1302 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

1Petition of the United States Postal Service 

Requesting Initiation of a Proceeding to Consider a 

Proposed Change in Analytic Principles (Proposal 

Thirty), December 22, 2009 (Petition). 

2See Docket No. RM2009–10, Order on 

Analytical Principles Used in Periodic Reporting 

(Proposals Three through Nineteen), November 13, 

2009, at 36–38. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

II. Commission Analysis 

III. Ordering Paragraphs 

I. Background 

On December 22, 2009, the Postal 

Service filed a petition to initiate an 

informal rulemaking proceeding to 

consider changes in the analytical 

methods approved for use in periodic 

reporting.1 Proposal Thirty would 

modify the billing determinants that are 

inputs to the cost models used to 

calculate the cost differences between 

the following price categories of Parcel 

Select: Inter-BMC, Intra-BMC, DBMC, 

DSCF, and DDU. 

The Postal Service explains that 

during FY 2009, the Inter-BMC and 

Intra-BMC price categories of Parcel 

Select were merged into a ‘‘Nonpresort’’ 

category. It notes that the Commission 

approved a conforming change to the 

mail processing and transportation cost 

models for Parcel Select/PRS whereby 

billing determinant data that reflects the 

mail processing and transportation costs 

of the new Nonpresort price category are 

recorded and used.2 As a result, the 

Postal Service explains, the billing 

determinant data used in these cost 

models consist of volume data for the 

Inter-BMC and Intra-BMC price 

categories for Quarters 1 through 3, and 

volume data for the new Nonpresort 

category in Quarter 4. Petition at 1. 

The Postal Service therefore proposes 

to recast Quarter 4 billing determinants 

for the Nonpresort price category to be 

consistent with the disaggregated 

classification structure and cost models 

that prevailed during the first three 

quarters of FY 2009. It would do this by 

assigning the Quarter 4 Nonpresort 

volumes for zones 6 through 8 to the 

Inter-BMC volume distribution table in 

the billing determinants. The Quarter 4 

Nonpresort volumes for zones 1 through 

5 would be assigned to the Inter- and 

Intra-BMC categories in the same 

proportion that these categories 

exhibited in Quarters 1 through 3. See 

Proposal Thirty supporting material 

attached to the Petition. 

The Postal Service explains that 

imputing the disaggregated volume 

distribution of Quarters 1 through 3 to 

Quarter 4 will approximately annualize 

the results of the classification structure 

that prevailed during most of FY 2009. 

It notes that the overall effect of Parcel 

Select results will be small because the 

Inter- and Intra-BMC categories account 

for a very small proportion of total FY 

2009 Parcel Select volume. Id. 

II. Commission Analysis 

Proposal Thirty is a technical change 

to input data used in the Parcel Select 

cost models. It is designed to 

accommodate the transition of Parcel 

Select to a less disaggregated price 

structure. It is a one-time adjustment 

that will have no impact on cost 

estimation for Parcel Select going 

forward. The volume affected is small 

and unlikely to materially influence the 

financial results for Parcel Select for 

purposes of the FY 2009 Annual 

Compliance Report. 

The Commission sets January 8, 2010 

as the due date for public comments. 

Since Proposal Thirty does not appear 

to raise substantive issues, Proposal 

Thirty will be adopted as a final rule for 

purposes of reporting FY 2009 results if 

no adverse public comments are 

received by that date. 

III. Ordering Paragraphs 

It is ordered: 

1. The Petition of the United States 

Postal Service Requesting Initiation of a 

Proceeding to Consider a Proposed 

Change in Analytic Principles (Proposal 

Thirty), filed December 22, 2009, is 

granted. 

2. The Commission establishes Docket 

No. RM2010–7 to consider the matters 

raised in the Postal Service’s Petition. 

3. Interested persons may submit 

comments on Proposal Thirty no later 

than January 8, 2010. 

4. John Klingenberg is designated to 

serve as the Public Representative 

representing the interests of the general 

public. 

5. The Secretary shall arrange for 

publication of this Notice in the Federal 

Register. 

By the Commission. 

Shoshana M. Grove, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2010–179 Filed 1–6–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–S 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 175 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2009–0095 (HM–224F)] 

RIN 2137–AE44 

Hazardous Materials: Transportation of 

Lithium Batteries 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), is proposing to amend 

requirements in the Hazardous 

Materials Regulations (HMR) on the 

transportation of lithium cells and 

batteries, including lithium cells and 

batteries packed with or contained in 

equipment. The proposed changes are 

intended to enhance safety by ensuring 

that all lithium batteries are designed to 

withstand normal transportation 

conditions. This would include 

provisions to ensure all lithium batteries 

are packaged to reduce the possibility of 

damage that could lead to a catastrophic 

incident, and minimize the 

consequences of an incident. In 

addition, lithium batteries would be 

accompanied by hazard communication 

that ensures appropriate and careful 

handling by air carrier personnel, 

including the flight crew, and informs 

both transport workers and emergency 

response personnel of actions to be 

taken in an emergency. These proposals 

are largely consistent with changes 

made to the United Nations 

Recommendations on the Transport of 

Dangerous Goods (UN 

Recommendations) and the 

International Civil Aviation 

Organization Technical Instructions on 

the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods 

by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions) 

and respond to recommendations issued 

by the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB). 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

March 12, 2010. 

We are proposing a mandatory 

compliance date of 75 days after the 

date of publication of a final rule in the 

Federal Register. In this NPRM, we 

solicit comments from interested 

persons regarding the feasibility of the 

proposed compliance date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods: 


cprice-sewell on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 1303 

• Federal Rulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the on-line 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 1–202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management System; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Dockets Operations, M–30, Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590– 

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: To U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Dockets Operations, 

M–30, Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590–0001 between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

Instructions: Include the agency name 

and docket number PHMSA–2009–0095 

(HM–224F) or RIN 2137–AE44 for this 

rulemaking at the beginning of your 

comment. Note that all comments 

received will be posted without change 

to http://www.regulations.gov including 

any personal information provided. If 

sent by mail, comments must be 

submitted in duplicate. Persons wishing 

to receive confirmation of receipt of 

their comments must include a selfaddressed stamped postcard. 

Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search 

the electronic form of any written 

communications and comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

document (or signing the document, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477), or you may visit http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Docket: You may view the public 

docket through the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

Docket Operations office at the above 

address (See ADDRESSES). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Charles E. Betts or Kevin A. Leary, 

Office of Hazardous Materials 

Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration, 

telephone (202) 366–8553, or Janet 

McLaughlin, International & Outreach 

Division, Federal Aviation 

Administration, telephone 202–385– 

4897. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Contents 

I. Background 

A. The Safety Problem 

B. Overview of Current Regulations 

C. Ongoing Efforts To Evaluate Lithium 

Battery Risk 

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulatory 

Changes 

A. Summary of Proposals in This NPRM 

B. Evidence Preservation 

C. New Shipping Names 

D. Watt Hours Versus Equivalent Lithium 

Content 

E. Design Type Testing 

F. Elimination of Exceptions for Small 

Lithium Batteries 

G. Packaging and Stowage 

H. Consolidation of Lithium Battery 

Regulations 

I. Ongoing Safety Initiatives 

J. Compliance Date 

III. Regulatory Analyses and Notices 

A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This 

Rulemaking 

B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

C. Executive Order 13132 

D. Executive Order 13175 

E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive 

Order 13272, and DOT Procedures and 

Policies 

F. Paperwork Reduction Act 

G. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 

H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

I. Environmental Assessment 

J. Privacy Act 

K. International Trade Analysis 

I. Background 

A. The Safety Problem 

Lithium batteries are hazardous in 

transportation because they present both 

chemical (e.g., flammable electrolytes) 

and electrical hazards. If not safely 

packaged and handled, lithium batteries 

can present a significant risk in 

transportation. Batteries which are 

misused, mishandled, improperly 

packaged, improperly stored, 

overcharged, or defective can overheat 

and ignite and, once ignited, fires can be 

especially difficult to extinguish. 

Overheating has the potential to create 

a thermal runaway, a chain reaction 

leading to self-heating and release of the 

battery’s stored energy. In general, the 

risks posed by all batteries are a 

function of battery size and chemistry. 

The high energy density (i.e., high 

energy to weight ratio) of lithium 

batteries increases the consequences of 

a short circuit or fire posing a greater 

risk in transportation. 

Lithium batteries fall into one of two 

basic categories, lithium metal, 

including lithium alloy (also known as 

primary lithium batteries), and lithium 

ion, including lithium ion polymer (also 

known as secondary lithium batteries). 

As the name indicates, lithium metal 

batteries contain a small amount of 

metallic lithium or a lithium alloy. 

Batteries of this type are mostly nonrechargeable and these cells and 

batteries are often used in medical 

devices, computer memory and as 

replaceable batteries (AA and AAA size) 

suitable for electronic devices. The 

lithium content in these cells and 

batteries ranges from a fraction of a gram 

to a few grams and typical geometries 

include coin cells, cylindrical, and 

rectangular. Conversely, lithium ion 

cells and batteries contain a lithium 

compound (e.g., lithium cobalt dioxide, 

lithium iron phosphate) and they are 

generally rechargeable. Lithium ion 

batteries are mostly found in portable 

computers, mobile phones and power 

tools. Common configurations are 

cylindrical and rectangular. The size of 

a lithium ion battery is currently 

measured by equivalent lithium content. 

Equivalent lithium content is described 

in greater detail in Part II, Section C 

‘‘Watt Hours versus Equivalent Lithium 

Content.’’ 

Once used primarily in industrial and 

military applications, lithium batteries 

have become commonplace in consumer 

electronic devices because they have a 

much higher energy density compared 

to their predecessors (e.g., alkaline, 

nickel cadmium, and nickel metal 

hydride batteries). They are now found 

in a variety of popular consumer items, 

including cameras, notebook computers, 

and mobile telephones. The numbers, 

types, and sizes of lithium batteries 

moving in transportation have grown 

steadily in recent years with the 

increasing popularity of these and other 

portable devices and a corresponding 

proliferation of battery designs, 

manufacturers, and applications. An 

estimated 3.3 billion lithium cells and 

batteries were transported worldwide in 

2008 by all modes of transportation. On 

aircraft, lithium batteries are transported 

in shipments of batteries by themselves 

and they are also packed with or 

contained in battery powered 

equipment. Lithium batteries are also 

carried on board aircraft by passengers 

in portable electronic equipment and as 

spares; however these are not addressed 

in this rulemaking. 

As the demand for lithium batteries 

increases, so do the risks associated 

with their transportation, especially on 

board aircraft. The risk of transporting 

lithium batteries on-board aircraft 

increases with the increase in the 

number of batteries transported by air, 

given the assumption that the 

proportion of the number of correctly 

packaged shipments to the total number 

of shipments remains constant. In other 

words, an increase in the number of 

shipments will result in an increase in 

the number of incidents even if the 

incident rate remains the same since the 

number of incidents is a product of the 

incident rate and the total number of 

batteries transported. Moreover, 

increasing the proportion of flights that 

transport only one lithium battery 

shipment introduces a risk where 

previously there was none. The risk of 


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1304 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

multiple shipments on one aircraft 

increases the probability of an event 

within individual shipments, and also 

introduces the possibility of one 

defective shipment influencing other, 

properly packaged shipments on the 

same aircraft. 

The increasing manifestation of these 

risks, inside and outside of 

transportation, drives the need for 

stricter safety standards. Since 1991, 

PHMSA and the FAA have identified 

over 40 air transport-related incidents 

and numerous additional non-transport 

incidents involving lithium batteries 

and devices powered by lithium 

batteries. These incidents occurred, 

variously, aboard passenger aircraft and 

cargo aircraft, prior to loading batteries 

aboard an aircraft, and after batteries 

were transported by air. Twenty-one of 

these 44 incidents involved a passenger 

aircraft. These incidents occurred in the 

cabin of the airplane, in a passenger’s 

checked baggage, in the cargo area of the 

airplane or in the airport prior to 

boarding an aircraft. The incident data 

suggest overheating or damage to the 

device occurred immediately prior to 

the first indications of an incident. The 

remaining incidents involved lithium 

batteries transported aboard cargo 

aircraft. Many of these incidents were 

attributed to external short circuiting 

and several packages involved in the 

incidents were not subject to regulatory 

requirements for display of hazard 

communication markings or labels. It is 

important to note that while each single 

incident may appear relatively benign 

and while the overall incident numbers 

may appear small when compared to the 

total number of lithium batteries 

transported by aircraft each year, the 

incidents illustrate the short circuit and 

fire risks posed by lithium batteries and 

the potential for a serious incident that 

could result if the risks as not addressed 

through transportation safety controls. 

The following table shows a breakdown 

of these incidents: 

Passenger aircraft Cargo on 

passenger 

aircraft 

Cargo 

aircraft Grand total 

Carry-on Checked 

baggage 

Lithium Batteries ...................................................................................... 16 1 4 23 44 

A list of aviation incidents involving 

batteries reported to the FAA since 1991 

is available through the following URL: 

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ 

headquarters_offices/ash/ 

ash_programs/hazmat/aircarrier_info/. 

Besides these incidents involving air 

transportation of lithium batteries, there 

have been several recalls of lithium 

batteries used in notebook computers 

and other consumer commodities. The 

Consumer Product Safety Commission 

(CPSC) found that these batteries could 

spontaneously overheat and cause a fire, 

because of a manufacturing defect or 

when the battery is struck forcefully on 

the corner (e.g., a direct fall to the 

ground). 

In addition to incidents definitely 

attributed to lithium batteries, the NTSB 

investigated a February 7, 2006 incident 

at the Philadelphia International Airport 

in which a fire—suspected to have been 

caused by lithium batteries—destroyed 

a United Parcel Service cargo aircraft 

and most of its cargo. While the captain, 

first officer, and a flight engineer 

evacuated the airplane after landing, 

sustaining only minor injuries, the 

NTSB concluded that flight crews on 

cargo-only aircraft remain at risk from 

in-flight fires involving both primary 

(non-rechargeable) and secondary 

(rechargeable) lithium batteries. 

Following the incident investigation, 

NTSB issued the following 

recommendations to PHMSA: 

Safety Recommendation A–07–104: 

Require aircraft operators to implement 

measures to reduce the risk of primary 

lithium batteries becoming involved in fires 

on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting 

such batteries in fire resistant containers and/ 

or in restricted quantities at any single 

location on the aircraft. 

Safety Recommendation A–07–105: Until 

fire suppression systems are required on 

cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety 

Recommendation A–07–99, require that 

cargo shipments of secondary lithium 

batteries, including those contained in or 

packed with equipment, be transported in 

crew-accessible locations where portable fire 

suppression systems can be used. 

Safety Recommendation A–07–106: 

Require aircraft operators that transport 

hazardous materials to immediately provide 

consolidated and specific information about 

hazardous materials on board an aircraft, 

including proper shipping name, hazard 

class, quantity, number of packages, and 

location, to on-scene emergency responders 

upon notification of an accident or incident. 

Safety Recommendation A–07–107: 

Require commercial cargo and passenger 

operators to report to the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

all incidents involving primary and 

secondary lithium batteries, including those 

contained in or packed with equipment, that 

occur either on board or during loading or 

unloading operations and retain the failed 

items for evaluation purposes. 

