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85–090PS

2003

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

U.S. SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Serial No. 108–2

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Printed for the use of the House Committee on Science and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

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JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

CHRIS BELL, Texas

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

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BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

VACANCY

VACANCY

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

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BART GORDON, Tennessee

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

CHRIS BELL, Texas

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director

ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member

RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member

KEN MONROE, Professional Staff Member

CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member

RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

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HON. JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairperson

TED STEVENS, Alaska

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

JOHN O. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

RON WYDEN, Oregon

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington

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FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

FLOYD DESCHAMPS, Republican Senior Professional Staff

KEN LA SALA, Republican Professional Staff

JEAN TOAL EISEN, Democratic Senior Professional Staff

C O N T E N T S 

February 12, 2003

Opening Statements

 Statement by the Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona; Chairman, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Technology, U.S. Senate

 Statement by the Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert, Representative from the State of New York; Chairman, 

Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives

Written Statement

 Statement by the Hon. Ernest O. Hollings, U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina

Written Statement

 Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. 

House of Representatives

Written Statement

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 Statement by the Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska

 Prepared Statement the Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey

 Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. 

House of Representatives

 Prepared Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of 
Representatives

Witness

Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; accompanied by Frederick 

D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, and William F. Readdy, Associate Administrator for Space Flight

Oral Statement

Written Statement

Discussion

Effects of Budget Decisions on Shuttle Program

Changes Needed to Assure an Independent Investigation

Contractor Incentives and Obligations

NASA's Budget Request to OMB

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Crew Escape Systems

Questioning NASA's Goals and Objectives

History of Tile Damage and Loss

Reiterating the Need for an Independent Investigation Board

ASAP's Safety Concerns

Questioning an Aging System

Suggesting a Presidential Commission

ISS Contingency Planning

Role of Automation and Robotics

Crew Escape Systems

Replacing the Space Shuttle Orbiter

NASA Workforce Legislation

Manned vs. Unmanned Spacecraft

Thermal Tile Adhesive

Debris Assessment and Need for Imagery

Re-evaluating NASA's Mission

Lessons From the Challenger Investigation

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Charter of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 

signed and dated May 1, 2003

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SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
House of Representatives,

Committee on Science,

Joint with U.S. Senate,

Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation,

Washington, DC.

 The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room SR–325, Russell Senate Office 

Building, Hon. John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

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 Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. I welcome my colleagues from the House Science Committee 

and Administrator O'Keefe.

 To keep this hearing to a reasonable length, I appreciate my colleagues' indulgence in limiting opening 

statements only to those of the chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation and the House Science Committee.

 Following Administrator O'Keefe's statement, all Members will be recognized for four minutes to ask 

questions. We will alternate between Senators and House Members for questions, which is the normal 

procedure in joint hearings of this nature.

 On February 1st, the Nation suffered a devastating loss. As the Space Shuttle Columbia descended 

from orbit, it broke apart. Debris from the accident is still being collected by government agencies and 

volunteers with the hope that this evidence will help determine the cause of the accident.

 The Space Shuttle crew was a remarkable team of professionals. They were and will always be role 

models for all Americans. Their dedicated service and sacrifice to promote scientific research not only for 

our country, but for the world, will never be forgotten. They paid the ultimate price in pursuit of not only 

their dreams, but the dreams of nations. For that, we will be forever grateful.

 As we look to the future of the space program, we can pay tribute to our fallen heroes by diligently 

carrying out our responsibilities as legislators. In today's hearing, we hope to examine what went wrong 

on February 1st, the status of the investigation, and how we can ensure that an accident like this will 

never happen again.

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 This will be the first of a series of hearings on NASA and our space program. While today we're 

focusing on the Columbia, the accident also has focused our attention on the broader policy issues that 

perhaps we have neglected for too long. In subsequent hearings we will address the role of manned and 

unmanned space exploration, the costs and benefits of continuing the shuttle program, and our investment 

in the International Space Station and the effectiveness of NASA management. More fundamentally, we 
must examine the goals of our space program.

 I firmly believe that manned space exploration should continue. Its nature, however, should be and will 

be examined. We also must examine the extent to which Congress and the Administration may have 

neglected the Shuttle's safety program. A comprehensive examination necessitates a review of our own 

actions and those of the Administration to determine if the Shuttle program was underfunded or managed 

in a manner that compromised safety.

 I applaud Administrator Sean O'Keefe and NASA for their openness and availability. This has been an 

extraordinarily trying time for everyone in the agency. The Administrator and other officials have 

conducted themselves in a manner worthy of an agency that is not only a national brain trust, but is 

entrusted with realizing the dreams of all humanity. Many have noted the vast improvement of the release 

of information, as compared to the Challenger tragedy of 1986.

 I would like to assure the families of the brave men and women who died aboard the Columbia and the 

dedicated employees of NASA that we will do everything in our power to identify the cause of this 

tragedy and remedy it.

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 I thank Administrator O'Keefe and his team for appearing before us today, and I look forward to the 

testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK 

 Chairman BOEHLERT. We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to be here 

today. But, of course, that is not the case. I'm reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared 

before Congress after the Kennedy assassination. He said, ''All I have, I gladly would have given not to be 

standing before you today.'' I'm sure that is the way we all feel with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew 

so fresh in our minds and in our hearts.

 But we owe it to those astronauts and their families and to the American public to work as hard as 

humanly possible to determine the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all the policy 

questions the accident brings to a head.

 I view this hearing as a start of a very long conversation we will all be having about 

the Columbia incident and its ramifications. I think that it's very appropriate that we start that 

conversation on a bicameral basis, and I want to thank Senator McCain for being so willing to make this a 

Joint Hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to cooperate as we each review the 

accident and the human space flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear signal that we 

can and will do just that.

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 We will also be coordinating with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board headed by Admiral 

Gehman. I've spoken to Admiral Gehman, and I am impressed with the Admiral's determination to be 

independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines. And 

I appreciate the swiftness with which Administrator O'Keefe activated the board.

 That said, the more I've read the board's charter, the more I've become convinced that it must be 

rewritten. The words of the charter simply do not guarantee the independence and latitude that both the 
Administrator and the Admiral have sincerely promised. The charter's words need to match everyone's 

intent now to avoid any problems later. I also continue to believe that several more members should be 

added to the board to ensure that it has the appropriate breadth of experience and expertise.

 We will be working closely with the board as the Science Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan 

investigation, which will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident. We're going to have 

to raise some tough and basic questions that have gone unanswered for too long.

 What are the true risks of flying the Shuttle, especially if it's going to remain in service for another 10 

to 15 years? What are the true costs of continuing the Shuttle program at specific levels of risk? And what 

are the advantages of investing in the Shuttle, as compared to investing in other NASA programs, other 

R&D programs, and, indeed, other government programs, in general?

 But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we have a better sense of what happened 

to the Columbia and why, and it's obviously too soon to expect to know that.

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 No one should expect any revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status report. We 

ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come to regret.

 I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive of the utility that owned Three Mile Island 

at the time of the accident there. He was asked, ''What was the worst thing you did in handling the 

accident?'' He answered immediately. He said, ''We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, 'I don't 

know.' ''

 I would advise Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis, don't 

hesitate to say, ''I don't know.'' You're still in search of elusive answers.

 Despite the best of intentions, NASA has at times already put out misleading information because it 

didn't check the facts. For example, information indicating that environmental rules could have 

contributed to the accident have so far turned out to be entirely spurious, but it's taken NASA a long time 

to clarify its statements.

 Today is a chance to put facts into the record, facts that will help chart NASA's future. If we are to find 

the facts and honor the memory of the Columbia crew, we have to approach our task in a true spirit of 

exploration, with open and probing minds, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That 

should be our goal today.

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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 [The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT 

 We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to be here. But of course today that is 

not the case. I'm reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared before Congress after the 

Kennedy assassination: ''All I have, I gladly would have given, not to be standing before you today.'' I'm 

sure that is the way we all feel, with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh in our minds and in our 
hearts.

 But we owe it to those astronauts and their families, and to the American public, to work as hard as is 

humanly possible to determine the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all the policy 

questions the accident brings to a head.

 I view this hearing as the start of a very long conversation we will all be having about 

the Columbia incident and its ramifications. I think that it's very appropriate that we start that 

conversation on a bicameral basis, and I want to thank Senator McCain for being so open to making this a 

joint hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to cooperate as we each review the 

accident and the Human Space Flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear signal that 

we can and will do just that.

 We will also all be coordinating with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, headed by Admiral 

Gehman. I spoke to Admiral Gehman earlier this week, as did our Committee staff on a bipartisan basis. I 

am impressed with the Admiral's determination to be independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed 

neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines. That's the right attitude, and we will be watching to 

ensure that it guides the Board's proceedings.

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 We will be working with Admiral Gehman as the Science Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan 

investigation, which will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident. In the end, we must 

have a full appraisal and open debate about the true risks of flying the Shuttle, the true costs of continuing 

the Shuttle program at specific levels of risk, and the comparative advantages of investing in the Shuttle 

as opposed to other NASA programs, or indeed as opposed to other R&D programs or government 

programs, in general.

 But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we have a better sense of what happened 

to the Columbia and why, and it's obviously too soon to expect to know that. No one should expect any 

revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status report.

 We all ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come to regret. I'm reminded of an 

interview I once read with an executive of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the 

accident there. He was asked, ''What was the worst thing you did in handling the accident?'' He answered 

immediately. He said, ''We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, 'I don't know.''' I would advise 

Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis: don't hesitate to say, ''I 

don't know.''

 Despite the best of intentions, NASA has already sometimes put out misleading information because it 

didn't check the facts. For example, information indicating that environmental rules could have 

contributed to the accident has so far turned out to be entirely spurious. But it's taken NASA a long time 

to clarify its statements.

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 One reason I believe that today's hearing can be useful is that with so much information is already 

floating around from so many sources, it's important that Congress and NASA have an opportunity to 

create a clear record of where things stand at this point.

 It's especially important today that we get a clear sense of how NASA will handle the investigation and 
what contingency plans are in place should the Shuttle be grounded for an extended period of time. I'm 

sure we will also examine how NASA had been viewing the long-range safety of the Shuttle prior to the 

accident and how this may already have changed.

 All of us are still mourning the loss of the Columbia crew, but we must now turn to planning the future. 

And we can do that only in a true spirit of exploration—with a full and open examination of all the facts, 

without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That process starts today. Thank you.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hollings.

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST O. HOLLINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

 Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this meeting. We welcome our 

colleagues from the House side and my old friend, Administrator O'Keefe. We're glad to have you with 

us.

 Chairman Boehlert, I got the message, ''Let's don't jump to conclusions.'' I'm reading in the morning 

paper a similar message—Admiral Gehman said that ''the investigation with solid evidence thus far hard 

to come by.'' On the contrary, we have a lot of solid evidence that we've come by, and I sort of discern 

some kind of eery avoidance here of what really happened.

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 Here is the hard evidence. NASA's had a long history of problems with the Shuttle's heat tiles. We 

know that the Columbia's VERY first mission, many of the tiles flew off. That's 22 years ago. In 1994, a 

study entitled the Risk Management for the Tiles of the Space Shuttle, by Stanford and Carnegie Mellon 

University, found that 15 percent of the Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of the risk. And that was 

confirmed by a 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences.

 Then a study by the Johnson Space Center in March of 2000 found that the leading edges of the wing, 

quote, ''pose the highest risk for critical failure,'' end quote. And then during the launch of 

the Columbia on January the 16th, we have video evidence of debris striking the Shuttle orbiter 81 

seconds after launch, potentially causing a gash in the left wing of some 30 inches long, seven inches 

wide, and over two-and-a-half inches thick. And then 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was pitching 

and yawing due to drag on the left wing.

 And, of course, this morning's paper says that as it was coming down, and I'm quoting the Mission 

Control, ''FYI,'' for your information, ''I've just lost four separate temperature transducers on the left side 

of the vehicle, hydraulic return temperatures,'' he calmly reported.

 Again quoting, eight minutes before all communications was lost, Mr. Kling noticed the loss of data 

from temperature gauges on the left wing on the spacecraft as he monitored the Shuttle's descent into the 

atmosphere. A few moments later, Mr. Kling reported drag on the spaceship, but controllers expressed no 

alarm.

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 And, finally, the elevons, the picture that showed the elevons, tried to counteract that drag in engine 

thrusters to help it gain control, because a minute before the explosion, the U.S. Air Force captured that 

picture of the Shuttle showing a bulge of deformity along the front edge of the left wing. Right on down 

the list.
 Mr. Administrator, I would think, in the testimony, we all agree that we don't want to jump to 

conclusions. We all agree to be very thorough and leave no stone unturned, but we do have a rebuttable 

presumption here that the damage to the left wing at the time of liftoff was the cause. And let's rebut it. 

Let's find something. But don't all of a sudden be discovering debris all around and all of these other 

things that pant one way and say we have no idea what happened.

 I have been in these investigations before, and we knew exactly what happened at 

the Challenger. Allen McDonald said he was in the control room. They had warned not to take it off. It 

was going to cause a catastrophe. And he said one gentlemen said, ''There she goes.'' Another one said, 

''Like a piece of cake.'' Then he said it exploded, and everyone in the room knew why. We spent years 

investigating to find out the same thing that we knew immediately at the time of explosion.

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 [The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNEST O. HOLLINGS 

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 I would like to begin by offering my condolences to the family members of the Space 

Shuttle Columbia crew of mission STS–107. These heroes gave their lives in the advancement of science 

and all Americans should be overwhelmed by their sacrifice. The Columbia crew was on a special 

mission to conduct scientific research in outer space. As a strong supporter of scientific research, I'm 

grateful to all the men and women of NASA who undertake such endeavors to advance scientific 

knowledge.

 Welcome Administrator O'Keefe. You are here today to provide my distinguished colleagues and I 

with answers of how this tragedy was allowed to happen. There is a question as to whether this committee 

has consistently provided NASA with the funds it has requested for the Space Shuttle program. We want 

to get to the bottom of this accident so that we can ensure that it does not happen again.

 Now I know that the NASA engineers have developed this ''fault tree'' to identify all the possible causes 

of this tragic event. Branches are continually added, but nothing is eliminated. Investigators are exploring 

every lead, but the facts of the matter are:

We have video evidence of debris striking the Shuttle orbiter 81 seconds after launch. Engineers 

estimated the damaged tile area in the left wing to be 30 inches long by 7 inches wide, yet there was no 

concern for the tiles failing upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.

NASA's had a long history of problems with the heat tiles. These problems date back to 1981 when the 

first Columbia launch came back with lost or damaged tiles.

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NASA has recognized the tile problem. Numerous studies have been conducted. In 1990 a study found 

that 15 percent of the Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of its risks and recommended that improving 

maintenance procedures could reduce the probability of tile related Shuttle accidents by 70 percent.

Less than 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was pitching and yawing due to drag on the left wing. Its 
elevons tried to counteract the drag and engine thrusters had fired to gain control.

 It is clear that we have a rebuttable presumption to go forward with the investigation to focus the 

examination on how the tiles failed causing the catastrophic failure.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Hollings.

 Congressman Hall hasn't arrived yet, so we will proceed to Mr. O'Keefe, the Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He's accompanied by Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, who is 

the Deputy Administrator, and Mr. William Reedy, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. If you'd 

like to join—or they can remain where they are.

 And, again, I want to thank you for the extreme willingness on your part to share all information that 

you have with not only Members of Congress, but with the American people.

 Please proceed, Mr. O'Keefe, and I hope you understand that we're interested in as thorough a briefing 

as possible, as are Americans who are viewing this hearing today.

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 Thank you.

 [The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG 

Mr. Chairman,

 Today's hearing on the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the hearings likely to follow in the weeks 

and months ahead will bring additional pain to that which we already feel while in a period of mourning 

for seven brave, exceptional human beings in the prime of life. The hearings will also bring pain because, 

frankly, indications are that some earlier warnings might have raised questions about whether or not 

presumption of risk was insufficiently reviewed.

 The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster forces us to ask difficult questions. The Federal Government has 

spent more than $60 billion on the Space Shuttle program, the International Space Station, and the X–

33/VentureStar Space Plane (which advocates believed would replace the Shuttle). Our fleet of Shuttles is 

grounded at least until we determine what caused the Columbia accident and fix it; the three-person crew 

of the Space Station spends 80 percent of their time on maintenance; and the Bush Administration has 

canceled the Space Plane project. As a result of that cancellation, we now intend to continue using 

Shuttles at least until 2012, and possibly beyond 2020. Some of the technology on the Shuttles is 30 years 

old. We never intended to use them this long.

Page 24

 I want to make it clear that I feel that the Shuttle astronauts made a major contribution to our effort to 

assess the value to humankind of research in space, and I grieve over their deaths. The desire to reach for 

the stars is as old as human history and the ambitions embodied in our manned space program are noble 

ones. But we have had two fatal accidents in 113 Shuttle missions. Many people have become inured to 

the dangers inherent in sending people into space and bringing them back safely. But the fact is, it's a 

high-risk venture. Some risk is unavoidable—that's what makes our astronauts such brave individuals. 
But are we willing to divert precious resources available for other essential research and experimentation 

planned or in place to reduce the risks of manned space exploration to the point where they become 

acceptable?

 Because of the downturn in the economy that started in March 2001, the September 11th terrorist 

attacks, and the tax cuts enacted that year, we are facing federal budget deficits ''as far as the eye can see.'' 

And now the Administration proposes to reduce federal revenues even more. How can we guarantee that 

we can spend what it takes to make the space effort safer and successful? If we make the investment 

necessary, what benefits will we reap from continued Shuttle operations? What are the ''opportunity costs'' 

of such an investment? In other words, what other national priorities will suffer in the battle for scarce 

funds? Our manned space exploration program has been long on ambition but increasingly short on the 

hard-headed assessments needed to answer these fundamental questions.

 Manned space exploration isn't cheap. If we try to do it on the cheap, we put safety—and people's 

lives—at risk. I'm sure we will hear in testimony today and in the future that safety has never been 

compromised. But NASA has always had problems overseeing its contractors. And the National Research 

Council has concluded that the contract to manage the Shuttle program awarded to United Space Alliance 

in 1996 contained financial incentives for investments in efficiency, but not for investments in 

modernization and safety improvements.

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 Much of today's hearing and the hearings to come will focus on technical matters—possible causes of 

the Columbia accident, possible safety improvements. I am interested to know, for instance, what steps—

if any—NASA took to ensure Columbia's safe re-entry after determining that debris—presumably foam 

insulation from the fuel tank—hit and may have damaged the left win during lift-off. I am also interested 

in learning from NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe what additional safety precautions might have been 

assured with greater funding. And I want to know what safety upgrades, if any, were made after 

the Columbia space flights scheduled for August 2000 and March 2002 were postponed.

 In the course of today's hearing and future hearings, we will also scrutinize NASA's relationship with 

its contractors. We will also review Congress's relationship with NASA. We will analyze Administration 

budget requests for NASA past and present.

 I hope our investigation will be more about fixing problems than fixing blame—although determining 

accountability obviously is important. But beyond such immediate concerns, I hope we will address the 

harder question about whether the benefits outweigh the risks when we send people into space at this time 

and in the current fashion when unmanned missions can almost entirely match the quality of human 

participation.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE 

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Mr. Chairman,

 Thank you for calling this hearing and bringing us all together to speak and learn about 

the Columbia tragedy. This is a tough time for all of us from the Houston community, but especially for 

the team at Johnson Space Center. To the world those astronauts were valiant heroes; to us they were also 
friends, neighbors, and family—or as the Houston Chronicle proclaimed them, ''The Heroes Next Door.'' I 

am impressed by the diligence, progress, and openness of the NASA investigators that we have all been 

getting to know through the press.

 Those investigators have a difficult job ahead, and it is essential that that job be done well. We must 

find all the available facts, and we must not jump to hasty conclusions. It seems that the data is pouring 

in, in the form of video, computer analysis and collection of debris. I am concerned by reports of loose 

foam or ice that may have damaged the left wing during liftoff, especially since this may have been a 

problem in a past mission. I want to know what was done to keep such chunks from detaching and 

striking our multi-billion dollar Shuttle, entrusted with the lives of 7 Americans.

 However, we cannot be myopic and disregard or short-change other evidence and explanations. The 

inquiries must be methodical and objective. The team must leave no room for suspicion of cover-up or 

sloppiness. The families of the seven valiant crew members that lost loved ones deserve to know why this 

tragedy happened, as do the American people. Most importantly, we owe it to our brave future astronauts 

to show them our commitment to their safety.

 I am pleased that after we Democrats in the Science Committee sent a letter to the President expressing 

our concerns about the independence of the investigatory board, that the hearing and make-up of the 

board were changed. However, I feel there is still room for improvement. I recommend the inclusion of 

Nobel Laureates, academicians, and depending on their interests—perhaps family members of lost crew. 

It is important that the team is weighted toward bright people, who are not employees of NASA, and who 

do not have close personal ties to NASA or the Administrator.

Page 27

 The conclusions we all reach must not only be in the form of, ''Part A broke, and part B got too hot.'' 

We must discern what were the factors that led to those parts being included in a vehicle entrusted with 

seven lives and such an important mission. What were the quality assurance protocols? Were corners cut?

 Furthermore, this investigation needs to be expeditious. We have three Space Shuttles with critical 

missions already planned. We also have the International Space Station, with three astronauts high up 

above us waiting to hear their own futures. Thankfully, we have partnered with our Russian allies and 

others and ensured that we have the means to get those astronauts home, even though we may need to 

ground our own fleet for some time. However, we cannot continually place American lives in the hands 

of another nation for long. Nor can we risk losing the use of the International Space Station that we have 

been working so hard, and investing so much, to achieve.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ZOE LOFGREN 

 I'd like to thank Congressman Boehlert and Senator McCain for convening this hearing. Over the next 

few months, we will be asking some tough questions related to the breakup and loss of the Columbia, and 

the future of the United States space program. But first, our country has paused to reflect on the heroism 

of the seven astronauts who gave their lives so that the dreams of humans reaching for the stars can live 

forever. My thoughts go out to the families of our fallen, and to the extended NASA family.

Page 28

 I am pleased the NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has joined us here today. I look forward to 
hearing from and working with you and the dedicated and hard working members of the NASA employee 

family, as we seek answers to our concerns about the future of the United States space program. I trust 

that you will ask us for help, keep us informed and be prepared to make your recommendations to this 

committee that will help us be able to move our space program forward. I firmly believe this committee 

must focus on asking the difficult questions that relate to how we are best able to resume our quest to 

explore space.

 This committee must work in a nonpartisan manner and should not waste any time in trying to assess 

blame or create excuses for things that should have been done to help prevent this immense tragedy and 

loss. To do so would be a waste of time and money and, more importantly, would dishonor the sacrifices 

made of the brave Columbia crew and devalue the efforts being made by all who seek to ensure that this 

never happens again.

 I believe that our pursuit of answers to this tragedy would best be served by the appointment of a truly 

independent board of inquiry, much like President Reagan appointed after the Challenger disaster. Until 

that happens, Mr. O'Keefe, I am pleased that you accepted some of the recommendations contained in a 

letter sent to the President last week by 16 Democratic members of the House Science Committee. I am 

sure many of our Republican colleagues would have joined us in expressing our concerns about the 

composition of the review board, and I am confident they would have echoed our concerns. Without these 

changes, I believe the results of this work would have been viewed with great skepticism and certainly 

would have suffered without the added, independent expertise of the new members of the board. Just 

as Columbia's crew went into space seeking to expand our knowledge of space, we must do all in our 

power to ensure that our investigations will answer more questions than they create.

Page 29

 Mr. Chairman, I am committed to sending humans into space. We are explorers by nature, and I believe 

we must explore our own planet and those beyond. I believe these hearings need to focus not only on 

investigating the policy concerns that led to the Shuttle tragedy, but where we go from here in the 

exploration of space.

Has NASA shifted monies to the ISS and away from the Shuttle program?

Are we going to develop the next generation of space vehicle, and should we pursue a single-stage-toorbit program?

Should we also develop the use of expendable rockets to ferry equipment and personnel to the 

International Space Station?

Are we prepared to fund this program—as I think we should—in the current budget climate?

 With this in mind, I believe this committee can best honor the memory of Columbia's crew by 

conducting an honest examination of the role, if any, of recent budget cuts played in this disaster. Should 

we take this opportunity to acknowledge that the Space Shuttle has never lived up to its dreams of being a 

cost effective way of traveling to space? Or are we better served by pursuing a new generation of space 

vehicles, one that can take advantage of the tremendous advances in our knowledge and our technologies 

than those present in the remaining Shuttle fleet?

Page 30
STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 

ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY FREDERICK D. GREGORY, DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR, AND WILLIAM O. READDY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE 

FLIGHT 

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Boehlert.

 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation Committee and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to discuss the 

tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia——

 Chairman MCCAIN. Could you pull the microphone a little closer?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. —the ongoing investigation into this tragedy and the implications of the loss 

of Columbia to the Nation's space exploration efforts.

 This morning, 11 days after the accident, our work continues to honor the solemn pledge we made to 

the astronauts' families and to the American people, that we'll find out what caused the loss of 

the Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and do our utmost to make sure this never 

happens again.

 We welcome the Joint Committee's interest in working with NASA to determine how we can learn 

from this tragic accident so that we continue advancing the Nation's research and exploration objectives in 

space while at the same time striving to ensure that we make human space flight as safe as possible.

Page 31

 Throughout NASA's 45 years of serving the public interest, Congress has been our partner helping us 

achieve the goals outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels NASA to 

explore, use, and enable the development of space for human enterprise; advance scientific knowledge 

and understanding of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe; and use the environment of space for 

research; research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies.

 With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of significant achievements that have 

tangibly improved the lives of all Americans. And when we have erred, you have helped us right our 

course.

 This morning, you'll be asking tough questions, and that's as it should be. Believe me, none of the 

questions that you will ask can be any tougher than those we're asking of ourselves. I can assure you, 

however, that whatever determinations are reached regarding the cause of the accident, you'll find that 

complacency is not one of them.

 An ethos of safety is evident throughout the agency. For example, last year we temporarily halted 

Shuttle flight operations when tiny cracks of less than two inches were discovered in metal liners used to 

direct the fuel flow inside the propellent lines on two separate orbiters. We did not fly again until that 

problem was corrected. In a signal of our continuing commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also 

made it a point to praise a very young examiner, a fellow named David Strait, the young contract 

employee who had actually discovered the cracks.

Page 32
 Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made with the goal of operational safety being 

paramount. And from working with the dedicated employees who keep the Shuttle flying safely, I know 

they have the utmost regard for the enormity of that duty.

 This week, at NASA centers throughout the country and in the field, with the support of more than 

2,000 people from more than 20 federal agencies, state and local organizations, the important work of 

data analysis and recovery operations is continuing. We should all be extremely proud of the work that's 

being conducted by these dedicated public servants.

 President Bush observed last week, ''The people of NASA are being tested once again. In your grief, 

you are responding as your friends would have wished, with focus, professionalism, and unbroken faith in 

the mission of this agency. Captain Brown was correct, America's space program will go on.'' We intend 

to maintain that professionalism he referred to until we reach conclusion and beyond.

 This morning, to help frame our discussion, I'd like to review for you the significant actions NASA has 

taken since the morning of the accident in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to articulating 

notification of first-response procedures defining the roles and responsibility of mishap response and 

Mishap Investigation Teams, the plan specifies selections of persons outside of NASA to head an 

independent, seasoned, accident investigation team. Now, while we did not foresee this tragedy, our

response has unfolded as we had planned and prepared for in that contingency plan that we had hoped to 

never have to activate.

 This plan was one of many positive outcomes from the terrible loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger 17 

years ago. So we developed the plan shortly after that and have updated it before every flight. And a 

contingency was simulated for this very event just three months ago.

Page 33

 When we first became aware of the problems with STS–107, I was waiting at the Space Shuttle landing 

strip at the Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, on Saturday morning, February the 1st. At 8:59 a.m. 

eastern time, we lost communication with the Columbia. At 9:16, the countdown arrival clock reached 

zero, and there was no signal or sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill Readdy, our Associate Administrator 

for Space Flight and a former astronaut, declared a space flight contingency and activated the recovery 

control center at the Kennedy Space Center. At that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing strip 

and headed to the launch control center.

 We arrived at the launch control center 13 minutes later. At 9:29 a.m., we activated the contingency 

action plan for space flight operations. Through the White House situation room, we notified the 

President as well as other senior staff of the loss of communications. In addition, Members of Congress 

and the Government of Israel were notified. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the National 

Security Council were also made aware of the situation and were present there in the situation room that 

morning.

 Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that this situation was terrorism related. Shortly 

after, he made the determination it was highly unlikely terrorism was involved. Secretary Ridge then 

announced that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be the lead federal agency for the 

recovery effort on the ground.

 Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were escorted from the landing strip to the 

astronauts' crew quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30, we met with the families at the crew 

quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express our condolences, offer any and all support we could give, 
and assure them that we would offer that support throughout this entire ordeal, and stated our 

commitment to find the cause of the accident, fix the problems we find, and continue the work that their 

loved ones had started.

Page 34

 Data at all the NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10 a.m., and the headquarters action 

team in Washington, D.C., was activated with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty 

stations. By 10:30, an hour after the contingency plan had been activated, the mishap response team 

convened to assess the preliminary data and focus on the location of the crew compartment through the 

Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The rapid response team was 

activated for deployment to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana that day.

 The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on 

Saturday, February 1st, one hour after the contingency plan was activated. I placed a call to the NASA 

deputy administrator, Fred Gregory, also a former astronaut, who was at NASA headquarters in 

Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling the Columbia Accident Investigation Board members, which 

are specified by position in the contingency action plan.

 At 1:15 that afternoon, I made a brief televised statement expressing our national regrets for the tragic 

accident and informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

 The Accident Investigation Board was formally activated during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team 

teleconference, which occurred at 5 p.m. that afternoon, Saturday, February the 1st, less than eight hours 

after the event.

 By 6 p.m., during a teleconference with the White House situation room, we briefed officials from the 

Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of 

Defense, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status of the accident 

investigation.

Page 35

 At 6:40 that evening, staff members of the National Transportation Safety Board departed Washington 

and traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team, 

that day. They were later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

 On Sunday, February the 2nd, the Accident Investigation Board, chaired by retired United States Navy 

Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, less than 30 hours 

after the accident. We also began the practice of twice-daily briefings at headquarters in Washington and 

at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.

 Membership of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of persons selected for their 

positions in heading civil and military offices with responsibility for aerospace safety, accident 

investigations, and related skills. Many have been chief investigators on major accidents. And between 

them, board members have the experience of some 50 major investigations to draw upon. Quite simply, 

the people who are now on the board are some of the best in the world at what they do, and they were 

activated immediately. You have our assurance that this distinguished board will be able to act with 

genuine independence.

 When the board assembled, it modified its charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the 
administration of the investigation. The framework that was contained in the contingency plan was 

modified and will continue to be to ensure the independence of this board. NASA accepted the changes to 

the charter without objection, as I will continue to do in the future, as well, for any changes they propose.

Page 36

 Further, the NASA Inspector General Robert Cobb is an observer on the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board, having arrived on Monday, February the 3rd. He will help assure the independence 

of the board, as he reports both to the President and to the Congress under the terms of the Inspector 

General Act.

 There are additional details about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its activities that are, 

I think, important to note. The board has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that we 

cannot alter anything unless the board approves. We've already begun to honor document requests from 

the board, as we have all along, and have also supplied additional documents to the board which were not 

requested, but we believe might be helpful in their work as we move along. And, finally, the board has 

instructed NASA to conduct a fault-tree analysis that it intends to independently validate, to look at all the 

possible causes that could have occurred and to examine those in a very methodical way, which they will 

then, in turn, independently validate.

 On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and working with local officials 

in Texas and Louisiana. The State of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist 

with the retrieval of debris, and I am eternally grateful to Governor Rick Perry for his immediate response 

within hours of our request.

 By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor personnel working recovery 

operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, and California. They were part of the more than 2,000 people 

from Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the FBI, the 

Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, the U.S. Forest Service, Texas National Guard, 

Louisiana National Guard, and state and local authorities working to locate, document, and collect debris.

Page 37

 By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transferred to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At 

Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, and former astronaut, and ceremonial honor guard 

were present to pay our respect to the seven fallen astronauts.

 Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our efforts to recover debris from the 

accident. We have, thus far, recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The search effort, as you 

know from our press conferences, is a large, complex, and ongoing effort with hundreds of square miles 

with challenging weather and terrain conditions. And, indeed, the graphic that's up now is that 500-mile 

swath from Dallas/Fort Worth area to just south of Shreveport, Louisiana, in and around the Lufkin, 

Texas, area.

 We're very grateful that no one was injured on the ground as a result of flying debris from the accident, 

and we're working with our agency partners to assure recovery operations remain safe as we continue this 

effort.

 Throughout the course of this activity, I've also briefed the President and the Vice President on a neardaily basis to advise and apprise them of all the progress we're making, as well as the cooperation of all of 

the federal agencies, who have been extremely participating in this effort.
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in Lufkin, Texas, on Saturday, 

the 1st of February, and has been operating nonstop since then. Debris collection activities began at 

Barksdale Air Force Base on Sunday, February the 2nd.

Page 38

 Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the Kennedy Space Center where they'll be 

assembled and analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed by the Gehman 

board.

 I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my own assessment of the operation, but, more 

importantly, to personally thank the volunteers, in addition to all the federal, state, and local public 

servants, who have been working so tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.

 Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major 

inspections and upgrades, which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and 

stacked in a Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center for STS–114, the next mission due 

to have, or planned to have, been flown. The Endeavour, the third of the orbiters, is in the Orbiter 

Processing Facility and being prepared for STS–115, which was scheduled a couple of months later.

 The next Shuttle mission, STS–114, was to have been to the International Space Station in March, that 

mission commanded by Colonel Eileen Collins, United States Air Force. And I met with her on Friday to 

further advise that the mission is on hold until we understand the causes of the Columbia accident and are 

able to resolve any issues identified.

 At this time, we don't know how long it will be before we can resume Shuttle flights. We will only 

know when the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its findings to all 

of us.

Page 39

 Columbia was the first orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having flown 28 successful missions, or just over a 

quarter of its certified life of a hundred flights. In February 2001, a little over a year 

ago, Columbia completed a major scheduled 18-month overhaul and update of its systems, a process we 

call ''Orbiter Major Modifications.'' The STS–107 mission was Columbia's second flight following that 

major overhaul. A successful servicing mission that had been conducted, the first one, was to the Hubble 

Space Telescope in March of 2002. So this was the second flight after it had been nearly completely 

rebuilt.

 Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected Shuttle flight rate was five per year, starting 

in 2004, and funding is requested for that flight rate in the budget the President just submitted last week. 

The flight rate will be adjusted as needed, of course, once we determine when we can return to flight 

safely.

 The crew of the International Space Station is, of course, deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and 

her crew, as are all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space Station 

crew members, Ken Bowersox, the commander, United States Navy, Don Pettit, who is our science 

officer aboard, and Nikolai Budarin, who is a cosmonaut engineer, on Sunday, February the 2nd for the 

first time in our discussions, to inform them of the accident and how we're proceeding. Despite the 

tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy schedule of work.
 The day after the loss of STS–107, our Russian partners conducted a successful planned launch of an 

unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P 

should provide the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June 2003, through this 

summer. Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our Russian partners will continue 

as scheduled. The next flight is scheduled for June 2003.

Page 40

 We're working with Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials, to determine 

what we might want to place on that flight to make sure we have the best use of the space available. In 

addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle exchange is planned already for the launch 

in April 2003, as it had been prior to February 1st.

 Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess the impact on the International 

Space Station. These teams are focused on how we will, first, sustain the station, second, continue to 

assemble the station, as it is not yet complete, and, third, to maximize the utilization of this unique 

research platform.

 We have kept our International Space Station partners informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we 

have met with our international partners just last week, and continue to each day, to plan future meetings 

in the weeks ahead to develop an International Space Station partner plan.

 We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station as long as it is necessary, with 

support from Soyuz and Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient 

propellent to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the Space Shuttle.

 But the nearer-term issue for crew support beyond June is water. The International Space Station 

cannot support a crew of three after June with the currently planned support in progress. As a 

consequence, we're discussing with our international partners the possibility of changing the April Soyuz 

flight from a taxi mission to a crew exchange mission, as well as the feasibility of adding Progress 

resupply flights. But I want to really emphasize that there are no decisions that have been made, and all 

options are being examined at present.

Page 41

 I talked to the Expedition 6 crew that Captain Bowersix commands, now in orbit, and they've expressed 

determination and desire to do whatever is necessary to continue the research and deal with any changes 

in crew rotation schedule that may be necessary.

 As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action in responding to 

the Columbia accident, I'd like to point out that NASA developed an Integrated Space Transportation 

Plan, which was submitted by the President to the Congress in November as an amendment to the fiscal 

year 2003 budget. So three months ago, that plan was presented at that time. The Integrated Space 

Transportation Plan could help us address many of the near-term issues we're facing, even though it was 

developed prior to the loss of Columbia.

 The plan reflects the tight coupling required across the Space Station, Space Shuttle, and the Space 

Launch Initiatives. It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the International Space Station can be 

supported for the foreseeable future. It consists of three major program elements—the Space Shuttle, the 

Orbital Space Plane, and the Next-Generation Launch Technology.
 This new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's operational life for continued safe operations. The 

Orbital Space Plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability as early as possible to assure access 

to and from the International Space Station. And the Next-Generation Launch Technology program funds 

next-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle technology in areas such as propulsion, structures, and 

operation. This initiative will focus on the Orbital Space Plane and the Next-Generation Launch 

Technology, including third-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle efforts.

Page 42

 Now, the 2003 budget amendment that the President submitted last November, in 2002, also proposed 

adding funds to International Space Station reserves to assure that we could successfully reach the 

milestone of U.S. core configuration and maintain progress on the long lead items for enhanced research 

aboard space station and the continued buildout of that remarkable research laboratory platform.

 Space flight is a means to an end at NASA. That end is research, exploration, discovery, and 

inspiration. The crew of STS–107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research that could be 

conducted nowhere else but in space and had significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew 

took great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop yields, developing firesuppression techniques, building earthquake-resistant buildings, and understanding the effects of dust 

storms on weather. As was recorded by the media, Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.

 The crew of International Space Station is also conducting research now that cannot be conducted 

anywhere else. Thus far, more than 60 experiments spanning such scientific disciplines as human 

physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth observations, physics, and cell biology have been conducted on 

the International Space Station. From these experiments, scientists are learning better methods of drug 

testing and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of fundamental processes in 

manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis, and changes in Earth climate, vegetation and crops.

 The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our 

objectives in this regard are very clear. First, we will keep on-orbit International Space Stations crews 

safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in order to assure 

the reliability of the station itself. And, third, we intend to return to assembly—as soon as we're able, to 

return the Shuttle fleet to safe operations and complete the research goals for ourselves and for our 

international partners.

Page 43

 To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew-return capability to complement and 

augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by our partners. We intend to build that new return capability 

to create a new crew-transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space Station 

independent from the Space Shuttle.

 We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the remaining Shuttle fleet is a good 

investment, because it will help maximize the science return from the International Space Station.

 We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan to ensure that we have coordinated resources to 

exploit the unique research environment of space and the International Space Station in the near-, mid-, 

and long-term. We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it, and we believe that it's not only 

valid today, but even more compelling to pursue. While we believe that this plan is a good one, we will 

re-examine it as necessary in light of the investigative findings of Columbia.
 Just over a week ago, although it seemed more like a lifetime, the President spoke so eloquently and 

powerfully at the Johnson Space Center memorial service in Houston, Texas. He said, ''The cause of 

exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We're all 

part of a creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find the best among us, send them forth into 

unmapped darkness, and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind is in 

their debt.''

 The noble purposes described in the President's words frame all that we do and how we do it. These 

purposes drive our mission goals, which are to understand and protect our home planet, to explore the 

universe and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of explorers as only NASA can.

Page 44

 And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations 

on the International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days and weeks and months ahead, the 

American people should know we will also press ahead with other activities to achieve these important 

goals.

 This centennial flight year, we are launching the Mars exploration rovers, the Mars spacecraft, the 

space infrared telescope facility, and a number of Earth science spacecraft and instruments, as well as 

continuing our work to help improve aviation security on behalf of our homeland defense. In these 

activities and in all that we do at NASA, we strive for unmatched excellence. When it comes to human 

space exploration, those margins are razor thin, and we know we're graded on an extremely harsh curve. 

For us, 96 percent to 99 percent is not an ''A.'' One-hundred percent is the minimum passing garde.

 Now, despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible accident is not to turn our backs on 

exploration because it is hard or risky. John Shedd once said about the age of ocean exploration, ''A ship 

in safe harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.''

 Human history teaches us that in exploration, after accidents like this occur, we learn from them and 

further reduce risks, although we must honestly admit that risk can never be eliminated.

 President John F. Kennedy observed once, some 41 years ago, speaking of our fledgling space program 

at that time, ''All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be 

enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.''

Page 45

 The immediate task before our agency is clear. We'll find the problem that caused the loss 

of Columbia and its crew, we'll fix it, and then we'll return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly 

possible in pursuit of knowledge. We have no preconceptions about what caused the failure or what it will 

take to make it so that it will never happen again. We have an independent Accident Investigation Board 

of truly outstanding and eminently quality individuals, and they, and only they alone, will determine the 

cause of the accident and its remedy, no matter where it leads. We're ready and willing to support the 

addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman deems necessary to the effective conduct of the board's 

investigations.

 Part of my job as Administrator is to remind folks of what NASA does and what we are capable of 

doing. It's a responsibility I take very, very seriously. And, at the same time, I am saddened beyond words 

at the loss of seven outstanding men and women of STS–107. I'm also very proud and humbled by the 
focus, dedication, and professionalism of the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are 

assisting in this challenging recovery effort.

 Today, February the 12th, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for 

an entirely different purpose, have come to mind this past week. ''It is rather for us to be here dedicated to 

the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increase devotion to that cause 

for which they gave the last full measure of devotion.''

 We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss and renew the boundless spirit of 

exploration present at NASA's beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American people 

for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research, exploration, and inspiration 

for future generations.

Page 46

 And, finally, during the 16-day STS–107 mission, we had no indication that would suggest a 

compromise to flight safety. The time it has taken me to present this testimony is about the same amount 

of time that transpired between when mission control first noticed anomalies in temperature 

measurements and the accident.

 (Pause.)

 I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time that transpired from mission control's 

last communication with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.

 May Good bless the crew of STS–107.

 Chairman McCain, Chairman Boehlert, thank you all very much for you attention.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE 

85090a.eps

 Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing of the Senate Commerce, 

Science and Transportation Committee and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

to discuss the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the ongoing investigation 

into this tragedy, and the implications of the loss of Columbia to the Nation's space exploration efforts.

Page 47

 This morning, eleven days after the accident, our work continues to honor the solemn pledge we've 

made to the astronauts' families and to the American people that we will find out what caused the loss of 

the Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and do our utmost to make sure this never 

happens again.

 We welcome the Committee's interest in working with NASA to help determine how we can learn from 

this tragic accident so that we may continue advancing the Nation's research and exploration objectives in 

space while at the same time striving to ensure we make manned spaceflight as safe as humanly possible.
 Throughout NASA's forty-five years of serving the public interest, Congress has been our partner, 

helping us achieve the goals outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels 

NASA to:

Explore, use, and enable the development of space for human enterprise.

Advance scientific knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the Solar System, and the Universe and 

use the environment of space for research.

Research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies.

 With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of significant achievements that have 

tangibly improved the lives of all Americans. When we have erred, you have helped us right our course.

Page 48

 This morning you will be asking us tough questions. That's as it should be. Believe me, none of the 

questions you will ask can be any tougher than those we are asking of ourselves.

 I can assure you, however, that whatever determinations are reached regarding the cause of the 

accident, you will find that complacency is not one of them. Last year we temporarily halted Shuttle flight 

operations when tiny cracks were discovered in metal liners used to direct the fuel flow inside propellant 

lines on two different orbiters. We did not fly again until that problem was corrected. To signal our 

continued commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made a point to praise David Strait, the 

young contractor employee who discovered the cracks. Other flight decisions made throughout the year 

were made with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from working with the dedicated 

employees who keep the Shuttle flying safely I know they have the utmost regard for the enormity of their 

duty.

 This week, at NASA Centers throughout the country and in the field, with the support of more than 

2000 people from more than 20 federal, state and local organizations, the important work of data analysis 

and recovery operations is continuing. I am extremely proud of the work that is being conducted by these 

dedicated public servants. As President Bush said last week, ''The people of NASA are being tested once 

again. In your grief, you are responding as your friends would have wished—with focus, professionalism, 

and unbroken faith in the mission of this agency. Captain Dave Brown was correct: America's space 

program will go on.''

 This morning, to help frame our discussion, I would like to review for you the significant actions 

NASA has taken since the morning of the accident in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to 

articulating notification or first response procedures, defining the roles and responsibilities of mishap 

response and mishap investigation teams, the plan specifies selection of persons outside of NASA to head 

an independent, seasoned accident investigation team.

Page 49

 While we did not foresee this terrible tragedy, our response has unfolded as we had planned and 

prepared for that contingency plan. This plan was one of the many positive outcomes from the terrible 

loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger seventeen years ago. The plan is updated before every flight and a 

contingency was simulated just three months ago.

First Response: Saturday February 1, 2003
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 When we first became aware of the a problem with STS–107, I was waiting at the Space Shuttle 

Landing Strip at the Kennedy Space Center on Saturday, February 1. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost 

communications with the Columbia.

 At 9:16 a.m. the countdown arrival clock reached zero and there was no sign of the Columbia. Captain 

Bill Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight, declared a spaceflight contingency and 

activated the Recovery Control Center at the Kennedy Space Center. At that point, Bill Readdy and I 

departed the landing strip and headed to the Launch Control Center.

 We arrived at the Launch Control Center thirteen minutes later, at 9:29 a.m., and we activated the 

Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations. Through the White House Situation Room, we 

notified the President as well as other senior staff of the loss of communication. In addition, Members of 

Congress and the Government of Israel were notified. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the 

National Security Council were also made aware of the situation. Secretary Ridge then began assessing 

the possibility that this situation was terrorism-related. Shortly after, he made a determination that it was 

highly unlikely terrorism was involved.

Page 50

 Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be the lead 

federal agency for the recovery effort.

 Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were escorted from the landing strip to the 

astronauts' crew quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30 a.m., I met with the families at the crew 

quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express my condolences, offering any and all support we could give, 

and stated our commitment to find the cause of the accident, fix any problems we may find, and continue 

the work that their loved ones had started.

 Data at all NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10:00 a.m. and the Headquarters Action 

Center in Washington, D.C. was activated with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty 

stations.

 By 10:30 a.m., the NASA Mishap Response Team convened to assess the preliminary data and focus 

on the location of the crew compartment through the Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force 

Base in Virginia. The Rapid Response Team was activated for deployment to Barksdale AFB in

Louisiana.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board

 The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on 

Saturday, February 1, when I placed a call to NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, who was at 

NASA Headquarters in Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board members currently listed in our contingency plan.

Page 51

 At 1:15 p.m., I made a brief televised statement expressing our ''deepest national regrets'' for the tragic 

accident and informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
 I verbally activated the Columbia Accident Investigation Board during the NASA Mishap Investigation 

Team teleconference, which occurred at 5:00 p.m.

 By 6:00 p.m. during a teleconference with the White House Situation Room, we briefed officials from 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of 

Defense, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status of the accident 

investigation.

 At 6:40 p.m. staff members of the National Transportation Safety Board departed Washington and 

traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team. 

They were later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

 On Sunday, February 2, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, headed by retired U.S. Navy 

Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale AFB, less than 30 hours after the accident. We 

also began the practice of twice daily briefings at Headquarters in Washington and at the Johnson Space 

Center in Houston.

 Membership in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of persons selected for their 

positions in heading civil and military offices with responsibilities for aerospace safety accident 

investigations and related skills. Many have been chief investigators on major accidents and between 

them the Columbia Accident Investigation Board members have the experience of some 50 major 

investigations to draw upon.

Page 52

 Quite simply, the people who are now on the Board are some of the best in the world at what they do.

 You have our assurance that this distinguished Board will be able to act with genuine independence. 

When the Board assembled, it modified its Charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the 

administration of the investigation. NASA accepted the changes to the Charter without objection. Further, 

the NASA Inspector General, Robert Cobb is an observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

and he will help assure the independence of the Board as he reports to the President and Congress.

 There are some additional details about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its activities 

that are worth noting. The Board has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that NASA 

cannot alter anything unless the Board approves. NASA has already begun to honor document requests 

from the Board, and has also supplied additional documents to the Board which were not requested that 

we believe may be helpful to their work. And finally,. the Board has instructed NASA to conduct fault 

tree analysis that it intends to independently validate.

Recovery Operations

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 On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and working with local officials 

in Texas and Louisiana. The State of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist 

with the retrieval of debris.

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 By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor personnel working recovery 

operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, and California. They were part of the more than 2000 people 

from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, U.S. Forest Service, Texas National 

Guard, and state and local authorities working to locate, document, and collect debris.

 By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transported to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At 

Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory and a ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our 

respects to the seven fallen astronauts.

 Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our effort to recover debris from the 

accident. We have thus far recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The search effort, as you 

know from our press conferences, is a large, complex and ongoing effort over hundreds of square miles 

with challenging weather and terrain conditions. We are very grateful that no one was injured on the 

ground as a result of flying debris from the accident and we are working with our agency partners to 

ensure recovery operations remain safe.

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 The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in Lufkin, Texas on Saturday, 

February 1, and has been operating non-stop since then. Debris collection activities began at Barksdale 

Air Force Base on Sunday, February 2. Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the Kennedy 

Space Center where they will be assembled and analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident 

investigation directed by the Gehman Board. I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my 

own assessment of the operation and to personally thank the many volunteers who have worked so

tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.

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Space Shuttle Status

 Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major 

inspections and upgrades which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and 

stacked in the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center for STS–114. The Endeavour is 

in the Orbiter Processing Facility and being prepared for STS–115.

 The next Shuttle mission, STS–114, was to have been to the International Space Station in March. That 

mission, commanded by Col. Eileen Collins, U.S. Air Force, is on hold until we understand the causes of 

the Columbia accident and are able to resolve any issues identified. At this time we don't know how long 

it will be before we can resume Shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its findings.

 Columbia was the first Orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having flown 28 successful missions or just over a 

quarter of its certified life of 100 flights. In February 2001, less than a year ago, Columbia completed a 

major scheduled eighteen month overhaul and update of its systems, a process we call Orbiter Major 

Modifications (OMM).

 The STS–107 mission was Columbia's second flight following OMM and a successful servicing 

mission to the Rubble Space Telescope in March 2002.
 Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected Shuttle flight rate was five flights per year 

starting in FY 2004, and we have requested funding for that flight rate in this budget. The flight rate will 

be adjusted as needed once we determine when we can return to flight.

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International Space Station Status

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 The crew of the International Space Station is of course deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and 

her crew—as are all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space Station 

crew members Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin on Saturday, February 1st to inform them 

of the accident and how we are proceeding. Despite this tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy schedule 

of work.

 The day after the loss of STS–107, our Russian partners conducted a successful launch of an 

unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the Station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P 

should provide the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June 2003.

 Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our Russian partner will continue as 

scheduled. The next Progress flight is scheduled for June 8, 2003. We are working with the Russian 

Aviation and Space Agency officials to determine what we want to place on the flight to make sure we 

make the best use of the space available. In addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle 

exchange is already planned for launch in April 2003.

 Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess the impact on the International 

Space Station. These teams are focused on how we will 1) sustain the Station, 2) continue to assemble the 

Station, and 3) maximize the utilization of this unique research platform. We have kept our International 

Space Station partners informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we met with our international partners 

last week and plan future meetings in the weeks ahead to develop an International Space Station partner 

plan.

Page 56

 We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station as long as is necessary with 

support from Soyuz and Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient 

propellant to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the Space Shuttle. A nearer, term 

issue for crew support beyond June is water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of 

three after June with the currently planned support from Progress. As a consequence, we are discussing 

with our international partners the possibility of changing the April Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a 

crew exchange mission as well as the feasibility of adding Progress resupply flights.

 I should emphasize however, that no decisions have been made and we are examining all options. I 

have talked to the Expedition Six crew now on-orbit and they have expressed determination and desire to 

do whatever is necessary to continue their research and deal with any changes in the crew rotation 

schedule that may be necessary.

Integrated Space Transportation Plan

 As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action in response to 
the Columbia accident, it is worth noting NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which 

was submitted by the President to Congress in November as an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2003 

federal budget. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan can help us address many of the near-term 

issues we are facing, even though it was developed prior to the loss of Columbia.

 The Integrated Space Transportation Plan reflects the tight coupling required across the Space Station, 

Space Shuttle, and Space Launch Initiatives efforts. It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the 

International Space Station can be supported for the foreseeable future. It consists of three major 

programs: the Space Shuttle, the Orbital Space Plane, and Next Generation Launch Technology.

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The new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's operational life for continued safe operations.

The Orbital Space Plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability as early as possible to assure 

access to and from the International Space Station.

The Next Generation Launch Technology Program funds next generation reusable launch vehicle 

technology developments in areas such as propulsion, structures, and operations.

The SLI will focus on the Orbital Space Plane and Next Generation Launch Technology, including Third 

Generation RLV efforts.

 The FY 2003 budget amendment also proposed adding funds to International Space Station reserves to 

assure that we could successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core complete and maintain progress on 

long-lead items for enhanced research aboard the Space Station.

Science and Research Objectives

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 Space flight is a means to an end and at NASA that end is research, exploration, discovery and 

inspiration.

 The crew of STS–107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research that could be conducted 

nowhere else but in space, and had significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew took 

great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop yields, developing fire-suppression 

techniques, building earthquake-resistant buildings, and understanding the effects of dust storms on 

weather. As was written in the press, ''Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.''

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 The crew of the International Space Station is also conducting research now that can be conducted 

nowhere else. Thus far, more than sixty experiments spanning across such scientific disciplines as human 

physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth observations, physics, and cell biology have been conducted on 

the International Space Station. From these experiments scientists are learning better methods of drug 

testing, and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of fundamental processes in 

manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis, and changes in Earth climate, vegetation, and crops.

 The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our 

objectives in this regard are very clear. First, we will keep our on-orbit International Space Station crew 
safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in order to assure 

the reliability of the International Space Station itself. Third, we intend to return to assembly as soon as 

we are able to return the Shuttle fleet to safe operations, and complete the research goals set for ourselves 

and our international partners.

 To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew return capability to complement and 

augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by our Russian partners. We intend to build on that new return 

capability to create a crew transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space 

Station independently from the Space Shuttle.

 We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the remaining Shuttle fleet is a good 

investment because it will help maximize the science return from the International Space Station.

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 We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) to ensure that we had the coordinated 

resources to exploit the unique research environment of space and the International Space Station in the 

near-, mid-, and long-term.

 We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it and we believe that it is not only valid today 

but even more compelling to pursue. While we believe the ISTP is a good plan, we will re-examine it if 

necessary in light of investigation findings on Columbia.

Moving Forward

 Just over a week ago—although it seems more like a lifetime—the President spoke eloquently and 

powerfully at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. He said:

''The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human 

heart. We are that part of creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find the best among us, send 

them forth into unmapped darkness, and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind, and all 

mankind is in their debt.''

 The noble purposes described in President Bush's words frames all that we do and how we do it. These 

purposes drive our mission goals, which are:

To understand and protect our home planet; To explore the Universe and search for life; and, To inspire 

the next generation of explorers as only NASA can.

Page 60

 And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations 

on the International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days ahead, the American people should 

know that we will also press ahead with our other activities to achieve these important goals.

 This Centennial of Flight year we will be launching the Mars Exploration Rovers, the Mars Express 

spacecraft, the Space InfraRed Telescope Facility, and a number of Earth Science spacecraft and 

instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve aviation security on behalf of our Homeland 

Defense.

 In these activities and in all we do at NASA, we strive for unmatched excellence. And when it comes to 
human space exploration, where margins are razor thin, we know we are graded on a very harsh curve. 

For us, ninety-six percent to ninety-nine percent is not an ''A.'' One hundred percent is the minimum 

passing grade.

 Despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible accident is not to turn our backs on 

exploration simply because it is hard or risky. As John Shedd wrote about the age of ocean exploration, 

''A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.'' Human history teaches us that in 

exploration, after accidents like this occur, we can learn from them and further reduce risk, although we 

must honestly admit that risks can never be eliminated. And as President John F. Kennedy said some 41 

years ago, speaking about our fledgling space program, ''All great and honorable actions are accompanied 

with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.''

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 The immediate task before the Agency is clear. We will find the problem that caused the loss 

of Columbia and its crew, we will fix it, and we will return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly 

possible in pursuit of knowledge. We have no preconceptions about what the cause of failure was or what 

it will take to make sure it never happens again. We have an independent accident investigation board of 

truly outstanding and eminently qualified individuals and they, and they alone, will determine the cause 

of the accident and its remedy—no matter where it leads.

 We are ready and willing to support the addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman deems necessary 

to the effective conduct of the Board's investigations.

 Part of my job as Administrator is to remind everyone of what NASA does and what we are capable of 

doing. It's a responsibility I take very seriously. At the same time that I am saddened beyond words for 

the loss of the seven outstanding men and women of STS–107, I am also very proud and humbled by the 

focus, dedication and professionalism of the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are 

assisting us in the recovery effort.

