### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 210 -CR

G r e go r y M ic hae l K

lap e sky , A ppe lla nt
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 03- 1063 -K 26 , HO NORAB LE B ILLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Appellant Gr eg ory

Michae l Klapesky

appea ls his conviction for f irst-deg ree murder of his wife, K ali Sansone. See Tex . Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (2) ( West 2003). The jury found appellant guilty

and asse ssed his punishment at imprisonment for life.

P OIN TS OF ER RO R Appellant adva

nces f our points of err or. F irst, appellant conte nds that the t rial cour t
err ed in fa iling to allow a h earing on appellant’ s motion for a newtrial. Second, a ppellant urg es that the trial cour

t erre d in removing his first appointed trial counse l on the State’s motion. Third,
a pp e lla nt a sse rt s th a t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli ng his mot ion to su

pp re ss the e vid e nc e fo un d in appellant’ s vehicle. F ourth, appellant claims that the trial court e rre d in allowing the alternate jurors to e nter the jury

room to beg in deliberation in viol ation of ar ticle 36.22. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. ar t. 36.22 (West 2006) (conve rsing with jury).2 BACK GR OUND Ap pe lla nt d o e s no t c ha lle ng e the le g a l or fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s us ta in the conviction. A br ief summary of the voluminous evidence will place the points of e rror in proper perspe ctive. Appe llant and Kali Sansone lived tog ether and then late r marr ied in 2001. They had a son, Philli p , soon therea fter. A ppellant was on f

elony probation for

possession of narc otics and he c ontinued to have diff iculties with ill eg al d ru gs . He did ac quire a rea l estate lice nse and started wor

k in that field. Appellant a nd his wife we nt to a marria g e counse lor in an attempt to save their marr iag e. The y

had monetar

y problems. The family

car s were reposse ssed bec ause of loans
ma de to a pp e lla nt. K a li ’s par ents, Phill ip and “Ne ca” Sansone, beg an to provide mone y to Kali, who was working . They purcha sed a home i n Cedar Par k and plac ed the title in Kali’s name . The Sansones also purcha sed a 1994 White L exus automobi le and plac ed the title in Kali’s name
.

Sometime in J u l y 2 0 0 3 , a motion to revoke a ppellant’s probation was filed and a
war rant for his arre st was issued. To avoid a rre s t , appellant fled to Mexi co with a g irl named “Summer.” B efor e leaving the Austin area , appellant sold a numbe r of items and a boat to financ e his trip. L ater , appellant be g an conta cting friends in Te x as to send him money for fo o d
. Severa l friends c omplied with the reque sts. I n ear ly September 2003, due to the lack of money , appellant returne d to Texas. His friend , Elfeg o Wences, met a ppellant at the Me x ican bor der a nd drove
a pp e lla nt t o A us tin . O n thi s tr ip, a pp e lla nt tol d Wen c e s that he pla nn e d to se ll the Ce da

r P ark ho me and buil d a h o m e in M exico where he would live per manently . Appellant first stay ed in a spa re room at the Wence s’s house, but moved around to diff ere nt Austin homes of friends. Wence s saw3

a pp e lla nt d ri vin g a y e llo w C hr

y sle r c ar. Ap pe lla

nt re tur ne d on on e oc c a sio n wi th a wo man, no t hi s wi fe . Wh e n We nc e s le arn e d th e y we re smo kin g mari hu ana , h e re mon str a te d w itha pp e lla nt. J ohn Her nandez, another Austin friend, had purc hased the boat from a ppellant and later se nt money to appellant in Mexi co. On September 19, 2003, Her

nandez re ceive d a ca ll from appellant a sking f

or help in moving items from the C edar Park house. I n the early morning hours of September

21, 2003, betwee n 1:00 and 6:00 a.m., Hernande z rec eived severa l urg ent telephone
c a lls fr om a

pp e lla nt a sk ingfo r he lp in mov ing
. He rn and e z te sti fi e d that on that date , h e dr ov e his Toy ota L and Cruiser and picked up appellant at a bus stop near the Wences home. The y then drove to t he Ce da r Park ho us e wh e re a

pp e lla nt c los e d th e g ara g e do or s a ft e r H e rn and e z dr ov e his ve hic le inside. He he lped appe llant loa d the vehicle with personal items and ba by clothes. He did not see any proper ty belong ing to a

ppellant’s wife , Kali. On the r eturn trip, appe llant u s ed a cell phone and had some methamphetamine a nd marihuana

delivere d to them en route , which they both used on the re turn trip. Appellant told Her nandez that he (appe llant) had been arguing with Kali for thre e day s and had be en unable to sleep. At some point, appellant asked He rnande z if he had eve r killed any one. When Her

nandez posed the same question to appella n t, he re sponded that he ha d never k i l l e d an y o n e “ t h a t d i dn ’ t d e s e r v e i t
. ” A p p e l l an t t h e n s t a t e d , “ W h a t i f I t o l d y o u I k i l l e d m y w i f e ?” Appellant re lated to H erna ndez that he loved Kali and wa nted to g et bac k toge ther with her , but she
was c razy beca use she ha d tried to kill him by running over him with a c ar. When they

arr ived at the W ence s home, Hernande z saw a white L exus parked in the drivewa y . He he lped appe llant move the items from his vehicle into a r oom in the Wences home. Th e re a ft e r, He rn and e z le ft the pr e mis e s.4 J essica Wenc es, Elfe g o’s wife , testified that appe llant, in a white L exus, arrived at her home in the ear ly

morning hours of Sunday , September 21, 2003, with his son, Phill ip. She took
car e of Phillip when appe llant left. He later re turned with He rnande z. Af ter He rnande z’s departure , appellant be g an pac king items into the L exus. Jessica Wences saw appellant try

ing to plac e what appea red to be a lar g e metal ba r in the L exus’s t ru n k
. W h en t h e trunk wa s opened, she saw something like a g rey