Safety Recommendation A–07–108: 

Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and 

fires involving secondary and primary 

lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, 

take appropriate action to mitigate any risks 

determined to be posed by transporting 

secondary and primary lithium batteries, 

including those contained in or packed with 

equipment, on board cargo and passenger 

aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carryon items. 

Safety Recommendation A–07–109: 

Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the 

packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo 

shipments of small secondary lithium 

batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent 

lithium content) until the analysis of the 

failures and the implementation of risk-based 

requirements asked for in Safety 

Recommendation A–07–108 are completed. 

Safety Recommendation A–08–01: In 

collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers 

of lithium batteries and electronic devices, 

air travel associations, and other appropriate 

government and private organizations, 

establish a process to ensure wider, highly 

visible, and continuous dissemination of 

guidance and information to the air-traveling 

public, including flight crews, about the safe 

carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium 

batteries or electronic devices containing 

these batteries on board passenger aircraft. 

Safety Recommendation A–08–02: In 

collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers 

of lithium batteries and electronic devices, 

air travel associations, and other appropriate 

government and private organizations, 

establish a process to periodically measure 

the effectiveness of your efforts to educate 

the air-traveling public, including flight 

crews, about the safe carriage of secondary 

(rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic 

devices containing these batteries on board 

passenger aircraft. 

Most of the recent lithium battery 

incidents have been determined to 

originate from packages in noncompliant shipments of lithium 

batteries. As a result, many feel that 

additional regulations will not help 

lower the number of incidents. PHMSA 

and FAA believe non-compliance most 

often arises from confusion concerning 

the regulatory requirements. This 

confusion typically results from a lack 

of proper training. Currently, shippers 

of small-size lithium batteries are 

excepted from the training requirements 

in Subpart H of Part 172 of the HMR. 

The proposals in this NPRM would 

require these shippers to train 

employees who prepare lithium battery 

shipments for transportation to ensure 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 1305 

the employees are knowledgeable about 

all the applicable regulatory 

requirements and that shipments 

conform to those requirements. The 

training requirements would also apply 

to air carrier employees; thus, training 

in the requirements applicable to the 

transportation of small lithium batteries 

would be included in the currently 

required air carrier training for 

acceptance, handling, and loading and 

unloading lithium battery packages. 

The proposals in this NPRM would 

also subject packages of small-size 

lithium batteries to well-recognized 

hazardous materials marking and 

labeling requirements. These hazard 

communication provisions will ensure 

that packages of lithium batteries are 

placed into a well-established and highfunctioning cargo transportation system 

that provides for more careful handling, 

more precise record keeping, and more 

detailed tracking and reporting than is 

typically provided for non-hazardous 

cargo. 

In addition to markings and labels, 

the proposals in this NPRM would also 

require transport documentation to 

accompany a shipment of small-size 

lithium batteries. This includes notation 

of the presence and location of lithium 

batteries aboard the aircraft on the 

notice to the pilot in command (NOPIC). 

This will allow pilots and crew to make 

appropriate decisions in the event of an 

emergency. For example, if the flight 

crew identifies fire or smoke in a 

location where a lithium battery 

shipment is stowed, the crew can make 

an informed decision about the possible 

severity of the fire, whether the 

presence of lithium batteries could 

worsen the fire, and the time available 

to land the aircraft or take other 

emergency actions. The NOPIC also 

allows ground crew, firefighters and 

first responders to know how they 

should respond in case of an emergency 

because they will know not only that 

there are packages of lithium batteries 

aboard the aircraft, but also where on 

the aircraft these packages are located. 

The hazardous materials regulatory 

system has for decades proven its 

effectiveness in mitigating hazardous 

materials transportation risk. Shippers 

and operators understand this system 

and have included steps in their 

processes to ensure compliance. 

However, lithium batteries have largely 

operated outside of this structure 

through the use of exceptions. This 

current exception-based system has 

created a set of regulations that is not 

easily understood or enforced. This, 

coupled with the lack of required 

training, adds to the difficulty of 

ensuring compliance. PHMSA and FAA 

believe the system created specifically 

for the transportation of hazardous 

materials is sound and can be used to 

effectively mitigate the risk posed by 

lithium batteries in air transportation. 

B. Overview of Current Regulations 

Currently, the HMR address lithium 

battery transportation safety through 

design type testing, short circuit 

protection, limits on battery size, and 

limits on net and gross weight. The 

HMR provide exceptions for small cells 

and batteries often found in consumer 

electronic devices. 

Lithium batteries are regulated as a 

Class 9 material. Class 9 materials 

present a hazard during transportation 

but do not meet the definition of any 

other hazard class. The HMR prohibit 

the transport of primary lithium 

batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft 

unless packed with or contained in 

equipment. Packaging and design type 

testing requirements and exceptions for 

lithium batteries are found in § 173.185. 

For transportation by all modes, lithium 

batteries of all types and sizes must pass 

applicable tests in the UN Manual of 

Tests and Criteria. These tests are 

designed to ensure that the battery can 

withstand conditions normally 

encountered in transportation. In 

addition, the battery must be designed 

in a manner that precludes a violent 

rupture and must be equipped with an 

effective means of preventing external 

short circuits and a means to prevent 

reverse current flow if it contains cells 

that are connected in parallel. 

Batteries transported as a Class 9 

material must be packaged in 

combination packagings that conform to 

the performance standards specified in 

Part 178 of the HMR at the Packing 

Group II performance level. In addition, 

the batteries must be packaged so as to 

prevent short circuits, including 

movement that could lead to short 

circuits. A package containing lithium 

batteries must be labeled with a Class 9 

label and must be accompanied by a 

shipping paper that describes the 

lithium batteries being transported and 

emergency response information. The 

location and quantity of shipments must 

also be provided to the pilot in 

command. 

The HMR provide exceptions for 

lithium batteries based on the battery 

size and packing method. Generally, 

shipments of small lithium batteries are 

excepted from the specification 

packaging and hazard communication 

requirements outlined above provided 

each package containing more than 24 

lithium cells or 12 lithium batteries is: 

(1) Marked to indicate that it contains 

lithium batteries and that special 

procedures must be followed if the 

package is known to be damaged; (2) 

accompanied by a document indicating 

that the package contains lithium 

batteries and that special procedures 

must be followed if the package is 

known to be damaged; (3) no more than 

30 kilograms gross weight; and (4) 

capable of withstanding a 1.2 meter 

drop test in any orientation without 

shifting of the contents that would allow 

short-circuiting and without release of 

package contents. Further, each such 

package that contains a primary lithium 

battery or cell forbidden for transport 

aboard passenger carrying aircraft must 

be marked ‘‘PRIMARY LITHIUM 

BATTERIES—FORBIDDEN FOR 

TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER 

AIRCRAFT’’ or ‘‘LITHIUM METAL 

BATTERIES—FORBIDDEN FOR 

TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER 

AIRCRAFT.’’ The marking, 

documentation and 1.2 meter drop test 

requirements described above do not 

apply when these small cells or batteries 

are contained in a piece of equipment. 

For medium-size lithium batteries and 

cells transported by motor carrier or rail, 

the HMR provide exceptions similar to 

those for small lithium batteries. Under 

these exceptions, a package containing 

medium size lithium batteries and cells 

of all types must: (1) Be marked to 

indicate it contains lithium batteries 

and special procedures must be 

followed if the package is known to be 

damaged; (2) be accompanied by a 

document indicating the package 

contains lithium batteries and special 

procedures must be followed if the 

package is known to be damaged; (3) 

weigh no more than 30 kilograms; and 

(4) be capable of withstanding a 1.2 

meter drop test. For those packages that 

are not prepared for air shipment, (i.e., 

not offered and transported as a Class 9 

material) the HMR require the package 

to be marked to indicate that they may 

not be transported by aircraft or vessel. 

The marking, documentation and 1.2 

meter drop test requirements described 

above do not apply when these medium 

cells or batteries are contained in a 

piece of equipment. 

The exceptions for small and medium 

size lithium batteries described above 

are found in § 172.102 Special 

Provisions 188 and 189 respectively. 

Additional exceptions for special cases 

such as small production runs of 

batteries and specific aircraft quantity 

limitations are found in § 172.102, 

Special Provisions 29, A54, A55, A100, 

A101, A103, and A104. 

The current requirements in the HMR 

pertaining to the transport of lithium 

batteries reflect a number of actions 

taken by PHMSA and FAA in response 


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1306 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

to the past incidents and NTSB 

recommendations, aimed at reducing 

the risks posed by batteries and battery 

powered devices in transportation. 

These include— 

• Safety advisories issued by PHMSA 

to the public (64 FR 36743 [July 7, 

1999]; 72 FR 14167 [Mar. 26, 2007]) and 

by the FAA to the airline industry on 

July 2, 1999, May 23, 2002 and August 

3, 2007 to remind persons that batteries 

and electrical devices that contain 

batteries are prohibited for transport 

unless properly packaged to prevent the 

likelihood of creating sparks or 

generating dangerous heat. 

• Changes to UN Recommendations 

in 2000 and the 2003–04 ICAO 

Technical Instructions based on 

proposals by the United States which (1) 

revised battery testing requirements and 

required testing of small lithium 

batteries, (2) adopted hazard 

communication and packaging 

requirements for small batteries, (3) 

eliminated an exception for mediumsized batteries, and (4) adopted limited 

exceptions for passengers and crew to 

carry lithium batteries and batterypowered equipment aboard an aircraft. 

• A series of tests performed by FAA 

in 2004 concluded that the presence of 

a shipment of primary lithium batteries 

can significantly increase the severity of 

an in-flight cargo compartment fire and 

the fire suppression systems currently 

in use aboard passenger aircraft are 

ineffective. 

• PHMSA’s December 15, 2004 

interim final rule (69 FR 75208, 

correction, 71 FR 56894 [Sept. 28, 

2006]), based on the results of the FAA 

tests, adopted a limited prohibition on 

the transportation on passenger-carrying 

aircraft of primary lithium batteries. 

• Further testing by FAA in 2006 

concluded that flames produced by 

secondary lithium batteries and cells are 

hot enough to cause adjacent cells to 

vent and ignite, but currently approved 

fire suppression systems are effective on 

the electrolyte fire and prevent any 

additional fire from subsequent cell 

venting. 

• PHMSA’s August 9, 2007 final rule 

(72 FR 44930) finalized the December 

15, 2004 interim final rule and (1) 

adopted design type testing of all 

lithium batteries in accordance with 

international standards, and (2) revised 

the exception for consumer electronic 

devices and spare lithium batteries 

carried by passengers and crew. The 

preamble to this final rule also 

discussed in more detail some of the 

prior incidents during transportation of 

lithium batteries, the FAA testing 

programs, the recalls of notebook 

computer batteries, and the rulemaking 

changes up to that time. 

• PHMSA’s January 14, 2009 final 

rule (74 FR 2199) addressed NTSB 

safety recommendations A–07–106 and 

A–07–107 by requiring an air carrier, in 

the event of a serious incident, to make 

immediately available to an authorized 

official of a federal, state, or local 

government agency (including an 

emergency responder), the shipping 

papers and notice to pilot in command 

or the information contained in those 

documents. This requirement represents 

a proactive approach to information 

dissemination similar to that in the 

ICAO Technical Instructions. This final 

rule also added a requirement to report 

all incidents that result in a fire, violent 

rupture, explosion or dangerous 

evolution of heat (i.e., an amount of heat 

sufficient to be dangerous to packaging 

or personal safety to include charring of 

packaging, melting of packaging, 

scorching of packaging, or other 

evidence) that occurs as a direct result 

of a battery or battery-powered device. 

Additionally, the final rule amended 

regulatory requirements to clarify 

acceptable methods for packaging 

batteries to protect against short circuits 

and overheating and required the 

reporting of certain incidents involving 

batteries or battery powered devices. 

PHMSA set forth examples of methods 

to prevent short circuit and damage 

(such as individually packaging each 

battery, securely covering terminals 

with non-conductive caps or tape, or 

designing batteries with terminals that 

are recessed or otherwise protected) 

appropriate for all batteries. 

• PHMSA and FAA have also 

conducted a campaign to educate the 

public about ways to reduce lithium 

battery transportation risks. On 

February 22, 2007; April 26, 2007; May 

24–25 2007; and April 11, 2008, 

PHMSA hosted meetings with public 

and private sector stakeholders who 

share our concern for the safe 

transportation of batteries and battery 

powered devices. The meetings 

provided an opportunity for 

representatives of the NTSB, CPSC, 

manufacturers of batteries and battery 

powered devices, airlines, airline 

employee organizations (e.g., pilots and 

flight attendants), testing laboratories, 

and the emergency response and law 

enforcement communities to share and 

disseminate information concerning 

battery related risks and developments. 

The amendments to the HMR adopted 

since 2004 have produced positive 

results, but they addressed only very 

specific issues and specific transport 

contexts. The proposals outlined in this 

NPRM are intended to comprehensively 

address the hazards posed by lithium 

batteries in all modes of transportation 

and further reduce the likelihood and 

the consequences of a battery related 

fire in transportation. In this NPRM, 

PHMSA plans to address safety 

recommendations A–07–104, A–07–105, 

A–07–108 and A–07–109. 

In addition to the safety measures 

identified in this NPRM, PHMSA and 

FAA are considering additional safety 

standards. Many of these additional 

measures affect multiple transport 

modes, including aviation. As we 

develop these concepts we will 

continue to work with the appropriate 

international transportation standardssetting bodies, such as the United 

Nations Subcommittee of Experts on the 

Transport of Dangerous Goods 

(UNSCOE TDG) and the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

Dangerous Goods Panel, to encourage 

their world-wide acceptance. These 

additional measures may include: 

• Establishing a new system for the 

classification of articles, such as lithium 

batteries that have the potential to 

produce heat and fire. 

• Determining the feasibility of 

developing performance standards for 

fire resistant containers that can be used 

for the transport of lithium cells and 

batteries of all types and all other 

flammable materials on board aircraft. 

• Examining the role of packaging in 

preventing damage and short circuits to 

lithium cells and batteries. 

C. Ongoing Efforts To Evaluate Lithium 

Battery Risk 

As previously mentioned, PHMSA 

and FAA have identified 44 air 

transport related incidents and 

numerous additional non-transport 

incidents involving lithium batteries 

and lithium battery powered devices. 

The January 14, 2009 final rule required 

air carriers to report all incidents that 

result in a fire, violent rupture, 

explosion or dangerous evolution of 

heat that occur as a result of a battery 

or a battery powered device. In addition 

to requiring an incident report NTSB, 

A–07–107 recommends PHMSA require 

air carriers retain the failed items for 

evaluation purposes. We have concerns 

with requiring a person involved in an 

incident reported under §§ 171.15 or 

171.16 to maintain in a secure manner 

items or packages especially if the item 

is an airline passenger’s property. Such 

a requirement would impose additional 

responsibility on the air carrier to 

maintain possession of the item or 

package in a secure manner. Currently, 

when an incident occurs, DOT works 

with the person in physical possession 

of the item such as a battery or device 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 1307 

to ensure the incident is thoroughly 

documented and when the air carrier 

has accepted the property (68 FR 9735) 

it is maintained and in some instances 

transported for evaluation. Depending 

on the nature and severity of the 

incident we work with carriers on a 

case-by-case basis to collect and analyze 

evidence as appropriate and we 

continue to seek ways to improve the 

quality and consistency of data we 

receive. As part of this NPRM, PHMSA 

seeks comments on how this data 

collection could be improved. 

