NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

Relevant Technical 

Requirements

Fire Protection

OCHMO-TB-008

Rev A

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1, Rev C

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care

[V1 3009] Palliative Comfort Care

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2, Rev D

[V2 6024] Combustion Monitoring and 

Alerting

[V2 6025] Contamination Monitoring and 

Alerting

[V2 6049] Chemical Decomposition

[V2 6050] Atmosphere Contamination Limit

[V2 6107] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat 

Atmospheric Ventilation

[V2 7083] Cleaning Materials

[V2 9028] Isolation of Crew from Spacecraft 

Equipment

[V2 9053] Protective Equipment

[V2 9055] Protective Equipment Automation 

[V2 9059] Fire Detecting, Warning, and 

Extinguishing

[V2 9060] Fire Protection System Health and 

Status 

[V2 9061] Fire Protection System Failure 

Alerting

[V2 9062] Fire Protection System Activation 

[V2 9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers 

[V2 9064] Emergency Equipment Accessibility

[V2 10114] Distinguishable and Consistent 

Alerts 

Executive Summary

Throughout the history of spaceflight, there 

have been numerous combustion events that 

have ranged in severity. Besides injury due to 

fire itself, a secondary hazard of fires is the 

inhalation of toxic combustion products. 

During and after a fire event, combustion 

products can present an immediate threat to 

the life of the crew due to the limited escape 

options, the fragility of the atmosphere, and 

the crew’s immediate need for safe air. The 

major approach to fire protection in current 

human-crew spacecraft is through prevention. 

Thus, fire safety relies strongly on the selection 

of materials proven to be fire-resistant through 

analysis and testing. During the design of new 

spacecrafts, trade studies for fire detection, 

fire suppression, crew response, crew 

protection, and post-fire clean-up and 

monitoring systems must be conducted. 

Improvements in the current fire-safety 

technology are necessary for future humancrew missions beyond low-Earth orbit. Deep 

Space exploration will challenge the existing 

tools and concepts of spacecraft fire safety.
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Overview

Understanding how fire spreads in space is crucial for the safety of the crew. Changes in gravity and 

airflow can alter the way fire behaves in space, making it harder to extinguish.

In gravity, fire is the result of the reaction between a fuel and oxygen in the air. As hot gasses from 

the flame rise, gravity pulls cooler, denser air to the bottom of the flame which regulates its speed and 

size. This also creates both the shape of the flame, as well as a flickering effect.

In microgravity, this flow doesn’t occur. This reduces the variables in combustion events, making them 

simpler and creating spherical-shaped flames. In low gravity situations, there is no buoyancy from flames; 

the flame burns equally in all directions.

Ventilation fans on space vehicles replace natural convection and can supply the air a fire needs to burn. 

Under these circumstances, the fire can spread in any direction, rather than just upward. The flame’s 

unusual shape creates different amounts of soot, smoke, or harmful gases.

2

Ventilation is not the only source of 

flame stimulating flow. Some burning 

plastic materials may induce flow to 

continue combustion through the action 

of boiling and vapor-jet ejection.

In systems or environments with higher 

oxygen content and/or pressure, 

materials that normally do not burn 

have a lower ignition temperature, are 

more vigorously combustible, and have 

a higher flame temperature if they do 

burn.

Detecting a fire in space is also different. On Earth, smoke detectors are installed on the ceiling or upper 

section of a wall because that's the direction in which smoke travels. In space, smoke doesn't rise, so 

detectors are placed within the ventilation system.

An additional source of early warning in the case of a fire event is the rate of buildup of atmospheric 

gasses. This particularly includes carbon monoxide concentrations. The ISS uses continuous atmospheric 

sampling of air-quality monitoring. This has the potential to detect the buildup of carbon monoxide as the 

confirmation of a fire event.

Flames in near quiescent or low-oxygen environments are 

often pale blue and almost invisible. Photo Credit: NASA

The basic approach to minimizing fire hazards in space is through prevention, which implies the 

elimination of one of the three fire-causing factors: fuel, oxygen, and ignition energy. Prevention is never 

absolute; thus, the overall strategy of fire safety must include fire detection, response, and suppression. 

