[Cite as Pratte v. Stewart , 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860.]

P RATTE , A PPELLANT , v . S TEWART , A PPELLEE
. [Cite as Pratte v. Stewart , 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860.] Statute of limitations — Childhood sexual abuse — R.C. 2305.111(C) — Retroactivity — Discover y rule inapplicable. (No. 2009-0953 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided May 5, 2010.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 08-CA-95,
2009-Ohio-1768.

__________________ S YLLABUS OF THE C OURT 1. The 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effective
date of that subsection. 2. Pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. 3. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a to lling provision for repressed memories
of childhood sexual abuse. The discove ry rule does not apply to toll the
statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse. ( Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.)

__________________ O’C ONNOR , J. {¶ 1} This appeal requires a determinati on of the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse in which theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 claimant alleges that memories of th e abuse were repressed. Appellant, Amy Pratte, asserts that the 12-year stat ute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C), which became effective on August 3, 2006, cannot be applied retroactively to her claim that she suffered childhood sexual abuse, because her memory of the abuse was repressed until after the limitations period expired. Pratte argues that pursuant to
this court’s decision in Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870,
the statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse does
not accrue until the victim recalls or othe rwise discovers that she was sexually abused. Pratte therefore contends that repressed memory continues as a tolling mechanism after the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). {¶ 2} Conversely, appellee, Rodney St ewart, contends that R.C. 2305.111(C) unambiguously applie s retroactively to Pratte ’s claim and that the statute does not contain a tolling provisi on for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. Stewart therefore maintains that Pratte’s claim, which was filed beyond the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), is time-barred. {¶ 3} We hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to all civil actions arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior
to the effective date of the enactment of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired
before the effective date of that subsecti on. We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from chil dhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represse s memories of that abuse. ( Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.)January Term, 2010

3 {¶ 4} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Relevant Background {¶ 5} On April 14, 2008, Pratte filed a la wsuit against Stewart alleging that he sexually assaulted her on three occasions when she was a child, the most recent occasion happening in the fall of 1984. Pratte was 33 years old at the time she filed the lawsuit. She alleged that she had repressed memories of the sexual abuse until April 20, 2007, when a news ev ent triggered the recovery of the
memories. {¶ 6} Stewart moved to dismiss Pratte’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. More specifically, Stewart argued that Pratte’s complaint was time-barred by R.C. 2305.111(C), which requires that a claim of childhood sexual abuse be brought within 12 years after the cause of action accrues. Stewart relied upon the statute’s specification that a cause of action fo r childhood sexual abuse accrues when the alleged victim atta ins the age of majority. Because Pratte reached the age of majority on July 13, 1992, Stewart argued that her claim must have been filed by July 13, 2004, and was untimely becaus e it was not filed until April 14, 2008. {¶ 7} Pratte countered that th is court’s holding in Ault v. Jasko , 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870

— that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of
limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that
abuse

— remains viable despite the enactme nt of R.C. 2305.111(C). Because her memories of the alleged abuse were repressed until April 20, 2007, Pratte maintained that her claims were timely filed within one year of her recovery of
the memories. {¶ 8} The trial court granted Stewart’s motion to dismiss, finding that the legislative intent in granting a minor 12 years after reaching majority in which to bring an action for childhood sexual abus e was to permit the minor a period of time to recall repressed memories. The trial court therefore rejected Pratte’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 arguments and held that her claim was filed beyond the time permitted by R.C. 2305.111(C). {¶ 9} On Pratte’s appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, the
court affirmed the trial c ourt’s judgment. The Second District found that “the legislature by enacting R.C. 2305.10(G) states that the twelve-year limitation period applies regardless of the prev ious rule of law established in Ault .” 2009- Ohio-1768, at ¶ 17. The court of appeals further concluded that the legislature intended to apply R.C. 2305.111( C) retroactively. Id. {¶ 10} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. 122 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2009-Ohio- 4233, 912 N.E.2d 107. Pratte asserts four propositions of law for our consideration: {¶ 11} (1) “R.C. 2305.111(C) does not apply retroactively to deprive a repressed memory childhood sexual a buse victim of her cause of action.” {¶ 12} (2) “Repressed memory as a tolling mechanism of the civil statute
of limitations remains viab le after the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C).” {¶ 13} (3) “The statute of limitations period for sexual abuse in Ohio begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused, or when through the exercise of ordinary diligence, the victim
should have discovered the abuse.” {¶ 14} (4) “The statute of limitations is tolled where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.” Analysis
A. History of the Statute of Limitati ons for Claims of Childhood Sexual
Abuse {¶ 15} A discussion of the history of the limitations period applicable to
claims of childhood sexual abuse is useful to our resolution of Pratte’s appeal. {¶ 16} Prior to the enactment of the statute at issue, the General Assembly had not enacted a limitations period specifi cally for claims of childhood sexualJanuary Term, 2010

