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2018 IL App (3d) 160440 

Opinion filed November 14, 2018 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2018 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

) Will County, Illinois, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) Appeal No. 3-16-0440 

v. ) Circuit No. 15-CF-581
 

)
 

RAMIRO RODRIGUEZ III, ) Honorable
 

) David M. Carlson, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.
 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Ramiro Rodriguez III, pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver. On appeal, he argues the circuit court erroneously imposed a 

$1000 street value fine as part of his sentence. We vacate the fine and remand for an evidentiary 

hearing on the street value of the controlled substance. 
 

 

 

 

 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 On November 12, 2015, defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2014)). As a factual basis, the 

State averred that officers executing a search warrant found defendant in possession of more than 

“one gram but less than 15 grams of cocaine.” The circuit court sentenced defendant to a term of 

nine years’ imprisonment. In a corresponding written order, the court also imposed a number of 

monetary assessments. These assessments included a $1000 “Street Value Fine.” 

¶ 4 ANALYSIS 

¶ 5 On appeal, defendant contends the imposition of the street value fine was error and 

should be vacated because no evidence was introduced regarding the street value of the cocaine 

he possessed. The State concedes that the record contains no evidence concerning the street 

value of the cocaine and agrees the assessment should be vacated.1 The State argues, however, 

that this court should remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing and reimposition of the fine. 

¶ 6 Section 5-9-1.1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) 

(West 2014)) provides that a fine of not less than the street value of any seized controlled 

substance shall be imposed where a person is convicted under the Illinois Controlled Substances 

Act (720 ILCS 570/401 et seq. (West 2014)). The same section of the Code explains that 

“ ‘Street value’ shall be determined by the court on the basis of testimony 

of law enforcement personnel and the defendant as to the amount seized and such 

testimony as may be required by the court as to the current street value of the 

cannabis or controlled substance seized.” Id. 

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The State also concedes that the issue is reviewable. 
 

 

 

 

The imposition of a street value fine without any evidentiary basis on the record requires a 

reviewing court to vacate that street value fine. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 49 (2009). We 

therefore accept the State’s concession and vacate defendant’s street value fine. 

¶ 7 Next, the State correctly points out that, in Lewis, our supreme court not only vacated the 

fine but remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing and imposition of a new fine. See id. 

Defendant notes that Lewis was decided prior to People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916. Citing 

both Castleberry and this court’s decision in People v. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶¶ 11­

13, defendant argues that a reviewing court may not properly remand for the imposition of 

vacated but mandatory fines. 

¶ 8 Wade has no bearing on this case for two reasons. First, the fines at issue in Wade were 

imposed by the circuit clerk, not the trial judge. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 5. Here, the 

street value fine was not imposed by the clerk but was properly ordered by the trial court. There 

is no disputing the judge in this case had both the necessary jurisdiction and proper statutory 

authority to impose a street value fine. Following the abolition of the void sentence rule, the fine 

imposed by the judge, but erroneously calculated by the court, is not void like the fines imposed 

by the clerk in Wade, but merely voidable. See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 11. 

¶ 9 Second, our supreme court’s holding in People v. Vara, 2018 IL 121823, ¶ 23, decided 

after Wade, changed the landscape by holding our reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to even 

review clerical errors as our court did in Wade. Following the holding in Vara, it is questionable 

whether Wade is of any precedential value at this time. 

¶ 10 In any event, the street value fine in this case was explicitly ordered by the trial court and 

authorized by statute. The trial court’s error was linked to the court’s arbitrary methodology for 

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selecting the value of the contraband on the street without a prior evidentiary hearing supporting 

the amount assessed by the court. 

¶ 11 The dissent argues remand in this case is not appropriate. However, many courts have 

adopted an approach of remanding erroneously calculated street value fines to the trial court with 

directions for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the correct amount for the street 

value. The courts consistently adopting the approach since 1991, include: (1) our supreme court; 

(2) this reviewing court, and (3) every other district of the appellate court. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 

49; People v Nelson, 2013 IL App (3d) 110581, ¶ 7; People v. Tyson, 221 Ill. App. 3d 256, 259 

(3rd Dist. 1991); People v. Gonzalez, 316 Ill. App. 3d 354, 366 (1st Dist. 2000); People v. Otero, 

263 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (2nd Dist. 1994); People v. Spencer, 347 Ill. App. 3d 483, 488, 492 

(5th Dist. 2004); see also People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767 (3rd Dist. 2009) 

(modifying street value fine on appeal based on evidence adduced at trial). 

¶ 12	 For the reason stated below, we are not willing to adopt a universal approach to set aside 

a street value fine without remand, as the dissent suggests. Such an approach would eliminate a 

valuable source of direct funding for law enforcement agencies and local government that is not 

dependent on the State budget. The street value fine bypasses the State’s budgetary process and 

is distributed directly by the circuit clerk to local law enforcement agencies and county 

government. For example, at least 871⁄2% of the proceeds from a street value fine remain local. 

Significantly, at least 50% of the street value fine is distributed directly to the local law 

enforcement agency or agencies that took part in the seizure. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.2(b), (c) (West 

2014). Similarly, 121⁄2% of the fine proceeds are deposited in the State’s Youth Drug Abuse 

Prevention Fund. Id. § 5-9-1.2(a). Finally, any amounts remaining after these two allocations will 

be deposited into the county’s general fund. Id. 5-9-1.2(b). 

