IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–0356

Filed January 16, 2015

Amended March 27, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF STEVEN MICHAEL GUST AND LINDA 

LEANN GUST

Upon the Petition of

STEVEN MICHAEL GUST,

Appellant,

And Concerning

LINDA LEANN GUST,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. 

Hanson, Judge.

An ex-spouse seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming a district court order requiring him to pay spousal support 

indefinitely. AFFIRMED.

Kodi A. Brotherson of Becker and Brotherson Law Firm, Sac City, 

for appellant.

Michael B. Oliver of Oliver Law Firm, P.C., Windsor Heights, for 

appellee.
2

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider the duration and amount of a spousal 

support award in a dissolution of marriage. Based on the evidence at 

trial, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay $1400 per month in 

spousal support, increasing to $2000 per month upon the termination of 

child support, for life. The trial court also divided the assets of the 

parties approximately equally, rejected a dissipation-of-assets claim 

raised by the respondent, and declined to award the respondent trial 

attorneys’ fees. 

The petitioner appealed and the respondent cross-appealed. We 

transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the order of 

the district court. We granted further review.

On further review, we limit our review to questions arising from the 

award of spousal support. On the other issues raised in the petitioner’s 

appeal and the respondent’s cross-appeal, the order of the district court

as upheld by the court of appeals is affirmed.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In this case, we consider the spousal support award made by the 

district court in connection with the dissolution of Steven and Linda 

Gust’s marriage after trial in May of 2012. In its order, the district court, 

among other things, divided the assets and debts of the parties and 

required Steven to pay traditional spousal support in the amount of 

$1400 per month for as long as he was paying child support for a minor 

son, and $2000 per month thereafter. 

Steven filed a posttrial motion seeking to expand the findings of the 

district court. Among other things, Steven asked that the spousal 

support begin at $1400 per month, but that it be reduced after a period 

of time to $1000. Steven also asked the court to place a termination date 
3

on spousal support at Steven’s retirement. The district court denied the 

motion. 

Steven appealed and Linda cross-appealed. Steven challenged the 

spousal support amount as excessive in amount and duration. In her 

cross-appeal, Linda challenged the district court’s division of assets and 

sought attorneys’ fees for trial and appellate proceedings. We transferred 

the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the order of the district 

court. We granted further review. 

Based upon our review of the entire record, we make the following 

findings of fact. Steven and Linda Gust were married in 1985. At the 

time of trial, Steven and Linda had two children, aged seventeen and 

twenty-one. At the time of the entry of the district court’s order in this 

case, Steven was fifty-seven years old and Linda was fifty-two years old.

Steven received his bachelor’s degree in economics from Iowa State 

University in 1977. After working at several construction companies, he 

testified he began working at MD Construction in approximately 2005, 

rising to his current position of general manager. Steven testified his 

base salary from MD Construction was $76,000 per year. In 2011, the 

year prior to trial, Steven received incentive payments of about $16,000. 

For 2012, Steven expected to receive incentive payments of between 

$6000 and $8000. Through his work, Steven received partially paid

health insurance, paid vacation, and paid sick leave. We, like the district 

court, find that Steven’s earning capacity from his position is $92,000 

per year. Additionally, although Steven has type 1 diabetes, the disease 

does not prevent full-time employment. 

Steven also testified regarding the operations of an entity called 

Sound Real Estate, LLC (Sound). Linda and Steven were the sole 

members of Sound and under the operating agreement were entitled to 
4

equal amounts of any distributions to members. The original purpose of 

Sound was to flip houses. More recently, Steven restructured Sound and 

obtained subcontractors to engage in lead-based paint removal for MD 

Construction. Steven has certifications as a lead abatement contractor, 

a lead abatement worker, and lead abatement trainer. 

Steven testified the business of Sound was a result of grants 

administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development for Sioux City and Polk County. Steven’s role in Sound’s

business focused on completing paperwork for lead abatement projects 

performed under the grants. Because of the exhaustion of grant funds,

Steven’s desire not to work nights and weekends, and Steven’s concern 

about aggravating his diabetes, Sound ceased to be active, and Steven 

resigned from the entity in 2012. 

During 2011 Steven withdrew $64,000 from Sound, which, 

combined with his compensation from MD Construction, yielded a total 

gross income for 2011 of approximately $156,000. The funds were 

largely used, however, to pay credit card debt and to provide temporary 

support for Linda during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding. 

Steven testified he has no desire to continue Sound’s business or 

open a similar business at the present time. Because Sound’s business 

focused on completing paperwork that is no longer required in 

connection with lead paint abatement projects, there is no current 

prospect that the business could be resuscitated. Because Steven has a 

full-time job and because Sound has no current business viability, we do 

not include earnings from Sound in our calculation of Steven’s present 

earning capacity. 

At the same time, however, we find that Steven paid $50 to the 

Iowa Secretary of State for filing fees on behalf of SafeCon, a business 
5

owned by his girlfriend that provides lead-based abatement services to 

community colleges. Steven testified he had “no idea” whether he would 

work for SafeCon in the future, but emphasized he was done working two 

jobs. We find that Steven has no plans to work for SafeCon or any other 

similar entity while he is employed full time by MD Construction. There 

is at least a possibility, however, that utilizing his lead abatement 

training and expertise, Steven will work with SafeCon or a similar entity 

sometime in the future. 

Linda testified that she was almost fifty-two at the time of the trial 

and lived in a rented townhouse with the parties’ minor son. She 

attended Des Moines Area Community College in the distant past, where 

she was close to obtaining a two-year degree. Between 1982 and 1986, 

Linda worked as a secretary for an accounting firm. She also worked as 

a bookkeeper in Steven’s business, H & S Builders, Ltd., from 1992 to 

1994 and had done some work for Generavivity, an assisted nursing care 

facility in Lake Panorama. Aside from this employment, Linda, with the 

agreement of Steven, took care of the house and kids until 2008 while 

Steven earned an income to support the family. 

Beginning in 2008 as the children grew older, Linda became 

employed outside the home. She currently holds two part-time jobs with

the Ankeny Community School District, one involving work in the media 

center, which pays $12 per hour, and another barcoding textbooks,

which pays $9 per hour. The combination of jobs yields $15,000 in 

income per year. She does not, however, receive benefits from these two 

part-time jobs. 

