PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TED CARROLL and BELLA CARROLL, 

individually and as parents and next friends 

of AKC, a minor, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

LAWTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT NO. 8; VICKIE CANTRELL, 

individually; LYNN FITZ, individually; 

JOHN WHITTINGTON, individually, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-6245 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-00407-M)

_________________________________ 

Courtney D. Powell, Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Jerry A. Richardson, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma (Kent B. Rainey and 

Staci L. Roberds, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Charles E. Wade, 

Wade & Mackey, Lawton, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Lawton Independent 

School District No. 8, Defendant-Appellee. 

Mark S. Rains, Mark Rains Attorney at Law PLLC, Jenks, Oklahoma, for Vickie 

Cantrell, Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

November 10, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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McHUGH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This appeal arises from allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered 

abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, 

Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Ms. Cantrell, the 

school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a 

variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, 

concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing 

suit as required by section 1415(l) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

(the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appeal. 

The single issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in determining the 

Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because 

we conclude the Carrolls’ complaint alleges educational injuries that could be 

redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, we agree with the 

district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could 

file suit. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ complaint. 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

AKC is a minor child and a student at Pat Henry Elementary School, a public 

school in Oklahoma’s Lawton Independent School District No. 8 (the School 

District).1

 Ms. Cantrell was AKC’s third-grade teacher at Pat Henry. AKC is autistic 

and her autism impairs her ability to verbally communicate. She received education 

assistance under the IDEA through an Individualized Education Program, or IEP. 

In May 2012, the Carrolls discovered AKC had been injured at school. Upon 

further inquiry, the Carrolls learned that Ms. Cantrell had “‘punished’ AKC by 

pulling her undergarments so hard into a ‘wedgie’ that AKC’s underwear was torn” 

and that AKC “had been placed in a dark closet on previous occasions.” The Carrolls 

were never previously informed of disciplinary issues involving AKC or told that 

AKC had been disciplined. 

As a result of the “punishments,” AKC now refuses to get out of the car to go 

into the school building and becomes upset and agitated when she enters the school. 

Once inside, she does not want to leave her parents’ side. The incident “damaged 

AKC’s overall academic progress as well as her emotional health” and “[t]he impact 

of these punishments, coupled with AKC’s autism, significantly altered AKC and her 

ability to attend and participate in the educational process.” AKC’s academic 

achievement has also been negatively impacted, and she will require tutoring to 

 1

 Because this appeal is taken from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite 

the facts as alleged in the Carrolls’ complaint and in the light most favorable to them. 

Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 771 F.3d 697, 699 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014).

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return to her previous academic level. Since the incident, AKC has regularly acted 

out against others and cannot participate in normal children’s activities like summer 

day camp. AKC’s behavioral problems are so severe Mr. Carroll had to leave his job 

to stay home and care for AKC. 

B. Procedural History 

The Carrolls filed suit, naming as defendants Ms. Cantrell, the School District, 

and two other School District employees. The Carrolls asserted a range of state-law 

claims against the defendants, including negligence, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, assault, battery, conspiracy, and violation of due process under 

the Oklahoma Constitution. The Carrolls brought their federal claims under the ADA, 

Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 only against the School District. The Carrolls 

requested compensatory damages including medical expenses and damages for pain 

and suffering, punitive damages, and costs and expenses, including reasonable 

attorney fees. 

All defendants moved to dismiss. The district court first considered whether 

the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The 

district court concluded the Carrolls’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims alleged 

educational injuries and that exhaustion was therefore necessary. But the district 

court concluded the Carrolls’ § 1983 claim was premised only on the physical 

injuries suffered by AKC and that exhaustion was not required as to that claim. Thus, 

the district court dismissed the Carrolls’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against 

the School District for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, concluding it 

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lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the unexhausted claims. The district court 

then dismissed the remainder of the Carrolls’ claims for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted, with the exception of an unchallenged negligence 

claim against the School District. But the district court gave the Carrolls leave to 

amend their § 1983 and Oklahoma Constitutional claims against the School District 

and their assault, battery, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims 

against Ms. Cantrell.2

 

The Carrolls amended their complaint to allege additional facts in support of 

their claims against the School District and Ms. Cantrell, and the defendants again 

moved to dismiss. The district court reevaluated the Carrolls’ § 1983 claim in light of 

the amendments to the complaint, concluding that “even though generally alleged, 

plaintiffs have alleged educational harms requiring plaintiffs to exhaust their 

administrative remedies under the IDEA.” The district court therefore dismissed the 

Carrolls’ amended § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust. Having dismissed the last of 

the Carrolls’ federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over their state-law claims and dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint. 

