SECOND DIVISION June 12, 2007

No. 1-05- 2602 THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, ) ) Appe al fro m the Plai ntif f-A ppel le e, ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of v. ) Co o k C o un t y. ) ) PIOTR G ORK

A, ) Ho no r ab le ) Joseph M. Claps, Def endan t-App el l an t. ) Judge Presidin g. JU STI CESO UT H del

i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Defend ant Piotr Gorka appeals h is convi ctions f or aggravated fl eei

ng or att em

pting to elude
a police off ic er which cause d

bo dily in jury to a Chicago po li

ce offi cer and pro pert y dam

age in ex cess of $300. He w as convi

cted foll owing a jury trial and sen tenced to co ncurrent pri son terms of 18 months. The record reveal s that on September 25, 1999, C hi cago pol i ce of f i cers wh o weredr iving
an unm arked patro l v ehi cl e attempted to curb def

endan t’s veh ic le in the vi ci ni ty of 5122 South Arch

er Avenueaft er r ec eiv ing a c o mp laint fr o m t wo ind ividua ls t ha t a p er so n in a da r k- co lo r ed ve hic le pointed a g un at them . The of

f i cers ga ve ch as e a nd turn ed on their s iren

and f la shi ng he adl igh

ts, but de f en da n t, wh o was dri

vi ng a b la ck car, fai

le d to stop and continued dri vi ng at a speed wh

ic h exceeded the posted speed li

mi t. Subsequently

, a marked s quad ca

r, which was being dr iven by uniform ed offi cers, joined i

n the pursuit with its si

ren and oscil

latin g Mars li ghts act iv ated. The chase covered a 4 0- blo ck mix o f main and res i den tia l streetsand al

l eys. As the ch

ase approached 51 st

Street1-05-2602

2

and Kedzi e Aven

ue, a seco nd m

arked squad car join

ed in the pursuit, also with i

ts si re n a nd M ars l i gh ts act ivate d, but defend ant di d n ot stop . A

t the i nte rs ec ti on of 47 th Place

and K edzi e Av enue, defen dant sl am me d on the brakesin or der t o mak e a t ur n, an d o ne o f t he mar ke d s qu ad ca r s hit his veh ic le , subse quently

hi tt in g a tree and inj uri

ng t he o ffi

cer who was inside t hat squ ad c ar . T he dam age to the squad car was so ex tensi ve that i t was rendered inop er able and had t o be towe d f rom the s cen e. Meanwh il e, defen dant contin

ued driv in g on 47 th Pl

ace as the other m

ark e d squad car followed. Eventual

ly , defen dant stopped at 47 th Pl

ace and Ch ri sti ana A venue , wher e h e a nd his passen ger werepl ac ed un der a rre st. No g

un s w ere rec ove red f rom hi m , hi s p as seng er, orhi s veh ic le
. At t rial, d efenda nt , w ho is a Po lish natio nal and r eside nt alien, t es t ified t ha t he did not s top because he t hou ght a c ar wa s fo llo win g h im, a nd wh en t he mar ke d s qu ad ca rbe ga n fo llo win g h im, he fear ed t hos e we re t he sam e poli ce o ffice r s w ho ha d mis t r ea t ed him dur ing a p r io ralt er ca t io n in 1998. Defe

ndan t admi tt ed that he attempted to el ude the poli

ce off ic ers but deni

ed hi s veh ic le ever cam e i nto con tact wi th a p oli ce c ar, an d he never saw

a pol i ce c ar i nv olv ed i n a n acci den t. I nit iall y, de f

en da n t en tered i n to a neg ot iate d plea of g uilty t o fo ur co unt s o f agg ra vat ed fleeing and el udin g a poli ce off ic er in exch ange f or a o ne-y

ear sentence

with a recomm enda t io n o f boot
cam p. The trial

court entered an order to that eff ect on June 12, 2000. Howe ver, once he w as in carcerated, de f

en da nt l ea rn ed tha t boot cam p was not an

opt ion a s promi sed and recom me nded due to his immigr an t st at us an d t he ch an ge s in the im mi gration law as of 1996. He sub sequentl y a ppeal ed that matt er t o t his co ur t in case N o. 1- 00- 370 7, co nt e ndi ng that he was n

ot properly

adm onis hed pur sua nt t o S upr eme Co ur t Rule 6 05( b) (188 Ill . 2d R. 605(b)). On February 21, 2003, we granted1-05-2602

