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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.F., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1439 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000018-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.F., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1440 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000030-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.F., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1441 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000031-2023
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IN THE INTEREST OF: E.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.F., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1442 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000032-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: O.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.F., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1443 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000033-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1444 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000034-2023
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IN THE INTEREST OF: W.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1445 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-31-DP-0000035-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 14, 2024

In these consolidated cases, F.F. (“Father”) appeals the September 15, 

2023 orders that adjudicated as dependent his daughter, G.F., born in June 

2007; his two sons, O.F., born in February 2009, and E.F., born in March 

2012; and his daughters, L.F., born in March 2015; and A.F., born in August 

2021. Separately, J.F. (“Mother”) appeals the September 15, 2023 orders 

that adjudicated as dependent her biological sons, L.M., born in April 2014;

and W.M., born in March 2016.1 After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 We have consolidated these cases sua sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513

(“Where there is more than one appeal from the same order, or where the 

same question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the 

appellate court may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all 

particulars as if but a single appeal.”). Instantly, Father and Mother 

(“Parents”) have raised identical issues concerning the same factual and 

procedural events in their respective appeals and briefs.
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We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter 

from the certified record. Father is the natural father of G.F., O.F., E.F., L.F., 

and A.F., and the stepfather of L.M. and W.M. Mother is the natural mother 

of L.M., W.M., and A.F., and stepmother to the remaining children. Parents

have been married since 2020, after Father’s first wife and natural mother of

G.F., O.F., E.F., and L.F., passed away in 2019.

2

 See N.T., 9/13/23, at 16, 

35. Parents have resided with G.F., O.F., E.F., L.M., L.F., W.M., and A.F. 

(collectively, “the Children”) on a family farm located in Warriors Mark 

Township, Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. Father works remotely in

information technology and Mother is a stay-at-home parent. See N.T.,

8/25/23, at 26. We also gather that Children have been homeschooled for 

the entirety of their lives. See id. at 24; N.T., 9/13/23, at 35-36.

Huntingdon County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the Agency”) 

first became involved with this family on June 17, 2023, when Father 

contacted the Agency to unsuccessfully request that G.F. be committed to a 

“juvenile facility” after she attempted to “run away” from Parents’ home on 

seven different occasions. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 3-4, 35. Thereafter, on June 

19, 2023, the Agency received a ChildLine report indicating that G.F. did not 

____________________________________________

2

 The natural father of L.M. and W.M. passed away in approximately 2015. 

See N.T., 8/25/23, at 28, 32. We also discern that Mother has a third adult 

child who also resides in Parents’ home. See id. at 32.
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feel safe in Parents’ home and alleging, inter alia, that Parents were restraining

her in the home using leather dog leashes and zip ties. See id. at 34-35.

That same day, CYS caseworker Christi Shawley responded to the family

residence. Initially, Parents believed that Ms. Shawley was visiting in

response to Father’s earlier request that G.F. be institutionalized. To that end, 

Parents initially responded favorably to Ms. Shawley’s presence and repeated 

their shared desire to have G.F. removed. See id. at 35. Parents’ demeanors

soured, however, when Ms. Shawley informed them of the Agency’s concerns. 

Thereafter, Parents refused to cooperate with Ms. Shawley’s investigation.

See id. at 4-6, 35-36. Specifically, they would not permit Ms. Shawley to 

enter their home or to speak with any of the Children. See id.

Ms. Shawley called upon the assistance of the Pennsylvania State Police 

(“the PSP”), who responded to the scene. Eventually, Ms. Shawley was able 

to extricate, examine, and interview G.F. for approximately fifteen minutes at 

a short distance from the home, but still within Parents’ line of sight and 

hearing. See id. at 36-37, 43. During this brief interaction, Ms. Shawley 

noted multiple bruises on G.F.’s right wrist, which G.F. confirmed were from a 

zip tie. See id. at 36. G.F. also substantiated that Parents were confining 

her in the home by using a leash connected to her belt loop. See id. G.F. 

also averred that Mother had struck her and given her a bloody nose while 

trying to prevent G.F. from running away during a previous incident. See id.

at 12, 37-38. Ms. Shawley also reported that many of G.F.’s answers 
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appeared to be “scripted” and “very hesitant,” which Ms. Shawley believed 

were caused by Parents’ close proximity. See id. at 37, 44-45.