ish-bluish a ir mattress there in. Unable to g et the “bar ” in the trunk, a ppellant place d it insi de the L exus. Appellant was in a hurr y and when the L exus was packe d with items, he le ft in t he L e xus w ithhis so n, Phi lli p, in t he ba c k s e a t. Eu g e nio Ga

me z ha d wo rk e d a s a me c ha nic in his un c le ’s a

uto sh op and

ha d r e bu ilt appellant’ s Mustang au t o mobile. At about 8:30 a.m. on September 21, 2003, G amez rec eived a telephone c all from appe llant, wh o as ked if he could g o to Gamez’s house. Ga mez ag ree d, but appellant did not ar

rive until noon. He wa s in a wh i t e L ex u s au t o mobile with his son, P hillip. App ell ant told G a me z that he wa s g oin g to M e xico and wa nte d to bury

so me mon e y

in a ho le in Gamez’s bac ky ar d
. T h i s somewhat conf used Gamez. As they

talked, appe llant beg an to smoke wh a t a pp e are d to Ga

me z to be me tha

mph e tamin e . App e lla

nt l a te r t oo k a

me ta l ba r o ut o f t he L e xus,
w h ic h a p p e ar e d to G a me z to b e a p o s t h o le d ig g e r o f s o me k in d
. B o r r o w in g s h o v e ls f

r o m G a me z, appellant star

ted di g g ing in the backy ard. Gamez went inside his house. He later returned with a brea kfast tac o for a

ppellant, and f

ound a five to six foot long and one f oot deep hole in his bac ky ard. Ga m ez told a

ppellant, “You could put a body in the re.” Appellant responde d: “ There ’s no t h i n g I could have did. She wasn’t g oing to le t me see my littl e boy ag ain.” Ga

mez knew appe llant’s wife, Ka li. Ap pe lla

nt t old Ga me z that Ka li ha d be e n “c he a tin g on him .” Ga me z be c a me un c omf

or ta ble5

and told appellant that he (Gamez) had to leave , t h at his uncle would be c oming by , and aske d appellant to come back later. As appe llant drove off , Gamez observe d that the re ar e nd of the L exus was lowe r than it should be.

Gamez left his house with his family . As he drove to his uncle’ s house, Gamez saw appellant at a nea

rby convenie nce store . After arr iving at his uncle’s house, Ga mez revea led what had occ urre d, and his suspicions. Two of the f emale r elatives ther e ca lled 911 and conta cted the po lic e . When Ga

me z re tur ne d home , his famil y we nt ins ide . Game z the n a pp ro a c he d a

pp e lla nt i n the L exus parked on Gamez’s property . He obse rved that appell an t had a six pack of bee r and was g oing thr oug h Kali’s purse. As appe llant threw items out of the purse , he would say that “she won’t have use for

this any more.” The poli ce had not arr ived, and Gamez was worrie d about what appellant would do nex t. To distract him , Gamez offere d him a marihuana cig are tte, which appe llant grab b ed
. Ab o u tt h i s t i m e, Ga m ez s aw t h e p o l i ce v eh i cl e ap p ro ac h i n g.

Hay s County

Deputy Sheriff L enny Martinez testified that he r ece ived a dispatc h at 4:16 p.m. on September 21, 2003, about a man in a white L exus wit h a boy in the car and the man’ s
mur de re d w if

e in t he tr un k. Up on arr ivi ng a t the Ga me z ho me , M art ine z saw the wh ite L e xus, its driver, a nd a y oung boy . Wit h his weapon dr awn, Ma rtinez ordere d appellant to g et out of the L exus
an d o n h i s kn e e s . A s M art i n e z g o t c l o s e r t o t h e c ar ’ s t r u n k , h e s m e l l e d t h e o d o ro f a d e a d b o dy. Appellant would not conse nt to a search of the t runk wit hout a warra nt. Martinez opened the trunk and found the body

of Ka li Sansone rolled in an air mattress, wra

pped in bed linens a

nd other clothing, a

nd tied with a cut-up g arde n hose.6 At the tim e of bo ok ing , a

pp e lla nt dis pla y e d sig ns of

int oxic a tio n: p oo r e y e c on ta c t, slurred speech, and poor balanc e. He a lso ex hibited signs of la ck of slee p. At a hospital, appe llant’s blood was t aken for testi ng . His blood alcohol content was low, but he tested positive for ma rihuana and methamphe tamine.

The body of Kali S ansone w as transpor ted to the morg ue in the same condition it was found in the trunk of the L exus. Dr. Eliz abeth Peacock, Travis C ounty Deputy Medica l Ex aminer, testified t hat after the autopsy , she determined Kali Sansone was the victim of homicide by manual str angulatio n. Th e re we re pr e ssu re po int s o n b oth

sid e s o f t he ne c k b ut n o e vid e nc e of any str ug g le or def ensive wounds. I t w as shown that appellant was a strongman with a muscular build. Among the ite ms that he re mov e d f ro m th e Ce da

r P ark ho us e wa s h is w e ig ht- lif

tin g e qu ipm e nt. The de fense rested a

nd closed with the State. At the conclusion of the testimony at the g uil t/i nn oc e nc e sta g e , in op e n c ourt

and in t he jur y ’s a bs e nc e , a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l e xpla ine d to th e t ri al cour

t and for the purpose of

the re cord w hy

no evidenc e had be en off ere d on behalf

of
a pp e lla nt. Th is e xplanatio n w a s ma de in a pp e llant’ s pre se nc e . Co un se l st a te d th a t th e de fe ns e evidenc e would have shown ac ts of violence be tween Kali and appe llant. The district attorney had made c lear

that in response to such defe nsive evidenc e, the State would of fer evidenc e that appe llant tried to drown Ka li, had choked a nother fe male, and had commit ted ot her ex tremely prejudicia l bad acts. I t had bee n decide d that a re asonable approa ch would be not to pre sent the pl anned de fensive evidenc e, which w ould open the door to e vidence that would be har mful to appellant. Counsel stated that he and co-c ou ns e l ha d “ ta lke d to Mik e [ap pe lla nt] a nd he a g re e s th a t’ s th e re a so na ble wa y to proce ed. B ut we wa

