Administrative Histories Project 

I 

PRELIMINARY HISTORY 

OF THE 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

DURING THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF 

PRESIDE:N-"T LYNDON B. JOHNSON 

November 1963 - January 1969 

FINAL EDITION 

\ 

National Aeronautics and Space Administra.tion 

January 15, 1969 
in Congress and by the general public. However, in development centers such as GSFC and JPL, requirements for development, test and operations facilities were also developed and met. 

And, over the past decade, many of the facilities specifically 

funded and built in NASA 1 s programs of science, applications, 

and advanced research and technology have contributed significantly to developing or upgrading the nation•s overall basic 

research capability. 

The importance of adequate basic research facilities 

was emphasized by Dr. Raymond L. Bisplinghoff in testimony 

before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in defense of NASA 1 s FY 1965 authorization: 

The technical program I have described is critically 

dependent upon the existence of research facilities which 

represent one of the Nation•s strongest resources in its 

bid forpre-eminence in aeronautics and space. The very 

existence of advanced research facilities such as high 

speed wind tunnels or environmental chambers has spelled 

the difference between success and ~ailure in projects 

in the past; Interestingly, many of our new facilities 

must themselves be evolved through research since they 

usually have little or no precedent •••• 

One of the fundamental premises of NASA 1 s program of 

advanced research and technology is that of performing 

as much ground research and development as possible before undertaking flight experiments. A continuous upgrading of our research facilities is mandatory if we 

are to maintain the I~fectiveness of our research 

and development programs. 

A fundamental requirement of NASA 1 s research facilities 

was to provide simulation of the full range of environmental 

conditions to which aeronautical and space vehicles would be 

exposed. Experience has illustrated that the timely construction of research facilities which permit the simulation of 

flight environment on the ground have reduced costly flight 

programs and saved valuable time. Hence, wind tunnels, environmental chambers, centrifuges, flight simulators were indispensible tools in research programs in such areas as propulsion, aerodynamics, materials, structures, controls, guidance 

and life support. Facilities were needed to simulate the effects 

of space in order to examine and solve operating problems of 

VI-14 

Science and Engineering Research Facilities

NASA expenditures for facilities for the manned space

flight program have quite naturally attracted major attention in
these systems, and also to provide an understanding of the physical 

phenomena underlying this operation. 

The decision to create NASA•s newest field center-- the 

Electronics Research Center {ERC) in Cambridge, Massachusetts -­

brought into focus basic issues of how best to meet a defined 

research need. In his letter to Congressman George P. Miller, 

Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Aeronautics, Mr. 

Webb oescribed the problem and the solution {the establishment 

of ERC) ~roposed in the President•s FY 1964 budget request as 

follows: 3

During the first few years of NASA•s existence, 

the Agency relied heavily on existing electronics 

technology and electronics research being conducted 

in industry and in universities for the aeronautics 

and missile fields. Electronics research and development within the Agency has been conducted on 

a decentralized basis, primarily as an adjunct to 

the major booster, spacecraft, or ground-support 

system developments. As a consequence, most of the 

NASA centers developed a limited electronics research competence closely related to those specific 

technical areas and development missions comprising 

their primary missions. 

By 1961, a number of top NASA space scientists 

and engineers began to recognize the need for additional 

electronicl? research and advanced development. The 

accumulated flight experience was beginning to show 

the significant differences between the atmospheric 

and the space environments for electronics components 

and systems. The magnitude and importance of the 

problem is reflected in the fact that electronics 

components account for over 40 percent of the cost 

of our boosters, over 70 percent of the cost of our 

spacecraft, and over 90 percent of the cost of the 

resources going to tracking and data acquisition. It 

was becoming clear that the existing technical base 

was not adequate to the growing electronics requirements. 

Following discussions with members of the NASA 

staff and others about this problem, I took a number 

of steps to correct this deficiency. A separate office 

VI-15 
of electronics and control was created with the 

Office of Advanced Research and Technology during 

the NASA Headquarters reorganization of November 

1961. This office, under the leadership of Dr. 

Albert J. Kelley, was asked to study in detail NASA 1 s 

present resources and capabilities in electronics research, -the long-range needs of the overall space 

program in this field, and to recommend a plan to 

meet these needs. 

Dr. Kelley•s group found that, although NASA was 

involved deeply in developmental projects covering 

almost all segments of the electronics field, NASA•s 

in-house research efforts were diffused and comprised 

a relatively small cumulative effort. Our program 

for contractual research in electronics was handicapped 

by NASA 1 s lack of a group of able scientific and engineering personnel, concentrating on electronics and 

associated physics research, and relating such contracted research effectively to the overall space 

program. Early in the fall of 1962, Dr. Kelley reported that NASA 1 s long-range requirements for inhouse competence required a substantial increase in 

electronic research efforts, and strongly recommended 

the establishment of a new research center. This 

matter was carefully reviewed by Dr. Bisplinghoff, the 

Director of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, 

Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden, and myself. We were unanimous 

in our judgment that the best interest of NASA, and of 

the Nation, would be served by the establishment of a 

new electronics laboratory to fulfill the requirements 

of the Nation•s aeronautics and space program. 

