UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) JEREMY D. ORCHIN, Trustee of the Eugene C. Gadaire Insurance Trust, Plaintiff,
v. GREAT - WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Actio n No. 12 - 1743 ( RDM) (consolidated with No. 13 - 0055) ) Defendant,

____________________________________ ) ) ) ELIZABETH GADAIRE, Plaintiff , v. ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 13 - 00055 (RDM) ) (consolidated with No. 12 - 1743 ) JEREMY D. ORCHIN, et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION These consolidated cases arise out of a dispute over the life insurance coverage of Dr. Eugene C. Gadaire, which was assigned to a trust maintained for the benefit of Dr. Gadaire’s spouse, Elizabeth Gadaire
. The trustee

— Jeremy D. Orchin

— missed two semi

- annual payments beginning in July 2009, leading to the termination of Dr. Gadaire’s coverage. After the insurance lapsed, Dr. Gadaire died. Upon learning of Dr. Gadaire’s death and realizing that he had failed to make the required payments, Orchin contacted the insurance company, Great

- West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. (“Great

- West”), and successfully convinced them to reinstate the2 insurance

— without mentioning that Dr. Gadaire was already deceased
. After learning that Dr. Gadaire had died before the insurance was reinstated, Great

- West asserted that the reinstatement was invalid and refused to pay the $750,000 value of the insurance benefits to the trust. Orchin brought suit against Great

- West on behalf of the t rust, alleging that Gre at
- West breached contractual obligations and failed to comply with relevant laws in termina ting the insurance and that it should have honored the reinstatement. Orchin v. Great

- West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. , No. 1 2

- cv - 0 1743 (D.D .C. Oct. 26, 2012). In a separate action, Mrs. Gadaire brought similar claims against Great

- West and additionally sued Orchin for missing the payments and causing the insurance to lapse. Gadaire v. Orchin , No. 13

- cv - 00055 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2013). The two cases were subsequently consolidated. 1 See Minute Order, Feb. 1, 2013. T hree motions for summary judgment are now before the Court. In the first, Orchin seeks summary judgment against Great

- West. Dkt. 29. In the second, Mrs. Gadaire seeks summary judgment on two of her three claims against Orchin
. Dkt. 30. And in the third, Great

West seeks summary judgment against both Orchin and Mrs. Gadaire . Dkt. 31. For the re asons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Great

- West’s moti on for summary judgment, Dkt. 3 1 , and DENIES the motions fo r summary judgment filed by Orchin and Mrs. Gadaire, Dkts. 29 and 30
. I. BACKGROUND Except as noted, the following facts are undisputed. In April 1975, Dr. Gadaire, a recent graduate of dental school, obtained insurance through an American Dental Association (“ADA”) group term life insurance policy administered by Great

- West. See Dkt. 29

- 1 (application for insurance), Dkt. 31

- 6 (certificate of i nsurance)
. H is spouse, Elizabeth Gadaire, was designated

1 The order consolidating the cases provided that all filings be entered only in the lead case, Orchin v. Great

- West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. , No. 12

- cv - 01743 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2012)
. See Minute Order, Feb. 1, 2013. Accordingly, all citations to the record refer only to that case.3 as one of the insur ance’s beneficiaries. Dkt. 31

- 6 at 35
. Payments were due twice a year, on July 1 and January 1
. Id. at 11 ; Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 4
. The certificate of insurance provided that “31 days are allowed to pay a premium in default
. . . . If the premium is not paid by the end of the days of grace, the insured Member’s insurance will terminate,” Dkt. 31

- 6 at 11 , and, in another provision, explained that “[t]he insurance of an insured Member will end on the earl iest of the following: . . . t he 32nd day after the due date of any unpaid premium.” Id. at 18. In 1993, Dr. Gadai re transferred ownership of his life insurance to a trust he created, the Eugene C. Gadaire Insurance Trust (“Trust”). See Dkt. 29

- 4 at 7

- 17 (Trust Agreement). The Trust ’s sole beneficiary is Mrs. Gadaire. Dkt. 21 ¶ 1 5 ; see also Dkt. 29

- 4 at 9
. Orchin

— who is also a dentist and was Dr. Gadaire’s close friend , Dkt. 31

- 4 at 3, 10

- 11

— was named as the trustee. Dkt. 29

- 4 at 7
. To transfer the life insurance to the Trust, Dr . Gadaire submitted to Great

- West a n assignment of ownership form, Dkt. 29

- 4 at 3 , and an “Absolute Assignment of All Incidents of Ownership” form, Dkt. 29

- 4 at 5. Plaintiffs claim that they also submitted a copy of the Trust Agreement between Orchin and Dr. Gadaire , Dkt. 29

- 4 at 7

- 17 ; Dkt. 29

- 20 (declaration from Mrs. Gadaire asserting that “[t]o the best of [her] knowledge and recollection, [she] enclosed a copy of the Trust Agreement” along with her Desig nation of Beneficiary and Desig n a tion of Ownership forms to Great

- West ); but Great

- West disputes this, see Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 16 (noting that there is no evidence that the Trust Agreement was sent to Great

- West at this time). The “Absolute Assignment of All Incidents of Ownership” form provided, in rel evant part, that Dr. Gadaire was assigning the insurance on [ his ] life . . . together with all incidents of ownership therein and all [his] right, title, claim, interest, and benefit in and to all moneys which are or may at any time become payable thereund er or in connection therewith, with full power to the assignee to receive same and grant receipts therefor . . . , and with full power of the assignee at any time to exercise all rights, options and privileges4 given to or at any time exercisable by the ins ured under the said policy in respect to the insured’s intere st under the above certificate. Dkt. 29

- 4 at 5
. Under the new arrangement, Dr. Gadaire remained the insured, but ownership of the insurance was transferred to the Trust. The Trust A greement pr ovided that Orchin , as tru stee, would make payments on the insurance
. Dkt. 29