The proposals in this NPRM are 

intended to address the root causes of 

lithium battery incidents. The available 

incident data suggest the most likely 

causes of lithium battery incidents are: 

1. External short circuiting—occurs when 

an exposed battery terminal contacts a metal 

object. When this happens, the battery can 

heat up and may cause ignition of the battery 

and/or the surrounding combustible 

materials. 

2. In-use situation—generally relating to 

improper ‘‘charging’’ and/or ‘‘discharging’’ 

conditions associated with the use of 

equipment (e.g., computer or cell phone). 

This also includes inadvertent activation and 

subsequent overheating (such was the case 

when a power drill activated and burned in 

a passenger’s checked baggage). 

3. Non-compliance—includes faulty design 

of the battery (cells or battery packs), false 

certification of compliance with regulatory 

testing/classification requirements, and 

improper packing and handling including 

some counterfeit batteries. 

4. Internal short circuit—can be caused by 

foreign matter introduced into a cell or 

battery during the manufacturing process. An 

internal short circuit can also occur when a 

battery is physically damaged (e.g. dropped 

or punctured). 

As noted in the previous section, 

FAA’s Technical Center initiated a 

series of tests to evaluate the risk posed 

by lithium batteries involved in an 

unrelated fire. FAA completed a study 

in 2004 to assess the flammability 

characteristics of bulk packed primary 

lithium batteries and a second study in 

2006 examining the flammability 

characteristics of bulk packed secondary 

lithium batteries. In both studies the 

tests were designed to simulate the 

behavior of the batteries in an 

environment that is similar to actual 

conditions possible in an aircraft cargo 

compartment fire. Both the 2004 and 

2006 test reports are available at the 

following url: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/ 

reports/reports.asp. 

In the case of primary lithium 

batteries, the FAA tests showed that the 

packaging materials delayed the ignition 

of the batteries, but eventually added to 

the fire and contributed to battery 

ignition, even after the original (alcohol) 

fire had been exhausted. In addition, the 

packaging material held the batteries 

together, allowing the plastic outer 

coating to fuse the batteries together. 

This enhanced the probability of a 

burning battery igniting adjacent 

batteries, increasing the propagation 

rate. The technical report concluded 

that the presence of a shipment of 

primary lithium batteries can 

significantly increase the severity of an 

in-flight cargo compartment fire. In 

addition, the report concluded that 

primary lithium batteries pose a unique 

threat in the cargo compartment of an 

aircraft because primary lithium battery 

fires cannot be suppressed by means of 

Halon, the only FAA-certified fire 

suppression system permitted for use in 

cargo compartments of a passengercarrying aircraft operating in the United 

States. 

The second study completed in 2006 

used a similar methodology to 

determine the flammability of secondary 

lithium batteries and cells. The testing 

demonstrated that flames produced by 

the batteries are hot enough to cause 

adjacent cells to vent and ignite. The 

testing also demonstrated that Halon is 

effective in suppressing the electrolyte 

fire and preventing any additional fire 

from subsequent cell venting. The 

lithium ion cells will continue to vent 

due to high temperatures but will not 

ignite in the presence of Halon. 

We are aware of additional testing 

conducted in 2004 and 2005 

independent of the FAA or PHMSA to 

assess the effect of a battery’s state of 

charge on its overall risk. The 2004 

preliminary report titled ‘‘Effect of Cell 

State of Charge on Outcome of Internal 

Cell Faults’’ concluded the severity of 

the result of an internal short circuit is 

strongly affected by the state of charge. 

The Draft 2005 report titled ‘‘US FAA 

Style Flammability Assessment of 

Lithium Ion Cells and Battery Packs in 

Aircraft Cargo Holds’’ concluded: (1) 

Direct flame impingement on small 

unpackaged quantities of lithium ion 

cells and battery packs can lead to 

thermal runaway; (2) Halon 1301 is 

effective at controlling burning lithium 

ion cells; (3) the fires had a minimal 

effect on bulk packaged lithium ion 

cells with less than 50% state of charge; 

and (4) the aircraft liner typically used 

on commercial aircraft is capable of 

withstanding burning gases discharged 

from venting lithium ion cells and 

batteries. A copy of this analysis is 

available for review in the docket of this 

rulemaking. 

The FAA results with lithium ion 

batteries at 100% state of charge 

exposed to a fire showed similar, but 

more forceful results (i.e. more sparks, 

and more forceful cell venting). FAA 

and other test data on lithium ion cells 

and batteries suggest that state of charge 

affects their behavior under abuse 

conditions. PHMSA recognizes this fact 

and commonly requires transport at a 

reduced state of charge as a condition of 

competent authority approvals issued 

for the transport of extremely large 

lithium ion batteries found in vehicles 

and military and aerospace equipment. 

To date, we are not aware of any data 

that can be used to suggest a reduced 

state of charge affects the behavior of 

primary lithium batteries under abuse 

conditions. 

The United Kingdom Civil Aviation 

Authority completed a report in 2003 

titled: ‘‘Dealing with In-Flight Lithium 

Battery Fires in Portable Electronic 

Devices.’’ The test results verified the 

effectiveness of existing fire 

extinguishing agents in responding to an 

in-flight fire involving a lithium battery 

powered portable electronic device. The 

report also concluded that the safety 

systems inherent to lithium batteries 

and battery powered devices decrease 

the likelihood of a fire, but since there 

is a potential for a fire, these devices 

must be considered a potential risk in 

flight and during ground based 

operations. If a fire does occur in the 

aircraft cabin, the force of the explosion 

is not sufficient to cause structural 

damage to the aircraft, but there is a risk 

the fire could spread to adjacent 

flammable material such as clothing and 

seats and flames and fumes from 

burning batteries pose a hazard to 

passengers in the immediate vicinity. 

The UK CAA testing, combined with 

additional research from the FAA has 

formed the basis for improved response 

procedures and cabin crew fire fighting 

training. Since 2007, the International 

Federation of Airline Pilots Associations 

has issued several safety bulletins with 

updated recommendations for flight 

crew actions. In March of 2009, the FAA 

released a training video recreating inflight scenarios which includes actual 

lithium battery fires and appropriate 

response measures. All of these test 

reports are available for review in the 

public docket for this rulemaking. 

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulatory 

Changes 

A. Summary of Proposals in This NPRM 

In this NPRM, we propose a number 

of provisions to enhance the safe 

transportation of lithium batteries. The 

proposals are intended to reform the 

current regulatory framework specific to 

lithium batteries and strengthen the 

regulations by eliminating certain 

exceptions. These revisions will 


cprice-sewell on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
1308 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

a In 2006, separate shipping descriptions for 

lithium metal batteries and lithium ion batteries 

were adopted into the UN Recommendations. The 

International Civil Aviation Organization and the 

International Maritime Organization subsequently 

adopted these shipping descriptions. All references 

to primary or secondary lithium batteries in 

international regulations were revised to reflect this 

change. 

enhance safety by ensuring that all 

lithium batteries are designed to 

withstand normal transportation 

conditions, packaged to reduce the 

possibility of damage that could lead to 

an incident, and accompanied by hazard 

communication information that 

ensures appropriate and careful 

handling by air carrier personnel and 

informs transport workers and 

emergency response personnel of 

actions to be taken in an emergency. 

The additional hazard communication 

information will also provide the pilot 

in command with additional 

information about the location and 

quantity of lithium batteries should an 

unrelated fire require emergency 

measures. Several of the proposals are 

based on recommendations issued by 

the NTSB. Specifically, in this NPRM, 

we propose to: 

• Revise current shipping 

descriptions for lithium batteries 

(UN3090), lithium batteries packed with 

equipment (UN3091), and lithium 

batteries contained in equipment 

(UN3091) to specify lithium metal 

batteries including lithium alloy 

batteries as appropriate.a

• Adopt shipping descriptions for 

lithium ion batteries including lithium 

ion polymer batteries (UN3480), lithium 

ion batteries packed with equipment 

including lithium ion polymer batteries 

(UN3481), lithium ion batteries 

contained in equipment including 

lithium ion polymer batteries 

(UN3481).a

• Adopt watt-hours in place of 

equivalent lithium content to measure 

the relative hazard of lithium ion cells 

and batteries. 

• Incorporate by reference the latest 

revisions to the United Nations Manual 

of Tests and Criteria applicable to the 

design type testing of lithium cells and 

batteries. 

• Adopt and revise various 

definitions including ‘‘Aggregate lithium 

content’’ ‘‘Lithium content’’, ‘‘Lithium 

ion cell or battery’’, ‘‘Lithium metal cell 

or battery’’, ‘‘Short circuit’’, and ‘‘Watthour’’ based on definitions found in the 

UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. 

• Require manufacturers to retain 

results of satisfactory completion of UN 

design type tests for each lithium cell 

and battery type and place a mark on 

the battery and/or cell to indicate testing 

has been completed successfully. 

PHMSA and the FAA will coordinate 

with the appropriate international 

organizations to ensure consistency. 

• For air transportation, eliminate 

regulatory exceptions for lithium cells 

and batteries, other than certain 

exceptions for extremely small lithium 

cells and batteries that are shipped in 

very limited quantities such as button 

cells and other small batteries that are 

packed with or contained in equipment 

and those required for operational use 

in accordance with applicable 

airworthiness requirements and 

operating regulations. 

• For all transport modes, require 

lithium cells and batteries to be packed 

to protect the cell or battery from short 

circuits. 

• Unless transported in a container 

approved by the FAA Administrator, 

when transported aboard aircraft, limit 

stowage of lithium cells and batteries to 

crew accessible cargo locations or 

locations equipped with an FAA 

approved fire suppression system. 

• Consolidate and simplify current 

and revised lithium battery 

requirements into one section of the 

HMR. 

• Apply appropriate safety measures 

for the transport of lithium cells or 

batteries identified as being defective for 

safety reasons, or those that have been 

damaged or are otherwise being 

returned to the manufacturer. 

To expedite compliance with the 

amendments in this notice, we are 

proposing a mandatory compliance date 

of 75 days after the date of publication 

of the final. The following sections 

discuss these changes in detail: 

B. Evidence Preservation 

In this NPRM, in § 171.21, we propose 

to require a shipper, carrier, package 

owner or person reporting an incident 

under the provisions of §§ 171.15 or 

171.16 to provide upon request, by an 

authorized representative of the Federal, 

State or local government agency 

reasonable assistance in investigating 

the damaged package or article, if 

available. 

C. New Shipping Names 

Currently, under the HMR, lithium 

metal batteries and lithium ion batteries 

share the same UN number. However, 

differences in chemistry, functionality, 

and behavior when exposed to a fire are 

well documented. Based in part on the 

previously mentioned FAA fire tests, 

PHMSA imposed additional 

requirements on lithium metal (primary) 

batteries including prohibiting them 

from transportation aboard passenger 

aircraft, unless packed with or 

contained in equipment. The fact that 

both lithium metal and lithium ion 

batteries share the same UN number yet 

are regulated differently has the 

potential to cause problems in 

acceptance procedures for carriers and 

may unnecessarily hinder or delay the 

transportation of these products. 

In 2006, the UN Recommendations 

adopted separate shipping names and ID 

numbers for lithium metal and lithium 

ion batteries. The ICAO and the 

International Maritime Organization 

subsequently adopted these entries into 

their respective dangerous goods lists 

effective January 1, 2009. While the 

HMR permit the use of the ICAO 

Technical Instructions and the 

International Maritime Dangerous 

Goods (IMDG) Code for international 

and for domestic transportation when a 

portion of the transportation is by 

aircraft or vessel, subsequent domestic 

reshipping of packages containing 

lithium batteries remains difficult. 

In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to 

provide two separate entries in the 

hazardous materials table for primary 

lithium batteries, now referred to as 

‘‘lithium metal batteries’’ and secondary 

lithium batteries, now referred to as 

‘‘lithium ion batteries’’. Separate entries 

for lithium metal and lithium ion 

batteries will facilitate the 

transportation of these materials 

through various modes, both 

domestically and internationally, and 

enable the application of different 

emergency response actions. We will 

replace all references to ‘‘primary 

lithium batteries’’ with ‘‘lithium metal 

batteries’’ and all references to 

‘‘secondary lithium batteries’’ with 

‘‘lithium ion batteries’’. 

D. Watt Hours Versus Equivalent 

Lithium Content 

When requirements for lithium ion 

batteries were first adopted into the 

HMR, it was necessary to provide an 

indication of the lithium content in each 

cell and battery. Since lithium ion 

batteries do not contain metallic 

lithium, an expression of lithium 

content analogous to lithium metal 

batteries was devised. This term became 

known as equivalent lithium content 

(ELC), also known as lithium equivalent 

content. The ELC of a lithium ion cell 

measured in grams is calculated to be 

0.3 times the rated capacity in ampere 

hours. The ELC of a lithium ion battery 

equals the sum of the grams of ELC 

contained in the component cells of the 

battery. Although the term equivalent 

lithium content is used in the HMR, this 

term is not widely used or understood 

and can lead to confusion when 

calculating the ELC of a battery. For 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 1309 

bAs previously discussed, shipments of small 

lithium cells and batteries have been prohibited on 

passenger-carrying aircraft since December 15, 

2004, but, before October 1, 2009, small lithium 

cells and batteries that met certain limited 

packaging and hazard communication conditions 

could be shipped by surface transportation (and 

small secondary lithium cells and batteries could be 

shipped on cargo-only aircraft), without being 

subject to the testing requirements in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria. Small lithium cells 

and batteries were defined as follows: Cells with up 

to 1 g lithium (primary) or 1.5 equivalent lithium 

content (ELC) (secondary); batteries with up to 2 g 

lithium (primary) or 8 g ELC. 

example, the aggregate ELC for a lithium 

ion battery consisting of multiple cells 

within a battery can be difficult to 

calculate based solely on the amperehour capacity of the battery. Information 

on the ampere-hour capacity of the 

component cells within a battery is not 

normally provided and the ampere-hour 

capacity of a battery can change 

depending on the configuration of 

component cells within a battery. 

PHMSA proposes to adopt a 

methodology for determining the 

relative strengths of lithium ion 

batteries using measurements of watthours rather than ELC. The term watthour, expressed as (Wh) is commonly 

used in electrical applications. The 

watt-hour value of a lithium ion cell or 

battery is determined by multiplying a 

cell or battery’s rated capacity in 

ampere-hours, by its nominal voltage. 

Therefore, watt-hour (Wh) = amperehour (Ah) × Volts (V). This product is 

easy to calculate for both cells and 

batteries and the watt-hour 

measurement is independent of how the 

component cells within a lithium ion 

battery are connected. 

PHMSA further proposes to replace 

the term equivalent lithium content, or 

lithium equivalent content and 

aggregate equivalent content each place 

it appears with watt-hour and replace 

the equivalent lithium content values 

with their equivalent watt-hour values. 

These proposals are consistent with 

proposals already adopted in the UN 

Recommendations, ICAO Technical 

Instructions, and IMDG Code. 