At trial, Steven offered expert testimony suggesting that Linda had 

an earning capacity of between $29,619 and $30,400 per year. Based 

upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that while 
6

the expert report overstates Linda’s earning capacity somewhat, Linda’s 

earning capacity is $22,500 per year. 

The property owned by the parties is accurately described in the 

appendix attached to the district court order. The district court divided 

the parties’ assets roughly equally, with Steven receiving a net equity of 

$62,249 and Linda $81,651. In the attached appendix, the district court 

determined Steven was to be awarded approximately $136,000 (valued in 

2012) in retirement accounts, and Linda $58,000. The parties had 

equally divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home with the 

expectation that the proceeds would pay each party’s attorneys’ fees. 

With respect to maintaining the standard of living the parties were 

accustomed to, we find because of the inefficiencies resulting from the 

establishment of two households and because the parties used credit

card debt to live beyond their means during the marriage, neither party 

will be able to maintain their predivorce lifestyle in the postdivorce world. 

We find Steven’s current living expenses at the time of trial were $4387 

per month (assuming no reduction of principal of credit card debt). 

While Linda claimed $4623.99 in current living expenses, we find this 

amount was somewhat overstated. Making adjustments for lower costs 

of health insurance, food and household expenses, cable costs, and 

eliminating the savings component, we find Linda’s current monthly 

expenses at the time of trial were $3819 per month. 

II. Standard of Review.

An appeal regarding the dissolution of marriage is an equitable 

proceeding. Iowa Code § 598.3 (2011). Our review is therefore de novo. 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 

484 (Iowa 2012). We give weight to the factual determinations made by 
7

the district court; however, their findings are not binding upon us. Iowa 

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). 

In reviewing questions related to spousal support, while our review 

is de novo, we have emphasized that “ ‘we accord the trial court 

considerable latitude.’ ” In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 

(Iowa 2005) (quoting In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 319 (Iowa 

1996)); see also In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 486. We 

will disturb the trial court’s order “ ‘only when there has been a failure to 

do equity.’ ” In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting In re 

Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d at 319). We noted in In re Marriage of 

Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996):

This deference to the trial court’s determination is decidedly 

in the public interest. When appellate courts unduly refine 

these important, but often conjectural, judgment calls, they 

thereby foster appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering 

expense to the parties wholly disproportionate to any benefit 

they might hope to realize.

III. Discussion.

A. Overview of Iowa Law Regarding Spousal Support. We begin 

our discussion with an overview of Iowa law regarding spousal support. 

Originally, the Iowa legislature provided that in a divorce action the court 

could enter an order with respect to maintenance of the parties “as shall 

be right.” Iowa Code § 1485 (1851). In awarding spousal support under 

this wide-open provision, Iowa courts considered a range of facts and 

circumstances, which were reprised in Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 

398, 405 (Iowa 1968). In Schantz, the court laid out “a general formula” 

for considering the equitable determinations in divorce proceedings, 

including “the troublesome problem inherent in awarding alimony.” Id.

at 405. Although the Schantz general formula consisted of five 
8

premarital and ten postmarital criteria distilled from prior caselaw, the 

court pointed out that each element is not always present or important 

in every case. Id. 

In 1970, the legislature enacted no-fault divorce. See 1970 Iowa 

Acts ch. 1266 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 598 (1971)); see also In re 

Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 1972) (noting “the 

overriding legislative purpose of the dissolution act is to remove faultbased standards for termination of marriages”). A decade later, the 

Schantz approach (except for provisions related to fault of the parties) 

was largely adopted by our legislature. See 1980 Iowa Acts ch. 1175, § 3 

(codified at Iowa Code § 598.21(3) (1981)). Under the current version of 

Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2011), a court

may grant an order requiring support payments . . . for a 

limited or indefinite length of time after considering all of the 

following:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the 

parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to 

section 598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of 

marriage and at the time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking 

maintenance, including educational background, training, 

employment skills, work experience, length of absence from 

the job market, responsibilities for children under either an 

award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party to find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance 

becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the 

length of time necessary to achieve this goal.

g. The tax consequences to each party.

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties 

concerning financial or service contributions by one party 

with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation 

by the other party.

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
9

j. Other factors the court may determine to be

relevant in an individual case.

(Emphasis added.) Our cases applying the statute have identified three 

kinds of support: traditional, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. See In 

re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 2008); In re Marriage of 

Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63–64 (Iowa 1989). While the categories may 

overlap in some cases, see, e.g., In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at

827 (involving spousal support award the court could not characterize as 

strictly rehabilitative or traditional), this case involves traditional spousal 

support. “The purpose of a traditional or permanent alimony award is to 

provide the receiving spouse with support comparable to what he or she 

would receive if the marriage continued.” In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 

N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Traditional support is ordinarily 

of unlimited or indefinite duration. See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 

N.W.2d at 64. 

Our cases repeatedly state that whether to award spousal support

lies in the discretion of the court, that we must decide each case based 

upon its own particular circumstances, and that precedent may be of 

little value in deciding each case. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Becker, 756 

N.W.2d at 825–26; In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 

2007); In re Marriage of Fleener, 247 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Iowa 1976). Our 

cases tend to emphasize the need to closely examine all the statutory 

factors and the entire record in each case. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 484–87. Further, the various factors listed 

in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) cannot be considered in isolation from 

each other. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1) (noting “all” factors are to be 

considered by trial court in awarding spousal support); In re Marriage of 
10

Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 486 (emphasizing that spousal support is 

calculated based on “all” the factors in 598.21A(1)).

The law of spousal support under the multifactored statutory 

approach has been criticized for its arbitrary nature and lack of 

predictability. See Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital 

Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of 

Alimony, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 23, 24–25 (2001). According to the 

critics, the terms of the statutes embracing multifactored tests for 

spousal support are not well defined and the standards are so vague that 

just about any outcome, including those based on the personal 

preference of an individual judge, may be justified by citation to pliable 

statutory factors. See id.; David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important 

Policy in Need of a Coherent Policy Purpose, 9 Nev. L.J. 325, 326 (2009) 

(characterizing spousal support as “judge-specific, idiosyncratic, 

inconsistent, and unpredictable”). Some courts have joined the fray. 

See, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 819 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

(Farmer, J., concurring specially) (“[B]road discretion in the award of 

alimony is no longer justifiable and should be discarded in favor of 

guidelines, if not an outright rule.”); Melzer v. Witsberger, 480 A.2d 991, 

994 (Pa. 1984) (noting under Pennsylvania law “a total lack of 

organization with respect to how these principles interact and how they 

should be applied in order to arrive at an appropriate award of support”). 