- 4 at 7
. To fulfill that responsibility, whenever Orchin received a statement, he would call M rs. Gadaire and t ell her that a payment was due. Mrs. Gadaire wou ld then deposit m oney i n the T rust’s checking account, and Orchin would write a check to Great

- West. Dkt. 29

- 5 at 8. From 1993 through the payment due January 1, 2009, Orchin made every semi

- annual payment as required on behalf of the T rust. Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 4
. Before payments were due, Great

West would mail a notice of payment due to Orchin ’s address of record, which was his home on 44 th Street , NW, Washington, D.C. Id. ; Dkt. 31

- 10 at 3. In April 2009, Orchin moved to a new home on Westover Place , NW, Washingt on, D.C. See Dkt. 26 ¶ 26 ; Dkt. 31

- 4 at 6
. Before that, as a “temporary measure,” he moved into an apartment in Bethesda , Maryland , while renovating the new home. 2 Dkt. 31

- 4 at 6
. He allegedly submitted change of address forms to the U.S. Postal Servic e after each move, but he did not notify Great

- West of his moves. Id
. In June 2009,

2 In one deposition, Orchin stated that he moved to his new Westover Place home in 2008 and that he moved to the temporary Bethesda home in 2007. Dkt. 31

- 4 at 6, 11. In another deposition, he stated that he submitted his change of address form for the move from Bethesda to Washington, D.C. to the U.S. Postal Service in April 2009. Dkt. 37

- 5 at 8 . His amended complaint states that he moved in April 2009, but it does not specify when he moved to the Bethesda home. Dkt. 26 ¶ 26. Because it appears that Orchin was mistaken about the timing of the move back to D.C., it is not entirely clear from the record when, exactly, Orchin moved to Bethesda. In any event, although Orchin testified that he did not specifically recall receiving premium notices from Great

- West during 2007 and 2008, he paid the premiums due during that period. Dkt. 31

- 4 at 8; see also Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 4.5 Great

- West mailed a notice for the premium due on July 1, 2009 , to Orchin’s address of record, which was still the 44 th S treet address. Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶¶ 4

- 6. 3 When Orchin did not pay the premium within the 31

- day grace period that expired on July 31, Great

- West mailed a notice of termination, which offered an additional 31

- day period during which insurance could have been reinstated without re

- application or re

- qualificati on. Id. ¶ 25 . Dr. Orchin testified that he never received a premium notice in July 2009 and also asserts that he did not receive a lapse notice in August 2009. Dkt. 31

- 4 at 6; Dkt. 29

- 10 at 3; see also Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 22
. I t is undisputed that no payment w as made for the premium due on July 1, 2009. The coverage accordingly terminated on August 1, 2009. See Dkt. 31

- 10 at 3

- 5. The deadline for the next payment that would have been due

— January 1, 2010

— also passed without Orchin or the Gadaires making a pay ment or contacting Great

- West. See Dkt. 30

- 10 at 2

- 5; Dkt. 26 ¶ 33 ; Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 18. Dr. Gadaire died suddenly on January 15, 2010. Dkt. 21 ¶ 25, Dkt. 26 ¶ 36; Dkt. 29

- 16; Dkt. 29

- 10 at 13. Three days later, Orchin

— who was aware of Dr. Gadaire’s death and realized

3 Although they do not directly argue the point, Plaintiffs suggest that whether Great

- West ever mailed the June 2009 notice of premium due and the August 2009 termination notice is disputed. Dkt. 39

- 2 at 3. The only evidence Plaintiffs adduce to dispute Great

- West’s evidence that the notices were mailed , however, is Orchin’s assertion that he never received the notice. Great

West submitted a declaration describing in detail its largely

- automated system for ensuring t hat notices are prope rly mailed. Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶¶ 22

- 26 , and produced a copy of both of those notices. Dkt. 31

- 8, Dkt. 31

- 9. Given this evidence and the undisputed evidence that Orchin did not change the address on record with Great

- West before he moved, the fact that he did not receive these notices does not create a dispute of material fact as to whether they were ever mailed to his address of record. See Spinelli v. Monumental Life Ins. Co ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 898, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (quotation marks omitt ed) (Under Illinois law, “[w]hile an insurer is required to provide notice to a policy holder that a premium is overdue before rescinding that policy, it is only required to prove that a legally sufficient notice was addressed and mailed, not that it was r eceived by the policy holder.”) (quotation marks omitted).6 that he had not made the most recent payment on the insurance

— called Great

- West. Dkt. 31

- 4 at 9

- 11. In that phone call, which was recorded, 4 Orchin stated: I’m the trustee of a life insurance trust for a friend of mine and I think I need to clear up a discrepancy in billing. I haven’t gotten a statement for the balance that was due in December. I think I’ve moved several times and I’ve put in a change of ad dress but I’m not sure it’s gotten through so I need some help to clarify this. Dkt. 31

- 4 at 2
. Great

- West representative Jan Guthrie explained that the insurance had been terminated, and she noted that the address in the system was 2831 44 th Street, NW

— Orchin’s old address. Id. at 3. Orchin repeated that he was the trustee and stated that he needed “ to reinstate the policy because there was a miscommunication on addresses, ” and he asked whether any notices “would have been sent out . . . [b]ecause [he ] didn’t get anything.” Id
. Guthrie explained that “a bill would have been sent out in June for the July 1 renewal, and then since [Great

- West] did not receive payment within that 31 day grace period, by the end of July, a lapse notice would have been se nt out.” Id. She asked whether Orchin had put in a change of address form, and he explained that he “neglected to do that because of . . . two moves in six months.” Id. Orchin further explained that it was “his fault” and that he was under “a lot of pr essure because [he was] the trustee.” Id. Guthrie explained that Dr. Gadaire’s insurance could not be reinstated and that Dr. Gadaire would have to re

- apply for life insurance. Id. In response, Orchin asked if he could talk to someone higher up and explained the situation . The parties debate what exactly Orchin said, as follows: Is there someone else I can talk to that might have more influence because I’m feeling so guilty, I’ve been a trustee for 15 years and I’ve never let it slip and I