III. DISCUSSION 

The Carrolls argue the district court erred in dismissing their federal claims for 

failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. They contend their claims as alleged 

are not subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements or, in the alternative, that the 

 2

 The district court did not give the Carrolls leave to amend their claims 

against the School District employees other than Ms. Cantrell, and the Carrolls have 

not challenged on appeal the dismissal of their claims against those defendants. 

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district court abused its discretion in denying them leave to allege additional facts 

showing exhaustion or the futility of pursuing administrative relief. 

A. The Carrolls’ Federal Claims Are Subject to the IDEA’s Exhaustion 

Requirement. 

“We review the denial or grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the 

same standard used by the district court.” Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

233 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept 

all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and view those 

allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sutton v. Utah State 

Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). 

1. Exhaustion Under the IDEA 

The Carrolls first argue the district court erred in concluding that their ADA, 

Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 claims are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion 

requirement. The IDEA is a federal statute that “imposes obligations on the states to 

provide certain benefits in exchange for federal funds.” Ellenberg v. N.M. Military 

Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2007). A state accepting such funding must 

“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 

public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to 

meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Educational services must be 

provided in accordance with the child’s IEP, which “sets forth the child’s present 

performance level, goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to 

meet those goals, and evaluation criteria and procedures to determine whether the 

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child has met the goals.” Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 

1043 (10th Cir. 1993). 

The IDEA also creates a mandatory administrative framework for resolution of 

disputes over the education of children with disabilities: If a parent has a complaint 

“with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 

placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such 

child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A), the IDEA entitles the parent to an “impartial due 

process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the 

local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational 

agency,” id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). If the parent is unsatisfied with the outcome of the due 

process hearing, he or she “may appeal such findings and decision to the State 

educational agency.” Id. § 1415(g)(1). These administrative remedies must be 

exhausted before a civil action may be filed in district court under the ADA, 

Rehabilitation Act, or “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with 

disabilities,” if the plaintiff “seek[s] relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 

Id. § 1415(l). 

In interpreting § 1415(l), this court has read “available” relief to mean “relief 

for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains, not 

necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers or specifically seeks.” Padilla, 233 

F.3d at 1274 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our exhaustion inquiry 

therefore focuses on “the source and nature of the alleged injuries for which he or she 

seeks a remedy,” not the specific remedy sought. Id. Thus, “the dispositive question 

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generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any 

degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies.” Id. “If so, exhaustion 

of those remedies is required.” Id.; see also Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 

F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here the alleged injuries were educational in 

nature and therefore presumptively redressable through the IDEA’s administrative 

procedures . . . we would require exhaustion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

And “the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement will not be excused simply because,” as in 

this case, “a plaintiff requests damages, which are ordinarily unavailable in 

administrative hearings held pursuant to the statute, if his alleged injuries could be 

redressed under the IDEA.” Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1066–67 (citations omitted). Finally, 

we construe ambiguities in favor of exhaustion. In Padilla we explained, “Where the 

IDEA’s ability to remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be required 

in order to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate 

the alleged problem.” 233 F.3d at 1274. By “focusing on whether there is any relief 

available under the IDEA to remedy the injury, as opposed to the particular relief 

sought by the plaintiff,” the IDEA process cannot be “short-circuited by a rush to 

court seeking damages.” Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

2. The Carrolls’ Claims 

We agree with the district court that the Carrolls have alleged educational 

injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative 

remedies. The complaint alleges that Ms. Cantrell, AKC’s teacher, “‘punished’ AKC 

