FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-2529

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MATTHEW R. HOOVER,

Appellant,

v.

CATIA PEAK, o/b/o C.P., a Minor,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

William F. Stone, Judge.

August 7, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

Matthew R. Hoover appeals the trial court’s final judgment 

granting Catia Peak a permanent injunction for stalking against 

him. We reverse because the record does not support the 

imposition of such an injunction. 

I

On Independence Day, 2023, Hoover aimed a Roman candle 

firework at several children present in his neighborhood. Peak’s 

daughter, C.P., was one of those children. C.P. had her back turned 

to Hoover when the firework went off, and she suffered a minor 

injury to her thigh. 
2

Peak reported the incident to the Department of Children and 

Families, which led to Hoover’s arrest for child abuse. Hoover was 

also arrested for a separate domestic incident with his now 

estranged wife Mandelin Hoover. The court granted Mandelin

Hoover a domestic violence injunction against Hoover with a nocontact provision.

Then, in August 2023, Hoover and his ex-wife—not Mandelin

Hoover—attended their daughter’s ninth-grade orientation at 

Crestview High School. C.P. was also a ninth-grader at Crestview 

High School. Thus, Peak, her husband, C.P., and Mandelin Hoover 

(Peak’s purported best friend) also attended the orientation. While 

at the orientation, Peak and Hoover crossed paths on four 

occasions. Peak believed that Hoover understood his criminal case 

for child abuse due to the fireworks incident to also include a nocontact order as to C.P. In fact, no such provision existed.

Peak sought out the school police deputy to inform him that 

Hoover was on the premises and that he should be removed. At the 

same time, Hoover turned into the same hallway but after seeing 

Peak’s family, he walked away. Based on the four encounters at 

orientation, Peak filed the underlying petition for an injunction for 

stalking against Hoover.

The trial court held a hearing, where it heard from Peak, her 

husband, Mandelin Hoover, and Hoover’s ex-wife. C.P. did not 

testify. The court also denied Hoover’s request to allow his 

daughter to testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

found that Peak satisfied her burden of showing that a reasonable 

person would have been placed in substantial emotional distress 

by Hoover’s actions and granted the permanent injunction final 

judgment. Hoover appeals.

II

We review the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction for 

abuse of discretion. See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143–

44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). But we review the sufficiency of the 

evidence for such an injunction de novo. See id. at 1144; Brennan 

v. Syfrett, 369 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). 
3

Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes, creates a civil cause of 

action for injunctive relief from stalking. Paragraph (6)(a) further 

provides that “[u]pon notice and hearing, when it appears to the 

court that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may

grant such relief as the court deems proper . . . .” § 784.0485(6)(a), 

Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). Stalking occurs when a person 

“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or 

cyberstalks another person[.]” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. 

To establish a showing of “stalking” under the statutes, a 

petitioner must show evidence of “repeated acts” of “following, 

harassment, or cyberstalking.” Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144 (quoting 

Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). 

Moreover, competent, substantial evidence must be present in the 

record to support a finding that a “reasonable person” suffered 

from emotional distress due to the stalking. See Pickett, 236 So. 3d

at 1146 (noting that a petitioner must “prove stalking by 

competent, substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)); Brennan, 

369 So. 3d at 324 (noting that “courts have repeatedly reversed 

injunctions where a reasonable person would not have suffered 

emotional distress from the asserted conduct.” (citation omitted)); 

Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) 

(reversing a stalking injunction because the petitioner “did not 

sufficiently establish his case that [the respondent]’s conduct 

caused him substantial emotional distress[]”). 

Here, there was neither evidence of harassment nor 

following—much less evidence of “repeated acts” of such actions, 

that would support an injunction for stalking.1 We address each in 

turn. 

A

“‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct[2] directed at 

a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to 

1 We do not discuss whether cyberstalking occurred given that 

the allegations presented were the result of physical interactions. 

2 “‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of 

a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which 

evidences a continuity of purpose. The term does not include 
4

that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. 

Stat.

In this case, Hoover attended his daughter’s Crestview High 

School orientation, where parents were to “walk the schedule” of 

their children. The Peak family and Mandelin Hoover attended the 

orientation with C.P. Peak, her husband, and Mandelin Hoover 

testified that they saw Hoover four times during the orientation: 

1. First, near room 501. Hoover was walking toward 

what was likely room 514 when he allegedly turned back, saw 

Peak’s group, and kept walking. 