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¶ 13 Accordingly, based on longstanding precedent originating in our supreme court, we 

vacate the street value fine as incorrectly calculated by the circuit court and remand the matter 

for an evidentiary hearing on the correct street value for the seized narcotics in this case and 

impose a street value fine not exceeding the original $1000 fine. 

¶ 14 CONCLUSION 

¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated, and the matter is remanded 

with directions. 

¶ 16 Vacated and remanded with directions. 

¶ 17 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: 

¶ 18 We should simply vacate the street value fine and move on to the next case. See Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 615(b)(1), (b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Because there are myriad reasons to not remand the case, 

I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 19 The double jeopardy clause prevents a defendant from being retried after a reviewing 

court has found the evidence against him insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. E.g., Tibbs 

v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). Agreed, the double jeopardy clause generally does not apply 

at sentencing. People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 144 (1993). 

¶ 20 We have the discretion not to remand the case, and with the principles underlying the 

double jeopardy clause in mind, remand here seems offensive to legal sensibilities. The Code 

requires the State to prove the precise amount of a controlled substance seized as well as the 

street value of that amount before the street value fine may be imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) 

(West 2014). The State addressed the court on two relevant occasions, once in delivering the 

factual basis for defendant’s plea, then again 17 days later at sentencing. Neither time did the 

State offer any of the requisite evidence for the imposition of a street value fine. The majority 

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insists that we should remand the matter so that the State may try again—or, more accurately, try 

for the first time. Such a result would be intolerable in the trial context; the majority offers no 

reason why remanding for a second chance here is any more palatable. It is not the duty of the 

appellate court to rescue the prosecution from its own errors. 

¶ 21 Imagine, if you will, a fine only case where, on appeal, the only argument was that at trial 

the State failed to prove one or more elements necessary for imposition of the fine. The appellate 

court agrees. Remand to give the State another chance to introduce sufficient evidence? No! Not 

even in the Twilight Zone. While this case is technically different, it seems close enough to 

consider the same principles. 

¶ 22 To further illustrate the irrationality of this result, consider the street value fine from the 

perspective of the circuit court. The court presumably knew that defendant would be eligible for 

a street value fine, yet it had not received any evidence regarding the value of the controlled 

substance seized. Surely, the proper course of action in such a situation is to simply not impose 

the street value fine, for lack of any evidentiary basis to do so. Instead, the court here, in the 

majority’s words, “arbitrarily selected” a figure of $1000 for the street value fine. Supra ¶ 10. 

While the majority seems to condemn this tactic, remand for an evidentiary hearing and 

reimposition of the fine actually serves to reinforce it. A court in this situation might as well 

make up a number for the street value fine; the worst that can happen, apparently, is that the case 

gets remanded and a new fine imposed. 

¶ 23 Not only does remanding in this situation push the circuit court to impose an arbitrarily 

calculated fine, it encourages the court to set that arbitrary number quite high. As the majority 

has held here, the court on remand is limited to setting the new street value fine at an amount less 

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than or equal to $1000, so that defendant does not incur a larger sentence following remand.2 

Supra ¶ 10. Thus, the court choosing a number out of thin air in the absence of actual evidence 

should aim high, so as to not be constrained in the case of a remand. 

¶ 24 Not least among the practical reasons for not remanding this or similar cases is the 

logistical reality that a remand creates. After a remand, sheriff’s deputies or corrections officers 

will be tasked with transporting defendant from Sheridan Correctional Center to the Will County 

courthouse, then back to Sheridan. In between, defendant will sit through a presumably 

uncontested evidentiary hearing to determine a fine that is unlikely to ever be paid. Defendant’s 

journey, of course, will be funded by the taxpayers. Furthermore, deputies/corrections officers 

will continue to transport all types of felons across the state to similar hearings. Each such 

journey provides the convicted felon the opportunity to attempt an escape, or worse. If these 

deputies/corrections officers are to put their lives on the line to transport convicted criminals, the 

least we can ask is that there be a good reason for it. Saving the State from its own mistakes for 

the remote possibility of collecting a modest fine is not a good reason. 

¶ 25 I recognize that on similar facts, the supreme court in Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, vacated the 

street value fine and remanded to the trial court for a new hearing. That was in 2009. A lot has 

changed since then, the courts’ budgets not being the least. The cost of remand will no doubt 

greatly exceed any benefit to the State. It may be time to rethink Lewis. There seems to be no 

reason to give the State a second chance to prove the elements necessary for imposition of a 

street value fine. This is not a case where the trial court “miscalculated” the street value fine. 

2

I am not sure if that is correct, but it matters not to the main thrust of my analysis. If the majority 

is correct and, if the actual street value exceeds $1000, then the majority is telling the trial court to violate 

the law by setting the street value fine below that amount required by statute. Do we have the authority to 

tell the circuit court to ignore the law? 

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Rather, the court assessed the fine in the total absence of any evidence. For these reasons, I 

believe a remand constitutes an abuse of this court’s discretion. 

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