On June 27, 2023, CYS filed a petition alleging that G.F. was a

dependent child. Robert M. Covell, Esquire, was appointed to serve as her 

guardian ad litem (“GAL”). The court held an initial dependency hearing with 

respect to G.F. on July 25, 2023. Therein, CYS requested and was granted a 

continuance in order to complete its investigation. See N.T., 7/25/23, at 1-

4. At the conclusion of this brief proceeding, the trial court granted an oral 

request advanced by Parents’ counsel and appointed Andrea Lehman, Esquire, 

to serve as G.F.’s legal interest counsel. See id. at 3.

On August 4, 2023, G.F. absconded from Parents’ home and began 

residing with her maternal grandparents (“Maternal Grandparents”) in 

Phillipsburg, Pennsylvania. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 11, 17. It also came to light 

that Parents were attempting to enroll G.F. in intervention programs for 

troubled teens located out of state. See id. at 12-14. Specifically, Father 

explained that Parents were “looking for a private solution for [G.F.] instead 

of allowing CYS to choose” what occurred. See id. at 13. These events were 

not contemporaneously disclosed to the trial court. See id. at 12-14.

On August 23, 2023, the Agency received a second ChildLine report 

alleging that Parents were utilizing inappropriate physical discipline and 

corporal punishment in the home. The same day, CYS was awarded

emergency protective custody of the Children. CYS caseworkers and PSP 
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troopers cooperated in removing the Children. During the removal, Mother 

extolled the Children to not speak with representatives of the Agency without 

Parents’ counsel present. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 40. On August 25, 2023, the 

trial court held a shelter care hearing and affirmed the Children’s placement.

3

During the shelter care hearing, Father denied using a leash or zip ties 

to restrain G.F. See N.T., 8/25/23, at 7-11. However, he invoked his privilege 

against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution when asked if anyone in the home had used zip ties or a leash to 

restrain G.F. See id. at 10-12. Father also invoked the Fifth Amendment 

when asked if he uses a “wooden paddle” to discipline the Children. See id. 

at 15. Father also admitted that Parents continued to refuse CYS access to 

his home and the Children up until their removal. See id. at 28.

Also on August 25, 2023, CYS filed dependency petitions with respect 

to O.F., E.F., L.M., L.F., W.M., and A.F. On September 13, 2023, the court 

held a consolidated hearing on the various petitions pertaining to the Children. 

Therein, G.F., E.F., L.F., Mother, and CYS director Kelvin Abrashoff testified. 

At the time of this hearing, G.F. was sixteen years old, E.F. was eleven years 

old, and L.F. was eight years old. They were interviewed in camera with the 

____________________________________________

3 G.F., L.F., W.M., and A.F. have been placed in kinship care with Maternal 

Grandparents. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 71. O.F., E.F., and L.M. were placed in 

foster care with the family’s pastor. See id.
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attorneys for each party present.4 Mother and Mr. Abrashoff testified in open 

court. The Agency also admitted the testimony adduced during the prior 

hearings. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 1. During her testimony, we note that Mother 

invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “when asked 

about the incident in which she struck G.F. in the process of stopping her from 

escaping over a fence, about her use of the dog leash on G.F., and about what 

forms of discipline she uses on the Children.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/23, 

at ¶ 44 (citing N.T., 9/13/23, at 58-59, 60, 66).

On September 15, 2023, the trial court filed orders of adjudication and 

disposition at the above-captioned docket numbers adjudicating the Children 

dependent within the meaning of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301–65

(“the Act”). Specifically, the trial court found that the Children were “without 

proper care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other 

care or control necessary for [their] physical, mental, or emotional health, or 

morals.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302; see also Orders of Adjudication, 9/15/23, at 2. 

Additionally, the trial court determined that G.F. was also dependent due to 

having “committed a specific act or acts of habitual disobedience of the 

reasonable and lawful commands of [her] parent, guardian, or other 

custodian” and “being ungovernable and found to be in need of care, 

____________________________________________

4

 Attorney Covell was appointed to serve as GAL for the remaining Children.
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treatment, or supervision.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302; see also Order of 

Adjudications, 9/15/23, at 2.

On October 12, 2023, Father filed separate, timely notices of appeal 

with respect to the adjudications concerning G.F., O.F., E.F., L.F., and A.F. 