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by pulling her undergarments so hard into a ‘wedgie’ that AKC’s underwear was 

torn” and that “in addition to the ‘wedgie’ punishment AKC had been placed in a 

dark closet on previous occasions.” The complaint further alleges that, as a result of 

these “punishments,” AKC “suffered and continues to suffer,” particularly with 

respect to her education: AKC now refuses to get out of the car to go into the school 

building and becomes upset and agitated as she enters the school. The punishments 

“damaged AKC’s overall academic progress as well as her mental and emotional 

health” and “[t]he impact of these punishments, coupled with AKC’s autism, 

significantly altered AKC and her ability to attend and participate in the educational 

process.” AKC’s academic achievement has also been negatively impacted and she 

will require tutoring to return to her previous academic level. Finally, the complaint 

alleges that “AKC was excluded from participating in and denied the benefits of the 

educational programs offered by [the School] District.” 

These allegations of injuries to AKC’s academic progress and access to 

educational programs are unambiguously “educational in nature and therefore 

presumptively redressable through the IDEA’s administrative procedures.” Cudjoe, 

297 F.3d at 1067. Though not all of the injuries alleged in the complaint are 

educational, the Carrolls have “alleged injuries that could be redressed to [some] 

degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies.” Padilla, 233 F.3d at 

1274. The Carrolls therefore “seek[] relief that is also available under [the IDEA],” 

and their federal claims are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. 20 U.S.C. 

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§ 1415(l); Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274. The Carrolls resist this conclusion in three 

ways. 

The Carrolls first argue “[e]xhaustion is not required where the complaint 

alleges physical, non-educational injuries.” In Padilla, we concluded that, under the 

“narrow circumstances” of that case, the plaintiff was not required to exhaust her 

claims arising from a skull fracture she suffered while restrained in a windowless 

closet without supervision. Id. at 1274. We noted the plaintiff sought “damages 

solely to redress the fractured skull and other physical injuries she suffered” and 

made “no complaints regarding her current educational situation.” Id. We also 

observed “she expressly attests that her new school meets her educational needs and 

that she presently receives the full benefits of a free and appropriate education in an 

integrated, least restrictive educational environment.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under these circumstances, we reasoned that the IDEA’s administrative 

remedies, which are targeted at providing prospective educational benefits, could 

provide no relief for the plaintiff’s “severe physical, and completely non-educational, 

injuries.” Id. 

Here, as discussed above, the Carrolls have alleged a number of “complaints 

regarding [AKC’s] current educational situation.” Id. at 1274. The IDEA’s 

prospective educational benefits are presumptively well suited to remedy the alleged 

educational injuries. Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067. Thus, unlike Padilla, this is not a case 

involving solely “severe physical, and completely non-educational, injuries” for 

which the IDEA can offer no remedy. Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274. The allegation of 

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educational injuries removes this case from the “narrow circumstances” that we 

concluded made exhaustion unnecessary in Padilla. Id. While the School District 

may not ultimately succeed in remedying all of the injuries alleged through the 

administrative process, it must be given “an initial opportunity to ascertain and 

alleviate the alleged problem.” Id.

Next, the Carrolls argue that “[f]or the exhaustion requirements to be 

triggered, there must be an ‘educational source’ and an ‘adverse education[al] 

consequence.’” See Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “courts consistently 

have required exhaustion for alleged acts that both have an educational source and an 

adverse educational consequence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The IDEA 

offers redress for claims whose genesis and manifestation . . . are educational.” Id. 

(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Carrolls contend 

exhaustion is not required here because their claims arise from Ms. Cantrell’s 

conduct in “punish[ing]” AKC, rather than “from some allegation that the education 

or services rendered by the [School] District are inadequate.” 

However, the Carrolls’ attempt to limit the IDEA’s reach to claims of 

inadequate provision of educational services is inconsistent with our case law. We 

have long recognized a “close relationship between the use of discipline and in-class 

instruction in providing a child with a ‘free appropriate public education.’” Hayes ex 

rel. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1989). In 

Hayes we rejected the argument that disciplinary measures did not involve the 

provision of a “free appropriate public education” and that they thus fell outside the 

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scope of the IDEA’s predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act. Id. at 812–

13. We observed that the statute provides administrative remedies “‘with respect to 

any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.’” Id.

at 813 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E)). Concluding that 

“[p]roper conduct and education are inextricably intertwined,” we held that 

“discipline of a child in the classroom . . . is a matter that relates to the public 

education of a handicapped child and that therefore falls within the scope of the 

[IDEA].” See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, we cannot agree the allegations of classroom discipline here—that AKC 

was “punished” by her teacher, at school and during the school day—do not 

constitute an “educational source” for AKC’s injuries. 