E. Design Type Testing 

Each lithium cell or battery is 

required to be of a type proven to meet 

the requirements of each test in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria.b These 

tests are designed to ensure that the 

cells and batteries will withstand 

exposure to severe environmental 

conditions encountered during transport 

without resulting in a short circuit or a 

rupture. A comparison of the battery 

appearance before and after these tests 

is intended to detect battery damage 

such as leakage or abnormal venting, 

disintegration, cracking, swelling or 

distortion of the battery pack, or any 

other observation that could indicate the 

occurrence of an internal short circuit or 

constitute a transportation safety 

hazard. Certain tests, including altitude 

simulation, thermal, vibration and 

shock tests are designed to simulate 

extremes that may be encountered 

during transport. External short circuit, 

impact, overcharge and forced discharge 

tests are included, as these conditions 

contribute to short circuits and other 

potentially hazardous conditions. 

An informal lithium battery working 

group of the United Nations 

Subcommittee of Experts on the 

Transport of Dangerous Goods 

(UNSCOE TDG) met in November 2008 

and again in April 2009 to discuss the 

test methods relevant to lithium cells 

and batteries as contained in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria. The group 

concluded that while the design type 

tests outlined in the UN Manual of Tests 

and Criteria adequately address safety 

concerns involving lithium cells and 

batteries, they can be improved based 

on an evolving understanding and use 

of lithium battery technology. 

Recently, interest in adding an 

internal short circuit test into the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria has grown. 

Several different tests have been 

developed; however, each method has 

strengths and weaknesses including 

repeatability and the ability to control 

the mechanism of the internal short 

circuit. While no consensus has been 

reached on this subject, research and 

discussion continues. Once a reliable 

internal short circuit test method is 

developed and incorporated into the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria, we will 

consider adopting this additional test 

into the HMR. We invite commenters to 

address issues related to the 

development of an internal short circuit 

test, including recommendations on an 

appropriate and effective test 

methodology, real-world experience in 

applying such a test, and the costs that 

would be associated with an additional 

test requirement. 

In December 2008, the UN Committee 

of Experts adopted several amendments 

to section 38.3 of the UN Manual of 

Tests and Criteria (fourth revised 

edition), which we propose to 

incorporate by reference in § 171.7. 

These changes include: 

• Modifications to the terms 

‘‘module’’ and ‘‘battery assembly’’, new 

definitions for the terms ‘‘large battery’’ 

and ‘‘small battery’’ and modifications to 

the testing protocol for large batteries 

and battery assemblies. 

• Revised criteria for a different 

design type by adding additional criteria 

for rechargeable lithium cells and 

batteries that would trigger a new round 

of design-type testing. 

Currently, the UN Manual of Tests 

and Criteria specifies that a change from 

a tested design type of 0.1 grams or 20% 

by mass to the anode, the cathode, or 

electrolyte material constitutes a change 

in the design of the battery requiring 

design-type testing. A change that 

would materially affect the test results 

is also considered a new design type 

requiring retesting. While we continue 

to believe in the importance of 

harmonization with international 

standards, we believe a change of 20% 

by mass to the anode, cathode, or 

electrolyte material by mass is too high. 

Additionally, the language referencing a 

‘‘change that would materially affect the 

test results’’ remains too broad and 

leaves a great deal to interpretation from 

the individual cell or battery 

manufacturer or assembler. In this 

NPRM we propose to require a change 

of 0.1 grams or 5% by mass to the anode 

cathode or electrolyte material from a 

tested design type to constitute a new 

design and require retesting. Depending 

on the lithium content, such a change 

would affect the test results. In addition, 

we propose to include the examples of 

changes that could materially affect the 

test results developed by the informal 

UN working group. These examples 

include: 

• A change in the material of the 

anode, the cathode, the separator, or the 

electrolyte; 

• A change of protective devices, 

including hardware and software; 

• A change of safety design in cells or 

batteries, such as a venting valve; 

• A change in the number of 

component cells; 

• A change in connecting mode of 

component cells. 

In recent years, lithium battery 

technology has been developed for use 

in electric vehicles, hybrid electric 

vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric 

vehicles. The batteries now being 

utilized in hybrid electric vehicles are 

assemblies that include systems of 

electronic controllers, sensors, air flow 

ducts, cabling, cell mounting fixtures, 

cells, trays, covers, and attachment 

brackets and are much larger than 

lithium batteries found in consumer 

electronic devices (vehicle battery sizes 

generally have a gross mass between 14 

kg and 80 kg). While the current UN 

Test standards and the HMR are broad 

enough in scope to accommodate 

extremely large batteries and 

assemblies, some believe the forces 

required by some of the UN tests are 

excessive and certain HMR 

requirements hamper the commercial 

development of this technology. 


cprice-sewell on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
1310 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 6 / Monday, January 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Because these new lithium battery 

applications may require modifications 

to the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria 

and revisions to the HMR, we issue 

competent authority approvals on a 

case-by-case basis and continue to 

actively participate in the advancement 

of modified testing schemes and 

practical methods that support the 

development of this technology without 

compromising safety. Based on 

transportation experience gained 

through competent authority approvals, 

we may consider revising the HMR to 

more adequately address these 

scenarios, provided we can do so 

without creating adverse safety 

consequences. 

The cell and battery design type tests 

outlined in the UN Manual of Tests and 

Criteria are generally completed prior to 

the initial shipment of a battery from the 

manufacturer. While we believe most 

cell and battery manufacturers ensure 

the appropriate tests are conducted and 

the batteries and devices are safe for 

use, we remain uncertain that all 

manufacturers or battery assemblers 

take such steps or are even aware of the 

need to test each battery design type. 

We also remind battery manufacturers 

and assemblers that each lithium battery 

design-type is subject to the tests in the 

UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, even 

if the cells that make up the battery have 

been tested. 

In this NPRM, we propose to require 

cell and battery manufacturers to retain 

evidence of satisfactory completion of 

each of the lithium cell and battery 

design type tests outlined in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria. This 

evidence must be maintained in a 

readily accessible location at the 

principal place of business for as long 

as the lithium batteries are offered for 

transportation in commerce and for one 

year thereafter. Each person required to 

maintain this evidence must make this 

information available for inspection by 

a representative of a federal, state or 

local government agency. Since cell and 

battery design type tests already must be 

completed prior to transport we do not 

believe this should be a particularly 

burdensome requirement. 

Additionally, we are considering a 

requirement for a visible quality mark to 

appear on the outside case of each cell 

or battery. This mark would signify 

successful completion of the required 

lithium battery design type tests in a 

readily recognizable manner. Visible 

quality marks on electronic devices are 

very common. Familiar examples 

include the UL symbol meaning a 

particular product has been evaluated 

and representative samples have been 

tested by Underwriters Laboratories and 

those products meet particular 

requirements for safety and quality. The 

CE marking certifies compliance with 

certain European Union Directives. For 

the purposes of lithium design type 

testing, we are considering requiring a 

UN symbol, identical to the symbol 

currently required on UN packagings 

and UN cylinders to appear on all cells 

and batteries that have met each of the 

design type tests prescribed in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria. Below is 

an example of the mark we are 

considering: 

This mark is readily recognized 

throughout the world and is generally 

associated with hazardous materials 

transportation. The intended effect of 

these new provisions is to promote 

knowledge of the UN Tests throughout 

the world and enhance compliance with 

these important safety standards. We 

intend to develop proposals for a quality 

mark and associated documentation for 

inclusion in the UN Model Regulations 

and the UN Manual of Tests and 

Criteria. We invite commenters to 

address these concepts. Based on 

comments from the public in response 

to this notice and discussion with the 

UN SCOE TDG, we may adopt the UN 

Marking or a similar mark in the final 

rule. 

F. Elimination of Exceptions for Small 

Lithium Batteries 

As noted above, since October 1, 

2009, the HMR except small lithium 

cells and batteries from most HMR 

requirements provided the cells or 

batteries meet the test requirements in 

the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria and 

the shipment conforms to minimal 

packaging and hazard communication 

requirements (see Special Provision 188 

in § 172.102(c)). Consistent with NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–07–109, in 

this NPRM we propose to eliminate the 

regulatory exceptions for lithium cells 

and batteries when transported aboard 

aircraft. Thus, small lithium batteries 

and cells would be required to be 

offered for transportation as Class 9 

materials and would be subject to the 

requirements for lithium cells and 

batteries in § 173.185, including the 

packaging requirements discussed in the 

next section and the hazard 

communication requirements (shipping 

papers, package marking and labeling) 

that apply to shipments of Class 9 

materials. 

In cargo transportation, generally 

packages are treated as either regulated 

hazardous materials or non-regulated 

general cargo. Packages that display a 

hazardous materials label are typically 

handled in a separate cargo stream to 

ensure more direct oversight than nonregulated cargo. Those materials that are 

regulated as hazardous materials are 

recognized by handlers, who ensure that 

proper precautions are taken and the 

package is handled in accordance with 

all applicable regulatory requirements. 

The proposals outlined in this NPRM 

have the net effect of moving a discrete 

number of shipments of lithium cells 

and batteries that are currently handled 

as general cargo into the hazardous 

material transport system. When lithium 

batteries are offered for transportation as 

a Class 9 material, the package itself 

provides a clear indication of the 

presence of hazardous material that is 

readily recognized by transport workers 

and ensures these packages are handled 

in a manner appropriate to their hazard. 

This also ensures that individuals 

responsible for ensuring the safety of 

these packages are appropriately trained 

in accordance with the HMR. We 

believe most air carriers who accept 

lithium batteries for transportation also 

accept other hazardous materials for 

transportation and already have the 

necessary personnel and procedures in 

place to handle these packages safely. 

Thus, the requirement to identify and 

package lithium batteries as Class 9 

materials provides significant safety 

benefits without imposing large 

additional costs on air carriers. 

Air carriers are required during the 

certification process to declare in their 

Operating Specifications if a business 

decision has been made to ‘‘carry 

hazardous materials’’ or a business 

decision has been made ‘‘to prohibit the 

carriage of hazardous material’’. Each air 

carrier who elects to carry hazardous 

material must include handling 

procedures, incident reporting 

procedures, and other information in its 

operations manual for the appropriate 

personnel to follow, as well as a 

hazardous material training program 

that is approved by FAA and provided 

every 24 months to all appropriate 

persons. This training would include 

recognition of all hazard 

communication information that would 

be associated with lithium battery 

shipments as they are trained to 

recognize all hazard class labels, 

marking and documentation. 

Under the HMR, materials that pose a 

specific and serious air transportation 


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risk are regulated more stringently than 

materials that pose less of a risk when 

transported by air. Lithium batteries are 

a current exception to this standard. The 

need to fully regulate these items and to 

aggressively enforce all applicable 

regulatory requirements is critical to air 

safety. Once lithium batteries are fully 

regulated, enforcement agencies will be 

able to take appropriate action against 

non-compliant shipments, reducing the 

number of non-compliant packages and 

therefore, reducing the number of 

lithium battery incidents. 

We note the ICAO Technical 

Instructions include provisions for 

certain lithium cells and batteries, 

provided outer packages are marked 

with a lithium battery handling label. 

This handling label shown below notes 

the presence of lithium batteries and 

communicates a fire hazard if damaged. 

While this handling label is not 

specifically authorized by the HMR, we 

believe that it complements the basic 

intent of identifying the materials 

adequately for emergency response and 

we would permit packages containing 

lithium batteries to display the lithium 

battery handling label in addition to the 

markings and labels required by the 

HMR. The ICAO lithium battery 

handling label is displayed below: 

The Class 9 label would alert 

transport workers to the presence of a 

hazardous material and should result in 

more careful handling and stowage. 

Shipping papers would provide written 

notice to the pilot in command of the 

presence of lithium batteries and the 

type, location and number of packages 

of lithium batteries on board the aircraft. 

The NOPIC serves as a valuable tool to 

relay information about the hazardous 

materials on board an aircraft to first 

response personnel and provide critical 

safety information when making 

decisions in emergency situations. The 

additional information will also assist 

carriers in the acceptance and handling 

of shipments. The hazardous material 

regulatory system has been effective in 

mitigating risk for decades. Shippers 

and carriers understand this system and 

have included steps in their processes to 

ensure compliance and safety. 

Operating outside of the regulatory 

structure has created a safety 

environment that is haphazard, at best, 

and a set of requirements that is not 

easily understood. The lack of required 

training only adds to the difficulty. 

PHMSA and FAA believe the current 

system for the transportation of 

hazardous materials is sound and can be 

used to effectively mitigate the risk 

posed by the batteries in air 

transportation. 

A requirement for small lithium 

batteries and cells to be transported as 

Class 9 materials will have significant 

safety benefits that will more than offset 

any additional transportation costs that 

may result. PHMSA invites comments 

on the impacts associated with 

elimination of existing regulatory 

exceptions and the risk reduction 

benefits associated with eliminating the 

exceptions. 

To reduce compliance costs and 

facilitate multimodal transportation 

without sacrificing safety, in 

§ 173.185(d) we propose to specify 

provisions for the transportation of 

lithium cells and batteries by highway, 

rail and vessel consistent with the IMDG 

Code. In addition, we propose specific 

requirements for extremely small 

batteries with very low energy (e.g., less 

than 0.3 grams or 3.7 Wh) when packed 

with or contained in equipment. When 

contained in equipment, these types of 

batteries are often embedded into circuit 

boards and are well protected from 

damage and pose a negligible risk. We 

are seeking comments on whether 

certain exceptions are appropriate from 

a risk and cost perspective. Such 

exceptions would include lithium ion 

batteries shipped at a reduced state of 

charge (e.g. less than 50% state of 

charge) or ‘‘very low energy’’ batteries 

(3.7Wh) packed or contained in 

equipment. 

On December 15, 2008, we received a 

petition (P–1533) from the Air Transport 

Association of America and the 

Regional Airline Association requesting 

we amend the HMR to permit airlines to 

carry a limited number of small lithium 

batteries in the aircraft cabin in a 

constant state of readiness with 

adequate backup power for the duration 

of the flight. The petition states such 

necessary equipment includes 

electronic flight bags, onboard medical 

monitoring devices, portable oxygen 

concentrators, personal entertainment 

devices and credit card readers. We 

agree a need exists for airlines to use 

and maintain certain types of equipment 

that are increasingly powered by 

lithium batteries. Under Federal 

Aviation Regulations, these devices 

must be approved by the FAA to ensure 

they will not cause interference with the 

navigation or communication system of 

the aircraft on which it is to be used and 

crew members can safely handle these 

devices and batteries. In this NPRM we 

propose to modify § 175.8 to allow other 

items approved by the FAA 

Administrator to be used on board an 

aircraft. FAA will provide additional 

information published in an upcoming 

INFO to supplement this requirement. 


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G. Packaging and Stowage 

The risks associated with the 

transport of lithium cells and batteries 

are largely a function of the amount of 

stored energy in a single cell or battery 

and the number of batteries in a 

shipment or a package. In addition, 

factors such as battery chemistry, state 

of charge, transport mode, type and 

method of packaging, quality of 

manufacturing, age, and handling all 

contribute varying amounts to the 

overall risks in transportation. 

Understanding and addressing these 

risks pose unique challenges to U.S. and 

international regulatory bodies. 

The available incident data suggest 

external short circuiting is a leading 

cause of lithium battery incidents. 