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

ISS Fire Safety Strategy

For a fire on ISS, the following actions will be taken sequentially by the crew until the fire is extinguished:

3

1. Fire detection and warning [V2 6024] Combustion Monitoring and 

Alerting, [V2 9059] Detecting, Warning and Extinguishing.

2. Terminate ventilation in the affected module to slow the spread of fire.

For fires detected by smoke detectors, software response 

automatically terminates intra-module ventilation within the affected 

module, terminates inter-module ventilation between that module 

and the rest of ISS, and closes powered inter-module ventilation valves 

in the affected and adjacent modules [V2 9062] Protective System 

Activation.

3. Don protective masks [V2 9053] Protective Equipment, [V2 9054] 

Protective Equipment Use, [V2 9055] Protective Equipment 

Automation, [V2 9064] Emergency Equipment Accessibility.

4. Manually remove electrical power: Removing electrical power from 

hardware within the affected module should cease any continuous 

ignition sources [V2 9062] Protective System Activation.

5. Use fire extinguishers to put out the flames: The ISS has a portable CO2

extinguisher for use in the U.S. modules, and two types of water-based 

extinguishers for the Russian modules [V2 9063] Portable Fire 

Extinguishers.

6. If obvious signs of fire continue, the crew will power down the 

module [V2 9062] Protective System Activation.

U.S. Portable Fire Extinguisher on ISS

Russian water-based foam fire 

extinguisher

7. After the fire has been extinguished, if breathing protection is required due to atmospheric 

contaminants from the fire or if a CO2 portable fire extinguisher was discharged, the crew will egress 

and isolate the affected module by closing the hatches. This action is performed to prevent the 

migration of atmospheric contaminants into the other modules of the ISS.

8. If atmospheric contaminants are present and require breathing protection, the affected module will 

remain isolated until atmospheric scrubbing has reduced monitored contaminants in the atmosphere 

(CO, HCN, HCL) to admissible concentrations. The crew may use flexible vapor barriers instead of 

hatches to isolate the affected modules, especially for hatchways that are between a U.S. vehicle and its 

crew [V2 6024] Combustion monitoring and Alerting, [V2 6050] Atmosphere Contamination Limit.

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

Health and Medical Management of an ISS Fire

• During a fire event, contaminant readings are taken frequently (several per hour) per Emer-1 SODF 

procedures. This frequent sampling allows the crew and ground to have insight into whether 

contaminant levels are quickly rising and approaching (or at) levels requiring masks to be donned. 

These measurements are necessary to ensure that the crew does not experience acute exposure to 

contaminants that may pose a risk to crew health.

• A crewmember in smoke, near the flame, or experiencing symptoms of exposure to combustion 

products are considered adequate criteria for mask donning. Contaminant Level readings are not 

required prior to mask donning because taking readings from different devices or modalities would 

delay the crew from getting to the important steps of donning a mask (if necessary) and addressing the 

fire. 

• To protect crewmembers from toxicological injury, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) must be 

donned when in smoke/near fire or when preparing to enter that environment. If a crewmember is 

experiencing symptom(s), the affected crewmember should be treated using a supplemental breathing 

source with eye protection (i.e., portable breathing apparatus (PBA) or ИПК-1M) and consultation with 

a Flight Surgeon should occur.

4

• Protection of the eyes and respiratory tract is 

achieved by donning the PBA, ИПК-1M or the 

Emergency Mask with fire cartridge.

• Goggles are required when using the Russian Half 

Mask to ensure the crew is not unnecessarily 

exposed while preserving full gas masks.

• If the crew experiences symptoms while on the 

Russian Half Mask and goggles, the crew can don 

a new PBA or ИПК-1M.

First Response Masks located throughout station

PBA ИПК (IPK)

• Protection of the skin is also recommended since it is unknown what other products have escaped 

into the environment that may cause irritation. 

