IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0253

Filed May 11, 2016

DAMIEN NEWSOME,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom, 

Judge.

A postconviction relief applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his 

application. AFFIRMED.

Ryan Gravett of Oliver Gravett Law Firm, Windsor Heights, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
2

VOGEL, Judge.

Damien Newsome was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance. See State v. Newsome, No. 12-0686, 2013 WL 1749922, 

at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013). After this court affirmed his conviction, he 

filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR), asserting counsel was 

ineffective in a number of respects. The district court denied Newsome’s PCR 

application, and Newsome now appeals that denial claiming: (1) his trial counsel 

provides ineffective assistance when counsel did not offer into evidence the 

affidavit of another passenger in the vehicle, who claimed ownership of the drugs 

at issue in an affidavit signed after Newsome’s arrest; (2) counsel was ineffective 

when counsel advised him to waive a jury trial and proceed to a stipulated bench 

trial; and (3) counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to object to the court’s 

consideration of hearsay statements from a confidential informant at the bench 

trial. 

Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court’s 

dismissal of Newsome’s PCR application. See Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 

860, 868 (Iowa 2015) (noting the applicable standard of review). Even if the 

affidavit had been offered and not excluded on hearsay grounds, the court found 

the result of the trial would have been the same. The court further concluded,

with regard to the jury-trial waiver, the evidence against Newsome was strong 

and there was a considerable sentencing concession offered to Newsome to 

agree to a stipulated bench trial. We agree with the district court’s assessment of

both of these claims. 
3

Newsome’s final claim regarding the alleged hearsay was already 

presented to, and rejected by, this court on direct appeal. See Newsome, 2013 

WL 1749922, at *7-8 (noting none of the statements made by the confidential 

informant were hearsay because the statements were not used for the truth of 

the matter asserted; instead the statements “were used to show why the officers 

conducted the stop of the vehicle”). Because this issue has already been raised 

and resolved, Newsome is precluded from asserting it again on appeal from the 

dismissal of his PCR application. See Iowa Code § 822.8 (2013); see also 

Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). To the extent 

Newsome claims his confrontation rights were violated by his inability to crossexamine this confidential informant by following counsel’s recommendation to 

agree to a stipulated bench trial, we agree with the district court’s assessment 

that Newsome cannot prove prejudiced because Newsome failed to show “what 

would have been gained by cross-examin[ation] . . ., []or that it would have 

changed the outcome of the trial.” 

We affirm the district court’s denial of Newsome’s PCR application

pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d) and (e).

AFFIRMED.