nted to put our rea soning on the rec ord.”7 M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS I n h is thir d p oin t of

e rr or , app ell ant c la ims tha t th e “ tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in fa ili ngto
su pp re ss t he e vid e nc e fo un d in

a pp e lla nt’ s v e hic le .” Ap pe lla

nt fi le d a pr e tr ia l mot ion

to s up pr e ss all evidenc e seized from the trunk of the white L exus, cla iming that it c onstitut ed an i l l egal
warrantles s s e ar c h in

v io lati o no f

th e F o u rth

an d F o u rte e n th

A me n d me n ts to th e U n it e d St ates Constit ution and article I , section 9 of the Texas Constitution. B efor e trial, the tria l court hea rd the motion to s uppress a

nd overr uled it. Appellant urg es such ruling was in er ror a nd reque sts a reve rsal of his conviction.

Duri ngtr ia l, w he n th e State int ro du c e d p ho tog ra

ph s o f t he L e xus a

uto mob ile a nd

its contents at the time of the sear ch, appe llant stated: “No objec tion, Your Hon o r. ” L ater , when a videotape a

t the scene of the sea

rch showingthe re moval of a body from the L exus’s t ru nk was offe red into evide nce by

the State, appe llant ag ain stated: “No objection.” No objection was made wh e n D r. Pe a c oc k te sti fi e d that the vic tim ’s bo dy wa s b ro ug ht t o th e me dic a l e xami ne r’ s o ff ic e in the same condition as i t had been found, on an air mattress, wra

pped in bed linens, a

nd tied with a g arde n hose. When a videota pe an d p h o t o gra phs of the autopsy wer e off ere d into evidence , appellant state d eac h time: “We have no objec tion, Your Honor.”

When a pre trial motion to suppress evidence is overruled, a defe ndant nee d not object
su bs e qu e ntl y

a t tr ia l in or de r t o p re se rv e e rr or . H ow e ve r, wh e n th e de fe nd ant a ff ir ma tiv e ly a sse rt s during trial that he has no objection t o the admis sion of t he complained-of e vidence , he wa ives any
err or i n the admis sion of t he evidence. Se e Mo od yv . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 875, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 92 ); De e n v . S

tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d 80 , 83 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ); Mo ragu e z v . S tat e , 701 S.W .2dDistrict Attorney J ohn Br adley

was lea d counsel for

the State in the instant case
. 1 8 90 2, 90 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); Ge ar ing v . S tat e , 685 S.W .2d 325, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Fi e rro v . S

tat e , 9 69 S.W. 2d

51 , 5 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 98 , n o p e t.) . T he thi rd po int of e rr or is
overr uled on the basis of w aiver
.
RE M OV AL OF CO UN SEL I n his se cond point of err or, appe llant claims that the “trial c ourt err ed in re moving trial counsel on [the] S tate’s motion [and] over a ppellant’s objec tions.” After two hear ings on the State’s pre trial motion to disqualify Mike Davis, appellant’ s first appointed counsel, the trial court
remove d Davis as counsel on the basis of his c onflict of intere st. The evidenc e wa s undisputed that Da vis ha d b e e n e mpl oy e d in the pa st by Willi a mso n Coun ty to r e pr e se nt t he c ounty and its of fi c ia ls in civil law case s. At the time of the hea ring s, Davis was rep re s en t i n g the county on appea l in a fede ral c ivil rights ca se, in which district attorne y J ohn Br adley had bee n a par ty and had be en 1 repr esente d by

Davis. Davis also repre sented the c ounty and the she riff in a

nother pe nding c ase, br ou g ht b y

fi re d e mpl oy e e s a g a ins t th e sh e ri ff , in wh ic h th e dis tr ic t att orn e y and so me of his
a ssi sta nts wo uld po ssi bly be c ome wi tne sse s. Both the f

eder al and state constitutions guar antee a d ef en d an t , in a cr iminal case, the rig ht to have the a ssistance of c ounsel. See U.S. Cons t
. am end. VI ; Tex. C onst. art. I § 10; see also Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 1 .0 5 ( Wes t 20 05 ); Ex parte Pre jean , 625 S.W .2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). This ri gh t co n t empl ates a defe ndant’s rig ht to obtain assistance fr om counsel of the defe ndant’s choosing
. Go nz ale s v . S tat e , 117 S.W .3d 831, 836-37 (Te x . Crim. App.9

2003). Howe ver, the rig ht is not absolute. W heat v. United States , 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). A defe ndant has no rig ht to an advoca te who is not a member

of the ba r, an attorney

he ca nnot affor d, or who de clines to repr esent him, or an attorney who has a previous or ong oing r elationship with an opposing pa

rty
. Id. ; Gonzales , 117 S.W .3d at 837. One of the limitations arises w hen counse l has
an a c tu a l o r p o te n ti a l c o n f li c t o f in te r e s t in r e p r e s e n ti n g th e d efe ndant. Br ink v . S tat e , 78 S.W .3d 47 8, 48 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; see also G lasser v. United St ates , 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).

Th e re is, of

c ours e , a

str on g pr e su mpt ion

in f a vo r o f a

defe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o reta in counsel of choice , but this presumption m ay be over ridden by other important conside rations relating to the integ rity

of the ju d i ci al p ro cess a nd the fa ir and orde rly

administration of justice. Gonzalez , 117 S.W .3d at 837. A t rial court has an independe nt duty to ensure a

fair tr ial and may infring e upon a defe ndant’s constitutional rig ht to counsel if there is an ac tual or ser ious potential for c onflict of intere st. Brink , 7 8 S
. W
. 3 d at 4 8 5 -8 6 (c i t i n g S tearnes v. Clinton , 780 S.W .2d 216, 222-23 (Te x . Crim. App. 1989)).

