justifiably expected immediate delivery of title to a 

lot. 

c. Criminal History of an Executive for the Developer 

The Donners also allege that the defendants failed to disclose the 

criminal history of an executive for the developer. This allegation is also 

not plausible. 

To survive the motion to dismiss on this claim, the Donners had to 

adequately allege a factual basis to infer that Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus 

Golf owed a duty to disclose this information. Shah v. Intermountain 

Healthcare, Inc., 314 P.3d 1079, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 

The Donners have not adequately alleged such a duty. As we explain 

below, the parties’ relationship is attenuated, and the Donners have not 

alleged a basis for a fiduciary duty or an obligation arising out of a statute 

or license. See Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 

2006) (“A person who possesses important, even vital, information of 

interest to another has no legal duty to communicate the information where 

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no relationship between the parties exists.”). Because the Donners have not 

adequately alleged such a duty, we conclude this claim is not plausible. 

E. Claims Involving Negligent Misrepresentation Under State 

 Law (Economic Loss Doctrine) 

On the claims involving negligent misrepresentation, the defendants 

invoke the economic loss doctrine. We conclude that this doctrine 

precludes recovery for negligent misrepresentation. 

Under the economic loss doctrine, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily 

recover economic damages for negligence when the subject matter is 

covered by a contract. Reighard v. Yates, 285 P.3d 1168, 1176 (Utah 

2012). But, the economic loss doctrine does not apply when the tortfeasor 

incurs a duty outside of any contract. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 

Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 

246-47 (Utah 2009). 

The general rule applies: The charter membership agreement covers 

the subject matter of the Donners’ dispute; thus, that agreement provides 

the “exclusive means of obtaining economic recovery.” Reighard, 285 P.3d 

at 1176. And, the Donners have not adequately alleged that Mr. Nicklaus or 

Nicklaus Golf incurred a duty outside of a contract. 

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1. General Rule (Subject Matter of the Dispute) 

We first ask whether the charter membership agreement covers the 

subject matter of the dispute. If so, the general rule would preclude 

liability for negligent misrepresentation. See id.6

We conclude that the agreement covers the subject matter of the 

Donners’ dispute with Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf. The Donners’ 

alleged damages relate to whether they received the benefit of their bargain 

under the charter membership agreement. As a result, that agreement 

provides the “exclusive means of obtaining economic recovery.” Id.

2. Exception (Existence of a Duty Outside of any Contract) 

We next ask whether Mr. Nicklaus or Nicklaus Golf incurred a duty 

outside of the charter membership agreement. If so, the doctrine would not 

apply because the Donners’ claims would be based on a duty independent 

of any contract. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002). 

We conclude that the Donners have not adequately alleged such a duty. 

The existence of a duty entails a question of law. Yazd v. Woodside 

Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 286 (Utah 2006). To determine whether a duty 

arises outside of a contract, we analyze the nature of the parties’ 

relationship. See id. In general, the more attenuated the relationship, the 

less likely a duty exists. Id.

 

6

 The general rule would apply notwithstanding the absence of privity 

of contract between the Donners and the defendants. See West v. InterFinancial, Inc., 139 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 

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Even under the Donners’ allegations, the parties’ relationship is 

attenuated: The Donners have no contractual relationship with the 

defendants and never dealt directly with them. In the absence of a direct 

relationship, Utah courts have recognized an independent duty only when 

the defendant has incurred a fiduciary duty or an obligation to deal fairly 

and honestly under a statute or license. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 

235, 240-41 (Utah 2002) (real estate agents); West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 

139 P.3d 1059, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (real estate appraisers); see also 

Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (stating that 

an accountant can incur liability to a non-contracting third party when the 

accountant knew that his work would be relied on by a party to extend 

credit or assume certain obligations); Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 

Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 

246-47 (Utah 2009) (recognizing a developer’s limited fiduciary duty). 

The Donners have not alleged a basis for a fiduciary duty or an 

obligation arising out of a statute or license. Instead, the Donners have 

alleged that Mr. Nicklaus is known for his integrity and trustworthiness. 