Effective insulation of exposed 

terminals, designing batteries with 

recessed terminals and other such 

measures would help to prevent 

incidents resulting from external short 

circuits. To reduce the potential of 

short-circuiting, in this NPRM we are 

proposing to require lithium cells and 

batteries to be transported in inner 

packagings of combination packagings 

that completely enclose the cell or 

battery. The intent of the requirement 

for inner packaging is to ensure that the 

conductive terminals of batteries remain 

isolated from each other. This can be 

achieved in many ways including 

individually packing each cell or battery 

or packing batteries in blister packs 

commonly found in retail outlets where 

the batteries would be contained 

between paperboard card and 

transparent clear plastic. We continue to 

stress the intent of the packaging is to 

protect the batteries from short circuits 

and damage. The above examples are 

provided only to enhance 

understanding of the packaging 

requirement and not to limit the 

acceptable packaging methods used for 

compliance. 

For air transportation, the HMR 

impose per-package weight limitations 

for lithium cells and batteries. However, 

there are no limits on the number of 

packages that may be transported in an 

overpack, unit load device, or cargo 

compartment. PHMSA and FAA are 

concerned about the aggregate risks 

inherent in transportation situations in 

which a large number of packages each 

containing small-sized batteries, are 

transported in close proximity to one 

another. Indeed, the risks inherent in 

the transportation of multiple packages 

of small-sized batteries may be more 

serious than the risks associated with a 

small number of packages containing 

large-sized batteries. Currently, 

packages containing up to 24 cells or 12 

batteries may be transported without 

marks or labels indicating the presence 

of lithium batteries. Further, a single 

battery shipment may consist of many 

packages, each of which is excepted 

from the packaging and hazard 

communication requirements. An 

individual battery will pose a fire risk 

that can be exacerbated by poor 

packaging and careless handling and, 

the number of batteries in a shipment 

can substantially affect the severity of 

an incident. For example, several 

thousand small lithium batteries 

consolidated together may present more 

significant potential risks than a 

shipment of a single large lithium 

battery, because one burning lithium 

battery can produce enough heat and 

energy to propagate to other lithium 

batteries in the same overpack, freight 

container, or cargo hold. 

PHMSA and FAA are aware of one 

incident that involved a shipment of 

120,000 lithium metal batteries 

contained in small packages, each 

excepted from the HMR. The pallets 

containing the packages were 

mishandled by ground crew personnel, 

which led to their eventual ignition. 

Initial attempts to extinguish the fire 

with water and chemical fire 

extinguishers were ineffective. More 

recently, PHMSA and FAA observed an 

incident involving lithium metal 

batteries contained in personal 

disposable vaporizers. The shipment 

consisted of 40 cartons with each 

package containing 50 devices. Upon 

landing at their destination, the flight 

crew was alerted to a fire in the forward 

compartment. Fire department 

personnel successfully extinguished the 

fire with no injury or damage to the 

aircraft. These two examples illustrate 

the potential for a serious incident that 

could result if the risks are not 

addressed through transportation safety 

controls. Both the 2004 and 2006 FAA 

technical reports show that an increase 

in the number of batteries involved 

increases the duration of a fire. 

Currently, fire suppression systems are 

not required in all cargo compartments 

of cargo only aircraft. Therefore, even 

though Halon fire suppression systems 

are effective at suppressing a fire 

involving lithium ion batteries, flight 

crews on cargo only aircraft remain at 

risk. In this NPRM we are proposing 

several actions intended to mitigate this 

risk. Specifically we propose to prohibit 

the stowage of lithium batteries in an 

inaccessible manner unless the 

inaccessible cargo compartment or 

freight container is equipped with an 

FAA approved fire suppression system 

or the lithium batteries are packaged in 

an FAA approved fire resistant 

container. We believe the enhanced 

packaging and hazard communication 

combined with loading and stowage 

limitations will reduce the likelihood of 

a fire and will mitigate the 

consequences of such a fire should one 

occur. We are also considering whether 

imposing a limit on the number of 

lithium battery packages transported in 

a single aircraft, single compartment, 

unit load device, pallet, or similar 

overpack would further enhance safety. 

We invite commenters to address such 

a limitation, including potential safety 

benefits, possible cost impacts and 

operational implications or alternative 

suggestions for reducing risk. We invite 

commenters to address methods 

available to quantify lithium battery 

risks, and potential risk mitigation 

techniques and alternatives—either in 

lieu of, or in addition to, the provisions 

proposed in this NPRM. Based on the 

merits of these comments we may 

consider adoption of additional stowage 

requirements in the final rule. 

H. Consolidation of Lithium Battery 

Regulations 

At present, requirements on 

transporting lithium cells and batteries 

are located in several different special 

provisions in § 172.102 and in 

§ 173.185. We believe that consolidating 

in a single section the requirements that 

apply to these articles, in a manner 

similar to most other hazardous 

materials, will promote greater 

understanding and compliance with the 

regulations and reduce the potential for 

undeclared or frustrated shipments. 

In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to 

consolidate the regulations pertaining to 

the packaging of lithium batteries 

primarily by relocating relevant 

provisions currently contained in 

special provisions to § 173.185. 

Additionally, aircraft quantity 

limitations currently located in 

§ 172.102, Special provisions A100, 

A101 and A103 will be incorporated 

into the § 172.101 hazardous materials 

table (HMT). Consequently, Column 9A 

of the HMT (passenger aircraft/ 

passenger rail quantity limits) for the 

entry ‘‘Lithium metal batteries, UN3090’’ 

will be revised to read ‘‘Forbidden’’ and 

packages containing lithium metal 

batteries would be required to display 

the cargo aircraft only label. We would 

remove the current requirement found 

in Special provision 188 to mark 

packages as forbidden aboard passenger 

aircraft. However, general requirements 

applicable to all hazardous materials, 

such as hazard communication, 

training, and emergency response 

information would not be repeated in 


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§ 173.185 (except to the extent that any 

exceptions from these requirements 

apply). 

The United Parcel Service (UPS) filed 

a petition for rulemaking on May 11, 

2009 (P–1541), requesting an 

amendment to the HMR specific to the 

marking of packages containing lithium 

batteries shipped under the exceptions 

found in § 172.102(c) Special Provision 

189. In its petition, UPS states the 

markings required by Special provisions 

188 and 189 are too similar and can be 

easily confused. The UPS petition asked 

PHMSA to develop a pictorial marking 

that would unambiguously 

communicate the prohibition of loading 

packages meeting the exceptions of 

Special provision 189 aboard aircraft 

and vessel. 

We agree the markings required by 

Special provisions 188 and 189 are 

similar and can be confused. As 

previously described, all packages of 

small lithium metal batteries (UN3090) 

would be required to display a Class 9 

label and the cargo aircraft only label. 

We believe the addition of the new 

proper shipping names specific to 

lithium ion cells and batteries and the 

elimination of the exception currently 

found in § 172.102(c), Special provision 

188 effectively eliminates the confusion 

expressed by the petitioner. 

We are aware of situations in which 

damaged or recalled batteries are 

required to be returned to the 

manufacturer. Product recalls or returns 

may occur for a variety of reasons 

including a consumer product recall in 

cooperation with the CPSC, a defective 

product that failed during field tests or 

a battery or device involved in an 

incident. In this NPRM we are 

proposing requirements for transporting 

such articles based on requirements 

developed for competent authority 

approvals and previously developed 

guidance. We propose to limit transport 

of damaged or defective batteries to 

highway and rail transport only. Where 

rail or highway transport is 

impracticable, we will work with FAA 

to develop air shipping protocols under 

Competent Authority Approvals on a 

case-by-case basis. 

I. Ongoing Safety Initiatives 

This NPRM represents another step in 

our continuing efforts to increase the 

safety controls applicable to the 

transportation of lithium batteries. This 

NPRM is part of a larger effort to 

comprehensively address the risks 

posed by the transportation of lithium 

batteries primarily those lithium 

batteries shipped as cargo. This NPRM 

does not impact lithium batteries 

carried by a passenger or crewmember 

in checked or carry-on baggage. PHMSA 

has taken steps to address this safety 

issue through several initiatives, 

including a battery safety public 

awareness campaign targeting airline 

passengers and infrequent battery 

shippers, focused enforcement with the 

goal of maximum compliance, and 

research into appropriate fire detection 

and suppression and containment 

methods. 

Since 2007, PHMSA has been working 

with air carriers, battery manufacturers, 

air travel associations, airline pilot and 

flight crew associations and other 

government agencies, including the 

Transportation Security Administration, 

to educate the public about potential 

safety problems and measures that will 

reduce or eliminate those problems. 

PHMSA agrees that these efforts must be 

highly visible and continuous to be 

effective. One of the most visible 

programs to promote battery safety is 

the SafeTravel Web site, which includes 

guidance and information on how to 

travel safely with batteries and batterypowered devices. We have also been 

working with the major airlines, travel 

and battery industries to provide 

SafeTravel information for ticketed 

passengers and frequent flyers, and 

place printed battery safety materials in 

seat pockets on passenger planes. We 

have recorded several million hits on 

our SafeTravel Web site. PHMSA 

continues to maintain and update the 

SafeTravel Web site as new information 

becomes available and is currently in 

the process of a major revision to the 

site. TSA includes SafeTravel 

information and links on its popular 

public Web site and FAA has issued 

Travel Tips and FAQs on Batteries 

Carried by Airline Passengers with a 

link to the SafeTravel Web site. This 

material illustrates appropriate means 

for airline passengers to safely handle 

and protect their portable electronic 

devices and spare batteries. The goal is 

to educate the flying public to play a 

part in ensuring air transportation 

safety. Application of the measures set 

forth in this guidance would likely have 

prevented at least some of the incidents 

involving lithium batteries in a 

passenger’s checked or carry-on 

baggage. 

PHMSA continues to pursue other 

initiatives targeting infrequent shippers 

of lithium batteries. In March, 2009, 

PHMSA published a guidance booklet 

called ‘‘Shipping Batteries by Air: What 

You Need to Know.’’ This booklet 

describes the requirements applicable to 

the air shipment of all battery types 

including lithium batteries in easy to 

understand terms and is intended to 

assist infrequent shippers. PHMSA and 

FAA continue to collect battery incident 

data to enhance our understanding of 

the causes of lithium battery failures 

and have conducted several effective 

investigations of battery shippers. 

PHMSA seeks comments on the impact 

of the proposals in this NPRM on 

infrequent shippers, and seeks data on 

the number of shipments, types of 

shipments, costs incurred by these 

shippers. PHMSA also seeks comments 

on how communication of the 

requirements for travelers and 

infrequent shippers could be improved. 

J. Compliance Date 

PHMSA and FAA believe that, if 

adopted, the provisions of this NPRM 

will significantly enhance the safe 

transportation of lithium batteries by 

aircraft. Therefore, we are considering 

requiring compliance with the 

provisions of the final rule no later than 

75 days after its publication in the 

Federal Register. We are seeking 

comments as to the feasibility and 

practicability of such a compliance 

schedule. We invite commenters to 

provide data and information 

concerning the additional costs that 

would result from such a compliance 

schedule, practical difficulties 

associated with quickly coming into 

compliance with the provisions of a 

final rule, and any other issues that we 

should consider in making a decision on 

the compliance schedule. We also invite 

commenters to address the feasibility 

and practicability of a phased 

compliance schedule under which 

certain provisions of the final rule 

would become effective on a faster 

schedule than other provisions for 

which immediate compliance would be 

more difficult. 

III. Regulatory Analyses and Notices 

A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This 

Rulemaking 

This proposed rule is published under 

the following statutory authorities: 

1. 49 U.S.C. 5103(b) authorizes the 

Secretary of Transportation to prescribe 

regulations for the safe transportation, 

including security, of hazardous 

material in intrastate, interstate, and 

foreign commerce. 

2. 49 U.S.C. 44701 authorizes the 

Administrator of the Federal Aviation 

Administration to promote safe flight of 

civil aircraft in air commerce by 

prescribing regulations and minimum 

standards for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce and 

national security. Under 49 U.S.C. 

40113, the Secretary of Transportation 

has the same authority to regulate the 


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transportation of hazardous materials by 

air, in carrying out § 44701, that he has 

under 49 U.S.C. 5103. 

B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

This proposed rule is a significant 

regulatory action under section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, 

was formally reviewed by the Office of 

Management and Budget. This proposed 

rule also is a significant rule under the 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures of 

the Department of Transportation (44 FR 

11034). The following sections address 

the costs and benefits of the measures 

adopted in this proposed rule. 

In developing this NPRM, PHMSA 

considered several regulatory 

alternatives including (1) a do nothing 

approach, (2) imposing Class 9 

requirements on all lithium battery 

shipments, (3) adopting the latest 

requirements of the ICAO Technical 

Instructions for all lithium battery 

shipments and (4) adopting certain 

provisions of options (2) and (3). In this 

NPRM we adopted alternative (4). This 

alternative combines many of the safety 

elements described in Alternative 2 

while harmonizing with international 

regulatory standards to create a more 

complete regulatory solution. Under the 

proposed regulations, we will minimize 

the regulatory exceptions for lithium 

batteries transported by aircraft. 

Specifically, certain extremely small 

lithium batteries packed with or 

contained in equipment that do not pose 

an unreasonable risk in transport would 

not be subject to the HMR, and we 

would maintain an exception for 

specifically packaged lithium batteries 

transported by highway and rail only. 

All other lithium cells and batteries 

must be transported as fully regulated 

Class 9 material, and will be required to 

be packaged in combination packages. 

Each inner packaging must be packed 

into an outer package meeting the 

Packing Group II performance standard. 

This is expected to result in new costs 

associated with packaging, hazard 

communication, cargo stowage and 

training requirements. We expect two 

primary industry groups will be most 

directly affected by the proposals in this 

NPRM: (1) Manufacturers and 

distributors of all types of lithium 

batteries (including electronic device 

manufacturers); and (2) passenger and 

cargo air carriers. The costs of 

implementing the new rules come to 

approximately $9.3 million for the first 

year; using a constant 7% discount, the 

10-year projected costs for the proposed 

rule come to $70.2 million. PHMSA 

invites commenters to address the 

assumptions in the regulatory 

evaluation, and to provide supporting 

data related to battery shipments which 

would be covered by this proposal. 

Specifically, data on the size 

distribution, value distribution, end 

usage, and number of batteries by type 

of shipment and mode of 

transportation—as well as any other 

data that would assist in validating 

impact estimates for this proposal, 

including quantification of costs and 

how these costs would be distributed 

across the lithium battery supply chain. 

PHMSA also invites comments on the 

diversion of shipments from air to other 

modes of transportation (due to the 

proposed elimination of regulatory 

exceptions), including the impacts this 

diversion will have on cost and length 

of shipments, and the nature of these 

shipments that would be impacted. In 

addition to data related to quantification 

of costs, PHMSA invites comments and 

data related to the quantification of risk, 

and risk-reduction benefits. 

The regulatory evaluation does not 

include costs associated with handling 

charges that are sometimes imposed by 

air carriers on hazardous materials 

shipments. PHMSA believes the net cost 

of the handling fee is zero; cash is 

transferred from one affected industry 

group—shippers—to another industry 

group—carriers. The shipper incurs the 

surcharge to compensate the carrier for 

the enhanced service involved with 

transporting a hazardous materials 

package. Moreover, the dynamics of this 

market make it difficult to conclude that 

shipping costs will rise, fall, or remain 

relatively steady. Some high volume 

shippers may negotiate a reduced 

surcharge with air carriers. Some 

shippers may decide to switch to 

another mode. Rail and highway 

transport is less expensive than air 

transport, although both require more 

time in transit. If a shipper chose a 

different transport mode, the net effect 

would be that the shipper or consignee 

would be required to maintain an 

increase in inventory (and related costs) 

to replace the product in transit, 

offsetting to some extent the savings 

realized by using the less expensive 

mode. In this NPRM PHMSA 

specifically invites commenters to 

address the economic impact of 

surcharges and other fees associated 

with the handling of hazardous 

materials including how the fees are 

determined. 