A trial cour

t’s act i o n s ri se to a c onstitut ional level if the c ourt unrea sonably or arbitra rily interfe res with a defenda nt’s rig ht to choose counsel. Gonzalez , 117 S.W .3d at 837. Gre at caution must be exercise d in disqualify ing or removing defe nse counse l. Id
. I n the instant case , appellant wa s repr esented by appointed counse l after

reta ined counsel withdre w. Some distinctions arise betwee n defe ndants who retain attorney s to defe nd them
an d defe ndants for w hom attorney s are appointed. Cam ac ho v . S tat e , 6 5 S. W. 3 d 1 0 7, 109 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 00 , n o p e t.)
. Ge ne ra lly , a de fe nd ant ha s the ri g ht t o r e ta in c ouns e l of his10

own choice
. Stearnes , 780 S.W .2d 216, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). An indige nt defe ndant may not, howeve r, i nsist on the appointment of a particula r attorne y . Id. at 221. Once established, the attorney -client re lationship should be protected by the courts without distinction as to whether the attorney is retained or

appointed. Id. a t 22 1- 22 ; Camacho , 65 S.W .3d at 109. The re cord in the instant ca se re flec ts t h at appellant wa s orig inally repr esente d by reta ined counse l, Be n Flore y . When Flore y was p er m i t ted to withdraw, D avis was a ppointed to repre sent appe llant. Subsequently , the State filed its mo t i o n t o d i s q ualify Davis for

a conf lict of int e re st. As de sc ri bed earl ier , p ri or to t he tw o h e ari ng s, Da

vis fi le d a

wr itt e n r e sp on se to the State’s motion, ge nera lly questioning a

ny possible conflict of inter est and a lleg ing that he was being threatened with ec onomic sanctions by the distri ct at torney . He a lleg ed that he ha d been informed that if he was n o t re moved as c ounsel for a ppellant, the district attorne y would ask the
c omm iss ion e rs c o u rto f

t h e c o u n t y

t o d i s c h ar g e h i m a s c o u n s e l i np e n d i n g l i t i g a t i o nan d n o tto employ him for furthe r litigation. Davis fur ther a lleg ed that the State’s motion had, in f act, cre ated a “ne w” c onflict of int e re s t b e t w e e n h i m an d a p p e l l an t
. H e u r g e d t h a t t h e r e w a s , f o r t h a t r e a s o n , g o o d c a

u s e f o r h im to withdraw as counsel and that new counsel should be appointed for appellant. Appe llant filed a pr o s e state me nt t

hat he de sir e d D a vis to c on tin ue a s h is c ouns e l. At the se c on d p re tr ia l he ari ngon Au g us t 5, 20 04 , on the St a te ’s mot ion , th e Sta te of fe re d to with dr aw its moti on and a llo w Davis to r e ma in a s a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l if

a pp e lla nt w ou ldUnder cer tain circ umstances, a

defe ndant may

waive his rig ht to c onflict-fr ee counsel if the 2 waiver is made knowing ly and voluntarily
. See E

x parte Pre

jean , 625 S.W. 2d 73 1, 73 3 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1981). A wr it of mand a mus to pr e ve nt an a tto rn e y ’s re mov a l f

ro m th e c a se is t

he no rm a l ve hic le 3 for se eking relief

from the compl aint now made. See B untion v. Harmon , 827 S.W .2d 945, 946 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Stearnes v. Clinton , 7 80 S.W. 2d 21 6, 21 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); se e als o Statts v. W

isser , 894 S.W .2d 366, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Attorney Mike Davis objected that the first attorney who was sug g ested as his replac ement 4 lacke d experience
. He ag ree d, howeve r, to c all attorney Patricia Cummings a

nd inform her

of her appointment when the a

ppointment was made. 11 wa ive the c on fl ict-o f-i nt eres t is su e in o rd e r t o p ro te c t any re su lti ngc on vic tio n o n a pp e a l. Da

vis 2 informed the tr ial court that he h ad i nstructed a ppellant not to waive the issue a nd there was no waiver . Davis ar g ued that ther e wa s no conflict of inter est under the circ umstances. The trial c ourt dis a g re e d a

nd g ra nte d th e State ’s mot ion . T he tr ia l c ourt wa s c on c e rn e d th a t th e c on fl ic t of int e re st
c ou ld b e su c c e ssf

ull y ra ise d in a n ineffect iv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im o n a

pp e a l or in a po stc on vic tio n s c e na

ri o. De sp ite Da

vis ’s dis c la ime r, the re c or d re fl e c ts t he po ssi bil ity

of se lf -i nte re st in future litigation employ ment. Moreove r, Davis urg ed his own withdraw al b ec au s e of a “ne w” confl ic t a n d th e a p p o in tm e n t o f

d if f e r e n t c o u n s e l. D a v is to o k s o me w h a t i n c o n s is te n t p o s itions d u ri n g t h e h ea ri n g.

Appellant did not object to the trial c ourt’s rulingon constitutional grounds or otherwise. I

n fac t, Davis expressly

stated t h at h e wo u l d n ot seek a writ bec ause of

the ruling and
none wa s filed. 3

On the same date ( Aug ust 5, 2004), with Davis’s approval, the trial court a ppointed
a tto rn e y Pa tr ic ia Cum min g s to re pr e se nt a pp e lla nt. C u m m i n gs ap p ea re d at t wo p re t ri al h ea ri n gs 4 on Aug ust 12 and Octobe r 21, 2004. Ther e wa s no objectio n t o Cummi ng s’s repr esentation. On12