 Today, February 12, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for a 

very different purpose, have come to be in my mind this past week:

''It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored 

dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion.''

 We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss, and renew the boundless spirit of 

exploration present at NASA's beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American people 

for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research, exploration, and inspiration 

for future generations.

Page 62

 Finally, during the 16-day STS–107 mission we had no indications that would suggest a compromise to 

flight safety. The time it took me to present this testimony is about the same amount of time that 

transpired between when Mission Control first noticed anomalies in temperature measurements and the 

accident.

 I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time that transpired from Mission Control's 

last communication with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.
 May God bless the crew of STS–107.

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 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

 The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the House Science Committee, the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Hall.

Page 65

STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH M. HALL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS 

 Representative HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Chairman McCain, and I thank this 

group.

 Mr. O'Keefe, I thank you, your Deputy and your Associate Administrator for Space Flight and those 

valiant people who sit behind you there that contribute so much day in and day out. We're grateful to you.

 And I speak for Bart Gordon, who is the Ranking Member of the Space Subcommittee, who has the 

same respect I have for the leadership. And this is a day and time when we should be neither Republicans 

nor Democrats, but Americans. And I think it's a day in time when we come together.

 And, Mr. Administrator, you did a great job that Monday, that fateful Monday, in Houston. Thank you 

for that.

 I think, certainly, that this one of the most painful hearings that I've ever had the duty to try to get 

prepared for. It's less than two weeks now since the Shuttle broke apart in the sky up over my home in my 

area in Texas. I'm saddened every time I think of these seven brave astronauts and the grief-stricken 

families that they left behind. I knew three of them very well.

Page 66

 And the young lady from India, who had accomplished so much and came so far, came to my district 

on more than one occasion, had a great sense of humor, was really great for the program. In one of her 

speeches to one of the classes in Canton, in Vanzant, Texas, one of the students said, ''We have a hard 

time pronouncing your name.'' She said, ''That's all right. I have a hard time pronouncing yours.''

 (Laughter.)
 Representative HALL. She had a way with youngsters and was very helpful.

 I know that there are a lot of questions about what went wrong, and I'm going to shorten my speech 

here because we have so many others that really should be heard from and we have questions that we 

have to ask you.

 There has also been a lot of speculation as to what or who may be to blame for the accident. The reality 

is that it doesn't appear that anyone yet knows what caused the accident, although the NASA 

Administrator may have some information in the progress of the investigation to share with us here today. 

And you've done that, and I thank you. And I think the questions will elicit more information and will be 

helpful to us.

 So it might be some time before we'll be clear on what factors have contributed to the accident. Thus, 

it's important that we have a thorough and, I want to stress, independent, as Mr. Gordon has stressed, 

investigation of the accident so that the American people can be assured that everything's on top of the 

table. And I know that's what everybody in this room wants. Anything less would be a disservice to the 

courageous men and women who died on the Columbia.

Page 67

 Our nation is grieving. We're mournful at this time. And the families are in mourning. But time lessens 

and sometimes heals that. But that same time is going to bolster the need for an independent investigation, 

and that's what we're looking for. And, Mr. Administrator, I understand that you've pledged to do that, 

and we thank you for that.

 I think we need to take a very close look at what can be done to improve Shuttle crew survivability. As 

a long-time Member of this committee, I've always had problems cutting the NASA budget, because not 

having the knowledge that you men have, not having the exposure of life or death that so many of you 

have, I didn't know how to cut it or how to recommend cutting it without endangering someone. So we've 

had to call on the Administrator to do that. We had to call on Dan Goldin to do that. He did it, and, I 

think, did it in a good manner. We call on you, Mr. O'Keefe, to give us that same type leadership, and we 

pledge our support to you as we seek out causation and how to keep it from ever happening again.

 NASA's talking about spending upwards of $9 to $13 billion, by its own estimates, over the next 

decade to develop a still-to-be-defined Orbital Space Plane. That's long-range planning. We have to have 

that, and we have to have some short-range decisions.

 I think we need to examine whether some of that money would be better spent on developing crew 

escape systems for the existing Shuttle fleet and on completing a simply, reliable U.S. crew rescue vehicle 

for the International Space Station, and doing both of these things as soon as possible.

 With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like unanimous consent to put my full speech in the record, and I yield 

back the time.

Page 68

 Thank you.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL 

 This is one of the most painful hearings that I have had to prepare for in all my years in Congress. It is 

now less than two weeks since the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart in the sky over my home state of 

Texas. I'm saddened every time I think of those seven brave astronauts and the grief-stricken families and 

friends that they left behind. They made the ultimate sacrifice for the cause of space exploration, and we 

shall miss them dearly.

 When the STS–107 mission was launched into orbit in mid-January, I was looking forward to what we 

would learn from it. As many of you know, it was a mission dedicated to research. As a result, it was a 

mission that offered the promise of improving the lives of our citizens back here on Earth. That is the 

vision I have long had for our space program: learning things in space that can be used for the benefit of 

all Americans. It is what the International Space Station should be about if this nation will step up and 

honor our long-standing commitments to complete the project. And it is what the astronauts of STS–107 

were trying to accomplish on their ill-fated mission.

 I know that there are many questions about what went wrong. There has also been a lot of speculation 

as to what or who may be to blame for the accident. The reality is that it doesn't appear that anyone yet 

knows what caused the accident, although the NASA Administrator may have some information on the 

progress of the investigation to share with us today. So it's likely to be some time before we can be clear 

on what factor, may have contributed to the accident. It thus is important that we have a thorough, 

independent investigation of the accident so that the American people can be assured that nothing is being 

hidden. Anything less would be a disservice to the courageous men and women who died on Columbia.

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 Whatever the specific cause of the Columbia accident, we in Congress need to take a hard look at 

where we go from here. NASA's latest proposal doesn't envision having an alternative means of launching 

crews into space for another decade or more. And in any event, NASA seems to lie committed to flying 

the Shuttle to the Space Station throughout the lifetime of the Station. A decade or more is a long time. If, 

God forbid, there is another accident sometime during that decade, will we be able to look back and say 

we had done all we could to improve the crew's chances of survival? I hope so.

 For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's March 2002 report found that 17 years after 

the Challenger accident the Shuttle program still is facing a situation where:

''there is no in-flight crew escape system for the Orbiter other than for abort below 20,000 feet during a 

controlled glide''

 and it recommended that NASA:

''complete the ongoing studies of crew escape design options and implement an improved system as soon 

as possible.''

 I think we need to take a close look at what could be done to improve Shuttle crew survivability. 

NASA is talking about spending upwards of $9 to $13 billion by its own estimates over the next decade to 

develop a still-to-be-defined Orbital Space Plane. I think we need to examine whether some of that money 

would be better spent on developing crew escape systems for the existing Shuttle fleet and on completing 

a simple, reliable U.S. crew rescue vehicle for the International Space Station—and doing both of those 

things as soon as possible. I don't think the brave men and women who serve in our nation's space 
program should be needlessly put into harm's way any longer than necessary if there are practical 

remedies available.

Page 70

 Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Stevens has to return quickly to chair the conference concerning the 

Omnibus Appropriations bill, which all of us eagerly await the result of his work, and so he'd like to make 

a brief statement.

 Senator Stevens.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

 Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I do have to return to that conference. I have come 

because the gentleman that's before you I consider to be one of the closest friends I have in the world. I 

think members should know who he is.

 He came to Washington as a White House fellow. He worked for the Department of Navy, and then he 

became a Senate employee and became the chief of staff of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. 

He went from there to become the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy. 

He subsequently became a professor at Syracuse University, then a deputy director of the Office of 

Management Budget, and is now the administrator of NASA.

 I know of no one who has committed himself to good government and conducted himself in the finest 

of our traditions than Sean O'Keefe. He is a man of integrity, of complete honest and openness in all he 

does. I would back him, as I know he would me, with my life. And I urge you to listen to Sean O'Keefe 

today. He'll tell you the truth.

Page 71

 Thank you very much.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens.

Discussion

Effects of Budget Decisions on Shuttle Program

 Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for your presentation.

 Look, one of the issues that is going to be talked about a lot today by a lot of the members is the issue 

as to whether the NASA's budget was, ''starved,'' cut to the bone. There will be allegations that certain 

recommendations were made by certain people.

 For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel annual report for 2001 stated, ''The current and 

proposed budget are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of operating the Space 

Shuttle.'' I've seen a lot of rhetoric in the media, and you have too, that you were ''starved.'' That was not 
my experience, as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Commerce Committee, but I think it's very 

important that you take that issue head on and immediately.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, I fully agree. There is no question, this is a concern that we continue to 

have, as well, and to assure that all of the facts that are laid out on that particular matter. As it pertains the 

views of the ASAP and the advisory committee, as well, their reports, I think, reiterate consistently their 

view that the future concerns about Space Shuttle operations and safety considerations were the matter 

they were most focused on. As a consequence, their continued effort that I see in the report before us 

always is that they quote specifically, ''It's important to stress that the panel believes that safety has not 

yet been compromised. NASA and its contractors maintain excellent safety practices and processes, as 

well as an appropriate level of safety consciousness. This has been—contributed to significant flight 

achievements in the defined requirements for operating, and an acceptable level of risk are always met.''

Page 72

 So their concerns were always presented in the context of future approaches. And, as a matter of fact, if 

we call up slide number 35, that will cover that particular question, as well. Their focus was always on the 

future operations as well as future efforts that were to be engaged in.

 At the present time, in terms of current operations and activities they certified as recently as a year ago, 

they felt that the current operations were concentrated on very specifically to assure flight safety as a 

primary paramount objective.

 Chairman MCCAIN. I think you're going to be confronted with some numbers in further questioning, 

and I hope you will have responses to that, as well.

 At a Commerce Committee September 6th, 2001, hearing on Shuttle safety, William Readdy, then 

Deputy Associate Administrator of the Office of Space Flight, acknowledged the challenges NASA was 

facing to maintain Shuttle safety in light of budgetary constraints, but, nevertheless, stated, ''The safety of 

the Space Shuttle has also been dramatically improved by reducing risk by more than a factor of five.'' 

Later in his testimony, he said, quote, ''The Space Shuttle is the safest, most capable and reliable 

transportation system in the world.''

 Mr. Blomberg, the former chief of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, testifying before the 

House Science Committee in April 2002 on behalf of the advisory panel, stated that, quote, ''In all the 

years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for Space Shuttle safety as I am right now. The 

concern is not for the present flight or the next or perhaps the one after that. In fact, one of the roots of my 

concern is that nobody will know for sure when the safety margins have been eroded too far. All of my 

instincts, however, suggest that the current approach is planting the seeds for future danger.''

Page 73

 How do we reconcile those two statements by two highly regarded individuals who are within the 

bureaucracy of NASA?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Well, just to clarify the record on that, Bill Readdy, of course, is the 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight. Richard Blomberg was a independent external member of and a 

chairman of the advisory panel for safety, so he was not a full-time NASA employee in that regard. He 

was representing a panel view.

 Reconciling that is—I think if you trace the history just a little bit, the plan that had existed until this 
past November contemplated the retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet as early as the middle of this 

decade, certainly no later than 2012, so it altered over the course of several years from about '95 forward, 

the best I can tell, over the history of this.

 Based on the recommendations of that advisory panel on safety, as well as the testimony and comments 

made at several different committee hearings, as well, we went back and really looked seriously at the 

question of what it would take in order to maintain Shuttle operations for a sustained period of time, what 

kind of continued upgrades would be necessary, modifications necessary, in order to assure safe flight 

operations, and on the basis of that, as recently as last summer, went through that planning effort, which 

ultimately yielded the amendment that was sent forward by the President on November 13th of last year 

to propose a specific change in the funding profile for Shuttle, which envisioned a maintenance of that 

asset for a sustained period of time, though next decade.

Page 74

 So the focus of these concerns, which were all exactly as you stated, Mr. Chairman, in context of future 

concern, were the things we were very mindful of, took heed of, made adjustments to, and specifically put 

in plan in order to assure that we covered those kinds of concerns in the future and addressed those.

 As it pertained to current flight operations, again there was no indication that I knew of that raised 

concerns along the way of current flight operations. If anything, the diligence that I see among the entire 

folk in NASA, in the community, is very much that of a culture that's dedicated to assuring safe flight 

operations, or else the launch doesn't occur. And that is the mindset and ethos we continue to encourage 

and will continue to encourage in the future.

Changes Needed to Assure an Independent Investigation

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. O'Keefe, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I remain concerned 

about language throughout the charter of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The language 

would appear to indicate that everything the board does is subject to NASA approval, and that, to me, 

raises some fundamental questions about the independence of the board. And we all want the board to be 

independent, and not just in name, but in fact.

 Are you willing to re-examine that charter and remove some of the language that raises these questions 

and make adjustments in other places?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. We'll continue to work with Admiral Gehman to assure whatever he needs in 

order to guarantee the independence and objectivity of that board. We will absolutely work with him, 

without objection.

Page 75

 Chairman BOEHLERT. I mean, just to give you an example, the independent board will conduct 

activities in accordance with the provisions of applicable NASA policies and procedures. And then it goes 

on to say, ''The interim scheduled board activities, interim board reports, and the submission of final 

board report, in coordination with the NASA Administrator.'' I would think that they would have 

independence, they could schedule their meetings and determine the type of report they want to submit. 

Of course they will submit the report to you. But the report should come also to the—the final report—not 

just to the NASA administrator, but to the President, the Congress, and the American people. So I think 

that charter has to be revisited, and very promptly.
 We've already had conversations with each other, and I have had with Admiral Gehman, and both have 

assured me that additional members from outside the community, so to speak, and experts in different 

fields, will be added to the board. I think that's very important.

 It's essential that we maintain the independent nature of the board.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I fully concur, Mr. Chairman. And, as a matter of fact, I think in Admiral Gehman's 

press conference yesterday, he was very explicit that all of the factors he needed in order to maintain 

independence and to be an objective investigator in this particular case, for all of his board members, was 

what the present condition required.

 Having said that, if, on examination, the latest change that was made to the charter at his request, we 

made it, if he wants further changes they'll be made, as well, anything that it takes in order to guarantee 

their independence, because we will be guided by their findings. And, as I've reiterated publicly as well as 

to you, sir, and to him, that about the only thing that will be unique about the reporting requirement is that 

he'll be putting an address that says NASA on it, on the envelope, sending it to us. But that report will be 

made public concurrent with its receipt. So he will be reporting to the President, to the Congress, to the 

American people, to all of us simultaneously.

Page 76

Contractor Incentives and Obligations

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, I was comforted by my conversation with Admiral Gehman, because he 

is insisting on independence, and he has also indicated, obviously, he'll have to have a liaison with NASA 

and use some of your resources, but the staffing will be independent of NASA, and I think that's essential.

 Obviously, we're all going to be spending a lot of time looking at Shuttle contracts even though there's 

no indication at this point that they are a problem. How comfortable are you that the incentives in the 

current contracts captured the proper balance between efficiency and safety? And then, as a follow-on, do 

the contracts have clauses that will ensure that the contractors have to, must, cooperate with fully with the 

Gehman investigation?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. On the first part, the emphasis on safety in the current Space Flight 

Operations Contract that we have very much emphasizes the safety parameters. And, indeed, they have 

tremendous incentives to do better each and every time. And as a consequence of that, there are a series of 

weighted factors in the guidelines that heavily look at the metrics of any difficulties or problems on orbit 

or at launch or any other time. As they drive those factors down, they're given a specific incentive to do 

better in each of those cases. So they've got a powerful motivation to want to move in that direction.

 In doing so, I think the approach also yields some efficiencies. But that's a secondary matter, at most. 

And so, as a result, there are real advantages and real emphasis on the safety considerations that are 

currently built into that contract framework.

Page 77

 As it pertains to their cooperation with the Gehman Board, positively we will advise them, and have, 

that we fully expect everyone to be cooperative with that board. We have absolutely nothing to hide. 

There is no evidence or no fact that we can think of out there, short of national security information or 

some private proprietary issue that some individual may want to assert, that would preclude us from 

making any information available. And so everyone within the contractor community should feel the 
same as we do.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. But is there something more than a moral obligation or a desire? Is there 

something that binds them, commits them, to cooperate fully with the Gehman investigation board?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I will take you up on your opening statement that, on that contract clause, I don't 

know, but I'll find out.

 [The information follows:]

85090zz.eps

85090a3.eps

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Page 78

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hollings.

NASA's Budget Request to OMB

 Senator HOLLINGS. Right to the point with respect to costs, and I'm sure you don't have, Mr. 

O'Keefe, the actual figures with you, but on the shortchanging of the space program, we had a report 

yesterday in the New York Times stating that we cut the space program $800 million. I've been checking it 

overnight. At my check, it's $700 million.

 Be that as it may, what's the truth? That's what we want. Last week I asked Mitch Daniels, Director of 

the Office of Management and Budget, to furnish the Budget Committee the figures of what was 

requested by NASA. I want you to furnish the figures that were requested by NASA of OMB for the last 

10 years. And not just this Administration, but the past Administrations so we can see the trend line and 

exactly how we financed it.

 Yes, we all are trying to find out the cause. But, in the meantime, as you try to piece together the 

retrieved parts and everything else like that, I don't know how long that'll take, a year or months, whatever 

it is, we all want to see the space program continue. And for this senator, I don't want it to continue with 

upgrades.

 I've heard enough about these upgrades. We've lost 14 astronauts and $5 billion in hardware with 

upgrades, and we had a new reusable launch vehicle. We had a spaceship that was cancelled the year 

before last. Then we had a Reusable Launch Vehicle, and that was cancelled last November, just a couple 

of months ago. And you said we were going to use these vehicles, Shuttles, until 2020. Are you willing to 

use one of these Shuttles with all of the tiles flying off? And after all of these losses, you'd still want to 

use them until 2020 and not get new technology, Mr. Administrator?

Page 79

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, thank you. As I understand the history here, the effort during the course 

of the '90's was in anticipation of a retirement of Shuttle concurrent with the introduction of a new 
Reusable Launch Vehicle. That was envisioned to be the X–33, as I understand it. Based on a variety of 

technical issues, which were based on the assumption that a series of unconquerable engineering and laws 

of physics challenges would be overcome, ultimately that—two-plus years ago, the choice was made to 

cancel that program and to continue with Shuttle operations.

 What we proposed a year ago and is not a cancellation of any RLV effort, Reusable Launch Vehicle, 

instead it's a selection, if you will, of looking at the Integrated Space Transportation Plan.

 What's included in the November amendment that the President sent forward for the 2003 budget is a 

selection specifically of an Orbital Space Plane option which, frankly, is not a technology leap. It is the 

capability of putting aboard an Expendable Launch Vehicle, a orbital space system, space plane, that 

would be launched in a conventional manner using an Expendable Launch Vehicle.

 The next generation beyond that is what we focus on our Next-Generation Launch Technology. So 

we've tried to narrow and focus a lot more the Space Launch Initiative efforts in order to get some nearterm gain to supplement, to complement, the Space Shuttle and to provide that dynamic as well as flexible 

return system and transfer system to the International Space System and also to pursue the development 

of a Reusable Launch Vehicle that may be, hopefully, the product of breakthroughs that were not possible 

that forced the motivation or the cancellation a few years ago of the X–33.

Page 80

 So we're trying to do both of those concurrently, but to get some near-term capability, and, in the 

meantime, use Shuttle in the future as a cargo lift, heavy lift capacity, which is what it was really designed 

to do in the first place, rather than a crew transfer capability. So we're trying to balance both ends of that 

to utilize capabilities for their best purposes as we move along.

 Senator HOLLINGS. We've got to find out what you think we ought to Appropriate. We all want to 

continue space exploration, but we just don't want to waste time waiting on the results, on the one hand, 

and trying to find out what we already know. Let's get on and get your best advice on how we should 

proceed to get going on this thing, and not just with upgrades.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, the——

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Senator.

 Mr. Hall.

Crew Escape Systems

 Representative HALL. Mr. O'Keefe, you heard my opening statement. And I'm, quite frankly, 

disappointed that 17 years after the Challenger accident so little attention has been given to developing 

crew escape systems for our astronauts, whether they're flying on the Shuttle or whether they're in the 

space station. I know you share that.

Page 81

 I share with you the disappointment and the blame—I've been here 23 years, so it's a partnership for us, 

and that's what it is, that's what it'll continue to be, but especially since NASA has indicated that the 

Shuttle is going to fly for another decade and a half, and maybe, probably, longer than that, and in light of 

a media report, I think on February the 5th, that NASA's most recent effort in that regard was a $5 million 
so-called ''study'' in 2001.

 To put that study in context, the amount expended on that study of potential a Shuttle crew escape 

system amounted to just a little bit more than one-tenth of one percent of a single year's budget. That 

doesn't strike me as being very aggressive in your effort to look for ways to improve the odds of survival 

for astronauts in the event of a Shuttle accident.

 That leads me to say that I have no doubt that it's going to be challenging to develop practical crew 

escape systems for the Shuttle, but NASA is in the business of performing miracles, NASA is in the 

business of meeting challenges, and we call on you to do that.

 I'm very afraid that a clue as to why NASA has not done more is found elsewhere in that article, 

namely, and I quote, ''The proposed fixes were also seen as prohibitively expensive additions to an 

already aging and financially strapped Shuttle fleet.'' We've seen a similar situation with regard to 

developing a Crew Rescue Vehicle for the International Space Station.

Page 82

 So, as you know, NASA decided to cancel the ongoing development of U.S. Crew Rescue Vehicles, 

just a demonstration vehicle, we thought was nearing its flight test. And now we're dependent on the 

Russians for their Crew Rescue Vehicles until the end of this decade.

 So, in the meantime, I guess my question to you is, Did you explicitly consider investing in the 

development of Space Shuttle crew escape systems when you revised the Integrated Space Transportation 

Plan that you announced last November?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. We're continuing to look at what we would use as enhancements, if you will, 

of the Space Shuttle as part of that November amendment that was submitted last November, and we're 

getting together here, had planned to all along, to identify that priority set of what will emphasize the 

highest safety margin improvements that could be yielded from different modifications of the orbiter 

system.

 But with regard to the specific crew escape efforts, recall that since Challenger there have been a 

number of operational changes made. There is an egress system that was put into place right after 

the Challenger accident that was part of the Rogers Commission recommendations—that ultimately 

stemmed from it, I should say—that we put in to place that now still exist to this day.

 Once launched, though, there is a number of different approaches that have been proposed, examined, 

reviewed, and all of which added significant amounts of weight, I'm advised, to the overall effort, and so, 

as a consequence, were viewed to be technically infeasible.

Page 83

 What we have instituted, though, is, again, a series of abort procedures. And, as recently as the 

December launch of the STS–113, on a perfectly clear night at Cape Canaveral in Florida, where 

everything was nominal, everything was ready to go, all the systems were completely operational, we 

scrubbed the launch because the alternate abort site at Zaragossa, Spain, the weather continued to be 

marginal. So we take every precaution in this process in order to assure that, all the way through assent, 

that every possible opportunity is there as much as possible.

 But, again, the idea of an escape system was looked at, examined very thoroughly, and the conclusion 
was that the weight factor would almost be prohibitive in terms of its technical clarification.

 So we'll continue to look at that. We'll go back and look at it again, you bet. In light of this 

circumstance, we really do need to focus entirely on what all the alternatives are, and I guarantee you, sir, 

we'll make that part of our effort underway now as part of this November amendment that is before the 

Congress to consider for the 2003 program, that we'll factor that into the equation and proceed as 

appropriate.

 Representative HALL. Even on a local level, city councils rarely ever fix a bad bridge or a bad turn in 

the road until a teenager gets killed, and then it's too late. It seems to me that we launched the vehicle 

without any ability to dock. We lost the vehicle because we didn't have telescopic ability to inspect. We 

have three birds left. I just urge caution. And I thank you for your time.

 I yield back my time.

Page 84

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Brownback.

Questioning NASA's Goals and Objectives

 Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. O'Keefe, thank you very 

much for coming in front of our Joint Committees here and your great leadership at NASA in a very 

difficult and trying and challenging time.

 We all grieve the loss of human life that's happened to NASA. And at this particular point, I'm chairing 

a subcommittee in the Senate that'll be dealing with this, and I want to work with you and your agency as 

we lay out the future of manned space flight in the United States.

 I want to ask you about the broad objectives and broad program objectives that we're talking about 

right now. It seems to me that the space program is really at a critical juncture and that the totality of the 

space program is. And it's got to decide amongst a couple of competing options. One is to maintain the 

current set of programs and current missions. The second one that you read a lot about in the newspaper 

and people speculate is to dramatically reduce manned space flight, go into more robotics and different 

types of vehicles, questioning about the safety and to try to be more safe. And the third, a number of 

people are saying that our vision is too small in space currently right now, that we need new initiatives, 

we need to go back to the Moon, we need to go to Mars. And we're at this tremendous fork-in-the-road 

decision of which path to take.

Page 85

 It's certainly my intent in the Subcommittee to look closely at where NASA has been and where you 

are today and where we plan to go into the future. And, most importantly, we need to discuss, as well, the 

financial situation, the terms of how we get NASA where it needs to be. I'm glad to see that, in the 

Appropriations Committee, we're putting in an additional $414 million over the President's request.

 The goal is to reflect an accurate and effective determination for the future of NASA, and I would 

simply like to ask you, What have you done recently—and I realize you're dealing with the tragedy 

mostly now, but—to look at this need for a review of the mission of NASA amongst these three policy 
objectives, have you had a chance to start contemplating some of that? And I hope you'll be open to 

working openly with the Congress as we look at this fork in the road we're in right now.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Of course, Senator, I'd be delighted to work with you and any other Members 

of Congress to sort through really what is the proper role and objective of NASA in our pursuit of 

exploration objectives, always.

 We have, indeed, had an opportunity prior to February 1st to really think seriously about what is the 

strategy and the focus of how we concentrate on what we do best, and do that only in a way that 

guarantees and assures that we—to offer to folks that we can actually deliver on and have a capability to 

look at longer-term exploration objectives. And I think that's contained in the strategic planning 

documents that were all forwarded, along with the budget that was submitted by the President just last 

Monday.

Page 86

 Prior to that, in all the efforts we put into it, was to think seriously about the very kind of questions 

you've raised, and, again, to narrowly focus on the kinds of exploration and discovery objectives we think 

we do exceptionally well. And, for those that are done by others or can be pursued elsewhere, to leave 

that to folks who have expertise or capabilities that would otherwise have to be duplicated by us.

 What it leads to, I think, is a stepping-stone approach, an exploration strategy, if you will, that assumes 

that we start off with a series of robotic capabilities, and moves forward then, thereafter, toward other 

exploration objectives that may or may not involve human involvement.

 The best example that we've seen played before us in the last several years is the Hubble Space 

Telescope. There was a $2 billion capability that, when launched in 1992, in fairly short order was 

deemed to be, as a marvelous robotic capacity, a capability that was in need of an eye examination, if you 

will, a lense correction. And it was, at that time, determined to be a $2 billion piece of space junk. A year 

later, we were able to send a Shuttle flight with astronomers and other engineering capability that was 

resonant among the astronauts there to make that correction. That could not have been done remotely.

 And so the human intervention that was necessary to adjust that, and all the servicing missions we've 

done since that time, have yielded the kind of astronomy breakthroughs and discovery, just in this past 

year, that we never dreamed imaginable. So that combination, that heel-toe kind of approach towards a 

strategy that utilizes robotic capabilities, much like we're going to do here in the coming months when we 

send the Mars explorers in May and June of this year intended for landing in January of '04, is to then 

consider all the efforts we've got to do to prepare for, then, the follow-on kinds of exploration objectives.

Page 87

 But, again, the reiteration of the first commitment to you, positively we'll continue to work together and 

refine this strategy to assure that we do it with least risk, but the greatest opportunity for exploration and 

discovery potential.

 Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. And I look forward to working with you on that design of where 

we——

 Chairman MCCAIN. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.
 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Rohrabacher.

 Representative ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

 First and foremost, I'd like to associate myself with the remarks and the concerns of Chairman Boehlert 

about the basic nature and the importance of the integrity of this commission's investigation and our 

oversight of that commission's work.

 Second of all, I would like to just note that, at the memorial service down in Texas I was touched 

particularly by the people of Texas, and especially by the children of Texas, who, as we went to this 

memorial service, they came out on the streets and roads and waved little American flags and had little 

signs up to encourage us, and it was very encouraging for our country. So we recognize that there was a 

special bond between the children of America and our astronauts.

Page 88

 And today we're building, and we're going to make sure that we build a better future for our children. 

And if there's going to be a better future for our children, we've got to have a viable space program that 

will keep them in the forefront of this great human endeavor of going into space and pioneering space.

 So let me—I have a few thoughts, and I'll have a few questions for you. The hardworking and patriotic 

people of NASA have always understood and appreciated the risks with space exploration, especially 

manned missions. Unfortunately, in the past 17 years, we have been reminded of the dangers of human 

space flight with the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1996—or '86, I should say —and now 

the Columbia.