Though the Donners allegedly trusted Mr. Nicklaus based on these 

qualities, there was no relationship between the Donners and Mr. Nicklaus 

or Nicklaus Golf. In the absence of any relationship, Mr. Nicklaus and 

Nicklaus Golf had no independent duty to the Donners. See Yazd v. 

Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) (“A person who 

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possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no 

legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship between 

the parties exists.”); see also Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners 

Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC., 221 P.3d 234, 245 (Utah 

2009) (“Knowledge and expertise alone do not establish an independent 

duty; privity or a direct relationship is also required.”). 

The parties’ relationship is attenuated, and Mr. Nicklaus and 

Nicklaus Golf have no obligations growing out of a fiduciary duty, statute, 

or license. In these circumstances, we conclude that neither Mr. Nicklaus 

nor Nicklaus Golf has incurred a duty outside the charter membership 

agreement. 

The Donners argue that Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf incurred an 

independent duty based on 

● conduct preceding the contract and 

● the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 

We reject both arguments. The first argument is invalid under Utah law; 

and, as discussed above, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act does 

not apply. 

 Utah courts have not confined the economic loss doctrine to 

wrongdoing taking place after entry into a contract. This sort of limitation 

would make little sense: The doctrine is designed to allow parties “to 

allocate risk by contract.” West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 139 P.3d 1059, 

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1064 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). The parties can use a contract to allocate risks 

that may arise pre- or post-formation. As a result, we must apply the 

economic loss doctrine to conduct regardless of whether it preceded or 

post-dated the contract. See Gibbons v. Hidden Meadow, LLC., 524 F. 

App’x 451, 453 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (applying Utah law) 

(holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded a claim involving “pre 

contractual disclosures” when no independent source existed for a duty);7

accord Holden Farms, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055, 1063 (8th Cir. 

2003) (“We know of no reason why the economic loss doctrine in Iowa 

would not cover pre-contract-formation negligent-misrepresentation 

claims.”). 

 The Donners rely on Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 

Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986), and Worldwide Mach., Inc. v. 

Wall Mach., Inc., No. 2:06CV130DS, 2006 WL 2666411 (D. Utah 2006) 

(unpublished). Reliance on these opinions is misguided. 

 In Price-Orem, a property owner hired a contractor, and the 

contractor entered into a contract with a surveyor. The surveyor erred in 

marking the property boundary, and the owner sued the surveyor for 

negligent misrepresentation. See Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 56-57. 

 

7 Gibbons is persuasive, but not precedential. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(a). 

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 On appeal, the surveyor argued that the contractor was an 

indispensable party because the only parties to the surveying contract (the 

second contract) were the contractor and the surveyor. See id. at 59. The 

Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that privity of contract 

was not necessary for liability based on negligent misrepresentation. Id. 

In reaching this holding, the court never mentioned the economic loss 

doctrine. See id., passim. That is not surprising: None of the parties had 

mentioned the economic loss doctrine in their appeal briefs, and it would 

be another decade before the economic loss doctrine gained recognition in 

Utah outside of product liability cases. See West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 

139 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (“Outside of a products liability 

context, Utah first applied the economic loss rule in American Towers 

Owners Ass’n v. CCI Mech[.], Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996).”). 

 Because privity was unnecessary for liability, the Utah Supreme 

Court never had to address the effect of the contract between the owner 

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and the contractor (the first contract). Instead, the court noted that the 

owner’s claim did not depend on rights under the separate contract between 

the contractor and the surveyor. Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59. 

 Likewise, the Donners’ claim does not depend on rights under any 

contracts between the developer and Mr. Nicklaus or Nicklaus Golf. No 

one suggests otherwise, for the Donners’ claim of negligent 

misrepresentation involves the inability to obtain the benefits of their own 

contract with the developer. 

 The circumstances in Price-Orem were similar. There, the owner’s 

claim involved an inability to obtain the benefit of its contract with the 

contractor. But, the state supreme court had not yet recognized the 

economic loss doctrine outside of products liability cases; the parties did 

not mention the doctrine in the appeal; and the Utah Supreme Court never 

referred to the doctrine. Thus, Price-Orem has no bearing on the 

defendants’ invocation of the economic loss doctrine. 