Dec emb er 1 6 , 2 0 04, she wa s allowed to withdraw as counse l. Appellant answe red, “ Yes, Your Honor,” when asked by the trial court if he ag ree d to Cumm ings’ s withdrawa l. There afte r, the trial
c ourt e xpre ssl y

fo un d th a t ap pel lant

a pp ro ve d th e su

bs tit uti on of Rus se ll H un t, Jr . a s h is
new appointed counsel. On J anuar y 31, 2005, Hunt appea

red in ope n court and reque s t ed t he appointment of additional counsel, attorney Virg inia Gre enwa y . Hunt’s motion st ated that a ppellant
wa s w ill ingto a c c e pt G re e nw ay a s c ouns e l. H un t and

Gr e e nw ay

we re a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l a tto rn e y s. Under our statutory

scheme , a trial c ourt may repla ce a ppoint ed co u nsel for g ood
cause . See T e x. Co d e Cr im
. Pr o c . A n n . art. 2 6
. 0 4 ( j) ( 2 ) ( We s t Su

p p . 2 0 0 7 )
. H e r e , th e tr ia l court fo u n d fr o m the undisputed evidenc e that ther e wa s a conf lict of interest. Da

vis advised appe llant not to waive his rig ht to conflict-fr ee c ounsel. Yet, at the s ame tim e, Davis urg ed that he be allowed to withdraw a

nd new c ounsel be a

ppointed beca

use of a “new ” conflict be tween him and a ppellant
cause d by the State’s motion. This is ex actly what the court did, ex cept upon the ba sis of the orig inal conflict of interest. A def endant may

not insist on the counse l of an attorney who has a

previous or
on g oing rel ati onsh ip w ithan o pp os ingpa rt y , e ve n w he n th e op po sin g pa rt y is the g ov e rnme nt. W heat , 486 U.S. at 159.

Even if it could be sa id that the t ri al cour t erre d in gr anting the State’s motion and did not remove Dav i s fo r a p ri ncipled re ason, there was a waiver of any err or by appellant ag ree ing and accepting new c ounsel. Se e Sp rin ge r v . S tat e , 940 S.W .2d 322, 323-24 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 7, no pe t.) ; Em e rso n v . S tat e , 756 S.W .2d 364, 369 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1988, pet. re f’d)
.13 The trial c ourt did not a

buse its discr etion in r emoving Davis. The sec ond point of
err or is overr

uled.
ALTERNATE JURORS I n his fo ur th po int of e rr or , a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s that the “ tr ia l c ourt a llo we d th e a lte rn a te jur or s to e nte r the jur

y ro om to be g in de lib e ratio ns in vio la tio n of a rt ic le 36 .2 2. ” Te x. Cod e Cr im. Proc. Ann. a

rt. 36.22. Early on, the trial cour

t informed the jury

panel that two a lternate jurors would be
c ho se n in thi s murd e r c a se in t

he e ve nt a

ny on e of t he tw elv e -m e mbe r j ur y be c a me ill and

un a ble to complete jury

service in the case . The trial c ourt ex p l ai n ed that the a lternate jurors would be excused at the beg inning of deliberations if they wer e not neede d. At the conc lusion of the voir dire examination of t he jury panel, two a lternate jurors we re se lected. See id
. art. 33.011(a) (West Supp. 2007). After

the completion of jury

arguments at the g uilt/i nnocenc e stag e of the trial, the trial court e x cused the jurors to commenc e deliber ation. About five minutes later , the trial cour t had the jury returne d to the courtroom, a pologized for

not relea sing the alternate jurors, a nd discharg ed the alter nates. At the State’ s reque st, the trial court instructe d the jury not to consider any

thing said in the prese nce of

the alter nate jurors and to beg in deliberations. Appellant ag ree d the State’s
re qu e s t w a s r e a s o n a

b le
. T h e tr ia l c o u rt th e n a s k e d th e ju r y w h e th e r d e li b e r a ti o n s h ad bee n
commence d. The jury

in unison answere d, “No, sir.” Appellant made no objection as the jury then retire d to deliberate.14 Appellant did not raise a

ny issue about the alter

nate juror s in his mot i o n for a new trial but advanc es it for the f irst time on appeal. To pr eser ve er ror f or appe llate re view, a de fenda nt
m u s t m ak e a timely , specific objection at trial. See T e x. R
. A p p . P
. 3 3
. 1 ( a )
. A s p e c if ic contempora

neous objec tion to the claimed er ror is nec essar

y to g ive the trial court or the opposing party an opportunity to c orre ct the situation. Zill e nd e r v . S tat e , 5 57 S.W. 2d

51 5, 51 7 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1977). Ap pe lla

nt r e lie s u po n a rt ic le 36 .2 2 w hic h p ro vid e s:
No person shall be per

mitted with a jury

while it is deliberating . No per son shall be permitted to conve rse with a juror about the ca se on trial except in the pre sence and by the pe rm iss ion

of the tr ia l c ourt
. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.22.

Har m to the acc used is presumed w hen a j u ror c onverse s with an unauthorized person a bout the case
. Se e Qu inn v . S tat e , 9 58 S.W. 2d

39 5, 401 (Tex . Crim . App . 1 99 7) ; Gree n
v . S tat e , 8 40 S.W. 2d

39 4, 40 6 ( Tex
. Cr im
. App. 19 92 ); Stu ltz v . S tat e , 23 S.W .3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, pet. re f’d) ; Dr on e v . S tat e , 9 0 6 S. W.2d 608, 617 (Tex. Ap p . —Austin 1995, pet. ref ’d). I f the pre sumption of harm arise s, the State has the bur den to rebut the presumption by showing no injury or pre judice to the ac cused. Stu lts , 23 S.W .3d at 206; see also Quinn , 9 58 S.W. 2d a t 40 1. Ho we ve r, the defend ant has the ini tia l bu rd e n to sh owthat a
conver sation about the c as e o n t ri al occ urre d betwee n a juror a nd an unauthor ized person. See Cha mb lis s v . S

tat e , 6 47 S.W. 2d 25 7, 26 5- 66 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Stu lts , 23 S.W .3d at 206-07. The de fenda

nt’s burden is not satisfied if ther e is no s h o wi n g what a reporte d conver sation was about. Stu lts , 23 S.W .3d at 207. I n this case, the jur y told the tria l co u rt t h at i t h ad not begunT h e S t at e b y l e t t e r b r i e f c ite s Bo gue v . S

tat e , 204 S.W .3d 828 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 5 2006, pet. ref