 Seventeen years ago, we took a step backwards for a few moments to take a look at that tragedy and 

pinpoint to our satisfaction what caused it and then correct those causes, at least the technical causes of 

the loss.

 Today, I am confident that Admiral Gehman and his commission will get to the truths that will help us 

understand Columbia's fatal accident. However, many questions need to be addressed that transcend the 

immediate technical and managerial problems of this tragedy.

 We're going to hear a lot about the technical end of it, but there's a lot of other questions that go way 

beyond that. The lack of long-term goals or a unifying vision for America's space effort, for example, 

needs to be addressed to fully understand this tragedy. This failing, I believe, weaken the efforts that 

would have been taken to replace the Shuttle system long before age became a factor. And we will find 

out, I believe, that age was, indeed, a factor.

Page 89

 Perhaps Mr. Hollings, or Senator Hollings, is right, perhaps it's simple what we're looking at. Perhaps it 

was the tiles and—in terms of a simple answer; and a more complex answer might be facing—it might be 

age. But this tragedy and this investigation, nonetheless, gives us an opportunity to revisit the 

fundamentals and make recommendations that will chart America's future space endeavors.

 NASA's leadership has faced, and will continue to face, the challenge of exercising responsible 

stewardship with limited resources while providing a coherent blueprint of what can be accomplished and 

how it can be accomplished. But hopefully, forward-looking strategies will lead us to incremental 
advances that will then permit us to achieve long-term objectives. A new propulsion system might be a 

good start, as well as, perhaps, a look at robotics and remote control on the part of NASA, a new 

commitment on that end. But before we move forward, we must fully understand why these seven people 

perished.

 My question to you today is, the age factor, Was this Shuttle's age, a 30-year-old system, a major factor 

in this tragedy we're investigating today?

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Administrator O'Keefe.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Congressman. And, again, I associate myself entirely with your 

observation that ultimately the investigation will be what guides us to that conclusion. And if that is a 

factor, you bet, that's exactly what we'll operate on.

Page 90

 Having said that, it is worth noting two really important factors on this. The Columbia, indeed, is the 

oldest, or was the oldest, of the four orbiters. It was delivered in late 1970's. Its first flight was in 1981. It 

was half the age of the average bomber aircraft that flew in Afghanistan just a year ago that prosecuted 

that very important effort that we were engaged in there.

 So the air frame condition on this—each time we go through this orbiter major modification I referred 

to in the opening statement—is essentially the equivalent of the same kind of effort the military, the 

Defense Department, goes through of tear-down of every single element of the capability of the orbiter 

itself, its structural integrity inspected and examined very carefully, then rebuilt to modernize it to 

contemporary capability. That particular effort had just been conducted, an 18-month tear-down of the 

Shuttle Columbia, and delivered early last year in advance of the March flight that went to Hubble, that 

did the servicing mission. STS–109 was the first flight of Columbia after that particular Orbiter Major 

Modification effort, which, again, is patterned very much after the depot kind of approach that's taken at 

all of the Defense Department-related assets, only even more exhaustively to conduct the upgrades. This 

was the second flight after that particular tear-down.

 So the age factor, again, you're exactly right, the investigation may yet prove or may demonstrate to us 

that there was a contributor there. But in terms of our efforts to assure that not be a factor, again, it 

appears to be every element of diligence could be done to assure that, there was a previous flight that 

operated just perfectly, no difficulty whatsoever on Columbia, no structural defects upon return. And 

upon every single orbiter flight return, we examine all of the elements of the Shuttles themselves, the 

orbiters themselves, and we move it through the Orbiter Processing Facility to assure that any damage, 

any structural problems, anything are detected. And there was absolutely nothing wrong with 

the Columbia that we could detect in that regard. So when it flew on its second flight, it was in the same 

shape it was when it left the Orbiter Major Modification program just a year before.

Page 91

History of Tile Damage and Loss

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Breaux.

 Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. O'Keefe, thank you. I want to also congratulate you on the method in which you've handled this 
tragedy and the openness that I think we've seen from NASA in how you are approaching the 

investigation, both internally and with the external investigation, as well.

 Let me ask, do we have any idea of how many times the insulating tiles have come off a Shuttle during 

launch and how many tiles have actually come off during the history of the Shuttle launches?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. To the best of my recollection, sir, in our efforts there, it's no more than a half a dozen 

times that was specifically related to it. After each flight, there is always, again, as I mentioned just a 

moment ago to Congressman Rohrabacher, an assessment summary that's conducted to look at each 

element of the orbiter when it returns. There's also an inspection of the external tank, which, as you're 

aware, when it reaches the upper atmosphere, it disintegrates. The two Solid Rocket Boosters, once 

expended, drop back into the ocean——

 Senator BREAUX. Well, but on the tiles themselves.

Page 92

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I'm sorry.

 Senator BREAUX. How many times have the tiles come off, and how many tiles have come off during 

the history of the Shuttle launches?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. At each flight, there's typically a ding or a scratch or whatever else from all 

the various efforts that occur as they are re-entering, as well as on ascent. I'll provide, for the record, a full 

summary of all of the times on each flight that a tile has been missing or lost or whatever else. But it was 

never considered to be significant, in terms of its safety-of-flight consideration that we've examined on 

the orbiters when we moved it through the Orbiter Processing Facility to look at the condition of the 

orbiters after each flight. But we'll submit that for the record, sir.

 [The information follows:]

85090b3.eps

85090c3.eps

 Senator BREAUX. If engineers on this particular case had determined that insulating tiles had, in fact, 

departed the Shuttle at some point and that it was in an area that was important and very key, could the 

angle of attack on the re-entry of the Shuttle have been adjusted to deflect the heat?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. That's a potential maneuvering capability. But, again, there are more than 4,000 

sensors aboard each Shuttle orbiter, and if there were any indication that there were any abnormalities as a 

consequence of tile loss or whatever else, they likely would have shown up during that 16-day orbiting 

mission.

Page 93

 More importantly, during the course of that time, recall that in each orbit you're looking at a sunset and 

a sunrise every 90 minutes, which means every 16 times a day, the temperature variation on an orbiter or 

a Shuttle flight varies by as much as three to four hundred degrees, plus—200 degrees during the sunlight, 

and minus about 150-plus during the darkness period of that 90-degree rotation—or 90-minute rotation 

each time it orbits. So that wide range of temperature variation, if there had been exposure, almost 
certainly would have shown up on one of those 4,000 sensors that are aboard the Shuttle orbiter to have 

given us an indication.

 The fact of the matter remains, there were no abnormalities that would suggest that problem until 8:53 

the morning of Saturday, February the 1st.

 Senator BREAUX. But is there no way that these sensors or any other methodology would have 

determined if any of the tiles had departed the Shuttle during the actual mission, before it returned to 

Earth?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. We don't think so. Every effort that were made on previous flights to examine any 

structural damage or change or whatever else using any kind of visual capabilities were either 

inconclusive or not of the level of granularity that really gave us that much detail. And, again, all the 

supporting data would have also suggested if there were problems on it.

 Again, the reality remains, over that 16-day mission—and, again, the investigation may find some data 

that we're not aware of right now, because everything was locked down within a half an hour after the 

incident. If there's something else that emerges to suggest to the contrary, we're going to get to the bottom 

of it. But all the information we have now and after the flight and after the examination of it, suggests no 

abnormalities that would have pointed in that direction at all.

Page 94

 Senator BREAUX. What degree of certainty——

 Chairman MCCAIN. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Gordon.

Reiterating the Need for an Independent Investigation Board

 Representative GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. O'Keefe. I'm glad you joined 

us today.

 Before I move to discuss other issues, I just want to stress my concern that the investigation of 

the Columbia Space Shuttle accident ultimately must be perceived as objective and independent if 

Congress, the President, and the American taxpayers are going to reach a consensus on how to move 

forward with our space program. It's no reflection on you or the Admiral, but that's not going to be 

possible if there are lingering questions regarding the independence of the board.

 As you know, I've raised this question for several days now. And having checked with your office this 

week and the NASA Web site this morning, there seems to be a clear disconnect from your statements 

about the board's independence and the rules you're laying down for the board.

 Let me quote just a few examples of your rules, as Mr. Boehlert had earlier. The current board not only 

includes NASA employees, but you also require it to be staffed by NASA employees who will help write 

the board's final report, which goes to you. You require that the board must, and I quote, ''schedule board 

activities, interim board reports, and submit the final board report in coordination with the NASA 

administrator in accordance with the applicable NASA policies.''

Page 95
 Now, Mr. O'Keefe, I am afraid this will not pass anybody's smell test of independence. So please, let us 

move forward in a concrete way and put this bipartisan concern behind us.

ASAP's Safety Concerns

 Now, let me turn to another issue that is troubling. As you know, there have been numerous warning 

flags regarding the health of the Shuttle program in recent years. Just a few examples. April 2002, 

Richard Blomberg, head of the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, issued a blunt warning 

when he testified before this House Subcommittee. And I quote, ''In all the years of my involvement, I 

have never been as concerned for the Space Shuttle safety as I am now.''

 A month earlier, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel gave you a report that stated, and I quote, ''The 

current and proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk level of 

operations for the Space Shuttle.''

 Yet in spite of these warnings, you sent over a NASA budget request that cut the budget for Shuttle 

upgrades by $500 million, even while finding a billion dollars for new initiatives.

 Because of my concern, I asked Fred Gregory, who was then the NASA Associate Administration for 

Space Flight, the following question at this same April 2002 hearing. ''Mr. Gregory, how would you 

support the space station in the event you lost a Shuttle and the rest of the fleet was grounded for some 

period of time?'' Mr. Gregory responded, ''There would be no way to do that.''

Page 96

 Now, I assumed that such an admission would have kicked off an intense effort to develop a 

contingency plan for supporting the space station. However, at your press briefing Monday, you indicated 

that over the next few weeks NASA would be working with the space station international partners to 

come up with a plan. You reiterated that earlier today.

 Given the fact that you've had numerous warnings and you knew the Shuttle was grounded for twoand-a-half years after the loss of Challenger, I would assume Mr. Gregory's admission nearly a year ago 

would have been a wake-up call.

 So my questions are, Did NASA prepare a contingency plan for the space station last year? If so, what 

was in the plan, and why do you now believe that you need to redo it? And, finally, if you didn't have a 

plan, why not?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. We did prepare a contingency plan. I guess I've outlined a number of those 

options. You've acknowledged that you heard those as part of presentation and the testimony. We'll 

continue to look at those alternatives using Soyuz as well as Progress vehicles, and we're also hopeful of 

an expeditious conclusion that would tell us what occurred on Shuttle Columbia that would give us an 

opportunity to return to flight expeditiously.

 All those factors are in play. Those are all part of that contingency plan. I think the specific reference in 

this case from the testimony you cite, was no way to get back with Shuttle immediately given the safety 

considerations that we will always ground the fleet under those circumstances.

Page 97
 I fully concur on your opening comments, too, as it pertains to charter revisions, to the extent they are 

necessary. As I pledged to Chairman Boehlert, we will make those changes in any way that Admiral 

Gehman feels he has to have in order to guarantee that independence.

 I have no difficult whatsoever understanding his requirements for independence, and he has reiterated 

those, and I intend to comply exactly with that approach.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fitzgerald.

Questioning an Aging System

 Senator FITZGERALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. O'Keefe, the day after the Columbia accident, I happened to be having a town hall meeting in 

Champaign, Illinois, and I asked—there were about two, maybe two-hundred-fifty, people in the room—I 

asked them whether they thought we should continue with manned exploration of space, and I explained 

to them that it could cost us billions of dollars and years to make ourselves able to continue going forward 

in space.

 To my surprise, I'd say about four-fifths of the people in that room wanted us to go back and continue 

human exploration of space. And my state of Illinois has very little in the way of spending that it benefits 

from. We're not Florida or Texas. And I want the space program to continue.

Page 98

 And I wondered if you had a gut impression at this point—and I know it's early, but it seems to me we 

can go in one of two directions. We could spend billions of dollars and perhaps years trying to patch up 

and fix whatever may be wrong with the Shuttle program, but you're basically dealing with a 30-year-old 

design. My understanding is there are some 1.2 million checks that have to be done by hundreds of people 

before a single Shuttle flight can take off. It's extraordinarily complex.

 My question is, Do we go forward and spend that time and that money reinforcing the Shuttle program, 

or would we be better off not diverting the resources to reinforcing this 30-year-old Shuttle program, and, 

instead, try and proceed with a new vehicle and focus all our effort on that?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Senator. The factors, I think, that lead to the complexity of the 

Shuttle and the amount of checking that goes on there certainly is driven by the technology, no doubt 

about that, the number of moving parts on that asset. But I would submit that any asset we have that we 

would use, for the purpose of a Reusable Launch Vehicle capability to launch, would also require an 

awful lot of checks, as well, because of the absolute dedication, the unwavering commitment to safety, 

that we always pursue.

 Every time we launch a Shuttle flight, no matter what that asset would be, it would require, I think, a 

review of all the systems checks. And the ethos that we have within the agency and all that are part of the 

community is that if there's a single thing that is wrong or that appears to be wrong in the judgment of any 

individual, there is a process set up to stop the launch.

Page 99

 Two weeks in advance, there's a Flight Readiness Review that runs to ground every issue involved in 
that. If there's any residual issues all the way up to the moment of launch, we don't do that. I don't 

envision that changing. Even if we had a system today that was brand new, I think that same ethos would 

have to dominate, because we really are committed to that objective to minimize the risk. We'll never 

drive the risk out of it completely. And so I think that same approach would be employed no matter what 

assets or capabilities.

 Having said all that, if the investigation leads us to conclude that there is anything structurally deficient 

about the continued safe operations of the Shuttle system, we positively will take that as a very strong 

element of the investigation findings and make judgments accordingly that may lead us in the kinds of 

directions you're talking about.

 In the interim, again, our approach is, as I discussed with Congressman Rohrabacher, we tear down this 

system about every eight to ten flights, essentially rebuild it as new, and it goes through that 18- to 24-

month Orbiter Major Modification Program. And so every time that asset goes up there, it is as safe as we 

know how to make it.

 We'll never drive the risk out entirely, but we're trying to manage it down to the lowest possible level 

and assure that anything that appears even vaguely awry is beaten to parade rest before we let the flight 

take off, and during orbit, as well.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Mr. Calvert.

Page 100

 Representative CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for attending today. And certainly my sympathies to the family and to the 

NASA family that's certainly still grieving over this loss.

 I think all of us here today share one thing, and that's that we desire an independent assessment, 

unbiased and with the highest integrity, to ensure that future astronauts, NASA, this Congress, and the 

country have confidence in its ultimate result. Certainly you're off to a good start, and I certainly 

appreciate that, and I know that we do and the country does. But as Chairman Boehlert has indicated, it 

may be necessary that changes be made to make sure we maintain that confidence. And I'm thankful that 

you're open-minded to that.

 It's reported that we have a certain amount of money appropriated, I believe about $50 million, for 

NASA to complete this investigation. Is that funding adequate to pursue, in your mind, to the levels that 

we're discussing?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I don't know, sir. As I understand it, that's part of the current appropriations conference 

deliberations. I've read the same press accounts you have. I have no other knowledge of what you and 

your colleagues may have in mind for that Omnibus Appropriations bill provision, and so I can't make an 

assessment of that. And I don't know what the cost of this will be, other than to say that whatever it costs, 

that's what we ought to spend in order to be sure that we reach the answers to what caused this accident.

 Representative CALVERT. Obviously, NASA is not the only agency that's going to be involved in this 

investigation. Are you receiving cooperation from other agencies, full cooperation?
Page 101

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. It's overwhelming. There is no hesitancy, there is no confusion of how that 

process works. I've just been amazed to see how forward-leaning 20 different Federal agencies, state and 

local law enforcement officials from Texas and Louisiana, have been in helping us work through what is a 

real nightmarish circumstance in a way that's professional, aboveboard, and fully cooperative. No 

hesitation on that point at all.

 Representative CALVERT. And that also would apply to the contractors that are involved in this 

program?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir, absolutely.

 Representative CALVERT. I know I've read the press quotes. You mentioned, just as of yesterday, 

that you had no favorite theories of what occurred, and I understand that. However, as we move forward 

in this Congress, I guess that what Mr. Rohrabacher and others have indicated, do you believe, because of 

the age of the Shuttle, there is any systemic problem that may be there? And what's our alternatives if, in 

fact, that's the case?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Again, none that I'm aware of. And, again, we go through an exhaustive process to 

assure that that the safety-of-flight operation is adhered each and every time. This is not a one-shot deal. 

It's every—every time it comes back, the orbiters return, we do a careful inspection, we go through a very 

exhaustive review of everything, and we do not roll it out immediately. There's an orbiter processing

facility effort that goes on for the better part of three months as we move it through an exhaustive 

examination. And then when it gets out to the launch pad, typically it's there for the better part of 30 days 

in order to make sure that every single thing checks out.

Page 102

 So if there's something systemically wrong, we will be guided by the Gehman board's view of that and 

we'll correct it. But based on our assessment right now and everything we've done, it sure doesn't look 

like a systemic failure. But if it is, we positively will correct that before we launch ever again.

 Representative CALVERT. Thank you.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.

 Representative CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Dorgan.

Suggesting a Presidential Commission

 Senator DORGAN. Mr. O'Keefe, thank you for being here today. I think most of us feel that a nation 

that doesn't explore is a nation that's standing still, and this space program must continue exploring the 

frontiers of space.

 I want to ask you a question, and I don't want you to think the origin of my question poses any distrust 

for you or the men and women of NASA. I have great admiration for your leadership and also for the men 

and women of NASA. But as we attempt to find out what happened with this tragedy, it seems to me that 

in almost any circumstance of this type, an agency can't very effectively investigate itself. I feel there 
ought to be a Presidential Commission empaneled. I would ask the question, Have you had a chance to 

visit with President Bush about the prospect of that? And can it be done enveloping reconfiguring the 

kind of commission that you have now created?

Page 103

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Oh, yes, indeed, we have visited on the question, to the President as well as 

the Vice President and all the senior staff on the issue. And I guess the approach that—history is a guide 

in these cases.

 In the Challenger accident, it was five days after the accident that President Reagan announced the 

intent to appoint a commission. It was the better part of 10 days to two weeks before they assembled. It 

was probably the better end of three to four weeks before they were fully prepared to engage and really 

start taking testimony and doing the things that were necessary. And they still, nonetheless, produced a set 

of findings and recommendations by June of 1986. So roughly six months after the accident they were 

able to reach some conclusions.

 In this circumstance, given the development of this contingency plan that we've put together as a lesson 

learned from Challenger, and there was an awful lot that we learned out of that event, that really informed 

us about how we ought to go ahead and look at ourselves and how we do business. And what it called for 

as part of that contingency plan was to identify, by positions, the kinds of people that ought to be 

activated, who are non-NASA individuals and experts, and mobilize them right away.

 And so as a consequence, what we defaulted in favor of in this case was speed. We had an opportunity 

then to have all the members except one, who was a NASA center director of a non-space-flight center, 

who has no involvement with space flight at all, who was appointed to that particular board. Everybody 

else is removed from it, and we're moving ahead in that regard as independent as we can possibly make 

that.

Page 104

 Senator DORGAN. Can I make the point that I think you did exactly the right thing, because you don't 

want time to elapse. You took action and did the right thing. I'm asking, I guess, as we go along, whether 

a presidential commission can now envelope, reconfigure the commission that you have started.

 I really do think that a year from now, three, five years from now, the question people will ask is, 

Could NASA really have investigated itself? Again, I don't say that with any distrust at all. I think you've 

got a great organization. But I really do hope, as we go along here, we're finding a way to perhaps have a 

Presidential Commission. We don't want to duplicate different investigations, but I think this could be 

done in the right way and will resolve these questions of independence.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Senator DORGAN. So let me wish you well, and please extend, on behalf of all of us in the Congress, 

our thoughts and prayers to the men and women of NASA.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. We're committed to exactly the same objective. We want to find 

the answers, and we want it to be credible. I mean, there's no question about that at all. So whatever it's 

going to take in order to do that, that's what we are committed to doing.

 And the process, again, is not investigating ourselves. This is an independent group of folks who have 
no, baggage to carry as it pertains to, NASA biases. Admiral Gehman came from a distinguished naval 

career that had no involvement whatsoever with NASA, and yet, at the same time, I think he's had a lot of 

experience, as all the other members did, of better than 50 different investigations into accident situations.

Page 105

 So this is not a group of NASA investigating itself. This is going to be an independent group that's 

going to reach some conclusions, and we want to make sure that's as credible as we can possibly make it, 

because that's going to turn on—I think the trust and confidence of the American people depend upon 

that. Your point is exactly right. I associate myself with that sentiment, as well.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Lampson.

 Representative LAMPSON. I want to thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for coming to Capitol Hill to testify 

today. As the member of Congress who represents the Johnson Space Center, I would also like to thank 

you and your NASA team for the support and encouragement that you've provided to the space center 

community in Houston during this very difficult time.

 I'm somewhat of a reluctant participant in this hearing. Today is the 11th day since the tragic loss of 

Space Shuttle Columbia. There's so much that we do not yet know and perhaps some things that we may 

never know.

 It's my understanding that there were no Congressional hearings on the Challenger investigation in 

1986 until after the Rogers Commission completed their report four months later. And while I know we're 

operating under different circumstances, with three astronauts orbiting the Earth in the International Space 

Station, I do question the merits of having this hearing so soon after the Columbia Shuttle accident.

 I believe Congress needs to allow the investigation to move forward and to let the accident 

investigation board members do their work. Hopefully we will complement your efforts and not impede 

the process.

Page 106

 That being said, I firmly believe that the Administration needs to move forward with a truly 

independent investigation similar to what President Reagan appointed in 1986 after 

the Challenger accident.

 I think NASA made a good first step by revising the board's charter last week, but I still believe, as my 

colleagues have stated, that NASA's external investigation team is too closely tied to the agency.

 As NASA Administrator, the board's charter allows you to appoint the team members, to staff the 

board with NASA employees, and to receive the final report. In order for this review to have credibility, I 

believe it needs to have team members who are truly independent and who report to the White House and 

Congress.

 Also, seeing all the cameras and the media presence in this hearing room today begs the question, 

Where was all this attention to our human space flight programs before February 1st? While I applaud the 

renewed interest, I regret that it takes the loss of seven fine astronauts for our space program to make the 

front page of the newspaper or the top story on the evening news.

 And while it may seem routine, the work that is being done by NASA in outer space is far from 
routine. We're doing so many great things in space that benefit us right here on Earth. My hope is that 

somehow this terrible tragedy will spur the Administration to develop an interest in a real, truly robust 

space program.

Page 107

 And I'd like to call for a new space race for the 21st century. This space race is not against the old Cold 

War enemy or an emerging power in the East, but rather our new space race needs to be against ourselves 

for our own future.

ISS Contingency Planning

 And let me ask two things, Mr. O'Keefe. First, a copy of the contingency plan for the International 

Space Station that you referred to a few minutes ago, could you possibly get that to us within the next 

week or so? We would appreciate it.

 [The information follows:]

 Copies of the following documents have been provided to the Committee:

85090ww.eps

 And then let me ask, in 1999, when problems with the experimental X–33 Reusable Launch Vehicle 

demonstrator made it clear the Space Shuttle would have to be relied on for many more years, perhaps 

until 2020, the Clinton Administration's OMB sensibly increased the Shuttle upgrades budget 

significantly. However, in 2001, the Bush Administration's OMB, of which you were deputy director, 

simultaneously cancelled X–33 program and cut the Space Shuttle safety upgrades budget. How can that 

possibly have made sense, and can you tell us why you did that?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Again, I'd have to go back and take a look at when NASA cancelled the X–33 program 

and exactly what was leading to that particular case. But if I can get slide 16, please? The history over the 

course of time, as I understand it, was a span that you'll see on this particular slide that was for Shuttle 

funding over the course of that time. The increase that you see occurred, again, as part of the fiscal year 

'03 budget proposal that we made, and '04, that was just submitted to the Congress last Monday.

Page 108

 [The information follows:]

85090d3.eps

 So my reading of the data and the information is that there's an awful lot that contributed to this 

particular change in funding profile over this span of time, but it was primarily driven by a concurrent, I 

think, focus on safety improvements and kind of concentrating on all of the factors that would lead to 

safe-flight operations, and, concurrently, efficiencies that drove down the cost of guaranteeing those 

particular safe-flight operations through the '90's.

 And the most significant increase that's occurred is part of the fiscal year '03 budget amendment the 

President submitted last November, and the fiscal year '04 budget was submitted last Monday. So those 

are the primary increases that I've been able to examine, but I'd certainly be prepared to submit all that for 

the record for your consideration, sir.
 Representative LAMPSON. Thank you.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Allen.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. One other comment, if I could, Senator, is just to reiterate again that the Gehman 

Commission will report to all of us. He's going to report to the President, to Congress, to all the American 

people as soon as they reach findings. I have no intention whatsoever of putting any value added to their 

findings. As soon as the ink is dry, it will be released by Hal Gehman. There is no other approach that I 

can think of that would be a more appropriate way to handle this so we can move on with finding what 

the solution is to the problem, get the answers to it, and make the corrections necessary to get back to 

flying safety.

Page 109

 Representative LAMPSON. Thank you.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Allen.

Role of Automation and Robotics

 Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for being here.

 I want to associate myself with some of the thoughts and philosophy stated in the beginning by our 

chairman, Senator McCain. And I want to focus on the long-term goals of NASA, broader goals.

 If anything good can come out of this tragedy, I think it would be the reinvigorated focus on the 

mission, primary mission, of NASA, which ought to be scientific research that has benefit for people here 

on Earth. And I think such sensible strategic planning would be a salutary goal and part of the legacy of 

the tragic loss of these brave men and women. And I know that of paramount concern to you and all the 

people in NASA is safety, safety for humans primarily.

 Previously, before this tragedy, I know you're on record as supporting refurbished or upgraded Shuttles 

so they can remain operational for the next 10 to 20 years. I think, in examining the broader goals of 

NASA, it would be helpful if we'd have some consideration of what is going to be the next orbiter. There 

are so many questions that we have to determine, and this is just the beginning of this examination. Once 

we get into our committees in the House and Senate, we'll get in greater detail.

Page 110

 But my question is specific on automation and robotics, and how can robotics and automation and 

advances in technology, how can that make it safer? It is less costly, but it's also safer for human life. And 

so is NASA considering an entirely new space plane orbiter or downsizing the manned space flight? 

Depending on which option is chosen, how will that shape our efforts, our efforts also as the $30 billion, 

of course, that we've already invested in this space station, the International Space Station, as an 

investment? But where are we in embracing some of these advancements in automation and robotics? 

And in the strategic planning, will it effect the continued dangerously underfunding of aeronautics, which 

I think have tangible benefits to us militarily as well as in the commercial markets?

 So I'd like your thoughts on these key paths that we need to go down and decide which ones we're 

going to go down in the future.
 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. It is, in my judgment, not an issue of either/or, robotics or human 

space flight. It's how do you do it compatibly? How do you find the appropriate role for robotic 

capabilities that set, in advance, the kind of knowledge base that you need in order to then support, when 

necessary, and in circumstances where human intervention and human involvement then becomes very 

critical.

 Again, the Hubble Telescope is the classic example. It's a marvelous piece of machinery that didn't 

work, and the only way it could be adjusted was to have human involvement in order to make those 

adjustments on each of the respective servicing missions that have gone on. And now it is rewriting the 

astronomy books. It is a classic example of how that compatibility between robotics and the use of human 

space flight intervention, when necessary, can advance the knowledge base dramatically.

Page 111

 But we have to really focus on the risk management side of this and assure that we always use those 

robotic capabilities, I think, as you've suggested, as a way to fully beat down any of the manageable risk 

that we see before involving a human space flight capability for that reason, as well as being careful about 

when you utilize the human involvement dimension to this. That's part of the reason, and a lot of the 

reason, why the Mars program that we're pursuing for the Mars landers that are planned for later this year 

and arriving in January of '04 is to advance that knowledge base, understanding fully what's going on in 

order to then fully support what could be, down the road, a human—a mission that could support that 

case, if deemed appropriate, necessary, and supported by the research and the science opportunities that 

could be yielded.

 So the strategy you've talked about and the approach that you're alluding to is precisely the direction 

we're trying to develop now, and have been for some time, as a means to complement those capabilities 

and always use the robotic capacity up front as the means to inform those judgments.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Mr. Lucas.

 Representative LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. Administrator, down at the Smithsonian, they have a piece of your old equipment hanging for all 

the world to see, the X–15 from the 1960's, which is a symbol of a debate and a decision by the 

generation ahead of you and I that, in the spirit of satisfying the common need of the United States 

Congress and the American people for immediate gratification, it was better to strap men and women and 

equipment on ballistic missiles than it was to focus on creating space planes.