4 With one small exception, the parties do not dispute the contents of the telephone communications and have submitted a stipulated transcript of those calls. Dkt. 31

- 10; see id. at 3 (parties disagree whether Orchin stated “I don’t want him to know that I did this” or “I don’t want them to know that I did this.”).7 don ’t want [him or them

— parties disagree ] to know that I did this. There must be a way that I can pa y the past monies or something. Dkt. 31

- 10 at 4. Guthrie agreed to a sk a supervisor, Nancy Fix, to speak to Orchin
. Id. at 5; s ee Dk t. 29

- 11 at 10. Orchi n then explained his dilemma to Fix, noting that in the last year he had “moved tw ice ” and that he had not received a notice for the premium. Dkt. 31

- 10 at 5
. He asked if there was any way that he could pay the back premiums and further stated that “I do n’t want them to know . . .
. ” Id. Fix told Orchin that she would need to speak to a “higher manager.” I d. She subsequently contacted manager Rochelle DeMills. Dkt. 29

- 11 at 11

- 12. DeMills testified at her deposition that she looked at Dr. Gadaire’s “coverage history , ” reviewed his file “in full,” and saw that he was a “long

- standing participant” with a good payment history. Dkt 29

- 13 at 7. She then noticed that Dr. Gadaire had previously applied for further insurance and had b een declined for he alth reasons and thus concluded that Dr. Gadaire would probably not be able to successfully re

- apply for life insurance. Id. at 8. In light of Dr. Gadaire’s status as a long

- time customer, the fact that he would no t be able to re

- apply for insurance, and the fact that the trustee had made this mistake, DeMills decided to exercise her authority to reinstate the coverage. Id. at 8

- 9. Fix called Orchin back and left a voicemail informing him that Great

- West would “make
a one - time exception just because this isn’t, you know, [Dr. Gadaire’s] doing” and explained that she would send a bill that afternoon. Dkt. 31

- 10 at 6 . Great

- West followed up with a wr itten letter establishing that Great

- West would make a “one time exception and reinstate Dr. Gadaire’s Term Life coverage.” Dkt. 29

- 17 at 2 . The letter noted that the exception was “not to set precedence ” and that Great

- West would “require evidence of in surability with full medical underwriting if the policy lapses for non payment of future premiums.” Id. Orchin paid the back8 premiums, and the insurance was reinstated. See Dkt. 29

- 18; Dkt. 29

- 21. During this course of these communications, Orchin neve r disclosed that Dr. Gadaire was deceased
. Great

- West did not learn that Dr. Gadaire had died until Dr. Gadaire’s former business partner, Dr. Tromblay, called several weeks later to repo rt the death
. See Dkt. 29

- 10 at 1 1

- 12
. Dr. Tromblay incorrectly be lieved that he and Dr. Gadaire had obtained “buy/sell insurance”

— that is, life insurance intended to provide surviving business partners with the funds needed to buy out a partner’s share of the business upon death. Id. ; see also Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 9. In fact, although Drs. Tromblay and Gadaire had applied for buy/sell insurance in 2007, the request was denied because Great

- West concluded that Dr. Gadaire was uninsurable due to a heart condition. See Dkt. 29

- 14; Dkt. 29

- 15. This denial was the basis for DeMill s’ conclusion that Dr. Gadaire would not have been able to re

- apply for insurance. Dkt. 31

- 11 ¶ 5
. Upon being informed of Dr. Gadaire’s death, Great

- West’s personnel “followed normal procedures” by sending a claim form to Orchin , as trustee for the bene ficiary of record, Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 13. Orchin signed and returned the claim form on February 10, 2015. Id. Upon investigating Dr. Gadaire’s death, Great

- West quickly became aware that he had died three days before the insurance was reinstated, id. , and it denied Orchin ’s claim both on that basis and because Great

- West employees concluded that Orchin had misled them. Id. ¶ 15. Great

- West also sent a refund of the back

- premiums that Orchin had paid in order to reinstate the insurance
. Id. In October 201 2, Orchin brought suit against Great

- West. Dkt. 1
. Mrs. Gadaire brought suit against both Orchin and Great

- West in January 2013, see Gadaire v. Orchin , No. 13

- cv - 0055 (Jan. 14, 2013) , and the cases were consolidated shortly thereafter. The consolidated cases include two operative complaints. In Mrs. Gadaire’s amended c omplaint, Dkt. 21, she asserts9 five counts against Great

- West and three “alternative” counts against Orchin . The five counts against Great

- West are each styled as breach of c ontract claim s. Count I alleges that Great

- West violated D.C. Code Section 31

- 4201, which sets forth notice requirement for “cancellation” of insurance policies , ¶¶ 36

- 47 ; Count II alleges that the insurance was in effect when Orchin filed a claim on behalf of the tru st and that Great

- West breached its contract by failing to tender proceeds , ¶¶ 48

- 52 ; Count III al leges that Great

- West breached its “duty to maintain contact with its insured , ” ¶¶ 53

- 56; Count IV alleges that Great

- West violated District of Columbia regul ations requiring notice for cancellation of an insurance policy , ¶¶ 57

- 63 ; and Count V alleges that Great

- West breached its contract by failing to provide notices to Dr. Gadaire (in addition to the notices sent to Orchin ) , ¶¶ 64

- 68
. Mrs. Gadaire’s “altern ative” claims against Orchin include claims for negligence , ¶¶ 69

- 83; breach of contract , ¶¶ 83

- 90; and breach of fiduciary duty, ¶¶ 91

- 99
. Orchin ’s amended c omplaint, Dkt. 26 , asserts five counts against Great

- West, which, as the parties agree, are materially the same as Mrs. Gadaire’s claims against Great

- West. See Dkt. 31

- 1 at 2 n.1
. All three parties have now moved for summary judgment. II I . DISCUSSION Because Mrs. Gadaire’s claims against Orchin only arise if Great