1 The mandate i ssued on

Apri l 8, 2003
. 3 defendant’s moti on f

or a s um mary rem an d f orfull and pr op er admo nishments unde r Ru le 605 (b) and to gi v e h i m th e op por tun i ty to fil e any appropri ate m otion s wi thi n 30 day s the reaf ter. 1 We n

ot e that t he re cord does

n ot co n tai n a transcri pt o f the p ro cee di

ngs f rom th e adm oni sh men ts he ari ng or a com m on law r eco rd of a ny mot ions whi ch were f il ed at that t im

e. However, in

asm uch as the m

atter su bse qu en t ly

proceeded to a j ury tri al , we may r ea so na bly as su me t ha t de fen da nt su cc es sfu lly move d to with draw h i s pl ea of gui l ty. Defend ant was char ged wit h fou r c ou nt s o f agg ra vat ed fleeing orattempting to elude a poli ce off i cer: (1 ) w hile tr aveling at a sp eed of a t least 21 miles pe r ho u r over the legal speed l im it; (2)
ca us i n g b odi l y h ar m to J ose ph En ge l h ardt; (3) cau sing bo dily harm to Mar k T ro st ; and ( 4) cau sing pr operty da mag e i n ex ce ss of $3 00 . Pr i or to t rial, d efenda nt fil

ed a mot ion t o d ismi ss t he co mplaint
on th e g rou n dsof dou b l e j eop ardy

v i ol ati on s, wh i ch wa s den i ed b y th e tr i al cou rt. Su bseq uent t o his j ury tri al , defen

dant was acqui

tt ed of counts I and III and f ound guil ty of counts II and IV. Defendant’s mot ion fo r a new t rial was denied by the t rial co ur t , a nd he was sub sequentl

y s entenced to concurrent prison terms of 18 m onths, with credi

t given f or 230 days wh

ic h ha d been served pr ev io us ly. Defend ant t hen filed a mot ion fo r jud gment notw i ths tan di ng the ve rdi ct a nd di sm i ss al of the c omp l ai

nt wi th pre j udice, wh

i ch the tri al court al so den

i ed. On app eal, defend ant has raised the f oll owi ng i ssues f or our revi ew: w

hether (1 ) the tri

al court erredin ordering a n

ew trial ; (2) the j udgme

nts were l egally

in consi stent; and (3) the t r ial c ourt exceeded it s j uri sd i cti on an d a uth ori ty an d a b us ed i ts dis cretion i

n i mposi ng an 18-month "res entence" on counts II and IV.1-05-2602

2 Def endan t’s ori gi na l appe al i n c ase No. 1-00-3 707 w as re

manded on

def endan t’s m otion
. The record d oes n ot contai n a copy of that m otion , a tran scri

pt of de f endan t’s pl ea h eari ng, or a transcript of the proceedi

ngs on rem

and. 4 Fi rs t, de f en da nt c onte nds th at the tri al cou rt e rr ed in o r de r ing a n ew t r ial w he r e ( a) in
re ver sing his co nvictio ns, t his co ur t never or der ed a new t rial, a nd(b) he h ad been in carcerated f

or t he full t er m, an d mo r e, o f t he o r igin al s en t en ce , t he r eb y un co nst it ut io na lly su bje ct ing him t o do ub le j eopardy and vi ola tin g the pri nc i pl es of f und am en tal f ai rne ss a nd justice. The law in I llino is is we l l

settl ed th at f ol l owi n g th e en try of a j udgm en t on a n eg oti ate d g

ui l ty ple a, ev en i f a def en da n t onl y wa n ts to ch al l en ge h i s s en ten ce , h e m us t m ov e to w i th dr aw th e g ui l ty pl ea an d vac ate th e j udgm

en t so th at, in the e vent t he moti on i s g ra n ted , the p ar

ti es ar e r etu rned to t he status q

uo. Peo ple v. Eva ns , 17 4 I ll . 2d 320, 332 (1996). A m ot ion to reconsi der a sentence alone is i ns uf f i ci en t. People v . Wal

le r , 317 Il l . Ap p. 3d 39 0, 391 ( 2000)
. Here, ac cordi

n g to the re cord, defendan t o rigi nal ly ple d guil ty i n exchan ge for a one-y