Page 112

 Your comments today—you point out about the potential future for an Orbital Space Plane and the 

Reusable Launch Vehicles—with reasonable budget and reasonable focus, how far down the road are we 

talking about before we have functioning replacement systems like that?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, the budget before the Congress as part of the amended fiscal year '03 proposal 

the President made last November, would contemplate a technology demonstrator of the Orbital Space 

Plane as early as fiscal year '06, flight testing and so forth to occur as soon as next summer that would 

lead up to that technology demonstrator. Then, from there to developing as we've now completed the 
essential baseline requirements, if you will, look for competing approaches—not a technology 

demonstrator, but an operational vehicle—that would accomplish the objectives of both rescue and return 

capacity as well as transfer to the International Space Station. It would be online, we would hope, as early 

as the end of this decade, and we're kind of moving in that direction to try to establish that.

 This would be a complementary capability to the Space Shuttle and use the Space Shuttle primarily as a 

cargo capacity, heavy-lift ability, rather than trying to make a vehicle that's all things to all requirements. 

This would be a crew transfer capability that would be maneuverable, flexible, and responsive to those 

kinds of circumstances where needed most.

 Representative LUCAS. Booster, slash, plane, or a two-stage plane, Administrator?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. It is initially planned as a capability mounted atop an Expendable Launch Vehicle. 

And that technology demonstrator will be that initial capability that we will utilize at that time.

Page 113

 Representative LUCAS. Along that line, since it's obvious that, with that amount of effort required and 

the need, as you've pointed out so succinctly, to keep the workhorse, the old Shuttle, up and going, could 

you address for a moment some of the discussion we've had on the committee for some time about the 

effect on the reduction in the number of people who—full-time employees who support the Shuttle over 

the last decade—literally, what, one-third less people still making, if not the same number, but even a 

greater number of safety checks?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Absolutely. I think the history appears to suggest—and, again, we'll be guided a lot by 

the review that the investigation board will go through in terms of looking at the systemic causes of what 

may have been there. So their charter is very broad, and their scope is rather extensive. But it would 

appear as though that the—exactly as you've suggested, the history is that while cost reductions and 

efficiencies were gained over the course of that period, as previously described on a slide, there were also 

improvements in the safety margins as well as the reduction of incidents prior to launch, on-orbit 

incidents, you name it, there were—all the trends were moving in a direction that proved or demonstrated 

greater efficiency in addition to slide 18, if you will, that would prove the capabilities, I think, that have 

significantly improved over the span, both decreasing incidents and increasing efficiencies.

 But, again, all that is, is based on the data and the information we see over this particular trend line. 

We're going to be guided by what the systemic causes are that the investigation board may come back and 

look at for this information and say that may or may not have been a contributing factor to it. And we'll be 

guided by their view.

Page 114

 Representative LUCAS. Thank you, Administrator.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Boxer.

 Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

 Mr. O'Keefe, I want to join my colleagues in sending my condolences to the families and also my 

feelings of condolence, as well, to NASA. In California, we're the birthplace of the Shuttle program. We 
hold a very special place in our heart for the heroes who conduct these flights. And it's in this spirit that I 

ask my questions.

Crew Escape Systems

 In the year 2000, your safety panel made a very clear recommendation. I ask unanimous consent that I 

place this page in the record. I trust, without objection, that will be done.

 [The information referred to follows:]

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 Senator BOXER. This is a quote, ''The Presidential Commission on the Shuttle Challenger Accident 

addressed crew escape in their report and recommended that NASA make all efforts to provide a crew 

escape system. NASA responded by initiating crew escape studies.'' This is in this safety panel. Then it 

says, ''Over the lifetime of the Space Shuttle, the reliable post-launch crew escape system will provide the 

largest potential improvement in crew safety. NASA has completed or has underway a number of studies 

that also suggest such a system is feasible.'' And then they say, ''The time is past due for the 

implementation of a more capable crew escape system.''

Page 115

 Now, Mr. O'Keefe, after that report was filed, members of the safety panel were fired. And I ask 

unanimous consent to put in the record the New York Times story entitled NASA Dismissed Advisors 

Who Warned About Safety.

 Mr. Chairman, will you put that in the record for me? Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection.

 Senator BOXER. Thank you.

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 Senator BOXER. And after that report and after the people were fired, four board members were fired, 

two consultants were fired, one board member quit because he was upset at the firings. That left you two 

people. You changed the charter of the panel.

 And I ask unanimous consent that the new charter and the old charter be placed in the record.

Page 116

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection.

 [The information referred to follows: the old charter, dated April 29, 1999; the new charter, dated May 
1, 2001. Please see Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for the charter dated May 1, 2003.]

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 Senator BOXER. And, in essence, without going through the bureaucratic talk in here, the new charter, 

Mr. O'Keefe, gives you much more power—the NASA Administrator, not you personally; in this case, 

you personally—more power to essentially veto who they choose as chair of the panel.

Page 117

 So I put all these pieces together, Mr. Chairman, and I have concern. I see a report that clearly doesn't 

mince words here that time is past due for the implementation of a more capable crew escape system. I 

see members being fired. I then see a new charter where now there's less independence of the safety 

panel.

 I want to know how you feel about this array of facts. First of all, do you agree that the time is past due 

for the implementation of a more capable crew escape system? And if you do, why haven't we seen more 

done about it? Number two, why do you think those folks were fired? And, number three, would agree, in 

light of your, I believe, very sincere comments that safety is a priority, that you would go back to the old 

charter where the panel could choose its own leader and not have the NASA administrator veto it?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Senator.

 On the first issue, as it pertains to crew escape, again there were a series of very important 

recommendations that came from the Rogers Commission or outgrowths of the postChallenger experience—that changed operational procedures as it pertained to crew escape and 

capabilities that were recommended therein. And prior to launch, there is a complete safety regime that's 

in place that didn't exist prior to the Challenger, because of their recommendations. It's a very significant 

change.

 Having said that, my understanding is that the analysis that went on a couple or three years ago 

following that particular set of reports of the options all led to a series of technical modifications to the 

Shuttle which have increased its weight dramatically, its operations, its maneuverability, and so, 

therefore, were deemed to be a marginal improvement in safety that could be attained, if at all, and yet 

dramatically increased weight, which would have compromised the safety of on-orbit capabilities.

Page 118

 Senator BOXER. So you didn't agree with this recommendation of the——
 Chairman MCCAIN. And the gentlewoman's time is expired.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. No, I——

 Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm just trying to see——

 Chairman MCCAIN. No, I'm sorry, the gentlewoman's time has expired.

 Senator BOXER. I know that you're sorry.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Go ahead. We'll recognize the next——

 Senator BOXER. I know that you're sorry. Thank you.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I'm sorry, Senator.

 No, it is—my agreement, notwithstanding or not, I, again, am not fully aware of all of the parameters 

of it. I'm advised that's what led the folks to conclude two or three years ago.

Page 119

 Having said that, we are going to look at anything that the investigative board comes back with and 

says, ''These are the changes that must be made in order to guarantee safe flight operations.'' If it contains 

that particular set of questions, which, by the way, were primarily pertaining to, as I understand it, ascent 

requirements, not descent capabilities, that, in turn, those kinds of requirements be factored in and that we 

make the changes appropriate to do so.

 To your second point as it pertains to the safety panel board composition, its charter, and so forth, that 

occurred prior to my tenure. I don't know exactly what the circumstances were, short of the press accounts 

and the folklore or legend that may have gone into who did what to who when. Nonetheless, I do 

understand that, in '97, based on a report from the Inspector General at that time, offered as how a cadre 

of panel members with long-term experience and in-depth NASA knowledge is important. But to be most 

effective, this group must be routinely infused with the fresh perspective of new, diverse members. So, as 

a consequence, the Inspector General's position, as I understand it, was acted upon by my predecessor.

 Suggestions were made as to the charter to limit the duration of the tenure to two terms, I believe, of six 

years each. We'll certainly go back and re-examine that. If it's the desire on the part of the panel members 

to look at a different tenure period of time that they think enhances their wisdom and understanding of the 

safety issues, I am all ears on that.

 The prior chairman introduced himself to me within 30 days of my arrival at NASA as the outgoing 

chairman. So I don't know how they arrived at who was going to become the chairman and who would be 

the next chairperson, but the current chair is the individual that was anointed and appointed, I guess by 

me, but with the concurrence of the board prior to that time. I made no objection to it. And the only 

individual who is new to the board is one individual who was added to it during the course of my tenure. 

No one else has been released.

Page 120

 So I've really been trying to look at what the composition of the panel is, and assure its advisory status, 
that's the strongest we can possibly make it, and changes made prior to that we'll certainly go back and 

revisit to assure that if they have different views that would enhance or strengthen their position, that's 

what we want to hear. We want to make sure that safety of operation is adhered to at all times.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

 Mr. Udall.

 Chairman MCCAIN. Could I just say, I want to apologize to all members for enforcing the time limits. 

We do have such a large number of questioners, and our members have been very patient, and I 

appreciate that.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Udall.

 Representative UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 I, too, want to thank Mr. O'Keefe for taking his time to join us today. And I found your testimony 

insightful, enlightening, and, in fact, quite moving, and I want to thank you for your leadership.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you.

Page 121

 Representative UDALL. I know you're beginning to think you're in an echo chamber, but I did also 

want to associate myself with the remarks of our Chairman on the House side and the Ranking Member 

and others, who have urged you to create as independent a commission as possible and that we'll all be 

well served when those results are announced.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Representative UDALL. In my experience in my previous career as an outdoor educator and someone 

who was very involved in the climbing and mountaineering communities, we found that when we had 

accidents, that independent entities that had no fiduciary relationship or other relationship with those 

involved could make quite accurate and objective determinations of what occurred. So I want to lend my 

voice to those of others here.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Representative UDALL. I did also want to acknowledge the tremendous sacrifice and the bravery of 

our astronauts and send my condolences to the family members and friends of the brave astronauts. We in 

Colorado have a proud history of involvement with NASA. In fact, Kalpana Chawla was one of the 

members of the crew, and she was a graduate of the University of Colorado, so we feel that loss very 

deeply in Colorado.

 Mr. Chairman, if I might, I'd like to include in the record an article from the New York Times on 

Monday, February 10th, that talks about all the tremendous benefits that have been generated by the space 

program. I know there are some——

Page 122
 Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, so ordered.

 Representative UDALL. Thank you.

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Replacing the Space Shuttle Orbiter

 Representative UDALL. There have been debates and discussions and comments that the astronauts 

were involved in minor science projects while they were orbiting the Earth. And I think if you look into 

the record, in fact, what's resulted from our space program is truly remarkable, and day in and day out we 

see the results of those advancements here on Earth.

 If I could, I'd like to focus a little bit on the Space Shuttle orbiter and whether we ought to replace it. 

Have you gotten to the point where you have an opinion in that regard about the replacement of the Space 

Shuttle orbiter?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan we're currently working with was 

devised over the course of last year and culminating in the November 13th, 2002, amendment that the 

President submitted to the 2003 budget that the Congress is still deliberating on at this time. It's reinforced 

in the 2004 budget submission the President made last Monday, which is to look at all the elements of 

how these particular systems support each other.

Page 123

 I think, for a long time, all the trends seemed to suggest that every one of these were looked at as 

individual, standalone programs. But there's a great interrelationship between them. And the requirement 

for Space Shuttle capabilities, both in terms of crew transfer, which is how we typically have rotated the 

crews aboard the International Space Station, as well as the launch of cargo assets—in other words, all of 

the new pieces that are being installed on International Space Station to build out that laboratory that can't 

be duplicated here on Earth—is a capability we've really got to look at in relationship to each other and to 

consider a crew transfer and rescue return capacity that can be introduced more aggressively than we 

presently have.

 So the combination of both Shuttle and how we maintain its cargo lift capacity for capabilities to 

continue to not only support, but finish building, the International Space Station, the capability to transfer 

crew in order to rotate the expedition crews that we've seen now in our—here we are in our third year of 

permanent presence onboard that system—as well as the Orbital Space Plane that would provide that 

capability, all three of those dimensions and the Next-Generation Launch Technologies to ultimately 

replace the cargo capacity is our focus in that amendment, as well as in the present budget before the 

Congress right now.

 Representative UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I don't know where my time is, but what is the status of the 

orbiter——
 Chairman MCCAIN. Your time has expired.

Page 124

 Senator Wyden.

 Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Administrator O'Keefe, when I chaired your confirmation hearings, I found you to be honest and 

candid, and we're going to need an awful lot of that in the days ahead, and we appreciate your being here.

NASA Workforce Legislation

 My first question deals with the huge brain-drain situation at NASA. It seems to me that you all are 

hemorrhaging talent in key areas, like electrical engineering. And I think this has implications both for the 

short-term and the long-term.

 The February 1st date, for example, on that date, you all were being pushed to, in effect, use more 

outside contractors and fewer people within the agency, and so some, of course, are saying that when we 

have a chance to study this, it's going to back ''the people.''

 So I'd like you to comment on the brain-drain problem, both from the short-term and the long-term, and 

what's being done to address it.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.

 Indeed, that is a concern that, as we've discussed previously, as well as we've talked about in various 

hearings, over the course of the last dozen years or so, we've seen a very clear trend in the direction of an 

aging workforce that are capable, very strong professionals, but it is, nonetheless, a very mature 

workforce. We've got three times as many scientists and engineers that are over 60 as we have under 30. 

And so the consequence of that set of decisions made in years gone by of bringing in additional talent at 

gradations, there's no way to instantly grow longevity as well as experience base.

Page 125

 What we submitted last June to the Congress was a series of legislative initiatives specifically focused 

on strategic management of human capital, as has been advised by the General Accounting Office. Dave 

Walker, as the Comptroller General, has consistently talked about this. So we forwarded this series of 

legislative provisions. They have been sent to the Congress, they're in the appropriate committees of 

jurisdiction, and are under consideration to try to deal with what those tools would be that we could use 

for the purpose of not only retaining for the near-term period the kinds of capabilities and talent we have 

today, but also recruiting talent with some experience base with a variety of walks and backgrounds, as 

well as bringing in new graduate students and doctoral students who would replace that roughly 60 

percent of the workforce that is of scientific and technical background. You're exactly right, it's a concern, 

and we want to act on it.

 Senator WYDEN. I want to ask——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. We look for to the Congress' early enactment of all those provisions to move us along 

that way.
 Senator WYDEN. I want to ask one other quick question. I think when we get to the bottom of this, I 

think we're going to see that we've got to address this issue, and I just pray that this tragic loss hasn't been 

due to some human error.

Manned vs. Unmanned Spacecraft

 The second question I had deals with manned versus unmanned space flight. I think that manned flights 

represent the aspirations and hopes of so many Americans, but I will tell you, I personally believe we're 

going to need to do more in the unmanned area. I think it is going to be an imperative in the days ahead. 

And I'd like your judgment as to how to make that call.

Page 126

 For example, I'm attracted to the argument that when you're talking about the space station a few 

hundred miles, you know, up, that wouldn't be as high a priority as really looking to distant worlds. But 

I'd be curious how you'd go about tackling this question and making the tough calls with respect to 

manned versus unmanned space flight. I want to see the manned expeditions go forward, but I do think 

we're going to have to have a bigger role for unmanned expeditions in the days ahead, and I'd like to hear 

you tell us how you'd go about making those calls.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure, thank you, Senator. I think you've hit the nail right on the head.

 The strategy we've tried to employ here, again, is not an either/or, but very much a combination of how 

do you best employ the robotic capabilities that we have to advance our knowledge base and understand 

what the challenges will be in order to assure the greatest probability of safety of flight operations when 

and if called upon to engage humans in that science and research set of objectives.

 So the approach that we've devised, for example, in the case of the Mars landers that are planned, and 

explorers that are planned, for later this year, due to arrive there in early '04, is to continue to build that 

knowledge base understanding the challenges and difficulties we will work with.

 And the inhibitors on exploration much beyond where we are today typically are human related, to be 

sure, but it's partly technology related. The first one is that our limitations on capacity for propulsion, 

speed, to get anywhere is currently restricted by the same laws of physics we've been living with for 40 

years. And so as a result, until we develop a new space propulsion capacity to dramatically reduce the 

time as well as the capacity to get anywhere, we're going to be really restricted, in terms of the 

capabilities we have in that regard.

Page 127

 The second is how to assure that humans survive the experience. And as it stands now, the exposure 

that we see and that we're learning on International Space Station as a consequence of long duration 

spaceflight are the debilitating effects on human beings of space travel and space exploration. We're 

looking to conquer those. Part of the budget proposal you have before you as part of the '04 submission 

that the President just made is an intensive effort to look at human factors. And only then, after we've 

conquered those kinds of challenges of degradation, of muscle mass, bone mass, radiation effects, all 

those things, should we venture much beyond where we have the capacity to do today, which is a very 

important pursuit of science and research aboard station and other objectives.

 So the whole strategy here is to lay this out in a way that informs the knowledge base by robotic 

capabilities, follow along to the extent necessary and when human intervention gives us the opportunity to 
expand that knowledge base, and make sure they can only do it when there's a safety-of-flight capability 

that we can assure.

 Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Weldon.

 Representative WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Administrator O'Keefe, thank you for coming. And I have the highest confidence in your leadership, as 

I do in Admiral Gehman's leadership, who did an outstanding job in investigating the USS Cole.

Page 128

Thermal Tile Adhesive

 I have a very specific series of questions that you may not be able to answer here, but I would like a 

thorough response for the record, relative to one aspect of the operations of the Shuttle, and it deals with 

the tiles.

 The tiles are glued to the Shuttle by a special adhesive. That adhesive has, as it's primary component, 

urea. The urea that's produced is produced around the world, and much of it's for agriculture and 

industrial purposes. But the specific urea that NASA has used for the glue for the tiles was produced by 

one plant, and that one plant was in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, Canada. And the reason why that plant 

was selected was because none of the U.S. manufacturers were able to meet the very stringent 

requirements that NASA had established for the urea, for the glue for the tiles.

 About five years ago, that plant was acquired by another Canadian firm that does business in Cuba. 

And because of that, they were concerned about the implications of Helms-Burton legislation, and so they 

no longer supplied NASA the urea for the glue for the tiles.

 The U.S. manufacturer of the adhesive that used that specific urea was very concerned at the time about 

finding a new source of urea that would meet the very specific, tough requirements that NASA had for the 

glue to hold the tiles on. And I would say there are millions of tons of urea consumed in the U.S. every 

year. But only a very, very small portion of it would be used specifically by NASA for the glue for the 

tiles. And, as I said before, up until that takeover five years ago, it was from one plant in Canada that had 

a separate mechanism for producing that urea that U.S. manufacturers did not, or perhaps could not, 

achieve the same quality standards that NASA required.

Page 129

 So what my concern is, whether or not we found an equally reliable supplier of urea. And, for the 

record, I'd like you to give us that information relative to the specifics of NASA specifications.

 Thank you.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, I don't know. I really am not aware of the nuances there, but I positively 

will provide that for the record.
 Representative WELDON. Thank you.

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 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir.

 Representative WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Snowe.

 Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. O'Keefe. I know this a very trying 

time for you and the NASA family and most certainly the families of the astronauts. And it just reminds 

us how fortunate we are as a nation to have been blessed with men and women like these astronauts who 

are willing to take risks for this country.

Page 130

Debris Assessment and Need for Imagery

 I'm trying to get at the picture of how NASA approaches certain decisions—what is minimized, what is 

discounted. We know that for 12 days, from the time that you all learned of the debris that hit the Shuttle 

and then the Shuttle was scheduled to land, no action was taken other than doing some computer model 

simulations to predict damage and to rely on past experiences where Shuttles had returned safely, even 

though there had been several Stanford studies in 1990 and 1994 that had already warned of some 

potential damage that a single piece of debris could have had on the tiles.

 Could you tell me as to why no request was made for military telescope imaging? We know that a 

camera was not working at the time of orbit that really could have shown the damage that was done on the 

underside of the Shuttle. Why wasn't that requested at some point in time during the flight to do a greater 

examination of this type of damage, rather than relying on computer modeling when you really didn't 

know what had happened, rather than doing the modeling on something that you knew had happened?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.

 The investigative process, and certainly the Gehman Board, if they come to find we should have done 

something else, positively we'll be, you know, guided by that particular finding. Nonetheless, the 

approach that was taken here is, this is a piece of foam material that was about a foot and a half by six 

inches of which there have been incidents like this before. And, as I mentioned earlier, there are cases 

where after the flight, there's a full examination of every square inch, every single element of the orbiter 

when it comes back, to see what the damage effect was. It was determined, in previous cases of 

comparable circumstance, not to have been a safety-of-flight consideration.

Page 131

 Again, the circumstances here were, it came off of the external tank as the entire Shuttle orbiter system 

was traveling at 3600 miles an hour. The piece came off, dropped roughly 40 feet at a rate of something 

like 50 miles an hour, so it's the functional equivalent, as one astronaut described to me, of a Styrofoam 

cooler blowing off of a pickup truck ahead of you on a highway. And every incident we'd seen before 

that, every model we ran, every analysis that had been done on every prior case demonstrated no 
significant damage in that circumstance.

 Of the 4,000 sensors aboard the Shuttle orbiter, none of them indicated any anomalies during that 16-

day flight. And given the wide variation of heat of several hundred degrees that was experienced 16 times 

a day, if there was any penetration, any damage that could have been evident, the assumption was those 

sensors would have picked it up.

 Nonetheless, if the Gehman Board finds that we really erred by not examining this in yet another 

direction, based on all the historical evidence, we positively will run that finding to ground and make 

corrective actions as necessary.

 Senator SNOWE. But wasn't this piece of debris the largest documented piece ever to hit the Shuttle?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Not to my knowledge, but I will correct that for the record if that proves to be in error. 

I don't know whether that's true or not, but I certainly will provide that for the record.

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 Senator SNOWE. I guess——

 Senator BROWNBACK. The time of the senator is up. I'm sorry.

 Senator SNOWE. Thank you.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Wu.

 Representative Wu. Thank you for being with us during a very difficult time, Mr. O'Keefe.

 During my colleagues' questions, I took the liberty of drawing up a little diagram to illustrate my 

inquiry to you. It's not a PowerPoint presentation; it's just felt tip pen on a piece of paper. Across the 

bottom here, cuts in your budget. And going up, risk. And the red line is the typical hockey puck kind of 

curve that some of us in high tech like to see in financial returns, but we don't like to see in this kind of 

context.

 And earlier, I heard you say that you are pounding out as much of the risk as possible before each and 

every Shuttle launch. But we also have a history of delayed improvements, perhaps delayed in future 

generations of crafts which may be safer. And I am concerned that the tragic loss of seven astronauts tells 

us that we are somewhere out on this leg of the curve and not somewhere here, you know, in the flatter 

portion.

Page 133

 It's our job to try to set policies which maintain reasonable safety, a job which we share with you. You 

are a very good team player. You should be. But in response to specific congressional inquiry, I think that 

you are free to answer those inquiries.

 And I want to make this a standing congressional inquiry, if you will, that whatever the optimal budget 
is, as we are adjusting that budget, can you work with us to find that inflection point? I'm concerned that 

we have gone past that inflection point in risk where the risk has become unacceptably high.

 It is always going to be inherently risky to put human beings in space. I'm a strong supporter of human 

space exploration. But I want to invite you to work with us to find some reasonable point in here where 

we are not expending exceptional resources, or unnecessarily expending resources, but we are doing

everything reasonable to keep humans safe in space.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure. No, absolutely, Congressman. I'm delighted to work with you to try to find what 

that breakpoint is. And, again, my appreciation—slide 18 again, please—is that over the course of time, 

we've seen a reduction in cost of activities, there has, at the same time, been an improvement in 

efficiencies as well as the reduction of in-flight anomalies, technical scrubs have dropped by a lot, all of 

the basic factors that would drive you to conclude that, as your chart suggests, as you reduce resources, 

you should see an enhancement of risk. If anything, what appears to suggest here is a case where 

efficiencies have been attained and risk has been reduced.

Page 134

 So the extent there are differences of view about that over the course of this past decade of whether or 

not that is the contributing factor to it, we really are looking forward to trying to determine how to correct 

that. And if we've crossed that threshold I think you've so eloquently alluded to, we really ought to figure 

out exactly where we make those adjustments as necessary.

 But the trends are the things that I think we need to analyze here, as well as just the basic theory, that 

you've advanced, which is a sound one.

 Representative Wu. Well, this is why I drew it in this way, because if you have effectively reduced cost 

and reduced risk, you've shifted this curve to the left or to the right, up or down, or diagonally, but the 

curve is still here——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Representative Wu.—if you make these assumptions that such a point could be statistically determined. 

And I just want to invite you, as this curve shifts, as policy shifts, to help us look for this curve. You and I 

have been in this discussion before——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Representative Wu.—about the worthiness of human space flight. And I want to remind you of our 

conversation that Lewis and Clark went west 200 years ago. They got an Appropriation of $2,500. They 

spent $38,000, and that caused President Jefferson a lot of heartache. But that turned out to be a pretty 

good deal for America in the long-term.

Page 135

 And I would just encourage you to aggressively ask for what you need and to keep the explorers safe 

out there.

 Senator BROWNBACK. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Representative Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Mr. Wu.

 Senator Burns.

 Senator BURNS. We need you on Appropriations.

 (Laughter.)

 Senator BURNS. Mr. O'Keefe, I wish we were meeting under different circumstances, but we are not. 

And my question is a general question, because I was pretty close to the negotiations of the International 

Space Station and the agreement that we signed with Russia.

 And at that time, I asked a question that we really didn't pursue for some reason or other. I think it 

would help this committee if—as you know, we look at programs and the infrastructure that it takes to 

carry those programs out. At the time we built the orbiter, was there any estimates of—what every 

program goes through is, there is a point diminishing returns whenever upgrades are not sufficient to 

carry out the mission, and I'm wondering if any estimates early on this program were made by engineers 

of at what point do we come to a point of diminishing returns. And if we could look at that and then—and 

I know programs change and missions change, and if history tells us anything, we should be looking at 

those kind of things in order to change the way Congress should be shouldering its responsibility.

Page 136

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Senator BURNS. And I would just ask if there were—any research could be done in your records of 

when do we reach that point, did we reach that point, and what was—and as programs change, what is 

being dictated in the future if this equipment is going to be asked to do things maybe it was never 

intended to do.

 I'm not going to go over the past, because I've been intimately involved with it. And no other program 

stimulates the curiosity or the interest in our sciences and our mathematics in our schools like this 

particular agency of the United States Government. And so I deem it very, very important.

 But if we could have a history and see the things that we can do, and then you do what you do best, we 

may have to call on our older end of the engineers, so to speak, to make those determinations, but I think 

it would help us a lot if we could reach back there and look at history, take a look at what happened, and 

then make some decisions to enable you. We don't want to see this happen again, but we know that this 

will happen. Accidents will happen, especially in the area of going into the unknown.

 And I thank you for being here today and some explanations we've reached today. I'm looking for 

history, something that we base policy on into the future, upon your recommendations.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Senator. I'd be delighted to provide that. We'll go through that 

consideration. There is no question that as it pertains to current flight operations, and I want to reiterate, 

we have a culture that is just obsessing over not letting anything go until it's all exactly right. If the 

investigation board found that systemically we have failed in that quest, that's precisely what we'll be 

guided by, as well.

Page 137
 But your point is very well taken. I think we've got to really be thinking seriously about where is that 

stage where we really make those decisions, and I think we'll provide that, for sure. I'll work through that 

analysis and provide it for the record, as well.

 [The information follows:]

85090h3.eps

 Senator BURNS. Thank you for your leadership, and I appreciate your cooperation.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The time of the Senator has expired.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. We're going to take a brief five-minute break. Five 

minutes only. And then we're right back. And when we come back, Mr. Nethercutt starts the questioning.

 [Recess.]

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The Committee will resume.

 The Chair recognizes Mr. Nethercutt.

Page 138

 Representative NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. O'Keefe, I want to welcome you, sir. Over here.

 (Laughter.)

 Representative NETHERCUTT. I know, I moved.

 I appreciate your being here, and I appreciate the sensitivity with which you and the entire NASA team 

reacted to this terrible tragedy. I certainly was touched by Senator Stevens' remarks and agree with him 

with respect to your integrity and your qualifications.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman.

 Representative NETHERCUTT. Thank you.

 The crew that we lost touched my Eastern Washington District. Michael Anderson was a proud product 

of our community, and Ron Dittemore certainly is, too. And so it touched our community very deeply. 

But in that respect, we're respectful of all that they have done and, in the case of the NASA team, will 

continue to do.

 This was a science-driven crew. They spent 16 days in space and were 16 minutes from landing. And in 

the process, with the space research double module, we're doing tremendous numbers of experiments, as I 

understand it. And with the loss of the Columbia, the question comes, what data might we have been able 

to collect with respect to their 16 days of scientific research efforts? And maybe that's my question, 
basically, is what were we able to retain and preserve with respect to their scientific research legacy?

Page 139

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No question, it was an extraordinary mission. It was intensively science 

focused. You've characterized it exactly right. Over 16 days, a lot of the data and returns from many of 

those experiments were relayed back, and so the scientific community has the benefit of that information. 

