### No. 85-163 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PEARL E. MARTIN, Petitioner and Respondent, and ROBERT M. 

### MARTIN, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable John

### M. McCarvel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Baiz & 

### Olson; ThomasA. 

### Baiz, Great Falls,Montana

For Respondent: Alexander & 

### Baucus; Nancy P. Cory, Great Falls,Montana

Submitted on Briefs: July 25, 1985 Decided: 

### September 10, 1985

Filed: 

## SEP10

# 1985Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of the Court. The marital estate of Robert i?!. Martin and Pearl E. Martin was distributed in the Eighth Judicial District Court by decree dated January 31, 1985. Robert Martin appeals, alleging that the property division 

### is inequitable and results in substantial injustice to him. F7e disagree and affirmthe decree of the

### District Court. Robert and Pearl 

### were married on August 1-2, 1972. She 

### ispresently 53 years of age. He 

### is 60 years of age. Though both parties had children by prior marriages, no chi-Idren



### wereborn of theirmarriage. Pearl 

### isa 1-egalsecretary. Hergross income 

### is $14,800

a year, with take home pay of $844 per month. Her expenses total $1,430 per month. Robert owns and operates Great Falls Cleaning Service. His net monthly income 

### is approximately $1200, excluding tax consequences from the depreciation of his business. His personal expenses total $850 per month. The parties testified and the trialjudge found that the parties contributed their respective incomes totheir joint benefit and that the parties' nonfinancial contributions to themarriage

### were equal. The trial judge found the net marital estate toconsist of the following: REAL PROPERTY Family residence

# - 2271 Beech Drive, Great Falls, Montana. (Equity increase sincedate of marriage). $21,600.00 Rental Property 

## - 807 and 809 6th Street SW, Great Falls, Montana 46,831.80 Residence

# - 1546Meadowlark Drive, Great Falls, Montana

### PERSONAL PROPERTY 1978 Ford Van 1976 Ford LTD 1966 GMCVan 1983 Buick Stocks and bonds Furniture,etc. Petitioner's IRAAcct. Respondent's LC1Acct. Petitioner's Gov't. pension Respondent's savings acct. Respondent's checking account Petitioner's checking account Petitioner's savings account Respondent's IRA account Cash in safe (American) (Canadian) Husband's coin collection Joint coin collection Finding of Fact

### VII. Notably, the trial judge omitted Robert's cleaning business from the net marital estate, choosing instead to permit Robert to retain it in its entirety. The business is worth $81,000: $27,500 for the building; $8,500 for the equipment; and $45,000 for its good will. The trial judge divided the net marital. state 

### between the parties as follows: PETITIONER Residence

# - 1546 Meadowlark Drive Stocks and bonds 1983 Buick Petitioner's IRAAccount Petitioner's Government Pension Petitioner's Checking Account Petitioner's Savings Account Cash in safe (American) (Canadian) Coin collection Cash (tobe paid by the Respondent within sixty (60)daysRESPONDENT Residence

# - 2211 Beech Drive Rental

# - 807 & 809 6th St. SW Personal property

# - 2211 Beech Drive 1978 Ford Van 1976 Ford LTD 1966 GMC Van Respondent's LC1 Account Respondent's SavingsAccount Respondent's Checking Account Respondent's IRAAccount Respondent's Coin collection Finding of Fact VIII. Robert objects tohis $45,000 cash obligation toPearl, claiming that Pearl then receives 61% of the net marital estate while he 

### receives only 39%. However, Robert failsto consider thathe was allowed toretain.hiscleaningbusiness, despite Pearl's substantial contributions to 

### its success. The Court notes that the Petitioner 

### set up a bookkeeping system for the business, prepared income taxreturns and answered phone calls, filled in for the secretary's vacations for 11 years and saved some business accounts in 1978. Petitioner terminated her employment with the law firm of Alexander & Baucus in 1978 toaccomodate [sic] the Respondent. As a result she lost fringe benefits and 

### a Keogh Plan interest, having been employed by that firm since 1961. The Court notes thisbecause she 

### is not being awarded any interest in that business. Finding of Fact IX. This finding supports the $45,000 payment. Robert also complains that the trial judge failed to properly consider the $11,000 inproperty he brought into the marriage and the $16,000 he inherited from his parents. Again 

### we must disagree. The $11,000 consists of the cash value of an insurance policy on Robert's lifeand theprofit realized when Robert sold rentalproperty he brought intothe marriage. Robert testified attrialthat these proceeds

### were used topurchase the rental.property owned by the parties atthe

### timeof theirdissolution. That property was included in Robert's portion of themarital estate. There 

### is no specific rule concerning how an inherited asset 

### is to be treated when marital property 

### is divided. "Each case has to be decided on 

### its own facts." Vivian v. Vivian (2978), 1.78 Mont. 341, 344, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074. However, 

### 5 40-4-202(1), MCA, does require consideration of the "contributionsof the other spouse tothemarriage

# ..."

Pearl and Robert testified that Pearl assisted inthe upkeep of the home, the rental property and the business. She willingly quit a long 

### term job, forfeiting substantial retirement security, in order 

### to assist her husband in improving his own life. Again, 

### we find no abuse of discretionby thetrial.judge. In determining whether the trial court abused 

### its discretion, thereviewing court does not substitute 

### its judgment for that of the trial court. The standard for review 

### is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. [Citationsommitted.] Creon v. Creon (1981), 195 Mont. 254, 257, 635 P.2d 1308, 1309. Not only has the trialjudge not acted arbitrarilynor exceeded the bounds of reason, he has achieved a well-reasoned, exceedingly fair distribution of the marital property. Affirmed.

### We 

### concur: 

# .-' hief 

### Justice