’d). Bogue prese nts a si milar fac t situation as t he ins tant case . There the alter nate juror wa s in the jur

y ro om fo r ap pr oximate ly thi rt e e n minu te s bef or e the jur y wa s r e c a lle d a

nd the a lte rn a te discharg ed. Id . at 829. The court of appeals found that the trial court er red by not timely

discharg ing the alter nate juror but c onsidered the ca se a matter of jury misconduct (outside influenc e) w here the standard of

revie w was a

n abuse of discretion. Id
. Articles 33.011 (a) , (b) and 36.22 wer e not cited. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 33.011 (a ), (b) (West Supp. 2007), ar t. 36.22 (West 2006). The Bogue court a ffirme d the fe lony DWI conviction finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court a nd no appar ent harm. Id
. at 830. The right decision was reac hed despite any differ ence in the rea soning with the i nstant case . The trial c ourt’s proc edure in Bogue , afte r discover ing the err or, is interesting and wor thy of consider ation. After

the alter nate juror was discharg ed, the tria l court, in the abse nce of the re g ular jury , called the alternate as a witness and had him testify about what occ urre d during the t hirteen minut es t hat he was in the j ury room afte r submission of the case
. Id
. At the conc lusion of the trial, the tr ial court c alled the jury fore man as a

witness and inqui red into the m atter. Id . A clea r re cord w as pre serve d by such proc edure
. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. §§ 13 2. 00 1, 13 2. 00 3 ( Wes t 20 05 ); Ba hm v . S tat e , 6 219 S .W .3 d 391, 39 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ow e ns v . S tat e , 763 S.W .2d 489, 491 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref ’d); 43A Geor g e E. Dix & Robe rt O. Da ws o n , Texas Practice : Criminal Practice and Procedure § 41.26 (2d ed. 2001)
. 15 deliberations in t he five minutes that the al t er nate juror s were in the jury room, and ther e is no showing of any conver sation about the case betwee n the two alter nate juror s and the re g ular juror s during the time period invol v ed. As fa r as this rec ord is conce rned, the jurors may not have
commence d to select their pr esiding juror. Appe llant did not orig inally object nor sustain his initial burden unde r ar

ticle 36.22. The f

ourth point of err or is overr uled. 5
MOTION F OR NEW TRIAL I n his first point of e rror , appellant asser ts that the “trial court err ed in f ailing to a llow a hea ring on appellant’ s motion for a newtrial.” On Marc h 11, 2005, the trial court imposed sentence on appellant in open c ourt. On A p r i l 7 , 2 0 0 5 , a

p p e l l an tf i l e d anu n s w o r

nm o t i o nf

o r n e w t r i a l , w h i c h w a s w i t h i nt h e 3 0 d a ys require d. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 21 .4 . O n Apr il 1 1, 20 05, app ell ant fi le d h is “ inm a te a ff ida vit ” in 616

support of the motion but one day outside the 30 day

limit
. Id. The recor d does not ref lect that the motion wa s prese nted to the trial court within 10 day s as re quired. See Tex. R. App. P . 21.6. The State, on April 27, 2005, filed an a nswer w ith controvertingaff idavits from appe llant’s trial counsel reg ardingappellant’ s claim of inef fec tive assistance at trial. See Tex. R. App. P . 21.5. Appellant, in a written document filed May 2, 2005, responde d to the State’s answe r. I n an orde r filed Ma

y 2, 2005, bu t dated Apr il 29, 2005, the trial court—noting consideration of the motion for new tr ial, the State’s answ er, a nd appellant’ s response —stated that a he aringon the motion for new tria l would be held on af fidavits alone. See Tex. R. App. P
. 21.7. The orde r fur ther provided that a ll aff

idavits for the purpose of the hearing be filed by May 16, 2005. No date f

or such he ari ngwa s se t.

On May 17, 2005, appellant’ s counsel on appea l filed a written objec tion to a hear ing
on the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l ba se d o n a ff ida vit s a lon e . I n thi s d oc ume nt, sw or n to by c ouns e l, i t is alleg ed that Davis, who had been remove d as defe nse counsel, ref used to g ive an a ffidavit but was wi lli ngto t e sti fy

a t a he ari ng , and that he (D a vis ) wa s no w re pr e se nti ngoth e r i nd ig e nt d e fe nd a nts by appointment without objection from the S tate. This portion of t he af fidavit is relate d to one of the g ro un ds fo r a

ne w tri a l. On May 23 , 20 05 , a

pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l fi le d a

re qu e st f or an e xten sio n o f t ime to f

ile aff idavits. I n this written reque st, counsel alleg ed that he ha d b ee n i n fo rm ed by the trial cour

t that his written objection had be en over ruled. Att ac h ed to this request wa s the aff idavit of Renee Monroe, a

ppellant’s mother, dated May 2 0 , 2005, detailing incidents of diffic ulties betwee n the
a pp e lla nt a nd the vic tim . We fi nd

no ru lin g on

thi s mo tio n o r r e qu e st.17 The re cord doe s not ref

lect any further action. The motion for new tria l was over ruled by operation of law 75 day s after the impositi on of sentenc e. See Tex. R. App. P . 21.8 (a) , (c) . An evidentiar y hear ing on a

defe ndant’s timely

filed and pr o p erly

prese nted motion for new tr ial is n e c e ssa ry on ly if th e mot ion

and the a c c omp anyinga ff

ida vit (s ) “ ra ise ma tte rs no t de te rm ina ble from the r ecor d upon which the a ccuse d could be entitled to relief.” W all ac e v . S tat e , 106 S.W .3d 10 3, 10 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Re y es v . S tat e , 849 S.W .2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) . To be suff ici ent t o entitle a def

endant to a he aring , the motion for new tr ial and ac company ing aff idavit(s) “ne ed not establish a pr im a fa c ie case ” for a n ew trial. J

or da n v . S tat e , 883 S.W .2d 66 4, 66 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Mc In tir e v . S tat e , 698 S.W .2d 652, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’ g ). Rather , they must merely

ref lect that re asonable g rounds exist for holding that such
re l i ef could be g rante d. Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 7 4 S
. W
. 3 d