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Technical Requirements

[V2 6024] Combustion Monitoring and Alerting, [V2 9059] Detecting, Warning and Extinguishing, [V2 

9062] Protective System Activation, [V2 9053] Protective Equipment, [V2 9054] Protective Equipment 

Use, [V2 9055] Protective Equipment Automation, [V2 9064] Emergency Equipment Accessibility, [V2 

9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers, [V2 9062] Protective System Activation, [V2 6050] Atmosphere 

Contamination Limit

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Background

Challenges of Deep Space Exploration

Venturing past low-earth orbit brings a host of additional risks with the specific fire safety procedures and 

equipment depending greatly on the mission details:

• Partial gravity levels affect the whole chain of the fire safety strategy, with expected consequences 

on flammability, flame spread rate, smoke production, detection, mitigation, and clean-up.

• Surface operations on the Moon or on Mars will introduce intermediate buoyancy conditions 

which haven’t been investigated.

• Long-term exposure to radiation will also generate indirect fire safety issues. There is a lack of 

knowledge regarding the impact of long-duration radiation exposure on material flammability and 

coating efficiency.

• Material flammability in partial gravity remains a major gap for exploration missions. Groundbased flammability tests have proven relatively effective for low-gravity screening of material 

flammability based on decades of practice. There is no terrestrial facility that can confirm these 

results are relevant for partial gravity.

• In the habitat phase, the influences of celestial dust on surfaces or entering the atmosphere on 

flammability and smoke detection are presently unknown.

• Handheld fire suppression devices will be expected to meet requirements for operation in 

microgravity.

• Suppression devices need to operate in both microgravity and partial gravity.

• Stowage of suppressant and atmospheric diluents is more limited.

• Consultation and emergency communications with the ground may be of poor quality and 

delayed.

• The technical solutions presently implemented on the ISS are not designed for long-duration 

missions.

5

Deep Space expeditions featuring no emergency resupply, increased oxygen content in a low-pressure 

atmosphere, intermediate gravity levels, radiation exposure, and changes in the nature of the missions 

call for a cautious upgrade of present protocols to ensure the safe development of space exploration.

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

Fire safety is divided into capability areas that include: (1) fire prevention and material flammability, (2) 

fire detection, (3) fire suppression, and (4) post-fire clean-up. It is key that these areas work together, not 

only with each other but with the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS)1 and other 

systems on the spacecraft. The connectivity between these procedures and systems requires an 

integrated approach that includes crew response to the fire alarm, fire suppression, clean-up, and 

monitoring of the event.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 includes many requirements dedicated to the appropriate design and 

implementation of an integrated fire protection system. The system is comprised of detecting, warning, 

and extinguishing devices that shall be provided to all spacecraft volumes during all mission phases 

without creating a hazardous environment [V2 9059] Fire Detecting, Warning, and Extinguishing.

6

Fire Prevention and Material Flammability

• Design requirements are to ensure that the crew has the capability of determining the health and 

status of the fire protection system [V2 9060] Fire Protection System Health and Status. The crew is to 

be aware as soon as possible when the fire protection system has failed or is unreliable [V2 9061] Fire 

Protection System Failure Alerting.

• The system design must provide the crew with a fire protection system that allows for manual 

activation and deactivation [V2 9062] Fire Protection System Activation.

• Design requirements need to specify pressure and % O2 combinations permitted in the habitable 

volume: The potential for fire in a spacecraft can be reduced by maintaining the oxygen level below 

hazardous levels and by carefully selecting materials for compatibility with the O2 atmosphere.

11/29/2023

Rev A

1. OCHMO-TB-002 ECLSS Technical Brief
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

• Monitoring systems must provide real-time capability for the measurement and display of atmospheric 

concentrations of toxic combustion products. The gaseous combustion products that are to be 

monitored must be identified.

• Fire response scenarios must be defined and evaluated for the exploration of spacecraft and habitats.