5 abuse. In Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, this court was asked to deter mine what statute of limitations applied
to such actions. We concluded that a ca use of action premised upon acts of sexual abuse was subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery in former R.C. 2305.111. Id. at pa ragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 17} Having determined the relevant limitations period, we went on to
address when a claim for childhood sexual abuse accrues. The defendants in Doe argued that such a claim accrued on the vi ctim’s 18th birthday, while the plaintiff sought application of the discovery rule. This court found that the facts of the case before it did not require us to consider whether to apply the discovery rule to toll the limitations period in cases involvi ng childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 541. The court ultimately held, “A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has one year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has occurred.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 18} In Ault v. Jasko , however, we were presented with facts requiring us to determine whether to apply the di scovery rule in cases alleging childhood sexual abuse. The plaintiff, Kathy Ault, filed a complaint when she was 29 years old, alleging that she had been sexually abused as a child by her father. Ault v.
Jasko , 70 Ohio St.3d at 114, 637 N.E.2d 870. Her father moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. Ault responded that her cause
of action did not accrue until she was able to verify that she had been sexually abused and that her father was responsible for that abuse. {¶ 19} This court held: “The discovery rule applies in Ohio to toll the
statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, this court held: “The one-year statute of limitations period for sexual abuseS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 in Ohio begins to run when the victim reca lls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
victim should have discovered the sexual abuse.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 20} Both Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Wright dissented from the majority’s creation of “a rule of law that would permit a person at any age after any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and the revived memory of such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages.” Id. at 120. Chief Justice Moyer emphasized that “[i]f that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General Assembly that should declare it as such rath er than this court.” Id. Chief Justice Moyer further explained: {¶ 21} “The proper forum to determine such issues is in the General Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all scien tific data, and all empirical studies can be presented, review ed and debated by those who have an interest in the issue. That process did not occur, nor could it have occurred, in the
case before us. {¶ 22} “There probably will be a day, as there has been regarding the forensic use of DNA, when courts can be given reliable, competent information on the issue of repressed memory. That day is not here. We should dispose of this case with a strong dose of judicial restraint. Until the General Assembly acts on the issue, we should apply our holding in Doe v. First United Methodist
Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, and hold that Kathy Ault’s cause of action for assault and battery ag ainst John Jasko should have been filed within one year after the date of her eighteenth birthday.” Id. {¶ 23} Justice Resnick concurred in the majority’s decision in Ault but agreed with the dissenters’ view that the General Assembly is the most appropriate body to establish a discovery rule for cases of childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 119, 637 N.E.2d 870. However, Justi ce Resnick believed that un til theJanuary Term, 2010