The same day, Mother filed separate, timely notices of appeal with respect to 

the adjudications respecting L.M. and W.M. Parents also submitted timely 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On November 21, 2023, the trial court filed an opinion 

jointly explaining its rationale pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii).

Parents have raised the following issues for our consideration:5

1. Did the use of corporal punishment exceed parental 

privilege or contribute to mental or physical harm to the 

[C]hildren?

2. Whether the petition and order for general protective 

custody was based on a faulty legal and factual premise?

3. Were the [C]hildren without proper care or control, 

subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or 

control necessary for their physical, mental[,] or emotional 

health or morals?

4. Whether an in-home dependency or general protective 

services would have been sufficient to address any concerns 

that the court and the [A]gency had regarding the family’s 

disciplinary practices, thus alleviating the need for removal 

of the [C]hildren from the family home?

____________________________________________

5

 Although Parents initiated separate appeals and have submitted 

individualized briefs and reproduced records, those submissions are 

functionally identical. See Mother’s Brief at 2; Father’s Brief at 2. To avoid 

confusion, we collectively refer to and cite to “Parents’ Brief” in this writing.
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Parents’ Brief at 4 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).

Our general standard of review in this context is well-established:

Our scope of review in child dependency cases is limited in a 

fundamental manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of 

the trial court. We accord great weight to the hearing judge’s 

findings of fact because the judge is in the best position to observe 

and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses. Given this unique 

posture, we will not overrule the findings of the trial court if they 

are supported by competent evidence[.]

Interest of R.C.-G., 292 A.3d 582, 587 (Pa. Super. 2023). We are not 

required, however, to accept the trial court’s evidentiary inferences or 

conclusions of law. See id. Overall, it is this Court’s responsibility “to ensure 

that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge 

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.” In re R.W.J., 826 

A.2d 10, 12 (Pa. Super. 2003).

In pertinent part, the Act defines a “dependent child” as a child who “is 

without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by 

law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional 

health, or morals.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. “A determination that there is a lack 

of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by 

the parent, guardian, or other custodian that places the health, safety, or 

welfare of the child at risk[.]” Id. In order to adjudicate a child dependent, 

“the court must determine that the above definition has been met by clear 

and convincing evidence.” In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831, 835 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty 
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and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re J.C., 5 

A.3d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. 2010) (cleaned up)

With these basic legal parameters in mind, we turn to Parents’ first claim

for relief. Therein, they assert that the trial court’s dependency findings

violated their “right and privilege” to utilize physical corporal punishment 

under Pennsylvania law. Parents’ Brief at 22 (“Absent a substantial risk of 

death, disfigurement, serious bodily injury, gross degradation, extreme pain 

or mental distress, Pennsylvania accepts corporal punishment as a permissible

means of child discipline, provided, of course, that the parent does not act

with malicious intent in punishing the child.”). Parents argue “[t]he Agency 

did not prove malicious intent in this case, or that [Parents] were acting out 

in anger against the [C]hildren when imposing disciplinary measures.” Id. 

In support of this contention, Parents rely upon a number of cases and 

statutes concerning the parameters of “child abuse” as defined pursuant to

the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”),

6

the Protection from Abuse Act 

(“PFAA”),7 and the Crimes Code.8 See Interest of J.H., 293 A.3d 606, at 

*3-*6 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum) (determining whether 

____________________________________________

6 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-88.

7 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-22.

8 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9546.
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parents had committed “child abuse” as defined at 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1) of 

the CPSL); Chronister ex rel. Morrison v. Brenneman, 742 A.2d 190, (Pa. 

Super. 1999) (considering whether a single incident of corporal punishment 

administered by a parent constituted “abuse” as defined at 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6102(a) of the PFAA); Boland v. Leska, 454 A.2d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. 1982)

(adjudicating in a custody action whether two reported incidents of a parent 

striking their child rose to the level of “child abuse” as defined by the Crimes 

Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 509(1)). Parents have also invoked 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6304(d), which provides that “nothing” in the CPSL “shall be construed to 

restrict the generally recognized existing rights of parents to use reasonable 

force on or against their children for the purposes of supervision, control and 

discipline of their children.”

We find Parents’ legal arguments on this particular point to be inapt. 