• Gravity material flammability tests must be defined and verified to evaluate reduced gravity 

flammability. Material flammability must be assessed in relevant cabin atmospheres and gravity levels 

for exploration transit vehicles and habitats.

• Hazardous Materials Summary Tables (HMSTs) are required by Safety for all Programs (Reference 

Document JSC 26895 – Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test 

Materials for additional information).

• Materials used in pressurized cabins of spacecrafts must have high ignition temperatures, slow 

combustion rates, and low potential for explosion. Some materials that have been approved as having a 

low risk of flammability for spaceflight are Nomex and GORE-TEX.

7

Hazardous Materials Summary Tables 

(HMSTs) are a compilation of the 

chemical, biological, and flammability 

hazards of materials on a given flight or 

mission. Johnson Space Center (JSC) 

toxicologists evaluate the toxic hazard 

level of all liquids, gases, particles, or 

gels flown on or to any manned U.S. 

spacecraft. 

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Technical Requirements

[V2 9059] Fire Detecting, Warning, and Extinguishing, [V2 9060] Fire Protection System Health and 

Status, [V2 9061] Fire Protection System Failure Alerting, [V2 9062] Fire Protection System

Activation

Relevant Technical Brief: OCHMO-TB-015 Spaceflight Toxicology Technical Brief

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

Fire Detection

• Human-crew spacecraft require automated 

detectors that respond to fire "signatures“. Typical 

signatures are temperature rise, combustion gases, 

light and other radiation, particulates (smoke), 

pressure rise, and acoustic waves.

• The conditions on a spacecraft require rapid 

detection of fires with limited false alarms.

• Detection also depends on knowledge of where a 

fire detector should be located and the associated 

time to detection.

8

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Technical Requirements

[V2 10114] Visual and Audio Annunciations, [V2 10055] Distinguishable and Consistent Alarms

U.S. Smoke Detector (optical sensing)

• When designing fire-detection systems, consider the following features:

 Smoke detectors should be located in equipment bays, the cabin, and nearby ventilation return 

ducts.

 Airflow must be provided in occupied areas to make smoke visible and/or cause its odor to be 

detected.

 The fire detection system must be capable of operating independently of other components of 

a caution and warning system in the event of a triggered power failure or failure of an 

associated system.

 Failures of the fire warning system must be annunciated to the crew; due to the extreme 

danger a fire presents.

 Since the first detection of the fire may be a visual or olfactory indication to a nearby 

crewmember, the fire-detection system must be capable of being manually activated in the 

event a fire is detected by a crewmember.

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

Fire Suppression

• Once a fire is detected, crewmembers need to act quickly to extinguish it. In microgravity, the 

extinguishing system must be usable without assistance from gravity conditions. Per NASA-STD-3001 

Volume 2, the design of the spacecraft and its components must provide for rapid access to fireextinguishing equipment. The fire suppression equipment must be clearly identified, accessible, and 

useable to extinguish the fire in the time required during all mission phases. All extinguishing systems 

are not to create any additional hazardous conditions for the crew per [V2 9053] Protective Equipment

and [V2 9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers .

• PPE must be donned when in smoke/near fire or when preparing to enter that environment since even 

small concentrations of some combustion products can be immediately harmful. 

• Portable fire extinguishers must be provided for extinguishing fires in open areas, as well as areas 

behind panels per [V2 9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers and [V2 9064] Emergency Equipment 

Accessibility.

9

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1 Technical Requirements

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care, [V1 3009] Palliative Comfort Care

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Technical Requirements

[V2 9028] Isolation of Crew from Spacecraft Equipment, [V2 9053] Protective Equipment, [V2 9055] 

Protective Equipment Automation, [V2 9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers, [V2 9064] Emergency 

Equipment Accessibility

• Portable breathing apparatuses are needed to protect the 

crew from smoke and combustion products and must allow 

communication between crewmembers and ground 

personnel per [V2 9053] Protective Equipment.

