UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

BERNARD KENNETH RIVERS, JR.-

EL; TRACI DAWN HAMILTONRIVERS, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

STATE OF COLORADO; CITY OF 

GREELEY, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-1310 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01899-LTB) 

(D. Colo.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Appellants Bernard Kenneth Rivers, Jr.-El and Traci Dawn Hamilton-Rivers 

initiated this pro se action against the State of Colorado and the City of Greeley, 

Colorado, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal statutes. Because appellants 

sought to reverse state-court proceedings, the district court dismissed the case for 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 26, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-1310 Document: 01019375585 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 1 
- 2 - 

lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes lower 

federal courts from reviewing state-court judgments. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

Alternatively, the court ruled that if no final judgment had been entered in the 

state-court proceedings, it must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which precludes federal courts from intervening in 

ongoing state-court proceedings. Finally, after observing other impediments to 

appellants’ “unnecessarily verbose, rambling, repetitive, vague, and conclusory” 

complaint, R., Vol. 1 at 102, the district court certified that any appeal would not be 

taken in good faith, and it denied leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP), 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). 

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on its various 

conclusions of law. See generally Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1209 

(10th Cir. 1998). Although appellants’ pro se materials are entitled to a liberal 

construction, we will not act as their advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 

972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). 

On appeal, appellants raise largely incomprehensible arguments that provide 

no basis for reversing the district court’s decision. They also ask us, in at least five 

separate motions, to take judicial notice of events that have transpired in state-court 

proceedings. Having reviewed their materials and the relevant legal authorities, we 

agree this case was subject to dismissal for substantially the same reasons stated by 

Appellate Case: 14-1310 Document: 01019375585 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 2 
- 3 - 

the district court in its decision dated July 11, 2014. The judgment of the district 

court is therefore affirmed, and appellants’ motions for judicial notice are denied. 

Because this appeal fails to present any reasoned, non-frivolous argument, we deny 

IFP and direct appellants to remit the full filing and docketing fees to the clerk of the 

district court forthwith. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 

1079 (10th Cir. 2007). 

 Entered for the Court 

 Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

 Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 14-1310 Document: 01019375585 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 3