The principal anticipated benefits 

associated with this proposed rule are a 

reduction in the risk of an aircraft cargo 

compartment fire that involves lithium 

batteries becoming a catastrophic fire 

that can threaten the entire aircraft. 

While the risk of this type of incident 

is small, PHMSA has determined that, if 

adopted, the proposals in this NRPM 

will generate benefits for system users 

by reducing that risk. Our data shows an 

average of about three lithium battery 

incidents aboard aircraft per year. The 

total costs of an incident can vary 

greatly, from under $500 for a minor 

incident to hundreds of millions of 

dollars should an incident result in the 

loss of an aircraft and cargo. To 

calculate benefits we assumed that 

under the current regulations and 

battery-market growth trends, we will 

observe approximately three incidents 

per year and assume the average loss of 

$4.4 million per incident. We anticipate 

benefits to be approximately $13.2 

million per year. Starting with 2008, the 

annual cost of $9.3 million and benefit 

of $13.2 million have been discounted 

at a 7% annual rate to project a total 

cost of $70.2 million and total benefit of 

$99.2 million, for an overall benefit-cost 

ratio of 1.41, clearly demonstrating the 

utility of the proposed regulation. A 

regulatory evaluation is available for 

review in the public docket for this 

rulemaking. 

C. Executive Order 13132 

This proposed rule has been analyzed 

in accordance with the principles and 

criteria contained in Executive Order 

13132 (‘‘Federalism’’). This proposed 

rule preempts State, local and Indian 

tribe requirements but does not impose 

any regulation that has substantial 

direct effects on the States, the 

relationship between the national 

government and the States, or the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Therefore, the 

consultation and funding requirements 

of Executive Order 13132 do not apply. 

The Federal hazardous material 

transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101– 

5128, contains an express preemption 

provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that 

preempts State, local and Indian tribe 

requirements on the following subjects: 

(1) The designation, description, and 

classification of hazardous material; 

(2) The packing, repacking, handling, 

labeling, marking, and placarding of 

hazardous material; 

(3) The preparation, execution, and 

use of shipping documents related to 

hazardous material and requirements 

related to the number, contents, and 

placement of those documents; 

(4) The written notification, 

recording, and reporting of the 

unintentional release in transportation 

of hazardous material; and 

(5) The design, manufacture, 

fabrication, inspection, marking, 

maintenance, recondition, repair, or 


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testing of a packaging or container 

represented, marked, certified, or sold 

as qualified for use in transporting 

hazardous material in commerce. 

This proposed rule addresses subject 

items (1), (2), (3), and (5) above and 

preempts State, local, and Indian tribe 

requirements not meeting the 

‘‘substantively the same’’ standard. 

D. Executive Order 13175 

This proposed rule was analyzed in 

accordance with the principles and 

criteria contained in Executive Order 

13175 (‘‘Consultation and Coordination 

with Indian Tribal Governments’’). 

Because this proposed rule does not 

have tribal implications and does not 

impose substantial direct compliance 

costs, the funding and consultation 

requirements of Executive Order 13175 

do not apply. 

E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive 

Order 13272, and DOT Procedures and 

Policies 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an agency to 

review regulations to assess their impact 

on small entities, unless the agency 

determines that a rule is not expected to 

have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

This NPRM proposes measures to 

enhance the safety in transportation of 

lithium batteries by ensuring that all 

lithium batteries are designed to 

withstand normal transportation 

conditions, packaged to reduce the 

possibility of damage that could lead to 

an incident, minimize the consequences 

of an incident and ensure packages of 

lithium batteries are accompanied by 

hazard information that ensures 

appropriate and careful handling by air 

carrier personnel and informs transport 

workers and emergency response 

personnel of actions to be taken in the 

event of an emergency. 

Two types of businesses are likely to 

incur costs associated with compliance 

with the provisions of this NPRM— 

manufacturers and distributors of 

lithium batteries and manufacturers of 

equipment using lithium batteries. 

Unless alternative definitions have been 

established by the agency in 

consultation with the Small Business 

Administration (SBA), the definition of 

‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning 

as under the Small Business Act. Since 

no such special definition has been 

established, we employ the thresholds 

published by SBA for industries subject 

to the HMR. For this analysis, we 

identified 60 small businesses that 

manufacture and/or distribute lithium 

metal or lithium-ion batteries or cells 

and are potentially affected by the 

NPRM. Additionally, we identified 

2,179 businesses that manufacture or 

distribute electronics shipped with 

lithium metal or lithium-ion batteries. 

The compliance costs to small 

businesses subject to the provisions in 

the NPRM are costs primarily related to 

packaging for lithium battery shipments. 

As detailed in the regulatory evaluation, 

incremental costs are expected to range 

from $0.02 to $0.09 per cell for those 

shipments that are currently excepted 

from specification packaging 

requirements. We estimate that small 

businesses will make 69,876 shipments 

per year for which more robust 

packaging will be required; each 

shipment will average about 200 cells. 

Using the mid-range incremental 

packaging cost estimate of $0.04 per 

cell, a small business will incur an 

incremental cost of about $8 per 

shipment. The total incremental 

packaging cost is $559,008 per year or 

about $250 per small entity per year. 

Small entities will also incur 

increased costs related to training. 

These costs are estimated to total $98 

per small entity per year. 

We have prepared and placed in the 

docket a regulatory impact analysis 

(RIA) addressing the economic impact 

of this rule. The RIA includes 

qualitative discussions and quantitative 

measurements of costs related to 

implementation of this rule. 

Based on this analysis, I certify that 

the provisions of this NPRM, if adopted, 

would not have a significant impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

F. Paperwork Reduction Act 

PHMSA currently has an approved 

information collection under Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) Control 

Number 2137–0034, ‘‘Hazardous 

Materials Shipping Papers and 

Emergency Response Information’’ with 

an expiration date of May 31, 2011. 

PHMSA believes this proposed rule will 

result in an increase in the annual 

burden of this information collection. 

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1995, no person is required to 

respond to a collection of information 

unless it is approved by OMB and 

displays a valid OMB control number. 

Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of 

Federal Regulations requires that 

PHMSA provide interested members of 

the public and affected agencies an 

opportunity to comment on information 

collection and recordkeeping requests. 

This notice identifies a revised 

information collection request that 

PHMSA will submit to OMB for 

approval based on the requirements in 

this proposed rule. PHMSA has 

developed burden estimates to reflect 

changes in this proposed rule, and 

estimates the additional information 

collection and recordkeeping burden as 

proposed in this rule to be as follows: 

OMB Control No. 2137–0034: 

Additional Annual Number of 

Respondents ........................... 5,131 

Additional Annual Number of 

Responses ............................... 167,800 

Additional Annual Burden 

Hours ....................................... 1,939 

Additional Annual Burden 

Costs ........................................ $48,480 

PHMSA specifically requests 

comments on the information collection 

and recordkeeping burdens associated 

with developing, implementing, and 

maintaining these requirements for 

approval under this proposed rule. 

Requests for a copy of this 

information collection should be 

directed to: Deborah Boothe or T. Glenn 

Foster, Office of Hazardous Materials 

Standards (PHH–10), Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, Room E24–426, 1200 

New Jersey Ave., SE., Washington, DC 

20590–0001, telephone (202) 366–8553. 

G. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 

A regulation identifier number (RIN) 

is assigned to each regulatory action 

listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal 

Regulations. The Regulatory Information 

Service Center publishes the Unified 

Agenda in April and October of each 

year. The RIN contained in the heading 

of this document can be used to crossreference this action with the Unified 

Agenda. 

H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

This proposed rule does not impose 

unfunded mandates under the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995. It does not result in costs of 

$141,300,000 or more, adjusted for 

inflation, to either State, local or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or to the 

private sector in any one year, and is the 

least burdensome alternative that 

achieves the objective of the rule. 

I. Environmental Assessment 

The National Environmental Policy 

Act (NEPA), §§ 4321–4375, requires 

Federal agencies to analyze proposed 

actions to determine whether the action 

will have a significant impact on the 

human environment. The Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) 

regulations order Federal agencies to 

conduct an environmental review 

considering (1) the need for the 

proposed action, (2) alternatives to the 

proposed action, (3) probable 

environmental impacts of the proposed 

action and alternatives, and (4) the 

agencies and persons consulted during 


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the consideration process. 40 CFR 

§ 1508.9(b). 

Purpose and Need. As discussed 

elsewhere in this preamble, lithium 

batteries are potentially hazardous in 

transportation because they present both 

chemical (e.g., flammable electrolytes) 

and electrical hazards. If not safely 

packaged and handled when 

transported, lithium batteries can 

become dangerous. Defective batteries 

or batteries which are misused, 

mishandled, or improperly packaged, 

improperly stored, or overcharged can 

overheat and ignite and, once ignited, 

fires can be especially difficult to 

extinguish. This NPRM proposes 

measures to enhance the safety in 

transportation of lithium batteries by 

ensuring that all lithium batteries are 

designed to withstand normal 

transportation conditions, packaged to 

reduce the possibility of damage that 

could lead to an incident, minimize the 

consequences of an incident and ensure 

packages of lithium batteries are 

accompanied by hazard information that 

ensures appropriate and careful 

handling by air carrier personnel and 

informs transport workers and 

emergency response personnel of 

actions to be taken in an emergency. 

Alternatives. PHMSA considered the 

following alternatives: 

Alternative 1: Do Nothing 

Under this alternative, the current 

regulatory scheme applicable to lithium 

batteries would continue in place. We 

rejected this alternative because newly 

identified safety risks would not be 

addressed. 

Alternative 2: Impose Class 9 

Requirements on All Lithium Battery 

Shipments 

Under this alternative, we would 

eliminate the current regulatory 

exceptions for small lithium batteries 

and require their shipment as fully 

regulated Class 9 materials. The current 

packaging requirement for these 

excepted batteries (a package meeting 

the general packaging requirements of 

Subpart B of Part 173 and capable of 

withstanding 1.2 meter drop test in any 

orientation) would be replaced by a 

requirement to package the batteries in 

UN specification packaging conforming 

to the Packing Group II performance 

level. The current marking applicable to 

packages containing these excepted 

batteries would be replaced with a 

CLASS 9 label and proper shipping 

name, UN ID number mark, and the 

CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY label, as 

appropriate. In addition, each shipment would be 

accompanied by shipping papers and 

emergency response information, 

documentation that is currently not 

required for excepted battery shipments. 

In addition, eliminating the regulatory 

exceptions would require notification to 

the pilot in command of the presence of 

lithium batteries, the number of 

packages, and their stowage location. 

Under this alternative, the ban on the 

transport of lithium metal batteries 

aboard passenger aircraft would 

continue. The maximum quantities that 

may be offered for transportation in one 

package aboard passenger and cargo 

only aircraft would remain unchanged 

at 5 kg and 35 kg respectively. 

We rejected Alternative 2. While it 

would address many of the safety issues 

associated with the transportation of 

lithium batteries, Alternative 2 does not 

represent a comprehensive regulatory 

solution. Moreover, Alternative 2 does 

not address critical international 

harmonization issues. 

Alternative 3: Impose ICAO 

Requirements on All Lithium Battery 

Shipments 

Under this alternative, PHMSA would 

amend the HMR to harmonize 

transportation requirements for lithium 

batteries with requirements in the ICAO 

Technical Instructions, as follows: (1) 

The current exception for small lithium 

batteries would be retained; (2) for 

excepted shipments, the watt-hour 

rating for the batteries would be marked 

on the outside case and the package 

would be required to have a new 

lithium battery handling label in place 

of the current mark; (3) package weight 

limitations applicable to different 

lithium battery types would be revised; 

and (4) for lithium metal batteries, each 

package would be allowed to contain up 

to 2.5 kg of net lithium content per 

package when surrounded by 

cushioning material and packaged in 

rigid metal outer packaging. 

We rejected Alternative 3. Although it 

harmonizes the HMR with international 

requirements applicable to lithium 

batteries, it does not address safety 

issues associated with small batteries 

nor does it limit the weight of batteries 

that may be carried in inaccessible 

compartments on cargo aircraft. Our 

data and research suggest that the 

severity of a fire involving lithium 

batteries is proportional to the number 

of batteries involved in the fire. 

Alternative 4: Adopt the Provisions in 

Both Alternatives 2 and 3 

Under this alternative, PHMSA would 

adopt the new and revised regulatory 

provisions summarized in the 

discussion of Alternatives 2 and 3 

above. In addition, we would adopt 

requirements for the transport of 

recalled or defective batteries. 

Alternative 4 is the selected 

alternative. This alternative combines 

many of the safety elements described 

in Alternative 2 while harmonizing with 

international regulatory standards to 

create a more complete regulatory 

solution. This alternative will minimize 

the regulatory exceptions for lithium 

batteries transported by aircraft. 

Specifically, with the exception of 

incident reporting requirements, certain 

extremely small lithium batteries 

packed with or contained in equipment 

that do not pose an unreasonable risk in 

transport would not be subject to the 

HMR, and we would maintain an 

exception for specifically packaged 

lithium batteries transported by 

highway and rail only. All other lithium 

batteries would be fully regulated Class 

9 materials. These lithium batteries 

would be packed in UN specification 

packaging conforming to the Packing 

Group II performance level and 

appropriately marked and labeled 

consistent with Part 172. Each shipment 

of lithium batteries would be 

accompanied by shipping papers, 

emergency response information, and a 

notice to the pilot in command. Further, 

we would limit the manner in which 

lithium batteries may be stowed on 

cargo aircraft. Finally, under this 

alternative, the requirements applicable 

to lithium batteries would be 

harmonized with international 

standards to the extent possible 

consistent with our overall safety goals, 

thereby enhancing safety and facilitating 

transportation of these critical energy 

devices. 

Analysis of Environmental Impacts. 

Hazardous materials are substances that 

may pose a threat to public safety or the 

environment during transportation 

because of their physical, chemical, or 

nuclear properties. The hazardous 

material regulatory system is a risk 

management system that is preventionoriented and focused on identifying a 

safety hazard and reducing the 

probability and quantity of a hazardous 

material release. Hazardous materials 

are categorized by hazard analysis and 

experience into hazard classes and 

packing groups. The regulations require 

each shipper to classify a material in 

accordance with these hazard classes 

and packing groups; the process of 

classifying a hazardous material is itself 

a form of hazard analysis. Further, the 

regulations require the shipper to 

communicate the material’s hazards 

through use of the hazard class, packing 

group, and proper shipping name on the 

shipping paper and the use of labels on 

packages and placards on transport 


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vehicles. Thus the shipping paper, 

labels, and placards communicate the 

most significant findings of the 

shipper’s hazard analysis. A hazardous 

material is assigned to one of three 

packing groups based upon its degree of 

hazard—from a high hazard Packing 

Group I to a low hazard Packing Group 

III material. The quality, damage 

resistance, and performance standards 

of the packaging in each packing group 

are appropriate for the hazards of the 

material transported. 