7 General Assembly chose to act, this court could interpret the relevant statute of limitations to allow potentially va lid claims to proceed. Id. {¶ 24} This court next examined the availability of the discovery rule in
cases of childhood sexual abuse in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati , 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268. We followed our holding in Doe v.
First United Methodist Church and declined to apply the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations in a case of childhood sexual abuse against the employer of an alleged perpetrator when the victim knew the identity of the perpetrator and the employer of the perpetrator and knew that a battery had occurred. Id. at syllabus. The majority found the Ault ruling to be inapplicable because Doe had not alleged that he had repressed his memory of the a lleged abuse. Id. at ¶ 25. However, we stressed that the remedy sought by Doe re quired a legislative response to create an exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations and endor sed Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent in Ault . Id. at ¶ 51. {¶ 25} Shortly before the decision in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati was released, on March 29, 2006, the Genera l Assembly enacted a statute of limitations expressly for causes of acti on resulting from childhood sexual abuse, in 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 17. S.B. 17 became effective on August 3, 2006, and
amended former R.C. 2305.111 to create a 12-year statute of limitations for
actions for childhood sexual abuse. It is the construction and applicability of R.C. 2305.111, and the viability of the discovery rule adopted in Ault
, that we must consider today.
B. Retroactive Application of R.C. 2305.111(C) {¶ 26} In her first proposition of law, Pr atte challenges the retroactive application of R.C. 2305.111(C) to her claim against Stewart. Pratte argues that this court must presume that the legisl ature did not intend to apply the 12-year statute of limitations to repressed-memory victims who do not recover their memories before the age of 30 years. Othe rwise, Pratte contends, the statute runsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 afoul of her constitutional guarantee to a remedy and open courts in Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
1. Retroactivity {¶ 27} Although neither party nor the lowe r courts address retroactivity correctly, the proper analysis for determining whether a statute can be applied retroactively is summarized in State v. Consilio , 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167: {¶ 28} “It is well-settled law that statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless expressly declared to be retroactive. R.C. 1.48; Van Fossen
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 522 N.E.2d 489. It is also settled that the General Assembly does not possess an absolute right to adopt
retroactive statutes. Sec tion 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the retroactive impairment of vested substantive rights. See State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 13. However, the General Assembly may make retroactive any legislation that is merely remedial in nature.
See State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 537, 542, 8 O.O. 531, 9 N.E.2d 505.” (Plurality opinion.) Id. at ¶ 9. {¶ 29} With these principles in mind, this court reiterated its two-part test for evaluating whether a statute may be applied retroactively: {¶ 30} “First, the reviewing court must determine as a threshold matter whether the statute is expressly made retroactive. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d at 181, 772 N.E.2d 1172, citing Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. The General Assembly’s failure to clearly enunciate retroactivity ends the an alysis, and the relevant statute may be applied only prospectively. Id. If a st atute is clearly retroactive, though, the reviewing court must then determine whether it is substantive or remedial in

nature. LaSalle at 181, 772 N.E.2d 1172.” Id. at ¶ 10.
2. Express Designation of RetroactivityJanuary Term, 2010

9 {¶ 31} We begin our analysis by ascertaining whether the General Assembly expressly made the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) retroactive. As part of S.B. 17, th e General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.10(E), which states, “An action brought by a vi ctim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual a buse, as defined in section 2305.111 of the Revised Code, shall be brought as provided in division (C) of that section.” {¶ 32} Uncodified Section 3(B) of S.B. 17 states: {¶ 33} “The amendments to section 2305.111 of the Revised Code made
in this act shall apply * * * to all civil actions brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse for a claim resulting from ch ildhood sexual abuse that occurs on or
after the effective date of this act * * * and to all civil actions brought by a victim
of childhood sexual abuse for a claim re sulting from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of this act in relation to which a civil action for that claim has never been filed and for which the period of limitations applicable to such a civil action prior to the effective date of this act has not expired on the
effective date of this act.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 34} In Hyle v. Porter , 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 899, we discussed two examples of clear ex pressions of retroactivity. We first referred to our holding in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, where we found a clearly expressed legislative intent for former R.C. 4121.80 to apply retroactively based on the following passage: “ ‘This section applies to and governs any action * * * pending in any court on the
effective date of this section * * * not withstanding any provisions of any prior
statute or rule of law of this state.’ ” Hyle at ¶ 15, quoting former R.C. 4121.80(H). We also cited our determination in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, that the General Assembly specifically made former R.C. 2950.09 retroactive by making the statut e applicable to anyone who “ ‘was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense prior to the effectiveS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 date of this section, if th e person was not sentenced for the offense on or after’ that date.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting former R.C. 2950.09(C)(1). {¶ 35} Similar to former R.C. 4121.80 and 2950.09, Section 3(B) of S.B. 17 expressly makes the 12-year stat ute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applicable to acts of sexual abuse committed prior to the effective date of S.B. 17. Thus, we conclude that the statute incl udes strong, unequivocal declarations of retroactivity.
3. Substantive v. Remedial {¶ 36} Because R.C. 2305.111(C) was expre ssly made retroactive, we must next determine whether the statute retroactively impairs a vested substantive right or is merely remedial in nature. Van Fossen , supra. {¶ 37} It is well established that a statute is substantive if it impairs or takes away vested rights, affects an a ccrued substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, ob ligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction, or creates a new right. Van Fossen , 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489. Remedial laws, however, are those af fecting only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right. Id. A purely remedial st atute does not violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constituti on, even if applied retroactively. Id. {¶ 38} Prior to the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C), the common law, as expressed in Ault , permitted a victim of childhood se xual abuse to file a cause of action within one year from when he or she recalled or otherwise discovered that he or she had been sexually abus ed, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the sexual abuse. Pratte
maintains that she had not discovered that she had been sexually abused prior to
S.B. 17’s enactment. Because Pratte’s cause of action had not yet accrued under the law existing prior to the enactment of S.B. 17, Pratte, or any victim with repressed memories, did not have a vested right or an accrued substantive right toJanuary Term, 2010