1 9 , 2 2 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ; Jordan , 883 S.W .2d at 665 (de fenda nt need only

asser t rea sonable g rounds for r elief, w hich are not de te rm ina ble fr om the re c or d in ord e r to be e nti tle d to a he ari ng ); Le mp ar

v . S tat e , 191 S.W .3d 230, 23 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 05 , p e t. r e f’ d) . T he purp os e of a he ari ng is fo r a

de fe nd ant t o f

ull y develop the issues r aised in his motion for a new trial. Jordan , 883 S.W .2d at 665. As a pre requisite to obtaining a hea ring , the motion must be ver i fi ed or supported by an aff idavit spe cifica lly

showing the truth of the g rounds of attack. Martinez , 74 S.W .3d at 21; Rey es , 849 S.W .2d at 816. Althoug h it is not specific ally require d by

statute or the Te x as Rules of Appellate Proc edure that a motion for new trial be supporte d by

an af fidavit, Texas courts, by judicial fiat, have long he ld that when the g rounds for a new tria l are outside the rec ord, a de fenda nt must support his m otion by h i s o wn aff idavit or by

the af fidavit of someone with knowledg e of18

the fa cts. Rey es , 849 S .W .2 d at 81 6; Mc In tir e , 6 98 S.W. 2d

a t 65 8; Be ar

de n v . S tat e , 648 S.W .2d 68 8, 69 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Ma lle t v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 856, 865 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2000, no pet.); 43A Ge org e E. Di x & R o b ert O. D awson, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice and Procedure § 41.23 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp
. 2 0 0 7 ). T he re quirement of a n aff idavit is to prevent “fishing expeditions ” and is a prer equisite to obtaining a hear ing and as a matter of pleading
. Rey es , 84 9 S. W.2 d at 81 6; Mc

In tir e , 698 S.W .2d at 658. A d e fe nd ant do e s no t have an a bs olute ri g ht to a he ari ng on a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. Rey es , 8 49 S.W. 2d

a t 81 5; W rig ht v. Sta te , 178 S.W .3d 905, 928 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2 005, pet. re f’d) . This is true for some of the re asons alre ady

mentioned. I n addition, the written motion for new trial must be filed within 30 day s after the date the trial court imposes or suspe nds sentenc e in open c ourt. Tex. R. App. P. 21.4( a). The motion must be “pre sented” to the trial court within 10 day s of its filing. Te x . R. App. P. 21.6. A moti on for ne w trial is denied by operation of law whe n not ruled on by written orde r within 7 5 d ay s af t er the date se ntence was imposed or suspended in open c ourt. Tex. R. App. P . 21.8(a) , (c)
.

A m oti on fo r n e w tri a l a lle g ingfa c ts out sid e the re c or d w ith ou t su pp or tin g a ff ida vit s is not a proper

pleadingand is defe ctive; a tria l court does not er r in ref using to gr an t a hea

ring on such a motion. Flores v . S tate , 1 8 S. W.3 d 7 96 , 7 98 (T e x. Ap p. —A ustin 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; see also W allace , 1 0 6 S
. W
. 3 d a t10 8; Al cot t v . S tat e , 26 S.W .3d 1, 4-5 (Te x . App.—Waco 1999), aff’d 51 S.W .3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

Ap pe lla nt’ s un sw or

n mo tio n f

or a ne w tri a l w a s ti me ly

fi le d w ith in t

he 30 -d ay tim e limit
. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 21 .4 (a ). Ap pe lla

nt’ s a ff ida vit , ho we ve r, wa s n ot f

ile d unti l th e 31 st f

ullAny a me ndme nt t o th e mot ion fo r n e w t ri al mu st als o b e c omp le te d w ith in t he same 7 30 day s. Me rc ie r v . S

tat e , 9 6 S. W.3d 56 0, 56 2 (Tex . App .—F or t Wor th 2 00 2, no pe t.) ; Mallet v . S tat e , 9 S
. W
. 3 d

8 5 6 , 8 6 5 ( T e x. A p p . — F o rtW o rt h 2 0 0 0 , n o p e t .) ; In reR. V. , J r. , 9 S.W .3d 69 2, 69 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 99 9, pe t. d e nie d) ; Gu e v ara v . S tat e , 4 S
. W
. 2 d 771, 780 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 19 99 , no p e t.) ; Ra ng e l v . S tat e , 972 S.W .2d 827, 838 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. ref’d) . Rule 21.4(b) doe s not allow an ame ndment to the motion for new tria l after the 30 da y s h a s e xpir e d. Te x. R. A pp . P. 21 .4 (b ); Merc ier , 96 S.W .3d at 562.

19 day afte r the imposition of se ntence in ope n court. A def endant may

amend his motion for newtrial befor e it is acte d upon as long as it is amended within 30 day s of the sente ncing date. Te x . R. App. P. 2 1. 4( b) ; F

l ores , 18 S.W .3d at 798. F il in g a f f id a v it s in s u p p o rt o f a mo ti o nf o r n e w tr ia l m ore 7 than 30 day s after

sentenc ing is c ons i d er ed an u n timely attempt to amend the motion. Du ga rd

v . S tat e , 688 S.W .2d 524, 529-30 (Te x . Crim. App. 1985), overrule d o n o t h ergrounds , W

illiams

v . S tat e , 78 0 S.W. 2d 80 2, 80 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); Flores , 1 8 S. W.3 d at 79 8; Ma lle t v. S tat e , 9 S.W .3d at 865.