Before reaching this judgment, consideration was given 

to several ways of creating an in-house electronics research capability. One was to increase the present 

electronics research capability at several NASA research 

centers. A second was to create a major electronics 

subcenter at an existing NASA center. The third was 

to create a new electronics research laboratory. Although 

the estimated costs in personnel and facilities for these 

three approaches is similar in magnitude, our judgment 

was based on other factors. The first course of action 

was not adopted, primarily because the total program 

would remain diffused and electronics research would not 

VI-16 
permit the creation of an essential "critical mass' 

or concentration of electronics capability \o;hich is 

needed to perform the many advanced efforts in 

electronics research and technology facing NASA and 

the Nation. We rejected the concept of a satellite 

or appendix to an existing NASA laboratory, because 

we were concerned that the addition of a satellite 

facility would adversely affect both the quality of 

performance in the ongoing effort of any center 

charged with this additional responsibility as well 

as of the electronics research we urgently need. 

The basic purpose of the laboratory is to provide 

this Agency with the in-house competence it requires 

to properly plan, conduct, direct, and supervise a 

major segment of electronics research and advanced development in our aeronautical and space program. As 

much as possible of this will be under contract or 

grant to universities or industries capable of performing the work required. Existing NASA centers will 

continue to carry out some electronics research, and 

will conduct those developments necessary for their 

primary missions. These centers will draw heavily 

on the proposed center for electronics technology, 

components, subsystems, and prototype systems, required 

for their projects . 

With regard to the selection of a site for the 

proposed new research center, there were several basic 

criteria that had to be satisfied. A community having 

adequate utilities, services, communications, and transportation facilities was, of course, basic. In addition 

it would be very desirable to be assured of adequate 

housing and the related family welfare, education, and 

recreation facilities, as well as adequate land in a 

reasonably convenient location not in conflict with 

local metropolitan planning. However, in addition to 

these considerations, there were two overriding criteric 

which carried the greatest weight in the selection. 

The first of these was to have the research center located in close proximity to institutions, of graduate 

and postgraduate scientific and engineering education, 

which are already deeply immersed in the forefront of 

the electronics basic research and technology over a 

broad range. The second was to be located in an area 

VI-17 
that they had rejected, for the time being, any support for 

plans for a manned lunar landing. The letter, which became 

public~was interpreted in some quarters as indicating the NASA 

program could be slowed.215 

The international climate had improved in the summer of 

1963 with the agreement on a treaty to ban nuclear tests. On 

September 20, 1963, President Kennedy proposed at the United 

Nations that the world make "the most of this moment and the 

momentum'' through additional agreements, including a joint 

manned lunar landing program.216 

The President's speech was interpreted by many Congressional leaders as a move away from support of the concept 

of achieving pre-eminence in space. The House of Representatives 

reacted on October 10, 1963, with an amendment to the NASA 

appropriation bill barring any such agreement without Congressional approval. The Senate agreed with the House. In its final 

form, the provision forbade the expenditure of any part of the 

appropriation for participation in a manned lunar landing 

program carried out jointly with any other country without the 

consent of Congress.217 

Considerable controversy on the new electronics center 

had been under way since January, when President Kennedy proposed 

in his budget for fiscal year 1964 that it be established in 

Boston. The location and -- to a lesser extent -- the necessity 

of the center were debated extensively. NASA felt there was a 

need because, during the first five years of the space program, 

the greatest single cause of failure in spacecraft and rockets 

was difficulty in electronics. The agency had asserted that 

existing government facilities, either within or outside of 

NASA, could not properly meet the need. NASA stated that dozens 

of potential sites were considered during an extensive evaluation 

process o Boston was preferred because of its proximity to electronics

research-oriented graduate-level educational resources, as well 

as an established science-engineering community in the area. 

Critics from other regions of the country maintained 

that their areas should have been selected. Some contended that 

Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, brother of President 

Kennedy 0 had influenced the selection. 

Amendments to delete the $3.9 million initial appropriation for the center were defeated in the House votes on the NASA 

authorization and appropriation. However, the authorizing 

I-62 
legislation required NASA to submit to the Congressional committees a detailed report on the need, nature and location of the 

center, and ~rohibited expenditure of the funds until 45 days 

afterward. 21 , 

In its action on the budget for fiscal year 1964, 

Congress made a substantial cut in the requested appropriation. 

The $5.712 billion request was reduced to 5.1 billion by the 

time the House and the Senate had completed work on the 

authorization and appropriation bills in December 1963. 219 

In terms of program growth, this decision brought the 

NASA expenditure level to $4.17 billion for the fiscal year 

that ended in June 1964. Two years of continued stressful 

growth remained ahead before the expenditure total was to 

reach its peak 40 percent higher than 1964.220 But in five 

years, NASA had succeeded in extablishing a new agency of government that carried out extensive activities in the private sector 

of the economy, carrying to completion several major programs, 

planning a decade of activities, expanding and accelerating in 

response to the Soviet challenge and the resulting public and 

Congressional demands, surviving severe tests of its ability to 

grow, initiating construction of new facilities valued at $3 

billion, and organizing for full implementation of the manned 

lunar landing program. It had created a strong, capable inhouse technical and managerial staff. And it had established 

effective working relationships with industry, the scientific 

world, and the regions and communities of the country in which 

the program was conducted. Altogether, NASA had developed in 

five years into an agency of the government that could carry 

out its assigned tasks and hold its own in dealing with external 

forces. 

As autumn leaves fell, the debate continued on Apollo 

and cooperation with the Soviets. On November 14, 1963, Vice 

President Johnson took up the question in an address at Huntington Beach, California. He said: 

Today in our land -- and in the world -- there are 

those who argue for the view that we should not push 

forward into new realms or new enterprises unless there 

is clear and compelling evidence of competition from 

other nations and other systems. I beleive the American 

people reject the concept that their future or the future 

of freemen everywhere -- shall be defaulted to the vision 

and ambition of the totalitarians. 

J:-63