 We are also unpersuaded by Worldwide Mach. There, a federal 

district court stated that the economic loss doctrine does not apply when a 

party is fraudulently induced to enter a contract. Worldwide Mach., Inc. v. 

Wall Mach., Inc., No. 2:06CV130DS, 2006 WL 2666411, at *4-5 (D. Utah 

2006) (unpublished). For this conclusion, the district court relied on two 

cases: 

● Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003), and 

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32 

● United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207 (10th 

 Cir. 2000). 

 In Grynberg, the court applied Wyoming’s version of the economic 

loss doctrine, not Utah’s. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 10-

14 (Utah 2003). As a result, Grynberg does not shed light on Utah law. See 

BC Technical, Inc. v. Ensil Int’l Corp., 464 F. App’x 689, 699 n.16 (10th 

Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“Grynberg is not relevant because it interprets 

Wyoming law rather than Utah law.”). 

 The federal district court also relied on United Int’l Holdings, which 

applied Colorado’s version of the economic loss doctrine. United Int’l 

Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2000). 

But, the Utah Supreme Court has noted its disagreement with aspects of 

Colorado’s version of the rule: 

[T]he Association contends that we abandoned the economic 

loss rule as set forth in American Towers and expressly adopted 

Colorado’s interpretation. We have not. Although we have 

agreed with Colorado regarding the independent duty analysis, 

we have not abandoned our own line of cases interpreting and 

applying the economic loss rule. Nor do we wholly adopt all of 

the independent duties recognized by Colorado. 

Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at 

Pilgrims Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 248 (Utah 2009). 

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33 

 The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized an exception for 

claims of fraudulent inducement, and we do not regard the federal district 

court’s unreported decision in Worldwide Mach as persuasive.8

 We must apply the doctrine here, rejecting the Donners’ reliance on 

pre-contract misrepresentations and the Interstate Land Sales Full 

Disclosure Act. Under the economic loss doctrine, the defendants cannot 

incur liability for negligent misrepresentation because the Donners’ claim 

involves the benefit of their bargain under the charter membership 

agreement.9

III. Consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment (Election of 

 Remedies) 

 In an alternative ruling, the district court granted summary judgment 

to the defendants on all claims. The court did so on the ground that the 

Donners had elected their remedies against the defendants through the 

settlement agreement. This ruling was erroneous. 

 

8 The Donners also cite MP Nexlevel, LLC v. Codale Elec. Supply, 

Inc., No. 2:08-CV-0727CW, 2010 WL 1687985 (D. Utah 2010) 

(unpublished), for the proposition that the economic loss doctrine does not 

apply to pre-contract misrepresentations. There, the district judge (who 

also issued the decision we are reviewing) stated that the economic loss 

doctrine does not apply to pre-contract misrepresentations, but gave no 

authority for this conclusion. MP Nexlevel, 2010 WL 1687985, at *4. The 

Utah Supreme Court has never recognized an exception for pre-contract 

misrepresentations. 

9

 The economic loss doctrine does not affect the claims involving 

intentional misrepresentation. See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 

Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 680 n.8 (Utah 2001). 

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 In considering the ruling on summary judgment, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Donners. Lenox MacLaren 

Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 2014). 

Viewing the evidence in this manner, we can uphold the summary judgment 

ruling only if there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and the 

defendants establish their right to judgment as a matter of law. Kovnat v. 

Xanterra Parks & Resorts, 770 F.3d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 2014). Because 

election of remedies involves an affirmative defense, the defendants’ 

burden is intensified. See Kuhl v. Hayes, 212 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 1954) 

(“An election of remedies is an affirmative defense.”); Pelt v. Utah, 539 

F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f the moving party has the burden of 

proof, a more stringent summary judgment standard applies.”). This 

standard requires the defendants to “establish, as a matter of law, all 

essential elements of the issue before the nonmoving party can be 

obligated to bring forward any specific facts alleged to rebut the movant’s 

case.” Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1280. 

