RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4122-17T1

B.P.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

R.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted March 25, 2019 – Decided May 9, 2019

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FV-07-1641-18. 

Law Office of Harriet E. Raghnal, attorneys for 

appellant (April C. Bauknight, of counsel and on the 

brief; Harriet E. Raghnal, on the brief). 

Philip B. Vinick, attorney for respondent. 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant appeals from an April 2, 2018 final restraining order (FRO),

entered in favor of plaintiff (his ex-wife) under the Prevention of Domestic 

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. On December 8, 2017, 

plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on a domestic 

violence complaint alleging that on December 7, 2017, defendant harassed her 

and the parties' children by sending a threatening email after plaintiff failed to 

respond to his request to visit the children. Following a lengthy trial on nonconsecutive days, during which defendant appeared pro se while plaintiff was 

represented by counsel, the trial court entered the FRO after determining that 

defendant had committed the predicate act of harassment, and that an FRO was 

necessary to prevent further abuse. See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 

125-27 (App. Div. 2006).

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED 

UPON MULTIPLE INCREDIBLE HEARSAY 

STATEMENTS IN REACHING ITS DECISION 

WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT 

EVIDENCE AND OFFEND[S] THE INTERESTS OF 

JUSTICE.
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POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE 

DUTY TO INTERVENE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL 

WHICH WAS NEGATED BY ITS REPEATED 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY AND PREJUDICIAL 

EVIDENCE INTO THE RECORD.

POINT III

THE TRIAL [COURT] ERRED WHEN IT 

CONVERTED THE TRIAL ON AN ALLEGED ACT 

OF D[O]MESTIC VIOLENCE INTO ONE FOR ACTS 

WHICH WERE NOT ALLEGED IN THE 

COMPLAINT.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED . . . DEFENDANT'S 

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY FAILING TO INFORM 

DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR 

THE CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT 

FROM[] A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER; 

THEREBY, OFFENDING THE INTERESTS OF 

JUSTICE.

POINT V

THE COURT SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF 

FROM . . . PLAINTIFF TO . . . DEFENDANT 

REQUIRING THAT HE PROVE THAT HE DID NOT 

SEND OR CAUSE TO SEND . . . PLAINTIFF THE 

ALLEGED EMAIL.
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Because we agree that the court failed to inform defendant of his right to counsel 

or the serious consequences that could result from the entry of an FRO against 

him, we reverse.

We have previously stated that an FRO "is not merely an injunction 

entered in favor of one private litigant against the other." J.S. v. D.S., 448 N.J. 

Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2016). Instead, courts "have consistently recognized 

that the issuance of an FRO 'has serious consequences to the personal and 

professional lives of those who are found guilty of what the Legislature has 

characterized as a serious crime against society.'" Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J. 

Super. 534, 541 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Bresocnik v. Gallegos, 367 N.J. 

Super. 178, 181 (App. Div. 2004)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. In fact, "[o]nce 

a final restraining order is entered, a defendant is subject to fingerprinting, 

N.J.S.A. 53:1-15, and the Administrative Office of the Courts [(AOC)] 

maintains a central registry of all persons who have had domestic violence 

restraining orders entered against them, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-34." Ibid. (quoting 

Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005)).

In addition, "[v]iolation of a restraining order constitutes contempt, and a 

second or subsequent non-indictable domestic violence contempt offense 

requires a minimum term of thirty days imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30." 
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Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. at 124. "The issuing court may also impose a number 

of other wide-reaching sanctions impairing a defendant's interests in liberty and 

freedom in order 'to prevent further abuse.' N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)." Ibid. See 

also D.N. v. K.M., 216 N.J. 587, 593 (2014) (Albin, J., dissenting) (cataloging 

the consequences under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) resulting from entry of a domestic 

violence FRO).

Thus, the right to seek counsel is an important due process right that 

affords defendants "a meaningful opportunity to defend against a complaint in 

domestic violence matters[.]" D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. 