Releases of hazardous materials, 

whether caused by accident or 

deliberate sabotage, can result in 

explosions or fires. Radioactive, toxic, 

infectious, or corrosive hazardous 

materials can have short- or long-term 

exposure effects on humans or the 

environment. Generally, however, the 

hazard class definitions are focused on 

the potential safety hazards associated 

with a given material or type of material 

rather than the environmental hazards 

of such materials. 

Lithium is the lightest solid metal. It 

can be absorbed into the body by 

inhalation of its aerosol and by 

ingestion and is corrosive to the eyes, 

the skin and the respiratory tract. 

Lithium reacts violently with strong 

oxidants, acids and many compounds 

(hydrocarbons, halogens, halons, 

concrete, sand and asbestos) causing fire 

and explosion hazard. In addition, it 

reacts with water, forming highly 

flammable hydrogen gas and corrosive 

fumes of lithium hydroxide. Lithium 

hydroxide represents a potentially 

significant environmental hazard, 

particularly to water organisms. Lithium 

metal batteries contain no toxic metals. 

Lithium ion batteries contain an ionic 

form of lithium but no lithium metal. 

Lithium ion batteries do not pose an 

environmental hazard and are safe for 

disposal in the normal municipal waste 

stream. While other types of batteries 

include toxic metals such as cadmium, 

the metals in lithium ion batteries— 

cobalt, copper, nickel and iron—are 

considered safe for landfills or 

incinerators. 

The measures proposed in this NPRM 

will reduce the risks to people and the 

environment posed during 

transportation of lithium metal and 

lithium ion batteries by ensuring that 

the batteries will withstand conditions 

normally encountered in transportation; 

packaged to reduce the possibility of 

damage that could lead to an incident 

and minimize the consequences of an 

incident; and ensure packages of 

lithium batteries are accompanied by 

hazard information that ensures 

appropriate and careful handling by air 

carrier personnel and informs transport 

workers and emergency response 

personnel of actions to be taken in an 

emergency. 

Lithium batteries are a key part of 

strategies to develop greener 

technologies to power many different 

applications from automobiles to cell 

phones and computers. The measures 

proposed in this NPRM will facilitate 

the safe transportation of lithium metal 

and lithium ion batteries across national 

boundaries, thereby supporting more 

widespread use of these batteries as 

alternatives to other types of energy 

sources that have adverse 

environmental impacts. We have 

preliminarily concluded that there are 

no significant environmental impacts 

associated with proposed amendments 

in this final rule. 

Consultation and Public Comment. 

We invite commenters to address the 

potential environmental impacts of the 

proposals in this NRPM. 

J. Privacy Act 

Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of any written 

communications and comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

document (or signing the document, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 

65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you 

may visit http://www.regulations.gov/ 

search/footer/privacyanduse.jsp. 

K. International Trade Analysis 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing any standards or 

engaging in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. For 

purposes of these requirements, Federal 

agencies may participate in the 

establishment of international 

standards, so long as the standards have 

a legitimate domestic objective, such as 

providing for safety, and do not operate 

to exclude imports that meet this 

objective. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. PHMSA 

participates in the establishment of 

international standards to protect the 

safety of the American public, and we 

have assessed the effects of the 

proposed rule to ensure that it does not 

exclude imports that meet this objective. 

Accordingly, this rulemaking is 

consistent with PHMSA’s obligations 

under the Trade Agreement Act, as 

amended. 

List of Subjects 

49 CFR Part 171 

Exports, Hazardous materials 

transportation, Hazardous waste, 

Imports, Incorporation by reference, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

49 CFR Part 172 

Education, Hazardous materials 

transportation, Hazardous waste, 

Incorporation by reference, Labeling, 

Markings, Packaging and containers, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

49 CFR Part 173 

Hazardous materials transportation, 

Packaging and containers, Radioactive 

materials, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Uranium. 

49 CFR Part 175 

Air carriers, Hazardous materials 

transportation, Radioactive materials, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

In consideration of the foregoing, we 

propose to amend 49 CFR Chapter I as 

follows: 

PART 171—GENERAL INFORMATION, 

REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS 

1. The authority citation for part 171 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49 

CFR 1.45 and 1.53; Pub. L. 101–410 section 

4 (28 U.S.C. 2641 note); Pub. L. 104–134, 

section 31001. 

2. In § 171.7, in the paragraph (a)(3) 

table, the entry ‘‘UN Recommendations 

on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, 

Manual of Tests and Criteria, Fourth 

revised edition, (2003), and Addendum 

2, (2004)’’ is revised to read as follows: 

§ 171.7 Reference material. 

(a) * * * 

(3) Table of material incorporated by 

reference. * * * 


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Source and name of material 49 CFR reference 

* * * * * * * 

UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Manual 

of Tests and Criteria, Fifth revised edition (2009).

172.102; 173.21; 173.56; 173.57; 173.58; 173.115; 173.124; 173.125; 

173.127; 173.128; 173.137; 173.185; Part 173, appendix H; 178.274. 

* * * * * * * 

3. In § 171.8: 

1. The definition for ‘‘Equivalent 

lithium content’’ is removed. 

2. The definitions for ‘‘Lithium cell or 

battery’’, ‘‘Lithium ion cell or battery’’, 

‘‘Lithium metal cell or battery’’, ‘‘Short 

circuit’’ and ‘‘Watt-hour’’ are added in 

appropriate alphabetical order. 

3. The definitions for ‘‘Aggregate 

lithium content’’ and ‘‘Lithium content’’ 

are revised. 

The additions and revisions, in 

appropriate alphabetic order, read as 

follows: 

§ 171.8 Definitions and abbreviations. 

* * * * * 

Aggregate lithium content means the 

sum of the grams of lithium content 

contained by the cells comprising a 

battery. 

* * * * * 

Lithium cell or battery refers to a 

family of cells and batteries with 

different chemistries comprising many 

types of cathodes and electrolytes. A 

lithium cell is a single encased exhibits 

a voltage differential across its two 

terminals. A lithium battery consists of 

multiple lithium cells electrically 

connected together fitted with devices 

necessary for use, for example, case, 

terminals, markings and protective 

devices. For the purposes of this 

subchapter, units that are commonly 

referred to as ‘‘battery packs’’ or ‘‘battery 

modules’’ or ‘‘battery assemblies’’ having 

the primary function of providing a 

source of power to another piece of 

equipment are treated as batteries. 

Lithium content means 

(1) For a lithium metal or lithium 

alloy cell the mass in grams of lithium 

or lithium alloy in the anode, and 

(2) For a lithium metal or lithium 

alloy battery, the sum of the grams of 

lithium content contained in the 

component cells of the battery. 

(3) For a lithium ion cell or battery, 

see the definition for ‘‘Watt-hour’’. 

Lithium-ion cell or battery means a 

rechargeable electrochemical cell or 

battery in which the positive and 

negative electrodes are both lithium 

compounds constructed with no 

metallic lithium in either electrode. A 

lithium ion polymer cell or battery that 

uses lithium-ion chemistries, as 

described herein, is regulated as a 

lithium-ion cell or battery. 

Lithium metal cell or battery means 

an electrochemical cell or battery 

utilizing lithium metal or lithium alloys 

as the anode. 

* * * * * 

Short circuit means a direct 

connection between positive and 

negative terminals of a cell or battery 

that provides a virtual zero resistance 

path for current flow. 

* * * * * 

Watt-hour means a unit of energy 

equivalent to one watt (1 W) of work 

acting for one hour (1 h) of time and is 

expressed as (Wh). The Watt-hour rating 

of a lithium ion cell or battery is 

determined by multiplying a cell or 

battery’s rated capacity in amperehours, by its nominal voltage. Therefore, 

Watt-hour (Wh) = ampere-hour (Ah) × 

volts (V). 

* * * * * 

4. In § 171.12, paragraphs (a)(6) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 171.12 North American shipments. 

(a) * * * 

(6) Lithium cells and batteries. 

Lithium cells and batteries must be 

offered for transport and transported in 

accordance with the provisions of this 

subchapter. Lithium metal cells and 

batteries (UN3090) are forbidden for 

transport aboard passenger-carrying 

aircraft. 

(i) The provisions of this paragraph 

(a)(6) do not apply to packages that 

contain 5 kg (11 pounds) net weight or 

less lithium metal cells or batteries that 

are contained in or packed with 

equipment (UN3091). 

(ii) Lithium cells and batteries with a 

lithium content of not more than 0.3 

grams or a watt-hour rating of not more 

than 3.7 Wh packed with or contained 

in equipment are not subject to any 

other requirements of this subchapter 

except for the requirements in §§ 171.15 

and 171.16 applicable to the reporting of 

incidents. 

* * * * * 

5. Section 171.21(a) is revised to read 

as follows: 

§ 171.21 Assistance in investigations and 

special studies. 

(a) A person reporting an incident 

under the provisions of § 171.15 or 

§ 171.16 must: 

(1) Give an authorized representative 

of the Federal, State or local government 

agency reasonable assistance in the 

investigation of the incident; (i.e. 

making all records and information 

pertaining to the incident available or 

assisting in the transportation of the 

evidence upon request). 

(2) Give an authorized representative 

or special agent of the Department of 

Transportation reasonable assistance in 

the investigation of the incident; and 

(3) Upon request, provide an 

authorized representative or special 

agent of the Department of 

Transportation reasonable access to the 

damaged package or article, if available. 

* * * * * 

6. In § 171.24, paragraphs (d)(1)(ii) 

and (d)(1)(iii) are revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 171.24 Additional requirements for the 

use of the ICAO Technical Instructions. 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(ii) Lithium cells and batteries. The 

following conditions and limitations 

apply to lithium batteries and cells: 

(A) Lithium cells and batteries 

meeting the provisions found in Section 

II of Packing Instructions 965 through 

970 must be offered for transportation 

and transported in accordance with the 

provisions of this subchapter; 

(B) Lithium metal cells and batteries 

(UN3090) are forbidden for transport 

aboard passenger-carrying aircraft. 

(1) The provisions of this paragraph 

do not apply to packages that contain 5 

kg (11 pounds) net weight or less 

lithium metal cells or batteries that are 

contained in or packed with equipment 

(UN3091); and 

(2) Lithium cells and batteries of a 

design type proven to meet the criteria 

of Class 9 in Subsection 38.3 of the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria with a 

lithium content of not more than 0.3 

grams or a watt-hour rating of not more 

than 3.7 Wh packed with or contained 

in equipment are not subject to any 

other requirements of this subchapter 


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except for the requirements in §§ 171.15 

and 171.16 applicable to the reporting of 

incidents. 

(iii) Pre-production prototype lithium 

cells and batteries. Pre-production cells 

and batteries must be approved by the 

Associate Administrator prior to 

transportation aboard cargo aircraft. 

* * * * * 

7. In § 171.25, paragraph (b)(3) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 171.25 Additional requirements for the 

use of the IMDG Code. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) Lithium cells and batteries— 

(i) Transported in accordance with 

Special Provision 188 of the IMDG Code 

may be offered for transportation and 

transported by highway, rail or vessel 

only. Additionally, each package must 

be marked ‘‘LITHIUM BATTERIES— 

FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT 

ABOARD AIRCRAFT’’ on a background 

of contrasting color. The marking must 

be durable, legible and of such a size 

relative to the package as to be readily 

visible. 

(ii) Lithium cells and batteries of a 

design type proven to meet the criteria 

of Class 9 in Subsection 38.3 of the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria with a 

lithium content of not more than 0.3 

grams or a watt-hour rating of not more 

than 3.7 Wh packed with or contained 

in equipment are not subject to any 

other requirements of the subchapter 

except for the requirements in §§ 171.15 

and 171.16 applicable to the reporting of 

incidents. 

* * * * * 

PART 172—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, 

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE INFORMATION, AND 

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 

8. The authority citation for part 172 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49 

CFR 1.45 and 1.53. 

9. In § 172.101, the Hazardous 

Materials Table is amended by removing 

and adding entries in the appropriate 

alphabetical sequence, to read as 

follows: 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 


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BILLING CODE 4910–60–C 

§ 172.102 Special Provisions 

10. In § 172.102, in paragraph (c)(1), 

Special Provisions 134 and 157 are 

revised; Special Provisions 29, 188, 189, 

and 190 are removed; and in paragraph 

(c)(2), Special Provisions A54, A55, 

A100, A101, A103, and A104 are 

removed. 

The revisions read as follows: 

§ 172.102 Special provisions. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(1) * * * 

Code/Special Provisions 

* * * * * 

134 This entry only applies to 

vehicles, machinery and equipment 


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powered by wet batteries, sodium 

batteries, or lithium batteries that are 

transported with these batteries 

installed. Examples of such items are 

electrically-powered cars, lawn mowers, 

wheelchairs, and other mobility aids. 

Self-propelled vehicles that also contain 

an internal combustion engine must be 

consigned under the entry ‘‘Vehicle, 

flammable gas powered’’ or ‘‘Vehicle, 

flammable liquid powered’’, as 

appropriate. 

* * * * * 

157 This entry includes hybrid 

electric vehicles powered by both an 

internal combustion engine and wet, 

sodium or lithium batteries installed. 

Vehicles containing an internal 

combustion engine must be consigned 

under the entry ‘‘Vehicle, flammable gas 

powered’’ or ‘‘Vehicle, flammable liquid 

powered’’, as appropriate. 

* * * * * 

PART 173—SHIPPERS—GENERAL 

REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS 

AND PACKAGINGS 

11. The authority citation for part 173 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49 

CFR 1.45 and 1.53. 

12. Section 173.185 is revised to read 

as follows: 

§ 173.185 Lithium cells and batteries. 

Lithium cell and battery. A lithium 

cell or battery must be transported only 

under the following conditions: 

(a) General Requirements. (1) Each 

lithium cell or battery must: 

(i) Be of a design type proven to meet 

the criteria of Class 9 in Sub-section 

38.3 of the UN Manual of Tests and 

Criteria (IBR; see § 171.7 of this 

subchapter). 

(A) A lithium cell or battery that 

differs from a tested design type would 

be considered a new design type and 

would be required to be retested: 

(1) A change of 0.1 grams or 5% by 

mass to the cathode, to the anode, or to 

the electrolyte; or for rechargeable 

batteries a change in the nominal energy 

in watt-hours or an increase in the 

nominal voltage of more than 5%; or 

(2) A change that would materially 

affect the test results would be 

considered a new design type; 

Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A): The 

type of change that might be considered 

to differ from a tested type, such that it 

might lead to failure of any of the tests, 

may include but is not limited to: 

—A change in the material of the anode, 

the cathode, the separator, or the 

electrolyte; 

—A change of protective devices, 

including hardware and software; 

—A change of safety design in cells or 

batteries, such as a venting valve; 

—A change in the number of component 

cells; 

—A change in connecting mode of 

component cells. 

(B) Each person who manufactures 

lithium cells or batteries must maintain 

a record of satisfactory completion of 

these tests prior to offering the cell or 

battery for transport and must make this 

record available, upon request, to an 

authorized official of a Federal, State, or 

local government agency at reasonable 

times and locations. Each person who 

manufactures lithium cells or batteries 

must retain this record for as long as 

that lithium battery design type is 

offered for transportation and for one 

year thereafter. 

(ii) Incorporate a safety venting device 

or otherwise be designed in a manner 

that will preclude a violent rupture 

under conditions normally incident to 

transportation. 

