[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11310

Non-Argument Calendar

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RILEY MITCHELL, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00457-MSS-TGW

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Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Riley Mitchell appeals the district court’s denial of his federal 

habeas petition. During his state court trial, the government introduced Mitchell’s testimony that was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but his 

counsel did not pursue a motion to suppress that testimony. The 

district court held that although Mitchell’s counsel’s performance 

was deficient, Mitchell could not establish that deficiency prejudiced him under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 

district court granted a certificate of appealability for Mitchell’s argument that the state court unreasonably applied Miranda and 

Strickland under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by denying his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with the district court that 

Mitchell cannot establish that any of his counsel’s deficiencies were 

prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Riley Mitchell was arrested and questioned on two separate 

occasions in late 2010. He was first arrested on November 13 for 

dealing in stolen property. He was questioned in relation to that 

arrest on December 1, invoked his Miranda rights during that questioning, and was released from jail on December 12. He was again 

arrested on December 15 and charged with burglary of a dwelling 

and grand theft. Detectives brought Mitchell to an interview room 

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and attempted to read him his Miranda rights, but Mitchell interrupted the detectives and stated that he had gone into abandoned 

homes to collect metal to scrap and that he knew it was wrong to 

break into those abandoned buildings. 

At Mitchell’s trial for the burglary and grand theft charges, 

the government introduced Mitchell’s statements after the December 15 arrest. The government also introduced evidence that 

Mitchell’s blood and flesh were found on the exterior of a broken 

window of the house the copper tubing was stolen from and that 

Mitchell did not have permission to enter the home. And the detectives who interviewed Mitchell after his arrest testified that they 

noticed and photographed scars on Mitchell’s arms. The jury found 

Mitchell guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to thirty 

years. 

Mitchell appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida

Second District Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction and 

sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling but vacated his 

conviction and sentence for grand theft. The court of appeals directed the trial court to enter a judgment and sentence for first-degree petit theft instead of grand theft. 

Mitchell later filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief 

that argued, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his statements to the 

police that he said were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 

He argued that because he invoked his Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation on December 1, 2010, the police were 

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prohibited from reinitiating an interrogation on December 15, 

2010. The state postconviction court denied relief, reasoning that 

his counsel was not deficient because his first invocation of his Miranda rights was in an unrelated case and therefore did not apply to 

police interrogation related to the offense here. Mitchell appealed 

that denial, and the Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed. 

Mitchell filed a pro se habeas petition on February 18, 2019. 

The district court denied that petition. It held that the state court 

unreasonably applied Strickland and its progeny when it determined Mitchell’s trial counsel was not deficient, but that Mitchell 

could not establish prejudice because of that deficiency. The district court granted a certificate of appealability as to whether Mitchell’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress Mitchell’s statements to police. 

II.

“We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Morrow v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 886 F.3d 

1138, 1146 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Williamson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 

805 F.3d 1009, 1016 (11th Cir. 2015)). Moreover, “[a]n ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact[,] 

which we review de novo.” Williams v. Alabama, 73 F.4th 900, 905 

(11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 

(11th Cir. 1998)).

Because these claims were adjudicated in state court, we will 

not grant habeas relief unless the state court decision “was contrary 

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to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established Federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a 

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than 

[the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A 

decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal 

principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. To 

show that a state court decision was an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law, the prisoner must show the decision “is so obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 

(2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 

Mitchell argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress 

his statements to detectives that were offered at trial. A claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to establish 

his counsel was deficient and that deficiency resulted in prejudice 

to the defendant. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

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The state court held that Mitchell did not establish that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of his 

statements to police. It reasoned that Mitchell’s counsel was not 

deficient because his first invocation of his Miranda rights was in an 

unrelated case and therefore did not apply to police interrogation 

related to the offense here.

We disagree and hold that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court caselaw in holding that Mitchell’s counsel 

was not deficient. A suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights 

during a custodial interrogation is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available or the suspect initiates 

further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–

85 (1981). This rule prevents an interrogation for 14 days after the 

suspect’s release from custody. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 

110 (2010). And the rule prevents reinitiating interrogation about 

any crime, even if the new questioning relates to a different crime 

than the suspect was originally questioned about. See Arizona v. 

Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1988). 

Mitchell invoked his Miranda rights on December 1, 2010, in 

an unrelated case. He was released from custody on December 12, 

2010, and detectives reinitiated interrogation on December 15, 

2010, when he was rearrested in relation to the burglary and stolen 

copper tubing. Because Mitchell’s interrogation regarding the burglary took place within 14 days of his release from custody, and 

because Mitchell invoked his Miranda rights during that custody, 

his trial counsel—who knew of these facts—should have filed a 

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motion to suppress the statements he gave to the detectives. His 

failure to do so was deficient, and the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when it determined the counsel 

was not deficient. 

However, the state court was correct to reject Mitchell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Mitchell’s counsel’s 

deficient performance did not prejudice Mitchell. To prove prejudice, Mitchell must show “a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The errors must 

be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The state court did not engage in a 

prejudice analysis because it determined Mitchell’s counsel was not 

deficient, so we review Strickland’s prejudice element de novo. 

The evidence presented at trial establishes there is no reasonable probability that Mitchell would have been acquitted if the 

jury had not heard Mitchell’s statements to police about scrapping 

copper. Thus, even though Mitchell’s counsel was deficient, Mitchell was not prejudiced by that deficiency.

Mitchell was charged with burglary under Florida law, 

which requires the government to prove he unlawfully entered or 

remained in a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense 

therein. Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b)(3)(b). A dwelling includes a home’s 

curtilage, and a fenced-in back yard is part of the curtilage of the 

home. See id. § 810.011(2); Baker v. State, 636 So.2d 1342, 1343 (Fla. 

1994). And under Florida law, “[s]tealthy entry, together with the 

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absence of owner or occupant consent, is an evidentiary tool with 

which to establish prima facie proof of intent to commit an offense.” Baker, 636 So.2d at 1344. The government offered evidence 

that the backyard of the burglarized home was fenced in, that 

Mitchell’s blood and flesh were found on a broken window used to 

gain entry into the home, that the detectives observed scrapes and 

scars on Mitchell’s arms, and that Mitchell did not have permission 

to enter the home. Thus, even though Mitchell’s counsel erred by 

not filing a motion to suppress his statements to police, that error 

was not serious enough to deprive Mitchell of a fair trial with a reliable result. Instead, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find

Mitchell guilty of burglary under Florida law. 

Mitchellseparately arguesthat he was prejudiced because he 

might have elected to testify had his counsel filed a motion to suppress his statements to police. But Mitchell does not explain why

the suppression of those statements would have made him decide

to testify at trial or how his testimony could have overcome the 

weight of the evidence against him. At Mitchell’s postconviction 

hearing Mitchell’s trial attorney explained that Mitchell admitted 

to him that he burglarized the home. Because of that admission,

the attorney could not have advised Mitchell to take the stand and 

perjure himself. See Scott v. Dugger, 891 F.2d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 

1989). Moreover, had Mitchell testified contrary to the statements 

that he made to the police, the prosecution could have impeached 

him with those statements even if they had been excluded from the 

prosecution’s case-in-chief. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 

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(1971). There is no connection between the suppression of these 

statements and Mitchell’s right to testify.

III.

The district court is AFFIRMED.

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