ear se nt en ce wit h c o ur t - r ec o mmend ed bo o t ca mp, wh ich t he co ur t gr an t ed
. Ho we ve r , sinc e h is status as a resi den t al i en prev en ted hi m f rom r ece i vi ng b oot cam

p, he wasi nc arce rated i nstead. Defend ant then fi le d an appeal, presumab ly contesting h

is sentence , 2 at whi ch tim

e he reques ted a su

m mary re mand be caus e h e h ad n

ot been properl y adm oni shed un

der R ul e 605 (b) (1 88 Il

l . 2d R. 6 05(b )). T his cour t agr eed and remanded the cause for pro per admonish men ts a n d th e opportu

ni ty f or defend ant t o file an ap pr op riat e po st judg ment m

oti on. That remedy

is appropriate under these ty pes of ci rcumstances. See Peo ple v. Crowder , 351 Ill . App. 3d 1 096 , 10 98 ( 200 4); Peop l e v . Ta y l or , 345 Ill . App. 3d 1064, 1083 (2004). At t hat jun cture, once def

endan t was properly a

dmoni shed, ev en1-05-2602

5

if he onl y s ought t o challe

nge h is sentence , he was sti

ll required to fi

le a m ot ion t o va cat e t he judg ment and wi

thdraw hi s guilty

ple a si nce that pl ea was m

ade in e xc ha ng e fo ra s pe cific sentence , irrespec tive of whether or not he was el igi ble for boot camp. See People v . Clark , 183 Ill . 2d 261, 268 (1 998). We further note that defen dant hasfai

le d to present the report of the proceedin gs fro m the
reman ded ad moni sh men ts h ea ri ng or th e re cord

of an y moti on s ma de durin

g that hearin

g, whi ch
makesi t dif f i cul t, i f not i m pos si bl e, f orus t o p ro per ly evaluat e his claim tha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in orderi ng a new tri al . "It

is incumbent upo n t he pa rt y appe aling a judg ment t o br ingup a s m uc h of t he trial court recor d as is n ecessary to co mpl

etely dispose o f the i ssues presented o n appeal." Glove r v. Glove r , 24 Il l . A pp . 3d 73 , 76 (1 97 4) . " W

h er e p orti on s of th e r ec ord

ar e l ac ki n g, i t w il l be presum ed that t he trial

court acted properly i

n the en try of the ch

al le nged order and that such order is suppor ted by that part of the reco rd not bef ore t he revi ewin

g cour t. " Glove

r , 24 Ill . App. 3d at 76. See al so Departmen

t o f Re ven ue v. Val le e Foods, Inc. , 129 Ill . App. 3d 876, 877 (1 985) (s uch f ail ure re quir es t hat we a ffi

rm t hos e issue s which d epe nd up on t he missingrep ort of pr o ce ed ing s fo rt he ir resol uti on). Ac co r din gly, we sha ll presum e that the tr ia

l co ur t pr op er ly ord er ed a new t rial o n re mand f rom th i s c our t. Defend ant f

ur th er con ten ds , howev er , that th

e order of

a n ew tr ia l un co nst it ut io na lly subj ectedhi

m to double j eopardy

and v iolated princi

ples of f undamen tal fai rness and j ustice because he had be en inc ar ce r at ed fo rt he full t er m, an d mo r e, o f his o r igin al s en t en ce . We be lieve t his
argu men t i s wi th out m eri t. "One of th e pur pos es of th e p rote cti

on ag ai n st d oub l e j eop ardy

i s to prot ect an 'acc

used f rom1-05-2602

6

t he unfai r harassmen

t o f successi

ve trials .' " Peop l e v . Mc Cu tcheon , 68 I ll. 2d 10 1, 106 ( 1977) , quo t ing Uni

ted St ates v. Goldm

an , 352 F.2d 263, 266 (3d Ci r. 1965 ). The " ' double

je opardy impli cat ions re ver ber at ingf

rom a g ui l ty pl ea an d a j ur y v erdi ct a ren ot i den

ti ca l ' ev en th oug h a ' gui l ty ple a is as f in al as a jury verdict.' " Mc Cu

