CONGRESSMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT (R-NY)

OPENING STATEMENT FOR CAIB HEARING

September 4, 2003

I want to welcome everyone here for the first of what will be an extensive series of hearings on the 

future of the Shuttle program, and of the manned space flight programs, in general. This is a pivotal 

moment in NASA's history, and this Committee intends to lead the way in examining the issues that 

will enable Congress and the White House to chart NASA's future. Perhaps I should say in 

"confronting the issues" because moving forward will require asking tough questions and facing up 

to tough choices.

We will be better able to do that because of the extraordinary work that has been done by Admiral 

Gehman and the entire membership and staff of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

(CAIB). The Board members have been inspiring models - independent, focused, inquiring, tough, 

candid and accessible. The CAIB report has to be the starting point for setting NASA's future.

If the Shuttle is to return to flight, then, at a minimum, every one of the CAIB's return-to-flight 

recommendations must be implemented. That includes the recommendation that NASA have a 

detailed plan for addressing the organizational and cultural deficiencies the CAIB has so 

convincingly described. Indeed, Mr. Hall and I wrote to Admiral Gehman back in July suggesting 

just that sort of recommendation to help ensure that NASA would act on the central 

recommendations concerning organization and culture.

I think all of us need to face up to the rather disheartening picture of NASA that has been so 

painstakingly drawn by the CAIB. If we fail to do so, it's readily apparent that we will just have to 

go through this same sad exercise again. NASA's experience may be the ultimate proof of 

Santayana's famous observation about those who fail to learn from the past being doomed to 

repeat it.

The sad fact is that the loss of the Columbia and her crew was preventable. This is not even close to 

being a case in which the problems could only be seen in hindsight. We need to clearly identify and 

root out each of the systemic and individual failures that led to this accident. The CAIB report is a 

blueprint for doing so. The memory of the Columbia crew compels us to do no less.

I have to say that I am concerned about some of the ways NASA has been approaching the return to 

flight thus far. I admire Administrator O'Keefe and I'm pleased he has embraced the CAIB report 

with his words. But deeds are what will count. And I'm concerned that NASA may already be 

rushing to meet unrealistic launch dates instead of examining this report closely and moving 

deliberately.

I'm also concerned that NASA has been trumpeting changes in its safety organization that do not 

appear to address any of the problems that have been persuasively identified in the CAIB report. 

Delay is not the goal, but if safety is to improve, NASA must not be judging itself by how quickly it 

can send the Shuttle back into orbit.

And undue haste is ill-advised for another reason, too. We, as a Committee, and as a nation, need 

some time to consider our overall space policy.

We need to make fundamental decisions about the future of the Shuttle program and of the manned 

space flight program. We need to get, perhaps for the first time, accurate cost estimates of what it 
will cost to run the Space Shuttle and other manned programs safely and accurate descriptions of 

what they will be able to accomplish. I, for one, am not willing to write NASA a blank check for the 

Shuttle program.

We also need to have a better appraisal of what the risks are of operating the Space Shuttle -

because even after implementing the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle will continue to be a risky 

vehicle - and I am not willing to see the Shuttle fly without regard to the level of risk.

Finally, we need to better define NASA's overarching human space flight vision - something that 

has been lacking for more than a generation. That won't be easy, and it can only be done after 

hearings that will enable us to make a clear-eyed appraisal of the costs, benefits and risks of 

different options.

So I approach today's hearing soberly because of the tragedy that has brought us here and the 

daunting tasks that lie ahead. But I also approach today with eagerness because we have a rare 

chance to reshape our nation's space program, and we will be able to benefit from the outstanding 

work of Admiral Gehman and his team. I look forward to hearing from them.

Mr. Hall?