- West properly declined to p ay the Trust the proceeds from the insurance, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ claims against Great

- West before turning to Mrs. Gadaire’s separate claims against Orchin
. 5 Because this issue arises on summary judgment, the Court must consider whether any g enuine issue of material fact is in dispute, and, if not, which, if any, of the cross

- moving parties is entitled to judgment as a

5 In their briefs, Mrs. Gadaire refers to Orchin as “Defendant,” Great

- West refers to Orchin as “Plaintiff,” and Orchin refers t o himself as “Counter

- Claimant.” To avoid confusion, the Court refers to each party by name rather than by their status in this litigation, except that the Court refers to Orchin and Mrs. Gadaire, collectively, as “Plaintiffs” in the context of discussing the claims brought by both of them against Great

- West.10 matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Under Rule 56, the moving party bears the initial burden to identify the portions of the record that, in its view, “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party carries that burden, t he opposing party must then “designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quotation marks omitted). As explained below, the Court concludes that the undisputed facts support judgment for Great

- West , but that summary j udgment is not warranted at this point on the claims between Orchin and Mrs. Gadaire
. A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Great - West Plaintiffs claim that Great

- West breached its contractual obligations and contravened District of Columbia law by failing to pay the $750,000 value of Dr. Gadaire’s insurance to the Trust . Their allegations focus on two questions: (1) whether Great

- West provided adequate notice before terminating Dr. Gadaire’s insurance , and (2) assuming the insurance was properly terminated , whether Great

- West’s decision to reinstate the insurance bars Great

- West from refusing the pay the insurance proceeds , even though Dr. Gadaire was already deceased w hen Great

- West reinstated the insurance
. 1. The August 2009 Termination Of Coverage The first issue is whether the August 2009 termination of Dr. Gadaire’s insurance coverage was effective. Plaintiffs contend that it was not because , in their view, Great

- West failed to comply with specific notice requirements imposed by the District of Columbia Life Insurance Act, D.C. Code § § 31

- 4201 et seq. , and D.C. municipal regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act. See Dkt. 29

- 1 at 8

- 15. They contend that because Dr. Gadaire was a D.C. resident, the insurance certificate should be construed to incorporate the minimum requirements11 of D.C. law. Id. ; see Dkt. 26 ¶¶ 60, 76; Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 44, 58. Great

- West respond s that pursuant to the express choice

- of

- law provision contained in the certificate of insurance , the law of Illinois law

— not D.C.

— governs all disputes ari sing out of the insurance contract and that the Court should , therefore , decline to construe the insurance to incorporate D.C. law. 6 It is undisputed that Illinois law contains no provisions equivalent to the D.C. rules upon w hich Plaintiffs’ premise their claims. See Dkt. 29

- 1 at 11. In diversity cases like this one, “the law of the forum state supplies the applicable choice

of

- law standard.” Williams v. First Gov’ t Mortg. & Inv’rs Corp. , 176 F.3d 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Court thus applies D.C. choice of law rules . Under those rules, courts enforce express contractual choice of law provisions “ ‘ as long as there is some reasonable relationship with the state specified. ’ ” Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc. , 68 F.3d 1391, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Norris v. Norris , 419 A.2d 982, 984 (D.C. 1980)); see also , e.g. , A neke v. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. , 841 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting this rule and applying Utah law where the defendant was based in Utah). The D.C. Circuit has applied this choice of law rule in a case similar to this one. In Whiting v. AARP , a resident of Arizona was insured under a group life insurance plan, and the certificate of insurance specifi ed that disputes arising out of the insurance agreement would be governed by D.C. law. 637 F.3d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Applying D.C. choice of law rules, t he Court of Appeals concluded that a “reasonable relationship” with D.C. existed because the group plan was sponsored by an entity that was based in D.C
. Id
. Accordingly, despite the fact

6 Great

- West further argues that because Plaintiffs acknowledge d in the ir amended c omplaint s that the choice of law provision applies, “albeit under the mistaken notion that it applies ‘jointly’ with the District of Columbia,” Plaintiffs are “precluded” from arguing that Illinois law does not apply. Dkt. 41 at 5. Be cause the Court concludes that Illinois law applies and the D.C. provisions do not, the Court need not address this argument.12 that the insured was a resident of Arizona, the Court concluded that the choice of law provision in the agreement should be given effect an d that the dispute should be resolved under D.C. law. Id. Here, Dr. Gadaire was insured under a certificate of insurance he purchased pursuant to a group policy sponsored by the American Dental Association
. That certificate contains an express choice

- of

- law provision , which reads as follows: At the request of the [ADA], which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and with the agreement of [Great

- West], the Policy and any dispute between an insured person or claimant and the Company arising in connection therewith are subject to, governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with the law of the State of Illinois . . . The Policy is sitused in the State of Illinois, and is amended to comply at all times with the minimum requirements of the State of Ill inois, which apply to Group Term Life Insurance. The Policy and individual Certificates issued are deemed to be i ssued in the State of Illinois. Dkt. 31

- 6 at 25. Because the ADA is headquartered in Illinois, the contractual choice of law provision bea rs the same “reasonable relationship with the state specified” as the choice of law provision at issue in Whiting
. 637 F.3d at 631. T hus, for the reasons given in Whiting , the provision must be enforced. This conclusion is consistent with the uniqu e nature of group insurance policies. As the Supreme Court has explained , p arties to a group insurance pla n intend that “everywhere it shall have the same meaning and give the same protection, and that inequalities and confusion liable to result from appl ications of diverse state laws shall be avoided.” Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. , 301 U.S. 196, 206 (1937) (enforcing choice of law provision in group life insurance policy). Choice of law provisions in group insurance plans promote uniformity . Moreover, because large employers and associations like the ADA have significantly more negoti ating power than individuals, “[c] hoice

- of

- law provisions contained in group life insurance policies are . . .13 less likely [than those in individual insurance policies] to have a ‘take

- it

- or - leave

- it’ character ,” and courts are accordingly especially likely to enforce choice of law provisions in group plans. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 192, cmt. h (1971). Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the plain language of the choice