tcheon , 68 Ill . 2d at 105-06, quot in g Ward v. Page , 424 F.2d 491, 49 3 ( 10 t h C ir. 19 70 )
. "U nfa ir h ar as sme nt o cc ur s o nly if je o pa r dy h as al ready a tt ached to an offense ch arged ." Mc Cu

tcheon , 68 Ill . 2d at 106. "When a convi ction i s set

aside for grounds other thansufficiency of t he evide nce, re mand and a new t rial ar e pr op er and a re not a violat ion of th e concept of double j eopar dy." Pe opl e v . Rei m n i tz , 97 Il l . Ap p. 3d 94 6, 947 ( 1981)
. In the case at b ar , c on

tra ry to de f en da nt’ s a ss erti

on, hi s c onv i cti ons an d s en ten ce s w ere not re v er se d b

y th i s c our t; rathe r, th e c au se

wa s rem an de d to th e tr i al cou rt f or p rop er ad mon i sh men ts under Rul e 6 05(

b) . 18 8 Il

l . 2d R. 6 05( b) . A ppa ren tl y , af ter rec ei vi ng prop er ad mo ni shm

ents, defend ant wanted his sen

tence reconsi

dered and m

oved to withdraw hi s pl ea of gui lty, w hi ch was granted, and h

e was gi ven a j ury tri al . (On ce a gai

n, we were not provided wi th the record o f that proceedin g, so we mus t pr esu me tha t t he t rial co ur t ’s ac t ion is su ppo rt ed by t he missing re co rd .) The do ub le je opardy cl

ause i s not vi olated i

n thi s i nstance be cause def

endan t’s convi ction was n

ot set aside due to the

i ns uf f i ci ency of the ev i den ce, n or does de f

endan t ma ke th at clai

m . Accordin

gly , we find t he t r ial c o ur t did no t er rin o r de r ing a n ew t r ial. Defend ant nex

t contends t ha t his c o nvic t io ns s ho uld be r ever sed as be ing legally inconsist ent because t he t r ial c o ur t ac qu it t ed him of count I (aggravated fl

eei ng or att em

pting to elude a

police off ic er whi le traveli ng at a speed at

le ast 21 mi

le s per hour over the lega l s peed lim it) when bo t h t he Sta te and the trial

court in structed t he j ury that

i t wa s a n es se n ti al el em en t of cou n ts I I a n d I V, b oth1-05-2602

7

o f whic h he wa s c o nvict ed o f. A legall y i nconsis tent verd ict is

defi ned as fol lows:

“‘V er di ct s o f g ui lt y o f c r ime A an d n o t gu ilt y o f cr im e B, wh ereb oth

cri mes ari se out of th e s am e s et o f f ac ts , ar e le ga lly i n con siste nt whe n t hey nece ssar ily involve t he co nclusio n t hat t he
sa me es se nt ial e leme nt o rele men t s o f ea ch cr ime wer e fo und b oth to exi st and n

ot to exi st.’ ” People v . O’Mal le y , 108 Ill . App. 3d 823 , 829 (1982), quo ting Pe opl e v . Murray , 34 Ill . App. 3d 521, 531 (1975 ). "G en er ally, there

i s n o i nc ons i stenc

y i n v erd i ctsof ac qui ttal an d c onv i cti ons upon ch arg esof crim es composed o f diff

erent elemen

ts although arisin

g out of the same set of facts." Pe o ple v. F i ore , 169 Ill . App. 3d 6 01, 603 (1 988 ). "Ho weve r, in the e vent that com m i ssi on of one cri me i s nece ssa

ry to pr ove t he comm

is sion of another cri

me , close s cruti

ny i s req ui red to asc ertai

n w hether incons iste nt verdicts are leg ally o ro nly lo gi ca lly in consistent." Fi

ore , 169 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 603. "W here one elem

ent of an offen

se ( i.e., a de pend ent offense ) r equ ires p ro of t hat defend ant hascomm itted another off

ense (i.e ., a p re di

ca te off ense) a j ur y' s v erdi cts of ac qui ttal of th e p re di ca te offense but convi

ction of the depe

nden t o ff ense are leg ally in

consi stent verdi cts, and reversal of t he
con vi cti on of t he de pend ent off