The instant case does not implicate criminal charges advanced under the 

Crime Code or findings of abuse rendered pursuant to the provisions and 

definitions applicable to proceedings under the PFAA or the CPSL. Indeed, 

Parents’ own brief acknowledges as much. See Parents’ Brief at 21 (“The 

petitions filed in these cases did not allege child abuse or seek a finding of 

abuse.”). At bedrock, Parents are essentially contending that the trial court 

was required to conclude that Parents had committed “abuse” within the 

meaning of these various additional statutes in order to adjudicate the 

Children dependent. We must disagree.
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Our case law undercuts Parents’ argument. In dependency proceedings, 

it is generally true that the trial court’s evaluation and the definitions of 

dependency pursuant to the Act are focused upon the behavior of the parent 

vis-à-vis the child. See In re L.J., 691 A.2d 520, 525 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

However, this Court has held that the Act “does not require proof that the 

parent has committed or condoned abuse, but merely evidence that the child 

is without proper parental care.” In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citing In re R.R., 686 A.2d 1316, 1317-18 (Pa. Super. 1996)). 

Moreover, “[a] finding of dependency is not the same thing as a determination 

of the best interests of the child[.]” Matter of Jackson, 448 A.2d 1087, 1090 

(Pa. Super. 1982). Rather, the legal standard for an adjudication of 

dependency is whether a child is without “proper parental care,” defined as 

“care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health or 

morals.” R.R., 686 A.2d at 1317-18 (emphasis in original). We acknowledge

that our review will unavoidably entail an examination and assessment of the 

reasonableness of Parents’ use of corporal punishment in their home. 

However, Parents have not provided any arguable support for the proposition 

that their use of such parenting methods must rise to the level of child abuse 

in order to declare the Children dependent. Cf. R.P., 686 A.2d at 1317-18.

Based upon the foregoing, we decline Parents’ invitation to review the 

trial court’s findings under the inapposite statutory definitions noted above. 

Since this appeal does not implicate or touch upon any findings of child abuse 
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pursuant to the CPSL, the PFAA, or the Crimes Code, we will confine our review 

of the trial court’s holdings to the legal standards governing dependency. See 

id. Therefore, no relief is due with respect to Parents’ first claim for relief.

Parents’ second claim for relief alleges that the trial court should have 

dismissed the Agency’s dependency petitions concerning the Children prior to 

holding a hearing. See Parents’ Brief at 28 (“The factual and legal allegations 

were insufficient even as alleged to support the findings of dependency or 

result in removal of the [C]hildren for [sic] the home. . . . [T]he court . . . 

should not have proceeded to hearing the Agency’s claims that the [C]hildren 

were dependent as alleged.”). Tellingly, however, Parents have failed to 

provide any citations to pertinent legal authorities, or to the certified record,

in support of this particular argument. See id. at 26-28. Accordingly, Parents 

have waived this claim for lack of development. See C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 

A.3d 1272, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“It is well-established that the failure to 

develop an argument with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent authority 

results in waiver of that issue on appeal.”) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)). 

Even assuming, arguendo, that Parents had not waived this issue, we 

note that the dependency petitions filed by the Agency noted concerns 

regarding inappropriate physical discipline that was resulting in injuries to at 

least two children, excessive corporal punishment, and Parents’ continued

inability to control the actions of the Children, i.e., G.F.’s persistent attempts 

to run away from the family home. See Dependency Petition, 6/7/23, at 3; 
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Dependency Petition, 8/25/23, at 3-5.

9

 As discussed further infra, 

substantiated allegations of this type are sufficient to establish dependency.

In their third claim for relief, Parents assert that the evidence adduced 

by the Agency was insufficient to establish that the Children are dependent as 

defined in the Act.

10/11

 See Parents’ Brief at 15 (“The parents in this case 

____________________________________________

9

 We note that the dependency petitions filed with respect to all the Children, 

except for G.F., were substantially identical.

10 We note that Parents have essentially conceded that G.F. was dependent 

due to her ungovernable behavior. See Parents’ Brief at 17 (“The parents did 

not contest the fact that [G.F.] was dependent on the basis of her habitual 

disobedience and running away from home.”). On the basis of this admission, 

alone, we could affirm the order adjudicating G.F. dependent. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6302. As discussed further infra, however, it behooves us to discuss the 

trial court’s findings as to lack of proper parental care and control.