(iii) Be equipped with an effective 

means to prevent dangerous reverse 

current flow (e.g., diodes, fuses, etc.) if 

a battery contains cells or a series of 

cells that are connected in parallel; and 

(iv) Be equipped with an effective 

means of preventing external short 

circuits and the evolution of a 

dangerous amount of heat (i.e. an 

amount of heat sufficient to be 

dangerous to packaging or personal 

safety to include charring, melting or 

scorching of packaging, or other 

evidence). 

(2) Packaging. Lithium cells and 

batteries must be packaged as follows: 

(i) Lithium cells or batteries, 

including lithium cells or batteries 

packed with or contained in equipment, 

must be packaged in a manner to 

prevent short-circuiting, generation of 

sparks, or a dangerous quantity of heat. 

Examples of acceptable packaging 

methods include but are not limited to 

the following: Packaging each battery or 

each battery powered device in fully 

enclosed inner packagings made of nonconductive material; separating batteries 

and battery powered devices in a 

manner to prevent contact with other 

batteries, devices, or conductive 

materials (e.g., metal) in the packagings; 

ensuring exposed terminals are 

protected with non-conductive caps, 

non-conductive tape; or other 

appropriate means; and 

(ii) Lithium cells or batteries must be 

packaged in combination packagings 

conforming to the requirements of part 

178, subparts L and M, of this 

subchapter at the Packing Group II 

performance level. The lithium cell or 

battery must be packed in inner 

packagings that completely enclose the 

cell or battery. The inner packagings 

must be packed within one of the 

following outer packagings: Metal boxes 

(4A or 4B); wooden boxes (4C1, 4C2, 4D, 

or 4F); fiberboard boxes (4G); solid 

plastic boxes (4H2); fiber drums (1G); 

metal drums (1A2 or 1B2); plywood 

drums (1D); plastic jerricans (3H2); or 

metal jerricans (3A2 or 3B2). 

(3) Except as provided in paragraph 

(e) of this section, cells and batteries 

with a liquid cathode containing sulfur 

dioxide, sulfuryl chloride or thionyl 

chloride may not be offered for 

transportation or transported if any cell 

has been discharged to the extent that 

the open circuit voltage is less than two 

volts or is less than 2⁄3 of the voltage of 

the fully charged cell, whichever is less. 

(4) Cells and batteries with lithium 

content of not more than 0.3 grams or 

a watt-hour rating of not more than 3.7 

Wh that meet the requirements of 

paragraph (a) that are packed with or 

contained in equipment in accordance 

with paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section 

are not subject to any other 

requirements of the subchapter except 

for the incident reporting requirements 

in §§ 171.15 and 171.16. 

(b) Lithium cells or batteries packed 

with equipment. Lithium cells or 

batteries packed with equipment must 

meet all the requirements of paragraph 

(a) of this section except the 

specification packaging requirements of 

paragraph (a)(2)(ii). 

(1) The cells or batteries must be 

packed to prevent short circuits, 

including shifting that could lead to 

short circuits. The equipment and the 

packages of cells or batteries must be 

further packed in a strong outer 

packaging. 

(2) The package may contain no more 

than the number of lithium cells or 

batteries necessary to power the piece of 

equipment plus two spare cells or 

batteries. 

(c) Lithium cells or batteries 

contained in equipment. Lithium cells 

or batteries contained in equipment 

must meet all the requirements of 

paragraph (a) of this section, except the 

specification packaging requirements of 

paragraph (a)(2)(ii). 

(1) The equipment must be packed in 

a strong outer packaging that is 

waterproof or is made waterproof 

through the use of an inner packaging or 

a liner unless the equipment is made 

waterproof by nature of its construction. 

(2) The package may contain no more 

than the number of lithium cells or 

batteries necessary to power the piece of 

equipment plus two spare cells or 

batteries. The additional cells or 

batteries must be packaged in 


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accordance with paragraph (b) of this 

section. 

(3) If package contains cells or 

batteries in equipment and other cells or 

batteries packed with equipment, the 

package must be marked with the 

proper shipping name ‘‘Lithium metal 

batteries packed with equipment’’ or 

‘‘Lithium ion batteries packed with 

equipment’’ as appropriate. 

(d) Exceptions for surface transport. 

When transported by motor vehicle, rail 

car, or vessel, lithium cells or batteries, 

including lithium cells or batteries 

packed with or contained in equipment, 

are excepted from the subparts C, D and 

E of part 172 of this subchapter and the 

specification packaging requirements of 

paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section 

provided they conform to all of the 

following conditions: 

(1) For a lithium metal cell, the 

lithium content is not more than 1 g per 

cell and the aggregate lithium content is 

not more than 2 g per battery and, for 

a lithium ion cell or battery, the watthour rating is not more than 20 Wh per 

cell and not more than 100 Wh per 

battery. These limits may be increased 

to 5 g per lithium metal cell or 25 grams 

per lithium metal battery and 60 Wh per 

lithium ion cell and 300 Wh per battery 

when transported by highway or rail 

only; 

(2) Cells or batteries are separated or 

packaged in a manner to prevent short 

circuits and are packed in a strong outer 

packaging or are contained in 

equipment; 

(3) Except when contained in 

equipment, each package containing 

more than 4 lithium cells or 2 lithium 

batteries must be capable of 

withstanding a 1.2 meter drop test in 

any orientation without damage to cells 

or batteries contained in the package, 

without shifting of the contents that 

would allow short circuiting and 

without release of package contents; 

(4) Each package must be marked 

‘‘LITHIUM BATTERIES—FORBIDDEN 

FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD 

AIRCRAFT’’ on a background of 

contrasting color. The marking must be 

durable, legible and of such a size 

relative to the package as to be readily 

visible and include any special 

procedures that should be followed if 

the package is damaged; 

(5) Each shipment consisting of one or 

more packages must be accompanied by 

a document indicating that the package 

contains lithium batteries and any 

special procedures that should be 

followed if the package is damaged; and 

(6) The net weight of lithium batteries 

or cells in the package may not exceed 

30 kg (66 pounds). 

(e) Lithium cells and batteries, for 

disposal or recycling. A lithium cell or 

battery offered for transportation or 

transported by motor vehicle to a 

permitted storage facility or disposal 

site or for purposes of recycling is 

excepted from the specification 

packaging requirements of paragraph 

(a)(2)(ii) of this section and the 

requirements of paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and 

(a)(3) of this section when protected 

against short circuits and packed in a 

strong outer packaging conforming to 

the requirements of §§ 173.24 and 

173.24a. 

(f) Small production runs and preproduction prototypes. When 

transported by motor vehicle or rail car, 

production runs of not more than 100 

lithium cells or batteries per year or preproduction prototype lithium cells or 

batteries transported for purposes of 

testing are excepted from the testing 

requirements of paragraph (a)(1)(i) of 

this section provided: 

(1) The cells or batteries are 

individually packed in an inner 

packaging, surrounded by cushioning 

material that is non-combustible and 

non-conductive; and 

(2) The cells or batteries are packed in 

an outer packaging that is a metal, 

plastic or plywood drum (1A2, 1H2, 1D) 

or a metal, plastic or wooden box (4A, 

4B, 4H1, 4H2, 4C1 or 4C2) that meets 

the criteria for Packing Group I 

packagings 

(g) Damaged, defective, or recalled 

batteries. Lithium cells or batteries that 

have been damaged, identified as 

defective, or are otherwise being 

returned to the manufacturer for safety 

reasons must be packaged in accordance 

with paragraph (a)(2) of this section. 

Inner packagings must be surrounded by 

cushioning material that is noncombustible, and non-conductive. 

Damaged, defective, or recalled batteries 

packaged in this manner must be 

transported by highway or rail only. 

(h) Batteries exceeding 12 kg. 

Batteries employing a strong, impactresistant outer casing and exceeding a 

gross weight of 12 kg (26.5 lbs.), and 

assemblies of such batteries, may be 

packed in strong outer packagings, in 

protective enclosures (for example, in 

fully enclosed wooden slatted crates) or 

on pallets. Batteries must be secured to 

prevent inadvertent movement, and the 

terminals may not support the weight of 

other superimposed elements. Batteries 

packaged in this manner are not 

permitted for transportation by 

passenger aircraft, and may be 

transported by cargo aircraft only if 

approved by the Associate 

Administrator prior to transportation. 

(i) Approval. A lithium cell or battery 

that does not conform to the provisions 

of this subchapter may be transported 

only under conditions approved by the 

Associate Administrator. 

13. In § 173.219, paragraph (b)(3) is 

revised as follows: 

§ 173.219 Life-saving appliances. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) Electric storage batteries or lithium 

batteries. Life saving appliances 

containing lithium batteries must be 

transported in accordance with 

§ 173.185. 

* * * * * 

14. In § 173.220, paragraphs (d) and 

(e) are revised as follows: 

§ 173.220 Internal combustion engines, 

self-propelled vehicles, mechanical 

equipment containing internal combustion 

engines, and battery powered vehicles or 

equipment. 

* * * * * 

(d) Lithium batteries. (1) A vehicle, 

engine, or machinery powered by 

lithium metal batteries that is 

transported with these batteries 

installed may be transported on board 

passenger-carrying aircraft provided the 

lithium content of each cell, when fully 

charged, is not more than 5 grams, the 

aggregate lithium content of the anode 

of each battery, when fully charged, is 

not more than 25 grams and the net 

weight of lithium batteries does not 

exceed 5 kg (11 pounds). Lithium 

batteries contained in vehicles, engines, 

or mechanical equipment must be 

securely fastened in the battery holder 

of the vehicle, engine, or mechanical 

equipment and must be protected in 

such a manner as to prevent damage and 

short circuits (e.g., by the use of nonconductive caps that cover the terminals 

entirely). Except for vehicles 

transported by highway for product 

testing with prototype lithium batteries 

securely installed, each lithium battery 

must be of a type that has successfully 

passed each test in the UN Manual of 

Tests and Criteria as specified in 

§ 173.185, unless approved by the 

Associate Administrator. 

(2) Equipment (other than vehicles, 

engines or mechanical equipment) 

containing lithium batteries, must be 

described as ‘‘Lithium metal batteries 

contained in equipment’’ or ‘‘Lithium 

ion batteries contained in equipment’’, 

as appropriate, and transported in 

accordance with § 173.185. 

(e) Other hazardous materials. (1) 

Items containing hazardous materials, 

such as fire extinguishers, compressed 

gas accumulators, safety devices, and 

other hazardous materials, that are 


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integral components of the motor 

vehicle, engine, or mechanical 

equipment and are necessary for the 

operation of the vehicle, engine, or 

mechanical equipment, or for the safety 

of its operator or passengers must be 

securely installed in the motor vehicle, 

engine, or mechanical equipment. Such 

items are not otherwise subject to the 

requirements of this subchapter. 

(2) Equipment (other than vehicles, 

engines or mechanical equipment) 

containing lithium batteries must be 

described as ‘‘Lithium metal batteries 

contained in equipment’’ or ‘‘Lithium 

ion batteries contained in equipment’’, 

as appropriate, and transported in 

accordance with § 173.185. 

* * * * * 

PART 175—CARRIAGE BY AIRCRAFT 

15. The authority citation for part 175 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49 

CFR 1.45 and 1.53. 

16. In § 175.8, add a new paragraph 

(a)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 175.8 Exceptions for operator equipment 

and items of replacement. 

(a) * * * 

(4) Items containing hazardous 

materials used by the operator aboard 

the aircraft when approved by the 

Administrator of the Federal Aviation 

Administration. 

* * * * * 

17. In § 175.10, paragraph (a)(17) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 175.10 Exceptions for passengers, 

crewmembers, and air operators. 

(a) * * * 

(17) Except as provided in § 173.21 of 

this subchapter, portable electronic 

devices (for example, watches, 

calculating machines, cameras, cellular 

phones, laptop and notebook 

computers, camcorders, etc.) containing 

dry cells or dry batteries (including 

lithium cells or batteries) and spare dry 

cells and batteries for these devices, 

when carried by passengers or crew 

members for personal use. Each 

installed or spare lithium battery must 

be of a type proven to meet the 

requirements of each test in the UN 

Manual of Tests and Criteria, and each 

spare battery must be individually 

protected so as to prevent short circuits 

(by placement in original retail 

packaging or by otherwise insulating 

terminals, e.g., by taping over exposed 

terminals or placing each battery in a 

separate plastic bag or protective pouch) 

and carried in carry-on baggage only. In 

addition, each installed or spare battery 

must not exceed the following: 

(i) For a lithium metal battery, a 

lithium content of not more than 2 

grams per battery; or 

(ii) For a lithium-ion battery, a rating 

of not more than 100 Wh, except that up 

to two batteries with a watt hour rating 

of more than 100 Wh but not more than 

300 Wh may be carried. 

* * * * * 

18. In § 175.75, the last sentence of 

paragraph (c) and paragraph (e)(1) are 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 175.75 Quantity limitations and cargo 

location. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * The requirements of this 

paragraph do not apply to ORM–D 

materials or Class 9 materials, except 

that lithium batteries, including lithium 

batteries packed with or contained in 

equipment may be loaded in an 

inaccessible manner only if they are 

packaged in an container approved by 

the FAA Administrator for such use or 

carried in a Class C cargo compartment. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(1) Class 3, Packing Group III, 

materials that do not meet the definition 

of another hazard class, Division 6.1 

materials except those also labeled 

FLAMMABLE, Division 6.2, Class 7, or 

ORM–D materials; Class 9 materials, 

except that lithium batteries, including 

lithium batteries packed with or 

contained in equipment may be loaded 

in an inaccessible manner only if they 

are packaged in a container approved by 

the FAA Administrator for such use or 

carried in a Class C cargo compartment. 

* * * * * 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 6, 

2010, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 

part 1. 

Magdy El-Sibaie, 

Acting Associate Administrator for 

Hazardous Materials Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2010–281 Filed 1–8–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 300 

[Docket No.: 080228336–9133–01] 

RIN 0648–AW09 

Implementation of Regional Fishery 

Management Organizations’ Measures 

Pertaining to Vessels that Engaged in 

Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported 

Fishing Activities 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: NMFS proposes regulations to 

implement international conservation 

and management measures adopted by 

the International Commission for the 

Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 

Commission for the Conservation of 

Antarctic Marine Living Resources 

(CCAMLR), Northwest Atlantic 

Fisheries Organization (NAFO), Western 

and Central Pacific Fisheries 

Commission (WCPFC), Inter-American 

Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 

and the Agreement on the International 

Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP). 

The measures pertain to vessels that 

have been identified by these regional 

fishery management organizations 

(RFMOs) as having engaged in illegal, 

unregulated, and unreported (IUU) 

fishing activities and included on their 

respective IUU vessel lists. As a party to 

these RFMOs, the United States is 

obligated to take certain actions against 

the listed IUU vessels in a manner 

consistent with our laws and policies. 

This proposed rule would clarify the 

domestic processes by which the United 

States intends to meet these obligations. 

Specifically, it would implement 

obligations to restrict entry into any port 

or place of the United States and access 

to port services by vessels on the IUU 

vessel lists of the aforementioned 

RFMOs. It would also prohibit the 

provision by persons and business 

entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction of 

certain services to, and commercial 

transactions with, such vessels. NMFS 

is seeking public comment on the 

proposed rule. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received by February 25, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments on this 

action, identified by RIN 0648–AW09, 

may be submitted by any of the 

following methods: 


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