The criticisms are not entirely off the mark, as a multifactored legal test 

in which all factors are relevant and none are dispositive can be 

extraordinarily difficult to consistently apply. 

In part in response to such criticisms, reform efforts have been 

undertaken as reflected in the National Conference of Commissioners on 

Uniform State Laws, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), in 1970 
11

(abandoning concept of fault, limiting the reliance on spousal support, 

and emphasizing self-support even if at a substantially lower level than 

existed during the marriage), the American Law Institute (ALI), Principles 

of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, in 

2000 (establishing presumptions or guidelines based more on 

compensation for loss than upon need to provide predictability and 

consistency for setting spousal support award), and the guidelines of the 

American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, AAML Commission 

Recommendations, in 2007, see Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking 

Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal 

Support, or Maintenance, 21 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 61, App. A (2008) 

[hereinafter Kisthardt] (proposing a presumptive formula based upon 

duration of marriage and earning capability of the parties). As is 

invariably the case when a family law change is proposed, these reform 

efforts produced fervent supporters and bitter detractors. See, e.g., John 

J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 Fam. L.Q. 673, 

685 (2008) (noting the UMDA generated considerable controversy but 

limited support); Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American 

Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years 

After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 Fam. L.Q.

573, 577 (2008) (noting the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family 

Dissolution sparked immense commentary but have only been examined

in about 100 cases). Although these reform efforts were diverse in terms 

of their underlying theories and substantive content, they all sought to 

more clearly define the law of spousal support, to provide greater 

structure to the application of multifactored tests, and to enhance the 

predictability of outcomes. 
12

In recent years, there has been a movement to statutorily modify 

multifactored spousal support statutes. Colorado and Massachusetts 

have recently amended their law to provide more detailed guidelines for 

the award of spousal support. Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-10-

114(3)(b)(II), 14-10-122 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 69th 

Gen. Assemb.); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, §§ 48–55 (West, Westlaw 

through ch. 389 of 2014 2d Ann. Sess.).

A major impetus to the legislation in Massachusetts was the 

question of the impact of retirement on spousal support (referred to as 

alimony in Massachusetts). Rachel Biscardi, Dispelling Alimony Myths: 

The Continuing Need for Alimony and the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, 36 

W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 30–31 (2014); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 

§ 49(f) (“[G]eneral term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor 

attaining the full retirement age.”). In 2009, the Massachusetts Supreme 

Judicial Court declined to create a presumption in favor of the payor’s 

request to be relieved of alimony obligations upon retirement. See Pierce 

v. Pierce, 916 N.E.2d 330, 344–45 (Mass. 2009).1 In response, the 

Massachusetts legislature amended its alimony statute to provide, 

among other things, that general (or traditional) alimony should not 

presumptively continue beyond the payor reaching full retirement age,

absent a showing of good cause. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, §§ 49(f),

53(e). The Alimony Reform Act of 2011 also provides that a court may 

1Absent statutory directive, most courts that have considered this issue have 

declined to impose a presumption of termination of support when the payor retires at a 

certain age. See, e.g., Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Tenn. 2001) (“Although an 

obligor’s retirement age may be considered in assessing the overall reasonableness of 

the retirement, we are reluctant to establish a presumptive age for an objectively 

reasonable retirement.”); Coates v. Coates, No. 97-3118, 1998 WL 734476, at *2, *4 

(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1998) (finding payor’s voluntary retirement at age sixty-eight was 

unreasonable, and he could reasonably be expected to work until the payee was sixtyfive).

 
13

consider alimony for an indefinite period only for marriages of twenty 

years or more and generally limits support payments to between thirty 

and thirty-five percent of the difference between the parties’ gross 

incomes at the time of the alimony order, unless there are circumstances 

warranting deviation. See 2011 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 124, § 3 (West) 

(codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, §§ 49(c), 53(b), 53(d)); see also

Biscardi, 36 W. New Eng. L. Rev. at 17–37; Charles P. Kindregan, 

Reforming Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsiders Postdivorce Spousal 

Support, 46 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 13, 24–41 (2013) (same).

A new statute in Colorado uses an approach similar to that in 

Massachusetts. The Colorado statute provides guidance regarding the 

duration of spousal support (referred to as spousal maintenance in 

Colorado), noting that in a marriage lasting more than twenty years, the 

court may award spousal maintenance for a specific term or an unlimited 

term, but in no event for less than ten years without making specific 

findings for ordering such reduction. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-

114(3)(b)(II). The new statute addresses retirement situations by 

providing that retirement upon reaching full retirement age gives rise to a 

rebuttable presumption that the retirement is in good faith, thereby 

providing structure when the retiring payor spouses seek to terminate or 

reduce spousal maintenance in a modification action. See id. § 14-10-

122(2)(b). The statute presents a guideline for the amount of spousal 

maintenance. Id. § 14-10-114(3)(b)(I). Notably, the Colorado statute also 

preserves a previous procedure whereby a district court may retain 

jurisdiction to consider adjustments to spousal maintenance in the 

future based on specifically described events. Id. § 14-10-114(3)(g); In re 

Marriage of Caufman, 829 P.2d 501, 502 (Colo. App. 1992).
14

Iowa was one of the very first states to adopt no-fault divorce after 

the promulgation of the UMDA. See In re Marriage of Williams, 199 

N.W.2d at 344 (“California was the first to make the move in 1969 

followed by Iowa and Michigan in 1970.”). However, the legislature did 

not adopt the spousal support approach of the UMDA, and there has 

been no legislative action as in Massachusetts and Colorado to alter our 

traditional multifactored statutory framework for spousal support 

determinations. As a result, we are compelled to follow the traditional 

multifactor statutory framework. A number of general principles emerge 

from our caselaw, however, that suggest the comparative weight or 

importance of various factors and provide at least a degree of structure 

for traditional spousal support determinations. 