11

 Parents also assert that the trial court should not have been permitted to 

consider their refusals to cooperate with the Agency’s investigation or permit 

access to their home. See Parents’ Brief at 18 (“The lack of cooperation and 

the parents’ reliance on their constitutional rights should not be considered in 

favor of a finding of dependency.”). A significant portion of their brief is 

devoted to a discussion of Interest of Y.W.-B., 265 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2021). 

See Parents’ Brief at 18-19. Therein, our Supreme Court determined that the 

protections of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution apply in the context of “searches 

conducted in civil child neglect proceedings, which have the same potential 

for unreasonable government intrusion into the sanctity of the home” as 

similar searches conducted during criminal investigations. Id. at 627-28. 

Specifically, Parents reference Y.W.-B. by way of arguing that it was improper 

for the trial court to take note of Parents’ lack of cooperation with the 

investigations conducted by CYS. See Parents’ Brief at 18 (“[Parents’] 

reliance on their constitutional rights should not be considered in favor of a 

finding of dependency.”). There is no dispute that Parents invoked their 

Fourth Amendment rights in refusing CYS access to their home. Nonetheless, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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were providing proper parental care to their children and they should not have 

been adjudicated [dependent].”). We must disagree.

Overall, the trial court concluded that the “the facts show that [Parents] 

have gone beyond the parental privilege to educate and discipline their 

children . . . and created a home environment that can only be characterized 

as physically, psychologically, and emotionally abusive.” Trial Court Opinion, 

11/21/23, at 1-2. In particular, the trial court found the testimony of G.F. to 

be credible and compelling, while finding Parents’ assertions to be largely

incredible and self-serving. See id. at 1-42. Our review reveals that there is 

ample support for the trial court’s findings as to dependency.

As indicated by the trial court, the testimony of G.F. concerning Parents’ 

behavior following the death of G.F.’s biological mother paints a troubling 

picture of the dramatic changes to the family dynamic. In particular, G.F. 

____________________________________________

Parents’ reliance upon this case is unavailing. The holding in Y.W.-B. solely 

concerned whether there was probable cause to support the issuance of an 

order compelling a parent to permit a search of their home. See Y.W.-B., 

265 A.3d at 635 (“Mother’s constitutional rights were violated. The order 

compelling her cooperation with a governmental intrusion into her home was 

deficient for want of probable cause.”). 

In sharp contrast, CYS did not request any such directive in the instant case, 

and the trial court explicitly declined to order Parents to submit to a search of 

their home. See N.T., 7/25/23, at 2 (“I’m not going to tell [Parents] to allow 

the Agency in the home.”). Thus, Parents’ invocation of their Fourth 

Amendment rights successfully precluded a search of their home. Accordingly, 

Y.W.-B. does not provide any arguable basis for relief. Overall, Parents have 

provided no legal authority in support of their bald suggestion that a trial court 

is precluded from considering a parent’s lack of cooperation with CYS 

investigations in conducting a civil dependency adjudication. No relief is due.
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reported that Parents’ use of physical corporal punishment in the home quickly

shifted from a rare occurrence prior to Father’s marriage to Mother, to a daily

ritual afterwards. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 14-17. Specifically, G.F. reported 

that the younger children—L.F., W.M., L.M., and A.F.—were beaten on their 

bare buttocks with a wooden paddle for every infraction that they committed

during the course of the day. See id. These beatings were severe enough 

that the wooden paddle broke in use. See id. at 17, 44, 48-49. Parents both 

participate in administering punishment, with Mother spanking the Children in 

the mornings and Father spanking them in the evening. See id. at 15, 47. 

In particular, L.F.’s testimony was revealing concerning the frequency and 

timbre of the physical discipline meted out by Parents. She reported that 

Parents spanked her “constantly” for “disobeying” them. See N.T., 9/13/23, 

at 43-44. L.F. also testified that she regularly suffered bruising from these 

beatings.12 See id. Both G.F. and L.F. reported that Parents also had warned 

the Children not to tell anyone about their use of corporal punishment in the 

home. See id. at 13, 45-46.