11 file a lawsuit. Thus, R.C. 2305.111(C) did not impair vested rights or affect an accrued substantive right. {¶ 39} Pratte’s argument that the retr oactive application of R.C. 2305.111 violates the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is not persuasive and does not establish that the statute is substantive
and not remedial. 1 {¶ 40} “Any constitutional analysis must begin with the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by all legislation, and the understanding that it is not this court’s duty to assess the wisdom of a particular statute.” Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 141. In Groch
, this court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 199, 551 N.E.2d 938, that the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I applies only to existing, vested rights, and it is state law that determines what injuries are recognized and what remedies are available. Id. at ¶ 117–119 and 148. More over, “[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the comm on law. * * * Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.” Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77; see also Groch at ¶ 117. Thus, as we affirmed in
Groch , “ ‘[t]his court would encroach upon the Legislature’s ability to guide the development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the
courts. * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law.’ ” Id. at ¶ 118, quoting Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cook Co. (1978), 476 Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715.

1. Pratte did not raise this constitutional ch allenge in any of the lower court proceedings.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 {¶ 41} In accordance with the constitutional principles espoused in Groch
, the retroactive application of the 12 -year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C) does not violate Section 16, Article I of th e Ohio Constitution. Pratte did not have a vested right in the common-law discovery rule announced in Ault , and we would offend the separation-of-powers doctrine by invalidating the legislature’s decision to impose a reasonable statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse. {¶ 42} In so holding, we observe that if Pratte’s view prevailed, any statute of limitations that does not afford explicit discovery tolling provisions would violate the right-to-a -remedy provision, irrespective of whether it is applied retroactively or prospectively. Furthermore, the adoption of Pratte’s position
would discount the axiom that statutes of limitation serve a ga te-keeping function for courts by “(1) ensuring fairness to the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt prosecution of causes of action, (3) suppr essing stale and fraudulent claims, and (4) avoiding the inconveniences engendered by delay—specifically, the difficulties of proof present in older cases.” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati
, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 10. Justice is not served
in such cases. {¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) can be applie d retroactively and does not violate the right-to-a-remedy provision of Secti on 16, Article of the Ohio Constitution. R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil acti on arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired
before the effective date of that subsection.
C. Construction of R.C. 2305.111(C) and Viability of the Discovery Rule {¶ 44} Having determined that R. C. 2305.111(C) can be applied retroactively, we now turn to Pratte’s remaining propositions of law, which averJanuary Term, 2010

13 that the repressed-memory tolling mechanism in Ault remains viable after the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). We disagree. {¶ 45} The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004- Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. In interpreting statutes, this court has long held that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sens e of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. “A court is neither to insert words that were not used by the legislature nor to delete words that were
used.” Cleveland Mobile Radio Sales, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, 113 Ohio St.3d 394, 2007-Ohio-2203, 865 N.E.2d 1275, ¶ 12. {¶ 46} R.C. 2305.111(C) provides: {¶ 47} “[A]n action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood se xual abuse, shall be brought within twelve years after the cause of action accr ues. For purposes of this section, * * *
a cause of action for a claim resultin g from childhood sexual abuse, accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. If the defendant in an action brought by a victim of childhood se xual abuse asserting a claim resulting
from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or after the effective date of this act has fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff f acts that form the basis of the claim, the running of the limitations period with re gard to that claim is tolled until the time when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered those facts.” {¶ 48} We find that the language of R.C. 2305.111(C) is plain and unambiguous. It is beyond dispute from the unambiguous statutory language that R.C. 2305.111(C) governs a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse. TheS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 statute clearly provides th at a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resu lting from childhood abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. {¶ 49} The only exception to the accrual of the cause of action on the date the victim reaches the age of majority is when the defendant fraudulently conceals facts from the plaintiff. 2 While R.C. 2305.111(C) explicitly sets forth a tolling provision for cases involving fraudulent co ncealment, the statute does not contain a tolling provision for persons with re pressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The legislature could have included a tolling provision for repressed memory, but it chose not to do so. That de cision is a legislative prerogative that we are not permitted to overrule. Pratte is asking this court to disregard that rule
and to contravene established axioms of statutory construction by inserting words in the statute that were not used by the General Assembly. {¶ 50} Our rationale in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati is particularly germane to the issues herein: {¶ 51} “The remedy Doe seeks requires a legislative response to create such an exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations. The dissent of Chief Justice Moyer in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114 [120], 637 N.E.2d 870, is on point with the situation we consider today: {¶ 52} “ ‘The majority opinion announces a rule of law that would permit a person at any age after any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and the revived memory of such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages. If that is to be the law of Ohio, it is th e General Assembly that should declare it as
such rather than this court. * * * {¶ 53} “ ‘We simply do not have in the record in this case sufficient scientific, empirical or other information from which to craft a rule of law that