The doctrine of election of remedies precludes a party from obtaining 

redress for an injury through two wholly inconsistent remedies. See Cook 

v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P. 196, 200 (Utah 1927) (stating that a 

party cannot pursue two remedies that are “so inconsistent that the 

assertion of one involves a negation or repudiation of the other”). The 

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burden of proving an inconsistency lies with Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus 

Golf. Kuhl, 212 F.2d at 39. 

They argue that the Donners are seeking inconsistent remedies 

involving both affirmance and repudiation of the charter membership 

agreement. We disagree. Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf have not shown 

either an affirmation or a repudiation of the agreement. 

In settling a bankruptcy claim against the developer’s parent 

company, the Donners agreed to accept a lot, with certain amenities, if the 

development was ever completed. The lot was acquired through settlement 

against a bankrupt debtor, not through a judgment based on a successful 

contract claim. The defendants have not proven that this settlement 

involves affirmation of a contract or that the Donners were made whole by 

obtaining the lot in an undeveloped tract. 

Nor have the defendants proven the Donners’ disaffirmance of the 

contract. In settling with other entities and seeking damages from Mr. 

Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf, the Donners are merely trying to recoup their 

losses from separate parties under separate causes of action. 

We addressed a similar issue in Sade v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 483 F.2d 

230, 234 (10th Cir. 1973), where we applied Oklahoma’s doctrine of 

election of remedies. After a catastrophic injury, the claimant settled with 

Northern Natural Gas Co., releasing Northern but not its employees. See 

id. at 232. The claimant then sued Northern’s employees, who successfully 

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defended by arguing that they were released through the settlement with 

Northern. See id. at 232-33. The claimant sued Northern for fraud. See id.

at 233. Northern invoked the election-of-remedies doctrine, arguing that 

the claimant was seeking to affirm the settlement agreement after 

disaffirming the settlement agreement in state court. See id. at 234. We 

rejected this argument, in part because the claimant had never 

“disaffirmed” the settlement agreement: 

In the first place, we disagree with Northern’s initial 

premise that in instituting the [state court] action, [the 

claimant] disaffirmed the . . . settlement. Rather, as we see it, 

in instituting the [state court] proceeding it was [the 

claimant’s] position that the [settlement] agreement was valid 

and binding, but that it did not cover Northern’s employees, but 

only Northern itself. In this regard, as earlier noted, the release 

made no mention of Northern’s employees, and, according to 

[the claimant], Northern’s attorneys repeatedly assured him 

that the release did not preclude him from suing Northern’s 

employees. Hence, we fail to see just how [the claimant] was 

disaffirming the release when he sued Northern’s employees. 

Id. at 234-35. 

Similarly, the Donners did not disaffirm the charter membership 

agreement by suing Mr. Nicklaus or Nicklaus Golf. Like the claimant in 

Sade, the Donners did not believe they had been made whole when they 

settled with the developer. Thus, the Donners―like the claimant in 

Sade―sued other parties for fraudulently inducing entry into the contract. 

Like the panel in Sade, we do not regard this fraud action as 

“disaffirmance” of the contract. 

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The contract was not “affirmed” through receipt of a lot worth less 

than $1.5 million or “repudiated” through the assertion of tort claims. In 

these circumstances, the election-of-remedies doctrine does not apply. See 

Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) 

(concluding that “[t]he doctrine of election of remedies is inapplicable . . . 

because [the claimant] is not seeking or obtaining ‘double redress for a 

single wrong’”). Because the election-of-remedies doctrine is inapplicable, 

the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Mr. Nicklaus and 

Nicklaus Golf. 

Because the Donners are not precluded from pursuing tort remedies, 

we reverse the award of summary judgment. 

IV. Conclusion 

In conclusion, we reverse (1) the dismissal of the claim involving 

intentional misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus’s membership status, and (2) 

the award of summary judgment to Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf. 

Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further proceedings on the 

Donners’ claim relating to intentional misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus’s 

membership status. But, we affirm the dismissal on the claims involving 

(1) violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, (2) 

intentional misrepresentations or omissions involving progress of the 

development, availability of legal title, and failure to disclose an 

executive’s criminal history, and (3) negligent misrepresentation. 

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