• The selected extinguishing agent must not:

 Support combustion in an O2 enriched 

environment

 Contain toxic agents 

 Emit toxic products when applied to a fire 

 Interfere with visual observation

 Be difficult or time-consuming to initiate

• Design rules for the suppressant system must be able to stop 

the flow of O2 into the cabin. If loss of O2 in an unoccupied 

area or isolated compartment can be tolerated, then the use 

of depressurization for fire control or clean-up should be 

considered.

Astronaut Marsha Ivins performing a Zero-G 

evaluation of orbiter fire extinguishers while 

onboard the KC-135

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Application

• The characteristics of the fire and the burning agent determine how to handle the fire in terms of 

airflow distribution and pressurization. Cabin depressurization may be useful in addressing a fire but 

may initially accelerate flame propagation depending on the location of depressurization valves (i.e., 

they may increase airflow to the fire).

• Automated systems are to be used where crews are not capable of extinguishing fires (large fires or 

fires where the crew could be absent, or fires in volumes inaccessible to the crew). Other systems may 

be effectively protected with portable extinguishers per [V2 9059] Fire Detecting, Warning, and 

Extinguishing.

• Hand-operated extinguishers are to be clearly labeled and easily accessed by the crew. All extinguishing 

systems are not to create any additional hazardous conditions for the crew per [V2 9059] Fire 

Detecting, Warning, and Extinguishing.

• Fire suppression is intimately linked to the post-fire response. The crew must clean up the cabin 

atmosphere from any smoke or gaseous combustion products as well as clean up any fire suppression 

agent that was discharged. 

Post-Fire Monitoring and Response

• Considerable clean-up will be required after all fire events, minor or major. The most important 

requirement in developing a post-fire clean-up process is to specify the state of the environment to be 

scrubbed: pressure, temperature, and composition.

• Resources for recovering from the fire must include proper procedures for removal of contaminants 

from the atmosphere, and the ability of the crew to determine if the atmosphere is safe enough for 

them to remove their breathing apparatuses.

• The ventilation system may need to be shut down to protect the safety of the crew.

• Atmospheric revitalization to remove even trace quantities of fire and extinguishment contamination 

may tax the environmental controls and require the use of portable air-breathing equipment for 

lengthy periods of time. The crew must be wearing a breathing apparatus or filtering respirators to 

provide protection for the duration of the clean-up process. 

• After nominal conditions are restored, the subtle toxic and corrosive aftereffects of the fire on 

equipment, systems, and payloads must be recognized and appropriately mitigated.

10

Relevant NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Technical Requirements

[V2 7083] Cleaning Materials, [V2 6024] Combustion Monitoring and Alerting, [V2 6025] 

Contamination Monitoring and Alerting, [V2 6050] Atmosphere Contamination Limit, [V2 6049] 

Chemical Decomposition, [V2 6050] Atmosphere Contamination Limit, [V2 6107] Nominal 

Vehicle/Habitat Atmospheric Ventilation

Relevant Technical Brief: OCHMO-TB-002 ECLSS Technical Brief

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Lessons Learned

Apollo 1 (1967)

• On January 27th, a fire killed three astronauts aboard 

Apollo 1 during a launch rehearsal test. 

• An unidentified ignition event led to the rapid spread of 

fire in the closed cabin, and astronauts trapped inside 

could not escape in time. The electric wiring and 

plumbing carrying a combustible and corrosive coolant 

were considered the most probable ignition sources.

• Material and atmospheric choices in the module were 

revised after the accident to reduce the magnitude of 

any accidental fire.

• Flammability tests were conducted to limit fire hazards 

associated with individual components in an oxygenenriched atmosphere, and more than 100 full-scale 

mock-up fire growth tests were carried out on the 

ground to investigate under which atmospheric 

conditions a fire may propagate beyond its incipient 

region of ignition in the redesigned spacecraft interior.

Apollo 13 (1970)

• A malfunction was caused by an explosion and rupture 

of oxygen tank no. 2 in the service module. It was the 

first recorded fire-related accident in the absence of 

buoyant flow. The shock of the explosion put two extra 

oxygen tanks out of commission, crippling the 

Command and Service Module. 