First, our caselaw demonstrates that duration of the marriage is an 

important factor for an award of traditional spousal support. Traditional 

spousal support is often used in long-term marriages where life patterns 

have been largely set and “the earning potential of both spouses can be 

predicted with some reliability.” In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d at

62–63; see also In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1997). Further, particularly in a traditional marriage, when the 

parties agree a spouse should stay home to raise children, the economic 

consequences of absence from the workplace can be substantial. See, 

e.g., In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 827. While neither we nor 

the legislature have established a fixed formula, the shorter the marriage, 

the less likely a court is to award traditional spousal support. Generally 

speaking, marriages lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the 

durational threshold and merit serious consideration for traditional 

spousal support. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630, 

632, 635–39 (Iowa 2013) (twenty-three years); In re Marriage of Olson, 
15

705 N.W.2d at 315–17 (twenty-three years); In re Marriage of Geil, 509 

N.W.2d 738, 740, 742 (Iowa 1993) (nearly nineteen years); In re Marriage 

of Debler, 459 N.W.2d 267, 268–70 (Iowa 1990) (twenty-two years); In re 

Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 N.W.2d 656, 661–62 (Iowa 1989) (twenty 

years); In re Marriage of Wegner, 434 N.W.2d 397, 397–99 (Iowa 1988)

(twenty-six years); In re Marriage of Murray, 213 N.W.2d 657, 659–61

(Iowa 1973) (nineteen years); In re Marriage of Boyd, 200 N.W.2d 845, 

854 (Iowa 1972) (twenty years). 

Second, the cases emphasize that in marriages of relatively long 

duration, “[t]he imposition and length of an award of traditional alimony 

is primarily predicated on need and ability.” In re Marriage of Wendell, 

581 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). For over forty years, by 

virtue of both judicial decision and legislative provision, the yardstick for 

determining need has been the ability of a spouse to become selfsufficient at “a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed 

during the marriage.” Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f); accord Schantz, 163 

N.W.2d at 405; see In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 827 (noting 

support payments needed until payee can become “self-supporting at a 

standard of living reasonably comparable to that she enjoyed during the 

marriage”); In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 316 (same); In re 

Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d at 742 (same). The standard for 

determining need is thus objectively and measurably based upon the 

predivorce experience and private decisions of the parties, not on some 

externally discovered and imposed approach to need, such as 

subsistence or adequate living standards or amorphous notions of selfsufficiency. 

In determining need, we focus on the earning capability of the 

spouses, not necessarily on actual income. See In re Marriage of Wegner, 

434 N.W.2d at 398–99 (“We have consistently examined the earning 
16

capacity [of the parties] beyond simply ascertaining present income.”). In 

marriages of long duration, the historical record ordinarily provides an 

objective starting point for determining earning capacity of persons with 

work experience. See, e.g., id. In order to establish earning capability for 

persons without work experience or who are arguably unemployed, the 

parties may use vocational and other experts to assist the court in 

making the determination. See generally Edward M. Mazze & Candace 

E. Mazze, Putting a Vocational Expert to Work in a Divorce Case, 36-WTR 

Fam. Advoc. 26, 26–30 (2014) (describing the expertise of vocational 

experts and the process by which they determine the earning capacity of

the parties); Brett R. Turner, Earning Capacity and Spousal Support: The 

Uses and Abuses of Vocational Evidence in Divorce Cases, 14 No. 12 

Divorce Litig. 213 (2002) (noting that “determining income capacity is a 

field which particularly requires experience and personal contacts-factors 

which trial judges are not equipped to develop”).

With respect to ability to pay, we have noted that “[f]ollowing a 

marriage of long duration, we have affirmed awards both of alimony and 

substantially equal property distribution, especially where the disparity 

in earning capacity has been great.” In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d at 

742; accord In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 438 (Iowa 

1981). Where there is a substantial disparity, we do not employ a 

mathematical formula to determine the amount of spousal support. See 

In re Marriage of Conley, 284 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Iowa 1979); In re Marriage 

of Andersen, 243 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 1976); cf. In re Marriage of 

Huffman, 453 N.W.2d 246, 248 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (determining an 

equitable property division “cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical

formula”). We have, however, approved spousal support where it 

amounts to approximately thirty-one percent of the difference in annual 
17

income between spouses. See In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d at

638 & n.7. Where a spouse does not have the ability to pay traditional 

spousal support, however, none will be awarded. See In re Marriage of 

Woodward, 426 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (noting the payor 

did not have the income to meet more than the parties’ children’s 

minimal needs). 

With respect to duration, we have observed that an award of 

traditional spousal support is normally payable until the death of either 

party, the payee’s remarriage, or until the dependent is capable of selfsupport at the lifestyle to which the party was accustomed during the 

marriage. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826; In re 

Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d at 64. In order to limit or end 

traditional support, the evidence must establish that the payee spouse 

has the capacity to close the gap between income and need or show that 

it is fair to require him or her alone to bear the remaining gap between 

income and reasonable needs. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative 

Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 Fam. L.Q. 

573, 583 (1988); Joan M. Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of 

Development, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 259, 308 (1985). Spousal support may end, 

however, where the record shows that a payee spouse has or will at some 

point reach a position where self-support at a standard of living 

comparable to that enjoyed in the marriage is attainable. See, e.g., In re 

Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 827. 

B. Impact of Retirement on Award of Traditional Spousal 

Support. Although traditional spousal support is generally awarded for 

life, the question arises how the prospective retirement of a payor or 

payee spouse should be considered in the spousal support analysis. 

Cases across the country have produced a variety of answers that have 
18

been catalogued in an extensive annotation. See Jane Massey Draper, 

Annotation, Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances 

Warranting Modification of Divorce Decree—Prospective Retirement, 110 

A.L.R. 5th 237, 258–276 (2003) [hereinafter Draper]; see also Colleen 

Marie Halloran, Petitioning a Court to Modify Alimony When a Client

Retires, 28 U. Balt. L. Rev. 193, 207–229 (1998). The issue of continuing 

spousal support after retirement is particularly pressing in light of longer 

lifespans and the fears that persons approaching retirement may outlive 

their money. 

We have considered the impact of future retirement on support 

awards in only a handful of cases. Our most recent case dealing with 

retirement benefits in the context of traditional spousal support is In re 

Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d at 632, 638. In this case, a sixty-threeyear-old payor spouse sought modification of a prior spousal support 

order. Id. at 632. Among other things, the district court modified the 

order to provide that spousal support should terminate when the payor 

spouse reached the age of sixty-seven. Id. The court of appeals reversed. 