- of

- law provision in several ways. First, they argue that the certificate of insurance “ should be construed in accordance with both the law of Illinois and the law of the District of Columbia, and when in conflict or [when ] Illinois law is silent on an issue, the law of the District of Columbia should prev ail and govern.” Dkt. 29

- 1 at 11 (emphasis added) . Because Illinois has no laws that “directly address[ ] or conflict[ ] with” the D.C. C ode provisions that form the bas is for Plaintiff’s claims , they argue, D.C. law controls. Id
. In other words, Plaintiffs ask the Court to give effect to the choice of law provision only to the extent that Illinois law neatly overlaps with the law of the state in which the individuals i nsured under t he group policy live. That contention, however, simply rejects the meaning of a choice of law provision. If subject to the law of “both” jurisdictions, as Plaintiffs suggest, group insurance policies would continue to lack uniform applicati on, and , if anything, uncertainty would increase. Moreover, the fact that Illinois does not have an y rule or statute that conflicts on its face with the D.C. notice provisions does not mean that Illinois law , and those who re ly on it , ar e necessarily indifferent to the issue; the absence of a rule can be as much of a po licy choice as the adoption of one
. Plaintiffs also argue that there is no “reasonable relationship” between the case and the state of Illinois. See Dkt. 39

- 2. But the qu estion is not whether a particular case bears a sufficient nexus to t he choice of law forum; rather, it is whether a “reasonable relationship exi s ts” between the group policy and the c hoice of law forum. “Unlike individual insurance14 policies, rights against the insurer under a group policy are generally governed by the law of the state where the master policy was delivered.” Karpenski v. Am. Gen. Life Cos. , LLC , 999 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (brackets and quotation marks omitt ed); s ee also , e.g. , Boseman , 301 U.S. at 206 ; Whiting , 637 F.3d at 361; Miller v. Home Ins. Co. , 605 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 192, cmt. h (1971)
. Indeed, in light of the strong interest in uniformity , the Restatement ru le is that even in the absence of a choice

- of

- law provision, the location of a group policyholder

— not of the insured individual or the litigation

— governs disputes between individuals and insurance companie s . See Restatement (Second ) of Conflict of Laws § 192 cmt. h (1971). Plaintiffs next argue that the choice of law provision in the group policy “must be balanced with the interests of the District of Columbia in protecting its residents from wrongful or deceptive acts of insurance companies.” Dkt. 29

- 1 at 8. The D.C. Circuit, however, at least implicitly rejected just that approach in Whiting
. In the underlying distri ct court decision in that
case , the court balanced Arizona’s interests against D.C.’s interests to determine which jurisdiction’s consum er protection laws applied, and it considered the choice

- of

- law provision as one factor in that analysis. Whiting v. AARP , 701 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2010). 7 Reviewing that decision, the Court of Appeals did not engage in an interest

- balancing approach , but, instead , concluded that the choice of law provision was dispositive based solely on that the fact that the group policyholder was located in D.C. , thus establishing a “reasonable relationshi p ” with the juris diction. C ompare Whiting , 637 F.3d at 361 , with Whiting , 701 F. Supp. 2d at 29.

7 As to other issues, the district court concluded that no choice of law analysis was necessary because the laws did not conflict
. 701 F. Supp. 29 at 26.15 C ourts do, of course, decline to enforce contractual choice of law provisions that
c ontravene a “‘fundamental policy’” of a state with “‘a materially greater interest than the chosen
s tate.’” Restateme nt (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 187(2)
. Maryland common law

— to whic h “D.C. law ‘commonly looks for guidance in the absence of its own precedents,’” Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co
. , 351 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

— recognizes this exception. See, e.g. , Nat’l Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Props., Inc. , 650 A.2d 246, 249 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) . But the exception does not apply whenever there is a mere difference in law ; indeed, such a rule would entirely defeat the utility of choice of l aw covenants . Rather, for another state’s “law to be unenforceable, there must be ‘a strong public policy against its enforcement, ’” id. , and Maryland “has not hesitated to apply out

- of

- state law, even where it would trump an act of the [legislature].” Henry v. Gateway, Inc. , 979 A.2d 287 , 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. , 2009). Maryland courts thus typically reserve application of the public policy exception to unusual circumstances, such as where a statute expressly states that its violation would be contrar y to public policy, see , e.g. , Nat’l Glass , 650 A.2d at 250, or where application of another state’s law would violate policy expressed i n Maryland’s state constitution. Henry , 979 A.2d at 9
. Although it is possible that D.C. courts might, in some circum stances, decline to enforce state laws that are less protective of individual life insurance for public policy reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to show that such a departure from the ordinary rule is warranted here. First, given that the ADA , which negotia ted the policy, is based in Illinois, and that Orchin is one of many insured individuals, it is not at all clear that the District of Columbia has a “materially greater interest” in this dispute than Illinois
. Moreover, although Plaintiffs’ claims are pre dicated on statutory and regulatory provisions that govern life insurance “policies” issued or delivered in D.C ., a separate provision of the D.C. Life Insurance Act specifically provides that “the standard16 provisions required for individual life insurance policies shall not apply to group life insurance policies” that are delivered in the District. D.C. Code § 31

- 4711. In other words, it is not even clear that group insurance policies issued in D.C. would , in any event, be subject to the provisions up on which Plaintiffs rely. Plaintiffs also mount several arguments against the termination of the insurance that are not exclusively predica ted on D.C. law
. They allege that when Dr. Gadaire assigned his insurance to the Trust and, as required, filed relate d paperwork with Great

- West , he also submitted a copy of t he Trust A g reement . See Dkt. 29

- 20
. 8 Plaintiffs characterize this submission as an “offer,” and co ntend that by effectuating the a ssignment and accepting payments from Orchin (rather than from Dr. Gadaire), Great

- West impliedly “accepted the benefits” of a “contractual Assignment Agreement between [Great

- West], Dr. Gadaire, and the Trust” that bound Great

- West to abide by terms of the T rust. Plaintiffs attempt to cast Great

West as an active pa rticipant in this so

- called “contractual Assignment Agreement between [Great

- West], Dr. Gadaire, and the Trust” by suggesting that Great

- West

— rather than Dr. Gadaire

— “assigned” the insurance to the Trust. The Trust A greement, in turn, provided that notice of premiums should be sent to both Orchin and Dr. Gadaire. Dkt. 29

- 4 at 8. (“All premium notices shall be mailed to the Trustee
. . . , with a copy to the Grantor ” ). Thus, the argument goes, Great

- West breached its contract by failing to mail notices to Dr. Gadaire.