The older children—G.F., E.F., and O.F.—were not punished in this 

fashion due to their age. Instead, they were forced to undertake strenuous 

physical exercise at Parents’ direction and had their free time restricted in 

____________________________________________

12

 It is unclear whether Parents ceased using physical discipline upon L.F. 

once they realized they were bruising her, as the testimony was inconsistent 

on this point. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 44-47, 53.
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half-hour increments for every incident of misbehavior.13 Both G.F. and E.F. 

confirmed the use of these discipline tactics by Parents. See id. at 31, 52-

56. Specifically, G.F. averred she had been forced to do as many as 300 pushups in a single day, with up to one hundred repetitions at one time. See id.

at 31. G.F. also detailed that Mother had forced her to do sets of push-ups 

with 40-pound paving stones placed upon her back on multiple occasions. See 

id. at 18. Finally, G.F. also reported that Mother had singled out G.F. for 

specialized punishment by intentionally destroying G.F.’s possessions from her 

birth mother. See id. at 33-34. Mother admitted that she had disposed of

“books and movies” that were important to G.F. See id. at 68.

During their testimony, G.F., E.F., and L.F. each described the scope of 

what qualified as “misbehavior” in Parents’ home as being quite broad and 

loosely defined. Specifically, E.F. explained that he had been punished for 

behaviors ranging from “not following directions or forgetting something or 

not asking questions and doing my own thing.” See id. at 52-53. In her 

testimony, L.F. seemed largely unable to fully understand why she was 

physically punished by Parents so frequently. See id. at 48 (“It just constantly 

happens.”). Finally, G.F. averred that she and her siblings were punished for 

____________________________________________

13

 G.F. and E.F. both explained that Parents provided the Children with two 

hours of free time per day, which was reduced in half-hour increments based 

on every incident of “bad” behavior. See id. at 31-32, 52-56. G.F. averred 

that Parents had informed her that she would have no free time to herself for 

at least “a year” and potentially as long as two years, at the time of her 

removal by the trial court. See id. at 32, 36.
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“[n]ot following instructions, not working promptly or diligently, being rude to 

another sibling like a normal young child would.” See id. at 15.

G.F.’s testimony reflects that she began trying to run away from Parents’ 

home because she no longer felt safe in Parents’ care:

14

____________________________________________

14

 During the course of these proceedings, G.F. submitted a letter to the trial 

court wherein she attempted to retract some of her allegations concerning 

Parents. See Parents’ Exhibit 13. G.F. explained, however, that she had only 

written the letter at Mother’s urging. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 26 (“My mother 

– my stepmother was the one who suggested it to me.”). G.F. also claimed

the letter was not an accurate reflection of her beliefs and thoughts:

Q. You wrote a letter to the [j]udge. Do you recall doing that?

A. Yes.

Q. And it’s titled dear presiding judge. How did you come up 

from [sic] saying dear presiding judge?

A. I asked my parents what I should begin with because I really 

didn’t know.

Q. Okay. Are the rest of the words in that letters yours, 

theirs[,] or something else?

A. Something else. It was both. I was the one who typed it in 

but [Mother] overviewed it and told me – she told me to take out 

a few things and to change a few things and gave me some ideas 

of what I should say.

Q. Is that reflective of – is it true as it is written there?

A. Not completely.

N.T., 9/13/23, at 24-25. G.F. further explained that the language in the letter 

was dictated by Parents. Specifically, G.F. testified that the letter’s troubling 

statements that she was “addicted” to stealing, lying, and self-harm were 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Q. Why do you keep running away?

A. Because I felt like something was wrong and I needed to tell 

someone but I was so confused that because I was hearing so 

many different things from different people, I felt like I was being 

wrong but my parents were telling me I wasn’t [sic] and I didn’t 

understand. I had no other way to tell anyone because I had no 

access to the phone. I don’t have a phone myself, so I tried to 

get out the best I could. I wasn’t allowed to talk to my 

grandparents about anything in private, so I felt like I had no other 

way.

Q. Did you feel safe?

A. That I was also confused about because I didn’t understand 

the difference between abuse and discipline because my parents 

were saying one thing and other people were saying another, so 

in my opinion I didn’t feel safe but my parents were telling me I 

was.

Id. at 12-13. 

Parents’ response was to enact stricter and harsher methods of control. 