Id. at 634. We sided with the court of appeals on this issue. Id. at 634, 

640. We held that the question of whether the payor spouse’s obligation 

should terminate at his retirement “will depend on the circumstances of 

the parties prevailing at that time.” Id. at 639 n.8. Thus, the payor 

spouse in In re Marriage of Michael was required to wait until actual 

retirement to seek a reduction in his spousal support payments through 

a modification action based upon the impact of his retirement on his 

ability to pay. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Maro, No. 04-1043, 2005 

WL 427720, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005) (reversing trial court 

order which found that if a fifty-five-year-old payor spouse retired before 

the payee spouse reaches the age of sixty-five, this would constitute a 
19

significant change of circumstance meriting modification, reasoning that 

such a determination was premature and must await circumstances that 

will prevail at the time of trial of any future modification action). 

We took a somewhat different path several decades ago in Locke v. 

Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246 (Iowa 1976). In Locke, we noted that the future 

receipt of social security benefits was a factor to consider under the 

Schantz support formulation. Id. at 254. Yet, we held the record was 

inadequate to calibrate the appropriate amount of spousal support 

because there was an absence of important testimony regarding the 

value of marital assets. Id. As a result, we remanded the case to the 

district court to develop an adequate record. Id. The implication of 

Locke is that although the record on appeal was inadequate, the trial 

court’s consideration of the impact of future retirement on support 

obligations when the initial support order was being crafted was 

appropriate in that case. See id. The inadequacy in the record, however, 

was not based upon lack of evidence regarding future events, but present 

valuations. See id. 

In another dated case, Craft v. Craft, 226 N.W.2d 6, 8–9 (Iowa 

1975), we considered a support order where support of $200 per month 

continued until the payor applied for social security benefits and filed 

proof that payee was receiving benefits as a divorced spouse. Upon such 

a showing, the amount of social security benefits paid to the payee 

spouse would be a credit against the original support obligation. Id. at 9;

see also In re Marriage of Helmle, 514 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1994) (reducing spousal support payments when payee is entitled to 

social security benefits by amount of such benefits). The case does not 

suggest a reevaluation of the need for spousal support so much as 
20

merely providing a credit against preestablished spousal support for 

future retirement benefits. 

Other Iowa appellate court cases have addressed the issue of the 

impact of future retirement on support obligations in a variety of ways. 

Sometimes the initial support obligation has been adjusted based upon 

the future receipt of retirement benefits by the payee spouse. For 

example, in In re Marriage of Ennenga, No. 04-1641, 2005 WL 2756723, 

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2005), the court of appeals held that 

because the disparity in the parties’ income will be significantly reduced 

when the payee spouse retired, support should terminate upon her 

receipt of social security benefits. Similarly, in In re Marriage of Schriner, 

No. 03-1131, 2004 WL 1898484, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004), 

opinion vacated in part on other grounds by 695 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Iowa 

2005), the court of appeals held a reduction of support payments from 

$1400 to $700 per month based upon the payee’s retirement was 

equitable in light of the expert testimony adduced in the case. 

The court of appeals has also held support obligations are affected 

by the date the payor retires. For example, in In re Marriage of Markham, 

No. 02-1134, 2003 WL 21074445, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2003),

the court of appeals approved an order where support terminated when

the payor retired or reached sixty-five. See also In re Marriage of Miller, 

524 N.W.2d 442, 444–45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (involving support order in 

which payor’s obligation to make spousal support payments terminated 

when payee retired, either party died, or when the payor took social 

security benefits). On the other hand, in In re Marriage of Bell, 576 

N.W.2d 618, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by In 

re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d at 200, the court of appeals held that 

under all the facts and circumstances a support obligation should not be 
21

affected by retirement and that if the payor was unable to continue 

support he could petition for modification of the decree.

Our caselaw also reveals other instances where spousal support 

orders take future retirement into account in reducing but not 

eliminating traditional spousal support. In In re Marriage of McCurnin,

681 N.W.2d 322, 326, 331 (Iowa 2004), we modified the trial court award

of spousal support and ordered a more appropriate award of $1500 per 

month until the payor retired or the payee reached sixty-five, whichever 

occurred last, and then reduced the payments to $1500 minus the 

payee’s social security payments. Another payments-reduction case is In 

re Marriage of Bell, 576 N.W.2d at 621, 623, where the district court 

reduced support payments by fifty percent on the date of retirement. In 

In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 644 (Iowa 1996), the parties 

stipulated to an arrangement whereby the $1000 per month support 

payments would be reduced upon the payor’s retirement to one-half of 

the payor’s monthly IPERS payment. Further, “[t]he parties would 

combine their social security benefits and each would receive one-half of 

the combined amount.” Id.

There is also authority for the proposition that traditional spousal 

support may terminate upon reaching retirement. In In re Marriage of 

Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2005), the district court imposed an 

award of traditional spousal support until the payee attained the age of 

sixty-five or either party dies. While the limitation was not challenged on 

appeal, we found the traditional spousal support so limited was 

“equitable and [therefore, it] should not be disturbed.” Id. at 541; accord

In re Marriage of Soloski, No. 05-0310, 2006 WL 623583, at *2, 3–4 (Iowa 

Ct. App. March 15, 2006) (holding spousal support which terminated 

when payor reached age sixty-five equitable as to amount and duration); 
22

In re Marriage of Aronson, No. 05-0373, 2006 WL 334250, at *3–5 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006) (holding termination of spousal support when 

payor reached age sixty-five equitable where fifty-one-year-old wife 

received one-half of payor’s retirement benefits at that time).

On the other hand, some appellate court cases have held that 

retirement has no effect on traditional spousal support under the facts 

and circumstances of the case. See In re Marriage of Wiedemann, 402 

N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1987) (holding trial court did not err in awarding 

traditional spousal support without decrease at time of retirement where 

there was disparity in parties’ earning capabilities, husband would 

receive much higher rate of social security, and husband was awarded 

greater share of assets); In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 353

(Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (holding trial court did not err in ordering former 

husband to continue to pay spousal support after his retirement).

C. Analysis.

1. Introduction. In analyzing the questions posed in this case, we 

consider two related but separate issues. The first issue is the general 

question of whether traditional spousal support of unlimited duration in 

the amount of $2000 per month was fair in this case. We next consider 

how we should treat the issue of the potential impact of Steven’s future 

retirement on the spousal support obligation. 

