Filed 3/21/ 22 Monroy v. Alaska Airlines CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DORA MONROY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AL ASKA AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent. B310495

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV01220)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed. Raymond Ghermezian for Plaintiff and Appellant. Worthe Hanson & Worthe, Todd C. Worthe and MacKenzie C.
Foellmer for Defendant and Respondent.

________________________2

This is a slip and fall case in which the trial court granted a defense

m otion for summary judgment. Appellant Dora Monroy was descending an exterior staircase from an Alaska Airlines, Inc. plane, using the handrail for support. When her hand came in contact with a clear slippery substance, her hand slid and she fell. The issue is whether Monroy present ed evidence establishing a triable issue about Alaska ’s knowledge of the slippery spot on the handrail (or, put differently, whether its inspection was legally sufficient). The trial court found that, under the circumstances of this case, the inspection w as reasonable

. We agree and affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 14, 2018, Monroy was on an Alaska flight from Seattle

to Burbank. When the plane la nded, s he exited through its rear door, stepping first onto a platform, then on to the stai rs, her left hand on the rail as she descended. Her hand encountered something slippery on the
rail (it was clear and not visible) ; her hand slid, and she fell down the remaining stairs

.

In January 2019, Monroy sued Alaska ; the c ities of Burbank, Glendale, Los Angeles and Pasadena ; the County of Los Angeles ; and the
Burbank

- Glendale

- Pasadena Airpo rt Authority, alleging causes of action for damages on theories of maintaining a dangerous condition (Gov. Code, § 835), vicarious liabi lity , negligence and premises liability (the only causes of action against Alaska are those for negligence and premises liability ). Alaska answered

, then moved for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) on the ground that there is no
evidence that Ala ska had (or should have had) notice of the slippery
handrail

.

Alaska has one set of stairs used to deplane passengers from the back of planes landing at the Burbank airport . On the day Monroy fell, an Alaska employ ee , Kimberly Crawford, waited on the gr ound while the3

stairs were positioned for the arriving plane. Crawford then walked up
the stairs , looking for any “issues” ( periodically using the handrails )

, then opened the aircraft door and informed the flight attendant that the passengers could deplan e. Crawford’s inspection was primarily visual,
to ensure the stairs were free of any debris

— but she use d the handrails
and did not feel or otherwise find any problems. Before Monroy fell,
Crawford stood at the bottom of the stairs

, watching 12 to 1 5 passengers deplane (none of whom said anything to Crawford about a slippery railing)

.

Monroy opposed Alaska’s summary judgment motion, contending the inspection was unreasonable because Crawford did not use a checklist and because no one wiped the handr ails before the passengers deplaned. There is no showing that a checklist was required or that, had one been used, the result would have been different. Monroy presented her own declaration, and one from her expert (Eris Barillas) who opined that, had th e handrail been “foreign

- substance free,” Monroy would not
have fallen. There was at most a five

- minute gap of time between Crawford’s inspection and Monroy’s fall.

In November 2020, the trial court granted Alaska’s motion for summary judgment . After o bserving that the elements are the same for premises liability and negligence (duty, breach, causation , damages) ( Castellon v. U.S. Bankcorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998), the trial
court noted the issue here

— that for both causes of action, if a dange r exists, the property owner is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to
make the condition reasonably safe or, if that isn’t possible, to give notice of the danger . (

Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) A plaintiff alleging inju ries arising from a dangerous condition (or opposing a defense motion for summary judgment) must prove the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous cond i tion. ( Ortega v. Kmart Corp

. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 .)4

Based on the evidence discus sed above, the trial court found that Alaska did not know (and should not have known) about the slippery patch o n the handrail

— in short, that Alaska did not have actual or constructive notice of the slippery sub st ance

— and that Monroy failed
to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact about the reasonableness of Alaska’s inspection. For this reason, Alaska’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted.

Monroy appeals from the judgment thereafter entered.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A

. Standards of r eview

.

In the trial court, the initial burden is on the moving party to show
there are no triable issues of material fact. ( Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant meets its burden
if it shows that a cause of action has no merit because one or more elements of that cause of action cannot be established; at that point, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact. ( Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med ical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. ( Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36 ; Hamburg v. Wal

- Mart Store s , Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.Ap p.4th 497, 503 .)

On appeal, our review is de novo, meaning we apply the same test the trial court used ( Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000)

83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054; Zavala v. Arce ( 1997 ) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925), liberally construing the evidence and resolving all evidentiary doubts in Monroy’s favor. ( Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005)

36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999)

75 Cal.App.4th 832, 854.)5

B. There i s n o t riable issue of f act a bout whether Alaska e xerc ised r easonable c are
.

Monroy contends there is a triable issue of material fact about
whether Alaska exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its property. (

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (20 0 1) 25 Cal.4th 8 26, 840.) We disagree.

Uncontrove rted evidence establishes that Crawford examined the stairway, including the handrails, for debris and other hazards (Monroy does not explain how Crawford or Alaska could possibly have discovered an invisible slippery patch on one handrail )

. Although Monr oy claims Crawford should have used a checklist, Monroy does not explain how that would have helped (and common sense tells us that, by carrying a
checklist at least one of Crawford’s hands would have been encumbered

, making it difficult for her to use the handrail herself )

. Moreover, a s Crawford watched from a spot at the bottom of the stairs, 12 to 15 people safely descended the staircase before Monroy, suggesting the slippery spot was far from obvious.

We reject Monroy’s assertion that she did not have to show actual knowledge beca u se the evidence suggests the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge Alaska with constructive knowledge. She fails to point to any evidence showing how long it had
been there , and she ig nores the fact that Alaska did inspect the stairway
before it was used . And as already noted, at least a dozen people safely
descended the stairs without incident before Monroy fell. No reasonable jury could determine on these facts that Alaska could or should have
done more than it did. Where

, as here, the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the hazard existed long enough to be discovered in the exercise of reasonable care, the issue of notice may be
resolved as a matter of law. ( Orte ga v. Kmart Corp.

, supra , 26 Cal.4th
at p. 1207. )6

C. Monroy’s e xpert’s t estimony w as c onsidered

.

Monroy contends the trial court failed to consider her expert’s testimony. T he expert’s view was legally irrelevant since a layman
would under stand the is sue

— whether Alaska knew or should have
known about the invisible substance on the handrail

. Monroy offers no authorities or argument to suggest that the answer to this question required expert testimony.

The trial court expressly rejected the expert’s effort to shift the blame for the fall to the steepness of the stairs, a theory that was not pleaded in Monroy’s complaint. ( Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life
& Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 6 0, 74

- 75.) Monroy’s complaint raised only one issue, and that was her claim that there was an invisible slippery substance on the handrail. Her complaint said nothing about the steepness of the stairs. Monroy could have but did not seek leave to
amend. (

Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (199 5 ) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 [summary judgment cannot be defeated by a claim not raised by the complaint].)

The trial court correctly concluded that Monroy’s opposition to Alaska’s motion for summary judgment did not raise a triable issue of
material fact. No re asonable juror could or would find that a “reasonable” inspection in this case required the inspector to touch every portion of the staircase , including the handrails, or that Alaska should have wiped down both handrails before each use

.7 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Alaska Airlines shall recover its costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

VOGEL, J. *

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.