But, to be sure, the physical laboratory as well as the physical experimentation that was aboard STS–107 

is lost for all eternity. There's no question there.

 But let me provide for you for the record a rundown of the kind of data and information we have gotten 

back, categorized by the kind of areas. But it was a phenomenal trove of information that I think will yet 

prove to be very enlightening information as research continues on a range of biomedical as well as 

physical sciences research and material research activities in the future.

 [The information follows:]

85090xx.eps

 Representative NETHERCUTT. Let me ask you if there is any support that NASA will offer to the 

principal investigators who lost scientific capability as well. Have you been able to assess that yet or 

make any judgments about the principal investigators and what losses might have been sustained as 

the Columbia was lost?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. There are a number of folks who had based a lot of experimentation, their 

entire dissertations were riding on this, so years of research activity has really been set back dramatically 

as a result of that. That's inconsequential, though, by comparison to the loss of lives, to be sure, but it is 

something we need to be extremely mindful of.

Page 140

 There was to have been a get together this past week, I think, with the biological and physical research 

components of our agency with all the principal investigators that had a stake, if you will, in the STS–107 

experiment and research regime. We are certainly intent on trying to reconvene that session to find out 

what may be remedial for their efforts as we work through this, in terms of the kind of information we 

might look to in future flights. But we will work that. I assure you, that's something that's prominent on 

our minds, as well.

 Representative NETHERCUTT. Is your commitment lessened or diminished at all to scientific 

research and the value of station and the efforts that were undertaken by this crew?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. No one iota. As a matter of fact, the families of the STS–107 crew, the most stoic, 

courageous people you would ever want to meet, within two hours of this activity were already saying, 

''You know, you cannot give up on this set of objectives. They dedicated their lives to this. That's what 

they were committed to doing. You cannot move away from it.'' It had been an inspirational group, and 

that, in and of itself, has been sufficient cause in my mind to not step back from our commitments in this 

regard one inch.

 I appreciate it, Congressman. Thank you.

 Representative NETHERCUTT. Thank you.
 Senator BROWNBACK. The time of the Member has expired.

Page 141

 And if I could ask the people operating the door if you could keep that door closed as much as possible, 

there is some beautiful singing going on outside, but we don't need it in the room.

 Now, I have the only astronaut that's serving currently in the United States Senate, Senator Nelson, 

from Florida.

 Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Mr. O'Keefe, prior to you arriving at NASA, the Space Shuttle budget was whacked by some $1.4 

billion. Basically, part of that over a nine-year period, this says. And, by the way, it's not the easiest to 

find this out, because prior to your arrival back in the early '90's, everything was lumped in together into a 

human space flight account—the Space Shuttle, the kinds of new technologies, plus the station. But when 

you break it out, what you find is that the Congress whacked part of it, about $600 million, out of the 

Space Shuttle, and then NASA itself whacked another $750 million.

 Putting those two together, you can see the years. And this is prior to you arriving, in '02. That year, the 

Congress had added some $45 million, and NASA had whacked $70 million to the Space Shuttle.

 So this will be an ongoing dialogue that we will have. But the question is, What is your opinion, prior 

to your arrival, as you look back, what had happened over that nine-year period? Sometimes the Congress 

would take the money out or just reduce it. Sometimes NASA would basically reprogram the money and 

take it out the Space Shuttle and put it elsewhere. Does that compromise safety?

Page 142

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, sir, I don't know the audit trail, clearly, as well as you've obviously researched 

this. But this particular, I think, matches with what you've projected here, which is the funding history. 

And the convergence of two events—and, again, I've got to really look at this in much greater detail to see 

the individual year changes that have occurred and so forth—but the trends seem to connote two things.

 The first one is that at the same time that efficiencies were being yielded and different ways of going 

about business that are more risk management and more what I would call quality-assurance-related 

approaches that raises and improves the risk-management probabilities, at the same time also yielded 

some cost reductions along the way by not having an intensive group of individuals involved in the 

activity. And so all the indicators over this same span of time seem to suggest—but, again, we've got to 

back and really look at this very, very carefully—would seem to suggest that there were improvements in 

incidents prior to launch, incidents on orbit, all of the trend lines that we use to measure the efficiency and 

performance of the space flight operations program seem to be moving in that kind of a trend line.

 That said, we're going to be guided by what the Gehman Board looks at as systemic causes. If this 

appears to have been a contributing factor, we will be right back here looking at what those fixes need to 

be to work on that.

 Senator NELSON. And we will carry on a continuing dialogue on this. I can tell you, there are people 

at NASA and in the astronaut office that feel like that safety has been compromised over the last 10 years 

as a result of the Space Shuttle budget being raided. And that's something that we've got to be concerned 
about.

Page 143

 One other item——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. We're happy to hear those comments and any other views from anybody inside to 

external to the agency. It'll come to ground truth and find the answers to what happened in this case, 

absolutely, Senator.

 Senator NELSON. Might you comment on the fact that if that——

 Senator BROWNBACK. I'm sorry, the time of the Senator has expired. We're having to stay on very 

tight time frames.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Weiner.

 Representative WEINER. Thank you. Welcome.

 I fear in your statement you have articulated, I guess, a strawman that some of my colleagues in their 

questions have knocked down. And when you said that we ought not turn our backs on exploration and 

that the research that was done on the Shuttle was valuable in cancer treatment, crop yield, and fire 

suppression, and dust storms. But it is a fact that all of that research could have, should have, and would 

have been done on the space station had it been completed. And, in fact, the Shuttle has, more often than 

not, not been a research vehicle, but a delivery vehicle supporting other platforms for science, whether it 

be satellites or telescopes or the space station.

Page 144

 One of the many things that made the Columbia mission noteworthy was the fact that it was a pure 

science mission. Apparently only 11 of the last 46 Shuttles have been able to say that. It got to be so 

frustrating that in the 106th Congress there was actually language put into the Appropriation bill that this 

Shuttle should contain more research.

 You know, Shuttle astronauts, I fear to say, have become, more often than not, very high skilled, often 

brilliant, undeniably courageous cargo carriers. And to demonstrate this point, I don't have a graphic, but 

you do, and I'd ask you to put up number 20.

 Under something marked ''safety indicators'' is a chart that said launches more than ever cargo capacity 

up as much as 100 percent. Cargo capacity being an indicator of safety leads me to the inescapable 

conclusion that having more cargo means fewer flights, means safer human beings. This should not be 

how we measure whether someone is safe or not, because, frankly, as we learned within, I guess, 48 hours 

after this horrible accident, an unmanned vehicle went up and brought cargo to the space station.

 And also, on chart number 18, the same chart that has the reduction of in-flight anomalies, monthly 

mishap frequencies, technical scrubs, brags about the increase in lift capacity to the Space Shuttle. It 

seems that we're mixing the need to keep people safe, which is something that I think you have articulated 

several times here today, with this ever-growing notion that the Space Shuttle is the only way should 

develop or the only way, the only means we should use to carry cargo.
Page 145

 We want science to be done in space. Over and over again, we, in Congress, have been asked the 

question, because our colleagues put it to us, ''Do you want to continue the space station funding?'' We all 

say yes. I say yes. But we have to be careful not to confuse what the Shuttle has been as a science 

mission. It has been a UPS truck for Space Shuttle supplies. And I'm not sure that if you believe that 

increasing cargo is a way to make people safer than having a manned cargo carrier is the right way to go 

at all. And if you'd just address that, particularly chart number 20, if you could.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure. Thank you, sir.

 Cargo, in the term you've used here, means assembly and science, both. In the last four years, many of 

the Space Shuttle flights, and I think you've pointed out the history precisely right, that we have dedicated 

the use of Shuttle for the purpose of bringing up large sections of the International Space Station for onorbit assembly.

 This is an engineering marvel we're building in space. You know, there's no other way to do this. 

There's no way to launch the completed International Space Station in one fell swoop or one piece, so 

each of it's been assembled on orbit. And by no means are these UPS truck drivers.

 Representative WEINER. No, the question, if you'll just understand, the question is not that. It is if 

you can bring food, if you can bring clothing, why can't you bring Space Shuttle?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I'm sorry, I didn't get to the answer fast enough. I apologize.

Page 146

 Representative WEINER. I'm sorry, I'm——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. The Progress vehicle that went up the Sunday after the accident did, in fact, contain 

groceries, logistics supplies, those kinds of things. That's not typically what we put aboard Shuttle. There 

are some of those things that are there, but mostly those are carried by those unmanned autonomous 

capabilities that are brought in to sustain the typical consumable requirements.

 Others are put aboard Shuttle, too, like water and a few other things, but typically what is, is the cargo 

section includes the components, the modules of the International Space Station that couldn't get there 

any other way, or the science. And as we see in this particular case of the STS–107 as well as on every 

one of the Shuttle flights, the science experimentation going up-mass to the International Space Station to 

bring those scientific experiments to there, there's no other way to do that. There's no way to put them 

aboard autonomous unmanned vehicles at this juncture that would do anything other than provide basic 

logistics requirements.

 So I get your point. You're exactly right. We're trying to maximize the yield of what can be, as we call 

it, up-mass to the International Space Station or in any other orbit pattern, but, at the same time, also 

minimize the risk to the individuals so that really the human involvement is minimized to the point where 

it's actually necessary.

 Senator BROWNBACK. The time has expired. Thank you very much.

Page 147
 We now have the Senator from the host state for the Johnson Space Center, state of Texas, Senator 

Hutchison.

 Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 And I will just say, Mr. O'Keefe, I know how devastated you are. I've never seen a sadder face than 

yours in the last few weeks in all the pictures, and I think that you have handled the immediate aftermath 

very well, and I appreciate that.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.

 Senator HUTCHISON. I also want to say I appreciate Mr. Rohrabacher's mention of the Texas 

residents who never expected anything like this but have been so supportive of NASA throughout East 

Texas looking for the debris, and consider themselves, sort of, deputies in the investigation, and I'm very 

proud of my home state, and especially the NASA people and the NASA family. I grew up in the area. I 

have known the NASA family since the announcement that NASA would come to Johnson, and have 

known the close-knit nature of that community. And I appreciate all of them, as well.

 I want to talk about some of the experiments that have been successful and have made a difference in 

our lives really, from the National Science Biomedical Research Institute, which is not the old, past 

successes of space research, but the newer ones. They have developed portable infrared sensors to 

determine blood and tissue chemistry noninvasively, which could help us in intensive care units and 

ambulances be able to test people quickly and determine hemorrhaging or other maladies; developed a 

biosensor for microbes and toxins that has an application in the bioterrorism field for early detection and 

treatment, could be used by military searching caves in Afghanistan or by weapons inspectors; helped 

further development of a focused ultrasound system for hemorrhage control and for destroying unwanted 

tissues or tumors that could one day allow bloodless surgery.

Page 148

 Right there on the Columbia, they dealt—dealing with combustion, they created the weakest flame ever 

seen in a laboratory environment, about one/two-hundredth that of a match, which would be significant 

since soot contributes to 60,000 premature deaths each year in the United States.

 My question is this. We do have a future in medical research. Your own board of scientists came back 

to you and said that is a future for manned space research. The question is: If the Space Shuttle is 

grounded for a year or six months, what would be the impact on research, or do you foresee something 

even further down the road for the use of the Shuttle? And, secondly, if the space station is not serviced 

by the Shuttle regularly for a long period of time, what would the capability be to continue the use of 

those microgravity conditions? Or do any of our international partners have a vehicle capable of 

servicing, including assembly, the station?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator.

 If I could, just on the front, associate myself with your comments about the folks from East Texas. 

Unbelievable support. And folks like C.G. Macklin, who is the city manager of Lufkin, Texas, Captain 

Paul Davis, from the Department of Public Safety down there, unbelievable people who have stepped up 

in a way that is just truly heroic, and we are grateful to them. They have never been associated with the 

NASA family, and yet here they are contributing in a way that really is remarkable, and we are eternally 

grateful to them for their assistance as we've moved through this very difficult time in working through 

the challenges there.
Page 149

 The impact on station, to be sure, is a real difficult circumstance, given the fact that the next flight that 

was due in March would have been a crew rotation for Expedition 6 to be replaced by Expedition 7. To 

the extent that we are able to get answers to the current challenges that are underway that the investigative 

board is looking to. If we can get back to flight and resume flight operations, there should be no 

diminution of that support to station.

 To the extent that that doesn't happen and the best scenario is not realized, we do have the capability on 

the Soyuz flights, which is the twice-a-year rotation of the emergency egress capsule. Three cosmonauts 

were due to be sent up—cosmonauts and astronauts—were due to go up in April. We're looking at what 

that crew configuration is, consulting with our International Space Station partners to determine the best 

way to configure the crew to use it potentially as a rotation capability for the folks that are aboard 

International Space Station now. Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin potentially have the 

opportunity to come back aboard that particular Soyuz return vehicle and send a replacement crew up. 

We're looking at what those options may call for.

 In terms of the long-term sustainment of the International Space Station for science, there's no question, 

between now and June there is an ample trove of science aboard the station right now that Ken Bowersox 

assures me, and, more important, Don Pettit, who is the science officer, says has got him occupied every 

single day and won't be a limiting factor between now and the time the summer rolls around.

 Beyond that, there's no question, it would end up likely be a sustaining capability, because, in pursuit of 

the earlier commentary we just had, and conversation, there is a—the up-mass, or the capability to be able 

to lift the science experimentation in the mid-deck lockers and so forth that are aboard the Shuttle 

typically are what bring the scientific experimentation return or rotation for the International Space 

Station to that laboratory condition, and that would not be feasible to do. You can't get all that aboard a 

resupply vehicle like Progress, which is unmanned and for logistics and basic consumables. For 

everything you take out of it, it's that much less sustaining capability we have for the human beings 

aboard, and the humans are going to be the primary focus of our intentions. So, therefore, we would see a 

limitation and a diminution of the science focus that would be aboard.

Page 150

 But, for right now, it is positively stationed today as it was yesterday and will continue through the 

balance of this time as the most capable laboratory condition we have, and we are maximizing the 

science, and that sustains for several months to come. We'll have to make adjustments beyond that, if this 

goes beyond that period of time.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The Senator's time has expired.

 Mr. Etheridge.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Etheridge.

 Representative ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 And, Mr. O'Keefe, thank you for being here. And let me also associate myself with expressing 
condolences to the families and others, and also with the concerns that many of my colleagues have 

expressed today to make sure this study is independent. I think that needs to be done for the confidence of 

this Congress and for the American people for the future of the program, which I strongly support and 

think it's important to continue.

 And let me say the people of North Carolina share with you greatly, because we will celebrate the 

100th anniversary of flight this year in two of the four celebrations in this country. So we have a deep 

commitment to space and to flight.

Page 151

 I was in school on Monday, right after the Saturday terrible disaster. Children were concerned, 

obviously, as they always are. You mentioned earlier, someone did, and I think it's appropriate to cover it, 

because this is a great teaching tool, not disasters, but space flight.

 In the 1960's, President Kennedy said we're going to put a man on the Moon before the end of this 

decade. We didn't know we could do it. We didn't know how to do it. But it spawned the growth of 

scientists and engineers that you talked about that were getting ready to age out. Don't you think it's about 

time we had another grand plan and decide we're going to put a man on Mars or some great planet? That 

may be above your pay grade, but someone needs to say it so we get another generation of excited young 

people to decide they want to get involved.

 I know the scientists we have in NASA, which is a very small, elite, capable group are there because 

they were excited. But we need a bigger core.

 Very quickly, because I have one more question I want to get to you. That is, beyond that—and I hope 

you'll speak to that—on March of this year or last year, the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

reported to you that, simply stated, the panel believed that the repeated postponement of safety upgrades, 

restoring aging infrastructure, and the failure to look far enough ahead to anticipate and correct shortfalls 

and critical skills and logistical availability will inevitably increase the risk of operating the Space Shuttle. 

However, since then, I understand that NASA has cancelled planned upgrade projects, shifted funding for 

upgrading further out in time, and has indicated that it needed to do more studies of what the upgrades 

should be and how they would be undertaken.

Page 152

 Can you tell us if that's true, and, if so, why and how that will help improve safety?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. To your first question on big goals, you bet, the approach that the President, I 

think, has advanced as a part of our plan that as a part of the strategic plan and all the objectives therein is 

to develop those enabling technologies that would then permit the establishment of those big goals to be 

attainable.

 And the two major limitations that I think we have got to beat down and be very, very thorough in our 

efforts to explore the technology opportunities to conquer is the ability get anywhere in a period of time 

and speed that would inform the research agenda and also assure that humans, when they go, can survive 

the experience for the full duration of that flight.

 And as it stands right now, based on our current technology, just to get to the edges of this solar system 

would take us 15 years. That's an unacceptable period of time it would take. And assuming that any of the 

scientists, the principal investigators, the research focus, are still interested by the time someone would 
arrive there is one of our biggest problems, because things change an awful lot in the span of a decade and 

a half.

 So our first objective, which you see dominantly in last year's budget and this year's budget, is how to 

beat and how to conquer the in-space propulsion power generation requirements we have.

 The second dimension of that is to look very carefully at how we can assure that humans survive the 

experience. And, again, the degradation we see of the five expedition crews who have been aboard 

International Space Station for sustained periods of four to six months or longer is typically a 

physiological challenge, and we've got to figure out how to conquer that, because the amount of time it 

would take to roundtrip to anywhere that seems to be of curiosity that would be informed by research and 

scientific objectives, and we've got to be sure that the folks can survive that experience.

Page 153

 So that and the radiation effects, all those things, an intensive amount of effort that you see in the 

budget proposal before you, is concentrated on trying to conquer those kinds of limitations and 

understand what it would take to assure a safe roundtrip activity in that regard.

 As it pertains to the second point you raised of upgrades, what we have proposed in the budget 

amendment that came forward last November 13th of 2002 was a direct consequence of recommendations 

from both the General Accounting Office, the Safety Advisory Panel, all the different external groups that 

we have had reviewing what we do, have suggested that the longer-term Shuttle requirements, to the 

extent we want to sustain that capability, require that we look at modernizing and upgrading those 

capabilities each and every time, as we do in the Orbiter Major Modification Program. What's in the 

proposal for fiscal year '03 that the Congress is still deliberating on now and for the '04 program that the 

President just submitted a week ago is a very specific plan that would provide for those increases 

necessary to sustain this capability through the next decade, primarily for lift capacity of those 

requirements, as well as crew transfer capabilities to and from International Space Station and elsewhere. 

That's as maneuverable as we can make it.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time is expired.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Smith.

Page 154

Re-evaluating NASA's Mission

 Representative SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 I don't have any question beyond those that have already been asked, but I do have a statement I'd like 

to make and then I'd welcome Mr. O'Keefe's comments when I finish.

 Mr. Chairman, I have long supported our efforts to learn more about the universe around us. In fact, 

I've always thought that a great rallying cry would be ''one percent for space.'' That is, we should commit 

one percent of our national budget, or about double what we now spend, on scientific discoveries beyond 

the bounds of Earth.
 The Columbia disaster, though, has made me question not our financial commitment, but the nature of 

our space initiatives. Perhaps we should re-evaluate some of our missions.

 Launching astronauts into an inherently dangerous environment is always risky. Such efforts should be 

made only when the results justify the sacrifices. That may mean NASA undertakes fewer manned 

missions and more unmanned ones.

 From what I read and hear, astronauts on the space station spend most of their time on maintenance and 

conducting experiments that could be performed by mechanical means. Of course, human judgment 

sometimes is indispensable, so there always will be a need for manned missions. But robotics should be 

employed more often. They can achieve our scientific goals more cheaply and with less risk to astronauts' 

lives. In other words, can we justify decades of repetitious yet demonstrably lethal roundtrip Shuttle 

flights to a space station that has not met expectations?

Page 155

 It's tempting to aim farther, at an inhabited outpost on Mars, for example. However, that endeavor 

could be one hundred times or maybe one thousand times more dangerous than a Shuttle flight. And 

through the video eyes of a Martian rover, we've seen what the planet already looks like up close.

 Nor are prospects great for exploring our cosmic neighborhood, considering the distances involved. 

Our fastest spacecraft can travel a hundred times faster than a bullet. Yet even at that incredible speed, 

such vehicles would take 100,000 years to reach the nearest stars.

 There is a way to reach across the expansive space, seize the public's imagination, and learn more about 

ourselves and the cosmos, and that is to search for signs of life elsewhere in the universe. A new 

generation of telescopes launched into space would be able to identify life on worlds orbiting nearby 

stars. Other types of telescopes could detect radio or light signals from distant civilizations.

 Discovering the probable existence of life ''out there'' would cause more excitement than any news 

event in the history of humankind. It would certainly be a showstopper. And the possibility of 

extraterrestrial life, a show-starter for our next major space program. Searching for something more than 

microbes, for planets like the Earth, and for other sentient life forms could lift our faces again to the 

heavens with hope and expectation.

 Shuttle flights using new space planes would service these telescopes. No doubt, such operations will 

often require the good judgment and capable skills of astronauts. And astronauts who have gone before, 

such as those aboard the Columbia, will have laid a foundation from which we can push off seeking to 

discern the secrets of the universe.

Page 156

 Mr. O'Keefe, I'd like for you to respond to the idea, if not my specifics, then the general idea of 

reframing the mission that we have in mind. And if you have other suggestions, I'd be happy to hear them. 

I mentioned one for seizing that public's imagination and yet I'm learning more about the universe, and I'd 

be happy for you to respond to those suggestions.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. Well, no, I thank you for the very thoughtful commentary. And those are, I 

think, the same kind of issues we're wrestling with, in terms of what our appropriate strategy should be.

 It's not an either/or proposition; it's a capability in which you build on the robotic unmanned, non-
human intervention of capabilities that you can deploy and then utilize human requirements when 

necessary.

 Again, the best example I've come across in my short one year of tenure at NASA is the Hubble Space 

Telescope. It is just a remarkable instrument today. It's something that is rewriting the astronomy books. 

Folks are just marveling at the capacity and the imagery that's coming back from the information from the 

Hubble Telescope is not only the new imagery that we're getting, but it's also informing the archival data 

that was collected in the last few years that suddenly now makes more sense because of the information 

we're getting today that now puts that in a different context and makes it more spectacular.

 The reality is, that fantastic instrument would never have worked had we not had the capacity to launch 

a Space Shuttle and send folks to the Hubble Space Telescope to make the adjustments to correct the 

problems, which was, again, roundly considered to be space trash 10 years ago. This same instrument that 

was roundly, you know, dismissed as a mistake, has turned into a marvelous piece of machinery.

Page 157

 Representative SMITH. I just think we need more instruments just like that, but a bigger program and 

a more expensive——

 I know my time is up. Maybe we can discuss this further later one.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. But I hasten to add, as well, that what you see before you in the current 

configuration of International Space Station is the same kind of example. This is a work in progress. We 

are six flights away from still achieving what is a core configuration. It had been planned to be resumed 

by this time next year, is where we'd be in that configuration, to build the scientific laboratories around it. 

But, at present, we're still looking at an amazing laboratory condition that is, in contrast to your 

characterization, sir, with all due respect, they are spending a lot more time on the science on these—and, 

matter of fact, the last two expeditions, Peggy Whitson just returned as the first science officer aboard, as 

we have transitioned from this engineering phase to one that's more intensively focused on the science.

 It does take a lot, at least two folks to maintain it. No question about it. But it is—as we are able to 

build the crew capacity and focus on the scientific objectives, once we have reached a configuration that 

would permit that full use of the laboratory, it's going to be, I think, the same result that we saw out of 

Hubble in the long-term, which is going to yield the kinds of breakthroughs that we never dared imagine.

 As humans, we are impatient. We want to see it now. And yet, at the same time, I think the persistence 

that we're trying to exert is to say, and the perseverance, is to make sure that we have that capability so 

that those kinds of revelations, like what we see today coming from our Hubble in our stick-to-it-iveness 

over this past decade yields the return we'd hope for. And it is today, and it will tomorrow, if we keep this 

up.

Page 158

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. You will note, and you're a frequent witness our panel, the House members 

are particularly skilled at time management, because we operate under different rules. And so they've 

developed the knack for asking—using all their time to ask their question, and then obviously we'll give 
you the opportunity to respond, because no question should go unresponded to. But we're going to stick, 

as much as possible, to the time limitations in the interest of all concerns.

 The Chair now recognizes another skilled practitioner of the art of questioning, Ms. Jackson Lee.

 Representative JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, what an introduction.

 (Laughter.)

 Representative JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman and the Chairman of the Senate 

Committee for this opportunity.

 And, to Mr. O'Keefe, you have shown the proudness and wisdom that we have seen over the last two 

weeks, compounded, of course, or matched, with your compassion and love for the NASA family. My 

sympathy to the extended family, and specifically to the families of the astronaut, Columbia seven. A 

local newspaper called them ''Astronauts, The Heroes Next Door.'' And I do want to announce to you, and 

we're very pleased, that now almost 80 members of Congress in H.R. 525 have joined us to give them the 

Congressional Gold Medal, which is the highest civilian honor. And we look forward to NASA 

supporting us. We believe that we can move this legislation quickly. We are going to call on our Senate 

colleagues in that, and we are very grateful to Republicans and Democrats who have signed onto this 

legislation very quickly.

Page 159

 I think the important message that I'd like to convey in my brief time is that the Shuttle will fly again, 

and that the challenge should be, for lack of a better term, that it flies sooner rather than later, sooner than 

two-and-a-half years, sooner than three years.

 You've heard this before, so let me focus on it again. I think it is extremely important that we have the 

Admiral's committee expanded, and I think it you need to consider the likes of a Nobel laureate, an 

academic, some industry engineers should be considered, some advocates of aviation. And, I believe, 

after 9/11, depending on their desires, family members or representatives should be considered to be part 

of this committee, because our job is to instill confidence in the employees, in the families, in the 

astronauts, not necessarily in that order, and the American people and this Congress.

 And I'm reminded of the Rogers Commission that had a subsection, the Silent Safety Program. And I 

assume if I was to read that, it would again comment on the issue of safety.

 Let me bring these points to you and tell you what I'd like to hear, whether it be in writing or you'll be 

able to say it now. I want actual dots, a road map, to lead me from —or to the conclusion, whether it be a 

conclusion that is not popular, that budgeting did not interfere with the safety of this program. I want an 

actual—we don't want to be presumptive, we don't want to speculate, and we don't want to be afraid of 

saying ''mistakes.''

 I want to be able to understand about the frozen foam that fell under the underbelly and then hit the left 

leaning wing, and how we can speculate that that didn't count, when we had a report in 1994 from 

Stanford and Carnegie that suggested 15 percent of the tiles could count for 85 percent of the damage. 

And I understand an engineer in 1997, most recently, said that he thought debris falling might have an 

impact. And as we all know, this goes on its belly, and, therefore, it's possible for debris to hit while it 

was enroute or while it was in space. So I'd like the direct lines to that.
Page 160

 I'd like to also say that an orbiter Shuttle is excellent, but I'm very interested in payload. I think it is a 

valuable part of what we do, and I would not want to just have a vehicle that transported human beings, 

because I want research to be able to be done, because we're saving lives. And if you can comment on 

that idea, because I understand that we're pushing forward with the research on the orbiter, I am certainly 

excited about that, but I want to make sure we can carry a good payload so that that research, that vital 

research, can be done.

 If you can comment on the fact of the icicle that fell, I call it that, and why we could suggest, or should 

suggest, that that was not a problem, and that you will instruct, or however the instructions are, to this 

commission, the committee headed by Admiral Gehman, that he will leave no stone unturned and that 

we'll be able to track or follow his tracks.

 Budget cuts that did occur did not have an impact. An aging vehicle did or did not have an impact, 30 

some years old.

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85090yy.eps

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentlelady's time has expired, proving the point.

 Representative JACKSON LEE. And I thank the distinguished Chairman.

Page 161

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. O'Keefe, you have.

 Representative JACKSON LEE. I had come to an end of my sentence. If the——

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, thank you very much.

 Representative JACKSON LEE. If he——

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Administrator——

 Representative JACKSON LEE.—could comment briefly, I would appreciate it.

 Chairman BOEHLERT.—you'll have the opportunity to respond, by all means. We would not——

 Representative JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

 Chairman BOEHLERT.—cut off——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you. Very probing questions, no question, all of which I think we should find 

the answers to, we must find the answers to, to understand exactly what happened to the Columbia. And 

the investigative board, when they come to conclusion on each of those points, we positively will be 

guided by it.

Page 162
 But let me offer the following observations. Everything we've seen on the budget and the resource 

profile for Shuttle would suggest that concurrent with improvements in efficiencies, there were also 

improvements in performance. And to the extent that doesn't bear out, to the extent there are systemic 

problems that the investigative board concludes led to this tragedy, that's the kind of thing we'll have to 

fix, too. And their charter is broad enough to cover that range of issues. We're not just looking for a 

technical finding of what happened on this one flight. Anything else they want to observe, they are free to 

do so, and we'll be guided by their view.