8 In support of their argument that they submitted the trust agreement to Great

- West, Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of Mrs. Gadaire, who submitted an affidavit stating that “[a]s office manager, [she] submitted the [assignment forms] to Great

- West for processing. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I enclosed a copy of the Trust Agreement with my submission.” Dkt. 29

- 20 ¶ 6
.17 This argu ment merits little discussion
. 9 First, to the extent Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on this issue, Great

- West has adduced evidence that they did not receive the Trust Agreement in 1993
. Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 16 . More to the point, even as suming that the Trust Agreement was sent to Great

- West, Great

- West was not a party to that agreement. The Trust Agreemen t is, on its face, “between Eug ene C. Gadaire . . . (hereinafter referred to as ‘Grantor’ ), and Jeremy D. Orch in (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trustee’ )
. ” Dkt. 1

- 2 at 2. Great

- West is not mentioned in the Trust Agreement, except in an attachment listing two insurance policies

— and even that attachment describes the “insurance trust agreement . . . between Eugene C. Gadaire, Grantor, and Jeremy D. Orchin, Trustee.” Id. at 12. The Court concludes as a matter of law that m ailing this fully

- executed agreement, along with a “change of ownership” form and a “change of beneficiary” form, did not make Gre at
- West a party to the Trust Agreement , even though Great

West continued to accept payments for the insurance from the Trust
. Dkt. 1

- 3 and Dkt. 1

- 4. Finally, Plaintiffs’ third claim allege s that Great

- West breached an implied “duty to maintain contact with the insured” by failing to send “correspondence, notices, or premium statements” to Dr. Gadaire. Dkt. 26 at ¶¶ 68

- 72; Dkt. 21 ¶¶ 53

- 56. Great

- West argue s that nothing in the insurance contract imposed such a condition and that there is no evidence that anyone ever re quested that Great

- West send notices to Dr. Gadaire
. Pl aintiffs do not respond to this argument, but, instead, recharacterize the claim as one alleging that Great

- West breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to notify Dr. Gadair e prior to cancelling the

9 Plaintiff submitted an expert report asserting that if the Trust was received prior to the lapse of the insurance , “any notice sent to the Trustee should have been provided to Dr. Gadaire.” Dkt. 29

- 22 at 3. However, “[a]n expert witness may not deliver legal conclusions on domestic law, for legal principles are outside the witness’ area o f expertise under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Weston v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 78 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1996), opinion amended on reh'g , 86 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1996).18 insurance, and they a ssert , without explanation , that the claim is no t “ripe for summary judgment. ” Dkt. 39

- 2 at 5 (discussing California law on implied duties). Great

- West argue s that Plaintiffs are attempting , in effect, to am end their pleadings to state new claims. But even construing Plaintiffs’ pleadings as alleging claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Claim III cannot stand
. Plaintiffs’ argument is not that Great

- West acted in b ad faith ; rather, w ith no relevant authority, they ask the Court to read into the contrac t specific notice requirements that do not exist
. Plaintiffs identify no evidence that anyone ever requested that Great

- West send notice s to anyone other than Dr. Orchin after Dr. Gadai re effected a n “absolute assignment” to the T ru st, Dkt. 31

- 7 ¶ 18, and Great

- West’s failure to provide such additional notice of its own accord is not indicative of bad fa ith or a lack of fair dealing in carrying out the duties that it actually had. Cf. , e.g. , Paul v. Howard Univ. , 754 A.2d 297, 311 (D.C. 200 8). There is no basis to conclude that Great

- West was “ evad[ing] the spirit of the contract, willfully render[ing] imperfect performance, or interfer[ing] with per formance by the other party
. ” Id. Thus, even if pled, Plaintiffs would be unable to proceed on an implied covenant theory. The Court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiffs ’ claims that Great

- West violated D.C. law and breached the insurance contract or any other agreement by terminating Dr. Gadaire’s insurance 31 days after a missed payment fail as a matter of law
. Great

- West is , accordingly, entitled to summary judgment on Count I (“Breach of Contract: D.C. Code § 31

- 4201”); Count III (“Breach of Contract: Duty to Maintain Contact with the Insured”); Count IV (“Breach of Contract: DCMR 26

- A300 et seq. ”); and Count V (“Breach of Contract: Duty to Provid e Notices to Insured”) of both amended c ompla ints. Dkt. 21 and Dkt. 26.19 2. The February 2010 Reinstatement Of Coverage Because the Court rejects Pl aintiffs’ contentions that the insurance was never val idly terminated, the Court must next consider whether Great

- West’s subsequent decision to reinstate the coverage is enforceable. The parties do not dispute that at the time Great

- West agreed to reinstate Dr. Gad aire’s life insurance coverage , the company was unaware that Dr. Gadaire had died. Nor, with a few small exceptions, do the parties dispute the details of Orchin ’s communications with Great

- West and the events that followed the reinstatement of Dr. Gadaire’s insurance . Based on the l argely undisput ed facts, Great

- West argue s that the reinstatement of insurance is voidable under Illinois law because the insured loss occ urred before the reinstatement and the insurance company was un aware of the los s, and that , in any event, Orchin fr aud ulently induced Great

