IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA LABOR DEPARTMENT, 

Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

SOFRITA LLC,

Respondent Employer.

No. 1 CA-IC 21-0033 

Special Action - Industrial Commission

No. CL-1819-0292

The Honorable Jonathan Hauer, Administrative Law Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Scott J. Cooley

Counsel for Petitioner

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Gaetano J. Testini

Counsel for Respondent

Schumacher Law Firm, Fountain Hills

By Douglas M. Schumacher

Counsel for Respondent Employer

FILED 6-16-2022
ICA LABOR v. SOFRITA LLC

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Arizona law forbids some businesses from hiring children for

some work, designated as too hazardous by our legislature. At issue here

is a child labor law that forbids “retail food [] establishment[s]” from hiring 

minors under the age of 16 to “work in, about, or in connection with [both] 

cooking and baking.” See A.R.S. § 23-232(A)(8)(b). The Industrial 

Commission of Arizona, which enforces our child labor laws, presently

interprets these words to forbid Arizona restaurants from hiring those 

children for any job that requires them to walk through a kitchen. An 

administrative law judge rejected that interpretation. So do we.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Sofrita is a family-owned Latin American restaurant in 

downtown Fountain Hills. In September 2018, an anonymous tipster

advised the Industrial Commission that Sofrita hired children “under the 

age of 16 [to] work[] long hours with no breaks” for jobs requiring them to 

be “around [or] in the kitchen.”

¶3 The Industrial Commission formally notified Sofrita of 

“possible violation[s] of state youth employment laws,” and asked the 

owner for a list of restaurant employees, including their ages, dates of 

employment, type of work and shift schedules. The owner provided the 

information by email, revealing that the restaurant had three employees 

under 16 years old; each worked as a hostess near the front door, greeting 

the diners who entered.

¶4 Six months later, the Industrial Commission sent an 

investigator to visit Sofrita and interview its owner. Asked about the young 

hostesses, the owner insisted they had no hand in cooking, baking or food 

preparation. Asked how the young hostesses interacted with the kitchen, 

the owner said they occasionally (1) bussed tables, which required them to 

transport dirty dishes from the dining room to a busser’s tub “just inside

the kitchen entrance,” away from the stoves or ovens, and (2) sometimes 
ICA LABOR v. SOFRITA LLC

Opinion of the Court

3

had to enter the restaurant through a back door, mostly for big events,

forcing them to walk through the kitchen to staff their workspace at the 

front. Based on that, the investigator informed the owner that Sofrita had 

broken Arizona law, advising the young hostesses “cannot be in the 

kitchen,” “for any reason,” “even if they are passing through to clock in,” 

and “should not [] enter through the kitchen at all.” 

¶5 The investigator recommended that the Industrial 

Commission charge the restaurant with four state child labor violations; 

three under A.R.S. § 23-232(A)(8)(b) for “cooking and baking,” and one 

under A.R.S. § 23-233(A)(3) for shift limits. 

¶6 Accepting the recommendation, the Industrial Commission 

issued a cease-and-desist order to Sofrita, imposing the maximum $1,000 

civil penalty. Of this amount, $800 was for “underage workers passing 

though the kitchen in close proximity to cooking and baking equipment,” 

and $200 was “for not providing any timekeeping records to rule out a 

violation” of A.R.S. § 23-233(A)(3).

¶7 Sofrita requested a hearing. An administrative law judge 

heard the evidence and argument. The investigator testified. She offered 

her interpretation of the relevant statute, Section 23-232, and its phrase “in, 

about, or in connection with.” The investigator described those words as

“a very important part of all of our youth labor investigations.” Asked 

what they meant, she answered “it means [that minors] may not . . . 

perform[] the duties that are related to prohibited occupations or 

equipment, but if [the minors] are in the area and around the equipment or 

the occupation, that still qualifies as a violation.”

¶8 The ALJ rejected the Industrial Commission’s interpretation 

and argument, holding that Section 23-232 did not regulate “casual 

encounters [between minors and] the kitchen space.” The ALJ compared 

such sporadic contact to four exceptions listed in the statute: “soda 

fountains, lunch counters, snack bars, and cafeteria serving counters”

where “cooking and baking activities presumably occur.” The ALJ also 

found the Industrial Commission had an “inadequate factual basis” for the 

civil penalty. As a result, the ALJ modified the cease-and-desist order and 

vacated the civil penalty.

¶9 The Industrial Commission petitions for special action 

review. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 23-237(C), -951(A); see also Ariz.

R. P. Spec. Act. 10.
ICA LABOR v. SOFRITA LLC

Opinion of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶10 The Commission insists this court “gives great weight” to the 

Commission’s interpretation of state child labor laws because the 

Commission enforces them. We disagree. This argument sounds like 

Chevron deference, which died under Arizona law in 2018. See A.R.S. § 12-

910(F). The legislature now directs that Arizona courts “shall” interpret all 

statutes and all agency rules “without deference to any previous 

determination that may have been made on the question by the agency.” 

A.R.S. § 12-910(F).

A. Relevant Statute

¶11 We interpret Arizona statutes de novo, seeking to determine

and achieve the legislature’s intent, which is most obvious from the 

statute’s plain and unambiguous language. See Matter of ABB Tr., 251 Ariz. 