 The operational problems, again, I really want to avoid any favorite theory of what it is that could have 

contributed to this. We have closed off no branch in this fault-tree analysis, if you will. We want to make 

sure that everything is analyzed, every possible thing that could have contributed to this, to include the 

foam pulling off the External Tank, whatever. All of those are theories that, again, are current. They're 

certainly plausible, and we're going to be guided by the investigative board's conclusions of what their 

ultimate contribution was in these kind of cases. So I really want to be sure we're not shutting off any of 

those avenues, but, at the same time, not pursuing one we think is more likely or favorable or not.

 In my limited experience with dealing with crisis circumstances or management of situations where 

you're responding to incidents, typically one of the variables that occurs, not always, but many, many 

times, the initial evidence proves to be not nearly as illuminating as it was when it first came out. And so 

rather than tracing or chasing what turns out to be a blind alley, and, therefore, foreclosing and letting the 

trail go cold on all kinds of other options, we're trying to maintain an even-keel approach of being sure 

that we not go out and favor one favored approach versus another, and to let all the evidence, let the facts 

speak for what ultimately occurred in this case. So we're avoiding that.

Page 163

 And I, too, am looking forward to the assessment of the investigative board's conclusions about how 

that particular item—whether it was the contributor or not. And that's what I'll be guided by as we move 

along.

 Lastly, your observation that you asked the science content. Absolutely, we have to really maximize 

that. That's the—the risk that we deal with each day, those seven heroic folks who went aboard 

the Columbia were making a contribution to, ultimately, the science and research objectives. We have to 

have a equally intensive and disciplined approach about what we would ask them to risk their lives for, 

and be equally serious about it for every one of those cases in which we ask folks to venture off to do 

these things.

 And so we've got to be as disciplined as they are in their training of assuring that the science and the 

research yield we think could come from this meets that same test and standard. And that's what we're 

about, that's what I think we're attempting to do on International Space Station. We're trying to build that 

capacity to yield those kinds of breakthroughs that would never be possible were it not for that facility 

that can't be duplicated here on Earth. So we continue in that pursuit. We are completely in agreement on 

that, really, imperative to be that serious about it. And I thank you for your observations.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

 Representative JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Feeney.
Page 164

 Representative FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for Chairman McCain and the Senate for 

their hospitality today.

 Mr. O'Keefe, it's great to talk to you. I know it's been a very difficult weeks for you and your staff, and 

I would wonder if you could comment on a couple of thoughts that I had.

 Number one, within about 15 minutes of the Columbia's failure to land on time at Kennedy Space 

Center, there was a contingency plan put into place, and I'd like to know what, if any, steps you took upon 

assuming the control of the administration at NASA with respect to reviewing, familiarizing yourself with 

the contingency plan and what you found.

 And, secondly, I was struck by the portion of your testimony when you spoke. I think you used the 

phrase ''the ethos of safety at NASA,'' and I think you included the contractors who work for NASA, as 

well.

 Not long ago, you and I sat as we hoped for a liftoff. We didn't get one that day. But in the audience, a 

young man was introduced by the name of David Strait. I wasn't familiar with his name. I thought, by the 

reception he got from the people there that day, he must be a rock star or a TV star. I don't watch much 

TV or listen to much music, either.

 But I wonder if you could comment on the fact that the people involved in this program are passionate 

about it, what your view of their professionalism is, and what we can do as we go through this very 

difficult process of the investigation, the fix of the problem, and hopefully creating a new vision of space 

to enhance that esprit de corps during some tough times.

Page 165

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you, Congressman.

 The issue of the contingency plan, no question, this was something that occupied my interest from the 

first hour that I was privileged to be in the capacity as administrator at NASA. On the first day I walked 

into the office, I asked folks to please take off the shelf whatever it is, whatever that plan is, of how we 

would respond to a disaster like Challenger. And I asked that that meeting occur within an hour of when I 

requested it so that nobody would have to feel like they have to run off and make something up, that 

they'd just pull off the shelf what was there. And we sat down and reviewed that plan, and it clearly is of 

the origin from the Challenger circumstance, no question, an awful lot of the contingency planning efforts 

that went into it. And I reviewed it in great detail, to assure myself that I would have some working 

familiarity with it.

 Then I asked our senior leadership folks to then benchmark it against the only other community I know 

of that is as equally obsessed with safety as NASA is, which is the nuclear reactors community, the naval 

reactors community, the legacy of Hyman Rickover and all the folks who have, over 40-plus years, have 

operated safely over 125 billion miles, they say, of safe operations of nuclear reactors.

 So we imposed upon Admiral Skip Bowman, who is the head of naval reactors today, who is 

Rickover's successor several times removed now, to benchmark, help us benchmark, relative to the 

approach of what they use as their contingency planning efforts. Over the course of the next six months, 

we were able to compare notes, if you will, upgrade our plan, he upgraded his based on the way we do 

business, too. We both benefitted by the exercise. The contingency plan was updated and republished in 
September of 2002. We ran a simulation of it in November, secure in the confidence we'd never have to 

use it. But, nonetheless, it was organized that way.

Page 166

 And specifically, all the folks who were to be on the Independent Investigation Board, named, 

identified by position, were notified so that everybody understood the procedure. All the folks internally 

were exercised on the activity. And we were confident we'd never have to really worry about using 

something like this.

 On the day it occurred, at 9:29, Bill Readdy had it with him, as did all the senior officials at Kennedy, 

opened up the first page, and we went to item one on that contingency plan. And it was the saddest 

moment I can ever recall, to be followed by the most tragic moment I've ever experienced in my life, 

which was to face the families of these crew members, but to tell them and to reassure them that we are 

working through this as diligently as we know how to find what caused this, what are the answers, how 

are we going to fix this, and assure that we pursue the same dream that their spouses, loved ones, fathers 

and mothers wanted to see pursued.

 And so this plan is as good as we know how to put it together. It is that legacy. It has been really 

worked as smart as we know how.

 And the safety ethos, if I can get to slide 23 real quick, to be sure, the example you cited, the fellow 

you talked about, David Strait, notice on the lefthand of this chart, there's—you can barely even see it—

there's a hairline facture of no more than about an inch and a half that was enough to ground the entire 

orbiter fleet for four months until we knew what was the source of that problem. How did it happen? It 

isn't supposed to have shown up in anything. We stopped all flight operations, made the repair area to it 

that you see on the right over the course of that time, after they had run many, many simulations of this to 

figure out what the right answer was. And yet there's a bead weld right above it that was there without any 

consequence since the day this orbiter was first put together. And this effect was made on all four of those 

Shuttle flights.

Page 167

 So even something as minuscule as that that David Strait, with 20–20 vision, noticed as he just went 

through his routine business, like they all do, of inspecting the orbiter, every square inch of it after every 

flight, noticed that seemingly innocuous problem, and that was enough to ground that fleet for four 

months.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman's time has expired.

 Ms. Lofgren.

 Representative LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank you, as well as Senator 

McCain, for convening this hearing. Over the next few months, I think all of us will be asking tough 

questions related to the loss of the Columbia, as well as the future of the space program.

 But it's appropriate that first our country has paused to reflect on the heroism of the seven astronauts 

who gave their lives so that the dreams of humans reaching for the stars could live forever. And my 

thoughts and prayers are with the families of those we lost, as well as to the extended NASA family. And 

I know from my own experience that part of our NASA family at home, at NASA–Ames, is very much 

grieving with the rest of the country over this loss.
 You know, I also believe that this committee is going to focus on asking difficult questions that relate 

to how we're best able to resume our quest to explore space, and that's really the best way to honor those 

who were lost, to ask those tough questions and to find answers.

Page 168

 Clearly, we're not going to find the answer to the specific technical issues relative to the Columbia. 

We've got technical people to do that. But it is appropriate for us to examine our own actions and to 

question each other about the policies and whether those policies had any impact on the risk that was 

inherent in this flight.

 Clearly, at least into the foreseeable future, space flight will be risky. And we know that the percentage 

of odds right now is—although initially we thought that the use of these vehicles would have a risk of one 

in one-hundred-thousand, it's down to now one in fifty-seven if you just look at the records. And so we 

need to—I'm a believer in human space travel, but we need to make sure that we're doing our part to 

minimize the risks.

 Now, I was late for this hearing, and I wish to apologize. It's been a big science day. We spent all 

morning on stem cell research in the Judiciary Committee, and I have hopes that science will do better in 

the Science Committee than science did in the Judiciary Committee today.

 But one of the questions I have for you, Administrator, is; as we look at what we should do to make 

sure that the risks are minimized, were there any safety upgrade proposals ever made to you, either as 

Administrator or in your prior life over at the OMB, that you did not support? And if so, what were those 

recommendations, and why did you reach the conclusion that you did?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Not that I'm aware of, but I certainly will review the history of both of my capacities in 

the course of this Administration and ascertain the dates of when there were any deferrals or anything else 

of any upgrades that would be categorized as exclusively focused on safety. So, to my knowledge, we 

have not done so.

Page 169

 The only issues I'm aware of is an Electric Auxiliary Power Unit upgrade that had been planned that 

was determined to be technically deficient and wasn't—you know, so, in other words, no amount of 

money we threw at it was going to yield its performance in the manner in which it would contribute to not 

only efficiency but also safety characterization—that was deferred. And we're now re-examining to figure 

out how we can pick that up or continue it in the future that would yield the performance requirements we 

know of.

 But we will go back, and I will submit for the record any other changes that were made during the 

course of— well, since Inauguration Day 2001, and if there are any changes that have occurred in that 

time, we'll certainly report those.

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85090g3.eps

 Representative LOFGREN. So you'll go back and review the record and take a look at your—

obviously, hindsight's 20–20; we're all doing that in terms of our own activities —what you recommended 
both at OMB and in your role as NASA Administrator. And I know my time——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I'll do my best.

 Representative LOFGREN. Thank you very much. And my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it 

very much.

Page 170

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

 The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington.

Lessons From the Challenger INVESTIGATION

 Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for your diligence 

today. I've been to several meetings since I first checked in here this morning, and I think you've had a 

total of a five-minute break. So thank you for your diligence in answering these questions.

 I don't think any of my colleagues have asked specifically about the lessons learned from 

the Challenger inquiry. And I don't know if, in this current configuration of the Columbia inquiry, you 

think that we have a sufficient independent scientist on this review team.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, Senator, very specifically, the contingency review plan and the activation of an 

investigative board is a direct outgrowth and a direct education from the Challenger accident. So what we 

put in motion on the day of the accident was something that was a lesson learned from Challenger. It was 

part of the Rogers Commission recommendations of how we would proceed in various cases, and this is 

an outgrowth of one of their concerns, which is how to get ahead of these cases as quickly as possible.

Page 171

 The investigative board was appointed the same day as the accident. So, as a result, that was a very 

clear result of the lesson learned that came from that.

 So an awful lot of what we attempted to do here is to build on that experience and assure that we have a 

result, in this case, that is driven by our interest in absolute dedication to finding the answers to what 

caused the terrible tragedy, find the solutions to it, the fixes, and get about the business of getting back to 

safe flight to support the folks aboard International Space Station.

 Senator CANTWELL. So who is that independent scientist, then, on——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Oh, I'm sorry. The independent—there is—I spoke as recently as last night to Admiral 

Hal Gehman, who is the chairman of the current board, who has five different folks he has in mind, I'm 

told, who are physicists, scientists, etcetera, that he is considering to propose for addition on the board. I 

have advised him whoever he wants to put on that board that will expand his expertise, that will improve 

the independence of the board, help its objectivity, we will do it without qualification and without 

hesitation.

 Senator CANTWELL. Well, I am struck, reading last night and this morning, the Feynman minority 

report to that report that I think finally got in as an appendix in which Mr. Feynman was very critical of 

discrepancies between engineers and managers as the probability of failure. So you had engineers having 
studies and analysis saying that maybe the risk is a lot higher than what the high-level managers thought. 

The criteria used for flight-readiness reviews often developed a gradual decreasing strictness, ''If the 

Shuttle had flown with it before, chances are it worked before, so let's just—let's not think about the 

variations that might happen.''

Page 172

 The Feynman Report even said NASA might have exaggerated the reliability of product, that there 

were variations in models, that NASA was more of a top-down system in testing the entire system instead 

of testing the individual properties and limitations of the material within the Shuttle to the degree that I 

think the report was quite critical of NASA, in the sense of maybe even coming to Congress and catering 

to us in the public relations expectations that were there by the public, instead of relying back on this 

basic engineering information.

 So I guess my concern is, is that the panel, as I see it now, doesn't have that Feynman voice, and I think 

what we really do want to do here is make sure that we are not engaged in that PR battle, but 

understanding how we really do build the NASA systems of the future——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Right.

 Senator CANTWELL.—with more reliability and predictability based on those materials.

 And so I'd be very interested in how those recommendations were actually implemented, because I 

have a feeling we might find the same circumstances are true here. We're going to find out that there is 

some material property limitations that were discovered in some report written by some engineer that 

somewhere along the way got translated into ''not as big a risk'' and, thereby, the disaster that we've all 

been dealing with. So I appreciate your attention.

Page 173

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, thank you, Senator.

 That may be. And if the investigative board comes back and points to the systemic problems that we 

have, we positively will take that as a firm recommendation and go fix it.

 What I can advise, though, in my one year experience, with no prior experience with NASA at all—this 

is my first year at it—and reading the Challenger, the Rogers Commission Report, I was a Senate 

Appropriations Committee staff member on the day Challenger blew up, read the report thereafter, and 

that's my only association with that up until a year ago, is—what I see is a different agency than what 

existed 17 years ago, in that sense.

 One of the observations they made, Feynman's view, I think, was exactly right, he pointed to the 

difficulty of that chain of command and how it gets altered. This whole process I've witnessed, and I'm 

advised I'm the first Administrator to have attended what is called a Flight Readiness Review two weeks 

before a launch, it resembles a room like this, with everyone that you could possibly imagine associated 

with this activity, all of which are empowered to raise their hand during the course of a full day, 

sometimes two-day, review of every single technical issue. And if they disagree with the way it was 

presented, they disagree with the conclusion, they immediately raised their hand, and the issue was then 

put to the side to go work the conclusion of it. That didn't exist prior to Challenger. It was all done by 

telephonic tag-up occasionally. This is a in-the-room, everybody there associated with the activity.
Page 174

 There was a big difference at that time, where schedule drove everything. They were looking to get to a 

flight rate of 20, 30 flights a year. We're operating on a five- to six-flight-a-year approach.

 And as we discussed with Congressman Feeney a minute ago, and I appreciate your bringing this out, 

we stopped flight operations for four months over a hairline fracture found on not the orbiter that was 

scheduled to go up, but one that's in an Orbiter Processing Facility. Everything ended. The engineer, the 

inspector, that noticed that, that stopped operations cold for four solid months.

 The disjointed chain of command, that doesn't—I don't see it. We have astronauts, former astronauts, 

who are in capacities as high as the Deputy Administrator, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, 

the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, all three are former astronauts. That didn't 

exist prior to Challenger. None of those positions included anybody with that kind of background.

 And all the way through this process, every single one of those managers are empowered, are expected, 

there's a responsibility that each of them feel they have, to stand up and be counted and stop all the 

operations until there is any issue that has been left unresolved, beaten to ground truth.

 So what I've seen—and, again, from an objective opinion, I think, until a year ago, and now I'm steeped 

in it, there's no doubt about it—but until that time, unfamiliar with it other than what I read in 

the Challenger Rogers Commission Report, as well—would tell me this is a different place than it was 

then.

Page 175

 All that said, we will be guided by what the Gehman Board comes back and tells us was the problem 

here. And if it was systemic problem, we're going to fix it. If it was a technical problem, we're going to fix 

that, too. There is nothing I can imagine that's not on the table, and I have no bias against any finding they 

could possibly come up with that wouldn't otherwise contribute to the solution in this particular case. We 

are going to act on that without reservation.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

 Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Moore.

 Representative MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for staying.

 Yesterday, in the Washington Post, it was reported, I believe, that you said that—you defended the way 

you set up the accident investigation board, arguing that you proceeded the way you did so that it could 

launch an investigation immediately with members who were already well briefed on Shuttle operations. I 

guess my question is, Mr. O'Keefe, how important it is that we launch an investigation immediately, or 

should we take a more slow and diligent approach, as I think you said to Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee recently? 

I'm just—I'm asking what kind of investigation do we need here? What's, in your opinion, the best 

approach?

Page 176
 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir, thank you.

 I believe what I tried to say—and if I was inarticulate, I apologize—was to say we developed a 

contingency plan to activate an investigative board so that they could act immediately, get on with the 

task immediately. They are not—and if I said this, I am in error, and I need to correct the record—they 

are not conversant in Shuttle operations.

 There is only one member of the group who is even vaguely familiar with NASA operations. The rest 

of them have had no experience with NASA at all. The chairman of board is Hal Gehman, a United States 

Navy admiral, retired, who never had any association with NASA. I don't even think he ever attended a 

launch before. All of the other members of the board are from the FAA, the Department of 

Transportation, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, all folks dealing with safety, mission 

assurance, flight certification, etcetera. I don't know if any of them have even toured a NASA facility. 

They spent the past week in Shreveport, Louisiana, and have now, just now, this past Friday, arrived at 

Johnson Space Center, and went through the simulation of what a re-entry is like, astronaut simulations 

they do. None of them have ever been through that before.

 So Admiral Gehman has advised me that part of what he's done this past week is get up to speed on 

what he calls ''Shuttle 101,'' just to understand what the lingo means and what the acronyms are. They are, 

nonetheless, were available up and running and talking to each other as early as seven-and-a-half hours 

after the accident. On Saturday afternoon, at 5 p.m., they were already identified and ready to go.

Page 177

 So at least we picked up the time that gave them the opportunity to then become more familiar with the 

processes, the evidence, the facts, the data, so that they could get about the business of investigating as 

quickly as possible before the trails go cold.

 That's the approach that—you know, certainly, there's no one-size-fits-all approach to this, but it 

certainly was one of the most effective ways to get moving.

 Slide 33, if you would, at least this is what happened two days after the event. That's the folks that got 

there, and they're talking to FEMA, you know, managers on site, you know, it at least gave us an 

opportunity to get moving, as opposed to sitting around thinking about who should we pick, when should 

they go.

 Representative MOORE. In terms of a realistic time frame, then, what might Congress and the 

American people expect us to—when you see this investigation really getting underway, and I know you 

can't predict what results we're going to find. I assume you can't predict what results we're going to find. 

But what time frame are we looking at, Mr. O'Keefe?

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, the guys that's right on the other side of the fellow with the FEMA jacket on, 

right ahead of him, is Admiral Hal Gehman, and he can answer that question better than I can.

 Representative MOORE. All right.

Page 178

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I wouldn't even presume to suggest when he's going to finish. And he has—there's no 

amount of time that's necessary that we think is appropriate to go out and find out what happened here. 

We're going to be guided by he and his board's view of exactly what occurred, and there is no time limit 
on that.

 Representative MOORE. Very well, thank you.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Thank you. I appreciate it very much.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

 Mr. Administrator, I want to thank you very much. Before we wrap up, I just want to touch on a couple 

of more points. I want to bring clarity to a very important issue.

 I think it should be self evident that the Congress is committed to the proposition, on a bipartisan, 

bicameral basis, that we need to strengthen the evidence supporting the assertion that 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board is truly independent. Now, I know the message has been sent, 

and I think it's been received, and I know it's been heard, and I want some assurance that it will be 

heeded. So I'd like you to visit that a little bit more and comment.

 I carefully listened to you as you said you'll consult with Admiral Gehman, but I hope you're hearing 

what Congress is saying. We are the ones, and others, too, insisting that we get some clarity to this issue. 

So can you address that a little bit more for me?

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 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, I appreciate your patience on it, and I do not mean to equivocate in any 

way, shape, or form.

 I share exactly the same objective, I think, as all Members here do, which is to determine what are the 

answers to this tragedy, what are the facts that led to it, and ultimately find out how we go about fixing it 

and getting back to safe flight.

 And in that pursuit, I will not just consult with Admiral Gehman, I will advise. As soon as this hearing 

is concluded, I will give him a call back and say my clear understanding from the Members of this Joint 

Committee is that there are aspects of the charter that need further revision. Let's examine what those 

might be. And, to his satisfaction, we will make a change——

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, let me give you an easy one right off the bat. I mean, number 10, 

provide a final written report to the NASA Administrator not later than 60 days. First of all, the 60-day 

time frame——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure.

 Chairman BOEHLERT.—is totally unrealistic. But the report will come to the President, to the 

Congress, to the American people, and to the NASA administrator simultaneously.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

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 Chairman BOEHLERT. All right.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. I'll make that an alteration and suggest to him that that's exactly—and we'll go ahead 
and make that charter change, because, again, I've stated that.

 There's a letter, too, that I—that's part of the record, as well—on the 60-day issue, that, when I 

commissioned the panel in the very first place, said, ''Our contingency plan contemplated 60 days, but you 

take whatever time you think you need, Mr. Chairman, Admiral, to come to conclusion on this.'' I'll 

reiterate that. We will eviscerate the 60-day. It has no bearing. It was intended as part of the continency 

plan originally, but not envisioned to be used. So to the extent that there is any amount of time he needs, 

that's what he's got. I don't intend to impose anything different on him.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, that's the easiest one.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Sure.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. We have, you know, some others that——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Well, actually, we'll revise whatever is necessary.

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 Chairman BOEHLERT. We want to deal with it clearly so that it's clear in our own minds that they're 

truly independent.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. And if they decide they want to go down a certain path or they want to hire a 

certain expert, they don't have to march over to NASA headquarters to get approval.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. The admiral and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board have the 

authority to proceed as they deem best——

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir.

 Chairman BOEHLERT.—to get us the answers we are all demanding. And that's critically important.

 Mr. O'KEEFE. Yes, sir, I concur. I appreciate it. Thank you.

 Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, I think, as we come to the end, we've done several things today. First 

and foremost, the current status report. And obviously, this is a very dynamic situation, so events almost 

change hour by hour, let alone day by day. And so that was very important.

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 And we've started what I have characterized in my opening remarks as the national conversation, which 

we have to start, people talking to each other, not through each other, over each, around each other—

directly.

 We have affirmed the commitment to the concept of an independent board, and we've had agreement 

on the need for charter changes. I think that is very important.
 Now, this is not the beginning of the end; it's the end of the beginning. And we always want instant 

analysis of immediate findings, and that's understandable. But experience tells us we learn the most from 

in-depth examination of more complete data.

 So now we are in the fact-assembling phase, and all of us with responsibility in this very important 

assignment—the Congress, NASA, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board—are all going about the 

business of assembling the facts. Then all of us will have this database to look at and take care and 

caution as we go forward with our special responsibilities.

 Obviously, NASA and the Accident Investigation Board will be focusing more on the technical 

aspects. Obviously, there's a need on the part of the Congress to focus more on policy as we chart the 

course for the future. That does not mean they are mutually exclusive. We'll be looking at each other.

 I have been very pleased with the response I've had from Admiral Gehman in assuring us that Congress 

will be very much involved in all of the proceedings. I have been very pleased with the cooperation we've 

received from Administrator O'Keefe and his team. And I have been just impressed beyond any ability to 

adequately explain at the total commitment I find on the part of every single person involved in this 

procedure to get the facts. And let us be guided by the facts as we fulfill our important responsibilities.

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 Mr. Administrator, thank you.

 The hearing is closed.

 [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Appendix 1: 

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

Questions submitted by Chairman John McCain

Q1. In a Wall Street Journal article dated February 11, 2003, a fundamental question of ''What is the next 

step for manned space flight after the Shuttle?'' was discussed. The article also talked about NASA's four 

alternatives for replacing the Shuttle program, three of which would be limited to servicing the 

International Space Station. The fourth option would develop a space craft that takes off like an airplane 

without the help of unmanned boosters. This could allow for servicing of the Station along with a number 

of other options such as a mission to Mars.

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Q1a. Do you believe that we are short-changing ourselves by proceeding with a vehicle that can only 

service the Space Station?

A1a. No. The Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is only one element of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan 

(ISTP), which provides the roadmap for NASA's future investments in space transportation. The principal 
benefits of the OSP include: (1) providing assured access to the International Space Station (ISS), (2) 

meeting the U.S. ISS crew rescue responsibilities, (3) improving the overall crew safety, and (4) 

providing a bridge for crewed space flight on future launch vehicles. The OSP Level 1 requirements are 

focused on meeting the first three benefits based upon the Agency's near-term needs. But by addressing 

the crewed segment, OSP would also provide a crucial building block for future human space flight 

vehicles under the ISTP. The ISTP will continue to evolve consistent with NASA's strategic objectives.

Q1b. While there were technical difficulties in the X–33 program which led to its eventual cancellation, 

were the difficulties insurmountable if the Nation had made a conscious decision to pursue a manned 

space craft for exploration beyond the Space Station and the moon? What were the technical barriers to 

the X–33 program?

A1b. The X–33 was intended to demonstrate, in flight, the technologies needed for a full-size, singlestage-to-orbit Reusable Launch Vehicle. As a technology demonstrator, it required dramatic 

breakthroughs in multiple technologies, including the development of composite liquid hydrogen (LH) 

tanks that were an integral structural part of the overall vehicle. Achieving single-stage-to-orbit, X–33 

was also founded upon the principle that the commercial market would continue to grow. The X–33 

program had reached the end of the time period specified in the cooperative agreement between NASA 

and Lockheed Martin. When faced with the decision of providing additional funding to continue the X–33 

vehicle after the failure of the LH tanks, the Agency decided the X–33 would have to compete for funding 

with all other reusable space transportation system development efforts under the SLI program. This 

decision was communicated to Lockheed Martin prior to the completion of the original cooperative 

agreement, which ended on March 31, 2001. The X–33 proposal was not selected for award under the SLI 

NRA 8–30 Cycle I competition (May 2001).

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 There are multiple vehicle configurations that would be considered if the Nation made a conscious 

decision to pursue a manned spacecraft for exploration beyond the Space Station. Unless dramatic 

progress is made in the technologies necessary to achieve single-stage-to-orbit, it is likely that the final 

configuration would be different than the X–33 design.

Q1c. The Wall Street Journal article also implied that if we shifted to capsules launched on expendable 

launch vehicles, it would be an admission that the Shuttle program never really made much sense. Do you 

agree with that implication?

A1c. No. The unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle have enabled a broad range of missions that would 

not have been accomplished without it, including the Hubble Space Telescope deployment as well as 

repair and maintenance missions, satellite servicing, and construction of the ISS. The Space Shuttle 

remains the Nation's primary means of transporting crew and cargo to the ISS.

Q1d. Many are calling your space plane concept a step backwards because it is half disposable and not 

fully reusable. What's your response to these claims?

A1d. OSP does not replace the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). The RLV architectures always consisted 

of NASA Unique Systems (renamed OSP) and booster systems. The OSP represents a step forward for 

the Agency, offering the following benefits: (1) providing assured access to the ISS, (2) meeting the U.S. 

ISS crew rescue responsibilities, (3) improving the overall crew safety, and (4) providing a bridge for 

crewed space flight on future launch vehicles. The Next Generation Launch Technology program 

continues technology work on future launch systems, paced to address key issues that are still open, 

including requirements definition, level of DOD cooperation, and technical maturity. We believe this 
approach will provide a more resilient bridge to providing a future launch system while assuring access to 

space during a future transition from the Shuttle.

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Q2. If the Shuttle orbiters had lived up to their original design intent of one launch per week, they would 

have exceeded their design limits of 100 flights. Space Shuttle Discovery has flown the most missions of 

all orbiters at 30.

Q2a. Do you still believe the orbiters are capable of 100 flights per their original design?

Q2b. If not, how can we tell if any of them are capable of more than 30 flights?

A2a&b. It is important to note that the 100-flight design limit refers to the Space Shuttle orbiter airframes. 

NASA has not altered the expectation that the orbiter' airframes are capable of being flown at least 100 

times with the specified maintenance and periodic upgrades to eliminate obsolescence issues associated 

with other Shuttle sub-systems. The Shuttle is subjected to rigorous inspection and maintenance following 

each flight. Each orbiter also undergoes a major overhaul every three to five years. NASA is 

implementing a Shuttle Service Life Extension Program to assure that the appropriate investments are 

made so that Shuttle can fly safely at least through the middle of the next decade.

Q3. In a Boeing impact analysis of ascent debris, six different scenarios in which tiles are lost from 

various parts of the wing were examined. It is my understanding this report was used to determine if 

NASA would proceed with Columbia's re-entry. After reviewing the analysis results, only four of the six 

scenarios contained thermal prediction results of ''No Issue.'' The other two scenarios, which involve 

analysis of the lower wing area and the main landing gear door, has no results.

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Q3a. Can you explain why the thermal predictions under these scenarios were not summarized?

A3a. On January 23, 2003, Cases 5 and 6 were not complete prior to preparation of charts that were to be 

used during management reviews the following day. Case 5 was completed late in the evening and the 

results were discussed at the January 24, Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering Office (SSVEO) tag up and 

at the STS–107 Mission Management Team (MMT) in addition to Cases 1 through 4. An action was 

taken from the MMT to follow up with the Case 6 results. The Case 6 results were discussed at the 

January 27, 2003 SSVEO tag up and the STS–107 MMT.