Last, the Carrolls argue they are excepted or excused from the exhaustion 

requirement under the facts of this case. Exhaustion under the IDEA is not required 

“when administrative remedies would be futile, when they would fail to provide 

relief, or when an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general[] 

applicability that is contrary to the law.” Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. 

Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). But 

unless the case “falls within one of the three exceptions, [plaintiffs are] not entitled to 

judicial review . . . absent exhaustion of [the IDEA’s] administrative remedies.” Id.

The Carrolls contend “[e]xhaustion in this case not only fails to provide relief 

but would be futile.” But in raising this argument they merely restate their position 

that they are seeking damages for Ms. Cantrell’s conduct rather than “a failed or 

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flawed IEP.” As explained above, our interpretation of the IDEA is broad enough to 

reach Ms. Cantrell’s conduct in this case, and the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is 

not limited to challenges to a child’s IEP. Nor does the Carrolls’ request for only 

damages render futile a consideration of AKC’s educational injuries in the 

administrative process. While damages are normally unavailable through the 

administrative process, Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1066, the School District may be able to 

provide other relief for AKC’s educational injuries. And it is entitled to make that 

effort before being exposed to a lawsuit for damages. Id. at 1065. The Carrolls do not 

otherwise explain why it would be futile to request relief through the administrative 

process for the injuries alleged in their complaint—injuries we have determined are, 

for the most part, educational and therefore presumptively redressable through the 

IDEA’s administrative process—or why no relief for these injuries could be obtained 

through that process. We are therefore not convinced the Carrolls’ claims fall within 

one of the enumerated exceptions to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. 

In summary, the Carrolls have alleged that AKC’s educational progress has 

been impeded, that she has been excluded from access to educational programs, and 

that she will require remedial education in the form of tutoring to return to her proper 

academic level. Under the IDEA, the school is entitled to “at least the first crack at 

formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of educational shortfalls.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Carrolls were required to exhaust their 

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administrative remedies before bringing their claims in the district court.3

 The district 

court therefore properly dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims seeking relief “also 

available” under the IDEA.4

Our disposition of this argument also resolves the Carrolls’ claim that the 

district court erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

Carrolls’ state-law claims. That claim is premised upon a conclusion that the district 

court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ federal claims was erroneous, and the Carrolls 

argue only that it would be error for the district court to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state law claims while adjudicating the federal claims. Because 

we conclude the district court correctly dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, it did 

not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 

 3

 The Carrolls also argue that requiring them to exhaust their administrative 

remedies violates AKC’s right to equal protection. Specifically, they contend that 

“[r]equiring exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative requirements when there is no 

educational source to trigger the IDEA places additional burdens on AKC because of 

her disability.” As discussed, the Carrolls have alleged educational injuries for which 

relief is available under the IDEA. Thus, contrary to the Carrolls’ argument, there is 

an “educational source to trigger the IDEA.” The Carrolls do not argue the broader 

issue of whether the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is constitutional when otherwise 

validly applied, and we therefore decline to address it. 

4

 The parties dispute whether the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is a 

jurisdictional requisite or an affirmative defense. However, as we have previously 

recognized, this characterization “is important . . . only when the defendant has 

waived or forfeited the issue.” McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. 

No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 2007); accord Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch., 

715 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 2013) (concluding “IDEA exhaustion’s status as a 

jurisdictional prerequisite is not at issue” because the defendants raised IDEA 

exhaustion below and on appeal). Because the School District here raised the 

exhaustion requirement in its motion to dismiss and has renewed that argument on 

appeal, we need not decide whether exhaustion is jurisdictional because the result is 

the same in either case. 