ense i s requi redpursuant to pr in

ci ple s of colla

teral estoppel al

though b oth off enses were prosecuted in

the sam e p roceed in

g." Fi ore , 1 69 I ll. App. 3d a t 603 . " If t he off enses could have been

pro perly tried separat ely

, t he j udgment of acquittal of the predicate o ff ense wo uld un qu es t io na bly bar the rel itigation of the de

pend en t of f ense b ec au se gui l t of th e p re di ca te1-05-2602

8

offense wo uld have t o be est ablished c ont ra ry t o t he verdict of acquittal." Fi ore , 169 Ill . App. 3d at 603-0 4. "On t he oth er h an d, a j ur y' s v erdi cts of not guil

ty as to the dependen

t o ff ense an d guil ty as t o the predica

te offense are onl

y l ogical ly in consi stent, do not rais e coll ateral estoppel

is sues, an d
ac co r din gly

do n ot re qui rere v er sa l of de f en da n t' s c on v i cti on of th e p re di ca te offense." Fi

ore , 169 I ll. App. 3d at 60 4. "F ur t he r mo r e, wh er e v er dic t s a r e me r ely lo gic ally inc o nsis t en t , t he jur y's h ist o r ic power of len

ity m ay b e recog ni

zed." Fi ore , 169 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 604. Here, defend ant was char ged wit h fou r c ou nt s o f violat ingsubse ctions (a)(1) through (a)(3), and co nvic t ed o f vio lat ing su bse ct io ns ( a) ( 2) an d ( a) ( 3) o f se ct io n 1 1- 20 4. 1 o f t he I llino is V eh icle Code (Code) (6 25 IL CS 5/ 11 -2 04 .1 (W est 19 98 )), wh i ch sta tes i n perti n en t pa rt: “(a) The off

ense of aggravated fl

eei ng or att em

pting to elude
a pol i ce of f i cer is com

m i tted by an y dri ver or o pe rator

of a m otor ve hic le wh

o f l ee s or att em pts to elude a po lice officer , a fte r be ing giv en a v isu al o r a udibl e signal by a poli ce off ic er in the ma nne r prescrib ed

in su bs ec ti on (a) of Section 11-204 of thi s Code, and such fl igh t o r att em pt t o elude: (1) is at a rate o f s

peed at least 21 m iles per ho ur ove r t he l eg al sp ee d l i m i t; (2) ca us esbod i l y i njury to an y i nd i vi dua l ; or (3) ca use s da mage i n e xc ess of $ 300 to property .” Su b se cti on (a) of se cti on 11 -2 04 of

th e C ode , a s ref

er en ce d a b ov e, sta tes i n perti n en t pa rt:1-05-2602

9 “(a) *** The signal given by the peace off

ic er may be b y h and, voice, si ren, red or blue l

igh t. Pr ovide d, the offi

cer giv in g such signal sha ll be i n p ol i ceun

i f or m , an d, i f dr iving a v eh icle , su ch ve hic le s ha ll dis pla y il lum in ated oscil la ting, rotating o r fl ash i

n g r ed or b l ue l i gh ts whi ch when u sed in co nju nc t io n w it h a n a ud ible ho rn o rsir en wo uld in dic ate the vehi

cl e to be an off

ic ia l pol ic e veh ic le .” 625 ILCS 5/11- 204 (W est 199 8). The record clearl

y i ndicates, nor does defendan t dispute, t ha t he faile d t o st o p h is veh ic le after be i ng s i gna l ed b y uni f orme d poli ce of

f i cers who were driv

in g ma rked squad cars. The si

gnal s used by t ho se o ffice r s w er e s ire ns a nd o sc illat ing Ma r s lig ht s, wh ich is required un der section 11-204. Defend ant was acqu

i tted of c ount I, or su

bs ection 11- 204.1( a)(1), i.e., opera ti n g h i s v eh i cl e a t a ra te of sp ee d w hic h w as in e xc es s o f 21 miles o ve rt he sp ee d lim it, and c ount III , or subsection 11- 204.1( a)(2 ), i .e ., causin

g bodil y i nj ury to an off

ic er; but he wa s convi

cted of subsec

tion 11- 204.1( a)(2), i.e. , c aus ingbodi l y i nj ury to a secon

d of f i cer, and sub section

204.1( a)(3), i.e., cau sing
m ore t han $3 00 wo rt h o f pr o pe rt y da mag e. Th at se ct io n cr ea t es a s ingle o ffens e o f agg ravated fleeingor at t empt ingto el ude a poli ce off ic er, whi ch m