313, 317–18, ¶¶ 18, 22 (App. 2021).

¶12 This appeal requires us to interpret Section 23-232, which 

forbids Arizona restaurants from hiring children under the age of sixteen 

to perform a list of hazardous activities. See A.R.S. § 23-232. The statute 

lists several “[p]rohibited employments for persons under the age of 

sixteen,” and then catalogues the “activities” for which these children 

cannot be hired:

[A] person shall not employ or allow a person under the age 

of sixteen years to work in, about or in connection with: 

8. Any of the following activities in a retail food . . . 

establishment[, including] (b) [c]ooking and baking, except at 

soda fountains, lunch counters, snack bars or cafeteria serving 

counters.

See A.R.S. § 23-232 (A)(8)(b) (emphasis supplied).

¶13 The Commission urges that Section 23-232 prohibits food 

retailers from authorizing “underage” employees to “occasionally pass[] 

through the kitchen and plac[e] dishes into a tub at the bussers’ station.” 

As support, the Commission maintains uninterrupted focus on five words

in the statute: “in, about or in connection with.” But those words have no 

meaning unless tethered to the actual prohibited activities: “cooking and 

baking.” Indeed, Section 23-232(8)(b) never mentions the word “kitchen” 

or says that location is off limits, and instead focuses on two activities—

cooking and baking. And the legislature knows how to craft location-based 
ICA LABOR v. SOFRITA LLC

Opinion of the Court

5

restrictions, which appear elsewhere in the same statute. Compare A.R.S. 

23-232(9)(d) (“in a pen”), (9)(f) (“from a ladder”), (9)(g) (“on a tractor”), 

(9)(h) (“inside a fruit storage area”). Nothing in the statute supports the 

Commission’s reading that employers must prevent minors from entering 

the kitchen to drop dishes in a busser’s tub. See Matter of ABB Tr., 251 Ariz. 

at 318, ¶ 25 (“[T]hat argument is not supported by the statute’s plain 

language, and this court ordinarily resists reading words or requirements 

into a statute.”).

¶14 Returning to the plain language, Section 23-232 prohibits 

retail food establishments from hiring children under 16 for “cooking and 

baking” activities. The legislature never defined “cooking” or “baking,” so 

we use the “common meaning” of those words, Ariz. Biltmore Hotel Villas 

Condos. Ass’n v. Conlon Grp. Ariz., LLC, 249 Ariz. 326, 332, ¶ 26 (App. 2020). 

According to one popular dictionary, the word “cooking” means “to 

prepare food for eating by applying heat,” and the word “baking” means 

“to cook food with dry heat, especially in an oven.” See American Heritage 

Dictionary (5th ed. 2020). Properly defined, then, Section 23-232 prohibits 

Arizona restaurants from hiring children under 16 years old “to work in, 

about or in connection with” the heating of food, “especially in an oven.” 

It does not forbid employees under 16 years old from walking in the 

kitchen.

¶15 That interpretation is confirmed by the statute’s exceptions. 

See Cal. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 416, 419–20, ¶ 11 

(App. 2004) (declining to construe the “use in connection with” provision 

“so broadly that it would eliminate [the statute’s] exclusion”). In particular, 

Section 23-232 carves out “soda fountains, lunch counters, snack bars or 

cafeteria serving counters,” which presumably have kitchens, too. See

A.R.S. § 23-232 (A)(8)(b).

¶16 Federal regulations also undermine the Commission’s broad 

interpretation. Arizona modeled its child labor laws on their federal 

counterparts, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See A.R.S. § 23-410(1) 

(“propos[ing] adoption of national consensus standards or federal 

standards” for employment conditions and occupational safety). The FLSA 

permits minors to do “kitchen work,” including food preparation and 

cleaning of kitchen equipment, and even to “occasionally enter freezers to 

retrieve items.” 29 C.F.R. § 570.34(i).

¶17 The centerpiece of the Commission’s argument is a UCLA law 

review article, which it offers to “explain[] why broad language was used.” 

By using passive voice, the Commission leaves unclear who used the 
ICA LABOR v. SOFRITA LLC

Opinion of the Court

6

“broad language,” but we assume it means the Arizona legislature. We are 

unmoved. The law review article never mentions the Arizona legislature 

or “cooking” and “baking,” the words used by our legislature to delineate 

the restricted activities. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor 

Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory 

Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983 (1999) (discussing neither 

Arizona’s child labor laws nor cooking and baking restrictions in general). 

We affirm the ALJ’s interpretation and deny relief.

B. Civil Fine

¶18 The Commission next contends the ALJ erroneously vacated 

the $1,000 civil penalty imposed on Sofrita. We disagree. First, the record 

contains no evidence that Sofrita violated Section 23-232(8)(b). Second, the 

Commission has cited no authority to fine Sofrita for “not providing any 

timekeeping records to rule out a violation” of Section 23-233(A)(3). The 

legislature authorized civil penalties only when the Commission “has 

reasonable cause to believe that any person is violating” Section 23-

233(A)(3), which does not address the timely production of time sheets 

upon demand. See A.R.S. § 23-236.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm the ALJ’s order.