- West to reinstate the policy by mis leading the company to believe that Dr. Ga daire was alive. Under Illinois law, “ [f] orfeiture of an insurance contract for nonpayment of premium is not favored in the law, and courts are prompt to s eize upon circumstances which indicate a waiver of forfeiture ” or lapse. Van Hulle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 254 N.E.2d 457 , 461 (Ill. 1969 ). But , although Illinois courts are quick to impute knowledge of a loss to an insurance company and are pr epared to find waiver of a lapse based on even modest indications of assent,
some indicia of an insurance company’s knowledge of an existing loss is required. The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Van Hulle highlights how this line is drawn. In that case, an insured woman died in a car accident shortly after being informed that her insurance policy had lapsed but would be reinstated upon payment of a premium. Id. at 459. In the wreckage, her husband found an envelope with a signed check intended to reinstate the policy. Her insurance agent was informed of the lo ss and the already

- signed check. Id. He explained that he could not20 accept the check , but that the check could be mailed directly to the in surance company’s office and that the comp any could decide whether to accept it. Id. The agent then informed the claim s office of the situation, and the insurance company subsequently deposited the check. The state Supreme Court concluded that the cashi ng of the check constituted a waiver of the l apse
— but it repeatedly emphasized the importance of the insurance company’s knowledge of the loss. See, e.g. , id. at 460 . The Court wrote, for example, that “[t] o imply the waiver of lapse the insurer must hav e kn owledge of the intervening loss,” id. at 460, and that “t o constitute waiver an intent to get retroactive coverage must b e communicated to the insurer,” id . at 461
. Relying on Van Hulle , other Illinois courts have both declined to find the waiver of a lapse where the insurance company lacked knowl edge of the pre

- existing loss, s ee Kelly v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. , 553 N.E.2d 41 2, 414

- 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and, although enforcing a policy, observed that “[i]n order to imply a waiver of lapse, the insur er must have knowledge of the intervening loss,” Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Brown , 300 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Il l. Ct. App. 1973)
. This focus on the insurer’s actual knowledge dates back to the Illinois Supreme Court ’s decision in Miller v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. , 110 Ill. 102 ( 1884). There, an insurance agent accepted an overdue premium payment from a friend of the insured . At the time, neither the friend nor the agent knew that the insured had already died. The state Supreme Court concluded that the accept ance of the payment did not renew the insurance contract or “wai ve a forfeiture already accrued. ” Id. at 107. The Court explained that a “waiver presupposes knowledge of the right waived, and is not to be inferred from a purely negligent act, or one done under a misapprehension of the real condition of the rights of the parties at the time; and a renewal contract of insurance necessarily requires the continued existence of that which is insured.” Id.21 Courts in other jurisdictions have taken similar appr oaches. As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed in Southern States Life Ins. Co. v. Matthews , 20 5 F.2d 830, 832 (4th Cir. 1953), “[i] t is firmly established that the acceptance of overdue premiums on a life insurance policy after death of the insured does not constitute a waiver of the delinquency, if the insurer has no knowledge of the death, since in such case there could obviously be no intentional relinquishment of a known right.” See also Dehart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , No. 42932, 198 2 WL 2473, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 15, 1982) (“[K]nowledge of an intervening loss of liability for payment has normally been held to be a prerequisite to waiver.”) ; O’ Connor v. Metro. Life Ins. Co
. , 186 A. 618, 622 (Conn. 1936) (“ The authorities generall y agree that a waiver by reason of the receipt of overdue premiums does not arise where, at the time when that waiver is claimed to have occurred, the insured is dead but the insurer is ignorant of that fact. ”)
. Here, there is no dispute that Great

- West was unaware of Dr. Gadaire’s death when it agreed to reinstate his insurance. Indeed, the company discussed the possibility that Dr. Gadaire might be required to reapply for the insurance and only agreed to the wa iver so that Dr. Gadaire could avoid the otherwise required medical exam. See Dkt. 29

- 10 at 5; Dkt. 29

- 13 at 8 . At the same time, it also warned Orchin that this was a one - time exception

— a w arning t hat clearly contemplated ongoing coverage
. Dkt. 29

- 17 a t 2
. Plaintiffs argue that the “knowledge” requirement applies only to cases involving implied waivers, and that the waiver here was express. But the point of these cases is that an in surer’s decision to reinstate insurance going forward does not equate to a decision t o cover already

- incurred losses. Given this rationale, t here is no reason to conclude that express reinstatements should be treated differently than implied reinstatements for these purposes. The decision to insure a risk of possible loss in the future is of an entirely different nature than the decision to insure a loss that has already22 occurred. To paraphrase the Illinois Supreme Court, an insurance company cannot knowingly and intentionally relinquish a right to enforce a lapse in coverage

— whether expressly or by imp lication

— when it does not know that the insured loss has already occurred. Plaintiffs also argue that the reinstatement should be enforced because Great

- West knew that Dr. Gadaire was “uninsurable” for medical reasons when it reinstated the insurance
. Dkt
. 39

- 2 at 19
. But there is a fundamental difference between agreeing to insure a living person whose health makes insurance riskier, and agreeing to insure the life of someone who is already deceased. Even taking into account the flexible approach warranted in determining whether an insurer waived its right to deny coverage for losses incurred when the insurance had lapsed, the Court concludes that the reinstatement of insurance on Dr. Gadaire’s life is unenforceable. For this reason , Great

- West is entitled to summary judgment as to Count II of both amended
c omplaints , which is predicated on the failure to pay the policy proceeds after reinstatement
. Great

- West further argue s that even if the reinstatem ent was not voidable solely for lack of knowledge, Orchin fraudulently induced Great

- West to reinstate the insurance coverage
. Although the tas k of demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment on a claim or defense of fraud is a daunting one, Great

- West has made a compelling case that Orchin’s failure to disclose to Great

- West that D r. Gadaire had died m ight well satisfy this d emanding standard. Because the Court has already concluded that reinstatement was voidable becaus e Great

- West was unaware that the insured died before the insurance was reinstated, however, it is not necessary to reach this question. The Court, accordingly, declines to decide whether Great