He re , th e be la te dly

fi le d a ff ida vit wa s n ot be fo re the tr ia l c ourt and the c ourt did no t,
on th at bas is, a

bu se its dis c re tio n in

fa ili ngto c on du c t a

he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w t ri a l or in allowing the m otion to be over ruled by operation of law. Se e Bu rn s v . S tat e , 844 S.W .2d 934, 936 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, no pet.). The overr uling of a motion for newtrial at any stag e of the proce eding s could not be assig ned as e rror wher e the moti on was insuffic ient as a ple ading
. Pr oc e lla

v . S tat e , 395 S.W .2d 637, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (op. on re h’g ).

Even if a

ppellant’s af

fidavit had be en timely

fi l ed , appellant would not have been e ntitled to a hear ing on his motion for n ew t ri al
. T h e mot ion and af fidavit tog ether

did not specific ally show the truth of the g rounds under attack, Martinez , 74 S.W .3d at 21, or ra ise mattersTh e se c on d is su e , in a c on c lus or

y mann e r, a lle g e s tha t th e S ta te , n ot t he tr ia l c ourt , 8 re mov e d “ pr e fe rr e d c ouns e l” w ith ou t de sig natin g c ouns e l or the c la ime d c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts violated. The fir st and third issues relate to a cla i m o f i n effective a ssistance of c ounsel at the g uil t/i nnoc e nc e sta g e of

the tr ia l. O ne re la te s to a pp e lla nt’ s “ inn oc e nc e ” and

the oth e r r e fe rs to appellant’ s “af

firmative de fense .” The first i ssue re fer s to “ea rly obtainable e vidence ” without the e vid e nc e be ing re ve a le d. Th e thi rd iss ue a lle g e s c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to c a ll w itn e sse s to su bs tanti a te appellant’ s aff

irmative def

ense. Adefe nse is not an af firmative de fense unless so l ab el ed by the pena l code. See Tex. P en al C ode Ann. § 2.04 ( West 2003). The motion does not identify the a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e c la ime d. No a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e wa s r a ise d b y the e vid e nc e or

su bmi tte d to t h e j u r y. 20 not determinable from the rec ord that ref lect re asonable g rounds exist to entitle appellant to re lief. W allace , 1 06 S.W. 3d

a t 10 8; Rey es , 849 S.W .3d at 816. Th e mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l ma de on ly

ba re a sse rt ion s th a t: [1] Def

endant’ s trial attorney

failed to pre sent ea sily

obtainable e vidence of defe ndant’s innoce nce. [2] T h e S tate violated de fenda nt’s constitutional rights by filing a nd removing de fe nd ant’ s p re fe rr e d c ouns e l pr ior to t ri a l. [3] Trial counse l failed to ca ll witnesses which [sic] woul d h ave substantiated de fe nd ant’ s a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e a t tr ia l. 8 Appellan t ’s af

fi davit was c onclusory

in nature. F irst, appellant alleg ed a matter
c le arl y de te rm ina

ble fr om t

he re c or d. He a lle g e d D a vis wa s re mo ved , that he wi sh e d f or Da vis to continue his repr esentation, a nd he “did not f

orese e any problems in his [ Davis’s] repre sentation of me.” Appellant’s a ffidavit also r e fer s to seven name d witnesses and “ other witnesse s” who would have te stified as to the victim’s history , propensity and re putation fo r v i o l en ce, a nd “being21

the fi rs t a g g re sso r. ” Ap pe lla nt state d that “ [s]ome of

the se wi tne sse s w ou ld t e sti fy that th e vic tim was unde r doctor’ s car e for mental hea lth problems.” Appellant c oncluded that “ [t ] hese issues would have substantiate d my defe nse.” A s in the motion, t he def ense w as not desig nated. Appellant’s a ffidavit made no ref ere nce to or

at t em p t t o disclaim trial counsel’s statement, in the jury ’s abse nce, a s to why , with appellant’s a g ree ment, counsel would not offer witnesses and evidenc e as acts of violence betwee n the victim and appellant. The rec ord re flec ts that counsel, for

the purposes of

strateg y , was fe arf

ul any such evide nce w ould “open the door ” for the State to sho w that app e lla nt al le g e dly tr ie d to dro wn the vic timand

c ho ke d a no the r w oma

n a s w e ll
a s o the r p re

jud ic ia l a c ts. A motio n ’ s b ar e a s s e rti o n s an d an a f f id a v it th a t is c o n c lu s o r

y in n a tu r e and
un su pp or te d b y fa c ts a re ins uf fi c ie nt t o p ut a

tr ia l c ourt

on no tic e that r e a so nable g ro un ds e xist for r elief. Jordan , 88 3 S. W.2 d at 66 5; see also King , 29 S.W .3d 556, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A p p e l l an t ’ s m o t i o nan d

a f f i d a v i tf a l l i nt h i s c a t e g o r

y. Stil l f ur the r, a ft e r t

he Ma y 25 , 20 05 fi lin g of a

pp e lla nt’ s mot ion fo r e xten sio n o f t ime to file aff idavits and attac hment of t he affidavit t o appellant’ s motion, no ruling on the re quest was made a nd no further

action wa s taken by any one. I t was appellant’s burden to ensure that a hea ring
wa s h eld within the 75-day period a fter se ntence
. Ke e n v . S tat e , 8 5 S. W. 3 d

4 0 5 , 4 1 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 2, pe t. r e f’ d) ; se e als o Ba k e r v . S tat e , 956 S.W .2d 19, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under the circ umstances pr esente d, we f ind no abuse of discretion by the trial cour t in not conducting a hea

ring on the motion for new tr ial. The fir st point of error is overrule d.22 The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Onion* Affir med Filed: Apr il 16, 2008 Pub lis h

* Be fore J ohn F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (re tired), Texas Court of Criminal Appe als, sitting by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 2005).