2. Second, inside room 514. Hoover was in the room (the 

computer lab) when Peak’s family entered the room, saw Hoover, 

and then they—the family—left the room. Hoover’s ex-wife stated 

that when they saw the Peaks “pop” into room 514, they—the 

Hoover “entourage”—decided to leave to avoid any issues with

Mandelin Hoover, who maintained a no-contact order against 

Hoover.

3. Third, along the room 501 hallway. Peak’s family was 

next to room 501 after they walked out of room 514 and shortly 

thereafter, Hoover walked towards them in the hallway from 514 

to 501—which was the direction in which Hoover’s daughter’s 

math class was. 

4. Last, near the “Media Center.” Peak’s family was near 

the media center speaking with the school police officer about 

Hoover being at the school when he turned a corner, saw them, and 

turned around to walk away. 

All four encounters—Peak argued—were evidence of 

“stalking.” Peak’s main contention was that C.P. suffered 

emotional distress every time she came into contact with Hoover. 

Thus, Peak claimed that Hoover was “harassing” C.P. and the 

family. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (defining “harass” as 

engaging in “a course of conduct directed at a specific person which 

constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other 

organized protests.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat.
5

causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no 

legitimate purpose[]”).While Peak alleged in the petition that C.P. 

asked “to start attending therapy to cope with the nightmares and 

him showing up and following her,” no evidence of the alleged 

therapy was presented at the injunction hearing. Nor was there 

any evidence that a reasonable person in C.P.’s position would 

have suffered “substantial emotional distress.” No evidence of any 

other dispute other than the firework incident appears in the 

record that would support such a finding. 

Because no competent, substantial evidence is present in the 

record that Hoover “repeatedly harassed” C.P. or her family while 

at the Crestview High School orientation, we turn to whether 

Hoover “repeatedly followed” Peak’s family. See § 784.048(2), Fla. 

Stat. 

B

In the petition, Peak alleged that Hoover “followed” C.P. 

during the orientation and caused her distress. But as discussed,

Peak must have shown that Hoover “repeatedly followed” C.P. for 

the injunction to be valid. See Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144 (citing 

Lukacs, 982 So. 2d at 1219). Peak provided no instances of C.P. 

being “followed” by Hoover. 

Unlike harassment, “following” is not defined in the statute.

Therefore, we apply its ordinary meaning. See State v. Nichols, 892 

So. 2d 1221, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). To follow someone is to 

“move behind and in the same direction” as them or “to go after 

[them]” or to “pursue” them “as if with the intention of overtaking 

[them].” See Follow, Followed, Following, & Follows, The 

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New 

College ed. 1982). Of the four “encounters” with Hoover, none 

showed that Hoover was “following” C.P. Mere speculation that 

someone is following you is not sufficient to warrant an injunction 

against that person. See cf. Brennan, 369 So. 3d at 324–25.

Although “[w]e are sensitive to the difficulties faced by the 

trial court in teasing out a thread of truth from a jumbled 

patchwork of conflicting narrative . . . [being] mindful that we are 

not the factfinder[,]” Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1146, we must still 

scrutinize such findings against the backdrop of the record. Here, 
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nothing in the record suggests that Peak met her burden below to 

show Hoover “followed” or “harassed” C.P. so as to warrant the 

placement of a permanent injunction with restrictions on certain 

liberties guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. See 

Brennan, 369 So. 3d at 323 (“Stalking injunctions deprive citizens 

of important rights, including the constitutional right to possess a 

firearm . . . . They carry serious restrictions of freedoms that can 

also result in criminal liability when violated, with punishment up 

to one year in the county jail.” (citations omitted)). 

We “must be careful not to apply the stalking statute to 

infringe on another person’s constitutionally protected freedom of 

association or free speech or apply in an overbroad manner to 

reach non-malicious conduct.” Id. This observtion applies here. 

Hoover was attending his daughter’s high school orientation with 

her and his ex-wife. He spent, at most, thirty minutes at the school 

going from classroom to classroom, “walking” his daughter’s 

schedule. Nothing about that behavior is malicious or criminal. See 

id. at 323 (discussing the understanding that section 784.084 

penalizes criminal and malicious conduct).

III

Accordingly, the trial court’s final judgment granting an 

injunction for stalking against Hoover is REVERSED and the case is

REMANDED with instructions to dissolve the injunction.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Catia Peak, pro se, Appellee.