2. Initial spousal support obligation. We begin our analysis here by 

canvassing the traditional factors that have had a substantial bearing on 

the determination of spousal support. We note the marriage was of long 

duration, nearly twenty-seven years. As is often the case where 

traditional spousal support is awarded, Linda spent many years as a 

stay-at-home mom. The length of the marriage is comfortably within our 

caselaw where a spouse may be considered for indefinite spousal 
23

support. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d at 632, 635–39; 

In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 315–17; In re Marriage of Geil, 509 

N.W.2d at 740, 742.

Further, the record establishes Linda will not be able to be selfsupporting in a lifestyle to which she was accustomed during the 

marriage. Although she has now returned to the workforce, her 

economic prospects are limited. While she may be expected to earn 

$22,500 per year, spousal support would be necessary for her to live in a 

fashion approaching her lifestyle during the marriage. See, e.g., In re 

Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 827; In re Marriage of Olson, 705 

N.W.2d at 316; In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d at 742.

Steven, on the other hand, earns $92,000 per year. There is thus 

considerable disparity between the annual income Linda can reasonably 

be expected to earn, $22,500, and Steven’s expected income, $92,000. 

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d at 742; In re Marriage of 

Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d at 438. We further note that under the trial 

court’s order, Linda will live off income and support of approximately 

$46,500 per year ($24,000 in spousal support a year, plus $22,500 in 

salary), while Steven will have approximately $68,000 per year ($92,000 

in salary, minus $24,000 per year in spousal support payments) at his 

disposal. 

We recognize it may be that neither party will be able to maintain 

their marital lifestyle, as the parties at times lived beyond their means 

using credit card debt, and two households are inevitably more expensive 

to maintain than one. However, the spousal support award allows Linda 

to live in a fashion that approaches the lifestyle to which she was 

accustomed in the marriage without undermining Steven’s ability to do 

the same. 
24

In considering duration of the award, we note that traditional 

spousal support is ordinarily unlimited in duration except upon the

remarriage of the payee spouse, or death of either party. See, e.g., In re 

Marriage of Cooper, 451 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); In re 

Marriage of Bornstein, 359 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); In re 

Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d at 351. There can, however, be 

exceptions to the general rule. For example, in In re Marriage of Becker, 

756 N.W.2d at 827, we limited spousal support in a twenty-two year 

marriage where the record showed that after a period of rehabilitation 

and retraining, the income of the payee spouse “should allow her to 

become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to 

the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.” In contrast, in 

this case, there is no reason to believe Linda will ever be able to generate 

enough income to support herself at the standard of living she enjoyed 

during the marriage. Under the record of this case, Linda’s need for 

support to maintain the lifestyle she has grown accustomed to and 

Steven’s ability to pay should remain unchanged for the indefinite future.

See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 924 S.W.2d 22, 25–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)

(holding where evidence indicates that dependent spouse’s financial 

prospects will not improve materially in the future and the means of the

spouse providing maintenance are not likely to decrease, original 

maintenance should stay in place).

We also recognize the trial court was in the best position to 

balance the parties’ needs, and we should intervene on appeal only 

where there is a failure to do equity. See In re Marriage of Olson, 705 

N.W.2d at 315; In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 257. Setting 
25

aside the retirement issue, we do not find the award of $2000 per month 

fails to do equity in this case.2

3. Treatment of future retirement. The fighting issue in this case is 

whether the district court erred in not fashioning a spousal support 

order that took into account the future retirement of Steven. In this 

regard, we have several options. First, we could follow the approach in In 

re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d at 639 n.8, and hold that the 

question is not ripe for review and must await Steven’s actual retirement. 

Second, we could consider a flexible approach which allows the district 

court wide latitude to consider the issue when there is an adequate 

factual record, but to defer the question to a modification action where 

2We note our resolution on this issue is consistent with the recommendation of 

the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. See Kisthardt, 21 J. Am. Acad. 

Matrim. Law. at 80–85. The Academy urges a guideline approach where marriages over 

twenty years qualify for unlimited spousal support. See id. at 80. The amount of 

unlimited spousal support is determined by taking 30% of the payor’s gross income 

minus 20% of the payee’s gross income. See id. In this case, application of the AAML 

guideline formula would produce a presumptive unlimited support payment of $23,100 

per year. 

The AAML guidelines, of course, are not Iowa law, but the similarity between the 

AAML guidelines and our application of Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) factors is 

apparent. While clearly not binding on an Iowa court, the AAML guidelines nonetheless 

provide a useful reality check with respect to an award of traditional spousal support. 

See, e.g., Boemio v. Boemio, 994 A.2d 911, 925–26 (Md. 2010) (citing AAML guidelines 

in applying multifactored state statute). 

Our resolution is also consistent with ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family 

Dissolution, which suggest in an illustration that unlimited traditional spousal support 

is presumptively appropriate in thirty-year marriages where the claimant is fifty-five 

years of age, but not for a twenty-year marriage where the claimant was forty years of 

age. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 5.06, at 949–50. Here, Linda was 

fifty-two years of age when the decree was entered and the marriage lasted nearly 

twenty-seven years, just shy of the facts presented in the ALI illustration that 

presumptively qualified for unlimited spousal support and well away from the facts of 

the illustration where only term support was merited. See id. In this case, even if 

Linda was not entitled to unlimited spousal support under the ALI framework, the 

length of her definite term spousal support under section 5.05 according to an 

illustration would entitle her to support for seventeen years, or to age sixty-nine. See 

id. § 5.05, at 939–40.

 
26

there is a paucity of information. Third, we could simply do our best to 

consider the likely impact of retirement on both the parties in light of 

their ongoing needs as well as the reduced ability to pay that ordinarily 

flows from retirement. 

We think the best course in this case is to follow In re Marriage of 

Michael. Under this approach, future retirement will ordinarily be 

considered to raise too many speculative issues to be considered in the 

initial spousal support award. In this case, as in In re Marriage of 

Michael, we simply do not know important facts. For starters, we do not 

know when Steven will actually retire. He may retire at his normal social 

security retirement age, but he may also continue to work at a time when 

Linda still has significant need. We do not know what the relative 

financial position of the parties will be at the time of Steven’s eventual 

retirement. When Steven does retire, he may maintain consulting 

relationships or other arrangements that enhance his retirement income. 

We do not know whether there will be health considerations that would 

impact the equities. We do not know what the impact of Linda’s 

retirement will have on the party’s relative financial posture. And, we do 

not know whether the retirement will be motivated by a desire to avoid or 

reduce support obligations, a factor that normally would not support a 

reduction in support benefits. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1037–

38 (Me. 1980) (noting “retirement of the payor spouse for the primary 

purpose of avoiding alimony does not of itself bring about the substantial 

change in the payor’s circumstances needed to justify a reduction in 

alimony”). 