ay be perf ormed i n a n umb er of way

s. See Peo ple v. Price , 221 Ill . 2d 182, 189 (2006). Put anot her way , defen dant’s conv

ictions f or bodi l y i nj ury an d p rop er ty damage durin

g the co mm

issi on of the o ff

enseof aggravated f

le ei ng or eludi

ng a pol i ceof f i cer di d n ot dep end o n whet her he wa s dr iving at a r at e o f spee d 21 mil es o ver t he speed limit or whethera second person was i njure d. W

e, th ere f ore, con cl ude the j ury ’s ve rdi ctswe re n

ot l eg al l y i n con siste n t.1-05-2602

10

Fin ally, de f

en da n t c ontends t ha

t the tri al cou rt ex ce ed ed i ts j urisd i cti on and a ut hor ity and abused i ts d i scre ti on i n i m pos i n g a n 18 -m on th "res en tenc e" on coun ts II an d I V w he n his pr ev io us ly im posedse nt en ce wa s o nly o ne ye ar, he served the enti re origi nal sentence , and the sen

tence was dis propo rtionate to the conduct constituting the of fen se. “W here a c onv

i cti on or sent ence has be en se t aside on direct review or on collateral

attack, t he co ur t shall not impose a new sent ence for t he same off ense or for a diff

erent o ff ensebase d o n t he
sa me co nd uc t wh ich is mo re severe than the prior sentenc e l ess the portion of the pri or sentence p r ev io us ly sat isfied unless t he mor e se ver e se nt ence is based upo n co nduc t on t he pa rt of t he defend ant occurri

ng a f ter t he o rigina l sen

tencing.” (Emphasis added.) 7 30 ILCS 5/5- 5-4 (West 2004). "The cl ear la

nguageof section 5-5-4 [ of the Unif ied Code of Corr ections] precludes the use of t he st at ut e in t hi s case si nce def endan t's m ot ion to withdraw h

is guil ty plea was n

ei ther a direct review n or a co ll atera l attack. " People v . Pittman , 316 Il l . Ap p. 3d 24 5, 250 ( 2000)
. Here, de f en da nt' s w i thd rawal of h i s g ui l ty pl ea wa s a l l owe d b y th e tr i al cou rt, and n o direct review or colla

teralatt ack occur red o n his origin al convi ctions and sentences. As this court not ed in Pe o ple v. Ad ams , 169 Ill . App. 3d 312, 317 (1988), defendan t’s trial an d sub se que

nt c onv i cti on was t he r esu lt o f his own d ecisio n t o w ithd ra w his gu ilty plea; t her efo re , he co uld no t claim the prote cti on in tended for those who attack their conv ictions on consti

tut iona l grounds by ei ther direct review or colla

teralat t ack . D efenda nt was even a dmo nished a t his sent encing heari ng that the trial court was not boun d or obl i gated b y the s en tenc e tha t had be en prev i ousl y i m posed
. We not e t hat t he su pr eme co ur t re cent ly addr esse d t his issue in People v . Diaz , 192 Ill . 2d 211, 225 (2000), fi

ndi ng that when

a trial cour t gr ants a m

oti on to withdraw a gu ilt y pl ea , “ b oth1-05-2602

11

parties ar e t hen retu rned to the stat us quo as i t ex i ste d pr i or to th e a cc ep tan

ceof t he pl ea . ” C lea r ly,
re t ur ningdefen

dant to t he stat us qu o pr

i or to the accept ance of his gu ilt y pl ea a l l owed th e tri al

court to sen tenc e hi m to any term perm i tted by the statute, in

cl udin g the sent ence which he recei ved. See Pittman, 316 Ill . App. 3d at 253. Theref ore, we fi nd that defen

dant's i ncreased sentence

follow ing t he wit hd r aw al o f his o r igin al gu ilt y ple as and h is sentence fol lowi ng hi s new trial doe s n ot v i ol ate section 5-5-4 b eca

use that se cti on i s i

na ppl i cab l e. For the foregoing reas ons, the judgm ent of the ci

rcuit court is af

fi rmed. Af fi rmed. HOF FM AN and HA LL , JJ., c oncu

r.