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claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The district court therefore did not err in 

dismissing the Carrolls’ complaint. 

B. The District Court Properly Denied the Carrolls’ Request for Leave to Amend. 

Last, the Carrolls argue the district court abused its discretion by denying their 

request for leave to amend their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. They assert that, 

had they been given leave to amend, “additional facts would have been alleged 

regarding meetings with numerous District officials regarding the abuse; a police 

investigation into the abuse; and multiple meetings with various District employees 

relating to AKC’s IEP after the abuse occurred.” Relying on Muskrat v. Deer Creek 

Public Schools, 715 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 2013), the Carrolls contend these allegations 

would have supported a claim that the exhaustion requirement was satisfied or 

excused despite their failure to request a due process hearing or otherwise comply 

with IDEA’s specific procedures. 

Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(2). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of leave to 

amend. Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 700–01 

(10th Cir. 2014). We conclude the Carrolls have failed to demonstrate an abuse of the 

district court’s discretion for two reasons. 

First, the Carrolls never moved for leave to amend their complaint but rather 

asked for leave to amend as an alternative to dismissal in their opposition to the 

School District’s motion to dismiss. “Rule 7 requires a request for relief to be made 

by a motion that (1) is in writing, (2) ‘states with particularity the grounds for 

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seeking the order,’ and (3) specifies the relief sought.” Albers, 771 F.3d at 706 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). “We have recognized the importance of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 7(b) and have held that normally a court need not grant leave to amend when 

a party fails to file a formal motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Second, and more fundamentally, the Carrolls failed to identify the specific 

factual allegations they would allege in an amended complaint. “[A] bare request to 

amend in response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient to place the court and 

opposing parties on notice of the plaintiff’s request to amend and the particular 

grounds upon which such a request would be based.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must 

“specify the new factual allegations that would correct the defects in their 

[complaint].” Id. In seeking leave to amend below, the Carrolls stated, “If Plaintiffs 

were granted . . . leave to amend, additional facts would be alleged regarding 

meetings with numerous District officials regarding the abuse; a police investigation 

into the abuse; and multiple meetings with various District employees relating to 

AKC’s IEP after the abuse occurred.” The Carrolls present a functionally identical 

assertion in their appellate briefing. But nowhere have they set forth the specific 

factual allegations that would establish exhaustion or an exception thereto. 

The Carrolls’ reliance on Muskrat to support their argument that they 

effectively exhausted their administrative remedies is misplaced. In Muskrat, the 

record demonstrated the plaintiffs had “worked through administrative channels to 

obtain the relief they sought,” conferred with school staff, and obtained a favorable 

modification to their child’s IEP as a result of their efforts. 715 F.3d at 786. The 

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court concluded that, “given the steps the Muskrats took and the relief they obtained, 

it would have been futile to then force them to request a formal due process hearing 

. . . simply to preserve their damages claim.” Id. Thus, in Muskrat, the plaintiffs had 

already obtained all of the relief they could from the administrative process, and any 

further administrative proceedings regarding their remaining damages claim would 

be futile because damages are not available through the administrative process. 

Here, the Carrolls merely set forth categories of allegations that could be 

pleaded; they did not present the district court with any specific factual allegations 

regarding the administrative steps already taken to obtain relief. Nor did they identify 

any specific allegations to demonstrate that, like Muskrat, they had obtained all of the 

educational relief available under the IDEA’s administrative regime and therefore 

further exhaustion would be futile. Their appellate briefs fare no better on this score, 

reciting the same assertions without detailing any factual allegations. Because the 

Carrolls have “fail[ed] to specify the new factual allegations that would correct the 

defects in their [complaint],” the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

their informal request for leave to amend contained in their opposition to the 

District’s motion to dismiss. See Albers, 771 F.3d at 706. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Carrolls’ complaint alleges educational injuries that could be redressed to 

some degree by pursuing the IDEA’s administrative remedies. The Carrolls’ federal 

claims are therefore subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, and the district 

court did not err in dismissing those claims or abuse its discretion in declining 

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supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Because the Carrolls 

failed to identify the new allegations that would allegedly correct the defects in their 

complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to 

amend. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Carrolls’ complaint. 

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