• All oxygen stores were lost within about 3 hours, along 

with loss of water, electrical power, and use of the 

propulsion system. The mission was consequently 

aborted, and the crew retreated into the Lunar Module 

for the trip back to Earth.

• Numerous design changes were made to the Apollo 

service module and command module on subsequent 

missions in the Apollo program following the incident. 

11

The damaged Apollo 13 service module after 

separation

Wreckage of the Apollo 1 command module

Damage after the Apollo 1 fire

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Lessons Learned

Mir (1997)

• A fire erupted on the Russian Space Station Mir after an astronaut routinely ignited a perchlorate 

canister that produced oxygen to supplement the space station’s air supply. The fire came from an 

oxygen generator, where the oxygen supplied a ready source of fuel. Tests showed that the generator 

had to run out of oxygen for the fire to burn out. The fire caused little damage and no injuries, but it 

was difficult to control.

• The trace contaminant control fire on Mir showed that carbon monoxide, which can be generated in 

large quantities from a small fire, can cause serious effects on crew health. Lesser fires have shown that 

the crew needs immediate assurance of the limited threat to their health when they smell combustion 

products. This requires a carefully planned monitoring strategy, which includes volatile gases as well as 

smoke.

• Fire detection was based on optical smoke detectors and mitigation relied first on portable 

extinguishers, releasing a water-based foamy solution expanded by Halon 1301.

• Based on lessons learned during the incident, Russian space officials instituted changes in how 

crewmembers trained for similar emergencies, and how ground controllers responded to aid the 

onboard crew. Eventual knowledge of the cause of the fire enabled them to implement changes in the 

ground preparation of the solid-fuel oxygen generator canisters.

• Ground investigations of ignited generators, induced by cassette contamination or steel-shell failure, 

showed that water-based foam, the agent used in the Mir incident, is the most effective extinguishing 

agent, somewhat superior to water alone. The foam must be applied directly to the surface of the 

generating cassette.

12

NASA Astronaut Jerry Linenger wearing a respirator 

following the fire aboard the Mir space station

Charred remains of the solid fuel oxygen generator 

returned from space station Mir 

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Back-Up

13

11/29/2023

Rev A
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1 Revision C

[V1 3004] In-Mission Medical Care All programs shall provide training, in-mission medical capabilities, and 

resources to diagnose and treat potential medical conditions based on epidemiological evidence-based 

PRA, individual crewmember needs, clinical practice guidelines, flight surgeon expertise, historical review, 

mission parameters, and vehicle-derived limitations. These analyses consider the needs and limitations of 

each specific vehicle and design reference mission (DRM) with particular attention to parameters such as 

mission duration, expected return time to Earth, mission route and destination, expected radiation profile, 

concept of operations, and more. In-mission capabilities (including hardware and software), resources 

(including consumables), and training to enable in-mission medical care, and behavioral care, are to include, 

but are not limited to: (see NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1 Rev C for full requirement).

[V1 3009] Palliative Comfort Care The program shall provide in-mission palliative comfort care capabilities 

for medical scenarios where onboard medical resources have been exhausted, or a timely return to Earth 

(or another location of higher medical capability) is not feasible, and survival of the crewmember has been 

determined to be impossible. 

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D

[V2 6024] Combustion Monitoring and Alerting The system shall monitor in real-time the toxic 

atmospheric components listed in Table 6.2-3—Recommended Combustion Product (CP) Monitoring 

Ranges, that would result from pre-combustion and combustion events in the ranges and with the accuracy 

and resolution specified in the table, and alert the crew locally and remotely in sufficient time for them to 

take appropriate action. 

[V2 6049] Chemical Decomposition The system shall use only chemicals that, if released into the habitable 

volume, do not decompose into hazardous compounds that would threaten health during any phase of 

operations. 

[V2 6050] Atmosphere Contamination Limit The system shall limit gaseous pollutant accumulation in the 

habitable atmosphere below individual chemical concentration limits specified in JSC-20584, Spacecraft 

Maximum Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants (SMACs).