Div. 2013). Although due process does not require the appointment of counsel 

for indigent defendants opposing the entry of an FRO in a domestic violence 

proceeding, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant understand that he or 

she has a right to obtain legal counsel, and that a defendant is afforded a 

reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney. Ibid.

"[E]nsuring that defendants are not deprived of their due process rights 

requires our trial courts to recognize both what those rights are and how they 

can be protected consistent with the protective goals of the [PDVA]." J.D. v. 

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 479 (2011). Thus, in D.N., we concluded that the 

defendant relinquished her right to seek counsel because the judge "adequately 
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questioned [her] regarding her decision to decline the opportunity to obtain legal 

representation." D.N., 429 N.J. Super. at 607. There, the trial judge asked D.N. 

(1) whether she wanted the opportunity to obtain counsel, pointing out that the 

opposing party was represented; (2) whether she understood what would happen 

if a final restraining order was entered; and (3) whether she knew that she might 

be subject to civil penalties and other consequences. Ibid. The judge also 

advised D.N. that she could request an adjournment to consult with an attorney 

or further prepare for the final hearing. Ibid. Given that advice, we held that 

D.N.'s waiver of her right to seek counsel was clear and knowing. Ibid. 

Here, defendant was never informed of the significant consequences of an 

FRO. For instance, on January 5, 2018, when defendant expressed his concern

that "serious allegations . . . [were] hanging over [his] head," the court agreed,

but failed to elaborate on the serious consequences resulting from the issuance 

of an FRO, including fingerprinting and entry into the domestic violence 

registry. In a later colloquy on January 26, 2018, the court again dismissed

defendant's concerns about the allegations without further explication: 

[Defendant]: . . . . I just thought because, ultimately, [I 

am] being accused of a crime . . . .

The Court: Well, [it is] not a crime.

. . . .
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The Court: . . . . It [does not] [rise] to that level. [It is] 

not a criminal matter. [It is] a civil matter.

[Defendant]: Oh, because when we initially appeared 

--

The Court: Okay, [you are] not threatened with jail.

[Defendant]: -- the magistrate said that the end result of 

this could be a criminal charge. He was quite clear 

about that.

The Court: Well, if you violate a [TRO], that is a 

criminal charge.

Likewise, nowhere in the record did the court advise defendant of his right 

to obtain counsel. That failure was particularly significant in this case because 

defendant had asserted that evidence was "being sprung upon [him] with no 

opportunity to prepare" and no "amend[ment to] the TRO[.]" See L.D. v. W.D., 

Jr., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1999) ("[I]t constitutes a fundamental 

violation of due process to convert a hearing on a complaint alleging one act of 

domestic violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are 

not even alleged in the complaint." (quoting J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387, 

391-92 (App. Div. 1998))); see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 ("[A]t a minimum, due 

process requires that a party in a judicial hearing receive 'notice defining the 

issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond.'" (quoting H.E.S. v. 
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J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321 (2003))). Indeed, aside from the court confirming on 

January 5, 2018, that defendant was self-represented, and indicating on February 

23, 2018, that it was "not being as strict as [it] could" because defendant was 

"self-represented," there was no discussion or explanation of defendant's right 

to obtain counsel by the court, or any express waiver of the right to seek counsel

by defendant. 

As a result, we vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand for a new 

hearing. Because of our decision, we need not address defendant's remaining 

arguments other than to remind the trial court that "evidence presented [at a 

domestic violence trial] must meet the test for admission as provided by our 

Rules of Evidence." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 222 (App. Div. 2017). 

On remand, in fairness to the FRO judge, who made credibility findings, we 

direct that a different judge conduct the new hearing. R. 1:12-1(d); Pressler & 

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1 (2019) ("[A] matter 

remanded after appeal for a new trial should be assigned to a different trial judge 

if the first judge had, during the original trial, expressed conclusions regarding 

witness credibility.").

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.