Our approach in In re Marriage of Michael is not an outlier. A 

number of courts in other jurisdictions appear to have taken a similar 

approach and deferred consideration of the impact of retirement upon 
27

spousal support obligations. See, e.g., DeShazo v. DeShazo, 582 So. 2d 

564, 565 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (affirming award of alimony because 

ability of husband to pay alimony in future is speculative); Chaney v. 

Chaney, 699 P.2d 398, 401–02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that though 

future retirement was contemplated by parties at time decree was issued, 

precise date and what payor’s benefits would amount to were speculative 

and therefore did not bar later modification); Frost v. Frost, 155 S.W.2d 

895, 896 (Ark. 1941) (indicating payor spouse retiring in the next few 

years will have opportunity at time of retirement to show that he is 

required to pay support in a sum beyond his means); In re Marriage of 

Kuppinger, 48 Cal. App. 3d 628, 639 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding mere 

eligibility to retire at age sixty-five not a basis for adjustment in spousal 

support); Ryan v. Ryan, 697 A.2d 60, 61–62 (Me. 1997) (holding parties 

should be allowed to reopen the relative economic issues at a more 

“propitious time,” as payor’s retirement was speculative and payee’s 

future earning ability was unknown); Sommer v. Sommer, 636 N.W.2d 

423, 430–31 (N.D. 2001) (declining to reduce support in the future based 

upon payor’s retirement noting exact date of retirement is unknown and 

there was no evidence the reduction of income that would occur); Mottice 

v. Mottice, 693 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding because 

payor spouse submitted he was considering retirement, but provided no 

details as to retirement income or when he was going to retire, therefore, 

his anticipated retirement did not constitute a basis for reduction or 

termination of support payments); In re Marriage of Wilson, 63 P.3d 

1244, 1249 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (“[E]ven if husband’s retirement was 

foreseeable when the parties’ marriage was dissolved, the timing of its 

occurrence was speculative and, thus, it could not have affected his 

support obligations at that time.”); Browder v. Browder, 675 S.E.2d 820, 
28

824 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“Any change in circumstances regarding 

Husband’s retirement may warrant a modification of alimony when that 

event occurs; however, consideration of this anticipated but speculative

occurrence at this time was inappropriate.”); Lambertz v. Lambertz, 375 

N.W.2d 645, 646–47 (S.D. 1985) (per curiam) (holding trial court was 

aware that husband might retire after decree issued; however, evidence 

was speculative and did not bar modification based on substantial 

reduction in income); Adamson v. Adamson, No. 20010516-CA, 2002 WL 

31770882, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2002) (finding payor’s 

speculative retirement was not ripe for decision). Lengthy annotations 

outline various situations in which state courts have considered whether 

a spousal support order should be modified based upon retirement. See, 

e.g., Draper at 258–76.

Further, the legislature has expressly directed that in order to 

modify spousal support awards, a court must consider a number of 

specific factors. Iowa Code § 598.21C(1). Some of these factors cannot 

be properly considered at the time the initial spousal support award is 

determined (changes in resources, changes in medical expenses, changes 

in health, possible support of a party by another person). See id. The 

most consistent approach with the statutory scheme is that unless all of 

the factors in Iowa Code section 598.21C(1) can be presently assessed, 

future retirement is a question that can be raised only in a modification 

action subsequent to the initial spousal support order. 

Based upon In re Marriage of Michael, the authorities in other 

jurisdictions, and our desire to vindicate the statutory scheme 

established by the legislature, we conclude the question of whether 

Steven’s spousal support should be modified upon his retirement must 
29

be made in a modification action when retirement is imminent or has 

actually occurred. 

IV. Conclusion.

For all the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of 

appeals.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Wiggins, Waterman, and Mansfield, JJ., 

who concur in part and dissent in part.
30

#13–0356, In re Marriage of Gust

WIGGINS, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

When we decide whether to award spousal support and its 

duration, the first step is to determine which party has the burden of 

proof to show he or she is entitled to alimony and its duration. We said 

long ago, the person seeking spousal support has the burden to show he 

or she is entitled to spousal support. Moore v. Moore, 192 Iowa 394, 

395–96, 184 N.W. 732, 732 (1921). 

In 1921, when we made this statement, the Code required a party 

to verify the petition for dissolution and establish the allegations in the 

petition by competent evidence. Iowa Code § 6622 (1919). In this 

regard, the Code has not changed. A party must still verify the petition 

for dissolution and establish the allegations in the petition by competent 

evidence. Iowa Code § 598.5(2)–(3) (2011).3

Moreover, putting the burden of proof on the party requesting 

spousal support is consistent with the general legal principle that the 

“burden of proof in an action ordinarily rests with the party who is

seeking recovery.” Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage 

Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370, 374 (Iowa 2000). In the 

present case, Linda requested spousal support in her answer to Steve’s 

petition for dissolution. Accordingly, Linda bears the burden of proof to 

establish from the competent evidence produced at trial that she is 

entitled to spousal support, and if she is entitled to spousal support, its 

amount and duration. 

3All references to the Iowa Code are to the 2011 Code unless otherwise noted.

 
31

In proving her claim for spousal support and its duration, it is 

important to note the legal principles associated with her burden of 

proof. The legislature has set forth the criteria a court should use to 

determine spousal support awards. These are: 

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the 

parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to 

section 598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of 

marriage and at the time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking 

maintenance, including educational background, training, 

employment skills, work experience, length of absence from 

the job market, responsibilities for children under either an 

award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party to find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance 

becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the

length of time necessary to achieve this goal.

g. The tax consequences to each party.

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties 

concerning financial or service contributions by one party 

with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation 

by the other party.

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

j. Other factors the court may determine to be 

relevant in an individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A(1).

I agree with the district court that Linda is entitled to spousal 

support. I also agree the amount of the support should be $1400 per 
32

month while Steve is paying child support, and then increase to $2000 

after child support terminates. I reach this conclusion for a number of 

reasons. 

First, at the time of the decree, Linda’s earning capacity was 

around $22,500 per year compared to Steve’s actual earnings of $92,000 

per year. Second, at Steve’s and Linda’s present ages, there is not much 

either party can do to increase his or her earning capacity. Finally, this 

award will allow both parties to live at a standard of living reasonably 

comparable to what they enjoyed during the marriage. 

