surveillanc

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

Message from 

Joseph S. Mahaley, 

NASA Assistant 

Administrator for 

Protective Services

Maximizing our Agency’s counterintelligence/

counterterrorism (CI/CT) effectiveness is 

even more important today than it was when 

I wrote my first message for last year’s NASA 

CI Newsletter. Over the past few months, we 

have seen an increasing number of media 

reports concerning the wide variety of cyber 

and espionage threats arrayed against the U.S. 

Government and its contractors by foreign 

governments as well as nonstate actors. NASA 

and its contractors are not immune to these 

threats. To the contrary, because of the research 

and projects that our Agency conducts, NASA 

is one of the most attractive targets for those 

who are determined to steal America’s technology not only for financial and ideological 

gain but also to do harm to our country.

It is for this reason that all of us at NASA, 

civil servants and contractors, need to be constantly mindful of these threats to our Agency 

and our Nation and do our utmost to identify 

and counter them. In the past year, I’ve had 

the opportunity to visit every major NASA 

facility and meet hundreds of employees. 

I’ve seen firsthand that NASA’s workforce 

is composed of hard-working, exceptionally 

talented individuals who endeavor to protect 

our technology and our infrastructure. It is 

our mission to ensure that they have the protections in place to help them to succeed.

As NASA’s senior intelligence, counterintelligence, and security official, I place a strong 

emphasis on the CI/CT Program. In fact, one 

of my first priorities as the incoming Assistant 

Administrator for Protective Services was 

to initiate a 5-year CI/CT expansion plan to 

address the ever-increasing threat from CI/

CT activities. To date, this has resulted in the 

hiring of several CI Special Agents detailed 

to our Centers and a CI Cyber Analyst here 

at NASA Headquarters. Despite the challenges imposed by budgetary limitations, 

I am committed to pursuing our expansion 

and improvement of this vital program.

In closing, I want to take this opportunity to 

thank you, our frontline CI professionals, for 

your dedication to keeping NASA’s people 

and property safe. I want you to know that 

your continuing diligence and outstanding 

efforts are appreciated by NASA’s senior leadership. Thank you for the exceptional work 

you do for our Agency and for the United 

States of America.

Continued on next page

Who in Cyberspace Is Viewing, Collecting, and Responding to Your Thoughts?

A NASA employee experienced two unusual 

and unexpected response “tweets” to generic 

information posted via Twitter by the 

employee while she was recently on official 

foreign travel. The employee experienced 

this issue in different countries, and both 

instances were unexpected. This employee, 

like so many at NASA, is excited and electrified by NASA and the work the Agency 

does, and she regularly tweets her opinions 

Office of Protective Services

Assistant Administrator 

Joseph S. Mahaley

202-358-3752

Counterintelligence/

Counterterrorism Division

Director

Operations

Cyber Analyst

Administrative Assistant

Fall 2013

Informational Newsletter on Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Issues Affecting NASA

www.nasa.gov A publication of the Office of Protective Services, Counterintelligence Division

Counterintelligence Quote

“Foreign attempts to collect U.S. technological and economic information 

by cyber espionage will continue at a 

high level in 2012 and will represent a 

growing and persistent threat to U.S. 

economic security.”

—Antone Gonsalves, InformationWeek

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)
and thoughts, as well as events happening at 

NASA, via Twitter and other social media.

The first event occurred after the NASA 

employee posted a picture, via Twitter, of 

the view from her hotel room with no geographical tags or location finders. Almost 

immediately, she received a response to the 

tweet, from someone in a neighboring hotel, 

commenting on her post and hoping she 

was enjoying her stay. This was alarming 

to the employee because she had not tagged 

the location in the photo and because the 

response tweet was generated from a hotel 

down the block from where she was staying. 

The employee did not respond to the tweet.

The second incident occurred in the same 

fashion: during the employee’s official 

travel, but in a different country. The 

employee was in the country’s airport and 

tweeted an off-the-cuff remark about needing coffee. Within seconds of the tweet, a 

response from inside the airport showed her 

multiple coffee shops located throughout the 

airport terminals. Although this was helpful 

in her search for coffee, the tweet made the 

employee contemplate that all information 

released into cyberspace is information for 

anyone to view, collect, and act upon. The 

remarks tweeted were of little or no consequence; however, the responses to them 

brought home the lesson that you do not 

know who is out there in cyberspace.

NASA Counterintelligence Perspective

NASA is an information-sharing agency that 

collaborates with many nations around the 

world in research, technology, information, 

and missions; however, the NASA community needs to keep in mind that each person 

with a NASA badge has been entrusted with 

safeguarding sensitive, proprietary, and (in 

some cases) classified material.

In accordance with NASA Policy Directive 

1660.1B, the employee who received the 

tweets showing knowledge of her location 

reported the incidents because she thought 

that her experience might raise potential 

security concerns for others in the Agency. 

Vigilance is the best single defense in protecting information, operations, facilities, 

and people.

Please report counterintelligence-related 

incidents or issues to your local NASA 

Counterintelligence office.

Possible Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance of a NASA 

Employee While on Official 

Overseas Travel, As Well As 

Useful Countermeasures

During recent official overseas travel to a 

country that, historically, has engaged in 

aggressive intelligence collection against the 

United States and NASA, a NASA employee 

experienced two suspicious/unusual events 

indicative of possible host-nation intelligence service targeting.

In the first instance, while looking for an item 

in an outer, zipped pocket of a piece of luggage he had left in his hotel room, the NASA 

employee discovered that his RSA token 

(which he had stored in that outer luggage 

pocket) had been detached from the lanyard 

that he normally used to carry the token. The 

employee found this highly unusual since the 

token was not easy to remove from the lanyard.

The second suspicious event occurred when 

the employee returned to his hotel room earlier that had originally been planned. As he 

approached his room, he saw a housekeeper 

who appeared alarmed at his early return 

and ran up to him with the television remote 

from his room. The employee believed the 

housekeeper was almost in a panic that he 

would return to his room without the remote 

being there.

The employee also mentioned observing 

multiple smoke detectors in hotel rooms he 

had previously stayed in during official travel 

to the same country. Other NASA employees 

have reported similar circumstances.

NASA Counterintelligence Perspective

NASA is a world leader in the research, 

development, testing, evaluation, and fielding of leading-edge technologies. Our 

accomplishments awe and inspire the world. 

As such, the Agency is also a target of foreign intelligence collection. Countries and 

companies can save substantial amounts of 

money by stealing technology and can use 

that stolen information to challenge us culturally, militarily, and economically. Though 

one may explain away the above events by 

saying that the token was separated from its 

lanyard due to jostling during travel, that the 

housekeeper may have changed the batteries 

in the remote to ensure that the guest had a 

properly working remote, and that the country visited is just security-conscious when it 

comes to fire prevention, it is also likely that 

these events were related to host-nation intelligence targeting of this NASA employee.

The bottom line is this: When traveling overseas, in particular for official business and 

where accommodations are provided by the 

host, assume that your hotel room and work 

spaces contain clandestine audio and video 

surveillance devices.

A publication of the Office of Protective Services, Counterintelligence Division

NASA Center CI Offices

Ames Research Center: 

Dryden Flight Research Center: 

Glenn Research Center: 

Goddard Space Flight Center: 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory: 

Johnson Space Center: 

Kennedy Space Center: 

Langley Research Center: 

Marshall Space Flight Center: 

Stennis Space Center: 

CI Home Page Web Site:

Fall 2013

Informational Newsletter on Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Issues Affecting NASA

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)