- West has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment on this alternative theory.23 B . Mrs. Gadaire’s Claims Against Orchin This leaves Mrs. Gadaire’s claims , as beneficiary of the Trust, against Orch in for allowing the insurance to lapse . She now seeks summary judgment on two of those three claims: Negligence (Count VI) and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count VIII). As an initial matter, the Court notes that, unlike the claims arising out of the insurance contract, the parties do not dispute that these claims are governe d by District of Columbia law. In relevant respects, Mrs. Gadaire alleges that Orchin’s failure to update his address of record with Great

- West “caus[ed ] him not to receive either the Pre mium Notice or the Lapse Notice ” and eventually resulted in the non

- payment of the insurance premiums. Dkt. 30

- 1 at 11
. Under District of Columbia law, a cause of action for negligence requires the existence of a duty
o f care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty that proximately causes harm to the plaintiff. Dist. o f Columbia v. Harris , 770 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C. 2001). The applicable standard of care is “ordinary care under all of the circumstan ces,” and “ the amount of care owed a plaintiff by a particular defenda nt is ‘a relative concept’ that changes ‘according to circumstances.’” Sinai v. Polinger Co ., 498 A.2d 520, 531 (D.C. 1985)
. A cause of action for b r each of fiduciary duty , in turn, req uires that the defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty; that the defendant breached that duty; and that the breach proximately caused harm to the plaintiff. See 3M Co. v. Boulter , 842 F. Su pp. 2d 85, 118

- 19 (D.D.C. 2012). D.C. also has specific laws
re gulating the conduct of trustees, including D.C. Code § 19

- 1308.09, which provides that “[a] trustee shall take reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property,” and D.C. Code § 19

- 1310.02(a), which provides that “[a] trus tee who commits a breach of trust is liable to the beneficiaries [ for ] . . . the amount required to restore the value of the trust property.”24 Although a close question, the Court concludes tha t summary judgment is not warranted
o n the current record
. I t is undisputed that Orchin did not update his ad dres s of record with Great

- West but t hat he submitted form s to the post office to have his mail forwarded. See Dkt. 37

- 10 at 58. B eyond that, however, the record says little about the timing and circumstances of Orchin’s moves , the care that he exercised as Trustee, whether it was reasonable for him to expect the insurance notices to make it to his new address , or whether it was reasonable for him to rely solely on the mail as a reminder to make payments
. Orchin conte nds that the Trust Agreement provides that he is not liable for “any action taken or not taken or for any loss of depreciation in the value of any property in the trust estate, whether due to an error of judgment or otherwise, where such Trustee has exerci sed good faith and ordinary diligence in the exercise of his duties.” Dkt. 29

- 4 at 14 (emphasis added). He contends that he acted in good fai th and with “ordinary diligence. ” Although Mrs. Gadaire disputes this conclusion, she does not cite any authority that defines the contours of “ordinary diligence” as a m atter of law

— and not fact. To the contrary, “ determining the applicable standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. ” Burke v. Scaggs , 867 A.2d 213, 219 (D.C. 2005) ; see also, e.g. , Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDavitt , 804 A.2d 275, 285

- 86 (D.C . 2002) (question of applicable standard of care was “a subject amenable to common sense, to which the lay jurors . . . could apply their own experience in deciding how any reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances.”) (quotation ma rks omitted). Orchin also raises a number of potential defenses. He argues, for example, that Mrs. Gadaire failed to provide him with the money required for payments; did not notify him that she had not provided the necessary funds for two insurance periods; failed to “institute any sort of calendar system” to track her obligation to provide the funds; and failed to notify Great

- West25 that she was not receiving copies of premium notices. Dkt. 37 at 11

- 12. Although the undisputed ev idence shows that, in the past, Orchin had notified Mrs. Gadaire when she should make payments into the Trust account to facilitate his payments to the insurer, Dkt. 29

- 5 at 8 , Orchin apparently suggests that Mrs. Gadaire bore at least a portion of the res ponsibility for failing to notice that the insurance payments were not being made as required. Relatedly, Orchin also argues that his only d uties were those defined in the Trust Agreement and that , because the Trust Agreement imposed only a duty to pay pr emiums if the Trust’s account had sufficient funds, he cannot be held liable for the failure to make payments. See Dkt. 37 at 8

- 10. In response to these defenses, Mrs. Gadaire contends that a beneficiary of a trust cannot be held contributorily neglige nt as a matter of law, relying on precedent from Colorado , New York, and Utah. Dkt . 43 at 11. At least some courts, however, have concluded that contributory negligence applies to actions for breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g. , Solutia Inc. v. FMC Corp
. , 456 F. Supp. 2d 429, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing conflicting authorities under New York law). This issue , however, was only raised in a single paragraph on the last page of Mrs. Gadaire’s reply brief , Dkt. 43 at 11, and that paragraph does not addres s whether the District of Columbia follows or would adopt this rule
. B ecause the issue was raised in reply, moreover, Orchin has not had an opportunity to respond to the argument. Accordingly , the Court is not prepared to resolve this legal issue at this time and will instead allow the parties an opportunity to raise it at a later stage. Although the Court recognizes that Mrs. Gadaire’s arguments have considerable force, at least on the present record and in light of the briefing to date, Mrs. Gadaire has failed to demonstrate that there is no issue of fact for the jury . A ccordingly, the Court will deny Mrs. Gadaire’s motion for summary judgment. This denial, however, is without prejudice to Mrs. Gadaire filing a renewed motion addressing (1) whether D.C. law permits a trustee to assert the26 defense of contributory negligence against the trust’ s beneficiary, and (2) whether or in what circumstances a court can conclude as a matter of law that a defendant’s conduct v iolated the applicable standard of care. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, Great

- West’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 31, is GRANTED ; Orchin’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29, is DENIED , and Mrs. Gadaire’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 30, is DENIED without prejudice
. /s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge Date: September 30, 2015