[V2 6107] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat Atmospheric Ventilation The system shall maintain a ventilation rate 

within the internal atmosphere that is sufficient to provide circulation that prevents CO2 and thermal 

pockets from forming, except during suited operations, toxic cabin events, or when the crew is not 

inhabiting the vehicle.

[V2 7083] Cleaning Materials The system shall provide cleaning materials that are effective, safe for human 

use, and compatible with system water reclamation, air revitalization, waste management systems, 

spacesuits and other spacecraft materials. 

[V2 9028] Isolation of Crew from Spacecraft Equipment Protective provisions, e.g., close-out panels, shall 

be provided to isolate and separate equipment from the crew within the habitable volume.

Referenced Technical Requirements

14

11/29/2023

Rev A

View the current versions of NASA-STD3001 Volume 1 & Volume 2 on the 

OCHMO Standards website
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D

[V2 9053] Protective Equipment Protective equipment shall be provided to protect the crew from expected 

hazards.

[V2 9055] Equipment Automation of Rescue Aids Automation of protective equipment rescue aids shall be 

provided when the crew cannot perform assigned life-saving tasks. 

[V2 9059] Fire Detecting, Warning, and Extinguishing The vehicle shall have a fire protection system 

composed of detecting, warning, and extinguishing devices that do not create a hazardous environment to 

all spacecraft volumes during all mission phases.

[V2 9060] Fire Protection System Health and Status The fire protection system health and status data shall 

be provided to the crew and other mission systems. 

[V2 9061] Fire Protection System Failure Alerting The crew shall be alerted to failures of the fire protection 

system. 

[V2 9062] Fire Protection System Activation The fire protection system shall be capable of being manually 

activated and deactivated. 

[V2 9063] Portable Fire Extinguishers A fire protection system shall include manually operated portable fire 

extinguishers usable while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated. 

[V2 9064] Emergency Equipment Accessibility Emergency equipment shall be clearly identified, accessible, 

and useable to complete emergency response in the time required during all mission phases where the 

corresponding emergency may occur while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing 

anticipated. 

[V2 10114] Distinguishable and Consistent Alerts The system shall provide distinct visual and audio 

annunciations to the human operators for emergency, warning, and caution events which require human 

operator action, and advisory alerts that are necessary for human operator situation awareness as specified 

in Table 10.3-1—Table Alert Type and Annunciation Table.

All referenced tables and figures are available in NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 Revision D.

Referenced Technical Requirements

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View the current versions of NASA-STD3001 Volume 1 & Volume 2 on the 

OCHMO Standards website
NASA-STD-3001 Technical Brief

OCHMO-TB-008

Fire Protection

NASA Office of the Chief Health & Medical Officer (OCHMO)

This Technical Brief is derived from NASA-STD-3001 and is for reference only.

It does not supersede or waive existing Agency, Program, or Contract requirements.

Reference List

1. Human Integration Design Handbook. (2014). 

https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/human_integration_design_handbook_revision_

1.pdf

2. Gary A. (2011). Final Report: Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression Project. NASA/TM-2011-

217036. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20110020262/downloads/20110020262.pdf

3. Fire Prevention in Space. (2004). https://www.nasa.gov/missions/shuttle/f_fireprevention.html

4. Guibaud, A., Legros, G., Consalvi, J.L., and Torero, J. (2022). Fire safety in spacecraft: Past incidents and 

Deep Space challenges. Acta Astronautica, 344-

354.https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576522000303?via%3Dihub

5. Martin, C. and DaLee, R. (1993). Spacecraft Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS) Systems: An 

Overview and Recommendations for Future Flights. SAE Technical Paper 932166. 

https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/932166/

6. Robert, F. and David, L. (2000). Progress in Fire Detection and Suppression Technology for Future Space 

Missions. NASA/TM-2000-210337. 

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20000120278/downloads/20000120278.pdf

7. Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials. (2014). JSC 

26895. https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/jsc_26895_rev1_final.pdf

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