Q3b. Has NASA or Boeing since analyzed those scenarios and, if so, what are the results?

A3b. At the SSVEO tag up and the STS–107 MMT conference on January 24, 2003, the results for Case 5 

were discussed and it was reported that the surface temperature of the analyzed areas could reach 430F, 

which posed no risk for entry. At the SSVEO tag up and the STS–107 MMT conference on January 27, 

2003, the results for Case 6 were discussed and it was reported that the surface temperature of the 

analyzed areas could reach 705F, which could result in a localized ''soft spot'' in the area, but posed no 

safety of flight issue. This area would require post-flight inspections and repairs. The analysis did not 

identify any potential burn through of the structure for any of these cases.

Q4. Did NASA sacrifice funding for Shuttle safety in order to pay for cost overruns on the space station? 

If not, has the cost overruns on the Station program prevented increased funding for the Shuttle 
upgrades?

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A4. No Space Shuttle safety upgrades funding has been used to supplement the International Space 

Station budget.

Q5. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which is currently charged with investigating 

the Columbia accident, was created by NASA and reports to NASA, leading to criticism that it is not an 

independent body.

Q5a. Why is this approach better than having the White House set up a blue-ribbon panel that is clearly 

independent of NASA, as was done after the 1986 Challenger accident?

A5a. Prior to Challenger, NASA had no contingency plan for conducting accident investigations; as a 

result, there was a delay before the Challenger investigative panel was put into place. One of the lessons 

learned was to have a standing panel of experts from outside the Agency to be available immediately to 

conduct an external investigation.

 NASA's goal is to find the cause of the accident, to fix it, and to return to flight. We will support any 

approach that the Gehman Board, Congress, and the Administration feel best accomplishes this goal. 

Since all but one of the members are from organizations external to NASA, the Board is not under the 

control of the Agency and can therefore conduct an independent investigation. Furthermore, we have 

received very helpful advice and counsel from Members of Congress that the Board's charter should 

include revisions to strengthen the independence of the investigation, and to enable it to be as thorough as 

possible. NASA has been responsive to these suggestions, and has moved expeditiously to make 

appropriate changes to the original charter.

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Q5b. Are there problems with having the Board staffed by NASA and subject to NASA disclosure rules?

A5b. The NASA employees initially assigned as staff to the Board primarily provide administrative 

support and have been phased out over the past month. A Task Force Team comprised of NASA 

employees has been created by the Board as a conduit to obtain information and data that the Board 

requests from NASA in the form that the Board wants. There have been modifications to the Gehman 

charter to strengthen the independence of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). These 

changes have satisfied Admiral Gehman regarding questions of independence of the Board.

Q5c. Do you have any plans for increasing the membership of the Board?

A5c. Admiral Gehman, not NASA, has already determined the need for additional Board members. 

Additional appointments to the Board include Dr. Sheila Widnall, Dr. Douglas Osheroff, Dr. Sally Ride, 

and Dr. John Logsdon. Admiral Gehman has the authority to augment the Board with whatever additional 

members and resources he deems necessary.

Q6. Recent news reports have charged that changes in NASA's budgeting accounts in the mid-1990s 

forced the Space Shuttle program to compete with the International Space Station and the X–33 program 

for funding. How did the need to fund the Space Station and the experimental space plane affect NASA's 

budgeting for long-term use of the Space Shuttle?
A6. Beginning in FY 1990, in an effort to better utilize precious resources, restructured its budget to align 

the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs under a single Human Space Flight appropriations account. 

This action allowed the Space Flight Programs the necessary flexibility to incorporate efficiencies by 

combining functions common to both program. Some of these activities included crew training and 

mission control functions.

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Q7. In 2001, NASA announced that it had a $218 million shortfall in its budget for Space Shuttle 

operations. To solve this problem, NASA proposed canceling or delaying Space Shuttle safety upgrades, 

and delaying major upgrades of the Space Shuttles Discovery and Endeavour. What affect did this 

shortfall and subsequent actions by NASA have on Space Shuttle safety?

A7. In the FY 2002 Operating Plan, the Space Shuttle program cancelled or deferred several upgrades 

because of cost growth or technical immaturity. In the Operating Plan, reviewed by Congress, the funding 

made available as a result of these actions was then applied to Space Shuttle operations to accommodate 

operations cost growth. These actions did not affect safety.

Q8. A February 3, 2003, article in the New York Times alleges that NASA removed five of the nine 

members of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Committee, who warned that work on long-term Shuttle safety 

''had deteriorated.'' According to the report, NASA claimed that it had changed the charter of the group. 

Could you please explain NASA's rationale for changing the charter of this committee and what factors 

led to this change?

A8. Based on the recommendations of the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) and the 

Inspector General, in April 2002, NASA requested that several ASAP Members and Consultants step 

down from their positions to make room for new members with a different and more current skill mix. 

The Agency deemed this necessary to better reflect the current demands of its programs. All of those 

asked to step down had served on the Panel for at least six years—the normal term of a panel member. 

The average tenure of those asked to step down was 12 years.

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Q9. There has been some discussion as to whether or not the re-entry path for the Columbia could have 

been altered to reduce the heat build-up in certain parts of the orbiter. Could Columbia's re-entry path 

have been altered to reduce heat to the left wing?

A9. The CAIB is attempting to determine the cause of the Columbia accident. While we still do not know 

what caused the accident, it is unlikely that the thermal profile could have been significantly reduced. The 

re-entry path is already optimized to minimize heating.

Q10. The public has asked why the astronauts were unable to eject from the Columbia as it broke apart. 

In 2001, NASA spent $5 million to study crew escape systems, such as ejections seats and a detachable 

cockpit that could fly away as an escape pod and float down with parachutes. What were the results of 

this study, and are such escape systems practicable?

A10. NASA has continued to study crew escape systems, including systems during re-entry. Over the past 

several years, a series of studies on the subject were commissioned as a part of NASA's Shuttle upgrades 

analysis.

 Various concepts for crew escape systems have been considered against critical operating parameters. 
Some considerations which limit potential crew escape systems include: vehicle structure, weight, 

operational use, and thermal environment.

 It is highly unlikely that any of the proposed crew escape concepts NASA has considered would have 

allowed the crew to safely escape in the dynamic environment we believe the Space 

Shuttle Columbia experienced. They were far too high and going far too fast for the existing escape 

system.

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 Currently, the astronauts wear parachutes and have a pole deployable from the crew hatch that allows 

the crew to bail out in level, sub-sonic flight at 25,000 feet or below.

Q11. Last December, RAND completed a study looking at possible privatization scenarios for the Shuttle 

program. The FY 2004 budget appears to indicate that NASA intends to pursue privatization alternatives. 

Has this tragic accident changed your view of expanding Shuttle privatization?

A11. The operational work of the Space Shuttle program has always been primarily performed by a 

contractor workforce. However, the Government has provided insight, oversight and technical expertise.

 As of this date, NASA has exercised a 2-year extension option to the current SFOC contract, which 

carries the contract through October 2004. NASA's FY 2004 budget does not provide for ''privatization 

alternatives,'' but rather assumes continued exploration of alternatives for competitive sourcing of Space 

Shuttle, flight operations. Further examination of Shuttle competitive sourcing options is being held in 

abeyance until the Gehman Board recommendations are received and assessed. It would be premature for 

NASA to propose any detailed plans for Shuttle competitive sourcing prior to receipt of 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board conclusions.

Q12. Based on your plans prior to the loss of the Columbia orbiter, I understand that NASA was planning 

to fly that orbiter in November to support continued construction of the International Space Station (ISS). 

Attainment of ''core complete'' was projected for around February 2004. Because of the Shuttle fleet's

major modifications schedule, I understand that only three orbiters would have been available at any 

given point in time. For example, Discovery is now undergoing major modifications and is not scheduled 

for a mission until July 2004.

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Q12a. In light of recent events, do you envision any major changes to the Shuttle modifications and ISS 

assembly schedule when flights resume?

A12a. It is premature for NASA to predict any potential changes to Shuttle vehicle or modification 

schedule. We will wait until the Gehman Board has completed its investigation, found the cause of the 

accident and provided its findings. Although NASA can meet both ISS assembly and other agency 

science priorities with the three remaining Orbiters, the schedule for these missions is under review.

Q13. In his testimony before the Commerce Committee on September 6, 2001, William Readdy, the thenDeputy Associate Administrator of the Office of Space Flight, stated that ''[e]very single Space Shuttle 

employee is empowered to call a 'time out' if they believe that there may be a potential threat to safety.''

Q13a. Could you please describe process for a Space Shuttle employee to call a ''time out?''
Q13b. Does this ability apply to only NASA employees or also include contractors?

A13a,b. United Space Alliance has a formal Time-Out Policy (E–02–18) signed by the Vice President, 

Safety Quality & Mission Assurance, that encourages and actively supports the safety practice of calling a 

''time out'' when anyone is unsure or uncomfortable with any situation.

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 The term ''time out'' is used by United Space Alliance for its employees. However, policies are in place 

for all employees, whether civil service or contractors to stop any activity that they feel is unsafe. This 

safety awareness behavior is highly encouraged and rewarded at all levels.

Q13c. Could a ''time out'' be applied to a landing operation?

A13c. ''Time out'' is a term that is used in the ground processing of the Space Shuttle vehicle. During 

mission operations, all technical issues are documented and processed through the Mission Management 

Team. However, there are corollary policies in place for all phases of the Shuttle's mission that allow 

employees to raise safety issues.

Q13d. Did any NASA employee or contractor attempt to call a ''time out'' before or during 

the Columbia mission?

A13d. No ''time out'' was called during the Columbia mission. During the mission, following examination 

of launch film showing a debris hit on the orbiter, a variety of potential safety issues were raised, 

discussed, and reviewed through the normal agency process. Based on these reviews, the MMT judged 

that there was not a safety of flight issue. The Gehman Board is reviewing all documentation related to 

the processing, pre-launch, and launch activities for the STS–107 mission.

Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

Q1. John Macidull, a member of the presidential commission that investigated the Challenger disaster, 

has raised questions as to why NASA managers did not prepare alternative strategies for Columbia's reentry, in response to the damage which occurred at liftoff.

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 After you saw the video footage of the liftoff, did you suspect the loss of heat shield tiles, and did you 

consider alternate plans to assure a safe re-entry?

A1.

Based on our analysis during the Columbia's mission, we did not believe that there was a critical threat to 

the Shuttle's safety posed by the foam impact.

Each Shuttle mission entry profile is optimized for the best re-entry approach. It is unlikely that the 

thermal profile could have been significantly reduced.

Had we been aware that there was a critical problem during the Columbia's mission, we would have used 

all means at our disposal to resolve the problem and return the crew safely to Earth.

Q2. We've learned that at the same time the Space Shuttle Program was being asked to undertake 
additional flights to support the International Space Station, its budget was, being reduced. You were 

being asked to do more with less. If your funding had not been reduced, are there additional safety 

upgrades you would have performed?

A2.

NASA proposed, and received, funding for those upgrades we considered to be the highest priority, and 

which provided the greatest return in terms of safety improvements for the Shuttle. We did this within the 

framework of the President's budgets and Agency priorities.

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NASA's FY 2003 budget amendment increased outyear funding for the Space Shuttle program. This 

increase provides for an additional flight in support of the ISS and funding for the Shuttle Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP). The amendment increases funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle system by 

approximately $660 million for the FY 2004–2008 timeframe. The budget amendment recognized that the 

Space Shuttle would be the workhorse for Space Station transport through at least the middle of the next 

decade.

Q3. The Columbia flights scheduled for August 2000 and March 2002, were both delayed due to last 

minute safety concerns about the tiles and insulation. What changes were made after those delays to 

improve the safety of the Columbia? Were any safety upgrades made on the Shuttle during that period?

A3.

Neither STS–93 nor STS–109—the two previous missions of Columbia (OV–102)—experienced delays 

due to problems with the orbiter's thermal protection system (tiles and insulation).

STS–93 Delays:

The launch of STS–93 was delayed twice due to ISS manifest problems first to December 3, 1998 and 

then to January 21, 1999.

The launch date was moved seven more times due to delays in the readiness of the Chandra satellite and 

the inertial upper stage booster.

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The launch count down for STS–93 was aborted twice, first for a concern with hydrogen concentrations 

in the aft of the Orbiter; the second time was due to trans-oceanic abort landing site weather issues.

STS–93 launched on July 23, 1999.

No launch delays were caused by issues with the Orbiter's thermal protection system.

No new hardware or upgrade was required prior to launch.

Between STS–93 and STS–109 Columbia underwent its scheduled year-long structural inspection, major 

maintenance and modification. During this time a number of upgrades were installed to combat 

obsolescence and improve safety including:
Multifunction Electronic Display System or ''glass cockpit''

Micrometeoroid protection on wing leading edge and payload bay radiator doors

Device Driver Units—improved avionics

Complete wiring inspection and repair

Main Propulsion System upgrade of helium check valve and hydrogen fill and drain line

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STS–109 Delays:

STS–109 was originally scheduled for launch on November 1, 2001.

The launch date was rescheduled three times due to ISS manifest priorities and in delays in the OV–102 

wiring inspections.

Two further delays were caused by problems with Hubble Space Telescope support hardware.

The STS–109 Flight Readiness Review established a new launch date of February 28, 2002.

The launch was delayed by one day due to predicted weather at KSC. STS–109 was launched on March 

1, 2002.

No launch delays were caused by issues with the Orbiter's thermal protection system.

Q4. It appears that each time NASA requested additional funding for safety upgrades, Congress 

appropriated these funds. So, tell me, why didn't NASA request whatever funding was needed for all 

possible safety improvements?

A4.

NASA proposed, and received, funding for those upgrades we considered to be the highest priority, and 

which provided the greatest return in terms of safety improvements for the Shuttle. We did this within the 

framework of the President's budgets and Agency priorities.

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In the FY 2002 Operating Plan, the Space Shuttle program cancelled or deferred several upgrades 

because of cost growth or technical immaturity. In the Operating Plan, reviewed by Congress, the funding 

made available as a result of these actions was then applied to Space Shuttle operations to accommodate 

operations cost growth. These actions did not affect safety.

NASA's FY 2003 budget amendment increased outyear funding for the Space Shuttle program. This 

increase provides for an additional flight in support of the ISS and funding for the Shuttle Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP). The amendment increases funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle system by 

approximately $660 million for the FY 2004–2008 timeframe. The budget amendment recognized that the 

Space Shuttle would be the workhorse for International Space Station transport through at least the 

middle of the next decade. SLEP will be coordinated with NASA's other space transportation investments 
through the Agency's Integrated Space Transportation Plan and will make prioritized investments in the 

Shuttle system to ensure that the Shuttle can fly safely through at least the middle of the next decade.

The President's budget for FY 2004 reflects our commitment to the SLEP investment process, including 

upgrades, necessary to safely operate the Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade.

Questions submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

Q1. If Columbia was indeed damaged during ascent, and this had been known by folks on the ground, 

what could NASA or USA have done, if anything, to ensure the safe return of Columbia's crew, such as 

changing the re-entry profile or launching a rescue mission with another orbiter?

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A1.

NASA was unaware of any potential problems during ascent. It was only after film and video review the 

day following the launch that NASA became aware of potential damage to the Shuttle's tiles from debris.

NASA has tried to develop procedures to allow on-orbit tile repairs in the past. With our current 

capabilities, it is not technically feasible to do so. Currently, we have no way to reach the underside of the 

orbiter without significant risk to the crew and Orbiter. We will be revisiting this problem in the near 

future.

The orbiter did not have sufficient fuel to rendezvous with the ISS, nor did it have the required hardware 

to do so.

Columbia did not have sufficient consumables to sustain the crew on orbit for more than an additional 

four days. The time required to prepare another orbiter for launch and train the crew for the mission 

would not have allowed us to launch in time to rescue the Columbia's crew.

We do not have any procedures in place that could accomplish an on-orbit transfer of crew between 

vehicles without compatible docking mechanisms.

The re-entry profile for each mission is already optimized for landing with the minimum heating.

Page 201 

However, had we been aware that there was a critical problem during the Columbia's mission, we would 

have used all means at our disposal to resolve the problem and return the crew safely to Earth.

Q2. Please explain NASA's basic goals for human space flight prior to February 1. What changes have 

occurred in this plan, so far, since the tragic events of February 1?

A2.

NASA's basic human space flight goals are unchanged since we articulated them in our Strategic Plan. 

Our first priority is, and will continue to be to ensure the safety of the public, our employees, and our high 

value assets such as the Shuttle.

Space flight, both human and robotic, is the fundamental enabling capability for NASA's mission: to 
understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, and to inspire the next 

generation of explorers.

Our Space Flight Enterprise goals enable this mission by:

Ensuring the provision of space access and improving it by increasing safety, reliability, and 

affordability;

Extending the duration and boundaries of human space flight to create new opportunities for exploration 

and discovery; and

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Enabling revolutionary capabilities through new technology.

Q3. How did NASA respond, specifically, to concerns expressed over the past several years by the 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and others that the Shuttle program was under stress due to funding 

and workforce constraints? Please list dates of policy changes along with any changes in funding or 

workforce.

A3. To respond adequately to this question, one needs to examine the actions that led to the downsizing 

of the NASA and contractor workforce.

 In August 1994, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight initiated a Shuttle Functional Workforce 

Review to identify the minimum workforce necessary to safely fly seven Shuttle flights per year and to 

establish a baseline and implementation plan to optimize the Shuttle workforce while ensuring safety.

 Also in March 1994, the findings of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team, under 

the chairmanship of Dr. Christopher Kraft, recommended that NASA consolidate all program operations 

under a single business entity, such as a single prime contractor.

 The fundamental premise of this recommendation was:

— Separation of the operations functions from the development activities within the program by moving 

the government from an oversight role to an insight role.

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— Elevation of the NASA-contractor interface to the program level to disengage NASA daily operations 

activities and empower the contractor to assume this responsibility.

— Development of a contract structure to incentivize the contractor to reduce operations costs by 

implementing efficiencies while maintaining safety of flight and mission success.

 The findings of both the Shuttle Functional Workforce Review and the Space Shuttle Management 

Independent Review Team were incorporated into NASA's Zero Base Review. The objective of the Zero 

Base Review was to examine the NASA-wide organization and management structure, requirements and 

functional interfaces with a view toward moving through restructuring the reductions anticipated in 

NASA's out-year budget.

 To respond to the reductions in the out year budget, NASA offered incentives for retirements and early-
out opportunities across the Agency. In addition, the Space Flight Operations Contract with United Space 

Alliance, (a joint venture between Rockwell International (now Boeing) and Lockheed Martin 

Corporation) was initiated in October 1996 and was designed to begin a transition of Space Shuttle 

operations that could eventually lead to privatization. Consolidation of contracts and moving day-to-day 

routine Shuttle operations to the contractor while maintaining insight/oversight allowed NASA to reduce 

the civil service workforce and subsequently reduce cost. A review was conducted by the ASAP in the 

1996/97 time frame to assess any safety impact on the initial transition to the Space Flight Operations 

Contract. The Panel determined that safety would not be compromised, however, they would continue to 

monitor the transition process. Whenever there were any indications of workforce stress observed by 

NASA management or anticipated gaps in skills, management responded by providing the resources 

necessary to ensure continued safe operations of the Shuttle.

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 Contractor and civil service staffing reductions continued in 1998 and 1999, mostly through attrition. 

In 1998 NASA's Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance verified that the staffing 

reduction process used by United Space Alliance (USA) the prime contractor for Space Shuttle 

operations, did not compromise safety. Also, a subgroup of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) 

observed the review by the Risk Assessment Team and provided concurrence with the Team's findings.

 In the FY 2000 (CY 99) budget process the Office of Space Flight (OSF) was provided relief from the 

downsizing. Also, in 1999 the Agency conducted a NASA-wide Core Capability Assessment, a centerby-center analysis to identify workforce and infrastructure requirements. One of the objectives of the 

review was to help chart a strategy that would provide the OSF Centers with the requisite flexibility to 

attract and retain the critical skills necessary to ensure safe mission and program success.

 The ASAP Report (published in February 2000) noted that the effects of the hiring freeze and 

downsizing had produced critical skills deficits in some areas and growing workforce pressures. The 

Panel applauded NASA's rehiring efforts but recommended that the Agency should continue to 

aggressively address workforce issues.

 The aging of our workforce placed a strong emphasis on entry level recruiting. It naturally follows that 

many of NASA's critical specialty and program vacancies were filled from within and then these newly 

created vacancies were filled with fresh outs. Therefore, while the ability to hire allowed us to fill many 

critical needs, new hires did not often go directly to critical vacancies but rather to replace employees who 

had moved internally to where we needed them the most.

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 Over the past several years, the workforce hiring in the Space Shuttle program has helped to address 

critical hiring needs. While new hires addressed needs in understaffed critical skilled areas, workload 

levels have also increased. Due to the reduced number of experienced Science and Engineering (S&E) 

personnel in the current pipeline, we have to maintain the current level of program support and we have to 

ensure that our new S&E hires receive the proper skill training to meet future program needs. Given our 

S&E retirement eligible pool, a competitive job market for technical skilled personnel and a reduced pool 

of S&E graduates, we will have to enhance current recruitment and retention strategies.

 From an Agency perspective, NASA uses a number of tools and flexibilities to recruit and retain 

critically needed skills. For example, the Agency offers starting salaries above the minimum rate, when 

necessary, and offers recruitment bonuses and retention allowances, when appropriate. NASA has also 

established a National Recruitment Initiative to develop Agency-wide recruitment strategies to attract and 
hire a highly technical S&E workforce. In addition, NASA will continue to use programs, such as the 

Presidential Management Intern Program, the Co-operative Education Program, and the Federal Career 

Intern Program as sources for entry level hires. The Agency may also repay student loans to attract or 

retain employees in critical positions.

 The GAO reviewed NASA's use of Human Capital in early CY 2000 and determined that the actions 

NASA was taking were sufficient to sustain a quality workforce.

 It was noted in the 2001 ASAP Report that although workforce concerns continued to be a focus of the 

Panel, they saw no safety shortfall attributable to workforce issues.

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 NASA has continued to provide updates to the GAO regarding progress in the workforce efforts. As 

part of the FY 2003 budget process, NASA conducted a Strategic Resources Review. This review 

highlighted several areas for transforming current business operations.

 In addition, consistent with the President's Management Agenda initiative on Strategic Management of 

Human Capital and to support Agency SRR activities and decisions, the Office of Human Resources and 

Education's Functional Leadership Plan, dated May 2000 (which was developed after consultation with 

the Enterprises), is now being revised to reflect a more comprehensive, agile Agency-wide human capital 

strategic plan. As decisions are made, the Agency will address each change using the plan as a 

framework.

 Our attention to workforce issues is focused on the future as well as the present. Recognizing that 

veteran space flight program employees will be retiring in the coming years, we have been aggressively 

taking action to attract and retain a high performing workforce to replace them.

 We have a complement of skilled and dedicated civil servants and contractors who are fully able to 

perform the work required to ensure the continued safety and viability of our space program.

Q4. What strategy should guide operation of the International Space Station while the Space Shuttle 

system is grounded? Should permanent occupancy of the space station be suspended until the Shuttle 

system is operating again, or should the space station partners rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress 

spacecraft to bring crews and cargo to space station?

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A4.

The ISS continues to function well and the Expedition 6 crew continues to perform science and routine 

ISS maintenance.

It is important to keep the ISS crewed. Without routine maintenance by an onboard crew, reactivating 

ISS after re-crewing becomes increasingly more complicated. There is also some risk associated with a 

de-crewed ISS. System failures are best handled by the on-orbit crew and some failures require crew 

interaction to resolve. Crewing also continues the on-going science activities.

There are no threats to the ISS or the crew in the near-term and we are working options with our 

International Partners to be able to sustain both until we return to flight. The crew can remain on the ISS 

through at least June 2003 with the logistics delivered on the Progress that docked February 4. We are 
evaluating options for the continued crewing and operations of the ISS beyond this time period.

Under the current planning with our International Partners, the Expedition 6 crew of three will return on 

Soyuz 5S, which is currently docked to ISS as the emergency return vehicle, in late April or early May 

and will be replaced by a crew of two on Soyuz 6S, the replacement rescue vehicle. The planned three 

Progress cargo spacecraft in 2003 will be increased to four and the four Progress in 2004 will be increased 

to five to provide sufficient logistics to sustain the crew. With these changes and the continued rotation of 

a two person crews on future Soyuz replacement missions, plans are in place to keep the ISS continuously 

crewed through 2004.

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In the unlikely event that de-crewing is required, the ISS can be configured and de-crewed—as a 

contingency procedure. The ISS can remain without a crew for an extended period of time while 

maintaining altitude with unassisted Progress re-boost. Progresses routinely dock to and re-boost the ISS 

without crew interaction.

Q5. If the decision is made to rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft beyond those that Russia 

already has agreed to provide at no cost to the other partners, who will pay for them. How do these plans 

take into account the requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106–178), which prohibit NASA 

from making payments to Russia, in cash or in kind, in connection with the space station program unless 

the President certifies to Congress that Russia is not proliferating nuclear or missile technologies to 

Iran?

A5.

NASA has met with the Russians and our other International Partners and has briefed them on the status 

of the ISS and the Columbia investigation. The maintenance of the ISS is a Partnership issue and will be 

resolved in this cooperative framework.

Russia is capable and willing to provide one additional Progress in both 2003 and 2004 to sustain the ISS 

crew. However, Russia has indicated that doing so will require additional partner funding. The 

International Partners are working together in an attempt to resolve this issue.

Any arrangements reached with the Russians or any other Partner will be in compliance with existing 

U.S. law and policy.

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Q6. The Columbia tragedy and the subsequent grounding of the orbiters may have a significant impact on 

the core capabilities supporting the Space Shuttle and the ISS through the loss of key personnel with 

unique technical expertise by corporate layoffs as well as with the loss of unique assets such as the 

orbiter and research modules. What immediate impact will the Columbia tragedy have on NASA's 

workforce or field centers? How does NASA recover from this loss? How do these critical assets, both 

human and hardware, get replaced once you have identified the cause, fix the problem and get back to 

flying again? Is it possible to estimate what impact it will have on future workforce needs?

A6.

NASA has established a program to help all NASA, NASA contractors and NASA grantees and their 

families to cope with any consequences of this disaster through its Employee Assistance Programs. 
 

NASA has placed counselors, expert in trauma and critical incident stress management in the field to help 

workers directly. NASA will continue to monitor this issue and do everything possible to minimize the 

possibility of PTSD.

We do not anticipate any reductions in the work force as a result of the Columbia accident at this time.

The Space Shuttle workforce is deeply dedicated and committed to flying the Space Shuttle safely. 

Currently, many of our highly skilled employees, both civil service and contractor, are supporting the 

efforts of the Gehman Board. Others are performing their regular duties and will continue to do so until 

the cause of the accident is determined and any recommendations from the Board are implemented.

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Although we do not know exactly how long it will be until we return to flight, there have been several 

extended periods of time between Space Shuttle launches in the twenty-two years of Space Shuttle 

operations. After the Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle workforce was dedicated to implementing 

improved processes and procedures that greatly enhanced the way the Shuttle vehicle was prepared, tested 

and validated for flight.

Also, after the Challenger accident and during the 1990s there were several technical issues causing a 

''stand down'' of the Shuttle program lasting six or more months. During those extended periods of time, 

the workforce kept their skills well honed by participating in simulations and extensive training in 

addition to performing many activities to catch up on a backlog of activities, such as facility maintenance.

Question submitted by Senator John B. Breaux

Q1. Given the expended period of time that is expected before another Shuttle flight is undertaken, what 

steps are you taking to ensure the Shuttle technical base and manpower doesn't suffer during this down 

time so that we aren't behind the eight ball when we start up again?

A1. The Space Shuttle workforce is deeply dedicated and committed to flying the Space Shuttle safely. 

Currently, many of our highly skilled employees, both civil service and contractor, are supporting the 

efforts of the Gehman Board. Others are performing their regular duties and will continue to do so until 

the cause of the accident is determined and any recommendations from the Board are implemented.

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 Although we do not know exactly how long it will be until we return to flight, there have been several 

extended periods of time between Space Shuttle launches in the twenty-two years of Space Shuttle 

operations. After the Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle workforce was dedicated to implementing 

improved processes and procedures that greatly enhanced the way the Shuttle vehicle was prepared, tested 

and validated for flight.

 Also, after the Challenger accident and during the 1990s there were several technical issues causing a 

''stand down'' of the Shuttle program lasting six or more months. During those extended periods of time, 

the workforce kept their skills well honed by participating in simulations and extensive training in 

addition to performing many activities to catch up on a backlog of activities, such as facility maintenance.

Appendix 2: 

Additional Material for the Record 
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