Specifically, Parents began to use leather dog leashes attached to G.F.’s belt 

loops to restrict her freedom of movement inside and outside the home by 

tethering her to large objects, or to her older siblings. See id. at 9-10, 56-

57. G.F. testified that Parents also utilized a “bed monitor” in the home, which 

____________________________________________

mere references to G.F. eating food from the family’s pantry outside of 

established mealtimes and her running away from home in order to escape 

Parents’ excessive use of corporal punishment. See id. at 26-28. For her 

part, Mother flatly denied these allegations and claimed she had no 

involvement in G.F.’s drafting and sending of the letter. See id. at 65.

Instantly, the trial court did not credit the averments in this letter and 

concluded that G.F. had not drafted it of her own free will. Since this 

conclusion is supported by the record, we may not disturb it.
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would sound an alarm if she left her bed before the morning. N.T., 9/13/23, 

at 30-31. G.F. explained that the door to her room was also locked. See id.

at 31. These countermeasures prevented G.F. from using the restroom during 

the night without seeking the aid of Mother’s adult daughter, who held the 

key. See id. at 31. During the day, Parents’ also began to lock G.F. inside of 

the family’s chicken coop for long periods of time while the Children were 

working outside on the farm. See id. at 33. Parents were also attempting to 

fit G.F. with a GPS monitoring device using zip ties on G.F.’s wrists at the time 

of her removal from their care. See id. at 21-22. G.F. persisted in her

attempts to flee, which resulted in Mother physically striking and giving G.F. 

a bloody nose on one occasion. See id. at 18.

Critically, Parents’ testimony does nothing to refute the Children’s 

averments concerning the use of excessive discipline in their home. As noted 

above, both Mother and Father invoked their privilege against selfincrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment when questioned specifically 

concerning the use of corporal punishment and extent of discipline utilized in 

the home. See N.T., 8/25/23, at 7-12; N.T., 9/13/23, at 58-59, 60, 66. It is 

well-established that, “[w]hile a defendant in a civil case may invoke the 

privilege of the [F]ifth [A]mendment against self-incrimination, and invocation 

of the privilege may not be used against him in any way in a subsequent 

criminal prosecution, the trial court in a civil case may draw any adverse 

inference which is reasonable from the assertion of the privilege.” Sawko v. 
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Sawko, 625 A.2d 692, 695 (Pa. Super. 1993). While Parents’ were certainly 

entitled to invoke their constitutional privileges against self-incrimination, 

Pennsylvania courts are equally empowered to draw an adverse inference 

from such an assertion in a civil proceeding such as this one.

Finally, we also note that Mother’s testimony reflects that the Children 

have not received regular medical and dental services since at least the time 

of Parents’ marriage. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 60-61 (averring that the Children 

do not have “regular dental checkups” or “standard medical checkups”).

Taken together, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of law in the 

trial court’s findings of dependency in the cases sub judice. The record reflects 

that Parents rely upon an excessively harsh and unreasonably restrictive 

regime of corporal punishment and discipline in their unsuccessful attempts 

to strictly control the Children. While G.F. was unquestionably singled out for 

the worst of Parents’ misbehavior to the exclusion of the others, our case law 

clearly provides that Parents’ unreasonable actions with respect to a single 

child may have definitive and serious implications for all of the children in a 

family. See, e.g., In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870, 872-73 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Moreover, the record indicates that Parents have failed to ensure that the 

Children enjoy regular medical care during their tender years. 

Based upon the foregoing, no relief is due on Parent’s third claim. 

Accordingly, we turn to Parents’ final issue, which challenges the trial court’s 

decision to remove the Children from Parents’ home. See Parents’ Brief at 33 
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(“[T]he court did not adequately consider remedies for the [C]hildren other 

than placement outside the home[.]”). As framed, Parents’ claims facially 

implicate the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (“Disposition of dependent 

child”) and Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(a) (“Dispositional Findings Before Removal From 

Home”). However, Parents’ arguments do not discuss these provisions with 

any specificity, but instead merely seek to re-litigate the various aspects of 

their claims for relief already detailed above. See Parents’ Brief at 29-34. We 

discern that Parents are simply repeating their arguments that the trial court 

should not have adjudicated the Children dependent in the first place. See 

id. at 33 (“This matter could have been resolved short of a finding of 

dependency.”). Based upon the discussions already set forth above, we 

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s holdings.

Overall, the trial court’s findings are well-supported by competent 

evidence. Thus, we affirm the orders adjudicating the Children dependent.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2024