I cannot agree, however, with the spousal support award 

continuing beyond when Steve reaches age sixty-six4 or retires, 

whichever is later. The record is void of any evidence and Linda has 

failed to meet her burden to show Steve will have the income or the 

assets to support such an award after his retirement. If we look at the 

assets awarded Steve, he netted $64,249 worth of assets while Linda 

netted $81,651 worth of assets. We can calculate the net asset value 

awarded to Steve by taking the district court’s award of gross assets in 

the amount of $167,125 and subtracting the court awarded liabilities of 

$102,876 from the gross assets. Linda leaves this marriage with no 

liabilities. 

In analyzing the assets the court awarded Steve, we can break 

those down into four types. They are as follows:

Type of Asset Value

Vehicles $22,235.00

4At age sixty-six and two months, Steve is entitled to his full benefits under 

Social Security.

 
33

Cash Value Life Insurance $ 4,371.00

Cash $ 4,582.00

Retirement $135,937.00

TOTAL $167,125.00

The liabilities Steve received are in the form of his truck loan, 

credit card expenses, and back taxes. He must pay these debts in the 

near future. To do so would require him to liquidate his retirement 

funds and the cash value of his life insurance. The liquidation of these 

funds has tax consequences, which we must also consider. Hence, after 

paying these debts, he would be left with little or no assets to generate 

any income after his retirement. Thus, I would find that once his income 

stops after his retirement his main income would be his social security, 

which is not sufficient to support a $2000 per month payment. 

Therefore, I would conclude Linda did not prove Steve would have the 

income to support the spousal support payments ordered by the court 

after his retirement. 

Had these parties remained married beyond Steve’s retirement, it 

is apparent to me they would not have much more than their social 

security, IPERS, and any retirement benefits left after paying their debts. 

This is the lifestyle Linda would have had after retirement. Under the 

property settlement in the decree, Linda will have available to her 

$56,738 in IRAs, a social security benefit based upon Steve’s earnings,5

and her IPERS. She will also have her earnings until she retires. I find 

these amounts would be equal to, if not greater than, the amounts she 

5A divorced spouse whose marriage lasted ten years or longer can receive 

benefits based upon their ex-spouse’s earning record. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 416(d)(1) 

(2012).

 
34

would have available to her if she and Steve had remained married. 

Lifetime spousal support puts her in a much better situation than she 

would have been if she had stayed married.

I also think the majority’s reliance on the notion of traditional 

alimony is misplaced. We first referenced the notion of traditional 

alimony in 1989. In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 

1989). We said traditional alimony is “payable for life or so long as a 

spouse is incapable of self-support, a change in status (e.g., remarriage) 

may alter the support picture and warrant a modification.” Id. at 64. At 

the same time, we introduced the terms of reimbursement alimony and 

rehabilitative alimony. Id. at 63–64. These classifications served us well 

in 1989, but should not totally drive our decisions on spousal support 

awards twenty-five years later. As we said in a recent case, it is not 

necessary for the court to characterize alimony as traditional, 

reimbursement, or rehabilitative. In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 

822, 827 (Iowa 2008). What the legislature requires us to do is to apply 

the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21A to determine a fair and 

equitable spousal support. For all the reasons stated above, applying the 

principle contained in section 598.21A, spousal support should not 

continue after Steve reaches sixty-six years of age or retires, whichever 

occurs later.

Contrary to the majority’s position, I do not think Steve would be 

able to modify the spousal support payments upon his retirement. Our 

law is clear and well settled—you can only modify a decree if there is a 

substantial change in circumstances not contemplated by the court at 

the time of the entry of the decree. In re Marriage of Sisson, 843 N.W.2d 

866, 870–71 (Iowa 2014).
35

At the time of the entry of this decree, the court contemplated 

Steve would retire at some time in the future. It also contemplated his 

only retirement income would be from his social security and any 

retirement accounts he had after paying off the liabilities the court 

assigned to him. As I previously stated, this would not be enough to pay 

the $2000 a month spousal support. Therefore, when he comes back to 

court after his retirement and asks for a modification on the basis his 

income will not justify the spousal support, the court should deny the 

modification because the court contemplated his earning situation at 

retirement when it entered the original decree. The more logical and 

equitable approach is to terminate Steve’s spousal support obligation 

when he reaches age sixty-six or retires, whichever is later. At that time, 

if his financial situation has improved beyond the contemplation of the 

court at the time it entered the original decree, Linda can file for a 

modification to have the support continued. 

Finally, I think the majority’s reliance on In re Marriage of Michael

is misplaced. 839 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 2013). Michael supports my view 

that Steve’s spousal support obligation should cease when he reaches 

age sixty-six or retires, whichever is later. Michael is a modification 

action, modifying a decree the court previously modified. Id. at 631–33. 

Both modifications required the husband to file appeals.6 Id. Each 

modification was necessary because the court in the original decree 

awarded lifetime spousal support without knowing what the future held 

for these litigants. Modification actions are not only very expensive to 

the litigants, but also use valuable judicial resources. 

6The parties settled the first modification while it was on appeal. Michael, 839 

N.W.2d at 633.

 
36

In Michael, we lowered the amount of spousal support, but did not 

end it on his retirement. Id. at 638–39. We did this because the original 

decree and the first modification had a provision for lifetime spousal 

support. Id. at 632, 639. Moreover, the husband in Michael did not 

appeal the original award of lifetime spousal support. Obviously, the 

husband in Michael did not contest the fact that the facts and 

circumstances in existence at the time the original decree was entered 

supported lifetime spousal support. In contrast, Steve is appealing the 

original decree awarding lifetime spousal support.

We can avoid the lessons of Michael by basing the duration of 

spousal support on the proof presented at trial. Linda has not met her 

burden of proof to allow the court to award lifetime spousal support. 

Linda has not proved Steve has the ability to pay lifetime spousal 

support and that her standard of living will be significantly worse off 

than if the parties had stayed married and Steve retired. In other words, 

the legislative mandates of section 598.21A(1) do not allow the district 

court to award lifetime spousal support.

For these reasons, I must dissent to that part of the majority’s 

opinion requiring Steve to pay spousal support after he reaches age 

sixty-six or retires, whichever is later. 

Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this concurrence in part and 

dissent in part.