2. Pratte does not rely on the tolling provision for fraudulent concealment.January Term, 2010

15 will protect those accused of being abuser s and those who have been abused or believe they have been abused as child ren. The proper forum to determine such issues is in the General Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all scientific data, and all empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debatedby those who have an interest in the issue.’ ” Id., 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 51–53. {¶ 54} Like the plaintiff’s argument in Doe , Pratte’s argument asks this court to step into the role of the legislature and extend the limitations period for
claims of childhood sexual abuse. Our ba sis for rejecting Doe’s argument has even greater weight herein, given that the legislature has now created a specific limitations period and considered tolling provisions. We are cognizant of the proposition that some victims of childhood sexual abuse may not recover their memories of the abuse prior to the expiration of the 12-year statute of limitations, and we are not without compassion for those victims. But this court would invade the province of the legislature and violat e the separation of powers if it rewrote the statute to include a tolling provision for repressed memory. See Arbino v.
Johnson & Johnson , 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21. This court will not engage in such a practice and must leave it to the General Assembly to rewrite the statute if it deems it necessary. {¶ 55} Pratte’s reliance on the di scovery rule adopted in Ault to extend the statute of limitations is improper. Ault was an equitable rule of law created at a time when the legislature had not enacted a limitations period for claims of
childhood sexual abuse and this court had adopted a one-year limitations period
for claims of childhood sexual abuse. Th at case is patently and materially different from the situation with which we are now faced, in which the General Assembly has responded by establishing a substantially longer limitations period of 12 years.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 {¶ 56} We can reasonably infer that the General Assembly considered repressed memory by increasing the limitations period for claims of childhood sexual abuse from one year to 12 years. It is further reasonable to infer that the legislature was reacting to Ault ’s adoption of a discovery rule for repressed memory in enacting R.C. 2305.111(C). The fact that the legislature did not expressly denounce Ault is of no consequence. When the legislature amends an existing statute, the presumption is that it is aware of our decisions interpreting it. Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719. {¶ 57} We therefore presume that when the legislature amended R.C. 2305.111(C) to include a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood sexual abuse, it was aware of our decision in Ault . It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature had Ault in mind when it increased the limitation period from one year to 12 years and sought to afford victims a greater period of time in which to recover their repressed memories. {¶ 58} For these reasons, we hold that effective August 3, 2006, the
statute of limitations for a cause of acti on of childhood sexual abuse is governed by R.C. 2305.111(C). The General Assembly did not include a tolling provision for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, and it is not our province to add such a provision where one pl ainly does not exist. In light of the legislature’s unambiguous enactment, the discovery rule for repressed memory
announced in Ault is no longer viable and has been abrogated by R.C. 2305.111(C). Because Pratte di d not file her claim against Stewart within the 12- year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C) , and the fraudulent-concealment tolling provision is inapplicable, the cour t of appeals soundly affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Pratte’s claim.
Conclusion {¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhoodJanuary Term, 2010

17 sexual abuse that occurred prior to the e ffective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effectiv e date of that subsection. {¶ 60} We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood se xual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abus e. The discovery rule does not apply
to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexu al abuse represses
memories of that abuse. {¶ 61} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Judgment affirmed.
P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , and C UPP , JJ.,

concur. B ROWN , C.J., not participating.

__________________ Kircher Law Office, L.L.C., and Konrad Kircher, for appellant. Matan, Wright & Noble and Sco tt E. Wright, for appellee. Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Catherine G. Hoolahan, urging reversal for amici curiae, National Association to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of Children, Survivors’ Network of Those Abused by Priests, and National Center for Victims
of Crime.

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